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**POWER AND RESISTANCE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATE-OWNED  
ENTERPRISES REFORM PROGRAMME IN GHANA**

by



**Edna Demornam Djokoto**

**A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

**Department of Sociology**

**Edmonton, Alberta**

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
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
  
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**Dedication**

**For my parents,**

**Mercy and Throne Djokoto**

## **Abstract**

**Drawing on Michel Foucault's concepts of discourse, power and knowledge, this study examines the restructuring component of the World Bank-sponsored State-Owned Enterprises Reform Programme (SOERP) in Ghana. The SOERP is an integral part of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank-sponsored Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Using Cityline Corporation, a state-owned real estate corporation as a case study, I argue that although the aim of the restructuring programme is to create an efficient and a profitable corporation, it also produced a disciplined government, managers, employees and tenants. Thus the study is a micro-level analysis of the SOERP and concentrates on the institutional practices of the World Bank and its disciplinary effects. In order to uncover the disciplinary technologies, I analysed interviews, government documents and texts such as worker evaluation forms. My analysis unravels the dynamic and discursive relations between the World Bank, government, managers, employees and tenants and shows how it disciplines. For example, the performance appraisal system makes workers discipline themselves to conform to restructuring programme because they know that their performance is being monitored by their superiors. However, compliance to the restructuring was not total and I interpret this as resistance. Resistance was organized, spontaneous, and solitary.**

**This work challenges the binary view of power that casts the World Bank as an instrument of oppression and recipient countries as simply victims of the Bank's policies. Thus, the parties involved in achieving the goals of the restructuring are neither free nor oppressed. Instead, they have turned themselves into subjects by participating in the functioning of the restructuring. By analysing the complex nature of power relations that exist between the parties, I am able to examine the dialectic relationship between power and**

**resistance within the organisation. Therefore, this study challenges previous research that examines opposition to the SAP by focussing only on organized protests as an indicator of resistance. Overall this study suggests that theoretical approaches to understanding the effects of economic reform policies in Southern countries should be broadened to include the nuances and complexity of power relations at the micro-level.**

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## **Acronyms**

<b>AFRC</b>	<b>Armed Forces Revolutionary Council</b>
<b>CIDA</b>	<b>Canadian International Development Agency</b>
<b>CMB</b>	<b>Cocoa Marketing Board</b>
<b>ECLA</b>	<b>Economic Commission on Latin America</b>
<b>ERP</b>	<b>Economic Recovery Programme</b>
<b>GIHOC</b>	<b>Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation</b>
<b>GIMPA</b>	<b>Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration</b>
<b>GNI</b>	<b>Gross National Income</b>
<b>GNP</b>	<b>Gross National Product</b>
<b>GREDA</b>	<b>Ghana Real Estate Developers Association</b>
<b>IDA</b>	<b>International Development Association</b>
<b>IDC</b>	<b>Industrial Development Corporation</b>
<b>IFAD</b>	<b>International Fund for Agricultural Development</b>
<b>IFI</b>	<b>International Financial Institutions</b>
<b>IMF</b>	<b>International Monetary Fund</b>
<b>ISI</b>	<b>Import Substitution Industrialization</b>
<b>MDPI</b>	<b>Management Development and Productivity Institute</b>
<b>NLC</b>	<b>National Liberation Council</b>
<b>NPE</b>	<b>New Political Economy</b>
<b>NRC</b>	<b>National Redemption Council</b>
<b>PNDC</b>	<b>Provisional National Defense Council</b>
<b>SAC</b>	<b>Structural Adjustment Credit</b>
<b>SAP</b>	<b>Structural Adjustment Programme</b>
<b>SEC</b>	<b>State Enterprises Commission</b>
<b>SMC</b>	<b>Supreme Military Council</b>
<b>SOE</b>	<b>State-Owned Enterprise</b>
<b>SOERP</b>	<b>State-Owned Enterprises Reform Programme</b>
<b>SSA</b>	<b>Sub-Sahara Africa</b>
<b>UNCID</b>	<b>United Nations Centre for Industrial Development</b>
<b>UNDP</b>	<b>United Nations Development Programme</b>

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **Introduction**

Figure 1 shows a cartoon that was published in the *West Africa Magazine*, a weekly that explores issues in the West African sub-region. Before the explosion of information on the Internet, it was one of the most reliable, although sketchy, source of information on Ghana for most Ghanaians studying abroad. This cartoon depicts a showcase with the inscription “IMF model market” written on it. Inside the showcase is a female model on whom is written “Ghana”. The model is looking at the words “ALL PAINS AND NO GAINS,” which is posted on the glass in the left corner of the showcase. On the right side of the case is a man with a smiling face peeping through an opening in the door, looking at two people, probably decision makers or leaders from other countries who are looking at the model. The cartoon describes the onlookers as customers. One can conjecture that the two onlookers came shopping for economic help and were looking at the IMF’s model country before entering the office to make their request for financial assistance. The cartoon appeared to be ridiculing the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) assertion that Ghana is a success story. It suggests that despite all the pains that have been associated with the implementation of the IMF and World Bank-sponsored Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in the country since 1983, there have been no gains.

Some of the policies perceived to be causing the pain are deficit reduction, currency devaluation, introduction of user fees for health care and education, and public sector reforms that entail the restructuring and privatization of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). When I first saw the cartoon, it appeared to be the usual critique of the SAP that I had become

Figure 1



Aahhhh...Customers!

WEST AFRICA

18 - 24 October 1993

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accustomed to. But two other publications both published in 1994 re-ignited my interest in the cartoon. They are a *Newsweek* special advertising section on Ghana and a World Bank publication entitled *Adjustment in Africa* which contained a chapter on Ghana. Both publications addressed the success of the SAP in Ghana.

The *Newsweek* article was titled “Africa’s Star Performer: Ghana’s Success Beckons Foreign Investors.” It notes that:

While the programme [SAP] has caused inevitable social and economic dislocation, it has made Ghana a star performer in Africa and the developing world. Despite the *painful nature<sup>1</sup>* of the transition to a market-driven economy, the country and its people have persevered in carrying out the onerous remedies prescribed by international agencies. According to the World Bank, the country’s adjustment programme “is by any yardstick *one of the more successful* in Sub-Sahara Africa.”(November, 1994, p. 2)

In the World Bank’s publication, Leechor (1994) authored a chapter titled “Ghana: Frontrunner in Adjustment” which was introduced as follows: “By customary criteria, Ghana’s adjustment programme has been a success. Policy reform has been extensive, despite opposition and institutional constraints. The benefits of adjustment have been large, visible, and widely shared” (p. 153). The first quote mentioned the pain associated with the transition to market-based economic reforms as well as its success. The second quote touched on the success, its beneficiaries, and opposition to the SAP. Although the second quote made no reference to the adverse effects on the population, the article recognizes that the transition was not without sacrifices. Two issues puzzled me after reading both publications. First, they both discussed the success on a more general level without exploring the dynamics involved in achieving it. Second, I wondered about the nature of the opposition

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<sup>1</sup> Italics added for emphasis.

to the SAP since the government managed to implement the reforms despite resistance from the public. My quest to find answers to these questions led to this study.

Since the SAP is broad, I decided to narrow the focus of the study to the State-Owned Enterprises Reformed Programme (SOERP). My choice was motivated by two factors. First, the SOERP is one of the major components of the SAP because SOEs have been the vehicles for the country's development<sup>2</sup> since independence. The government subsidized most of them because they provided such noncommercial functions as social services, employment, and economic development. One of the aims of the SAP is to limit government participation in the economy. A strategy adopted to accomplish this goal is to make SOEs more entrepreneurial. This change requires the withdrawal of government subsidies to SOEs and the elimination of their noncommercial functions. Since the institutional framework of SOEs is being transformed from state-led to market-led, focussing on this sector provides a good example for understanding the processes involved in achieving the country's perceived economic success. Second, since the SAP is aimed at transforming public sector institutions such as SOEs and the civil service, I think a good context to explore the dynamics involved in implementing the adjustment policies could be SOEs.

Thus, this study is about the restructuring component of the World Bank-sponsored SOERP in Ghana. The SOERP has three components: strengthening of management of the SOERP, divestiture of SOEs, and the SOE restructuring programme (State Enterprises

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<sup>2</sup> Development is used within this context as a construct or as a status that undeveloped countries must achieve (Escobar, 1995). Development has meant different things historically, (see Esteva, 1992; Illich, 1969) but its usage since World War II represents a means of replicating conditions that exist in the "advanced" countries in other parts of the world. Countries that lack the characteristics of the advanced countries are seen as underdeveloped.

