# *The Politics of the Heart: Female Sentimental Travel Writers and Revolution, 1775-1800*

by

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# Abstract

*The Politics of the Heart: Female Sentimental Travel Writers and Revolution, 1775-1800* addresses the discursive constructions of nation and gender in British women's sentimental travel writing during the last quarter of the eighteenth century, and specifically during the American and French Revolutions. This study is predicated upon two major and intertwined contentions. First, that the convergence of sentimental discourse and the travelogue genre introduced in Laurence Sterne's *A Sentimental Journey* (1768) provided women with an entry point into the male-dominated genre of the travelogue. Eighteenth-century theory, culture, and even science invested women with an acute sensibility; their socially constructed expertise within the realm of feeling consequently allowed them particular authority within sentimental discourse. Sterne's emphasis on untutored response over erudite reflection and on sociability over critical detachment created a mode of travel writing tailored to women's putative 'natural' abilities, ultimately contributing to the emergence of the female travel writer post-1768. Second, that the combination of affective language and eyewitness authority that characterized Sterne's new approach offered female travel writers a unique and effective means of describing and directing the socio-political transformation of the British nation during a period when its national identity was being challenged and consolidated through a series of political revolutions. The four travelogues at the center of this study manifest the direct and indirect repercussions of revolution: Janet Schaw's *Journal of a Lady of Quality* (1774-1776) and Helen Maria Williams' *A Tour in Switzerland* (1798) provide firsthand accounts of the emergent or fully-emerged

revolutions in America, France, and Switzerland, while the anonymous author of *A Journey to the Highlands of Scotland* (1777) and Mary Morgan in *A Tour to Milford Haven* (1795) deal with the domestic effects of these political crises. Their strategic deployment of sentimental discourse is calculated to shift the political temper of their nation and to shape the contours of British national identity by manipulating the circulation of feeling both within and outside of the nation. Although the women included in this study pull from different directions of the political spectrum, the shared dislocations of travel and revolution help them to reimagine and to rearticulate women's political subjectivity; the experiences, reflections, and self-representations they offer actively resist conventional definitions of femininity and envision a place for women within the British polity.

# Preface

This thesis is an original work by Linda Van Netten Blimke. No part of this thesis has been previously published.

# Dedication

*To Matthew, whose unfailing support, love, and humor sustained me throughout this project. And to my parents, who instilled in me the joys of reading and learning*

# Contents

# Introduction

# The Politics of the Heart: Female Sentimental Travel Writers and Revolution, 1775-1800

There is no greater mistake in ethics, and perhaps none more fatal, than that of imagining nations are governed by their laws. The laws have indeed their influence, and do essential good or harm; but the great governing power is opinion . . . The code of the nurse is the morality of the child; and he that would reform nations must reform their opinions.
~Thomas Holcroft

A national crisis, a political convulsion, is an opportunity, a gift to the traveler; nothing is more revealing of a place to a stranger than trouble. Even if the crisis is incomprehensible, as it usually is, it lends drama to the day and transforms the traveler into an eyewitness.
~Paul Theroux

The title of a work no longer announces its intention: books of travels are converted into vehicles of politics and systems of legislation. Female letter-writers teach us the arcana of government, and obliquely vindicate . . . manners and actions at which female delicacy should blush.
~Jane West[1]

## Critical Contexts: Eighteenth-Century Women's Travel Writing

*The Politics of the Heart: Female Sentimental Travel Writers and Revolution, 1775-1800* addresses the discursive constructions of nation and gender in British women's sentimental travel writing during the last quarter of the eighteenth century, and specifically during the American and French Revolutions. This study is predicated upon two major and intertwined contentions. First, that the convergence of sentimental discourse and the travelogue genre introduced in Laurence Sterne's *A Sentimental*

[1] Thomas Holcroft, *Travels from Hamburg through Westphalia, Holland, and the Netherlands to Paris*, vii; Paul Theroux, *The Tao of Travel*, 16; Jane West, *A Tale of the Times*, 24.

*Journey* (1768) provided women with an entry point into the male-dominated genre of the travelogue. Eighteenth-century theory, culture, and even science invested women with an acute sensibility; their socially constructed expertise within the realm of feeling consequently allowed them particular authority within sentimental discourse. Sterne's emphasis on untutored response over erudite reflection and on sociability over critical detachment created a mode of travel writing tailored to women's putative 'natural' abilities, ultimately contributing to the development of the female travel writer post-1768. Second, that the combination of affective language and eyewitness authority that characterized Sterne's new approach offered female travel writers a unique and effective means of describing and directing the socio-political transformation of the British nation during a period when its national identity was being challenged and consolidated through a series of political revolutions. The specific forms of politics with which the travel writers in the following chapters engage relate to both national and gender politics; the women in this study engage with the ideas, cultural codes, values, and practices that shape Britain's national identity and determine its international presence, and they critique the structures of power that impose and naturalize their political dispossession and suppression by proposing and enacting alternate forms of women's political subjectivity. The four travelogues at the center of this study manifest the direct and indirect repercussions of revolution: Janet Schaw's *Journal of a Lady of Quality* (1774-1776) and Helen Maria Williams' *A Tour in Switzerland* (1798) provide firsthand accounts of the emergent or fully-emerged revolutions in America, France, and Switzerland, while the anonymous author of *A Journey to the Highlands of Scotland* (1777) and Mary Morgan in *A Tour to Milford Haven* (1795) deal with the domestic

effects of these political crises. Their strategic deployment of sentimental discourse is calculated to shift the political temper of their nation and shape the contours of British national identity by manipulating the circulation of feeling both within and outside of the nation. Although the women included in this study pull from different directions of the political spectrum, the shared dislocations of travel and revolution help them to reimagine and to rearticulate women's political subjectivity; the experiences, reflections, and self-representations they offer actively resist conventional definitions of femininity and envision a place for women within the British polity.

It is only recently that the political dimensions of eighteenth-century women's travelogues have been rediscovered and addressed by scholars. Current scholarship has moved away from the purely celebratory and/or biographical approaches to female travelers common among earlier explorations of the genre.[2] Sara Mills' groundbreaking research on nineteenth-century women's travel writing was one of the first studies to acknowledge and analyze at length the serious political content of early women's travelogues. In *Discourses of Difference* (1993), Mills explores the imperial politics at work within women's travel texts, analyzing their contributions to colonialism and its various discourses in an effort to refute the notion of female travel writing as "simply the accounts of the lives of individual women" (197). Mary Louise Pratt similarly focuses on the political rather than the purely personal content of nineteenth-century women's travelogues in *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (1992). Her

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[2] For celebratory and/or biographical approaches to early female travelers, see Barbara Hodgson, *No Place for a Lady* (2002); Marion Tinling, *Women into the Unknown* (1989); and Jane Robinson, *Wayward Women* (1990). More recently, Mick Conefrey's *How to Climb Mont Blanc in a Skirt* (2011) has followed in this celebratory strain, providing rollicking accounts of early female travelers' daring-do.

brief sketch of Flora Tristan's and Maria Graham Callcott's travelogues reveals the serious socio-political investments of these texts in issues such as abolition, social reform, national and international warfare, and the rights of women, and suggests how travel could empower women to become political activists. In *Women Travel Writers and the Language of Aesthetics, 1716-1818* (1995), Elizabeth Bohls illuminates how women's appropriation of aesthetic conventions in their travel narratives exposed, challenged, and adopted the matrix of racist, classist, and gendered assumptions embedded in the foundations of eighteenth-century aesthetic discourse. More recently, in *British Travel Writers in Europe, 1750-1800* (2001) and in *Women Writing the Home Tour* (2008), Katherine Turner and Zoë Kinsley have studied the ways in which the texts of female travelers—either on the Grand Tour (Turner) or on the home tour (Kinsley)—were invested in defining or redefining British national identity through their politically inflected representations of home and away, or of 'Britishness' and 'otherness.'

These studies provide insightful strategies for thinking about women's travelogues as political documents and their journeys as political acts. However, very few of the works that address eighteenth-century women's travel narratives analyze or even acknowledge the prevalence of sentimental discourse within these texts; the matter of feeling—presented in rich and complex detail across the spectrum of eighteenth-century women's travelogues—is often treated as a marginal or even aberrant aspect of the text, but not evaluated as a unified strategy or as a deliberate mode of representation. The impulse to underestimate, overlook, or dismiss the sentimental nature of women's travelogues is perhaps rooted in a desire to steer the

discussion of their texts away from the eighteenth-century stereotype of the frivolous and flighty female tourist and away from more contemporary readings of early female travelers as curiosities, both of which suggest that the journeys and texts of female travelers lack intellectual rigor.[3] There is a handful of exceptional chapters and articles that investigate the convergence of sentimental ideology and travel in eighteenth-century women's travelogues, but most of these occur within studies of sensibility rather than within studies of the travelogue.[4] *The Politics of the Heart* bridges the gap between studies of sensibility and of the travelogue, contemplating the relationship between sensibility and travel post-1768 in an effort to reveal the ways in which the convergence of sensibility and mobility in Sterne's innovative form jointly sanctioned women writers to address controversial political issues related both to nation or to gender, or, to use Jane West's words, the ways in which they coalesced to convert "books of travel" into "vehicles of politics and systems of legislation" (24).[5]

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[3] For example, Mary Wollstonecraft describes the typical eighteenth-century female tourist as more concerned with "the impression that she may make on her fellow travellers; and . . . on the care of the finery that she carries with her" (130), and Mick Conefrey is quick to use the words "brave," "reckless," "fascinating," and "eccentric" (ix) to describe female travelers, reinforcing common contemporary interpretations of early female travelers as "eccentric creatures" and "exceptional spinsters" (Mills 6).

[4] See Gary Kelly, "Feminizing Revolution: Helen Maria Williams" in *Women, Writing, and Revolution, 1790-1827*, 30-79; Lynn Festa's section on Janet Schaw's travelogue in *Sentimental Figures of Empire in Eighteenth-Century Britain and France*, 171-178; Chris Jones, "Travelling Hopefully: Helen Maria Williams and the Feminine Discourse of Sensibility" in *Romantic Geographies: Discourses of Travel, 1775-1844*, 93-107; and Deborah Weiss, "Suffering, Sentiment, and Civilization: Pain and Politics in Mary Wollstonecraft's *Short Residence*" in *Studies in Romanticism*, 199-221.

[5] It is important to note that West's criticism was directed at Helen Maria Williams—a female sentimental traveler whose careful integration of sentimental rhetoric and the conventions of the travelogue produced disarming contemplations on the progress of the French Revolution.

## Social Contexts: Gender and Journeying

In Thomas Gisborne's popular conduct book, *An Enquiry into the Duties of the Female Sex* (1797), he suggests that women's stasis is vital to the stability of the British nation. Women (particularly those who belong to the middle and upper classes) provide the 'glue' that binds local communities together; their philanthropy secures the affection of the laboring class and their presence within the home keeps their husbands from wandering abroad and neglecting their domestic responsibilities. Gisborne argues that women's participation in Britain's traveling culture effectively compromises the local ties that they are responsible for maintaining. "When the rage of rambling has seized a woman," he warns, "[t]he ties of connection between them and the vicinity are broken. With the upper ranks, their intercourse is that of form and hurry; to the lower, they become distant, cold, and estranged" (293, 291). Their absence inevitably displaces their husbands as well, disrupting the "friendly intercourse" (293) between tenant and landowner and destabilizing the relationships of power that underpin Britain's governing structures. "The absence of a common patron," he continues, "who used to conciliate differences, to encourage the meritorious, to overawe the refractory is severely felt in the neighbouring villages and hamlets" (293-294). He concludes by exhorting women to obey dutifully the Biblical injunction to be a "keeper 'at home'" (294). The sense of domestic and national disorder that Gisborne evokes in his depiction of the transient woman was part of an emerging discourse that firmly situated women's value and influence within the home; women were cast, to use John Donne's metaphor, as the "fixed foot" (27) around which men moved—their domestic presence

ensuring the stability of the "center" (27) and the return of the adventuring male.[6] "[T]he plot of the male journey," Karen Lawrence succinctly explains, "depends on keeping woman in her place. Not only is her place at home, but she in effect is home itself, for the female body is traditionally associated with earth, shelter, and enclosure" (1). However, although Gisborne denies women a directly political role within society—establishing politics, law, philosophy, navigation, commerce, and warfare as strictly masculine affairs (21)—it is important to note that his emphasis on their unique capacity for sociability inadvertently provides them with a distinctly public *and* political role. Eighteenth-century women used their socially sanctioned roles as mediators and as stewards as a means through which to claim active participation within British political culture, reifying their sociability into political property.

Amanda Gilroy observes that in response to a culture that increasingly valorized their stasis, "an important consideration for many women was how they could operate in the public sphere of travel and writing and yet still preserve their association with the private sphere" (5-6). Those women who wanted to join the ranks of male travel writers were faced with the question of how to represent their travels in such a way that avoided suspicions of moral laxity, allegations of domestic negligence, or—the most dreaded—accusations of being a "petticoat pedant" (Anonymous, *A Journey to the Highlands of Scotland*, 22) or a "masculine wom[an]" (John Fordyce 211). The immense cultural challenges faced by the female travel writer can be plainly seen in the fact that in the first six decades of the eighteenth century—decades which witnessed the rapid

[6] Donne's comparison of women to the "fixed foot" of a compass, firmly positioned in the "center" (27) while their male counterpart actively circumferences outer realms, is a particularly apt description of the idealized gender dichotomy in eighteenth-century Britain.

rise of the female novelist—only two British women published accounts of their journeys, and one of those publications was released posthumously.[7] Those female travelers who did publish saw fit to vindicate their acts of travel and publication in the preface to their works, a convention that Turner describes as a "framework within which women writers fashion an apologetic . . . for the act of travelling itself" (144). It is my contention that the growth of women's travel writing in the last three decades of the eighteenth century has as much—if not more—to do with formal changes in the travelogue genre as with rising literacy rates, the development of mass tourism, and the increasing presence of women writers within the literary marketplace. The contribution of *A Sentimental Journey*'s generic innovations to the development of women's travel writing should not be underestimated; Sterne's narrative crafted a textual persona and a literary form that allowed women to negotiate strategically the public act of travel with their private character and domestic obligations. Offering an alternative to what Turner classifies as the "disputatious and xenophobic writings" (86) popular around the mid-century, his mock travelogue theoretically emphasizes cultural connection rather than competition through his protagonist's sympathetic interactions with foreigners. Organized around moments of sympathetic exchange rather than around topics "commercial, political, œconomical, and philosophical" (*Analytical Review* 30), the sentimental travelogue obscures its political commitments in the guise of sensibility; spectacles of sociability supplant political controversy, seemingly dissociating the sentimental travelogue from the realm of politics. It is this outward emphasis on the personal rather than the political, or on social rather than political spaces, that makes

[7] Elizabeth Justice, *A Voyage to Russia* (1739) and Mary Wortley Montagu, *The Turkish Embassy Letters* (1763, posthumous publication).

the sentimental travelogue a congenial form for women within which to represent their travels. Sterne's creation of the sentimental traveler—sympathetic, sociable, and emotionally responsive—and his protagonist's performance of travel as a "quiet journey of the heart" (137) offered women an opportunity to extend their 'natural' sociability and sensibility beyond the domestic sphere, fostering on a national and international scale the "ties of connection" (Gisborne 291) for which Gisborne claimed they were uniquely responsible.

## Theoretical Contexts: The Politics of Sensibility

Pointing to the ways in which travel writers—and specifically female travel writers—sublimated their political motivations and meanings into alternate discourses, Ulrike Brisson calls for a diversity of approaches to "the politics of travel" in order to "tease out the complex ideological and socio-political transactions that attend the act of journeying" (5). This study offers one such approach by remapping the sentimental discourse in eighteenth-century women's travel texts as political terrain. To understand how their exercise of sensibility could be and was deployed as a political tool, it is necessary to turn to the ways in which it was defined and theorized within eighteenth-century culture. Defining sensibility for the purposes of this study is an essential albeit complex imperative. Scholars who study the eighteenth-century phenomenon often either gloss over the matter of definition or admit to the impossibility or undesirability of distinguishing among the various terms used within the culture of sensibility. "The terms 'sensibility' and 'sentimental'," Markman Ellis asserts, "denote a complex field of meanings and connotations in the late eighteenth century, overlapping and coinciding to such an extent as to offer no obvious distinction" (7). Chris Jones agrees with Ellis'

statement that "it is not possible to legislate between the closely allied terms of 'sensibility' and 'sentimental' in the mid-eighteenth century" (7), himself arguing that "[s]ensibility was clearly not a uniform or unitary concept" (5). As Ellis' and Jones' decisions suggest, current confusion and contention over the precise definitions of sensibility and its attendant vocabulary of sympathy and sentimentalism (and sentiment, sentimental, and sentimentality) is indicative of the lack of precision surrounding these terms in the eighteenth century. However, although I agree with Jones that sensibility was not a "uniform or unitary concept," there are also enough basic similarities in the eighteenth-century use of the various expressions associated with the culture of sensibility to justify the proposal of provisional definitions in order to clarify the central terms of this study: sensibility, sympathy, and sentimentalism. Sensibility is here defined as acute emotional sensitivity. Samuel Johnson's eighteenth-century definition of the concept as "quickness of sensation and perception" is developed in Lynn Festa's and Stephen Ahern's more nuanced descriptions of sensibility as an "individual's susceptibility to particular kinds and degrees of feeling" (Festa 7) and as a "capacity for living intensely that is demonstrated in a heightened sensitivity to one's environment" (Ahern 12). While sensibility denotes the capacity to feel, sympathy allows for the communication of that feeling between two or more people. According to Johnson, sympathy can be understood as "mutual sensibility; the quality of being affected by the affection of another." His description finds current support in Juliet Shields' articulation of the eighteenth-century concept as "the mobility of emotion between different individuals" (3). I understand sentimentalism as a particular form within the culture of sensibility that draws on a recognizable set of tropes, themes,

stereotypes, and rhetorical expressions. For this interpretation I am indebted to Ahern's explanation of eighteenth-century sentimentality as "a representational mode that operates according to various media and literary genres and includes two elements: a focus on the workings of heightened emotion . . . and an always implicit and often explicit goal to stimulate an affective response in the observer" (25).

All of these definitions—both the eighteenth-century descriptions and their contemporary interpretations—point to the powerful potential of feeling insofar as it was understood as a potent stimulant and as an effective conduit. Enlightenment moral philosophy provided a theory of the emotions that developed the socio-political possibilities of sensibility by investing it with both moral and political agency. The philosophical history of sensibility has become a well-worn tale, and its complex plot is too lengthy and intricate to repeat given the confines of this introduction; however, I will briefly focus on the strains of thought and on the specific developments that are particularly germane to this project.

Building upon John Locke's empiricism, borrowing from Latitudinarian theology, and reacting against egoistic interpretations of humankind, Anthony Ashley Cooper (the 3rd Earl of Shaftsbury) and Francis Hutcheson first suggested the presence of a moral intuition within the human consciousness that was capable of differentiating between good and evil. "[T]here may be implanted in the heart," Shaftesbury asserted, "a real sense of right or wrong, a real good affection towards the species or society" (185). As inherently relational creatures, human's social affections naturally orient them towards choosing good over evil; the impulses of the heart are geared towards moral action. "[F]eeling," R. F. Brissenden explains, "was necessarily the *primary* element in the

process which led to the formation of moral sentiment" (24, original italics). David Hume and Adam Smith fundamentally agreed with their predecessor's reification of sensibility as the locus of morality, but it is their discussion of the role of sympathy in the formation of national identity and their more precise rendering of its operation that makes their theories particularly relevant for this study, as will be discussed at length in Chapter 1. The Scottish philosophers labored to invest the emotions with a formative and transformative role within society that rivaled the influence of formal politics or, in fact, was constitutive of traditional political structures. Both philosophers imbue feeling with the power to create and to reform societies, arguing that social and political organizations—families, local communities, and nations—are not only *made possible* but *made through* humankind's propensity for sympathy. Hume and Smith argue that the human impulse to "enter into the sentiments of others" (Hume 367) constitutes both individual and collective identity. Individuals both unconsciously (Hume) and consciously (Smith) change to 'fit' the emotional contours of their immediate environment, and the resulting emotional synchronicity forms the foundations of collective identity. The formulation both of individuals and of societies as malleable constructs vulnerable to emotional energies exposes the political dimensions of feeling, suggesting that the emotions are the most effective means either of securing political hegemony or of generating political dissent. Feeling was not understood simply as a personal attribute—limited in its scope—but as a catalyst of action and as a means of social transformation. Inasmuch as they reflected and constituted their social worlds, emotional orientations and expressions were inherently political.

The political possibilities of emotion suggested by Enlightenment thought can be helpfully aligned with contemporary affect theory in order to further understand the political dimensions of eighteenth-century women's sentimental travel texts. Jonathan Flatley's explanation of "revolutionary counter-moods" (503) builds upon Hume and Smith's sense of the constitutive nature of feeling, with particular emphasis on the revolutionary potential embedded within emotional communication. Flatley grounds his theory of the emotions in the idea of cultural 'moods,' which he derives from Martin Heidegger's concept of *Stimmung*: "the overall atmosphere or medium in which our thinking, doing, and acting occurs" (503). Our affective environment fundamentally shapes both how we imagine and how we interact with the world around us; the cultural mood in which we are immersed inevitably establishes the conditions of possibility regarding both thought and action. Take, for example, Britain in the mid to late-1790s: gripped by what can be described as a reactionary atmosphere, the expression and circulation of radical ideals became increasingly difficult to negotiate as the cultural mood was dominated by an emerging disposition towards conservatism. However, composed as they are of emotion—an eminently malleable entity—cultural moods can be altered or replaced through the process of emotional realignment, or what Flatley refers to as "affective attunement" (504). Taking as his case study the political pamphleteering that successfully engineered collective socialist action among Detroit factory workers in the 1960s, he explains that the process of publicly introducing and sharing new or alternate emotional states—a process that Hume and Smith refer to as 'sympathy'—enables the emergence of new collectives that can generate shifts within the cultural mood. In other words, affective communication can

transform emotion into embodied effects. Flatley's argument that emotional expression provides the necessary antecedent for political change provides a helpful framework for interpreting the performance of feeling within the sentimental travel texts examined in this work.

This study focuses on narratives produced during periods of revolution due to the ways in which political crises intersect with travel to broaden the grounds for political participation and to imbue emotion with heightened political importance. Sensibility and its attendant practices—particularly as they are associated with moral authority and personal/political transformation—become overtly politicized as legitimate grounds for political action in revolutionary moments, as evidenced by the simultaneous appeals to and fear of individual and collective feeling expressed by British society during the American and French Revolutions. Thomas Holcroft's persuasion, cited in the epigraph above, that opinions rather than laws are the "the great governing power" and that "he that would reform nations must reform their opinions" (vii) manifests the influence of Enlightenment interpretations of feeling, and illustrates the relevance of sensibility for revolutionary moments. Paul Theroux's characterization of political crisis as "a gift to the traveler" on account of its revelatory ("nothing is more revealing of a place to a stranger than trouble") and empowering ("it transforms the traveler into an eyewitness" [16]) properties suggests the license and authority to be derived from political revolution for the female traveler. For Schaw and Williams, their proximity to the American and the French Revolutions both demands and validates their political participation; for the anonymous Lady of *A Journey* and Mary Morgan, the pressure of revolution transforms the national landscape into

political terrain and invests their representations of the domestic space with political meaning. I interpret the work of these sentimental travelogues as comparable in their intention to the work of the political pamphlets highlighted by Flatley—as mechanisms used to guide the revolutionary moods in which they were immersed. By publicly performing and sharing their own emotional orientations—particularly as it related to political revolution and its implications for national and gender identities—female sentimental travel writers solicited their readers' emotional complicity to accomplish the mood-altering or consolidating "affective attunement" that Flately argues is key to achieving socio-political change.

## Generic Contexts: The Cultural Authority of the Sentimental Travelogue

Aligned with morality and laden with political potential, sensibility in its various forms became a site of significant and serious political contest within the eighteenth century. "Rather than worrying about degenerating into sentimentality," Brycchan Carey explains, "many aspired to it, recognizing an opportunity to tap directly into the heart of the human condition. If sentimental literature could put people in touch with their emotions, as many in the eighteenth century believed, it was clearly a powerful tool" (2). Yet, in large part due to the smear campaign that sullied its reputation in the 1790s and to changing cultural tastes, only in the past three decades have scholars begun to rehabilitate the culture of sensibility and to rediscover its texts—with particular attention to the sentimental novel—as a site of political contest that intervened in all the major socio-political issues of its time. Both Markman Ellis (*The Politics of Sensibility* [1996]) and Brycchan Carey (*British Abolitionism and the Rhetoric of Sensibility* [2005]) have explored the convergence of sentimental and

abolitionist discourses in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Whereas Ellis specifically focuses on the ways in which the sentimental novel was a particularly congenial form for addressing politically controversial issues such as abolition, Carey explores how sentimental rhetoric was used to bolster the claims of the anti-slavery movement. Sarah Knott (*Sensibility and the American Revolution* [2009]) and Chris Jones (*Radical Sensibility* [1993]) reveal the revolutionary potential of sensibility in their considerations of its function within the American and French Revolutions; Knott argues that the language and culture of sensibility helped Americans shape a distinct and cohesive national identity over the course of the Revolution and its aftermath, while Jones emphasizes the chameleon-like quality of sentimental discourse that allows it to serve radical and conservative political platforms equally during the French Revolution. Evan Gottlieb (*Feeling British: Sympathy and National Identity in Scottish and English Writing, 1701-1832* [2007]) and Juliet Shields (*Sentimental Literature and Anglo-Scottish Identity, 1745-1820* [2010]) turn their attention to the constitutive power of sympathy within the British nation following the Act of Union in 1707, both presenting an argument for the role of sentiment in consolidating (and also problematizing) Anglo-Scottish relations over the course of the eighteenth century. Finally, the productive connections among gender, sensibility, and politics have received a tremendous amount of attention in contemporary criticism. In *The Culture of Sensibility: Sex and Society within Eighteenth-Century Britain* (1992), G. J. Barker-Benfield reveals how the conflation of morality and/or spirituality and emotional sensitivity promulgated within the culture of sensibility effectively provided women with a particular socio-political cachet that augmented their social status and enlarged their field of activity. In *Women,*

*Writing, and Revolution: 1790-1827* (1993), Gary Kelly argues that female authors were "quick to exploit the revolutionary and feminist potential of 'sensibility' in the construction of women and subjectivity" (7). He reveals the ways in which women feminized public and political culture by politicizing the cultural discourse of sensibility. While continuing the reclamation of the sentimental novel as political terrain, Claudia Johnson's *Equivocal Beings: Politics, Gender, and Sentimentality in the 1790s* (1995) reveals the ways in which the male appropriation of sentimentality effectively limited women's already restricted options for political participation; rather than dismiss the excesses often derided within women's sentimental literature, Johnson reads these moments as politically-inflected reactions to their deteriorating socio-political status.

This study situates itself among and builds upon these scholarly considerations of the dynamic intersections among sensibility, gender, and politics in the eighteenth century; it contributes to the burgeoning body of work that recognizes and explores the political valence of sensibility and the nuanced position of women within this culture. Where it differs from previous studies is in its singular attention to eighteenth-century travel writing, and particularly to the sentimental travelogue—a mode that is often (and understandably, given its genesis as a fictional narrative) read and interpreted as an extension of the sentimental novel. Sterne's fictional adaptation of the travelogue in 1768 married the moral and affective power of the sentimental novel to the cultural and intellectual authority of the travelogue; crafting a genre that equally appealed to the sentiments and to the intellect, this innovation altered both who could author the travelogue and the ways in which the genre could act upon its audience. Although the sentimental travelogue shares with the sentimental novel several defining

characteristics—namely, an "interest in feeling and emotional states" (Carey 18), a tendency towards "emotional and rhetorical excess" (Ahern 12), and "an always implicit and often explicit goal to stimulate an affective response" (25)—its association with reality and its attendant cultural status crucially distinguishes it from its fictional counterpart. "[T]ravel writing," Pamela Cheek observes, "could, by the second half of the century, be celebrated for the edifying connection to the panorama of the real that it offered" (12). In an attempt to counter the accusations of falsification or misrepresentation leveled at travel writing since the fantastical travel narratives of the past centuries, eighteenth-century travel writers attempted to establish their credibility by emphasizing their strict adherence to fact, or by emphasizing the factual rather than fictive nature of their observations. In his 1775 travelogue, Nathaniel Wraxall clearly distinguishes between past and present travel texts in an effort to establish the genre's credibility: "[T]he age of imposition on one side, and of credulity on the other, seems now to be over: truth and sound knowledge are introduced into subjects where formerly they scarce ever intruded" (3). George Dekker attributes this new commitment to truth—or, at least, this performance of truth-telling—to the genre's classification as an educational resource. He argues that the intensified scrutiny and subsequent evolution of the travelogue was intimately related to "the importance of travel literature as a source of information about foreign peoples for such pioneering social theorists as Montesquieu and Adam Smith" (6). Indeed, the Scottish philosopher Dugald Stewart wrote in 1793 that even the "casual" (34) observations of travelers served as a valuable resource for historians and philosophers. "[T]he detached facts which travels and voyages afford us," he declared, "may frequently serve as landmarks to our

speculations" (xiii). Travelogues were also used as a source of political information as travelers could provide firsthand accounts of international political developments. For example, Alexander Schaw's travel report on North Carolina was sent to Lord Dartmouth in 1775 to assist the British government in determining an appropriate course of action in regards to the rebellion in the Carolinas (Hugh F. Rankin 29). That the travelogue was valued for its exposition of empirical data is further evident from the importance that eighteenth-century reviewers attach both to its veracity and to the presence of what a critic for *The Monthly Review* refers to as "useful instruction" (295; 1797). In a review of Jemima Kindersley's 1777 travel narrative, a critic for *The Monthly Review* is quick to assure those "who read for information" that "[t]hese letters are not . . . the manufacture of a hireling, but the production of a real Traveller" (243; 1777).

It is precisely its association with fact rather than fiction that furnished the travelogue with social approbation; whereas eighteenth-century society worried that the fictional scenarios presented in novels would corrupt young readers by instilling a dangerous disregard for the exigencies of reality, travel writing was promoted on the basis of its injunction to reflect rather than to obscure or alter reality. "Fiction," M. O. Grenby explains, "was supposed to be guilty of conjuring up a chimerical vision of life, as full of heroes, heroines and easily acquired fortunes as it was empty of the harsh realities of life, a utopian no-place in which a naïve reader might erroneously place his or her faith" (17-18). In their conduct books directed towards young women, both Hester Chapone (*Letters on the Improvement of the Mind* [1773]) and Rev. James Fordyce (*Sermons for Young Women* [1766]) discourage the reading of novels due to their pernicious ability to "inflame the passions of youth" (Chapone 188), but encourage

the perusal of travelogues based on their instructive quality, or their ability to "open and enlarge the mind" (Fordyce 214). Whereas novels implant "the expectation of extraordinary adventures . . . and the admiration of extravagant passions and absurd conduct" (Chapone 188), travelogues "remind us that we are citizens of the universe; they show us how small the part that we fill in the immense orb of being" (Fordyce 214). According to these arguments, fiction was dangerous not just because it displaced readers from reality, but because in doing so it fostered contempt towards traditional customs and values; the travelogue was an acceptable form of entertainment because it firmly grounded its audience within their world and shaped their perception and practice of citizenship. This notion of the travelogue's comparative value as a source of positive instruction was repeated in reviews of genre throughout the eighteenth century. Writing a few years earlier than Chapone and Fordyce, a writer for the *The Critical Review* argues that whereas the novel "generally croud[s] [the mind] with images that, even allowing them to be innocent, we ought to banish," the travelogue "will always entertain and improve the understanding" (375-376; 1764). Nigel Leask argues that even if travel writing challenged social conventions, "inasmuch as it represented a 'literature of fact'—and of heroic endeavour—it was considered to be at least potentially improving in a way that no purely fictional narrative could be" (14).

The travelogue's instructive quality not only made it 'safe' reading, but also concomitantly invested it with a form of legitimacy and authority denied the novel in the eighteenth century. Susan Lamb argues that the "tremendous power and authority" (17) apportioned to the travelogue in this period was fundamentally related to its association both with knowledge *acquisition* and with knowledge *generation*.

"Tourism," she asserts, "was one of the eighteenth century's primary modes of producing, confirming, and interpreting knowledge . . . about human relationships of all kinds" (24). The genre's comparative authority (compared, that is, to fiction) is reinforced by travelers, who repeatedly point to the discrepancy between fiction and reality, or between empirical evidence and mediated knowledge. In order to validate her own firsthand account, Janet Schaw frequently draws attention to the gaps, inconsistencies, and/or omissions in narratives of America written by armchair travelers; she underscores the cultural influence of the eyewitness in her statement that her audience "know[s] nothing of the power of this country, nor will you believe it till you find it with a witness" (189). Samuel Johnson similarly emphasizes the superiority of information gained through the act of witnessing, stating that "[t]he use of travelling is to regulate imagination by reality, and instead of thinking how things may be, to see them as they are" (509). His distinction between an armchair and an authentic traveler suggests that knowledge acquired through indirect means is a poor substitute for direct experience. Despite constant (and often merited) suspicions regarding the factuality of travelogues, they were nonetheless understood as predominantly nonfictional accounts of a traveler's actual experiences and, as such, the firsthand information provided by travelers could be integrated into networks of knowledge.

The convergence of the travelogue's eyewitness authority and sensibility's moral authority in the sentimental travelogue provided female travel writers both with a legitimate motive and with a powerful discourse with which to intervene in eighteenth-century politics. As travel writers, women became beneficiaries of the genre's significant socio-political franchise; in appropriating the influence afforded the

eyewitness, they became legitimate producers of knowledge—providing their British audience with raw data that could subsequently circulate through the nation in various forms of knowledge. As specifically *sentimental* travel writers, they not only gained access to a genre previously gendered as male, but they were given the license to infuse their eyewitness observations with emotional and, by extension, moral substance. Female sentimental travel writers, then, both provide their readers with useful information about their own and other nations through empirical observation *and* manipulate their readers' emotions regarding this material through sentimental representation. In the words of an eighteenth-century reviewer, they establish "both what they saw and what they felt" (*The Critical Review* 361; 1804) to guide the manner in which the foreign is integrated into the British nation's political perceptions and practices.

The authors included in this study engage with the culture of sensibility in two related but distinct ways: as political rhetoric and as political praxis. Each woman engages with sensibility on the level of rhetoric and representation; their performance of sensibility models right feeling, effectively shaping their readers' sympathies and directing them towards what they perceive as right action. The calculated disclosure of their emotional judgments exploits the transformative power of feeling to produce affective attunement between the authors and their audiences, creating a space in which both British national identity and the place of women within the nation can be renegotiated. As well as or due to engaging with sensibility as a rhetorical form and representational mode, they are simultaneously invested in establishing and defending sympathy as political praxis; threaded through each of their narratives is an argument

for the value of feeling in and as political action in the face of endemic prejudice and/or the diminishing franchise of sensibility. The 1770s saw the germination of an anti-sentimental backlash that reached its zenith during and after the French Revolution; the moral and political objections leveled against the culture of sensibility in the final decades of the eighteenth century prompted the gradual alienation of feeling and politics. By reinforcing the political legitimacy of sensibility, female sentimental travel writers defend both a way of imagining and a way of participating in political society. Following in the ideological footsteps of Sterne's protagonist—whose sentimental orientation implicitly endorses the political value of sympathy in the operation of national and international relations—female sentimental travel writers advocate the assimilation of feeling and politics, arguing for what they interpret as a humane politics (understood in either radical or conservative terms) that ameliorates the instabilities and/or injustices created by Britain's uneven power relations. In doing so, they simultaneously defend the tenuous grounds of women's political participation within the public sphere.

## Chapter Outlines

My project reclaims the work of four British female travel writers whose travel narratives are either designated as sentimental by the authors or whose representational mode manifests the characteristics of sentimental travel. The first chapter outlines and examines the philosophical discourses and generic parameters that inform my reading of eighteenth-century women's travel texts. This chapter is divided into two sections. Section 1 examines Adam Smith and David Hume's philosophical theories of sympathy, specifically focusing on how their theories relate sympathy to the

formation of national identity. Their theories form two allied but occasionally divergent hypotheses for the process and socio-political function of sympathy, the tenets of which female sentimental travel writers alternately exemplify, revise, or resist in practice. Section 2 moves into an analysis of Sterne's application of Smith's and Hume's theories of sympathy to the travelogue genre in *A Sentimental Journey*. My consideration of Sterne's innovative approach to travel writing focuses on three key issues: 1) building a definition of the 'sentimental tourist' according to the description given in Sterne's text and developed by his imitators, 2) describing the political possibilities latent in the convergence of sentimental discourse and the travelogue genre as demonstrated by Sterne's narrative, and 3) delineating both the possibilities and the difficulties Sterne's prototype of the 'sentimental traveler' posed for female travel writers.

Chapters 2-5 analyze the use of the 'sentimental tourist' figure in four women's travelogues, examining how these female travel writers use the mode's manipulation of feeling to intervene in revolutionary politics, shape British national identity, and contest their own place within the polity during the American and French Revolutions. It brings together authors from fundamentally different political persuasions in order to demonstrate the diverse appeal and applications of the sentimental mode, as well as to establish the socio-political diversity of eighteenth-century female travel writers.

Chapter 2, " 'I Am Sure You Will Share My Feelings': Janet Schaw's *Journal of a Lady of Quality* and the American Revolution" considers how Schaw manipulates the discourse and practice of sympathy to influence Britain's response to the Revolution. Her deployment of sentimental discourse suggests a theoretical grasp of the workings of sympathy that both implements and revises Hume's ideas in order to achieve her own

political ends. Whereas the Scottish philosopher insists that certain imminence is key to the cultivation of sympathy—distance limits the sympathetic exchange and can even naturally engender mutual hostility—Schaw's depiction of Scottish expats in the West Indies and America as even more British than the British posits that distance need not rupture sympathies. According to her portrayal of Scottish immigrants, distance has intensified emotional connections with their mother country rather than redirected their sympathies towards those contiguous to them (African slaves and born and bred Americans). Schaw's revision of the operation of sympathy is politically motivated. Her Scottish family and friends are economically dependent upon the British Empire; the success of the Anglo-Scottish union and its guarantee of unlimited access to England's resources is necessary for her circle's economic survival. It is precisely her dedication to the success of the Empire that motivates her profoundly *un*sympathetic treatment of Americans; she actively attempts to interrupt the sympathetic exchange between Britain and its American colonists by portraying them not only to be irremediably foreign, but also to be unrecognizable as humans. Her selective deployment of sympathy supports an aggressive British military response against the American colonists, which she believes is the only method by which Britain will retain its overseas Empire. Schaw continues to carefully manipulate the power of sympathy when it comes to gender; she encourages her audience to sympathize more strongly with the women (including herself) than the men she portrays. Her deeply sympathetic portrayal of women (even the occasional American woman) posits that they are far superior colonizers than men because of their greater moral (and, occasionally, physical) strength.

Chapter 3, "The Ties that Bind: *A Journey to the Highlands of Scotland* and Colonial Politics," examines an anonymous Lady's explicit appropriation of the sentimental tourist figure and suggests that her sympathetic portrayal of the nation is intended as response to the spectacle of colonial disintegration in America. Her personal interaction with the Scottish nation can be read as a model for imperial interaction that ensures loyalty rather than creates and/or exacerbates division. Taking a page from Smith's theory of sympathy, she implicitly argues that regulated sympathy is key to social harmony; although she admits that excessive sentiment generates harmful behaviors, she is keen to demonstrate that the absence of sympathy within human interactions is equally—if not more—destructive. Her extension of sympathy to the Scottish nation provides an example for how the British government should approach its colonies, while simultaneously condemning a practice of 'Britishness' that is defined by insularity and exclusivity. The Lady's critique of exclusivity extends beyond ethnic and into gender relations; her modeling of what she presents as an alternative form of British national identity and her enshrining of sympathy as an essential national quality jointly articulates that women possess qualities that equip them for active participation in public and political debates about citizenship and national identity .

Chapter 4, "Rescuing Sensibility: Mary Morgan's Defense of Emotional Engagement in *A Tour to Milford Haven, 1791*," moves into the period of the French Revolution and analyzes Mary Morgan's use and defense of sympathy throughout her Welsh tour. The political significance of her contemplations on the role of feeling within social relations is patent when contextualized within the twin narratives of Britain's national instability and the eroding status of sensibility in the revolutionary mood of the early 1790s. Her manner

of travel clearly identifies her as a sentimental traveler and she expertly transmutes the sentimental travelogue's practice and discourse of sympathy into a political dialogue. She evinces a profound concern with what she perceives as the deficiency of sympathy within British society—a concern that is rooted in her fundamental belief that active sympathy is the cement that stabilizes society; without the bonds of affection holding society together, it is vulnerable to what she perceives as the anti-social violence tearing apart France. Morgan illustrates her theory through her richly detailed depiction of Elizabeth Montagu's idyllic estate and the contrast she constructs between Sandleford (Montagu's estate) and Blenheim (the Duke of Marlborough's estate). Through her fulsome depiction of Montagu's exemplary management of Sandleford and her indirect criticism of Blenheim's sublime aesthetics, she implicitly argues that just and successful governance is grounded in sympathy rather than in domination. Her observations on Welsh estates reinforce her argument; she is careful to emphasize the necessary evolution from the model of the estate as a dictatorship to its current iteration as a reciprocal community of free individuals. While the British government was aggressively and controversially stifling Revolutionary activity in order to protect Britain from a political upheaval similar to that in France, Morgan suggests that the cultivation of sympathy, rather than the suppression of dissent, forms the basis of effective governance. Her confidence in sympathy's synchronizing power finds parallels in Smith's conviction that the cultivation of sympathy *regulates* society as it compels individuals to experience life and evaluate themselves through the eyes of another. The final section focuses on the implications for gender politics of Morgan's argument for the importance of sentiment within government politics. Her insistence on the political value of sympathy evinces an investment in

defining British national identity according 'feminine' principles at a time when the British polity was being increasingly characterized as 'masculine.'

Helen Maria Williams' later travelogue is the focus of the last chapter, " 'A Renovation of Existence': Helen Maria Williams' *A Tour in Switzerland* and the Renewal of Political Vision." I investigate how her carefully crafted image as a sentimental traveler aids her political purpose both of justifying the invasion of Switzerland and facilitating the socio-political transformation of Britain. Her text was published during a period of particular tension between France (her adopted nation) and Britain (her mother country); not only had they been at war for five years, but France's profoundly controversial decision to invade Switzerland and its support of the Society of United Irishmen gave Britons very real reason to fear that they might be next. With the increasing hostility between the two nations hindering open communication, she mediates between Britain and France in an attempt to interrupt the violence between the two nations and allow for the free correspondence of sentiments. Her belief that the French cause—loosely understood as establishing republican governments across the Continent—is both just and necessary is illustrated in her pointed representation of Switzerland. She is careful to portray her critique of Switzerland's oppressive political structures as consistent with her sentimental orientation; it is her sympathy with the burdened Swiss population that motivates her negative appraisal of their institutions. By appealing to her British audience's hearts rather than their heads, she hopes that they will begin to sympathize with France's political motives and subsequently share its political vision—effectively accomplishing the political regeneration of Britain and the suspension of international hostilities. Similar to the female travel writers who came before her,

Williams values sympathy as a potent political device—one that she uses to her advantage in her appropriation of the sentimental mode, while also positing its value as a vital component of political systems. She further shares an interest in changing the political status of women in the societies she inhabits, a motivation that can be seen in her insistence on demonstrating the strength rather than the weakness of women—a strength that is particularly revealed when placed under strain. That this strength more often than not comes from women's superior ability to *feel* and *sympathize* erects an argument against the socially constructed weakness of women based upon their emotional susceptibility. Williams argues that it is precisely this quality that allows women to remain steadfast in times of duress and, given her experience of corruption and betrayal during the French Revolution, it emerges in her writing as a particularly important *political* quality.

This project posits that the sentimental travel narrative is a major site of eighteenth-century women's engagement in national and gender politics. It addresses the question of how and why women used the discourse and practice of sensibility integral to the sentimental travelogue to participate in the dialogues emerging from the political revolutions that punctuated the eighteenth century. It further recovers the eighteenth-century female political voice—so often submerged in alternative discourses and rendered indistinguishable *as* political—and considers how they sought to shape or alter British national identity during periods of political and cultural rupture. Although their political convictions are diverse and often at odds, the women included in this study are unanimous in their dissatisfaction with their marginalized presence within the British nation; during a period when the British national character was increasingly

imagined as masculine, these female travel writers staked a visible and significant place for women within the national space and collectively projected a national identity defined by both feminine and masculine principles.

# Chapter I

# Sympathy and the Sentimental Traveler: Contexts and Definitions

## Introduction

History may be read in the closet; antiquities examined in plates or in museums: but the human heart can only be perused in the living volume, which daily changes and decays…Sterne, in this path, made some advances.
~ *The Critical Review*[8]

Eighteenth-century culture was immersed in debates regarding the sensible self and the function and value of sympathy—both as an intrinsic quality (the capacity for sympathy) and as a social apparatus (the utility of sympathy). Scottish Enlightenment philosophers elaborated complex theories of sympathy that positioned it at the origins of society; physicians studied the effects of feeling upon the human body; novelists immersed themselves in the study of the man and woman of feeling, illustrating and interrogating philosophic and scientific articulations of sympathy; and travelers tested the possibilities promised by Enlightenment theories of sympathy within unfamiliar environments, eager to try to adapt new ways of negotiating and encountering otherness. Samuel Jackson Pratt's blunt declaration of sympathy's all-encompassing nature—"[a]ll, Sympathy, is thine" (48)—captures the eighteenth-century's preoccupation with feeling. The inquiries launched within the diverse fields of fictional and nonfictional literature, philosophy, and science invariably reveal a belief (or hope) in the powerfully formative or transformative capacity of sympathy. Sympathy in these accounts unites nations, alters the body, refines individuals and the societies in which they live, and alternately clarifies and diminishes difference. The transformations

[8] Anonymous, *The Critical Review*, 1: 361.

wrought by sympathy are not unequivocally positive; where it has the power to unify and improve, it also has the power to divide and destroy. By articulating and demonstrating its shaping influence on both the physical and social/national body, the various eighteenth-century discourses of sympathy invest it with what Barbara Benedict identifies as a "revolutionary threat to change society" (3). This dissertation will argue that female sentimental travel writers recognized that the demonstrated capacity for and manipulation of feeling provided them with an instrument of power; they harnessed the emotional power of sympathy to redefine both what it meant to be a 'Briton' and what it meant to be a 'woman.' The following examination of Adam Smith's and David Hume's influential articulations of sympathy and of Laurence Sterne's application of their philosophical theories to the travelogue genre will provide the necessary philosophical and literary foundations for my investigation of 1) the political deployment of sympathy within women's sentimental travelogues and 2) the ways in which female travel writers used the sentimental travelogue to represent an alternative understanding and practice of 'femininity' that challenged conventional and conservative interpretations of womanhood.

## Eighteenth-Century Theories of Sympathy: David Hume and Adam Smith

David Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1740) and Adam Smith's *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1769) posit sympathy as the linchpin of society, asserting its central role in the creation and maintenance of social groups—from families, to tribes, to nations. Their exhaustive theories of sympathy suggest its significant socio-political function; they propose the formative role of fellow-feeling in the process of national development by positioning sympathy as the magnet that draws people together and

the governor that ensures their social and political conformity. "In the context of a wider eighteenth-century literary culture," Markman Ellis contends, "it could be argued that the moral sense philosophers were more valued for their general vindication of feeling, for their argument that rational society is based on an intuitive and emotionally registered condition, than for the minutiae of their psycho-physiological model of the senses" (14). Both philosophers invest sympathy with tremendous socio-political import by identifying it as the source of human behavior and identity; the immaterial operation of sympathy determines how we act, who we become, and the type of societies that we build. Hume and Smith were reacting against environmental explanations of human behavior and social organization, against theories that posited the creative and unifying power of biology and geography. Faced with a nation spilling out of its traditional borders and increasingly composed of varied racial groups, they realized that the method by which national character is formed had to be reconceived in order to accommodate the new reality represented by the British Empire. Their answer to what Hume referred to as the "curious" (115) question of national character was sympathy: the 'nation' was not united through and defined by shared blood and land, but through shared sympathies. Their theories not only indicate the growing philosophical and cultural importance of sympathy in the eighteenth century; they also reflect the reality of Britain's emerging identity as an imperial nation and the anxieties associated with this new identity.

The idea that national character was the product of the physical environment was well established by the time Hume wrote his essay and persisted throughout the eighteenth century in one form or another. Two French writers—Abbé Dubos and

Charles Montesquieu—provided the most influential formulations of the causal relationship between physical environment and national character. In his *Critical Reflections on Poetry, Painting, and Music* (1719), Dubos suggests that air imperceptibly shapes human behavior, basing his hypothesis in the quasi-scientific theory that air affects the constitution of blood which, in turn, shapes the body's organs. Permeated with the "emanations of the earth" (177), air changes according to the differences in the composition of the soil. It follows that the unique characteristics of a group of people are directly linked to the environment they share—the air that they breathe, the ground that they tread upon—and varies according to alterations in the chemical structure of the soil. Montesquieu's later and far more developed theory in *The Spirit of the Laws* (1748) similarly argues that national identity is the product of geographical location and climate. Also citing scientific evidence, he posits that the physical effects of cold and heat on the body invariably shape the character of a people. He attributes everything from a nation's choice of government and economy to its sense of morality, alcohol consumption, and culture to the contraction and slackening of the bodily fibers according to the temperature to which they are habitually exposed (246-260). Although Dubos and Montesquieu provide different scientific explanations, both texts herald physical environment as a major deciding factor in the development of national identity.

The translation of *Critical Reflections* and the publication of *The Spirit of the Laws* coincided with the publication of Hume's "Of National Characters" (1748).[9]

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[9] There is some evidence that Hume read *The Spirit of the Laws* while in Turin in 1748. See Paul Chamley, "The Conflict between Montesquieu and Hume: A Study of the Origins of Smith's Universalism," 276.

Hume—and later Smith—recognized and addressed a key limitation in Dubos' and Montesquieu's theories of national identity formation: their accounts fail to satisfactorily address the fact that nations in the eighteenth century were by no means limited to one geographical location and that people inhabiting a particular nation may not actually share the same environment. Indeed, by the latter half of the century, the British Empire encompassed sub-tropical, tropical, temperate, and polar climate zones; a 'Briton' could be born and raised in the frigid air of the British Northwest Territories or in the sweltering heat of the British West Indies. The series of epic wars, revolutions, and exploratory activity that marked the eighteenth century continuously reshaped the geographical borders of the nations involved both directly and indirectly in the political contests. Through the Seven Years' War, the American Revolution, the French Revolution, the French Revolutionary Wars, and a series of other conflicts and conquests, territories and the people that inhabited them were lost and gained as the major European powers sought to augment their sphere of influence and as the people within those spheres began to actively challenge the structures of power within which they lived. Over the course of the eighteenth century, Britain gained a considerable amount of territory through war and exploration that stretched from Australia to India, and it consolidated its political authority over its Scottish neighbor through the Act of Union. However, it also lost its valuable American colonies and a handful of Caribbean islands. The increasingly global nature and incessantly fluctuating borders of the British nation in the eighteenth century necessitated different methods for accounting for and cultivating a cohesive national identity: Britain's imperial character demanded new ways of imagining the nation.

Smith's and Hume's lengthy and detailed theorizations of sympathy in the mid-eighteenth century provided an alternate explanation for the formation of national character. Both philosophers dismiss the idea that human behavior and, by extension, collective traits are the product of physical causes—they ridicule environmental arguments as unsatisfactory and ultimately inadequate given the pattern of allegiances that they perceived in reality. They argue that individuals and nations are fundamentally shaped by psychosocial factors rather than by the interplay between the body and its physical environment. More specifically, they propose that both personal and collective identity is the result of the natural and complex operation of sympathy. Hume and Smith contend that the nation is best understood as a sympathetic union among like-minded individuals: its parameters are created, defined, and revised by the fluid action of sympathy rather than by the rigid qualifications of blood and land. Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature* provides the theoretical foundation for his later and more direct consideration of the role of sympathy in the development of national identity in "Of National Characters." In his study of human nature, Hume posits sympathy as the author of identity—writing it (identity) into being and determining its contours. He argues that individual identity is a dynamic amalgam of received opinions and emotions rather than an indestructible and static absolute. These emotions and opinions are exchanged and internalized through the medium of sympathy, which humans naturally possess and instinctively exercise. Hume's explanation of identity formation suggests that collective identity is spontaneously achieved through the transformative action of sympathy; the human propensity to adopt the sentiments of others via sympathy results in the emergence of a shared identity. Evan Gottlieb posits

that Hume, by theorizing the spontaneous and inexorable movement of sympathy, "provides a model for how a national identity is 'naturally' produced over time" (22). Although he provides an account for how collective identity can emerge and persist in spite of geographic, climatic, and racial differences, the infectious nature of sympathy in Hume's definition raises questions regarding the maintenance of a truly 'British' national identity given the scores of non-British cultures being absorbed into the Empire.

Smith's *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* addresses this anxiety while strengthening the position of sympathy in the development of national identity. Like his predecessor, Smith jettisons physical factors in his consideration of the evolution of collective identity, favoring a more fluid model that posits sympathy as the galvanizing force. He agrees that humankind is naturally drawn to sympathy but revises the mechanism whereby sympathy is exercised and received. According to Smith, the sympathetic exchange is a controlled and conscious process that shapes human behavior through regulation rather than infection; the sympathetic exchange requires and accomplishes the suppression of the original self in favor of a socialized identity that accommodates the sentiments of others. Unlike Hume's "nonrational, involuntary" (Gottlieb 22) conception of sympathy, Smith includes a series of checkpoints in the sympathetic process that allows people the option of rejecting incoming sentiments based on their social merit. His theory draws attention to the fact that sympathy is as much about exclusion as it is about inclusion, and that national identity is shaped by our decisions regarding to whom we extend and do not extend sympathy.

## "A Very Powerful Principle": Sympathy and National Identity in David Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature* and "Of National Characters"

Hume's explanation of the operation of sympathy within society in *A Treatise of Human Nature* invests it with tremendous creative power; its seemingly uncontainable and overpowering nature and its formative and transformative capacity furnish it with an almost quasi-mystical quality. "Sympathy," he repeatedly asserts, "is a very powerful principle in human nature" (628). The source of its power lies in its ability to shape human behavior and fuse individuals together. Hume begins by establishing that individual identity is an inherently mutable "bundle or collection of different perceptions" (300) rather than an abstract and fixed absolute. "When I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*," Hume observes, "I always stumble on some particular perception or other . . . I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception" (300, original italics). Perception, according to Hume, is derived from sensation; he follows in John Locke's philosophical footsteps by rejecting the presence of innate ideas and reinforcing the empirical basis of knowledge. As an assemblage of externally derived perceptions, identity thus emerges as a social construct that is entirely dependent upon and vulnerable to external influences. Hume goes as far as to suggest that when man is entirely cut off from his perceptions—as in sleep or utter isolation from society—he effectively ceases to exist (300). That our identity is therefore constituted by and within community (insofar as community is understood as a source of external influences) is evidenced by the fact that "[w]e can form no wish, which has not a reference to society" (412). "[T]he minds of men," he explains, "are mirrors to one another" (414). The

metaphor of the mind as a mirror represents the receptivity of the mind to external influences: our mind manifests the sentiments that we see expressed in the visages, voices, and actions of those around us with the same immediacy and facility of a mirror.

According to Hume, sympathy provides the means by which external influences are transferred into the mind. It is not the content but the method of communication; it is "the medium, rather than the message, of social contact" (Gottlieb 31). Hume's description of sympathy's action is deceptively simple: "In sympathy there is an evident conversion of an idea into an impression" (370). We first perceive another's emotional or ideological state through observation, which strikes upon our mind as an idea; this idea is absorbed into our psyche and becomes an impression—that is to say, the emotional state or sensation of the other becomes our own (370).[10] The process of sympathy fundamentally differs from that of understanding in that the latter converts the impression of a sensation into an idea, whereas sympathy converts an idea into the sensation itself—crudely described, the movement of sympathy is from thought to feeling. Hume suggests that the impulse to sympathize is so deeply rooted within the human psyche that the transmission of sympathy is a seemingly unconscious and even uncontrollable process: we appear to spontaneously "enter into the sentiments of others" (367). He observes with a tone of wonder that "[n]o quality of human nature is more remarkable . . . than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own" (367). Hume's comparisons of the operation of sympathy

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[10] Ideas and impressions are distinguished by what Hume refers to as their "force and violence" (49), with impressions possessing superior power and energy compared to that of their fainter counterpart.

both to the inexorable movement of a virus (655) and to the rapid reverberation of sound waves across the taut strings of an instrument suggest the equally unstoppable and spontaneous nature of sympathy (626-627). "So close and intimate is the correspondence of human souls," he confidently asserts, "that no sooner any person approaches me, than he diffuses on me all his opinions, and draws along my judgment in a greater or lesser degree" (642-643). Through this psychic transfer of sentiments, we are interpolated by others' emotional states and ideologies and enabled to effectively *feel* their emotions and *share* their opinions; indeed, through the operation of sympathy these invasive sentiments are internalized to the extent that they "operat[e] as if originally our own" (437).

For Hume, the similarities that he observes within human populations prove his hypothesis that sympathy actually works to convert external perceptions into internal convictions. From the imitative nature of children who "implicitly embrace every opinion propos'd to them" to "men of the greatest judgment and understanding" who "find it very difficult to follow their own reason or inclination, in opposition to that of their friends and daily companions" to "the great uniformity we may observe in the humours and turn of thinking of those of the same nation," it is evident that the emotions and opinions that individuals claim as their own are "more from communication than from [their] own natural temper and disposition" (367). Individual and collective identity, then, is a composite of external influences, continuously subject to modification depending upon alterations within the social environment. We are not formed of "soil and climate" (367), we do not emerge from the womb possessed of a fully realized and immutable "SELF" (299), nor are we actuated by the power of

"abstract and demonstrative reasoning" (461), but are shaped and driven by the operation of sympathy within ourselves and throughout the whole structure of society. To "reconcile" his audience to his opinion, he challenges his readers to "take a general survey of the universe, and observe the force of sympathy thro' the whole animal creation, and the easy communication of sentiments from one thinking being to another" (411-412). Hume asserts the political and social significance of sympathy by configuring it as the source of individual and collective identity: if we become that with which we sympathize, then sympathy truly can be regarded as a powerfully transformative "force" within the natural world.

However, the course of sentiments does not flow unimpeded. Hume does provide limitations to the movement of emotions and opinions, the major qualification being the necessity of contiguity or resemblance in the effective operation of sympathy. The ability to effortlessly "enter into the sentiments of others" (367) or to be infected by emotional contagion is heavily dependent upon similarity or immediacy. "[W]e find," he explains, "that where, beside the general resemblance of our natures, there is any peculiar similarity in our manners, or character, or country, or language, it facilitates sympathy. The stronger the relation betwixt ourselves and any object, the more easily does the imagination make the transition" (368). That we sympathize with far greater facility with those proximate or similar to us is evident from the powerful ties between parents and children and among families and tribes; because we are intimately aware of the causes and effects of their sentiments, and because what affects them has an immediate impact upon us, it is with ease that we adopt their sentiments as our own (401). On the other hand, Hume argues that we have far more difficulty extending

sympathy to that which is remote from us in either time or space. Providing a scenario of a ship in distress, he contends that observers are unlikely to fully sympathize with the passengers if absent from the scene or placed at a distance; it is only when they are close enough to be able to explicitly see "the horror, painted on the countenance of the seamen and passengers" that they feel "the motions of the tenderest compassion and sympathy" (645). Contiguity and resemblance both contribute to what Hume refers to as "easy sympathy" (404), being the fluidity with which our mind appropriates an idea and manifests it as an impression. The stipulation of immediacy and similarity in the successful operation of sympathy appears to severely limit its mobility; yet, according to Hume, the scope of those with whom we have "connexion" is relatively wide—a shared nation, trade, or even moniker are said to count as effective similarities (401). Indeed, he goes as far as to propose that humans—by virtue of being human—share an inherent similarity: "The minds of men are similar in their feelings and operations; nor can any one be actuated by any affection, of which all others are not, in some degree, susceptible" (575). This statement of universal resemblance appears to suggest that we possess the *capacity* to sympathize with all humans, but that it is far easier and more natural to adopt the sentiments of those whose feelings directly and immediately affect us.

Although the traffic of sentiments must yield to certain obstacles, Humean sympathy largely blurs the boundaries between self and other; indeed, it can be said that self *is* other in Hume's theory, insofar as the self is shaped by and negotiated through our social interactions. Sympathy not only enables the *communication* of sentiments, it also allows for the *transformation* of sentiments from other into ours.

John Mullan observes that this ability of sympathy to "transcend particular interests and render passions intelligible" is "crucial" within Hume's theory "as that which promises to harmonize interest" (55). By establishing sympathy as that which transmits and synthesizes sentiments, and by imagining the sympathetic exchange as both instinctive and spontaneous, he institutes sympathy as the condition of possibility for society and as the source of collective identity. Hume, Janet Todd asserts, "makes community a spontaneous formation, a combination of self and other through sympathy and tenderness that elide individual differences" (27). This elision of "individual differences" or transcending of "particular interests" facilitates the emergence of a shared identity that Hume describes as "the great uniformity we may observe in the humours and turn of thinking of those of the same nation" (367).

Whereas the *Treatise* broadly suggests that sympathy determines national identity, "Of National Characters"—an essay written by Hume a few years later—explicitly states that this is the case. Reaffirming and developing what he had suggested in his earlier work, Hume spends the entirety of the essay refuting materialist theories of national identity and providing examples that substantiate his hypothesis that sympathy forms national character. His explication of the process by which sympathy shapes collective identities deserves to be quoted at some length:

> The human mind is of a very imitative nature; nor is it possible for any set of men to converse often together, without acquiring a similitude of manners, and communicating to each other their vices as well as virtues. The propensity to company and society is strong in all rational creatures; and the same disposition, which gives us this propensity, makes us enter deeply into each other's

> sentiments, and causes like passions and inclinations to run, as it were, by contagion, through the whole club or knot of companions. Where a number of men are united into one political body, the occasions of their intercourse must be so frequent, for defence, commerce, and government, that, together with the same speech or language, they must acquire a resemblance in their manners, and have a common or national character, as well as a personal one, peculiar to each individual. (115)

According to Hume, collaboration and fraternization ultimately generate a cohesive national identity due to our inability to resist internalizing and reproducing the sentiments of those with whom we interact. He follows this assertion with a series of examples that verify his theory. Nations that share the same borders but refuse to comingle frequently develop "a distinct and even opposite set of manners" (117), whereas neighboring nations that maintain close contact due to "policy, commerce, or travelling" ultimately "acquire a similitude of manners, proportioned to the communication" (118). Displaced groups of people can preserve their national identity if they "maintain a close society or communication together" (117), and nations spread across vast tracts of land can attain cohesion if the government consistently "communicates to every part a similarity of manners" (116). By making social interaction rather than physical location the basis of national identity, Hume enlarges the potential compass of national belonging and allows for the possibility of a unified national identity for a geographically fragmented nation like Britain. Regarding the significance of Hume's theory for British national identity, Gottlieb observes: "The implications for Britain is clear: a unified national identity will eventually coalesce as

local attachments and habits give way to wider-reaching national sympathies. That such transformation will occur naturally by sympathy, seemingly without government interference, made Hume's statement all the more attractive" (52). Given England's constant interaction with its diverse territories and colonies due to "policy, commerce, or travelling," the conditions exist for the development of a cohesive British national identity. Hume's theory promises that sympathy—if properly cultivated and exercised—can convert the chaotically heterogeneous nature of Britain into a more harmonious collection of sympathetic individuals; in short, sympathy has the power to actively constitute the nation.

From a certain angle, the transformative capacity of sympathy offers a hopeful vision to a nation struggling with its burgeoning imperial identity; however, viewed from a different perspective it also articulates a certain amount of ambivalence. Hume's emphasis on 'uniformity' and 'unity' presents the operation of sympathy in a particularly constructive light that averts attention from the more negative connotations of his frequent comparison of sympathy to a contagion. Humean sympathy's infectious character suggests both its dangerously volatile and potentially destructive nature, and raises questions regarding the reliability of sympathy and the stability of identity. As Mullan notes, when sympathy is invested with the power of transformation, "there is always the risk that it can do so in the wrong way" (27). As a Scot who witnessed both Jacobite uprisings in Scotland and the surge of Scottophobia in England, Hume was well aware of the ability of 'destructive' sympathies to spread like a contagion through a "whole club or knot of companions" ("Of National Characters" 115)

and threaten existing (if tenuous) unities.[11] Moreover, Hume's concept of identity—in both its personal and collective sense—as inherently mutable and vulnerable to the contagion of sentiments renders it a significantly unstable entity. He is very clear about the fact that both humans and nations change throughout their lives and through time. "The manners of a people," he asserts, "change very considerably from one age to another, either by great alterations in their government, by the mixtures of new people, or by that inconstancy to which all human affairs are subject" (118).

