# Mass Technology, Mass Appeal, and Emotion in Mass Art

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

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# Abstract

My goal in this dissertation is to identify the essential features of mass art and provide a definition of mass art in terms of a set of necessary conditions which are jointly sufficient. To achieve this goal, I will provide a conceptual analysis of mass technology, mass appeal, and emotion in mass art, and address problems arising from previous discussions of the topics. I will start my project by discussing three preparatory but important questions: how do we identify mass art? Why is “mass art” a useful category to identify? Why mass art is “art?” And then, I will discuss the main theme: “What is mass art?”

One of the distinctive features of mass art is the use of mass technology, which is a kind of technology capable of producing aesthetically identical copies for audiences at widely different sites. Another important feature of mass art is mass appeal. Mass art tends to allow enormous audiences around the world to enjoy and understand the artwork without difficult requirements.

Noël Carroll's influential theory of mass art grasps the two distinctive features mentioned above. I suggest that his theory is a good starting point for a contemporary analysis of mass art. He provides three necessary conditions for mass art which are jointly sufficient. First, mass art is multiple instance art; second, it is produced and delivered by mass technology; third, mass art has accessibility, which means that it can be easily understood by untutored audiences. However,

Carroll’s theory is not without problems.

The first problem arises from the accessibility condition. I will argue that Carroll’s overly “cognitivist” account of accessibility fails to properly explain emotional engagement in mass art. To solve this problem, I suggest that we should pay attention to what I call "emotional accessibility." I argue that R. G. Collingwood's discussion of expression and emotion is particularly useful here (in light of Kantian aesthetics). I will focus on a Collingwoodian distinction between individualizing and generalizing emotion. Based on Collingwood’s insights, I will provide a useful author-centered account of emotional accessibility. Reconciling this account with Carroll’s cognitivist account, I will propose a new accessibility condition for characterizing mass appeal of mass art.

The second problem lies in Carroll’s ontological condition. For Carroll, mass art has to be a type-template artwork produced and delivered by a technology which can mechanically generate aesthetically identical tokens of the same type. To refute, I will argue that this view is too limited because it does not allow different human actions and aesthetic variation among multiple realizations of a mass artwork. Here, I will discuss some counterexamples such as video games or street artworks. As an alternative, I will provide a new ontological condition of mass art which can include not only type-template artworks, but also other type artworks whose tokens are generated by a range of human actions. Finally, I will provide an inclusive definition of mass art.

# Acknowledgements

To start, I would like to thank the members of my supervisory committee. My supervisor, Jennifer Welchman, guided this project from the very beginning. The influence of her constructive criticisms can be seen in every chapter. I would like to thank her for invaluable comments and intellectual mentoring. Her mentoring will continue to provide guidance on my future academic life and research. Alexander Rueger greatly sparked my interest in aesthetics. It was not until taking his class on Kant's aesthetics that I became deeply interested in aesthetics and philosophy of art. Amy Schmitter has been one of the most important sources of my intellectual growth. I would like to thank her for a continuous encouragement and for invaluable comments on my project. I also want to thank Marie-Eve Morin for agreeing to be on my committee and for commenting on my work at such short notice. Her feedback has been insightful and thought-provoking.

I also owe much gratitude to the following for their support in the writing of this project:

- My external examiner, Cynthia Freeland, for her invaluable feedback and generosity with her time.
- Bruce Hunter, for his critical and valuable comments, and Deborah Knight, for her helpful suggestions for revision and expansion of Chapter 1 and Conclusion.
- The Associate Chair, Graduate Studies, Ingo Brigandt, and the former Department Chair, Jack Zupko, for their administrative support and help.
- The administrative staff in the Department of Philosophy, in particular Gail Mathew, Joanne McKinnon, Santhi Thomas, and Diane McKen, for all kinds of assistance.

- My colleagues and some of my best friends, Jay Worthy, Emine Hande Tuna, Octavian Ion, Nicholas Ferenz, Hui-Ming Chin, and Taro Okamura. As an international student who has been studying abroad and writing the dissertation in a non-native language, their support and encouragement are essential and invaluable to me. In particular, I would like to thank Jay Worthy for his kindness, humor, and wit.
- My parents for their sacrifices. My pursuit of academic philosophy would be impossible without their understanding and support.

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# Introduction

My goal in this dissertation is to identify the essential features of mass art and provide a definition of mass art in terms of a set of necessary conditions which are jointly sufficient. To achieve this goal, I will provide a conceptual analysis of mass technology, mass appeal, and emotion in mass art, and address problems arising from previous discussions of the topics.

Why is “mass art” worth discussing? In contemporary industrialized, urbanized society, we are surrounded by mass artworks produced and delivered by mass media including broadcast, audio recording, film, magazine, and the Internet. Most people's first contact with art comes through those works designed for enormous mass audiences across nations and cultures, for instance, many Hollywood movies, pop music, or popular literature. Nowadays it is also common to appreciate artworks through photos, videos, and sound recordings on the Internet. We can initially categorize those artworks which have mass appeal and are designed for and distributed to mass audiences as instances of mass art. Issues about mass art, such as its essential features, its aesthetic value, and its relationship to high art, are widely discussed and debated in our society, since it has almost become impossible to encounter art without any previous exposure to mass art. Therefore, discussions of mass art will be helpful for us to classify some familiar works and to reexamine our daily aesthetic experiences, independent of whether we would like to advocate for a certain work of mass art.

Based on these reasons, there are two main motives for my project. First, an analysis of mass art is useful practically since in social, political, and cultural spheres, audiences, artists, critics, taxpayers, and politicians from time to time look for a certain distinction between low art and high art, which in contemporary society usually occur in the form of the distinction between mass art and avant-garde art. For instance, the distinction between commercial film and art-house film is well-known in contemporary society, and it relates to debates about arts subsidies and other cultural debates. Therefore, philosophical discussions of mass art are helpful for clarifying some confusions and misunderstandings of this kind of debate.

Second, there is another more philosophical motive. Since mass art is designed for enormous masses across nations and cultures, it is often produced and reproduced by mechanical forms of technology and it is usually designed to be easy to be consumed by different groups of people. Therefore, I am interested in how we can properly characterize those essential features of mass art. For instance, one could observe that mass art is produced by mass technology, which is essentially different from traditional art media, such as painting or sculpture. Then we will need to explain what this mass technology really is. Furthermore, the divergence between mass art and avant-garde art suggests that mass art seems to be easy for consumption, while avant-garde art seems to be challenging. In order to properly account for this distinction, we need to analyze why mass art implies mass appeal or the ease of consumption.

There are three important questions that need to be answered before giving a thorough conceptual analysis of “mass art.” First, what is a legitimate method for identifying mass art? To identify art in general or a specific art-type, one traditional approach is to give a definition. However, anti-essentialists have raised doubts about whether a definition of art in general can be given. Therefore, it is worth discussing whether anti-essentialist doubt can be applied to mass art as well and whether it is plausible to give a definition of mass art.

Second, even if we are able to identify mass art, a further question remains: should we bother? In other words, why is the art-category “mass art” a distinct and useful category to identify? We can categorize all artworks created on Sunday as Sunday art, but this categorization is not useful. Since “mass art” is still not a well-recognized art-type, I will defend why this category is worth discussing. I will also explain why I focus on “mass art” rather than “popular art,” even though “popular art” is another common label for artworks designed for mass audiences and with mass appeal.

Third, even if I can identify “mass art” and defend its usefulness as a category, I will need to resolve doubts about the art status of mass art: are mass artworks really artworks properly so called? Or, are they at best cultural products, crafts, or entertainment rather than genuine artworks? Maybe ordinary audiences misunderstand and mislabel mass artworks as works of art? Since I aim to examine mass "art" rather than mass "culture" in my project, I will provide a defense that at least some mass artworks qualify as art.

In the first Chapter, I will use a review of previous literature to answer these three questions. First, I will argue that without committing to any definition of art in general, one can still use a “definitional” method to characterize and identify essential features of an art-type, as I will do. Hence, it is legitimate to take this approach, without offering a definition of art in general. Second, by analyzing the relationships between closely related concepts including popular art, high art, mass art, avant-garde art, cultural products, craft, and entertainment, I will argue that “mass art” is a useful category worth discussing, and it is distinct from and more precise than “popular art.” Finally, even though I do not endorse any definition of art as such, I will adopt some brute accounts of art and argue that some mass-produced artifacts qualify as art.

For now, I should just briefly explain why I use the label “mass art” to categorize those artworks which have mass appeal and are designed for common, ordinary audiences. It is true that “mass art” is a relatively uncommon label for those artworks in the history of philosophical discussion of art; rather, art critics and theorists often use “popular art.” For a long time, art critics and theorists have often discussed whether popular art, compared to high art, is artistically or aesthetically inadequate. One might even suggest that we can replace the discussion of popular art with a discussion of mass art. However, I think that we should not confuse the two concepts.

Compared to "popular art," "mass art" offers an increase in precision. Popular art is usually an ambiguous label and different people use it in different senses. It is hard to give a clear characterization of popular art. On the other hand, for mass art, at least we can specify that it involves a certain kind of mass, industrial means and came to existence only after the rise of modern industrialized, urbanized mass society. Mass art appeared when mass technologies of production and distribution, such as the printing press or cinema, were invented. Therefore, we can tentatively suggest that mass art and popular art have different conditions of production, and so are not identical. Sometimes the two concepts overlap. A work of mass art can be popular and a work of popular art can be a mass product, but mass art has at least one distinctive feature which is not essential for every work of popular art: the use of mass technology.

Presumably, mass art is art designed for mass audiences in mass society. Who are mass audiences? We can roughly say that they are enormous audiences spread across national and cultural boundaries. For instance, a work of mass art such as an acclaimed Hollywood commercial film is often designed for audiences around the world. In this sense, we can also say that mass art is art designed for mass consumption. Since it is designed for mass consumption, a mass artwork also needs to be mass produced or reproduced in order to reach mass audiences.

This analysis suggests that mass art *prima facie* fits in with what Walter Benjamin calls "art in the age of mechanical reproduction."[1]

Since a work of mass art is designed for mass consumption, the ability to produce identical, or more precisely, artistically or aesthetically identical, copies of the work is important. For instance, a film, a photograph, or a sound recording can be designed in this way in order to be consumed by mass audiences across national or cultural boundaries. To achieve the goal of mass consumption, using the technology of mechanical reproduction is ideal, if not necessary. As Benjamin points out, artworks in the age of mechanical reproduction are different from stage performances or singular artworks like paintings. A painting or a play is the kind of art that has an "aura," a unique aesthetic presence which makes an artwork one of a kind.[2] On the other hand, a mechanically-produced artwork or a mechanical copy does not have a unique aura. A film can be aesthetically seen in virtually the same way by different groups of audiences around the world.

Therefore, we can suggest that the first important feature of mass art is that it involves the use of mass technology. In Benjamin's view, mass technology is the technology of mechanical reproduction. This feature also distinguishes mass art from popular art because it is not necessary for popular art to make use of a mass technology. A play, a musical, or a painting can all be popular without involving the use of mass technology. Moreover, many artworks created long before the age of mechanical reproduction can also be popular artworks. For instance, a Shakespeare play might be said to be a popular artwork at his time, but the play per se could never be a work of mass art.

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[1] Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 2007), 217-52. William Irwin also mentions a similar point that Benjamin captures an important feature of mass art by discussing reproducibility. See William Irwin, "Philosophy as/and/of Popular Culture," in *Philosophy and the Interpretation of Pop Culture*, ed. William Irwin and Jorge J. E. Gracia (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 42-44.

[2] Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," 220.

There is another important feature of mass art related to mass consumption. Since a mass artwork is designed for mass audiences across national and cultural boundaries, it tends to allow enormous audiences around the world, sometimes regardless of their ages, genders, or religions, to understand the work without too much specialized knowledge or professional knowledge of art. For instance, many films by Walt Disney Animation Studios are designed to have this feature. If mass art is designed to be consumed by mass audiences, it should be able to be understood by them without demanding conditions or difficult requirements. In other words, works of mass art tend to have mass appeal: they tend to promise some degree of ease of consumption.

Given the two essential features that mass art has, I will then suggest that a good starting point for a contemporary analysis of mass art is Noël Carroll's theory of mass art. Carroll is the first philosopher rigorously analyzing the concept “mass art” in the analytic philosophy of art. He defends the art status of mass art, and performs an analysis of mass technology and mass appeal in mass art. Carroll provides an essential definition of mass art, including three necessary conditions which are jointly sufficient: first, mass art is multiple instance or “type” art; second, the production and delivery of mass art involves mass technology, such as the printing press or sound recordings; and third, mass art is “accessible” to general audiences in the sense that it can be easily understood by untutored audiences. Carroll's well-formulated definition of mass art provides some insightful analyses which are helpful for properly classifying works of mass art. However, Carroll's analyses are not without problems.

The first main problem in Carroll's theory arises from his “accessibility” condition. Carroll uses the accessibility condition to characterize the feature of mass appeal in mass art. Carroll explains that mass art is functionally designed to be consumed or understood by as many untutored audiences as possible, virtually on first contact. Many commentators including John Fisher, William Irwin, and David Novitz disagree with Carroll on his accessibility condition. They argue that many musical artworks, specifically sound recordings of punk, heavy metal, or classic rock like Jimi Hendrix, would fail to satisfy this condition, but it seems that they are works of mass art. By examining this disagreement, I will argue that Carroll’s overly “cognitivist” focus on his definition of accessibility is the main cause of confusions and disagreement because this focus fails to properly explain our relatively less cognitive engagement in mass art.

In order to solve this problem, I propose that we should pay attention to emotional engagement and emotional accessibility. I suggest that emotion plays a distinctive and important role in our engagement in mass art, but Carroll and other contemporary aestheticians fail to sufficiently explain this kind of emotional engagement. Having said that, I agree with Carroll that to define mass art, it is better to find a functional account of mass appeal or accessibility which focuses on designed, intended functions and structural, intrinsic features of artworks, rather than social features or audiences' responses.[3] To this end, I aim to offer better functional accounts of emotional engagement and emotional accessibility. I suggest that R. G. Collingwood's discussion of expression and emotion is particularly useful, though it has been often ignored in the analytic philosophy of art.

Collingwood's aesthetics has lost its importance over the past several decades. One of the main reasons is his idealist definition of art.[4] However, since the 1990s, a few philosophers have tried to rediscover and defend the significance of Collingwood's theory of expression. For instance, Aaron Ridley and Jenefer Robinson both argue that Collingwood's theory of expression does not rely on his idealist definition of art, and they defend the importance of his theory of expression.[5] Lately, Robert Hopkins adopts a similar position and interestingly discusses

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[3] In chapter 1, I will defend this point based on a review of popular art and mass art.

[4] For more discussion of this criticism, see Chapter 3. The other reason may be Alan Tormey's influential criticism that the existence of expressive qualities in a work of art does not need to imply a prior act of expression. See Alan Tormey, *The Concept of Expression: A Study in Philosophical Psychology and Aesthetics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 104. For a Collingwoodian reply to Tormey, see Jenefer Robinson, *Deeper Than Reason: Emotion and Its Role in Literature, Music, and Art* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), Chapter 8. Robinson shows that Tormey misinterprets Collingwood and that Collingwood's theory of expression can be defended.

[5] Aaron Ridley, "Not Ideal: Collingwood's Expression Theory," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 55, no.

Collingwood's theory of the mind in order to show how a specific kind of expression of emotion in art, in Collingwood's view, can give one a special understanding of emotion which is distinct from the kind of understanding offered by conceptualizing or categorizing.[6] I think that Hopkins elucidates one important aspect of Collingwood's aesthetics which has been long neglected: the "particularist" view whereby Collingwood argues that good expression is "individualizing" or "particularizing" emotion.

In this project, I do not adopt Collingwood's limited definition of art and do not agree with his sharp distinction between "art proper" and "craft" (or "art falsely so called") such as entertainment. However, along with those contemporary Collingwoodian philosophers, I will make use of Collingwood's account of expression in search for a useful account of emotional engagement and mass appeal. I will particularly focus on Collingwood's view of expression as individualizing emotion, and his distinction between individualizing and generalizing emotion. Since Collingwood's account of expression has received relatively less discussion and has been sometimes misunderstood, in Chapter 3 I will interpret and analyze his view of expression as individualizing emotion.

In short, individualizing emotion is a way of structuring artworks whereby an artist induces

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3 (1997): 263. Robinson, *Deeper Than Reason: Emotion and Its Role in Literature, Music, and Art*, 255-57.

[6] However, I will not discuss Hopkins's approach in detail, since I aim to develop an approach from the view of aesthetics and philosophy or art, rather than from the view of philosophy of mind. For his discussion of Collingwood, see Robert Hopkins, "Imaginative Understanding, Affective Profiles, and the Expression of Emotion in Art," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 75, no. 4 (2017): 363-74.

the kind of emotional engagement which discourages understanding of emotion by conceptualizing or categorizing, while the process of generalizing emotion is a way of structuring artworks whereby an artist induces the kind of emotional engagement which encourages understanding of emotion by conceptualizing or categorizing. Sometimes, generalizing emotion induces over-categorization such that a generic, typical kind of emotion is usually designed for a general genre or type of art. Based on the distinction between individualizing and generalizing emotion, I will provide a neo-Collingwoodian account of emotional accessibility, and also a more satisfactory accessibility condition for mass art.

The second main problem in Carroll's theory is about his second condition of mass art. Carroll proposes that a work of mass art is necessarily a multiple instance artwork produced and delivered by a mass technology. This condition implies an important view about the ontological status of mass art. Hence, I will call this the technological-ontological condition.

Carroll thinks that an artwork is ontologically qualified as a mass artwork if and only if it is a type-template, multiple instance artwork produced and delivered by a technology which can generate artistically or aesthetically more and less identical tokens of the same type. Here, type-template art such as a film is in contrast with type-interpretation art such as a play. Different instances of the same type-interpretation art such as a theatrical musical essentially imply aesthetically discernible variation because they require human interpretation, and each interpretation potentially produces a work that contains new and different aesthetic properties. In this way, Carroll thinks that mass art-forms include film, photography, or sound recording, but exclude stage performances and singular artworks.

Carroll's analysis of mass technology and his ontology of mass art explain why the kind of art in the age of mass consumption is essentially different from the kind of art produced by traditional media. However, by providing some counterexamples, including video games and Banksy's street art, I will argue that Carroll’s ontological condition is too limited and inadequate because it does not allow different human actions and aesthetic variation among different multiple realizations of the same work of mass art. Carroll’s condition would disqualify a video game as mass art because generating multiple tokens of a video game requires players’ interaction and thus implies a range of human actions and aesthetic variation. To refute Carroll, I will argue that we should broaden the ontological condition of mass art, and allow some non-type-template artworks to be works of mass art. Finally, I will offer a more inclusive definition of mass art.

This dissertation is comprised of five chapters. In Chapter 1, I will provide a review of the literature and discuss three preliminary questions on mass art. In Chapter 2, I will review Carroll’s definition of mass art. I will focus on his characterization of mass appeal and suggest that his excessive focus on cognitive understanding of narrative makes his “accessibility” condition unsatisfactory. In order to develop an alternative and more inclusive approach to accessibility, I suggest that we should pay more attention to emotional accessibility, which involves the connection between emotional engagement and the ease of consumption. By reviewing contemporary discussion of emotional engagement and some previous accounts of emotional accessibility, I will justify why it is reasonable to pursue a neo-Collingwoodian account of emotional accessibility.

In order to pursue such an account, in Chapter 3 I will discuss Collingwood's view of expression. Since I do not want to commit to some of Collingwood's claims in his aesthetics, I will make some preliminary remarks and clarifications. First, I do not endorse Collingwood's idealist definition of art, but mainly focus on his account of expression. Second, I do not adopt his limited and technical usage of the terms "expressing" and "arousing," because they do not fit in with our contemporary linguistic intuitions. Rather, based on Collingwood's insights, I use the terms "individualizing" and "generalizing" emotion. Third, I will explain how I avoid a common criticism of Collingwood's account of expression that an artist in the process of expression must always be "sincere," i.e., if an artist is expressing sad emotion, she must feel sad. To reply, I suggest that an artist can also express other people's emotions or fictional characters' emotions in a psychologically "simulated" way. Fourth, I will emphasize that Collingwood adopts a phenomenological approach to emotion, i.e., he focuses on what it is like to feel or experience a certain emotion in his discussion of expression in art.

Based on Collingwood's insights, I will explain the mechanism of individualizing emotion, and make a distinction between individualizing and generalizing emotion. I take both accounts of individualizing and generalizing emotion as author-centered accounts of expression. Individualizing emotion is a way of structuring artworks and expressing emotion in particularity (rather than an "a-kind-of" emotion) and it discourages understanding of emotion by conceptualizing and categorizing. One of the plausible models of individualizing emotion is producing novel metaphors and associatively rich and nuanced experiences and imaginations of an emotional feeling. On the other hand, generalizing emotion is a specific form of non-individualization. It is a way of structuring artworks and expressing pre-categorized and pre-planned emotion. In this way, an artist first pre-categorizes a familiar or well-recognized kind of emotion and later uses suitable means to induce the kind of emotion as planned. The goal in this pre-planned process is not to individualize but to induce the pre-categorized and pre-selected general kind of emotion and correspondingly emotional effects. For individualizing emotion, an artwork is not simply a vehicle for expressing some kinds of mental states which can be pre-categorized into well-recognized kinds of emotions before the artwork is created. The expression or the entire artwork itself is an exploration and discovery of the emotional state. In contrast, for generalizing emotion, the artwork or expression is usually the vehicle by means of which an artist expresses a kind of emotion which is already well-known and well-recognized, such as joyfulness in a sitcom or suspense in a thriller film. I think that this distinction between individualizing and generalizing emotion will be helpful for marking the distinction between emotional accessibility and inaccessibility.

In Chapter 4, I will apply the distinction to a discussion of emotional engagement and different levels of expressiveness. Based on the discussion, I will then propose a neo-Collingwoodian account of emotional accessibility: an artwork has emotional accessibility if it is intentionally designed to generalize emotional engagement more than individualize it in its expressive features for audiences. Finally, based on this account, I will provide a new accessibility condition of mass art. My condition will be more inclusive and has more explanatory power than Carroll’s because it can account for more artworks and genres, such as sound recordings of punk or foreign films designed for mass audiences.

In Chapter 5, I will discuss Carroll's technological-ontological condition and its problems. By providing some counterexamples such as video games and street artworks, I suggest that Carroll's condition is too narrow. I argue that we should broaden the ontological condition for mass art. My proposed new ontological condition of mass art will include not only type artworks whose tokens are generated by physical templates and mechanical procedures, but also type artworks whose tokens are generated by a range of physically limited human actions.

In conclusion, by combining my proposed accessibility condition with the new ontological condition, I will provide an inclusive definition of mass art. Compared to Carroll's definition, my definition aims to include more artworks into the category of mass art, but still intends to grasp the two essential features of mass art: the use of mass technology and the tendency to mass appeal. Even if an artwork or a kind of artwork is not cognitively accessible or not a type-template artwork, my definition can qualify it as mass art. For instance, recordings of punk or heavy metal, films which are not cognitively or intellectually accessible, video games, and street artworks can all be candidates for works of mass art.

I aim to provide a more inclusive definition of mass art. The value of this inclusiveness is that we can better understand some new kinds of mass artworks in light of my proposed categorization of mass art. For instance, we can better understand video games based on their technological, ontological, and social connections to films. Given the ontologically similar "tokening" process of video games and films, one plausible implication is that the necessity of human interaction in video games does not imply that game players are more creative or active than film audiences because the interaction in a gameplay is just a tokening process, which does not create a new work worthy of independent aesthetic attention.. Rather, many video games and films are ontologically similar, and also similar in terms of their psychological and social roles: they are emotionally or cognitively easy for audiences to consume in a similar way.

Finally, based on my definition, I think there are two important insights which can potentially benefit future research on aesthetics. First, I emphasize the distinctive role of emotion in the design and appreciation of mass art, and defend a new approach to emotion based on Collingwood's insights, which I believe have long been underrated. Therefore, it will be worth discussing how my neo-Collingwoodian approach can fit in with contemporary discussions about emotion in the analytic philosophy of art, such as discussions of identification, simulation, empathy, or musical expressiveness. Second, my proposed definition suggests that we should pay more attention to the multiple tokening process of mass art and understand the ontological implications of different kinds of tokening. Therefore, in future research it will be worth addressing how other new mass technologies or new ways of using mass technologies, such as virtual reality games or artificial neural networks, may or may not create new ways in which we should understand the ontology of mass art. Therefore, in addition to a classificatory definition of mass art, I hope that my analysis of mass art can provide meaningful benefits in the treatment of emotional engagement in art and of the ontological status of contemporary artworks.

# Chapter 1 Three Questions on Mass Art

## 1.1 Three Preliminary Questions on Mass Art

What is mass art? What are the distinctive, essential features of mass art? My central aim in this project is to answer the above questions by providing a conceptual analysis for characterizing and distinguishing mass art from other art-types or art-forms. One common method in this kind of project is to provide a set of non-trivial conditions for mass art, such as a definition of mass art that comprises sets of necessary conditions that are jointly sufficient. However, doubts about definitions have been raised in the context of art, so it is worth discussing in the beginning what methods are available and defensible. Moreover, asking the question "what is mass art?" itself needs some justification, since “mass art” is not a familiar, well-recognized type of art. Therefore, in order to prepare the ground for analyzing what mass art is, in this chapter I will identify three important preliminary questions and address them properly.

First, what is the theoretical method I should adopt to identify mass art? To identify art in general, one of the common approaches is to give a definition. However, anti-essentialists have raised doubts about whether a definition of art can be given, so philosophers have proposed anti-definitional methods for identifying art.[7] Can anti-essentialist doubts be applied to mass art as well? Does a definition of mass art require a definition of art in general? To answer these questions, the relationship between defining art and defining an individual art, such as mass art, needs to be analyzed.

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[7] One of the most famous anti-essentialist arguments was proposed by Morris Weitz. See Morris Weitz, "The Role

After reviewing the previous literature on defining art and defining an individual art, I will argue that two kinds of definitional projects can be undertaken separately, and it is plausible to offer a definition and identify essential features of mass art without committing to any definition of art in general. Therefore, I will adopt this approach. Throughout the review, I will also clarify some important conceptual issues and distinctions between different kinds of art-identifying methods.

The second preliminary question is whether this art-category “mass art” is likely to be a useful category. We can categorize all artworks created on Sunday as Sunday's art, but this categorization is not meaningful. Since mass art is still not a well-established category, I need some extra arguments to show that analyzing this category is useful. To achieve this goal, I will show why “mass art” should be distinguished from another art-category “popular art,” a common category many theorists use when discussing artworks designed for common, mass audiences or artworks with mass appeal.[8] Moreover, I will argue that “mass art” is actually a more precise

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of Theory in Aesthetics," ibid.15, no. 1 (1956): 27-35. See later discussion in section 1.2 for more details.

[8] Many philosophers, aestheticians, and cultural theorists do not clearly distinguish the label “mass” art/culture from the label “popular” art/culture, but “popular art/culture” is a more common label. See, e.g., Abraham Kaplan, "The Aesthetics of the Popular Arts," ibid.24, no. 3 (1966): 351-64; Richard Shusterman, "Form and Funk: The Aesthetic

and useful category than “popular art,” and it deserves special treatment.

Third, I need to briefly address why I can include mass “art” among the individual “arts.” If yes, then why? This is a question about whether we can give mass art the status of art such that it forms its own kind under the general category of art. As some traditional critics such as Theodor Adorno or Dwight Macdonald would suggest, works of mass art or popular art cannot be genuine artworks.[9] Instead, they are at best cultural products, crafts, or entertainment, and it is just that ordinary audiences misunderstand and mislabel them as works of art. Therefore, since I aim to examine mass "art" instead of mass "culture" in my project, I will need to show mass art is a genuine category of “art.”

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Challenge of Popular Art," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 31, no. 3 (1991): 203-13; "Popular Art and Education," *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 13, no. 3-4 (1995); David Novitz, "Ways of Artmaking: The High and the Popular in Art," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 29, no. 3 (1989): 213-29; *The Boundaries of Art* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992); "Aesthetics of Popular Art," in *The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics*, ed. Jerrold Levinson (Oxford University Press, 2005), 733-47; Theodore Gracyk, "Searching for the 'Popular' and the 'Art' of Popular Art," *Philosophy Compass* 2, no. 3 (2007): 380-95. Similarly, some cultural theorists and critics tend to use the term “popular” culture instead of mass culture. See, e.g., Colin MacCabe, *High Theory/Low Culture: Analysing Popular Television and Film* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986); Simon Frith, "The Good, the Bad, and the Indifferent: Defending Popular Culture from the Populists," *Diacritics*, no. 4 (1991): 102-15; John Storey, *Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: A Reader*, ed. John Storey, 3rd ed. (England: Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2006); Herbert J. Gans, *Popular Culture and High Culture: An Analysis and Evaluation of Taste* (New York: Basic Books, 1999); John Storey, *Cultural Theory and Popular Culture : An Introduction*, 6th ed. (England: Pearson, 2012).

[9] For some typical criticisms of low art, popular art, or mass art as non-genuine art, see Theodor W. Adorno, "On Popular Music," *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* 9, no. 1 (1941): 17-48; "The Schema of Mass Culture," in *The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture*, ed. J.M. Bernstein (London: Routledge, 1991), 53-85; Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, "The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception," in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (New York: Continuum, 2001), 120-67; R. G. Collingwood, *The Principles of Art* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), Book I; "Art and the Machine," in *The Philosophy of Enchantment: Studies in Folktale, Cultural Criticism, and Anthropology*, ed. David Boucher, Wendy James, and Philip Smallwood (London: Oxford University Press, 2005), 291-304; "Magic," in *The Philosophy of Enchantment: Studies in Folktale, Cultural Criticism, and Anthropology*, ed. David Boucher, Wendy James, and Philip Smallwood (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 195-234; Clement Greenberg, "Avant-Garde and Kitsch," *Partisan Review* 6, no. 5 (1939): 34-49; Dwight Macdonald, "A Theory of Mass Culture," in *Mass Culture: The Popular Arts in America*, ed. Bernard Rosenberg and David Manning White (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1960), 59-73; Kaplan, "The Aesthetics of the Popular Arts," 351-64.

By addressing the three preliminary questions, I aim to show that discussion of mass art can be significant and informative. I will clarify some concepts closely related to mass art such as popular art, entertainment, and craft. I will conclude that mass art is not identical to popular art and is a more useful category of art because it is a more precise concept than either "popular art" or "low art." Moreover, at least some works of mass-produced artifacts can qualify as art. Therefore, mass "art" can be included among the individual arts. All in all, it is worth pursuing a precise conceptual analysis of mass art.

### 1.2 Identifying Art: Definitional and Non-Definitional Approach

In order to determine the method for identifying mass art, first it would be useful to give a quick review of several different kinds of methods for identifying art in general. In the review, I will introduce some important conceptual distinctions which will be useful for later discussion, such as the one between definitional and anti-definitional methods, the one between essential and disjunctive definitions, and the one between functional and institutional definitions. My purpose here is not to conclusively adjudicate between different kinds of defining or identifying methods, but rather simply to clarify. I also aim to show that it is difficult to find one single, non-controversial essential or disjunctive definition of art in general that most philosophers would endorse. But even if we cannot define art, we still have acceptable alternatives: theorists have proposed some non-definitional methods for identifying particular objects as artworks. Based on the review, in the following section I will argue that we can bypass the difficulties with definitions of art, and defend the approach that a definition of mass art can be given without endorsing any definition of art as such. For this reason, I need only a broad, non-definitional account of art in order to qualify some particular mass-produced objects or artifacts as art.

To identify art in general, the philosophical search for a definition of art has been one of the most important approaches. One typical, and potentially the most useful, form of a definition is an essential definition (or sometimes called a "real" definition by aestheticians) of art. An essential definition of art would identify essential features which characterize and distinguish art in general from everything else. In the view of many aestheticians, such as Stephen Davies, Noël Carroll, and as far back as the neo-Wittgensteinian philosopher Morris Weitz, an “essential” definition of art comprises a set of conditions or properties, each of which is necessary and all of which are jointly sufficient for an object being an artwork.[10] Some essential definitions of art were proposed before the mid-20th century. For instance, in Weitz’s view, Leo Tolstoy offers an essential, emotionalist definition that art is the expression of emotion;[11] Benedetto Croce defines art as intuitive, non-conceptual expression;[12] and Clive Bell defines art as what has "significant form," i.e., a unique combination of certain directly perceivable elements in their relations.[13]

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[10] Aestheticians in the philosophy of art often use the phrase an “essential” or “real” definition to exclusively mean the kind of definition which comprises a set of necessary conditions which are jointly sufficient. See Stephen Davies, "Definitions of Art," in *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, ed. Berys Gaut and Dominic Lopes (London: Routledge, 2001); Noël Carroll, "Identifying Art," in *Beyond Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Weitz, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics." However, in the discussion of metaphysics, a “real” definition is also often opposed to a “nominal” definition. See Richard Robinson, *Definition*, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950), Chapter VI. Therefore, to avoid confusion, hereafter I will adopt the usage “essential definition” to mean the kind of definition of art which comprises necessary and sufficient conditions.