Commission, 1995). The first component focusses on investment in human resources and providing technical support to institutions responsible for the management of the SOERP. The second deals with the privatization of some SOEs and the liquidation of those that cannot be salvaged in the process. While the final one, which is the focus of this study, deals with the restructuring of SOEs that cannot be privatized in the short-term or the ones that the government choose to keep for strategic and other reasons. The decision to study SOE restructuring was motivated, in part, by the relatively easy access to data at public institutions. The organization selected for the study is Cityline Corporation,<sup>3</sup> a state-owned real estate corporation. The restructuring was funded by the World Bank under the World Bank Urban II Project. The reasons for selecting the corporation are discussed in Chapter 5.

According to the government (Ministry of Works and Housing, 1991), the restructuring of Cityline Corporation is about creating an efficient and a profitable SOE. The main policies aimed at achieving this goal are limiting government interference in the corporation's business operations by granting the corporation autonomy, restructuring the workforce structures, withdrawing government subsidies, and eliminating the corporation's noncommercial objectives. Dropping the corporation's noncommercial objectives will make the tenants pay a higher rent that will reflect prevailing market prices. The three main parties that are directly involved in achieving the goals of the restructuring are the government, the corporation and its employees, and the tenants.

In this study, I argue that, although the goal of Cityline Corporation's restructuring programme is to create an efficient and a profitable SOE, the means of achieving this goal

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<sup>3</sup> This is a pseudonym for the SOE studied.



is transforming the parties involved. Specifically, the restructuring programme is producing a disciplined government, corporation and employees, and creating a new kind of tenant. Embedded in this process are complex power relations between the World Bank and the various parties involved; and a dialectic relationship between power and resistance.

In order to understand the transformation process and the nature of power relations involved, I view the SOERP as a discourse or as a set of ideas that shape our perception of the problems with the state enterprise sector. This view of reality then provides the space for interventionist policies such as the SOERP. By analysing the SOERP as a discourse I focus on the institutional practices of the World Bank that are producing these subjects and not the Bank as an institution. The functioning of a discourse produces and transmits power. This implies that the institutional practices embedded in the implementation of the SOERP are producing power that has effect on the government, the corporation and its employees, and the tenants. But are these parties passive victims of the World Bank's power or do they actively participate in producing their subjectivity? To answer this question I draw on Michel Foucault's work on power.

Foucault (1982) views power as a social relation and not as something that is possessed by a dominator and exercised over the dominated. Resistance is an integral part of this conceptualization of power and it is present whenever power is being exercised. Since power and resistance have a dialectical relationship what are the implications of this relationship for understanding the nature of opposition to the SOERP? I address this question by exploring the nature and types of opposition to the SOERP.

## **The Problem and the Method**

Research on the SAP in Ghana tends to focus on the impact of the programme; that is, the successes and the adverse effects on the population (Abbey, 1990; Alderman, 1994; Anyemedu, 1993; Cornia et al., 1987; Davis, 1991; Hutchful, 1989;1995; Jonah, 1989; Leechor, 1994; Rimmer, 1992; Rothchild, 1991; Sandbrook, 1993; Sowah, 1993; Weissman, 1990). Little is known about the implementation processes. Studies show that about 100,000 government employees, with the civil service, the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB) and other SOEs were either redeployed or laid off since 1983 (Cornia, Jolly & Stewart, 1987; Hutchful, 1986; Jonah, 1989; Sowah, 1993; Weissman, 1990). What is not known is what happened at the workplace after the layoffs. Also if the SAP is about transforming the economy from a state-led to a market-led model how is this shift in economic policy changing the workplace at affected public institutions such as SOEs?

With regard to opposition to the SAP, the existing studies argue that the government was able to push through the reforms because it discredited the union leadership and intimidated workers (Gyimah-Boadi & Essuman-Johnson, 1993; Herbst 1991:1993; Ninsin, 1991). The analysis of opposition to the SAP, however, has been limited to the macro-level. For example, Gyimah-Boadi & Essuman-Johnson, (1993) and Herbst (1991) measured opposition to the SAP using the number of strikes that occurred since 1983 compared to the preceding years. Such macro-level analyses do not capture the dynamics of protests at the micro-level. Specifically, they do not address unorganized protests.

The most appropriate way in which to answer the research questions posed above is by conducting a qualitative study, specifically a case study. This choice is influenced by the emphasis on understanding the implementation process. Such data can only be collected by

in-depth interviews. The exploratory nature of the study, as well as the detail that this approach provides, also played a role in selecting this method. The main sources of data were semi-structured interviews, government documents, personal observations and secondary sources. All the sources not only complemented each other but also made triangulation possible.

### **Significance of the study**

The SOERP represents a paradigm shift from a state-led to a market-led approach to development. A change that has implications for public sector institutions that constitute the state enterprise sector. Since its inception, many studies have addressed the impact of the SOERP, measured its successes and failures but so far none of them has focussed on the processes involved in reorganizing SOEs. This study fills in this gap in the literature.

Theoretically, this study is a departure from most studies on the on the SAP and the SOERP that characterized the World Bank and other International Financial Institutions (IFIs) as very powerful institution that force economic reforms on passive developing countries. While the potential power of the IFIs cannot be ignored, analyses that present them as the dominator exploiting poor countries are simplistic because they do not explore the complexity of the power relations that exist between these institutions and the recipient countries. Looking at the SAP from a Foucauldian perspective unravels the subtle and obvious ways in which power operates, from the language used to describe the economic policies and how it influences our understanding of reality, to how we participate in the functioning of the discourse. In other words, the study demonstrates that countries that receive financial assistance from IFIs participate in producing their own subjectivity. This

perspective enables us to go beyond the binary view of power. Specifically, it shows the complex nature of power relations and how these operate in both visible and invisible ways. It also highlights the importance of focussing on the embodied subject in any analysis of the effects of macro-level economic or social policies.

Another contribution of this study is that it shows that power can be disrupted, implying that resistance is an integral part of power. Therefore, the governments and citizens of countries that are recipients of aid from the IFIs are not totally powerless in resisting policies that they are uncomfortable with. Also this research is one of the few studies that provides a detailed theoretical analysis of the changes that have occurred at the workplace due to the paradigm shift towards neoliberal economic policies in Ghana.

### **Organization of chapters**

The study is divided into 8 chapters, including the introduction. In Chapter 2, I introduce the historical and socioeconomic context within which the SOERP developed. The chapter chronicles the economic, political, and historical problems that contributed to Ghana's economic decline. Also discussed are various factors that justified the establishment of SOEs. The discussions highlight the prevailing development discourse in the 1950s and 1960s and how it influenced government policies about SOEs. Chapter 3 situates the SAP and the SOERP within a theoretical framework by examining the New Political Economy. The chapter also provides a critique of the literature on the SOERP in Ghana and presents another way of examining the reforms in the sector. This discussion provides an overview of Michel Foucault's work on power, knowledge and discourse and its relevance to the study.

In Chapter 4, I describe the methodological approach adopted for the study. It

outlines the various phases of the study, including data collection and analysis. I also discuss how my identities were challenged and the ways in which I constantly negotiated these identities to deal with the emerging challenges. In other words, this section of the chapter tells the story about the research process. Chapter 5 introduces Cityline Corporation, the context of the study. This chapter provides background information about the corporation and an overview of the workplace structures that existed before and after the restructuring.

The next two are the analysis chapters. Chapter 6 examines the power-knowledge practices embedded in the restructuring policies and their disciplinary effects. I also examined how the various parties involved in creating an efficient and a profitable corporation participated in constituting their own subjectivity. Chapter 7 shows how resistance was present at every point in the network of power relations. It examines resistance and how the various parties disrupted the power that was being transmitted by the functioning of the discourse. In the last chapter, I summarize the major findings and highlight the theoretical implications for research on SAP in Ghana and other developing countries.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **Ghana: Background and Context of the Reform Programme**

#### **Introduction**

When Ghana attained political independence from Britain in 1957, the economy was mainly agrarian. The first elected Prime Minister, Kwame Nkrumah, had an ambitious plan to modernize the economy. He used State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) as the framework for his government's development strategy. The Nkrumah government's overall development strategy was a combination of modernization and import-substitution industrialization situated within a state-led development framework. This approach reflects the dominant development discourse of the 1950s and 1960s.

