CANADIAN THESES

THÈSES CANADIENNES

NOTICE

The quality of this microfiche is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Previously copyrighted materials (journal articles, published tests, etc.) are not filmed.

Reproduction in full or in part of this film is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30.

AVIS

La qualité de cette microfiche dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

Les documents qui font déjà l'objet d'un droit d'auteur (articles de revue, examens publiés, etc.) ne sont pas microfilmés.

La reproduction, même partielle, de ce microfilm est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30.

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED

LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS REÇUE

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

DEMOCRACY, FEDERALISM, AND NATIONALITY: UKRAINE'S MEDIEVAL HERITAGE IN THE THOUGHT OF N.I. KOSTOMAROV

by

© JAROSLAW IWANUS

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

OF MASTER OF ARTS

HISTORY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL, 1986

ISBN 0-315-32406-6

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

RELEASE FORM

NAME OF AUTHOR JAROSLAW IWANUS

TITLE OF THESIS DEMOCRACY, FEDERALISM, AND NATIONALITY: UKRAINE'S MEDIEVAL HERITAGE IN THE THOUGHT OF N.I. KOSTOMAROV

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED MASTER OF ARTS

YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED FALL, 1986

(SIGNED) .....

PERMANENT ADDRESS:

10215 137 Street

Edmonton, Alberta

T5N 2G8

DATED August 28, 1986

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled DEMOCRACY, FEDERALISM, AND NATIONALITY: UKRAINE'S MEDIEVAL HERITAGE IN THE THOUGHT OF N.I. KOSTOMAROV submitted by JAROSLAW IWANUS in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS.

.....

Supervisor

.....

.....

Date August 28, 1986

To the memory of
Professor I.L. Rudnytsky
who was the first to make
Ukrainian history
interesting for me

Abstract

Nikolai Ivanovich Kostomarov (1817-1885), Ukrainian historian and political thinker, has been called "one of the chief theoreticians of the Ukrainian national renaissance." He essentially originated the practice of historical scholarship in Ukraine. This thesis will investigate how Kostomarov developed a view of Ukrainian history which was in tune with the national awakening of the time. Kostomarov's claim that democracy and federalism are inherent Ukrainian national characteristics and that Kievan Rus' was a Ukrainian-centred democratic federation and thus Ukraine's -- not Russia's -- medieval ancestor will be critically analyzed within the context of its role as national myth. Although he saw himself as explaining historical phenomena in a scholarly and objective way, it will be shown that he was instead idealizing them -- creating an "organic tie of history with politics and journalism" -- and in doing so laying the initial theoretical groundwork for the Ukrainian national movement.

The first chapter looks at Kostomarov as an East European historiographer. It compares him to another historian of note, the Czech František Palacký, who played a role very similar to Kostomarov's in his country's national awakening. It includes a short academic biography of Kostomarov, a look at the usefulness of medieval history in the European national movements of the nineteenth century in general, and an assessment of Kostomarov as both mythmaker

and historian. The second chapter analyzes Kostomarov's view of democracy in medieval Rus' and notes the problems in his notion of the *knlaz'-veche* relationship during the Kievan period. The third chapter investigates the extent of the "federative principle" in Kievan Rus' and observes that Kostomarov was correct in labelling the political structure of the time a "seminal federation." The fourth chapter synthesizes the findings in chapters two and three and examines the role of the democratic and federative elements in Kostomarov's conception of the Ukrainian nationality. The final chapter summarizes the thesis and offers comment on Kostomarov's place in both historiography and history.

It is hoped that this work will create, in its own small way, an interest in this neglected but crucial figure in East European intellectual history.

Preface

The nineteenth century in Eastern Europe was not a period of what might be called "big events." However, it was perhaps the absence of cataclysms which engendered national revival in this part of the world. This was an era of unparalleled cultural and intellectual growth, without which the political restructuring of this area in the twentieth century would be incomprehensible. Many of the submerged nations, Ukraine among them, began at this time to acquire a national consciousness, due in no small part to the efforts of their *literati*.

Nikolai Ivanovich Kostomarov (1817-1885) was one of the most important Ukrainian writers in this regard. In studying his contribution to the development of Ukrainian national consciousness, it is the interplay of history as a discipline (for Kostomarov was indeed a professional historian), of history as an objective view of the past, and of history as a popular understanding of the past (i.e., history as "myth") which is most interesting. By examining the role of myth in the process by which the Ukrainians appropriated and came to understand their past, it is possible to learn a great deal about the foundations of nationalism in general. Studying the methodology and views of this crucial figure in Ukrainian intellectual history invites the drawing of comparisons to similar methods and views among the intellectuals of other submerged East European nations, such as the Czechs, and allows us to

understand how the formulation of a particular idea of history creates part of the infrastructure of our own perceptions of historical continuity.

Kostomarov, in comparison to some of his Central and East European counterparts, has been neglected in the study of historiography. It is hoped that this thesis will open the door just a little to creating a general interest in the ideas of this fascinating figure. This thesis is not meant to be exhaustive: Kostomarov left far too much of a legacy for a work of this nature to do him justice. However, by concentrating on only one aspect of his thought, that of the role of the democratic-federative element in Ukrainian history, it will hopefully encourage other scholars to pick up where it leaves off and begin to pay deserved attention to this man of great historiographical and historical significance.

The transliteration used in this work is the standard Library of Congress system. It uses the Russian, as opposed to the Ukrainian, transliteration for most terms, both because Kostomarov wrote in that language and because the world around him, except for the Ukrainian countryside, was very much a Russian world. Thus, for example, "*veche*" is used instead of "*viche*" and Kostomarov's own name is rendered as "Nikolai Ivanovich" instead of the Ukrainian "Mykola Ivanovych." The only exceptions are geographic terms: they are transliterated according to the political unit in which they are found today (e.g., Kharkiv is in

Ukraine and is therefore not rendered as "Kharkov").

I wish to express my sincere and profound thanks to the following people for their gracious assistance in helping me to prepare this work: to my supervisor, Dr. John-Paul Himka, whose own enthusiasm about the subject was contagious and whose guidance was invaluable; to my colleague, Michael Watson, for his kind suggestions and criticisms and for helping to make the University of Alberta Department of History an exciting place to be. Finally, a special thanks to my wife, Deb, and daughter, Karah, who offered the sort of moral support and encouragement without which this effort would have been impossible. All are entitled to share in the credit for any value this work may possess, but its errors and shortcomings are mine alone.

Table of Contents

Chapter — Page

I. Introduction 1

A. Prologue 1

Purpose 1

Academic Biography 3

B. Medieval History as a Basis for Legitimacy 6

A Common Historical Heritage 6

The Czechs 7

C. Kostomarov as Mythmaker 10

Ukraine's Palacký 10

Ideology 11

Historiographical Method 15

D. Kostomarov as Historian 20

II. Democracy 23

A. Introduction 23

B. Elements of Democracy 25

The *Veche* 25

The *Knîaz'* 30

The Evolution of Democracy 34

C. Analysis 38

The Genesis of the *Veche* 38

The Universality of the *Veche* 41

Patrimonialism-Proprietorship 46

Social Structure 54

D. Conclusion 57

III. Federalism 59

A. Introduction 59

B. Kostomarov on Federalism 60
The Bipolarity of East Slavic History 60
Causes of Unity and Disunity 61
Other Aspects of Federalism 67
A Limited Federalism 69
C. Analysis 72
Historiography of Rus' Federalism 72
Criticism 76
D. Conclusion 79
IV. Nationality 80
A. Introduction 80
B. Democracy and Federalism as Inherent Ukrainian National Characteristics 83
"Dve russkiia narodnosti" 83
The Ukrainians 85
In Contrast: The Great Russians 87
Summary 90
C. Analysis 92
Ethnographic Determinism 92
Cause and Effect: The Mongol Invasion and its Impact on East Slavic History 95
D. Conclusion 97
V. Conclusion 99
Bibliography 106
A. Works by N.I. Kostomarov 106
B. Secondary Sources 107

I. Introduction

> Our [Czech] literature, like that of any oppressed nation, has a great social and political significance. That is not to say that it preaches politics. But a people who have neither their own government nor their own parliament tend to pack all their thoughts and feelings of freedom into their literature....Literature is our parliament, government, and state.[1]

> All human groups like to be flattered. Historians are therefore under perpetual temptation to conform to expectation by portraying the people about whom they write as they wish to be. A mingling of truth and falsehood, blending history with ideology, results....In human society...belief matters most.[2]

A. Prologue

Purpose

Nikolai Ivanovich Kostomarov, Ukrainian historian and political thinker, has been called "one of the chief theoreticians of the Ukrainian national renaissance."[3] When he began his academic career, Ukrainian history was an entirely new field.[4] What little historiography there was, was based on poor scholarship and fantastic presuppositions and was generally in chaos.[4] Relying almost entirely on

---

[1] T.G. Masaryk in Draga B. Shillinglaw, *The Lectures of Professor T.G. Masaryk at the University of Chicago, Summer 1902* (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1978), 113.
[2] William H. McNeill, *Mythistory and Other Essays* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 12, 28.
[3] Dennis Papazian, "Nicholas Ivanovich Kostomarov: Russian Historian, Ukrainian Nationalist, Slavic Federalist" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1966), 5.
[4] F.D. Nikolaichik et al., "Pamiati N.I. Kostomarova," *Kievskaia starina*, Vol. XII (May, 1885): xxx.

original sources, Kostomarov originated the practice of historical scholarship in Ukraine,[5] though it should be noted he made significant contributions to purely Russian and Polish historiography as well.[6] He is rightly recognized as one of Ukraine's most important historians and as a pioneer in the development of East Slavic thought as a whole.[7]

Kostomarov's writings, polemical and publicistic as well as scholarly, are diverse and voluminous and no single work of this nature could ever hope to analyze all of them. This thesis, for its part, will investigate how Kostomarov developed a view of Ukrainian history which was in tune with the national awakening. Kostomarov's claim that democracy and federalism are inherent Ukrainian national characteristics and that Kievan Rus' was a Ukrainian-centred democratic federation and thus Ukraine's -- not Russia's -- medieval ancestor will be critically analyzed within the context of its role as national myth. It will become increasingly clear that while he saw himself as explaining historical phenomena in a scholarly and objective way, he was instead idealizing them -- creating an "organic tie of history with politics and journalism"[8] -- and in the process

---

[5] Dmytro Doroshenko, "A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography," *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U. S.*, V, No. 4 (1957): 145.

[6] Papazian, 357.

[7] A. Markevich, "Kostomarov, Nikolai Ivanovich," *Russkii biograficheskii slovar'*, Vol. IX (St. Petersburg, 1903), 316.

[8] M.A. Rubach, "Federalisticheskie teorii v istorii Rossii," *Russkaia istoricheskaia literatura v klassovom osveshchenii*, Vol. II (Moscow, 1930), 24.

laying the initial theoretical groundwork for Ukrainian unity and future national statehood.

Academic Biography

Kostomarov was born in Iurasovka village, Ostrogozhsk district, Voronezh province, on May 14, 1817 (o.s.) to a landowning family.[9] At the age of ten, he was sent to a boarding school in Moscow but he returned to Voronezh to graduate from the gymnasium (high school) there.[10] At nineteen, Kostomarov entered the military in his home district. In addition to learning the art of soldiering, he spent a great deal of time examining the Ostrogozhsk regiment's archives. He took to this task with such intensity and enthusiasm that he neglected his other obligations and, as a result, he was released outright from the service and declared "unfit for military duty." This turn of events is said to have "sent him on the road to scholarly activity."[11]

In 1838, Kostomarov graduated with a Bachelor's degree from the University of Kharkiv. In 1842, he submitted for approval his first Master's thesis, entitled "O znachenii Unii v Zapadnoi Rossii [On the significance of the Church Union in Western Russia]." The thesis was rejected by the Minister of Education, Count Uvarov, because of strong

---

[9] Doroshenko, 132.
[10] A. Kostomarova, "Nikolai Ivanovich Kostomarov: biograficheskii ocherk," *Sobranie sochinenii N.I. Kostomarova* [SS], Book I, v.
[11] Nikolaichik et al., iii.

opposition to it from the local clergy. In 1844, Kostomarov submitted another thesis, this one entitled "Ob istoricheskom znachenii russkoi narodnoi poezii [On the historical significance of Russian folk poetry]." Both its unique subject matter (as non-statist historiography) and its novel research methodology (Kostomarov frequented country taverns to collect his songs and poems) raised the eyebrows of his conservative examination committee, but the thesis was eventually approved and Kostomarov finally received his Master's degree that year.[12]

In the Imperial Russian academic circles of the nineteenth century, Kostomarov's "novelty and originality," as exhibited in his two theses, were impediments rather than aids to a career in the field. Many of his colleagues and professors thought him strange[13] and, at first, he obtained only the relatively minor position of a teaching post at the gymnasium in Rivne (this was when Kostomarov actually learned to speak Ukrainian).[14] It was not until 1846 that he became an adjunct professor of history at St. Vladimir University in Kiev. Then, disaster struck: Kostomarov was implicated in the activities of the pan-Slavic and democratic-federative Cyrillo-Methodian Society.[15] He was arrested

---

[12] Doroshenko, 132-133. See also V.I. Semevskii, N.I. Kostomarov, 1817-1885," *Russkaia starina*, Vol. 49 (January, 1886): 182ff., and Kostomarova, vi.

[13] Nikolaichik et al., iv.

[14] Semevskii, 186.

[15] See P.A. Zaionchkovskii, *Kirillo-Mefodievskoe obshchestvo, 1846-1847* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1959), and M.S. Vozniak, *Kyrylo-Metodiivs'ke bratstvo* (L'viv: Fond "Uchitesia braty moi", 1921).

and deported to Saratov but academically this was not time wasted. As secretary of the local Statistical Committee, he gathered songs, studied town archives, acquainted himself with the region, and generally prepared materials for his subsequent scholarly endeavours. Upon release by the new tsar, Alexander II, in 1856, his new freedom "did not catch Kostomarov unaware," and in 1857, a whole series of scholarly writings began to appear, the first being a monograph of the Ukrainian hetman, Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi.'[16]

That same year, Kostomarov travelled much of Europe but still did not obtain an academic position. He returned to his homeland and, because of the good reputation gained from his early post-exile works, he was invited to teach Russian history at St. Petersburg University. Here, he came into his own as a historian. He was a gifted orator and his lectures were exceptionally well attended. In 1862, the university was closed for a long time because of student unrest, causing Kostomarov to quit teaching entirely. He received an honourary doctorate in 1864,[17] but from then on he occupied himself exclusively with private study, remaining academically productive until his death in 1885.[18]

---

[16] Nikolaichik et al., v-vi.
[17] *Ibid.*, xxvi.
[18] *Ibid.*, v-vi, and Kostomarova, ix-xiii.

B. Medieval History as a Basis for Legitimacy

A Common Historical Heritage

Events and circumstances in the Middle Ages have often been used by peoples to legitimize modern political claims and aspirations. Under such influences as the French Revolution and the writings of Johann Gottfried Herder,[19] the submerged nationalities of Central and Eastern Europe began to turn to their own past, to appropriate their medieval heritage, so to speak, in order to "use it as a basis for drawing up a plan for the future."[20] The Poles in the nineteenth century claimed, for instance, that any new independent Polish state should encompass all the territories of medieval Poland, including many which were not ethnically Polish such as Belorussia and western Ukraine. Claims of this nature have not, in fact, ceased to this day in some Polish circles. Demands for Czech unity in the last century were also based on the existence of Bohemian and Moravian kingdoms in the Middle Ages. There is also the more directly relevant example of Kievan Rus' being used as the foundation for claims of both an independent Ukraine and a Russian Empire controlling all of East Slavdom, including Ukraine (proving that imperial powers were just as willing to tailor and use medieval history as were the nationalities they ruled). There are countless

---

[19] See below, Chapter IV, 79-81.
[20] John F.N. Bradley, *Czech Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1984), 1-3.

other examples of peoples, be they the rulers or the ruled, appropriating some aspect, real or imagined, of their medieval past as grounds for contemporary actions or beliefs.[21]

A people's feeling that it possesses a common historical heritage is fundamental to the development of national consciousness. A nationally conscious people considers itself

> ....a brotherhood born among those who have grown and suffered together, of individuals who can pool their memories under a succession of common historical experiences. ...the "alien" elements that debase and denaturalize men are defined as everything that does not spring directly from the consciousness and will of the subjected community.[22]

More importantly, such a feeling of "cohesion and distinctiveness" among a people "must have acquired at least a minimum of importance in the lives of individuals."[23]

The Czechs

This sense of oneness, especially in its inclusion of the Middle Ages, did not of course arise on its own. Literature in general and historiography in particular played key roles in formulating a nationalist ideology among the submerged peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. František Palacký's (1798-1876) monumental *The History of*

---

[21] See Ludvik Nemec, "The Pattern in the Historical Roots of Church-State Relationship in Central and Eastern Europe," *East European Quarterly*, Vol. XX, No. 1 (Spring, 1986): 4-5.
[22] Anthony D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 23.
[23] Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966), 173-174.

the Czech Nation in Bohemia and Moravia, the first volume of which appeared in 1836, is among the most noteworthy and well-known of such historiography. According to one author, it "proved to be the final act in the process by which the Czechs rediscovered their national identity."[24] Another goes even further, saying that "while in most countries historical study accompanied the revival of national feeling, in Bohemia it created it."[25] Histories such as Palacký's had the vital ability to permeate mass consciousness and create a feeling of national solidarity transcending class divisions:

> ...even the most abstract and academic historiographical ideas do trickle down to the level of the commonplace, if they fit both what a people want to hear and what a people need to know well enough to be useful.[26]

That Palacký was a scholar of the first rank is beyond question. Nonetheless, he was quite aware that whatever he wrote had to have popular appeal sufficient both to captivate and to enlighten all the Czech people. As an adherent to the Romantic stream of Czech nationalism, Palacký, though "[tempered] by a tolerant humanism," spent a great deal of his creative energy glorifying national history and folklore.[27] In other words, Palacký wrote with a definite practical purpose in mind and his work, scholarly as it was, was a perfect example of "blending history with

---

[24] A.H. Hermann, *A History of the Czechs* (London: Allen Lane, 1975), 94.
[25] G.P. Gooch quoted in Bradley, 9.
[26] McNeill, 22.
[27] Hermann, 93.

ideology." He wrote history which did not in the first instance concern itself with seeking perfect objectivity but rather which made the Czech people feel good about themselves as a nationality.

Palacký idealized the Czech Reformation of the fifteenth century, providing his audience with a sense that this was their Golden Age -- a model on which to base their unity and their plans for an independent national state. For the Czechs as for others, the Golden Age was absolutely fundamental to acquiring a national consciousness:

> ...nationalism may be described as the myth of the historical renovation. Rediscovering in the depths of the communal past a pristine state of true collective individuality, the nationalist strives to realize in strange and oppressive conditions the spirit and values of that distant Golden Age.[20]

"Of course," Smith adds, "the community of the future will not replicate the Golden Age but will recapture its spirit and set man free to be himself."[21]

It is on this basis, idealizing some aspect of the medieval past and using this idealization, this myth, as a social cement and subsequently as a fount for future independent national statehood, that Palacký wrote his nation's history.

