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Political Elites and Political Instability in Pakistan

by



A. Rashid Moten

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

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ABSTRACT

This study examines and analyzes the role of political elites in an attempt to explain political stability or instability in Pakistan during 1947-1958. The search for the causes of stability or instability focuses on the co-operative or confrontational behavior of the political elites. The explanatory power of the model is improved further by identifying the factors that are conducive to or inhibitive of elite cooperation. These factors are: the nature and types of the cleavages, the number and the relative sizes of various subcultures and the nature of elite attitudes. These factors have been useful in explaining the politics of Pakistan.

An examination of the elite behavior in terms of such specific elements as formation of a grand coalition, proportional representation, segmental autonomy and mutual veto, shows a pattern of elite confrontation rather than cooperation in Pakistan. Co-operation and accommodation were deemed less significant than the manipulation of power and the aggressive expression of authority. The reason for this confrontative behavior is found in the political culture of Pakistan which was not favorable for consociational choices. Pakistan also suffered from its inheritance of congruent cleavages and a multipolar imbalanced regional structure. The effect of the elite confrontation was political instability underscored by the frequent changes of

government, continuous constitutional revision, a low level of legitimacy and a high incidence of violence.

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I. Political Elites and Political Instability: A Framework

The purpose of this study is to examine and analyze the role of political elites in order to explain political stability or instability in Pakistan. The study proceeds from the basic assumption that the essence of politics in Pakistan, as elsewhere, is to be discerned in the nature and behavior of political elites. Masses, remaining on the fringes of the political process, have no role in the political system except as voters to be bribed or intimidated, or as mobs to be swayed. It is within a numerically miniscule percentage of the population that differences over the allocation of values, the policies and the mission of the nation are worked out. This fact, to Mosca, was so "obvious that it is apparent to the most casual eye. In all societies ... two classes of people appear - a class that rules and a class that is ruled".¹ Accordingly, this study maintains that the political elite is the most appropriate starting point for an understanding of political stability or instability in Pakistan.

This study considers the elite approach as a means of grasping the whole political system rather than as an isolated phenomenon in itself. This whole system approach to elite study is considered essential since anything less would abstract political elites from the context that gives

¹Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, ed., Arthur Livingston (New York, McGraw Hill, 1939), p. 50.

meaning to their actions. Elite analysis to be meaningful should emphasize not merely interactions among elite members but also highlight the general context within which they operate, stress interactions between the elites and their social and physical environment and finally, highlight the outcomes or effects of elite actions.² This study is an attempt in that direction.

The principal hypothesis, which will be tested and analyzed in subsequent chapters, relating political stability to elite role structure is: In a fragmented society, elite cooperation is positively related to political stability.³ There are other hypotheses linking elite attitudes, the nature and characteristics of social cleavages, and the relative strength of various subcultures to elite cooperation or confrontation. These will be discussed subsequently.

The focus of the study is on Pakistan. It begins with the birth of the Dominion in 1947 and ends with the imposition of martial law in 1958. Pakistan, with its strategic geographical location, internal divisions and

²Harold Lasswell, "The Comparative Study of Elites", in *World Revolutionary Elites*, eds., H. D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1965), pp. 10-12.

³See, among others, Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1968); Eric A. Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies* (Harvard, Center for International Affairs, 1972); Claude Ake, *A Theory of Political Integration* (Homewood, Illinois, Dorsey Press, 1967); G. Lowell Field and John Higley, *Elitism* (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980).

weaknesses, and its tortuous and complicated political maneuverings during the period under review, is particularly suitable for this kind of investigation. Moreover, Pakistan's politics during this period were marked by a high frequency of political instability which enhances its utility. The object of this study is to interpret the specific case of Pakistan through, what Eckstein calls, "established generalizations" and, by so doing, to cast a sharper light on the case and to confirm or modify these generalizations.⁴

A. Earlier Studies on Pakistan

The parliamentary period of Pakistan has been the subject of a number of scholarly studies. With the exception of some historical studies, scholars have analyzed the government and politics of Pakistan in terms of modernization, integration and development.

Since Pakistan was created, according to the first Prime Minister, "because of the demand of one hundred million Muslims",⁵ the religious aspect of Pakistan has received a good deal of emphasis from scholars at home and abroad. Binder's⁶ excellent study of the role of Islam in constitutional controversies and the part played by "four

⁴See Harry Eckstein, *Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 177.

⁵Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debates*, II, 5 (February 25, 1948), p. 17.

⁶Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1963).

loosely organized" religious groups sets the tone and was quickly followed by several equally competent studies.⁷

Along with religion, regional aspects also received a good deal of scholarly attention. The role of ethnicity in the political development or decay of Pakistan has been highlighted and the kind of issues which heightened regional rivalries have been well explained.⁸

Analyses of competition in Pakistan most often focus on political parties and their interactions.⁹ Their point of departure is the existence of several national political parties engaged in political competition. This led to the study of party organizations and their electoral support as a means of establishing their relative strength in parliament and of determining the links between the parties and their rank and file members. The competition, however, took place within the confines of legislative assemblies and most of the controversies centered around the question of a constitution for Pakistan. As such, several studies took the search for constitutional consensus as a theme and analyzed

⁷ See Manzooruddin Ahmad, *Pakistan: The Emerging State* (Karachi, The Allies Book Corporation, 1966); Freeland Abbott, *Islam and Pakistan* (Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1968); Saleem M. M. Qureshi, "Religion and Party Politics in Pakistan", *Contribution to Asian Studies*, ed., K. Ishwaran (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1971), pp. 36-58.

⁸ See K. B. Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin & Co., 1967); Wayne Wilcox, *Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1963).

⁹ See K. K. Aziz, *Party Politics in Pakistan, 1947-58* (Islamabad, National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976); M. Rafique Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan, 1947-1958* (Islamabad, National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976).

the problems that have caused repeated crises and constitutional changes.¹⁰

Recent studies of Pakistan politics, however, have moved away from an analysis based on modernization and development and moved toward analysis based on assumptions of power and inequality. In this respect mention should be made of Theodore Wright's perceptive analysis of the role of the Indian Muslim refugee elites in the politics of Pakistan.¹¹ Equally insightful is the work of La Porte Jr.,¹² which is a reassessment of Pakistan's history from the methodological perspective of elite analysis. His central point is that Pakistan's politics have evolved around an elite group, the complexity of which has been underestimated, cohesiveness overestimated and whose composition is undergoing significant change. The study, though provocative, is short on the "parliamentary" period - a period during which politics in Pakistan was relatively open. La Porte's study is followed by an article on the parliamentary period which quite convincingly argued that the politics during the initial phase of Pakistan was

¹⁰See Keith Callard, *Pakistan: A Political Study* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1957); Richard S. Wheeler, "Government and Constitution Making in Pakistan" (Ph. D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1957); G. W. Choudhury, *Constitutional Development in Pakistan* (London, Longman's Green & Co., 1959).

¹¹Theodore P. Wright, Jr., "Indian Muslim Refugees in the Politics of Pakistan", *The Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, XII, 2 (July 1974), pp. 189-205.

¹²Robert La Porte Jr., *Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision Making in Pakistan* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975).

"patrimonial" and elitist and should be described as such.¹³

Some questions, however, have either been left unanswered or have been brought to light by these studies. The question of relating the elites and the context in which they operate to the consequences of their actions has received least attention. The dynamics of factionalism and networks within elites remain vaguely understood and there is still no satisfactory way of conceptualizing these groups and their ties with each other. It is these questions which will be examined in the following discussion.

B. The Approach

Elite studies were developed in early twentieth century European scholarship as an alternative to the Marxist emphasis on class and as a corrective to the egalitarianism of democratic philosophy. Originating in the writings of Vilfredo Pareto¹⁴ Gaetano Mosca,¹⁵ and Robert Michels,¹⁶ elite analysis was further pursued, toward the middle of the century, by others; notably by Lasswell and Lerner,¹⁷ C.

¹³S. M. M. Qureshi, "Elite Politics: The Initial Phase of the Politics of Pakistan, 1947-58", *Asian Thought and Society*, IV, 12(December 1979), pp. 268-285.

¹⁴Vilfredo Pareto, *Vilfredo Pareto: Sociological Writings*, selected and introduced by S. E. Finer, translated by Derick Mirfin (New York, Praeger, 1966); idem, *The Mind and Society*, 4 volumes (London, Jonathan Cape, 1935).

¹⁵Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class*.

¹⁶Robert Michels, *Political Parties* tr., Eden and Cedar Paul, intro., S. M. Lipset (New York, Collier Books, 1962).

¹⁷Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner and C. E. Rothwell, *The Comparative Study of Elites* (Stanford, Hoover Institute, 1951).

Wright Mills,¹⁸ and Robert Dahl.¹⁹

In much the same way as Marx had viewed class conflict as endemic in all societies, so the elite theorists saw elite groups as endemic in all societies, perpetual elements of social organization. The basic premise of the earlier elite theory is that all of humanity can be divided into two groups: the elite and the masses. This premise finds its elaboration in the writings of Pareto and Mosca.

Pareto emphasized distinctions between elites and nonelites, and downgraded Marx's emphasis on economic forces as well as Mosca's concern with organizational ability. In particular, he stressed changing combinations of the characteristics of ruling elites, the behavior of which he likened to that of lions and foxes, and sketched the circumstances under which one elite combination would collapse and be replaced by the other. This concept of the "circulation of elites" - "one of the fundamental ideas of his political theory"²⁰ - refers to two kinds of processes: one in which circulation is between different categories of the elite, as for example when aristocracies decay or regenerate; and the other in which individuals circulate between two levels - a high stratum of the elite and a low

¹⁸C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1956).

¹⁹Robert Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1961).

²⁰T. B. Bottomore, *Elites and Society* (Middlesex, England, Penguin Books, 1974), p. 48.

stratum of nonelite.²¹ Arguing that correlations could be found in the degree of political and social influence and position in the hierarchy of wealth of any and all societies, Pareto divided the high stratum into a governing elite ("those who directly or indirectly play a significant part in government and political life") and a nongoverning elite ("the rest of the elite personnel").²² Pareto conceived of society as a system of interdependent forces moving together in equilibrium.

Mosca differed slightly in his conceptions. The term elite is not emphasized in his writings. Instead he preferred such terms as political class, ruling class and governing class. His conception of rule was similar to Pareto's. He was one of the first to distinguish clearly between elites and masses and to build, what Bottomore calls, "a new science of politics" based on that formulation.²³ Specifically, Mosca was concerned with the political or the ruling class, defined as the people who directly participate in government or influence it. He explains this rule of the minority over the majority by the fact that it is organized, whereas the individual in the majority stands alone before it, and also by the fact that the minority is usually composed of "superior" individuals. While Pareto had mentioned the fact of the political class being composed of distinct social groups, Mosca examines more closely the

²¹*Ibid.*

²²Pareto, *Sociological Writings*, p. 248.

²³Bottomore, *Elites and Society*, p. 9.

composition of the elite, and recognizes the role of certain "social forces" (representing numerous different interests in society) in balancing and limiting the influence of other "social forces".²⁴

In social-structural terms, the classical elitist perspective stresses the basic similarity of all societies, whatever their level of economic development or indeed of the nature of political organization which they exhibit. The traditional distinction in Western political thought between democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy as types of governmental structure is rejected by the elite theorists as an illusion. Though societies may intend to create different political arrangements, the reality is somewhat different. Elites not only exist, Michels argued, but they are inevitable. Whatever the form of organization, an oligarchy will emerge to occupy the positions of authority. To Michels, "organization" is simply another way of spelling "oligarchy".²⁵ In this regard Michels differed from his predecessors over the assumption that competitive struggle within the political class would allow access to political power. He demonstrated the impossibility, in his view, of ending the division between the rulers and the ruled within the society. He agreed with the Marxist interpretation of history, that it consists of a series of class struggles, tying that conception to his own doctrine that class

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 10.

²⁵Michels, *Political Parties*, pp. 389-90.

struggle would culminate in the creation of new oligarchies. To this doctrine he attached the label, "iron law of oligarchy" - a law which received a succinct restatement at the hands of Lasswell: "Government is always governed by the few, whether in the name of the few, the one, or the many."²⁶ From here it was just a small step for C. Wright Mills to propound his "power elite model" - an interlocking power elite consisting of a political directorate of politicians and bureaucrats, high corporate executives, and prominent military figures.²⁷

It should be evident that much of elite theorizing has tended to result in the use of psychological factors to explain elite dominance. James Meisel, writing about elite theories, has stressed the importance of three levels of social-psychological qualities which an elite must possess - group consciousness (a common consciousness of itself as a group with specific characteristics), coherence (coordination of the aims and motivations of its members by an elite organization), and conspiracy or unity of action.²⁸

The elite theory, outlined above, is criticized by the political pluralists on the ground, among others, that the elitist theory overlooks the power of electoral politics and citizen participation. At the same time, it strengthens the

²⁶Lasswell et. al., *The Comparative Study of Elites*, p. 7.

²⁷Mills, *The Power Elite*; Also G. William Domhoff and H. B. Ballard eds., *C. Wright Mills and The Power Elite* (Boston, Beacon Press, 1968).

²⁸James H. Meisel, *The Myth of the Ruling Class: Gaetano Mosca and the "Elite"* (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1962).

tendency to place power with a centralized bureaucracy while rationalizing the economic power of the privileged classes. Such criticisms moved R. A. Dahl and other pluralists to adopt a conception of power devoid of any notion of a ruling elite or ruling class.²⁹

In essence, pluralism is an important expression of democratic theory and is primarily concerned with the social conditions of democratic order and stability. The pluralists concentrate on the mechanisms by which a plurality of elites or interest groups maintain stable political management of a system of representative government. In some respects the pluralist approach is related to the elitist perspective, for it is concerned with the role of politically active groups in complex societies. But where the elitists saw an inevitable centralization of power, the pluralists have emphasized the possibility of power decentralization in modern societies.

The difference between the pluralists and the elitists may be seen by contrasting Dahl's and Mosca's conceptualization of the political elite. Because Dahl contends that the behavior of the masses influences the behavior of the elite and because Mosca's analysis reverses the causal connection, the two scholars use the same

²⁹See Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956); idem, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," *The American Political Science Review*, 52 (June 1958), pp. 463-469; idem, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1971).

variables but draw different theoretical conclusions.

Mosca's "ruling class" and Dahl's "political stratum" are defined in an almost identical manner. "In New Haven, as in other political systems", writes Dahl, "a small stratum of individuals is much more highly involved in political thought, discussion and action than the rest of the population".³⁰ He then describes the leaders of New Haven in terms strikingly similar to Mosca's fundamental idea: "In any durable association of more than a handful of individuals, typically a relatively small proportion of the people exercises relatively great direct influence over all the important choices bearing on the life of the association".³¹ This compares well with Mosca's oft-quoted passage: "In all societies ... two classes of people appear - a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantage that power brings, ...".³²

The crucial theoretical difference between the two studies lies not in the importance attached to the elite-mass distinction and to elite rule but in how they use the characteristics of the "political elite" (which is the same as ruling class or political stratum). This is evident in the theorizing over the effects of elections on the political elite. Where the elitists contend that mass

³⁰Dahl, *Who Governs?* p. 90.

³¹*Ibid.*, p. 95.

³²Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, p.50.

elections tend to increase the cohesion of the political elite, the pluralists argue that they serve to divide a formerly united political elite.³³ In both types of elite theory there are common strands: a concern with the role of the politically active group in the society, a concern about whether democracy is possible, and a concern with creating an "objective science of politics". There is an implicit suggestion that an elite-oriented focus would account for the variations in the performance of any political system.

There are a number of sources which reflect this research position. They differ, however, in regard to the theoretical independence attached to elite behavior. Sartori contends that the type of political cleavage and conflict depends on the attitude and goal of the political elite.³⁴ Similarly, Di Palma emphasizes the political elite characteristics as determinants of political performance.³⁵ Others use the political elite along with other explanatory factors. Lijphart in his study of consociational democracies links political stability and elite cooperation, which in turn is associated with the characteristics of political cleavage.³⁶ In a more detailed and complex argument, Nordlinger accounts for conflict regulation and elite

³³See Dahl, *Who Governs*, pp. 85-95.

³⁴Giovanni Sartori, "From the Sociology of Politics to Political Sociology" in *Politics and the Social Sciences* ed., Seymour Martin Lipset (New York, Oxford University Press, 1969).

³⁵Giuseppe Di Palma, *The Study of Conflict in Western Society: A Critique of the End of the Ideology* (Morristown, N. J., General Learning Press, 1973).

³⁶Arend Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation*.

cooperation by elite willingness to avoid conflict and explains the latter by conciliatory elite attitudes and characteristics of elite-mass relations within the segments.³⁷ The framework outlined below is based on the consociational model discussed by Lijphart, Nordlinger and others.

C. A Framework For Analysis

The relationship between elite behavior and political stability/instability is one of the central questions in political science and political sociology.³⁸ The literature linking the two variables is characterized by areas of theoretical agreement. Claude Ake believes that the political stability of the new states is "greatly furthered by increasing the group cohesiveness of its elites".³⁹ Conversely, he cites the example of Nigeria, where because of a lack of elite cohesion, political competition became a "life-and-death struggle between the different tribes".⁴⁰ He went further and argued that the main reason why the Nkrumah regime in Ghana collapsed was because the degree of

³⁷Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*.

³⁸Lewis J. Edinger and Donald D. Searing in "Social Background in Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry", *The American Political Science Review*, LXI (June 1967), p. 428, say: "... it would seem that the central concern of political science is competition for and the exercise of leadership by various elites...".

³⁹Ake, *A Theory of Political Integration*, p. 79.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 142.

elite-consensus was low.⁴¹ Lijphart argues that Dutch democratic stability depends on cooperation and "accommodation" within an elite cartel, a thesis which has been used to explain the political stability of several other plural societies.⁴² Suzanne Keller concurs that as "societies become more differentiated a considerable degree of cohesion and consensus is needed at the top".⁴³ Reviewing the literature on political elites, Putnam asserts, "the argument that elite integration fosters political stability and effectiveness is very prevalent and very persuasive".⁴⁴ Based upon these widely agreed assumptions, this study hypothesizes that:

In a fragmented society, elite cooperation is positively related to political stability.

Substantial support for this hypothesis is found in recent studies of fragmented countries which are "deviant cases". These countries - notably, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Austria - while fragmented, are nevertheless stable democracies. The crucial factor in the maintenance of their stability, according to Lijphart, is that political leaders, cognizant of the instability that could result from

⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 141.

⁴²Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation*; also Robert Presthus, *Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1973); Kenneth D. McRae ed., *Consociational Democracy* (Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1974).

⁴³ Suzanne I. Keller, *Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society* (New York, Random House, 1963).

⁴⁴Robert D. Putnam, *The Comparative Study of Political Elites* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 128.

fragmentation, consciously adopt accommodative politics to counter this possibility. Examples of accommodative politics are also found in Third World countries - Lebanon from 1943 to 1975, Malaysia between 1955 and 1969⁴⁵ and notably India. Lloyd and Susan Rudolph on the basis of a "rigorous examination" of key elements in the Indian political system (caste associations and the Congress Party), argue that India's political stability rests on the capacity of political parties, especially the Indian National Congress, to increase the group-cohesiveness of its elites".⁴⁶ Similarly, Myron Weiner attributes the continuation of stable government in India to the role of the Congress party in permitting various elites to further their own ambitions and interests within the party in such a way that it facilitates elite cooperation and consequently the electoral triumph of the Congress party.⁴⁷

The distinctive feature of these "deviant cases" is the "cooperation" at the elite level, a deliberate effort by the leaders of the rival subcultures to "counteract the immobilizing and destabilizing effects of cultural

⁴⁵See Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 145-157 for a brief discussion of elite accommodation in Malaysia and Lebanon.

⁴⁶Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susan H. Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India* (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 66.

⁴⁷Myron Weiner, *Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress* (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 496.

fragmentation".⁴⁸ The model of elite cooperation is the Dutch model, and fragmented societies that have such elites Lijphart calls "consociational" democracies. It is essentially a system of compromise and accommodation among the subcultural elites.⁴⁹

Consociational democracy is defined in terms of four characteristics or cooperative strategies, variously described as "rules of the game",⁵⁰ and as "conflict-regulating practices".⁵¹ These strategies or practices may be summarized as:⁵²

1. Grand coalition. The principle of power sharing which stipulates that the political leaders of the major segments of the fragmented society will jointly govern the country through the formation of a coalition.

2. Proportionality. The policy of allocating civil and military service appointments, scarce resources and

⁴⁸Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy", *World Politics*, 21, 2(1969), pp. 207-225.

⁴⁹Elite cooperation and confrontation is usually studied in terms of such variables as social homogeneity, recruitment patterns, personal interaction, value consensus, group solidarity and institutional context. See Putnam, *The Comparative Study of Political Elites*, pp. 107-32. The presumption that there is a causal link between social background and elite behavior has recently been criticized and a degree of caution is suggested. See Edinger and Searing, "Social Background in Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry"; Roberta E. McKown and Robert E. Kauffman, "The Use of Background Factors in the Prediction of Attitudes: Some Empirical Considerations," Occasional Paper 2 (Edmonton, Department of Political Science, The University of Alberta, n.d.).

⁵⁰Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation*,

⁵¹Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*, p.20.

⁵²For a detailed discussion of these strategies see Chapter IV.

positions of influence according to the proportionate population size of the segments. Proportionality serves as the basic standard of political representation, civil and military service appointments, and the allocation of public funds.

3. Mutual veto. The mutual or the minority veto provides that all decisions on matters of major contention will be taken on the basis of agreement between the segments. Minimally this gives each segment an assurance that it will not be outvoted by a majority when its vital interests are at stake.

4. Segmental autonomy. Delegating decision making authority (especially in matters not of common concern) to the separate segments as much as possible.

The hypothesis suggesting a link between elite cooperation and stability and conversely between confrontation and instability raises a new question. What are the conditions which influence the cooperative or confrontative behavior of the political elites? Since elite behavior has been crucial to the stability or instability of the fragmented societies, it is important that the conditions that have influenced this behavior be defined. Of a host of factors identified, scholars agree on the following factors: elite attitudes, the relative numerical strength of various subcultures and the nature and characteristics of societal cleavages. By linking these factors to elite cooperation or confrontation, it is

possible to set out several explanatory hypotheses:

1. Elite attitudes. It has been suggested earlier that in order to promote stability in a fragmented society, the political leaders must adopt a policy of cooperation. Such practices cannot be plucked from a vacuum, however; they must be part of a larger political culture which favors the adoption of accommodative policies. Nordlinger describes the need for a "culturally defined predisposition to behave in a conciliatory manner".⁵³ He defines this conciliatory attitude as "stable and internalized predispositions to view political compromise as respectable, combined with a willingness to bargain with and accommodate opponents".⁵⁴ Lijphart calls it the "habits of pragmatism and prudence in politics" which enables the elite to govern successfully in spite of the socially fragmented system.⁵⁵ Thus it is hypothesized that the political elites who subscribe to conciliatory attitudes tend to adopt accommodative policies more readily than those who do not. This characteristic is derived from a common set of rules which are a part of the political culture.

2. The nature and characteristics of social cleavages. The second factor conducive to elite cooperation is based on the notion of social cleavages. The hypothesis may be stated as follows: The leaders of rival subcultures will tend to be

⁵³Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*, p. 55.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*

⁵⁵Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation*, p.207.

more willing to cooperate if social cleavages are one of organizations instead of solidary groups, and if social cleavages are crosscutting rather than mutually reinforcing.

There exists apparent agreement among scholars that the types of cleavage most resistant to accommodation are those of ethnicity, religion, and culture. Class conflict is a conflict of organizations whereas ethnic conflict is a conflict of solidary communal groups.⁵⁶ "Communal cleavages are likely to be more salient and more intractable than class conflicts, more difficult to manage and more likely to provoke violence not only in emerging states but in many older polities".⁵⁷

The cross-cutting proposition is based on the generally accepted argument that membership in competing groups helps to create psychological cross-pressures in individual members which tend to moderate their political commitments.⁵⁸ Conversely, there is evidence that cumulative memberships result in increased commitment to a particular

⁵⁶See Brian Barry, "Review Article: Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy", *British Journal of Political Science*, 5, 4(October 1975), p. 502.

⁵⁷Milton J. Esman, "The Management of Communal Conflict", *Public Policy*, 21(Winter 1973), p. 49.; see also Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden, and Crawford Young, *Issues of Political Development* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 25-26; Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*, pp. 97-98.

⁵⁸See Robert E. Lane, *Political Life* (Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1959); M. Kriesberg, "Cross-pressures and Attitudes: A Study of the Influence of Conflicting Propaganda on Opinions Regarding American Soviet Relation", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 13(1959), pp. 5-16.

point of view and increased levels of political hostility.⁵⁹

3. The relative numerical strength of various subcultures. Elite cooperation or confrontation is also influenced by the relative size of component segments. Persuasive evidence has been advanced to support the hypothesis that political elites will tend to be more willing to cooperate if there are three or more separate subcultures that are all minorities. "The divisive effects of segmentation are softened by the circumstance that none of the subcultures has much chance of acquiring an independent majority".⁶⁰ Where one segment is in a clear majority, it is argued, its leaders may attempt to dominate rather than cooperate with the leaders of other subcultures. Where no segment is in a majority, however, it becomes necessary for leaders of the rival subcultures to form a coalition in order to govern. Lehmbruch suggests that this is an "internal genetic condition" of elite behavior: "No group exists which is able to govern by a zero-sum strategy. Therefore majorities can be formed by bargaining only".⁶¹ The situation least favorable to elite cooperation is one in

⁵⁹See Sidney Verba, "Organizational Membership and Democratic Consensus", *Journal of Politics*, 27(1965), pp. 467-97; G. B. Powell, Jr., *Social Fragmentation and Political Hostility: An Austrian Case Study* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1970).

⁶⁰Hans Daalder, "The Netherlands: Opposition in a Segmented Society", in *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, ed., Robert A. Dahl (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1961), p. 219.

⁶¹G. Lehmbruch, "Consociational Democracy in the International System", *European Journal of Political Research*, 3(1975), p. 381.

which the society is divided into two subcultures with one subculture capable of exercising hegemony, meaning political dominance. Lijphart contends that while the numerical strength of various subcultures is an important consideration, "the influence of unequal economic power or cultural predominance may also be an important factor".⁶²

In sum, the framework developed here consists of a number of explanatory hypotheses. Three of these bear directly on the behavior of the political elites and the latter, in turn, relates to political stability or instability. These hypotheses may be listed as follows.

1. In a fragmented society, elite cooperation is a major basis of political stability.

2. Political elites who subscribe to conciliatory attitudes tend to adopt accommodative policies more readily than those who do not.

3. The political elites of rival subcultures will tend to be more willing to cooperate if social cleavages are one of organizations instead of solidary groups and if social cleavages are cross-cutting rather than mutually reinforcing.

4. The political elites will tend to be more willing to cooperate if there are three or more subcultures that are all minorities.

⁶²Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, p.56.

D. Applicability of the Elite Approach

It is in the light of the above theoretical framework that the case of Pakistan will be analyzed. The question arises: whether, how, and to what extent can concepts and theories originating and deriving their significance from the contribution they make to the understanding of Western secular democracies be applied to a non-Western, confessional and authoritarian society like Pakistan? The question may be generalized: is it appropriate to develop political theories with high levels of generality and parsimony? One position is taken by Przeworski and Teune.⁶³ They argue that there are no logical reasons for simply assuming that social settings are not comparable and that it is usually not desirable to maximize accuracy at the expense of generality and parsimony in theory construction. Citing the works of Hempel, Nagel and others, they contend that social science theories should attempt to explain phenomena "wherever and whenever they occur".⁶⁴

Suggesting the relevance of "government by elite cartel" to "plural societies in the Third World", Lijphart presents his arguments in terms strikingly similar to those of Przeworski and Teune. He argues that most of the European and the Third World countries are comparable in that both are characterized by socio-cultural fragmentation. He strengthens his argument further by noting that the reality

⁶³Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* (New York, John Wiley, 1970).

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, p. 17.

of most of these countries include rule by oligarchies and that some of these countries did achieve stability by means of elite cooperation. This being so, he continues, there is no logical reason why the techniques which helped some of the smaller European nations to maintain political stability cannot be applied to the problems of developing areas.⁶⁵

A different point of view is espoused by those whose approach to other cultures has been represented by area study programs.⁶⁶ This is particularly true of scholars of the non-Western world, among whom there is frequently a certain skepticism about the universality of concepts and theories developed by Western social scientists. A number of scholars have been arguing for a long time that Western social scientists are often guilty of a certain ethnocentrism when attempting to theorize about the non-Western world.⁶⁷ The implication here is not that we should reject out of hand the possibility that theories and measures developed in the West may contribute substantially to explanation and predictions of events in the non-Western world but that we should exercise a degree of caution in applying these Western concepts to developing areas including Pakistan. Because Pakistan can best be regarded as a fragmented society, and because it was in fact an unusual

⁶⁵Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, pp. 142-175.

⁶⁶Przeworski, and Teune, *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry*, p. x.

⁶⁷See for example A. Mazrui, "From Social Darwinism to Current Theories of Modernization," *World Politics*, 21(October 1968), pp. 69-83.

and somewhat extreme case of a society divided into distinct subcultures, it serves to provide a critical test for theories of stability that emphasize the impact of socio-cultural fragmentation and elite cooperation.

E. Defining the Political Elite

Who are the political elites? Scholars using an elite approach vary considerably in their definitions. Some define them very narrowly to consider only the "men at the top".⁶⁸ Others define them broadly to include all "those who get most of what there is to get",⁶⁹ or all "those persons in a society with power - individually, regularly and seriously - to affect political outcomes".⁷⁰ Thus authors employing the elite approach vary in their definition of elites.

A helpful solution suggested by one scholar is to make a distinction between the terms elite, political elite, and the ruling elite. Following Bottomore, the term elite could be defined as "functional, mainly occupational groups which have high status in a society".⁷¹ To Bottomore's functional and occupational groups, I would also add hereditary and reputational groups which are of great social importance in a Third World setting. "Political elite" will be used to

⁶⁸ Edmund Leach and S. N. Mukherjee eds., *Elites in South Asia* (Cambridge, Mass., The University Press, 1970), p. x.

⁶⁹ Harold Lasswell, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How* (New York, Peter Smith, 1950), p. 3; also idem, *Power and Personality* (New York, The Viking Press, 1967), p. 19.

⁷⁰ Field and Higley, *Elites in Developed Societies: A Theoretical Reflection on an Initial Stage in Norway* (Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1972), pp. 9-10.

⁷¹ T. B. Bottomore, *Elites and Society*, p. 14.

refer to small active minorities who play an important role in "the authoritative allocation of values" and are directly engaged in the struggle for political leadership. The political elite so defined does not carry the notion, implicit in many studies, of the influentials constituting a homogeneous or well integrated group but allows room for the existence of competition and conflict among a variety of groups which characterizes highly complex societies. It allows for the existence of counterelites, alongside the governing elites. The term ruling elite will be used to refer to "those individuals who actually exercise political power in a society at any given time".⁷² It is these individuals who actually do the ruling and "whose preferences regularly prevail ... in case of differences on key political issues".⁷³

To be useful however, the concept has to be operationalized and the elites identified. Identifying the political elites and attributing degrees of influence is an undertaking fraught with methodological problems and pitfalls. Broadly speaking, empirical efforts to identify elites have tended to center around one of three fundamental questions: Who occupies the formal positions of power? Who is reputed to possess the most power? Who actually makes decisions? These methods are labelled respectively as the

⁷²*Ibid.* The classification follows the one laid down by Bottomore. For terminological consistency, however, I have substituted elite, political elite and the ruling elite.

⁷³Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model", p. 464.

positional, the reputational, and the decision-making method of elite identification.⁷⁴

The positional method of identifying elites is based on the assumption that formal authority and actual influence tend to be congruent. As Mills argued: "To be celebrated, to be wealthy, to have power requires access to major institutions".⁷⁵ The task here is to identify politically significant institutions and to treat the incumbents of these institutions as the elite. The reputational method is based on the assumption that individuals reputed to exercise power actually do exercise power, that reputed power equals real power. It does allow the researcher to discover personalities whose influence is only indirect or implicit. The decision-making approach is advocated on the ground that the true test of both power and elite status is the ability to make decisions. Those who actually do play a prominent role in the decision making process are identified as elites. None of these methods for finding the powerful is without defects and hence some scholars have merged several different approaches. Even this cumulative approach has not been able to resolve the uncertainties addressed.

⁷⁴For a detailed consideration of these methods see Richard L. Merritt, *Systematic Approaches to Comparative Politics* (Chicago, Rand McNally & Co., 1970), pp. 104-40; Frederick W. Frey, "The Determination and Location of Elites: A Critical Analysis" (Paper read at the Sixty-sixth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, September 1970); Jerry Hough, "The Soviet Experience and the Measurement of Power", *Journal of Politics*, 37(August 1975), pp. 685-710.

⁷⁵Mills, *The Power Elite*, p. 11.

The political elites of Pakistan to be considered in this study are identified by using the positional and the reputational approaches. There exists a sizeable literature suggesting the importance of various positions in Pakistan. The incumbants of these strategic positions played an important role in the politics of Pakistan and hence are relevant to this study. They include Governors General/President of the republic, provincial governors, central and provincial ministers, members of the national and provincial assemblies, members of the civil service of Pakistan who held commanding positions in the central and provincial secretariats, top ranking military officers, and some leading members of the business community representing chambers of commerce or important business families.

The positional elites were supplemented by a "reputational" list of influential members. An examination, over time, of the key newspapers, legislative debates and relevant literature discloses the names of the influential members whose utterances, judgments, decisions and actions have had consequences for "the authoritative allocation of values" in Pakistan. No attempt has been made to analyze the decision-network in order to identify the elites who actually made decisions. It will be shown that in Pakistan power-as-decision-maker overlapped with power-as-reputation and power-as-position.

Political elites thus identified are grouped in terms of their occupations. This exercise led to the

categorization of the political elites as the civil, military, professional, landowning, industrial, and the religious elites.⁷⁶ Numerous studies have suggested that the ethnic and regional backgrounds of the political elites have had a far more important influence on their politics than their socio-economic origins. One of the factors underlying Pakistan's instability is the geographical and ethnic fragmentation of its population.⁷⁷ Accordingly, the political elites will be identified in ethnic and regional terms as well.

F. Stability and Instability

In its common usage, "political stability" refers to the ability of a system's political institutions to endure without abrupt modifications.⁷⁸ It refers to a system which has demonstrated considerable staying power, "a capacity to endure, without great or frequent changes in pattern".⁷⁹ Similarly, Lijphart defines stability as "the system's

⁷⁶These elite groups have been described in detail in chapter three.

⁷⁷See Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan*; S. M. M. Qureshi, "Elite Politics: The Initial Phase..."; La Porte Jr., *Power and Privilege*.

⁷⁸Conversely, political instability can be defined as alterations in the structure of authority which are accomplished "outside the conventional legal or customary procedure". Michael Hudson, "Political Protest and Power Transfers in Crisis Periods: Regional, Structural and Environmental Comparisons", *Comparative Political Studies*, 4, 3(October 1971), 262.

⁷⁹Harry Eckstein, *Division and Cohesion in Democracy*, p. 227.

ability to survive intact".⁸⁰ A definition of political stability premised on the enduring quality of political institutions does not exclude change, rather it suggests that the essence of stability is that change occurs within the framework of a recognizable continuity. It is therefore advisable to consider the enduring quality of political institutions as one test of the phenomenon. These political institutions may be seen as a set of operating rules which specify the ways the members of a political system are expected to behave in political life. These are the ground rules for political participation.⁸¹ Such rules may be codified, as they are in the United States or in the Indian Constitution or they may be less formalized codes of procedure, such as those developed in Britain.

In applied terms, the durability of political institutions may be measured by evaluating the endurance of the constitution. A constitution, whether codified or uncodified, is the set of principles which defines the basic political institutions, the relationships between each of these institutions, and the relationships between these institutions and the citizenry.⁸² A stable political system maintains a consistent set of political institutions over time. The evidence of an unstable political system, however,

⁸⁰Arend Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems", *Comparative Political Studies*, I, 1(1968), p. 8.

⁸¹David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, (New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1968), p. 200.

⁸²See A. C. Cairns, "The Living Constitution", in *Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality*, ed., J. P. Meekison (Toronto, Methuen, 1971).

lies in the inability of its political institutions to adapt to changing conditions in the environmental setting and frequent changes in its constitution: the pressure of changing demands leads, not to adaptation, but to the replacement of the existing political structures.⁸³

While constitutional durability is a primary measure of political stability, such a conception has little relevance in a Muslim society like Pakistan. Islamic political theory does not concern itself with such matters as the method and procedure of election, term of office, or the manner of removal of the head of state.⁸⁴ Instead, it emphasizes the personal aspect of the ruler and unquestioning submission to whoever is in authority. "Institutions could not and have not been built and in the eyes of the masses government is identified not with any institutions or processes or specific rules or roles but with power and power with

⁸³The operational definition of durability proposed by Gurr and McClelland is "the length of time a polity endures without abrupt, major change in the pattern of authority relations among its basic elements". See Ted Robert Gurr and M. McClelland, *Political Performance: A Twelve Nation Study*, Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, no. 01-018 (Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1971), p. 11. The term polity here refers to the basic constitutional arrangements by which political communities govern themselves. Harry Eckstein, *The Evaluation of Political Performance: Problems and Dimensions*, Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, no. 01-017 (Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1971), pp. 21-22. The basic elements of a polity are its structures of rule-making and rule-application.

⁸⁴Saleem Qureshi, "Military in the Polity of Islam: Religion as a Basis for Civil-Military Interaction", *International Political Science Review*, 2, 3(1981):271-282.

individuals".⁸⁵ True, under Western influence and as a legacy of Western colonial rule, democratic institutions are maintained in these countries which necessitates an analysis of these institutions. For the ruling elites, however, stability is not the maintenance of political institutions but the retention of power - what is for most the primary goal of action. The retention of power is a multi-faceted task. It involves attention to forces that threaten to upset political order, and to devise strategies to bolster personal and governmental legitimacy in the eyes of the whole populace. It suggests therefore that in measuring political stability, attention should be paid, along with constitutional endurance, to the durability of government and personnel, political legitimacy and civil order. These are intimately related components whose presence indicates political health and whose absence signifies political instability.

Civil order refers to "the absence of collective resorts to violence, and actions that are latently violent, to achieve private or public objectives".⁸⁶ It refers specifically to "collective" group actions, which either use force physically to injure or destroy (i.e., violence) or which have a substantial probability of violence (i.e., latently violent). The assumption is that civil order

⁸⁵Saleem Qureshi, "Political Culture of Pakistan: The Mass Dimension" in *The Political Culture of South Asia*, ed., A. Husain (New York, Syracuse University Press, forthcoming), p. 39.

⁸⁶Gurr and McClelland, *Political Performance*, p. 17.

implies a high performance and conversely a high and an enduring level of disorder signifies socio-political malfunction. The use of civil order as a criterion of political stability ties in well with our commonsense notion that political violence is the antithesis of political stability, for it is precisely when large numbers of individuals come to challenge the legitimacy of the existing regime that political violence is most likely to occur. Operationally, the following three forms of strife constitute civil disorder: turmoil (i.e., demonstrations, political strikes, and violent conflict); conspiracy (political assassinations, terrorism, and coup d'etat) and internal war (civil war, and revolution).

A third component of political stability is "the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society".⁸⁷ Legitimacy is linked to cultural norms and values, which prevail in the society, and also to the extent to which people perceive the actions of government as promoting those values and goals that they, particularly desire.⁸⁸ Its primary ingredients are ideas, attitudes, subjective perceptions, and evaluations about the nature and role of authority. When the nature of the system is in accord with prevailing basic beliefs and conceptions of authority, it will be evaluated by people as legitimate

⁸⁷Lipset, *Political Man*, p. 64.

⁸⁸See Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, *Nation Building* (New York, Atherton Press, 1966), p. 12.

and widespread voluntary compliance tends to follow. When the system is perceived as illegitimate, it is forced to rely on coercion or to "buy" compliance by offering or promising various kinds of rewards. Neither one of these methods is a sound basis for durable and effective government.