For the female travel writers surveyed in this study, and other eighteenth-century individuals intent on reforming their nation, the idea that a nation's character can evolve by changing the direction and/or expanding or constricting the compass of its sympathies is both bracing and propitious. However, Hume's reference to the "mixtures of new people" is suggestive of his culture's anxiety that the ever-increasing periphery may come to determine the identity of the center—that Britain may be more like Lemuel Gulliver and less like Robinson Crusoe, transformed by the foreign rather than transforming the foreign.[12] Hume's theory of sympathy allows for both possibilities. The mobility of sentiments allows us to change others in our own image, but it also introduces the possibility of "dissolving into the elsewhere of another person" (Lynn Festa 24). In the *Treatise*, Hume briefly alludes to the attempts of politicians to control and monitor their subjects' sympathies in order to "govern men

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[11] That is, 'destructive' depending on the perspective from which you approach the events. The English might say that the Jacobite uprisings were an attempt to destroy the unity of Great Britain, while the Scots might say that John Wilkes and his associates were doing the same in their verbal debasement of the Scottish people.

[12] For an excellent discussion of how the fictional tales of Robinson Crusoe and Lemuel Gulliver can be read as parables about the "meaning and making of the British Empire" (1) see Linda Colley's *Captives*, 1-3.

more easily, and preserve peace in human society" (551). In an effort to discourage potentially disruptive sympathies, they harness the power of sympathy and direct their subjects' feelings towards approved objects, actions, and beliefs: "Any artifice of politicians may assist nature in the producing of those sentiments, which she suggests to us, and may even on some occasions, produce alone an approbation or esteem for any particular action" (551). These politicians recognize both the potential and the threat contained within sympathy's authority over our inclinations, and attempt to manipulate it to their advantage—endeavoring to foster a form of immunity within their nation against the infection of indiscriminate, itinerant sympathies by shoring up a particular political vision of the nation and encouraging a particular practice of citizenship.

## "I Divide Myself": Adam Smith and the Labor of Sympathy

Written two decades after Hume's *Treatise*, and receiving far more popular attention that his forerunner's text, Adam Smith's *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* affirms—and continues to reaffirm over the course of six revised editions and three decades—Hume's basic premise that sympathy is situated at the core of human nature and society. Echoing Hume, Smith contends that sympathy fundamentally shapes individual identity, governs human behavior, and facilitates the organization of individuals into societies. However, Smith attempts to stabilize sympathy by developing a far more regulated and detailed version that divests it of the dangerous volatility that Hume perceives in its operation. He understands the sympathetic exchange as a deliberate process in which the individuals involved consciously alter their behavior in order to achieve emotional correspondence; the deliberation involved in Smith's theory of sympathy diverges from the uncontrollable virulence of Humean sympathy. Smith's

opening sentence contains resonances of Hume, but his subsequent explanation of personal identity and the sympathetic exchange clearly amends Hume's earlier hypothesis. "How selfish soever man may be supposed," Smith observes, "there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it" (13). This disinterested investment "in the fortunes of others" is indicative of our "propensity . . . to sympathize with others" (Hume, *Treatise*, 367). However, Smith does not believe that our identities are constructed of permeable membranes or that sympathy effectively transmutes others' sentiments into our own. He insists that it is impossible to spontaneously absorb and literally feel another's sentiments. "Though our brother is upon the rack," he contends, "as long as we ourselves are at ease, our senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, carry us beyond our own person" (13). According to Smith, we are limited by our physical and mental distinctions. Bounded within discrete bodies, we cannot literally experience the same sensations as those around us: "Every faculty in one man is the measure by which he judges of the like faculty in another. I judge of your sight by my sight, of your ear by my ear, of your reason by my reason, or your resentment by my resentment, of your love by my love. I neither have, nor can have, any other way of judging about them" (25). Smith restores a sense of individuality to personal identity; every being possesses unique physical and mental capacities that shape their experiences and perceptions.

By divesting individual identity of the porousness and consequent vulnerability that Hume conveys in the *Treatise*, Smith articulates the sympathetic exchange as a

conscious process over which we exercise a measure of control. The danger of contagion is replaced by the challenge of overcoming our bodily and mental limitations—of liberating ourselves "from the constraints of our monistic existence" (Gottlieb 33). Like his predecessor, Smith understands sympathy as a process through which we come to understand and share the sentiments of others. "Sympathy," he explains, "may . . . without much impropriety, be made use of to denote our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever" (15). Integral to this process is the imagination; it is through the deliberate process of imaginatively placing oneself in another's situation that we can approximate their experience and achieve "some correspondence of sentiments" (27). "The spectator," Smith explains, "must, first of all, endeavor, as much as he can, to put himself in the situation of the other, and to bring home to himself every little circumstance of distress which can possibly occur to the sufferer. He must adopt the whole case of his companion . . . and strive to render as perfect as possible, the imaginary change of situation upon which his sympathy is founded" (28). The language that Smith uses to describe the pursuit of fellow-feeling—"endeavor," "as much as he can," "strive"—clearly renders the sympathetic exchange as a labor-intensive process. The activity of putting oneself in the "situation of the other" and bringing home to oneself "every little circumstance of distress" suggests an emotional and psychological exercise that contrasts with the more passive reception of emotions outlined in Hume's theory. The work of the imagination is quite literally *work*.

The more laborious nature of Smithian sympathy is further demonstrated by his emphasis on knowledge and judgment in the sympathetic process. Although Smith admits that sentiments are occasionally transmitted "instantaneously" (15), he argues

that knowing their source or cause allows the spectator more effectively to "adopt the whole case of his companion." His assertion that sympathy "does not arise so much from the view of the passion, as from that of the situation which excites it" (16) militates against Hume's more freewheeling concept that the mere sight of a passion actuates us. Once the work of the imagination is accomplished, Smith adds an additional step: the agent's feeling is weighed against what we would feel under the same circumstances. The ability to sympathize with their response—to "adopt" their sentiments and "ma[k]e them our own" (14)—is contingent upon our judgment regarding the propriety or impropriety of their emotional reaction. Smith's amendments to Hume's theory—from the restoration of individuality to the work of the imagination, the necessity of knowledge, and inclusion of judgment—registers a certain amount of discomfort with the infectious nature of Humean sympathy. His revised description of the process of emotional identification portrays sympathy as a choice rather than as a contagion—or, as Todd describes it, as more of a "duty" than an "original spontaneous feeling" (27). The apparent lack of spontaneity in the operation of Smithian sympathy may make it, as Todd suspects, "less optimistic" (27) than Hume's version, but it is also less erratic; the added details allow individuals a degree of control over their sympathetic unions by securing them against the potential invasion of 'wrong' sentiments. Smith appears to be arguing that individuals and collectives *can* monitor whom or what they become; they are not helplessly swayed by every powerful sentiment that crosses their path.

However, it would be wrong to assume that Smith divests sympathy of its powerfully transformative capacity by regulating its process; indeed, he reinforces the argument that sympathy—as the source of identity and the keystone of society—is "a

very powerful principle in human nature" (Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 628). The achievement of perfect sympathy depends upon a correspondence of sentiments between spectator and agent; while the spectator strives to "put himself in the situation of the other," the agent must reciprocate. Due to the fact that "the emotions of the spectator will be apt to fall short of the violence of what is felt by the sufferer" (Smith 28), it is necessary that the sufferer modifies his/her emotions and meets the spectator half way. Out of a desire for "complete sympathy," the agent must "flatten . . . the sharpness of its natural tone" to reach that "pitch . . . in which the spectators are capable of going along with him" (28). The result of this mutual adjustment is what John Dwyer refers to as "achieved sympathy" (102). Significantly, the repeated action of assuming the circumstances of another—both as the spectator and as the agent—effectively shapes the behavior of individuals within society. By imagining "what we ourselves should feel in the like situation," we become "in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them" (13-14). Smith goes as far as to assert that in the replication of another's affect, "I not only change circumstances with you, but I change persons and characters" (373). The result of sympathy is not an innocuous empathy, but a dynamic spirit that actuates us with shared desires; Smith argues that we adopt the conduct of those with whom we sympathize, motivated by their hatred and love. The sympathetic exchange enables a mediated experience and understanding of another's sentiments that fundamentally alters our emotional and psychological disposition. According to Smith, this alteration can be observed in the modified behavior of individuals engaged in company: "[I]f we are all masters of

ourselves, the presence of a mere acquaintance will really compose us, still more that of a friend; and that of an assembly of strangers still more than that of an acquaintance" (28). In its stipulation of psychological displacement and emotional identification, Smithian sympathy ultimately compels us to transcend our particular desires and consciously become more like those we sympathize with.

Smith's formulation of what he calls the "impartial spectator" reveals the extent to which sympathy shapes identity and creates society. Our effort to share the sentiments of others brings with it an awareness that others are doing the same for us; repeatedly assessing the world through their eyes, we become hyper-aware that we are also under constant surveillance. "We begin," Smith posits, "to examine our own passions and conduct, and to consider how these must appear to them, by considering how they would appear to us if in their situation" (135). The result of this out-of-body experience is the development of a binary consciousness or split personality that simultaneously instigates and regulates our behavior: "I divide myself, as it were, into two persons; and that I, the examiner and judge, represents a different character from that other I, the person whose conduct is examined into and judged of" (135-136). Smith variously refers to this internal judge as the "impartial spectator," "the inhabitant of the breast," and "the great judge and arbiter of our conduct" (159). Roughly defined, this resident censor represents our internalization of societal judgment; we appraise our behavior according to its standards, ideally reproducing "sentiments and motives" (133) that would elicit approval. The theory of the impartial spectator emphasizes that it is the symbiotic relationship between sensibility and self-command rather than pure susceptibility that is the primary mediator of personal and social identity. "Our

sensibility to the feelings of others," Smith argues, "so far from being inconsistent with the manhood of self-command, is the very principle upon which that manhood is founded" (175). The man capable of perfect sympathy is he who is capable of mitigating his emotions to correspond with the temper of his society, and of transcending his selfish impulses in order to share in the sentiments of others. As Juliet Shields explains, "[s]ympathy requires both the self-control necessary to regulate or moderate emotion and the sensibility necessary to imaginatively change places with others" (11). Fellow-feeling is accomplished through the concurrent action of self-command and sensibility; by entering into and sharing the sentiments of others, we demonstrate both "exquisite sensibility" and "the most perfect command of [our] own original and selfish feelings" (175).

Smith's introduction of judgment and self-control into the operation of sympathy once again addresses the issue of dangerous identifications raised by Hume's emphasis on susceptibility. The concept of the binary consciousness indicates that reflection and discernment are integral components of the sympathetic exchange; Smith proposes that we are able to distance ourselves from incoming sentiments and to decide whether or not they warrant sympathy. Lynn Festa observes that this "reflexive splitting of the self" allows us a measure of control over our affective affinities, as it "makes it possible to direct, or at least to monitor, identifications" (33). Within these precautions, Smith continues to assert the transformative nature of sympathy; its achievement requires participants to actively reorient and regulate their sentiments to attain correspondence—displacing themselves, tempering their impulses, and voluntarily policing their own actions. The instinctive desire to sympathize and to be the object of

sympathetic approval motivates us to "accommodate and assimilate, as much as we can, our own sentiments, principles, and feelings, to those which we see fixed and rooted in the persons whom we are obliged to live and converse a great deal with" (264-265). In other words, it prompts individuals to rub off their rough edges and sculpt an identity that 'fits' within the structure of society. Smith's emphasis on 'fitting in' crucially distinguishes his theory from Hume's. Smithian sympathy reveals itself as a largely conservative force that changes us to accommodate society. The language he uses to describe the operation of sympathy—we "master" ourselves, we "reduce" our passion, we "flatten" our instincts (28)— suggests rigid self-control, not the loss of control. As Michael J. Shapiro aptly notes, Smith's "more sanguine view" conveys the message that "[t]he world was to be accommodated not challenged, for pleasure was to exist in the absence of adversity not in the experience of emotional extremes" (103).

Smith's emphasis on self-suppression ultimately enlarges the potential field for our sympathetic energies. His specific argument regarding the emergence of national consciousness is that nations develop and cohere as a result of established patterns of sympathy. The sympathetic relations we cultivate within our immediate social circle ultimately enable us to extend sympathy to the anonymous individuals that constitute the nation. According to Smith:

> Not only we ourselves, but all the objects of our kindest affections, our children, our parents, our relations, our friends, our benefactors, all those whom we naturally love and revere the most, are commonly comprehended within [the state or sovereignty]; and their prosperity and safety depend in some measure

> upon its prosperity and safety. It is by nature, therefore, endeared to us, not only by all our selfish, but by all our private benevolent affections. (269)

Rather than generating insularity, these networks of sympathy effectively create the demand for its extension to the nation as a whole; "our regards for the multitude," Smith states elsewhere, "is compounded and made up of the particular regards which we feel for the different individuals of which it is composed" (108). Our established affections train us to overcome our selfish preoccupations and put us in mind of the needs, desires, and conditions of others. Smith contends that the ability of a hero or patriot to sacrifice his life for the nation is entirely due to the operation of sympathy; his sacrifice is made possible through the suppression of personal desire and the extension of sympathy to the nation as a whole. He enters into the sentiments of the nation and does not view either his duty or his life "in the light which they naturally appear to himself, but in that in which they appear to the nation he fights for" (223). Comparing Smith's version of sympathy to Hume's earlier formulation, Gottlieb concludes that Smith "rearticulates sympathy as a voluntary, 'achieved' state of emotional harmony capable of actively uniting disparate peoples" (22). This ability to transcend difference and create unity is possible precisely through the denial of self. Sympathy requires its participants to exchange or suppress their personal views, impulses, and desires for those of another (or others), enabling actions that benefit the collective. If a tribe or region (i.e. Scotland) is subsumed under the banner of Great Britain, Smith's theory of sympathy optimistically suggests that, in due time, the region's inhabitants will extend their sympathy to that which is now connected to them or to that which now determines the happiness of those connected to them. It further (and perhaps more

controversially) suggests that Britain must institute self-regulatory processes in order to achieve national harmony among its various colonies and territories; to complete the sympathetic exchange, Britons must extend their own sympathies to include their foreign peripheries.

Hume's and Smith's theories, Shields contends, "represent sympathy as the condition of possibility for the formation of community in a civilized, commercial state like eighteenth-century Britain" (11). With Britain expanding at an unprecedented rate and with its racial composition no longer limited to those of Anglo-Saxon or Celtic descent, 'Britishness' became a fraught and complex concept. Hume and Smith crucially provide a way of understanding the nation that accounts for the imperial realities of geographic divides, racial diversity, and cultural difference; they condemn environmentalist theories to the annals of history and rewrite national identity as an inherently dynamic concept, its parameters defined by feeling rather than blood or geography. They productively reimagine national identity as a social construct that effects transformation and achieves cohesion through the power of sympathy. For an empire that Linda Colley describes as "challenged at its core by smallness" (8)—its dimensions exceeding its resources—the concept that unity can be achieved through the discreet action of sympathy was seductive. Hume's representation of the contagious nature of sympathy provided the logic behind how British national identity could be filtered through and naturalized within its heterogeneous populations, while Smith's articulation of the regulative function of sympathy demonstrated how it could transform diverse individuals into reliable citizens. As psychological analyses of how sympathy works and as theoretical explanations of what it accomplishes, their theories

of sympathy, as Gottlieb explains, "both describe and enact the terms by which greater national unity can be achieved" (22). Nations, both philosophers suggest, are unified through the immaterial operation of sympathy due to its ability to infiltrate, engage, and influence the heart.

## "Altogether of a Different Cast": Towards a Definition of the 'Sentimental Traveler'

The female travel writers I discuss in this study engage the political dimensions of sympathy to participate in the political life of the nation; by manipulating the processes described by Hume and Smith, they regulate the circulation of feeling within the British nation in an effort to influence its socio-political transformation. Hume and Smith provided politically-attuned women writers with an accessible means of shaping the political contours of the nation that circumvented the political institutions from which they were excluded; Laurence Sterne's fusion of Enlightenment theories of sympathy and the travelogue genre successfully widened the scope of travel writing to accommodate women writers, allowing them both to experiment with and to represent Hume's and Smith's hypotheses in broader national and international contexts. While undoubtedly capitalizing on the commercial popularity of the sentimental plots found in the novels of Sarah Scott, Samuel Richardson, Henry Mackenzie, Francis Brooke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and on the increasing interest in subjective rather than objective approaches to travel narration in eighteenth-century culture, Sterne's marriage of sentimental narrative and travel writing in *A Sentimental Journey through France and Italy* (1768) also allowed him to engage with the theories of sympathy

flowing fast and furiously from the pens of his Scottish contemporaries.[13] By featuring a protagonist whose itinerary is narrated as if entirely composed of sympathetic exchanges, Kenneth MacLain asserts that Sterne "made literary material out of the concept of sympathy" (399). In doing so, he created a new way of representing travel that placed emphasis on its emotional dimensions—trading "history" and antiquities" for the "human heart" (*The Critical Review* 1: 361)—and provided a new way of enacting Britishness and negotiating otherness that diverged from what Katherine Turner refers to as the "disputatious and xenophobic" (*British Travel Writers in Europe* 86) modes common to eighteenth-century travel writing. Circulating outside of Hume's cozy "club or knot of companions" ("Of National Characters" 115) and on the edges of Smith's concentric circles of sympathy, Sterne's protagonist and the sentimental travelers that followed extend the boundaries of sympathy to their furthest extent. Both Sterne and his imitators experiment with the possibility of sympathetic identifications across national borders and grapple with the implications of sympathetic transformation for individual and national identity. Whereas Hume's and Smith's moral philosophies merely posited that nations could be produced and reproduced through sympathy, sentimental travel writers practice their theories within real-life contexts. Sterne's marriage of the travelogue to the discourse of sensibility ultimately instigated a transformation in the travel-writing genre, changing both the *way* travels were publicly documented and *who* could document their travels.

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[13] Incidentally, David Hume and Laurence Sterne met as travelers—they became acquainted while in France in 1764—and frequented many of the same spots while roaming around Paris and the French countryside.

*The Monthly Review* credits Sterne as "the first who had sense and taste enough to quit the beaten pack-horse path" of the "dull details of post-stages, and churches, and picture-catalogues, with which books of travels heretofore chiefly abounded" (39: 434). Sterne himself has his protagonist announce the innovative nature of his fictional travel narrative in the text's embedded preface, deliberately drawing attention to his generic revisions. Yorick, a minister by trade and a man of feeling by nature, admits that his style of travel and travel writing is unusual enough to merit a new classification that he labels "The Sentimental Traveller" (65).[14] "I am well aware," he states, "[that] both my travels and observations will be altogether of a different cast from any of my fore-runners" (66). Yorick's itinerary (or lack thereof) shatters the well-established template of the Grand Tour.[15] As Susan Lamb asserts: "In *A Sentimental Journey* . . . [Sterne] celebrates the tourist's subjective responses at the expense of everything that contemporaries used to justify both touring and publishing a tour" (154). Rather than travel for intellectual and aesthetic enlightenment, Yorick travels to receive an emotional education by engaging in "sentimental commerce" (64). He explicitly dismisses the conventional itinerary of the Grand Tourist, stating that he will not rush to see "the Palais royal—nor the Luxembourg—nor the Façade of the Louvre" nor will

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[14] Yorick classifies other travelers as "Idle Travellers, Inquisitive Travellers, Lying Travellers, Proud Travellers, Vain Travellers, Splenetic Travellers . . . the Travellers of Necessity, the delinquent and felonious Traveller, The unfortunate and innocent Traveller, The simple Traveller" (65).

[15] The Grand Tour was a circuit through Europe undertaken by young, upper-class men as the capstone to their education. The usual itinerary included the Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Italy, and the German states, and the purpose of the trip was (ideally) cultural refinement and intellectual enlightenment. Enshrined as a rite-of-passage for young men since the mid seventeenth century, the Tour had not only evolved a standardized itinerary of places and sights by the eighteenth century, but also standard expectations for how travelers should engage with their environment and what they should take away from their journey.

he fill his time cataloguing must-see "pictures, statues, and churches" (137). Rejecting the typical sights, aims, and justifications of travel, Yorick asserts that the foreign is best discovered and understood through its people rather than its places, and through feeling rather than detached observation. He desires to form emotional connections with rather than to categorize foreign individuals (ideally female and always anguished), and to explore the sentimental rather than the intellectual advantages of travel. "'[T]is a quiet journey of the heart," he explains, "in pursuit of NATURE, and those affections which rise out of her, which make us love each other—and the world, better than we do" (137-138).

In order to accommodate his revised ideological and physical trajectory, Yorick necessarily modifies or dismisses the conventions of travelogue genre. Rather than give a traditional account of the routes taken, the quality of the inns encountered, and the measurements and contents of the physical sites seen, his narrative presents and treats sentimental encounters as tourist attractions. The result is an introspective document that emphasizes emotional response over intellectual judgment and technical details; Yorick essentially *feels* his way through France, and accordingly chronicles "the weaknesses of [his] heart" (70) as an indication of his progress. Like the sentimental novel, which Leo Braudy suggests "asserts the superiority of the inarticulate language of the heart to the artifice of literary and social forms, the articulate mind and the fluent pen" (6), Yorick's travelogue privileges the experience and perception of what he refers to as the heart over that of the mind. Indeed, he claims that by allowing the heart rather than the head to guide one's itinerary, the sentimental traveler acquires an intensity of experience and a depth of vision unavailable to the other categories of traveler. "[He]

who interests his heart in everything," Yorick insists, "who, having eyes to see, what time and chance are perpetually holding out to him as he journeyeth on his way, misses nothing he can fairly lay his hands on" (81). Jean Vivies describes the goal of the sentimental journey as defined and enacted by Yorick as an "opening up to otherness" (71). The aim of the journey being sympathetic transaction, as opposed to the customary impulse towards comparison and judgment, the sentimental traveler is theoretically more open to and observant of the cultures and landscapes in which they find themselves.

Yorick criticizes conventional attitudes towards travel through the stereotypes of Smelfungus and Mundungus, both of whom he faults for their self-centered rather than other-centered approach to travel. Smelfungus is traditionally thought to be a caricature of Tobias Smollett, whom Sterne encountered in Montpellier and whose non-fictional continental travelogue, *Travels through France and Italy* (1766), is characterized by an insular English nationalism that asserts itself as obdurate dissatisfaction with and unrelenting critique of the foreign nations he visits. "The learned SMELFUNGUS," Yorick disparagingly observes, "travelled from Boulogne to Paris . . . but he set out with spleen and jaundice, and every object he pass'd by was discoloured or distorted—He wrote an account of them, but 'twas nothing but the account of his miserable feelings" (82). Sterne represents Smelfungus as a traveler incapable of *sympathetic* feeling (the ability to feel for or with someone else) due to his preoccupation with his own *physical* feeling. Yorick's observation suggests that the ailing scholar—oriented both inwards and towards criticism—suffers from emotional myopia, unable to see beyond his self and his ingrained prejudices. Mundungus appears

to be a parody of the typical aristocratic Grand Tourist, guided by established itineraries and intent upon checking off all the necessary attractions. "Mundungus, with an immense fortune," Yorick continues, "made the whole tour . . . without one generous connection or pleasurable anecdote to tell of; but he had travell'd straight on looking neither to his right hand or his left, lest Love or Pity should seduce him out of his road" (83-84). Rigorously goal- or object-oriented, the Grand Tourist experiences a highly mediated form of the countries he visits; he views the foreign through hyperopic eyes, seeing only what lies far ahead. Sterne, through his character of Yorick, presents an alternative approach to travel that corrects the compromised vision of conventional tourists; an orientation towards sympathy expands the traveler's vision beyond him or herself and beyond standardized ways of seeing. Whereas the scholar and aristocrat travel far and wide only to judge all foreign landscapes as irremediably "barren" due to their limited vision, the sentimental traveler could find himself in a desert and still "find out wherewith in it to call forth [his] affections" (81). Seeing with his heart rather than his head, Yorick contends that he is invested with a depth of insight unavailable to the typical British tourist shuttered by prejudice or tunnel vision.

Sterne's mock travelogue was a commercial success that triggered a deluge of imitators that effectively transformed the travelogue genre. J. C. T. Oates observes that "to judge from the book-lists and magazines, all England and most of Europe during the last thirty years of the eighteenth century were infested with sentimental travellers" (14), and Percy G. Adams concurs that Sterne's text "inspired a huge school of sentimental travel accounts" (198). Oates and Adams both argue that unlike later readings of Sterne's text, his eighteenth-century audience read *A Sentimental Journey* as

a travelogue rather than as a novel—treating Sterne's fictional protagonist as an actual person and attempting to recreate his journey and to find the people and places of which he speaks.[16] Katherine Turner notes that even critics "reviewed *A Sentimental Journey* as a travel narrative, rather than a novel, and admired the games Sterne played with the conventions of the genre" ("Introduction" 19). It is not surprising, then, that the impact of his innovative approach is particularly apparent in the production of non-fictional travel texts post-1768. The first imitator appeared so quickly after Sterne's publication that its author, Samuel Paterson, attempted to convince his audience that *Another Traveller!* (1768) was an entirely original as opposed to merely imitative work. By the time it reviewed Paterson's publication, *The Monthly Review* had already seen a sufficient amount of evidence to happily declare that "Sentimental Travels seem now to be coming into vogue" (39: 434). By 1779, the same journal reversed its initial excitement, complaining of saturation:

> *Trips*, and *Tours*, and *Excursions*, and *Sentimental Journeys*, are become so much the *ton*, that every rambler, who can write (tolerably or intolerably), assumes the pen, and gives the Public a journal of the *occurrences* and *remarks* to which his peregrinations have given birth. (60: 191, original italics)

*The Critical Review* evinced disenchantment with the form a year earlier, facetiously stating that "[i]n time we may expect to see sentimental stage-coaches and diligences

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[16] See J. C. T. Oates, "Shandyism and Sentiment, 1760-1800," 14; Percy G. Adams, *Travel Literature and the Evolution of the Novel*, 198; and Katherine Turner, *British Travel Writers in Europe 1750-1800*, 100.

advertised, to any part of his majesty's dominions" (45: 311).[17] Judith Frank argues that "part of the project of Sterne's novel was the creation of an alternative traveling subject" (98), and the complaints from weary reviewers indicate that Sterne was indeed successful in creating a new form of travel and travel writing. Although the majority of reviewers tend to object to demonstrations of excessive sensibility or productions that incorporate feeling at the expense of information, by the late eighteenth century the "possession of a feeling and susceptible heart" (*The Monthly Review* 60: 126) or the quality of "acute feeling" (*The Critical Review* 14: 241) is cited as a positive and even essential characteristic in a travel writer. *A Sentimental Journey* had irreversibly altered the way travel was ordered, recorded, and evaluated.

Although most travel writers did not espouse Yorick's purely people-based itinerary or excessive sensibility, there is an increased emphasis in late eighteenth-century travel literature on the three defining characteristics of the sentimental travelogue: the privileging of emotional response, an emphasis on sociability and an orientation towards sympathy, and an interest in anecdotes. There are certainly a handful of travel writers whose imitation verges on plagiarism—Samuel Jackson Pratt and John Bernard come to mind[18]—but the effect of Sterne's approach was more diffuse. The late eighteenth century witnessed travel writers increasingly incorporating sentiment and anecdote into their accounts—occasionally at the expense of rigorous scholarship—and adopting the amiable persona associated with Yorick. Chloe Chard

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[17] However, *The Critical Review* was tired of the form before *A Sentimental Journey*'s ink had time to dry. Sterne's unflattering parody of its editor, Tobias Smollett, did not recommend sentimental journeying to the periodical's staff.
[18] See Pratt, *Travels for the Heart* (1777), and Bernard, *A Sentimental Journey* (1770-1777).

characterizes this notable change as a shift from "a commentary of scholarly compilation to a commentary of viewing" (35) in which demonstrations of scholarly erudition are supplanted by "expressions of responsiveness" (36). The primary characteristic of professed sentimental travelers is their privileging of emotional response; they proclaim the heart as their guide and often as their aim, and stress the emotional dimensions of the objects, landscapes, and people encountered. Thus Pratt declares that every page in his travelogue "was written in the ardour of relating some event, which really happened; and the true impressions *of the heart* are given in every sentence" (xv, original italics) and Helen Maria Williams excuses her Revolutionary fervor as "an affair of the heart" (91). Intimately connected to this emphasis on feeling is the second distinguishing feature of sentimental travelers and their texts, which can be described as an emphasis on sentimental sociability and an orientation towards sympathy. The sentimental traveler assumes (rhetorically if not always in practice) an attitude of open-mindedness and impartiality that manifests itself as an interest in the social dimensions of their environments and in a repudiation of prejudice, described by Paterson as a "disposition to be pleased" (32). "Humanity itself," states Jean-Baptiste Mercier Dupaty, "is the light that guides us" (10). The third characteristic—the inevitable consequence of their sociable and sympathetic orientation—is the digressive nature of both their itinerary and their observations. Sentimental travelers either entirely dispense with traditional itineraries or incorporate and even actively create 'mishaps' or 'unplanned' incidents that momentarily disrupt their trajectory. Accordingly, they emphasize the anecdotal over the axiomatic, frequently interspersing their observations on "post-stages, and churches, and picture-catalogues" (*The Monthly*

*Review* 39: 434) with fragments of conversations, stories, and personal reflections. John Barnard, author of the series *A Sentimental Journey* that appeared in *The Lady's Magazine* from 1770-1777, distinguishes the "historical" from the "sentimental" traveler based on the laxity of his itinerary: "The historical traveller . . . is confined to his route, as much as a horse in a team . . . The sentimental traveller is not confined to such narrow limits; he ranges over a whole district in the twinkling of an eye, and can shift the scene from one country to another with the same ease and velocity as we find it done every night during the representation of a pantomime" (4: 3). According to eighteenth-century statements on the sentimental traveler, they are guided by emotion rather than material objectives, conventions, and time constraints. As Pratt explains, "all that is allied to the movements—stops and meanders of the heart, shall attract us on the way" (25). This is the ideal model. However, most sentimental travelers maintain a set itinerary while allowing time for and celebrating fortuitous or spontaneous detours and aberrations.

Sentimental travelers cite the ultimate advantage of their sympathetic orientation and rambling peregrinations as the acquirement of superior insight. They frequently claim that their approach reveals the genuine face of the countries they visit, hitherto unobserved due to prejudice and/or insularity. Yorick's proclamation that "[he] who interests his heart in every thing, and who, having eyes to see . . . misses nothing he can *fairly* lay his hand on" (81, original italics) is echoed by a parade of sentimental tourists, from an anonymous sentimental traveler's assertion that she "had noticed several things worthy of being made public, which more laborious travellers . . . had neglected, or overlooked" (*A Journey to the Highlands of Scotland* 4) to Pratt's defense

that his attention to seeming "trifles" is more incisive than the conventional tourist's focus on "the might, the marvelous, and the magnificent" as "these very trifles . . . more forcibly mark a character, develop an action . . . and serve as a clue to unfold the mazes of the heart" (vii). Neither myopic due to prejudice nor hyperopic due to a slavish dedication to schedule, sentimental tourists claim a fresh and unconstrained vision. Claiming insight that can penetrate to the very heart of individuals and entire societies, they assert the trustworthy and authoritative nature of their accounts. Other travelogues may provide the measurements, but their sentimental counterparts purport to provide the meaning.[19]

By revising the purpose of travel and the genre of the travelogue, Sterne was not simply "providing an alternative traveling subject" (Frank 98), but providing an alternative way of *seeing*. As *The Critical Review* notes in a review of a travel guide, a "good sensible traveller . . . should know, not only *what*, but *how* to see" (43: 399, original italics). What this reviewer is suggesting is that it is as important for a traveler to establish his ideological framework prior to departure as it is for him to structure an informed itinerary, as his mindset or attitude will determine his experience and judgment of the objects and places he encounters. Through the creation of the sentimental traveler, Sterne suggested a way of seeing the foreign that diverges from the conventional traveling positions outlined in his preface; in particular, it diverges from the orientations of the typical British travelers caricatured in the figures of

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[19] Commenting on a saying made by his hairdresser, Yorick claims that "I think I can see the precise and distinguishing marks of national characters more in these nonsensical minutiae, than in the most important matters of state" (104). Similar to Pratt's aforementioned assertion of the freighted nature of frivolities, Yorick suggests that the examination of particulars leads to a nuanced understanding of the whole.

Smelfungus and Mundungus, whose vision is compromised by prejudice and insularity. Katherine Turner and Frank Felsenstein both argue that Sterne's divergence from conventional and accepted modes of travel was not an offhand choice, but a politically motivated decision that had implications for Britons' understanding of themselves and their relation to and presence within the world. "[T]he sentimental mode," Turner asserts, "offered new possibilities for the construction of individual and national identities" (86). The demonstration of "[t]he traveller's capacity for sympathy abroad" revises the political narrative of international relations and British national identity by expanding "the boundaries of international tolerance" and allowing the narrator the freedom to craft "a narrative identity appropriate to his particular version of British nationality" (Turner 124). Felsenstein argues that Yorick's sympathetic interactions with his Gallic hosts construct a British national identity defined by its commitment to "peace and peace-making" (322) rather than a xenophobic commitment to establishing and maintaining difference through violence and hostility. By changing the way that travelers *see* the foreign, Sterne is changing the way that Britons *feel* about neighboring or distant nations—and perhaps even about themselves. By transforming their feelings he may ultimately impact their *actions*.[20]

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[20] To be clear: this is not to say that Yorick's exercise of sympathy is unproblematic, or even that he is represented as the model of tolerance. He is an undeniably flawed character who is guilty of national prejudice and is motivated by self-interest, and his practice of sympathy can be interpreted as laughably ineffective and blatantly inauthentic. However, the focus of my investigation is how *A Sentimental Journey* was interpreted and taken up by other travelers and travel writers; judging by the preponderance of serious imitators, Sterne's contemporaries found in his creation of a sociable and sympathetic traveling subject an appealing and viable way of enacting and representing travel.

The political dimensions of the sentimental travelogue are hidden within this dynamic relationship among perception, feeling, and action. In his examination of American sentimental novels, Philip Fischer asserts that "sentimentality often marks precisely the point within accepted patterns of feeling and representation where radical revision is taking place" (93). According to Fischer, it accomplishes this by appealing to its audience's emotions and asking them to extend their sympathies to and subsequently normalizing "new materials, new components of the self, new types of heroes and heroines, new subjects of mood and feeling" (93). Sentimental literature reconceives particular objects or individuals as worthy of feeling, and implicitly urges its audience to feel and act accordingly. "Sentimental literature," Todd contends, "is exemplary of emotion, teaching its consumers to produce a response equivalent to the one presented in its episodes. It is a kind of pedagogy of seeing and of the physical reaction that this seeing should produce" (4). Yorick (and, by extension, Sterne) teaches his British audience an alternative way of seeing their stereotypically reviled Gallic neighbors; by changing their vision, he also seeks to modify their feelings and actions to reflect the "spirit of reconciliation" (319) that he espouses. An old French officer expresses Yorick's sentimental agenda when he asserts that "the advantage of travel . . . was by seeing a great deal of both men and manners; it taught us mutual toleration; and mutual toleration . . . taught us mutual love" (115). However, as the writer for *The Critical Review* clarifies, *how* one perceives these "men and manners" determines whether or not "mutual love" is achieved. *A Sentimental Journey*'s provision of a sentimental lens through which to view foreign nations and unfamiliar cultures seeks to teach its audience how to see in order to manipulate how they feel; the political

consequence of this is nothing short of a revision of the ideological basis and enactment of British national identity.

## From Tourist Sites to Travelers: The Female Sentimental Object and Subject

It is not a coincidence that the rise of women's non-fictional travelogues corresponds with the publication of *A Sentimental Journey*. *The Monthly Review*'s complaint regarding the ubiquity of sentimental travelogues—that "every rambler, who can write (tolerably or intolerably), assumes the pen, and gives the Public a journal of the *occurrences* and *remarks*, to which his peregrinations have given birth" (60: 191, original italics)—irascibly suggests that Sterne effectively democratized a genre previously dominated by erudite scholars, intrepid explorers, and accomplished writers—the majority notably male.[21] By emphasizing personal experience over technical details and scholarly erudition, Sterne created a form of travel writing not only accessible to women writers, but also tailored to their socially sanctioned strengths. That women possessed a greater natural capacity for sensibility than men was an opinion propagated and confirmed in everything from medical treatises to conduct literature. Medical treatises on the human nervous system suggested that women's nerves were naturally more delicate than men's, making them more susceptible to

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[21] For instance, Joseph Addison set the standard for the scholarly travelogue in his *Remarks on Several Parts of Italy* (1705, rev. ed. 1718), his observations were more a statement on his extensive knowledge of the classics than of Italy; Thomas Pennant's exhaustively detailed *A Tour in Scotland* (1769) elevated expectations for the amount and precision of information found in travelogues, his fastidiousness intimidating even Samuel Johnson; and Henry Fielding's *Journal of a Voyage to Lisbon* (1755) and Tobias Smollett's *Travels through France and Italy* (1766) crafted compelling literary travelogues that provided a standard for wit and eloquence. The exceptions to the all-male line up of travel writers in the early to mid eighteenth century are Elizabeth Justice's *A Voyage to Russia* (1739) and Lady Mary Wortley Montagu's *The Turkish Embassy Letters*, the latter of which was published posthumously in 1763.

external impressions and imbuing them with greater sensitivity.[22] "Herein consists the indescribable superiority of the female organization," Pratt poetically rather than medically describes:

> [E]very artery, about them, is hung more airily; the avenues which nature hath opened to the heart, though perhaps more involved in mazes, are yet so like a wilderness of sweets, that we have more inducements to clear the way, and examine them: add to this that certain voluptuous particles swim along the beautiful labyrinths that are formed by the veins, and always fit them for a spirited proposal at a moment's notice. (29)

Pratt's interpretation of women's bodies as repositories of sensation is indebted to eighteenth-century medical explanations linking women's unique physical composition to emotional sensitivity. Enlightenment philosophy built upon this physical rationale and enshrined women's superior sensibility as an essential component of progress and civilization. According to Lord Kames, due to the 'fact' that women "polished sooner than men" (4), commingling was key to cultural refinement; by socializing with the opposite sex, men would feel compelled to rise to the level of civility achieved by women.[23] Francis Hutcheson determined that the "tender bonds" of marriage "chiefly civilize and unite men in society" (260), and Lord Kames agreed that "the gentle and

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[22] Take, for example, Bernard Mandeville's *Treatise of Hypochondriack and Hysterick Passions* (1711), which argues that women's nerves were structurally different than men's, and George Cheyne's *The English Malady* (1733), which characterizes physical firmness as masculine and physical weakness as feminine.

[23] In *The Character and Conduct of the Female Sex* (1776), Rev. James Fordyce claims that women "teach [general courtesy] without appearing to teach it, by a secret power over the conceptions of their scholars; who, naturally ambitious of approving themselves to such agreeable tutoresses, learn it from the insensibly, and yet effectually; as people in general catch the sentiments and manners of those they esteem" (85). In short, women teach passively by example.

insinuating manners of the female sex tend to soften the roughness of the other sex" (3). The fictional narrator of Bernard's *A Sentimental Journey*—not to be confused with Sterne's novel—evinces the influence of Enlightenment conceptions of women when she proudly declares, "[h]ow much does our sex refine the nature of the male! . . . Like rough diamonds they have an intrinsic worth; but it is owing to us that they sparkle and are polished" (1: 100). Sentimental novels like Samuel Richardson's *Pamela* (1740) and Sarah Scott's *Millenium Hall* (1762) centered their plots on the reforming influence of women's refined sensibility, illustrating how the exercise of female sympathy and sensitivity could effect individual and social transformation. Conduct literature such as Rev. James Fordyce's *Sermons to Young Women* (1766) and Dr. John Gregory's *A Father's Legacy to his Daughters* (1761) confirmed women's superiority in the realm of feeling, encouraging them to cultivate their sensibility as the heart rather than the head was their area of specialty. "It is not the argumentative but the sentimental talents," Fordyce proclaims, "which give you that insight and those openings into the human heart, that lead to your principle ends as Women" (211-212). Sterne's *A Sentimental Journey* reflects this belief in women's superior capacity for feeling. Yorick imputes greater sensibility to women and seeks sentimental encounters with them in order to refine his emotional faculties. "I could wish," he fervently proclaims, "to spy the *nakedness* of [women's] hearts, and through the different disguises of customs, climates, and religion, find out what is good in them, to fashion my own by" (137, original italics). Throughout the mock travelogue, he characterizes his particularly emotive moments as feminine; after an especially spectacular emotional outburst, he rather proudly declares, "I am as weak as a woman" (75). Yorick essentially desires to

'soften his roughness' through interaction with women—to "catch their sentiments and manners" (*The Character and Conduct of the Female Sex* 85) as Fordyce would say.

"Women," Turner observes, "were becoming beneficiaries . . . of the changing scope of the travel narrative, away from erudite classical traditions in favour of more sociological, affective, and miscellaneous preoccupations" (*British Travel Writers in Europe* 128). Indeed, it stands to reason that if the sentimental traveler is evaluated by his ability to feel, and if the goals of the sentimental journey are emotional connection and the exercise and expansion of sympathetic feeling, then women—as delineated by medical, philosophical, and cultural authorities—could legitimately claim a certain amount of expertise in this mode of travel and travel writing. Mary Wollstonecraft's critical observation that "[a] man, when he undertakes a journey, has, in general, the end in view; a woman thinks more of the incidental occurrences, the strange things that may possibly occur on the road" (130) could be appropriated by female sentimental travel writers as an asset. In a form shaped around digressions and invested in the incidental, their stereotyped propensities were perfectly adapted to the expectations of the sentimental travelogue. Moreover, women's accomplishments as sentimental novelists had already established them as doyennes in the literature of feeling, as Jery Melford admits in *The Expedition of Humphrey Clinker* (1771): "that branch of business [novels] is now being engrossed by female authors, who publish merely for the propagation of virtue, with so much ease and spirit, and delicacy, and knowledge of the human heart, and the serene tranquility of high life, that the reader is not only enchanted by their genius but reformed by their morality" (25). Melford's comment certainly contains a touch of factitiousness; however, the fact that women's 'gifting' as

sentimental novelists could be parodied demonstrates the extent to which their involvement in the production of sentimental fiction had become a cultural commonplace. Sterne shifted the travelogue into an area ceded to women on the basis of their unique biological composition and into a literary territory already well traversed by female authors by transferring value from the traveler's erudition to his or her emotions, and diverting attention away from human productions and towards the "human heart." In so doing, he provided a new way for women writers to justify their engagement in a literary field traditionally dominated by men; his model became one of the platforms from which they could propel themselves into the genre.

However, despite its apparent accessibility to women writers, the genre as developed by Sterne is inescapably gendered. Yorick's admission that his journey is motivated by the voyeuristic desire to "spy the *nakedness* of [women's] hearts" (137, original italics) may position them as models to be imitated, but it concomitantly reduces them into consumable objects or vehicles of sympathy. He compares his "thirst" for women to the passion "which inflames the breast of the connoisseur" (137), and like a connoisseur of art, he is eager to access, analyze, touch and even pay for the opportunity of consuming the objects of his desire. Commenting on Yorick's "unorthodox itinerary of sights," Chard observes that he "displace[s] the monuments and works of art designated as sights by discourses such as classical scholarship and art criticism by a sequence of women, poised to yield up to the enquiring traveller the secrets of their hearts" (153). Indeed, from delicate ladies to French grissets to unbalanced maids, Yorick's itinerary is dominated by his encounters with women. His rapid consumption of these "fair being[s]" effectively commodifies them, remaking

women into tourist sites akin to the "Palais royal," the "Luxembourg," and the "Façade of the Louvre" (137). His sentimental portrayal of women mystifies their objectification; however, the power that Yorick allots to the female sex is precariously predicated upon their weakness ("[I] have such fellow-feeling for whatever is *weak* about them" [137, original italics]), and his orientation as a tourist generates an acquisitive inclination that circumscribes women as sites or souvenirs—what Wollstonecraft later would incisively describe as the "insignificant objects of desire" and the "alluring objects for a moment" (4).

Post-Sterne, the objectification of women—and particularly their objectification as erotic objects—becomes a standard trope in the narratives of male sentimental travel writers. Paterson litters his travelogue with observations on (generally attractive) females in various stages of distress. Anonymous women exhibiting signs of grief, immured nuns, and persecuted female saints are of particular interest. In Pratt's unapologetically sentimental travel narrative, his female traveling companion becomes the frequent object of his observations; his physical journey is overshadowed by his spiritual journey through the "labyrinths" (29) of the female heart. Nathaniel Wraxall's frequent effusions upon the beauty of Northern women in his *Cursory Remarks Made in a Tour through Some of the Northern Parts of Europe* (1775) caused a contributor to *The Gentleman's Magazine* to exclaim with exasperation: "[C]ould he be prevailed on to strike out all mention of every woman that he would have us believe reigned the sovereign of his affections for an hour, in very rapid succession . . . [his *Cursory Remarks*] would appear to much greater advantage" (46: 24). Wraxall's admiration of the female sex knows no bounds, as evidenced by an episode of necrophilia in Bremen

where he finds himself entranced by the perfectly preserved 250-year-old corpse of an alleged English countess (401-404). Addressing his *Sentimental Letters on Italy* (1785) to his wife, Jean-Baptiste Mercier Dupaty is careful to constrain the majority of his robust descriptions of the female form to their representations in statuary and painting (he appears to have traveled to Italy to spy the nakedness of their statues!). However, he cannot resist waxing poetic on lovely but consumptive English ladies, half-clothed Roman matrons escaping burning buildings, and beautiful though unconscious maidens—all either distressed or undressed, but rendered innocuous due to their unattainability. "It is generally said," he sighs, "that there is something of the woman in whatever we love" (117). Although descriptions of women had a long history in the travelogue genre—it was expected that travel writers would address the appearance, customs, and behavior of foreign women in their accounts—the details recorded by Yorick and his successors diverge from convention. The male sentimental tourist's interest in foreign females is more of the erotic than the ethnographic or even the moral kind. Rather than classifying women according to proto-ethnographic methods or studying them in order to assess a foreign society's socio-cultural evolution, they generally aim to collect a series of intimate (though always 'innocent') experiences for personal as opposed to public edification.[24]

Manifest in this sentimental fixation with beautiful and/or distressed women is what Robert Markley identifies as "a masculinist complex of strategies designed to

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[24] It may be more accurate to say that male sentimental tourist's interest in foreign females is more explicitly presented as erotic, whereas earlier Grand Tourists and explorers present their interest in females as ethnographic, although scholars have argued that their 'ethnographic' approach to women obscures an erotic interest. See Chloe Chard's discussion of women as signifiers of the foreign in *Pleasure and Guilt on the Grand Tour*.

relegate women to the status of perpetual victims" (211). The tropes of the unattainable ideal or the suffering innocent position women at the center of the narrative, yet effectively relegate them to the margins of society by emphasizing their fragility and specifically physical desirability. The attention to mad, mourning, sickly, or otherwise physically vulnerable females found in the pages of male sentimental travel writers suggests the victimization of women accomplished by sentimentalism: their glorification is contingent upon their impotence.[25] They are "biologically constrained," Markley observes, "to passive suffering and sociopolitical docility" (211). Smith's references to women in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* exemplify the extent to which women's association with exquisite feeling could justify their exclusion from public political life. Smith repeatedly genders weakness and strength, referring to varied displays of weakness as "unmanly" (36) and "womanish" (288) and defines expressions of strength as evidence of "manhood" (175). His fear that "delicate sensibility" will inevitably corrupt the nation's "masculine firmness of character" (245) implicitly suggests that women have no place within the business of the nation. Smith's assertion that genuine patriotism requires self-command—the impeccable capitulation of the self to the demands of the society—coupled with his intimation that self-command is a specifically masculine virtue compounds his underlying suggestion that women lack the qualities of a model citizen. Smith's gendering of weakness as feminine quietly yields to and supports the prevailing idea that women were too emotionally volatile to be trusted with the demands of active citizenship.

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[25] Yorick's mad Maria, Wraxall's unintelligible Norwegian beauties and embalmed English countess, Paterson's immured nuns, and Dupaty's unconscious maiden come to mind.

The emphasis placed on beauty similarly reduces the women featured in sentimental travelogues to what Wollstonecraft identifies as "short-lived queens…exalted by their inferiority" (116). Their 'power' over men is precariously predicated upon ephemeral and arbitrary appeal. Edmund Burke definitively linked beauty and weakness in his attempt to define the beautiful, asserting that "[a]n air of robustness and strength is very prejudicial to beauty. An appearance of *delicacy*, and even of fragility, is almost essential to it" (186, original italics). Accordingly, "the beauty of women is considerably owing to their weakness, or delicacy, and is even enhanced by their timidity, a quality of mind analogous to it" (Burke 187). Wollstonecraft targeted this disturbing side of "the culture of the heart" (110) in *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792), arguing that her culture's definition of women as "creatures of sensation" (131) effectively produces and secures their subordination. Explaining the relationship between sensibility and subjection, she contends:

> [T]o their senses, are women made slaves, because it is by their sensibility that they obtain present power. And will moralists pretend to assert, that this is the condition in which one half of the human race should be encouraged to remain with listless inactivity and stupid acquiescence? Kind instructors! what were we created for? To remain, it may be said, innocent; they mean in a state of childhood. (131)

The power women gain through their acknowledged superiority in the realm of feeling is contingent upon their physical and intellectual powerlessness; paradoxically cultivating fragility to acquire strength, they are ultimately made dependent upon and subordinate to men. The "soft phrases, susceptibility of the heart, delicacy of sentiment,

and refinement of taste" that Wollstonecraft believes are "synonymous with weakness" (6) are the very things that male sentimental travelers find so admirable and even irresistible in the women they portray. By reifying the 'female' qualities that manifest weakness, they implicitly condemn them to the position of "perpetual victims," if not to perpetual childhood.

## Conclusion: The Female Sentimental Travel Writer

The eighteenth-century female travel writers that I examine in the subsequent chapters all adopt to some extent Yorick's sentimental model of travel and travel writing, manifesting his influence in their conspicuous deployment of the three main characteristics of the sentimental traveler: a distinct emphasis on emotional responsiveness, an acknowledged orientation towards sympathy, and an interest in anecdotes. Where they radically differ from Sterne is in their displacement of women from the perceived to the perceivers—a shift that has significant implications for how femininity is defined and treated within these texts. Eighteenth-century female travel writers composing within the sentimental vein inevitably faced the problem of working within a form adapted to their designated strengths yet one that naturalized their objectification, eroticization, and stasis. The (non-fictional) women writers who followed in Yorick's footsteps confronted the form's gendered assumptions in their very act of appropriation; by transitioning from the sentimental object to the sentimental subject, they fundamentally challenged the form's construction of femininity. The figure of the female sentimental travel writer pits the image of the traveler and author (vigorous, authoritative, mobile) against the character of the sentimental female (weak, passive, inert). Their negotiation of these two competing positions exposes and

questions the matrix of gender assumptions and demands at work both within the sentimental narrative and within eighteenth-century society as a whole. Through both their portrayal of themselves and the women they encounter, female travel writers strategically exploit and modify sentimental narratives and their constructions of femininity—appropriating sentimental discourse and the authority it conferred while complicating its characteristic representation of women. In the following chapters I analyze how female sentimental travel writers' representations of their own gender subtly undermine or subvert the portrait of women offered both in male sentimental travel narratives and in the whole spectrum of sentimental literature, and I read their subversion of eighteenth-century gender norms as political acts intended to reconstitute the political subjectivity of women in eighteenth-century Britain. Rather than portraying women as victims of their feelings, they confirm women's expertise within the realm of feeling while simultaneously demonstrating their ability to master their emotions and, ultimately, themselves. They are explicitly *not* dependent upon men. Their texts emphasize the diversity of women's capabilities, strengths, and experiences, avoiding the tendency of sentimental narratives (and eighteenth-century society at large) to locate women's particular abilities solely in their capacity for feeling and in the practice of domesticity. By enlarging the sphere of female ability and activity, these writers craft an alternative or more multifaceted model of femininity that implicitly argues for the greater inclusion of women in the politics of the British nation.

Female travel writers' engagement with sentimental discourse is as complex and fraught as their portrayals of gender. Their deployment of sympathy is thoughtful, discerning, and deliberate; these women writers harness the emotional power of

sentimental discourse in service to their social and political agendas, using their demonstrations of sympathy to influence and educate their audience. Their emotional responses are presented as edification rather than as spectacle. As Festa explains, sentimental authors' focus on emotional responsiveness—both demonstrating and inciting it—often serves a socio-political purpose, "train[ing] the many in the 'proper' reactions, becoming the means by which to create (and potentially dominate) the collective" (52). The revolutionary environments in which each of these women wrote alerted them to the literally creative nature of sympathy. The American and French Revolutions effectively demonstrated how the communication of feeling had the ability to produce, shatter, and/or reshape nations. The four female sentimental travel writers included in this study evince an awareness of the political dimensions and uses of sympathy as demonstrated within revolutionary rhetoric and action, specified by Hume and Smith, and illustrated by Sterne. They project the innocence of Yorick but wield sympathy like Hume's politicians[26]—"assist[ing] nature" in the production, incorporation, and circulation of sentiments in an attempt to "govern men" (*A Treatise of Human Nature* 551) by influencing the direction of their sympathies and, to use Jonathan Flatley's theory and terminology, shaping the national mood. The political message of these texts is located in and disseminated through their sentimental discourse; it is through the expression of their personal feelings and through

[26] Yorick rather implausibly admits half-way through his travelogue that he was blissfully unaware of the fact that England and France are at war; his political ignorance suggests
the political innocence of the text, ultimately serving as the sugar that helps the medicine of Sterne's fairly insistent political statement go down.

manipulation of their readers' feelings that female sentimental travel writers attempt to shape the political contours of their nation.

Understanding Hume's and Smith's theories of sympathy provides a way of grasping the socio-political implications of the discourse of sensibility used within the texts of the female sentimental travel writers included in this study. Aspects of Hume's and Smith's moral philosophies can be found woven throughout the travelogues of female sentimental travel writers, who apply Enlightenment theories of sympathy in real-life contexts as a way to interpret their foreign environment and to think about the meaning both of British national identity and of female identity within the changing national climate wrought by political revolutions and imperial expansion. The philosophers' contention that we naturally absorb (Hume) or accommodate (Smith) other's emotions—thus fundamentally changing our own emotional composition—provides a way for these politically minded women to imagine and shape a viable form of political participation in which they can engage. By revealing their own affective affinities through their sentimental representations of people, objects, and ideologies, they attempt to align their readers' sympathies with their own, either through the operation of emotional contagion or through Smithian accommodation. At the same time, female sentimental travel writers police the flow of sympathetic traffic between different individuals or groups by engaging the caveats elaborated in Hume's and Smith's texts. Despite (or due to) the ambiguity of his definitions, Hume's emphasis on the importance of contiguity or resemblance in the circulation of feeling provides a useful way for female travel writers to rhetorically prevent the extension of sympathy to individuals or groups that compromise their political vision. Similarly, Smith's

insistence on the importance of reciprocity within the sympathetic exchange indirectly provides these shrewd authors with the means to interrupt the formation of indiscriminate or objectionable emotional connections. If one party refuses to or is incapable of sympathizing with the other's "misfortunes," "grief," "injuries," or "resentments," Smith cautions that the sympathetic exchange is compromised: "We become intolerable to one another" (27). The travel writers included in this study carefully designate who deserves to be included in the sentimental community and who does not by illustrating and judging the ability of particular individuals and groups to engage in the circulation of feelings. Discussing philosophies of sympathy and their manifestations in sentimental literature, Mullan argues that "neither type of text simply reflects social conditions or relations: both *produce* society; both seek to make society on the page" (25, original italics). Female sentimental travel writers' representations both of their society and of the foreign societies they encounter accomplish a similar intervention; their portrayals are not static copies, but dynamic impressions that attempt to remake the British nation according to their own ideals.

# Chapter II

# "I Am Sure You Will Share My Feelings": Janet Schaw's *Journal of a Lady of Quality*, Imperial Desire, and the American Revolution

## Introduction: Text and Context

Men are rarely without some sympathy in the sufferings of others; but in the immense and diversified mass of human misery . . . the mind must make a choice. Our sympathy is always more forcibly attracted towards the misfortunes of certain persons, and in certain descriptions: and this sympathetic attraction discovers, beyond a possibility of a mistake, our mental affinities, and elective affections.
~Edmund Burke[27]

On October 25, 1774, a single, upper middle-class Scottish woman by the name of Janet Schaw began a remarkable journey across the Atlantic to the West Indies and North Carolina, eventually returning to Scotland via Portugal. Schaw could not have anticipated that her stay in North Carolina would throw her into the midst of an accelerating colonial rebellion, threatening the lives and property of both herself and her loved ones and transforming this 'lady of quality' into an active political player. Her politicization over the course of her journey is portrayed as a response to her colonial and revolutionary environments, and suggests the liberating possibilities of physical mobility and of political instability for women in the eighteenth century. Her correspondence demonstrates that travel is inherently political as border crossings and contact zones are inescapably politicized spaces of national, cultural, and economic negotiation,[28] while revolution penetrates every facet of society, blurring the already

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[27] *Letters on a Regicide Peace* 210.
[28] The 'contact zone' is a term coined by Mary Louise Pratt in *Imperial Eyes*: *Travel*

imprecise demarcations between private and public spaces. Schaw's travel letters document her emerging political consciousness and become the means of her active political intervention; positioned as a witness to colonial realities and to revolutionary events, her personal experiences are transformed into political information.

Her integration of feeling and observation produces a sentimentalized politics that derives power from the magnetism of sympathy. Schaw's understanding of the nation as a "Social Circle" (21)—its parameters defined by affection rather than by geography or biology—suggests the immense political importance of feeling both within eighteenth-century culture and within her travel letters. She shares with Edmund Burke a conviction both of the instrumentality of emotions—that "sympathetic attraction discovers . . . our mental affinities, and elective affections" (Burke 210)—and of the limited and selective quality of sympathy. During the period in which Schaw was writing, Britons were forced to "make a choice" (Burke 210) between two 'suffering' parties: the American rebels and the British loyalists. That the direction of their affections would determine the shape of their political actions is evident from Allan Ramsay's contention that definitive action for or against America would be impossible until the colonists' "true relation to Great Britain is accurately known" (20). Schaw engages with sensibility as political rhetoric, painting the "misfortunes" of those with whom she sympathizes using sentimental "descriptions" (Burke 210) intended to shift her British audiences' sympathies towards what she perceives as the appropriate objects of feeling. Her adoption of a sentimental persona for political effect reveals both the possibilities and the limitations of sentimental travel and of sensibility as political

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*Writing and Transculturation* to describe the spaces in which colonizers and colonized interact.

praxis when situated within real and volatile socio-political contexts. Laurence Sterne's idyllic representation of universal love breaks down under the pressure of colonial and revolutionary politics, where sentimental encounters become complicated by political commitments, economic realities, and ethnic affiliations. Schaw's form of sentimental travel demonstrates an affinity with Burke's opinion that "in the immense and diversified mass of human suffering, the mind must make a choice" (210). Her sentimental travel narrative urges her British readers to make what she believes to be the right choice.

Little is known about Schaw besides what is disclosed in her travelogue. However, what both her own story and the sparse available details of her life reveal is a self-possessed woman who was a product of the Enlightenment culture in which she was raised and of the British Empire in which she and her circle were actively engaged and upon which they were profoundly dependent. Schaw was likely born sometime between 1739 and 1744 and raised in the Lauriston suburb of Edinburgh, the daughter of a customs official who died just prior to her journey across the Atlantic (Andrews 9-10, 106-107). Her eloquence, frequent allusions to literature, excellent knowledge of botany and agriculture, and personal connections suggest a woman who is educated, well-positioned within Edinburgh society, and integrated into its vibrant intellectual and cultural life. She realizes with humor that her text of choice during a particularly harrowing storm is Lord Kames' *Elements of Criticism* rather than the Bible. "[W]e discovered," she laughs, "we were meeting death, like philosophers not Christians" (45). Her bedside copy of Kames' theoretical contemplation of aesthetics is suggestive of her familiarity with and interest in Enlightenment thought, while her warm memories of the

"evening Conversations . . . I have feasted on" (21) conjures up images of the convivial intellectual milieu that characterized eighteenth-century Edinburgh. Schaw's connections along her journey and her casual references to acquaintances in Scotland indicate the impressive circles in which she moved; her network of friends included noteworthy politicians, Scottish aristocrats, wealthy planters, and successful professionals. In October 1774, she joined her brother aboard the *Jamaica Packet* as a travelling companion on his voyage to the West Indian colony of St. Christopher to secure a position as a customs official. Her journey would also include a visit to an older brother on his plantation in North Carolina and an unexpected detour to Portugal on her premature trip home in January or February 1776. She also went as the unofficial guardian of the three Rutherfurd children—Fanny, Jack, and Billie—who had been sent to Scotland for their education and were returning to their father's plantation in North Carolina after a lengthy absence. It is unclear whether Schaw traveled to the Atlantic colonies as a tourist or as a colonist; she assures her Scottish correspondent that "[t]ime will restore me to you" but then more ambivalently states that time will "*perhaps* [restore me] to my Native land" (21-22, italics mine). Her expressions of astonishment at being able to return to Scotland following the breakdown of colonial relations in America suggests that she perhaps had intended to remain with her brother in St. Christopher: "[S]hall I really see you and dear Scotland once more? My head turns giddy at the thought. I am ready to faint. Oh my God! 'tis a sort of feeling I have long been a stranger to" (214-215). Following the abrupt conclusion of her letters in Portugal, Schaw disappears into obscurity; the sole indication of the type of life she led upon her return home is a fragment of an address and date inscribed on one of the three existing

copies of her travelogue: "St. Andrews Square, March 10, 1778" (Andrews 3). It seems that she settled into one of the choicest addresses in Edinburgh, making her home in the center of its New Town—the city's posh new addition that had been built with the profits of empire and where she would have called David Hume her neighbor. Schaw's final known location once again suggests her integration within Scotland's cultural, intellectual, and political elite, as well as the extent to which her life was enmeshed with the fortunes of the British Empire.

Her travelogue is purported to be a compilation of the letters she intermittently sent to a close friend in Scotland throughout her voyage. The frequency of Schaw's letters is subject to the vagaries of travel; her entries are interrupted by a busy social schedule, a rigorous travel itinerary, or a lack of resources. Nevertheless, she manages to weave together a cohesive narrative of her time abroad. Her account of the journey is separated into four distinct parts: the seven-week voyage to the West Indies, her sumptuous progress through the sugar islands of Antigua and St. Christopher, the terrifying experience of Revolution in North Carolina, and her brief stop in Portugal prior to returning to Scotland. Once settled back in Edinburgh, Schaw transcribed her original letters into at least three different polished manuscripts, which remained the form in which her travel narrative was circulated until Charles McLean Andrews and Evangeline Walker Andrews found one of the manuscripts in the British Museum and finally published Schaw's travelogue in 1923. Although the manuscripts maintain the appearance of a private correspondence, the sophisticated presentation of Schaw's letters, her evident concern with literariness, and the urgency of her political concerns suggest that her text was written (or rewritten) with a wider audience in mind. The fact

that she produced at least three manuscripts provides compelling evidence that she intended her letters to be received by a relatively large readership.[29] In her study of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century manuscript culture, Margaret Ezell has cautioned against the tendency of contemporary scholarship to conflate "private" with "personal" (38). She argues that unpublished texts by both women and men served a "'social' function" (39) and often enjoyed extensive circulation—occasionally more extensive than their published counterparts. "By collapsing 'public' into 'publication,'" she warns, "we seriously misconstrue the literary practices of such women" (39). Based on her study of women's travel manuscripts, Zoë Kinsley suggests that some women deliberately chose to circulate their texts in manuscript form in order to retain a certain amount of control over circulation and reception (57). The presence of multiple copies of Schaw's travelogue indicates that her text did, indeed, serve a social purpose. Katherine Turner further notes that Schaw's practice of replacing names with blanks throughout her manuscript "suggests that she envisaged a readership far beyond the circle of her family, and may even have been considering publication" (135). It is possible that, in the end, she was satisfied with the distribution of her manuscripts and felt little need to pursue the grimy avenues of publication and risk the public shaming many female authors received. Considering her unvarnished and sometimes controversial opinions on gender and colonial politics, it certainly may be the case that

[29] Additional copies of Schaw's text have not been found since the Andrews found the three existing manuscripts, although this does not necessarily preclude the existence of more copies. One copy—which found its way into the hands of an Antiguan historian—is dedicated to Alexander Schaw, one remains inaccessible in the hands of her distant relations, and one was located in the British Museum until it was destroyed during the bombing of London in WWII.

she also wanted to retain a measure of control over the circulation of her text to protect her reputation.

