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NIGERIA AND THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF NIGERIAN-AMERICAN  
RELATIONS DURING THE CARTER AND REAGAN ADMINISTRATIONS

BY

Lawrence T. Udo-Ekpo

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH  
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE  
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

POLITICAL SCIENCE

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

SPRING, 1986

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ISBN 0-315-30249-6

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TITLE OF THESIS      Nigeria and the United States: A  
Study of Nigerian-American Relations  
During the Carter and Reagan  
Administrations

DEGREE                      DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED      June 1986

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled **NIGERIA AND THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF NIGERIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS DURING THE CARTER AND REAGAN ADMINISTRATIONS** submitted by Lawrence T. Udo-Ekpo in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of **DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

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Date 26 March 86

DEDICATION

To Gabriel and Marguerita

## ABSTRACT

This dissertation is a study of Nigerian-American bilateral relations during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Its theoretical objective is to explain Nigerian-American relations and to discover the immediate impetus for those relations. Its practical objective is to contribute to the analysis of U.S. foreign policy by examining the policy objectives and actual policies of the Carter and Reagan administrations. The hypothesis put forward holds that the immediate impetus for Nigerian-American relations is not the character of their leadership, the nature of their respective societies, or the states' economic needs, but the nature of international system (still often characterized as a bipolar East-West Struggle) and the problems inherent in the politics of the African sub-system of that struggle.

The study begins with an analysis of intellectual approaches to the study of Nigerian-American relations. These approaches fall into three main perspectives, notably, the state, systemic and dependency perspectives. Each perspective provides a set of assumptions and conclusions that can be tested against various dimensions of Nigerian-American relations during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Thus, the question as to which perspective is most

relevant to understanding this relationship becomes part of the intellectual search for the determinants of bilateral relations between the two countries.

The data shows little support for the dependency interpretation which stresses Nigeria's position as the subordinate partner in a dominance-dependence relationship with the United States. The state perspective sees a steady strengthening of Nigerian-American relations, emphasizing the significance of the political, economic and military relations. But, like the dependency perspective, it is equally lacking in its portrayal of relations between the two countries. The state interpretation is largely static because it focuses solely on the internal variables and ignores the impact of the external environment on Nigerian-American relations.

A more comprehensive interpretation is proffered by the systemic perspective, and one that the author finds most useful in understanding the subtleties of Nigerian-American bilateral ties. Following the assumptions associated with the systemic perspective, the study contends that Nigerian-American relations are best understood through sound appreciation of the politics of the African sub-system and, more importantly, American view of Nigeria's role in East-West struggle on the continent.

The author contends that the increased importance of Nigeria in America's African policy under Carter signalled a trend towards American perception of Nigeria as a potential



ally in the struggle against communism in the African sub-system. The Reagan administration has also conducted American relations with Nigeria in the context of the East-West struggle. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, policy-makers in Lagos and Washington were becoming increasingly aware of the affinities between the two countries, as well as their role as key players in African politics. Although policy differences were evident during the Carter and Reagan administrations, some parallels in Nigerian and American positions were beginning to emerge on several African issues such as Angola, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. Overall, the study contends that the maintenance of regional peace and security has been the basic disposition of both countries towards the politics of the African sub-system.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to express my thanks and appreciation to all those who, directly and indirectly, contributed to my research and writing. This thesis would not have been possible without the timely aid of my brother, Gabriel, who has made great contribution to my education. I am deeply grateful to my wife, Marguerita, whose encouragement, patience and understanding facilitated the completion of this project. I thank the following members of my Ph.D. supervisory committee for their careful reading of the draft: Professors Juris A. Lejnieks, Tom Keating, and Robert R. Gilsdorf. Special credit is due my supervisor, Professor Juris A. Lejnieks, whose advice, assistance, and penetrating criticism of the earlier drafts of this thesis have been absolutely essential to the completion of this study. I accept full responsibility for any error of judgement or misinterpretation.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

AID	Agency for International Development (U.S.)
ANC	African National Council
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.)
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency (U.S.)
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa (U.N.)
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FCDA	Federal Capital Development Authority (Nigeria)
FMS	Foreign Military Sales (U.S.)
FNLA	National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IMF	International Monetary Fund (U.N.)
IMET	International Military Education and Training (U.S.)
JACC	Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee (Nigerian-American)
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
MAP	Military Assistance Program (U.S.)

MPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola  
(Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola)

NAACP National Association for the Advancement of  
Colored People

NEPD Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree

NIC Newly Industrializing Country

NNPC Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation

NSWAFP Nigerian Socialist Workers and Farmers' Party

NTUC Nigerian trade Union Congress

NYC Nigerian Youth Congress

NSSM National Security Study Memorandum (U.S.)

DAU Organization of African Unity

OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

SWAPO South West African Peoples Organization

UNITA National Union for Total Independence of Angola  
(Uniao Nacional de Independencia Total  
de Angola)

UN United Nations

ZANU Zimbabwe African National Union

ZAPU Zimbabwe African Peoples Union

## Introduction: Perspectives on Nigerian-American Relations

The principal objective of this work is to analyze the relationship between the United States and Nigeria in the late 1970s and early 1980s. While there is considerable secondary literature in this area (to be looked at below), such literature normally assumes certain conditions as existing in that relationship, and only fills in the necessary factual blanks. The dependency literature is a good example of this problem. A further purpose, therefore, is to discover those factors that explain Nigerian-American bilateral relations during the Carter and Reagan administrations. The study is limited to this period because of apparent differences between the two administrations in dealing with the politics of the African sub-system in the face of Soviet-American competition on the continent - an



issue of major concern to Nigerian leaders. Whereas the Carter administration is claimed to have adopted populist methods such as concern for human rights and majority rule in Southern Africa, the Reagan administration supposedly concentrates on constructive engagement or the preservation of the status quo as a method of checking the perceived Soviet threat. Yet, such differences could be misleading because it owes more to contrasts in what the two administrations and their respective officials said than what they actually did.<sup>1</sup> Finally, evaluating the Carter and Reagan administrations will allow the use of a comparative perspective that will provide the answers to the issues raised above.

It will be argued that the explanation of Nigerian-American relations is not to be found in the character of their leadership, the nature of their respective societies, or the states' economic needs, but the nature of international system (still often characterized as a bipolar East-West struggle) and the problems inherent in the politics of the African sub-system of that larger struggle. As George Bush stated in 1980 "Africa is ignored at our peril."<sup>2</sup> To the policy-makers in Washington, that statement is as true today as it was in 1980. In the specific case of Nigerian-American bilateral ties, there has been increased trade, investment, top level exchanges in the

-----  
<sup>1</sup>For this line of reasoning see Coral Bell, "From Carter to Reagan", Foreign Affairs, vol. 63, no. 3, 1985, pp. 490-510.

<sup>2</sup>Africa Report, vol. 25, no. 3, May-June 1980, pp. 39-41.

form of official visits, and technical assistance to Nigeria's agricultural sector. In turn, Nigeria has cautiously supported Reagan's peace plan for Namibia, while at the same time expressing concern about the U.S. President's policy of "constructive engagement" with South Africa. In order to understand this rapprochement between Lagos and Washington, one must take full cognizance of the Nigerian and American foreign policy positions on selected African issues such as Angola, Zimbabwe, and South African crisis.

The Carter administration realized as much as Reagan and his advisers that African, and Nigerian, resources such as oil as well as strategic minerals are vital to American and Western economies, that Southern African in the course of the next decade, could well be the focal point of East-West confrontation. The fault of the Carter administration's foreign policy, according to Nigeria, was not in its lack of attention to Africa, it was the gap between rhetoric and performance. And under the Reagan administration the gap is perceived to be as large as (if not larger than) it was during the Carter administration. But Nigeria expects more than East-West considerations and diplomatic rhetoric in its relations with the United States. For example, in the face of continuous violence in South Africa, most Nigerian leaders believe a greater U.S. anti-apartheid commitment is in the interests of Nigerian-American relations, as well as regional and

ultimately international stability.

The various interpretations of Nigerian-American relations in the existing literature raise the question of the appropriate level of analysis in explaining that relationship. Even before Rosenau made his first attempt at systematizing foreign policy analysis, students of specific foreign policies (usually taking the form of case studies) have been concerned with the internal and external sources of state behavior.<sup>3</sup> These concerns have often been explained as the search for systemic, state or ideosyncratic factors affecting foreign policy. Some thought and effort have gone into determining what Rosenau refers to as "relative potency" of systemic variable versus societal, governmental, role, and individual variables for different kinds of states in various situations. However, surveys of comparative foreign policy literature by McGowan and Shapiro clearly show that despite the great deal of attention that has been devoted to internal/societal factors, little progress has been made in thinking about the external/systemic influences on foreign policy.<sup>4</sup> Research on Nigerian-American relations reflects this general tendency to emphasize the state level of analysis.

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<sup>3</sup>James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy", in R.B. Farrell (ed.) Approaches to Comparative International Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 27-92.

<sup>4</sup>Patrick McGowan and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. "Introduction: External Influences on Foreign Policy Behavior", in Patrick McGowan and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (eds.) Foreign Policy and Modern World-System, Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, Vol. 8 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983), pp. 7-34.

In his influential book, *Theory of International Politics*, Waltz conceptualizes the international political system at two levels: at one level, a system consists of a structure; at another level the system consists of interacting units.<sup>5</sup> According to this view, the appropriate concerns of systems analysis in international politics are two-fold: (1) to trace the expected "careers" of different international systems by "indicating their likely durability and peacefulness", and (2) "to show how the structure of the system affects the interacting units and how they in turn affect the structure".<sup>6</sup> Hoffman, on the other hand, defines the international system as a "pattern of relations among the the basic units of world politics"; he sees the structure of the international political system as the systemic level component. In Hoffman's view, the international system is both an analytic scheme and a postulate. As an analytic scheme or an intellectual construct, the systemic approach is a way of organizing plentiful and complex data. As a postulate, "system is an assertion" that there are "distinguished patterns of relations and key variables that can be discerned without artificiality or arbitrariness".<sup>7</sup> In both Waltz and Hoffman, there is a recognition that the system has an impact on the

<sup>5</sup>Kenneth N. Waltz, The Theory of International Politics (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison Wesley, 1979), pp. 38-59.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid. p. 43. See also Stanley Hoffman, The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 90-92; Gulliver's Troubles (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968), pp. 11-12.

units and that their interactions are the building blocks of the system.<sup>8</sup>

Parsons, in contrast, discusses the existence of a basic unit which is the entire social system defined as a complete society whose main function is survival or self-maintenance. The social system in Parsons's analysis consists of three sub-systems: (1) the personality sub-system, (2) the social sub-system, (3) the cultural sub-system. These sub-systems are interconnected within what Parsons described as an "action system" where all actions occur so that each sub-system affects the other. A change in one sub-system is thought to affect the other sub-systems and the whole action system. But when the distinction is made between society and social structure, system and sub-system are treated as two different kinds of systems.<sup>9</sup> The various levels of analysis identified here have been employed in explaining Nigerian-American relations, and I now turn to a discussion of the three main approaches to that explanation: state, systemic and dependence perspectives.

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<sup>8</sup>For the view that units of the system are of the same "set" by which is meant they have features in common that enable a particular relationship, see J.W. Burton, Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 6.

<sup>9</sup>James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), pp. 140-142; Peter Nettl, "The Concept of System in Political Science", Political Studies, vol. XIV, no. 3, 1966, pp. 305-338.

## Interpretations of Nigerian-American Relations

The various dimensions of Nigerian-American relations, notably the economic, political and military, have given rise to interpretations which can be divided into three broadly defined analytical perspectives: the systemic, state, and dependence perspectives. The three main perspectives, which this thesis sets out to explore, consist of statements, or propositions, that attempt to explain Nigerian-American bilateral ties. From the state perspective, such statements focus on the characteristics of both states and on their leaders, emphasizing the role of internal factors in the explanation of bilateral relations between them. Consequently, states are not only the prime actors, they are units of analysis in international relations.

State interpretations of the Nigerian-American relations stress such indicators as internal economic needs and type of leadership as essential in explaining the interaction between the two countries. The exact role of leadership is difficult to ascertain precisely. Nevertheless, under Prime Minister Balewa, Nigeria was said to have become a bastion of pro-Americanism, especially in the early 1960s.<sup>10</sup> It was during Balewa's conservative rule, it is argued, that Nigeria took the American line on several cold war issues and became one of Washington's "most

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<sup>10</sup>Olaide Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), pp. 99-111.

reliable satellites" in black Africa.<sup>11</sup> During the Balewa years, October 1960 to January 1966, the general orientation of Nigerian foreign policy was characterized by a passive approach to foreign affairs and rapidly strengthening ties with the United States.<sup>12</sup> This development is attributed to the personality of Prime Minister Balewa, which was greatly influenced by the traditionalism of his Nigerian culture, and his brand of Islamic faith.<sup>13</sup>

Others argue that while leadership is not unimportant, its influence on policy is limited by internal factors, as well as the politics of foreign policy decision-making. The influence of these factors on the Balewa government of the early 1960s is well summarized by Aluko: among others these include (1) the domestic situation which leaders had to cope with, (2) the social instability and difficult federal structure of the country, and (3) military weakness.<sup>14</sup>

The late 1960s saw a near reversal in Nigerian-American relations as the Gowon leadership adopted a more non-aligned posture. Aid from the United States was no longer eagerly

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Olajide Aluko, "Nigeria and the Super-powers", Millenium, vol. 5, no. 2, Autumn 1976, P. 132. He suggests that during the Balewa era, "Nigeria's policy of non-alignment exhibited a great deal of partiality in favour of the United States" and against the Soviet Union.

<sup>13</sup>See A. B. Akinyemi, Foreign Policy and Federalism: The Nigerian Experience (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1974), pp. 200-201; Mark W. Delancey, "Nigeria: Foreign Policy Alternatives" in Timothy M. Shaw and Olajide Aluko (eds.) Nigerian Foreign Policy: Alternative Perceptions and Projections (London: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 164-203.

<sup>14</sup>Olajide Aluko, Ghana and Nigeria 1957-70: A Study in Inter-African Discord (London: Rex Collins, 1976), pp. 20-21.

sought and very little was accepted during this period. But General Gowon had no intention of undermining Nigerian-American bilateral ties. These ties were remarkably improved after the civil war in 1970, as both countries moved to strengthen their commercial, financial, and technical relations. Yet as suspicion of American intentions surfaced again in the early 1970s, the Nigerian-American relationship deteriorated. The new strain in political ties between the two countries climaxed in the exchange of harsh words and insults over Angola, as well as the refusal of a visit to Nigeria by Secretary of State Kissinger.<sup>15</sup> Most accounts of development in Nigerian-American relations in the mid-1970s have attributed a great deal to the personality and leadership of eminent Nigerian leaders such as Generals Mohammed and Obasanjo, as well as the fundamental changes in both style and content of Nigerian foreign policy during their administrations.<sup>16</sup> From the American side, the leadership factor also came into play in the interpretation of Nigerian-American relations. Analysts have contended that as long as President Ford was in the White House and Henry Kissinger in the State Department, rapprochement between the two countries was out of the question; that relaxation of tension between Nigeria and the U.S. came only when Jimmy Carter was elected President of

<sup>15</sup>Sandy Feustel, "Leadership in Africa", Africa Report, May-June 1977, pp. 48-50.

<sup>16</sup>Bolaji Akinyemi, "Mohammed/Obasanjo Foreign Policy" in Oyeleye Oyediran (ed.) Nigerian Government and Politics Under Military Rule 1966-79 (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 150-168.



the United States. According to this view, President Carter inspired greater confidence in Nigerian-American relations than Nixon, Ford and Kissinger through public statements and shrewd choice of staff, notably, Andrew Young.<sup>17</sup> How much President Carter's personal initiative counted may be debatable.

On the other hand, the main thrust of the systemic perspective focuses on external factors, emphasizing the impact of the systemic environment. It focuses on the U.S.-Nigerian joint concern for peaceful resolution of conflict in Southern Africa, and East-West competition. It pays particular attention to the importance the United States and Nigeria attach to the configuration of forces on the African continent in general. Bach's analysis of Nigerian-American relations makes an important point about U.S. support for the development of Nigerian influence, arguing that this support in the late 1970s was based on American acknowledgement of the "stabilising character" of Nigeria's African policy.<sup>18</sup> Since this policy was primarily concerned with the preservation of the territorial status quo, the United States, according to this view, extended support to the Nigerian government's attempt to assert itself as the "status quo mediator" on the African continent. Washington, it is argued, saw Nigeria in

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

<sup>18</sup>Daniel C. Bach, "Nigerian-American Relations: Converging Interests and Power Relations", in Timothy M. Shaw and Olajide Aluko, (eds.) Nigerian Foreign Policy: Alternative Perceptions and Projections (London: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 35-55.

strategic terms: a bulwark against Soviet expansion in Africa, and as a possible regional manager much like Brazil in Latin America. Thus as the first Shaba crisis erupted in March 1977, which started as a border conflict between Zaire and Angola, various senior American officials in the Carter administration, including Andrew Young, and then U.S. ambassador to Nigeria, Donald Easum, requested Nigerian Foreign Minister Garba to find an African solution to the conflict.<sup>19</sup> With American support, Garba also offered to help in the settlement of the dispute between Kenya and Uganda. This was followed by the Nigerian decision to intervene in the Somali-Ethiopia conflict. In the latter conflict, Nigerian and American positions were similar, to the extent that the Carter administration adopted the same position as that of the O.A.U. *Ad Hoc* commission chaired by Nigeria. The commission advocated the restoration of peace between Somalia and Ethiopia on the basis of respect for the established colonial boundaries. The U.S. and Nigeria accordingly refused to accept Somalia's annexation of the Ogaden despite the fact that Somalia was fighting against the Soviet backed Marxist regime in Ethiopia.<sup>20</sup> The Nigerian decision to act as a mediator in these various African conflicts is seen as being responsible for rapprochement in Nigerian-American relations.<sup>21</sup> Nigerian leaders admit that

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Feustal, "Leadership in Africa", pp. 48-50; Bach, "Nigerian-American Relations: Converging Interests and Power Relations", pp. 35-55.

<sup>21</sup>Bach, "Nigerian-American Relations: Converging Interests and Power Relations", pp. 39-43.

the role that the United States expected them to play in the African sub-system somewhat coincides with Nigeria's own interest based on a commitment to a free and stable Africa.

Finally, the interpretations of Nigerian-American relations associated with the dependence perspective can be classified as a hybrid of the state and systemic perspectives. The dependence perspective draws from diverse sets of assumptions which give emphasis to the nature of "power" distribution in the international system, and Nigeria's political, economic, and cultural dependence on the dominant actors in the international arena. Its interpretation of Nigerian-American relations emphasizes the fact that in international relations dominant powers manipulate and use weaker states for their own objectives and benefits; or that state "power" has always been expressed through the ability to influence other nations in desired directions. But since the dependence perspective is treated here as a hybrid of the ideas inherent in the state and systemic perspectives, it is pertinent to examine the concept of system and state levels in the context of Nigerian-American relations, before making any further statements about interpretations from the dependence perspective.

### **The State Perspective**

The state perspective partakes of a number of alternative explanations of Nigerian-United States

relations. For example, one explanation emphasizes the fact that despite occasional military coups and counter-coups in Nigeria, Nigerian-American relations are characterized by a steady strengthening of the economic, political, and military relations between the two countries. Other state interpretations focus on the interaction between economic and political dimensions of the Nigerian-American relationship rather than the military.

The principal assumptions governing explanations from the state perspective point to the fact that at the time of Nigeria's independence in 1960, the United States had important economic, political and cultural reasons for maintaining good relations with Nigeria. Olajide Aluko, a prominent Nigerian scholar, has suggested that the presence of a large black community in the U.S. has been an important factor in the Nigerian-American bilateral relations.<sup>22</sup> But the extent to which the black Americans affect American policy may be difficult to establish.<sup>23</sup>

In a similar vein, Robert B. Shepard suggested that from 1960 to 1965 American policy-makers, influenced strongly by liberal principles, made Nigeria the largest

<sup>22</sup>Olajide Aluko, "Nigeria and Superpowers", Millennium, vol. 5, no. 2, Autumn 1976, pp. 127-129.

<sup>23</sup>Their lack of clout in foreign policy is evident in the fact that black congressmen, with few exceptions, represent districts comprised often of impoverished inner-city areas with an overwhelming majority of black voters. In such constituencies, foreign policy issues take second place to the debate about economic issues and social welfare programs. Arch Puddington, "Jesse Jackson, the Blacks and American Foreign Policy", Commentary, vol. 77, no. 4, April 1984, pp. 19-27.

African recipient of American foreign aid, in the hope that Nigeria would become a model of liberal, capitalist and democratic development.<sup>24</sup> As Aluko contended, "It was not unusual for American leaders to feel that their government could make Nigeria modify her position by the threat of cutting off aid".<sup>25</sup> Prior to the Nigerian civil war, American Congressman, Mr. Joseph Y. Resnick, is on record as saying that if the crisis in Nigeria deteriorated into armed conflict, the American government would stop its aid to the country.<sup>26</sup>

A study by M. Bassey Eyo Ate attempts to show how bilateral ties with the United States in economic and political fields, might have conditioned the decolonization policy of the Nigerian decision-making elites. His basic premise is that to understand properly the existing pattern of relationship between the two countries, it is necessary to examine the interconnection between economics and politics. Consequently, Ate's work focuses on the interrelated role of American capital aid projects, technical assistance, personnel, and private investment initiatives in the Nigerian economy, identifying Nigeria's first National Development plan as the institutional channel for U.S. involvement in Nigeria. The conclusion of Ate's study points to the diminishing features of

<sup>24</sup>Robert Benjamin Shepard, "Superpower and Regional Power: The United States and Nigeria 1960-1979", Ph.D. Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University, 1984.

<sup>25</sup>Aluko, "Nigeria and the Superpowers", P. 138.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid. Resnick issued this warning in March 1967 in Ibadan, Nigeria. In July the civil war broke out.

Nigerian-American relations: (a) the structure of bilateral economic relations with the U.S. was greatly altered in the 1970s because of the changing economic fortunes of Nigeria, and (b) aid for economic development purposes was eliminated as Nigeria emerged as the second largest supplier of crude oil to the United States.<sup>27</sup>

The arguments emphasizing American economic interest in Nigeria are often based on the fact that in 1967, on the eve of the civil war, total U.S. private investment was given at US\$200 million. In April 1969, private investment in oil ventures reached a substantial value of \$400 million.<sup>28</sup> These figures indicate that despite the civil war, America was becoming increasingly aware of Nigeria's oil potential and the financial stakes of the American oil companies in the Nigerian economy. Gulf Oil, one of the most important oil producing companies in Nigeria, had expanded rapidly during the war. Its pre-war output of 57,000 barrels per day had reached the 200,000 barrel mark by April 1969, when its investment in Nigeria rose to \$168 million.<sup>29</sup> In 1977, the U.S. had some \$1500 million invested in the Nigerian oil industry. Import of oil from Nigeria stood at around one-eighth of total American imported oil. This fact of Nigerian-American relations shows in a brief historical context the extent to which both countries have fostered

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<sup>27</sup>M. Basseyy Eyo Ate, "Effects of Nigerian-United States Bilateral Ties on Nigeria's Decolonization Policies, 1960-1966", Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1980.

<sup>28</sup>Cronje, The World and Nigeria, PP. 246-247.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid. P. 250.

economic and political contact since the 1960s, demonstrating that America's vested interest in the country cannot be denied. In addition, it is argued that in the 1970s American companies and institutions were genuinely involved in the development of Nigeria's vast resources and the country's search for solutions to the problems of urbanization, inflation, port congestion, shortages of trained manpower, communications, transportation, housing and power.

From the point of view of Nigeria's needs during the Ford-Kissinger administration, there was a belief that the U.S. would be able to make a highly effective contribution to the resource transfers Nigeria badly needed for the implementation of its ambitious national development program. This emphasis on close bilateral relations between the two countries is closely followed by a recognition that Nigeria's independence in foreign policy has grown with the country's economic strength, that in spite of America's growing trade deficit with Nigeria both countries need each other for political and economic reasons. Furthermore, it is argued that at independence in 1960, the Nigerian economy was heavily dependent on the export of primary products and the import of manufactured goods. The economic problems created by the declining prices of primary products in the world market, and the desire for economic development by the emergent elites in Nigeria had fueled the need for greater access to the American market and technical assistance. The

consequence of this was the desire to maintain good relations with the United States. The central strand in this state level argument is that although Nigeria no longer needs American financial aid, it will continue for the foreseeable future to use technical assistance, especially in the oil sector, iron and steel industry, heavy industry, petro-chemical and communications industries. Hence the need for closer bilateral ties with the United States.<sup>30</sup>

Further evidence of the significance of the economic factor is based on the prominent position of the American oil companies in the Nigerian oil industry; the principal ones being Mobil, Gulf, Texaco, Philips, Occidental, and Ashland. In other sectors American companies like Raymond International, TAMS, C.E. Tec, Pfizer, 3M, Johnson and Johnson, and many others work together with Nigerians in joint ventures that have led to a significant degree of American economic penetration of Nigeria. For former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria, Donald Easum, there is a particularly important potential for U.S. enterprise in Nigeria that is perhaps not evident in many other countries. He expressed the hope that whatever the differences on political issues, the strength of economic ties between the two countries can be maintained and even strengthened.<sup>31</sup>

Daniel C. Bach argues that the close relationship between Nigeria and the United States is based on the

<sup>30</sup>Aluko, "Nigeria and the Superpowers", P. 130.

<sup>31</sup>Donald B. Easum, "Nigerian-American Relations", Africa Report, July-August, 1981, PP. 52-54; "Why Nigeria is important to the U.S.", West Africa, June 15, 1981, P. 1345.



convergence of interests between the two countries. The main thrust of Bach's argument is that the political and legal guarantees offered to private American investors by the Nigerian-American agreement of September 1980, constituted the most innovative feature in this relationship. But according to this view, while the U.S. was interested in counter-balancing the reliance on Nigerian oil with Nigeria's technological (and agricultural) reliance on the U.S., the Nigerians perceived their rapport with the U.S. in terms of increased foreign investment.<sup>32</sup>

Commenting on the political dimension of Nigerian-American relations during his testimony before the U.S. Senate Sub-committee on African Affairs, Donald Easum contended that despite the differences on certain issues, Nigeria and the United States share similar goals of political self-determination.<sup>33</sup> The emphasis on political similarities between the two countries also figured prominently in the U.S. President's speech during the October 11, 1977 visit to Washington by the former Nigerian Head of state, Olusegun Obasanjo. The President reminded his honourable guest that Nigeria, with its growing political leadership and a federal form of government is a country of

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<sup>32</sup>Daniel C. Bach, "Nigerian-American Relations : Converging Interests and Power Relations", in Timothy M. Shaw and Olajide Aluko (eds.) Nigerian Foreign Policy: Alternative Perceptions and Projections, (London: MacMillan Press, 1983), pp. 35-55.

<sup>33</sup>U.S. Congress, Senate, "United States-Nigeria Relations", in US Policy Toward Africa, Hearings, before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, 1976, pp. 163-179.

great importance to the United States:

Nigeria is a nation making great social and political progress. A new constitution has already been drafted for this great country, substantially similar to our own, providing for a President, a bicameral legislature, and the continuation of a completely independent judiciary, which has always been a part of the political life of Nigeria.<sup>34</sup>

The President assured the Nigerian leader that his administration would co-operate with Nigeria "in seeking ways to tie our countries even closer together in a mutual partnership involving politics and economics".<sup>35</sup> On the Nigerian side Obasanjo reflected on the common political experiences shared by Nigeria and the United States: (1) a history of colonial rule and political struggle for independence, (2) the fact that both countries have progressive, dynamic, and resourceful peoples deeply committed to political freedom, equality, and social justice, as well as the pursuit of peace and security.<sup>36</sup> But while the political and economic factors have long played a significant role in the state interpretation of the Nigerian-American relations, the military factor has only just started to make its mark. Its importance, from the state standpoint, lies in the fact that Nigeria represents a large potential market for private U.S. arms manufacturers.<sup>37</sup> Although the U.S. does not provide any

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<sup>34</sup>U.S. President, Public Papers of the President of the United States (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), Jimmy Carter, 1978, PP. 1762-1809.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>U.S. Congress, Senate, "United States-Nigeria Relations", P. 176.

security assistance to Nigeria, the country is, however, a very large purchaser of services such as military training under the American foreign military sales program. As of 1980, there were about 1,000 Nigerian military personnel undergoing training in the United States, with the entire cost of \$12 million per year being absorbed by the Nigerian government.<sup>38</sup> The purchase of military equipment has been limited to such items as C-130 aircraft, military trucks, carbines, military clothing and boots. Nigeria was also considering the purchase of American CH-47 helicopters, an air defense system, fighter aircraft, and artillery from the United States.<sup>39</sup>

The role of the United States in the Nigerian civil war is still open to debate. Some observers speak of the hidden rift in Nigerian-American relations caused by the U.S. policy of formal neutrality during the war; while others stress the humanitarian concerns of the Americans throughout the war years.<sup>40</sup> Other observers from the state standpoint

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<sup>38</sup>U.S. Congress, House, Report of the Delegation to Africa, Committee on Armed Services, 96th Congress, 1st Session, 1980, p. 5.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid. Nigeria already has an arsenal of Soviet-made MIG 17, MIG 21, and Iluyshin 28 war planes bought during the civil war. It is purchasing U.S. military supplies in order to diversify its sources. Nigeria is also looking to Western Europe for further diversification. See Aluko, "Nigeria and the Superpowers", pp.130-131; and The Military Balance:1974-75 (London: IISS, 1974), p. 43.

<sup>40</sup>See John Stremiau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-70 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 289-297; John de St. Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1972), pp. 181, 358; Olajide Aluko, "The Civil War and Nigerian Foreign Policy", The Political Quarterly, vol. 42, no.2, April-June 1971, pp. 177-190.

emphasize the American diplomatic approval of the federal government of Nigeria throughout the civil war, despite public declaration of a formal arms embargo. What worried Washington, as Suzanne Cronje asserts, was that the disintegration of the Nigerian state might threaten the very conditions inside Nigeria which made the federation so attractive to the American interest in the first place.<sup>41</sup> Cronje's contention is based on the assumption that (1) Washington was fully aware of the extent to which Lagos depended on American aid, investment and goodwill, (2) the Americans were in the picture early enough to contain any dangerous ideas which might have posed a threat to American interests, and finally (3) Washington would have used every possible pressure to reverse the trend the moment American economic and political interests were at stake. Thus she concluded, that whatever President Nixon's real intentions might have been during the Nigerian civil war, American interest was at stake; that "it was against American interests to put any obstacles in Nigeria's road to victory". Hence the American-assumed "neutrality" was a farce.<sup>42</sup> Based on the state perspective, it would thus appear that the United States and Nigeria have established a number of policy objectives in their relationship. These objectives can be subsumed into three categories: political, economic and military.

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<sup>41</sup>Suzanne Cronje, The World and Nigeria: The Diplomatic History of the Biafran War 1967-1970 (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1972), p. 246.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid. pp. 210-251.

1. In its relations with Nigeria, American objective is to foster the establishment of a durable democracy in that country.
2. The U.S. seeks ways of improving bilateral relations with Nigeria because of the common historical experience shared by both countries, and the great constitutional progress made by Nigeria in the 1970s.
3. On the Nigerian side, friendship with the United states is based on deep admiration of the American form of government, institutions, and American devotion to freedom and equality. Since the Nigerian constitution or its federal system of government is substantially similar to that of the United States, Nigeria's objective is to build upon the existing political affinity between the two countries.<sup>43</sup>
4. The United States needs closer bilateral ties with Nigeria because of its dependence on Nigerian oil.
5. The Nigerian economy offers tremendous opportunities to American private investors.
6. On the Nigerian side, the ever-increasing need for capital, technology, and greater access to the American market has led to the desire to maintain good relations with the United States.
7. The U.S. needs Nigeria to the extent that the country represents a large potential market for private American arms sales, and a large purchaser of American military

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<sup>43</sup>U.S. President, Public Papers of the President of the United States, Jimmy Carter, 1978, PP. 1762-1776.

training services.

8. Nigeria needs American military equipment in its effort to diversify the sources of its military supplies.

### The Systemic Perspective

To the extent that the systemic perspective focuses on the external variables, it emphasizes American foreign policy behavior in Africa as a major determinant of bilateral relations between Nigeria and the United States. The differences (and similarities) between the two perspectives can be stated as follows: while the state view focuses on internal factors, emphasizing the significance of the political, economic, and military aspects of Nigerian-American relations, the systemic interpretation recognizes the relevance of the external factors, especially American and Nigerian policy in Africa and East-West relations.

From the systemic perspective, then, the principal explanation of Nigerian-American relations is that Nigeria is a country with a good record of effective inter-African diplomacy; and to the Americans, the Nigerians view of peace, stability, self-determination, and racial equality throughout the whole continent of Africa is of great importance to them.<sup>44</sup>

This view had a lot of support during the late 1970s. Nigeria's stand against the apartheid regime in South

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<sup>44</sup>U.S. Congress, Senate, "United States-Nigerian relations", pp. 169-170.

Africa, its support for liberation struggle, and its role in regional economic institutions such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) were seen as factors which helped to enhance the diplomatic and political leverage of the country in global affairs.<sup>45</sup> Bach argues that the close relationship between Nigeria and the United States after Carter's election as president was in many respects a reflection of a more comprehensive evolution of Nigeria's status in the international system. Thus, at the systemic level, Bach's analysis is focused on the process of convergence in Nigerian-American relations based on, first, a joint concern for Southern Africa's future stability; and second, the American wager with respect to the inauguration of a "pax Nigeriana" on the African continent.<sup>46</sup> The American perception of the role Nigeria could play in the Carter administration's foreign policy towards Africa was well summed up by Easum:

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<sup>45</sup>Amadu Sesay, "Comparative Study of Foreign Policies: A Critique", International Studies, vol. 19, no. 1, January-March 1980, PP.221-241.; Sandy Feustal, "Nigeria: Leadership in Africa", Africa Report, May-June 1977, PP.48-50.; Ibrahim A. Gambari, "Nigeria and the World: A Growing Internal Stability, Wealth and External Influence", Journal of International Affairs, vol. 29, no. 2, Fall, 1975, PP. 155-169.; Jean Herskovits, "Nigeria: Africa's New Power", Foreign Affairs, vol. 53, no. 2, January 1975, PP. 314-333.; "Dateline Nigeria: A Black Power", Foreign Policy, no. 29, Winter 1977-78, PP. 167-188.; "Nigeria: Africa's Emerging New Power", Saturday Review, February 1974, PP. 14-17.; Jean-Pierre Langellier, "The Rise of Nigeria", PP. 21-23.; Okon Udokang, "Nigeria and ECOWAS: Economic and Political Implications of Regional Integration", in A. Bolaji Akinyemi (ed.) Nigeria and the World: Readings in Nigerian Foreign Policy (Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 1978), PP. 57-81.

<sup>46</sup>Daniel C. Bach, "Nigerian-American Relations: Converging Interests and Power Relations", PP. 35-55.

We take Nigerian views seriously, and not just on African issues but on issues of global concern. We consult and discuss together such problems as the North-South economic relationship, or the law of the sea or Zimbabwe and Namibia, or the question of political rights and equal opportunity within South Africa itself. Nigerian views on these issues are an increasingly important factor in the formulation of U.S. policies.<sup>47</sup>

Viewing both countries as increasingly important to each other, the systemic perspective maintains that Nigeria and the United States are involved in a secured relationship of mutual dependence or interdependence.<sup>48</sup> For Ali Mazrui, this interdependence is taking a fascinating form as "the giant of Africa, Nigeria, and the giant of the West, the United States, have entered into a strange social contract without fully realizing it."<sup>49</sup> Mazrui's position supports the contention that U.S. policy is based, first, on a recognition that Nigeria is indeed evolving into a great power; and second, on the growing interdependence between the two countries.

To most observers, the U.S. had deliberately chosen Nigeria as its principal African ally; and Nigeria's spectacular rapprochement with the U.S. during Obasanjo's visit to Washington was seen as facilitating a "common language" which could be looked upon as a threat to Nigeria's non-aligned status. Jean-Pierre Langellier,

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<sup>47</sup>Cited in Dye Ogunbadejo, "A New Turn in U.S.-Nigerian Relations", The World Today, March, 1979, pp. 117-125.

<sup>48</sup>West Africa, July 27, 1981, pp. 1688-1689.

<sup>49</sup>Ali Mazrui, "Nigeria and the United States: The Need for Civility, the Dangers of Intimacy", Orbis, vol. 25, no. 4, Winter 1982, pp. 858-864.



writing in the French newspaper, suggested that "the U.S., sensing how much Nigeria wants to be understood, consulted, and respected, has responded to the aspirations of its leaders with friendly deeds and honeyed words."<sup>50</sup>

Langellier failed to mention one of the most important factors in Nigerian-American relations: the role Nigeria could play in East-West relations. In the 1970s, conflict between the two super-powers was becoming a possibility in Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique where the Soviet Union was seeking to consolidate its legitimacy as trusted political ally, an effective trading partner, and a strong supporter of African nationalist sentiments.<sup>51</sup> Since maintaining close ties with African countries, whose strategic raw materials were considered important for U.S. security and the political stability of Western industrial democracies, had become one of principal items on the American political agenda in the 1970s, the primary interest of the U.S. in Africa during the Carter administration was to see to it that these countries did not fall into the Soviet sphere of influence; especially after the Ford administration was forced to watch with impotent frustration in the face of Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola. There was a clear recognition in the Carter administration that by supporting African nationalism, and working in close collaboration (and

<sup>50</sup>Jean-Pierre Langellier, "The Rise of Nigeria", Atlas World Press Review, June 1978, pp. 21-23; first published in Le Monde, March 1-4, 1978.

<sup>51</sup>Lindsay Barret, "Superpower Spheres: The Roots of Soviet and U.S. Interests in Africa", Atlas World Press Review, October 1978, p. 41.

consultation) with an influential and moderate country like Nigeria, the U.S. could enhance its position, influence African opinion, and perhaps turn the tide against the Soviet Union and its allies.<sup>52</sup> In this context, American perception of Nigeria's role was operationalized when President Carter sent a letter to the Nigerian Head of State, General Obasanjo, describing his concerns about the Soviet-Cuban involvement in Ethiopian affairs, and urging Obasanjo in turn to warn Moscow and Havana of the negative consequences for East-West relations of continued outside interference in the internal affairs of Ethiopia.<sup>53</sup> Suffice it to say that although the administration had promised to address African problems in their own terms rather than through East-West prism, the strategy was to forge close relations with Nigeria in order to counteract Soviet-Cuban involvement in Africa.

It should be noted that the administration's policy of developing close ties with Nigeria was perfectly consistent with the Carter doctrine of reliance on friendly regional powers whose vision of their security interests presumably converged with that of the United States - a doctrine whose origin is traceable to the Nixon doctrine of "Vietnamization". As Feinberg suggested, the fact that the

<sup>52</sup>Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), pp. 256-313.

<sup>53</sup>Similar letters were sent to Giscard, Tito, Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela, and Morarji Desai of India. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981, pp. 180-181.

inadequacies of the Nixon doctrine as a foreign policy strategy had become apparent in the post-Vietnam period did not prevent the Carter administration from adopting and considerably broadening the doctrine into the slogan of "integrating the upper-tier developing nations into the global system."<sup>54</sup> In a similar vein, Carter's principal foreign policy adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, could speak of more co-operation with "the richer and more successful" Third World countries.<sup>55</sup> Such powers included Nigeria, Brazil, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Iran, and India.<sup>56</sup> John Gaddis has contended that this attempt to rally the support of Third World powers came at a time when the Soviet Union was launching a new series of challenges in Africa and elsewhere by relying largely on Cuban proxies, or through the direct use of Soviet troops as during the December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. He concluded that the U.S. was facing unusual constraints in trying to counter the Soviet challenges.<sup>57</sup> In the specific case of Nigerian-American ties, there was a belief that co-operation between both countries would help the U.S. in overcoming

<sup>54</sup>Richard E. Feinberg, The Intemperate Zone: The Third Challenge to U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983), pp. 43-44.

<sup>55</sup>Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981, p. 7.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid. pp. 53-54.

<sup>57</sup>The Carter doctrine stated that "any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary including military force"; see John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 345-352.

some of these constraints. However, from the dependence perspective, Nigerian-American links have made Nigeria dependent on the United States. But from the systemic perspective, American relations with Nigeria are based on the recognition of Nigeria as a regional leader, and the East-West considerations of the United States. The systemic explanations of Nigerian-American relations suggest the following objectives:

1. The United States has deliberately chosen Nigeria as a principal African ally because of a joint concern for Africa's future stability, and the fact that Nigeria is a country with a good record of effective inter-African diplomacy.
2. The United States consults more closely with Nigeria on key African issues since such consultation could result in U.S. policies that better reflect African sensitivities.
3. The United States maintains good relations with Nigeria in that the Nigerians' view of peace, stability, self-determination and racial equality in the African sub-system is of great importance to the United States since (a) Africa has become an arena of East-West rivalry, (b) Nigeria is the largest country in the region, and (c) Nigeria assumes importance as the regional ally of the United States to protect Western interests in Africa.
4. On the Nigerian side, good bilateral ties with the

United States are based on the desire to be recognized, understood, consulted, and respected as an emerging African power.

5. There is a genuine desire within Nigeria to strengthen Nigerian-American relations because of a growing fear in Lagos about the possibility of a Washington-Pretoria alliance.
6. The U.S. needs Nigeria because of the growing interdependence between the two countries and Nigeria's emerging status as a great power.

#### The Dependence Perspective

Preoccupied with structures of dominance and dependence, dependency writers see Nigeria, first, as a weak penetrated power within the international system dominated by the United States. Second, Nigeria's historical experience, since independence in 1960, is viewed in terms of a steady drift from economic, political and cultural forms of dependence on Great Britain into increasing dependence upon the United States. Third, Nigeria's dependence is seen as a drain on the country's resources, and as inhibiting the ability of Nigerian decision-makers to influence events in the external environment. Fourth, while the sub-systemic perspective still regards Nigeria as an autonomous national actor in international politics, the radical genre of literature in the dependency perspective concentrates on (a) Nigeria's continued reliance on external

trade, technology and finance; and (b) Nigeria's emergence as a newly industrializing country (NIC) at the semi-periphery of the world system. In their explanation and projections of Nigerian foreign policy, Shaw and Fasehun suggest that while Nigeria has enjoyed continuous growth and avoided the problems of national impoverishment so common in Africa, the country has continued to confront "a variety of significant structural conditions that cannot be readily or incrementally alleviated."<sup>58</sup> These structural conditions are thought to be underdevelopment and dependence. Stephen Wright has pinpointed two central strands in Nigerian foreign policy, i.e. dominance and dependence, suggesting that the dependent nature of the Nigerian economy has brought limitations to Nigeria's potential to play a dominant role in international politics; he concludes that dependence has led to the country's failure to achieve its foreign policy goals.<sup>59</sup>

Using some of the assumptions of dependency theories, many analysts from the dependence perspective emphasize the degree of incorporation of Nigeria into the capitalist world economy, and the continued penetration or distortion of its national development patterns as some of the factors which

<sup>58</sup> Timothy M. Shaw and Orobola Fasehun, "Nigeria in the World System: Alternative Approaches, Explanations and Projections" in Shaw and Olajide Aluko, (eds.) Nigerian Foreign Policy: Alternative Perceptions and Projections (London: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 205-235.

<sup>59</sup> Stephen Wright, "Nigerian Foreign Policy: a case of Dominance or Dependence?", in Timothy M. Shaw and Olajide Aluko (eds.) Nigerian Foreign Policy: Alternative Perceptions and Projections (London: MacMillan, 1983), pp. 93-121.

inhibit its ability to avoid dependence. However, the historical incorporation of Nigeria into the world system is probably not a sufficient reason for continued dependence. For example, Usoro has stated that Nigeria's economic dependence on the industrialized countries in the 1960s was a function of the absence of an effective and acceptable leadership committed to internal reforms capable of ameliorating the impact of foreign control;<sup>60</sup> that in the 1970s, the principal objective of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria was to reduce the increasing dependence of the economy on foreign capital, foreign ownership, control and management.<sup>61</sup> However, Segun Osoba has suggested that the reasons underdevelopment and dependence have survived in Nigeria can be found in an analysis of the

objective and subjective factors operating within the Nigerian society and on the global scene to inhibit positive and decisive action by successive bourgeois regimes in Nigeria. These factors can be subsumed under four main categories: (1) the structure of world imperialist economy into which Nigeria has been effectively coopted; (2) the profitability of the Nigerian bourgeoisie's role as commission agents; (3) contradictions within the ranks of the national bourgeoisie; (4) contradictions between the national bourgeoisie and the masses.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>60</sup>Eno J. Usoro, "Economic Transition from Colonial Dependency to National Development: The Nigerian Case", The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, vol. 24, no. 2, July, 1982, pp. 209-231.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid. p.216.

<sup>62</sup>Segun Osoba, "The Deepening Crisis of the Nigerian National Bourgeoisie", Review of African Political Economy, 13, May-August, 1978, pp. 65-66.

Osoba's view is shared by a critical minority of scholars who stress the dependent nature of the Nigerian position in the international system, and who wonder whether the country's reliance on the importation of food and technology is just a new source of external dependence and new dilemmas.

Research on dependency based on the investigations of the internal and external conditions is also evidenced in the writings of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who examines the structural processes of dependency in Latin America in terms of class relations, stressing the internal structure and emphasizing "internal contradictions" in the light of international politics and economics. He concluded that dependent capitalist development has become a new form of monopolistic expansion in the Third World; that dependency and capitalist development can be compatible - a view which differs markedly from those of Frank, Rodney and Samir Amin. Indeed, Cardoso's "associated-dependent development" model deserves some attention because of its innovative attempt to clarify two apparently contradictory notions inherent in the dependency debate: development and dependence. As Cardoso explicitly stated, the phrase "associated-dependent development" was deliberately chosen to combine the two notions. His contribution to the dependency debate is that (1) the investment by the multinational corporations in the peripheral economies has led to a new international division of labour, and has introduced a dynamic element into the



operation of the domestic market of the host countries, and (2) the interests of the foreign corporations have, to some extent, become compatible with internal prosperity of the dependent countries. "In this sense, they help promote development".<sup>63</sup> But although Cardoso's model departs from the orthodox dependency model's emphasis on stagnation in the periphery, it, however, leaves unanswered the basic question of whether the term "dependent" has any real meaning.<sup>64</sup>

However, because of the inherent flexibility of their terminologies, dependency theories have been popularized, in the African context, by such writers as Samir Amin and Walter Rodney.<sup>65</sup> In particular, Rodney presented an overview of African underdevelopment in which the achievements of the

<sup>63</sup>Cardoso, "Associated Dependent Development: Theoretical and practical Implications", PP. 142-176. It should be stated that the dependency formulations have their intellectual antecedents in the approach to the analysis of Latin American economic experiences adopted by Andre Gunder Frank. The radical structuralism of early Frankian dependency theory, though nationalist in ideology, attempted to show how critical capitalist penetration of the Third World had led to the emergence of the phenomenon of underdevelopment - suggesting that the international system is characterized, or polarized, by the extremes of developed and underdeveloped countries. Andre Gunder Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment", Monthly Review, vol. 18, no. 4, 1966, PP. 17-31; Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967).

<sup>64</sup>Hendrique Fernando Cardoso, "Dependent Development in Latin America", New Left Review, vol. 74, July-August, 1972, PP. 83-85; "Associated Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications" in Alfred Stepan (ed.) Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), PP. 142-176.

<sup>65</sup>Samir Amin, Accummulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974); Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Dar-es-Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1973).

pre-colonial empires such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, and Ghana are highlighted; he amassed historical data in support of his thesis that Europe underdeveloped Africa, perceiving underdevelopment to be related to exploitation. Rodney's work also tends to support the thesis that contemporary African states are creatures of imperialism in a world system characterized by three main zones of economic activity, the core, semi-periphery, and periphery, with unequal exchange and persistent merchandise trade imbalances between them, as well as a multiplicity of state structures which are strong in the core, and weak in the periphery.<sup>66</sup> According to this view, underdeveloped countries are the products of capitalist, imperialist and colonialist exploitation; they are underdeveloped because they are incapable of escaping from their backward conditions. Nigeria is increasingly seen as approaching a new alliance of state, local and transnational capital along the lines of the Brazilian model in an attempt to promote what Peter Evans calls "dependent development". The triple alliance of state, local and transnational capital is in Evans view a

special instance of dependency, characterized by the association of international and local capital. The state also joins the alliance as an active partner and the resulting alliance is a fundamental factor

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<sup>66</sup>Rodney's schema is somewhat akin to Wallerstein's model of the capitalist world system characterized by inherently exploitative international hierarchy of dominating and dominated states: core-semiperiphery-periphery. In Wallerstein's view, Nigeria belongs to the semiperiphery. See Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York & London: Academy Press, 1974), pp. 1-36, 19-21, 61, 159, 291.

in the emergence of dependent development.<sup>67</sup>

Several observers admit that the new alliance is taking place throughout Africa.<sup>68</sup> However, the extension of the theories of dependency from Latin America to Africa and elsewhere assumes a homogeneity in the Third World, thereby making generalizations about conditions and prospects of states as diverse as Brazil, Argentina, Taiwan, and Nigeria on the one hand and Bangladesh, Mali, Niger, Chad, Botswana on the other, without paying any serious attention to the significant differences between states, or the empirical and theoretical problems of such generalizations.

Since the nature of dependence may vary from country to country, generalizations that dominant groups in the Third World are subservient to the international system of inequality, conformity and underdevelopment may not be true in all cases. In what appears to be a revision of the dependency argument in the Nigerian case, Sullivan has contended that due to the oil wealth, the nationalist elite can act in the national interest and against the interest of monopoly capital and world imperialism.<sup>69</sup> He admitted that Nigeria can "afford to disengage its economy from the

<sup>67</sup>Peter Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State and Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 32.

<sup>68</sup>Aaron T. Gana, "The State in Africa: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow", International Political Science Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1985, pp. 115-132; Claude Ake, A Political Economy Of Africa (Essex: Longman, 1981).

<sup>69</sup>See Victor C. Uchendu, "Dependency and the Development Process: An Introduction", pp. 10-13; B. C. Sullivan, "Structural Dependency: The Nigerian economy as a Case Study", Journal of Asian and African Studies, vol. 14, 1-2, January and April 1979, pp. 45-53.

burdens of the colonial past" and build an economic system which is geared to fair income distribution, while providing incentives to its entrepreneurs.<sup>70</sup> John P. Renninger goes further than Sullivan to argue that (1) Nigeria is one of the new "middle powers" that are assuming an increasing importance in world affairs; (2) in neofunctional terms, the role of the "core" has been filled by Nigeria given its role as an instigator in securing the agreement of its West African neighbors to sign the ECOWAS Treaty, and its activist stance in negotiating the protocols as well as maintaining the momentum for regional integration, and, finally, (3) Nigeria is becoming a diplomatic, financial, and administrative centre for the entire West African area.<sup>71</sup>

Major scholars of dependency differ in analytical approach, degree of emphasis, policy recommendation and perspectives for political action. Most emphasize the structural analysis of society, drawing on neo-Marxist insights into capitalism and imperialism. However, some dependency theories do not fit all aspects of Marxist

<sup>70</sup>Ibid.