---

[20] Smith, 22.
[21] *Ibid.*, 23.

C. Kostomarov as Mythmaker

Ukraine's Palacký

The process by which each of the submerged nationalities of Central and Eastern Europe acquired a national consciousness was remarkably similar:

> In examining the developments in the first half of the nineteenth century, it will be found that over and above the natural diversity of the realities and situations in each part of Europe, there were convergent lines in the manner in which the nations concerned went about attaining their objective, viz.: the formation of national states of their own.[30]

For this reason, it is possible to consider Kostomarov's role in awakening the national consciousness of his people as very similar to Palacký's, though it should be noted that the latter actually played an active political, as well as scholarly, role in his country's march towards independence. Kostomarov is less well known than his Czech counterpart but his respective contribution is no less significant. He, too, attempted to captivate and enlighten his Ukrainian audience with his many writings. He painted a positive picture of Ukrainians (and a correspondingly negative one of Great Russians), encouraging them to take pride in their democratic-federative heritage and in their national mission of preserving it. He hearkened back to the Ukrainian Golden Age -- Kievan Rus' -- and left no doubt that a future Russia

---

[30] Dinu C. Giurescu, "Landmarks in the Building of European National States in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century," *East European Quarterly*, Vol. XX, No. 1 (Spring, 1986): 5.

would do well to emulate such a shining example of political attitude and organization. All in all, each historian in a sense appropriated his respective country's history. Kostomarov's task was perhaps more difficult in this regard because Russia had already claimed Kievan Rus' as her own, but each provided his people with a sense that their collective existence had a long, proud history and that henceforth pride in this heritage would be a force with which to be reckoned.

Ideology

Kostomarov's conception of history in general and of Kievan Rus' in particular may be understood only within the context of his political ideology. He saw Rus' as he wanted to see it, idealistically, the way it would have had to have been to suit his democratic-federative and nationalist ideology.[31]

This ideology can be discerned in the Cyrillo-Methodian Society's program, the *Knyhy buttia ukrains'koho narodu*, also known as the *Zakon Bozhyi*, which Kostomarov is strongly suspected of having written. It advocated the federation of all Slavic peoples in a democratic state.[32] This democratic-federative position was based on two psychological

---

[31] Rubach, 24.

[32] For a detailed analysis of the Society's program, see Georges Luciani, *Le livre de la genèse du peuple ukrainien* (Paris: Institut d'études slaves de l'Université de Paris, 1956). For a discussion of the Society's membership and an English translation of the *Zakon Bozhyi*, see Papazian, 113ff.

motivations. One was his optimistic view of human nature. Kostomarov envisioned people living in brotherhood; this is why he loved the Cossack period, especially the Zaporizhian Cossacks, with their communal existence and their emphasis on democratically chosen leaders.[33] This is also why he had no trouble seeing Rus' the way he did, with its own supposed democratic-federative element: he wanted to believe that people could and did live this way.[34] The second psychological motivation was ethnocentrism, which necessarily limited his optimism. The boundaries of his vision of brotherhood, as it appeared in the Cyrillo-Methodians' program, were coterminous with those of Slavdom. Kostomarov was not an internationalist;[35] he was a pan-Slavist with many beliefs similar to those of the Great Russian Slavophiles, the future historical mission of the Slavs and especially of the East Slavs being among the most prominent of these.[36] It should be noted, however, that because of his federalist theories and his Ukrainian particularism, Slavophiles certainly did not consider him one of their number.[37]

---

[33] Doroshenko, 143.
[34] Markevich, 316.
[35] It should be noted that Palacký was an internationalist who called for a "federation of Austrian nations." He saw the multinationality of Austria as a microcosm of the world and in that sense, hoped for a future democratic federation of all peoples, based not on "historical kingdoms but rather [on] nations as ethnographic wholes." See Shillinglaw, 102-104.
[36] Markevich, 313.
[37] This is evident in Kostomarov's correspondence with K. Aksakov, for example. *Ibid.*, 317.

Kostomarov's ethnocentrism was based on the Slavs as a whole, but on Ukrainians in particular, especially in the latter's role, as he saw it, as trustees of the Slavic democratic-federative tradition. Seeing the Slavs and the Ukrainians this way gave Kostomarov's political ideology a historical basis and ensured that he did not have to invoke Western ideas in calling for the liberalization of Russian political life, including Ukrainian national autonomy.[32] He approached all his work "from the point of view of a republican and a democrat,"[33] and being a typical product of the Romantic Age, he had no trouble seeking, and finding, a Golden Age of democracy and federalism, this being the Kievan period.[34]

Kostomarov denied that his desire to see the Russian Empire reconstituted along democratic-federative lines had any effect on his objectivity.[35] He considered himself to be a spiritual disciple of the eighteenth century Russian historian, V.F. Miller, who said that the historian has no allegiances -- "no fatherland, no faith, no sovereign" --

---

[32] Kostomarov was critical of the Great Russian Slavophiles, saying that the idea of freeing the serfs did not come from within Russia or the Orthodox Church, but from the West, especially France. See N.I. Kostomarov, "Po povodu knigi M.O. Koialovicha: 'Istoriia russkogo samosoznaniia po istoricheskim pamiatnikam i nauchnym sochineniiam,' 1884 g.," *Naukovo-publitsystychni i polemichni pysannia* [*NPPP*], ed. M. Hrushevs'kyi (Kiev: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo Ukrainy, 1928), 309. See also L.K. Polukhin, *Formuvannia istorychnykh pohliadiv M.I. Kostomarova* (Kiev: Akademiia nauk URSR, 1959), 59-62.

[33] Doroshenko, 142-143.

[34] Papazian, 309, 407.

[35] N.I. Kostomarov, "Zamechanie g. Lokhvitskomu," *NPPP*, 282.

and that his only task is to search for historical truth.[42] Nonetheless, his work was imbued with an obvious longing for the principles of medieval *veche* democracy and apanage federalism, which he felt reappeared in a somewhat different form in the Cossack state:

> In the spirit of the political ideas of the Cyrillo-Methodian Brotherhood, which had as its ideal a future Slavic state of a federal-republican structure, Kostomarov emphasized these propensities for popular sovereignty [*narodovlastia*] and federalism in the Ukrainian people's past and saw them in full bloom in the life of Kievan Rus', in the entire pre-Mongol period, and later among the Cossacks.[43]

As outright political activity was not an option open to Kostomarov, it is not surprising that he took to academia, this being the only safe way he could have espoused his ideological position.[44]

Kostomarov's political ideology was very much a form of opposition to the tsarist government. It advocated democratization and federalization of the Russian Empire, but it was not socio-politically based, as was, for example, Alexander Herzen's.[45] Seeing his ideals as inherent in the submerged Ukrainian people, Kostomarov's work, if not always accepted as scientifically sound by his contemporaries, had the potential of lending an air of scholarly legitimacy to

---

[42] "Po povodu knigi M.O. Koialovicha," 308.
[43] Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, "Ukrains'ka istoriografiia i Mykola Kostomarov," *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, Book V, Vol. L (May, 1910): 220.
[44] Rubach, 23-24.
[45] See Martin Malia, *Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1965), vii, 3, 399, 402.

claims of a Ukrainian nation as distinct from, and equal to, the Great Russian. His opposition was thus nationally based.[46] He considered himself politically harmless in scoffing at "official" interpretations of Russian history, i.e., those focussing on the rise of the Russian state, but his own position could conceivably elevate Ukrainian national consciousness, based on a political scheme antithetical to the Russian system existing in the nineteenth century. National opposition was not politically harmless, as the tsarist administration was well aware; it was dangerous -- the Polish uprising of 1830-31 was clear evidence of that. It was with good reason, as Hrushevs'kyi notes, that the government acted as it did towards him.[47]

Historiographical Method

Kostomarov's early-formed interest in ethnography, as well as his optimistic view of human nature, lay at the basis of all his work.[48] In response to Russian and Polish statist historiography and within the context of the Romantic focus on *Volksgeist* and "the people," Kostomarov was among the first of East Slavic historians to assert that studying nationalities was equally valid to studying states. History was nothing if it was not an attempt to understand

---

[46] N.L. Rubinshtain, *Russkaia istoriografiia* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1941), 423.
[47] Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, "Kostomarov i novitnia Ukraina," *Ukraina*, Book III (1925): 5.
[48] A.N. Pypin, *Istoriia russkoi etnografii*, Vol. III: *Etnografiia malorusskaia* (St. Petersburg, 1891), 158-159.

the "psychology of the people,"[49] and in this sense, said Kostomarov, "ethnography should generally go hand in hand with history."[50] This de-emphasis of statist historiography was well-suited to the Ukrainian situation in that the Ukrainians, like the Czechs and others, possessed no state of their own. It was only natural that nationally conscious historians of the submerged nationalities would turn to their own people as a focus of study and idealization. They simply had no other choice.

Most historical questions broached by Kostomarov were decided within the context of ethnographic determinism.[51] In other words, he tried to explain every historical phenomenon by saying that it was the result of the nationalities of the peoples involved. This approach served him particularly well in comparing the Ukrainians to the Great Russians. The latter, he said, were predisposed to monocracy and autocracy; the former, to voluntary association and personal freedom.[52] This is not to say that Kostomarov necessarily considered one nationality morally superior to the other. Each had its role to play in Slavdom, its mission to accomplish, so to speak. The Russians built a powerful state while the Ukrainians were to retain and pass on the ancient

---

[49] Markevich, 313.
[50] N.I. Kostomarov, "Ob otnoshenii russkoi istorii k geografii i etnografii," *SS*, Book I, Vol. III, 724.
[51] Rubinshtain, 429.
[52] See S.M. Stanislavskaia, "Istoricheskie vzgliady N.I. Kostomarova," *Ocherki istorii istoricheskoi nauki v SSSR* II, ed. M.V. Nechkina et al. (Moscow: Akademiia nauk SSSR, 1960), 132-135, 146.

Slavic characteristics of democracy and federalism. Kostomarov even praised the former's achievements and noted that the individualistic Ukrainians were likely to remain forever stateless if they did not join (i.e., federalize on the basis of equal to equal) with a more disciplined nationality such as the Great Russian. By outlining the propensities and contributions of each nationality in its own right, irrespective of whether it possessed a state, Kostomarov placed them on an equivalent footing and thus justified his claim that the Ukrainians were as worthy of scholarly consideration as were the Great Russians.

This ethnographic framework had many weaknesses.[53] In his effort to flatter and idealize the common people, he conveniently overlooked how passive their role in history really was. He liked to think that they were responsible for making history but his conclusions were decidedly otherwise. The best example of this is his explanation of how the Mongol invasion affected the rise of Russian autocracy.[54] Simply put, if national propensities are inherent in a people, this should be sufficient to explain why the Great Russians developed autocracy: it was in their nature to do so. But his claims to the contrary notwithstanding, Kostomarov knew this was not enough to explain its rise. This was why he turned to the Mongol invasion as a scapegoat

---

[53] Kostomarov's methodological problems will be discussed here only insofar as they affected his task of legitimizing the Ukrainian nationality. For a more complete analysis, see Rubinshtain, 428-431, and Papazian, 336ff.

[54] This problem is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. See also Rubach, 35-43.

for the difference between democracy and autocracy, between federalism and monocracy, and most importantly between the Ukrainian-centred past and the Russian-centred present. Yet this was precisely the sort of statist explanation for historical causation which Kostomarov had set out to debunk in the first place. He knew the "people" had played little part in transforming ancient freedom to modern despotism and he was forced to look to external elements to buttress his position.[55] Clearly, even in his own mind, the ethnographic plan was found to be sorely lacking.

While ethnographic determinism may have had a limited value in explaining certain historical phenomena, it came at the expense of all other forms of analysis, especially the social and economic. Such omission is not surprising since Kostomarov was far more concerned with conveying a positive impression of Ukrainians, to both themselves and others, than he was with giving an objectively correct interpretation of the past. Looking at the effect of class differences in medieval institutions, for instance, made for a more complete historical picture but emphasized division instead of unity among a people. It lacked the idealized flattery necessary to "awaken the interest of the reader," which was, according to Kostomarov, an essential part of the historian's task.[56]

The timeliness of Kostomarov's approach is not to be underestimated:

---

[55] Papazian, 343, and Rubinshtain, 430-431.
[56] Papazian, 407.

> Groups struggling--towards self-consciousness...are likely to demand (and get) vivid, simplified portraits of their admirable virtues and undeserved sufferings.[57]

After all, Kostomarov felt, what use were dry facts, true as they may be, if no one read them or worse yet if no one believed them? Moreover, if no one believed them, how could they be expected to serve any practical purpose in inculcating national consciousness or in spurring the people on to any sort of unified stand or action?

Kostomarov wrote what Carl L. Becker has called "living history" -- history written with the idea of enhancing a certain popular understanding of the past, of mythologizing its useful aspects, rather than of contributing to an objective understanding of it.[58] This is clearly evident Kostomarov's statement: "If a certain historical fact did not take place, but there exists the belief and conviction that it did, then for me it remains as an important historical fact."[59] This summarizes well his approach to seeking a Golden Age of democracy and federalism in Ukraine's past, a time when "the Rus' people lived according to their own original principles of life..."[60] If Ukrainians as a group **believed** that this was their medieval heritage and were made to feel proud that it was, this would cement social relations and lay the emotional foundation for any possible future collective political action. The perception

---

[57] McNeill, 13.
[58] Papazian, 414.
[59] G.F. Karpov quoting Kostomarov in *Ibid.*, 405.
[60] Markevich, 313.

was sufficient to serve the ideology, and since truth and ideology do not always make compatible bedfellows,

> Grubby details indicating that the group fell short of its ideals can be skated over or omitted entirely. The result is mythical: the past as [a group wants] it to be, safely simplified into a contest between good guys and bad guys, "us" and "them."[41]

As McNeill adds, "...we cannot afford to reject collective self-flattery as silly contemptible error. Myths are, after all, self-validating."

D. Kostomarov as Historian

Kostomarov's primary task of mythologizing Ukraine's medieval heritage naturally left him vulnerable to accusations, made by both contemporaries and latter-day analysts, that he was weak as a pure scholar. He has been criticised for the "slipshod generalizations and outright errors one is able to find in his works," providing "grounds for considering his writings superficial."[42] S.M. Solov'ev spoke of the "subjectivity" of Kostomarov's method,[43] while P. Polevoi was much more harsh in stating that he had no respect for Kostomarov as a "historian-researcher" or as a "historian-critic" and that Kostomarov had absolutely no insight into human nature.[44] The Soviets have, of course, concentrated on Kostomarov's lack of class-based

---

[41] McNeill, 12-13.
[42] Anatole G. Mazour, *Modern Russian Historiography*, rev. ed. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975), 171-172.
[43] Rubinshtain, 439.
[44] P. Polevoi, "Istorik-idealist," *Istoricheskii vestnik*, Vol. 43 (1891): 507.

analysis.[15] Others have been more generous, recognizing his scholarly shortcomings, but complimenting him for his "excellence of style," his abilities as a "historian-artist,"[16] and his original contribution to East Slavic historiography.[17]

Kostomarov claimed to be scholarly and objective in his approach, it is true, and while it is easy to prove that he did not live up to his pronouncements, it is reasonable to think that he saw himself that way. If seeking historical objectivity were simply a matter of telling the whole truth, then he may well have said that by focussing on the heretofore ignored Ukrainian nationality he was contributing to a greater objective understanding of Russia as a whole. Still, his method was weak because he believed *a priori* what he had not yet proven. Pieter Geyl's criticism of Albert Sorel is germane here:

> The thesis so dear to the writer, so often repeated and explained from different angles, has certainly not been proven. His work does indeed provide us with a striking example of the historian who approaches history with his opinions already made and who seeks only those facts necessary to support them.[18]

Kostomarov used an "abundance of documentary evidence in his writings" but he "used them in a literary, psychological, subjective way, not with a concern for scientific

---

[15] See, for instance, Rubach, 65-67, Stanislavskaia, 129ff., and Polukhin, 98-99.
[16] Pypin, 159-162.
[17] Rubinshtain, 433.
[18] Pieter Geyl, *Napoleon: For and Against* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1949), 244.

exactitude."[69] The result was a "romanticised narrative of the past that must disclaim any pretense to scientific research."[70] It was deficient, "not in value, to be sure, but in solidity."[71]

Ultimately, however, Kostomarov must be judged as a historian in terms of his own stated purpose, which was to awaken his readers and add a new dimension to the study of history in Russia. In this he succeeded, undoubtedly far more than he had ever hoped. He was indeed a trailblazer at a time when trailblazing was important to historical scholarship. Even if they disagreed with him vehemently, other historians were forced at least to answer Kostomarov's assertions and henceforth to consider, whether positively or negatively, the so-called "federalist school"[72] of Russian historiography:

> ...his voluminous writings stirred deep interest in a field of history that had been formerly de-emphasized if not entirely neglected by Great Russian writers who generally included the Ukraine as a mere annex of Moscow.[73]

That the Ukrainian national movement ever took place and that the Ukrainians are today considered to be a nationality in their own right must be attributed in no small part to the early foundations laid by Kostomarov's contributions, both to historical scholarship and, as a result, to the Ukrainian national myth.

---

[69] Papazian, 404.
[70] Mazour, 172.
[71] Raymond Guyot and Pierre Muret on Sorel in Geyl, 244.
[72] Mazour's term.
[73] Mazour, 171-172.

II. Democracy

A. Introduction

According to Kostomarov, the democratic principle is inherent in all Slavic peoples. Like all other national characteristics, it formed very early in history as a result of geography and "living historical circumstances," i.e., interaction with other peoples.[1] Slavs did not tolerate absolutism, were not very good at building states, and were inordinate "natural" lovers of freedom. At first, all Slavs lived in small communes or republics and it was only because of dissension that they allowed themselves to be subjugated by other peoples.[2] The East Slavic tribes knew no tsars or lords, but from the Germanic peoples (*nemtsi*) they accepted kingship, lordship, and subjection, and consequently fell under the suzerainty of their neighbours. Those remaining independent were Poland (with its large number of Ukrainians), Lithuania (with an absolute majority of Ukrainians and Belorussians), and Muscovy.[3] Among these peoples, only the Ukrainians kept the "old true Slavic order" in its purity, cleansing and enlightening it with Christianity, and preserving its legacy through the ages.[4]

---

[1] N.I. Kostomarov, "Dve russkiia narodnosti," *SS*, Book I, Vol. I, 33.
[2] N.I. Kostomarov, "Nachalo edinoderzhaviia v drevnei Rusi," *SS*, Book V, Vol. XIII (St. Petersburg, 1904), 5.
[3] See Hrushevs'kyi, "Kostomarov i novitnia Ukraina," 6.
[4] *Ibid.*, 6, 11.