Schaw identifies her travel persona as sentimental within the first few pages of her travelogue by freely declaring the emotional character of her perceptions and observations. "[E]very subject," she states, "will be guided by my own immediate feelings" (20). She explains that the form in which she relates her observations will be adapted to reflect her sentimental orientation. Echoing Yorick's assertion that his travelogue will offer an account of "the weaknesses of [his] heart in this tour" (Sterne 70) rather than the usual catalogue of sites, Schaw forewarns her correspondent that she will not "inform you of what you know so well already" but will compose "a journal of my own thoughts, ideas and apprehensions, where every thing is new to me" (217). She is not primarily concerned with calculations and categorization but with her own emotional response to the foreign environment. Schaw reinforces her sentimental disposition throughout her account, repeatedly gesturing towards her "feeling heart" which, she assures her reader, "is not composed of very hard materials" (33). Near the conclusion of her travelogue she asserts the merits of a sentimental orientation by criticizing the work of Richard Twiss—author of *Travels through Portugal and Spain* (1775)—using the same language found in Yorick's appraisal of the 'splenetic' traveler.[30] "Mr Twiss says a great deal," she observes, "but his travels seem only a journal of his own bad humours, prejudices and mistakes, for I believe he would not willingly tell a falsehood, but I am at a loss to think where he found the dirty scenes he

[30] "The learned SMELFUNGUS travelled from Boulogne to Paris—from Paris to Rome—and so on—but he set out with the spleen and jaundice, and every object he pass'd by was discoloured or distorted—He wrote an account on them, but 'twas nothing but the account of his miserable feelings" (Sterne 82).

describes" (250). Schaw recycles the sentimental traveler's common defense of their affective disposition: divested of the prejudices and the egocentricity that encumbers their unsentimental counterparts, the sentimental traveler is endowed with clarity of vision that ensures the veracity of their observations. Projecting his "bad humours" and "prejudices" onto the foreign environment, Twiss' perception is inevitably distorted; Schaw's determination to "keep good humour" (20) ostensibly allows her to avoid the egregious "mistakes" in judgment committed by her predecessor. Although she admits that her feelings directly affect her judgment, confessing that her "opinions and descriptions will depend on the health and the humour of the Moment" (20), she repeatedly demonstrates that her feelings—oriented towards sympathy and directed outwards rather than inwards—ultimately *clarify* rather than *cloud* her judgment. That Schaw repeatedly aligns tyranny with a lack of feeling—referring to tyrannical individuals or collectives as "without heart or feeling" (23) or "hard-hearted" (34)—suggests that sympathetic feeling ultimately serves as a moral compass that directs individuals towards right action. Given this correlation between feeling and morality—a correlation well established by Scottish Enlightenment philosophy—the audience is directed to read Schaw's expressions of emotional responsiveness as moral judgments rather than as spectacles of self-indulgence.

The spontaneity and intensity of her emotions ultimately work to justify her political engagement. As a sensible individual, she cannot help responding to the immediate spectacle of her nation's trauma during the beginning stages of the American Revolution. Her emotional convictions demand to be articulated and shared for the amelioration of her national community; in the battleground that was the heart during

the colonial crisis, Schaw attempts to win the war by speaking to her audiences' emotions. Her account actively intervenes in British society's perceptions of Scots, Americans, and women. The alternate versions that she provides through her observations on how all three groups function within colonial and foreign environments contest and/or consolidate their positions within the British Empire and within British national identity. Schaw fuses the powerful imperatives of emotional expression with the authority and immediacy offered by travel to manipulate what Burke refers to as the "elective affinities, and mental affections" (210) of her British audience towards the social groups that she describes and the political projects that she supports. The political work of her sentimental discourse and her performance of sensibility can be clarified through Sara Ahmed's contention that emotions function to determine the contours of society, establishing who is enshrined at the center and who is relegated to the margins of the nation-state. "Emotions shape the very surface of bodies," she argues, "which take shape through the repetition of actions over time, as well as through orientations towards and away from others" (4). Ahmed's thesis aligns with David Hume's and Adam Smith's ideas regarding the impact of sympathy on socio-political structures and practices; sympathy determines the "shape" of individuals and nations through its ability to generate emotional conformity. Schaw's vividly expressed emotional orientations are intended to effectively "shape the very surface" of the British and colonial "bodies" she encounters, sculpting the nation's profile into a form that approximates her political vision. Her sympathetic representations of both her nation and gender advocate for their greater inclusion within the British polity, while her failure to sympathize with the American colonists (or, to be more specific, *their* failure

to elicit sympathy) ultimately justifies both their exclusion from and their oppression under British rule. Throughout her travelogue, sentimental discourse interacts with imperialist ambitions to exploit the transformative power of feeling and to justify the violent practices that her political commitments require.

## "What, in the name of God, shall we do with it?": The American Crisis

In order to fully understand Schaw's intervention in the political debates of her day and to clarify her political motivations, it is necessary first to contextualize her position within the political dynamics and socio-political forces that defined Anglo-American and Anglo-Scottish relations during the early years of the American Revolution. That Schaw was at least marginally aware of the increasingly fraught relationship between Britain and its American colonies is evident both from her active intellectual life and from the tone of anxiety that pervades her text. Given that she had assiduously prepared herself for her journey by reading "all the descriptions that have been published of America" (151), she could not have been ignorant of the fact that she was traveling to a troubled part of Britain's empire. In addition to the coverage the colonial situation received in pamphlets, books, and periodicals, her close connections in both the West Indies and in North Carolina presumably would have informed her of the fragile political situation in the American colonies. Although she dismisses her Bostonian supercargo's revolutionary pronouncements and commitments as "silly" (65), her hope that "what this fool says may not prove at last too true" (65) contains a note of insecurity that suggests her concern with the rapidly disintegrating relationship between Britain and America. By the time Schaw left Scotland in October 1774, an internecine war between Britain and its American colonies had become a real

possibility. In his study of the British press' coverage of the American Revolution, Troy Bickham finds that by late 1774 the press was busily estimating the potential costs of a war and speculating on Britain's chance of success against its colonies (67). Although Parliament was still working towards a peaceful resolution with the colonies—with conciliatory proposals drafted by Lord North, Edmund Burke, and Lord Chatham in the late months of 1774 and the early months of 1775—Lord North's administration was simultaneously preparing for war. Evidence of Britain's militarization is found in Schaw's travelogue: in December 1774, the *Jamaica Packet* passed a "King's ship of seventy four guns" with "troops on board for Boston" (64). She could not have foreseen that the troops abroad the *Boyne* would go on to fight in the first battles between Britain and the colonies—Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill (Andrews 65).

In his final formal proposal for conciliation between Britain and its American colonies in March 1775, Burke succinctly stated the question that plagued the British government and populace since the first signs of American resistance. "[T]he question is," he opined, "not whether their [fierce spirit of liberty] deserves praise or blame; [but] what, in the name of God, shall we do with it?" ("Speech on Conciliation with the Colonies" 37). Parliament had alternately attempted to appease and reprimand their recalcitrant colonies in an attempt to avoid an all-out war while maintaining at least the appearance of authority. Burke blamed the escalating crisis on the government's uneven approach to their colonies. "What woeful variety of schemes have been adopted," he laments, "what enforcing, and what repealing; what bullying, and what submitting … what shiftings, and changes, and jumblings of all kinds of men at home, which left no possibility of order, consistency, vigor, or even so much as a decent unity of color in any

one public measure" ("Speech on American Taxation" 254-255). The lack of unity and uncertainty that Burke perceives in Parliament's approach to its colonists' hostility was mirrored in British popular opinion. Similar to their indecisive and divided leaders, the public's response to the question of what was to be done with the colonists' discontent—or their "fierce spirit of liberty"—was by no means unified or coherent. "Opinion within Great Britain," Linda Colley argues in regard to the American crisis, "was just as seriously fractured . . . responses were neither overwhelmingly pro-war nor uncompromisingly anti-war, but instead profoundly mixed" (*Captives* 207). James E. Bradley's analysis of the anti-war petitions and pro-war addresses sent from all corners of Britain to Parliament from 1775-1776 exposes the national schism produced by the American war. While he found that the addresses outnumbered the petitions, the numbers of signatures on the anti-war petitions ultimately outnumbered those on the pro-war addresses (93). What this demonstrates, as Stephen Conway observes, "is not the preponderance of one side or the other, but the deep division over the justice and necessity of the conflict" (131-132).

The question of what should be done with the recalcitrant colonists was fundamentally problematized by their complicated status as British citizens. Dror Wahrman believes that "the whole problem of the American war in a nutshell" came down to the question of "whether this was a civil war among Englishmen or a war with aliens . . . masking themselves as Englishmen" (1256). Allan Ramsay, then employed as George III's principle painter, certainly blamed Britain's lack of direction and resolve on the colonists' split or slippery identity. Neatly dividing the world into the categories of "Englishmen" and "Foreigners" (17), he explains: "[T]here has lately started up to view

in America a new class of men, who will be found upon examination to belong to neither of those two classes; who for that reason, give great perplexity both to the Government and people of England, and must ever continue to perplex them till their true nature, and their true relation to Great Britain is accurately known" (19-20). Ramsay imputes both the government's vacillations and the political schisms within British society to the colonists' heterogeneous identity as both "Englishmen" and "Foreigners"—not altogether British, yet not recognizably or officially foreign. He stresses that "a suitable mode of proceeding" (19) in regards to the crisis is impracticable until the colonists' identity is clarified. How Britons perceived the American colonists ultimately impacted political decisions, a reality that Ramsay acknowledges in his assertion that the colonists' slippery identity was hindering effective action. Indeed, as both Colley and Wahrman argue, the identity of the American colonists significantly contributed to the ideological divisions within British society and to the British government's schizophrenic response to the colonial crisis. Colley suggests that "the British had never succeeded in forging a consensus on how to view their American colonists" (227), and Wahrman contends this "the lack of clarity about who the Americans were, enemies or brethren . . . returned inescapably to undermine and destabilize the rhetoric of all sides" (1238). Opponents to and proponents for the war fought it out in the press and in Parliament, with opponents concurring that Britain had trespassed upon the sacred principles of liberty in their governance of America and warning that a war against the colonies was a war against liberty, while proponents defended Britain's method of colonial governance and essentially accused the Americans of attempting to steal what rightfully belonged to Britain.

American sympathizers maintained the view that the colonists were inescapably British, and emphasized the genealogy between the inhabitants of the British Isles and those in North America, referring to the colonists as their "children" (John Erskine 10), "brethren" (Richard Price 55), and "kindred" (Burke, "Speech on Conciliation with America," 128). Emphasizing the shared heritage between Britain and its American colonies served the purpose of justifying the Americans' resistance as a fundamentally 'British' act while simultaneously representing Parliamentary aggression as suspiciously authoritarian, and the support of violent repercussions as palpably anti-British and even perverse. Asserting the kinship ties between Americans and Britons further complicated efforts to mobilize British support for aggressive action against the recalcitrant colonists. Anti-war petitioners stressed that this was not a war that pitted the British against easily 'othered' foreigners, but an internecine struggle that pitted the British against themselves. Projecting horror, John Erskine exclaims: "Shall the friend, the brother, the father, the son, imbrue their hands in the blood of men, by the tyes of nature, esteem, or gratitude, dear to them as their own souls?" (10). American sympathizers endorsed conciliatory action as the means to restore the colonists' loyalty and ensure the continuation of the important transatlantic trading networks. John Knox attempted to convince his British audience that the stability and perpetuation of the nation's empire could only be ensured through the cultivation of sentimental ties between Britain and her colonies. "Politically speaking," Knox mused, "clemency . . . proves an irresistible victory over generous minds, and its charms frequently reaches even the most stubborn heart, which it unhinges, softens, and qualifies for the duties of society. It is this, more than the conquering swords, which raises petty states to mighty

empires, as the opposite reduces mighty empires to insignificant states" (28-29). Invoking the ruin of the "great empires of antiquity" (29), Knox ascribes their downfall to the violent means through which they secured and maintained their territory. By acknowledging Americans as brethren and treating them as such, American sympathizers hoped a form of familial affection would "once more *unite* both sides of the Atlantic … upon a basis more durable than the precarious and the expensive security arising from any army of mercenaries stationed among them, to enforce obedience" (Knox 31, original italics).

The government and its supporters, however, preferred a more hardline approach that favored the intimidation of an "army of mercenaries" to Knox's ephemeral ties of affection. Their rhetoric tends to project unsavory images of Americans as unscrupulous rebels, intent on appropriating power to satisfy their selfish, materialist desires. Ramsay argues that Americans should not be perceived or treated as either trustworthy or as equals, but as natural inferiors with suspect motivations. He accuses Americans (and, indirectly, American sympathizers) of pulling at the heartstrings of Britons by calling themselves "*Fellow Subjects*" and labeling the conflict a "*civil war*" (23-24, original italics). "But all this juggling," he clarifies, "must lose its effect upon Englishmen, whenever they come to be distinctly informed, that the Americans are not their fellow-citizens, but their subjects" (24). Constructions of Americans as self-indulgent rebels rather than conscientious objectors—traitorously plotting the ruin of their magnanimous government—suggest the criminality of their actions, and effectively justify aggressive intervention in order to preserve both the threatened British institutions and the people they represent. Wilson explains:

"Loyalists insisted . . . [that] American 'resistance' was rebellion against legally constituted authority, and the government was acting for the preservation of 'the people' by defending the rights and sovereignty of the state against those on both sides of the Atlantic who wished to subvert them" (*The Sense of the People* 279). Indeed, government supporters feared that the extension of political leniency towards the American colonies would set a dangerous precedent within Britain and its Empire—rousing colonists and Britons alike to demand the institution of similar freedoms and privileges within the British Isles and Britain's other colonies. "Affection," Adam Ferguson observes, clearly addressing American sympathizers, "has proved but a poor tie, to restrain the Americans—Interest would be not an iota more binding—Nothing but concessions from us, that would disallegiate them, would be of any effect" (50). Not that "concessions" is what Ferguson would advocate. Indeed, he confidently proclaims that "[a] war, thus undertaken in the support of our constitution . . . ought to be promoted, and carried on with united vigor on our side, till rebellion is convinced, that her erroneous destructive principles have been the detested cause of the profusion of so much blood" (36). Lord North's administration and its supporters effectively demonized the colonists to validate their conviction that coercive measures were necessary and just. Americans, they argued, were not acting as Britons through their rebellion, but were actively destroying British principles.

There was also a small but vocal minority of Britons who favored the complete emancipation of the American colonies for purely economic reasons. The incredible expense involved in securing Britain's North American colonies during the Seven Years' War weakened arguments regarding the financial value of empire. Josiah Tucker, who

had been agitating for American emancipation since the conclusion of the Seven Years' War, felt that support for his cause had ostensibly gained popularity in the 1770s. "The Proposal for separating totally from *North-America*," he confidently asserts, "is observed to make Converts every Day" (16, original italics). Indeed, Bickham's research finds that Britons were deeply anxious about the financial costs of another war—an anxiety that may have fueled the desire to simply "release [their] claims, declare [Americans] masters of themselves, and whistle them down the wind" (Johnson, "Taxation no Tyranny," 83). "The press coverage," Bickham summarizes, "offered few illusions that an all-out conflict could be won easily or without some suffering on the domestic front" (67). By late 1774, newspapers were estimating that war with the colonies would cost Britain £14 million per year—a total, Bickham notes, that "substantially exceeded the accepted value of annual trade with the mainland colonies" (67). Considering the significant costs of maintaining the American colonies against the comparatively minimal financial gains, Adam Smith concluded that Britain would be wise to pursue American emancipation. He closed his 1776 publication of *The Wealth of Nations* by casting aspersions on the economic benefit of Britain's Atlantic holdings:

> The rules of Great Britain have, for more than a century past, amused the people with the imagination that they possessed a great empire on the west side of the Atlantic. This empire, however, has hitherto existed in the imagination only. It has hitherto been, not an empire, but the project of empire; not a gold mine, but the project of a gold mine; a project which has cost, which continues to cost, and which, if pursued in the same way as it has been hitherto, it likely to cost,

> immense expense, without being likely to bring any profit…If the project cannot be completed, it ought to be given up. (619)

Smith's message to his British audience was that the fantasy was over: the American war had exposed and would continue to expose what he perceived as the bleak reality of empire. Costing more than it contributed and effectively exposing the gap between Britain's imperial ideal and the lived experience of empire, the American Revolution raised uncomfortable and ultimately divisive questions regarding the tenability of empire. "The colonial crisis," Wilson observes, "provoked a crisis in imperialism that forced most English people to rethink the benefits and dangers of empire" (237-238).

## The Ties that Bind: Anglo-Scottish Relations and the Bonds of Empire

Janet Schaw came from a population within Britain whose status within the nation underwent a similar process of being alternately contested and consolidated throughout the eighteenth century. The relationship between Scotland and England remained fraught following the Act of Union in 1707. Two Jacobite rebellions and the virulent racism of John Wilkes and his supporters during the Earl of Bute's tenure as prime minister exposed and exacerbated the deep cracks within the façade of political unity. While the Act of Union attempted to neutralize tensions and mitigate difference, the early attempts of Scots to achieve independence and the mid-century efforts of Wilkes' followers to reinforce Scots as "inherently, unchangeably alien" (Colley, *Britons*, 113) and preserve a specifically English identity for Britain reveal the mutual suspicions and animosities that continued to plague the relationship between the two nations. However, as Colley argues, the paranoid Scottophobia of the Wilkite movement may also be taken as an indication of the increasingly political integration of Scotland and

England by the latter half of the century. "In reality," Colley suggests, "[Wilkite virulence against the Scots] was a testimony to the fact that the barriers between England and Scotland were coming down, savage proof that Scots were acquiring power and influence within Great Britain to a degree previously unknown" (121). The Act of Union allowed Scots previously unprecedented access both to England and to its colonial markets, an opportunity of which ambitious and/or beleaguered Scots took full advantage. From 1750 onwards, Scotland's overseas commerce increased by 300 percent—far exceeding England's 200 percent commercial expansion (Colley 123). Significant numbers of Scots left their native country to seek their fortunes in Britain's Atlantic colonies; David Dobson has estimated that 150,000 Scottish emigrants left for North America prior to 1785 (4), while Douglas J. Hamilton has estimated that 17,000 Scottish emigrants left for the West Indies from 1750-1799 (23). These emigrants often dominated colonial administration in the Atlantic colonies (Hamilton 145). Colley posits that the number of Scots who held positions of power within the colonies may be due to the abundance of quality Scottish talent streaming overseas. "[E]ven the rawest frontiers of the empire," Colley states, "attracted men of first-rate ability from the Celtic fringe, because they were usually poorer than their English counterparts with fewer prospects on the British mainland" (128-129). Hamilton suggests that Scottish success and proliferation within the British Empire is closely related to Scotland's tight-knit and highly operative kinship networks. In his study of Scottish influence in the West Indies, Hamilton notes that "[t]he practice of employing relatives or associates from the same part of Scotland as overseers or managers . . . suggests the adaptation of some traditional forms of clan trusteeship to a more entrepreneurial imperial setting" (55).

Although much derided by the English, the persistence of Scottish 'clannishness' often provided the motivation for those considering emigration and the means for new emigrants to succeed and prosper.

For the English, the loyalty of their Scottish neighbors ensured a measure of security against foreign invasions and a ready supply of manpower necessary for the expansion and maintenance of their burgeoning Empire. The participation of Scottish Highlanders in the Seven Years' War and Scottish colonists' resistance to the American Revolution indicates the links forged between the nations by the demands and assets of the British Empire. "Such changes," Leith Davis argues, "were due to the work both of the Scots, who were anxious to present a more positive view of Scotland to ensure their participation in the British economic market, and of the English, who were equally anxious to create a unified national identity in the face of international unrest and competition in Europe and North America" (74). In the three decades between the last Jacobite Rebellion in 1745 and the beginning of the American Revolution in 1775, Scots had gone from presenting a threat to Britain's stability to becoming its bulwark. In 1775, Governor Josiah Martin had enough confidence in the loyalty of North Carolina's Highland population to believe that he could raise a regiment of 3000 Highlanders to march against the American revolutionaries (Ian Graham 154). It is certainly significant that the second-in-command of this loyalist regiment (ultimately composed of 1500 soldiers) was the husband of Flora MacDonald—the Jacobite heroine who infamously assisted Bonnie Prince Charlie's escape and was briefly imprisoned for her rebel sympathies. Thirty years later, she was an active opponent of the American Revolution and her husband was eventually imprisoned by the Americans for his loyalty to the

British government. Considering this seemingly remarkable shift in Anglo-Scottish relations, Colley observes: "Here, perhaps, is further evidence that Scots . . . had become much more reconciled to the British polity since the rising in '45, and deeply attached as well to a British empire that afforded them so many opportunities" (140). Hamilton argues that "the majority of Scots, whether in Scotland or in the colonies, saw themselves as partners in the empire as part of the metropole, rather than as subordinate provincial associates like North Americans" (161). Hamilton's language of partnership suggests that Scots felt a sense of ownership over the British Empire; having a stake in its success, their energetic defense of the British Empire is perhaps better understood as a defense of their own economic interests and investments than as a patriotic defense of the British nation. Like so many eighteenth-century marriages of convenience, perhaps economics more than affection functioned as the glue that held the union together.

## "This royal first-rate vessel": Confessions of a Sentimental Imperialist

The colonial crisis threw into sharp relief the problematic dynamics of the British Empire, challenging the fundamental tenets of British national identity and compromising the traditional solidarities and principles that shaped the nation. "Reacting to these pressures," Colley contends, "would force a major reassessment of the meanings of Britishness and of the implications of empire" (105). Schaw's travelogue is written in reaction to these pressures. Politicized by her immediate experience both of the British Empire and of the Revolution that threatened to break it apart, she uses her eyewitness account to zealously promote the Empire that supported her family and financed Scotland's flourishing in the eighteenth century. She establishes

empire as foundational rather than peripheral to British national identity and fiercely advocates for the expansion and defense of Britain's imperial interests. Her travelogue negotiates the position of both Scotland and the American colonies within the nation according to their contributions to the Empire. Schaw does not appear to harbor traces of the hostility and bitterness that motivated both the 1715 and 1745 Jacobite rebellions, but embraces the union between England and Scotland as mutually beneficial partnership. She and her family appear to be part of the Scottish population for whom the union represented profit rather than loss; those whom Colley describes as having reconciled themselves to a political marriage that "afforded them so many opportunities" (140). Schaw emphasizes the significant contributions of Scots to the development and defense of the British Empire in an effort to establish their political reliability and overcome the latent suspicions that dogged Anglo-Scottish relations. Her tireless endorsement of Scots as loyal subjects appears motivated by a desire to ensure that they and their interests would be further and constructively acknowledged by Britain's political center. Schaw's comparatively negative treatment of Americans as "foreigners"—to use Ramsay's category and understanding of the term—is consistent with her political agenda. Her hostility towards the American colonists is a reaction to the threat they pose to the Empire upon which her family is profoundly dependent. Witnessing the aggressive militarization of the colonists and motivated by the economic dispossession of her loyalist friends and family, Schaw voices her support for coercive action against the rebellious colonists in an effort to protect British imperial interests. The exception to her unsympathetic treatment of the American population is its women; she remains consistent in her sympathetic treatment of colonial women throughout her

travelogue, regardless of their nationality. As a woman attempting to fortify her precarious speaking position and justify her political intervention, Schaw provides an argument for the political acuity of women by demonstrating their particular fitness for colonial leadership. Through her representations of the colonists and colonial relations, she attempts to clarify Scottish, American, and women's "true nature" and "true relation to Great Britain" (Ramsay 20) in a manner that supports Britain's expansionist impulses and her own imperial vision for the nation.

In order to align her audience's political commitments with her own, Schaw manipulates the language of sensibility that forms the lexicon of the sentimental traveler. Through her strategic deployment of sympathy, she polices the circulation of feeling between colonial and metropolitan populations; her extension of sympathy identifies those worthy of emotional endowment. Despite the appearance of spontaneity, her sentiments are carefully structured responses to political realities that provide a framework for thinking about and categorizing distant Britons. Schaw's repeated assurance of her audience's affective complicity—"I am sure you will share my feelings" (33)—indicates her confidence in the power of sympathy to incite what Hume refers to as "like passions and inclinations" ("Of National Characters" 115) within her distant readers. The transformative power both of Schaw's sentimental gaze and of sympathy is established in an early episode involving a community of Highlanders smuggled aboard the *Jamaica Packet*. Her immediate reaction to the unexpected passengers is revulsion. Likening the Highlanders to the filthy, brutish 'Yahoos' that Jonathan Swift invents in *Gulliver's Travels*, she seeks to influence her reader's relationship to the individuals she describes through her own aversion. Schaw's

description of the Highlanders as more beast than human draws on Hume's contention that the absence of similarity or resemblance inevitably impedes emotional transactions; their bestiality effectively obstructs sympathetic identification on the basis of radical difference.[31] However, Schaw's perception of her fellow passengers is quickly reversed upon witnessing their outpouring of emotion at the sight of their former home (the Orkney Islands). The Highlanders' display of sensibility participates in their transformation into sentimental subjects as their suffering demands and activates a sympathetic response from Schaw's "feeling heart" (33). Her instinctive response to their suffering corroborates Hume's and Smith's theories of human sociability. According to Hume, the distinct and immediate perception of another's grief instigates the "motions of the tenderest compassion and pity" (*A Treatise of Human Nature* 645) due to the susceptibility of the human heart; Smith similarly asserts that compassion operates as an instinctive response to misery "when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner" (*The Theory of Moral Sentiments* 13). The Highlanders' transformation into members of the sentimental community to which Schaw belongs is completed by her response to their suffering. Her apostrophe to pity establishes the transformation effected by sympathy:

> Pity, thou darling daughter of the skies, what a change do you produce in the hearts where you vouchsafe to enter . . . What a change has she wrought on me since my last visit to the deck. Where are now the Cargo of Yahoos? they are transformed into a Company of most respectable sufferers, whom it is both my duty and inclination to comfort, and do all in my power to alleviate their

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[31] See Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature,* 389.

> misfortunes, which have not sprung from their guilt or folly, but from the guilt and folly of others. (36)

The mutual transformation accomplished by sympathy—Schaw shares the sentiments of the steerage passengers, while they conform to her standards of human—ultimately enables the formation of community within the microcosmic world of the ship. Schaw's lived experience of perceptual and emotional conversion both illustrates and validates Hume's and Smith's models of sympathetic exchange, revealing her Enlightenment understanding of sympathy as a powerful tool of personal and collective transformation. It is a tool she continues to use throughout her letters, governing her British reader's relationship with its colonial populations by deploying or withholding sympathy according to political exigency. Manufacturing resemblance between the West Indies and Britain and extending sympathy to its colonists, Schaw effectively clears the way for sympathetic identification between the distant populations. Detailing the suffering of North Carolina's beleaguered loyalist faction, she casts them as the proper objects of feeling in an effort to elicit sympathy and its attendant political commitments from metropolitan Britons. The inability of both Americans and slaves to inspire sympathy redounds upon them as judgment; Schaw suggests that she cannot sympathize with either population because their racial and cultural alterity obstructs sentimental identification. In both cases, their radical difference justifies their violent repression. Schaw's strategic manipulation of sympathy within the colonial context bears out Lynn Festa's argument that sentimentality "is bound up with the interests of empire" as sentimental literature's positioning and governance of emotion ultimately "helps define who will be acknowledged as human" (3).

## "This Little Paradise": Bringing the West Indies Home to Britain

Schaw's magnificent five-week sojourn in the West Indies forms an important comparison to her stay in the American colonies. Her direct experience of the British Empire in Antigua and St. Christopher fundamentally shapes her vision of model colonial relations and generates ideas about nationality, race, and ethnicity that subsequently inform her interpretation and representation of America. Schaw's immediate affinity for the West Indies is perhaps predictable given the density of its Scottish population, but the sense of home that she feels while in Antigua and St. Christopher is also staged for a particular political effect. With the American crisis raising questions about the function of empire and suspicions regarding the character of colonists, Schaw embraces both the West Indian landscape and its inhabitants to generate enthusiasm for the grand scheme of empire and to underline the exemplary work of Scots within Britain's colonies. Eager to overcome the detachment produced by distance, she attempts to collapse the gulf between Britain and the West Indies through her sentimental representations of West Indian society. She familiarizes her British audience with its distant colonists by describing her emotional experience of both the people and the place, projecting a sense of continuity between Britain's metropolitan and colonial populations in an effort to strengthen Britons' sympathetic attachment to its West Indian investments.

Schaw's immediate sense of familiarity in the West Indies significantly diverges from common eighteenth-century representations of West Indian culture as conspicuously foreign. West Indian colonists occupied a liminal position within British society; while the colonial population in the Caribbean fiercely maintained their

Britishness, their metropolitan compatriots were inclined to perceive them as a distinct cultural (and even racial) group. "West Indian planters," Steve Thomas argues, "had to insist repeatedly that they shared a common heritage, a common economic future, and even a 'common nature' with England" (85). Schaw emphasizes the colonists' loyalty to Britain in her consideration of the rampant absenteeism in Antigua and St. Christopher, blaming the ongoing exodus of British West Indian planters on the "longing they have to return to Britain" (92).[32] However, as she goes on to suggest, Britons were more ambivalently disposed towards their prodigal countrymen. Schaw describes the reception of showy West Indian planters in London as cold at best: "[T]hey are, either entirely overlooked or ridiculed for an extravagance, which after all does not even raise them to a level with hundreds around them" (92). Her comment suggests that West Indian returnees were regarded with suspicion within London society; despite (or due to) their newly accumulated wealth, they remained outsiders. British metropolitan representations of absentee planters reveal that domestic culture did, indeed, perceive them as fundamentally different from their native countrymen. Although Richard Cumberland's wildly successful play *The West Indian* (1771) stages a sympathetic portrait of Belcour—the play's West Indian protagonist—it also reinforces the sense that West Indian colonists were distinctly foreign. Belcour's ignorance of British customs quickly situates him as the victim of scheming Londoners, his foreign mannerisms single him out as an object of ridicule, and his incongruity is staged for comic effect. The titular West Indian admits that he must learn how to be British, as he

[32] When Schaw visited Antigua and St. Christopher in 1774, the islands' plantations were more often than not in the hands of overseers. Absentees represented 80 percent of Antigua's and 50 percent of St. Christopher's planter population (Andrew O'Shaughnessy 5).

explains to his love interest: "New to your country, ignorant of your manners, habits, and desires, I put myself into your hands for instruction; make me only such as you can like yourself" (50). That Belcour must be taught how to be British marks the protagonist as foreign, and demonstrates metropolitan society's suspicion of West Indian colonists.

Belcour's attribution of his integral difference to the shaping effects of the West Indian climate ("O my curst tropical constitution! Wou'd to Heaven I had been dropt upon the snow of Lapland, and never felt the blessed influence of the sun, so I had never burnt with these inflammatory passions!" [60]), reveals the extent to which metropolitan Britons 'othered' West Indian colonists. Anthropological studies like Lord Kames' *Sketches of the History of Man* and Adam Ferguson's *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* posited a link between hot climates and inflamed or unruly passions, fueling suspicions that the effects of climate would contribute to the demise of the cultural and moral constitution of West Indian colonists.[33] Edward Long's description of Jamaica's British planters in his 1774 travelogue, *The History of Jamaica*, takes the environmental argument to the extreme. According to Long:

> The native white men . . . are in general tall and well-shaped . . . their cheeks are remarkably high-boned, and the sockets of their eye deeper than is commonly observed among the natives of England; by this conformation, they are guarded from those ill effects which an almost continual strong glare of sun-shine might otherwise produce . . . The effect of climate is not only remarkable in the structure of their eyes, but likewise in the extraordinary freedom and suppleness of their joints, which enable them to move with ease . . . Although descended

[33] See Kames, *Sketches of the History of Man*, 1: 205-211 and Ferguson, *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*, 171-177.

> from British ancestors, they are stamped with these characteristic deviations. Climate, perhaps, has had some share in producing the variety of features which we behold among the different societies of mankind, scattered over the globe. (261-262)

He describes the Jamaican colonists as if they were a different race; his ethnological interest in their physical "deviations" and his reference to the influence of climate on the human body suggests that they are evolving into a unique racial group.

While Long limits the influence of climate to the purely physical, others worried that the tropics effected a moral change in its inhabitants. Almost seven decades prior to Long, Hans Sloane toured the West Indies and reported his findings in his comprehensive travelogue, *A Voyage to the Islands Madera, Barbados, Nieves, S. Christophers and Jamaica* (volume I was published in 1707, volume II was published in 1725). Sloane eschews environmental theories, but notes that he finds West Indian colonists significantly "more debauch'd than in *England*" (xi, original italics). In his extensive list of medical conditions unique to the West Indies, he frequently identifies excessive living (heavy drinking, sexual promiscuity, and hard partying) as the cause of the diseases he encounters—regardless of gender. Salacious reports like Sloane's did not help the integration of West Indian returnees into British society. Andrew O'Shaughnessy notes that the well-oiled absentee planters that poured into Britain were subject to "moral censure" (14) for their luxurious lifestyles and, increasingly, for the slave economy that underwrote their wealth. In *The History of George Ellison* (1761), Sarah Scott contrasts the ethical behavior of the recently emigrated eponymous hero

with that of his morally bankrupt Creole wife.[34] Whereas the selfless Ellison acknowledges the humanity of his slaves and treats them accordingly, his Creole wife is happy to perpetuate their inhumane treatment. Scott's comparison between the British born and educated Ellison and his West Indian wife suggests the disintegration of British values that could occur within the exotic environment. Wilson observes that eighteenth-century stereotypes of plantation society commonly associated the West Indies with moral inversion: "The fabulously wealthy Caribbean planter that emerged in fact and fiction came to represent the West Indian uncouthness, backwardness and degeneracy that inverted the acclaimed standards of English civility and culture" (*The Island Race* 130). Hume's theory that distance impedes sympathetic identification is demonstrated in the perception and construction of difference between mainland Britons and their West Indian colonists. Britons, it seems, conflated distance and difference; separation from the mother country compromised the national integrity of the colonial subject.

Schaw's description of her intimate interactions with the Scottish inhabitants of the Leeward Islands differs considerably from the ethnographical descriptions of West Indian populations in the travelogues of Long and Sloane. Rather than categorize the colonists according to scientific or Enlightenment systems of classification, she describes them on an individual level. Her portrayal of colonists as friends and compatriots rather than as objects of scientific curiosity establishes connections between metropolitan and colonial Britons; she does not find foreigners when she arrives in the West Indies, but "a whole company of Scotch people, our language, our

[34] 'Creole' is here being used to designate Britons who were born and raised in the West Indies.

manners, our circle of friends and connections, all the same" (81). Despite the exoticism of the environment—sugarcane instead of wheat fields, turtle instead of chicken soup, palmettos instead of birches—the people are "the same" and provide an immediate sense of home for Schaw and her companions. "We were intimates in a moment" (82) she declares after only a few hours on shore. This instant connection that she purports to experience in the company of Scottish transplants repudiates the Belcour-like stereotype of West Indian colonists as inherently foreign—possessing different manners, customs, and even different physical features. Her comfort within her new environment and among her new hosts indicates the national integrity of West Indian colonists; she experiences her arrival into the West Indies as a homecoming because she is re-entering a British—not a foreign—society.

As part of her project to designate the Scottish colonists with whom she interacts as meriting emotional endowment, Schaw is careful to depict their socio-economic activity as estimable. Her representation of their endeavors constructs the colonists as deserving of sympathetic recognition not simply because of her emotional ties with them, but because they have embraced and enacted their duties as responsible and loyal British citizens. Upon first viewing the Antiguan landscape, Schaw is struck by its similarity to rather than its difference from Scotland. After detailing the island's natural features, she ruefully concludes: "Will you smile, if after this description, I add that its principle beauty to me is the resemblance it has to Scotland, yes, to Scotland" (74). Her unlikely comparison of the lush tropical hills to the naked heaths of Scotland performs the opposite function of the alienation effect that she first applied to the Highlanders: rather than make the familiar strange, here Schaw attempts to make the strange

familiar. The tropical landscape has been thoroughly domesticated: where the hills are not covered by neat rows of sugarcane they serve as pastureland for cattle, the shorelines have been tamed into shaded pathways designed for leisurely walks, and both the outcroppings high above the ocean and the valleys beneath serve as platforms for sumptuous plantation houses and army barracks (74-75). According to Schaw's description, the colonists have transformed unruly nature into an orderly and productive landscape; Antigua appears to have been remodeled into an exotic version of Britain. Her brief acknowledgement of the presence of British soldiers in the tropical terrain reinforces the overall sense of order she perceives in the landscape. "We saw a number of officers walking among the Orange-trees and myrtles," she describes, "and I own I thought the prospect mended by their appearance" (75). The presence of the soldiers mitigates the exoticism of the landscape by reassuring Schaw that British order is forcefully present in Antigua.

As she shifts from the broad prospect of the Antiguan landscape seen aboard the ship to a more intimate view of the individual plantations seen as she travels through the Leeward Islands, it becomes apparent that the domestication she observes in the highly cultivated landscape redounds upon its Scottish proprietors as both approbation and endorsement. She carefully smoothes over the 'rough edges' of colonial society (namely: slavery, insurrections, rampant disease, and worrisome soil erosion) in order to display Scottish planters in the best possible light. Schaw effectively enacts the process of accommodation by proxy that Smith describes as necessary to the sympathetic exchange; in order to be considered as objects of sympathetic consideration, the colonists must "accommodate and assimilate" their "sentiments,

principles, and feelings" (Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 264) to those from whom they seek sympathy. She sculpts an identity for the colonists that appeals to her metropolitan audience's sense of propriety, facilitating a transatlantic exchange of sympathy that ultimately strengthens both the bonds of empire and the Anglo-Scottish union. Her letters from Antigua and St. Christopher contain fulsome descriptions of the various plantations owned primarily by Scots. The picture of the islands that emerges from her letters is of a paradisiacal place where nature's bounty is matched by its beauty. Describing the view from *The Eleanora*—a sugar plantation owned by a Scottish doctor—Schaw decides that "it is almost impossible to conceive of so much beauty and riches under the eye in one moment" (90). The sight of the shipping industry in the bay, the "rich plantations" (90) flourishing on the land, the orderly rows of sugarcanes, and the loaded fruit trees that line the gardens and fill the air with fragrance impress upon Schaw the idea of Antigua's abundance. "I am resolved," she concludes, "to enter into no particulars . . . till I recover my senses sufficiently to do it coolly; for at present, the beauty, the Novelty, the ten thousand charms that this scene presents to me, confuse my ideas" (91). Her enthusiasm for Antigua's "riches" betrays the imperialist desire that underlies her eager endorsement of colonialism. Schaw's statement that the profusion of goods is physically overwhelming suggests the island's infinite potential to her audience perhaps more effectively that reporting "particulars." However, she is careful to clarify that both Antigua and St. Christopher have been actively *shaped* into a paradise by their Scottish proprietors; nature may provide the raw materials in abundance, but it is Scottish industry and taste that has developed the tropical landscape into a colonial utopia. After itemizing the "delightful confusion" (126) of fruit

trees, cotton plants, and coffee shrubs that line the banks of a river in St. Christopher, she is quick to note that the native plants are "generally raised in cultivated plantations, for tho' they are all indigenous, they are much the better of culture" (127). Her ensuing discussion details the agricultural practices of planters, which she describes as enriching the already productive soil in order to increase the yield of crops (127). In both instances, British industry and skill are shown to improve nature. Similarly, her approbation of an acquaintance's carefully arranged gardens indicates that the Antiguan landscape is infinitely enhanced—or even corrected—through the application of British aesthetics. "His plantation," she observes, "which is laid out in the greatest taste, has a mixture of the Indian and European. If your eye is hurt by the stiff uniformity of the tall Palmetto, it is instantly relieved by the waving branches of he spreading Tammerand, or the Sand-box tree" (101). Schaw attributes the beauty and bounty of the Leeward Islands to the effective management of its British (and specifically Scottish) colonists. The level of cultivation they have achieved is summarized in her observation that St. Christopher as a whole resembles an extensive garden, bringing to mind the highly structured British landscapes popular in the seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries: "I was surprised at the complete cultivation I met every where. The whole Island is a garden divided into different parterres" (130). Her portrayal of the responsible stewardship practiced by the Scottish colonists who dominated West Indian society accommodates their character to British standards and reinforces the value of Scotland within the British Empire. In their literal and figurative enrichment of the British Empire, or in the ownership that they exercise over the land, they are shown to be invested in the success of the Empire. That Scots have introduced order to the

landscape and have engineered its increase becomes particularly significant when later contrasted with the conduct of the American colonists in North Carolina.

The manifestation of British aesthetics and the evidence of British industry in Antigua and St. Christopher articulate an important message regarding its inhabitants: that they are busy changing their environment signifies that their environment has not changed them. The Scottish population in the West Indies has preserved their Britishness; the "longing they have to return to Britain" (92) serves as evidence of the primal connection they retain to their mother country. Schaw's appraisal of the colonists' conduct largely reinforces this sense of continuity between metropolitan and colonial Britons. Her description of their morals and manners implicitly counters negative West Indian stereotypes and downplays the transformative effects of climate. The qualities that she ascribes to the West Indian men of generosity, gallantry, and honesty (111-112) repudiate their caricatured traits of "uncouthness, backwardness, and degeneracy" (Wilson, *The Island Race*, 130). Her particularly detailed account of Colonel Martin's benevolent leadership indicates the presence and preservation of British identity and values within the very different plantation culture of the West Indies. As both a long-time commander of the Antiguan militia and as a plantation owner, Martin is a leader in both private and public areas of colonial life. As an officer he is loyal to his nation and committed to the maintenance of British order; despite his advanced years, "he says with his usual spirits, if his country need his service, he is ready again to resume his arms" (109). As a plantation owner he exercises a form of benevolent paternalism that Schaw believes ensures the loyalty and affection of his slaves. As she explains: "[His Estates] are cultivated to the height by a large troop of

healthy Negroes, who cheerfully perform the labour imposed on them by a kind and beneficent Master, not a harsh and unreasonable Tyrant. Well fed, well supported, they appear the subjects of a good prince, not the slaves of a planter" (104). She goes on to describe his practice of emancipating the slaves who work within his home due to his belief that free men and women produce better work than the enslaved. "[T]he alacrity with which they serve him," she observes, "and the love that they bear him, shew he is not wrong" (105). Her fiercely whitewashed account of Martin's plantation counteracts abolitionist narratives of cruel West Indian plantation owners and their wretched slaves. Anti-slavery literature like Thomas Bicknell and Thomas Day's poem *The Dying Negro* (1772) paint colonial slave owners as "pallid tyrants" with "a soul unus'd to pity or to feel" (15) and other West Indian travel narratives like John Singleton's *A Description of the West-Indies* regard planters as "revengeful lord[s]" (18) and dwell on the "painful life" of slaves, "where all their piteous hours / Drag heavily along in constant toil, / In stripes, in tears, in hunger, or in chains" (46). Schaw's heavily sentimentalized portrait of Martin's plantation—healthy slaves joyfully serving a paternalistic master—can be interpreted as a direct response to abolitionist literature that emphasized the moral impoverishment of slave owners. Her comparison of Martin's leadership style to "a kind and beneficent Master" and "a good prince" rather than to a "harsh and unreasonable Tyrant" suggests a model of authority that is ideally British in character.

However, Schaw's promise to "write without prejudice" (111) obliges her to address the well-known and all too obvious practice of miscegenation within the colonies. "I would have gladly drawn a veil over this part of their character," she admits,

"which in every thing else is most estimable" (113). Nevertheless, her prejudice is clearly demonstrated in her representation of the sexual dynamics between planters and their female slaves; although she does not necessarily exonerate the white male participants, she does attempt to shift blame from the white to the black population. She explains that "[t]he young black wenches lay themselves out for white lovers, in which they are but too successful" (112). Schaw's representation of sexually aggressive slaves and acquiescent white men subverts the power structure between owners and their slaves, positioning white male colonists as the victims of female slaves. Accordingly, she proceeds to censure the female slaves rather than their 'victimized' owners, accusing them of willfully ignoring their "natural mates," bearing children "[un]fit for the field," or inadvertently taking their own lives through abortion attempts (112-113). That Schaw spends only one sentence on the "indulgence" (112) of white men and the remainder of the paragraph on the sexual deviance and moral subversion of their female slaves clearly suggests that it is the male participants who are being seduced. Her representation of the seduction of white male colonists by their female slaves inverts the sentimental narrative of the ruined woman: whereas women are the objects of aggressive seductions in novels like Samuel Richardson's *Clarissa* and *Pamela*, in Schaw's narrative it is the men who occupy this position. It follows that she may be vaguely indicating that if anyone deserves sympathy in this scenario, it should fall on the side of the 'victimized' planters.

In order to balance out the moral "failings" (112) of white male colonists, Schaw is careful to represent their white female partners as morally inviolable. She rehabilitates the image of West Indian female colonists who were frequently portrayed

as morally suspect due to their susceptibility towards the effects of heat and luxury. Ferguson's theory that heat unleashed "burning ardours, and the torturing jealousies of the seraglio and haram" (171) manifested itself in the figure of the selfish, unbridled Creole woman that remained in currency all the way up until Charlotte Brontë's creation of Bertha Mason—Rochester's insane and insatiable Creole wife in *Jane Eyre*.[35] Schaw's description of the community of Scottish women she encounters as veritable nuns casts doubt on the stereotype of the intemperate West Indian woman. She specifically clarifies that the sun does *not* cause women to let loose in the West Indies, but appears to refine their sense of propriety. "[T]he women," she describes, "are modest, genteel, reserved and temperate . . . The truth is, I can observe no indulgence they allow themselves in" (113). Her depiction of Lady Isabella Hamilton as her plantation's resident Virgin Mary reinforces the purity of the West Indian female colonist. "There were several of the boilers condemned to the lash," she explains, "and seeing her face is pardon. Their gratitude on this occasion was the only instance of sensibility that I have observed in them" (129). This bizarre, quasi-religious ceremony in which Lady Hamilton acts the part of the saint suggests the role West Indian women play as their colonies' active moral conscience. Schaw's representation of Scottish women as the moral pillars of West Indian society—paragons of virtue who ensure

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[35] It is telling that Mary Wollstonecraft uses the stereotype of the depraved colonial woman to exemplify the morally enervating effects of the eighteenth-century definition of women as creatures of sensibility: "Where is the dignity, the infallibility of sensibility, in the fair ladies, whom, if the voice of rumour is to be credited, the captive negroes curse in all the agony of bodily pain, for the unheard of tortures they invent? It is probable some of them, after a flagellation, compose their ruffled spirits and exercise their tender feelings by the perusal of the last new novel" (*The Rights of Man* 105). That Wollstonecraft attributes her information to the "voice of rumour" suggests the extensive circulation of this stereotype within eighteenth-century British society.

rather than compromise colonial morality—demonstrates their particular fitness for colonial endeavors. Their ability to maintain and enforce British values within an unfamiliar environment recommends them to a metropolitan audience accustomed to images of the Creole woman abandoned to her passions.

In order to sanitize the image of West Indian society and harmonize their character with that of their fellow citizens across the Atlantic, Schaw recognizes that she needs to address the issue of slavery beyond her brief acknowledgment of miscegenation. The slave economy that underwrote West Indian wealth had become an increasing source of division and differentiation between Britain and its Atlantic colonies. Schaw's sentimentalized depictions of West Indian society carefully ignore or offset the fact that the beautifully cultivated islands she describes are the product of slave labor. She attempts to neutralize and dismiss the violent implications of slave labor through her representations of benevolent masters and compassionate mistresses, but the issue of their direct engagement in and perpetuation of the slave trade looms large over her letters. Schaw left Scotland one year after the historic Somerset Case, in which Lord Mansfield ruled that slaves could not be forcibly taken from British soil to be sold abroad. Considering that she held Lord Mansfield as a close acquaintance (89), Schaw no doubt would have been very familiar with his celebrated ruling and with the furor of abolitionist activity spurred by his decision. The anti-slavery material that emerged from this period frequently relies on the language of sentiment to incite sympathy for slaves and direct their audience towards right action. In his study of early Scottish abolitionist poetry, Corey E. Andrews finds that "much Scottish poetry from the eighteenth century sought to redress the sufferings of slaves by

appealing to core emotions in its audience, producing as a result a body of political writing that powerfully imagined the painful experience of slavery" (2). Bicknell and Day's aforementioned abolitionist poem *The Dying Negro* takes as their subject a slave driven to suicide after being forcibly separated from his beloved and his home and driven into a life of brutal labor. The authors assert in the preface that they "delineate the feelings of the [servant]" (Advertisement) in order to provoke moral outrage in their audience. James Grainger's poem *The Sugar-Cane* similarly emphasizes the emotional suffering of slaves in order to advocate for their amelioration. "[P]lanter, let humanity prevail," he urges, "Perhaps he [thy slave] wails for his wife, his children, left / To struggle with adversity" (128). Grainger compels the planters he addresses to acknowledge the humanity of their slaves both by portraying their capacity to feel and by asking the planters to imagine their suffering. This focus on slaves' feelings can be understood as deploying what Brycchan Carey calls the "sentimental argument" that "all human beings experience pain and misery in the same way" therefore "since all people felt the same way they should all be treated in the same way" (38).

By asking its readers to sympathize with the slaves, abolitionist literature concomitantly invites them to deplore the masters who orchestrated the slaves' suffering. Bicknell and Day preface their antislavery poem by stating: "They who are not more inclined to sympathize with the *master*, than the *servant*, upon the occasion,—will perhaps not be displeased at an attempt to delineate the feelings of the latter" (Advertisement, original italics). Sympathy is directed away from unfeeling West Indian masters towards the victims of their cruelty. To facilitate the movement of sympathy between her British audience and the slave owners condemned within abolitionist

literature, Schaw interrupts the sympathetic gaze cast upon suffering slaves by denying the black population the very thing given to them by abolitionist writers: feeling. In both Smith's and Hume's theories of sympathy, the presence of feeling is requisite for a sympathetic exchange to occur. In Hume's version of the sympathetic exchange, we are infected by the feelings of those with whom we interact; in Smith's adaptation, the agent responds to the subject's outwardly expressed or presumed feelings. That Schaw understands the necessity of mutually expressed feeling for the operation of sympathy is seen in her interaction with the Highland emigrants; their expression of feeling triggers Schaw's recognition of their common humanity and instigates her sympathetic response. Indeed, her first impression of West Indian slaves mirrors her impression of the Highland emigrants. Like the emigrants, she describes the slaves she encounters as animal-like. "I found what I took for monkeys," she says, "were negro children, naked as they were born" (77). However, Schaw refuses to humanize the West Indian slaves through sympathy as she did with the Highland emigrants; what restrains her is very likely her political and economic investment in the people who rely upon the West Indian slave economy. As with her explanation of miscegenation, she places the blame for her own failure of feeling squarely on the slaves' shoulders. Confronted with a visual reminder of the violence that underwrites slave economies upon noticing the whip marks on the backs of laboring slaves, she hurriedly prevents her readers from transitioning into empathy by asserting the slaves' fundamental absence of feeling:

> When one comes to be better acquainted with the nature of the Negroes, the horror of it must wear off. It is the suffering human mind that constitutes the greatest misery of punishment, but with them it is merely corporeal. As to the

> brutes it inflicts no wound on their mind, whose Natures seem made to bear it, and whose sufferings are not attended with shame or pain beyond the present moment. (127)

It is here that the dark potential of the eighteenth-century understanding and practice of sympathy is revealed with horrifying clarity. Schaw distinguishes between emotional and physical pain, asserting that slaves are immune to the deeper and more lasting repercussions of emotional pain while insinuating that their experience of physical pain is mitigated through their unique biological composition (note the modifiers: "*merely* corporeal" and "*present* moment," as well as her observation that their "Natures seem made to bear it"). Schaw explains that the slaves' lack of feeling—specifically as it related to the emotions—renders sympathy theoretically impossible and justifies their exclusion from the community of sensible individuals. She justifies both her own position and that of the West Indian planters by asserting that, contra the assumption of abolitionist narratives, slaves do not feel suffering and are therefore closer to beasts of burden than to fully evolved humans. Her justification of slavery appropriates the sentimental abolitionist argument and turns it on its head: since slaves *do not* feel the same way they *should not* be treated the same way. Schaw's profoundly racist representation of slaves contains strong hints of the polygenist arguments advocated by Edward Long and favored by both Hume and Kames, all of whom accounted for the distinctions between European and African populations by suggesting that they were composed of different species.[36] Whether or not Schaw espouses a polygenist point of view, she certainly posits that the emotional capacities of white and black populations

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[36] See Hume's footnotes to "Of National Characters" (note 120), 360; Lord Kames, *Sketches of the History of Man*, 1: 12-28; Edward Long, *The History of Jamaica*, 356-380.

are fundamentally different, and it is this difference that enables her to situate slaves outside of and Scottish slave owners within systems of sympathetic exchange. "Janet Schaw's *Journal of a Voyage to the West Indies*," Festa aptly summarizes, "betrays the way sentimental tropes may curtail the ostensibly spontaneous movement of sympathetic affect . . . Sentimental tropes, when not used as directed, block emotions as well as channel it" (154).

By blocking sympathetic traffic between her British audience and West Indian slaves, Schaw concomitantly removes the potential emotional blockages between metropolitan Britons and West Indian colonists. Her sentimental treatment of islands' Scottish communities distinguishes them as the proper objects of feeling, effectively channeling her reader's sympathy towards the masters rather than their slaves. She draws on sentimental tropes to engage her audience's emotions: relating the tragic circumstances surrounding the death of Dr. Dunbar's recently-deceased wife, who she imagines "expiring in his arms" as he "in vain carried her from place to place" (91) to protect her from the ravaging hurricane; tracing the benevolent character of the elderly Colonel Martin, at whose parting her "heart felt a pang like that which it sustained when I lost the best of fathers" (106); describing the joy with which she reunites with Lady Isabella Hamilton and the heartbreak with which they part (124, 132); and mourning the slow decease of the young Miss Milliken and Miss Acres, both of whom suffer from consumption and latter of which she pitiably depicts as preparing for marriage and death simultaneously (124). "They are a people I like vastly," she concludes, "and were there nothing to make me wish otherwise, I would desire to live for ever with them" (130). Through her finely drawn sentimental portraits of West Indian colonists, Schaw

invites her metropolitan readers to sympathize with these distant Britons; her readers enter into the relationships she cultivates, vicariously forming connections with the individuals she describes. Her intimacy with West Indian colonists provides her audience with a concrete structure for imagining relations with this seemingly foreign society. Schaw's use of sentiment to consolidate imperial relations demonstrates Festa's assertion of the symbiotic relationship that existed between sentimental literature and the project of empire. "In an era in which imperial reach increasingly outstripped imaginative grasp," she contends, "sentimental fiction created the tropes that enabled readers to reel the world home in their minds. By designating certain kinds of figures as worthy of emotional expenditure and structuring the circulation of affect between subjects and objects of feeling, the sentimental mode allowed readers to identify with and feel for the plight of other people" (2). Although Schaw does provide an abstract of West Indian society near the conclusion of her stay in Antigua, she clarifies that she does so to satisfy the demands of her correspondent (who is obviously well-versed in the conventions of the travelogue) and she explicitly resists the biological examination of the colonists favored by travel writers such as Long. She prefaces her brief summary by admitting that her partiality for certain individuals within Antigua may incite the charge of prejudice (111). Although she assures her audience of her objectivity, her affectionate reference to individuals within West Indian society prior to launching into her generalized description counteracts the objectification that abstraction invites. Indeed, Schaw's overall representation of West Indian society removes the colonists from their abstract form and carefully develops them into fully realized citizens with whom her audience could imagine forming constructive relationships.

## "This land of nominal freedom and real slavery": The American Revolution and the Labor of Unfeeling

Schaw's sympathetic depiction of the West Indies provides two important precursors to her American narrative: it both establishes her as a sentimental rather than a splenetic traveler—intuitive to her surroundings and oriented towards sympathy—and it provides her British audience with a model society that demonstrates the benefits that accrue within a well-managed and loyal colony. It follows that her negative reaction to the American colonies cannot be attributed to 'spleen' nor can it be unproblematically used to illustrate the burdens or drawbacks of empire. The structural and rhetorical relation between the West Indian and American sections of Schaw's travelogue necessitate their equal consideration; the political motivations undergirding her insistently edenic portrait of the West Indies are clarified when placed within the context of the American Revolution, and the process by which she demonizes or, more appropriately, dehumanizes the American colonists is illuminated by an examination of her careful manipulation of sympathy within her West Indian account. The two sections collectively demonstrate how sympathy could be simultaneously deployed as an exclusionary and inclusionary force within eighteenth-century culture, equally capable of metaphorically contouring bodies to fit or not fit within the national mold.

Alerted to the advantages to be gained from empire after her stay in the West Indies, Schaw experiences the American Revolution as a direct threat to her personal investments and to national coherence. Thrust into a revolutionary context that increasingly threatens the stability of Britain's Atlantic Empire, she believes that Britain must take substantive action to protect its valuable assets and preserve its colonies.

During Schaw's residence in North Carolina, Governor Josiah Martin—the son of Colonel Martin—was urging the British government to send sufficient supplies and troops to quell the burgeoning rebellion. While in March 1775 he was confident that a shipment of arms and ammunition would impede the progress of rebellion (Duane Meyer 138), by October of the same year he increased his request to include two battalions of troops (Graham 158). The intensification of Governor Martin's demands indicates the quickly deteriorating situation in North Carolina over the period of Schaw's stay (she arrived in February 1775 and left in September or October 1775). The British government's failure to meet his requests is repeatedly alluded to throughout Schaw's letters. Witnessing Governor Martin's escape in the spring, the increasing persecution of loyalists under the newly-inaugurated Committee of Safety, and the organization of locals into rebel militias throughout the summer, she shares the Governor's conviction that Britain must act quickly and fiercely. While her younger brother is furtively sent to Cape Fear, Boston, and Britain carrying messages from the Governor—never to return to his promised post in St. Christopher—Schaw throws herself into the work of changing British perceptions through her letters in order to hasten the military defense of the colonies. Her representation of the American colonists is calculated to interrupt sentimental identification between Britons and Americans (what Festa refers to as the "labor of unfeeling" [176]) and to redirect her readers' feelings towards more deserving objects—namely, the colony's beleaguered Scottish loyalists (what Carey refers to as "sentimental diversion" [41]).[37] Ramsay's strict classification of "Foreigners" as

[37] Festa defines the "labor of unfeeling" as "the work necessary to justify the failure of sympathy" (176); Carey explains that what he refers to as "sentimental diversion"

"enemies" of England and "Englishmen" as "friends" (17) of the nation is instructive here. Schaw draws on and applies his contention that Americans must be sufficiently 'othered' in order to be understood and treated as legitimate enemies by the British nation. She transmutes Americans into objects of terror—inherently foreign and hostile—by emphasizing their rejection of British practices and values and by expressing her own sense of alienation within the culture. Schaw concomitantly portrays the loyalist faction as the appropriate objects of sympathy; made to suffer for their national integrity, they embody the eighteenth-century sentimental trope of 'virtue in distress.'

## "My heart dies within me": Fear and Loathing in the American Wilderness

Schaw could not have left the idyllic shades of the West Indies for a more different place than North Carolina. Settlement of the colony had only begun in earnest approximately fifty years prior to Schaw's arrival (Bradford J. Wood 18), and her descriptions of the primitive conditions that exist in North Carolina indicate that the colony was still in its early stages of development. According to a certain Scotus Americanus in 1773: "This colony [North Carolina] is but in a manner in its infancy, and newly settled in respect to its neighbouring ones" (16). Fifty years after settlers began streaming into the Cape Fear region, the majority of British commentators writing on the American colonies still profess to know very little about this relatively new colony. Writing in 1779, Alexander Hewat laments the paucity of information regarding the Carolinas: "The southern provinces in particular have been hitherto neglected,

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occurs when "the sufferings of one person or group of people are invoked in order to divert attention away from the sufferings of another" (41).

insomuch that no writer has favoured the world with any tolerable account of them" (iii). Indeed, Schaw notices that despite her extensive reading, she "meet[s] every moment with something I never read or heard of" (151). The few publications that did consider North Carolina tend to emphasize the opportunities available in the young colony. Americanus—purportedly an emigrant from Islay in Scotland—describes North Carolina as a land of "liberty and plenty" (9) where "each may sit safe, and at ease, under his own fig tree" (32). Targeting a specifically Highland audience, he assures prospective emigrants that "Highlanders are kindly received, and sumptuously entertained" (30) and that "they may live as well and happy as lairds at home" (26). North Carolina is represented as an improved version of Britain: the people are freer, the soil is richer, the inhabitants are kinder, and the food more plentiful. His idealized depiction of the colony aligns with a well-established literary tradition that imagined America as a utopian space, a representation dating back to fifteenth- and sixteenth-century travel accounts that depicted America as the new Eden for obvious political reasons.[38] That this perception was well and alive in eighteenth-century Britain is evident in the fictional portrayals of America in Arthur Young's *The Adventures of Emmera, or the Fair American* (1767) and in Frances Brooke's *The History of Emily Montagu* (1769). Both epistolary novels—one set on the shores of Lake Ontario in America and the other in Canada—represent North America as a pastoral paradise untouched by the corruptions of urbanization and luxury.

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[38] See, for example, Christopher Columbus' *The Letter of Columbus to Luis de Santángel, Announcing his Discovery* (1493) and Thomas Harriot's *A Briefe and True Report of the New Found Land of Virginia* (1590).

Americanus' text is a typical example of early boosterism: eager to attract British colonists, he represents North Carolina as a veritable utopia that will prosper desperate Highlanders. Schaw's goal of attracting the British military to North Carolina's shores requires an opposite approach: she represents the colony as a place that *requires* rather than *extends* help—as a dystopian rather than utopian space.[39] Needless to say, she does not encounter an "abundantly inviting" (Americanus 31) and "safe" (32) place upon arriving in February 1775. Her initial description of North Carolina's landscape forms a marked contrast to her first impression of the West Indies; her nod to the political unrest suffusing America suggests the motivation underlying her bleak description. "At last America is in my view," she heavily states:

> A dreary Waste of white barren sand, and melancholy, nodding pines. In the course of many miles, no cheerful cottage has blest my eyes. All seems dreary, savage and desert; and was it for this that such sums of money, such streams of British blood have been lavished away? Oh, thou dear land, how dearly has thou purchased this habitation for bears and wolves. Dearly has it been purchased, and at a price much dearer still will it be kept. My heart dies within me, while I view it. (141)

Gone is the cultivated beauty of the West Indies; here Schaw perceives no resemblance to Scotland and feels no connection to home. The sight of Fort Johnston augments rather than alleviates her anxiety. Whereas the solid army barracks and red-coated officers in

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[39] That Schaw aligns America with the fallen world rather than with the Biblical Eden is obvious from a brief aside in which she relates an apocryphal story of Adam's struggles to cultivate the wild earth after being expelled from Eden. The angel Gabriel teaches Adam about the wonders of labor, and he eventually carves out a "new Eden" (162) from fallen nature. Schaw's parable clearly aligns America with fallen nature rather than with Eden, suggesting that America must be redeemed by British labor.

Antigua offer the appearance of stability, the meager facade of the military quarters on North Carolina's coast augur disorder. "In figure and size this fort resembles a Leith timber-bush," she mocks, "but does not appear quite so tremendous, tho' I see guns peeping thro' the sticks. If these are our fortresses and castles, no wonder the Natives rebel; for I will be bound to take this fort with a regim$^{t}$ of black-guard Edinburgh boys without any artillery, but their own pop-guns" (141). The fragile appearance of the Fort suggests the equally fragile state of British order in the American colonies. The wild landscape—unalloyed by signs of order or life—imbues Schaw with a real sense of fear that she communicates to her audience. While her description of Antigua prepares her audience to be emotionally receptive to the people who have created such beautiful surroundings, her first impression of North Carolina grooms her audience to be wary of the people who inhabit such a hostile environment.