<sup>71</sup>John P. Renninger, "The Future of Economic Cooperation Schemes in Africa With Special Reference to ECOWAS" in Timothy M. Shaw (ed.) Alternative Futures For Africa (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982) pp. 153-177. For arguments relating to Nigeria's rise to prominence, see Ibrahim Agboola Gambari, "Nigeria and the World: A Growing Internal Stability, Wealth and External Influence", Journal of International Affairs, vol. 29, No.2, Fall 1975, pp. 155-169; Jean Herkovits, "Nigeria: Africa's New Power", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 52, No. 2, January 1975, pp. 314-333; Timothy M. Shaw, "Discontinuities and Inequalities in Africa's International Politics", International Journal, Vol. 30, No. 3, Summer 1975, pp. 369-390.

interpretations, given the emphasis they place on the international economic aspects of exploitation, as opposed to focusing on the internal conditions, namely, the nature of class and its relationship to the means of production.<sup>72</sup> Nevertheless, some of the claims of dependency theories are relevant to systemic formulations.<sup>73</sup>

But analysts do not always agree on the exact nature of Nigerian-American relations, or even on Nigeria's place in the world system. While some argue that Nigeria is, indeed, a dependent nation, others including S.J.S. Cooley grudgingly admit that the country's prospects for development have brightened considerably since the oil boom years of the early 1970s.<sup>74</sup> Still others contend that by

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<sup>72</sup>One can speak of dependency theories rather than dependency theory because, as Harding argues, "there is no such thing as a single unified body of thought called dependency theory". He probably overstates his case when he asserted that "any common ground between those who share the terminology of dependency tends to dissolve as the importance of differences between them become greater". See Timothy F. Harding, "Dependency, Nationalism and the State in Latin America", Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 3, No. 4, Fall 1976, P. 3.

<sup>73</sup>These claims can be grouped under six main propositions: (1) underdevelopment results from dependence, (2) underdevelopment results mainly from the exploitation of the weak by the strong, (3) development and underdevelopment are dialectically linked, the former impoverishes the latter while the latter enriches the the former, (4) underdevelopment is not just the product of national history; it is the product of a global, imperial history, (5) underdevelopment is not caused by archaic social structure and traditional institutional arrangements but by advance capitalism, and (6) there is one cure for underdevelopment: de-satellization and socialism. See Uchendu, "Dependency and the development Process: An Introduction". PP. 3-15.

<sup>74</sup>S.J.S. Cooley, "Colonialism and Process of Underdevelopment in Nigeria", Journal of Asian and African Studies, vol. 14, 1-2, January and April 1979, PP. 19-31.

acting as an intermediary, Nigeria is indirectly enhancing its position by supporting American foreign policy in Africa and in the existing structure of power relations in contemporary international system. By contrast, the systemic perspective, discussed earlier, sees a growing interdependence between the two countries, and relies on the following factors to support its case: (1) an increasing independent role for Nigeria in world affairs, (2) the increasing American economic dependence on Nigeria as Nigeria refused to join the Arab oil embargo of 1973, (3) the trade deficit between the two countries, exceeding \$10 billion in 1982, which has been in Nigeria's favour, (4) the fact that United States sells far less to Nigeria than it buys, or that what the U.S. buys is much more fundamental to the U.S. economy than what Nigeria buys is fundamental to Nigeria's economic well-being.<sup>75</sup>

The economic fortunes of Nigeria in the 1970s had profound consequences for Nigerian-American relations in that they served to exacerbate the debate about the correct way of explaining this relationship. From the dependence perspective, explanations of Nigerian-American relations suggests that:

1. Nigeria is a client, or favourite country, of the United States.
2. Nigerian-American relations are asymmetrical ones of exploitation and penetration, mainly politically,

<sup>75</sup>Ali Mazrui, "Nigeria and the United States: The Need for Civility, the Dangers of Intimacy", pp. 858-864.

economically, culturally and in communication, which means that the U.S. is the imperialist power, a patron that is using Nigeria as an intermediary in its relations with Africa as as a whole.<sup>76</sup>

3. Nigeria's relatively superior economic, political and military status in black Africa could not have been achieved without the recognition and encouragement by the United States.
4. America needs a strong and powerful Nigeria which can support local forces in exercising control so as to maintain the status quo, or a law-and-order pattern compatible with the liberal ideology and capitalist types of development.

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<sup>76</sup>Johan Galtung, "Conflict on a Global Scale: Social Imperialism and sub-imperialism - Continuities in the Structural Theory of Imperialism", World Development, Vol. 4, No. 3, March 1976, PP. 153-165; Lindsay Barret, "Superpower Spheres: the Roots of Soviet and U.S. Interests in Africa", Atlas World Press Review, October 1978, PP. 41-42; for more on this discussion see Raimo Vayrynen and Luis Herrera, "Subimperialism: From Dependence to Subordination", Instant Research on Peace and Violence, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1975, PP. 165-177; Vayrynen, "Economic and Military Position of Regional Power Centres", Journal of Peace Research, No. 3, Vol. 16, 1979, PP. 349-369.

## II.

### Research Design


All research designs used in political research have one major goal: to provide plausible answers to research problems.<sup>77</sup> The purpose here is to discover the sources of foreign policy or immediate impetus for Nigerian-American bilateral relations during the Carter and Reagan era in order to explain those relations. Both U.S. and Nigerian objectives and policies will be considered over the period of the two U.S. administrations since that period represents internal political shifts both in the United States and Nigeria, and will therefore serve to test the systemic<sup>2</sup> against the state and dependency perspectives. Each intellectual approach (state, systemic and dependency)

<sup>77</sup>David C. Lege and Wayne L. Francis, Political Research: Design, Measurement, and Analysis (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 65-95.



provides a set of assumptions and conclusions that can be tested against the performance of Nigerian-American relations during the Carter and Reagan administrations. More specifically, I will look at the similarities and/or differences between the United States and Nigeria on such critical issues as Angola, Zimbabwe, and South Africa; the voting behaviour of both United States and Nigeria at the United Nations; the result and significance of top level visits; the patterns of foreign aid; the extent and change in the pattern of trade relationships; and the significance of United States investment in Nigeria.

One of the ways of testing actual U.S. and Nigerian policies is through examination of voting behavior at the United Nations. The U.N. resolutions (although directed against South Africa) are chosen for this analysis because they not only touched on key issues in American and Nigerian foreign policy, they are directly related to some of the issues affecting Nigerian-American bilateral relations. Furthermore, by examining the Nigerian and American positions on Angola, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, systemic influences on Nigerian-American bilateral ties could be demonstrated. In a similar vein, data on bilateral aid, trade, investment and top level exchange (visits) are meant to show the strengths and weaknesses of the state level variables or the extent to which they affect relations between the two countries.



This analysis will allow the examination of the stated objectives of both the United States and Nigeria and allow those objectives to be compared to policy performance. Haas defines the term "objective" as a goal that may be achieved by actions.<sup>78</sup> For Hopkins and Mansbach, an objective "may always be stated as an intention" to move from the present state of affairs to a predicted future state of affairs. An objective is a mental construct.<sup>79</sup> For the purpose of this analysis, it is obviously convenient to focus on the Carter administration first, followed by the Reagan era. Once their policy objectives and actual policies are discussed then comparisons will be made between the two administrations as they relate to Nigeria.

This study is based on information and data obtained from published sources, especially statements by both United States and Nigerian government officials concerning their respective foreign policies. By necessity, only those materials available at the University of Alberta and such materials as could be obtained through inter-library loan were used. While this, at first glance, would appear to bring the validity of this study into question, the problems represented by a potential lack of source material are in fact minimal. First, the study is looking at recent (late 1970s and early 1980s) foreign policy for which little additional material is available outside of any library

<sup>78</sup>Haas, International Conflict, P. 501.

<sup>79</sup>Raymond F. Hopkins and Richard W. Mansbach, Structure and Process in International Politics (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 60-61.

holdings. Second, I have attempted to draw the research questions in such broad terms that in-depth analyses of certain aspects of the various administrations is not necessary. For example, I have avoided, for the most part, an intensive study of the personalities of the various leaders and how these may have affected their respective foreign policies. Focusing along the broad factors (state and systemic) influencing Nigerian-American relations will, allow this researcher to ask the question: to what extent is American foreign policy towards Nigeria designed to support the East-West struggle on the African sub-continent, and to what extent is the Nigerian response based on similarly perceived objectives? And, more importantly, to what extent is the subsequent Nigerian-American relationship a captive of these objectives?

### III.

#### The Carter Administration: The Objectives

During the U.S. presidential election campaign of 1976, Mr. Carter's campaign rhetoric on American-African relations focused on the need for a reformulation of U.S. policy towards Africa. He argued that American foreign policy must be "reformulated towards unequivocal and concrete support of majority rule in Southern Africa. Efforts should be made to normalize relations with Angola."<sup>80</sup> Although Mr. Carter certainly was not an expert on African affairs, his choice of personnel and knowledge of the issues did help to strengthen his concern for the human rights situation in South Africa; a concern which infused his speeches throughout the campaign. In an interview published in

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<sup>80</sup>Keesing's Contemporary Archives, October 8, 1976, P. 27974.

November 1976, Carter revealed that he had considered abandoning his political career to lead a crusade for black majority rule in South Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).<sup>81</sup> The "crusade for black majority rule" was a catchy phrase, for although Carter was virtually unknown to the Nigerian leaders, his campaign message was closely watched in Lagos; even his election had raised hopes for a new chapter in American-African relations.<sup>82</sup> Government officials and editorial writers in Nigeria, and elsewhere in Africa, had made it clear that the Carter administration would be judged by one standard only, its policy on the problem of Southern Africa.<sup>83</sup>

When President Carter assumed office in January 1977, the question that immediately haunted the new administration was whether the U.S. was merely interested in containing Soviet influence, or whether there was a strong commitment

<sup>81</sup>"Playboy Interview: Jimmy Carter - Candid Conversation", Playboy, vol. 23, no. 11, November 1976, P. 70.

<sup>82</sup>John Darnton, "Carter's Election is Raising Hopes in Black Africa", New York Times, December 25, 1976, P.14.

<sup>83</sup>The term "Southern Africa" can be broadly defined to include the Republic of South Africa, Namibia, and the nine member-states of the Southern Africa Coordination Conference (SADCC): Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Angola, Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia and Tanzania. Geographically though, the last two - Zambia and Tanzania - belong more properly in Central and East Africa respectively. Here they are classified as Southern African states because both have acted in concert with other states on political, economic and security matters in the sub-region. See Robert S. Jaster, Southern Africa in Conflict: Implications for U.S. Policies in the 1980s, AEI Special Analysis (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1982), PP. 1-42; Colin Legum, The Western Crisis Over Southern Africa (New York: Africana Publishing, 1979), PP. 3-32; Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara (ed.), International politics in Southern Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), PP. ix-xv.

to justice and development in Southern Africa. Faced with the possibility of dealing with the situation in Angola, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, the administration set out to establish an agenda of U.S. foreign policy in Africa that has as its principal goal, the implementation of human rights. Although the emphasis on human rights was not a new phenomenon in American diplomacy (it was akin to the priorities of Woodrow Wilson), its application to Africa was first perceived by some observers as a revolution in American foreign policy.<sup>84</sup> In an attempt to formulate a new policy towards Africa, the administration undertook two important, albeit largely symbolic, steps aimed at allaying the fears of Nigeria and other African leaders concerning the real intentions of U.S. foreign policy behavior. The first step was the appointment of Andrew Young as the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Young accepted the post and claimed responsibility for U.S. policy in Africa as well. The symbolism was clear: the U.S. had a black man in charge of its policy in Africa. However, Ambassador Young's predicament was how to deal not only with the black leaders, but also with the white minority governments in South Africa and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) in that for any talk of political reform to succeed he needed the co-operation of white and black leaders. The second symbolic step was the repeal of the Byrd Amendment. In its original form the Amendment

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<sup>84</sup>Richard E. Bissell, "United States Policy in Africa", Current History, vol. 73, no. 432, December 1977, pp. 193-195.

sponsored by Senator Harry Byrd, Jr. (Democrat - Virginia) in 1971, from which the bill took its name, legally allowed for exceptional imports of chromium from Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) thereby contravening the United Nations sanctions against that country.

When the Byrd Amendment was passed it was argued that for strategic and economic reasons the United States needed continued access to Rhodesian chrome. In the early months of 1977, however, the Carter administration could downplay the importance of that mineral by arguing that access to Rhodesian chromium and other minerals was not an important element in U.S. security or its overall economic policy since the U.S. maintained a huge supply of chromium in its strategic stockpile and that the Defense Department's requirement for metallurgical-grade chromite was relatively small.<sup>85</sup> Several other arguments were made in favour of the repeal. First, the administration contended that the repeal of the Byrd Amendment would strengthen the hand of the United States and others who were working to find a peaceful solution to the Rhodesian problem. Second, the expectation was that the repeal would return the United States to conformity with its obligations under the United Nations Charter. Third, to the extent that the American industry was not dependent on the Rhodesian chromium because of imports from other countries such as the Soviet Union, the Philippines, India, Finland, Brazil, Turkey and Albania,

<sup>85</sup>Department of State Bulletin, vol. 76, February 1977, pp. 170-171.

the administration stressed the fact that repeal of the Byrd Amendment would not be harmful to the U.S. economy. These were convincing arguments. On March 18, 1977, President Carter signed the bill - H.R. 1746, (Public Law 95-12) - which repealed the Byrd Amendment and restored the executive authority to enforce sanctions against the importation of Rhodesian chromium, as well as steelmill product containing Rhodesian chromium. The implication of the repeal of the Byrd Amendment on U.S. foreign policy was clear: the President saw the measure as an appropriate and positive step towards his administration's commitment to the concept of rapid transition to majority rule in Rhodesia under non-violent conditions.<sup>86</sup>

Taking a look at the Carter administration's African policy as formulated during the first few months of 1977, the following broad outlines as put forward by the Secretary of State Cyrus Vance defined the general nature of the objectives adopted by the administration.

1. The effective policies towards Africa are affirmative policies. Applied to specific cases such as Angola, Rhodesia(Zimbabwe), and South Africa, the following scenarios emerge:
  - a. In Angola the administration will work towards normalization of American-Angolan relations by extending full diplomatic recognition to the Marxist oriented government of the Popular Movement for the

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<sup>86</sup>Department of State Bulletin, vol. 76, April 1977, PP. 333-334.



Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

- b. In Zimbabwe the administration wanted to help achieve majority rule by (a) participating in the mechanism of transfer of power in 1977-1978, (b) helping to convene a constitutional conference by mid-1977, and (c) seeing the new black majority government installed by 1978.<sup>87</sup>
- c. In South Africa the administration had the intention of setting in motion a progressive and peaceful transformation of the country towards a multi-racial democracy by (a) forging a coalition of moderate black leaders in order to stem the tide of continental radicalization and eliminate the Soviet-Cuban presence from the continent, and (b) keeping up pressure " so that by 1980 there would be marked progress in dismantling apartheid in South Africa itself".<sup>88</sup>

- 2. American foreign policy objective in Africa will foster a peaceful, prosperous and strong Africa.
- 3. American policies will recognize and encourage African nationalism.
- 4. American policies towards Africa will reflect American national values.
- 5. American ties with Africa will cover a wide spectrum of activities - cultural and economic as well as political.

<sup>87</sup>Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), P. 55.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid.

6. The Carter administration will seek openness in dealings with African states.

The first objective responds to the inadequacies of past U.S. policies which were basically reactive to the activities of other powers such as the Soviet Union and Cuba. It was not quite clear how the curious mixture of economic pragmatism evident in the decision not to apply economic sanctions against South Africa and human rights moralism would function. However, through subsequent statements of Carter, Vance, and Young, as well as those of the Under-Secretary of State for African affairs, Mr. Richard Moose, the central strands of the administration's policy can be found. The administration believed it could effectively influence South Africa on the Rhodesian (Zimbabwean) and Namibian issues while expressing its concerns about apartheid.<sup>89</sup> The linkage between the three issues stood in contradistinction to the Kissinger approach which sought to separate the problem of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Namibia from the apartheid situation in South Africa.

In an attempt to project a new image of an activist foreign policy orientation, the President and his policy advisers came to the conclusion that a negative reactive policy that sought only to oppose the Soviet-Cuban involvement in Africa would be both dangerous and futile. Consequently, the best policy for America was seen as that of helping to resolve the problems which create the

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<sup>89</sup>West Africa, May 1977, P. 1571.

opportunities for external intervention in the first place.<sup>90</sup> Indeed, the administration's apparent attempt to eliminate superpower conflict from black Africa was perceived as an innovative stance, since it came about soon after the American policy failure in Angola. Although it is difficult to say how much of the administration's policy positions can be attributed to the President himself, Russell W. Howe has suggested that the administration's initiatives were conditioned by many factors such as (1) the President's religiously motivated concerns about human rights and the racial situation in South Africa, (2) his political relations with Andrew Young, (3) his appointment of several pragmatic liberals with good knowledge of Africa, notably, Anthony Lake as head of the State Department's Policy-Planning Staff and Richard Moose as Assistant Secretary of State for African affairs; and (4) the fact that the President was elected with massive black American support. The latter factor deserves additional attention, to the extent that the influence of black Americans in U.S. foreign policy is implied.

The black American community gave 94 per cent of its vote in the Presidential election to Mr. Carter. Given its overwhelming nature, some analysts have contended that had the black vote for Mr. Carter been even a few percentage point less than it was, President Ford, not Carter, would

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<sup>90</sup>Cyrus Vance, "The United States and Africa: Building Positive Relations", Department of State Bulletin, vol. 77, August 1977, pp. 165-170.

have won the election.<sup>91</sup> Seyom Brown has suggested that as black Americans have developed greater consciousness of their African "roots" and have translated this into an attentiveness to U.S. policies affecting Africa, it is no longer simply the geographical significance of particular countries that defines the "national interest" of the United States but also the anger on the part of the politically influential blacks about the apartheid regime in South Africa, and the reluctance of South Africa to grant full independence to Namibia.<sup>92</sup> During the 1977-1978 period, the Congressional Black Caucus, an active lobby of Black American legislators, enunciated certain steps which they felt the U.S. government should take against South Africa.<sup>93</sup> These steps were spelled out as follows: (1) recall the U.S. Ambassador in Pretoria for consultation, (2) down-grade the U.S. Mission to South Africa, (3) withdraw the U.S. commercial, defense, and agricultural attaches, and end all co-operative agency agreements, such as those with the Treasury and the Department of Defense, (4) deny tax credits to any American company which invests and pays taxes in South Africa, (5) support the elimination of Export-Import Bank guarantees for loans to those U.S. companies which trade and invest in South Africa, especially

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<sup>91</sup>Christian Science Monitor, September 8, 1977, p. 3;  
Christian Science Monitor, September 6, 1977, p. 30.

<sup>92</sup>Seyom Brown, On the Front Burner: Issues in U.S. Foreign Policy (Boston: Little Brown, 1984), pp. 8-9.

<sup>93</sup>Davidson Nicol, "Africa and U.S.A in the United Nations", Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 16, no. 3, 1978, pp. 365-95.

stop the flow of high technology, (6) end U.S. co-operative agreements on nuclear energy and research as well as the export of nuclear materials to South Africa, (7) stop the Department of Commerce from licensing so-called "non-military" weapons for exports to South Africa, (8) support immediate congressional action to introduce economic and diplomatic sanctions against South Africa, and (9) strongly affirm a U.S. policy that calls for "one-man-one-vote" in South Africa.<sup>94</sup> Some analysts have suggested that these steps were under "active consideration" by the Carter administration.<sup>95</sup>

However, the fact that they were not adopted probably means that some of the recommendations by the Black Caucus either ran counter to the administration's perception of threats and opportunities in the politics of the African sub-system of the late 1970s or were not considered important enough to be adopted since there were other competing interests both in Congress and within the administration itself. The demand for economic and diplomatic sanctions might have been interpreted as against U.S. interests. More importantly, given the increasing Soviet activities in Africa, South Africa's perception of itself as a bastion against communism and particularly the so-called "Soviet threat" to the vital shipping routes between the Atlantic and Indian oceans, was powerful enough

<sup>94</sup>Ibid.

<sup>95</sup>Clyde Ferguson and William R. Cotter, "South Africa: What Is To Be Done", Foreign Affairs, vol. 56, no. 2, January 1978, pp. 253-274.

to produce a positive response in the minds of many policy makers in Washington.<sup>96</sup> Additional substantial constraints on U.S. policy, and the adoption of the steps suggested by the Congressional Black Caucus, centred on what Ferguson and Cotter correctly identified as the domestic imperative of U.S. society. According to this view, U.S. policy has always been shaped by domestic concerns, the least of which is the opinion of the black American community.<sup>97</sup> To the extent that American policy towards South Africa emanates from the nature of American society, South African-American relations are viewed as analogous to American black-white relations, the constraining force on policy options is that imposed by racism.<sup>98</sup>

The second objective of the administration's policy recognized that the long term success of American foreign policy in Africa will depend more on actual assistance to African development and the ability to help Africans resolve their disputes than on maneuvers for short term diplomatic advantage.<sup>99</sup> On the practical side, U.S. economic assistance

<sup>96</sup>David Nicol, "Africa and the U.S.A. in the United Nations", pp. 388-389.

<sup>97</sup>Ferguson and Cotter, "South Africa: What Is To Be Done", pp. 264-274. "To assert that an activist U.S. policy of pressuring South Africa to reform its internal racial policies is (or would be) solely a product of domestic black political forces is to give far too much credit to the power of the black community in the United States and to underestimate American idealism".

<sup>98</sup>Ibid. "On the one hand, American experience has taught the political impotence of blacks on issues on which the decisive factor is race; on the other hand, the same experience has instructed that there is always a nonviolent accommodation to essentially racial conflicts".

<sup>99</sup>Vance, "The United States and Africa: Building Positive Relations", p. 166.

increased from \$270 million in fiscal year 1974 to \$470 million in 1978 and \$486 million in 1979.<sup>100</sup> In 1977, the Carter administration also requested Congress to approve \$200 million for the devastated economies of the poorest African countries in the Sahel region. The fund was to be managed by Club du Sahel.<sup>101</sup> The African share of U.S. aid increased from about 5 per cent in 1976 to 10 per cent in 1979, 22 per cent in 1980, and 23 per cent in 1981. The percentage increases were quite substantial, probably indicating U.S. continued commitment to African development, although the total amount of aid remained exceedingly small. For example, between 1976 and 1979 Israel received four to five times as much aid as all of Africa.

However, the point to note is that the decision to extend American economic aid to the Sahel in particular, and Africa in general, was in line with established U.S. policy; in other words it was not a phenomenon peculiar to the Carter administration. For example, while visiting Dakar, Senegal, in May 1, 1976, Kissinger had issued an appeal to the industrialized countries to establish a \$7,500 million development fund to end the chronic drought in the Sahel region in West and Central Africa. In a seven-point program which included plans for water conservation, communications and scientific use of dry-land-area crops and livestock. Kissinger also proposed what he described as measures to

<sup>100</sup>Department of State Bulletin, vol. 80, March 1980, P. 15; Department of State Bulletin, vol. 80, April 1980, P. 10.

<sup>101</sup>Vance, "The United States and Africa: Building Positive Relations", P. 167.

"roll back the desert" and to assist Chad, The Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso).<sup>102</sup> In terms of African development, then, the difference between the new Carter administration and that of the Ford-Kissinger period can be perceived as differences in rhetoric rather than substance.

The third objective of the Carter administration was to recognize and encourage African nationalism. This objective was guided by two principal assumptions that, first, African nations will defend their independence against challenges from any source and that, second, if America tried to impose its solutions for African problems, it would undermine the ability of the African states to oppose efforts at domination by others. Before Carter, it was evident that America was slow to come terms with nationalist struggles in Africa. All that was expected to change under Carter because of the administration's recognition that Moscow, Beijing, and in the 1970s Havana, had the advantage of having always been on the right side of African nationalism in Southern Africa; and consequently on the side of the eventual winners as in Mozambique and Angola. There was also an increasing awareness in the Carter team that despite the communist arms supplies, African nationalists were far from following the path of communism. This was backed up with the perception that whereas the Soviet Union, China and Cuba could

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<sup>102</sup>Keessing's Contemporary Archives, June 11, 1976, P. 27778. Kissinger also held out the prospect of more U.S. financial assistance to Black African states, and the lowering of trade barriers.



gaurantee African victory through armed struggle, the United States held out the possibility of a more peaceful and perhaps swifter transition to a more representational government.<sup>103</sup> Some of the practical ways the administration wanted to oppose the Soviet-Cuban threat and to demonstrate American sensitivities to African nationalism was the establishment of a negotiating framework for the Zimbabwean and Namibian independence questions. It is apparent that the administration did not succeed in bringing about Namibian independence; although negotiations continued throughout the Carter era, they were essentially stalemated.<sup>104</sup>

The fourth policy objective had to do with American support of individual human rights. President Carter began his administration with the inaugural pledge that his foreign policy would exemplify the moral and ethical standards of the American people, and that "because we are free we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere."<sup>105</sup> Secretary Vance also echoed the same sentiment when he stated that "we must have policies based upon fundamental values...We must stand for human rights".<sup>106</sup> Generally, the administration's areas of concern were violations of integrity of the person in the form of officially sanctioned murders, tortures, or detentions

<sup>103</sup>Howe, "United States Policy in Africa", P. 98.

<sup>104</sup>See Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), PP. 256-313.

<sup>105</sup>Quoted in a statement by Warren Christopher, "Human Rights: An Important Concern of U.S. Foreign Policy", Department of State Bulletin, vol. 76, March 1977, P. 289.

<sup>106</sup>Ibid.

without trial. Political rights and civil protection were also accorded high priority. In the African context, however, the administration's human rights policy was broadly defined in terms of commitment to majority rule, self-determination and racial equality in Southern Africa. This definition of human rights was necessary because, as the administration officials contended, if the U.S. did not support social and political justice in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Namibia, and South Africa, African leaders would have correctly dismissed the American human rights policy as mere cold war propaganda, employed at the expense of the Africans.<sup>107</sup> The emphasis on the economic, political and social aspects of human rights means that, at least in terms of creating a favorable image, the administration was on the right side of the issue, joining the majority of African states to demand racial justice in Southern Africa. As an administration official stated:

Abuse of human rights is wrong on any grounds. It is particularly offensive when it is on the basis of race. In Southern Africa, issues of race, of justice, and of self-determination have built to a crisis.<sup>108</sup>

Thus, instead of tilting towards the status quo in Southern Africa as Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger did until they faced the reality of the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola, all policy declarations pointed to the fact that the Carter administration would concentrate on key problems that

<sup>107</sup>Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy, pp. 256-257.

<sup>108</sup>Vance, "The United States and Africa: Building Positive Relations", p. 167.

could win the approval of the majority of black African states.

The fifth objective of the Carter administration concentrated on the importance of America's growing trade and investment with African nations, and how the enormous potential of African states is tied to the "national interest" of the United States. In his speech at the annual convention of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) on July 1, 1977, Secretary Vance reminded his audience of the political, economic, and cultural importance of Africa to the United States. He talked of Africa's mineral and agricultural wealth which already provided a substantial proportion of American imports of such commodities as copper, cobalt, manganese, cocoa, coffee, and more importantly crude oil.<sup>109</sup> Vance's speech indicated that the new administration was clearly aware of the significance of the role of the African states at the United Nations. The importance of the cultural dimension was well summed up in the following words: "our society and culture are enriched by the heritage so many Americans find in Africa. We experience this enrichment every day - in our literature, our art, our music, and our social values".<sup>110</sup> Although the American cultural and economic ties to Africa were thought to be the most important and enduring aspects of the relationship, no

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<sup>109</sup>Vance, "The United States and Africa: Building Positive Relations", P. 165.

<sup>110</sup>Ibid.

specific policy measures relating to the cultural dimension were spelled out.

Finally, the sixth objective expressed the administration's intention to seek openness and consultation in its dealings with the African states, as well as its willingness to discuss issues with African leaders. Here again, the administration stopped far short providing details. Nevertheless, its approach appeared to contrast sharply with the type of "Lone Ranger" secret diplomacy of Kissinger. The term "Lone Ranger" was first used by Carter to refer to Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy" during a speech delivered on June 1, 1976, to the Foreign Policy Association in New York. The emphasis on consultation and open discussion was meant to convey the impression that the Carter administration was different from previous ones, and that the administration did not see itself as providing solutions to African problems but rather to work with African leaders in a supporting role. This was the main thrust of Ambassador Young's statement during a press conference in Nairobi, Kenya, on February 7, 1977.<sup>111</sup> The statement could be seen either as a revision of an earlier position, or a means of dampening expectations of radical change in America's African policy. In one important sense, however, it was an acknowledgement of the limitations of U.S. power as the President himself once conceded: "I (President Carter) recognize that the United States cannot

<sup>111</sup>African Research Bulletin, vol. 14, no. 2, March 15, 1977. P. 4334.

solve the problems of the world. We can sometimes help others resolve their differences, but we cannot do so by imposing our own particular solutions".<sup>112</sup> The administration's admission of its limitations was also aimed at domestic consumption in the United States in that its approach to Southern Africa was neither popular in Congress nor well understood by the American public. According to Vance's account, most conservatives feared that the administration favoured communist supported black guerilla groups; some even tried to compel the administration to support the minority regime in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).<sup>113</sup> American liberals were equally worried that the administration was overly cautious, too solicitous of the feelings of political groups within Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), too anxious to keep in step with its western allies, and unwilling to accept the political costs of exerting strong diplomatic and economic pressures on South Africa, the linchpin of white minority rule.<sup>114</sup> The extent to which the Carter administration's African policy facilitated the political rapprochement between Lagos and Washington can be fully appreciated by taking full cognizance of Nigerian and American foreign policy positions on selected African issues such as Angola, Zimbabwe, and South African crises.

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<sup>112</sup>See Robert Shogan, Promises to Keep: Carter's First Hundred days (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1977), P. 163.

<sup>113</sup>Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy, P. 257.

<sup>114</sup>Ibid.

## Angola and Nigerian-American Relations

Under the Ford administration, strains in Nigerian-American relations were evident in the difference of views over Africa's internal conflicts. The Ford administration's note to all O.A.U. member states on the eve of the extraordinary summit meeting of African leaders in Addis Ababa, early in January 1976, was seen by the Nigerian Head of State, general Murtala Mohammed as an insult to African leaders. The direct message of that note was the U.S. insistence on the withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban military advisers from Angola as a pre-condition for the withdrawal of South African troops from southern Angola. The message was designed to influence African attitudes to the Angola crisis, in an attempt to bring them closer to the position held by the United States. Washington admitted this was simply a re-statement of U.S. policy with the hope that the O.A.U. would insist on an immediate end to all foreign involvement in Angola, and that the Organization would arrange a cease-fire between the forces. President Ford also assured the Nigerian government that the U.S. would support such initiatives, and would in turn urge the South African regular troops to withdraw from Angola. The President wrote: "We cannot, however, stand idly by if the Soviet and Cuban intervention persists".<sup>115</sup> Nigeria's negative reply to President Ford's note came when its Foreign Minister, Joseph Garba, announced that the Nigerian delegation would actively

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<sup>115</sup>Facts On File, January 10, 1976, pp. 2-3.

seek to convince other nations at the summit to resist U.S. pressure for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Angola. This did not go down well with the administration in Washington which saw the Angolan crisis as an East-West problem. Nigeria, whose stance was expected to weigh significantly in the O.A.U. emergency session on Angola, did not see the crisis as an East-West problem at all. These divergent perceptions had created problems in Nigerian-American relations during the Ford Presidency.

When Carter came to power it was already clear that he could not continue with the Ford-Kissinger approach to African issues. For one, Carter had repeatedly attacked the Ford Administration's African policy during his election campaign, contending that the United States had bungled in the Angolan Civil War and had lost the possibility of playing a positive role in Southern African developments.<sup>116</sup> From the same premise, Andrew Young later went a step further by openly defending the Cuban presence in Angola, arguing that the Cuban troops should be seen as a stabilizing force. Young's statement must have signified a radical shift in American perception of the Soviet-Cuban presence in Angola; it was seen by many African states, including Nigeria, as an apparent reversal of America's previous posture. But there was no such shift in actual U.S. policy. It will be argued that despite the promise by the

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<sup>116</sup>West Africa, August 1, 1977, p. 1571; Oye Ogunbadejo, "A New Turn in US-Nigerian Relations", The World Today, March 1979, pp. 117-126.

Carter administration, of a brand new approach to African problems, there was no substantial difference between Carter and previous U.S. administration policies; the administration was as equally conscious of the Soviet-Cuban presence in Angola as its predecessors. The Carter administration, like the Ford-Kissinger administration before it, neither extended diplomatic recognition to the Soviet-backed MPLA government in Luanda nor actively sought the participation of all groups in a government of national unity in that country. Such recognition and insistence on participation by all groups would have steered American policy closer to the original position adopted by Nigeria.<sup>117</sup> This possibility makes it all the more necessary to trace the evolution of the U.S. and Nigerian policies from the pre-Carter years before considering developments under Carter.

Initially Nigeria wanted a government of national unity that would accommodate the three leading liberation movements in Angola - the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Even when the Angolan civil war broke out, Gowon's administration in Lagos still

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<sup>117</sup>When asked by *Africa Report* Washington correspondent Richard Deutsch whether the U.S. would recognize the dos Santos regime and provide support for UNITA, President Carter responded that the "Cuban involvement has been an obstacle to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Angola." *Africa Report*, vol. 25, no. 4, July-August 1980, pp. 9-10.



worked within the O.A.U. Reconciliation Committee to bring all the Angolan groups to agree on a coalition government in spite of the failure of such governments in other parts of the continent. In Angola, a coalition government was almost impossible because of ideological differences between the three liberation movements. Yet, with only three days to go before Angola's independence, Nigeria issued a statement proposing that independence should be delayed for another three weeks to allow for more time to find a solution. (There was, however, no support for Nigeria's proposal within the O.A.U.). At the same time, the Nigerian Foreign Minister denounced the Soviet Union for its intervention in Angola.<sup>118</sup> On November 8, 1975, Nigeria "deplored the support given by the Soviet Union to one of the liberation movements to declare independence unilaterally", suggesting that such interference in the internal affairs of Angola was inimical to the African initiative to resolve the ~~the~~. "The federal government (of Nigeria) therefore calls on the Soviet Union and others of the same inclination to desist forthwith from further interference in the Angola situation".<sup>119</sup>

Both Nigeria and the United States had the option of collaborating in an "honest broker" role in Angola - a strategy which as Bruce Oudes suggested, would have entailed using maximum diplomatic leverage to keep the three feuding

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<sup>118</sup>Colin Legum, "Foreign Intervention in Angola", in Colin Legum (ed.) Africa Contemporary Record 1975-76, pp. A3-A38.

<sup>119</sup>Ibid.

nationalist factions together. This option was not seriously considered because from January until November 1975, U.S. policy in Angola was based on the premise that the MPLA would be squeezed out of any participation in the government of independent Angola.<sup>120</sup> As the FNLA military positions collapsed, it became clear in November that the MPLA could not be prevented from playing a decisive or vital role in Angolan politics. The U.S. policy switched to one of partition (the strategy was to exacerbate divisions among the groups and support the more Western-oriented movements) for a few weeks until the U.S. Senate on December 19 refused to grant Kissinger the funds he needed. It was already too late when Kissinger told Congress on January 29, 1976, in his first appearance before the Senate Sub-committee on Africa that, "we have consistently advocated... a government representing all three factions in Angola".<sup>121</sup> Kissinger clearly over-stated his case: since he thought that the FNLA would win the civil war in Angola, there was no effort to stress the importance of preserving the Angolan coalition or to support Nigeria's call for unity all liberation movements.<sup>122</sup> The opportunity for a Nigerian-U.S. joint

Bruce Oudes, "The United States Year in Africa: Postscript to the Nixon Years", in Colin Legum (ed.) Africa Contemporary Record 1975-76, PP. A118-A126.

<sup>121</sup>Ibid.

<sup>122</sup>U.S. policy was inhibited by two major weaknesses: its role during the anti-Portuguese colonial struggle in Angola which left Washington on the losing side, and, according to Colin Legum, the refusal of a Congress, wrestling with the aftermath of Vietnam, Watergate and C.I.A. exposure, to support administration's policy proposals on Angola. Legum, "Foreign Intervention in Angola", PP. A3-A38; Neil C. Livingstone and Manfred Von Nordheim, "U.S. Congress and the

effort on Angola was further negated due to the change of government in Nigeria. When the Murtala Muhammed administration came to power in 1976, Nigeria decided to abandon its initial support for coalition government in Angola and complete support was given to the Soviet-backed MPLA. This shows, from the point of view of Nigeria, radical policy shifts based on change of government. Muhammed totally reversed his country's earlier critical attitude to Soviet intervention in Angola and instead criticized the U.S. for its attitude towards African liberation. The problem, he said, was no longer one of calling for a simple solution in the African tradition, but one of foreign intervention by extra-African powers in collusion with Pretoria. He stated: "If the neo-colonialists succeed in Angola, then our hopes for Southern Africa, will have been dashed".<sup>123</sup> He also said that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries had been the traditional allies of African liberation struggle and supporters of African freedom fighters. For the Nigerian leader there was no cause to doubt that successive U.S. administrations would continue to support the apartheid regime of South Africa "whom they see as the defender of Western interest on the continent. How can we now be led to believe that a government with a record such as the US has in Africa can suddenly become the defender of our interests?"<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>122</sup>(cont'd) Angolan Crisis", Strategic Review, vol. 5, no.2, Spring 1977, pp. 34-44.

<sup>123</sup>Legum, "Foreign Intervention in Angola", pp. A22-A26.

<sup>124</sup>Ibid.

Here, it is pertinent to reiterate that Nigeria, like the United States, was originally against Soviet presence in Angola and was strongly in support of UNITA, having promised military aid to Savimbi. After the coup of July 29, 1975, that toppled General Gowon and brought Mohammed to power, then Commissioner for External Affairs, Joseph Garba, said the new Mohammed administration did not necessarily agree with the policies of the previous government which at that time were being carefully examined. The Angolan crisis provided the new regime with a serious test in foreign policy. On November 26, the Mohammed administration came out in support of the MPLA and actively canvassed other African states to follow suit. In December, Nigeria provided \$200 million in aid to Angola and was said to have pledged more financial and material aid worth a total of \$100 million.

Nigerian-American relations became severely strained as a result of what Nigerians believed was America's support for the South African invasion of Angola. For example, on January 11, 1976, demonstrations in two Nigerian cities, Kaduna and Ibadan, against U.S. policy towards Angola were followed by an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Lagos. On February 17, after the coup attempt in which Muhammed was assassinated, demonstrators again attacked the U.S. Embassy, claiming U.S. (and Western) complicity in the plot and shouting "C.I.A. must go". Nuhu Bayero, the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Lagos, said: "As far as I am concerned, the CIA has its hands in the recent coup attempt because of

Nigeria's refusal to sign the iron and steel agreement with America, and ...Nigeria's stand on Angola."<sup>125</sup> Although there was no proof of such allegation, Radio Moscow on February 20, 1976 encouraged the suspicion: "In many African countries the February events in Lagos are directly linked with U.S. policy in Africa".<sup>126</sup> As relations between the two countries worsened, Nigeria refused to receive U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger during his tour of Africa in April 1976. The U.S. Government was given until April 1976 to close its radio station in Kaduna.<sup>127</sup>

The Mohammed administration's decision to support Soviet-backed MPLA rather than the American-backed movements was a reaction to the invasion of Angola by South African forces in support of the UNITA and FNLA.<sup>128</sup> Nigerian officials and current thinking on the subject support this fact.<sup>129</sup> Nigerians did not relish foreign involvement in the

<sup>125</sup>Legum, (ed.) Africa Contemporary Record 1975-76, PP. B781-B809.

<sup>126</sup>Ibid.

<sup>127</sup>Ibid.

<sup>128</sup>See A. Bolaji Akinyemi and Margaret Vogt, "Nigeria and Southern Africa: The Policy Options" in Douglas G. Anglin, et al. (eds.) Conflict and Change in Southern Africa: Papers from a Scandinavian-Canadian Conference (Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1978), PP. 151-168. Akinyemi and Vogt contended that Nigeria's decision to recognize the MPLA was an indication of an "ideological preference"; but are careful to point out that by "ideological preference...one does not mean that Nigeria preferred Marxist to non-Marxist groups, but preferences in terms of commitment to African liberation." Akinyemi, "Mohammed/Obasanjo Foreign Policy", in Oyeleye Oyediran (ed.) Nigerian Government and Politics Under Military Rule, 1966-79 (London: Macmillan, 1979), PP. 150-168.

<sup>129</sup>See A. Bolaji Akinyemi, "Nigerian-American Re-examined", in Oyeleye Oyediran (ed.) Survey of Nigerian Affairs 1976-1977 (Lagos: the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1981), PP. 105-114. Elsewhere Akinyemi asserted

Angolan problem; as discussed earlier, they were initially quite critical of the Soviet and Cuban intervention.

However, their attitude changed remarkably when it became evident to them that South Africa had sent its forces into central Angola in late October 1975. It was at that point that the Soviet-Cuban activity was legitimized, at least in Nigerian eyes, and U.S. policy became suspect to the extent that the Nigerians saw the U.S. as being allied with South Africa.

Other factors had to be taken into account in evaluating the acceptability of the MPLA to both the Nigerians and the Americans. For the Nigerians, the MPLA was not just a nationalist movement, it was a party that supported the ongoing struggle against racism and colonialism on the continent. In other words, the MPLA would not regard Angolan independence as an end in itself. The U.S. had the same perception of the MPLA and the corresponding connection between its victory in Angola and the course of events in Southern Africa. Some have acknowledged that it was the radicalism and ideology of the MPLA that had led to this amazing uniformity of the Nigerian-American perception of the movement.<sup>130</sup> It was,

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<sup>129</sup>(cont'd) that Nigeria's decision to support the MPLA would have been made "even if the South Africans had not invaded", believing that the decision would still have been made on the basis of the credentials of the MPLA as a militant anti-colonial Pan-Africanist movement committed to the total liberation of Southern Africa. Akinyemi, "Mohammed/Obasanjo Foreign Policy", pp. 160-168.  
<sup>130</sup>Akinyemi, "Nigerian-American Relations Re-examined", p. 105.

however, ironic that Nigeria with its anti-radicalism and conservative tradition in both domestic and foreign policy had supported the MPLA instead of the more liberal pro-American movements. Akinyemi was probably right when he asserted that the anti-colonial cause of the MPLA had provided sufficient justification for Nigeria's support of the movement, even without the South African invasion of Angola. On issues involving African de-colonization, Nigeria's "conservative tradition" has at times been abandoned not because of any conversion to radicalism but because the anti-colonial cause has invariably proved more potent than commitment to conservative values.<sup>131</sup> On the contrary, the objective of U.S. policy was primarily to counter the Soviet threat and slow down, or if possible reverse, the trend towards radicalism in Africa.

The point to note as far as Angola and Nigerian-American relations are concerned is that the two countries finally supported opposite sides in the Angolan crisis. There was pressure from the United States which wanted Nigeria to tow the line, so to speak, by supporting American policy or maintain its neutrality; and pressure from those Nigerians who wanted their country to throw its weight behind the MPLA. In terms of domestic politics in Nigeria, the recognition of the MPLA was a popular political move by the Mohammed administration. The decision was praised by the political editor of the Lagos *Sunday Times* as

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<sup>131</sup>Ibid. P. 106.

"singularly the most daring and responsible foreign policy decision taken by any Nigerian government since independence."<sup>132</sup> Some still argue that although a lot of Nigerians would have been bitterly disappointed if the MPLA had been defeated by "Western imperialists" in Angola, they would have been convinced that their country was right in recognizing the MPLA.<sup>133</sup> The domestic support for Nigeria's Angolan policy began with the publication of what Nigerian officials described as President Ford's "overbearing directive" to the Nigerian Head of State discussed earlier. A text of Nigeria's reply to the United States was also published: it rejected the Ford administration's "fatuous attempt" to "insult the intelligence of African nations and scorn the dignity of the black man", totally repudiating "the false logic which equates the presence of the Cuban and Soviet advisers in Angola with that of the South African regular troops, their fellow soldiers of fortune and motly mercenaries".<sup>134</sup> This too was well received in Nigeria as evident in the Daily Times editorial of January 9, 1976: "who would have believed that this country (Nigeria) could ever muster enough courage to stand up to Washington overlords and tell them to shut up and stop insulting Africa and the blackman? This precisely is what the federal government has done. Needless to say it has the support of

<sup>132</sup> Sunday Times, (Lagos) February 1, 1976 cited in James H. Polhemus, "Nigeria and Southern Africa: Interest, Policy and Means", Canadian Journal of African Studies, vol. 11, no. 1, 1977, pp. 43-66.

<sup>133</sup> Akinyemi, "Mohammed/Obasanjo Foreign Policy", p. 159.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid.



Nigerian people who must be feeling proud and confident in our ability to tell grey beards the truth. It is a mark of real independence".<sup>135</sup> Nigeria's rejection of the American position and its recognition of the MPLA had obvious international implications. It contributed to the acceptance of the MPLA as the legitimate government by most African states, and eventually by all Western countries except the United States.<sup>136</sup> More importantly, Nigeria's decision was followed by an approval of Soviet and Cuban involvement on the side of the MPLA as action necessary for independence of Angola - a foreign policy position which was diametrically opposed to that of the United States. One is bound to agree with James H. Polhemus that "Angola was a success for Nigeria because a timely abandonment of the policy of national unity (in Angola) placed Nigeria on the winning side at a time when its winning was by no means inevitable."<sup>137</sup> Nigeria's policy shift had also created a close bond between Angola and Nigeria even at the risk of alienating the United States or jeopardizing Nigerian-American relations. Akinyemi and Vogt, indeed, have suggested that Nigeria's opposition to American-Supported movements such as Jonas Savimbi's UNITA and Holden Roberto's FNLA indirectly influenced the decision of the Ford administration to re-examine America's African policy.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid.

<sup>136</sup> A. Bolaji Akinyemi, "The Emergence of Nigeria as a Regional Power in International Relations", Studia Diplomatica, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 227-243.

<sup>137</sup> Polhemus, "Nigeria and Southern Africa: Interest, Policy and Means", pp. 43-66.

Nigeria impressed upon the United States that she was not interested in improved bilateral relations "as long as the United States supported the status quo in Southern Africa".<sup>138</sup> But this did not drastically change American policy on Angola.<sup>139</sup> Ofoegbu has contended that because of the strategic and economic interests of the United States in South Africa, the American perception of the Angolan Crisis was more or less in line with the South African view of the crisis. This means in effect that behind the scenes the Ford administration was in favour of the installation of a government in Angola that would threaten neither American, and Western, interests in Southern Africa nor seek to force radical departure from the status quo. Publicly, however, the U.S. concentrated its criticisms on the Soviet and Cuban involvement on the side of the MPLA.<sup>140</sup>

Despite the claims of the early Carter administration, there is a remarkable continuity between Ford and Carter. During the 1979-1980 period, several factors contributed to the similarity: the fall of Iran, the seizure of the American hostages in Teheran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. All had an immediate effect on U.S. policy towards Africa. In 1980, there was American military co-operation with Somalia, military support for Morocco King Hassan's war against the Polisario in Western Sahara, and

<sup>138</sup>Akinyemi and Vogt, "Nigeria and Southern Africa: The Policy Options", P. 160.

<sup>139</sup>Ray Ofoegbu, The Nigerian Foreign Policy (Uwani, Enugu: Star, 1978), pp. 35-38.

<sup>140</sup>Ibid. P.35.

greater polarization of Africa along the lines of East-West tension.<sup>141</sup> In the same year, a study conducted for the Department of Defense called for a re-assessment of U.S. policy towards Africa in the context of Soviet-Cuban activities and recommended that

1. It is legitimate and necessary to focus on Soviet-Cuban dimension of African problems because of the importance of American relationship with Moscow, and Moscow's often important role in African trouble spots. It, however, warned that this focus should not be the only thrust of African policy, but that it was a valid thrust and should not be down-played.
2. The growing Soviet and Cuban political and military involvement in Africa represents a serious challenge to U.S. interests. That the United States cannot deter the Soviets and Cubans by pursuing exclusively reactive anti-Soviet policies; and concern about Africa and Soviet-Cuban advances should be followed by positive action and policies.
3. To eschew dealings with important political actors such as Angola because of its Marxist-Leninist ideology might be short-sighted. The argument was that African states such as Angola and Mozambique with their Marxist-Leninist ideology may have certain local security needs compatible with U.S. interests.

Furthermore, the U.S. could pursue a "denial" strategy

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<sup>141</sup>Richard Deutsch, "Carter's Africa Policy Shift", Africa Report, vol. 25, no. 3, May-June 1980, pp. 15-18.

towards important Soviet interests.<sup>142</sup>

It should be noted that these recommendations were simply a re-statement of some of the basic assumptions that had guided the administration's policies since 1977. Except that in 1980, in spite of a drift towards increased militarization across North and East Africa, as evident in the positioning of American military support facilities in Somalia, Tunisia, Morocco and Kenya, there were no clear indication of a return to the post-war orthodoxy of containment, with its emphasis on intervention to keep Marxists or leftist regimes from power. The apparent shift in Carter's African policy flowed from the desire in the Pentagon to create the impression of a stiffer U.S. global stance. This fitted in with political calculation in the White House to get President Carter re-elected. An attempt to create such impression did not, however, resolve the inherent problem in the administration's policy: the question whether to see African crisis as an Africa problem or whether to perceive it solely as an East-West conflict. This dilemma came about as a result of two conflicting currents in American foreign policy: notably, considerations of global and regional strategies. For Brzezinski, whenever the two strategies presented themselves, the East-West struggle or the responsibility of the United States as a great power often took precedence over more narrowly

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<sup>142</sup>Michael A. Samuels, et al. "Implications of Soviet and Cuban Activities in Africa for U.S. Policy", Africa Report, vol. 25, no. 1, 1980, pp. 51-53.

conceived regional interests. Robert M. Price argues that while global and regional "interests" are usually consistent with each other, they are not necessarily identical in the short-run. <sup>143</sup> Kissinger also tried to make a distinction between the two when he argued the case for an activist role for the United States in the Angolan Civil War.