An essential definition of art, if successful, would be useful because its conditions specify a property (or a set of properties) that all artworks possess and which is exclusive to artworks. So, an essential definition provides one of the most precise ways in which one can identify artworks. However, the possibility of providing such a definition of art has been questioned. Since this skeptical position aims to refute an essential definitional approach to art, it can be called anti-essentialism.

An early, influential anti-essentialist argument comes from Weitz. Weitz argues that the concept of art cannot be defined by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions because it has been and will be constantly evolving and expanding.[14] Since artistic activities are constantly creating new properties and categories in the art world, those creative activities will continue to challenge any attempt to provide some fixed properties to identify art, making an essential definition impossible. For Weitz, the concept of art should be seen as an "open" concept which will extend itself to a broader usage over time.[15] Though an essential definition is not possible, Weitz recommends an alternative way of identifying art, particularly a neo-Wittgensteinian "resemblance-to-paradigm" understanding of family resemblance.[16]

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[11] Leo Tolstoy, *What Is Art?*, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (London: Penguin, 1995), Chapter IV.

[12] Benedetto Croce, *The Aesthetic as the Science of Expression and of the Linguistic in General*, trans. Colin Lyas (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1-32.

[13] Clive Bell, *Art* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1924), Chapter 1. For some other possible essential definitions of art after the 1960s, see Arthur C. Danto, "The Artworld," *The Journal of Philosophy* 61, no. 19 (1964): 571-84; *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981), 81-82; George Dickie, *The Art Circle* (New York: Haven, 1984), 81-82.

[14] This argument derives from Ludwig Wittgenstein's discussion and refutation of philosophical definitions. For instance, he questions if we can find a definition of a game. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), Part I, Section 65-75.

To use the method of resemblance-to-paradigm, one starts by considering an artwork or a set of artworks as a paradigm and then determines whether a new candidate is art by comparing the features of the candidate to the features of the preestablished paradigm. If the candidate resembles the paradigm closely enough, one can conclude that the candidate should be regarded as an artwork. In this way, we do not need necessary and sufficient conditions for art in order to identify what art is.

However, one strong criticism of the resemblance-to-paradigm method is that it does not tell us how to identify the resemblance and the paradigm.[17] Thus, this method is incomplete insofar as it does not provide a selection procedure. Even if we could find a paradigm, without a strict, limited account of resemblance, this method would be too inclusive because everything can be said to bear a similarity to an artistic paradigm under this method. A new work such as Jeff Koons's *Balloon Dog* can be said to bear a similarity to an art paradigm, such as a modernist or conceptual artwork with features of irony and self-reflectiveness, but other ordinary balloon dogs may bear strong similarities to Koons's work as well. So, we would have to count many other such objects as artworks. Yet this classification would be too broad to be useful. Therefore, the method of resemblance is not helpful.

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[15] Weitz, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics," 32.

[16] Ibid., 31.

[17] For more detailed criticisms of resemblance-to-paradigm method, see Stephen Davies, *Definitions of Art* (Cornell University Press, 1991), 9-21; Berys Gaut, ""Art" as a Cluster Concept," in *Theories of Art Today*, ed. Noël Carroll (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2000), 25-44; Carroll, "Identifying Art," 75-100.

Despite Weitz's suggestions, analytic philosophers since the 1960s have still attempted to provide definitions of art, albeit not necessarily essential definitions. Many philosophers have learned the lesson offered by Weitz, therefore, many of their proposed definitions of art aim to be able to explain constantly evolving, new properties of art while avoiding the selection problem in Weitz's method. One possible solution is to bring in the disjunctive element to define art. In what follows, I will give a quick review of some major philosophers' definitions of art after Weitz. I will then show that it is still difficult to find one single, non-controversial definition of art which many philosophers would endorse. Different new problems arise for each of those definitions of art after Weitz. Hence, I will also review some alternative non-definitional methods which have been proposed in order to respond to the definitional approach as such. According to these methods, without a definition of art as such, one can still use non-definitional methods for determining whether particular objects are artworks or not.

There are some convenient ways of classifying those different definitions of art after Weitz. In terms of the form of a definition, we can distinguish a disjunctive definition from an essential one. A disjunctive definition of art still specifies a single concept of art, but its conditions are disjunctive, rather than individually necessary and jointly sufficient as in the case of an essential definition. It states that X is art if and only if it satisfies condition A, or condition B, or condition C, etc. No one of these conditions is necessary, but satisfying one of the conditions is sufficient for being art. As Robert Stecker points out, many contemporary definitions of art are disjunctive.[18] One advantage of disjunctive definitions is that they avoid Weitz's criticisms of essential definitions because disjunctive definitions imply that there is no value or property essential to all artworks. There is no set of necessary and sufficient conditions of art, or any necessary conditions for art. Rather, there are only disjunctively sufficient conditions for art. But because of these disjunctively sufficient conditions, at least there are some general criteria to select artworks, thereby avoiding the selection problem arising from Weitz's resemblance methods.

We can also classify different definitions in terms of their content. A convenient classification is to categorize them into four different kinds: functional, institutional, historical, and hybrid definitions.[19] This way of classification is independent of whether a definition is essential or disjunctive. For instance, there can be essential functional definitions and also disjunctive functional definitions. First, a functional definition of art attempts to define art in terms of functions of artworks, or in terms of artists' intention to fulfill functions. Functions here exclude accidental functions that are not the functions an artwork is intended to serve or is standardly used to serve.[20] Since the 1960s, a major functional approach is to define art in terms of the function of providing aesthetic experience. For instance, Monroe Beardsley famously gives a functional and disjunctive definition stating that art is "either an arrangement of conditions intended to be capable of affording an experience with marked aesthetic character or (incidentally) an arrangement belonging to a class or type of arrangements that is typically intended to have this capacity."[21]

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[18] Robert Stecker, "What Is Art?," in *Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art: An Introduction* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 102. By making the distinction between an essential and disjunctive definition, we can reject an essential definition as Weitz did, but accept a disjunctive definition of art.

[19] I mainly derive this classification from Stecker's *Artworks: Meaning, Definition, Value* (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), Part I; "What Is Art?," 83-108; Davies, "Definitions of Art," 227-39. Davies also famously describes the taxonomy between procedural and functional definitions of art. However, here I will not adopt this taxonomy. For the taxonomy, see *Definitions of Art*, Chapter 2. For a criticism of Davies's taxonomy, see, e.g., Dominic McIver Lopes, *Beyond Art* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 50.

Second, while a functional definition does not stipulate how an artwork must be regarded in a social context because an intended function can be determined by an author alone, institutional definitions of art incorporate such social, relational element and suggest that an artwork is properly situated in a system of social relations or in relations to an institution. For example, George Dickie's definition states that "a work of art is an artifact of a kind created to be presented to an art world public." For Dickie, the art world consists of art world systems each of which is a framework for the presentation of a work of art by an artist to an art world public.[22] If we see "being an artifact" and "created to be presented to an art world public" as two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for being art, then Dickie's definition of art is an essential definition.

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[20] Stecker, *Artworks: Meaning, Definition, Value*, 32.

[21] Monroe C. Beardsley, *The Aesthetic Point of View: Selected Essays* (London: Cornell University Press, 1982), 299. For other possible functional-aesthetic definitions of art, see Richard Eldridge, "Form and Content: An Aesthetic Theory of Art," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 25, no. 4 (1985): 303-16; Richard Lind, "The Aesthetic Essence of Art," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 50, no. 2 (1992): 117-29. George Schlesinger also proposes a real, functional definition that a work of art is "an artifact which under standard conditions provides its percipient with aesthetic experience." See George Schlesinger, "Aesthetic Experience and the Definition of Art," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 19, no. 2 (1979): 175.

Third, a historical definition of art attempts to define art in terms of an artwork's historical relation to its artistic predecessors. As Davies points out, because of this relation, every historical definition has a recursive form. It must refer back to a certain art-historical context in which an artwork is created. In other words, a historical definition defines the art-now through its relation to art-past.[23] For instance, Jerrold Levinson offers a historical, essential definition with the element of an author's intention: an artwork is a thing that "has been seriously intended for regard-as-a-work-of-art, i.e., regard in any way pre-existing artworks are or were correctly regarded."[24]

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[22] Dickie has proposed two institutional definitions of art. Here, I focus on his second definition, which is a part of his essential framework of art with five definitions: 1. an artist is a person who participates with understanding in making a work of art. 2. a work of art is an artifact of a kind created to be presented to an art world public. 3. a public is a set of persons whose members are prepared in some degree to understand an object that is presented to them. 4. the art world is the totality of all art world systems. 5. an art world system is a framework for the presentation of a work of art by an artist to an art world public. Dickie, *The Art Circle*, 80-81. For Dickie's first institutional definition of art, see *Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1974), Chapter 1. For other institutional definitions, see Stephen Davies, "A Defence of the Institutional Definition of Art," *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 26, no. 3 (1988): 307-24; *Definitions of Art*, Part II; T. J. Diffey, "On Defining Art," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 19, no. 1 (1979): 15-23. Some early ideas about institutional definitions can be found in Danto, "The Artworld," 571-84.

[23] Davies, "Definitions of Art," 232.

[24] Jerrold Levinson, "Refining Art Historically," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 47, no. 1 (1989): 21. Also see "Defining Art Historically," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 19, no. 3 (1979): 21-33; "Extending Art Historically,"

However, this account has been criticized as incomplete because "first art" cannot be solely explained by this historical context.[25] It is not a decisive objection, but to avoid this, some “disjunctive” historical definitions have been proposed, for instance, James Carney provides a definition: something is an artwork if and only if either (i) it is an artifact that is historically connected to general style features of previous artworks, or (ii) it is first art.[26]

Finally, a hybrid definition can be offered when combining the two or all of the above three kinds of definitions.[27] For instance, Stecker proposes a historical-functional hybrid definition: an item is a work of art if and only if (a) either it is in one of the central art-forms at the time of its creation and is made with the intention of fulfilling a function art has at that time or (b) it is an artifact that achieves excellence in fulfilling such a function.[28] Stecker does not enumerate the functions of art but suggests that the functions at a given time are to be identified by looking at central art-forms of that time.[29] Furthermore, he adds the second disjunct to allow that an artwork can be created outside central art-forms if it fulfills a proper function. This definition is thus also a disjunctive definition, which appeals to historically evolving functions.[30]

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*Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 51, no. 3 (1993): 411-23.

[25] Stecker, *Artworks: Meaning, Definition, Value*, 88; Stephen Davies, "First Art and Art's Definition," *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 35, no. 1 (1997): 19-34; "Definitions of Art," 232.

[26] James D. Carney, "The Style Theory of Art," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 72, no. 4 (1991): 272-89; "Defining Art Externally," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 34, no. 2 (1994): 114-23.

[27] Davies, "Definitions of Art," 234-35; Stecker, *Artworks: Meaning, Definition, Value*, 50.

[28] *Artworks: Meaning, Definition, Value*, 50.

[29] Ibid., 100.

[30] It has been considered that Danto also offers a hybrid (and “essential”) definition of art with functional and historical elements. Carroll summarizes Danto’s theory as follows: something is a work of art if and only if 1. it has a subject, 2. it projects an attitude or point of view, 3. by means of rhetorical ellipsis (metaphorical), 4. which ellipsis

Although most of these different kinds of definitions avoid the selection problem arising from Weitz's resemblance method because they specify some general properties of art, each of them has their own new problems. First, the main problem for developing a functional definition is that it is difficult to find any single function or a set of functions that are common to all artworks. The functional-aesthetic approach also excludes the possibility that an artwork can plainly perform non-aesthetic but artistic functions. In other words, functional definitions usually cannot be inclusive enough.[31] Second, a common problem for developing institutional definitions is that they are apt to be circular and incomplete. Philosophers have argued that Dickie's second definition is circular because it defines an artwork based on an art world, but the art world cannot be defined without appealing to the presentation of an artwork.[32] The definition is also incomplete and uninformative because it does not distinguish clearly how the art world differs from other similar institutional systems.

Third, one main problem for developing historical definitions is that the way of identifying "first art" remains unknown, given that the historical approach aims to define the art-now

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requires audience participation to fill in what is missing (interpretation), and 5. where the work in question and the interpretations thereof require an art-historical context. See Arthur C. Danto, "After the End of Art : Contemporary Art and the Pale of History," (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 195; *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art*; Noël Carroll, "Danto's New Definition of Art and the Problem of Art Theories," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 37, no. 4 (1997): 386-92; "Identifying Art," 80-90; Davies, "Definitions of Art," 235.

[31] For a criticism of Beardsley's functional definition, see *Definitions of Art*, Chapter 3. Also see Stecker, *Artworks: Meaning, Definition, Value*, Chapter 2.

[32] Kendall L. Walton, "Review of Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis," *Philosophical Review* 86, no. 1 (1977): 97-101; Davies, *Definitions of Art*, Chapter 4; Robert Stecker, "The End of an Institutional Definition of Art," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 26, no. 2 (1986): 124-32.

through its relation to art-past.[33] Finally, although a hybrid definition like Stecker's aims to combine the advantages of different approaches, Stecker's definition has also faced some criticisms. Katheleen Stock argues that Stecker's historical-functional definition does not offer a clear distinction between the correctly recognized and the accidental functions of an art form; thus, it is insufficient for identifying functions of art.[34] Davies adds a strong challenge: the "Artworld relativity problem," by which he means that there are different Artworlds (the Arworld of Europe, Africa, the East etc.) each with its own history. This problem applies to all definitions that have historical elements. Hence, to give a sufficient historical-functional definition of art, the nature of each Artworld also needs to be analyzed.[35]

Given these various different kinds of criticisms of different kinds of definitions of art, it is not surprising that the definitional approach as such has been questioned once again. Responding to the post-Weitz definitional approach which still aims to find general conditions for being art as such, some contemporary non-definitional, anti-essentialist accounts have been proposed as alternative methods for identifying particular objects as artworks.

Noël Carroll is sympathetic to the neo-Wittgensteinian doubt that we can ever find an essential definition of art in general. He remains agnostic about whether art can be generally defined, but maintains that we can still identify particular artworks by a method of historical narrative.[36] According to Carroll, the question of "what is art" includes at least three different issues. The first one is the question of how one identifies artworks or distinguishes artworks from other kinds of objects. The second is the question of whether one can mark some essential features of art. And the third is the question of whether one can offer an essential definition of art. Carroll focuses on the first question and proposes an "identifying narrative" to identify artworks. He argues that we can recognize a particular object as a work of art if we can develop an intelligible historical description or explanation of how a new candidate for art can be linked and understood in a preestablished art-historical context. Based on this linking narrative, we could identify a new candidate as an artwork without offering a general definition of art.

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[33] Levinson has replied to these criticisms. See Levinson, "Extending Art Historically," 411-23; "Refining Art Historically," 21-33. However, more criticisms have been offered. See, e.g., Stecker, *Artworks: Meaning, Definition, Value*, Chapter 3; Davies, "Definitions of Art," 227-39.

[34] Kathleen Stock, "Some Objections to Stecker's Historical Functionalism," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 40, no. 4 (2000): 479-91.

[35] Davies, "Definitions of Art," 230-35.

Another non-definitional identifying method is proposed by Berys Gaut. Gaut agrees with Weitz that an essential definition of art in general cannot be found, but provides an alternative method for identifying particular artworks, which may avoid the criticisms directed at Weitz. According to Gaut, we should think of art as a cluster concept because there are many different ways in which a work can qualify as art. We cannot enumerate exact properties which will be sufficient for being art in any kind of general way. That being said, Gaut provides a list of some common properties to identify art. Sometimes, one or more of these properties will be sufficient for an object being an artwork. But it is also likely that a new property not listed here will be discovered, so it is an incomplete list. Those common properties include: 1) possessing positive aesthetic properties, 2) being expressive of emotion, 3) being intellectually challenging, 4) being formally complex and coherent, 5) having a capacity to convey complex meanings, 6) exhibiting an individual point of view, 7) being an exercise of creative imagination, 8) being an artifact or a performance from a high degree of skill, 9) belonging to an established artform, 10) being the product of an intention to make a work of art.[37] Gaut thinks that this cluster account is better than resemblance-to-paradigm method for two reasons. First, it avoids some degree of the selection problem because this account does not need to state which works are paradigms. Second, it provides some substantial claims about art by specifying some general properties which *might* suffice for being art.[38]

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[36] Noël Carroll, "Historical Narratives and the Philosophy of Art," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 51, no. 3 (1993): 313-26; "Identifying Art," 82.

One thing worth noting is that Gaut's cluster account is conceptually different from a disjunctive definition of art. Stecker points out that if the set of conditions sufficient for being art are finite and enumerable, then a cluster account would be equivalent to a disjunctive definition.[39] However, Gaut in fact suggests that there are many different ways different works can be considered art, so we are not able to enumerate all the conditions and features of art. The list of general properties he provided can be expanded or revised to account for different artworks or new artworks. In other words, while a disjunctive definition of art still aims to specify a single concept of art, Gaut's cluster account allows the concept of art to be indeterminate.[40] Therefore, it is a rather loose account of art which does not require precise identification of art in general.

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[37] Berys Gaut, "The Cluster Account of Art Defended," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 45, no. 3 (2005): 273-88; ""Art" as a Cluster Concept," 28.

[38] Philosophers' views about the cluster account of art vary. For criticisms which hold that the cluster account is not a better approach than definitions of art, see Thomas Adajian, "On the Cluster Account of Art," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 43, no. 4 (2003): 379-85; Stephen Davies, "The Cluster Theory of Art," ibid.44, no. 3 (2004); Stecker, *Artworks: Meaning, Definition, Value*, 24-26. For the reply to these criticisms, see Gaut, "The Cluster Account of Art Defended," 273-88. For philosophers who support Gaut's cluster account of art, see Aaron Meskin, "The Cluster Account of Art Reconsidered," ibid.47, no. 4 (2007): 288-400; Francis Longworth and Andrea Scarantino, "The Disjunctive Theory of Art: The Cluster Account Reformulated," ibid.50, no. 2 (2010): 151-67.

### 1.3 Defining an Individual Art without a Definition of Art

There is no single, uncontroversial definition of art with which many philosophers would agree. I will also not adopt one in this project, since to defend a definition of art would be demanding and unnecessary for my project. Based on the above review, in this section I argue that I can bypass the difficulties with definitions of art because one can still give a definition of an individual art-type without committing to any definition of art in general. Therefore, it can be legitimate to identify some essential conditions for mass art without offering a definition of art. In fact, this approach has been thought to be generally plausible in contemporary philosophical research on an individual art-type or art-form.

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[39] Stecker, "What Is Art?," 93.

[40] Davies, "Definitions of Art," 229.

Dominic McIver Lopes rejects the traditional approach to art in general and proposes that we should pass the buck to theories of individual arts.[41] Some major individual arts include literature, painting, music, sculpture, etc. It may also include their sub-categories such as poetry or a sonnet. In other words, for Lopes, instead of starting with a general definition of art which can be later applied to subcategories of art, we should start with theories of subcategories of art, each of which explains what makes any item a work in that individual art and what conditions define that individual art. The buck passing theory of art can be formulated as: "x is a work of art if and only if x is a work of K, where K is an art."[42]

Lopes argues that we should rather first pursue theories or definitions of individual arts because those theories can better explain our art practices and also because they can better deal with hard cases in avant-garde art, which challenge received definitions of art. To achieve these goals, Lopes thinks that we need to explain the audience's appreciative practices, the work's artistic value, and the significance of the media for artistic engagement. All of these explanations require some art-form specific studies, which will be mostly empirical. Since these medium-specific or art-form specific studies are required in order to judge whether an object is a work of art, general abstract definitions of art would not be useful here. Instead, we should focus on particular theories or definitions of individual arts.[43]

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[41] Dominic McIver Lopes, "Nobody Needs a Theory of Art," *Journal of Philosophy* 105, no. 3 (2008): 109-27; *Beyond Art*, Part I.

[42] *Beyond Art*, 14.

Lopes's theory suggests not only that we should shift our research focus to individual arts but also that a definition of an individual art does not need to be grounded in any definition of art in general. For instance, Lopes himself offers an essential definition of computer art with a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, but does not endorse any definition of art in general.[44] However, we do not have to adopt Lopes's buck-passing theory in order to agree that this definitional approach to an individual art is plausible.

Other philosophers also adopt a similar definitional approach to individual art-types. They do not explicitly endorse Lopes's buck-passing theory, but their approach is at least compatible with the buck-passing one. For instance, Ted Nannicelli proposes an intentional-historical definition of the screenplay, utilizing Carroll's historical narrative method in order to argue that screenwriting can be an art practice and many screenplays are artworks.[45] For Nannicelli, "x is a screenplay if and only if x is a verbal object intended to repeat, modify, or repudiate the ways in which plots, characters, dialogue, shots, edits, sound effects, and/or other features have historically been suggested as constitutive elements of a film by a prior screenplay(s)…"[46] In this form, the definition seems to be an "essential" one. But because of the historical element in the definition, Nannicelli also addresses the problem of first screenplay and discusses a possible functional, formalist account of first screenplay. Therefore, it could also be a disjunctive definition if a disjunct of first screenplay would be added. Moreover, Nannicelli addresses the problem of art-status separately from his definition of the screenplay. He defends Carroll's historical identifying narrative and suggests that a definition of art is not necessary for answering how and why many screenplays are art. Therefore, Nannicelli's approach suggests that it is not required to offer a definition of art in general for a definition of screenplay art.

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[43] Ibid., 19.

[44] Dominic McIver Lopes defines that x is computer art if and only if 1. it's art, 2. it's run on a computer, 3. it's interactive, and 4. it's interactive because it's run on a computer. See *A Philosophy of Computer Art* (London: Routledge, 2010), 27.

[45] Ted Nannicelli, *A Philosophy of the Screenplay* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 62.

[46] Ibid., 31.

Grant Tavinor adopts a similar approach when he provides a definition of videogames. Tavinor offers a disjunctive definition of videogames but argues that Gaut's cluster account, a non-definitional, non-essentialist account of art, can be adopted to explain why some videogames are art. For Tavinor, an object is a videogame if it is an artifact in a visual digital medium, is intended as an object of entertainment, and is intended to provide such entertainment through the employment of one of both of the modes of engagement: rule and objective gameplay, or interactive fiction.[47] Moreover, a videogame is videogame art if it possesses some general features suggested by Gaut's cluster account of art.[48] Therefore, a definition of videogame art would not need a definition of art in general.

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[47] Grant Tavinor, *The Art of Videogames* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 26.

[48] Ibid., 180-81.

Lopes's, Nannicelli's, and Tavinor's methods all suggest that it is plausible to define individual arts or art-types independently from art in general.[49] Another good example which directly relates to my project is Carroll's essentialist approach to mass art. While he rejects an essential definition of art in general and remains agnostic about it, he offers an essential definition of mass art.[50] Similarly, Gaut also offers an essentialist account of cinematic art, though he thinks that we cannot find essential features of art in general. For him, cinema is the "medium of moving images," so art created through this medium, i.e. cinematic art, would have at least this essential feature.[51] Hence, an essential definition of cinema could be provided based on this feature.

I take this kind of independent "definitional" approach to an individual art-type to be plausible, and along with these philosophers, I will adopt this kind of approach. To identify the individual art-type known as "mass art," I aim to provide an essential definition which characterizes and identifies necessary and sufficient conditions for mass art, without endorsing any definition of art in general. Though I do not directly adopt Lopes's buck-passing theory, my approach is compatible with it. I leave open which elements (functional, institutional etc.) should be most useful for grasping the concept of mass art. This is the task I will accomplish after examining different general and essential features of mass artworks.

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[49] Except that in Aaron Meskin's interpretation, Weitz applied his anti-essentialist argument to the individual arts as well as art. Therefore, Meskin would suggest that a definition of an individual art cannot be given either. See Aaron Meskin, "From Defining Art to Defining the Individual Arts: The Role of Theory in the Philosophies of Arts," in *New Waves in Aesthetics*, ed. Kathleen Stock and Katherine Thomson-Jones (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2008), 125-49. However, some powerful objections to Meskin (and Weitz) have been raised by Lopes and Nannicelli. Nannicelli attacks Weitz's original argument and points out that Weitz falsely assumes creativity as an essential feature of art. Furthermore, Nannicelli argues that the concept of an individual art is usually more nebulous than art in general, thereby more likely to be determined. See Nannicelli, *A Philosophy of the Screenplay*, 12, 34-37. Lopes also criticizes Weiz's argument for being vague about the distinction between empirical concepts and technical concepts. Moreover, Lopes suggests that there is no way to know whether a definition of an individual art can be given in advance of the empirical research. Also, the starting point, he suggests, should be the individual arts as we understand them today. See Lopes, *Beyond Art*, 127-30.

[50] As Michael Kelly points out, Carroll's essentialism is an essentialism just about the "mass" of mass art. Michael Kelly, "A Philosophy of Mass Art," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 61, no. 2 (2000): 481.

[51] See Berys Gaut, *A Philosophy of Cinematic Art* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 6-20.

Before pursuing such a definition in detail, I will need to address the other two preliminary questions. In what follows, I will give another review and explain why "mass art" is not identical to "popular art" and why it is a more useful category worthy of separate treatment. Finally, without endorsing any definition of art, I will still show that at least some mass-produced artifacts should qualify as art. Therefore, mass "art" is a genuine category of "art."

### 1.4 Theories of Popular Art and Problems

"Mass art" has been a relatively uncommon label in the history of art, but it bears a historically and aesthetically close relation to "popular art," a label aestheticians have more commonly used in order to make a contrast with "high art" throughout the twentieth century. *Prima facie*, there is some connection between popularity and mass appeal. Given the connection, it is tempting to identify mass art as popular art.[52] However, I will argue that we should not confuse popular art with mass art and should give special attention to mass art. One of the main reasons is that popular art is an ambiguous concept, and as such, using “popular art” to categorize a certain group of artworks in contrast with works of high art is also misleading. On the other hand, we are able to provide a more precise definition in terms of mass art. “Mass art” also captures some important features of contemporary art-making that “popular art” does not recognize.

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[52] For philosophers who do not distinguish the two concepts, see footnote 1. Furthermore, I leave open the possibility that mass art is a subcategory of popular art. Whether it is or not depends on one's definition of popular art. Personally, I think that a clear concept of popular art cannot be given. However, for instance, Carroll in his discussion of mass art suggests that mass art is a "noteworthy subspecies" of popular art. See Noël Carroll, *A*

I will start from a review of some previous theories of popular art, and clarify some closely related concepts such as entertainment and craft. By examining those theories, I will discuss the difficulties in identifying popular art and explain why we should focus more on "mass art."

At least since the early twentieth century, the distinction between low art and high art has been frequently drawn and discussed by art critics and philosophers.[53] One of the original motives for this distinction is to distinguish more aesthetically valuable artworks or artifacts from those less valuable ones. For this purpose, the label "popular culture" or "popular art" has been commonly used by cultural theorists and philosophers such as the Marxist philosopher Theodor W. Adorno, R. G. Collingwood, Abraham Kaplan, Richard Shusterman, Simon Frith, or

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*Philosophy of Mass Art* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 199. Also see Novitz, "Ways of Artmaking: The High and the Popular in Art," 213-29; "Noël Carroll's Theory of Mass Art," *Philosophic Exchange*, no. 23 (1992): 39-50; "Aesthetics of Popular Art," 733-47.

[53] See Adorno, "On Popular Music," 17-48; Kaplan, "The Aesthetics of the Popular Arts," 351-64; Novitz, "Ways of Artmaking: The High and the Popular in Art," 213-29; Ted Cohen, "High and Low Thinking About High and Low Art," *Journal of Aesthetics & Art Criticism* 51, no. 2 (1993): 151-56; "High and Low Art, and High and Low Audiences," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 57, no. 2 (1999): 137-43; Gans, *Popular Culture and High Culture: An Analysis and Evaluation of Taste*, 1-26; John Fisher, "High Art Versus Low Art," in *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, ed. Berys Gaut and Dominic Lopes (London: Routledge, 2001), 527-40.

David Novitz to discuss the value of those so-called "low" works.[54] To describe an artwork "popular" was often regarded as condemning the work. This tendency can be seen in the work of some critics, such as Adorno's or Kaplan's preferred usage of the term popular "culture" rather than popular "art," because they do not believe that popular works have enough aesthetic or artistic value to be considered genuine artworks. But is this criticism valid? Is popular art or culture aesthetically or artistically less valuable? To answer these questions, I need to start with identifying non-trivial conditions for popular art. Knowing the conditions of popular art, we can also answer what draws the borderline between popular art and high art.

The first possible approach to identifying popular art is to look at popularity. From its name, the label "popular" art seems to suggest that works of popular art imply popularity, that is, they are liked or consumed by many audiences. However, this condition is not sufficient, and it fails to mark the distinction between popular art and high art. For instance, Beethoven's symphonies are liked and consumed by many audiences but they are generally regarded as works of high rather than popular art. Similarly, an avant-garde artwork such as Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses* can become a bestseller consumed by many audiences.[55] Yet avant-garde works are also generally categorized as high rather than popular art. Moreover, the feature of popularity is not even a necessary condition of popular art, since there may be popular artworks that lack popularity. For instance, nowadays every year there is a discussion about big musical flops in the pop music industry. In 2016, Bon Jovi's album *This House Is Not For Sale* was a notable flop.[56] Yet it was intended to be a work of popular culture or art. The reason is that popularity is not an intrinsic feature or a designed function of the artwork but an accidental, extrinsic feature acquired after the production of art. Furthermore, this extrinsic feature can also be acquired by those works of high art. Therefore, it would seem that "popular" art would be a misleading label, if we understand it in terms of popularity.[57]

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[54] See the footnote 8.

[55] This example is mentioned by Carroll, *A Philosophy of Mass Art*, 190.

Since the feature of popularity would be a neither sufficient nor necessary condition of popular art, an alternative approach, often adopted by cultural theorists and aestheticians, is to look at those non-accidental, designed functions, or formal features of popular art. Here, my review will start from a classic essentialist account of popular art proposed by Adorno.[58] Though Adorno does not explicitly state a definition of popular art, a functional definition could be developed from his discussion.[59] He argues that popular artworks, or more precisely, popular cultural products, are goods designed by cultural industry for consumers. One distinctive intrinsic feature of popular products is that its form is highly standardized. Because of standardization in its form, Adorno argues, popular products have no significant aesthetic function but mainly socio-psychological functions.

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[56] See the article "The Biggest Musical Flops Of 2016" in the Forbes online magazine. https://www.forbes.com/sites/hughmcintyre/2016/12/29/the-biggest-musical-flops-of-2016

[57] For a similar argument against popularity, see Aaron Smuts, "Popular Art," in *The Continuum Companion to Aesthetics*, ed. Anna Christina Ribeiro (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2012), 215-27.

[58] For other possible essentialist accounts of popular art, see Gans, *Popular Culture and High Culture: An Analysis and Evaluation of Taste*, 9-15; Henry Jenkins, Tara McPherson, and Jane Shattuc., "Defining Popular Culture," in *Hop on Pop : The Politics and Pleasures of Popular Culture*, ed. Henry Jenkins, Tara McPherson, and Shattuc. Durham (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002). On the other hand, Shusterman thinks that a firm distinction between high art and popular art cannot be philosophically defined and justified. Richard Shusterman, "Performing Live: Aesthetic Alternatives for the Ends of Art," (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), xii.

[59] Other than "popular culture" (or popular art), Adorno also uses the term "mass culture." There are some similarities between his analyses of the two concepts. Here, I will focus on popular art and provide a review of a functional definition of popular art based on Adorno, "On Popular Music," 17-48; Adorno and Horkheimer, "The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception," 120-67; Robert W. Witkin, *Adorno on Popular Culture*

The psychological function is to produce emotional effects, specifically sentimental feelings, and produce relaxation and gratification as entertainment for consumers. The social function is to make economic profits, reduce social resistance, and to be politically manipulative for unsuspecting audiences. In short, works of popular art, in Adorno's view, are designed to be standardized entertainment and industry products for the sake of catering for audiences and impeding their development of becoming autonomous, critical individuals. Therefore, popular art in general is detrimental to social improvement and political reformation.