In Islam, as stated, there is no distinction between religious and political functions. "Muhammad ruled over his people as a divinely inspired and guided prophet. He led the public prayers; he acted as judge; he controlled the army".⁸⁹ His successors - the Caliphs - emulated him in every detail. "No matter how evil a tyrant the actual ruler, no matter how offensive his conduct, the subject was bound to loyal obedience".⁹⁰ As a result, the political culture which emerged in Muslim countries came to be dominated, among others, by two orientations: dogmatism and authoritarianism. Consequently, whoever seizes power and presents himself in proper religious terms is likely to be perceived as legitimate.⁹¹

⁸⁹Duncan B. MacDonald, "Islamic Institutions", *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1956, Vol. 12, p. 712.

⁹⁰Gustave E. Grunebaum, *Medieval Islam* (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 168. Cited in Qureshi, "Political Culture of Pakistan", p. 26.

⁹¹Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, could not become the Quaid-i-Azam (the great leader) until he appealed to the strong religious susceptibilities of the Muslims in India and until he threw away his wardrobe of Savile Row suits and put on the Muslim dress of Sherwani and Shalwar and Karakuli cap (later became known as the Jinnah cap). In an interview to Qureshi, the political secretary to the first Prime Minister of Pakistan stated: "If after the 'righteous caliphs' any name shines in the history of Muslims then it is that of Qaid-i-Azam Jinnah". Saleem M. M. Qureshi, "The

⁹¹ Failing that he will be forced to rely on coercion in order to maintain himself in power. It should be noted that in the West legitimacy pertains most importantly to political or governmental institutions; in Muslim countries it pertains mainly to specific leaders.

In the absence of survey data, political legitimacy can be measured by focusing on negative indicators, that is, by looking for "illegitimacy manifestations".⁹² These indicators include organized opposition to state's constitution, its personnel, and repressive action by regimes in response to such opposition.

The final component of political stability is the frequency and circumstances of government turnover. The focus of attention here is not on the endurance of patterns of political institutions but on the persistence of a particular government or chief executives within that regime. Rapid and frequent changes of the government are generally associated with ineffective government and hence are considered unstable. Frequent changes in executive personnel particularly when such changes are the consequence of elite dissension may be assumed to indicate a lack of decisional efficacy. Support for this assumption is found in the very high negative correlation ($r = .91$) between polity

⁹¹(cont'd) Consolidation of Leadership in the Last Phase of the All-India Muslim League", *Asian Profile*, I, 2 (October 1973), p. 305.

⁹²Gurr and McClelland, *Political Performance*, p. 33.

turnover and efficacy score.⁹³ A government which is unable to act quickly and decisively is unlikely to be able to maintain authority and even to preserve its own existence. Given the importance of personalities in Muslim countries, governmental stability or instability is of great importance and hence is relevant to this study.

The elements of political stability proposed here correspond closely to those employed by Eckstein⁹⁴ and Gurr and McClelland⁹⁵ as the four "axiomatic" dimensions of political performance: constitutional durability, civil order, political legitimacy, and decisional efficacy. The last dimension is measured with reference to the frequency of government turnover. The argument is that frequency of turnover implies decisional inefficacy. The two variables are highly correlated. Accordingly, these four dimensions will be used in evaluating the performance of the political system of Pakistan. Gurr and McClelland point to durability as the principal dimension and argue that the other three dimensions have "interacting, time-dependent relations" with durability.⁹⁶ The presence of these components does not indicate merely overt challenge to the regime but may also be a reflection of the fact that the ground rules of political participation are not strictly observed by those who seek political power within the existing political

⁹³*Ibid.*, p. 70.

⁹⁴Harry Eckstein, *The Evaluation of Political Performance*.

⁹⁵Gurr and McClelland, *Political Performance*.

⁹⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 6, 71.

system. Politics of this kind are typically those in which power is transferred either by palace intrigues or by coups d'etat. Such systems are generally considered unstable.

G. Data Base

As stated, the purpose of this study is to examine and analyze the political system of Pakistan during the period 1947 to 1958. This period is chosen for several methodological reasons. First, a study of Pakistan taking in the whole of the period from 1947 to 1971, when the country splintered into two, would undoubtedly have been more interesting. However, the additional time had to be sacrificed in the interest of the depth of analysis in order to keep the study manageable. Second, the forces generated during this period, especially between 1948-54, and the precedents established, continued throughout the subsequent periods of Pakistani politics with fluctuating intensity. Finally, the data for the period 1947-58 are far more reliable than those available for latter periods. The government agencies making and implementing policies were few, less well organized and less endowed with the motivation and talent for distorting figures. These figures were submitted to the legislature and were subjected to close scrutiny by members of parliament. The data for the subsequent periods are aimed at building the personality cult of the chief executive, referred time and again to his "dynamic and inspiring leadership", and always painting a

picture of increasing prosperity.

The data for this analysis come from the usual major sources of non-survey data, namely, the press reports and standard biographical publications for elite backgrounds and census and other government and nongovernment sources of aggregate data on ecological and other variables. Among newspapers, the most carefully combed sources are the three English dailies: *Dawn* (Karachi) with an approximate daily circulation, as of 1958, of about 38,000; the *Pakistan Times* (Lahore and Rawalpindi) with a circulation of 34,000 and *The Pakistan Observer* (Dacca) with a circulation of about 12,000. The Urdu daily *Jang* (Karachi and Rawalpindi) and a Bengali daily *The Azadi* (Dacca) were also consulted. Among the foreign sources, reliance is placed on the *New York Times*, the *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* and *The Times* (London). These papers are supplemented by several other dailies and weeklies as will be evident from the citations made throughout the study. The newspapers served as a valuable source of information. They indicated periodic changes in the Pakistani political scene, chronicled events, provided perspective on substantive issues, and reflected elite views on important domestic and international events. Since none of the Pakistani papers carried a subject index, each and every single issue of each paper had to be examined.

The other major sources of data for this study are the Constituent Assembly and the National Assembly debates.

These debates provide an easy access to useful information. The documents contain the identity of speakers which made it easy to establish their ethnic and regional identities as well as their professional affiliations. The debates also reveal underhand manoeuvres resorted to by various elite groups to arrive at a solution to a given problem.

Most of the biographical information on the elites comes from official government publications, *Who's Who in Pakistan*, biographical sketches in various newspapers and biographies and autobiographies. The last mentioned sources, few and far between, are of great importance in finding out the roles that an elite member assigned to other members of the political elite as well as to members of his own group. Equally valuable are the interviews of elites published in various newspapers.

The primary source of demographic data is the vast array of 1951 and 1961 census volumes available in most libraries. Figures on rates of change in urbanization, occupational structure, literacy, and newspaper circulation are culled from the Pakistani census volumes. Similar figures are also available from government publications such as the *25 Years of Pakistan in Statistics* and were cross-checked with census figures. While no formal interviews were conducted, the study benefitted immensely from consultation with people who are knowledgeable and who played some part in the events which affected the politics and economics of Pakistan during the period under

consideration.

The study is organized into six chapters. Chapter two deals with the political culture of Pakistan. Chapter three identifies the Pakistani political elites in regional as well as occupational terms and briefly discusses their role in the politics of Pakistan. This is followed by an analysis of the cooperative or confrontative behavior of the political elites in terms of conflict regulating practices. Chapter five examines those conditions that have either inhibited or fostered elite cooperation in Pakistan. It concludes by evaluating the performance (stability or instability) of the the political system of Pakistan in terms of the "four" dimensions of political performance. The final chapter summarizes the findings of this study and explores their theoretical implications.

II. The Political Culture of Pakistan

Empirical democratic theory has ascribed decisional ineffectiveness, a low level of legitimacy and consequent instability to political systems characterized by social fragmentation.⁹⁷ These immobilizing and destabilizing effects of fragmentation can, however, be countered and a degree of stability achieved if the political elites of rival subcultures make deliberate efforts to reduce occasions for conflict and adopt a policy of cooperation. The fact that the political elites in some cases did adopt such cooperative behavior is attributed, among other factors, to the political culture which favors the adoption of accommodative policies.

The political culture of a society guides the behavior of political actors and contains the catalysts as well as constraints to political action. A regime may actively seek to change the content of the political culture of the society which it governs. But until the time it actually does so, the regime is to some degree the captive of its culture. As Almond points out, "every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action".⁹⁸ Almond found it useful to refer to this pattern of orientations as the political culture. This conception of political culture was refined later by Almond

⁹⁷Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems", *Journal of Politics*, 18, 3(August 1956), pp. 391-409.

⁹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 396.

and Verba⁹⁹ and they used it in an empirical study and survey of attitudes in five nations. They defined political culture in terms of political orientations and attitudes held by individuals in relation to their political system. "When we speak of the political culture of a society, we refer to the political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and evaluations of its population. People are inducted into it just as they are socialized into nonpolitical roles and social systems".¹⁰⁰ Cognitive orientations include knowledge and beliefs about the political system, its leaders, and operation. Affective orientations involve feelings about the system such as attachment or alienation. Evaluative orientations comprise judgments and opinions about the system and might, for example, include the application of values such as democratic norms. These orientations become the basis for types of political culture. Three types are postulated: "parochial", implying that individuals have low expectations and awareness of government and generally are not involved; "subject", in which individuals are aware of the outcomes of government but do not participate in the processes that result in policy decisions; and "participant", in which individuals are active and involved in the system as a

⁹⁹Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963).

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*, p. 14.

whole, that is, in both the input and output processes.¹⁰¹

The purpose of this chapter is to enquire into the political culture of Pakistan and the way it helped shape the manner of operation of the political elites. A systematic treatment of the political culture, however, requires an understanding of the structures of the Pakistani society and their historical bases. This is important because a country's political culture is embedded in the larger social culture, and authority relations are set in the matrix of social relations.

A. Pakistan: A Fragmented Community

Almost every study of Pakistani politics has begun with two prominent features - the religious nature of the union of East and West Pakistan and the unique geographic aspects of this union. What has not been emphasized is the division of the society into several distinct territorial,

¹⁰¹The literature on political culture is extensive. For an overview see, among others, the following: Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba eds., *Political Culture and Political Development*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965); Young C. Kim, "The Concept of Political Culture in Comparative Politics", *Journal of Politics*, XXVI (May 1964), pp. 313-336; Carole Pateman, "Political Culture, Political Structure, and Political Change", *British Journal of Political Science*, I, 3 (July 1971), pp. 291-305; Lucian W. Pye, "Culture and Political Science: Problems in the Evaluation of the Concept of Political Culture", *Social Science Quarterly*, LIII (September 1972), pp. 285-296; Kenneth Jowitt, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist Systems", *The American Political Science Review*, LXVIII (September 1974), pp. 1171-1191; Rajni Kothari, "Political Culture Revisited: Notes on a Coercive Ideology", *Indian Journal of Political Studies*, XXXIX (January-March, 1978), pp. 89-98.

linguistic, ethnic and cultural entities with little or no sense of mutual history. This horizontal division of the society was exacerbated by the social structure which produced a vertical division in the society and laid the basis for elite rule. Though Islam was singled out as the main unifying force, it served to reinforce the social fragmentation and the social basis for elite rule.

Geography: Pakistan presented a unique example of a "fragmented state".¹⁰² It consisted of two distinct blocks of territory separated by about one thousand miles of an alien land. With an area of 310,403 square miles, the western wing of Pakistan was nearly six times the area of its eastern counterpart with 55,126 square miles, yet the latter constituted a majority of, according to the Census of 1951, 55 percent (42 million as against 33.8 million in West Pakistan).

¹⁰²It is important to differentiate conceptually between social fragmentation, social pluralism and social cleavage. Social fragmentation is used in this study to refer to divisions in the society in terms of distinct language, religion, race, ethnicity, or sense of historical experience. While a great many divisions exist within any society, based upon these cultural differences between individuals, these become cleavages only insofar as these differences are recognized as being the basis for competition and dispute. Social pluralism is usually referred to divisions in the values of different groups in the society when these divisions have produced their own network of interconnected social organizations like schools, communication media, interest groups, political parties and others (see Almond, "Comparative Political Systems"; V. R. Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the Smaller European Democracies", *Comparative Politics*, 3(1971), pp. 141-175).

The Eastern part of Pakistan¹⁰³ comprised the province of East Bengal and a portion of Assam. The provinces of West Punjab, Sind, North West Frontier (NWFP) and Baluchistan made up the Western wing, which also included a number of adjoining princely states and special areas.

Population: Pakistan, according to the Census of 1961, had a population of about 93.8 million compared to 72.99 million in 1951. The growth rate was estimated at 2.2 percent per annum. The greater part of the population, 54.3 percent, lived in East Pakistan and 45.7 percent in West Pakistan. In the latter, the Punjab contained the largest concentration of population (about 60 percent of West Pakistan's population in 1961) and exerted the greatest degree of social, economic and political influence in the country. Sind was next in population followed by the NWFP and trailed by Baluchistan.

In terms of density, East Pakistan was one of the most densely populated areas in the world. Its population density in 1951 was 701 per square mile which a decade later shot up to 922 persons.¹⁰⁴ In contrast, West Pakistan with its smaller population and six times greater area, had, in 1961,

¹⁰³Eastern wing of Pakistan was originally called East Bengal. It was renamed "East Pakistan" through the Governor General's special ordinance issued on March 27, 1955, see Keesing's Research Report, *Pakistan: From 1947 to the Creation of Bangladesh* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), p. 5. For the sake of consistency, however, I have used "East Pakistan" throughout the study.

¹⁰⁴Pakistan, Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs, Home Affairs Division, *Population Census of Pakistan, 1961*, Vol. I, Pt. ii, Statements 2.3, 2.11, 2.14.

a population density of 138 persons per square mile which was about seven times less than that of East Pakistan. With the exception of Chittagong Hill Tracts, East Pakistan's least dense areas were more densely populated than the most densely populated areas of West Pakistan.

Despite East Pakistan's high population density, its rate of urbanization was lower than that of West Pakistan: 4.3 percent and 5.2 percent respectively in 1951 and 1961 as against West Pakistan's 17.8 percent and 22.5 percent. The population was made up of a very uneven distribution of components. West Pakistan was made up almost wholly of Muslims (97.2 percent in 1961), while in East Pakistan Hindus formed nearly one-fourth of the population (see table II.1)

Language: Whereas East Pakistan very closely approximated a linguistic unit, West Pakistan presented a complex polyglot.¹⁰⁵ Bengali gave the eastern region a high linguistic unity paralleling and reinforcing its already existing geographical unity. As shown in table II:2, Bengali, which had been "in the vanguard of the literary renaissance in Modern India",¹⁰⁶ was spoken by about 98 percent of the people throughout East Pakistan and it remained almost constant. West Pakistan, conversely, was more a land of Babel. Major West Pakistani languages were

¹⁰⁵Donald N. Wilber; *Pakistan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture* (New Haven, Human Relations Area File Press, 1964), p. 71.

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*, p. 74.

Table II:1

Percentage Distribution of Population by Religion
1951 - 1961 (in Percent)

Religion	East Pakistan		West Pakistan		Pakistan	
	1951	1961	1951	1961	1951	1961
Muslims	76.8	80.4	97.1	97.2	85.9	88.1
Caste Hindus	10.0	8.6	0.5	0.5	5.7	4.9
S.C.Hindus	12.0	9.8	1.1	1.0	7.2	5.8
Christians	0.3	0.3	1.3	1.3	0.7	0.8
Others	0.9	0.9	-	-	0.5	0.4

Source: Adapted from Pakistan, Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs, Home Affairs Division, *Population Census of Pakistan, 1961*, Vol. I, statement 2.18, Table 5.

Table II:2

Frequency of Major Languages Spoken as Mother Tongue
in Pakistan (Percent of Population)

Language	East Pakistan		West Pakistan		Pakistan	
	1951	1961	1951	1961	1951	1961
Bengali	98.16	98.42	0.02	0.11	56.40	55.48
Punjabi	0.02	0.02	67.08	66.39	28.55	29.02
Pushto	--	0.01	8.16	8.47	3.48	3.70
Sindhi	0.01	0.01	12.85	12.59	5.47	5.51
Urdu	0.64	0.61	7.05	7.57	3.37	3.65
Baluchi	--	--	3.04	2.49	1.29	1.09
Brahui	--	--	--	0.93	--	0.41
Others	--	0.93	--	1.44	--	1.14

Source: Adapted from Pakistan, Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs, Home Affairs Division, *Population Census of Pakistan, 1961*, Vol. I, pt. IV, statement 5.3, p. 31.

Punjabi, Sindhi, Baluchi and Pushto spoken respectively in Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and the Frontier Provinces. Thus each of these four major languages was "geographically boxed within its region".¹⁰⁷ Urdu, which the pioneers of the Pakistan movement had hoped would one day become a national lingua franca, was the mother tongue of only 7.05 percent in 1961 mainly because of the heavy influx of Indian immigrants (Muhajirs) since 1947.¹⁰⁸ Almost everyone in East Pakistan belonged to one ethnic group, Bengali, while West Pakistan was made up of Punjabi, Pathan, Baluchi, Sindhi and other ethnic groups.

History: The areas that constituted Pakistan did not have a long history of a common orientation, of being part of one political entity, sharing common institutions and structures and of having a past of living together and dealing with one another. West Punjab was partitioned from East Punjab; Sind until 1937 had been part of Bombay. The Frontier people had been more tuned to their tribal and trans tribal affairs than to the affairs further East and Baluchistan had been too isolated from the rest of West Pakistan. Each linguistic group had a distinctive history of its own, and a heritage of regarding neighbouring groups with suspicion. Sindhis with "a strong cultural and geographical unity, reinforced by language, history and

¹⁰⁷Ian Stephens, *The Pakistanis* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 28.

¹⁰⁸The 7.05 percent figure does not include the other 3 millions who spoke Urdu as an additional language.

common misery",¹⁰⁹ were reluctant to see Sindh as part of a broader political system. Similarly, the Pathans of the Northwest Frontier Province, sometimes called Pakhtuns or Pashtuns, being aware that they belonged to a separate race, were "second to none in their spirit of independence" and could boast at partition that they had never been ruled by a foreign power.¹¹⁰ Even among themselves, they were seldom governed by one another. Baluchis, "a proud people", had in the recent past shown a belligerent concern for their independence.¹¹¹ These regional groups had their own laws and their own pattern of life style which reinforced the linguistic, geographic and other divisions which existed within West Pakistan. Indeed there had been two regional movements in West Pakistan: the Pakhtunistan movement which called for a separate state called Pakhtunistan which would have included all the Pushto speaking areas of West Pakistan and the Sindh Awami Mahaz (Sindh National Movement) which stood for provincial autonomy on the basis of the Lahore Resolution of 1940.¹¹²

East Pakistan, of course, was one thousand miles apart from West Pakistan and did not form an integral part of the Muslim state demanded by Sir Iqbal in his Presidential

¹⁰⁹George M. Platt, *Pakistan: A Continuum* (New York, Americal Geographical Society, 1951), p. 61.

¹¹⁰Richard V. Weekes, *Pakistan: Birth and Growth of a Muslim Nation* (Princeton Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1964), p. 11.

¹¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 17.

¹¹²For a discussion of these movements see, Hafeez Malik, "Problems of Regionalism in Pakistan", in *Pakistan in Transition* ed., Howard Wriggins (Islamabad, University of Islamabad Press, 1975).

address to the Muslim League in 1930.¹¹³ The Lahore Resolution of March 23, 1940 (in retrospect called the Pakistan Resolution) which demanded the grouping of "the North-Western and Eastern zones of India" spoke of independent states in which the constituent units were to "be autonomous and sovereign".¹¹⁴ Indeed, Bengalis who became Pakistanis in 1947 were committed to the idea of a Muslim state separate from the North-Western provinces¹¹⁵ and it is on record that several Bengali leaders fought for the creation of a Greater Bengal separate from both India and Pakistan.

Evidently, there were sharp differences in language and culture, food and costumes, race and customs, and in the historical traditions of various regions which constituted Pakistan in 1947. By many standards, then, Pakistan seemed to fail the test of nationhood even in "hope". Its curious character baffled many an observer and seemed to weigh the odds heavily against its maintaining a stable polity.

¹¹³The territorial demand for a separate Muslim state consisting of the Muslim majority provinces in the North-western region was made by Sir Mohammad Iqbal in 1930. Bengal was not included in this scheme. Similarly, Choudhury Rahmat Ali who coined the name "Pakistan" thought of regions in Northwestern India. Later he put forward schemes for two more Muslim states Bang-i-Islam (Bengal) and Usmanistan (state of Hyderabad). See C. Rahmat Ali, *What Does the Pakistan National Movement Stand For* (Cambridge, W. Heffer & Sons, 1933), p. 4. For details on the development of the idea of Pakistan see Choudhury Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan* (Lahore, Longmans, 1961).

¹¹⁴For full text of the resolution see G. Allana, *Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents* (Karachi, Paradise Subscription Agency, n.d.), p. 172.

¹¹⁵See Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan: The Engima of Political Development* (England, Westview Press, 1980), pp. 46-47.

B. Bases of the Political Culture of Pakistan

Most Pakistanis shared in varying degrees the theological beliefs, social stratification pattern, family loyalty and concepts of status and rank¹¹⁶ despite their tendency simultaneously to exhibit contrasting sets of orientations that kept them apart as separate subcultures. Since these factors have shaped the attitudes and values of the Pakistanis and provided political motivation as well as bases for political action, a brief discussion of these factors will help provide a useful basis for an understanding of the political culture of Pakistan.

The Religion of Islam

An overwhelming majority of the Pakistanis are Muslims. Even though the two provinces of Pakistan had a somewhat different way of looking at Islam,¹¹⁷ the fact remains that Islamic fervor, among the Muslims of East and West Pakistan, was largely responsible for the birth of Pakistan. It is also true that Pakistanis differed in the actual observance of religious practices and rituals with the rich, the Western oriented, and the urbanite more lax in the observance of the rituals than the poor, the illiterate, and

¹¹⁶See Wilber, *Pakistan*, p. 153.

¹¹⁷See Charles Burton Marshall, "Testimony Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs", U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Review of the Mutual Security Programs, Hearings Before a Sub-Committee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs* (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959), pp. 4-5; also A. Tayyeb, *Pakistan: A Political Geography* (London, Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 17.

the rural masses.¹¹⁸ Despite these differences, a belief in the role of religion constituted a basic part of the social ideology of Pakistanis. Islam provides guidance for and regulates every aspect of life in Pakistan¹¹⁹ and occupies the centre stage in the social, economic, and political life of all Pakistanis. No single element in the lives of Pakistanis played a more pervasive role than religion. It helped determine their diet, marriage customs, education and their interpersonal relations.¹²⁰ It is worth noting that the preamble to every constitution of Pakistan emphasized the commitment to setting up of a polity which would help Pakistanis to order their lives in accordance with the requirements of Islam.¹²¹

Islam, to its adherents, is a complete way of life. Unlike Christianity it does not divide corporate functions between Caesar and God. Islam is an all-pervasive phenomenon which entails within itself religion and state, society and culture. The emphasis in Islam is "on unity, i.e., the unity of God, the unity of the community of the faithful which is

¹¹⁸For a revealing study of East Pakistan see A. F. A. Husain, *Human and Social Impact of Technological Change in Pakistan* (Dacca, Oxford University Press, 1956); for West Pakistan see Fazl Ullah Khan & M. Ahmad Khan, *Socio-economic Survey of Village Turangzai* (Peshawar, Peshawar University Press, 1964).

¹¹⁹Wilber, *Pakistan*, p. 1.

¹²⁰*Ibid.*

¹²¹The preamble can be traced back to the Objective Resolution of 1949 most of which was reproduced in the Draft Constitution of 1954 and the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1956. For these documents see G. W. Choudhury ed., *Documents and Speeches on the Constitution of Pakistan* (Dacca, Green Book House, 1967) (Hereinafter referred to as *Documents and Speeches*).

the *Ummah*, the unity of life as a totality, the unity of temporal and the spiritual".¹²² According to Muslim belief, every aspect of life is provided for by appropriate religious regulations. "Our law is complete", said Maulana Abul Hasnat, "no question can arise the law relating to which cannot be discovered from the Quran or the hadith".¹²³

Islam is an equalitarian religion which prescribes equality of believers and brotherhood of Muslims irrespective of caste, color or place of origin. Despite the promotion of an equalitarian principle, Islam in the Indian subcontinent came to provide for social stratification which resembles the Hindu caste system. According to this stratification, the Muslims of India were divided into two groups: the Ashraf (the high-born) and the Azlaf (the low-born). The Ashraf were further subdivided into the Sayyid, Shaikh, Moghul and Pathan. Sayyids claimed descent from the son-in-law of the prophet Muhammad, Moghuls and Pathans from the Turkish and Afghan conquerors of India, and the Shaikh from the tribe to which the prophet Muhammad belonged. The Azlaf were generally the descendants of indigenous people.¹²⁴ Two things about this Islamic

¹²²Saleem Qureshi, "Military in the Polity of Islam", p. 272.

¹²³Government of Punjab, *Report of the Court of Inquiry Constituted Under Punjab Act II of 1954 to Enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953* (Lahore, Government Printing, 1954), p. 211. (Hereinafter referred to as *Munir Report*).

¹²⁴Wilber, *Pakistan*, pp. 117-118; also A. K. M. Nazmul Karim, *Changing Society in India and Pakistan* (Dacca, Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 128-129. Karim mentions four social classes: Ashraf, Atrah Bhalamanus, Atrah and Arzal.

stratification are well worth noting. First, one could discern a positive correlation between the occupational hierarchy and the class hierarchy. Second, the social structure was intimately tied to the patterns of land tenure. High social status was accorded to families that were associated with the feudal landholding system by inheritance, or by marriage. Thus, there existed a convergence between landownership and high rank in the hierarchy. From here emerged the elaborate etiquette with distinct modes of behavior for superiors and subordinates. The super-sub distinction was justified by referring to such Quranic verses as "Obey Allah, and obey the messenger and those of you who are in authority".¹²⁵

Historically the model of leadership acceptable to Muslims, and to most Pakistanis, has been that of the "righteous" first four caliphs.¹²⁶ This phase of caliphate, which lasted for a period of less than thirty years, was followed by a history of autocratic and arbitrary rule by Muslim hereditary rulers. Muslim societies generally have shown a respect for power and appreciation of those who are in authority. Good government, in general, meant a government under a strong leadership. "There has been no place for weak leaders with notions of diffuse authority over Muslims, and such leaders have generally not been

¹²⁵Koran, Surah 4, verse 59, cited in Saleem Qureshi, "Islam and Development: The Zia Regime in Pakistan", *World Development*, 8, 7/8 (July/August 1980), p. 564.

¹²⁶*Munir Report*, p. 203.

successful".¹²⁷

Acceptance of the super-sub distinction by Muslims on the authority of the Quran reveals another aspect of the religion of Islam as it is understood by Muslims - submission. In fact, the literal Arabic meaning of the word Islam is "submission",¹²⁸ submission to the will of God, accepting His word, and acting according to the path it delineated for man. Because God created all, is just and omniscient, His commandments are intrinsically superior to any man-made ruling. This belief that all things are emanations from God, tends to make the believers fatalistic in their approach to life. A survey conducted by Dacca University in East Pakistan discloses that most of the people were fatalistic, they believed that calamities were sent by God to punish people for their sins.¹²⁹

The consequence of dogma and fatalism was a sense of impotence which in turn made an individual rely on superiors for decisions. "It relieves his anxiety if the elders and persons in positions of authority make the decisions".¹³⁰ This satisfaction at being able to depend on the judgment of a superior has instilled in people's inner consciousness the

¹²⁷Qureshi, "Elite Politics", p. 269.

¹²⁸C. R. Sutcliffe, "Is Islam an Obstacle to Development? Ideal Patterns of Belief versus Actual Patterns of Behaviour", *The Journal of Developing Areas*, 10(October 1975), pp. 77-82.

¹²⁹Hussain, *Human and Social Impact of Technological Change in Pakistan*, II, pp. 28-29, 36-37, 51-52.

¹³⁰Everett E. Hagen, "A Framework for Analyzing Economic and Political Change", in *Development of the Emergent Countries: An Agenda for Research*, eds., Robert E. Asher et. al., (Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1962), p. 12.

notions of superordinate and subordinate relationships.

This dogma and fatalism had two further consequences: first, it induced the masses to show respect to religious leaders - the Ulema (religious functionaries) and the Pir (religious divines). Their authority emanated from the belief in their religious knowledge, piety and spiritual powers. They provided what may be called the orthodox leadership to the community. Second, it made the masses an object of manipulation in the hands of the elites. Elites could mobilize the masses for any cause by presenting it in appropriate religious terms. One thing for sure, "it is that provided you can persuade the masses to believe that something they are asked to do is religiously right or enjoined by religion, you can set them to any course of action regardless of all considerations of discipline, loyalty, decency, morality or civic sense".¹³¹ The Khilafat and the Non-cooperation movement of 1920s, the Pakistan movement of 1940s, and the Ahrar-sponsored, anti-Ahmadi agitation of 1953 in Pakistan testify to the validity of the above statement.

Social Stratification

Almost every study of Pakistan politics has emphasized the relatively egalitarian social structure of East Pakistan and compared it with the West Pakistani structure which consisted of few families owning large estates and large

¹³¹ *Munir Report*, p. 285.

number of peasants owning small holdings. As shown in tables II.3 and II.4, there was a good deal of variation between the two wings of Pakistan and that land ownership in East Pakistan was more dispersed than in the West wing¹³² where a majority of the people were "under the thumb of Zamindars".¹³³ Nevertheless, landlords in East Pakistan retained their influence in the social matrix. This is confirmed by a study of the background of Union Council members elected under Basic Democracies Scheme instituted by President Ayub Khan in 1960. The study showed that whereas only 10 percent of East Pakistani farmers had holdings above 7.5 acres, 63 percent of Council members did. And while 15 percent of East Pakistani farmers earned over 3,000 rupees a year, 48 percent of Council members did.¹³⁴ Similarly, survey studies conducted in East Pakistan have shown an overall positive association between landownership and relative social rank and status.¹³⁵ It could therefore, be

¹³²This was due to The East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act of 1950 which abolished, with compensation, all rent-receiving interests between the cultivating tenants and the State, and fixed a ceiling for the khas (self-cultivated) possession of land to a total of 100 standard bighas (about 33 acres) per family or 10 bighas (about 3.3 acres) per family member, whichever was greater. See Government of Pakistan, National Planning Board, *The First Five Year Plan, 1955-60* (Karachi, Manager of Publications, 1957), pp. 313-317.

¹³³*Time* (Magazine, Asia edition), September 17, 1965, p. 22.

¹³⁴Rahman Sobhan, *Basic Democracies, Works Programmes and Rural Development in East Pakistan* (Dacca, Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 121-126.

¹³⁵Peter J. Bertocci, "Community Structure and Social Rank in Two Villages in Bangladesh", in *Muslim Communities of South Asia*, ed., T. N. Madan (New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1976), p. 41. The survey was conducted in 1966-67.

Table II:3

Percentage of Farms and Area Classified by Size
East Pakistan, 1960

Size of Farm (in Acres)	Percent of Farm	Percent of Area
under 0.5	13	1
0.5 to under 1.0	11	2
1.0 to under 2.5	27	13
2.5 to under 5.0	26	26
5.0 to under 7.5	12	19
7.5 to under 12.5	7	19
12.5 to under 25.0	3	14
25.0 to under 40.0	--	3
40.0 and over	--	2

Source: Pakistan, Ministry of Food and Agriculture,
Agricultural Census Organization, *Pakistan
Census of Agriculture, East Pakistan, Vol. I*
(Karachi, Manager of Publications, 1962),
Table 3, p. 33.

Table II:4

Pattern of Land Ownership in West Pakistan, 1959

Size of Holdings (in Acres)	Percent of total Owners	Area Owned	Percentage of total Area
0 to 5	64.44	7,425,614	15.27
5 to 25	28.66	15,438,138	31.74
25 to 100	5.65	10,616,308	21.83
100 to 500	1.13	7,671,537	15.77
500 and over	0.11	7,490,933	15.40

Source: Adapted from West Pakistan, *Land Reforms
Commission Report, 1959* (Lahore, West
Pakistan Government Press, 1959), Appendix I.

concluded that society in both East and West Pakistan was stratified in which landlords were at the top of the pyramid and the peasantry formed the base.

The life style of a landlord in West Pakistan is portrayed by M. Masud as follows:

He is a feudal lord and maintains a legion of servants, owns fine horses, cows and buffaloes. He possesses a large number of firearms and his shooting expenses every year run into thousands of rupees. Extravagance in food and dress, gross and vulgar sexual excesses, garish ostentations are the things on which he chooses to devote his income. He has feudal rivalries with the neighbouring landlords and has therefore to maintain a show of power. This he does by commanding a gang of thieves and robbers ... (and by having) in his confidence the police officials¹³⁶

The tenant (known as Hari in Sind) had lived under oppression and tyranny for generations and accepted the servile life as "his destiny and the local religious 'leaders', the pirs and the mullahs console the hari with the doctrine of 'fate'".¹³⁷ The landlords, evidently, were the powerful elements in the society. The notion of relationship which this social pattern instilled in people's inner consciousness was based on dominant-subordinate, command-compliance relations which encouraged the dependence of the peasant on the landlord.

Patrimonialism: The loyalty and support of the peasant was to the landlord as a person and, not to his impersonal

¹³⁶M. Masud, *Hari Report: Note of Dissent* (Karachi, Hari Publications, 1948), pp. 3-4. Malcolm L. Darling, *Rusticus Loquitur* (London, Oxford University Press, 1930), pp.286, 291, described the landlord as "all throat stranglers," and "tyrants"(zalim).

¹³⁷M. Masud, *Hari Report*, p. 6.

position.¹³⁸ This kind of relationship, following Max Weber, may be termed patrimonialism in which:

The object of obedience is the personal authority of the individual which he enjoys by virtue of his traditional status. The organized group exercising authority is, in the simplest case, primarily based on relations of personal loyalty cultivated through a common process of education. The person exercising authority is not a "superior" but a personal "chief". His administrative staff does not consist primarily of officials but of personal retainers. Those subject to authority are not members of an association but are either his traditional "comrades" or his "subjects". What determines the relations of the administrative staff to the chief is not the impersonal obligations of office, but personal loyalty to the 'chief'.¹³⁹

Evidently, patron-client ties develop between two parties unequal in power, status, wealth and influence; the relationship is based on reciprocity in exchange of goods and services and that the relationship rests on face-to-face contact between the two parties.¹⁴⁰

The patrimonial system is pyramidal in form, the top and the bottom of the pyramid being linked by middle echelon patrons. The reciprocity in patron-client relationships, placing, as it does, formal and final authority at the top causes most of the resources to flow upward rather than downward. Despite the presence of reciprocity, patrimonial

¹³⁸ Qureshi, "Elite Politics", p. 269.

¹³⁹ Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations*, trans. by Talcott Parsons (New York, Free Press, 1957), p. 341. Weber defines patrimonialism as existing "where authority is primarily oriented to tradition but in its exercise makes a claim to full personal powers". p. 347.

¹⁴⁰ John Duncan Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientist Politics", *The American Political Science Review*, 64 (June 1970), pp. 412-413.

systems are exploitative and depend on coercion. The system works because the top patrons maintain a near monopoly over the use of force and are quick to use it to enforce their control.¹⁴¹

Muslim rule, as pointed out by Qureshi, has generally been highly patrimonial.¹⁴² This has especially been so in India. During the Mughal Empire (1526-1707), the Muslim nobility mainly of foreign descent comprised the privileged class. The middle rung was composed of small groups of merchants and bankers, petty traders and traditional professionals. The lowest on the ladder were the great mass of ordinary people living in absolute poverty - "so great and miserable that the life of the people can be depicted or accurately be described as the home of stark want and the dwelling place of bitter woe".¹⁴³ This threefold grouping was crosscut by other social divisions of which Ashraf/Azlaf distinction was the most significant. Nevertheless, there was a positive correlation between the occupational hierarchy and the class hierarchy. Mughal Emperor, Mughal aristocracy, and Mughal courts were at the top of the pyramid, followed immediately by the members of the Ashraf class, the landowning gentry viz., Jagirdars and Zamindars.

¹⁴¹Robert E. Gamer, *The Developing Nations: A Comparative Perspective* (Boston, Allyn and Bacon Inc., 1976), esp. ch. 4.

¹⁴²Qureshi, "Elite Politics", p. 270.

¹⁴³The description is by Francisco Pelsaert regarding 17th century India quoted in Angus Maddison, *Class Structure and Economic Growth: India and Pakistan Since the Moghuls* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1970), pp. 18-19.

The decline of the Mughal Empire and the advent of the British rule in India meant quite naturally the displacement of the Mughal aristocracy and its substitution by a civil-military bureaucracy, the top positions in which were manned almost entirely by the British. This, however, did not mean the repudiation of the Mughal tradition. The pomp and grandeur of the Mughal tradition remained intact so much so that Lord Beveridge's father, who did not have a successful career, "had 21 servants to start married life, 39 when he had three children, and 18 when living on his own".¹⁴⁴ It meant, of course, the removal of the traditional economic and political base of Muslim aristocracy - the Zamindars and Jagirdars - resulting in declining numbers of Muslim landed aristocracy. The All-India Muslim League was organized initially to arrest further decline of Muslim aristocracy. Composed exclusively of Muslim notables, the Muslim League Council, even after graduating from an interest group to a nationalist movement and despite British attempt at transformation of the social structure and westernization, had, as of 1942, 163 landlords, the single largest group out of a total of 503 members.¹⁴⁵ With the establishment of Pakistan, they formed a part of the "major network" of the patrimonial system inaugurated by Mr. Jinnah. Together with other elite groups, in a series of

¹⁴⁴Lord Beveridge, *India Called Them* (London, Allen and Unwin, 1957), cited in Maddison, *Class Structure and Economic Growth*, p. 43.

¹⁴⁵Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan*, p. 55.

shifting permutations, they operated the political system that allocated values principally within a network of patron-clients.

The effect of the existence of this social pattern over the generations has been the instilling in the consciousness of the masses of the notions of proper super-subordinate, ruler-subject relationships. It has imbued the society with a belief system that ascribes superiority either to noble birth or to inherited wealth and the latter in turn to the will of God without whose command, as the Bengali saying goes, "not a leaf moves". Consequently, the wealthy potentates, the landed gentry or the civil and military bureaucracy have always been able to command support in the society.

Family

Profound respect for power and authority had its grounds in several features of the fundamental unit of the Pakistani society, the family. There exists a sharply defined hierarchy of sex, generation and age. The children were not encouraged to exercise independent authority. There was no equality between the members of a family. Almost each and every member of the family enjoyed some status and authority which he exercised over those who were younger than him or her. Thus in the family one ruled and in turn was ruled by another. In fact, authority and status were the keynotes of the Pakistani family life. Authority was vested

in the male members of the family and was "organized hierarchically by respect relationship".¹⁴⁶ The eldest male member exercised absolute authority and control and children were expected to render total, unconditional submission. "This submission of juniors to seniors (also females to males) established the pattern of all relationships between the individual and the authority".¹⁴⁷

In addition to respect and deference, the family also conditioned a child to promote his self-esteem and that of his family, clan, tribe or lineage. He was conditioned to live up to the social code for his role and class, to fulfill the standards of his particular family, tribe, or lineage and to emphasize the superiority of his group over other groups.¹⁴⁸ Emphasis on loyalty and respect for one's own group resulted in an attitude of touchiness and competition which made harmonious cooperation difficult and factionalism rife.

C. The Political Culture of Pakistan

Given the above discussion of the essential features of the Pakistani society, it is now possible to analyze some of the most important dimensions of the political culture of Pakistan. It needs to be emphasized that the main basis for the political culture of Pakistan is to be found in the religion of Islam. The other two bases, the social structure

¹⁴⁶Wilber, *Pakistan*, p. 123.

¹⁴⁷Qureshi, "Political Culture of Pakistan", p. 27.

¹⁴⁸Wilber, *Pakistan*, p. 161.

and the family socialization pattern, were underlaid by the same religious factor. Admittedly, the vague but tenaciously held belief of the unarticulated, illiterate average Muslim differs from the Islam of the educated, urban and non-practicing Muslims, the imprint of Islam nonetheless is clearly visible.¹⁴⁹ The religious values which influence the simple folk of the rural areas generally extend to the urban educated as well. "I have quite often heard my colleagues saying", stated a high ranking Pakistani civil servant, "that no matter what changes took place because of industrialization, our Islamic values would hold together and, therefore, we had nothing to be afraid of".¹⁵⁰ As empirically observed, there appears no real difference in the attitudes of the urban and the rural populations. They shared in varying but significant degrees the attitudes and orientations of the larger political culture. As stated above, they all shared certain religious beliefs, experienced almost identical social structural patterns and underwent a not wholly different pattern of socialization. The result has been a considerable sharing of certain underlying values and orientations towards the political

¹⁴⁹According to Sharabi, Islam had survived in three main forms: in the instinctive belief of the common man, in the self-image of the urban Muslim, and in "the shape of the moulds in which thought and evaluations are cast". Hisham Sharabi, "Islam and Modernization in the Arab World", in *Modernization of the Arab World*, ed., J. H. Thompson & R. D. Reischauer (New York, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966), pp. 26-27.