America's modest strategic and economic interests in Angola are not the central issue. The question is whether America maintains the resolve to act responsibly as a great power...the culprits in the tragedy that is now unfolding in Angola are the Soviet Union and its client state Cuba. But I must note...that the Executive has been deprived of indispensable flexibility in formulating a foreign policy which we believed to be in our national interest... A stable relationship with the Soviet Union based on mutual restraint will be achieved only if Soviet lack of restraint carries the risk of counteraction. <sup>144</sup>

According to this view, although America's tangible interests and threats to them are assumed to exist from increased Soviet-Cuban activity, the case for a U.S. interventionist role in Sub-Saharan Africa does not rest on the significance of tangible interests there, but rather on the need to maintain the image of U.S. resolve and determination. <sup>145</sup> In other words, there is a prestige type of benefit to be gained by the United States. However, Price's argument does not make American intervention in

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<sup>143</sup>Robert M. Price, U.S. Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa: National Interest and Global Strategy (University of California: Institute of African Studies, 1978), p. 30.

<sup>144</sup>Ibid. See also U.S. Congress, Senate, Angola, Hearings, before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, 1976, p. 8.

<sup>145</sup>Robert M. Price, U.S. Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa: National Interest and Global Strategy, pp. 32-33.

Sub-Saharan Africa any less real, no matter the official justification for such intervention.

President Carter spared few opportunities to criticise publicly the Cuban and Soviet intervention in Africa. In a major speech during the state visit to Nigeria in 1978, the President devoted a central portion of his attention to decrying Soviet-Cuban intervention in Africa, even though his remarks were met with little enthusiasm on the Nigerian side. Such lack of enthusiasm did nothing to weaken the strength of the declarations concerning the new spirit of co-operation in Nigerian-American relations; even when in July 1978 the Nigerian head of state, General Obasanjo said, at the annual conference of OAU heads of state, that the Russians "were invited into Africa for a purpose" and that "they intervened as a consequence of failure of Western policies on behalf of legitimate African interests".<sup>146</sup> What the Nigerian head of state probably meant was that although the Soviet Union and Cuba had intervened in Angola, such intervention had thus far not occurred indiscriminately, but rather only in those situations in which their actions would be supportive of principles that have strong support among the African states - a view which neither the Ford nor Carter Administration could easily digest.

The Nigerians viewed American concern for the Soviet and Cuban interference in Angola as based more on issues of concern for American global policy than being motivated by

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<sup>146</sup>Ibid., p. 40.

any concern for true independence in Africa. To the extent that the Soviets and Cubans were invited into Angola by the MPLA, the Nigerians had a different view of the Soviet and Cuban role in that country. They contended that the Cubans were not seeking territorial aggrandizement. As the Nigerian Head of State, General Obasanjo, put it "to the Soviets and their friends, I should like to say that, having been invited to Africa in order to assist in the liberation struggle and consolidation of national independence, they should not overstay their welcome".<sup>147</sup> On the contrary the Nigerian administration believed that South Africa, which the U.S. supported, was interested in some form of territorial aggrandizement by trying to set up some kind of buffer state for the Ovambo ethnic community in Namibia - a state that would extend across the Namibian border into Southern Angola. The Nigerians found that South Africa was trying to establish some kind of "unholy alliance" with UNITA and the FNLA to ensure that their Namibian boundary with Angola would be protected from what the South African regime perceived as the possibility of "terrorist" incursions into Namibia from Angola. Given the Nigerian foreign policy position on Angola, American attempts to persuade Nigerians and other Africans along the lines that the U.S. Administration thought were correct, led to the Nigerian criticism that the U.S. was in support of South Africa's invasion of Angola.<sup>148</sup>

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<sup>147</sup>Ibid.

<sup>148</sup>It is interesting that this same conclusion was arrived

In sum, the policies adopted by the United States and Nigeria towards the Angolan crisis had resulted in two conflicting approaches to African politics. The U.S. approach saw African politics as an extension of the East-West struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, while the Nigerian approach regarded the U.S.-Soviet competition as marginally related to African problems. Within the context of the Angolan crisis, the two approaches manifested themselves in U.S. perception of the MPLA as communist and UNITA and FNLA as friends of the West. For Nigeria, however, the MPLA represented a truly nationalist organization, while UNITA and FNLA were seen as ethnically based movements. The MPLA's self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist ideology, its dependence on the Soviet Union for arms and on Cuba for men were historical accidents as far as Nigeria was concerned. As one observer put it "a group that is involved in arms conflict is not likely to be too choosy about where the arms come from".<sup>148</sup> Thus on the issue of Angola, Nigeria and the United States were as far apart under Carter as they were during the Ford-Kissinger administration. The Carter administration failed to achieve its stated objective as evident in its inability or unwillingness to establish normal diplomatic relations with Angola. As Vance later admitted,

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<sup>148</sup> (cont'd) at in Congressional hearings dealing with the Ford administration. See U.S. Congress, Senate, "United States-Nigerian Relations" in U.S. Policy Towards Africa, Hearings, before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, 1976, pp. 163-199.

<sup>149</sup> Akinyemi, "Mohammed/Obasanjo Foreign Policy", p. 156.



such failure remained a serious error on the part of the United States in that the hope of increasing American leverage in Angola had disappeared with the administration's decision not to recognize the Neto government as long as Cuban forces remained in Angola.<sup>150</sup> For Brzezinski,

improving bilateral relations with Angola had proved more difficult than achieving majority rule in Zimbabwe.

Nevertheless, Vance and Brzezinski believe that, overall, U.S. policy in Southern Africa had achieved some real successes. As Brzezinski put it, there was a greater willingness to listen to the African view in Washington, and a better understanding in Africa of America's dilemmas by the end of Carter administration.<sup>151</sup>

#### Zimbabwe and Nigerian-American Relations

In January 1977, it was perfectly clear that the Rhodesian (Zimbabwe) government of Prime Minister Ian Smith would be seeking an "internal solution" to the Zimbabwean problem. The "internal solution" was a reaction to the Anglo-American proposal for a settlement. The proposal which was announced on September 1, 1977, set forth seven basic principles for transition to a more representative government in Zimbabwe. These principles, which the United States, Britain, Nigeria, and other countries supported, were as follows: (1) an independent Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), (2)

<sup>150</sup>Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy, pp. 71-72.

<sup>151</sup>Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981, pp. 143-144.

a transition period, (3) majority rule, (4) pre-independence elections based on universal suffrage, (5) elections administered by a neutral, impartial authority, (6) a democratic constitution with an integral bill of rights, and (7) the formation of an army loyal to the new government.<sup>152</sup> As a counter-measure, following the publication of Anglo-American proposals, Prime Minister Smith started his own negotiations with African nationalists on a limited transfer of power, and in March 1978, he signed an agreement with three black nationalists resident in the country. Those nationalists outside the country were excluded from this agreement which provided for limited majority rule, eventual elections with universal suffrage, and an interim administration headed by an executive council and a cabinet with white and black members. However, the civil service, the military, and the judiciary were to remain under white control, unaffected by the Salisbury agreement which paved the way for the so-called "internal solution".<sup>153</sup> It should be noted that the "internal solution" strategy was also a device through which Smith sought to split the leadership of the nationalist movements, and negotiate a settlement with moderate black groups and individuals most amenable to a solution acceptable to the white minority. The candidates for such negotiations were black leaders such as Bishop Abel Muzorewa head of the African National Council (ANC),

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<sup>152</sup> Department of State Bulletin, vol. 78, December, 1978, P. 27.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid.

Ndabaringi Sithole who led a faction of the ANC, and Joshua Nkomo, leader of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU); while Robert Mugabe, the Marxist leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and present Prime Minister, was excluded. Lagos was in favor of the full participation of all factions in a negotiated settlement that would lead to black majority rule, and this had a more general effect on Nigerian policy during the crisis. There was an awareness that the Nigerian Government could not continue to maintain its close relations with Washington if the Carter Administration failed to take concrete steps to bring about black majority rule in Zimbabwe.<sup>154</sup> For the first time since the beginning of the Zimbabwean crisis, Nigerian-American relations became directly linked with the peaceful resolution of the conflict. During his visit to Lagos in March 1978, President Carter denounced the internal solution in Zimbabwe and declared his interest in a policy that ensures freedom, justice and human dignity. Despite the vagueness of the President's position, it was perfectly clear that, unlike the Angolan crisis, Nigeria and the United States were strongly on the same side of the Zimbabwean dispute.

In a statement read to a news conference in Washington, the U.S. further clarified its position on the Zimbabwean problem by stating that negotiations which excluded the leaders of the nationalist movements would not produce a

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<sup>154</sup> Aluko, Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy, PP. 258-260.

peaceful settlement.<sup>155</sup> Secretary Vance also repeated before the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs that under no circumstances could the Smith minority regime in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) count on any form of American support in its effort to prevent majority rule.<sup>156</sup> In his testimony before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa, Donald B. Easum, the former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria contended that Nigerian support of the Anglo-American plan for Zimbabwe grew out of the conviction that the Carter Administration was sincere in its attachment to full democracy in Zimbabwe and equal rights in South Africa. He maintained that the repeal of the Byrd Amendment, the diplomacy of Andrew Young, and the personal commitment of President Carter were seen by Nigerians as true demonstrations of a concern for the way in which Africans define their problems.<sup>157</sup>

The Anglo-American initiative, though largely dissipated by early 1979, contained five major elements for peaceful change. First, every stage of planning and implementing the initiatives involved close consultation with Nigeria. Second, the leading liberation movements - ZANU and ZAPU - were brought into the negotiating process. Third, the stated objective was to achieve majority rule.

<sup>155</sup>"U.S. Rejects 'Internal Solution' to Rhodesian Problem", Department of State Bulletin, February 1977, P. 126.

<sup>156</sup>The Secretary reaffirmed the Carter Administration's unequivocal support for the repeal of the Byrd Amendment. See Department of State Bulletin, April 1977, P. 320.

<sup>157</sup>Donald B. Easum, "Nigerian-American Relations", Africa Report, July-August 1981, PP. 52-54. ○

Fourth, the agreed aim was to defuse violence. While not condemning the armed struggle, the basic premise of the Anglo-American diplomatic initiative was that armed violence was not necessarily the only road to majority rule. Fifth, there was explicit opposition to the introduction of East-West rivalry into the region; the justification for Anglo-American role was that U.S. and Britain were already involved in the area and could use their leverage positively.<sup>158</sup> These five broad objectives were accepted by Nigeria and other African countries involved in the diplomatic exercise. However, the Anglo-American diplomatic initiative appeared to have been a failure as the Carter administration ran into increasing pressure in Congress which, sensitive to the influence of pro-South African and pro-Rhodesian lobbies, seemed inclined to support "internal solutions" in Zimbabwe and Namibia. Congress was willing to remove sanctions and accept "internal solutions" after the formal agreement, which established the Executive Council to supervise the transition to a multi-racial regime, was announced in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) in March 3, 1978. Conservatives building upon growing public concern about Cuban and Soviet activities in Africa were gaining strength.<sup>159</sup> Some Senators were increasingly receptive to the idea of "internal solutions", and the President was hard

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<sup>158</sup>Colin Legum, The Western Crisis Over Southern Africa, PP. 3-4.

<sup>159</sup>Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in American Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), PP. 285-290, 300-301.

put to justify U.S. policy; especially since the Anglo-American proposal was not working and the administration had not made any substantial progress.<sup>160</sup> Others Senators were adamantly calling for the U.S. recognition of Smith regime despite the fact that no other country had done so.<sup>161</sup> In July 1978, Senator Jesse Helms, leader of the pro-Smith forces in the Senate, introduced legislation to suspend temporarily U.S. sanctions against Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) as a demonstration of support for the "internal solutions". Helms' proposed measure had a significant support as Smith's supporters in Congress continued to paint a simplistic picture of an embattled multi-racial, anti-communist executive under attack by a communist-supported, radical Patriotic Front - an argument that was becoming increasingly difficult for the Carter administration to counter.<sup>162</sup> Yet no serious disruption of Nigerian-American relations occurred because of Nigeria's apparent belief in the genuineness of Carter's intentions.<sup>163</sup>

In 1978, the Anglo-American initiatives on Zimbabwe were generally accepted by the federal government of Nigeria

<sup>160</sup>Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1983), pp. 140-145; Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of A President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), pp. 68-69.

<sup>161</sup>Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of A President, p. 175.

<sup>162</sup>Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in American Foreign Policy, pp. 285-290.

<sup>163</sup>Daniel C. Bach, "Nigerian-American Relations: Converging Interests and Power Relations", in Timothy M. Shaw and Obajide Aluko, (eds.) Nigerian Foreign Policy: Alternative Perceptions and Projections (London: Macmillan Press, 1983), pp. 35-55.

which (a) though had supported the war waged by the Patriotic Front, had hoped for a constitutional conference to bring all the nationalists together. Yet, the Anglo-American proposals were seen by some Nigerians as an attempt by the United States and Britain to rob the Patriotic Front of the fruits of their labour. The main points of the criticism were that (1) the Nigerian government had jeopardized its goodwill, influence, and prestige in co-operating with the Carter administration's initiatives in Zimbabwe or in backing the Anglo-American plan, (2) as a result of its involvement with the United States, Nigeria may have effectively removed itself from any future role in Zimbabwe, (3) Nigeria's opinion in Washington was not highly regarded, and (4) that America's African policy under Carter was nothing more than a change in style rather than a change in substance.<sup>164</sup> These criticisms stemmed from the basic mistrust of the U.S. by Nigerians during the post-Angolan era. There was a real fear of what one observer described as "the Americanization of Nigerian foreign policy".<sup>165</sup> Most of these criticisms were irrefutable. Contrary to what most critics said, Bach has contended that Nigeria's effective association with the Carter administration's diplomatic

<sup>164</sup>The Rockefeller Foundation, Nigerian-American Relations: A Bellagio Conference (New York: Rockefeller Foundation, 1978), pp. 8-13. Underlying the Carter administration's diplomatic efforts was a belief that the U.S. was prepared to enter into a relationship with Nigeria in which Nigeria's voice would be heard and its concerns respected; a belief that finally America was prepared to lend its economic and political weight to resolving conflict in Southern Africa.

<sup>165</sup>Akinyemi, "Nigerian-American relations Re-examined", pp. 107-108.

initiatives on Zimbabwe contributed to its pre-eminence in the U.N. and the O.A.U. In other words, one positive gain to Nigeria from this relationship was the recognition of its regional and international status as first among equals in Africa.<sup>166</sup> Such view has no doubt failed to convince some critics who insist that (1) Nigeria achieved world recognition of its status through its 1975/76 Angolan policy and did not need further recognition by the Carter administration, (2) since Nigeria always had a reputation of being pro-West, America's recognition of its regional status should not have been openly sought and that the legitimization of that status should have been sought from the Eastern bloc, and (3) a regional status demands genuine non-alignment from the country claiming that status, thus "the close identification with the United States robbed Nigeria of that status."<sup>167</sup>

<sup>166</sup>Bach, "Nigerian-American Relations: Converging Interests and Power Relations", pp. 38-39.

<sup>167</sup>AKinyemi, "Nigerian-American Relations Re-examined", pp. 110-111, makes a brief statement on the role of the United States as a legitimizer of the "world status" of states during the post-World War II period. According to this view, "the legitimizer role of the United States derives from her long status as the most powerful country in the world". For example, "the post World War II foreign policy of both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have been greatly influenced by the need to secure recognition of their world power status by the United States. The Soviet Union secured partial recognition through the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty while the People's Republic of China secured hers through the visit of President Nixon to Peking in 1972." For a statement on Nigeria's predominantly "Western" orientation see Claude S. Phillips, Jr. The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 89-118; for a debate over Nigeria's non-aligned status see Douglas G. Anglin, "Nigeria: Political Non-alignment and Economic Alignment", Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 2, no.



In an attempt to counter its critics, the federal government of Nigeria first pointed to the overall positive role of the new Carter administration's stand in Zimbabwe, arguing that the Anglo-American proposals were negotiable.<sup>168</sup> In February 1977, the government was quoted as saying that it was necessary for the U.S. to intervene in Zimbabwe since Britain had failed to resolve the crisis. Three years later, then President Shagari justified Nigerian-American ties in a similar fashion when he told Vice-President Mondale that after Zimbabwe's independence, Namibia and South Africa "must be free if the friendship between Nigeria and the United States is to thrive".<sup>169</sup> Statements directly linking the Nigerian-American relationship to conflict resolution elsewhere in Africa were accompanied by threats of an oil embargo or economic sanctions. Yet, according to Bach, "such public declarations (by Nigeria) did appear to be rather symbolic for they were voiced in the context of a pre-existing convergence in the overall policy options of the U.S. and Nigeria in Southern Africa".<sup>170</sup> Bach's assessment is perfectly correct. For, as far as the immediate objectives were concerned, the Nigerian

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<sup>167</sup> (cont'd) 2, 1964, pp. 247-263; S. O. Osoba, "The Economic Foundation of Nigeria's Foreign Policy During the First Republic 1960-1965", in I. A. Akinjogbin and S. O. Osoba, Topics on Nigerian Economic and Social History (Ife: University of Ife Press, 1980), pp. 208-223.

<sup>168</sup> Bach, "Nigerian-American Relations: Converging Interests and Power Relations", p. 38.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid. See also Olajide Aluko, "Nigeria, the United States and Southern Africa", African Affairs, vol. 78, no. 310, January 1979, pp. 91-102.

and American foreign policy objectives were in harmony during the Zimbabwean crisis. It should be noted, however, that the Carter administration's support for majority rule was perfectly in line with the policy position established by the Ford-Kissinger administration in 1976.

In retrospect, U.S. support for majority rule was first declared in a "message of commitment and co-operation" delivered by Kissinger during his visit to Lusaka, Zambia, on April 27, 1976. Kissinger stated: "We support self-determination, majority rule, equal rights and human dignity for all peoples of Southern Africa".<sup>171</sup> This, he said, involved U.S. commitment to help bring about "a rapid, just, and African solution to the issue of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)".<sup>172</sup> In reality, Kissinger's motive for support for majority rule during his last year in office was to deny the Soviet Union an opportunity of exploiting the potentially explosive situation in Southern Africa. As

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<sup>171</sup> Keessing's Contemporary Archives, June 11, 1976, P. 27777.  
<sup>172</sup> Ibid. Kissinger's "message of commitment and co-operation" called for common action to achieve "the great goals of national independence, economic development and racial justice" in Africa. Announcing that the U.S. was anxious to provide economic assistance, Kissinger declared emphatically that "Africa's destiny must remain in Africa's hands". Africa, he went on, should remain united; contending that the U.S. did not want to establish a pro-American bloc in Africa, nor did it want to support one faction against another; but added "neither should any other country pursue hegemonial aspirations or bloc politics." His tour and speeches were intended to usher in a new era in U.S. policy towards Africa and to "find our common ground and act boldly for common ends". He wanted to repair the damage to American reputation in black Africa caused by the NSSM 39 discussed earlier, but because of his earlier stand on the critical issue of white minority rule in Southern Africa, his message was treated with utmost skepticism.

Andrew Young put it, the Kissinger policies "were based on stopping the spread of Communism in Africa. And there was no policy toward Africa until the Cubans got there".<sup>173</sup> On May 13, after his return to the United States, Kissinger was quoted as saying that the situation in Africa was drifting. "War in Southern Africa had already started. the radical elements were gaining the upper hand. the Soviet Union was appearing from the outside as a champion; the moderate regimes were coming under increasing pressure, and therefore all moderate governments in Africa were in danger and all Western interests were in jeopardy."<sup>174</sup>

Although Kissinger did declare support for majority rule, Nigerians did not share his cold-war perspective on what the Lagos *Daily Times* described as "America's cold-war paranoia about the presence of Russian and Cuban elements" on the continent.<sup>175</sup> An official in Nigeria's Ministry of External Affairs stated at the same time that U.S. policy in Africa would only be successful if Kissinger were "to announce immediately that the United States is going to give...millions of arms and money to the liberation movements"; and added: "even that would be seen as jumping on the bandwagon. It would not bring (the U.S.) up to the level of the Russians because the Russians were there at first".<sup>176</sup> However, no such skepticism was evident when the

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<sup>173</sup>Africa: An International Business, Economic and Political Magazine, 70, June 1977, pp. 13-15.

<sup>174</sup>Keesing's contemporary Archives, June 11, 1976, p. 27778.

<sup>175</sup>Ibid.

<sup>176</sup>Ibid.

Carter administration first reaffirmed U.S. support for majority rule in Zimbabwe. Nigeria was, indeed, more willing to identify with U.S. policy under Carter than it was under the previous administration; apparently believing that the Carter administration would move away from the East-West interpretation of African politics and would adopt a more flexible attitude towards black Africa. Yet, Leslie Harriman, the Nigerian Ambassador to the United Nations, was quick to suggest that the upswing in Nigerian-American relations could easily change if the Carter administration did not follow through with its pledge to pursue majority rule in Zimbabwe in particular, and Southern Africa in general.<sup>177</sup> The achievement of majority rule in Zimbabwe, then, was not only the finest achievement of the Carter administration, it was also a perfect demonstration of the close relationship between Nigeria and the United States on an important African issue.

#### South Africa and Nigerian-American Relations

The South African regime has been termed totalitarian by some observers, authoritarian by others, and oligarchic by still others; but above all the Nigerians considered the regime to be racist and therefore unacceptable.<sup>178</sup> Of all foreign policy issues, the Nigerians feel more deeply about South Africa than any other issue. The Carter

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<sup>177</sup>David Anable, "Nigeria Looks to U.S. on South Africa", Christian Science Monitor, September 19, 1977, p.5.

<sup>178</sup>Donald B. Easum, "Nigerian-American Relations," p. 53.

administration's human rights declarations concerning firm and clear opposition to racial injustice had brought Nigeria and the United States closer together on the issue of South Africa; indirectly making Nigeria an integral part of American strategy of containing Soviet influence on the continent. Carter's position had become more evident during the 1979-1980 period, although his administration's strategy of containment dates back to the early 1977 period.

In his statement before the subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on International Relations on March 3, 1977, Philip C. Habib, under Secretary for Political Affairs in the Carter Administration, referred to "the importance for the world at large of achieving just solutions to the problems of Southern Africa" and the American contributions to those solutions.<sup>179</sup> Habib contended that U.S. policy must be true to America's ideal as a nation; he was talking about America's opposition to racial and social injustice - a proposition that gave firm support to Carter's personal commitment to human rights. "A policy toward Southern Africa that is not firmly grounded on this principle would be inconsistent with our national character and therefore would not command the support of the American people".<sup>180</sup> In broad terms, Habib outlined the general principles upon which U.S. policy towards Southern Africa should rest. First, although the Carter Administration believed that the Africans

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<sup>179</sup>Philip C. Habib, "Southern Africa in the Global Context", Department of State Bulletin, March 1977, pp. 318-319.

<sup>180</sup>Ibid.

themselves hold the key to the solution of African problems, he assured his audience that the United States would remain fully committed to using its diplomatic offices to support racial and social progress on the African continent. Second, he argued that prolonged violence in Southern Africa, born out of racial discrimination, and social and political injustice, could create opportunities for foreign intervention and confrontation, thereby jeopardizing American economic and strategic interests. Finally, "...the United States has a stake in what happens in Southern Africa because of our belief that political harmony can and must be achieved in diverse societies like our own".<sup>181</sup>

In a statement before the American Academy of Political and Social Science at Philadelphia on April 16, 1977, William E. Schauffele, Jr., Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, spoke of the necessity of U.S. role in South Africa "...Our history dictates that we have a role to play with respect to the system of apartheid in South Africa".<sup>182</sup>

Others argue the case for "exceptional moral response" to the problem of apartheid in South Africa on the grounds that (1) the South African regime defines "our common humanity in terms which the rest of the human race now rejects", and (2) the apartheid system is a retreat from the lofty ideals of Western institutions and Western Civilization.<sup>183</sup> As in the

<sup>181</sup>Ibid.

<sup>182</sup>William E. Schauffele, Jr. "United States Relations in Southern Africa", Department of State Bulletin, May 1977, pp. 464-471.

<sup>183</sup>"Why Apartheid is Worse", The New Republic, November 12, 1977, pp. 5-6.

Zimbabwean case, the American position on South Africa under Carter closely approximates that of Nigeria, although they differed on tactics and methods of eliminating apartheid.

Nigeria's objectives in South Africa include the following: (1) the destruction of the apartheid system and the establishment of self-determination for the people of all races on the basis of one-man-one-vote, (2) independence for the South African controlled territory of Namibia predicated on the participation of all groups with priority given to the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO), and (3) support for liberation movements in South Africa.<sup>184</sup> Aluko has suggested that Nigeria's sympathy towards the black majority in South has been an important factor shaping Nigerian foreign policy towards South Africa.<sup>185</sup> In 1971, General Gowon explained Nigeria's attitude towards apartheid in South Africa as follows:

apartheid is a crime against humanity. This view is not based on a diagnosis of probability. The facts are clear. The international community knows them. Africa has identified them. It is for us to mobilize ourselves effectively and totally to deal with the situation. Let no one deceive himself that South Africa is...seeking to acquire nuclear capability only to come to terms with independent Africa and to grant the right of self-determination to her African population. South Africa is growing into an octopus...It is being used by imperialist powers to regain their foothold in Africa.<sup>186</sup>

<sup>184</sup> SWAPO is a nationalist movement that has been fighting for the independence of Namibia (South West Africa). See Akinyemi and Vogt, "Nigeria and Southern Africa: The Policy Options", pp. 151-168.

<sup>185</sup> Olajide Aluko, "Nigeria and Southern Africa" in Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara (eds.) International Politics in Southern Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), pp. 128-147.

<sup>186</sup> Nigeria joined twenty-seven other O.A.U. members in

The above remarks were made during a full scale debate on dialogue with South Africa at the meetings of the O.A.U. Council of Ministers and Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa in June 1971.

Although Nigeria shares no boundary with either South Africa or Namibia (the distance between Nigeria and South Africa is 1,800 miles, between Nigeria and Namibia 1,450 miles), it has consistently expressed its abhorrence to racism, and its position vis-a-vis the issue of dialogue with South Africa has not altered since the issue was first mentioned in 1971. Nor has Nigeria reneged on the necessity of liberating South Africa which was proposed in 1961 by its Minister of External Affairs, Jaja Wachuku. The Minister saw "the total eradication of all forms of racial discrimination" in South Africa as "one of the pillars of Nigerian foreign policy".<sup>187</sup> In 1963, Prime Minister Abubakar told the Addis Ababa summit conference which founded the O.A.U. that "on the question of colonialism and

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<sup>186</sup>(cont'd) adopting a declaration which stated that "the proposal for a dialogue between the independent African states and the racist minority regime of South Africa is a manoeuvre by that regime and its allies to divide African states, confuse world public opinion, relieve South Africa from international ostracism and isolation and obtain an acceptance of the status quo in Southern Africa." See Organization of African Unity, The Principle of the O.A.U. Charter, the Lusaka Manifesto, Dialogue and Future strategy, (Addis Ababa: O.A.U. Secretariat, 1971), P.153; James H. Polhemus, "Nigeria and Southern Africa: Interest, Policy, and Means", pp. 64-65.

<sup>187</sup>Polhemus, "Nigeria and Southern Africa: Interest, Policy and Means", pp. 46-47; Jaja Wachuku, "Nigeria's Foreign Policy", University of Toronto Quarterly, vol. 31, October 1961, pp. 68-69.



racial discrimination...Nigeria will never compromise".<sup>188</sup> Such general statements with regard to South Africa were followed by Nigeria's determination to apply practical measures in the form of economic, and diplomatic, sanctions against Pretoria. The highlight of the diplomatic sanction was Nigeria's role in forcing South Africa out of the Commonwealth in 1961. Many observers credit the expulsion of South Africa to Prime Minister Abubakar who was attending his first Prime Ministers' Conference at the time. He was known to be strongly opposed to apartheid, and was under pressure from home to take strong measures against South Africa. Claude S. Phillips concluded that the Nigerian leader went to the Conference determined to challenge South Africa's race policy.<sup>189</sup> Yet, the importance of Abubakar's role is still a matter of disagreement. An account by J.D.B. Miller suggests that Nigeria's part in the expulsion of South Africa was important but not preponderant.<sup>190</sup>

Nevertheless, Nigeria has demonstrated increasing determination in the application of sanctions against South Africa. For example, in reaction to the Sharpsville massacre of blacks in South Africa in 1960, both federal and regional governments in Nigeria pledged not to employ South Africans in Nigeria. Further practical measures came at the meeting

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<sup>188</sup>Ibid., p. 47.

<sup>189</sup>Phillips, The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy, p. 119.

<sup>190</sup>J.D.B. Miller, "South Africa's Departure", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, vol. 1, November 1961, pp. 56-74.

of the International Labour Organization in June 1961 when Nigerian Minister of Labour, J.M. Johnson, moved a resolution that South Africa should be asked to quit the Organization. The motion was carried by 163 to 0, with 89 abstentions. The United States was among those abstaining.<sup>191</sup> In November 1961, South Africa lost the privileges of Commonwealth citizenship in Nigeria. In the same month, the South African Dutch Reformed Church was expelled from Nigeria. Between 1972 and 1976, Nigeria had withdrawn from several international sports events, including the Davis Cup tennis competition in 1975, the World Amateur Squash Championship in 1976, and the junior tennis Championship at Wimbledon during the same year. These actions were based on the National Sports Commission's policy of "total boycott of racist South Africa in any sporting event any where in the world."<sup>192</sup> However, the 1976 boycott was indirectly related to South Africa, for the real issue was New Zealand which had not prevented its private football club from making a tour of South Africa. Nigeria thus withdrew from the 1976 Olympics as a protest against apartheid and New Zealand's presence. Furthermore, it should be noted that Nigeria's attempt to organize an international boycott of the 1978 Commonwealth Games in Edmonton failed as

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<sup>191</sup>Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Western European countries also abstained. See Claude S. Phillips, The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy, P. 120.

<sup>192</sup>Polhemus, "Nigeria and Southern Africa: Interest, Policy and Means", P. 57; Phillips, The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy, P. 120.

no country followed its call for a boycott.<sup>193</sup> Such failure did not prevent Nigeria from withdrawing from the Edmonton games.

The Sports boycott of South Africa was followed by economic sanctions. Nigeria's economic sanctions against Pretoria date back to the 1960s when the House of Representatives placed a ban on South African imports. The ban has remained in force since then. However, business and commercial leaders are anxious to promote economic and trade ties with Pretoria. Some dissenting voices were heard in 1978 when Chief Adeyemi Lawson, President of the Nigerian Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture recommended the establishment of such ties with South Africa after visiting the Front-line States.<sup>194</sup> But public opinion was highly critical of any attempt to remove sanctions against Pretoria.<sup>195</sup> The federal government denied its policies have in any way affected Nigeria's economic well-being abroad, and has continued to maintain the official ban on economic, commercial and technical ties with Pretoria, even though South Africa would be pleased to purchase Nigerian oil.<sup>196</sup>

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<sup>193</sup>The New York Times, July 28, 1978, P. 18.

<sup>194</sup>Front-line States are made up of Zambia, Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, and Botswana. See Robert M. Price, "U.S. Policy Towards Southern Africa", in Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara (eds.) International Politics in Southern Africa, pp. 45-88.

<sup>195</sup>Aluko, "Nigeria and Southern Africa", P. 135.

<sup>196</sup>Ibid.

Nigeria's belief in the efficacy of economic sanctions against South Africa is not shared by the United States. The U.S. is wary of sanctions in spite of American support for the 1969 "Lusaka Manifesto" which stated that South Africa "should be isolated from world trade patterns... The South African government cannot be allowed both to reject the very concept of Mankind's unity, and to benefit by the strength given through friendly international relations".<sup>197</sup>

Nigerians often stress the fact that the preferred alternative to violence would be the use of economic levers or sanctions. Americans believe that economic sanctions would be ineffective, although more effective sanctions such as the interruption of telecommunication links or the denial of aircraft landing rights could be selectively imposed for limited periods to press the South African government towards a particular policy decision. But successive U.S. governments since World War II have avoided the application of economic sanctions against South Africa. This has had some effect on the way the Nigerians see U.S. policies. For one, Nigerians still feel that while the civil-rights movement has wrought major social changes within the United States, negative racial attitudes are endemic in most American institutions, and are especially reflected in U.S. policy towards South Africa. During the conference on

<sup>197</sup>The "Lusaka Manifesto" was signed by leaders of 14 East and Central African states at a summit meeting in Lusaka in April 1969. The document defines the attitude of those states towards the racial question in Southern Africa. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, March 28-April 4, 1970, p. 23902.

Nigerian-American relations organized by the Rockefeller Foundation in October 1978, a Nigerian delegate complained that the U.S. has historically been much more tolerant of racial oppression in South Africa than various other human rights abuses elsewhere on the continent.<sup>198</sup> Congressional pressures for an embargo against the excesses of Amin regime in Uganda and Washington's unwillingness to apply even the mildest form of economic pressures against South Africa were used to substantiate this argument.<sup>199</sup> From the Nigerian perspective, the paralysis of American policy towards South Africa is due to the uncertainty over what black majority rule would mean for the continuation of America's economic interests in South Africa, and a fear that a frustrated black majority will turn increasingly towards the Soviet Union. However, the Nigerian delegates to the Bellagio conference believed there was a difference between the Carter administration and previous U.S. administrations. Carter's policy towards South African controlled Namibia was seen as constructive because of its recognition of the need for majority rule and an independent Namibia.

The Nigerians and the Americans differ on whether the Soviet Union should play an effective role in the struggle to defeat the forces of racial oppression and apartheid. The Carter administration wanted the Russians to stop or at least reduce the level of their military aid to the freedom

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<sup>198</sup>The Rockefeller Foundation, Nigerian-American Relations: A Bellagio Conference, pp. 3-6.

<sup>199</sup>Ibid.

fighters, whereas the Nigerian government wanted the Russians to continue to arm those fighters. This is not to say that Nigerian leaders wanted to see pro-Soviet satellite states replacing the white supremacist regime in South Africa and Namibia. What this means is that on the issue of communism in Africa, there was (and still is) no fundamental difference between Nigeria and the United States. There was also no remarkable difference between Nigerian and American objectives vis-a-vis negotiations over Namibian independence: U.S. efforts, like those of Nigeria, were directed towards getting SWAPO and other nationalist groups to accept the principle of election as the basis of determining the composition of the group that would shape the constitutional framework for Namibia. Consequently, Carter's policy was cautiously endorsed by Nigeria because by asking all the nationalist groups to accept the principle of an election, it had opened lines of communication that were hitherto closed; it had also shown some concern for the plight of blacks in South Africa. Nevertheless, the Nigerians maintained that "a more substantial and consistent policy which goes beyond expressions of good intentions, and includes more direct pressures against the status quo in South Africa" was necessary for the maintenance of good relations between Nigeria and the United States.<sup>200</sup> Many believed that if the U.S. was inactive, then Nigerian public opinion was unlikely to allow any Nigerian government

<sup>200</sup>The Rockefeller Foundation, Nigerian-American relations: A Bellagio Conference, pp. 6-9.

whether civilian or military, to expand diplomatic, economic, or cultural relations with the United States.

"Most conscious Nigerians have come to feel that the indignities heaped upon blacks in South Africa affect all Nigerians".<sup>201</sup>

But words were not enough: neither the limited pressure from the Carter administration nor sanctions and propaganda campaigns by Nigeria produced any real change in South Africa in the 1970s. Although petty apartheid in public conveniences, parks, post offices and cemeteries was discarded, the basic structure of the apartheid system with its separate development of semi-independent units for blacks - the so-called Bantustans - remained untouched. Even with Carter's emphasis on human rights, the South African regime was becoming increasingly oppressive: peaceful demonstrations by school children in Soweto and other black townships were brutally repressed. Between September and November 1977, more than twenty-five political prisoners, among whom was Steve Biko, died in police detention in South Africa.<sup>202</sup> While the Carter administration was clearly conscious of numerous human rights violations in South Africa, and Nigeria's view of the situation in that country, the administration's policy options appeared to have been severely constrained. Militarily, the Carter administration was unwilling to provide or sell arms to the liberation

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<sup>201</sup> Ibid.

<sup>202</sup> Olajide Aluko, Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), pp. 255-260.

movement for use against South Africa. Diplomatically, the 1978 target set for Namibia's independence was not achieved - negotiations seemed unlikely either to win Namibia's independence or bring about majority rule in South Africa. Politically, economic sanctions had become a difficult issue. It was distinctly clear that the U.S. and the Western powers would refuse to vote for or even consider sanctions.

Here, it is pertinent to focus on the importance of Nigerian-American relations in the Carter administration's African policy. In retrospect, during the Nixon and Ford-Kissinger era, the main source of disagreement between Nigeria and the United States centred on (1) the appropriate policy to adopt towards the white supremacist regimes in Southern Africa, (2) the refusal of the U.S. administration to sell arms to the federal government of Nigeria during the Nigerian-civil war 1967-1970, (3) the massive pro-Biafra propaganda campaign in the U.S. during the Nigerian civil war, (4) the tough stand taken by Nixon and Ford in dealing with the Third World countries, and (5) American importation of chrome from Rhodesia despite the U.N. sanctions. Of all these factors, the one that affected Nigerian-American relations most was American policy towards South Africa.<sup>203</sup> While Nigeria counted very little in American foreign policy calculations during the Nixon and Ford period, the Carter

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<sup>203</sup> Although economic relationships between Nigeria and the United States was growing during the Nixon and Ford administrations, the political aspect of this relationship remained rather cool until the period of rapprochement under the Carter administration.



administration perceived Nigeria to be important as an instrument of the East-West struggle in the African sub-system. On the specific issue of Zimbabwe, Nigeria's role was seen as that of an intermediary attempting to persuade Robert Mugabe and other nationalists to resume negotiations with then Prime Minister Smith.<sup>204</sup> Thus Young was anxious to keep the Nigerian head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo, informed and in tune with the U.S. foreign policy objectives. The unstated premise, however, was to keep Nigeria's large army from intervening on the side of Zimbabwe freedom fighters, although Young did not rule out the possibility of Nigerian troops participating in the Zimbabwe settlement as a "peacekeeping force" during the transition from white rule to black majority government.

Richard E. Bissell has suggested that the proposal for Nigeria's participation was made informally; that Carter and his advisers clearly believed that Nigeria should play an important role in the "balance of power" in Africa, given Nigeria's economic and military power. But whether Nigeria could play "balance of power" politics was not yet demonstrated.<sup>205</sup> Nevertheless, the administration's overtures were well received in Lagos. In a discussion of Carter's African policy, a Radio Lagos commentary noted that relations between Nigeria and the U.S. "have never been as cordial" as they had been since the beginning of 1977, when

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<sup>204</sup>Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy, pp. 304-305.

<sup>205</sup>Bissell, "United States Policy in Africa", pp. 195, 224.

the new Carter administration took office.

The new and encouraging phase in the ties between the two countries was heralded by the attitude of Mr. Carter to Africa. Like the Federal government, Jimmy Carter shared Nigeria's view on the Angolan crises while campaigning for the Presidency. Also since his assumption of office he has abrogated the Byrd Amendment law under which the United States imported chrome from the rebel regime in Zimbabwe. In particular, President Carter's Administration has been emphasizing closer ties with Nigeria, which it recognizes as a force to be reckoned with in Africa and a key factor to be consulted on the situation of Southern Africa.<sup>206</sup>

The optimism in Lagos regarding the administration was particularly encouraged by the fact that Nigeria was the only country President Carter planned to visit on the continent - a visit which took place on March 1978.

Furthermore, Secretary Vance's speech to the annual convention of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) on July 1, 1977, was apparently seen in Lagos as a total repudiation of the Kissingerian policy framework embodied in the National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39). The essential features of the Kissinger directed NSSM 39 were the following assumptions that had caused a lot of concern and suspicion of American intentions in Nigeria and other black African states:

1. Africa was only one aspect of the global problem and a very minor one at that.
2. Armed struggle by African nationalists was unlikely to succeed against the status quo powers in Southern Africa.

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<sup>206</sup>Africa Research Bulletin, October 1-31, 1977, p. 4622.

3. The White minority regimes in Southern Africa were here to stay, and time was on their side to achieve evolutionary change.
4. Consequently, American diplomacy should do nothing to weaken the Portuguese or South African regime while seeking to win goodwill from moderate African leaders through modest programs of economic aid.<sup>207</sup>

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<sup>207</sup>Complicity with the Portuguese characterized U.S. policy as the Nixon administration acted on the premise that "there is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence". The so-called "Tar Baby" option (or second option) that would cleave the U.S. policy to the white minority regimes in Southern Africa became official after Kissinger recommended a lower profile at the United Nations, reduced pressure on the Portuguese, and additional assistance of about \$5 million to the black African states. The proponents of the "Tar Baby" option assumed that a moderation of U.S. rhetoric and measures would encourage economic growth along with peaceful change. Although it is not clear whether Kissinger embraced this option in its entirety, a series of actions did ensue that gave every indication of a pronounced policy tilt in this direction. Thus president Nixon failed to offer a resolute leadership to Congress in opposition to the Byrd amendment, thereby acquiescing in the passage of legislation in 1971 that permitted U.S. import of Rhodesian chrome and other minerals in violation of U.N. sanctions. See Henry F. Jackson, From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. foreign Policy Towards Africa Since 1960 (New York: William Morrow, 1982), pp. 59-70; Roger Morris, Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), pp. 119-131; Anthony Lake, The "Tar Baby" Option: American Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), p. 214; Gale W. Mcgee, "The U.S. Congress and Rhodesian Chrome Issue", Issue, vol. 2, no. 3, Summer 1972, p. 6; Donald Rothchild, "U.S. Policy Styles in Africa: From Minimal Engagement to Liberal Internationalism" in Kenneth A. Oye, Donald Rothchild, and Robert J. Lieber (eds.) Eagle Entangled: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Complex World (New York & London: Longman, 1979), pp. 304-335; William Minter, "Allies in Empire: Part II - U.S. Military Involvement", Africa Today, vol. 17, no. 4, July-August 1970, pp. 28-32; "Allies in Empire: Part III - American Foreign Policy and Portuguese Colonialism", *Ibid.*, pp. 34-36; and Jennifer Davis, "Allies in Empire: Part I - U.S. Economic Involvement", *Ibid.*, pp. 1-15; William Roger Louis, "American Anti-colonialism and the Disolution of the British

These assumptions could not be defended because within five years the Portuguese authority in Angola and Mozambique had collapsed under the pressure of nationalist struggle. Nor were the white ruled minority governments in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South Africa free from such pressure. African nationalists were in fact showing every sign of attaining political control through armed struggle. In this sense, NSSM 39<sup>207</sup> was a disaster and an embarrassment. In the introduction to their widely acclaimed book, Mohammed A. El-Kawas and Barry Cohen suggest how little Kissinger understood Africa in the late 1960s and early 1970s and how obsolete his analytical categories were.

Indeed, political development in Southern Africa in the early 1970s had led to an abrupt change in at least one basic assumption that guided traditional U.S. policy towards Africa for many years - the permanence of white minority rule in Southern Africa.<sup>208</sup> However, even with Kissinger's visits to Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Zaire, Liberia, and Senegal between April 24 and May 6 1976, the damage had already been done. The Ford-Kissinger administration was incapable of reversing the trend towards suspicion of American intentions in Nigeria and elsewhere caused by NSSM 39. Kissinger personally admitted that his "shuttle

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<sup>207</sup>(cont'd) Empire", International Affairs, vol. 61, no. 3, Summer 1985, pp. 395-420; Mohammed A. El-Kawas and Barry Cohen (eds.) The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa: National Security Study Memorandum 39 (Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill, 1976), pp. 19-74.

<sup>208</sup>Richard J. Barnet, "Judgments and Material for Judgments", The New York Times Book Review, October 17, 1976, pp. 5-6.

diplomacy" in Black Africa was intended to give a fresh impetus to co-operation between the United States and Africa in order to usher in a new era in U.S. policy and to end what he described as "mutual recrimination."<sup>209</sup> But nothing much had changed during the Ford-Kissinger administration; nor did African views of the U.S. intentions change. But, judging from the positive reaction given to Mr. Carter's campaign speeches and his administration's policy pronouncements during the first few months in office, a change in foreign policy images created by the administration was beginning to have the effect of changing the perception of U.S. foreign policy in Africa. For the Nigerian foreign policy community in Lagos, President Carter had established a reputation of being "a man who wants peace and good relations" with countries that were formerly at arm's length with the United States.<sup>210</sup> In contrast to the realpolitik overtones of the Ford-Kissinger administration, with its cynical attitude towards repressive but strategically important right wing authoritarian regimes, President Carter was striving to project a liberal image abroad with emphasis on global justice, equity and human rights.<sup>211</sup>

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<sup>209</sup> Keesing's Contemporary Archives, June 11, 1976, P. 27777. Kissinger's requests to visit Nigeria were denied on several occasions.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid.

<sup>211</sup> Aluko, Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy, PP. 250-251.

### Decisions: Testing U.S.-African ties under Carter

The Carter administration's relations with Africa underwent their harshest test when the United Nations called for specific actions against South Africa. For example, during the Thirty-second Session of the U.N. General Assembly on December 14, 1977, the administration's delegates to the United Nations voted against or abstained from several draft resolutions that were aimed at South Africa. The resolutions called for actions by member states on all aspects of the struggle against apartheid. The draft resolutions (although directed against South Africa, as stated earlier) were chosen for this analysis because they not only touched on key issues in American foreign policy, they are directly related to some of the issues affecting Nigerian-American bilateral relations: (1) military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa, (2) economic collaboration with South Africa, (3) assistance to national liberation movement in South Africa, and (4) the overall situation in South Africa.<sup>212</sup> Table one shows the U.S. and Nigerian votes on resolutions adopted by the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council with regard to South Africa.

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<sup>212</sup>United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, Thirty-second Session, 102nd Plenary Meeting, (A/32/PV.102), December 14, 1977, PP. 1674-1678.

TABLE 1

U.S. and Nigerian Votes on Resolutions Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council With Regard to South Africa. The votes are shown under appropriate columns using the following key: Y-Yes; N-No; A-Abstain.

Resolutions	Title	US	N	Date
A/32/L.22	Trade Union against apartheid. (invites trade union organizations to intensify their support for the struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa and their national liberation movement.)	Y	Y	14.12.77
A/33/L.24	Political prisoners in South Africa. (The General Assembly pledges its solidarity with all political prisoners and detainees in South Africa.)	N	Y	24.1.79
A/33/L.25	Nuclear collaboration with South Africa. (condemns the nuclear collaboration by certain governments and corporations with South Africa. Calls for embargo on the supply of nuclear equipment.)	N	Y	24.1.79

TABLE 1 - Continued.

Resolutions	Title	US N	Date
A/32/L.26	Economic collaboration with South Africa. (convinced that mandatory economic sanctions are essential to facilitate the speedy eradication of apartheid.)	N Y	14.12.77
A/33/L.27	Dissemination of information on apartheid. (requests the co-operation of all governments and organizations with the U.N. for the widest possible dissemination of information on apartheid.)	A Y	24.1.79
A/32/L.28	Programme of work of the special committee against apartheid. (calls for support of special committee to promote campaigns for the cessation of nuclear, economic, and other relations with South Africa.)	A Y	24.1.79



Table 1 - Continued.

Resolution	Title	US	UN	Date
447	Invasion of Angola (condemned South Africa for its premeditated, persistent, and sustained armed invasion of Angola.)	A	Y	28.3.79
A/32/L.29	Assistance to national liberation movement of South Africa. (declares that national liberation movement has inalienable right to continue its struggle for the seizure of power by all means including armed struggle.)	N	Y	24.12.77
A/32/L.30	Situation in South Africa. (recalls the special responsibility of the world body towards the oppressed people of South Africa and their national liberation movement.)	N	Y	14.12.77

TABLE 1 - Continued.

Resolution	Title	US	N	Date
32/35	Activities of foreign economic and other interests in South Africa. (states (states should refrain from economic relations with minority regimes in Southern Africa.)	N	Y	28.11.77
A/33/L.31	Military collaboration with South Africa. (calls for cessation of all military co-operation with South Africa.)	A	Y	24.1.79
A/33/L.32	Apartheid in Sports. (The aim of this resolution is to eliminate apartheid from the sporting world. Recommends the drafting of an international convention against apartheid in sports.)	A	Y	14.12.79

TABLE 1 - Continued.

Resolutions	Title	US	N	Date
A32/L.33	Bantustans. (condemns South Africa's bantustan policy and its declaration of the so-called "independence" homelands.)	Y	Y	14.12.77
S/2310/ Rev.1	Trade with South Africa.(calls for an end to government encouragement of trade with South Africa.)	N	NA	24.10.77
S/1211/ Rev.1	Arms Embargo. (calls upon all states to take measures to revoke contractual arrangements with South Africa, and all existing licences relating to the manufacture and maintenance of arms, ammunition, military equipment and vehicles.)	N	NA	24.10.77

TABLE 1 - Continued.

Resolutions	Title	US	N	Date
S/1213/ Rev.1	Investments and credits (calls upon all states to refrain from any investments in, loans to, or any import and export credits to Pretoria.)	N	NA	24.10.77

Source: U.N., General Assembly, Official Records, 32nd Session, 102 Plenary Meeting, (A/32/PV.102), December 14, 1977, PP. 1674-1684; Yearbook of the United Nations 1978, Vol.32 (New York: U.N. Department of Public Information, 1981), PP. 214-215.; Yearbook of the United Nations 1979 Vol. 33 (New York: U.N. Department of Public Information, 1982), PP. 167-264.; UN Monthly Chronicle, vol. 15, no. 11, December 1977, P. 43; U.N. Security Council, Official Records, 2042nd Meeting, (S/PV.2042), 27 October 1977, P. 6.

N =Nigerian Votes

US=United States Votes

NA=Not Available. Efforts to trace information on Nigerian votes on resolutions S/2310/Rev.1, S/1211/Rev. 1, and S/1213/Rev. 1 failed.

Nigeria is favorably disposed towards all of the issues addressed by the resolutions under discussion (Table 1). Its leaders have repeatedly called for an end to all foreign investment in South Africa, arms supply, and co-operation with Pretoria in the nuclear field.<sup>213</sup> In the late 1970s, Nigeria naively hoped that the resolution dealing with the arms embargo against South Africa would help restrict arms sales to Pretoria. This was not to be because of the difficulties involved in implementing such resolutions, or in monitoring the embargo. In a similar vein, Nigeria's opposition to nuclear co-operation with South Africa was based on the premise that Africa would remain a nuclear-free zone. Events proved otherwise due to increasing transfer of nuclear technology to South Africa.<sup>214</sup> Nevertheless, Nigeria, like the United States, did not abandon the notion of peaceful settlement of disputes as the best possible solution to racial problem in South Africa despite its position on resolution A/32/L.29. The Nigerians did not see armed struggle as an end in itself, but rather a means towards a negotiated solution as evident in Zimbabwe. Nigerian leaders also saw a big role for the U.S. in the process of conflict resolution in South Africa. Leslie O. Harriman, Nigeria's representative at the United Nations and Chairman of the U.N. Special Committee against Apartheid, believed that (1) the Carter administration would support

<sup>213</sup>Keesing's Contemporary Archives, October 21, 1977. P. 28621.