Adorno uses popular music as an example. For particular cases, he often refers to popular Jazz songs at his time, such as Peter DeRose's *Deep Purple*.[60] According to Adorno, popular music is designed to be a standardized consumer product which has no artistic value, and thus it is sharply different from serious, high music such as Beethoven's symphonies. Serious music has more complex, difficult, and refined formal structure and its challenging aesthetic features help audiences acquire more autonomous, resistant cognitive capacities. On the other hand, popular

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(London: Routledge, 2003), Chapter 1, 2, 7.

[60] Adorno, "On Popular Music," 35. For a recording of the song, see: https://youtu.be/GCJ0KwY5-xk.

music belongs to cultural industry instead of production of genuine art. Its formal structure is standardized, formulaic, so it lacks genuine aesthetic value. Its goal is only to entertain or amuse listeners by producing some immediate affective responses.

Another traditional functional definition of popular art could be formulated based on Collingwood's discussion.[61] Collingwood argues that popular songs, fantasy novels, or dance-music are only amusement or entertainment and thereby at best works of "craft." And crafts are not works of art proper but "art falsely so called."[62] Collingwood thinks that a craft is designed to achieve a definite end and the process of making a craft is predictable and formulaic. For popular art as entertainment, its function is to achieve the definite end of arousing or stimulating a kind of emotion which is enjoyable for audiences without significant practical consequences in the affairs of everyday lives.

According to Collingwood, the craft-production always involves i) a distinction between means and ends, ii) a distinction between planning and execution, iii) a distinction between raw material and finished product, iv) a distinction between form and matter.[63] All of these distinctions are closely interwoven. A craftsperson is an individual who possesses mastery of the skills required to make an explicit plan in advance and rightly execute it thereafter. This process also implies that the craftsperson will take some raw materials and organize them into a more mature product. Making popular art or entertainment is like a craftsperson making a chair out of different kinds of raw material. The process of making popular art also involves finding suitable means and using raw material to arouse a certain typical kind of emotion, such as laughter in a sitcom, sadness in a romantic film, et cetera.

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[61] Despite using Collingwood's view of popular art here, I am not wedded to his evaluations. For the question of to what extent I adopt Collingwood's aesthetics in this project, see section 3.1.
[62] Collingwood, "Art and the Machine," 291-304; "Magic," 195-234.
[63] *The Principles of Art*, Chapter 2-4.

In contrast, art proper is designed to be highly expressive instead of merely stimulating emotion. For the sake of expression, an artist creates an artwork in a process of trial-and-error without having a pre-determined definite end. For instance, in the making of good poetry, Collingwood suggests, there is no definite end before writing, since a poet may not have an exact idea of what she is going to express before she actually tries out the expression. Furthermore, those distinctions between the means and ends, between raw material and finished product cannot be clearly identified in production of good poetry. According to Collingwood, since art proper aims to be highly expressive instead of merely stimulating emotion, it is aesthetically more valuable and higher than popular art.

Adorno's distinction between economic products and artworks and Collingwood's distinction between craft and genuine art can be both traced as far back as Kant. Kant argues that craft or handicraft is a kind of labor with a definite purpose that is not agreeable and valuable in itself but only valuable in its effect.[64] In contrast, fine art is created without a determinate purpose and its creative process involves the free play of imagination and understanding which is valuable and pleasurable in itself. Though Kant does not address the issue of popular art, his account of craft paves the way for critics and philosophers to criticize popular works as lacking artistic or aesthetic value, thereby being at best cultural goods, crafts, or artifacts instead of genuine artworks.

However, there are many difficulties in this functional approach to popular art. First, not only popular artworks but also high artworks can be products or goods for consuming or making economic profits, but high artworks do not thus become merely cultural products without artistic value. No doubt Jane Austen's novels were profitable products for her publisher at that time, but this would not seem to undermine the artistic value in her artworks. Therefore, the feature of profit-making is not sufficient for identifying popular art or distinguishing it from high art. One might try to improve upon this functional account by adding a condition that popular artworks are works specifically designed for making profits. However, plausible counterexamples can be found. For instance, when Mozart was commissioned to compose *The Requiem* in D minor, K. 626, he might mainly have intended to make money by his production of art. But it would not imply that his work is less aesthetically valuable. And we tend to view Mozart's work as high art instead of popular art. The point is that the aesthetic value of an artwork can coincide with its economic end, and the intention of making profits can also coincide with the intention of making good artworks. Therefore, defining popular art by the designed function of making economic profits is not defensible.

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[64] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), § 47.

Second, Adorno thinks that popular art has the social function of reducing social resistance and preventing social improvement or reform. However, this account is also problematic. Sometimes popular art, rather than high art, can be a better means for social improvement. For instance, Collingwood would disagree with Adorno here. Collingwood points out that high art is sometimes considered amoral or even immoral because it aims to express emotions without selection. It not only expresses emotions that are generally considered healthy and positive but also expresses emotions that may be unpleasant or even harmful for the urgent needs of the general public. Collingwood mentions that T. S. Eliot's poetry was sometimes criticized for the undesirability of the emotions it expressed at his time.[65] On the other hand, Collingwood would suggest that some popular artifacts can be considered as “magic,” and they serve as better means of energizing people and of social improvement than works of high art.[66] Moreover, some contemporary cultural theorists and philosophers also propose that some works of popular culture or art can be potentially helpful for social resistance or improvement, though they take a different approach. Specifically, they argue that works of popular culture or art can be helpful for resisting dominant ideologies or stereotypes, such as those of class, race, or gender.[67]

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[65] Collingwood mentions that T. S. Eliot is sometimes reproved by his contemporaries for freely expressing how it feels to live in a society with decaying civilization. In this way, Eliot is not selecting a particular emotion that is suitable for energizing people or trying to improve the situation of his society by creating certain exhortation or percept. See Collingwood, "Magic," 229.

[66] Ibid., 230.

The other functional account of popular art, suggested both by Adorno and Collingwood, is that popular artworks are designed to induce emotional effects and entertain general audiences. However, this focus on emotional elements of artworks may not be satisfactory. First, not all popular artworks will involve strong emotional arousal. For instance, some popular crime fiction or mystery fiction may not aim to induce strong emotion but more to create intellectual puzzles for audiences. Moreover, high art can also be designed to entertain. Many of Shakespeare's plays can be seen as being designed to entertain the audiences of his time. Therefore, the designed function of entertaining people is not sufficient for characterizing popular art or distinguishing it from high art.

Another account proposed by Collingwood is that popular art is merely craft. However, if we consider how a good novel, such as Dostoevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov*, is generally to be finished, then we can see that the process of writing would involve the craft-making process Collingwood describes, such as those distinctions between planning and execution, or between raw material and finished product. Yet this novel is not merely a work of craft. It is also not a work of popular art. Similarly, a large-scale Rembrandt's painting would also involve the craft-making process, but it would not thus be less aesthetically valuable just because Rembrandt set up a determinate goal and specific plans before he drew. It seems that creations of most artworks will involve the kind of process of making craft which Collingwood describes.[68] Therefore, Collingwood's account is also not useful for explaining popular art or drawing the borderline between popular and high art.

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[67] See Sheryl Tuttle Ross, "(500) Days of Summer: A Postmodern Romantic Comedy," *Aesthetics and Gender: special Issue of The Polish Journal of Aesthetics* (2016): 155-75; Janell Hobson, "Venus in the Dark : Blackness and Beauty in Popular Culture," (New York: Routledge, 2005); Deborah Knight, "Aesthetics and Cultural Studies," in *The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics*, ed. Jerrold Levinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 788-89.

Adorno and Collingwood's accounts both focus on some intrinsic features such as emotional elements or formal structures in popular works. They are also author-centered accounts since they involve explanations that those functions are designed in certain ways by cultural industry or a craftsperson for certain purposes. However, difficulties with their approach to popular art have made critics think that no intrinsic or author-centered account of popular art can be found and that the distinction between popular art and high art is only accidentally marked by an extrinsic class distinction in society. For example, Novitz has argued that it would be futile to identify popular art by looking at those intrinsic features or designed functions in artworks because there is no formal or structural basis for the distinction between popular and high art.

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[68] H. O. Mounce makes a similar criticism of Collingwood's distinction between craft and art. See H. O. Mounce, "Art and Craft," *The British Journal of Aesthetics* 31, no. 3 (1991). For a Collingwoodian reply, see Richard T. Allen, "Mounce and Collingwood on Art and Craft," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 33, no. 2 (1993).

Rather, he argues that the distinction is grounded in a class distinction between different groups of audiences or consumers.[69] Specifically, in his view, something becomes popular art not by virtue of certain functions or intrinsic features but by virtue of the accidental outcome that it is consumed and enjoyed by common people or general audiences instead of erudite elites. This kind of approach Novitz takes can been called the social reductionist approach.

The social reductionist approach has several serious problems.[70] First, artistic tastes may not perfectly fit in with social classes. People with high income or power may not prefer high art. People with low income may also be able to appreciate and enjoy high art such as classical music. Furthermore, it is simplistic to divide all societies into two social classes whose tastes correspond to the distinction between popular and high art.

Second, if there were no intrinsic difference between high art and low art, it would be impossible for members of a certain group or class to identify the "right" objects for their group or class. As Carroll points out, we need some non-arbitrary reasons or methods for elites and general audiences to pick up the right objects that properly belong to their class.[71] Otherwise, if the two categories of popular art and high art were defined as anything often consumed by general audiences and elites respectively, some artworks such as classical music would likely be included into both categories. Then the distinction between the two categories is not informative.[72]

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[69] David Novitz, "Ways of Artmaking: The High and the Popular in Art," ibid.29, no. 3 (1989): 213-29; *The Boundaries of Art*, Chapter 2; "Aesthetics of Popular Art," 743-47. Another socially accidental approach can be found in Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction : A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); *The Field of Cultural Production* (Columbia University Press, 1994).

[70] For more criticisms of the reductionist approach, see Carroll, *A Philosophy of Mass Art*, Chapter 3; Cohen, "High and Low Thinking About High and Low Art," 151-56; "High and Low Art, and High and Low Audiences," 137-43; Irwin, "Philosophy as/and/of Popular Culture," 41-63; Smuts, "Popular Art," 215-27; R. A. Berman, "Popular Culture and Populist Culture," *Télos* 1991, no. 87 (1991): 59-70.

[71] One possible identifying method could be found in Andrew S. Winston and Gerald C. Cupchik's psychological study. They discover that naïve viewers prefer paintings of popular art and explain their preferences in terms of subjective emotional responses (e.g. "makes me happier"), intelligibility, and gratification. On the other hand,

Perhaps social reductionists could claim that works of popular art should not be defined as whatever is consumed by general audiences but as something that is statistically consumed more by the class of lower income people than by elites. So, they could suggest that classical music is high art at a given time because more educated elites than general audiences consume classical music at that time. However, this claim is also questionable because in the art market nowadays, the number of general audiences consuming a work of high art, such as a recording of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, may likely be much more than the number of elites consuming it. Therefore, without some intrinsic differences, it would be hard to categorize the right artworks into the right social classes.

## 1.5 Why Mass Art?

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experienced viewers prefer paintings of high art and explain the preferences by emphasizing the complex, dynamic structural properties of the artworks. See Andrew S. Winston and Gerald C. Cupchik, "The Evaluation of High Art and Popular Art by Naive and Experienced Viewers," *Visual Arts Research* 18, no. 1 (1992). However, this method tends to appeal to different audiences' tastes and their abilities to appreciate some intrinsic features of popular and high artworks. Therefore, the social reductionist cannot really adopt this method. Otherwise, a definition based on this would be circular. See Ted Cohen's point mentioned in the following section.

[72] Carroll, *A Philosophy of Mass Art*, 176-80; Smuts, "Popular Art," 218-19.

If neither the functional-intrinsic approach nor the social reductionist approach is successful, we have reached an impasse here. One of the reasons is that popular art is a misleading label. Its "popular" nature implies an accidental feature and thus leads to a version of social reductionism. Since the social reductionist approach has not been successfully defended, aestheticians still aim to provide intrinsic or author-centered accounts to explain why a certain work promise popularity. But this latter approach has also been questioned.

As Ted Cohen points out, appealing to audiences when defining popular art or high art would easily lead to circularity.[73] Popular art is often a label people use to account for some socially accidental features of artworks, so popular art is low because low audiences like it. However, if we ask what makes the audiences low, we also tend to appeal to their low tastes. And then we would appeal to how they fail to appreciate some formal features of high artworks in order to explain their low tastes. In my view, this kind of circularity can be due to the fact that when people use the concept of popular art, they refer to the feature of popularity in some contexts but also refer to intrinsic features of artworks in other contexts. Yet we do not have any clear criterion for properly using the concept in the right context. Therefore, it is better to reject the misleading label "popular art."

Another important reason for rejecting “popular art” is that this concept does not indicate the feature of using mass reproduction and communication technology in producing the kind of art consumed by mass audiences. As suggested by Walter Benjamin, art in the age of mechanical reproduction is different from traditional art because it is produced by mass technology of reproduction for mass consumption.[74] Furthermore, this new kind of technology changes the nature of the art that is produced thereby. For Benjamin, a traditional artwork such as a painting, a theatrical performance, or a musical performance absent the use of mechanical reproduction is often considered a unique artwork because it has an aura, a unique aesthetic presence which makes an artwork one of a kind. On the other hand, film and photography involves the use of mechanical reproduction and their copies are often mass reproduced for virtually identical consumption. Mass audiences can appreciate the same film through different copies at the same time.

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[73] Cohen, "High and Low Art, and High and Low Audiences," 142.

Popular art existed long before the inventing of mass technologies and many popular artworks are designed and produced without the use of the technology of mechanical reproduction. Either a kitsch painting or a Hollywood film can be a work of popular art. Moreover, a film can be produced by mass technology without being popular. Therefore, if we focus on the concept “popular art,” we would fail to explain how mass technology plays an important role in shaping the nature of the art in the age of mass production.

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[74] Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," 217-52.

For these reasons, I suggest that we should analyze the concept “mass art” instead of “popular art” if we would like to draw a more precise distinction and better understand how mass technology transforms art in our time, where mass media become the central media by which artworks are produced and distributed. Popular art is too misleading and ambiguous to be defined. Mass art can be a better topic for contemporary aestheticians and philosophers. As Aaron Smuts also points out, mass art is a more precise concept than popular art.

As argued by William Irwin and Cohen, high art is also an ambiguous label.[75] As with popular art, people sometimes think that high art becomes high by an extrinsic feature such as social recognition through the test of time, so, it is not very surprising that many artworks we think of as high art was once popular or low art.[76] But we also tend to explain why something is high art by appealing to people's tastes and how they appreciate artistic features in artworks. Therefore, there is no clear criterion for properly using this label to sort out artworks. Given this fact, I suggest that we should also replace “high art” with “avant-garde art.” Then a more precise and illumining contrast can be drawn between mass art and avant-garde art, compared to the distinction between popular and high art.[77]

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[75] Cohen, "High and Low Thinking About High and Low Art," 140-42; "High and Low Art, and High and Low Audiences," 155; Irwin, "Philosophy as/and/of Popular Culture," 41-43.

[76] "Philosophy as/and/of Popular Culture," 42.

[77] In this, I am following Carroll who makes the suggestion that we should focus on the contrast between mass art and avant-garde art. See Carroll, *A Philosophy of Mass Art*, Chapter 3. A similar suggestion can be found in Smuts, "Popular Art," 215-27.

Certainly, the two categories “mass art” and “avant-garde art” do not exhaust all different kinds of contemporary artworks. For instance, some works of cinematic art produced by Hollywood may be neither mass art nor avant-garde art.[78] However, mass and avant-garde art are still useful concepts. We can more precisely identify the two categories by offering some essentialist account such as an author-centered functional account. For instance, artworks do not usually become avant-garde through the test of time, but they are created as works of the avant-garde. They are designed by artists in a challenging, experimental, unorthodox way in relation to their cultural-historical contexts. And they are challenging because they usually have certain unusual, non-standardized formal structures. We can also adopt a similar approach to mass art.

Along with avant-garde art, mass art does not become mass art through time but is designed to be or produced as mass art. For a work of mass art, there are at least a few non-accidental, essentialist features we can identify. First, a mass artwork is produced by mass reproduction or distribution technology. Second, based on the contrast between mass and avant-garde art, we can suggest that mass art tends to be created in a less challenging way with some readily-understandable structural features. This feature is closely related to the feature of mass technology. Since a mass artwork is produced and distributed by mass technology, it tends to reach a large number of audiences across different cultures and nations. Therefore, a mass artwork would need to be designed for mass appeal. It aims to be readily understandable for general audiences without challenging them. By identifying these two essential features of mass art, we can avoid the social reductionist tendency and the intrinsic/extrinsic impasse arising from the discussion of popular art.

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[78] A prima facie example which is neither mass art nor avant-garde art could be Stanley Kubrick’s *2001: A Space Odyssey*. The film is famous for its ambiguity and obscurity, so it is not designed to be easily understood by general audiences. However, it is also not deliberately designed to challenge audiences or question pre-established norms of filmmaking. In an interview by Joseph Gelmis, Kubrick said he did not deliberately strive for ambiguity, but this ambiguity was simply an inevitable outcome of making the film nonverbal because his main goal was to avoid "intellectual verbalization." See Joseph Gelmis, *The Film Director as Superstar* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1970), 293-300. For an online version, see http://www.visual-memory.co.uk/amk/doc/0069.html. Some more recent examples could be Ridley Scott’s *Blade Runner* and Quentin Tarantino’s films such as *Pulp Fiction* or *Kill Bill.*

However, because mass art has an antithetical relation with avant-garde art, we would tend to characterize mass art as being "easier" for consumption or “simpler” than avant-garde art. Therefore, regarding less challenging and less complex features of mass art, a possible criticism similar to the one raised in popular art should be answered. Can there be mass “art?” Can any works of mass art be genuine artworks? Or, is it the case that mass “art” is an individual “art” that is falsely so called?

## 1.6 Mass “Art” or Mass “Culture?”

Dwight MacDonald famously argues that TV shows, films, photos, or novels designed for mass audiences are at best mass cultural products or economic goods but never artworks. Hence, MacDonald uses the label mass “culture" to categorize those works designed for mass audiences and mass consumption. In the article "A Theory of Mass Culture," he argues that those mass cultural products tend to lower the taste to "that of least sensitive and most ignorant" because mass culture is designed for consumption by as many consumers as possible.[79] For him, mass culture, in contrast to high art, is an industrial product that mainly serves an economic purpose.[80] Thus, mass culture is not art. Rather, it is simply created as a kind of commodity for the masses.

MacDonald's criticism of mass art is not sound. In his view, mass-produced products cannot be genuine artworks because they appeal to the lowest, most rudimentary tastes. However, he does not sufficiently explain why *all* mass cultural products appeal to the lowest tastes and why all of them lack artistic value. For instance, some Alfred Hitchcock's films such as *North by Northwest* or *Psycho* are designed for mass consumption and thus would be mass cultural products in MacDonald's sense. Yet they do not only appeal to the lowest tastes or lack any artistic value. Hitchcock's films such as *Psycho* are often praised as highly valuable works of cinematic art.[81]

Moreover, MacDonald contends that all mass-produced items are merely industrial products for economic profits, so they are not artworks. This criticism resembles Adorno's criticism of popular art. Therefore, the response to Adorno, as discussed earlier, can be applied: the aesthetic or artistic value of a work can coincide with its commercial or economic end. Even if mass-produced products are commercial goods for profits, it does not imply that they cannot be genuine artworks at the same time. Similarly, to disqualify mass art as art by drawing a sharp line between art and entertainment, or art and craft, would not be successful. As shown in the earlier discussion, many works of high or fine art are designed for entertainment or can be viewed as works of craft.

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[79] Dwight Macdonald, "A Theory of Mass Culture," *Diogenes* 1, no. 3 (1953): 14.
[80] Ibid.
[81] See reviews of *Psycho* on the "Rotten Tomatoes."

Another possible criticism is that mass art, compared to avant-garde art or good art, is relatively easy to understand and less challenging for audiences, so it is art that is falsely so called.[82] However, accepting the reasoning that easy art cannot be genuine art comes with a hefty cost. It implies that, for instance, Adolph Bouguereau's paintings are not artworks. Bouguereau's paintings often depict pretty little boys and girls with innocent appearances and they are considered easy to understand because of their content and the style of realism.[83] However, to argue that they thus lack any artistic value is problematic.[84] Bouguereau's paintings are considered works of academic art, one of the categories of fine art, and they are displayed in institutions like the Musée d'Orsay. Most of Bouguereau's paintings give evidence of his great artistic techniques. Moreover, even if it could be argued that those paintings are not works of good art, it does not imply that they are not works of art at all, since art should not only contain good art or avant-garde art.

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[82] Adorno and Horkheimer, "The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception," 120-67; Greenberg, "Avant-Garde and Kitsch," 34-49.

[83] For an extensive gallery of Bouguereau's paintings, see Wikimedia Commons: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/William-Adolphe_Bouguereau

[84] Karsten Harries criticizes Bouguereau’s paintings as aesthetically unsatisfactory. See Karsten Harries, *The Meaning of Modern Art* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1979), 74-82. A strong reply was made by Robert C. Solomon. See Robert C. Solomon, "On Kitsch and Sentimentality," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 49, no. 1 (1991): 1-14.

Some more recent examples also show why less challenging art can qualify as art, at least in a broad sense. Steven Spielberg's films are usually easier to understand for general audiences, compared to avant-garde films. However, many of his films such as *The Color Purple*, *Amistad*, *or Schindler's List* are produced with innovative artistic techniques.[85] His works were also displayed in institutions like the Museum of the Moving Image.[86] Many of Spielberg's commercial films which are easy to understand for mass audiences can also be considered major works of cinematic art. Similarly, some video games designed for mass consumption have also received recognition in the art world. They might be candidates for art and mass art. For instance, the Museum of Modern Art has selected some video games such as *Pac-Man* and *SimCity 2000* as part of its permanent collection and exhibited them in order to recognize their good designs and challenge the common conceptions of art.[87]

Based on the above discussion, we can suggest that none of the general features of mass art disqualifies it as art. The feature of easy consumption does not imply it is not art. The feature of mass technology also does not disqualify mass art as art, since avant-garde films or art-house films also involve the use of mass technology. Therefore, it would be futile to suggest that a particular object is not genuinely art because it belongs to the general category of mass art or mass-produced products. Rather, it would be better to look at each particular case and see if a certain object qualifies as art or not.

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[85] For a review of Spielberg's innovative film techniques, see http://www.lavideofilmmaker.com/filmmaking/steven-spielberg-film-techniques.html

[86] http://www.movingimage.us/programs/2017/06/03/detail/see-it-big-spielberg-summer

[87] Antonelli, Paola, "Why I brought Pac-Man to MoMA". TED (2013); Stephanie Milot, "MoMA Exhibit Showcases Video Games as Modern Art," *PC Magazine* (March 2, 2013).

Therefore, instead of trying to find out the general conditions of being art and the disqualifying features of mass art which do not meet those conditions, we can adopt a non-definitional method of identification for judging particular cases. As shown previously, two methods are available in this approach: Carroll's identifying narrative and Gaut's cluster account. These two methods can be used to determine whether a particular work of mass art is a genuine artwork, without offering general or essential conditions of art as such. For instance, most Disney animations or George R. R. Martin's novels are easy to understand for general audiences, and some of them may be mass-produced mainly for economic profits. However, if we adopt Gaut's cluster account, we could suggest that those works may still possess artistically valuable features. The Disney animation *WALL-E* is highly emotionally expressive, has creative imagination, and it is produced by a high degree of technique and skill. Martin's series of epic fantasy novels *A Song of Ice and Fire* are formally complex and coherent, exhibiting his individual point of view, involving creative imagination, and are also very well written. Hence, there are some reasons for qualifying these mass-produced products as artworks, even without a definition of art.

Another reason can be given to support the idea that at least some mass cultural products or artifacts should be considered genuine artworks. Stecker points out the social fact that the contemporary concept of art is becoming more and more "democratic," compared to previous limited understandings of art merely as good art or fine art which were common from the 18th century to mid-20th century. According to Stecker, artistic activities nowadays are considered common to all human cultures and beings, instead of being limited to genius, and they spread throughout society. As a result, people accept the multiplication of art-forms and have broadened the scope of things capable of achieving art status.[88] Based on this idea, it is not controversial to give art status to the kind of art designed for general audiences in mass society, even if this kind of art is easier for consumption than avant-garde art.

Given the reasons above, I adopt a democratic approach to the art status of mass art in this project. Specifically, I endorse the view that nowadays at least some mass-produced cultural products or artifacts should qualify as art. Hence, mass “art” can be and should be included among different subcategories of “art.” It is legitimate to discuss mass “art.”

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[88] Stecker, *Artworks: Meaning, Definition, Value*, 17.

# Chapter 2 Mass Technology, Mass Appeal, and Emotion in Mass Art

## 2.1 Carroll's Definition of Mass Art

A good starting point for analyzing the concept of mass art is to look at Noël Carroll's definition of mass art. Carroll is the first philosopher who systematically discusses "mass art" in the analytic philosophy of art. He rejects the idea that mass-produced artifacts cannot be genuine artworks, and defends the art status of mass art.[89] Furthermore, his definition grasps the two important features of mass art: the use of mass technology and mass appeal.

This chapter will mainly contain two parts. The first part gives an overview of Carroll's definition of mass art by introducing what I call his "technological-ontological" condition and the "accessibility" condition. I will briefly discuss the technological-ontological condition, but will give a more detailed conceptual analysis in Chapter 5. The second part of this chapter (sections 2.3-2.8) will focus on problems with accessibility and emotion in mass art.

In his 1998 book, *A Philosophy of Mass Art*, and several related articles afterward, Carroll provides comprehensive discussions of philosophical issues of mass art.[90] Here, I focus on his definition of mass art. The definition is mainly classificatory because he thinks that mass art should be defined in descriptive terms independent of any evaluative implications. In other words, we should not condemn or praise mass art in general by its definition.

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[89] Carroll criticizes the traditional tendency to treat mass art as merely a cultural product or non-art. Specifically, he rejects four main kinds of arguments against mass art as art: the massification argument, the passivity argument, the formula argument, and the freedom argument. See Carroll, *A Philosophy of Mass Art*, Chapter 1.

[90] Those discussions include his critical review of past attempts to define mass art, his technical definition of mass art, his view of the relationship between mass art and emotion, and the moral implications of mass art. Those related books and articles include: ibid.; "Mass Art: The Debate Continues," *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 35, no. 3 (2001); "Mass Art as Art: A Response to John Fisher," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 62, no. 1 (2004); "On Some Affective Relations between Audiences and the Characters in Popular Fictions," in *Empathy: Philosophical and*

Carroll then gives an “essential” definition of mass art with three necessary conditions that are jointly sufficient:

> x is a mass artwork if and only if 1. x is a multiple instance or type artwork, 2. produced and distributed by mass technology, 3. which artwork is intentionally designed to gravitate in its structural choices (for example, its narrative forms, symbolism, intended affect, and even its content) toward those choices that promise accessibility with minimum effort, virtually on first contact, for the largest number of untutored (or relatively untutored) audiences.[91]

This definition allows us to identify mass artworks by their essential properties. Carroll also maintains that these essential properties are opposed to "socially adventitious" properties, which are used to characterize mass art by social reductionists.[92] The first condition specifies the art-status of mass art and the ontology of it. The second condition indicates that mass art emerges from the rise of mass information technology, such as the printing press, sound recordings, and motion pictures. The third condition suggests that accessibility (the ease of consumption) is a distinctive designed function of mass art.[93]

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*Psychological Perspectives*, ed. Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie (Oxford University Press, 2011); "The Ontology of Mass Art," in *Minerva's Night Out: Philosophy, Pop Culture, and Moving Pictures* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013); "The Ties That Bind," in *Minerva's Night Out: Philosophy, Pop Culture, and Moving Pictures* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).

[91] *A Philosophy of Mass Art*, 196.

[92] Ibid., 185. Also see my discussion of social reductionism in Chapter 1.

[93] Some might question why the feature of accessibility is intrinsic to artworks since it could also be an audience-dependent feature. In my understanding, Carroll thinks that accessibility can be basically defined in terms of some general, usually natural and hardwired, structure of human cognition. For instance, he argues that some type

Carroll intends to develop his theory of mass art to show how previous understandings of mass art or artifacts are more or less erroneous. For instance, Clement Greenberg criticizes mass-produced artifacts as ersatz art or pseudo art.[94] Carroll rejects this kind of criticism of mass art as non-art, and emphasizes that a work of mass art can possess genuinely artistic properties.[95]

There is a more important element in the first condition. Carroll proposes an ontological requirement that mass art is a multiple instance or type art. This ontological condition is interwoven with his second condition. In the second condition, by "mass technology" Carroll means that they are "technologies capable of delivering multiple ... tokens of mass artworks to widely disparate reception points."[96] For instance, he considers the printing press as the first mass technology since it can easily reproduce different copies of one literary work in a mass

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of pictorial representation is natural and easy to consume for every human being among different cultures. He also argues that the question/answer narrative structure utilizes a kind of natural logic of human cognition. In this sense, accessibility does not depend on cultural associations. See ibid., 193-94. Based on Carroll's discussion of accessibility, I think he would suggest that we can look at some structural features internal to artworks to see if artworks are accessible or not. It could be said that Carroll has a very clear-cut distinction between intrinsic/structural and extrinsic/relational properties. Certainly, this adoption of the clear-cut distinction may be questionable, but since my purpose here is not to argue for or against any account of what constitutes intrinsic or extrinsic properties, I will simply follow Carroll's relatively naive conception of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction in order to focus on clarifying and examining his definition of mass art.

[94] Greenberg, "Avant-Garde and Kitsch," 34-49.

[95] See Carroll, *A Philosophy of Mass Art*, Chapter 1; "Mass Art as Art: A Response to John Fisher," 61-65. Carroll distinguishes mass artworks from what he calls "mass cultural production." For instance, some mass media advertisements, network news programs, and game shows may be mass cultural productions instead of mass artworks. In this way, Carroll admits that there are many mass media products which are not mass artworks because they are not "artworks" at all. This is why Carroll thinks that John Fisher's criticisms of his definition of mass art are not legitimate. Fisher criticizes Carroll's first condition of mass art as too liberal because it may include some mass media advertisements, quiz shows, televangelism, or talk shows as mass art, which he thinks that they are not. But since Carroll distinguishes mass artworks from mass cultural production, he only needs to reemphasize that there are many mass media products which are not mass artworks because they are not "artworks" at all, such as Fisher's examples of Denver's Dealin' Doug's Auto Emporium advertisements and the talk show *Live! With Regis and Kelly*. See John Fisher, "On Carroll's Enfranchisement of Mass Art as Art," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 62, no. 1 (2004): 58; Carroll, "Mass Art as Art: A Response to John Fisher," 62-63.

[96] *A Philosophy of Mass Art*, 188.

scale and deliver them to different groups of people. Through the use of mass technology, the same mass artwork can be presented to different people in different regions simultaneously. It implies that mass artwork is a multiple instance art, as stated in the first condition, and its tokens delivered to disparate points are more or less aesthetically identical.

By regarding mass artwork as a certain kind of multiple instance artwork produced by mass technology, the first two conditions stipulate the ontological status of mass art. To be a candidate for mass art, the work has to be multiply realizable without significant aesthetic variations. It also has to be created through mass art-forms, such as photography, television programs, film, sound recording, broadcasting radio, or the printing press. On the other hand, these ontological conditions exclude some art forms from being mass art-forms and thus an artwork created through those art forms cannot be mass art. For instance, stage performances such as Vaudeville in Carroll's view cannot be mass art, since they could only be performed before an audience of limited size in one theater at a certain time.[97]

The third condition states that mass art is intentionally designed to guarantee accessibility for untutored audiences. According to Carroll, this is the condition that distinguishes mass art from other arts that also meet the first two conditions, such as avant-garde films. Avant-garde films are multiple-instance, type artworks but they are designed not for mass consumption; on the contrary, Carroll argues, they are designed to "frustrate mass consumption" and to challenge the masses.[98] One of Carroll's examples of avant-garde art is Cocteau's film *Blood of a Poet*.[99] On the other hand, mass artworks are not designed to be challenging and difficult to be understood. Carroll argues that in order to appeal to enormous audiences across different cultures and societies, mass art must be understood almost on first contact without the need for tutoring. Therefore, mass art implies an ease of comprehension, and this is what Carroll calls the condition of "accessibility." He states:

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[97] Ibid., 187. Carroll is aware of the possibility that a performance of a play can be broadcast through mass media. In this case, Carroll maintains that the broadcasting play is either a mere recording of the original artwork or indeed a new kind of artwork, which can be counted as mass art, created through mass broadcastings if the original play has been edited and revised through the broadcasting.