Successive governments built upon this strategy, although as early as the mid-1960s the SOEs had to grapple with problems ranging from inadequate capital to political interference (Hutchful, 1987). The problems with the sector did not change dramatically over the years. The centrality of SOEs to the country's post-independence development policy meant that a shift from state-led to market-led economic policies required a corresponding change in government policies about SOEs. That is why the IMF and the World Bank viewed reforming the state enterprise sector as crucial to the success of the SAP. The reasons for the poor performance of the economy in general and the SOEs in particular are complex. The historical, economic, political, social, and global dimensions of the problem demonstrate its complexity.

This chapter provides an overview of Ghana. The discussion focuses on the land and its people, as well as the country's socio-economic and political history. It highlights the development strategies pursued by various governments since independence. I concentrate

on the Nkrumah government's development strategy because it provided the framework that subsequent governments built on, although with some modifications. The discussions also focus on the intellectual, political and socioeconomic context in which the state's involvement in the economy evolved. This information situates the reasons for implementing the SAP within a broader context. The global dimension of the economic crisis in Ghana is explored to highlight how its location in the international economy exacerbated the problem. Finally, I discuss the SAP and the components of the SOERP.

### **The Historical and Socioeconomic Context**

Ghana is located in West Africa near the equator on the Greenwich meridian. It shares borders with 3 French-speaking African countries, to the east by Togo, to the north by Burkina Faso, and to the west by Ivory Coast. The southern part of the country is demarcated by the Atlantic Ocean. The average temperature in the southern part of the country range from 21 - 26 degrees Celsius with a relative humidity of 70 per cent while the northern part of the country has average temperatures ranging from 24 - 35 degrees Celsius and a relative humidity of 50 per cent (Rimmer, 1992). The total land area is about 238,537 square kilometres. In comparison Canada's land size is about forty-two times that of Ghana (Ray, 1986).

Ghana's population is about 19 million (2000 estimates) with life expectancy at 58 and 62 for men and women respectively (World Bank, 2002). The average population density is about 84 persons per square kilometres with an annual growth rate of 2.6 per cent. The southern part of the country is densely populated compared to the north. The literacy rate in

1975 was 30 per cent (World Bank, 1980).<sup>4</sup> The rate increased to 70 per cent according to 1999 estimates (World Bank, 2002). The major ethnic groups are Akan, Ewe, Guans, Dagomba, Gonja, Ga-Adangbe and the Dagabas. The major languages spoken are Twi, Fante, Ewe, Ga Hausa, Dagbani and Nzema, but the official language is English. This broad classification of ethnic groups and languages clouds the heterogeneity and complexity of the ethnic and cultural landscape. For example, there are variations in cultural practices, dialects, and staple diet within each major ethnic group.

Politically, Ghana practices a multi-party democracy. But this has not always been the case. Ghana has a checkered political history. The first civilian government led by Kwame Nkrumah was overthrown in a military coup in 1966. The National Liberation Council (NLC) which replaced the First Republic returned the country to civilian rule in 1969. The Second Republic, led by Kofi Busia, was ousted in another military coup in 1972. The National Redemption Council (NRC) led by Acheampong which overthrew Busia's government was renamed the Supreme Military Council (SMC) in 1975. The SMC was overthrown by another military leader, Akuffo, in a palace coup in 1978 and replaced with Supreme Military Council II (SMC II). As the country prepared to make a transition from a military administration to a civilian regime in June 1979, there was another coup—a particularly violent one—by junior military officers led by J. J. Rawlings. Three months after it took power, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) led by Rawlings handed over power to the country's third civilian government led by Hilla Limman. Rawlings returned to power again through another military coup in December 1981 (Chazan, 1983;

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<sup>4</sup> This refers to the number of persons aged 15 and over who can read and write, a short simple sentence about their everyday life.



Hansen & Ninsin, 1989; Ray, 1986; Okeke, 1982; Rimmer, 1992). The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) led by Rawlings was in power until 1991 when democratic elections were held to return the country to a multi-party democracy. J. J. Rawlings, the former military leader, contested the election as a presidential candidate and won. He was re-elected in 1996 but could not run in the 2000 election because under the constitution a president can only serve two terms. In December 2000, the first transfer of power from one civilian government to another through democratic elections occurred, an event unprecedented in Ghanaian history.

The governance project of the IFIs and internal political pressure influenced the move to a multi-party democratic system of government. Beginning in the 1980s, the IMF and the World Bank began to link poor economic performance in Sub-Saharan Africa to crisis in governance (Hyden, 1992; Kapur & Webb, 2000). For example, the World Bank (1989) asserts that the presence of unelected governments that are corrupt, unaccountable, and the absence of the rule of law contributed to the continent's economic woes. This perceived crisis in governance was "filtered through a neo-liberal lens that saw the state... as bloated, inefficient and an obstacle to market-based reform" (Islam and Morrison, 1996, pp. 6-7).

The governance project goes beyond economic policies: it includes democracy and human rights. However, democracy and human rights were not explicitly stated by donor agencies until the end of the Cold War in 1989. During the Cold War, development agencies made development instead of democracy their focus of discussion with recipient countries because of the superpower rivalry. But with the end of the Cold War, donor agencies were forthright with such discussions (Islam and Morrison, 1996). With these changes on the global political scene, Western governments wanted the World Bank and other bilateral

institutions to provide financial assistance to developing countries conditional upon good governance, human rights, and democracy. Subsequently financial assistance became tied to good governance (Gillies, 1993; Kapur & Webb, 2000).

Attributing economic problems in developing countries solely to domestic policies is myopic because it ignores the fiscal imbalances in those countries that are due largely to inequities within the global economy (Dasgupta, 1998, Toye, 1991a). Also, it is ironic that the donor agencies wanted to tie financial assistance to democratic reforms since the implementation of the SAP in many countries was possible partly due to the existence of dictatorships. For example, the implementation of the SAP in Ghana was possible mainly because of political repression by Rawlings' military government (Gyimah-Boadi, 1993).

Internal pressures also forced the military government to return to civilian rule. The military regime of J. J. Rawlings was characterized by authoritarian rule. But democracy has not always been a feature of politics in post-colonial Ghana. Authoritarian rule, however, become more pronounced and systematic during Rawlings' military regime (Gyimah-Boadi, 1993). During this period, most people were afraid to criticize the government publicly because those who dared were reportedly tortured or detained.

But the political scene in the country began to change after the mid-1980s when the PNDC wanted to consolidate its support. Support for the PNDC came mainly from the rural population, especially farmers that cultivated crops for exports, because they benefited from economic policies implemented under the SAP (Chazan, 1992). In order to build upon this support while attempting to gain legitimacy among the disaffected urban population, who bore the brunt of the economic reforms, the government initiated political reforms leading to local elections in 1988 (Callaghy, 1990, Chazan 1992) and eventually, a national election

in 1991. Although internal political pressure played a role in the democratization, a wave of political reforms in Africa during this same period also influenced the political changes in the country (Chazan, 1992; Diamond & Plattner, 1999, Gyimah-Boadi, 1999; Hyden 1992; Lyons, 1999).

Understanding the country's political history is germane to the study since the political instability may have contributed to the country's economic problems. Apart from the Nkrumah government, no other government implemented a long-term economic plan. Civilian governments that attempted to, or carried out such economic policies were overthrown by the military because they perceived such policies as draconian. For example, the second democratically elected government, led by Busia, was overthrown in a military coup in 1972 when it implemented a World Bank-sponsored economic reform programme. It is worth noting that the Busia government was not the first to implement an IFI-sponsored economic programme. The first military government in the country's history, the NLC, which handed over power to the Busia government, was the first government ever, in the history of the country, to implement an IMF-sponsored stabilization programme (Hutchful, 1997).

The political reforms brought corresponding changes in the country's administration. Administratively, Ghana is divided into 10 regions and has a unitary system of government. This means that political authority is centralized and none of the 10 regions is autonomous. There are three levels of government. The local or district level, the regional level, and the national level. The first level comprises district assemblies that are responsible for decision-making at the local level. Some members are directly elected, while the rest are government appointees. The districts are headed by government appointed District Secretaries. Officials

at the regional level are mainly government bureaucrats and politicians. The regions are also headed by government appointed Regional Secretaries. The final level is a parliament, which is made up of elected representatives and it is the only legislative body in the country.

