

Learning in Social Action in Contexts of Mining Dispossession: A Critical Case Study of Roşia

Montană, Romania

by

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ABSTRACT

Transnational corporations promise win-win development, but extractive projects often deliver dispossession, displacement, impoverishment, environmental degradation, and disrupt social relations in rural localities. These conditions can in turn engender contestation and resistance to dispossession, including learning in social action in anti-dispossession struggles and movements. Roșia Montană, Romania, is one such site where Roșieni villagers and small land holder peasants, their organizations AM and RMCF, and trans/national solidarity campaigns/movements have waged two decades of resistance against a proposed Canadian open-pit mining project. The purpose of the proposed research was to develop an initial and exploratory understanding of knowledge production and learning in social action undertaken by these agents in Roșia Montană by addressing the following research questions: (1) what is learning in social action in a context of mining dispossession?; (2) how does learning inform social action?; and (3) how do trans/national actors augment local struggles and contribute towards learning in social action?

Utilizing a critical research methodology and a critical case study strategy pertaining to this site of mining resistance, the research sought to develop an initial and exploratory understanding of learning in social action in Rosia Montana. Data collection to develop the case study included: 16 semi-structured interviews with 18 participants including Roșieni members of grassroots groups and activists/NGO members; observation at the case site; and a review of documents produced or used in struggle.

Thematic analysis elucidates several aspects of learning in social action. Participants shared knowledge constructed in struggle pertaining to the anatomy of dispossession, including corporate tactics and Roșieni counter tactics. The initial Roșieni grassroots struggle was catalyzed by processes of incidental learning and resistance, which quickly spawned more

intentional forms of learning and praxis. Knowledge developed through learning in social action informed: grassroots and social movement organization, future actions, and more structured and complex forms of learning—especially when augmented by growing support from a trans/national solidarity network. These findings contribute to the conceptual, theoretical, and empirical literature on rural dispossession, resistance, and learning in social action by highlighting the politics of dispossession as understood by Rosieni. Further, this research illustrates processes of learning in social action at the nexus of grassroots and trans/national solidarity and contributes towards an understanding of how diverse forms of learning in social action are integral to processes of resistance and contestation addressing capitalist mining dispossession.

PREFACE

This thesis is an original work by Taylor Kermit Christopher Witiw. The research project, of which this thesis is a part, received research ethics approval from the University of Alberta Research Ethics Board, Project Name “Learning in Social Action in Contexts of Mining Development: A Case Study of Roşia Montană, Romania”, No. Pro00091552, July 29, 2019.

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DEDICATION

To the Roşieni who shared their knowledge, minds, homes, time and hospitality with me:

Viitorul Satului

Gold-tipped, silver-trunked
Transylvanian birches
Thrust upwards in clans,
Like sun-drenched spearheads,
And pierce the fog
Rolling through old shepherd passes.

Only they and immortal evergreens
Remain enrobed in colour
On these Apuseni thrones—
This place of sunsets
That watches over lifelike colour birthed
And dreamlike empires decay, the same.

Ancient guardians of the massif—
Asleep beneath blankets of flowering heather—
They remember times of fever:
Of fire and steam that crack the slumber,
Of searching, clinking chisels,
Of explosions, and beasts that maul the earth.

Dust ever rising and settling again,
While blankets of heather leaves
Fed their blossoms, which fed the bees
Above picnics by Taul Mare's waters;
And above spring celebrations,
That opened the commons, which fed the Moţi.

And I, a stranger, see the fools gold:
For brevity makes deep things shallow thoughts.
But others rooted here, know it—
What it is and was, and wills to become—
Men and women like glowing trees,
Standing sun-drenched in Munţii Apuseni.

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I would also like to thank my employer, the Northern Alberta Institute of Technology, and my manager, Angela Briggs, whose understanding, support, and flexibility made my studies possible. Finally, I would like to thank my family for their support. Special thanks to my parents, Pat and Krysta, for demonstrating and instilling me with a sense of care and concern for justice, as well as for their encouragement and support with everyday life when school and work felt heavy. My deep thanks also to my in-laws, Pavel, Mărioara, and Remus, for their love, support, and for sparking this study. Most of all, I thank my wife Naomi, for her endless love and kindnesses. Naomi, thank-you for sharing your sense of place, perspective, and inviting me into your world—it is a constant inspiration in all that I do.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABD	Accumulation by Dispossession
AM	Alburnus Maior
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CERT	Youth Resource Centre (Roşia Montană)
DFDR	Development Forced Displacement and Resettlement
EC	European Commission
ERT	European Round Table of Industrialists
EU	European Union
GBU	Gabriel Resources (and Toronto Stock Exchange Symbol)
IFI	International Financial Institution
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
ISDS	Investor-State Dispute Settlement
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OECD	The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
RMCF	Roşia Montană Cultural Foundation
RMGC	Roşia Montană Gold Corporation
SM	Social Movement
SRM	Save Roşia Montană (solidarity network, campaign, movement)
TNC	Transnational Corporation
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
WB	World Bank

GLOSSARY OF ROMANIAN TERMS

<i>Doamna</i>	Madame
<i>Fân</i>	Hay
<i>Gogleazuri</i>	Garbage
<i>Gold-iști</i>	“Gold-ers” (<i>Roșieni</i> nickname used for mining supporters)
<i>Gospodărie</i>	Homestead, including agriculture and husbandry holdings
<i>Green-Peace-iști</i>	“Green-Peace-ers” (nickname used for anti-mining supporters)
<i>Haidúc</i>	Bandits who targeted oppressors
<i>Harcea parcea</i>	To tear apart
<i>Holoangări</i>	Veteran clandestine miners
<i>Jandarmi</i>	Gendarmerie
<i>Moți</i>	Ethnic Romanians in the Apuseni Mountains
<i>Obște</i>	Common lands and their collective systems, labour, and values
<i>Pensiune</i>	Bed and breakfast
<i>Roșieni</i>	People of Roșia Montană (plural)
<i>Rosiancă</i>	Woman of Roșia Montană (feminine)
<i>Roșian</i>	Man of Roșia Montană (masculine)
<i>Straiță</i>	Traditional woven peasant bag
<i>Țărani</i>	Peasants (of <i>țară</i> /the country)
<i>Țăranca</i>	Peasant woman
<i>Țăran</i>	Peasant man
<i>Țuică/Vinars</i>	Traditional Romanian plum brandy
<i>Vâlva</i>	A spirit of the land

CHAPTER ONE: Introduction

In 1997, less than a decade after Romania's transition out of authoritarian socialism, the Roşia Montană Gold Corporation (RMGC) —owned 80% by the Canadian-registered company Gabriel Resources (GBU) and 20% by the Romanian government—attained legal rights from the Romanian government to explore for minerals on the land of the Roşia Montană commune, situated in the Apuseni mountains of Alba County and the historical region of Transylvania (Velicu, 2014).




Figure 1 RMGC's structure as described at www.gabrielresources.com.

RMGC promoted their mining project to locals with fliers, propounding benefits of their proposed pit mine, such as bringing jobs to the community. The corporation also began exploratory drilling near Roşieni homes. Cattle became sick, calves died, and some Roşieni began throwing up or reporting a loss of their sense of taste. As a result, Roşieni started to seek clarification about the mining project and met with its then-leader Frank Timis in 2000.

After meeting with the project's leadership, Roşieni were still incredulous about “the number of jobs, the required skilled work, the sustainability of the mine, state earnings” (Velicu, 2014, p. 224), as well as other aspects like making money from market speculations. Further to the meagre and uncertain benefits, for the Roşieni:

...the project would mean relocation of households, displacement of people, destruction of four mountains, a lake of cyanide and toxic waste, demolished patrimony buildings (such as the unique Roman galleries),... ancestors' exhumation through the destruction of nine cemeteries and eight churches... destruction of... natural monuments as well as a decantation pond for the processed sterile deposits (on the territory of the present-day village of Corna) with a one hundred and eighty-five-metre high dam. (p. 224)




Figure 2 Gabriel Resources' depiction of Roșia Montană before and after planned exploitation of approximately 17+ years, including a massive cyanide tailings pond. (http://www.gabrielresources.com/images/RMProposedOps_Map2.jpg) (http://www.gabrielresources.com/images/RMProposedOps_Map1.jpg).

For these reasons, approximately 300 families or 1200 Roșieni refused to sell and formed the organization Alburnus Maior (AM) in 2000 (Buțiu & Pascaru, 2011). AM rejected RMGC due

to social and environmental concerns, since mineral exhaustion would leave nothing for traditional mining, and because the project would make alternative development impossible (Velicu; Velicu and Kaika, 2017). In response, RMGC increased pressure on inhabitants to sell their property and an estimated 80% of the Roşieni, including former members of AM, sold their homes to RMGC between 2002 and 2010 (Velicu). RMGC's mining project required the acquisition of critical Roşieni-owned properties and worked toward the expedient removal of these owners. Approximately 1,000 of the 3,290 residents left by 2012, resulting in an increased average age of the residents and decreased ethnic and religious diversity (Vesalon and Creţan, 2012). Those who remained faced deteriorating civil and social infrastructures and thus, increasing pressure to sell.

In addition to the compelling realities of this case, my interest in this research was driven by formative experiences in Romania and through conversations with family members there. I first travelled to Romania in the mid-2000s while in high school and several times after. During these trips, the economic devastation of Romania's transitional period out of authoritarian-socialism was clear. However, my understanding of these realities changed through my studies at the University of Alberta. Whereas in the past it was easy to ascribe the material deprivation, lack of infrastructure, and dearth of essential services that many Romanians faced to a failing political ideology inferior to capitalism, it became clear to me that other powers were at play. In subsequent trips these later years, I have personally witnessed predatory economics at play resulting in deforestation, emigration, now mining and other forms of land and resource grabs; through my studies I have come to see that this unjust economic system is not distant from the one I am a part of in Canada, rather it is an interconnected reality. A proof of this interconnectedness, beyond the involvement of Canadian businesses and institutions in Romania, is the Indigenous and rural communities in Canada who face forms of disastrous development similar to what this study explored in Romania.

My inability to recognize this interwoven reality in the past was not simply a lack of knowledge but also a state of mind, a set of values, a way of thinking that many critical scholars refer to as imperialism and many Indigenous scholars describe as a European/Euroamerican sickness. It is a selective forgetting of the past that enables exploitation in our collective futures. In this study, the prospect of meeting European (an identity often tied to imperialism in critical literature) peasants, whose native values and state of mind bring them into conflict against these

same exploitative processes/states of mind, was one which brought me hope, made me wonder about obscured/alternative pasts, and the possibilities of alternative futures. Romania has given me much. The weight of that gift demands I listen and understand as best I am able.

Background to the Study

Development projects such as mines, ecotourism, plantations, and dams contribute to the material and socio-cultural dispossession of local populations through processes of development forced displacement and resettlement (DFDR) (Oliver-Smith, 2010). Sometimes development projects promote land governance strategies that claim to balance productivity with benefit to local populations to produce win-win scenarios (Hilary, 2013; Kuyek, 2019; Leech, 2012; Oliver-Smith, 2010; Zoomers, 2010). Historically however, development often leads to material impoverishment, interference with cultural practices, fragmented social relations, and degradation of the environment. This is especially true of transnational extractive industries, which often offer meagre benefits for locals in the short-term and leave ongoing environmental cleanup and damage mitigation to the same local populations for the long-term. Further, Velicu (2020) argues that many of the unfavourable impacts wrought by development may proceed the actual “development work,” thus greasing the wheels of DFDR through a process she describes as prospective environmental injustice. Neither is resettlement a simple “exit stage left to your happy ending” scenario. Oliver-Smith (2010) notes that resettlement processes typically attempt to substitute the comprehensive historical material processes by which communities typically form with simple administrative rearrangement—a process not equal to the task at hand. This is a recurring socio-political phenomenon in Romania, where rural populations were resettled to urban apartment blocks during the post-war period of nationalization and again in the case at hand (Daub, 2012; Gillette, 1985). Those relocated struggle to adapt and are often left feeling despondent, aimless, and confined, sometimes not surviving their new reality.

David Harvey (2003) describes these persistent global trends as ongoing processes of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (ABD) or contradictions generated by a globalizing capital. Transnational development projects like mines or dams penetrate distant geographic territories to alter and/or contaminate the land of specific localities, thereby threatening to eliminate place-based ways of being (Kapoor, 2017a; Kwaipun, 2009; Leech, 2012; Shukla, 2009). The harmful impacts of development and shortcomings of resettlement have not gone unnoticed and invite opposition.

Populations faced with uprooting and relocation often refuse to “go gentle into,” what corporations argue is, “that good night” and struggle to survive. Local resistance may evolve into grassroots non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and form solidarity networks which contest dispossession (Oliver-Smith, 2010). In turn, social action often involves non-formal, informal, and incidental critical adult learning and education, since contestation involves reflection on oppressive circumstances, agency, and action. Freire (1970) described such emancipatory learning processes of action and reflection as “praxis.” Therefore, grassroots organizations of the dispossessed and their solidarity networks who contest DFDR are important sites of adult learning in social action (Foley, 1999; Kapoor, 2009a, 2009b, 2011) and knowledge production.

Roșia Montană is one location where grassroots resistance—fomenting into the local organizations AM and the Roșia Montană Cultural Foundation (RMCF)—and their solidarity network—Save Roșia Montană (SRM)—have continued to contest mining development for over two decades (Velicu, 2012; 2015; Velicu & Kaika, 2017). Their struggle thwarted repeated attempts by RMGC to build a mine that would displace several communities, destroy churches, and desecrate Roșieni graves, and inspired a transnational social movement and protests that shook the nation (Bejan et al., 2015; Egresi, 2011; Velicu, 2012; 2015). Roșia Montană is a significant site for advancing research on learning in social action in rural contexts of ABD.



Figure 3 2013 Protests in Romania bearing the Save Roșia Montană banner
(<https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/romanian-mining-plan-sparks-mass-national-protests-a-923625.html>)

“Continue to be Vigilant and Not Give Up Just because it Looks Like We Have Won”

AM’s networking efforts led to the formation of the national SRM campaign, which was established in 2002 (Velicu, 2012). The struggle reached a peak in September 2013, with such largescale, nation-wide and international protests not seen since the fall of communism (Margarit, 2016). These protests were dubbed the “Romanian Autumn” and represented a significant turn against RMGC’s fortunes. In 2016, the Romanian government capitulated to the SRM campaign’s long running argument/anti-pit mining tactic and requested that Roșia Montană be included as a UNESCO World Heritage Site (<https://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/6082/>). However, the same year GBU announced that they would sue the Romanian government for \$4.4 billion dollars in lost profits on the project in an international tribunal court (Canadian Center for Policy, 2017; Ciobanu, 2016; Rosia Montana: How to blackmail, 2015). As a result, in June 2018 RosiaMontana.org reported that then Minister of Culture George Ivașcu had taken the unprecedented step of halting the UNESCO process. By 2020, the Romanian government reactivated the UNESCO World Heritage Site process and continue to argue their case against

GBU in the international tribunal in Washington (<https://www.juniorminingnetwork.com/junior-miner-news/press-releases/1163-tsx-venture/gbu/77005-2020-first-quarter-report.html>). Roșia Montană itself is quieter than usual—NGO offices are silent and there are no protests, but anticipation remains for what comes next.

Statement of Purpose and Research Questions

While there is a growing body of research into grassroots struggles against rural dispossession, the related research concerning the nature and role of learning and knowledge being produced in and by such movements is still nascent. Roșia Montană, Romania, is one such site of long-term resistance against mining dispossession being waged by Roșieni villagers and small land holder peasants, their organizations AM and RMCF, and trans/national solidarity campaigns/movements. The purpose of the proposed research was to develop an initial and exploratory understanding of knowledge production and learning in social action undertaken by these agents in Roșia Montană by addressing the following research questions: (1) what is learning in social action in a context of mining dispossession?; (2) how does learning inform social action?; and (3) how do trans/national actors augment local struggles and contribute towards learning in social action?

Research Methodology

This research into learning in social action in contexts of mining dispossession utilized a critical research methodology (Merriam & Tisdell, 2015) given the interest in amplifying the struggle of the Roșieni opposing DFDR, as understood by the actors in this struggle, and a reliance on Neo/Marxist analytical perspectives (Harvey, 2003; Hilary, 2013; Leech, 2012; West, 2016) on dispossession and related theories of resistance (Gramsci, 1971; Oliver-Smith, 2010; Polanyi, 2001) in peasant and rural contexts (Kapoor, 2017a; Scott, 1985). Actors involved in this struggle were viewed as knowledge creators, i.e., the research explored the emergent analysis of mining dispossession and resistance as understood by engaged actors; a perspective informed by and consistent with the learning in social action literature (Choudry, 2015; Foley, 1999; Freire, 1970; Holst, 2002; Kapoor, 2009b, 2011; Langdon & Larweh, 2017). A critical case study of mining development dispossession and learning in social action in Roșia Montană (Merriam, 1998; Stake, 1995) was developed using the following methods of data collection: semi-structured interviews with the various agents through snowball sampling, which a member of AM granted initial access for; observation at the commune and site of struggle; and

secondary documentation from the movement, organizations, and NGOs (Merriam & Tisdell, 2015). Data was centralized for triangulation and reviewed for codes and themes related to the questions and the purpose of the study (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008; Merriam & Tisdell, 2015; Plano Clark & Creswell, 2010). Self-reflexivity informed the intentional analytical inclusion and reliance on primary data (extensive use of quotations), to ensure that participant perspectives were not submerged and given precedence over theoretical and secondary interpretations.

Significance of Research

The proposed study draws on and contributes towards theoretical and empirical literature pertaining to: (1) adult learning in social action (Foley, 1999; Freire, 1970) by local struggles and grassroots NGOs in rural contexts of dispossession (Kane, 2000; Kapoor, 2009a, 2009b, 2011; Kwaipun, 2009; Masalam, 2017; Langdon & Larweh, 2017); (2) national and transnational NGO solidarity campaigns in contexts of dispossession (Choudry, 2015; Kamat, 2002; Kapoor, 2013a); and (3) rural development dispossession (Harvey, 2003; Kapoor, 2017a; Oliver-Smith, 2010; West, 2016).

Through interviewing that asks participants to reflect on their experiences, this research contributed to knowledge building for the participants. For example, this study asked participants to reflect on their experiences and social actions as learning processes. Participants were also asked to consider how the politico-historical context—experiences of authoritarian-socialism and subsequent transition to democratic capitalism—influences their struggle.

Grassroots struggles and associated social movements produce knowledge about power and political economy through acting, reflecting, organizing, and touching and experiencing alternatives (Choudry, 2015). Knowledge produced by specific struggles can help raise consciousness regarding the causes of injustice and thus enable agents to change conditions, like those related to ABD. This knowledge is crucial, as Chomsky points out, opportunities for struggles to succeed are greater than ever, thanks to growing possibilities for international solidarity (as cited in Meyer, 2010). As such, this study contributes to a growing knowledge base of social action against ABD and DFDR. Additionally, this research will be accessible to the participants in this study to further their struggle in a small way and to raise awareness in Canada (e.g. via exchanges with Mining Watch) about the Canadian mining foot print internationally, given that the industry accounts for over 60 percent of global mining capacity.

Finally, as Stake (1995) points out, advocacy is an important part of educational research as it is in relation to critical research methodologies (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008). This study contributes towards advocating on behalf of those Roşieni opposing DFDR.

Limitations and Delimitations of the Research

This study was delimited to the active grassroots anti-mining development struggle of Roşieni. Due to the complexity of local micropolitics, the case included two grassroots organizations: AM and RMCF. Both organizations had their genesis in the grassroots formation of AM but evolved along different paths. The data shared by both groups is critical to developing a fuller picture of the development politics and adult learning occurring in Roşia Montană. Additionally, due to the multi-faceted and ambiguous nature of learning in social action, several non-Roşieni activists and NGO members were included in the case given their long-term involvement at the site of Roşia Montană and the closeness of their involvement and integration in the actions and learning processes of AM and RMCF. For example, more distant international NGOs were not approached. These delimitations were set so the study remained focused on the grassroots struggle, which was deeply integrated with solidarity groups in direct proximity.

This study was limited to approximately 3 months on site. This was a tight timeframe for a study dependant on snowball sampling. Therefore, a bounded case study was more appropriate than other potential study designs, such as an ethnography. This timeframe also contributed to delimiting this study to the grassroots struggle of Roşieni organizations, local NGOs in direct proximity to them, and a relatively minor focus on international NGOs that undoubtedly offered valuable contributions and solidarity.

Another limitation of the study has to do with being a Canadian researcher. Roşieni experiences with Canadians have been predominantly oppositional in nature, with Canadian corporate and government representatives being unabashedly aligned with RMGC's mine project. Additionally, their experiences with RMGC-aligned individuals included deceptions and pressure to extract information from locals that would forward the mining project. Initially, Roşieni were understandably cautious when speaking with me. Furthermore, while the case of Roşia Montană is little-addressed in Western literature, Roşieni have faced immense scrutiny in the national Romanian and even European public eye for many years. Many locals are fatigued by constant interviewing and attention from journalists, environmental interest groups, and even

students and scholars like myself. As a foreigner generally, I appeared as an un-placed individual and possibly someone of concern. For this reason, I bear an immense sense of gratitude and responsibility to those who were willing to share their stories and hospitality. Finally, I am not proficient in the Romanian language. While a native-speaking Romanian volunteer translated for me, this limited the organic flow of conversation in interviews.

Lastly, I had initially planned to conduct focus groups as part of the research process. However, due to the complexity of local micro-politics, the decentralized nature of the struggle at present, and the mountainous terrain and geographic distance between Roşieni who were occupied with work, I found that many participants were not willing to take part in a focus group. It might be that with significant time a focus group was possible, but in light of the current context, the most responsible course of action was to forgo attempting focus groups.

Organization of the Thesis

This thesis is organized into six chapters. The above introduction presents a brief overview of the case, the context of this study as a broader literature on rural development dispossession and related processes of learning in social action, and research questions. The second chapter will expand the context of the study by providing historical and politico-economic context, and by expounding on relevant theory and empirical literatures, including contemporary capitalist processes of ABD (Harvey, 2003), resistance, and learning in social action. Thus, this thesis situates the place-based case within theory as well as historic material and cultural patterns that have critical and descriptive potential. Chapter three presents the research design, theoretical framework, researcher commitments, and outlines the research methods used in the study. Chapter four presents data themes and analysis on knowledge artifacts regarding the politics of mining dispossession, produced through learning in social action. This chapter presents the relationship between local Roşieni knowledge of mining DFDR and an expanded understanding of Harvey's (2003) critique of contemporary capitalism and related processes of ABD. Chapter five describes how Roşieni resist, learn, and struggle against the mining dispossession efforts described in chapter four. This chapter follows a messy, heterogenous, non-linear blossoming of incidental resistance, foundational peasant politics, social action, and related interwoven, concurrent processes of organic learning. Finally, chapter six provides concluding reflections, addresses the research purpose and questions, and discusses the meaning and relevance of this study.

CHAPTER TWO: Literature Review¹

You have to learn and study the issue in order to understand things. Otherwise these corporations will harcea-parcea [tear apart] your logic. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 18, 2019)

This chapter aims to situate the case of a struggle against Canadian mining development in Roșia Montană, Romania within the context of relevant history, politico-economics, and theoretical and empirical literature. Thus, it will help illuminate this case study by speaking to how oppressive politics foment resistance, which produces learning in social action. This context will highlight the rurality of this case and the importance of peasant identity and politics in Romania and establish a foundation for understanding the case.

PART A: Historical and Contextual Landscapes of Resistance

As a globalizing capital penetrates new territories in keeping with the coercive logics of imperialism (Harvey, 2003), conflict and landscapes of resistance (Scott, 1985) are engendered, increasingly influenced by distant temporal and spatial realities. Utilizing James Scott's concepts of *background*, *middle ground*, and *foreground*, Part A of this chapter contextualizes mining development dispossession at Roșia Montană and learning in social action by opponents of DFDR.

Scott's (1985) concept of *background* pertains to the essential bits of social history that give the landscape of resistance its contours. This includes political and economic realities that shape the experiential reality of locals, which they may be mostly unconscious about: "One cannot, after all, expect the fish to talk about the water; it is simply the medium in which they live and breathe" (Scott, p. 48). Denzin and Lincoln (2008) propose that this terrain is always historically specific in a way that influences local politics, problems and aspirations, and Smith (2012) argues that there is emancipatory potential in re-telling stories from the past. As Jordan and Wood (2017) note, history is essential, not as static context, but as that which defines the past and influences the present and the future. In keeping with these observations, Part A describes some major historical contours in the region, many of which were referenced by

¹ Abridged sections of this chapter published in: Witiw, T, & Kapoor, D. (2020). Capital and coercive neoliberal accumulation by dispossession (ABD): Canadian mining in Rosia Montana, Romania. In V. Pejnovic (Ed.), *New Understanding of Capital in the Twenty-First Century*, pp. 296-326. Belgrade, Serbia: Institute of Political Studies (ISBN: 978-86-7419-325-9).

participants in this study. Historical imperialisms complicate and contextualize Romania in the present day and influence Roșieni perceptions of new forms of imperialism.

The *middle ground* portrays more recent yet still historical economic and social landmarks. Scott's 'landscape sketch' of resistance in Sedaka, Malaysia included a middle ground of ten years of recent history. However, in the case of Roșia Montană it makes more sense to go back about 30 years, as the struggle has lasted about 20 years and the nation is arguably still in an era that began with the 1989 revolution away from socialism/communism. The *middle ground* draws upon David Harvey's (2003) foundational theorization of neoimperialism and processes of ABD in relation to Romania's distinctive liberalization during the last 30 years, as conceptually mapped by Ban (2016). This lays the groundwork for understanding how globalized capitalist logics are transmitted and adapted to the local context of Roșia Montană.

Finally, this section will address the struggle's *foreground* in the commune of Roșia Montană.

The Background: Romania's Historical Disposessions

Who could benefit, the big, these people who have money. They benefit. Let me tell you something. You see Roșia, how modern it is. It's a poor area, an area, let's not cry for pity, because people have their suffering too, and their issues, and their laziness and everything. But it was a mining area. What did it bring? Did mining ever lift up Roșia Montană? It lifted up Rome, where the gold went. It lifted Austria, Vienna, Budapest. How the empires strolled through, and it lifted where the gold went. The Roșieni still ruptă în fund [with torn pant bottoms], sorrowful and poor. And they remained unpolluted, but after what these big... worldly people want, with their money, they don't come to put you in environmental protection. They come to get stuff out in the shortest amount of years, if possible in two years, or one year, so they can wake up with tons of gold and go to hell, with tens or hundreds of tons of gold, to go - God have mercy. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 29, 2019)

It is worth noting that Romania has been impacted by four of the nine exemplars of empire Harvey provides (2003, p. 5): Roman, Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and Soviet (Oltean, 2007; Panaitescu, 2016; Roper, 2004; Turnbull, 2003; Verdery, 1979). These socio-historical contexts include the imperial exploitation of vast amounts of minerals, agricultural products, natural materials, and even a blood-tax of child slaves from Romania. Such historic contexts form relations relevant to the analysis of Roșieni experiences of neoimperialism; Velicu (2012; 2014), for example, noted that Roșieni have articulated a concern that they will become the "new

slaves” or are witnessing the completion of the work of “communists.” As Carpenter and Mojab (2017) put it, culture hinges on historic, social, and material relations.

Ancient Dispossession and Resettlement. In 100 AD much of the territory of modern-day Romania, including then-operational gold mines in Roșia Montană, were controlled by a people known as the Dacians (Baron, Tămaș, Cauuet, & Munoz, 2011; Piso, 2011a; Schmitz, 2005). In 106 AD the Roman Empire defeated the Dacians and dismembered their cultural heart, the city of Sarmisegetuza, after which, “The Dacians were quickly romanized, and their language, which had no written form, was forgotten” (Sarmisegetuza, 2015). After exploiting the Dacian treasure stores of 165,500 kilograms of gold, and twice this in silver, the Romans established their own mines for gold, silver, copper, tin, lead, salt and stone (Oltean, 2007). In 165 years of Roman occupation, historians estimate that 1.3 tonnes of gold were extracted from Dacia, causing significant transformations to the landscape that are exemplified by famous sites such as Roșia Montană. “Dacian wealth, as some modern scholars have estimated it, annually contributed seven hundred million *denarii* to the Roman economy after Decebalus’ [the Dacian’s king] defeat” (Schmitz, p. 8).

Foreign Empire in Romanian Lands. In the late 1300s the Ottoman Empire seized the territory of modern-day Romania from the local principalities of Wallachia, Transylvania, and Moldavia (Turnbull, 2003). Historian Steliu Lambru (2014) explains that the Ottomans established a system of ‘harachi’ or tribute and ‘pesches’ or gifts for selecting Romanian rulers, assuring Romanian subservience through a bribe culture. The children of non-Ottoman rulers were taken as hostages and the *devshirme* system collected local children as tribute for janissary or slave armies; the children were uprooted and immersed in a new country, its customs, language, and converted to Islam (Arnakis, 1963; Shaw, 1963; Turnbull, 2003). Arnakis relates that the Ottomans resettled local populations to allow the settlement of Turkic peoples. Further, Wallachia was set up as an export economy: “One of the basic functions of Wallachia, as was emphasized in official Ottoman rhetoric, was that of *kiler* – the storage, deposit – of the Porte: a very important provider of grains, cattle, sheep, grease, honey, timber and other products for the population of Istanbul, a role that gave Wallachia a colonial feature” (Panaitescu, 2016, p. 209). Lambru (2014) relates that the Romanian principalities paid a comparatively large tribute to the Ottomans, amounting to 10% of what the supreme Porte received.

Moți Rising: Western European Empire and Peasant Resistance. In the 1690s, the Hapsburgs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire seized the principality of Transylvania from the Ottomans (Verdery, 1979). Politically the empire was organized to placate the Hungarians, who had dominion of Transylvania, where Roșia Montană is located. Saxon towns were strategically settled to monopolize trade (and profit). Despite representing over half the population of the territory, Romanians were: deprived of their own language for liturgical or administrative functions until the 1800s; barred from guilds; paid disproportionate tithes; and critically, could maximally attain the status of ‘free peasant.’ Some estimates show that Romanians only owned 3% of the capital in economic ventures, while Saxons held 31% and Hungarians 66%. Since the region was wealthy, the local ruling classes funded large garrisons to suppress peasant uprisings.

One such uprising is significant to the case at hand and formative for Roșia Montană’s ethnic Romanians, the *Moți*: the Revolt of Horea, Cloșca, and Crișan (Branea, 2013). Of these three renowned peasant leaders, Cloșca and Crișan lived in the commune of Roșia Montană (Piso, 2011b). Bogdan (2009) describes this model of peasant struggle for justice:

The fight for the “liberation” of serfs entailed an incremental struggle for more rights regarding labor, land-ownership, pay, education, and other freedoms and general life options for the peasant classes, though the actual revolt itself broke out over the entangled issue of military conscription. In the months and years leading up to the breakout of violence, Horea and Cloșca took their case all the way to Vienna, lobbying the governing powers for various increased legal rights, some of which had already begun developing, albeit at a slow pace. (Peasant Uprisings)

Though the leaders themselves were tortured and executed, the uprising had important cultural and political influence in the Romanian struggle for more equitable treatment.

Despite the uprisings, Hapsburgs maintained dominance by creating ‘interdependencies.’ Manufacturing centres were set in the western regions of the empire, like Austria, and primary goods like wool, livestock, and raw materials were exported from the eastern regions like Transylvania. Later, Transylvania also supplied heavy industry and mining. Verdery (1979) summarises the colonial domination and exploitation of Romania, stating it consisted of:

...complete political incorporation and high administrative integration; external determination of prices and labor; careful manipulation of trade and licensing regulations and tariffs to undercut Transylvanian manufactures competitive with outside interests; high exports of primary products (coal, timber, and ores), though some of these were processed locally to profit from cheap labour, but the capital for it was external; and a lack of social services. Undoubtedly, Transylvania was damaged by these colonial

processes, and its residents suffered a reduced standard of living... (p. 390-391)

Boatcă (2007) argues that, despite the end of all Ottoman occupation in 1821 and movement made toward Romanian unification, the overall dearth of Romanian power meant it became the subservient breadbasket of Western Europe. He writes, “although never formally colonized, nineteenth century Romania had entered European modernity through its back door – coloniality, and as such was subjected to the economic, political, but also epistemological redistribution of power that the modern world-system had put into effect” (p. 372). Much of the existing historical development in the village of Roșia Montană still visible today was completed under Austro-Hungarian rule.

Soviet Domination and the Beginning of Romanian Nationalization. Prior to World War II, the Romanian state was forced to bow to an ultimatum and yield a third of its territory to the burgeoning Soviet Union, an ultimatum that drove Romania to join the Nazi invasion of Russia in 1941 (Mihaylova, 2015). In 1944, hot on the heels of a new Soviet advance into Romania, a coup took place and Romania capitulated to the Allies, who agreed Romania would be given over to Soviet administration (Roper, 2004). When the war ended in 1945, the Soviet Union and the Allies demanded reparations from Romania. To ensure payment, the Soviets established Sovroms, or transnational companies, to extract resources from Romania “in the form of oil, timber, grain, and other natural resources” (p. 18).

To produce the large amounts of grain sought by the Soviets, the state made autonomous production economically impossible for peasants and created collective farms through land grabs, redistribution and machinery (Kideckel, 1982). Redistributed land was often of no use because of its distance from the recipients; many people were also displaced from their villages due to political and economic circumstances. As for the state, collective farms did not produce their desired material results, but they engrained the communist ‘way of life’ in the citizenry. As Kligman and Verdery (2011) put it:

Quotas had six main functions: (1) to force agricultural surpluses into accumulations for industrial development (following Preobrazhensky’s theory of primitive accumulation); (2) to provide food for urban workers at low prices; (3) to contribute war-reparations payments to the Soviet Union; (4) to push peasants into joining collectives; (5) to stimulate them to produce more goods on their private farms; and (6) to foment class war among different strata of the peasantry. (p. 112)

Fătu-Tutoveanu (2012) explains that the Soviets practised a form of ideological dispossession via the local communist political elite. The leadership enforced massive importation and internal production of Soviet literature—producing over 22 million books in five years—geared toward re-educating Romanians with socialist art, literature and ethics. However, this was a one-way exchange, as little literature from nations like Romania made it back to the Soviets.

Materially, Sovrom exploitation of the land was extensive and unchecked. Timber war reparations were set at approximately 256,000 ha, but modern mapping suggests a total amount of 530,000 ha were harvested, old growth forests fell from 25% to 21% of total Romanian woodlands, and the impact lasted two decades at minimum (Nita, Munteanu, Gutman, Abrudan & Radeloff, 2018). One Sovrom company built the world's largest open pit uranium mine at Băița-Ștei, which delivered 20,000 tons of metallic uranium (Cosma et al., 2013). The effects of this mine were far reaching: “people living in this valley and in the surroundings... used uranium waste from this mine as building material” (p. 860). Unsurprisingly, uranium mining produced many hazardous material dumpsites that have caused significant environmental harm (Brandula, Lazăr & Faur, 2015). In the end, the sum of reparations agreed upon totalled around \$300 million US, but Sovroms extracted an estimated \$2 billion US by 1948—86% of the country's GNP (Roper, 2004).

Soviet era dispossession was enacted by transnational organizations as well as Romania's internal political elite for the declared purposes of “war reparations” and nationalization projects. However, these processes of dispossession were characterized by poignant Marxist brutality toward the “barbarous rural populations,” who Marx described, politically, as “sacks of potatoes” (Gillette, 1985; Kligman & Verdery, 2011; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2013). President Ceausescu pre-eminently declared that his goal was to eliminate small peasant villages—a goal that was economic, political, and cultural in nature. Those who opposed collectivization were dealt with harshly. Approximately 35,000 peasants were reported arrested in 1951-52, and over 80,000 in 1961—a greater proportion of arrests than the Soviet Union at its peak in early 1900s. Additionally, the state's coercion included beatings, torture, nighttime summons, threats, and for rebellion, execution and deportation to wastelands. The state also interrupted peasant ways of life with “rewards.” The difficulty of rural life made traditional “pensions”—kinship and plots of land—untenable and replaced them with state pensions, which increased the reliance of peasants on the state and initiated a process of class transformation. In Roșia Montană, the state

even extracted gold from the miners themselves, who were paid and did commerce in gold, through arrests and torture (Piso, 2011a):

They took the mills away from them. First, they confiscated the factories where they processed things. Those who had more gold were beaten up so they would give up the gold. Back then, a parcel, like the one here, mine, which the house is on, you wouldn't buy it with money, you'd buy it with a kilogram of gold, and a kilogram of gold you'd have to work hard for. A property in Roşia Montană, when it would sell it would be very rare, because I remember that my parents too, my great-great grandparents when they came here there was a problem because it was very hard to come by land. Generations had to pass in order for children to leave in different areas and they would be the one to yield a piece of land. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 29, 2019)

The political re-organization and dispossession in Romania during nationalization had significant impacts, particularly on the rural population. However, it also galvanized peasant ideology as one NGO Member of a peasant organization stated:

Yes. Here's where East meets West and North meets South. So in general in the popular struggles that are documented and that are displayed in the world, Eastern European experience is not really present. Because our region is a very young democracy, as a whole, it's not just Romania it's the whole region... We experienced communism and socialism until 30 years ago, which failed into dictatorship and totalitarianism, took away the rights, the means of production, the natural resources of the peasants— I'm talking about the peasant experience, which is very relevant because the peasants had the most to lose during this regime and they were the biggest martyrs. The political prisons and all the forced labour camps in Romania, and in the region, were *filled* with peasants. It was the peasants who built all these mega projects of Ceausescu, or in other regions other leaders, and peasants never got the opportunity and the resources to tell their story. And to tell the world what they went through. What does it mean for them [property/land]: emancipation and freedom. In 1990, we thought Coca Cola is freedom and emancipation.

I'll tell you the story of my grandpa. My grandpa was a serf. My grandpa was a slave owned by the landlord that he was working for, and who's land he was living, until the First World War started. Until 1939. My grandpa was sent to the war. He came back without a hand. He walked from Tatra mountains in Slovakia, he walked for a year, my grandma thought he died. He came back. He got land for his sacrifice, for what he did. And peasants in Romania got land, I mean many peasants in Romania got land for the first time then. So this is something, it was a desire and something that people lived for. It was something so profound. And then communists came and stole that resource, that base of life, and they transformed peasants into rural workers. They made them starve because the communist state was incapable to manage, I mean it was so centralized, to manage everything well. They weren't able to pay peasants for their work, which is hard work even though it started to be industrialized, still they were counting so much on the back-labour of the peasants, and these people had no way to feed themselves. So they were stealing from their own, corn holes, and these collective kind of state-owned farms. So the measure of humiliation they had to go through, and the

thing that they always dreamed of was, my father and his brothers and sisters, my grandpa always showed them: "This is where our land used to be. This is where our land actually is, but there are these dark times and when they are over we're gonna get back our land." So they always talked about getting back their land.

So when that happened, that was *everything*. People killed themselves, killed each other, for not calculating the right amount of land they had to receive back and so on. Romania had probably the most successful, even though it was terrible, super imperfect, but the most, let's say broad, land redistribution of the post-soviet countries. When that happened 16% of the population went back to the countryside because the industry, the people who were brought to the urban areas to build the industrialization and so on was falling apart. So getting the land back, it meant "Oh my God, we're going to be free, we're going to have the land back." And this was so important. This for us, the right to land—we don't see it as property. It's the right to land. This is the most correct articulation because... peasants are not capitalist beings, they are social beings. If you go into a community and you see how much socialism there is there in practice, it is incredible. Great examples, we have. (Interview, Sep. 25, 2019)

This narrative history provides a generational account of how Romanian peasants survived complete material and ideological dispossession in Romania and describe important differences in how peasants perceive concepts like “private property.”

These local histories contribute to the culture and consciousness of Roșia Montană. Threads of past coercion and extraction are intertwined with the region and are etched in its mountain-scape. Further, the impact of these activities heavily influences local peasant politics. The forced peasantization and exploitation of ethnic Romanians by successive empires and the socialist state's attempt at forced proletarianization of the same centuries later uncover the reproduction of a protracted war, or relations of domination and exploitation, against peasants.

The Middle Ground: Liberalization and the Birth of a Capital-State Nexus

It was like an earthquake. A strong earthquake, that shook your society, and now we do a primitive capitalism, that others were doing 100 years ago. Even though capitalism evolved in some countries, in France, in Germany, America. Although, even there they have people who sleep in parks, don't have food to eat. But here, we took the bad side of capitalism. What was worse is what we took from capitalism. First of all, the biggest mistake made, we destroyed everything that was built before, which was very useful to the country. That was our first fatal mistake, of countries that went from socialism to capitalism. Where they were smart, like the Czechs, the Hungarians, who did not destroy anything. We destroyed state farms, factories, everything. And we had factories that were ultra-modern, with the most modern technology in the world. You know we used to produce highest quality diamonds; did you know that? We would produce artificial diamonds, of the best quality. You know where they were made? In the basement of a building in Bucharest. So, it was an earthquake. Just as if you went to bed, slept well in

a bunk bed, and then fell on the floor. That's how the transition from socialism to capitalism happened. Completely wrong understanding. (AM Member, Interview, Oct. 17, 2019)

Cornel Ban (2016) argues that when neoliberal doctrines find “new homes” in nations as governing ideologies, they are translated, innovated upon, and reinvented by local policy elites. Neoliberal meanings and implementations are recalibrated by the host state in its image, and influence the social redistribution of resources. In Romania, the communist government fell during a critical expansion of neoliberal ideology (Ban; Gürel, 2019). As the entire Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) socialist block crumbled, capital picked-up (and accumulated) the pieces (Vincze, 2015). In 1989, CEE countries were emerging from decades under Stalinist regimes and eager for the “market-maximizing” effects that neoliberal doctrines promised (Ban, 2016). Romania was in the middle of a debt crisis that enabled the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to create networks of training institutes and programs for bureaucrats while funding local policy advocacy, think tanks, foreign aid agencies, and political party networks to control emergent post/socialist economic institutions and the related neoliberal ideological discourse. Neoliberal doctrine was not introduced to CEE alongside commensurate alternatives, nor did it come by way of the context of decades of debate and negotiation for state-mediated social protections. Caradaică (2013) argues that aggressive neoliberal restructuring and globalization after the 1980s was also assisted in Europe. CEE nations were drawn from the socialist vacuum into the orbit of established Euro-Atlantic powers, thus becoming new asset targets/opportunities for seizure. The result was swift deregulation and liberalization of CEE in the mid-1990s via bilateral agreements.

The neoliberalization of CEE is also accelerated by European transnational corporations (TNCs), who easily bypass states via lobby groups like the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT). European economic policies are supranational but social and equality protections are state delivered, indicating the power of TNCs to externalize social and ecological costs on to post/socialist states. In 1997, the ERT urged the European Union (EU) to reform its institutional structure to allow even greater ‘cooperation’ with applicant countries—like Romania—and consistently advises Europe to become more integrated into the global economy (Caradaică, 2013). In alignment, the European Commission’s (EC) Europe 2020 Strategy calls for greater labour market flexibility, welfare state retrenchment, austerity, and neoliberal

restructuring via developing the economy's knowledge bases, green resource-efficiency, and territory/social cohesiveness within the neoliberal frame. For Caradaică, “globalisation itself, even if it is an independent process, should not be understood as a distinct process from European integration, but a complementary one” (p. 26). Thus, he suggests the EU is aligned with the transnationalism of production and finance and the global dissemination neoliberalism.

Romania acquiesced to the good-governance guidance of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and Euro-Atlantic powers by grafting an intensified version of neoliberalism into their market (Ban, 2016). Ban describes this as “disembedded neoliberalism” where the “main implication is not to moderate markets and their effects, but to ‘set them free’ or radicalize them while redistributing resources toward the higher socioeconomic strata” (p. 4). Harvey (2003), however, notes that such bilateral “trade relations, clientelism, patronage, and covert coercion” (p. 54) are weapons of control. Concurrently, the EU created protectionist instruments against industries that CEE was competitive in, like production of steel, textiles, clothing, chemicals, and agriculture (Caradaică, 2013). The EU also provided CEE irregular and unequal financial support to aid their transition compared to other nations (e.g. Czech Republic's €29 per person to Ireland's €418). Subsequently, industry devaluation in CEE in combination with the sudden inability—fabricated by tilted capital logics—to produce competitively for local markets left the region conveniently situated to provide the struggling global market with a spatiotemporal fix for the 1970s-1980s recession (Harvey, 2003). Land and resources in CEE were ripe for seizure/investment and stalled production compelled the population to absorb surplus commodities from established capitalist states. Vincze (2015) notes that, in particular, “Romania seemed to be a desirable target for foreign investments attracted by land and natural resources that could be privatized, and by cheap and 'disciplined' labour force” (p. 127). By 2013, 6% of Romanian farmland had been grabbed by foreign investors for “agricultural, mining, energy, tourism, water resources, [and] speculation” (Bouniol, 2013)—a conservative estimate obscured by joint-ownerships and transnational investment schemes.

Implementing Neoliberal Capitalism in Romania. On a national level, a foothold for neoliberal ideology in Romania began to form as Stalinism weakened, before communism fell (Ban, 2016). The Ford Foundation enabled this shift in 1962 by funding study trips for Romanian economists to the United States, albeit seemingly to limited effect. Nonetheless, the transitional government of Romania, like many CEE states, initially sought a neo-developmental

compromise favouring both industrial recovery and entry to the market economy. Top Romanian policymakers produced *The Blueprint for Romania's Transition to a Market Economy* in early 1990. This neo-developmental document reflected a paradigm of calculated policies for “engagement with the world economy via the state-led stimulation of foreign direct investment and export-led strategies, as well as increasing the share of medium and high-value-added, domestically produced products and services” (p. 126). However, these policies did not offer a strong position on the degree to which price liberalization should be selective or gradual. This was a weakness that IFIs exploited. IFIs stood alone as willing financiers of Romania’s transitional deficit, conflating democracy and capital.

Between 1990 and 1996 the WB and IMF, in concert with the Romanian national bank, used loan programs, technical assistance conditionalities, and increased preferential credit rates to increase privatization and prioritize economic overhang issues, instead of the national economic depression, by devaluing the currency (Ban, 2016). These approaches resulted in excess liquidity, blockages in monetary flows, and prevented follow-through on neo-developmental policies. This neoliberalization correlates with the first land grabs in the 1990s by Romanian firms supported by state authorities, opening the door to foreign investment by way of legal mechanisms that allowed for foreign-Romanian partnerships (Bouniol, 2013). While the rest of the world experienced disenchantment with neoliberal policies between 1990 and the early 2000s, Romanian commitment galvanized, so much so, that in 1997 the Romanian president handed state economic policy design to the IMF (Ban; Gürel, 2019).

Romanian politicians continued to work contrary to the global abandonment of orthodox neoliberalism and even the IMF’s (rhetorical) reversal of position on “trickle down” economics (Ban, 2016; Gürel, 2019). State authorities propped up a second large-scale land grab in the 2000s by foreign firms to massive effect (Bouniol, 2013). The 1996 Romanian government inherited a state-owned economy but by the early 2000s, the private sector dominated an economy characterized by labour disputes, violent miner protests, and factory sit-ins. Romanian policy reformation for accession to the EU, guided by the EC, IMF, and WB, was fulfilled by 2006 and brought even deeper market-radical neoliberalism to Romania (Ban; Bouniol). Veteran Romanian-grown policymakers were replaced by Bretton Woods trained technocrats thanks in part to the support of Western resources and new CEE political and civil elites. Meteorically, Western credentialed economists and former Bretton Woods employees came to dominate

Romanian economic policymaking. Initiatives led by the IMF, WB, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Bank for International Settlements, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Austrian government, as well as the establishment of Western business institutions, think tanks, and NGOs by the United States Agency for International Development, the Mellon Foundation, and George Soros's Open Society Institute, saw amateur economists take the helm of Romanian economic policy development. Ban (2016) describes these processes as "international coercion generating national reforms".

Pauperization and Exploitation. Radical neoliberal reforms produced significant foreign direct investment and export complexity at dramatic expense to the Romanian population: public service spending was halved; unemployment benefits tightened; public utilities privatized; a flat tax imposed; wages devalued; corporate tax cuts made; and 40% of government industry was sold for a small sum of 2.1 billion dollars (Ban, 2016). These are hallmarks of neoimperialism (Harvey, 2003). Four years after the 1996 neoliberal shift, industrial output fell by 20% (Ban). From the 1990s onward, over a third of the Romanian labour force migrated, both internally and externally, in search of employment and began to generate significant remittances, thereby keeping the country on life support (Ban; Biscione & Pace, 2013; Bunea, 2012). Many Romanians believed economic migration would improve their lives, but research suggests that it may have had the opposite impact on happiness (Bartram, 2013). Meanwhile, failure of state farms, mass impoverishment and unemployment, and the reduction in public services also contributed to the first modern European urban to rural internal migration, with many returning to pre-socialist means of reproduction as subsistence farmers (Ban).

The government then hit smallholders with increased small farm taxes, attempting to reallocate labour (Ban, 2016). Government, think tanks, and banks blamed smallholders for low agricultural production and forwarded the development of agro-industry to large-scale private production while ignoring smallholders (Bouniol, 2013). EU subsidies for farms was also unevenly distributed in favour of large scale agro-industry. This is significant given the number of smallholders in Romania. Bouniol reported that "99.2% of farms have no legal status as they are individual or family subsistence plots" (p. 134) and "the average size of such farms was 2.5 ha." In 2017, the Romanian țărani organization Eco Ruralis, associated with the international peasant organization La Via Campesina (www.viacampesina.org), reported that there were 4

million active țărani in the country, accounting for 50% of all peasants in the EU and approximately 20% of Romania's population (Drepturile taranilor).

To make matters even more dire for Romanian peasants, by 2007 Romania was the lowest spender on social protection per person in the EU at 13%, despite having the lowest public debt in the EU by a high margin (Ban, 2016; Vincze, 2015). 40% of Romanians were reported at risk of poverty and 29% severely materially deprived—much above the EU average. In the late 2000s, Romania ranked lowest with Eurostat given its minimum wage and number of working poor. In 2008, however, President Băsescu ascribed Romanian impoverishment to sloth and welfare abuse. In only a decade, consumer credit was deregulated, and private debt increased from 5 to 200 billion euros by 2009 (Ban). By the same year, the government responded to a currency attack by “hiking the VAT from 19 to 24 percent, cutting public sector wages by 25 percent across all income categories, and slashing 15 percent from all social assistance payments (handicap benefits, unemployment benefits, child allowances, etc.)” (p. 213), which was considered socially regressive even by IMF standards. Simultaneously, firms from wealthier EU nations profited from Romania, accounting for two-thirds of Romanian exports, as well as multinational “Romanian” firms, which recorded 86% of firm profits. Labour's share of the national GDP decreased, while capital's share increased, and the nation experienced a significant ‘brain drain’ of physicians, engineers, and researchers.

Land and resource grabs, and the creation of a reserve labour force demonstrate how neoliberal policy reforms create favourable conditions for neoimperial projects (<https://www.farmlandgrab.org/post/view/19636>; Harvey, 2003; Miszczyński, 2017). Strengthening the position of foreign and transnational interests is commensurate with weakening the positions of wage labourers and smallholders. Policy shifts significantly amplify the power difference that already exists between labourers or smallholders and wealthy firms that enjoy the support of governments and financial institutions alike.

Interlaced with neoliberal policy reforms and the drive toward development were presidentially expressed and concomitant values of economic racism demonstrated by Băsescu's description of the poor as inferior if not ‘non-persons,’ and calls for ‘modernization of the state’ through economic investment and technological development (Vincze, 2015). Gürel (2019) describes capitalist Modernization Theory as a denial of uneven capital relations that promises the poor development equal to the wealthy if they catch up on the same linear historic processes

pioneered by the wealthy. Accusations of laziness, corruption, rigidity, and improper processes deflect from the systematic issues related to capitalism and ties impoverishment to lagging modernity. Thus, alternative means of production and related social mobilities, such as Romania's urban to rural wage-work migration, are construed as regressive and their adherents (e.g. subsistence farmers, rural villagers, pastoralists, and țărani) inferior. After all, populations and resources exiting capital systems represent lost profit. One AM member summarized his understanding of these politics:

...when we entered the EU, the leaders were allowed a period of time to put their affairs in order, to resolve their problems, something that was unexpected for us. We thought that things would become lawful right away, that things would be respected and followed to the same level as in the West; that the salary levels would increase, in comparison with those from other countries; that public politics would become a thing here too, social protections. The majority of us were poor, not rich. But it was not even close to this. They allowed those in power to "mend the basil" [save appearances], to put their kids in roles of leadership in their businesses... So, they sort of split Romania into slices, and each of them squeezed in wherever they needed to. Meaning, foreigners were given some conveniences, in buying properties, retrocessions of goods in important cities, etc.... and in the end people were left disoriented, having been fired from big steel mills where they had gained a specialization. Four or five steel mills closed. So, they went as far as they could go in other countries in order to find a better life. Where possible, others took over: shipyards, car or tractor manufacturers, and I don't know how and when this thing will stop.

I have the feeling that if they had told us from the beginning that we are going to have a public-private partnership, from areas like public services to strategic areas of government, you at least would have known what was happening, and the Romanian industries could have oriented themselves. But they were left to "the will of the wind," and I don't understand this even now, how a foreign businessperson who comes to start something is supported by the Romanian state. Employees' salaries are paid for a few months and the Romanian person does not benefit from anything. Even if they were to have capital, or a certain number of years of experience in a certain field—why this discrimination? Even at the same level, for example, medium size businesses, even the small ones—encourage the small guys first, so they can create jobs, and then the rest will come on its own, Romanians would come back too. But they do not want to, I think it is the state's politic, and this is the worst thing, because it's the state's politic without them explaining anything to you clearly, so that you don't have a perspective other than going from today to tomorrow—you cannot see the day after tomorrow, you know?...

We give away billions without thinking and then we whine that we do not have a budget for this and that. They even scare the retirees and state employees, that "you are the heavy inheritance, it is you we don't have money for in our budgets"—that is 25-30% of the country's budget in a year, it would never be an issue of not having money. But people enter a state of "at least they are giving us this." They do not hope for something

better, they are happy with the little bit... High up countries with all sorts of social securities in their own countries, in other countries they do what economic interests dictate, and they do not care that the poor person does not have firewood for the winter, or that they cannot even access the money to be able to buy it... So, then you end up depending on a child from a family who is working abroad. It is pathetic to be waiting for 100-200 Euros a month. This export of “minds” is strategic, because we are building the pensions for those in more civilized countries and we do not look after our own anymore...

Think of the kind of people who place themselves in strategic industries to be able to buy, to access colossal bank loans, only certain people. It is not based on competition. It is based on information... Those who endorse and support politicians, this kind of high-level people. I think they negotiated their roles, their positions. And instead of the money staying in the country, we are hemorrhaging capital and we will never be able to recover. All the profit is going elsewhere, billions and billions and billions of Euros. (Interview, Oct. 17, 2019)

A Brief Note on Common Lands. Marx (1904) originally argued that pre-capitalist reproduction and common lands, which benefit țărani, are the antithesis of private property. To validate processes of ABD, capital logic espouses an ideology where such forms of reproduction—those outside of capital—are considered: “outside of the natural order of things—with the assumption that the natural order of things is a kind of linear progression fantasy in which everyone, globally, has come to live, or should have come to live, in urban, cosmopolitan ways” (West 2016, p. 21). Carpenter and Mojab (2017) note this is a characteristic of historical imperialisms, which cast a binary of the “us” versus the uncivilized “them.” For this reason, it is not surprising to note that laws established in 1990 and 1997 by neo-developmental and neoliberal regimes respectively, prevented villages from reclaiming traditional common lands, known as obște and compossessorates, first nationalized under communism (Diaconu, 2017). When villages regained this right in 2000 via the communal villages’ law, it was derided by a member of parliament as being “crazy” and “obsolete.”

Over the past 30 years an emergent nexus of the Romanian post/socialist state and international capital formed to fill a vacuum of power and legitimacy left by the crumbling socialist block. Through the implementation of neoliberal policies this nexus created a politico-economic climate of pauperization and exploitation in rural Romania. As Velicu (2014) describes, these material conditions predicate a corresponding ideological impact at the case site:

...the market has colonized life-worlds in post-communist Romania, selling dreams of individual and family prosperity, well-paid jobs, and devaluing traditional, communal,

and human bonds. In the case of Roșia Montană (Transylvania), through attempts at privatizing and commodifying whole areas of social life, the market has taken on a life of its own, marginalizing fundamental values related to spirituality, ancestry, land, and nature. The tentacles of the “market society” are now touching all aspects of social life, objectifying and quantifying them under the impetus of maximizing efficiency and profits. (Velicu, 2014, p. 220)




Figure 4 *Graffiti in Cluj-Napoca expressing disenfranchisement with the EU/Euro Dollar.*

Ongoing processes of ABD in Romania and the concentration of land in the hands of capital set the stage for localized policy implantation, extraction, and contestation. Further, the post-socialist period definitively reproduced exploitation and domination against rural populations and peasants. Given the contextual specificity of Romanian peasant politics, and their resilience against aggression in the form of coercive class transformation, this thesis will refer to local peasants with the appropriate Romanian term, *țărani*.