¹⁵⁰Agha Abdul Hamid, *Views of Administration in Pakistan* (Lahore, Pakistan Administrative Staff College, 1963), p. 7.

system, the political process, and towards oneself vis-a-vis others. Though these themes have not been systematically studied in all their ramifications, they are pervasive enough to have been singled out by foreign and Pakistani scholars.

We may begin by considering the political culture along the political activism dimension with its threefold typology: participant, subject and parochial.¹⁵¹ In the absence of survey data, we may look at urbanization and literacy figures to have a rough idea of the relative strength of each type.¹⁵² As of 1961, Pakistan had an urban population of 13.1 percent as against 86.9 percent of the rural population. The total literate population in Pakistan was about 15.9 percent. The proportion of literates in the population was higher in the urban areas (30.2 percent), the figure for the rural areas sharply dropped to 13.6 percent.¹⁵³ Given the "rudimentary" nature of the transportation network and facilities,¹⁵⁴ it could safely be assumed that most of the 73 percent of the total population which was both rural and illiterate tended to be parochial.

A substantial proportion of literates had no formal

¹⁵¹ Almond and Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics*, p. 53.

¹⁵² There is general consensus among scholars that urbanization and education make the individual less parochial. See Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe, Illinois, Free Press, 1958); also Joseph La Palombara, "Italy: Fragmentation, Isolation, Alienation," in *Political Culture and Political Development*, p. 325.

¹⁵³ *Twenty Years of Pakistan, 1947-1967* (Karachi, Pakistan Publications, 1967), p. 19.

¹⁵⁴ Karl Von Vorzys, *Political Development in Pakistan* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 16.

education. About 57.4 percent of literates had completed Grade V or less. Only a small proportion of literates (7 percent) had completed high school or higher education and it is they who evidenced the participatory or the activist political attitudes. The rest of the literates and the urbanites seemed to have been better informed and more interested in political affairs than the illiterate rural population, but there is no convincing evidence that this gave rise to participatory attitudes on their part. They may be categorized as subjects.

Admittedly, this classification of political sub-cultures is overly simplistic but it serves the purpose in suggesting the dominance of the "parochial" orientation. The general masses had never been the audience to whom political action had been addressed. As stated by General Iskander Mirza:

The masses of this country are overwhelmingly illiterate. They are not interested in politics.... They are bound to act foolishly sometimes.... It was thus necessary, in fact, essential, that there should be somebody to rectify their blunders.¹⁵⁵

One of the most crucial aspects of any political culture is the manner and degree of popular identification with the nation. How uniformly and reliably did the Pakistanis identify themselves as Pakistanis in a national political sense? There is virtual unanimity among scholars of Pakistani politics that the attitudes of most of the Pakistanis were characterized by the primacy of their

¹⁵⁵*Dawn*, October 31, 1954.

familistic, tribal, ethnic or regional loyalties and identifications. Ethnic and regional groups opposed one another, demanded representation in central cabinets and assemblies, and quarrelled over public sector investments by the central government.

Pathan leaders demanded the creation of a separate state called Pakhtoonistan. Sindhi political elites looked to Sindh as a "national homeland". Bengali political elites talked glibly of "two peoples", "two cultures" and "independence".¹⁵⁶ About half (49.1 percent) of the civil servants, surveyed by M. Ahmed, agreed they were strongly influenced by regional considerations in their administrative decision making. Of the rest, 14.4 percent said they were somewhat influenced by regional considerations and 22.9 percent denied having had any such considerations. It should be noted that about one-third of Muneer's sample consisted of Muhajirs who had no constituency of their own in Pakistan.¹⁵⁷

The regions that became Pakistan were either backward hinterlands or tribal territories where little political consciousness focused on the idea of corporate state. Most Pakistanis were inclined to give their support to the more

¹⁵⁶Ataur Rahman Khan once took the parliament into his confidence: "As a matter of fact I may tell you, it may be a great weakness with me that I feel a peculiar sensation when I come from Dacca to Karachi. I feel physically, apart from mental feeling, that I am living here in a foreign country". Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debates*, I, 4 (March 19, 1956), p. 216.

¹⁵⁷Muneer Ahmed, *The Civil Servant in Pakistan* (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 112-113.

familiar patrimonial landlords, headmen, tribal chiefs and religious leaders in their particular region. In any case, strong attachment to kinship, ethnic and local territorial group hinders the formation of the vague, intermittent, and genuine unity of spirit which is considered essential for a modern political system.

The complex of beliefs and values regarding authority constituted another key component of the Pakistani political culture. Pakistanis considered authority as indispensable for the society and worthy of unremitting deference. They believed that government was capable of doing everything under the sun and that the interest of the people will be looked after by it. As pointed out by Griffith, "To some extent this was in keeping with Indian tradition."¹⁵⁸

There are numerous forms for indicating deference to superiors. Some of these are linguistic, the numerous respect forms used in reference and address to superiors. Mr. Jinnah was given the title Quaid-i-Azam (the great leader) and his name was read as "Amirul Millat" during the Friday sermons in mosques.¹⁵⁹ Similarly, the first Prime Minister Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan was dubbed Quaid-i-Millat (leader of the nation). When the United Front party won a landslide victory in East Pakistan, its organizer Maulana Bhashani was addressed as Quaid-i-Mazloom (leader of the oppressed). There are in addition many nonverbal gestures of

¹⁵⁸Sir Percival Griffith, *The British Impact on India* (London, Macdonald, 1952), p. 230.

¹⁵⁹*Dawn*, August 25, 1947.

respect toward superiors, such as standing up to speak when addressed by an authority figure. This notion of authority predisposes adherents toward agreeable, pleasing and conformist kinds of social actions. This kind of orientation leads to subordination and submission to authority figures to the point of unqualified and unquestioning obedience.

The psychological roots of these attitudes toward authority lay, of course, in the structure and working of the family.¹⁶⁰ As stated above, the character of the family was patriarchal. The father was endowed with considerable powers and was entitled to the utmost respect and obedience. The physical punishment which he might inflict upon his wife and children was usually considered to be productive of salutary effects. Obedience was the prime objective in the socialization of children. The family socialization process was reinforced by the patron-client relationship at the societal level which in turn was sanctified by religious injunctions which the political elites in Pakistan repeatedly emphasized.¹⁶¹

A final Pakistani orientation often stressed by commentators was the strong sense of mutual distrust which characterized interpersonal relationships. There was a general lack of trust in the essential goodness of human

¹⁶⁰Qureshi, "Political Culture of Pakistan", p. 27.

¹⁶¹Thus the Law Minister of Pakistan, in the course of a debate, argued that the main reason why an individual should obey the law is that it has been so "declared by God. He says in the Quran: 'Obey God, obey the Prophet, and obey those who are in authority amongst you' ". *Documents and Speeches*, pp. 152-153.

nature. Men accused one another of subverting the state and of being loyal to their own narrow selfish interests. As pointed out by Weiner, "few men or groups trusted one another".¹⁶² The distrust was racial, tribal, as well as personal. At times the focus of attack was "unmistakably the short stature and the small calibre of present Bengali leadership",¹⁶³ at other times the whole race was slandered: "You have such sweet music", said the Pathan General to an East Pakistani friend, "I wish to God you were half as sweet yourself".¹⁶⁴ A Bengali member of the Constituent Assembly told his Punjabi colleague during the debate: "Exploitation is the only religion that you follow, I am very sorry to say".¹⁶⁵ Landowners like Qizilbash, Noons, Tiwanas, Gardézis, the Legharis, and the Gilanis from Punjab were sworn enemies of the Daulatana, and Qureshis. Some of these landlords were involved in feuds dating back several decades.¹⁶⁶

Qureshi attributes this sense of distrust to the depth of loyalty and pride that Pakistanis had in their own family, clan, tribe or lineage and to an emphasis in the

¹⁶²Myron Weiner, "The Politics of South Asia", in *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, eds., Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 198.

¹⁶³*Evening Times* quoted in Z. A. Suleri, *Pakistan's Lost Years* (Lahore, Progressive Papers Ltd., 1962); p. 49.

¹⁶⁴Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography* (London, Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 27.

¹⁶⁵Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, in Documents*, p. 307.

¹⁶⁶Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan*, p. 87.

family on "the validation of status i.e., Keeping the respect of one's fellows, whether by a display of power and wealth or by a generous distribution of hospitality".¹⁶⁷

This indeed was the most sought-after objective in Pakistan. Sacrifices for family security or family honor are routinely expressed in frontier areas. Here families and clans live in their fortresses armed with weapons. A visitor to one family is a suspect to the occupants of a fortress only a few yards away. Ready accessibility of guns and rifles makes the attempt at the validation of status a bloody affair.

As stated above, part of the reason for this distrust was ethnic and racial, partly tribal and partly personal. Perception of humanity with apprehension was not conducive to harmonious cooperation. This not merely rendered horizontal integration difficult but also hindered cooperation at the elite level.

D. Conclusion

Pakistanis, divided into several groups, shared in varying degrees the religious belief, social stratification pattern and an almost identical socialization process. Blind faith in religion, without even understanding the meaning of words uttered in prayers, and belief in predestination easily assumed fatalistic characteristics in the belief of all Pakistanis. The consequence of dogma and fatalism was a sense of impotence which in turn made an individual rely on

¹⁶⁷Qureshi, "Political Culture of Pakistan," p. 20.

superiors for decisions. This, in turn, instilled in people's inner consciousness the notions of superordinate and subordinate relationships.

The influence of feudal and caste patterns of hierarchical social structure, sanctioned by religion and reinforced by family socialization patterns, has been identical - instilling in people's consciousness a notion of proper command-compliance relationships. Under this rigid framework, it was essential for one to feel that he was a protege of a higher-ranking person who was thereby a benefactor in a reciprocal relationship of blind loyalty and benevolent obligation. As the religious tradition, the stratification pattern and the socialization processes sanctioned and justified the elitist and the patrimonial nature of the Pakistani society.

From these socializing agencies emerged the political culture of Pakistan which was predominantly parochial and strongly particularistic in the form of intense and overriding identification with the family, clan, tribe or region rather than with the nation. These primordial loyalties created a sense of different rather than common identity in that people did not identify as Pakistanis but as members of a Bengali, a Punjabi, a Pathan, or similar other ethnic groups which often came into conflict with the national identity. Members of these sub-cultures tended to define the "society" as the sub-cultural group, with all others considered to be "outsiders". This again intensified

conflicts, making it extremely difficult to organize an effective government at the national level, and marred the degree of cultural consensus necessary for political stability.

A majority of Pakistanis may be described as not only ignorant of the political processes, structures and institutions but were totally indifferent to them. Politics has been the preserve of the minority not merely because the minority so desired but also because the majority felt satisfaction at being able to rely upon the judgment of superiors. Most people viewed their role in the political process as being that of subjects to be ruled over, not as participants in politics. They believed in subordination and submission to political authority to the point of unqualified and unquestioning obedience. Such a conception of authority legitimizes rule by a minority of elites on the basis of some widely accepted criteria, and the concentration of authority in the hands of these elites who rule in a more or less authoritarian fashion.

Acceptance of elite rule has been induced by their family and religious socialization and reinforced by the pattern of social structure. From here emerged beliefs about the inherent inequality of human beings, about the natural superiority of certain types of people because of their heredity, religious status, wealth, and education. When such beliefs prevail, a hierarchical social and political order based on submission and obedience to superior beings tends

to be accepted as legitimate.

The elite dominance of the society is also helped by an attitude which considered authority as indispensable for the society and worthy of unremitting deference and by a strong sense of mutual distrust in interpersonal relationships. When distrust prevails, when greater hostility characterizes attitudes and relations among competing groups and people, groups fail to be responsive to each other, and offers of compromise tend to be spurned because motives and intentions are suspect. Such a perception does not lead to an attitude of cooperation, thus exposing to manipulation by those who are wealthy and organized.

These orientations, either individually or in combination, tend to produce conceptions that the proper role of the common people is that of a subject to be ruled over by whatever authority the culture endows with legitimacy. It helps place far-reaching authority in the hands of rulers, although other beliefs or longstanding traditions may restrict political authority and the potential for arbitrary rule. The religion of Islam stresses authoritarian rule for the good of the people. Traditions also require the ruler to arrive at a decision, not by bargaining and consultation, but in an arbitrary manner.

The masses expected the elites to behave in a strong high-handed manner. The educated section also demanded a similar behavior:

(This inquiry)... has given us the opportunity to ask our officials, on whom lies the burden of administration, to bear this burden in the tradition of the steel-frame, when we saw the erect figure of a district officer in the middle of an excited procession, a soft smile on a firm mouth, determination written on his face.¹⁶⁸

Firmness in decision making was the natural and accepted behavior of the elites. Consultation and deliberations were considered signs of weakness by both the elites and the masses. These attitudes, as hypothesized, are hardly conducive for the adoption of cooperative strategies.

¹⁶⁸Munir Report, p. 287.

III. Pakistani Political Elites

The term "political elite" is used here to refer to small active minorities who play an important role in "the authoritative allocation of values" and are directly engaged in the struggle for political leadership. The political elites are identified by using the positional and the reputational approaches. No attempt has been made to analyze the decision making network in order to identify those who participated directly in public policy decisions. This is because in Pakistan, power-as-decision-maker overlapped with power-as-position and power-as-reputation. Keith Callard, the only scholar to analyze the decision making network of Pakistan, points out that a small group of about twenty individuals made all important decisions and transferred from one field to another.¹⁶⁹ The decision makers he identified have been the same individuals reputed to be the most influential in Pakistan. Their names, along with others, are most frequently cited in key newspapers, legislative debates, and other relevant sources.

The importance of various positions in the government of Pakistan is testified by a sizeable literature dealing with Pakistani politics. The incumbents of these strategic positions played important roles in the "authoritative allocation of values" and are therefore relevant to this study. These individuals include Governors General, the

¹⁶⁹Keith Callard, *Pakistan*, pp. 25-26.

President of the republic, provincial Governors, Prime Ministers, Chief Ministers, central and provincial ministers, members of national and provincial assemblies, members of the Civil Service of Pakistan, the higher officers in the armed forces, leading members of the business community representing Chambers of Commerce and other important business firms. An examination, over time, of the key newspapers, Constituent Assembly Debates, and relevant published and unpublished literature reveal the names of additional people reputed to be influential in Pakistan. Elites thus identified are grouped in terms of their primary occupations. These are the professional elites, landowning elites, administrative elites, military elites, industrial elites, and the religious elites.

In this chapter we will identify some of the most important members of the political elites in each category whose utterances, judgments, and actions have had major impact on the politics of Pakistan. We will discuss the reasons why they should be considered as elites, look at the general composition of respective groups and examine the recruitment procedures.¹⁷⁰

Before we proceed with the discussion of these categories, it is essential to identify the elites in regional terms. An emphasis on regionalism is essential because the most frequent source of political conflicts and

¹⁷⁰For brief biographical notes on important members of the political elites, see Appendix II.

a major contributor to political violence has been the force of regional or cultural pressures. The most dramatic example of regional grievances and antagonisms was provided by the bifurcation of Pakistan in 1971.

A. Elite Identification by Region

The cultural and regional backgrounds of the political elites have had an important influence on the politics of Pakistan. This is due to the fact that the political culture of Pakistan has been characterized by a particularistic orientation. The political elites could not transcend their regional identities.

Region has been a highly relevant consideration in producing a keen sense of identification among Pakistanis. The cultural and regional criteria are not usually synonymous, but in the case of Pakistan they reinforced each other. Different linguistic groups were generally concentrated in different well defined areas. The groups that comprised Pakistan were exclusive, distinctive congeries of peoples who associated themselves with persons they considered to be like themselves and who gave their allegiance to familiar local patrons. Customs and traditions which guided their social and political behavior were different in various regions. They maintained their specific characters, spoke their respective languages, harbored special interests and endeared themselves to particular life styles. One could therefore say that the regions of Pakistan

were separate cultural entities.

The primary loyalty of a Bengali, a Punjabi or a Pathan is to his family, clan, tribe or lineage - biradaris. Along with the village, they formed the basic units of the Pakistani society. Clans are closely related families. Tribes are clusters of families which claim some form of common ancestry. Villages, like tribes, are clusters of family units. In some cases the village may be coterminous with a tribe, in others, it may embody several tribes or several clans of a single tribe. The fact to be noted is that the tribe or the village generally defines the outer perimeters of the individual's existence. While tribes and villages formed parts of a national entity, the individual's activities and his loyalties seldom moved beyond the confines of the region. "The hiatus between loyalty to the kin group and loyalty to the nation or government has proved to be the source of considerable difficulty in the building of modern Pakistan".¹⁷¹

Another feature of the Pakistani society which made regionalism significant was the minimal interaction between various units caused by the "rudimentary" nature of the transportation network and communication facilities. Railways covered, in 1954-55, only about 10,021 miles, approximately one mile of track for every 52 square miles of

¹⁷¹Wilber, *Pakistan*, p. 154.

territory.¹⁷² Roads were narrow and unsatisfactory. There were, in 1947, only 14,021 miles of road averaging one mile of road for every 26 square miles of territory.¹⁷³

Similarly, water transport was inadequate. There were about 2,500 miles of navigable waterways.¹⁷⁴ The communication system, consisting of the postal services, telegraph, telephones and radios, started with severe handicaps. The broadcasting stations covered mainly the urban centres because radio sets were not available in the rural areas.¹⁷⁵

The most important feature of the Pakistani society was isolation. Spatially, individuals were clustered in scattered villages, each an island unto itself. The problem was confounded by the geographical separation of the two wings of Pakistan by over one thousand miles of Indian territory. This geographical discongruity reinforced by varying climatic conditions made communications between the two wings fitful and expensive. Communications by sea had to go around the peninsula of India, a distance of about 3,000 miles. Rail communication which existed before Independence was completely cut off by India. Air traffic between East

¹⁷²Government of Pakistan, Central Statistical Office, Economic Affairs Division, *Statistical Pocket Book of Pakistan, 1968* (Karachi, Manager of Publications, Government of Pakistan Press, 1968), pp. 172-73.

¹⁷³Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Adviser to the Government of Pakistan, *Pakistan Basic Facts, 1966-67* (Islamabad, Department of Films and Publications, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1967), p. 55.

¹⁷⁴Government of Pakistan, National Planning Board, *The First Five Year Plan, 1955-60* (Karachi, Manager of Publications, Government of Pakistan Press, 1957), p. 499.

¹⁷⁵For figures on the communication network see *Ibid.*, pp. 510-515.

and West Pakistan was expensive and hence labor mobility was limited and between 1955-56 and 1958-59 averaged 20,000 persons per year.¹⁷⁶ The Geographical barrier also prevented effectively the development of a single integrated economy. The multiplier effects of greater investment could not spread to the other wing which created strain in the body politic of Pakistan. It was exacerbated further by the location of the capital in Karachi, West Pakistan, which placed East Pakistan, economically and administratively, in a disadvantageous position. The government had to build a second capital at Dacca to meet the challenge of the physical distance between the two wings of Pakistan. Moreover, the geographic and climatic variations led to common but different economic problems. For instance, even though the problem of water was common to both units, in West Pakistan it was a problem of deficiency and variability, whereas in East Pakistan, the problem was one of excess and consequent flooding. This necessitated two different strategies of development: irrigation for West Pakistan and drainage and flood control for East Pakistan. In sum, cultural differentiations coupled with a low-level of intergroup mobility, a rudimentary communication system and the geographic separation of the two wings by an alien land, enhanced the significance of regionalism in Pakistan.

¹⁷⁶East Pakistan, Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Digest of East Pakistan*, (Dacca, East Pakistan Government press, 1966), p. 153.

Every significant issue was interpreted in cultural and regional terms and every conflict had a regional overtone. These conflicts had already cropped up during the pre-independence period. Bengalis resented the commercial prosperity of non-Bengalis. There were similar jealousies between the Pathans and the Punjabis. In the heat and excitement of the movement for Pakistan, the Muslim League leaders underestimated the potency of regional and ethnic forces. The technique used by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, was to avoid all controversial issues, the need of the hour was unity. "We shall have time", said Jinnah, "to quarrel ourselves..., but first get the government. This is a nation without territory or any government".¹⁷⁷ The post-independent experience revealed that the spirit of nationalism that swept these peoples during the struggle for Pakistan against the Hindu Congress and the British colonial rulers was somewhat superficial. The very achievement of Pakistan intensified regionalisms or sub-nationalisms for the obvious reasons of competition, fear of ultimate domination by the ruling group, and an increased awareness of their separate identities. The political elites wielded influence based on landowning, tribal position, familial prestige, and similar other considerations in their local areas. They had deep roots in their constituencies and commitment to their interests and

¹⁷⁷ Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad ed., *Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Vol. II (Lahore, Ashraf, 1947), p. 393.

views. Within their regions, they were divided into rival groups but in their confrontation with other regions they presented a united front. Punjabis, one observer has commented, "become Punjabis only when they are outside the province".¹⁷⁸

Regions provided the most secure base for the political elites and it was to this base that they almost invariably gravitated in the competitive arena. The local press highlighted issues without placing them in the historical and national context and thus heightened regional feelings and animosities. Parties and factions obtained their principal support from one linguistic or cultural group. The Awami League identified with East Pakistan, the National Awami Party (Wali Khan faction) with the Frontier areas and the Sind United Front with Sind. The leaders were concerned with their respective regions and therefore were not merely symbols but perpetuators of subnational ethnic parochialisms which the ruling group was determined either to domesticate or to suppress.

Pakistan was composed essentially of five major groups - the Bengalis, the Punjabis, the Sindis, the Pathans and the Baluchis. Emerson's definition of a nation may apply equally to each of these groups. In addition, there was a sixth group, the Muhajirs or immigrants from India but they were heterogeneous and scattered all over Pakistan.

¹⁷⁸Salim Alvi, "A Nation's Halting Evolution", *Outlook*, May 11, 1974, p. 11.

Bengalis have always been acutely aware of their cultural or regional identity which is backed by a historical depth and a sense of cultural cohesion. They produced dynamic leaders many of whom clustered around three important personalities who played important roles in the politics of Pakistan. The groups they formed came to be identified with their names. These were the Nazimuddin group, the Fazlul Huq group, and the Suhrawardy group.¹⁷⁹ Khwaja Nazimuddin, the first Chief Minister of East Pakistan, and Maulana Akram Khan, the provincial chief of the ruling Muslim League party headed the Nazimuddin group. Conservative in outlook, they represented the landed interests. Khwaja Shahabuddin, the brother of Nazimuddin, Mohammad Ali Bogra, two times Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nurul Amin, the second Chief Minister of East Pakistan, and Fazlur Rahman, the most powerful Bengali minister in the first two central cabinets identified with the Nazimuddin group. A. K. Fazlul Huq, who moved the famous Pakistan Resolution in 1940, headed the Fazlul Huq group. He founded the Krishak Proja Party and was serving as the Governor of East Pakistan when Martial Law was imposed in 1958. His trusted lieutenants included Hamidul Huq Choudhury who owned the English daily *The Pakistan Observer*, and Abu Hussain Sarkar who served three times as the Chief Minister of East Pakistan. Hussain Shahid Suhrawardy headed the Suhrawardy

¹⁷⁹Rounaq Jahan, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 39.

group. The inner core of his group, the Awami League, included Abul Mansur Ahmad, the Commerce Minister in the Suhrawardy cabinet, Ataur Rahman Khan, twice the Chief Minister of East Pakistan, and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the General Secretary of the party. Mention must also be made of Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani who for a while associated with Suhrawardy but later formed his own National Awami Party. He never occupied any public office but his actions had great effect on the politics of Pakistan. The Hindus, constituting a significant minority, had their own leaders including, among others, J. N. Mandal and K. K. Dutta.

Another important personality in the politics of Pakistan was General Iskander Mirza, the first President of Pakistan. He belonged to the Nawab family of Murshidabad (West Bengal) and was considered a Bengali. He, however, never lived in East Pakistan and was not seen as representing the Bengali interests. Trained as an Army officer, he was later transferred to the Indian Political Service. Much of his career as a district officer was spent in the tribal areas and he built up a good deal of support there. This, plus his rank within the Army made him a major spokesman for the Punjabi-Pathan dominated Pakistan Army, which led to his position in the central cabinet as the Minister of Defence.

Punjabis were the second largest group in Pakistan. But they formed the largest group in West Pakistan and supplied most of the civil and the military elites. In addition,

there was a strong landed aristocracy in the Punjab. The Army officers and the civil servants got along well with the landed gentry of Punjab because most of them came from the same social background.¹⁸⁰ Three Punjabi families who were important in the pre-partition politics and whose members continued to be active in the politics of Pakistan were the Hayats of Wah, the Noons and Tiwanas of Sargodha and the Daulatanas of Multan.¹⁸¹ The leading member of the Hayat family was Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan who died in 1942. His son Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan was a prominent member of the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. His brother, Sardar Barkat Hayat Khan was a member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly until 1948. The Noon-Tiwana group was represented by Malik Sir Muhammad Firoz Khan Noon, the last Prime Minister of Pakistan prior to the imposition of Martial Law in 1958. The principal member of the Daulatana family has been Mian Mumtaz Mohammad Khan Daulatana, one time Chief Minister of Punjab. Other important Punjabi elites who either allied with one of the three families or maintained independent identities included: Mian Iftikharuddin, Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani, Muzaffar Ali Qizilbash, Syed Amjad Ali, Raja

¹⁸⁰ Ayub Khan rationalized his mild land reform program by saying: "a large number of these landowners are personal friends of mine. They are people I went to school with, people I was associated with in the Army and elsewhere". U. S. House of Representatives, *Congressional Record*, 87th Congress, 1st session, Vol. 107, pt. 9 (July 12, 1961), p. 12394.

¹⁸¹ Craig Baxter, "The People's Party vs. The Punjab 'feudalists'" in *Contemporary Problems of Pakistan*, ed., J. Henry Karson (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1974), pp. 10-15.

Ghaznafar Ali Khan, Chaudhri Nazir Ahmad Khan, Abid Hussain, Sir Zafrullah Khan, Ghulam Mohammad, Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, Abdul Hamid Khan Dasti and Z. A. Suleri.

Sindis are characterized as amiable, and "less doctrinaire than their northern neighbours".¹⁸² The peasantry (Haris), in Sind, were at the beck and call of the feudal landlords (Wadera). During the pre-independence period, Sind was one of the politically stable provinces in the subcontinent. During 1937 to 1947, only two men, Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah and Khan Bahadur Allahbux, served as Chief Ministers. Nevertheless, Sindi elites were constantly at odds with each other. Some of the important political elites of Sind were Mohammad Ayub Khuhro, Pirzada Abdus Sattar, G. M. Syed, Pir Ilahi Bakhsh, Yusuf Abdullah Haroon, Ghulam Ali Talpur, Pir Ali Mohammad Rashdi, Ghulam Nabi Pathan, and A. K. Brohi.

The Pathans of the Frontier Province could claim, like Bengalis, that their identity is backed by great historic depth as well as by a great sense of cohesion. Pathan identity is based on their belief in the kinship system and a patrilineal descent traced to a common ancestor.¹⁸³ Their feudalistic tribal structure revolves around the Pakhtoonwali, the code that guides their behavior, which embodies the principles of vengeance (badal), hospitality

¹⁸² Wilber, *Pakistan*, p. 65.

¹⁸³ F. Barth, "Pathan Identity and Its Maintenance," in *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, ed., F. Barth (Boston, Little Brown, 1969), pp. 117-34.

(melmastia) and asylum for fugitives and provision for truces (nanawati).¹⁸⁴ They divide into numerous distinctive tribal units and gave Pakistan some of its most dynamic personalities including Abdul Gaffar Khan (known as the "Frontier Gandhi") who led the Pakhtunistan movement, his brother Dr. Khan Saheb, one time Chief Minister of West Pakistan, and his son Abdul Wali Khan, chief of the National Awami Party. Other important Pathan elites include: Abdul Qayyum Khan, Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, Sardar Bahadur Khan, Sardar Abdur Rashid Khan, Pir of Manki Sharif, General Mohammad Ayub Khan, General Mohammad Musa, General Azam Khan and Mian Jafar Shah.

Baluchistan, territorially the largest of West Pakistan's four divisions, is the home of Baluchis, a "proud people, they have in the recent past shown a belligerent concern for their independence".¹⁸⁵ They are divided into a number of tribes such as the Bugtis, Bizenjos, Mangals, Marris, Mohammad Hasnis, Raisanis, and Zehris. Tribal diversity was matched by economic underdevelopment. In the Kalat district, there were no literates in 1951 and the 1961 census enumerated only 4,000 out of about half a million as literates. According to Bhutto, the ruling elites of Pakistan always accused the Baluchis of feudalism and

¹⁸⁴J. W. Spain, "Pathans of the Tribal Areas," in *Pakistan: Society and Culture*, ed., S. Maron (New Haven, Human Relations Area File, 1957), p. 62.

¹⁸⁵Weekes, *Pakistan*, p. 17.

tribalism and always tried to subjugate them.¹⁸⁶ The Baluchis had very little access to the political arena and were marginally represented in the political elite. Baluchistan was administered by a Chief Commissioner, and the four Baluchistan States were governed by their local rulers (sardars) the most powerful being the Khan of Kalat who was arrested in 1958 on charges of plotting secession.¹⁸⁷

The Muhajirs in Pakistan are those who, because of the partition of the subcontinent in 1947, had migrated from India to Pakistan. It is estimated that Pakistan received about seven million Muslim refugees but lost about six million non-Muslims in return. Regionally, those coming to East Pakistan totalled about 0.7 million as against an outflow of about 2.5 million. About 80 percent of those who migrated to East Pakistan were peasants and workers. They settled in rural areas.¹⁸⁸ Immigrants to West Pakistan mostly settled in towns and cities. They formed about 46 percent of the four million people who lived in the 19

¹⁸⁶*Pakistan Times*, April 20, 1974. The ruler of Kalat, in his autobiography, also complained of "insulting treatment" Baluchi government received "at the hands of Jinnah's successors. Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, *Inside Baluchistan: A Political Autobiography of His Highness Baiglar Baigi: Khan-e-Azam XII* (Karachi, Royal Book Company, 1975).

¹⁸⁷See Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, *Inside Baluchistan*, Ch. 11.

¹⁸⁸See M. V. George, "Internal Migration in Assam and Bengal, 1901-1961" (Ph.D. dissertation, Australian National University, 1965), p. 255.

largest cities of West Pakistan.¹⁸⁹

There is general agreement among scholars of Pakistani politics that the Muhajirs enjoyed their greatest power in the first four years after independence. Their power declined thereafter but was never completely eclipsed. Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister, was a Muhajir from U. P. Others who held offices were I. I. Chundrigar, Dr. I. H. Qureshi, Dr. Mahmud Husain, Shoaib Qureshi, Habib I. Rahimtoola, Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, Maulana Syed Suleiman Nadvi, and Choudhury Khaliquzzaman. Mention should also be made of other influential Muhajirs including Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, Abdul Wahid Adamjee, and Abdul Latif Ebrahim Bawany. The founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, although born in Karachi (the capital of Sind which later became the federal capital of Pakistan), spent most of his life in Bombay and was therefore considered a Muhajir.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁹See Pakistan, *Population of Pakistan, 1951*, Vol. I, p. 31; Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan: A Demographic Report* (Washington D.C., Population Reference Bureau, 1973) for geographical distribution of refugee population. The Muhajirs were of different types. Some belonged to the same ethnic groups (West Bengali Muslims migrating to East Pakistan and East Punjabis migrating to West Punjab), and were easily assimilated. The least assimilable immigrants have been the Urdu speaking Muhajirs from Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Hyderabad Deccan. See Theodore Wright, "Indian Muslim Refugees in the Politics of Pakistan", pp. 192-93. In this last category should also be added the Gujrati speaking Muhajirs from Bombay. In this study, only the Urdu and the Gujrati speaking immigrants are considered as Muhajirs.

¹⁹⁰Wheeler, *The Politics of Pakistan*, p. 210, treats Jinnah as "from Bombay". Theodore Wright, "Indian Muslim Refugees in the Politics of Pakistan", p. 193, prefers to call him a "returnee".

B. Elite Identification by Occupation

We will now identify the political elites in terms of their occupational categories. To recapitulate, the political elites in Pakistan include the professional, the landowning, the administrative, the military, the industrial and the religious elites.

The Professional Elite

At the time of independence, the most important elite group in Pakistan were the professional elites composed mostly of lawyers, teachers, journalists, and medical doctors. The presence of these professionals, especially lawyers and educationists, in Pakistan's political life, at the national level has frequently been noted,¹⁹¹ detailed studies, however, have yet to be done.

From the early days of the colonial period, lawyers were present in the legislative councils. They had at least a secondary education followed by professional training. The legal profession gave them an independent income, a set of skills in articulation of demands and in negotiations, a wide range of connections and social prestige, all of which made political participation a natural extension of their activities.

¹⁹¹For instance, Khalid Bin Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan*; Keith Callard, *Pakistan: A Political Study*; M. Rashiduzzaman, *Pakistan: A Study of Government and Politics* (Dacca, Ideal Library, 1967); Mushtaque Ahmad, *Government and Politics in Pakistan*; Rounaq Jahan, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration*.

The Muslim political movement spearheaded and dominated by the landed aristocracy came, at a later stage, to be led by a landlord-lawyer coalition. That is, the leadership of the Pakistan movement was shared jointly by both the Muslim aristocracy and the upper/middle class professionals. The alliance of these two classes is well explained by Qureshi. The landlords despite their pre-eminent position in the society were dependent on the goodwill of the British government. They were traditional and not well educated in the Western curriculum. The lawyers, on the other hand, were well educated and knew the intricacies of the government to the point of manipulating the latter. The landlords therefore needed the services of the lawyers. Although the relationship between the landlord and the lawyer was one of patron-client it was the client who protected and looked after the interests of the patron, making the landlord dependent upon the lawyer.¹⁹²

The legal profession supplied the leaders of the Pakistan movement and numbered 145 of the 503 members of the All-India Muslim League Council.¹⁹³ The leader of the independence movement, M. A. Jinnah, himself was an outstanding member of the legal profession. Consequently, after independence, lawyers emerged as the most powerful elite group in politics and were well represented in high offices. One Governor General out of four, four Prime

¹⁹²Qureshi, "Elite Politics", p. 270.

¹⁹³Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan*, p. 55.

Ministers out of eight, 32 out of a total of 79 members of the first and 27 of the 80 members in the Second Constituent Assembly of Pakistan were lawyers.

A random sample of some of the influential professionals include Mohammad Ali Jinnah, a Karachi-born Bombay barrister, Liaquat Ali Khan, an aristocrat lawyer from U.P., I. I. Chundrigar, a lawyer from Bombay, Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan of Punjab, A. K. Brohi of Sind, and Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan of the NWFP. Lawyers represented in the Constituent Assemblies were predominantly from East Pakistan and represented regional interests. They were A. K. Fazlul Haq, Nurul Amin, Fazlur Rahman, H. S. Suhrawardy, Abul Mansur Ahmad, and Aatur Rahman Khan. In addition to lawyers, some members of the professional elite included educationists like the two Muhajir Professors I. H. Qureshi and Mahmud Hussain, and journalists such as Pir Ali Mohammad Rashdi, the editor of the *Sind Observer* and Z. A. Suleri, the Punjabi editor of *The Times of Karachi*.

The Landowning Elite

The landlords derived their power from their control of land and of those who made a living from the land. ¹⁹⁴ In

¹⁹⁴At independence, Pakistan was largely an agricultural country. The population census of 1961 revealed that about 86.9 percent of the country's population depended, directly or indirectly, on farming. *Population Census of Pakistan, 1961*, Bulletin No. 2, p. 14. Some 90 percent of the people lived in rural areas; about 75 percent of them had agriculture as their primary or sole occupation, and about 60 percent of the national income was derived from agriculture. *The First Five Year Plan*, p. 326.

Pakistan, land aside from its economic benefits came to be associated with special values. The ownership of land has always been regarded as a symbol of prestige and its management as an instrument of power.¹⁹⁵

The origin of landlordism in Pakistan was comparatively recent. The landlord's estates were "rewards given by British Imperialism for services rendered to it".¹⁹⁶ The Agrarian Committee of the Muslim League argued that since the services "rendered to Imperialism were services against the nation", the government must "abolish the stigma of the past".¹⁹⁷ Consequently, several agrarian reform committees were set up by various governments but the landlords subverted all such attempts and committee recommendations "were consigned to the shelves, for white ants to feed on".¹⁹⁸

As discussed in the second chapter, in West Pakistan there had been a large concentration of landholdings in a few hands such that "one is struck with their similarity to feudalism".¹⁹⁹ The tenants were held "at the beck and call" of the Zamindar (the landlord) because the latter by virtue of his control over lands controlled the social, economic

¹⁹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 14.

¹⁹⁶Pakistan Muslim League, *Report of the Agrarian Committee* (Karachi, Pakistan Muslim League, 1949), p. 23.

¹⁹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁹⁸*The Pakistan Observer*, 1959 quoted in Pakistan, Planning Commission, Agriculture section, *Land Reforms in Pakistan* (Karachi, Manager of Publications, Government of Pakistan Press, 1959), p. 58; see also Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, p. 87.

¹⁹⁹*The First Five Year Plan*, Vol.II, p. 118

and political life of tenants who lived on his land.²⁰⁰

The bulk of the tillers of the land were tenants-at-will with no protection in law.²⁰¹ They leased the land in return for a fixed share of the produce. The share of the landlord was "as high as 75 percent and sometimes as preposterous as 90 percent".²⁰² In order to survive, the tenant had to take some produce on loan from the landlord. Most often, the tenant was in debt making him a virtual slave of the landlord. Given the intense pressure on land and surplus farm laborers, the tenants had no bargaining power. Under such circumstances the landlords were virtually the masters of their tenants. The tenants voted in elections at the bidding of their landlords with the result that the landowner had an advantage in political life and played a prominent role in the politics of Pakistan. In East Pakistan, while Zamindari (landlordism) was abolished in 1952, landlords continued to command respect and authority and to control the local votes.

As Morris Jones points out, the leading members of the

²⁰⁰Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debates*, Vol. I, No. 71 (February 14, 1956), p. 3060.

²⁰¹"The name of the tenant was not recorded in any register of the patwari (revenue department functionary), so he could be evicted by the landlord without getting any share of the crop he had raised". See H. H. Kizilbash, "Local Government: Democracy at the Capital and Autocracy in the Villages", *Pakistan Economic and Social Review*, XI, 1 (Spring 1973), p. 119.

²⁰²Pakistan Muslim League, *Report of the Agrarian Committee*, p. 25.

landowning families held the key to politics in Pakistan.²⁰³

A considerable number of members of the national and provincial assemblies came from landholding families and held key political offices. In the first Constituent Assembly, landlords accounted for about 34 percent and in the second they constituted about 35 percent of the total number of members. The first Chief Ministers of East Pakistan, Sind and the NWFP were landlords. In the Punjab provincial legislature, 80 percent of the members were landlords²⁰⁴ and the West Pakistan legislative assembly contained about 200 landlords.²⁰⁵

A representative sample of the landowning elites include: Khwaja Nazimuddin, Khwaja Shahabuddin, and Mohammad Ali Bogra from East Pakistan; Nawab Iftikhar Hussain Khan of Mamdot, Mian Mumtaz Daulatana, and Malik Firoz Khan Noon from Punjab; Mohammad Ayub Khuhro and Pirzada Abdus Sattar from Sind; Abdul Gaffar Khan, Dr. Khan Saheb and Abdul Wali Khan from the NWFP; and the ruler of Kalat from Baluchistan.

The Administrative Elite

The administrative elites consisted of members of the public service who held commanding positions in the central

²⁰³W. H. Morris Jones, "Experience of Independence - India and Pakistan", *Political Quarterly*, 29, 3(1958), p. 235.

²⁰⁴*Dawn*, April 19, 1951.