> According to the accessibility condition, what we refer to as mass art in our culture must be such that it is designed to gravitate in its structural and stylistic choices (and perhaps even in its content) toward articulations that are easily accessible … virtually on first exposure, to mass untutored audiences.[100]

One thing worth noting is that, though he thinks that mass art is relatively easy and accessible, Carroll is not condemning mass art as bad nor does it commit him into any evaluative or normative implications; rather, it just points out the fact that mass art is designed to be easy for comprehension or understanding.

## 2.2 The Technological-Ontological Condition

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[98] Ibid., 189.

[99] Many contemporary art house films can be examples of avant-garde films, such as Terrence Malick's 2011 film *The Tree of Life*. (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0478304/) For a trailer, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WXRYA1dxP_0.

[100] Carroll, *A Philosophy of Mass Art*, 227.

In the first and second condition, Carroll proposes that mass art is “multiple instance art” (or what he also calls “type art”) produced and distributed by a mass technology. I will refer to this as Carroll's "technological-ontological" condition of mass art. The immediate implication of this condition is that if popular artworks are created through some traditional media that are not constituted by a mass technology, those artworks cannot be mass artworks.

For instance, popular musicals or plays can be designed for mass consumption. The musical *We Will Rock You* and other Broadway-style musicals can be said to be designed to appeal to the largest number of untutored spectators, so it will meet the accessibility condition. However, Carroll thinks that these arts should be excluded from the category of mass art. Mass art must be a multiple instance artwork whose tokens can be aesthetically identical and be simultaneously distributed to enormous audiences across social boundaries instead of limited audiences in one playhouse.

As David Novitz points out, mass art is "mass" in two senses for Carroll. Firstly, "mass" means that it is produced and distributed by technologies capable of delivering multiple instances of mass artworks to widely disparate sites, but "mass" also implies that it is designed to be accessible to large number of consuming populations across different social groups.[101] Carroll intends to include both meanings of the term "mass" into his definition of mass art, so the first and second condition exemplifies the idea of mass production and delivery, and the third condition exemplifies the idea of accessibility to mass audiences. Carroll insists that both conditions are necessary for mass art.

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[101] Novitz, "Noël Carroll's Theory of Mass Art," 48.

Along with Carroll, I agree that both senses of "mass" should be taken in to account. Hence, mass art must involve mass technology. However, there remains the different issue of how one understands mass technology. For instance, in response to Carroll's insistence on the technological-ontological condition, Novitz suspects that mass producing and delivering technology does not need to be constitutive in every stage of the production of mass artworks. For Novitz, when a filmmaker, such as Steven Spielberg, starts writing down the plot and some detailed ideas for his next movie, the process of producing a mass artwork begins, but this part of the production of a mass artwork is not made by a mass technology. For this reason, Novitz argues that Carroll's condition is too restricted.

In reply, Carroll maintains that he is only suggesting that mass technology is a necessary feature instead of the only feature in the production of a mass artwork.[102] Therefore, Novitz's criticism misfires. That being said, Novitz's counterexample indicates that critics could raise some important questions about Carroll's technological-ontological condition, since there are different possible understandings of the use of a mass technology in producing art.

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[102] Carroll, *A Philosophy of Mass Art*, 226.

Consider cases of contemporary stage performances. Some of them, such as a contemporary *Swan Lake* ballet performance, could use lots of sound recordings or motion pictures in their production, so it can to some extent be convincingly argued that those constitutive parts of stage performances are multiple instance artworks produced by mass technology. In this way, some musicals or plays can be said to be produced partially by mass technology. However, Carroll would still deny that they are instances of mass art, no matter how accessible they could be. Why?

His reason is that they are not essentially multiple instance artworks that are capable of being reproduced and delivered to different sites simultaneously with aesthetically identical properties. Even if the scripts of a play and some of its settings are always the same, Carroll insists, every performance of a play involves a human interpretation, and interpretation potentially produces some aesthetically relevant new features.

In order to clarify the difference between mass multiple instance artworks and non-mass multiple instance artworks, such as the difference between films and plays, Carroll makes a distinction between templates and interpretations.[103] Carroll calls those artworks capable of being multiply instanced "type" artworks. For instance, both performances of a film and of a play are often regarded as tokens of a type. They can be performed simultaneously in different places and each token is an instance of the type. In this sense, films and plays seem to have a similar ontological status, in contrast to certain paintings and sculptures, which usually can only be token artworks.

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[103] Ibid., 212.

However, Carroll adds that there is one important ontological difference between a film and a play. The difference is that a film-type can be realized by templates that are necessarily tokens, while a play will be performed by interpretations that can potentially become types. A template is something we need for making a token realization from a film-type, while an interpretation is something we need for making a token realization from a play-type. Templates are physical media, usually occupying a certain precise physical space and time. On the other hand, interpretations are not purely physical and they are required for each theatrical performance of a certain play. And interpretations, Carroll argues, can become new types because, aesthetically speaking, each interpretation may potentially produce unique and new artistic properties.

Carroll's insight is that, even if the production of a stage performance involves some use of mass technology, every performance in any given night may potentially produce new aesthetically relevant features. For instance, if by accident, in a stage performance some special effects do not work well or an actor forgets lines on one given night, this small permutation could change the aesthetic nature of the performance as a whole. In contrast, a film will remain aesthetically the same artwork regardless of how many times it has been played or delivered.

The upshot is that, for Carroll a mass artwork must ontologically be a multiple instance artwork capable of being realized by templates. Carroll emphasizes the concept of identical multiple realization and of reproducibility to a greater extent when defining mass art. In consequence, only technologies and art forms which can simultaneously present numerous copied templates of the same type to different viewers matter in the production of mass art. It is because templates can promise reproduced copies to have aesthetically identical properties, while interpretations often produce variation.

Carroll’s ontological condition thus excludes all non-type-template artworks. Would this condition be too restricted? It seems so. Later in Chapter 5, I will discuss this potential problem in detail, and try to find a broader ontological condition of mass art.

## 2.3 Critical Responses to the Accessibility Condition

In the rest of this chapter, I will focus on Carroll's characterization of mass appeal: the accessibility condition. The accessibility condition states that mass art is intentionally designed to guarantee accessibility for the largest number of untutored audiences. First, there is an intentional element in this condition, which states that mass art is intentionally designed to be accessible. In other words, accessibility is an author-centered designed function of mass art.

Although Carroll does not offer a further exposition of the intentional element in his theory of mass art, he does endorse an account of the author's intention which he calls "modest actual intentionalism" in his other writings about art and intention.[104] Carroll rejects traditional, extreme intentionalism, which holds that the meaning of an artwork can be fully determined by the actual intentions of its creator and concedes that the weakness of traditional intentionalism is unavoidable because an artist cannot simply give a work any arbitrary meanings just because he or she intends to do so, regardless of context of the work.[105] Thus, Carroll chooses to adopt a modest view that the artist's actual intentions do not fully determine but at least constrain the meanings of artworks.[106] Any non-authorial meanings of artworks can coexist with authorial meanings as long as the former is compatible with the latter.

This view allows that other non-authorial elements, such as audiences or social context, could take part in determining meanings of an artwork in so far as those parts of meanings do not conflict with authorial meanings. Also, this view allows Carroll to avoid some potential criticisms of the possible failure of the author's intention. For instance, it is conceivable that an artist may intend to create something challenging but fail to achieve this goal. Justine Kingsbury in her review of Carroll's theory suggests a possibility that a director of a James Bond movie may intend to make it an avant-garde artwork but fail. In the end the finished artwork is very accessible to general audiences and can be regarded as mass art.[107] But according to Carroll's definition of mass art, the artwork in this case cannot be mass art since the artist does not intend it to be accessible. Therefore, Kingsbury thinks Carroll’s condition is flawed, since there is an apparent gap between the intended and actual function of the finished work.

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[104] Carroll, "Interpretation and Intention: The Debate between Hypothetical and Actual Intentionalism," *Metaphilosophy* 31, no. 1-2 (2000): 75-95. Carroll thinks that his intentionalist position is more "moderate" because he holds that not all meanings of a certain artwork will be determined by the author's intention; instead, he allows that the meaning of an artwork can co-determined by the author's intention and also by other non-authorial contexts, as long as the latter does not conflict with the former. Moreover, Carroll adopts "actual" intentionalism in the sense that the meaning of an artwork is determined, either fully or partially, by the real, actual intention of the author. In contrast, an alternative view called "hypothetical intentionalism" argues that the meaning of an artwork is determined, either fully or partially, by some hypotheses of the author's intended meanings. For more discussions of these two views, see Gary Iseminger, "Actual Intentionalism Vs. Hypothetical Intentionalism," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 54, no. 4 (1996): 319-26.

[105] This strong claim has been questioned for a long time since Monroe Beardsley and William Wimsatt made their famous criticism. See William K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley, "The Intentional Fallacy," *The Sewanee Review* 54, no. 3 (1946): 468-88.

[106] Carroll, "Interpretation and Intention: The Debate between Hypothetical and Actual Intentionalism," 76.

By adopting modest intentionalism, this problem can be solved. It is possible that the director intends to make it an avant-garde artwork but fails to fully realize it; nevertheless, if some new and unintended meanings arise out of his failure, they may still be compatible with his original intentions. Since accessibility for Carroll is a degree concept, which means that difference in accessibility is always in degree but not in kind, he could suggest that the director's intention of making a James Bond movie challenging will not conflict with the fact that his movie may gain some degree of accessibility from non-authorial sources. Certainly, this possible answer would need more elaboration. But since this criticism of the intentional element can be seen as a more general problem with the intentional fallacy than a problem with mass art, it is actually a relatively minor criticism regarding Carroll's theory of mass art.

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[107] Justine Kingsbury, "A Philosophy of Mass Art," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 81, no. 1 (2003): 135.

Another more serious kind of criticism of Carroll's third condition lies in his account of accessibility. Carroll uses the term “accessibility” to mean the “ease of comprehension or understanding” for audiences. He argues that there are various artistic choices that can be considered more accessible than others. Here, I think that the debate between Carroll and Novitz, one of the most vocal critics of Carroll's theory of mass art, can be a good starting point for examining Carroll's account of accessibility.

Carroll thinks that we can find some general features of accessible artworks through empirical research, such as biological, psychological, or even cultural studies about human nature. For instance, Carroll argues that film and photography are inherently more accessible than other art forms because pictorial representation is naturally more easily understood by human beings than other forms. Pictorial recognition is an innate capacity, which does not require any training in symbol, language, or interpretation. Some of Carroll's other examples of artistic choices that promise accessibility include the point-of-view editing structure used in motion pictures, the question-and-answer format[108] used in literary media, content that can easily excite and provoke basic human desires, and the technique of "fade-out" in movies, all of which have been established through cultural convention.

One problem pointed out by Novitz is that Carroll’s account of accessibility is potentially inconsistent. Based on Carroll's theory, the answer of whether an artwork is accessible, that is, whether it is easily comprehended, is usually relative to audiences' cultural knowledge. For instance, Novitz contends that some of William Shakespeare's plays are accessible to Elizabethan audiences because the vocabulary, the stories, the values, and the ways of talking are not uncommon or idiosyncratic in that place and era. It is for people living in different cultures that it seems to be an artwork difficult to understand. In other words, it is at least possible, and very often likely, that an artwork is accessible for one group of people, but inaccessible to another group of people.

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[108] Carroll defines the question-and-answer format as "encouraging audiences to entertain certain questions that the novels in question then go on to answer." Carroll, *A Philosophy of Mass Art*, 194.

Novitz then argues that this result undermines Carroll's condition because it shows mass art to be a culturally based product that cannot be understood simply "on first contact" by "untutored" audiences. For instance, linguistic skill, Novitz suggests, is also a kind of tutored knowledge and one must be tutored in English in order to understand English TV dramas. Moreover, he argues that most of what we consider as mass art usually requires specific cultural knowledge:

> *L.A. Law*, *Twin Peaks,* and *Casualty* are not works of mass art—not just because they are in English, but also because one has to know, and have learned something about the law, about mental illness, parody, human foibles, and hospitals, in order to understand them.[109]

In reply, Carroll elaborates his idea of accessibility and proposes that the "tutoring" in question is a process that involves "training in specialized background knowledge, including training in deciphering erudite codes, cues, implications, and allusions."[110] Hence, an "untutored" audience is one whose members lack specialized knowledge but can still be fluent in their native languages and have basic cultural knowledge. For example, Carroll argues that audiences do not need any special knowledge, such as professional knowledge about law or mental illness, in order to understand *L.A. Law* or *Twin Peaks*. All the audiences need to have is a natural skill to understand motion pictures and basic cultural knowledge of the English-speaking world.

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[109] Novitz, "Noël Carroll's Theory of Mass Art," 46.

Carroll's explanation answers parts of Novitz's criticisms, but later commentators still question that it is not clear what kind of artwork requires tutoring. For instance, in later exchanges, Novitz questions the status of heavy metal music as mass art, while Carroll insists that it can be. Similarly, John Fisher questions that many examples of rock music such as Jimi Hendrix's songs do not satisfy the accessibility condition.[111] William Irwin also argues that most punk music is not accessible to untutored mass audiences.[112] Here, the underlying question is whether audiences need to be "tutored" in order to understand heavy metal, rock music, or punk. Carroll and his critics disagree.

This disagreement is sometimes arising from Carroll and his critics' different views of understanding a certain artwork.[113] If the composition of a mass artwork is complex, then the views of how we understand it may diverge more widely. For example, there are different, but maybe equally significant, aspects of movies that one can attend to, such as narrative styles, scripts, acting, plots, or cinematography. When Novitz mentions *The Rocky Horror Picture Show* as an example of inaccessible mass art, designed for a limited and special audience, he is primarily referring to its content.[114]

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[110] Carroll, "Mass Art: The Debate Continues," 227.
[111] Fisher, "On Carroll's Enfranchisement of Mass Art as Art," 58.
[112] Irwin, "Philosophy as/and/of Popular Culture," 43-44.

On the other hand, Carroll focuses on the narrative style of this film and tends to regard it as the essential feature of its accessibility. For instance, the way of narrating the story in *The Rocky Horror Picture Show*, he argues, is essentially easy for audiences to follow without special training or thinking. Thus, it is mass art accessible to untutored audiences, though it is distasteful for some.

Kathleen Higgins in her review of Carroll's arguments also points out that Carroll tends to regard narrative as the essential feature of mass art and implicitly tend to restrict the discussion to some paradigm examples which contain narrative forms while ignoring those artworks without narrative forms, such as mass produced designer clothes or accessories.[115] Therefore, Carroll may indeed take the narrative to be the paradigmatic feature of his account of accessibility whiling downplaying other features of art.

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[113] Novitz criticizes: "... Carroll assumes an account of what it is to understand a work of mass art without properly articulating, let alone defending it." David Novitz, "The Difficulty with Difficulty," *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 34, no. 2 (2000): 11.

[114] Noviz states: "... if one does not take pleasure in the celebration of uninhibited sex, the seduction and corruption of Brad and Janet, the gyrations of Frank N. Furter, and the eating of poor Eddie, one has missed the point of *The Rocky Horror Picture Show*. It is not that one has understood it and found it wanting; one simply has not grasped it at all." Ibid.

[115] Kathleen Higgins, "Mass Appeal," *Philosophy and Literature* 23, no. 1 (1999): 200.

Carroll might reply to this kind of criticism by pointing out that his accessibility condition is inclusive, and that it can actually allow different structural features, other than the narrative structure, to play roles in the audience's ease of consumption. Therefore, attacking his focus on narrative art does not really undermine his general, inclusive account of accessibility. This may be true. However, based on the above discussion, I will propose one more serious problem: Carroll's account of accessibility is too "cognitivist" to be satisfactory.

## 2.4 The Limits of Carroll's Accessibility Condition and Emotional Accessibility

Consider Stephen King's horror fiction and Ernest Hemingway's novels. King's fiction is usually well-structured in his narrative styles. He is willing to write a large ensemble of characters and a complex plot. He is also not afraid to try complex narrative styles. For instance, he adopts an epistolary form in *Carrie* by using narratives from different points of view such as letters, news clippings, and magazine articles.[116]

In contrast, Hemingway in some of his greatest novels seems to deliberately avoid complicated narrative structures, as well as complex sentences, and choose relatively linear narrative structures and easy vocabulary. The relationships between characters in his novels are not usually very complicated either. We can observe most of these structural features in *The Old Man and the Sea* or *A Farewell to Arms*.[117] Therefore, can we conclude that Hemingway's works are more accessible than King's works?

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[116] *Carrie* is a 1974 horror fiction written by Stephen King. It tells a story of an unfortunate and bullied high school girl Carrie who uses her supernatural, telekinetic powers to take revenge on people bullying her.

Literary theorists would tend to disagree. They would usually suggest it is the other way around. In other words, they would disagree with Carroll about his narrative-based account of the ease of consumption. But what other approaches can we use to explain different degrees of accessibility between Hemingway's and King's artworks?

One might appeal to their different treatments of human emotions. Since King's works are best known as evoking suspense, fear, or other related emotions in his horror fiction, one could suggest that his works of art are designed to arouse more immediate and automatic emotional responses. On the other hand, one could suggest that Hemingway's works have a more complicated expression of human emotions. To further explain this claim, an in-depth aesthetic analysis of emotion in art is needed. The point I am trying to make here is that accessibility may not mainly depend on our understandings of narrative structures of artworks. By mainly focusing on narrative structures in art, Carroll does not pay enough attention to other possible forms of accessibility.

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[117] *The Old Man and the Sea* is a short novel written by Ernest Hemingway in 1951. The novel depicts an aging fisherman who struggles with a giant marlin. *A Farewell to Arms* is a 1929 novel also written by Hemingway. The novel is about a love affair between an American paramedic and an English nurse during the Italian campaign of World War I.

Carroll might reply to this criticism by saying that the accessibility condition is inclusive enough to account for different structural features other than the narrative structure. However, Carroll's excessive focus on narrative art actually precludes some other explanations of accessibility from being developed, especially for those explanations involving our relatively non-cognitive engagement with mass artworks. His concern with narrative structure may be one of the reasons why he adopts some highly intellectualist and cognitivist conceptions in his explanation of accessibility, since linguistic-laden thinking and reasoning are often required in order to understand the narrative in an art form such as film or fiction.

For Carroll, “accessibility is a cognitive affair.”[118] The concept "understanding" has been constantly adopted in this cognitive sense in his writing. To make an artwork accessible is to make it easy to be “understood” by audiences with minimum effort, virtually on first contact. This is *prima facie* a reasonable claim. However, if we closely examine Carroll's account of "understanding," some confusion arises.

To argue that our appreciation of mass artworks must involve comprehension or understanding seems to suggest cognitive processing of artistic features. This implication is made explicit when Carroll spends a great deal of time discussing the linguistic and rational reaction to a work of mass art, such as detecting the question-and-answer format in mysterious novels, while saying little about our relatively non-cognitive engagement in mass art. One of the main reasons why Carroll tries to show that active intellectual understanding plays an important role in receiving and interpreting mass artworks is that he would like to reject previous theorists such as Greenberg and argue that receiving mass art is not as passive as those theorists suggested. To achieve this goal, Carroll analyzes how audiences need to involve active cognitive processes to understand and follow certain narrative structures of mass artworks. For instance, we need to actively attend to the development of cues and conversations in a detective story in order to unfold the plot.

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[118] Carroll, "Mass Art as Art: A Response to John Fisher," 64.

However, this cognitive and intellectualist tendency in the ease of consumption is not always faithful to our appreciative experiences in some works of mass art. It is not rare that we can successfully engage in or enjoy a foreign film even if we do not totally understand its plot or scripts. In this case, the film can still be accessible to untutored audiences. Moreover, being moved by movie soundtracks, astonished by visual special effects, experiencing emotional contagion, or receiving affective mirror reflexes from actors and actresses, all provide ease of consumption and engagement in a film. Artworks which lack narrative can still be accessible without much involvement of cognition, such as rock music. Musical mass art, especially music with a text, does not usually have a narrative. It is reasonable to suggest that to properly "engage" in a certain mass musical artwork, it does not necessarily require actively cognitive understanding.

Therefore, to focus on the comprehension or understanding in cognitive terms tends to preclude some non-cognitive elements in artworks, such as affective features, from playing an important role in accessibility of mass art. It is true that Carroll intends to provide an inclusive account of accessibility which allows him to take musical artworks into consideration. However, the point is that his explanation of how audiences easily consume a narrative artwork is not compatible with or useful for an explanation of less cognitive-laden, emotional engagement in musical works or non-narrative artistic features.

Moreover, the terminology of the ease of “comprehension” or the ease of “understanding” Carroll uses implies some cognitivist requirement of appreciation of mass art. One could say that using those terms is just a choice of terminology, but it is not as trivial as it seems. For instance, Novitz disagrees with Carroll and argues that heavy metal music is not mass art because large groups of people cannot understand it easily. This objection eventually leads to Novitz's general criticism of Carroll's assumption of what understanding a work of mass art means. Carroll, in reply, tries to suggest that most people understand heavy metal music, but just do not enjoy it. In his defense, he argues that heavy metal music is accessible in terms of the audience's understanding but just *distasteful* to most untutored audiences on first contact. Here, the fundamental disagreement between Novitz and Carroll actually lies in their different conceptions of "understanding" in terms of heavy metal. It could be argued that Carroll tries to extend his account of understanding from narrative art to music, but Novitz disagrees with this extension.

In my view, by defending that heavy metal music is accessible to most people, Carroll intends to argue that most people do "understand" the emotive contour of heavy metal music. It is just that some of them enjoy this "understanding," and others do not, so music for the latter group of people becomes distasteful. If this is the case, to understand heavy metal music does not mainly involve cognitive understanding, such as understanding the cultural-historical reason why some players are wearing makeup, or other performative characteristics, or the lyrics; instead, to "understand" heavy metal music is just to be moved or aroused affectively, such as aroused by an intense drum beat, high volume, strong rhythm, or other affective features in music.

This kind of "understanding" must be very different from the heavily cognitive-laden account of understanding that Carroll discusses previously when talking about the ease of comprehension of a narrative text, since here the subject matters are relatively non-cognitive feelings or affective states induced by music. However, Carroll does not offer further explanation of how this kind of understanding differs from the understanding of narrative mass art and how this new kind of understanding actually works.

Therefore, to better account for this latter sense of "understanding" as well as to avoid possible confusion, I suggest that in this context we should rather talk about “engagement” or specifically “emotional engagement,” which can include relatively less conceptual, less cognitive forms of involvement in artworks.

In turn, we can also call the particular kind of accessibility in emotional engagement "emotional accessibility." Emotional accessibility is a special kind of accessibility and it should be used to characterize our emotional engagement with mass art, especially our engagement with music or other non-representational forms of mass art. Moreover, emotional engagement, even in representational mass art such as films and novels, sometimes plays a more important role than cognitive understanding of mass art.

It is at least possible, if not often the case, that one engages in a film due to its music, sound effects, or visual special effects without properly understanding the narrative in the film. In this case, one could suggest that the film is emotionally accessible but not cognitively accessible to general audiences. On the other hand, is it likely for a film to be accessible in terms of its narrative without being emotionally accessible? It is possible but not generally the case. Carroll himself also admits that prior emotional engagement is usually a precondition of understanding the narrative structure of a mass artwork.

> Indeed, with much mass art ... eliciting the appropriate emotional response from the audience is generally a condition of our comprehending and following the story successfully as it unfolds. For example, if we do not hate certain characters, then the trajectory of a

narrative bent upon punishing them may not only be unsatisfying, but even unintelligible.[119] This explanation shows that emotional accessibility is to some extent more fundamental than accessibility of narrative structure in works of mass art. Therefore, to properly explain accessibility in mass art, it is crucial to take a closer look at emotional accessibility.

## 2.5 Carroll's Account of Emotional Accessibility and Its Problems

Carroll does not explicitly include emotional accessibility in his accessibility condition, but he is aware of the role of emotion in mass art. In a separate chapter, he discusses the relation between emotion and mass art. This discussion could amount to a potential account of emotional accessibility. However, I will provide two counterexamples to show that this potential account cannot mark the distinction between accessibility and inaccessibility.

Carroll distinguishes two kinds of emotion: universal emotions and specialized emotions. Then he argues that mass art that gravitates toward accessibility will tend to elicit universal emotions and their correspondingly generic emotional responses. This description of the interdependent relationship between universal emotions and accessibility could be seen as Carroll's account of emotional accessibility. Emotional accessibility thus consists in artistic features which are designed to elicit universal emotions as much as possible.

For Carroll, universal emotions refer to human emotions elicited by similar antecedent situations in different cultures.[120] For example, sadness elicited by irrevocable loss, generally of a family member, is universal. Fear elicited by the appearance of some dangerous monster is universal. Anger or outrage elicited by some villains who oppress innocent people is universal. On the other hand, Carroll argues that usually avant-garde art, as non-mass art, is emotionally inaccessible because it attempts to elicit specialized emotion instead of universal one. For instance, Jean-Paul Sartre's novel *Nausea* for Carroll is an example of avant-garde art. The novel is designed to reveal the distinctive emotion of existential anxiety or anguish by showing that the protagonist finds objects and the universe meaningless and has a kind of visceral discomfort. This kind of emotion cannot be easily understood in different cultures and it may not be elicited by a general kind of antecedent situation. It is a specialized emotion with special causes and antecedent conditions.

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[119] *A Philosophy of Mass Art*, 249.

However, I think that the distinction between universal emotions and specialized emotions is not very useful to distinguish emotional accessibility from inaccessibility. I will use two examples to illustrate that the relationship between universal emotions and accessibility is not be as necessary as Carroll proposes. Through discussion, I will also suggest that emotional accessibility does not consist in what kind of emotions is revealed but more likely consist in certain different ways in which those emotions are revealed.

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[120] Ibid., 278.

First, consider Yasujirō Ozu's *Tokyo Story*.[121] Sadness caused by the death of the mother in the film is nothing specialized like existential anguish. Those emotional interactions and tensions between family members are also mundane and universal in Carroll's sense, especially common in modern urbanized society. However, those emotions are visually expressed in a distinctive way by Ozu such that they are not very accessible to common mass audiences. Emotions in the film are individualized in depth and are distinguished from other similar emotions of the same general kind. How?

In this film, Ozu uses some distinctive ways to visually express those universal emotions such as sadness. He seldom moves the camera and puts it at a very low height. In transitions between different scenes, he shows static objects instead of a continuity of events. His editing is relatively minimal and expresses another form of slow movement. Sometimes important events in transitions are also neglected and only mentioned later in the plot. All of these visual expressions tend to reveal feelings of weight, heaviness, and unwillingness accompanied by sadness. Therefore, this film does express some universal, non-specialized emotions with common antecedent causes, but also expresses them in a sophisticated and particularized way. Eventually, those emotions are still universal in terms of their antecedent situations. For instance, most audiences can understand sadness caused by a mother's death based on the narrative. However, those universal emotions are not thus accessible because most mass audiences cannot properly engage with emotions revealed in Ozu's visually innovative, sometimes even challenging, artistic expression.

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[121] *Tokyo Story* is a 1953 Japanese drama film directed by Yasujirō Ozu. The story is mainly about an elderly couple who travel from rural areas to Tokyo to visit their grown children. The film depicts different reactions and behaviors of their children in Tokyo. Some are too busy to take care of them, while their widowed daughter-in-law treats them kindly. After the couple returned from Tokyo, the mother becomes seriously ill and passes away. During and after the funeral, family conflicts become more prominent.

Another example is Ingmar Bergman's *Wild Strawberries*.[122] It also deals with some universal emotions, such as an emotion of fear caused by common antecedent conditions such as loneliness and impending death. But Bergman uses several visual expressions to particularize those emotions. One of the most important expressions in this film is his usage of symbolic and metaphorical images, usually presented as dreams or imaginings of the protagonist. For instance, at the beginning of the film, a dream is depicted with clocks, coffins, and empty streets which represent a deeply metaphorical meaning of the character's emotion. This metaphorical scene in visual expression individualizes a universal fear which is caused by a common antecedent situation, that is, loneliness and the sense of impending death, and reveals some special qualities of the emotion. The universal emotions revealed in Bergman's particularized filming technique are not easily engaged with or understood by untutored audiences on first contact. Therefore, in this case universal emotions do not imply emotional accessibility either.

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[122] *Wild Strawberries* is a 1957 Swedish drama film directed by Ingmar Bergman. The film depicts a stubborn, egocentric old man Isak Borg who sets out a long car ride, with his daughter-in-law who does not very much like him, in order to receive an awarded degree in Lund. During the trip, he met several hitchhikers. Those encounters stir Borg's memories and induce nightmares and daydreams that haunt him and eventually change his thinking.

These two examples show that the distinction between universal emotions and specialized emotions is not very useful to mark the distinction between emotional accessibility and inaccessibility. So-called high art and avant-garde art can also tend to elicit universal emotions but they do not thus guarantee accessibility to untutored audiences. Universal emotions expressed in an artwork can bemuse audiences if they are expressed in a distinctive way. Then the object of engagement or understanding in this case is not just an antecedent situation or cause and effect in a narrative, but also the specificity and particularity of what it is like to be in an emotional state. Ozu's and Bergman's films are often highly and richly expressive in this sense, but the kind of emotions they express are usually not something with specialized causes or situations, as Sartre's existentialist novel tends to reveal.

The upshot is that Ozu and Bergman are revealing universal emotions in their works, but it does not follow that the works are necessarily accessible. These examples show that emotional accessibility or inaccessibility is usually not about the kind of emotions revealed but more about the way or the artistic technique in which emotions are revealed. Therefore, to characterize emotional accessibility by universal emotions is not satisfactory.

## 2.6 Emotional Accessibility and Affective Engagement

Another possible account of emotional accessibility could be given based on aestheticians’ discussions of affective engagement in art, including Carroll's discussion, which was made several years after he proposed the definition of mass art.[123] However, I will show that this possible account would also be unsatisfactory because affective engagement does not necessarily indicate emotional accessibility.

The distinction between emotional and affective engagement has been made by contemporary aestheticians. Emotional engagement usually refers to a higher-level emotional processing which involves cognitive states such as beliefs or other propositional attitudes, while affective engagement refers to a lower-level, relatively non-cognitive emotional processing which produces automatic and involuntary responses such as visceral feelings in the audiences. "Emotional contagion," as suggested by Amy Coplan, is often considered to be an example of the latter kind of engagement.[124] This distinction is made based on different kinds of emotion involved in an artwork. For instance, feelings or affects induced by movie soundtracks would be very different from emotions with cognitive elements, such as fear of something dangerous or anger at an unfair situation in a narrative work of art.

Regarding the distinction between emotion and affect, Carroll, along with many cognitivist theorists of emotion, thinks that emotion usually involves cognitive elements.[125] This kind of emotion is distinct from affective states such as moods, feelings, or reflexive affective responses because those affective states can be induced without much involvement of cognitive thoughts, beliefs, desires, or judgments.

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[123] Note that Carroll never explicitly states whether accessibility of mass art can be explained by appealing to affective engagement or not.

[124] See Carroll, "On Some Affective Relations between Audiences and the Characters in Popular Fictions," 180; "The Ties That Bind," 44; Amy Coplan, "Catching Characters' Emotions: Emotional Contagion Responses to Narrative Fiction Film," *Film Studies* 8, no. 1 (2006): 27; Robert Sinnerbrink, *Cinematic Ethics: Exploring Ethical Experience through Film* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 1-24.

One of the most common kinds of affective engagement Carroll discusses is called "affective reflexes."[126] For instance, while walking in a winter's night, something may suddenly pop out of the dark in front of you. You may not even recognize what the object is but still feel scared immediately and show some involuntary reactions, such as being startled or screaming. Alternatively, imagine that you suddenly hear a huge noise in a quiet library and are scared. This kind of reaction does not require any cognitive understanding, judgments, or intentional states. The reaction is like a reflex. We are simply performing involuntary affective responses to outside stimuli.