Economically, Ghana is predominantly a primary resource economy. It is dominated by natural resources. Its main exports are cocoa and timber. Ghana was once a world leader in cocoa exports. In 1965, the country produced 560,000 tonnes of cocoa, about 34 per cent of the world output. However, production fell to 160,000 tonnes in 1983 (Leechor, 1994) because of the government's pricing and marketing policies. The government paid cocoa farmers between 15 per cent to 40 per cent of world prices, while their counterparts in Ivory Coast, the neighbouring country to the west, received about 66 percent of prevailing world prices (Leechor, 1994). This pricing policy led to cocoa smuggling into neighbouring countries, thus affecting the country's export revenues. Other factors that contributed to the decline in cocoa production were natural disasters such as drought and a drop in the price of cocoa on the international market. Ghana is also rich in gold, diamonds, manganese and bauxite. Apart from cocoa, these minerals are the country's leading exports. The average annual growth rate of the Gross National Product (GNP) between 1960-78 was -0.5 per cent with a GNP per capita of \$390 in 1978 (World Bank, 1980). The statistics for 1990-2000 shows an average annual growth rate of 4.3 per cent with a Gross National Income (GNI)<sup>5</sup> per capita of \$350 (World Bank, 2002). In 1980, Ghana was a middle-income country

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<sup>5</sup> The World Bank replaced the GNP with the GNI as a key indicator of development. The GNI is made up of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the net receipt of income from foreign sources claimed by residents of a county (World Bank, 2002).

(World Bank, 1980) but it became a low income country in 1983.<sup>6</sup>

The labour market is made up of the informal and the formal sectors. The informal sector refers to private economic activities and businesses that exist outside state regulations (Engberg-Pedersen, Gibbon, Raikes & Udsholt 1996). Hart (1973) divides activities in the informal sector in Ghana into two broad categories: legitimate and illegitimate businesses. The legitimate businesses are further divided into four categories: 1) Primary and secondary activities, such as farming, local breweries, and self-employed artisans; 2) Tertiary enterprises with relatively large capital inputs, including housing and transport sectors; 3) Small-scale distribution, mainly petty traders, street hawkers, and caterers; and 4) Other services which comprise musicians, barbers, mechanics, hairdressers, and photographers. Hart (1973) categorizes as illegitimate, business activities in the informal sector that are illegal under the law. They include such activities as drug pushing, smuggling, robbery and usury.

Before the implementation of the SAP, businesses in the informal sector paid no taxes directly to the government. The only revenues from this sector were daily levies collected by local City Councils. But this system was not very effective because some vendors evaded the levies. With the SAP, however, things have changed. The government has encouraged the various businesses in the informal sector to form associations. For example, there are now associations for hairdressers, petty traders, seamstresses, and other trades. Members pay taxes directly to their associations. The leadership of these associations

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<sup>6</sup> The World Bank changes the income cut-off point for classifying countries periodically. For example, in 1980, the Bank placed countries with GNP per capita or \$350 or less (World Bank, 1980) in the low-income category but the cut-off point in 2002 is \$755 or less (World Bank, 2002).

urged members to report non-members in the trade since non membership by default meant tax evasion. Underlying the government's policy of encouraging the formation of trades associations for the purposes of improving tax collection is one of the goals of the economic reform, which is to produce a "rational economy." In this rational economy each citizen can be monitored by others to ensure that nobody evades taxes. For example, members of the various trades associations police non-members to ensure that they pay taxes. This system of surveillance not only benefits the government but the individuals as well by creating a level playing field for all in the emerging rational economy.

The formal sector is made up of the public and private sectors, that is, registered organizations, which operate within state regulations, have some bureaucratic structures and are amenable to enumeration by surveys (Engberg-Perdersen et al., 1996; Hart, 1973). Government employees account for about two-thirds of the workers in this sector (Leechor, 1994).

Although both the formal and informal sectors are presented as distinct, they are not necessarily dichotomous. There are overlaps between them and the boundaries between them are often breached by employees in the formal sector. For example, some workers in the formal sector engage in informal sector activities to supplement their income. These activities are informal because they are private businesses that cannot be accounted for statistically. There are no official statistics to determine the exact number of workers in this category. This issue is important to the analysis because as I discuss later, one of the aims of the SOE restructuring programme is to create an efficient workforce. This requires increasing workers' productivity by monitoring their performance to ensure that they do not conduct unofficial business during business hours.

The country's economic history is also tied to the distribution of commerce and infrastructure. Since colonial times, commerce and infrastructure in the southern part of the country have been more developed than in the north. This reflects the pattern of development pursued by the colonial government. Because the colonial administration was headquartered in the south, the communication, road and railway network in that part of the country were more developed. In fact, there was no railway network in the north because the colonial administration developed the railway network in the south to facilitate the extraction of natural resources for export (Killick, 1978; Ray, 1986). This pattern has not changed significantly since independence. The south is still more developed than the north and there is still no railway network from the south to the north. The overemphasis on the extraction of natural resources for export by the colonial administration meant that, at independence, the economy was predominantly export oriented with little industrial base (Killick, 1978).

It was against this background that the first elected government, led by Kwame Nkrumah, embarked upon a massive industrialization drive to modernize the economy. SOEs were the vehicles for achieving this goal. After over 40 years of independence, Ghana's economy is worse than it was when it achieved independence (Herbst, 1993). To demonstrate how the Ghanaian economy had deteriorated since independence, Herbst asserts that when Ghana achieved political independence it was in a much better economic condition than other African countries. There was a large amount of foreign exchange reserve, and Ghana had the same per capita income as South Korea. As of 1982, however, Ghanaians were significantly poorer than they were at independence, while Koreans had quintupled their per capita

income.<sup>7</sup> In 1963, Ghana was:

**Richer than most [African countries], carefully groomed for independence, with trained cadres exceeding those of far larger countries, without racial minority problems, having inherited a good and expanding educational system, Ghana is regarded as having the resources, manpower and moral and spiritual qualities to set the pace and tone of political development in all of Africa. (Apter cited in Rimmer, 1992, p. 227)**

A fall in real wages further demonstrates the economic deterioration. Between 1960 and 1971, real wages fell by 50 per cent and dropped further by 80 per cent between 1971 and 1983 with the exception of 1967-68 and 1972-74 when the trend was in the reverse (Rimmer, 1992).

The poor performance of the economy can be attributed to both internal and external factors. Internally, the development policies pursued by various governments since independence played a major role. The next section provides a detailed discussion of these policies. Also, inefficient fiscal policies led to huge government deficits causing internal economic disequilibrium. For example, between 1975 and 1981 the total government deficit ballooned 690 per cent, and expenditure rose by 615 per cent in current terms between fiscal year 1975-76. At the same time, government revenues increased by only 56 per cent (Hutchful, 1996). The government resorted to heavy borrowing from the Central Bank to finance these huge deficits. The SOEs that were to provide the economic infrastructure for the country's development policy did not perform any better. The poor performance of the economy, coupled with price controls for goods and services, provided ideal conditions for corruption, the growth of the parallel market or an underground economy, and smuggling.

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<sup>7</sup> While Herbst's (1993) comparative analysis seeks to identify internal causes that brought about economic stagnation, this is problematic because the United States' financial assistance to Korea for geopolitical reasons played an important role in South Korean development.



A new Ghanaian vocabulary was coined to describe these illegal activities. It was called "*kalabule*" (Hutchful, 1997). These problems did not provide an ideal environment for economic growth.

The domestic policy failures were exacerbated by external factors over which the country had no control. Since Ghana is linked to the international economy through its imports and exports, it was not immune from falling commodity prices on the world market, the global economic recession of the 1980s, and the two oil price rises in 1973 and in 1979-80. Due to the worsening terms of trade the economy could not absorb these external shocks. Besides, foreign companies withdrew their investments when the economy began to decline, thus, further crippling an already fragile economy (Callaghy, 1990; Campbell & Loxley, 1989; Rothchild, 1991). Also the government had no control over natural disasters such as the drought and bush fires that occurred in 1982 and 1983. Worst of all, the economy had to absorb about a million Ghanaians who were expelled from Nigeria in 1983. External factors notwithstanding, Ghana's deplorable economic situation cannot be fully understood without analysing development policies pursued by the various governments since independence.