Every East Slavic branch could not similarly preserve this democratic tendency. Invasions, foreign tribal influences, and other historical circumstances caused it to die among certain of them, notably the Great Russians, and gave them another role in history -- that of building a strong, centralized state. This fundamental dichotomy of the Ukrainian democratic-federative nation versus the Great Russian monocratic-autocratic state, being two forces in constant opposition to each other, was the basis of Kostomarov's view of East Slavic history.[5] Based on this dichotomy, he divided this history into two periods, "each different from the other in political and social structure": the first was apanage-*veche* Rus', which interestingly included the entire pre-Mongol period; the second was monocratic Rus', which began with the Mongol onslaught and continued in Russia to Kostomarov's own day.[6] The former had its centre in South Rus', i.e., Ukrainian lands, while the latter was based in the north-east, i.e., in Great Russian lands. The Mongol invasion provided a convenient dividing line between the Ukrainian-based past, the Golden Age of freedom and democracy, and Kostomarov's own present -- the Great Russian-based age of oppression and autocracy.

In the apanage-*veche* period, he said, democracy was "at the basis of political life" in Rus'.[7] Each Land (*Zemlia*),

---

[5] Rubach, 27.
[6] N.I. Kostomarov, "O znachenii Velikago Novgoroda v russkoi istorii," *SS*, Book I, Vol. I, 199.
[7] Hrushevs'kyi, "Ukrains'ka istoriografiia i Mykola Kostomarov," 221.

or region, had royal leaders, *knlaz'la*, but these were not sovereigns. The people of a Land were sovereign, and they met in a loosely-organized, open-air assembly known as a *veche* to manifest their sovereign authority by electing their *knlaz'la* and by making other political decisions:

> Where there was a Land, there was a *veche*, and where there was a *veche*, there certainly was a *knlaz'*: the *veche* had elected him. The Land was an authority unto itself; the *veche* was the expression of this authority, and the *knlaz'* — its organ.[8]

Both the *veche* and the *knlaz'* will be examined in turn.

B. Elements of Democracy

The *Veche*

It is important to note that Kostomarov defined democracy in its political sense: popular participation in matters of state. The extent to which the broad masses participated in the royal authority's decision-making process is the extent to which Kostomarov asserted that democracy existed in Rus'. The vehicle of such participation was the *veche*.

Kostomarov claimed that the *veche* had existed from time immemorial. When the Varangians were "invited" to make order in Rus' lands,[9] they did not try to destroy this "fundamental manifestation of Slavic-Rus' life," but

---

[8] "Nachalo edinoderzhaviia," 26.

[9] Kostomarov accepts this legendary "invitation" virtually uncritically. See N.I. Kostomarov, "Tysiacheletie," *NPPP*, 128-129.

concentrated instead on collecting tribute. The Varangians did not interfere in the day-to-day affairs of the Rus' people. This, combined with the civilizing influence of Christianity, enabled the *veche* principle eventually to become predominant.[10]

Although the *veche* was equally important throughout Rus', Kostomarov said, it was never the same in any two places. This was supposedly because Slavs did not like "exact forms."[11] The *veche* was not of a precise and legalistic nature; it was simply a semi-formal gathering for people to voice their opinions on matters of the day.[12] There were no recorded votes, no fixed number of delegates, nor any of the other paraphernalia normally associated with modern-day legislative assemblies.

The "eternal rule" of the *veche* principle was most evident in Novgorod and Pskov, which Kostomarov called the "north-Rus' democracies" (*severnorusskiia narodopravstva*), and to which an entire volume of his collected works is devoted.[13] Novgorod, whose inhabitants Kostomarov considered to be far closer ethnically to the Ukrainians than to the Great Russians,[14] represented the character of the apanage-*veche* structure "more clearly and fully" than any

---

[10] "Nachalo edinoderzhaviia," 17.
[11] *Ibid.*, 20.
[12] *Ibid.*, 37-38.
[13] Note that with an eye on the censor, according to Hrushevs'kyi, Kostomarov called them "democracies" instead of "republics." See N.I. Kostomarov, "Severnorusskiia narodopravstva vo vremena udel'no vechevogo uklada," *SS*, Book III, Vols. VII and VIII (St. Petersburg, 1904).
[14] "Dve russkiia narodnosti," 43.

other Rus' land.'[15] Kostomarov denied that proximity to, and trade with, Germanic peoples brought Novgorod any closer to the West, "morally" or otherwise,'[16] but because it was never occupied or invaded by the Mongols (though it was under Mongol suzerainty), it gained the time and the isolation to develop into a free city-state with its own indigenous political system, comparable to contemporary Venice and Genoa. All Novgorod's autonomy, Kostomarov said, relied upon the *veche*. Here, as everywhere in Rus', this body did not begin as something "distinctive and legalistic," but for the reasons given above, it eventually did evolve into a "legally recognized [*pravosoznatel'noe*] popular assembly."'[17] The Novgorodian *veche* was much more of an official gathering than that of any other Rus' land. Nonetheless,

> Anyone could summon the *veche*. Doing so meant...placing a matter before the judgement of the people and therefore everyone who considered himself within his rights to speak before the people could summon the *veche*.'[18]

The Novgorod *veche* was summoned by ringing a special bell in the town square. Significantly, the Muscovite grand duke, Ivan III the Great, finally subjugated Novgorod to Moscow's centralized authority in the fifteenth century by arms, to be sure, but also symbolically, by removing this bell. In fact, Kostomarov commented, "...when the monocratic order

---

[15] "O znachenii Velikago Novgoroda," 202.
[16] See *Ibid.*, 212.
[17] "Severnorusskiia narodopravstva," *SS*, Book III, Vol. VIII, 252-253.
[18] *Ibid.*, 253.

began to gain ascendancy, the notion of the *veche* became a notion of treason..."[19]

Kostomarov wrote a great deal about the Novgorodian *veche* because he had more information on it than on any other *veche* in Rus'. Its functions included making administrative decisions, confirming agreements with foreign powers made by its *knlaz'*, declaring war, concluding peace, electing *knlaz'ia*, appointing archbishops, supervising the assembly of troops and generally overseeing the defence of the country (*strany*), owning land, assigning commercial rights, and passing other laws and regulations. It was a lawmaking authority, but it presented itself as a juridical authority as well, especially in "matters pertaining to the infringement of community laws [*obshchestvennykh prav*]."[20] In theory, all had the right to participate in the *veche*:

> All citizens, the rich and the poor, the *bolare* and the broad masses [*chernye liudi*], had the right to be at the *veche* as active members. Qualifications did not exist.[21]

Although Kostomarov claimed there were no legal estates or class distinctions (*sosloviia*) in Novgorod,[22] he admitted the inevitable influence of the wealthy on the city-state's social and political affairs and, therefore, on *veche* proceedings. He was also aware that, practically speaking, only the inhabitants of Novgorod proper participated in the

---

[19] *Ibid.*
[20] *Ibid.*, 254.
[21] *Ibid.*
[22] Kostomarov made a series of his own class distinctions for Novgorod. See *Ibid.*, 244-252.

Novgorod Land's *veche*: the bell was only so loud, effectively disenfranchising a significant number of rural citizens. Nonetheless, he emphasized his belief that all classes could and did take part in *veche* affairs. "As far as the broad masses are concerned, their participation is beyond doubt..."[23]

As mentioned above, the *veche* itself was not sovereign -- the people were; the *veche* was but an expression of the people's sovereignty, said Kostomarov. This distinction is comparable to the difference between the modern British and American theories of government. In the former, Parliament, composed of the Commons, the Lords, and the Crown, is itself sovereign. Although the Commons are elected, authority theoretically flows downward from Parliament to the people. The latter, based on the French model, is a republic in which the national representative body, the Congress, is not sovereign; it is merely a manifestation of the sovereignty of the whole people, from whom all authority theoretically derives and flows upward to the government. Kostomarov's conception of sovereignty in Kievan Rus' closely resembled the French-American model and reflected his father's insistence that he read the French *philosophes*, especially Rousseau, and become a free thinker along those lines.[24] The *veche* represented the legislative manifestation of popular sovereignty, while the *knіaz'*, the *veche*'s "organ," embodied the supreme executive power. Especially in Novgorod, but

---

[23] *Ibid.*, 254.
[24] Markevich, 305.

throughout all Rus', according to Kostomarov,

> With the word *veche* was connected the mechanism of independence and civic freedom. The *veche* was an indication of the existence of a Land conscious of its autonomy...[25]

This democratic view of sovereignty and of the *veche*'s role in apanage-*veche* Rus' was well-suited indeed to Kostomarov's political ideology.

The *Kniaz'*

The popular will of the *veche* went hand in hand with that of the royal power, the *kniaz'*. Just as there had supposedly always been *vecha* in Rus', there had always been *kniaz'ia*, too. Kostomarov was not certain about the genesis of this princely authority: in one place, he postulated that the *kniaz'ia* may have been elected from time immemorial,[26] but elsewhere he doubted this[27] and said their prototypes were probably clan patriarchs.[28] Eventually, they somehow (it is not clear how) came under the control and scrutiny of their respective *vecha*.

Kostomarov, as noted above, said the Varangians were "invited" to rule over Rus' because of the lack of order in the realm.[29] The *Riurikovichi* -- the scions of Riurik, the legendary founder of the Rus' royal dynasty -- thereupon

---

[25] "O znachenii Velikago Novgoroda," 202.
[26] "Nachalo edinoderzhaviia," 7.
[27] M.I. Kostomarov, *Istoryia Ukrainy v zhytiepysiakh vyznachniishykh iei diiachiv*, trans. O. Barvins'kyi (L'viv: Knyharnia Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka, 1918), 40.
[28] "Nachalo edinoderzhaviia," 7.
[29] *Ibid.*, 26.

gained the right to be recognized as *kniaz'ia* in the various Lands.[30] Kostomarov was inconsistent in discussing the relationship between *kniaz'* and *veche*. The two were interdependent, but it is not always clear which he thought had greater relative authority and freedom of action. Sometimes, Kostomarov was characteristically idealistic, such as when he claimed, "The will of the living people, as in everything, stood higher than any law [*pravo*] and even higher than any custom."[31] In Novgorod, the *kniaz'* was especially subject to *veche* authority, he said. The *kniaz'* was "an arbitrator, not a part of the community but designated by it, he could not act independently of the will and participation of the *veche*."[32] At other times, Kostomarov was much more the political scientist, more detached and realistic:

> ...as to the *kniaz'ia*, the people of Rus' felt that there existed two rights [*prava*] -- the right of ancestry and the right of election, but both these rights were thrown into disorder and lost significance in South Rus'. *Kniaz'ia*, by family seniority, acquired princely thrones, and election ceased to be a unanimous selection by all the people. It depended [instead] on military support -- on the princely retinue, so that there actually remained only one right -- the right of the *Riurikovichi* to rule Rus'. But as to which *kniaz'* was supposed to rule where -- for this, there was no other right except strength and success.[33]

It was particularly difficult, he said, for people to assert their will in the face of *kniaz'ia* who received support and

---

[30] *Ibid.*, 28.
[31] N.I. Kostomarov, "Cherty narodnoi iuzhnorusskoi istorii," *SS*, Book I, Vol. I, 108.
[32] "Severnorusskiia narodopravstva," *SS*, Vol. VII, 93.
[33] *Istoryia Ukrainy*, 78.

assistance from foreign powers.[34]

The *kniaz'*'s authority included all aspects of leadership. He was considered indispensable in the pre-Mongol period, especially in his capacity as military commander. When Kostomarov wrote of the *kniaz'* being the "organ" of the people's sovereignty, he meant he was the people's representative in all foreign relations. Although the *veche* was supposed to have final say in most military matters, Kostomarov recognized that this would have been impractical and noted that it was the *kniaz'* and his retinue who were actually charged with negotiating peace, organizing troops, and generally defending territorial security.[35] It may be noted that Kostomarov's *kniaz'* had many of the powers and prerogatives held by the modern Americ[illegible] supreme executive power, the president.[36] Unlike the American president, however, the Rus' kniaz' was a "foreign figure who entered the Novgorodian [or Galician or Kievan, according to Kostomarov] family under certain conditions which the family [felt it] had the right to put forth."[37]

The *kniaz'* was manager, judge, keeper of order, and defender of the Land, who could theoretically be dismissed by the people if he did not live up to expectations.[38] Kostomarov cited several chroniclers who wrote of the people ridding themselves of undesirable *kniaz'ia*: Polotsk in 1128

---

[34] "Cherty narodnoi iuzhnorusskoi istorii," 113.
[35] "Severnorusskiia narodopravstva," *SS*, Vol. VII, 92.
[36] The president's powers are delineated in the American Constitution, Article II, Section 2(ii).
[37] "Severnorusskiia narodopravstva," *SS*, Vol. VII, 93.
[38] "Dve russkiia narodnosti," 41.

and 1159, Drutsk in 1159, and Smolensk in 1175 and again in 1230. The *knіaz'*, as noted above, did not always accept his deposition willingly; he often retaliated by seeking military aid from relatives in other Rus' lands, and sometimes even from foreign powers, such as Poland. This was possible, Kostomarov said, because of a "lack of binding federative ties among the Lands," causing "the right of the people unwillingly [to give] way to the right of might."[39] There is even a celebrated instance of the Kievan people, whose *knіaz'* was considered *primus inter pares* among Rus' royalty,[40] overthrowing their leader. In 1068, Iziaslav I proved himself incapable of organizing resistance against the Cumans. He was replaced in favour of Vseslav of Polotsk, but recalled when the latter also proved inept.[41] This action, in its severity, was unique in Kiev, but according to Kostomarov, the *veche* carefully evaluated the leadership of every Kievan *knіaz'*.[42]

In Galicia, the powers of the *knіaz'* were severely restricted, more so than anywhere else in Rus' except Novgorod and Pskov. The Galician *veche*, said Kostomarov, judged its *knіaz'*'s activities, both political and domestic, harshly.[43] *Knіaz'* Iaroslav, for example, was made to give up his mistress, and forced to take back and live with his

---

[39] "Nachalo edinoderzhaviia," 32, 34.
[40] *Ibid.*, 26.
[41] "Cherty narodnoi iuzhnorusskoi istorii," 113. See also George Vernadsky, *A History of Russia*, Vol. I: *Kievan Russia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), 179.
[42] "Nachalo edinoderzhaviia," 31.
[43] "Cherty narodnoi iuzhnorusskoi istorii." 145, and *Istoryia Ukrainy*, 127-128.

legal wife and estranged legal son.[44] By contrast, in Rostov-Suzdal', under the famous *Knіaz'* Andrei Bogoliubskii, the *veche* was weak and subjugated, giving *Knіaz'* Andrei a relatively free hand in pursuing his adventurous political goal of shifting the Rus' political centre from the south to the north-east. Subsequently, said Kostomarov, Rus' monocracy (*edinoderzhavie*) was born in this principality.

The Evolution of Democracy

Kostomarov observed that in the pre-Mongol period the *veche* had control over the *knіaz'* and that a rudimentary democracy generally prevailed in Rus' political life. The *knіaz'* did not possess a fully developed idea of rulership (*tsarstvennost'*), while the people had no precise concept of their relationship to the royal authorities.[45] No one even thought there should be a single sovereign over all of Rus': it was neither necessary nor feasible to eliminate the right of the individual Lands to decide their own fates.[46] The *knіazia* Vladimir the Great and Iaroslav the Wise were not sovereigns (*gosudari*) of all Rus', said Kostomarov -- how could they be if sovereignty resided within the people? -- they were merely lords or masters (*gospodini*).[47] Within Rus', there were no *knіazhestva* (self-contained states with a sovereign *knіaz'*), only *knіazhenіia* (princely rule with

---

[44] "Nachalo edinoderzhaviia," 31.
[45] "Cherty narodnoi iuzhnorusskoi istorii," 89.
[46] "Nachalo edinoderzhaviia," 40.
[47] *Ibid.*, 27.

the *kniaz'* as the supreme executive power).[48] There was no concept of Rus' as a state, but only as a system of lands paying nominal tribute to the Kievan *kniaz'*.[49] Most importantly, said Kostomarov, the apanage-*veche kniaz'ia* were elected to govern, to lead, to defend, but they did not own the land over which they ruled: "They are mistaken, those who have imagined that the ancient *kniaz'ia* were hereditary possessors [*votchinniki*] or owners [*vladel'tsi*] of their principalities..."[50] The principalities belonged to their inhabitants, he insisted, not to any *kniaz'ia*,[51] who were simply managers or leaders.[52]

When the Mongols enslaved Rus', the *vecha*, except for Novgorod's, were destroyed. The Mongol khan became, in reality, the sovereign head of state of all Rus'. The *kniaz'* now had to come to the khan instead of to the people to ask for the privilege of ruling his principality. Upon receiving this privilege, said Kostomarov, the *kniaz'* did not have to move from place to place, and as he settled himself in his principality, he began to see his holding as his own patrimony (*votchina*), his to dispose of as he pleased. As the *kniaz'* became more tied to the land, so, too, did the

---

[48] N.I. Kostomarov, "Lektsii g. Koialovicha po istorii Zapadnoi Rosii," *NPPP*, 208. See also Kostomarov's 'Rech o tom chto prichinoiu bezporiadkov i razstroistva Rusi v udel'nyi period nashei istorii,' in Volodymyr Miiakovs'kyi, "Kostomarov u Rivnomu," *Ukraina*, Book III (1925): 38.
[49] "Nachalo edinoderzhaviia," 14.
[50] *Ibid.*, 25, 27.
[51] "O znachenii Velikago Novgoroda," 208.
[52] "Cherty narodnoi iuzhnorusskoi istorii," 135.

people over whom he ruled.[53] This was the point in Rus' history where the line between public domain and private property became virtually non-existent.[54] The idea of a strong prince, supposedly initiated by Andrei Bogoliubskii, evolved to where it enabled the Russians to cast off the Mongol yoke,[55] but only after Rus' had come to be subjected to the authority of a new, and this time, in contrast to Kiev, a truly political centre, namely Moscow.[56] The Muscovite *velikii kniaz'* (usually rendered as "grand duke") began to see himself, not only as ruler-owner of his own principality, but, because of his special relationship with the Mongol khan, ruler-owner of all the Rus' Lands within his grasp. In Kostomarov's mind, the Mongol invasion was decisive in eradicating the apanage-*veche* system in Rus' and with it, all vestiges of democracy:

> From the Mongol invasion came the following: the apanage *kniaz'ia* were...not owners, but leaders of the Lands and cities...[;] now the *kniaz'ia* truly became proprietors, or rather landlords, for they received their lands from the khans....[T]he grand *kniaz'*, for his part, became the khan's trusted representative in matters pertaining to the Rus' world [*mir*] and as a result he became, in the end, its owner-proprietor...[57]

---

[53] "Dve russkiia narodnosti," 50. See also Hrushevs'kyi, "Kostomarov i novitnia Ukraina," 17.