Forward to the Foreground

The Roșia that has once been will never be again. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 14, 2019)

The *background* above presents the historico-cultural context that influences present day Roșieni ideological positions and the *middle ground* offers explanatory insight into the material conditions and experiences that shaped (and continue to shape) the terrain of the ongoing 20+

years of Roșieni struggle. At present AM, RMCF, and the network of NGOs supporting them through the SRM campaign continue social action against the project and the aftereffects of massive DFDR. AM originally formed in 2000, representing a significant proportion of the local population who were actively opposed to the mining project: 300 families or approximately 1200 residents (Buțiu & Pascaru, 2011). By comparison, in 2002 when SRM formed, the entire commune consisted of 1352 households or 3865 individuals with approximately 2.6 ha/household of arable land and 7.2 ha/household of agricultural land like pastures (Radulescu & Ioan, 2012). This may seem like a significant amount of land for smallholders, but the mountainous terrain impacts the productivity of the land, making it hard for a family to survive on 3-4 hectares as one elderly Roșieni noted (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 14, 2019). However, many of the commune's population left or passed away during the years of struggle, forever changing the villages within the commune. Thus, while the project's dispossession/resettlement processes remain incomplete, real harms have been visited on the commune's inhabitants. Still, a core population of țărani, villagers, and newly immigrated activists remain today. AM's headquarters and local company-aligned NGOs are quiet, but an altered day-to-day life continues in Romania. Articles of resistance present as now-uninhabited buildings restored by volunteers and national familiarity with the locality and its struggle continues to bring visitors throughout the year, particularly in the summer.

By wresting the extractive project to a standstill, Roșieni opposed to the mine forced GBU and the Romanian state into an awkward conflict. GBU, following the logic of ABD toward the most likely source of profit, has temporarily shifted their strategy toward legal mechanisms for generating revenue and away from actual mining extraction. The 80% owner of RMGC, GBU, is moving to sue their co-owner, the Romanian government, for \$4.4 billion dollars in lost profits (Canadian Center for Policy, 2017; Ciobanu, 2016; Rosia Montana: How to blackmail, 2015). Once again, GBU is attempting to remove affected Roșieni from the equation by pursuing revenue through an international investor-state settlement dispute court case in Washington, via Romania's bilateral investment treaty with Canada (Canadian Center for Policy). However, AM's website also notes that this mechanism is not yet refined; less than 10% of disputes are settled favourably for Canadian investors (Rosia Montana: How to blackmail). Disturbingly however, so-called "developing countries" are increasingly the targets of such measures. Through their support networks and NGOs, Roșieni from AM and RMCF managed to

wedge testimonies into the court case and participate in protests in Washington. At this point, time will determine what new forms and processes ABD will evolve in attempts to dispossess Roşieni for profit. As members of AM described it:

Yeah, Yeah, I don't know, this is the thing. Because our concern is that, yeah, Washington, basically there will be, the decision will be that, "Look," maybe our government will say that, "we Romania, were put to pay these 4 billion dollars, and we won't give them as from this money will be schools and so on, and we will invest in education, highways and I don't know what better." And basically they are knowing that the properties, private properties, here in the area and basically they started to change the law of mine in order to be able to expropriate by force. So I really think that only this could be the way for the company to go ahead, and maybe our government will give such a law, to expropriate by force the people who are staying in the way of mining exploitation. And if that happens, then private property... it doesn't have any value. It depends, but we are quite expecting for this to happen with RM. And this is a "good" scenario. We will see. (AM Member, Interview, Oct. 25, 2019)

Be vigilant and take action when it comes to international corporations who look to make the most profit with the least expense. Continue to be vigilant and not give up just because it looks like we have won. They will continue to push and try to push us out. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 18, 2019)

Market Speculation: Money from Thin Air to Maintain the Corporate Machine.

Meanwhile, GBU continues to be traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange (as GBU), and is featured on the Royal Bank of Canada's Dividend Reinvestment Program (<https://www.rbcdirectinvesting.com/drip-list.html>). These banking mechanisms allow GBU to "raise additional funding" for "reinforcing the financing of the Company" through new stock market investment, market speculation, and the re-investment of profits made through market speculation (<https://www.juniorminingnetwork.com/junior-miner-news/press-releases/1163-tsx-venture/gbu/77005-2020-first-quarter-report.html>). In 2016, around the same time that GBU announced they would take the Romanian government to court over the Roşia Montană project, company stocks surged (<https://icsid.worldbank.org/cases/case-database/case-detail?CaseNo=ARB/15/31>). However, the smaller decline seen most dramatically in January 2020 matches with the Romanian government's turnabout and reactivation of their request to include Roşia Montană in the list of United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Sites. Despite mining operations having been silent in the commune for many years, World Heritage Site developments that could further hinder mining development, and the fog-of-war of

an international court settlement case, GBU is still able to acquire funds to maintain their “operations” through banking instruments like Dividend Reinvestment Program that multiply investment funds based on stock exchange performance—or simply the anticipation of profit (<https://inspiredinvestor.rbcdirectinvesting.com/en/di/hubs/investing-academy/article/what-is-a-drip/jeoz82ib>).



Figure 5 *Gabriel Resources’ performance on the Toronto Stock Exchange.*
(www.juniorminingnetwork.com)

Table 1 A timeline of events in the struggle for Roșia Montană

	1995	● Frank Timis scouts Roșia Montană for RMGC project
	1996	
RMGC obtains mining exploration rights	● 1997	
	1998	
	1999	
	2000	● Rosieni organization Alburnus Maior forms to oppose mine
RMGC begins purchasing properties in Rosia Montana	● 2001	
	2002	● The Save Roșia Montană campaign launches in solidarity with AM
	2003	
	2004	
	2005	
First FânFest event launched by SRM to build solidarity	● 2006	
	2007	
AM and SRM win legal victories, Roșia Montană declared reservation.	● 2008	● Romanian Academy holds conference in solidarity, large social action protests begin
	2009	
	2010	
	2011	● President Băsescu visits Roșia Montană and holds fake consultation out of decency
Government attempts to remove Mount Carnic's protected status	● 2012	
Prime Minister Ponta visits Roșia Montană, annuls environmental rulings, and approves expropriation	● 2013	● Romanian Autumn begins with large protests not seen since the fall of communism
	2014	● RMGC is under investigation for tax evasion and loses archeological discharge for Mount Carnic
RMGC announces it is seeking \$4 billion in compensation from Romania in international court	● 2015	
	2016	● Ministry of Culture seeks to add Roșia Montană as a UNESCO Heritage Site
EU-Canada trade deal applies provisionally, which could strengthen investor-state lawsuit	● 2017	
	2018	● Romanian Minister of Culture delays UNESCO process
	2019	
Romanian Government renews request to add Roșia Montană as a UNESCO Heritage Site	● 2020	

Part B: Theoretical and Empirical Literature on Dispossession, Resistance and Learning in Social Action

This second Part of the literature review considers critical theoretical perspectives pertaining to dispossession, resistance and learning in social action that are methodologically pertinent for this research. A selective consideration of empirical literature pertaining to studies on rural resistance and learning in these formations is also included in order to help locate the academic contribution of this critical case study work in Romania.

Capitalism, Coercive Neoliberal Accumulation by Dispossession and the State-Capital Nexus

Euro-American imperialism consistently reproduces relations of dispossession; its logic requires “something outside of itself in order to accumulate” to sustain capital, a process identified as “neoimperialism” (Harvey, 2003, p. 141). Countries like Romania, and other emergent post/socialist regions, provide capital with expanded opportunities for accumulation resulting in pauperization (land-dispossessed unemployed superfluous populations) and/or exploitation (expanded reproduction via the wage relation). Post/socialist sites proffer insights for socio-political theory and counter-hegemonic praxis concerning 21st century neoliberal capitalism (Fine & Saad-Filho, 2017; Cahill, Cooper, Konings, & Primrose, 2018; Vukov, 2013; Witiw & Kapoor, 2020) and its context-specific variations.

According to David Harvey (2003), neoliberal policies offer a political-economic framework for ABD. Both policy and process are geared to address crises of capital and in particular, crises beginning in the late 1970s arising from overaccumulation, “a condition where surpluses of capital (perhaps accompanied by surpluses of labour) lie idle with no profitable outlets in sight” (p. 149). This phenomenon causes economic engines to seize up and devalue, thus generating capitalist crises like market crashes, depressions, and debt saturation. The application of spatiotemporal fixes, theorized by Rosa Luxemburg (2003) as geographic fixes, offer capital a short-term solution to the decay of its closed systems “through temporal deferral and geographical expansion” (Harvey, p. 115). Neoimperialism subsequently addresses capital’s limitations via recurrent processes of ABD, including commodification, privatization, the imposition of property rights, colonization, monetization, and suppression of other modes of production and existential realities (Harvey). ABD releases “a set of assets (including labour power) at very low (and in some instances zero) cost” (p. 149) and enables over-accumulated

capital to acquire resources like water, housing, “new land, labor, and natural resources in order to keep itself going” (West, 2016, p. 19).

Mechanisms of Dispossession. As David Harvey (2003) and Gary Leech (2012) suggest, ABD is enacted through the marriage of capital logic with territorial logics. State power, expressed through legislation and enforcement of the rule of law, creates a favourable environment for the accumulation of inter/national capital. Meanwhile, associated environmental and social degradation is ‘outsourced’ to local ‘others’ and ignored by states, while profit is generated and whisked away by, for instance, transnational entities. The complexity and diversity of instances of ABD is staggering. However, a growing body of academic and activist literatures documents patterns which suggest that shared capital logics drive diverse processes and agents of ABD down well-worn paths (Frederiksen & Himley, 2019; Imai, Gardner, & Weinberger, 2016; Kuyek, 2019; Leech, 2012; *Promise, divide*, 2019).

Neoliberal hegemony is primarily established and maintained through privatization, strengthened “neo-liberal ground rules of open financial markets and relatively free access” (Harvey, 2003, p. 68), values of competition, and the contradictory pursuit of calculable stability via monopoly. Global institutions including the IMF, World Trade Organization, OECD, EU, United Nations (UN) and big international non-governmental organizations enable the reproduction of capitalist social relations and new spaces for ABD via, for example, laws and policies advancing trade, investment, and liberalization including microfinance for poverty alleviation, wherein capital logics supersede territorial logic (Cammack, 2006; Caradaică, 2013; Harvey, 2003; Petras & Velmeyer, 2011; Vukov, 2013). At the same time, nation-states continue to act as enforcers of neoliberal policy:

The neo-liberal state typically sought to enclose the commons, privatize, and build a framework of open commodity and capital markets. It had to maintain labor discipline and foster 'a good business climate'. If a particular state failed or refused to do so it risked classification as a 'failed' or 'rogue' state. (Harvey, 2003, p. 184)

Oliver-Smith (2010) concurs, in that “the current trend toward privatization of infrastructural projects, capital still looks to the state for institutional support and frequently for financial guarantees” (p. 7). Thus, states lubricate processes and mitigate risks for extractive industries. Ban (2016) also notes that neoliberal policies often exist in tandem with protectionist approaches to local and transnational industry.

National governments also reinterpret and reproduce preeminent neoliberal doctrines and Structural Adjustment Programs in their own policies (Oliver-Smith, 2010). Global governance structures such as the UN General Assembly Declaration on the Right to Development are reinterpreted by nation-states, so that the “right and duty to expand its capacity to serve the needs of its population” (Oliver-Smith, p. 17), for example, is used as an impetus to dispossess populations for the good of the amorphous “national economy.” The national scale of projects involving development-forced displacement and resettlement (DFDR) necessitates such state collaboration—and often its initiation—with the private sector. Extractive projects inevitably require DFDR of local populations because extractive processes involve destruction of land while local labour is seldom employed (Gürel, 2019; Kuyek, 2019; Leech, 2012). Therefore, Gürel describes ABD as “the transfer of small-scale private property or common property (over land and natural resources) from lower-class people to capital for various productive or speculative purposes through the state’s deployment of extra-economic and/or economic coercion” (p. 10), thereby augmenting Harvey’s (2003) predominantly economic rationale for ABD. The role of the state is to influence discourse and action on development, projecting “state ambitions into the local context, restructuring it toward government priorities and goals” (Oliver-Smith, p. 204).

Liberal governments and application of “the rule of law” serve to create and protect the neoliberal conditions that favor capitalism. “In other words, according to the logic of capital, society exists to serve the economy, rather than the reverse” (Leech, 2012, p. 26). ABD thus produces shakedowns that make resources available to over-accumulated capital from the imperial centers, often involving environmental degradation and social dislocation which are rarely if ever factored into capital logics, especially in the case of extractive industries (Hilary, 2013; Leech, 2012; Oliver-Smith, 2010). Central and Eastern European (CEE) states of the former Soviet Union undergoing processes of transition from socialism toward integration into globalized neoliberalism provide stark examples of ABD (Ban, 2016; Caradaică, 2013; Daub, 2012; Harvey, 2003). Through mechanisms established by international organizations, financial institutions, and bilateral trade agreements, formerly common or nationalized resources and means of production are auctioned off by complicit neoliberal post/socialist government authorities to wealthy foreign investors.

Accumulation by Dispossession+: The Expansion Pack. Frederiksen and Himley (2019) also propose that critical discourse on extractive industries should address “the diverse ways that power is employed to secure dispossession, and to sustain reworked relations of land and resource access over time” (p. 3). The researchers argue this expanded conceptualization of ABD is needed because Harvey’s (2003) description is too narrowly focused on the role of state power and legitimacy. Therefore, the researchers recommend examining ABD tactics through a framework of authority, coercion and domination, persuasion, seduction, and manipulation.

Nodding to Harvey (2003), Frederiksen and Himley (2019) note that historically, extractive industries leverage state authority—or legitimacy that achieves compliance by consent—to produce industry expansion. While state political authority is central to establishing legitimacy, extractive companies also mobilize authority from what Gramsci (1971) describes as civil society to help create a compliant environment for extractive development. For example, Leech (2012) notes that education and media establish authority that can be lent to extractive companies. Thus, extractive development both leans on and contributes to the penetration and/or entrenchment of what Gramsci envisioned as capitalist hegemony. Authority tactics employed by globalized capital beyond the extractive industry also demonstrate this tendency. Another example is palm oil companies that seek support from both government officials and important non-government voices in villages to acquire community land and resources in support of their project’s development (Promise, divide, 2019). Approvals and acquisitions often occur once the decision to invest is made, but before a project is presented to effected villages. Companies also set up community committees, with controlled meetings, or invite locals and officials to see plantations the company has established in other countries. These tactics aim to inculcate compliance for the project top-down, thus reducing start-up time or monetary resources. Authority tactics are inconspicuously designed and predominantly outside the spheres of populations targeted for DFDR, thus minimizing resistance and lubricating procedural action, which is fundamental groundwork for ABD.

The state’s role in ABD can also extend beyond applications of authority to the utilization of its monopoly on direct forms of violence, which exist on a continuum: coercion, or threats of force, may escalate into violence or domination, especially in non-Western contexts (Frederiksen & Himley, 2019; Harvey, 2003; West, 2016). Frequently, coercion and domination have been deployed to discipline place-based opposition to mining development (Imai et al., 2016; Kapoor,

2017a; Kuyek, 2019; Leech, 2012; Oliver-Smith, 2010; West, 2016). Frederiksen and Himley argue that domination and coercion come in many forms but operate on a shared principle: they are “used not to convince or persuade, but to overrule, subdue, silence, or drown out” (p. 6). Coercive tactics often operate effectively based on implied force alone and are used to acquire land for development, securitize extractive sites, and intertwine public and private power.

Dispossession by Persuasion. Frederiksen and Himley (2019) argue that corporations also employ “quieter registers of power” that work to induce desired behaviours through arousal rather than duress or force. For example, firms engage communities in order to extend their control in extractive zones and offer “compensation in the form of money, employment, or other benefits (e.g., relocation and/or development programmes) ... codifying these offers in quasi-legal “impact and benefits agreements” or “community development agreements” with local stakeholders” (p. 7). On the company’s end, these costs are construed as extractive investments meant to replace assets lost by those dispossessed. However, these negotiations are rarely mutually beneficial as they are primarily intended to establish order, rework “relations of land and resources access” (Frederiksen and Himley, p. 3) and thus secure extraction (Himley, 2013; Kapoor, 2017a; Kuyek, 2019; Kwaipun, 2009; Peterson St-Laurent & Le Billon, 2015). These ABD tactics extend Harvey’s (2003) theory beyond the marriage of territorial and capital logics by considering variously nuanced local contexts.

Dispossession by Seduction. Like persuasion, seduction works in two directions: polishing the image of extractive industry and muddying the opposition, labeling it backwards. RMGC’s subtler extractive tactics also included creating an imagined alignment between Roşieni and corporate interests through portraying seductive visions of the future, cultural politics, and championing industry-led progress and modernity—what Frederiksen and Himley (2019) call seductive tactics. In the case of Roşia Montană—and generally—it is important to refute the idea that corporate visions of the future are “stand-alone” projects; rather, the imaginary constructed by RMGC is an augmentation of the already existing cultural force that Gramsci (1971) termed hegemony. Seduction in Roşia Montană, is the art of linking Roşieni into the globalizing capitalist values that had begun to penetrate the country in the early 1980s, thus speeding up local penetration. In other words, the company’s promises are the promises of capitalism in general. Hegemony produces a new “common sense” and shifts collective identities in a way that suggests other groups, like Roşieni, share interests and goals in common

with the dominant group, like RMGC and its foreign investors (Mayo, 1999; Wullweber, 2019). As Wullweber puts it, hegemony—and thus seduction—depend on the ability to “universalize the particular interests of a group as a socioeconomic and political structure” (p. 3). As a tactic, seduction offers flashy promises that simultaneously aggrandize the status of capitalism and tantalize subjects to obtain their consent.

Dispossession by Manipulation. Frederiksen and Himley (2019) also argue that the subtler registers of power in mining development politics include: downplaying costs, exaggerating benefits, dishonesty and outright deception that results in “false promises, broken agreements, and unmet expectations” (p. 9). Globally—in Africa, South America, North America, and India—mines consistently fail to produce the long-term employment prospects and environmental rehabilitation promised (Leech, 2012; Kapoor, 2017a; Kuyek, 2019; and Kwaipun, 2009). Where persuasion and seduction fail, extractive corporations dress up swindling as legitimate business practice; Frederiksen and Himley call this tactic manipulation.

Politics of Resistance: Countering Dispossession

Thematically, ABD in mining contexts produces oppositional social action by those who are threatened with dispossession. Harvey (2003) notes that this pressure results in diverse, locality-specific opposition and resistance. Such processes of action and reaction were evident when global capital employed ABD to address the capital crises of the 1970s, which resulted in a wave of peasant and landless worker social movements (SMs) started to emerge in the 1980s and 1990s (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2011).

Research describes these processes of globalizing capital as having a particularly negative impact on Indigenous peoples, peasants and small landholders worldwide, as it displaces them for the sake of capital projects (Kapoor, 2017b; Oliver-Smith, 2010; Petras & Veltmeyer, 2011). One distinct form of ABD that impacts rural groups in this way globally—particularly in the global South—is extractive and especially mining dispossession (Conde, 2017; Hilary 2013; Kuyek, 2019; Oliver-Smith, 2010). Conde notes that resistance often springs up in rural locations due to the dispersion of state power in distant localities. More frequently over the last 20 years, these struggles include extra-local alliances, but little research describe how these alliances form or operate. The Environmental Justice Atlas (<https://ejatlas.org/>) tracks many sites of dispossession and resistance around the world tied to “mineral ores and building materials extraction” and provides a visualization of the global scope of these projects, including

309 cases in Central and South America, 68 in Africa, 43 in South Asia, 58 in South East Asia, and, with relevance to the case at hand, 38 in Central and Eastern Europe. Many companies, including many notable Canadian ones, are engaged in conflicts with peasants, Indigenous peoples, and small landholders around the globe over the negative social, health, and environmental impacts that development projects have on these populations. The resulting local struggles against developmental domination offer insights into forms and processes of resistance. The following discussion introduces several theoretical and conceptual perspectives on resistance that were variously instructive for researching and understanding the case of Roșia Montană including: hegemony/counter-hegemony; countermovements; everyday resistance; and rights based resistance.

Hegemony/Counter-hegemony. Mayo (1999) ties the struggle of totalized and totalizing actions for and against domination to Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony. Hegemony describes the control of a predominant societal group over others (Birchfield, 1999; Buttigieg, 2005). Gramsci's theorization here helps contextualize the importance of learning processes in struggle and transformative social action. Specifically, Mayo argues that Gramsci's hegemony—"a social condition in which all aspects of social reality are dominated by or supportive of a single class" (p. 35), or whereas Mayo prefers to substitute 'a single class' for 'dominant groups'—is a learning process or educational relationship. This is one learning vector important to this thesis, the other being oppositional or resistant: learning in social action. Throughout this case, the corporate-state alliance embodied by RMGC attempted to leverage all aspects of social reality to forward their project.

Learning is essential to Gramsci's understanding of hegemonic domination because it is achieved through "social institutions such as law, education, mass media, religion and so forth" (Mayo, 1999, p. 36), which make up civil society and teach to create a "cultural bedrock of power." In other words, hegemony is not achieved purely through coercive domination, but by a manipulated consensus obtained, for example, through leadership and persuasion. Dominant groups use the "superstructure - the cultural, intellectual and moral realm -" (Birchfield, 1999, p. 42) which is enmeshed with the economic base of production, to capture and maintain hegemony and thereby state power (McSweeney, 2014). Gramsci saw the state as being formed of political society—the source of coercive power immanent in "the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, the police, etc." (Buttigieg, 2005, p. 43)—and civil society—the source of consensus which is

comprised of public spaces between political and economic institutions and cultural institutions such as religious institutions, schools, associations, trade unions, families, personal relations and others (Birchfield, 1999; Buttigieg). Civil society is the site where ideas and worldviews form, producing the superstructure; it is the primary arena for teaching, reproducing and entrenching or alternatively, resisting and competing for cultural and political hegemony (Birchfield; Buttigieg; McSweeney, 2014). Thus, hegemony is renegotiable, incomplete, vulnerable to crisis and contestation. The mechanisms of hegemony also hold the promise of agency and the refutation of traditional Marxist economic determinism.

Enter the Gramscian counter proposal: to *displace* neoliberal hegemony via counter-hegemony and instate an alternative ideology (McSweeney, 2014). In this historic process, Gramsci argues that the ruling class (dominant groups) must be swept aside and that subalterns must seize the hegemonic reins of the machinery of globalization: political and civil society.

For Gramsci, counter-hegemony requires that a “war of position” precede a “war of manoeuvre” (Mayo, 1999). A “war of position” involves social organization and cultural activity in the arena of civil society. Only once key victories have been achieved in areas of law, education, media and other institutions, are those acting for social transformation able to openly challenge the state in a “war of manoeuvre.” In other words, cultural support for the state must be eroded, thus shifting the balance of power so that dominant groups lose their impregnable position. To support intellectual reform, Gramsci argues that various intellectuals are needed to conduct educational and cultural work. Further, these intellectuals need to be rooted in popular consciousness. Therefore, social action intellectuals must either spring from the oppressed themselves or be assimilated and thus educated by the oppressed. From Mayo’s analysis, Gramsci offers a variety of sites, social relations and content that contribute to emancipatory adult education. Wars of position—processes of unlearning/learning—can occur through circles, clubs, associations, unions, and workers parties. In addition to sites of social practice, Gramsci showed that the use of media such as journalism and other critical appropriations of dominant culture can serve as platforms for emancipatory adult education.

Mayo’s (1999) analysis of Gramsci implies that social relations within counter-hegemony must “be participative and radically democratic” (p. 47), reciprocal, and must blur the practical distinctions between pupil and teacher. Thus, wars of position develop the agency of the participants but also renews the knowledge and theoretical insight of the movement itself.

Importantly, this educational relationship includes both intellectual and non-intellectual members of the population. However, Gramsci argues that andragogy is not a simple act of facilitation. Rather, instruction or the conveyance of information is required to ensure that dialogical processes progress in the spirit of critical analysis. Thus, the reinforcement of dominant paradigms can be avoided. Mittelman and Chin (2005) point out that Gramsci acknowledges that subalterns may simultaneously engage in conformity and resistance. To contend with this complexity, his argument was that the most effective forms of resistance were “national popular movements” which are about whole ways of life rather than wars of position. However, globalization has made identities more complex than ever, and therefore, the authors contend that Gramscian framework must be stretched to include new actors and spaces.

Addressing the andragogy of wars of position—a bridge between resistance and learning in social action—Gramsci (as cited in Mayo, 1999) relates the importance of exploring both “high culture,” which includes prominent and traditional disciplines and works of literature, and “low/popular culture,” which includes the latest cultural artifacts enjoyed broadly in a given society. Gramsci saw “high culture” as a tool for political education and “low culture” as a bridge for subalterns on “the periphery of political life” (p. 51) toward understanding the dominant/common hegemonic language. Finally, Gramsci saw history as a necessary element of wars of position. Mayo writes that, “as with the canon, which has its roots in the past, history too needs to be confronted, mastered and transformed” (p. 52). In other words, understanding history enhances the agency and transformative potential of those taking social action. Gramsci (2000) describes history as a chain of efforts, and states that therefore “it is hard to understand why the proletariat, which seeks to add another link to the chain, should not know how and why and by whom it has been preceded or what advantage it might derive from this knowledge” (p. 59). In sum, wars of position are resistance and learning processes toward the critical appropriation and ultimate transformation of the dominant culture.

Double Movement. In *The Great Transformation*, Polanyi (2001) presents a politico-economic analysis of the 19th century wherein he famously describes that era’s “double movement: the market expanded continuously but this movement was met by a countermovement checking the expansion in definite directions” (p. 136). Polanyi proposes that the organizing principle of the market expansion movement was economic liberalism whereas the countermovement’s principle was “social protection aiming at the conservation of man and

nature” (p. 138). Polanyi also makes the important point that counter-movements were not motivated by ideological positions like socialism or nationalism. Rather, a countermovement is a specific reaction against forces negatively impacting society:

While the organization of world commodity markets, world capital markets, and world currency markets under the aegis of the gold standard gave an unparalleled momentum to the mechanism of markets, a deep-seated movement sprang into being to resist the pernicious effects of a market-controlled economy. Society protected itself against the perils inherent in a self-regulating market system— (p. 79-80)

While Polanyi’s countermovement is reminiscent of Gramsci’s counter-hegemony and does *technically* address class, the distinction above separates these two theorizations of resistance. Specifically, Gramsci’s counter-hegemony requires class awareness and competition in civil society whereas Polanyi’s countermovement is directed against policies, not dominant classes. As McSweeney (2014) puts it, a countermovement is a reformist strategy wherein social improvement is obtained through negotiation rather than the structural transformation needed to shift the balance of power. However, Polanyi’s theorization is nonetheless valuable for understanding how ecological and social justice movements may be closely tied together and arise from civil society, as it happened with the SRM campaign in the case at hand. Furthermore, Polanyi’s description of countermovements is helpful toward understanding the longevity of successful struggles.

Mittelman and Chin (2005) expand on this theory, noting that “Polanyi understood resistance in the form of countermovements as having arisen from, and affecting, different ways of life” (p. 20). They argue Polanyi’s theorization is relevant to describing modern social movements as “a form of collective action (a) based on solidarity, (b) carrying on a conflict, (c) breaking the limits of the system in which action occurs” (p. 21). However, Mittelman and Chin also note that Polanyi’s work “neither advances analysis of differences within countermovements nor adequately anticipates undeclared forms of resistance” (p. 22). For example, many modern social movements are complex and contradictory, fragmented or decentralized rather than unified, and submerged rather than open contestations.

Everyday Resistance. James C. Scott’s (1985) case analysis of peasants in a Malaysian village drew out the political implications of an informal, submerged struggle, or “everyday resistance” (Kerkvliet, 2009; Moreda, 2015; van den Berg et al., 2019). His theorization is important to this study given the historical material importance of țărani politics as well as the

decentralized and submerged aspects of the SRM campaign at large. Scott observed villagers': private dialogue(s), descriptions of oppressive class structures, recollections and historical narratives, "development" sabotage, foot-dragging, and struggle for survival, and argued this was not the nonsensical/unintelligible autonomic responses of an unconscious class (as Marx himself argued), but rather a form of class struggle with transformative potential. "Resistance refers to what people do that shows disgust, anger, indignation or opposition to what they regard as unjust, unfair, illegal claims on them by people in higher, more powerful class and status positions or institutions" (Kerkvliet, 2009, p. 233). Critically, Scott's research argued that "people need not be organised to be political" (Kerkvliet, p. 229) and "resistance does not need to be recognized to be effective; its intent...is more important than its outcome" (Schneider, 2011, p. 6). Pre-empting some of his detractors on this position, Scott himself acknowledges that not everything peasants do to maintain their lives qualifies as everyday resistance, but some actions do, which "may feed into other forms of resistance but may also cultivate existence and the desire for alternatives" (van den Berg et al., p. 5).

Everyday resistance as a transformative politic also provides important insights on learning through incidental action. For example, the diversity of incidental action is a conscious response to the multi-level threat that development projects impose on rural groups:

That threat has at least three facets: it is the palpable threat of permanent poverty; it is the no less palpable loss of a meaningful and respected productive role in the community; and it is the related loss of a great part of both the social recognition and cultural dignity that define full membership in this village. (Scott, 1985, p. 240)

In other words, material, social, and cultural/ideological threats require material, social, and cultural/ideological responses, respectively. Thus, everyday resistance demonstrates an awareness of different arenas of struggle. It is irrelevant to debate whether peasants articulate their actions in theory recognizable to scholars, it is the content of the actions that matters:

At one level it is a contest over the definition of justice, a struggle to control the concepts and symbols by which current experience is evaluated. At another level it is a struggle over the appropriateness of a given definition of justice to a particular case, a particular set of facts, a particular behavior... Finally, at a third level, of course, it is a struggle over land, work, income, and power in the midst of the massive changes brought about by an agricultural revolution. (p. 27)

Scott saw the multi-level struggle of Malaysian peasants as representative of complex, political action. Despite the threat that focusing on material survival negates the possibility of

transformative, systemic action, everyday resistance is a compounding process that simultaneously “resists” and builds the practical capacity for resistance:

...the "beauty" of much peasant resistance is that it often confers immediate and concrete advantages, while at the same time denying resources to the appropriating classes, *and* that it requires little or no manifest organization. (p. 296)

When the dominant ideology is one that attempts to deny peasant existence, peasants existing constitutes a form of resistance. Thus, incidental action may be political and of importance to this study.

The measure or intensity of everyday resistance also demonstrates important learning. van den Berg et al. (2019) write, “This form of resistance is informal, subtle, indirect, and non-confrontational” (p. 4), and in Scott’s (1985) own words: “the "war news" consists almost entirely of words, feints, and counter feints, threats, a skirmish or two, and, above all, propaganda not all out assault” (p. 22). This is reminiscent of Gramsci’s war of position. Scott argued everyday resistance takes this form, not through lazy happenstance, but by peasants’ critical awareness of the massive power differential that exists between them and the state or oppressive classes (Schneider, 2011). All-out conflict almost certainly results in all-out defeat for those bereft of the monopoly on coercion, which would effectively end the immediate possibility for transformation. Thus, while survival cannot replace transformative action, both ideological and material survival are fundamental for transformation and therefore, survival sometimes becomes a tactic within the broader transformative strategy (Moreda, 2015). For Scott, rural peasant and smallholder struggle “is best suited to extended guerrilla-style campaigns of attrition that require little or no coordination... individual acts of foot dragging and evasion are often reinforced by a venerable popular culture of resistance” (p. 35).

Scott (1985) also noted that peasant everyday resistance involved not only decentralized actions, but also critical reflections. As van den Berg et al. (2019) put it, “The transformative potential of everyday resistance is found in the establishment of a supportive narrative that carries criticisms of prevailing political conditions” (p. 5). One of the ways Scott described this was through what might otherwise be dismissed as simple nostalgia:

assessing the present forcibly involves a re-evaluation of what has gone before. Thus, the ideological struggle to define the present is a struggle to define the past as well. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the accounts given by poor villagers, who have had the least to be thankful for over the past decade and whose current prospects are bleak. They have

collectively created a *remembered village* and a *remembered economy* that serve as an effective ideological backdrop against which to deplore the present. (p. 178)

Scott acknowledges that these recollections are highly selective but argues that finely tuned historical accuracy is not centrally important because there are greater stakes in the present organization and the potential for a transformative future. Again, what matters is that peasants reflect on and assess the relative justice of their material conditions. Scott notes that the critical awareness that develops from this sort of reflection allows peasants to reject deflective narratives that suggest the state of their poverty reflects their own laziness and/or opposition to “progress.”

Critiques of Scott’s work suggest that everyday resistance is insufficient as transformative or revolutionary action, however, patterns of spontaneous resistance are important herein as sites of incidental learning and sites themselves that give rise to organization (Brass, 2015; Gutmann, 1993).

Expanding Civil Society through Rights. Like Scott (1985), Oliver-Smith (2010) highlights the importance of localized, often cultural resistance to DFDR. However, Oliver-Smith also describes how DFDR resisters may enter open contestation for a variety of reasons, including themes he identified as: “(1) the environment, (2) economics (3) culture (4) project risks, (5) governance and administration, (6) approaches to development, and (7) justice and human rights” (p. 104). Furthermore, he argues that the discourse of DFDR resisters may evolve alongside the struggle, switching between spiritual, environmental, or justice rationale. Placed identities are complex, and all such reasons for struggle are valid regardless of potential contradictions. This is evident in the pillars of the SRM campaign, for example.

DFDR resisters have increasing opportunities to catalyze evolution in their struggles. Oliver-Smith (2010) points out that international and supranational organizations as well as Indigenous, human rights, and environmental movements often find common ground with local DFDR resisters at development sites. These connections allow DFDR resisters to take novel approaches by leaning on political power “emerging in supranational organizations, NGOs, and private institutions to expand the claims for disempowered subjects under the law” (p. 255). Oliver-Smith describes these convergence points as expanded international civil society terrains where development in the global South may be contested. Thus, Oliver-Smith’s description speaks to Polanyi’s (2001) countermovement of civil society, and ultimately the importance of civil society mechanisms in maintaining long-term struggles against DFDR.

Empirical Studies on Rural Resistance and Extractive Dispossession

This critical case study is situated within a growing body of empirical literature on resistance to extractive forms of ABD. In Bolivia, for example, there are complicated, double-edged relations between peasants and mining: peasant-miners are displaced by mine closures favouring transnational interests while peasants subsisting on the land (who may be ex-miners) are displaced by mining projects themselves (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2011). These mining projects also conflict with Indigenous Bolivian cosmovisions, which are oppositional anti-capital ideologies (Foley, 1999; Petras & Veltmeyer). In other Andes nations like Ecuador and Colombia, mining development dislocates local miners and traditional strategies for mineral extraction, relocates towns, and severs traditional peasant social ties (Rincón & Fernandes, 2018). Studying cases in Chile and Argentina, Urkidi and Walter (2011) note that many groups opposing mining projects in Latin America describe such development as processes of sacking and plunder; mining pollutes and destroys the source of both the material and immaterial fundamentals of life, like water and cultural identity. In response, local groups articulate the conflict by stating that water is more valuable than commodities like copper, coal, bauxite, and gold.

Growing research is also addressing mining dispossession in Africa. Bruchhausen (2015), for example, describes the Marikana massacre in South Africa. In 2012, the state disciplined its low-cost labour force by killing 34 miner inhabitants of the eNkanini shack settlement who were protesting their socio-economic hardship or pauperization. In Ghana, a social-action NGO and popular movements, inclusive of peasants, formed to resist mining companies which displaced communities by developing mining sites, polluting community lands, and disrupting local traditions and mining practices (Kwai-pun, 2009). In Chiadzwa, Zimbabwe locals resisted displacement for diamond mining through civil action, shaming officials with derogatory names, and bribing guards in order to continue artisan mining (Hwami, Madzanire, & Hwami, 2018). Many of those who were forcibly relocated continued to demand compensation for their property and for the exhumation of their ancestors whose burial places had been impacted by the project.

In India, Kondh, Jharania, Dalit, small land holders, landless peasants, and forest dwellers organized in resistance to a transnational bauxite mining company, which threatens to displace communities, land-based values, and desecrate a sacred mountain (Kapoor, 2017a). Chan,

Ruwanpura, and Brown (2019) note that mining for building materials in another South Asian nation, Sri Lanka, resulted in pollution, degradation of the environment, and deforestation that negatively impacted irrigation and drinking water. Similarly, this development stoked local mobilizations in opposition.

Dispossession in the Balkans. ABD through transnational mining operations are also apparent in the region that is home to this case study, the Balkans. Many of the nations in this Central and Eastern European region are in “political and economic transition toward liberal democracy and a liberal version of capitalism” (Hicks, 2011, p. 214), and thus are vulnerable targets for over-accumulated wealth. In Bulgaria, villagers from Popintsi set up a camp in 2006 to disrupt the mining operations of a Canadian company, Euromax Resources, for 36 days (Friends of the Earth International, 2010). The villagers stated that, based on their knowledge of past environmental disasters, they feared the company’s use of cyanide-based extraction would result in environmental degradation that would force them to leave their homes. Similarly, villagers of Chavdar, Bulgaria protested the expansion of the Chelopech mining site to an open-pit cyanide mine, which was proposed after the Canadian company Dundee Precious Metals acquired its concession rights (Friends of the Earth International; Hicks). Despite mining representatives arguing that cyanide “was good” for the community, one villager stated: “...we didn’t believe them because everyone comes to Bulgaria to make a profit and then they leave again. We are left here with the poison. We have to pay the price” (Friends of the Earth International).

In 2011, 16 Greek villages began mass mobilizing as the SOS Halkidiki organization to oppose the expansion of mining in the Halkidiki prefecture by Canadian-based Eldorado Gold (Calvário, Velegrakis, & Kaika, 2017). The forests and agricultural land acquired by the company and the scope of the open pit threatened the livelihoods of many villagers who farm, keep bees, and fish. Villagers and allies organized in the Skouries forest in 2010 where conflict ensued. In 2013, several intruders broke into the company facilities and set fire to it with firebombs causing extensive damage (Protesters in Greece, 2012; We want the land, 2013).

Getova (2018), an activist with Friends of the Earth and resident of Valandovo, writes that the Macedonian communities of Valandovo, Gevgelija, Strumica, and Dojran are actively opposing the development of the open-cast Kazandol mine, which threatens the health and livelihoods of organic farmers, agricultural producers, herders, and marginalized Turkic

communities (Grassroots Resistance to Mining, 2018). ABD at the Kazandol mine, and at Euromax Resources Ilovica-Shtuka mine, have been catalyzed by the Macedonian government's amendments to mineral resource laws. These amendments "made it easier for investors – to translate their exploration concessions into extraction concessions for copper, gold, and silver with leaching, and the intensive use of sulphuric acid and cyanide." In response, community members mobilized in six different municipalities and collected 40,000 votes opposing the Kazandol mine. Activists also sought solidarity from similar movements in Romania, Greece, and Bulgaria (Getova).

In Serbia, while the majority of energy related mining is owned by the state, globalizing capital is able to penetrate the state through the provision of loans via European public banks, including the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Kolubara lignite mine, n.d.). At the Kolubara lignite mine site, the state negotiated with Vreoci villagers to get initial consent from the majority toward working out terms of a resettlement plan (Petrić, 2005). However, the state moved ahead with the project without reaching final agreements. In the villages of Vreoci and Barosevac, residents were ultimately involuntarily displaced when mining operations damaged their homes and village cemeteries were dug up without consent (Kolubara lignite mine, n.d.). Many villagers face unsanitary living conditions with no compensation in sight.

These patterns are also present in Romania. In 2000 a tailings pond near the community of Baia Mare, operated by Australian-owned Esmerelda Exploration, burst (Egresi, 2011). Hungarian authorities, whose country was affected when the spill reached the Danube, estimated that the spill destroyed at least 1241 tonnes of fish and impacted two million people who relied on affected water sources for drinking. More recently, residents of the town of Voia have opposed mining in the Certej region, which would interfere with their water and ability to farm (Pencea, Brădăţan, & Simion, 2013). Despite facing a complicated opponent whose acrobatic ownership is dizzying—the company they are opposing is Deva Gold, whose majority shareholder is European Goldfields, which split from a conglomerate with GBU, and now European Goldfields has been taken over by Eldorado Gold—the residents and their solidarity network struck a serious blow to the project by arguing that the plans for deforestation interfere with ongoing litigation over protected forests (Citizens vs. Eldorado, 2018). These cases offer a broad political-economic context for the case this paper will focus on, a mining site at Roşia Montană, Romania.

Learning in Struggle: Transformational Possibilities

The challenge with resistance movements is that radical change is often needed to repel disastrous development with any permanence. John Holst (2002) argues that education or perspective-changing alone cannot drive transformation, but that critical education is a needed catalyst to make social movements transformative. However, learning in social movements is often dismissed due to false understandings of politics and education as mutually exclusive, ignoring informal forms of learning, and the professionalization of social movements. Despite this, Holst points to how learning occurs in movements that educate the public and its officials, and as participants organize, share ideologies, and adjust their lifestyles.

Civil Societarian and/or Socialist Adult Education. Holst (2002) distinguishes between two approaches to education in social movements: radical pluralists organizing New Social Movements versus the socialists of the Old Social Movements. Radical pluralists see civil society as social sphere largely independent of—and in need of protection from—the state and the economy, and education as the inherent praxis of their social movements. In this view, social movements protect civil society, contribute to identity and culture building, democratization, and achieve this largely through nonformal and informal adult education within the movement. Thus, the civil societarian politics of radical pluralists centre on inclusion, identity, influence, and reform. On the other hand, socialists highlight the relationship between civil society and the state, and argue “we must change our relationship to and understanding of knowledge” (p. 91). Socialists argue that andragogy should be understood in relation to the social, political, and economic context, from a Marxist lens. Further, socialists believe it is crucial to develop dialogical educational social relations and understandings of social contradictions. According to Holst, radical pluralists take a more direct approach to democracy, emphasizing horizontal relations whereas socialists have a more representative and hierarchical understanding.

Despite the differences between Old and New Social Movements, Holst (2002) sees the potential for a critical convergence. He highlights Gramsci’s description of the Historic Bloc and comments on this importance of alliance building between the two social movement paradigms. However, he cautions that New Social Movements will need to adopt the revolutionary approach to education of the Old in order to ensure their longevity.

Learning in Social Action. Contestation is fertile ground for adult learning, as Holst (2002) noted. However, Foley (1999) argues that a broader conceptualization of adult education

is require in order to illuminate such knowledge production. For Foley, “learning is a dimension of human life that manifests itself in many forms” (p. 130) and is present in the day-to-day of persons in political-economic conditions that pit domination against their resistance. This reality demands a broader understanding of learning and education. Foley argues that while andragogy typically focuses on formal, politically-neutral learning, “some of the most powerful learning occurs as people struggle against oppression, as they struggle to make sense of what is happening to them and to work out ways of doing something about it” (p. 1-2). Mayo (1999) suggests that fixation on technical-rational and practical content—including education in workforces for flexibility, adaptability, and continuous learning to keep pace with the geographical shifts in employment opportunities—speaks to a neoimperial undercurrent. Carpenter (2012) further argues this default understanding of “learning” is the result of our exclusive familiarity with learning as it occurs in “a capitalist, patriarchal, racist, heterosexist world” (p. 30). Beyond what is familiar, these profound forms of learning may be organized and informal, or even incidental, which is “tacit, embedded in action and... often not recognized as learning” (Foley, p. 3).

Understanding the causation of social action is important, because it undergirds and defines the practical purpose of learning in social action—hence this thesis’ attention to Harvey’s (2003) critique of dispossession. Foley (1999) proposes that learning in social action occurs as a response to diverse forms of domination. He notes that domination is both material and ideological; “originates in, and is constructed in, relationships of production and power” (p. 48); and is exemplified globally and persistently through history. For example, this reality was exemplified in Part A of this chapter. Foley concurs with Harvey’s analysis, noting that capitalist imperialism—capitalism’s monopolization of production, institutions, and culture—produces characteristics of dependency on endless economic growth, domination of labour, and a political economic climate of extreme change and crises in the present time period. This domination is achieved by alienating workers from the means of production via the globalization of capitalism through processes like ABD (Foley; Harvey; Marx, 1904). Since domination and its relations of production and power are materially and ideologically based, it is also contested materially and ideologically (Carpenter and Mojab, 2017).

Forms of Learning in Social Action. Choudry (2015) notes that some of the characteristics that delimit forms of education include process, location and setting, purposes, and content. **Formal** education is generally the most familiar but perhaps least common form of

learning in social action, and typically occurs in institutions or as technical workplace training as a highly structured and expert/teacher-controlled process (Choudry, 2015; Foley, 2020; Marsick & Watkins, 2001; Ollis, 2020). **Informal** learning is intentional but less structured and instruction and learning relationships are less formalized (e.g. teachers or less formal relationships like advisors, family, or friends); “Examples include self-directed learning, networking, coaching, mentoring, and performance planning...” (Marsick & Watkins, p. 25-26). **Non-formal** education is also deliberate and may take the form of somewhat structured/systematic workshops and training, but often occurs sporadically in reaction to specific needs and in less formal settings like the community (Choudry, 2015; Foley, 1999; 2020; Marsick & Watkins; Ollis). **Incidental** learning is not intentional—it occurs by happenstance, in everyday or sporadic action, and often goes unrecognized as learning. Incidental learning is perhaps least valued and understood in the academic world, but as Foley points out, contributes a great deal to learning and critical consciousness.

Partially informed by Foley’s analytical and praxis-oriented scheme (1999, p. 9) but recontextualized for and specific to learning in social action in contexts of rural dispossession and resistance in the global South, Kapoor (2009a) traces the kinds of learning and knowledge engendered in anti-dispossession struggles around land and forests including: critical, strategic, tactical and informational learning (2009b). Learning takes place in multiple sites of movement activism, including for example, during episodic direct action (e.g. blockades) and spans the spectrum from incidental to informal and nonformal possibilities.

Praxis and Learning in Social Action. Foley (1999) also references adult educator Paulo Freire’s (1970) work, noting that his concept of conscientization is demonstrated in social learning processes where learners’ perspectives are transformed. For Freire, the root of learning in social action is the ontological struggle whereby the oppressed engage in becoming more fully human. This struggle is realized through the “pedagogy of the oppressed,” which involves emancipation, learning by problem-posing, and “praxis:” a process of action and reflection. Contrary to mainstream andragogy, transformative adult education is necessarily and essentially political (Mayo, 1999). Praxis leads to conscientization, and thereby greater ontological humanization, by engaging learners via their distinctively human faculties of critical thought (Freire). Learners reflect on the world around them, its historical and material roots, its influence on their lives, and the changes their actions create (Carpenter and Mojab, 2017; Freire). Thus,

praxis is a process of unlearning as well as learning; learning is defined by the dialectical relationship between reality and consciousness (Carpenter, 2012). As Freire puts it, “To exist, humanly, is to *name* the world” (p. 69), to rename it when there is change, and to name the problems in it. Praxis then is not a singular process with a crisp beginning and end. Rather, it is continuous, organic, growth-focused, a lived and living feedback loop, just as the learners engaging in it.

Foley (1999) argues that analysis of learning in social action offers a missing jigsaw piece for understanding emancipatory adult education. Whereas formal education systems both reproduce dominant capitalist systems and ideology and produce recognitions of systemic injustices, learning in social action may proffer insights obscured by such contradiction:

Analysis of the dynamics of informal learning in different sites can produce insights into the way people develop critical consciousness, that is an understanding of themselves as social actors in struggles for autonomy and liberation... by setting narratives of people’s experiences alongside conditions for the development of critical consciousness, judgements can be made about whether or not instances of collective action are examples of critical learning. (p. 49)

This highlights the andragogical importance of sites of struggle like Roşia Montană.

For Freire, and Foley (1999), praxis and learning are dimensions of life. Further, as Amilcar Cabral puts it: “Struggle is a normal condition of all living creatures in the world. All are in struggle, all struggle” (cited in Kohn & McBride, 2011, p.31). Struggle and learning are interwoven and inextricable from life, and especially the lives of those effected by DFDR. Thus, oppression drives critical learning and praxis imbues resistance with revolutionary consciousness or transformative potential (Carpenter, 2012; Carpenter and Mojab, 2017).

Empirical Studies on Rural Learning in Social Action Research

As part of the growing literature on learning in social action, this research makes new context-specific contributions to the following empirical studies in rural contexts of dispossession:

Table 2 Empirical Studies on Rural Learning in Social Action

Location	Rural Dispossession	Rural Resistance	Learning in Social Action	Reference
Bangladesh	River Development, Microfinance	Locals/Uttaran social action groups and small peasants organized hunger strikes, “demonstrations, newspaper and mobilizations of human chains” (p. 150).	Informal reflection via collective proverbs, storytelling, and local wisdom; formal participant action research.	(Barua, 2019)
Brazil	Land privatization/ commodification	The Brazilian Landless Workers Movement (MST) engages in land occupations.	Non-formal learning in advanced political organization, teacher education, public education/dialogue, and revolutionary education.	(Kane, 2000)
Brazil	Hydroelectric plants, Agribusiness	The Brazilian Landless Workers Movement (MST) engages in land occupations.	Incidental learning in occupations and asserting survival, Informal solidarity learning, partnering with academics/activists in formal research.	(Mariano & Tarlau, 2019)
Ghana	Gold Mining	Indigenous tribal members of the Wassa Association of Communities Effected by Mining organizes protests, petitions, rallies, legal cases, solidarity network building, and demonstrations.	Workshops to reflect collectively on common experiences and compare life before and after the mine; educate NGO organizers; incidental learning from actions.	(Kwaipun, 2009)
Ghana	Dam Development; Salt Mining	Indigenous Dangme (Ada) tribe artisanal salt winning, forming a cooperative, Ada Songor Advocacy Forum organization, radio campaigning, marches by spiritual mobilizations women’s collectives.	Radio links salt and oil industries, Village to village meetings about relocation, agricultural display of spiritual-historical narrative, and songs.	(Langdon & Larweh, 2017)

Location	Rural Dispossession	Rural Resistance	Learning in Social Action	Reference
India	Bauxite Mining	Adivasi, Dalit forest-dwellers, Dongria Kondh tribe, and Niyamgiri Surakhya Samiti movement made petitions, legal cases, protests, traditional tribal shows of strength and sabotaging machinery.	Leaflet campaigns, solidarity networking, elder mentorship, village-hosted meetings, and incidental learning in action.	(Kapoor, 2017a)
India	Land and forests	Adivasi, Dalit forest-dwellers, small and landless peasants, their Ektha Abhijan organization and the Center for Research and Development Solidarity make legal arguments and refuse to cooperate with/support forest patrols.	Anti-colonial participant action research, <i>Bakhanis</i> or cosmological narratives, “skits/ plays...; puppetry; poetry; songs/ ballads; elder narratives/ soliloquy; musical events; interactive dialogues and debates on social issues” (p. 94).	(Kapoor, 2009a&b)
Indonesia	Palm Oil and Coconut Plantations	Landless Workers, fisher groups, small and landless peasants and their Peasant Labor and Fishermen Organization threatened thugs and police, took hostages, disrupted transport protested and occupied land.	Songs, participant action research, incidental learning in action, hidden transcripts, solidarity networking, media campaigns and case study sessions.	(Masalam, 2017)
Mexico	Oil and natural gas, biodiversity property rights	Neo-Zapatista groups of Indigenous Mayans and peasant Mestiza like the Coffee initiative, Indigenous Women’s Collective, and Independent Women’s Movement of the Chiapas form.	Solidarity network building, workshops, action research, and daily organizing activities.	(Swords, 2010)

Literature Review Summary

This literature review was conducted in two sections. Part A explored the historical and political economic context of Roșia Montană. The flow of these cultural-historic narratives, experiences, and material relations influence Roșieni consciousness, struggle and their analysis of dispossession. This section also connected the localized case of ABD in Roșia Montană to ongoing processes of dispossession in post-socialist CEE. Further, this section highlighted the significance of rural *țărani* politics and relations in the case being considered for this research.

Part B presented theoretical and empirical literature on dispossession, resistance, and learning in social action. These literatures provide frameworks to better understand the case of Roșia Montană and situate it within a globalizing politics of dispossession. Mining dispossession represents a looming social, environmental, cultural, and economic threat for many rural localities; while there are universal characteristics to the strategies and behaviours of extractive industries, local political climates and contestation create variances in these patterns including feedback loops whereby state-market-civil society actors and resistance formations constantly adapt their tactics and strategies to each other.

CHAPTER THREE: Research Methodology

Jordan and Wood (2017) note that traditionally, methodology reflects underlying philosophical principles. The methodology for this qualitative study was influenced by critical and interpretivist philosophical perspectives (Merriam & Tisdell, 2015). Stake (1995) argues that an interpretivist orientation is fundamental to conducting qualitative studies; thick descriptions of participants' concerns and values, experiential understanding from narratives, and reference to "multiple realities" all help qualitative researchers make intuitive connections and construct knowledge (Yazan, 2015). Thus, the interpretivism goes hand-in-hand with constructivist epistemology for Stake (Yazan), who breaks down how multiple realities relate to qualitative research:

We may conceive of three realities. One is an external reality capable of stimulating us in simple ways but of which we know nothing other than our stimuli. The second is a reality formed of those interpretations of simple stimulation, an experiential reality so persuasively that we seldom realize our inability to verify it. The third is a universe of integrated interpretations, our rational reality. The second and third, of course, blend into each other. (p. 100)

For Stake, "The function of research is not necessarily to map and conquer the world, but to sophisticate the beholding of it" (p. 43). Therefore, instead of focusing on reality #1 this research attempts to build knowledge by clarifying reality #2 and sophisticating reality #3.

Since reality is made collectively, narrative participant data is crucial. Wellington (2000) argues that "The interpretive researcher... accepts that the observer makes a difference to the observed," (p. 16) and therefore must "explore perspectives and shared meanings to develop insights into situations" through fieldwork. Stake proposes qualitative research must also be holistic, considering interrelationships, and empathetic, conveying the experience itself (Yazan, 2015).

Critical Research Methodology

Critical research is aligned with many of the above epistemological positions but moves beyond rejecting positivism and interpreting peoples' understandings of the world (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008; Merriam & Tisdell, 2015). Merriam and Tisdell argue that critical research attempts to understand the social and historical construction of power relations in order to "critique and challenge, to transform and empower" (p. 10). Smith (2012) notes that a critical orientation involves "notions of critique, resistance, struggle and emancipation" (p. 187) and

Denzin and Lincoln (2008) state that “Critical qualitative research embodies the emancipatory, empowering values of critical pedagogy” (p. 5). Further, Denzin and Lincoln argue that “critical qualitative research represents inquiry done for explicit political, utopian purposes, a politics of liberation, a reflexive discourse constantly in search of open-ended, subversive, multivoiced epistemology.” Due to the relationality of critical qualitative research, Denzin and Lincoln call for a model “that makes the researcher responsible, not to a removed discipline (or institution) but rather to those studied” (p. 15), and which “stresses personal accountability, caring, the value of individual expressiveness, the capacity for empathy, and the sharing of emotionality.” The explicit political positioning of critical qualitative research closely aligns with Stake’s (1995) view of the researcher as a teacher and advocate, who convinces readers of a position rather than feigning neutrality/objectivity. Therefore, this research takes the position that Roşieni face oppressive circumstances as a direct result of exploitative mechanism of ABD inherent in the logic, policies, and practices of contemporary capital. Further, it assumes that the resistance and learning in social action knowledge explored herein is immanent with emancipatory potential.

Theoretical Perspectives

Critical qualitative research draws from a well of many different traditions, which include Marx’s (1904) analysis of socioeconomics and class, Freire’s (1970) emancipatory praxis, as well as Indigenous scholarship (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008; Merriam & Tisdell, 2015; Smith, 2012). As chapter two expounded, this thesis on draws on three distinct yet interconnected literatures that make up its critical theoretical framework: a politico-economic critique of the exploitative logic of capital and related processes of ABD (Harvey, 2003); resistance as a reaction to social relations that oppress subalterns and serve the interests of dominant groups (Gramsci, 1971; Polanyi, 2001; Oliver-Smith, 2010; Scott, 1985); and learning in social action (Foley, 1999; Freire, 1970).

Neo-/Marxist analysis critiques the socioeconomic logics and processes that produce development dispossession (Ban, 2016; Harvey, 2003; Kapoor, 2017b; Oliver-Smith, 2010; West, 2016). Jordan and Wood (2017) argue that this critique is essential to critical research, since “the social is itself a construction of (neoliberal) capitalist social relations and that these same social relations define the everyday life and interactions of literally billions of individuals on the planet” (p. 153). In this thesis, Harvey’s analysis of contemporary capitalism and related processes of ABD allows the research to interrogate dominant understandings of the

globalization of capitalism, which obscure how economic systems create oppressive circumstances, i.e. neoimperialism. In the case of Roșia Montană, Harvey's conceptualizations of neoimperialism and ABD illuminate how RMGC's development is neither a win-win project nor "just business," but rather an exploitative and destructive process that serves capital rather than territorial logics, and externalizes ecological and social costs to locals. Frederiksen and Himley's (2019) expanded understanding of Harvey's work is of further use for anatomizing the mechanisms by which development dispossession occurs.