<sup>214</sup>U.N. Monthly Chronicle, vol. 15, no. 10, November 1977, P. 94.

U.N. resolutions since such action would have a great impact on the evolution of the situation in South Africa, (2) the conscience of the Americans had been stirred by events in South Africa, (4) American leaders would exert their influence in favor of the forces of freedom and liberty in South Africa, and lead the Western world, and (5) the U.S. has a special responsibility as a great power and homeland of the second largest community of people of African origin in the world, after Nigeria.<sup>215</sup> In his speech at the U.N. General Assembly, Harriman said that history "will not forget great countries like the the United States if they do not move forward in their commitment to free the suffering and the enslaved."<sup>216</sup>

The votes discussed here are one way of testing not only U.S. commitment but more importantly Nigerian-U.S. ties during the Carter administration. The disparity between image and substance was clearly evident when the administration abstained from, and later voted against, the resolution dealing with the "Situation in South Africa"

<sup>215</sup>U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, 32nd Session, 102nd Plenary Meeting, (A/32/PV.102), December 14, 1977, pp. 1684-1685. In late 1985, Jubril Aminu, Nigeria's Minister of Education, could still say that his country is fully committed to the elimination of prejudice, intolerance, racism, apartheid, and all forms of discrimination wherever they exist. He called for a new international commitment against apartheid, just as Harriman did years earlier. Aminu made this statement at the opening session of the 23rd General Conference of UNESCO held in Sofia, Bulgaria. In his speech he commended the efforts of those countries which through sanctions on investment, trade, sports, and cultural exchange had contributed positively towards the just struggle against apartheid. Nigerian High Commission, (Ottawa) News Review, November 1, 1985, p. 7.

<sup>216</sup>Ibid.

because the government of South Africa was singled out for condemnation as an illegitimate government.<sup>217</sup> Under the Carter administration, the United States regarded the South African government as legitimate in the legal sense, and would not accept any interpretation, (based on the resolution A/32/L.30) which held that South Africa's rights under international law was in any way abridged.<sup>218</sup>

The administration was faced with a dilemma concerning the draft resolution A32/L.29 entitled "Assistance to national liberation movement of South Africa". For despite its belief in human rights and full political participation, the administration refused to accept the view, enshrined in the resolution, that member states of the U.N. should endorse or provide assistance to what one U.S. delegate described as "a violent seizure of power within another state".<sup>219</sup> In retrospect, talk of support for liberation movements dates back to the Assembly's 31st session which began in September 1976. That session was dominated by issues concerning Southern Africa in particular, and decolonization in general. It was marked by decisions in which the Assembly for the first time expressed support for armed struggle for "self-determination, freedom and national

<sup>217</sup>Ibid. The resolution also proclaimed its full support of the national liberation movement of South Africa as "the authentic representative of the South African people, in its just struggle".

<sup>218</sup>United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, vol. 32, 1978, (New York: United Nations, 1981), P. 214.

<sup>219</sup>Mr. Whelan, U.S. delegate, made that remark in a speech after the vote. See United Nations, Official Records, 32nd Session, 102nd Plenary Meeting, (A/32/PV.102), December 14, 1977, P. 1680.

independence" in Namibia. It declared that the South African government policies left blacks no alternative but to resort to armed struggle, and approved the use by Africans of "all means at their disposal to achieve their objectives".<sup>220</sup> The Carter administration believed it was inappropriate for the United Nations, a body dedicated to peaceful settlement of disputes, to advocate the use of armed force to solve political problems.<sup>221</sup>

In apparent criticism of communist support for armed struggle to bring about change in South Africa, Andrew Young cautioned against the use of armed struggle, suggesting in effect that armed struggle "is advocated most vigorously by those who are thousands of miles away and whose only contribution to the struggle is the rhetoric of frustration."<sup>222</sup> At a U.N. sponsored Conference on apartheid held in Lagos on August 1977, Young said the United States would never supply arms to black nationalist movements in

<sup>220</sup> Ibid.

<sup>221</sup> A report released in 1981 by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) stated that, individually and collectively, states should accord high priority to their "normative obligation to use all means to bring to an end the supreme and continuing evils of apartheid, racism and denial of self-determination". UN Monthly Chronicle, vol. 18, no. 1, January 1981, P. 22. The report which shared some of the assumptions of the resolution under discussion was the result of a UNITAR colloquium on the Prohibition of Apartheid, Racism and Racial Discrimination and the Achievement of Self-determination in International Law held in Geneva from October 20 to 24, 1981. It was attended by a number of legal experts and representatives of international movements. The main purpose of the meeting was to discuss the role of law and government in establishing a stable and just system after the elimination of apartheid in South Africa.

<sup>222</sup> Africa Research Bulletin, vol. 14, no. 8, August 1977, P. 4522.



Southern Africa, and that the U.S. would never subscribe to a situation "where one group is armed to kill off the other".<sup>223</sup> At the Maputo Conference, Young appealed to African leaders to believe in the Carter administration's determination to produce peaceful change in Southern Africa through economic incentives and negotiations rather than blanket sanctions and military confrontations. Indirectly criticizing guerilla leaders and their allies for radical rhetoric, Young referred to the huge South African military budget and warned: "I dare say even with a mandatory arms embargo it would be very difficult to mount sufficient power to deal with the problems in this area strictly through military means".<sup>224</sup> Young appeared to have irritated some of his closest African associates in a speech aides conceded was aimed mainly at a domestic American audience. Symptomatic of the African reaction to Young's speech were remarks made by Leslie Harriman, Nigeria's U.N. ambassador and a prime mover in black African efforts to end racial discrimination policies in South Africa. "One could have hoped that Andrew Young would contribute to the conference and not lecture us on civil rights...In Atlanta, I would have listened 10 years ago with some patience, but instead I listened today with considerable irritation."<sup>225</sup> Young

<sup>223</sup>The Washington Post, August 25, 1977, P. A22.

<sup>224</sup>The Washington Post, May 20, 1977, P. A25.

<sup>225</sup>Ibid. In his 33-minute speech, Young credited Indian leader Mahatma Gandhi's philosophy of passive resistance and its application by late Martin Luther King Jr. for "securing change through the use of force which did not destroy either persons or property. He reiterated his familiar theme that the American blacks accession to political rights "set free

admitted there was a parallel between the problems of Southern Africa and those of the American South in the 1960s.<sup>226</sup>

A passive role for the U.S. was also evident in Young's statement that he did not see the Carter administration trying to oust those in power in South Africa. Speaking in Nairobi Airport before his departure to Nigeria, Young thought the administration was committed to involvement in Africa "but not assuming the full burden...I do not see the U.S. role as upsetting anyone in power".<sup>227</sup> This was in direct reference to John Vorster in South Africa. A singular exception to this pattern has been in Zimbabwe where the Carter administration tried to overcome ideological division and supported the legitimacy of political rule by black nationalist forces; although armed struggle against the illegal regime of Ian Smith was still paid for by Moscow, not Washington. Nevertheless, Young's observation still left unresolved the basic question whether the American decision not to support actively armed struggle against the minority regimes in Southern Africa was a suitable way of dealing with the perceived Soviet threat. For example, in 1978, the U.S. intelligence reports indicated that the Soviet Union

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<sup>225</sup>(cont'd) white Americans" and set in motion "political change that now in some way put the South in charge of the nation". In Young's mind, whenever there is a possibility for a negotiated settlement since "the history of Africa says that is to be preferred". Only when negotiated settlement had been totally rejected did armed struggle become inevitable.

<sup>226</sup>The Washington Post, May 11, 1977, P. A17.

<sup>227</sup>The Washington Post, February 8, 1977, P. A10.

and its allies were pressing black nationalists to escalate their armed struggle in Zimbabwe and Namibia, rather than co-operate with efforts to peaceful solution favoured by the United States and Western powers.<sup>228</sup> Indeed, the Carter administration's approach based on non-violent solution to African problems contrasted sharply with the view held by majority of African leaders in the 1970s that in order to compete with Moscow, the United States must support a military assault on Southern Africa. By implication, Washington must duplicate the Kremlin's policy of effective support for nationalist movements, which was specifically designed for maximum Soviet influence on the continent.<sup>229</sup>

The U.S. abstained from resolutions dealing with collaboration with South Africa because it could not support U.N. campaigns for cessation of economic, nuclear, and military collaboration with South Africa. One principal reason for the U.S. abstention was that the peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social development was of great importance to the United States.<sup>230</sup> At the Security Council's session on October 24, 1977, the United States, along with Canada, West Germany, Britain and France voted against three draft resolutions which called for (1) an end to government encouragement of trade with South Africa, (2) restriction of new investments in and loans to South Africa,

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<sup>228</sup>The Washington Post, May 6, 1978, P. B1.

<sup>229</sup>The Washington Post, July 16, 1977, P. A15

<sup>230</sup>United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, 32nd Session, 97th Plenary Meeting, (A/32/PV.97), December 8, 1977, P. 1614.

(3) a permanent mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. The latter includes the revocation of existing licences under which South Africa was producing military equipment, and a ban on all co-operation in the nuclear field.<sup>231</sup> The U.S. veto came a day after Young had indicated in an interview published in Johannesburg that the United States would not use its veto "to block proposals for action against South Africa" because using the veto would undermine the United States entire African policy.<sup>232</sup> Before the joint veto, Young stated that the United States strongly believed Africa should remain free of nuclear weapons, and that the U.S. was urging South Africa to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. He declared that the purpose of the Carter administration's policy "is not to exclude South Africa or isolate it from the rest of the world;" and added "we are anxious to see the kind of change in South Africa that will permit it to play the role in international community that it deserves".<sup>233</sup> The same logic guided the U.S. decision to vote against the General Assembly resolution 32/35 on November 28, 1977. This resolution, like those previously vetoed by the U.S. and its allies in the Security Council, requested all states to refrain from economic relations with the minority regimes in Southern Africa.<sup>234</sup> In a similar vein, the administration had

<sup>231</sup> Keessing's Contemporary Archives, January 6, 1978, P. 28750.

<sup>232</sup> Ibid.

<sup>233</sup> Ibid.

<sup>234</sup> UN Monthly Chronicle, vol. 14, no. 11, December, 1977, P. 43.

reservations regarding the Lagos Declaration for Action Against Apartheid.<sup>235</sup> It abstained from the vote on the resolution entitled "International Declaration against Apartheid in Sports" which appealed to all states, international and national sports bodies to implement the declaration against apartheid in sports. A spokesman for the administration contended that "it would be difficult for us to implement and enforce several key elements of this resolution under the U.S. law".<sup>236</sup> In March 28, 1979, the U.S. abstained in the vote on Security Council resolution 447 which strongly condemned South Africa for its "premeditated, persistent and sustained armed invasions of Angola".<sup>237</sup> The resolution demanded that South Africa respect the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Angola. The Council requested member states of the United Nations to extend necessary assistance to Angola and other frontline states to strengthen their defense capacities. The United States had reservations regarding this resolution, especially paragraph 6, which "requests the Secretary-General of the United Nations to obtain available information from Angola on the human casualties and material

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<sup>235</sup>According to Leslie Harriman, Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid, the Lagos Declaration was "a declaration of conscience by governments and peoples of the world, and a call to eradicate apartheid by international action as the slave trade was abolished in the last century. For apartheid is nothing but a refined system of slavery". United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, 32nd Session, 102nd Meeting, (A/32/PV.102), December 14, 1977, P. 1684.

<sup>236</sup>United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, vol. 32, 1978, P. 215.

<sup>237</sup>UN Monthly Chronicle, vol. 16, April 1979, P. 45.

and other damage resulting from repeated acts of aggression by the racist regime of South Africa.<sup>238</sup> Besides, the United States did not believe that a solution to the problem of the area could be found through the introduction of more arms and other forms of military assistance. Speaking after the vote, the U.S. delegate Richard Petree said, in general terms, that the U.S. condemns all acts violence by any party in Namibia. He insisted that "the only real solution was a peaceful one; force would not ultimately solve the problems of Southern Africa and would only bring greater problems in its wake".<sup>239</sup>

The negative votes and abstentions on key decisions in the world body created the impression that the Carter administration was not fully committed to genuine change in South Africa. (Although abstentions were meant to reflect U.S. agreement in principle with the overall thrust of the resolutions but disagreement with specific aspects of them). Indeed, it could be argued that negative votes represented part of an attempt to reverse the administration's African policy during the first half of 1977. From the African point of view the U.S. was trying to return to the pro-apartheid position Kissinger had advocated in the National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 39 of 1969.<sup>240</sup> Thus the historic

<sup>238</sup> Ibid.

<sup>239</sup> UN Monthly Chronicle, vol. XVI, no. 4, April, 1979, pp. 44-45.

<sup>240</sup> The NSSM 39 also recommended reduced U.S. pressure on the Portuguese colonial administration and a "lower profile" at the U.N. regarding Portuguese colonialism in Africa. The incipient Angola policy was nicknamed "tar baby" by a State Department critic who foresaw that the policy would bind the

moment of a basic revision in American policy towards South Africa was lost, as Henry Jackson put it, "the (Carter) administration, through its embarrassing volte-face after its momentous promise, was beginning to relegate all Black Africa to virtual insignificance in policy priorities".<sup>241</sup> Jackson probably over-states the case. Nevertheless, several statements by officials in the Carter administration pointed to a trend towards greater accommodation with South Africa. Young's statement that the Carter administration would not upset the status quo in South Africa was comparable to Vice-President Mondale's explanation that the United States had never proposed a plan for change in the apartheid regime because Washington did not have one.<sup>242</sup> Mondale contradicted himself on this issue. After meeting with the South African

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<sup>240</sup>(cont'd) United States to the Portuguese colonialists. The "tar baby" option marked the emergence in Africa of a broader cold war global doctrine. The policy applied not only to Angola and Mozambique but also to other Portuguese colonial territories such as Sao Tome and Principe, Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands off the Atlantic Coast of Africa. However, it was Angola where the war of national liberation was being waged, and that became the testing ground of America's power and will against the Soviet Union. Complicity with the Portuguese characterized subsequent U.S. policy towards Angola and the Ford-Kissinger administration acted on the premise that "there is no hope for the blacks to gain political rights they seek through violence". Mohammed A. El-Khawas et. al. (eds.) The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa, PP. 101-116; Henry F. Jackson, From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960, (New York: William Morrow, 1982) PP. 59-68. "Strategic interests prevailed as the basic determinant of U.S. policy" Jackson writes. "In addition to the Azores bases, Kissinger valued the facilities of Portugal's African territories which U.S. naval vessels and aircraft used for refueling and space support missions."

<sup>241</sup>Jackson, From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Africa Since 1960, PP. 260-282.

<sup>242</sup>The New York Times, October 18, 1977, P. 2.; The Washington Post, February 8, 1977, P. A10.

Prime Minister Vorster in Vienna on May 1977, Mr. Mondale had asserted that the United States would like a "one-man, one-vote" policy to prevail in South Africa.<sup>243</sup> Due to public pressure after the meeting, Mondale and other administration officials were at pains to assert that the United States had no preference on how the blacks and mixed race populations in South Africa should be brought into the political process.<sup>244</sup> Thus the several references to the problem of South Africa by the Carter team such as Carter's statement in November 1976 that he had considered abandoning his political career to lead a crusade for reform in Southern Africa, and Mondale's remark that "we would take steps to be true to our beliefs and values", did not go beyond the realm of rhetoric. Neither President Carter nor Vice-President Mondale fulfilled the promise suggested by their early insights into the problems of South Africa.

Referring to "a vital difference in outlook", after the talks with Vice-President Mondale, Mr. Vorster rejected any idea of change in the apartheid regime, contending that the separate development policy, providing for ultimately "independent" homelands for South Africa's "black nations" - the so-called Bantustans - was the only sort of majority role South Africa could envisage. The conclusions drawn by Vorster from the Vienna meeting quickly neutralized Mondale's hope that the meeting would lead to a change of course by the South African government.

<sup>243</sup> The New York Times, October 18, 1977, P. 2.

<sup>244</sup> Ibid.



With the problem of the Cuban troops in Angola not resolved, Mr. Carter's African policy makers knew their difficulty was South Africa's intransigence. Yet, the administration's statements were mild. White minority rule in South Africa was condemned in very moderate terms by the President, Secretary Vance, and Ambassador Young. There was no direct talk of freedom for black South African dissidents, nor was there any serious debate on "disinvestment" - tightening of trade credits, removing military attaches, or even cutting back on the existing United States-South African nuclear cooperation arrangements.

Beyond the various foreign policy declarations, what the U.S. should do about the issue of apartheid has certainly been a contentious issue in Nigerian-American relations. When President Carter arrived in Lagos on the evening of March 31, 1978, the Nigerian Head of State was openly critical of the American attitude towards South Africa, accusing the United States, and Britain, of adopting a "lukewarm" attitude to proposals to eradicate apartheid, and for pursuing policies of outright collaboration with Pretoria in both military and economic matters.<sup>245</sup> But in a joint communique issued in Lagos during the visit, the two leaders renewed their joint condemnation of the "evil and

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<sup>245</sup>Ogunbadejo, "A New Turn in US-Nigerian Relations", pp. 121-122; for the argument against "disinvestment" see Ron Collister, "Beware All Those Simple Solutions", The Edmonton Journal, February 27, 1985, p.5.

oppressive system of apartheid" in South Africa.<sup>246</sup> Beyond the Lagos Communique, however, the Carter administration was a puzzle to the Nigerian leaders because of its seemingly helpless nature in the face of defiance by the white supremacist regime in South Africa. The President's personal commitment to human rights was apparently not in serious doubt, but his ability to turn his administration's commitment into reality certainly was. Some observers have attributed the problem confronting the administration to internal and external constraints, arguing quite convincingly that even if the administration had seriously considered a ban on American trade and investment in South Africa, President Carter's critics in the Congress would have refused to give easy passage to any measure interfering with economic relations with South Africa.<sup>247</sup> For Aluko, the constraints facing the administration were not unrelated to the growth of the pro-South African lobby in the United States in the 1970s, and the need to preserve the interest of its European allies in South Africa - a development that had led to increasing support for South Africa within the United States. The main thrust of Aluko's argument is that while a few Nigerian leaders appreciated these constraints, majority of them seemed unable to understand why the President did very little to try to affect decisive change

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<sup>246</sup>Ogunbadejo, "A new Turn in U.S.-Nigerian Relations", pp. 121-122.

<sup>247</sup>West Africa, October 31, 1977, p. 2190.

in the white minority regime.<sup>248</sup>

The weakness in the actual policies of the administration seemed to many observers, with African experience, to be the fruits of well-intentioned but misguided idealism.<sup>249</sup> The administration's dedication to human rights, and opposition to racist rule suffered sustained criticism from the conservative political forces in the United States for failing to consider Africa in the context of United States-Soviet competition. The administration was also criticized for failing to employ the traditional instruments of power and force where United States interests were at stake, leading to the perception of U.S. weakness. It was ridiculed for suggesting that Africa should and could be insulated from great power competition. Critics argued that the essence of American strategy was precisely the containment of communism; that the United States failure to counter communism in Angola had encouraged the Soviet Union in Ethiopia and Afghanistan.<sup>250</sup> The administration's support for African nationalism, or majority rule in Zimbabwe, were seen as helping to install radical Marxist governments whose leaders and policies would be profoundly inimical to American interests. In the final analysis, it was argued that the administration's emphasis on human rights punished friendly authoritarian governments

<sup>248</sup> Olajide Aluko, Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), pp. 247-260.

<sup>249</sup> Howe, "United States Policy in Africa", p. 100.

<sup>250</sup> John Kraus, "American Foreign Policy in Africa", Current History, vol. 80, no. 463, March, 1981, pp. 97-100.

and down-graded weapons credits and sales abroad as basic instruments of diplomacy. Its emphasis on black majority rule in South Africa, critics contended, substantially alienated a country of great strategic value to the West. It should be noted that some of these criticisms were largely caricatures of the actual policies of the Carter administration, and were articulated by those who would shape the Reagan administration's policies.

#### Top Level Exchange: Visits

Top level exchange characterized Nigerian-American relations during the Carter years. The visit to Washington by General Obasanjo of Nigeria in October 1977, was followed by President Carter's visit to Nigeria the following year. It was generally believed that the President's visit would lead to a new a new era of economic co-operation between Lagos and Washington, and that it could restore the prestige once enjoyed by the United States in various African countries.<sup>251</sup> But the main purpose of the Carter's visit was to rally African support for his administration's strategy of containing the perceived Soviet-Cuban threat to American interests on the continent. President Carter's speech at the National Theatre in Lagos on April 1 was mostly concerned with the Horn of Africa, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Southern Africa; he also had a good deal to say about Nigeria. According to the President, Nigeria and the United States

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<sup>251</sup>African Diary, February 12-18, P. 8872.

share three basic commitments to the future of Africa: (1) a commitment to majority rule and individual human rights, (2) a commitment to economic growth and "human development", and (3) a commitment to "Africa that is at peace, free from colonialism, free from racism, free from interference by outside nations and free of the inevitable conflicts that can come when the integrity of national boundaries is not respected."<sup>252</sup> Indeed, the President warned that Soviet and Cuban intervention on the continent threatens Africa's future ; that military intervention of outside powers, or their proxies, in African disputes "too often makes local conflicts even more complicated and dangerous and opens the door for new form of domination".<sup>253</sup> Carter's speech at the national theatre signalled no change in U.S. policy towards Africa. Rather, the President sought to re-assure Nigerians and other Africans of American intentions, particularly in connection with the explosive situation in Southern Africa; warning that "the hour is late" in the effort to achieve majority rule in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Namibia. The President also pledged that the United States would continue to press South Africa to move towards majority rule, although he did not endorse any specific action to increase pressure on the white minority south African government.<sup>254</sup>

<sup>252</sup>Ibid. P.9015.

<sup>253</sup>The Washington Post, April 2, 1978, P. 1. He added: "We (Americans) oppose such intervention. We must not allow great power rivalries to destroy our hopes for an Africa that is peace."

<sup>254</sup>Ibid. "We have made it clear to South Africa that the nature of our relations will depend on whether there is progress towards full political participation for all her

In their private talks in Lagos, Carter and Obasanjo discussed the situation in Southern Africa and business relationship between Nigeria and the United States. Obasanjo pressed President Carter to take stronger economic measures against South Africa. However, the most significant political decision made at the talks was the bilateral understanding that the United States would refrain from any approval of the internal solution in Zimbabwe, and would work towards a solution that included the Patriotic Front. Nigeria, in turn, would continue to try to amass black African support for the Anglo-American Plan for Zimbabwe. The crisis in Zimbabwe was the first major test of the administration's policy, and Nigeria's role in it because, according to the administration, "Soviet and Cuban intervention is a strong possibility if the conflict continues, and U.S. interest would suffer".<sup>255</sup> The administration was aware of the direct aid to the Zimbabwe liberation movements offered by the Soviet Union and other communist states, notably, East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, and North Korea.<sup>256</sup> It was common knowledge, too, that African interest in defeating the "remnants of colonialism" was an inspiration with which the Soviets could

<sup>254</sup>(cont'd) people in every aspect of the social and economic life of the nation and an end to discrimination based on race or ethnic origin... We stand firm in the message."

<sup>255</sup>Robert M. Price, U.S. Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa: National Interest and Global Strategy (Berkeley: University of California, 1978), pp. 1-5.

<sup>256</sup>John T. Tierney, "The Terrorist War in Rhodesia", in Roger Pearson, (ed.) Sino-Soviet Intervention in Africa (Washington: Council on Foreign Affairs, 1977), pp. 34-43.

identify themselves without compromise or ambiguity since their own interest was to liquidate what they described as "outposts of Western colonialism".<sup>257</sup> To limit communist influence in Africa, the Carter administration was apparently convinced that, with the help of friendly countries such as Nigeria, it could replace the Russians as supporters of African nationalism, thereby depriving the communist bloc of its instrument of penetration.<sup>258</sup>

President Carter's visit to Nigeria had a symbolic importance, since it marked the first time that an American President had made an official visit to a black African nation. It also represented a recognition of the importance of Nigeria, a former British Colony that is considered an emerging economic and military giant in Black Africa, and which is the second largest supplier of oil to the United States. Carter identified U.S. goals in Africa with those of Nigeria, seeing the Nigerian-American relationship as that of mutual dependence. He stated: "our goals should always be to find ways of making this relationship even more beneficial to both our people."<sup>259</sup> On human rights issues, the President found up equating the United States and Nigeria in making "every effort to enhance human rights".

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<sup>257</sup>Colin Legum, "The Soviet Union's Encounter With Africa", in Pearson (ed.) Sino-Soviet Intervention in Africa, pp. 9-26.

<sup>258</sup>The Washington Post, April 2, 1978, p. C7. For example, "President Carter was apparently convinced he could push the Russians out of Somalia. He twice made public statements implying the United States was ready to replace the Russians as Big Daddy in Somalia..."

<sup>259</sup>The Washington Post, April 2, 1978, p. A6.

Suppression of human rights under Nigeria's military was not mentioned. As one Presidential aid noted, "It gets hypocritical when we are attacking Brazil and Chile but close our eyes to human rights violations in (black) Africa".<sup>260</sup> Evans and Novak appeared to be at least partially correct in their contention that if "Nigeria wants no talk about the Cuban expeditionary force or black African repression, that is not viewed" by the Carter administration as "a large price for friendship".<sup>261</sup> The Carter administration was particularly encouraged by the movement towards democracy in Nigeria and the decision to abolish military rule by 1979. Indeed, the development of the instruments of democracy - public debate, free and fair elections - in Nigeria was seen by the administration as an "inspiration to all those in the world who love democracy and who love freedom".<sup>262</sup>

Reaction to the visit was not necessarily positive in both Lagos and Washington. There was a feeling of skepticism and cynicism in the Nigerian press that President Carter's primary interest was only to insure that Nigerian oil would continue to flow to the United States. The size of Carter's 500-man press entourage caused some surprise and comment in Lagos. A columnist in the Lagos *Sunday Times* thought there was ulterior motive: "It is well known that some American journalists are part of the official intelligence-gathering

<sup>260</sup>Roland Evans and Robert Novak, "A Double Standard on Human Rights", The Washington Post, April 12, 1978, P. A27.

<sup>261</sup>Ibid.

<sup>262</sup>Africa Diary, vol. 18, May 21-27, 1978, P. 9015.



apparatus...some of the journalists have come to get the information needed to fill in a gap in the knowledge that the Pentagon or the CIA has about us".<sup>263</sup> There was no proof that this was actually the case. In the United States, many wondered whether keeping a close relationship with Nigeria had not become a goal in itself; or whether pleasing Nigeria was not too high a priority, one that diminished the administration's flexibility in finding a solution to Zimbabwe question. The *Washington Post* contended that "having chosen Nigeria as the chief object of American courtship...U.S. is offering opposition to Zimbabwe's internal solution as a dowry."<sup>264</sup> The *Washington Post* suggested that President Carter "seemed to have succumbed to Nigeria's uncomplicated fervor for a Popular Front guerrilla victory...Frankly we liked the administration's Rhodesia/Zimbabwe policy better before he dropped in on Nigeria".<sup>265</sup> It could be argued that President Carter's visit to Nigeria and the development of good relations with that country was part of the Administration's strategy to pre-empt the Soviet threat, and secure American interest.

There were other exchanges of visits by the officials of both countries. For example, in January 1980 a 12-member U.S. Congressional delegation led by Congressman Jim Wright, a Texas Democrat and leader of the Democratic majority in

<sup>263</sup> Ibid.

<sup>264</sup> The Washington Star, April 4, 1978.

<sup>265</sup> The Washington Post, April 4, 1978, P. A13; Robert B. Shepard, "Superpower and Regional Power: The United States and Nigeria", 1960-1979", Ph.D. Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University, 1984, PP. 173-191.

the House of Representatives, visited Lagos to discuss oil and energy issues with Nigerian officials.<sup>266</sup> Hundreds of Nigerian officials and politicians grappling with their country's new democratic federal system also toured the United States in 1980 for pointers. This was an indication that there was greater awareness of the importance of close interaction between the two countries - a dramatic turn-around from the open differences over U.S. involvement in Angola in 1975, and the unwillingness of Lagos to receive then Secretary of State Kissinger.<sup>267</sup>

#### Foreign Aid

In the 1960s, Nigeria was one of the 10 largest recipients of U.S. foreign assistance and was host to America's second biggest Peace Corps contingent.<sup>268</sup> It was also one of the so-called "development emphasis" countries that were to be the show-case of American development assistance. Furthermore, for the policy makers in Washington, Nigeria was one of those countries with the best possible prospects for development or "where there is special U.S. interest or relationship."<sup>269</sup> Between 1960 and

<sup>266</sup> West Africa, January 21, 1980, P. 128.

<sup>267</sup> In terms of cultural exchange, at least 20,000 Nigerians were studying in the U.S. in 1980. Aaron Segal, "Uneasy Partners", Africa Report, vol. 27, no. 1, January-February, 1982, pp. 11-16.

<sup>268</sup> The Rockefeller Foundation, Nigerian-American Relations: A Bellagio Conference, October 9-12, 1978, P. 2.

<sup>269</sup> Crawford Young, Crawford Young, Ideology and Development in Africa (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 278-326. Other "development emphasis" countries included Tunisia, Zaire, Liberia, Ethiopia, and member-states of the defunct East African Community - Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania.

1973, American financial aid to Nigeria amounted to more than \$201 million compared with \$933,000 offered by the Soviet Union during the same period.<sup>270</sup> However, as Nigeria's balance of payment position moved from a deficit of \$75 million in 1970-1971 to a surplus of \$5.4 billion in 1973-1974, and foreign exchange holdings rose from \$279.6 million in December 1969 to \$8.5 billion in 1974, Nigeria, as an oil producing state, was considered too wealthy to qualify for U.S. aid. This was in line with the idea that oil-rich nations, while important to the United States, are not candidates for sizeable economic assistance because their oil revenues can finance their development requirements.<sup>271</sup> Consequently, commitments for economic assistance to Nigeria by the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) dropped sharply from \$349 million during the 1962-1976 period to zero in the 1977-1981 period. (Table 2).<sup>272</sup> Grants and credits declined from \$36 million in 1970 to \$8 million in 1975, and became almost negligible during the Carter and Reagan administrations. (Table 3). As Nigeria's requirement for foreign aid declined in the late 1970s and early 1980s, U.S. aid commitments, grants and credits became negligible. Aid requirement was substantially

<sup>270</sup>Olaide Aluko, Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), P. 101.

<sup>271</sup>Joan M. Nelson, Aid, Influence and Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1968), P. 33; Eugene R. Wittkopf, Western Bilateral Aid Allocations: A Comparative Study of Recipient State Attributes and Aid Received (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972), PP. 12-17.

<sup>272</sup>U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstracts of the United States 1982-83, 103rd edition (Washington D.C.: U.S. government Printing Office, 1983), P. 829.

reduced from an estimated 50 per cent of total investment in the public sector in the 1962-1968 National Development Plan to 20 per cent of total investment during the 1970-1974 Plan period. The 1975-1980 Plan made no provision for foreign (capital) aid.<sup>273</sup> But Nigeria has continued to seek, from the U.S., managerial and technical expertise, as well as foreign investment and transfer of technology. Some observers still argue that American aid to Nigeria should come in the form of joint ventures, especially in agriculture.<sup>274</sup>

American support for the Nigerian military began in 1962 when several Nigerian officers were accepted for training in the United States under the Military Assistance Program (MAP). As an aid program, MAP was expanded to

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<sup>273</sup> Aluko, Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy, p. 110.

<sup>274</sup> World Press Review, August 1985, pp. 31-32. The U.S. Department of Commerce defines credits as loan disbursements or transfers which give rise to specific obligations to repay over a period of years, usually with interest. Grants are transfers for which no payment is expected other than a limited percentage of the foreign currency "counterpart" funds generated by the grant. In the case of U.S. military grants to Nigeria, the 1972 Nigerian-U.S. agreement states that Nigeria must deposit 10 per cent of each such grant in an account specified by the U.S. government, and "at a rate of exchange which is not less favorable to the United States government than the best legal rate at which United States dollars are sold." U.S. Department of State, Nigeria: Military Assistance Deposits Under Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, Lagos, April 12 and 20, 1972, pp. 1-2. Such payment can also be made in Nigerian currency (Naira). In 1981, the average rate of exchange of one U.S. dollar per Nigerian Naira (N) was 1.6292; in 1983, it was 1.3823. But this provision does not apply to military training received under the auspices of the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program. The latter continues to require full payment of all training costs in U.S. dollars within 120 days of the signing of an agreement to purchase such training by the representative of the Nigerian government.

include cadet training.<sup>275</sup> In June 1967, 311 Nigerian Officers and Cadets were trained in the United States; Nigeria also secured some \$335,000 in credits towards military purchases in the United States. But the U.S. support for the Nigerian military was suspended almost entirely during the Nigerian civil war. The number of Nigerians trained under MAP dropped to 19 during the war years, while commercial delivery of a military nature from private U.S. companies increased from \$33,000 in the year preceding the civil war to \$3.7 million during the war years 1967-1970.<sup>276</sup> In 1972, Washington terminated the MAP-supported training program after a total of 472 Nigerian Officers and Cadets had been sponsored. After 1972, training hitherto provided under MAP was made an integral part of International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. Nigeria has fully re-imbursed the U.S. for all subsequent deliveries of American training and equipment, and has increased its purchases since the 1970s. The cost of such training and equipment to the Nigerian government amounted to \$13 million in 1980. Under the FMS program, the U.S. military sales and deliveries to Nigeria increased from \$1.4 million in 1976 to \$6.2 million in 1980 and \$9.5 million in 1981. (Table 3).<sup>277</sup> The number of Nigerian

<sup>275</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, Nigeria: A Country Study, Area Handbook Series, edited by Harold D. Nelson (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982) PP. 237-285.

<sup>276</sup>Ibid.

<sup>277</sup>U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstracts of the United States 1984, 104th edition (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), P. 349.

military personnel trained in the U.S. under IMET and FMS was 428 in 1976, 825 in 1977, 406 in 1978, 482 in 1979, and 428 in 1980.<sup>278</sup> Such training has not only added to the technical capabilities of the Nigerian military, it has introduced Nigerian military personnel to the concepts of planning, budgeting, and logistics that are vital to the success of military organization.

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<sup>278</sup>Peter Duigan and L.H. Gann, The United States and Africa: A History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 319-324.

Table 2

## U.S. Grants and Credits to Nigeria (Million US\$)

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Year	Total grants and Credits
1956-1965	84
1966-1969	128
1970	36
1971	48
1972	29
1973	24
1974	10
1975	8
1976-1977	-4
1976-1978	-10
1979	-3
1980	-3
1981	7
1982	-5

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Source: Compiled by the author from figures of the U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstracts of the United States 1973 (Washington DC.: U.S. government Printing Office, 1973), PP. 770-778; also from the 1974 and 1975-1983 volumes.

Table 3

## U.S. AID Commitments to Nigeria 1962-1981 (Millions US\$)

Year	Total	Loan Proportion
1962-1974	342.1	120.2
1962-1975	348.9	120.2
1962-1976	349.0	120.2
1977	(-)	(-)
1978	(-)	(-)
1979	(-)	(-)
1980	(-)	(-)
1981	(-)	(-)

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstracts of the United States 1976, 97th edition (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), PP. 836-837; including the 1974, 1975, 1977, and 1978-1981 volumes.

(-) Dashes indicate no aid recorded in the in the statistics used.



Table 4

## U.S. Military Sales Deliveries to Nigeria.\*

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Year	Amount (Millions US\$)
1960-1969	.4
1976	1.4
1977	2.0
1978	5.9
1979	5.9
1980	6.2
1981	9.5
1982	7.7

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Source: Compiled by the author from U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstracts of the United States 1984, 104th Edition (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), P. 349. Also from the 1980, 1981, and 1982-83 volumes.

\* Represents U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) military sales deliveries, excluding training. It covers DOD sales orders authorized under Arms Export Control Act.

In the 1960s and early 1970s, U.S. aid to Nigeria was channelled in large part towards those sectors of the economy in which the funds would help lay the foundation for the eventual creation of private business.<sup>279</sup> This was in line with the belief that private sector development was consonant with American values, and ultimately was a faster and more stable path to economic growth.<sup>280</sup> In the political sphere, the major goals in the 1960s were to build a

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<sup>279</sup>The use of foreign aid to promote U.S. trade or economic interest is an often cited, although often criticized, rationale underlying the existence of U.S. aid program. The "economic rationale" for a U.S. commitment to the development of poor countries, as Robert E. Asher suggested, is that development is "good business". It widens the market for American exports. It provides new opportunities for productive private investments. It builds more promising, lower-cost sources of supply for imports. Robert E. Asher cited in Eugene R. Wittkopf, Western Bilateral Aid Allocation: A Comparative Study of recipient State Attributes and Aid Received (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972), pp. 15-17. But according to Wittkopf "An analysis of aid and trade patterns at a single point in time, or even at several points, cannot explain the extent to which foreign aid has (or has not) been an engine of expanding international trade, either globally or for particular aid donors". However, this is not to say that such factors as trade, investment or more importantly East-West considerations has not affected U.S. decisions regarding aid. Within the context of the East-West struggle, U.S. aid, especially in the 1950s and early 1960s, was designed to "contain" the Soviet Union. Aid could be used to win and maintain friends, alliances, military bases, American presence, and votes in international organizations. It could also be used to strengthen non-communist forces and promote economic development - all were seen as conducive to American security in the context of the cold war. According to Packenham, foreign aid properly designed and used could contribute to the emergence and strengthening of constitutionalism and pluralist democracy. Robert A. Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 3-22.

<sup>280</sup>Robert B. Shepard, "Superpower and Regional Power: The United States and Nigeria 1960-1979", pp. 116-117.

political democracy, instill democratic beliefs, and bring Nigeria into the orbit of the so-called "Free World". In the early 1970s, U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) acknowledged a shift in its priorities from building democracy to promoting commerce through foreign aid. Indeed, aid was to build political stability, enhance the prosperity of American corporations, and reduce American trade deficit. There was a belief that

an effective aid program meeting Nigeria's development objectives can also help to widen and facilitate U.S. contacts on political and commercial issues and support U.S. policy objectives in the latter area.<sup>281</sup>

But despite apparent shift in AID priorities, the political, economic, and strategic significance of aid was no less important in the 1970s than it was a decade earlier.<sup>282</sup> Chester Crocker could still argue in the early

<sup>281</sup> Ibid.

<sup>282</sup> According to Joan M. Nelson, three basic criteria largely determine the volume and content of U.S. economic assistance in any particular country. These are the political importance to the United States of the country's stability and growth, the ability of the country to absorb external resources for growth, and the availability, to the country, of resources on appropriate terms from other sources. Nelson goes on to suggest factors which determine "the importance to the United States of another country's stability and growth". Among them are the country's size, population, location, resources, special historic ties with the United States, military ties with the U.S., the country's role in regional or international affairs, the country's internal political orientation, U.S. trade ties, investments, and the potential for expanding these ties. It is argued that the most significant variable determining a country's political importance to the U.S. is size, suggesting that the United States will show a greater interest in larger countries, whose internal political and economic development and foreign policy behavior are likely to be of more concern to the United States. In the context of East-West struggle, it is often argued that it matters most if a large country "goes communist" than if a small country does. Joan M.

1980s that American "aid will help to insure continued access to important facilities and to build economically and politically self confident states around Nigeria - our second largest source of imported oil".<sup>283</sup>

Although skepticism persisted over Nigeria's eligibility for certain types of U.S. aid, a technical co-operation agreement between the two countries was signed as soon as the Carter administration assumed office. The objective of the agreement was to provide the mechanism for technical co-operation in geological survey, water resources, land-use and related studies deemed essential for orderly urban planning for Nigeria's new federal capital territory area.<sup>284</sup> The purpose of the U.S.-Nigerian technical co-operation agreement was to augment and help strengthen the technical capabilities of Nigeria's Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) and other Nigerian agencies associated with the FCDA in carrying out the project. The technical accord was expected to include, but not limited to, assistance in field and laboratory investigation, project design and planning, program

<sup>282</sup>(cont'd) Nelson, Aid, Influence, and Foreign Policy, PP. 31-33; Wittkopf, Western Bilateral Aid Allocations: A Comparative Study of Recipient State Attributes and Aid Received, PP. 15-16.

<sup>283</sup>Chester A. Crocker, "FY 1983 Assistance Requests", Department of State Bulletin, July 1982, PP. 61-63.

<sup>284</sup>U.S. Department of State, Technical Cooperation Agreement Between the United States of America and Nigeria, February 4, 1977, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), PP.1-11. The capital territory area is defined as an area of about 7,000 square miles within North Western State and Benue-Plateau State in central Nigeria which has been designated by the federal government as the site for their new national capital.

co-ordination, and cartographic services, as well as training in special technics for Nigerian specialists in the facilities of the U.S. Geological Survey, Department of Interior.<sup>285</sup> Under the agreement, responsibility of the survey lies with the U.S. program co-ordinator who, in concert with the FCDA program co-ordinator, was also responsible for the U.S. Geological Survey in overall planning and co-ordination of the program. The agreement for technical co-operation between Nigeria and the United States signed during the Carter administration has been honored by the new Reagan administration.

### Trade

The Nigerian-American relationship was characterized by a significant progress in the functional area of trade during the Carter administration. When the administration took office in 1977, 17.2 per cent of U.S. oil imports came from Nigeria - second only to 20.6 per cent from Saudi Arabia. In the same year oil comprised 98.9 per cent of Nigeria's exports to the United States.<sup>286</sup>

Table 5 shows the growth of U.S. trade with Nigeria over the past decade. Oil brought economic boom to Nigeria which helped to enhance trade with the United States in the 1970s, but a slump in prices brought a recession in the

<sup>285</sup>Ibid.

<sup>286</sup>E. Wayne Nafziger, The Economics of Political Instability: The Nigerian-Biafra War (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), P. 182; J.K. Onoh, The Nigerian Oil Economy: From Prosperity to Glut (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), PP. 95-97.

1980s that was made worse by corruption and mismanagement of the elected government.<sup>287</sup> In the early 1970s, agriculture was the mainstay of the Nigerian economy and provided about 50 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The debt-service burden was light, and a rapidly developing oil industry was starting to relieve balance of payment pressure and boost government revenue.<sup>288</sup> As higher oil prices transformed the pattern of the economy from agriculture to oil-based development, GDP increased at the rate of 7 per cent between 1970 and 1973 - more rapidly than in the 1960s. By 1972, oil already contributed 83 per cent of Nigerian exports. The oil share of federal government revenue rose from 67 per cent in 1973-74 to 78 per cent in 1976-1977.<sup>289</sup>

Nigeria experienced the impact of the first oil glut in the world market during the 1977-1978 period. However, despite dwindling sales and low prices for oil during this period, American exports to Nigeria rose slightly from \$958 million in 1977 to \$985 million in 1978. The American trade deficit with Nigeria declined from \$5.4 billion to \$3.7 billion during the same period. (Table 5). The decline was short-lived in that the U.S. trade deficit with that country continued to grow throughout the Carter administration. The

<sup>287</sup>The military seized power from the elected government at the end of 1983 in what Maj.-Gen. Ibrahim Babangida described at the time as "a New Year's present to the nation", promising to stamp out corruption. Hundreds of officials, including then President Shagari, were arrested and many were imprisoned. The Edmonton Journal, August 28, 1985, P. A6.

<sup>288</sup>World Development Report 1981 (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1981), PP. 90-91.

<sup>289</sup>Ibid.

high deficit was attributed to the removal of Iranian oil from the world market, the increasing dependence of the United States on Nigerian oil, and the decline in the American share of the Nigerian market.

The strained relationship between the U.S. and Iran resulting from the overthrow of the late Shah, his replacement by the Iranian Revolutionary government of Ayatollah Khomeini, and the granting of political asylum to the Shah by the United States, led to the Iranian decision to cut oil supplies to the United States. Having lost a major source of oil supply, the Carter administration requested Nigeria to step up its oil production so that the U.S. might make up the difference created by the Iranian oil embargo; just as the Reagan administration did, in the case of Libyan oil, a few years after the defeat of Carter. The political turmoil that followed the overthrow of the Shah had also resulted in a significant increase in oil price, from \$14.80 per barrel on January 1, 1979 to \$23.47 per barrel by July 1, thereby leading to a vastly increased U.S. trade deficit with Nigeria.<sup>290</sup>

Trade is one of the most important factors in Nigerian-American bilateral ties. And since the Arab oil embargo of 1973, American trade with Nigeria has risen substantially. Non-oil imports from Nigeria also increased

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<sup>290</sup>Onoh, The Nigerian Oil Economy: From Prosperity to Glut, pp. 107-124. The estimated increase in American food exports to Nigeria during the 1979-1981 period added very little to the American share of the Nigerian market. The New York Times, November 26, 1982, p. D4.

from \$21 million in 1970 to \$114 million in 1978.<sup>291</sup> Although trade (oil and non-oil) is said to have fallen from a high of about \$6 billion in the 1970s to around \$4.5 billion in early 1985, Nigeria remains an important market to the United States.<sup>292</sup>

In 1980, the U.S. purchased approximately \$11 billion worth of Nigerian goods. During the same period its exports to Nigeria reached the \$1 billion mark for the first time. The resulting \$9 billion U.S. trade deficit with Nigeria represented the second largest bilateral trade deficit in American foreign trade account. (See Table 5). Although the U.S. did emerge as a major supplier of the \$1.5 billion dollars worth of agricultural products imported by Nigeria in 1980, it has yet to capture more than 10 per cent of the Nigerian market - lagging behind the United Kingdom and West Germany.<sup>293</sup>

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<sup>291</sup> Figures for U.S. non-oil imports from Nigeria were compiled by the author from U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. General Imports, Schedule A, FT 135 - various issues.

<sup>292</sup> West Africa, February 11, 1985, P. 274.

<sup>293</sup> Aaron Segal, "Uneasy Partners", P. 12.



Table 5

Direction of U.S. Trade with Nigeria (millions US dollars)

Year	U.S. Exports to Nigeria	U.S. Imports from Nigeria	Non-oil Imports
1970	129	75	21
1974	286	3,519	49
1975	536	3,525	25
1976	770	5,251	62
1977	958	6,440	67
1978	985	4,709	114
1979	632	8,161	(z)
1980	1,150	11,105	(z)
1981	1,523	9,249	(z)
1982	1,295	7,045	4
1983	864	3,736	(z)
1984	577	2,508	(NA)

Source: Compiled from U.S. Department of Commerce, Highlights of U.S. Import and Export Trade, - various issues; and Colin Legum (ed.) Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents 1977-1978, (New York: Africana, 1979) PP. C205-C215;  
(z) Less than a million  
(NA) Not Available

But despite the fact that oil imports have made Nigerian-American trade balance unfavorable to the United States over the past decade, Nigeria's large potential market provides an opportunity for sizable returns on future U.S. investments. No matter whether the Republicans or Democrats are in power in Washington, American trade with Nigeria is likely to remain one of the most important functional areas of bilateral relations, mainly because of oil and the potential instability of the Middle East.<sup>294</sup>

#### Foreign Investment

American investment in Nigeria is concentrated primarily in the oil industry. In 1975, about \$489 million out of a U.S. total investment of \$535 million went into oil exploration and production in Nigeria. In 1977, U.S. investment amounted to \$335 million, of which \$250 million was concentrated in the oil sector. The U.S., however, lagged behind Great Britain whose investment in Nigeria reached \$800 million during the same year.<sup>295</sup> There were clear indications during the 1970s and early 1980s that the American investors were slow to capitalize on investment opportunities in other sectors of Nigerian economy, despite attempts by both American and Nigerian government to

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<sup>294</sup>Ronald I. Meltzer, "United States Trade Policy: An Overview", Current History, vol. 76, no. 447, May-June 1979, pp. 193-196.

<sup>295</sup>U.S. Department of Commerce, Market Profiles for Africa, Overseas Business Reports, OBR 78-20, June 1978, p. 31; Marketing in Nigeria, Overseas Business Reports, OBR 79-11, April 1979, p. 29.

encourage diversification of American investment in that country. The Carter administration is credited with the most formidable effort, of any administration since the 1960s, to encourage American investment in sectors of the Nigerian economy other than petroleum. The administration negotiated several new treaties with a Nigerian government that was eager and willing to help smooth the way for American investment. Yet American investors failed to show any significant new enthusiasm about committing assets to Nigeria. Before discussing the growth of American investment in Nigeria, it is necessary to examine factors affecting foreign investment in that country. This can be done by taking a brief look at the "investment climate" in Nigeria.

Commenting on the investment climate in Nigeria in 1983, the U.S. Commerce Department noted that the government of Nigeria "supports and encourages foreign investment, both in cash and in kind by way of equipment, technical expertise, and services as a means of increasing the supply of investment capital to the economy and of encouraging technology transfer to Nigeria".<sup>296</sup> In its analysis of economic trends and their implications for the United States, the Department also noted the incentives offered by the Nigerian government to both domestic and foreign investors to strengthen those sectors of the economy which the government believed could contribute most towards economic development. The Department's analysis was backed

<sup>296</sup>U.S. Department of Commerce, Marketing in Nigeria, Overseas Business Reports, OBR 83-03, April 1983, P. 25.

up by President Shagari's remark to Vice President Mondale that Nigeria was eager to obtain American investment in large-scale farming for such commercial crops as cocoa, peanuts, palm products, and cotton.<sup>297</sup> In October 1980, Shagari made a similar appeal to a representatives of U.S. agro-industry firms in Washington D.C., describing Nigeria's agricultural goals and desire to obtain American investment.<sup>298</sup> The Commerce Department, however, acknowledged that the Nigerian government "strictly regulates the establishment and operation of foreign investment through laws and decrees it has adopted" since Nigeria gained independence from Great Britain in 1960.<sup>299</sup>

The two main laws affecting foreign investment, the Companies Decree of 1968 and the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (otherwise known as the indigenization decree) of 1972 amended in 1976 and 1977, ensure that all foreign investment is government approved and has indigenous equity participation. When the indigenization decree first became operational there were questions by the American business community whether indigenization was another name for nationalization. In 1980, the U.S. Department of Commerce, however, cautioned that indigenization of the Nigerian economy should not be misconstrued to mean nationalization of industry by the Nigerian government.<sup>300</sup>

<sup>297</sup>The New York Times, August 15, 1980, P. 3.

<sup>298</sup>U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States, FET 81-043, April 1981, P. 7.

<sup>299</sup>U.S. Department of Commerce, Marketing in Nigeria, P. 25.

<sup>300</sup>Ibid.

Indeed, the government's primary interest in regulating foreign investment was merely another facet of its interest in regulating and guiding the Nigerian economy to self-sustained and indigenously controlled development. It was also meant to address some of the critical questions relating to the effect of foreign investment in general.