²⁰⁵Talukder Maniruzzaman, "Group Interest in Pakistan Politics, 1947-58", *Pacific Affairs*, 39, 1&2 (Spring and Summer 1960), p. 86.

and provincial secretariats.²⁰⁶ Though it included individuals from various services such as the Pakistan Foreign Service, Audit and Accounts and even some members of the Planning Commission, this study will be concerned mainly with the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP): "a body of a few hundred only" who exercised "many of the most important functions of government" and were responsible "for securing the tranquility, well-being and good government of their country".²⁰⁷

The Civil Service of Pakistan was a successor to the former Indian Civil Service (ICS), the "steel frame" of British Administration, the like of which, according to Lord Dufferin, was not to be found elsewhere in the world.²⁰⁸ The civil service was meant to function "under ministerial and legislative direction",²⁰⁹ but this could not happen for several reasons. First, the top echelon of the civil service

²⁰⁶There were four classes in Pakistan's central administrative structure. Classes I and II were better paid gazetted services whose names appear in the official gazette. Of the three categories of these gazetted officers - viz., generalist-administrative (i.e., the CSP); functionalist (such as the Pakistan Foreign Service); and specialized services (for example, engineering and health) - the real power lay with the CSP. Class III officers were mainly secretarial engaged in routine work under the supervision of gazetted officers and Class IV employees were manual workers.

²⁰⁷Government of Pakistan, The Cabinet Secretariat, Establishment Division, *Careers in the Pakistan Superior Services* (Karachi, Government Printing Press, 1954), p. 2.

²⁰⁸Dufferin said, "There is no Service like it in the world." Quoted in L. S. S. O'Malley, *The Indian Civil Service: 1601-1930* (London, Frank Cass and Company, Ltd., 1965), p. 173.

²⁰⁹Pakistan, *Careers in the Pakistan Superior Services*, p. 2.

was a tightly-knit cohesive group with memories of their being the "steel frame" of administration. Their pre-eminence was underscored by the constitutional guarantees of their status and terms and conditions of service - virtual guarantee of permanence in service. Second, during the early years of Pakistan, the ruling elites relied heavily on the civil servants who possessed expertise and know-how to make the government function. They enjoyed special powers over the elected representatives because of their knowledge, skill and control of confidential files on all provincial ministers. They dispatched secret reports on the activities of the ministers to the Head of State.²¹⁰ Third, in training, experience and loyalty to the service, the C.S.P. was unequalled by any other group, with the possible exception of the military. It was the inner cohesion of the C.S.P. cadre that enabled it to continue unchallenged as well as basically unchanged. It has shown a remarkable resilience in the face of drastic regime changes culminating finally in an "overt" seizure of power by the latter especially after the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister.

During the first quarter of 1947, there were a total of 1,157 officers in the ICS and the Indian Political Service (IPS) cadre, of whom 608 (or 52 percent) were British, 448 (or 39 percent) Hindus and others and 101 (or 9 percent)

²¹⁰Rashiduzzaman, *Pakistan: A Study of Government and Politics*, p. 116.

were Muslims. Of the total ICS-IPS cadre, 157 opted for Pakistan which included 50 British (36 ICS and 14 IPS), 11 war service candidates, one Christian, and 95 (83 ICS and 12 IPS) Muslims.²¹¹ About half of the 95 Muslim officers were Urdu-speaking Muhajirs; fully one-third were Punjabi by birth²¹² and only one or two were Bengalis.²¹³

Of the 157 officers who opted for Pakistan, 21 were posted to judicial work or were given diplomatic assignments. So that Pakistan started her administrative service with a total strength of about 136 officers (inclusive of the IPS officers) in 1947.²¹⁴ The strength of the CSP since then gradually increased to 270 in 1955 and to 335 in 1958. The average annual intake in the CSP during the period 1947-1958 was about 20.²¹⁵

As is evident, the CSPs wielded enormous power and influence in Pakistan. Their presence was felt immediately after the elevation of Ghulam Mohammad to the position of

²¹¹Ralph Braibanti, "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan, in *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, ed. Joseph La Palombara (Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 365, 367. Tables 1 and 2.

²¹²*Ibid.*, p. 365.

²¹³According to the Minister for Information, there was only one ICS officer from East Bengal (see *Dawn*, June 27, 1965), whereas the parliamentary secretary of the Establishment division, said there were two. See Pakistan, *National Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, Vol. II, No. 6 (June 11, 1963), p. 241.

²¹⁴Braibanti, "Public Bureaucracy in Pakistan", p. 367.

²¹⁵Calculated from Pakistan, Establishment Division, *Civil List of Class I Officers Serving Under the Government of Pakistan*, 1st January 1966 (Karachi, Government of Pakistan Press, 1966); *Gradation List of the Civil Service of Pakistan*, January 1, 1968 (Karachi, Government of Pakistan Press, 1968) >

the Governor General. "Although the implications were not grasped at the time", his rise to the office of the Governor-General "restored the civil service to its pre-eminent position".²¹⁶ In the second half of the first decade (1953-1958), two former civil servants rose to power and expanded the area of their influence. By 1955 the main political offices of the country were occupied by members of the civil bureaucracy: Ghulam Mohammad, General Iskander Mirza, Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, Akhtar Hussain, Aziz Ahmad, and Sardar Abdur Rashid.

The Military Elite

The top level military officers are an especially important segment of the elite. The military occupies a distinct position because of its marked superiority in organization, high prestige assigned to the career in the Army and control of instruments of violence. The armed forces are more organized than any civilian body and are more nationalistic in outlook than the civilians.

From its very inception, the Pakistan military was told that their task was to defend Pakistan and their loyalty was to their country. When Ayub Khan took over as the first Commander-in-Chief, he told the officers: "This Army belongs to the people of Pakistan" and that the Army was doing "its best to serve our cause.... We do this as a matter of duty

²¹⁶Lawrence Ziring, *The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan 1958-1969* (Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1971), p. 122.

and through a sense of patriotism".²¹⁷ The military was able to develop a sense of uniqueness and cohesion, an "esprit de corps" and was instilled with a philosophy that its loyalty lay with the nation. As with other military organizations, the Pakistan Army was characterized, to borrow Finer's words, by "their centralization, hierarchy, discipline, inter-communication and esprit de corps".²¹⁸ Hence when General Ayub with his few "trusted confidants" decided to take over in 1958 the "military establishment responded as a whole and without any dissent".²¹⁹

The military also enjoyed considerable prestige in Pakistan. The military is considered a strong, stable and honorable career for the men of means. For the newer recruits who may not come from elite backgrounds, service in the military guarantees leadership and implies social mobility. Illustrating the desirability of a military career is the fact that in 1957 there were more than 3,000 applicants for 80 vacancies for officer cadets at the Pakistan Military Academy.²²⁰

Starting in 1947 with "a paper Army of 150,000 officers

²¹⁷Dawn, January 18, 1951.

²¹⁸S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horse Back: The Role of the Military in Politics* (London, Pall Mall, 1969), p. 10.

²¹⁹Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 86.

²²⁰Manfred Halpern, "The New Middle Class", in John J. Johnson ed., *The Role of Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 298.

and men" inherited from the British Indian Army,²²¹ Pakistan quickly developed and maintained a military organization with a full range of equipment, services and branches. Unlike the military of most of the developing countries which tended to be decorative, Pakistani military, in view of the growing threat from India, was expected to fight and preserve the territorial integrity of the country.

The budgetary allocation to the military reflects the importance attached by the ruling elites towards the armed forces. As shown in table III:1, during the period 1947-48 to 1958-59, on an average Pakistan's defence expenditure amounted to about 60 percent of the total government expenditure. The size of the military force (excluding the police force) rose from 150,000 in 1947 to about 260,000 in 1959 and the size of the officer corps, rose from about 2500 in 1948 to about 13,000 in 1959.²²² Generals, Admirals and Air Marshals became one of the most important elite groups "with first priority for money, resources and manpower".²²³ These officers constituted the military elite in Pakistan including, among others, Mohammad Ayub Khan, Mohammad Musa, Mohammad Azam Khan, Nawabzada Sher Ali Khan, and Wajid Ali

²²¹Major General Fazal Muqem Khan, *The Story of the Pakistan Army* (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 42.

²²²The figure for 1947-48 were from Muqem Khan, *The Story of the Pakistan Army*, pp. 42, 22; for 1949, Manfred Halpern, "Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class," in *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, ed., John J. Johnson (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 292.

²²³*The Economist* (London) October 18, 1958.

Table III:1

Defense as Percentage of Total Government Expenditure
1947-48 to 1958-59 (in Million Rupees)

Year	Defense Expenditure	Total Expenditure	Defense as percent of total
1947-48	153.8	236.0	65.17
1948-49	461.5	647.0	71.33
1949-50	625.4	856.0	73.06
1950-51	649.9	1,266.2	51.33
1951-52	779.1	1,442.3	54.02
1952-53	783.4	1,320.1	59.34
1953-54	653.2	1,108.7	58.92
1954-55	635.1	1,172.6	54.16
1955-56	917.7	1,433.4	64.02
1956-57	800.9	1,330.7	60.19
1957-58	854.2	1,521.8	56.13
1958-59	996.6	1,956.5	50.94

Source: Government of Pakistan, Central Statistical Office, Economic Affairs Division, 25 *Years of Pakistan in Statistics 1947-1972* (Karachi, Manager of Publications, 1972), p.173.

Burki.

The Industrial Elite

The industrial elites in Pakistan were of relatively recent origin. Their rise to both economic and political power can be traced from 1947 onwards. Their emergence as an elite group, based on wealth, was due mainly to massive government intervention in the economy.

In 1947, Pakistan received, out of a total of 14,569 industrial establishments in British India, only 1,406 (or

9.65 percent) industrial units.²²⁴ The situation was compounded by the absence of an entrepreneur class in Pakistan. Strenuous efforts were required to sustain and develop the industrial framework. The government offered highly profitable opportunities for import substitution opened up by the severe quantitative restrictions, and provided incentives to persons desirous of setting up new industries.²²⁵ The government also offered various incentives to prospective industrialists in the form of land for industrial development at prices far below market rates plus various tax concessions. The result of all these actions was the emergence of able industrial entrepreneurs in Pakistan.

As shown in table III:2, a tiny minority of "a new, able, ruthless group of industrial entrepreneurs", constituting less than one percent of the total population, came to control roughly two-thirds of the industrial assets. Gradually, they acquired an associational character in the form of Chambers of Trade and Commerce. By 1958, there were about 250 such associations in Pakistan.²²⁶ They also controlled some newspapers (for example, *Millat* and the *Gujrati Dawn*), sponsored and financed the government-backed

²²⁴Pakistan, *Economy of Pakistan, 1948-1968*, p. 74.

²²⁵Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, *Pakistan Economic Survey, 1971-72* (Karachi, Manager of Publication, 1972), p. 25.

²²⁶See *The Pakistan Times*, November 20, 1958; Also Maniruzzaman, "Group Interests in Pakistan Politics", p. 89.

Table III:2

Approximate Percentage of Industrial Assets by "Community"
in Pakistan, 1959

Community	Private Muslim Firms	All Firms	Population
Private Muslim Enterprises	100.0	67.0	88.0
Halai Memon	26.5	18.0	0.16
Chinioti	9.0	6.0	0.03
Dawoodi Bohra	5.0	3.5	0.02
Khoja Isnashari	5.5	4.0	0.02
Khoja Ismaili	5.0	3.5	0.06
Others	5.5	4.0	0.08
Syed and Sheikh	18.0	12.0	0.00
Pathan	8.0	5.5	7.0
Bengali	3.5	8.5	37.5
Others	14.0		
Private Hindu and Foreign Enterprises		21.5	12.5
Bengali Hindu		8.5	10.0
Marwari		2.0	0.00
Other Hindu & Sikh		1.5	2.5
Parsi		1.0	0.01
British		7.5	0.00
American, other		1.0	
Public Enterprises		12.0	0.00
Pakistan Industrial Deve. Corporation		7.0	
Government		5.0	

Source: Gustav F. Papanek, *Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 42.

National Press Trust, and funded various political parties.²²⁷ As such, they emerged as one of the powerful elite groups in the society.

²²⁷*Morning News*, March 28, 1964.

Some businessmen had very close associations with the top political leadership of the country. These businessmen, having played important roles, mainly financial, in the struggle for Pakistan, came to occupy a number of leading positions in the central and provincial administrations. Some of the leading members of the industrial elite include Habib I. Rahimtoola, M. A. H. Ispahani, Yusuf Abdullah Haroon, Abdul Latif Ebrahim Bawany, and Abdul Wahid Adamjee.

The Religious Elite

The religious elites, the Ulema (religious functionaries) and the Pirs (spiritual guides), were the traditional leaders with a demonstrated capacity to mobilize mass support. Though there are no priests in Islam, a great majority of Muslims have placed themselves under the spiritual guidance of the Ulema and the Pirs. This is because a majority of Muslims in Pakistan were not only illiterate (the rate of literacy was a meagre 19.2 percent) but could not follow the Quran or the sermons given in the mosques. Out of a total population of 82.5 million Muslims, only 0.51 percent could read and write Arabic without necessarily understanding it. Consequently, a majority of Muslims have always been dependent upon the Ulema and the Pirs for guidance in religious matters. This gave the Ulema and the Pirs considerable influence and authority in the society. Their authority emanated from the belief in their religious knowledge, piety and spiritual powers. They

provided the orthodox leadership to the community. Their strongholds were the mosques numbering about 40,000 in the West and about 70,000 in the Eastern part of Pakistan - where the congregational prayers were held and Friday sermons were delivered, and the madrasahs or maktabs where education with heavy emphasis on religion was imparted.²²⁸

In view of the extreme differences in outlook, most of the Ulema²²⁹ opposed the idea of Pakistan. Jinnah, however, managed to persuade a small section of the Ulema to accept his two-nation theory and the idea of an Islamic State. Once accepted, this section of the Ulema played an important role, with the support of some members of the landowning elites who were given important religious titles, in popularizing the Muslim League's movement for Pakistan.²³⁰ In the post-independence period, they gained considerable influence in Pakistan which is indicated by the fact that the ruling Muslim League Assembly Party included four prominent religious leaders as members of the first Constituent Assembly. The Government had also established, a

²²⁸Maktabs are schools attached to mosques entrusted with the task of teaching the rudimentary 3 R's of Islam and sufficient Arabic to read the Qur'an. Madrasahs are the higher level institutions maintained by both public and private funds.

²²⁹The traditionalists led by the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind and the orthodox fundamentalists working through Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi's Jamaat-i-Islami opposed the idea of Pakistan. The traditionalists believed in the "covenantal theory of composite nationalism", and hence opposed the idea of Pakistan. Maulana Maudoodi opposed the idea of Pakistan and denounced the secular nature of the Muslim League leadership.

²³⁰See *Munir Report*, p. 255.

Board of Talimaat-e-Islamia (Islamic Teachings) in 1949 to advise its various committees on the religious requirements.²³¹ Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, Maulana Zafar Ahmad Ansari, Maulana Syed Suleiman Nadvi, Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, Maulana Akram Khan, were some of the leading Ulema in Pakistan. A sample of the famous pirs include the Pir of Manki Sharif, the Pir of Pagaro, the Makhdum of Hala and Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani.

C. Recruitment to the Political Elite

The final question to consider is one of access or recruitment to the political elites. How were the members of various professions recruited into the specialized roles of the political system? Political recruitment, according to Seligman, includes both eligibility for elite status and selection or assignment to specific elite positions.²³² Eligibility refers, in general, to the qualifications whereas assignment refers to the process whereby those who are qualified are selected for political roles.

Eligibility to elite status can be obtained by education, group membership, wealth and political skills. Education was the most important prerequisite for elite status. The very fact that an overwhelming majority of the

²³¹The Committee was created on the demand of one highly placed Alim (singular of Ulema). The demand was made in February 1949 (see *The Pakistan Observer*, February 10, 1949) and was conceded in April 1949.

²³²Lester G. Seligman, "Political Recruitment and Party Structure," *The American Political Science Review* 55, 1(March 1961), p. 77.

political elites were well educated and had foreign degrees testifies to the importance attached to education as a prerequisite for eligibility to rule. The importance of education, however, varied from one profession to the other. The lawyers, by definition, had to be educated. Similarly, to be admitted to the C.S.P., a citizen must have obtained a degree from a recognized university. The military profession at the officer level required at least a Grade 12 level education. Education, other than the ability to read the Quran, though an asset is not a pre-requisite for recruitment to the group of Ulema. As long as a man follows a traditional syllabus of study and accepts the Ijma (consensus of scholars) of his learned predecessors, he will be accepted as an Alim. Some of the landowning and the industrial elites were well educated but education was considered of secondary importance. Papanek found no "clear relationship between education and success in industry".²³³

The second prerequisite for membership in the political elite were wealth and family background. Recruitment into and politics within the landowning elites was based almost exclusively on family lines. The power of the landowning elite was considerably buttressed and expanded by intensive

²³³Gustav F. Papanek, "Pakistan's Industrial Entrepreneurs - Education, Occupational Background and Finance" in *Development Policy II: The Pakistan Experience*, eds., Walter P. Falcon and Gustav F. Papanek (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 239.

intermarriage.²³⁴ Among the Muslim industrialists, Papanek found that about half of his sample who controlled almost two-thirds of the industrial investments in 1959, came from families that had had some experience with industry before independence, and that nearly two-thirds of all firms obtained technical expertise to run industries from some members of the controlling families.²³⁵

Among the religious elites, the office of the Pir is often hereditary. A person has to spend a goodly part of his life in the service of a Pir to become a Pir himself.

The most important requirement for elite status seems to have been a personal connection with the party heirarch or Minister or the President. In Pakistan, as Keith Callard observed, "politics has begun at the top".²³⁶ It was made up of a large number of leading individuals who established loose personal alliance systems to achieve power and maintain it. In such a system, personal contacts and connections assume extraordinary significance for an individual's strategy of political advancement and are often the determining factors in his career. This explains why the potential elites maneuvered to develop more intimate ties with Ministers and Deputy Ministers and why the latter

²³⁴ Thus Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan was brother-in-law of both Muzaffar Khan and Maqbul Mahmud. Sir Fazli Hussain's daughter is married to Sir Feroze Khan Noon's brother. For detailed discussion of family connections see Craig Baxter, "The People's Party vs. The Punjab 'Feudalists'", pp. 168-189.

²³⁵ Papanek, "Pakistan's Industrial Entrepreneurs", pp. 244, 250.

²³⁶ Keith Callard, *Pakistan: A Political Study*, p. 67.

competed to spend more time in the actual presence of the Prime Minister and the Governor General.²³⁷ In short, it is difficult to move into the political elite without strong personal ties with someone who is already a member of the group. In general, recruitment to the political elites has been on the basis of physical and social proximity to the personal center of power.

D. Conclusion

Political elites in Pakistan can thus be categorized either as Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindis, Pathans, Baluchis and Muhajirs or as the lawyers, landlords, civil servants, military officers, industrialists and the Ulema. It should be noted that there is a good deal of overlap between these two categories as well as within the occupational categories which are shown in the list at the end of this chapter. Some of the landlords from Punjab, Sind and Frontier shared similar outlooks with the Urdu speaking Bengali elites such as Nazimuddin and his associates. But these similarities dissolve once we consider that the Punjabi landlords were much closer to the Punjabi civil servants and military officers than the Bengalis could ever be.

²³⁷One strategy adopted by the lawyers to develop personal connections was to render free legal services to members of the ruling elite.

Political Elites by Region and Occupation

Name	Region	Occupation
Abdullah-al-Baqui, Maulana	Bengal	Religion
Adamjee, A. Wahid	Muhajir	Business
Ahmad, A. Mansur	Bengal	Law
Ahmad, Aziz	Punjab	Civil Service
Ahmad, Farid	Bengal	Law + Religion
Ahmad, Dildar	Bengal	Law
Ali, Chaudhri Mohammad	Punjab	Civil Service
Ali, Syed Amjad	Punjab	Business
Ali, Tafazzal	Bengal	Law
Alim, Abdul	Bengal	Law
Allahbux, Khan Bahadur	Sind	Landlord
Amin, Nurul	Bengal	Law
Achakzai, A. S.	Baluchistan	Landlord
Bakhsh, Pir Ilahi	Sind	Landlord
Biswas, A. L.	Bengal	Law
Brohi, A. K.	Sind	Law
Bawany, Abdul Latif	Muhajir	Business
Bhashani, Maulana A. H. K.	Bengal	Religion
Bogra, Mohammad Ali	Bengal	Landlord
Burki, Wajid Ali		Army
Choudhury, Hamidul Huq	Bengal	Law
Choudhury, Nurul Huq	Bengal	Law
Chundrigar, I. I.	Muhajir	Law
Dasti, A. H. Khan	Punjab	Landlord + law
Daulatana, M. Mumtaz	Punjab	Landlord + law
Dutt, K. K.	Bengal	Law
Fazlullah, Qazi	Sind	Landlord
Gurmani, Mushtaq A.	Punjab	Landlord
Haq, Fazlul	Bengal	Law
Haroon, Y. A.	Sind	Business
Hidayatullah, G. Hussain.	Sind	Landlord + Law
Hussain, Mahmud	Muhajir	Teaching
Hussain, Abid	Punjab	Landlord
Hussain, M.	Bengal	Law
Iftikharuddin, Mian.	Punjab	Landlord
Ispahani, M. A. H.	Bengal	Business
Jinnah, M. A.	Muhajir	Law
Khaleque, M. Abdul	Bengal	Law
Khaliquzzaman, Chowdhury	Muhajir	Law
Khan, Akram	Bengal	Religion
Khan, Ataur Rahman	Bengal	Law
Khan, Azam	NWFP	Army
Khan, Sardar Shaukat Hayat	Punjab	Landlord
Khan, Maulvi Tamizuddin	Bengal	Law + Religion

Khan, Mumtaz Ali	Punjab	Landlord
Khan, Raja Ghaznafar Ali	Punjab	Landlord
Khan, Choudhury Nazir	Punjab	Landlord
Khan, Abdul Gaffar	NWFP	Landlord
Khan, A. Wali	NWFP	Landlord
Khan, A. Qaiyum	NWFP	Landlord + Law
Khan, Sardar Bahadur	NWFP	Law
Khan, Sardar A. Rashid	NWFP	Civil service
Khan, M. Ayub	NWFP	Army
Khan of Kalat	Baluchistan	Landlord
Khan, Liaquat Ali	Muhajir	Landlord + Law
Khan, Sir Zafrullah	Punjab	Law
Khuhro, M. Ayub	Sind	Landlord
Kyani, M. R.	Sind	Law
Malik, A. M.	Bengal	Medical
Mandal, J. N.	Bengal	Law
Mamdot, Nawab Iftikhar H.	Punjab	Landlord
Musa, Mohammad	NWFP	Army
Mirza, Iskander	Bengal	Army + Civil S
Maudoodi, Abul Ala	Muhajir	Religion
Mohammad, Ghulam	Punjab	Civil Service
Nazimuddin, Khwaja	Bengal	Landlord + Law
Noon, Malik Firoz Khan	Punjab	Landlord + Law
Nishtar, Sardar Abdur Rab	NWFP	Landlord + Law
Nadvi, Syed Suleiman	Muhajir	Religion
Pagaro, Pir of	Sind	Religion
Pathan, Ghulam Nabi	Sind	Landlord
Pathan, Ghyasuddin	Bengal	Law
Pirzada, Abdus Sattar	Sind	Landlord + Law
Qureshi, I. H.	Muhajir	Teaching
Qureshi, Shoaib	Muhajir	Journalism
Qizilbash, Muzaffar Ali	Punjab	Landlord + Law
Rahimtoola, H. I.	Muhajir	Business
Rahman, Fazlur	Bengal	Law
Rahman, Lutfur	Bengal	Law
Rahman, Nurur	Bengal	Law
Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur	Bengal	Private employee
Rashdi, Pir Ali Mohammad	Sind	Journalism
Shahabuddin, Khwaja	Bengal	Landlord
Saheb, Dr. Khan	NWFP	Medical+Landlord
Sarkar, Abu Hussain	Bengal	Law
Soomroo, Maula Bakhsh	Sind	Landlord
Syed, G. M.	Sind	Landlord
Sharif, Pir of Manki	NWFP	Religion
Sharif, Pir of Sarsina	Bengal	Religion
Shah, Mian Jafar	NWFP	Law
Suhrawardy, H. S.	Bengal	Law
Talpur, Ghulam Ali	Sind	Landlord
Zahiruddin	Bengal	Law

IV. The Political Elites: Cooperation and Confrontation

One of the hypotheses of this study is that in a fragmented society, elite cooperation is a major basis for political stability. Support for this hypothesis comes from numerous empirical studies, the oft-cited example of which is Lijphart's study of the Netherlands. Lijphart observed that the Netherlands despite its historical legacy of intensely ideological, class, ethnic, and religious cleavages, sustained an enviable record of political stability. Instead of immobilism, it demonstrated decisional effectiveness, and he attributes this to the cooperative behavior of the political elites.²³⁸ This cooperative behavior covers a number of political strategies including: grand coalition, proportionality, segmental autonomy and the principle of the mutual or minority veto. In what follows, I shall briefly discuss each of these strategies and examine the behavior of the political elites of Pakistan along this cooperative/confrontational dimension.

A. Cooperative Strategies

Grand Coalition: The most important strategy is a grand coalition or the principle of power sharing. It refers to the establishment of a governing coalition that includes the political leaders of all the major groups in the fragmented

²³⁸Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation*, chs., VI and VII.

society. It means that the political elites of all significant segments of the fragmented society will jointly govern the country. This consensual rule sharply contrasts with the Westminster model in that it implies a multi-group coalition, based on the support of the overwhelming majority, while the Westminster model is based on the support of a bare majority.²³⁹ The style of leadership in the latter is competitive with its typical government versus opposition pattern of majority rule.

The British system works well when opinions are distributed unimodally with relatively little spread, i.e., when there is considerable consensus and the majority and minority are not very far apart. Under such circumstances, as Lord Balfour put it, people "can safely afford to bicker".²⁴⁰ In fragmented societies, the cleavages are likely to be fundamental, therefore difficult to manage and are likely to provoke violence. The political process in a homogeneous society takes on the atmosphere of a game, a "good game", where "the outcome is in doubt" but "the stakes are not too high".²⁴¹ Victory and defeat can be accepted with equal equanimity. In contrast, the political process in a fragmented society is a serious matter: victory and defeat are objects of widespread concern. The stakes are high. If the political elites are to maintain stability in such a

²³⁹*Ibid.*, p. 25.

²⁴⁰Quoted in Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory and Practice in Europe and America* (Mass., Blaisdell, 1950), p. 422.

²⁴¹Almond, "Comparative Political Systems", pp. 398-399.

community, they must reduce the occasions for conflict, they must "consciously eschew the competitive practices which underlie the norms of British style democracy".²⁴² Since cooperative elites contribute to political stability and competitive elites to political instability, Lijphart, Daalder, Nordlinger and others have championed the strategy of grand coalition.²⁴³

The essential characteristic of a grand coalition is not so much any particular institutional arrangement as the participation by the political elites of all significant subcultures in governing a fragmented society. It follows therefore that power-sharing in grand coalitions can take a variety of forms: a grand coalition cabinet in parliamentary systems (for example, Austria and Switzerland), grand councils with important advisory or coordinate functions (i.e., Belgium and the Netherlands), and a coalition of the President and other high political functionaries in presidential systems (e.g., Cyprus and Lebanon).²⁴⁴

The most common device, however, is the grand coalition cabinet. Switzerland, Austria and Malaysia offer excellent examples here. The Swiss seven-member federal executive body, the Federal Council, has been composed of members of the four major political parties: the Christian Democrats, the Free Democrats, and the Social Democrats each having two

²⁴²Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme", p. 607.

²⁴³Hans Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme", *World Politics*, 26 (1974); Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*; Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*.

²⁴⁴Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, p. 33.

representatives on the Council, and the Swiss People's Party having one representative. These councillors also represent various subcultures in the Swiss society.²⁴⁵ The Austrian grand coalition cabinet that ruled the country from 1945 to 1966 included leaders of the Socialists and the People's Party representing the Catholic and Socialist segments. All important decisions were made by leaders constituting the coalition committee.²⁴⁶ A third instance of stable coalition is found in Malaysia during 1955-1969. Here the principal device was the grand coalition of the three major parties: the United Malays National Organization representing the largest segment, Malay, comprising about 53.2 percent; the Malaysian Chinese Association, representing about 35.4 percent Chinese; and the Malayan Indian Congress, representing about 10.6 percent Indians.²⁴⁷ The cabinets formed by the coalition party represented all three segmental parties.

A grand coalition, however, does not have to take the form of cabinets in a parliamentary system. It could take the form of a coalition of top office holders in a "quasi

²⁴⁵ See Jurg Steiner, *Amicable Agreement versus Majority Rule: Conflict Resolution in Switzerland* (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1974).

²⁴⁶ See Frederick C. Engelmann, "Austria: The Pooling of Opposition", in *Political Opposition in Western Democracies*, ed., Robert A. Dahl (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966).

²⁴⁷ See R. S. Milne, *Politics in Ethnically Bipolar States: Guyana, Malaysia, Fiji* (Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 1981), p. 54.

presidential system" as in Lebanon during 1943-1975.²⁴⁸ The latter does not occur frequently and, because of the predominance of a single leader, is considered less suitable for fragmented societies.²⁴⁹

Proportionality: A second cooperative strategy is the principle of proportionality, the policy of allocating positions of influence and scarce resources proportionately between the groups or segments. This principle is a refinement of the concept of grand coalition: not merely that all significant subcultures should be represented in decision making structures but that their representation should be more or less proportional to their numerical strength. The basic characteristic of proportionality "is that all groups influence a decision in proportion to their numerical strength".²⁵⁰

The Swiss "magic formula" (seven member council) for the allocation of positions on the council is roughly proportional to the parties' share of the popular vote. Efforts have always been made to have the "appropriate" mix of linguistic, religious and cantonal representatives on the Federal Council. The principle has also been applied in Lebanon. The unwritten National Pact of 1943 prescribed a

²⁴⁸See Pierre Rondol, "The Political Institutions of Lebanese Democracy", in *Politics in Lebanon*, ed., Leonard Binder (New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1966), p. 135.

²⁴⁹Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, p. 33.

²⁵⁰Jurg Steiner, "The Principle of Majority and Proportionality", *British Journal of Political Science*, 1(January 1971), p. 63 quoted in Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*, p. 23.

Maronite Christian President, a Sunni Muslim Prime Minister, a Shiite Muslim speaker of the legislature, and a Greek Orthodox Deputy Speaker and Deputy Prime Minister. The relative strength of each sect is reflected in the relative importance of the offices. The highest offices were reserved for members of the largest segments. Cabinet portfolios were also proportionately distributed among Christian and Muslim sects.²⁵¹ Proportionality was also applied to civil service positions.

The principle of proportionality serves two important functions. First, it serves as a neutral and impartial method of allocating various positions of power and scarce financial resources. Where each subculture is assured that it will receive a just share of these resources, the anxiety that would result from a competitive allocation may be avoided. The second function relates to the decision making process itself. It ensures that all groups in the society will have influence in a decision proportional to their numerical strength. Lijphart has thus described proportionality as the "most prevalent rule of the game in consociational democracies".²⁵²

Segmental Autonomy: The third important feature of cooperative behavior is the principle of segmental or provincial autonomy. Simply defined, it is the rule of the minority over itself in matters which are the exclusive

²⁵¹Rondol, "The Political Institution of Lebanese Democracy", p. 135.

²⁵²Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems", p. 23.

concern of the minority. It is the logical corollary of the principles of grand coalition and proportionality. On issues which affect all members of the society, decisions should be made by members of all segments with roughly proportional degrees of influence. On all other issues, the decisions and their executions can be left to the separate subcultures.²⁵³

Scholars in their attempt to deal with the problems of fragmentation in developing countries have suggested three alternative strategies. One is assimilationist policy of eliminating the distinctive cultural traits of minority subculture - a method which, as exemplified by the Cyprus Civil War, can be extremely divisive in nature. The second is the policy of "unity in diversity", a policy characterized politically by "ethnic arithmetic",²⁵⁴ and finally partition. The principle of segmental autonomy is related to the second of the three solutions. It guarantees separate political entity to the subcultures, ensures non-interference in matters of their exclusive concern and thus restricts competition on sensitive issues.

Autonomy was one of the features of the Lebanese political system. As Binder points out, it was an integral part of the unwritten pact that the central government will not interfere in the "intra-confessional social

²⁵³Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, p. 41.

²⁵⁴See Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development", in *Political Development and Social Change*, eds., J. L. Finkle and R. W. Gable (New York, Wiley, 1966), p.555.

relationships".²⁵⁵ Moreover, each sect has its own network of social organizations and personal status laws administered in separate sectarian courts. Segmental autonomy has also been important in Switzerland.

Mutual Veto: The principle of grand coalition and proportionality gives a particular subculture, in all decisions of common concern, a chance to present its case as forcefully as possible to its coalition partners, it may nevertheless be outvoted by the majority. If such decisions affect the vital interest of that subculture, such a defeat will be regarded as unacceptable and will endanger elite cooperation.²⁵⁶ The mutual veto principle stipulates that on issues considered vital by any subculture, no decisions can be made without the concurrence of the majority of the members of that subculture.

The veto can be an informal and unwritten understanding or can be codified and enshrined in the constitution. Switzerland is an example of the informal application of the veto. In Austria during 1945 to 1966, the leaders of the Socialist and Catholic parties formally affirmed their acceptance of the principle at the outset of each coalition government. Before the cabinet could act upon a proposed policy decision, it had to be approved by the coalition

²⁵⁵ Leonard Binder, "Political Change in Lebanon", in *Politics in Lebanon*, p. 295.

²⁵⁶ Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, p. 36.

committee in which both parties exercised a veto power.²⁵⁷ The mutual veto was also a basic provision of the political system of Lebanon. But, like Switzerland, it was unwritten and was based on a tacit understanding between the leaders of the various sects.²⁵⁸

The mutual veto principle invests each subculture with "the power of protecting itself, and places the rights and safety of each where only they can be securely placed, under its own guardianship. Without this there can be no systematic, peaceful, or effective resistance to the natural tendency of each to come into conflict with the others".²⁵⁹ By providing security to each subculture the principle helps prevent competition for ascendancy between various subcultures.

B. Politics in Pakistan

Pakistan came into existence as an independent Dominion in 1947 with a political system which was parliamentary and federal. The two central governing structures provided by the interim constitution (the Government of India Act, 1935 as adapted in the Indian Independence Act of 1947) came to be the executive and the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁷Engelmann, "Austria: The Pooling of Opposition", p. 266.

²⁵⁸Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*, p. 26.

²⁵⁹John C. Calhoun, *A Disquisition on Government*, ed., C. Gordon Post (New York, Liberal Arts Press, 1953), p. 28 cited in Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, p. 37.

²⁶⁰For full text of the Indian Independence Act, 1947 see

²⁶⁰ The Act of 1935 vested the executive authority in the Governor General, aided and advised by the Council of Ministers. As adapted for Pakistan, the Act put an end to the discretionary powers of the Governor General bringing the entire field of administration under the authority of the cabinet which was to be responsible to the legislature i.e., the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan.²⁶¹

The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan functioned in a dual capacity: as a constitution-making body and as the federal legislature of Pakistan. Until the authoritative constitutional interpretations of the Federal Court in 1955, the Constituent Assembly was considered "sovereign" in the sense that it was believed that its bills did not require the assent of the Governor General to become laws.²⁶² The first Constituent Assembly, composed initially of 69 members (raised subsequently to 79), was dissolved in 1954 and a new assembly was convened in 1955 with a total of 80 members equally divided between the two wings of Pakistan. On the completion and promulgation of a republican constitution in 1956, the Constituent Assembly transformed itself into the National Assembly of Pakistan (and the Governor General became the President).

²⁶⁰(cont'd) *Documents and Speeches*, pp. 3-18. (Henceforth to be cited as *Documents and Speeches*).

²⁶¹*Ibid.*, pp. 6-8.

²⁶²The structural features of the Constituent Assembly has been quite competently described by Keith Callard, *Pakistan*, pp. 77 - 123; also Mushtaq Ahmad, *Government and Politics in Pakistan*, pp. 88 - 124.

Jinnah-Liaquat Period and the Nature of Coalition

The political organization which spearheaded the movement for Pakistan was the All-India Muslim League. With the establishment of Pakistan, the elites who dominated the League transferred themselves to Pakistan and became the ruling elites to the exclusion of any other organization. Jinnah, the President of the Muslim League, became the Governor General and Liaquat Ali Khan, who had been the General Secretary of the League for many years, became the Prime Minister. The League leaders insisted that the survival of Pakistan was contingent upon the survival of the League. To Liaquat, "the existence of the League, not only the existence of the League, but its strength, is equal to the existence and strength of Pakistan".²⁶³ He considered himself, in his own words, "the Prime Minister of the League" since it carried "more weight than the Parliament".²⁶⁴ Fatima Jinnah, sister of the Quaid-e-Azam, even in 1954 considered it necessary to warn the people: "If you destroy the League, you destroy Pakistan".²⁶⁵

The tradition of the Muslim League was one of exclusiveness and the pattern of leadership and interaction Jinnah had established, during the last decade of the League's Indian phase, amounted to a "unitarian model": concentration and personalization of authority in the hands

²⁶³ *Dawn*, October 9, 1950.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁵ *Pakistan Observer*, August 14, 1954.

of the Quaid-e-Azam, the great leader.²⁶⁶ These traditions did not leave room for the application of the principle of grand coalition either in cabinet composition or in the nature of decision making.

During the national liberation period the League, as the embodiment of Muslim nationalism, had claimed that it alone represented the Muslims of India. In dealing with the British and the Indian National Congress, the League constantly demanded its recognition "as the authoritative and representative organization of the Mussalmans of India".²⁶⁷ The Congress which claimed to represent all communities of India found this demand unacceptable²⁶⁸ which resulted in Jinnah's refusal to deal with the Congress. Similarly, when the Indian Viceroy Lord Wavell called a conference at Simla to consider proposals for the reconstitution of the Executive Council so that a balanced representation could be given to the main communities of India, the League insisted that it alone should nominate all the Muslim members to the Council. Wavell wanted to include the Muslim Chief Minister of Punjab who had broken with

²⁶⁶Saleem M. M. Qureshi, "Iqbal and Jinnah: Personalities, Perceptions and Politics" in *Iqbal, Jinnah and Pakistan: The Vision and the Reality*, ed., C. M. Naim (Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1979), p. 36.

²⁶⁷Jinnah's communication to the President of the Indian National Congress in G. Allana, *Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents*, pp. 176-77; see also Penderel Moon, *Divide and Quit* (London, Chatto and Windus, 1962), p. 23; Saleem M. M. Qureshi, "Mohammed Ali Jinnah: Concept of Self-Determination", *Scrutiny*, 5, 4/5(1979), pp. 1-15.

²⁶⁸See Congress President's reply in Allana, *Pakistan Movement*, p. 192.

Jinnah; but the latter stood firm and wrecked the conference.²⁶⁹ In dealing with Muslims and competing Muslim parties, the League demanded a total submission to its programme and leadership. "It could absorb or destroy but could not cooperate with them".²⁷⁰ Individual Muslims who identified with the Congress were considered traitors, the Muslim parties which did not side with the League were either destroyed, condemned as traitors, or absorbed as repentents. Malik Khizr Hayat Khan Tiwana, the Unionist Premier of the Punjab, who "courageously resisted" the League's demand to submit to its directives, was expelled from the League and the Unionist Party was destroyed.²⁷¹ Other Muslim groups such as Fazlul Haq's Krishak Proja Party of Bengal and the United Muslim Party of Bengal were absorbed. Unlike the Congress which aggregated diverse interests, the League effectively destroyed varying interests. The Congress accepted any groups which favored independence, irrespective of the methods they advocated or the kind of society they envisioned after independence. It even permitted them (the Communists, Socialists, Marxist-left parties) to maintain their identity.²⁷² The League hardly tolerated any group, party or individual

²⁶⁹Penderel Moon, *Divide and Quit*, p. 41; also Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (Calcutta, Orient Longmans, 1959), p. 114.

²⁷⁰Saleem M. M. Qureshi, "Pakistani Nationalism Reconsidered", *Pacific Affairs*, 45, 4 (Winter 1972-73), p. 563.

²⁷¹Penderel Moon, *Divide and Quit*, p. 39.

²⁷²See Weiner, *Party Building in a New Nation*.

except those wholly in agreement with its anti-Congress objectives. Those who advocated independence, but not Pakistan, were excluded from the League. The groups which agreed with the League were absorbed at the cost of their identity.