### **State Intervention and Development in Post-independent Ghana**

At independence, Ghana's economy was oriented towards the export of raw materials, it lacked "modern" know-how and industries, and it served as a dumping-ground for surplus manufactured goods of industrial nations (Killick, 1978). With regard to the dumping of manufactured goods in the country, the first Prime Minister, Kwame Nkrumah said "it is precisely because we were, under colonialism, made the dumping ground of other countries' manufactures...that we remained backward" (quoted in Rimmer, 1992, p. 89-91).

Nkrumah's government not only wanted to transform Ghana into a modern industrialized economy, but also, it was anxious to achieve economic independence as well. The government sought to accomplish this goal by depending on ideas from the development literature of the 1950s and 1960s, which favoured a state-led approach to economic growth and development (Fitch & Oppenheimer, 1966; Killick, 1978; Rimmer, 1992).

This approach was rooted in development economics, which emerged as a field of study in the mid-1940s. Britain, France and Portugal attempted to use ideas being developed in this emerging field to transform the economies of their former colonies and make them "more productive" (Leys, 1996, p. 5). The main concern for these former colonial powers was to achieve growth through development and they sought to accomplish this goal by favouring the state's involvement in the economy. The series of ideas and formulations that supported state intervention in the economy were put forward by economists, who were heavily influenced by Keynesianism ( Killick, 1978; Leys, 1996; Mensah, 1997; Moore, 1995). Keynesian economics asserts that, contrary to neoclassical economic theory, free markets cannot restore equilibrium or achieve full employment. Therefore, the state has to intervene to take care of under-consumption and over production to ensure full employment. In other words, the state has to intervene directly in the economy through tax policies, monetary policies such as interest rates, and government expenditure programmes to stimulate economic growth and development.

In order to modernize the economy, the Nkrumah government developed an economic policy that was a combination of modernization and dependency theories situated within a framework of a state-led development policy. Briefly, modernization is a process of social change whereby less-developed societies become more developed by emulating

western cultural practices (Hoogvelt, 1976). Modernization theorists thought that the cultural diffusion of Western economic and technological processes would eventually transform developing countries into developed ones. Social psychologists such as McClelland (1961) saw developing societies as backward and called for the education of such societies in Western values. He believed that the assimilation of these values will transform traditional societies into modern ones. Others like Rostow (1960) focussed on the evolutionary nature of development by emphasizing the five stages of growth. In the 1950s and 1960s, the modernization approach was popular with donor agencies. For example, the World Bank sent experts to developing countries, to advise governments so the donor agencies could secure the optimum economic success for their financial contributions (Hoogvelt, 1976).

But dependency theorists such as Raul Prebisch, who came out of the United Nations Economic Commission on Latin America (ECLA), was critical of modernization theory because it does not question the global economic order (Kiely, 1995). When the demand for primary products began to fall in the early 1950s, there were fears by other development economists, that decline in the price of primary products may slow down economic development in developing countries. This was because primary products were the main source of foreign exchange for those countries. Also protectionist policies by Western countries meant that the developing countries could not produce and export manufactured goods, which could be sold at a higher price in the international market than primary products. Hence development economists such as Prebisch (1950), Nurkse (1953), Hirschman (1958) and others recommended import-substitution industrialization (ISI). Import-substitution industrialization is the idea of establishing local industries to produce goods that would otherwise be imported from abroad. These industries were expected to give

developing economies the big push needed to trigger transformation from export-based economies to modern industrialized ones. Despite their differences, modernization and dependency theorists had one thing in common, that is, to achieve economic growth through industrialization (Kiely, 1995).

Other development economists such as Gunnar Myrdal, Arthur Lewis and Dudley Seers also saw the need for a centrally planned economy. For them, development entailed structural transformation which in turn requires massive capital investments. Due to the limited supply of entrepreneurs in developing countries, the economists argued that governments have to intervene in the economy directly to provide the necessary financial investment (Killick, 1978, Rimmer, 1992). Myrdal (1968), for example, argued that massive government investment was needed to break the cycle of poverty in those countries.

The prevailing intellectual climate legitimized the Nkrumah government's development policies. Nkrumah often defended his economic policies by making reference to the development literature (Rimmer, 1992). In 1963, the government held a conference to discuss its seven-year development plan. Hirschman, Lewis, and Seers were among the economists who attended the conference and offered expert advice to the government on the development plan (Killick, 1978).

In implementing its development strategy, the Nkrumah government embarked upon a programme of import-substitution industrialization and partially closed the economy as a protection from foreign competition. This, in turn, was supposed to promote greater economic independence by reducing reliance upon imports. The industrialization project, however, presented its own challenges. It required substantial capital investment that the local economy could not support. Besides, Nkrumah was pessimistic about the availability

of local entrepreneurs to accelerate the pace of economic development, just like the development economist thought (Killick, 1978). The Nkrumah government felt that the indigenous private sector was small and had limited access to capital and technology to enhance development through industrialization.<sup>8</sup> In the seven-year development plan implemented in the early 1960s, the government was of the view that, “most of Ghana’s entrepreneurs are farmers and small traders....Manufacturing and similar enterprises...would clearly lie beyond their entrepreneurial horizon....The state itself is pre-eminently suited for this role” (quoted in Ramanadham, 1991, p. 26).

The state became an entrepreneur and established light manufacturing industries such as bus and truck assembly, an oil refinery, and textile manufacturing industries. Other state-owned business ventures included agriculture (state farms), food marketing, and supermarket chains (Killick, 1978; Ray, 1986; Rimmer, 1992; Sandbrook, 1993). These enterprises were expected to stimulate growth and the proceeds reinvested in other sectors of the economy. Besides economic, there were political, ideological, social, and pragmatic reasons why Nkrumah favoured a state-led strategy.

Politically, the Nkrumah government thought political independence could be consolidated only if it could preserve substantial control over the economic forces that could be used to subvert it (Mosley, Harrigan, & Toye, 1991). Specifically, the government was not willing to relinquish substantial control over the economy to foreign investors for fear

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<sup>8</sup> This notion of industrialization is problematic because it neglected the potential of local small scale industries that could have been supported to expand instead of establishing industries that could not be supported by the raw material, and industrial base of the country. Nkrumah’s view of industrialization was probably influenced by Lewis’s (1955) dual economy model (Lewis was an economic advisor to the Nkrumah government). This model divides a country’s economy into two sectors: the modern and the traditional. The traditional is characterized as backward. This implies that development strategies should aim at eradicating the traditional. This approach makes no room for incorporating any relevant traditional practices into the modern economy.

of losing its sovereignty. The perceived fear of foreign interests controlling the economy led to partial<sup>9</sup> or total nationalization of some foreign-owned private businesses. Protecting the country's sovereignty and economic nationalism were crucial to the establishment of SOEs. The government's active participation in the economy must be seen both as a real and perceived vulnerability of the country to the colonialists (Mosley et al. 1991). As a young country, the government saw aspects of the economy, such as mines, power (electricity) and the financial institutions, as strategic to the national interest, hence the need to establish SOEs to protect them from foreign control.

Ideologically, Nkrumah was a socialist.<sup>10</sup> He reportedly grew impatient with the results of what he perceived as liberal capitalist policies pursued by the colonial administration (Killick, 1978). These policies had not contributed significantly to the country's economic development and had left the economy "backward" (Ninsin, 1989). Additionally, the success of the former Soviet Union in modernizing its economy with the state as an entrepreneur provided Nkrumah with an attractive alternative (Killick, 1978). Although there were local entrepreneurs, Nkrumah wanted state control of the economy for ideological reasons. In a *National Assembly Debate*, Nkrumah noted that "we would be hampering our advance to socialism if we were to encourage the growth of Ghanaian private capitalism in our midst"(quoted in Killick, 1978, p. 37). The government explicitly stated

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<sup>9</sup> The state entered into joint-ventures with some foreign businesses when outright nationalization was not possible. This move was to ensure some state control over the activities of these businesses.

<sup>10</sup> This may sound ironic because Nkrumah went to great lengths to travel to the U.S. for his doctoral degree (Nkrumah, 1971). He was probably disillusioned by capitalism as practiced in the U.S. and decided Socialism could be the answer. Many analysts believe that his visit to the former Soviet Union in 1961, led him to call for a greater role for the state in the economy. He was reportedly impressed by how the former Soviet Union had modernized its economy with the state as the entrepreneur (Killick, 1978).