Schaw's initial characterization of the American landscape as a wasteland is quickly reversed upon a closer examination of North Carolina's wilderness. Backtracking on her early description of the landscape as "barren," she increasingly emphasizes the potential capital to be gained from the colony's abundant natural resources. Schaw feeds her culture's appetite for imperialist accumulation through her descriptions of plenty: "[t]he cotton is in plenty growing every where for the wick"; "[t]he berries hang to the hand, and seem to beg you to gather them" (203); "[w]herever you see the peach trees, you find hard by a group of plumbs so fit for stocks, that nature seems to have set them there on purpose" (163); "noble trees that might adorn the palaces of kings are left to the stroke of thunder"; "[t]he banks [are] so constituted by nature that they seem formed for harbours" (159). "I do assure you," she stresses, "that

every gift of nature is here. Not Italia, Spain, or Portugal produce an Article that might not be had in higher perfection" (174-175). This emphasis on the colony's resources directly contests the idea popularized by Tucker and developed by Smith that it was in Britain's best interest to emancipate the Americans as the cost of maintaining the colonies exceeded their worth. Schaw makes it abundantly clear that the issue is not with the colonies' scarcity of resources, but with the colonists themselves; the apparent barrenness of the land is a reflection of the Americans' character rather than of the land itself. "[T]ho' I may say of this place what I formerly did of the West India Islands," she explains, "that nature holds out to them every thing that can contribute to conveniency, or tempt to luxury, yet the inhabitants resist both, and if they can raise as much corn and pork, as to subsist them in the most slovenly manner, they ask no more" (153). Unlike West Indian colonists, Americans are not interested in enriching Britain through the cultivation of its colonies; they are invested in themselves rather than in the Empire. The "dreary, savage" (141) scenery that Schaw first encounters demonstrates the colonists' negligence rather than land's deficiency. Indeed, according to her imaginative descriptions, personified nature appears to be pleading for cultivation: berries "beg" to be gathered (203); nature appears to have formed plums "fit for stocks" (163); pine trees "seem to lament that they exist for no purpose" (159); banks "seem formed for harbours," and there are various other commodities "fit for hedges" that "straggle wild thro' the fields or woods" (163). The products of empire lie fallow in the land, waiting for the active hand of cultivation. "[O]ne is really grieved," she asserts in frustration, "to see so many rare advantages bestowed on a people every way so unworthy of them" (174). Schaw's 'grief' in this passage is directed towards the environment and the

Empire; both are ultimately victims of the colonists' negligence. Accordingly, the colonists' refusal to appropriately care for their nation's imperial investments designates them as unworthy—of nature's bounty, of prosperity, and of sympathy.[40] Schaw carefully sows seeds of discontent within her metropolitan readers towards their American population by implying that the Americans' disregard for the land directly translates into a disregard for their fellow Britons: their subsistence living is a rejection of the mutually beneficial, reciprocal relations of empire.

Through her depiction of their unaltered environment, Schaw seriously questions the imputed British character of the colonists. The West Indian scenario is here reversed: that they have not changed their environment suggests that their environment has fundamentally changed them. She provides confirmation of the colonists' evolution through her detailed sketch of the 'typical' American male. "Their appearance," she begins, "is in every respect the reverse of that which gives the idea of strength and vigor . . . They are tall and lean, with short waists and long limbs, sallow complexions and languid eyes, when not inflamed by spirits. Their feet are flat, their joints loose and their walk uneven" (153). Schaw applies ethnological description to American colonists in order to assert their difference; she alleges that Americans are physically differentiated from Britons to refute the idea of their common nature. Indeed, her representation of American colonists suggests their essentially animalistic character: their long limbs, flat feet, and loose joints bears a striking resemblance to contemporary descriptions of monkeys and to Swift's characterization of the monkey-

[40] Schaw would agree with Frances Brooke's description of colonists as "the bees, who roam abroad for that honey which enriches the paternal hive" (240). According to this centralized interpretation of colonialism, it is the duty of the colonists to render Britain's imperial investments "as flourishing and populous as possible" (Brooke 219).

like Yahoos.[41] Schaw's surprise at meeting an American with human-like characteristics—he "spoke with a voice that seemed humanized and entered into conversation very much like a rational being" (81)—reinforces her implicit assertion that Americans are closer to beasts than humans (it should come as no surprise that she later learns that this remarkably sensible American is actually a recently-emigrated Scot). By suggesting the brute nature of Americans, Schaw deploys the same distancing technique she applied to Highlanders and to West Indian slaves. Her insinuation that they have evolved into a distinct racial group aggressively defamiliarizes (by dehumanizing) the colonists in an effort to block the channels of emotional traffic that connected Britons with their Atlantic colonists.

That Britishness is effectively incompatible with Americanism and that it is under attack within the colonies is clarified through Schaw's profound sense of alienation and unease within North Carolina. During her trek to Schawfield (her brother's plantation), her party is hindered by the "impenetrable darkness" (147) and difficult terrain of their American surroundings. "[T]he idea of being benighted in the wilds of America," Schaw relates, "was not a pleasing circumstance to an European female . . . All I had heard of lions, bears, tigers and wolves now rushed on my memory, and I secretly wished I had been made a feast to the fishes rather than to those monsters of the woods" (146-147). The precarious position of the "European female" within the hostile terrain suggests the perilous status of Britishness within the American colonies.

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[41] Brett Mizelle specifically notes that eighteenth-century representations of monkeys emphasized their long limbs and flexibility. For more on the eighteenth-century representation of monkeys and the use of anthropoid apes in the period's debates regarding racial distinction, see Mizelle's article, " 'Man Cannot Behold It Without Contemplating Himself:' Monkeys, Apes and Human Identity in the Early American Republic."

Schaw's terror is in response to the perceived foreignness of the American landscape: it is impenetrable, wild, unfamiliar, and brimming with latent violence. The contested status of Britishness within America is reiterated in another episode where Schaw finds herself navigating the coarse streets of Wilmingtown:

> [T]here was no object on which my own ridicule fixed equal to myself and the figure I made, dressed out in all my British airs with a high head and a hoop and trudging thro' the unpaved streets in embroidered shoes by the light of a lanthorn carried by a black wench half naked. No chair, no carriage—good leather shoes need none. The ridicule was in the silk shoes in such a place. (154)

Dierdre Coleman interprets the absurdity of the silk shoes on the unpaved streets as signifying American hostility towards Britain: "The last comment attempts to contain the ridicule, but the very idea of Britishness—of British nationhood and of British race—is under threat" (181). Schaw portrays herself as both visibly out-of-place and distinctly vulnerable within the American environment; in each scenario, it is her European or British identity that renders her conspicuous. Whereas the West Indian landscape has been adapted for and is navigable by the British female, American topography resists British incursion; whereas the British female is protected within the West Indies (Schaw speaks of being constantly accompanied by a male chaperone), she is left exposed in the American colonies. That Schaw's "British airs" are an object of ridicule within America communicates that its colonists are not British but decisively American—or, to use Ramsay's categories, they are not "Englishmen" but "Foreigners" (17).

## Not All in the Family: "Unlawful Brethren" and "True Obedient Sons"

Through her representation of the American landscape and society as ineffably foreign—and, more significantly, as noticeably hostile—Schaw interrupts the circulation of sympathy encouraged by British pro-American activists who habituated their metropolitan audiences to the idea of Americans as their brethren and even as their moral superiors. She deliberately eschews the language of brotherhood and the idea of a shared identity, estranging her subjects from her readers by emphasizing the distinct lack of 'familial' resemblance between the two populations and by compelling her audience to imagine Americans as radically different from themselves. Her intervention in Britons' perceptions of their American colonists accomplishes the work of differentiation that Ramsay believed was necessary for the protection of the British Empire in America. However, it is not enough for Schaw to convert Americans into strangers—she must also transform them into legitimate enemies. Alienating British affections from American colonists may inhibit the exchange of sympathy, but it does not follow that her metropolitan readers will be actuated by the desire to instigate violent reprisals. Smith and Hume are quite clear that distance in and of itself does not give rise to enmity—it simply ensures indifference. "When I am a few miles from home," Hume observes, "whatever relates to it touches me more nearly than when I am two hundred leagues distant" (*A Treatise of Human Nature* 75). Smith posits that animosity implies care—we must have feelings for something in order to develop animosity against someone. We are animated by expressions of hatred against our communities (*The Theory of Moral Sentiments* 45) and adopt the antipathies of our friends (19). Schaw attempts to activate her readers' animosity against Americans by deploying both

of these principles. She clarifies the Americans' feelings of hatred towards the British and directs her audiences' sympathies away from the rebels and towards the victimized loyalists.

Responding to the preponderance of sentimental imagery in the literature of the American Revolution, Sarah Knott observes that there was "a tangible instrumentality in sensibility's wartime logic" (157). American sympathizers churned out sentimental images of suffering colonists throughout the 1770s in order to solicit support for conciliatory methods or for American emancipation. Thomas Paine imagines the plight of the desperate Bostonians as "prisoners without hope of redemption" who "but a few months ago were in ease and affluence, [and now] have no other alternative than to stay and starve, or turn out to beg. Endangered by the fire of their friends if they continue within the city, and plundered by the soldiery if they leave" (25). Knox speaks of "the unarmed, the ruined, and the disconsolate Americans" and their "half starved, desponding families" (30). Not to be outdone, Erskine envisions the British "imbru[ing] their hands in the blood of men, by the tyes of nature, esteem, or gratitude, dear to them as their own souls" (10). The theatrical and often graphic nature of these depictions is meant to appeal to the heart rather than to the head—to induce the instinctive desire in readers to remove the source of suffering in an effort to mitigate their own vicarious experience of trauma. Unmerited British aggression being the source of this suffering, these images frame the American experience as 'virtue in distress'—drawing on the popular eighteenth-century scenario of the innocent victim molested by a corrupt aggressor.

Schaw seeks to reverse her audience's emotional commitments and affective affinities by rewriting the narrative of the colonial crisis; her eyewitness account pits malevolent Americans against virtuous loyalists. Governor Martin's confidence that he could raise a regiment of 3,000 loyal Highlanders (Graham 154) to defend British authority suggests the significant size of the loyalist population in North Carolina; the Scottish circles in which Schaw moved would have been largely composed of loyal Britons. "All the Merchants of any note," she confirms, "are British and Irish, and many of them very genteel people. They all disapprove of the present proceedings" (155).[42] She highlights a number of these British loyalists and carefully details the suffering they undergo as the revolutionaries gain power and momentum. There is Governor Martin—son of the venerable Josiah Martin of Antigua—who is forced to flee from his home, hastily send his young family away to an unknown fate, and move to a miserable military ship (186-187)—all but abandoned by the British nation that he is attempting to protect. Schaw portrays him as a "worthy man by all accounts" (156) whose "situation is every way to be pitied … he must submit, as he has not power to do otherwise" (173). In true sentimental fashion, she draws attention to his disrupted domestic situation in order to pull on her audience's heartstrings. "What renders these circumstances the more affecting," she observes, "is that poor Mrs Martin is big with child, and naturally of a very delicate constitution, yet even this is better than her staying here, where she would be rendered constantly miserable with fear" (187). Governor Martin's young Scottish assistant, Archibald Nielson, is similarly styled as a sympathetic figure. Made literally sick with fear for his employer (197, 206), threatened

[42] It is important to note that by 'British,' Schaw always means Scottish and English.

with death by unruly rebels for his loyalty (209), and divested of the opportunities he had come America to pursue (188), his suffering serves as an indictment of the power exercised by American rebels. "When one considers the fate of this young fellow," she states, "it is impossible not to be greatly affected. Had this unlucky affair not happened, he had been in as fine a way as any man in the province, and as he had turned all his attention to this line, it will not be easy for him to carry it to another" (188). For Nielson, American authority manifests itself as physical, emotional, and financial devastation rather than fulfilling its revolutionary promise of 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.' The persecution of the Scottish merchants and planters who dominated North Carolina's economy further exemplifies the suffering experienced by British loyalists in revolutionary America. Schaw details the arrest of eleven merchants and planters (seven of whom were Scots [Graham 155]) who refused to declare allegiance to the Continental Association. She transcribes their intrepid words after being threatened by their captors with further violence: " 'And we will suffer every thing,' replied one of them, 'before we abjure our king, our country and our principles.'" (192). Their devotion to 'king, country, and principles' stands in stark contrast to the British nation's seeming abandonment of its loyal subjects. In each of these cases, suffering functions as both a sign of loyalty and as a condition for sympathy; Schaw's representation of British loyalists as political martyrs invokes sympathy by appealing to nationalist feeling.

Schaw is careful to guide her audience towards the appropriate response in each scenario, prohibiting itinerant emotions from adhering to the 'wrong' objects. She tells her reader that they *should* be "affected" (188) by her tales of suffering and describes

*how* they should feel by revealing her own emotional response (for instance, she describes her profound "horror" (192) at witnessing her friends bound by American rebels). Schaw also directly condemns her British readers for their negligence and/or aberrant affections: "Oh Britannia, what are you doing, while your true obedient sons are thus insulted by their unlawful brethren; are they also forgot by their natural parents?" (192). Her identification of loyalists as "true obedient sons" and of American rebels as "unlawful brethren" performs a serious rewriting of the colonial narrative as composed by American sympathizers such as Burke, who characterizes the colonists as Britain's legitimate offspring. He speaks of their "kindred blood" ("A Speech on Conciliation with America" 104) and their English "pedigree" (45), determined to convince his British audience that the American spirit of independence has been embedded within their genes by their British parents. Erskine implores Britons to moderate their response by imagining the familial relationship between the two nations: "Let not the mother-country forget her children," he urges, "let not the children tear in pieces the bowels of the mother . . . Let not Abraham's trial be our choice" (10). Schaw's appeal is similarly Biblical in tone and allusion, but her comparison of "obedient sons" and "unlawful brethren" draws on the Bible's narratives of bitter sibling rivalries between innocent and/or chosen sons and evil and/or illegitimate brethren: Cain and Abel, Esau and Jacob, Ishmael and Isaac. She differentiates between Britain's 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' progeny according to their loyalty to the British nation, or to their acceptance of the British government's authority. While loyalists demonstrate their parentage through their filial obedience, American revolutionaries equally demonstrate their corrupted lineage through their rebellion. Schaw's message is clear:

by treating all American colonists with moderation—or all colonists as brethren—Britons are perversely supporting and exacerbating the suffering of their legitimate children. Her pointed observation that "the *Loyal* party are all as one family" (193, original italics) functions as an indictment of metropolitan Britons whom she represents as absconding their familial obligations. Drawing from her opponents' bag of sentimental tricks, she manipulates a sense of paternal responsibility to encourage her readers to protect their "insulted" (192) children from those attempted to steal their inheritance—redirecting her audience towards what she considers to be appropriate objects of feeling.

That the American rebels should not be considered as kin is exposed in their abuse of the land and of loyalists; that they should be treated as enemies is revealed through their explicitly expressed enmity towards Britain. Schaw insists that the rebels' violence towards Britain's "obedient sons" (192) should be considered as violence towards the nation as a whole. She suggests that political conciliation is not only contributing towards the ruin of Britain's "obedient sons," but will progressively contribute towards damaging Britain through the collapse of its Atlantic empire. Observing the rapid development of a revolutionary infrastructure within North Carolina, Schaw warns her audience that they are effectively nurturing these rebellious "schemes" through their "mistaken mercy to a people, who have a rooted hatred at you and despise your mercy, which they View in a very different light" (149). American sympathizers shared the optimistic assumption that "principles of moderation" (Knox 26) would ultimately defuse the colonists' militant spirit. "It is only by gaining the heart," Erskine reasons, "that destroys all inclination to revolt. No victories have such

irresistible, happy, and abiding effects, as victories gained by clemency and condescension" (21). Burke decried the efficacy of either suppression or force in mitigating the colonial crisis, instead urging Parliament "to comply with the American spirit as necessary; or, if you please to submit to it, as a necessary evil" (53). By demonstrating mercy towards the colonists, Burke was confident that the Americans would subsequently "cling and grapple to you [the British government]; and no force under heaven will be of power to tear them from their allegiance" (104). Schaw dissembles this confidence in the political power of clemency by asserting that the colonists are motivated by blind hatred rather than by legitimate dissatisfaction; they do not perceive Britain as their mother country, but as an enemy nation. In an effort to convey the profoundly dangerous nature of the colonial rebels, Schaw repeatedly represents them using violent imagery. "[T]hey are of that sort of figure," she shudders, "that I cannot look at them without connecting the idea of tar and feather" (154). Americans embody violence; the threat they represent to her British body is so palpable that she can only see them in terms of her own physical destruction. Schaw's comparison of American colonists to an alligator further indicates the danger they pose to the British body. Having earlier established the "amazing strength" (150) of a full-grown alligator in a riveting scenario where two men attempt to kill the dangerous creature, she later uses the creature as a metaphor for the American colonists:

> You at home know nothing of the power of this country, nor will you believe it till you find it with a witness. I yesterday killed an Alligator with my foot that in six months hence would be able to devour me. Six months ago a very little force

> would have done here, and even yet a proper exertion would do much towards resettling peace in these Southern parts. (189)

Imagining the colonists as this wild beast, Schaw underscores their menacing nature and suggests the futility of mercy. The colonists cannot be 'tamed' through conciliatory methods, but must be crushed through more aggressive means.[43]

Positioned as a witness to that of which she speaks, Schaw warns her British audience that their mistaken interpretation of America may lead to the violent dismemberment of the British Empire. "Surely you folks at home," she provocatively suggests, "have adopted the maxim of King Charles: 'Make friends of your foes, leave friends to shift for themselves'" (189). It would not be lost on her British readers that King Charles' faulty strategy led to his execution; Schaw's comment suggests that Britons must acknowledge and assess the American colonists as enemies or risk the dissolution of their Empire. Echoing her earlier warnings, she pleads: "I wish to God those mistaken notions of moderation to which you adhere at home may not in the end prove the greatest cruelty to the mother country as well as to these infatuated people" (157). Her depiction of American life indicates that the colonists are not laboring under British oppression and motivated by a sincere desire to protect their liberties, but are

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[43] Although Schaw does not say of the colonists what she says of the slaves, "with them it is merely corporeal" (58), her repeated allusions to their bestial nature certainly suggest their insensibility. Her monkey-like description of Americans mirrors her actual confusion of West Indian slaves with monkeys, while her mockery of the drunken and vulgar appearance of the American militia (190) mirrors her description of slaves "laughing and jumping, making faces at each other, and not caring a single farthing for their fate" (128). The parallel between her descriptions of Americans and slaves may be suggesting that Americans are *becoming* like their slaves—and accusation often made of West Indian colonists. Considering her blatant abrogation of feeling from slaves, this parallel could be taken to indicate that Americans' capacity to feel has been dulled through their evolution—which, like her justification of using violent means against slaves, would accrue justification for aggressive action against the colonists.

"endeavouring to ruin this royal first-rate [vessel] on purpose to steal from the wreck materials to build themselves boats with" (211). They are willing to destroy the grand structure of the British Empire for the promise of small gain; Schaw argues that the prevention of their selfish objectives through military reprisals will ultimately protect Britain's Empire and save the Americans from themselves. Endorsing Governor Martin's petitions for military support, she asserts that "gentle methods will not do with these rusticks" (156-157). Her documentation of the rebels' military organization and training (albeit somewhat shambolic) and frequent assertions of their rapidly increasing strength collectively illustrate the necessity of swift and potent military intervention. "A few months ago the task would have been easy," she says in frustration, "it is still possible, but (God make me a false prophetess) it will not be long so" (197). As history shows, Schaw's prophetic insight proved only too correct. Only months after she left, Governor Martin gathered together his Highland army with half the numbers he expected and no external support. They were slaughtered at the Battle of Moore's Creek Bridge by an organized rebel army, and North Carolina subsequently belonged to the American revolutionaries.

## "A Rebel to Custom": Schaw's Personal Revolution

"For Schaw," Elizabeth Kim observes, "political needs dictate the mode of othering" (181). Indeed, Schaw's disparagement of American colonists is ultimately complicated by her uncompromising commitment to her own sex. While aggressively 'othering' Americans, she is always quick to mitigate her criticism of American women. She is happy to discover "amiable and agreeable acquaintances amongst the Ladies; many of whom would make a figure in any part of the world" and not surprised that

"few of the men who are natives of this country . . . rise much above my former description" (154). Her commendation of American women clearly reveals that in the matrix of loyalties and animosities that form her political ideology, gender and nationality share a complex relationship. Her interest in the position of women within the British Empire is a dominant theme in her text; as a woman attempting the influence the political mood of her nation, it is perhaps unsurprising that Schaw is deeply invested in advocating for the greater inclusion of women within Britain's political life. In order to be heard, she must first shift her culture's assessment of her gender.

In the midst of detailing what she believes is an appropriate response to the colonial crisis, Schaw stops to acknowledge the extent to which her circumstances have politicized her: "I am no politician, as yet at least, tho' I believe I will grow one in time, as I am beginning to pay a good deal of attention to what is going on about me" (157). Her own identification as a (potential) politician abjures the eighteenth-century axiom that femininity and politics are incompatible. She loosely defines a politician as an individual who takes an active interest in politics and suggests that women can occupy this customarily male domain given the opportunity to engage in politics in real and vital ways. In the hyper-politicized environment of revolutionary America—where daily activities and associations assumed major political significance—Schaw is *compelled* to engage in politics. Accordingly, she is able to imagine occupying a conventionally masculine role because traditional social practices and structures are undeveloped or compromised within both colonial and revolutionary contexts. Schaw's indication of her political potential forms part of her recurrent message that women are not limited by inherent difference, but by sexist ideologies designed to keep women powerless. Her

issue with proscribed gender roles is demonstrated in her frustration with Antiguan women's apparently insalubrious practice of abstaining from alcohol. The ladies' explanation that "[i]t was custom" prompts Schaw to briefly rage against restrictive social conventions: "What a tyrant is custom in every part of the world. The poor women, whose spirits must be worn out by heat and constant perspiration, require no doubt some restorative, yet as it is not the custom, they will faint under it rather than transgress this ideal law" (81). She sets out both to demonstrate the loss society sustains by repressing women's diverse abilities and to model an alternative understanding of femininity that openly transgresses the restrictive 'laws' so diligently heeded by the women she encounters.

That Schaw believes British women merit greater inclusion in the political life of the nation is evident in her pointed comparisons between colonial men and women. Her representation of female colonists suggests a position for women within the empire that reaches beyond their passive role as simply "the emblems and proxies of the whole male enterprise of colonialism" (Laura Brown 54). Schaw's detailed exposition of the moral failings of West Indian men may be included for the sake of veracity, but it also provides a sharp and important contrast to the exemplary morality of West Indian women. She represents the sexual activities of West Indian men ultimately as compromising the stability of colonial power. Schaw argues that the practice of miscegenation jeopardizes the already tenuous power structure between plantation owners and their slaves ("[the] wenches become licentious and insolent past all bearing" [112]) and drains the financial resources of the plantation economy by producing unfit slaves ("neither so fit for the field, or indeed any work, as the true bred

Negro" [112]) or by inadvertently depleting valuable slave populations ("[attempted abortions] cut short their own lives, as well as that of their offspring" [113]). The impressive restraint of British women in the face of male excess displays their comparative fitness for the business of colonialism. Schaw suggests that whereas West Indian men have difficulty maintaining British protocol within foreign environments—becoming "gay, luxurious, and amorous"—West Indian women develop a heightened sense of propriety that manifests itself in impeccable morality—becoming "modest, genteel, reserved, and temperate" (113). Unlike their metropolitan counterparts, female colonists shun alcohol, despise scandal, are unacquainted with jealousy, and are deeply religious (113-114). Displaced from the metropolitan center, British women remain impervious to the attractions and freedoms of their foreign environments and are capable of maintaining and establishing British culture.[44] Although Schaw derides West Indian women's obsessive maintenance of their white complexion, this physical preservation of whiteness also serves to signify their role and ability as the keepers of cultural and racial distinction within colonial society (114-115). "Certainly," Deirdre Coleman observes, "Schaw's narrative strongly reflects the view that the future of the colony's British race lies in the sexual purity and virtue of its white women . . . while the

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[44] Schaw's representation of women as impervious to the attractions and freedoms available in the West Indies clearly contrasts with the eighteenth-century representations of Creole women discussed earlier in the chapter. Fictional and non-fictional portrayals of the licentious and/or powerful Creole woman suggested that female colonists were as likely as men to avail themselves of the attractions and freedoms offered within Britain's colonies. That the recurring criticism of Creole women was their lack of restraint (sexually, financially, and in terms of their use/abuse of power) not only suggests that they eagerly pursued freedoms unavailable in Britain, but it also confirms the wisdom of restricting women's access to the liberties available in the 'uncivilized' corners of the British Empire.

men endanger racial purity and cultural identity by interracial mixture, the women uphold white prestige and are the safekeepers of colonial morality" (180).

The surprising difference she finds between American men and women is once again attributed to her gender's greater immunity to the transformations wrought by the foreign environment. As Schaw explains to her reader:

> The mothers took care of the girls, they were train'd up under them, and not only instructed in the family duties necessary to the sex, but in those accomplishments and genteel manners that are still so visible amongst them, and this descended from Mother to daughter. As the father found the labours of his boys necessary to him, he led them therefore to the woods . . . But a few generations this way lost every art or science, which the fathers might have brought out. (155)

The women preserve British values by actively instilling them in the younger generations, whereas the men have forgotten their ancestral ways by neglecting to practice and to instruct their sons in British 'arts and sciences.' Matriarchal governance is represented as both more effective and more reliable than patriarchal control. Schaw's suggestive comparison of American men and women indicates the latter's competency as colonial subjects and proposes the wisdom of expanding women's participation in Britain's imperial endeavors.

Despite her effusive praise of West Indian women, Schaw carefully differentiates herself from the Creole ladies. While they staidly drink water, she raucously throws back 'bumpers' of wine with her approving landlady (80); while they avoid physical exertion, she proudly hikes up mountains (83, 125); while they cover their faces to

avoid the sun, she revels in her "brown beauty" (125)—a feature that physically distinguishes her from the pale-skinned ladies who dominate West Indian society and that visibly signifies her disregard for convention. Elizabeth Bohls argues that this contradiction between what Schaw says and what she does exposes an "unstable tension" within the text "between explicit homage to conventional femininity and an unstated resistance against it" (390). This tension that Bohls perceives reveals Schaw's incisive recognition of women's problematic position within eighteenth-century British society. In order to assert their fitness for imperial duties, she must establish their strict adherence to and propagation of British standards. Women fulfill rather than flout social conventions within foreign environments—they are "excellent wives, fond attentive mothers and the best house wives" (113)—demonstrating their ability to resist the temptations of their exotic climes. However, Schaw also registers discomfort with proscribed gender roles in her stated frustration with custom and her personal rebellion against it. She is profoundly aware that conventional definitions of femininity and its attendant practices effectively circumscribe women's sphere of influence and condemns them to weakness. She takes issue with the West Indian female custom of abstaining from alcohol because it protracts physical weakness ("The poor women, whose spirits must be worn out by heat and constant perspiration, require no doubt some restorative, yet as it is not the custom, they will faint under it rather than transgress this ideal law" [81]) and criticizes their obsession with pale skin because it similarly undermines their physical strength ("[T]hey only want colour to be termed beautiful . . . Yet this I am convinced is owing to the way in which they live, entirely excluded from proper air and exercise" [114]). In both cases, Schaw demonstrates that

adhering to gender norms literally enervates women. However, to demonstrate the depth and diversity of women's abilities through her representation of the colonial women she encounters would undoubtedly invite the accusation that their environment has changed them—that their unconventional behavior is the unfortunate result of the climate or the seductions of foreign cultures. That women deserve political agency is evident in her detailed report of their domestic accomplishments within the colonies; but in order to gain political agency she must demonstrate women's capabilities outside of the domestic sphere. Schaw places the weight of demonstrating difference upon her own person, proclaiming her intention to be "a rebel to a custom that did not appear founded on reason" (81). As a female traveler positioned outside of the traditional female roles of wife, mother, housekeeper, or romantic object, she has greater freedom to embody an alternative model of femininity. Indeed, although she briefly finds herself in one romantic entanglement with a certain Mr. Baird, she offers a distinctly unsentimental representation of her suitor as both aged and ugly, and comically emphasizes their mutual lack of physical attraction in order to obviate sentimental objectification (82). Her refusal to be pigeon-holed into traditional female roles opens the opportunity for her to explore and exemplify the range of women's abilities beyond the sentimental template of distressed virgins, adoring wives, and long-suffering mothers, while her rejection of what she describes as "custom that did not appear founded on reason" (81) poses a direct challenge to eighteenth-century constructions of femininity.

Schaw establishes the depth of her abilities by resorting to the same strategy she uses to represent the strength of colonial women: she juxtaposes her character with

that of a man—Archibald Nielson's, to be exact—in order to disturb the gender hierarchy that justified the marginalization of women on the basis of their natural inferiority. Her initial description of Neilson aligns him with the physically fragile and immaculately white West Indian women. "His wan meagre looks disgusted me," she recollects, "his white hands gave me great offence, as I could not help thinking he displayed them ostentatiously" (181). Nielson's delicate, feminine appearance forms a visible contrast to Schaw's "brown beauty" (125) and robust physical condition (83, 125), effectively subverting eighteenth-century theories that rationalized male dominance by conflating physical and mental strength. According to Lord Kames, the physical and mental vigor of men designates them for leadership, while the relative weakness of women naturally circumscribes their abilities to the domestic sphere:

> The man, naturally more robust, is fitted for severe labour and for field-exercises: the woman for sedentary occupations . . . The man, as a protector, is directed by nature to govern: the woman, conscious of inferiority, is disposed to obedience. Their intellectual powers correspond to the destination of nature: men have penetration and solid judgment to fit them for governing: women have sufficient understanding to make a decent figure under good government. (181-182)

By representing herself as Nielson's physical superior, Schaw disrupts Kames' gendered equation; her subsequent comparison of their "intellectual power" further problematizes the logic of Kames' hierarchy. Nielson quickly assumes authority over his female companions upon their arrival in Portugal, naturally adopting the status of the "protector" based upon his gender rather than his actual leadership qualities. "I plainly

see he is to take such a charge of us," Schaw sighs, "Lord help him" (221). His attempts at governance quickly becomes an inside joke between Schaw and her reader as the narrative reveals Neilson's incompetence as a leader; he presupposes his female companions' weakness in his appropriation of authority, but it is Neilson who is ultimately exposed as the weak link.

While Schaw describes herself as "perfectly easy" with the vagaries of travel and "more inclined to laugh than cry at the little accidents we meet on this journey" (221), Neilson's incessant anxiety becomes troublesome. "I am often vexed at his anxiety," she complains, "for as he is hurt by our smallest inconveniency, he is for ever uneasy" (226). Her demonstration of comparative fortitude and her gentle criticism of Nielson's fastidiousness disparage the gender ideology that informs his misdirected concern with the wellbeing of his female companions. Schaw's underlying message that women are limited by convention rather than by nature is repeated in a scenario where Nielson refuses to allow Schaw and Miss Rutherford to ride packsaddles. Although the women are delighted by the prospect of riding a donkey, his strict adherence to convention prevents them from taking advantage of the opportunity. "What! Miss Rutherford and me on pack saddles!" Schaw playfully mimics, "[b]e it ever so easy a method, he would not submit to see us in such a style" (227). Nielson's conventional interpretation of femininity imposes limits upon Schaw and Miss Rutherford that constrains them to "sedentary occupations" (Kames 168) despite their physical ability and inclination. Schaw's ensuing comical portrayal of Nielson's dismal attempt at riding a packsaddle pointedly underscores that masculinity does not translate into superiority (230-232). Having first indicated Nielson's relative weakness, her subversion of Kames' gender

hierarchy is complete upon revealing that it is Nielson who ultimately requires Schaw's protection; she rescues him from the suffocating embraces of a particularly amorous Portuguese landlady by charading as his wife. She relates with delight that "[h]e is quite afraid of her" and explains their arrangement: "I am to take him under my protection" (222). The image of Nielson cowering under Schaw's protection (from a woman, no less!) offers a direct contrast to Kames' parallel image of women scuttling under the protection of almighty men. The stress of reality exposes Schaw as the individual endowed with true leadership qualities and ridicules a system that enshrines women's weakness at the expense of progress and improvement. The exigencies of travel and pressures of the foreign environment destabilize idealized eighteenth-century gender categories and allow her to suggest the essential irrationality and inaccuracy of the conventional categorization of women. Marching at the head of a night watch while in North Carolina, she revels in her new-found freedom from the constraints of social convention: "Oh! I shall make a glorious knapsack-bearer. You have formed a very wrong idea of my delicacy; I find I can put it on and off like any piece of dress" (201). Schaw reveals eighteenth-century femininity to be a set of socially constituted practices that are just as superficial as clothing. Like her sympathetic rehabilitation of the West Indian colonists, Schaw's depiction of women implicitly purports to correct common misinterpretations and/or stereotypes and asks her readers to dispense with their prejudicial ways of seeing and consider who women *are* rather than who they *should* be.

## Conclusion

Prior to embarking upon her journey, Schaw offers this contemplation on the meaning and definition of 'nation': "I had long taken root in my native Soil, yet it is not the spot of Earth that gave me being I call my Country. No! it is the Social Circle of such friends, as few can boast their brightest hours of prosperity were enriched with, it was these that constituted my happiness" (21). Schaw's articulation of the nation as a social construct recalls Hume's argument that national formation is the direct product of humankind's propensity for sympathy.[45] She is reassured by the idea that her sense of 'home' is the consequence of shared sympathies rather than of shared topography; if national belonging is demarcated by relational rather than physical parameters, then she is capable of extending her sense of 'home' to the exotic climes of the West Indies and North Carolina. However, as Eve Tavor Bannet observes, Schaw discovers that "political allegiances based on the natural tie to friends with a common culture could, in these crucial years, easily go either way" (150). Her experience in America reveals the fragility of a national identity built upon sympathetic attachments; the transient and impressionable nature of feelings could lead to errant political connections capable of destroying the "royal first-rate vessel" (211) to which she belongs. Indeed, while describing the qualities of two men vying for leadership within the rebel army, Schaw asserts that what makes Col. James Moor a particularly frightening choice (frightening, that is, to Britain) is his ability to inspire affection. "[A] virtuous life," she states, "has gained him the love of every body, and his popularity is such that I am assured he will have more followers than any other man in the province" (167). Yet it is precisely this

[45] See Hume, "Of National Characters," 248.

recognition and experience of the emotional basis of national identity that empowers Schaw to intervene in the national debates regarding the function of empire, the American Revolution, and the place of women within the polity. She writes with the intention of targeting her audience's feelings in order to manipulate the highly malleable "fashionable evolutions of opinion" (Burke, "A Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol," 150) that threatened to dissolve Britain's Empire. Schaw attempts to access people's convictions through their emotions in order to influence the formation of a national circle that sustains her in ways not dissimilar from her much smaller "Social Circle." Her conviction that sympathy can, indeed, transform individuals into a nation indicates that her "feeling heart" (33) functions as a political tool throughout her travel letters; her performance of feeling is more a political act than an expression of self.

Schaw's mobility is often overlooked in contemporary scholarship, yet her physical movement through the colonial terrain invests her feelings with particular power. An understanding of travel as a means to truth or knowledge is manifest within her narrative; the direct experience travel affords effectively reveals the 'true' nature of both nation and gender. Schaw's eyewitness authority exposes British perceptions of Americans as ignorant ("You at home know nothing of the power of this country" [189]), inaccurate ("I fear you at home are suffering to gain too much ground from mistaken mercy to a people, who have a rooted hatred at you" [149]), and incomplete ("[I] meet every moment with something I never read or heard of" [151]). Tied to empirical observation and authentic experience, her feelings are presented as a form of knowledge. Her position as a traveler allows her to 'correct' British perceptions of their overseas colonies, revealing the American colonists' "true nature, and their true relation

to Great Britain" (Ramsay 20). Schaw's self-representation as a traveler further reveals the "true nature" of women; her ability to manage and overcome the physical, mental, and emotional hardships she faces outside of the cozy domestic sphere exposes the fictive nature of women's putative "delicacy" (20). The binary of male strength and female weakness disintegrates within the colonial environment as social constructions (or fantasies) are pitted against stark realities.

Not only does travel associate her feelings with truth, but Schaw's circulating body and letters also act as proxies between Britain and its colonial populations, alternately overcoming and reinforcing the constraints posed by geography. The hospitality or harm proffered her British body in the diverse colonial spaces through which she moves articulates the "true relation" (Ramsay 20) between Britain and its various colonies. Her experience of community with fellow Scots and British loyalists and of enmity from American revolutionaries does not simply reflect reality, but actively constitutes the British nation by demarcating these social groups as part of or as inimical to the national community. Reading Schaw's letters literally connects her British audience to their colonial populations; her textual representation of cultural dis/connection allows her readers vicariously to enter into relationships with West Indian and American colonists. That she characterizes her letters as a substitution for actual encounters suggests the relational work accomplished by her correspondence. "Tho it be a hundred to one you never see these letters," she comments, "yet as they give an idea of conversing with you, they afford myself infinite satisfaction" (36). As her readers' imaginary relationships with their colonial populations are filtered through her personal experience, Schaw maintains control over the ways in which Britons envision

relationships with their colonial populations; the relationships into which she enters and the antipathies she forms model right relations for the British nation.

This representation of personal interactions as templates for political relations is taken up and redeployed by the anonymous English Lady whose sentimental travelogue is the focus of the next chapter.[46] She also uses her circulating body and letters to weave emotional connections and a sense of national unity between Scotland and England, contributing to the work of reconciliation that Schaw promotes in her travelogue. However, whereas Schaw's exposure to the realities of colonial life and political revolution reveals the potential dangers of sympathy, the Lady locates the threat to national unity in the absence of sympathy. She aggressively condemns the practice of selective sympathy, arguing that exclusive affections effectively inhibit the emergence of unified Britain given the nation's multi-ethnic, -racial, and -cultural composition. She suggests that it is precisely Schaw's inability to sympathize with those different from her that creates the inter-cultural hostility to which Schaw is subject and which was quickly escalating the American crisis from a national skirmish into a civil war.

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[46] I will henceforth refer to the author of *A Journey to the Highlands of Scotland* as 'the Lady.' Although the travelogue was for some time attributed to Mary Ann(e) Hanway—who wrote several novels in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries—recent scholarship has cast doubt on the travelogue's authorship. Betty Hagglund concludes that the absence of references to *A Journey to the Highlands of Scotland* in Hanway's subsequent work and that fact that she is described "an unpracticed" (156) author with no publishing record in reviews of her first novel suggests that Hanway is not the author of the travelogue. Barbara Britton Wenner sides with Hagglund's conclusion, basing her suspicions on the twenty-two year gap between the travelogue's publication and the publication of Hanway's first novel, the difference in style between the travelogue and Hanway's novels, and that fact that the British Museum Library appears to have attributed the travelogue to Hanway some time between 1872 and 1890. Both scholars refer to the author as 'the Lady' as a result of their well-founded suspicions; I have chosen to do the same.

# Chapter III

# The Ties that Bind: *A Journey to the Highlands of Scotland* and Colonial Politics

## Introduction

My hold of the colonies is in the close affection which grows from common names, from kindred blood, from similar privileges, and equal protection. These are ties, which, though light as air, are as strong as links of iron. Let the colonies always keep the idea of their civil rights associated with your government;—they will cling and grapple to you; and no force under heaven will be of power to tear them from their allegiance.
~Edmund Burke[47]

Janet Schaw's hasty departure from America coincides with the more leisurely arrival of a certain English "Lady" to Schaw's much-beloved Scotland. Although the two travelers share similarities, their journeys and political positions could not be more different. Both women evince an interest in imperial politics and exploit their extra-domestic experience and exposure to Britain's diverse populations to intervene in the divisive political debate inaugurated by the American Revolution. However, the Lady's pacifist leanings clearly contradict Schaw's sanction of war; whereas Schaw finds evidence in America's revolutionary landscape for the necessity of violence, the author of *A Journey to the Highlands of Scotland* finds evidence in Scotland's past and confirmation in its present for the inadequacy of violence in securing political stability. In her study of eighteenth-century women's physical and symbolic engagement in the equally violent enterprises of war and empire, Kathleen Wilson concludes: "British women's engagement with the romance of war and empire generated possibilities for

[47] *Speech on Conciliation with America* 128.

both complicity with and resistance to the nation-state's injunction to militarism. Equally important, their involvement created conditions that construed the terms and iconography of national belonging, circulating competing notions of nation, liberty, and political identity" (*The Island Race* 96). The conflicting positions on war and empire presented in the travel letters of Schaw and this unidentified English Lady bears out Wilson's assertion of women's diverse experience of and involvement in the British Empire, as well as the opportunity for political engagement opened by the ideological fissures exposed or created under the pressure of conflict. Their adoption and adaptation of Laurence Sterne's sentimental mode and its attendant theories of sympathy further demonstrates the various and nuanced ways that feeling can be manipulated for political effect; a comparison of their travelogues reveals that sentimental discourse could be used to support radically different political ends and contradictory visions of the British nation. The anonymous author of *A Journey* problematizes Schaw's limited sympathy, proposing that culturally- or ethnically-specific sympathies create dichotomies that effectively weaken the structure of the British Empire by inhibiting the formation of national unity.

The slim volume of travel letters entitled *A Journey to the Highlands of Scotland: With Occasional Remarks on Dr. Johnson's Tour* appeared on the market in 1777. The text is the work of an anonymous female author who assiduously compiled and published 18 letters ostensibly written during her tour of Scotland, each letter alternately addressed to two women and one man: Lady Mary B—, Miss— (her sister), and the Earl of C—. The letters reveal the author as a playful, opinionated, and inquisitive individual with a romantic streak and a knack for self-effacing humor. Like

Schaw, she is a single woman who appears to be accompanied by a traveling party. Together with her companions, she spends four months touring the Scottish landscape from Edinburgh, to Inveraray, and all the way up to Banff, completing what was referred to as the 'Short Tour' of Scotland. The resulting text never saw a second printing, and was quickly dismissed by reviewers as "[not] sufficiently curious and original to merit the public's attention" (*The Monthly Review* 57: 241). Although the Lady's travelogue may appear unexceptional, her place both in the history of tourism and in the travelogue genre invests her text with historical interest. Scottish tourism was certainly becoming more common by the mid-1770s, but Lady's trip to the Highlands was still relatively novel for the time period and characterizes her as an intrepid tourist. Martin Rackwitz argues that when Thomas Pennant traversed and recorded the length and breadth of Scotland in 1769—only six years prior to the Lady's trip—there was "hardly anything known about the Highlands of Scotland and their population" (131), and that it was not until the 1780s and 1790s that travelogues about Scotland began to be published in earnest. Indeed, the publication of *A Journey* was the first of its kind from a female pen; travelogues by women were still in scant supply by 1777, and the Lady's was the first account of Scotland published by a woman. As both a tourist and a female author, she is more "original" than *The Monthly Review* gives her credit for.

Although reviewers denigrate her attention to what they perceive as "frivolous subjects" (*The Critical Review* 43: 238), they unanimously commend her "agreeable" (*The Monthly Review* 57: 242) and "lively" (*Scots Magazine* 51) style. *The Monthly Review* even recommends her text as a cheerful alternative to Samuel Johnson's moody Scottish travelogue: "[These letters] give a lively and pleasing view of the country,

which may serve as a counter part to the picture which Dr. Johnson has drawn with his *sombre* pencil" (242, original italics). The critic indirectly attributes the difference in tone and style to the author's gender, manifesting the cultural expectation that a woman's observations would be "lively and pleasing" as opposed to intellectually rigorous. However, read within the context of the travel genre's eighteenth-century developments and in the shadow of Sterne's *A Sentimental Journey*, it becomes clear that the unidentified 'Lady' of this text has deliberately assumed a persona modeled after the definition of Sterne's sentimental traveler. She is careful to state her travel orientation in the preface of her travelogue in order to immediately signal her difference from previous travel writers: "I did not suffer the postilion to indulge his professional passion, to pass briskly through any parts of cultivated country, or rattle rapidly over the pavement of towns, that were fertile of remark, but ordered him to go *sentimentally*" (3, original italics). By labeling her style of travel 'sentimental,' the Lady rhetorically associates her orientation with the category of the 'sentimental traveler' as defined within Sterne's text and developed by his various imitators. Her reference to the postilion in the preface ensures that her readers will recognize the literary connection; her injunction to the postilion to travel at an appropriately sentimental tempo alludes to Yorick's wish for his postilion to have "stolen off with [him] in something like a pensive pace" rather than "clattering like a thousand devils" (Sterne 96). Although the Lady of *A Journey* does not replicate the structure of Sterne's text—her narrative is organized around physical sites rather than amorous attachments—she adopts its anecdotal form, copies Sterne's emphasis on feeling rather than judgment, and espouses his sympathetic approach to otherness. She is openly critical of "*literary* travellers" who "travel not with

the intent to give the world a fair account of manners and customs, but merely to exaggerate the bad and sink the good" (23, original italics). In true sentimental form, she expresses her intention to sympathize with rather than suspect those she encounters. "I am convinced," she announces, "that virtue is the growth of every clime!" (43). The Lady enters Scotland's unknown terrain with Yorick's sympathetic disposition, believing that she will encounter both people and landscapes with which she will connect and through which she will be emotionally enlightened or educated. She acknowledges the emotional source of her observations through frequent poetic outbursts, statements of inexpressibility, and direct confirmation of her sentimental nature. Her assertion that "my sentiments always flow from my feelings" (35), echoes Yorick's declaration that he will describe his experiences "with the same simplicity, with which I felt them" (70). In each statement as in each travelogue, feeling is cited as the inspiration for the written reflections.

As an inexperienced writer and as a woman following the pathway trod by a series of men with towering reputations, she finds both justification for her endeavor and authority for her voice in Sterne's fresh approach to travel writing. The anonymous author directly informs her audience of the value of her sentimental orientation: "I . . . noticed several things worthy of being made public, which more laborious travellers, and some of those who absolutely journeyed *ex officio*, had neglected, or overlooked" (4, original italics). She is likely alluding to three of her distinguished predecessors in this statement: Daniel Defoe, Thomas Pennant, and Samuel Johnson. The "laborious travellers" presumably describes Pennant and Johnson; Pennant's travelogues were praised for their exhaustive documentation of Scotland, and the Lady frequently mocks

Johnson's travelogue for its "great scrupulosity of minute investigation" (anonymous 18). Travelers who "journeyed *ex officio*" likely refers to Daniel Defoe, whose *Tour thro' the whole Island of Great Britain* (1729) was written based on travels undertaken on official business. The Lady's suggestion is that by travelling sentimentally—with the intention of feeling rather than cataloguing or judging—she is able to discern details missed by those who objectify Scotland. Her sentimental orientation gives her a distinct edge over the competition; her travelogue can rival their productions based on her unique and even superior approach. Her comment on Defoe, Pennant, and Johnson's ultimate deficiencies as travelers and travel writers recalls Yorick's ridicule of "Smelfungus" and "Mundungus"—the two stock travelers whose emotional (Smelfungus) and physical (Mundungus) distance from their environment compromises their visual acuity. The Lady is making a very similar statement in her preface, noting that her sentimental approach has allowed her to see gaps in other travelers' visions. Echoing Yorick, she also claims that traveling sentimentally "not only made amends for those occasional glooms which seemed to breathe the spirit of melancholy, from the surrounding barrenness, but gave to the whole that sort of *chequer-work*, which inevitably mixes with every business, and every pleasure" (4, original italics). She does not view the prospect and declare "'[t]is barren" (Sterne 81). Her perspective—tinctured with sentiment—allows her to see the landscape's nascent qualities. Smelfungus' and Mundungus' fault is that they do not attempt to engage with their surroundings; that is, they refuse meaningful connections with the foreign environment and/or with its inhabitants. As a result, the documentation of their travels is fundamentally unreliable, made inaccurate through self-absorption, prejudice, and a

lack of authentic experience. The Lady accuses Johnson of similar faults, asserting that his account is compromised by his "illiberal aspersions" (43), his "unjust partiality" (47), and his limited scope, as suggested by her mocking reference to his "great scrupulosity of minute investigation" (18). According to the Lady, Johnson's observations are rendered untrustworthy due to his failure to sympathize with his Scottish neighbors. His "contracted sentiments" (43) result in a "false representation of a very worthy set of people" (22). The implication, of course, is that the sentimental traveler—who possesses *expansive* or *unbounded* sentiments—produces a comparatively reliable travel account because their disposition enables authentic connection with the environments and people they encounter.

However, her sentimental orientation provides more than a justification for this Lady's literary endeavor: it also provides both the framework and the façade for a penetrating political critique. Sold amidst warring political pamphlets and missives from the American colonies, the Lady's breezy, sentimental travelogue appears to be a reprieve from the wartime concerns that dominated the British literary landscape in 1777. But appearances, as they say, are deceiving: her political voice is located precisely within her sentimental lexis. Her chosen travel persona *is* her political statement; the sentimental orientation provides her with an interpretive framework that corresponds with her political beliefs and her vision of British national identity. The Lady's travel text is invested in redefining Britain's national character according to a sentimental model that imagines a British politics and imperial policy rooted in sympathy and characterized by benevolence. Her sentimental engagement with the Scottish landscape and people allows her to demonstrate how Britain should structure its imperial

relations in order to ensure the stability of its empire. For the author of *A Journey*, Scotland provides the ideal platform for considering the current Revolution. Although the Lady does not directly address the American Revolution, her experience of traveling through a once-rebellious territory provides her with the opportunity to reflect on issues and questions relevant to the contemporary colonial crisis. Despite obvious differences in terms of its contemporary political representation and past political history, Scotland's post-Union status as a "stateless nation" (Gottlieb 101) within the British Empire and its history of rebellion against English rule offers compelling parallels with the American colonies.[48] The imprint of rebellion on Scottish soil organically introduces the reality and nature of political insurrection, its contemporary amity suggests a model for successful imperialism, and its removal from the scene of political action (London and America) camouflages the insistently political message underlying the text's observations. The Lady's itinerary serves as a pretext for her political commentary, while her manner of journeying serves as a model for intercultural relations.

Johnson's recently published travelogue, *A Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland* (1775), presents yet another occasion for the Lady to consider and critique conventional ways of structuring imperial relations. She takes Johnson to task for what

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[48] The Scottish historian Adam Ferguson recognized the similar positions of Scotland and America within the British Empire, briefly comparing the two countries in his critique of the American Revolution. He argues that England was responding to the American crisis in the same way that it would respond to a rebellion in Scotland, "[t]he one case [being as] equally applicable as the other" (39). Tobias Smollett's statement on Scotland in *The Expedition of Humphry Clinker* (1771) that "people have a strange itch to colonize America, when the uncultivated parts of our own island might be settled to greater advantage" (254) also suggests the similar ways in which Scotland and America were conceptualized within the national imaginary: both functioned as potential economic resources for England.

she perceives as his deeply prejudiced perception of Scotland's people and landscape. Her condemnation of Johnson's interaction (or lack thereof) with a part of the British nation develops into an impassioned argument against a practice of Englishness characterized by insularity and exclusion. The danger that she locates in Johnson's Smelfungus-like approach to otherness is that it ultimately erects or reinforces emotional barriers between England and its peripheries—leading to dangerous fractures within the British Empire that threaten both its unity and its progress. The Lady combats the pro-war argument disseminated by the Tories and illustrated in Schaw's text by insisting upon the cyclical nature of violence, positing a version of the Biblical maxim that those sustained by aggression will perish through the same means. With America questioning the ideological foundations of Britain's imperial prerogative and demonstrating the fragility of political ties, the Lady seeks to reform her nation's imperial politics and strengthen the connective fabric between England and its colonies by encouraging the development of affective affinities between England and its various peripheries. Deploying her sentimental orientation as a model, she attempts to establish sympathy as the medium through which all imperial relations should be understood and conducted. Through the language of sentiment, she articulates that an empire stitched together by the threads of affection is far stronger than an empire bound by the iron chains of fear; friendships endure, but prisoners will always attempt to escape.

## Smitten Rebels: The American Revolution as Sentimental Elopement Narrative

The Lady's first paragraph betrays her awareness of the American Revolution, and suggests that the events overseas are nascent in her mind as she crosses into England's adjacent territory. Her visit to the infamous Gretna Green presents her with

the opportunity to consider the relationship between freedom and constraint—a key issue in contemporary discussions regarding the nature of liberty. As Scotland's premier destination for clandestine weddings following Lord Hardwicke's Marriage Act of 1753, the very name of Gretna Green elicited images of liberated young lovers escaping the parental harness to pursue their passion (for better or worse).[49] "When one thinks of a Gretna wedding," A. Ireland Robertson observes, "the imagination conjures up an image of a pair of youthful lovers; their wild flight in a post-chaise drawn by four horses, with an angry parent hard in pursuit" (qtd. in Lisa O'Connell 10). Gretna Green elopement narratives often featured hasty young couples shedding restrictive English laws and even more restrictive parents to fulfill their desires. The result, however, is often far from ideal: the grim reality of marriage quickly reveals to the young couple the wisdom of their former restrictions.[50] The Lady takes full advantage of the border town's fraught associations with independence, using the elopement industry's exploitation of lax rules to consider the meaning and practice of liberty. Traveling on the infamous road to Gretna Green, she comments on its relatively recent popularity: "Nothing need to be said of the road between England and this place, it being so universally known, since the legislature thought fit to form an act which hath rendered it so usefully fashionable to the happy race of Hibernian heroes and English *misses* longing to throw off the leading-strings of parental restraint" (5, original italics). She reflects on the motivations of these

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[49] Lord Hardwicke's Marriage Act of 1753, also known as "An Act for the Better Preventing of Clandestine Marriage," decreed that marriages must be performed in a parish chapel of the Church of England and that individuals under the age of twenty-one must receive parental consent.

[50] See, for instance, the Gretna Green episode in Tobias Smollett's *The Expedition of Humphry Clinker* (210-212), William Whitehead's play *A Trip to Scotland* (1770), and Lisa O'Connell's discussion of the Gretna Green elopement plot in "Dislocating Literature: The Novel and the Gretna Green Romance, 1770-1850."

"English misses," concluding that the new generation of young women are eagerly pursuing and prioritizing independence: "[T]he glowing females of the present generation are not to be tyed down by either prudish or prudential duties, to fathers or mothers, or any such antiquated doctrines—No, forsooth, liberty! Dear liberty is the TON" (5). Although the Lady's exclamation is contextualized within the Greta Green elopement narrative, it is nonetheless tempting to read this declaration as an allusion to the Americans' desire for liberty from their fiscal "duties," from the control of the 'parental' authority of the British government, and from the "antiquated" political "doctrines" enforced by the British Parliament in the wake of the Seven Years' War. Indeed, familial metaphors were commonly used to describe and make sense of the imperial dynamics between Britain and America. Jay Fliegelman's comparison of eighteenth-century family dynamics and the familial rhetoric deployed during the American Revolution yields the conclusion that, "[t]he relationship of the American colonies to England had long been accepted by both the British government and it subjects in America as analogous to that of a child's relationship to its parent" (93). Sara Knott suggests that the discourse surrounding the American Revolution heavily borrowed from the sentimental novel's anti-patriarchal plotlines to clarify and dramatize the issues involved in the crisis. "Family discord," she asserts, "was the lingua franca of the Revolution" (63). Given the pervasiveness of the analogy between the nuclear family and the nation-state in Revolutionary rhetoric, it is not a stretch to read the elopement narrative as a fictional parallel to actual political events. The Lady's final exclamation—"[d]ear liberty is the TON"—indicates that her observation has

implications beyond her immediate focus on eager "English misses"; her submission that liberty is currently 'in fashion' suggests its wider cultural cachet.

The American colonists' demand for and declaration of independence in 1776 effectively made the issue of liberty the center of intense debate and action on both sides of the Atlantic. As the object of desire and the cause of war it was, indeed, "the TON" in 1777. The colonists' condemnation of the British government and their claim to be on the right side of liberty sparked a heated debate in Britain regarding the nature and practice of liberty. Intellectuals such as Richard Price and Adam Ferguson published warring pamphlets on the nature of liberty in order to justify (Price) or criticize (Ferguson) the colonists' grievances and their desire for autonomy.[51] Whereas Price defined liberty as the "[freedom] to be guided by one's own will" (16), Ferguson argued that liberty meant "regulated freedom, not an anarchy of acting agreeably upon passion" (3). Price locates authentic liberty in the American colonies, declaring that their understanding and practice of liberty is faithful to its true meaning. He believes that Americans exhibit a profound comprehension of liberty in their opposition to the British government, whom they recognize as attempting to impose a system of slavery upon them by abrogating their constitutional right to representation. According to Price, the American's desire for independence is just as their desire is grounded in an opposition to arbitrary power, or to rule without consent. "ENGLAND should venerate this attachment to Liberty amidst all its excesses," he urges, "and instead of indignation or scorn, it would be most becoming them, in the present instance, to declare their

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[51] Richard Price, *Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, the Principle of Government, and the Justice and Policy of the War with America* (1776); Adam Ferguson, *Remarks on Dr. Price's Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty* (1776).

applause" (129). Ferguson, on the other hand, is more than willing to pour "indignation and scorn" upon the colonists' bid for independence. "Real liberty," he insists, "consists in due obedience on laws and government" (31). Defining specifically *civil* liberty as the ideal balance of consent and restraint, he believes that both Price and the Americans possess a mistaken understanding of liberty that confuses liberty with a pure lack of restriction: "The vulgar think that their liberty is infringed, if they receive the least curb of legal restriction: unrestrained by morality, a lawless conduct, unchecked, is the only idea they possess of liberty" (6). Ferguson rigorously defends the British government's conduct in the American colonies and provides justification for their decision to enter a civil war. Due to his belief that the British constitution clearly embodies and enshrines liberty, he logically concludes that the British would be fighting *for* liberty and *against* tyranny. "It would ill become those celebrated in the glorious defence of liberty," he asserts, "to stile rebellious subjects by that generous title . . . [there is an] amazing difference between the cause of real liberty, and the cry of ambition veiled under the specious mask of freedom" (60). Motivated by ambition, the Americans will only succeed in forming a despotic government in the absence of British liberty: "Ambition in every one of them would lead some artful individual to place himself at the head; and opposition, that sprung from a mistaken sense of liberty, would end in despotism" (15). By engaging the Americans in battle, Britain is effectively fighting for the cause of liberty by preventing the inevitable establishment of a tyrannical government. Price and Ferguson's debate regarding the definition of liberty not only demonstrates the relatively unstable nature of the concept, it also reveals why defining this concept became profoundly important in this period: the accepted definition of liberty

fundamentally impacted political action—it could justify Britain's decision to pursue military action against the American colonies, and the colonists' decision to pursue independence from Britain.

In order to invest their arguments with emotional substance, both Price and Ferguson draw on familial analogies. Price depicts Britain as an incompetent or tyrannical parent unnaturally attempting to dominate its fully-grown children. "We should have been gradually relaxing our authority as they grew up," he states in regards to America, "[b]ut, like mad parents, we have done the contrary; and, at the very time when our authority should have been most relaxed, we have carried it to the greatest extent, and exercised it with the greatest rigour. No wonder then, that they have turned upon us; and obliged us to remember, that they are not children" (51). Price's metaphor posits that the colonists' desire for independence is a natural progression rather than an act of insubordination; it is Britain's obstinacy that should be considered perverse. As the victims of a tyrannical parent, the colonists are depicted as the appropriate objects of sympathy. Ferguson fires back with his own sentimental parent/child analogy, predictably turning the metaphor against the colonists. "Cruel must that disposition be," he asserts, "who after rising to manhood, by the protecting wing of an indulgent guardian, wishes to plunge a dagger in his breast" (18). Ferguson does not deny that the American colonists have reached adulthood, but likens their violent resistance to the British government as the deviant act of an ungrateful child. Rather than working to perpetuate and preserve the family unit through acts of reciprocity—like natural children might be expected to behave—the colonists are portrayed as committing patricide in order to achieve unmitigated power. As the wounded victim of its

dependents' greed, the British government is presented as the appropriate object of sympathy. The familial analogy equips Price and Ferguson with a ready and accessible vocabulary with which to sway and mobilize public sentiment. The emotional impact and real life tangibility of the metaphor provide both sides of the debate with a way to saturate their argument with visceral appeal.

The author of *A Journey* could not have been unaware of the associations that either the word 'liberty' or her use of the familial analogy would have evoked in the midst of these political events. Although the Lady's political posture on the Revolution is veiled at best, her playful reference to 'liberty' and her critical portrayal of the liberated "English *misses*" (5, original italics) absconding from parental protection suggests an oblique criticism of the Americans' actions and ideals. Her lighthearted description of elopement as "usefully fashionable" and liberty as "the TON" (5) belies a serious critique. By labeling liberty as currently 'in fashion,' she is also positing that the desire for liberty can be motivated by entirely superficial reasons. Rather than being based in actual privation and/or conviction, the pursuit of liberty may arise out of a transitory but infectious cultural fixation. She is not alone in her sense that the current fascination with liberty is superficial; Ferguson likens the Americans' current aspirations to an "infatuation" (68) and declares them to be motivated by a heady mixture of "restlessness," "giddiness," and "illusion" (18), and Janet Schaw characterizes the American rebels as an "infatuated people" (157). The Lady's derisive portrayal of those pursuing this fashionable object—the infatuated English females—reinforces the sense that she is constructing a pointed critique of the reckless pursuit of independence. The starry-eyed lovers' desire for liberty is founded on nothing but thoughtless rebellion;

they long "to throw off the leading-strings of parental restraint" (5) and pursue their fleeting affections. The situation they subsequently find themselves in is tragically comical: the "sighing pair" (5) are linked together by none other than a business-like, unsentimental blacksmith who fuses people with the same facility as he fuses iron. "[T]hough they who visit our Vulcan," she explains, "go, now and then, upon the wings of passion, the blacksmith himself makes it, uniformly, a mere matter of business" (5). The Lady shatters the illusion of romance surrounding the idea of liberation; although the fantasy of freeing oneself from constraint and flying off on the "wings of passion" appears alluring, the reality is undeniably prosaic. Her specific characterization of these eloping couples as "Hibernian heroes and English *misses*" (5, original italics) references the bumbling elopement attempt between a young Irishman and his English intended in Tobias Smollett's *The Expedition of Humphry Clinker* (1771) and further invests her own fictional portrait with an additional layer of cynicism. The Lady's gesture to Smollett's fictional scenario suffuses her depiction of "the glowing females of the present generation" (5) and their desire for liberation with the absurd, and ensures that her audience will recognize the impulse of these "English *misses*" as irrational and even perverse.[52] Similar to Ferguson's critique of Price's definition of liberty and to his observations on the American colonists, the Lady represents the idea of liberty espoused by these young, impassioned women as a profound misunderstanding of the

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[52] The Irishman and Englishwoman appear violently in love when Matthew Bramble and his companions initially encounter them; their passion has led them to escape her parents in the pursuit of everlasting love. However, upon finding out that her intended is but a humble tailor, the young lady immediately resolves to elope with Jery Melford's silver-tongued servant—whom she has known for the whole of a day (Smollett 210-213). The entire exchange exposes the young lovers' passion as fickle and based entirely on appearances and economics rather than on authentic feeling.

concept. They imagine liberty as the freedom to do whatever they want—the freedom "to be guided by [their] own will" (Price 16). However, as Ferguson warns, the ignorant pursuit of what appears to be independence may result in a stricter, more profound bondage.