The influx of foreign investment into Nigeria during the post-civil war years of the 1970s had generated a heated debate about the place of such investment in the country's economy. During this period, Nigeria had become what Nicholas Balabkins described as the "foreign investor's dreamland".<sup>301</sup> Profit rates were high compared to the industrialized countries of North America, Western Europe and Japan. For example, in the service industry, returns were as high as 30 per cent per annum and in commerce, a 25 per cent return on investment was considered the rule. According to Balabkins, in manufacturing, earnings of 20 per cent per annum were a minimum.<sup>302</sup> With such returns on investment, coupled with the flow of oil, there were eager foreign investors waiting to enter Nigeria in the early 1970s - a development which generated the so-called indigenization debate. This debate was focused on such arguments as "foreign economic domination", "neo-colonialism", fear of the multinational corporation, or quite simply exploitation from abroad. At the same time,

<sup>301</sup>Nicholas Balabkins, Indigenization and Economic Development: The Nigerian Experience (Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press, 1982), pp. 152-161.

<sup>302</sup>Ibid.

Nigerian academics and government officials began to look at the foreign investor more suspiciously than had been the case in the 1960s. Nigeria's Second National Development Plan 1970-1974 cautiously advocated the need for a Nigerian self-reliance doctrine by making a call for indigenization.

Claude Ake, for instance, has contended that the indigenization decree of 1972 was the first major initiative for putting the strategy of independence into practice.<sup>303</sup> The decree stated that it was necessary to localize ownership and control of the economy, that political independence without economic independence was an "empty shell", and that a "truly independent nation cannot allow its objectives and priorities to be distorted or frustrated by manipulations of powerful foreign investors".<sup>304</sup> The essential strategy of indigenization, then, is a combination of state and private capitalism. First, the state provides the policy instrument and plays a leading role in the indigenization process; it provides the financial and administrative machinery for the revitalization of the economy. Second, while the state limits itself to policy formulation, the private sector assumes direct responsibility for private enterprise. The key word is "participation": in sectors that had experienced a long standing monopoly of foreign private capital, the government has increased its participation in the management and

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<sup>303</sup>Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa (Harlow: Longman, 1981), pp. 105-126.

<sup>304</sup>Ibid.

control of the economy by acquiring a majority shareholding in such sectors. At the same time, the federal government of Nigeria insisted that it was not its intention to participate in the private sector, except in strategic economic sectors such as petroleum, iron and steel, communications, utilities, and in some cases, banking. The government insisted that foreign investment was welcome within the constraints of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (NEPD).

But there was a negative feeling among company executives in Nigeria that the controversial indigenization decree under which more and more industries were required to be run by Nigerians would affect the future trend of foreign investment. Some foreigners were speculating that the ultimate goal of the scheme was full nationalization. But the real goal of indigenization was to encourage the growth of a strong Nigerian bourgeoisie, rather than nationalization of enterprises as such.<sup>305</sup> The programme, therefore, affords Nigerians the opportunity of handling a substantial proportion of economic activities that were hitherto in the hands of foreigners. It also gives greater job opportunities for Nigerians, and an increase in their managerial responsibilities. The scheme further has the effect of exposing Nigerians to new management techniques and the development of indigenous financial institutions.<sup>306</sup>

<sup>305</sup>Thomas J. Biersteker, Distortion or Development? Contending Perspectives on Multinational Corporation (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1978) pp. 69-82.

<sup>306</sup>Emeka Ezeife, "Nigeria" in Adebayo Adedeji (ed.)

Table 6 illustrates the growth, and decline, of U.S. investment in Nigeria in the 1970s. The total U.S. investment of \$383 million in 1978 was \$37 million greater than the 1976 total, and \$48 million more than the 1977 figure; but far less than the \$535 million recorded in 1975. The decline of U.S. investment in Nigeria, from 23.6 per cent of total foreign investment in 1967 to 17.5 per cent in 1973 (Table 7) may be attributed to a number of causes, notably, Nigeria's indigenization policies, recession in the U.S. economy, the Nigerian civil war, and tension in the Nigerian oil industry resulting from government policies. Onoh has contended that the major factor in the decline of U.S. investment in Nigeria was the recession in the U.S. economy which started in the mid-1960s.<sup>307</sup>

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<sup>306</sup>(cont'd) Indigenization of African Economies (London: Hutchinson, 1981), pp. 164-186.

<sup>307</sup>J.K. Onoh, The Nigerian Oil Economy: From Prosperity to Glut (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 4.



TABLE 6

U.S. Direct Private Investment in Nigeria (Millions US\$)

Year	All Industries	Petroleum Industry
1975	535	489
1976	346	282
1977	335	250
1978	383	262
1979	(NA)	(NA)
1980	18	(z)
1981	219	4
1982	492	(a)

(a) Suppressed to avoid disclosure.

(NA) Not available.

(z) Negligible

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, August 1977, 1978, 1979, 1981, 1982, and 1983.

TABLE 7

## Cumulative Foreign Investment in Nigeria

Country or Region	1962	1967	1973	1977
	%	%	%	%
United Kingdom	61.4	47.1	48.8	42.37
United states	8.7	23.6	17.5	11.33
Western Europe (excluding UK)	21.2	21.2	23.5	29.20
Others	8.7	8.1	10.2	17.10
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.00

Source: Adapted from J.K. Onoh,  
the Nigerian Economy: From Prosperity  
to Glut (New York: St. Martin's  
Press, 1983), P.

There was also the persistent deficit in the U.S. balance of payments, and the devaluation of the dollar in 1973 arising from dollar pressure on the international foreign exchange markets.<sup>308</sup> Furthermore, the Nigerian civil-war which lasted from mid-1967 to January 1970 damaged Nigeria's investment climate. New investors were scared away as a result of the war, while some investors already operating in Nigeria panicked and left. By 1973, the U.S investment in Nigeria began to decline as well as those of the United Kingdom; although the U.S. investments declined at a much faster rate than those of the U.K. which in 1977 amounted to 42.37 of total foreign investments in Nigeria. The U.S. contributed 11.33 per cent of the total.<sup>309</sup> Gordon Bertolin attributes the decline to Nigeria's policy of indigenization which led to the transfer of equity from a U.S. petroleum firm to the Nigerian government.<sup>310</sup> The decline of U.S. investment in Nigeria from \$383 million in 1978 to \$18 million in 1980 (Table 6) was clearly due to tensions in the Nigerian oil industry arising out of fear of nationalization. In 1980, tension between the Nigerian government and the oil industry increased because of the government's decision to impose a penalty that could have amounted to \$6 billion against three major oil giants, two of which were American - the Mobil oil corporation, the Gulf oil corporation, - and the Royal

<sup>308</sup> Ibid.

<sup>309</sup> Ibid.

<sup>310</sup> Gordon Bertolin, "U.S. Economic Interests in Africa: Investment, Trade, and Raw Materials", in Jennifer Seymour Whitaker (ed.) Africa and the United States: Vital Interests (New York: New University Press, 1978), pp. 21-59.

Dutch/Shell group.<sup>311</sup> The government directive to this effect was contained in a 10-page "White Paper" prepared by the administration of President Shagari. The "White Paper" was released along with a report written by an independent tribunal that investigated alleged improprieties on the part of the officials of Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and 10 foreign oil companies. The report stated that between 1975 and 1978, an understanding reached between these companies and NNPC called for them to produce and sell nearly 183 million barrels of crude oil, which at that time would have brought the Nigerian government \$2.5 billion in additional revenue.<sup>312</sup> According to the report, however, the oil was not produced. Moreover, the report asserted it was the Nigerians who, in effect, were further penalized because the NNPC, the government's oil agency, paid nearly \$1 billion to Gulf, Mobil, and Shell as its share of operating costs. It contended that the government suffered lost revenue between 1975 and 1978 because the share of oil that would have been sold on behalf of the NNPC was never marketed; while the oil companies themselves had no trouble marketing their share even though they asserted there was a glut in the world oil market. The companies, however, argued that the principal reason the NNPC's oil was neither produced nor sold in the agreed quantities was that the price set in Lagos was unrealistically high, given the prevailing market conditions. Furthermore, oil executives

<sup>311</sup>The New York Times, August 11, 1980, P. D1.

<sup>312</sup>Ibid.

contended that each partner in the production venture was responsible for marketing its own share, that the NNPC lapsed in its marketing efforts, and that the oil companies were unfairly penalized for the ineptitude of the NNPC.<sup>313</sup>

The feud between the government and the oil companies not only affected American investment in the Nigerian oil industry in 1980, it also raised questions concerning the impact that souring relations might have on the domestic market in the United States. The oil companies were also mindful of the threat of nationalization. They were not oblivious of the take-over of the British Petroleum by the Nigerian government in August 1979 on charges that B.P. had sold Nigerian oil to South Africa. Some oil executives, understandably, feared that their operations in Nigeria might be affected if the dispute between government and industry was not amicably resolved. However, although the squabbling had a negative impact on foreign investment in 1980, it did nothing to reduce Nigeria's dependence on the co-operation of foreign interests in such fields as petroleum extraction and refining; in other words the fear of nationalization did not materialize. If 1980 was a bad year for American investment in Nigeria's economy, there was a remarkable increase in investment during the 1981-1982 period: the U.S. investment increased from \$219 million in 1981 to \$492 million in 1982. But on the whole, the 1982 total was still less than the \$535 million recorded for

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<sup>313</sup>Ibid.

1975.

It could be stated that the U.S. economic stake is clearly on access to Nigerian oil. American investment in this sector is not only of vital importance, it also serves a political function of the first magnitude: the retention of the prevailing mode of production which in turn ensures the perpetuation of commercial, financial, and industrial relationships in which American and Western capital predominate. Nevertheless, U.S investment in Nigeria has its positive effects at least from the Nigerian government's perspective. Along with investments from other countries, American investment has helped to boost local manufacturing, assisted in effective transfer of technology, and promoted training programmes to back up Nigeria's indigenization policies.<sup>314</sup>

Yet Nigerian-American relations are not determined solely by America's economic stake in Nigeria. Nor does U.S. investment and dependence on Nigerian oil imply any Nigerian influence over America's African policy. Some potential for leverage certainly exists as Nigeria is the dominant economic force of independent Africa and second largest supplier of oil to the United States. Gordon Bertolin has contended that the weakness of any direct link between political and economic relations makes it unlikely that the United States "could actually be forced to change its

<sup>314</sup>Henry L. Bretton, Direct Foreign Investment in Africa: Its Political Purpose and Function in Patron Client Relations (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1976), pp. 17-30.

position in a direct confrontation, unless the African (Nigerian) effort coincided with another Arab oil embargo".<sup>315</sup> It is, however, argued that even if Nigeria could influence the U.S. in this way, it is hardly likely that it would actually turn off its oil. Given its ambitious development plans, which are going to be difficult to achieve in any case, Nigeria can ill afford to forgo its major source of revenue.

### Conclusion

The actual policies of the Carter administration fell far short of Mr. Carter's original promise of a "crusade for black majority rule" in South Africa, a phrase that had raised the hope in Nigeria for a new chapter in American-African relations.<sup>316</sup> Even if attention is focused on the administration's policy objectives rather than the crusading element in Carter's original position, one is still left with the impression that the administration was apparently at a loss as to what to do in order to achieve its policy objectives; notably: (1) normalization of

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<sup>315</sup>Ibid. "The weakness of any direct linkages between political and economic relations was demonstrated by the attitudes of both the United States and Nigeria during the Angolan civil war. With the United and Nigeria supporting opposed factions in that struggle, political relations became strained. Yet the active role of American businessmen in Nigeria and the flow of Nigerian oil to the United States continued unabated. Neither country's political behavior was constrained by economic relationship, and business was unhindered by the political chill".

<sup>316</sup>Keesing's Contemporary Archives, October 8, 1976, P. 27974; John Darton, "Carters Election is Raising Hopes in Black Africa", P. 4.

relations with Angola, (2) moving towards a peaceful and progressive transformation of South Africa towards a multi-racial democracy, (3) recognition and encouragement of African nationalism, (4) forging a coalition of moderate black leaders in order to eliminate the Soviet-Cuban presence from the continent, (5) fostering a peaceful, prosperous, and strong Africa.

Looking back at the administration's African policy, it is fair to say that, except in Zimbabwe, the United States had failed to achieve its policy objectives on the continent during the late 1970s. For example, the Carter administration had failed to restore diplomatic relations with Angola; and from the Nigerian point of view, the administration was indecisive with regard to apartheid and majority rule in South Africa. The Nigerian leaders were understandably disappointed with the actual policies of the administration because the much talked about new approach to African problems, especially during the early days of the administration, did not materialize. At the end of the administration's term of office in 1980, the Cuban troops were still in Angola and the American perception of the Soviet-Cuban threat was no less apparent than it was during the Ford administration. Majority rule in South Africa was out of the question, so was the hope of peaceful transformation of South Africa towards a multi-racial democracy. Although the Namibian independence negotiations continued to be stalemated, the administration did not put



forward an acceptable alternative proposal for dealing with the problem. As a result, the Namibian issue, like the problem of majority rule in South Africa and the recognition of Angola, had become the weakest point in the administration's approach to Africa. These issues, or the administration's failure to achieve its objectives, quite clearly demonstrated not only the limits of American diplomacy under Carter but also the gap between image and performance.

The shift in the Carter administration's African policy during the 1979-1980 period was prompted by internal and external factors. On the external dimension was the Soviet-Cuban involvement in Ethiopia, the seizing of U.S. embassy officials by Iranian revolutionaries in November 1979, and the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. On the internal dimension was President Carter's rapidly deteriorating popularity at home in the late 1970s, having lost what Walter Lafeber described as "the small consensus to govern that he (Carter) had earlier enjoyed."<sup>317</sup> These factors had enormous implications for the Carter administration: they helped the administration along the road to a more explicit or tougher position on containment and a foreign policy position backed by a new reliance on military force - a more vigorous response to Soviet military build-up. This was evident in the administration's military

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<sup>317</sup> Walter Lafeber, "From Confusion to Cold War: The Memoirs of the Carter Administration", Diplomatic History, Vol. 8, No. 1, Winter 1984, pp. 1-12.

budget: within six months of the events in Afghanistan and Iran, the projected five-year military spending increased from \$800 billion to \$1.25 trillion.<sup>318</sup>

But the events of the 1979-1980 period and the shift in U.S. policy did not resolve the problem confronting America's African policy, notably, the question whether the situation in Angola and Zimbabwe for that matter could be classified exclusively as African or global problem; or whether Zimbabwe could be seen as an East-West problem at all. Although Zimbabwe was a potential target for Soviet intervention, it was not an explicitly East-West problem since the Soviet Union was not as extensively involved in Zimbabwe as was the case in Angola. Yet, the dominant view in the Carter administration was that the crisis in Zimbabwe was part and parcel of the East-West struggle. The administration's motive for supporting majority rule or the fight for human rights, then, was to deny the Soviet Union the opportunity of exploiting the situation to its own advantage. As a result, as far as the definition of African conflict as an East-West struggle goes, the Carter administration had few differences of substance with Nixon-Ford-Kissinger policies.

The continuities in policy substance between Carter and previous administrations were remarkable. For example, apart from the definition of African issues, the extension of American economic aid to African countries was in line with

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<sup>318</sup> Ibid. See also The Washington Post, June 26, 1980, p. A31.

past U.S. policies. Aid to the drought-stricken Sahelian nations of Chad, The Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Burkina Faso was a brain child of the Ford-Kissinger administration.<sup>319</sup> The Carter administration even attempted to carry, to their logical conclusion, elements of Kissinger's belated conversion to the cause of black liberation movements in Southern Africa, while at the same time supporting the status quo in that region. Along with this was an almost desperate attempt by the administration to establish a distinctive identity through its devotion to human rights. Human rights and morality, although not a new phenomenon in American foreign policy, was seen by the administration as a means of modifying Soviet behavior. From the very beginning of the Carter era, human rights was simply a continuation of American post-war strategy of containment. President Carter saw his human rights policy as a weapon in what he described as the "peaceful struggle for influence."<sup>320</sup> But since there was no objection to continuing Kissinger's tactic of working with some communists to contain others, the human rights issue, as the President asserted, was apparently not the direct cause of the administration's failure in working with the Soviets on matters of common interest. However, it did create tension between the two countries and remained a point of contention in Soviet-American relations.

<sup>319</sup> Keesings Contemporary Archives, June 11, 1976, P. 27778.

<sup>320</sup> Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, PP. 149-150.

The administration's advocate of human rights, then, like its support for majority rule in Zimbabwe and political rapprochement with Nigeria were not conceived outside the policy of containment. This is not to question President Carter's personal belief in human rights. Carter apparently wanted to replace Soviet influence in Africa in his own way based on his values, but his administration was quite conscious of the fact that the struggle for political rights for blacks in Zimbabwe might create an opportunity for Soviet intervention.<sup>321</sup> To contain Communist influence in Africa in general, the administration was convinced that with the help of friendly countries such as Nigeria, it could replace the Russians as supporters of African nationalism thereby depriving the Soviet Union of its instrument of penetration. It is probably fair to say that Carter had difficulties translating his idealism or belief in human rights into actual policies because of competing principles and values coupled with economic and ideological interests within his administration and Congress. For even if the President had seriously considered punishing South Africa for its violation of human rights by banning American trade and investment in that country - a policy position favored by Nigeria - his critics in the House and Senate would have refused to give easy passage to any measure that interfered with America's economic relations with South Africa.

<sup>321</sup>Price, U.S. Foreign Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa: National Interest and Global Strategy, pp. 1-5.

Furthermore, the growth of pro-South African lobby in the United States during the late 1970s and increasing support for South Africa within the U.S. had served as a check on executive power; and was partially responsible for the apparent shift in Carter's African policy during the 1979-1980 period. The emergence of these constraints show that Carter's values might not have been representative of more general societal values when it comes to apartheid and black rights. Part of the reason being that by late 1970s and early 1980s, the issues of apartheid and political rights for blacks in South Africa were not well established in the United States. As a result, the American public could not fully understand their implications for U.S. foreign policy. But those issues remained a major factor in Nigerian-American relations since the Carter administration, in the face of sagging popularity at home, did not develop any new strategy of dealing with them.

Consequently, it could be tentatively concluded that as far as American approach to African problems was concerned, there was no significant difference between the Carter administration and its predecessors. That for the Carter administration, African problem was part of a global problem predicated on East-West struggle. This had become more evident during the 1979-1980 period as the administration eagerly and explicitly embraced the basic premise established by its predecessors. Thus the right wing critics of U.S. policy probably misjudged the case when they

contended that the Carter administration had failed to consider Africa in the context of the United States-Soviet competition. In actual fact the administration's objective relating to the fact that American policies must recognize and encourage African nationalism had become secondary to considerations of East-West struggle and containment of communism in the African sub-system.<sup>322</sup>

But despite the Carter administration's failure in Angola, Namibia, and South Africa, the late 1970s marked the Golden Age of Nigerian-American relations because it was during this period that political rapprochement between Lagos and Washington created a common bond between the two countries. This enabled one observer to comment that "Washington had deliberately chosen Nigeria" as its "chief African ally."<sup>323</sup> But although the administration had shrewdly given Nigeria the spotlight, beyond Zimbabwe Nigeria-American rapprochement did not seem to have had much impact on the outcome of the struggle for political rights for blacks in South Africa and Namibia. The new political sensibility between Lagos and Washington did not affect American investment in South Africa, despite the fear by Nigerian leaders that such investment was inimical to political reform in that country or that it might actually help to strengthen the apartheid regime. The U.S. Senate

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<sup>322</sup>Howe, "United States Policy in Africa", p. 100; Kruas, "American Foreign Policy in Africa", pp. 97-100; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar National Security Policy, p. 346.

<sup>323</sup>Langellier, "The Rise of Nigeria", p. 23.

subcommittee on Africa reached the same conclusion in a 1978 report which stated that "the net effect" of American investment "has been to strengthen the economy and military self-sufficiency of South Africa's apartheid regime."<sup>324</sup>

Some commentators also contended that the greater the West's financial stake in South Africa, the greater will be the West's commitment to maintaining apartheid.<sup>325</sup> Despite its concern over America's continued investment in South Africa, Nigeria was no more successful in its efforts to persuade the U.S. government under Carter to limit its investment in that country than it was during the Ford-Kissinger administration. On the other hand, because of domestic and external political considerations, the Carter administration apparently did not consider disinvestment as a viable option or one of the effective ways of putting pressure on South Africa to reform apartheid - an attitude that further dampened Nigeria's hope for change in America's African policy. Thus, in terms of the Carter administration's approach to South Africa, it was business as usual despite South Africa's record on human rights or its refusal to make any transition towards a more representational government.

Nigeria's inability to persuade the Carter administration to adopt a more progressive African policy was evident during the Lagos Anti-apartheid Conference in August 1977 when American Ambassador Young, to the

<sup>324</sup> Manchester Guardian Weekly, September 8, 1985, P. 15.

<sup>325</sup> Ibid.

dissatisfaction of the Nigerian delegation, flatly rejected the efficacy of arms struggle in African liberation. This was apparently seen in Lagos as a direct U.S. denial of support for Nigeria's position on the issue, at a time when Nigeria needed it most. Lack of significant progress in the liberation of Namibia and South Africa through arms struggle have proved that without some form of external support, Nigerian and other African countries do not have the means or probably the will to carry arms struggle to its logical conclusion: And without arms struggle, as some Nigerians believe, it is unlikely that South Africa will make any significant political concessions to the majority of its population.

Nevertheless, despite these weaknesses, it is probably true to say that the establishment of close ties between Lagos and Washington during the late 1970s had yielded some positive results since it helped not only to enhance Nigeria's status in international relations but also provided an opportunity for the exchange of views between the two countries on regional security matters. Rather than reinforcing dependence on the United States, it enabled Nigeria to move to a more independent position in international relations as evident in its policy towards Angola. Furthermore, Nigeria's close relationship with Washington during the Zimbabwe crisis, like its efforts at mediation between Angola and Zaire during the Shaba conflict, was a useful exposure to the art of conflict



resolution at the international level - an exposure that had provided Nigerian diplomacy with an invaluable experience in big power politics. Thus Bach's contention that one positive gain to Nigeria from this relationship was the recognition of its regional and international status as first among equals in Africa has more general validity than the competing interpretation that Nigeria had already achieved such recognition and did not need further recognition by the United States.<sup>326</sup>

There is no doubt that considerations of East-West struggle in the politics of the African sub-system had helped to consolidate relations between the two countries, influencing U.S. policy on aid to Nigeria during the Carter period just as it did during the 1960s and early 1970s. The motive behind U.S. bilateral aid was not only an attempt to establish and maintain a capitalist economic system in a resource-rich country such as Nigeria, it was also an effort to tie Nigeria economically to the United States. Aid was also an instrument through which the United States could help develop a stable pro-Western commerce in Nigeria. Bilateral aid in the form of military training of Nigerians in the United States further suggest the Carter administration's attempt to tie Nigeria politically to the United States. In this case the administration appeared to have been even more successful than its predecessors.

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<sup>326</sup>Bach, "Nigerian-American Relations: Converging Interests and Power Relations", pp. 38-39; Akinyemi, "Nigerian-American Relations Re-examined", pp. 110-111.

#### IV.

### The Reagan Administration: The Objectives

As Governor of California, Reagan is on record as having said that the basic issue in U.S. relations with Africa is not the American desire to achieve racial equality or elimination of injustice based on race, but rather the power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. "The African problem...is a Russian weapon aimed at us".<sup>327</sup> In a 1978 syndicated column, Reagan referred to Soviet determination to have important bases for strategic reasons and for control of vital resources, reminding his readers of the Soviet successes in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and the Horn of Africa.<sup>328</sup> Because of his perception of African issues as an extension of the

<sup>327</sup>Richard Deutsch, "Reagan's African Perspectives", African Report, vol. 25, no. 4, July-August, 1980, pp. 4-7.

<sup>328</sup>Ibid.

super-power struggle pure and simple, indications were that a Reagan administration would not rely on African nationalism as a barrier against communist intervention. Some argued that if the so-called Soviet expansion continued, the Reagan administration would not hesitate to get involved in an arms race with the Soviet Union in Africa.

After its inauguration in January 1981, the Reagan administration wanted to achieve the following objectives in its policy towards Africa:

1. To promote peace and regional security.
2. To support "proven friends" and be known as reliable partner in Africa.
3. To maintain "open market" opportunities, access to key resources, and contribute to expanding African and American economies.
4. To support negotiated solutions to problems of Southern Africa.
5. To "expand that group of nations whose development policies produce economic progress" and which have democratic institutions.
6. To help meet Africa's humanitarian needs and basic human liberties in keeping with both our principles and interests.<sup>329</sup>

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<sup>329</sup>Chester A. Crocker, "Strengthening U.S.-African Relations", Department of State Bulletin, vol. 81, August 1981, pp. 57-58.

Some elements of these objectives such as "support for negotiated solutions", concern for regional peace, security, and regional development have a lot in common with the policy objectives of the Carter administration. But unlike the Carter administration, the concept of majority rule in South Africa is not high on the list of priority issues in the Reagan administration. However, the Reagan administration does not consider Africa to be largely insignificant as was the case during the Nixon and Ford administrations. From the early days of the administration, it was obvious that, like the Carter administration, Reagan's preoccupation with global super-power competition or Soviet-Cuban intervention in the African sub-system would ensure his administration's attention to African issues.<sup>330</sup>

In its regional peace and security objectives, the Reagan administration emphasizes the fact that without a minimum of regional political order, American regional interests such as economic, humanitarian, and commercial can not be pursued. That without political order, African states will fail in their crucial tasks of nation-building and economic development. The administration believes that since Africa is an integral part of the world political system, the United States, as a world leader, has a responsibility to help shape the strategic context that impinges on Africa.<sup>331</sup> The administration's rhetoric concerning regional

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<sup>330</sup>Richard Deutsch, "Reagan and Africa", Africa Report, vol. 26, no. 1, January-February, 1981, pp. 4-6.

<sup>331</sup>Crocker, "Regional Strategy for Southern African", p. 24.

peace and security often stress America's commitment to lend its "influence, resources, and diplomatic ability", to solve not just the problem of Namibia, but also to help address the cycle of violence which threatens the whole region.<sup>332</sup> To the extent that the concern for regional peace and security is related to the East-West struggle, the Reagan administration sees the Soviet Union as the principal enemy who is ready to fuel military solutions and exploit the deep-rooted problems of Southern Africa. The administration sees the Soviet-Cuban and Eastern bloc intervention in African affairs and the presence of Cuban troops in Angola as an attempt to undermine the political, economic and strategic interests of the United States.<sup>333</sup> The U.S., the administration believes, must confront the Soviet threat by remaining actively engaged in this geopolitically important region because failure to do so can only lead to heightened regional tension, polarization and Soviet-backed adventurism. According to Chester A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, the stakes are too high and American interests too great to turn away from the Soviet threat in Southern Africa.<sup>334</sup>

The Reagan administration started to lay the groundwork for its African policy by suggesting that it would do business even with African Marxist regimes and, like the Carter administration, press for a negotiated deal on

<sup>332</sup> Africa Report, vol. 29, no. 5, September-October, 1984, p. 6.

<sup>333</sup> Crocker, "Strengthening U.S.-African Relations", p. 57.

<sup>334</sup> Ibid.

Namibia. Reagan's realism was viewed with skepticism at home and abroad. Some commentators contended that if Reagan persisted on moving both ways on the continent, "it will neither appease conservative Americans nor befriend a wary black Africa".<sup>335</sup> The most cogent statement on the policy choice facing Reagan was made by the *New York Times*: "The United States can embrace South Africa, or it can continue in the successful effort to befriend black Africa. It cannot do both".<sup>336</sup> Nigeria, which holds a position of critical importance on such issues as Namibia and whose oil and influence epitomize the realpolitik argument for close ties with black Africa, was concerned that Reagan administration would drastically revise America's African policy, with a bias towards South Africa. In a statement during an African-American Conference in Freetown on January 1981, Akporode Clark, Nigeria's representative at the United Nations referred to serious consequences for African-American relations if the new Reagan administration adopted policies easing pressure on South Africa to give up control of Namibia, or if it started supporting Savimbi's UNITA forces fighting the Marxist government in Angola. "United States backing of Savimbi would be like waving a red flag in the face of Africa and would cause serious problems in relations with the United States..." Clark said.<sup>337</sup>

<sup>335</sup>The New York Times, April 3, 1981, P. A26.

<sup>336</sup>"Drifting Into An African Policy", The New York Times, March 22, 1981, P. 18E.

<sup>337</sup>The New York Times, January 12, 1981, P. A12.

In a more cautious tone, Nigerian President Shagari warned that Nigeria "will use every means at our disposal" to fight "the evil system of apartheid" in Southern Africa and collusion and encouragement of Western powers.<sup>338</sup> As a result, there is an element of truth in Leon Nash's assertion that the Reagan administration's relations with Nigeria "has been strained" by U.S. dealings with white-ruled South Africa.<sup>339</sup> The linchpin of Reagan's policy towards South Africa is "constructive engagement", which means using friendly encouragement rather than confrontation in an effort to make Pretoria change its policy of apartheid.

The degree to which Nigerian-American relations is affected by Reagan administration's African policies, or the politics of the African sub-system, can be fully appreciated through an analysis of the Nigerian and American positions on such issues as Angola, as well as South Africa.

### Angola and Nigerian-American Relations

In early 1981, the Reagan administration was faced with the complex problem of determining not only America's relations with Angola, but also what form Nigerian-American friendship should take. Further complicating the problem was what William Raspberry, writing in the *Washington Post*, described as the "single-minded anti-communism" of the Reagan administration, and the presence of Cuban troops in

<sup>338</sup> The Washington Post, March 21, 1981, P. A12.

<sup>339</sup> The Washington Post, November 13, 1982, P. A12.

Angola.<sup>340</sup> Mr. Reagan said during the Presidential campaign in 1980 that he favored military assistance to Jonas Savimbi, leader of the UNITA forces that have refused to accept the legitimacy of the Marxist-Leninist government of Angola headed by the MPLA. When he assumed office, President Reagan and then Secretary of State Haig were highly critical of the Angolan government and the presence of Cuban troops in that country. They had hinted at the possibility of supporting UNITA. The administration had also asked Congress to repeal the Clark Amendment which prohibits covert U.S. intervention in Angola. In essence, support for UNITA was in line with the new Reagan administration's view of Africa as a place to blunt the Cuban and Soviet ambition, and a place where the great mineral wealth of Central and Southern Africa needed to be protected against for American and Western investment. But aid to the UNITA rebel forces was likely to generate major controversy in Washington and abroad.

A more delicate problem for the new administration was how to handle support for UNITA without upsetting relations with the conservative government in Nigeria. This problem was compounded by a warning from Senator Jesse Helms, an influential Republican conservative from North Carolina, that the United States must not view its interests in Africa "through Nigerian eyes" meaning that he wanted American strategic interests, as he perceived them, to come before

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<sup>340</sup>The Washington Post, Friday, February 27, 1981, P. 15.



friendlier attitude towards Nigeria.<sup>341</sup> Such view is derived from the premise that the Carter administration, in general, sought better relations with Nigeria by trying to help solve problems that the Nigerians, and other Africans, thought were important even though they might not have been of major U.S. concern. The Carter administration, it is argued, believed that if the United States could help, the African states that have Cuban and Soviet backing would be less dependent on them and more likely in time to ask them to leave. During Reagan's first term, State Department specialists asserted, however, that the Reagan administration had indeed turned the Carter strategy "on its head" at least philosophically. Reagan's starting point, the officials claimed, was to view Africa first in terms of American strategic interests.<sup>342</sup> Another view is that Helms' warning epitomized the struggle between the "conservatives" and "moderates" in the new Reagan administration to shape what would eventually become U.S. policy towards Angola and Africa in general.<sup>343</sup>

Nevertheless, on March 19, 1981, the administration asked Congress to lift its ban on all aid to anti-government

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<sup>341</sup>The Washington Post, March 6, 1981, P. A3.

<sup>342</sup>Ibid.

<sup>343</sup>Helms was particularly concerned with the appointment of Chester A. Crocker, a so-called moderate, as the new Assistant Secretary of State for Africa. Presidential aids admitted the Senator's concern was a factor that held up Crocker's official nomination until early March 1981. The ultra-conservative Republicans, among whom was Helms, were probably convinced that Crocker would look at Africa through "Nigerian eyes" or try to resurrect Carter's strategy which right wing Republicans had discredited.

forces in Angola. The request was made by Under-Secretary of State William Buckley, when he presented the U.S. military expenditure budget to the foreign affairs committee of the Congress. Buckley said that the Clark Amendment, which came into effect in 1976 after the U.S. had helped the forces of UNITA in the civil war in Angola, constituted "a unique and unusually all-encompassing restriction on U.S. policy options towards an individual nation".<sup>344</sup> A State Department spokesman later stated that because the U.S. had not recognized the Marxist regime that won the civil war in Angola, it did not consider the regime a government.<sup>345</sup> U.S. policy under Reagan, no doubt, continued to portray UNITA as a "legitimate political force" in Angola, as evident in Savimbi's visit to Washington in 1981 and the reception accorded him by top officials of the administration. Thus, for a while, the U.S. had moved from non-recognition of the MPLA under Carter to outright support for Savimbi's attempt to overthrow the MPLA government by force during the Reagan administration, although other aspects of U.S. Angolan policy remained exactly as they were throughout the Carter administration.<sup>346</sup>

Indeed, the Reagan administration's perceived need to counter Soviet influence in Angola and its demand for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from that country posed a dilemma for the Nigerian government: Nigeria did not see its

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<sup>344</sup> Africa Research Bulletin, March 1-31, 1981, P. 6001.

<sup>345</sup> Ibid.

<sup>346</sup> The Washington Post, February 27, 1981, P. A15.

interest served by a potentially disruptive super-power presence on African soil; yet to associate itself with the American demand for Soviet-Cuban disengagement would offend other black African nations, and Africa's frail sense of its own independence. At a Lagos news conference, the Nigerian Vice-President Alex Ekwueme openly voiced opposition to American policy of linking Cuban withdrawal from Angola with efforts to obtain Namibia's freedom from South African domination.<sup>347</sup> The geopolitical logic behind the linkage was stated as follows: "if the Cubans have not withdrawn from Angola by the time Namibia becomes independent, the Soviet Union will extend its influence to Windhoek, the Namibian capital...since the Soviet supported leader (Sam Nujoma) of the South West African Peoples Organization...is based in Angola".<sup>348</sup> But the Angolans claimed, and the Nigerian leadership seemed to have agreed, that "the presence of Cuban troops is a sovereign and legitimate act by both countries and has nothing to do with the problem of Namibia".<sup>349</sup> Nigeria refused to go along with the American aim of creating a "sanitized" Angola that would implicitly limit Soviet influence in that country.

Nigerian President Shagari cautioned Reagan against arming the rebel forces of Jonas Savimbi, contending that such act would be in defiance not only of Angola but of all Africa.<sup>350</sup> Furthermore, Shagari said at a press conference

<sup>347</sup> The New York Times, November 18, 1982, P. A3.

<sup>348</sup> Ibid.

<sup>349</sup> West West Africa, February 15, 1982, P. 477.

<sup>350</sup> Ibid.

during a state visit to Britain in March 1981 that "if the United States is willing to support rebels in a sovereign African nation, it would be extremely serious". He continued: "I don't believe (the Reagan administration) will do it because it would be very unwise".<sup>351</sup> However, in a cautious move, Shagari said he realized that Washington was still studying the situation and we can give them the benefit of the doubt until we see exactly what they are going to do".<sup>352</sup>

A few days after the end of Shagari's visit to Britain, Nigerian Foreign Minister, Ishaya Audu, expressed the same caution with regard to U.S. policy when he said that the Reagan administration would join forces to promote change in Southern Africa. Comments by Nigerian leaders fell short of a threat to cut off oil shipments to the United States or take over American oil interest in Nigeria should the Reagan administration insist on arming the UNITA. Nigeria had once before moved swiftly in such cases. For example, in August 1979, Nigeria nationalized British Petroleum's \$150 million share in a joint venture when Britain appeared likely to lift sanctions against the interim government in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). There were no such unpleasant consequences for U.S. interests as a result of Reagan administration's overtures towards UNITA. American companies with large establishments in Nigeria such as Gulf,

<sup>351</sup>The Washington Post, March 21, 1981, P. A12.

<sup>352</sup>Richard Deutsch, "Reagan's Unruly Review", Africa Report, vol. 26, no. 3, PP. 23-26.

Texaco, Ashland oil, Mobil Oil, the Midland Bank, and Chase Manhattan received no threat whatever.<sup>353</sup>

Several factors were responsible for Nigeria's cautious reaction to the new Reagan administration's attitude towards Angola. First, the new administration, like its predecessor, did acknowledge the importance of Nigeria as the most populous African state, member of OPEC, and one of the leading states of the Third World. As America's African policy began to evolve during Reagan's first term, Nigeria was increasingly seen as a potential ally in the fight against communism in the African sub-system. The infant democracy in Nigeria, modeled on that of the United States, was of significant interest to the Reagan administration. Second, the two countries had a lot in common: both were under conservative administrations with a common dislike of Colonel Gaddafi's activities and a desire for political stability in Africa and the Middle East. Consequently, Nigeria's suspicions and anxieties about Reagan's approach to Angola were played in a low key.<sup>354</sup>

President Shagari's willingness to give the Reagan administration "the benefit of the doubt" did not, however, change Nigeria's perception of its role in Angola in particular, and Africa in general. Nigerian leaders fervently believe that Nigeria's vocation is to lead Africa.

<sup>353</sup>The New York Times, January 1, 1984, p. 10. Gulf oil holds 40 per cent of a joint venture with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) that in 1981 produced 390,000 barrels of oil a day.

<sup>354</sup>David Anderson, "America in Africa, 1981", Foreign Affairs, vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 658-685.

Some see their country's place in the international caucus of "middle powers" such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, or as a country with a larger mandate in international arena.

Briefly summarizing Nigeria's foreign policy during his October 1, 1983, speech to the nation, President Shagari said:

our special commitment to Africa as a centre piece of our foreign policy will continue. The struggle for the achievement of freedom for all the oppressed people in Africa will continue to attract our sympathy and support. Nigeria will try to encourage other African countries to emulate our democratic experiment and learn from our democratic experience. No sacrifice will be considered too great in the achievement of a real freedom and democracy in Africa.<sup>355</sup>

Shagari's foreign policy was criticized for being too vague, too conservative, and too bureaucratic in dealing with African issues. Some observers contended that if Africa was the centrepiece of Nigerian foreign policy, as the administration claimed, then the country should have adopted a clearer stand on the Reagan administration's idea of linking Namibian independence with removal of Cuban troops from Angola. Still others maintained that any back-sliding such as the Shagari leadership wanted to do would merely "encourage further South African intransigence and American befuddling".<sup>356</sup> Gloomy references were made to the low-key style of quiet diplomacy evident in the Shagari administration. There was also some nostalgia for action when Shagari's approach was compared with the role of

<sup>355</sup> West Africa, October 10, 1983, P. 2350.

<sup>356</sup> West Africa, February 6, 1984, P. 267.

another Nigerian leader, Murtala Mohammed, during )  
 Nigerian-American confrontation over the recognition of the  
 MPLA.<sup>357</sup>

Such comparison was unwarranted because Mohammed belonged to a different era in Nigerian-American relations - a period that was lacking in overall understanding between the two countries on major African issues. After the overthrow of the Shagari administration and the assumption of power by Major-General Buhari, the new head of state was quick to indicate that indeed certain things had changed since late 1975 and early 1976 when Nigeria recognized the MPLA over American opposition, publicly rebuked American President Gerald Ford, and declared his Secretary of State Kissinger unwelcome in Lagos.<sup>358</sup> Although Buhari did not say which conditions had changed, one could only infer that he meant, (1) the emergence of politics of accommodation between Nigeria and the United States on Angola, (2) the dwindling revenues from Nigerian oil, (3) the weak position of oil producers vis-a-vis oil consumers in the early 1980s, and (4) the down-turn in Nigerian economy.

#### South Africa and Nigeria-American Relations

The South African regime has been termed totalitarian by some observers, authoritarian or oligarchic by others. Nigerians, above all, consider the regime to be racist and

<sup>357</sup> West Africa, October 10, 1983, p. 2350.

<sup>358</sup> West Africa, February 6, 1984, p. 266.

therefore unacceptable.<sup>359</sup> Opponents of the strategy of constructive engagement insist that Reagan's policy has neutralized Nigerian-American co-operation on the sensitive issues of human rights and self-determination in South Africa. Nigerian officials see the so-called constructive engagement as a substantial and tactical shift from the Southern African policies of the Carter administration. As one official put it, "the South African attitude of renewed intransigence comes from the rightist stance of the United States. Now the United States is less sensitive to Africa. Africa feels disappointed".<sup>360</sup> Because Nigerians see themselves as playing an active or predominant role in African affairs, they feel deeply about issues of racial injustice in South Africa and independence of Namibia. Nigeria's position is based on the premise, that unless there is a fundamental change in South Africa through the recognition of the right of the more than 20 million blacks to participate fully and equally in the political and economic processes in that country, there is a serious danger of a catastrophic racial conflict that will have serious ramifications throughout the world.<sup>361</sup>

<sup>359</sup>Daniel C. Bach, "Nigerian-American Relations: Converging Interests and Power Relations", in Timothy M. Shaw and Ojajide Aluko, (ed.) Nigerian Foreign Policy: Alternative Perceptions and Projections, (London: Mcmillan Press, 1983), pp. 35-55.

<sup>360</sup>U. S. Congress, House, Report of a Congressional Study Mission, Africa: Observations on the Impact of American Foreign Policy and Development Programs in Six African Countries, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, 1982, pp. 50-61.

<sup>361</sup>UN Chronicle, Special Supplement, March 1984, p. 30.



For the Nigerian leadership, the issue of black rights in the South can not be divorced from the political rights of blacks in South African controlled Namibia. Nigeria's position on the Namibian question is consistent with its South African policy and the view that (1) South African occupation of Namibia is a wrongful act, and a challenge to international law, (2) South African occupation of Namibia is a colonial policy which constitutes a denial of the rights of self-determination, and that (3) the continued occupation is depleting Namibia's natural resources.<sup>362</sup>

Since the strategy of constructive engagement has provided no solutions to either the Namibian question or issues of human rights in South Africa, the prevailing attitude in Lagos seems to be that there is no difference between Reagan's policy and mere collaboration with the architects of apartheid. Hence, the prospects of closer Nigerian-American relations will be evaluated in terms of official American policy towards Southern Africa. Nigeria rejects constructive engagement because it is not a balanced policy; for within its framework, there has been increased U.S. diplomatic, political, economic and military co-operation with Pretoria.<sup>363</sup>

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<sup>362</sup>For the legal case of Namibia's independence see Julio Faundez, "What Use is International Law?", West Africa, November 19, 1984, pp. 2315-2316.

<sup>363</sup>UN Chronicle, Special Supplement, March 1984, p. 30. As Mohammed Bello, Nigerian representative at the United Nations, put it, "at the United Nations, the United States would not even permit condemnation of racist South Africa for its invasion and continued occupation of Angola".

Some American observers do tend to agree that:

1. American policy towards South Africa is a test of America's moral credibility.
2. That although the U.S. must have a working relationship with the regime in Pretoria, it must appear not to like the system of apartheid.
3. That a slackening of America's sentiment for its South African ally would cost nothing in security for South Africa or the U.S.; "but it will unslacken our conscience".<sup>364</sup>

An editorial in *The New Republic* of October 31 1983, spoke of South Africa's occupation of Namibia in defiance of international law and political good sense, as well as the Botha regime's adventure in the neighboring countries of (Botswana, Angola) Lesotho and Mozambique.<sup>365</sup> During its first year in office, the Reagan administration was coming under increasingly sharp criticism from Nigeria, and a growing number of African countries, that the U.S. was trying to turn back the clock on independence of Namibia because of its support for the white-minority government in South Africa at the expense of black Africa. On April 1981, for example, the U.S. joined other Western members of the Security Council in vetoing a resolution imposing economic sanctions against South Africa.<sup>366</sup> The veto coupled with constructive engagement widened the gulf between the Reagan

<sup>364</sup> "Constructive Enragement", The New Republic, October 31, 1983, pp. 5-6.

<sup>365</sup> Ibid.

<sup>366</sup> The New York Times, May 16, 1981, P. 7.

administration and Nigeria on the issue of Namibia.<sup>367</sup> On June 19, Nigeria and other nations belonging to the Organization of African Unity unanimously endorsed a report drafted by its Liberation Committee. The panel criticized what it described as "overt and covert collusion of the United States, Britain, France, Canada and West Germany...with South African racists".<sup>368</sup>

In a similar vein, the Nigerians argue that since the Reagan victory and the emergence of constructive engagement South Africa has launched a new campaign of bannings and detentions, and has made renewed efforts to destabilize the neighboring nations in the sub-region. During a visit to Nigeria by the U.S. congressional study mission in 1982, various Nigerian officials informed the American delegation that the new South African campaign was due to Reagan's policy of constructive engagement and friendlier attitudes towards Pretoria.<sup>369</sup> Nor were the Nigerians particularly happy about the South African Springbok rugby tour of the United States during Reagan's first term in office.

Judging from their reaction to this policy, there is no doubt that the Nigerians see the U.S. government as having

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<sup>367</sup>Peter Mueshihange, Foreign Secretary of the South West African Peoples, a guerilla group fighting to make South-West Africa an independent nation of Namibia said, however, that "in spite of Reagan, or even because of him, the struggle will continue." New York Times, Friday, June 19, 1981, P. A7.

<sup>368</sup>ibid.

<sup>369</sup>U.S. Congress, House, Report of the Congressional Study Mission, Africa: Observations on the Impact of American Foreign Policy and Development Programs in Six African Countries, PP. 50-61.

the economic and political means of bringing about racial justice in South Africa; although there are limits to what America can do directly. They believe that, as the world's greatest power, the U.S. has the responsibility to be consistent with its own constitutional ideals of equality, by playing an active role in resolving the crisis in South Africa. In a recent statement, the Nigerian head of state, Major-General Muhammadu Buhari reiterated that the so-called policy of constructive engagement has failed to provide any genuine solution to the Southern African problem. The Nigerian leader indicated that the only constructive policy should be disengagement from South Africa and "the imposition of economic and military sanctions against the racists".<sup>370</sup>

Even when the so-called "conservative consensus" was evident between the Reagan administration and the Nigerian government of President Shagari, Reagan's policy of constructive engagement raised Nigerian fears of a Washington-Pretoria alliance.<sup>371</sup> The need for a better relationship between the two countries also featured prominently in the *Report of the Congressional Study Mission*

<sup>370</sup>African Research Bulletin, vol. 22 no. 1, February 15 1985, P. 7496.

<sup>371</sup>Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, vol. 14, 1981-1982, P. B513. Such alliance can take several forms, one of which is an "All Ocean" naval alliance in which South Africa would play a key role in the defense of the Cape Route as suggested by Ray Cline, executive director of World Power Studies at Georgetown University Centre for Strategic and International Studies. An "All Ocean" naval alliance would include Spain, Brazil, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, South Africa, Indonesia, South Korea and Mexico. South African Digest, April 18, 1980, P. 5.

to *Six African Countries* in 1982. First, the report recognized that "there is a genuine desire" within Nigeria, to strengthen Nigerian-American relations; concluding that "there is a great concern" about the changing policies of the United States, particularly with respect to South Africa and Namibia.<sup>372</sup> Second, the report emphasized that Nigeria's perception that the United States has abandoned its opposition to apartheid and its commitment to Namibian independence cannot be allowed to grow or America's interests in Nigeria and the continent as a whole can be seriously jeopardized. "...It is possible that U.S. investment, and trade in Nigeria, might be adversely affected by an American failure in the Namibian diplomacy, or by increased American accommodation to the apartheid regime in South Africa".<sup>373</sup>

Third, the report recommended that in the political arena, the U.S. should consult more closely with Nigeria on key African issues. Given the role that Nigeria plays as a "barometer" of African sentiment on issues that affect the continent, it stated that greater consultation with key Nigerian officials could well result in U.S. policies that better reflect African sensitivities, thereby improving the prospects for greater support among black African nations for America's African policies.<sup>374</sup>

<sup>372</sup>U.S. Congress, House, Report of the Congressional Study Mission, Africa: Observations on the Impact on American Foreign Policy and development Programs in Six African Countries, PP. 50-61.

<sup>373</sup>Ibid.

<sup>374</sup>Ibid. P. 58.

Finally, the report stressed that co-operation between Nigeria and the United States should be encouraged and strengthened with respects to trade and agriculture. The Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee (JACC), created during the Carter administration and continued under Reagan, was meant to assist Nigeria in achieving its agricultural development objectives by encouraging U.S. private sector investment in agriculture. It is now viewed as one of the major forms of Nigerian-American bilateral relations in the economic sphere. The JACC has led to the consolidation of the link between aid, trade and investment in Nigerian-American relations; for American aid to Nigerian agriculture had given rise to investments and contracts worth over \$37 million in U.S. goods and services in 1984. Another \$185 million in American products and services is expected to be realized in the foreseeable future. But this significant progress in the functional areas of trade and agriculture is not followed by the development of an effective co-operation on policies towards Southern Africa. Such co-operation is necessary given Nigeria's anxieties over constructive engagement.<sup>375</sup> On specific issues pertaining to South Africa and Namibia, Nigerian leaders think it is desirable to harmonize the foreign policies of Nigeria and the United States.<sup>376</sup> However, the lack of co-operation on the sensitive issues of Southern Africa is a

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<sup>375</sup> "Nigeria's Anxieties Over U.S. Policy", West Africa, July 27 1981, pp. 1687-1688.

<sup>376</sup> Ibid.

major problem in Nigerian-American relations. In the face of constructive engagement, such co-operation or harmonization of policies is unlikely to materialize during Reagan administration's second term.

In sum, for Nigeria, the deepening racial turmoil, mounting evidence of police brutality and imprisonment of anti-apartheid demonstrators in South Africa testify to the fact that constructive engagement has not worked to promote internal peace, security and racial harmony as anticipated by its proponents. Instead, the strategy of constructive engagement is not only a matter of great concern in Nigeria, it has, according to a recent statement by the former Nigerian head of state, "encouraged the South African government to conclude that the world believes that its recent and dubious constitutional changes mean genuine progress in solving its racial problems".<sup>377</sup> Such changes coupled with the much publicized revision of the conjugal laws (the repeal of the Mixed Marriages Act and Section 16 of the Immorality Act) deflect attention from the real issue: the denial of franchise to the majority of the population in South Africa. In its present form, the strategy of constructive engagement is incapable of recognizing the hard political fact that black South Africans, including Asians and colored, must be allowed true

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<sup>377</sup>Olusegun Obasanjo, "Africa's Needs" Foreign Policy, no. 57, Winter 1984-85, pp. 80-91; for the various options open to U.S. policy-makers see "Options for U.S. Policy Toward Africa", Foreign Policy and Defense Review, vol. 1, no. 1, 1979. The whole volume is devoted to policy options.

participation in their society before any meaningful change can occur.