During the last decade of the Indian phase, the leadership of the Muslim League lay exclusively in the hands of Jinnah. The power in the organization was highly centralized.²⁷³ Jinnah is "credited with ruling the Working Committee of the Muslim League with a rod of iron. He is said to tell them what's what and then they invariably fall into line".²⁷⁴ Most authorities agree that for ten years he had ruled the League as an absolute ruler. The exigencies of the struggle called for a closing of ranks and subordination of many views to the one authoritative will. Jinnah was convinced that in politics what matters most is power: "If there is not sufficient power, create that power. If we do that, the Mission ... may be ... freed from being cowed down by the threats of the Congress...".²⁷⁵ Most of the documents and proposals he forwarded dealt primarily with political

²⁷³For a detailed discussion of the consolidation of the leadership in the Muslim League during this crucial period see Qureshi, "Consolidation of Leadership in the Last Phase of the Politics of the All India Muslim League", pp. 297-327.

²⁷⁴R. G. Cassey, *An Australian in India* (London, Hollis and Carter, 1947), pp. 64-65.

²⁷⁵M. Ashraf ed., *Cabinet Mission and After* (Lahore, Ashraf, 1964). p. 291.

power.²⁷⁶ While it is possible to find occasional references concerning democratic political order, Jinnah would not want people, in his own words, "to be dazzled by democratic slogans that have no foundation in reality".²⁷⁷

Jinnah's relentless determination to marshal all Muslims under his leadership was illustrated in 1941 when the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow invited the Chief Ministers of Punjab, Bengal, and Assam to join the National Defence Council. Jinnah publicly challenged the Viceroy's right to directly appoint the Muslim Chief Ministers without his prior approval and ordered the Chief Ministers to resign from the Council which they did.²⁷⁸ By defying the Viceroy and forcing the three strongest men of Muslim India to resign, Jinnah "had become the unofficial viceroy of Muslim India and that is how he ran the Muslim League".²⁷⁹ It was therefore logical that Jinnah would continue, in the governing of Pakistan, the only pattern of politics he knew and considered most effective for his party and now for his

²⁷⁶For instance, the Lucknow Pact of 1916, the Fourteen Points of 1929 and the Pakistan Resolution of 1940. For full text of the first two proposals see Allana, *Pakistan Movement*, pp. 25-33. For the Pakistan Resolution see Khaliqzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, Appendix.

²⁷⁷*Dawn*, August 18, 1947.

²⁷⁸The three Chief Ministers were Fazlul Haq (Bengal), Sir Sikander Hayat Khan (Punjab), and Sir Saadullah (Assam). Fazlul Haq later resigned from the League as well. In a statement he said: "The Genius of the Bengali race revolts against autocracy and I could not, therefore, help protesting against the autocracy of a single individual". See *The Indian Annual Register*, Vol. II (Calcutta, The Annual Register Office, 1941), p. 19.

²⁷⁹Kalim Siddiqui, *Conflict, Crisis and War in Pakistan* (London, Macmillan, 1972), p. 76.

country. Consequently, Jinnah and his favorite disciple Liaquat, could only have subordinates, not associates or colleagues.

In 1947, the Muslim League became the government of Pakistan. Though the context had changed, the League was unable to transform itself and disown the character of exclusiveness. Consequently, those who opposed the League or the Pakistan movement were not allowed to operate freely. The leaders of the anti-Pakistan parties, for instance Kisan Sankar Roy the first leader of the opposition in the Constituent Assembly, had to leave Pakistan. Others - for instance, A. Gaffar Khan - were imprisoned or placed under official surveillance. Strong provincial leaders who enjoyed pre-eminent positions in their respective areas but who opposed the League or its leader were eliminated and replaced by pliable men acceptable to the League leadership. The cabinets had regional representations but they could hardly be called grand coalitions.

The cabinet headed by Liaquat did not include the more important of the landowning elites of the Punjab, Sindh and the Frontier Provinces because of their outright opposition or lukewarm attitude toward the Pakistan Movement and/or Jinnah.²⁸⁰ Jinnah had asked the Peshawar gatherings: "Do you think that the Muslim League can give you the right lead or those who are against us, those who were in the enemy camp.

²⁸⁰For an account of the attitude of the landed aristocrats to the demand for Pakistan, see Azim Husain, *Fazl-i-Husain: A Political Biography* (Bombay, Longmans, 1946).

Are they entitled to look after Pakistan or we?".²⁸¹ The only representative of the Punjabi landlords was Ghaznafar Ali Khan who was unacceptable to the Punjab Unionists and vice-versa.²⁸² Liaquat's cabinet also excluded several prominent Bengali leaders with representative standing including Suhrawardy and Fazlul Huq. Suhrawardy incurred the displeasure of Jinnah because of his advocacy of Great Bengal, separate from Pakistan; while Huq courted displeasure of Jinnah and the Muslim League leadership for his stand on the question of Bengal's autonomy.²⁸³ Jinnah's chosen cabinet attempted to offset their influence by including I. I. Chundrigar, a Delhi lawyer and a member of the Muslim League Working Committee; Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, a faithful associate from the NWFP; J. N. Mandal, a leader of the Hindu Scheduled Caste from East Pakistan; Drs. Mahmud Hussain and I. H. Qureshi, both Muhajirs; and other

²⁸¹Jinnah's speech at Peshawar on April 20, 1948 in M. Rafique Afzal ed., *Speeches and Statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1911-34 and 1947-48)* (Lahore, Research Society of Pakistan, May 1973), p. 464.

²⁸²Ziring, *Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development*, p. 140. The Punjab's first political organization of importance was the Unionist Party formed in 1924. It was essentially a party of large landholders of Punjab. See Firoz Khan Noon, *From Memory*, p. 98.

²⁸³When Fazlul Huq broke with the Muslim League on the question of membership in the Imperial Defense Council, he complained bitterly of Jinnah's "autocracy" adding that Jinnah "sought to rule as an omnipotent authority over the destiny of thirty five million Muslims in the province of Bengal...". See Huq-Jinnah correspondence in S. Sharifuddin Pirzada, ed., *Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah's Correspondence* (Karachi, Guild Publishing House, 1966), pp. 55, 84; see also Kazi Ahmed Kamal, *Politicians and Inside Stories* (Dacca, K. G. Ahmed, 1970), pp. 27-32.

Jinnah loyalists.²⁸⁴ Though the cabinet was to swell subsequently, the composition, until 1953, did not change much.

If the cabinet composition was non-coalitional in the sense that it did not include leaders with representative but independent standings, so was the nature and style of the decision making which was personal and centralized. Jinnah, the Governor General, conducted the affairs of the government as he had been accustomed to ruling the Muslim League. From a strict constitutional point of view the Governor General had lost his powers to act independently of the cabinet by Section 3(2) of the Pakistan Provisional Constitution Order, 1947. Yet as the *Dawn* editorialized: "Whatever the constitutional powers of the Governor General of a Dominion may nominally be, in Quaid-i-Azam's case no legal or formal limitations can apply".²⁸⁵

In assuming the office of the Governor General he made it quite clear that his position would be more than ceremonial. "The executive authority", said Jinnah, "flows from the Head of the Government of Pakistan who is the Governor General".²⁸⁶ Additionally, he was the President of the Constituent Assembly, President of the federal legislature, the legal guide to the Assembly in drafting the

²⁸⁴See Appendix I.

²⁸⁵*Dawn*, (Delhi), July 13, 1947.

²⁸⁶Cited in Herbert Feldman, *A Constitution for Pakistan*, p. 8.

new constitution²⁸⁷ and also held on to the Presidency of the Muslim League. Ready acquiescence of the elites to Jinnah's wishes is reflective of a key component of the political culture of Pakistan: deference to authority.

Jinnah created the first cabinet, named Liaquat as Prime Minister, selected Ministers for him, and even distributed portfolios among them. "More than one Minister subsequently made public declarations to the effect that he was a nominee of the Quaid-e-Azam".²⁸⁸ He formulated the policies of the cabinet, presided over its regular meetings and conducted cabinet meetings in the absence of the Prime Minister.²⁸⁹ He created and personally took charge of the Ministries of the States and Frontier Regions, and of Evacuees and Rehabilitation.²⁹⁰ Baluchistan was converted into a Governor General's province and was, as he said, "my special responsibility...".²⁹¹ He appointed provincial Governors in his discretion with three of the four Governors being British. These Governors acted as his agents and exercised considerable control over their respective provincial governments. One of them even reallocated the cabinet portfolios against the wishes of the Chief

²⁸⁷*Dawn* (Delhi), August 25, 1947.

²⁸⁸Mushtaq Ahmad, *Government and Politics in Pakistan*, (Karachi, Space Publishers, 1970), p. 20.

²⁸⁹*Ibid.*, p. 21.

²⁹⁰*Dawn*, July 17, 1948.

²⁹¹*Quaid-e-Azam Speaks* (Karachi, Pak Publicity, n.d.), p. 76.

Minister.²⁹² The Governors were required to send fortnightly confidential reports to the Governor General which gave him detailed assessments of the administration of their provinces.²⁹³ In short, decision making power was concentrated in the hands of the Governor General. As long as Jinnah lived, his decisions and desires became binding on the new state of Pakistan. As pointed out by Liaquat, "... the man who has been vested with all powers is the Governor General. He can do whatever he likes".²⁹⁴ No decision was or could ever be taken without the approval of the Quaid-i-Azam.²⁹⁵

Liaquat emerged as the de facto Prime Minister only after Jinnah's death and emulated him in every detail. Though Nazimuddin, a Bengali of Kashmiri descent, became the Governor General, the real power was inherited by the Prime Minister, as the first lieutenant of Jinnah, whose primacy the Governor General acknowledged:

There is no one better qualified in Pakistan than our Prime Minister, Liaquat, to lead the country along the path marked out by the Quaid-e-Azam.²⁹⁶

Liaquat took over the portfolio of the States and Frontier Regions which Jinnah had held, relieved the Governor General

²⁹²*The Times* (London), April 26, 1948.

²⁹³Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan*, p. 63. One of these letters written by Sir Francis Mudie was obtained by and published in K. L. Gauba, *Inside Pakistan* (Delhi, Rajkamal Publications, 1948), Appendix A, pp. 301-303.

²⁹⁴Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, I, 8 (May 1948), p. 239.

²⁹⁵Qureshi, "Iqbal and Jinnah", p. 36.

²⁹⁶Broadcast on September 15, 1948 cited in Qureshi, "Elite Politics", p. 276.

of the Presidency of the Constituent Assembly and himself assumed the presidentship of the Muslim League party.²⁹⁷ Even though during his time, the Constituent Assembly became the focus of national debate and despite his giving freedom to members of his Cabinet to deliberate on policy matters, he is reported to have taken major decisions without prior consultation with his Cabinet colleagues.²⁹⁸ He, on his own initiative, suspended the ministry of Khan of Mamdot in Punjab, and without Cabinet consultation pledged Pakistan's support to the U. N. action in Korea while on an official visit to the U.S., and initiated at his own instance negotiations with India.²⁹⁹ Similarly, as testified by Nazimuddin, "Quaid-e-Millat himself was responsible for the Objective Resolution and over-ruled all opposition to it in the Muslim League Parliamentary Party".³⁰⁰ In sum, as with Jinnah so with Liaquat, the decision making was personal in nature. Cooperation was not the keynote of their decision making style. The system was patrimonial, the power was concentrated at the top of the pyramid where there was "no sharing, no equal and no competitor".³⁰¹ The example set by Jinnah, the founder of the Pakistan Movement and the Father

²⁹⁷In February 1948, the Muslim League adopted a new constitution which debarred Cabinet members from holding any office in the party organization. *Dawn*, February 20, 22, 1948. The constitution was amended in 1952 and Liaquat was elected as President of the party. *Ibid.*, October 9, 1950.

²⁹⁸Mushtaq Ahmad, *Government and Politics in Pakistan*, p. 42.

²⁹⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 42-43.

³⁰⁰*The Pakistan Times* December 2, 1953.

³⁰¹Qureshi, "Elite Politics", p. 269.

of the Nation, and reiterated and reinforced by his trusted lieutenant Liaquat Ali Khan became the norm and was religiously emulated by their successors, though much lesser leaders, especially by Ghulam Mohammad, the Governor General.

Emergence of Ghulam Mohammad

To fill the position of the Prime Minister, fallen vacant by Liaquat's assassination in 1951, Nazimuddin stepped down from the office of the Governor General and conferred that office on Ghulam Mohammad, then Finance Minister.³⁰²

³⁰²According to Siddiq Ali Khan, secret negotiations between Ghulam Muhammad, M. A. Gurmani and Chaudhri Mohammed Ali took place in Rawalpindi and a decision was reached to the effect that Ghulam Mohammed would become the Prime Minister. Nazimuddin at a later stage intervened and himself became the Prime Minister. Siddiq Ali Khan, *Be Taig Sipahi* [Swordless Soldier] (Karachi, Lloyds Book, 1971), p. 489. Siddiq Ali Khan served as secretary to Liaquat. According to him the meeting took place in the absence of Nazimuddin and it took such a long time that Liaquat's burial had to be delayed.

The decision reflected the power struggle between Punjab and Bengal. Both Ghulam Mohammed and Nazimuddin sought the Prime Ministerial position but the latter won because he was the Governor General. The Punjabi elite might have felt that Nazimuddin being weak, would be easily manageable. Nazimuddin in assuming the Prime Ministership had every reason to believe that he was ascending the political ladder, from a symbolic to an effective executive position. Thus, on becoming the Prime Minister Nazimuddin remarked: "Political power had come to me at a stage when it could have no attraction for me". *The Pakistan Observer*, February 1, 1952. It did not occur to him that Ghulam Mohammed, trained as a public accountant and having been a very powerful member of the Liaquat cabinet was not accustomed to being a symbolic leader. Nazimuddin was later to complain to Ghulam Mohammed, "When I was Governor General I never interfered with Liaquat". To this the Governor General retorted, "Ah, but you see I am not Nazimuddin and

³⁰² The Governor General's attempt at patrimony or faction building was to take about 18 months and during that period he played a symbolic role but "kept himself informed of all that was taking place, and developed a considerable interest in the armed forces".³⁰³ Once the alliance was finalized,³⁰⁴ the Governor General, taking advantage of the anti-Ahmadi religious disturbances,³⁰⁵ dismissed Nazimuddin. The dismissal of Nazimuddin made it "obvious where power now lay: with the bureaucracy; in particular with Ghulam

³⁰²(cont'd) you are not Liaquat". Z.A. Suleri, *Pakistan's Lost Years* (Lahore, Progressive Papers, 1962), p. 78.

³⁰³ Keith Callard, *Pakistan*, p. 135.

³⁰⁴ The alliance reached its final stage in 1953. The leader (patron) was the Governor General, a former civil servant. The clientele included the landed gentry whose support was conditional - sharing of the decision making power specifically at the provincial level. Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-77*, (London, Macmillan, 1980), p. 31. Thus, the spokesman of the anti-land reform landlord group, Firoz Khan Noon, became the Chief Minister of Punjab. *Dawn*, March 24, 25, 1953. Pirzada Abdus Sattar, another landlord, became the Chief Minister of Sind. The "frontier tiger", Khan A. Qaiyum Khan, an urbanite and a professional, had to resign in favor of Sardar Abdur Rashid who enjoyed the confidence of the landed gentry belonging to that province. Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto*, p. 31.

Along with landlords, the military was also taken into confidence. It was General Ayub Khan, not the Prime Minister, who accompanied the Governor General to Washington "to consider an exchange of air bases for military equipment". *New York Times*, November 12, 13, 1953. On February 25, 1954, the military assistance needed for "strengthening the defensive capabilities of the Middle East" was approved by the United States. *Ibid.*, February 26, 1954.

Government policies toward business were essentially regulatory in nature, and this made those who operated the state, the higher civil servants, important to businessmen. In short, the patron was the Governor General, and the clients represented various constituencies: the landed gentry, the Army and the business group.

³⁰⁵ According to Nazimuddin the agitation "was a political movement actuated by power politics". *Chronology of Pakistan*, pp. 94-95.

Mohammad, backed by another former civil servant, Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, who had been Finance Minister since 1951".³⁰⁶ Nazimuddin's dismissal was followed by the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly³⁰⁷ by an ordinance on October 24, 1954.³⁰⁸

The reconstituted cabinet had Mohammad Ali Bogra, the Bengali landlord who before his appointment was serving as Pakistan's Ambassador to the United States, as the Prime

³⁰⁶Ian Stephens, *Pakistan: Old Country New Nation*, p. 290.

³⁰⁷The dissolution was in retaliation to the Assembly's attempt at curbing the powers of the Governor General. Ghulam Mohammad bided his time and carefully planned his counter-coup. He wooed the politicians who were out of power, quashing PRODA disqualification against Khuhro and Daulatana. see *Dawn*, October 21, 31, 1954. He also made overtures to members of those Bengali political elites, especially to Suhrawardy, who were demanding the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. See Suhrawardy's statements in *Dawn*, March 17, April 13; October 9, 1954. See also the resolution adopted by the United Front at a Dacca public meeting. *Dawn*, April 5, 1954. The editor of *The Times of Karachi*, Z. A. Suleri, travelled, as Ghulam Mohammad's emissary, to Zurich where Suhrawardy was convalescing and on his return the Punjabi group took up the demand for the dissolution of the Assembly. See Suleri, *Pakistan's Lost years*, p. 92. Suhrawardy's exposition of the Punjabi group's demand for the dissolution is as follows: "Well, this (Punjabi) group could not get along with the Prime Minister Muhammad Ali and found themselves in a minority in the now dissolved Constituent Assembly. So, they suddenly took up the Awami League's demand to do away with the Constituent Assembly". *Dawn*, October 27, 1954.

³⁰⁸*Dawn*, October 24, 1954. The Punjabi group was in support of the action and some of the Army officers (especially Generals Ayub and Musa) were present at the Governor General's house on the night of October 23, 1954, when dissolution was ordered. See General Mohammad Musa's preface to Col. Mohammad Ahmad, *My Chief* (Lahore, Longmans, Green & Co., 1950), p. XII. General Ayub was upset by the constitutional amendments curbing the powers of the Governor General because, as he said, "it meant destroying the focal point of authority". Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, p. 50.

Minister. Described as a "cabinet of talents",³⁰⁹ it included the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, two prominent businessmen, two ex-civil servants, four landlords and five members from various professions. The vice-regal system established by Jinnah had reappeared in which the real power was in the hands of the civil-military bureaucracy.³¹⁰ The Governor-General himself was a civil servant, the Interior Minister General Iskander Mirza was another, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army headed the Ministry of Defence, while another former civil servant, Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, was in charge of Finance.³¹¹

On May 27, 1955, the Governor General, promulgated an Emergency Powers Ordinance, assumed the powers, *inter alia*, to make provisions for framing the Constitution of Pakistan, to constitute the Province of West Pakistan, to validate laws which had not received the Governor-General's assent and to authenticate the central government's budget. Thus the Governor-General had "virtually assumed the powers of an absolute ruler".³¹² When the Governor General found that some provincial Chief Ministers were opposed to the

³⁰⁹*Dawn*, October 31, 1954.

³¹⁰The vice-regal system in India was characterized by a British Proconsul at the top issuing orders to a civil service which exercised their power most of the time without any interference from politicians.

³¹¹The *Dawn* of August 11, 1957 wrote: "... with a General to the right of him and a General to the left of him, a half-mad Governor General imposed upon a captured Prime Minister the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the virtual setting up of a semi-dictatorial executive".

³¹²*Pakistan Times*, March 31, 1955. See especially the editorial comment.

unification of West Pakistan, he dismissed the recalcitrant Chief Ministers (of Sind, NWFP., and Punjab) one after another.³¹³

The Governor General was thwarted in his attempt to frame the Constitution by a decision of the Federal Court which conceded the power to dissolve the Assembly,³¹⁴ but advised him to convene a new one which the Governor General felt constrained to do.³¹⁵ Thus ended another period in which decision making was personal and centralized.

Like Jinnah and Liaquat, Ghulam Mohammad established a highly centralized, autocratic system in the country. He appointed Mohammad Ali Bogra as the Prime Minister but gave

³¹³See *Dawn*, November 9, 1954; May 21, 22, 1955; July 8, 9, 19, 1955.

³¹⁴The court categorically stated that the Governor General "himself is not the Constituent Assembly and on its disappearance he can neither claim power which he never possessed nor claim to succeed to the powers of that Assembly". Judgement in the case of Usif Patel and Two Others v. The Crown in Jennings, *Constitutional Problems in Pakistan*, p. 245.

³¹⁵"The country is faced with a grave situation", said Suhrawardy. *Dawn*, April 15, 1955. If the Assembly is not convened, Suhrawardy explained, following measures will be necessary: (1) A revolution to start afresh; (2) A civil dictatorship with military support; and (3) Martial law. *Ibid.*, April 24, 1955. The first alternative was not available since there was no revolutionary party. The second and the third alternatives were most promising but the Governor General, besides being a sick man, was told point blank by the Commander-in-Chief that the Army was not willing to intervene and that "he was not going to be a party to an act of recklessness". Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, p. 52. The reason Ayub gave for his unwillingness to take over the country was: "I am engaged in building up the army". Having no alternative, the Governor General decided to follow the court ruling and convened a new Constituent Assembly.

him no power.³¹⁶ The Governor General received periodic reports from provincial Governors³¹⁷ and constantly interfered in provincial affairs. As Mujib pointed out, "He (Ghulam Mohammad) can do everything; he is in power".³¹⁸ Instead of opting for a "coalitional" type of executive, the Governor General established a highly centralized, patrimonial system. Such a system aroused antagonisms and deep-seated suspicions of the political elites of various subcultures who had their own political constituencies. Their exclusion from the highest executive body intensified the rifts among the political elites.

Coalition during the Republican Period

The year 1955 is of great significance in the politics of Pakistan. First, a new Constituent Assembly was convened. Second, the political leaders, whom Jinnah and Liaquat tried to eliminate, were back in the political arena. Finally, and most importantly, there was an apparent attempt to accommodate diverse interests.³¹⁹

³¹⁶Bogra is reported to have described himself as a "miserable being" and "a puppet" who had no say in the administration of the country. Carl T. Rowan, *The Pitiful and the Proud* (New York, Random House, 1956), p. 269.

³¹⁷G. W. Choudhury, *The Last Days of United Pakistan* (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1974); p. 42.

³¹⁸Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, I, 9 (August 25, 1955), p. 293.

³¹⁹The overriding objective of the ruling elite in dissolving the Assembly was the integration of West Pakistan into a single unit so that the West Pakistanis could confront the Bengalis as a single entity. This is what the Punjabi political elites notably Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, M. A. Gurmani and Daulatana had been pressing for as a condition precedent to a constitutional settlement with East

³¹⁹ This spirit of cooperation was revealed in the signing of the Murree Pact on the following terms:

1. Integration of West Pakistan into one unit.
2. Complete regional autonomy for the two wings.
3. Parity between East and West Pakistan in all respects.
4. Joint electorate.
5. Bengali and Urdu as state languages of Pakistan.³²⁰

Based on accommodation and compromise reached at Murree, the Constitution, promulgated on March 23, 1956, tried to accommodate the demands of various elite groups. To satisfy the religious elites, the Constitution (a) proclaimed Pakistan an Islamic Republic (Part I, Article I); (b) included in its preamble the Objective Resolution which had been passed by the first Constituent Assembly in 1949;

³¹⁹ (cont'd) Pakistan. General Ayub, for reasons of strategy and economy, had come to a similar conclusion. Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, p. 187. Accordingly, the Bengali political elites were told that their demand for provincial autonomy could be met only if West Pakistan could be merged into one unit "as giving complete autonomy to the existing small provinces would mean that powers would be used wrongly and there would be chaos". Pir Ali Mohammed Rashdi, "EK Unit ki Aakhri Kahani", [The Last Story of One Unit] (Urdu text) Part III in *Jang*, September 7, 1970. Moreover, Bengalis were told that one unit was an internal matter of West Pakistan and that they should not interfere. Abul Mansur Ahmad, *Amar Dekha Rajnitir Panchasha Bachar* [Fifty Years of Politics as I Saw It] (Bengali text) (Dacca, Nauroj, 1968), p. 364.

³²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 364. Also *Dawn*, July 11, 1955. Suhrawardy enumerated only four points: one unit, parity, autonomy and division of offices of Governor General and Prime Minister between the two wings. See Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debates*, I, 22 (September 12, 1955). The accord was signed by Suhrawardy, Fazlul Huq, Abul Mansur Ahmad and Aaur Rahman Khan from East Pakistan and Dr. Khan Saheb, Chaudhri Mohammed Ali and Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani from West Pakistan. Mohammad Ali Bogra, although a Bengali, also signed on behalf of West Pakistan. Abul Mansur Ahmad, *Amar Dekha Rajnitir Panchash Bachar*, p. 365.

(c) required that the Head of the State must be a Muslim (Part IV, Article 23(c)); (d) provided that laws passed by parliament should not be repugnant to the Quran and the Sunnah (Part XII, Art. 198(1)); and (e) enumerated several Islamic provisions in the "Directive Principles of State Policy".

The Constitution also represented formidable gains for the Bengali political elites. Their demand for Bengali as a "state" language was conceded. The Constitution also adopted parity of representation in parliament (Part IV, Art. 44(1)) and contained a declaration of the intent, in the Directive Principles, to let "people from all parts of Pakistan participate in the Defence Services of the country" and to "achieve parity in the representation of East Pakistan and West Pakistan in all other spheres of Federal administration" (Part III, Art. 31 (1)(2)). It also provided for the National Finance Commission to make a suitable recommendation for the allocation of national resources between the centre and the provinces (Part VI, Art. 118). A National Economic Council was also to be constituted by the President to review the overall economic condition of the country and to formulate plans so that "uniform standards are attained in the economic development of all parts of the country" (Part XII, Art. 199(2)). The elites failed, however, to reach an agreement on the electorate issue: whether there should be separate electorates or a joint electorate for both the national and provincial elections. Therefore, the

Constitution left the matter undetermined, to be settled later by ordinary legislation.

The Constitution safeguarded the economic power of the landowning elites by means of Article 15 which stipulated that:

1. No person shall be deprived of his property save in accordance with the law; and
2. No property shall be compulsorily acquired or taken possession of save for a public purpose and save by the authority of law which provides for compensation.

It also entrenched powers of the administrative elites. Article 181 made it clear that no civil servants could be removed from service, or reduced in rank, by an authority subordinate to that by which they were appointed. In addition, Article 183(4) enshrined that no civil servants "shall be transferred to serve in connection with the affairs of that Province, or be transferred from that Province, except by order of the President made after consultation with the Governor of that Province". What was true of the administrative elites was equally true of the military elites. Both were accorded guarantees of immunity from "political interference".

General Iskander Mirza was elected the first President of the Pakistan Republic.³²¹

³²¹The Governor General Ghulam Mohammed took two month's leave on health ground on August 6, 1955 and Mirza stepped in as acting Governor General. Ghulam Mohammed resigned effective October 6, 1955 and Mirza became the new Governor General. *Ibid.*, October 20, 1955. It is reported that Mirza

³²¹ With Mirza as the President and Chaudhri Mohammed Ali as the Prime Minister, the power, as before, was solidly in the hands of the administrative elites. Decisions were not taken on the basis of cooperation. The leader of the opposition had no say in the formulation or the execution of policy. As revealed by Suhrawardy:

... the policy of the government was not dictated by the Honourable leader of the Opposition. The policy of the Government was dictated by the Honourable Prime Minister (Chaudhri Mohammed Ali) sitting there and by other Ministers who shall be nameless in the House.³²²

The hard core of the ruling elite consisted of General Mirza, Chaudhri Mohammed Ali, General Ayub and other Punjabi leaders.

Thus the composition of the first coalition cabinet under the new constitution did not differ much from earlier practices. Five of the 14 ministers came from East Pakistan, four from Punjab, two from Sind, two Muhajirs, and one was from the North West Frontier Province. The Cabinet composition did not honor the consensus formed at Murree. The historic Murree Pact which, according to one

³²¹(cont'd)refused to sign the Constitution Bill, as the Governor General, unless he was assured of being elected President. He signed it only after his nomination papers for the office of the President had been signed by members of the Assembly. See Qayyum Khan's statement in *Dawn*, July 26, 1956. It is also reported that General Ayub threw his support in favor of Mirza. Pir Muhammad Rashidi, "Ek Unit ki Akhri Kahani". In any case, 50 members in a House of 80 had signed Mirza's nomination paper and elected him President. *The Pakistan Observer*, March 6, 1956. The Constitution went into effect on March 23, 1956.

³²²Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debates*, I, 61(January 31, 1956), p.2241.

participant, laid the solid foundation for Pakistan, proved fragile and tenuous.³²³

The pact was the result of mutual but momentary need rather than any shared objectives. The Punjabis needed Bengali support for a safe passage of the one-unit bill in the Assembly and the Bengalis, after waiting in political wilderness since the 1954 election, needed the Punjabi support to occupy power positions. Since it was entered into by particular leaders and groups for particular ends, and not for providing stability to the country, the consensus evaporated as quickly as it was arrived at. One-unit was under attack from its conception, and its continuance was a lively political and constitutional issue. The failure to provide for a common electorate in the Constitution provoked the Awami League leaders to renew demands for majority representation for East Pakistan.³²⁴

The preceding discussion suggests that the political elites in Pakistan were not willing to share political power with each other. Personal power unchecked by impersonal rules and institutions has been the norm rather than the exception. One manifestation of this attitude is the large number of ordinances issued during the long intervals between short parliamentary sessions. Even when the Assembly was in session, the tendency was to get the bills passed

³²³Abul Mansur Ahmed, *Amar Dekha Rajniti Panchash Bachar*, p. 366.

³²⁴See chapter V for a discussion of the controversy on the question of electorate.

Table IV:1

Annual Incidence of Acts and Ordinances of the
Central Government, 1948-58

Year	Acts	Bills passed without discussion	Ordinances
1948	30	16	27
1949	38	22	21
1950	62	45	9
1951	44	30	9
1952	63	38	10
1953	41	27	6
1954	13	9	4
1956	47	25	25
1957	50	28	18
1958	40	17	15

Source: Compiled from Mushtaq Ahmad, *Government and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi, Space Publishers, 1970), Appendix, pp. 371-372.

without discussion. As shown in table IV:1, out of a total of 428 acts, 257 bills were passed without any discussion.

Successive Cabinets in Pakistan contained members of various ethnic groups, and therefore may be characterized as forming a grand coalition, but the tendency of successive ruling elites had been to establish personal, centralized rule rather than a collegial executive. Political elites argued, intrigued and conspired to reduce each other to impotence.

Proportionality: The essence of the principle of proportionality, and of cooperative behavior for that matter, is that elites recognize the fragmented nature of

the society and attempt, through various policies and actions, to perform a difficult balancing act. Given the strong sense of distrust underlying interpersonal relationships in Pakistan, the task of balancing various interests proved difficult.³²⁵

The Constituent and the National Assemblies of Pakistan mirrored the regional and ethnic diversity of the society. The composition of the two constituent assemblies of Pakistan is shown in table IV:2. Although the territorial distribution, in accordance with the population ratio, gave East Pakistan about 56 percent of the representation in the first Constituent Assembly, about half a dozen seats from East Pakistan were given, by the Chief Minister on the urging of the Governor General, to persons from other provinces, mainly to refugees, who had no political constituency of their own. The first Prime Minister, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, a Muhajir from U.P., and two other Muhajirs, Drs. I. H. Qureshi and Mahmud Hussain, who subsequently became ministers in the central cabinet were given East Pakistani seats. Similarly, when Abdul Qaiyum Khan joined the central cabinet as a minister after serving five years as Chief Minister of the N.W.F.P., a seat was found for him from East Pakistan. The fact remains, however, that the composition of the legislature reflected the

³²⁵According to Finer, the political elites of West Pakistan "have tended to regard Bengalis as disloyal autonomists and separatists...." S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horse Back: The Role of the Military in Politics* (Middlesex, England, Penguin Books Ltd., 1976), p. 38.

Table IV:2

Composition of the two Constituent Assemblies by Region

Province	Population % of total	First Constituent Assembly		Second Constituent Assembly	
		No.	%	No.	%
East Bengal	55.4	44	55.7	40	50.0
Punjab	24.9	22	27.8	21	26.3
N.W.F.P.	4.3	3	3.8	4	5.0
Sindh	6.1	5	6.3	5	6.3
Baluchistan	0.8	1	1.3	1	1.3
Karachi	1.5	-	-	1	1.3
Bhawalpur	2.4	1	1.3	2	2.5
Khairpur	0.4	1	1.3	1	1.3
Frontier States	3.5	1	1.3	1	1.3
Baluchistan States	0.7	1	1.3	1	1.3
Tribal Areas	-	-	-	3	3.8

Source: *Dawn*, (Karachi), May 29, 1955; Mushtaq Ahmad, *Government and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi, Space Printers, 1970), p. 88; Keith Callard, *Pakistan: A Political Study* (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1957), p. 37.

proportionate strength of various ethnic or regional groups of Pakistan.

The rule of proportionality did not apply to successive central cabinets. Though the Bengalis formed a majority of about 55 percent, they had an overall representation of only 39 percent. As shown in table IV:3, over the years, the Bengali position gradually improved but at the cost of Muhajir representation. Baluchistan had no representation at the ministerial level. Only one Baluchi was appointed as a Minister of State in charge of the Interior in the cabinet

of Firoz Khan Noon.

Major complaints of the Bengali political elites and of the minority provinces of West Pakistan centered around the question of economic resource allocation and recruitment to the government services. As pointed out by Abul Mansur Ahmed, during the period 1947-48 to 1954-55, East Pakistan received about 5.12 percent of the total public investment, the rest was spent in West Pakistan.³²⁶ The allocation of revenue expenditure including working expenses of commercial departments was also discriminatory. East Pakistan, during the period 1947-48 to 1960-61, received about 12 percent of the central government's revenue expenditure as against 45 percent for West Pakistan and if the working expenses of commercial departments are excluded, East Pakistan's share amounted to a meagre 5 percent as against West Pakistan's 34 percent.³²⁷ Similarly, out of the total amount of foreign development aid received during the same period, East Pakistan's share was about 17 percent as against 62 percent for West Pakistan.³²⁸ In addition, a number of studies have appeared demonstrating the steady exploitation of the eastern wing by its western counterpart. These studies have

³²⁶Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debates*, I, 51 (January 16, 1956), pp. 1818-1819.

³²⁷East Pakistan, Planning Department, *Economic Disparities Between East and West Pakistan* (Dacca, East Pakistan Government Press, 1963), p. 17.

³²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 21. According to Abul Mansur Ahmed, East Pakistan received a meagre 8.61 percent of the total amount of foreign aid received during 1947-48 to 1954-55, see Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, I, 51 (January 16, 1956), pp. 1846-47.

Table IV:3

Regional Representation in Successive Central Cabinets
(in percentages)

Cabinets	E. Pak	Punjab	Sind	NWFP	Muhajir	N
Liaquat	28.57	35.71	7.14	14.29	14.29	14
Nazimuddin	33.33	25.00	8.33	16.67	16.67	12
Bogra	27.27	27.27	9.09	18.18	18.18	11
Bogra	50.00	21.43	7.14	14.29	7.14	14
Md. Ali	35.71	21.43	21.43	7.14	14.29	14
Suhrawardy	50.00	20.00	20.00	20.00	0.0	10
Chundrigar	42.86	28.57	14.29	7.14	7.14	14
Noon	50.00	16.67	6.67	16.67	0.0	18

Source: Great Britain, Commonwealth Office, *The Commonwealth Relations Officer List* (London, His Majesty's Office, 1952-1959); Keith Callard, *Pakistan: A Political Study* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1959); *Biographical Encyclopedia of Pakistan* (Lahore, Biographical Research Institute, 1955); *Dawn*, 1948-58; *The Pakistan Observer*, 1948-58.

shown as well that there has been an annual drain of resources from East Pakistan to West Pakistan.³²⁹ This resource transfer, according to the government advisory panel's estimate, amounted to, during 1948-49 to 1968-69, approximately 2.6 billion dollars.³³⁰ These disparities resulted in the Bengali demand for a radical reallocation of economic resources and for full provincial autonomy.

³²⁹ See especially Mohammed Anisur Rahman, *East and West Pakistan: A Problem in the Political Economy of Regional Planning* (Cambridge, Mass., Center for International Affairs, Harvard University Press, 1968).

³³⁰ Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, *Reports of the Advisory Panels for Fourth Five Year Plan, 1970-75*, Vol. I (Islamabad, Government of Pakistan Press, July 1970), Appendix 3.

The ruling elites of Pakistan did not pay much attention to these grievances and instead tried to explain away the disparity in terms of historical and economic factors "beyond our control". Whatever the economic rationale, the disparity in allocation of resources was, as Suhrawardy said, a fact which was open for all to see.³³¹ Lack of sharing the benefits derived from the country's economic growth was not contributory to the growth of patriotism, political unity and political stability. First, it transformed the relations between the two wings of Pakistan into those between a metropolitan power and a colony. The East wing became the market for protected industries located in West Pakistan, especially in Punjab and Sind. Second, the non-recognition of these disparities by the ruling elites helped deepen the suspicions of diverse regional groups who became convinced that their rights and needs would never be acknowledged.

Another reason pointed out by the political elites of East Pakistan for their economic retardation was their insignificant representation in government services. This imbalance was due largely to historical factors. Before independence, the Muslims of Bengal, like those of other Muslim majority provinces, with the exception of the Punjab, had an insignificant representation in government services. It was expected, however, that the post-independent recruitment policy would quickly restore the balance. This

³³¹See Suhrawardy's speech in *Documents and Speeches*, p.973.

did not happen which incensed the political elites of East Pakistan as well as those of other minority provinces of West Pakistan.

Faced with mounting criticisms, the Central Government fixed a quota system: 15 percent of the posts were reserved for Muhajirs and the remaining 85 percent were to be equally shared between the two wings of Pakistan. In the year 1950, the quota for the Muhajirs was abolished and the policy stipulated that 20 percent of the officers were to be recruited on merit and the remaining 80 percent were to be shared equally between the two wings. As revealed later, the fixed ratio for recruitment was not maintained on the ground that suitable candidates were not available from East Pakistan.³³²

The quota system did help improve East Pakistan's position in the civil service but still, in 1955, the West Pakistani officers outnumbered their Eastern counterparts by five to one.³³³ East Pakistan had barely a 20 percent representation in the CSP cadre. Taking the Class I and II services as a whole, the regional breakdown in 1948 showed a meagre 7 percent share for East Bengal (202 out of a total of 2,862) which rose to about 14 percent by 1955.³³⁴ This

³³² Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, I, (March 21, 1950), p. 258; Vol. I, no. 10 (March 25, 1950), p. 561.

³³³ Pakistan, *Civil List of Class I Officers*, 1st January 1963. Out of 232 officers, only 47 belonged to East Pakistan.

³³⁴ Pakistan, *National Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, I, 1 (October 8, 1956), p. 63.

increase, however, had been at the lower level of the service cadre. At the highest level of the services, East Pakistan had little or no representation. Thus out of a total of 722 officers occupying the positions of Under Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries, and Joint Secretaries (548, 133, and 41 respectively) in 1955, only 51 officers (38, 10, and 3 respectively) were from East Pakistan. At the level of Secretaries, out of a total of 19 occupants, not a single individual came from East Pakistan.³³⁵ Data for other provinces of Pakistan, for the year 1952, are shown in table IV:4. Evidently, Sindh, Frontier Provinces and Baluchistan also suffered from under-representation and hence demanded proper representation in the services.³³⁶ There had been no change in the recruitment policy throughout the period. Sayeed's data for the period 1965-1970 showed very clearly that as of 1966 not a single officer from East Pakistan, Sindh or Frontier areas was holding an influential position in the central secretariat. Of the 69 officers on whom

³³⁵ Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, I, 17 (January 17, 1956), p. 1844. In a Ministry or Secretariat, the Secretary was usually in charge of a ministry who functioned under a Minister. The Secretary was assisted by a Joint Secretary who administered a division. There were two or three Deputy Secretaries under a Joint Secretary. See Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, *Report of the Administrative Reorganization Committee* (Karachi, Efficiency and O & M wing, President's Secretariat, 1963), pp. 225-274.

³³⁶ For regional distribution of missions and diplomatic officers see Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (Legislature) Debates*, I, 4 (March 4, 1952), p. 808; for the personnel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth, see *Ibid.*, I, 21 (April 14, 1951); for Posts and Telegraph officers, *Ibid.*, I, 10 (March 25, 1950), pp. 343-44.