Carroll thinks that affective reflexes are the automatic, involuntary, visceral feelings or physiological states that could occur completely independently from cognition. Affective reflexes are "cognitive impenetrable."[127] Examples of affective reflexes include muscles flexing, involuntary trembling, screaming, having goose bumps, or sweating, and similar bodily feelings. There are two main ways in which the subject will be aroused to have affective reflexes. First, the arousal can occur by directly encountering some physical stimulus. Second, the arousal can also occur through what Carroll calls "mirror reflexes."[128]

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[125] Carroll, Carroll, "On Some Affective Relations between Audiences and the Characters in Popular Fictions," 162-70; "The Ties That Bind," 162-84.

[126] This view of affective reflexes may resemble the discussion of "affect" in music which can be traced as far back as Kant. In his discussion of music, Kant claims that music can express two kinds of emotion: affects and emotions which are interwoven with thought and reflection. Affects in Kant's view are lower-level emotions that appear immediately without being mediated by higher-level mental processing such as cognition, and thus they are not able to be conceptualized. See Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, trans. Robert B. Louden (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 7:252; *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 5:272.

Mirror reflexes occur through automatic mimicry of other people's facial expressions or physical behaviors. This process does not involve identifying others' beliefs, desires, or imaginations but simply perform reflexive reactions caused by others' observable physiological or physical behaviors. For instance, in everyday experience, when we see other people smiling, we may involuntarily smile even without being aware of this mirroring effect. When we see others performing painful reactions, we tend to reflexively have similar painful feelings, too.

According to Carroll, this process of mirror reflexes could be said to be hard-wired in our biological endowment. As Coplan also points out, there is scientific evidence in psychology and neuroscience supporting mirror reflexes or emotional contagion.[129] Evidence based on neural correlates also support the distinction between mirror reflexes and higher-level emotional processing. For instance, Stephanie Preston and Frans de Waal have proposed that emotional contagion or mirror reflexes involve sub-cortical processes directly from sensory cortices to the thalamus to the amygdale and to physiological response without involving other higher level cortical processes.[130] This evidence also explains why mirror reflexes are fast automatic reactions independent from our cognitive control.

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[127] Noël Carroll, "Art and Mood: Preliminary Notes and Conjectures," *The Monist* 86, no. 4 (2003): 525.
[128] See "On Some Affective Relations between Audiences and the Characters in Popular Fictions." The account of mirror reflexes has also been called "emotional contagion" by other theorists such as Coplan.
[129] Coplan, "Catching Characters' Emotions: Emotional Contagion Responses to Narrative Fiction Film," 28.

Based on Carroll's discussion, we can conclude that to induce mirror reflexes in the audiences in an artwork, an artist needs to adopt some techniques directly causing the audiences to react immediately and reflexively without much cognitive involvement. Therefore, it does not matter if the artwork involves representational content or not. The examples of techniques aiming at producing affective reflexes may include special sound effects such as loud noises, flashes of light, sudden explosions, fast editing or camera movements, or simply having something suddenly show up or pop out. Most of the devices here can be commonly observed in pop music and commercial films.[131] Since engagement in affective reflexes involve reflexive responses without cognitive involvement, this process tends to promise emotional accessibility.

However, inducing affective reflexes or emotional contagion is just one form of inducing affective engagement. Not all forms of affective engagement promise emotional accessibility.

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[130] Stephanie D Preston and Frans B. M. De Waal, "Empathy: Its Ultimate and Proximate Bases," *Behavioral and brain sciences* 25, no. 01 (2002): 1-20.

[131] It is worth noting that, according to Carroll, arousing affective reflexes, though different from arousing emotion, may nevertheless have certain influences in our later, slower, but more sophisticated emotional processing. For instance, arousing affective reflexes may raise the audience's blood pressure, heart rate, and thus increase their attention and make people more alert to emotional features in an artwork. Mirror reflexes can also serve as affective cues for the later understanding of emotion that a fictional character is undergoing. See Carroll, "The Ties That Bind," 56.

For instance, mood-engagement is another form of affective engagement often induced in art. Sometimes it is challenging for audiences to engage in a complicated or rich mood expressed in an artwork.

## 2.7 Carroll's Discussion of Moods

In a 2003 article titled "Art and Mood: Preliminary Notes and Conjectures," Carroll explains how the mood as a kind of affective state can be induced in artworks in a way distinctive from that which is used to induce emotions such as anger and fear. However, as Carroll shows, moods are usually considered to be affective states, but mood-engagement of audiences, despite being a form of affective engagement, is sometimes more challenging than emotion-engagement, such as feeling angry at a villain's deed in a film.

Moods, like affective reflexes, are different from emotions in a number of respects. First, one important difference is that moods are global rather than focal. Emotions are usually about focusing our attention on specific objects, while moods are often objectless mental states. For example, anxiety and melancholy are moods and they do not require proper intentional objects in order to be brought into existence. But anger and love, as instances of emotions, need a specific object such as a person or a thing.

Second, moods can occur independently from emotions and vice versa. An anxious person may not necessarily be angry, and a man angry with someone who does wrong to him may not have any bad moods. In contrast to emotion, propositional attitudes such as beliefs, desires, or thoughts do not have direct relationship to moods. Therefore, moods in general are more primitive than emotions in the sense that they, similar to affective reflexes, seem to involve less cognitive involvement.

Based on the distinctive features of moods, Carroll explains how an artwork can be designed to reveal moods on the audiences in a distinctive way. Expressing moods involves a more complex process than stimulating affective reflexes because it is not simply producing physical or physiological automatic responses. Moreover, surprisingly, Carroll suggests that expressing moods sometimes can also be more complex and difficult than expressing emotion such as fear or anger because moods are non-focal and not directly caused by specific objects. To express moods is to produce global, diffuse affective states without specific intentional objects. As Carroll points out, moods can be vague, imprecise, and ambiguous, so these special qualities of moods will potentially cause difficulty in expressing moods because the features of moods are vague and the relevant factors that will influence the mood are thereby not easily identified and controlled by artists and not easily received by audiences.

Carroll argues that moods are usually expressed in an artwork, not directly, but indirectly in at least two different kinds of ways. First, expressing or stimulating moods can be achieved by initially arousing some general kinds of emotions or feelings which may later metamorphose into moods. For example, an artist can express sadness in a song which may later metamorphose into a melancholic mood. We as audiences also often use music to change our moods because we recognize the connection between musical expressiveness and mood-inducement. Second, a more complicated way is to express and explore mood by adopting indirect expression or sophisticated adumbration and allusion. As Carroll acknowledges, this latter kind of technique aims to reveal richness and particularity of mood states and it echoes the view of traditional Expression Theorists.

For the first kind of way, the artist can express moods indirectly through stimulating emotions or feelings. For instance, sometimes to properly stimulate anger at someone or something can indirectly lead the audience to have an irritable mood for a longer period of time. Empirical studies in psychology also support the idea that direct emotional responses can be used for inducing moods. Emmett Velten's mood induction is a technique that has been used for decades to frame subjects' emotional responses and induce their moods. The subjects are asked to read self-referential statements expressing certain feelings, such as "I feel light-hearted" or "I've certainly got energy and self-confidence to share" and visualize a related scene or imagine what the statements represent in their own lives while reading.[132] Those statements can be said to be designed to elicit emotional responses whose continuous affective powers may lead to global, long-term mood states. Carroll calls this continuous affective influence the "spillover effects" of emotions.[133]

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[132] Emmett Velten, "A Laboratory Task for Induction of Mood States," *Behaviour Research and Therapy* 6, no. 4

According to Carroll, some artistic examples of mood-inducement by indirectly stimulating emotions include dejected moods aroused in the opening of *The Wizard of Oz* and moods of sublimity aroused in the opening of *Triumph of the Will*.[134] By representing the contrast between joyful lives and pitiful events for Dorothy, the audiences may launch certain emotional responses that gradually metamorphose into moods as the story evolves. The opening of *Triumph of the Will* shows camera shots through the clouds and evokes feelings of the sublime whose focal affects may turn into a global, long-term mood of sublimity.[135]

For the second kind of way, the artist can express moods in a more complicated way by adopting indirect and ambiguous expressions of phenomenological feelings.[136] This is also a more challenging way of understanding moods for both artists and audiences. Carroll argues that many lyric poems explore moods in this way, which involves a more dynamic, particularized, and anti-generalized process:

> Artforms, like lyric poetry, provide a way of coming to understand moods, of becoming

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(1968): 473-82.

[133] Carroll, "Art and Mood: Preliminary Notes and Conjectures," 544.

[134] Ibid., 542. For a video clip, see "Triumph of the Will - Opening Scenes" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yl2iIHRE1ng)

[135] These are Carroll's interpretations of films. For more detailed interpretations, see ibid., 542-44.

[136] Ibid., 533.

> acquainted with them in their specificity and particularity. Because artistic explorations of moods are typically more fine-grained than scientific ones, they afford readers with more readily recognizable and informative access to the varieties and unique profiles of mood states; the poets' exhibitions, dissections, and adumbrations of moods are more diverse than the psychologists'. There are more moods in heaven and earth than can be found in any laboratory list of mood terms (or any dictionary, for that matter), and it is part of the charge of lyric poetry to map that uncharted territory - to make it available for reflection by observing it closely and specifically.[137]

Carroll also explains how an artist, compared to a laboratory psychologist, can do a better job of exploring and inducing more fine-grained and richer moods. For instance, in Carroll's analysis, Shakespeare in his Sonnet LXXIII (That time of year thou mayst in me behold / When yellow leaves, or none, or few, do hang / Upon those boughs which shake against the cold, / Bare ruined choirs, where late the sweet birds sang.) explores a peculiar mood of melancholy in its specificity and particularity, instead of a general typical kind of melancholy, indirectly through various associative experiences:

> The speaker's attention is riveted on images of passing: yellow leaves, barren branches, twilight, sunset, ashes, etc. Wherever his glance rums, so to say, he finds absence. Each quatrain develops a different image of something waning, something on the brink of extinction. To employ a metaphor that Shakespeare does not, the cognitive processing here reflects a cast or frame of mind that finds every glass already more than half empty. What Shakespeare has done is to provide the reader with the implementation or instantiation of the kind of biasing characteristic of a melancholy mood.[138]

Here, Carroll only focuses on moods. It may be because moods are, according to Carroll, particularly elusive, amorphous, diffuse, global, and ambiguous.[139] Hence the artist cannot simply and directly identify or name them by clear conceptual description and categorization. Therefore, to reveal and explore ambiguous feelings of moods thus requires the artist to find creative and dynamic artistic languages rather than using a "laboratory list of moods terms."

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[137] Ibid., 534.
[138] Ibid., 535.
[139] Ibid., 551.

Making this analysis of moods, Carroll is aware that his approach is indebted to traditional Expression Theorists, especially R. G. Collingwood. Moreover, based on the explanation of how an artist explores sophisticated, rich moods by a special expressive process, Carroll also points out that for this particular kind of mood-engagement, "the audience may not only savor the mood state in question, but also reflect on it, thereby cultivating deeper insight into the nature of human being."[140] Since mood-engagement is one form of affective engagement, Carroll's analysis suggests that some inducement of affective engagement in art can tell against emotional accessibility. Mass artworks are designed to be easy for audiences to engage. However, at least for the second kind of expression of moods, expressive features in art can prevent audiences from easily engaging.

## 2.8 Pursuing an Alternative Account: Insights from Collingwood

Carroll's discussion of mood-engagement shows that affective engagement need not indicate emotional accessibility. Now, one could bite the bullet and adopt an account of emotional accessibility which only identifies the kind of affective engagement involving affective reflexes or emotional contagion. However, this account would only have limited usefulness because it would fail to explain how in some artworks audiences can sometimes easily engage in moods or emotions, rather than affective reflexes alone. Moreover, apart from devices for inducing affective reflexes, there are devices or techniques which can induce emotional engagement in audiences with varying degrees of difficulty, such as making audiences feel angry about a certain unfair situation a protagonist faces. Hence, it would be ideal if we can find a broader account of emotional accessibility to explain both the ease of emotional engagement and that of affective engagement.

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[140] Ibid., 553.

In contemporary aesthetics, especially in the philosophy of film, there is a rich amount of literature discussing emotional engagement in terms of fictional artworks. One line of discussion is about why and how we have emotional responses to fictional events and characters, if we can. However, accounts of emotional engagement offered in this line of discussion are not particularly useful for me to develop a general account of emotion accessibility. I will briefly explain why.

As far back as Plato, theorists explain our emotional engagement in art by an account of identification: we identify with fictional characters and experience the same emotional states as them. A contemporary account of identification can be found in Berys Gaut's discussion. In Gaut’s view, the fiction invites an audience to imagine being the character in a certain situation and then feel the character’s emotion in that situation.[141] On the other hand, refuting the account of identification, some contemporary philosophers such as Gregory Currie propose a theory of simulation. This theory suggests that audiences’ emotions are at best similar to characters but not identical. So, audiences do not identify with fictional characters to feel their emotions, but to "simulate" characters' emotions. In simulation, audiences put beliefs and desires from fictional characters into their conscious or unconscious systems of beliefs and desires, and then simulate and imagine how they would feel and respond if they were in the situation of the characters.[142] There is another contemporary approach to emotional engagement which focuses on empathy. Carl Plantinga argues that empathy can explain our emotional engagement with fictional characters especially in films. Empathy in this context consists of a disposition to know, to feel and respond to what fictional characters are feeling, and this disposition is often promoted by emotional contagion in films.[143] This account of empathy is similar to the account of affective reflexes or emotional contagion discussed previously.

These various accounts provide some useful explanation of audiences’ emotional engagement in fiction. However, I will not adopt these accounts. The main reason is that I aim to find an author-centered, functional account of accessibility. As shown in Chapter 1, it is better to consider mass art, unlike popular art, as produced as mass art or designed to be so. And it is not clear how those contemporary discussions of emotional engagement can be understood in terms of an author-centered functional approach, which focuses on designed functions of artworks and artists' processes of creation. This is also why I do not use Peter Kivy's and Stephen Davies's discussions of music and expressiveness. They focus more on the connection between a musical artwork's expressiveness and human emotional contours, rather than how an artist uses particular artistic design to express an emotion in a certain way.[144]

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[141] Berys Gaut, "Passionate Views: Film, Cognition, and Emotion," ed. Carl Plantinga and Greg M. Smith (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 200-16.

[142] Gregory Currie, "The Moral Psychology of Fiction," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 73, no. 2 (1995): 256-58. Also see "Imagination as Simulation: Aesthetics Meets Cognitive Science," in *Mental Simulation*, ed. Martin Davies and Tony Stone (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 151-69.

[143] Carl Plantinga, "The Scene of Empathy and the Human Face on Film," in *Passionate Views: Film, Cognition, and Emotion*, ed. Carl Plantinga and Greg M. Smith (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 244-45.

Therefore, in order to pursue an author-centered functional account of emotional accessibility which can account for both emotional states and other affective states, I will provide an alternative. Based on Carroll's discussion of moods, I suggest that we should not focus on different kinds of affective states; rather, we should focus on different ways in which an artist uses techniques and designs to expresses emotion. We should take a closer look at the distinction between two ways of structuring artworks and expressing emotion: individualizing and generalizing. According to Carroll, individualizing techniques are often employed by artists who aim to explore a mood’s richness and specificity. On the other hand, generalizing techniques have something to do with making the audience “savor” the mood state, rather than reflect on it. In order to clarify these ideas and apply them to emotion and other kinds of affective states, it would be helpful to examine the traditional Expression Theory, specifically Collingwood's view.

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[144] In short, Kivy and Davies argue that music can express emotion not because an artist intends or designs it to do so but because there are some similarities between music's expressiveness and human emotional contours. See Peter Kivy, *The Corded Shell: Reflections on Musical Expression* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 83; Stephen Davies, "The Expression of Emotion in Music," *Mind* 89, no. 353 (1980): 67-86. For criticisms, see Jenefer Robinson, "The Expression and Arousal of Emotion in Music," *The journal of aesthetics and art criticism* 52, no. 1 (1994): 13-22; *Deeper Than Reason: Emotion and Its Role in Literature, Music, and Art*, Chapter 10.

Collingwood distinguishes two ways of revealing emotion. This account can be used to draw the distinction between individualizing and generalizing emotion. Moreover, Collingwood provides an author-centered account of expression, which is useful for characterizing designed functions in expressive features of artworks. This account would fit in with a functional approach to the accessibility condition. Along with Carroll, I suggest that an item is a work of mass art if it is designed or intended to be accessible in certain ways. Collingwood's account of expression can support this approach. Hence, it is worth discussing Collingwood’s ideas in detail.

However, as commentators of Collingwood have pointed out, there are some problems in Collingwood’s account of expression and his aesthetics in general. Therefore, I should emphasize that I do not endorse some of his controversial claims in aesthetics. Rather, I only focus on his claims about expression and emotion, whereby I aim to propose the distinction between individualizing and generalizing emotion and a neo-Collingwoodian account of emotional accessibility.

# Chapter 3 Individualizing and Generalizing Emotion: Insights from Collingwood

## 3.1 Preliminary Remarks on Collingwood

Drawing useful ideas from R. G. Collingwood, my primary goal is to propose a neo-Collingwoodian account of emotional accessibility. In this chapter, based on Collingwood's account of expression, I will mainly explain the mechanism of individualizing emotion, and then make a distinction between individualizing and generalizing emotion. Since I do not want to commit to every one of Collingwood's claims in his aesthetics, some preliminary remarks and clarifications are needed.

First, Collingwood's idealist definition of art has created several controversial interpretative problems.[145] However, I will not endorse his idealist definition of art, but mainly focus on

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[145] For Collingwood's definition of art, see Collingwood, *The Principles of Art*, Chapter VI-VII. It has been common to link Collingwood's definition of art with Benedetto Croce's aesthetics and argue that Collingwood's definition, in some way following Croce, exclusively focuses on the mental activity in the artist's head. Croce is probably the first theorist explicitly arguing for the ontological claim that art is solely a mental activity. For Croce, what an artist aims to create is actually an expression of immediate experience and feeling in his or her mind. The bodily work of art is only a means to communicate his or her mental expression to the audience. See Croce, *The Aesthetic as the Science of Expression and of the Linguistic in General*, 8-12 and 111-17. Richard Wollheim has famously criticized Collingwood as similarly suggesting that what constitutes an artwork is solely and exclusively the artist's imaginative experience, thereby ignoring the importance of material media and the role of the audience. According to this interpretation of Collingwood, while previous theorists, such as Kant, recognize the importance of material vehicles for realizing imagination and see creative imagination as only a necessary but not sufficient condition for producing a work of art, Collingwood, along with Croce, falsely assume that creative imagination alone is sufficient. See Richard Wollheim, "On an Alleged Inconsistency in Collingwood's Aesthetic," in *Critical Essays on the Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood*, ed. Michael Krausz (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 68-78. However, the idealist interpretation is not the only way we can read Collingwood's theory. Aaron Ridley later questions the Wollheimian way of reading and proposes an alternative interpretation. See Ridley, "Not Ideal: Collingwood's Expression Theory," 263-72. Further discussions of this interpretative problem can be found in Carl

Collingwood’s account of expression. Hence, I will not discuss those controversial interpretative problems. Collingwood's account of expression explains what it means to individualize emotion in art, and it plays autonomous roles in his theory of art in general. As Aaron Ridley argues, Collingwood's account of expression has its own legitimacy and it does not rely on his definition of art.[146] Jenefer Robinson also puts it, the Expression Theory, of which Collingwood's aesthetics is a classic example, "does not offer a very good definition of art in general" since it only privileges one aspect of art, but it still retains value and "gives us a framework for a plausible theory of *expression*."[147] I will basically adopt this approach to Collingwood, and aim to explain how the mechanism of individualizing emotion, which is what a good expression should aim for, can be properly understood.

Therefore, I do not endorse Collingwood’s distinction between art proper and craft, since the term "art" in contemporary discussion could certainly be used more widely and cover more different kinds of work rather than merely refer to highly expressive or meritorious artworks. I

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R. Hausman, "Aaron Ridley's Defense of Collingwood Pursued.," ibid.56, no. 4 (1998): 391-93; John Dilworth, "Is Ridley Charitable to Collingwood?," *Journal of Aesthetics & Art Criticism* 56, no. 4 (1998): 393-96; Paul Guyer, *A History of Modern Aesthetics*, vol. 3 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 189-233; David Davies, "Collingwood's ‘Performance’ Theory of Art," *The British Journal of Aesthetics* 48, no. 2 (2008): 162-74. Because I only aim to offer a better account of emotional accessibility instead of a theory of art in general, it is not necessary for me to argue against Collingwood's definition of art. I will just simply suggest that Collingwood’s expressive account of art, if considered as a general definition of art, cannot be sufficient, since arguably there can be emotionless artworks such as some conceptual artworks.

[146] Ridley, "Not Ideal: Collingwood's Expression Theory," 263.

[147] Robinson, *Deeper Than Reason: Emotion and Its Role in Literature, Music, and Art*, 255-57. In particular, Robinson shows that the Expression Theory, especially Collingwood's version, can be defended from Alan Tormey's misinterpretation and critique. For Tormey’s criticism of Collingwood and other Expression Theorists such as Eugene Veron, Leo Tolstoy, Curt Ducasse, and Benedetto Croce, see Tormey, *The Concept of Expression: A Study in Philosophical Psychology and Aesthetics*, Chapter IV.

will reject Collingwood's limited understanding of art, but focus on his account of expression.

Second, Collingwood's terminology of "expression" is too technical. Later in my own discussion of expression and emotional engagement, I will not adopt his technical usage but adopt a broader, contemporary usage of the term "expression." Collingwood draws a sharp, mutually exclusive distinction between "expressing" emotion and "arousing" emotion because in his usage, the terminology of "expression" should be understood only as "individualizing" emotion. However, this understanding is too limited and outdated. In contemporary usage, expressing emotion does not necessarily imply individualizing emotion. Therefore, that sharp distinction between expressing and arousing is also not defensible. As Noël Carroll points out in his discussion of expression of moods, the distinction "is not so fixed insofar as arousing certain states in audiences may be *a* way of enabling them to detect the expressive properties."[148] I agree with this criticism. In my view, this problem is derived from Collingwood's technical and limited terminologies. Hence, I reject his usage of "expressing" as well as "arousing." That being said, it is still worth discussing Collingwood's account of expression in order to explain the mechanism of individualizing emotion. Therefore, to preserve insights from Collingwood and avoid confusion, I will propose a new Collingwoodian distinction between "individualizing" and "generalizing" emotion.

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[148] Carroll, "Art and Mood: Preliminary Notes and Conjectures," 538.

Third, Collingwood suggests that to express an emotion is to become conscious of the emotion an artist would like to express, so an artist must experience her emotion. In other words, it seems that for Collingwood an artist must always be "sincere."[149] One criticism of this claim is that if an artist is expressing sad emotion, she must be sad. Yet there seem to be cases in which an artist expresses others' sadness without herself being sad. If it is true, then Collingwood's account of expression is flawed.

One potential Collingwoodian reply can be made here. It is true that an artist must express an emotion she can be conscious of, but an artist can also express an imagined person's or a persona's emotion. In this case, the artist is expressing emotions of others through her own eyes, or through the artist's "simulated" psychological states.[150] For instance, Collingwood mentions that Dante expressed what it feels like to be a Thomist in his poem. Shelley, when he made the earth say "I spin beneath my pyramid of night," expressed what it feels like to be a Copernican.[151] Here, Dante and Shelley would be conscious of those emotions expressed in their poems but those emotions belong to their imagined characters. Furthermore, to apply this idea, we can suggest that when Aglaya falls in love with the protagonist "idiot" in Dostoyevsky's novel *The Idiot*, Dostoyevsky does not himself fall in love with that persona. Rather,

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[149] Robinson, *Deeper Than Reason: Emotion and Its Role in Literature, Music, and Art*, 255.

[150] See my discussion of simulation in section 2.8. Presumably, a creation-based account of simulation can be made based on an audience-centered, reception-based account of simulation.

[151] Collingwood, *The Principles of Art*, 295.

Dostoyevsky would be imagining how it feels to fall in love with that persona and then expressing how he feels to be a girl like Aglaya with an emotion of love in that situation. Therefore, Collingwood's view would not be flawed if we accept that artists can also express an imagined person's or a persona's emotion.[152] I adopt this solution. Later, when I apply Collingwood's account of expression to make a distinction between individualizing and generalizing emotion, I will assume that this criticism of sincerity is not a serious problem.

Finally, another important view worth clarifying is that when Collingwood discusses "emotion," he mainly refers to the phenomenology of emotion, i.e., what it is like to feel or experience a certain emotion. He does not usually refer to intentional elements or functional roles of emotion, but focus on the "feeling" element of emotion. In what follows, when I discuss "emotion" in the context of Collingwood, I will mainly adopt this understanding and usage. I also believe that the what-it-is-like feeling or the phenomenal content plays an important role in appreciation and creation of expressive features of art.[153] Later, to elucidate this conception of emotion in a contemporary point of view, I will briefly introduce Peter Goldie's account of emotion and compare it with Collingwood's.

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[152] Proposing a Collingwoodian theory of expression, Robinson provides a similar solution to this problem. She argues that an artist can also express a poetic speaker, an implied author, or a persona's emotion. She argues that an artist can create an authorial voice that is expressing its own emotions. This view is compatible with Collingwood's account of expression. In this way, we can allow that emotions expressed do not always belong to the actual author, while also preserving Collingwood's insight that expression is, for an artist, individualizing and becoming clear about an emotion. See Robinson, *Deeper Than Reason: Emotion and Its Role in Literature, Music, and Art*, 256-58.

[153] For other contemporary aestheticians who adopt a similar position, see Robinson, "Expression and Expressiveness in Art," *Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics* 4, no. 2 (2007): 19-41; Samantha Matherne, "Kant's Expressive Theory of Music," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 72, no. 2 (2014): 129-45.

Arguably, in the contemporary philosophy of mind, discussion of emotion mostly focuses on the functional, causal role of emotion or the cognitive content of emotion. I do not reject the functional or cognitive approach to emotion. I think that the functional approach and the phenomenological approach to emotion highlight different aspects of emotion, but they can be both useful in different contexts. The phenomenological approach should be useful in the context of aesthetics. I will later illustrate this point by comparing Collingwood's view and some contemporary cognitivist views of emotion.

Based on these four preliminary remarks, I will start to explain the mechanism of individualizing emotion.

## 3.2 Expression as Individualizing Emotion: Collingwood's View

Expression can be generally defined as an activity or a process through which an artist manifests, articulates, or elucidates an emotional state. However, for Collingwood, expression proper has a more specific meaning. According to him, the process of expression is to elucidate and express the artist's emotion which is actually not able to be preconceived as determinate and easily specifiable states before the execution of expression actually begins. This process is a more open-ended one, unlike the production of craft which involves clear distinctions between means and ends, form and matter, or planning and executing. The artist in the expressive process does not know what exactly he needs to arrive at before he actually tries it and works it out; it is more like a process of trial-and-error. It is also why artistic practice is called a creative process.[154] Collingwood assumes that most human mental experiences are saturated with emotions. The expressive artist's job is not to pre-determine and pre-select what kind of emotion is a proper content of his work but to try to express and discover "all the peculiarities" of certain emotional states she has. This distinctive process of self-discovery is central to what Collingwood calls "expression."[155]

Collingwood uses phenomenological description as a method to capture the process of experiencing and articulating emotion. He describes that emotions in the process of expression should not be conceived as determinate states that have already been fixed and ready for discovery prior to articulation. Initially, the person who experiences an emotion knows almost nothing about it. We can say that at this stage emotion is highly fluid and indeterminate. It does not appear as an expressible emotion but merely as an unarticulated emotion which is not entirely namable and controllable. At this pre-conceptual, involuntary level, we can only be aware of some indefinable and indeterminate emotional qualities to a certain extent.

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[154] By emphasizing the act of expression in this way, Collingwood does not disregard the importance of artistic techniques. He is simply suggesting that the artist who aims at expression is not simply like a craftsman who merely uses professional techniques to realize a preconceived idea because the production of expression is a more unified process without necessarily involving the sharp distinction between means and ends.

[155] Collingwood is not suggesting that there is a distinction between "aesthetic emotion" and non-aesthetic emotion, and that only talented artists can discover the aesthetic emotion. For an account of aesthetic emotion, see Bell, *Art*, 2.

Collingwood notes that our phenomenological experiences of emotion at this involuntary level present themselves as vague perturbations that we cannot readily capture or articulate.

Intuitively, for the sake of articulation, an artist could try to convey that emotional state by "labeling" it as a thing of a kind, but Collingwood argues that such labeling is not "expressing" in its strict sense. Labeling would tend to generalize and simplify that emotion. Since each particular emotional state has its phenomenological peculiarities and richness, they cannot be fully revealed by simple labeling. To label a certain emotion, such as anger, is to categorize it as a thing of a kind and thus ignore its particularity:

> The anger which I feel here and now, with a certain person, for a certain cause, is no doubt an instance of anger, and in describing it as anger one is telling truth about it; but it is much more than mere anger: it is a peculiar anger, not quite like any anger that I ever felt before, and probably not quite like any anger I shall ever feel again. To become fully conscious of it means becoming conscious of it not merely as an instance of anger, but as this quite peculiar anger.[156]

For Collingwood, in order to more fully articulate an emotion, that is, to get all its phenomenological peculiarities, one needs to "individualize" or particularize it as much as possible:

> The poet, therefore, in proportion as he understands his business, gets as far away as possible from merely labelling his emotions as instances of this or that general kind, and takes enormous pains to individualize them by expressing them in terms which reveal their difference from any other emotion of the same sort.[157]

Through the act of expression as individualizing, Collingwood thinks that we can thus become more conscious of the quality of emotion we are experiencing. In this process, we transform a primitive emotion into a more fine-grained, full-fledged emotion, which is what an artist aims to fully reveal.

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[156] Collingwood, *The Principles of Art*, 112-13.

[157] Ibid., 113.

Here, we can see that expression for Collingwood specifically refers to the process of getting clear the phenomenological peculiarities of a certain emotion through "individualizing," so it should not be confused with our common usage. To simply say, "I'm happy." may be seen as an expression of joy in an ordinary conversation, but it is not an expression in Collingwood's strict sense. Instead, it is just labeling an emotion as an instance of a general kind. To turn pale involuntarily may be regarded as having a facial "expression," but for Collingwood, strictly speaking this is just showing effects of emotion rather than expressing emotion per se. Basically, Collingwood thinks that everyone is capable of expression, but the artist can do the best job at the task because of her talent of "individualizing" emotion and also because ordinary people usually reduce the emotion to a state with merely cognitive "labels" for the sake of the exigencies of our lives.

### 3.3 A Closer Look at Collingwood's Conception of Emotion

Collingwood's conception of emotion is certainly distinctive but also insightful. In order to show his account of individualizing “emotion” in more detail, I will delve deeper into his conception of emotion. Also, explaining Collingwood's conception of emotion will prove helpful for me to later emphasize the distinction between individualizing and generalizing emotion.

First, Collingwood mainly refers to phenomenology of emotion, i.e. what it is like to be in a certain emotional state, when talking about emotion. Collingwood thinks that every emotional experience comes into our minds with some particular qualities and features in a certain moment of here-and-now. However, at the initial stage, emotion is often vague and involuntary. It is just a "psychical"[158] level of experience independent from cognitive involvement and expression. Collingwood emphasizes that we cannot readily articulate our phenomenological experiences of emotion at this involuntary level because a person encounters a primitive form of emotion "is conscious of having an emotion, but not conscious of what his emotion is ... While in this state, all he can say about his emotion is: 'I feel ... I don't know what I feel.'"[159]

Some clarification of terminology is required here before more exposition of Collingwood's conception of emotion is presented. The contemporary discussion of emotion in philosophy and cognitive science usually adopts the term "feeling" in mainly two different ways. The first usage of the term can be traced back to William James. James in his theory of emotion proposes that emotion is constituted by feeling, and feeling is understood as some bodily change or physiological arousal.[160] He contends that those bodily states are not merely effects of feelings but feelings themselves which constitute human emotions.[161] In this way, the feeling for James refers to a certain bodily, physiological state.[162] This usage of the term feeling can be considered materialist and reductionist in the sense that it reduces our mental experiences to physical or physiological states.

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[158] Collingwood adopts the term "psychical" in order to emphasize that emotion at this level is mostly independent of cognitive thinking processes. Here, he makes a distinction between feeling and thinking, which can be regarded as a contrast between a pure perceptual state and a cognitive state.

[159] Collingwood, *The Principles of Art*, 109.