However, it is important to note that Marxist commitments to the inevitability of progress, the exclusion and dissolution of peasant and Indigenous realities, theorization "within a Western, linear political framework" (Grande, 2008, p. 243) and critiques noting its Eurocentrism, reveal that this tradition of thought—while valuable for anti-capitalist analysis—is not sufficient to be emancipatory (Bedford, 1994; Kligman & Verdery, 2011; Riddell, 2008). Marxist commitments and their critiques demonstrate problems in relation to the interpretivist exploration of multiple realities, critical qualitative research, and political alignment with those studied (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008; Hale, 2006; Merriam & Tisdell, 2015; Smith, 2012; Stake, 1995). Therefore, given the history of imperialisms and the predominance of *țărani* culture in Romania this critical research includes additional participant-centred agentic literatures and commits to self-reflexivity to temper Marxist analytical insights (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008). To this end, quotations were used extensively to try and ensure that participant analyses were not submerged but rather dialogued with in the research.

Gramsci's (1971) descriptions of hegemony and counter-hegemony and Polanyi's (2001) descriptions of counter-movements offer two different ways of understanding how social dominance is achieved and how it creates conditions that foment resistance. Gramsci's description of hegemony deepens an understanding of how RMGC achieves dispossession, but his understanding of counter-hegemony depends on class conscientization and socialist revolutionary action. In this sense, AM and SRM's actions more closely resemble Polanyi's concept of a countermovement wherein elements of civil society mobilize to defend persons and the environment from market aggression—a sort of natural social antibody. Scott's (1985) analysis offers further insight into peasant politics and everyday forms of resistance, which dialogues with the *țărani* politics in AM's struggle.

Resistance also leads to incidental, informal and non-formal knowledge production that often goes ignored in academic circles (Foley, 1990; Freire, 1970; Kapoor, 2011). Theory tied to participant experience shifts the lens of this thesis back towards those studied rather than getting lost in an abstracted knowledge production process (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008). In the case of Roşia Montană, incidental and informal forms of learning were critical for fomenting initial Roşieni resistance and ultimately organization. However, Roşieni opposing DFDR also recognized the limitations of everyday resistance and engaged in solidarity networking that lead to the more structured and intentional non/formal forms of learning needed to preserve the longevity and enhance the force of their struggle. What began as events of happenstance, door-to-door resistance to RMGC and decentralized information sharing soon grew to include workshops and even the pursuit of formal education.

The socioeconomic and experiential literatures described herein inform this critical qualitative research. Freire (1970) describes conscientization—the development of critical consciousness of socioeconomic conditions—as being built through literacy of the word and the world: scholarly pursuit contextualized by experiential realities. Weaving these literatures together in the spirit of self-reflexivity represents a commitment to the studied and this thesis’ epistemological approach to knowledge creation and advocacy.

Critical Case Study Strategy

This qualitative research uses Stake’s (1995) instrumental case study to understand grassroots resistance and learning in social action through opposition to mining DFDR in Roşia Montană, Romania. For Stake, a case represents a bounded and integrated system: “Case study is the study of the particularity and complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within important circumstances” (p. xi). Merriam (1998) adds that “case study design is employed to gain an in-depth understanding of the situation and meaning for those involved” (p. 19) for the purpose of influencing policy, practice, and future research.

The case study design is well-suited to the subject of social action opposing globalizing capitalist ABD. Groups engaged in social action and the knowledge they produce are argued to be best understood within the contexts of specific cases (Foley, 1999). In his foundational work, *Learning in Social Action*, Foley relied on case studies to better illuminate the complex social processes involved in learning in struggles. Similarly, Piven and Cloward (1979) argue that struggles are best understood through an analysis of the context of their relations. They reason

this is because “people experience deprivation and oppression within a concrete setting, not as the end product of large and abstract processes, and it is the concrete experience that molds their discontent into specific grievances against specific targets” (p. 20). Social action struggles do not follow set formulas (Meyer, 2010). Rather, a struggle’s form “depends on the nature of the community, how integrated they are, how committed they are to retaining their own identity, what kinds of external pressures they are under, [and] straight economic issues” (p. 13). Harvey (2003) describes the variety of different struggles against accumulation by dispossession in Africa, India, and Latin America as ‘simply stunning,’ and contends that specificity is a necessity: opposition to domination is done by specific struggles, in specific ways. Speaking from the perspective of research that addresses Indigenous struggle, Denzin & Lincoln (2008) state that “Critical theory must be localized, grounded in the specific meanings, traditions, customs and community relations that operate in each Indigenous setting” (p. 5).

Stake (1995) notes that case studies are not sampling studies to aid the understanding of other cases. However, case studies demonstrate “petite generalizations” or challenge existing generalizations. What is learned in the context of this struggle is not generalizable to all.

Self-Reflexive Considerations of Researcher as Primary Instrument

Merriam (1998) notes that in case studies, as in other qualitative research, the researcher is “the primary instrument for gathering and analyzing data” (p. 20). As the critical researcher, I must recognize my own relationality to this case and neoimperialism. I live in a settler state in the global North and belong to forebearers who migrated here because of economic and other disasters, amongst a variety of other reasons. My experiences and analyses are coloured by these generational realities, of migration and integration into colonial/imperial systems that continue to benefit from the exploitation of Indigenous peoples. Taiaiake Alfred (2005) and Moana Jackson (2007) argue that colonialism is not only a set of historical, political and social relations, but also a viral state of mind. Therefore, I must challenge my own positionality before travelling to another site of neoimperialism. As Jordan and Wood (2017) put it, qualitative researchers must “be open to embracing different cosmologies, ontological principles and epistemological standpoints that may well conflict with and contradict their own training” (p. 157).

Denzin and Lincoln (2008) write that alliances between some strands of critical inquiry and Indigenous scholarship are forming naturally: “Today, nonindigenous scholars are building these connections, learning how to dismantle, deconstruct, and decolonize traditional ways of

doing science, learning that research is already both moral and political, learning how to let it go” (p. 3). The authors emphasize the need for political alignment with the studied, as well as problematizing overly positivistic/scientistic approaches. Jordan and Wood (2017) argue that researchers should lean on emerging approaches from the last two decades, like Indigenous and activist research, to “counter the subordination [of qualitative research] to an emerging neo-positivist hegemony” (p. 157). A favourite reminder for myself comes from the psychologist Carl Rogers (1955), who relates that science itself “is not an impersonal something, but simply a person living subjectively another phase of himself” (p. 278). Research also begins and is conducted by way of the aims, values, and purposes of subjective people.

Reflection on decolonizing scholarship has influenced this case study. For example, Yin (2014) proposes that the case study of a “contemporary phenomenon” does not include study of “the “dead” past, where no direct observations can be made and no people are alive to be interviewed” (p. 24). Instead, he relegates such inquiry to the category of a “history” study. However, Smith (2012) writes that “*Coming to know the past* has been part of the critical pedagogy of decolonization,” (p. 36) and “Telling our stories from the past, reclaiming the past, giving testimony to the injustices of the past are all strategies which are commonly employed by indigenous peoples struggling for justice.” Likewise, Denzin and Lincoln (2008) argue that “The “local” that localizes critical theory is always historically specific. The local is grounded in the politics, circumstances, and economies of a particular moment, a particular time and place, a particular set of problems, struggles, and desires” (p. 9). Therefore, the literature review included discussion of the history of the area, interwoven with Roşieni narratives, so that it is rooted in “the specific meanings, traditions, customs and community relations” (Denzin & Lincoln, p. 5) operating at Roşia Montană.

Research Purpose and Questions

Roşia Montană, Romania, is a site of long-term resistance against mining dispossession being waged by Roşieni villagers and small land holder peasants, their organizations AM and RMCF, and trans/national solidarity campaigns/movements. The purpose of the proposed research was to develop an initial and exploratory understanding of knowledge production and learning in social action undertaken by these agents in Roşia Montană by addressing the following research questions: (1) what is learning in social action in a context of mining

dispossession?; (2) how does learning inform social action?; and (3) how do trans/national actors augment local struggles and contribute towards learning in social action?

This study critiques “win-win” development narratives and describes resistance in hopes of furthering humanizing, emancipatory possibilities.

Methods: Data Collection and Analysis

Gaining Access and Recruiting Participants. This study used purposeful, snowball sampling to recruit participants (Merriam, 1998). Freire (1970) argues that emancipatory knowledge is produced by those experiencing injustice. Roşieni participants were selected on the basis on their participation in grassroots opposition to the RMGC through the organizations AM and RMCF, and non-local participants were selected based on working directly with the grassroots opposition in their struggle.

While in Canada, I successfully contacted one NGO that worked closely with locals in Roşia Montană and a leader of the grassroots organization AM. I identified these contacts through close review of articles that were available on the SRM campaign website, www.rosiamontana.org. Both contacts went positively and thus, both individuals represented potential gatekeepers—informal leaders who could help me locate and gain access to people and places relevant to the research (Plano Clark & Creswell, 2010). This was a critical first step to beginning the snowball sample (Plano Clark & Creswell, 2010; Merriam, 1998; Merriam & Tisdell, 2015).

After arriving in Romania in September 2019 the NGO gatekeeper referred me to other potential participants, however, in Roşia Montană neither of the AM leaders I met were willing to make direct referrals. Further, my original contact declined to participate in an interview but stated I could share his reasoning: “We shouldn't have to undress in front of the company, or others. These things don't need to be dissected.” This leader demonstrated a critical consciousness that studies and information shared by well-meaning students and academics are not only read by other well-meaning persons, but also by company analysts/tacticians. Given this and the nuanced context of specific struggles, he was incredulous that detailed analyses of AM’s struggle or similar struggles benefited them more than harming them. Similar though not compatible views have been expressed by leaders of the Brazilian Landless Workers Movement, for example, who note that research itself is not sufficient for a struggle’s success, “however, research increases the possibilities for success” (Mariano & Tarlau, 2019, p. 35). The second

AM leader was willing to participate in an interview, however, he also stated that many locals were fatigued by the inquiries of curious persons, media, and researchers who had come to Roșia Montană during the past 20+ years of struggle. He said that he did not wish his position as leader to impact the decisions of individuals choosing to participate or not, and therefore would not provide direct referrals. Both AM leaders assured me that many locals would be willing to participate.

Fortunately, snowball sampling through my NGO contact lead me to locals who were willing to interview and to provide other direct referrals to potential participants living in Roșia Montană. Additionally, during my first month in Roșia Montană—October 2019—I spent a significant amount of time in the town square, walking the mountain commune, helping with chores at the *gospodărie* I was staying at, and spending time with locals. Additionally, I took several tours of the area with local guides. Stake (1995) argues that “Opportunity should be taken early to get acquainted with the people, the spaces, the schedules, and the problems of the case. With most studies, there is a hurry to get started, yet a quiet entry is highly desirable” (p. 59). These early actions allowed me to familiarize myself with the locality and likewise allow locals and potential participants to become familiar with my presence. In this manner, I found “key informants” in Roșia Montană who I developed a closer relationship with, and who were able to provide me with insights, mentoring, and guidance (Wellington, 2000).

Wellington (2000) notes that fieldwork can be enjoyable as well as messy, frustrating and unpredictable since research hinges upon the lives of participants who are frequently caught up in their lived realities, which may not align with a researcher’s goals and timelines. This was especially relevant to village life in rural Romania. Potential participants often did not live by detailed time schedules and were often busy, for example, in town, in the hills, chasing down a lost cow, with family emergencies, or simply unreachable by phone or other means. Others indicated that they were not interested in interviewing. Therefore, key informants were essential to gaining access to enough participants for thick and rich descriptions.

Research Sites. I arrived in Romania in September 2019, and travelled by train to the city of Cluj-Napoca, Cluj county, in the historical region Transylvania before travelling to the commune of Roșia Montană. I chose to travel to this larger city first to meet with the gatekeeper contact and relevant NGOs located there, and to take advantage of more familiar terrain; as Appadurai and Holston (1996) put it, “cities represent the localization of global force” (p. 189)

and thus globalized customs. Stake (1995) notes that most fieldwork occurs on the “home grounds” of participants and constitute a degree of invasion of privacy. To mitigate this, I wanted to begin in a location with fewer cultural/linguistic barriers in order to learn appropriate protocols for gaining access to rural participants in the mountain commune of Roșia Montană. This was especially relevant given that these NGOs had worked directly with Roșieni over a long period of time. The advice and guidance of the Cluj-Napoca participants was invaluable.

Finally, I took a bus to the village of Roșia Montană, Alba County from October 2019 to November 2019. Roșia Montană is the name of both the central village and the commune of 16 villages in total—four of these villages were in the direct path of the mining project proposed by RMGC (Community, 2013). The area is somewhat isolated and located in the *Apuseni* (Western/Sunset) Mountains of the Carpathian Mountains. Interviews were conducted in two of the four affected villages: the rural village of Tarina, and administrative central Roșia Montană.

Research Participants. This study involved 18 participants—8 females and 10 males. Five participants joined the struggle against RMGC that was started by the Roșieni of AM from outside the community. Three of these five were members of Romanian NGOs that work closely with AM and had also made significant contributions to the SRM campaign from very early on. One participant was a founding coordinator of the SRM campaign. The last had worked as an activist in the campaign. 13 participants were local Roșieni who remembered when the company first came. 12 of these Roșieni opposed the mine from the very beginning of the struggle in one form or another—since before 2000—and one had originally been employed by the company before refusing to sell their house.

The Roșieni interviewed were presently involved with either AM or RMCF, two grassroots organizations opposed to the mine. AM was the original property owners’ association opposed to the mine (rosiamontana.org) and RMCF is an NGO dedicated to “To protect, promote and uphold the historical, cultural, architectural, ethnic and natural value of the Roșia Montană and the surrounding area” (<http://rosia-montana-cultural-foundation.com/>). The Roșieni I interviewed ranged in age from 31 to 90. Rural participants could be described as semi-proletariat as they often subsisted on a combination of pension checks—many had been employed by the state mine in various forms—and the *gospodărie*, some participants lived off unemployment, and others were involved in local businesses including small-scale tourism.

Data Collection. This study utilized both secondary and primary data sources. Prior to travelling to Romania, I conducted a literature review exploring scholarship on the history of the region, neoimperialism, and learning in social action, as well as scholarly articles, news sources, and documentaries describing the situation in Roșia Montană—especially sources presenting the perspectives of Roșieni. Choudry (2015) argues that struggles are “ordinary people organizing, learning, and creating knowledge together” (p. 9), but that this knowledge is usually transmitted through informal mediums and not taken seriously in scholarship. This is an epistemological problem. As Jordan (2013) puts it:

First, in order to develop novel and promising ways of working, the social sciences need to become open to new and perhaps unorthodox ways of conceptualising and investigating the social. Indigenous research methodologies might offer one model for this process. Other models might be alternative forms of leadership, social organisation, decision-making and knowledge creation.

The social sciences have historically tended towards knowledge-producing practices that can seem abstract, decontextualized and inaccessible to lay populations, especially those on the margins of society. (p. 458)

Therefore, I also conducted a detailed review of the article archives on www.rosiamontana.org, which activists use to help share communications from AM and SRM. This helped me build an understanding of the theoretical and experiential contexts of participants.

Interviews. I conducted 16 semistructured interviews for this case, two of which were group interviews with couples. Three interviews had to be conducted online, as some willing participants were in different localities when they were able to interview—two were conducted by Skype and one by Zoom at the participant’s request. Originally, this study considered conducting focus groups, however, I did not proceed with this given the conceptual and geographical decentralization of the struggle, and the unwillingness of participants to engage in this form of interview. Prior to travelling to Romania, I created an interview guide based on my research questions as well as information and consent letters (Merriam & Tisdell, 2015; Stake, 1995; Wellington, 2000). I used these open-ended questions flexibly, constantly adjusting them throughout the research trip for better understandability and shifting the focus of my interviews based on the participant’s experiences, interest, and what they felt was important to share.

Wellington (2000) notes that the importance of interviews is their ability to prompt information that is not observable: “an interviewee’s thoughts, values, prejudices, perceptions,

views, feelings and perspectives... their version or their account of situations which they may have lived or taught through..." (p. 71). In line with this critical case study, Wellington also argues that the interview's function is to create a platform to amplify the viewpoints of participants; "an interview empowers people – the interviewer should not play the leading role" (p. 72). Interviewers are sponges, sounding boards, probers, listeners, counsellors, recorders, challengers, prompters, and sharers. In different interviews, depending on rapport, my commitment to those I was studying meant I engaged in each of these different roles at different times.

I offered to conduct interviews with participants in whatever setting they were most comfortable in. This often translated into interviews being conducted in the houses of the interviewees. It is important for me to note the generosity and hospitality of my host-participants. In each interview, I sought the participant's permission before proceeding, informed them of how their anonymity would be protected, made sure they were aware of right to withdraw, and provided information about my study. In each interview, I requested the participants permission to record the interview. Only in one interview was this request denied—in this interview I only took notes. Primarily, written permission was given, however, several participants opted to give oral permission instead. The context of dispossession tactics, described later in this thesis, made some participants wary of signing documents.

Six interviews were conducted in the English language. Ten interviews were conducted in the Romanian language with the assistance of a native-speaking Romanian, who interpreted for the interviews. The translator also assisted with transcribing these interviews.

Finally, all data written down was kept in a lock box for the duration of the study. The electronic storage device used for this study was encrypted. This data will be stored for five years before being destroyed.

Observation. While in Roșia Montană I also took the time for careful observation, describing the context in fieldnotes (Merriam & Tisdell, 2015; Stake, 1995). At the beginning of my stay, I took advantage of tours offered by Roșieni connected with AM. During these tours and other informal conversations, I ensured to get permission before writing down notes on the persons comments for my study. During the tours and my time exploring Roșia Montană, I also took pictures of relevant landmarks for later analysis. These notes and summaries help contextualize and triangulate the other data collected.

Document Review. During this study, I took several opportunities to mine data from documentation (Merriam & Tisdell, 2015; Stake, 1995). As indicated earlier, I reviewed articles produced by SRM available on the movement’s website, as well as information made available on RMCF’s website. Regarding documentation, Stake (1995) notes that “One needs to have one’s mind organized, yet be open for unexpected clues” (p. 68). This is accomplished partly by anticipating the usefulness of different sorts of documents. For this study, I reviewed public records, popular culture documents, and visual documents. I also had the opportunity to review documents at one NGO headquarters—including educational/learning documents and technical reports on the mine—and RMGC mining development pamphlets that had been collected by a participant.

Data Analysis. For Stake (1995), intuition and impression take precedence over protocol in case study data analysis (Yazan, 2015). Further, analysis takes place throughout the research process and not simply in a specific stage—it happens in first impressions and final compilations when “We take our impressions, our observations, apart” (Stake, p. 71). Analysis also involves the careful search for patterns sought in advance or otherwise. The case is always central to the analysis as well—the researcher must always ask how a theme or pattern relates back to this specific, localized case.

To help provide my analysis structure, I used Wellington’s (2020) data analysis stages as a guide: immersion, reflecting, taking apart/analysing data, recombining/synthesizing data, and relating and locating data. Firstly, I practised immersion through listening to recordings, transcribing interviews and re-reading translated transcriptions. Thus, I was able to sink back into the experience of spending time with each participant and hearing what they had to say. Secondly, I spent periods of time working on other aspects of the research while I wrestled with the concepts and meanings of the data in the back of my head, thus allowing for reflection and intuition to come into play.

Thirdly, I used the qualitative research software program NVivo 12 to help me organize the coding of my data. Coding was done manually; I imported research data to NVivo 12 and used the program to create and assign codes to different segments of data. Next, after another period of reflection I spent time re-examining the codes, their connections and relationships to each other, and their meaning to the case of struggle at Roşia Montană. The final steps included relating the data back to theory—if and how it hung in relation to the literature—and presenting

the data in this thesis. Ultimately data analysis was a messy, holistic, ongoing process throughout the entirety of this thesis project.

Trustworthiness

Stake (1995) re-presents Denzin's four triangulation protocols to address case study validity—evidence that a study is accurate, logical, and “getting it right” (Yazan, 2015). This study utilized these protocols and addressed data source triangulation and methodological triangulation by examining the struggle at Roșia Montană in other times and spaces by way of archive and document review, observation, and interviews described above. Throughout the study I was in close contact with my supervisor, discussing research data and related theories. Thus, I also engaged in investigator and theory triangulation.

Guba (1981) also presents four guiding principles for the trustworthiness of case studies that fall within the naturalistic inquiry paradigm. To establish credibility or naturalistic truth value I spent two months of prolonged engagement at Roșia Montană and engaged in observation consistently. I also engaged in what Guba describes as peer debriefing through communications with my professor, as noted above. Guba argues that triangulation—and thus the examples described above—also contribute to the credibility of studies. Member checks were used, for example, to help establish the demographics engaged in the struggle in order to better understand and more accurately describe those studied.

At the onset of this study, some sources described this case as a peasant struggle, however, member checks revealed that members of AM were labourers, small business owners, and semi-proletariat—persons who depend both on work or pensions and what they produced on the *gospodărie*. One villager participant did not like to use the term *țărani* to describe themselves or others because of the colloquial derogatory bias of the term—common across many languages—for example, Google Translate offers “clown” or “churl” as synonyms for the interpretation of *țărani*. At the same time, many participants whose livelihood descriptions matched the conceptual description of semi-proletariat often self-identified as being *țărani*. Given the complex historical processes of peasantization and then proletarianization impacting the local Romanian population and the commitment of this “primary instrument” to processes of decolonization, this thesis will not speak over the knowledge/narrative of the subjects. Rather, I argue that the Roșieni anti-mining struggle and the membership of AM is complex,

heterogenous, and deeply rooted in *țărani* politics. Thus, member checks complicated and enriched this study and the document review contributed to establishing referential adequacy.

In relation to transferability, or naturalistic applicability, Guba (1981) argues that thick description is the goal since naturalists eschew generalizations. This was accomplished through case-dependant purposive sampling and the collection of thick descriptive data. Due to the critical orientation of this study, I focused on developing context rich descriptions of Roșia Montană. In the interest of dependability, or naturalistic consistency that allows for the apparent instabilities caused by multiple realities and developing insights, there is a document trail beginning with project and grant proposals, field notes, and ending with this thesis.

Finally, Guba (1981) argues that confirmability should be used in place of the traditional aspect of neutrality or investigator objectivity. I met confirmability through significant document triangulation and referencing, as well as through practicing reflexivity by laying bare my underlying epistemological positionality and commitments.

Summary

This critical case study was informed by theoretical perspectives on dispossession, resistance, and learning in social action. I worked to develop methodology and methods by which to understand learning in social action in the context of mining dispossession at Roșia Montană—specifically, from the perspectives of those targeted for dispossession. I conducted an instrumental case study from a critical philosophical foundation. I travelled to Cluj-Napoca for several weeks and then Roșia Montană for two months in order to collect data via interviews, observations, and documents. I used a qualitative software program to help with manual coding and analysis.

CHAPTER FOUR: Anatomy of Dispossession²

Also, you know very well their strategies, because it's more or less the same. They never do real public consultation, because they are afraid of that and they always do some sort of fake public consultation procedures, that you can then, once you detect the procedural flaws, you can turn them into legal arguments. They never do real environmental impact assessment studies. We even found, in all these battles, studies that were copy pasted from a case to another. It's mind blowing how they were, but there is a lot of money involved and they don't really care about that. (NGO Member, Interview, Oct. 16, 2019).

This chapter will take up the first research question (what is learning in social action in a context of mining dispossession?) by presenting knowledge artifacts—predominantly in the form of narratives—produced through learning in social action. The analysis in this chapter will demonstrate how these knowledge articles, which describe RMGC's mining DFDR efforts, dialogue with an expanded conceptualization of Harvey's (2003) ABD. The first theme, which deals with RMGC's attempts to establish the authority to demand DFDR also provides an initial understanding of the anatomy in terms of who the agents of DFDR are. The second theme indirectly speaks to the second and third research questions by demonstrating how RMGC evolves its tactics to include coercion and domination, persuasion, seduction, and manipulation in response to a growing oppositional struggle becoming more informed and networked with trans/national actors. In other words, when the shock-and-awe authority campaign failed to produce traction for the project, RMGC was dragged into more direct contestation with local grassroots resistance.

Authority Tactics for Establishing a Beachhead

Roșian: All the companies that are coming here, it's a global thing. The same tactic is used by these companies wherever they go. First they send emissaries, in the form of tourists, professors, of who knows what. Then they come with spy services, they spy everything out, they corrupt everything they can, then... comes and destroys things, and after the destruction—

Roșianca: They go bankrupt and then—

² Abridged sections of this chapter published in: Witiw, T, & Kapoor, D. (2020). Capital and coercive neoliberal accumulation by dispossession (ABD): Canadian mining in Rosia Montana, Romania. In V. Pejnovic (Ed.), *New Understanding of Capital in the Twenty-First Century*, pp. 296-326. Belgrade, Serbia: Institute of Political Studies (ISBN: 978-86-7419-325-9).

Roșian: They go bankrupt and then goodbye. And then you're left with what happened here... (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)

As noted in chapter two, Mayo (1999) argues that Gramsci's hegemony is a learning process or educational relationship. The description of RMGC's tactics in this chapter will demonstrate that many diverse ABD tactics lean on this cultural, 'consent'-based power in addition to political use of force. In doing so, it elucidates an entanglement between RMGC and the state, and civil society as well.

Buying Post-Socialist State Authority

All these authorities, they go to "Agentia de Protectia Mediuli Alba," Environment Protection Agency of Alba Iulia. Also, all these fake authorities, because I can't call them otherwise, they also work the same. These people never read the documentation, for example. They are not involved in, they are not interested in, wide consultation procedures, analyzing public petitions and giving them answers. They are just like machines to print out permits. (NGO Member, Interview, Oct. 16, 2019).

Increasingly, literature is identifying how the lightning introduction of neoliberal policies into post-socialist contexts "link neoliberal economic opportunities with the unchecked power of political elites" (Kenney-Lazar, 2019), especially during inevitable transitional periods of unclear property rights (Sikor, Stahl, & Dorondel. 2009; Stahl 2010). Roșieni opposing mining development in their native mountains agree that state authority was crucial in affecting ABD. State complicity is seen as playing an essential role in thrusting the project forward:

It was not my choice; it was my suflet's [soul's] choice [to live off the gospodărie]. From inside. I had lots of colleagues who went, they left. They probably didn't care about the area. They were not interested. They went, they left, they're gone. Each does whatever they think is right for them. That is what I thought. Maybe I did a bad thing, maybe I did a good thing. I think, for myself, I did a good thing. Each—that's why I don't condemn even the people who work for the company. I condemn the Romanian state, because the company, without the involvement of the Romanian state, cannot do anything to me, absolutely nothing. That you can put in brackets, that: the company, without the filth of the Romanian state, they cannot do anything. If the laws are respected, and we are a state, as we claim, democratic. If we are on the subject of capitalism, or the subject of socialism, with our boots on people's property, then God forgive us. That's not democracy anymore, it is totalitarianism. And that is it. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 29, 2019)

Roșieni are skeptical that the company could impact their livelihoods or assert any authority without the government but argue that the company took advantage of the tumultuous political-economic circumstances precipitated by the Romanian transition from socialism in 1989 (AM

Member, Interview, Nov. 18, 2019). RMGC had its pick of collaborators in Romania, including businessman Frank Timis, then-President Ion Iliescu, and many ministers.

According to Roșieni, the post-socialist government was embedded with opportunists looking to benefit from their position and the cover of political chaos:

Roșian: After '89, we've had only garbage as leaders of our country. Do you understand? Garbage. These weren't ministers, they were garbage. People who weren't interested in the citizen's issues, they were interested in their personal issues. My opinion about them, I cannot tell you. They're *gogleazuri*. You know what that is? It is garbage, finely, finely chopped garbage. Because if they were big pieces of garbage you could take them away, but it is hard to get rid of *gogleazuri*. They are people who are nothing. And those guilty because they could be corrupted, the same guilt falls on those who corrupted them. If we put them on a balance, 50% guilty is the one who corrupts, 50% the one who receives the corruption. Who accepts it. They are just as guilty. Because if you didn't accept the corruption, he couldn't have corrupted you and then there'd be no corruption. So they used all the methods. Corruption, corruption, corruption. They corrupted everything, they gave money left and right, they did sponsorships, soccer teams, rugby teams, they bribed.

Roșianca: They would bring students. And they would feed them.

Roșian: They would bring students. They would bring them with buses so they can see that they are here, and to have them say they agree with the project, against us. (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)

The post-socialist political-economic context in Romania obscured corruption from the view of potential opposition and anti-corruption authorities, and effectively prevented them from counteracting mining collaborators within the government early in the project's inception:

And then the NAD [National Anticorruption Directorate], or these structures that are there, are good but they have to be “we only investigate windows and—we close our eyes to those who came with the money.” Because people from the Romanian state, who represent it, Ministers and State Secretaries, if this guy didn't come with the money, they would not have given them this [access for the project] just to be polite. For sure they would not have given them it to be hospitable. Just like if you were to come here and you would have an interest for me to give you a piece of land and the land is not mine, you know? Because the Ministers either, it's not theirs. It is everyone's, the whole peoples, the deposit. It is not the Ministers, it is the whole nation's, yours, whoever has Romanian citizenship, it is everyone's. And then, why would one of them, are they going to make it a present to them to be hospitable. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 29, 2019)

Members of the Roșieni opposition argue that government collaborators—from the local council to the federal government—were acquired primarily through bribes. Essentially, the company was purchasing authority as though it were any other resource for the project start-up:

So they broke the laws in Romania gravely, gravely they broke them. Why did they break them? Because they were allowed to. Because corruption was at a high level in Romania, after '89 corruption reached a very high level. And all state authorities were supporting them, because this company was bribing anything that could be bribed. (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)

The Romanian state fulfilled all of their [RMGC's] conveniences. They broke laws. They did very grave things. They humiliated us as Romanian citizens. They pushed us aside. They disregarded us. Because they had taken bribes from this company. (RMCF Member, Interview, Oct. 24, 2019)

At first no one knew anything. We were sitting and not knowing. The investors were going to come, they are coming. So we were waiting to see what they were going to do, how. At a certain point, oh, they are not good, because they're not giving our country what they should be giving it, only 2-4% [see below in Putting Post-Socialist Authorities to work]. It is not good, and we saw that. There were big interests here. Băsescu [then President] was here, he came to the mine and he said that he came here ready for the trial to start. Then the stocks went up and only lies. How would the project work if they didn't have a proper project? There was a different mayor—we changed the one mayor because we thought that we will put another mayor who is going to be on our side and be correct. Then he joined their side too. They would go around and bribe everyone. That's why I say they had a lot of money. They had money and they would buy everyone. If they managed to buy Adrian Nastase [then Prime Minister], they bought them all. We stressed out. *Bata-i focul lor sa-i bata* [Strike them, may fire strike them]. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 19, 2019)

One particularly clear method of bribery involved RMGC hiring voting members of the town council, who were in clear conflict of interest but continued to vote in relation to the mining project (AM Member, Guided Tour, Oct. 13, 2019). Once identified, this example became a sticking point for AM's opposition:

...we challenged in court this urban planning made by the mining company in Roșia Montană, freezing the area as a mono-industrial area exclusively reserved for their mining project. In this court case AM, had from the very beginning, from when there were the very first consultations for this plan—fake consultations—their main argument was that the local councillors who voted for this plan were in a conflict of interest because they were also employees of the mining company, and the law forbids you to vote when you are in a conflict of interest. (NGO Member, Interview, Oct. 16, 2019).

Yet despite the crucial role of the state, Roșieni indicated that Romanian collaborators played second fiddle to the company and did not direct the development or stand to benefit in equal measure with the foreign investors (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 18, 2019). This exemplifies Harvey's (2003) contention that capital logics supersede territorial logics in processes of ABD.

It is important to note that, over 20 years ago RMGC not only acquired mineral rights through the government but also received validation and commitment from public figures. The Rise Project (riseproject.ro) of investigative journalists confirmed that RMGC brought and paid for officials from the Romanian National Agency for Mineral Resources, including directors and a vice president, to attend mining events in Las Vegas and Rio de Janeiro. These seminal first plays enabled RMGC to enjoy a long-lasting, invasive support system within the Romanian state:

So the project started during the Democratic Convention in 1996, when Radu Vasile was Prime Minister, who died. Those who signed then are still public persons now, Calin Popescu Tariceanu and Radu Berceanu. They were the ones who signed, who sealed that project. But throughout the years, all of the parties that were in power, supported more or less this project. (SRM Coordinator, Interview, Oct. 15, 2019)

Infiltrating Local Authorities. Much alike palm oil industry tactics discussed in chapter two, RMGC held exclusive meetings with town mayors and local authorities to sway them in favour of the company. Through cajoling the company was able to gain a monopoly over local political power:

Roşian: Whoever comes does so by applying a certain strategy. In coming. First, they come, they sent the mayor, they had Timiş [businessman] as a source of information. Timiş took Gruber from Roşia Montană, they informed him of everything that was here, and they said "hey, we can buy the Roşieni with a liter of *vinars* [or *ţuică*, a Romanian spirit]." They drank here, they had a party here at the headquarters for the exploitation, Gruber, the former director for the exploitation - he said to Timis " Roşieni are from my tool down." Well, it was proven that Roşieni, some of the Roşieni are much much above you. So, first, that's the strategy. All these companies apply the same strategy. They send some people, spies, they study the society. After that they form an action plan. What methods should we use? Maybe this would work there. And when they come, they corrupt some people, in all areas of activity. They take some people by their side, corrupt them, they give them money, so that they can find out as many details as possible. So when they come, they have already learned the lesson.

Roşianca: The field is already prepared.

Roşian: But many times, the market from home doesn't match the market market. (RMCF Members, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)

...there were all our local authorities from all the cities and villages around. When they were having meetings and so on, I saw all our mayors coming and making lobby for the company... Basically, for all our authorities. They were making huge dinners, meetings, workshops and so on—the company—in order to attract them, and to tell them how good is the project. (AM Member, Interview, Oct. 25, 2019).

AM members also related that in all the years of struggle, no single mayor opposed the project and in later years support for the RMGC became the only viable election platform.



Figure 6 *Apuseni Liberi* issue 6 depicts RMGC’s tentacles in various officials. (https://issuu.com/saverosiamontana/docs/no6_apuseniiliberi_web)

Putting Post-Socialist Authorities to Work. Critically, RMGC was able to leverage its relationship with the Romanian state into a double-edged weapon. Firstly, it enabled RMGC to establish a strangle-hold on Roșia Montană by influencing the government to declare it a disadvantaged, mono-industrial zone (Community, 2013; Velicu, 2014). This status reserved the area for mining, thereby stifling alternative development, investment, and regular village life. The Roșia Montană Cultural Foundation (RMCF) described the resulting situation as ‘hopeless.’ These actions describe contradictions in the logic of capital, by establishing a monopoly for RMGC:

They went to local council, and they put on their table an urban planning act, and they said, "RM is a mono-industrial area and this is it. No other construction or development can take place here." They wanted to secure the area... if they [locals] wanted to build

on their own lands, for example to do an extension of their house, they were not allowed to because according to the plan the area was mono-industrial, exclusively reserved for RMGC and the population had to be resettled from there. So that's why no other construction permits were issued. The area was simply frozen. They did that already since 2002. That was their very first move. (NGO Member, Interview, Oct. 16, 2019).

The RosiaMin state factory that many Roşieni depended upon for work was closed (Velicu, 2015). Maximizing time use, RMGC began simultaneously processing leftover waste rock and capitalizing on the hardship created for the Roşieni:

They first came for the sterile [tailings]. Then they came, they closed the mine ... the Romanian state closed it, the government. And then people didn't have a place to work in anymore, they came and did registrations for the lands, the houses, they registered people and gave them their price and then they left. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 27, 2019)

We weren't a very vulnerable place, until the high level decision was not made to instate privatization in the mining system... but, so you know, these privatizations were only instated in areas where the mining reached depletion. Look at the Baia de Aries, where they closed and didn't take anyone there, they took them in Certej where there was still a little bit left, in Roşia, in Rovina, and around Deva. But it's these kinds of companies, that no one's heard about. Junior companies that come, do some publicity, sell some stocks, and then goodbye. They do some drilling and bye. The drilling could have been done by our guys, they did it for 50 years, and there are maps and everything.. those were sold too. But the major interest was to enter through this market and I think they tried to create a precedent in Roşia. Because if there is a precedent somewhere, then it's much easier to do even worse things. (AM Member, Interview, Oct. 17, 2019)

Oliver-Smith (2010) describes similar factory closures resulting in massive unemployment as a clear displacement strategy. Impacts on both Roşieni who were not materially self-sufficient (e.g. not subsistence farmers) and Roşieni who remained can only be described as structural violence (Oliver-Smith, 2010; Leech, 2012). 80% of remaining Roşieni primarily survive through the subsistence economy and face decreasing availability of services; pharmacies, bakeries, food shops, and cultural centres closed (Community, 2013; Vesalon & Creţan, 2012). RMCF reports challenges like the abandonment of road maintenance; declining quality of education due to fewer students and teachers; and violations of the right to public health, such as when Roşia Montană's local practitioner was bribed 840 000 000 ROL (approximately 20 000 USD) to simply leave the town for a year.



Figure 7 *The local elementary school has been shut down.*

Secondly, government collaboration significantly enhanced profit prospects for its foreign investors. To begin with, the initial agreement allowed GBU to recuperate all preproduction costs prior to paying out any profit to its state-owned Minvest (U.S. Department of the Interior & U.S. Geological Survey, 2001). This represents big risk elimination for a mine project considered to have low grade ore. Further, the Rise Project (riseproject.ro) of investigative journalists found that Minvest accepted hundreds of millions of dollars from GBU in loans, which must be repaid before the state can collect dividends. Additionally, leaked government documents revealed that the Romanian state would only receive 2.2% in royalties from the mine (Dale-Harris, 2013). An analysis of the Academy of Economic Studies in Bucharest that factored in environmental cleanup costs and loan repayment indicated it would be impossible for the Romanian state to generate \$4 billion dollars as was claimed by RMGC. Special interest laws further padded the situation, making RMGC exempt from both income taxes and customs duties (Velicu, 2014). While GBU is technically headquartered in Canada, Kuyek (2019) notes that there are many ways for mining companies to avoid the cost of taxation when hosted by Canada. For example, exploration expenses can be deducted; the Canadian Foreign Resource Expense benefit allows deductions of 10-30% for “acquiring, exploring, and

developing foreign property” (p. 200); in cases where a foreign subsidiary is set up, such as RMGC, only dividends returning to Canada are considered income; and if foreign affiliates carry out work in a country that shares a tax treaty with Canada, like Romania does, then active business income is exempt (Department of Finance Canada, 2008). Thus, RMGC is in a good place to evade taxation on either end of its transnational connections.

Property Acquisition. The post-socialist state also proved a valuable ally for RMGC when efforts were needed to push the project forward. In 2013 Victor Ponta’s social-democratic government declared its intent to remake Romania into an extractive country, promote shale-gas industry, and made Roşia Montană a national interest (Velicu, 2014). These plays reopened the legal possibility of forcibly relocating Roşieni who were unwilling to sell and imposed the “transfer of two hundred and fifty-five hectares of public forests to the benefit of the mining investors” (p. 226). For its part, RMGC entangled itself with the state at every turn possible in a bit to establish its legitimacy. This campaign is visible on countless RMGC owned buildings in the historic centre of Roşia Montană, which bear both the symbol of a national historic monument plaque and RMGC logo in close proximity.



Figure 8 *Two buildings with national historic monument symbols and RMGC signs.*

Following the lead of the national government, Roşia Montană's local authorities also contributed to, and made use of the freshly minted crisis. The local council refused to engage with locals and instead evangelized in favour of RMGC's monopoly:

... local authorities, they are not interested and they are not supporting. Because also I've seen that the local authorities here in RM, they are not active doing something, they were just promising this mining project and that's it. So they were just supporting one idea. "Nothing else," they said, "this is the only solution." They are not working for the community, just for this mining company... I wanted to rent space for the Scouts, for our Scout group and for [a local business] to have a space where to have our activities. And I went, I made all kind of requests at the town hall, but in two years, you know, no space, and it's not like I wanted this space for free. I was actually writing, "I want to pay. You decide how much, and if I agree I will rent it. I don't want something for free." And I was explaining exactly what I'm doing. It's not like I want just to rent this place and I will do whatever I want. No, I was very specific for what I need, and what I offer, and also what I offer for the community by renting this space. And they didn't want. I made requests for 3 buildings. For one they said, "no, no, we can't this." Okay next one, this and this, and in the end I got an answer that they had to vote in the local council, and they voted, "no we don't want." (SRM Activist, Interview, Nov. 9, 2019).

Further, the local council sold RMGC public land and resources in Roşia Montană, reprising palm oil tactics and Gürel's (2019) description of ABD as smallscale and common land transfers. These actions further strained the already hard-pressed Roşieni:

Roşian: And these people were affected enormously, because the local councillors came, those who are the local government, and they made some conveniences for the company. They approved some lands that were public domain, public domain, they were under everyone's ownership, they came and passed them under the townhall, and they were sold to the company. Laws were broken, gravely. So what is public domain is public domain... you're not allowed—

Roşianca: It belongs to everyone.

Roşian: It belongs to everyone. But, to be able to make a concession for a piece of land, you have to pass it from the public domain to the private domain of the townhall. And this can't be done without the approval of the government of the locality, of the local council... Laws were broken gravely. Why were they broken? Because the company corrupted everything that could be corrupted. From the local council in Roşia Montană to the President Băsescu... The whole ladder was corrupted, from the bottom up, or the top down. Corruption was a virtue. (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)

These processes of ABD, much alike commons enclosures, created greater pressure on Roşieni to accept the "one solution" and represented critical land acquisitions for the project. As a result of land acquisitions from Roşieni and the council, common land use declined:

...now we can't use it anymore, because they conceded it and they took their part there, parcels, and now the forest grew there because they've been here for a long time... we don't have access anymore. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 19, 2019)

Further, some AM members reported that exploratory drilling affected the water tables of common pasturelands, making it more difficult for animals to find water (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 18, 2019). Roşieni even reported that local agriculture was impacted by the forest clearing. Additionally, the mayor's office sold RMGC the local commercial complex, which included grocery and textile shops, which was built by Roşieni funds. These changes underscore the reworking of common resources.

One AM member also noted that the company gained access to Romanian surveying and research for the development of the project, as well as ownership data from the land registry in nearby Campeni to use against families in property acquisition (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 18, 2019). He ruminated that, in the past, turning over such historical resources would have constituted treason. For the company, however, this meant acquiring significant data for the prospecting and exploration phases of the mining project at minimal cost, which can be assumed to reduce timelines and initial investments (Kuyek, 2019).

Leveraging the Contextual Experience of the Past Socialist State. RMGC's initial lightning warfare tactics—which involved establishing authority and swiftly translating this intangible resource into tangible properties, processed tailings, and demolition—hinged upon inculcating Roşieni with a sense that the mining project was inevitable. This was a particularly effective method for pressuring Roşieni to sell, given their experience with the previous socialist state. The choice articulated as ‘help with the project now and you will be rewarded or say no and end up with nothing.’ This tactic has been noted in other cases of extractive development (Hall, 2013). As one RMCF member put it:

Unfortunately, what happened in Roşia are the remnants of communism. Meaning, people accepted very easily to leave in exchange for a promise. They accepted any promise, or better said, the company used a communist slogan, that being 'you will have jobs'. This shakes me even now when I hear it. The people who were taking to the streets and who were acting against us in the end, used the message 'we want to work, not to beg.' But I never saw anyone who created their own job, because you can work even if you don't go into the street to ask for work. There are lots of possibilities. I became unemployed in 2006, I worked in mining for 22 years and on the 1st of June, they decided that's it, it's done. Tomorrow you have to start something else. I didn't cry, I didn't start a protest, I didn't gather people. I thought about what I needed to do, what I could do, what I know how to do. Because all of the people who were asking for mining thought they would be going back to the mining done during Ceausescu's time. So there are people with reminiscent of, who have a communist mentality, and it's sad to say, but I know all of them. Because they've said before, they've said to me “the company is giving me a job, what are you giving me?” And this made me believe, and I still believe, that

this famous company has speculated the poverty and naivety of people here. I don't know if it would have been the same in another area, but in Roșia Montană they took advantage of it to the max. (RMCF Member, Interview, Oct. 24, 2019)



Figure 9 RMGC owned property famous for its galleries where Roman artifacts were found. The sign on the left reads, “Vrem să mâncăm, nu să cerșim,” or “We want to eat, not to beg.”

The Roșieni context includes historical experiences of state nationalization under a socialist government. First-hand, cultural, and kin-group memories include physical beatings and other forms of coercion used to extract private gold stores and rights to mine from locals, as well as the forcible relocation of persons living in nearby Geamăna for the Roșia Poieni copper mine. (AM Member, Guided Tour, Oct. 8, 2019; AM Member, Interview, Nov. 18, 2019). Those forced from Geamăna were unfairly compensated and underpaid.



Figure 10 *Roșia Poieni copper mine and tailings pond continue to grow, engulfing a village. Some villagers have remained nearby; their hay stooks overlook the ash-grey tailings which paint the trees when the wind blows.*

Roșieni living near the Orlea mount knew these histories of violence and that Orlea was RMGC's first planned pit-mine; these residents sold quickly for fear that blasting would launch

debris and shatter their homes. This was one of the first areas in the commune to be almost entirely abandoned.



Figure 11 *Houses sold and abandoned for fear of nearby mining plans at Orlea peak.*

Colouring this reality further, one AM member described his family's initial experience with RMGC before they were aware of AM's opposition to the project:

At the beginning, when the company came, they made the offers, everything sounds good, they meet the great community here with the communist mentality, where during communism you learn just to stay and listen to your superior. You can't say nothing. You can't be creative. No entrepreneurial. No nothing. So at first, my father, when he heard, he came in the house and he said, "well look, a company has come, there are important people there, they want to make a new project, a mining project, so where will we move?" So that was the thing, we didn't think, "well we don't have to sell, we don't have to leave." We don't have, that wasn't our... the thing was, for sure, if they said we have to move, then we have to move. (AM Member, Interview, Oct. 25, 2019).

ABD authority tactics have incredible psychological influence on subalterns in this post-socialist context. NGO members working to support grassroots opposition in Romania further note how effective authority is, since it happens quickly and is difficult to respond to:

Member: So there is a lot of propaganda and false information that the company uses in order to convince people to sell, and because people don't have this kind of knowledge they are easily convinced. Like in Romania, in no way a company can get your land if you don't want to sell, but a lot of people that lived during the communists, and got their

lands stolen by the state, they still believe that one day this could return and it would be possible for the mining company to get their land. And then they say "okay, I'm gonna sell it to you now, because otherwise you'll get it for free."

Interviewer: So this is kind of part of being—

Member: Post-communist country.

Interviewer: It means that these tactics are particularly—

Member: Efficient.

Interviewer: Because these people have experience, somebody's done this to them in the past—

Member: Experienced. Yeah. And usually the people in these communities are quite old and less educated. They are very easy to mislead... And the most horrifying part, like rural communities don't stand a chance in front of this approach.

Interviewer: So what's the counter proposal? Like this is happening, and I'm assuming this is being used, not just in Roşia Montană.

Member: Yeah, at this level there is no efficient countermeasure. Not really. They are very successful, yeah companies, in doing this. (NGO Member, Interview, Oct. 3, 2019)

Corporate Penetration and Reproduction in Civil Society

When the grassroots property ownership group AM formed in opposition to RMGC, the company attempted to swarm local civil society and co-opt various forms of non-governmental authority to forward indoctrination for compliance. One AM member described his initial experiences with the company while he was a teenager at school in nearby Abrud:

Regarding the company, they also have workshops in schools to tell us, like look what will happen, what the project will be, and you are so lucky of being here, and you will be able to work and stuff like this. I remember they were quite—our teachers, our directors—they were quite making lobby for the company. Supporting them and so on. They got all the children in the schoolyard and we had, I think it was once or twice, and they put all the children inside of the schoolyard and they came with all their presentation, and telling us how great will be the project, and how you need it and so on. Basically, that was my most far, far memory regarding the company in my school. That was in Abrud, basically a city nearby RM. It wasn't even Roşia. In Roşia, they were even more. (AM Member, Interview, Oct. 25, 2019).

Here, RMGC is leaning on the authority of local schools to influence children in favour of the project. This tactic extended to the formation of after school groups and was meant to influence not just children, but the families they went home to:

CERT [the Youth Resource Centre] was the name of the organization. They were also making, to present the project and so on, and propaganda for the project, but it was also like a scouts organization to make action with the youths and so on, beside the lobby that was made there for the company, in order for the children to see and tell to the parents and so on...

They were making all kinds of trips. They were having all kind of fancy games, board games, and we didn't saw back then. They were bringing new things and, of course, everything was for free, so, of course, everyone wanted to get involved. In Abrud, it's a small city, there was nothing happening for the kids.

RMGC might as well have been advertising alongside toy commercials between Saturday morning cartoons. Using the authority of civil society groups like youth groups allowed the organization to insert its promise-tendrils into the local imagination. Thus, RMGC's authority leaned on Gramsci's (1971) concept of cultural hegemony.

In local and nearby villages, the company paid for opportunities to advertise their logo with local businesses or speak at events (AM Member, Interview, Oct. 25, 2019). RMGC's logo made it onto road signs and maps that were put up during marathon runs. The company even sponsored a "Women's Fitness Day" on March 8th, 2003 (NGO Member, Interview, Sept. 25, 2019). Other important community institutions were also co-opted to support the company:

... Everything was sponsored, even the priest in the church, at the end of each ceremony, from the Catholic service, was saying "thanks God, to the Canadian company, that they bought us the lights, they put us the lights, to illuminate the road to the church." They were making small things to everything they could find in the area, in order to get involved and to make their name to be heard. (AM Member, Interview, Oct. 25, 2019)

According to AM members, only the priest of the Unitarian Church remained staunchly against the company, while other churches in the Roșia Montană commune "lobbied" for RMGC. After interviewing religious ministers, Butiu and Pascaru (2014) found that while the Orthodox church was initially opposed, both Orthodox ministers and a reformed minister presented neutral opinions about the project, while the Baptist and Pentecostal ministers were in favour to varying degrees. Thus, religion remains a contested space. The researchers note that the Greek-Orthodox Church has persisted to oppose the project, and in 2003 the church offered a Holy Synod communique stating "The Holy Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church pronounces

itself against the realization of the Roșia Montană Gold Corporation project and hopes that the area will remain intact in its holiness, purity and beauty” (p. 171). Again, in 2011, the Mitropolit Bartolomeu Anania was quoted saying:

Roșia Montană is now in a hot period, of maximum tension between those who think that in Romania everything (including peoples’ consciences) can be bought with money and those who struggle hard to protect a very precious historic, cultural and economic patrimony as well as our national dignity. (...) I make it a duty of conscience to ask you Minister to make all effort and to use all legal avenues available to your post to save Roșia Montană, Transylvania and the neighbouring areas from a certain environmental disaster. We know that Roșia Montană is under threat of poverty, but now it has to choose between being poor and not being at all. Against poverty we can find solutions, but not so against environmental crime for which enormous sums are being spent, back stage intrigues are being consumed, expert documents are being falsified and specialist documentation is made to disappear.

Other religious leaders have taken a different direction. In Corna, villagers were denied burial at the local churchyard and families required to exhume and transport their dead to other locations (Community, 2013).

RMGC also attempted to dominate the local “NGO discourse” by founding/supporting local pro-mining NGOs including “Pro-Dreptatea” (or Pro-Justice, founded by the town’s bribe-taking medical practitioner), “Pro Roșia Montană,” and “The Roșia Montană Environmental Partnership,” and even the pro-mining museum “Aurul Apusenilor” (AM Member, Guided Tour, Oct. 8, 2019). Each of these headquarters is visible from the town square, and during the peak of the struggle their members would rush out to evangelize on behalf of RMGC to visitors. However, when I visited in 2019 the headquarters were inactive, the pro-mining evangelization stifled by the lack of project movement and the staunch resistance of opposed Roșieni.



Figure 12 *Pro-Dreptatea (Pro-Justice) Centre (above) and RMGC property (below). Above a historic Stamping Mill for breaking ore is in front and the sign reads, “Mining alone is the solution for Roșia Montană.” The poster below states the company invested \$17 million in the patrimony of Roșia Montană.*



Figure 13 The Aurul Apusenilor (Apuseni Gold) mining museum (Above) Syndicate for the Future of Mining with logo “Roşia Montană means mining” and Pro-Roşia Montană headquarters with logo “Dedicated to the Community” (below).

Even the authority of the local state mine leadership was leveraged to pressure Roșieni into making way for the project by selling, before its closure in 2006:

...the director had called me, said "...it would be good to come to an agreement, so you're not putting your life in danger" and I said "Mr. Director, my life is in danger since I was born and until I die. You know what, my property wasn't made by the company or you, I made it. I make the decisions related to that. You make the decisions here, where I work. If you think you still need me I'll go to work, but for you to take me to a work where I'm going to lose my rights, I won't waste my time. I'll go to agriculture" and I said "tell me, because from this moment... if you don't think you need me, I'll go file [for retirement] and I'll put up a cross [it will have reached the end or is dead]." "Well, no... you're not someone who I couldn't get along with, but you know, there are pressures being put on me from the company as well." (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 29, 2019).

Furthermore, this Roșian indicated that the company also put pressure on his wife, moving her to a different location and arranging their shifts so it was difficult to manage work, the *gospodărie*, and their children.

Media. RMGC's use of media authority was likely the company's most resource-intensive tactic and permeated Romanian society broadly. Smolean (2015) argues that mainstream media in Romania is undemocratic, heavily commercialized, and in a state of crisis—much like Harvey's (2003) description of the crisis-prone capitalist economies media exist in. SRM campaign activists, as well as members of AM recalled the overwhelming economic force used to dominate the media during the struggle:

They paid a lot of media... pfff I mean, so much media. They had the most ridiculous TV ads and print ads and radio ads that you can *imagine*. With these children from Roșia Montană who want a new job for daddy. Claiming that they're going to create a golf course on the cyanide tailing pond. I mean... they were so bad that they were good you know? It worked against them. They created a media blockade against criticism against their project. There were terrible years. On the market, who was investing in the media the most, it was Orange and Vodaphone who are two mobile phone companies who were actually selling something, and that's why they were buying a lot of publicity ads. But the third was RMGC and they weren't selling anything, they were just trying to buy the public opinion. (NGO Member, Interview, Sept. 25, 2019).

So networks were sponsored by, not bought, "sponsored by" [quotation marks per interviewee] the company so they would advertise them. That there's honey and milk here. Of course, they would say whatever, they would wire them money into their accounts, and they would buy them. I remember that we would go, we went to protests in Bucharest and stuff, and I remember that they would turn us around, the networks would turn their backs to us, they wouldn't broadcast anything. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 29, 2019).

In Smolean's research, investigative journalist and present Romanian senator Mihai Goțiu reported that RMGC spent 60 million Euros between 2008 and 2012 on media, an enormous amount in the Romanian context. When the initial media campaign failed to garner public support, RMGC shifted the focus in 2011-2012 to the material deprivation of Roșieni who were by then suffering at the closure of the state mining operation (Claudia, 2012). Both Goțiu and ActiveWatch campaigner Răzvan Martin (2012) note that RMGC paid for 'journalists' and politicians' trips to New Zealand, to see similar 'successful' mine projects—projects that ironically, New Zealand ended up banning (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 18, 2019). In 2012, RMGC was one of Romania's top investors in media and ports. However, pro-RMGC advertisement was so clearly propaganda and misinformation that the National Audio-visual Council was forced to put sanctions on the company.

Martin (2012) and Goțiu (Smolean, 2015) also note that media authority was used to obscure negative or critical information, this included: faux-critical reporting, paid positive commenting/reviewing and removal of critical commenting/reviewing on forums and websites, stifling critical journalism by funding news sources and gaining the acquiescence of chief editors, and even having a producer at Cluj-Napoca's Hungarian theatre sabotage his own play, which was on the topic of Roșia Montană. By purchasing a media monopoly, RMGC gained crucial, one-sided access to the "information authority" on every television in Roșia Montană, and more broadly in Romania. Thus, through a non-governmental authority, RMGC attempted to control the discourse surrounding the project.

At times, the state-corporate alliance orchestrated and presided over grand theatres that incorporated institutions like the media, government presence, RMGC employees, and pro-mining civil society elements. One AM member (Guided Tour, Oct. 8, 2019) described how RMGC hired locals to clean some of the historic houses they had purchased with underground mining galleries that had contained Roman artifacts. The employees were dressed in mining uniforms and later became part of a pro-mining "protest," declaring to the media that they would not leave until the project began. The protests drew more crowds and media until a helicopter arrived, with Prime Minister Ponta who went into the gallery, "negotiated," and came out with miners stating he promised the project would start. This strong-leadership theatre demonstrates how separate sources of authority, legitimacy and power, are assembled to generate momentum in favour of the mining project (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gjbfmxy9E1k>).

Expansions into Transnational/International Authority

RMGC's use of authority connects mining development at Roșia Montană to the concept of imperialism—ongoing political-economic domination of a region for the private appropriation of local wealth (Carpenter & Mojab, 2017). Roșieni have contested views on whether mining development at Roșia Montană should be considered local or international (perhaps not surprising since they are caught up in a milieu that scholars describe with complicated phrases like transnational, globalized, glocalized and so on). However, Roșieni do have a clear sense of who mining development is ultimately 'for:' "Foreign corporations benefit—they will do things, make things, but take wealth elsewhere and leave destruction" (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 18, 2019). The reach and seemingly unlimited resources that the company possesses further suggest international ties:

Interviewer: Do you see it as an international or local?