**its intentions to create a socialist society in its seven-year development plan:**

**Ghana has chosen the socialist form of society as the objective of her social and economic development. The choice is based on the belief that only a socialist form of society can assure Ghana a rapid rate of economic progress without destroying that social justice, that freedom and equality, which is a central feature of our traditional way of life. (Ghana, 1964, pp. 1-2)**

**There were also social reasons for establishing SOEs. The leaders of the independence movement created strong welfare expectations during the struggle for independence. Nkrumah once said “seek ye first the political kingdom and all other things shall be added unto thee” (cited in Callaghy, 1990, p. 257). In the early 1960s, the government felt pressured to fulfill the promises made during the struggle for political independence. Therefore, it saw the establishment of SOEs as an opportunity to create jobs which will serve as the tangible economic benefits promised (Killick, 1978). The government’s job creation programme using SOEs was in congruence with one of its socialist objectives, that is, to provide full employment (Rimmer, 1992).**

**Because of its modernization agenda, the government wanted the newly established SOEs in the manufacturing sector to be physically impressive and serve as visible indicators of the transformation from the backward to the modern. The factories were distributed across the country to address regional imbalances in economic development, create jobs, and provide other benefits such as lower consumer prices for products. Despite its best intentions, however, the government’s decision to use the factories to address the regional imbalances in development threatened their viability. For example, the establishment of a meat processing plant to produce corned beef in Bolgatanga, in the northern part of the country was ill-conceived. According to Killick,**

**The competitive production of corned beef either requires a large supply of scrap meat left overs after the prime cuts have been removed, or a substantial exportable surplus of low-cost slaughter-stock which may be canned and sold abroad. Neither of these conditions existed, for Ghana imports much of her meat and cattle, the whole carcass finds a ready market for demand as raw meat. (1978, p. 232)**

Due to these problems the meat factory operated below full capacity. Other reasons for the poor performance of the industries include over-capitalization, shortage of raw materials and the failure to match supply with the market demand (Hutchful, 1987; Killick, 1978; Rimmer, 1992).

Thus, the prevailing development discourse that emphasized modernization and import-substitution industrialization meshed well with Nkrumah's ideological, political, and social reasons for establishing SOEs. Although the NLC and the Busia government attempted to limit the state's participation in the economy by reducing the number of SOEs, the changes they implemented were not significant to minimize the sector's importance to the country's economic development agenda. Subsequent governments built upon the SOE economic infrastructure that the Nkrumah government attempted to create.

### **The History of State-Owned Enterprises in Ghana**

SOEs are businesses that are wholly state-owned or under joint ownership by the state and individuals and/or groups, with the state as the majority or minority shareholder. They are made up of statutory boards, authorities, and corporations and have been in existence in Ghana since the colonial era (Birmingham, Neustadt, & Omaboe, 1966; Gyimah-Boadi, 1991; Huq, 1989; Rimmer, 1992). SOEs provide employment for a huge percentage of the labour force in the formal sector. For example, as of 1987, SOEs employed about 250,000 workers. In 1990, more than 50 percent of these employees were concentrated



in about 40 SOEs. Each of these 40 SOEs had an average of 1,336 employees (Adda, n.d).

SOEs have been in existence since the colonial era. The colonial administration established them to provide public utilities such as water, electricity, postal and telegraphic services, railways and motor transport. The services these utilities provided, however, were limited, and existed mainly in urban centres (Gyimah-Boadi, 1991). In 1947, the colonial government formed a statutory body, the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), whose main function was to develop policies that would lead to the development of industries in the country (Birmingham et al., 1966). The functions of the IDC were not limited to the public sector. It also provided financial assistance to private entrepreneurs in the form of long-term loans (Hutchful, 1987). When Nkrumah formed a transitional government to handle Government Business during the transition to independence, it established more SOEs in addition to those already in existence. Arthur Lewis, an economist, provided expert advice on the government's SOE industrialization strategy. He urged the government to give subsidies to the SOEs and provide them with protection only on a temporary basis (Rimmer, 1992). Later, when the Nkrumah government formed the First Republic, SOEs became the basis of its economic policy.

By 1965, there were about 53 SOEs in the country. Around the same time, evidence of problems within the sector began to emerge. Between 1964-65, the sector lost £G 7 million (Rimmer, 1992).<sup>11</sup> The IDC went into liquidation and the government transferred its functions to the Ministry of Industries (Hutchful, 1987). In 1964, the government formed the State Enterprises Secretariat (SES) and transferred the supervision of joint ventures to the

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<sup>11</sup> Ghana used the West Africa Currency Board (WACB) pound until 1957 when it was replaced with the Ghana pound. The Ghana pound was also replaced in 1965 with the cedi (Rimmer, 1992).

secretariat. A 1966 report about the performance of SOEs identified a number of problems facing the sector. They include the diffusion of responsibility for SOEs among various government bodies, the lack of skilled personnel, the operation of SOEs as public utilities with no obligation to be profitable, overstaffing, lack of autonomy for management, and insufficient or no working capital (Hutchful, 1987). The Nkrumah government was unable to find a long-term solution to these problems. Not surprisingly, the military cited the failure of the SOE strategy as one of its reasons for overthrowing the Nkrumah government in a military coup in 1966.

The National Liberation Council (NLC), the military government that overthrew the Nkrumah government, did not promote SOEs as the basis for economic development. Instead, it initiated two major policies to address problems plaguing the sector. First, it privatized some SOEs and invited private participation in others. The privatized SOEs, however, were small and not considered strategic by the country. Second, the government asked the United Nations Centre for Industrial Development (UNCID) to send in experts to assist in reorganizing the operations of SOEs. The government expected the experts to help the SOEs to operate more efficiently (Hutchful, 1987). The attempted overhaul of the state enterprise sector was an integral part of an IMF-supported stabilization programme. This was Ghana's first experiment with IMF stabilization programmes (Hutchful, 1997).

In 1969 the Second Republic, a civilian government, led by Kofi Busia, assumed office. The Busia government tackled the problem from a broader perspective. Based on the advice of the World Bank, it liberalized the economy. State participation in the economy was not totally abandoned but was limited to basic projects for which private capital was unavailable (Hutchful, 1997; Killick, 1978). The Busia government reorganized the activities

of SOEs by establishing the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation (GIHOC). GIHOC was, however, dissolved as a holding company in 1990 as part of the SOERP (Anyemedu, 1993). Although the NLC and the Busia government were more sympathetic towards private enterprise, 43 of the 53 SOEs in existence in 1965 were still functioning in 1971 (Rimmer, 1992). Other World Bank proposals implemented by the Busia government, such as currency devaluation, led to another coup in 1972.

The new military government, the National Redemption Council (NRC), was very nationalistic. It used such slogans as “self reliance” and “operation feed yourself” to support its nationalist fervour and emphasized self sufficiency. Contrary to the policies of the previous government, the Acheampong government expanded the state’s involvement in the economy by partial or total nationalization of foreign businesses, and confiscation of others. The industries in this category included gold mining, textiles and even auto parts companies (Gyimah-Boadi, 1991). Rawlings also nationalized more SOEs during his 3 months in office in 1979.

The establishment and acquisition of SOEs from the time of Ghana’s independence in 1957 until the early 1980s occurred over three distinct phases. These phases reflect a combination of accident and design (Hutchful, 1996). The first phase occurred during the Nkrumah era; the second involved the establishment of new enterprises and the partial or total nationalization of a number of private enterprises after Busia’s government was ousted in 1972; and the third phase occurred through confiscations during the 3 month brief appearance of Rawlings on the political scene in 1979. The sporadic nature in which some of the SOEs were nationalized and new ones established was an expression of the absence of long-term vision of the state’s involvement in the operation of SOEs (Hutchful, 1996).

The number of SOEs grew from about 88 in 1966 (Killick, 1978) to about 308 in 1982 (Dotse & Agbeko-Kra, 1990).

Adda, (n.d.) attributes SOEs' poor performance to poor policy framework, poor management, poor monitoring; and poor feasibility studies. He argues that the poor policy framework of SOEs was a consequence of the government's economic and labour policies. For example, the government's fixed foreign exchange rate policy led to an overvaluation of the local currency, the cedi. Rationing foreign currencies through a system of import licensing did not help matters because the central bank did not have enough foreign exchange. The high underground or parallel market rate for the cedi, made imports, especially equipment and raw materials for the industrial sector, expensive. At the same time, the government's price control policy made most SOE operations unprofitable because they could not pass on the cost of providing the goods and services to consumers. The labour laws were equally restrictive. The SOEs could not lay off excess staff even when they were a financial drain on them.