On the other hand, the other usage of feeling focuses on one's subjective experience and this usage may fit in with Collingwood's framework. Contemporary theorists of emotion sometimes include the feeling component in their accounts of emotion and use it to refer to the phenomenological and qualitative aspect of emotional experiences. Peter Goldie summarizes that some cognitivist theorists include the feeling state into their accounts of emotion and they see it as a subjective "what it is like" or "phenomenological" state of experience without causal efficacy.[163] The feeling in this second usage refers to a qualitative state of a certain experience which cannot be exhaustively explained by causal relations between mental states and external physical states.[164]

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[160] William James, "What Is an Emotion?," in *Essays in Psychology* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 173-4.

[161] See "The Place of Affectional Facts in a World of Pure Experience," *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* 2, no. 11 (1905): 137-54; Paul Redding, "Feeling, Thought and Orientation: William James and the Idealist Anti-Cartesian Tradition," *Parrhesia* 13 (2011): 41-42.

[162] This physiological definition of feeling has been adopted by some later philosophers and psychologists, even including those theorists who reject James's identification of emotion with mere feeling.

[163] Peter Goldie, "Getting Feelings into Emotional Experience in the Right Way," *Emotion Review* 1, no. 3 (2009): 232-33. Here, my discussion is mainly concerned about emotion and feeling, but this emphasis on quality of experience has been widely discussed in terms of conscious experience in general. For more discussion about the qualitative/phenomenological aspect of conscious experience, see Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?," *The Philosophical Review* 83, no. 4 (1974): 435-50; David J Chalmers, "Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness," *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 2, no. 3 (1995): 200-19.

This contemporary usage of the term feeling to some extent resembles Collingwood's terminology, though Collingwood also points out that the term feeling can also refer to sensation. We may say that we feel hot and cold, we feel pain, or sometimes we may say that we have a feeling of color, sound, scents, and so on. Therefore, the term feeling, for Collingwood, has two senses. That being said, most of the time Collingwood still uses the term feeling to refer to emotional feeling. Based on the resemblance between contemporary usages of feeling and Collingwood's, I will understand the meaning of the term feeling as subjective phenomenological state of emotion, unless otherwise stated.[165]

Moreover, in Collingwood's conception of emotion, he distinguishes two levels of our phenomenological experiences of emotion: the primitive, involuntary level and the more expressible level where expression functions. Based on this distinction, he explains how a primitive, vague emotion develops into a clearer and more fine-grained emotion through expression, or the process he calls "clarification." The emotion at the involuntary level cannot be fully articulated. When we are aware of having a vague emotion, we are not necessarily conscious of what that emotional state is. In order to "know" or "clarify" this initial state, one has to try to "express" it by "languages" such as paint, music, or words.[166] By the act of conscious expression through languages, one becomes more and more conscious of what-it-is-like feelings and at the same time transforms the initially vague emotional feelings into more fine-grained and expressible emotions, which is what Collingwood is aiming at when he argues for artistic expression. Based on this view, emotion at the involuntary level is initially a vague and fluid state instead of a determinate state, conceived as ready for us to perceive before we attend to it. Only through the act of conscious expression can we fully reveal or "clarify" the richness of peculiar phenomenological what-it-is-likeness of a certain emotion.

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[164] I will come back to this point in the next section.

[165] Collingwood and Goldie are both focusing on the subjective "quality" of emotional experience instead of its causal basis or causal roles.

Here, we can derive one important insight from Collingwood's theory. The commonsensical notion of expression or the "contagious" model of expression proposed by Tolstoy tends to suggest that expressing emotion is aiming to find out a suitable medium for externalization and communication.[167] In this way, emotions, like our ideas, beliefs, or thoughts, are regarded as determinate states with clear, definite contents ready for articulation before the process of expression. The act of expression is just contingent externalization that can be realized in different ways.

However, this commonsensical model may be too simplified. As Collingwood points out, our phenomenological experiences usually suggest that emotions present themselves as vague, fluid, and indeterminate. When an emotion at first appears, we may be conscious of having that emotion but not fully conscious of what it is. We may categorize this primitive state of emotion but we still need to reveal what it fully is, i.e. what it peculiarly feels like, if we aim to fully "elucidate" a certain emotion. To achieve this goal, Collingwood suggests that we need to "individualize" the emotion as much as possible through expression.

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[166] Here, "languages" for Collinwood refer to any kind of controllable, observable articulation including words, musical notes, paint, or even facial expression.

[167] Tolstoy, *What Is Art?*, 157.

Therefore, to reveal the full-fledged nature of emotion, expression is necessarily required. Expression, in Collingwood's model, is thus not just contingent and something external to the nature of emotion. Expression is necessary for fully articulating a certain emotion and after it starts, it turns the primitively vague emotional state into a more fine-grained emotional state. This is why Ridley describes that for Collingwood, "the emotion is not revealed for what it is through being expressed. Rather, it becomes what it [fully] is through being expressed."[168]

### 3.4 Comparison between Collingwood's and Contemporary Cognitivist Conception of Emotion

Collingwood's view of emotion may not be understood easily and clearly from a contemporary point of view since his approach is distinctive from that usually adopted by contemporary cognitivist theories of emotion, which include some of the most popular views about the nature of emotion in analytic philosophy. The difference may be understood in terms of their different approaches to the relationship between cognition and emotion.

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[168] Ridley, "Not Ideal: Collingwood's Expression Theory," 269.

Cognitive theorists think that emotion involves cognition, especially propositional attitudes, which play roles in directing emotion to other mental states and external objects. Thus, cognitivists focus on some intentional or functional explanations of emotion. On the other hand, Collingwood, since his concern is about aesthetics, does not discuss functional explanation but focus on how cognition, such as linguistic articulation or expression, plays a role in individualizing and sustaining the fine-grained content, richness, and particularity of an emotion. This expressing process, as I will show later in the next section, could be understood as the task of finding metaphor in expression. In this section, I will spend some length of time comparing Collingwood's view of emotion to cognitivist theories.[169] I would also like to clarify some misunderstandings of Collingwood's account of individualizing emotion, such as Noël Carroll's misunderstandings, which may derive from his excessive focus on cognitivist approach to emotion.

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[169] Among different cognitivist theories of emotion, I will mainly discuss Carroll's view and Martha Nussbaum's theory. See Noël Carroll, "Art, Narrative, and Emotion," in *Emotion and the Arts*, ed. Sue Laver and Mette Hjort (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 190-211; *A Philosophy of Mass Art*, 245-60; "Philosophical Insight, Emotion, and Popular Fiction," in *Narrative, Emotion, and Insight*, ed. Noël Carroll and John Gibson (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011), 45-68; Martha C. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 19-66. For other versions of cognitivist theories, see, for example, Robert C. Solomon, *The Passions: The Myth and Nature of Human Emotions* (New York: Anchor Books, 1977), 125-31; Mick Power and Tim Dalgleish, *Cognition and Emotion: From Order to Disorder*, 2nd ed. (New York: Psychology Press, 2008), 60-101.

According to cognitive theories, emotions are not totally at odds with our reason and cognition. Traditionally, a common philosophical view of emotion, which can be traced back to Plato, has suggested a mutually exclusive dichotomy between emotion and cognition. They assume that emotions are simply opposed to cognitive states and may even go further to argue how the excitation of emotions in representational art is harmful to a person or society. As I have tried to show in Chapter 1, some theorists and art critics, such as Greenberg, may implicitly adopt this view without defending it properly.

On the other hand, cognitive theories defend the idea that emotions are not totally at odds with cognitive propositional states. Instead, emotion essentially involves cognitive states such as beliefs. For instance, it seems to be true that our anger is always about some external objects and this emotion is interwoven with what we believe about those objects. If we are angry, we must be angry *with* someone or something instead of being angry without a proper object.[170] This intentionality suggests that there needs to be something in an emotional state directing or linking our internal mental states to external things. Therefore, cognitive theories argue that the cognitive state, i.e., a state with propositional contents and intentional elements, plays the role of linking or directing. They would suggest that, for instance, a person needs to have a belief that someone has wronged him in order for him to be angry with that person. Furthermore, if that belief or thought is proved to be incorrect, his anger is very likely to disappear. Therefore, cognitive states not only establish the link but also influence or even determine our emotional states. Based on this fact, cognitive theories argue that emotions necessarily possess a rational, cognitive element.

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[170] Cognitivists would probably deny that there is no unnamable mental disturbance in this case. Even if there is, it cannot be emotion proper.

Advocates of the cognitivist theory of emotion basically share the view described above, but they usually adopt different versions of the theory and those versions can be further categorized into two main kinds. The first kind is to identify emotions merely with cognitive states. For instance, Martha Nussbaum argues that emotions are evaluative judgments, which can be understood as a process of cognitive thinking through which we evaluate external things for the purpose of our well-being. Providing her theory in this way, she rejects non-intentional, non propositional "feelings" as part of constituents of emotion; instead, she argues that, though feelings are frequently associated with emotion, they do not constitute emotion. Evaluative judgments, if accompanied with "the requisite eudaimonistic contents," are sufficient for emotion.[171]

On the other hand, some cognitive theorists, such as Carroll, may include feeling as a component of emotion.[172] In this version of cognitive theory, there are two necessary constituents in emotion: a cognitive part, such as a judgment, a belief, a thought, or other possible intentional states, and the part of feeling. Here, "feeling," as mentioned previously, refers to a physiological state or a subjective, phenomenological state with a certain non-conceptual, qualitative character. According to this cognitivist version, when we are having a certain emotion, we not only have an intentional state, but also "feel" something, such as visceral reactions in our bodies or some phenomenological experiences, but those changes and experiences do not have conceptual or intentional contents; in other words, feelings understood in this way cannot be articulated as propositional sentences.

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[171] Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*, 56-57.
[172] Carroll, *A Philosophy of Mass Art*, 254.

Goldie describes this second version of cognitivist theory of emotion as the "add-on theory" which first presupposes fundamental separation between the cognitive intentional state and the feeling state, and adds them on later.[173] According to Goldie, the cognitive state in add-on theories is usually explained by its functional or causal role in information-processing terms. On the other hand, the feeling state is understood as purely qualitative, phenomenological experience which has no functional role or causal efficacy at all.

In a sense, the feeling component described in the add-on theory resembles Collingwood's conception of emotion. For Collingwood, emotion, either at the initial involuntary stage or the expressible stage, refers to the subjective, phenomenological experience instead of the functional role it plays in human mental states. Furthermore, Collingwood emphasizes the individualized subjective quality of emotion and takes it to be the essential element which an expressive artist can properly articulate. This account of the phenomenological quality of emotion resembles what "add-on" theorists describe as the purely qualitative, phenomenological experience of the feeling state.

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[173] Goldie, "Getting Feelings into Emotional Experience in the Right Way," 232.

Perhaps one of the closest contemporary counterparts of Collingwood's conception of emotion is Goldie's account of "feeling towards."[174] Goldie identifies emotions with feelings, understood as phenomenological "what it is like" experiences, and rejects the cognitivist "add-on" theory. Contra cognitivists, he thinks that emotions as feelings themselves have intentional elements which are able to link feelings directly with the external world:

> ... there are emotional feelings of a kind that can be directed immediately towards objects in the world beyond the bounds of the body: these feelings are bound up with cognition and perception, and are not the mere effects of cognition or perception. Above all, though, they must be feelings, and in deference to that, I call them feelings towards.[175]

This kind of emotional feeling is different from bodily feelings, such as a painful feeling on my ear. Though we may not find scientific explanation of "feelings towards," Goldie thinks that his claim is actually faithful to our phenomenology in everyday lives. For example:

> ... when you feel pride at your son's achievement, there may well be a certain *feeling* involved, but the phenomenology of the feeling does not seem to involve awareness of any particular bodily change or state.[176]

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[174] Collingwood also seems to suggest that emotion as a phenomenological feeling state directly bears certain functional relations to other mental states or external worlds. In this interpretation of Collingwood, emotion does not need extra propositional attitudes in order to direct itself to external things. See Collingwood, *The Principles of Art*, 231-32. For Goldie's account of "feeling towards," see Peter Goldie, *The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 58-61; "Emotions, Feelings and Intentionality," *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 1, no. 3 (2002): 241-46; "Getting Feelings into Emotional Experience in the Right Way," 232-35.

[175] "Getting Feelings into Emotional Experience in the Right Way," 232.

[176] Ibid., 233.

In short, Goldie argues that feelings themselves have non-propositional intentionality. They do not need to rely on the cognitive thinking process in order to be directed to the external world. Therefore, the emotional feelings do not need to be constituted by cognitive states and they should not be regarded as a mere emotional add-on to the cognitive state. For example, a person may have the belief that the ice in front of her is dangerous, but once she really slips and falls on that ice, she would likely have a new "feeling" with the same belief. Now, she believes what she always believes with a new feeling of fear, a feeling directly towards that ice.[177] Based on this intuition, Goldie argues that emotions are feelings and feelings are not just purely subjective, qualitative "what it is like" experiences with no intentional roles; instead, they can be feelings towards the external world.

Goldie and Collingwood both point out the importance of the phenomenological feeling state of emotion. However, Goldie primarily focuses on the explanation of how the feeling state can have non-propositional intentional relations towards the external world; whereas Collingwood makes a great effort to explain how one expresses "the quality of his emotion."[178] Nevertheless, their theories need not be viewed as fundamentally different but merely focused on different questions. Goldie explains how to fuse intentionality into the phenomenology of feeling. On the other hand, Collingwood is more concerned how an artist can do the best job at expressing the phenomenological quality of emotion or the "what-it-is-like" experience of emotion. Another difference is that, as mentioned previously, Collingwood goes further and distinguish two levels of the phenomenological experience of emotion: the phenomenology of emotion at the involuntary level and that at the expressible level.

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[177] Ibid., 234.

[178] Collingwood, *The Principles of Art*, 122.

It is true that cognitivist theories provide some convincing functional and intentional explanations of how emotions are related to external states or other mental states. It is also true that in our ordinary conversations or folk psychology, cognitive elements related to emotions are what we mainly aim to articulate. When I feel an emotion, I am likely to, for the purpose of communication, try to make explicit to my friend that I am in a certain kind of intentional state, say, I feel something like anger and this anger is at someone for a certain reason. However, at the same time we often experience some peculiar what-it-is-like feelings in emotional experiences. Therefore, by defining emotion primarily in those functional terms, cognitivists usually overlook the subjective feeling component in their theories of emotion. As Goldie would say, the cognitivist approach may sometimes "over-intellectualize" our emotions, and thus it is not totally faithful to our phenomenology of emotional experience.

For Collingwood, to fully and richly reveal what an emotion is requires us to individualize what it is like to have that certain emotional feeling in one's mind. Cognitive theorists often pay less attention to those phenomenological qualities of an experience in their discussion because those subjective feelings of emotions are considered unnamable or inexpressible. Sometimes we may certainly feel that our linguistic expressions are too poor to capture the particularity and specificity of an emotion. Collingwood's insight is that an emotion can be and should be articulated in as individualized a way as possible, especially in art, if we aim to capture those phenomenological qualities of the emotion.

What I have tried to show in this section is to elucidate Collingwood's technical concepts, such as clarifying or individualizing emotion, in his conception of expression and emotion by making comparisons with cognitive theories of emotion. Moreover, based on Collingwood's insights, I also point out that cognitive theorists pay less attention to the phenomenology of emotion than they should. This focus on expressing the phenomenology of emotion is also what makes Collingwood's conception of emotion and his theory of expression valuable, at least in the context of aesthetics.

Regardless of whether Collingwood's conception of emotion is compatible with cognitivist theories, we could at least suggest that to generalize and categorize emotion in a functional role and to "individualize" phenomenological feelings of emotion may be both truthful, but exploring the nature of emotion from different aspects. The two approaches may only disagree about how we should highlight different aspects of emotion.

### 3.5 Carroll's Misunderstanding and Two Conceptions of Individualizing

Having said that, one thing worth emphasizing is that the idea of individualizing emotion in Collingwood's sense should not be misunderstood as describing particular properties of objects and situations of emotions. For example, while trying to refute Collingwood's theory of expression, Carroll, as a defender of the cognitivist approach, misunderstands Collingwood's view of individualizing:

> Concerning the distinction between generic and individualized emotions, it seems to me that all emotions have something generic about them. In the standard analysis of emotions, it is presumed that being in a given emotional state has necessary conditions; fear, for example, typically requires that the object of the state be taken by the agent in question to be harmful. But if each emotional state has a necessary condition, then, to that extent, every emotion is generic. The distinction between generic emotions and individualized emotions is not sharp. Even individualized emotions like a particular poet's joy in response to a sunset will have certain generic features.[179]

This claim is actually not totally at odds with Collingwood's, since Collingwood admits that we certainly tell some truth about emotion when we label it or find out some similarities between different emotions.[180] Therefore, this argument does not really refute Collingwood. But there is certainly a misunderstanding because Carroll construes "individualized emotion" in a very different way from how Carroll does.

Carroll once proposed his view of individualizing emotion.[181] He raised a similar question to Collingwood's: what individuates emotion (what makes a certain emotion clearly different from other emotions of the same kind)? But Carroll's answer is very different from Collingwood's. Carroll suggests that cognitive intentional states such as beliefs are the components which individuate emotions. For instance, my fear can be individuated because it regards a particular big truck near my car. This fear would be different from another fear I have when I am encountering a cockroach. Based on this reasoning, emotions of fear are individuated by their "beliefs about the properties of objects and situations."[182]

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[179] Carroll, *A Philosophy of Mass Art*, 66.
[180] Collingwood, *The Principles of Art*, 112.
[181] Noël Carroll, "The Nature of Horror," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 46, no. 1 (1987): 54.

In contrast, Collingwood would argue what individuates or individualizes an emotion are the phenomenological peculiarities, that is, what it peculiarly feels like in a certain emotion. Recall that individualizing emotion for Collingwood is different in kind from "categorizing" it. To specify a particular situation such as that "I'm in a state of fear because of a cockroach" is to categorize an emotion, not to individualize it. Therefore, to identify a particular poet's "joy in response to a sunset" is just a more precise description of the label of the emotion, "joy." However, it is not individualizing in Collingwood's sense because it does not really reveal one's phenomenological feelings of that peculiar joy. In fact, Collingwood would probably suggest that by only "categorizing" those external properties such as causes or situations of an emotion, we actually generalize the joy by viewing it as a merely functional role.

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[182] Ibid.

Contra Carroll's focus on cognitive elements, Collingwood would suggest that what individuates an emotion is its phenomenological element or the "feeling" element. It could be said that when Carroll comments on Collingwood, he may focus on the intentional aspect of emotion as if it were the sole element that constitutes emotion and thus he ignores the phenomenological "feeling" state of emotion. Therefore, by adopting an over-intellectualized account of individualized emotion which focuses on cognitive states about external causes and situations, Carroll misunderstands Collingwood's distinction between generic and individualized emotions and fails to properly capture Collingwood's conception of expression as individualizing.

### 3.6 The Individualizing Task and Metaphor

However, it may not be fair to mainly ascribe the blame to Carroll or other commentators with similar criticisms, since Collingwood's account of expression as individualizing has escaped notice or even been largely misunderstood by later commentators. One of the reasons may be that Collingwood does not spend much time explaining in detail how this task of individualizing actually works.

Having said that, Collingwood does provide some clues to the answer by suggesting that it has something to do with indirect articulation:

> Expressing an emotion is not the same thing as describing it. To say 'I'm angry' is to describe one's emotion, not to express it. The words in which it is expressed need not contain any reference to anger as such at all. Indeed, so far as they simply and solely express it, they cannot contain any such reference. The curse of Ernulphus, as invoked by Dr. Slop on the unknown person who tied certain knots, is a classical and supreme expression of anger; but it does not contain a single word descriptive of the emotion it expresses.[183]

Collingwood also suggests that to achieve the goal of expression, i.e. individualizing emotion, one needs to avoid direct references and "frigid" words:

> This is why, as literary critics well know, the use of epithets in poetry, or even in prose where expressiveness is aimed at, is a danger. If you want to express the terror which something causes, you must not give it an epithet like 'dreadful'. For that describes the emotion instead of expressing it, and your language becomes frigid, that is inexpressive, at once. A genuine poet, in his moments of genuine poetry, never mentions by name the emotions he is expressing.[184]

By distinguishing expressing emotion from making emotion frigid, Collingwood considers scientific terminology as an example of the latter and argues that it can only be used to describe or generalize emotion instead of individualizing it:

> Some people have thought that a poet who wishes to express a great variety of subtly differentiated emotions might be hampered by the lack of a vocabulary rich in words referring to the distinctions between them; and that psychology, by working out such a vocabulary, might render a valuable service to poetry. This is the opposite of the truth. The poet needs no such words at all; the existence or non-existence of a scientific terminology describing the emotions he wishes to express is to him a matter of perfect indifference. If such a terminology, where it exists, is allowed to affect his own use of language, it affects it for the worse.[185]

These passages provide some interesting insights into the nature of individualizing, but the ideas are still underdeveloped. Therefore, to further explicate the account of indirect articulation, and more importantly, to explain how the task of individualizing can be fulfilled, I will introduce Max Black's interactionist theory of metaphor and Kant's account of aesthetic ideas.[186] I will argue that their discussion provide a model of a way in which the individualizing task in Collingwood's theory can be understood.

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[183] Collingwood, *The Principles of Art*, 111-12.

[184] Ibid., 112.

[185] Ibid.

Metaphor, as I will show, is more than merely linguistic and intellectualistic play that is at odds with non-conceptual or emotional activity. It is true that understanding metaphors, such as linguistic metaphors, may usually require conceptual and linguistic understanding, but one key component of metaphor is associative experiences of different thoughts, imaginations, or feelings. Metaphor works when it produces rich and concrete associative experiences.

An influential claim in Black's theory is that metaphor tends to induce novel, dynamic, and open-ended meanings that cannot be paraphrased, translated, or fully understood by literal statements with definite and rigid references. Black maintains that metaphorical statements are not substitutable with some other literal statements and not identical with analogy or similarity.[187] Instead, each metaphor introduces a novel and distinctive system of "associated commonplaces" which create indefinite and rich meanings.

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[186] Max Black, *Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), 25-47; "More About Metaphor," in *Metaphor and Thought* ed. Andrew Ortony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 19-41; Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, § 49.

[187] Black calls the former the substitution view and the later the comparison view of metaphor.

Associated commonplaces refer to thoughts, experiences, or imaginations connected with and induced by linguistic expressions. Those commonplaces should be freely evoked, regardless of being true or false. In a metaphorical statement, the associated commonplaces first arise from the metaphorical part of the expression and then influence the associated commonplaces of other more literal parts of the expression. Metaphor in this sense works like a filter. However, it not only selects certain meanings but also transforms usual meanings into something new.

For Black, every linguistic metaphorical statement contains the "focus," words or phrases used non-literally, and the surrounding comparatively literal "frame". The focus will incite the audience to select the frame's meanings and also produce many associated thoughts about the frame that are relevant to the focus. In turn, those associative meanings of the frame will also influence the meaning of the focus, and the meanings of the frame will reciprocally be changed by those associative meanings that can fit the focus.

For example, in the relatively simple metaphor mentioned by Black "a man is a wolf,"[188] the "wolf" here is the focus and the "man" is the frame. The word "wolf" here prompts many thoughts and associative experiences about this kind of animal and all those associations will influence our imaginations of the qualities of "man," such as being ferocious, playful, or treacherous, so the common associations attached to "man" will have to be changed in accord with common associations attached to "wolf." The associations of "wolf" will continually change our thoughts and imaginations about the "man," but in the meantime the associations of "wolf" will also be reciprocally influenced by those associations of "man." There will be an interaction between the "wolf" and the "man" and this interactive relationship will constantly prompt rich experiences and thoughts. Consequently, the man is imagined to be wolfish, but the wolf also becomes human-like. Metaphor thus provides more concrete and richer imaginations and experiences of a man's qualities.

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[188] Black, *Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy*, 39.

This interaction between the focus and the frame is indeterminate in the sense that no literal statement can fully translate the meaning of metaphor.[189] To simply understand "a man is a wolf" as saying "a man is treacherous" is only partially and trivially true since it reduces richness and multiplicity of metaphorical statement to one simplified literal statement. In metaphor, we cannot specify our associative experiences very well and we cannot organize them into clear categories. Therefore, the meaning of metaphorical statement is in this sense open-ended and the associative experiences prompted by metaphors are much richer and individualized than those induced by literal statements with direct and definite references. Richness, concreteness, and individuality in metaphor thus resemble Collingwood's focus on individualizing in contrast to the task of generalizing or categorizing.

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[189] In Black's words: "The literal paraphrase inevitably says too much - and with the wrong emphasis." ibid., 46.

While many philosophical discussions of metaphor focus on the linguistic-conceptual analysis of metaphorical statement, what is insightful in Black's theory is that he brings in interaction between associative thoughts, experiences, imaginations, and even feelings to explain how metaphor functions. Therefore, it may imply that metaphor functions not only at the linguistic level but also at the level of thoughts and experiences. For instance, our associative imaginations or thoughts about a wolf may not be always linguistic-laden. Associated commonplaces may also include how we feel about a wolf or our primitive appraisal.

Metaphor in Black's view is able to achieve the task of individualizing experiences and of getting as far away as possible from merely categorizing or labeling them by definite concepts. The lack of determinate conceptual translation of metaphor also explains why we usually think that a great artwork seems to be not able to be categorized and often open to further interpretations.

Although Max Black's theory mainly focuses on literary metaphors, his theory of metaphor can also be applied to visual arts. Nelson Goodman in *Languages of Art* adopts Black's insights and explains how a pictorial metaphor works in a similar way to a literal metaphor. For instance, Goodman states that Daumier's painting *Laundress* can be seen as metaphorically expressing weight. And what makes this metaphor work is Daumier's special arrangement of color. Daumier's painting is unusual in the sense that it differs from our common associative experiences of what the ordinary arrangement of color should be like in that certain situation. We may think that some places in the painting that are supposed to be bright are painted in dark colors. Here, we can regard the focus as Daumier's special arrangement of colors and the frame as ordinary arrangement of colors that we are acquainted with. A set of associations connected with our understanding of ordinary color-arrangement will interact with associations of Daumier's arrangement of colors. Eventually, some rich associations elicited by this interaction will allow us to say that this painting expresses "weight," though it literally does not. In the meantime, Daumier's special way of using colors will also change our associative experiences of ordinary color-arrangement in a similar situation, compared to that depicted by Daumier. As a result, one could argue that the interactive visual metaphor in this case equips us to obtain richer and more individualized associative experiences.[190]

### 3.7 The Individualizing Task and Kant's Account of Aesthetic Ideas

There is another way of explicating how indirect articulation can serve to reveal richer and more individualized experiences. It is to trace this view back to Kant's account of aesthetic ideas. In §49 of the third *Critique*, Kant introduces the account of aesthetic ideas which he defines as the counterpart of rational ideas:

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[190] See Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), 71-87.

> [B]y an aesthetic idea ... I mean that representation of the imagination that occasions much thinking though without it being possible for any determinate thought, i.e. concept, to be adequate to it, which, consequently, no language fully attains or can make intelligible.[191]

Rational ideas, for Kant, are concepts for which no suitable experiences, or in Kant's terminology, representations of the imagination, can be correspondingly given. For instance, metaphysical ideas such as freedom, God, or the immortal soul are examples of ideas of reason. We can think of these metaphysical ideas as if we could know what they mean, but in fact theoretically we cannot have experiences of them and thus do not grasp those concepts in the fullest sense (or in Kantian terminology, we cannot "cognize" them). On the other hand, the aesthetic ideas can be understood as producing phenomenological states of rich experiences for which no determinate concept can adequately describe its experiential content. So we also cannot cognize aesthetic ideas because they are experiences without being properly understood or categorized by concepts. In other words, those experiences, or associative experiences, prompted by the aesthetic idea are too rich and too complex to be captured in a determinate conceptual description. As Kant puts it, an aesthetic idea "arouses a multitude of sensations and supplementary representations for which no expression is found."[192] Any linguistic expression with determinate meanings or references will not sufficiently describe aesthetic ideas. It is true that a poem is necessarily expressed in linguistic concepts, but Kant's point here is that a poet is able to use those concepts in an indeterminate, metaphorical way through which he creates rich associative experiences. This is also why we often find poetry ambiguous or vague. Furthermore, the fact that a poem seems to be always open to further interpretations implies that no single, determinate description can exhaustively reveal all those particular and individual imaginations and experiences an aesthetic idea creates. This idea could also be seen in Collingwood's distinction between description and expression: "To describe a thing is to call it a thing of such and such a kind: to bring it under a conception, to classify it. Expression, on the contrary, individualizes."[193]

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[191] Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 5:314.

[192] Ibid., 5:316.

For instance, consider the first two lines in the poem "Ode on a Grecian Urn" by John Keats:[194]

> Thou still unravish'd bride of quietness!
> Thou foster-child of silence and slow time

There are many associative experiences readers may have while reading. Keats links the imagination of "unravished bride" and "foster-child" to the urn and hints the feature of "quietness," "silence," and "not aging" is possessed within its nature. Consequently, those associations prompt rich experiences in the reader's mind. From the expressions, we seem to know that Keats intended to express the beauty of the urn, or as Collingwood would suggest, express his emotions, probably admiration or adoration, of the beauty of the urn, but certainly what Keats expresses is much more than a determinate concept such as "beauty of the urn" or "admiration of the beautiful urn." While trying to understand the poem, we may also interpret these expressions into different literal paraphrases.

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[193] Collingwood, *The Principles of Art*, 112.
[194] John Keats, "Ode on a Grecian Urn," in *The Complete Poems* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 1988), 344-45.

However, to some degree there is no determinate answer of the question of what experience or feeling Keats is expressing in this poem because what he exactly expresses are those associative imaginations and experiences, or what Kant calls aesthetic ideas, and those experiences always outstrip a certain determinate conceptual description.[195] Any literal paraphrase or description will not exhaustively capture the richness of those associative experiences. To mistakenly subsume aesthetic ideas of the poem under a determinate concept is to damage its individuality and richness.

In a sense, this richness, if successfully revealed, indicates why we usually think a certain experience or feeling revealed in an artwork is individual and unique, for it avoids simple categorization of our experiences and feelings. When artists try to express experiences and feelings as richly as possible, they avoid using generalized categories or techniques in their creations. When Chopin composed Étude Op. 10, No. 3 in E major, he is not just trying to write a "sad" song with "homesickness" but is trying to express and individualize his or his persona's emotion as richly as possible.[196] We can surely categorize this piece of music as expressing a feeling of farewell or homesickness, but this "description" as categorizing may be neither sufficient nor necessary for understanding those rich emotional experiences Chopin reveals in the music. Therefore, aesthetic ideas can individualize experiences and feelings not by determinate conceptual description but by inducing rich, indeterminate associative experiences.

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[195] Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, 5:342.

Although Kant and Black undertake different projects, Kant's account of aesthetic ideas resembles Black's theory of metaphor at least in one aspect. They both suggest that metaphor or aesthetics ideas can reveal richer and more fine-grained associative experiences which cannot be grasped in determinate conceptual descriptions. While Kant does not explain in what ways a metaphor can successfully create rich associative experiences, Black provides a further analysis of the mechanism of metaphor and suggests that the interaction between different associative commonplaces of the "focus" and the "frame" will prompt much imagination and thinking that are not limited to the literal, determinate meanings of the concepts.

It is also not difficult to conceive how this way of thinking may be applied to music. Music can be metaphorical in the sense it reflects and develops how emotions and feelings are expressed in ordinary contexts. For instance, aesthetic ideas expressed in music may interact with the pace we walk, the tone in which we talk, or what some may call our "biological rhythms in the body."[197] Here, the focus is a certain musical metaphor and the frame can be some ordinary biological rhythm. As Samantha Matherne puts it, for Kant, music as an art form capable of revealing aesthetic ideas may not only imitate our emotions but also metaphorically interact with our ordinary emotions and “aesthetically enlarge” or create richer and reflective experiences which are unnamable in ordinary contexts.[198]

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[196] This example is also mentioned by Samantha Matherne when she discusses Kant's aesthetic ideas. See Samantha Matherne, "The Inclusive Interpretation of Kant's Aesthetic Ideas," *The British Journal of Aesthetics* 53, no. 1 (2013): 32. This work is sometimes identified by the names "Tristesse." For the music, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EmQBFLJAIcY

All in all, we can see how different forms of artwork saying or picturing something indirectly and metaphorically are able to achieve the task of revealing experiences as richly and individually as possible. For instance, the poet Horace may use "exile" and "raft" to manifest how we should feel about death.[199] In this way, he provides more concrete and particularized experiences by inducing the density of immediate sensual experience and avoiding generalizations or abstractions. It is another reason why we sometimes talk about poetry as something richer and packed together with many representations or experiences at the expense of providing analytical and abstract distinctions between different things in different categories.