Roșianca: No, not local. I think it is international. Because where would they have so much money from, to come and do so many things? Who would have sponsored them?

Interviewer: Right. And there's been a lot of money poured into—

Roșianca: Of course, they threw money around, they didn't know what to do. They would give to some and not others, others would cry that they gave so much to those people and not them. I don't know. A serious company like this would not have done these sorts of things. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 19, 2019)

For Roșieni, even RMGC's behaviour appears foreign and governed by unfamiliar and contradictory logics. The experience of this company's transnational, networked nature appears nonsensical at times to locals but is clearly tied to profit.

European and Canadian Politics in Roșia Montană. While Roșieni are aware that Canadians may be unfamiliar with the situation in Roșia Montană, the same is not true for Canadian government officials. Foreign ambassadors, members of European parliament, and international institutions were observed being summoned or courted on behalf of RMGC:

Roșian: For example, the embassies. Canada's embassy, that would come here every year, and bring gifts to kids for the winter holidays. Yeah, every year, and they would tell them about the project, how beautiful it was going to be. I talked to, I have also talked to the Canadian ambassador, but he left disappointed.

Interviewer: ...when was the last time there was an ambassador here?

Roşian: I think around 2012-13, something like that. And it happened several times, not just once.

Interviewer: ...any other nations, ambassadors, or other institutions?

Roşian: They used, for example, Emma Nicholson [British European Parliament Member], if that name says anything to you. She was a member of Parliament who was involved with international issues, I think, she was involved at a high level, an image of, and they brought her here, and she talked about how good the project was even though she had nothing to do with mining. They used EU Parliamentarians, they tried to tie their name to the World Bank, because they tried to borrow money. But the Royal Bank of Canada lent them some money, from my understanding. So that they can build the new community in Recea. (RMCF Member, Interview, Oct. 24, 2019)

Another Roşian reported that he felt the ambassador from Canada was "Brutal in their language, and did not like that there was local opposition," expecting locals to fall in line with the Romanian government's amorous perspective toward the mining plans (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 18, 2019). This is not a stand-alone occurrence. For example, Kuyek (2019) notes that Canada's High Commissioner interceded on behalf of Barrick Gold in Tanzania over unpaid taxes. Further, the intercession of political figures on behalf of the extractive industry demonstrates Harvey's (2003) contention that capital logic supersedes territorial logic in globalized economics—particularly, as Kuyek notes, because states like Canada get relatively small taxation value out of extractive industries. Additionally, these comments from local Roşieni demonstrate that international legitimacy can pave the way to valuable development loans and confidence from IFIs; in the case of Roşia Montană, RMGC was seeking a 250-million-dollar loan from the WB (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019).

Shifting Tactics. When the trade winds generated by leaning on Romanian government authority began to fail, the company shifted to international sources of authority:

Interviewer: Do you see this struggle as being tied to international politics or economics?

Roşian: I don't know, probably. Probably. It probably is, because if the order is given from outside to proceed with the exploitation, then it'll be done. That's what I think.

Roşianca: If they get the green light.

Roşian: If they get the green light, then it'll be done.

Translator: The green light given by?

Roșian: From abroad.

Roșianca: Now to wait for the trial to be done. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 27, 2019)

Shifting authority plays contribute to the complexity of mining development politics and the challenge Roșieni face when trying to understand and describe them. It also underlines the importance of understanding the project at Roșia Montană in relation to theoretical frameworks of imperialism and ABD (Carpenter & Mojab, 2017; Harvey, 2003).

Specifically, Roșieni refer to GBU's attempt to extract \$4 billion directly from Romania through a WB tribunal—made possible through an investor-state dispute settlement mechanism embedded in Romania's bilateral investment treaty with Canada—which is approximately 2% of the country's GDP (Canadian Center for Policy, 2017; Ciobanu, 2016; Rosia Montana: How to blackmail, 2015). In other words, RMGC is working to shift decision-making authority away from the local context, Roșia Montană, to afar; ship locally appropriated wealth out of the local context; but expel project costs—social and environmental degradation and resource depletion—to the local context. Again, this demonstrates imperial tendencies. As one Roșian put it:

Now we just need to wait and see about the trial in Washington, what the courts across the ocean have to say about this business. It could be what some have been saying since 2007 on, a last way of exploitation of an exhausted deposit and that they're counting on the stock exchange. I never had the courage to believe that they would stretch out their hand and ask the Romanian state to give them money as if they had begun the exploitation at an industrial level. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 29, 2019)

At the same time, Roșieni refuse the legitimacy of international tribunals. RMGC appears to be using international legitimacy garnered through the WB tribunal to either extract profit directly from the Romanian people, secure more gains on the stock market, or to compel the state to forward the project via coercion. The Roșian further expressed his view of the tribunal:

Roșian: I don't know these international rules, that's their problem. I, for one, don't recognize them. More than that, I would have to study it a bit to be able to talk more about it. But in one word, to repeat it, I don't recognize them. What I do recognize is the Romanian state where I have to pay my rights and obligations, and the Romanian state has the right in turn, to defend me, to protect me, so I can lead a decent life. I shouldn't sneak around, to pay my taxes and debts to the Romanian state, those need to be paid. I would say we've had successes even with these trials, and it means that these trials were won not based on non-rights, because no one gave us any rights, they were won based on some things that were well proven. So this trial—there, who would represent me, some—I don't even, to tell you, I'm not interested because I don't recognize them...

Interviewer: So do you think they're trying to erase those victories by moving it to Washington?

Roșian: Probably, I don't know. I don't know what, because we didn't go to court with the Gold, we never went to court with the Gold, why would—I don't want—We went to court with the Romanian state because of authorizations given illegally... they don't have the power either, they can't take me by the bottom of my pants and tell me “out of here,” they can't. Only if the Romanian state does this crap, to kick me out by force. They can't. The Romanian state, they have to manage it. The Romanian state can pass these laws that can be interpreted; these have a limit too. Tricks like this, my garbage bin is full of these tricks.

Here, Roșieni demonstrate the ability to critically distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate authority. The above Roșieni conclusion affirms Harvey's (2003) contention that states, and in a tactical sense state authority, play an essential role in ABD.

Legitimacy for Foreign Investors. Perceived legitimacy isn't a tactic for dispossession only, but also for accumulation. Roșieni suggest that broader international legitimacy can raise the potential profitability of the project. They describe authority tactics being used simultaneously for extractive dispossession and more abstract financial dispossession:

Here, lots of people were fooled too, even from Canada, the States, retired people, pension funds—they said, oh we found there a big gold deposit and oh my goodness what kind of profit will come out. And they made people buy shares and then in the end, and as it happens a lot of times they wake up without their money. When Băsescu was president too, I can't prove it, but I think—whenever he showed up on TV and he would say that the exploitation would start, shares would go up and if they were taking a step back, the shares would go down. I think they would play with the stocks, they were hand in hand, to increase them, to drain suckers of money. They profited from publicity, of the suckers' gullibility. No one condemns them, that's what they know to do and that's what they do. It's a job too, it makes money. A fool is who funnels money into something unknown. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 29, 2019)

Referencing Goțiu, Sevastre (2017) suggests that RMGC's preliminary work obtaining permits, drilling for samples in visible locations, and seeking widespread approval was a tactic used to gain confidence in the stock market, essentially selling the idea of the gold mine back to the globalized market. This sort of feedback loop seeking perpetual profit is an example of what Harvey (2003) describes as a contradiction of capital. Some suggest this is why the mining project has limited play in mainstream Canadian media:

They don't talk about it [the situation in Roșia Montană] there [in Canada], because—to give you an example. We had a girl from here in Roșia Montană who lived in Toronto. She had left with her parents... She had her grandparents in Roșia Montană, here, her

grandpa was a professor of math and physics, a well-renowned professor. God forgive and rest him. And her, in order to get access—there would be trimestral and semesterly meetings there. There were meetings with the shareholders from Roșia Montană. And she went, she participated. In order to be able to participate, she bought some shares. She bought shares for the gold in Roșia Montană. And when she went there, being a very good English speaker, since she had done her studies there and growing up in Canada, born in Romania but raised in Canada—she stood up and said "It's not true. There's opposition in Roșia Montană. What's being said here is lies." They turned her mic off, the bodyguards came, and they evacuated her from the room. So there, the shareholders were being lied to by those who were here. (RMCF Member, Interview, Oct. 24, 2019)

These perspectives on RMGC's pursuit of legitimacy demonstrate the importance of situating the extractive industry's drive to produce profit within broader themes of ABD. It also illustrates the prevalent trend of the extractive industry being unwilling to engage in 'public consultation' in any forum (Geenen, 2014; Hall, 2013; Kuyek, 2019; Oliver-Smith, 2010)—a reality paralleled in Canada recently when the RCMP were called in to arrest a journalist in a purportedly public meeting about a local gold mine (Baxter, 2019).

Examining Roșieni and allied perspectives on RMGC's use of authority tactics reveals much regarding the politics of dispossession at Roșia Montană. The Roșieni experience describes an anatomy of authority that includes a massive transnational spread of agents including the TNC itself, international bodies and officials, and in the words of an RMCF member, "The local council, the mayors, the county council, prefecture, government, and president... Including the Romanian Parliament, even they are guilty" (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019). The corporate body of this development project and its diverse parts work in the service of imperialism by attempting to dominate the political economy of Roșia Montană, thereby forwarding processes of ABD. However, as authority tactics alone were unable to convert national-level compliance into regional development, agents of capital were forced to engage in more nuanced tactics.

Fighting Door-to-Door: Coercion, Persuasion, Seduction, and Manipulation

Beyond anatomizing the greater extractive development "body" at work in Roșia Montană, this chapter also considers how the body works, lives, moves, and "is" in this local context. One example of this is how Roșieni describe the state not only as a source of legitimacy but also as martialing violence in the service of ABD. Harvey (2003) argues this is one of the key ways that states support capitalist logics (West, 2016). In Roșia Montană, when legitimacy

alone proved insufficient for providing RMGC all land necessary for the mining project, the company and its network employed tactics to move against its opposition.

Coercion and Domination at Roșia Montană: “We’re Guarding the Billionaires”

Roșianca: And threats, that they will kill our cows, that they'll set our hay on fire, that they'll burn our house down, that they'll cut our hands off with a chainsaw— (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)

Many Roșieni stories reflect the potency of implied force as well as processes of securitization and state intertwining, which Frederiksen and Himley describe as marks of coercion (2019). For example, one Roșian described how the Romanian state mobilized their intelligence agency to monitor mining opposition as part of a broader campaign of intimidation:

They tried to intimidate everyone who came to our support. First of, all to intimidate us, those of us who are here, locals, through all the methods possible: threats, pressures. My daughter, for example, was a student in Cluj, in law, and she had a professor, in law school, and the professor was the company's lawyer, of Gold, and my daughter went to write an exam—And of course, I was followed by the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service], by the Gold's employees, I was followed by everyone. Wherever I went, I was followed by everyone. And then in the end, wait a second sir, am I a criminal, did I murder someone? To protect your locality that you live in, to protect your property makes you a criminal? I didn't do anything bad to anyone. Why do I need to be followed? At a certain point, I was here at the Information Centre, because we created an Information Centre there in the market too, to fight against them, and we made them into dust, we demolished them. (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)

In this Roșieni's narrative, he notes a clear disjunction between state logic and the deployment of state officers to surveil him. From this experience, he induces that the state is operating not by state or territorial logics, but rather the capital logics of RMGC. He also notes that the state used the deployment of police and intelligence agents to disrupt the learning networks of grassroots Roșieni resistance and their support networks:

They [SRM campaigners] came at night, at night because they were followed, SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service]. In Gura Roșiei, at the intersection coming in, there were four cops. One year they stayed there, and if you came in like you came here, they would stop you, they would ask you where you're going, to ID yourself. Just like if Roșia Montană was a neutral territory from Romania, excluded, as if no one was allowed to come in Roșia Montană. Only the company and us who were already here. That's it. The rest, those who wanted to come help us, they weren't allowed to come in to Roșia Montană. That's what was created, that was the psychosis that was created here. I asked one of them, "Hey, what are you doing here in Gura Rosiei?" "We're guarding the billionaires in Roșia Montană." So Roșieni were billionaires.

The, albeit temporary, enforcement of what is herein described as a “neutral territory,” meant to enable monopolization by RMGC, bears a striking similarity to so-called special economic zones: territories within sovereign states but explicitly governed by capital logics (Kapoor, 2017b; Zoomers, 2010). This similarity speaks to the universalizing qualities of ABD.

Subtlety is crucial to understanding ABD tactics in the context of Roșia Montană, and this cannot be overstated. For example, Roșia Montană was never quite a special economic zone but was declared a special mono-industry zone disciplined by intelligence and police services. Roșieni experience a reality of in-betweenness as explained in theorization, one rooted in history. Romania is not quite “Oriental” nor quite “Western”—a quality captured in the term Balkanism and a status shaped by the historical processes of Ottoman domination/subjugation and subsequent/concomitant informal colonization by “Western” powers (Boatcă, 2007; Velicu, 2012). Presently, Roșieni in-betweenness includes their experience of ABD; as another example, Roșieni note the differential between their experiences of coercion and domination from those West (2016) describes in the global south:

In Africa, where the companies went, they killed people. They did exploitations and there, there were private mines too, and the private people didn't accept to give their mines for exploitation too. So then these guys came along with the corrupted people in the government, they came and with the bulldozer, they covered the entrances to the galleries and they died in there, suffocated. They used all the methods and then, in the end, you know what the last method is? Attempts [against people's lives], they start to liquidate those who are—but the problem is the following: in Africa it works, here it doesn't work, to go as far as killing, because here you'll have people on top of you. (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)

Roșieni acknowledge that their context offers some shelter from the aggression of ABD tactics. At the same time, their experience with coercion and domination may appear alien to Western contexts that laud transparency and security for private citizens:

I had to be careful, so that I wouldn't get ran over by cars. One night I was coming home with the cows, over there, and they came with a car at night, they drove all the way close to me and then I fell into a river, three metres down. In this valley that goes down. If I hadn't ducked them, they would've hit me with the car. So they tried all sorts of methods.

The post-socialist context Roșieni exist in, their historic experiences of state violence, and the threats and “near-misses” they endure constitute a distinct form of violence.

Coercive tactics are in full display on the streets of Roșia Montană and inscribed on its venerable infrastructure. Many RMGC owned houses bearing the company's insignia and a national historic monument logo also proclaim surveillance warnings. The oppressive atmosphere created through this architectural language is experientially consistent with the operations of Romanian state agents. Thus, the constant threat of surveillance is also coercive.



Figure 14 *RMGC property with information plaques and surveillance warnings.*

Coercion is also expressed through the disjunction between state logic and the administrative organization of Roșia Montană. One Roșian noted that locals need to travel to other towns, Campeni or Abrud, for medicine and they only have access to a doctor twice weekly (RMCF Member, Interview, Oct. 24, 2019). Presumably, this is because the state does not have the funds to provide such services in Roșia Montană. However, the state does fund and operate both a police station and gendarmerie post.



Figure 15 *Police station pictured (left) and gendarmerie post (right) in Roșia Montană*

Furthermore, it was all too clear for Roșieni whose interests the gendarmerie military police served:

My husband didn't care as much, he was a man, he went to work then came home and then he would say, "Don't worry, we won't leave like they're saying. What do they think, they can kick us out?" And when I saw what happened with... [a local Roșieni], they had *jandarmi* [gendarmerie] standing by his windows, so that he can't get out. People from here wouldn't let him leave his house because why is he getting involved; they wanted the investors to come here. And the poor man didn't want to, he fought until his death. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 19, 2019)

The presence of gendarmerie was clearly a show of force, a threat, and demonstrated how public-private entanglement also included elements of civil society that had been coopted as well:

They [pro-mining people] would jump at us in the market, the *jandarmi* would pretend to protect them and stuff, but they didn't intimidate us. You owe a death anyways, but I didn't run away... They tried, especially when they announced that they're stopping the project, they caught on fire, the company employees. It went out like a straw fire, after there was no money left in all directions. And what did they care about for 10 or more years? They've been on our heads since '96. You can imagine, I "grew old" with them here. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 29, 2019)

Here, RMGC also incited pro-mining citizens who worked alongside state enforcement to threaten mining opposition.

RMGC's rhetoric, claiming the project would forcibly move ahead, was coercion intended to overrule and drown out opposition. However, many Roşieni rejected this posturing as a bluff:

They came, they hired some of our people here, to sabotage us, aimed at us. They came and told us the news, they came with all sorts of things so that we do what they say. You can imagine the amount of bribery and what they did with us. They would leave things at the door, papers, they started to bring free papers because they would say we need to leave from here because of this and that. And woe are we, if we don't leave in a certain amount of time then threats, all sorts of threats. If you don't leave by the date of—maybe in February or January—then they won't give us money, or 3%, we'll be left here and the dirt and hill will come down on us. What threats! That's when we realized they weren't serious. They weren't serious. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 19, 2019)

Roşieni faced threats of physical violence from pro-mining villagers, implied threats from state authorities, and also the direct threat of dispossession from mining officials who came with the message 'accept whatever payment we offer, or we will steal what you own.' If RMGC pushed ahead as they threatened, even the most steadfast opposition would face an unlivable situation:

We realized, because we know what a mining project means. Living in a mining area we know automatically what has been left behind by mining. When they blew things up here you can imagine that a big dust cloud would form right above us, very big and very harmful. It was noxious. And even more, if the project would start, you realize that there would be no stone on stone left here. What these people would do here. So then of course, it would affect me very much, to see these mountains, four mountains in danger of being destroyed. And they want to just grind everything down. What does the project mean: the destruction of the mountains and the filling of the valleys. Because this would be full of sterile, which is harmful, with so much industrial residue. Noxious from an environment point of view, for people's health. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 13, 2019)

Roşieni are familiar with destruction caused by mining development both from the local communist-era open pit exploitation of the nearby Cetate peak and the ongoing exploitation of Geamăna mentioned above. Some inhabitants of Geamăna that I spoke to say that the tailings are neutralized and safe, however, studies suggest possible bacterial leaching, pollution of the Aries river, and cases of toxicity in those living nearby (Petru & Badescu, 2009; Muscat, 2019). For Roşieni, mining development itself is a very real threat.

RMGC's mining actions also extend from coercion to domination, in that they directly cause mental and physical distress to Roşieni:

Around me there used to be up there a house, over there a house, another house there. So it affected me, simply, the way in which people were bought. When you saw that—I would suffer twice, once when the company would come and would buy the person, and

after that a big truck would come and load up everything they had, and then the bulldozer would come nicely and would jolt the house. You can imagine what, what, what kind of infernal noise. And first of all the mayor was guilty here. What did they do first. They bought starting with the mayor, the local council, the county council, everything that could be bought so they could develop this project. And of course, through big sums of money because they had money. It was a foreign company that, that's how they are these foreign companies. And then, of course it affected us. Not to mention the research in the mountains. To tell you, the noise that those machines were making, it simply affected me. It was an extraordinary amount of sound pollution. They would roar day and night. To tell you, I've gone through some very, very difficult days, sleepless nights. Stress from all sides. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 13, 2019)



Figure 16 *An AM Member remembers several houses on this section of land—his neighbours—and that it is now painful to pass by, as now only the ruins of a few foundations are visible.*

RMGC's work literally drowned out the sound of local opposition. Threats of further destruction were accompanied by direct violence against day-to-day life in Roșia Montană:

...people started to understand what the project means, they knew a bit about the surface exploitation in Roșia Montană. When they came and started doing the geological prospecting they came and brought here about 20 drills to drill everywhere, to see, to research the deposit and they polluted us, they ripped us, they sound polluted us. These drills worked day and night non-stop, they replaced each other non-stop. There was a dust here in Roșia Montană, terrible, terrible. So people understood, sir. Now, when you're only doing the exploration, it has such a negative effect on people, what will happen when the project is running? So people were aware, knowing that even here in Roșia Montană they blew up in the Cetate Massif, and they've done stupid things too, those who loaded up and there were some big boulders that ended up on top of some people's houses. The boulder came in through the roof of the house... some boulders

ended up down in the basement. So people knew, they were warned, they were aware of the danger that was going to come up. (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)



Figure 17 *View of exploited peaks of Cetate and Cârnic in 2019. Above is the view from the former and below the view from the latter—the communist-era partially exploited peak of Cârnic, overlooking the distant open-pit remnants of Cetate.*

For Roșieni, coercion and domination worked hand in hand. Exploratory processes were a demonstration or threat and a new imaginary for the future of the region. Simultaneously, exploratory drilling had direct impact on the locals:

When the drilling happened, there were galleries that were blocked with water, and when they put a hole through, those waters started to flow and reached the groundwater and they went down. That's how lots of these red waters showed up, after they started to—just like when, in a bread, you put a bunch of holes through it, and that bread will have—just like the waters, they seek to go down the valley. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 29, 2019)

It is worth noting that beyond exploratory drilling, locals contend that the company was engaging in preliminary small-scale mining that likely exacerbated these effects:

...they sometimes now come here and steal some gold, *holoangari* [clandestine veteran miners]. They are now a sort of *holoangari*, they steal some gold, they have all of the strands [know the ore veins], they have the maps, they have probe machines, and they do their thing. And they take gold, even now from Roșia Montană. The company steals gold from Roșia Montană. (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)

AM members pointed out that RMGC took specific efforts to make the area less desirable and instill a feeling of foreboding regarding the coming project: chemical samples were discarded in the town, garbage dumped on the roadside, and locals paid to allow piles of rocks in their yards to influence people to leave (AM Member, Guided Tour, Oct. 13, 2019). This shows some awareness and culpability on the part of RMGC, whose work negatively impacted the day-to-day lives of Roșieni.



Figure 18 *Grass grown over old piles of rubbish as pointed out by an AM member.*

RMGC also attempted total economic domination by working to shut down local services. When some service providers refused to sell, RMGC propped up competing stores and told their civil society collaborators not to shop at the grocery store offering opposition, at one point suggesting they shop out of town if needed. In Roșia Montană, coercion was not the simple act of a particular agent working one particular tactic or angle of ABD. Rather, coercion included several different agents—members of civil society, state employees, and RMGC—working in tandem, as though in a complex, macabre play.

Persuasion: “Poisoned Gifts”

It was all a facade. As the saying is, “outside the painted fence, inside the leopard.” So you go in and the leopard will eat you. That's what they did too. “We're extraordinary,” but in the background they were ready to finish you, to grind you up. (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)

Targeted and Systematic Negotiations. Roșieni indicate that RMGC’s property purchasing campaign was guided by two factors. RMGC targeted locals based on their locality in relation to project timelines and their vulnerability or assumed willingness to sell; the company was systematic and predatory. These factors enabled the company to purchase swiftly and prevented locals from having time to consider their options:

Roşian: Since 2001, the company started buying houses, it was an objective, and it was a very strong signal. In the stocks, the company was already sought after in the Toronto stocks. June 1st, 2001 was when they bought the first three houses. They had a plan, because in the beginning people didn't want to leave and to abandon their place for nothing in the world, but they bought for three months, then they would stop for three months, again three months and stopped three months, they did that for seven years, that's how they went about it so that people would weaken the community and so it would be easier to buy the properties. That's how they managed to buy 850 properties out of 1150. That's how many they needed, 1150.

Interviewer: ...that break period, you were saying that there was a tactic with that as well, the tactic was to wait for some sort of impact to happen, that they seemed to know that that was going to happen?

Roşian: Yes, so that people would say “oh, I should have.” Because people who had left would say 'it's good, we got a lot of money, it's worth it' and so then there were neighbourhoods or streets that were basically abandoned. There were maybe a couple of houses, an elderly person whose family would say 'come to the city, what are you going to do there alone, it will be hard for you, why would you stay' and then the wave would be stronger because things started out very slowly in the beginning. It was a tactic because they brought experts from Australia I think, experts in displacement. You can look him up, the guy who did displacements in Africa, he was well known—Mark Stein. He was the guy who came here because this company made a lot of mistakes when it first came here. For example, they wanted to displace the locals according to a certain plan. The plan was divided into areas. So they wanted to displace the population based on who would be affected first. They, I mean we actually, were broken into zones: zone one, two, three, four. Zone one was the first to be affected. And then people were unhappy. They said “you need to treat us all the same, as in I want to leave, even if I'm in zone four, I want to take my money and leave.” And that's how a lot of people left. This was a shock for me. I never thought I would see with my own eyes how a locale would empty itself out, as in depopulating. (RMCF Member, Interview, Oct. 24, 2019)

RMGC's approach to persuasion also included a combination of sweetening the deal for leaving, and simultaneously souring the prospect of staying. Simply by moving forward with displacement, the company made life more difficult for those who remained and benefited from the advertisement of the newly displaced, still in the “honeymoon” phase of relocating. An NGO member described these tactics in detail.

So at the very early stage of permitting or authorization, these mining companies start to buy land from the locals. And this changes the dynamics in the community. So, as soon as people start, some of the people in the community start to realize that they can sell and leave away because anyway they wanted to leave and this is a great opportunity for them, they not only give up their property, but they also become actors in convincing others to do the same. So they are starting to convince their family, friends, relatives, to also sell and leave. So this is something that all the mining companies do. Another thing is the

mining companies come and they create this impression that if you don't sell, either you won't get hired or if you don't sell willingly, they will need to sell at an even lower price because they will be forced to do so. (NGO Member, Interview, Oct. 3, 2019)

In this way, persuasion tactics work in tandem with authority tactics—one reinforcing the other.

The persistent use of persuasion tactics demonstrates how firms like RMGC respond to opposition. Being unable to acquire instantaneous access to resources, the company shifted its tactics from shock-and-awe to attrition:

...but the organization [AM] after a few years became smaller and smaller, because the people started to sell. Mostly they said to their neighbors, to their friends, that they received good money for the prices of the properties around the area at that time. Basically, they were paying good amounts comparing to what was before. So they started to get after each other. Pretty much, those who left, they were saying, "Well, you will remain here on *lonely island*—it will be just your property and a huge open pit around, so then you will go, and you will sell, on less money. Maybe, you will go for nothing from here--so go and sell now, and find a place to move" and such thing. (AM Member, Interview, Oct. 25, 2019)

Previous AM members who leave justify their exit from the melee by reproducing the joint state-corporation message that the project is inevitable and immanent.

RMGC was equally as systematic in targeting specific locals as it was with its purchasing timelines. One elderly Roșian noted that, during Romania's period of nationalization under the socialist government, the state moved workmen and their families to Roșia Montană to mine. He argued that the company targeted many of these people first, since they "did not have the same roots" (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 18, 2019). He also noted the company approached houses that were not well maintained—this could suggest that the company thought houses that were already abandoned, or whose owners needed income, would be easy purchases. Further, documentation on ownership from the Campeni land registry—originally seized during nationalization—were loaded into RMGC cars and shipped to their office for study. He also suggested that similar documents were acquired by collaborative family members in secret. Another AM member noted that the company used clergy to collect documents on behalf of the company and also sought antiquated Austro-Hungarian mining stakes, perhaps to buoy the company's legitimacy (AM Member, Guided Tour, Oct. 13, 2019).

AM members note that the company used the information they collected to target vulnerable persons who were divorced, had low income, were in financial difficulties, and especially the elderly (AM Member, Guided Tour, Oct. 13-14, 2019). RMGC approached

different demographics, with different deals. Those needing income were offered work, allowed to stay in the house they sold for free until the project began, were provided wood for their furnaces and other services, and offered the use of gardens purchased from other Roşieni. These benefits were not only a bartering advantage but also created human shields that the company used to avoid taxation. As one AM member put it, “they owed money to an agency, but when the agency came to collect, they said are you really going to kick these people out?” Elderly Roşieni without children were driven around town and to the pharmacy by RMGC employees, then given cell phones and told to call when they were ready to sell their properties.

This bears a striking similarity to what Freire (1970) calls false charity, which “constrains the fearful and subdued, the “rejects of life,” to extend their trembling hands” (p. 27). From a tactical extractive perspective, it serves as strategic philanthropy (Hilary, 2013). Other Roşieni noted similar tactics, “They would send workers to the homes of elderly people, to help them with painting their rooms, or chopping wood, or they would bring them water from the well here. To persuade the elderly to agree with them” (RMCF Volunteer, Interview, Nov. 25, 2019).

Further, Roşieni realized that these “kindnesses” came with the costs and dependency:

Roşian: I think, my opinion, is that they used the local community the most. They gave some poisoned gifts to the community.

Interviewer: Like what?

Roşian: They, for example, helped them can things in the winter. They gave them money. They would drive them to the hospital using the company's vehicle, they would buy them firewood, they would send teams to the elderly to bring them water, organize their wood, they would buy them cellphones that they would pay for, monthly contracts. For some they would upgrade their houses inside, like the bathrooms.

The company even offered elders willing to sell “good deals” that included paying for their grave sites in another town and for their dead, already buried loved ones to join them there—demolition and body removal were covered (AM Member, Guided Tour, Oct. 8, 2019; AM Member, Guided Tour, Oct. 13, 2019).

RMGC revealed the darker side of these one-on-one negotiations, particularly in their treatment of the elderly. One AM member recounted how his wife witnessed the movement of one gravesite while in town and was deeply disturbed to see the body in a state of decay, being transported in transparent plastic (AM Member, Guided Tour, Oct. 13, 2019). Other Roşieni shared stories of the treatment of their loved ones. Another AM member recalled how messy it

was for his grandmother, who was upset by the sudden disappearance of long-term friends and the forcefulness of RMGC negotiators (AM Member, Guided Tour, Oct. 8, 2019). He stated that the company trained sellers to become salespeople for the project. His grandmother was straightforward in sending company representatives away, but one day, a RMGC representative came to the door with an old friend, “So of course she couldn't send them away; “Of course, come in I'll make you a coffee”.” Thus, if company employees were denied access to a local’s property, they found ways to take advantage of Roşieni custom and hospitality. Children were also used by the company to affect the elderly. Many said they left so their children could be in the city or buy a new car.



Figure 19 Unitarian Church monument erected for the first interned persons moved.

Some Roşieni also describe how stress lead to negative health consequences for the elderly:

We know they lied. We know what they did to us. Living here, being here inheritors of these lands, for them to lie like that. No, no. They would keep coming, the negotiators. They hired themselves some negotiators, and they would keep coming here. "You have to start your file, you don't have a file, we need to measure, we have to see, we have to do this." They never gave us peace. They stressed us out too much, too much. My mother then got diabetes, because they would keep coming here and they would find her alone here at home. "You have to leave too, you have to think of where to go. Let us come and we'll build your house, we'll do something somewhere, we'll buy for you." At a certain point we couldn't handle it anymore. And she told him, the poor lady, "When I bother you, that's when you can come bother me." (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 19, 2019)

This provides further proof that the charity offered by RMGC was a persuasive tactic; the company was just as ready to bring force to the table as it was firewood and trips to the doctor.

Employment: The Dangling Carrot. RMGC corporation was incredibly direct with their property-for-employment agenda, which was one of the main ways they influenced Roşieni to sell. The company had clear targets, which they gambled could be bought with a promise:

985 families needed to be relocated from Roşia Montană, to leave. This meant a population of about 1600 people would need to be relocated. They came with this program, they sent negotiators to people, they would fire some on this side and then others would come from another side. So people didn't, they didn't want to negotiate with them. They came the first time and in order to attract people, when they started to hire people here from Roşia Montană. They hired them so they could attract them to their side, anyways. On the door of the Community Hall where they had their information centre, in the market, by [Roşieni], there, that building there, at a certain point in time a poster showed up on the door: "we hire only those who sell their properties." I regret enormously that I didn't take that poster and keep it. (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)

However, in the extractive industry employment promises are often significantly overblown (Leech, 2012; Kuyek, 2019). In the context of Roşia Montană, many of the locals were familiar with mining operations since the area was mined during communism. As a result, RMGC made the mistake of thinking the locals gullible:

They came with pressure, at first, yes. They would come and put [documents] in your mailbox. At first, they said, when they first came, they came with 50,000 jobs. And I said to my wife, are we truly going back to Roman times? Are we going back 2000 years? Is that how stupid they think we are? Where would we work, because in a mining industry, what is there, there are a few big capacity drills, a few loaders, a few big dump trucks, a high-performance factory with a few people. You don't need 100 people to work, but what about 50,000. Who's a sucker. It's the most stupid thing. Then they went

down to 25,000. Then the Minister Dan Ioan Popescu, a Minister of Industry or whatever the hell it was called, and he said 5000 jobs. Where are 5000 jobs? Oh, well, in the end they proved that 100 or something jobs were going to be needed for mining. So then where are the jobs? Let's be serious, that's a mockery, you're mocking people. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 29, 2019)

Regardless, the promise of work was enough for many who had become increasingly desperate with the closure of the state mine.

Promises of employment not only secured properties needed to progress the project development, but also support that could be weaponized against those resisting the project:

What the company did was that they came and bought the houses here, they demolished 300 houses with the tacit approval of the local council... they had employees. Not sure how much they were paid, but they didn't exploit them, there weren't abuses to call them that. They were hired. What they did—how to say—they created a mass they could maneuver, who they used to put tremendous pressure on the locals who didn't want to, who didn't agree with the project. That was the hardest thing for the locals here— [employees] who would threaten us with death, that they would burn down our houses. (RMCF Member, Interview, Oct. 24, 2019)

By demolishing the houses for the project, RMGC also prevented Roşieni from having time to reflect on their decision and attempting to return. Further, persuasion was used to incite elements of civil society and thus tacitly further the company's coercive tactics. The promise of employment also offered greater regional political-economic control, since they could direct pro-mining civil society on where to shop and even to take civil action:

...they would ask you to write a request for a job, and there were rumors that they were taking the requests to Bucharest to show to the Environment [Ministry] to show how many people want the project. That's where they used our requests for jobs...

Lots of people were going to demonstrations too, even those who didn't have a job, but I never went. If I didn't get a job, I told them I'm not going to the demonstration. But they would go, even to Bucharest for demonstrations. (RMCF Volunteer, Interview, Nov. 25, 2019)

To reinforce political-economic control, the company even funded the setup of a local *pensiune*, so that the operator would turn around and impugn economic alternatives saying, “Look I tried and it didn't work...” (AM Member, Guided Tour, Oct. 8, 2019). Ironically, despite this attempt to coop and repute alternative livelihood pursuits, AM members note that this *pensiune* operator and his family have lived off the *pensiune* for 10 years, and expanded the operation.

Persuasion tactics not only provide access to specific land and resources, but help cultivate broad consent, political-economic control, and reinforce other tactics. Herein it can be seen that they are not simple, friendly negotiations, but rather predatory and speculative acts of violence reminiscent of other common forms of ABD. Influencing locals to sell their properties, then converting those who sold into salespeople by leveraging “enrollment” for services and potential employment, is reminiscent of pyramid schemes. Company employees targeted, pressured, and exploited elderly Roşieni like expert telemarketers and telescammers. Negotiators constantly badgered locals about selling and sought ‘consent’ like sexual predators.

Seduction: “Here is no life” / “We’ll go to the city”

And they promised modern hospitals. “It would be good.” They were deceivers. They wanted to work the suckers, those who were suckers. When they start promising things, you already see that there's something rotten. Our people would say that they're doing “our politics.” Five regional hospitals, one metropolitan. What the hell? Not even the US can do that in such a short time. Huge things. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 29, 2019)

Seductive tactics were already described above, in RMGC’s forays into media when the company described its environmental rehabilitation and golf course building plans. RMGC also used the promise of building modern medical facilities as described above—ironic considering the commune’s medical doctor was bribed to leave—to promote the idea that mining was the only option for reinvigorating the area. Equally, the company made a point of coopting the dramatic imagery of red water, promising to clean up the rivers:

*They're going to rehabilitate our rivers, because they were going to build a water purification station. Who has money to do a water purification station for decades or centuries? Let's be serious. They're going to take what's good. Don't think that they're interested in where the technologic process is, with huge costs. No, they're interested in what's quick, short, with maximum profit, and the rest put the big *straita* [traditional woven peasant bag] in the small *straita* and they're gone. And the people from the area are left with everything on their head. The Romanian state is not capable anymore, they would say that “Oh, they were going to put millions of dollars or euros for the rehabilitation.” This country, this country how many times have they lied to us? Not the foreigner, our people, that we have so much money. Then you turn around and find out you're butt naked. And then you believe? We shouldn't destroy, keep your millions, do whatever you want with them. But what, you think you're gonna come here and do good for me? That's for suckers, not everyone's a sucker. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 29, 2019)*

Again, there is a sense of irony in promises to clean up the environment, since Roşieni state that RMGC exploratory drilling and small-scale mining exacerbated water conditions by creating perforations in mining galleries that allowed previously trapped water to enter the water table.

Furthermore, this tactic is easy to distinguish as seduction rather than ecological concern and repair; an NGO member working with AM noted that the company was not interested in a serious environmental survey of the area:

And the company was never able to prove any kind of baseline studies, because of course they refused to do real baseline studies, in terms of soil quality or water quality. They just use images like, "look red water" and stuff like that. I mean, that red water is there since 2000 years, because it's red water coming from the mine shafts. It's a natural phenomenon. It's nothing to do with that. So yeah, that was pure publicity. It was not science. (NGO Member, Interview, Oct. 16, 2019)



Figure 20 *A RMGC facility positioned beside the main road and the infamous red stream. The messaging that reads “Modern mining guarantees life in the waters of Roşia Montană.”*

Similarly, members of AM stated that RMGC’s public-private alliance employed tree planting as a seductive tactic. One AM member took me to a peak overlooking a grove of evergreens and told me that Băsescu had been there with the company, planting trees for a photo op (Guided Tour, Oct. 13, 2019). He pointed out how little of an effect this would have on the ecosystem. Another AM member said sarcastically, “They would plant trees, because you see, if we were here people without vegetation, they would bring the oxygen” (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 29, 2019). These seduction tactics have been referred to as “green capitalism,” which coopts the image of doing ecological work but ultimately ignores the complexity of ecosystems (Corporate

Watch, 2016). This happens because corporations ultimately operate on (monetary) value systems that struggle with—or are entirely incapable of—preventing destructive levels of exploitation of the natural world (Corporate Watch, 2016; Harvey, 2003; Oliver-Smith, 2010). Instead of diminishing the power of corporations doing ecological damage, green capitalism ultimately extends their power by establishing a sort of public trust through seduction.

Seduction tactics are closely entwined with persuasion. In negotiations, RMGC wanted their offers to be as seductive as possible and equally to tarnish the idea of remaining. Their offer was presented as the gateway to modernization and civilization and employed economic racism by impugning life in Roșia Montană as polluted, unsanitary, barbaric, and uncivilized. However, members of AM saw through the charade:

With jobs, with these things, nothing clear. Nothing, everything was in a fog. There's lots of things. Jobs, that was the first thing. They would pay people for properties. Wait, they said that we don't have bathrooms, they came and "oh, we're unwashed," without bathrooms. I'll open the door, I have a bathroom, water, electricity, and not since today. The company didn't build them, neither did the Romanian state, I made them through my work and my family's work. You know, like as if they brought us to civilization, because woe is me, we had just come down from [trees?]. Let's be serious. And that "they discovered the deposit." That was discovered by the Geto-Dacians, Romans, I don't know—But since Roșia Montană 's birth certificate was on the wax tablets. Father forgive us, why are you coming here and telling lies? Those tablets that were found in one hundred something [Roman artifacts attesting to a local mining settlement], I can't remember, but on the 13th of February—that's the birth certificate of the Romanian peoples, the Romans, so many nations that were around here and now they come and say that they found them? They said that "woe is me, people can't live here, the water is polluted, the vegetation is weak, there's no vegetation, it's a lunar world." Well, now, if we go outside it's the exact opposite. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 29, 2019)

In the eyes of Roșieni, RMGC oversold their capabilities, claims, and contributions. Further, they identified a disjunction between how RMGC defined their lives and how they saw their own lives.



Figure 21 *Roșia Montană's healthy valley (above) and Tarina's green pastures (below).*

Resistance to RMGC's property purchasing was construed as selfish and even detrimental to the community. Politicians in favour of the project made clear attempts to characterize RMGC's opposition as standing in the way of progress:

...one of the European Parliamentarians was very violent towards me. He met with them first, then with me. Even though we had a meeting scheduled and they delayed it for an hour and a half, so that they can meet first. And so he said how do I think that a company can stumble because of someone like me, and a community can suffer because of me,

because they won't have jobs, it won't have the future it wants, and all because of one property. How do I think this can happen? (RMCF Member, Interview, Oct. 24, 2019)

Thus, seduction tactics operate through attempting to humiliate those opposing 'development.'

Alongside trying to seduce Romanians with images of green capitalism, RMGC also fielded seduction tactics closer to their own values. As noted earlier, the company claimed mining development would bring prosperity to locals in unrealistic numbers of jobs. RMGC also attempted to make a pageant out of the payments they were making for properties:

Money. Money. First of all, billions. You can imagine, who would have had billions. It was very hard to get money. First of all, money changed people. When they promised huge sums of money, billions, people forgot about the land, they forgot about animals. And it automatically changed people. And they used a strategy too... they would come with sacks full of money so that people could see how much money there was, and it was all small currency, small bills, of 10,000 [ROL equal to 1 RON or 0.22 USD] that used to be then, so it would seem like they had a lot. They would carry them out of the building there, can you imagine how people were looking at them. So, it automatically made others to want to leave with a sack of money. They would fall over when they saw that much money. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 13, 2019)

RMGC demonstrated awareness that money itself, even without context, is incredibly seductive. People will imagine for themselves what the money represents. Here, the AM member notices a shift in the values and "common sense" of rural people, upon seeing intoxicating amounts of money for the first time. This demonstrates the role of hegemony in facilitating seductive ABD.

Unsurprisingly, AM members noted that young people were particularly susceptible to monetary seduction. Kapoor (2017a) notes that local youth are cooptation targets for mining campaigns. Young people played an important role in influencing the elderly on whether to sell:

Yes, the kids would say let's go to the city. They [elders] didn't want to go because there was here a neighbour of mine and relative of mine. They didn't want to go, the poor elderly folks, but the kids "Let's go, let's go, we'll go to the city" and they had to go and now they're not well. Forced, forced, they didn't leave freely: "Oh, I'll go because it'll be good in the city"—they knew from here in the country how good it is in the city. They saw after, that it's one thing to be born here and to live here a lot of years, to get used to everything here, and then to go over there and be closed like in a cage. It's not good. They miss their neighbours, they miss traditions, they miss everything, everything. It's not like it used to be. Lots regret it because I talk to them. We're acquaintances, and even relatives of mine, they regret it because they shouldn't have taken this step, they shouldn't have. But see, that unfortunately—they shouldn't have worked people like this. If they indeed wanted to do something, they should have had the project done properly, they should have had all the approvals... (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 19, 2019)

RMGC worked from the cultural bedrock of power established on the Romanian state's transition into capitalism. Through education and media, young Roșieni were already being seduced from their roots. RMGC used that hegemonic pull to create momentum to sell. A young Roșian in AM explains:

Roșian: ...they are getting to attract more and more young people to move to the Oraș [city]... It depends. I have friends who move from the city to the village and so on. They are doing the thing differently. There are some that are also doing as our ancestors, but it is a little bit difficult. It's this thing, that if you live in the city you really have that connect: you know, you see all the young people going into trips and all around the world and basically you, to live there and have everything that you want from that space—if you started to get animals, and so you won't be able to go abroad or to travel. I mean, you have to organize yourself in a different way. Yeah, I think this is a little bit different, if you go to the city, to get rid to a little bit of comfort and to work like our ancestors did, but there are.

Interviewer: I imagine since almost everyone is going to university, or a good chunk of people, that they get that experience—

Roșian: Exactly, yeah, yeah, yeah. No, they are not coming back. I mean, I think 90% of them... there are 5 to 10%, maybe, that returns but most of them are moving in the city or if not, they are coming to bigger city around their village. Or if they are not, moving to the city where they did their faculty and university. But for sure, yeah. And this is what our parents tell us, "Stay there. Don't come back. Go. Go abroad. Go study. Go and work abroad. Here is no life." And this is not only because of in our area, but is in the whole of Romania, because of our communist period that left such a bad impression upon our country, to all--most of its inhabitants. Basically, we in Romania, we have I think a really, really, really bad opinion upon our country, upon our lands. I also think it is a little bit wrong. (AM Member, Interview, Oct. 25, 2019)

RMGC exploited the post-socialist contexts of young Roșieni. In this interview, the AM member reflects on a problematic belief that has gripped the imagination of many Romanians: the devaluation of Romanian land and Romanian ways of being. This internalized belief is something RMGC preys upon when they describe Roșia Montană as impoverished, sullied by pollution, or implying Roșieni as insignificant. The confusion seduction creates, by interposing value systems, creates complexity when it was translated into the web of micropolitics that make up Roșieni lives. Seduction is not a tool that engenders consciousness, cautious reflection and careful reasoning; seduction creates a smokescreen that is difficult to see past:

Roșian: They did it for money, but then after they probably regret it. I don't know exactly what the case is. And they don't talk, they don't say it, because they don't like to admit.

Roșianca: At a funeral in Brad, there was a family that had left here. The husband was sick, and she said "Woe, I have so much trouble with [person], keeps asking for me to take him to Roșia one more time."

Roșian: A lot of people regret it. They are attracted to the place; this is where they were born. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 27, 2019)

Manipulation: “‘Transforming’ the Victim into a Beneficiary”

So first, they started with lugu-lugu. If they saw that lugu-lugu wasn't working, they would go harder. And then with hei-rup [interjection when lifting something, e.g. “up!”]! So they would come to negotiate with you, you didn't want to negotiate; you kicked them out the door, they would find another way in. (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)

In Roșia Montană, RMGC used promises and hegemonic allure to secure consent and thereby land resources. In the instances where this failed, RMGC attempted to manipulate Roșieni in many ways. For example, the way RMGC used money to seduce villagers was not only salient, but also dishonest. The company used theatre, props, and media to exaggerate the benefit of selling:

There was that period of time when the money was a lot, before Tariceanu cut the four zeros, you know [reference to changing the old, devalued currency]? And they would come and they would negotiate with people and they would have the money in the white house and they had brought the TV, ProTv came, and they filmed “The Billionaires in Roșia Montană.” They had sacks full of money, because they used small currency, small coins, lots of paper currency but of low value, of no value. (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)

The way the offer was designed to be perceived—the promise of wealth and a modern life—did not represent the actual monetary value Roșieni received. As one Roșian put it, ‘People in the area gave in, sold, moved, bought cars and houses, ran out of money, and moved back home; it was propaganda’ (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 18, 2019). One AM member further described how another Roșianca ran out of money after selling and was forced to return to Roșia Montană and live in the only place available: a small shed owned by her sister (AM Member, Guided Tour, Oct. 8, 2019). Since many Roșieni are used to making a living—at least in part—from their own garden plots, pastures, or the common lands of the compossessorate, personal funds typically stretch much further in rural lands. This was not factored into displacement negotiations (Vesalon & Crețan, 2012).

One AM member argued that the inception of RMGC's project itself was a manipulation. Given millennia of pre-existing exploitation, the valuation of the remaining ore was dubious:

The deposit's value was inflated, not just as a quantity, but also the quantity in tonnes of gold and silver. Whereas no one was talking about the other resources that could be valued—the cultural patrimony, the architectural patrimony, the underground patrimony—but no one put them on a balance to identify their values. About the community, you know, we're relocating 180 families, but no one thought that maybe 200 families are productive, and out of these, 180 could have done other things that are more important. Everything was unilateral, transforming the victim into a beneficiary, you convince them for a short period of time that that's the way it is, you sign and give them some money to make their life somewhere else, and then they'll see what happens—maybe it'll be better, maybe it'll be worse. But you should know that lots of people, with sadness in their soul, years later now have realized that they've switched back from their status of beneficiary to that of victim. It would have been better to let them decide without trying to sway them, in my opinion, to make the decision in an informed manner. (AM Member, Oct. 17, 2019)

This AM member notes that the cost of displacement for locals was downplayed, while the economic value was exaggerated. This was partly accomplished by skirting the issue of conflicting value systems. With time and reflection, he notes that many Roşieni regretted their decision and attempted to return. The AM member describes manipulation tactics as functioning by “transforming the victim into a beneficiary.” However, this transformation is temporary because it is more imaginary than substantiated by reality.

Leech (2012) notes that overvaluing extractive development also exaggerates benefits, such as employment estimates. Leech describes how projects rarely employ locals in the numbers estimated and often go belly up long before project plans reach maturation, thus significantly shortening terms of employment. In the aftermath, locals are left without employment and cannot resume their previous livelihoods due to environmental devastation. As other Roşieni pointed out, extractive companies like RMGC destroy, extract, go bankrupt, and leave locals with the fallout.

Employment: Twisting the Carrot. Roşieni dependent on the state mine for work faced significant manipulation. Employment facilitated dispossession and rarely met expectations for those who sold. One Roşieni recounted several of these tactics:

Roşian: Well, it affected us because first of all we didn't have jobs. That's about it, that was the biggest thing. We didn't have a job and we sat and watched others how they have a job and we don't. They wanted the properties, and we didn't agree with that. They said,

sign your property over and then we'll give you a job, but then they wouldn't give you it anymore because they would say that we're not locals anymore...

I worked for the old company until it closed down, and then starting in 2006 I've worked for them too, but I didn't work a year—to qualify for unemployment—and from then welfare kicked in and I'm living on welfare even today.

Interviewer: So you worked with the Gold Corporation?

Roşian: For 9 months.

Interviewer: What was the reason they decided to lay you off?

Roşian: They didn't want to keep us anymore. We did digging, seasonal, during the summer, and then they didn't want to extend our work. There were a lot of us, 150 people, in that situation...

Interviewer: What are the other ways you learned about the mining company and the problems of the project?

Roşian: From friends, who were with them, who worked with them longer.

Interviewer: So there have been many of your friends, or many of the people who were working for the company became disenfranchised?

Roşian: Very many. At a certain point they had 400 employees in 2013 and they let them all go.

Interviewer: Wow. That's pretty tough on those people.

Roşian: Tough, very tough. Because with the welfare, that's only 142 Lei [a little more than 30 USD] ...

Interviewer: What other ways did the company use jobs to try to convince people to sell?

Roşian: There were other situations like this, similar. They would give you a job for 2-3 years or more, and then after they signed over the property, they wouldn't keep them as workers anymore.

Interviewer: Really, it was that obvious?

Roşian: Yes, yes, yes. (RMCF Volunteer, Interview, Nov. 25, 2019)

Firstly, the Roşian notes a disingenuous tactic: RMGC did not consider those who sold and moved 'too quickly' locals any longer, making them ineligible for employment. Kuyek (2019)

notes that mining companies often do not honour verbal agreements, and therefore recommends any agreements with mining companies be legally documented. Secondly, the work that was offered to Roşieni was seasonal labour, not the long-term employment the company promised. RMGC employment of Roşieni also peaked during 2013, which parallels the peak of the SRM campaign and its protests. This suggests that the RMGC attempted to buy local support during periods of stiff opposition against mining development. Further, continued employment by RMGC seems to be dependent on Roşieni still possessing property that the company wished to purchase. In other words, once RMGC acquired all needful property from a Roşieni the company was no longer interested in employing them.

For many Roşieni dependent on the state mine, the urgency of finding employment may have obfuscated the finer points of what RMGC was offering them. One Roşian recounted the situation, and their conversation with a RMGC employee:

Roşian: I am certain that they [pro-RMGC Roşieni] didn't even read about it, didn't inform themselves on what a project of this scale means.

Interviewer: They just accepted that it was somebody giving them a job.

Roşian: Yes, this is what made it through to their minds: the work. But I don't know what they would have known how to do. I had a discussion with the director of the company, he requested a talk. We talked for seven hours. I got him to tell me how many people from Roşia Montană were going to work—to see if he was prepared—because if he said 1000, I would have said “you're lying.” But actually, he was honest and said that in Roşia Montană there are no people who were going to work in the type of mining that they were doing. There are no specialists here. So then I asked what was going to happen. He said that “we would send them to learn.” “And until then you put the exploitation on hold and wait for them to come?” And I said that if he's a man, he should go outside and tell them what he told me, tell people on the street. This, because he was saying—and it was the politics of the company—that the project was for the people in Roşia Montană. (RMCF Member, Interview, Oct. 24, 2019)

This Roşian deduced that Roşieni were unlikely to benefit from the project in any substantial way. Roşieni miners were inexperienced with the large-scale, cyanide leaching techniques and it was illogical for the company to put the entire project on hold to wait for locals to receive training. Promises of local employment were ultimately a farce.

Kin Groups. RMGC's manipulation tactics extended beyond purchasing and employment to the social relations that made up Roşia Montană. RMCF argue that the corporation “increased instability and disunity among family members” (Community, 2013).

The testimonies of many Roşieni describe how RMGC caused this breakdown of social relations through manipulation tactics aimed at family groups. These narratives illuminate the breadth and experience of such deceptions. Several are presented in succession below to present a fuller picture:

I had a brother who worked for them and their kids would say the same, to sign. I didn't want to, and they wouldn't take only half of the property, they wanted everything. And since I didn't agree, he worked only a little while after that, a year, and then they let him go too. And he kept arguing with me, but I said give me a job and then I'll sign. But since they didn't, I didn't sign either. (RMCF Volunteer, Interview, Nov. 25, 2019)

We didn't realize. They wrote things, they started files, and wrote whatever they wanted. I had two aunts here who didn't sign anything, only their kids. They needed to sign too, so they can get their shares too. No, they already made files for those who had some elderly family, like [a Roşieni] who sold their father's house and their apartment, and they stuck the elderly folks in care. Even the kids were for the money, and the poor elderly folks—Lots of suffering. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 19, 2019)

So they came, the first time with *lugu-lugu* [to make false promises, to lie] with everyone and then they changed the method, slowly. Then they started to attract people to their side, they started to instruct them, we started to become disunited. So the motto, *divide et impera* is more applicable than ever. This was from the Roman times, the Romans came with *divide et impera*, divide and rule. They did the same thing. They divided us slowly, slowly. They caused feuds between family members, some against others. So they came and bought, at a certain point, they bought a quarter of a house. So only one didn't sell. One sold his share and the rest stayed. The company has a quarter of that house. But that quarter can never be taken out of there, how would you take a quarter out of the house, you can't. But in order to force the others to sell, they hung on to anything they could hang on to. To everything they could hang on to. They disunited people, very many had their parents here. There were 4-5 in a family. They said, you stay here, because you're younger, you stay here, stay with the house, you take care of our parents, you burry them, and our share we give to you. And they went to the notary, and through the notary they made the retrocession. Well, the company came, they took them, and whoever wanted to sell, "come, I'll sell my part." They came and they did a removal from the division and divided the property, each with their share. If there were 5, they made 5 gates, for each, and instead of giving the money to the one who sold the house because he was the owner, they gave it to the others too. They called the other siblings to come there and they gave them their shares. And the siblings said, "Dear brother, we need money too." "Yes, yes dear brother, but you gave up your share, see, I have the paper here." But that wasn't taken into consideration. So they broke the laws in Romania gravely, gravely they broke them. (RMCF Volunteer, Interview, Nov. 25, 2019)

Interviewer: The association [AM] has shrunk quite a bit, why do you think so many people have left?

Roşian: It got smaller because first of all, how to say, the natural elimination too. There were people who were older and they passed on to the eternal, others—pressures, probably. I can't say 100%, I'm telling you as I—pressures from the family, because they had no respect, they stuck their noses in so that they can get what they want and they didn't care if people suffer, or families. And families too, maybe the kids. Lots of the kids were gone and what did they say, “You are older, so we will take you beside us” and the poor elderly gave up quick, because moving them when they are old—they cannot adapt anymore. In our families there were [divisions] too: my sister-in-law, because my mother-in-law was in the association [AM], and my sister-in-law brain-washed her with the company and made my mother-in-law change and they went. They paid them and they left, and now it is their problem. We do not have—they are upset with us. I don't know why. The mother-in-law said to us, “you should leave too.” You left though, so what do you care about what we do, or about Roşia. Once you left, what business do you have? Well, that means you didn't care about culture, about the environment, about anything, so what business do you still have here? (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 29, 2019)

First of all, they would come and try to, in each family there was one person who needed a job. Meaning, he worked for mining and then when that closed down, he ended up without a job. So the company first of all offered a job. And of course, he opted for that job and then they would convince him to sell their house too. It was very easy for them. They knew how to attract people. “We'll see.” It was like a war. You lose your people, you lose the war. Even one of the ladies from the Gold said to me, “With each day that passes, you are left with fewer people. And then you become weaker.” (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 13, 2019)

Roşian: They basically break our community apart, in two sides. My mother and her sister, they are not getting along [with] each other. The sister of my mother was for the project, my mother was against it, and so that also started a fight that we still feel the roots of the fight also today, as we are not quite close together. There was huge, huge fights, as they wanted to start the project, they wanted to work. My aunt and my uncle, they wanted to work for the project. It was the same as for the others. It was like a god, this project and this company, coming here in the area and making the jobs and so on. And we didn't want to, and they were telling to them “Look, it's their fault, it's because of them we can't start the project.” Of course, they got really mad of us “because they are not selling.”

Interviewer: So you noticed all that tension as a kid?