[54] For an excellent discussion of this mixing of *imperium* and *dominium*, see Richard Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974), esp. 27-84.

[55] Recognizing that a strong, centralized authority was needed to rid Rus' of its occupiers, Kostomarov himself saw *veche* election of the *kniaz'* as a weakness at this point. See *Istoryia Ukrainy*, 80.

[56] Moscow became the new centre of the old Rostov-Suzdal' principality.

[57] "O znachenii Velikago Novgoroda," 200-201.

It is significant that this new centre had moved from South to North-East Rus', i.e., from Ukrainian to Great Russian lands, and that the new, centralized realm did not include the vast majority of ethnically Ukrainian territory, which had been absorbed by Poland and Lithuania. The people of this territory were supposedly to retain their democratic propensity through the ages while the Great Russians had other work to do.[58]

The apanage-*veche* system fell because of the Mongol invasion, said Kostomarov, but it was ripe for conquest for a number of internal reasons. It is generally accepted that the subdivision of Rus', with the concomitant lack of unity and consequential inability to face internal and external foes with a singularity of purpose, is chief among these.[59] Kostomarov thought this was only partly true: "...the apanage system by itself was not the source of disorder... The reason is to be found, not in the idea itself, but in its incompleteness."[60] To survive and serve as a source of strength, rather than weakness, the apanage-*veche* system would have had to institutionalize itself. Kostomarov narrowed the problem down to two points: 1) commonly recognizing a superior *kniaz'* for all of Rus', including accepting primogeniture as the only legitimate means of succession, and 2) establishing a legal forum in which the various *kniaz'ia* could discuss their concerns in an

---

[58] See Rubinshtain, 429-429.
[59] See, for instance, Vernadsky, 215-217.
[60] Kostomarov's speech in Miiakovs'kyi, 39.

organized, structured way, i.e., a princely diet. It is interesting that he did not wish to institutionalize the *veche*, even as a consultative body to the *kniaz'*. Recognizing it as a disruptive force when unity was badly needed, Kostomarov relegated the *veche* to the status of a luxury to be used only when circumstances permitted it. Almost in passing, he cited some other internal causes of decay, such as people from foreign tribes living in Rus' (he is not clear on why this contributed) and the rise of the aristocracy in certain areas, e.g. Galicia, but these problems could have been managed, he said, if only a system of succession and a princely diet had both been instituted.[1]

C. Analysis

The Genesis of the *Veche*

Kostomarov assumed and wished for much more than he proved in his assessment of the *kniaz'-veche* relationship. As noted above, the extent to which the *veche* exercised control over the *kniaz'* is the extent to which it is possible to speak of limited and rudimentary democracy existing in Kievan Rus'. One aspect of the *kniaz'-veche* question is Kostomarov's claim that the *veche* had existed and checked princely authority in East Slavic lands from

---

[1] *Ibid.*, 41, and "Tysiacheletie," 130. He mentions that autocratic ideas from Byzantium also played a part in the apanage-*veche* system's decline and fall. See also Polukhin, 114.

time immemorial. This is evident in his accepting the theory that the Varangians were "invited" to rule in East Slavic lands. Inviting a power to rule meant there had to be someone empowered to speak on behalf of the people to issue the invitation and, in Kostomarov's mind, this was precisely the *veche*'s role.[12] He was not alone in this,[13] but there is simply no evidence to support this position. According to the chronicles, the *veche* appeared for the first time in Rus' political life in Belgorod in 997.[14] It of course played a major role in the Kievan uprising of 1068, but it did not begin to become a true political force in Rus' until at least a half century later.[15]

The reasons why the *veche* gained ascendancy after the turn of the twelfth century are particular to that period and therefore necessarily undercut any notion that it was a dominant force before that time, though this is not to say that public gatherings had no history whatsoever on Rus' soil. The simple explanation for the *veche*'s ascendancy is that it filled a power vacuum created by a weakening of the

---

[12] See A.D. Gradovskii, "Gosudarstvennyi stroi drevnei Rossii (po povodu knigi V.I. Sergeevicha, 'Veche i kniaz'')," *Sobranie sochinenii*, Vol. I (St. Petersburg, 1899), 346, where he criticizes Sergeevich for falling into a trap similar to Kostomarov's.

[13] For instance, V.I. Sergeevich, *Veche i kniaz'* (unavailable to me).

[14] V.T. Pashuto, "Cherty politicheskogo stroia v drevnei Rusi," *Drevnerusskoe gosudarstvo i ego mezhdunarodnoe znachenie* (Moscow: Akademiia nauk SSSR, 1965), esp. 24-51.

[15] According to B.D. Grekov, the *velikii kniaz'* of Kievan Rus', before it dismembered, was sufficiently strong and independent not to have to enter into any specific agreements with "the people." See B.D. Grekov, *Kievskaia Rus'* (Moscow: Akademiia nauk SSSR, 1944), 235-236.

royal authority due to the "continual shifting of ruler from throne to throne and the many quarrels which accompanied that movement."[6] In other words, the Rus' people realized that there was no institutional continuity and decided to take more power into their own hands to ensure that this continuity would exist so that they would be governed in their own best interest. A more complete explanation must include the growth of the monied and landed classes in Rus', the *veche* being the means by which these classes expressed their growing political relevance and power. Seen in this light, the *veche* may be considered to have been a symptom of decline in Rus',[7] because it manifested opposition to any effective central authority in the realm.

These circumstances, coupled with the *veche*'s being mentioned often in the chronicles from this point onward, indicate that the popular assembly gained ascendancy after the death of Iaroslav the Wise in 1054. It is probable that it had "prehistoric origins," but certainly not as a full-fledged people's assembly. The term "*veche*" may have referred to any council, conference, or official discussion,[8] though it more likely began as meaning a district or village tribal gathering which had no legal status and which did not see itself as making a contribution

---

[6] V.O. Kluchevsky (Kliuchevskii), *A History of Russia*, Vol. I, trans. C.J. Hogarth (New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, 1911), 115.
[7] See Pipes, 31, and Vernadsky, 215-217.
[8] S.M. Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen*, Book II, Vol. III (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1960), 28.

to state affairs. In the ninth and tenth centuries, when Kostomarov would have had his readers believe that the *veche* was already a highly developed political organism, it entered a transitional stage, reflecting the growth of commerce and of the towns. It changed from a tribal assembly into a town assembly:

> [T]o decide matters, the "better" people of the whole land gather[ed] in the senior town and deliberate[d] questions in the presence of the citizens of that town.[']

After 1054, the *veche* achieved its "full manifestation" as an independent citizen's assembly with completely developed rights.['] Kostomarov was correct about the *veche*'s ancient origins but he did not consider that its history was organic, developing in response to changing social and economic circumstances. Ignoring the reasons for the *veche*'s rise enabled him to assign it much more authority in its early period than it actually had. Because it did not see itself as an organ of state and because the *knіaz'* did not need its support to rule before 1054, it is unlikely that the *veche* played so dominant a role early in East Slavic history.

The Universality of the *Veche*

Another problematic aspect of the *knіaz'-veche* question is the *veche*'s universality in Rus'. Because of abundant

---

['] See M.F. Vladimirskii-Budanov's theory of the *veche*'s genesis as it is outlined in A.E. Presniakov, *Knіazhoe pravo v drevnei Rusi* (St. Petersburg, 1909), 163.
[']' *Ibid.*

extant sources, Kostomarov easily asserted the the "eternal rule" of the *veche* principle, i.e., of *veche* control over the *knlaz'*, in Novgorod and its "younger brother," Pskov. Historians concur that these were the two centres in Rus' where the *veche* gained almost complete control of the political process. Vernadsky explains that a different branch of the House of Riurik established itself in every Rus' principality except Novgorod, where "the prince was elected from the members of the princely family at large."[71] Gradovskii claims that the contract or convention (*rlada*) made between the *knlaz'* and the *veche* had real significance in Novgorod:

> In Novgorod, the *veche* had broad legislative powers....The Novgorodian "contract" was actually meant to limit the activity and authority of the *knlaz'*; it was intended to unite this authority with the freedom and interests of the community.[72]

There has been a consensus among historians on Novgorod's strong democratic propensity. Kostomarov's works on Novgorod agreed with this consensus but erroneously claimed that Novgorod was the norm, rather than the exception, in Rus'. His evidence is flimsy: the words of a Suzdalian chronicler who, in 1176, spoke of "Novgorodians,...Kievans, Polotskians, and all the districts [*i vsi vlasti*]" holding *vecha*. "This shows clearly," Kostomarov said, "that the custom of *veche* deliberation was, to the same degree, universal in all Rus' Lands."[73] There was also the popular

---

[71] Vernadsky, 175.
[72] Gradovskii, 360.
[73] "Nachalo edinoderzhaviia," 20.

uprising of 1068 in Kiev: here, the *veche* unquestionably placed the candidate of its choice on the princely throne. That the *veche* principle was always strong in South Rus', (i.e., Ukraine) is affirmed, Kostomarov argued, by two points. One is that the term was used still in the sixteenth century, "in the sense of a popular assembly, even though this was a time when other conditions of political life had already superseded most ancient conceptions and had made a new impression on popular customs."[74] The other is that Ukrainians were supposedly very close ethnically to the Novgorodians and if democratic propensities were inherent in the latter, the same must have been true for the former. This being the bulk of his evidence, Kostomarov lamented how little the chroniclers said about the *veche* and the internal affairs of Rus' in general,[75] yet he was satisfied that this popular assembly was as vital and significant everywhere else in Rus' as it was in Novgorod and Pskov.

Might not the reason for the chroniclers' omitting information about the *veche* be that it simply was not the dominant, powerful institution throughout Rus' he wanted to believe it was? And if the chroniclers say so little about the *veche*, how did Kostomarov purport to know so much about it? Other historians are convinced that *veche* authority was different everywhere. Gradovskii says:

> In Kiev, the *veche* had less significance than in Novgorod; in Suzdal' and Rostov, less than in Kiev....The need for a *kniaz'* was felt everywhere,

---

[74] *Ibid.*
[75] *Ibid.*, 17-18.

but not everywhere to the same degree...'[76]

Vernadsky concurs when he says that the degree of *veche* authority "varied in various cities."[77]

Examining the reasons why Novgorod developed a strong democratic tendency shows why it stood in sharp contrast to the rest of Rus'. Geographically, Novgorod was far removed from the principal arena of squabbles among Rus' princes. This "relieved Novgorod from any direct pressure at the hands of those princes," and allowed it relative freedom of development. There was also an absence of an agricultural base in the Novgorod land, making commerce the dominant "popular industry" virtually by default. That Novgorod lay close to all the main waterways of Rus', the Volga, the Dnieper, the Western Dvina, and the Volkhov contributed to this, causing Novgorod to be "drawn at an early period into the vortex of the commercial traffic of the land."[78] This created a powerful monied class in Novgorod which had the wherewithal to set the terms of princely rule, especially when the princely family was weakened by feuds. When the *kniaz'* was weak, the *veche* was strong,[79] an opportunity of which the wealthy of Novgorod "took every possible advantage."[80]

Kostomarov failed to take into account these unique reasons for the relatively high level of democracy in

---

[76] Gradovskii, 360-364.
[77] Vernadsky, 186.
[78] Kluchevsky, 323-324, and Solov'ev, 28-29.
[79] Gradovskii, 366.
[80] Kluchevsky, 324.

Novgorod political life. It had the insularity, the trade opportunities, and the social structure which Kiev, Pereiaslav, and Rostov-Suzdal' respectively lacked and, in the absence of conforming causal conditions, it is reasonable to assume that the effects would probably vary as well.

Apart from Novgorod, the extent of the *veche*'s participation in daily political affairs, even when it had gained ascendancy in various of the principalities, was probably limited to accepting or rejecting a given *kniaz'*. That it did so participate is accepted by Kostomarov (and Sergeevich), to be sure, but it is also accepted by those who downplay the *veche*'s role in Rus' politics, such as Gradovskii and Presniakov. According to Gradovskii, the *veche* would have been unable to achieve self-government, even if it had wanted to, though he did concede that it was an important community institution. It "did not exist on any solid basis." This resulted in a

> lack of clarity about the relationship between the *kniaz'* and the people, [and] about the rights of the *veche* and the matters within its competence....The *veche* as a form of community contribution into matters of state, **except for its summoning princes** was actually of secondary significance. (emphasis added)[1]

Presniakov agrees, but qualifies his observation with an important proviso. Popular affirmation and the making of a contract between *kniaz'* and *veche*, Presniakov says, were establishing themselves as facts of life in Rus':

---

[1] Gradovskii, 348, 359.

> ...the population of every capital city was well within its rights in summoning and making contracts with *kniaz'ia* if, indeed, it had the strength to actualize its right... (emphasis added)[12]

The *veche*'s semi-organized structure -- it was not a representative body and it required unanimous agreement on all its decisions -- [illegible]ded its deliberating any complicated question or legislation. Legislative initiative by the *veche* would have been impossible, even in Novgorod, where the *veche*'s sense of itself as a lawmaking authority was greater than anywhere else. A "plain yea or nay" on a given question, the affirmation of the *kniaz'* included, was [illegible]ably the most that any common *veche* participant could [illegible]ve expected to offer the Rus' political process.[13]

Patrimonialism-Proprietorship

A third aspect of the *kniaz'-veche* problem is the question of patrimonialism -- when it began, how, and by whom. Kostomarov, as noted above, believed that patrimonialism, the blending of public rule with private ownership, and the related development of monocracy, all resulted from the Mongol invasion. The latter originated in Rostov-Suzdal', he said, when Andrei Bogoliubskii ruled there in the twelfth century, but this was because Bogoliubskii as a Great Russian was intrinsically predisposed to state building whereas the more democratic

---

[12] Presniakov, 69.
[13] Kluchevsky, 337, Vernadsky, 178-179, 186, Gradovskii, 360, and Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, Vol. II (New York: Knyhospilka, 1954), 294-295.

Novgorodians, Belorussians, and Ukrainians were not. Patrimonialism did not develop fully until the Rus' princes had to go to the *de facto* Rus' head of state, the Mongol khan, to ask for their lands. Granted as pieces of personal property, they were accepted and treated as such by the Rus' princes.

This is a complex question, unresolved in Russian and Ukrainian historiography. Kostomarov was aware that Kievan Rus' under the early *kniaz'ia* did not become a sovereign state. The *kniaz'* in Kiev did not have the means to exercise *de facto* control over all the regions of Rus' and the realm therefore could not and did not develop the infrastructure to operate as such. As Kostomarov correctly noted, primogeniture as an aspect of rulership had not developed yet either. Iaroslav the Wise was determined to prevent the squabbles over the Kievan throne which had marked his own ascension to it[4] and, as a result, he formalized and codified the rota system of succession. He definitively assigned each of his heirs a region of Rus' to rule: the more senior the heir, the richer and more productive the province assigned to him. Kiev, as spiritual and political centre of Rus', was always supposed to go to the eldest son while the others, in order of seniority, occupied the remaining thrones in order of their respective wealth and importance.[5]

---

[4] See Vernadsky, 74-79.

[5] For a complete explanation of the rota system, see Kluchevsky, 94-106.

This complicated system depended far too much on the good will of the *Iaroslavichi* and their descendants and, as might be expected, Iaroslav's good intentions gave way to internecine strife. The result was that each branch of Iaroslav's family held on to what land it could, thereby diminishing Kiev's role as the ultimate plateau of princely succession and territorializing itself completely.[46] Kluchevsky explains:

> It was only later that difficulties arose -- that genealogical relations began to grow more complex and the princes took to disregarding such relations when it was a question of whether a son, or whether some other near relative, should succeed to a given province. The result of it all was that each branch became more and more identified with, and confined to, a particular province, and that each particular province began to be more and more looked upon as the special [patrimony] of its own branch.[47]

Instead of every prince aspiring to rule over a united Rus' realm, each settled into his own principality, his to rule and bequeath to his descendants. The conference of *kniaz'ia* in Liubech in 1097 is said to have been the first expression of interprincely relations which recognized this patrimonial principle.[48]

The economic and cultural reasons for the relatively easy individualization of Rus' territories are important in

---

[46] *Ibid.*, 114.
[47] *Ibid.*, 107. See also Vernadsky, 175, and Presniakov, 154.
[48] Presniakov, 67, 107, and Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, 108-109. Presniakov calls the apanage period the "apanage-patrimonial" period, "as it is usually called," he says. Significantly, Kostomarov (though his definition encompasses the entire Kievan Rus' period) and, interestingly, Gradovskii call it the "apanage-*veche*" period.

understanding this process. The first is that each was a self-contained geographic entity, i.e., a river basin. This in itself facilitated the subdivision of lands.[8] The second is that (perhaps partly as a result of geography) the economy and culture of each Rus' principality were growing and maturing on their own, apart from a common Rus' culture and economy. The interprincely struggles were but "an outward expression of the much deeper rivalry between cities and principalities." Paradoxically enough, Vernadsky says, "...the political weakness of Rus' in this period was partly the result of her economic and cultural growth."[9]

Outright proprietorship of principalities, along with the related development of newly emerged monocracy, evolved under Andrei Bogoliubskii in the newly colonized north-east of Rus'. Bogoliubskii's personality was instrumental in this. He was "a haughty man obsessed by the monarchical idea." He

> attempted to introduce the principle of Byzantine absolutism into [Rus'] political life by undermining the institution of the *veche* on the one hand and [by] subordinating all other princes to his suzerainty on the other.[10]

By sacking Kiev in 1169, Bogoliubskii became *velikii knіaz'* of Rus', but by remaining in Rostov-Suzdal' (actually in his favourite city of Vladimir), he vested all the authority of the *velikii knіaz'* in a particular person rather than in a territorial throne, as had heretofore been the case with

---

[8] Kluchevsky, 253.
[9] Vernadsky, 215-217.
[10] *Ibid.*, 220.

Kiev.'[12] In this way, Rostov-Suzdal' acquired the character of being Bogoliubskii's own property:

> ...it lost its family significance and, acquiring the character of personal, inalienable property belonging to the prince alone, [it] dropped out of the rota of provinces governed in order of princely seniority.'[13]

Needless to say, "personal, inalienable property" had little room or need for a *veche* to participate in its administration, and it is at this point that the popular assembly began to lose significance in Rus' political affairs except, of course, in the northwest democracies.

There is a good example of Bogoliubskii's threatening tone as *velikii kniaz'*. He had assigned three of his nephews, Roman, David, and Mstislav to govern Kiev and two of its by-towns. On one occasion, they apparently disobeyed him in his capacity as suzerain prince. He responded with the following ominous message: "If thou, O Roman, and thy brethren walk not in my will, of a surety shalt thou depart from Kiev, and David from Belgorod, and Mstislav from Vishgorod. Yea, ye shall all of you return to Smolensk, where ye may apportion yourselves as ye will." Kluchevsky wryly observes that this response, which was supposed to be in the tone of a senior adressing his younger kinfolk, was offered "in a strain neither paternal nor fraternal."'[14] Bogoliubskii, being about three centuries ahead of his time, was assassinated in 1174, probably by those who were not as

---

'[12] Presniakov, 107-108.
'[13] Kluchevsky, 225.
'[14] *Ibid.*, 224.

politically daring as he.