Although Black, Goodman, and Kant are not mainly concerned with emotions,[200] we can see how Collingwood's view of indirect articulation or "individualizing" what-it-is-like feeling can be supported and further developed with the aid of their explications of aesthetic ideas and metaphor. In conclusion, I suggest that one possible model of a way in which we can understand the task of individualizing in Collingwood's sense is to understand it as inducing rich, concrete, and fine-grained associative experiences and feelings of emotion by finding or creating metaphor or aesthetic ideas.

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[197] Andrew Bowie, *Aesthetics and Subjectivity : From Kant to Nietzsche*, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 34.

[198] Matherne, "Kant's Expressive Theory of Music," 140.

[199] This example comes from George Lakoff and Mark Turner, *More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor* (University of Chicago Press, 2009), 67-68.

[200] The traditional interpretation of Kant's account of aesthetic idea suggests that he is mainly concerned with the question of how moral or rational ideas can be expressed through aesthetic ideas. However, a more "inclusive" interpretation has been offered recently. Samantha Matherne argues that Kant's aesthetic ideas can also aim to

### 3.8 The Distinction between Individualizing and Generalizing Emotion

Based on Collingwood's insights and the above elaborations of the task of individualizing, now I can provide a distinction between individualizing and generalizing emotion. Following Collingwood's focus on the artist's creation, my distinction is drawn between two different ways of structuring artworks whereby artists reveal or express emotion.

Individualizing emotion refers to an author-centered process. It is a way in which an artist uses certain artistic design to express an emotion in its particularity.[201] The individualized

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express emotions and empirical concepts. See Matherne, "The Inclusive Interpretation of Kant's Aesthetic Ideas," 21-39.

[201] This element may not require a demanding view of authorial intention. An artist can individualize or generalize emotion without self-consciously planning to do so. For instance, a composer may mainly follow some traditional techniques in the movie soundtrack industry and create a work that is able to generalize emotion in the audiences. However, I will suggest that in this case the artwork and the techniques are still *designed* by the artist to generalize emotion, though they may not be self-consciously intended by the artist. The process of individualizing or generalizing emotion thus only requires that artworks are designed by artists to produce emotion in a certain way. This clarification means to include as many artworks as possible but exclude some artworks which may accidentally individualize or generalize emotion (such as computer-made poetry). This view may be compatible with some theories of authorial intention, such as Carroll's view of modest intentionalism.

expression tends to discourage understanding of the emotion by conceptualizing or categorizing. One of the plausible models of individualizing is finding novel metaphor to produce associatively rich and nuanced experiences and imaginations of an emotional feeling. Individualizing emotion could be called a form of “elucidation” or "clarification" because it aims to reveal fine-grained particularity and specificity of an emotion through the process of expression. It is also because in individualizing emotion, an artwork or an expression is not just a vehicle for expressing pre-planned and pre-categorized feelings or emotions. The process of expression itself is a new exploration and discovery of an unidentified emotion because an emotion can be ambiguous and not specifiable before expression. To reveal richness and fullness of one’s unidentified emotion, an artist can do the best job at individualizing and avoiding categorization of the emotion. Individualizing emotion is like a trial-and-error experiment, a creative process where no determinate plan can be made before actually trying out expression by mediums such as paints, music, or words. There is no clear distinction between plan and execution, nor between means and ends, in this process.

Based on Collingwood’s insights, I can also provide an author-centered account of generalizing emotion.[202] Generalizing emotion is a specific form of non-individualization. It is a way of structuring artworks and expressing some pre-categorized and pre-planned emotions. In this way, an artist first pre-categorizes a familiar, well-known, or well-recognized kind of emotion and later uses suitable means to induce the kind of emotion as planned. For example, for generalizing emotion, an artist usually focuses on a determinate emotional effect such as making an action film exciting, inducing suspense in a thriller film, or making a horror film shocking and scary. The goal in this process is not to individualize emotion, but to stimulate the pre-categorized general kind of emotion and correspondingly predictable emotional responses. One important feature of generalizing emotion is that this process involves a general categorization of a certain familiar *kind* of emotion without much attempt to explore the particularity of a certain emotion.

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[202] My account of generalizing emotion is indebted to Collingwood’s discussion of “arousing emotion.” See Collingwood, *The Principles of Art*, Chapter VI.

For instance, a producer of a sitcom tends to pre-categorize the emotion of laughter as the kind of emotion she would need to express without an attempt to explore the particularity of a specific pleasant emotion. Hence, the producer would tend to induce some typical emotional feelings and responses in audiences. Similarly, a director of a popular horror film will tend to generalize a character’s emotions of fear and suspense when facing danger without exploring the peculiarities and complexities of them. Artists in these cases plan to stimulate some general types of emotion before the process of expression begins. Here, certain categories or types of emotions are pre-selected as desirable ends and later realized by suitable means. Compared to individualizing emotion, generalizing emotion fits in more with what Collingwood describes as "the technical production of art," which involves sharper distinctions between planning and execution, raw materials and finished products, and means and ends.[203]

Generalizing emotion cannot succeed in individualizing emotion because pre-selection or pre-categorization of emotion filters out some peculiar features of an artist's or a persona's emotion which should be explored through expression. Hence, artists who design and structure artworks in this generalized way usually focus on some typical kinds of emotion. Consider the example of a popular sitcom again. A director of a sitcom will not try to individualize and dig into a character's nuanced feelings of an emotion when he or she faces a death in a family. Instead, the director will tend to focus only on certain parts of emotions in the character useful for stimulating relaxing moods and emotions of laughter while tending to avoid thoroughly depicting what it is like to be in the character's emotional states in that particular situation.

However, it does not imply that generalizing emotion is necessarily incompatible with an artist’s creativity. To induce emotion in a generalized way, an artist needs to pre-select and pre-categorize some general, familiar kind of emotion and then use suitable means to induce it. Finding those means is sometimes a creative process. Steven Spielberg’s *Jaws* is one of the most successful thriller films. Although *Jaws* induces some general kinds of emotions such as a typical kind of suspense developed from some real danger looming and some hope in the plot,

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[203] Ibid., Chapter II.

Spielberg and his collaborators devised some innovative sound, camera, and editing techniques to induce those emotions. For instance, the main soundtrack theme for *Jaws*, "Main Title and First Victim," composed by John Williams, is an effective, creative means to induce tension, excitement, or fear.[204] On the other hand, certainly artists also often adopt typical and quasi-formulaic means to induce emotion in a generalized way. For instance, to induce the general kind of fear in a popular horror film, directors often make use of flickering bulbs. Using a typical, pre-established technique can predictably induce a certain typical kind of emotional effect.

To conclude, based on Collingwood’s insights, I explain the mechanism of individualizing and in what ways some artistic expression can individualize emotion. Moreover, I provide a contrast between individualizing and generalizing emotion. In the next chapter, I will provide a neo-Collingwoodian account of emotional accessibility and a better accessibility condition for mass art.

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[204] For the soundtrack, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:JawsJohnWilliams.ogg

# Chapter 4 Emotional Accessibility and the New Accessibility Condition

## 4.1 Emotional Engagement and Three levels of Expressiveness

Generalizing emotion is a way of structuring artworks in which an artist designs, selects, and brings into existence some pre-categorized, familiar kinds of emotions and correspondingly predictable or sometimes even stereotyped emotional effects. In short, it aims to stimulate a general kind of emotion without exploring the particularity of the emotion. In order to explain emotional accessibility based on this account of generalizing emotion, two more questions need to be answered.

First, since this account is author-centered, what is its implication for audiences' emotional engagement? Second, this account of generalizing emotion derives many insights from Collingwood, but Collingwood would suggest that artworks that fail to individualize emotion cannot be very expressive or even not expressive at all, thereby not having any artistic value. Therefore, based on my Collingwoodian account, can generalizing emotion in expression be compatible with artistic value? Or, can generalized affective features be artistically expressive features?

To answer these two questions, I will first adopt the distinction between the concept of "expression" and "expressiveness," and then distinguish three levels of expressiveness. As

Jenefer Robinson points out, in the philosophy of art, the word “expression” is used for the author-centered aspect of an expressing process, and the word “expressiveness” is used for the audience-centered aspect of the process. The two concepts can be distinct. Discussion of “expression” focuses on how an artist articulates or elucidates an emotion, and discussion of “expressiveness” tells us something about in what ways or to what extent an expression promises emotional engagement for audiences.

According to Robinson, there are two different levels of expressiveness.[205] First, relatively inexpressive expression in art indicates that an author, a persona, or a hypothetical character is having an emotional state, but the audiences may not really "feel" the emotion. For instance, from some simple verbal expression such as "I'm angry" or some subtle facial expressions, we can see if a person is angry or not. But we may not know very much about what it feels like to be in that anger state, i.e. the phenomenological feeling of the emotion. Expressiveness here only shows the person having some emotion, but the audiences may not really feel it within themselves.

Second, Robinson suggests that a relatively more expressive expression not only shows that a person or a persona is having an emotion but also shows "what it is like to be" in that state. This greater expressiveness means that an artwork "succeeds in evoking a responsive emotion in audiences."[206] This process makes the audience aware of the what-it-is-like quality of an emotion. For instance, to simply say "I feel low because I had a bad day" is relatively inexpressive. A higher degree of expressiveness, according to Robinson, requires some expressions like the poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge says "A grief without a pang, void, dark, and drear, / A stifled, drowsy, unimpassioned grief, / Which finds no natural outlet, no relief, / In word, or sigh, or tear ..."[207]

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[205] Robinson, "Expression and Expressiveness in Art," 29-31.

We can see that Robinson's discussion shares some of Collingwood's insights. It could be argued that Coleridge's poetic expression reveals higher degrees of expressiveness because it individualizes emotion in art. However, the first level of expressiveness is not useful for categorizing the kind of expressiveness promised by generalizing emotion. My account actually suggests that generalizing emotion in an expression can promise more expressiveness for audiences. For instance, an actor can show a strong and typical kind of facial expression and successfully make audiences receive emotional contagion and feel what it is like to be angry in the actor's or a persona's emotional state. In this case, the actor does not aim to individualize emotion but generalize emotion. But he still successfully evokes a strong responsive emotion in audiences. Hence, his act can promise more than the first level of expressiveness.

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[206] Ibid., 33.

[207] These expressions come from Coleridge's poem "Dejection: An Ode" written in 1802 (as quoted by Robinson in ibid., 31.)

Therefore, to supplement Robinson's analysis, I will distinguish three levels of expressiveness rather than two. Robinson fails to point out that Coleridge's poem is aiming not only to show what it is like to be in the state of a dejected feeling but also to reveal the state of the feeling in a highly rich and individualized way such that no involuntary facial expression, or cognitive descriptions that convey a propositional content, such as "I feel low because I had a bad day," can simply offer.

Coleridge’s poem indicates a higher level of expressiveness. This kind of highly expressive art not only promises what it is like to experience an emotion for audiences but also show the richness and particularity of the emotion for audiences. This is what the process of individualizing emotion can offer. Collingwood is right that ordinary expression is usually spontaneous and coarse, while highly artistic expression such as poetry involves careful, reflective exploration of human emotion and thus it aims to reveal richer and more individual expressive qualities. The third sense of expressiveness captures this kind of highly expressive art.

Therefore, I agree with Robinson that we should understand expressiveness on a scale but add that we should distinguish three levels of expressiveness. At the first level, a relatively inexpressive expression only shows that a person or a persona in an artwork is having an emotion. For instance, I can tell my friends "I'm angry," or "I feel low." They are still expressions, but they only show a limited degree of expressiveness. At the second level, a person or a persona in an artwork succeeds in evoking a responsive emotion or what it is like to in that emotional state. This captures the kind of expressiveness often promised by the artistic process of generalizing emotion. For instance, actors in sitcoms or popular TV dramas usually show the audience some typical facial expressions such as an angry face or a happy smile in order to express their emotions. The audiences will then have emotional contagion and feel what it is like to experience that emotion.

The third level of expressiveness not only shows what it is like to be in an emotion but also aims to individualize the particularity of the emotion. For instance, many lyrical poems or Chopin's piano works such as Étude Op. 10, No. 3 in E major reveal this highest degree of expressiveness. Chopin's Étude successfully shows that his sadness due to farewell or homesickness is with this or that peculiar quality rather than a merely typical kind of sadness.

One clarification worth making is that sometimes the modern usage of a "highly expressive" act merely refers to the second level instead of the third level of expressiveness. For instance, "a highly expressive face" may mean that one shows a strong emotional facial expression and make others or the audiences have some immediate and strong emotional contagion. Here, "high" is more about intensity of emotional effects instead of higher degree of expressiveness. On the other hand, the third level of expressiveness in my distinction is higher because it refers to a higher quality in terms of those rich and individualized features of the emotion revealed. This higher degree of expressiveness usually requires special artistic techniques.

Given that there are at least three levels of expressiveness, I can thus suggest that a work that aims to generalize emotion can still be very expressive to the extent that it may evoke a strong responsive emotional engagement in the audiences. In general, expressiveness in mass artworks would fall somewhere between the first level and the highest level of expressiveness in my model. The first level is common in our ordinary, natural expression. We usually smile to express a friendly feeling, but we will not normally be very expressive in our smiles. But works of mass art, as well-designed creative artworks which are accessible to general masses, usually reveal something more than merely showing the existence of an emotion like an ordinary smile.

Therefore, even if it is true that artworks designed for mass consumption do not aim to individualize peculiarities and richness of an emotion, we can still consider their generalized expressive features artistically valuable. By producing emotional effects through generalized artistic techniques, mass artworks can often successfully evoke a responsive emotion such as emotional contagion and make the audiences feel what it is like to be in a certain familiar kind of emotion. The upshot is that artworks designed to generalize emotion can still be genuinely expressive and artistically valuable.

## 4.2 A Neo-Collingwoodian Account of Emotional Accessibility

Based on the discussion of expressiveness and emotional engagement, I propose my neo-Collingwoodian account of emotional accessibility as follows: an artwork has emotional accessibility if it is intentionally designed to generalize emotional engagement more than individualize it in its expressive features for audiences.

This account indicates that an artwork is emotionally accessible if it aims to reach the second level of expressiveness. An emotionally accessible artwork is designed by an artist to not only indicate that there is an emotion, but also evoke a responsive emotion in audiences and show what it is like to be in that state. But it does not aim to express the individualized qualities of a certain emotion.

Here, I understand "emotional engagement" in a broader sense. This kind of engagement not only includes engagement in emotions that have cognitive elements but also includes engagement in moods, feelings, or other affective states. An artwork is emotionally accessible if it is designed to gravitate toward the incorporation of features that induce certain familiar kinds of emotions, moods, feelings, or other affective states in a generalized way.

Moreover, along with Noël Carroll's approach to accessibility, my account of emotional accessibility is also an author-centered one which focuses on how an artist produces certain designs. However, this account does not require a demanding view of authorial intention. An artist can aim to generalize emotional engagement without self-consciously doing so. For instance, a composer may mainly follow some traditional techniques in the industry of movie soundtracks and create an artwork that is able to induce typical emotional responses in the audience. In this case, the artwork and the techniques are still designed by the artist to generalize emotional engagement, though they may not be fully and consciously intended by the artist.[208] This author-centered requirement only excludes some artworks which accidentally generalize emotional engagement.

This account of emotional accessibility also indicates that an artist, by making an emotionally accessible artwork, tends to pre-select and pre-categorize a certain familiar, general kind of emotion, and stimulate the kind of emotion for audiences through useful techniques. Sometimes, mass artists can also invent new techniques or devices useful for emotion-inducement, but probably they more often adopt well-established or even quasi-formulaic techniques in order to produce predictable and controllable emotional responses. For instance, contemporary directors of action films often use dynamic shots, constant movement of objects, and fast editing in order to create huge-scale visual impacts and arouse certain involuntary affective responses, thereby inducing the emotion of excitement. One of the most famous examples is Michael Bay's cinematic style.

Michael Bay is famous for directing big-budget action films. Since one of the most important goals in Bay's film is to produce maximum excitement (or what some people call "epicness") in the viewers, we may see that often he does not consider whether those visual impacts really fit with the plot or with actor's individual emotional states. He would tend to maximize visual impacts in every shot and every frame for the sake of simulating a generalized feeling of excitement. As a result, there is usually no differentiation between this and that feeling of excitement under different circumstances in a plot. The audience's feelings of excitement become generalized and formulaic in Bay's film technique. This is also why the term "Bayhem" has been coined to refer to Michael Bay's style of fast-editing, large-scale explosions, slow motion, and other formulaic methods of stimulating excitement in his films such as *The Rock*, *Bad Boys*, *Armageddon*, *Pearl Harbor*, and the *Transformers* film series.[209]

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[208] This view may still be compatible with some theories of authorial intention. See my brief discussion of Carroll's "modest intentionalism" in Chapter 1.

Another example of well-established techniques for generalizing emotional engagement is the use of "temp track" (also called the "temp music") in film production. A temp track is an existing piece of music that is usually taken from another film. It is commonly used by directors in film production as a guideline for emotion-inducing in a specific scene during the editing phase. The temp track is intended to be replaced before release by an original soundtrack, but often a director would ask a composer to compose the soundtrack which highly resembles the temp track. Therefore, the temp track will not only limit how film editing and film cut are done but also dictate a way in which a new soundtrack should be composed. As a result, by using the technique of temp track, films that aim to induce a similar kind of emotion tend to look alike and sound alike.[210]

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[209] It may not be clear who first coined the term "Bayhem." For a rough definition of "Bayhem," see an entry in the Urban Dictionary: http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Bayhem. For a detailed analysis and some typical examples of "Bayhem," see filmmaker and freelance film editor Tony Zhou's analysis in the video "Michael Bay - What is Bayhem?" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2THVvshvq0Q)

In contrast, a film that aims to produce a higher degree of expressiveness will induce emotion in a more individualized way and also turn emotion into something not easily categorizable. This kind of film does not promise emotional accessibility. For example, by revealing sadness through individualized visual expression in *Tokyo Story*, Ozu turns characters' sadness into something more than a typical kind of sadness from family loss. His distinctive visual expressions and filming techniques reveal nuanced and rich phenomenological qualities of emotion which discourages understanding of the emotion by determinate categorization.

Now, why is my proposed account of emotional accessibility better than other accounts? As mentioned previously, the account which distinguishes between lower-level affective states and higher-level emotional states cannot mark the distinction between emotional accessibility and inaccessibility. Mood-engagement, as a kind of engagement in less cognitive-laden affective states, can be more challenging than emotion-engagement, such as understanding a character's anger. Moreover, Carroll's account of universal emotion is also not useful for characterizing emotional accessibility because a universal emotion can be expressed in a sophisticated and individualized way such that the audiences would find the expression relatively difficult to engage.

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[210] For some examples, see Zhou's analysis in the video "The Marvel Symphonic Universe" (https://youtu.be/7vfqkvwW2fs?t=5m50s)

My proposed account of emotional accessibility can be more promising because, according to it, emotional accessibility or inaccessibility is not a matter of different kinds of emotions artists plan or intend to express, but rather depends on the different artistic ways or techniques whereby artists produce expressiveness and emotional engagement in a work of art for audiences.

Movie soundtracks made based on temp tracks usually tend to express lower-level, affective states in a generalized way. They promise emotional accessibility. Similarly, emotional states that have higher-level, cognitive elements can also be expressed in a generalized way. Consider *Gladiator* and *Bad Boys*.[211] Emotions such as anger at unjust situations revealed in these films usually have specific intentional objects and identifiable antecedent situations. We may feel angry because we have a rational belief that certain characters are wronged by villains. Here, these emotions can be categorized as emotions that have higher-level cognitive elements, rather than lower-level moods or feelings. However, these emotions are not thus more challenging to engage with because when generalizing emotion, mass artists often pre-categorize some familiar kinds of emotion for inducement in a certain genre. In turn, those emotions can be expressed in a generalized way through suitable means. For instance, anger in the films is usually revealed in a typical way with the aid of close-up shots, common facial expressions, higher pitch and faster speech rate, or the act of yelling. As Collingwood would suggest, to structure expressive features of an artworks in a generalized way is to pre-select a typical kind of emotion, such as making kings very royal or making soldiers very brave and soldierly. In this way, audiences do not need to make much effort to engage with those kinds of emotions.

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[211] *Gladiator* is a 2000 historical drama film directed by Ridley Scott. The film portrays the fictional character, the loyal Roman general Maximus. Maximus is betrayed when the ambitious son of the Emperor murders his father and takes the throne. While becoming a slave, Maximus rises again as an acclaimed gladiator in the arena and aims to take revenge on the new Emperor. *Bad Boys* is a 1995 American buddy cop action-comedy film directed by Michael Bay. The film tells the story of two detectives who try to find $100 million worth of heroin. They become more involved and revengeful after a friend is murdered by the drug dealers.

On the other hand, emotions, moods, or feelings revealed in some avant-garde film such as *Mulholland Drive* may not be very "cognitive" in the sense that they sometimes lack clear intentional objects and specifiable antecedent situations.[212] But those emotions or moods in the film are usually revealed in more individualized and non-typical ways, sometimes with some culturally thick metaphors, thereby making them less emotionally accessible to general audiences.

To sum up, based on my account of individualizing and generalizing emotion, I propose that all kinds of affective states, including emotions, moods, affects, or feelings, can be induced in two different kinds of ways of structuring artworks. If an artwork is designed to generalize emotional engagement more than individualize it in its expressive features, it promises emotional accessibility.

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[212] *Mulholland Drive* is a 2001 neo-noir mystery film or psychological thriller written and directed by David Lynch. The film tells the story of an aspiring actress Betty who meets a mysterious amnesiac woman hiding in the apartment that Betty stays in. The film develops the story with some ambiguous dreams and unrelated vignettes.

### 4.3 A New Accessibility Condition of Mass Art

In his theory of mass art, Carroll proposes the accessibility condition, which focuses on cognitive understanding of narrative art. This condition is not sufficient because it does not give adequate attention to how emotions or affective states can play important roles in accessibility. For instance, Carroll does not properly explain why we are able to enjoy a foreign film without attending to or understanding its narrative. Also, his account of accessibility cannot sufficiently explain why sometimes our enjoyment of some artworks such as physical comedy need not be based on our cognitive understanding of a plot. Therefore, the accessibility condition needs to be improved. For this purpose, I suggest that we should turn to examination of emotional accessibility.

Based on the neo-Collingwoodian account of emotional accessibility, my proposed accessibility condition of mass art, then, is this:

> x is a work of mass art only if it is intentionally designed to tend toward the ease of cognitive understanding in its structural features, and/or intentionally designed to generalize emotional engagement more than individualize it in its expressive features, without intended incongruity between the two kinds of design, for audiences with no more than a general

knowledge of art at any given time t.

I agree with Carroll that accessibility is a necessary condition of mass art. However, I allow that there are two different ways of design which can make a mass artwork accessible. Audiences can find an artwork cognitively easy to understand in terms of its narrative style, plot, or scripts. They can also find an artwork easy for emotional engagement in terms of its expressive elements. This is why this revised accessibility condition has a disjunctive element. An accessible artwork can possess merely one of the two kinds of designed features. For instance, some heavy metal music that does not involve much cognitive structure can still be accessible by virtue of its generalized expressive features.

In contrast to music, appreciation of many other kinds of artworks, such as films or novels, usually not only requires emotional engagement but also requires cognitive understanding. However, sometimes a film or a novel possesses one of the accessible designs but not the other, and there is inaccessible incongruity between the two kinds of design. For instance, a 2011 American experimental film *The Tree of Life,* directed by Terrence Malick, used Bedrich Smetana's musical work *Vltava* in *Má vlast* ("My Homeland") as a soundtrack in many scenes. Smetana's *Vltava* may be considered emotionally accessible, but it could be interpreted that in this film the director intended to produce incongruity when combining experimental, non-linear narrative with conventional soundtracks. In this case, the incongruity would make the film as a whole inaccessible. If this interpretation is true, then the film should not be considered a candidate for mass art. Hence, I add the requirement that for a given artwork to be a candidate for mass art, it requires that there is no intended incongruity between the two kinds of design in the artwork.

Moreover, in this new condition I replace Carroll's account of "untutored audiences" with "audiences with no more than a general knowledge of art." Though the accessibility condition is an author-centered account, I also think that a work of mass art is intentionally designed for certain groups of audiences. The groups of people here include anyone who has no more than a general knowledge of art. By a general knowledge of art I mean broad knowledge of art and basic cultural knowledge of art distributed through a wide range of non-specialist, non-professional media. It is an empirical question to find out what "general knowledge of art" specifies at any given time t. This requirement is looser than Carroll's account of untutored audiences and thus it also avoids the criticism that has been made of Carroll: if a work of mass art is designed for untutored audiences, with minimum effort, virtually on first contact, this condition would exclude many artworks as works of mass art. My condition can bypass this problem.

This new accessibility condition can better account for musical mass art since it includes emotional accessibility. The condition also avoids the criticism of Carroll that his accessibility condition fails to explain why some works of heavy metal, works of punk, or works of rock music can be accessible. Also, it does not exclude the possibility that some artworks of rock music such as Jimi Hendrix’s works could be inaccessible. Since emotional accessibility, like accessibility, is also a degree term, to adjudicate whether a specific artwork is emotionally accessible depends on to what extent a given artwork generalizes or individualizes emotional engagement for audiences.

This new condition takes into account not only features of artworks that require cognitive understanding but also the other structural features that require less-cognitive engagement. For instance, a Japanese or Chinese martial arts movie could be designed to generalize emotional engagement, such as inducing affective reflexes from action scenes, without making foreign audiences understand its narrative. In this case, the film meets my accessibility condition, though its narrative or scripts may not be really accessible to foreign audiences.

To conclude, I allow that, regarding accessibility, there are two different kinds of ways in which we should classify and judge designed structural features in an artwork: one way is to judge them in terms of cognitive understanding, and the other is in terms of emotional engagement. Therefore, this new accessibility condition has better explanatory power than Carroll's condition.

# Chapter 5 Problems of the Ontology of Mass Art

## 5.1 Carroll's Technological-Ontological Condition of Mass Art

Noël Carroll thinks that mass art is essentially produced and delivered by a mass technology. This view is interwoven with his ontological requirement that a mass artwork must be a type artwork which requires "templates" to have different realizations/performances. For Carroll, a template, such as a film print, a video cassette, or a laser disk, is information coded in a physical medium. A template is a token of a mass artwork, and making a template into a performance is a mechanical process.[213] Consider a film-type: a film performance is generated from a template mechanically, in accordance with technical procedures and devices such as projecting, and each showing is also a token of the film-type.[214] In this way, Carroll argues that different film performances/tokens can be generated and distributed in discrete sites at the same time and remain aesthetically identical.

Carroll develops his technological condition of mass art based on the ontological distinction between singular art, type-template art, and type-interpretation art. Wollheim famously argues that literary and musical works are not merely physical objects but are "types."[215] Each copy of a novel or each performance of a musical work is a token of the same literary or musical type work. Type artworks can be multiply realized, while each token of the type remains aesthetically or artistically identical. The content of a copy of a novel such as *The Old Man and the Sea* has the same content of any other copy. In contrast, there are artworks regarded as "individuals" or "singulars," which cannot possess multiple tokens. Common examples of singular artworks include paintings or sculptures. The Mona Lisa painted by da Vinci cannot be identical with any other artworks or tokens. Also, it cannot be multiply reproduced while its copy remains identical with the original. The painting is singular and unique.

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[213] Carroll states: "Just as projecting a film is neither artistic nor interpretive, neither is turning on or tuning a radio or a television." Carroll, "The Ontology of Mass Art," 20.

[214] *A Philosophy of Mass Art*, 212-13.

[215] Richard Wollheim, *Art and Its Objects: With Six Supplementary Essays* (New York: Cambridge University Press,

Carroll adopts Wollheim's view that there is an ontological distinction between singular artworks and type artworks, but he argues for a further distinction between two different kinds of type artworks. Wollheim does not distinguish works designed for theatrical performances, such as plays, from works like films. In his view, they are both multiple instance or type artworks. On the other hand, Carroll distinguishes "type-template" artworks such as films from "type-interpretation" artworks such as plays. The former refers to type artworks whose tokens or performances are generated from templates, while the latter refers to type artworks whose tokens or performances are generated from human interpretation. According to Carroll, films are type-template artworks because the different "performances" of a film are identical tokens of the

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1980), 74-79.

same film. On the other hand, type artworks such as drama or musical works are artworks whose realizations require human interpretation.

Carroll uses this distinction to show that different theatrical performances of the same play are not merely tokens of the same play; instead, each performance will involve interpretation and thus it could be considered a new, distinct object of aesthetic attention. Theatrical performances are often regarded as artworks in their own right, but film showings are not often regarded in the same way.[216]

Based on Carroll's distinction, we can see why films and photographs are type-template works which can be distributed as multiple tokens of the same artwork at the same time because they are essentially capable of being mass reproduced into different tokens without being aesthetically altered or individualized, at least not in a significant way.[217] Therefore, audiences of different film showings around the world can usually appreciate the same film and make their aesthetic judgments of the same film based on different showings.

On the contrary, if we reproduce a singular artwork, a new object that needs independent aesthetic judgment will be created. There can be two different cases here. First, a new, distinct object is produced as a copy of the original singular artwork and at the same time the new object is also an artwork. Some Rodin's sculpture reproductions may count as examples.[218] Second, a new, distinct object is produced as a facsimile which is not an artwork itself. For instance, the Mona Lisa can be photocopied and made into a poster or a postcard. Here, a photocopied poster of the painting is not an artwork.

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[216] Carroll, "The Ontology of Mass Art," 17.

[217] According to Carroll, some photographs may be singular artworks rather than type-template artworks. Ibid., 19-20.

Similarly, for Carroll, a type-interpretation artwork, if it is being multiply realized, will also potentially produce new performances that need independent aesthetic judgments. However, there is one important difference between this case and the case of photocopying a singular artwork. Here, the performance-objects are not totally independent from the original type artwork. Carroll suggests that multiple interpretations of the same type-interpretation artwork, such as a Mozart symphony, should not be regarded as totally independent new artworks or singular artworks, since we can still say that different productions are playing the same theatrical or musical work at different place and time, just with different interpretations. Instead, Carroll suggests that we should consider those different interpretations as "types within a type."[219] A theatrical performance as an interpretation is an instance of a type work but it can likely also become a new type work worthy of aesthetic attention as long as that particular interpretation is viewed as a model or exemplar which can be interpreted again by someone else. Here is an example: we may consider a talented actor's performance of *Hamlet*, such as Richard Burton's performance of *Hamlet* in 1964, as a paradigmatic model for imitation.[220] In this case, Burton's performance is a token of the play-type *Hamlet* but also could become a new type artwork within the play-type.

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[218] For example, Rodin's *The Thinker* has been cast in multiple versions and is found around the world. Some versions may be considered copies of the original artwork but also new artworks. For a list of *The Thinker* sculptures, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_The_Thinker_sculptures

[219] Carroll, *A Philosophy of Mass Art*, 213.

To take another example, consider a musical artwork designed for theatrical performance. According to Carroll, there could be different type artworks involved in multiple realizations of a musical work. When there is a recording of a performance of a Beethoven's symphony, say, from *Karajan: Beethoven Symphonies* released in 1963, Carroll would suggest that there are at least three different kinds of type artwork we can distinguish: the type artwork as Beethoven's original composition, the type artwork as Herbert von Karajan's interpretation in the musical performance, and the type artwork as a sound recording of the particular performance.[221] At the same time there can be multiple performances of Beethoven's original work, but each performance requires new creation and interpretation and thus each of them can become a new type artwork, instead of merely a token of the type. Moreover, the sound recording of a particular performance is also ontologically different from the performance, since the production of a tape likely involves new interpretations from producers or audio engineers, who edit and adjust sound tracks by using techniques such as equalization, special audio effects, or mixing. According to Carroll, in this case only the sound recording can be a candidate for mass art because Beethoven's composition and Karajan's performance fail to be multiply realized and distributed to discrete sites at the same time and remain aesthetically identical. According to Carroll, to realize multiple instances of mass artworks, which are type-template artworks, we do not need interpretations, but only need mechanical processes such as projecting a film or transmitting broadcasting signals. He states: "the mass artwork is a type whose numerically distinct tokens are identical in the sense that two dimes of the same minting are identical."[222]

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[220] Richard Burton's *Hamlet* is played in the Broadway from April 9 to August 8, 1964 at the Lunt-Fontanne Theatre. For details, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Burton%27s_Hamlet.