Roşian: Of course, I mean with my aunt, when I was really little before all of these things we used to have pictures—I mean with my uncle and my aunt—but you know, after that we really broke apart. I mean, yeah, we talk but, again, we avoided the subject and so on, but didn't as nice before. (AM Member, Interview, Oct. 25, 2019)

These stories demonstrate how the company identified members of Roşieni families most vulnerable to seduction: the young, those who had already moved away and forsaken their

shares, and those in need of work. The company leveraged that vulnerability to dissolve bonds between Roșieni and Roșia Montană, and thus also the social relations amongst Roșieni. In Daub's (2012) documentary, Roșieni describe how in another case one, stepbrother refused to sell but the other sold his share of the property. One former Roșianca whose family had sold and relocated to the Recea community developed by RMGC, stated that her family had moved because of the children. However, despite accepting the company's offer she related that she cried when the company tore down her family home and that the company was responsible for spreading a lot of unnecessary hatred between the villagers. These testimonies also demonstrate that RMGC used unethical if not illegal purchasing mechanisms, such as buying properties in part, buying from persons who no longer held shares, and directing others to manipulate their elderly family members to sell.

Women and Roșieni Elders: Deep Roots of Roșia Montană. Social relations rooted Roșieni to Roșia Montană. Therefore, the company made significant efforts to manipulate and tear them from the locality. Roșieni elders represented the deepest of these roots and therefore a threat to mining development. Unsurprisingly, Roșieni elders suffered heavily from the impacts of manipulation. When RMGC first arrived in Roșia Montană, there were many widows whose husbands had died from occupational lung disease related to mining—Silicosis (Daub, 2012). The children of many such widows sold their properties and sent them to care facilities, but there are stories of women who broke free and returned to Roșia Montană only to be apprehended by the police days later. There are also many stories of deaths of those resettled, shortly after their departure, including death by suicide. Another elderly couple sold on the advice of their nephews but could not adapt so they tried to return to Roșia Montană. Since they could no longer stay in the home they had sold, they died by hanging themselves rather than being removed (AM Member, Guided Tour, Oct. 8th, 2019). Another elderly man's family tricked him into selling by signing a paper unawares, that stipulated he could stay in his home until he died. This man only found out he no longer owned his home in Roșia Montană when he went to pay his property taxes and was told he no longer had property in Roșia Montană.

Women were also adversely impacted by the displacement efforts in specific ways, which is characteristic of capitalism (Carpenter & Mojab, 2017; Kwaipun, 2009). As noted above, elderly widows were particularly vulnerable to manipulation tactics. Further, as one elderly Roșianca noted, women adapted to rural life faced adversity after being relocated to urban areas:

They wanted to move the whole population here but weren't able to. I told them, don't be stupid and leave. No one comes to your country for you. They come for themselves. To take what's best, in the shortest amount of time, and to leave the fucking whole area destroyed. And it's destroyed forever, you can't do anything about it. Especially women. Men maybe could find some jobs, but women no way. And there were lots of women here. To tell you how many people left. About 7,300. People are suckers. They thought, they did get money for the houses and land, but do you think you'll live your whole life with that money? *Doamna*, the city is the city, it's not the same as in the country. Women in the city, lots of them now work, fair. But it's hard, you can't manage with a salary. (AM Member, Nov. 14, 2019)

The promises made, and expectations created by RMGC were not commensurate with the reality that many Roșieni experienced. Employment opportunities created by mine sites do not provide the same opportunities for women as they do men (Kuyek, 2019; Kwaipun, 2009). Thus, mining induced displacement is particularly detrimental for rural women, whose primary responsibilities often are tied to the *gospodărie*. One AM member described how RMGC preyed upon these experiential disparities between Roșieni based on their intersectionalities:

At the same time, everything fell on the state, as in the person was not as affected or conscious—involved in a manner that would allow him to notice and critique things. But now, the case was one of disappearance, displacement, relocation, and everything was to be done very fast, before we could even tell what was going on. We would have awoken having been taken from a rural area where income was not bad and the cost of living pretty low, to environments where many of us would have a very hard time accommodating, particularly the elderly. The young have had a better fate because of their ability to get hired, but we need to understand these things in their complexity—it's not as simple—because if you would have interviewed only young folks who worked for the company they would have put forward one perspective, the elderly another perspective, but if you lift yourself up above and look in all directions, you would have seen the whole puzzle. Actually, that's what the sociologists brought by the company did: they stayed here for about a year, studied the community in great detail, and identified its vulnerable spots, and that's where they started to dissolve the community. (AM Member, Interview, Oct. 17, 2019)

Manipulation culminates in the exploitation of the most vulnerable members of a community. Often, those most rooted have the most to lose from displacement. This explains why manipulation tactics, understood as a means of temporarily “transforming the victim into a beneficiary,” are crucial to the figurative uprooting and literal preparatory work for mining.

Manipulation was also aimed at the social relations undergirding the opposition to mining development. One Roșian told the story of a Reuters journalist—Adrian Dascalu, who later worked for RMGC—that tried to prove that the Roșieni refusing to sell to RMGC were actually

willing, but wanted a very high price for their properties (RMCF Member, Field Notes, Nov. 13, 2019). The Roșian was meeting with other members of AM in his courtyard when the journalist came up uninvited and asked, "So have you changed your mind? Have you thought of a price, or a range?" He replied, "I think you have the wrong address my friend." This was another example of how agents working for the company attempted to create distrust within the RMGC's opposition and pressure to sell.

Anatomy of Mining Dispossession Conclusion

This chapter presented knowledge on the agents and tactics of mining DFDR at Roșia Montană, produced by local Roșieni and their solidarity networks learning in social action against the project. The stories told by Roșieni demonstrate the predatory tendencies of the extractive industry, which depend on corporate-state alliances governed by capital logics. This nexus marshalled authoritative legitimacy and coercive force to push mining development forward. In the face of determined resistance, RMGC turned to subtler tactics including persuasion, hegemonic seduction, and deceptive manipulation. Local knowledge contextualizes these realities, not as some abstract financial game, but as real suffering, material and ideological dispossession, and even death. However, stories of dispossession are not only sites where oppression is deployed; dispossession is contested through resistance and learning.

CHAPTER FIVE: Learning in Social Action

Roşia Montană was an incredible accident in our society. It was, basically, a community of peasants had a normal reaction towards a project, a mining project, that planned to destroy their community, and nature, and take away the opportunities of development in the region and so on. And they realized that, very clearly—their lucidity, something that is very interesting—and they stood up to it. And it was such an inspiration the way they did it, completely autonomous, without it being taught, without having a history of resistance in the region that could have built at. It was so genuine and so impressive that it sparked a lot of support from civil society and so on... And from other peasant communities. (NGO Member, Interview, Sep. 25, 2019)

Chapter four presented knowledge artifacts produced through learning in social action, which spoke to the destructive juggernaut that is globalizing capital—in this case embodied by RMGC. This chapter will take up the research questions by exploring the learning processes that created such knowledge artifacts by highlighting three themes. Firstly, it will explore catalyzing fomentations of resistance and related processes of incidental learning. Given the *țărani* elements of Roşieni resistance and the dispersed nature of rural struggle, this chapter will pay careful attention to what Scott (1985) describes as everyday forms of resistance, which require little planning and may be forms of self-help. Secondly, it will explore the informal processes of praxis that characterize early and ongoing aspects of the Roşieni struggle for of Roşia Montană. The thematic of place-based reflection and action speaks to the keystone role of the grassroots resistance to this struggle and dialogues with the second research question by describing the contextual knowledge that would later form the foundation of the broader struggle. Finally, it will speak to the growing structure of the struggle, which lead to multiple forms of organization, non-formal and formal learning processes, and ultimately the force required to sustain a long-term struggle and shake the state to its core. While these themes are organized roughly by the chronology in which they occurred, they should not be viewed as distinct steps in the evolution of the struggle, but rather interwoven and ongoing processes.

Resistance and Related Learning at Roşia Montană

Roşieni narratives demonstrate that incidental learning played a pivotal, if initial, role in igniting local anti-mining resistance and struggle. The unannounced appearance of company employees conducting prospecting and exploratory work is often the first opportunity whereby locals learn about a potential mine site (Oliver-Smith, 2010; Kuyek, 2019). This was consistent in the case of Roşia Montană, where incidental learning sites catalyzed rising Roşieni

awareness—this is the first sub-theme in this section. It also resulted in a sort of informal, unstructured, rudimentary praxis of experience and reaction, which further built awareness of what the project meant for locals (Foley, 1999; Freire, 1970).

While AM and RMCF contain both members who identify as *țărani* and members who do not, the ongoing independent actions taken by members are consistent with Scott's (1985) description of peasant struggle. Scott theorized that some forms of peasant survival and livelihood persistence in development contexts represent resistance to domination and a rejection of exploitative notions of progress. Similarly, the second sub-theme addresses Roșieni livelihood alternatives that represent their rejection of material and ideological dispossession. Scott's theorization is also reflected in the third sub-theme, which describes how Roșieni subvert RMGC's legitimacy for enacting DFDR.

Learning Fomenting Local Opposition to Mining Development

Foley (1999) argues that adult learning takes place informally and incidentally as people live, for example, through their pursuits, and “naturally and socially in workplaces, families, community organisations and social action” (p. 7). Since locals often first hear of mining development projects in their area when preparatory work first begins, incidental learning and the formation of grassroots resistance often occur at the site of first encounter (Geenen, 2014; Hall, 2013; Oliver-Smith, 2010; Kuyek, 2019; Velicu, 2020). As one Roșian explained, it was by friendly happenstance that he first learned of the existential threat that RMGC posed for his village:

Roșian: ...I dedicated the rest of my life, and I am not exaggerating... to fighting this company. I realized that nothing is more important than saving Roșia Montană even from the beginning, because I realized that Roșia Montană is being threatened. Even if the approach of the company was done in a shy and friendly way, I realized that what the company wants is aberrant for this place. As I told you, I had other priorities, I was a young married man, I wanted to and did start a family, maybe I wanted peace, we even built a house, but once the company made its appearance I realized that Roșia Montană is no longer a quiet place. I met the first employees of this company who didn't pose a threat yet, I didn't see them as a threat. They came here, the first geologists from the company came here and we were neighbours, we became friends, they were from Australia. More than that, they asked me to rent them the house from the historical centre by the store, to rent it to them because an exploration team was going to come and they were going to do some exploring, and I didn't realize what was going on. Because I don't think they had a project development plan yet, they were just exploring, and they hadn't bought any houses.

Interviewer: When was that?

Roşian: In '95-96. More than that, I helped them find a babysitter for their kid, I helped them find a cleaning lady for the house, we were actual friends and we'd see each other every day. But during a discussion on a Sunday, they said “if you see this mountain”—this is also the place of my dreams, the view [in reference to where we sat]—“if I look at this mountain, in 25 years it would no longer be there,” they said very cynically. Also, that this is where the biggest mining project in Europe was going to develop, and that they would start buying land and houses in order to make this project happen. For me, hearing this from his mouth raised an alarm, although right after this the number of employees increased, their offices multiplied, they looked for office spaces and they started the process of spreading information locally. Each of us, each door, would receive a manifest, first a piece of paper which informed us that a project of global capacity would start in Roşia Montană, with thousands of jobs, with new technology, with environmental restoration or environmental protection and there's a need for strong support from the community for this. So yeah, my understanding was that a very speedy agreement was made with the town hall or local authorities, everything was, after which they started consulting the people—actually, more like informing not consulting. The company started to inform people what was going on. (RMCF Member, Interview, Oct. 24, 2019)

Through befriending strangers and assisting them with finding lodging, childcare and hired help, this Roşian learned about the destructive nature of the project. Thus, the slowly massing company employees and properties developed a new meaning beyond simply being new neighbours. Further, this Roşian interpreted the company's actions through his own value system and integrated what he learned about RMGC into his daily life as a commitment to oppose the project. Another Roşian took notice of RMGC after witnessing Australian-Romanian businessman Frank Timiş— a mining “entrepreneur” accused of heroin possession, drug trafficking, and recently tax evasion—visit the village in association with the company as early as 1995-1996, stating when he saw Timiş alarm bells went off (Tomlinson, 2002; The wealthy businessman, 2019; AM Member, Interview, Nov. 18).

For other Roşieni, RMGC's large scale property purchasing campaign was the incidental experience whereby they learnt that the company intended to forever alter the village (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 18). RMGC's corporate-state alliance paired with the aggressive “negotiation” or dispossession tactics described in chapter four, created experiences that Roşieni learned from. As one Roşianca put it, the company's treatment of locals and the logic of the project left a lasting impression that was at odds with the goodwill it proclaimed:

They put a lot of pressure on us. We went through tough times. They didn't do good, what they did. To be honest with you that as long as we live, we'll remember them. The kind of people they had. They had some negotiator who were on us constantly, constantly. And then they created hate between those who were leaving—why don't you leave too? Then we sort of became hostile too. If someone would come here, foreigners or someone, they would come here to stay or to see the traditions and stuff. What are they coming for, that they didn't want to show anything? They didn't want anything, they wanted to leave. They turned around, tell us that we had to leave. We didn't agree. Then they realized that they're not serious, it wasn't serious what they [the company] wanted to do. I understand that they would say that they would create a lot of jobs, they would have so many jobs, and the young people would say let them come and do something. I understand the young people too, but they didn't think about the risks, big ones. And only for a few years, 15 years, with cyanide rain on the rocks, and they would do, that's what they said they would do. That was their project, cyanide rain. You can't do such a thing in an area, you maybe do it in the desert but not here where there's a population. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 19, 2019)

Many Roşieni did not passively receive the information they were fed by RMGC, as though deposited through what Freire (1970) described as banking education. Rather, they reflected on the meaning of the information and interpreted it in relation to their own context.

However, as Foley (1999) and Scott (1985) contend, these forms of contextual understandings and related processes of incidental learning are often difficult to articulate, go unrecognized as learning, or are experienced as a feeling of the situation. This was reflected, for example, in the simplicity with which one elderly Roşianca described how they came to oppose the company:

Interviewer: When did you first realize that the company couldn't be trusted?

Roşianca: From the beginning.

Interviewer: And how?

Roşianca: Well, through hard times. (AM Member, Nov. 14, 2019)

RMGC's negotiation dispossession tactics were ubiquitous, house-by-house, and intensive. Negative experiences were not passively felt, but rather actively interpreted by Roşieni into a broader picture of what the development project and the company meant for them. Resentment was broadly felt, and even Roşieni willing to sell noted that the company negatively influenced the community by dividing its Roşieni and their families (Daub, 2012). Since the company's divisive negotiation tactics were waged on a person-by-person or house-by-house basis, incidental learning was critical to grassroots opposition. When one Roşian was asked if he had shared his personal experiences with RMGC to inform others he said, "Not really, because a lot

of people had things happen to them too, so I didn't teach them” (RMCF Volunteer, Nov. 25, 2019). In other words, incidental and indirect experience taught Roşieni about the project.

Learning Se Poate—It is Possible—to Find Alternatives

*Of course, you can't ask for help if you don't help yourself too. First of all, **you need to be vertical** [my emphasis], so that you can be helped.* (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 29, 2019)

As noted earlier, Marxist scholarship critiques the efficacy of everyday resistance (Brass, 2015; Gutmann, 1993). However, anti-colonial scholarship makes the case that dispossession is composed of distinct but inseparable material and ideological processes (Kapoor, 2009a; 2017b). Indigenous scholarship also attests to this characteristic of—as Sockbeson (2017) labels it—“meta-dispossession,” and further presents surviving these interlocking aspects of dispossession as interwoven with resistance (Smith, 2012; Steinman, 2016). Given scholarship that describes how hegemonic ideas of linear, inevitable progress—one possible future/solution—forward ABD, survival becomes more than an autonomic concept (Frederiksen & Himley, 2019; Kapoor, 2009a; Kwaipun, 2009; Oliver-Smith, 2010; Smith, 2012; Velicu, 2020; West, 2016). Scott (1985) cautions that not all forms of survival represent resistance, e.g. survival via exploiting others, but only those that reject dispossession through alternative and continued forms of ideological and material reproduction. As Smith (2012) notes, survival too is a learning process.

In Roşia Montană, beneath the pro-Gold Corporation banner that reads “Mining is the only solution for Roşia Montană,” Roşieni are dispelling RMGC’s seduction by finding alternative ways to survive. Many of these alternatives are still located within capitalist markets and thus are contested spaces, however, they still weaken the extractive monopoly and the hegemonic corporate-state discourses. Whether classified by scholarship as resistance or a sort of semi-resistance or sub-resistance (which I will not attempt to do), it represents a real facet of grassroots struggle at Roşia Montană.

One female AM member, for example, shared that she worked for a local, activist initiated knitting company not associated with AM (Field Notes, Nov. 19, 2019). She related that the income helped maintain her household and that the work was something villagers could gather together and share in. She also shared that her household engaged in small-scale agritourism. Tourists provide income and help with work on the *gospodărie*, which up to 10 neighbors—now long gone—would have helped with in the past. Hospitality, sharing *ţuică*,

fresh cheese, the harvest, and conversation, with helpers, neighbours, and family were important parts of everyday social and material life. Small-scale tourism and businesses, while still located within capital, shatter the idea that Roşieni livelihoods are inherently dependant on mining. These alternatives represent possibilities for material, psycho-social, and ideological survival by addressing the loneliness, labour, and material scarcities affected through what Velicu (2020) terms prospective environmental injustice—or dispossessions inflicted by preparatory development. The activist who initiated the knitting businesses to help Roşieni sell some knitwear for additional income further iterated testimonies of what this work translated to for many of those still living in Roşia Montană:

Yeah, for the time they are knitting it's a very, in my opinion, a very good income and it has a very big impact. And I know from their feedback, there are different feedbacks, "I managed to buy my medicine and buy a pig for Christmas, and to pay all kind of things." "I managed to invest in an electric fence for my cows." It depends. Some of them also got this kind of feedback, that "I was depressed, I didn't know what to do, I had not activity, and I started to become useful and I felt that I am doing something, and I am not thinking so much about all kind of problems." It depends. There are all kind of feedbacks. Now for instance, this year but also last year, having everything organized and I can see, like the impact, also the financial impact, how much they actually earn for a month of knitting. Now we are knitting for 3 months: September, October, and November, also this month [author notes that this coincides with the seasonal slowing of agricultural work, when *țărani* would be less busy and more isolated]. December, I don't know exactly, because we are almost out of wool. No more wool to produce. We still have, but this month I think we will finish and then maybe we start with the famous socks. (SRM Activist, Interview, Nov. 9, 2019)



Figure 22 *Grassroots resistance artifact: traditional Roşieni-knitted țărani socks*

For Roşieni, finding alternative livelihoods to mining reinforces the idea that RMGC's destructive project is not inevitable. Adult education scholarship argues that hope and emotionality are critical to adult learning and to sustaining engagement in struggles (Butterwick & Elfert, 2015; Freire, 1970; Walter, 2007). As Freire put it, hopelessness is silencing;

Hope, however, does not consist in crossing one's arms and waiting. As long as I fight, I am moved by hope; and if I fight with hope, then I can wait. As the encounter of women and men seeking to be more fully human, dialogue cannot be carried on in a climate of hopelessness. (p. 73)

Roşieni engaging in anti-hegemonic survival cultivate the hope and material resources needed to persist with their lives and reject development discourse.

Another young Roşian member of AM described his return to Roşia Montană after attending post-secondary in a larger city. For young people wishing to return and struggle to protect and exist in the commune, RMGC's employment monopoly represents a serious challenge. Young Roşieni must learn to be confident and hopeful in their ability to survive:

Roşian: I was quite conscious that if I came back at that point here in the area, I don't have nothing to do in the area to be able to live here, and to earn my existence here, as there were money needed to renovate the house in order to open something. And I didn't have any knowledge, I don't know, in IT to be able to work as a freelancer or such thing. There was no option. Everything that you could do in the area, basically it didn't exist. Only if you were getting into the company, you could then have colleagues and so on that worked for the company. They weren't doing quite much, but yeah, they lived, they have a salary from the company and so on. For me it wasn't good, I was coming each weekend and during the holidays, and like that but not to live here. Basically, only after a while when I started to gain experience, and basically we started to invest and to make a room, and to renovate space by space, year by year, basically I was able to make a living here. That's quite good, because I'm quite happy that I'm living from my ideas that were put into practice. There is no one, there is no company, and no stranger, and this is what makes me happy, who got involved or who I work for—there was my ideas and my family's ideas that started to grow and to be able to make a living. This is quite good to see that. From your work, it can work... That's something huge for us.

Interviewer: *Se Poate...* So really realizing, any other alternative being possible is kind of like its own victory?

Roşian: Yeah, exactly. (AM Member, Interviewer, Oct. 25, 2019)

Even though this young Roşian was unable to access European grants or funds for entrepreneurship because of the mono-industrial zoning status, he found a way to invest his own

savings to make a living in his family's generational home—which he related preferring in the end since it affirmed his ability to be self-sufficient. Here Freire's point becomes clear, that the continuance of grassroots struggle is dependant on the belief that one will be able to lead a life worth living. Furthermore, this young Roșian consciously intertwines his survival, unassociated with AM, with personal tactics of resistance:

Yeah, exactly and this is my point: I'm not making all this with the guided tours only for a living, because what I'm also trying to make you know, I'm trying to make the story, to me, to be spread across the people who are coming to see what had happened here, because I know that we will need their support in the future. I'm quite sure that things won't remain like this. I'm quite sure that the company has other plans, and mostly because our government blocked the UNESCO decision and the company didn't sell any of their properties. I'm quite sure they will try it again, to come and to take all over it. This is the main reason of my tours, in order to show the people what was the story, what had happened here, for them to know the story. So maybe, back in the times when they will heard that, "look, the Canadian company want"—they will hear on the news—"they want to take their plans again to start the mining company," and maybe they will remember, some of them. "Well, I was in RM, I know this story, this is not right, I have to do something." This is what I hope to make the people who are coming, who are visiting, who I talk to, I want this story to be really well heard, and for most of them to know what had happened, and maybe in the future to react. Because I saw that, with the support of the people in the big villages, with the protests, and that it was made. Because of that, pretty much the project had stopped in the area.

This Roșian's tactic simultaneously addresses his survival, a non-formal education for the public, and solidarity networking. He even noted that he keeps his solidarity network in mind when properties go up for sale, to prevent them from ending up in the hands of the company. The conscious, everyday struggle of this Roșian, who did not identify as *țărani*, complicates notions that separate survival from resistance that affects needful social change. The complexity, tenacity, and awareness of his tactics—including leading tours that represent a form of consciousness raising, land-based, non-formal adult education—undoubtedly bear emancipatory potential.

Roșieni narratives also demonstrate that the survival of life in Roșia Montană is not simply the survival of individuals, but a social, communal struggle. AM members described how leaders in their association help elderly Roșieni by getting firewood, milk, and doing other sorts of work—but do so outside of the organization (Field Notes, Nov. 19th, 2019). These actions are social in nature, but Roșieni argue this is not organized social action. Rather, the work of AM leaders demonstrates common, everyday forms of resistance whereby Roșieni take

on the responsibility of caring for others in their commune, thus making alternatives to RMGC more viable for others. Another Roşian shared how his family helped care for an elderly woman impacted by the project, but clarified this work was not done as part of AM or organized action:

Roşian: It happened that my wife got involved, knowing the lady—she was my mother-in-law's neighbour—and being her neighbour, my wife gave her some medical attention. We [AM] didn't do these kinds of gestures. We encouraged people and told them to not count on outside supports, outside of themselves. You know what it's like? It's like skiing. When you're skiing, you can afford to incline in a curb, but when you're on flat terrain and lean in, you can fall. So then we encouraged people to put their centre of gravity on their own supports, not to expect financial support or other kinds of supports from elsewhere. That's what we considered normal, that they are conscious that things are just as they were up until then, but if there are extra efforts needed, maybe needing a pro-bono lawyer, we can do it through the association, not each on their own. So for us, this danger united us, but it didn't unhinge us, so that we were relying on the association or something else. Each of us did our own thing. Of course, some with more enthusiasm, others with less.

Interviewer: So the helping that happens in the community is just the community members helping each other, outside of the organization.

Roşian: Yeah, because we didn't have this in our mandate either. There are others who provide social assistance, like the Orthodox Philanthropy—they asked me if I wanted to be an administrator for the area here—or there's other associations, like the Red Cross, but yeah, we didn't have that in our mandate. Our mandate was to protect the right to property through legal means. That was something completely different. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 17, 2019)

This AM member articulates that it is important to members that AM continues to represent something specific: the defence of Roşieni properties from RMGC as a first line of defence against the project. However, this does not preclude the members themselves from supporting their community. Thus, supporting other Roşieni remains an everyday form of resistance that supports the human base of opposition. The member also notes that boundaries are important, since he believes that the struggle's success depends on its members' ability to remain self-sufficient. If Roşieni needed support beyond what locals could provide, AM was aware of other philanthropic organizations that could potentially help.

Possibilities within Retaliatory Resistance. Other forms of everyday survival, more distant from AM and RMCF, also contest RMGC's claim that life could not continue without their project in Roşia Montană. For example, locals tell stories of 150 *holoangari* that were laid off by RMGC (AM Member, Guided Tour, Oct. 13, 2019; Oct. 14, 2019; Field Notes, Nov. 19,

2019; RMC Volunteer, Nov. 25, 2019). The locals decided that they did not need RMGC in order to mine and returned to galleries themselves at night for some time. Eventually RMGC infiltrated these *holoangari*, filmed them, and had them put under house arrest. However, there are signs that some miners still return to the exploited areas of Carnic Massif to find gold and thereby make a living. Sadly, while I was in Roșia Montană, one AM member told me that a young Roșian of 24 had passed away, being injured in a water-logged gallery and refusing to seek medical help because he was mining illegally. AM members insist these *holoangari* act spontaneously, and without organization, but there is also historic precedence and resonance for Roșieni *holoangari* in local and national narratives.

Historically, Roșieni tell stories of the poorer inhabitants (usually ethnic Romanians) of the commune who, while under the Austro-Hungarian empire, mined galleries illegally (without a stake) at night and sold the gold under the authorities' noses (AM Member, Guided Tour, Oct. 13, 2019; Oct. 14, 2019). Eventually, the local Austro-Hungarian authorities established a barracks and attempted to securitize the village.



Figure 23 *The historic Austro-Hungarian Barracks in Roșia Montană.*

On a national level, “illegal” gold mining done under the nose of a foreign power (RMGC) also resonates with the ubiquitous term *haiduc*, that refers to local “bandits” who targeted oppressors like the Ottoman Empire.

An AM member I spoke to clarified that he did not condone theft, nor condemn the *holoangari* (AM Member, Guided Tour, Oct. 13, 2019; Oct. 14, 2019). As Scott (1985) argued, survival is not resistance if it exploits others, but the AM member noted that *holoangari* small-scale mining and processing did not interfere with the lives of other Roşieni. Occasionally, soiled clothes were left on Carnic Massif. However, the AM member said when he signalled the *holoangari* by piling the clothes up, the *holoangari* appeared to return and collect them, and therefore there was no problem.



Figure 24 Left: Clothes left at possible *holoangari* site. Right: Unprocessed ore heap.

Learning Demonstrated in Small Arms Fire

Scott (1985) notes that peasant rejection of hegemonic domination is also demonstrated by “an exchange of small arms fire, a small skirmish, in a cold war of symbols between the rich and poor” (p. 22). Hostilities can be “conducted over a shifting terrain in which there are many neutrals, bystanders, and reluctant combatants with divided loyalties,” which is reminiscent of the *holoangari* who began to work against the interests of RMGC when their employment was terminated. Peasant “small arms fire” also includes “war news,” immanent with incidental learning. Roşieni demonstrate knowledge of how to: avoid jeopardization through “all-out confrontation,” identify the complex sides of conflict, adapt to shifting terrain, and show that a foolish looking corporation is not omnipotent.

For example, one elderly Roșianca took pride in telling me how she dealt with the aggressive negotiators from RMGC:

I notice people who try to find an in. I saw that he was slipping. I've had people come here from Gold and they said we want this and that. And I said, "You know what, I'll tell you for the last time: you have nothing to do in my yard. I didn't build this house to sell it. I made it so I can live in it. And if you come back here a second time, I'll give you the axe." That's what I told them. No one came after. No one. I'm determined. Because us, our parents, worked for what we have. They worked. Even these miners, in Roșia Montană, they worked, they worked. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 14, 2019)

This courageous example of anger and resistance from one of the most vulnerable members of the community tested the boundaries of how much pressure RMGC employees were willing to exert. The threat was a gamble that produced a small-scale victory for Roșieni opposed to selling. The story clearly circulated within anti-RMGC circles: another AM member, unprompted, took joy in sharing the same story with me on a guided tour (Oct. 14, 2019). He also told me another story of an elderly woman who admonished AM to do more to oppose the corporate-state alliance, saying that if she were a man she would, “ride in on a horse and take everyone out,” and that when she was younger she would have been worth two men. For AM members these stories are humorous, encouraging, and even inspiring. Thus, everyday Roșieni “small arms fire” provides emotional sustenance for resistance.

Roșieni “small arms fire” also includes locating their current struggle in relation to their history and traditions. For example, one elderly Roșian told me that when he thinks of all the Roșieni who sold, left and ran out of money or died, he is reminded of the old stories of the Dacian curse of the gold, that “*Blestemul aurului este pentru cei care se vand*” or “The curse of the gold is for those who sell themselves” (Field Notes, Nov. 18, 2019). Other Roșieni hint that the selling of their land is immoral through Christian allegory, recalling that Christ was also sold for 30 pieces of gold (Daub, 2012). When in Roșia Montană I attended a service at the Unitarian Church, which is held in high regard by Roșieni of AM and RMCF (Field Notes, Nov. 17, 2019). The minister referenced Luke 12:13-21—the “parable of the rich fool” which warns about greed turning to loss—and Matthew 6:19-21, which reads:

Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth, where moth and rust doth corrupt, and where thieves break through and steal: But lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, and where thieves do not break through nor steal: For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also (KJV).



Figure 25 *Chronicles of mining opposition line the walls of the Unitarian Church.*

Read in the context of Roșia Montană—which is important since the church walls are decorated with information on the struggle—these verses are an indictment of RMGC and the Roșieni who operate solely by capital logics and the promise of financial gain. Such metaphors are particularly relevant given the stories of villagers who exemplify non-resistance survival: those that took loans and built more structures on their property so they could demand more compensation from RMGC, but ultimately lost their properties to banks (AM Member, Guided Tour, Oct. 13, 2019).

The overview of ABD tactics in chapter four demonstrated that religion is a contested space in the context of mining development at Roșia Montană. Roșieni religious “small arms fire” challenges the morality of RMGC and its supporters. Artifacts of this contestation exist throughout the village.



Figure 26 *A cross raised by a traditional gathering spot by Taul Mare, drained to crush ore. The public symbol reads: “Raised by Zeno Cornea as thanks to God for saving Roșia Montană, in honor of the Roșieni who did not sell their souls and properties, of all Romanians who took to the streets to save Roșia Montană and in honor of the families Ravai, Mestecan, Roman, Emilia, Brutus, and Liviu. August 2017.”*

One example is the cross at Taul Mare, which equates selling one’s property for mining development to forfeiting one’s soul. Another is the graffitied likeness of a weeping mother and child, reminiscent of Mary and Christ-child, overlooking the village from its weather station.



Figure 27 Graffiti of weeping mother and child, reminiscent of Orthodox Christian allegory. The worn accompanying text is from national poet Mihai Eminescu’s “Glossă,” which reads:

*Days go past and days come still,
All is old and all is new,
What is well and what is ill,
You imagine and construe
Do not hope and do not fear,
Waves that leap like waves must fall;
Should they praise or should they jeer,
Look but coldly on it all.*

Beside the graffitied image, a literary allegory calls for perseverance and critical consciousness. When paired with religious imagery at a sight point overlooking Roșia Montană, the message here is consistent with other religious small arms fire and appears as a tool for incidental adult education: act consciously; your actions matter and have moral implications.

Other aspects of Roșieni spirituality are also invoked as moral small arms fire. Romanian folk tales of *vâlve*—mountain spirits—are interwoven with regional Christianity (Daub, 2012; Piso, 2011b). *Vâlve* are described as rewarders of piety and guardians against greed, who select, protect, and guide worthy miners in both the discovery and distribution of their wealth. *Vâlve*

also obscure mine veins or punish those who act greedily by taking beyond what is gifted without satiation. In Daub's documentary, one Roșian stated RMGC was also subject to the arbitration of the *vâlve* who guard the mountain galleries of Roșia Montană. Thus, RMGC's capital logics are re-interpreted through local Roșieni folklore and condemned as amoral greed.

Other Roșieni also used the history of the region to contextualize their struggle. One Roșian used the oppression of historical foreign powers like Rome, and the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires to explain who benefits from mining development; another elderly Roșian stated that the Dacians, Moți people, and modern Romanians share origins (Field Notes, Nov. 19, 2019; AM Member, Interview, Nov. 29, 2019). Historical and cultural associations that connect RMGC's actions to other oppressive foreign powers, and Roșieni struggle to renowned resistance impugn the corporation's claims that it is beneficial for the community and contextualizes the struggle of Roșieni opposing the mine as a moral one.

However, Roșieni small arms fire is not always steeped in cultural, traditional, historical, or religious meaning. Incidental contestation, imminent with anti-hegemonic realization, often occurs through simple name-calling, or what Scott (1985) calls character assassination. For example, one RMCF Member described the Romanian government leaders who allowed this as “*gogleazuri*”—finely chopped garbage, and one of RMGC's displacement architects as “the snake with glasses” (Nov. 5, 2019). Further, when a representative of Romania's secret service labelled all RMGC opposition *Green-Peace-isti*—attempting to characterize Roșieni of AM as outsiders and terrorists in an overarching belonging narrative—local Roșieni retaliated by calling RMGC employees and their supporters *Gold-isti* (AM Member, Guided Tour, Oct. 14, 2019). These actions reflect not only spunk and cleverness, but critical Roșieni learning: *gogleazuri* leaders do not produce policies that are helpful for Roșieni; snakes with glasses are something to be cautious of but not to fear; and amoral *Gold-isti* cannot be trusted to dictate the politics of belonging.

Place-Based, Informal Roșieni Praxis

For Freire (1970), conscientization requires that subjects reflect on a historical reality to be transformed. Conscientization is both an ever-moving goal and a problem-posing process (Freire, 1970; Ollis, 2008; Patton, 2017). When learners pull elements out of the “background” of their concrete realities for consideration, they “develop their power to perceive critically *the way they exist* in the world *with which* and *in which* they find themselves” (p. 64). The first sub-

theme in this section highlights how Roşieni held up RMGC's claims and tactics to the light of their pre-existing knowledge of mining activities, thus demonstrating learning processes of comparative reflection. Scott (1985) suggests that peasants engage in a similar process of reflection by way of a "*remembered village* and a *remembered economy* that serve as an effective ideological backdrop against which to deplore the present" (p. 178). Scott argues that this remembering enables "a struggle over facts and their meaning, over what has happened and who is to blame, over how the present situation is to be defined and interpreted." Likewise, the second sub-theme identifies how Roşieni drew on their histories and contexts in order to compare and assess their present realities, and the future proposed by RMGC. The third sub-theme dialogues with resistance literatures by showing discussing ideological contestation of dominant globalizing values and the building urge for a countermovement to protect the local community and environment against market aggression.

Reflection: Mining Knowledge

As noted in chapter four, Roşieni live in a geographically historic mining locality and many are quite familiar with the shifting politico-historical realities that shaped mining practice. Mining knowledge was acquired through integrating training, hands-on experiences, historical knowledge, and family experiences:

Because I had experience in mining, so my dad died at 48 years old of silicosis, because here in Roşia Montană was lots of silicon and it's a professional disease. And I learned from a young age, from being "this big," I knew what a gallery is, I knew what a '*suitoare*' is, a '*inaintare*' [gallery styles]. I even prepared and got to do mining topography, and I coordinated mining work. I knew very well what a project, such a big project like the one here, because the project that was proposed in Roşia Montană was six times bigger than the Roşia Poieni one. Although the Roşia Poieni quarry is one of the biggest quarries in Eastern Europe. So I knew what the project meant... They want to do some extraordinary things, the project that Ceausescu did, during Ceausescu's time, and which Ceausescu said no, because it's too much. And I realized what danger we are in and that's how I ended up opposing the project. (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)

Roşieni mining knowledge became a point of reference for considering RMGC's project, thereby creating new knowledge and meaning from corporate information. One Roşianca opposed to RMGC's project saw their regional education and work experiences as tools for resistance:

We were lucky because in college, in Baia Mare, we studied geophysics. And the earth has a lot of types: the earth's electricity, radiometry, seismography, magnetometry. So

then if they opposed, and we opposed the project, we had some weapons.

Roşieni mining knowledge was so formidable, it was also recognized by activists who travelled to Roşia Montană to learn about and support the resistance:

They knew before RMGC published their mine proposal, they knew exactly how the mine proposal would look like, cause they know where every gram of gold is, and they know everything. Super, super smart. [AM leader] went to the famous school of mines in Petroşani, so [AM leader] is a very good mining engineer. And so amongst the members of AM there were topographers, geologists, engineers, I mean the best of the best, of the best, of the best, of the best, and there was also [AM member]... the local schoolteacher, and she opened the mine museum that you can visit in Roşia Montană... the Aurul Mines, she opened it, and she basically knew a lot about Roşia Montană and the history, and she knew where all the Roman mine galleries are, like Carnic, that famous place. (SRM Coordinator, Oct. 15, 2019)

The politico-historic processes of nationalization had professionalized many Roşieni as miners, enabling them to anticipate ramifications obscured by the company. In other words, Roşieni themselves constructed knowledge that RMGC had withheld.

For example, Roşieni familiarity with other extractive projects in Romania, which was mentioned in chapter four, suggested that large-scale pit mines create enormous and long-term ecological destruction—a reality confirmed by other accounts of extractive projects (Leech, 2012; Kuyek, 2019). As with Geamăna, resettlement compensation is also typically inadequate.

Roşian: So these guys “appeared on our heads” [a surprise burden] in Roşia Montană, this company, and in the beginning people were reticent, they didn't accept. So, when the company came here 98% said no, we don't accept this sort of thing, to do the exploitation, because mining has been done here for the last 2700 years. People knew what mining meant, and especially because here, very close is Roşia Poieni—that's where I beat the first stake in the Roşia Poieni quarry and I coordinated the activity there from a topographical point of view for 25 years. And I left that, now I've been retired for 20, and I left that there and I still go. I've been there recently and I saw that what I left there is still there. They didn't need to touch again the peaks that were there, because the quarry is very beautiful at Roşia Poieni, from a technical point of view, it's an extraordinary achievement, but from an ecological point of view, it's not good. But that's life.

Interviewer: Would people around here have been very familiar here with Geamăna at the time?

Roşian: Of course, how wouldn't they? How wouldn't they? They knew *domnule* [sir]...

Interviewer: And Baia Mare of course.

Roșian: I did studies in Baia Mare. It was well known Baia Mare, the accident in 2000 in Baia Mare was very well known. But especially when a director from Hungary came, Tibor Kocsis, who came here in 2000 and filmed all of the activity here, and he had filmed the part in Baia Mare, how the fish were being taken out, with everything that was here. (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)



Figure 28 *Graffiti beside Geamăna reads “Do not forget Geamăna, Save Roșia Montană”*

Roșieni understood the risks that extractive projects posed from other mining operations. When RMGC proposed an even larger project than Roșia Poieni/Geamăna, Roșieni knew the risks were also larger. The “noxious” impact of exploratory drilling described in chapter four, would also likely increase with increased mining activity. Roșieni knowledge of the existing gold reserves also did not align with RMGC’s valuation of the project. Therefore, they anticipated that the entirety of the project and its benefits were overestimated: “...they told us the whole exploitation would last 17 years. No. They lied with no shame. The whole exploitation would last maximum 10 years and they would have taken everything that was here.” The ability to anticipate knowledge ignored or withheld by RMGC helped shatter the company’s attempts at seduction and thus became a tool for resistance.

Additionally, Roșieni mining knowledge allowed locals to predict the repercussions of the project for alternative livelihoods. One Roșianca recognized that the value of these lost possibilities was not considered in the rationale of the project and upended its logic:

You can't have both, parallel. Tourism and the project, no, because the project is with cyanide, a disaster. That's not possible. Lots of towns here will die if they come to do the project, that can't be done. That cyanide, it's a disaster, all the trees, the quarries, four

quarries to be ruined. That's why we're scared, we leave here because if they kick us out, they kick us out, but what will happen to the areas around for a radius of kilometers, what will they do? It's not possible what they wanted, it's not possible. For what so much trouble, for what? Because the green gold should be, not the gold that's in the ground—however much of it there is, and however long it would last, I don't know how long it will last. But this green gold and health should remain, not to kill yourself digging for that other gold. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 19, 2019)

By using the term “green gold” this Roșianca demonstrates a critical consciousness of her reality. To her way of being, the gold underground is of less value than the green forests and *gospodărie*.

Comparative Reflection: The Remembered Village, Economy, and State

Beyond mining knowledge, RMGC's preparatory work at Roșia Montană created a situation that Roșieni compare to other historical, experienced realities. Scott (1985) suggests such “nostalgia” is selective but functions to illuminate injustice despite its occlusions. For example, Roșieni challenge RMGC's narrative that mining alone could provide for the people through remembering the past commune:

Roșian: Before there wasn't, it was always said that mining was the base here in Roșia Montană. Truly, it was, somewhere, mining. But you didn't live only out of mining in Roșia Montană. People, at home, they had husbandry, they had cows, sheep, they planted things, they had pigs.

Roșianca: They sowed wheat.

Roșian: So they were, they did agriculture. Even though it was a mountainous area. They did specific agriculture. And especially here, raising animals was very developed. And as a culture, the potato was of value, sowed the most here. A long time ago, when it was warmer, they sowed wheat, barley, oats. So people made their bread at home then, they had ovens. So people didn't live only from mining. Those who worked at the mine would go to the mine—

Roșianca: Men, boys—

Roșian: Men worked so they could make some pension years. So that when they retire their livelihood would be guaranteed, from today to tomorrow, you know? Aside from the husbandry. Always, the attached *gospodărie* was very, very important. You didn't live—the company, “what, here you only lived from mining.” Come on sir, go steal sir. Because you didn't live only from mining.

Roșianca: And how it was the fashion to have lots of children, there was a cow at least, so that milk, butter, cream would be guaranteed, meat. (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)

Not only did RMGC's campaigning attempt to obscure the reality of how life was reproduced in Roșia Montană, but it silenced the life-giving role of the women who were the primary workers of the *gospodărie*. This demonstrates the gendered exploitation characteristic of capital relations (Carpenter & Mojab, 2017). Through the remembered village and economy, another Roșianca illuminated that not only is RMGC's salvation illusory, but the problems of the present village also fall at the corporations' doorstep:

Well, how to tell you. The women had work in the *gospodărie*. That's how it was, we worked in the *gospodărie*, and the men worked wherever they could, some had jobs, and we'd work on the farm. Once the company came, we couldn't work the same because the pastures were ours given to us by Maria Theresa [Austro-Hungarian Monarch]. How to tell you, who Maria Theresa was: she cared a lot for this community, and it was very rich, and she left us an inheritance for us. All of a sudden, they [the company] set parameters, they divided things, they divided things into parcels, and they were going to buy everything. Then they started buying things, buying things. We had a dispensary, they paid the doctor to leave, they gave him a billion lei [or 100,000 RON, approx. 22,600 USD] to leave. We had a bakery in our community, they destroyed it, they changed the space. Us locals didn't have access to the lands, the houses they bought. We don't have stores anymore, we buy bread on the street here, the bread car comes up the road and then we go on the road with a bag and we buy our bread. When we had stores, we had stores at every step. They ruined a lot of things, a lot of things. It's not going to come back because it's not possible. The people, they uprooted them, they scattered them...

And if we had a *gospodărie*, we would do it ourselves, I would give you milk, you would give me money, or whatever. We would manage. When they uprooted us and scattered us, I have no one to sell milk to, to sell a pig to, someone to help me. I don't have anyone. So we ended up bad, because of them we ended up really bad. We keep trying to stand up, to hold our own. A young man came here, he does knitting, so that we can do something, so we can produce something; so we can raise animals, so we can raise calves and sell them; so that we can have at home and then we don't have to go to stores and buy from there. And once our neighbours and others left, it's worse and worse, because we were a community here, we would all gather together, we would help each other with hay and other things. We all had lots of activities, but now we are alone, left like this, it's very hard. Very hard... (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 19, 2019)

Thus, Roșieni identify the processes by which RMGC creates the material and social structural violence they face, which further impacts cultural and ideological dispossession:

Roșianca: For Easter, Christmas, celebrations, we get together at church, we go, we visit each other, we meet up. We like it. Those who are left we would give our souls for each other because that is how it is. When we see that we are the ones left, and look what they did with us, and we understand each other, and wonder what will be from now on, for them to leave us in peace so it can all be over so we can at least be here in peace. In our area wasn't like in other areas, crime, or people to break in—doors were left unlocked to

rooms, no one would come in. It is a very peaceful area, we never had problems here. A community that got along, wow, they would sing romances, it is a shame that—it would be nice to have videos of our ancestors, how we would get together in the evening for stories, to crochet, we would crochet, laugh. It wasn't a mean, ugly community, we all cared about each other. Carols, we would sing, we had those traditions that we kept.

Interviewer: And that was what life was about.

Roșianca: That was our life. Now we are all scattered, we don't get together anymore, we can't. Lots of people died from distress, when they left they each felt foreign, and they couldn't—It was a beautiful, beautiful life. But what can you do, that's how it was meant to be. They could have come with different investments here, other things...

Physical erasure of Roșieni presence worked to demoralize local opposition but also highlighted contrast with communal memories. The demolition and abandonment of houses—which represent Roșieni lives and social relations—is also a constant reminder of what has changed since RMGC's arrival, as one elderly Roșianca related:

Yeah, you can imagine. 700 left. Maybe even more. The houses, lots of them in ruins. Lots of times you feel like crying, because all around here was full of houses. From here down to the Gura Rosie, very few houses are left. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 14, 2019)

The loss of houses reflects a loss of neighbors, and with them communal (and economic) means by which the village reproduced itself materially:

Roșianca: Because now you're left, you have no—there used to be neighbours here, now the forest is growing.

Roșian: They tore down the houses and now the forest is growing.

Roșianca: The foxes come and boars, up to the yard, in front of the house. The foxes come up at night.

Roșian: Foxes, but the boars, they're the ones that destroy.

Roșianca: And our chickens are now in a little, even during the day we have to keep them in a fenced area, because we'll end up with none otherwise. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 27, 2019)

These narratives demonstrate how Scott's remembered village was used by Roșieni as a reflective, emancipatory tool for understanding their present oppression and its root cause (Freire, 1970; Ollis, 2008; Patton, 2017). In these examples, RMGC's influence on the community is measured in terms of how the development project altered everyday village life.

Roşieni remembering can also be directed at politico-historical iterations of the state. As Foley (1999) would predict, Roşieni micropolitics played a significant role in determining how remembering and reflecting shape what is learned and whether learning has emancipatory potential. Chapter four described how informal Roşieni reflections on state power led many to believe they could be forcibly removed from their land and others to trust the authority of RMGC when it promised employment, to disempowering effect. For other Roşieni, reflection on corporate-state collaboration allowed them to connect media, government, and corporate claims to the familiar concept of propaganda. ever-present during communism:

SRM Coordinator: You know, a coin has two sides. On the one side, I think that the fact that the newer propaganda was from the old communist times, they were really good at sort of like fighting back at propaganda, or identifying much of Gabriel as propaganda. Because Gabriel was always in cahoots with the government, and don't forget that they sleep together, I mean "80/20." They would, of course, appear together on public tribunals or public spheres to show the perfect marriage— I presume that when they saw the post-communist wankers were continuing to talk in propaganda and things like that, for them it was easier to recognize that propaganda first by the government and then to associate it immediately with Gabriel because they were standing next to them. When I was in South America, when I was in Peru, when I was working with global opposition against gold mining. There, for people there was still, at the beginning when the gold-mining company came, they thought "*oh it's a company, oh it's multinational, es mui beloso, es mui bueno—it's a company!*" With AM, they never had that respect, they couldn't give a shit about this. I thought that was great, that was the whole idea, and I think that came because they were using the same propaganda as the government. And they knew that the propaganda is, that the government is, shit and corrupt and wankers and just leftovers from the communist times. In the communist times they would wear old suits, now they were wearing Armani, but that's the whole difference...

Interviewer: It seems like they already got the concept of propaganda based on their experience with the state, and then connecting, when they saw the state was complicit with the company, they knew that the company was also going to use propaganda.

SRM Coordinator: Right, that's exactly what I wanted to say. Thank-you Taylor. Their fight was so powerful and so great, because they are Eastern Europeans, and they take no fucking shit, because they went through so much shit, you know? And so they don't take any. Even when the European Commission, or European Parliamentarians came to Roşia Montană, and other countries, when they would go, Greece or I don't know, and they would go "We are MPs." At Roşia Montană with [AM leader], "Pffft, yeah do your work, do your job, prove to us that you are a good MP, and do your job, yeah?" And I like that arrogance, and—it's not an arrogance because arrogance is the flip-coin of insecurity, it's not that—they are sure, and they are stubborn, and they are strong. There is a famous saying in Romania, especially in Roşia, "*Eu nu cred, până nu văd.*" It means

"I don't believe anything before I see it." And that guided us really well. "Show me, show me, show me." (SRM Coordinator, Interview, Oct. 15, 2019)

Remembering back to the transition from communism, one Roşian noted that there were early warning flags that signalled the beginning of corporate-state collaboration:

It's interesting because you see, the land, the forests were given back. Everything was given back. But the gold wasn't, because it used to privately owned, and that wasn't given back. Normally, it should have been given back, it was private, people's property. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 27, 2019)

In this case, remembering consistently creates opportunity for praxis, but does not guarantee emancipatory progress. In the case of some Roşieni, reflection fomented resistance or was guided by leaders, whom Freire (1970) would describe as organic intellectuals, to that effect.

Roşieni narratives also complicate Scott's (1985) description of the selective nature of remembering. For Roşieni, the remembered state during nationalization marshalled coercive force against locals (much greater than the liberalized state), used propaganda, and created environmental destruction. On the other hand, the communist state also operated by logics closer to those of Roşieni. Roşieni do not idolize any particular iteration of the state, but rather reflect on their values and the benefits or harms they brought about:

Well, it didn't happen the same, because us, here in Romania, were in a socialist society that is superior to capitalism. Superior. From lots of points of view. Because, in socialism, the most valuable capital was the person, yes? In capitalism, the most valuable capital is money. So people have no value. So that's the thing. So we knew what it is. (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)

Through reflection, Roşieni identify complex notions of contested values and underlying philosophies, and thereby the logics by which the corporate-state alliance functions. Thus, Roşieni predicted RMGC's responses to human concerns and the actions it would prioritize.

Reflection: Contested Values to Countermovement, "My light lit here, here it will extinguish."

Learning sites that illuminate the contestation between Roşieni and RMGC values enable reflection on ideological dispossession and the implications of material dispossession. When Roşieni reflect on the proposed project, the differences between their values and those of RMGC, and what stands to be lost, they see their place-based culture and identities at risk. This is a critical to the formation of opposition. Scott (1985) states that:

It is impossible, of course, to divorce the material basis of the struggle from the struggle over values, the ideological struggle. To resist a claim or an appropriation is to resist, as

well, the justification and rationale behind that particular claim. (p. 297).

In other words, resistance to domination is both material and ideological. Roșieni resistance to RMGC's material project is driven by an oppositional set of logics, beliefs, and feelings.

Many Roșieni opposed to RMGC's project connect their resistance to ideology. This is demonstrated in religious small arms fire and interconnectedly in contested views of the land:

They want something they can ruin, they seek to excavate, to ruin. Those of us who stayed here see a pasture for our animals, we see green, we see trees. We see a living here, a life. They don't see life, they only see death. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 19, 2019)

This Roșianca reframes the contestation with RMGC from being about investment and profit to life and death. This is particularly stark given Freire's (1970) insistence that "Oppression—overwhelming control—is necrophilic; it is nourished by love of death, not life" (pg. 58). At Roșia Montană, RMGC is attempting to sacrifice the organic environment for inorganic gold, and to make Roșieni "receiving objects" for their plans rather than subjects. However, this Roșianca materially and ideologically rejects, and resists displacement:

When you think that you can't build anything, that you're just sitting there, not knowing what to do anymore. You're just waiting, and what are you waiting for? Where can you go and what can you do? Because nowhere would be better than here, because we're used to it here, we live well with only a bit of money. Once you have water and you don't have to pay for it, once you have so much wood for a fire whenever you want, you have peace. I can go pick raspberries, but can I go do that somewhere else? To pick blueberries, forest berries, I can go wherever I want. You're not sequestered, just sitting like in the city, not allowed to go there or there, I'm not allowed to do that, not good. I am free here, like a bird in the sky.

At the root of this Roșianca's resistance is her cultural, placed identity. When asked if she considered herself *țărani* (since not all Roșieni identify as such), she responded with a poem:

Of course, I'm in the country. We are in the country. *Țărani*, that's what we are:
"I make the apples and make the wine,
I plow the land year by year,
I know the taste of wormwood."
That's the *țărani*.

Țărani identity is critical for understanding Roșieni resistance. Roșieni, for example, accept property rights or the belief that land can be bought and sold—but critically, these exchanges, the transferring of who manages a plot, are not commensurate with the meaning of globalizing private property policies. The difference, and the reason for Roșieni resistance to

RMGC's project despite its property ownership, lies in the placed meaning of the land, which is difficult to articulate. For Roşieni, the land's meaning is material, cultural, and spiritual:

For me, the land is something holy. I was born on it here, and here I want to, in it I want to leave. I came from it, and I need to return to it. My place is here. It's not somewhere else. If it was somewhere else, I would have left when that wave happened. I, from the beginning, said that I'll go up to the fence, to the end. I won't be better off even if they kick me out. You can be very affected, but I told you, for me the land is holy. Oh, for a businessman who takes it from here, buys it from there, and as they say, there's no footbridge. For me, you know what it's like: like a birth certificate. It means that I wouldn't know, if I was to give up Roşia Montană, I would, how to say, I would give up my birth certificate. I wouldn't know who I was anymore. I wouldn't have a history, I wouldn't have the pleasure and culture in which I was born and lived my life and in which I want to be in it to the end. So for me, the land—I don't know, I talk for myself, in no way, others each have their opinion—but for me the land in Roşia is holy. It doesn't warm me up with anything to have double the amount somewhere else. You know how you'd be? Like a huge spruce tree and someone comes with strong equipment, they uproot it, and take it wherever they want. Maybe it won't die right away, but its time will be very short. It'll start to dry up and it won't do well anymore. That's how it happens for me... (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 29, 2019)

For this Roşian, resistance to displacement is existential. His meaning, as what Escobar (2001) termed a placeling, is derived from his continued existence in Roşia Montană. He further acknowledged that un-placed persons—those from the cities—may have difficulty in equating with this experiential reality:

Interviewer: For *ţărani*, what does a healthy environment, healthy forests, healthy pastures mean?

Roşian: What can they mean. Life, joy, the pleasure of living, of feeling good in those places, and taking forward that history, how it was. And first of all, history, because you have a history that you were born into, you can't—in the city it's different, in the city you are in an apartment building, if you know your neighbours you do, if not not. You understand? But in an area like this, people know each other differently.

Another Roşian used the metaphor of uprooting a tree to describe the impact of displacement on Roşieni who sold. Again, this reflects the existential nature of placed, Roşieni resistance:

Out of those who left from Roşia Montană, the 1600, there are over 700 who've died, who've been cleaned out. You know the story with the tree? If you pull an old tree out and I move it to a different area, what chances does that tree have to catch on? 5%, 10% is a lot. The same thing with man. If you take him from here, your roots are here, you move over there, it's like you're in the air, you float. You're a lost man. (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)

Thus, Roșia Montană is the source that sustains continued Roșieni reproduction.

These interconnected realities and the interdependence between Roșieni and the land show how RMGC's project represents what Sockbeson (2017) calls "meta-dispossession" for Roșieni. It also underscores the difference in how Roșieni see property, and thus property rights, property stewardship, and the sale and purchasing of property, as one couple described:

Roșian: There are only a few true *țărani* who won't sell. And you know what, that's the old folks, who are not around anymore, and the young people aren't—

Roșianca: Tied to the—

Roșian: Tied to the land. Those who were old, who died and are still dying, they cared and care for the land.

Roșianca: To tell you, my mother-in-law told me once, she says "if there was someone in the village, who wanted to sell a little piece of land, they would reach out" to my father-in-law.

Roșian: My father.

Roșianca: He liked the land, he liked the land.

Roșian: And he would buy it.

Roșianca: Any land, so that it doesn't end up in someone else's hands. We have in all different areas in his village.

Roșian: We have a lot of land.

Roșianca: It's not all in one place.

Roșian: In a lot of pieces.

Roșianca: That's what she said, whoever wanted to sell would go to your dad, she would say.

Roșian: He liked *gospodărie*, animals.

Interviewer: Why do you think it's hard to express what the land means? Because it's hard to define.

Roșianca: **It is a part of us. Because we are the land. You cannot explain it. We are the soil.** [researcher's emphasis] (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 27, 2019)

As these Roșieni relate, the root of their resistance, the land and its meaning, is lived and inexplicable. Land is bought and sold, and land is also inextricable from Roșieni themselves.