Ferguson's sense that American 'independence' may devolve into arbitrary power was a fear shared by Britons and Americans alike. During the nascent years of the Revolution, Francis Hopkinson—eventually one of the signatories of the Declaration of Independence—expressed anxiety that an independent America would be vulnerable to the machinations of ambitious individuals. Deploying the proverbial familial metaphor, he argues:

> Should the colonies with base ingratitude, attempt to throw off all dependence on the mother country, they would put themselves in a situation of a silly girl, who leaves the guidance and protection of a wise and affectionate parent and wandering away exposes herself to ruin by the artful insinuations of every wicked and designing stranger. (108)

Through her sentimental familial narrative, the Lady can be read as developing a parallel concern for the young American colonies. Her portrait of a hasty Gretna Green elopement ends with the following ominous image: "When the conjugal *work* is brought to [the blacksmith's] anvil, he always strikes the iron while it is warm, and often proves himself, alas! but too able an artificer, at connecting the *links* of the matrimonial *chain*" (5, original italics). The abrasive language used to describe the marriage—iron, striking, links, and chains—evokes images of incarceration. The young women's pursuit of liberty ends with them fused to their husbands by a permanent "matrimonial chain"

that is far more binding and than the comparatively slight "leading-strings" (5) of parental supervision. The obvious contrast between the two types of ties further emphasizes the tragedy in the young brides' change of circumstance. The purpose of fabric leading strings is protection, guidance, and an aid to movement, while the purpose of iron chains is control, punishment, and the restriction of movement. The Lady's portrayal of flighty young women turned chained brides recalls Ferguson's and Hopkinson's conceptions of the equally flighty American colonists turned disillusioned subjects of a tyrant. Similar to the young women escaping the protection of their parents, the colonists have chosen to abscond the "protecting wing of an indulgent guardian" (Ferguson 18). However, their giddy flight from the guardianship of the British government has the potential to founder into a far more insidious form of governance. "[T]he levity of the Americans," Ferguson forewarns, "tired with the lenient administration of a British parliament, are eager to experience the change of a free government, to a despot of their own" (44). What the Lady's naïve girls, Ferguson's eager colonists, and Hopkinson's "silly" (108) Americans interpret as oppression is simply protection; parental restraint and the British constitution ultimately safeguard their dependents from binding marital mistakes and political blunders, from "designing individuals" (Ferguson 6) and "wicked . . . strangers" (Hopkinson 108) seeking political power. Just as the "leading-strings of parental restraint" can potentially prevent the "matrimonial chain" (Anonymous 5) from binding these parents' young daughters to conniving opportunists, the "strings that moved the wheels of government" ultimately prevent the "despotism of the most artful" (Ferguson 6).

The similarities between the arguments being developed to criticize the American rebellion and the arguments the Lady deploys to criticize the rebellion of eloping young women situate her discourse firmly within the debates surrounding the American Revolution. Although the author of *A Journey* is ostensibly discussing the perils of elopement, the resonances with the rhetoric and images surrounding the American Revolution suggest that her observations may also be read as a political metaphor. Indeed, Fliegelman contends that the interpretation and representation of American rebels was so deeply informed by "a generation of sentimental heroes and heroines" that "to understand properly the history of one set of rebels is to understand better the history of the other" (5). If the rebellious young women are interpreted as representing the American colonists and the parental figures the British government, then the Lady can be understood as articulating an argument against American independence and in favor of a strong imperial union bound by the ties of sympathy. She does not regard the American colonists as mature children well equipped for autonomy, nor does she portray them as murderous deviants eager to assume power. Posited as impetuous young women chasing a romantic illusion, the rebels are characterized by their naiveté—their recklessness and gullibility effectively establishing their continued need for guardianship. According to this rendition of the parent/child analogy, to encourage the colonists to act upon their flawed understanding of liberty would be both irresponsible and insensitive; their flight should be checked lest their escape terminates in inescapable chains. Rather than lionize the colonists like Price or demonize them like Ferguson and Schaw, the Lady carefully develops an analogy that maintains sympathy towards rebellious subjects while simultaneously cultivating an

aversion towards their actions. She further avoids Price's condemnation of authority and Ferguson and Schaw's approbation of disciplinary action; the parental figures in her narrative are represented as both necessary in their function and benign in their intent. Her image of the tender "leading-strings of parental restraint" (5) recalls Benjamin Franklin's description of Parliament's former and, according to his interpretation, salutary relationship with its American colonies. Standing before the House of Commons in 1766, he stated: "[The American colonists] were governed by this country at the expense only of a little pen, ink and paper: *they were led by a thread*" ("Examination of Dr. Franklin" 375, italics mine). The Lady affirms this form of constitutional governance characterized by enlightened benevolence. She does not champion the disciplinary tactics defended by Ferguson and Schaw, but implicitly endorses a non-coercive version of authority that carefully balances the demands of consent and restraint through a commitment to the preservation of civil liberties, evocatively illustrated by Franklin's picture of the colonists being "led by a thread" (375) and by her own sentimental image of parental "leading-strings" (5).

## Romanticized Rebels: The 1745 Jacobite Rebellion and the American Revolution

The political analogy buried in the Lady's narrative of romantic rebels is extended to and further developed in her observations on a set of increasingly romanticized rebels—the Jacobites of the 1745 rebellion. Her discussion of the '45 clearly parallels the familial analogy that she develops in the first few pages of her travelogue. Like her experience on the road leading to Gretna Green, the Lady's journey into the Highlands once again allows her the opportunity to tread in the footsteps of rebellious subjects, providing her with another occasion to contemplate the nature of

liberty and the legitimacy of political rebellion. In both cases, physical location and the demands of her sentimental orientation furnish the author with the means to delve into ideas and issues that are in themselves political or that connect to larger political questions. She concludes her observations on the Jacobite rebellion by claiming the combined effect of contiguity and emotional susceptibility: "[B]eing on the spot, which at that period, set all England in a tremor; I was led irresistibly to these consequent reflections; let this plead my excuse" (22). The more nakedly political nature of her reflections on the Scottish incendiaries is revealed in her efforts to justify her incursion into political argument. The Lady's assessment of the rebellion and its participants both reinforces and clarifies the importance of sympathy within human relations, firmly advocating for the establishment of an empire that is solidified through sympathetic bonds and characterized as a sentimental union of hearts.

Wandering along "the track of the rebel army" (21) the Lady switches from landscape description to political disquisition, contritely but urgently launching into a discussion of Britain's last political rebellion. She seeks to discover why Prince Charles Edward Stuart gained such popular support in 1745—an important answer to pursue given Britain's immersion in a new rebellion. Based on her knowledge of the Scots' "life and manners," she concludes:

> [T]heir so easily gaining followers, and possessing themselves of these towns, is not at all surprising; since those who were well-affected to government, were so few, in comparison to the ignorant multitude, which run with the stream, and are one moment ready to join the Pretender's standard, and the next, on sight of our

> troops to discard their new-acquired friends and throw up their bonnets for KING GEORGE. (21)

Her criticism of the Jacobites resonates with her previous treatment of the impulsive young girls escaping to Gretna Green: she conveys that the rebels' fight for liberty was founded in ignorance and mimicry. The representation of the Jacobite army as a multitude of fish mindlessly following the political current mirrors her depiction of fashionable young females recklessly following the cultural current. Their rebellion is essentially a mechanical response to a powerful stimulant; the superficiality of the rebels' conviction is revealed in the alacrity with which they switch sides, not dissimilar from the rapidity with which Smollett's English affianced transfers her affections from the tailor to the footman. The Lady's comparison of the Scottish rebels to senseless fish recalls a similar metaphor used by Ferguson to represent the American rebels: "The cry of freedom, that never-failing word, that incendiaries make as subservient to their designs, and which always *sets the multitudes in uproar*, inflamed some; while others, *carried by the current*, unintentionally aided the rebellion" (49, italics mine). Similar to the Lady's treatment of the Jacobites, Ferguson denigrates the American cause by suggesting that they lack authentic conviction—their rebellion is the product of fashion rather than of principle. The impact of this particular method of disparagement is twofold: it demystifies the rebels by depicting them as scarecrows—intimidating on the outside, but without substance—and defends the existing political order by asserting that the rebellion is motivated by licentiousness rather than by liberty.[53]

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[53] John Phillip Reid argues that 'licentiousness' was a word bandied about during the American Revolution, and commonly denoted unrestrained liberty, or liberty running into excess (32). The concern in the eighteenth century was that licentiousness could be

Ferguson's quote further suggests that the *idea* of liberty is often exploited as a means to power; incendiaries harness the appeal inherent in the "cry of freedom" to accomplish their base designs. Whereas Price is convinced that "ENGLAND should venerate the attachment to Liberty amidst all its excesses" (129), Ferguson believes that an "attachment to Liberty" may be a counterfeit; what appears to be the desire for liberty may conceal a desire for control—or simply desire. In her commentary on the '45, the Lady reveals a similar pessimism towards the "cry of freedom." Inserting a quote from a John Dryden play, she suggests that the idea of liberty is often used as a manipulative tool:[54]

> Some popular Chief
>
> More noisy than the rest, but cries halloo,
>
> And in a trice the bellowing herd come out;
>
> And one and all is the word;
>
> They never ask for whom, or what they fight,
>
> But turn 'em out, and shew 'em but a foe;
>
> Cry liberty, and that's the cause of quarrels. (21)

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easily confused with liberty. "Licentiousness," a concerned pamphleteer states, "too often passes upon the world for liberty; yet the licentious are the greatest enemies and disturbers of liberty, though at the same time they cry the loudest for it" (*Licentousness Unmask'd* 5). Reid notes that accusations of licentiousness were commonly used to denigrate the American rebels, stating: "there were many who thought [licentiousness] a peculiarly American trait . . . in the colonies it was not unusual for a loyalist to be a person who felt that the major danger to liberty was posed by the licentious mob" (35). Ferguson's characterization of the American mob inflamed by the idea of freedom, and his argument that the American colonists understood liberty as "unrestrained by morality, a lawless conduct" (6) suggests that what Ferguson is critiquing in this passage is licentiousness—he indicates that the colonists have, indeed, confused liberty with anarchy.

[54] The quote is from John Dryden's "The Spanish Fryer" (1681), which was written and performed during the Exclusion Crisis.

Liberty becomes the "cause of quarrels" rather than the objective—the means as opposed to the end. The "bellowing herd" is incited by the cry of liberty, but not because they desperately seek genuine liberty; indeed, Dryden's text indicates that although they respond to the cry of liberty, they do not understand or even care for "what they fight." The sheep-like rebels resemble the eloping young girls in their lack of understanding regarding the true nature of liberty: neither party is fully aware of what they are pursuing or whom they are embracing. However, the image of the chained brides conveyed on the first pages of the travelogue indicates that the costs of ignorance are high. The Lady is careful to clarify that the Scottish rebels were effectively fighting to maintain what she characterizes as an oppressive political hierarchy administered by chieftains who reigned like "absolute monarchs" or "oriental potentate[s]" (40). "It very frequently happened," she asserts, "that, a chieftain would involve his slavish subjects in the calamities of public contest, to gratify his private ambition, his envy, or his avarice" (40). According to this representation of Scottish society, what may have seemed like liberty from the English in '45 would have resulted in the establishment of a genuinely oppressive government. Similar to the parents with their protective "leading-strings" (5), the English government ultimately safeguards liberty by protecting the rebels from their rapacious chieftains; it is the English who extend "a proper proportion of liberty to the commonality" (40), not "[s]ome popular Chief" (21).

Although the current Revolution remains an unspoken reality in the author's reflections on the '45, the similar nature of the political events organically invites comparison. Indeed, by using Dryden's statement on a past political crisis to articulate her opinion on the Jacobite rebellion, she demonstrates that Britain can gain wisdom

from its former contests and use this knowledge to interpret the present. The Lady's act of using the past to explain the present suggests that her examination of a former political rebellion can be readily and productively applied to Britain's new political rebellion. Once again, a part of the British Empire is rebelling in the name of liberty and is "setting all England in a tremor" (22). The Lady's explanation of the former rebellion's cause and her representation of the offending party posits a reading of the American Revolution that defends British interests and dismantles arguments that favor American independence. In her version of events, genuine liberty is located within England. The Scots erroneously believed that they were fighting for liberty, when they were actually fighting for their own continued enslavement in an oppressive political system. It is the English who, through "the many wise acts since passed" (40), successfully liberated the Scottish people from their archaic practices. Reinforcing the image of England as the seat of liberty is an undeniably significant political statement during a period when England's claim to be the protector of liberty was being aggressively disputed by Britons on both sides of the Atlantic. "A nation," Price reprimanded Britain, "once the protector of Liberty in distant countries, and the scourge of tyranny, [is] changed into an enemy of Liberty, and [is] engaged in endeavoring to reduce to servitude its brethren" (125-126). The Lady cautions that what appears to be liberty may in fact be servitude; Jacobites also "[cried] liberty" (21), only to realize that liberty was what they were resisting. In her suggestive portrait of the '45, the rebellion is instigated by greedy chiefs eager for additional power, and fueled by blind followers armed with skin-deep convictions. Collectively, they are best described as "a rabble of desperadoes . . . not an army" (22). Her portrayal of these past rebels suggests that Britain's current crop of

"desperadoes" have been similarly misled by "some popular Chief / More noisy than the rest" (21) and that their cause is likely void both of meaning and of principle.

The Lady's loaded examples of rebellious subjects suggests that proponents of American independence may actually be contributing to the colonists' eventual distress by supporting their ill-conceived desire for liberation—their misplaced sympathy may, in fact, be fundamentally unsympathetic. She implants the idea that the British government is a bastion of defense *against* tyranny, and that its minor "leading-strings" of restraint effectively protect its populace from their baser instincts and preserves liberty for all. By reminding her audience that constitutional governance functions to protect rather than to undermine personal liberty, the Lady counteracts the criticism of detractors like Price. According to her rendering of rebellion, those who defy the safeguard of benevolent authority find themselves dangerously vulnerable to predatory individuals eager to exploit the lure of autonomy in order to confiscate it. Her sympathetic depiction of authority—both parental and political—reinforces the British government's position during a period when its legitimacy was being questioned both from within and without.

To be clear, the anonymous author of *A Journey* is not attempting to instigate a thoroughgoing hate campaign, either against the Scottish rebels of days past, or against the contemporary American rebels across the Atlantic. In cultivating sympathy towards the British government, she does not simultaneously withhold sympathy from those who have threatened and are threatening its authority. Indeed, her representation of the Jacobites is tinged with the same vulnerability that characterizes her earlier representation of the impulsive young women. Both groups are susceptible to the

emotional manipulations of devious men and both flights of fancy terminate in ruin or near-ruin. Inflaming either anti-Scottish or anti-American sentiment would counteract her overall political investment in the British Empire. In order to preserve the unity of her nation, the Lady must dismantle the revolutionary discourses that threaten the stability of the Empire. Price's support of American independence and Ferguson's conservative defense of war both imperil Britain's cohesion; the Lady seeks to find a middle ground that successfully negotiates the prerogatives of government and the rights of its citizens. The complex negotiations required "to make authority and liberty compatible" or "to find surer ground for obligation and obedience than 'the fear of the rod'" was, as Fliegelman argues, "[t]he great challenge of eighteenth-century politics, familial and national" (14). Through her contemplation of rebellion in both familial and national contexts, the Lady attempts to harmonize authority and liberty by supporting a form of benevolent authority that both ensures and protects individual liberty. The "surer ground" within which this relationship is rooted is sympathy. Her understanding of sympathetic governance is partly contained in the image of the "leading-strings of parental restraint" (5): the exercise of authority should apply itself in the protection rather than in the oppression of the community. The Lady's criticism of the chieftains who operate according to a personal rather than a communal consciousness—prioritizing "private ambition" (40) over the good of the community—indicates the desirability of sympathy in the exercise of authority that parallels Adam Smith's argument for the necessity of sympathy within the organization of society. Smith contends that private desires must be regulated and/or overcome in order to establish a correspondence of sentiments that contributes to the cohesion of society; the acting out

of selfish ambitions or expression of unmitigated feelings introduces a disharmony that fractures relationships.[55] Taking a page out of Smith's book, the Lady suggests that figures or structures of authority must adopt a communal consciousness in order to construct an ethical society bound by the reciprocal imperatives of sympathy. Her precise articulation of the necessity of sympathy within the functioning of the nation-state is where we must now turn.

## "Surer Ground": Sympathy as Political Response

The author of *A Journey* acknowledges that discussing one political rebellion while Britain is engaged in stifling another strays onto sensitive political ground. While discussing the '45, she suddenly avers: "But a truce with politics, they ill become a woman's pen" (22). Her "truce" is deceiving: it appears to convey a temporary cessation of political argument, yet the Lady's self-effacing statement simply serves to divert attention away from the political undertones of her ensuing observations. Having indirectly established the imprudence of granting independence to young and naïve rebels, she proceeds to consider how Britain should manage its so-called 'children.' The period between her travels and the publication of her travelogue was a particularly crucial moment in the American Revolution. The outbreak of open war in the spring of 1775, George III's Proclamation of Rebellion in summer of 1775, and the Americans' Declaration of Independence in the summer of 1776 intensified and complicated debates regarding the appropriate way to respond to the crisis. Parliament was flooded with anti-war petitions and pro-war addresses and pamphlets grappling with the American crisis increased exponentially during this period of political uncertainty

[55] See Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 25-30.

(James E. Bradley 93). As the *annus mirabilis* that was 1776 drew to a close, Benjamin Franklin made it very clear that the Americans would not be easily wooed or coerced back into a relationship with Britain. "These atrocious injuries," he said, referring to Britain's war efforts, "have extinguished every spark of affection for that parent country we once held so dear" ("Dr. Franklin's Answer to Lord Howe" 405).

Given her charged political milieu, it is unsurprising that the Lady's travelogue evinces concern with England's relationship to its periphery. While her reflections on liberty dismantle arguments for independence, her portrayal of Scotland and her biting criticism of Samuel Johnson's travelogue jointly convey both the reason why the colonies must be retained and the method through which Britain can ensure their loyalty. The Lady's observations on Scotland reveal her conviction that colonization is essential to national progress and development; her travel letters detail the economic and cultural benefits of political integration both for the center and for its peripheries. Like Schaw, her paean to colonization implicitly refutes the argument that Britain should acquiesce to the Americans' demands for liberty and sacrifice its largest collection of colonies. However, unlike her aggressively Tory counterpart, she perceives militarism as an inherently destructive and ineffective approach to rebellion; her denunciation of war in past Anglo-Scottish hostilities heavily discourages military action as an appropriate response to internecine conflicts. The Lady's sympathetic engagement with the Scottish landscape and people constructs a model for colonial relations, demonstrating precisely how Britain should interact with its colonies and providing an ideological framework for effective colonization. She advocates for the implementation of sensibility as political praxis, suggesting that Britain's transactions

with its colonies should be rooted in sympathy and characterized by benevolence. Her aggressive critique of Johnson cautions that the marginalization and alienation of non-English British citizens ultimately weakens the foundations of the Empire. By attacking Johnson's response to Scotland, she is able to denounce and dismantle what she interprets as an exclusionary politics characterized by the failure of sympathy. Her criticism of Johnson suggests that Britons must pursue a politics of inclusion and widen the restricted circumference of British national identity in order to accommodate their rapidly expanding borders and the diversity of their inhabitants.

## "Blindness of Heart": The Cost of War

Following the commencement of military action in the spring of 1775 between the American rebels and the troops that Schaw had passed on board the *Boyne*, the issue of war became central to the debates regarding the American Revolution. Whereas Schaw is heartened to hear of the British victory in the Battle of Bunker Hill just prior to her escape from America (210), Britons' reaction to the outbreak of war was seriously fractured. In his 1776 pamphlet "Taxation no Tyranny," Johnson professes to be uncomfortable with the reality of bloodshed, but adopts the particularly Tory argument that punitive measures are necessary in order to discourage the colonists from further rebellion: "Nothing can be more noxious to society, than that erroneous clemency, which, when rebellion is suppressed, exacts no forfeiture, and establishes no securities, and leaves the rebels in their former state. Who would not try the experiment, which promises advantage without expense?" (87). American sympathizers perceived the war either as evidence of their government's increasingly authoritarian personality or as a disastrous political move that would irretrievably alienate the colonies. Criticizing

Johnson's pro-war stance in "Taxation no Tyranny" (as well as criticizing his baffling title), Samuel Estwick condemns war against the colonists as distinctly anti-British: "Dictionary Johnson, cries out for fleets and for armies for America; and treating the body politic, as the French doctors do the body natural, maintains, that the best cure for a fever is to bleed the patient into consumption. This method of cure I had like once to have experienced myself, and therefore may venture to pronounce it a practice ill suited, at least, to an *English constitution*" (10, original italics). British aggression is not only reminiscent of French tyranny, but it is also profoundly perverse given the self-destructive quality of civil war. John Erskine similarly laments the perverse nature of internecine conflict, and argues that reconciliation is only possible through benevolent action: "It is only by gaining the heart, that destroys all inclination to revolt. No victories have such irresistible, happy, and abiding effects, as victories gained by clemency and condescension" (21). Erskine's use of the words "clemency" and "condescension" suggests that the appropriate response to political rebellion is the lenient exercise of power rooted in sympathetic understanding.[56] Unlike these impassioned commentators, the author of *A Journey* does not directly address the civil war occurring across the Atlantic at the time of her travels. She subtly intervenes in the popular discussion through historical analogy; documenting past events that occurred in the places she visits allows her the freedom to consider issues relevant to the American Revolution

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**56** Here I am drawing on the eighteenth-century use and definitions of clemency as "[m]ildness or gentleness of temper, as shown in the exercise of authority or power; mercy, leniency" and condescension as "[g]racious, considerate, or submissive deference shown to another; complaisance" (*Oxford English Dictionary*).

while maintaining enough distance from current events to appear suitably apolitical. As the Lady wanders through ancient Scottish castles and through the ruins of the 1745 Jacobite rebellion, she pauses to consider the drawbacks of militant societies, arbitrary power, the consequences of civil conflict, and the advantages of benevolent governance. Her disquisitions on traditional Scottish society steadily build a critique of militarism and her observations on the 1707 Act of Union remind her current society of the libertarian principles and sympathetic methods that she believes defined them in the past.

Writing the Earl of C— from an old castle in Dalvey with her Highland adventures behind her, the Lady spends the length of a letter reflecting on the history of violence suggested by the architecture of the castle in which she is ensconced and by those that she has encountered on her travels. "[A]ll the castles of this country," she explains, "are built for defence; which precaution was but too necessary in times of civil commotions amongst themselves" (39). The structure's sturdy fortifications 'naturally' lead her into a discussion on the nature of the society that built these defenses, and she uses her observations on the castle's aesthetics as a platform from which to launch into a lengthy polemic on the evils of militant societies and of arbitrary power. She asserts that pre-Union clan culture was characterized by excessive violence motivated by the unchecked exercise of power. Painting Highland society with a broad brush, she observes that it was "their great delight to harass and distress one another" (36) and attributes this incessant hostility to a hierarchical clan system that enshrined the power of the chieftains. "Every chieftain was absolute monarch," she explains, "[b]y virtue of this authority, however originally obtained, or with whatever tyranny carried on, these

chieftains, could with all the supremacy of an oriental potentate, lead forth their slaves to battle" (40). According to the Lady, war was not motivated by the "justice of the cause" or the "propriety of the bloody engagement," but more often than not instigated to "gratify [the chieftain's] private ambition, his envy, or his avarice" (40). Embedded in her condemnation of the clanship system is a trenchant criticism of war. Whereas the Tory administration and pro-war apologists such as Schaw were confident that military action would effectively overawe the colonists and preserve the unity of the British Empire, the author of *A Journey* implies that militancy breeds rather than inhibits aggression. "[A]s is the common practice of war," she pointedly suggests, "to have the power to distress, and the inclination to use that power, [is] exactly one and the same thing" (40). Militarism—having the power to distress—nurtures violence. The Lady establishes that war fundamentally produces divisions rather than unity, the evidence of which is manifest in the fortified castles littering Scotland's landscape. "[I]t appears that they were always altercating," she observes, "so that nothing but arms, and structures almost impregnable, could render their persons or property to any degree secure" (39). The impenetrable structures suggest the alienation and division accomplished by "civil commotions" (39): the physical barricades that the Lady sees symbolize the emotional barricades built by the practice and expectation of violence. Her evocative illustrations suggest that violence—or even the capacity for violence—inevitably fragments nations; societies built upon and sustained by aggression self-destruct as communication and connection are rendered unfeasible in the midst of hostility.

Her assessment of the social repercussions of war is reminiscent of Edmund Burke's criticism of civil war in his 1777 pamphlet, *A Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol*. He states:

> War suspends the rules of moral obligation, and what is long suspended is in danger of being totally abrogated. Civil wars strike deepest of all into the manners of the people . . . By teaching us to consider our fellow citizens in a hostile light, the whole body of our nation becomes gradually less dear to us. The very names of affection and kindred, which were the bond of charity whilst we agreed, become new incentives to hatred and rage, when the communion of our country is dissolved. (149)

The Lady's bleak depiction of clanship society illustrates Burke's belief that civil war creates irreparable schisms by inhibiting sympathy and creating a constricted moral community. Adam Smith made morality contingent upon sympathy in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* and, according to the author of *A Journey*, it is precisely the chieftains' failure of sympathy that destroys their sense of "moral obligation." Motivated by self-interest, the chieftain "involve[s] his slavish subjects in the calamities of public contest" (40) without regard for the welfare of his subjects. The Lady's praise for the changes instigated by the Act of Union in 1707 makes her case for the importance of sympathy in national governance. "[U]nion with England," she states, "regulated the power, and put an end to the inhospitable bickering of these petty princes, and chieftains. Add to which, the many wise acts since passed, have given a proper proportion of liberty to the commonalty. Industry, civilization, and plenty, are the natural consequence of such political, public measure" (40). In her clearly whitewashed and uncomplicated

rendering of the Anglo-Scottish Union and the later Heritable Jurisdictions Act of 1746,[57] England interrupted the cycle of violence perpetuated by the Scottish chieftains by restricting their authority and empowering the people. Her rendition suggests that English governance is characterized by sympathy; unlike the Scottish chieftains, they prioritize the well being of their subjects as evidenced by their protective action of guaranteeing the security of the "commonalty." The "natural consequences" of a political system grounded in sympathy is "[i]ndustry, civilization, and plenty" (40). Whereas the Scottish clan system is described in terms of its insular and destructive qualities, the Lady attributes connection and progress to sympathetic governance. Not surprisingly, modern architecture becomes a symbol of the overall improvement produced by the practice of sympathy; she asserts that the "fair and open temper of the times" is reflected in the exposed aesthetic of modern buildings, forming a contrast to the "inhospitality" (12) of the enclosed buildings belonging to a harsher political period. "Everything is now sufficiently displayed," she observes, "and, whatever charges may be brought against the moderns; neither moralist, critic, or cynic will, I believe, reproach them for concealing their possessions" (12). With the protection of the individual and their property secured by their government (rather than threatened by arbitrary power) and the emergence of a more sentimental politics reflecting the general flourishing of sympathy within social relations, possessions no longer need to be concealed nor persons protected by physical fortifications. Historical precedent verifies

[57] The Heritable Jurisdiction Act of 1746 was passed in the aftermath of the 1745 Jacobite Rebellion. The Act abolished the rights of the clan chieftains to inherit regalities and to act as official judges within their clan. By regulating the power of the chieftains, the English government hoped to dismantle the clan system and discourage future rebellions.

that sympathy as a political practice—other-centered rather than self-indulgent, outwardly rather than inwardly inclined—is morally, economically, and politically sound.

By 1777, Burke was of the opinion that the British government and its people had abandoned the principles that the Lady describes in her rendition of the Union. "[I]n most of the late proceedings," he laments, "we see very few traces of that generosity, humanity, and dignity of mind which formerly characterized this nation." He explains the growing clamor for and support of war as a "blindness of heart" that "arises from the phrenzy of civil contention" (149). In the midst of this warmongering, the Lady subtly reminds her nation that "generosity, humanity, and dignity of mind" are not only what distinguish the British government, but are also the keys to its success as showcased by the stability of the Union. "I dare say there are none," she claims, "who do not rejoice at the friendship which subsists between the two countries" (40). Read in the political context of 1777, her description of the Anglo-Scottish Union reads as a call for what Erskine refers to as "clemency and condescension" (21) in Britain's current contest. Hostility, or "inhospitable bickering," is what her nation abolished in the past, while the extension of a "*proper* proportion of liberty to the commonality" (40, italics mine) is what they offered. Her observations on liberty clarify that, ideologically, she does not support the American colonists' rebellion, nor does she support their political independence; however, her reflections on the Union serve as a reminder that generosity is an effective political tool. What she interprets as the English government's sympathetic measures ultimately overcame the Scots' initial hesitation ("it was a good while before either the higher or lower degrees of the Scots, could be taught to consider

the union of the two kingdoms as either constitutional or salutary" [40]) and yielded a productive friendship. Viewing Fort George near the conclusion of her travels, she reasserts her discomfort with war or violent repression through her aversion to the armory: "I never can conceive much pleasure in beholding so many instruments of destruction to my fellow-creatures" (44). Her statement emphasizes the human aspect of war: the proudly displayed machines are destroying *fellow-creatures*. Her emphasis on the stark reality of violence gently reminds her readers of the horrors of war in an effort, perhaps, to counteract the "blindness of heart" (149) that so profoundly grieves Burke and to restate her opinion of war as an inescapably destructive rather than constructive device.

## "Industry, content, and opulence": The Economics of Sympathy

The Lady's discomfort with militarism is apparent in her observations on the violence embedded in clan culture and manifest in the appearance of weaponry, but it is in her rigorous criticism of Johnson's 1775 travelogue, *A Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland*, that she most clearly advocates for sympathy as a powerful political alternative to intimidation. As the title of her work suggests, the Lady's travelogue is almost as much a disquisition on Johnson's literary faults as it is a reflection on Scotland. Her travelogue is written in the manner of a corrective: lengthy passages enumerating Johnson's errors in judgment, speculating on his malicious motivations, and suggesting his disreputable character are littered throughout the text. The Lady's recorded impressions of Scotland deliberately amend Johnson's interpretation of the northern nation; indeed, she indicates that her travelogue was motivated by a deep-seated desire to vindicate the Scottish nation from those "illiberal aspersions under

which they have too long labored" (43). Addressing the Lord of Seaforth, she states: "The intention of the following work, is, to give a just representation of [your] country" (2). Scholars have interpreted her trenchant criticism of Johnson either as a smart commercial move or as a comment on gender. Zoë Kinsley asserts that the Lady's text "is carefully constructed to exploit current reader interest in both the Highlands and in Johnson, and demonstrates an astute understanding of the way in which the literary marketplace works" (54). Marie E. McAllister, on the other hand, perceives a gendered motivation behind the Lady's criticism, asserting that she is "trying throughout her account to counter the male voice of travel established by generations of male writers before her" (115). Both interpretations of the Lady's engagement with Johnson's text are perceptive and eminently useful. However, I would like to further suggest that the juxtaposition the Lady constructs between Johnson and herself acts as a political allegory; the contrast between the two travellers forms a comparison of two competing attitudes and their associated treatment of Britain's periphery. Careful scrutiny of her condemnation of Johnson and attempt at reparation through her own observations reveals a profound concern with the prejudicial and imperious attitude that underlies Johnson's judgments and behavior. By critiquing Johnson's conduct and correcting his vision, the Lady is effectively condemning an insular form of Englishness that manifests itself as xenophobia. She seeks to disparage this posture and to model an alternative approach to otherness that cultivates connection rather than creates alienation, ultimately proposing an imperial character that extends moral sentiments to those outside of England's reified borders.

Although Johnson's travelogue is not unremittingly unsympathetic or unfair towards his northern neighbors, his observations do tend to emphasize the weaknesses and the failings of the Scottish nation. The landscape is repeatedly characterized as gloomy, desolate, and unproductive—a "wide extent of hopeless sterility . . . incapable of form or usefulness" (*A Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland* 27). He infamously fixates on Scotland's dearth of trees as an indication both of its sterility and of its inhabitants' negligence, declaring that "few regions have been as denuded as this, where many centuries must have passed in waste without the least thought of future supply" (6). The Scottish people are frequently portrayed as incompetent or philistine, their lack of sophistication manifested in their "rude" (83) language, their "incommodious" (14) dwellings, their "mediocr[e]" (119) education, and their uncultivated landscape. Johnson's portrayal of Scotland further perpetuates the sense of threat (both economic and political) that England had long associated with its neighbors. In his explicit and implicit comparisons between Scotland and England, the latter is consistently confirmed as the exemplar: Scotland remains uncomfortably foreign for the English traveler. It is precisely his perpetuation of this English/Scottish hierarchy that infuriated Scots and even discomfited a certain number of Englishmen and women. Discussing the reaction to Johnson's travelogue, Katie Trumpener claims: "*The Journey* was read with bitter indignation by several generations of Scottish readers, for whom it marked the lowest point in Anglo-Scottish relations and served as a lightening rod for nationalist anger" (68). For Scots, Johnson's text epitomized England's attitude towards Scotland; his sense of natural superiority and his criticism of various aspects of Scotland's culture and landscape was taken as an index of England's disdain for its

northern affiliate. Evan Gottlieb observes that Johnson's assumed narrative identity as an objective spectator merely made him appear to his hosts as "yet another overbearing, proto-colonial, southern overseer" (122). Rather than forge connections and contribute to the fusion of the two nations, Johnson exacerbated Scotland's deep-rooted suspicions and animosities towards England by approaching Scotland with what Gottlieb labels "a fundamentally superior subject position" (122). As one anonymous Scottish critic bitterly put it: "The flame of national rancour and reproach has been for several years but too well fed—you too have added your faggot, and well deserved the thanks of your friends" ("Remarks on a Voyage to the Hebrides" 240).

In light of the antagonistic reception of Johnson's text, the Lady's rigorous criticism of Johnson and her own sympathetic portrait of Scotland's geography and culture read as an act of reparation. Her reference to the "the chorus of ironical approbation for the edifying remarks of the great D. J—" (19) demonstrates her knowledge of the hostility with which Johnson's travelogue was received.[58] She willingly joins this "chorus," accusing Johnson of overtly abusing Scottish hospitality by producing a derogatory account of Scotland intended to affirm England's sense of superiority. "What shall be said of a person," she vents, "who, after many printed confessions of kindness, goes deliberately through an extensive track of country, drinking your drink, eating your bread, reposing on your bed, and then, with premeditated malignity, dipping his goose-quill in gall, and returning to his own country, merely to swell her triumph over that, which cherished him?" (23). The Lady

[58] Note that both 'approbation' and 'edifying' are meant here in a purely mocking manner. The line is preceded by the comment that Johnson's "informations, have, I perceive, already attracted the ridicule of our acute English critics" (18).

alleges that Johnson deliberately misrepresented Scotland in order to augment English pride—to "swell" England's "triumph" over its northern neighbor. She insists that, "those who go on the same road, will soon be convinced, how false an account he has given of a country, to the hospitality of whose inhabitants he owns himself so much obliged" (23). By criticizing what she perceives as Johnson's duplicity, the Lady enters into a sympathetic relationship with the affronted nation; she validates their sense of betrayal and expresses a shared antipathy towards the source of their offense. Her adoption of what she envisages as a Scottish perspective of Johnson again evokes a specifically Smithian notion and practice of sympathy. "[A]s we sympathize with the sorrow of our fellow-creature whenever we see his distress," Smith contends, "so we likewise enter into his abhorrence and aversion for whatever has given occasion to it. Our heart, as it adopts and beats time to his grief, so is it likewise animated with that spirit by which he endeavors to drive away or destroy the cause of it" (82). The Lady demonstrates her sympathy by expressing "abhorrence and aversion" towards the source of the Scots' distress; imagining their sense of betrayal, she adopts their resentment and becomes animated by the desire to redress the injuries they have endured. She declares her fellow-feeling with the Scots and identifies her text's intervention in nationalist discourse in her bold statement that "nothing but justice for the opprest, could have obliged me to have spoken my sentiments of Dr. J—'s historical *Ramble*; and, for that I have, though a woman, fortitude enough to stand any attack from the pens of *such* critics, in the defence of *our mountainous neighbors*" (48, original italics).

Her attempt at reparation does not stop at the condemnation of Johnson's travelogue, but is further pursued in her own description of Scotland. The Lady is determined to produce a "just representation" (2) of the nation that gives due recognition to its positive qualities and endeavors to redeem its putatively negative characteristics. She suggests that her consciously sympathetic orientation allows her both to see past the "occasional glooms which seemed to breathe the spirit of melancholy" and anticipate the "gayer and fairer complexion of country [which] always succeeded" (3-4) and to identify the beauty and purpose in the foreign landscape and culture where others had only perceived inadequacy. Distinguishing herself from Johnson and other "literary travellers" who "ever look on the black side of the prospect" (23), the Lady demonstrates an alternative approach to tourism, travel writing, and cross-cultural interaction that presupposes approval ("virtue is the growth of every clime!" [43]). Her endorsement of sentimental travel has political implications that extend beyond the individual journey: she is proposing a way of *seeing* the foreign that transforms both the perceiver and the perceived, generating a mutually beneficial relationship that allows for the growth of both national and international relations.

The author of *A Journey* intentionally divests the Highland landscape of its threatening aspect, desolation and infertility by rewriting it as an Arcadian paradise—the "Elysium of Caledonia" (38), in fact. Under her pen, the Highlands become fecund and pleasing to the cultivated English eye. Nature is abundant in her gifts; the land easily and profusely yields its fruits to its Scottish inhabitants. Describing the landscape near Taymouth, she observes: "[T]his favored spot seems to enjoy every benefit of the boasted South. Nature having poured out her blessings with the hand of profusion;

everything appears to grow with the greatest luxuriance" (30). The road between Dunkeld and Blair is "one of the most agreeable [she] ever travelled" and boasts "cornfields, woods of natural oaks, [and] plantations of fir trees" (35). Indeed, the crops she sees in Scotland may even "rival the boasted production of the English soil" (39), and the villages she visits "[are] not inferior to the most cultivated village in England" (38). Her profuse admiration of Scotland's natural wonders—its "noble rivers" (22), the "splendor" of Loch Lomond (16), the "formidable grandeur" of its numerous waterfalls (30), its "Arcadian scenes" (14)—certainly suggests the landscape may even exceed England in terms of aesthetic beauty. The Lady's descriptions of luxuriant cornfields, plentiful trees, and natural wonders are undoubtedly meant to discredit Johnson's portrayal of Scotland as curiously and unfortunately tree-less and the Highlands as "dismissed by nature from her care and disinherited of her favors, left in its original elemental state" (Johnson 27). She admits to crossing "heaths of almost immeasurable sterility," but assures her audience that "a gayer and fairer complexion of country always succeeded" (3-4). According to this female traveler, the Scottish landscape appears neither foreign nor unproductive. Indeed, after viewing greenhouses successfully growing exotic plants, she suggests that it is prejudice—not mediocre soil, laziness, or an unmanageable wilderness—that has prevented cultivation: "[I]t is nothing but prejudice which can make us suppose any reason why, with proper care, the plants of all countries may not thrive here as well as in England" (49). Blinded by prejudice, Johnson is unable to perceive the potential of the Scottish landscape and soil; his unshakeable belief in England's superiority and concomitant assumption of Scotland's inferiority fundamentally compromises the validity of his observations. The

Lady indicates that her comparatively sympathetic orientation opens her eyes, like those of the Scots in recent years, to the "degree of improvement [of which] their country [is] capable" (4).

Like her description of the Scottish landscape, the Lady's sketch of its inhabitants is similarly sympathetic and calculated to counter Johnson's portrayal of Scottish society. Her professed "just representation" (2) of the Scots depicts their society as composed largely of picturesque peasants and admirable ladies and gentlemen; she removes the threatening and/or foreign aspect of the Scottish character by portraying them as accomplished, civil, and ultimately similar or superior to the English. The inhabitants of a hut she visits receive her with "untaught good nature and hospitality" (27). Comparing her reception at the hut with her reception at the houses of the "genteel and polished" (28), she condemns the latter's generosity as often duplicitous; the genteel "smile, and smile, and murder while they smile" (28), while the goodwill of the Scottish peasants is authentic and restorative. Her comparison effects an interesting reversal of cultural stereotypes, locating real personal danger within upper-class English society rather than Highland society, so often portrayed as a "lawless, primitive and barbaric" (Rackwitz 522). The lady continues to repudiate negative Scottish stereotypes by emphasizing their peaceable society. "[T]here is hardly ever such a thing heard of," she states, "as a Highland robber; their roads are not, like ours, infested by those pests to society" (42-43). She attributes this absence of crime to the superiority of Scottish legal system, whose judicious administration effectively prevents criminal behavior: "Your purse and your person are equally secure; nor do their news-papers, like ours, shock humanity every month . . . [t]heir laws are too wisely calculated for the

good of the community in general" (43). Her praise of their institutions extends to the organization of their churches, whose ethical administration she claims to be worthy of emulation. Contrasting the deeply hierarchical structure of the Church of England with the Kirk, she explains that "[t]heir church is under most excellent regulation" due to the egalitarian structure of the Presbyterian Church. "[H]ere," she pointedly states, "the clergy are upon an equality" (43).

It is not insignificant that she chooses to praise the two institutions that remained under Scottish administration following the Act of Union; she suggests that where the Scots have been allowed a certain amount of self-government, they have surpassed similar English institutions. She infers that the excellence of the Courts and the Kirk is ultimately due to the Scots' remarkable natural capabilities. Unlike the South with its addiction to "softening luxuries" (19), Scots are distinguished for their "general habit of œconomy, which, from the highest to the lowest order of men is here characteristic" (20). In addition to their economically and morally sound habits, the Lady is quick is quick to praise their intellectual and cultural talents, which she presents as advantageous to the British nation as a whole. "[N]o country," she confidently claims, "has produced men, more capable of making a shining figure than *Scotland*; as indeed our Senate, our Army, and our Courts, both of justice and politeness can witness" (43-44, original italics). Although the Act of Union may have provided the condition of possibility for improvement, the Lady argues that the Scots have been assiduous in their own cultivation. Her final impression of Scotland is that the nation is "making large strides to equal us" and that, speaking both metaphorically and literally, "this once naked country [will] become a towering forest" (49). Whereas Johnson somewhat

dispiritedly and condescendingly equates the possibility of cultivating the Highlands to seeing the deaf successfully taught arithmetic in Edinburgh—challenging, but possible given "courage" (121)—the Lady not only emphasizes that cultivation is *already* underway, but that the Scots have *themselves* undertaken the process of self-improvement. They are neither a threat nor a burden to England, but essential to Britain's progress as a commercial and imperial nation. She carefully establishes a reciprocal rather than hierarchical relationship between the two nations. England may have set the precedent, but Scotland now provides its southern neighbor with lessons in matters economic, moral, social, cultural, and intellectual.

The Lady is certainly not unequivocally positive in her assessment of Scotland, raising objections to clan culture, bagpipes, the claustrophobic landscape of Hamilrow, the peasantry's lack of shoes, and the aesthetics of plaid. Yet despite these objections, she is consistent in her desire to liberate the Scottish nation "from those illiberal aspersions under which they have too long labored" (43), both through her criticism of prejudiced travelers and through her comparatively sympathetic description of Scotland. The danger of these "snarlers" is that they "travel not with intent to give the world a fair account of manners and customs, but merely to exaggerate the bad and sink the good" (23). Yet the impulse towards deliberate misrepresentation is a symptom of a greater problem, which the Lady identifies as a lack or circumscription of sympathy in her country's imperial administration. She proposes that Johnson is part of a "set of men, whose prejudices are such, that they think wisdom and worth confined to one spot only, and that spot without doubt, they think *their own*" (43, original italics). The "contracted sentiments" (43) of these men have the toxic effect of inhibiting the

cultivation of meaningful connections, the repercussions of which threaten the British Empire's very foundations. Focusing on what Scotland lacks, English travel writers have been prevented from seeing the wealth of resources apparent to the sympathetic perceiver. The Lady strategically quotes and agrees with Johnson's own words that "I cannot but be conscious that my thoughts on national manners are the thoughts of one *who hath seen but little*," and she asserts that with these words Johnson "condemns himself" (48, italics mine). Her choice of quotation indicates that Johnson's fault lies within his circumscribed vision; the shutters of prejudice have obscured Scotland's potential from his perception. The Lady complains that Johnson and his type—these "querulous gentlemen"—do not grasp that "if the face of the earth was naturally uniform; if destitute of that diversity, which it derives from the hill and valley, the barren heath, the blooming garden, there would neither be any motive to excite the curiosity of the traveller, nor, perhaps, any incentive for one country to connect itself *commercially* with another" (22, original italics). Her message is clear: difference is productive, but sympathy is required to perceive value in the foreign and unfamiliar. Echoing Smith, she argues that sympathy has a transformative impact on vision. Moving within the medium of sympathy, Smith's perceiver is able to transcend his particular feelings and individual perceptions and provisionally feel and perceive in accordance with the object of his sympathy.[59] In *A Journey* as in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, sympathy allows the perceiver to *see* differently. The ultimate advantage of this changed perception is the cultivation of reciprocity; Smith's participants establish social harmony through their emotional and perceptual transformations, while the Lady

[59] Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 11.

emphasizes the specifically *commercial* connections enabled by a worldview informed by sympathy.

The author's suggestion of the connection between sympathy and commerce decisively reveals the politico-economic commitments underlying her endorsement of the extension of British moral sentiments. An earlier comparison of Edinburgh and Glasgow first indicates her investment in the economics of sympathy:

> [Glasgow] is, by far, the greatest commercial town in the kingdom, and that very mercantile spirit, produces those effects in the appearance of the people, which commerce never fails to bestow,—industry, content, and opulence; whilst in Edinburgh, there is poverty, and a sort of northern misery in the very feature of the commonalty—*here*, on the contrary, they appear happy, and debonair. (9, original italics)

Glasgow, she states, is a "modern" (9) city. While Edinburgh's "contracted" design bespeaks and perpetuates a detrimental insularity reminiscent of ancient times, Glasgow's "liberal scale" (9) evinces a generous receptivity to and engagement with the world characteristic of modernity. Edinburgh's "dirty, dismal, and irregular" (9) design effectively resists incursion; its streets are "narrow" (7) and difficult to navigate, the height of its buildings obscure the sun, and its looming castle appears ""impregnable" (8). In contrast, Glasgow's "broad and well paved" streets, "architectural uniformity," and the "spacious" (9) arrangement of buildings creates a hospitable environment for visitors. The corollaries of Glasgow's openness to and involvement in the world—as symbolized by its approachable design and exemplified in its commercial activity—are the twin blessings of happiness and wealth. "[S]uch will ever be the benefits," the Lady

promises, "arising from the seats of trade, to every part of mankind" (9). Her comparison of the two cities directly correlates insularity with stagnation, and openness with progress; these associations are repeated throughout her travelogue—most notably in her criticism of the clan system—effectively building an argument for the necessity of reciprocity in the socio-economic progress of a nation. In light of her economic theory, the Lady's criticism of Johnson and the type of English traveler he typifies suggests itself as a criticism of an insular definition and practice of 'Englishness' that actively alienates other members of the British nation. Trade is imperative to Britain's progress, but the "contracted sentiments" (43) of Englishmen, like Edinburgh's "contracted" design, ultimately repels outsiders and inhibits growth. Alternatively, openness to and engagement with alterity—manifested in Glasgow's "liberal" composition and demonstrated in the Lady's sentimental orientation—successfully establishes vital connections that stimulate progress.

That the city she so effusively praises was intimately connected with the American colonies is a point not to be overlooked. Glasgow's success was built on its commercial connections with the Atlantic trading network; the city was the center and direct beneficiary of the tobacco and tar trade, commodities that were almost exclusively produced in the southern American colonies. Scottish merchants dominated the tobacco trade in the years leading up to the American Revolution, with Scotland receiving 52 percent of all British tobacco imports by 1769 (cited in Alexander Murdoch 76). Streets and houses named after American colonies and powerful tobacco merchants ("Virginia Street," "Virginia House," "Buchanan Street," "Ingram Street") served as reminders of the American source of Glasgow's success (Arthur Herman 169).

That it is specifically Glasgow's relationship with *America* that has produced its "opulence" (9) would not be lost either on the Lady or on her British audience. Her admiration of the city and enumeration of the benefits it has accrued through its Atlantic connections strongly implies the importance of the American colonies to the British economy. The Lady's glowing depiction of Glasgow's display of wealth serves as a concrete reason why Britain should accommodate its colonies: while the absence of trade inevitably produces "poverty" and "misery," Glasgow's American connection has effectively generated "opulence," "happ[iness]," and "content" (9). It would not be far from the mind of either the Lady or her audience that the American Revolution was, to an extent, precipitated by a series of laws regulating trade, interpreted by the colonists as an arbitrary abuse of power. Her emphasis on the importance of trade relations and on a spirit of 'liberality' as opposed to 'illiberalism' in national relations suggests that the British government would do well once again to extend a "proper proportion of liberty to the commonality" (40)—acquiescing to the colonists' initial demands for representation in order to ensure their continued membership within the national family. Her comparison of Edinburgh and Glasgow on the basis of their relational character and commercial activity poses the question to her British audience: which example shall the nation follow?

## A Petticoat Politician?

Given *A Journey*'s condemnation of damaging stereotypes that preclude those targeted from full participation within the nation, it is perhaps unsurprising that its female author also challenges the misrepresentation of women within eighteenth-century culture. The Lady's travelogue is not only invested in defining Britain's national

character and ascertaining the place of Scots within the nation, it also is actively involved in defining (or redefining) femininity and querying the place of women within the nation. Her text shows an acute awareness of what eighteenth-century society deemed to be 'feminine' and 'unfeminine.' She introduces her letters with a long justification of her foray into the 'unfeminine' territory of Paternoster Row. The Lady assures her audience that her travels did not divorce her from the domestic sphere; indeed, her mind remains "untravelled," clinging to the "domestic circle" (3) left behind. Accordingly, she suggests that her original letters from Scotland should be interpreted as physical manifestations of her connection to home rather than as threatening symbols of her mobility and independence from the domestic sphere. She explains that the publication of her correspondence is the result of the intervention of an eager friend, who secured an offer of publication by furtively submitting the Lady's original letters into the hands of a "literary gentleman" (4). Her account of the publication process insists that *A Journey* is the product of obedience (an admirable feminine trait) as opposed to ambition (an unequivocally unfeminine trait). The apologetic undertone of the Lady's preface acknowledges that both her mobility and her literary production come dangerously close to transgressing gender boundaries; she distances her physical and literary adventures from a politics of dissent by repeatedly acknowledging and affirming proscribed gender roles. Thus, after launching into a tirade against Scottish political dissidents, she apologizes to her reader for her politically inflected outburst, demurring that "politics ill become a woman's pen" (22) and promising that she will subsequently refrain from broaching political controversy. "I know not a more ridiculous figure," she continues, "than a petticoat pedant, or politician" (22). The Lady

distances herself from the figure of the female politician in her readers' imaginations by drawing explicit attention to the comic nature of the "petticoat pedant." She acknowledges gender boundaries to deflect suspicions that she is participating in similarly transgressive behavior, appeasing her audience by creating a distinction between herself and the manifestly political woman—or those who defy rather than support traditional structures of authority (like the rebellious daughters).

Yet by announcing the incompatibility of women and political conflict, she effectively draws attention to the fact that she is engaging in political discourse; and although she apologizes for her political tangent, *she does not omit it*. Despite her resistance to the figure of the female politician, she posits that moral exigency and sentiment both demand and justify her political involvement. The Lady asserts that her feelings "irresistibly" (22) lead to her political reflections on the Jacobite rebellion. The spontaneous and inexorable nature of her emotions vindicates their expression, as she informs her audience, "[w]hen a woman *sets her heart upon any thing* . . . 'tis not in nature, or argument, to make her easy" (9, original italics). Likewise, she excuses her political intervention in Anglo-Scottish relations by insisting that her involvement is impelled by a sense of moral responsibility. "I have, though a woman," she contends, "fortitude enough to stand any attack . . . in the defence of *our mountainous neighbors*" (48, original italics). She characterizes her intervention as a moral obligation rather than as political dissidence; to ignore her responsibility towards an injured people—suffering under "illiberal aspersions" (43)—would be tantamount to participating in their abuse. Becoming a "petticoat" politician in order to defend Johnson's victims is the

lesser of two evils, comparatively less questionable than ignoring their suffering in the name of propriety.

That her sensibility demands and justifies her political intervention ultimately complicates her mockery of the female politician; the Lady's theoretical affirmation of gender roles is contradicted by her own practice. By configuring sensibility as a form of responsiveness that assists in the administration and integration of the British Empire, she concomitantly infers the particular fitness of women within imperial politics. Indeed, her self-positioning in relation to Johnson suggests her comparative facility for the work of socio-political analysis demanded by the travelogue genre and for the complex negotiations demanded by national and imperial politics. It is Johnson who ultimately cuts a "ridiculous figure" (22) rather than the female author who dares to address politics; he is "totally unfit for the task he undertook" (48), while the Lady's fitness for the task of political mediation is implied through her ability to correct Johnson's lapses in judgment. The superiority she demonstrates within the province of national and imperial relations throws into question her laughter at the "petticoat pedant" and suggests its function as a clever literary mechanism for obscuring her own political purposes. Her mockery of politicized women capitulates to her society's standards of femininity, yet her own actions ultimately resist these standards and suggest the broader faculties of women. Sensibility becomes the tool of her empowerment rather than the source of her marginalization; establishing the relevance of the feeling heart beyond the domestic sphere, she also establishes the relevance of women beyond their sequestered domains.

Her subtle derision of gender expectations throughout her text obliquely indicates her own personal objections to the restrictive definitions of femininity. After using the word "horticulture," she teases "surely I may in *my* journey, my dear, be allowed one hard word" (13, original italics) and prior to using the word "extravagantly" she pronounces—tongue-in-cheek—that she will now use a "woman's word" (14). The Lady's playful contempt of the gender expectations inscribed in language suggests her skepticism towards eighteenth-century definitions and practices of femininity. Like Schaw, she also deplores the affectation and enshrinement of female weakness, censuring women who exaggerate or internalize their socially constructed helplessness. Admiring the exertion of a "Scotch woman" who walked twelve miles in a day, she declares:

> I think I hear some fine lady amongst my own countrywomen, who affect to be tired with a couple of turns in the Mall, exclaim, Oh! What horrid, indelicate creatures must those women be that could *form* such a plan, much less *execute* it! But I know you will join me in despising the affectation of those females who think, because indulgent Fortune has thrown a coach in their power, they are not to make use of the gifts Nature has bestowed. (16, original italics)

These moments reveal that her attitude towards femininity is not as conventional or as unambiguous as she would have her audience believe. She balks at the intellectual and physical limitations both imposed upon and perpetuated by women, her resistance suggesting the inadequacy and inaccuracy of contemporary delineations of the female sex. The Lady's self-exclusion from typical sentimental categories of femininity—the object of pity or desire—contributes to her suggestion that women as well as Scots are

laboring under specious representations. Mobile, single, childless, and with no romantic attachments or aspirations, she cannot be neatly grouped into any the conventional sentimentalized images of women. She carefully wards off her possible objectification as an object of desire by emphasizing her relative unattractiveness in comparison to other females:

> The ladies here are the great *sublime in beauty*, most of their favourite toasts being five feet eight, or even nine. Methinks, I hear you laugh, and say, what chance stands my little lively friend? Why, they look at me with as much wonder as did the Brobdignags at Gulliver, and spare me, I suppose, out of compassion to my diminutiveness: in my turn I am content, their beaus being much to *high*, to raise in me an aspiring expectation. (8, original italics)

The Lady further reminds her correspondent—who appears to be inquiring into her romantic life—that her "province is to make *remarks* not *conquests*" (39, original italics).[60] Similar to Schaw, she subverts the objectification of women within sentimental literature by assuming the position of the subject rather than the object; as an eyewitness and producer of knowledge, she occupies a position of authority that challenges a gender hierarchy based upon the presumed inferiority of women. In a text that repeatedly condemns divisive cultural hierarchies and exclusive social practices, it seems possible that its author is also offering a rebuttal to the distortions that justify the exclusion of women from various facets of public life through her alternate performance of femininity.

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[60] The language of imperialism ("conquests") in this comment may also suggest a colonial subtext. By distancing herself from the image of the colonizer, she may be defining herself against the figure of the "overbearing, proto-colonial, southern overseer" (Gottlieb 122) that Johnson projects in his travelogue.

## Conclusion

The Lady's mobility is key to her political project; her movement across and narration of the nation impacts the manner in which her readers imagine Britain. She enacts on a national scale Thomas Gisborne's injunction to women to foster "ties of connection" (291) within their local communities. Travel extends her sense of community—the "domestic circle" (3) of which she speaks—to encompass her Scottish neighbors, and extends her conciliatory role beyond the local to the national. I close this investigation of *A Journey* with a final example to clarify how the Lady's act of travel and her political ideology intersect to promote her vision of a unified nation. She marks her entrance into Scotland with a seemingly innocuous comment on the Great North Road: "Nothing need to be said about the road between England and this place, it being so universally known" (6). Penny Fielding's explanation of the symbolic significance of the Anglo-Scottish border and of the Great North Road as "the principle topographic figures on which the social geometrics of the nation rest" (81) suggests that the Lady's focus on the road rather than the border can be read as subtle indication of her political project. "[T]he road and the border," Fielding argues, "provide a visible shape to the nation . . . the border marks the distinction between England and Scotland while the Great North Road traces their union" (81). The Lady's focus on points of connection (the road) rather than points of division (the border) between England and Scotland distinguishes her work from that of her predecessors, and could be interpreted as part of her effort to shape the British nation into a unified space. For example, Daniel Defoe and Thomas Pennant specifically emphasize their act of border crossing and invest their movement between England and Scotland with a sense of jarring transition rather than of

continuity. Defoe's description of the Anglo-Scottish border accentuates the cultural gulf between the two nations. "When we entered upon the *Scotish* Borders," he writes, "the first Town we came to is almost as perfectly *Scots*, as if you were 100 Miles North of *Edinburgh*; and there is very little Appearance of any thing *English* there" (60, original italics). A generation later, Pennant reinforces this image of Scotland as a distinctly foreign space. He asserts that compared with the English landscape which precedes it, "[t]he entrance into *Scotland* has a very unpromising look" (52, original italics), and likens the appearance of Scotland to "the work of a new colony, in a wretched impoverished country" (53). The Lady's comparative silence on the experience of 'crossing over' suggests continuity; her alternate emphasis on the road rather than the border spatially configures Scotland as part of rather than distinct from the national space, indicating that difference need not translate into disconnection. The Lady's sentimental journey maps Britain according to the idea of unity-in-difference, a configuration that disrupts the violence instigated and enabled through the reification of cultural barriers.

Not long after the Lady published her travelogue, Burke conceded that reconciliation between Britain and its American colonies seemed increasingly unlikely given the division that had grown between the two nations. "[B]ut," he stated, "this we know with certainty, that though we cannot reclaim them, we may reform ourselves. If measures of peace are necessary, they must begin somewhere; and a conciliatory temper must precede and prepare every plan of reconciliation" (*A Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol* 155). Burke's statement articulates directly what the author of *A Journey* expresses indirectly in her sentimental travelogue. She uses her representation of

Scotland, her narrative identity, her criticism of Johnson, and her subtle revision of femininity to weave a complex argument for a reformed British national identity that mirrors her sentimental orientation, and urges her audience to develop a national character that is open to the diversity encompassed by Britain's expanding borders. Following in the philosophical track of Adam Smith, she quietly argues that sympathy is necessary to establish a stable, harmonious society. Smith warned his eighteenth-century audience that the absence of sympathy in social relationships creates irreparable fractures through the breakdown of communication. "[I]f you have no fellow-feeling for the misfortunes I have met with," he states, "or none that bear any proportion to the resentment which transports me, we can no longer converse upon these subjects. We become intolerable to one another. I can neither support your company, nor you mine" (26). The Lady's severe criticism of xenophobia manifests a belief in the necessity of sympathy that mirrors Smith's contention: if the English approach their peripheries without a "conciliatory temper" (Burke 155), they risk alienating those "inhabitants" to which they are "so much obliged" (Anonymous 23). The high cost of colonial alienation was being demonstrated across the Atlantic as she wrote her reflections. In the absence of sympathy, Britons and Americans were becoming "intolerable" to one another, and the Lady evinces a specific concern with the economic implications for the Empire if Britain does not adopt the "conciliatory temper" urged by Burke and demonstrated by the Lady's sentimental engagement with and representation of Scotland. With the British increasingly favoring intimidation over sympathy in their response to their American colonists, the Lady chooses to critique forms of authority that assert themselves through physical or emotional violence. She

carefully and cleverly suggests the destructive consequences and moral failure of an imperial politics that establishes itself upon the exclusion and/or subjugation of another people. Her criticism argues for a constructive approach to otherness that cultivates fusion rather than friction, connection rather than division. Surveying the landscape of the once-rebellious Scottish nation, she finds evidence for Burke's belief that sentimental ties "though light as air, are as strong as links of iron" (Burke, *Speech on Conciliation with America*, 128).

The redefinition of Britain according to shared sympathies rather than geographical boundaries is continued in the work of Mary Morgan, whose 1795 travelogue is the subject of the next chapter. However, the decades between the Lady's Scottish tour and Morgan's Welsh excursion saw a shift in the socio-political climate away from the culture of sensibility. Female sentimental travel writers publishing in the final decade of the eighteenth century were forced to navigate a culture that was increasingly suspicious of sentimental forms of expression. The Enlightenment interpretation of humans as reservoirs of emotion was not denied by late eighteenth-century society, but was reconceived as a potentially fearful property as sensibility was increasingly aligned with socially destructive desires. Emotions became a facet of one's character to be overcome or disciplined into submission. Katherine Turner argues that, given the hostility towards the culture of sensibility in the 1790s, both male and female travel writers shied away from Sterne's emotionally flamboyant style and turned towards "a narrative persona which [was] textually and ideologically bland enough to function as a representative of the newly defensive variety of common sense" (201). To assume that sentimental travel met its demise in the 1790s would, however, be

misguided: there continued to be a steady stream of sentimental travel writers during this period, many of whom recognized that emotional expression still functioned as a powerful tool of political persuasion (which is, of course, one of the reasons it was so feared in the socio-political tinderbox that was the French Revolutionary period), or for whom feeling still registered as a necessary correlative of politics. Morgan falls into both categories; despite a rather fashionable distaste for excessive sensibility, she evinces a profound concern with the increasing alienation of feeling from politics in the 1790s. Like the Lady of *A Journey*, Morgan's sentimental persona forms part of her political statement; she resists the pressure to fashion an emotionally neutral character, instead articulating the dangers associated with the *absence* of sensibility in a culture balancing precariously on the knife-edge of political revolution.

# Chapter IV

# Rescuing Sensibility: Mary Morgan's Defense of Emotional Engagement in *A Tour to Milford Haven, 1791*

## Introduction

See what it is to destroy the chain of subordination, which binds the various orders of national society in one common form of polity; that gradatory junction, which can alone give vigour and effect to the laws, extent and circulation to commerce, and create mutual love, and mutual dependence, amid the various ranks of men.
~Anna Seward

[L]oyalty seems, in its common acceptation, to include in it also a sentiment of affection. It is the obedience of love, and anticipates compulsion. It is a sentiment which all men will feel, when they live under a good government, honestly administered.
~Vicesimus Knox[61]

Two decades after the anonymous Lady braved the physical and political terrain of the Scottish Highlands to find substance for her feelings and to forge national connections, her message of enlightened benevolence and her project of national unification were taken up and redeployed by Mary Morgan, a like-minded sentimental traveler. Although the two female tourists traveled in different periods and under the threat of different revolutions, the circumstances and the ideological motivations of their travels are similar: Morgan, as with the anonymous author of *A Journey*, leaves England's tumultuous urban center for its rural retreats in search of a platform from which to convey her vision of a regenerated Britain during a moment when its socio-political degeneration appeared a frightening possibility. While drawn to the equally appealing prospects of sublimity and stability promised by Britain's Celtic Fringe, both

[61] Seward, "Anna Seward to Helen Maria Williams, 17 January 1793," 202; Knox, *The Spirit of Despotism*, 68.

travel writers implicitly conceptualize their journeys and letters as political acts; their movement through and re-presentation of the national space participates in binding the disparate communities, ethnicities, and spaces that constitute Britain in what Benedict Anderson refers to as a "deep, horizontal comradeship" (7). Their sentimental appeal to the idea of a nation bound by ties of affection and experienced as a symbiotic relationship—or as a "mutual dependence, amid the various ranks of men" (Seward 202)—counteracts what they perceive as the revolutionary impulse towards national fragmentation and disorder. Like her anonymous predecessor, Morgan does not travel and write to escape from political reality; rather, her exposure to Britain's social, political, and historical landscape enables her to speak from a position of authority, and to construct an informed response to the spectacle of national disorder and reordering occurring at the time of her peregrinations and publication. However, Morgan's late eighteenth-century context presented a challenge in the form of an emergent culture of anti-sentimentalism that threatened the discourse of sensibility. Fundamental to her project, then, is a defense of sensibility as political praxis that reinforces the value of emotional exchange at a time when sensibility and its attendant practices were being unceremoniously pushed to the margins of political society. The following investigation situates Morgan's text within her immediate political context of the French Revolution and within her cultural context of the trenchant anti-sentimentalism pervading Britain in the 1790s, and explores her counter-revolutionary response to radicalism and reason as expressed through her country house tourism and her antiquarian pursuits in South Wales.