Apart from the negative impact of poor government policies, SOEs had to grapple with management problems. These problems ranged from the absence of skilled personnel to poor accounting and budgeting systems. The absence of skilled personnel was due mainly to higher salaries in the private sector, which made comparable positions in the SOE sector unattractive to prospective recruits. Without qualified staff, the SOEs could not operate efficiently, hence their poor performance (State Enterprises Commission, 1995).

The fragmented monitoring system did not help matters. At least three or more government ministries were responsible for overseeing the operations of each SOE. Moreover, the monitoring system was neither well-coordinated nor well-defined (State

Enterprises Commission, 1995). The problem was exacerbated by the limited resources that the monitoring teams had to work with. Consequently, the ministries could not hold the management of the SOEs accountable for poor performance.

Also the poor feasibility studies undertaken before the establishment of some SOEs came back to haunt the country. Sometimes the results of the feasibility studies did not provide enough economic justification for the establishment of the SOEs but for social and political reasons the governments went ahead anyway. This problem meant that some of the SOEs, especially those in manufacturing, operated below capacity because of inadequate raw materials (State Enterprises Commission, 1995).

The problems outlined above are similar to those indicated in a 1966 Report on the sector (Hutchful, 1987), meaning that not much changed since the 1966 report was prepared. By 1982, 101 of the about 308 SOEs in existence incurred losses totalling about 2.9 billion cedis, that is, about US\$1 billion (Dotse & Agbeko-Kra, 1990).<sup>12</sup> Because of the poor performance of the SOEs most of them had to depend on government subvention to pay their workers and to maintain their day-to-day operations. The government's financial involvement with the SOEs, however, went much deeper than the provision of subsidies. It also guaranteed loans for them. The state was therefore obliged to bail out SOEs that defaulted on their loan payments. The losses incurred by the sector, and the state's bailing-out approach were drains on an already fragile economy.

The above factors, the poor economic policies of successive governments, and external factors culminated in a pervasive economic decline in the 1970s. By 1981, it was

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<sup>12</sup> The official exchange in 1982 was 2.75 cedis to the US \$1 while the parallel market rate was about 75 cedis to 1 US dollar making the losses substantially lower at about US \$3.8 million.

obvious that the economic problems had to be addressed. With a civilian government in power, once again the response came from the military. Rawlings returned to power for the second time and called for a “socialist-style” revolution (Ray, 1986). The daunting task of addressing the country’s economic problems confronted the new government.

Tackling the problem required a huge infusion of capital into the economy. But the government did not have many options when it came to where to turn for financial assistance. The Western-based multilateral institutions were not an option, because of the government’s socialist ideological orientation. In the early days of the revolution, imperialism was denounced daily in the state-controlled media (Ray, 1986). The government perceived these institutions as capitalists and economic predators whose aim was to take away the country’s sovereignty by dictating economic policies that would ultimately re-colonize the country (Ray, 1986; Toye, 1991b). Naturally, the government turned to its allies, Libya and the former Eastern bloc countries, for financial assistance but the request was turned down. Meanwhile, the economic problems persisted. So the government turned to the previously disparaged Western-based financial institutions for assistance. Consultations with the IMF and the World Bank culminated in the implementation of the SAP in 1983. The acceptance of the IMF and World Bank’s economic package significantly redefined the country’s economic policies from a state-led development approach to one that emphasizes a minimal role for the government in the economy. These changes had implications for the country’s SOEs. Before examining these implications, I provide a brief outline of the SAP.

## **The Structural Adjustment Programme**

Structural adjustment can loosely be described as “a shift in economic policies from an interventionist stance...towards a neo-liberal position which aims to minimize it, letting the market allocate resources whenever possible” (Engberg-Pederson et al., 1996, p. 3). It advocates a minimal role of the state in the economy. The rationale behind this view, is the perception that, state intervention in the economy not only creates market distortions, it also crowds out private investment. Structural adjustment policies are, therefore, designed to change the orientation of development from a state-centred approach to a neo-liberal economic framework that allows market forces to allocate resources to stimulate growth and development.

Usually, structural adjustment programmes are implemented in two phases: stabilization and adjustment phases (Engberg-Pedersen et al., 1996). The stabilization phase attempts to reduce public expenditure, raise interest rates, and allow the local currency to reflect its market value. These macroeconomic measures fall within the jurisdiction of the IMF. The adjustment phase entail longer-term measures intended to boost economic performance. They include such measures as State Enterprise Reform, Civil Service Reform, and investment in human capital. This phase is the responsibility of the World Bank. The two phases, however, are sometimes implemented simultaneously.

If economists once encouraged governments or states to play a central role in the economy, why do the IFIs now want market forces to allocate resources to stimulate growth and development? The answer can be attributed to two main factors: an ideological move in the Western World inspired by Thatcherism and Reaganomics, and the influential Berg Report commissioned by the World Bank (1981).

In the 1970s and early 1980s, neo-liberal economic policies pursued by governments in Europe and North America, especially in the United States and Britain, had a significant impact on economic decisions in cash-strapped developing countries. This was because these countries depended heavily on financial assistance from the institutions which are controlled by Western countries. The policy change in parts of Western Europe and North America was spurred by economic problems during the late 1960s and early 1970s. For example, the U.S. economy experienced high inflation and high unemployment rates concurrently (Mensah, 1997) especially since the first oil price crisis in 1973. Keynesian economics, which influenced the U.S. government's economic policies until then could not provide an answer to the problem. The Reagan administration saw the solution in the free market economic policies championed by Milton Friedman, once a lone voice who trumpeted the merits of the free market in the 1960s and early 70s. Moore (1995) calls this phase of development neo-liberal deregulated capitalism. In fact, this change of policy was publicly announced by Reagan in a speech to the North-South conference in Cancun in 1981 (Escobar, 1995).

The story was the same in Britain. Margaret Thatcher, who came to power in the late 1970s, implemented economic policies, based on free-market principles because for her, there was no alternative to the market (Moore, 1995). The policy reversals in these countries help to explain the situation in Ghana because the policies of the IMF and the World Bank are defined by the foreign policies of most western countries, especially the United States (Escobar, 1995). For example, the influence of the American and British governments at the World Bank is demonstrated by their voting power. Together, the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France and Japan control about 45 per cent of the votes of the World Bank (Escobar, 1995).



The other factor that changed the role of the state with regard to development in Africa was the Berg Report. The World Bank (1981) commissioned this study to find out the cause and potential cure for Africa's dismal economic performance in the 1970s. The report was released in 1981 and named the Berg Report after the principal author, Elliot Berg. The Berg Report attributed Africa's economic stagnation to social and political reasons.<sup>13</sup> It recommended liberalization of African economies and the implementation of policies that would stimulate growth and development in a free market environment. The report also recommends a minimal role for the state in the economy, hence the privatization and restructuring of SOEs in Africa. This was the prevailing intellectual and ideological climate internationally when the government of Ghana went to solicit financial assistance from the IMF and the World Bank. With this as background, I now discuss Ghana's adjustment programme in general and, specifically, one of the measures that the government implemented to minimize its role in the economy—the State-Owned Enterprises Reform Programme.

### **The Structural Adjustment Programme in Ghana**

J.J. Rawlings's military government implemented Ghana's adjustment programme in 1983. The implementation was in two phases. The first phase, known as the Economic Recovery Programme 1 (ERP1), took place from 1983 to 1986. It addressed such macroeconomic issues as reforms in the exchange rate, that is the devaluation of the local currency to reflect its value on the market; abolition of price controls; increases in interest

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<sup>13</sup> This issue is explored further in the next chapter.

rates; withdrawal of subsidies on most goods and services; layoffs in the public sector; and rehabilitation of the export sector (Hutchful, 1996; World Bank, 1984). This phase of the reform was expected to stabilize the economy and attract foreign investment (Hutchful, 1989). The second phase, stabilization phase, or the ERP II officially began in 1987. It entailed reforming public sector institutions including SOEs. For the purposes of this study, I concentrate on the state enterprise reforms. The goals of the state enterprises reforms are: to limit state involvement in the productive sector; reduce the financial and managerial burden of managing SOEs on the government; improve the efficiency and productivity of SOEs; increase their managerial autonomy; and make the management of SOEs more accountable (Hutchful, 1989; Gyimah-Boadi, 1991; World Bank, 1984).