Table IV:4

Regional Representation in the Civil Service of
Pakistan, 1952

Regions	Secy.	Jt. Secy.	Deputy Secy.
East Pakistan	0	1	4
Punjab	5	7	28
NWFP	1	0	2
Sind	0	0	1
Muhajirs	5	9	19
Non-Pakistanis	2	2	5
Total	13	19	59

Source: Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (Legislature) Debates*, I, 18 (April 5, 1952), pp. 1063-64.

Sayeed had information; 45 were Punjabis, 14 were Urdu speaking Muhajirs, 4 were Pathans, 3 Bengalis and only one from Sindh.³³⁷

The Bengali share in the armed forces came to even less than their share in the civil service. Given the heterogeneous nature of the country, one would have expected a policy more or less of a balanced recruitment, but there had never been a commitment to representative recruitment of military officers in Pakistan. In 1955, the Bengalis numbered 13 of 909 officers in the Army. Of these, one was a Major General, two were Lieutenant Colonels and 10 were

³³⁷K. B. Sayeed, "The Breakdown of Pakistan's Political System", *International Journal*, XXVII, 3 (Summer 1972), p. 391, Table 1. Two officers were placed under "other" category.

Majors.³³⁸ Of the remaining 896 officers, Sindh contributed only 3 officers (one Lieutenant Colonel and 2 Majors). In the navy, out of a total of 593 officers, 7 of them (or 1.3 percent) came from East Pakistan and in the Air Force the proportion of Bengali officers was a meagre 60 out of a total of 640.³³⁹ As Sayeed points out, the Pakistan Army drew heavily from four districts of northern Punjab (Rawalpindi, Campbellpur, Jhelum and Gujrat) and two districts (Peshawar and Kohat) in the Frontier Provinces. Sixty percent of the Army was Punjabi, 35 percent was Pathan and only five percent was contributed jointly by Sindh, Baluchistan and East Pakistan.³⁴⁰ Sayeed provides information on 48 officers who attained the rank of Major General and above, between 1947 and 1960. Of these, 17 came from Punjab, 19 from North West Frontier Province, 11 were Muhajirs and only one was a Bengali.³⁴¹ These revelations created such a sensation among the population that the government stopped disclosing the actual figures. The virtual absence of Bengali representation in the Army reinforced latent Bengali feelings of alienation from the Central Government and strengthened a perspective on national security that posed a fundamental threat to policy requirements as defined by the

³³⁸ Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, I, 52 (January 17, 1956), p. 1845.

³³⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁰ Sayeed, "The Role of the Military in Pakistan", p. 276.

³⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 278. Interestingly enough, Pakistan's first four Commanders-in-Chief i.e., Generals Ayub, Musa, Yahya and Gul Hasan were all Pathans from the Frontier Provinces and Baluchistan. Generals Tikka Khan, Akbar Khan and Abdul Majid were Punjabis.

Army and the West Pakistani ruling elites. The Bengali alienation gradually strengthened as the Army gradually intruded into politics.

Thus the rule of proportionality found to be "of fundamental importance to the success of the politics of accommodation in Holland"³⁴² was not given any consideration in Pakistan. The quota system was not maintained and the parity proposal was not strictly adhered to by the ruling elites.

Segmental Autonomy: From the very inception of Pakistan, the ruling elites believed that the only way to counter the centrifugal force of regionalism, made possible by the geographical incongruity, was to keep these disparate groups under firm control of a Central Government. Autonomy was considered as disruptive of the integrity and stability of the country. A weak centre, as demanded by autonomists, would threaten national unity, retard economic development, and would deal a crippling blow to the security of Pakistan by weakening and dividing the armed forces.³⁴³ A. K. Brohi, the Law Minister in the Bogra cabinet, therefore concluded that there was "no alternative but to provide for a strong Central Government".³⁴⁴

³⁴²Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation*, p. 129.

³⁴³The ruling elites always emphasized the need for an appropriate military security for Pakistan because of the hostile neighbor, India, which has not been reconciled to the creation of Pakistan.

³⁴⁴Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debates*, XV, 2(October 23, 1953) p. 349. To General Ayub, "without centralization, unity and solidarity, no system can claim to be an Islamic system". Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Speeches and*

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The impetus for centralization and strong government came from two related directions. The first was the political and constitutional tradition inherited by Pakistan. The Government of India Acts, 1919 and 1935 which defined the Central Government until 1947, provided for a strong Central Government with a powerful executive governing with the assistance of a council. The council was responsible to the executive and not to the legislature. The Act of 1935 gave overriding powers to the centre with exclusive jurisdictions on Defence, Foreign Affairs, Currency, Posts and Telegraph, Finance, Banking, Customs Duty, Income Tax, etc. The Act further provided for the taking over of the administration of a province by declaring an emergency in case of the break down of the normal administrative machinery. The Indian Independence Act of 1947, also stipulated that the Government of India Act 1935, with necessary adaptation, modification and amendments, would constitute the provisional constitution of each Dominion. Despite amendments, the basic nature of the system remained unchanged. The Basic Principles Committee Report adopted by the Assembly in 1954 followed the method of three lists of subjects, federal, provincial and concurrent. The Central Government was to be strong with 66 items as against 48 items in the provincial list and with residuary power

344 (cont'd) *Statements* (Karachi, Pakistan Publications, 1960), Vol. II, p. 43.

vested in the Head of State.³⁴⁵ The Constitution of 1956 enlarged the number of provincial subjects and provided for the creation of several special bodies to provide joint federal-provincial policy control in economic matters but otherwise closely followed the lists of the 1935 Act and maintained the priority of central powers over provincial powers.³⁴⁶

The second impulse for centralization, as stated above, came from the personalities of the leadership in the formative phase of Pakistan. In addition to the vice-regal tradition, Jinnah brought to the office of the Governor General his tremendous prestige as the father of the nation. "As the Quaid-i-Azam, Jinnah and Jinnah alone was the source of legitimacy of the government".³⁴⁷ The system he established and legitimized was the approximation of the British Government of India. Those who succeeded him to the chair of the Governor General, with the exception of Nazimuddin, emulated his style. The fact that they belonged to the Indian Civil Service, "with all its traditions of vigorous executive action" gave further impetus to centralization.

The major agents of centralization were the civil servants and the provincial Governors. Jinnah and Liaquat both maintained the tradition introduced by the British in 1920 and retained under the Act of 1935, whereby the

³⁴⁵ See *Documents and Speeches*, pp. 265-271.

³⁴⁶ See *Ibid.*, pp. 233-234.

³⁴⁷ Qureshi, "Iqbal and Jinnah", p. 35.

Secretaries under the Ministers were given the right to see the Governors over the head of the Ministers.³⁴⁸ The civil servants who manned the top positions in the centre as well as in the provinces became powerful. As stated above, Jinnah appointed British ICS officers as provincial Governors who used to preside over Cabinet meetings and used to send fortnightly reports to Jinnah. Liaquat inherited all the powers, maintained the vice-regal tradition and used to receive reports from Chief Secretaries of the provinces.³⁴⁹

Another instrument of centralization was the power to dismiss Ministries and to impose the Governor's rule on the provinces (under Section 92A of the Indian Independence Act) and to disqualify, under the Public and Representative Office (Disqualification) Act of 1949, individual Ministers found guilty of corruption or misconduct by a tribunal set up by the Government. Section 93 of the Government of India Act of 1935, which empowered the provincial Governors, in case of emergencies, to seize control of the provinces, was rescinded by the Pakistan Provisional Constitution Order. Jinnah acting on his own initiative, however, inserted section 92A into the Independence Act.³⁵⁰ These acts were used so extensively that in the first seven years of independence no less than ten provincial ministries fell

³⁴⁸ See J. Coatman, *India: The Road to Self-Government* (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1942), p. 62.

³⁴⁹ Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (Legislature) Debates*, I, 19 (November 9, 1955), pp. 2777-78.

³⁵⁰ Keith Callard, *Pakistan*, p. 160.

victim to central action.³⁵¹

Several scholars have rationalized the policy of centralization by arguing that at a time when the fledgling state was struggling to consolidate its place in the firmament of nations, a strong, firm and quick executive action was required. Braibanti even thought it "probably wise that Pakistan continued its identification with the British system of administration, for this resulted in reinvigoration of the transplanted ideas and structures of bureaucracy by contact with their source".³⁵² This identification with the vice-regal tradition, however, did not augur well for Pakistan. First, personalization of such a plenitude of power in the hands of the Governor General not merely relegated the legislative organ to the status of a minor partner, it also quietly but firmly strengthened the anti-democratic tendencies in the country. The precedent established by Jinnah, for the thirteen months that he ruled, was emulated by his successors and became the modus operandi of Pakistani political elites. Second, though the Act of 1935 provided for a federation, the Government of Pakistan as it emerged was highly centralized. Whatever autonomy the provinces enjoyed under the 1935 Act was curtailed. This was resented especially by the East

³⁵¹The ten ministries were: 1947 - Khan and Rashid Ministry in the NWFP; 1948 - Khuhro of Sind; 1949 - Khuda Bakhsh of Sind and Mamdot of the Punjab; 1951 - Khuhro of Sind; 1953 - Daulatana of the Punjab; 1954 - Pirzada of Sind, Noon of the Punjab and Fazlul Haq of East Pakistan.

³⁵²Braibanti, "Public Bureaucracy in Pakistan", p. 381.

Pakistani political elites. Finally, as Braibanti points out, it led to the reinvigoration of the bureaucratic structure but it did so at the expense of other nation-building institutions. Consequently, actual exercise of effective power passed into the hands of the civil servants, which was resented by other political elites. The mere fact of meagre Bengali representation in the civil service was enough to alienate them from the centre but in addition the Punjabi and to a lesser extent the Muhajir civil servants who manned all the key positions in the provincial administration had what Chaudhri Mohammad Ali called "an attitude of supercilious superiority".³⁵³

The regional political elites with the exception of the Punjabis and the Muhajirs had asked the ruling elites to leave the provinces to work out their "own destinies". As Fazlul Huq argued, "you cannot have the same constitution for all the different units of Pakistan. It must be different from unit to unit".³⁵⁴ The ruling elites resisted these demands for autonomy and made repeated attempts to strengthen the center which provoked bitterness and resentment from the regional elites. Each time the ruling elites tried to set up a centralized system, the opposition from East Pakistan and the other minority provinces of West Pakistan was intense and unequivocal.

³⁵³Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, p. 6.

³⁵⁴Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, XV, 2(October 23, 1953), p. 400.

Mutual Veto: The idea of protecting the rights of the various subcultures from being overruled by a majority has been a dominant theme in Pakistan. The Basic Principles Committee appointed by the Constituent Assembly was assigned the task of finding a formula for the representation of the various units in the legislature in "such a way that no single unit should be in a position to dominate others".³⁵⁵ The instrumentality for such a protection was considered to be a "federation" with bicameral legislatures.

The report presented by the first Prime Minister of Pakistan proposed a federation of equal units in which the lower house would have an East Pakistani majority by virtue of population and the upper house a West Pakistani majority through the equal representation of the existing provinces, including Baluchistan. The report also provided for equality of powers between the two houses with a proviso that in case of a dispute on any question, the decision should be taken in a joint session of the two houses. These proposals being unacceptable to the Bengali political elites, in 1952 the Basic Principles Committee proposed a solution abandoning the idea of equality of units and providing equal representation for East and West Pakistan in each house. This scheme was also criticized and hence it gave way, in 1953, to what is popularly known as the "Mohammad Ali Formula", a compromise drawn up by the Prime Minister and adopted by the Assembly in 1954. This scheme proposed, once

³⁵⁵Choudhury, *Constitutional Development in Pakistan*, p. 69.

again, a federal legislature composed of two houses in which the East Pakistan majority in the lower house was to be balanced by a West Pakistan majority in the upper chamber (see table IV:5). The two houses were given equal powers and the decisions were to be made by a simple majority. Such a majority, however, must have included at least 30 percent of the members of each zone (i.e., East Pakistan and West Pakistan). In addition, controversial matters were to require passage in a joint session of the two houses by a majority including 30 percent of the members from each zone.

The federal structure envisaged in the Mohammad Ali formula, according to Bhutto, reflected the realities of Pakistan.³⁵⁶ The scheme, however, was not incorporated into the Constitution of 1956. Instead, it declared Pakistan to be a federation consisting of two provinces. Unlike other federal constitutions, the 1956 constitution provided for a unicameral legislature in which the two provinces were given parity of representation. The result, as pointed out by Bhutto, was disastrous. A federation of only two provinces accelerated polarisation to the "galloping point between East and West Pakistan" because it brought two forces, two powers into confrontation with each other.³⁵⁷

Conclusion: From the above analysis it is evident that the behavior of the political elites in Pakistan has not

³⁵⁶Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *The Great Tragedy* (Karachi, Pakistan People's Party, 1971), pp. 4-5.

³⁵⁷*The Pakistan Observer*, May 16, 1970.

Table IV:5

Successive Proposals for Representation of various units
in the legislature

Regions	Lower House			Upper House	
	(1)*	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)
East Pakistan	200	165	155	60	10
West Pakistan	200	135	155	60	40
Punjab	90	75		27	10
Sind	30	19		8	9
NWFP	25	13		6	10**
Tribal areas	17	11		5	
Bhawalpur	13	7		4	4
Baluchistan	5	3		2	3***
Baluchistan st.	5	2		2	
Khairpur	4	1		2	1
Karachi	11	4		4	3

Notes: *(1) refers to BPC report, 1952
 (2) refers to BPC report, (as adopted 1954)
 (3) refers to the Constitution of 1956
 **includes tribal areas Frontier States.
 ***includes Baluchistan states union.

Source: G. W. Choudhury ed., *Documents and Speeches on the Constitution of Pakistan* (Dacca, Green Book House, 1967), pp. 78-79, 81, 206, 209, 405.

been characterized by norms of cooperation. Cabinets and parliaments did have representation from various regions but they were inconsequential since political power always remained concentrated in the hands of a patrimonial leader: the Governor General, the Prime Minister or the President. Regional representation in various services was not proportional to the numerical strength of various regional and ethnic groups. Bengalis, the majority group, were

discriminated against and so were the Baluchis, Pathans, and Sindhis leading to demands for provincial autonomy and other safeguards. Each time the ruling elites tried to set up a highly centralized system, the opposition from East Pakistan was intense and unequivocal. The collision course which the Pakistani political elites pursued was disastrous and disruptive from the very beginning.

Regional representation in central governing structures, the quota system for recruitment to government services, the recognition of Bengali as one of the state languages of Pakistan, the acceptance of the principle of parity in various spheres, are some of the attempts made to apply accommodational solutions to the problems of the fragmented society. They did not succeed in fostering elite cooperation and political stability in Pakistan. The reasons for their failure will be explored in the next chapter.

V. Factors Influencing Elite Behavior

The elite behavior in Pakistan, as we have seen in the last chapter, was characterized by norms of confrontation rather than cooperation. Attempts were made by some of the political elites to apply an accommodational solution to the problems of a fragmented society but they did not succeed in making Pakistan politically stable - because a vital element was missing: support for an accommodational arrangement by the leaders of various subcultures. The theoretical framework outlined in the first chapter identified two additional factors that are conducive to elite cooperation. In this chapter, we will review these factors and assess their impact on the performance of the political system of Pakistan.

A. Factors Conducive to Cooperative Behavior

There are three factors conducive to or inhibitive of cooperative elite behavior: (1) the relative size and number of subcultures, (2) the nature and characteristics of social cleavages, and (3) elite attitudes.

1. The relative size and number of subcultures. In considering the conditions that are conducive to the establishment and maintenance of a cooperative attitude between subcultural elites, Lijphart suggests that the situation most favorable to cooperative attitude is one in which there are three or more separate subcultures that are

all minorities. Much less favorable is a bipolar situation in which the two groups are evenly matched in size. The bipolar situation contributes to a growing temptation on the part of the contending elites to pursue their aims by domination or the use of force rather than by cooperation and bargaining.³⁵⁸ There are at least three reasons why such a duality is not conducive to cooperative elite attitudes. First, the leaders of both the groups may hope to win a majority and hence "the temptation to shift from coalition to competition is bound to be very great".³⁵⁹ Second, a bipolar situation leads to an interpretation of politics as a zero-sum game: "a gain for one is easily perceived as a loss for the other".³⁶⁰ This produces competition and confrontation. Third, the "enemy" is more clearly identifiable. There is always an uncertainty over ultimate strength and power. There is no balancing or arbitrating group to mitigate the conflict. Accordingly, Dahl concludes and Lehbruch confirms that a bipolar situation tends to be an unstable solution and that it reinforces subcultural antagonisms.³⁶¹

³⁵⁸ Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy", pp. 217-218.

³⁵⁹ Robert A. Dahl, *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, p. 337.

³⁶⁰ Jung Steiner, *Amicable Agreement versus Majority Rule: Conflict Resolution in Switzerland*, p. 268.

³⁶¹ Dahl, *Political Opposition in Western Democracies*, p. 337; Gerhard Lehbruch, "A Non-Competitive Pattern of Conflict Management in Liberal Democracies: The Case of Switzerland, Austria and Lebanon", in *Consociational Democracies: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies*, ed., Kenneth D. McRae (Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1974), p. 95.

The least favorable situation is the one with two or three subcultures of which one subculture is in a position of exercising dominance. Because one subculture is in a clear majority, it will be tempted to dominate and suppress the rival minorities. Accordingly, it is hypothesized that a multipolar situation (with three or four subcultures) with an approximate equilibrium is conducive to cooperative elite behavior.³⁶² Since no subculture is in a majority, it becomes necessary for leaders of the subcultures to form a coalition in order to govern.³⁶³

Combining the size of the largest segment (majority, minority, or approximately 50 percent), number of segments (two, three, or more) and relative sizes of segments (balance, imbalance), Lijphart presents a series of hypothetical examples in order of their potential contribution to cooperative elite behavior: (1) a tripolar balance combination (33-33-33), (2) a tripolar imbalance combination (45-30-25), (3) a bipolar balance (50-50), (4) a tripolar imbalance combination of 60-20-20, and other combinations.³⁶⁴ Netherlands with relative sizes of 34 (Catholic), 32 (Socialist), 21 (Protestant), and 13 percent (Liberal) Dutch *zullen* approximates a tripolar imbalance situation in the second combination.³⁶⁵ Austria which fits a balance bipolar situation (combination 3) worked under

³⁶²Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, pp. 55-61.

³⁶³Lehmbruch, "Consociational Democracy in the International Systems", p. 381.

³⁶⁴Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, p. 58.

³⁶⁵*Ibid.*, p. 60.

severe strains. The accommodational nature of politics in Austria did work but as Lehmbruch points out, "the bipolar structure of the coalition reinforced their antagonisms".³⁶⁶ Lebanon contains numerous minority segments and the four largest together comprise 80 percent of the population and therefore approximates the tripolar balance combination. The Malay segment in Malaya has a majority and a near majority in Malaysia as a whole. Their dominance was somewhat reduced during a brief period of union with Singapore. One of the reasons for the breakdown of the union is suggested to be the Malay desire to regain former dominance.

2. The nature and characteristics of social cleavages. There seems to exist general agreement among scholars that cleavage-membership perception is likely to result in a polarized cleavage system and thereby in political instability. Consequently, attempts have been made to specify the types of cleavages and to explore the saliency of each type and their effects on the performance of the political system. Conflicts may occur along two primary lines of cleavages.³⁶⁷ First, conflict may occur along an ethnic line as the dominant ruling culture attempts to assimilate localized counter-cultures within its territorial boundaries. The attempt by the ruling elites to impose a standard language, a uniform law, and a central

³⁶⁶Lehmbruch, "A Non-Comparative Pattern of Conflict Management", p. 8.

³⁶⁷S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York, Free Press, 1967), p. 14.

administration meets resistance from other subcultures. Second, conflict may occur along religious lines. Insofar as one religious denomination may be allied with the state often as a national church, the dispute between church and state frequently appears as an interdenominational conflict. Conflict can also occur along class lines characterized first by conflict between the landed interests and the industrial enterprises and subsequently by conflict between the industrial owners and their hired workers. Unlike the ethnic cleavage which takes place along territorial axis, the class conflict tends to occur along a functional axis. In one case, the major criterion of alignment is "commitment to the locality and its dominant culture" while, in the other case, the criterion is "commitment to a class and its collective interests".³⁶⁸ The class cleavage is determined not only by occupation but also by a variety of additional socio-economic resources contributing to the economic standard of living. An unequal distribution of economic resources may divide a community into opposing classes of "haves" and "have-nots".

The long term effects of these cleavages are determined to a significant degree by the nature of these cleavages and by the relationship between these cleavages. Ethnicity, religion, culture, and class, can each form the basis for important political cleavage, although they are rarely of equal significance. The types of cleavage most resistant to

³⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

accommodation are those of ethnicity, religion and culture. Lipset argues that class parties are likely to engage in the "politics of bargaining"; the conflict of religious parties lead to instability.³⁶⁹ Rose and Urwin argue that the predominance of parties based upon religious and communal ties are likely to lead to regime strains regardless of the level of economic development of a society.³⁷⁰ Similarly, Anderson et. al. maintain that communal attachments (race, language and religion) are of such a high salience that they can easily eclipse all other issues including class cleavage.³⁷¹ They indicate why such attachments are of high salience:

Racial consciousness, facilitated by its extreme visibility, creates its own stereotypes of cultural differentiation. Language, as the medium of social communication, simultaneously creates networks of intensive social communications Religion, by positing a divine or supernatural imperative for communal identity, removes differentiation from the plane of human rationality debate.³⁷²

The argument is taken one step further by Brian Barry who argues that class conflict is a conflict of organization whereas ethnic conflict is a conflict of "solidary groups" which do not need organization to initiate a riot or a pogrom as long as they have some way of differentiating "we"

³⁶⁹S. M. Lipset, *Revolution and Counterrevolution* (New York, Anchor Books, 1970), p. 243.

³⁷⁰Richard Rose and Derek Urwin, "Social Cohesion, Political Parties and Strains in Regimes", *Comparative Political Studies*, II (1969-70), pp. 40-42.

³⁷¹Fred Anderson et. al., *Issues in Political Development*, p. 26.

³⁷²*Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

from "they".³⁷³

The effect of social cleavages is also mediated by the kind of relationship between these cleavages, in particular, whether they tend to crosscut or coincide. According to the theory of cross-cutting or overlapping memberships, cross-cutting entails cross-pressures which help moderate attitudes and actions. The crisscrossing of antagonistic groups, George Simmel reasons, "serves to 'sew the social system together' by cancelling each other out, thus preventing disintegration along one primary line of cleavage".³⁷⁴ Bingham Powell found confirmation of this theory in his Austrian Community study.³⁷⁵

In political culture terminology, Lijphart points out, cross-cutting memberships are characteristic of homogeneous political culture whereas a fragmented political culture has little or no such overlapping between its distinct subcultures.³⁷⁶ Fragmented societies are characterized most often by cumulative memberships. There is evidence that cumulative memberships, by eliminating exposure to diverse group pressures, contribute to development of extremist attitudes and, ultimately, to political instability. Verba postulates and Powell confirms that cumulative memberships increase the cohesion of social organizations, produce more

³⁷³Barry, "Review Article", pp. 502-503.

³⁷⁴Quoted in Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (New York, The Free Press, 1956), p. 72.

³⁷⁵Bingham Powell, Jr., *Social Fragmentation and Political Hostility*, esp. pp. 37-38.

³⁷⁶Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic System", p. 12.

militant leadership and demand, and consequently intensify the conflict between the subcultures.³⁷⁷

Where cleavages are congruent, the resolution of conflicts is more difficult, the issues tend to accumulate as new disputes reinforce traditional ones. Antagonisms build up between the major subcultures making future reconciliation difficult. As Lipset points out, "carrying over issues from one historical period to another makes for a political atmosphere characterized by bitterness and frustration rather than tolerance and compromise".³⁷⁸

We may conclude this section by recapitulating the hypothesis linking the cleavages to elite behavior: The leaders of rival subcultures will tend to be more willing to cooperate if social cleavages are one of organization (class type) instead of solidary groups (linguistic and cultural types), and if cleavages are cross-cutting rather than mutually reinforcing.

3. Elite Attitudes. The third factor influencing elite behavior is the presence or the absence of conciliatory elite attitudes, i.e., "a culturally defined predisposition to behave in a conciliatory manner".³⁷⁹ Robert Dahl, in his analysis of various patterns of political opposition in Western democracies, calls attention to the importance of

³⁷⁷Verba, "Organizational Membership and Democratic Consensus"; Powell, Jr., *Social Fragmentation and Political Hostility*.

³⁷⁸S. M. Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (New York, Anchor Books, 1963), p. 71.

³⁷⁹Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*, p. 55.

conciliatory attitudes: "Some cultures emphasize the virtues of cooperating with others, conciliating opposing views, compromise, willingness to submerge one's own special ideas in a larger situation".³⁸⁰ Hans Daalder and Lijphart also attribute a good deal of importance to such attitudes. In his analysis of the historical process of nation-building in the Netherlands and Switzerland, Daalder points at the tradition of "political accommodation" as a "reason why subcultural divisions never did become perilous".³⁸¹

Lijphart, in his study of the Netherlands, concludes that particular cultural characteristics, notably the "habits of pragmatism and prudence in politics", enables the political elite to govern successfully in spite of the socially fragmented system.³⁸²

Based on these insights, it is hypothesized that political elites who subscribe to conciliatory attitudes tend to adopt accommodative policies more readily than those who do not. Conciliatory attitudes are defined, following Nordlinger, as "stable and internalized predispositions to view political compromise as respectable, combined with a willingness to bargain with and accommodate opponents".³⁸³ Such conciliatory attitudes are derived from the political culture of a society.

³⁸⁰Dahl, *Political Opposition in Western Democracies*, p. 354.

³⁸¹Daalder, "On Building Consociational Nations", pp. 367-68.

³⁸²Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation*, p. 207.

³⁸³Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*, p. 55.

B. Pakistan: Favorable and Unfavorable Conditions

A consideration of the above three factors throws light on some of the reasons why the political elites in Pakistan failed to cooperate. Pakistan had an unfavorable multipolar imbalanced situation in which one subculture was numerically a majority. Political conflicts in Pakistan centered primarily around ethnic, linguistic and religious lines. The economic conflicts were also identified in ethnic and linguistic terms. These cleavages were congruent rather than cross-cutting. Finally, the conciliatory attitudes were virtually non-existent. Each of these factors warrant more detailed examination in order to fully grasp their effect upon the elite behavior and upon the politics of Pakistan.

A Multipolar Imbalanced Situation.

There were five major ethnic groups in Pakistan inhabiting geographically distinct territories. The geographical separation of East and West Pakistan, by a thousand miles of Indian territory, led commentators to regard Pakistan as a "double country",³⁸⁴ but ethnically and structurally Pakistan was multipolar. Table V:1 shows the population, area and density of population by geographic regions. According to the census of 1961, Bengalis occupying 15 percent of the total land mass formed a majority of 54.3 percent. Punjabis comprising about 27 percent formed the

³⁸⁴Weekes, *Pakistan: Birth and Growth of a Muslim Nation*, p. 3.

Table V:1

Population, Area, and Density of Population
by Geographic Region

Regions	Population in Million		Area ('000 sq. m.)	Density per sq. m.	
	1951	1961		1951	1961
East Pakistan	41.9	50.8	55.1	761	922
Punjab	20.7	25.6	79.5	259	321
NWFP	5.9	7.6	39.3	149	192
Sind	5.0	6.4	57.1	87	112
Baluchistan	1.0	1.2	126.1	8	9
Federal capital	1.2	2.1	8.4	144	254
Pakistan	75.7	93.7	365.5	207	256

Source: Compiled from Government of Pakistan, Central Statistical Office, *25 Years of Pakistan in Statistics 1947-1972* (Karachi, Manager of Publications, 1972), p. 25.

second largest ethnic group in Pakistan. They occupied about 22 percent of the total area.³⁸⁵ Together, these two ethnic groups comprised about 82 percent of the total population. The rest were all minorities, but ethnically distinct and strongly attached to their particular regions. Equally significant were the Muhajirs representing under one percent of the population but controlling, in 1959, more than half the industrial assets. Evidently there were numerous subcultures in Pakistan but the situation was one of extreme imbalance.

³⁸⁵They formed a majority in West Pakistan with 61.2 percent of the West Pakistani population.

Although the Bengalis formed the majority, political and economic domination was exercised by the Punjabis who manned, as we have seen in the previous chapter, most of the top positions in the civil-military bureaucracy. The Punjabi group nevertheless felt threatened by the possibility of losing political power. The fact that East Pakistan had a majority of the population meant that in the electoral contest the Punjabis had little or no chance to control the government.

Since East Pakistan had an overall majority, Bengalis felt entitled to more than an equal share in various decision making structures. As early as 1948, the Chief Minister of East Pakistan, Khwaja Nazimuddin, presented a list of demands the "first and foremost" among these was that "as far as East Pakistan is concerned, we must have a fair and proper share in the Armed Forces of Pakistan".³⁸⁶ On becoming Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1951, he adopted certain measures which would have assured Bengali dominance in governmental structures. His amendments to the constitution of the Muslim League which gave 327 seats to East Pakistan, 184 seats to Punjab and 143 seats to other minority provinces,³⁸⁷ and his draft constitution introduced

³⁸⁶ Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (Legislature) Debates*, I, 2 (March 1, 1948), p. 82.

³⁸⁷ *Dawn*, October 12, 13, 14, 1952; also Z. A. Suleri, *Pakistan's Lost Years*, pp. 39-40. This was a radical departure from the 1948 constitution which provided for the following representation: East Pakistan 180, Punjab 150, Sind 50, NWFP 40, Baluchistan 20, and President's nominees 10. See Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*, p. 127.

in 1952 envisaging a parity of seats between East and West Pakistan incensed the Punjabi elites who interpreted these policies as calculated "Bengali moves" to dominate the Central Government.³⁸⁸ Z. A. Suleri, a prominent Punjabi journalist, charged Nazimuddin with spreading provincial outlook.³⁸⁹ The Punjabi daily *Zamindar* warned that Punjab would not tolerate Bengali domination of the Muslim League party.³⁹⁰

At the heart of the problem lay the "fear psychosis" of the Punjabi political elites. Behind the subverting of democratic processes by the Punjabi Governor General which began in 1953, with the dismissal of Prime Minister Nazimuddin, and continued with the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in 1954, lay the determination of the Punjabi political elites that there would be no ruling by the Bengali elites. The Army's tacit support for the Governor General's actions was given for the same reason.³⁹¹ The tendency of the Sindhi, Baluchi and Pathan representatives to support the Bengalis against the "Punjab

³⁸⁸ Suleri, *Pakistan's Lost Years*, p. 46.

³⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

³⁹⁰ *Daily Zamindar* (Lahore), November 13, 1952. See Maulana Akhtar Khan's statement.

³⁹¹ Additionally, Nazimuddin had antagonized the armed forces. He had appointed an Economic Appraisals Committee under the chairmanship of Bengali Minister Fazlur Rahman which recommended "minimum expenditure on defence consistent with security". See Government of Pakistan, The Ministry of Economic Affairs, *Report of the Economic Appraisal Committee* (Karachi, Manager of Publications, 1953), p. 152.

Nazimuddin, according to his successor Mohammad Ali Bogra, reacted favorably to the Committee's report and introduced certain measures of retrenchment in the Armed Forces. See *Dawn*, September 2, 1953.

group" was an additional reason why the latter stood firm in their determination not to allow the axis of power to shift from Karachi (West Pakistan) to Dacca (East Pakistan).³⁹²

In desperation, the Punjabi group decided to consolidate their position in West Pakistan and proposed a plan for the merger of all the provinces of West Pakistan into one-unit. This manoeuvre as spelled out in the one-unit "Document"³⁹³ was calculated to provide an effective counter-balance against the Bengalis since it prevented them from playing the "small brother's big brother" role of dividing West Pakistan and capturing political power.³⁹⁴ But in actual fact, merging of the various provinces of West Pakistan aggravated the problem. For one, it confirmed the Sindi, Pathan, and Baluchi fear of Punjabi domination. The policy intensified the conflict within West Pakistan. The issue remained live until 1970 when the government was forced to restore the old provinces. Two, it transformed the Bengali-Punjabi conflict into a conflict between East and

³⁹² Suhrawardy after winning the provincial elections in 1954 is reported to have said: "East Bengal would henceforth rule Pakistan via Karachi" in "Pakistan: Problems of Partition", *Round Table*, XLIX, 176 (September 1954), p. 400.

³⁹³ The "Document" was drafted by M. M. Daulatana. It was never published but lengthy extracts were read in the Assembly by members. See Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, I, 16 (September 6, 1955), pp. 508-513; and I, 19 (September 9, 1955), pp. 612-614.

³⁹⁴ The one-unit document, according to Mansur Ahmad, was based on "fear for and conspiracy against East Bengal". *Ibid.*, I, 29 (September 30, 1955), p. 1423. The document stated: "One Unit will mean more effective power to the people of West Pakistan than they have hitherto enjoyed. The present position is that all real power lies with the Central Government in which Bengal has the dominating share". *Ibid.*, p. 1457.

West Pakistan. As Fazlur Rahman pointed out in the Assembly, "... by dividing Pakistan into two, you are manifold magnifying that provincialism.... Then no longer the cry will be Punjabis and Sindhis but the cry will be Bengalis and non-Bengalis".³⁹⁵ The approximate equality in numbers (East Pakistan's 55 percent against West Pakistan's 45 percent), plus the emergence of only two groups, produced not balance but competition and confrontation.

Socio-economic Cleavages.

Few political systems have completely complementary political and cultural units. The problems of political stability and national integration need not arise from the mere fact of cultural diversity. The real question is not whether social cleavages will manifest themselves but, rather, along which lines of cleavage will salient political divisions appear. In order to understand conflict among political elites, it appears necessary to examine the nature and characteristics of social cleavages.

The early history of ethnic conflict in Pakistan is typical of the process of nation-building (and empire-building) where a dominant centralizing culture attempts to assimilate localized countercultures by imposing a standard language, a uniform law, and a central administration. There were several issues which became the basis for important political cleavages in Pakistan. The

³⁹⁵*Ibid.*, I, 8 (August 24, 1955), p. 274.

problem started with the question of national language which, as declared by Jinnah, was "going to be Urdu and no other language".³⁹⁶ Though the language question affected the Sindis and the Pathans too, the Bengalis felt it more bitterly, not simply because Urdu was unintelligible to them but also and mainly because Urdu was sought to be imposed on the Bengali speaking majority of the people against their will at the behest of a minority.³⁹⁷

The Urdu-Bengali controversy had already erupted as early as 1937 in the Lucknow session of the All-India Muslim League, when a resolution was introduced recommending Urdu as the *lingua franca* of Muslim India and its adoption as the official language of the Muslim League. The Bengali delegates argued that they constituted one-third of the total Muslim population and therefore vehemently opposed this resolution. The situation was saved by a compromise resolution which recommended to the Muslim League that it should do everything "possible" to make Urdu the official language of the Muslim League.³⁹⁸

³⁹⁶Jamiluddin Ahmad ed., *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Vol. II, p. 490.

³⁹⁷Punjabi and Baluchi are spoken tongues without scripts of their own. The Punjabi Gurmukhi script used in East Punjab, India, is unknown in West Punjab, Pakistan. Even as a spoken tongue, Punjabi was never used as the medium of instruction in schools. Punjabis supported Urdu as the national language. See Hafeez Malik, "Nationalism and The Quest For Ideology in Pakistan" in *Pakistan: The Long View*, eds., Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Braibanti and W. Howard Wriggins (Durham, North Carolina, Duke University Press, 1977), p. 294.

³⁹⁸*The Pioneer* (Lucknow), October 17, 1937 in K. B. Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase* (London, Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 210.

There were several reasons why the ruling elites preferred Urdu as the national language of Pakistan. First, Urdu was considered to be closely associated with Islam, a language which, according to Jinnah, was "nearest to the language used in other Islamic countries".³⁹⁹ This aspect was also emphasized by the first Prime Minister of Pakistan:

Pakistan is a Muslim State and it must have its lingua franca the language of the Muslim nation.... Pakistan has been created because of the demand of a hundred million Muslims in the sub-continent and the language of a hundred million Muslim is Urdu.⁴⁰⁰

Liaquat's comment, in response to a motion for permitting the use of Bengali in the Constituent Assembly, gave the impression that Bengali was a Hindu language and hence was unacceptable as the State language of Pakistan. One Bengali leader told the Assembly bluntly that Liaquat and other Punjabi leaders viewed the defence of Bengali as both un-Islamic and opposed to the idea of Pakistan.⁴⁰¹ Second, the ruling elite argued that one state-language was an essential pre-requisite for national unity and that Urdu alone was such a language. Finally, Bengali formed a link with West Bengal in India and its preservation would "weaken the ties with West Pakistan and strengthen those with Indian and Hindu Bengal".⁴⁰²

³⁹⁹Jamiluddin Ahmed ed., *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Vol. II, p. 490.

⁴⁰⁰Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, II, 5 (February 25, 1948), p. 17.

⁴⁰¹*Ibid.*, I, 16 (September 6, 1955), p. 518.

⁴⁰²Keith Callard, *Pakistan*, p. 181.

These arguments caused much resentment among the Bengali political elites. It was unjust enough to ignore their legitimate demand of having the majority language, Bengali, as the national language, but to label the demand as un-Islamic and opposed to the ideology of Pakistan, they thought, amounted to adding insult to injury. As to the claim that one state language alone could bring national unity, the Bengali political elites cited the examples of multi-lingual states such as Switzerland and Canada as viable states. Finally, the Bengali political elites feared that if Bengali was not accorded an official status, they would be at a perpetual disadvantage vis-a-vis Urdu speaking West Pakistanis in the competition for central services and other government jobs.

The movement for the recognition of Bengali as one of the state languages, which began in 1947, reached its peak on February 21, 1952, the day when the movement had its first martyrs. The civil commotion and the police firing which followed, seriously injured about 400 persons and killed about 35. Three of the persons killed were students. Since then, 21st February is observed in East Pakistan as the Martyr's day (Shaheed Dibosh).⁴⁰³

⁴⁰³For a detailed account of the language movement see Badurddin Umar, *Purbo Baglar Bhasha Andolan O Tatkalin Rajniti* [East Bengal's Language Movement and its Contemporary Politics] (Bengali text), Vol. I (Dacca, Moula Brothers, 1970); Also idem, *Sanskritik Sankat* [Crisis in Culture] (Bengali text) (Dacca, Granthana, 1967).

The province of Sind also mounted a challenge against the policy of cultural domination. The campaign was launched by G. M. Syed's Sindh Awami Mahaz.⁴⁰⁴ Mass demonstrations took place in Hyderabad, Sukkur and Larkana on February 24, 1952. As a result of the police firing, 12 persons were killed and 180 were seriously injured.⁴⁰⁵

The growing unpopularity of the Central Government resulted in the crushing defeat of the ruling Muslim League party in the March 1954 provincial elections in East Pakistan. Sensing the passionate intensity that lay behind the demand for Bengali, Prime Minister Bogra hurriedly moved an amendment to the Basic Principles Committee report in 1954 which stipulated that:

The official languages of the Pakistan Republic should be Urdu and Bengali and such other languages as might be declared to be such by the Head of the State on the recommendation of the provincial legislatures concerned.⁴⁰⁶

It stipulated further that the members of the Assembly should have the right to speak in either language and that for central superior services, all provincial languages should be placed on an equal footing. The English language was to continue to be used for all official purposes for the next twenty years. The report was supported by smaller provinces of West Pakistan with Punjabis and Muhajirs opposing it. Thus while Qaiyum Khan was contending that the

⁴⁰⁴ *Dawn*, February-March, 1952.

⁴⁰⁵ *Alwahid* (Karachi), November 25, 1952.