Another Roșian tried to express the *țărani* relationship with the land:

As a person who's worked on my grandparents' land in Moldova from a young age, I feel like it's tied to the human concept, like an anchor, you know? For some, it symbolizes stability, perennialism. You pass through time much easier and relaxed from an intellectual perspective when you know you have your own piece of land. Whereas, when you know that your owning the land or the land itself is being questioned by a

political power or institution that wants to make some grand development on your land, you have this feeling that something is being shaken within that security that you had... Like an orchard—grown in 40 years, so you have to think about how to do it, what kind of trees to plant. Or a grapevine, you plant it now and renew it after 20 years—so it's a thing, you invest money, time, your soul, not just waiting for things to happen. You build a house for your kids if you have any, and then they move somewhere else, and so on. You know, at least those decisions are yours, good or bad... But that's how people are made, meditative in nature and always looking at the past, not enough at the future, and those who do are usually businesspeople. More contemplative— they feed from that state, when they walk into the field in the morning, look at [AM Leader] or [Roșieni], or others—it's like they're at home—haha. Even when you see a person yawning while standing in their field, it's like they give you a certain sense of security—haha (AM Member, Interview, Oct. 17, 2019)

For Roșieni, accepting RMGC's plans would mean severing their humanizing relationship with the land, and abandoning their economic/material and cultural/ideological security. Further, the corporate-state alliance's attempts to undermine Roșieni rights to remain on their land—enshrined in the UN Declaration on the rights of peasants—caused a state of anxiety in the villages of Roșia Montană (Claeys & Edelman, 2020). Acknowledging and articulating the specificity of the relationship between *țărani* Roșieni and their relationship with the land of Roșia Montană created a critical consciousness about the future reality proposed by RMGC.

Roșieni described how these various contested values and understandings translated into their desire for futures that were irreconcilable with large-scale mining development. One Roșian, for example, described how he was unwilling to sacrifice his future, and the material, social, and spiritual relations with the land:

It's my native place, where I was born, and I did all my activity. I lived my life here. I will never accept for others to come to tell me "leave here so I can come here." I was born here, it's my native place. I'm tied to the land in Roșia Montană body and soul. I started a family here, I raised my children here, this is where my life is. In Roșia Montană. That's why I care about it enormously. It's my native village. (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)

Here, resistance is born from relationship with the land of Roșia Montană. However, Roșieni relationality with Roșia Montană is not solely confined to forward temporal flow into the future either. Standing atop a shepherd's hill, overlooking the valley, one Roșian simply said to me, "How can I forget my ancestors?" (AM Member, Guided Tour, Oct. 14, 2019). For many Roșieni opposed to selling, the idea of handing traditional land over to be destroyed is a betrayal of those who worked it before and of the land itself. As another elderly Roșianca put it:

How to tell you, the land is from the parents. My parents, my mother, had three hectares of land, and it wasn't here, it was in a different area. But she sold that and bought here, because the owner here died, over there. So she bought it here and they bought nine hectares on top of it. We had what we wanted, me and my brothers, to be here in the centre. The land is about the parents. The house too. It was very hard to build it. From a salary of 900 that my husband had, what could you make? (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 14, 2019)

In a sense, a denial of the land represents a denial of the stories of Roșieni suffering and survival, which is particularly true for *țărani*. Though the specificities shift, resisting annihilation has been the theme of *țărani* in the Apuseni mountains for hundreds of years, a reality felt through RMGC's attempted displacement as it was under the communist government:

You know, Ceausescu didn't, not that he couldn't have—people here in the mountains, before kicking him out he knew, he kept threatening us, that he would finish the *chiaburi* [wealthy people] in the Apuseni, that's what he called us. You think, us poor people had some animals and we were big *chiaburi*. He'd say he would finish the *chiaburi* from the Apuseni. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 29, 2019)

It was the same point another Roșian made when he said that future generations would see the actions of those who would not sell as akin to those of the Moți hero Avram Iancu (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5th, 2019).

For other Roșieni, the ancestors, personal past, and future are all bound up together and inextricable from the present. Spirituality links Roșieni to this specific space through tradition:

Roșian: We are tied to this place, since you know the place and you're used to it, it's not as easy to leave.

Roșianca: The children were in the area.

Interviewer: It sounds like your children and grandchildren give you strength as well to keep up the fight.

Roșian: Yes, yes. Of course.

Roșianca: Yes.

Interviewer: Do you think that this is especially true for *țărani* si *țăranca*? That they are especially resistant to selling?

Roșian: They're more determined, they fight stronger.

Interviewer: What makes them more determined?

Roșianca: You're tied to it [the place], it's different.

Interviewer: What does that mean to you, being tied?

Roșianca: To care about the past, the parents. The graves of our parents, grandparents are here.

Roşian: You're born here, you're used to it here, it ties you to the place.

...

Roşianca: For example, November 1st is the Day of the Dead. I go and respect my parents, I respect my grandparents, and my great grandma who I know from this cemetery. When mom lived, she respected her—

Roşian: They put lights and—

Roşianca: We tend to the grave and put flowers. So we are tied.

Interviewer: Do you think about your, because I know you think about your granddaughter when you're making this decision, do you think about your great-grandparents when you made the decision not to sell?

Roşianca : Of course, of course. It's something. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 27, 2019)



Figure 29 Red candle holders on ancestral graves after the Day of the Dead, October 31st.

Similarly, another Roşian shared that he would not leave because he was tied to his parental home, the church, the cemetery, the ancestors, and the place itself (RMCF Member, Interview, Oct. 24, 2019). In his words, “Property is the place that gives me the most power. It is the place that I can defend myself with. The place that gave me life. And I will never kill it.” At the same time, he stated it exists for those who come to see it, and future generations.

To understand Roşieni resistance, it is critical to understand that their arguments for the area’s culture, history, and patrimony are not what Western perspectives might be tempted to deride as dusty nostalgia. Rather, Roşieni are engaged in existential struggle for their living history, for the ancestors they are tied to and the descendants who will carry on forward. Neither are Roşieni succumbing to nostalgic feelings despite “constantly being accused of being emotional” (AM Member, Interview, Oct. 17, 2019; RMCF Member, Interview, Oct. 24, 2019). Instead, Roşieni demonstrate clear-mindedness and keen logic—just not capital logic:

My hope is to be able to continue living my life as I have until now. For thirty years, we have this suffering on our head, but the thing is that while we still have antibodies, us and others, we will be able to defend ourselves. You are antibodies too, everyone who understands what the environment means. That's the thing. If there's no environment, you can't tell me, the biggest employers—you can take them to any hostile environment and see how long they survive. Or take him into a storage room full of ingots, don't give him coffee or food, my darling, eat from these riches. So we can see if he can survive like that. Gold—You can live without gold. We cannot live without meat, without water, and without cereal, vegetables, oxygen. Without gold, believe me, I guarantee it, no one will die. I've never been a fan of it. We live not with chemicals, as we call them. We live with products that are natural. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 29, 2019)

The Roşieni resistance that fed future iterations of opposition and social action were often a refusal to contest RMGC or politicians on their turf, because to do so would be to give up what it means to be “Roşieni.” This sensibility is characteristic of ideological contestation. As Kahnawake educator Taiaiake Alfred (2005) writes of anti-colonial struggle in Canada:

To fight against genocide, we are told to arm ourselves and take vengeance upon the white man. To fight against economic oppression, we are told to become capitalists and to live for money. To fight against unfair laws we are told to become lawyers and change the system from within. None of these paths is our own! (p. 130)

In other words, to lose the spirit and identity that are the wellspring of the struggle, is to lose the struggle.

Commitment to refuse ideological compromise glows at the fringes of Roşieni narratives. For example, in a YouTube video, an AM leader refused to be intimidated by the economic racism of corporate-state agents attempting to humiliate him for not wearing business attire to a partially impromptu meeting (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XbVW2v5WYqs&t>).

Another Roşian described how he was propositioned by another corporate-state agent:

Roşian: And this man saw, he was a Saxon who had left Romania and he was a reporter for Deutsche Welle in Germany. And he asked, where can we talk? And I said I am the last one in Roşia Montană, here, and then he came here at home, we went into the kitchen. "Sir, what can I serve you, a glass of *ţuică*," because that's the custom here, the man will serve you the best he has from his home. That is the Romanian. Might not be like that everywhere, but us, *Ardeleni* [from Ardeal region], that's how we are, and especially *Moşii*. And I said "I'll give you a *ţuică*, some wine, a beer, what do you want?" "No, no, no." I said "don't make me give you coffee, because I don't drink coffee and can't make it. If you want coffee, I have it, you can make it yourself. He said to make him a tea. Then I came here outside to get some wood and I have some raspberry bushes here. And I cut some raspberry bush, I put it in a cup, I boiled it, the tea came out nice, red, just like if there was fruit in it.

Then he asked permission to record, he started the recorder, I said sure, I explained to him what this project means, everything, everything, everything about damages, absolutely everything. When he was done, he said, "Good Mr. [name], now.." and he stuck his hand in his pocket and he took a piece of paper out and a pen and set them on the table. "Mr. [name], write down whatever sum you want on this piece of paper, so that you leave Roşia Montană." I backed up a bit and I looked back at him and said, "Sir, I have the feeling that you're misunderstanding me. I have my whole genealogical tree here, great grandparents, grandparents. I will not leave Roşia Montană even if you give me the whole world to be mine." I do not need it. I come from a poor family; we were seven children in the house. I was an orphan at 14, I am not ashamed to say it... There was one week when we did not have bread on the table. I am not ashamed. That is why I lived. That is life. And I am tied, body and spirit, to this land. For me, my light lit here, here it will extinguish. "Still, [Mr. Participant], I know you have two houses... For example, I will give you \$100,000." "My sir, I explained to you, you can give me the whole world to be mine, I don't need it. I am content to live here from these two, from these two. What I have done with these, I know I can sleep peaceful on my pillow, I have not taken anyone's work. We help everyone. Everyone. However we can. With money, with anything. We help everyone. Because we think, the time will come when we will have to leave to the other side. And when that will be, what will I present in front of the Lord with?"

Roşianca: When the balance will be done.

Roşian: When the balance will be done. What will I present in front of God. With what? With bad things I've done to some or another? No. I have only done good things for everyone. And I will not be at the bottom of hell, I will be somewhere around there, in a

garden, I will pick some flowers, something. Because, miss, no one knows what's there. No one's come back from there. (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)

This narrative illuminates the subversive tactics of the corporate-state alliance, as well as the integrity of Roşieni identity. In the way this Roşian tells his story, the traditions and culture of hospitality, his personal context and familial history, the making and his pleasure at the redness of the tea, and his spirituality are all as important as his refusal. Roşieni identity, especially the *ţărani* element, is fundamental to the grassroots beginnings of mining development opposition.

Action: Roşieni Teaching Roşieni

For Freire (1970), praxis is not complete in reflection alone—it is ongoing revolutions of reflection into action into reflection again (Ollis, 2008; Patton, 2017). Emancipatory reflection impacts the learner, so “they come to see the world not as a static reality, but as a reality in process, in transformation” (p. 64). Through action, learners realize their transformative agency.

Roşieni action early in the struggle was largely informal, with neighbours reaching out and sharing what they knew of the project—especially those with mining knowledge (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 27, 2019; RMCF Member, Interview, Oct. 24, 2019). These conversations reinforced the decisions of many who refused to sell and even circulated among those hired by the company (RMCF Volunteer, Interview, Nov. 25, 2019). Those with mining experience explained what the project represented methodically, and in practical terms:

And when I went and explained to them too: 'hey folks, do you know what this means? do you not know what this project means?' here, the production capacity in the exploitation was somewhere, it would be 250 000 tons a year, and the company came and proposed to us three versions of the project. One with a production capacity of 8.5 million tons a year, one with 13 million tons a year, and one with 20 million tons a year. So what does this mean? The one with 20 million tons a year was the most profitable for the company, because in that case, for lowest price, taking everything big, they would end up with the cheapest gold. And that's what the company was interested in. This, for those who are in the area here, was an ecological disaster. Because they would have needed to do massive explosions. We only looked at the third production capacity. When they saw that there is an opposition, they backpedaled to the version with 13 million tons a year... But, in Roşia Montană, the ratio between the sterile and useful is of 1:1.2 tonnes. So, in order to get one tonne of ore one had to clear 1.2 tonnes. So, to the 13 million tons would be added another 14-15 million tons. In total it was 26-27 million tons a year. You know what that meant? In Roşia Montană would be hell. Hell on earth. They would have had to blow it up, major explosions in order to dislodge that ore; you would need to do major explosions. Well, for this production capacity they would have had to blow up every week six times a week. If they blew up six times a week they would have needed to blow up 25 tonnes of explosive 25 tonnes. But they told us in the

project that they wouldn't blow up 3 times, maximum 3 times a week. Why were they doing this? Because in surface exploitation you would have had to withdraw all the equipment from the quarry and this meant some expenses, you would lose some dead time, there was dead time that would come up, and they weren't interested in dead time. They needed, in a short a period of time, to take everything to do the exploitation. So then if they were blowing up three times a week, they would need to blow up 50 tons of explosive at once. And if they blew up twice, 75 tonnes of explosive at once. Miss, at 75 tonnes of explosive at once there was nothing left standing in Roşia Montană. Because they came here and said this is a protected area. Protected on paper. In reality, the protected area didn't exist. (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)

This Roşian also shared with the villagers how Corna and Bunta were to be submerged by a tailings dam, and that Roşia Montană and Tarina would be impacted by the activity he described at the mine sites. Operational and geographic details shared by Roşieni helped cultivate the villagers' understanding of how the project would impact them.



Figure 30 *The Geamăna valley tailings pond (above) and the village of Corna (below). Corna is the proposed site for RMGC's tailings pond (see Figure 3), providing provocative comparative imagery. Traditionally, churches are often the highest building in the village, and thus the last to be submerged in tailings.*

Roşieni were also innovative in the methods of their informal actions, some resorting to anti-propaganda tactics used during communism:

Roşian: Yes, I started with, how can I say, what some did during communism:

I put posters up. That's where I started. Or I would run with the mail to the post office, a letter.

Interviewer: With the information centre?

Roşian: No, that's just where I started.

Interviewer: Just by yourself?

Roşian: Well, with the teacher, my aunt. (RMCF Member, Interview, Oct. 24, 2019)

The informal action that Roşieni took to educate one another catalysed local values and raised consciousness. Thus, many Roşieni realised they had a choice that entailed action:

There were all sorts of meetings, accidental ones, with elderly folks and young folks, discussions that, at a certain point along the fight—although it wasn't a fight in the true sense of the word—would encourage you, openly or indirectly, however they could. Some of them were even part of state institutions, so then you would feel that what you're doing is not just for the residents who wanted to oppose a mining project, the majority of them being owners of land, farmers—I was an exception you could say, because I only had a pharmacy with my mom, but the others, most of them, had land and were raising animals—of course, the majority of them also being former miners. But even more reason for them, because they understood the meaning of exploitation at a large scale because they would've processed 20 million tonnes per year whereas before, the state mine processed 400,000—meaning a difference from heaven to earth. We were promised an apocalypse here, in the area of the Apuseni mountains. You had two choices: you could either take some money and move to a newer house in a different area **or you could respect your way of being and thinking and you did what you thought was right [my emphasis]**. We chose to respect what we thought, even though that meant no money, no real estate business, nothing. We held on to what our initial stance was and what we later verified, data being the same, unchanged. I see that even now, at the end, the results have confirmed our beliefs. (AM Member, Interview, Oct. 17, 2019)

Roşieni informal adult education was conducted in such a way, that reflection led to further actions. They describe their actions, not as part of an organized effort of resistance, but more akin to Scott's (1985) description of the common, everyday resistance by individuals.

Since the grassroots groups AM and RMCF maintained specific mandates, Roşieni continued to work independently of one another to oppose RMGC's mine project in their own ways. For example, one young Roşian described how he learned to make a livelihood in contradiction to RMGC's development plans—despite corporate-state domination of the local economy—and began to work alongside other Roşieni, demonstrating alternative possibilities:

I am also trying to get in touch, also with the people who are living here, in order to make something in tourism. And you know, as is our neighbour from here below, that he was "*Gold-ist*," man of the company, basically I had a lot of fights with him when I started here, that he was with the company—and now he made a small accommodation offering food, and each time when I have a chance I send tourists to take dinner there and such things. And we also want to involve as much people as we can. We also have, this summer, even if we could clean out the house by tourists, we had a teenager who came and worked for us. We had a lady who came here and prepared food. I want more people to see that this can work, and I am keep on pushing them. "Well, come and make a space at your home, and prepare a table, prepare a room and make something and I will send you tourists." I mean, it won't be like you will make a living from this, but it will be maybe during the summer there will be some times when you can make some money out of it, and of course if you want to get involved you will be able to make more. But this depends upon you." Yeah, this we are also what we are trying to make, some of our neighbors to prepare some spaces where we can send tourists to have dinners or some places to go at a picnic and so on. I want to involve more into this. (AM Member, Interview, Oct. 25, 2019)

This Roşian was working to shift the perspectives of other Roşieni who had originally aligned with the company, or who had been persuaded that RMGC's solution was the only way to live in Roşia Montană. By working with other Roşieni, he was demonstrating the RMGC's posturing was a bluff, and their displacement was not inevitable.

The complex micropolitics of Roşieni—which includes both RMGC-coached, pyramid scheme style pressure to sell and the common, everyday resistance of some determined villagers—is an important site of learning that informed villagers' decisions on how to take action. On the one hand, many Roşieni were seduced by the "mining is the only solution narrative" and sold. On the other hand, Roşieni like the young man above break the enchantment of seduction through co-constructing alternative development. The constant churning of incidental and informal learning and the subsequent reorganization of micropolitics created seemingly impossible reconciliations and the shifting of local alliances. One Roşian told the story of his uncle, who was an important member of the community and an ardent pro-mining NGO voice but turned against the company with the final act of his life:

It's been a year now since he fell ill, and he passed away this last May and we made up, meaning, I forgave him. He called me over to make up. And after his passing, I was left the house. The house that he had sold to the company. He was the first man out of 850 people who got his house back, who the company gave his house back to. I mean, I don't know. It seemed like an act of justice somehow. I mean, I was his nephew, I was his rightful inheritor and I don't think the company would have given him the house back if

they had known that it would end up mine. (RMCF Member, Interview, Oct. 24, 2019)

Through witnessing and interacting with the everyday resistance of their fellow Roşieni, some *Gold-isti* learn and their micropolitics shift.

Another Roşian described the story of how he petitioned politicians outside of Romania to exert political pressure. This narrative demonstrates an advantage of informal or incidental action: it only takes one individual to respond to a perceived weakness in the corporation, instead of making efforts to mobilize a group of people:

Because I saw that in Romania, the company was unstoppable. I felt like it was weakened, because when it was weak it would put forward all sorts of good communications, so I knew that it was weak, but I could see that still, no one was stopping it. Meaning, it was making steps forward. It was buying houses, exhuming the dead from the cemeteries, they would build roads for a new town, they would drill in areas including here right behind us and the water would run all the way down into our yards. So I made a petition in my own name and went to Brussels to speak to the European Parliament, so that they can tell me what is happening with my property, which is threatened by the project, because all the houses here are bought. At about 100 meters from here would have been another open pit mine, and how I was being treated as a European citizen. Do I still have a life in Roşia Montană? What do I need to do? I cannot say I have done wonders, but I did cause people to ponder. That committee that asked for some papers, some proof from the Romanian state in order to see what stage the work was in, what is happening in Roşia Montană, what is being done. On top of that, I brought upon myself a fair number of European Parliamentarians, Romanians, not foreigners. The foreigners were very appreciative.

I was asked another time to join a discussion in Bucharest, on the same topic. The leader of the committee appreciated me and agreed with me. She told me that she was going to take all the steps to inform herself on what was going on. She knew a lot of things but asked for more proof. When that committee came to Bucharest, the company intervened along with the Mayor, they talked to the committee... And after the company worked the committee, part of it I mean, because not all of them believed, the committee, one of the European Parliamentarians was very violent towards me. He met with them first, then with me. Even though we had a meeting scheduled, and they delayed it for an hour and a half, so that they can meet first. And so he said how do I think that a company can stumble because of someone like me, and a community can suffer because of me, because they won't have jobs, it won't have the future it wants, and all because of one property. How do I think this can happen? After that meeting, the Vice President from Spain wanted to talk to me, and we talked about a lot of things. What was decided was that, strangely, if the project was going to start, that was when they could intervene. I mean, how, we would let them start the project so that they can intervene in my favour somehow? So that I can be treated just as any other EU citizen, because this is what I asked for—being an EU citizen I have the right to a home, to access my home, to water, to electricity, these things I would lose. So they said that's when they would intervene, if

somehow the project started up, they could intervene in my favour. I didn't understand this. (RMCF Member, Interview, Oct. 24, 2019)

There are several components to this narrative relevant to adult learning. This Roşian acted individually, based on knowledge of the project, which was constructed through firsthand experience with the company and his pre-existing knowledge of mining practices. Further, he noticed a pattern to RMGC's behaviour: the company employed legitimacy tactics to curry favour when the mine project's position was weak. Additionally, he had learned that the corporate-state alliance hindered Romanian opposition to the project. Based on this nuanced understanding the politics of mining development, this Roşian found another source of political authority to oppose RMGC.

Reflecting on this experience, this villager realized that even international political pressure was insufficient to prevent RMGC from causing irreparable damage. He continued:

Well, first we stop them. They asked for some documents from the company and, for sure, the company didn't have these. How do you say it, they didn't have the rights because they could have started the project if they had bought the 1,150 [properties], they would have had the entire land, you know. But since they didn't have all the properties purchased, you start running into things... After this, I was invited by one or two EU Parliamentarians to a meeting that the company scheduled in Brussels, on the topic of Roşia Montană... That's where a wonderful story of the project was presented, which was all honey and milk. Without being offered a turn, towards the end of the debate or presentation, they presented a PowerPoint with a map of Roşia Montană and how it would look after the project. Everything was green, everything was wonderful, water with swans. And I stood up, without being given permission, and I asked the person who, it was a director from the company, who said everything was green, "We will plant things, we will rehabilitate the environment" and I said "What, I don't see are houses." I said, "I don't see my house. Maybe I don't see one, but I can't see my second one, or my third one. So out of three houses, I can't even see one of them. Where are they?" They couldn't give me an answer. They got mad. Some intervened in my favour, there were some EU Parliamentarians there, the Greens from Germany, who were very vocal. Then it broke out into argument, you couldn't understand each other anymore. And then when we left, the same politics. When we left that room: "Because of you this can't be done, people are dying of hunger, you'll see. People will rise up against you. They will break into your store, they will burn your houses, because people are capable." I was accused, and not only once, that I was treating this subject from an emotional perspective. That I'm tied to my parental home, that I'm tied to the church, the cemetery, the ancestors, this place. And then I asked "But you, who say we're dying of hunger, we have nothing to feed our children"—because that's their slogan, if this exploitation doesn't move forward, we're going to die of hunger here—"what am I going to feed my children with, I can't live," aren't these also feelings that you have? (RMCF Member, Interview, Oct. 24, 2019)

Thus, this Roșian created another site of contestation and learning. His original actions hindered RMGC by forcing them to reconcile with incomplete legal processes and brought him into contact with members of the European Parliament. Through these contacts he attended a second meeting and challenged RMGC's rehabilitation narrative by pointing out that this "ecological" vision of Roșia Montană employed environmental rhetoric to obscure the dispossession of Roșieni. In this way, he reframed RMGC's environmental reclamation—and promises to create "green" tourism like a golf course—as an attempt to justify land grabbing for mining development by arguing that it would become at best a "green grab" in the future (Fairhead, Leach & Scoones, 2012; Rocheleau, 2015; Zoomers, 2010). Green grabs are well attested in the literature as overlooking intersecting forms of injustice involved with development. Roșieni opposition argue it is impossible to carry out this project in a way that does not irreparably harm the environment. However, this Roșian points out that even were it could, the mine still constituted land grabbing and displacement that would cause other forms of irreparable damage.

The stories Roșieni tell about the early days of their struggle to remain rooted in the places that give them life and meaning, and their ongoing everyday actions of resistance throughout the intervening 20+ years, reveal patterns of decentralized and incidental action and learning. This mode of resistance arose organically in response to RMGC's door-to-door, divide-and-conquer tactics. Thus, the grassroots foundation of mining development contestation in Roșia Montană closely resembles Scott's (1985) description of peasant struggles. Scott's theorization is especially relevant to understanding this case, given the presence of *țărani* members in RMCF and AM (though membership demographics are not homogenous). Learning happened through reflection on personal histories, self-directed education, experiencing the impacts of mining exploration, and talking with company employees, government representatives, and European Parliament members (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 18, 2019). This led to further learning through meetings and discussions within AM. Thus, the everyday, learning and resistance of Roșieni built into more collective and organized learning in social action. It is important to note the incidental roots of learning in social action at Roșia Montană. As one elderly Roșianca put how she learned to resist RMGC, "Force teaches you and the situation teaches you" (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 14, 2019).

Learning in Social Action: Rooted, Mobilized, Networked, Countermovement

Social action scholarship describes a variety of development contestation from urban to rural contexts, grassroots groups to institutionalized NGOs, and solidarity networks to social movements that counter globalization (Choudry, 2015; Foley, 1999; Kamat, 2002; Kapoor, 2017; Kwaipun, 2009; Masalam, 2017). Foley's (1999) seminal work opened the door to understanding such collective efforts as sites of learning and contested micropolitics. Learning in social action is often complex and ambiguous, arising from collaboration within and between groups engaged in struggle. In Roşia Montană, local resistance to RMGC's mining development recognized the limitations of their weapons. Therefore, Roşieni mobilized in response the corporation's plans to move ahead and sought solidarity from NGOs and activists, thus catalyzing the formation of a social movement with Romania's largest protests since communism that proclaimed "this is the revolution of our generation" (Bejan, Murvai, Mihăilă, & Cherciov, 2015; Margarit, 2016; Soare & Tufiş, 2020; Velicu, 2015).

Choudry (2015) argues that social movement literature needs to better understand the relations between movements and local community organizing. He notes that local struggles are characterized by continuity of place and context, whereas movements are typically driven by campaigns that eventually disband. Thus, grassroots struggle can be critical to the longevity of a movement. Collective struggles are understood by the processes whereby local people attempt to meet local needs, organize around an issue, and learn through struggle on multiple levels. Therefore, the longevity of a struggle may be tied to a bi-directional relationship that is maintained by both the specificity and needs of the local context and the civil-societarian force required to engage in open contestation with the state. This section of chapter five will address learning that occurred through Roşieni organization, the development of multiple levels of struggle, and engagement in learning social action.

At Roşia Montană, local resistance and mobilizations, solidarity networks, and the social movement were interconnected with *and distinct* from each other. Roşieni grassroots resistance did not "evolve into" a social movement, rather it catalyzed a movement and acted in relationship with participating activists and NGOs. The contact points made between individuals and groups mobilizing represent sites of adult learning in themselves.

Grassroots Mobilization: Organizing Multi-Faceted Elements of Struggle

First of all, through the organization we created, Alburnus Maior. That was our only way to defend ourselves. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 29, 2019)

Choudry and Kapoor (2010) note the importance of addressing and correcting “silences” and misrepresentations that occur in scholarship and NGO documentation on mobilizations within struggles. Too often the politics of knowledge production obscure geohistorical contexts, simplify complex micropolitics, and ignore or misconstrue “forms of social action that do not fit within a preestablished theoretical framework” (p. 6). Contestation of mining development at Roșia Montană occurred on multiple levels, however, there is specificity alongside complexity. In 2000, approximately 300 Roșieni families banded together to form the property association AM as a form of place-based resistance to RMGC’s mining plans (Velicu, 2012). This early, local mobilization precipitated the formation of the SRM campaign in 2002 when Roșieni began seeking support outside of the commune. Eventually, this campaign attracted the support of many NGOs and even seeded the formation of new NGOs that would create solidarity networks for facilitating knowledge exchanges between Roșia Montană and other sites of contestation—nationally and internationally.

The trajectory and local, place-based origins of struggle at Roșia Montană are important to keep in mind considering Choudry and Kapoor’s (2010) charge. Some scholarship on Roșia Montană has implied the “objectives of local movements are embedded in universal values” (Anghel, 2013, p. 104); that the “the preservation of local identity” is primarily about protecting the villages’ historical centre and nearby archaeological sites (Pascaru, 2013); that discourse on the project is a battleground between two groups—mining industry and environmental opposition (Egresi, 2011); and recently, in the international tribunal case in Washington DC, the 2013 Romanian solidarity protests for Roșia Montană were recharacterized as protests supporting “democracy and the rule of law” (ARB/15/31, 2019). However, these notions ignore Roșieni geohistorical and cultural contexts; obscure the specificity of Roșieni values and their role in local learning and resistance; highlight Roșieni “silences” in the discourse; and attempt to deflect opposition to the project, respectively. Professor Augustin Stoica dismembers the lattermost of these claims, made by GBU’s expert witness, by pointing to its problematic reliance on sources like Wikipedia and disregard of protester perspectives (which he witnessed firsthand). To Stoica’s claims, SRM posters feature prominently in photographic evidence of the

2013 protests. Roşieni narratives do not reflect globalizing values, but as Oliver-Smith (2010) suggests, Roşieni and their solidarity network utilize “rights” in a tactical sense.

Coagulating Resistance: Organizational Learning. Foley (1999) describes how processes of organization entail learning. For example, when individuals committed to social action come together, they learn: to distinguish between forms of organization, the challenges of formations, and that their collective action has both intended and unintended outcomes.

Roşieni members of AM described learning processes tied to the formation of their organization. As noted in chapter four, RMGC attempted to engage “the community” by selecting favourable villagers and local authorities to consult with and by engaging Roşieni individually with materials and negotiators. Several Roşieni identified the critical moment when they learned that organization was their only recourse:

...only certain people were invited to these discussions. They may not have been able to invite the whole community, but there were some chosen people the company already picked. I remember that at the first discussion we waited outside four hours, it was winter too. We waited outside by the gate to the courtyard of the place where the meeting was happening. It was protected by security—*jandarmi*—and we were standing outside thinking that maybe they would let us in too but no, not a chance. There were a few of us, maybe 15 people. When they came out from that meeting, the car that the Alba Prefect was in, the mayor, who was there too, and the investor, Frank Vasile Timiş. They asked us why we not pleased and said that it wasn't going to be an issue, they would talk to us too, they would set up a meeting. Then they invited us to the town hall after about two weeks, but that was again a room full of people from their entourage, people who were supporting the project without blinking or thinking twice. There were some speakers outside so that those of us who didn't go inside could hear what was being discussed. Somehow, with great difficulty, we managed to make our way in because some people were leaving so we went inside too. And a few of us expressed our discontent, that what is happening is not normal, we were not consulted, we did not agree with what is being said and planned. And then the Prefect, being on side of the investor, was very upset and said "Oh yeah, you don't want it, then you can die of hunger here." From that moment on, we realized. One of the people who was there, he was a member of parliament—because there were some members of parliament there, people who maybe had decision power over the project—one of the parliamentarians came outside and told us that “If you don't organize yourselves, it will be very hard for you to resist, for those of you that do not want this project. It would be good for you to organize yourselves somehow, in a structured way, some sort of association.” He said this to us outside, not within the meeting, but outside the room without others hearing him. To say what he said, “If you don't organize yourselves, these guys are going to eat you,” were his exact words. (RMCF Member, Interview, Oct. 24, 2019)

Several expressions of learning are present in this narrative. The appearance of notorious businessman Frank Timiș and the inaccessibility of supposed “community discussions” raised Roșieni suspicions, making them vigilant. The hidden meetings, irrational security and anger, and the stated need to organize all connected in this moment and led to the organization of AM. Another Roșian remembering the meeting distinguished between processes of learning that action was needed, and learning what kind of action was needed—how to take action:

Yes, I think in 2000, I can't remember because its been a while. When Timiș came. Even the priests, such a mind they had to get involved. They would tell us stupid things like that the churches would be moved stone by stone. Leave me alone with stupid things like this. The priests would say stupid things like that. How that wise guy got his money in—and that there would be a big lake here, and oh my goodness. And then it gave us goosebumps and we said we can't sit around anymore. We have to do something. And in that meeting, there was one guy, Tabara who participated. I don't know who invited him, and when he came outside, we knew that he was a politician and we knew that he was reasonable, and we said lets see what this guy says. And we asked him, how can we defend ourselves? I mean, we wouldn't take it 100%, but we wanted to hear his opinion. And he said you need to organize yourselves as fast as you can, because one by one, they won't take you seriously. But if you're organized, they can't do anything, they'll have to take you into consideration. And then it was fast, put our IDs and registered. That's where it started. We had something, but you know, him being a politician, at least he gave us—he didn't lie to us. He was from the area here, and so he was probably interested in the area, in pollution. Then, in 2000, I think that's when it happened, Timiș came and organized a big meeting at their office and said there's no other way, “Out with you!” Well, well. He thought us to be, who knows—a villain [Timiș]. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 29, 2019)

The proposals and unbelievable promises made by RMGC compelled Roșieni to take action and the critical moment in 2000 outside RMGC’s town hall meeting informed Roșieni on how to do so.

By organizing, or reorganizing members of the pre-existing community into a particular formation for resistance, the new founders of AM shifted the context for other Roșieni. In other words, the act of organization prompted reflection and learning:

So basically, by this association, by AM when they got formed, we saw that there are many people that didn't want this project. They didn't like it. They didn't want to move. So then we got courage, to say, "well, okay, we don't have to move if we like to stay here, and that's fine." Basically, at the beginning, I remember there were quite a lot of members in AM. There were 100-200, something like that, there were many people involved from what my father said. (AM Member, Interviewer, Oct. 25, 2019)

As this young AM member recalls, the initial formation of AM “taught” his family that resistance to the development was possible. The appearance of other Roșieni taking a stand against RMGC’s mining project unsettled existing notions of the state’s omnipotence, established during Romania’s period of authoritarian-socialism.

The organization of Roșieni into AM occurred informally at first, by word of mouth between those who shared similar ideas (AM Member, Interviewer, Oct. 25, 2019). The level of organization within AM typically depended on the perceived pressure at a given point in time, with leadership rallying members in response to mounting threats, or allowing periods of dormancy. For example, when I arrived in 2019, GBU’s efforts were directed at the international tribunal and little information was making its way back to Roșieni. As a result, AM was not active. Periods of activity and dormancy demonstrate how members of AM balanced the 20+ years of stress and strain of organizing on their own personal resources and time with making a living and everyday life in their villages (AM Member, Interviewer, Oct. 25, 2019). This offers a critical insight into grassroots organizations. For AM, grassroots organization reflects a temporary reorganization of Roșieni into a formation of resistance. AM is not separate from Roșia Montană, but rather a phase in the commune’s broader life. As one Roșian put it, AM members are the commune’s immune system.

When the threat of mining development was greatest, AM was more structured. One Roșian described the organization’s democratic processes during years of higher activity:

...as an association, we had a general meeting once a year. That was the supreme forum for the organization. And if we didn't meet the quorum—because there were 365 families signed up into the organization, families, not members, a family would have had 5 members—if the quorum wasn't met, we wouldn't have the first meeting. It would be rescheduled for 3 days later. And then you'd have it with however many showed up. (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)

Thus, AM leaders functioned as the village watch, allowing villagers to conserve their psychological and material resources when possible and ensuring democratic decision-making when action was needed. This is an important characteristic of AM; Mayo’s (1999) analysis of Gramsci implies that anti-hegemonic adult education must “be participative and radically democratic” (p. 47), reciprocal, and blur the practical distinctions between pupil and teacher.

However, despite the complexity and tenacity of AM’s resistance, Roșieni acknowledge they faced losses along with victories—or prospective environmental injustice (Velicu, 2020). In

other words, their mobilization did not prevent the initial impacts of ABD. Contestation is complex. While organization has halted RMGC's progress for the past 20+ years, Roșia Montană has suffered blows:

We were the ones who, the ones from Alburnus Maior, we were the ones who got on the train and we pulled the alarm. Brothers, there's a problem. Let's gather and unite, otherwise we will be shredded. Even so we were shredded. You need to know that the company bought in Roșia Montană 80% of the properties. They demolished 265 houses. Roșia Montană was a prosperous community, beautiful, fixed up nicely around the valley, the water. A very beautiful locality. And they decimated it all. So man, when he sees himself in trouble, starts to give a hand out and says, "let's help each other." (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)

For Roșieni, houses represent the continuance of villagers and their villages, of material and cultural reproduction. The loss of these buildings also reflects greater social losses and losses of ways of being. Through these losses, Roșieni learn that organization within AM, on its own, was unable to prevent RMGC from altering and destroying aspects of their context. All the same, members of AM saw local organization as necessary if not sufficient:

Interviewer: What could people learn from the struggle here that would help them in their struggles?

Roșian: That they need to mobilize and do protests. Only through protests. To organize themselves in associations. Because you can't do it on your own, if you don't have an association, you can't. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 27)



Figure 31 *Alburnus Maior Headquarters in a cow field.*

Roșianca—The Women of AM. Carpenter (2012) states that feminist scholarship on adult education addresses the ways “women learn in varied social and political contexts” (p. 30), but further argues women’s learning is contextualized by historical capitalist social relations. Globally, women learn through efforts to transform their specific individual and collective oppressive conditions (Carpenter & Mojab, 2017). The specific learning processes of women impacted by ABD represent important politics and knowledge; Carpenter proposes that a more nuanced approach to understanding adult learning should address “the relationship between active social organization, reorganization, and learning; while consciousness moves in unconscious ways, the outcome of educational efforts will not be just new ways to make meaning but transformed human relations and practice” (p. 30). In chapter four, Roșience members of AM described how the mining development project impacted women in specific ways, but women also responded to these contextual injustices in specific ways.

The resistance and social action of Roșience is characterized by their social relations within Roșia Montană. One Roșianca described the contributions of women to mobilization within AM:

Roșianca: Women, we didn't get involved. Some did, yes. But their initiative was a bit weaker from the women. We sent our representatives to participate more in the fight of the community.

Interviewer: Did that mean that women had to take care of the house more, of things on the farm and the house so that the representatives could go?

Roșianca: Yes, yes, yes. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 27, 2019)

This Roșianca describes the role of women in AM as indirect, but also active. She also confirmed that women agreed to the temporary commitment to extra work on the *gospodărie* in order to send representatives from their kin groups to engage in the more direct struggle. This demonstrates the complex micropolitics of social struggle from the perspective of a living village, including temporary change in its social relations (Carpenter, 2012; Foley, 1999).

The role of women in AM’s collective struggle was also an ideologically or culturally significant one. Another Roșianca described how cultural values specific to women cultivated seeds of resistance into specific forms of organization:

Interviewer: Did women have a specific role in fighting against the company?

Roşianca: They did, that's what I think. They did, lots of women thought that being a woman means you have to give life. Cyanide being here, you wouldn't be able to live here, you'd automatically have to leave. It would affect you; you wouldn't be able to live here with the radiation. You had to think about it where to go, kilometers away, you couldn't stay in the area. Being a woman, to raise children here wasn't possible.

Interviewer: So how did women express that, the value of life and the importance of life?

Roşianca: They got together with other women from other areas and they came and helped us. They came here and there were lots of us for demonstrations, and we got together, we socialized. On the internet too, we would agree that we have to be united, that we can't leave and allow destruction. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 19, 2019)

While raising children is a collective activity, of the village and kin groups, the women of AM took the initiative to push it forward as a contention against the mining development project. This profound commitment to the role of life-giver dialogues with Indigenous scholarship on “women’s power, as the power of the mother” (Trask, 1999, p. 105), a power shared with the land itself. Finally, women engaged in forms of social organization and informal learning specific to their gender, reaching out across their networks to raise support for the struggle via shared cultural values.

The Leadership of AM. Gramsci (1971) proposed that while all persons are inherently intellectuals, only certain individuals hold the social function of intellectual work: organizing people and ideas. He contended that some intellectuals arise organically within the working class. These “organic” intellectuals play important roles resisting hegemony, raising the consciousness of the working-class, and model a more equitable social system (Fischman & McLaren, 2005). Fischman and McLaren suggest that organic intellectuals:

...serve as vehicles for interrogating emergent patterns of thought and action, radicalizing subaltern groups, translating theory into strategy, and creating revolutionary subjectivity through the formation of continuous and multifaceted counterhegemonic activity and the development of a revolutionary historical bloc where divergent interests converge and coalesce around shared visions and objectives. (p. 434)

It is worth noting that Gramsci also argued that the peasant class, distinct and apart from the working-class, “does not elaborate its own "organic" intellectuals, nor does it "assimilate" any stratum of "traditional" intellectuals” (p. 5). However, Gramsci conceded that peasants contributed some of their number as traditional intellectuals in the service of the dominant social group. Freire (1970), however, contradicts this point.

Freire (1970) also contended that leaders within oppressed groups were critical for coordinating social action, providing direction, and praxis—such as Che Guevara, an authentic revolutionary leader who worked in service of the peasant class and thus provides an exemplar opposing Gramsci (Lewis, 2007). In other words, intellectuals are also relevant to the peasant class. For Freire, praxis is the marriage of ongoing action and reflection; it cannot be separated so that leaders “think” and the masses “act.” Nor is it the work of leaders to manipulate, since “the revolutionary’s role is to liberate, and be liberated, with the people—not to win them over” (p. 76). Instead a “with” relationship—communion with the oppressed—becomes the method of social action. Freire writes that leaders need to work “for unity among the oppressed—and unity of the leaders with the oppressed—in order to achieve liberation” (p. 152). Since social action for liberation is cultural action against an alienated and alienating social structure, it depends on shared “historical and existential experience within the social structure” (p. 156). Unity among oppressed groups depends on this social context and leaders must be in close communion with it to coordinate social action: “Organization is not only directly linked to unity, but is a natural development of that unity” (p. 157). Thus, it makes sense that “organic” intellectuals—given their innate communion—stand to work effectively as leaders within grassroots groups.

AM membership is complex and often does not fit neatly into Gramsci’s (1971) class categories. Many of the villagers live as semi-proletariat and count themselves as *ṭārani*. However, their shared existences and histories need not be academically or theoretically satisfying in order to be an effective foundation for unity and social action. Regardless, the elected grassroots leadership of AM played an important role in the organization’s struggle (AM Member, Interview, Oct. 25, 2019).

When asked to describe the role of leaders in their organization, many regular members exemplified complex micropolitics, differing opinions, and some specific goals. For example, one AM member argued that their leaders were responsible for presenting alternatives and their sustainable plan for mining activity (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 18, 2019). Others stated:

First of all, we should have attracted people to our side. It would have been very good if we could have attracted them so that they don't sell their properties. You can imagine, they [the company] had access to very large sums of money and they [the locals] leaned towards the company because they offered them like I said, a job, then they managed to buy them. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 13, 2019)

What they should do is unite in one thing. Jobs should be for the long term. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 14, 2019)

They shouldn't do anything; they have done lots. I am pleased with them. Constantly in meetings, looking after us, helping each other. From them, we don't have that many expectations. When something comes up, we'll gather and talk, but now I'm not sure if we can still fight that much. Lots pass away, people in our organization are old, the young ones don't get involved anymore. Our children are gone. I don't know how much this organization will last either. While we're alive, after that, I don't know. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 19, 2019)

They need to get involved in the situation... they need to get involved, to tell people, to help people understand what to do. To mobilize people for protests. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 27, 2019)

Membership impressions of leadership in AM are varied, but also reflect similarities to Gramsci's (1971) "organic" intellectual and Freire's (1970) "revolutionary" leader. For members of AM, their leaders played an important role in counteracting hegemonic domination tactics employed by RMGC, articulating strategy, raising consciousness, and recruiting, organizing, uniting, and coordinating membership.

One AM member above lamented a perceived imbalance between the pressure from RMGC and efforts to "attract" Roşieni to stay. This power imbalance makes Freire's (1970) contention that leaders do not attempt to "win over" the oppressed more complex. Regardless of the imbalance, AM leaders saw Roşieni as their own persons and decision-makers. While AM members worked to connect with Roşieni and raise their awareness, they did not put pressure on individuals to stay. As one AM leader put it, people usually will not listen if you simply "tell them" so they never took that approach; rather, they worked from the perspective that each member decides what is best for them (AM Member, Guided Tour, Oct. 13, 2019). Another Roşian who had worked as a leader of AM explained how he would attempt to counteract RMGC's tactics through consciousness raising and encouragement:

I would walk from house to house and I would explain each thing to them. I would explain, I would tell them, "be careful, because they are going to come and corrupt you." They're going to offer you money, do not take it. I would sit and talk to them, encourage them. Some were desperate, I would go and encourage them.' I would say "Don't worry." There were many who left Roşia Montană because of fear. We had here Mr. [Rosieni] who left, the poor man, because of fear. "They are going to do the project, even the television networks are—". "Don't be scared sir, you are the one who decides, you are the one here." He left, then he died in Sibiu. (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)

This leader also demonstrated his boundary at the point of manipulation; even when Roşieni of AM decided to sell, leaders refused to exert pressure or attempt to control them:

And I, when they were selling their properties, I would meet with them. Being, I was a leader here, so I discussed with them. Brothers, I can't command on your property. Your property, you do what you want, because it's yours. But I'll give you some advice. If you're really going to sell your property, sell it for lots of money. At least 2-3 generations after you to not have to work.

This AM leader's narrative demonstrates what attempting to raise consciousness looks like while refusing to manipulate, by accepting and humanizing a choice that may harm the struggle.

AM leaders engaged in specific learning processes and/or came from organic contexts that taught them to facilitate the conscientization of AM members. One AM leader stated that he prioritized knowledge generated through Roşieni experiences by documenting what he learned from their stories along with his own research (AM Member, Guided Tour, Oct. 13, 2019).

Alongside documenting incidental and informal learning about the project, this leader shared that he felt accountable to the struggle, and therefore also engaged in more formal forms of learning:

I took some courses related to non-governmental organizations, one time eight months, and then another time I can't remember how many sessions... In the meantime, I got my sociology degree—law and social sciences degree with a specialization in sociology in Alba—and these courses that I told you about. And some of these courses were taught by trainers from Bucharest, some of them by university professors from 1 December University, and these guys said it would be a great gain for the association and for myself if I got my sociology degree, because there were some terms that I would understand very well and compared with all the people and what was happening in Roşia, it would help a lot. (AM Member, Interview, Oct. 17, 2019)

In order to better facilitate conscientization, this leader took informal courses with NGO groups where he was encouraged to pursue a degree in sociology. Connecting formal social sciences learning and theory with AM's struggle seems to be a critical effort, given Freire's (1970) insistence that reflection and praxis at large are augmented by an understanding of theory.

Another Roşian who had worked as a leader of AM shared how his previous leadership and mining experiences, the meetings where he represented AM, and his own proclivities created an important knowledge base from which he fulfilled his role:

Roşian: If I worked that many years in mining, and I got involved and created the association Alburnus Maior, it was normal for me to be the most informed person. I had to know what tactics the company was using. We had meetings, we went to the Romanian Parliament, I met with the Romanian Academy, I met with people, Parliamentarians, I went to Budapest seven times, I met with the Hungarians. I went to

Paris, to Grenoble, where there was Village Roumaine, the organization, we had meetings on the same topic of Roșia Montană. I was invested body and soul in the situation in Roșia Montană.

Interviewer: How did you educate others about the struggle, including other Roșieni, including Romanians, and... other struggles, right? In other places of the world.

Roșian: In the moment where you became involved here, you become a public individual. When you become a public individual, people get to know you. Being at the information centre, I would meet with people, everyone knew me. My fellow villagers all knew me, I was a very active person in Roșia, I coordinated a quarry, a fantastically difficult project. I was a Secretary for a Party Committee, I was among people, I helped a lot of people, I hired them, I did all sorts of good for everyone. And so, I became a well-known person. And then the other side. I'm a balance, I weigh everything. First think, then speak. I think, then I speak. And God gave me a quality of orator, I'm a good orator, and I'm also very convincing. When I tell people something, I am certain of it. I don't tell lies, I tell them the truth. When you tell people the truth, they'll come beside you, and see that you didn't lie to them, they'll come beside you. You gain allies. And then they tell each other "go to that man." (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)

This Roșian described several important characteristics of grassroots leadership: leaders are expected to be informed on the struggle, on the company's tactics, and to work as a public representative of the organization. Much of this leader's work hinged on his connection with Roșieni; while he notes that his communication skills were important, it is ultimately trust and relationship building that makes a leader and grows the grassroots group.

AM leaders also took on additional sacrifices for their membership in the form of resources, time, and risks. Leaders took on the role of being a public figure to protect their members from being targeted by RMGC or exacerbating the tension between AM members and their *Gold-isti* neighbours (AM Member, Guided Tour, Oct. 13, 2019). For example, leaders posted signs on their properties that read "not for sale" but recommended their member do not, so they could not be identified. One leader also described the tolls of leadership:

When needed I retreated a little bit, I maintained a close relationship with the state authorities because they were in constant conflict with us and someone needed to leave a door open there too. I've gone to the authorities in Alba, to the Court of Appeal when it was needed, or the courthouse, or when we needed to take documents—like my wife said, "You go to the Treasury or the Courthouse in Campeni, for the association you go all over the place, but when it comes to going for us, you are very shy and reserved, you're not as resourceful." Where you have to, you have to, and that's it. But I was also the happy owner of surplus of free time, meaning that I worked two to three days a week for the pharmacy, going around to the bank or treasury in Abrud or Campeni, and I had the rest of the time off... Out of all these things, the most difficult for me was to go from

house to house. Whenever we needed to set up meetings and call on everyone to attend, or signatures for trials, or with different information we needed to provide face to face as opposed to telephones. So, these would consume time and mental energy, and patience and other things—I don't know how to explain—I would go as if I was doing a favour, sometimes I was afraid to impose when in fact it was the other way around. But it depends on how you were brought up, and how you knew them from your childhood. And not just once, tens of times... (AM Member, Interview, Oct. 17, 2019)



Figure 32 AM member sign reads: “this property is not for sale.”
It is displayed in the United parish house, which was donated as a mini-museum to the struggle.

Leaders of AM needed to spend significant amounts of time and emotional energy engaging the state as part of the continuous search for allies, efforts that cannot but impact their personal lives and families. Even the work of rallying membership took time and energy. Since this Roşian was not *ţărani* and worked part-time, he learned he had the needed the capacity in terms of time and resources to provide leadership for AM. Like organization work, the important facilitation of learning within AM, through door-to-door visits or other methods, also took significant work:

I rarely personally initiate things like this, but at a certain point in time, [because villagers were] asking about this and that, especially on the Internet—because people had subscriptions to the press—I would make them little packages containing a few articles, six, seven, eight, ten—but you realize that [I was] making 20-30 of these for the people who needed this information. I wouldn't go to those who didn't want or ask for it, but with time, they got used to me making these: I would roll them up and stick them into Ziploc bags that you use for freezing meat, and I would leave them at their doors... but the nice thing was that I named this whole thing 'misinformation,' and people would ask, “Why do you call it that?” So, I told them to first read the one article, so that they learn how to read the rest of the articles. I would help them read between the lines, I would ask them “What do you think this says, do you think it's saying good or bad things?” “Well it starts off good things until this spot, and then they change it.” I would always have disputes with my dad, “I don't know, you and [Roşieni] always see things differently than

we do," "Well dad, you see only what's written, but we read between the lines too." Dad would believe what the press said. "How would you not believe if it's written in the paper or you see it on television, they are serious." And the best thing was when together with [Roşieni], they were reading an article very fast and reading between the lines, an article written by woman who would have wanted to join the campaign sort of "in the last few meters," very smart, having done studies abroad and stuff. She would write very nicely, the beginning and the end, but in the middle, one sentence got away from her, and she wrote what she thought, about the association and the Gold and stuff, and these guys wanted to contact her. And I was like, "Guys, are you sure?" "Yes." "Let me show you something"... I looked for the sentence or the phrase or something, found it, underlined it and said, "Here, read. If you agree, then we will take her and I can leave." Then they were like, "Man, you are right! To hell with her, how clandestine she is!" "See who you wanted to take into your bosom?"... So you had to pay very much attention, with the press releases. For example, the chief of the EU commission came here, a Swedish guy, gave us a statement at the end: how things were, how he saw them, and when he went to Gold he told them something that was favourable to them. Then, when he gave his official statement, he mixed everything to the point that you couldn't even tell what was what, so that he would please everyone.

This AM leader provides a clear picture of some activities through which he facilitated conscientization of AM members. AM leaders are not simply responsible for knowing more about development politics and organization, they are actively involved in using their knowledge to facilitate the learning of members and even helping facilitate the direction of AM by helping members navigate complex external and internal politics. Leaders help AM organize and function more strategically.

Grassroots Strategy: A Site of Contestation

Writing from her experience with grassroots opposition to mining development projects, Joan Kuyek (2019) specifies that, "Strategy and tactics are not the same thing. Strategy is the long-term plan to reach a goal. Tactics are tools that can be used to get there" (p. 234). Choudry (2015) points out that praxis involves, not just any kind of action, but strategic action—purposeful work put toward transforming oppressive social realities. Since strategy is within the realm of goals, it is also a site of micropolitics, complexity, and contestation, as Foley (1999) attested. Strategy was also critical to the victories achieved by AM.

Alburnus Maior's Strategy. Roşieni villagers organized AM around a straightforward strategy, the refusal to sell. In a twist of fate, AM members used the newly established private property laws—which typically serve the interests of capital—to deny the project. In effect, this

initial refusal prompted RMGC to shift its divide and conquer tactics to extend beyond coopting local authorities to address the emergence of grassroots power:

We used the right to property. And we obligated them to come and negotiate with you, whoever wanted to sell their property. But if I don't want to sell my property, I don't sell it. Short, "si cu asta basta" [and that is that]. (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)

For some *țărani*, the power of their self-sufficiency was amplified by these laws:

As long as I have my land... I am the owner of this world. And I am very strong. And I can't be manipulated. The land gives me the power and strength to rely on myself. Every time I meet the company managers I ask them a question. 'What will you do if I refuse to leave?' They never have the answer. They have answers to the complicated questions, but not to the simple ones. (Kenarov, 2012)

This challenge to power is historically issued by peasants with access to "land, the means of labour and subsistence" (Wood, 1995, p. 209), which forced authorities who wished to acquire peasant labour or resources to use superior juridical, political, and/or military force. As identified earlier in this chapter, this strategy of resistance arose with the realization that the local context had shifted during the exit from communism. Unfortunately, RMGC's response proved effective over time in driving many Roșieni to sell.

Regardless of RMGC's actions, AM's commitment to their strategy was consistent. At the same time, AM members recognized that different goals, and a complex web of micropolitics, motivated its members:

I mean Alburnus Maior, it was for activism NGO, it was activated only for this thing: for save Roșia Montană. They are saving from mining, but from there on, the members of Alburnus Maior, they have different ideas. I mean not all of them there are with tourism, and they are thinking about tourism. There are also people that are doing agriculture and they are living from this... AM was mostly for reactions, to react when need[ed]. The company wants to, redo something, re-come and something like that. So that we are focusing only on this aspect. And then of course, as me and [AM Leader 1], we wanted to go through tourism, I don't know, [AM Leader 2] and [AM Member]... they wanted to go to agriculture. (AM Member, Interview, Oct. 25, 2019)

Behind the acknowledgement of complex micropolitics and a diversity of goals was an underlying philosophy of respect for each Roșieni's agency. This commitment to a humanizing strategy is essential for critical learning, but also came with the understanding of sacrifice:

Yeah, so that's why maybe also Alburnus Maior, we didn't want to tell the people what to do next. So I think that was our objective, was the area, we don't want to destroy the area, we want to keep on having, and it was to react against the mining project, and for

sure it will be reactivated once the company came here, and they will start to make something. Also, Alburnus Maior, we didn't have nothing against the people, there were a lot of them, who left the association, and they sold and they went. Well, this is your decision, we tried to, but we can't put you to not to sell, and of course we are talking with the people who sell, who sold. In my point of view, this was our common objective, for this is what was Alburnus Maior fighting for: in order to not let the area being destroyed, by the [mining project].

For members of AM, acknowledging the humanity of their neighbours meant that at some point, they had to grapple with the reality of those who decided to sell or who felt that they had no choice. In other words, even were it in the power of members to pressure their neighbours into remaining, AM as an association was unwilling to engage in the same tactics as RMGC.

Contested Goals: Debates on the Means of Material Reproduction. One of the more complicated aspects of AM's strategy is the ongoing debate over how a commune with several thousands of years of mining history, and a swiftly shrinking population that depended on mining for employment, deals with this relationship moving forward. Many members argue there should be no mining at all, while others think there should be room for more traditional forms of artisanal mining, and others yet think a sustainable state mine could be developed in consultation with local villagers—all, however, bar the use of cyanide (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 18, 2019; Daub, 2012; Kenarov, 2012; Velicu, I., & Kaika, M. (2017). Roşieni stories quickly clear up the reason many are opposed to all mining.