Although details of Morgan's life are scant, her character and circumstances can be pieced together from her publications and from an obituary tucked away in the *The Gentleman's Magazine* and *The Athenaeum* in the fall of 1808. Her husband, Rev. Caesar Morgan, was a vicar and occasional author who published in the various fields of poetry, philosophy, religion, and politics. His obituary upon Morgan's death celebrates her diverse qualities, painting a picture of a devout and intelligent women actively engaged in the social and intellectual issues and processes of her day: "The uniform tenor of her conduct through life conspicuously shewed what a grace, what an odour of sanctity, the practice of domestic virtues, and the duties of religion and humanity, diffuse over a vigorous understanding, a brilliant genius, an elegant taste, and a lively wit" (*The Gentleman's Magazine* 75: 751). The obituary lists her intellectual and social achievements, acknowledging her authorship of *A Tour to Milford Haven* and her philanthropic efforts, noting her "attentions to the wants of the distressed" (751). It fails to mention her editorial work on a small edition of a putatively ancient poem, *The Knyghte of the Golden Locks*, published in 1799. It is significant for the present work that Morgan's sensibility is particularly emphasized; in addition to highlighting her humanitarian and philanthropic efforts, the obituary includes one of her poems that laments the pain associated with possessing a "heart . . . [t]oo full of Sensibility" (751).

The obituary's description of Morgan closely aligns with the more nuanced and particularized persona that emerges in her travelogue. Her letters reveal a woman firmly integrated into the intellectual network of the Bluestocking circle and committed to its Enlightenment ideals of progress, self-improvement, refined sociability, philanthropic activity, moral and cultural reform, and female education. Morgan's

travelogue is in itself an expression of her investment in the practice, promotion, and defense of female intellectual and creative development, or what Elizabeth Eger and Lucy Peltz characterize as the "Enlightenment belief in freedom of enquiry irrespective of nature or gender" (16). "As a female," she argues in her preface, "I have certainly no occasion to excuse my temerity, so many of my sex have shewn they are capable of the most admirable compositions on the most important subjects" (ix). She supports this assertion throughout her travelogue, commending Sarah Scott's and Ellis Cornelia Knight's novels, Elizabeth Montagu's scholarship, and Anna Laetitia Barbauld's and Sarah Trimmer's children's literature. Indeed, Morgan herself appears to have directly benefitted from Bluestocking patronage networks—her subscription list reveals that Elizabeth Montagu (styled by Samuel Johnson as the "Queen of the Blues" [qtd. in Eger 28]) ordered 10 copies of *A Tour to Milford Haven*. The fundamental tenants of Bluestocking philosophy are borne out in Morgan's travelogue. Aided and encouraged by her intellectual milieu and by the expansive nature of the travelogue genre, her topics wander between aesthetic contemplation, poetic expression, sentimental reverie, political commentary, religious reflection, historical fact, antiquarian pursuits, and ethnographic description. Her sharp intellect and emotional registers are finely attuned to the social, political, and aesthetic issues of her day, which her own work explores and to which it contributes.

Morgan's four-month journey took her and her husband from their home in Ely, across the width of England, to his birthplace in South Wales. The purpose of their travels is both social and recreational. "We have two things in view in this journey," Morgan explains, "[t]he first is, to visit friends we have long wished to see, and the next,

to enjoy the prospects of a much-admired and picturesque country, without hurry or interruption" (4). While her excursion took place in the summer and fall of 1791, Morgan did not publish her travelogue until 1795; she acknowledges that the significant gap between her journey and the publication of her travelogue merits an excuse, and explains to her readers that her initial hesitation to publish, the labor involved in compiling and editing her many letters, and her various responsibilities and activities inevitably delayed publication. The eventual result of her efforts is a lengthy travelogue composed of a series of letters to various correspondents, including Elizabeth Montagu and her brother, Rev. William Robinson, and nine other anonymous recipients. The travelogue was published by subscription and the impressive list of names—impressive both in terms of its length and caliber—caught the attention of the critic in *The Monthly Review*, who notes with approbation that "the list is a very handsome one" (274). Despite the "handsome" list of subscribers, however, *A Tour to Milford Haven* received a lukewarm reception from reviewers. *The Gentleman's Magazine* criticizes the travelogue's lack of originality and rigor both in terms of its subject ("[t]his good lady has chosen one of the most public and least picturesque roads in England") and its substance ("[she] has made the most of her book by trifling and common incidents, and now and then a marvelous story" [65: 943]). *The British Critic and Quarterly Theological Review* also takes issue with what it perceives as a well-worn itinerary, and similarly objects to the subjective nature of Morgan's observations: "[I]t was scarce worth while to compose a book, to tell how people were deluged by thunder storms, how they were frighted by darkness, or how they are obliged to buy a new horse when the old one is knocked up. Very trifling events are interesting to the parties concerned,

but the mass of readers are very little affected by 'the joys or sorrows of a chaise and one'" (160). *The Monthly Review* is far more generous in its appraisal of Morgan's text; the travelogue's subjective style, so disparaged by *The Gentleman's Magazine* and *The British Critic*, is the quality admired by the reviewer in the *Monthly*. Although disparaging her attempts at poetry, the critic commends her "talent for description," "taste for the beauties of nature," and "modesty and good sense" (269). Particular praise is reserved for her "great sensibility of temper and disposition" (269); the critic admires Morgan's episodes of sympathetic identification (they do "honour to her feelings") and invests her personable/ personal style with the power of persuasion ("Mrs. Morgan has a vivacity and good humour in her manner, which engage the attention and frequently interest the heart of the reader" [269]). However, the critic feels obliged to note that the "natural and easy style" espoused by Morgan occasionally shades into "that affectation of sentiment and flippancy of language which of late years have infected many of our good writers of travels" (269).

All three reviews of *A Tour* take issue with the sentimental style of travel writing that Morgan adopts in her text; that they each evince varying degrees of antipathy or suspicion towards her sentimental orientation is indicative of the increasing social condemnation of sensibility in the 1790s. The moral threat associated with sentimental fiction in the 1780s quickly became a political threat following the eruption of the French Revolution in 1789, and particularly following its increasing radicalism under the influence of Maximilien de Robespierre and the Jacobins. The merit and function of sensibility and its attendant practices of sentimentalism and sympathy were heavily contested over the course of the Revolutionary period. Britons on opposite sides of the

political spectrum alternately accused one another and the French Revolutionaries of lacking sensibility or of using it immoderately; feeling became simultaneously entangled with Revolutionary excess and with reactionary regression. Although contemporary scholarship continues to struggle over the meaning and status of sensibility in the 1790s, the majority of scholars tend to agree that the culture of sensibility that dominated British society in the last half of the eighteenth century eventually retreated under the pressure of political events. "[B]y the end of the century," Chris Jones argues, "the concept [of sensibility] and its associated vocabulary were virtually unusable except for the purposes of satire" (3). Yet it would be a mistake to assume that sensibility and its associated concepts failed to exert influence in the eighteenth-century's tumultuous final decade; indeed, the controversy regarding sensibility formed a central component of what became known as the 'Revolution Debate.' [62]

The language of feeling dominated early responses to the French Revolution; conservatives and radicals alike enlisted sensibility and its attendant practices in the service of their disparate political agendas. In Edmund Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790), the former defender of the American cause flagrantly draws on sentimental tropes and language both to excoriate the French Revolution and to shore up Britain's hierarchical system. Reacting to Britons' early enthusiasm for the Revolution and to the reignited push for parliamentary reform instigated by the liberal ideas undergirding France's political transformation, Burke defends Britain's

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[62] Markman Ellis incisively contests the dominant narrative of sensibility's downward trajectory during the 1790s, arguing that the discourse of sensibility survives into the nineteenth century, and Janet Todd sees the "sentimental strain" (147) continue to manifest itself in the genres of drama and fiction well after its supposed decease. I would certainly argue that sentimentalism continues to exert its influence within contemporary travel literature.

constitutional monarchy by naturalizing sentimental attachment to prevailing power structures and by demonizing the French Revolutionaries as dangerously unsentimental.[63] "In England," he asserts, "[w]e preserve the whole of our feelings still native and entire . . . We have real hearts of flesh and blood beating in our bosoms. We fear God; we look up with awe to kings; with affection to parliaments; with duty to magistrates; with reverence to priests; and with respect to nobility. Why? Because when such ideas are brought before our minds, it is *natural* to be so affected" (86-87, original italics). Burke sanctions loyalty to traditional structures of authority by claiming the organic nature of these hierarchical relations; his famous statement that "no cold relation is a zealous citizen" (198) encapsulates his idea that national loyalty is simply a natural extension of private affections. These emotional attachments—within families and nations—create affective bonds that stabilize and preserve society through the reciprocal action of sympathy. Burke throws aspersions upon the French Revolution by accusing its leaders of emotional vacuity; they are men unnaturally constituted of "cold hearts and muddy understandings" (77) who have "perverted in themselves, and in those that attend them, all the well-placed sympathies of the human breast" (65). He imputes France's pronounced socio-political instability in the aftermath of the Revolution to their dismissal of the powerful imperatives of the social affections. Situating sensibility rather than reason at the core of social relations, he posits that civic

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[63] Burke was specifically responding to Richard Price's incendiary sermon *A Discourse on the Love of Our Country* (1789), in which the Dissenting minister encourages the espousal of universal benevolence in the place of national prejudice, charges his audience with upholding and extending the rights the British people achieved in the 1688 Revolution, and hails the French Revolution as an auspicious event that he hopes will instigate widespread (read: British) reform.

order is fundamentally compromised by the removal or alteration of traditional social bonds. Burke exposes the danger of this new mechanistic system and its callous disciples in his infamously sentimental depiction of Marie-Antoinette's near-assault at the hands of the angry French mob and the Royal family's forcible removal from Versailles. "Oh!" he exclaims following his unrestrained representation of the Queen's suffering, "what a revolution! and what an heart must I have, to contemplate without emotion that elevation and fall!" (75-76). The desecration of the domestic space (the Queen's bedchamber), the assault on the innocent and vulnerable (the Queen and her children), and the debasement of authority (the royal family) suggests the social chaos that ensues following the disintegration of traditional structures of feeling. His own emotional response to the spectacle of royal suffering suggests a 'natural' reaction that concomitantly indicates the perversity of the Revolution's perpetrators. David Bromwich explains that Burke "constructed politics and morality as a scene of imaginative sympathy with two characters, a sufferer and a spectator, and asked us to recognize, in the way we answer a cry of help or an appeal for loyalty, that in the response we give every ounce of our humanity is at stake" (120).

Various prominent radicals, notably Helen Maria Williams and John Thelwell, challenged Burke's early appropriation of sensibility for the conservative cause. Williams' sentimental representation of the French Revolution in her series of travel letters from France alternatively yoked the values of sensibility to radical politics. In the first of her *Letters*, published conterminously with Burke's *Reflections*, Williams mobilized British support for the French Revolution by framing Revolutionary events within a sentimental narrative meant to appeal to her readers' hearts. She represents

those victimized under the oppressive *ancien régime* as the proper objects of feeling as opposed to Burke's glittering Marie Antoinette. "Must I be told that my mind is perverted," she retorts, "that I have become dead to all sensations of sympathy, because I do not weep with those who have lost part of their superfluities, rather than rejoice that the oppressed are protected?" (148). Williams counters Burke's defamation of the French Revolutionaries as unsentimental rationalists by locating authentic feeling rather than superficial sensibility at the core of the Revolutionary cause. She insists that the leaders of the Revolution are men "well-acquainted with the human heart" (90) and that their sensibility is manifest in France's emerging system of government and evident in the "universal joy" (147) pervading the nation. Her assertion of the Revolutionaries' sensibility demonstrates her shared belief in the moral and political function of feeling; political systems must incorporate sensibility in order to truly serve the people. Similar to Burke's 'natural' sympathy with power, the emotional alignment that she experiences with the Revolution's energy and aims serves as the ultimate evidence of its legitimacy. "It is very difficult … to avoid sympathizing with general happiness," she argues, "[m]y love of the French Revolution, is the natural result of this sympathy, and therefore my political creed is entirely an affair of the heart" (91). Radical appropriations of sensibility lingered throughout the 1790s, one notable example being John Thelwell's mock travelogue *The Peripatetic* (1793). In his walking tour around the English countryside, Thelwell's protagonist creates an argument for the "finest susceptibilities of nature" (178) against the "maxims of cold-blooded apathy" (179). He stresses the revolutionary rather than the conservative quality of sensibility by linking emotional responsiveness with a reformist agenda, insisting that true sensibility cannot help but

be actuated by the "picture[s] of oppression" (143) populating Britain's landscape. "The subject of our political abuses," he declares, "is so interwoven with the scenes of distress so perpetually recurring to the feeling observer, that it were impossible to be silent in this respect, without suppressing almost every reflection that ought to awaken the tender sympathies of the soul" (viii). Drawing on Williams' strategy, Thelwell asserts that it is difficult to avoid sympathizing with general *un*happiness; his heart ultimately directs his actions towards the general good—in his case, towards the victims of Britain's asymmetrical power relations.

The radical backlash against Burke's sentimental attack on the French Revolution and the conservative reaction to the Revolution's increasing radicalism contributed to the eventual ignominy of sentimental discourse. Mary Wollstonecraft, Thomas Paine and William Godwin produced some of the most critical (and, in Paine's case, the most widely disseminated) responses to Burke's *Reflections*, attacking his political manipulation of sensibility and exposing the fundamental irrationality and degenerate solipsism of his sentimental methodology and the vacuity of his 'natural' feelings. All three respondents placed reason above sensibility as the appropriate foundation of moral and political action, rescuing rational idealism from its dubious status as the "barbarous philosophy" (77) in Burke's *Reflections*. Wollstonecraft's prompt response to Burke in *A Vindication of the Rights of Men* (1790) takes the politician to task over his sentimental defense of the established government and of institutionalized inequality. "Sensibility is the *manie* of the day," she observes, "and compassion the virtue which is to cover a multitude of vices, whilst justice is left to mourn in sullen silence, and balance truth in vain" (5, original italics). Wollstonecraft

repeatedly yokes sensibility and corruption, suggesting that—*pace* Burke—instinctual feelings obscure rather than reveal immutable truths. Reason or "reflection" (57) is required for the emergence of truth; it is the "sober suggestions of reason" rather than the "pretty flights" of "pampered sensibility" (9) that contribute to the amelioration and development of society. Wollstonecraft grants the emotions a formative role within the individual and within society, but warns that they must submit to reason in order to avoid the dangerous solipsism or the "partial feelings" (53) exhibited by Burke. In his immensely popular *Rights of Man* (1791), Paine reiterated Wollstonecraft's antipathy towards Burke's sentimental rhetoric and shared her conviction in the revolutionary potential of reason. "Mr Burke should recollect that he is writing History," he rebukes, "and not *Plays*, and that his readers will expect truth, and not the spouting rant of high-toned exclamation" (100, original italics). Paine suggests that Burke is misled by his feelings into forming irrational judgments and misguided sympathies. He carefully distinguishes between actions "excited by personal hatred" and those generated by "rational contemplation" (99), arguing that the former—limited by its narrow scope—fails to accomplish the transformation of the latter. Although this distinction is made within a discussion of political revolutions, Paine's comment also applies to Burke's political argument in the *Reflections*: "excited by personal hatred," Burke cannot see the proverbial forest for the trees. "He pities the plumage," Paine states, "but forgets the dying bird" (102). By attacking the substance and style of Burke's *Reflections*, both Wollstonecraft and Paine attempt to diffuse the powerful pull of his feelings and discredit the validity of his 'natural' affections.

Godwin's contribution to the Revolution Debate provides what is perhaps the most resounding statement on what Wollstonecraft calls the "sovereignty of reason" (57) and earned him the dubious reputation of "the coldest-blooded metaphysician of the age" (Jones 87). The first edition of *An Enquiry concerning Political Justice* (1793), which appeared three years after Burke's publication, takes an expansive view of political society, the nature of man, and the ethical and epistemological questions related to the concept of revolution. Like his radical contemporaries, Godwin argues that societal progress is dependent upon the expansion and exercise of reason rather than the operation of sensibility, asserting that "[i]t is not the frenzy of enthusiasm, but the calm, sagacious and deliberate effort of reason, to which truth must be indebted for its progress" (195). He rejects Burke's argument—and, by extension, that of the Scottish moral philosophers—regarding the connection between primordial affective ties and responsible citizenship.[64] It is not the capacity for sympathy that produces a good citizen, but the capacity for ratiocination unfettered by emotional considerations. Godwin juxtaposes the dictates of reason and feeling in his infamous 'fire clause': if a building were to go up in flames containing François Fenelon and a close relation (wife, mother, or benefactor), reason enables an individual to overcome his/her partial feelings and choose the action that benefits the whole—in this case, rescuing the philosopher rather than the relation. His example suggests that emotional attachments counteract the "general good" (82) as they incline individuals to the immediate rather than to the universal, leading Godwin to rank reason as the faculty most suited to guide humanity in its march towards perfection. "For Godwin," Evan Radcliffe summarizes,

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[64] See Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, 46-47, 198; and Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 268.

"ties of kinship, affection, or gratitude simply inhibit us from choosing the proper action. And he renounces the reliance on the affections common in British moral philosophy, invoking abstract justice, rather than fellow-feeling or sympathy, as the basis of his system" (68). Godwin interprets both the conservative commitment to hierarchy and the disturbing turn towards violence in the French Revolution as products of unthinking, unreflecting sensibility, concluding that unregulated feeling leads society to choose the wrong actions or constrains it to inaction.

However, the attack on sensibility was not confined to radical polemicists; conservatives and radicals came to share a suspicion of emotional communication and each accused the other of manifesting the execrable quality. Sensibility became synonymous with degeneracy; radicals associated it with political and moral corruption (exemplified by Burke) while conservatives worked to align sensibility with moral and political disorder (exemplified by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Jacobins). In George Canning's prototypically conservative rendering of sensibility in *New Morality* (1798), the poet imagines sensibility as a young woman irreparably corrupted by her association with Rousseau and radical politics. He addresses the now-contaminated quality:

> Sweet child of sickly Fancy!—her of yore,
>
> From her loved France Rousseau to exile bore;
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Taught her o'er each lone vale and Alpine steep
>
> To lisp the story of his wrongs, and weep
>
> . . . . . .

—Taught by nice scale to mete her feelings strong,

False by degrees, and exquisitely wrong;—

—For the crush'd beetle *first*, —the widow'd dove,

. . . . . .

*Next* for poor suff'ring *guilt*;—and *last* of all,

For Parents, Friends, a King and a Country's fall. (125-139, original italics)

Canning's representation of sensibility emphasizes its dangerously solipsistic tendencies and worrisome vulnerability; its easy conversion to radicalism and obvious misdirection marks it as a fundamentally volatile quality. The morally suspect character of sentimentalism is further expressed by Rev. Thomas Rennell, who thunders against the "miserable artifices, and poor plausibilities, of those, who under a pretence of promoting sentiments of benevolence, have only pandered to those wretched passions, and promoted that deplorable licentiousness, which has in its operation carried disorder, havock, and misery among mankind" (1-2). Rennell's alignment of radical sensibility with moral transgression became commonplace by the latter half of the decade, spurred by the flagrant violence of the Reign of Terror and the scandalous revelations concerning the personal lives of several prominent radical figures. Robespierre's bloody vengeance, the violence of the revolutionary mobs, and the revelations of sexual immorality in Rousseau's memoirs (*Confessions* [1782-1789]; *The Reveries of a Solitary* [1789]), in Godwin's perhaps ill-conceived biography of Wollstonecraft (*Memoirs of the Author of a 'Vindication of the Rights of Women*' [1798]), and in salacious reports regarding Williams' relationship with the married John Hurford Stone were quickly blamed on emotional excess by conservative critics.

Nathaniel Kent describes the revolutionary fervor among the laboring class as a "running into excess" (173), Anna Seward speaks of Paine's "system of equality" as effectively "abandon[ing] all mankind to the dominion of their own fierce desires" (203), and Richard Polwhele draws attention to the "loose desires" (42) of infamous female radicals. Maria Edgeworth's consideration of sensibility in *Practical Education* (1801) encapsulates the conservative reaction to emotional responsiveness by the end of the eighteenth-century:

> Experience does not teach us, that sensibility and virtue have any certain connexion with each other. No one can read the works of Sterne, or of Rousseau, without believing these men to have been endowed with extraordinary sensibility; yet who would propose their conduct in life as a model for imitation? That quickness of sympathy with present objects of distress, which constitutes compassion, is usually thought a virtue, but it is a virtue frequently found in persons of abandoned character. (4)

Sensibility, according to Edgeworth and many anti-Jacobin writers, is too volatile and too slippery to be trusted. Contaminated by its associations with political radicalism, sensibility became a questionable quality and was confined to only the most regulated and disciplined contexts.

Whether feeling was being appropriated or excoriated, it was undeniably and intensely political in the 1790s. The French Revolution and the debate that it instigated in Britain reiterated and reevaluated the issues discussed earlier in the century within Scottish moral philosophy regarding the nature and function of feeling. Are the emotions vicious or virtuous? To what extent should an individual be guided by their

feelings? To what extent should social affections influence politics? What are the broader implications of sympathy (or, how does it/what is its function within society)? Jones argues that these debates over sensibility were fundamentally debates about politics, and that what has been termed as the "problem of sensibility" (Markman Ellis 190) must be explored in order to understand the terms of the political arguments that rocked the period. He states:

> The debates of the 1790s were characterized by a politicizing of issues raised within the school of sensibility to the extent that one's stand on matters such as the conduct of the private affections, charity, education, sympathy, genius, honour, and even the use of the reason, became political statement, aligned with conservative or radical ideologies. Under the suppression of direct political expression, these issues became a code in which conservative and progressive thinkers proclaimed their allegiances and work out terms of accommodation. (13)

Marilyn Butler stresses that these debates were primarily concerned with the structure of British rather than of French society. "The effect," she asserts, "is not that of a protracted university seminar, dedicated to studying events overseas, discussion centres instead on British society, what it is like and what it ought to be . . . the word 'revolution' comes to have a meaning that is close to home and practical" (1). Mary Morgan inserts herself into this national debate simply by adopting a sentimental persona; choosing to write within the school of sensibility was not a neutral act, and it implicates her text in the politically freighted discussions regarding the sensible self and the social affections. Her critique of the radical excess associated with Rousseau in her

prefatory material immediately suggests her political orientation and ideological commitments. Publishing during the *annus mirabilis* that was 1795 and after an equally distressing year that saw the full flourishing of the Reign of Terror in France and ended with the Treason Trials in Britain, Morgan admits that a sprightly account of her peregrinations may appear to lack discretion. "Perhaps this Book could not come out at a less favourable time than the present," she concedes, "when the fate of princes and kingdoms is hourly at stake. At such an awful period I cannot expect it should attract attention for a moment" (v-vi). From the time of her trip in 1791 to the time of her text's publication in 1795, her political context had drastically changed: Britons had transitioned from being cautiously optimistic spectators of the French Revolution to being engaged in a full-blown war against both the French army and French ideas. That she acknowledges Britain's current crisis indicates her political awareness; that she condemns the precarious status of authority as "awful" suggests her politically conservative tendencies, which are further indicated in her pointed criticism of sentimental literature.

Distinguishing between her work and that of other sentimental writers, she states: "In an age, which abounds with idle, not to say licentious productions, and when the press groans with a species of novels, replete with what a Reviewer very significantly terms 'sentimental profligacy,' if in such an age an observer of nature can induce his readers to 'look from nature up to 'nature's God,' his work may not only prove amusing but beneficial" (x-xi). Morgan's condemnation of "sentimental profligacy" illustrates Jones' contention that British writers encrypted their political loyalties in their discussions of sensibility and its associated concepts. Her reference to

Rev. Rennell's denunciation of a particularly Rousseauvian strain of sentimental literature in his published sermon, *The Connexion of the Duties of loving the Brotherhood, fearing God, and honoring the King* (1792), clearly aligns her opinion with conservative politics. It is politically significant that the phrase occurs during Rennell's pointed criticism of the French author, who he accuses of subverting the morals of a generation by promoting radical socio-political ideologies in the guise of sensibility. "The mischief done to morality and religion by Rousseau," he rages, "are beyond all calculation. The passions, in their worst excesses, are painted by him in the garb of virtue; and, by these means, the progress made to vice is most artfully rendered imperceptible to the unwary mind" (2). Rebuking the excessive sensibility associated with Rousseau by invoking Rennell's severely conservative defense of "SOCIAL SUBORDINATION and RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLE" (3), Morgan simultaneously distances her work from the subversive tendencies of the culture of sensibility and asserts her disapproval of radical politics.

Her excoriation of "licentious productions" is not a disavowal of feeling *per se*, but of a particular emotional orientation associated with socio-political radicalism—excessive, unregulated, self-indulgent, and leveling. Indeed, Morgan defies the trend towards "a narrative persona which is textually and ideologically bland" (Katherine Turner 201) that emerges in the travel literature of the 1790s to accommodate the reactionary conservatism of the period. As her reviewers indicate, Morgan's narration clearly marks her as a sentimental traveler. Their compliments and criticisms jointly emphasize the sentimental nature of both the author and her text, alternately praising her "great sensibility of temper and disposition" (*The Monthly Review* 269) and

castigating her "affectation of sentiment and flippancy of language" (274). That the persona Morgan projects is indebted to the Sternian tradition is indicated by several characteristics. Her interest in the interpersonal and anecdotal (derided by her critics as "trifling and common incidents" [*The Gentleman's Magazine* 65: 943]) and the contemplative pace of her travels (she states her intention to travel "without hurry or interruption" [2]) contains shades of Yorick, who likewise magnifies "nonsensical minutiae" (Sterne 104) and expresses his preference for a "pensive pace" (96). Her orientation towards sympathy is manifested in her professed commitment to cultural sensitivity (she asserts her "difference of opinion" from those who characterize the Welsh "to be an ignorant and uncivilized set of people" [xiii]) and in her admission and performance of a sentimental disposition. "I never remember that time in my life," she claims, "when I could laugh at the sufferings of a fellow-creature, whether deserved or undeserved, real or imaginary. However, I took great care to conceal these emotions, taking it to be a great defect in my nature, that I should be ready to weep at what diverted every body else" (433-434). Similar to Yorick's contention that sentimental travel is experienced as an opening up to and recognition of authenticity (Sterne 81), Morgan identifies the value of a sentimental orientation as its ability to perceive truth rather than perpetuate stereotypes:

> Travelers, who only run through a country, perfect strangers to every body in it, take their notions of people from inn-keepers, and, with a degree of arrogance and folly hardly to be conceived in persons who set up for delineators of manners, positively set a place down for good or bad, for polite or uncivilized, just as the inns at which they stop happen to be comfortable or not, or the

> landlord obliging, or the contrary. To discover the genius, disposition, and natural bent of a people, requires a much longer acquaintance with them than a night's stay at an inn. (xiv)

Her censure of the disengaged traveler mirrors Yorick's critique of Mundungus—who "travell'd straight on, looking neither to his right hand or his left lest love or pity should seduce him out of his road" (84)—and likewise suggests sympathy as a precondition for true knowledge. Unlike the deceptive and degenerative nature of Rousseau's "artfully rendered" (Rennell 2) sentiments, Morgan's 'natural' feelings reveal truths that work towards the amelioration of her community. Similar to Burke's consecration of his feelings as internal repositories of truth—*naturally* drawn to what is right—she aligns her feelings with discernment rather than deception, with morality rather than corruption, and with communal profit rather than self-indulgence. Her reproof of "sentimental profligacy" creates a distinction between her affective prose and the more suspect emotionalism found in sentimental fiction; she accrues moral credit by asserting that her sensibility is rooted in religious rather than sensual feeling. "[T]here is no reason," she states, "why I should not depicture scenes that have so often elevated my ideas, and awakened in me a thousand moral and religious sentiments" (x). Morgan posits a spectrum of sensibility bracketed by "sentimental profligacy" on the one side and "moral and religious sentiments" on the other. She is careful to position herself on the opposite end from Rousseau—castigating excessive sensibility, but advocating for feeling that emits from moral and religious sources.

Indeed, Morgan is invested in rescuing sensibility from the ignominy of Jacobinism; her text gradually reveals itself as a defense of feeling within a culture that

was—in theory if not always in practice—increasingly hostile to sensibility and its attendant practices. Drawing on older, Enlightenment ideas of sympathy as a cohesive social force, she persistently advocates for the importance of feeling within social relations. The necessity for balance between the dictates of reason and feeling rather than the strict subordination of feeling to reason become clear as Morgan witnesses and negotiates the interactions of self and other throughout her travels. Responding to the rational idealism of the Godwinian strain of radical philosophy and to the reactionary pragmatism of the conservative vanguard, she contends that feeling must be allowed to inform social relations in order to achieve the societal progress so important to radicals and the social stability desired by conservatives. Morgan published her travelogue at a moment in time when national stability appeared tenuous both at home and abroad; her foreboding representation of "princes and kingdoms" (v) as threatened by the hour captures the sense of anxiety that permeated British society at the time of the text's publication. British troops were floundering against France's advancing army on the Continent; riots over military impressments and bread shortages erupted across the nation in the spring of 1795 and lasted well into the summer; and reform societies continued to flourish despite opposition. The British government responded to the threat of revolution by becoming progressively authoritarian—instituting surveillance operations to monitor its citizens and introducing repressive measures to stifle both real and imaginary threats to Britain's political stability. The aggressive repression of radical activity reached its peak in the mid-1790s with the much-publicized Treason Trials of 1794, concurrent suspension of habeas corpus, and introduction of the Treasonable Practices Act and the Seditious Meetings Act (also known as the 'Gagging

Acts') in 1795. These external and internal pressures produced a British public that both Godwin and Thelwell characterized as conspicuously paranoid; Godwin referred to his public as "panic struck" (xii) and Thelwell represented the British nation as buffeted by a "torrent of popular delirium . . . by which the tranquility of every district in the kingdom has been so artfully disturbed" (vii). More recently, M. O. Grenby has declared that "[i]t is impossible not to notice the sort of communal psychosis which permeated British society in the 1790s and beyond" (7). While the British government was aggressively stifling Revolutionary activity and radical sentiment in order to prevent a political upheaval similar to the French Revolution, Morgan suggests that it is the cultivation of sympathy rather than the suppression of dissent that forms the basis of effective governance. Through both her own sentimental exchanges and her description of the estates she encounters in her journey to and through Wales, she observes that relationships and societies are held together by the complex working of sympathy rather than through the operation of fear or the application of reason. She repeatedly casts aspersions on forms of governance that rely on violence to establish and maintain authority, questioning the political efficacy of aggression and authoritarianism through her representation of their ultimate instability. In a period that saw sensibility excoriated as potentially subversive and a threat to social order, Morgan suggests that the greatest threat to social order is actually the cultural demise of sympathy; it is the possession and operation of a 'feeling heart' that effectively engenders social harmony rather than endangers it.

Despite her conservative leanings, Morgan is unwilling to ally herself with a particularly reactionary school of conservatism that abjured progression; she cautiously

supports a reformist platform that corresponds with the moderate social reforms promoted by the Bluestocking circle in which she was fully immersed. Although, as Gary Kelly explains, Bluestocking women "were so well connected with the established order, and had such a vested interest in it, that they resisted radical change to it," they actively promoted social agendas that sought "the moderation and modification of the established order" (*Bluestocking Feminism* xiii) according to their broadly middle-class interests and values. Grenby argues that the conservative reform movement in the 1790s was explicitly invested in averting a French-style revolution. "[A]nti-Jacobins," he asserts, "found Britain possessed of a brittle social structure, riddled with corruption, which, if not quickly shored up, might collapse at any moment and achieve that which French agents, arms and principles had thus far found impossible" (6). Morgan favors a Burkean style of gradualism dedicated to building upon tradition rather than beginning anew; she advocates for reforms that will stabilize Britain's foundations rather than threaten the integrity of the whole. Her statement on educational reform is suggestive of her position on political reform:

> People must be aware of expecting more than is intended to be done, and of being in too great a hurry to see this change. It must come on by very slow and almost imperceptible degrees, as indeed all permanent improvements in education and manners do . . . Whatever is done with an intention to last, must be done gradually; and even then people should not expect to see them either polished in their manners or well-informed; for nothing more is necessary than to teach them the fundamental principle of the religion they profess, decency of

> behaviour, and cleanliness of person. In short, "to do their duty in that state of life, unto which it has pleased God to call them." (320)

Morgan's gradualist philosophy mirrors Burke's contention that change is both inevitable and even salutary, but that it must be pursued thoughtfully and with an eye to tradition.[65] Her engagement with the British landscape and culture is politically invested in reforming British society according to its foundational principles in order to prevent its complete subversion according to French principles. She turns her estate tours and her visits to ancient ruins into veiled contemplations on the nature of power, consistently condemning authority motivated by profit and perpetuated through force while advocating for forms of authority predicated upon service and maintained through reciprocity. She connects aristocratic decadence, the government's wartime policies, and patriarchy: all are self-serving mechanisms that operate through exploitation and repression and merely invite retribution. Britain's stability, she argues, depends upon an aristocracy alive to its duties and obligations, a government grounded in sympathy, and the inclusion of women in the management of the state. Although Morgan consistently solicits allegiance to traditional structures of power, she posits that the preservation of those structures is contingent upon their moral and social renewal; in order to survive the magnetism of revolution, they must appeal to and secure the sentiments of their population.

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[65] "Our patience," Burke asserts, "will achieve more than our force . . . By a slow but well-sustained progress, the effect of each step is watched; the good or ill success of the first, gives light to us in the second" (170).

## "I am ready to weep, instead of laughing": An Apology for Sensibility

Morgan's dedication to the Countess of Winterton opens with a pointed criticism of what Burke refers to as the "mechanic philosophy" (77) of radical politics. "There is nothing more mortifying to an affectionate heart," she states, "than to be restrained, through fear of the world, or of giving offence to the delicacy of a friend, from expressing the dictates of its regard. Yet, according to the present system of things, every mark of attention to a superior rank is so liable to be construed into adulation, that real affection is often obliged to be silent" (iv). Her comment is an obvious reference both to Richard Price's infamous sermon, *A Discourse on the Love of Our Country* (1790), and to Edmund Burke's reply to Price in *Reflections on the Revolution in France*.[66] In his provocative address, Price condemns what he refers to as the "idolatry" (24) of authority figures, arguing that the veneration of superiors participates in creating relationships of exploitation. "Adulation," he contends, "is always odious, and when offered to men in power it corrupts them . . . and it debases those who offer it, by manifesting an abjectness founded on improper ideas of themselves" (22). Burke responded to Price's egalitarianism by arguing that the admiration inspired by and due to society's leaders is a feeling as natural as that of the familial love between children and their parents ("We fear God; we look up with awe to kings; with affection to parliaments; with duty to magistrates; with reverence to priests; and with respect to nobility. Why? Because when such ideas are brought before our minds, it is *natural* to be so affected" [86-87, original italics]). He accuses Price of replacing instinctive affections with an artificial construct that suppresses or ignores human nature. "As things now

[66] That Morgan was familiar with Burke's *Reflections* is also evident from her direct (mis)quotation of his line: "[t]he age of chivalry is gone" (Morgan 387).

stand," Burke observes, "with everything respectable destroyed without us, and an attempt to destroy within us every principle of respect, one is almost forced to apologize for harbouring the common feelings of men" (80). Morgan's comment to the Countess of Winterton that "real affection is often obliged to be silent" directly echoes Burke's statement on the newly suspect status of sympathy with the privileged; in the same vein as Burke, she suggests that the egalitarian demands of political radicals such as Price effectively stifle the expression and operation of "real affection." That the Countess is revealed to be Morgan's cousin at the conclusion of her dedication serves to emphasize the perversion of Price's mechanistic system: despite the familial relation between Morgan and the Countess, her cousin's social position nevertheless renders the feelings of an "affectionate heart" questionable according to the exigencies of egalitarianism. The conflation of private and public affections in figure of the Countess speaks to Burke's concern that radical politics ultimately threatens the cohesion of society by attacking all domestic and social ties—from the primordial to the political. Analyzing the potential socio-political impact of Price's "barbarous philosophy," Burke cautions: "On this scheme of things, a king is just a man; a queen is but a woman; a woman is but an animal; and an animal not of the highest order . . . Regicide, and parricide, and sacrilege are but fictions of superstition . . . the murder of a king, or a queen, or a bishop, or a father are only homicide" (77). By demanding equality, radicals effectively reduce humans to mere objects and expunge their humanity by denying the common feelings of humankind. The conclusion that social chaos is the inevitable result of this mechanization and dehumanization of society is evoked by Burke's immediate transition to its violent and anarchic consequences: regicide, parricide, and sacrilege.

Morgan illustrates Burke's concern in two contemplations that explore the connection between sensibility and social responsibility. Using William Cowper's poem *The Diverting History of John Gilpin* (1782) and Cervantes' *Don Quixote* (1605-1615) as examples, she demonstrates the depth of her own sensibility while exposing the deficiency of feeling within her culture. She questions the tendency of British readers to laugh at John Gilpin's and Don Quixote's misadventures rather than sympathize with their torment; or, to restate the question, she wonders how suffering—whether real or imagined—can become the object of comedy. After recapitulating Gilpin's distressing journey, Morgan reveals her own, atypical response to the text: "You will, perhaps, think me affectedly generous, when I say that I am ready to weep, instead of laughing, at John's misfortunes" (6-7). She describes a similar emotional reaction to the Knight of La Mancha's delusional exploits in *Don Quixote*: "I was always affected with tenderness by those parts, at which others professed to have laughed the most heartily, I mean his distresses. Indeed I never remember that time in my life, when I could laugh at the suffering of a fellow-creature, whether deserved or undeserved, real or imaginary" (433). Morgan attributes her sympathetic reaction to her responsive sensibility, asserting that her inability to find diversion in the unfortunate protagonists' misadventures is the product of a Smithian practice of sympathy in which she transports herself into the position of the victim(s) and inhabits their suffering (6-7, 434). "Who," she asks, "[can] forbear to participate in their sufferings, or can withhold their esteem and affection from them? Yet there are those who are so cruel as not feel for the undeserved misfortunes of my admired knight of La Mancha" (432). She suggests that the impulse towards laughter is the result of a worrisome perversion of

the moral imagination. "[S]hould they see a man in the situation in which poor John is described to be," she observes in regards to Cowper's text, "[they] would themselves run great hazards to prevent his getting any hurt. Why then do they laugh at the description of a scene, at which were they to be witnesses, every one of them would tremble?" (8). Burke ponders a similar question in regards to the British response to the demotion of the French royal family, wondering how his countrymen could exult in their suffering. He insists that humans "are so made as to be affected at such spectacles with melancholy sentiments upon the unstable condition of mortal prosperity" (80). Burke attributes the corruption of humanity's moral constitution to the exigencies of revolution and to the operation of reason, suggesting that the "politics of revolution . . . temper and harden the breast, in order to prepare it for the desperate strokes which are sometimes used in extreme occasions. But as these occasions may never arrive, the mind receives a gratuitous taint; and the moral sentiments suffer not a little, when no political purpose is served by the depravation" (64).

Morgan's concern with her culture's apparent disregard for or—more disturbing—enjoyment of suffering appears to mirror Burke's apprehension of the pleasure British society derives from the torment of the French royal family. Both authors are fundamentally concerned with the attack on sensibility and the concomitant enervation of sympathy that they perceive occurring within their culture. Burke demonstrates the socio-political consequences associated with the repression of the "well-placed sympathies of the human breast" (65) in his theatrical depiction of the institutionalized violence authorized by France's new political system. Morgan similarly connects the presence of violence with the absence of sympathy in her narrative; in an

equally dramatic retelling of a pillaging incident off the coast of Wales, she clarifies the relation between sympathy and social responsibility. According to Morgan's version of the events, a laboring ship was besieged by rapacious pillagers who willfully ignored the distress of the imperiled passengers and eagerly ravished the vulnerable ship of its contents. In the frenzy that ensued, one of the looters—consumed by greed and incited by "unthinking wantonness" (207)—set fire to the plundered gunpowder, killing and maiming all those within the general circumference of the explosion. Morgan clearly attributes the mercenary behavior of the pillagers to an absence of sympathy, observing that "[t]hey fly with too little remorse and compunction to share the plunder of the wretched, who are suffering under the afflicting hand of Providence!" (208-209). That they become victims of the brutality they enact demonstrates the cycle of violence that circulates within a culture divested of sensibility. As both Smith and Hume argued earlier in the century, sympathy forms a connection between self and other that ultimately enables community. Morgan's narrative of the pillagers' destruction demonstrates that in the absence of sympathy the demands of desire overcome those of duty; the result—as Burke both prophesied and feared—is unmitigated social chaos. She concludes her tragic tale by observing that the culprits "do not yet feel all that sympathy for the distresses of ship-wrecked mariners, which naturally arises in the breasts of those, who are less habituated to such scenes of woe" (208).[67] Her appeal to

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[67] Morgan's description of the rapacious mob—eager to profit off of another's misery—notably contrasts with Hume's hypothetical description of the natural impulse towards sympathy occasioned by the sight of a shipwreck. He contends that the visual and visceral experience of the passengers' actual suffering naturally invites sympathy. "Suppose the ship be driven so near to me," he explains, "that I can perceive distinctly the horror, painted on the countenance of the seamen and passengers . . . [n]o man has so savage a heart to reap any pleasure from such a spectacle, or withstand the motions

the 'natural' feelings of sympathy situates her on the same philosophical spectrum as Burke and the Scottish moral philosophers, all of whom make a case for an active moral constitution that intuitively responds to suffering.

Morgan's fear that repeated exposure to suffering may dull the moral imagination illuminates her anxiety regarding her culture's insensitivity towards fictionalized forms of suffering. Similar to Burke's apprehension that the politics of revolution "temper and harden the breast" (64), Morgan appears to harbor the concern that the objectification of suffering may inure readers towards distress and ultimately impair their moral judgment. With the specter of revolutionary France looming in the background of her text, Morgan's concern with her society's moral constitution can certainly be interpreted as a concern with Britain's political stability. Her nightmarish representation of the unruly destruction of the beleaguered ship forms an uncomfortable parallel to Burke's equally horrifying representation of the French mobs demolishing the "edifice" (51) of their traditional political structure. The revolutionary connotations of the pillagers' act become amplified in much later and specifically political comment on the equally destructive actions of both French and British mobs:

> It is impossible to avoid being filled with awe and veneration, when we behold the sacred remains of those who were raised by their abilities and fidelity to the highest honours that their king and country could bestow . . . Let any one who pretends to despise titles and dignity, and affects to call stars and ribbons baubles, say, whether it is not better to be a statesman, a general, a counselor to princes, a patronizer of merit, and a friend to the learned and elegant, than to

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of the tenderest compassion and sympathy" (645). Morgan's observation that it is 'natural' to feel sympathy at the sight of such "scenes of woe" echoes Hume's assertion.

> grovel in obscurity, and have no way to raise themselves from their native meanness, but by pulling others down, and railing at those talents and those honours which they can never hope to emulate, or by any *honest* means obtain. (418-419, original italics)

The revolutionary image of subordinates "pulling others down" to arrogate power mirrors the equally violent conduct of the peasant thieves ripping apart a ship for fleeting personal gain. Both sets of actions are borne out of a pronounced deficiency of sensibility and of the attendant dictates of sympathy; the avaricious incendiaries are immune to the "awe and veneration" so powerfully felt by Morgan. Retributive violence, then, is posited as the consequence of a culture that excoriates and expunges sensibility. In order to ensure that Britain avoids France's fate, Morgan reinforces its socio-political framework by encouraging the cultural development of sensibility and championing the inclusive practices of sympathy upon which she believes the stability of the nation is dependent. Her travel letters participate in the regeneration of sensibility within the nation both through her modeling of right feeling and through her observations on right relations between the different sectors that constitute British society. She combines the perspectival advantages gained through travel with the rhetoric and performance of sensibility to contribute to the development a counter-revolutionary mood within the nation—one which is neither disseminated through force nor dependent upon animosity.

## Country House Tourism and the E/State of the Nation

Morgan's British itinerary implicitly announces her political commitments. Turner notes that home tours multiplied in the 1790s due to the twin constraints of

political unrest abroad and the conservative demand for patriotism at home (206). Domestic tourism, as Carl Thompson explains, could be "easily constructed as a patriotic exercise, in keeping with a self-image that identified the middle classes as the moral and economic heart of the nation" (34). Travel abroad increasingly invited accusations of bolstering foreign economies, contracting foreign 'contagions,' or of implicitly conveying a belief in British cultural, political, or aesthetic inferiority. However, domestic tourism was not always synonymous with political conservatism; in Thelwell's mock travelogue, the protagonist and his friends tour the British countryside in order to accumulate fodder for their radical agenda. Their particular interest in the dwellings of the poor rather than in the country houses of the rich enables them to highlight the conditions of oppression that demand reform. Whereas Thelwell seeks to emphasize the evils of property in order to encourage political revolution, Morgan seeks to reinforce the benefits of property in an effort to divert revolutionary energies. While she does not spurn the country cottage, her itinerary revolves around the splendid estates of the rich; both her keen interest in and general approbation of Britain's country houses can be taken as indication of her loyalty to rank and station. Rather than emphasize a contrast between the possessions of Britain's ruling and lower classes, Morgan represents the estates of the rich as emblems of *national* rather than of *private* prosperity and as the *pillars* rather than the *corrosives* of the nation. Since, as Kelly notes, the estate was often considered a "metonymy and metaphor for the larger state of the nation" (*Women, Writing, and Revolution: 1790-1827*, 28), Morgan's attention to and description of country houses can be read as political allegory. The tradition of conflating the private space of the propertied gentleman with the broader compass of the nation extends back

to—and well beyond—the country-house panegyrics of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.[68] In her study of the country house and its literary representations in eighteenth-century culture, Virginia C. Kenny observes that British writers were actively involved in "modifying the symbol of the country-house ethos as an interpretive image of the right use of the wealth, power and knowledge now available to civil society" (210). Morgan draws on this tradition to communicate her political (re)vision of the state. Her position as a tourist allows her the opportunity to access a variety of country homes and to compare and contrast their qualities in the evaluative manner anticipated of the travel writer, and she is eager to parlay her eyewitness perspective into political currency. Morgan's detailed descriptions of and inevitable comparison between the very different estates of Sandleford and Blenheim form the crux around which she carefully develops her political vision for the British nation. Her brief stay at Elizabeth Montagu's estate in Berkshire comes early in the text and subsequently becomes the standard against which both the larger 'estate' of British nation and all other private estates are weighed.

Sandleford was very much Montagu's creation and an expression of her ideals; the estate was crafted according to her tastes using the inheritance she acquired upon her husband's death in 1775. The house and its grounds were designed by the brightest lights in eighteenth-century building and landscape design, with James Wyatt redesigning the mansion and Lancelot 'Capability' Brown providing the plans for the grounds. The organization and management of the estate reflected Montagu's

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[68] See, for instance, Ben Jonson's "To Penshurst" (1616), Andrew Marvell's "Upon Appleton House" (1651), Alexander Pope's "Epistle to Burlington" (1731) and Mary Leapor's "Crumble-Hall" (1751).

Enlightenment values, demonstrating the philanthropic tenets championed within the Bluestocking circle. Her efforts were admired by the many distinguished visitors invited to enjoy the rural retreat; Hannah More declared it a "delightful abode" (354) and Horace Walpole approved of its lack of "tawdry" details and decided that "it is a noble simple edifice" (qtd. in Zoë Kinsley 203). Morgan and her husband were two of Montagu's many guests. They were evidently family friends—counting two of Montagu's brothers and her nephew among their close acquaintances—and stayed at Sandleford upon Montagu's request. "[W]e availed ourselves of the invitation," Morgan explains, "we had several times received from Mrs.—, to visit Sandleford" (32). That she is biased in her host's favor is certainly suggested by the obvious ties of friendship among the Morgans, Robinsons, and Montagus—and she freely admits her bias, declaring that she approached Sandleford "as full of expectation, as a young beauty going to be introduced at court, but without all the anxious fear of not being able to shine as much as [she] wished" (32-33). As a guest rather than as a tourist, Morgan is allowed intimate access to the house and its environs; however, her observations are very much written in the style of a visitor rather than as a resident. Her detailed observations on the socio-economic philosophies manifest in Montagu's perfectly ordered estate, her catalogue of the particular merits of Montagu as a woman, intellectual, and landowner, and her enthusiastic recapitulation of the architecture, landscape design, and management of Sandleford clearly establishes the estate and its owner as models to be emulated. "[Montagu's] whole behaviour," enthuses Morgan, "gives you a perfect conception of what is meant by possessing 'the milk of human kindness' . . . [she] is always thinking of some great or good work, which tends to the encouragement of genius, or the promotion of

plans for the benefit of her species" (42-43). Morgan's characterization of her host emphasizes Montagu's sympathetic character; her nature and actions are oriented towards community and stand in direct contrast to the twin menaces of British stability: the equally solipsistic figures of the profligate aristocrat and the mercenary Jacobin. Rather, Montagu is characterized as the exemplification of Burke's "true lawgiver" who possesses "an heart full of sensibility" (169).

According to Morgan's description, the estate that Montagu had been transforming since the 1780s manifests her exquisite sensibility; a concern with the welfare of others is evident in Sandleford's every detail. "Many superb edifices," Morgan comments, "eclipse the owners so much, that they seem the most insignificant things in them. But in every part of [Sandleford] you see the soul that animates the whole" (40). The entrance to the mansion rebuffs architectural features designed to display the power of the owner and to overawe outsiders, following Richard Payne Knight's advice to "let th' approach and entrance to your place / Display no glitter, and effect no grace" (14). Morgan notes with approbation that visitors are not subject to a "high flight of steps in view of the windows" and space has not been wasted on a "grand vestibule" (33)—instead, visitors disembark at the front door and enter into a modest hall. The architecture of the entrance establishes the sympathetic and virtuous character of the host: it neither intimidates nor discomfits those who enter with unnecessary displays of luxury. In a letter to Hannah More, Montagu states that she intended the estate's gothic entrance to convey precisely what Morgan feels, that "ancient simplicity and hospitality resided there, and a homely and sincere reception awaited them, if they would do the mistress of the mansion the favour to walk in" (372).

This commitment to hospitality carries through the rest of the house. Morgan marvels at the attentive reception she receives, admitting that she felt as if she was "transported into some fairy region, where I was to be waited upon by spirits, that were every where attending without being called for" (37-38). This care is manifest in the design of the interior spaces, which are thoughtfully constructed in order to cultivate sociability and to ensure the comfort of visitors. Rooms transform in order to suit the mood of the guests and formerly unwelcoming or solitary spaces have been renovated to invite society and to encourage the conversations for which Montagu's gatherings were renowned (35). The emphasis on comfort rather than display is once again demonstrated in Montagu's choice of furniture, which Morgan describes as "not superb . . . [but] perfectly elegant" (37). The overall impression that she conveys is one of harmony: interior spaces are skillfully integrated, interior and exterior spaces flow seamlessly into one another (34-35), and the company that resides therein loosely resembles the cohesive community that Sarah Scott describes in *Millenium Hall* (44-47). Morgan asserts that the character of the mansion evinces the character of its owner. "[T]here is a style in every part of it," she observes, "that bespeaks a superior degree of judgment" (40). Montagu's consideration of others—her dedication to the " benefit of her species" (44)—is evident in the design of her mansion, and her care affects her guests accordingly.

Morgan's further survey of the estate and its inhabitants provide additional evidence of the proprietor's sympathetic character through an emphasis on her social initiatives. The grounds have been developed both to delight the owner and to serve the community—carefully balancing the dictates of beauty and utility, desire and duty. "The whole of the place," Morgan commends, "suggested to me the idea of a Roman villa. There

is everything for use as well as beauty" (40). Sheep graze on the "fine lawn" (33) and "the farm and the dairy are not omitted" but "supply the family and table with all things necessary and delicate" (40). The estate's integration of aesthetic and practical considerations bucks the solipsistic trend towards the use of arable land for pleasure grounds, while the appearance of "neat farmhouses" (36) suggests that Montagu has sustained traditionally inclusive land-use practices.[69] Morgan's description of the estate's functional qualities participates in a larger socio-economic discussion that debated the wisdom of dispossessing Britain's yeomanry and rupturing the traditional bonds between landowners and their tenants for aesthetic and/or economic reasons. The ruin of local economies due to the Enclosure Acts had been subject to criticism for decades, and the disturbing progress of the French Revolution lent renewed urgency to the discussion. The year following the publication of Morgan's text, Nathaniel Kent detailed the local devastation caused by the trend towards the removal of dairies from estates in his survey of the Britain's agricultural practices. He states: "[F]rom the great farmers dropping their

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[69] Oliver Goldsmith famously denigrated the "man of wealth and pride" who sacrificed the communal good for personal gain in his 1769 poem, *The Deserted Village*. He states:

> . . . The man of wealth and pride,
> Takes up a space that many poor supplied;
> Space for his lake, his park's extended bounds,
> Space for his horses, equipage, and hounds;
> The robe that wraps his limbs in silken sloth,
> He robbed the neighbouring fields of half their growth;
> . . . . . .
> While thus the land adorned for pleasure all
> In barren splendour feebly waits the fall. (466, lines 277-288)

Over two decades after Goldsmith's poem, Uvedale Price criticized the "solitary grandeur" of the modern landowner, arguing that "he who destroys dwellings, gardens, and inclosures, for the sake of mere extent and parade of property, only extends the bounds of monotony, and dreary selfish pride; but contracts those of variety, amusement, and humanity" (*Essay* 340).

dairies the markets of Yarmouth and Norwich are so ill supplied with butter, that it is become a matter of favour to be able to obtain enough for common consumption, notwithstanding the price, within a very few years, is increased from 8d. to 16 d. a pint" (132). Kent feared the political repercussions of economic dispossession, and urged landowners to maintain the social function of their land. The laborer who is assured property, he asserts, "is always a faithful servant to the farmer who employs him; he has a stake in the common interest of the country, and is never prompt to riot, in time of sedition, like a man who has nothing to lose; on the contrary, he is a strong link in the chain of national security" (172). Uvedale Price—a landowner and the author of the influential *Essay on the Picturesque* (1794)—reiterated Kent's connection between inclusive land use practices and national stability, arguing that the welfare of the laboring classes serves as an antidote to revolution. "Vast possessions may give ambitious views" he observed, "and ambition destroys local attachments; but even the cottager, with a few acres which he has tilled and manured . . . has at least as much attachment to his little spot, as the greatest lord to his immense domain" (19-20). Kent and Price identify the proliferation of a transient yeomanry as the real danger posed by land enclosures; in the absence of a material attachment to the land and a social attachment to the landowner, they are unlikely to form attachments to their nation at large. Morgan's approbation of the form and function of Montagu's estate suggests that she would agree with Kent's and Price's endorsement of land use practices invested in social reality, an intimation that is later confirmed by her pointed commendation of Welsh landlords. Echoing Kent and Price, she states: "The gentlemen in Wales have not adopted the custom of throwing several little farms into one great one, by which the small farmer . . . is deprived of the

means of subsistence, and must perhaps become the menial servant of one who has hired his cottage over his head, or starve" (270). As the riots in Britain and the mobs in France had recently demonstrated, the failure of the aristocracy to recognize and mitigate the real, concrete effects of depravation could have significant repercussions. Montagu reconciles traditional practices and progressive initiatives through an overall commitment to serving her community; while her aesthetic improvements evince a desire to accommodate her guests, her practical considerations demonstrate her attention to the local community.

The ethic of care manifest in the physical structuring of Montagu's grounds extends to her management of the estate; it is here that the impact of her sympathetic governance is most effectively displayed. Montagu's numerous philanthropic activities were well-known in her time and have been amply documented both by her contemporaries and by recent scholars. Her charitable work extended from literary patronage to the establishment or support of educational institutions to labor reform within her collieries.[70] Morgan mentions one particularly celebrated example of Montagu's beneficence: her May Day breakfast for chimney sweeps, which she held annually and very publically on the front lawn of her London residence (45). However, Morgan specifically attends to her host's philanthropic projects *within* her community at Sandleford. She represents Montagu as a responsible and engaged landlord, carefully detailing her maternal, sympathetic, and perhaps unorthodox treatment of her employees:

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[70] For a more detailed description of Montagu's philanthropic initiatives, see Zoë Kinsley, "Female Charity and the Example of Elizabeth Montagu," and Elizabeth Child, "Elizabeth Montagu, Bluestocking Businesswoman."

> When walking in the grounds, I observed an extraordinary degree of cleanliness and decency in the men, who were at work upon them. Upon enquiry I found they were all fed and cloathed by her hand. I perceived too that many of them had some great defect, occasioned by age, natural infirmity, or misfortune, being either blind, deaf, dumb, or lame, yet she had so paired them, and fitted their employments to their several faculties, that the remaining senses of the one served to supply the deficiency of the other. (39)

As a result of Montagu's sympathetic initiatives, she remakes marginalized individuals into "useful and happy members of society" (39). Morgan's rather over-the-top comparison of Montagu to Christ is revealing: "I hope it is not prophane to say [that] she has made the blind to see, the deaf to hear, the dumb to speak, and the lame to walk" (39-40). Sandleford's architecture, landscape, and (now) people effectively demonstrate the transformative power of sympathy: Montagu wields sympathy as an agent of transfiguration, "convert[ing] things ugly and uncouth into beauty and uniformity" (40). Her privileging of moral over economic considerations forms a direct contrast to landowners who enclose their land for economic gain, yet Morgan is quick to point out that Montagu's charitable actions redound upon her in the forms of personal and collective contentment. "[T]hough she does not get so much work done," she explains, "as she would by stronger and abler men, she has the heartfelt satisfaction of making those happy and useful members of society . . . who, but for her, must be dependent upon a parish for an idle and scanty subsistence" (39). The benefit that Montagu accrues through her social initiatives lies equally in her own "heartfelt satisfaction" as in the reciprocal loyalty of her employees. Sympathetic authority, then, is revealed as an effective mode of

governance: peaceful and productive, Sandleford exhibits the qualities that Britain was desperately attempting to secure. Morgan's representation of Montagu's estate bears out Uvedale Price's contention that it is the practice of sympathy rather than the operation of force that obviates revolution. "[A]ttentive kindnesses," he states, "are amply repaid by affectionate regard and reverence; and were they general through the kingdom, they would do much more towards guarding us against democratical opinions 'Than twenty thousand soldiers arm'd in proof'" (340). Montagu's practice of humanitarian sensibility produces a community that demonstrates in reality what Price proposes in theory: that affection is a far more effective antidote to disorder than fear.

To Montagu's nephew, Morgan writes: "I cannot help comparing [your aunt] to a loadstone, which has not only the power of attraction, but communicates some of its virtue to everything that approaches it" (209). Montagu need not resort to force or intimidation to secure obedience; her sympathetic character simultaneously attracts loyalty and actively transforms those who come under her influence into loyal subjects. Morgan's suggestion of the transformative value of sympathy and its contribution to collectivity recalls both Smith's and Hume's ideas regarding the ability of sympathy to convert atomistic individuals into like-minded communities. Her image of the "loadstone" transferring its qualities to contiguous elements specifically evokes their delineations of the transmissible quality of sympathy. According to Smith:

> [The] natural disposition to accommodate and to assimilate, as much as we can, our own sentiments, principles, and feelings, to those which we see fixed and rooted in the persons whom we are obliged to live and converse a great deal with, is the cause of the contagious effects of both good and bad company. The

> man who associates chiefly with the wise and the virtuous, though he may not himself become either wise or virtuous, cannot help conceiving a certain respect at least for wisdom and virtue. (264-265)

And here is Hume:

> The human mind is of a very imitative nature; nor is it possible for any set of men to converse often together, without acquiring a similitude of manners, and communicating to each other their vices as well as virtues. The propensity to company and society is strong in all rational creatures; and the same disposition, which gives us this propensity, makes us enter deeply into each other's sentiments, and causes like passions and inclinations to run, as it were, by contagion, through the whole club or knot of companions. (248)

Smith's and Hume's emphasis on propinquity illuminates the socio-political dimensions of Morgan's approbation and endorsement of Montagu's socially engaged landlordism. Her sympathetic interaction with her laborers creates social cohesion, as the dissemination and assimilation of her "virtue" within her community ultimately brings its various constituents into "uniformity" (40).

Morgan's visit to the Duke of Marlborough's magnificent estate almost immediately follows her stay at Sandleford, naturally inviting comparisons between the two disparate estates. Blenheim Palace was a must-see tourist attraction by the 1790s, and had constructed an entire industry around the demand. "[T]he flow of human traffic into the house and park," Carole Fabricant explains, "was carefully controlled and monitored at the same time that it was actively (indeed, aggressively) promoted" (266). Morgan describes the packaged feel of the tour, recounting her sense of being herded

through the palace: "Through that house, which would take a week to survey, you are dragged in an hour, and, perhaps, as it was our fate, to be obliged to follow a party, whose numerous absurd questions to the person who conducts you prevents even the agreeable ideas you might have in that short stay" (69). The combined sense of coercion and exclusion that she professes to feel in Blenheim provides a notable contrast to the hospitality she experiences at Sandleford; the restrictions placed upon the tourist at the Duke of Marlborough's residence reminds Morgan of her status as an outsider. Her veiled critique of Blenheim pivots on this perceived lack of hospitality, which she slowly exposes as the product of a disturbing solipsism that reveals itself in the design of the estate. Just as Montagu's virtue is manifested in the character of Sandleford, the more questionable nature of the Marlborough dynasty is suggested through Blenheim's aesthetic. By directing her criticism towards the estate's aesthetics, Morgan avoids the appearance of directly evaluating its aristocratic owners; she must tread lightly in a period where even a hint of anti-aristocratic sentiment could invite accusations of Jacobinism. In his discussion of Jacobin and Anti-Jacobin novelists, Kelly comments that both groups shared "an anxiety as to how to expose to members of the middle class the nature of aristocratic and gentry hegemony without at the same time arousing the 'lower orders' . . . to question all power from above" ("Jane Austen and the English Novel of the 1790s" 294). This is an anxiety that Morgan evidently shares. She is exceedingly careful to maintain the appearance of appropriate deference towards the aristocratic owners of the palace while laboring to address their problematic qualities and values through her juxtaposition of Sandleford and Blenheim's contrasting aesthetics.

Blenheim by its very nature invoked issues of aristocratic profligacy and the right use of power. Built largely from public funds awarded to the Duke of Marlborough in recognition of his military achievements, the ostentatious palace quickly became enmeshed in controversy. Its over-the-top architecture prompted accusations of decadence and came to represent the enervating effects of luxury; Marlborough's detractors, Kenny explains, denigrated the building as "a useless show-place" (210). The matter of the estate's excess and elitism is picked up by Morgan, who contrasts the bloated grandeur of Blenheim against the *dulce* and *utile* of Sandleford. The difference between the two estates is immediately apparent in her description of the approach to the palace. After passing through a "prodigious grand triumphal arch" (67), Morgan is overcome by the estate's sumptuousness: "I seemed transported into a new world, such a magnificent scene presented itself all at once to my ravished sight. The palace, the park, the canal, the bridge, and a hundred other objects, struck upon my senses in a moment" (69). Blenheim is designed to display the power of its owner and to concomitantly diminish the spectator. Morgan feels overwhelmed or, more precisely, overpowered by the visual stimulation that Blenheim offers. Indeed, the ambiguous characterization of her sight as "ravished" could certainly be taken in its more positive sense as 'transport' or it could be taken to refer to its more violent meaning of 'seizure'—either way, it indicates her sense of being overcome by the estate's sensory assault. Compare her entry to Blenheim with her entry to Sandleford:

> The approach to the house is a fine lawn, with sheep feeding upon it. This gives you an idea of beauty blended with utility, which always produces agreeable sensations in the mind. The carriage draws close up to the front door, by which

> comfortable circumstances we avoided running the gauntlet up a high flight of steps in view of the windows, to which people are often subject, when they visit at great houses. No such distress awaits you at Sandleford. (33)

The design of Montagu's estate is premised on the inclusive principles of hospitality (as she herself confirms in the aforementioned correspondence with Hannah More): it both invites community and invokes the idea of community by drawing visitors in through a succession of welcoming gestures rather than presenting them with a series of obstacles to overcome. The design of Blenheim is premised on the principle of intimidation: it manufactures distance between those inside and those outside by announcing the superior subject position of its proprietors through the very architecture of the building. William F. Mavor, who wrote the definitive guide to the palace in 1789, remarks that its appearance reflects the militaristic legacy of its owner: "Its massy grandeur, its spacious portals, and its lofty towers, recal the ideas of defence and security" (34). Although Mavor approves of this nod to the building's genesis, his observation that Blenheim's façade conjures up images of ancient fortified castles is indicative of the building's intimidating and insular aspect—forming a significant contrast to Sandleford's appeal to "ancient simplicity and hospitality" (Montagu 372).[71] Morgan's sensation of being immobilized, or "tranfixt" (69), by the image presented by the estate suggests that the

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[71] In *Perpetual Peace* (1795), Immanuel Kant defines hospitality as "the right of a stranger not to be treated as an enemy when he arrives in the land of another" (22). This definition more or less aligns with the idea of hospitality enshrined in the aesthetics of Montagu's entrance, which is that "a homely and sincere reception awaited [those who approach], if they would do the mistress of the mansion the favour to walk in" (372). Blenheim, on the other hand, is revealed as fundamentally inhospitable when contextualized within Kant's definition of hospitality ("not to be treated as an enemy"). The estate's outer aspect of "defence and security" immediately constructs outsiders as potential enemies to be protected against rather than welcomed within its walls.

architecture answered its intention. Her description of the two different entrances suggests two approaches to power: while Montagu maintains her authority by cultivating sentimental attachments through social responsibility, the Duke of Marlborough appears to favor a form of power premised on coercion and intimidation.