⁴⁰⁶ Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, XVI, 9 (May 7, 1954.), p.83.

language resolution "fulfills the dream of the 8 million Pushto-speaking people in Pakistan",⁴⁰⁷ the Muhajirs in Karachi were on the street protesting the resolution.⁴⁰⁸ Punjab was also in opposition and a Punjabi Youth League demanded that if Bengali was made the national language, then Punjabi should also be given the same status.⁴⁰⁹

Before the resolution could be enacted, the Bogra ministry was dissolved and along with it the solution to the language controversy. It took another two years for the ruling elites of Pakistan to accept Bengali, along with Urdu, as the State languages of Pakistan. Even though the Constitution of 1956 accorded equal status to the Bengali language, the Bengalis felt bitter that they had to put up a bloody fight in order to secure satisfaction that should have been theirs without any argument.⁴¹⁰ Despite constitutional recognition, the attack on the Bengali language continued and the ruling elites continued to express their hope of having Urdu as the lingua franca of Pakistan.⁴¹¹

The prominence of cultural conflict also manifested on the electorate issue: whether there should be separate electorates or joint electorate for both the national and

⁴⁰⁷*Ibid.*, p. 91.

⁴⁰⁸*Dawn*, April 23, 1954.

⁴⁰⁹*Ibid.*, February 24, April 28, 1954.

⁴¹⁰Keith Callard, *Pakistan*, p. 183.

⁴¹¹In Sind, the language movement continued to simmer which exploded in 1972. On July 7, 1972, the Sind Assembly passed a language bill declaring Sindi to be the official language of the province. See *Dawn*, July 8, 1972.

provincial elections. The matter was so serious that the constitution of 1956, framed after nine years of struggle, left the matter undetermined to be settled later by ordinary legislation.

The electorate issue had ideological trappings and was also tied to the question of parity between the two wings of Pakistan. Ideologically, the joint electorate was considered by the religious elites to be against the tenets of Islam and as contrary to the ideology of Pakistan. Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi argued that the demand for the joint electorate in East Pakistan was originated and propagated by the Hindus. It was supported by rival Muslim factions out of sheer consideration of power politics. He argued further that the introduction of joint electorate in East Pakistan would give rise to a feeling of Bengali nationalism which would be suicidal for the national unity of Pakistan.⁴¹²

Politically, separate electorates would mean great diminution of East Pakistan's electoral power. Since Hindus constituted about 18 percent of the East Pakistani population, acceptance of separate electorates would mean allocation of a certain number of seats to the minorities from the number of seats allotted to East Pakistan. This would mean, in effect, that East Pakistani Muslims would be reduced to a position of a permanent minority, a prospect

⁴¹²See Abul Ala Maudoodi, "System of Electorates: Separate or Joint?" in *Dawn*, June 3, 4, 5, 1956.

not liked by the Bengali political elites.⁴¹³ They construed the advocacy of separate electorates as another device to perpetuate Punjabi domination.⁴¹⁴ Suhrawardy advocated joint electorate because, he argued, this would help destroy the seeds of suspicion, distrust and hatred between the citizens professing different religions and would therefore weld all people together into "one great Pakistan nation".⁴¹⁵

Evidently, the two wings differed on the electorate issue with the West wing recommending separate electorates and the East wing demanding a joint electorate. After a good deal of bargaining, a compromise was reached whereby the National Assembly passed the Electorate Act by 48 to 18 votes which stipulated a joint electorate for East Pakistan and separate electorates for West Pakistan. The Muslim League, led by Mr. Chundrigar, and other religious parties characterized the Act as an attack on the ideology of Pakistan, and vowed to reverse the decision by "all possible constitutional means".⁴¹⁶ Maulana Maudoodi, equally bitter, demanded a referendum on the issue and urged the dissolution of the coalition cabinet.⁴¹⁷ The Republicans were divided in their opinion on this issue but most of the members favored separate electorates. Suhrawardy, however, succeeded in selling the idea of a joint electorate to the President who

⁴¹³*The Economist* (London), December 21, 1957, p. 1961.

⁴¹⁴*Dawn.*, October 6, 1956.

⁴¹⁵Pakistan, *National Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, II, 3 (October 10, 1956), pp. 167-68.

⁴¹⁶*Ibid.*, October 16, 1956.

⁴¹⁷*Ibid.*, October 25, 1956.

intervened and made the Republicans accept the joint electorate. The Electorate Act amended in 1957 stated that the electors to the National and Provincial Assemblies in both the wings of the country would be constituted on the principle of a joint electorate.⁴¹⁸

The conflict did not end with the passage of the electorate bill. When Chundrigar became Prime Minister he tried to reverse the earlier decision since the joint electorate "menaced the ideology of Pakistan".⁴¹⁹ This led Mujib and other Bengali political elites to join hands with Feroz Khan Noon who was the dominant partner in the Republican-Muslim League coalition cabinet headed by Chundrigar. On a written assurance of support from the Awami League, the Republican party headed by Noon withdrew its support from the coalition which led to the resignation of Chundrigar.⁴²⁰

In addition to the linguistic and the religio-political conflict, Pakistan was faced with an economic controversy. The areas which comprised Pakistan happened to be among the economically most backward in the subcontinent. East Bengal had through many decades before partition been treated as the hinterland of the industrialized port of Calcutta which now belonged to India. East Pakistan, the world's biggest grower of jute, had no jute mills. Similarly, although the

⁴¹⁸Pakistan, *National Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, III, 7(August 29, 1957), p. 433.

⁴¹⁹*Dawn*, November 3, 1957.

⁴²⁰*Ibid.*, December 15, 1957.

former provinces of Punjab and Sindh in West Pakistan were important growers of cotton, there were hardly any cotton textile industries. Out of a total of 921 major factories in the subcontinent employing 1,137,150 persons daily, only 34 factories (less than 4 percent) with an employment capacity of 26,400 persons a day, were located in Pakistan.⁴²¹ In terms of total industrial units, Pakistan received only 1,406 industrial units out of a total of 14,569 establishments in British India.⁴²² Agriculture was the mainstay of the economy and, during 1949-50 to 1954-55, contributed about 60 percent of the national income compared to the mining and the manufacturing sector's contribution of about 8 percent and the service sector's (including construction) of about 8.5 percent.⁴²³

During the first decade of her independence, Pakistan's economy was characterized by a relative stagnation in per capita income and by year to year fluctuations in the level of agricultural output. Nevertheless, growth did take place and her national income (at constant prices) and her per capita income rose, although slowly and marginally. During 1949-1955, the gross national product in constant prices grew at 2.6 percent per annum and during the first plan

⁴²¹Government of Pakistan, *Twenty Years of Pakistan 1947-1967* (Karachi, Pakistan Publications, 1967), p. 183.

⁴²²Pakistan, Economic Adviser to the Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, *Pakistan Basic Facts: 1966-67* (Islamabad, Department of Films and Publications, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1967), p. 42.

⁴²³Government of Pakistan, *The First Five Year Plan, 1955-60*, p. 10.

period (i.e., 1955-1960), the growth rate was 2.4 percent. The gross per capita income (at the 1959-60 constant factor cost) increased from Rs. 311 in 1949-50 to Rs. 316 in 1954-55 and to Rs. 318 in 1959-60.⁴²⁴

While agriculture continued throughout the decade to be the dominant sector of the economy, its contribution to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) declined over time with the rise in the importance of mining and manufacturing sectors which almost doubled their share in the aggregate national income.⁴²⁵

The conflict feature of Pakistan's economy pertains to the fact that most of the benefits followed the physical location of industries in West Pakistan. If industrialization is measured in terms of deployment of the labor force then it would seem that industrialization did not take place in East Pakistan at all. Her labor force employed in agriculture increased from 83.2 percent in 1951 to 85.3 percent in 1961 as against a decrease in West Pakistan's agricultural labor force from 65.1 percent to

⁴²⁴Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Development, Central Statistical Office, *25 Years of Pakistan in Statistics 1947-1972* (Karachi, Manager of Publications, Printing corporation of Pakistan Press, 1972), pp. 300-301.

⁴²⁵In 1949-50 agriculture accounted for about 59.8 percent of the GDP, which declined in 1954-55 to about 56 percent and went further down by 1958-59 to about 52.8 percent. Industrial output, during the corresponding period, increased from about 5.8 percent in 1949-50 to about 9.3 percent in 1958-59. The percentage of labor force employed in agriculture declined only fractionally, however, from 76.45 percent as against a rise from 6.33 percent to 8.25 percent in industrial labor force in the ten years between 1951 and 1961. Pakistan, *Twenty Years of Pakistan, 1947-1967*, p. 458, Table 58.

59.3 percent during the same period.⁴²⁶ Correspondingly, the industrial labor force in East Pakistan declined by about 0.6 percentage points (from 6.6 percent to 6 percent) whereas in West Pakistan it showed an increase by about 8.7 percentage points (from 11.6 percent to 20.2 percent).⁴²⁷ A look at the rate of growth of the two regions showed similar differences. The growth rate in East Pakistan was significantly lower, in nearly all the sectors, than in West Pakistan. Thus during the period 1949-50 to 1954-55, East Pakistan experienced an annual growth rate of 0.9 percent in agriculture and 21 percent in the manufacturing sector as against West Pakistan's 1.9 percent and 34 percent respectively. In terms of per capita income, East Pakistan showed a negative growth rate of -0.5 percent as against a growth rate of 1.5 percent for West Pakistan.⁴²⁸ The natural consequence of these differences was the ever widening regional disparity between the income levels in East and West Pakistan. In 1949-50 West Pakistan's per capita income was 8.20 percent higher than East Pakistan's which increased to about 19.5 percent by 1954-55 and from there to 29.5 percent by 1959-60.⁴²⁹ The widening disparity was partly due to a continuous increase in West Pakistan's per capita income but was mainly due to a steady decline in East Pakistan's per capita income from Rs. 305 in 1949-50 to Rs.

⁴²⁶Pakistan, *25 Years of Pakistan in Statistics*, pp. 13-14.

⁴²⁷*Ibid.* See also the population Census of respective years.

⁴²⁸Gustav F. Papanek, *Pakistan Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives*, p. 20.

⁴²⁹*Ibid.*

289 in 1954-55 and to Rs. 288 in 1959-60.⁴³⁰

These disparities existed not only as between East Pakistan and West Pakistan but also as between different regions of West Pakistan. Comparable data showing the disparity between the different regions of West Pakistan are not available. The estimate made by the Advisory Panel for the Fourth Five Year Plan throws some light on the extent of disparity within West Pakistan. According to this estimate, the NWFP and Baluchistan, in 1968-69, had a per capita income of Rs. 360 and 455 respectively as against Rs. 614 for Punjab and 854 for Sind (including Karachi); the average for West Pakistan being Rs. 626.⁴³¹

There were several reasons for the relative stagnation of East Pakistan and other minority provinces of West Pakistan and conversely for the rapid expansion of Punjab. These include the location of the capital, the concentration of the majority of the bureaucrats, the recruitment into the Army from the "martial" races, and the stationing of the headquarters of the armed forces - all in the Western wing. To this should be added the investments made by the Muhajirs in West Pakistan and the generous expenditures granted to

⁴³⁰ *Ibid.*,

⁴³¹ Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, *Report of the Advisory Panels for the Fourth Five Year Plan*, Vol. I, p. 156. In calculating the per capita income for Sind, the advisory panel included Karachi which, during the period under consideration, was the federal capital of Pakistan. Industrial investments were also concentrated in Karachi, the Muhajir stronghold, and other urban areas of Punjab.

Punjab by the central government.⁴³²

These disparities gave rise to demands for radical reallocation of economic resources never heeded by the ruling elites. They argued that the central government policy on the allocation of funds for development projects and the licensing of imports and exports were dictated by "priorities", needs and the requirements of each province.⁴³³ The non-recognition of these disparities by the ruling elites helped deepen the suspicions of the diverse regional groups who became convinced that their rights and needs would never be acknowledged.

From the above discussion, it is evident that the conflicts in Pakistan occurred primarily along an ethnic cleavage as the dominant culture attempted to assimilate other cultures within its territorial boundaries. To the ethnic division was added a religious and a political dimension by the controversy generated by the electorate issue. These conflicts proved to be extremely durable. Pakistan also faced an acute economic conflict. The fundamental characteristic of the conflict was the unequal distribution of economic resources between various ethnic groups. The majority Bengali group and other minority groups

⁴³² Thus in 1952 the central government approved development projects for various provinces. The breakdown, in lakhs (10 lakhs = 1 million) of rupees, is as follows: Punjab 89,61; East Pakistan 41,26; Sind 32,38; NWFP 24,57; and Baluchistan 2,09. See Pakistan, *Report of the Economic Appraisal Committee*, p. 136.

⁴³³ *Documents and Speeches*, p. 300; also, Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, I, 3 (March 24, 1951), pp. 233, 257-58.

in West Pakistan did not receive equal economic benefits.

There was a good deal of congruence between the linguistic, cultural and economic cleavages. For instance, the Punjabis who strongly favored Urdu were economically advantaged and politically dominant. The Bengalis speaking Bengali were economically disadvantaged and strongly oriented toward the Bengali cultural tradition.

Elite Attitudes.

The final factor conducive to cooperative elite behavior is the inclination of most or all members of the political elite to bargain with and accommodate opponents. Absence of such "conciliatory attitudes" will almost inevitably divide the political elites and adversely affect the performance of the political system. Political relations in Pakistan, as we have seen, have largely followed a course of confrontation. Instead of avoiding sensitive issues, the political elites have mobilized regional loyalties and exploited religious fears. They have emphasized traditional racial antagonisms and subordinated every vital issue, economic or political, to their ethnic and regional considerations.

The absence of conciliatory attitudes has to be explained by the way various ethnic groups viewed each other. These attitudes are related to memberships in different ethnic and linguistic groups and the degree of trust which prevails within a society. While the cultural

groups of West Pakistan held antagonistic attitudes toward each other, the Punjabi attitude towards the Bengalis amounted to racial chauvinism.⁴³⁴ Punjabi political elites sensed no threat to their pre-eminence from the minority provinces of West Pakistan. They were deeply troubled by the Bengali claim to proportional representation in various services and could not conceal their contempt for Bengalis.

The British had left behind myths about the bravery, sacrifice and martial tradition of the Punjabis and the Pathans and about the lethargy, cowardice and untrustworthiness of the Bengalis.⁴³⁵ The West Pakistani based ruling elites added, the promiscuity and semi-Hinduism, of the Bengali Muslims. A typical expression of this attitude of racial superiority is to be found in the observation of General Ayub:

The East Bengalis ... probably belong to the very original Indian races.... They have been and still are under considerable Hindu cultural and linguistic influences. As such they have all the inhibitions of down-trodden races and have not yet found it possible to adjust psychologically to the requirements of the new-born freedom.⁴³⁶

⁴³⁴A typical comment about Punjabis was that of M. H. Gazder, a Sindi member of the Assembly: "... But one defect in the Punjab's character is that wherever a Punjabi goes, he establishes a Punjabi colony, Punjabi administration, employs Punjabis, he would invite all his relatives and he will use all his powers for appointment of all his relatives and friends". See Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, III, 3 (May 22, 1948), pp. 79-80.

⁴³⁵The group labelled as Martial were Gurkhas, Pathans, Sikhs, Rajputs, Dogras and Punjabi Muslims. See S. P. Cohen, *The Indian Army* (Berkeley, The University of California Press, 1971).

⁴³⁶Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, p. 187.

Malik Firoz Khan Noon, a Punjabi landlord and the Governor of East Pakistan from 1950 to 1953, once declared that East Pakistani Muslims were converted to Islam from low caste Hindus and that they were "half-Muslims".⁴³⁷ The inevitable reaction of the Bengalis was expressed by Ataur Rahman Khan:

Sir, I actually started yesterday and said that the attitude of the Muslim League coterie here was of contempt towards East Bengal, towards its culture, its language, its literature and everything concerning East Bengal. In fact, ... the leaders of the Muslim League thought that we were a subject race and they belonged to the race of conquerors.⁴³⁸

The non-Bengali civil servants posted in East Pakistan also had similar attitudes of superiority.⁴³⁹ Mention has already been made that only one or two Bengali officers belonging to the Indian Civil Service opted for Pakistan. The government tried to rectify that imbalance through special quotas. Yet in 1954 there was not a single Bengali occupying a top position as a Secretary even in the East Pakistan Secretariat.⁴⁴⁰ In the eyes of the Bengalis who came in contact with the non-Bengali civil servants, the dominance of the Secretariat by non-Bengalis was matched by their arrogance and their ethnic superiority. "You go and

⁴³⁷ See David Loshak, *Pakistan Crisis* (London, Heinemann, 1971). During the liberation war of 1971, an Army officer told a correspondent: "This is a war between the pure and impure. The people here (East Pakistan) have Muslim names and call themselves Muslims. But they are Hindus at heart". *The Sunday Times* (London), June 13, 1971.

⁴³⁸ Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, I, 17 (September 7, 1955), p. 530.

⁴³⁹ Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, p. 6.

⁴⁴⁰ Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (Legislature) Debates*, I, 26 (July 17, 1954), p. 1475.

see the I.C.S. from Western Pakistan or the minority provinces in Bengal and they are hardly on meeting terms with any of the Bengali officers".⁴⁴¹

Culturally, physically and psychologically, the Punjabis claimed superiority over the Bengalis and were determined not to allow democratic processes to stand in the way of their determination to control the country's affairs.⁴⁴² The ruling elites maintained a watchful eye on East Pakistan and on the Bengali political elites through the control of the provincial Secretariat by non-Bengali, mainly the Punjabi and the Muhajir civil servants. Aziz Ahmad, the Punjabi Chief Secretary of East Pakistan, is reported to have maintained "separate files for each Minister" in the provincial Cabinet.⁴⁴³

The Bengalis expressed their resentment not merely on the floors of the Assembly but also on the streets and in the industries. Industrial centers like Narayanganj, Chittagong and Khulna had been the scenes of Bengali-non-Bengali communal riots. The elections of 1954 in which the ruling party was badly defeated by the United Front was another manifestation of Bengali resentment. The

⁴⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 1474.

⁴⁴²The view that the Bengalis were half-Muslims coupled with the fact that the Hindus constituted about one-fourth of East Pakistani population made reconciliation even more difficult. Conflict regulation becomes difficult when distrust comes to be associated with dogmatism and doctrinairism. Politics is then viewed as a discordant process involving a struggle for ultimate supremacy between right and wrong.

⁴⁴³Kazi Ahmad Kamal, *Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Politics in Pakistan* (Dacca, Kazi Ghyasuddin Ahmed, 1970), p. 65.

elections were followed by serious disorders in the industrial centers throughout East Pakistan. Riots in a paper-mill at Chittagong led to the killing of about 25 non-Bengali staff members including a very capable manager, Khurshid Ali.⁴⁴⁴ Even more serious disturbances took place at Narayanganj in the world's largest jute mill which employed about 18,000 men. The death toll was estimated to be about 400.⁴⁴⁵ These riots seemed to be politically inspired. There were reports of the complicity of several prominent members of the United Front Party, notably Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.⁴⁴⁶ Viewing these events as communist inspired,⁴⁴⁷ the Central Government imposed the Governor's rule and despatched General Mirza to rule by ordinance. The United Front leader Fazlul Huq was dubbed a "self-confessed traitor".⁴⁴⁸

The absence of conciliatory attitudes has also to be explained in terms of different role conceptions of the elites and the masses. Chapter two analyzed the importance of feudalism and patrimonialism in the Pakistani society showing that as a religion, Islam is seen to stress authoritarian rule for the welfare of citizens.

The primary emphasis in Pakistan has been on the sharp gap between the rulers and the ruled; the function of the

⁴⁴⁴*Dawn*, April 18, 1954.

⁴⁴⁵*Ibid.*, June 15, 16, 17, 1954.

⁴⁴⁶*Ibid.*, June 15, 1954.

⁴⁴⁷*Pakistan, Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (Legislature) Debates*, I, 26 (July 17, 1954), pp. 1504-55.

⁴⁴⁸*The Pakistan Observer*, June 2, 1954.

rulers to govern in a patrimonial fashion, and the obligation of the subjects to obey. The determining characteristic of the ruling elites of Pakistan has been to control and to endeavor to prevent the emergence of any source or pocket of power independent of them. Mention has been made of the shabby treatment meted out to Fazlul Huq and Suhrawardy, the two leaders of East Pakistan with representative standing. Bypassing both, Jinnah willed Nazimuddin to be his successor, not because Nazimuddin was the most capable or most representative of Bengalis, but he was blindly loyal to Jinnah. Later when Nazimuddin tried to assert the pre-eminence of his position as Prime Minister, he was dismissed by the Punjabi Governor General, Ghulam Mohammad. Any provincial Governor or the Chief Minister who refused to comply with the orders of the Governor General or the President was not allowed to rule the province.

The Constituent Assembly, until 1954, was a single party institution. Liaquat, the first Prime Minister, repeatedly emphasized that there was no need for another political organization in the country and that attempts at the creation of opposition parties would create confusion and chaos in the country. He is reported to have made an attempt to "stifle" Miss Jinnah's voice on points where she was critical of his government.⁴⁴⁹ The counterelites with a predisposition to be critical of the government were not considered patriotic. Ghulam Mohammad is reported to have

⁴⁴⁹*Evening Times* (Karachi), September 12, 1951.

said, "We do not require tub-thumping politicians".⁴⁵⁰ Iskander Mirza went one step further and called the opposition politicians "crooks and scawags" and blamed them for making "a mess of everything".⁴⁵¹ Criticism of the government, on the whole, was equated with treason. Central and provincial budgets were passed under guillotine.⁴⁵² In order to prevent the independent minded members from attending the Assembly sessions, the Government brought unfounded criminal cases against them.⁴⁵³

The style of personal patrimonial rule was established by Jinnah and it became the modus operandi for the political elites who succeeded him. Jinnah personified Pakistan and enjoyed popularity, esteem and authority. "There was no one else, he was *Pakistan*" (Emphasis original).⁴⁵⁴ Those who followed him enjoyed none of Jinnah's qualities and hence were in need of alliances. Given the existence of subcultures, a high degree of distrust and an attitude of touchiness and competition, most alliances were shaky and short-lived. That is why parties were formed, parties coalesced, coalition governments formed and coalitions broke

⁴⁵⁰Dawn, May 4, 1951.

⁴⁵¹Reporter, January 27, 1955, p. 32.

⁴⁵²Muneer Ahmad, *Legislatures in Pakistan, 1947-58*, p. 57.

⁴⁵³Qazi Fazlullah was arrested on the door steps of the Assembly building a few minutes before the Sind Assembly was to elect its representatives to the second Constituent Assembly. *Ibid.*, p. 88. Mahmud Ali told the members of the Constituent Assembly that during his internment, he was repeatedly asked as to why he opposed the One Unit Bill. *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, II, 1 (February 1, 1956), p. 1753.

⁴⁵⁴Keith Callard, *Pakistan*, p. 19.

off in a kaleidoscopic formation.

In 1953, most of the opposition parties in East Pakistan combined in the United Front to oppose the Muslim League, however, the United Front disintegrated within a year of its formation. In 1956, the Azad Pakistan Party, the Red Shirts, the Sind Awami Mahaz and a few other groups merged to form the Pakistan National Party,⁴⁵⁵ but it too suffered the fate of the United Front. Prior to 1955, Bengali political elites used to combine with Sind and the Frontier against Punjab. Suhrawardy realized that the Dacca-Karachi-Peshawar axis was not beneficial to East Pakistan. He radically altered the earlier strategy and embarked upon an ambitious plan of forging an alliance with the Punjabi landowning groups.⁴⁵⁶ His plan did not work because the Punjabi landowning elites were divided into numerous factions. Noon headed the Republican party, Daulatana supported the Muslim League, and others frequently changed their party identities. No one knew from week to week who belonged to what. The only thing certain was that "a Government must either be a coalition or a minority and therefore unstable".⁴⁵⁷

⁴⁵⁵*Dawn*, August 9, 1956.

⁴⁵⁶In his letter to Gurmani he wrote: "... in the future there will still be scope for us to work together..." *Dawn*, September 4, 1957; also see Abul Mansur Ahmad, *Amar Dekha Rajnitiir Panchasha Bachar*, p. 530.

⁴⁵⁷Sir Ivor Jennings, "Reviewing Keith Callard's *Pakistan: A Political Study*", *Political Quarterly*, 29, 2(1958), p. 192.

C. Political Instability in Pakistan

The effect of the elite confrontation is revealed in the continuous constitutional revisions, high incidence of violence, a low level of political legitimacy and in the frequent changes of government. Pakistan has been a laboratory for constitutional experiments. The Government of India Act, 1935 was a stop-gap measure and was not intended to endure for eight years. During these eight years, Pakistan had been offered a number of constitutional plans and drafts.⁴⁵⁸ Before the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly in 1954, each of the first three Prime Ministers of Pakistan (Liaquat, Nazimuddin, and Mohammad Ali Bogra) presented a draft constitution for the consideration of the Assembly. While the first two drafts were incomplete, the third draft was a complete document which was approved by the Constituent Assembly and, as announced, was to be promulgated on December 25, 1954. It was brushed aside by the Governor General who dissolved the Assembly. The republican constitution promulgated in 1956 remained in force for barely thirty months after which it was abrogated by the Martial Law authority.

⁴⁵⁸ See Herbert Feldman, *A Constitution for Pakistan* (London, Oxford University Press, 1955); G. W. Choudhury, *Constitutional Development in Pakistan*; Syed Sharifudin Pirzada, *Fundamental Rights and Constitutional Remedies in Pakistan* (Lahore, All-Pakistan Legal Decisions, 1966); Sir Ivor Jennings, *Constitutional Problems in Pakistan* (Cambridge, The University Press, 1957); Wheeler, *The Politics of Pakistan*.

Pakistan also witnessed substantial opposition to its political institutions and even to its very existence. The bulk of this opposition came from the province of East Pakistan. As early as 1948 it was reported: "A feeling is growing among the East Pakistanis that Eastern Pakistan is being neglected and treated merely as a 'colony' of West Pakistan".⁴⁵⁹ The demand for autonomy rose in the Eastern wing as a reaction to the government policy of centralization and cultural domination. The Bengalis expressed their sense of alienation in the elections of 1954 by reducing the ruling party to a group of 10.⁴⁶⁰

The opposition was not confined to East Pakistan alone. The Sindh Awami Mahaz called for the recognition of the "de facto existence of separate nationalities" in Pakistan and for full provincial autonomy, leaving only defence, foreign affairs, and currency with the centre.⁴⁶¹ The Mahaz also started a campaign to regain Karachi from the central control, arguing that the central government's decision was against the expressed opinion of the people of Sind.⁴⁶² Additionally, there had been two regional movements in West Pakistan: the Pakhtunistan movement which called for a separate state called Pakhtunistan which would have included all the Pushto speaking areas of West Pakistan, and Sindh Awami Mahaz (Sindh National Movement) which stood for

⁴⁵⁹ Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, II, 1 (February 24, 1948), pp. 6-7.

⁴⁶⁰ *Dawn*, October 20, 1954.

⁴⁶¹ *Ibid.*, October 9, 1953.

⁴⁶² *Ibid.*, August 15, 1953.

provincial autonomy on the basis of the Lahore Resolution of 1940.⁴⁶³

The initial phase of Pakistan was turbulent and on numerous occasions the Government was compelled to call the Army to restore law and order in the country. Strife events recorded in Pakistan reflected the increased intensity of elite conflict. Strikes were severe in the early years of Pakistan's existence and had serious repercussions on the stability of the government (see table V:2).

During the period under review, Pakistan had four Governors-General (and President) and eight cabinets. If one excludes the lengthy tenure of the first Prime Minister (1947-1951), there was an average of one cabinet a year.

One dominant theme that emerges from the analysis of the politics in Pakistan is that the ethnic group which dominated the decision making structures was unwilling to give up its hegemony. This explains the differential preference displayed by various groups of leaders. Those in command were strongly in favor of a centralized executive dominant system. Those out of power favored a parliamentary system. While this latter group included political elites from the minority provinces of West Pakistan, the worst affected province, and its leadership, was East Pakistan. Numerically the dominant region, it was put at a severe

⁴⁶³For a discussion of these movements see, Hafeez Malik, "Problems of Regionalism in Pakistan, in *Pakistan in Transition* ed., Howard Wriggins (Islamabad, University of Islamabad Press, 1975).

Table V:2

Riots, Strikes and Anti-government Demonstrations
in Pakistan, 1947-1958

Year	Riots	Strikes	Demonstrations
1948	4,958	3	7
1949	4,855	4	5
1950	5,864	3	10
1951	4,429	5	9
1952	4,679	7	27
1953	5,008	1	9
1954	5,438	4	15
1955	4,842	1	9
1956	5,527	3	10
1957	6,456	1	4
1958	5,896	-	1

Source: Pakistan, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Central Statistical Office, *Statistical Year Book 1967* (Karachi, Manager of Publications, Government of Pakistan Press, 1967), p. 516; *The Pakistan Observer*, 1949-58; *Morning News*, 1949-58; *Dawn*, 1948-58; *The Pakistan Times*, 1948-58.

disadvantage by the political structures at the national level. The East Pakistani political elites pinned their hopes for redress of their grievances on the first general elections scheduled to be held in February 1959. From various accounts available, it appears that in the forthcoming election Suhrawardy was poised for a sure victory. But General Ayub Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, and General Mirza, the President, did not

like Suhrawardy⁴⁶⁴ and felt threatened by his popularity.⁴⁶⁵ Arguing that elections were not going to help the country,⁴⁶⁶ President Mirza abrogated the Constitution, dismissed the central and provincial governments, dissolved the national and provincial assemblies, abolished all political parties, imposed Martial Law throughout the country and appointed General Ayub to be the Chief Martial Law Administrator.⁴⁶⁷ Twenty days later Ayub forced Mirza to resign and himself assumed the Presidency.⁴⁶⁸

We can summarize the findings of this chapter. Elite political attitudes were non-conciliatory. The religious dogma, family structure, and the feudal social structure, establishing and legitimizing personal, patrimonial rule, could hardly be conducive to conciliatory attitudes. Conflicts in Pakistan occurred along cultural, linguistic,

⁴⁶⁴According to Ayub, Suhrawardy was "no friend of Pakistan" because he "took great delight in attacking the Army officers who appeared as witnesses" during the trial of officers who took part in a conspiracy to topple the civilian government in 1951. The case is known as the Rawalpindi conspiracy case. See Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, p. 37.

President Mirza reportedly told Suhrawardy that "your ministry can be formed upon my dead body". *Chicago Times* quoted in Jamna Das Akhter, *Political Conspiracies in Pakistan: Liaquat Ali Khan's Murder to Ayub Khan's Exit* (Delhi, Punjabi Pushpak Bhandar, 1969), p. 253.

⁴⁶⁵Mirza wanted to get re-elected as President in the forthcoming election. He demanded a categorical declaration from Suhrawardy who was reluctant to do so. See Abul Mansur Ahmad, *Amar Dekha Rajniti Panchash Bachar*, p. 510.

⁴⁶⁶Thus Mirza said: "Mere elections will not solve the problems...". *Dawn*, March 15, 1958. Ayub thought that the general elections would create "disturbances all over the country". See Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, p. 57.

⁴⁶⁷*The Pakistan Observer*, October 8, 1958.

⁴⁶⁸*Dawn*, October 28, 1958.


regional and economic lines and that these cleavages were congruent rather than cross-cutting and have therefore been almost impossible to resolve. Finally, the absence of a multipolar balance situation was an obvious unfavorable factor. Threatened by the Bengali claim for a proportionate share in the decision making structures, the Punjabi elites strived for a total "control" which produced competition and confrontation culminating in the imposition of Martial Law in 1958.

VI. Conclusion

In an attempt to explain political instability in the fragmented society of Pakistan, this study used the framework outlined in the first chapter. Conceptual schemes, as scholars often point out, are neither right nor wrong. They are more or less useful and must be judged in terms of whether they help understand and explain the problem under investigation. The framework used in this study serves two useful purposes. First, it provides insights into the theory of political stability and instability (see figure 1). Second, it contributes to our understanding of the government and politics of Pakistan.

The framework emphasizes the role of the political elites. The attention given to the political elites is based on the observation that much of what happens to the political system depends upon the role played by them. They may intensify the conflict within the society or may regulate it through development of institutions and supportive decision-making procedures. The relative conflict or cooperation characterizing their relations is contributory to the stability or the instability of the political system. Di Palma's complaint that the mainstream of recent literature accords extensive treatment to social, economic, and cultural forces and underplays the crucial role and impact of political leaders, obviously does not

Figure 1: Probable Relationship Between Fragmentation, Elite Behavior and System Performance



apply to the framework used in this study.⁴⁶⁹

The explanatory power of the model is improved further by identifying the factors that are conducive to or inhibitive of elite cooperation. These factors are: the nature and types of the cleavages, the relative size and number of various subcultures, and conciliatory elite attitudes. These factors have been helpful in explaining politics in Pakistan. By virtue of the fact that Pakistan shared similar socio-economic and political problems with other Third World countries, the framework used here should prove useful to the study of the politics of the developing areas in general.

Hypotheses Tested:

The first hypothesis, as discussed in the framework, links elite behavior to system performance. It has been argued that fragmented but stable systems work on the basis of understanding among the political elites that public business will be conducted in a particular way and according to certain "rules of the game". Such agreement had not existed in Pakistan. Cooperation and accommodation were deemed less significant than the configuration and manipulation of power and the aggressive expression of authority. There have been coalitions or attempted

⁴⁶⁹Di Palma, *The Study of Conflict in Western Society*, p. 19; also S. P. Huntington and J. M. Nelson, *No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 28.

coalitions, giving some representation to the major groups. Significantly, governments have never been restricted to members of just one group. As shown in chapter four, however, the representation was non-proportional and there was no mechanism to alleviate the fear of one subculture's interests being overrun by the other. The system of government was patrimonial, autocratic and highly centralized. The cultural, political and economic policies pursued in Pakistan were characterized by cultural domination, extreme centralization and expediency. These actions of the central government created much resentment in various provinces as expressed in their demands for autonomy. The central government's non-conciliatory attitudes to subcultural grievances seriously undermined the legitimacy of the federal structure in Pakistan. This case study is a convincing confirmation of the proposition that confrontation politics exacerbates the underlying tensions and antagonisms and contributes to political instability.

The second hypothesis linking elite cooperation to the nature and types of the cleavages has also been confirmed. Pakistan suffered from its inheritance of congruent cleavages - cultural, linguistic and economic. The cumulation of animosities deriving from different linguistic and regional identities and strengthened by an unequal sharing of the benefits of economic development were the reasons for the seemingly intractable character of the conflict. These increased the tensions between subcultures

and acted as barriers to negotiation and reconciliation. The Bengali political elites insisted on the recognition of the Bengali dimension - in other words, a proportionate role for the Bengalis in the governing of the country. Punjabis were equally determined that there would be no ruling by the Bengali elites who had the support of the political elites of the other minority provinces of West Pakistan.

Consequently, the competition that ensued had an "all or nothing" character. The stakes were high. The Punjabi group, feeling the tenuousness of their pre-eminent position, resorted to strong executive actions which impeded elite cooperation. The ruling elites did not progress beyond the traditional mode of conflict regulation. The personal autocratic system heightened the tension and widened the rift among the political elites.

Elite cooperation in Pakistan was also hindered by complicated, extremely imbalanced sizes of the rival subcultures. Numerically, the Bengalis formed the majority but politically, the Punjabi political elites dominated the central government to the disadvantage of the other four groups. Thus there existed a double imbalance in Pakistan which constituted an overwhelmingly unfavorable factor. The transformation of the multipolar imbalanced situation into an imbalanced bipolar structure heightened the ethnic self-consciousness of the Bengalis. The Bengali-Punjabi conflict escalated into a Bengali-non-Bengali conflict. Their demand for autonomy became so intense by 1955, that

one observer of the Pakistani political scene predicted eventual secession of the Eastern wing of Pakistan.⁴⁷⁰ Significantly, Abul Mansur's characterization of Pakistan as consisting of "two cultures" and "two peoples" came in 1956.⁴⁷¹ This finding is in conformity with the proposition that a bipolar pattern with equality or near equality leads to fear and semi-paralysis in the resolution of important inter-group differences.

A crucial explanation for the high degree of elite confrontation, it seems, is to be found in the political culture of Pakistan. The reinforcing presence of religion, family and the patrimonial, feudal social structure which helped shape the self-view and world-view of the Pakistanis were not favorable for consociational choices. The tradition of political accommodation and coalescent decision-making that might have predisposed the political elites to be moderate and cooperative was non-existent. Such factors as tribalism, family, biraderi, and feudal control of land made the elites form alliances for mutual support but the alliances never had any permanence. It was like a kaleidoscopic formation, unstable and shifting. They could coalesce to attain Pakistan but thereafter they could not work together. There was virtual absence of either trust or goodwill between the opposing political elites.

⁴⁷⁰ Stanley Maron, "The Problem of East Pakistan", *Pacific Affairs*, 28 (June 1955).

⁴⁷¹ Pakistan, *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, I, 11 (January 16, 1956), p. 1816.

Concluding Observations:

A major lesson to be gained from this study is that given a heterogeneous composition of a country like Pakistan, a highly centralized autocratic system operating within a democratic framework would contribute to political instability. The basic problem is that primordial loyalties have extremely deep and strong roots, and that single leaders or oligarchies almost inevitably are seen as exponents of particular subcultures and as such are unacceptable to other subcultures. Stability in such a fragmented society, if that society is to operate freely and democratically, would necessitate elite cooperation. In deeply divided societies where cooperation among political elites could not be achieved, effective subordination of a subculture or subcultures by a dominant subculture may provide executive stability to the country and help keep violence at a low level.

The problem with Pakistan was that the political elites had a predisposition to rule autocratically but within a democratic framework. The founder of Pakistan perhaps understood the society very well and hence arrogated all power to himself. As we have seen, he ruled as well as reigned and during his life time little dissent surfaced. Those who followed him were lesser men who tried to rule in an autocratic manner but pretending to operate within a democratic framework. Consequently, each time the ruling elites attempted to impose certain unitarian cultural,

religious or economic policies, the opposition from other subcultures was intense and unequivocal.

Pakistan is not unique in this respect. There are several other instances of plural democratic societies where efforts to bring about stability by domination and centralization have exacerbated the problem. Given the prevalent democratic framework, the ruling elites in Pakistan would have been wiser to have followed the opposite course and to have assured and reassured the regions that their cultural and regional identities would be respected and encouraged and that they would be given a meaningful role in the political system of Pakistan. The cases of Lebanon during 1943-1975, Malaysia during 1955-1969 and India lend considerable support to the suggestion that democratic stability is promoted by elite cooperation and by resorting to conflict regulative practices. The nature and mechanics of cooperation may differ but the common denominator in all cases is elite cooperation.

Decision making in India, unlike Lebanon and Malaysia, has not been conducted according to the principle of grand coalition. The dominant Congress party is a broadly based aggregative party rather than a party of cultural representation. But, as Kothari points out, the Indian system "is not just a system providing means of competition and conflict but also a coalitional arena in which both ruling and oppositional groups can enter their diverse

claims" (emphasis mine).⁴⁷² Additionally, India's federal structure provides autonomy for the linguistic groups. These features have been singled out by scholars as factors contributing to the maintenance of political stability in India.

The stability of culturally plural societies is threatened not by their fragmented nature but by the failure of the political elites to recognize and accommodate existing linguistic, cultural and regional divisions and interests. Stability in a democratic plural society is generally achieved when a political arrangement is found which gives to all major groups a meaningful role in the political system. The political instability in Pakistan is the result of the inability of the political elites of Pakistan who could not accommodate each other yet wanted to maintain a democratic framework. This suggests that cooperation among political elites is necessary for the maintenance of democratic political stability in a fragmented society. Pakistan's failure in this respect illuminates the key problems of the politics of deeply divided societies.

Various subcultures can work together and achieve political stability if their respective political elites develop a sense of partnership, a sense of accommodation and a feeling that more will be gained by remaining together

⁴⁷²Rajni Kothari, *Politics in India* (Boston, Little Brown, 1970), p. 421.

rather than falling apart. Cooperation has to be genuine in terms of rule-making, rule-application, and resource allocating processes.

The politics of accommodation is greatly hindered, as this case study suggests, when the cleavages are congruent, sizes of various subcultures approximate a multipolar imbalance or a bipolar imbalance situation and, most importantly, when the political culture is not supportive of conciliatory practices. In the absence of these favorable factors, the prospects for democracy and stability would be poor. In the case of Pakistan, with her heavy emphasis on Muslim political ideology, these supportive factors were lacking. The inability of the politically dominant West Pakistani political elites to provide a true measure of partnership and accommodation to the Bengalis led to political instability and eventually resulted in the break-up of Pakistan.

The ultimate cure for political instability in Pakistan, and similar other, particularly Muslim states, lies perhaps in the modification of the behavior of their political elites. Political stability would require appropriate arrangements to accommodate subcultural divisions and interests. Failing which, stability (or at least a respite from instability) can only be achieved when the emergence of some forceful personality restores one-man rule. The trend of Pakistan and similar other Islamic polities indicates the permanence of one-man rule.