Proprietorship took hold in north-east Rus' so easily because political authority antedated the population there. Settlement came only on the heels of the princes who, on their own initiative and with their own means, built new cities, cleared the lands, and constructed waterways.'' In the words of Kluchevsky,

> Colonization of the country usually brought the first prince of an apanage face to face, not with a ready made community, but with a desert wild which needed settlement and organization before it could contain one. Hence, the idea of a prince as the personal owner of his apanage was the juridical outcome of his significance as first settler and organizer.''

Under these circumstances, the inhabitants of such a territory were not considered to be much more than royal slaves or "tenants at best"; certainly, any thought of "inherent personal 'rights'" were out of the question.'' If the *knìaz'* could support his claim, it would have been impossible for the *veche* to operate and offer any opposition under such circumstances. As the princes of this territory eventually "gathered" as many Rus' lands as they could and subjected them to their monocratic, centralized authority, the *velikiì knìaz'* developed a similar proprietory view of all his subjects.

It is possible to observe the patrimonial-proprietory idea in Rus' as having developed in two stages. At first,

---

'' Pipes, 40.
'' Kluchevsky, 249-253.
'' Pipes, 40.

for about a century after the death of Iaroslav the Wise, the various branches of the House of Riurik settled into, and began to identify themselves with, their own particular territories. Later, after the mid-twelfth century, the princes, beginning with those in the north-east, started to develop an outright sense of proprietorship, combined with a striving for monocracy. Wherever the prince was strong enough to pursue his goals, the *veche*'s death knell was, of course, sounded. There was no more to be a clear distinction between a prince's ruling over a land and his possessing it, between public trust and private ownership, between *imperium* and *dominium*. The argument has been made that the seeds of autocracy can be said to have been sown on Rus' soil at this point.''

Kostomarov, for his part, did not see the development of patrimonialism-proprietorship in Rus' as the long and complicated process it was. His explanation of this phenomenon was superficial and ignored important political and social factors. He ascribed it simply to the Mongol invasion: this was the first time that Rus' had ever had a sovereign monarch, a single *gosudar'*, and it was from him, the khan, that the idea supposedly emanated. Kostomarov correctly assessed Bogoliubskii's role in founding monocracy

---

'' Pipes, esp. 58-59. Alexander Yanov counters this position and makes a convincing case that it was not until Ivan IV the Terrible's "revolution from above" in his use of the *oprichnina* terror as a means of political control that autocracy actually began in Russia. See Yanov, *The Origins of Autocracy: Ivan the Terrible in Russian History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).

in Rus', but he was too quick to ascribe this to Bogoliubskii's Great Russian nationality -- nothing more. There was no mention of Kiev's decline as an economic centre as the reason for Bogoliubskii moving to the north-east'' and there was no mention of the complex interplay of social factors as enabling Bogoliubskii to pursue his goals, only that the *veche* principle never "existed and manifested itself" in the north-east.''° There was also no mention that authority preceded settlement in the north-east, allowing the *knlaz'* to do virtually as he wished with his principality, including not brooking any opposition from an institution such as the *veche*. Much is told to us by Kostomarov, but little is explained. Here, as elsewhere, explanation was not as important as finding sources to support his ideological perspective. The explanations for the development of patrimonialism-proprietorship were not new in Kostomarov's day. He must have been aware of their existence, but his tendency to avoid secondary sources as a basis for his research may have caused him to push these aside. If he would have considered them, he might have realized that although the Mongol invasion undoubtedly intensified the patrimonial-proprietory idea in Rus', it did not, by itself, cause it to appear, this notion being far too complex to be instantaneous and monocausal.

'' Pipes, 37-38.
''° "Dve russkiia narodnosti," 45.

Social Structure

The fourth and final problem with Kostomarov's conception of democracy in Kievan Rus' is his lack of attention to the importance of social structure in defining the role of power relationships. He recognized that there were class distinctions[101] and that the *bolar* class did tend to dominate the *veche*'s proceedings, as in Galicia.[102] However, since all could theoretically take part in the popular assembly and class distinctions were not legally recognized estates,[103] he emphasized these points at the expense of any class-based analysis.[104]

Novgorod is the best example of this. In Kostomarov's mind, Novgorod was the epitome of Kievan Rus' democracy because the *veche* exercised virtually complete control of the *knlaz'*. But who controlled the *veche*? According to Kluchevsky, it was a small group of rich and powerful men known as the Council of Magnates. This group possessed legislative initiative and thus formulated questions for the

---

[101] "Severnorusskiia narodopravstva," *SS*, Vol. VIII, 244-252, and "Nachalo edinoderzhaviia," 34-37.

[102] "Nachalo edinoderzhaviia," 38. Attention should be called to the role of the *bolar duma*, a council composed of the trusted members of the princely retinue which advised the *knlaz'* on both internal and external matters.

[103] According to Gregory L. Freeze, legally recognized estates did not exist in pre-Petrine Russia. See Freeze, "The *Soslovie* Paradigm and Russian Social History," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 91, No. 1 (February, 1986): 14.

[104] Kostomarov undoubtedly knew that according to the Rus' legal code, the *Russkaia pravda*, the lives of men of certain classes were "worth" more than those of others, i.e., murdering a noble called for greater punishment than murdering a commoner, but this did not affect every man's right to voice his opinion at the *veche*, and it is on this that Kostomarov focussed. See Vernadsky, 136.

veche to "debate." It is safe to assume that if the Council wanted a matter decided a particular way, it anticipated Rousseau's Lawgiver and gave the assembly information favourable to only that decision. The *veche* simply validated decisions which had already been made by the Council of Magnates, and as the masses were not yet politically conscious enough to pursue their own interests, they usually followed the lead of the aristocracy.'[0] For this reason,

> the Council of Magnates was of far greater importance in the history of Novgorod's political life than the *veche*, which usually constituted merely its obedient instrument. In short, the Council was the hidden, yet exceedingly active, spring of Novgorodian administration.'[0]

Significantly, Kostomarov never mentioned the Council of Magnates *per se*, though he did admit the influence of the wealthy on the *veche*, as noted above. He believed, or better, wanted to believe, that matters were actually decided by "the people" at the *veche*. Interestingly, he suggested that Novgorod eventually fell from practicing democracy when a more authoritarian approach would have been needed to combat Moscow's centralizing thrust. But Novgorod "did not fall from an overabundance of freedom," counters Markevich,

> but rather from a lack of it, since economic conditions existing there enabled the powerful monied aristocracy or strong bourgeoisie ... to concentrate power in its own hands and usurp it for its own personal interests.'[0]

---

[0] Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, 291.
[0] Kluchevsky, 337-338.
[0] Markevich, 315.

Gradovskii suggests a theory which further elucidates the role of the monied classes in Rus'-politics. He is aware that it is important to differentiate between those who could attend the *veche* and those who did, and proposes that parties of sorts existed. The *knlaz'*'s position at a given time depended, not on the will of the whole people, but on the will of the *knlaz'*'s own party. In other words, if he appeased whatever faction placed him on the throne in the first place, he would remain there. *De jure*, everyone in the city could attend the *veche*, but *de facto*, it was "a gathering of well-known parties brought together for a particular matter." For this reason, one day's *veche* could be radically different from the next day's, depending on which group had an interest in that day's business.'[88]

Kostomarov's analysis ignored social structure almost entirely. He occasionally alluded to it, as in his reasons for the decline and fall of Rus', but this was always incidental and secondary to ethnic and political factors. Explaining the social basis of democracy in Kievan Rus' is vital to understanding much about the whole period, but Kostomarov, for ideological reasons, consciously avoided doing this. Significantly, although the Cyrillo-Methodian Society's program did advocate social reform through the abolition of serfdom, it emphasized the restructuring of the Slavic world based on ethnicity. The social element was not very important to Kostomarov's political ideology and, as a

---

[88] Gradovskii, 361, and Pashuto, 31.

result, He considered it minimally in his historical observations. It is difficult to escape the Soviet verdict on Kostomarov when it speaks of his lack of class-based thought (*bezklassovost'*)[109] and his "overestimation of the *veche* structure [compared to his] underestimation of the power of the *knlaz'*."[110] For Kostomarov, "the magnate, the noble who confessed and fought for the Orthodox faith stood abreast to the peasant-villager,"[111] and this unidimensionality ultimately undermined Kostomarov's credibility as a scholar and placed him very clearly in the category of political ideologue.

D. Conclusion

Thus, Kostomarov's work on democracy in Rus' was an idealistic rereading of the past rather than a pursuit of historical truth. His explanations served and encompassed only the needs of his ideology. He believed only what he wanted to believe -- what he had to believe, in his typical Romantic way, to give some basis to his hopes for the future.[112] This included the unrealistic notions that 1) popular control of the princely authority was deeply rooted in antiquity, 2) such control was universal in Rus' and was everywhere as strong and effective as it was in Novgorod, 3) patrimonialism-proprietorship was exclusively the result of

---

[109] Polukhin, chap. 6, and Stanislavskaia, 129ff.
[110] Iu. A. Pinchuk, *Istoricheskie vzgliady N.I. Kostomarova* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1984), 22.
[111] Polukhin, 98-99. See also Rubach, 65-67.
[112] Smith, 23.

the actions of outside forces, and 4) so[redacted]and economic factors played a minor role in deciding [redacted]structure of power relationships. In a word, he conceived that democracy in Kievan Rus' was far more advanced than it actually was, indeed than it could have been, given the period. That such a view of Rus' did not stand up to objective analysis mattered little to Kostomarov: in the past, he clearly saw the spirit of what he desired in the future, and if the facts did not quite fit the perception, it was the perception which mattered most anyway.

III. Federalism

A. Introduction

Federalism was no less important to Kostomarov's political ideology than was democracy. Although his perception of federalism in the later Kievan period stands up to objective analysis much better than does his view of democracy, seeking the "federative principle [*federativnoe nachalo*]" in the Golden Age was just as vital to his plans for the future. Historical federalism served as a foundation for 1) a future federation of all Slavic peoples based on the equal participation of each, and 2) the recognition of a Ukrainian nationality, ethnically distinct, but not politically separate, from the Great Russian. The idea of federalism was a conscious, measured response to the political demands and realities of nineteenth century Eastern Europe. On the one hand, national consciousness was a growing phenomenon, rapidly becoming a political force with which to be reckoned, as was clearly evident in the Polish and Hungarian uprisings. On the other hand, the traditional empires, conservative and reactionary as they were, were certainly not prepared to cave in to every demand for change especially when put forward by groups claiming historical legitimacy but having no known history of independent statehood. Federalism was proposed as a compromise between the seemingly opposing forces of nation and empire, a solution which its proponents hoped could be

offered to each side with a minimum of political risk to everyone involved.'

B. Kostomarov on Federalism

The Bipolarity of East Slavic History

The bipolar theme of indivisibility vs. decentralization, of state versus nation, dominated Kostomarov's theory of East Slavic history. There had always been an "oscillation" between unity and autonomy, between the "centralization of absolutism" and the "diversity of democracy."[2] The former is a Great Russian trait, formed in response to the Mongol invasion. The latter is an inherent Slavic characteristic which had died among the Great Russians but which predominated in Kiev-centred apanage-*veche* Rus' and was henceforth preserved specifically in the Ukrainian *Volksgeist*. This bi-directional pull existed within apanage-*veche* Rus', too, as the realm fluctuated "from unification to division, and again from division to unification."[3] One trend emphasized the oneness of Rus' while the other emphasized the individuality of each Rus' land but without breaking the ties among all of them.

---

[1] Rudolf Schlessinger, *Federalism in Central and Eastern Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945), 3.
[2] N.I. Kostomarov, "Kniaz' Vladimir Monomakh i kazak Bogdan Khmel'nitskii," *NPPP*, 149, and "Mysli o federativnom nachale v drevnei Rusi," *SS*, Book I, Vol. I, 3.
[3] N.I. Kostomarov, "Mysli ob istorii malorossii," *Biblioteka dlia chteniia*, Vol. 78 (1846): 24.

This, then, was Kostomarov's definition of the "federative principle" in Rus': "...the independence of the parts and the existence of ties among these parts which induce all of them together to recognize themselves as a single entity."[4] Elsewhere, he elaborated:

> The ideal of apanage-*veche* life was the independence of the lands of the Rus' world [*mir*] so that each constituted its own whole in the manifestation of its local life while being united with one bond, common to all.[5]

Rus' strove towards federation, Kostomarov said, and this is the form in which it began to array itself.[6] The territory was, in fact, a "natural" federation.[7]

Causes of Unity and Disunity

The sources of disunity in Rus' were, according to Kostomarov, geography and "living historical circumstances."[8] By contrast, the sources of unity were:

1) common ancestry, customs, way of life, and language,
2) a single royal family, and
3) the Christian faith and a single Orthodox Church.

All Rus' peoples had a "mutual kinship [*vzaimnoe rodstvo*]." Kostomarov claimed that all Slavs came from the lower Danube region and migrated to their modern territories. This is proven by the word "Danube" appearing often in both Ukrainian and Great Russian folk songs, and

---

[4] "Zamechanie g. Lokhvitskomu," 202.
[5] "O znachenii Velikago Novgoroda," 200.
[6] "Mysli o federativnom nachale," 30.
[7] Markevich, 314.
[8] "Dve russkiia narodnosti," 33-34.

without a doubt, he said, the people of ancient Rus' were quite aware of this common heritage. A *polianin* (a member of the tribe of the *poliane*) could, for example, be the enemy of his neighbour the *derevlianin*, but they were both aware that they had common ancestors: "...among the enemies, there were the same ancient attachments which brought them closer together and indicated to them and everyone else that there was a mutual kinship." The traditional political relationship between Novgorod and Kiev was also a case in point: Kostomarov attributed it to the close ethnic affiliation between the two peoples.'

A universality of customs and mores also united the Eastern Slavs. Even though every tribe, said Kostomarov, had its own traditions and the laws of its own fathers, these all had something in common with those of other tribes. Again, he used folk songs as proof because "even today," they have "much that is the same and common to all." This form of evidence, which he adduced frequently, showed that "in antiquity, Slavic tribes had, at the basis of their spiritual life, similar beliefs, customs, and religious rituals."'° This was also true for many aspects of community life, the most notable being the *veche*. This popular assembly was supposedly common to all East Slavs, the proof being that the expression "*veche*" was common to the language of all the tribes.

' Mysli o federativnom nachale," 14.
'° *Ibid.*, 14-15.

Similarity of language was important in providing a sense of oneness among the Rus' peoples, asserted Kostomarov. A person simply felt more kinship to someone from a tribe speaking a language closely related to his own than he did to someone speaking a language which was very different. With the acceptance of Christianity, all of Rus' acquired a single literary language which provided a "new, stronger tie among the Rus' peoples, a more solid bond of their spiritual indissolubility." It became "an instrument, of both the dissemination of the faith and the life of the state," and it gave everyone "common ideas and views." No matter what church a person entered anywhere in the realm, he heard the same language spoken; religious customs and moral guidelines were propagated everywhere by means of the same tongue. In what schools there were, the language of instruction was the common Rus' literary language. In a word, "Language furnished us with unity," said Kostomarov (his emphasis).''

Language was not enough, though. It was sufficient to help provide a sense of unity, but not unity itself. In the early stages of Rus' history, the single Rus' royal family did this by means of its "ramification" (i.e., branching out) and its "multiformity." A decentralized infrastructure necessarily had to come into being because of the multi-tribal nature of Rus', but in Kostomarov's mind, such a system "could lead [Rus'] only to greater unity, not to

---

'' *Ibid.*, 16-21.

greater dismemberment." A given *kniaz'* felt much closer to Rus' as a whole than he possibly could to any foreign land. "I am neither a Magyar nor a Pole [*Liakh*]," he may well have said, "my share being in the Rus' land." Similarly, Kostomarov asserted, any inhabitant of Rus' could have said that "he is not a Magyar or a Pole, [and] that his share is in that broad Rus' land where the *Siverianin*, the *Rusin-Polianin*, the Volhynian, and the Suzdalian are all conscious of their kinship." There may have been internecine strife, but it would have been much worse had it not been internecine. These were domestic, not foreign wars. This is proven by Novgorod, which fought "furiously" with Suzdal' at the beginning of the thirteenth century, but which soon re-established ties with the northeastern principality and once again accepted *kniaz'ia* from there. The importance of dynastic ties is also shown when the House of Riurik was replaced in western Rus' by the Lithuanian House of Gedymin. Communication between eastern and western Rus' weakened considerably thereafter and the two parts of Rus' virtually ceased to look upon each other as brothers.[12] In sum,

> Rus' lands existed each independently and everyone together recognized his connection with the whole of the Rus' state as an indissoluble union of lands; accordingly, each of the members of the royal house recognized his independence [while] altogether they constituted one governing family, one estate in the whole of the Rus' state.[13]

Kostomarov was so convinced of the importance of the

---

[12] *Ibid.*, 21-25.
[13] "Tysiacheletie," 129.

dynastic tie; he even suggested that if primogeniture had been the recognized principle of succession in Iaroslav I's time, Rus' would have fallen apart much more quickly than it did under the apanage order.'[14]

The most important unifying factor in Rus', according to Kostomarov, was the Orthodox Christian faith. Christianity gave the different sectors of the Rus' population "elements which represented the highest sanctity [*vysochaishuiu sviatyniu*] for all." The Orthodox faith "cultivated and affirmed a higher single nationality," and "disseminated the same moral ideas and rituals of worship." Moreover, the need for enlightenment arose as a result of Christianity. "Whoever was an educated person in those days either belonged to the church or was familiar with its circle of ideas." The masses, too, understood that the Church and its significance were not particular to any one part of Rus', but rather that it was pan-Rus'ian. The divine liturgy ensured this, because wherever a person travelled in Rus', he could attend the same church service, observe the same rituals, keep the same fasts, read the same prayers, and venerate the same saints as he could at home.'[15]

The Orthodox Church provided Rus' with new temporal forms as well. Church laws developed juridical ideas among the people and "disseminated among all the Rus' lands a single conviction on the sanctity of laws." Customs became laws to be obeyed by all. The clerical hierarchy was also a

---

[14] "Mysli o federativnom nachale," 23.
[15] *Ibid.*, 25-26.

unifying factor in that all district bishops were subordinated to the same "Metropolitan of all Rus'" in Kiev, who in turn was responsible to the patriarch in Constantinople. "The clergy," said Kostomarov, "in most of its relations with the people, stood higher than [any] local customs and ideas, and impressed upon the people its moral strength and, together with the old popular guidelines, introduced new ones which were universal and which applied equally to all parts of the Rus' world." A priest's primary responsibility was to the Church, not to his district. The clergy, which had come to look upon Rus' as a "single whole," urged the *kniaz'ia* to do the same. In general, its influence -- "temporal, moral, and juridical" -- was pan-Rus'ian: "in Novgorod, in Polotsk, in Kiev, and everywhere."[16]

These were, in Kostomarov's mind, the ties which bound Rus' spiritually, if not politically. "Nature and historical circumstances" ensured that each Rus' land was to develop, to a great extent, an independent political life and that all the parts would not easily be moulded into a single whole, but these spiritual ties ensured equally that all sense of oneness would not be lost. On this basis, Rus' strove towards federation and this is the form in which it began to organize itself.[17]

---

[16] *Ibid.*, 26-28.
[17] *Ibid.*, 30.