Since there is little likelihood of a major change in U.S. policy towards South Africa under the present Republican administration, American relations with that country will continue to be seen in Nigeria as constituting a serious obstacle to the development of a more profitable Nigerian-American relations. The mood in Lagos is that South Africa's intransigence has only been made possible by the moral, financial and diplomatic support of the United States. Indeed, America's dilemma is how to pursue the strategy of constructive engagement without jeopardizing its relations with Nigeria, and its credibility in black Africa as a whole.

#### Top Level Exchange: Visits

In response to Nigeria's criticism of Reagan administration's tilt towards South Africa, the State Department quickly invited Nigerian Foreign Minister, Ishaya Adu, to Washington in March 1981 for talks with Secretary Haig and the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker. Adu emerged from the three-hour meeting convinced that the United States and Nigeria would co-operate in promoting racial change in South Africa, adding that Nigeria was waiting for the Reagan administration to act.<sup>378</sup> The visit by the Nigerian Foreign

<sup>378</sup>Richard Deutsch, "Reagan's Unruly Review", Africa Report, vol. 26, no. 3, May-June, 1981, pp. 23-26.



Minister was followed by Crocker's visit to Lagos in April, 1981. Crocker's visit was mainly about American diplomacy in Southern Africa, especially the Namibian issue. But his more conservative views contrasted sharply with those of Congressman Howard Wolpe who visited Lagos in August, anxious that Reagan's policy of constructive engagement with South Africa would not disturb profitable bilateral relations with Nigeria.

In September 1981, Nigerian Vice-President Alex Ekwueme met his American counterpart in Washington for talks on bilateral co-operation. During the meeting, American Vice-President George Bush singled out health care and technical teacher training as the two areas that might yield agreements. He also expected progress on a bilateral trade agreement, a tax treaty and ways of "promoting Nigerian investment opportunities and improvement in general business climate."<sup>379</sup> In addition to the areas of co-operation noted by Mr. Bush, Nigerian Vice-President Ekwueme indicated that Nigeria was particularly interested in science and technology, as well as obtaining a clear indication of the Reagan administration's position with respect to American companies importing liquefied natural gas (LPG) on which the Nigerian government had planned to spend N1.6 billion.<sup>380</sup> At a luncheon hosted by the black community in Washington, Mr. Ekwueme spoke on the subject of Namibian independence and liberation of Southern Africa as a whole. At another

<sup>379</sup> West Africa, September 21, 1981, P. 2217.

<sup>380</sup> N1.0 = US\$0.87 in September 1981.

luncheon arranged in his honor by the American National Alliance of Postal and Federal Employees in Washington, Ekwueme urged the black community in the United States to bring the cause of the oppressed people of South Africa to the attention of the Reagan administration. On economic issues, he stated that the expertise of the black Americans would be appreciated in the harnessing of the abundant resources of Nigeria. He told his audience that attempts to reach a settlement in Namibia were being frustrated because of succour and encouragement given to South Africa by those who felt that their economic and ideological interests were being cared for by the apartheid regime.<sup>381</sup> He did not say who the supporters of apartheid were, but the implications were clear. However, the visit was regarded as a success. A new agreement on Nigerian-American co-operation on health and education was signed during the visit.<sup>382</sup>

Vice-President Bush visited Nigeria in November 1982. Since there was no movement whatsoever on achieving Namibian independence, the Namibian question had become the number one issue that dominated bilateral talks between Nigeria and the United States. The object of Bush's visit was to address this issue.<sup>383</sup> In a joint communique issued in Lagos after an almost two-hour meeting between Mr. Bush and Nigerian Vice-President Ekwueme, Bush was said to have reviewed with Ekwueme efforts to remove all foreign troops from Southern

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<sup>381</sup> West Africa, September 21, 1981, P. 2160.

<sup>382</sup> Ibid.

<sup>383</sup> The Washington Post, November 13, 1982, P. A25.

Africa, a clear reference to U.S. support for the removal of Angolan-based Cuban troops as a precondition for Namibian independence. Despite the talks, both countries remained widely divided on their approaches for achieving independence for the South African-administered Namibia. In response to a reporter's question after the joint communique was issued, Bush and Ekwueme revealed the continued differences between their two governments on how best to bring about political change in Namibia, and in the Southern African government's policy of apartheid.<sup>384</sup> At a short news conference Bush stated that: "There are some differences that we ...faced up to very frankly."<sup>385</sup> Ekwueme contended that in contrast to U.S. policy, Nigeria "believes in mandatory (economic) sanctions because... that is the shortest way to get South Africa to reassess" and change the apartheid system. However, there were clear indications that Ekwueme wanted close ties with the United States despite differences over Southern Africa. He stated: "we would like American policy to change...but we will continue to hold a dialogue with the United States" on Namibia and Southern African issues in general.<sup>386</sup> However, his demand for effective action had little chance of success while the

<sup>384</sup> The Washington Post, November 14, 1982, P. A16.

<sup>385</sup> Ibid.

<sup>386</sup> Ibid. Ekwueme also said that "South African intransigence is not so much concern for the presence of (Angolan-based Cuban) troops as a ruse to further delay the independence of Namibia and what the apartheid regime itself seems to admit, the inevitable triumph of the South West African Peoples Organization in any free and fair election...we have seen the South Africans stall before".

United States, and its Western European allies continued to provide a diplomatic shield for South Africa at the United Nations. Although Reagan has frequently expressed abhorrence of the apartheid system, Washington's sense of its strategic interest far outweighs any consideration of effective action against the South African regime. Indeed, the Reagan administration, like the Carter administration before it, recognizes the strategic, economic, and political importance of South Africa to the United States. The U.S. calculation is apparently that the likelihood of change in South Africa does not yet constitute an imperative.<sup>387</sup>

Unlike Carter, Reagan has not yet visited Nigeria; although he did meet with then Nigerian President Shagari at the Cancun economic Summit in Mexico in November 2, 1981. In that brief meeting, the Nigerian President touched upon black Africa's concerns regarding Namibia and Angola. But this time it was the conflict in Chad that mattered. According to then Secretary of State Alexander Haig, President Shagari conducted a "tour de l'horizon", an overview, of the situation in Africa and emphasized his growing concern about efforts to destabilize many of the regimes on the African continent.<sup>388</sup> The discussion between Reagan and Shagari centred on the continuing presence of the Libyan forces in Chad, and the need for the formation of an O.A.U. peacekeeping force to provide an incentive for early withdrawal of those forces. The East-West implications of

<sup>387</sup>The New York Times, November 18, 1982, P. A3.

<sup>388</sup>West Africa, November 2, 1981, P. 2554.

Libyan adventurism in Chad were obvious. As far as the Reagan administration is concerned, Libya is a Soviet ally, and as Chester Crocker said in a testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "we recognize that African nations need assistance against Gaddafi's diplomacy of subversion and support for international terrorism".<sup>389</sup> Nigeria, which borders Chad, has a potential interest in the bilateral and multilateral aspects of U.S. policy towards Libya.<sup>390</sup> Nigeria was also among the friendly nations briefed by the United States about the evidence Washington claimed to have had of Libyan assassination plots against U.S. officials at home and abroad.<sup>391</sup> It was no coincidence then, that at the eve of the Cancun Summit on October 31, 1981, Nigeria pledged 2,000 troops, the largest contingent, for peacekeeping in Chad, with logistical support from the Reagan administration. On November 1, the arrival of the "pan African" peacekeeping forces in Chad was made public by the O.A.U. representative in that country. On November 2, President Weddeye of Chad called for the withdrawal of the Libyan troops. He was confident that Colonel Gaddafi would comply with his request. "We think the Libyans would pull out without any problems...I am convinced that Gaddafi would keep his words".<sup>392</sup> True, Libya did order the withdrawal of its forces from Chad. The exchange between Reagan and

<sup>389</sup>The New York Times, August 16, 1981, P. 23.

<sup>390</sup>Don Oberdorfer, "Haig, Nigerian Official Discuss Peace-Keeping Force in Chad", The Washington Post, December 11, 1981, P. A19.

<sup>391</sup>Ibid.

<sup>392</sup>West Africa, November 9, 1981, P. 2677.

Shagari was so warm, and successful, that Haig later described it as "extremely cordial and with remarkable convergence of views on all topics that were touched upon".<sup>383</sup>

### Foreign Aid

In September 1981, two technical assistance accords were signed between Nigeria and the United States: one for the training of 260 Nigerian technical educators in the United States each year, and the other providing for projects in public health, statistics, education, food and drugs as well as nursing and disease control.<sup>394</sup>

However, the principal misunderstanding in this area of relations between Nigeria and the United States during the early months of Reagan administration stemmed from the question of Nigeria's eligibility for American aid. The issue the administration had to resolve was whether Nigeria, an oil rich nation with a talented population of over 80 million and considerable natural resources could be classified as a rich country or a nation with a large growing population and rapidly depleting non-renewable resources. But as a member of the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC), Nigeria is by U.S. law not eligible for "concessional" as opposed to "re-imbursable" assistance.<sup>395</sup> Re-imbursable aid is given only when the

<sup>383</sup> West Africa, November 2, 1981, P. 2554.

<sup>394</sup> Africa Report, vol. 26, no. 6, November-December, 1981, pp. 27-28.

<sup>395</sup> Danny M. Leipziger, "The Concessionality of Foreign

recipient can pay full costs. For instance, re-imbursable services have been used to (1) train Nigerian Customs and Immigration officers in the U.S., (2) fund visits to Nigeria by U.S. environmental experts, and (3) educate Nigerian technicians at American community colleges.<sup>395</sup> When Reagan came to power, the prevailing view in Washington was that Nigeria, with its oil and petro-dollars, should pay full costs of whatever it wanted from the United States. In 1983, Princeton Lyman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, could still argue that Nigeria, as an OPEC member, was not qualified for "conventional" aid programs. He, however, conceded that the administration had not yet resolved the problem of dealing with the so-called middle income countries like Nigeria. He also pointed out that Nigeria did not need "project aid" but rather it needed assistance to meet balance of payment problems and to buy spare parts and fertilizer to rehabilitate existing

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<sup>395</sup>(cont'd) Assistance: Toward a Better Understanding of the Concept", Finance & Development, vol. 21, no. 1, March 1984, pp. 44-46. My use of the term "concessional aid" in this context is closely related to Leipziger's understanding of the concept when he writes: "to understand the definition of concessionality, consider that a \$100 loan for ten years at 4 per cent interest is 'worth' almost \$35 to a borrower who would otherwise pay 15 per cent a year to borrow from the market. Since the net value of repayments by the borrower totals \$65, the grant element benefit is \$35; to the borrower, the \$100 loan is equivalent to a \$35 grant and a \$65 loan."

<sup>396</sup>The Nigerian government, whose indebtedness to U.S. colleges and universities reached \$10 million in 1981, had arranged with the institutions concerned to pay its bills, according to Carl Herrin, a spokesman for the National Association for Foreign Student Affairs in Washington. The Washington Post, February 3, 1984, P. B11; The New York Times, September 10, 1981, P. A13.

industrial and agricultural programs.<sup>397</sup>

One is bound to agree with Aaron Segal that the rich versus poor misunderstanding in determining Nigeria's eligibility for U.S. aid was not unrelated to the huge U.S. trade deficit with Nigeria totalling over \$9 billion in 1980.<sup>398</sup> In Segal's view, Reagan cuts in bilateral and multilateral aid makes the prospects of working out a United States-Nigerian understanding on flexible aid formula unlikely. Re-imbursable aid is not only inadequate, it is argued, it simply prevents Nigerians and Americans from working together in many mutually beneficial areas.<sup>399</sup> However, the re-evaluation of the aid package to Nigeria during the Reagan administration is comparable to earlier skepticism over Nigeria's eligibility for certain types of military related aid under the Carter administration.

There is also a remarkable continuity in the nature of American aid to Nigerian agriculture. The Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee (JACC) started during the Carter administration has now developed to the point where several U.S. companies have submitted project proposals. In 1982, Crocker told the Council on Foreign Relations that JACC represented a major effort to bring American agribusiness skills to bear on Nigeria's food problem - an indication that the Reagan program of promoting private enterprise

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<sup>397</sup> The Wall Street Journal, July 14, 1983, P.30.

<sup>398</sup> Aaron Segal, "Uneasy Partners", Africa Report, vol. 27, no. 1, January-February, 1982, pp. 11-16.

<sup>399</sup> Ibid.



through aid is paying dividends in the Nigerian case.<sup>400</sup> The JACC has led to the consolidation of the link between aid, trade and investment in Nigerian-American relations; American aid to Nigerian agriculture has given rise to investments and contracts worth \$37 million in U.S. goods and services in 1984. Another \$185 million in American products and services are expected to be realized in the foreseeable future. Aid of this nature is often given to further the donor's "national interest", and the JACC under Carter and Reagan is no exemption. Aid can be given for a number of purposes, including: strategic and defense purposes; political and ideological purposes; and the donor's own economic and commercial interests sought through expanded exports or new opportunities for private investors.<sup>401</sup> In Nigerian-American relations, the success of JACC can be seen as a justification of the Carter and Reagan administration's belief in the fundamental tenet of economic liberalism, that an expanding and open international economy is still the system that best promotes prosperity for the United States. The continuation of JACC under the Reagan administration is consistent with Reagan's five-point strategy for global growth:

1. Stimulating international trade by opening up markets.
2. Tailoring particular development strategies to

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<sup>400</sup>Susan Gilpin, "Reagan's Private Sector Thrust", Africa Report, vol. 27, January-February, 1982, pp. 51-54.

<sup>401</sup>Roger D. Hansen, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Third World: Agenda 1982 (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 96-128.

- individual countries and regions.
3. Guiding assistance towards the development of self-sustaining productive capacities, particularly in food and energy.
  4. Improving the climate for private investment and transfer of technology that comes with such an investment.
  5. Creating a political atmosphere in which practical solutions can move forward.<sup>402</sup>

It should be noted that as a functional area of Nigerian-American relations, aid, like trade, is closely tied to the political and system-maintenance considerations of the United States, as evident in Reagan's five-point strategy for global growth.

### Trade

If Nigerian-American relationship was characterized by significant progress in the functional area of trade during the Carter administration, then the Reagan leadership has witnessed the growth and decline in trade between the two countries. For example, U.S. exports to Nigeria declined from a record high of \$1,523 million in 1981 to \$577 million in 1984. Imports fell from \$11.1 billion in 1980 to \$2.5 billion in 1984. (Table 5). In general, a serious down-turn in the Nigerian economy began in 1981. During that year, Nigeria's balance of trade position with the rest of the

<sup>402</sup>Gilpin, "Reagan's Private Sector Thrust", P. 51.

world also deteriorated significantly; oil income was \$17 billion, but imports continued to rise to \$24 billion - \$10 billion for merchandise imports and \$6 billion for services.<sup>403</sup>

In early 1981, Nigeria was faced with growing problems caused by a sharp reduction in its oil production due to the glut on the world market. By August 1981, Nigerian oil production had dropped from an average of 2.2 million barrels per day to 708,000 barrels per day. The slide continued into the following year. The drop in oil production and a fall in price, caused by an excess supply of crude oil by both Saudi Arabia and non-OPEC countries, had forced down Nigeria's OPEC production quota to about 650,000 barrels a day in the first half of 1982. Nigeria's foreign reserves were reduced to \$4.5 billion and then to \$3 billion which was hardly adequate to sustain two months imports.<sup>404</sup> Consequently, the government was faced with serious budgetary problems as foreign exchange earnings ran well below the cost of imports.

Things started to improve, for a short while at least, when the East-West struggle, and the politics of the African sub-system of that struggle, salvaged Nigerian oil production. Libya's alleged association with the Soviet

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<sup>403</sup>Africa South of the Sahara 1984-1985 (London: Europa Publications, 1984), pp. 666-671; United States Department of Interior, Minerals Yearbook 1983 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. government Printing Office, 1982) pp. 567-570; West Africa, February 11, 1985, p. 274.

<sup>404</sup>J.K. Onoh, The Nigerian Oil Economy: From Prosperity to Glut (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 95-97.

Union and Reagan's fear of Gaddafi led the U.S. to switch its oil imports from Libya to Nigeria. It is Reagan administration's belief that under the leadership of Colonel Gaddafi, Libya has been transformed into a leading Third World arsenal of Soviet-supplied hardware, and that Libyan arms and cash are at the centre of a skillful and sinister campaign of subversion that has become a major source of African instability.<sup>405</sup> Thus the switch from Libyan to Nigerian oil was an effective way of rallying Nigeria's support for Reagan's attempt to frustrate Soviet activities which the administration perceived as threatening American interests (and the security of Africa) in every corner of the continent. Like the Reagan administration, Nigeria was also reacting to Libya's interference in Chad and the transformation of Libya's embassy in Lagos into the so-called "People's Bureau". To the extent that Nigeria had its own reason for disapproving of Libya's activities, the common interests of the essentially conservative regimes - Shagari's and Reagan's - is thought to have served to revive Nigeria's oil production and exports during the later part of 1981 and the first few months of 1982. During this period, Nigeria's criticism of Reagan administration policies were mild and low-keyed. There were several criticisms of Nigeria's apparent passivity or its unquestionable acceptance of American policies during the

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<sup>405</sup>Chester Crocker, "Regional Strategy for Southern Africa", Department of State Bulletin, vol. 81, October 1981, pp. 24-27.

period under discussion. One such criticism claimed that Shagari's de facto acceptance of American foreign policy had made Nigeria virtually a member of NATO.<sup>406</sup> It is argued that Nigeria's ability to put the Reagan administration under pressure, on several African issues, was constrained by overall understanding, empathy, and some common interest or what some refer to as "conservative consensus" which characterized Nigerian-American relations throughout Reagan's first term. Both presidential systems were concerned about the conflict in Chad and Western Sahara, as well as populist coups in Liberia and Ghana.<sup>407</sup>

The Nigerian economy which grew rapidly between 1973 and 1981 due to the oil boom had led to soaring imports, particularly of luxury goods. However, the slump in the world market for oil which began in 1981 led to a series of strict controls. As oil production declined by about 8 per cent in 1982 following a 30 per cent drop in 1981, the country's balance of trade position further deteriorated.<sup>408</sup> Consequently, restrictions were imposed on the import of goods which are also manufactured on a significant scale in Nigeria. Imports of motor vehicles were suspended indefinitely and all unused import licences were recalled. These austerity measures were extended in 1983 when the Shagari government maintain a tight squeeze on the economy

<sup>406</sup>Colin Legum, (ed.) Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents 1982-1983 (New York: Africana, 1984), p. 545.

<sup>407</sup>Ibid.

<sup>408</sup>U.S. Department of commerce, Marketing in Nigeria, Overseas Business Reports, OBR 83-03, April 1983, p. 3.

and imposed additional controls designed to hold imports to \$11 billion a year. Experts predicted that even with a steady increase in demand for oil, it will take several years for the economy to recover from the slump of 1981-1983.<sup>409</sup> The global economic recession coupled with the over-supply of oil in the world markets caused in large part by high production levels in Saudi Arabia had a significant effect on Nigerian oil production and exports. Oil export earnings which reached a peak of (U.S.)\$22,400 million in 1980, declined to about (U.S.)\$9,600 million in 1983. Moreover, the exportable surplus of oil production was being gradually reduced by the growing domestic consumption of refined petroleum products. This development had a marked impact on Nigerian trade with the United States.

According to George Griffen, commercial counsellor at the U.S. embassy in Lagos, Nigerian oil export to the United States during the first quarter of 1983 totalled (U.S.)\$520 million. This represented a decrease of 78.3 per cent on the level of the corresponding period of 1982. Since more than 45 per cent of Nigeria's export earnings in the early 1980s came from the United States, there were indications that Nigeria's export earnings during the first three months of 1983 had fallen by about 60 per cent from the 1982's depressed figure. Owing to the decline in export and the reduced price for Nigeria's Bonny light crude oil which sold for \$30 per barrel in 1983, Nigerian oil income amounted to

<sup>409</sup>Africa South of the Sahara 1984-85 (London: Europa Publications, 1984) PP. 666-671.

only \$9.6 billion compared with \$13.2 billion in 1982.<sup>410</sup> Imports from the U.S. were \$230 million in the first quarter of 1983 compared with \$380 million in the same period of 1982. Trade between the two countries dropped by 46 per cent during this period. U. S. non-oil imports from Nigeria declined from about \$114 million in 1978 to \$4 million in 1982. (Table 5). Lack of investment in the non-petroleum sector is one of the factors preventing increase in Nigeria's more traditional exports such as cocoa, groundnuts, rubber, and palm oil. This development is likely to prevent increased earnings from these export crops in the near future, according to recent assessment by the U.S. Commerce Department.<sup>411</sup> Nigeria also dropped from being the second biggest oil supplier to the United States after Saudi Arabia in 1980 to the seventh position in 1983, far behind Mexico, Canada, Venezuela, the United Kingdom, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia.<sup>412</sup> But the fluctuating nature of trade between Nigeria and the United States in the early 1980s did not undermine Nigerian-American bilateral relations.

### Foreign Investment

In 1981, Nigerian Vice-President Ekwueme urged American investors to participate in Nigeria's Fourth National

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<sup>410</sup>United States Department of Interior, Minerals Yearbook 1983 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), pp. 567-570; West Africa, 20 June 1983, p. 1466.

<sup>411</sup>U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States, FET 85-05, January 1985, p. 8. Prepared by American Embassy, Lagos.

<sup>412</sup>West Africa, 23 April 1984, p. 890.

Development Plan (1981-1985), and called for increased U.S. investment in food production and processing in the country. In an effort to encourage foreign business to co-operate in its development plan, Nigeria also decided to ease some restrictions that had hitherto affected private investment: business travellers would henceforth be issued with multiple entry visas and lengthy licensing procedures would be expedited. The Plan offered a number of opportunities for American investment, in joint ventures with Nigerians, in such industries as cotton textiles, glass, paints, roofing sheets, machine tools, transportation and communication equipment, pharmaceuticals, petro-chemicals, electrical machinery and distribution equipment. The basic goals of the Plan were to develop Nigeria's physical and social infrastructure, as well as agricultural and industrial bases so that the country will be less dependent on the fluctuations of the world oil market. over 7,900 projects were listed in the Plan, with estimated investment totaling \$125-150 billion during the 1981-1985 period.<sup>413</sup> Efforts to encourage more U.S. investment in Nigeria continued during Reagan's first term, much as they did during the Carter administration. In January 1982, for instance, a high-level investment mission of 25 senior U.S. executives to Nigeria uncovered substantial opportunities in such sectors as agricultural commodities, agribusiness, construction,

<sup>413</sup>U.S. Department of Commerce, Nigeria: A Survey of U.S. Export Opportunities (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), pp. 5-94; Marketing in Nigeria, Overseas Business Report, OBR 83-03, April 1983, pp. 3-27.



communications, and mining. These were sectors in which profitable investment could be made. American firms were able to negotiate engineering services for a \$100 million dam, a poultry agreement for 50 million chicks, and a deal to sell 130,000 hogs. The *Washington Post* of January 22, 1982, said that an American firm was in the final stages of building a factory to make pasta from rice flour in Nigeria.<sup>414</sup>

Since 1977, as previously discussed, Nigeria and the United States have explored a number of potentially attractive investment areas such as solar energy, development of Nigerian coal, low-cost housing, and agribusiness. For example, Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical, an American firm, has established a model farm north of Lagos, and the Reagan administration has organized meetings between Nigeria and several other U.S. agribusiness firms. Yet, American reluctance to establish distribution and service facilities persists. Also pending for several years has been a major U.S. investment in liquefaction of Nigerian natural gas for export, a deal which experts say depends on the world, Nigerian and U.S. domestic gas and oil prices. The project came into being because of the discovery of large quantities of natural gas in the delta area of Southern Nigeria, some of which is associated with petroleum but is mainly in separate deposits. During the 1970s, the federal government announced its intention to construct one of the

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<sup>414</sup>The Washington Post, January 22, 1982, P. D3.

largest liquefied natural gas (LNG) plants at Bonny. The initial cost of the project was estimated at \$5 billion. But the development of an extensive network of pipelines to gather the gas and the construction of vessels to transport the LNG to foreign customers was expected to raise the cost of the project to between \$12-14 billion. The potential for foreign exchange earnings from LNG was considered to be in the same range as that of Nigeria's petroleum exports.<sup>415</sup>

In February 1980, a 20-year supply agreement was signed with a European consortium for 800 million feet of LNG per day beginning in 1984. However, the viability of the project depended, to a large extent, on the sale of a further 800 million cubic feet per day to four U.S. distributors.

Negotiations with the Carter administration broke down in 1980. Another round of negotiations this time with the Reagan administration did not result in an agreement on a suitable price for Nigerian gas.<sup>416</sup> A further setback occurred in 1981, when the Bonny LNG consortium broke up and a more modest version of the project had to be launched.<sup>417</sup>

In October 1981, an American company, Phillips Petroleum,

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<sup>415</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, Nigeria: A Country Study, Area Handbook Series, edited by Harold D. Nelson (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), pp. 139-186.

<sup>416</sup>Nigeria wanted a price comparable to the \$7.34 per million British Thermal Unit (B.T.U.) set in a 1977 agreement between American companies and Algeria. The United States maintained that the price would have to be more in line with the \$4.94 per million B.T.U. at which Canadian and Mexican gas is sold to the American consumers. A million B.T.U. is the amount of heat supplied by 1,000 cubic feet of natural gas. The New York Times, September 10, 1981, P. A13.

<sup>417</sup>Africa South of the Sahara 1984-85, 14th edition (London: Europa Publications, 1984), pp. 666-671.

technical leader of a six-company international consortium developing the liquefied natural gas industry in Nigeria said it was withdrawing from the project in early 1982; taking with it two of its subsidiaries - Phillips Petroleum Worldwide Gas Ltd. and Phillips Petroleum Gas Services Ltd.<sup>418</sup> The British Petroleum also withdrew from the Bonny LNG project in 1982, citing escalating costs and weak world market as reasons for withdrawal. A spokesman for Phillips said the withdrawal "was timed to be adjusted to the interest of the project and its participants in order to minimize any resulting delay in project development".<sup>419</sup> When the project was formed in 1978, the state-run Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) had 60 per cent ownership, Phillips and British Petroleum each had 7.5 per cent, leaving Elf Aquitaine with 5 per cent. The Nigerian government said it would continue with the project despite the withdrawal of BP and Phillips, and was consulting with four European Companies to appoint new technical managers.<sup>420</sup>

The Bonny LNG project consortium went into voluntary liquidation in early 1982. According to the statement issued by President Shagari's office, reasons for liquidation were "purely legal and financial" and "in no way implies that the government intends to abandon the development of Nigeria's abundant natural gas resources".<sup>421</sup> During the presentation

<sup>418</sup> The Wall Street Journal, September 29, 1981, P. 19.

<sup>419</sup> Ibid.

<sup>420</sup> West Africa, September 21, 1981, P. 2418.

<sup>421</sup> West Africa, February 15, 1982, P. 459.

of the federal budget later that year, President Shagari reiterated that careful study of Nigeria's financial and economic prospects for the 1990s had produced the firm conclusion that "the LNG project is strategically essential to the nation".<sup>422</sup> In an effort to boost investors' confidence, the president stated that the project would be financed largely from external sources by way of loans and equity participation. It was unclear how the project would be viable without access to the American and European markets. Nevertheless, the government set aside \$555 million towards commencement of the project in 1984, although the whole venture was "considered rather gigantic to be implemented alongside other major projects to be executed during the Fourth Plan period".<sup>423</sup> The project had to be adjusted. Three North American consulting firms were chosen for the execution of the scaled-down version of the project to be completed by 1989. The *International Bank for West Africa* was scheduled to work as local consultant with North American firms on the financial aspect of the project, while Nigerian executives handled the economic and legal aspects.<sup>424</sup>

In 1983, Nigeria was still pleading for a greater U.S. involvement in its investment plan. The appeal was made at a conference organized by First National Bank of Boston and

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<sup>422</sup> *West Africa*, November 15, 1982, P. 2937.

<sup>423</sup> U.S. Department of Commerce, *Nigeria: A Survey of U.S. Export Opportunities* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), P. 6.

<sup>424</sup> *West Africa*, May 31, 1982, P. 1479.

the African-American Institute, a U.S. government funded group. During that conference, Nigeria called on U.S. government, banking and industry officials to demonstrate faith in Nigeria's economy and to pay attention to the common interest of the two countries. Nigeria's Ambassador to the United Nations, O. O. Fafowora, said that Nigeria's expectations for U.S. investments had not been realized and that there was "considerable concern and disappointment in official circles in Nigeria over America's hesitancy".<sup>425</sup> A Nigerian official pointed to the fact that their country was on the road to recovery in 1983. Bankers with close business ties with Nigeria said the nation's foreign currency reserves climbed to \$2 billion in April 1983, from a low of \$600 million in December 1982. Yet, this increase was not enough to re-assure the confidence of American investors in Nigerian economy.<sup>426</sup> Uncertainty about Nigeria's ability to pay its trade bills amounting to over \$3 billion in 1983, and its ability to continue to find customers for its high-grade oil remained a worry for potential American investors.

For obvious reasons, American investors failed to show any significant new enthusiasm about committing assets to Nigeria, especially in sectors other than petroleum. In the construction industry, for example, American firms had trouble understanding the bidding process, working with

<sup>425</sup>The Wall Street Journal, July 14, 1983, p. 30.

<sup>426</sup>United States Department of the Interior, Minerals Yearbook 1983 (Washington DC.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), pp. 567-571.

Nigerian Banks, and establishing good relations with a local partner. On the other hand, the Nigerians generally see U.S. companies as too expensive: "they tend to employ too many non-Americans due to the cost factor; they take too long to finish the project".<sup>427</sup> The Commerce Department also noted that "U.S. companies have not won many contracts and due to combination of causes many left Nigeria in 1978".<sup>428</sup> It recommended that those firms interested in pursuing investment opportunities in Nigeria should focus above all on affiliating with the best possible Nigerian partner. Throughout the two-day conference in Boston, the debate over U.S. government and private investment in Nigeria focused on three broad issues. First, American business executives complained about Nigeria's slow decision-making processes, and the difficulties involved in obtaining import licences in Nigeria. But Joe T.F. Iyala, chairman of the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research refused to accept the view that the Nigerian bureaucracy was any worse than the Chinese or Japanese systems which he thought the U.S. companies were willing to put up with.<sup>429</sup> Second, Richard L. Kramer, managing partner of Arthur Anderson & co., described foreign exchange controls as "the single biggest disincentive for American investors, particularly with periodic balance of payment problems."<sup>430</sup> Third, a Bechtel

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<sup>427</sup> U.S. Department of Commerce, Nigeria: A Survey of U.S. Export Opportunities, P. 56.

<sup>428</sup> Ibid.

<sup>429</sup> The Wall Street Journal, July 14, 1983, P. 30.

<sup>430</sup> Ibid.

Group executive complained about corruption in Nigeria, arguing that the frequent demands for *dash* or bribes obstructed investment in Nigeria. Ambassador Fafowora conceded that corruption was a problem, and one that the Nigerian government had been fighting to contain. Other obstacles facing the American investor in Nigeria include limitations on repatriation of earnings, expatriate quotas, conflicting priorities among ministries, and constant issuance of retroactive decrees changing investment terms. The U.S. Commerce Department has advised potential investors that during the investment process, "the assistance of Nigerian partner is important to monitor the decision process and obtain necessary assistance from contacts in smoothing out any bottlenecks which may be encountered".<sup>431</sup>

While the declared policy of indigenization discussed earlier remained unchanged, the Shagari administration had re-scheduled some enterprises principally to attract greater flow of foreign investment into certain identified sectors. Investment promotion was stepped up in Nigeria and the United States. Forty feasibility studies to be made available to investors were commissioned. The *Investment*

<sup>431</sup>U.S. Department of Commerce, Marketing in Nigeria, OBR 83-03, 1983, PP. 26-27. On the specific issue of repatriation of earnings, remittances of profits and dividends can be made subject to any ceilings imposed by Nigerian law and subject to approval from the Ministry of Finance. Foreigners employed in Nigeria are allowed to remit up to 50 per cent of their net income on a monthly basis. When leaving Nigeria, such employees may remit their surplus Naira earnings provided that the authorities are satisfied that the amount to be repatriated is "reasonable" in terms of the individual's personal living expenses while in Nigeria.

*Information and Promotion Centre* continued to provide information concerning partnership in joint ventures.<sup>432</sup> In 1982, the federal government listed certain priority sectors to be favoured in the allocation of investment incentives:

(a) agribusiness and food processing industries,<sup>433</sup> (b) building materials industries,<sup>434</sup> (c) engineering and transport industries,<sup>435</sup> (d) chemical industries<sup>436</sup> (e) scientific instruments,<sup>437</sup> (f) telecommunication equipment and manufacturing,<sup>438</sup> (g) electrical and electronic manufacturing industries,<sup>439</sup> and (h) household equipment and furniture.<sup>440</sup> The incentives to be given to potential investors in these sectors include (1) automatically approved-user status by which some inputs can be imported duty free, (2) pioneer status in which the enterprise is given a three to five year tax holiday, (3) accelerated

<sup>432</sup>West Africa, October 4, 1982, P. 2561.

<sup>433</sup>For example, cattle ranching and meat processing, dairy industries, fruit growing and fruit juice production, rice plantation and milling, sugar complexes, plantation and processing of cocoa, groundnuts, coffee and cotton.

<sup>434</sup>Cement factories, roofing-sheet production of various types, ceiling materials, door locks, hinges, knobs, floor and wall tiles, linoleum, plumbing materials, steel pipes, faucets heads, bathtubs, wash basins, paints, window frames, and fittings such as louvres and panes.

<sup>435</sup>For example, manufacture of component parts for the vehicle-assembly plants, metal-working and plant-maintenance industries.

<sup>436</sup>Particularly pharmaceutical industries. Also industrial chemicals and down-stream petro-chemical products.

<sup>437</sup>This includes educational equipment manufacturing industries concerned with the manufacture of school and medical laboratory equipment.

<sup>438</sup>Telephone cables and receivers, intercom outfits.

<sup>439</sup>For example, electric fans, air conditioners, refrigerators and freezers, light bulbs and fluorescent tubes, elevators and escalators, musical instruments, radio and television sets with locally manufactured components.

<sup>440</sup>West Africa, October 11, 1982, P. 2636.



depreciation of capital investment, (4) protection from imports, and (5) excise tax reduction for substantial increases in local value added.<sup>441</sup>

United States direct investment in all industries in Nigeria increased from \$219 million in 1981 to \$516 million in 1983.<sup>442</sup> However, the figure for 1983 was less than the \$535 million recorded for 1975. (Table 6). There was some increase in direct investment in the manufacturing sector: from \$76 million in 1981 to \$92 million in 1983. But U.S. investment in the oil industry slowed down in 1983 as American and Western oil companies paused to assess the future of the world demand for oil and their own potential in Nigeria. In general, the larger established companies like Mobil, Gulf and Royal Dutch Shell were concentrating on development and up-grading of productivity on the existing fields. On the other hand, companies with less extensive holdings such as Texaco, Elf and Agip were investing in the future through ambitious exploration and development programs. In the iron and steel industry, two U.S. firms, FIDCO and Bethlehem Steel are currently involved in a joint partnership in a \$1.2 billion steel fabrication plant near Abeokuta. This plant produces a number of steel products and is planning to move into steel needs of the railways and

<sup>441</sup> Ibid.

<sup>442</sup> U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1984. The figures represent the book value of investors equity in Nigerian industries "plus loans outstanding to their Nigerian affiliates". They do not describe the value of U.S. corporate assets of plant and equipment expenditures in Nigeria. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Marketing in Nigeria, P. 25.

construction industries. Experts agree that Nigeria's ambitions in developing the iron and steel industries are based on the desire to attain self-sufficiency in many industrial and consumer goods, and to save large sums of foreign exchange.<sup>443</sup>

In an article, "Uneasy Partners", published in *Africa Report* in 1982, Aaron Segal observed that "the American businessman in Nigeria is subject to a much stricter U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act than any of his competitors".<sup>444</sup> He continued: "selling to or doing business in Nigeria is no picnic. Few U.S. firms except the seven oil companies have been willing to invest the time and capital to penetrate the Nigerian market".<sup>445</sup> Indeed, American investment in Nigeria has substantially lagged behind other aspects of Nigerian-American relations such as trade, political, educational, and cultural exchanges. Although total U.S. investment reached \$516 million in 1983, it was still below the amount the U.S. invested in South Africa. Few U. S. firms have shown interest in the oil refining and petro-chemical sub-sectors, given the requirement that the NNPC must hold majority of shares in any new venture.

American firms maintain that without a guarantee of higher

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<sup>443</sup>U.S. Department of Commerce, Nigeria: A Survey of U.S. Export Opportunities PP. 60-61. The cornerstone of Nigeria's iron and steel industry is the Nigerian-American joint venture in the steel fabrication plant near Abeokuta, the blast furnace plant at Ajaokuta built by the Soviet Union, and a direct reduction plant at Aladja near Warri which was built by a consortium of Germans and Austrians.

<sup>444</sup>Africa Report, vol. 27, no. 1, January-February, 1982, PP. 11-16.

<sup>445</sup>Ibid.

Nigerian oil production and exportable surplus, investment in refining and petro-chemicals is unattractive. Segal has suggested that the major opportunities for the U.S. to reduce its trade deficit with Nigeria is through investment in Nigerian research and development facilities. These investments, it is argued, will generate further imports of U.S. high technology and accompanying services; or that U.S. firms can increase their usefulness to Nigeria by participating in the establishment of Nigerian research capability, especially in the agribusiness industry. "A possible goal would be for each of the U.S. multinationals with \$10 million or more invested in Nigeria to establish a local research center, affiliated where possible with a Nigerian University or technical college".<sup>446</sup> Evidence indicates that U.S. advantage lies in the high technology area, including agribusiness rather than in light manufacturing or assembly operations such as automobiles.

Some argue that indigenization of business, often through combined government and private sector holdings was substantially completed in the 1970s. The 1980s is expected to be a decade in which Nigeria initiates manufacturing for export (principally refined petroleum, petro-chemicals and consumer durables) to its West African neighbors. It is also a crucial period for increasing Nigerian production of foodstuffs lest a food import bill that had reached \$1.5 billion in 1982 become unmanageable, politically as well as

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<sup>446</sup>Ibid.

economically.<sup>447</sup> President Shagari placed much emphasis on the development of agriculture and had instituted a program known as the "Green Revolution". The President's intention was to increase domestic food production by liberalizing investment policies in that sector. Resources devoted to the implementation of the program from both the federal budget of 1981 and the Fourth National Development Plan were substantial. For example, of the government's budget of \$22.8 billion, nearly 13 per cent or \$2.9 billion was devoted to agriculture and water resources during the Plan period.<sup>448</sup>

Nigeria's investment policy in the agricultural sector closely approximates Reagan's private sector initiative. In an attempt to find the right policy mix for accelerated production in both commercial and traditional sectors, Nigeria's food strategy places more emphasis on the smallholder and "minimum reliance on government companies and parastatals in direct production and distribution of food".<sup>449</sup> The Committee which was established during the Carter administration, and supported by Reagan, has been a

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<sup>447</sup>Segal, "Uneasy Partners", P.14.

<sup>448</sup>"Agricultural Situation in Nigeria", Africa Report, vol. 27, no. 1, January-February 1982, pp. 39-41. The "Green Revolution", essentially a publicity campaign for farming, is aimed mainly at encouraging small farmers and enticing people back to the land, since it is the small farmers that are the backbone of the industry and the efficient producers that are most likely to enable the country to attain self-sufficiency in food supplies.

<sup>449</sup>Maurice J. Williams, "Towards a Food Strategy for Africa", Africa Report, vol. 28, no. 5, September-October 1983, pp. 22-26; U.S. Department of Commerce, Nigeria: A Survey of U.S. export Opportunities, P.6.

leader in promoting U.S. private investment and encouraging joint ventures in all sectors of the Nigerian agriculture. One American company that has had considerable exposure to crop production and fish farming in Bendel state of Nigeria is Tiffany Industries. The company's successful enterprises in developing large commercial farms has been built on wide ranging experience in clearing lands, agricultural experiments and respectable harvests. Since the agricultural sector continues to be of crucial importance in providing employment for over half of Nigeria's total work force, food to meet the needs of ever-increasing population, and raw materials for the expanding industrial sector, the government has introduced additional incentives to increase private investment. The government bears up to 50 per cent of the cost of private sector agricultural projects and hopes to attract the interest of American investors under the auspices of the Nigerian-American Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee.<sup>450</sup> Furthermore, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Nigerian Association of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Mining and Agriculture, have signed an agreement to form the U.S.-Nigerian Business Council which will exchange information and act to improve economic co-operation between the United States and Nigeria.<sup>451</sup> As part of the liberalization measures, foreign investors in the agricultural business can now own up to 60 per cent of

<sup>450</sup> Africa South of the Sahara 1984-85, (14th ed., London: Europa Publications, 1984), pp. 666-671.

<sup>451</sup> U.S. Department of Commerce, Marketing in Nigeria, OBR 83-03, April 1983, P.4.

the equity.<sup>452</sup> American investors, and their Nigerian counterparts, see this as a clear effort by the government to attract investments in the high-priority agricultural field.

American investment in Nigerian agriculture is directed towards the establishment of river basin authorities, among others. These authorities are involved in the development of comprehensive integrated projects covering water resources, flood control, erosion, water shed management, the construction and maintenance of dams, dykes, wells and bore holes, irrigation and drainage systems, water for livestock, urban and rural water supplies, pollution controls, village resettlement, fisheries development, river navigation, and hydro-electric generation. Many countries are interested in the project, but the United States has had an early start with USAID having participated in the planning of the Kano River Basin. Recognizing the role of foreign investment in the development of agriculture, the United States and Nigeria signed a memorandum of understanding aimed at facilitating agricultural projects of mutual interest. The two countries have also established a Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee composed of public and private sector representatives, whose aims to promote contact between Nigeria and American investors, as well as increasing output in the agricultural field.<sup>453</sup>

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<sup>452</sup>West Africa, March 22, 1983, P. 807.

<sup>453</sup>U.S. Department of Commerce, Nigeria: A Survey of U.S. Export Opportunities, PP. 66-67.

Such efforts were not restricted to the agricultural field. Addressing the quarterly meeting of the industrial group of the Lagos Chamber of Commerce in 1982, Alhaji Abdulkadir Ahmed, Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, reminded his audience that the fiscal incentives and protective measures were intended to enable farmers and manufacturers to increase output and productivity.<sup>454</sup> But the expected level of foreign and domestic investments did not materialize because 1982, in particular, was a year of poor earnings and depressed share prices quoted on the Nigerian stock exchange. In October, Hayfold Alile, the Director General of the Nigerian Stock Exchange, told the Manufacturers' Association of Nigeria that due to poor performance and consequent fall in share prices, many companies were selling shares at below par value, while many shares had been on offer without finding buyers. He added that foreign partners were not willing to commit further capital to Nigerian investment.<sup>455</sup> The low level of American investment in Nigeria during Reagan first term was due to several factors: including reluctance to invest, or apparent unwillingness to go beyond the petroleum sector to examine investment opportunities in other sectors of the Nigerian economy. The decline of the oil market since the beginning of 1982 and the drop in oil prices had adverse impact on potential investment in Nigerian economy. Investors' confidence reached a low point as Nigeria's oil-based

<sup>454</sup> West Africa, October 25, 1982, P. 2797.

<sup>455</sup> West Africa, November 1, 1982, P. 2849.

economy was thrown into disarray during the 1982-1984 period. The negative effects of prolonged global recession caused uncertainties that weakened American investment in Nigeria, in spite of positive incentives offered by the government.

In sum, good bilateral relations between Lagos and Washington during the late 1970s and early 1980s did not yield immediate results in terms of greater American share of the Nigerian investment market, for reasons already discussed, despite attempts by both countries to push the frontiers of U.S. involvement in Nigerian economy. But the political significance of U.S. policy can not be denied.

#### Decisions: Testing U.S.-African Ties Under Reagan

America's African policy under the Reagan administration, like under Carter, underwent their harshest test when the United Nations called for specific actions in relation to Africa. For example, between 1982 and 1984, the U.S. delegates to the United Nations either voted against or abstained from several resolutions dealing with one of the principal issues confronting African politics in the late twentieth century, notably, apartheid in South Africa. Some of the resolutions discussed in Table 8 were concerned with issues such as (1) campaign against apartheid, (2) apartheid in sports, (3) dissemination of information on apartheid, (4) arms embargo, (5) elimination of all forms of racial discrimination, and (6) activities of foreign economic and



other interests in South Africa. The decisions embodied in these resolutions and the U.S. and Nigerian positions on them are important in themselves: not only do they enable one to test America's African policy, they also touch on key issues in American foreign policy, and point to some of the factors affecting Nigerian-American bilateral ties.

Table 8U.S. and Nigerian Votes on Resolutions  
Adopted by the United Nations.

The votes are shown under appropriate columns using the following keys: Y-Yes, N-No, A-Abstain, M-did not participate.

Resolution	Title	US	N	Date
39/29	Declaration on the Critical Economic Situation in Africa. (calls for emergency measures and long term strategies to alleviate the "rapidly deteriorating situation" of the continent)	Y	Y	3.12.84
39/72 B	Campaigns Against Apartheid. (the resolution authorized the U.N. Special Committee on Apartheid to organize conferences, seminars, and to assist campaigns against apartheid.)	N	Y	13.12.84
39/72 D	Apartheid in Sports. (the resolution authorized the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of International Convention Against Apartheid in Sports to continue its work with a view to submitting the draft convention to the Assembly at its 1985 session.)	A	Y	13.12.84

Table 8 - Continued.

Resolution	Title	US N Date
39/72 E	Dissemination of Information on Apartheid. (appealed to governments, information media, non-governmental organizations and individuals to lend their co-operations to the United Nations in disseminating information on "atrocities and crimes" committed by the by the apartheid regime.)	A Y 13.12.84.
39/72 G	Arms Embargo. (the resolution urged the the Security Council to consider the adoption of effective mandatory sanctions against South Africa, to take steps for the strict implementation of the mandatory arms embargo, and to secure an end to military and nuclear co-operation with South Africa and the impont of military equipment and supplies from South Africa.)	N Y 13.12.84

Table 8 - Continued.

Resolution	Title	US N	Date
A/C.3/39/L.9	Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. (this draft resolution dealt with the report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.)	N Y	9.11.84
A/37/23/ (Part III) /Add.1	Activities of Foreign economic and other Interests in Southern Africa. (addressed a number of issues concerned with foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the U.N. declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and efforts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination in Southern Africa.)	N Y	26.10.82

Table 8 - Continued.


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Resolution	Title	US N	Date
A/C.3/39/L.17	Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Second decade to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination; Report of the Secretary-General. (referred to the draft Plan of activities for the period 1985-1989, the second decade to combat racism and racial discrimination.)	M Y	8.11.84

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Source: UN Chronicle, Vol. 21, Nos. 10/11, November-December 1984, pp. 16-22; United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, Thirty-Ninth Session, Third Committee, 34th Meeting, (A/C.3/39/SR.34), November 8, 1984, pp. 2-17; General Assembly, Official Records, Thirty-Ninth Session, Third Committee, 35th Meeting, (A/C.3/39/SR.35), November 9, 1984, pp. 2-8; General Assembly, Official Records, Thirty-Seventh Session, Fourth Committee, 8th Meeting, (A/C.4/37/SR.8), October 25, 1982, pp. 4-6.

N = Nigerian Votes.  
 US = United States Votes.

In December 1984, the U.N. General Assembly adopted resolution 39/29 on the economic situation in Africa. The resolution, which was adopted by consensus, called for emergency relief measures and long-term strategies to aid the continent. Nigeria, like most countries which supported the resolution, or participated in the Assembly debate on the crisis in Africa, attributed Africa's economic crisis to several factors, including (1) the failure of food and agricultural sectors to keep pace with Africa's food requirements, (2) the adverse international economic environment which had manifested itself in declining export earnings arising from the fall in commodity prices, (3) the decline in official development assistance in real terms, and (4) the escalation of interest rates on commercial loans.<sup>456</sup> The U.S. also supported the resolution, stating that "the grim images from death from starvation...coming out of Africa have moved the compassion of the people of the United States".<sup>457</sup> The Reagan administration said it was providing an additional \$10 million in emergency food aid to Ethiopia. Another \$45 million in emergency food assistance went to Kenya, Mozambique, and Mali. On the whole American food aid to Africa had increased by an impressive figure of 175 per cent in 1984.<sup>458</sup> However it was not quite clear whether the Reagan administration was prepared to go beyond relief efforts to address some of the root causes of African

<sup>456</sup>UN Chronicle, Vol. 21, Nos. 10/11, November-December, 1984, P. 12.

<sup>457</sup>Ibid. P. 14.

<sup>458</sup>Ibid.

crisis enumerated by Nigeria. For Nigeria, the African crisis is part and parcel of global economic crisis, the solution to which requires structural adjustment at the national and international levels. In 1984, Nigeria's representative to the United Nations, Alhaji Mohammed Bello, stated quite explicitly that "the deepening global economic crisis makes it ever clearer that the world is dealing not with a mere cyclical phenomenon but with the problems of structural maladjustment that require global and integrated solutions".<sup>459</sup> He acknowledged that the economic situation in Africa is critical; that one of the major prerequisites for the continent's economic recovery is to secure a substantial flow of external finance.<sup>460</sup>

However, it was doubtful whether the Reagan administration would support Nigeria's assertion that a permanent solution to African problem can not be found without a structural adjustment in the international economic system. According to Nigeria, evidence that such an adjustment is needed is based on the fact that (a) the terms of trade of African developing countries had declined by more than 50 per cent during the 1977-1981 period, (b) the fall in commodity prices has had a devastating effect in Africa; for example, coffee, one of Africa's leading exports

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<sup>459</sup> UN Chronicle, Special Supplement, March 1984, P. 30.

<sup>460</sup> Ibid. Furthermore, Bello stated that the "multilateral spirit is on the wane, and there is little advantage in undue recourse to bilateralism, which has heightened the tendency to allocate assistance on the basis of strategic East/West considerations that are completely irrelevant to the needs of the developing countries".

now buys less than half of the imports it did in 1976, and (c) total development assistance from multilateral agencies has been declining since 1980, while debt service obligations of Sub-Saharan African countries rose by 25 per cent in 1982. According to World Bank estimates, the ratio of debt service to export earnings for low income African countries increased from 8.8 per cent in 1980 to 28.3 per cent in 1982.<sup>461</sup> Although the Lagos Plan of Action, which envisaged a total investment of \$21.4 billion for the 1980-1985 period, provided a framework for national action aimed at resolving economic and social crisis in Africa, Nigeria still sees the need for structural adjustment and a greater role for the United States.<sup>462</sup>

From its inception, the Lagos Plan represented the determination of Nigeria and other African states to resolve Africa's economic problems through the adoption of long-term strategies or what they aptly described as a "far-reaching regional approach based primarily on collective

<sup>461</sup> UN Chronicle, Vol. 21, March 1984, pp. v-xii.