That the two estates embody two different approaches to power becomes clear in a later and more explicit comparison between Blenheim and Sandleford. "Having before described Sandleford to you," she confides to her correspondent,

> I cannot help observing, that it is a striking contrast to Blenheim. But it is such a one, as when the eye, dazzled with gazing at the sun, falls on the soft green of a beautiful lawn, upon which it may rest for ever without satiety or weariness. At S— the mind is gratified with every thing, that can render life rational and happy. At B— it is fatigued with contemplating objects, that seem like a golden dream, too gay and too gaudy to be real. (76)

Morgan traipses carefully through the political minefield that was the critique of the aristocracy by submerging her political commentary in the language of aesthetics. Her comparison directly paraphrases a passage from Burke's *On the Sublime and the Beautiful* (1757) in which he discusses the tranquil appeal of the beautiful as opposed to the intense terror of the sublime. To use his precise words, "[i]t is rather the soft green of the soul on which we rest our eyes, that are fatigued with beholding more glaring objects" (206). Morgan's use of Burke's analogy loosely allies Sandleford with his definition of the beautiful and Blenheim with his description of the sublime, investing the two divergent estates both with the aesthetic qualities and with the socio-political dimensions manifest in Burke's aesthetic categories. According to his theory,

the innocuous nature of beauty elicits love, whereas the inherently threatening nature of the sublime produces terror. As a result, beauty is productive of society as it is naturally attractive. "I call beauty a social quality," Burke explains, "for where women and men . . . give us a sense of joy and pleasure beholding them . . . they inspire us with sentiments of tenderness and affection towards their persons; we like to have them near us, and we enter willingly into a kind of relation with them" (66-67). Although the sublime provokes respect, it is an admiration grounded in fear and therefore fundamentally anti-social; Burke argues that we intuitively distance ourselves from that which elicits terror out of a sense of self-preservation (206-207). The political applications of Burke's aesthetic theories become evident in his rough alignment of the sublime with "despotic governments" (99) and the beautiful with a form of British libertarianism; whereas the former acquires power through fear—obviating "mischiefs" (206) through the threat of "dangers, punishments, and troubles" (205)—the latter secures obedience through affection—garnering loyalty through the dispensation of "reliefs, gratifications, and indulgences" (206). "There is a wide difference between admiration and love," he asserts, "we submit to what we admire, but we love what submits to us; in one case we are forced, in the other we are flattered into compliance" (212). Montagu's sympathetic governance operates according to the dictates of the beautiful, procuring love (or at least loyalty) through acts of social amelioration—or through "reliefs, gratifications, and indulgences." The association that Morgan draws between Blenheim and the sublime suggests that Marlborough represents a more autocratic approach to governance that achieves submission through the specter of

terror—an effect revealed in Morgan's sensation of being overcome to the point of incapacitation in the estate's presence.[72]

In *The Spirit of Despotism* (1795)—Vicesimus Knox's response to the British government's increasingly autocratic practices in the years following the Reign of Terror in France—the radical author blames continued political instability on the "selfish spirit of despotism" (357) that he sees operating within the upper echelons of British society. Motivated by selfish desires and segregated from material reality, Britain's leaders pursue "sordid or vain-glorious purposes . . . with little regard to the real, substantial happiness of the governed" (357). Although Morgan would heartily disagree with Knox's radical tendencies, her appraisal of Blenheim faintly echoes his condemnation of aristocratic decadence and elitism. That she characterizes the tour as "fatiguing" (86), styles the "viewing [of] fine things" as "toil" (92), and describes her eyes as "tired with seeing" (86) suggests the spectacle of wealth presented by the palace; her own physiological response to the Duke of Marlborough's extravagance (fatigue) functions as an indication of the degenerative effects of aristocratic excess. Her elaboration of Burke's "glaring object" (206) into the scorching sun and the nightmarish experience of inhabiting a world gone slightly mad underscores the painful and terrifying experience of the sublime as described by Burke, indicating Blenheim's repulsive rather than its attractive quality.[73] She suggests that the Marlborough dynasty

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[72] Morgan's sense of being overwhelmed by Blenheim mirrors Burke's description of the astonishment evoked by the sublime: "The passion caused by the great and sublime in *nature*, when those causes operate most powerfully, is astonishment; and astonishment is that state of the soul, in which all its motions are suspended, with some degree of horror" (Burke 95, original italics).

[73] To be clear: "repulsive" is here being used in the sense of "tending to force back; drive away" rather than in the sense of "intense distaste" (*Oxford English Dictionary*).

has created a world divorced from reality—a dangerous quality at a time when socio-political realities threatened the very foundations of aristocratic privilege and power. That Blenheim is shown to eschew utility for beauty—or, more appropriately, for spectacle—suggests an element of egoism and elitism that Morgan underlines in her analogy of the estate's flower gardens to an "eastern harem" where "every female displays the utmost of her charms, in hope of attracting the attention of the sultan" (84). While the comparison is presented as poetic, the association between Blenheim and a cultural symbol that eighteenth-century society commonly associated with self-indulgence (morally) and despotism (politically) reinforces the inherently solipsistic rather than altruistic nature of the estate and the power that resides within. Morgan attempts to convey that Montagu's attention to social realities produces a society that is both contented ("the mind is gratified") and sustainable ("upon which [the eye] may rest for ever without satiety or weariness"), while the Duke of Marlborough's spectacle of wealth fosters disillusionment ("too gay and too gaudy") and is ultimately unsustainable ("dazzled with gazing at the sun").

The issues of autocracy and sustainability that Morgan raises through her Burkean metaphor are directly applicable to Britain's political crisis in the 1790s. Both the French revolutionaries and British radical polemicists denied the tenability of power predicated upon hierarchical frameworks and assumptions. While the revolutionaries demonstrated the instability of a hierarchical government, radical polemicists both theorized and prophesied the demise of Britain's stratified political and social structure. Price, Paine, Godwin, and others agreed that Britain's hierarchical government was incompatible with progress and would eventually collapse as society

advanced.[74] Commenting on the "conservative campaign to reform the manners of the great in the 1790s" (160), Grenby explains how a profligate aristocracy came to be seen by anxious conservatives as contributing to instability of Britain's political system. "[D]egenerate aristocrats," he states, "threatened revolution every bit as much as levelers . . . since in not fulfilling the duties incumbent upon them by virtue of their station they deprived the hierarchies of the nation of their *raison d'etre* and therefore of their sustainability" (168). His observation illuminates the political implications of Morgan's discomfort with the Duke of Marlborough's conspicuous consumption. Self-indulgence hardly constitutes the "socially conciliating" (Grenby 153) duties necessary for the maintenance of social stability; the Duke's acquisitiveness aligns him more closely with the self-destructive plunderers of Morgan's shipwreck tale or with self-indulgent foreign despots than with Montagu's philanthropic character. Her juxtaposition of the two estates subtly suggests both the need and a plan for the reform of Britain's leadership and political practices—not in the interest of subverting power but in the interest of maintaining it. That Montagu's model of socially responsible governance is sustainable proposes the efficacy of a system based on traditional obligations and sympathetic ties. Reflecting on the "toil" of Blenheim while resting at a friend's more humble abode, Morgan reiterates and affirms the strength of sentimental bonds over the fleeting awe inspired by spectacles of power. "[T]he dictates of sincere affection," she asserts, "exceeds all earthly grandeur" (92).

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[74] See Price, *A Discourse on the Love of Our Country*, 49; Paine *Rights of Man*, 126, 169, 182, 193; and Godwin, *Political Justice*, 31-2, 185, 215.

## Ruined Castles and Modern Idylls: Welsh Landowners and the Evolution of British Governance

The instability of governing systems that achieve and retain power through violence rather than through sympathy is further developed in Morgan's exploration of Britain's past through her interaction with its historical artifacts. Traveling through Wales provides her with ample opportunity to investigate her nation's genesis by collecting old texts and visiting ancient ruins. That the Welsh held the distinction of being the original inhabitants of the British Isles served to distinguish their homeland as the birthplace of the British nation. The Arthurian legends that Morgan collects and the ruins she is so eager to discover are therefore profoundly invested with national significance: by exploring Welsh history, she is simultaneously tracing the emergence of British national identity. However, Morgan has a fraught and complex relationship with history. Although she is fascinated with British history and interested in its preservation, she is also deeply critical of the past and harbors a suspicion towards the impulse to romanticize history and to turn to the past for a vision of the ideal future. Her seemingly contradictory impulse both to preserve and improve embodies Burke's argument for balancing the dictates of tradition and innovation. "A good patriot and a true politician," he asserts, "always considers how he shall make the most of the existing materials of his country, and an ability to improve, taken together, would be my standard of a statesman" (*Reflections* 157). For Morgan, the past is important as an indication or signpost of Britain's progress rather than as a model for how the nation should function; it is a reminder less of who Britons *are* or *should be* but of whom they *were*. She does not equate tradition with ancient freedoms, nor does she—*pace* Burke—

perceive change as the "recovery of an ongoing tradition" (Maggie Kilgour 13), but understands freedom as a relatively modern achievement acquired through the efflorescence of sensibility and change as a necessary evolution away from Britain's feudal history. Her ambivalence towards the past is imbricated with her disapproval of systems that perpetuate themselves through the evocation of sublime terror, and her criticism of the factionalism and the feudalism operative in Britain's past can be seen to double as a condemnation of the divisive politics of radical reformers and of the aggressive policies of the British government in her contemporary period.

Entering into Wales, Morgan is struck by the plethora of ancient ruins: "Every town and every village, through which we have passed, from Hay hither, has a castle in it, and all of them in ruins. These carry the mind back to other times, and bring to its view haughty barons and feudal tyranny, the croisades, the age of chivalry, bloody battles, paynim knights, distressed damsels, gallant lovers, haunted towers, ghosts, fairies, and inchantments" (146). She is drawn to these ancient remnants precisely for their evocative quality, equally fascinated by their (fictional) romantic associations as she is repelled by their (somewhat factual) history of violence. Yet despite her occasional indulgence in romantic reveries, Morgan refuses to allow Britain's actual history ("haughty barons and feudal tyranny") to be eclipsed or palliated by a romantic version of British history ("the age of chivalry"). She consciously avoids idealizing or, to use Burke's aesthetic category, beautifying Britain's past in an effort to prevent the perpetuation of past evils in the present. Similar to the Lady's reaction to Scottish ruins in Chapter 3, Morgan adopts what Malcolm Andrews refers to as a "political" response to Welsh antiquities, which considers "the ruin as an image of Nature's leveling of

haughty tyranny" (46). Her political approach to these fragments of the past is demonstrated in her statement on the contemporary condition of Welsh peasants: "There are no remains of that subjection, to which their free-born necks were unwillingly bowed down, when a stately castle over-awed every village. Those castles, now in ruins, serve only to remind them of the happy change that has taken place" (270-271). The ruined castles serve as symbols of Britain's political evolution; they are a material reminder of the unsustainability of political systems predicated upon fear and oppression. Ancient buildings that have been transformed into contemporary domiciles are made to fit Morgan's political and aesthetic criteria through an emphasis on the modern improvements that render the structures amenable to eighteenth-century standards. Her admiration is primarily directed towards their transformation, enabling an appreciation of the "existing materials" (Burke 157) without compromising her approbation of Britain's evolution from a feudal to a free society. "It is impossible," she states,

> for any one to behold a structure of this kind, without looking back on the time when this castle was the terror of the country, as much as it is now its ornament and delight. This comparison struck me very forcibly, when . . . I heard a cheerful party passing to the dining-room, and saw the happy faces of a number of free servants, not vassals, serving up covers for a large company. (401)

The nation's political evolution from tyranny to a constitutional monarchy has, like Montagu's conversion of "things ugly and uncouth into beauty and uniformity" (4), transformed the former object of terror into an object of beauty.

Morgan's aestheticizing of British politics recalls Burke's commentary on the aesthetics of political power in *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. "There ought to be a system of manners in every nation," he asserts, "which a well-formed mind would be disposed to relish. To make us love our country, our country ought to be lovely" (78). Burke argues that sentimental associations or "public affections" (78) mitigate or mystify the operation of power, without which "laws are … supported only by their own terrors" (77). Power, as Terry Eagleton explains, must be felt as "directly pleasurable, intuitively enjoyable, aesthetically appropriate" (55). This is for Morgan as well as for Burke the most sustainable practice of authority; power that appears worthy of admiration is that which operates according to the dictates of sympathy (attentive to the needs of the community) rather than of tyranny (centered on the desire of the ruling power)—the former evokes affection while the latter induces fear. Her juxtaposition between the images of the "happy faces of the free servants" and the "free-born necks . . . unwillingly bowed down" provides a visual correlative to Burke's argument. The 'unwillingness' of the enslaved vassals indicates the threat of disorder latent in authoritarian systems characterized by oppressive practices, while the apparently 'willing' service of the liberated servants concomitantly suggests the social stability generated by a constitutional government characterized by an ethic of care. Sublime terror ultimately contains the seeds of its own destruction: it generates repulsion through its very form. Morgan's personal attraction to moderated and moderate structures of authority posits that power must be lovely to be loved; without affection—hailed by Uvedale Price as the organic binding agent within societies—nations are in danger of falling into ruin.

Fragmented buildings further suggest the political fragmentation of ancient Britain. Surveying the landscape from the vantage point of hindsight, Morgan reminds her audience that these 'romantic' ruins reveal a violent history of political schism. Her representation of ancient Britain as a series of disconnected communities gestures towards the former division of the British Isles:

> [T]hey lived in solitary dignity, hemmed in on all sides by mountains and precipices, having a little principality within their own jurisdiction, and lording it over the poor simple peasant, their humble tenants and neighbours. This mode of living in voluntary seclusion from the society of their equals, was by no means peculiar to Wales, but prevailed over every part of this island. (132)

Morgan's initial portrayal of the "solitary dignity" of feudal societies suggests a romanticized reading of the past that is then disrupted by her negative appraisal of this "voluntary seclusion." Casting the side-eye towards Rousseauvian primitivism, she asserts that the absence of social feeling—indicated by the oppression of the peasantry and the "*voluntary* seclusion" of ancient Britons—engenders violent behaviors that ultimately work to obviate the formation of community.[75] The nation's fraught history of internecine violence is illustrated in a lengthy excerpt that recounts the life of King Arthur, which Morgan professes to have come across during her antiquarian 'digs' while in Wales. She confesses that the "marvelous and poetical" elements of ancient texts are suited to her sentimental tastes, but finds the "opinions and manners of remote times"

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[75] Whereas Jean-Jacques Rousseau idealizes the isolated condition of primitive man and envisages societal progress as moral degeneration (see *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* [1755]), Morgan's emphasis on the corrupting effects of isolation and on the violence of primitive societies underscores the benefits of modern culture and equates societal progress with moral improvement.

(160) to be perverse rather than exemplary. She guides her audience's reading of the legend by prefacing it with the following statement: "I know not whether it be most mortifying or pleasing to observe, how little can be attributed to our boasted natural understanding, when left to itself, uninformed by education, and unenlightened by revelation" (160). Morgan's ambivalence appears to be at least partially directed towards the brutality that characterized ancient life; the version of the Arthurian legend she presents is a catalogue of slaughter among the diverse nations that comprised medieval Britain. Although Jacqueline Pearson believes that the popularity of the Arthurian legend during the revolutionary 1790s and the subsequent Napoleonic Wars was "accelerated by its political usefulness in defining an idealized, stable and virtuous English nationalism" (123), Morgan appears to interpret the legend differently—not as an index of Britain's degeneration from its founding principles, but as an indication of Britain's progression from its primitive roots. Britain's monuments and myths present a legacy of factionalism that has been gradually overcome through the development of fellow-feeling and the integration of sympathy within local and national practices.

Indeed, Morgan clarifies that it is only after social feeling developed and sympathy mitigated the exercise of power that the British Isles could cohere and emerge as a nation. "What a happy change has this kingdom undergone since those times!" she exclaims,

> Now the nobility and gentry find rational pleasure in the society of those, who can either do them service or communicate information. They look upon their tenants and neighbours as men and brothers, and are happy, by the urbanity of

> their behaviour, to set them an example . . . In return, they receive sincere affection and friendship, instead of fear and servility. (132-133)

The cohesive and conservative implications of sympathy are blatantly advertised in this image of contemporary British unity. The development of social feeling among the aristocracy progressively eliminated the "bloody wars" (146) generated by endemic factionalism, while the transformation of leadership practices through the formation of sympathetic bonds between landowner and tenant established a model of society characterized by the exchange of mutual ministrations. Loyalty, then, arises organically from the reciprocal action of sympathy; the contemporary Welsh communities that Morgan describes are firmly bound through ties of affection rather than through the fear of retribution. This idealized version of Britain that she professes to find in eighteenth-century Wales is represented as an antidote to the socio-political ills threatening the health of the British nation.

The connection that Morgan creates between sympathy and social coherence in her observations on Montagu's estate extends to her description of the estates she encounters in Wales, progressively building an argument for the political value of sympathy. She is careful to note the Welsh landlords' sympathetic management of their tenants, and the corresponding wellbeing and, significantly, loyalty of the Welsh peasantry. She marvels at the "healthiness, cleanliness, and ease in the countenance of a Welsh peasant" and suggestively observes that "they are much better fed and clothed than ours are" (261). Morgan is quick to attribute the physical and emotional fitness of the Welsh peasantry to the benevolent paternalism practiced by Welsh landowners: "Men of fortune have a number of tenants . . . but I believe they never exercise the least degree

of tyranny. They rather consider them as under their protection, than as their vassals. It seems to be the land of perfect liberty" (270). She finds the same values governing Welsh estates as she found governing Sandleford: these modern landowners manage their communities using benevolent rather than coercive practices, protecting rather than threatening individual liberties. She attributes the orderly and decorous behavior of the Welsh peasantry to a genuine affection for rather than fear of authority: "[T]here are no marks, in either the looks or manners of the Welsh peasantry, which indicate a greater degree of subjection to superiors, than the due order of society requires. They have certainly more civility in their behavior than the boors in England; but it seems to be the result of a generous disposition, not of fear" (272). Her reference to the "boors in England" is reminiscent of Burke's derogatory classification of the lower classes as a "swinish multitude" (79) and invokes the mob activity that spread through Britain in the mid-1790s due to political unrest and food shortages. Morgan's pointed juxtaposition of the orderly Welsh peasantry to the disorderly English peasantry suggests that the source of their difference lies in environmental rather than in innate factors. That they have been shaped by the structures of power under which they labor is indicated by her observation that the aristocracy "set . . . an example" (133). Welsh landowners model "civility" and "genero[sity]" (79) through their leadership practices; their sympathetic behavior is mirrored back to them in the form of "sincere affection and friendship" (133). Given Morgan's variation of the golden rule, the English peasantry's boorish behavior has perhaps more to do with the deportment of English authority than the nature of the English peasantry.

Morgan's message is clear: fellow-feeling has political dimensions. She distinctly emphasizes the reciprocal benefits exchanged between landlord and tenant within a society ruled by sympathetic governance. Read within the hostile political context of 1795—a period marked by the British government's uncompromising suppression of subversive political expression—Morgan's depiction of these idyllic landed estates suggests itself as an active questioning of what some perceived as the British government's devolution into a regime motivated by fear. The wrecks of castles littering the Welsh landscape serve as a reminder that a kingdom constructed upon oppression—or "fear and servility" (133)—is unstable and, ultimately, unsustainable. According to Morgan, fear produces grudging subservience rather than authentic loyalty; without the presence of real social feeling, there can be no bond of trust between landlord and tenant. Under the pressures of revolution and war, she insists that Britain must not look for answers in the distant past or towards what radicals perceived as the future in France, but must consider contemporary models of benevolent leadership quietly and successfully operating throughout the British countryside. Morgan's mobility performs the crucial task of enabling her to study, compare, and submit what she believes are the best examples of governance functioning within the nation. Taking a comprehensive view of the nation as opposed to the limited perspective offered from the domestic sphere, she is able to authoritatively identify the contours, gaps, and buttresses of Britain's socio-political landscape.

## "The Tranquility of a Society of Females": Female Government and the Triumph of Sympathy

Fundamental to Morgan's project of national renovation is the alteration of the role women play in Britain's political culture. By reinforcing the political function of sympathy throughout her observations on Britain's socio-political landscape, she simultaneously opens up the possibility of women's inclusion in the nation's political life. Her representation of women—including her own self-representation—conspicuously supports the eighteenth-century construction of women as repositories of sensibility, alive and responsive to the complex emotional dynamics operating between individuals and within societies. She postulates that this heightened emotional responsiveness facilitates rather than debilitates their critical faculties and leadership qualities; the ability of women both to perceive vital emotional nuances and to create sympathetic communities aligns with Burke's aforementioned definition of the model political leader, endowed with "an heart full of sensibility" (169). Morgan builds her argument for the greater inclusion of women within the nation's political life by progressing through two rhetorical strategies: 1) she contrasts the sympathetic nature of women against the violent impulses of men and 2) she provides alternative models of femininity through her representation of Montagu and through her own self-representation.

Whereas Morgan repeatedly associates men with aggression, women are shown to foster community and counter the violent impulses of their male counterparts. Describing the society she encounters at Malvern Wells, Morgan finds similarities between the tourist hub and the "charming imaginary society" (113) pictured in Scott's

*Millenium Hall*; the only difference between the non-fictional and fictional societies is the absence of men in the latter. "In that," Morgan states, "Mrs S— shewed perfectly her knowledge of human nature, for men are terrible disturbers of the tranquility of a society of females" (112). The implications of this disruptive male quality are manifest in Morgan's ambivalent representation of war throughout her travelogue. Given her husband's contribution to the war effort in the form of patriotic sermons, it can be assumed that Morgan was well versed in Britain's ongoing struggle against the French Revolutionary Army. In "A Sermon on Public Spirit" (1798), Rev. Caesar Morgan rallied public support for king and country by representing Britain's leaders as paradigms of civic virtue. "[They] have stepped forth at the call of their country," he asserts, "have relinquished their princely abodes . . . [and] have placed themselves in the first rank, to oppose, at the hazard of their lives, the inveterate enemies of our king and our constitution" (11). Mary Morgan's publications noticeably lack the patriotic cheerleading of her husband's sermons; in both her travelogue and in her later edition of *The Knyghte of the Golden Locks*, she tends to focus on the destruction accomplished by masculine violence. Her image of the world "deluged . . . with blood" (115) coheres with her images of mutilated soldiers—few of whom ever "recover the injury done to their constitution by wounds or a great effusion of blood" or "had a limb restored when he was dismembered" (235)—to form a particularly grotesque rather than glorious picture of war. This bleak emphasis shares rhetorical and ideological similarities with Vicesimus Knox's anti-war missives rather than with the more militant effusions of her husband or even fellow female authors such as Jane West.[76] Knox's emphasis on "[t]he

[76] Jane West's militaristic poetry includes "Song for the Yeoman Cavalry" (1799), "The

ugliness of slaughter" (213) aligns with Morgan's representation of war, and she shares his discomfort regarding violence undertaken for personal and national profit.[77] Morgan's bold address to Britain's military leaders following her description of the pillaging incident posits that war is an elevated form of looting, motivated by the same selfish desire that impels the impoverished thieves. "Ye naval and military officers," she pronounces, "who rejoice at the rumour of war, in which thousands and ten thousands must perish . . . be not too severe in your strictures upon the inhospitable temper of these untutored rustics" (208). Her provocative statement suggests that Britain's military leaders suffer from the same deficiency of sympathy as the heartless plunderers, and that it is this absence of sympathy that ultimately activates and perpetuates violence. Comparing the behavior of territorial lobsters to the war-like tendencies of men, she asserts: "[t]hough there appears to be little worth contending for in the possession of a lobster; yet perhaps, in the eye of cool reason and philosophy, they may seem wiser than men in their quarrels. Their very existence may depend upon securing a booty of small fish, a commodious bank of land, or a piece of rock in a particular situation" (234-235). Morgan posits that the male *desire* for violence renders them more animalistic than lobsters; whereas the sea creatures are impelled by an instinctive drive towards self-preservation, men are impelled by an aggressive desire for personal gain—"rejoic[ing]" (208) in the prospect of war. The propensity of men to disturb rather than pursue peace implicitly questions their socially sanctioned role as

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Spartan Mother" (1799), and "The British Mother" (1799).

[77] Knox argues that war is pursued for "sordid or vain-glorious purposes of the governors, with little regard to the real, substantial happiness of the governed" (213).

Britain's political leaders. If men cannot be trusted to preserve the peace of small, local communities, Morgan queries, how can they be trusted with the security of a nation?

That women are shown to enable community and maintain "tranquility" (112) indicates their facility for establishing collectivity, a particularly expedient quality during a time of national fragmentation. If, as Morgan suggests, sympathy is the key to effective governance and to national coherence, then it follows that those endowed with superior sympathetic faculties should be allowed to contribute to the formation of political culture. Morgan clearly demonstrates the female potential and capacity for leadership in her portrayal of Elizabeth Montagu and in her own role as a traveler and as a writer. Both Montagu and Morgan provide tangible, alternative models of femininity, demonstrating the intellectual, aesthetic, and physical aptitude of women. Morgan's implied argument that Montagu's estate management provides the best prototype for the administration of the state concomitantly posits that women are gifted with leadership qualities worthy of wider application. It is not insignificant that Montagu's esteemed estate lacks a governing male figure; the absence of masculine supervision suggests that women can not only construct well-ordered societies independent of men, but that they can construct societies *better* than men. Whereas the broader political implications of Montagu's domestic management is suggested through the conventional association between the private estate and the nation, Morgan's physical and intellectual activity renders the *extra*-domestic capabilities of women visible and imaginable. Her movement forms an important counterpoint to Montagu's stasis. Operating within the national space rather than in the domestic sphere—forming connections between different ethnicities through her representation of the nation,

gaining perspective through her national survey, and imparting counsel through her socio-political insights—she demonstrates the ability of women to perform public political roles. Indeed, Morgan encourages the politicization of women through her rigorous support of female education; her argument for educational reform belies a desire to equip women with the tools necessary to achieve greater influence in their society. "I would not," she asserts, "have [women] stand by unconcerned spectators of what is passing in the world, but acquire such a general knowledge as not to be totally ignorant of any thing that is a frequent subject of conversation" (286). Her statement starts off strong, expressing a desire for her gender to be concerned and involved citizens and to exert influence both within and outside of the domestic sphere. Morgan clearly believes that women deserve a strong and visible presence within the nation. "I would *not* have it understood," she emphatically states during a discussion of domestic roles, "that I wish women to confine themselves to their nurseries" (285, italics mine).

She defends her own excursions (both physical and professional) into the public sphere by asserting the diverse and proven capabilities of women. Her preemptive rebuttal of the ubiquitous stuffy critics is worth quoting at length:

> As a female, I have certainly no occasion to excuse my temerity, so many of my sex have shewn they are capable of the most admirable compositions on the most important subjects. I therefore am not afraid of being accused of going out of my sphere in publishing this trifling Work. To those who think a woman cannot find leisure to write, without neglecting either her person or some part of her family duty, I say nothing. They must believe, that the sex is formed merely to

> dress and be admired, or for domestic drudgery. Those notions have long ago been exploded by people of polite manners and liberal education. (ix)

Morgan's defense of her publication both asserts the intellectual equality of women and condemns as archaic the attempts of overbearing critics to stifle her work on the basis of gender. Her gesture towards the repressive measures used by patriarchal society to condemn women to 'dress and domestic drudgery' is repeated in a deceivingly lighthearted jab at her husband's condescending treatment of her. "I see now," she declares, "how you men deceive, and treat us like children, for when you seem to be acceding to our humours the most willingly, you have something in reserve that you know must, in the end, bring us over to your own" (145). That men are represented as using intimidation and deception to force women into submission creates a suggestive parallel between their behavior and that of the despotic landlords whom Morgan describes as using similar techniques to maintain power over their tenants. Of course, whereas the power dynamics between landlord and tenant have evolved to reflect modern ideals, Morgan's rebuke of both her critics and her husband demonstrates that women remain confined within archaic standards. Her defense of women's public contributions reads as a clarion call for an evolved interpretation of the female sex that acknowledges their multifaceted nature and expands their influence beyond the traditional roles of sexual objects, wives, and mothers. Not only is their active intervention in the life of their nation defensible, it is exigent given the political crisis facing the British nation. Morgan cautiously suggests that masculine aggression must be mitigated by, or subordinate to, feminine sensibility to create the possibility of a cohesive national community.

## Conclusion

Morgan's personal interaction with the foreign and the familiar throughout her travels models sympathetic engagement and advertises the benefits of a sentimental disposition. She is deeply critical of travelers and of travel writers who approach different cultures with an attitude of suspicion rather than sympathy, detachment rather than interest, and judgment rather than openness. Morgan suggests that this mode of interacting with different cultures inhibits social relationships as it is productive of difference rather than unity; travel becomes a way to assert and perpetuate rather than overcome racial, cultural, and national divisions. As she explains, "I have deviated widely in my account of the manners and dispositions of the Welsh from the generality of those authors who have gone before me . . . They pronounce them, *in the mass*, to be an ignorant and uncivilized set of people " (xiii, original italics). Morgan argues that these travelers expect to experience different cultures as inferior, incomprehensible, and ultimately unrelatable: "They look upon the Welsh as foreigners, and expect to hear them speak unintelligibly, to see them dress grotesquely, and behave uncouthly . . . [when] they are in most respect like the rest of the world" (253). Their unsympathetic preconceptions of the Welsh both inhibit the formation of authentic relationships ("[they] only run through a country, perfect strangers to every body in it" [xiii]) and, inevitably, shape their treatment and assessment of the inhabitants ("[t]hey pronounce them, *in the mass*, to be an ignorant and uncivilized set of people" [xii, original italics]). Morgan contrasts the anti-social effects of the unsympathetic or unsentimental traveler with the more productive effects of the sentimental traveler:

> The freedom and politeness which an intercourse with the world produces are so very captivating, they make you consider every one as your friend who pays you any civility. This casts such a universal benevolence over the mind, that you feel in perfect union with all your species, you forget that clashing interests and cruel ambition have ever set mankind at variance, and deluged the world with blood. (115)

Her observation specifically underscores the socio-political value of emotionally engaged travel—travel that seeks rather than disdains emotional connections. Sentimental engagement with the world generates expansive sympathies and a sense of unity whereas detachment creates or reinscribes difference, generating suspicion and fear.

Both by practicing sympathy on a national scale and by observing its repercussions on a local level, Morgan discovers that emotional exchange actively counters the violent impulses that splinter nations and ravage the international community. Writing in a period when "clashing interests" had, indeed, "set mankind at variance," Morgan reminds her audience of the value of sympathy at a critical juncture within British history. She observes the effects of emotional deadening in the violent desires and actions of the French mob, the unscrupulous thievery of the pillagers, the appetite for war in Britain's military leaders, the despotism of past rulers, and even in her culture's active repression of women. Without sentimental attachment, Morgan speculates that traditional loyalties are rendered meaningless and authority, as Burke warns, is forced to preserve power through terror. She submits sympathy as a corrective to the cycle of violence that she sees operating in Britain's past and threatening to reemerge in its present—the impulse to "pull[] down others" (418) in an

effort to arrogate or maintain power. Relationships—between landlords and tenants, political leaders and their people, men and women, and nations—must be grounded in sympathy in order to be ethical, effective, and sustainable. "[T]he common rights of civility," Morgan concludes, "require some degree of compliance with the humours of others, as well in a party of pleasure, as in the journey through life" (12).

The "clashing interests" battering Europe in the mid eighteenth century forms the subject matter of Helen Maria Williams' *A Tour in Switzerland* (1798), whose experience in pre-revolutionary Switzerland is the focus of the next chapter. Although Williams contributes to the vindication of sensibility, agreeing that the absence of active sensibility augurs socio-political degeneration, her republican sympathies directly contradict Morgan's sentimental defense of Britain's hierarchical structure. Morgan's sympathy ultimately lies with power; her "real affection[s]" (iv) work to cultivate and naturalize sentimental attachments to what she refers to as "titles and dignity" (418). Williams, on the other hand, sympathizes with the politically dispossessed rather than with prevailing power structures; her 'natural' feelings effectively challenge the traditional hierarchies upheld by Morgan by exposing the antipathetic dimensions of asymmetrical power relations. She vocally supports the revolutionary impulse of the disenfranchised to "raise themselves above their native meanness" (Morgan 419), reinterpreting the unwillingness of those possessed of "titles of dignity" (419) to extend political privileges as the true source of violence within society.

# Chapter V

# "A Renovation of Existence": Helen Maria Williams' *A Tour in Switzerland* and the Renewal of Political Vision

## Introduction

[T]he subject of our political abuses is so interwoven with the scenes of distress so perpetually recurring to the feeling observer, that it were impossible to be silent in this respect, without suppressing almost every reflection that ought to awaken the tender sympathies of the soul.
~John Thelwell

The opinions of men with respect to government, are changing fast in all countries. The revolutions of America and France have thrown a beam of light over the world, which reaches into man. The enormous expense of government have provoked people to think, by making them feel: and once this veil begins to rend, it admits not of repair.
~Thomas Paine

When we survey the wretched condition of man under the monarchical and hereditary systems of Government . . . it becomes evident that those systems are bad, and that a general revolution in the principle and construction of Governments is necessary.
~Thomas Paine[78]

Helen Maria Williams arrived in Switzerland in 1794, travelling under circumstances very different from those of Mary Morgan. Williams entered Switzerland not as a tourist, but as an exile; fearing Maximilien de Robespierre's retribution for her blatant criticism of his government, she fled to the Alps seeking both personal security and emotional succor. "I am going to repose my wearied spirit on those sublime objects," she states at the outset of her travelogue, "to sooth my desponding heart with the hope that the moral disorder I have witnessed shall be rectified, while I gaze on nature in all her admirable perfections" (1: 4). Although this statement frames her tour

[78] Thelwell, *The Paripatetic*, viii; Paine, *Rights of Man*, 1: 169; Paine, *Rights of Man*, 1: 193.

as an escape from political reality, Williams' travelogue is an attempt to reframe political reality; her unconventional representation of Switzerland disrupts and revises the political sympathies that were shaping the course of the French Revolutionary Wars and the political composition of both Britain and Europe. Published four years after her actual journey, *A Tour in Switzerland* is written as a political intervention in the British public opinion of France's precarious new republic and its military endeavors on the Continent. Her text is a response to and a refutation of the pervasive anti-Jacobin opinion in Britain and directly counters many of Morgan's political assumptions and principles. Williams believes that the traditional loyalties and mutual dependencies hailed by Morgan as the source of national regeneration and cohesion are, in fact, the basis of the internecine and international violence that both women deplore; the revolutionary impulse that Morgan interprets as breeding national fragmentation and disorder is embraced by Williams as a generative force that effectively liberates individuals and nations from enervating structures of exploitation. Williams attempts to colonize the same emotional terrain sought after by Morgan; her radical argument is embedded in sentimental language, creating an emotionally engaged and engaging text that appeals to the feelings of her British audience in order to transform the nation's increasingly counter-revolutionary mood into a mood that is conducive to revolution or reform. Her political project seeks to direct (or redirect) her readers' emotional investments towards what she defines as the proper objects of feeling, forging mutually transformative sentimental identifications among nations in conformity with her republican vision. While Williams and Morgan use sensibility and its associated vocabulary to accomplish very different political ends, they are united in the conviction

that feeling—both the *capacity* to feel and the ability to *espouse* another's affect—informs the construction of a just and harmonious society. Both women attribute political injustice and social dissonance to the vitiation of sensibility they perceive in their respective societies. Their shared persuasion that gendered injustice fundamentally undermines social stability is intimately connected to their shared sense that social cohesion and progress are tied to the healthy circulation of feeling within and between nations.

Williams' multi-ethnic, feminocentric, and Dissenting background clearly informed her development into one of the century's most infamous 'female politicians' and most vocal apologist for the French Revolution. Born to a Scottish army officer and a Welsh mother, her combined heritage of two cultures so often marginalized within the British polity perhaps shaped her adoption of a cosmopolitan rather than a strictly British identity. Her upbringing in an all-female family after the early death of her father manifested itself in a life-long interest in the condition of women, while her immersion in the liberal atmosphere of Britain's Dissenting circles—composed of religious nonconformists who generally supported parliamentary reform, initiatives in education, abolition, and religious toleration—fostered a commitment to radical politics that would later inform her enthusiasm for the French Revolution and sustain her faith in its radical tenets even after she witnessed its disintegration into violence and tyranny. Williams was an established author by the time she published *A Tour in Switzerland*, having first distinguished herself as respected poet and novelist in the 1780s before reinventing herself as a controversial travel writer after moving to Revolutionary

France.[79] *A Tour in Switzerland* was Williams' ninth travelogue; her popular and provocative *Letters from France* spanned the six tumultuous years following her arrival during the Fête de la Fédération, establishing the English transplant as the "leading interpreter" (Gary Kelly 79) of the Revolution by the end of the decade. Her sentimental depiction of the French Revolution urged her British audience to sympathize with the radical agenda of the revolutionaries; "throw[ing] a line of connection across the divided world" (*Letters Written in France* 149), Williams hoped that Britons' sympathy with the French revolutionaries might instigate similar reforms in her native country. While her staunch commitment to the Revolution's early principles earned her admiration and friendship within France, it increasingly alienated her from her British friends and readers. She visited Britain for the last time in 1792, thereafter remaining principally in France until her death in 1827. Williams' texts continued to receive widespread recognition in Britain during the last decade of the century; although her support of radical politics was deeply controversial as the Revolution descended into unmitigated violence, her position as an eyewitness to the rapidly changing and sensational events in France ensured her an eager audience back home.

Williams' trip to Switzerland was motivated both by political exigency and by political curiosity. She explains that she left Paris under duress, forced to flee Robespierre's bloody campaign before she became the guillotine's newest victim. Due to her association with the deposed Girondins and to her public deprecation of Robespierre in her *Letters from France*, Williams occupied a particularly precarious

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[79] Williams' poetry includes *Edwin and Eltruda* (1782), *An Ode on the Peace* (1783), *Peru* (1784), *Poems* (1786), and *A Farewell for Two Years to England* (1791); her novel is entitled *Julia* (1789) and included the poem *The Bastille: A Vision*.

position in Jacobin-ruled France. "[W]ith the knife of the guillotine suspended over me by a frail thread," she describes, "I fled to Switzerland" (*Letters from France* 1: 174; 1795). She traveled to Switzerland in the company of several British expatriates, including the recently divorced John Hurford Stone who was scandalously rumored to be her lover. That Stone was reputedly traveling as a representative for the French government suggests that factors other than exigency determined their choice of destination. In its review of Williams' travelogue, *The British Critic* suspects that Stone may have been engaged in subversive and traitorous activity while in Switzerland, acting on behalf of the French government as an "incendiary" and as a "spy" (24). Although the exact purpose of his political business remains unknown, Stone's previous involvement with the United Irishmen and his subsequent trial for sedition certainly tarnished his reputation in Britain. The political events that transformed the Swiss Confederacy in the years immediately following their journey and Williams' particular attention to the revolutionary mood within Switzerland throughout her travelogue suggest the political interests and investments that the company may have been pursuing over the course of their six-month tour. Although their activity was centered in Basel, they also traversed the nation's northern, southern, and western parts in search of Switzerland's much-admired natural wonders, storied historical and literary sites, urban centers, intellectual elite, and—perhaps most importantly—to gain a sense of Switzerland's political climate.

*A Tour in Switzerland* was published in two volumes and appeared four years after Williams' actual journey, its contents based on a combination of her original travel journals and accounts of recent political developments. It is an engaging mixture of

sentimental reverie, aesthetic contemplation and rigorous political description, with Williams' narratives of personal and national regeneration holding the pieces together. Her explanation of the time lapse between journey and publication suggests that she had originally determined to keep her Swiss journals private, checked by the awareness that her "unfinished outline" ultimately "offered nothing new" (Preface) to a public well-served with Swiss travel accounts. However, the prospect of a French-style (or French-imposed) revolution in Switzerland in the years following her six-month stay provided Williams with a convenient excuse to publish her original observations. "It is the present moral situation of Switzerland," she declares, "that justifies the appearance of these volumes, in which an attempt is made to trace the important effects which the French Revolution has produced in that country, and which are about to unfold a new æra in its history" (Preface). The publication of her travelogue nearly coincided with the French invasion of Switzerland, causing at least one reviewer to (not inaccurately) speculate that her text "may be considered as a precursory apology for what has since happened between the french and swiss republics" (*The Analytical Review* 27: 562; 1798). Williams presents her observations in a journalistic style that both reflects her source material (journals) and mirrors the approach taken by her predecessors. Her frequent references to both Dr. John Moore's and William Coxe's immensely popular Swiss travelogues suggests her familiarity with their works (Moore was also a close family friend). Moore's *A View of Society and Manners in France, Switzerland, and Germany* (1779) and Coxe's *Travels in Switzerland* (1789) were considered the gold standard of travel writing; their weighty volumes were carried by travelers on their

Swiss tours,[80] were exceptionally well-reviewed, and had gone through multiple editions. Williams' decision to emulate their style of documentation suggests her determination to be placed among their ranks as a travel writer and for her revisionary work to be considered alongside with and compared to their productions.

Although her travelogue received extensive coverage in the British press, critical reception of her work was mixed. Williams' lifestyle and political investments had damaged her reputation in Britain; her unrelenting commitment to the Revolution's ideals despite its violent turn and reports of her scandalous affair with Stone were cited as evidence of her moral perversion. Moreover, her glowing representation of the French Revolutionary Army certainly did not gain her any favors in a nation at war against the very military she defended. Critics continued to admire her powers of description, but their condemnation of her politics was nearly unanimous. "As a Poetess," one reviewer cautiously comments, "Miss Williams attracts us much more than as a politician" (*The European Magazine* 390). Their judgment is directed both towards what they perceive as her transgression of gender roles and towards her specific political commitments. *The Monthly Review* carefully questions her political orientation by casting aspersions upon her intellectual capacity, commenting that "[p]olitics seem to be Miss W.'s favorite science, but it is not the subject in which she is the best qualified to excel" (140; 1798). *The European Review* interrupts its generally favorable evaluation of her work to condemn its politics, cautioning that "her bias to the *Gallic phantom of Liberty* is too obvious, not to make us read with jealousy, and

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[80] A reviewer for *The Monthly Review* notes that s/he can attest to the "fidelity of Mr. Coxe's topographical descriptions" as s/he has "travelled through Switzerland with his former work in [his/her] hands" (26; January 1790).

recommend with caution, [her] work" (390, original italics). Not unlike the negative appraisals of Morgan's travelogue three years earlier, the dominant reproach of Williams' text is her sentimental style of narration. The reviewers' pointed criticisms of her signature blend of politics and sentiment all suggest the suspicious and inherently unreliable nature of feeling. *The Analytical Review* archly implies that Williams' sentimental orientation compromises the veracity of her account. "Her fancy, cradled by Ossian," the reviewer suggests, "had peopled the primæval scenery of Alps, and rocks, and glaciers, with a primitive race, if not of giants, at least of patriarchal form and manners" (561). The reviewer for *The British Critic* similarly suggests that her sentimental form of expression reveals an inherent absence of judgment, characterizing her work as "more remarkable for the gaudy glare of declamation, than for sound reason or sober argument" (24; 1789). *The Monthly Review* provides a more general statement on the conflation of sentiment and politics, citing the sentimental politics of Edmund Burke and Williams as examples of the danger that comes from situating "sound over sense" (144; 1798). "Both [Burke] and Miss W.," the reviewer concludes, "afford very striking examples that poetical politicians are … objectionable; since all sound moral and practical reasoning, to which the science of politics eminently belongs, is totally incompatible with the giddy flights of an unrestrained and impassioned fancy" (140).

The recurrent attack on Williams' sentimental politics reflects the beleaguered condition of sensibility and its attendant practices by the late-1790s, as appeals to the heart became aligned with disordered imaginations and disorderly behavior, while the realm of politics became progressively divorced from feeling. Williams' joint identity as

a doyenne of sentimental literature and as a vocal apologist for the French Revolution made her an obvious target for the late-eighteenth century backlash against the culture of sensibility. Her *Letters from France* were a *tour de force* in sentimental travel writing; as she explicitly states in her first volume: "my political creed is entirely an affair of the heart, for I have not been so absurd as to consult my head upon matters which it is so incapable of judging" (*Letters Written in France* 1: 91). Early reviews for her travel letters reserved warm praise for her emotional investment in and sentimental representation of the French Revolution. The critic for *The Monthly Review* commends the "rapturous feeling" (215; 1790) with which she relates the events in France, and the reviewers for *The Gentleman's Magazine* and *The General Magazine* grudgingly indulge what they consider to be the "enthusiasm of a sprightly writer" (*Gentleman's* 218; 1790) and the "natural, and perhaps unavoidable effusion of a young and fervid imagination" (*General* 214: 1790). The critic for *The English Review* might doubt the veracity of Williams' account, yet s/he still admires and admittedly succumbs to her ability to "melt even a heart of stone" (219). Enshrined as the archetypical sentimental subject in Wordsworth's "Sonnet on Seeing Miss Helen Maria Williams Weep at a Tale of Distress" and in Edward Jerningham's "On Reading 'Letters Written from France, in the Summer 1790, to a Friend in England, by Helen Maria Williams,'" Williams was hailed for her ability to translate personal feeling into political argument. "She tries no formal refutation," Jerningham enthuses,

> Nor raves of Governments and Laws,
>
> For she to Nature trusts her cause;
>
> Makes to the heart her strong appeal,

Which all who have a heart must feel[.] (221)

However, as the French Revolution devolved from a political phenomenon into a national threat and failed to live up to the idealistic vision championed by its supporters, conservatives and radicals alike were quick to point out the dangers of what Laetitia Matilda Hawkins described as the "heart unaided by the head" (1: 35). Hawkins published a two-volume refutation of Williams' politics entitled *Letters on the Female Mind* (1793), which was written as an explicit condemnation of and corrective to Williams' sentimental defense of the French Revolution. "Sentimental ladies," Hawkins opined, "are not to be relied on for their opinions on subjects where the passions and affections ought not to interfere" (1: 45). Williams' tenacious advocacy of revolutionary ideals amidst the disintegration of France was increasingly interpreted as perverse rather than charming, and her sentimental persona became an indication of the dangers posed by sensibility. Chris Jones observes that for anti-Jacobins, Williams "demonstrated too clearly the untrustworthiness of sensibility as a creed that could justify assassination and the Terror" ("Travelling Hopefully" 101). The widespread unease with her persistent conflation of personal feeling and national politics exhibited in the reviews of her later work serves as an indication of the demise of the culture of sensibility in the final years of the eighteenth century.

Not unlike her stalwart commitment to the Revolution's original principles, she remained fiercely invested in what Jones refers to as the "wider potentialities of sensibility" (101) despite, or perhaps due to, the social backlash against sensibility in its various manifestations. Her belief that the heart holds the key to both ethical and effective political reform perseveres through the atrocities she witnesses, and remains a

guiding principle in *A Tour in Switzerland.* The travelogue certainly lacks the youthful excitement and hopeful energy of her first travel letters, a tone that has occasionally been taken as an indication of her waning faith in the socio-political possibilities of feeling—both as an internal quality (sensibility) and as an external expression (sympathy). Jones, for instance, reads Williams' Swiss travelogue as a failure of sympathy and as a statement on the limitations of sensibility in post-Terror Europe. "She follows a trajectory common to many radical writers," he contends, "from a relatively unthinking trust in the progressive reformation of society to a recognition that such hopes cannot rely merely on collective humanitarian feelings" (*Radical Sensibility* 159). However, the personal context of Williams' travels is important to take into consideration; what Jones interprets as skepticism may also be interpreted as the effects of hard-won maturity and/or as the preponderance of grief. That her sentiments are not as "sprightly" (*The Gentleman's Magazine* 218; 1790) as they once were is to be expected, yet it would be remiss to say that Williams absconds her faith in the transformative potential of sensibility and its attendant practices. She believes that it is precisely the impulse to divorce "sound" from "sense" (*The Monthly Review* 144; 1798) that is dangerous; she attributes the eruption of Revolutionary violence to the absence rather than the excess of sensibility, emphasizing the Jacobins' unsympathetic nature (*A Tour* 1: 83, 89-91) and characterizing their administrative period as "the epocha of the worship of reason" (1: 90). In the volatile period following Robespierre's execution, Williams measures national regeneration according to the role feeling is allowed to play within society. "The love of public virtue in the people of France," she effuses with some relief, "is now blended with all the sympathies and affections of their natures" (*Letters*

1: 258; 1795). She clearly reverses Hawkins' observation that the "heart unaided by the head is the most deceitful advisor" (1: 35), suggesting that the head unaided by the heart is a far more terrifying mentor. Similar to Burke's fear that the abstraction accomplished by reason reduces humans to animals (*Reflections on the Revolution in France* 76-77), Williams suggests that the absence of authentic feeling enables a process of dehumanization that both invites and justifies violence. I perceive a profound distrust of pure reason in Williams' later work, and read her Swiss travelogue as defense rather than as a denunciation of sensibility. Indeed, I believe that her experience with revolutionary violence reinforced her conviction that "collective humanitarian feelings" (Jones 159) must participate in the redevelopment of society, as it is only through the widespread cultivation of sensibility that the selfish imperatives of exploitation are inhibited.

Her choice to record her Swiss experience in the form of a sentimental travelogue—a form to which she had amply contributed over the years—demonstrates her continued investment in the political rhetoric and praxis of sensibility. The reviews of her work all attest to the sentimental tenor of her Swiss travel letters, and the travelogue itself exhibits all the typical characteristics of the sentimental traveler. Her emphasis on emotional responsiveness, intersubjectivity, and anecdote clearly categorizes her work within the Sternian school of travel writing, and her appeals to the heart are grounded in the Yorick-like conviction that the heart is more discerning than the head.[81] Although Jones labels Williams' political project within *A Tour* as "anti-

[81] Williams is familiar with *A Sentimental Journey* and Sterne's classification of travellers, at one point referring to "that class of travellers whom Sterne describes as

sentimental" given her criticism of "Swiss life and manners" (152), her active demythologizing of Swiss culture is strategically presented as an act of sympathy rather than of prejudice. She intentionally explains that she entered Switzerland with an optimistic rather than a negative spirit, carefully distinguishing her orientation as a sentimental rather than as a splenetic traveler:

> The first view of Switzerland awakened my enthusiasm most powerfully—"At length," thought I, "am I going to contemplate that interesting country, of which I have never heard without emotion! … [H]ow delightful a transition shall I find in the picture of social happiness which Switzerland presents! I shall no longer see liberty profaned and violated; here she smiles upon the hills, and decorates the vallies, and finds, in the uncorrupted simplicity of this people, a firmer barrier than in the cragginess of their rocks, or the snows of their Glaciers! (*A Tour* 1: 4-5).

Williams looks to Switzerland to fulfill her elusive ideal of a society that effectively operates according to the Revolution's founding principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Her subsequent criticism of Swiss society is portrayed as a necessary corrective to previous travel writers' false representations—necessary because these mistaken depictions of Switzerland as a land of liberty perpetuate the oppression of its population. Similar to John Thelwell's fictional sentimental traveler, the motivation for Williams' criticism is discursively presented as an irrepressible response to suffering. "The subject of our political abuses," Thelwell's protagonist states, "is so interwoven with the scenes of distress so perpetually recurring to the feeling observer, that it were

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sailing and posting through the politer kingdoms of the globe, in order to see sights and look into discoveries" (*A Tour* 2: 130).

impossible to be silent in this respect, without suppressing almost every reflection that ought to awaken the tender sympathies of the soul" (viii). Interpreted as an act of sympathy, Williams' rewriting of the accepted representation of Switzerland is *profoundly* sentimental rather than anti-sentimental. Her sympathy with the French population upon her arrival in France in 1790 motivated her glowing representation of the French Revolution; equally, her sympathy both with the Swiss Revolutionaries and with the nation's dispossessed population provokes her negative appraisal of Switzerland's social and political structures. To read her travelogue as "anti-sentimental" is to assume that her censure elicits from the head rather than the heart; however, in this as in her previous publications, Williams represents her politics as "an affair of the heart" (*Letters Written in France* 1: 91).

Both sympathy and travel have the (discomfiting or energizing) potential to destabilize the established boundaries that exist among individuals, cultures, and nations. In her study of political tourism, Maureen Moynagh finds that "as tourists move across boundaries of cultural difference, apparently fixed markers of social location, of belonging and attachment shift. Gender, race, sexuality and nationality come to mean differently . . . in the process, new terms of belonging are worked out" (26). This is precisely the political effect that Williams hopes to achieve in her sentimental travelogue; she attempts to shift her British readers' attachments from conservative ideologies to revolutionary ideals by disrupting their "fixed markers" through her own transnational affiliations and solidarity with the revolutionaries she encounters in both France and Switzerland. Her political agenda is clearly specified in *A Tour in Switzerland*. As several critics suspected in their reviews of her text, her travelogue

provides a detailed apology for the imminent French invasion (ideological and physical) of Switzerland, using eyewitness authority and sentimental argument to sway a hostile British public in favor of the aims and vision of the newly inaugurated French Republic and its army. *A Tour* is a carefully crafted political document intended to polish the reputation of the new French government and its military endeavors. Her description of the total regeneration (moral, social, intellectual, and political) of France following the dramatic fall of Robespierre and her glowing recommendation of the French military as the repository of unsullied Revolutionary spirit is sharply contrasted with her representation of Switzerland as a nation characterized by degeneration (moral, social, intellectual, and political) due to the perversion of liberty under its antiquated systems of government. Rather than a liberated nation, Williams finds in Switzerland a nation that is ripe for liberation; her descriptions of the political inequality and oppression found in the various cantons she visits and her documentation of the Swiss population's inchoate desire for revolution builds an argument for the desirability of France's intervention in Switzerland's affairs. Whereas France has discovered and instituted a true form of liberty that inhibits the arbitrary exercise of power, Switzerland's form of 'liberty' is freighted with an archaic understanding of the concept that is manifested in the absence of genuine independence. In order to align the sympathies of her British public with France rather than Switzerland, Williams draws on the principle of reciprocity established in the moral philosophies of Adam Smith and David Hume: that feeling for or sympathizing with suffering individuals carries with it either the moral obligation or the impulse to mitigate their pain. The textual representation of suffering, Lynn Festa explains, "brings the wretchedness of the earth home to the reader" in a

manner that moves him/her "not only to tears but also to right action" (17). What constitutes "right action" for Williams is the cessation of violence between Britain and France, allowing for the uninhibited movement of revolution from France to Switzerland—and, perhaps, to Britain—which she presents as a solution to the suffering she witnesses in the alpine nation. Her own (political and politicizing) movement through the physical spaces of France and Switzerland contributes to readjusting Britons' ideological attachments by bringing reality (or her version of reality) to bear upon the idealized and conservative interpretations of Switzerland that had shaped Britons' perceptions of and affiliations with the Continent for generations.

## "[L]et us not renounce the land of promise": The Political Regeneration of France

The French government's more temperate character following the deposition of Robespierre did little to appease public opinion within Britain; the memory of the Reign of Terror and France's unrelenting commitment to the establishment of republican governments across Europe cast a permanent pall over the newly instituted Directory. In an open letter addressed to Williams and published during the height of Robespierre's rule, Anna Seward urged her friend to "fly . . . that land of carnage!—from the influence of that equalizing system, which, instead of diffusing universal love, content, and happiness, lifts every man's hand against his brother!" (208). Seward approvingly reflects upon the rapid expansion of conservatism within Britain in response to the French Revolution's violent turn, observing that radical sentiments have been replaced by "such an universal glow of loyalty, such a grateful and fervent sense of the blessings of our balanced government" (208). Her rather harrowing description of France as the "land of carnage" is reliably superseded by Edmund Burke's figurative

alignment of the Directory with the Biblical Anti-Christ in his *Letters on a Regicide Peace* (1796):

> [O]ut of the tomb of the murdered monarchy in France has arisen a vast, tremendous, unformed spectre, in a far more terrific guise than any which ever yet have overpowered the imagination and subdued the fortitude of men. Going straight forward to its end, unappalled by peril, unchecked by remorse, despising all common maxims and all common means, that hideous phantom overpowered those who could not believe it was possible she could at all exist . . . The poison of other states is the food of the new Republic. (252)

Burke's liberal use of apocalyptic imagery recalls the monstrous creatures featured in the Book of Revelation, clearly representing the new Republic as the personification of evil.[82] His *Letters* were written to discourage William Pitt's ministry from pursuing peace with France, based on his conviction that Jacobin principles must be annihilated in order to prevent their dissemination. The cynical appraisals of France's recovery and disturbing portrayals of its military efforts by several British travel writers assisted in the diffusion and entrenchment of anti-Jacobin sentiment within Britain. In an obvious attempt to discredit the optimistic tone of Williams' post-Thermidor *Letters*, the anonymous British female author of *A Residence in France, during the Years 1792, 1793, 1794, and 1795* (1797) casts the Directory within the same mold as Robespierre's ministry, suggesting that it perpetuates the same evils under a different name. "[E]xaction and oppression are still practised in every shape," she declares, "and justice

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[82] "[T]he beast that ascendeth out of the bottomless pit shall make war against them, and shall overcome them, and kill them" (Revelation 11: 7). Also see Revelation 13: 1-10.

is not less violated, nor is property more secure, than when the former was administered by revolutionary tribunals, and the latter was at the disposition of revolutionary armies" (xxv). Her characterization of the Directory's commitment to the dissemination of republican principles as "spreading universal ruin" (xxvii) is shared and expanded upon by several British travelers who witnessed the devastation of war in the course of their Continental travels. In *Gleanings through Wales, Holland, and Westphalia; with Views of Peace and War at Home and Abroad* (1796), Samuel Jackson Pratt details the atrocities committed both by the French government against its own people and by the French troops against the nations they invade. "It is not easy to suppose," he states,

> the ravagers could, in so short a space of time, change *every happy circumstance to its bitterest opposite*; that they could turn, for instance, plenty into famine, health to disease, and a contented mind to an agonized, broken spirit! Yet all this had been done *by the sons of liberty*, who too truly put their threat of execution, of *carrying misery and death* into every place they visited. (270, original italics)

Pratt encourages and justifies Britain's military involvement on the Continent by comparing the French Republic to a "gangrene" that must be eradicated by "fire and sword" (286). Although Ann Radcliffe is more measured than Pratt in her assessment of the French Revolutionary War in *A Journey Made in the Summer of 1794* (1796), she also expresses her disapproval of the French government's instigation and maintenance of international aggression. Her disturbing descriptions of wounded soldiers, devastated landscapes, and destroyed cities construct an argument against the practice of war instigated for offensive rather than defensive purposes. In its cautious appraisal

of Williams' 1798 travelogue, *The European Magazine* characterizes the purpose of the French Revolutionary Army as spreading "[a]narchy" and describes the effect of war as "destroying mankind and devastating the face of nature, under the specious pretence of asserting their inalienable rights" (390). This emphasis on the violent genesis and investments of the new Republic contributes to its demonization, constructing fear and rejection as appropriate responses to the radically transformed French nation. In his overview of domestic responses to the British war effort, Philip Harling finds that "depictions of the Revolution as a system of absolute violence and destructiveness were commonplace among anti-Jacobin propagandists. They reflected as much as they shaped a widespread perception among Britons that French society and politics were engulfed in a perpetual Reign of Terror" (25).

It is precisely this perception and prejudice that Williams is addressing in her 1795 *Letters* when she solicits her audience not to "renounce the land of promise" (2: 88), and it is this image of France that she attempts to invalidate and dispel in *A Tour in Switzerland*. Williams openly despises Robespierre and his radical faction—whom she refers to as "ignoble usurpers" (*Letters* 2: 214; 1795). She attempts to create clear distinctions among the Revolution's original principles, the Jacobin Club, and the Directory. "The last stroke has been given to that vile and degrading system," she emphasizes in reference to Robespierre's ministry, "we may now approach the altar of Liberty with confidence and hope; the hideous spectres which haunted it have fled forever; and its incense in future will rise grateful to heaven, and spread fragrance over a regenerated land" (*Letters* 2: 214; 1795). Reifying liberty as a goddess, Williams suggests that Robespierre has desecrated her holy spaces through his twisted

exploitation of the concept. She quite literally demonizes Robespierre in an effort to demonstrate that his ministry was the nemesis rather than the natural extension of the Revolution, countering the perception broadcasted by anti-Jacobins such as the anonymous author of *A Residence in France*, who asserts that "all the principles of this monstrous government [Robespierre's ministry] were established during the administration of the Brissotins, and . . . the factions which succeeded, from Danton and Robespierre to Sieyes and Barras, have only developed them, and reduced them to practice" (xxvi). Williams strategically separates the Jacobins' conduct both from the Revolution's initial aims and from the character of the new Republic to preserve enthusiasm and support for political revolution. In an effort to counter anti-Jacobin rhetoric and feeling within Britain, she attempts both to foster sympathy for what she represents as the victimized French population and to problematize the demonization of the French Revolutionary Army by emphasizing the virtue of its leaders and of its overall purpose. She shows her audience that Robespierre's form of governance was a perversion rather than a fulfillment of the Revolution as it was initially conceived, and that the French military has remained free from the taint of the Jacobins and remains a stronghold of the Revolution's original principles.

Within the sentimental travelogue, anecdotes often function to personalize and humanize experiences and places; they quite literally represent a deviation from the well-trodden path of sights and accommodations to provide information that deepens the readers' understanding of the people, places, and events that the traveler encounters. In her first set of *Letters from France*—written during the heady period following the Fête de la Fédération—Williams extends the anecdotal form of the

sentimental travelogue to its limits, embedding a lengthy sentimental narrative featuring Madame and Monsieur du Fossés' harrowing tale of exile, imprisonment, and eventual rescue and reconciliation due to the timely arrival of the French Revolution. Her sentimental narrative humanizes the Revolution and draws her British audience into emotional identification with the political event by illustrating its aims and effects upon emotionally appealing subjects, and it was popular enough to be excerpted into a chapbook that was circulated in the early 1790s. She reuses this strategy in *A Tour*, explaining the political trajectory of the Revolution's rise, corruption, and regeneration through a lengthy anecdote that conflates political reality and sentimental narrative to shape the emotional orientation of her British audience towards the political events and ideologies represented in the story.

In her travels through Switzerland, Williams opportunely encounters a family of French émigrés living in humble circumstances in a small Swiss village; her lengthy account of their appropriately woeful history of betrayal and seduction clearly parallels the course of the Revolution and provides a way of thinking about its development that condemns its degeneration into tyranny while enshrining its original character. The sentimental heroine is Madame C—, who is described as a woman possessed of a virtuous character, sympathetic disposition, and aristocratic lineage who embraced the first stirrings of Revolution with the same fervor as Williams. Although her husband "detested the principles of the Revolution" with a revulsion common among the aristocracy, Madame C— "exulted in that change of system which she dared not openly applaud: she had often wept over the miseries of the oppressed people, and was more disposed to rejoice in the amelioration of solid substantial wretchedness, than to lament

the ideal deprivations of greatness" (1: 288). Following the Revolution's descent into retributive violence, Monsieur C— flees to Switzerland in order to secure a place for his young family; in the absence of his wife, he is seduced by a profligate émigré who represents all the worst excesses of the *ancien regime*. Selfish, voluptuous, and unscrupulous, Madame de—'s profound disregard for others is evinced through her indifference to the sacred ties of marriage ("[she] had broken the heart of many a tender female, from whom she had alienated the affections of a beloved husband" [1: 300]) and through her contempt for the poor ("whom she had been accustomed to consider as only born for slavery and silence" [1: 301]). Williams refers to her influence as "witcheries and enchantments" (1: 303), rhetorically aligning Madame de— with Robespierre, whose power she characterizes as a "terrible spell which bound the land of France" (*Letters* 3: 190; 1795). The apparently contradictory conflation of Madame de— with both the *ancien regime* and with the Jacobin's radical leader is consistent with Williams' political thought: she frequently compares the excesses and effects of Robespierre's administration with that of the *ancien regime*, arguing that the Jacobins simply reintroduced political tyranny in a different form. "Both the institutions of the old regime and the rule of Robespierre," Jones clarifies in regards to Williams' politics, "block an emerging revolutionary society in which individuals learn to unite love and service to the community" (97). The tyranny practiced by both regimes interrupt or disable the circulation of authentic feeling: the *ancien regime* hinders the romantic alliance between the du Fossés in the same way that Robespierre's regime effectively disrupts the domestic harmony of Madame and Monsieur C—. Williams' representation of the seduction of Monsieur C— by Madame de— parallels the corruption of the

Revolution by the Jacobins. She describes the perverse attraction of Madame de— as "those seductions which spread an alluring drapery over the form of vice, and render the simple charms of virtuous love insipid to the vitiated fancy" (1: 300). Made vulnerable by fear and grief, Monsieur C— succumbs to the "siege" of his seductress, his feelings corrupted as "virtuous love" (1: 305) is supplanted by perverse desire. The distortion and misdirection of Monsieur C—'s feelings mirrors the corruption of the French population, whose exploitation of revolutionary violence Williams interprets as "powerful testimony to the depravation, not merely of manners, but of the heart" (1: 42). As an allegory for revolutionary France, Monsieur C—'s infidelity suggests that France was seduced by the empty fascinations of the Jacobins during a period of political vulnerability, momentarily neglecting its original political commitments. That Williams describes Madame de— as establishing "dominion" (1: 306) over her subject recalls the oppression of the French people under Robespierre, who were held as "captives" (1: 305) rather than self-determining subjects under his inexorable will.