Other Aspects of Federalism

For Kostomarov, tribal differences were the foundations for the differences among the East Slavic nationalities. "Every little Slavic people had its autonomy," he said.[18] Oddly enough, he divided Rus', not into three, as is usual, but into six distinct nationalities: 1) the South Rus' (Ukrainian), 2) the Severian, 3) the Great Russian, 4) the Belorussian, 5) the Pskovian, and 6) the Novgorodian. These were listed as they appear here, and Kostomarov offered no further explanation of the differences between them or how the uniqueness of each arose. This is an odd agglomeration and suggests that Kostomarov may have been mixing political organization and geographic location with ethnic divergence.[19]

Primitive federative structures, based on sources of unity and disunity such as those found in Kievan Rus', are common throughout history, said Kostomarov, for whenever people have been free to organize their own states, they have inevitably tended to form federations.[20] "The federative principle, even to the smallest degree, may be discerned among all peoples," he claimed. The ancient Greeks were the perfect example of this: each city-state worshipped its own demigods, but all Hellenes worshipped the principal gods of the whole tribe. There was also, among the Greeks, a

---

[18] N.I. Kostomarov, "Pravda moskvicham o Rusi," *Osnova*, Vol. X (October, 1861): 8.
[19] "Mysli o federativnom nachale," 3-4, 13, 18-19. See also Papazian, 341-342.
[20] Papazian, 276.

universality of religious and literary language, and a consciousness of belonging to one tribe, as was the case in Rus'. Besides ancient Greece, Kostomarov cited several other primitive federations: Asia Minor, Italy, Sicily, and the Finnic tribes, to name but a few.[21]

The federative principle was appropriate in Rus' as it was in many other parts of the pre-modern world:

> The peoples [of Rus'] desired a single common defence, but they wished to forego neither their independence nor their local democracy, even though all recognized the essential need for an authority which would, for its part, sustain the enthusiasm of the masses.[22]

According to Kostomarov, the famous *kniaz'* Vladimir Monomakh was just such an authority. He was "a defender [*chelovek-borets*] of the federative principle in our [i.e., the Ukrainian] past." He established the custom that every *kniaz'* was to have his *volost'* and promoted the autonomy of the Rus' lands, "not allowing them to merge..." On the other hand, he left a "moral legacy of unity and agreement," as well as a "political legacy of reciprocity and the relationship of all Rus' lands..." Moreover, Vladimir supported "the ancient principle of Slavic *veche* democracy..." His leadership did not lead to precise political and social forms, but, said Kostomarov, "Vladimir endeavoured, at the end of the eleventh and the beginning of the twelfth century, to grow the crop which had been seeded

---

[21] "Po povodu knigi M.O. Koialovicha," 304-305.
[22] "Kniaz' Vladimir Monomakh," 149.

halfway through the ninth."[23]

Rus' was simply too large and diverse to have developed quickly and easily into a monocracy, or into any form of sovereign state for that matter.[24] "How can we discern the monocratic principle," Kostomoarov asked, "in a place where everything pointed towards greater division, rather than unification of lands?"[25] In the pre-Mongol period, no groundwork was laid for the future Russian monocracy (and certainly none for the future Russian autocracy). There was definitely no conscious striving for such a structure and the social order of the time could easily have facilitated a federated structure of some sort.[26] In fact, if the Rus' people had been left alone to develop their own political way of life, they undoubtedly would eventually have formed a federation in the modern sense of the term,[27] but the Mongol invasion turned federal possibilities into monocratic realities.[28]

A Limited Federalism

Kostomarov was criticized by some nineteenth century commentators, such as Markevich, Lokhvitskii, and Koialovich, for "exaggerating" the extent of federative ties

---

[23] *Ibid.*, 149-150.
[24] "Mysli o federativnom nachale," 3.
[25] "Nachalo edinoderzhaviia," 40-41.
[26] *Ibid.*, 41.
[27] N.I. Kostomarov, "Slovechko po povodu zamechaniia o federativnom nachale v drevnei Rusi," *NPPP*, 302-303.
[28] "Po povodu knigi M.O. Koialovicha," 305, and "Mysli o federativnom nachale," 30.

in Kievan Rus'.[2'] Lokhvitskii's doctoral dissertation, entitled "Guberniia," was, in fact, a partial critique of Kostomarov on the federative principle in Rus'. Lokhvitskii claimed that 1) the words "federation" and "federative principle" are out of place when discussing Rus', 2) Kostomarov used such words only in view of the possibility of a future Russia taking on such a structure, and 3) nationality is not a valid concept except for those peoples who possess a history of independent political life. Kostomarov dismissed the latter two points out of hand, saying respectively that he did not want to re-establish Russia along apanage-*veche* lines and that Lokhvitskii's statist ideas were "extraordinarily one-sided." As to the first point, Kostomarov took the opportunity to elaborate on his observations in "Mysli o federativnom nachale v drevnei Rusi." He said that Lokhvitskii understood the concept of "federative principle" in only its Western definition. That the Rus' federation was not like an eighteenth or nineteenth century federal state was self-evident. Federation in Rus' was not of a complete and structured nature; it was merely federalism in a very primitive stage. Irrespective of feuds and internecine strife, no Rus' land ever showed any outright separatist tendencies. Lokhvitskii, Kostomarov said, could not deny that while Galicia, for instance, was "cognizant of its autonomy in relation to the other parts of Rus'," it "never ceased to consider itself a Rus' land and

---

[2'] See Markevich, 314.

to find itself in political agreements and social ties with the rest of Rus'." Rus' was as much of a federation as could be expected for the time.[30]

If Kostomarov's observations are judged according to a modern definition of federalism,[31] it could be concluded that he saw federative ties where none existed. However, he was quite aware that federalism in its fullest manifestation was a relatively recent historical phenomenon.[32] The concept of federation should not be interpreted so narrowly, he said. Again, he turned to comparisons with foreign states and pointed out that federation in ancient Greece was certainly not of a modern form, "but who would say that there was no federative principle there?" He was quite clear in stating that among the Rus' lands, there were certain factors of unity and disunity which would have necessarily led the Rus' lands to federate in some way had they been left alone to do so. This is what he saw -- nothing more and nothing less:

> In ancient Rus', I did not see a completely constructed federation, and nowhere did I call apanage-*veche* Rus' a federation in the sense of a political body, with congresses or diets, in the mould of the United States; I spoke only of a federative principle, and if I allowed myself to see in ancient Rus' something of a federation, then perhaps a seminal federation.[33]

---

[30] "Zamechanie g. Lokhvitskomu," 201-202.

[31] Schlessinger defines federalism as "a political system under which every citizen is subordinated to at least two state organizations, and is in immediate contact with both of them." The mutual relationship between the two state organizations, too, is supposed to be one of subordination. See Schlessinger, 36.

[32] "Po povodu knigi M.O. Koialovicha," 304-305.

[33] "Slovechko po povodu zamechaniia," 302-303.

Kostomarov used phrases such as "the embryo of federation" and said that in Rus', there was no "structured, conscious, definite federation of lands."[34] It is evident that Kostomarov saw only a very limited federalism in Kievan Rus', a "federative principle," as he called it, and did not claim that Rus' had achieved full federalism in the modern sense. If this is not clear in "Mysli o federativnom nachale v drevnei Rusi," it is certainly so in everything he wrote to clarify this article. It would be fair to say that Kostomarov's critics were incorrect in censuring him in this regard.

C. Analysis

Historiography of Rus' Federalism

A sample of what other historians say about the federative principle having existed in Kievan Rus' is instructive. Kluchevsky discusses Rus' federalism extensively. He claims that Kiev developed into the centre of a great federation.[35] As the growth of patrimonialism-proprietorship developed, there was an increasing division among the lands, and by the end of the twelfth century, Rus' had become a system of "slenderly connected" principalities. Iaroslav the Wise's rota system of

---

[34] "Nachalo edinoderzhaviia," 7, 25, and "O znachenii Velikago Novgoroda," 201.
[35] Kluchevsky, 77.

succession[36] contributed to disintegrating the land, but interestingly, Kluchevsky says that it paradoxically created a consciousness of "common material ties binding the whole country into one." Kluchevsky admits that there was no effective political power in Kievan Rus', but he, like Kostomarov, claims that there were certain ties which inevitably kept the Rus' lands conscious of their essential oneness: 1) common "needs and aspirations" brought about as a result of the rota system, 2) the pan-territoriality of the clergy and the aristocracy, 3) Kiev's position as spiritual and nominal political centre of Rus', and 4) "homogeneity of forms and settings." These were not political ties, but "ties racial, social, religious, and economic[;] there was no unity of state -- only a unity of territory and population." He summarizes:

> ...that a dim responsibility towards fatherland had already arisen in Rus' seems evident from the fact that at the council held at Liubech in 1097 we find the princes clinching an oath which they had sworn with the following curse upon whomsoever should break it: "Upon him be the Holy Cross and the whole [Rus'] land!"[37]

Gradovskii is no less convinced that Rus' was a federation of sorts. There was no narrow, parochial patriotism, he says; all "poetical and political" ideas had a "common national [*obshchenatsional'noe*]" significance. Kievan Rus' did not have political unity but had spiritual unity instead. In the same way that Russia of Gradovskii's

---

[36] *Ibid.*, 94-106.
[37] *Ibid.*, 114-127.

time unified around such symbols as Pushkin, Karamzin, and Lomonosov, Kievan Rus' looked upon Vladimir the Great as its common spiritual focus. "The people used this name to designate, not the special *kniaz'* of the Kievan *volost'*, but the ideal *kniaz'* of that Holy Rus' which always lived in their consciousness" (Gradovskii's emphasis). Gradovskii, like Kostomarov, cites a number of poems and songs to support this view and sums up his perception of the federative principle in Rus:

> In spite of the disunity among *volosti* as independent centres, not only of administrative, but also, in part, of political life among the people and among the *kniaz'ia*, there lived a consciousness of a united Rus' land. In clashes with foreigners and pagans, the "land" was as one. In foreign relations, there were neither Pereiaslavian *kniaz'ia* nor Chernigovian *kniaz'ia*, but only Rus'ian *kniaz'ia*.[38]

Others agree as well. Presniakov notes that *kniaz'ia* "were conscious of themselves as a whole, broader than the individual *volosti*, their patrimonies, and that this whole was not merely the sum of the separate and independent *volosti*-principalities." Ancient Rus' cannot be understood as simply a unified sovereign state, a federation, or a sum total of sovereign principalities. It was none of these, yet it was some of each of these.[39] According to Dmytro Doroshenko, Rus', after the eleventh century, became "a federation of separate princedoms joined only by a common dynasty and the upper Church hierarchy, under the more or

---

[38] Gradovskii, 372-375.
[39] Presniakov, 66, 154.

less nominal (depending upon the individual) suzerainty of the grand prince of Kiev."[40] Hrushevs'kyi explains that the centrifugal forces in Rus' were too powerful. What were once actual bonds of state became mere ideas -- "a consciousness of a definite common political tradition, a common law, a common religion, and a common culture." There was a notion of oneness, but no real unity.[41]

George Vernadsky is perhaps the most convinced proponent of the idea that Kievan Rus' was based on the federative principle, a "kind of loose federation," as he calls it.[42] Vernadsky straightforwardly calls the period from 1139-1237 the "Russian Federation." Realistically, he says, Rus' consisted of several different states at this time, but because of dynastic and religious ties, there was a "faint sense of the basic unity of [Rus'] as such." He points out that Rus' citizens, when in a principality not their own, were referred to, not as "foreigners [*chuzhezemtsy*]" but as "outsiders [*inogorodnye* or *inozemtsy*]." There were attempts by the *knіaz'ia* to retain at least a modicum of "federative unity" by holding princely conferences, but after the death of Vladimir Monomakh's son Mstislav, the Kievan realm broke down completely as a political unit. Nonetheless, Rus' could still be designated at that time, not as "a mere agglomeration of wholly independent units," but as a state in the broadest sense of

---

[40] Dmytro Doroshenko, "Shcho take istoriia skhidn'oi Evropy?" *Ukrains'kyi istoryk* 1-2 (73-74) (1982): 11.
[41] Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, 47-51, 129-130.
[42] Vernadsky, 175.

the term.[43]

There appears to be a broad consensus on a rudimentary federative principle having existed in Kievan Rus'. Like Kostomarov, none of the historians cited calls the territory a true political federation, but each is aware that in spite of the causes of disunity, there were significant factors causing the Rus' people, regardless of which principality they inhabited, to consider the whole of Rus' their native soil. Common ancestry, religion, the royal dynasty -- these points are ubiquitous unifying tendencies in historiography on the Kievan period. Kostomarov showed himself to be in the nineteenth century mainstream in making his observations on this topic but it may be said that he was more thorough than most in explaining and elaborating on them.

Criticism

Kostomarov was much more solid on the federative principle in Rus' than he was on democracy, but once again, economic and social explanations for certain phenomena are conspicuous by their absence. This is evident in his consideration of unity and disunity. As noted in the last chapter, the Kievan state existed primarily to facilitate trade, especially between the Baltic region and Byzantium.[44] Under this condition, Kiev evolved into the

---

[43] *Ibid.*, 210-215.

[44] This is not necessarily to deny Grekov's thesis that Rus' was firstly and foremostly an agricultural state, but it is difficult to go as far as he does in saying that agriculture

"central point of the commercial and industrial traffic of the country."[1] Trade was organized on a "national scale" with the Dnieper as its main artery,[2] and Kiev's advantageous position soon enabled it to become the capital of an early type of federation[3] which undoubtedly possessed a feeling of spiritual unity for the reasons Kostomarov enumerated but which had no *de facto* significance as a single unit apart from the economic foundations of its existence. When trade between the Baltic and the Black Sea declined and eventually fell because of the Crusades (its death blow was the sacking of Constantinople in 1204), Kiev also declined and fell as a trading centre -- a process clearly evident to Andrei Bogoliubskii, who relocated the realm's centre in Rostov-Suzdal', which lay at the confluence of active and newly dominant trade routes.[4]

The political and economic ascendancy of Rostov-Suzdal' went hand in hand with similar but separate economic development in other principalities. Novgorod and Pskov traded abundantly with Western Europe, as did Galicia, giving such regions their own economic bases and allowing them to operate independently of any centralized authority. Kiev had lost its significance while Rostov-Suzdal' had not yet developed its own. Provincial societies formed their own

---

[1](cont'd) was the mainstay of both society and state. See Grekov, 35.
[2] Kluchevsky, 77. Kluchevsky goes a bit far when he virtually denies that agriculture played a vital role in the economic life of Kievan Rus'. See Vernadsky, 99-102.
[3] Vernadsky, 118.
[4] Kluchevsky, 77.
[5] Vernadsky, 117-121.

material (and ethnic) cultures at the expense of a common national one.[49]

Trade and economic relations in general contributed substantially to determining the relative unity and disunity of Kievan Rus' at a given time. This is not to deny the validity of Kostomarov's own observations on federalism, but only to say that he did not explore them in depth. The causes and effects of unity and disunity are often confused or lacking altogether, such as when he explained that eastern and western Rus' grew apart from each other because each was controlled by a different royal house.[50] This was not a cause of disunity, but its effect, the cause being *a priori* economic and military[51] factors which reinforced existing elements such as geography and ethnicity. Whether Rus' would eventually have developed into a full-fledged political federation is a question to which Kostomarov resoundingly answered "yes" based on the spiritual unity which the territory undoubtedly possessed; but without a complete assessment of the pertinent economic conditions, Kostomarov lost what little right he had, as a historian, to indulge in such speculations about what might have been.

---

[49] *Ibid.*, 216-217.
[50] "Mysli o federativnom nachale," 24.
[51] A divided Rus' could not, for example, stand up to outside aggression from both the Mongols and Lithuania.

D. Conclusion

As mentioned above, Kostomarov's observations on the federative principle in Kievan Rus' were much less contentious than than were his thoughts on democracy, even though he was guilty on both counts of ignoring crucial economic and social elements. Doing so allowed Kostomarov to see too much brotherhood and too many reasons why the Eastern Slavs would have developed their common bonds at the expense of explaining why they did not. Once again, the Mongol invasion provided a convenient scapegoat for a process which was far more complex than Kostomarov considered it to be.

This fundamental criticism aside, it may be said that Kostomarov offered both historical scholarship and nationalist mythology a clear, if somewhat incomplete, summary of the federative principle in Rus'. Spiritually, Rus' never did lose its sense of oneness, but this was not, and never would have been, enough to ensure a federal future for the territory, at least not the way Kostomarov envisioned it.

IV. Nationality

A. Introduction

Historically legitimizing a distinct Ukrainian nationality was Kostomarov's *raison d'être* as both a publicist and a historian. He authoritatively asserted the right of Ukrainians to be recognized as a separate social whole with their own history, equal in every way to all other nationalities,[1] and devoted a great deal of his creative activity to substantiating his claim. Kostomarov's argument was based on the view that in the relationship between state and people, the lives of the two must be considered separately.[2] An observer must differentiate between the nationality of the state (*narodnost' gosudarstvennaia*) and the nationality of the people (*narodnost' massy*), he said,[3] and realize that studying state actions is incomplete without looking at the people whom such actions affect.[4]

This embrace of "the people" and their nationality and folk traditions reflected the formative influence of Romanticism on Kostomarov, especially the teachings of Herder. The latter helped lay the theoretical groundwork for the "national rebirth of peoples" in the late eighteenth and

---

[1] N.I. Kostomarov, "Ukraina," *Kolokol*, No. 61 (January 15, 1860): 502-503.
[2] Papazian, 276.
[3] "O znachenii Velikago Novgoroda," 213.
[4] "Ob otnoshenii ruskoi istorii k geografii i etnografii," 722.

early nineteenth centuries by urging that the "examples and models" for independent national existence be sought in a people's own history[4] and by suggesting that language was the "natural vehicle for the expression of a people's soul."[5] Kostomarov's concern with nationality was typical Romantic "historical renovation." He, like others similarly influenced, attempted to legitimize his nationality by realizing "in" strange and oppressive conditions the spirit and values of that distant Golden Age."[6] Focussing on "the people" and on the historical delineation between people and state was also a legacy of Herder. History, for Herder, was

> a resultant of the interplay of two sets of forces: the external forces which constitute human environment, and an internal force which can be described only as 'the spirit' of man or, more accurately, as the spirit of the various peoples into which the homogeneous human species is broken up.[7]

This well suited Ukrainian history, as Kostomarov and other Ukrainian historians after him, such as Hrushevs'kyi, were quickly given to understand. Since the fourteenth century, the vast majority of Ukrainian lands had been under the control of the Lithuanians, the Poles, and the Great Russians, at various times, and Ukrainians therefore had little independent political history of which to speak. This submerged status did not, however, imply that the Ukrainian nationality did not have a history of its own, nor did it

---

[4] Polukhin, 62.
[5] McNeill, 56.
[6] Smith, 22.
[7] W.H. Walsh, *An Introduction to Philosophy of History* (London: Hutchinson, 1967), 131.

discourage Kostomarov from considering the Ukrainian people as worthy of scholarly investigation and, obversely, of historical idealization.'