<sup>462</sup> Ibid. The Lagos Plan of Action, which was adopted by African Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity in April 1980, sets out six basic guidelines to encourage economic growth: (1) using African resources principally to meet the needs and purposes of African peoples, (2) basing development and growth on a combination of Africa's natural and human resources and shifting away from its almost total reliance on the export of raw materials, (3) cultivating the "virtue of self-reliance", (4) mobilizing its entire human and material resources for development, (5) pursuing economic, social and cultural activities to mobilize the strength of each country and sharing by states of benefits derived from development, and (6) pursuing efforts towards African economic integration to create a "continent-wide framework for the much needed economic co-operation for development" based on collective self-reliance.



self-reliance".<sup>463</sup> The Plan provides, from an African point of view, relevant policy positions and a specific framework for restructuring and transforming the African food and agricultural sector, including other sectors such as industry, natural resources, environment, energy, human resources, transportation, communications, science and technology. But implementation of the Plan ran into difficulties in the early 1980s. In 1983, Nigeria's Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Secretary of Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and special representative of the UN Secretary-General on the African crisis, told the General Assembly's Second Committee in November that implementation of the Lagos Plan was in jeopardy. He declared that African economic conditions were rapidly deteriorating; saying that "for Africa to be able to arrest the present economic trends and survive economically, the injection of massive external support is imperative".<sup>464</sup> Evidence increasingly points to the fact that external support and the development of long-term strategies, as advocated in the Lagos Plan and the UN General Assembly resolution 39/29 of December 1984, are necessary to resolve the crisis in Africa. The Reagan administration support for resolution 39/29 was commendable, although there were no concrete policies to back up such support despite its earlier statement regarding America's commitment to lend its "influence, resources, and diplomatic ability", to help address African problems or contribute to

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<sup>463</sup>Ibid.

<sup>464</sup>Ibid.

the development of African economies.<sup>465</sup>

During the debates on resolutions 39/72 B, 39/72 D, 39/72 E, and 39/72 G, many speakers called for total isolation of the Pretoria regime in the political, diplomatic, consular, economic, commercial, financial, military, cultural, scientific and sports fields. Nigeria supported all four resolutions and the call for comprehensive sanctions against South Africa made by the General Assembly, criticizing the United States policy of constructive engagement as nothing more than open support for the regime in Pretoria. Joseph Garba, Nigerian UN representative and chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid voiced the sentiments of a number of speakers when he stated that American policy of constructive engagement had proved to be an "unmitigated disaster" because of its co-operation with South Africa.<sup>466</sup> Unlike Nigeria, the U.S. did not support those resolutions. Although the Reagan administration claimed to abhor injustice, opposed violations of human rights and human dignity, it, however, believed that expressions of concern about the situation in South Africa or criticism of the regime at the world forum would not solve the problem of apartheid. In apparent response to Nigeria's criticism of U.S. policy, the Reagan administration stated that since neither criticism nor

<sup>465</sup>Africa Report, vol. 25, no. 5, September-October, 1984, P. 6; Chester A. Crocker, "Strengthening U.S.-African Relations", Department of State Bulletin, No. 81, August 1981, pp. 57-58.

<sup>466</sup>UN Chronicle, vol. 21, Nos. 10/11, November-December 1984, P. 18.

military action could resolve the problem, its policy of constructive engagement was designed to encourage contact and dialogue among the contending forces.<sup>467</sup> But it was perfectly clear, even before the end of Reagan's first term, that as a policy strategy constructive engagement was of questionable utility.

Reagan administration was faced with a dilemma concerning the draft resolution A/C.3/39/L.9 entitled "Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination". For despite the claims that the United States was firmly opposed to apartheid and all forms of racism and racial discrimination, the administration did not even come close to accepting the definition of apartheid embodied in the document, for reasons discussed below. Nor did the administration come up with an acceptable definition of its own. In the United Nations Third Committee meeting of November 9, 1984, the United States voted against the draft resolution A/C.3/39/L.9 because of a formulation defining apartheid as a "crime against humanity".<sup>468</sup> The American delegation was probably afraid of the fact that such definition might extend to other phenomena such as Zionism. The delegation claimed that the definition was a controversial one; and that such definition had no place in a draft resolution which dealt with the report of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. A

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<sup>467</sup>Ibid. P. 19.

<sup>468</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, Thirty-Ninth Session, Third Committee, 35th Meeting, (A/C.3/39/SR.35), December 9, 1984, PP. 2-6.

slightly similar reasoning guided the U.S. position on resolution A/C.3/39/L.17. The U.S. delegation did not participate in the adoption by consensus of draft resolution A/C.3/39/L.17 because of an item in the document directly equating Zionism with racism.<sup>469</sup> In the specific case of resolution A/C.3/39/L.9, the Nigerian delegation, unlike that of the United States, had no problem with the legal definition of apartheid embodied in the document. For Nigeria, apartheid was, and still is, clearly a "crime against humanity" as reaffirmed in the text of the draft resolution A/C.3/39/L.9.<sup>470</sup> It should be noted that despite its negative vote for resolution A/C.3/39/L.9, the U.S. could still maintain that (1) the history of the United States was one of struggle at home and abroad against all forms of racial, cultural, and political intolerance, (2) the American constitution forbade intolerance, and (3) the U.S. has carried on a remarkable and largely peaceful legal and social revolution to ensure equality of opportunity for all Americans. Evidence of what has been achieved, as one U.S. delegate to the United Nations saw it, is the fact that

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<sup>469</sup> The traditional U.S. position is to reject any statement equating the two. This has been the case since UN Resolution 339(XXX) equating Zionism with racism was first adopted in 1975. Thus by refusing to participate in the deliberations leading up to the adoption of draft resolution A/C.3/39/L.17, the Reagan administration was simply falling back to the established U.S. position on resolutions dealing with the activities to combat racism and racial discrimination, despite claims to the contrary.

<sup>470</sup> This definition was not new to the world community since the General Assembly had previously adopted a similar definition in the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.

the United States has emerged as a nation of all races, religions and creeds, a nation of immigrants from every country on the globe.<sup>471</sup>

The Fourth Committee meeting of October 1982 dealt with the issue of foreign economic activities in Southern Africa. By supporting the draft resolution contained in document A/37/23/(Part III)/Add.1 that resulted from that meeting, Nigeria firmly believed that foreign economic and military activities constituted a major obstacle to decolonization and elimination of racial discrimination in Southern Africa. Furthermore, from the Nigerian point of view, "the activities of the Western transnational corporations" had indeed impeded the independence of Namibia. As a Nigerian delegate to the United Nations put it: "the national independence of Namibia could not be sacrificed on the altar of extraneous ideological and economic interests".<sup>472</sup> During the Committee meeting of October 20, 1982, the Nigerian UN representative, Mr. Abubakar, drew the attention of the international community to the need to isolate South Africa, and deplored the fact that South Africa continued to enjoy membership in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in spite of several UN resolutions. Nigeria called on the World Bank and the IMF to reject South Africa's application for a credit of \$1.7 billion, suggesting that

<sup>471</sup>United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, Fortieth Session, Third Committee, 8th Meeting, (A/C.3/40/SR.8), October 11, 1985, pp. 11-13.

<sup>472</sup>United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, Thirty-Ninth Session, Fourth Committee, 5th Meeting, (A/C.4/39/SR.5), October 18, 1984, pp. 2-3.

granting the loan in question would be tantamount to prolonging the sufferings of the innocent victims of apartheid.<sup>473</sup> But the Bank and the Fund went ahead with the loan. Elsewhere, Nigeria called for international action against the transnational corporations operating in South Africa and the imposition of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions.<sup>474</sup> More importantly, Nigeria called on the United States government to cancel its approval of the request by seven corporations to provide technical and maintenance services to a nuclear power installation in South Africa. The Nigerian government opposed the U.S. approval on the ground that it was granted despite South African refusal to allow inspection and verification of its nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).<sup>475</sup> In response to Nigeria's assertion concerning American activities in the nuclear field, the U.S. admitted that it was true that one American company had a contract to perform maintenance services for the nuclear reactor at a South African electrical generating plant, but insisted that (1) the services were under IAEA safeguards, (2) the plant, which was also subject to IAEA verification, was a purely civilian facility sold to South Africa by a country other than the United States, and (3) the South African nuclear reactor,

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<sup>473</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, Thirty-Seventh Session, Fourth Committee, 5th Meeting, (A/C.4/37/SR.5), October 20, 1982, P. 8.

<sup>474</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, Fortieth Session, Third Committee, 9th Meeting, (A/C.3/40/SR.9), October 14, 1985, PP. 9-10.

<sup>475</sup> UN Chronicle, Special Supplement, March 4, 1984, P. 30.

because of its design, could not be used for military purposes.<sup>476</sup> The country that sold the reactor to South Africa was not named, nor was there any evidence to substantiate the view that the South African nuclear reactor could not be used for military purposes. On this issue, the United States and Nigeria were poles apart.

The U.S. voted against resolution A/37/23(Part III)/Add.1 because the document made no distinction between the situation in small non-self-governing territories and those in Namibia and South Africa. Consequently, the U.S. delegation contended that the draft resolution was flawed not only in many of its specific provisions but above all in its fundamental premise. Thus according to this view it was simply not true that the activities of foreign economic interests were inevitably detrimental to the course of reform in Southern Africa, as the Nigerian position on the issue implied.<sup>477</sup>

Overall, the United States is convinced that (1) the activities of foreign economic interests or its economic and commercial involvement in Southern Africa could act as one of several instruments of change in the region because it

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<sup>476</sup>United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, Thirty-Ninth Session, Fourth Committee, 11th Meeting, (A/C.4/39/SR.11), October 26, 1984, pp. 3-4.

<sup>477</sup>United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, Thirty-Seventh Session, Fourth Committee, 8th Meeting, (A/C.4/37/SR.8), October 25, 1982, pp. 4-6. "The increasingly intense efforts of developing countries to attract foreign investment dramatized their belief that the activities foreign economic interests could enhance the welfare of their citizens and contribute to the progress of their societies".

opens the path to modernization, (2) economic and political freedoms are inexorably linked, and (3) restriction of foreign economic activities would harm South Africa's economy and deprive blacks of their most important tool in the struggle for justice in that country. A related assumption is that apartheid could be eliminated and a new society brought about by keeping open the line of communication with the South African government. That was the position clearly stated by Secretary of State Schultz in his remarks, on October 1985, in New York before members of the Organization of African Unity.<sup>478</sup> The U.S. officials pointed to the fact that their government had strongly encouraged American corporations to adhere to guidelines such as the Sullivan Principles, which sought to eliminate discrimination in the work-place, in the organization and formal recognition of trade unions, as well as equality in the payment of salaries. It is a program designed to hire, train, and promote non-white workers in American-owned companies in South Africa on a non-discriminatory basis. In 1985, the U.S. announced that it would not aid any American company which did not adhere to the Sullivan Principles.<sup>479</sup>

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<sup>478</sup>United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, Fortieth Session, Third Committee, 8th Meeting, (A/C.3/40/SR.8), October 11, 1985, pp. 11-13.

<sup>479</sup> Ibid. A code known as the Sullivan Principles has been in existence long before Reagan came to power. Mr. Sullivan, a veteran of civil rights campaigns, formulated the principles which took his name after a humiliating personal search by security officials during an overnight stay in Johannesburg in 1975. The code is revised occasionally to take account of new political developments. Under the provisions of the code, companies may not discriminate by race, must train blacks for supervisory positions, and must



The U.S. believes that both the Sullivan principles and the presence of American corporations in South Africa has already brought substantial improvement in the lives of many black South Africans. In the UN Third Committee meeting of October 1985, the U.S. delegation pointed out that between 1982 and 1984 the number of black South Africans enrolled in employment and training programs paid for by American businesses had increased from 4,295 to 27,940. That since 1980, American companies had spent nearly half a billion dollars on educational and training programs for black South Africans and nearly \$32 million to improve the health and living conditions of their employees in that country.<sup>480</sup> However, the efficacy of the activities of foreign economic interests or America's economic involvement, as an agent of change, has been grossly exaggerated given the deepening crisis in South Africa and growing frustration in Washington over the lack of progress towards the dismantling of apartheid. America's African policy is not working the way Reagan administration officials thought it would.

In 1985, the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives pressured the White House for action in the form of

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<sup>479</sup>(cont'd) take steps to improve health and living standards of black employees. The code has exercised great influence on American corporate dealings with South Africa. About 150 of the 350 U.S. companies operating in South Africa have signed the Sullivan principles and others generally adhere to them. The code has no formal status and there are no penalties for ignoring it other than what one observer described as "political opprobrium". Africa Research Bulletin, September 30, 1985, P. 7874.

<sup>480</sup>United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, Fortieth Session, Third Committee, 8th Meeting, (A/C.3/40/SR.8), October 11, 1985, P. 12.

sanctions against South Africa. Sanctions were meant to reflect increasing U.S. impatience with lack of significant reform in Pretoria's racial policies. President Reagan's Executive Order of September 9, 1985 announced measures apparently designed to deprive the government of South Africa of any direct or indirect U.S. support in maintaining its police, military, and apartheid-enforcing structures. The Reagan administration sanctions against South Africa were as follows: (1) no computer exports to law enforcement agencies, (2) no nuclear technology exports unless for nuclear non-proliferation or humanitarian purposes, (3) no loans except for projects benefitting all races, (4) no export assistance to any U.S. company in south Africa not adhering to fair employment principles, and (5) envisaged ban on Kruggerand exports.<sup>481</sup> The point to note is that sanctions, although meant to appease Congress and send a signal to South Africa, did not represent a marked departure in America's African policy. The Financial Times over-stated the case when it commented that the Reagan administration "has crossed the Rubican", and reached a point of no return regarding South African policy, or that the administration was now talking of "active" not "constructive" engagement.<sup>482</sup> Reagan administration officials conceded that the sanctions announced by the President represented, in part, a codification of existing regulations; that sanctions were not designed to put economic pressure on South Africa

<sup>481</sup>Africa Research Bulletin, September 30, 1985, P. 7873.

<sup>482</sup>Ibid.

but rather, as Secretary Schultz put it, to "send a single message on behalf of all Americans."<sup>483</sup> Thus despite increasing demand for new policy initiative in the face of mounting evidence of racial violence in South Africa, the Reagan administration clings to established policy lines. The administration would not go along with the Nigerian government demand that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund curtail loans and credits to South Africa, nor would it support UN resolutions restricting the activities of foreign economic interests in that country.

America's African policy under Reagan is broadly similar to Carter's African policy during the 1978-1980 period. For one, there is a trend towards greater accommodation with South Africa and unwillingness on the part of the United States to upset the status quo in that country. This development has greatly diminished U.S. ability to influence the direction of events in Africa in the 1980s. As South African woes grow, U.S. declaration of symbolic support for negotiated solutions is becoming an increasingly inadequate way of dealing with the problem. Like the Carter administration, Reagan's leadership has not adopted any blue-print for action or a proposal for dealing with the situation in Namibia and South Africa should racial violence continue and the government in Pretoria fails to make any significant progress towards the abandonment of apartheid.

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<sup>483</sup>Ibid.

Apparently, Nigeria has no ideological differences with the United States, despite normal differences of opinion on how best to approach Africa's pressing problems. Nigeria's concept of change in South Africa from the present system of white minority rule to a multiracial democracy is also not significantly different from that of the United States. Nigeria has established its credentials as a "frontline" state or one of the principal actors in the dual struggle for the independence of Namibia and elimination of apartheid. From the 1970s to the 1980s Nigeria's priorities have remained the same, namely, eradication of colonialism, racism, and apartheid from the African soil and the promotion of peace, stability, and economic development of the region. Nigerian leaders have taken specific measures to further the cause of Namibian independence and majority rule in South Africa. They remain totally committed to the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, and have provided moral and material support to the liberation movements.<sup>484</sup> Both Nigeria and the United States are positively disposed to the promotion of peace, stability, and regional security on the continent, although the U.S. does not provide any material support to the African liberation movements. However the main problem is that the U.S. tends to overlook the African dimension of the problem, focusing instead on the East-West struggle. Consequently, America appears to be oblivious to the possibilities that threat to peace and

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<sup>484</sup>Africa Report, July-August 1985, pp. 4-9.

security in the African sub-system may occur independent of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, by concentrating on the East-West factor, the U.S. has chosen not to recognize the dynamics of African nationalism, especially in the 1980s.

By voting against UN resolutions dealing with what most Nigerians consider to be critical issues in the politics of the African sub-system, the Reagan administration, like the Carter administration of the 1978-1980 period, has displayed a great deal of insensitivity to Nigerian opinion in these matters. Some Nigerian leaders have come to believe that Nigerian-American relations have cooled somewhat since the 1970s, and that the U.S. no longer accords as high a priority to relations with Nigeria as it once did when Nigeria was pivotal in American foreign policy considerations during the early days of the Carter administration. Although somewhat pessimistic, this view does not down-play the importance of Nigerian-American relations in the first half of the 1980s, especially in the area of trade. The real nature of Nigerian-American bilateral ties was well summed up by General Buhari, former head of the federal military government of Nigeria, when he acknowledged that "Nigeria's relations with the U.S. are on an even keel, although they could be better".<sup>485</sup>

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<sup>485</sup>Ibid.

## Conclusion

Analysis of Nigerian-American relations during the Reagan administration show basic similarities and differences between Nigerian and U.S. policy issues significant to both. Throughout Reagan's first term, Nigeria and the United States remained widely divided on their approaches towards Angola, South Africa and Namibia. Yet, at the level of diplomacy and economy, Nigeria wanted close ties and continued dialogue with the United States despite their differences over Southern Africa. Furthermore, as East-West considerations became the major determinant of America's African policy under Reagan, Nigeria was increasingly seen as a potential ally in the struggle against communism in the African sub-system

The politics of accommodation between Nigeria and the United States, which began in the late 1970s, had become one of the primary features of Nigerian-American relations during the early 1980s. Several economic and political factors were responsible for the growth and continuation of politics of accommodation during the latter period. On the Nigerian side, one could point to such factors as (1) the dwindling revenues from oil, (2) the weak position of oil producers vis-a-vis oil consumers in the the early 1980s, and (3) the subsequent down-turn in Nigerian economy. On the American side, Washington's sense of its strategic interest called for the need to balance U.S. policies with regard to Nigeria and South Africa. The Reagan administration, like

its predecessor, recognizes the strategic, economic, and political importance of Nigeria and South Africa to the United States. Thus, for the administration, the choice was not between Nigeria and South Africa, it was whether the United States could maintain good relations with both countries, while at the same time pursuing its policy of constructive engagement.

It should be noted that economic interest alone does not explain the attempts by the Reagan and Carter administrations to step up American involvement in Nigeria by way of investment, trade, and aid. Economic interest was not an end in itself, rather it represented a point in a continuum of building closer political bonds between Nigeria and the United States. The political implications were clearly far-reaching as U.S. policy during the Carter and Reagan era gave high priority to East-West considerations.<sup>486</sup> The Reagan administration, like its predecessor, gave high priority to the political pay-offs that would result from its efforts to increase trade with Nigeria, and diversify investment and aid. With the benefit of hind-sight, American investment, trade, and aid constituted a powerful instrument of (1) maintaining closer political ties with Nigeria, (2) garnering support for America's African policy, (3) sending a signal to Moscow, in

<sup>486</sup>Especially as the new cold war started to emerge. Walter Lafeber, "From Confusion to Cold War: The Memoirs of the Carter Administration", Diplomatic History, vol. 8, no. 1, Winter 1984, pp. 1-12; Samuel P. Huntington, "Human Rights and American Power", Commentary, vol. 72, no. 3, September, 1981, pp. 37-43.

the face of the emerging new cold war, that Nigeria was, and still is, very much a part of the so-called free world, (4) helping to cultivate liberal political values through education and training of Nigerians in the United States, and (5) building confidence in the Nigerian democratic institutions. Although Nigeria's experiment with the American system of government in the late 1970s had deteriorated into military rule during the early 1980s, the United States was probably still cautiously optimistic that democracy was possible in Nigeria.

Such optimism was not inconsistent with the foreign policy ideals of the Reagan administration, an administration which professes great faith in the correctness of the democratic way of life, and argues in the early 1980s that (a) the history of the United States was one of struggle at home and abroad against all forms of racial, cultural, and political intolerance, (b) American Constitution forbade intolerance, and (c) the U.S. has carried on a remarkable and largely peaceful legal and social revolution to ensure equality of opportunity for all Americans. The administration's belief in what the United States stand for at home and abroad is too idealistic given the degree of inequality between black and white Americans at home and the administration's refusal to support international effort aimed at eliminating apartheid in South Africa. Although in his State of the Union address in early 1986, President Reagan did provide what he described as a



"strategy of immediate action" to help the American poor, his proposed budget for fiscal year 1987 included: cuts in medicare for the elderly and the medicaid for the poor; cuts in student loans; cuts in legal services for the poor; an end to grants for urban development in depressed areas; and cuts in economic development grants to states and cities. Furthermore, emphasis on direct efforts to meet basic human needs has been rejected by the administration in favor of a return to seeking such outcomes indirectly through the "market forces" or by stimulating economic growth. The cornerstone of Reagan's development program is based on the basic premise that "free people build free markets that ignite dynamic development for everyone."<sup>487</sup>

This idealistic vision of development is the core philosophical tenet of the administration's approach to international development issues. Economic growth through "market forces" is seen by the administration as a means of ensuring equality of opportunity despite the fact that growth does not always benefit the majority of citizens in the poor countries. Furthermore, the administration's perception of an American ideal that is based on the struggle for racial tolerance at home and abroad directly contradicts Reagan's belief that the basic issue in U.S. relations with Africa is not the American desire to achieve racial equality or elimination of injustice based on race,

<sup>487</sup>Richard S. Newfarmer, "The Private Sector and Development", in John P. Lewis and Valeriana Kallab (eds.) U.S. Foreign Policy and the Third World: Agenda 1983, (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 117-138.

but rather the power struggle between the United States and the Soviet.

Even if attention is focused on the Reagan administration's policy objectives rather than Reagan's personal belief, one is left with a distinct impression that the United States has failed to achieve its policy objectives, notably: (1) promotion of peace and regional security, (2) support for negotiated solutions to the problems of Southern Africa, (3) support for regional economic development, and as a reliable partner in Africa (4) expand that group of nations whose development policies produce economic progress and which have democratic institutions. The Reagan administration does not consider Africa to be largely insignificant as was the case during the Nixon and Ford administrations. However, its pre-occupation with East-West struggle in the African sub-system means the administration has devoted very little attention to some elements of U.S. objectives dealing with economic and basic human liberties, not to talk of support for actions aimed at ending apartheid.

America's African policy under Reagan is broadly similar to Carter's African policy during the 1979-1980 period. For one, there is a trend towards greater accommodation with South Africa and unwillingness on the part of the United States to upset the status quo in that country. This development has greatly diminished U.S. ability to influence the direction of events in Africa in

the 1980s. As South African woes grow, the U.S. declaration of symbolic support for negotiated solutions is becoming an increasingly inadequate way of dealing with the problem. Like the Carter administration, Reagan's leadership has not adopted any blue-print for action or a proposal for dealing with the situation in Namibia and South Africa should racial violence continue and the government in Pretoria fails to make any significant progress towards the abandonment of apartheid.

The Reagan administration is on a shaky foundation regarding its number one objective, namely, the promotion of regional peace and security, since racial violence in South Africa has continued unabated, potentially threatening to engulf the entire Southern African region. Yet, through its policy of constructive engagement, the administration has, like its predecessors, increased ties with South Africa, and expanded diplomatic, military, and intelligence relationship with that country. At the United Nations, the administration frequently stood by South Africa, vetoing resolutions critical of the apartheid system and in some cases registering the only abstention when its Western allies voted to condemn South African actions. As far as the United States appears to be supporting the apartheid system and South Africa feels that it has a powerful ally in Washington, the regime in Pretoria will continue to pose a threat not only to regional stability but also to peaceful resolution of conflict in Southern Africa.

Under Reagan, a negotiated solution to the problem of apartheid is not likely. Recent developments show that the white minority leadership in Pretoria, far from responding creatively to the Reagan administration's confidence in the apartheid regime, is resorting once again to repression rather than reform. There is at least some element of truth in the assertion that the Reagan administration's policy of constructive engagement has actually exacerbated the situation inside South Africa by encouraging the divide-and-rule tactics of the Pretoria regime, and leading the South African government to believe that the United States supports its domestic policies.

Reagan's imposition of limited sanctions against Pretoria was an admission of the fact its policy of encouraging change in the apartheid system through dialogue with white minority leaders had failed. Some would quite understandably argue that although Reagan's policy of constructive engagement was a necessary step in the evolution of American attitude towards South Africa, the policy has "caused the United States to lose five valuable years when it might have influenced South Africa to begin negotiating a settlement of its unique and extraordinary racial problems."<sup>488</sup> There is no fundamental change in U.S. policy towards South Africa despite this failure. The administration in Washington still sees the need to reform

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<sup>488</sup> Sanford J. Ungar and Peter Vale, "South Africa: Why Constructive Engagement Failed", Foreign Affairs, vol. 64, No. 2, Winter 1985/86, pp. 234-258.

the apartheid system by honoring its rules, supporting its leaders, and working with the regime instead of working against it. In this case, the continuities in policy substance between Reagan, Carter and previous U.S. administrations are remarkable. For example, the Reagan administration's continued support for white-led change in South Africa and its apparent ignorance of the political needs of the black majority in that country is in line with past U.S. policies.

The U.S. objective concerning support for negotiated solutions to the problems of Southern Africa has not materialized. One of the reasons being that the administration has opted for a military solution, emphasizing that "support for freedom fighters is self-defense."<sup>489</sup> Consequently, in July 1985, the administration successfully fought for the repeal of Clark Amendment which banned any American assistance to rebel forces in Angola. In February 1986, the White House welcomed Jonas Savimbi, the Angolan UNITA rebel leader, to Washington. Conservatives who applauded the repeal of the Clark Amendment saw aid to Savimbi as an ultimate test of the so-called "Reagan Doctrine", the administration's declared objective of aiding anti-communist "freedom fighters" in their struggles against Soviet-Cuban backed governments. At a national conservative convention in early 1986, former U.N. Ambassador Jean Kirkpatrick urged the U.S.

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<sup>489</sup>Time, February 10, 1986, P. 42.

to provide the apparently pro-Western UNITA guerrilla movement led by Savimbi with what she described as "real helicopters, real ground-to-air missiles, real weapons."<sup>490</sup> In response, the Reagan administration informed the Senate and House Select Committee on Intelligence that it intended to offer UNITA about \$10 million in covert aid from a special discretionary fund that was not subject to Congressional approval.

The rationale behind the administration's aid to Savimbi is to work towards a UNITA's victory or to pressure the Angolan government to accept reconciliation with Savimbi and give his UNITA a place in the government. This is an unlikely prospect, and one that is well recognized by some commentators. However, analysts from U.S. intelligence agencies have conflicting assessments of Savimbi's prospects for victory. Although Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) have predicted a possible military and political victory for Savimbi, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research have concluded that Savimbi can neither win nor force a coalition government in Angola. The Reagan administration, whose position on the issue is not dissimilar to that of the Pentagon, has apparently decided to ignore the conclusions reached by the CIA and the Bureau of Intelligence. It has also ignored the argument by Republican and Democratic Senators that aid to Savimbi is a bad idea.<sup>491</sup> The

<sup>490</sup> Ibid.

<sup>491</sup> Manchester Guardian Weekly, February 16, 1986, P. 16.

conflicting assessments of the likelihood of success of the U.S. foreign policy by analysts from CIA, DIA, and Bureau of Intelligence came in the midst of an intense debate within the administration and Congress over whether the United States should resume its involvement, after a decade of abstinence in the Angolan civil war. Indeed, America's new activism is potentially dangerous because it may exacerbate regional tension and impacts upon Nigerian-American bilateral relations. Greater U.S. involvement in the Angolan civil war may spell an end to the politics of accommodation evident in Nigerian-American relationship since the Carter years, especially if Nigerian leaders see the U.S. role as an attempt to topple the MPLA regime in Angola or establish an American-UNITA-Pretoria alliance. The new activism in U.S. policy during Reagan's second term also indicates that negotiated solutions to regional problems in the African sub-system are still a long way away; that Reagan, like Carter, has not advanced beyond the policy framework established by the Ford-Kissinger administration.

The Reagan administration's support for regional economic development leaves much to be desired. Despite its pledge to lend America's influence, resources, and diplomatic ability to help address African problems or contribute to the development of African economies, the Reagan administration has no effective policy instruments for dealing with the problems of international debt and declining growth rates now affecting most Sub-Saharan

African countries. The administration has not only refused to support Nigeria's assertion that a permanent solution to African economic problems can not be found without a structural adjustment in the international economic system, it has also refused to back any demand for changes in the lending policies of the World Bank which has adversely affected economic development and financial solvency of poor countries.<sup>482</sup> The debt service burden for most Sub-Saharan African countries is becoming unmanageable, raising the spectre of economic collapse and political upheaval. In the face of continued economic crisis, some commentators believe that a rescheduling of debt owed by African countries is necessary, although the U.S. role in the whole process has not been seriously considered by the Reagan administration. It should be noted that the lack of economic development and growth in the African subsystem represent a threat to U.S. security interest or a lost market opportunities for U.S. business, much as the rise in interest rates and debt servicing ratio represent a potential threat to American banking system if most of the poorer countries default on their loans.

Nigeria, with a foreign debt amounting to \$20 billion, has experienced two military coups in the last two years - a political development not unconnected with economic problems facing that country in the early 1980s. Nor has the recent

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<sup>482</sup>Christine A. Bogdanowicz-Bindert, "World-Debt: The United States Reconsiders", Foreign Affairs, vol. 64, No. 2, Winter 1985/86, pp. 259-273.



oil price collapse helped Nigeria's economic recovery, having made the country's projection of \$8.1 billion in oil revenues in 1986 appear to be too optimistic. However, future political uncertainties emanating from continuing economic crisis may be avoided if (1) the Reagan administration takes appropriate measures to help Nigeria's economic recovery, and (2) Nigeria adopts a coherent economic strategy consisting of provisions for industrial revival, import restraint, and an emphasis on local production of basic commodities. The adoption of such a strategy may help to revitalize the lagging manufacturing and agricultural sectors, thereby freeing Nigeria's underlying ebullience. As one observer correctly put it "Nigerian energies have been dissipated by imported constitutions, factories, food and expectations."<sup>483</sup>

Overall, the role of external and domestic factors must be considered in any strategy of economic recovery. Recognizing this fact, the new Babangida government in Lagos has, like its predecessors, indicated that it wants closer relations with the United States and has promised to remove all obstacles to foreign investment. But the Reagan administration's emphasis on economic growth as the best relief for economic crisis, although it may benefit Nigeria in the long-run, is not likely to provide the immediate solution the new government needs to consolidate power. One

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<sup>483</sup> Timothy M. Shaw, "Nigerian Coups and Foreign Policy", International Perspectives, November/December 1985, pp. 17-19.

is bound to agree with the assertion that "the time might be propitious for the United States to take the lead in helping Nigeria to restructure its international obligations."<sup>494</sup> Furthermore, it is probably true to say that unless the United States, in conjunction with international financial institutions, act to help relieve Nigeria's debt burden, the deepening economic crisis may prevent Babangida's reform-conscious government from moving towards a political liberalization that would allow experiments with new forms of electoral representation and participation from the grass-roots.

Nevertheless, one can be moderately confident that despite Reagan's failure and broken promises elsewhere in Africa, the new maturity in Nigerian-American relations, evident in the emergence of politics of accommodation, will enable the United States to make a positive contribution to political and economic development in Nigeria. A positive attitude by Washington may also enable Nigeria to endure the short-term challenge of reviving its agricultural base, generating internal industrial inputs, and re-building domestic industries such as coal, cocoa, groundnuts, metals, palm oil and rubber. But, in the final analysis, a great deal depends on the ability of the Babangida administration to build a national consensus around a coherent economic strategy aimed at easing Nigeria's debt burden by cutting spending and putting a stop to the disastrous leakage of the

<sup>494</sup>Larry Diamond, "Nigeria Update", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 2, Winter 1985/86, pp. 326-336.

country's resources through corruption and mismanagement.

In general, Nigeria and the United States maintained good bilateral relations throughout the early 1980s. Meanwhile, evidence points to continued improvement in Nigerian-American relations and the continuation of politics of accommodation. However, further improvement in bilateral ties between the two countries is likely to depend, to a greater extent, not only on political developments in Africa, but also on how Washington deals with Nigeria; the test will be in the way officials in Washington handle the situation in Namibia, Angola, and South Africa.

### Conclusion: The Comparative Perspective.

This study began by raising the question of the nature of the Nigerian-American relationship and which of the various analytical approaches best serve the explanation of that relationship. The state level, systemic, and dependency perspectives have all offered their own perspective regarding Nigerian-American relations. While the state level explanations emphasized internal needs and goals of Nigeria and the United States, the systemic explanations emphasized the conflictual nature of the East-West relationship and the respective roles of Nigeria and the United States within that broader strategic conflict. The dependency perspective offered an alternative view of the relationship that employed both levels but emphasized the nature of the global economic relationship and the internal economic forces of

the two states. It is now necessary to return to a consideration of these explanations.

### State and Dependency

While there appear to be exclusive state level explanations of the Nigerian-American relationship, they all have systemic implications. For example, the decision to repeal the Clark Amendment, which on the surface looked like an internal political problem of the United States, was seen in Lagos as an indication of intent to give military assistance to Jonas Savimbi and his UNITA forces in Southern Angola. But there was strong opposition in the U.S. Congress. The Amendment, it will be recalled, placed severe restrictions on covert assistance to rebel groups in Angola. When Reagan was elected in November 1980, he promised to pull America out of its economic woes and to restore its "rightful place as the pre-eminent global power", unafraid to wield its economic or military strength if necessary. As an application of this view, President Reagan called on Congress to repeal the Clark Amendment, arguing that it limited the power of the executive to conduct foreign policy. The Carter administration also recognized this fact when it tried, unsuccessfully, to repeal the Clark Amendment. Carter's attempt began before his defeat in 1980, when he urged the Senate to remove restrictions on the President's authority to provide military and covert assistance to the rebel forces in Angola, if the President determined that

such aid was in the interest of national security of the United States.<sup>485</sup> The measure passed by the Senate required only that the President inform the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of his intentions in private, thereby effectively eliminating the restrictions imposed by Clark Amendment in 1976. However, as a result of strong opposition spear-headed by Stephen J. Solarz (Democrat - New York), Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa, the House of Representatives rejected the measure.<sup>486</sup>

Reagan, like Carter, saw nothing wrong with giving American military support to factions fighting against the Marxist oriented MPLA regime in Angola. Opposition to Reagan's move grew because, to some legislators, the Clark Amendment was much more than a bill to prevent the supply of arms to anti-communist factions in Angola. Primarily, the Amendment was seen as a reflection of American reality and a special moment in Presidential-Congressional relations: the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate era witnessed not only the passing of the Clark Amendment, but also the War Powers Act, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, and the 1974 Budget Reforms.<sup>487</sup> All these measures were unique efforts by

<sup>485</sup>Henry F. Jackson, From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960, PP. 77-86.

<sup>486</sup>Ibid.

<sup>487</sup>William F. Mullen, Presidential Power and Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), PP 63-64, 101-105. The War Powers Act placed a 60-day limit on future military deployments overseas without Congressional consent. The bill grew out of popular and Congressional frustration with the war making powers assumed by the executive. It was an attempt by Congress to re-assert its constitutional role in the issues of war and peace, or as the War Powers resolution of 1973 stated: "to fulfill the intent of the framers of the

Congress to exert greater control over the executive in foreign affairs.<sup>498</sup> By 1979-1980, however, the tide was changing: the apparent impotence of President Carter in the face of American hostages in Iran led to a demand, by many Americans, for a more powerful executive. But the repeal of Clark Amendment was no guarantee of a strong executive,

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<sup>497</sup> (cont'd) constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgement of both Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of the United States armed forces into hostilities", (PP. 101-105). In a similar vein, the Budget Reforms bill of 1974 was designed to make Congress an equal partner with the president in setting budgetary priorities, (PP. 63-64). For further reading see U.S. Congress, House, Congress, the President and the War Powers, Hearings, before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Development, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, 1970, PP. 435-512; U.S. Congress, House, War Powers, Hearings, before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, 1973, PP. 429-502; Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership From FDR to Carter (New York: Wiley, 1980), PP. 174-186. Furthermore, in the area of U.S. aid policy, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-559) adopted several pieces of legislation with implications for Africa. The Foreign Assistance Act requested the President to increase Africa's share of the United States economic assistance (sec. 49). It appeared to mark a Congressional effort to reverse a trend of declining levels of U.S. aid to Africa, and the policy of focusing development aid on a few selected African nations like Nigeria and Zaire, where it was believed aid would achieve the most substantial results, rather than concentrating on the poorest African countries. The Foreign Assistance Act contained other statements on Congressional policy on Africa. One of these was a statement on policy with respect to independence of then Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau, which called upon the President to take steps to show U.S. support for the peaceful transition of these territories to independence (sec. 50). For more details see U.S. Congress, House, Congress and Foreign Policy: 1974, Committee on international Relations, House of Representatives, 94th Congress, 1st Session, 1975, PP. 57-59.

<sup>498</sup> Monique Rubens, "Congress Focuses on Clark Amendment", West Africa, December 7, 1981, PP. 2922-2924.

partly because of a compromise proposal introduced by Senators Percy (Republican - Illinois) and Tsongas (Democrat - Massachusetts). The Percy-Tsongas compromise proposal linked assistance to Angola with a Namibian settlement which in effect tied the President's hands even further.<sup>499</sup>

According to Senator Tsongas, the Clark Amendment symbolized a "capacity of America for restraint". For Senator Cranston (Democrat - California), outright repeal would be viewed "throughout the world and particularly in Africa, as an American decision to favor military responses to Southern African problems".<sup>500</sup> Furthermore, Nigeria and other African countries contended that the proposal for repeal of the Clark Amendment was the work of a more aggressive and ideologically inclined administration in Washington; that the repeal would be tantamount to a public acknowledgement that under the Reagan administration the White House "seeks

<sup>499</sup>The Percy-Tsongas compromise proposal stated that assistance to Angola could only be given if the President provided assurance that substantial progress, including an effective cease-fire and preparation for internationally supervised elections (along the lines of U.N. resolution 435) had been made by all parties in achieving an internationally acceptable settlement in Namibia, and that assistance to Angola would not harm such a settlement. Rubens, "Congress Focuses on Clark Amendment", P. 2923. In May 1981, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved both the repeal of the Clark Amendment, and Percy-Tsongas compromise proposal. Earlier that week of May, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, always a strong backer of the Clark Amendment voted 19 to 5 to retain it. On September 30, 1981, the full Republican dominated Senate debated the Amendment: Senator Tsongas then introduced a surprise amendment which stated that the Clark Amendment would be repealed either when there was an effective cease-fire in Namibia or by March 1983, by which time it was thought an agreement on Namibia would be reached. This was not to be.  
<sup>500</sup>Ibid. West Africa, January 1982, P. 42.



the freedom to interfere" in the internal affairs of African states.<sup>501</sup> Nigerian officials argued that U.S. aid to Savimbi would in any case do the reverse of what the Reagan administration assumed would be the result behind such aid, i.e. it would bring an escalation rather than a reduction of Cuban and Soviet presence. It would also destroy any chance of a Namibian settlement. They were convinced that since the Reagan administration equates stability with absence of Soviet or Marxist activity, the administration would accordingly support factions or regimes that profess anti-communist conviction whatever may be their approach to equality of political and social opportunity.<sup>502</sup> Thus what begins as a Presidential-Congressional political struggle has clear systemic implications for America's attempt to deal with its perception of African problems.

Furthermore, two seemingly contradictory views of change in the international system co-existed in the Carter administration, with one occasionally gaining ascendancy over the other but never quite eliminating it. These views were divided into two opposing camps (or what some describe as "regionalists" and "globalists") that were respectively headed by Young and Brzezinski. Soon after the advent of the Carter administration, Ambassador Young, and a few months later President Carter, declared that the Cuban troops who a year earlier had been said to "threaten" detente now

<sup>501</sup>Alex Rontos, "The Reagan 'realism' on Africa", West Africa, May 11, 1981, P. 1013.

<sup>502</sup>Donald B. Easum, "Why Nigeria is Important to the U.S.", West Africa, June 15, 1981, P. 1345.

constituted a "stabilizing" influence in Angola.<sup>503</sup> Young, who advocated idealism and morality in foreign policy, was in favour of an all-inclusive openness towards different African nations no matter what their ideological leanings. Young, along with Vance, McHenry, and Moose were the so-called consistent "regionalists" within the Carter administration during the 1977-1978 period. They saw African development and change as shaped not by the "evil genius" of the Soviet Union but by indigenous forces and factors, stressing the specificity of particular situations and the essentially African and nationalist character of the diverse strands of socialist thought in Africa.<sup>504</sup> But the view expressed by Young and his associates was gradually giving way to Brzezinski's "globalist" perception of Africa from the Cold War perspective of East-West struggle or resistance to Soviet expansionism. Indeed, Brzezinski's view which had gained prominence in the Carter administration during the 1979-1980 period, was not dissimilar to the position adopted by the present Reagan administration. In his statement<sup>2</sup> of the goal of U.S. foreign policy in 1979, Brzezinski said that "the proper role of the United States is to deter Soviet military power."<sup>505</sup> With this statement the stage was set for the Carter administration's pre-occupation with the

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<sup>503</sup>W. Scott Thompson, "The African-American Nexus in Soviet Strategy" in David E. Albright, Communism in Africa (Bloomington & London: Indiana University Press, 1980), pp. 189-218; The Washington Post April 17, 1977.

<sup>504</sup>Crawford Young, Ideology and Development in Africa (London & London: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 253-296.

<sup>505</sup>Ibid.

perceived "danger" of Soviet activities during this period.<sup>506</sup> What begins as a struggle for influence and recognition in the Carter White House, becomes a response to the global Soviet menace, especially as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Consequently, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Carter and Reagan administration were more concerned with the East-West struggle than North-South issues. It was also the East-West struggle, as opposed to the North-South factor or Nigeria's position on international economic issues, that had a greater impact on Nigerian-American relations during this period.

The Carter and Reagan administration's concern with Soviet adventurism has enormous implications for Nigerian-American relations since both super-powers have continued to expand their interests in Nigeria. Before the mid-1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union placed emphasis on ideological victory in Nigeria. But while the United States was determined to ensure that Nigeria remained in the free world as a showpiece of Western-style democra

<sup>506</sup> Brzezinski, like Kissinger, is uninterested in Africa except as it figured in Soviet strategy, although as some would argue he appears to be less knowledgeable than Kissinger on Africa's history and development. His peculiar insight into Africa was clearly evident in his book *Africa and the Communist World*, a study he produced as a Professor at Columbia University: "Today Africa is in the midst of a profound revolution, spanning in decades processes which elsewhere took centuries to mature, molding nations out of often truly primitive tribes, seeking modernity without yet, in some places, having reached even the stage of backwardness". Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Africa and the Communist World* (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963), P.5.

the USSR was interested in building a socialist society in Nigeria.<sup>507</sup>

Since the 1960s a series of events and policy statements have strengthened the argument that Nigeria is pro-American or "Western" as opposed to pro-Soviet or "Eastern": (1) Prime Minister Balewa's support for American decision to resume atomic bomb testing, (2) Nigeria's rejection of the Soviet "Troika" principle for the United Nations administration,<sup>508</sup> (3) the rebuff of Khrushchev's proposal for a summit of heads of government to discuss the issue of disarmament, (4) the ban of subversive (communist) literature in Nigeria, (5) the failure to establish embassies in communist countries till the late 1960s, (6) the refusal to attend the Yugoslav Conference of non-aligned states in September 1961, (7) the refusal to grant passports

<sup>507</sup> Olajide Aluko, Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), pp. 99-113; Helen D. Cohn, Soviet Policy toward Black Africa (New York: Free Press, 1972), p. 8.

<sup>508</sup> In 1960, the "troika" principle was an important aspect of U.S.-Soviet confrontation at the United Nations. The Soviet Union, on September 27, proposed that the post of Secretary-General of the United Nations be left vacant and that four under-secretaries from the United States, the Soviet Union, Africa and Asia collectively take charge of the functions of the office, rotating a temporary chairmanship among themselves. The Western bloc led by the United States opposed the idea. The proposal was defeated. Nigerian Prime Minister Balewa naturally supported the U.S. and Western position when he said: "I feel there should be only one (secretary-General) and a first class man who is able, honest and sincere, who will have other assistants widely representative of the nations as much as possible". Claude S. Phillips, Jr. The development of Nigerian Foreign Policy (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 101-102; John G. Stoessinger, The United Nations and the superpowers: United States-Soviet Interaction at the United Nations, Second Edition (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 51-53, 54-56.

to Nigerian students wishing to study in the Soviet Union or other communist countries, (8) the alleged rejection of Soviet Scholarships, (9) the alleged lack of enthusiasm in government circles for the establishment of Soviet embassy in Lagos in the early 1960s, (10) the strong reliance on private enterprise despite domestic criticism that reliance on foreign private investors identified Nigeria with Western capitalism.<sup>509</sup>

Nigeria's pro-Western bias did not prevent the Soviet Union from trying to make an in-road into the country. During the 1961-1966 period, Moscow is said to have awarded "clandestine" scholarships to members of the Nigerian Youth Congress (NYC), the Nigerian Socialist Workers and Farmers' Party (NSWAFP) and to the Nigerian Trade Union Congress (NTUC). The NYC, NTUC, NSWAFP were classified as leftist organizations dedicated to Marxist-Leninist principles. As a vanguard party, the NSWAFP declared "scientific socialism" as its ideology and propagated the concept of class struggle. Its activities, which were seen in Moscow as representing progressive trends in Nigeria, quite naturally met with warm Soviet approval. Thus with the successful development of these organizations, the USSR felt it had at last succeeded in winning friends in Nigeria.<sup>510</sup> But reflecting on the problem posed by Soviet penetration of Nigeria, Prime Minister Balewa insisted: "we (Nigerians)

<sup>509</sup>Claude S. Phillips, Jr. The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy, pp. 101-102.

<sup>510</sup>Oye Ogunbadejo, "Ideology and Pragmatism: the Soviet Role in Nigeria 1960-1977", Orbis, 21, Winter, 1978, pp. 803-830.

shall use every means in our power to prevent the infiltration of communism and communist ideas into Nigeria".<sup>511</sup> Nevertheless, the Soviet Union was able to use its non-governmental allies in Nigeria to further its political interests in the country. While in Moscow in 1969, Tunji Otegbeye, general secretary of the NSWAFP and one time President of the NYC spoke of how Nigerian progressive groups had been debating "the possibility of a united front of all anti-imperialist forces...and the leading role of the party of a new type - the party of communists who can guide with the instrument of Marxism-Leninism the development of the national democratic revolution, and its transformation into a socialist revolution".<sup>512</sup> The Soviet Union allegedly also tried to train chief Awolowo, leader of the official opposition in the federal House of Representatives, to launch a plot to overthrow the government.<sup>513</sup>

Among the factors that helped to shape the values and world-outlook of the Nigerian ruling elite and subsequent ties with America and the West was the vigorous anti-communist offensive mounted by the colonial authorities in the 1950s.<sup>514</sup> In July 1957, the last colonial Chief

<sup>511</sup> Sam Epelle (ed.) Nigeria Speaks: Speeches of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (Lagos: Longmans, 1964), P. 10.

<sup>512</sup> Ogunbadejo, "Ideology and Pragmatism: The Soviet Role in Nigeria 1960-1977", P. 816.

<sup>513</sup> Ibid.

<sup>514</sup> For instance, an order was issued in Lagos on June 28, 1955, signed by one A. M. Muir, Acting Deputy Secretary to the Council of Ministers, banning a total of 33 books, pamphlets and other publications feared to carry communist propaganda materials. See S. O. Osoba, "The Economic Foundations of Nigerian Foreign Policy During the First Republic 1960-1965" in I. A. Akinjogbin and S.O. Osoba,

Secretary proudly announced in Nigeria's federal House of Representatives, in a tone reminiscent of the McCarthy era in the United States that:

It is the policy of the government, endorsed by this House, to exclude active communists from the public service, and from the service of public corporations, and this policy has been followed voluntarily by a number of commercial organizations...and in pursuance of it, it has been necessary, from time to time, for the Governor-General, acting in his own discretion to withhold passports from people who wish to travel, without apparent reason to countries behind the iron curtain.<sup>515</sup>

In view of the foregoing, therefore, it is not surprising that Nigeria in the early 1960s pursued a foreign policy that was truly partisan towards the United States and Western capitalist powers and cool, if not hostile to the Eastern bloc of nations. For example, it was revealed in parliament in 1961 that, despite Nigeria's policy to "seek trade everywhere in the world so long as that trade is in the interest of Nigeria", the government would not allow Nigerian businessmen to import cement from the Soviet Union, even though the Soviet cement was a lot cheaper than the one imported from the West.<sup>516</sup> While Nigeria's development clearly shows its Western proclivities, those very same conditions make Nigeria into a battleground for influence, because the United States wants to maintain its ties with Nigeria and the Soviet Union would like to lure the Nigerians away.

<sup>514</sup> (cont'd) Topics On Nigerian Economic and Social History (Ife: University of Ife Press, 1980), pp. 208-223.

<sup>515</sup> Ibid.

<sup>516</sup> Ibid.

From a Nigerian perspective, in terms of its relations with the Soviet Union, there were positive signs of a thaw in Nigerian-Soviet relations as the Nigerian civil war began in 1967. The federal government wanted to buy arms from the United States and Great Britain, its traditional Western suppliers; when the deal failed to materialize, Lagos turned reluctantly but with great success to the Soviet Union. The Soviets responded to the federal military government's requests with significant military assistance in the form of equipment which the Nigerian government purchased. Since that time Moscow has developed assistance programs in fields other than the military. This has been primarily in the field of jet aircraft, geology, medicine and vocational training. The Soviet Union, like the United States, has developed programs for training a variety of Nigerian military personnel at the officer level. The Soviets have an important training program for Nigerian jet aircraft pilots in the Soviet Union, and they train some pilots as well as associated personnel in Nigeria.<sup>517</sup> Since the 1960s, the Soviet Union has gained access to Nigeria's supply of strategic minerals such as columbite, over American opposition. Columbite is used in super-alloys for the world's aerospace industry. It is also used for low-alloy steels, stainless steel, and other alloy-steels.