Monsieur C—'s revelation of his wife's loyalty and her suffering as a result of his actions eventually rouses him from the "delusion" or "hideous dream" by which he had been "been so fatally misled" (1: 316). His affections restored to the right object, the prodigal—broken and broke—gradually experiences both physical and emotional healing, as well as renewed economic stability. Williams closes the tale of the prodigal husband by assuring her audience of Madame and Monsieur C—'s domestic harmony, stating that Madame C— in particular "has a mind capable of relinquishing rank and splendor without a sigh, since she has found happiness in exchange" (1: 322). Monsieur C—'s restoration to his original commitments functions as a commentary on France's

present socio-political circumstances. With Robespierre's "terrible spell" ruptured upon his execution, Williams represents Revolutionary France as returning both to its founding principles and to its overall health as a nation: "[T]he shrieking whirlwinds, the black precipices, the bottomless gulphs, suddenly vanished; and reviving nature covered the wastes with flowers, and the rocks with verdure" (*Letters* 3: 190; 1795). Madame and Monsieur C—'s discovery of domestic content in the absence of "rank and splendor" illustrate Williams' hopeful expectations for France's future. "Dreadful indeed has been the crisis we have passed," she reflects, referring to France's fling with Robespierre, "yet it is some consolation, amidst this mighty mass of evil, that France is at length beginning to learn wisdom from the things she has suffered" (*Letters* 2: 213; 1795). With the original, Girondin-lead revolutionary movement encapsulated in the figure of the virtuous wife—inspired by authentic feeling to ameliorate social inequality—and both the *ancien regime* and Robespierre's administration encapsulated in the figure of the seductress—whose deficiency of authentic feeling and desire for domination perpetuates systems of oppression—Williams illustrates the distinction between the different factions (specifically Girondin and Jacobin) within the Revolutionary movement. By soliciting her audience's emotional identification with the abandoned wife through her sentimental narrative, Williams simultaneously solicits their emotional identification with the original revolutionary principles to which France has been restored. To sympathize with Madame C—'s feelings of loss and betrayal and to rejoice in the restored relationship between her and her husband is to feel for the once abandoned and now reinvigorated French Revolution. Loosely represented by the prodigal husband in Williams' tale, France takes on a sympathetic rather than a

threatening character; it is the victim of a scheming opportunist rather than the Anti-Christ—the dupe of evil rather than its source.

However, Williams exonerates a significant segment of the French population from the guilt of betrayal: the French Revolutionary Army. "They alone remained pure and unsullied by the contagious guilt which overspread their country," she claims, "[t]hey alone appear to have been the true representatives of the French nation" (*Letters* 4: 206; 1795). Throughout her *Letters* and within *A Tour*, Williams consistently upholds the French military as the repository of original revolutionary feeling; their distance from Robespierre's influence and their front-line experience of extending and defending the republic preserves their commitment to the Revolution's founding programme. In *A Tour*, Williams extols the virtues of the French military and particularly of its leaders, with specific reference to a certain young Corsican general who was quickly emerging as the army's brightest luminary after his successful invasion of Italy.

Unlike several other British travel writers traversing the Continent, Williams' itinerary does not lead her directly through war zones; she does not witness the bloody vestiges of battle that devastate both Pratt and Radcliffe. It certainly can be argued that her lack of direct exposure to the reality of war allows her to maintain a pristine perspective of the French army. However, it is difficult to believe that Williams was ignorant of the horrors of the battlefield; her military heritage ensured a personal interest in the French army's progress that can be seen throughout her *Letters from France*. Avoiding the reality of war may be her way of dissociating France from the images of desolation circulated by other British travel writers—she shows her readers

what she *wants* them to see, generating a version of reality that aligns with her political project. By emphasizing the destruction left in the wake of the French army, both Pratt and Radcliffe (in varying degrees) associate France's international policy with violence and foster resentment towards what they represent as French aggression. "War," Radcliffe states after seeing recently wounded soldiers, "is compounded of something else, besides the glories, of which it is so easy to be informed" (114). Williams sidesteps the reality of the battlefield, instead focusing on the principles motivating France's invasion of Europe and on the admirable military leaders placed at the helm of the nation's international offensive. She divests the military of its faceless and threatening character using a well-worn sentimental tactic that draws on the theoretical strands of the Scottish moral philosophers: she delineates the sympathetic character of its two most prominent leaders—Napoleon Bonaparte and Amédée Emmanuel François La Harpe—in an effort to humanize the French Revolutionary Army. Williams draws on the understanding of sympathy as an intuitive response to the perception of likeness and/or the recognition of suffering:[83] if her audience can connect with those who compose the French military, then perhaps they will also be able to approximate and

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[83] Adam Smith asserts that the propensity to "derive sorrow from the sorrow of others" is inherently human; even the "greatest ruffian" (11) is moved to share in the sorrows of others. "How selfish soever man may be supposed," he observes, "there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him . . . of this is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner" (11). David Hume theorizes that some form of likeness between the viewer and the object of sympathy assists in the process of adopting his/her sorrow or plight. "[S]ympathy with others," he states, "is agreeable only by giving an emotion to the spirits, [and] an easy sympathy and correspondent emotions are alone common to relation, acquaintance, and resemblance" (404). Williams allows for an easy transition of sentiments by acquainting her British audience with her French, Swiss, and Corsican subjects.

share in their feelings. Her own experience bears out the political value of sympathy. Williams asserts in her earlier *Letters* that her revolutionary fervor is (at least in part) the product of her friendship with the du Fossés. "What, indeed, but friendship," she states, "could have led my attention from the annals of imagination to the records of politics? from the poetry to the prose of human life?" (*Letters Written in France* 140). Her representations both of Bonaparte and of La Harpe are written to establish a similar emotional connection between her audience and the French Revolutionary Army, to lead their "attention" from the negative images disseminated through anti-Jacobin commentators (most of whom could not claim eyewitness authority) to the positive images that she publicizes.

Williams uses her political observations on the recent revolutionary developments in Switzerland to offer panegyrics on Bonaparte—to whom the Canton of Grisons send a deputation—and on La Harpe—who is exiled from Switzerland due to his revolutionary activity. Her political argument regarding these military leaders proceeds on two fronts. By depicting both men as modern heroes—successors to the acclaimed classical heroes of ancient Greece and Rome—Williams effectively posits that they and the principles they espouse possess a universal appeal that transcends national borders. Her emphasis on the active sensibility evinced by both men further provides a political statement on the necessity of feeling within the realm of politics—an argument that is compounded through her attribution of unfeeling reason to "the greatest revolutionary sinners, the Jacobins" (*A Tour* 1: 83). Williams launches into a consideration of Bonaparte after recounting the recent insurrection in the Canton of Grisons and the liberation of the Valtelina region, immediately characterizing the

Corsican general as a deliverer rather than as an oppressor of the people. She suggests that Bonaparte ultimately exceeds the heroes of old as his exploits are motivated by sympathy with the oppressed rather than by selfish desire. "The heroes meed," she states,

> arises from other exploits than those of multitudes destroyed, and provinces desolated. It is not Buonaparte scaling the Alps, and chasing the imperial eagle back to its haunts . . . that claims the transport of admiration . . . it is the benefactor of his race converting the destructive lightening of the conqueror's sword into the benignant rays of freedom, and presenting to vanquished nations the emblems of liberty and independence entwined with the olive of peace. (2: 56-57)

This is indeed a different representation of war than the images of ruin depicted by Pratt and Radcliffe! Williams argues that Bonaparte's heroic endeavors have introduced growth rather than desolation, life rather than death, and liberty rather than oppression. Her wording suggests that multitudes have *not* been destroyed *nor* have provinces been desolated through his military maneuvers, creating the image of a bloodless intervention that contradicts Pratt's characterization of the French army "*carrying misery and death* into every place they visited" (270, original italics). Williams attributes Bonaparte's salutary influence to his finely attuned sensibility. "Nor do we wonder," she states, "to find associated with such a mind . . . 'that sympathy with the elevated sentiments, the pathetic sublimity of Ossian; Ossian the companion of his solitary hours, who seems to raise him above this terrestrial region'" (2: 56-57). Williams interprets his sympathy with James Macpherson's narrator and his obvious

sense of connection with Macpherson's epic poems—which Dafydd Moore characterizes as manifesting "heroic sentimentality" or the "sentimental sublime" (114)—as an indication of his capacity for feeling. It is this quality which distinguishes him from the classical heroes and from the Jacobins, both of whom Williams portrays as motivated by anti-social aspirations that inevitably result in crimes against humanity. Bonaparte is written as a new kind of sentimental hero whose actions—described as "unparalleled acts of pure expansive beneficence" (2: 57)—are grounded in sympathy and experienced as restorative on an individual and on a communal level.

Williams' sentimental narrative of La Harpe's exile from Switzerland and service in the French Revolutionary Army is motivated by her discussion of the government of Berne's strict repression of revolutionary activity. Exiled under the threat of execution for organizing a celebration commemorating the fall of the Bastille, La Harpe sought refuge with the French army and achieved a hero's status through his service. Williams first establishes the innocuous, sociable nature of the celebration he instigated in order to emphasize the injustice of the government's ruling against La Harpe. "[T]hey had drank to the success of the French revolution," she asserts, "but without ever conjecturing that those acts could justify an arraignment before such a tribunal" (2: 236). Williams clarifies that La Harpe's flight to France is not a sign of his guilt, but an indication of the government of Berne's tyranny: he fled because he had "little hope of establishing proofs of his innocence, when already persons arbitrarily arrested had, without accusation or proof, been sent to the prisons of Chillon" (2: 238). She strategically places the onus on the government, arguing that La Harpe's development into a French revolutionary is a direct response to his own experience of persecution. It

is the injustice of the government of Berne that radicalizes La Harpe, forcing him to seek refuge with the French military by divesting him of his freedoms, his possessions, and his life. In true sentimental style, Williams draws attention to La Harpe's disrupted domestic situation in order to condemn the actions of the government. She imagines his wife, surrounded by her six children, supplicating the government for the retention of her property in an effort to provide for her family in the compulsory absence of her husband (2: 242). Williams' emphasis on the private suffering caused by political action aims to expose the cruelty of oppressive systems; that tyranny obviates social harmony is illustrated through her representation of La Harpe's fractured family. Her subsequent account of his heroic endeavors with the French Revolutionary Army serves to underscore his virtue, communicating the admirable nature of those who oppose tyranny and the questionable nature of systems that would demand the death of such citizens. His victories are the direct result of his "military skill and valour" (2: 246), his "devotedness" (2: 243) to the cause of liberty serves as an inspiration to his troops, and his sensibility is demonstrated through his generous treatment of Swiss prisoners (2: 247). Upon his unfortunate death, Williams describes the "consternation and sorrow" (2: 247) that enveloped the French military and the profound regret with which Bonaparte himself received the news. Her eulogy of La Harpe reinforces the integrity of the French Revolutionary Army; that the army recognizes and values the quality of La Harpe—demonstrated through their embrace of the Swiss expatriate as a "martyr" (2: 243) and through his quick promotion through the ranks (2: 243-247)—suggests their own exemplary character.

To allow sympathy to flow unimpeded between her British audience and her revolutionary subjects, Williams grounds her sympathetic portrayal of both Bonaparte and La Harpe within a cosmopolitan context. She argues that Napoleon and La Harpe's heroism shares a universal appeal reminiscent of that demonstrated by classical heroes, whose influence is not limited to the cultures from which they emerge. "The glory of Buonaparte," she contends, "belongs not exclusively to France, or her revolution; like Homer, or Newton, Buonaparte belongs to the world" (2: 57). Bonaparte's advancements on behalf of liberty are equated with Homer's contributions to literature and Isaac Newton's discoveries in science and mathematics—each man has unfolded new forms of knowledge the impact of which extends beyond national boundaries due to their universal nature. Bonaparte embodies for Williams what Gary Kelly characterizes as an "internationalized Revolution" (70); like Newton and Homer's innovations, France's revolution is relevant for all nations and all people. The international character of France's political revolution is asserted in a footnote to Bonaparte's eulogy on La Harpe. Noting the novelty of a Corsican eulogizing a Swiss citizen for his service in the French army, Williams observes: "It is not unworthy of remark, that, among the Generals who have rendered themselves the most illustrious in the defence of the French Republic, we find the names of Italians, English, Scotch, Irish, and Germans . . . The friend of liberty, whatever may be his native soil, considers every free state as his country" (2: 248). This assertion of the multinational character of the French army suggests that Napoleon, La Harpe, and the army as a whole are fighting for universal freedom rather than for France; Williams challenges her audience to reimagine the French Revolutionary Wars as a struggle to extend the bounds of liberty

rather than to extend the boundaries of the French nation, creating an alliance of like-minded nations all pursuing and maintaining a standard of liberty. United under the auspices of a shared cause and vision rather than by shared origins, their national distinctions do not serve as limitations or as barriers. By asserting their cosmopolitan character, Williams suggests that to admire the military accomplishments of Bonaparte and La Harpe, and to espouse the revolutionary principles they represent, is not a betrayal of one's nation of origin, since the cause of the French Revolution is the cause of humanity.

It follows that to resist or to actively confront the French army is not to fight against France, but to fight against what the army represents: which is, according to Williams, *liberty*. Although it complicates Hume and Smith's emphasis on contiguity, Williams' cosmopolitan interpretation of the cross-cultural operation of sympathy meshes with their theories of social cohesion in her conviction that shared vision rather than shared soil is what binds people together. Her experience as a traveler—comingling and connecting with various national and ethnic groups—confirms the cohesive quality of sympathy. Bonaparte, La Harpe, and Williams herself are bound to the French cause and to one another by emotional rather than national or ethnic ties; indeed, her reference to the multinational character of the French Revolutionary Army indicates that shared sympathies are a far more powerful binding agent than a shared heritage. Although she approves of national attachments (indeed, she indulges in national pride when reflecting upon Bonaparte's preference for Ossian), Williams disapproves of a form of nationalism that obviates the formation of more universal affections—and that inhibits the dissemination of liberty. Her aversion to national

boundaries that translate into emotional barriers is evident in her criticism of Berne's strict border controls, which "destroy[s] all impressions of Swiss Freedom" (2: 197). She attempts to dissolve these barriers—particularly between Britain and France—both through her own transnational affiliations and through her representation of Bonaparte and La Harpe as figures that transcend national borders through their commitment to liberty. Their assault *on* national borders is justified through their principles; they are not fighting for personal or national gain, but for the extension and establishment of liberty throughout Europe for the amelioration of humanity. By casting the French Revolutionary Army as allies rather than antagonists of liberty, Williams provides a way of thinking about the Revolutionary War that allows Britons to sympathize with the 'enemy' and problematizes their involvement in the war against the French Republic.

## Restricted/Restricting Liberty: Deconstructing the Myth of Switzerland

The purpose underlying Williams' extensive engagement in political issues related to the French Republic and to its army in a travelogue that is advertised as being about Switzerland becomes clear when contextualized within the immediate political situation on the Continent at the time of her text's publication. In February 1798—around the same time that Williams published her travelogue—France began its invasion of Switzerland, and by April 1798 it had established a centralized state that was subsequently renamed the Helvetic Republic. Jones observes that France's conquest of Switzerland decisively turned the tide of public opinion in Britain and on the Continent against France and altered the manner in which the war with France was perceived. "The invasion of Switzerland," he asserts, "has been likened to the 1956

invasion of Hungary in its effect upon international opinion, and its 'subjugation' was . . . a crucial point of transition in public sympathies with the French" (152-153). One of the critics responding to Williams' travelogue indicates Britons' intense interest in the political drama taking place in Switzerland, noting that "the fate of Switzerland is the theme of general discourse and common commiseration" (*The Critical Review* 9). That the reviewer describes Britons as 'commiserating' with the Swiss indicates the general sympathy that they felt with the invaded nation in response to France's actions. Other critics are far more direct in their obvious sympathies with the Swiss, with a contributor for *The Analytical Review* bemoaning "the dissolution of a friendly nation, once the cradle, domain, and barrier of liberty, endeared to us by political alliance, religious and moral analogy, and long continued intercourse" (561).

That the source of this critic's sympathy lies within the apparent similarities between Britain and Switzerland suggests one of the primary reasons for Britons' interest in and sympathy with the invaded nation. British writers had long established the political, cultural, and ideological similarities between their nation and Switzerland. In particular, the political practice of and reverence for liberty united the two nations in a shared political vision and heritage emphasized by poets, travel writers, and politicians. In his poem *The Traveller*, Oliver Goldsmith characterizes the Swiss according to the image of the independent peasant, who

> Sees no contiguous palace rear its head,
>
> To shame the meanness of his humble shed;
>
> No costly lord the sumptuous banquet deal,
>
> To make him loathe his vegetable meal. (179-182)

Coxe's and Moore's immensely popular travelogues cemented the image of Switzerland as nation of independent citizens united under a series of democratic governing bodies. In *Travels in Switzerland*, Coxe emphasizes the liberty enjoyed by the Swiss and draws clear parallels between Britain and Switzerland:

> I feel great delight in breathing the air of liberty; every person here has apparently the mien of content and satisfaction . . . I can trace in all their manners, behaviour, and dress, some strong outlines, which distinguish this happy people from the neighbouring nations. Perhaps it may be prejudice and unreasonable partiality; but I am the more pleased, because their first appearance reminds me of my own countrymen, and I would almost think, for a moment, that I am in England. (1: 4-5)

He repeatedly classifies the various Swiss governments he encounters as "mild and equitable" (1: 232; 2: 79, 113, 390) and observes the effects of liberty in the independent bearing of Switzerland's inhabitants. Moore—whose early support of the French Revolution reveals a different political orientation than Coxe's deeply conservative leanings[84]—is similarly impressed by the implementation and preservation of liberty within Switzerland. "As far as I can judge," Moore states, "a spirit of independency and freedom, tempered by sentiments of decency and the love of order, influence, in a most remarkable manner, the minds of the subjects of this happy republic" (150). The influence of these representations can be seen in Williams' early enthusiasm for Switzerland as documented in "An Epistle to Dr. Moore," a 1786 poem addressed to her good friend. Inspired by the images and ideas that she finds in Moore's

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[84] See John Moore's *A Journal of a Residence in France* (1793) and William Coxe's *A Letter to the Rev. Richard Price* (1790).

travelogue, she imagines Switzerland as a place where "freedom rears her humble home" (19) and where "GREATNESS seems not quite so stern" (45). Given the tacit sense of confederacy or fraternity between Britain and Switzerland, it is unsurprising that Britons reacted to France's conquest of Switzerland as an affront to themselves. Indeed, Lord Carlisle appealed to the well-established parallels between Britain and Switzerland to mobilize Parliament's support for a military offensive against France: "The Swiss, in some degree, were in a similar situation with ourselves; they were opposed to the tyranny of the French nation, and they were contending for every thing that was dear to them; Switzerland and Britain were the last and only countries who had virtue and resolution enough to dispute the power and attempt to repel arms" (*The Gentleman's Magazine* 955; 1798). He argues that the cause of Switzerland is the cause of Britain—an attack on Switzerland is not only an assault on liberty, but it also makes a similar invasion of Britain alarmingly imaginable.[85]

Three attempts by French convoys to land on British shores in the period between 1796-1798 provided tangible reasons for alarm; as Lord Carlisle's speech suggests, Britons could concretely see their fate reflected in the recent conquest of

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[85] That this sense of a shared national character and purpose between Britain and Switzerland persists well into the twentieth century indicates the strength of the symbolic association between the two nations. In his 1946 speech on the cultural correspondence between Britain and Switzerland given at the Royal Society of Arts, Arnold Latt speaks of the "ties of sympathy" (611) between the two nations and underscores their parallel commitment to liberty:

> It is the element of character, the community of spirit, whose 'chosen music,' as Wordsworth put it, is Liberty, which brings us together from the Alps and from the sea as the two oldest champions of freedom. The undisputed enjoyment of freedom and its practice in every form of public life, has developed in both nations a strong sense of order and discipline, so that a respect for political institutions, cultural values and traditions, has become a national characteristic of the Swiss as well as of the English. (609)

Switzerland. The Irish Rebellion provided the Directory with ready allies and a point of entrance into Britain. Two of the three invasion attempts were made in Ireland, and at least one resulted in a minor insurrection. Linda Colley describes the "panic" (283) that permeated Britain during this period and details the anxious efforts of the British government to assess patriotic feeling within the nation. "The danger of a massive French invasion," she observes, "was so great after 1793, and so protracted, that they were compelled to establish how many Britons would take up arms in defence of their nation" (284). Written in response to the French expeditionary force that landed off the coast of Wales in 1797, Uvedale Price's *Thoughts on the Defence of Property* provides an indication of the seriousness with which Britons regarded the possibility of a French invasion. He constructs an argument in favor of arming Britain's yeomanry in order to provide a sturdy defense against French forces, contending that the ability to defend the nation is essential in promoting patriotic spirit. Johann Casper Lavater's *Remonstrance Addressed to the Executive Directory* (1798), in which the Swiss national criticizes France's invasion of and subsequent conduct in Switzerland, was translated and republished in Britain in an attempt to discourage Ireland's collusion with France to circumvent the potential of another invasion attempt. "Will not Ireland," the publisher pleads in his introduction to the text, "which the French at this moment look forward to as the very next victim of their rapacity, take warning from this awful testimony, and join with one heart to save their honour, their property, their existence?" (4). The publisher's characterization of Ireland as France's "very next victim" suggests the sense of imminence with which Britons regarded the Gallic threat during the French Revolutionary Wars. The invasion of Switzerland demonstrated that no European

powers were safe from the revolutionary fervor of the new French Republic, and the French Directory's involvement with the United Irishmen suggested the method by which they might launch a similar attack on Britain.

Williams was well-aware of France's political ambitions given her connections in Switzerland and France, and also given her acquaintance with the leaders of the Irish Rebellion: Theobald Wolfe Tone and Lord Edward Fitzgerald.[86] She dismantles the common stereotype of Switzerland as "one of the happiest, the most prosperous, and the best governed countries upon earth" (Burke 227) to effect a reversal of British sympathies—disrupting traditional loyalties in order to encourage new alliances. That Lord Carlisle draws on the idea of Anglo-Swiss fraternity to aid his anti-Gallic agenda suggests how British sympathy with Switzerland operated to increase hostility towards France, which manifested itself both in conflict abroad and in the entrenchment of conservative opinion at home. To interrupt the violence that Williams believes is perpetuated by British fears of France and its revolutionary principles, she deploys her eyewitness authority to counter the engrained perception of Switzerland as a land of perfect liberty, refuting and revising the largely complimentary accounts of Goldsmith, Coxe, and Moore with which she was evidently familiar.[87] Her romantic preconception of the alpine nation—aided by previous travel writers—gradually unravels in the face of what she represents as reality; Switzerland as the home of liberty and the Swiss as an

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[86] In his autobiography, Tone mentions having dined with Stone and Williams while in Paris in 1796, and specifically references the political nature of their discussions: "All our politics English" (2: 87). Fitzgerald frequented Williams' salons in 1791, where she introduced him to his future wife.

[87] Williams quotes from Coxe (1: 63, 114, 222. 2: 119, 201, 221) and Goldsmith (98) throughout her travelogue, and both her friendship with Moore and her poetic tribute to his travels and travel reflections provides evidence of her familiarity with his writings on Switzerland.

independent people are exposed as a fiction and myth. Williams' revision proceeds on three fronts: 1) she slowly deconstructs the Swiss definition and practice of 'liberty' to reveal what Jones calls "a bare idea, a construction of the mind" (153) rather than a fully-realized practice that seeks and ensures the freedom and rights of all citizens; 2) she challenges the perception of Switzerland as "one of the happiest . . . countries" (Burke 227) by revealing the social discontent endemic throughout Switzerland; and 3) she aligns contemporary Swiss political rebels with the historical Swiss freedom fighters traditionally revered in Britain, rewriting the narrative of the current revolution as part of the nation's ongoing struggle for liberty. Her alternative interpretation of Switzerland's political landscape presents a justification for France's political intervention, while concurrently suggesting that Britain might avoid a similar insurrection by modeling itself after France rather than Switzerland. Acting as an intermediary between the two hostile nations, Williams strives to promote a friendly alliance between Britain and France by suggesting that Britain's current friendship with Switzerland may ultimately lead to its degeneration, while friendship with the new French Republic will foster its renewal.

The culturally entrenched perception of Switzerland as a model republic that operates according to democratic principles is systematically debunked throughout Williams' travelogue. She disputes this romantic stereotype by interrogating the form and praxis of power exercised by the governments of the Swiss Confederation, examining who has access to political rights, how those rights are gained and transferred, and the manner in which they are exercised. What her analysis reveals is a series of governments characterized by asymmetrical power relations that create

cultures of dependence rather than independence. In order to emphasize the actual oppression of Swiss 'democracies,' she reveals the discrepancy between the total population of each canton and the number of individuals granted political agency. Surveying a number of the smaller Swiss cantons, she asserts: "No other part of Switzerland is so unenlightened, and consequently to hostile to the spirit of true liberty, as these little Cantons, where democracy and despotism march under the same banners; for although the government is democratic, the number of those who have the right to the seat in the general assembly is inconsiderable compared with the numbers that are excluded" (1: 213). The government in Switzerland may be "democratic with respect to those individuals who make a part of the sovereignty" but "[it] is to the unprivileged inhabitants of the Cantons . . . a confirmed hereditary aristocracy" (1: 214). She particularly draws attention to the political subjection suffered by the various territories under Swiss control. Those who inhabit the Valley of Levantina—subject to the Canton of Uri—have been divested of all political rights, and are depicted as "the slaves of their citizen-sovereigns" (1: 202). She describes the inhabitants of the Valtelina province as "oppressed subjects of the Grison democracies" (2: 48), creating an ironic juxtaposition between their political oppression and the ostensibly democratic practice of the Grison administration. Williams particularly emphasizes the "abuses" (2: 247) suffered by the Vaudois in their attempts to gain constitutional privileges denied them by the Canton of Berne. Her lengthy narratives of the systematic political dispossession and oppression suffered by the inhabitants in Switzerland's subject territories shatters the myth of Swiss democracy. "The history of these Cantons," she observes, "is nearly the same; the same sovereignty and the same servitude" (2: 72).

The coercive means through which authority is secured—economic manipulation, censorship, and violence—further emphasizes the restrictions placed upon this ostensibly 'independent' people. Williams details how the economic control exercised by the burghers in various cantons results in the essential enslavement of the lower classes; the freedom of the people is limited by taxation schemes and trade restrictions that financially benefit the burghers and financially burden the disenfranchised population. She describes the frustrations of a peasant farmer who "may cultivate his field of flax" but "has no right over the produce of his labour, no power to dispose of what he has acquired by the sweat of his brow and the toil of his hands" (1: 104). Williams' criticism of economic controls is fundamentally a criticism of arbitrary power. "[W]hat was feared in the eighteenth century," John Phillip Reid explains regarding British reformist and revolutionary thought, "was the power of government acting without restraint. To be subject to arbitrary governmental power was to live without liberty" (109). Divested of direct or indirect political influence, the peasant farmer has no say in how power is implemented and therefore lacks control over his own property. The strict censorship laws under which the press operates curtails whatever indirect political influence the unrepresented majority might exert, allowing power to govern unchecked. "To murmur is treason," Williams succinctly states, "to resist is death" (2: 87). What she refers to as "the gradual progress of that knowledge which will lead to freedom unsullied by anarchy or violence" (2: 120-121) is prevented by structures of authority that use violence to discourage the political movement towards genuine liberty. While in St. Maurice, Williams and her companions notice "a placard stuck on the wall, which stated the various degrees of corporal

punishment to be inflicted on those who should indulge themselves in discussions on the principles of Government, or be guilty of the overt act of receiving or reading the [French] papers" (2: 182). That those who do challenge the political status quo are subject to the "iron hand of oppression" (2: 188) is clearly illustrated through her detailed account of La Harpe's trial and exile as well as her descriptions of the violent suppression of insurgents within the cantons of Uri, Grison, and Berne. Swiss 'democracy' is ultimately exposed as an empty signifier, where "under the name of liberty, the greatest outrages are committed against the principle" (2: 37). Her frequent comparisons between the politically disenfranchised and slaves effectively combat the accepted image of the independent Swiss subject and recall John Cartwright's comparison between Englishmen and slaves. "Those Englishmen," Cartwright proclaimed in 1797, "who have *no* vote in the electing of representatives in parliament, are *not* free men, but are truly and really slaves to the representatives of those who *have* votes: For, to be enslaved is to have no will of our own in the choice of lawmakers, but to be governed by legislators whom other men have set over us" (20, original italics). By detailing the tyrannical ways in which authority is secured and exercised, Williams seeks to convey that the Swiss people deserve liberation in the same manner and with the same urgency as the slaves within Europe's and Britain's Empires.[88]

Having established the most flagrant social and political faults of the Swiss Confederacy, Williams proceeds to challenge the purported 'happiness' of its subjects by examining the effects of oppression upon the people. What she finds is a nation

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[88] Williams' anti-slavery platform was well known by the time she wrote *A Tour*; her abolitionist sentiments can be found throughout her work, most notably in "A Poem on the Bill Lately Passed for Regulating the Slave Trade" (1788).

fragmented by ongoing hostilities rather than a "happy republic" (Moore 150); Williams invalidates the common perception of Swiss happiness by reinterpreting the historical and contemporary internecine conflicts that have fractured the Swiss nation as a symptom of pervasive and perpetual socio-political discontent. Whereas other British travel writers celebrate Switzerland's history of revolution and reform as healthy expressions of the Swiss spirit of liberty, she draws her audience's attention to the conditions that enable oppressive structures of power to continually reassert themselves. The historical revolts celebrated by Coxe and others as assertions of the Swiss spirit of independence are reinterpreted by Williams as evidence of the Confederation's flawed political systems. "Were the boasted happiness of the subject classes of Switzerland founded in truth," she argues, "it is not probable that revolts against the sovereign would be so frequent. No people revolt against happiness" (2: 88). She suggests that the appearance of national contentedness perceived by former travel writers is not necessarily an indication of widespread happiness, but a measure of the extent to which the Swiss population has internalized and normalized their political subjection. "The implicit obedience of the subject," she observes, "never fails of being rewarded by the paternal protection of the state, the members of which, since the French Revolution, have earnestly inculcated the doctrine, that happiness is to be found in tranquility, than in the turbulent freedom of rights" (2: 224). Her argument indicates that there is a clear distinction between the happiness borne out of true freedom and the compliance borne out of fear.

By re-imagining the history of Swiss uprisings as an indication of ongoing tyranny rather than of an independent spirit, she redraws the contours of the argument

made by previous travel writers and re-presents Switzerland as a nation that requires further reform. Williams represents the incipient revolutionary fervor pervading the nation as a *natural* and *necessary* response to political oppression—one that carries on Switzerland's celebrated tradition of resistance against despotism. That Britons admired Switzerland's history of democratic reform is manifest in the voices of Coxe, Moore, and Goldsmith, and Williams notes that William Tell's fabled exploits in the service of political liberty are held equally sacred in Britain as in Switzerland. "Tell is in England," she remarks, "as well as Switzerland, the hero of our infancy; the marvelous tale of the apple is one of our earliest lessons" (1: 147). Similarly, British writers hailed the legendary tales of Swiss uprisings against tyranny as examples of the nation's inherent spirit of independence and engrained commitment to liberty. Coxe—whose vigorous objections to the French Revolution demonstrate his conservative politics[89]—repeatedly expresses his approbation of Switzerland's tradition of political resistance. "I have frequently remarked with pleasure," he comments, "the national enthusiasm which generally prevails in this country, and greatly admired the fire and animation with which the people discourse of those famous men among their ancestors, to whom they are indebted for that happy state of independence they now enjoy" (*Travels in Switzerland* 1: 292; 4th ed.). Whereas Coxe laments the French-inspired revolutionary movements spreading across 1790s Switzerland as an abrogation rather than as a manifestation of Swiss liberty,[90] Williams characterizes those whom she refers to as

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[89] For his objections to the French Revolution, see Coxe's *A Letter to the Rev. Richard Price*.

[90] For Coxe's conservative response to France's invasion of Switzerland, see "Additions to 'Travels in Switzerland': Containing an Historical Sketch and Notes on the Late Revolution" in the fourth edition of *Travels in Switzerland* (1802).

Swiss "patriots" as the natural successors of William Tell and represents their political aims as consistent with those of their ancestors. "[T]he Swiss," she states, "have only to consult their own annals . . . and they will probably reflect that the age of heroism is not past with that of chivalry; but those who march in the steps of an Albert, may find in their path a Verner de Stauffaken, or a William Tell" (1: 216-217). Williams intentionally explores the various expressions of and reasons for discontent found among the Swiss populace; her tour takes her through spaces of political discontent and of revolutionary energy, allowing her to see and to sculpt a different reality than previous travel writers. Referring to recent revolutionary activity among the inhabitants of the Valley of Valtelina, she argues that their rebellion can be interpreted as a reassertion of the independent spirit exhibited by their ancestors: "The indignation which has led them at the present moment to shake off the yoke of their tyrants, they have inherited in long succession from their fore-fathers" (2: 47). By aligning contemporary Swiss governments with ancient forms of despotism, she suggests that present structures of authority are an aberration from rather than a product of Switzerland's traditional commitment to liberty. That she speaks of restoring "this country to its ancient renown" (2: 121) suggests that Switzerland has deviated from its original democratic principles, but that it can be revitalized through the revolutionary principles and practices emanating from France. In turn, Williams develops a reading of Swiss radicalism that directly challenges British hostility towards the French invasion of Switzerland; her conflation of past and present political rebellions forces a reevaluation of contemporary republican activities that resists their easy demonization. By emphasizing the tyranny exercised by Switzerland's current governing bodies and

suggesting the political heritage between past and present rebels, she posits that the revolutionary spirit suffusing the nation should be read as part of Switzerland's legacy of reform and revolution rather than as a foreign incursion.

Through her dual offensive of identifying the egregious shortcomings of Swiss governments and of distinguishing Switzerland's present revolutionaries as the direct political successors of the nation's past heroes, Williams invites her audience to extend their sympathy to the nation's current discontents and to Revolutionary France, which she depicts as Switzerland's political savior through the figure of Bonaparte. To effect a complete reversal of British sympathies, she reinterprets contemporary Swiss rebels as national heroes—successors to the legendary Swiss champions eulogized within British and Swiss culture alike—while those inhibiting the spirit of revolution straining to burst over Switzerland's borders are aligned with the despotic regimes denigrated within Swiss history. That Britons were predisposed to sympathize with the fate of the "mild and paternal governments of Switzerland" (*The British Critic* 583; 1801) is evident from the severe backlash against France's act of invasion. "What must we *feel*," laments a critic for *The Analytical Review*, "at the dissolution of a friendly nation[?]" (561, emphasis added). The feeling that this commentator gestures towards is evidently grief; s/he indicates that this can be the only appropriate response to Switzerland's spectacle of ruin. That feeling *for* Switzerland translates into feeling *against* France is made obvious through this reviewer's comparison of the French invasion to a violent tempest: "[T]he flashes and thunder clouds of a storm ris[e] to involve hill, dale, and cottage in undistinguished ruin" (561). Williams disrupts previous writers' socio-political idealization of Switzerland in order to complicate the demonization of France; by

exposing the messy reality behind the nation's imagined perfection, she suggests that sympathizing with Switzerland *and* France need not be mutually exclusive. Through her elaboration of the oppressions suffered by the politically marginalized members of the Swiss Confederation—the disenfranchised classes, Jews, Catholics, and the inhabitants of the Levantine, Valtelina, and Pays de Vaud regions—she establishes those challenging Swiss authority rather than the structures of authority themselves as the proper objects of sympathy.

As part of her project to redirect Britons' sympathetic energies, she exchanges real-life sentimental heroes for the fictional sentimental characters Britons had become habituated to through Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Julie*. The castle of Chillon had become an immensely popular tourist attraction after it was immortalized in Rousseau's novel as a site of tragedy following the near-drowning of the eponymous character's son; tourists would traipse over the rocks with copies Rousseau's novel and attempt to imaginatively recapture Julie's horror. Yet again refocusing her audiences' attention on what she presents as political actualities rather than inventions, Williams substitutes fictional suffering with real anguish, insisting that the tragedy of the insurgents imprisoned within the castle's walls deserves the tourist's sympathy more so than Rousseau's fictional characters:

> All in nature is still romantic, wild, and graceful, as Rousseau has painted it; but the soothing charm associated with the moral feeling, is in some sort dissolved. The soft image of Julia no longer hovers around the castle of Chillon; which is now converted into a Swiss Bastile, and guarded by a stern soldiery. The tear of sensibility which has so often been shed over this spot for the woes of fiction,

> may now fall for sorrows that have the dull reality of existence. It is not the imaginary maternal shriek that pierces the ear, it is the groan of the patriot rising from the floor of his damp dungeon that rends the heart. (2: 179-180)

Katherine Turner interprets this passage as a renunciation of sensibility, observing that it is "edged out by political reality" (222). However, I would suggest that sensibility is shifted rather than supplanted by political reality in this passage; Williams urges her audience to transfer their tears from Julie's imaginary calamity to the real suffering of the Swiss revolutionaries languishing inside the castle walls. She does not appear to be arguing that political reality undermines sentimental experience, but that feeling must be redirected towards the proper objects—to the "patriots" suffering under the heavy hand of an oppressive government. Portraying the incarcerated revolutionaries and the people they represent as victims of a despotic system, Williams simultaneously depicts the French Revolutionary Army as the potential heroes of this political drama. They offer the promise of emancipation and restoration, liberating the Swiss people from their master-rulers and restoring the nation to "the character it has long usurped, of being the most free in Europe" (2: 119). Reversing her audience's emotional orientation to accomplish the reversal of their political opinion is a strategy in which Williams was proficient: in her early travelogues she deployed sentimental discourse to redirect her audience's emotional investments away from France's unseated aristocrats and towards its triumphant revolutionaries. It is a strategy that she recycles in *A Tour in Switzerland*, defining the appropriate objects of sympathy by imbuing them with emotional appeal and structuring the circulation of feeling between her British audience and the groups and/or individuals in which she is politically invested.

Williams' conviction that feeling *for* and *with* people contained the possibility of total political transformation is manifest in her portrayal of the circulation of revolutionary affect. Throughout her travelogue she uses the imagery of electricity, lightning, fire, and contagion to convey the way in which revolutionary principles are communicated—metaphors also used by moral philosophers to articulate the operation of sympathy. "The governments of Switzerland," she states, "placed within reach of the electrical fire of that Revolution, flashing around all their borders, behold the subtle spark, which finds a conductor in the human heart, escaping beyond its prescribed limits, and feel its strong concussion in every agitated nerve" (Preface). Williams' description of the spontaneous movement of revolutionary feeling parallels Hume's discussion of the uncontrollable transfer of emotions. Her comparison of emotional exchange to the inexorable movement of electrical currents mirrors his illustration of emotional communication as the unstoppable transfer of sound waves. Explaining the "nature and force of *sympathy*," he asserts:

> The minds of all men are similar in their feelings and operations; nor can any one be actuated by any affection, of which all others are not, in some degree, susceptible. As in strings equally wound up, the motion of one communicates itself to the rest; so all the affections readily pass from one person to another, and beget correspondent movements in every human creature. (*A Treatise of Human Nature* 626-627, original italics)

Both metaphors—electrical currents and sounds waves—suggest the transformative potential of feeling. Affective exchange is shown to change the internal emotional character of those affected by its relentless pull to mirror the original source of the

mobile feelings—impacting the heart, reverberating within the nerves, and resonating throughout the body. Similar to Hume, Williams appears to be indicating that political transformation is not accomplished through physical force or even through expository argumentation, but through the spontaneous movement of feeling. It is the heart that responds with "enthusiastic glow" to the history of those "who have struggled for the liberties of mankind" (1: 146) and it is "the burst of the heart that swells against oppression" (1: 216) that poses the greatest threat to political tyranny. That Williams locates the site of political transformation within the heart rather than the head indicates the political implications of her sentimental orientation: by addressing her readers' hearts through the language of sensibility, she is attempting to effect a conversion in her British audience, if not towards a revolution similar to that which she witnesses in the Swiss population, then at least to a productive friendship between France and Britain.

The projected political aims of a sentimental union between France and Britain are both directly and indirectly suggested through Williams' consideration of Switzerland's understanding and exercise of liberty. Using her journey to the headwaters of the Rhine to consider the 'course' of history, she contemplates the wars witnessed by the ancient river and creates an instructive connection to the current hostilities between Britain and France:

> Alas! so long has the iron storm of war raged around us, that the ear is become familiarized to its sounds, and the heart is grown callous to its desolation! While the rest of Europe is safely sheltered from its fury, why are two nations, formed for mutual esteem and admiration, still fated to brave its horrors, and remain the

> only votaries at its unhallowed shrine? Ah, when will Peace, with all her meek-eyed beamy train, with all her blessed attributes, revisit the earth, and begin, once more, her holy, her universal empire! (2: 23)

Given Williams' patent admiration of the French Revolutionary Army, and her approbation of its progress through Italy and its designs for Switzerland, it can be assumed that her appeal for peace must be directed more towards Britain than France. That she places the responsibility for ongoing Franco-British hostilities on the latter is made evident through her vigorous criticism of Switzerland's archaic understanding of liberty and its institutional resistance to revolutionary principles. The established parallels between Britain and Switzerland enable Williams to indirectly confront the political practices of her native country while avoiding the appearance of outright sedition. An apparent misquotation from Goldsmith's *The Traveller* provides a moment of productive confusion between Switzerland and Britain that suggests the similarities of their political shortcomings:

> What is remarkable enough in this celebrated land of freedom, where the poet tells us that,
>
> > Even the peasant boasts his rights to scan,
> > And learns to venerate himself as man:
>
> All the peasants in the Canton of Basil . . . are literally serfs" (1: 98-99)

Jones observes that Williams' comment—which is contextualized within an attack on Basel's government—is "rather blunted by the fact that Goldsmith applied the lines to England" (157). However, her misquotation could also be read as a strategic inter-textual reference to Britain; by applying lines describing Britain to Switzerland,

Williams' condemnation of the superficial nature of Swiss liberty can simultaneously function as an indirect criticism of Britain's analogous faults. Her subsequent parallel between ancient Switzerland's practice of serfdom and Britain's contemporary involvement in the slave trade ties her criticism of the two nations closer together. Turning from a discussion of past Swiss servitude to a contemplation of contemporary British slavery, she asserts:

> [T]he execrable traffic belongs almost exclusively to . . . that island which was the birth-place, and the refuge of liberty; but where now,
>
> Sterne Independence from his glebe retires,
> And anxious Freedom eyes her dropping fires;
> By foreign wealth are British morals chang'd,
> And Africk's sons, and India's, smiles aveng'd. (2: 73)

The image of independence and freedom compromised or enervated through the abuse of human rights (as understood within an eighteenth-century context) synchronizes with Williams' representation of Switzerland as a nation where "under the name of liberty, the greatest outrages are committed against the principle" (2: 37). Just as Switzerland's form of limited democracy exposes an impoverished understanding of the concept, Britain's involvement in the slave trade reveals the hypocrisy behind its veneration of independence and freedom. Although both nations profess to revere liberty, Williams contends that their participation in systems of exploitation reveals the superficial nature of their claims. "[L]iberty," she observes with reference to Switzerland, "of which so vain a boast has been made, is so little understood" (2: 272). It is this regressive understanding of liberty that justifies France's invasion of Switzerland.

Williams suggests that the "long list of transgressions against the privileges of equal freedom" (2: 269) committed by various Swiss governments validates France's intervention in the nation's political affairs. By opposing France's intervention, Britain is counteracting rather than protecting the principles and practices of liberty. Williams' desire is not that France would cease its quasi-imperial mandate, but that Britain would support France's interventionist policy as an extension of its own commitment to liberty. Peace between the two nations would enable the unhindered extension of France's republican programme, and might ultimately facilitate the political renovation of Britain through the transformations wrought by sympathy.

The list of justifications (2: 251-271) that Williams provides for France's direct intervention in Swiss affairs clearly demonstrates her support of the impending invasion and gestures towards the deeply subversive subtext of her travelogue. Given the fears of invasion circulating within Britain at the time of her travelogue's publication, Williams' defense of France's imminent conquest of Switzerland seems intentionally provocative. Her justification of France's aggressive international expansion perhaps should be read as a veiled message to her British audience: her outline of the faults within the Swiss government that justify French intervention suggest an alternate course of action for the British government that precludes both domestic and international violence. That she represents France's involvement in Swiss affairs as a moral obligation rather than as intentional aggression indicates that Switzerland is ultimately responsibility for its own subjugation; it is the misconduct of the Swiss government that provokes a republican intervention. In her lengthy analysis of the internecine conflicts pervading the Swiss cantons, Williams demonstrates that

Switzerland's governing institutions create violence through political oppression and through their obdurate resistance to progressive ideals. Her sketch of the conflict between the residents of the Pays de Vaud and the Bernese government is particularly instructive: it is the experience of political dispossession at the hands of the Bernese government that initially motivates the Vaudois to seek restitution, and it is the severity with which the Bernese government responds to their political appeals that incites them to seek political independence with the aid of a foreign power (2: 252). By characterizing France's involvement in the neighboring nation as a response to an "invitation" (2: 269), Williams insinuates that it is the will of the Swiss people—*not* the Directory's imperial desire—that motivates France's invasion of Switzerland. The implication is that Switzerland has the power to avert a foreign invasion through reform rather than through the force of arms; France's intervention would be unnecessary and unsolicited if Switzerland's governing institutions would evolve according to the general will.

The conflict between the Pays de Vaud region and the Bernese government forms a compelling parallel to similar hostilities emerging between Ireland and the British government in the late eighteenth-century. Like the Vaudois, the members of the United Irishmen were reacting to what they perceived as political oppression from an external governing body; their demands evolved from parliamentary reform to independence from British rule according to the violence of the government's attempts at suppression, and they subsequently invited the newly instituted French Directory to support their efforts. To a nation facing an internal conflict that could result in an external intervention, Williams demonstrates that oppressive, exclusionary, and

exploitative practices invite rather than mitigate conflict. "It requires no great penetration," she observes,

> to discover that the abuses which exist in these Swiss governments will be corrected, not so much from the struggles of the oppressed, as from the conviction in those who govern, how much it behoves their interest to loosen the reins of arbitrary power. The history of every country is full of examples how fatal to tyranny is the burst of the heart that swells against oppression. (1: 216)

Switzerland illustrates the necessity of political reform to and for Britain, demonstrating the wisdom of "loosen[ing] the reins of arbitrary power" rather maintaining authority through violence. Williams may, indeed, echo the sentiment of Lord Carlisle that "[t]he Swiss, in some degree, were in a similar situation with ourselves [the British]" (955), but suggests that the right response is to adopt rather than resist France's influence in accordance with the emerging sentiments of the nation.

## "[T]he noblest examples of fortitude": Women and the Nation

Included in Williams' attention to the stories of the dispossessed over the course of her travels are the stories of women; her travelogues build a significant archive of narratives that relate the universal strength and struggles of women, collectively asserting their significance within the socio-political life of nations. The political empowerment of women is central to the revolutionary project that she imagines and supports; continuing and contributing to the work of previous female sentimental travel writers, she revises the cultural definition of femininity in order to transform the role women play within society. Her recuperation of sensibility as a site of political transformation is key to this redefinition. Implicit in Williams' analysis of the Swiss

government is the argument that the absence of feeling—and particularly the absence of sympathy—creates the conditions for domination. It is the preponderance of reason that enables the violence of the Reign of Terror (1: 83); it is avarice that interferes with the properties of liberty in Switzerland (1: 215, 2: 36, 39); and it is obsession with personal gain that results in the perpetuation of slavery within Britain's empire (2: 73). Throughout her travelogue, personal interest is consistently shown to engender suffering, whereas sympathy seeks to mitigate affliction. Madame C— supports the aims of the French Revolution due to her sympathy with the oppressed (1: 288); the Abbot in Engelberg moderates the violence of French émigrés through "gentle counsels and acts of beneficence" (2: 106); and Johann Kasper Lavater's "effusion[s] of the heart" (1: 68) succeeds in "soothing" William's feelings, which have been "so long stunned with the cavils of French philosophers" (1: 72). The ability to think about and for others constructs a community-mindedness that obviates the selfish imperatives of exploitation. It is upon this understanding of sensibility that Williams posits female sensibility as a source of strength rather than weakness and suggests the constitutive role of women within the project of nation-building.

Her representation of women in *A Tour* reinforces her defense of women on the basis of their emotional and intellectual strength. Recounting a narrative told to her by a local Swiss woman of the legendary battle in which Switzerland won independence from Austria, Williams is careful to incorporate the unrecorded contributions of women to the success of the campaign:

> 'There,' said she, 'on the brow on that hill we stood, dressed in carter's frocks, and the Austrians thought we were a fresh army of soldiers.' By *we* were meant

> the women of that day, who, according to local tradition, for it does not appear to be recorded in any history, made use of this stratagem to multiply the appearance of the confederated forces. (1: 125, original italics).

She includes the heroics of these female warriors to demonstrate that women were active participants in rather than spectators to the development of the Swiss nation. The image of women standing in the gap or of providing support when and where masculine strength fails is repeated throughout Williams' works. Even in instances where female sensibility appears to be lacking, women possess a particular firmness of character that contrasts with male weakness. In the narrative of Madame and Monsieur C—, both Madame C— and Madame de— evince a strength of character in the face of personal disaster that emphasizes Monsieur C—'s weakness. He emotionally and physically collapses under the strain of loss, rendering him susceptible to Madame de—'s manipulations and forcing his wife to assume the role of protector and provider. Indeed, Williams' personal narrative of ideological consistency and emotional recuperation provides a compelling subtext of female resilience. Her fierce attachment to the original principles of the Revolution despite the threat of imprisonment and death demonstrates the admirable "constancy" and "fidelity" (1: 40) that she attributes to women in her previous works. She records her intense emotional response to the sublime in Swiss nature in an effort to demonstrate her particular emotional intelligence:

> [N]ever, never can I forget the sensations of that moment! when with a sort of annihilation of self, with every past impression erased from my memory, I felt as if my heart were bursting with emotions too strong to be sustained.—Oh, majestic torrent! which hast conveyed a new image of nature to my soul . . . thy

> course is coeval with time, and thou wilt rush down thy rocky walls when this bosom, which throbs with admiration of they greatness, shall beat no longer! (1: 60-61)

Her ability to perceive and respond to the sublime in nature contrasts with the indifference of the local residents, who are "inattentive to those thundering sounds which seem calculated to suspend all human activity in solemn and awful astonishment" (1: 63). It is precisely her imaginative and emotional capacities that indicate her facility for political participation. Both the cold skepticism of French philosophers (1: 72) and the apathy of Swiss peasantry (2: 224-225) disqualify them from effective political leadership, as each lead either to the institution or to the toleration of tyranny. "Williams," Kelly observes, "has a manifest capacity for the sublime, showing that she and readers who feel with her are qualified subjectively to constitute the cultural and political nation" (73).

Her brief mention of the official exclusion of women from French politics suggests a specific context for her persistent advocacy of women. "[U]pon the whole," she bitterly observes, "the women of France, to whom, by the Constitutional Act, all rights have been denied, find that they still hold a tolerably despotic empire over their lords and masters, the sovereign people" (1: 26). Refused political rights within the new French Republic, women are forced to exercise their influence on behalf of their "friends, lovers, or husbands" in informal and underhanded ways, using the "formidable artillery of bright eyes, gay smiles, lively sallies, and animated graces" (1: 25) to gain political advantages for their associates. Williams' caustic tone suggests her criticism of a system that uses women for political purposes, yet refuses to formally acknowledge

their political participation. That she characterizes French women's influence as "despotic" suggests the corrosive effects of inequality and reiterates the political message found throughout her reflections on Switzerland: that structures of domination invite and perpetuate violence. Women respond to their oppression by attempting to dominate men; their exercise of power ultimately mirrors the authority to which they are subjected—not entirely dissimilar from the continuity Williams sees between the *ancien regime* and the Jacobins. The absence of authentic feeling within relationships enables the flourishing of self-interest that manifests itself in the abuse of power.

## Conclusion

Williams characterized her stay in Switzerland as a period of renewal, stating: "[M]y mind is full of those scenes of beauty and grandeur which have calmed my troubled spirit, and in which I have found a renovation of existence" (*Letters* 1: 39; 1795). *A Tour in Switzerland* records both the regeneration of her faith in the Revolution and a renewal of her commitment to the potentialities of feeling—with particular emphasis on the transformative and restorative possibilities of fellow-feeling. Although Switzerland's political landscape does not offer a constructive alternative to France's messy implementation of liberty, it restores her faith in the French Revolution through negative rather than positive example. The abuse of power that she discovers in Switzerland provides Williams with a stark reminder of the necessity of political revolution; it brings her back to her ideological roots and provides a new determination and zeal for the French cause—loosely understood as exporting liberty through the active implementation of republican governments. Her survey of what Thomas Paine called "the wretched condition of man under the monarchical and hereditary systems of

Government" reignites her conviction that these systems are, indeed, bad, "and that a general revolution in the principle and construction of Governments is necessary" (1: 193). The fresh revolutionary spirit she sees animating both the citizenry of Switzerland (encapsulated in the figure of La Harpe) and the French Revolutionary Army (encapsulated in the figure of Bonaparte) offers her hope that the French Revolution might accomplish what it had originally set out to achieve: "equality, fraternity, and the rights of man" (1: 99). Her political tourism once again provides her with a cause: she returns to Paris with a renewed political vision for France, Britain, and Europe—that of an international revolution grounded in sympathy and offering freedom from exploitation to the dispossessed within nations and a peace rooted in a shared political purpose between nations.

Williams' implicit desire throughout her narrative is that her reignited passion for political revolution expressed in her text would prove to be the spark that would "kindle into flame" the "combustible materials" (2: 275) in both Switzerland and Britain. Her travelogue becomes the means of conducting revolutionary sentiment to the hearts of her British readers, which she attempts to accomplish through the cultivation of sympathy. Williams' emphasis on the significance of contiguity or similitude in the transfer of emotions echoes Hume's conviction that propinquity or familiarity assists the operation of sympathy, and suggests the strategy undergirding her self-appointed role as a mediator between her British audience and the French nation. That she speaks of the Swiss hearing the "shouts of equality, fraternity, and the rights of man" (1: 99) and the "shouts of liberty that filled the plains of Lombardy" (1: 48) indicates the threat France's proximity poses to Swiss despotism, as does her image of the "principles of

independence" simply vaulting over "the dyke which separates Switzerland from France" (2: 230). "It is natural to conclude," she states, "that the principles of that mighty revolution, which have already diffused themselves over remote regions of the globe, cannot fail to expand in those countries which are placed immediately within their influence" (2: 270). Given the "imitative nature" ("Of National Characters" 248) of the human mind, Hume contends that "[w]here any set of men, scattered over distant nations, maintain a close society or communication together, they acquire a similitude of manners" (250). Williams' intellectual debt to Hume is suggested in her attribution of the improbable "tie of sympathy" (2: 77) between the democratic canton of Glaris and *ancien regime* France to the "[h]abitual intercourse [that] sometimes changes repugnance into friendship" (2: 78). She opens the possibility of turning British "repugnance" towards the French into "friendship" by projecting her travelogue as an indirect means of communication between the hostile nations—a "line of connection across the divided world" (*Letters Written in France* 149). Williams renders sympathetic relations with France imaginable by humanizing and valorizing the new French Republic, providing Britons with the emotional incentive necessary to form mutually transformative sentimental identifications. Similar to the female travel writers who came before her, Williams values sympathy as a potent political device—one that she uses to her advantage in her appropriation of the sentimental mode, while also positing its value as a vital component of political systems.

# Epilogue

## "An Affair of the Heart"

Often enough in England, struggling to do work for which a deep disinterest in politics fitted me poorly, I had been accused of partisanship; but then the accusation had been that I was a Royalist, a Tory, one of the Red-bogey brigade. Years later I met an English diplomat whose toga I must have once or twice twitched in the war. "I could never make out," he said, "which side you were on." "I was," I answered, borrowing I fancy someone else's phrase, "on the side of the Greeks." And so I was.
~Dilys Powell[91]

The above passage is from Dilys Powell's *An Affair of the Heart* (1957), a twentieth-century travelogue by a British author that recounts her life-long love affair and political entanglement with Greece. I serendipitously chanced upon a worn copy of the travelogue some years ago while in an appropriately crammed bookshop in Europe; the title stuck out to me from the shelf as it reminded me of a line from Helen Maria Williams' first travelogue, where she excuses her "political creed" as "entirely an affair of the heart" (91). After delving into Powell's text—and discovering, to my delight, that it was a travel narrative—I realized that the parallels with Williams did not stop at the title; indeed, the "someone else" to whom she refers in the above passage could very well be Williams, who also justifies her controversial political choices by pleading the exigencies of friendship. "That system of politics must be the best," Williams states, "by which those I love are made happy" (140). As Powell goes on to show throughout her travelogue, she supports the political parties and ideologies that benefit those in whom she is emotionally invested—who are, as she states above, the Greeks. As her response to the English diplomat indicates, sympathy becomes Powell's means of navigating the

[91] *An Affair of the Heart* 38.

complex political relations both between Greece and Britain and between Greece's various political factions following World War II; her "especial affection" (21) for Greece and its people not only repeatedly draws her back to the nation, but it draws her into political debates and activism despite her purported "deep disinterest in politics." Powell's text illustrates two significant points about the life of the sentimental travelogue after its genesis in the eighteenth century: 1) that the sentimental travelogue continued to flourish as a literary mode after the demise of the culture of sensibility from which it emerged, and 2) that women have continued to negotiate politics in their texts by incorporating the sentimental travelogue's characteristic intersections of fact and feeling, distance and intimacy.

Although the language of Powell's text is distinctly twentieth century, the literary continuity between Powell and eighteenth-century female sentimental travel writers is undeniable; the same anecdotal form, emphasis on emotional responsiveness, and tendency towards sympathy are found in Powell's travelogue as in the travel narratives of the four women covered in this study. This continuity indicates that the history of the sentimental travelogue diverges from that of the eighteenth-century sentimental novel. While it is generally accepted that the sentimental novel more or less fell out of fashion in the nineteenth century and/or evolved new forms, the practice of sentimental travel and travel writing persists into the twenty-first century. The eighteenth-century sentimental travelogue's characteristics and aims can be easily identified in contemporary travel literature. Indeed, the current division of travel literature into guidebooks and literary memoirs has perhaps even intensified the affective approach inaugurated by eighteenth-century sentimental travelers; contemporary 'literary'

travelogues largely dispense with the technical particulars of travel—the "dull details of post-stages, and churches, and picture-catalogues" (*The Monthly Review* 39: 434)—and focus on the journey's emotional, spiritual, and interpersonal dimensions. A cursory glance through recent best-selling women's travelogues reveals their sentimental provenance. For instance, Elizabeth Gilbert's journey to enlightenment through both spiritual and cultural experiences in *Eat, Pray, Love: One Woman's Search for Everything Across Italy, India and Indonesia* (2006), Tanya Shaffer's pursuit of meaning through humanitarian work in *Somebody's Heart is Burning: A Woman Wanderer in Africa* (2003), and Rita Golden Gelman's quest for sympathetic identifications that transcend national boundaries in *Tales of a Female Nomad: Living at Large in the World* (2002) all give precedence to the emotional dimensions of travel and a relational approach to the cultures and environments in which the travelers are immersed. In their introduction to *Amazonian: The Penguin Book of Women's New Travel Writing* (1998), Dea Birkett and Sara Wheeler state that "the writer's inner journey is the most important part—and certainly the most interesting part—of any travel book. It doesn't make any difference where you go; it's your interpretation of it that matters" (viii). Although eighteenth-century sentimental female travel writers would vigorously object to the idea that place is immaterial, the claim that subjective experience is a vital component of travel would not have struck them as odd. Janet Schaw's proclamation in her travelogue that "every subject will be guided by my own immediate feelings" and that her "opinions and descriptions will depend on the health and the humor of the moment in which I write" (20) aligns with Birkett and Wheeler's assertion of the

importance of the traveler's emotional experience and subjective interpretation in current women's travel writing.

This focus on the "inner journey" in contemporary women's travel writing has prompted Bernard Schweizer to identify what he calls a "political gender gap" in twenty-first century travel writing, with male travel writers being three times more likely than women to write politically-engaged travel narratives (28). Female travel writers, he asserts, have a greater tendency to write in an intensely personal register that seems to abjure or disregard politics. However, in her study of cultural governance in twentieth-century women's travel writing, Hager Weslati reminds us that, in contemporary women's travelogues as in those of their eighteenth-century counterparts, the personal more often than not encodes the political. She argues that readers must be alert to the "cartographies of *affects* and maps of 'selves in transit'" (105, original italics) in women's travel writing in order to uncover the political dimensions encrypted in their apparently apolitical texts. Schweizer's struggle to find political content amidst the personal detail in contemporary women's travel writing and Weslati's insistence upon alternate reading strategies to locate and understand the political dimensions of feeling and mobility in these texts exposes the extent to which sentiment is still used to mystify political engagement in contemporary women's travel writing, and indicates that the interpretive strategies we develop for reading eighteenth-century women's sentimental travelogues are relevant for women's travel writing today. Maureen Moynagh, on the other hand, examines the ways in which twentieth-century travel writers use feeling not just to mystify but to intensify the political content of their texts. In *Political Tourism and its Texts* (2008), she describes

the "affectively resonant processes of identification and affiliation" (3) in which contemporary political tourists engage to "combat indifference in the public sphere" (252) and rouse support for their political (and specifically revolutionary) agendas. Her specific investigation of the travel narratives of women involved in Nicaragua's Sandinista Revolution reveals that sympathy functions in these texts as both a personal incentive and as a political tool—motivating their political tourism and vivifying their political argument. The political possibilities of sympathy—so well understood by eighteenth-century sentimental travel writers—continue to inform the ways in which travel writers (and specifically female travel writers) represent their political engagement.

Understood as a particular way of perceiving, engaging, and recording foreign or unfamiliar spaces and experiences, sentimental travel has become enshrined as a normative mode of travel in contemporary western culture. The desire to experience travel as self-realization, or as an 'authentic' experience, or as a form of cultural bridging roughly corresponds with eighteenth-century sentimental travelers' determination to be guided by their "immediate feelings" (Janet Schaw 20), to see with the "eyes of their own understanding" (Mary Morgan 268), and to provide "just representations" (Anonymous 2) of the countries they visit. Even current interest in slum, humanitarian, or responsible tourism can be seen to have its roots in the emphasis on the social and moral dimensions of travel in eighteenth-century sentimental travel writing. Examining, clarifying, and problematizing the mechanism of sympathy in eighteenth-century sentimental travel writing may help us identify and understand the use and misuse of sympathy in current travel practices, forcing us to confront the complex and often

uncomfortable relationships between exploration and exploitation, privilege and power, self and other, home and abroad. It may also facilitate the examination of our own emotional responses to the sentimentalized or "affectively resonant" (Moynagh 3) literary representations of the foreign, the unfamiliar, and the exotic in current travel writing—affording us some measure of control over our own sympathies and the political moods of which they are a part and to which they contribute.

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