Kostomarov's work, as noted earlier, concentrating as it did on "the people" and their nationality, was largely a response to the predominant Russian and Polish statist historiography of the period.'° In his writings, he constantly sought an understanding of the "true and proper relation" of Ukrainians to Great Russians and Poles and of Ukraine to Russia and Poland.'' A great many of his articles represented this "ethnographic trend" in nineteenth century European historiography, enabling Doroshenko to label Kostomarov as one of its most famous representatives.'² Articles such as the above-cited "Ukraina," written as a letter to Alexander Herzen's émigré journal *Kolokol*, "Pravda moskvicham o Rusi,"'³ and "Pravda poliakam o Rusi"'⁴ were among the most noteworthy of these, but it may be said that a majority of Kostomarov's scholarly activity, and certainly all of his polemical and publicistic writings related to

---

' *Ibid.*, 23.
'° Hrushevs'kyi, "Ukrains'ka istoriografiia," 222. Others, such as Zorian Chodakowski, had already set a precedent for Kostomarov's approach of talking to peasants and collecting folk songs as a legitimate basis of research. Chodakowski published his findings in 1818. See David B. Saunders, "Historians and Concepts of Nationality in Early Nineteenth Century Russia," *Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. 60, No. 1 (January, 1982): 44-62.
'' Papazian, 357.
'² Doroshenko, "A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography," 118.
'³ *Osnóva*, Vol. X (October, 1861): 1-15. See also "Dopolnenie k 'Pravde moskvicham o Rusi'," *Osnova*, Vol. I (January, 1862): 58-62.
'⁴ *Osnova*, Vol. X (October, 1861): 100-112.

this question in one form or another. In "Pravda moskvicham" and "Pravda poliakam," he attacked the particularism and great power chauvinism of the Russians and Poles, admonishing the former for thinking it had colonized South Rus' instead of the other way around,[1] and the latter for considering Ukrainians as "a mass which does not have...individuality [or] a distinctive character, able to serve only as raw material for the Polish nationality..."[2]

B. Democracy and Federalism as Inherent Ukrainian National Characteristics

"Dve russkiia narodnosti"

By far Kostomarov's clearest and most comprehensive statement of opposition to Russian statist historiography was his article "Dve russkiia narodnosti."[3] Here, he thoroughly investigated the Ukrainian relationship to Great Russians, drawing a variety of comparisons between the two peoples. The article, which has been called the "gospel of Ukrainian separatism"[4] and the "manifesto of the Ukrainian renaissance,"[5] was in may ways a synthesis of Kostomarov's views on democracy and federalism in East Slavic history. It validated the existence of a distinct Ukrainian nationality by claiming that a democratic-federative attitude was

---

[1] "Pravda moskvicham," 8.
[2] "Pravda poliakam," 112.
[3] SS, Book I, Vol. I, 31-65.
[4] Hrushevs'kyi, "Ukrains'ka istoriografiia," 223.
[5] Rubach, 65.

present from Kievan times among Ukrainians but absent among Great Russians. The article is "filled with indications that the [Ukrainian] people always distinguished themselves by altruistic qualities,"[20] while the Great Russians did not. The Ukrainian psyche, as representative of the ancient Slavic tradition, was characterized by a love and propensity for individual freedom, self-government, and rudimentary democracy. The Great Russian personality was strong in "discipline, organization, and governmental elements."[21] Ukrainians had always stressed freedom of individual action while the Great Russians went ahead and built a state.

Kostomarov used this article to state his belief that Kievan Rus' was the "fount and origin of Ukrainian history."[22] He was the first historian to state unequivocally that Kievan Rus' was Ukraine's medieval ancestor, not Great Russia's.[23] He even claimed that the name "Rus'" was a Ukrainian product in that it was the name of a realm centred in ethnically Ukrainian territory. Kievan Rus' had been known simply as "Rus'" but when the Muscovite state emerged, it took the name Rus' for itself and left South Rus' without a name, as it were.[24] How early in history it was, noted Kostomarov, that South Rus' as the geographic, economic, and, for a while, political focus of

---

[20] Markevich, 313.
[21] Papazian, 315.
[22] *Ibid.*, 350. See also Markevich, 316, and Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, Vol. I, 16.
[23] Rubach, 65.
[24] "Dve russkiia narodnosti," 37. See also N.I. Kostomarov, "Davno-li Malaia Rus' stala pisat'sia Malorossieiu a Rus' -- Rossieiu?" *NPPP*, 223-227.

East Slavdom took its own historical direction, different from that of the much younger north-east.

The Ukrainians

According to Kostomarov, there was already a semblance of unity among the South Rus' tribes during the time of the Antes and certainly by the ninth century. These peoples, being of a "single mind" and affected by the same conditions and circumstances, moved closer together; i.e., they took on similar psychological, ethnographic, and anthropological characteristics. Significantly, these peoples included the Novgorodians, whom Kostomarov always considered close ethnic relations to the Ukrainians.[25] Kievan Rus' well represented the "old true Slavic order" of rudimentary democracy and federalism to Kostomarov. There was certainly an element of personal freedom and political democracy in Rus' as was evident in the *veche* election of the *kniaz'*. According to Kostomarov, all impulses toward freedom in Kievan Rus' were tied to the Ukrainian south.[26] The same was true for federalism. Neither did Kiev strive to be the capital of a centralized, monocratic realm, nor was any other groundwork for the future Russian monocracy-autocracy laid in this period.[27] South Rus' and Novgorod both sought some sort of federated state structure from very early on, but because of the Mongol invasion, north-east Rus', i.e., Great Russia,

---

[25] "Dve russkiia narodnosti," 39-40.
[26] Papazian, 334.
[27] "Dve russkiia narodnosti," 50, and "Mysli o federativnom nachale," 30.

lost any of the traditional Slavic propensities for democracy and federalism which it may have had earlier and which were found elsewhere in Rus'. The "old-true Slavic order" remained not as a Great Russian, but as a Ukrainian national inheritance. The Kievan state itself did not continue, but there was a definite continuity of certain elements of this order among the Ukrainian people.[28]

The Cossacks' electing their leaders in an essentially unstructured way was, to Kostomarov, undeniable proof that the Ukrainian people retained the Kievan and ancient Slavic heritage of *veche* democracy and concomitant vagueness of form. A tolerance for other cultures and languages, as well as the absence of legal estates, of class privilege, and of the degradation of the "weak and insignificant" were qualities found among both the people of Kievan Rus' and the Cossacks.[29] As for the federative principle, continuity is evident in Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi's attempt to join Cossack Ukraine with tsarist Russia in 1654.[30] This was interpreted by Kostomarov as being an endeavour by the famous Cossack leader to re-establish the proto-federal relations which had clearly existed between the two peoples in the apanage-*veche* period of East Slavic history. The union was between two distinct and separate nationalities

---

[28] Hrushevs'kyi, "Kostomarov i novitnia Ukraina," 14.
[29] "Dve russkiia narodnosti," 54, and "Cherty narodnoi iuzhnorusskoi istorii," 117.
[30] The nature of this agreement remains controversial to this day. See John Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1982), esp. 107-108.

but it was nonetheless an "internal [*vnutrennaia*]" union, or rather reunion, of two tribal brothers.[31] Cossackdom itself was

> a form born specifically in ancient times [which] searched for this federation in unification with Muscovy, where such federative bases had ceased to exist long ago.[32]

In a word, Kostomarov felt that there were more similarities between Kievan Rus' and Cossackdom "than it was possible to say," with the exception that there was no single ruling family in the latter, though this may have changed had Khmel'nyts'kyi's son been of a higher personal quality.[33]

In Contrast: The Great Russians

As Kostomarov saw it, the Great Russians did not appear on the historical scene until the mid-twelfth century, with Andrei Bogoliubskii as the "first Muscovite *kniaz'*."[34] As a result of mixing with non-Slavic foreign elements, such as Finnic and Turkic tribes and later the Mongols, the Great Russians appeared as a nationality, establishing a new ethnic and anthropological type:

> ...in the north-east, a new Slavic-Rus' nationality was created with its own character [and] with different conditions and aspects of life. Its beginning is traced from early years unknown to us; in the twelfth century, it evinced its existence with several salient features.[35]

---

[31] "Kniaz' Vladimir Monomakh i kazak Bogdan Khmel'nitskii," 151-153.
[32] "Dve russkiia narodnosti," 43-44.
[33] *Ibid.*, 44-45.
[34] *Istoryia Ukrainy*, 75.
[35] "Dve russkiia narodnosti," 47.

Great Russian national characteristics formed as the exact antithesis of what Kostomarov saw as inherent Ukrainian traits:

> ...in contrast to the predominant [Russian] view that Ukraine was damaged by Polish incursions, while in Muscovy, the Kievan Rus' tradition continued, Kostomarov saw the Muscovite order as a fundamental perversion of the old way of life, and saw the living, organic continuation of it among the Ukrainians.[36]

Because of their geographic and political circumstances, the Great Russians developed a predisposition for collectivism (*obshchnost'*) in contrast to the Ukrainian love for individualism and personal freedom (*lichnoi svobodi*). This collectivist attitude enabled them to construct a monocracy:

> What differentiates the Great Russian people in its infancy from the people of South Rus' and other Rus' lands is this -- the striving to give solidity and formality to the unity of their lands.[37]

Any such desire for unity among Rus'-Ukrainians was, as Kostomarov said, a desire for federative unity. As mentioned above, there was absolutely nothing in the Kievan Rus' political or social structure to suggest that the realm would necessarily have evolved into a monocracy had not the centre of Rus' power shifted north-east and the Mongols invaded, changing the Great Russian national character forever.

There was a variety of other differences between the Great Russians and the Ukrainians, said Kostomarov. In art,

---

[36] Hrushevs'kyi, "Ukrains'ka istoriografiia," 222.
[37] "Dve russkiia narodnosti," 40, and "Nachalo edinoderzhaviia," 40-41.

as in social and domestic life, the Great Russians were very materialistic and practical while the Ukrainians exhibited an intense spiritualism. Great Russians did not much care for nature -- Kostomarov cited the example of a Great Russian farmer cutting down the trees around his house to get a better view -- while the Ukrainians showed a love for, almost an organic unity with, it. The Ukrainians' songs are filled with references to "grass, trees, birds, and animals." Also, Great Russian social ideas tended toward greater conformity than did the Ukrainian. The Russian *mir*, for example, was a communal organization to which every peasant had to belong. It alone spoke in the name of the peasants, individually or collectively. A member could never withdraw at will and dared not call any *mir* possession his very own. The Ukrainian *hromada*, on the other hand, was a free association of the people of a community. Whoever wanted to participate in it could do so; whoever did not was not forced. The Zaporizhian Sich was the best example of this form of community organization in Ukrainian history, said Kostomarov. In the *hromada*, every individual was considered an independent, autonomous personality who could speak for himself and make agreements with others in the interests of personal security, economic well-being, etc. Generally, the Great Russian element contained something communitarian (*gromadnoe*) and creative (*sozdatel'noe*), as well as "a spirit of order, a consciousness of unity, and the predominance of practical judgement." These qualities

were, according to Kostomarov, almost entirely absent among the Ukrainian people who were guided, he said, by an almost anarchic spirit.[33]

Summary

The contrast between the two nationalities was painted as strikingly as possible, showing Ukrainians to have an immemorial history of tolerance, individualism, and love of freedom, poor at building states and other matters requiring collective effort, discipline and precise form. The Great Russians, on the other hand, were shown to be collectivistic and intolerant, but quite talented at pulling themselves (and others) together for a common purpose. The contrast is so sharply defined because Kostomarov wanted to claim full-fledged nationality for the Ukrainian people and to place them on an equal footing of legitimacy with the Great Russians. He was attempting to counteract those who claimed that Ukrainians were merely "Little Russians" and that the Ukrainian language was nothing but a dialect of Great Russian. Again, neither nationality was morally superior to the other in Kostomarov's eyes. He wanted to assert the separate but equal existence of the Ukrainian nationality, to be sure, but he seemed quite pleased that someone, even if it was not the Ukrainians, had had enough discipline and sense of East Slavic unity to organize a state structure, even if it was monocratic in nature. This is evident in his

---

[33] "Dve russkiia narodnosti," 55-64.

seeing the *veche* as a sign of weakness after the Mongols had invaded.

Kostomarov believed that Ukrainians, because of their virtually anarchical nature, could never form an independent sovereign state and that they inevitably had to join Russia or Poland. Kostomarov lamented that Great Russia had lost its democratic, and federative bases, even though these had never been particularly strong there, and wished that it had accepted Ukraine as an equal partner in a reconstituted federation in 1654, but it was not to be. He loved and admired the Ukrainian national spirit, but he respected, and was thankful, that the Great Russian people were the way they were:

> In regard to the practicality of the federative system, we see that it was only with the Mongol invasion that the Land was really united. Kostomarov begins his narrative as if with praise for the Ukrainian love for freedom and the value of the federative system, but then he comes to the opposite conclusion in which he admits the value of an autocratic organization and the bankruptcy of the Ukrainians to maintain a viable state system.[39]

Kostomarov's view of East Slavic history was true to the words of nineteenth century French historian Mme. de Staël who said, "C'est la liberté qui est ancienne et c'est la despotisme qui est moderne,"[40] but practically speaking, he felt that despotism had its good side, too.

---

[39] Papazian, 320, 351.
[40] Quoted in Mykhailo Drahomanov, "Mykola Ivanovych Kostomariv," *S'vit*, No. 2 (February 10, 1881):30.

C. Analysis

Ethnographic Determinism

Kostomarov set out to explain the historical process by means of ethnographic determinism. In other words, the reasons for events taking place and historical figures acting the way they did were attributable to national traits. Ukrainians would react to a problem or situation within the framework of their unstructured democratic-federative, almost anarchical, mindset, while Great Russians would be predisposed to handling a similar problem in a much more structured and disciplined way. When the Ukrainians formed a system of government early in their history, for example, they developed the *veche*-federative system. By contrast, the Great Russians, early in their own history, were already well on the road to monocracy and later to autocracy.[41] Thus, according to Kostomarov, a people's fate is determined by little more than "spiritual peculiarities," inherent traits which "assert their basic nature" more or less, depending on the circumstances.[42]

This "ethnographic plan" was the means by which Kostomarov sought to resolve the problem of nation and state.[43] As mentioned earlier, the Ukrainian people, since the Kievan period, had had virtually no state of their own. Kostomarov wanted to show that this did not necessarily mean

---

[41] Rubinshtain, 428-429.
[42] Papazian, 313.
[43] Rubinshtain, 428-429.

Ukrainians had no history whatever: the Ukrainian people, with its particular language, folk traditions, and other anthropological characteristics remained a vital force in East Slavdom, even when subjected to Polish or Great Russian overlordship. If the Ukrainians had been left alone to build a state (and Kostomarov was far from certain that they could ever do so on their own), it would inevitably have mirrored their inherent national propensity for democracy and the federative principle and hence been antithetical to the Russian monocracy-autocracy which eventually did develop.

Does the ethnographic plan explain the actual historical process, though? Is the Great Russian "national spirit" sufficient reason why this people took the historical path it did and accomplished all it accomplished, while the Ukrainians became but passive agents in the march of East Slavic statist history? Of course not. If ethnographic determinism, as Kostomarov explained it, is accepted, this leaves no room for anything else to alter the historical process from pre-history onward. The concept of historical causation loses all significance because every historical phenomenon is reducible to the nationality of the actors involved: "He acted the way he did because he is a Russian." The study of history becomes nothing but the study of effects -- names, dates, and places -- because the cause always remains the same. There is no need to search any deeper. Ethnographic determinism plays the same role as Divine Providence as the basis for historical explanation;

it can be cited as the reason for everything being the way it is. Such a notion is neither provable or disprovable and it requires a great leap of faith for it to serve its purpose. While ethnographic determinism can arguably explain a "certain limited historical situation,"[42] it has little value as a comprehensive tool for elucidating the historical process as a whole.

It must be remembered that Kostomarov's purpose as a historian was not to explain, but to idealize, and ethnographic determinism served him well in this regard. He avoided searching for answers in such fundamentally important areas as social and economic relationships, preferring to think that these played little part in historical development. This is evident in his judgement on why Great Russia (i.e., Moscow), as opposed to Lithuania or Novgorod, eventually "gathered" the Rus' lands around itself. Kostomarov naturally ascribed this to the successful nationality's inherent monocratic propensity, though closer examination reveals a much more complex causal infrastructure. Lithuania (i.e., the ethnically Lithuanian ruling class) would probably never have succeeded in uniting Rus' because it was a Catholic island in a sea of East Slavic Orthodoxy. Novgorod, for its part, was at a disadvantage because of its "narrow, essentially commercial outlook."[43] Moscow was successful, not least of all because

---

[42] Papazian, 336-337.
[43] Pipes, 39.

of its advantageous geographic location.[46] Notwithstanding its conquest by the Mongols, it had a great degree of insularity. It was not easily susceptable to foreign invasion, such as those by the ascendent Turks. Yet its insularity did not place Moscow outside major trade routes. It lay at the confluence of several important river systems, giving it access to Baltic and Caspian, as well as Black Sea, trade. In addition, Moscow's central position between North and South Rus' allowed it to exert a significant amount of influence and control over both regions in church matters.[47] Andrei Bogoliubskii showed himself to be the intelligent and perceptive *kniaz'* he was when he recognized the political and economic advantages of moving the Rus' centre of power to Rostov-Suzdal' from the declining south. This indeed made him the first true "Muscovite" ruler,[48] not because of his nationality, as Kostomarov claimed, but because of his measured response to changing political and economic realities.

Cause and Effect: The Mongol Invasion and its Impact on East Slavic History

If political and economic conditions encouraged Bogoliubskii and his Great Russian successors to act as they did, their actions were effects, not causes. Their inherent

---

[46] Kluchevsky, 277.
[47] Solov'ev, Book II, Vol. IV, 453-455, and Kluchevsky, 237-238.
[48] *Istoryia Ukrainy*, 75.

national characteristics, supposedly formed in pre-history and henceforth unchangeable, could be moulded in response to contemporary conditions. If national traits could be formed by geography and "living historical circumstances" in pre-history, why could the same not happen in the historical epoch?''