The principal aim of this study has been to interpret the politics of Pakistan in terms of the framework set out in the first chapter. Elite behavior and its impact on the political system have broadly followed the propositions that the study set out to test. Elsewhere in the Third World, the behavior patterns of the elites are unlikely to be substantially different. The framework which has particularly been instructive in the case of Pakistan should prove useful for the students of the politics of the developing areas.

In developing the framework, a good deal of attention has been paid to concept formation and particularly to operational definitions. General propositions that have been developed are based upon an examination of empirical data rather than upon pure intuition and intellectual guesswork. The model is behaviorally and empirically oriented.

The kind of data needed for an application of this model should be evident. The model necessitates both the event data as well as the survey data. The design has to be longitudinal in perspective rather than a one-shot study. Data on chronological and functional changes of various governmental structures are essential. Equally important are the data on the number and diversity of structural subunits, diversity of functions, divisions of powers within different organizations, nature of cleavages within the society, and opinion surveys of activists as well as marginal participants.

In dealing with the applicability of this model, it is necessary to discuss some of the weaknesses of the framework. Mere enumeration of a plurality of causes is not the wise nor the best way of understanding fragmented societies. The need is to go beyond a mere enumeration of all the variables that might conceivably be involved and weigh each of them in such a manner as to understand how they fit together.

This case study did not facilitate a comparison of the variables specified in the model and therefore could not determine the weightage of each factor. The possibility of evaluating the relative importance of a particular variable is enhanced if some variables move in opposite directions. Such was not the case with Pakistan. As the discussion showed, all the variables moved in one direction, reinforcing each other and therefore contributing to political instability in Pakistan. Admittedly, determination of weightage is not an easy task, but equally true is the fact that its negligence resists coherent analysis. This is to suggest that the model needs to be refined which could be accomplished if it is applied to other empirical cases preferably on a cross-national comparative basis. The second method of testing, validating and refining the hypotheses specified in the model is through paired comparisons. Since this study has concentrated upon an unsuccessful case of conflict regulation, the latter method would correct the imbalance by comparing successful with unsuccessful cases of

conflict regulation.

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VIII. Appendix I

Central Cabinets of Pakistan

Liaquat Cabinet:

Prime Minister:

Liaquat Ali Khan Aug. 15, 1947 - Oct. 16, 1951

Ministers:

I. I. Chundrigar Aug. 15, 1947 - May 7, 1948

Ghulam Mohammad Aug. 15, 1947 - Oct. 16, 1951

Abdur Rab Nishtar Aug. 15, 1947 - Aug. 2, 1949

Ghaznafar Ali Khan Aug. 15, 1947 - July 30, 1948

J. N. Mandal Aug. 15, 1947 - Sep. 15, 1950

Fazlur Rahman Aug. 15, 1947 - Oct. 16, 1951

Zafarullah Khan Dec. 27, 1947 - Oct. 16, 1951

Pirzada Abdus Sattar Dec. 30, 1947 - Oct. 16, 1951

Khwaja Shahabuddin May 8, 1948 - Oct. 16, 1951

M. A. Gurmani Jan. 3, 1949 - Oct. 16, 1951

Sardar Bahadur Khan Sep. 10, 1949 - Oct. 16, 1951

Nazir Ahmad Khan Sep. 10, 1949 - Oct. 16, 1951

A. M. Malik Sep. 20, 1949 - Oct. 16, 1951

Nazimuddin Cabinet:

Prime Minister:

Khwaja Nazimuddin Oct. 19, 1951 - Apr. 17, 1953

Ministers:

Abdur Rab Nishtar Oct. 26, 1951 - Apr. 17, 1953

Fazlur Rahman Oct. 19, 1951 - Apr. 17, 1953

Zafrullah Khan	Oct. 19, 1951 - Apr. 17, 1953
Pirzada Abdus Sattar	Oct. 19, 1951 - Apr. 17, 1953
Khwaja Shahabuddin	Oct. 19, 1951 - Nov. 26, 1951
M. A. Gurmani	Oct. 19, 1951 - Apr. 17, 1953
Mahmud Hussain	Nov. 26, 1951 - Apr. 17, 1953
Sardar Bahadur Khan	Oct. 19, 1951 - Apr. 17, 1953
I. H. Qureshi	Nov. 26, 1951 - Apr. 17, 1953
A. M. Malik	Oct. 19, 1951 - Apr. 17, 1953
Chaudhri Mohammad Ali	Oct. 19, 1951 - Apr. 17, 1953

Mohammad Ali Bogra Cabinet:

Prime Minister:

Mohammad Ali Bogra Apr. 17, 1953 - Oct. 24, 1954

Ministers:

Zafrullah Khan Apr. 17, 1953 - Oct. 24, 1954

M. A. Gurmani Apr. 17, 1953 - Oct. 24, 1954

Sardar Bahadur Khan Apr. 17, 1953 - Oct. 24, 1954

I. H. Qureshi Apr. 17, 1953 - Oct. 24, 1954

A. M. Malik Apr. 17, 1953 - Oct. 24, 1954

Chaudhri Mohammad Ali Apr. 17, 1953 - Oct. 24, 1954

A. K. Brohi Apr. 17, 1953 - Oct. 24, 1954

Abdul Qayyum Khan Apr. 18, 1953 - Oct. 24, 1954

Shoaib Qureshi Apr. 18, 1953 - Oct. 24, 1954

Tafazzal Ali Dec. 7, 1953 - Oct. 24, 1954

Mohammad Ali Bogra (Reconstituted) Cabinet:

Prime Minister:

Mohammad Ali Bogra	Oct. 24, 1954 - Aug. 11, 1955
Ministers:	
A. M. Malik	Oct. 24, 1954 - Aug. 11, 1955
Ghyasuddin Pathan	Oct. 24, 1954 - Aug. 11, 1955
Chaudhri Mohammad Ali	Oct. 24, 1954 - Aug. 11, 1955
M. A. H. Ispahani	Oct. 24, 1954 - Aug. 11, 1955
Iskander Mirza	Oct. 24, 1954 - Aug. 7, 1955
Mohammad Ayub Khan	Oct. 24, 1954 - Aug. 11, 1955
Gulam Ali Talpur	Oct. 24, 1954 - Aug. 11, 1955
Dr. Khan Saheb	Oct. 28, 1954 - Aug. 11, 1955
H. I. Rahimtoola	Nov. 26, 1954 - Aug. 11, 1955
Syed Abid Hussain	Dec. 18, 1954 - Aug. 11, 1955
H. S. Suhrawardy	Dec. 20, 1954 - Aug. 11, 1955
Mumtaz Ali Khan	Dec. 22, 1954 - Aug. 11, 1955
Abu Hussain Sarkar	Jan. 4, 1955 - June 6, 1955

Chaudhri Mohammad Ali Cabinet:

Prime Minister:

Chaudhri Mohammad Ali Aug. 11, 1955 - Sep. 12, 1956

Ministers:

I. I. Chundrigar Aug. 31, 1955 - Aug. 27, 1956
 Dr. Khan Saheb Aug. 11, 1955 - Oct. 14, 1956
 H. I. Rahimtoola Aug. 11, 1955 - Sep. 12, 1956
 Syed Abid Hussain Aug. 11, 1955 - Oct. 14, 1955
 A. K. Fazlul Haq Aug. 12, 1955 - Mar. 9, 1956
 K. K. Dutta Aug. 11, 1955 - Sep. 12, 1956
 Pir Ali Mohd. Rashdi Aug. 11, 1955 - Aug. 27, 1956

Nurul Haq Choudhury	Aug. 11, 1955 - Sep. 12, 1956
Abdul Latif Biswas	Aug. 11, 1955 - Sep. 12, 1956
Hamidul Haq Choudhury	Sep. 26, 1955 - Sep. 12, 1956
Syed Amjad Ali	Oct. 17, 1955 - Sep. 12, 1956
M. R. Kyani	Oct. 17, 1955 - Sep. 12, 1956
Pirzada Abdus Sattar	Mar. 17, 1956 - Sep. 12, 1956

Suhrawardy Cabinet:

Prime Minister:

H. S. Suhrawardy Sep. 12, 1956 - Oct. 11, 1957

Ministers:

Amir Azam Khan Sep. 12, 1956 - Oct. 11, 1957

Ghulam Ali Talpur Sep. 12, 1956 - Oct. 11, 1957

Syed Amjad Ali Sep. 12, 1956 - Oct. 11, 1957

Abul Mansur Ahmad Sep. 12, 1956 - Oct. 11, 1957

M. A. Khaleque Sep. 12, 1956 - Oct. 11, 1957

A. H. Dildar Ahmad Sep. 12, 1956 - Oct. 11, 1957

Mian Jafar Shah Sep. 12, 1956 - Oct. 11, 1957

Zahiruddin Sep. 17, 1956 - Oct. 11, 1957

Chundrigar Cabinet:

Prime Minister:

I. I. Chundrigar Oct. 18, 1957 - Dec. 11, 1957

Ministers:

Firoz Khan Noon Oct. 18, 1957 - Dec. 11, 1957

Fazlur Rahman Oct. 18, 1957 - Dec. 11, 1957

Syed Amjad Ali Oct. 18, 1957 - Dec. 11, 1957

Mumtaz Ali Daulatana	Oct. 18, 1957 - Dec. 11, 1957
M. A. Qizilbash	Oct. 18, 1957 - Dec. 11, 1957
A. L. Biswas	Oct. 18, 1957 - Dec. 11, 1957
Gulam Ali Talpur	Oct. 18, 1957 - Dec. 11, 1957
Misbahuddin Hussain	Oct. 18, 1957 - Dec. 11, 1957
Mian Jafar Shah	Oct. 18, 1957 - Dec. 11, 1957
Abdul Alim	Oct. 18, 1957 - Dec. 11, 1957
Yusuf Haroon	Oct. 18, 1957 - Dec. 11, 1957
Lutfur Rahman	Oct. 18, 1957 - Dec. 11, 1957
Farid Ahmad	Oct. 23, 1957 - Dec. 11, 1957

Firoz Khan Noon Cabinet:

Prime Minister:

Firoz Khan Noon	Dec. 16, 1957 - Oct. 7, 1958
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Ministers:

Syed Amjad Ali	Dec. 16, 1957 - Oct. 7, 1958
M. A. Qizilbash	Dec. 16, 1957 - Mar. 18, 1958
Gulam Ali Talpur	Dec. 16, 1957 - Oct. 7, 1958
Mian Jafar Shah	Dec. 16, 1957 - Oct. 7, 1958
Abdul Alim	Dec. 16, 1957 - Oct. 7, 1958
Ramizuddin Ahmed	Dec. 17, 1957 - Oct. 7, 1958
K. K. Dutta	Dec. 17, 1957 - Oct. 7, 1958
Maula Bakhsh Sumroo	Jan. 20, 1958 - Oct. 7, 1958
Mahfuzul Haq	Jan. 24, 1958 - Oct. 7, 1958
B. K. Das	Feb. 7, 1958 - Oct. 7, 1958
Sardar Abdur Rashid	Mar. 29, 1958 - July 19, 1958
Amir Azam Khan	Mar. 29, 1958 - Oct. 7, 1958

M. A. Khuhro	Apr. 8, 1958 - Oct. 7, 1958
Hamidul Huq Choudhury	Sep. 16, 1958 - Oct. 7, 1958
Zahiruddin	Oct. 2, 1958 - Oct. 7, 1958
Dildar Ahmed	Oct. 2, 1958 - Oct. 7, 1958
Nurur Rahman	Oct. 2, 1958 - Oct. 7, 1958

IX. Appendix II

Biographical Notes on Pakistani Elites

East Pakistan:

Ahmad, Abul Mansur (b. 1898). Born in Mymensingh. Educated at Dacca and Calcutta. Graduated in Law, 1928.

Secretary, Mymensingh District Krishak Proja Party, 1934-38. Joined Muslim League, 1943. Member, Indian Constituent Assembly, 1946. Joined Awami League, 1952. Minister, East Bengal, 1954. Member, Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (CAP), 1955-58. Commerce Minister, Pakistan, 1956-57.

Ahmad, Dildar (b. 1911). Born in Khulna. Joined Khulna bar, 1936. Joined Muslim League, 1937. Joined Pakistan Awami League, 1951. Food and Agricultural Minister, Pakistan, 1956-57. Minister Without Portfolio, Pakistan, October 2 - October 7, 1958.

Ahmad, Farid (1922-1972). Born in Cox's Bazar. Graduated in Law, 1947. Municipal Commissioner, Cox's Bazar, 1951. Chief Whip, United Front Parliamentary Party, 1955-57. Member, CAP, 1955-58. Labor Minister, Pakistan, October-December, 1957.

Ali, Tafazzal (b. 1906). Born in Tippera, East Bengal.

Educated at Calcutta. Legal Practice at Calcutta.

Member, Comilla District Board, 1936. Member, Bengal Legislative Assembly, 1946. Revenue Minister, East Bengal, 1947. Commerce Minister, Pakistan, 1953-54.

Alim, Abdul (b. 1906). Born in Comilla, East Bengal.

Educated at Calcutta. Joined Calcutta High Court bar, 1937. Councillor, Provincial Muslim League, Bakerganj, 1952. Joined Krishak Sramik Party, 1953. Member, East Bengal Legislative Assembly, 1954. Minister of State, Finance, Pakistan, March-October 1957. Rehabilitation and Works Minister, Pakistan, October-~~November~~, 1957; 1957-58.

Amin, Nurul (1897-1947). Born in Mymensingh, East Bengal.

Educated at Calcutta. Legal Practice at Mymensingh, 1924-45. Member, Bengal Legislative Council, 1942.

Member, Bengal Legislative Assembly, 1946. Speaker, Bengal Legislative Assembly, 1946-47. Minister of Civil Supplies, East Bengal, 1947-48. Chief Minister, East Bengal, 1948-54.

Bhashani, Maulana Abdu Hamid Khan (b. 1885). Born in

Mymensingh, East Bengal. Educated in religion.

President, Assam Provincial Muslim League before

partition. Member, Assam Legislative Assembly, 1937.
 President, East Pakistan Awami League, 1949-57. Founder
 President, National Awami Party, 1957-58.

Biswas, A. L. (b. 1897). Born in Dacca. Educated at Dacca
 and Calcutta. Joined bar, 1923. Member, Bengal
 Legislative assembly, 1926; 1937-46. Member, East Bengal
 Legislative assembly, 1954. Revenue Minister, East
 Bengal, 1954. Food and Agriculture Minister, Pakistan,
 1955-56. Vice-President, Krishak Sramik Party, 1957.

Bogra, Mohammad Ali (1900-1936). Born in Bogra, East Bengal.
 Educated at Calcutta. Belongs to landed gentry. Member,
 Bengal Legislative Assembly, 1937. Chairman, District
 Muslim League, 1937-48. Parliamentary Secretary to Chief
 Minister of Bengal, 1943-45. Finance and Health
 Minister, Bengal, 1946. Member, CAP, 1947. Prime
 Minister of Pakistan, 1953-55.

Choudhury, Hamidul Huq (b. 1903). Born in East Bengal.
 Educated at Calcutta. Legal practice at Calcutta, 1930.
 Member, Bengal Legislative Assembly, 1937. Member, CAP,
 1947-55. Minister for Foreign Affairs, Pakistan,
 1955-56. Finance Minister, Pakistan, 1958.

Choudhury, Nurul Huq (b. 1911). Born in East Bengal.
 Graduated in arts and law from Calcutta. Joined local

politics in Bengal, 1937. Member, CAP, 1955-58. Labor and Works Minister, Pakistan, 1955-56.

Dutt, K. K. (b. 1878). Born in Comilla. Educated at Dacca and Calcutta. Legal practice at Comilla. Attached to Judicial Service, 1907-09. Legal practice in Dacca since 1948. Member, CAP, 1947-54, 1955-58. Minister for Law and Health, Pakistan, 1955-56.

Haq, Fazlul A. K. (1873-1962). Born in Barisal. Educated at Barisal and Calcutta. Member, Bengal Legislative Council, 1913, 1920. Secretary, Bengal Provincial Muslim League, 1916-21. President, All-India Muslim League, 1918. Education Minister, Bengal, 1924. Founder President, Krishak Proja Party, 1927. Chief Minister of Bengal, 1937-43. Advocate General, East Bengal, 1948-53. President, Krishak Sramik Party, 1953. Chief Minister, East Bengal, April-May, 1954. Minister for Interior and Education, Pakistan, 1955-56. Governor of East Pakistan, 1956-58.

Ispahani, M. A. H. (b. 1902). Born in West Bengal, India. Educated at Calcutta and Cambridge. Called to the bar, 1924. Joined family business, 1925. Member, Calcutta City Corporation, 1933-36; 1940-47. Member, Bengal legislative Assembly, 1937-46. Member, CAP, 1947. President, Muslim Chamber of Commerce, Calcutta,

1945-47. Minister for Industries, Pakistan, 1954-55.

Khaleque, M. Abdul. Born in Jessore, East Bengal. Educated at Jessore and Dacca. Member, Awami League, 1949. Member, CAP, 1955-58. Minister for Labor and Works, Pakistan, 1956-57.

Khan, Aatur Rahman (b. 1907). Born and educated at Dacca. Legal practice, 1936. Vice-President, Dacca sub-Divisional Muslim League, 1947. Joined Awami League, 1949. Vice-President, East Bengal Awami League, 1953. Member, East Bengal Legislative Assembly, 1954. Member CAP, 1955-58. Chief Minister of East Pakistan, 1956-58 (three times).

Khan, Maulvi Tamizuddin (1889-1963). Born in Faridpur, East Bengal. Educated at Calcutta. Legal practice at Faridpur, 1915. Joined All-India Muslim League, 1915. Member, Bengal Legislative Council, 1926, 1930. Member, Bengal Legislative Assembly, 1937. Minister, Bengal, 1937-46. Member CAP, 1947-54. President, CAP, 1948-54.

Malik, A. M. (b. 1905). Born in Chuadanga, East Bengal. Educated at Calcutta and Vienna. Practiced medicine. President, Indian Quartermaster's Union, and Sailor's Union, 1936. Joined Muslim League, 1936. President, All-Pakistan Trade Union Federation. Member, Bengal

Legislative Assembly, 1947. Minister, East Bengal, 1947-49. Minister for Health and Minority Affairs, Pakistan, 1949-51. Minister for Labor, Health and Works, Pakistan, 1951-55.

Mandal, J. N. (b. 1906). Born in East Bengal. Educated at Barisal and Calcutta. Practiced law at Calcutta. Formed Independent Scheduled Caste Assembly Party. Member, CAP, 1947. Minister for Law, Labor and Works, Pakistan, 1947-50. Defected to India, 1950.

Mirza, General Iskander (1899-1969). Born in Bombay. A member of the Nawab family of Murshidabad, India. Educated at Bombay and Sandhurst. Served in the Army till 1926. Joined Indian Political Service, 1926. Secretary, Ministry of Defence, 1947-54. Governor, East Bengal, 1954. Minister for Interior, Pakistan, 1954-55. Governor General, Pakistan, 1955-56. President of Pakistan, 1956-58.

Nazimuddin, Khwaja (1894-1964). Born in Kashmir. Educated at Aligarh and Cambridge. Member, Bengal Executive Council, 1934. Minister for Education, Bengal, 1930-34. Chief Minister, Bengal, 1943-45. Chief Minister, East Bengal, 1947-48. Governor General of Pakistan, 1948-51. Prime Minister of Pakistan, 1951-53. President, Pakistan Muslim League, 1954-55.

Pathan, Ghyasuddin (b. 1903). Born in Dacca, East Bengal.
 Educated at Dacca. Joined Mymensingh bar. Chairman,
 Mymensingh Municipal Board, 1948. Joint Secretary,
 All-Pakistan Muslim League, 1949. Member, CAP, 1947-54.
 Deputy Minister for Finance, Pakistan, 1951. Minister of
 State for Finance, Pakistan, 1952-53. Minister of State
 for Minority Affairs, 1954-55.

Rahman, Fazlur (1905-1966). Born in East Bengal. Educated at
 Dacca. Legal practice at Dacca, 1934. Member, Bengal
 Legislative Assembly, 1937, 1946. Minister for Revenue,
 Bengal, 1946-47. Minister for Industries, Commerce and
 Education, Pakistan, 1947-53. Minister for Commerce and
 Law, October - December, 1957.

Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur (1922-1975). Born in Faridpur, East
 Bengal. Educated at Calcutta. Manager, Insurance
 Company. Student Leader of All-India Muslim League.
 Member, Council of All-India Muslim Student Federation.
 Formed East Pakistan Student's League, 1947. Member,
 East Bengal Legislative Assembly, 1954. Secretary, East
 Pakistan Awami League, 1953. Minister for Co-operatives,
 East Bengal, 1954. Member, CAP, 1955-58.

Sarkar, Abu Hussain (1894-1969). Born in Rangpur, East
 Bengal. Educated at Dacca. Joined Krishak Proja Party,

1935. Member, Bengal Legislative Assembly, 1954.
 Minister, East Bengal, 1954. Minister for Health,
 Pakistan, January - July, 1955. Chief Minister, East
 Pakistan, 1955-56; 1958.

Shahabuddin, Khwaja (b. 1898). Born in East Bengal. Educated
 privately. Member, Bengal Governor's Executive Council,
 1936. Chief Whip, Muslim League Party, Bengal, 1937-40.
 Minister for Commerce, Labor and Industry, Bengal,
 1943-45. Member, CAP, 1947. Minister for Interior and
 Information, Pakistan, 1948-51. Governor of NWFP,
 1951-54.

Suhrawardy, Hussain Shaheed (1893-1963). Born in Midnapur,
 India. Educated at Calcutta and Oxford. Deputy Mayor of
 Calcutta Corporation. Chief Minister of Bengal, 1946.
 Founder, Awami League, 1949. Minister for Law Minister,
 Pakistan, 1954-55. Member, CAP, 1955-58. Prime Minister
 of Pakistan, 1956-57.

Zahiruddin, Ahmad (b. 1917). Born and educated at Calcutta.
 Joined the bar, 1948. Joined Awami League, 1949. Member,
 East Pakistan Legislative assembly, 1954-58. Member,
 CAP, 1955-58. Minister for Education and Health,
 Pakistan, 1956-57.

Punjab:

Ahmad, Aziz. Joined the Indian Civil Service, 1930. Joint secretary, Department of Planning, Bengal, 1944-46. Deputy secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India, 1946-47. Chief Secretary, East Pakistan, 1947-52. Cabinet Secretary, Pakistan, 1952-57. Secretary General, Pakistan, 1958.

Ali, Chaudhri Mohammad, (b. 1905). Born in Julunder (West Punjab). Educated at Punjab. Entered Indian Audits and Accounts Service, 1928. Accountant General, Bhawalpur State, 1932. Secretary General, Government of Pakistan, 1947-51. Finance Minister, Pakistan, 1951-53; 1953-54; 1954-55. Member, CAP, 1955-58. Prime Minister of Pakistan, 1955-56.

Ali, Syed Amjad. Born in Punjab. Educated at Lahore, Punjab. Private Business. Member, Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1937. Chief Whip, Punjab Government, 1942. Member, Indian Constituent Assembly, 1946. Finance Minister, Pakistan, 1955-58.

Dasti, A. H. Khan (b. 1894). Born in Muzaffargarh. Educated at Lahore. Chief of the Dasti tribe of Muzaffargarh. Enrolled as a lawyer, 1921. President, Zamindar Association, Muzaffargarh. Member, Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1945, 1951. Education Minister, Punjab,

1948-51. Agriculture Minister, Punjab, 1953. Chief Minister, Punjab, May-October, 1955.

Daulatana, Mian Muntaz Muhammad Khan (b. 1916). Born in Punjab. Educated at Punjab and Oxford. Called to the bar, 1939. Member, Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1943, 1946. General Secretary, Punjab Provincial Muslim League, 1944-47. Chief Minister, Punjab, 1951-53. Defence Minister, Pakistan, October-December, 1957.

Gurmani, Nawab Mushtaq Ahmad Khan (b. 1905). Born in Punjab. Educated at Aligarh. Member, Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1937. Parliamentary Secretary, Punjab, 1937-42. Joint Secretary, Government of India, 1945-47. Prime Minister, Bhawalpur State, 1947-48. Minister Without Portfolio, Pakistan, 1949-50. Minister for Kashmir Affairs, Pakistan, 1950-51. Minister of Interior, Pakistan, 1951-54. Governor of Punjab, 1954. Governor of West Pakistan, 1955. Member, CAP, 1955-58.

Hussain, Abid (1915-1971). Born in Punjab. Educated at Lahore. In army service, 1942-45. Member, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1942-47. Member, Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1951. Minister for Food, Pakistan, 1954-55.

Iftikharuddin, Mian M (1908-1962). Born in Lahore. Educated

at Lahore and Oxford. Member, Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1937-46. Secretary, Congress Assembly Party. Joined Muslim League, 1945. President, Provincial Muslim League, 1947. Minister for Refugee and Rehabilitation, Punjab, 1947-48. Member, CAP, 1947-58. Chairman, Progressive Papers Ltd., Lahore, 1947-58.

Khan, Choudhury Nazir (b. 1896). Born in Sialkot, Punjab. Educated at Lahore. Received title of Khan Bahadur, 1940. Member, All-India Muslim League Council, 1939-47. Member, CAP, 1947-54. Minister for Industries, Pakistan, 1949-51.

Khan, Mumtaz Ali (b. 1904). Born in Lahore, Punjab. Educated at Lahore. Legal practice, 1933. Member, Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1946, 1949-54. Minister for Information and Broadcasting, 1954-55.

Khan, Nawabzada Sher Ali. Second son of the ruler of Pataudi. Educated at Aitchison College Lahore, Dehradun and Sandhurst. Commissioned in 1933. Adjutant General, 1951. Chief of General Staff, Pakistan Army, 1955.

Khan, Raja Ghaznafar Ali (1895-1963). Born in Punjab. Educated at Lahore. Member, Central Legislative Assembly of India, 1924-30. Member, Indian Council of state, 1933-37. Member, Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1937,

1946. Minister for Food, Agriculture and Health,
Pakistan, 1947-48.

Khan, Sardar Shaukat Hayat (b. 1915). Born in Punjab. Son of
Sikandar Hayat. Member, Legislative Assembly, Punjab,
1943-47. Member, CAP, 1947-54.

Khan, Sir Zafrullah (b. 1893). Born in Punjab. Educated at
Lahore and Lincoln's Inn. Legal practice at Lahore,
1916-1935. Member, Punjab Legislative Council, 1926-35.
President, All-India Muslim League, 1931. Member,
Governor General's Executive Council, 1935-41. Judge
Indian Federal Court, 1942-47. Minister for Foreign
Affairs, 1947-54.

Mamdot, Nawab Iftikhar Hussain Khan (1905-1969). Born in
Punjab. President, Punjab Muslim League. Member, Punjab
Legislative Assembly, 1946. Chief Minister of Punjab,
1947-49. Founded Jinnah Muslim league. Member, CAP,
1947-58. Governor of Sind, 1954-55.

Mohammad, Ghulam (1893-1956). Born in Lahore. Educated at
Aligarh. Joined Indian Audit Services. Deputy Accountant
General, Government of India, 1943. Minister for
Finance, Hyderabad Deccan, 1942-46. Minister for
Finance, Pakistan, 1947-51. Governor General of
Pakistan, 1951-56.

Noon, Malik Sir Firoz Khan (1893-1970). Born in Sargodha, Punjab. Educated at Lahore and Oxford. Joined the bar from Lincoln's Inn. Member, Punjab Legislative assembly, 1921-36. Minister for Local Government, Punjab, 1927-30. Member, Viceroy's Executive Council, 1941-46. Member, CAP, 1947-58. Governor, East Bengal, 1950-53. Chief Minister, Punjab, 1953-55. Minister for Foreign Affairs, Pakistan, 1956-57. Prime Minister of Pakistan, 1957-58.

Qizilbash, Nawab Muzaffar Ali Khan (b. 1908). Born in Lahore. Educated at Punjab and Cambridge. Joined the bar, 1932. Member, Punjab Legislative Council, 1936. Minister for Revenue, Punjab, 1946-47. Joined Muslim League, 1947. Minister for Industries, Commerce, Pakistan, 1957-58. Chief Minister, West Pakistan, 1958.

Sind:

Brohi, A. K. (b. 1915). Born in Sukkur, Sind. Educated at Karachi. Joined Karachi bar, 1941. Advocate-General, Sind, 1951-53. Law Minister, Pakistan, 1953-54.

Fazlullah, Qazi (b. 1902). Born in Nawabshah, Sind. Educated at Bombay. Legal practice at Larkana, Sind, 1930. Joined the Muslim League, 1938. Member, Sind Legislative Assembly, 1946. Revenue Minister, Sind, 1947-48. Chief

Minister, Sind, 1950-51.

Haroon, Yusuf Abdullah (b. 1917). Born in Karachi. Educated in Karachi. Member, Karachi Municipal Corporation, 1940. Mayor, Karachi, 1944. President, Sind Provincial Muslim League, 1944-48. Chief Minister of Sind, 1949-50. Minister for Kashmir & Parliamentary Affairs, Pakistan, October-December, 1957.

Hidayatullah, Ghulam Hussain (1879-1948). Born in Sind. Educated at Sind and Bombay. Member, Bombay Legislative Council, 1912. Member, Bombay Executive Council, 1928-35. Member, Sind Legislative Assembly, 1937-47., Governor of Sind, 1947-48.

Khuhro, Mohammad Ayub (b. 1901). Born in Sind. Advisor to the Governor of Sind, 1936-37. Member, Sind Legislative Assembly, 1937-47. Three times Chief Minister of Sind (1947-48, March-December 1951, and 1954-55). Member, CAP, 1955-58. Minister for Defence, April-October, 1958.

Pirzada, Abdus Sattar (1907-1974). Born at Sukkur in Sind. Educated at Karachi and London. Called to the bar at Lincoln's Inn, London. Legal practice at Sukkur, 1930. Member, Sind Legislative Assembly, 1937. Chief Parliamentary Secretary, 1938. Minister for Public Works and Health, Sind, 1941-46. Minister for Food, Pakistan,

1947-53. Chief Minister, Sind, 1953-54. Member, West Pakistan Legislative Assembly, 1955-58.

Rashdi, Pir Ali Mohammad. Born 1917 at Sind. Editor, *Sind Observer* (Karachi). President, Pakistan Newspaper Editor's Conference. Minister for Revenue, Sind. Minister for Information and Broadcasting, Pakistan, 1955-56.

Syed, G. M. Belongs to district Dadu in Sind. President, Karachi Local Board. Member, Sind United Party. Member, Sind Legislative Assembly, 1937. Member, All India Muslim League Working Committee, 1935. Secretary, Sind Awami Party.

Talpur, Mir Ghulam Ali (1909-1966). Born in Tando Mohd. Khan, Hyderabad. Educated at Hyderabad and Aligarh. Member, Sind Legislative Assembly, 1937, 1953. Joined Muslim League, 1940. Minister in Sind provincial government, 1943. Minister for Information, Pakistan, 1954-55. Member, CAP, 1955-58. Minister for Interior, Pakistan, 1956-58.

North West Frontier Province:

Burki, Wajid Ali. Educated at St. Andrews University of Scotland (M.D.) and Fieldview Hospital, London (D.O.M.).

commissioned to Indian Medical Services, 1926. Deputy Director General of Medical Services, Pakistan Army in 1946. Major General and appointed Director General of Medical Services in 1955. Minister of Health and Social Welfare, Pakistan, 1958.

Khan, Abdul Gaffar (b. 1891). Born at Peshawar. Educated at Aligarh. Founded Khudai Khidmatgars, 1929. Member, CAP, 1947-54. Organized National Awami Party, 1957.

Khan, Abdul Qayyum (b. 1901). Born in Chitral. Educated at Peshawar and England. Called to the bar, 1926. Practiced law at Peshawar. Member, Indian Legislative assembly, 1937-45. Joined Muslim League, 1945. Chief Minister, NWFP, 1947-53. Minister for Industries, Food and agriculture, Pakistan, 1953-54. President, Pakistan Muslim League, 1957-58.

Khan, Mohammad Azam. Educated at the Military College, Dehradun and Sandhurst. Commissioned, 1929. Deputy President of Services Selection Board. Assistant Quarter Master General, 1947. Major General, 1950. Lieutenant General in 1954. Minister of Rehabilitation and Senior Cabinet member, Pakistan, 1958.

Khan, Mohammad Ayub. Born on May 14, 1907 in Hazara. Belonged to a Pathan tribe called Tareen. Educated at

Muslim University, Aligarh, India and Royal Military College, Sandhurst; commissioned in 1928. A colonel at partition. Promoted Brigadier, 1947. President, Services Selection Board. Major General in 1948 and made Commanding Officer of East Pakistan; Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, 1950. Chief Martial Law Administrator on October 8, 1958. President of Pakistan on October 28, 1958. Field Marshal, 1959.

Khan, Sardar Bahadur (1908-1976). Born in Hazara district. Educated at Aligarh. Member, NWFP Legislative Assembly, 1939. Speaker, NWFP Legislative Assembly, 1943-46. Member, CAP, 1946. Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Pakistan, 1949. Minister for Communication and Health, Pakistan, 1949-51. Minister for Communications, Pakistan, 1951-54. Chief Minister, NWFP, 1955.

Khan, Sardar A. Rashid (b. 1906). Born at Dera Ismail Khan. Jointed Frontier Police service, 1930. Transferred to Indian Political Service, 1942. Inspector General of Police, NWFP, 1951-53. Chief Minister, NWFP, 1953-55. Member, CAP, 1955-58. Chief Minister, West Pakistan, 1956.

Musa, Mohammad. Before independence served on the Armed Forces Nationalization Committee. Commander of a Brigade in 1948. Director and Inspector, National Guards.

Director of Infantry, General Headquarters. Deputy Chief of Staff and Chief of the Senior Services in the Secretariat of the Ministry of Defence. Major General in 1951 and Lieutenant General in 1957. Commander-in-Chief of the Army in 1958.

Nishtar, Sardar Abdu Rab (1899-1958). Born in Peshawar.

Educated at Peshawar and Aligarh. Enrolled as a Pleader, 1925. Member, Indian National Congress, 1927-31. Member, All-India Muslim League Council, 1936. Member, NWFP Legislative Assembly, 1937-45. Minister for Finance, NWFP, 1943-45. Minister for Communication, 1947-48. Governor of Punjab, 1949-51. Minister for Industries, Pakistan, 1951-53.

Saheb, Dr. Khan (1882-1958). Educated in Peshawar and London in Medicine. Served Indian Medical Service. Resigned in 1921. Private Medical practice, 1921-30. Chief Minister, NWFP, 1937-39; 1945-47. Minister for Communication, Pakistan, 1954-55. Chief Minister, West Pakistan, 1955-57.

Shah, Mian Jafar. Born 1903, at Nowshera. Educated at Peshawar. Joined Provincial Congress Committee. Member, NWFP Legislative Assembly, 1937, 1946. Joined Muslim League, 1947. Minister for Education, NWFP. Member, CAP, 1955.

Muhajir:

Adamjee, Abdul Wahid (b. 1908). Born in Rangoon. A member of the Memon community. Entered business in 1926 at Rangoon. Installed Adamjee Jute Mills in 1952. Chairman, Muslim Commercial Bank, Ltd. Director, Adamjee Cotton Mills Ltd., Pakistan International Airlines; Mohammadi Steamship Co. Ltd., and several other firms. Chairman, Pakistan Jute Mills Association. Once elected chairman of the Pakistan Chamber of Commerce.

Ansari, Maulana Zafar Ahmad. Served as office secretary of the All-India Muslim League, and secretary of the Muslim League Parliamentary Board. After partition, appointed to revise the constitution of the All-Pakistan Muslim League. Secretary to the Board of Talimat-i-Islamia (Board of Islamic Teaching).

Bawany, Abdul Latif (b. 1890). Born in Jetpur, Kathiawar. Entered business at Rangoon. Chairman, Bawany Violin Textile Mills, Ltd., and several other firms. Director, Karachi Transport Syndicate. President, Memon Jama'at. President, All Pakistan Memon Federation.

Chundrigar, I. I. (1897-1960). Born in Ahmadabad, Bombay. Educated at Bombay University. Legal practice at

Ahmadabad. Member, Bombay Legislative Assembly, 1937. President, Bombay Provincial Muslim League, 1940-45. Member, All-India Muslim League Working Committee, 1943-47. Commerce Minister, Pakistan, 1947-48. Governor, North West Frontier Province, 1950-51. Governor, Punjab, 1951-53. Law Minister, Pakistan, 1955-56. Prime Minister of Pakistan, October-December, 1957.

Hussain, Akhtar. Born 1902 in Burhanpur, Central Provinces, India. Educated at Allahabad and Aligarh. Joined the Indian Civil Service in 1924. Under Secretary, Government of India, 1930-32. Secretary to Financial Commissioner, 1936-38. Deputy Commissioner, Sialkot, 1943-44. After partition, he served Pakistan in various capacities including the Secretary of Defence. Governor of West Pakistan in 1957.

Hussain, Mahmud (b. 1907). Born in Farukhabad, U.P. Educated at Aligarh, Delhi and Heidelberg. Reader in History, Dacca University, 1933. Professor, International Relations, Dacca University, 1948. Member, CAP, 1946. Deputy Minister of Defence, Pakistan, 1949-51. Minister for Kashmir Affairs, Pakistan, 1951-53.

Jinnah, Mohammad Ali (1876-1948). Referred to as the "Quaid-e-Azam". Born in Karachi. Called to the bar in 1896. Member, Imperial Legislative Council, 1910. Joined

Muslim League, 1913. President, All India Muslim League, 1916, 1920 and 1934-1948. Governor General of Pakistan, 1947-48. President of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, 1947-48.

Khaliquzzaman, Choudhury (b. 1889). President, Muslim League, United Provinces, 1937-47. Governor of East Pakistan, 1953.

Khan, Liaquat Ali (1895-1951). Born in East Punjab, India. Educated at Aligarh and Oxford. Called to the bar, 1922. General Secretary, All-India Muslim League, 1936-47. Member, U.P. Legislative Council, 1926-1940. Member, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1940-1947. Member, Interim Government, 1946-47. Prime Minister of Pakistan, 1947-51. President, Pakistan Muslim League, 1950-51.

Maudoodi, Maulana Abul Ala (b. 1903) Born in India. Educated privately. A renowned alim. Started public life as a journalist. Editor, *Al-Jamiat*. Chief, Jamaat-i-Islami. Sentenced to death by Martial Law Court in 1954 but later the sentence was commuted to imprisonment.

Nadvi, Syed Suleiman. A prominent alim acknowledged to be the foremost student of Islamic history among the Ulema of the Indian subcontinent. Migrated to Pakistan in 1950. President, Board of Talimaat-e-Islamiya.

Qureshi, I. H. (b. 1903). Born in Delhi. Educated at Delhi and Cambridge. Lecturer, Stephen's College, Delhi, 1928. Reader, University of Delhi, 1940. Member, CAP, 1947-54. Deputy Minister for Interior, Pakistan, 1949-50. Minister of State for Refugee and Rehabilitation, Pakistan, 1950-51. Minister for Education, Pakistan, 1953-54.

Qureshi, Shoaib (b. 1889). Born in U. P. Educated at Aligarh and Oxford. Edited *New Era* (Lucknow) and *Muslim Outlook* (London). Minister, Bhopal state government, 1943-48. Minister for Information and Broadcasting, Pakistan, 1953-54.

Rahimtoola, Habib I. Born 1912 at Bombay. Educated at St. Xavier's College and Government Law College, Bombay. President, Federation of Muslim Chambers of Commerce and Industry 1947. Director of over 15 companies in India. Ambassador to France 1952-53. Governor of Sind 1953-54. Governor of Punjab, 1954. Minister for Commerce, Pakistan, 1954-56.

Usmani, Maulana Shabbir Ahmad. A highly placed alim in the ruling hierarchy. President of Jamiatul Ulema-i-Islam. Member, CAP, 1947-49. Member, Basic Principles Committee.

Baluchistan:

Khan of Kalat (b. 1904). Born in Kalat. Educated privately.

Received military training in the regular army. Ascended to the ancestral throne in Kalat, Baluchistan, 1933.

Arrested on charges of plotting secession, 1958.