...my dad died at 48 years old of silicosis because here in Roşia Montană was lots of silicon and it's a professional disease. (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)

My parents were miners... My dad died at 39, of an occupational disease. A lot of people died from the dust, the rock dust is very dangerous for the body. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 13, 2019)

I was 12 when my father [a miner] died. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 14, 2019)

People are already sick and full of diseases, should we wake up with professional diseases too? Because of gases and cyanide and dust? On top of calamities, we'll wake up that, once you open up so much land, you realize that the climate will be affected, enormously. Not to mention the pollution of rivers. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 29, 2019)

Chapter four noted there were many mining widows in Roşia Montană when GBU arrived; even when I was in Roşia Montană, the church bells tolled for a young *holoangari* of 24 who had died from injuries in a mine (Daub, 2012; AM Member, Field Notes, Nov. 30, 2019). Mining is

dangerous and its product, gold, does not directly benefit locals. However, this does not invalidate the reality that many Roșieni depended on the work. These are the realities of complicated micropolitics, a situation one AM member described thus:

What I have told you so far has been from the perspective of a certain group of people, like members of our association, who at a certain age were able to become owners in full right of lands and houses, built or inherited from their parents, because the other young folks didn't have the opportunity to initiate this process. So, these folks would be either future owners, or in the process of acquiring something, or maybe trying to make money. But don't think you can read people. So, in a community of 980 families there are many kinds of property owners—some more liberal, some more conservative, each with his own opinion. Some had the understanding that it is better to sacrifice their life for the betterment of their children's or grandchildren's. There are lots of things. If we took the whole issue of Roșia Montană and split it, we would find many different facets to it. Even the types of property owners are not all the same. The fact that they had a document in hand and they were owners of something did not also mean they had a common conscience—each to his own. Some could be convinced easily and it would be easy to make money off of them, to others they would offer development opportunities in the hope of gaining something from that. Each has their own conviction, education, and their own level of preparedness and experience. Those of us who stayed are only one part of the community, we never spoke on behalf of the whole community.... We spoke of a part of it. There are many kinds of people, of property owners, of concepts, of life philosophies. (AM Member, Interview, Oct. 17, 2019)

Contestation of Strategy: Micropolitics, Organization, and Reorganization. For some AM members, disagreements around strategy moved into the realm of tactical decisions. In 2007, the Soros Foundation's office in Bucharest approached some AM members to discuss a working relationship and funding for the association (AM Member, Field Notes, Oct. 13-14, 2019; RMCF Member, Interview, Oct. 24, 2019). However, the Soros Foundation's proposal did not align with AM's majority, who wished to avoid coalitions that could result in cooptation (NGO Member, Interview, Oct. 3, 2019). The divergence of Roșieni opinions on whether to work with the Soros Institute catalyzed pre-existing micropolitics. The result was a shift within AM's leadership and the formation of a Soros Institute funded Information Centre that was established in Roșia Montană's town square to directly contest the control of that space and the information being propagated by pro-mining NGOs. Former AM members were funded to do the Information Centre's work. Eventually however, broader Roșieni mistrust of the Soros Institute led the Roșieni involved to separate from the institute and continue the work on their own (Alexandrescu, 2012; RMCF Member, Interview, Oct. 24, 2019). In 2009, these Roșieni founded RMCF and the Green Association of Roșia Montană that work via local volunteers.

Members of RMCF ultimately believe they have many ideas (RMCF Member, Interview, Oct. 24, 2019) and a purpose in common: “the salvation of Roșia Montană and stopping the project” (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019). Even specific aspects were held in common, “We created a cultural foundation with [Roșieni]. Its purpose is for Roșia Montană to enter in UNESCO. That's our battle plan.” However, RMCF members also had an underlying belief that AM’s strategy was not sufficiently goal-oriented:

... So I mean, aside from this deaf fight—we don't sell our properties and that's it—we tried to come out with a different kind of openness towards the public. Including the fact that we edited this book showed something else, what Rosia had, what values it has... To provide alternatives for people. Because that's what they always said. And we offered them, we didn't do that agritourism course because I wanted to. We gathered with the people and we said, “what would you like to do, what do you think Roșia’s future is? Is it mining? No...” Yes, like I said, to provide an alternative. We didn't lead people astray and tell them that there will be jobs, that we'll do this and that. But we said that it's a preparation for people, something they could do. (RMCF Member, Interview, Oct. 24, 2019)

There are several key elements of learning tied to the reorganization of these former AM members into RMGC. Firstly, these RMCF members felt AM’s strategy was not dynamic enough to respond to the needs created by the shifting context, as is indicated by the description of a “deaf fight.” Secondly, they believed that Roșieni needed to do a better job of ideological articulation regard the values and characteristics of Roșia Montană. Finally, the RMCF members felt that local organization could better address the practical needs and future hopes of Roșieni.

Acting on their convictions, RMCF set about publishing materials to communicate their values, holding discussions around the changing nature of Roșieni needs, and networking to support these efforts (RMCF Member, Interview, Oct. 24, 2019). RMCF engaged the Romanian Academy, the Chamber of Deputies, the British royal family and their architects who were familiar with Roșia Montană’s historical building techniques, and the Adopt-a-House program ran by the Romanian NGO “Architecture, Restoration, Archaeology.” Roșieni who volunteered with RMCF helped restore buildings in their villages; helped create publications; attended and spoke at conferences; arranged medical check-ups; took a trip to nearby village of Viscri that had engaged in alternative and communal forms of development; and organized and attended computer and agritourism courses (RMCF Member, Interview, Oct. 24, 2019; RMCF Volunteer, Interview, Nov. 25, 2019; SRM Activist, Interview, Nov. 9, 2019). The intention of these non-

formal learning activities was to help shift remaining Roşieni views on what forms of development were possible and to help them re-envision their lives in the future.

At the same time, RMGC continued to track and work to stifle any forms of alternative development. One RMCF member explained how the company attempted to counter a workshop they put on to teach Roşieni how to repair their historical homes:

But to tell you how hard it was. We gathered, somehow, it would be impossible to do that now, 33 people. We gathered them for the course, five of whom stood up in the meeting with the professors because they had received a call from the company, during the course. They knew that we went, we were followed everywhere. “If you go there, you won't get jobs with the company.” (RMCF Member, Interview, Oct. 24, 2019)

RMGC's attempts to prevent the work being done by RMCF suggests that it views the Roşieni organization as a threat to the mining development project. This workshop also demonstrated that even *Gold-ist* Roşieni were impacted by the company and were looking for alternatives.

The Soros Institutes' entrance into Roşieni politics contributes to the picture Choudry and Kapoor (2010) paint, drawing out the complicated interconnections between local sites, larger contexts, grassroots groups, NGOs, and larger INGOs. Depending on the case and organizations involved, influence through financing has the potential to reprioritize survival efforts over mobilization. In other words, the great diversity of NGOs—and by extension the diversity of NGO goals and strategies—has the potential to impact DFDR sites in a variety of ways. At the same time, Oliver-Smith (2010) suggests resettlement, which Velicu (2020) and Kuyek (2019) note can take place in the prospective stages of development projects, attempts to “replace what has been a historical process of community evolution with an administrative process” (p. 25). As a member of AM put these complex relations:

...there are some hard things that take time to accomplish—“neighbourhoods.” When everything is in its place, when that is where your house is, and your property, your work time is shortened depending on the distance to your property, your neighbours who help you, who you cultivate relationships with in decades, you go to them and work with them if they need it; they come to you if you need it. (Interview, Oct. 17, 2019)

The crux of Oliver-Smith's point is that synthetic processes of redeveloping communities and their ways of being, are insufficient for recreating lived contexts or creating new lived contexts that are commensurable with what was lost through DFDR.

This reality also applies to the remnants of communities effected by development. Resettlement and structural violence destroyed the existing social relations in Roşia Montană,

largely through relocating most of its population. This reality forces those remaining to reimagine their lives and the social relations of their villages—which is not to say they are hitting the restart button but learning how to move forward as a historical communal entity—because their ways of surviving and living day-to-day have been forever changed. Members of AM and RMCF must continue to balance such cultural work with urgent survival tasks, and the need to mobilize against RMGC. NGOs and INGOs may shift this balance positively and/or negatively.

From the Roots to a Network of Branches: Tactics, Tools, and Tactical Ripples

This campaign, I mean the work, is more than just a campaign. A campaign has more limitations, but this... built around it a social movement. A social movement that had peasants in the centre, Alburnus Maior—the local landowners, peasants, inhabitants of Roşia Montană—and around them a lot of groups of support came up and started, to bring their contribution. And in this whole situation, like many things came out of this struggle, for example Mining Watch (Romania) came out of it. There were some people who decided "ah we think we are going to be active on the sectorial issue of mining." So they created an NGO that is following other projects as well. And other people looked at the reality aspect, and also the human rights aspect, the peasantry, the people who are living in these places, they don't have a voice, they are the best custodians of the land, of the natural resources. They deserve more support. So there was a group of people that created this organization, Eco Ruralis. (NGO Member, Interview, Sept. 25, 2019)

While RMCF split off from AM with its own strategy and tactics in a parallel struggle, AM also actively employed tactics from its inception. Kuyek (2019) writes that,

In choosing tools, you cannot forget to think holistically; to work with ideas like theatre, music, and relationship building, as well as political tools like demonstrations. Demonstrations can be festivals of art and drama. We can work on community economic development alternatives while we stop the mine. We can begin our protest with a circle of prayers. We can hold a potluck supper and sleepover on the steps of city call. We can create murals about our dreams. (p. 234)

Tactics against mining development typically involve appeals to—and educating—the public, especially people in institutions, and demonstrating the contradictions and hypocrisy of destructive development projects. Such tactics have already been reflected on above, in the AM leader's relationship building with government officials and RMCF's tactics. In the case of AM's struggle for Roşia Montană, relationship building tactics ended up sparking the SRM campaign and a social movement.

Roşieni Pedagogy and Curriculum. Between the formation of AM in 2000 and the initiation of SRM in 2002, members actively reached out through their networks to individuals or organizations that could provide guidance and support (Velicu 2015; 2017). Each of these sites

of contact represented a new site of learning. For Freire (1970), allies' or "authentic revolutionaries" "fundamental objective is to fight alongside the people for the recovery of the people's stolen humanity" (p. 75-76). This requires that people name, or teach, what has been stolen and the resolution they seek. Social movement and critical research scholars like Choudry (2015) and Denzin and Lincoln (2008) note that epistemological differences influence the content, processes, and products of knowledge production. In other words, the ways that Roșieni teach and learn—especially *țărani*—is a specific 'pedagogy.' Early in data collection I was fortunate to have a foundational conversation with a member of a Romanian *țărani* NGO who worked with AM from early on as a student; she illuminated characteristics of *țărani* learning:

Member: We are peasants, many of us not by choice, but it's because we're descendants of a peasant family. The education of the practices and the meaning of everything pass through practice. Peasants are not "pedagogic" people. They are not going to draw you a scheme or write you a book. They're going to show you, but this kind of knowledge and this kind of education goes much deeper. It forms you as a person. And when you are faced with the threat that your livelihood is in danger, the people respond in a very, very powerful way. It awakens something in you that you didn't realize is there, because you never have to articulate yourself politically. You don't have to do the things that the people from Roșia Montană had to do. It's a rare, very rare kind of situation. But I think peasants are—because of the cultural way and the traditional knowledge, the way it's transmitted—they are very resilient and very powerful people. They went through so much: changes of regimes, peasants have to work in the rain, in the climate crisis... and they don't have choices. Like they don't have breaks, animals don't have summer vacation. You have to adapt yourself to nature. It's very special.

Interviewer: When you say that the way peasants transmit things, it's not a pedagogical process, but it's deep... so how does it happen?

Member: It starts in countries that have a very... big community of peasants. We have 46% the population is rural. And Romania has over 40% of the peasants in the EU... They are in our country. Almost half the peasants in the EU are here. So when you have this big groupness everything starts in the family. For me, my grandma and my parents never answered me why. Cause I was always like, "Why are we doing things like this, why do we have to do the work like this, why are we working like this with the wine, why are we working like this with corn." They never answered me why. What I had to do was discover for myself why, and not only, but to adapt because nature is not the same as it was 10 years ago. Nature has to adapt to new situations, to climate change, and you are discovering everything by yourself, with assistance—of your family, of the neighbours, of the people who have their own experience and can share with you. It's very difficult for us to write books for example... Because peasants are dealing with life. You are dealing with things that are not mathematical...

Interviewer: ... It sounds to me like you're saying that it's hard to transmit the knowledge because things are changing all the time.

Member: Yes.

Interviewer: And so it's not like educational in the sense that, "Oh, these are all the things we know and I'm going to teach you about it" because you're constantly learning as you go along. And so, in your case, it's not like they were telling you what to do and how things are, they were learning alongside you and with you as things were changing.

Member: As well, yes. And also there are many other reasons. Peasants are also spiritual people and they explain the natural phenomenon(a) in a spiritual way... and they were following religious calendars, also incorporating some surviving cultural practices...

Interviewer: That helps me understand a little bit better how that's happening. So with this peasant "transmission," it's the same reason why it's hard to explain with the SRM campaign as it is with traditional peasant learning, because it was... organic communal learning, responding as things change?

Member: Uh, yeah. Peasants from Roșia Montană are open people, and peasants in general, and that was their big advantage. They were open to this new challenge. They were reflective. They thought about it, they thought a lot about what to do. They were embracing proposals and ideas. Many things we worked on because we built trust in each other and support, and that gave us more courage because we trusted each other. Peasants also are conservative people in the sense that they wanted to maintain their traditions, to maintain their livelihoods, to maintain the nature and so on. So, they felt the need to protect it against the mine. (Interview, Sept. 25, 2019)

Critically, this NGO member and *țărăncă* describes the cultural processes by which the *țărani* of Roșia Montană learn, and share—or teach—their knowledge. *Țărani* learning is deeply embedded and inextricable from ways of being and systems of meaning—a point reflected in this NGO member's reflection on the centrality of spiritual and cultural allegory in knowledge sharing. *Țărani* learning is also co-constructed; rural Roșieni share their traditional culture and *gospodărie* practices by "doing together." Similarly, Roșieni resistance and tactics of struggle reflect this same communal approach to learning. Further, this NGO member notes that these co-constructed learning practices are tied to values of openness, which pre-dispose *țărani* to praxis—reflection on new ideas for action and their present circumstances.

Roșieni members of AM employed the *țărani* approach to everyday life and learning in the context of their struggle. Members worked closely alongside those offering solidarity:

NGO Member: So, people in Alburnus Maior, they were always involved in all the discussions that happened especially in, I don't know, the interactions with the

authorities, and the strategic litigation. So, they were part of the processes of the discussions and of the decisions. And it was an instant transferring of information and knowledge, and contributions, ideas.

Interviewer: So, what were, as an activist or a Mining Watch member, what kinds of things have you learned from Alburnus Maior and those interactions, or the people, and the members?

NGO Member: So, one of the things that came from the locals and proved to be brilliant, and meant a lot for us, is that the campaign was never associated with a political party. The locals were approached by various political people in time, and they always refused to have, I don't know, "understandings" and to "work together" like to have joint declarations and everything. And this is something that the locals in Roșia Montană were smart enough to realize, that once we enter a discussion or a coalition with a certain political party, their struggle will be transformed into a political battle and won't be the struggle of the people of Roșia Montană. And this is very good and is something they wanted, and we understood in time how important this was. And we really made sure that it stays respected by everyone. In our communication, we had "The Save Roșia Montană campaign is an independent, non-partisan, non-political movement." (NGO Member, Interview, Oct. 3, 2019)

The deep relationship that developed between AM and their allies was established through "one-on-one meetings and hours of discussion," or engaging in the organization of struggle; this reflects the *țărani* approach to co-constructing learning through collaborative problem-solving. The dialogical nature of Roșieni-ally relations resulted in the learning that shifted action, such as the implementation of tactics for avoiding cooptation by political authorities.

For the Roșieni of AM, social action was as much about being in unity with their supporters as it was about impacting political and social change. As one Roșianca described it, the members of AM gave their time and resources in order to be present with allies taking social action on their behalf:

We did a lot of meetings; we went to as many meetings as we could. We came up with slogans, signs, however we could, no one gave us anything, no one sponsored us. We, poor us, in the evening with sheets, we would paint them, and we went to Bucharest, Cluj, Timisoara, big cities where we met with everyone. We worked, we suffered through cold, our hands froze in Bucharest... So that we can do something, so we can protest, so we can go, so they will do something with us, so they will leave us in peace, in our freedom. We worked hard, so you know. It was that period of time when the Ministers and all were saying that something needs to happen in Roșia, some sort of investment. What investment, they didn't have an investment here, only to destroy and to ruin everything. That's what they needed—so, they won't see one more person in Rosia. They want to kick everyone out, to the last person. And then what did they do with us, because they were only telling lies, nothing else. We went to Sibiu, Oradea. Wherever

there were events, we went. We paid for cars and went. Just so that we can be united, with as many as we could. And they took to the streets, we have videos. Everyone went into the street and protested for us and they helped us, they gave us hope. They would send us postcards from Iasi, they would send me postcards. When I would go into the garage, I would see the postcards - don't give up, because we are with you. (AM Member, Interview, Nov. 19., 2019)

As this Roșianca puts it, it is important for members of AM to express their unity and take action alongside their allies. Thus, the SRM campaign and evolving social movement was able to retain an important connection with its grassroots origins and continue to shift public opinion through first-hand narratives and actions, in line with Choudry (2015) and Kuyek (2019).

The actions and involvement of Roșieni AM members played a critical role in igniting and shaping social action in the broader campaign and movement. One activist and NGO member describes how AM members helped guide the focus and strategy of action:

Strategy. Yes. The thing is we were getting lost in the details. Knowing so much information, you're not able to distance yourself from it and you don't have the perspective anymore. So we would dive in... these mountains of information and data. And moments we had to also react, or considered that we had to react, we would alert ourselves for so many things that I tell you we kind of lost perspective... And the people from Roșia Montană, particularly [AM leader]... we were able for so many years... to win all these things, with all the effort we did, if we didn't have him to keep that cool... I mean there were so many problematic times and he was able to inspire us to continue, and he was able to see where exactly we have to go, what is the actual direction and what is more distraction. Some of things were fake alarms or some of the things we weren't evaluating properly... he was able to show us what the priorities were.

So the things from him [AM leader], from my knowledge is, he is a person that loves freedom. So he wants him and the people to be free. To decide for themselves. To make the choices, but informed choices. To life according to their principles and values. So he is very much for what we say in La Via Campesina—food sovereignty—the ability, the actual rights, the human rights, to decide your food systems, and to be part of the decisions that effect you. And he sees this role outside the system. He understood that we have to maintain the best weapon that we had, was to have credibility in front of the people. So we never associated ourselves with political parties, with dirty money. We came up with ethical fundraising with independency from political and religious and whatever kind of influences. Because he realized that we're going to win if we're able to build the political, public pressure. And people were fed up with lies and promises and fake heroes and things like that. And he also didn't see himself as a hero, which made all of us heroes. He was very right because after building, having all of this consistency for so many years, in 2013 we had an explosion of support in the streets and everywhere. And that was because of him, because he understood these things very early on and he pointed us in that direction. (Interview, Sept. 25, 2019)

Roșieni members of AM worked alongside their allies as they did with other members, analyzing information and co-constructing strategies and tactics. Grassroots leaders also played an important role in mentoring the activists and campaigners working with them, maintaining the same dialogical approach with supporters as they took with their members. Critically, AM members influenced the campaign so that it avoided cooptation, which led to widespread public support and a clarity of message.

It is also worth noting that many of these allies also learned cultural values from AM members through working alongside them. Several campaigners moved to Roșia Montană after the nation-wide September 2013 protests/Romanian Autumn, and others still plan to make a life there. One activist described her transformation:

So, what I learned from them, now there are many levels of things that I learned from them. So, first of all, well on a cultural level I learned what it is to have roots. So Roșia Montană became also my home and I have roots now, and that is a great present. It is the greatest present you can ever get. They gave me a home. And they became my friends. And what I also learned from them is to overcome fear. Sometimes, even when I was living in Romania for some years—it doesn't mean that you know everything—and so, for example, when we were called by the police and when we were taken to Bucharest and we were grilled under heavy light, for afternoons and things like that, AM showed me that I don't need to be fearful. And that is great, and so great that they did that. And so on a professional level, I learned from them... about mining. I know about geology, I know about engineering, I know about all these things now. I didn't know these things before. I learned about the history, I learned about Roman mine galleries, I learned about the importance of all of that. And I learned about RM, the place, but I learned about mining, yeah. (SRM Coordinator, Interview, Oct. 15, 2019)

By working alongside AM members, supporters and allies came into direct contact with Roșieni values—values tied to the land and the place they were working diligently to protect. As a result, activists and supporters from elsewhere in Romania and Europe learned a sense of place in addition to regional mining knowledge and methods of struggle. While the struggle for Roșia Montană was placed by nature, this activist's story demonstrates that placed-ness can be shared or transmitted to supporters struggling closely alongside the grassroots group AM.

Roșieni believe that AM's networking to promote the struggle more broadly in Romania not only created momentum that benefited SRM, it was also learning that impacted the broader consciousness of civil society. One Roșian explained that Romanians who became involved in supporting AM through social action, learned self-efficacy in relation to social action:

We've provided an example and we have awakened a civic conscience in a lot of people who were sleeping, but I felt, because I've been to a lot of protests across the country, where we received a lot of appreciation and I saw how much solidarity there is with Roșia Montană. And we demonstrated that it can be done, even if you're a minority, even if you're considered weak or vulnerable. That “the small log can flip the big cart.” (RMCF Member, Interview, Oct. 24, 2019)

Through participating in successful social actions, AM members transmitted a sense of hope for change into their supporters throughout Romania. Another NGO member who worked closely with AM explained this impact further:

NGO Member: ...after the fall of communism, people still were quite afraid to come together, to protest, to oppose something that they weren't okay with. So, we had all this culture of fear and dis-empowerment, and what Roșia Montană built, and needed all these years, was exactly this: a culture of protest, a culture of disobedience, a culture of courage to stand against the authority. So, we needed time. And this is why protests for Roșia Montană are so important. Because it was the biggest protest after the 1990s...

Interviewer: I'm really interested in building this culture of empowerment, and the two words you used were disobedience and courage. How do you build disobedience and courage in people?

NGO Member: By showing that if you do it, it's ok, and it gets you the results you want.

Interviewer: So, teaching by doing.

NGO Member: Mhmm. I think this is the way people learn to protest, to do all the things they did. Also, for the strategic litigation. The person that started and coordinated all this immense work was a student. She went to law school to be able to do a better job, but she learned the things, she started learning law because of the things she learned in the Save Roșia Montană campaign, which is really amazing. And she became a lawyer. (NGO Member, Interview, Oct. 3, 2019)

The grassroots values and approach to learning was “taught” to activists and supporters through collaborative social action. Learning by doing is certainly always an element of activism.

However, learning to struggle by struggling alongside AM created a unique context and site of learning for some activists, introducing them to concepts and perspectives that impacted their self-efficacy and career choices, encouraged them to deepen their learning in different areas of specialization, and influenced the formation of the three NGOs whose members I interviewed.

Knowledge produced through the SRM campaign and shared between AM members and activists was identified as valuable, not only for Roșia Montană, but also other sites as well. This

learning prompted the formation of NGOs that continued to work in the struggle for Roșia Montană, but also expanded outward in support of other sites of development contestation:

We knew exactly where to ask, what to ask, and how to get the information. And then we just connected the information we received from different authorities and put together a report, which is called—it's also in English—Transylvania Mined Land...

And Mining Watch [Romania], in fact, it was started not necessarily for working on Roșia Montană [but] work on the other mining projects. As we continued to work as people that were part of the Mining Watch network, within the umbrella of the Save Roșia Montană campaign for Roșia Montană. (NGO Member, Interview, Oct. 3, 2019)

Another NGO member further explained how learning by “doing together” furthered the struggle for Roșia Montană and the work of organizations associated with it:

Yeah, I mean we discovered basically how the world works through this struggle. Because we had to learn how central authorities work, how parliament works, how the legislative process works, how the government works, what's the difference between the various agencies, the local authorities, what's the power in the different levels. We discovered, I mean because we started documenting ourselves, how did this project come about, what kinds of permits they already obtained, and where can we stop them. That forced us to educate ourselves on the political and decision-making process. (Interview, Sept. 25, 2019)

In the examples that these NGO members describe, a clear pattern emerges of how *țărani* learning by doing was transmitted to and employed by activists/NGO members. In other words, those who became deeply involved in the struggle learned something of the inherent pedagogy—or method of learning—that Roșieni demonstrated.

Through expanding their network, members of AM and their supporters also engaged with other grassroots struggles. Many AM members are keen on this dialogue, both learning from others and sharing what knowledge they produced:

We invited people from other places. For example, I remember in 2004 we invited some people from Greece who were confronted with a similar situation and who were struggling for 10 years. And I remember we laughed at them. We were like "In one year we're done. We're very advanced." And they were very nice—much smarter than we were. Much more experienced. They were like, "Yeah, sure, you're gonna be over in one year." (NGO Member, Interview, Sept. 25, 2019)

Roșian: Yes, Greece, Peru, Slovakia. People came, yes, asked for help.

Interviewer: What's important to impart to these people?

Roșian: It is very good to teach them, to teach them to open their eyes and know how to

defend themselves... We've done exchanges, I was telling them about our experiences. They would tell us theirs and us ours. (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)

Dialogical learning and action are critical for AM, and thereby many other organizations that were involved with SRM.

Roșieni “pedagogy” re-introduced hope and a sense of empowerment to Romanian civil society by way of AM’s dialogical approach to social action. It is critical to witness how emergent learning from collaborative struggle did not simply benefit those opposed to the proposed mining development at Roșia Montană. Allies and activists that I spoke with attest that this struggle impacted their own lives and benefited Romanian society at large. Freire (1970) described how oppression degrades agency—dehumanizing the oppressed—and argues that:

As the oppressed, fighting to be human, take away the oppressors’ power to dominate and suppress, they restore to the oppressors the humanity they had lost in the exercise of oppression. It is only the oppressed who, by freeing themselves, can free their oppressors. (p. 38)

Freire continues by explaining how oppressors are not just those actively involved in oppression, but also those who benefit from systems of social organization that oppress others:

The oppressors do not perceive their monopoly on *having more* as a privilege which dehumanizes others and themselves. They cannot see that, in the egoistic pursuit of *having* as a possessing class, they suffocate in their own possessions and no longer *are*; they merely *have*. (p. 41)

Thus, Freire describes the critical role that the oppressed have in transforming, not only the worlds they interact with, but also broader society. I brought Freire’s perspective up in one of my interviews, and while the NGO member had not heard of him, she jumped in:

Like, during the protests, the most famous banner, slogan during the protest, it's "We don't save Roșia Montană, Roșia Montană Saves Us" huh? Just saying. It's the same logic, sorry for interrupting but yeah, it's true. (Interview, Oct. 3, 2019)

The Pedagogy and Curriculum of Activists and AM-Allied NGOs. Learning in social action is never unidirectional. AM members reached out to their networks to share their experiences and challenges, as well as to learn what they needed to survive as placed Roșieni. Conde (2017) argues that in the last 20 years anti-mining struggles have benefited immensely from extra-local alliances. Likewise, as one NGO member shared, the processes whereby campaigners shared information with AM was intentional and involved the interpretation of relevant data:

So, in time, imagine in 2012, all the campaigning around stopping the gold mine became quite sophisticated. We had from legal actions to, I don't know, you would communicate with the European Commission and have some technical replies from them, all sorts of technical stuff, also about the environmental procedure. So, we always needed to translate these into simple information that a seventh grade student could understand. We did this with the local newspaper for the people in the mountains, and we did a similar translation into social media for the people online. (NGO Member, Interview, Oct. 3, 2019)

This narrative demonstrates that local NGOs and campaigners played an important role in identifying relevant information—which they researched or received from larger INGOs like Green Peace or Friends of the Earth—and making it accessible to grassroots resistance and the public. For example, in response to RMGC's attempt to spread mining development ideology through their newspaper *Ziarul Apusenii* (The Apusenii Newspaper), SRM campaigners produced their own newspaper *Apusenii Liberi* (Free Apusenii). Articles in the SRM newspaper ranged from information on RMGC tactics or the environmental impact of the proposed development, to successful calls for mobilization: “We had good responses, like for example, people went to see their elected officials to ask them not to vote this mining law. And we had a very good response.” *Apusenii Liberi* was funded through individual donations (www.rosiamontana.org). As this NGO member put it, the role that local Romanian NGOs evolved to fill was an information hub or bank of tactical data:

...as we've been involved in several fights like this, for us it's quite easy to know what to do. So, it's a hub of information, but “less” than information, like very practical things to do. “We need to go there, do that, ask these people, this is the procedure, this is how a project gets the permits.” (NGO Member, Interview, Oct. 3, 2019)

Thus, local NGOs working with groups like AM articulate the nature of their relationship as supporting grassroots strategy through interpreting information and disseminating the same as practical tactics. The famous “not for sale” plaques were suggested by Green Peace, though many members took their signs down—encouraged by AM leaders—when RMGC threatened the employment prospects of their children (Field Notes, AM Member, Nov. 16, 2019).



Friends of the Earth Europe ISDS materials at an SRM-aligned NGO headquarters.



Broader knowledge is compared against local contexts by campaigners and translated, literally and metaphorically, into language relevant and appropriate to the local audience.



Materials on ISDS produced by SRM campaigners, including the newspaper Apusenii Liberi and an additional resource also made available to the broader public.

Figure 33 Example of how broad knowledge regarding investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) is produced by INGOs, collected and interpreted by local NGOs and campaigners, and re-presented for grassroots groups.

NGO members working closely with AM also distributed third party materials, like documentaries, directly to the membership. These materials facilitated reflective learning and growing conscientization within the membership, as one AM member noted:

They would tell us about the risks, they would show us movies, with what happened before, what this company has done in other places, because it has been in other places as well. And it only brought destruction. They did research so that they can find out what they had done before. Also, Frank Timiș, where they have been and what they had done. That is how we woke up with this whole thing, that it is not good, it is not good what they are doing. (Interview, Nov. 19, 2019)

The documentaries shared by NGO members gave AM members a broader lens with which to examine their circumstances. Many AM members saw the case of their home, Roșia Montană, as linked to other regional disasters such as Baia Mare. However, the resources shared by NGO members extended these intuitions into the terrain of globalization and thus to other cases of mining dispossession and ecological destruction around the world, including in Canada:

The problem is that the tailings pond in Baia Mare, the pond was a small one. It spread out on 9.6 hectares, and the quantity was small that was put in there. But the project was done by a company from Canada and was so badly done that it was impossible to not have the accident. There, it ripped, 100 000 cubic meters of waste containing cyanide spilled in the Săsar river, which ended up in the Someș [river], and the Someș in Tisa [river] and it killed fish all the way to the Black Sea. 100 000. Imagine what would have happened if the project in Roșia Montană would have been done, with a tailings pond where 150 million tons of waste containing cyanide, a tailings pond that would have been in a dam that was 185 meters tall. And on the other side of the dam was the Abrud town and everything that is there. And you have seen that lots of things, even in Canada where you are, there have been lots of major mining accidents. The last accident that happened where you are, in Canada, the project for the tailings pond was done by the company, which created the project for Corna. With the company. And then it broke, and the cyanide water ended up in Ontario Lake, yes [researcher correction: Quesnel Lake, in the Mount Polley disaster]? Three or four years ago. There are movies made, I've seen movies. (RMCF Member, Interview, Nov. 5, 2019)

Materials shared by NGOs allowed AM members to compare different global sites of development disaster and dispossession to the proposed plans for Roșia Montană and even trace connections between such cases. In the interview above, the Roșian explains that the company Knight Piésold, a designer of Imperial Metals' Mount Polley mine tailings pond in British Columbia, also designed the Corna Valley tailings pond for GBU's planned Roșia Montană mine (Cumming, 2016; Goțiu, 2014). Notably, the Mount Polley tailings damn burst in 2014, leaking 25 billion litres of arsenic-contaminated tailings into Polley Lake, Hazeltine Creek, and Quesnel

lake (Kuyek, 2019). Mount Polley is considered the “worst tailings disaster in Canadian history” (p. 51), impacting critical sockeye salmon runs, breeding and feeding areas, and the drinking water for locals and tourists alike. Furthermore, the estimated \$40 million required to clean up the disaster will likely be paid by taxpayers, who “can expect two dam failures every 10 years unless mining laws are updated” (Pollon, 2019). These factors clarify the unequal distribution of wealth to investors and risk to locals, as well as claims that modern mining is impervious to disaster.



Figure 34 *Photo of the Mount Polley Disaster.*

(<https://thenarwhal.ca/mount-polley-mine-expert-recommendations-not-implemented-report/>)

The production of learning articles and sharing of educational films were not the only way locals NGOs and campaigners facilitated grassroots learning. AM’s supporters also shared research directly through conversation. As the SRM coordinator described it, there was a method and skill underlying how information was deemed to be relevant for sharing:

So, it was important to feed them, all the time, this kind of information because fear arises when you don't know, and strength arises with knowledge. So, the more you feed them with knowledge, they knew how to fight, and they knew that they can fight... And we immediately started with a website, we started to communicate this to the wider public also, so it was not only to the members, but also the wider public. We would always write in Romanian and in English. We would make reports, we would make all kinds of things. Transfer of information was one of our main abilities, and each time there was a reason to write a press release, no matter how insignificant other people

might think that it was, we would do it... But to the members, of course, it was the most important for us. And the first thing, "Hey [AM leader], yo the guy Frank Timis, he is a drug-dealer, he's got two convictions—oh man, what does this mean about the professionalism of this fucking giant, this huge giant that seems to be so abstract and so far away, and on the Toronto stock exchange, so big and with millions of dollars—yo man, he's a drug-dealer, so lets go and get him."

This SRM coordinator describes how campaigners reviewed information, assessed what was actionable, tactical, meaningful to the local context, and encouraging. Relevance was determined by what “remains in your head, and things that empower you, that give you strength... *"millions of tonnes of cyanide"* or *"the tonnes of dynamite used everyday."*” Data shared to educate AM and the public had to be accurate and meaningful in a way that helped learners conceptualize the scope of the project. Campaigners shared information through discussions and reports, which validated concerns AM raised since before 2000:

So when Gabriel Resources said at the beginning, "Oh no, we will not use that much amount of cyanide," when we asked them okay, "so how much are you going to use?" ... it was also great, the confirmation for the members of Alburnus Maior, that when Gabriel Resources proposed the mine it was exactly as they had estimated it, and seen it, and known it. So, this was also great confirmation for their knowledge, for their expertise... it gave them self-assurance. "Yeah, I know my stuff, I know my shit." (Interview, Oct. 15, 2019)

These reports cultivated confidence, hope, and shifted AM’s understanding of RMGC as a distant/abstract entity to one with specific elements and components with vulnerabilities.

Hope and encouragement were also infused into AM when SRM campaigners mobilized mass social action. The involvement of supporters in centralized and decentralized action became sites of learning where AM members took heart, were validated, and reflected on the public support that resulted from their action. As one member described, hope translated into renewed, generational resistance:

I mean in Cluj there was the huge street protests around the area and then I saw, again the people, that they were getting out in the streets, and I was like, "Oh, I can't believe it, are all these people?" I was looking out the windows, and there are all these people out in the street for my local village, and it was also something huge. It was making thinking, even if in those times the house remained empty, basically as right when I went to university my grandmother passed away so the house remained empty, and the company was huge buying. They were heavily buying then, and of course we needed the money because also me and my brother, we went to the university, it was so good to have an apartment, but yeah we decided, and also told to my father, "no, no, no, don't sell, it is fine—it is very, very fine, we are doing very fine here..." (Interview, Oct. 25, 2019)

AM's organization and networking produced a ripple in public opinion. The work of campaigners and local NGOs helped mobilize responses that AM could see and reflect on.

Another AM member described the impact of allied campaigns and mobilizations:

They helped. When you see that you are not alone, there's a different energy. And I thank them, especially the young people, and those who understood this fight, this fight for the environment. But no, I mean that our properties were included in this issue, they depended on it, but the problem with the environment and the kicking out as if we were rodents, I thank everyone who jumped up to help us. And I am grateful until my death that because of them too we are still here. That, as many times as is needed, I for one will ask them for help. Whoever thinks they should get involved, it is each with their own faith. Of course, you cannot ask for help if you do not help yourself too. First of all, you need to be vertical, so that you can be helped. Because if you are not trying to defend because oh, I want to die, or—you have to fight. **And this fight, it should not be understood that someone needs to fight for me so that I can have food and live a decent life. No, those things I make for myself [researcher's emphasis].** No one needs to fight. **They need to fight where I can not, to fight with the Romanian state if they try to do crap, through trials, through democratic fights. Through money, not for me to use, to use it strictly for the cause. Because I can make a living.** (Interview, Nov. 29, 2019)

This AM member reflects, much as Choudry (2015) points out, that AM's grassroots mobilization around refusing to sell was the focal point of the campaign. He also clarifies that it is not the role of NGOs to support grassroots "survival strategies," which Petras (1999), Petras and Veltmeyer (2011), and Choudry and Kapoor (2013) warn lead to the depoliticization and cooptation of social movements. He also reflects that their struggle depended upon public support spread through campaigning for its success.

However, even in well-intentioned and collaborative alliances, micropolitics require balance. By facilitating the learning of AM members, allied NGOs and campaigners enter a trusted relationship and wield influence. As one NGO member put it, there was room for improvement in the SRM campaign:

I think we would have done more things to ensure a process of the peasants in Roșia Montană, to protect more their space. To guarantee that they have a space of their own articulation... to give the direction more. Because at one point it was the people who became experts, sort of, who started to give the direction. (Interview, Sept. 25, 2019)

Allied NGOs and campaigners were essential to AM's effectiveness—which earned them the deep appreciation of many Roșieni. In the same breath, AM resistance was central to the SRM campaign/movements and therefore, space for reproducing grassroots praxis and identity is key.

Education as Tactic: Schooling the Opposition. Expanding on the theme of the ambidirectional nature of learning, AM members and their allies described their work as educational, not only for the public and their allies, but specifically for the opposition as well. The SRM campaign took AM's resistance into direct and open confrontation with RMGC, educating the political and economic bodies that the corporation was working with—and even their investors—on the existence of the opposition, their arguments, and the largely unreported risks of the Roșia Montană project:

Okay we learned that they had no plan, that we did. They were clueless. But I just wanted to say that our education work... the swing of the Roșia Montană campaign in those days, but still today, is extraordinary. We did not only educate the World Bank, we educated the European Parliament, we educated the European Commission, we educated all these people, and in the end, one of the reasons why we could not pass the special law in 2013 [for the forceful development of Roșia Montană] was they could not declare the project of national interest. One of the main reasons why they couldn't do that was because the European Commission was telling them that they can't do this, and the reason the why the European Commission was able to tell them that they can't do this was because *we had explained this to the European Commission...* We were communicating to the European Commission for several years, we were talking to them. Even when we didn't get replies from them we were putting pressure on them, we were sending the information, and they had to reply in a way... They wanted to deviate a river in the Corna valley to put the tailing pond—you cannot deviate the natural course of a river, in European legislation under the water framework directive, unless you declare that project to be of national interest. Even if you declare it to be of national interest, you need before to have consulted the people, you need to register with the Danube River Basin Framework bullshit or whatever. They hadn't done any of that. In the end, this is an argument why they could not pass the special law. (SRM Coordinator, Interview, Oct. 15, 2019)

Public bodies were educated through informal communications, reports, reviewing assessments, investor assessments, and legal assessments. Political decisions made in favour of AM and SRM were often the result of political education work in addition to legal arguments:

Do you think that the World Bank or the European Parliament just came to us and said “Roșia Montană, very interesting?” Do you think the World Bank came and said “Ah, there's opposition to Roșia Montană?” No, the World Bank was talking to Gabriel Resources, and of course Gabriel Resources didn't tell them that we existed, they didn't assume that we existed. So, we went to them and said “Hi guys, we're the opposition, you better talk to us because if you're going to invest here we're going to make your life hell.” ...and that's when they came to Roșia Montană and they talked to us, and when they heard that Green Peace was involved, they were like “ah, my god shit”—you should have seen their faces. Then when there were the autumn meetings of the World Bank,

NGOs invited us along to put pressure because the decision was imminent... With the European Parliament, we went through them, I had worked with the European Parliament already in Sighisoara, and I contacted these MEPs again, and I built up relationships with these MEPs... it didn't happen like that out of the blue. They happened because this was the campaign work... [AM leader] was doing his fields, and we called [AM leader] when we needed a quote from him, but he was not in the office everyday, and that's the way it should be, he's a farmer. So [activist] and I were doing the office work, and that was the kind of things that we did, back in there.

Those working on the SRM campaign identified contradictions in globalized capital; risk and profitability were not shared equally by all politico-economic entities involved. Investors and transnational political bodies like EC were unaware of the legal and economic risks of the project and many were not even aware of the presence of stalwart opposition. Still today, RMGC attempts to argue to the WB tribunal that the Romanian Autumn was broad opposition to anti-corruption and not about Roșia Montană. Thus, education of RMGC's stakeholders represented a flipped approach to divide and conquer. By exposing contradictions in globalized capital—that obscure possible overall net losses—campaigners eroded political, economic, and public support.

Another crucial point made by this SRM coordinator shows an alignment to the *țărani* aspect of struggle. Specifically, the coordinator notes that much of this educational work rested heavily on campaigners, because it was important for *țărani* to continue their lives and work on the *gospodărie*. Life has forever changed for Roșieni and while the struggle to preserve their place-based existence depends on sacrifice, sacrificing the entirety of what they are trying to protect would defeat the purpose of the struggle itself. However, the solution as noted above is not to raise charity and material resources for AM members, but rather to carve enough space and time from the struggle so *țărani* can “remain vertical” by their own work.

Roșieni were also involved in such educational efforts. This is apparent in narrative of the Roșian above, who petitioned the European Parliament. Here, another Roșian described how he took on the role of educating politicians whom RMGC was cajoling into cooperation:

I had a lot of experience, because I worked, I led people, I had a job. And here, I gained even more experience. I have learned an enormous amount of things here. Being on television, attending debates, going to meetings, with ministers who were coming here, the Environment Minister, they came here. I taught them lessons too, the ministers. "Are you not being fooled?" They built a water treatment station, down at the mouth of the mine, and the water they were treating, that's coming out of the galleries here, because that has been like this for 15 million years, because these mountains are volcanic mountains and they have 15 million years. When the Environment Minister came, they

took water from there and put some fish in there, in the water they had treated. Right away, the fish “had their wheels uphill.” All of them died. They took all the water out, put potable water from the system, and then they put the fish in there. And I told the Minister, “Minister sir, you were tricked Mr. Minister. You were presented with fish in that water, the potable water from the system. If you really want to check, go and ask them to put recycled water there and then put the fish in there to see how many of them swim around.” Two, three times [the fish swum around] and then “their sneakers facing Mahomed” [the fish died]. Well, I exposed them, I told them. And the Alba Deputies participated too, who were supporting the project, who were taking money. (RMCF Member, Nov. 5, 2019)

As the SRM coordinator and this Roșian’s stories demonstrate, education is a critical tool for disrupting RMGC and the mining development project.

Legal Tactics: Bringing Roșieni Arguments into the courts. Conde (2017) notes that “taking a mining company to court is becoming a more realistic possibility for poor and marginalized communities through the alliances created with national and international NGOs and lawyers” (p. 85). As the SRM coordinator illuminated above, one of the key tactics employed through the SRM campaign was legal argumentation, which formed from the site of learning between AM and their network. One NGO member described how learning in social action evolved into contesting mining development in the legal sphere:

Alburnus Maior was always part of these court cases. So it was not only CIDRM [Independent Centre for Environmental Development], it was CIDRM plus Alburnus Maior. So, they were always a part formally, but not only formally, basically we discussed each and every strategy, and each and every court case, we discussed before. Like, “Shall we do this? Shall we try this?” Every single strategy was decided together... For example, I told you that we challenged in court this urban planning made by the mining company in Roșia Montană, freezing the area as a mono-industrial area exclusively reserved for their mining project. In this court case Alburnus Maior, from the very beginning, from when there were the very first consultations for this plan—fake consultations—their main argument was that the local councillors who voted for this plan were in a conflict of interest because they were also employees of the mining company, and the law forbids you to vote when you are in a conflict of interest... we then turned it into legal words and found the exact article in the law of local administration... Or for example, when we challenged acts related to the environmental impact assessment procedure, we invoked things like, there were no real public consultations, and Alburnus Maior was witness to that... Their voice was just turned into legal arguments, but they were always connected. (NGO Member, Interview, Oct. 16, 2019)

Here, this NGO member describes how their organization employed legal tactics rooted in grassroots knowledge and relationships with the Roșieni of AM. These cases had a tremendous impact on the struggle for Roșia Montană.

However, significant learning was also required to develop legal cases. Accession to the EU created immense vulnerability to ABD, but at the same time it opened the door to protective methods developed through historical contestation of liberalization within Western European countries. Potential for change was created, but no precedent yet existed in Romania:

I remember that we never lost a case. And the thing is we were some kids who were putting these cases together. In the beginning, when we started building information, I remember that at one point we took my professor for administrative law, who used to be seen as this giant academic from our university, and we took him to Roșia Montană. We had a room like this half piled with information, with documents, and he freaked out. He said that this is too much for him, that he cannot get into that. At one point we insisted, and we found the lawyers who were creative enough, because what we were doing was very unique. (NGO Member, Interview, Sep. 25, 2019)

We were all like beginners in these kinds of campaigning things. We just learned by doing, and we got more and more involved, because then you also get involved a bit emotionally, because you are there and you work with people and you like that place, and all this kind of stuff. Quite quickly, fortunately, we got to the conclusion that we needed to have a legal strategy in order to contest. Because at that time the company was already getting the first legal permits to do the mine. So we thought, okay if they do these legal steps, we need to do something about contesting these steps. If we manage to get them, at least slow down in this process, it gives us time to organize, and to get better, and to collect even more arguments. This is how we got have a legal strategy, to form a group of legal experts that would study documentation, and go to the courts, and do contestations in this legal language. 2002 to 2006, in this period we had the impression that the local courts from the Alba county were not impartial towards the issue of Roșia Montană—because of the local political pressures or whatever. We didn't feel really listened to. So this is how this idea came to have another organization, which is based somewhere else in the country but still has the legal capacity to act on the Roșia Montană case, but that would take legal cases in other courts, like Cluj courts or Bucharest courts, in order to somehow escape the jurisdiction of Alba Iulia. (NGO Member, Interview, Oct. 16, 2019)

The learning processes that resulted from campaigners consulting AM and legal experts, and further conducting their own research, led to expertise building and the formation of an NGO. NGO formation itself was a tactic, or social action that resulted from knowledge gained in this struggle. This demonstrates the complexity of interconnections between grassroots groups,

activists, and the organizations opposed to mining development at Roșia Montană. Confidence built through victories had an opposite affect on the opposition:

We used to send them thank-you letters each time we'd win a court case. And we're like "it must be a hard time for you guys, here's some help." We were so fearless, we were so unconscious—they were scared of us. For example, when they had to do a consultation for the environmental impact assessment. The EIA. And they came up with this huge study. I don't remember how many thousands of pages it had. It was something inhumane, and you couldn't print, you couldn't copy it, you had to go to a few libraries in the country to consult it, and we came up with the most amazing—I mean, there was a lot of work that was behind doing a counter-study to that—but the public consultation that they had to do, so we forced first of all a process that was very, very big. They had to do consultations in a lot of cities. We had hundreds of people, who had hundreds of questions—technical questions—they weren't able to answer. For example, the one in Cluj, I remember that we were there until 4:00 in the morning, because there were that many people asking questions. So when they were trying to do something, we responded back so badly... or we had to that EIA I think we had something like a million contestations and letters against it. Like, it was really heavy. It was so much. (NGO Member, Interview, Sep. 25, 2019)

Campaigners had to learn, not only how to operate in the legal sphere, but also how to address RMGC's extra-legal tactics—such as burying the information for an environmental assessment in a massive report that had very little access. In this example, campaigners leaned on social action networks to crowd-source the analysis of the document, flipping RMGC's tactic back on itself by overwhelming the company with a flurry of technical questions they could not address. Campaigners also learned from their own experiences of hope and anxiety, and amplified the emotional toll on RMGC by taunting the company after victories. These may seem like small tactics, but they are by no means insignificant in what is essentially a struggle of attrition. Sociologist Augustin Stoica notes that “there were 78 court and administrative petitions filed against this mining project between 2004 and 20 September 2013” (ARB/15/31, 2019, p. 3171).

FânFest. In order to build the social network for the SRM campaign that could support legal actions as described above and create pressure in civil society against mining development, campaigners needed to engage in a shift of tactics. Four years after AM had formed and two years after the SRM campaign had been initiated, campaigners had cut out enough of a buffer against the press for mining development to change their approach from averting immanent dangers to taking the offensive. One SRM coordinator described how the accumulation of learning in social action knowledge impacted their tactics:

Hay-fest, yeah, but it's also a play on the English name fun. That's why it's such a great name. It was at the end of hay, in August, when everybody has just finished putting the hay together, so that's why it also makes sense from an organic point of view. And people in Roșia Montană could identify that, because usually [AM leader] would really hurry up to finish his fân, so he could help us on FânFest... When we started in 2002 with [activist] we had to get rid of the immediate threats: the World Bank wanted to give them money, the gold corporation was already starting to relocate people, the shit was hitting the fan. Until 2004, we started to get rid of the immediate threats and at the same time, building the campaign: so our website, we started to look, we had to understand what was going on, we had to learn from [AM leader] and all the others; we also had to learn that the campaign has a social component, there's a heritage component, there's an environment component, there's an economic component—you have to strengthen these pillars. We called it strengthening the pillars of the campaign. And so that's what we did. First, we strengthened the pillars. We got the churches to be on our side, we got the Romanian Academy to be on our side...

Early successes allowed AM members and SRM campaigners to focus on defining the key facets of their strategy and argumentation—social, heritage, environment, and economic—thus learning informed action. Noticing their demonstrations/actions had limited effect, SRM took to the offensive with legal actions and organizational tactics to create “the mass of people you need to overthrow something.” They also learned public support augmented legal and political action:

So we realized that each time when people were coming FânFest, they got addicted by FânFest. They got hosted by Roșia Montană. They got the Roșia Montană bug. It was the same for all of us... If we get addicted to it, others get addicted to it too... Let's addict them so they can help us in the fight. We thought we can continue to do that by bringing 10-15 people to Roșia Montană... and they all became addicted. So this is really nice, but we need something on a bigger scale, and that's where we did FânFest. To bring more people to Roșia Montană, for them to see the beauty of the place, to see why we fell in love with it, and hope that they would also fall in love with it. Of course, that they would give a little bit of money at Roșia Montană... it was all free, and the musicians performed on a pro-bono basis.

So the idea was come to Roșia Montană, see how beautiful it is, and then when you hear on the television that this is the mono-industrial area, and that it has to be turned into a mine you get up and you fight and you can say, “I have been there, I have seen it, and no fucking way you're gonna do this...” we had music at night, but during the day it was all about the campaign and learning. We had NGOs coming, showing people about, we had really great debates with politicians, [AM leader] would take people to show them around FânFest so that they can see how beautiful it is, they could look at some of the Roman mines. So it was a visual education, it was, on all your senses... It is emotional of course, the rooting, the belonging, is emotional. And how does that rooting and belonging come? By looking at something that is so beautiful, and that inspires you so

much, and that is populated by people that are open and smiling and inviting you in. It's a place where you feel you can be. It's that blending. And of course the mine is about a place, that they want to destroy. To show that place instead, in its beauty and its glory, of course is a very strong anti-potion. (SRM Coordinator, Interview, Oct. 15, 2019)

Campaigners further reflected the powerful educational value of the place of Roșia Montană in shaping their commitment to struggle. They piloted the concept of free, place-based education with a small group. Then, finding success, SRM created FânFest and drew participants through entertainment, a tactic which Kuyek (2019) notes can curry public favour for mining opposition. AM members directly taught visitors about the commune, history, culture, and the land; thus, FânFest “rooted attendees” and gave them a stake in the struggle. Campaigners organized workshops by NGOs and politicians that taught both theoretical understandings of the issues and practical mobilization skills. FânFest also married the living needs of Roșieni to education on political action, by creating an opportunity for locals to sell what they produced. “Hundreds of activities, exhibitions, guided tours, farmers’ markets, workshops, concerts, live theater, and book launches are freely offered” (Bejan, Murvai, Mihăilă, & Cherciov, 2015, p. 203).

Education at FânFest was dialogical in nature rather than an attempt to “deposit knowledge,” as Freire (1970) would put it, in attendees. Rather it allowed participants to engage directly with the ideas and actors involved in the struggle, which created a social forum for cultivating processes of reflection to inform future social action.

... [We] had all kinds of workshops, interactions, and debates, and this was a way to discuss about things that were done that were proven successful. And then people would see: "Oh, they did that and they really managed to have a result, and they protested and nothing happened," and “Oh, they got a fine and it was annulled because it was an illegal fine...” (NGO Member, Interview, Oct. 3, 2019)

These educational efforts laid the groundwork for the Romanian Autumn in 2013 by raising support amongst activists, tourists, and citizens for Roșia Montană, thereby forging bonds within the emerging movement (Predoiu, 2017).

The efforts of FânFest transmitted the values of the struggle, not only to visitor but also Roșieni themselves. Under the constant barrage of RMGC’s corporate-state alliance, which characterized Roșieni as impoverished, backwards, and unintelligible, FânFest was an expression of the value of the commune, its people, and both its material and immaterial inheritance:

...for this area when you kind of need these things as a teenager, and it was quite crazy and quite nice and it was totally different. Basically, you know, until then, living here my

whole life, I wasn't quite impressed. By that, I mean I'm quite used with having all of this and as a human being, all the time you want something else. What other has, it is better. Basically, I didn't like that much the area, but by seeing the other people coming here, and how much they're enjoying it, and seeing the area through their eyes. Then I started to get more in love with the area, with our history, because for me, until then, it was quite common. I don't know, I didn't see nobody was interested to this and to our mountains, our history, and so on. Basically, starting with the FânFest, it started the interest into these kind of areas. Into nature, into heritage—the people were coming for these things—and I saw that they were returning, they were calling us to, "when we will come again? Let's go, I don't know where, and to see that." Basically, that is what it represented the most, the festival for me, it is that I got in love with the area. As before, it was something common for me. (AM Member, Interview, Oct. 25, 2019)

This young AM member expresses how FânFest facilitated his learning the value of his home. As Scott (1985) put it, it is difficult for fish to describe the water that they swim in. However, public expressions valuing Roșia Montană, and the validation of visitors, both contributed to locals reflecting on their own values and connection to their homes.

Centralized Social Actions. Since the SRM campaign and social movement was built and organized around relationships with AM, some aspects of the struggle became centralized. SRM coordinators and AM leaders played an active role in mobilizing members and allies for different events. Many AM members reported feeling that meetings were an essential part of the work of AM. As one NGO member recalls, collaborative gatherings—coming together or centralizing—characterized the struggle from the beginning when she visited as a student:

I was spending more time in Roșia Montană than I was spending at university. We also found a place there, for many years it was our office. It was like a base of activists. And people, support groups, were coming there, journalists, you name it. Alburnus Maior had no infrastructure. I remember the first general assembly was on a field, because there were too many people to fit in any building. We didn't have microphones. It was different. And I will never forget. Those times were, are still, I know imprinted in everybody who was a part of it. (NGO Member, Interview, Sep. 25, 2019)

The place-based coming together of locals and supporters generated ambidirectional informal if not non-formal learning. Dialogical exchanges enabled learning, which helped AM and its allies articulate and refine a strategy. From there, AM and SRM coordinators acted as a central point for conducting many tactics to drive the strategy:




Figure 35 Depiction of shifting politics in Roșia Montană, the learning terrain. Organizations based in Roșia Montană noted by*. Ambidirectional learning relationships are imagined between all organizations and between sides of the struggle.

...For many years everything that was done by individuals or groups, formal or informal, were done under the Save Roșia Montană umbrella, which was coordinated by Alburnus Maior. And this was a fact until, I don't know, recent years and none of the organizations that were involved were a partner in the campaign because the campaign was a multi-level campaign. It had environmental, archaeological, social... aspects. And basically, each of these partners worked on a certain area with Alburnus Maior. And Alburnus Maior did the coordinational effort. And in time each of these organizations grew more confident in what they are doing and started to develop more parts of the activity. Like, as you mentioned, people that are doing the Adopt-a-House program in Roșia Montană, they started as a collaboration with Alburnus Maior but now they are on their own because they put a lot of energy and effort into developing this more than it was at the beginning. And now it's an ongoing project that is independent from everything else. And it's huge. It has a lot of people coming during the summer. I have just heard that more than 120 young people, students, came and did restoration work during the summer so, yeah, this explains a bit for you how it developed. (NGO Member, Interview, Oct. 16, 2019)

One of the results of campaigners working directly with AM to address specific issues in the struggle was tight collaboration and centralization around Roșieni values. Another direct result was the formation of several Romanian NGOs such as CIDRM, Eco Ruralis, and Mining Watch.

Centralized tactics SRM included meetings, consultations for the legal proceedings, and protests. Early collaboration even resulted in AM members and activists working quickly and in direct response to RMGC actions:

They tried to pay, they were sponsors of various festivals and various important events and we boycotted them. For example, they funded TIFF, Transylvania International Film Festival, which in that year the guest of honour was Vanessa Redgrave. They gave her an award for like, something. And we spoke to Vanessa Redgrave, we said, "Oh my God do you know who is funding this"... We met with her in her hotel room, and on the stage, she called us on the stage, [AM Leader] was there, haha. "Like oh my God, you guys, I know it's difficult to survive as artist, but what did you do? Like where did you get money, I don't want this award." (NGO Member, Interview, Sept. 25, 2019)

SRM effectively disrupted RMGC's tactics. One AM member described the processes that AM members would go through when learning of RMGC's movements and responding with mobilization:

We would hear that, for example on the 14th let's say they were going to have a big meeting because someone has to come from Bucharest to approve the projects. So, then we would oppose that, "How can you approve that, what are you doing, come see for yourselves." When they would lie, we would have to go and see that it wasn't true. We would realize that it wasn't the way they said it was, so we would end up going to meetings, all over the place. We would go with mini-buses, we would pay, we would come up with slogans. We would have protests here in Roșia, lots of them, by their

headquarters. We would all gather up and protest. There were events for Miner's Day and they would have people come from Toronto, they would come here and they would say all sorts of things. We didn't agree, "Go back to your place over there." And we would fight with them a bit. (Interview, Nov. 19, 2019)

In the early 2000s centralized mobilization was difficult to accomplish, due to the limitations of communication. However, time passed, and technology became more accessible.