[221] Carroll also points out that if there is a broadcasting of the recorded performance and it is edited, the broadcasted work can be further regarded as a new artwork distinct from the mere recording. One thing worth noting is that for Carroll one-time broadcasts of a performance can also be regarded as type-template mass artworks. Live stream broadcasts in radio and television are produced by mass technologies and their reproducing template-tokens can exist at the distinct sites simultaneously. Here, Carroll suggests that the template is the transmission signal. See Carroll, *A Philosophy of Mass Art*, 201.

### 5.2 Counterexample: Video Games

However, Carroll's technological-ontological requirement for mass art is too restrictive. Here is one criticism arising from philosophical discussion of video games. In "Video Games as Mass Art," Grant Tavinor discusses whether single-player video games should be considered as mass art in Carroll's sense.[223] His discussion implies one strong criticism of Carroll's theory.

Tavinor explores the nature of video games and discusses the three conditions of mass art in Carroll's definition. First, Tavinor advocates that some single-player video games can be genuine artworks. Second, regarding Carroll's ontological condition of mass art, Tavinor suggests that single-player video games are designed to be multiple instance type artworks. The same game can be played by many different people at different sites (on different computers) simultaneously. Here, we can consider digital technologies as mass technologies capable of producing and delivering the multiple tokens of the same work to widely discrete reception points simultaneously. Third, he argues that many video games are certainly designed to be accessible to general audiences. Therefore, he suggests that some video games could be considered mass artworks.

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[222] Ibid.

[223] Grant Tavinor, "Video Games as Mass Art," *Contemporary Aesthetics* 9 (2011): 1-17.

I agree with Tavinor's view for several reasons. First, I agree that some video games qualify as art or at least show signs of art status. Arguably, many video games are designed to be creative and original works. Video games such as *BioShock Remastered*, *Final Fantasy X*, or *Assassin's Creed* contain beautiful graphics which are highly artistic and worth considering as objects of aesthetic appreciation.[224] Some video games are complex in design and narrative. For instance, *The Elder Scrolls* series is famous for its design of free-form gameplay, which permits multiple sequences to finish the game, free choices between paths to victory, different types of victory.[225] Many video games such as *Computer Space* or *Pong* have been displayed in institutions like the

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[224] Josh Raab & Matt Peckham "The 10 Most Beautiful Video Games of 2016," *Time Magazine* (December 05, 2016). Tom Bramwell, "Final Fantasy X Review," *Eurogamer* (June 16, 2002).

[225] Jody Macgregor, "The Evolution of The Elder Scrolls," *PCgamer* (November 3, 2016).

American Museum of the Moving Image.[226] The Museum Of Modern Art has selected some video games such as *Pac-Man* and *SimCity 2000* as part of its permanent collection and exhibited them.[227]

Moreover, several contemporary analytic philosophers and aestheticians such as Aaron Smuts, Tavinor, and Dominic McIver Lopes have argued that at least some video games qualify as art.[228] Carroll would also likely accept this claim. Based on Carroll's method of identifying artworks, which is giving an intelligible historical narrative of how a new candidate for art can be linked and understood in a preestablished art-historical context, connections between video games and works of cinematic art can be drawn. For instance, video games critics have given narratives describing how the video game designer Goichi Suda was inspired by auteurs like Quentin Tarantino or Hitchcock when he designed games such as *Killer7 or No More Heroes* and when he created his public persona.[229]

Second, a video game, like film, can be seen as a form of mass media through which a work can transmit information and reach large segments of population at the same time. In order to reach mass audiences at different sites, a video game as a mass medium also involves the use of mass technology of production and delivery. Therefore, a video game can be a work of multiple instance art.

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[226] *Computer Space* or *Pong* were first displayed at the American Museum of the Moving Image in the exhibition "Hot Circuits: A Video Arcade" from June 6, 1989 to May 20, 1990.

[227] Antonelli, Paola, "Why I brought Pac-Man to MoMA". TED (2013); Stephanie Milot, "MoMA Exhibit Showcases Video Games as Modern Art," *PC Magazine* (March 2, 2013).

[228] Tavinor, *The Art of Videogames*, 1-14; "Video Games as Mass Art," 1-7; Lopes, *A Philosophy of Computer Art*, 117-20; Aaron Smuts, "Are Video Games Art?," *Contemporary Aesthetics* 3 (2005): 1-12.

[229] G. Christopher Williams, "Is Suda 51 the Alfred Hitchcock of Video Games?" *PopMatters* (Feb 15, 2010); "The Mask of the Deviant: Understanding Our Role in Killer 7," *PopMatters* (July 09, 2009); Nick Cowen, "No More Heroes 2 developer interview," *The Telegraph* (April 8, 2010). Other designer such as Shigeru Miyamoto, the designer of *Mario*, and Will Wright, the designer of *Sims* are compared to and also treated as auteurs. See John Seabrook, "Game Master," *The New Yorker* (November 6, 2006)

Third, even though some video games may have complicated background stories, their narrative style and audio-visual presentations are usually designed to be cognitively accessible. For instance, a role-playing videogame like *Fallout* may have intricate fictional stories and complex relationships between different fictional characters in the game,[230] but its narrative style is easy to understand. The narrative style of a role-playing game often has a coherent and linear temporal sequence without flashbacks or chronological disorder. Also, a role-playing game usually encourages audiences to entertain certain questions and puzzles that the narrative then goes on to answer. This feature fits in with Carroll's account of question-and-answer format in his discussion of cognitive accessibility.

Moreover, many video games are emotionally accessible to general audiences. Sound effects and representational features in video games often evoke strong and typical emotional responses in audiences without challenging them through individualizing emotions. For instance, in a horror video game, designers will routinely tend to add certain typical sound effects like screaming or some high-pitched notes. In addition, even though the players in video games can adopt active and interactive role in playing, many emotional responses induced by audio-visual presentations in games are highly involuntary and immediate, thereby being emotionally accessible. Given these reasons, I suggest that at least some, if not most, video games would fit in with my analysis of emotional accessibility. Therefore, since some video games can be artistic and they also share the features of multiple instantiation and accessibility, it is reasonable to regard them as candidates for mass art.

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[230] A role-playing video game, commonly known as RPG, is a video game genre where the player controls the actions of a character in some fictional world. *Fallout* is a popular RPG released in 1997. The game has a post-apocalyptic setting in the aftermath of a global nuclear war.

However, as Tavinor also points out, some problems and complications arise if we attempt to apply Carroll's technological-ontological condition of mass art to video games. For Carroll, mass art is not simply any kind of type art but has to be type-template art whose multiple tokens can be realized in different places while remaining artistically or aesthetically identical. On the other hand, video games permit a range of artistically or aesthetically discernible variation in different instances of gameplay. Any two players of the same video game may likely create different ways of playing. For instance, in a role-playing game, two players may create different protagonists, make different choices, and develop different narratives throughout the game. Consequently, this kind of aesthetic variation precludes video games from being candidates for mass art in Carroll's sense, since video games fail to be type-template artworks.

Moreover, video games are ontologically different from type-interpretation artworks because having a certain theatrical performance often produces new objects of aesthetic attention, while having a new playing of a video game does not usually produce a new object of aesthetic attention. A good theatrical performance can even become a new type-interpretation work worthy of independent aesthetic judgment because that particular performance/interpretation can be regarded as a model or exemplar and interpreted again by successors. On the other hand, playing a video game, at least a single-player game, does not produce a new type in this sense; instead, it remains a token of a type even if there are many different ways of playing the game.

As Tavinor suggests, it is rather ridiculous to propose that each player of the same video game creates a new or unique object for new aesthetic judgment. Most designers, players, and critics will suggest that different instances of a video game artwork are not different artworks, but merely tokens of the same artwork. Most critical discussions and reviews of video games are also made based on the assumption that they are experiencing and talking about the same work or artwork even if there are different ways of playing among different players and critics.[231] Therefore, to apply Carroll's analysis of type-interpretation artwork to video games would also be unsatisfactory.

Based on this reasoning, we can conclude that video games are not type-template artworks because according to Carroll, tokens of a type-template artwork have to be artistically or aesthetically identical without variation, like two dimes of the same minting. But neither are video games simply type-interpretation art in Carroll's sense because unlike a performance of Mozart's symphony or a play, video game players do not create new type works but merely realize multiple tokens of the same game. Then how do we properly account for this special ontological status of video games? It seems that we need to have a new ontological category which falls somewhere between type-template and type-interpretation art.

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[231] Tavinor, "Video Games as Mass Art," 9.

One possible answer, I suggest, could be provided based on Lopes' discussion of games and computer art. Lopes argues that many games and computer artworks are ontologically grounded in algorithms.[232] They are type works and their interactive-instances are tokens of the type. Since a video game artwork shares aspects of both, it could also be regarded as a kind of type art produced by algorithms.[233] A game algorithm is a set of formal rules or methods expressed within a finite amount of space and time for calculating a function that controls a transition from a player's game input conditions to the output conditions. The algorithm, designed by the game's creators, gives precise definitions and limitations to a sequence of operation in the game program. Lopes uses the traditional game tic-tac-toe as an example of a game produced by a set of rules which is similar to an algorithm.[234] Tic-tac-toe allows players a certain amount of freedom to choose where to mark the place, but nevertheless the game is limited and defined by its rules which prescribe what moves are appropriate, given each possible play, and what result counts as victory. Therefore, players playing tic-tac-toe are simply realizing a token of the same game type but not creating a new type.

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[232] Dominic McIver Lopes, "The Ontology of Interactive Art," *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 35, no. 4 (2001): 75-77; *A Philosophy of Computer Art*, 27.

[233] *A Philosophy of Computer Art*, 44-45; Tavinor, "Video Games as Mass Art," 9.

[234] Lopes, "The Ontology of Interactive Art," 74.

Similarly, in video games, even if a player can make some free choices when interacting with a game program, such as making different mouse inputs, her actions are physically limited and regulated by an algorithm. Therefore, Lopes suggests that a player's interaction in video games is merely making a token-instance of the same work without creating a new work. Video games can be multiple-realized, but different realizations, though having notable aesthetic variation among them, are merely tokens. To realize different tokens of the same video-game-type means that different players make different interaction-instances, but play with the same algorithm designed by the same author (or the same group of authors).

Lopes' analysis not only focuses on video games but on computer-based art in general, so he tends to focus on algorithm alone without including visual or audio artistic features such as game graphic design. Tavinor, while accepting Lopes' analysis that the same type can be realized as tokens with variation, argues that a set of algorithms alone is not sufficient to define a video game because it is an entity too abstract to capture those representational, audio-visual, and narrative structures essential in a video game. Therefore, Tavinor adds that a video game as art must be at least defined by its representational features such as character appearance, graphic design, or sound design. In this respect, a video game is similar to a film and television shows, but it is different from both in that a video game can allow interaction on the audiences and aesthetic variation among different tokens. Tavinor thus suggests that a video game should be understood as a multiple instance work "consisting of a game algorithm and representational assets that can produce a range of such structures through the input of the player."[235]

We can see that video games share some features of type-template art, but do not exactly fall into this category. Like film and photography, some representational, visual-audio artistic features in video games are basically reproducible without artistically or aesthetically notable variation. However, in video games different choices made by players will generate different ways of presenting those representational, visual-audio features, so different realizations of a game on different players' computers are not indiscernible, like two dimes from the same minting. Moreover, video games are not type-interpretation artworks in Carroll's sense either because a gameplay of a game does not thus create a new work or a new artwork or new type worthy of independent aesthetic attention. Therefore, Carroll’s technological-ontological condition of mass art is limited and insufficient because it fails to account for some non-type-template artworks, such as video games, which are considered candidates for mass art.

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[235] Tavinor, "Video Games as Mass Art," 17.

## 5.3 Counterexample: Banksy's Artworks

Based on the discussion of video games, I will go further and argue that by inventing new ways of using mass technology, artists can create multiple instance mass artworks via singular art forms. If it is true, it is also another reason why we should reject Carroll's technological-ontological condition of mass art. Here, I will use Banksy's street art as an example.

The pseudonymous graffiti and street artist Banksy creates many works which may be seen as works of mass art. In October of 2013, Banksy undertook an artistic movement *Better Out Than In*, comprised of a series of artworks around streets in New York City, including graffiti and sculptures.[236] Some of those works are creative, original, expressive, and thus often considered genuinely artistic. But can we, *prima facie* at least, consider some Banksy's street artworks as candidates for mass art? I think we can. First, many of Banksy's artworks are accessible, especially emotionally accessible. They do not usually involve individualized expression that I defined in previous chapters. For instance, the graffito *Waiting in Vain* (Figure 5.1) is surely emotionally accessible to mass audiences without requiring much effort such as understanding metaphor or reflecting upon rich associative experiences. The expressive features in the work

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[236] For a more detailed description of the movement and some photos of artworks created in the movement, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Better_Out_Than_In.

*Waiting in Vain* do not include individualized expression, which might challenge our typical responses or expectations, but primarily consist of a simple representational image of a man slumping against the wall, waiting, and holding a bunch of flowers. The graffito viewed in this way is like a simple visual icon that is easily picked up and used for producing sentimental and sweet emotional effects. Those emotions induced can also be typical and generalized. We might also suggest that the audiences do not need to be sensitive to the artwork's size, color-relation, texture, or lighting conditions and viewing positions in order to properly engage with the emotions the graffito reveals. Other graffiti such as *Hammer Boy* (Figure 5.2) seem to also share this feature of emotional accessibility. Therefore, I think that it is legitimate to suggest that at least some Banksy's street artworks, if not many, promise emotional accessibility.[237]

Second, Banksy's artworks, after being unveiled, are usually widely publicized and distributed through mass technology such as online social media, email servers, or websites. Audiences and critics at different places around the world can thus talk about and make aesthetic judgments about a certain Banksy's work, even without seeing the work in person. In a sense, judging many Banksy's street artworks seem to have some similarities with judging films, print, magazine covers, or photographs: audiences can make aesthetic judgment of the same artwork based on different copies of the artwork. Therefore, those Banksy's artworks and films have the same feature of multiple tokening. Given the two reasons provided above, it seems reasonable to consider some Banksy's works of art as candidates for mass art.

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[237] Some may question if Banksy's street art is really accessible since it could be argued that to properly understand Banksy's artworks, some specialized cultural knowledge is needed. I agree that some of Banksy's works may require specialized cultural knowledge in Carroll's sense because street art is often subversive and to understand what it tries to destroy or criticize sometimes requires specialized cultural knowledge. But I will still maintain that at least *some* of Banksy's works can be understood by untutored audiences without specialized cultural knowledge, such as *Waiting in Vain* or *Hammer Boy*.



Figure 5.1 Banksy's 24th artwork *Waiting in Vain* in *Better Out Than In*, located outside a Hustler Club in Hell's Kitchen, NYC. Photo by Francisco Huguenin Uhlfelder, October 24, 2013 on *Flickr*, http://www.flickr.com/photos/franciscouhlfelder/10461092223. (CC-BY-2.0)



Figure 5.2 Banksy's 20th artwork *Hammer Boy* in *Better Out Than In*. Photo by Rob Zand, October 20, 2013, on *Flickr*, http://www.flickr.com/photos/robzand/10579416656. (CC-BY-SA-2.0)

However, we cannot simply assert on the basis of these considerations that Banksy creates mass art. There is an ontological problem here. Works distributed to the masses on the internet or mass media are not identical to graffiti produced by Banksy on the street. Graffiti are ontologically like paintings and thus they should be viewed as singular artworks, while works distributed on the internet are usually photos of graffiti. The authors are also different. Photos distributed are not usually made by Banksy, but by audiences like his fans or followers. Furthermore, most people and critics do not really see Banksy's graffiti or sculptures in person. They only see those works from photos or videos taken by the audiences and fans on the internet or other mass media, but they usually make aesthetic judgments of Banksy's works per se instead of a viewer's or a fan's reproduction of the works. Are they mistaken? Strictly speaking, given the ontological distinction given by Wollheim and Carroll, to claim that a photograph of Banksy's work is really Banksy's work of mass art is mistaken. But if it is the case, we have to admit that none of Banksy's created graffiti can be candidates for mass art. Is there a way in which we can include some Banksy's artworks in the category of mass art without having this ontological problem?

To provide a plausible answer, I argue that in many cases, Banksy appears to intentionally create multiple instance or type artworks, adopting crowdsourcing and using fans’ and audiences’ electronic devices as his mass media technologies. And the type artworks he creates are thus realized in different tokens with some discernible variation at discrete sites simultaneously.

Consider Banksy's graffiti. The graffito *Waiting in Vain* certainly has some distinctive features which can only be discovered if the viewers visit it in person and view it as a singular artwork, rather than view it through a photograph. However, to suggest that Banksy primarily aims to create a singular artwork may miss the point. Given that Banksy intentionally publicized and distributed some of his artwork-images on his official website and that only a small number of people can visit the site in person, it seems reasonable to suggest that Banksy means to create a type artwork via producing a singular work when he creates *Waiting in Vain* or *Hammer Boy*. The type artwork here could refer to a representational content in an image. By creating a type artwork, Banksy seems to intentionally let go of or "crowdsource" the reproducing process and invite his or her audience to take photos and reproduce the image as a type without making tokens by himself or herself. Therefore, we could suggest that Banksy, by making those street graffiti, does create type artworks via singular works.

One thing worth noting is that the authorial intention is important here. Not all street artworks should be viewed as type artworks. We can easily imagine that some graffiti are mainly designed to be singular artworks instead of being viewed as type artworks. The difference, I suggest, is mainly in the authorial intention of creating a type via singular art form. Based on this notion of authorial intention, it is also plausible that an artist creates a reproducible type art via traditional singular art form such as painting, in a similar way that Banksy creates a type via producing graffiti. In these cases, we need to consider whether the artist intends, at least modestly, a work to be viewed as a type artwork or not.[238]

So, what is the ontological status of this kind of type art? First, Banksy's type artworks cannot be type-template art because realizing tokens of his certain type work such as *Waiting in Vain* requires something more than physical templates and mechanical procedures. The tokening process actually requires different audiences' choices and actions of bringing cameras and taking photos. Since audiences can use different ways of taking photos such as taking them in different positions with different cameras, in some sense the multiple realizations of the same Banksy's image type imply aesthetically discernible variation. However, Banksy's type artworks are also not type-interpretation art understood in Carroll's sense.

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[238] See previous discussion of modest intentionalism.

By taking a photo of Banksy's painting, a fan or an audience does not usually create a new work. It is reasonable to suggest that the type image or icon made via a certain graffito is meant to be strictly limited or "framed" by its physical locations and surroundings. There are only limited ways in which a photo can be taken and the different ways in which a photo is made do not necessarily create new works. Here, we can adopt some insights from discussion of video games and interactive art to explain this claim.

The nature of the type art Banksy creates in a certain graffito can be regarded as some representational content such as an image or an icon, with some designated reproducing rules, realized as physical limitations such as locations, intended by the author. Multiple realizations of this kind of type art also allow interaction from the audiences, but here the interactions, like those in video games, do not create new works because they are limited and regulated by the author who designates certain explicit or implicit rules of how the audiences can react and reproduce the type image in a given physical space. For instance, the physical location of the graffito *Waiting in Vain* pre-determines limited ways an audience can take photos of it. Here, the intention of making a type artwork and the existence of rules for the reproducing process are both important in the production of creating a type mass artwork via making a singular work.

Moreover, another way in which we can suggest that variation in different ways of taking a photo of a Banksy's work can usually be ignored is to point out that the representational content of different tokens remains relatively identical. According to Tavinor, we do not usually consider different ways of playing a video game as creating independent, new objects because different playings of the game share some relatively identical essential features, such as some sets of visual-audio features generated from algorithms. Similarly, given designated rules and physical limitations, those tokens of a Banksy's type artwork can share the same representational content of the type and can be distributed to discrete sites at the same time. Therefore, reproducing photos of Banksy's artworks is not like making copies of the *Mona Lisa*. The latter copies are ontologically new and distinct from the original painting, while Banksy's artworks can be seen as type artworks whose reproduced photos are merely tokens of the types. Hence, it is plausible to suggest that some of Banksy's artworks are ontologically qualified to be candidates for mass art.

## 5.4 Broadening the Ontological Condition of Mass Art

Carroll's ontology cannot sufficiently explain multiple tokening of video games or those Banksy's artworks mentioned above. Video games and Banksy's artworks are not type-template artworks because their token-instances involve the audience's participation, thereby incorporating choices and some aesthetic variation. They are also not type-interpretation works in Carroll's sense because their multiple realizations do not create new types but make mere tokens. Multiple realizations of the same video game or the same Banksy's artwork allow some degree of audiences' choices, such as a choice of how to take a photo, but different choices and aesthetic variation allowed do not necessarily generate new works or new objects for independent aesthetic judgment. In these cases, different instances of the same artwork, though having variation, can still be considered as mere tokens of the work, if the tokening process is “physically” restricted by designated rules.

Therefore, Carroll's view is too limited, and we need to broaden the ontological condition of mass art. That being said, there are some of Carroll's ideas I agree with. Basically, my argument does not reject the ontological distinction between singular art and type art (or multiple instance art). Furthermore, I think that a work of mass art is a type artwork. Some of Banksy's artworks which are candidates for mass art should be viewed as type artworks rather than singular artworks. However, I disagree with Carroll's analysis that only type-template artworks can be candidates for mass artworks and that mass art-forms are only constituted by the media capable of generating tokens of the same type artwork from templates and vice versa.

Therefore, I propose that we should broaden the ontological condition of mass art in order to account for a specific kind of type artworks which allow limited variation in tokens. My proposed condition, then, is this:

> x is a work of mass art only if it is produced by a technology or a technique capable of generating multiple tokens of the same type artwork at widely disparate reception points,

> where tokens are designed to be generated from physical templates or a physically limited range of human actions.

The main difference between my condition and Carroll's lies in that my condition includes a disjunctive element which allows tokens to be generated from either physical templates with mechanical procedures or a physically limited range of human actions. In my condition, I still accept Carroll's account of type-templates: if a token of the type artwork is generated from a physical template, then the process of tokening only involves a template and a mechanical device or procedure. For instance, in many cases, the film performance only needs a film print and a mechanical procedure for projecting.

However, more importantly, I also allow that a token of a work of mass art can be generated from a process which involves non-mechanical human actions. "A physically limited range of human actions" means that those various different instances of human tokening are limited to a specific, definite number because of physical limitations, which realize a set of designated rules in space and time, such as algorithms or the author's intended rules whereby audiences should participate. Thus, this condition allows that authors, participants, or players in the process of "tokening" a mass artwork can still take different, non-mechanical actions, which imply aesthetic variation, as long as their actions are taken under those physical limitations.

In the ideal case, such as the case of video games, designate rules and physical limitations are explicit. The multiple tokening of a video game requires human players' actions, but players usually explicitly know the limitations under which they can make different inputs and gameplays. Here, a range of possible actions is physically limited by the game's algorithm and a computer's input devices. A game's algorithm physically restricts ways in which a player can manipulate the input devices such as a mouse.

In the case of Banksy, designate rules and physical limitations are relatively implicit. The multiple tokening of Banksy's *Waiting in Vain* involves implementation of crowdsourcing technology. Thus, the tokening is not purely mechanical but involves human actions. Here, different possible actions are also limited to a definite number because of physical limitations which realize a set of rules designed by Banksy. Those rules are relatively implicit in the sense that fans and participants may not know what exactly the rules are. There are physical limitations because it could be argued that the tokening of some of Banksy's type artworks is meant to be strictly limited by the artworks' physical locations and surroundings. Therefore, an audience only has physically limited ways in which she can take different actions, such as the action of taking a photo from this or that angle, to token or instantiate Banksy's type artwork.

The upshot is that my ontological condition is able to include more art-forms into the mass art-form. Carroll emphasizes that mass art-forms are art-forms which essentially involve mechanical production or reproduction, such as film, sound recording, or photograph. On the other hand, my condition allows at least some video games and street art to be candidates for mass artworks. Meanwhile, my condition still excludes traditional kinds of theatrical artworks, or in Carroll's term, type-interpretation artworks, such as *Hamlet* or Beethoven's Symphony No.9. Different productions of *Hamlet* are often different type artworks within a type, but different playings of the same video game are not different type works. In the case of type-interpretation artworks, the number of ways of instantiation or tokening is indefinite and unspecific, and human actions in tokening are not physically limited. Therefore, actions and choices can become interpretations, and aesthetic variation in different interpretations is relatively unrestricted. My ontological condition does not allow this kind of type art to be mass art.

Finally, my condition does not reject that some mass artworks are still type-template artworks. The disjunctive element in the condition allows that tokens can be generated from physical templates. I agree with Carroll to the extent that, for at least some works of mass art, the tokening procedure is mechanical and does not need to involve human actions. Meanwhile, my condition can account for a new kind of type artworks which ontologically falls between type-template and type-interpretation art in Carroll's sense. All in all, my proposed condition is more inclusive and has better explanatory power than Carroll's.

# Conclusion: An Inclusive Definition of Mass Art

Gathering together discussions of mass technology and the ease of consumption, my proposed definition of mass art, then, is this:

> x is a work of mass art if and only if
> 1. x is a multiple instance or type artwork.
> 2. it is produced by a technology or technique capable of generating multiple tokens of the same type artwork at widely disparate reception points, where tokens are designed to be generated from physical templates or a physically limited range of human actions.
> 3. it is intentionally designed to tend toward the ease of cognitive understanding in its structural features, and/or intentionally designed to generalize emotional engagement more than individualize it in its expressive features, without intended incongruity between the two kinds of design, for audiences with no more than a general knowledge of art at any given time t.

First, I think that mass art is multiple instance art or type art, so singular art per se cannot qualify as mass art. However, as shown in the case of street art, I argue that an artist can create multiple instance or type art via singular art-form such as painting or graffiti.

The second and the third conditions are necessary conditions which have disjunctive elements, but my definition of mass art is still an "essential" definition in the sense that each condition is individually necessary and jointly sufficient. Along with Carroll, I think that the use of mass technology and the tendency to the ease of consumption are both essential features of mass art. There are disjunctive elements because in the second condition, I allow that there are different ways in which we can understand multiple tokening of mass technology, and in the third condition, I allow that, regarding accessibility, there are two different kinds of ways in which we should classify and judge designed structural features in an artwork: one way is to judge them in terms of cognitive understanding, and the other is in terms of emotional engagement. The third condition has a functional element, since I suggest that the ease of consumption or accessibility is a designed function of mass art. As shown in Chapter 1, one reason for this functional element is that mass art, unlike popular art, does not become what it is through audiences' responses but is designed to be mass art.

Compared to Carroll's definition, one of the significant advantages of my definition is inclusiveness. My second condition contains a more inclusive ontological requirement which allows more artworks to be candidates for mass art. Video games, computer art, and street artworks which utilize crowdsourcing, can all be mass artworks, if their multiple tokens are generated by physically limited human actions rather than free interpretation. As Banksy's cases show, mass art can also be type artworks created via singular art-form. Another similar example would be some works of aerial art, which may potentially meet the ontological requirement for mass art.[239] Moreover, my third condition includes an account of the ease of emotional engagement or emotional accessibility. This element allows more artworks to be mass art, especially works of musical mass art or any works of mass art which cannot be judged based on the standard of cognitive understanding or comprehension.

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[239] Aerial art refers to art made by the technique of adopting perspective from the sky. Sometimes it is made via singular art-form such as painting or sculpture, but it is often designed to be viewed through photos taken on picture planes or drones. In this way, it could be argued that aerial art is multiple instance (or type) art made via singular art-form, since its multiple tokens are often instantiated by different photos. Thus, some works of aerial art can potentially be mass artworks, if they also meet the accessibility condition.

The value of my new, inclusive categorization of mass art is that we can better understand some new kinds of mass artworks in light of my proposed categorization. For instance, we can better understand video games based on their technological, ontological, and social connections to films. Given my argument for the ontologically similar "tokening" process between video games and films, one is able to suggest, the necessity of human interaction in video games does not necessarily imply that game players are more creative or active than film audiences because the interaction in a gameplay is just a tokening process, which does not create a new work worthy of independent aesthetic attention. Rather, mass video game art and mass film art are ontologically similar, and also similar in their psychological and social roles: they both aim for mass appeal and are emotionally or cognitively easy in a similar way for audiences' consumption.

Furthermore, we can also better understand some street artworks such as Banksy artworks in light of my categorization of mass art. My categorization suggests that some, if not many, of Banksy's artworks should not be viewed as singular artworks like paintings; rather, they are type artworks and are ontologically similar to films or video games. Thus, if one misses the participating, crowdsourcing element in Banksy's design, one might often fail to properly appreciate Banksy's artworks. For instance, some Banksy's artworks are viewed as works of performance art or works of social commentary.[240] Given my analysis that crowdsourcing is sometimes an essential part of production in some of Banksy's artworks, one plausible implication is that the participation of the crowd is also a constitutive part of Banksy's artworks. Appreciating and evaluating some Banksy's artworks in this way would be fundamentally different from evaluating them as singular artworks like paintings.

Although my discussion of mass art is indebted to Carroll, my proposed definition is not merely a simple revision of Carroll's. There are two important insights which can benefit future research. First, my condition of accessibility takes into account not only features of artworks that require cognitive understanding but also other structural features that require less-cognitive, especially emotional engagement. This inclusiveness emphasizes the distinctive role of emotional engagement in our appreciation of mass art. For this reason, I have proposed a new method for understanding the connection between emotional engagement and the ease of consumption. To propose a neo-Collingwoodian account of emotional accessibility, I borrow insights from a "particularist" approach to expression in the discussion of aesthetics, which can be traced back from Baumgarten via Kant to Croce and Collingwood, and develop the distinction between individualizing and generalizing emotion.[241] Therefore, one direction for future research is to discuss in what ways my distinction between individualizing and generalizing emotion can fit in with discussions of emotion and art in the analytic philosophy of art, such as those discussions of identification, simulation, empathy, or musical expressiveness. Another direction is to discuss whether my distinction can be useful for not only mass art but also for other types of art, such as popular art.

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[240] Jesse Carey, "Banksy's 10 Most Powerful Works of Social Commentary," *Relevant* (May 1, 2014); Ana Bambic Kostov, "Is Performance Art The Next Step for Urban Art?" *Widewalls* (August 9, 2014).

Second, my proposed definition suggests that we should draw more attention to the multiple tokening process of mass art and understand the ontological implications of different kinds of tokening. I propose a new ontological category of mass art because Carroll's category of type-template art alone is not sufficient. Similarly, a question may arise about whether the distinction between type-template art and the new kind of type art that I argue for is sufficient.

I have argued that, by utilizing the technique of mass communication and crowdsourcing, Banksy creates some multiple instance artworks via singular art-form. In future research it is worth discussing how other new mass technologies or new ways of using mass technologies, such as online games, virtual reality games, artificial intelligence like AlphaGo,[242] artificial neural networks, and interactive media, can create new ways in which we understand and classify mass artworks into different ontological categories. Another interesting question to ask is whether a theatrical artwork which involves heavy use of reproducing technology, such as the use of reproduced sound recordings or motion pictures, can still be a type-interpretation artwork, or in some cases be ontologically similar to video games or street art.

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[241] This particularist approach often focuses on subjective, qualitative, phenomenological feeling in our appreciative experiences of art. See Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, *Reflections on Poetry*, trans. K. Aschenbrenner and W.B. Holther. (Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 1954), 34-58. Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Chapter 1-3; Croce, *The Aesthetic as the Science of Expression and of the Linguistic in General*, Chapter 1-3. A few contemporary philosophers seem to adopt a similar approach to emotion and feeling in the discussion of music, see, e.g., Robinson, *Deeper Than Reason: Emotion and Its Role in Literature, Music, and Art*, Chapter 8-9; Matherne, "Kant's Expressive Theory of Music," 144-45.

[242] AlphaGo is a computer program and artificial intelligence developed by Google DeepMind to play the board

*Prima facie*, I think that my new ontological category can still account for some cases, such as online games. For instance, performances of online video games are physically limited by a definite set of rules, and there are limited numbers of ways in which an online gamer can make their choices and inputs in the game. Therefore, their performances are similar to different playings of a single-player game, and are ontologically different from performances of type-interpretation artworks. But certainly, more research will be needed in order to prove my point. All in all, my analysis of mass art provides meaningful benefits in the treatment of emotional engagement in art and of the ontological status of contemporary mass artworks.

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game Go. It is the first computer program which can beat a professional human Go player.

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