Kostomarov's problem with this whole question of cause and effect is strikingly obvious in his appraisal of the role of the Mongol invasion in East Slavic history. He believed that Mongol interaction with the Great Russians changed the latter's national psyche and forever perverted the "old true Slavic order" of democracy and the federative principle among them. Yet this "old true Slavic order" was somehow retained by the Ukrainians who, though they were not under Mongol suzerainty as long as the Great Russians, were also invaded. Why was the Ukrainian national character not similarly altered and made predisposed to monocracy-autocracy? Kostomarov may have answered that the Great Russians arrived on the historical scene already possessing the ability to build a strong, centralized state, but this would necessarily have undercut the decisive nature of the Mongol invasion in changing the Great Russian national character away from the ancient Slavic archetype.

Kostomarov could not have it both ways. Either the Mongol invasion was the catalyst of change in the Great Russians' national character or such traits had always

---

'' Papazian, 336-337.

inhered in them. If he chose the former, he would have been admitting that national predispositions can and do change because of contemporary historical circumstances. This is logically inconsistent with ethnographic determinism and would have left Kostomarov with no explanation of why Great Russia developed, among other things, a monocratic propensity as early as the time of Andrei Bogoliubskii, or of how the ethnically Great Russian Don Cossacks came into being if it was the Ukrainians who were supposed to be the post-medieval frontiersmen representing the "old true Slavic order." If he chose the latter, of course, it would not be clear why the Mongol invasion played any part at all in forming the Great Russian national character. As is quite often the case with a broad preconceived notion, such as ethnographic determinism, it purports to explain much, but in the end it creates more questions than answers and inevitably explains very little.

D. Conclusion

Kostomarov, having another mission to fulfill, did not want to search very deeply for historical causes. He completely ignored politics, economics, and the social structure as factors reinforcing each other and contributing to the historical process. Seeking such explanations would have undermined the ethnographic plan which was ultimately necessary to assert the existence of a Ukrainian nationality having as much right to recognition and legitimacy as did

the Great Russian, irrespective of the former being politically subjected to the latter. A more thorough historiographical method would perhaps have allowed Kostomarov to draw conclusions very different from those he did, but again historical impartiality was not what motivated Kostomarov, no matter how much he liked to quote V.F. Miller. As noted above, the facts had to fit the plan, not the other way around, and the plan of informing people about the distinctiveness and legitimacy of the Ukrainian nationality was far more important to Kostomarov than any strict adherence to historical facts ever could be.

V. Conclusion

All key figures in history have both shaped and been shaped by their milieu. This was perhaps never truer for anyone than it was for the early historians of the submerged Central and East European nationalities, such as Kostomarov and Palacký. Being products of the French Revolution and its theoretical antecedents as well as of German Romanticism, these men wrote at a time when their audiences were becoming sentient of themselves as national units and were therefore susceptible to the arguments laid before them and certainly to the flattery and idealization inherent in such an approach.

Kostomarov seemed quite cognizant of his role in the overall development of Ukrainian national consciousness or, at the very least, he knew how important historiography would be to this process. No nation unaware of its collective past, of its glories and sorrows, and of all else that binds it together and makes it feel that it is a nation, could ever achieve greatness or carry out its historical mission, felt Kostomarov, and it was the historian's task to awaken the people to this unity. In recognizing this, he showed a keen insight into social communication as a basis for nationalism.[1] In the case of the Ukrainians, if they remained oblivious to the importance and vitality of their democratic-federative propensities, they would be unable to mould the future in their own image

---

[1] Deutsch, 38, 173-174.

and best interest including, of course, forming a Ukrainian national government of some sort and working towards reconstituting the Russian Empire along democratic-federative lines.

Ukrainian historiography preceding Kostomarov was decidedly inappropriate to the task of focussing the nationalist tendencies of the Ukrainian people. The works of Bantysh-Kamenskii[2] and the unknown author of *Istoriia rusov*[3] were precursors for Kostomarov's rendition of the Ukrainian national myth and in many ways they were even his building blocks but they, for all the latter's advocacy of the "old, conservative, Ukrainian autonomism"[4] based on the Cossack order, were far too "Little Russian" in their outlook.[5] They hearkened back to a limited Ukrainian independence under the tsarist sceptre such as had existed in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, but they neither focussed on nor idealized the Ukrainian people to the extent necessary to excite and awaken them to their full national potential at this stage in history. What is more, neither work concentrated much on the medieval period and gave Ukrainians a sense of historical continuity and of how long (and proud) their history really was.

It was not until Kostomarov, with his preconceived Romantic notions and his democratic-federative ideology,

---

[2] D.N. Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Istoriia Maloi Rossii* (Moscow, 1822).
[3] See *Istoriia rusiv*, ed. and with an intro. by O. Ohloblyn, trans. by V. Davydenko (New York: Visnyk Publishers, 1956).
[4] *Ibid.*, xiv.
[5] Hrushevs'kyi, "Ukrains'ka istoriografiia," 216.

began writing that the Ukrainian people undertook to see themselves as a nation. Here was a prominent figure, a professional historian no less, telling Ukrainians exactly what they wanted and needed to hear about themselves at the time: that they were a legitimate social unit worthy of consideration and scholarly recognition, equal in every way to all other nationalities (including, especially, the Great Russian) and with their own history and historical destiny to fulfill. That he drew his conclusions from flimsy evidence and that he stated facts which he had not proven was irrelevant, both to Kostomarov and to his non-academic readers; his historiography was not important for the truth it contained but for the practical purpose it served.

Kostomarov presented a very idealized rereading of East Slavic history, based on his democratic-federative ideology as it appeared already in the Cyrillo-Methodian Society's program. Kostomarov chose the academic path to publicize his views both because this was safer than outright political activity (as he was only too well aware) and because this attached a scholarly legitimacy to his ideology which it would otherwise have lacked. Kostomarov, as a Slavophile, did not wish to turn to Western conceptions of democracy and federalism as bases for his call to reconstitute the Russian Empire: he wanted to believe that the Eastern Slavs were capable of building on their own past.

In looking for a way to justify indigenously his support for the democratization of the Empire, Kostomarov

was fortunate in being able to point to the ancient *veche* as a symbol of democracy in Ukrainian-centred Kievan Rus'. So little was known for certain about this medieval popular assembly that it was easy for Kostomarov to assert outright that it was as immemorial and universal as he said it was. If others disagreed, then the onus fell on them to prove him wrong, but meanwhile his own views would already have left an impression on the popular consciousness. Kostomarov painted the *veche* in the most appealing colours possible and it must have sounded inviting indeed to hear that all classes of people could participate in that assembly's proceedings and, moreover, that the assembly exercised a significant amount of control over the royal power, the *kniaz'*, everywhere throughout the realm. What Kostomarov omitted in his assessment of democracy in Kievan Rus', however, was more important than what he included. He ignored vital social and economic factors which, had he taken them into account, would have shown the Rus'ian democratic element to be far less extant than he claimed it to be. He simply did not include any evidence which would have thrown his ideologically-based assertions into doubt or, worse yet, disinterested his audience.

Kostomarov's tracts on the federative principle in Kievan Rus' were, as mentioned, much more solid than his works on democracy but no less motivated by, and vital to, his ideology. As Schlessinger says, "Only a federal organization...could reconcile the traditional units [of

Russia and Austria] with the spirit of nationalism,"[6] and for Kostomarov this meant conceptualizing and explaining Kievan Rus' in terms of a federation of nationalities. Since Rus' was a loose association of principalities under the nominal suzerainty of the Kievan *knîaz'*, Kostomarov may be considered as having been essentially correct in labelling this a "seminal federation"[7] or, in other words, as much of a federation as could be expected for the period. Here again, though, Kostomarov avoided delving very deeply into the nature of his claim, preferring instead to idealize what he saw as the factors of unification: 1) common ancestry and language, 2) common church and religion, and 3) a single royal dynasty. It is significant that these were the hallmarks of the Romantic conception of nationality and that as a result Kostomarov emphasized these bonds of spiritual unity at the expense of explaining the social, economic, and political reasons for the disunity which did eventually occur. Disunity would have made poor copy and would have given his readers little reason to think that this was their Golden Age, an era to fill them with pride about their past. Dwelling on the reasons for disunity would never have aided in cementing social relations, neither among the Ukrainians themselves nor among the rest of the Slavic world and it is only with this goal in mind that Kostomarov envisaged Rus' the way he did.

---

[6] Schlessinger, 3.
[7] "Slovechko po povodu zamechaniia," 303.

Kostomarov's idealized interpretation of the democratic-federative element in Kievan Rus' played an immense role in the formation of Ukrainian national consciousness. By "blending history with ideology" it portrayed only those aspects of Ukraine's medieval heritage which made Ukrainians feel good about themselves as a people. This is why his method and conclusion are so problematic: all "grubby details" about their past were "skated over or omitted entirely" by Kostomarov and this gave his readers, his people, the feeling that they were worthy of respect and consideration as a nation. This is also why he drew such a stark contrast between the Ukrainians and the Great Russians: comparing the Ukrainians as a nationality to the Great Russians and assigning them a separate but equally important destiny in East Slavic history, that of preserving the ancient Slavic characteristics of democracy and federalism, legitimized their collective existence and allowed them to unite, organize, and move on to other things, as it were. And move on they did -- in literature, in historiography, and especially in political thought and activity.

The Ukrainian Revolution taking its own course apart from the Russian as well as the Ukrainians forming their own independent nation-state in 1918 would have been inconceivable without the foundations laid by Kostomarov's contribution to historiography and the national myth. On his own terms, the terms of awakening a people and appropriating

for them a history, he was a success. Irrespective of his many shortcomings as a pure scholar, this success alone is enough to earn him a place of recognition and respect in both East European historiography and Ukrainian history.

Bibliography

A. Works by N.I. Kostomarov

"Cherty narodnoi iuzhnorusskoi istorii." *Sobranie sochinenii N.I. Kostomarova* [*SS*], Book I; Vol. I. St. Petersburg, 1903-04, 67-158.

"Davno-li Malaia Rus' stala pisat'sia Malorossieiu, a Rus' -- Rossieiu?" *Naukovo-publitsystychni i polemichni pysannia Kostomarova* [*NPPP*]. Edited by M.S. Hrushevs'kyi. Kiev: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo Ukrainy, 1928, 223-227.

"Dopolnenie k 'Pravde moskvicham o Rusi'." *Osnova*, Vol. I (January, 1862): 58-62.

"Dve russkiia narodnosti." *SS*, Book I, Vol. I, 31-65.

Istoryia Ukrainy v zhytiepysiakh vyznachniishykh iei diiachiv. Translated by O. Barvins'kyi. L'viv: Knyharnia Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka, 1918.

"Kniaz' Vladimir Monomakh i kazak Bogdan Kmel'nitskii." *NPPP*, 149-155.

"Lektsii Koialovicha po istorii Zapadnoi Rossii." *NPPP*, 204-208.

Lektsii po russkoi istorii. Vol. I: *Istochniki russkoi istorii*. Assembled according to the lecture notes of P. Gaideburov. St. Petersburg, 1861.

"Mysli o federativnom nachale v drevnei Rusi." *SS*, Book I, Vol. I, 1-30.

"Mysli ob istorii Malorossii." *Biblioteka dlia chteniia*, Vol. 78 (1846): 21-42.

"Nachalo edinoderzhaviia v drevnei Rusi." *SS*, Book V, Vol. XII, 3-91.

"O znachenii Velikago Novgoroda v russkoi istorii." *SS*, Book I, Vol. I, 197-214.

"Ob otnoshenii russkoi istorii k geografii i etnografii." *SS*, Book I, Vol. III, 717-731.

Pis'mo k izdateliu "Kolokola". Foreword by M. Drahomanov.

Geneva: Hromada Publishers, 1885.

"Po povodu knigi M.O. Koialovicha: 'Istoriia russkogo samosoznaniia po istoricheskim pamiatnikam i nauchnym sochineniiam,' 1884 g." *NPPP*, 304-312.

"Pravda moskvicham o Rusi." *Osnova*, Vol. X (October, 1861): 1-15.

"Pravda poliakam o Rusi." *Osnova*, Vol. X (October, 1861): 100-112.

"Severnorusskiia narodopravstva vo vremena udel'no-vechevogo uklada." *SS*, Book III, Vols. VII and VIII.

"Slovechko po povodu zamechaniia o federativnom nachale v drevnei Rusi." *NPPP*, 302-303.

"Tysiacheletie." *NPPP*, 125-130.

"Ukraina." *Kolokol*, No. 61 (January 15, 1860): 499-503.

"Zamechanie g. Lokhvitskomu." *NPPP*, 201-203.

B. Secondary Sources

Bantysh-Kamenskii, D.N.
Istoriia Maloi Rossii. Moscow, 1822.

Basarab, John.
Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1982.

Bradley, John F.N.
Czech Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1984.

Deutsch, Karl W.
Nationalism and Social Communication. Second edition. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1966.

Doroshenko, Dmytro.
"A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography." *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.*, V, No. 4 (1957): 11-304.

_____.
"Shcho take istoriia Skhidn'oi Evropy?" *Ukrains'kyi istoryk* 1-2 (73-74) (1982): 5-21.

Drahomanov, Mykhailo.
"Mykola Ivanovych Kostomariv." *S'vit*, No. 2 (February

10, 1881): 29-31.

Freeze, Gregory L.
"The *Soslovie* Paradigm and Russian Social History." *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 91, No. 1 (February, 1986): 11-36.

Geyl, Pieter.
Napoleon: For and Against. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1949.

Giurescu, Dinu C.
"Landmarks in the Building of European National States in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century." *East European Quarterly*, Vol. XX, No. 1 (Spring, 1986): 17-40.

Gradovskii, A.D.
"Gosudarstvennyi stroi drevnei Rossii (po povodu knigi V.I. Sergeevicha, 'Veche i kniaz''." *Sobranie sochinenii*, Vol. I. St. Petersburg, 1899, 339-381.

Grekov, B.D.
Kievskaia Rus'. Moscow: Akademiia nauk SSSR, 1944.

Hermann, A.H.
A History of the Czechs. London: Allen Lane, 1975.

Hrushevs'kyi, Mykhailo S.
Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy, Vols. I and II. New York: Knyhospilka, 1954.

_____.
"Kostomarov i novitnia Ukraina." *Ukraina*, Book III (1925): 3-20.

_____.
"The Traditional Scheme of 'Russian' History and the Problem of a Rational Organization of the History of the Eastern Slavs." *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.*, II, No. 4 (1952): 355-364.

_____.
"Ukrains'ka istoriografiia i Mykola Kostomarov." *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, Book V, Vol. L (May, 1910): 209-225.

(author unknown).
Istoriia rusiv. Edited and with an introduction by O. Ohloblyn. Translated by V. Davydenko. New York: Visnyk Publishers, 1956.

Kluchevsky (Kliuchevskii), V.O.

A History of Russia, Vol. I. Translated by C.J. Hogarth. New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, 1911.

Kostomarova, A.
"Nikolai Ivanovich Kostomarov: biograficheskii ocherk." *SS*, Book I, i-xiv.

Luciani, Georges.
Le livre de la genèse du peuple ukrainien. Paris: Institut d'études slaves de l'Université de Paris, 1956.

Malia, Martin.
Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1965.

Markevich, A.
"Kostomarov, N.I." *Russkii biograficheskii slovar'*, Vol. IX. St. Petersburg, 1903, 305-319.

Mazour, Anatole G.
Modern Russian Historiography. Revised edition. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975.

McNeill, William H.
Mythistory and Other Essays. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966.

Miiakovs'kyi, Volodymyr.
"Kostomarov u Rivnomu." *Ukraina*, Book III (1925): 28-65.

Nemec, Ludvik.
"The Pattern in the Historical Roots of Church-State Relationship in Central and Eastern Europe." *East European Quarterly*, Vol. XX, No. 1 (Spring, 1986): 3-16.

Nikolaichik, F.D., et al.
"Pamiati N.I. Kostomarova." *Kievskaia starina*, Vol. XII (May, 1885): i-l.

Papazian, Dennis.
"Nicholas Ivanovich Kostomarov: Russian Historian, Ukrainian Nationalist, Slavic Federalist." Ph.D. dissertation: University of Michigan (1966).

Pashuto, V.T.
"Cherty politicheskogo stroia drevnei Rusi." *Drevnerusskoe gosudarstvo i ego mezhdunarodnoe znachenie*. Moscow: Akademiia nauk SSSR, 1965, 21-51.

Pinchuk, Iu. A.
Istoricheskie vzgliady N.I. Kostomarova. Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1984.

Pipes, Richard.

Russia under the Old Regime. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974.

Polevoi, P.
"Istorik-idealist." *Istoricheskii vestnik*, Vol. 43 (1891): 501-520.

Polukhin, L.K.
Formuvannia istorychnykh pohliadiv M.I. Kostomarova. Kiev: Akademiia nauk URSR, 1959.

Presniakov, A.E.
Knlazhoe pravo v drevnei Rusi. St. Petersburg, 1909.

Pypin, A.N.
Istoriia russkoi etnografii. Vol. III: *Etnografiia malorusskaia*. St. Petersburg, 1891.

Rubach, M.A.
"Federalisticheskie teorii v istorii Rossii." *Russkaia istoricheskaia literatura v klassovom osveshchenii*, Vol. II. Moscow, 1930, 3-123.

Rubinshtain, N.L.
Russkaia istoriografiia. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1941.

Rybakov, B.A.
"Kievskaia Rus'." *Istoriia SSSR*, Series I, Vol. I. Moscow: Nauka, 1966, 476-572.

Saunders, David B.
"Historians and Concepts of Nationality in Early Nineteenth Century Russia." *Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 60, No. 1 (January, 1982): 44-62.

Schlessinger, Rudolf.
Federalism in Central and Eastern Europe. New York: Oxford University Press, 1945.

Semevskii, V.I.
"N.I. Kostomarov, 1817-1885." *Russkaia starina* (January, 1886): 181-212.

Sergeevich, V.I.
Veche i kniaz' (unavailable to me).

Shillinglaw, Draga B.
The Lectures of Professor T.G. Masaryk at the University of Chicago, Summer 1902. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1978.

Smith, Anthony D.
Theories of Nationalism. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.

Solov'ev, S.M.
Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen, Book II, Vols. III and IV. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1960.

Stanislavskaia, A.M.
"Istoricheskie vzgliady N.I. Kostomarova." *Ocherki istorii istoricheskoi nauki v SSSR*, II. Edited by M.V. Nechkina et al. Moscow: Akademiia nauk SSSR, 1960, 129-146.

Vernadsky, George.
A History of Russia. Vol. II: *Kievan Russia*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948.

Vozniak, M.S.
Kyrylo-Metodiivs'ke bratstvo. L'viv: Fond "Uchitesia braty moi", 1921.

Walsh, W.H.
An Introduction to Philosophy of History. London: Hutchinson, 1967.

Zaionchkovskii, P.A.
Kirillo-Mefodievskoe obshchestvo, 1846-1847. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1959.