Technological changes amplified AM and the SRM's coordinators' ability to mobilize larger social actions:

In the beginning we didn't have internet for example. We were communicating with... handwritten letters. We had quite rudimentary means to make the situation known, to reach out to the decision makers. There were a lot of things that we did instinctively, and the more time went by, the more we were also looking at what happens in the other places in the world. We started using the internet, it was easier for us to access information, to exchange with other groups. (NGO Member, Interview, Sep. 25, 2019)

Through experimentation, campaigners learned that communication can become a bottleneck for mobilizing social action tactics. This applied, not only to mobilizing protests, but other actions like satirical posters which were distributed overnight prolifically in major cities, then online:

because that guy is shit, not only for Roşia Montană, he is a shit person, and people will be drawn to that because he is shit and so they would want to learn okay, why is he shittier now? Ah... he is triple shit, and this kind of thing... most of them when we had money. Sometimes we did these poster campaigns digitally when we had no money. So we just shared them on Facebook or whatever, but Facebook wasn't always around. Most of the time, pre-Facebook, we printed them in hundreds of thousands, and we would organize poster actions overnight with volunteers. We would send them on the train, we would blackmail the conductor of the train—this is how it's done in Romania, it's Romania style—you go to him, you give him a bit of money, you take his mobile phone number, and you give it to the person of the town where the parcel is arriving, and then that person knows where to find the conductor, which wagon number, and he gets the parcels. And then he distributes them amongst friends, and you glue them at night. Of course you make the mixture, the famous mixture, with flour, water, and a bit of adhesive, and put it in a bottle, in a plastic bottle, that is used to also make music, and make a hole in it and you go at night and you can really put it up fast. It was all done by volunteers. And of course we tried to post them, particularly with relish, in the neighborhoods where the wankers used to live, or in the villages, so they're really popular when they go back home. (Interview, Oct. 15, 2019)

This narrative identifies one way in which growing access to technology amplified the social action and information sharing in SRM. Prior to technology like Facebook, SRM had to

coordinate information dissemination with campaigners through actions like manually distributing posters, but visual tactics were important regardless of the distribution method:

But Mindbomb, by the posters, took that to the more public level, for the greater public. So when then the public came to RM for FânFest, for the music festival, and they were getting more and more to know about our work, for them this work was not so abstract or radical. It was the cool thing.



Figure 36 Minister of Culture Ivașcu featured on *rosiamontana.org* in 2018 for postponing Roșia Montană's inclusion as a World Heritage Site, and Prime Minister Ponta.

Humour encouraged campaigners and AM members, discouraged key persons in the state-corporate alliance, and a form of adult education, creating reflective questions in the minds of the public about specific topics and actors.

Centralized social action connected the SRM campaign to AM's grassroots struggle and allowed for more effective mobilization. As the SRM coordinator's narrative above illustrated, campaigners used knowledge built through struggle to shift the campaign from being strictly reactive to a better articulated, more strategic approach. Small-scale protests and legal battles alone were unable to produce the policy and politico-economic changes needed to protect Roșia Montană, but the centralized elements of SRM answered by guiding the spirit of the broader overarching campaign.

The centralizing influence of AM and SRM coordinators on the campaign is also exemplified in the 174 archived English language articles on the struggle's shared site

www.rosiamontana.org. In 2008, after favourable moves by the Romanian government to declare Roșia Montană a natural and archaeological reservation and revoke RMGC’s mining license, several articles described attempts by AM and SRM to engage the government directly. In 2011-2012, when RMGC began to become more active, articles state that open letters were sent to ministers, that the organization condemns the president for not holding up legislation, and five articles describe small-scale protests (200-500 people) conducted to show concern over government actions. Around 2013, the tone of the articles shifted. One article on June 25th states that AM refuses to engage in “fake consultation.” Instead of calls for the government to abide by legislation, articles centre around informational critiques of government action. The only direct approaches to communicating with the government addressed in articles up to 2019 are open letters, which serve as much (if not more so) to provide critiques and raise public awareness. Instead of directing efforts to getting government attention and compliance, articles focus on mustering public support and mobilizing social action.




Figure 37 *Apusenii Liberi* issue 5 depicts the case as a mining company board game. Game spaces advance the player along the board, e.g. “bribe the mayor’s office,” pause movement, e.g. *FânFest*, or send the player back, e.g. activism. (https://issuu.com/saverosiamontana/docs/no5_apuseniiiberi)

Just as learning in social action in this struggle is exemplified by articles shared on the campaign website, so it can be seen in the thematic learning from the narratives collected in this study:

Table 3 Illustrations of Learning in Social Action in the Struggle for Roșia Montană

Learning	Illustration
Early social action organization is critical to resistance in contexts of mining dispossession	It would be good for you to organize yourselves somehow, in a structured way, some sort of association... “If you don’t organize yourselves, these guys are going to eat you,” were his exact words... (Oct. 24)... Alburnus Maior, we were the ones who got on the train and pulled the alarm. Brothers, there’s a problem. Let’s gather and unite, otherwise we will be shredded (Nov. 5)... Only through protests. To organize themselves in associations. Because you can’t do it on your own, if you don’t have an association, you can’t (Nov. 27)... and we asked him, how can we defend ourselves?... And he said you need to organize yourselves as fast as you can... And then it was fast, put our IDs and registered. That’s where it started... (Nov. 29)
The project represented a choice between whole ways of being	...You had two choices: you could either take some money and move to a newer house in a different area or you could respect your way of being and thinking and you did what you thought was right (Oct. 17)... lots of women thought that being a woman means you have to give life. Cyanide being here, you wouldn’t be able to live here, you’d automatically have to leave... Being a woman, to raise children here wasn’t possible (Nov. 19)...
Seduction tactics used against Roșieni (Roșieni are backwards/irrational and RMGC is modern/rational) are hypocritical/disingenuous	...I was accused... that I was treating this subject from an emotional perspective... and then I asked “But you, who say we’re dying of hunger, we have nothing to feed our children...I can’t live,” are not these also feelings that you have? (Oct. 24)... I saw that they were returning, they were calling us to, “when we will come again?”... I got in love with the area. As before, it was something common... (Oct. 25).
Grassroots organization illuminates this choice and encourages agency in post-socialist contexts	...by AM when they got formed, we saw that there are many people that didn’t want this project... So that’s when we got courage to say, “well, okay, we don’t have to move if we like to stay here, and that’s fine” (Oct. 25)... Some were desperate, I would go and encourage them... “Don’t be scared sir, you are the one who decides, you are the one here” (Nov. 5)...
Grassroots leaders play an important role in local organizing and facilitating learning	...I would make them little packages containing a few articles... I name this whole thing ‘misinformation,’ and people would ask, “why do you call it that?”... I would help them read between the lines (Oct. 17) ...should have attracted people to our side... so that they don’t sell their properties (Nov. 13)... What they should do is unite in one thing (Nov. 14)... I am pleased with them. Constantly in meetings, looking after us, helping each other... When something comes up, we’ll gather and talk... (Nov. 19) ...they need to get involved, to tell people, to help people understand what to do. To mobilize people for protests (Nov. 27)...

<p>The organization balances encouraging agency and resistance with manipulating or “winning people over”</p>	<p>[AM leader] wants him and the people to be free. To decide for themselves (Sept. 25) ...AM, we didn't have nothing against the people... who left the association, and they sold... Well this is your decision, we tried to, but we can't put you not to sell... (Oct. 25)... Brothers, I can't command you on your property (Nov. 5)...</p>
<p>Being a grassroots leader requires immense physical and mental effort, and risk</p>	<p>...the most difficult for me was to go from house to house. Whenever we needed to set up meetings and call on everyone to attend, or signatures for trials, or with different information we needed to provide face to face as opposed to telephones. So, these would consume time and mental energy, and patience and other things (Oct. 17)... It was normal for me to be the most informed person... I went to the Romanian Parliament... Romanian Academy... to Budapest seven times... to Paris, to Grenoble... In the moment where you become a public individual, people get to know you (Nov. 5)...</p>
<p>Being intentional about maintaining the struggle's integrity helps build solidarity</p>	<p>...we never associated ourselves with political parties, with dirty money (Sept. 25)... The locals were approached by various political people in time, and they always refused to have “understandings”... to have joint declarations (Oct. 3)... When I tell people something, I am certain of it. I don't tell lies, I tell them the truth. When you tell people the truth, they'll come beside you, and see that you didn't lie to them... You gain allies (Nov. 5)...</p>
<p>Still, the power of grassroots groups is limited</p>	<p>Even so we were shredded. You need to know that the company bought in Roşia Montană 80% of the properties. They demolished 265 houses (Nov. 5)... but now I'm not sure if we can still fight that much. Lots pass away, people in our organization are old, the young ones don't get involved anymore. Our children are gone. I don't know how much this organization will last either. While we're alive, after that, I don't know. (Nov. 19)</p>
<p>Not everyone in the grassroots organization can take part in social action all the time; continued survival is important too</p>	<p>[AM leader] was doing his fields... he was not in the office everyday, and that's the way it should be, he's a farmer (Oct. 25) ...initiative was a bit weaker from the women. We sent our representatives to participate more in the fight of the community (Nov. 27)...</p>
<p>Not everyone in the grassroots organization has the same goal</p>	<p>Each has their own conviction, education, and their own level of preparedness and experience... There are many kinds of people, of property owners, of concepts, of life philosophies (Oct. 17) ...aside from this deaf fight—we don't sell our properties and that's it—we tried to come out with a different kind of openness towards the public... to provide an alternative (Oct. 24) ...the members of Alburnus Maior, they have different ideas... tourism... agriculture (Oct. 25)...</p>

<p>But grassroots struggle can be amplified by a solidarity network and their resources (social movements are a lot of work!)</p>	<p>A social movement that had peasants in the centre...and around them a lot of groups of support (Sep. 25) ... I contacted these MEPs again, and I built up relationships... it didn't happen out of the blue (Oct. 15)... So man, when he sees himself in trouble, starts to give a hand out and says, "let's help eachother" (Nov. 5)... They got together with women from other areas and they came and helped us. They came here and there were lots of us for demonstrations, and we got together, we socialized. On the internet too... (Nov. 19)... They need to fight where I can not, to fight with the Romanian state... through trials, through democratic fights. Through money... strictly for the cause. Because I can make a living (Nov. 29)...</p>
<p>A solidarity network mutually encourages, and builds hope in post-socialist contexts</p>	<p>... we had all this culture of fear and dis-empowerment, and what Roşia Montană built, and needed all these years, was exactly this: a culture of protest, a culture of disobedience, a culture of courage to stand against the authority (Oct. 3) ...what I also learned from them [AM] is to overcome fear (Oct. 15)... I was looking out the windows, and there are all these people out in the street for my local village (Oct. 25)... Everyone went into the street and protested for us and they helped us, they gave us hope (Nov. 19)... When you see that you are not alone, there's a different energy (Nov. 29)...</p>
<p>Equity and the centrality of grassroots articulation is critical to the social movement</p>	<p>Strategy. Yes. The thing is we were getting lost in the details... [AM leader] was able to show us what the priorities were... I think we would have done more things to ensure a process of the peasants... To guarantee that they have a space of their own articulation (Sept. 25) ...people in AM, they were always involved in all the discussions that happened... in... interactions with the authorities, and the strategic litigation (Oct. 3)... I learned from them [AM]... about mining... geology... engineering... history... the place (Oct. 15)... Their voice was just turned into legal arguments, but they were always connected (Oct. 16)...</p>
<p>Solidarity networks help translate and disseminate information to the grassroots</p>	<p>So, we always needed to translate these into simple information that a seventh-grade student could understand... it's a hub of information, but less than information, like very practical things to do (Oct. 3)... it was important to feed them, all the time, this kind of information because fear arises when you don't know, and strength arises with knowledge (Oct. 15)... They [solidarity network] would tell us about the risks, they would show us movies, with what this company has done in other places (Nov. 19)</p>
<p>Place-based struggle and education roots participants</p>	<p>...on a cultural level I learned what it is to have roots... If we get addicted to it, others get addicted too... and they all became addicted... the rooting, the belonging, is emotional (Oct. 15)...</p>
<p>A small group of people can influence/educate civil society at large</p>	<p>"We don't save Roşia Montană, Roşia Montană Saves Us" (Oct. 3) ...we have awakened a civic conscience... "the small log can flip the big cart" (Oct. 24)...</p>

The company had vulnerabilities	Okay we learned that they had no plan, that we did. They were clueless... (Oct. 15) ...when it was weak it would put forward all sorts of good communications (Oct. 24)
Company/project vulnerabilities are struck through government pressure	We did not only educate the World Bank... the European Parliament... the European Commission... the European Commission was telling them that they can't do this (Oct. 15)... I maintained a close relationship with the state authorities because they were in constant conflict with us and someone needed to leave a door open there too (Oct. 17) ...So I made a petition in my own name and went to Brussels to speak to the European Parliament... being a European Union citizen I have the right to a home, to access my home, to water, to electricity—these things I would lose (Oct. 24)... We used the right to property. And we obligated them to come and negotiate... (Nov. 5)
Direct action is learned 'on the job,' and is formative, both in peasant contexts and in social movements	...we discovered basically how the world works through this struggle... how central authorities... parliament... legislative process... the government works... we were some kids who were putting these cases together... Peasants are not “pedagogic” people. They are not going to draw you a scheme or write you a book. They're going to show you, but this kind of knowledge and this kind of education goes much deeper. It forms you as a person (Sept. 25)... We were all like beginners in these kinds of campaigning things. We learned by doing... (Oct. 16)
Company tactics can be appropriated or made to backfire	...the environmental impact assessment... thousands of pages... It was something inhumane, you couldn't print, you couldn't copy it, you had to go to a few libraries... to consult it... We had hundreds of people, who had hundreds of... technical questions—they weren't able to answer... [RMGC] funded TIFF... the guest of honour was Vanessa Redgrave... We met with her in her hotel room (Sept. 25)... they brought televisions to film just one angle... I posted on YouTube... this video became viral on the internet... also showed by the TV channels because this video was so... hot and everyone was watching it... The TV channels couldn't hide (Nov. 9)...
Formal and non-formal education benefit/inform the struggle	The person that started and coordinated all this immense work was a student. She went to law school to be able to do a better job... [We] had all kinds of workshops, interactions, and debates, and this was a way to discuss about things that were done that were proven successful (Oct. 3)... I took some courses related to NGOs, one time eight months, and then I can't remember how many sessions...I got my sociology degree—law and social sciences... (Oct. 17)...
It is important the struggle become clearer about its values	... we also had to learn that the campaign has a social... heritage... environment... economic component[s]—you have to strengthen these pillars (Oct. 15)...
Use the internet	We started using the internet, it was easier for us to access information, to exchange with other groups (Sept. 25)...

Decentralized Social Actions. While AM members and a few pivotal SRM coordinators provided some organization in the campaign, both groups forwarded the premise that those who wished to get involved should do so, as some AM members put it, “on their own faith” or to their own conscience. This understanding is evident in how many Roşieni themselves engage in decentralized action outside of AM, for example, using tourism as an education tool. While AM and SRM coordinators articulate strategy and principals, and organized local actions and mobilizations, decentralized social actions were also openly promoted by having “many doors, open to new people who would join... so many people involved in formation, forming new people (NGO Member, Interview, Sep. 25, 2019). Art collectives like the Mindbombers, musicians, and activists created their own content on Roşia Montană (SRM Coordinator, Interview, Oct. 15, 2019). Activists painted “*nu vrem proiectul*”—“we do not want the project”—on the side of the Carnic mountain, and went back and forth with pro-mining elements writing and erasing “nu/do not” (AM Member, Guided Tour, Oct. 14, 2019). NGOs and independent campaigners organized solidarity camps, made statements calling for the end of mining development, raised awareness through marches, held decentralized protests, held photo and video workshops, proposed alternatives to development, and raised awareness of the project in Romania and abroad (www.rosiamontana.org).

Bejan et al. (2015) and Mercea (2014) argue that SRM did not consist of formal leaders directing action but rather, campaigners self-organized—primarily through Facebook, family and friend groups, and organization websites—informing tram-commuters about protests; setting meetings in bars and online; communicating messages in Bucharest’s main districts; circulating financial information regarding GBU’s propaganda; creating art exhibits, street paintings, and flash-mobs; and sharing information via social media, blogs, and journalist sites (Bejan et al.; Cazacu, 2013; Predoiu, 2017; Velicu, 2015). According to Stoica, “Between 2002 and 2013, there were 34 such protest actions which took place in Romania or abroad” (ARB/15/31, 2019, p. 3171). SRM ignited Romanian diaspora protests in New York, London, Berlin, Brussels, Paris, Chicago, Montréal, Toronto, Greece, and Kathmandu. On Halloween in 2013, campaigners marched into the Toronto Stock Exchange, where GBU is listed, wearing gold skull masks and carrying posters asking investors to pull out of the company (Bejan et al., 2015; Reguly, 2018). Another example is the group ‘papaya advertising’ on YouTube, which published two videos in 2012. In one video with nearly 70,000 views, a woman sits at a table in the bottom of an open

pit mine and states that she “would like to make a donation to those who desperately need gold” (0:12). The woman then tears out her earrings and sets down her gold jewelry. In the other, a man leaves his watch on the table and pulls out a gold tooth and states “I hope it’s enough...” (0:59).

FânFest also played a significant role in catalyzing and preparing many of these independent campaigners to act. One independent SRM activist described how his early experiences with FânFest lead to future engagement and learning in the campaign:

When I came here first time at the festival, at FânFest, I was 14 at that time in 2006, I think... But in 2012, when I was 19, I think, I was studying in Denmark, multimedia design, and in the summer I wanted to do a trip, a bike trip, to Romania and I needed a reason for what to cycle. And because I was following Roșia Montană on the internet, and I have quite a lot of friends which were supporting this campaign, SRM, and also because I have been here, I decided to, why not to cycle to support this campaign, to create awareness about the gold mining project proposed here, a destructive project. Probably also because I was a scout and scouts, they are environmentally friendly, I wasn't agree with this mine company proposal to destroy, to blow up four mountains, and to flood an entire village with cyanide just to take out some resources, some gold or some silver... So I made a blog writing about my trip, about what I'm doing and why, and for 30 days I was on my own on this biking trip from Copenhagen to Roșia Montană. I had Roșia Montană in my mind and to everyone I was meeting, I was interacting, I was telling about Roșia Montană... I arrived here at the festival again, a second time at the festival, and I heard more things about Roșia Montană... In Copenhagen I organized Roșia Montană day to celebrate Roșia Montană at my school. And then I started to run marathons, ultramarathons, promoting this campaign, SRM. I was wearing a t-shirt with SRM. I was filming myself with a go-pro, editing, posting on the internet, and in all the videos I was mentioning, saying things about Roșia Montană. This was a way to support. This was what I felt I can do.

And then I did another bike trip with a German girl again from Copenhagen to Roșia Montană on a tandem bike... So, we contacted friends or people we didn't know to help us organize different events on our route. Like for instance we had events in Copenhagen, Hamburg, Berlin, Leipzig, Chemnitz, Dresden, Prague, Vienna, Bratislava, and Budapest. At these events we were showing a documentary film made by a German director called Fabian Daub, and the documentary film, it's called " Roșia Montană Town on the Brink..." Yeah, and we arrived in August [2013] at the festival, and then maybe I started to become a little activist, haha... (Interview, Nov. 9, 2019)

As this activist describes, continued engagement with FânFest and his social group generated feedback loops of learning in social action. What he learned from Roșieni, SRM, and others he disseminated into his personal network, school, and those along the road. This provides a critical narrative on how a small grassroots campaign like AM can create rippling sites of learning.

Education was at the heart of AM and SRM, and their efforts multiplied through education.

Learning in social action rippled outwards, but also back in, fueling the campaign and struggle:

So, I heard that the next day after the festival, on 20th I think of August, yeah, there was a UNESCO commission coming here in Roșia Montană... I remember that at 7:30 in the morning, I was in the centre with my Go Pro, making reporting because I was studying in Denmark Multimedia Design, and I did my internship to a local television... but in that day I seen how a lot of people were brought up here in Roșia Montană by buses, by a lot of buses, buses coming from 8 o'clock in the morning until afternoon. Buses with a lot of people. In the centre, there were probably at one point around 500 people. It was crowded, like the whole square here, it was full of people. And I was filming all these buses. I was interviewing people, what is happening. "Do you know what's happening? I just heard about something is happening but I don't know. Who is coming and why? And why you are here? It's Sunday morning." And yeah, people didn't know what's happening, most of them... And at one point, some guys who were employed by this mining company, they started to be aggressive because I was filming... this video shows the real face of this mining company, and of the authorities—local, national authorities—how they are working together to create the impression that, you know, people here want to start the mining project... they just organized this to brought people and they brought televisions to film from just one angle, and to show, you know, to Romanians that here, people want this mining project to start...

And this video, I edited and after two days I posted on YouTube, on the SRM YouTube channel because some friends who were already, this campaign, involved... and this video became viral on the internet, and it was also showed by the TV channels, which was a big surprise because until that time, the TV channels showed just company commercial spots for many years, and they didn't want to show something against this mining company because they were getting a lot of money, all the TV channels, for this commercial spots. But because this video was so, you know, hot and everyone was watching it, and discussing about it, the TV channels couldn't hide. Even if they were *here*. They *filmed*. All the TV channels, *they were here on the same day when I was filming*. And on my video you've seen all this vans from the TV channels. And the first time they showed completely something else... it was on 22nd of August 2013, this video published—and first of September, probably the biggest protest in Romania since the revolution. (Interview, Nov. 9, 2019)

This activist detailed how he integrated his learning about Roșia Montană, his university education, developments in technology access and connections to the SRM campaign to punch a hole in RMGC's media blockade. Many weapons or tools were involved in this action, but they were all employed as education. The learning that resulted irreversibly shifted the contested landscape of Roșia Montană. Unveiling how the media collaborated to manipulate the public understanding served as an antibody against this corporate-state alliance's tactic (see video at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G7_dKoIzFAQ).

Throughout all the movement and campaign actions and learning processes it is important to note, as one NGO member put it, that the campaign was centred around a group of peasants—AM. AM was not subsumed or superseded by SRM. Rather, AM persists and continues in relationship with the various elements of SRM:

We had some big associations take certain positions, like Green Peace and at a certain point in time, when it seemed essential to them, especially when it came to cyanide, and nature, and rights tied to nature and the environment. But we didn't make this an end of a road, I cannot say that things depended on them, or solely on them. If nothing happened, they or others wouldn't have had who to join or to express their point of view. They could have expressed their point of view, but maybe not within such a cohesive framework, you know? I read in a presentation done here in the area that we were the beginning—well, wait a second. We were the beginning and then 17 years after what the heck did we do after that beginning? I mean, if you talk like that, it means that we were the spark, and the rest of it was done by others. It is not quite like that. It is fair [to say though], all sorts of people helped us, some even during a period of 15 years within the Save Roşia Montană campaign. (AM Member, Interview, Oct. 17, 2019)

SRM was an extension of a struggle that belongs to and is inextricable from Roşieni. As this AM member put it—the cohesiveness of the entirety of SRM's struggle resulted from the actual cohesiveness of Roşieni lives. This reaffirms Choudry's (2015) argument that social movements which amplify the *effectiveness* grassroots struggle, also rely on grassroots movements to provide the lifeblood for struggle *longevity*; a struggle is like a tree fed both by its roots (grassroots Roşieni struggle) and the network of branches that collect sunlight (trans/national support networks).

Learning in Social Action Conclusion

This chapter focused on the ways learning in social action occurred, informed the strategies and tactics of both centralized and decentralized actors, and how trans/national networks scaled up the impact of the struggle to drive a countermovement. The rolling narrative of local incidental and informal learning fomenting resistance—characteristic of Scott's (1985) description of peasant politics—which rippled into organization, dialogical networking, and a diversity of tactics reveals multiple cycles of Freire's (1970) praxis in action. Part of the complexity of the Roşia Montană case lies in the need to “see” the facets and folds of contestation, without working too hard to delineate them. Acts of opposition and education were made by *țărani*, Rosieni, RMCF and AM members, activists, campaigners, and NGO members, with both common and distinctive goals and world views. This is part and parcel with the reality

Foley's (1990) understanding of complex "micropolitics," as many of the above titles belong to the same people, separated or not, by time and circumstance.

Seeing learning and social action as part of a "whole" narrative highlights the importance of addressing the case of Roșia Montană from both peasant and social movement perspectives, since Roșia Montană was a site of interaction and relationship. Dialogical learning was crucial for the struggle in Roșia Montană, and the research herein has illustrated how it added nuance and expanded social action in the past 20 years.

CHAPTER SIX: Discussion and Concluding Reflections

The purpose of this research was to develop an understanding of learning in social action, in the context of mining dispossession at the case site of Roșia Montană. Specifically, this study explored processes of ABD and DFDR from the perspective of those engaged in learning in social action. The research included members from local grassroots organizations, as well as activists and NGO members directly engaged in solidarity and processes of learning in social action. The literature review and methodology contextualized, framed and outlined the research, and the data analysis in chapters four and five addressed the research questions presented in the introduction. This final chapter reviews the data analysis in relation to the research questions, concludes with researcher reflections in line with the self-reflexive framework and provides recommendation for future research.

Discussing Findings and Revisiting the Research Questions

This study was guided by three research questions that helped shape the emergent analysis of learning in social action. The analysis herein helps contribute to an understanding of the grassroots-trans/national nexus of struggle against ABD and DFDR in contexts of rural dispossession.

What is Learning in Social Action in a Context of Mining Dispossession?

Chapter four approached this question by examining knowledge articles on the anatomy of dispossession at Roșia Montană (predominantly in the form of narratives) that were produced via learning in social action, thus addressing the question by presenting products of learning in social action. Specifically, Roșieni members of AM, RMCF, and their close supporters illustrated the nuanced, evolving battery of tactics employed by the corporate-state alliance—embodied as RMGC—to achieve ABD. Participants described how complex social relations, formed through lived experiences of resource nationalization under authoritarian-socialism, contributed to RMGC's perceived legitimacy to enact DFDR. RMGC's majority shareholder, GBU, worked to secure various forms of authority to forward the Roșia Montană mine by amalgamating interests with the state via RMGC; engaging international authorities like the WB and the Canadian Embassy; cajoling local mayors and councillors; and spreading their reach into civil society through parishes, businesses, NGOs, and youth and cultural organizations. In part, the efforts made to establish these corporate-state alliances were set in motion by Frank Timiș, an expatriate who exposed Romanian mineral wealth and vulnerabilities to ABD like a modern

day Bicilis—the Dacian said to have betrayed his people’s treasures to the invading Romans alongside military leaders who defected (Peșan, 2016). Thus, learning in social action is an activity that produces contextual knowledge in relation to the politico-economics of dispossession.

Chapter five addressed this question by relating incidental, informal, non-formal, and formal processes of resistance and learning in social action. Learning at the outset of the struggle against RMGC occurred largely incidentally and informally, as Roșieni first encountered the corporation, shared information amongst themselves, and compared corporate information against their own cultural values and experiential knowledge. Emergent grassroots resistance aimed to protect the community’s environmental and social life, and often combined alternative means of survival along with efforts to subvert/counter RMGC’s legitimacy and informal critical adult education—a reality made necessary when local employment opportunities were suppressed via the closing of the state mine, zoning laws, and the closure of local services. These initial learnings fed Roșieni reflection on the massive power imbalance they faced, which drove locals to organize and network. Thus, spiralling praxis emerged from incidental recognitions of injustice and evolved into more systematic and structured learning. For example, learning in social action took on non-formal learning aspects like organization meetings, meetings for legal cases, workshops and discussions at FânFest, creating a newspaper, sharing documentaries, collective case and article reviews, and even formal activities such as an AM leader studying sociology and activists integrating their solidarity work with their studies and accessing the resources of the Romanian academy.

How does Learning Inform Social Action?

The anatomy of dispossession covered in chapter four revealed that corporate-state tactics are not static. From legitimacy to manipulation, DFDR tactics adapt in response to resistance—thus learning informs social action indirectly, by cycling a feedback loop of ambidirectional, oppositional learning. Participants described how RMGC adapted their DFDR tactics over 20+ years of trying to establish their large-scale pit-mine in Roșia Montană via predatory mechanisms of displacement. The testimonies of the participants in this study described threats of violence, the securitization of the commune, structural violence like the closure of essential community services, and deceptive promises and gifts. This knowledge enabled AM and SRM to counter specific tactics—for example, interjecting their position at cultural events sponsored

by RMGC, using a variety of mediums to counter RMGC's messaging and highlight contradictions, and counter-campaigning against RMGC as they attempted to establish political and financial networks with the WB and the European Parliament, which shifted public opinion.

In chapter five, the spiral of learning from less to more systematic forms demonstrate another way that learning informed social action—the very idea to organize and network began with incidental and informal learning. Early Roșieni learnings also directly translated into AM's and RMCF's strategies, and into political and legal arguments via SRM. Given widespread țărani and ruralisation social relations in Romania, AM's expressed values appeared to resonate with the public, providing a medium for the message of their struggle, which prompted action. As Choudry (2015) points out, many social movement theorists believe collective identity and shared consciousness is crucial to struggles. As the anti-mining development struggle expanded from its grassroots origins to include de/centralized solidarity actions and the social movement of the Romanian Autumn, so the complexity and structure of learning expanded.

SRM effectively utilized education in social action in several ways. Social action resources were interpreted for and shared with Roșieni as reflective tools via discussions, documentaries and newspapers. Additionally, the campaign developed an effective strategy for raising critical awareness and mobilizing social action—a key challenge for social movements. FânFest was a place-based strategy that used the land/locality itself as an educational tool for growing, informing and mobilizing a solidarity network. FânFest, drew participants with music and cultural activities, educated with speakers and NGO workshops, and “rooted” participants to Roșia Montană via tours lead by Roșieni who wished to remain there without end. Associated NGOs and activists used various forms of media like documentaries and posters to raise general public awareness. The non-formal learning that resulted from these actions directly catalyzed both the centralized and decentralized actions that would follow.

Learning in social action also precipitated a shift in the impact of EU ascension from being decidedly negative for the struggle—economic devaluation and policies that favoured international investment and other favourable conditions for ABD—to a counterbalance to RMGC's power. Activists were able to draw upon civil society protection mechanisms adopted alongside imposed the liberalization that had been developed in nations with longer histories of countermovements. NGO members attested that these new laws aided opposition to the mine.

Learning as Social Action. Education was also weaponized as a tactic for disrupting RMGC. For example, AM members and the activists/NGO members working closely with them educated various officials on the ways RMGC had violated protocols. Furthermore, AM and SRM pressured fractures in the contradictions of capital, by making national and transnational governmental authorities aware how these bodies distributed risks versus profits. For example, Romania and the EU by extension were assuming the risks of environmental disaster and tailings management whereas GBU was slated to walk away with the lion's share of the profit. This created dissension in the corporate-state alliance, which contributed to the Romanian government abandoning the project in the face of mounting, widespread public opposition.

Learning Informing Unexpected Action. However, learning and related solidarity networking also informed fragmentation within the anti-development struggle. Kuyek (2019) argues that one of the fundamental efforts of an anti-mining struggle is an alternative vision for the locality. As AM's struggle progressed and networked with NGOs and INGOs, diverse alternative visions for Roșia Montană emerged and lead some AM members to separate and form RMCF. Thus, learning and networking also impacted the struggle in unexpected ways.

Both AM and RMCF consistently engaged in conscientization through praxis—the living definition of how learning informs action. Locals reflected, acted, and viewed their own struggle in relation to the trends of globalizing capitalism. However, this study revealed that learning within the case was not restricted to the grassroots groups. Rather, Roșieni spread their own growing conscientization by sharing the case of their struggle so that conscientization spread and became a broader civil consciousness throughout Romania. National NGOs arose to take what was learned in the struggle for Roșia Montană and apply it to other localities. The SRM campaign even adjusted its motto to, “We don't save Roșia Montană; Roșia Montană Saves Us.” Thus, learning in social action can inform not only specific anti-DFDR struggles, but also countermovements within civil society.

How do Trans/National Actors Augment Local Struggles and Learning in Social Action?

As mentioned at the end of chapter five, this study identified how it is helpful to understand the anti-DFDR/ABD struggle for Roșia Montană as a tree, rooted in and fed by the specificity of a placed, grassroots struggle, and also fed by a network of branches at the same time. Both elements were necessary for the longevity, success, and social force of the struggle.

Both above research question sections speak to ways in which SRM augmented AM and RMCF's grassroots struggle. Since Roşieni organization into AM and solidarity networking occurred in such quick succession, activists, journalists and NGO members were closely involved with early organizations and actions onward. Indeed, it is difficult to demarcate the actions and knowledge of AM members from their solidarity network from about 2002 onward. Some of this critical integrated NGO work included operating as an information hub, interpreting social action knowledge from other studies and organizations into resources AM could use, and interpreting AM's argument into legal and political cases.

One theme that emerged as an answer to this question, was the way the dedicated activists and NGO members had access to time, resources, and communication tools that allowed, particularly țărani Roşieni, to “stay vertical” or continue the work necessary for survival during the struggle. SRM campaigners greatly expanded the capacity of the struggle by coordinating events, doing research and sharing resources with AM members, and expanding the approach to solidarity networking. During the early 2000s to the mid-2010s, information technologies and access to the internet greatly increased in Romania, which helped activists and NGO members expedite information dissemination to the broader public. This is evidenced by the Romanian Autumn and an instance where 50,000 football fans were recorded screaming, “United we save Roşia Montană” (watch <https://saverosia.wordpress.com/2013/09/07/save-rosia-montana-who-is-behind-gabriel-resources/>). Trans/national actors were essential to amplifying a specific grassroots struggle into a massive civil-societarian response.

Researcher Reflections

As noted in literature review and methodology, this thesis utilized three literatures for its theoretical framework: Harvey's (2003) neoimperialism and related processes of ABD and DFDR in extractive industries (Hilary, 2013; Leech, 2012; Oliver-Smith, 2010); resistance to domination (Gramsci; Oliver-Smith, 2010; Polanyi, 2001; Scott, 1985); and learning in social action (Foley, 1999; Freire, 1970). These literatures helped my understanding of the case at hand in relation to broader politico-economics, social formations, and an expanded understanding of andragogy.

Reflections on Accumulation by Dispossession in Roşia Montană

Through this critical study I expanded my understanding of how ABD is translated into and functions in a local context like Roşia Montană. Frederiksen and Himley's (2019) expansion

to Harvey's (2003) ABD on the varied ways that dispossession is secured was quite helpful. I explored ways that access to land, resources, services and complex relations were reshaped to enable ABD, consistent with "the contemporary politics of international extractive industry" (p. 11). I was surprised by how predictable (and detestable) capital logics functioned in this case, in a way that dialogues with the theoretical and empirical literature referenced in this study. This study deepened my understanding of the contradictions of capital as well as how the globalizing integration of economic systems, that I benefit from here in Canada, impact distant localities.

Ethics: Would the Real Dispossessors Please Stand Up? The sum of RMGC's "business practice"/tactical actions can only be described as devoid of ethical consideration. This study truly spoke to Harvey (2003) and Leech's (2012) understanding that capital logics take the easiest path to profit it can get away with. Roşieni were treated as inferior persons from the initiation of the project, when the company fabricated "consultations," making a mockery of freely given, informed, specific consent. Company employees: targeted vulnerable Roşieni through pyramid-like schemes wherein locals who hoped for employment were required to sell their properties and encouraged to pressure their neighbours to sell; badgered elderly Roşieni to sell like telemarketers or telescammers; and disregarded the requests of Roşieni who did not give consent to be solicited to sell.

Ethical considerations of globalized economics also arise. Banks like the Royal Bank of Canada, investment management companies, and individual investors on the stock market generate funds for companies like GBU. When companies like GBU—whose projects breach environmental licensing protocols, face local resistance and are subsequently stalled so that they involve very little "mining"—receive funds through stock market, these funds are put to other "operational" uses. In the case of Roşia Montană, investment dollars were used to fund "operations," such as reinforcing a corporate-state alliance by funding RMGC events and bringing local council members on the RMGC payroll (bribery). RMGC also used company funds to purchase what was described as a media blockade. Company funds are also used to pay the salaries of DFDR architects and the agents going door to door pressuring, persuading, and seducing locals to sell or, put another way: the systematic social and material deconstruction of villages and ways of life, cajoling/buying local authority, bullying the elderly and coercing/intimidating villagers. The stock market offers banks and investors a front that speaks in terms of abstractions like speculative profit, but the veil is thin. Thus, globalizing economic

systems make use of the bystander effect. All are paying for the geological, social, and cultural dismantling of a given locality, yet none are accountable.

Mining for Gold: Less than Glittering Prospects. Need for regulation shines even brighter when considering glittering mining profit estimations against the lack of actual payoffs mining offers in exchange for the costs it incurs. In this study Roşieni described how RMGC employees used theatrics to hyperbolize the benefits of the project in terms of compensation, local salaries and reclamation activities. However, Roşieni mining experience illuminated how the potential for employing locals would be slim, employment would lack longevity, and prospects for reclaiming a large pit mine and its cyanide tailings pond before GBU left the area was dubious.

Further, as Kuyek (2019) argues, mining companies contribute very little in terms of taxation to public coffers, may dissolve their responsibilities by claiming bankruptcy, and often leave disaster risks and ongoing tailings management to governments and taxpayers. In other words, companies have access to all the profits of mining and mechanisms for dissolving the economic risks to their profit. This would be critical to ensure profitability, since the testimony of Roşieni suggests that their mountains have been mined for thousands of years, leaving the gold mines conventionally depleted and less profitable than ever. Further, Roşieni noted that RMGC has already attempted to avoid taxation and is unlikely to stay for any amount of time beyond what it would take to remove the ore. Driving the economic unfeasibility home, Kuyek points to research that suggests extracting gold and other metals from electronic waste is 13 times more cost efficient than mining, and goes so far as to ask, “Given the enormous environmental and social costs of mining gold, why are we doing it at all?” (p. 144).

Shakedowns: A Canadian Export? It is disturbing to note that Canadian civil servants—ambassadors—are frequently involved in forwarding the interests of mining development (Kuyek, 2019). Further, trade commissions, trade deals like the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada in the case of Roşia Montană, and threats of withholding financial aid are employed to *extract wealth from other countries for corporate purses*. Canada intercedes on behalf of well-known companies like Barrick Gold in revenue disputes with their hosts states. These activities do not serve the Canadian public, and even if they did it would be unacceptable to export the social and material harm, suffering, and

environmental degradation for such developments to other localities in exchange for importing their wealth. To argue the contrary is imperialism.

Resistance in Roșia Montană

It is difficult to imagine that civil society is capable of reforming globalizing economics sufficiently to ensure justice and emancipation for all. This is certainly why Gramsci (1971) argues that counter-hegemony is a revolution wherein civil society—the cultural institutions whereby dominant groups maintain their power—is seized by subalterns. Gramsci's understanding of hegemony is certainly apparent in RMGC spreading its tendrils through the state and into all aspects of life in Roșia Montană. Further, ABD/DFDR at this locality are understood as an acceleration of a globalizing capitalist hegemony. However, the case of struggle at Roșia Montană more closely resembled Polanyi's (2002) countermovement, wherein civil society reacts to protect society from social and/or ecological injustice. Further, a strict Marxist prescription of socialism may not sit well with the țărani/peasants of Roșia Montană whose cause to struggle is their identity—an identity traditional Marxists would argue needs to be dissolved in the glorious revolution. Nonetheless, Holst (2002) suggests that there may be a middle way via civil societarian-socialist alliance. This may be possible if civil societarian groups like SRM accept critical elements of socialist emancipatory education, and if socialists accept a pluralist world “in which many worlds fit” as the Zapatistas say. Theoretical resistance literature deepened my understanding of the churnings that create resistance and the prognosis of plays/reactions against domination.

Understanding resistance in cases of DFDR, as well as concepts like hegemony, helps describe why some Roșieni sold and some stayed. This by no means is meant to simplify the complex micropolitics of decision making, but rather to highlight one element. Many of the participants in this study noted that those vulnerable to displacement were not as “rooted” in Roșia Montană, such as the young or those who had come to the area for employment rather than having a placed personal history in the locality. Rootedness versus vulnerability to selling speaks to related processes of a globalizing hegemony of economic/urban values as well as a lack of material possibilities like employment.

I have come to see that resistance cannot be simplified/objectified. Complex socio-historic realities, such as storied acts of force (acts of violence and wealth extraction) and layered DFDR (the forced movement of labourers in and out of the area), shaped diverse micropolitics in

Roșia Montană. Therefore, it is impossible to speak of Roșieni grassroots struggle in terms of a single contextual reality. Rather, grassroots struggle consisted of a post-socialist, class-heterogenous, and theoretically complex conglomeration, including: țărani with pensions—from a period of proletarianization under authoritarian-socialism—small business owners, and labourers. Diversity in anti-development struggles is to be expected. Worldwide, many anti-development dispossession struggles tracked by The Environmental Justice Atlas (<https://ejatlas.org/>) are class-heterogenous, sometimes involving urban and rural, townsfolk, Indigenous groups, and peasants in shared actions.

Țărani Rootedness: Struggle, Like Eternity, Was Born in the Village. Scott's (1985) analysis was important for highlighting the rurality of resistance in this case. While members of AM and RMCF are heterogenous, most made use of the mechanism Scott described as the remembered village: reflecting on the past village in comparison to the realities of the RMGC project. Even non-țărani Roșieni see the land of their commune and the values passed down by their families who worked the land, as things to be loved and cherished. In this sense, the țărani way of life, its values and rhythms, were used to determine what development is in/appropriate. Despite the economic racism leveled against țărani, their identity is not a stagnant ahistorical label for those trapped in the past but rather a reference point and historical, living culture—capable of change or development in the truest sense of the word, but which may also reject *globalizing capitalist development* without contradiction. I have come to believe this is an important way in which peasant scholarship can dialogue with Indigenous scholarship. Țărani-forged resistance to RMGC's ABD was land-based and drawn from a different world view with conflicting values and logics.

Marxists raise concerns about whether peasant-oriented struggles are emancipatory. It is true to say that țărani oppose ABD because of the *specific* changed way of life it represents (as opposed to change itself) and not because they are trying to institute a revolution—but that living, growing, historical, cultural, and spiritual reality is the basis for a revolution if there ever was one. Țărani inspired struggle does not belong to the linear historical trope that many Western theorists and academicians subscribe to, but rather a world where many worlds fit.

Learning in Social Action in Roșia Montană

This study leaned heavily on Foley (1999) and Freire (1970) for understanding learning in social action in this context of mining dispossession. In retrospect, due to the case site and the

dispersed/decentralized nature of trans/national solidarity networks, this study picked up heavily on the incidental and informal forms of learning inherent in the grassroots struggle. This is not a loss in the least. Social movement activist scholars like Choudry (2015) point out that this is often the sort of data ignored by academics. However, it is equally important to highlight the importance of non-formal/formal forms of education, and the role that the SRM trans/national solidarity network had in catalysing these to mobilize civil society.

Seeing Freire's (1970) praxis in relation to this case highlighted the importance of intentionality in informal, non-formal, and formal education, as well as the overwhelming possibilities of sites of learning. Initially, I saw this case primarily in relation to incidental learning and action. However, informal Roşieni learning was carried out with great intent and purpose, and even incidental learning had the habit of spawning intention and transforming everyday activities like hosting an accommodation, tours to make a living, and speaking with one's neighbor into praxis.

I have learned that grassroots and trans/national networks are necessary parts of the same tree, and of the massive scale of work and intentionality that goes into social movements. There is, it seems, a naturally spiralling effect to learning in social action—one cycle of reflection and action leads to another, more complex cycle. However, there is without a doubt an enormous amount of will exerted in this effort.

Two aspects of learning in social action I did not expect to see was the transference of rootedness and of conscientization. One of the things some NGO members related that they learned, was a sense of rootedness/belonging to Roşia Montană after their long years of struggle. During my time in Roşia Montană, I further became aware of many Romanians/Europeans—some from more urban settings—who had moved to Roşia Montană, despite the economic challenges that remain. This is perhaps one aspect of learning in social action in the context of a place-based struggle that I did not anticipate. These solidarity migrants receive varying degrees of welcome due to the complex micropolitics of Roşieni, but the steep population decline from DFDR might make such movement essential to the longevity of the struggle.

Regarding conscientization, I had taken one note made by Freire (1970) to be abstract in the beautiful way humanism sometimes is, that “It is only the oppressed who, by freeing themselves, can free their oppressors” (p. 38). However, I found an almost literal translation of this in the words of an NGO member who noted their slogan had been “We don't save Roşia

Montană, Roșia Montană Saves Us" (Interview, Oct. 3, 2019). My intuition is that these two notions—of transferring rootedness and conscientization through learning in social action—are important elements for permanence in emancipatory struggle. Finally, some further questions that arose when in my research include:

- What national/transnational hegemonic processes are at play in localities like Roșia Montană that promote values and culture aligned with capital logics?
- What are the longitudinal features of struggles where DFDR or ecological injustice are at play (i.e. how effective are such struggles over long periods of time, or generationally, at forestalling the interests of extractive development or other capital-driven development)?
- What is the emancipatory potential of țărani logics as native/rooted European ideologies as a countermovement to globalizing capitalist ideologies, which are represented in the literature as Euro-centric, Euro-American, and Western ideologies?

Conclusion

This thesis showed the oppressive tendencies of globalizing capital and associated processes of ABD alongside the powerful emancipatory potential that emerges when grassroots struggles merge with solidarity networks in trans/national counter-globalization efforts. Through these efforts, knowledge(s) of tactics, mobilization and successes produced globally are shared with local struggles for their use and encouragement, but the reverse is true as well. As Freire (1970) proposed, emancipation is achieved by the oppressed. As with the case of Roșia Montană, the struggle of oppressed Roșieni produced knowledge and action, immanent with emancipatory potential, that benefited the Romanian academy, students, and the public.

Hope and Action: What the Gabriel Resources-Romanian Government Breakdown Teaches

Today, AM, RMCF, and the residents of Roșia Montană wait to hear whether an international tribunal in Washington will decide in favour of GBU or the Romanian Government, and how that decision will influence their commune. Simultaneously, they wait for confirmation of UNESCO World Heritage Site and what changes this will bring. Though unresolved, the breakdown of the corporate-state alliance in this case proffers insights on a characteristic vulnerability for large corporations. As journalist Carlos Maza puts it:

Maza: ... while corporate propaganda tells us that tyranny is something done by politicians, and super-sexy secret police, big businesses don't really need any of that to control you. If your health insurance decides to raise your premiums, if your billionaire boss tells you to work in unsafe conditions, or if a factory starts dumping toxic waste into

your backyard, there's basically nothing you can do about it. No matter how much of a cowboy you are.

Noam Chomsky [clip]: If power shifts over into the hands of private tyrannies, than there's no way for the public to do a thing. There's no mechanism for doing it. These are tyrannical organizations.

Maza: ...corporations don't answer to the public... corporations have no borders...

Noam Chomsky [clip]: The government is the one institution that people can change. That's exactly why all the anger and fear is directed against the government. The government has a defect: it's potentially democratic. Corporations have no defect: they're pure tyrannies. (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N8ba5umiqHY>)

Herein lies the reality of the corporate-state breakdown in this case. Largescale conscientization of the public, rooted as Freire (1970) argues in the struggle of the oppressed, formed mobilizations against the state and thereby against the corporate interests of GBU. On the one hand, GBU's expert testimony alleges this did not happen and that there was no mass mobilization for Roșia Montană. On the other hand, GBU was forced into that very court by public will expressed through the state against their project.

In a thank-you video where residents of Roșieni expressed their gratitude to their solidarity network, one Roșian wished their message would be heard by Canadians. Despite the disturbing trend of Canadian government officials acting on behalf of the mining industry, the case of Roșia Montană demonstrates how states offer a vulnerability whereby the tyranny of private industries may be countered. Corporations will do what they can get away with; therefore the only possibility to hold Canadian mining to account is through conscientization of the Canadian public and social action such as Canadian NGOs that forward demands to "Withdraw Canadian government support for GBU's mining project..."

(https://www.earthworks.org/publications/joint_letter_to_canadian_officials_urging_withdrawal_of_government_support/).

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Appendix I
INFORMATION LETTER and CONSENT FORM

Study Title: Learning in Social Action in Contexts of Mining Development: A Case Study of Roşia Montană, Romania

Research Investigator:

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What is this study about?

This study looks at how mining development has resulted in work toward social change at Roşia Montană. The way that the Roşieni members of Alburnus Maior and other organizations learn in response to mining development is important knowledge for adult learning research and other similar campaigns. In my research, I am hoping to find out about how learning is occurring, how it informs action, and the forms of political learning taking place.

What is this form?

This is a Consent Form. It lets you know about the study so that you can decide if you want to participate. This form will provide you with the background and purpose of this study. It will describe what you will need to do to participate. If you decide to participate, the researcher will ask you to sign this form or give verbal consent. You will also be given a copy. Information will be kept confidential and private.

Background and Purpose

I am currently undertaking a research project for my Master's thesis and would like to know if you are willing to be interviewed. I may also ask if you are willing to participate in a focus group. I believe you have important views and experiences related to my research.

The purpose of this research is to understand better the ways people learn in social action about mining development in Roşia Montană. This study can help researchers better understand how adults learn. It can also benefit others who are also learning through social action. Finally, this research may offer insight into the ongoing struggle at Roşia Montană.

Study Procedures

You may choose to participate in either an interview, a focus group, or both. Interviews and Focus Groups will be approximately 60 to 90 minutes each. The researcher will ask questions about your experiences and views on learning and mining development at Roşia Montană. If agreed upon, the researcher will audio record the session. The researcher will also make notes. All data will later be typed out. This data will be summarized and included in a thesis.

For an **interview**, the researcher will meet you in a time and place convenient for you. **Focus groups** will be held at a time and place that works well for all those participating. Focus groups will include a guided discussion with three to five participants.

Benefits

I hope that this study can be used by those struggling to protect their land. This research can be used as a tool for reflecting on learning. It can also be used to compare and contrast with other cases of people learning in social action.

There are no personal benefits from being in this study. There are no costs involved in being in the research. There is no compensation or reimbursements for participation in this study.

Risk

This study involves minimal risk. There are not risks to physical or mental health beyond what is faced in everyday life. You may feel distress or worry if you describe painful events. Being part of a small group may mean that someone could identify you by your contributions.

Voluntary Participation

Your participation in this research is voluntary. If you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw at any time. You do not need to answer questions you do not wish to. You may leave an interview or focus group at any time.

Withdrawing Your Interview Data

You may tell the researcher to remove part, or all your information from the study for any reason. You have until December 6, 2019 to tell the researcher that you wish to withdraw from the study and have your data destroyed.

You May Not Withdraw Your Focus Group Data

Focus groups include all parts of a discussion that build on each other. If one participant's data is removed, the context for other participants' thoughts might be lost. Therefore you may not withdraw your contributions to a focus group.

Confidentiality & Anonymity

Careful steps will be taken to protect your identity. Individual participant data for this research will be kept confidential by the researcher. Typed data will NOT contain any mention of your name and any identifying information will be removed.

All written recorded data will be kept in a locked briefcase while the researcher is in Romania, or a locked office cabinet upon their return to Canada. All digital data will be secured on an external hard drive. Only the researcher and their supervisor will have access to the data. All information will be destroyed after five years' time.

Focus Group Confidentiality and Shared Responsibility

In a focus group, the researcher and each participant share the duty to protect the privacy of all participants. You should not discuss this session or any participants identities afterwards. This shared duty means the researcher cannot fully guarantee confidentiality. You will not be able to access a focus group transcript.

Interview Data Review

You may tell the researcher you wish to review your interview transcript. You have until December 6, 2019 to tell the researcher if you wish to add, clarify, or make changes.

If you wish to read the thesis, you may let the researcher know. The thesis will be written in English. Data from this study may be used in future research. If the researcher does this it will have to be approved by a Research Ethics Board.

Further Information

Contact Taylor Witiw if you have any questions or concerns by email at twitiw@ualberta.ca. The plan for this study was reviewed for its adherence to ethical guidelines by a Research Ethics Board at the University of Alberta. For questions regarding participant rights and ethical conduct of research, contact the Research Ethics Office by email at reoffice@ualberta.ca or by telephone at 1-780-492-2615.

Referrals

You may be asked if you know of other members of your organization who would be willing to participate in the study. To refer someone for the study, please provide them the researcher's contact information and ask them to contact the researcher if they are willing to be interviewed.

Participation Options

Please indicate if you are willing to participate in an interview, and/or a focus group. Please note that you may not be asked to participate in a focus group even if you offer to do so:

- I am willing to participate in an interview.
- I am willing to have my interview recorded.

- I am willing to participate in a focus group.
- I am willing to have my focus group recorded.

Consent Statement

I have read this form and the study has been explained to me. I have been given the opportunity to ask questions and my questions have been answered. If I have more questions, I have been told whom to contact. I agree to participate in the research study described. I will receive a copy of this consent form after I sign it, or alternatively after I provide verbal consent.

Participant's Name (printed) and Signature

Date

Name (printed) and Signature of Person Obtaining Consent

Date

*Note date and time if verbal consent is given.

Appendix II

PROPOSED INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR ROSIENI MEMBERS OF ALBURNUS MAIOR

Learning in Social Action in Contexts of Mining Development: A Case Study of Roșia Montană, Romania

Rapport Establishing Questions:

1. Hello, my name is Taylor. I am 31 and was born in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, where I am currently a student in the Education program. My partner is Romanian, and I learned about Roșia Montană through her family (reciprocal introduction). I will be guiding this interview. Could we begin by you telling me your name and age?
2. Do you have family in Roșia Montană?
3. Do you have land in Roșia Montană? If so, what do you cultivate on your land?
4. Can you tell me a happy or important memory you have in Roșia Montană?
5. Why is it important to you to preserve Roșia Montană?

Politics of Mining Development Questions:

1. Can you tell me about the history of mining in Roșia Montană?
2. What is the story of Roșieni on this land? What is the history of the Obste (commons)?
3. Who are the major “actors” in this struggle (opposition and allies)?
4. Which actors are interested in the lands of Roșia Montană? What do they say they need the lands for and why?
5. What strategies or tactics have been used to promote mining?
6. What has your response been to these actors?
7. Have your message and values been heard by the different actors (opposition and allies)?
8. How important is unity to your struggle?
9. What has the role of woman been in the struggle?
10. How has private property hindered and/or benefited your struggle?
11. Do you see your struggle as tied to global politics? If so, how?
12. What role **have** international and local networking collaborations played in your struggle, and what role **should** they play?

Learning in Social Action Questions:

1. The struggle for Roșia Montană has lasted many years, how has the struggle evolved since it began?
2. RMGC has had a disruptive impact on the town, has AM found a way to disrupt RMGC?
3. What knowledge have you learned through this struggle?
4. How has this knowledge come to you (through your own experience or by others)?
5. How has this knowledge how has it impacted your struggle?
6. What makes knowledge significant to your struggle?
7. How can learning and the knowledge you have gained inform your responses to government or the mining companies?
8. How do you see the Romanian education system impacting this struggle? Have you been involved with schools at all?
9. Does your organization engage in research or knowledge production?

Experience of Mining Development Questions:

1. How has the struggle against this mining project impacted your life over the years?
2. Have there been social, cultural, environmental, or economic impacts in your village?
3. How has the struggle impacted Roșia Montană and the lives of other Roșieni?
4. What is most important for people to know about your life and Roșia Montană?

Appendix III

PROPOSED INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

Learning in Social Action in Contexts of Mining Development: A Case Study of Roşia Montană, Romania

Rapport Establishing Questions:

6. Hello, my name is Taylor, I am a student from Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, at the University of Alberta. I will be guiding this interview. Could we begin by you telling me your name and age?
7. How would you describe your connection to Roşia Montană?
8. Can you describe your organization and your role in it?

Politics of Mining Development Questions:

13. What circumstances initiated your organization to become involved in this struggle?
14. What has your organization's response been to the struggle against mining at Roşia Montană?
15. What are the politics involved with this struggle?
16. Who are the major "actors" in this struggle?
17. What strategies or tactics have been used by the actors?
18. What role has your organization played in the struggle for Roşia Montană?
19. What roles do you think local and international organizations should play in the struggles of Roşieni for their land?

Learning in Social Action Questions:

10. How has your organization engaged in learning, education, and research about and for this struggle?
11. What knowledge has been gained through this struggle?
12. How has this knowledge been deployed to inform responses to attempts at opening the mine?
13. What approach has your organization taken to organize in this struggle?

Solidarity and Mining Development Questions:

5. In what ways have your organization worked with Roşieni or Alburnus Maior?
6. In what ways has your organization worked with other local or international organizations involved with this struggle?
7. What have been your greatest challenges to collaborating with other groups in this struggle? Greatest successes?
8. What would you say are the primary message and values communicated by Roşieni?
9. Why do you believe the preservation of Roşia Montană is important?