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<sup>517</sup>U.S. Congress, Senate, U.S. Policy Towards Africa, Hearings, before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, 1976, PP. 163-179.



Furthermore, a construction agreement for the Ajaokuta steel plant was signed between Nigeria and the Soviet Union in June 1976. The final terms of the contract was completed in early 1980 after complex, and at times acrimonious, exchanges between the two countries.<sup>518</sup> The Soviets are also participating in the construction of a network of oil distribution pipelines in Nigeria. The Nigerians contend that they needed Soviet Union assistance and still find Soviet assistance highly useful in certain areas, but they insist that their relationship with Moscow does not imply that the Soviet Union has any particular influence over government policy. Donald Easum, former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria, was perfectly correct when he described the Nigerian-Soviet ties as "a mutually advantageous relationship without ideological implications".<sup>519</sup> The Soviet Union does not have particularly active export ties with Nigeria except in the area of vehicles, whereas the United States is developing export outlets for a number products in Nigeria. The USSR does not have the kinds of access to the private sector of the Nigerian economy that the United States has. For example, there is no Soviet counterpart of U.S. companies like Raymond International,

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<sup>518</sup>Nigeria was among those countries which strongly criticized Soviet intervention in Afganistan. During a meeting with Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Snegirev on February 15 1980, External Affairs Minister Audu condemned the use of Third world Countries as a theatre for supr-power rivalry. Colin Legum (ed.) Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents 1979-1980, (New York: African, 1980), P. B602.

<sup>519</sup>Ibid. Ambassador Easum was testifying before the U.S. Senate sub-committee on African Affairs.

TAMS, C.E.TEC, Pfizer, 3M, Johnson and Johnson, to name just a few, working together in joint ventures and technical arrangements with Nigerians.<sup>520</sup>

Nigerian trade with the Eastern bloc has grown over the last decade, but still remains very small compared with trade with the United States and Western Europe. Whereas the United States absorbed 29 per cent of Nigeria's total imports and the U.K. 23 per cent, the Soviet Union accounted for 1.8 per cent in 1979.<sup>521</sup> On the other hand, the Soviet Union is self-sufficient in crude oil supply, and unlike Washington, Moscow has no pressing economic need for Nigerian oil, and could not like the United States contribute to the prosperity and development of Nigeria's oil-based economy. In 1978, during the Carter administration, the U.S. was buying 60 per cent of Nigeria's oil at a price which was slightly higher than what Nigerian competitors in the field of sulphur-free oil such as Libya and Venezuela who were willing to sell to the American consumers.<sup>522</sup> Since oil contributed about 95 per cent of Nigeria's total export earnings, and between 90 and 92 per cent of all oil and non-oil revenue, Nigeria was as one observer put it "theoretically dependent" or more closely tied to the U.S. for 54 per cent of its 1978 revenues. One could safely argue that under Carter, the U.S. was using

<sup>520</sup> Ibid.

<sup>521</sup> Colin Legum (ed.) African Contemporary Record 1979-1980 (New York: Africana, 1980), P. 602; Ray Ofoegbu, The Nigerian Foreign Policy (Uwani, Enugu: Star, 1978) pp. 34-50.

<sup>522</sup> Ibid.

trade with Nigeria as a means of shoring up political relationship between the two countries.

Nigeria's economic significance to the U.S is enhanced by U.S. efforts to encourage American investment in Nigeria. Such efforts continued during Reagan's first term, much as they did during the Carter administration. In January 1982, a high level investment mission of 25 senior executives to Nigeria uncovered substantial opportunities for American investment in such sectors as agribusiness, construction, communications, and mining.<sup>523</sup> The Carter administration also had encouraged such missions and negotiated several new treaties with the Nigerian government to help smooth the way for American investment.<sup>524</sup> But despite these efforts, American investment remained principally oil-centred during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Few American firms were willing to explore investment opportunities in sectors other than oil, for reasons discussed earlier.

Although the late 1970s and early 1980s can be classsified as the golden age of Nigerian-American relations because it was during this period that the closest ties between the two countries were fully established, the U.S. hope that good bilateral relations at the political level would help garner for the United States a larger share of the Nigerian investment market did not materialize. Part of

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<sup>523</sup>The Washington Post, Friday, January 22, 1982, P. D3.

<sup>524</sup>U.S. Department of Commerce, Market Profiles for Africa, Overseas Business Reports, OBR, 78-20, June 1978, P. 31; Marketing in Nigeria, Overseas Business Reports, OBR, 79-11, April 1979, P. 29.

the reason was the negative perceptions of the business environment in Nigeria by American corporate managers. In the latter case, the problem centred on several factors, including (1) regulations which prohibit the establishment and operation of certain types of business in Nigeria, (2) difficulties encountered in getting paid for goods and services delivered to Nigeria, (3) problems in placing expatriate managers and technical staff or arranging visits by headquarters executives, and (4) bureaucratic practices and shortcomings, notably, indecisiveness and corruption, which executives consider to be of a more serious deterrent nature to U.S. business than formal systems of regulations.<sup>525</sup>

Analysis of this area of Nigerian-American relations reveals the political factors affecting investment decisions. These factors are twofold: American companies' relationship with the Nigerian government on the one hand, and their relationship with the U.S. government on the other. The relationship between the Nigerian government and American corporations was subjected not only to considerable uncertainty regarding the ground rules under which companies

<sup>525</sup> Africa Business, August 1985, pp. 63-67. For more discussion of the relationship between U.S. companies and the Nigerian government see U.S. Congress, Senate, "United States-Nigerian Relations", in U.S. Policy Towards Africa, Hearings, before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, 94th Congress, Second Session, 1976, pp. 163-179. Even the Nigerian government of President Shagari, like the Buhari administration, soon realized that no matter whether the Democrats or Republicans are in power in Washington, the wish for more U.S. investment did not quickly translate into effective and sustained policies.

operate in Nigeria, but also abrupt changes in political leadership that the country had experienced during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The U.S. corporate executives believe that abrupt changes in political leadership often produce personnel changes that complicate dialogue and negotiations between American companies and Nigerian officials. They also worry about their blocked dividends and other remittances locked up in Nigeria for several years.<sup>526</sup> However, there were no unpleasant consequences for U.S. investment, such as seizure of assets or nationalization, directly associated with Nigeria's displeasure with U.S. policies elsewhere in Africa during the Carter and Reagan administrations, although the possibility of such development existed.

One of the main restrictions on U.S. corporate activity in Nigeria comes from the American side in the form of the Senate's anti-corruption legislation. The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prohibits American-based corporations from bribing government and business officials in other countries, including Nigeria, to secure commercial advantages.<sup>527</sup> Although American corporate managers complain about corruption in Nigeria, the anti-corruption legislation by the U.S. government has actually restricted rather than helped to promote American business in Nigeria.<sup>528</sup> Although

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<sup>526</sup> African Business, August 1985, pp. 63-67.

<sup>527</sup> Ibid.

<sup>528</sup> Ibid. "But in the light of recent revelations about U.S. arms manufacturers bribing Pentagon officials, it's questionable as to how seriously one takes U.S. protestations of being 'innocents abroad' in the matter of corruption and bribery".

the Senate's anti-corruption legislation was probably aimed at addressing the issue of morality in business, the notion of moral business behavior is vague and difficult to uphold. For example, in 1976, a United States Conference Board study showed that even those business executives who favored a code of business ethic acknowledged that if "faced with a problem of losing a major sale or, not they would pay up and keep quiet about it".<sup>529</sup> Furthermore, a report of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Multinationals, published in February 1976, indicated that Lockheed, the U.S. government's largest aero-space and defense contractor admitted to spending \$22 million in kickbacks in at least eight countries, including Nigeria. In Nigeria Lockheed paid about \$3.6 million on a \$45 million deal.<sup>530</sup> In November 1984, John Lehman, Secretary of the Navy, disclosed that the Navy had evidence that during the 1970s and early 1980s, Admiral Hyman Rickover of the U.S. Navy received "gifts" worth "tens of thousands" of dollars, not only from General Dynamics but also from General Electric, Westinghouse, and Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. - all of which are big Navy contractors.<sup>531</sup> In 1983, Mr. P. Takis Veliotis, a retired General Dynamics executive, was indicted by a federal grand jury for taking kickbacks from a subcontractor.<sup>532</sup> Thus far

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<sup>529</sup>Quoted in Terisa Turner, "Commercial Capitalism and the 1975 Coup" in Keith Panter-Brick (ed.) Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transformation of Nigeria (London: Frank Cass, 1978), pp. 166-197.

<sup>530</sup>Ibid.

<sup>531</sup>Time, December 24, 1984, p. 12.

<sup>532</sup>Ibid.

from being an anomaly, bribery or "gift" can be seen as part of business life or as Turner put it "the business bribe or commission is an essential element of the modern world system. Its centrality has to do with the profit-orientation of the corporate operation".<sup>533</sup> It could be argued that the Senate's anti-corruption legislation actually helped to diminish the growth of American business in Nigeria because it ignores the reality of doing business in that country.

Some may argue, as evident in the indigenization debate in Nigeria during the 1970s, that foreign investment may compromise Nigerian sovereignty since it raises the possibility of foreign economic domination and the possibility of foreign intervention in domestic politics.<sup>534</sup> Evidence showing instances of direct U.S. corporate intervention in Nigerian politics is difficult to obtain for the period covered by this study. Intervention may include, among other measures the promotion of secession, support for insurrectionist forces, and financial moves designed to pressure the government into acceptance of the corporate point of view. Before the Nigerian civil war foreign firms were accused of adapting their personnel policies to the ethnic politics of the region in which they happened to be

<sup>533</sup> Turner, "Commercial Capitalism and the 1975 Coup", P. 175.

<sup>534</sup> Nicholas Balabkins, Indigenization and Economic Development: The Nigerian Experience (Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press, 1982), PP. 152-161; Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa (Harlow: Longman, 1981), PP. 105-126.

located, but the national origin of these firms was not specified.<sup>535</sup> There also were allegations of corporate intervention in Nigerian politics by some oil interests during the civil war, although there was no proof to substantiate this allegation.<sup>536</sup>

The paucity on data on this phenomenon in Nigerian-American relations during the Carter and Reagan administrations makes it difficult to establish a plausible case for direct corporate intervention in Nigerian politics during this period. However, the apparent similarity between the Carter and Reagan administrations is evident in the fact that neither Carter nor Reagan saw direct intervention, corporate or otherwise, as an alternative to the existing political, economic and diplomatic channels of dealing with Nigeria. Nevertheless, one can not completely rule out the political implications of foreign investment since private foreign investors are generally said to be status quo oriented or naturally supportive of existing regimes, such as those in Nigeria since independence, that make ideological and practical commitments to the development of capitalism.

However, investment is the one area in which there appears to be no direct or indirect evidence for a U.S. government cold war motivation. U.S. corporations obviously

<sup>535</sup>Henry L. Bretton, Direct Foreign Investment in Africa: Its Political Purpose and Functions in Patron Client Relations (Morristown, New Jersey: General Learning press, 1976), pp. 13-17.

<sup>536</sup>Ibid.



pursued their own profit motivations, while the U.S. government encouraged that pursuit as best it could. Whether the government saw political gains beyond the increasingly beneficial economic relationship is difficult to say and is based on speculation. However, the politics of the African sub-system and the upsurge of East-West struggle on the African continent make it plausible to argue that the U.S. desire to maintain capitalist systems in economically and strategically critical areas was not unrelated to America's policy of containment.

In terms of the dependency perspective, there is inconclusive evidence as to whether Nigeria's position then and now represents a good case of dependence on America and the West. Douglas Anglin has assented that "in most cases Nigerian leaders pursued the policies they do because rightly or wrongly they happen to believe in them".<sup>537</sup> And implicitly making the case for Nigeria's dependence, Osoba argued that identity of interests, values, and ideological orientations between a substantial part of the Nigerian ruling elite and Western elites was a crucial factor in pro-Western orientation of the Balewa government.<sup>538</sup> The position adopted in this thesis is closer to view held by C.S. Phillips, Jr. who contended that despite its Anglo-American orientation, Nigeria is as independent as any

<sup>537</sup> Douglas G. Anglin, "Nigeria: Political Non-alignment and Economic Alignment", Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 2, no. 2, 1964, pp. 147-163.

<sup>538</sup> S.O. Osoba, "The Economic Foundations of Nigerian Foreign Policy During the First Republic 1960-1965", pp. 225-226.

other country. Nigeria's foreign policy position on Angola in 1975-1976 supports this view. As Phillips put it: "To charge that it is not independent when the decision-makers are making the decisions they want to make (even though conservative) is to imply that there is only one true way for an ex-colony to act".<sup>539</sup> This statement is also supported by Taylor Cole's observation that since its independence on October 1, 1960 "Nigeria has had full responsibility, in name as well in fact, for the maintenance of national defense and for the conduct of foreign relations."<sup>540</sup> The dependency argument exaggerates the nature of U.S. relations with Nigeria, by virtually reducing the dynamics of this relationship to conditions of dominance and dependence. In the final analysis, the dependence interpretation ignores the significance of relative autonomy of the Nigerian state and its approach to international issues which, as voting at the United Nations indicate, are not necessarily subservient to American foreign policy positions.

#### **System: Nigeria, U.S. and the East-West Nexus**

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, there were several developments in the politics of the African sub-system which might have given decision-makers in Washington reason to believe that the Soviet Union was still

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<sup>539</sup>Phillips, Jr., The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy, P. 144.

<sup>540</sup>Ibid.

trying to assert itself in an area that has long been the major preserve of American and Western interests. Along with its support of the revolutionary regime in Ethiopia during the 1977-1978 period, an apparently more assertive Soviet behavior in Sub-Saharan Africa manifested itself at the diplomatic and economic level. At the diplomatic level, the highlight of the Soviet effort was the signing of friendship treaties with Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia and the Congo. At the economic level, friendship treaties were followed by expanded commercial interactions and increased tempo of arms transfer. As the Soviet position appeared quite formidable by 1980, Americans were convinced that the Soviets were capable of exploiting Africa's political crises to their own advantage. The possibility of Soviet intervention in Zimbabwe or even in South Africa was not completely ruled out; especially after the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Ethiopian-Somali conflict during the 1977-1978 period, and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979. Although, on the surface, Soviet activities in Africa appear to have declined since 1980 - probably due to the problem of leadership succession within the Soviet Union - great power meddling in the politics of African sub-system and geo-political rivalry between Moscow and Washington were no less real during Reagan's first term than they were during Carter's presidency. Soviet support of African nationalism over a growing American opposition and its commitment towards socialist oriented regimes remained exactly as they

were even before the inception of Carter administration. Thus, as far as the politics of the African sub-system were concerned, there was no significant change in Soviet behavior during the late 1970s and early 1980s.

The Reagan administration's foreign policy is built on the fear that radical forces can take advantage of local instabilities, overthrow pro-American governments, and build pro-Soviet regimes. This view is deduced from the administration's heightened concern over Soviet "meddling" in the Third World, and the belief that change in developing countries is dangerously de-stabilizing and therefore more often than not inimical to American interests. However, not all cases of instability are caused by the Soviet Union. One can point to a significant number of trends and events such as wars, famines, religious and inter-ethnic conflicts that have nothing to do with Soviet involvement, to indicate the need to differentiate between issues before concluding that the Soviet Union is the source of all instability in the Third World. Such differentiation is not evident in the Reagan administration's view of Third World instability partly because of its general concern about the opportunities that such instability provides for increased Soviet influence.<sup>541</sup> A better insight into the subject of

<sup>541</sup>For this reason the administration draws a distinction between "totalitarian" and "authoritarian" regimes, with the latter being offered more tolerant treatment because of the belief that stability in the Third World deserves a higher priority than personal liberty. John Sewell and John Mathieson, "The United States and the Third World: Ties that Bind" in Robert Cassen et al. (eds.) Rich Country Interests and Third World Development (London & Canberra: Croom Helm,

change and instability in the Third World is provided by the Carter administration. Although equally concerned with the perceived Soviet menace, President Carter and his advisers acknowledged that change in the Third World does not necessary work against the long-term interests of the United States. They believed that while change may be de-stabilizing, it is also inevitable in a rapidly evolving world. As Secretary Vance noted in his Harvard Commencement speech of June 5, 1980, the United States faces a

World underlying rapid change, with growing expectations, quickened communication; a world in which neither the United States nor any other country commands a preponderance of power or monopoly of wisdom. It is a world of conflicts, among nations and values, among social systems and emerging new interests. It is a world in which competitive superpowers hold in their hands our common survival, yet paradoxically find it beyond their power to order events.<sup>542</sup>

The basic premise that guided the thoughts in this quote was the Carter administration's belief that change should be managed and channelled as peacefully as possible: the peaceful transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe was an excellent case of the administration's successful accommodation to change.

Nigeria perceives its relations with the Soviet Union, like its ties with the United States, not only in terms of Soviet activities in in Nigeria, but more significantly in terms of its involvement in Africa. Some of the foreign policy actions of the Soviet Union in Africa were taken

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<sup>541</sup>(cont'd) 1982), PP. 41-93.

<sup>542</sup>Ibid.

without regard for the likely roles which Nigeria could play in them. Lagos had criticized the extensive Soviet-Cuban build up in Angola, although at the time of the Angolan civil war Nigerian leaders were forced to take sides as soon it was clear that one of the factions was backed by South Africa. The fact that the United States also identified with the South African-backed faction further complicated the situation. However, Nigeria maintains good relations with the super-powers despite the new cold war politics at the global and continental level. Relations with the United States flourished under Carter and Reagan. During this period, Nigeria used top level exchange as an opportunity to review the general nature of Nigerian-American relationship in Africa. By contrast to the diversity and activity characteristic of Nigeria's relations with the United States, in which disagreement over attitudes and policies are contained by overall understanding, empathy, and common interests, ties with the Soviet Union remains more limited and formal. Top level exchanges with the Soviets are still marginal, notwithstanding the fact that Nigerian-Soviet positions on Southern Africa and decolonization are largely comparable.

Nevertheless, both super-powers have developed different strategies in their relations with Nigeria. Aid and economic organization remained the most potent weapon: in the 1960s the United States was interested in widening and preserving its interest in the private sector of the

Nigerian economy through aid, while the Soviet Union was attempting to undermine the American strategy by carefully directing Nigeria's attention to the evils implicit in the control of the economy by foreign capitalists.<sup>543</sup> Some observers contend that the Soviets were unhappy about the domination and control of the Nigerian oil industry by American and Western oil companies, and that they secretly urged nationalization of the industry.<sup>544</sup> But Soviet influence in the policy of indigenization is difficult to ascertain precisely. The link between General Gowon's state visit to the Soviet Union and the announcement of indigenization in April 1974 (less than a month after the visit) was a mere coincidence. For example, even before the state visit, oil production and banking were already subject to obligatory government participation; 40 per cent share

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<sup>543</sup>In 1972, Mr. David Newsom, then Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs played down the usefulness of aid in super-power struggle when he told a seminar in California: "We are no longer lured to respond to appeals from African countries by fact or threat of communist aid...There is less evidence than we expected some years ago" to suggest that communist political infiltration necessarily accompanied economic aid, and expectation that aid would give political benefits had proved incorrect for communist and non-communist donors. West Africa, February 4, 1972, P.129. But in a speech before the Foreign Policy Association on 7 July 1980, Edmund Muskie could still make the case for aid after examining America's bilateral and multilateral economic assistance efforts and found them alarmingly wanting: "With (these assistance programs) we have an opportunity to influence events in crucial areas of the world. Without them our power to shape events is drastically diminished." Richard E. Feinberg, The Intemperate Zone: The Third World Challenge to U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983), pp. 39-40. Muskie's position is closer to the truth than Newsom's.

<sup>544</sup>Aluko, Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy, pp. 100-101.

equity in the case of banking.<sup>545</sup>

However, the efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States to promote their economic and political interest in Nigeria are no less evident during the Carter and Reagan administrations than they were a decade earlier. One major consolation to the United States was Nigeria's transition from military to civilian government and its experiment with democracy during the late 1970s and early 1980s. President Carter saw Nigeria as a country making great social and political progress and a country of great importance to the United States. His perception was justified by developments in Nigeria at that time. For example, Nigeria had drafted a new constitution substantially similar to that of the United States, providing for an elected president, a bicameral legislature and a completely independent judiciary. President Reagan was also quick to react to this development: he said "the American people continue to be impressed with the remarkable transition to civilian government undertaken by Nigeria..."; and of Nigeria's democratic experiment he stated "the commitment to democratic rule and individual freedom demonstrated by your action is an inspiration and example for others to follow".<sup>546</sup> Even more re-assuring to the Americans was Nigeria's desire to extend an open invitation to the American investors to participate actively in its investment

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<sup>545</sup> West Africa, April 1, 1974, PP 362-363.

<sup>546</sup> West Africa, 27 July, 1981, P. 1688.



development plan after years of flirtation with the policy of indigenization. President Reagan could speak of ties of "mutual dependence" with Nigeria, and seeing the Nigerian-American relationship as "always" a close and secure one.<sup>547</sup>

There is a high degree of similarity in the nature and content of top level exchange between Nigeria and the United States during the Carter and Reagan administrations. During this period the situation in South Africa and concern for regional peace and security was the major content of the discussions. General Obasanjo's visit to Washington in October 1977 and President Carter's visit to Lagos in early 1978 provided a genuine opportunity for Nigeria and the United States to consolidate their relations and renew their commitments to Africa. Both leaders believed their two countries were committed to an African sub-system that was free from colonialism, racism, and Soviet-Cuban intervention.<sup>548</sup> In a similar vein, Nigerian-American co-operation on the issue of regional peace and security had been a salient feature of top level exchange between the two countries during the Reagan administration.

Given the emphasis on the issues of peace and security, it could be argued that Nigerian-American co-operation in this area is essential and could probably be advantageous to both countries. It could be beneficial to the United States if it helps to diminish the opportunity for Soviet

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<sup>547</sup> Ibid.

<sup>548</sup> The Washington Post, Sunday, April 2, 1978, P. C7.

activities in the African sub-system; and to Nigeria if it (1) reinforces regime stability, (2) helps in the process of regional integration on the continent, and (3) enhances Nigeria's regional influence. The three issues are not mutually exclusive since destabilization of the incumbent regimes or nation-states emanates not only from external sources but also internal ones. By focusing on co-operation with the United States on regional security matters, Nigeria is in fact trying to protect its own security. The security factor has been recognized by successive Nigerian governments as one of the primary determinants of Nigeria's African policy. In 1981, Ishaya Audu, then Minister of External Affairs, suggested that Nigeria's close ties with its neighbors was intended to ensure that "these states are not turned into areas of activities that are likely to impair our security".<sup>549</sup> In 1984, Nigerian officials redefined the country's national security priorities to include the threats posed by "external aggression", religious disturbances, armed robbery, and illegal aliens. Nwokedi has asserted that the last three categories of threat to Nigeria's national security has in recent years posed enormous problems to Nigerian security forces, such that the government had to resort to "shock therapy" in order to combat them.<sup>550</sup>

<sup>549</sup> EmeKa Nwokedi, "Sub-Regional Security and Nigerian Foreign Policy", *African Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 335, April 1985, pp. 105-209.

<sup>550</sup> Ibid. Illegal aliens were expelled from Nigeria in early 1983. Between 1981 and 1984, the Maitatsine Islamic fundamentalists went on rampage in the Nigerian cities of

Although the Federal Military Government has re-assured Nigerians that it "will not hesitate to take appropriate measures" to protect Nigeria's security, Nigeria is not self-sufficient in military hardware, and can not widen its defence parameter beyond its immediate borders without incurring an enormous cost.<sup>551</sup> Along with security, Nigeria has political, and economic interests in Africa as discussed earlier. In view of this, it is obvious that Nigeria seeks to maximize its interests within the framework of closer relations with the United States. The Reagan administration, like its predecessor, also recognizes the strategic, economic and political importance of Nigeria to the United States. Thus administration officials often emphasize the desirability of maintaining cordial relations with Nigeria and comment on the remarkable convergence of views between the two countries on several international issues.<sup>552</sup>

The diplomatic gains from such exchanges were as invaluable to the United States under Carter as they are under Reagan. For the Nigerians, top level exchanges with the United States were, and still are, an opportunity to present their views on issues affecting relations between the two countries. But beyond the exchange of views, or the propaganda value, Nigeria and the United States have accomplished very little in terms of practical and effective

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<sup>550</sup> (cont'd) Kano, Maiduguri and Jimeta; there were heavy casualties as the security forces tried to put down the unrest.

<sup>551</sup> Ibid.

<sup>552</sup> West Africa, November 2, 1981, P. 2554.

policies towards Africa as a result of top level discussions. Years of top level exchanges have not produced a common Nigerian-American approach to the situation in South Africa and Namibia, although their policies and political, economic, and security concerns are not mutually exclusive. The gap between official declarations of intentions and performance on both sides continue to widen as American and Nigerian interests grow more rapidly in the late 1970s and early 1980s. During this period, as previously stated, differences between the two countries were evident on issues relating to (1) economic problems confronting Africa and Third World, (2) majority rule in South Africa, (3) the question of Namibia, (4) economic sanctions against Pretoria or what to do about the elimination of apartheid in South Africa. To the extent that these issues are not easily resolved, they are likely to continue to find their way onto the agenda of bilateral talks between the two countries. However, since the political will to coerce Pretoria is apparently lacking in both Nigeria and the United States, both could help South Africa move ahead towards a different future by adopting a common front and working more closely at the United Nations to end racial segregation in South Africa and resolve the issue of Namibian independence.

The Reagan administration, like the Carter administration before it, supports the goal of independence for Namibia, at least in principle, believing that success

would strengthen U.S. interests throughout Africa, and reduce the opportunity for Soviet interference. For similar reasons, the Carter administration was also solidly behind the issue of Namibian independence, although the target date of December 1978 was not achieved during the life-span of the administration.<sup>553</sup> For the Carter administration, breaking the stalemate on Namibian negotiations had become more difficult than helping to achieve majority rule in Zimbabwe.<sup>554</sup> South Africa was determined to maintain its hold on Namibia, and was particularly encouraged by Carter's non-recognition of the MPLA government in neighboring Angola.<sup>555</sup> President Carter, and his principal advisers had agreed even before he took office in 1977, that American participation in resolving conflict in Namibia was vital. While in office, his administration was concerned not only with the issue of self-determination and political participation of the peoples of Namibia, but also it

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<sup>553</sup> See Statement by William E. Schaufele, Jr. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, "United States Relations in Southern Africa", Department of State Bulletin, vol. LXXVI, May 9, 1977, pp. 464-471. Namibia is the last major item on the agenda of African decolonization. Ever since the United Nations took up the matter after the Second World War, the U.S. has been deeply involved in the problem of Namibia. In 1966, the United Nations revoked South Africa's Mandate over Namibia, originally granted by the League of Nations. In 1971, the International Court of Justice upheld the U.N.'s authority, determined that South Africa's presence in Namibia was illegal, and stated that South Africa was obligated to withdraw immediately. Reagan, like Carter administration, has recognized that decision.

<sup>554</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1983), p. 143.

<sup>555</sup> Jackson, From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960, p. 90.

believed that a peaceful settlement in Namibia could be a step towards evolutionary change in South Africa itself. As Secretary Vance stated: "A successful pluralist society in Namibia could encourage those South African whites who were willing to move toward greater political, economic, and social equality".<sup>556</sup>

However, the administration was evenly divided on what to do about South African withdrawal from Namibia. Young and Vance believed that South African withdrawal from Namibia was necessary for the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola. This position was never to be accepted by President Carter and Brzezinski who were politically sensitive to Soviet-Cuban activities and their impact at home if the administration appeared too soft in dealing with them.<sup>557</sup> There was no apparent disagreement on the fact that the more intense the conflict in Namibia, the greater the risk that the South Africans would carry the war more deeply into Angola, thus increasing the possibility that the Cubans would be engaged directly in the fighting. The rationale for avoiding direct Cuban-South African military confrontation was that such conflict could spill over into Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) with disastrous consequences: "if a Cuban-South African conflict spilled over into Rhodesia...there would be a war along race lines in Southern Africa in which we would be virtually powerless to prevent immense damage to American

<sup>556</sup> Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in American Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), pp. 274-283.

<sup>557</sup> Ibid.

political, economic, and strategic interests".<sup>558</sup>

Nigeria's strategy was based on the conviction that the Carter administration would work towards peaceful settlement in Namibia. In September 1977, Leslie O.

Harriman, Nigeria's permanent representative at the United Nations, said that for the first time "we have an American administration working positively towards a solution" in Namibia, and Southern Africa. He, however, warned that unless a "definite pattern of progress emerged from current negotiations on Namibia by November", African countries would ask the U.N. Security Council for sanctions against South Africa. He specifically mentioned a nuclear boycott, an energy embargo, and a ban on new investments and loans.<sup>559</sup> Nigeria's position on the issue of Namibian

independence during the Reagan period remains exactly as it was under Carter. But the issue of sanctions in the form proposed by Nigeria was first rejected by the Carter administration, followed by the present Reagan administration. Nigeria's demand for sanctions represent what the Reagan administration, in particular, sees as the wrong course for the achievement of the goal of independence for Namibia. For administration officials, economic sanctions are not an effective means of influencing political policy. Rather than sharing the Nigerian belief in the efficacy of sanctions, the administration insists that the study of history supports its view that sanctions were

<sup>558</sup> Ibid. P. 274.

<sup>559</sup> The Christian Science Monitor, September 19, 1977, P. 5.

not effective when applied against Italy in the 1930s or against Ian Smith Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) in the 1970s. Reagan's apparent low regard for sanctions is also reflected in his decision to lift the grain embargo imposed by the Carter administration against the Soviet Union, although he had no hesitation imposing economic sanctions against Libya in early 1986.

Nevertheless, the achievement of Namibian independence remains a principal objective of Nigerian foreign policy, and the focus of international diplomacy even before the early 1980s. Nigerians admit that under Reagan's leadership, the issue of super-power ideological rivalry has made the Namibian issue more confusing now than it was during the late 1970s. As the External Affairs Minister Audu put it, the underlying aim of East-West rivalry "was to provide a pretext for the entrenchment of neo-colonialism in that part of Africa...Efforts were being made", obviously by the Reagan administration, "to forge a link between the withdrawal of foreign troops from Angola and progress towards Namibia's independence".<sup>560</sup> Nigeria rejects the validity of such links and unreservedly repudiated the claims of extra-African powers to dictate to any African country who their friends should be when their national survival was threatened.<sup>561</sup> However, Nigeria indicated its willingness to provide troops for a U.N. peace-keeping force

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<sup>560</sup> U.N. Monthly Chronicle, vol. 18, no. 11, December 1981, pp. 82-83.

<sup>561</sup> Ibid.



in Namibia, suggesting that such a force would be needed during the transition from South African rule to an independent Namibia. In an interview with the *Christian Science Monitor*, Ambassador Harriman pinpointed the critical issues relating to Namibian independence: the status of Namibia's main port, Walvis Bay, and the withdrawal of South African troops. In an apparent re-statement of Nigerian policy towards Namibia, he warned that it is unrealistic for South Africa to claim jurisdiction over Walvis Bay.<sup>562</sup> The Nigerian leadership hoped that Walvis Bay would be re-integrated into Namibia as speedily as circumstances permitted after Namibia's independence.

Nigeria is still unequivocally opposed to any expansionist policy by any state against the territory of another, and has given full support to SWAPO and the people of Namibia in their effort to recover their territorial integrity. In 1978, Nigerian Commissioner for External Affairs, Joseph Garba, said in speech at the United Nations General Assembly that "the manner in which Namibia was handed over to South Africa by the League of Nations in a fit of absent-mindedness" was a lesson for all mankind. And he added: "the failure of international community over the years to insist upon and secure South Africa's withdrawal was a blemish on everyone concerned."<sup>563</sup> Nigeria's position was well supported by the Carter administration when the

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<sup>562</sup>Ibid.

<sup>563</sup>U.N. Monthly Chronicle, vol. XIV, no. 4, April 1977, p. 9.

issue was brought to the attention of the United Nations. Nigeria and the United States supported U.N. resolution 432 (1978) on Walvis Bay. The resolution stated that Walvis Bay must be part of an independent Namibia, and called for negotiations between the parties concerned.<sup>564</sup> But neither Nigeria's effort at the U.N. nor diplomatic moves by the Carter administration resulted in any meaningful change in Namibia. When Carter's presidency ended in 1980, Nigeria's concern with South African occupation of that territory was no less obvious than it is during the present Reagan administration.

The highlight of the Carter administration's policy towards Namibia was a 1978 agreement that promised Namibian independence. The complicated pact which Young, Vance, and Donald F. McHenry, U.S. Deputy Representative to the U.N. Security Council helped to negotiate provided for (1) U.N. controlled elections, (2) the withdrawal of South African armed forces prior to Namibian independence, and (3) a U.N. peacekeeping force to guarantee the country a proper transition to independence after nearly sixty years under South African hegemony.<sup>565</sup> The agreement which had gained the support of Nigeria, and the Western "Contact Group"

<sup>564</sup> Furthermore the Security Council declared that pending re-integration of Walvis into Namibia, South Africa must not use Walvis Bay in a manner prejudicial to Namibia's independence or the viability of its economy. U.N. Monthly Chronicle, vol. XV, no. 8, August-September, 1978, pp. 6-7.

<sup>565</sup> Jackson, From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960, pp. 156-157. South Africa had gained control of Namibia, a former German territory, in 1920, had transplanted apartheid there, and was now enforcing it strictly.

(which consist of Canada, Britain, France, Western Germany, and the United states) was short-lived; it collapsed in December 1978 when South Africa reneged by proceeding with its own unilateral elections, rigged to maintain its control over the territory.

After the elections, the Carter administration, faced with increasing Soviet activities in the Horn of Africa, was becoming more sympathetic with the South African view of Namibia. The apparent tilt in the administration's policy towards Namibia was meant for domestic consumption in the United States; it was also a victory for the American conservatives who had worked hard to compel the administration to support the South African position on Namibia.<sup>566</sup> Nigeria and other black African States wondered, as they did during the Ford-Kissinger administration, whether the United States genuinely cared about African problems, or whether the U.S. wanted to protect American and Western strategic interests through a strong Republic of South Africa shielded by Namibia and other black client states dependent on Pretoria's economic, political, and military support. While this would appear to strengthen the argument that U.S. domestic political considerations shaped Nigerian-American relations, it is also true that increasingly conservative pressure in the United States was in turn shaped by heightened Soviet activity in Africa and elsewhere throughout both U.S. administrations.

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<sup>566</sup>Ibid. PP. 256-257.

The Reagan administration has worked closely with the five-nation U.N. Contact Group that has been negotiating Namibia's independence, under U.N. Resolution 435, for seven years. Resolution 435, the mandate under which the group operates, calls for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Namibia, the holding of internationally supervised elections, and the drafting of a new constitution for Namibia. But the efforts of the U.N. Contact Group in arranging the implementation of the Resolution have ground to a halt over the past two years. In an effort to implement its policy of constructive engagement, the Reagan administration turned a blind eye to the South African decision to install the so-called "transitional government of national unity" on June 17, 1985, in Namibia without elections or representation from the Ovambo, Namibia's largest black group.<sup>567</sup> Thus although Nigeria still believes that a successful resolution of the Namibian problem requires the participation of the United States, pledges made by the Carter and Reagan administrations to work towards an acceptable settlement have not yielded the expected result. Nigeria's belief in the efficacy of American participation suggest too much influence on the part of the United States. There is no evidence to support the assertion that a different policy by Reagan administration, short of outright military intervention, would lead to a different South African attitude

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<sup>567</sup> John R. Walker, "Shape Up South Africa", The Edmonton Journal, Wednesday, June 19, 1985.

Although skepticism persisted concerning Nigeria's eligibility for certain types of aid, the Carter and Reagan administrations did not depart from the basic conditions traditionally associated with U.S. aid. The use of foreign aid to promote American political and economic interests in Nigeria remained much the same as it was a decade earlier. For instance, in the 1960s and early 1970s, American aid to Nigeria was designed to help lay the foundation for the eventual creation of private business. The reason being that private sector development was perfectly in line with American values. The political role of aid was equally important. The principal objective was to build political democracy, instill democratic beliefs, and as stated earlier, bring Nigeria into the orbit of the so-called free world.<sup>568</sup>

For political and economic reasons, the United States has extended various kinds of aid to Nigeria during the Carter and Reagan administrations. Since the support for such aid cut across party lines, there has been a remarkable continuity in the conditions and nature of American aid to Nigeria. For example, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, aid to Nigerian agriculture was in line with the Carter and

<sup>568</sup> For this view of foreign aid see Eugène R. Wittkopf, Western Bilateral Aid Allocations: A Comparative Study of Recipient State Attributes and Aid Received (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972), pp. 15-17; Robert A. Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 3-22; Robert B. Shepard, "Superpower and Regional Power: The United States and Nigeria 1960-1979, Ph.D. Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University, 1984, pp. 116-117.

Reagan administration's belief in an open international economy as the system that best promotes prosperity for the United States. Aid to Nigeria during this period was therefore motivated by political and economic considerations, as was the case in the 1960s and early 1970s. In the late 1970s and early 1980s political considerations were probably more important than the economic ones. During this period the principal objectives of aid was apparently to influence Nigerian politics in a desired direction and to lend a helping hand to Nigeria's experiment with the American system of government. The secondary objectives were to promote private sector development in that country; and to open up the Nigerian market for American products.<sup>569</sup>

If the main purpose was the promotion and preservation of democracy in Nigeria through American aid, then there was very little by way of positive outcome. On the other hand, aid was apparently more successful in terms of the secondary objective of promoting private sector development than in promoting and preserving democracy in Nigeria. Although U.S. aid commitments, grants and credits had become negligible during the late 1970s and early 1980s, (Tables 2 and 3), American aid to Nigerian agriculture had started to pay dividends in terms of investments and contracts worth \$37

<sup>569</sup> Susan Gilpin, "Reagan's Private Sector Thrust", Africa Report, vol. 27, January-February, 1982, pp. 51-54; Roger D. Hansen, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Third World: Agenda 1982 (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 96-128; Crawford Young, Ideology and Development in Africa (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 275-326.

million in U.S. goods and services in 1984. This probably explains why aid to Nigeria continued after the 1983 military coup that had overthrown the democratic government in that country. One can in fact question the effectiveness of aid as a means of preserving democracy given the collapse of the democratic experiment in Nigeria at the very time that U.S. aid, especially to Nigerian agriculture, was in progress in that country. It could be argued that the administration in Washington was probably not doing its best to help Nigerian democracy.

Trade played an important role in Nigerian-American relations during the late 1970s and early 1980s. But the development in the functional area of trade was closely tied to political developments in the international arena. For example, having lost its major source of oil in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution of 1979, the Carter administration turned to Nigeria with a formal request to step up its oil production to help the United States make up the difference created by the Iranian oil embargo.<sup>570</sup> Nigeria complied with the request. This understanding between the two countries has far out-lived the Carter administration. After the electoral defeat of President Carter in 1980, a similar deal between Nigeria and the United States was negotiated when the East-West struggle and the politics of the African sub-system forced the new Reagan administration to cancel U.S. oil imports from Libya in

<sup>570</sup>J. K. Onoh, The Nigerian Oil Economy: From Prosperity to Glut (London & Canberra: Croom Helm, 1983), pp. 107-124.

1982. Again, Nigeria was asked to make up for any short fall in oil supply the United States might experience as a result of its policy towards Libya. In 1982, just as in early 1986, Colonel Gaddafi of Libya was accused by the United States of sponsoring international terrorism, of transforming his country into a leading Third World arsenal of Soviet supplied hardware, and of becoming a major source of African instability.<sup>57</sup>

If U.S. trade with Nigeria during the Carter administration had helped America to overcome the inconvenience caused by the Iranian revolution then, it was an effective way of rallying Nigerian support for Reagan's attempt to contain the Libyan and Soviet activities which his administration perceived as threatening American interests. In both cases, Nigeria's response was identical, although as discussed earlier, Nigeria had economic, political and security motives for supporting the United States and opposing Libyan activities in the African sub-system. However, Nigeria's role in the most recent U.S. sanctions against Libya is much more difficult to ascertain than its role in 1982.

### Conclusions

Which perspective is most appropriate to the study of Nigerian-American relations? While the state perspective

<sup>57</sup> Chester A. Crocker, "Regional Strategy for Southern Africa", Department of State Bulletin, vol. 81, October 1981, pp. 24-27; The Edmonton Journal, Thursday, January 9, 1986, p. A3.



remains the dominant view of students of Nigerian-American relations, it is not the most appropriate way of explaining this relationship because of its tendency to down-play the external variables at a time when both countries are becoming more and more involved in the politics of the African sub-system. The debate within the Carter administration as to how to deal with Africa is evidence for a state level interpretation of Nigerian-American relations. However, the state interpretation is greatly limited in that it ignores the impact of the external environment on Nigerian-American bilateral ties. The systemic perspective serves as an alternative to the state and dependency perspectives because of its superior explanatory capabilities. The comprehensiveness of the systemic interpretation is achieved mainly through its appreciation of the new African realities which emerged in the 1970s, notably, the emergence of Nigeria as a regional power in international relations and the resurgence of African nationalism throughout the continent. By implication, Nigeria's emergence as a regional or "middle power" means that the country has (1) come to exercise more autonomy in the conduct of its foreign policy, (2) become more involved in the politics of the African sub-system, thereby (3) initiated more interaction with the United States, and (4) sought improvement in its relations with the United States. This development was evident in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a period characterized by American recognition of

Nigeria's status in international politics. For the United States, Nigeria becomes increasingly important as an actor in the East-West struggle for influence on the African continent. For Nigeria, the United States is an important source of economic support for Nigeria's pursuit of increasing influence in African politics. Nigeria benefitted enormously through trade with the United States and improvement in other areas of bilateral relations.

Furthermore, Nigeria and the United States both were becoming increasingly aware of their role as key players in African politics. Although policy differences between the two countries were evident during the Carter and Reagan administrations, some parallels in their positions were beginning to emerge during the conflicts in Chad, Zimbabwe, and the Ethiopian-Somali dispute over Ogaden. From the systemic perspective, the maintenance of regional peace and security has been the basic disposition of both countries towards the politics of the African sub-system even if for different reasons. Consequently, America's view of the role of Nigeria in international politics, or more precisely its view of Nigeria's role in the East-West struggle, notably, how to deal with the perceived Soviet threat, not only formed the sources from which the particulars of U.S. foreign policy were derived but also the immediate impetus for Nigerian-American relations during this period. As American leaders are fond of reminding Nigerians, both nations have similar goals and dreams, having labored under

the yoke of British colonialism.<sup>572</sup>

The principal challenge to this view is the neo-Marxist/structuralist interpretation inherent in the dependence perspective. This perspective stresses Nigeria's fate as the subordinate partner in a dominance-dependence relationship with the United States, rather than commonalities and interdependence.<sup>573</sup> It suggests that the peculiarity of America's relationship with Nigeria is its drastic asymmetry. Furthermore, implicit in the dependence perspective is the contention that it is difficult to imagine a bilateral combination in which the power of the first partner to affect the second is so great and that of the second to affect the first so small. However, although there are clear signs of disparity in power and clear signs of Nigeria's technological dependence on the United States, the structural conditions of dependence in this case are not as pervasive as dependency writers would have us believe. Nigeria's unique historical experience, wealth, and status must be taken into consideration before making any generalizations about structural dependency. For example, if trade with the United States in the 1970s and early 1980s is any guide, then the interpretation of Nigerian-American

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<sup>572</sup> Africa Business, August, 1985, p. 73.

<sup>573</sup> From the dependence perspective, Nigerian politics is an activity in the periphery of the world capitalist system; and Nigerian state, the apparatus of an externally oriented ruling class bent on exploiting and oppressing the mass of its citizens. Sam E. Oyovbaire, "The Nigerian Political System and Political Science", The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Sciences, Vol. 23, No. 3, November 1981, pp. 355-377.

relations offered by the dependence perspective becomes more difficult to sustain than that of either systemic or state perspective. As a result, such interpretation has limited utility since it does not tell the whole truth. It is deficient in its portrayal of the dynamics of Nigerian-American relations, because it assumes certain conditions of structural dependence as inherent in that relationship which are not well supported by factual experience. It ignores the balance of trade between the two countries which has clearly been in favor of Nigeria since the early 1970s. Finally, it ignores the fact that Nigeria's technological dependence on the United States does not always translate into total acceptance of America's African policies.

Nigerian-American bilateral relations can be understood if one focuses on the politics of the East-West struggle in the African sub-system, to the extent that the United States perceives its policy in Africa as a projection of its power struggle with the Soviet Union and Nigeria a potential ally in that struggle. Shoring up U.S. relations with Nigeria during the Carter and Reagan administrations had the tremendous symbolic importance of sending the right message to Moscow that America would protect its interest by fostering good relations with a newly influential country such as Nigeria. In the final analysis, it would be a big loss to America and the West if Nigeria, one of America's largest overseas supplier of sulphur-free oil and Africa's

most populous country, falls into the communist hands.

The United States finds it advantageous to court Nigeria's support in matters relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes before they create an opportunity for Soviet intervention. The Carter administration's wooing of Nigeria resulted in a kind of collaboration that made Nigeria's understanding a useful asset to the administration during negotiations on Zimbabwe. This understanding between the two powers led to Nigeria's energetic attempt to mediate the Shaba conflict between Zaire and Angola in the summer of 1977, as well as its support for the American position on the Namibian negotiations early that year. However, that attempt was made possible only because Secretary Vance was able to assure Nigerian Foreign Minister Garba that the United States would not over-react to the reported role of the Cubans and East Germans in the Shaba affair. Nigerians are not happy about Soviet influence in Africa, or the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. At the same time, they are equally troubled by the fact that Washington often formulates its policy in terms of the U.S. strategic considerations, thereby failing to take into account the historical roots of Soviet influence in Africa as evident in the Angolan case.<sup>574</sup>

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<sup>574</sup>Richard E. Feinberg, The Intemperate Zone: The Third World Challenge to U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983), P. 245; Donald B. Easum, "Why Nigeria is Important to the U.S.", West Africa, June 15, 1981, PP. 1345-1347; Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in American Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), PP. 269-270, 291-292, 304-305.

President Carter's promise of a "new orientation" in America's African policy did not materialize. The administration had pledged to discard cold war stereotypes because (1) they can cut across that sense of African nationalism that is the surest barrier to external intervention, (2) they can make crisis more dangerous, (3) they inhibit African diplomatic efforts that offer the best hope of resolving disputes before they become conflicts.<sup>575</sup> Given this recognition, it was ironic that the Administration's policy had shifted from regional to purely strategic considerations during the 1979-1980 period. This change of emphasis was conditioned by several factors, notably, (a) Soviet invasion of Afganistan, (b) massive levels of Soviet and Cuban assistance to the Marxist government in Ethiopia, an act which had revived the old but still unresolved debate on the meaning of United States-Soviet detente, (c) wars in Western Sahara, Chad and the Horn of Africa, as well as (d) the continued presence of Soviet advisers and Cuban troops in Angola. Given these factors, the administration had become more concerned with how to respond to the perceived threat of Soviet-Cuban adventurism in Sub-Saharan Africa than majority rule in South Africa or finding a solution to the Namibian problem. As a result, the Carter administration did not live up to its promise of a new orientation in American-African and Nigerian-American relations. It can be safely concluded that

<sup>575</sup>Anthony Lake, "Africa in Global Perspective", Africa Report, Vol. 23, no. 1, January-February, 1978, pp. 44-48.

the administration's decision to keep Nigeria fully informed of U.S. intentions in Africa, like its decision to form military ties with Kenya and Somalia, was made because of strategic rather than regional considerations. The increased importance of Nigeria in Carter's African policy also signalled a trend towards American perception of Nigeria as a potential ally in the struggle against communist intrusion in the African sub-system.

The Reagan administration has also conducted American relations with Nigeria in the context of the East-West struggle, although President Reagan prefers to talk about Nigerian-American bilateral ties in terms of "interdependence" or "mutual dependence" in economic, political, and cultural spheres.<sup>576</sup> He regards Nigeria as a leader among African nations which share U.S. foreign policy objectives, even though, as Carter later discovered, this support does not usually mean Nigeria's decision to abandon the policy position adopted by a majority of African states. Nevertheless, the point to note is that Reagan's view concerning the importance of Nigeria is comparable to that of the Carter administration. Throughout the period covered by both administrations, the United States has placed a high value on the importance of co-operation and consultation with Nigeria on important African issues. To the policy-makers in Washington, the perception of Nigerian

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<sup>576</sup>Lake, "Africa in Global Perspective", pp. 44-48; Richard Deutsch, "Carter's Africa Policy Shift", Africa Report, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 15-18.

"power", its reliability as an ally, and its heightened sense of independence since the 1970s hardly mattered at all. In a letter to then President Shagari, Reagan promised to maintain close ties and strengthen various dimensions of Nigerian-American bilateral ties. He stated:

As we value your advice, and views, we look forward to consulting you on African and international issues of mutual concern. I share your concerns about the importance of the situation in Chad and the future of Namibia, and sincerely hope we can work together to resolve these issues.<sup>577</sup>

In fact, the importance of Nigeria's concern over Namibia in particular has been consciously down-played by Reagan administration officials in Washington due to the over-dramatization of the East-West factor. The administration has formulated its policy almost exclusively within the context of what Nigerian leaders see as American attempt to contain communism in Africa.<sup>578</sup> A distinct impression is formed that the U.S. is only interested in containing communism rather than trying to understand the forces of African nationalism, or alleviate the conditions of want and instability which breeds communism.

The evidence for which of the three perspectives best describes and explains Nigerian-American relations is rather mixed. The state level approach sheds light on the internal functioning of the two governments, but generally fails because of its lack of acknowledgement of the very important East-West dimension of Nigerian-American relations. While

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<sup>577</sup> West Africa, March 23, 1981, P. 652.

<sup>578</sup> West Africa, July 27, 1981, P. 1687.



there are shifts, for example, in the Carter administration policy towards Africa depending on which advisers are influential, the source of that influence does not depend on the individuals, personalities or personal relationship with the President, but on their promotion of a particular view of how to deal with the Soviet Union in the African context, based on Soviet activities there. Thus the issue in the final analysis becomes a systemic one based on the American perception of its need to contain the Soviet Union. The dependency perspective fails in the lack of adequate evidence and, in fact, contrary evidence. U.S. dependence on Nigerian oil and U.S. problems with its balance of trade with Nigeria, indicate a much more interdependent relationship than the dependency literature forecasts. It is only in the East-West context that one can achieve a broad and yet complete picture of a relationship that is driven by the perception of mutual system needs: the United States to contain the Soviet Union, and Nigeria to further its status as a major actor in the African sub-system.

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