### **The State-Owned Enterprises Reform Programme**

The SOERP constituted the stabilization phase of the SAP, but the preliminary studies for its implementation began earlier. In 1984, the government commissioned a group of local consultants from the Management Development and Productivity Institute (MDPI) and the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA), both public sector institutions to conduct a preliminary study of about 100 SOEs (Gyimah-Boadi, 1991). The findings of this study provided basic data for further studies of the sector. Based on the preliminary study, the Ghanaian Government and the International Development Association (IDA) agreed that a more comprehensive study of the sector was required. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the IDA funded the next phase of the study which was conducted by a foreign consultancy firm. Since the consultants had to bid for the project, their recommendations reflected the views of the Bank. Hence the consultants' report

cannot be viewed as neutral but rather as a representation of the World Bank's views.

After the consultants submitted their report in 1985, the government commissioned a task force to examine the report and its recommendations, and to design a reform programme. Among its many duties, the task force was to develop an SOE reform programme and identify aspects of the reform that could be used as a "basis for negotiating World Bank or other donor support in its implementation" (State Enterprises Commission, 1995, p. 9).

Based on the findings of the task force, the goals of the SOERP were, among others, to create a policy environment that favours the management of SOEs in a commercially competitive manner. Another aim is to increase the operational autonomy of SOE managers and to clarify the allocation of responsibility and accountability for SOEs. The rationalization of the SOE sector through divestitures and mergers so as to reduce the financial and managerial burden on Government is another objective. The SOERP is also designed to improve management and operating efficiency through staffing reductions (State Enterprises Commission 1995). These objectives are based on an agreement between the Ghanaian Government on one hand, and the World Bank and the International Development Association (IDA) on the other. The central role of the World Bank meant that the reform programme was oriented to market-based policies. The use of such phrases as "commercially competitive manner" in the government's own document demonstrates this view. On the role of the market, two of the World Bank's experts on SOEs, Shirley and Nellis (1991), note that the reforms would create a more competitive economic environment, that would improve "efficiency by applying market tests of viability and performance to its firms"(p. 4).

The SOERP is funded by Structural Adjustment Credits SAC I, 1987; SAC II, 1989;

and SAC III, 1991 (State Enterprises Commission, 1995). The reform programme has three elements. The first element concentrates on the organization that oversees the operations of all SOEs, the State Enterprises Commission (SEC). The SEC reform is aimed at improving the capacity of the commission to enable it to better manage and advise SOEs on reform issues and set policy direction. The second element focuses on the divestiture of SOEs based on discussions with the donor agencies, such as the World Bank (State Enterprises Commission, 1995). The final component, the SOE restructuring programme, which is the focus of this study, is aimed at an overhaul of the operations of state enterprises considered strategic to the nation.<sup>14</sup> If the rationale of the SAP is less government in the market, one might ask: why not sell all SOEs instead of restructuring them?

Shirley and Nellis (1991) recognized that it would be difficult to dismantle the entire system at once because developing countries lack the economic structures to make such a transition in the short-term, so they recommended a slower approach. Perhaps this is why the status of SOEs classified as strategic is temporary since the government is engaged in yearly discussions with donor agencies on SOEs that could make a transition from the temporary list to the divestiture category. The restructuring before divestiture approach of the Bank, might explain why about half of the total credit for the SOERP is allocated to the restructuring component (State Enterprises Commission, 1995).

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<sup>14</sup> It is unclear exactly what the government meant by strategic, since Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, which was once classified as strategic, was later privatized. An official at the State Enterprises Commission told me that enterprises in this category are subject to change because the government can decide that an enterprise that was once classified as strategic is no longer strategic and must, therefore, be sold.

## **The SOE Restructuring Programme**

The policy recommendation for the reform programme defines restructuring as “a term used to cover all remedial or corrective measures necessary to the sustained productive and financial viability of a state enterprise” (State Enterprise Commission: 1995, p. 65). The restructuring is aimed at addressing problems associated with:

**Excessive staffing levels and inflexible labour structures, low levels of capacity utilization, obsolete or non-operational plant, equipment and production technology, inadequate capitalization, inappropriate allocations of managerial and supervisory responsibility. (State Enterprise Commission, 1995, p. 65)**

Addressing the above issues, means work reorganization and, therefore, raises questions about the processes involved in solving them and their effects on the workers and the work process.

The broad policy initiatives in the restructuring programme include making SOEs commercially viable and competitive by eliminating their noncommercial or social functions. Shirley and Nellis (1991) argue that the noncommercial objectives make SOEs inefficient hence the need to develop objectives compatible with their commercial operations. Concentrating on their commercial functions meant transforming SOEs from government subsidized institutions into commercial entities that pay yearly dividends to the state. Also, the restructuring programme gives management greater autonomy over the decision-making process at the organizational level. The details of the SOERP as implemented at Cityline Corporation, the SOE that is the focus of this study, is discussed in Chapter 5.

## **Summary**

**In this chapter, I provided an overview of Ghana and situated the study within a socio-historical and economic context. I examined the political, economic, and the external factors that contributed to the country's poor economic performance in the 1970s and early 80s. Ghana's post-independence economic development strategy which emphasized a state-led approach with SOEs as the vehicles for growth and development was also discussed. The state-led approach, however, was not unique to Ghana. It was reflexive of the dominant development discourse espoused by some development economists in the 1950s and 60s. But the shift towards market-led policies in the 1970s onwards in Western countries that support the IFIs meant a change in the economic policies of countries that depend on these institutions for financial assistance including Ghana. In the next chapter, I provide a theoretical analysis of the SAP and review the literature on the SOERP in Ghana.**

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **Perspectives on Structural Adjustment Programmes, Literature Review and Theoretical Approach**

#### **Introduction**

The economic policies in the IMF and the World Bank-sponsored Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) are rooted in Adam Smith's (1776) neo-classical economic ideas that have been around since the 1700s. Neo-classical economists believe in allowing free competition in the marketplace because they claim that the operation of the free market leads to outcomes that are beneficial to both individuals and society as a whole. Since Adam Smith propounded this theory, the debate among academics has been attempts to "define the precise conditions which have to be satisfied in order to achieve those results, and to explain, predict, and control outcomes where these conditions are absent" (Colclough, 1991, p. 1).

Due to structural differences between developing and industrialized countries which affects neo-classical economic views about markets, some development economists (for example, Arthur Lewis, Gunnar Myrdal, Paul Steeten, Dudley Seers, and Ragnal Nurkse), favoured some state intervention in the economy to deal with the market imperfections (Colclough, 1991, Leys, 1996). These economists were not interested in replacing the market with central planning. Rather, they saw state intervention as necessary for the smooth operation of the market.

Central to the analysis of these development economists are ideas about savings, investment and growth. This is because they saw capital accumulation as crucial to economic development. For example, Nurkse (1953) argues that a vicious cycle of poverty exists in developing countries and suggests ways of breaking the cycle. He posits that there is a

**circular relationship between poverty and problems associated with capital formation. For him, problems of capital formation in developing countries were due to low real income which could also be attributed to low productivity. He suggests that the cycle can be broken by investment in all segments of the economy. These investments were expected to come from domestic and external sources. Since the level of domestic investment was already low, he suggested that domestic investment will increase when people are induced to save and invest. With low levels of domestic investment, foreign investment becomes crucial to breaking the cycle of poverty in developing countries.**

**Development economists, such as Raul Prebisch, who came out of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), also advanced theories about growth. Against the backdrop of deteriorating terms of trade in developing countries and increasing protectionism in industrialized countries, Prebisch (1950), argued that economic development and growth could only occur when developing countries industrialized. He advocated import-substitution industrialization (ISI) as the strategy for achieving this goal. Central planning was an integral part of the ISI strategy, making government intervention in the economy an important aspect of growth and development. Prebisch and his colleagues at the ECLA developed their ideas into what became known as dependency theory.**

**Modernization theorists such as Rostow, Parsons, and Huntington were also concerned about growth and development, but they focussed on changing the traditional values of people in the developing world through the diffusion of western values. Education, technology transfer, foreign aid, and scholarships were the means of modernizing developing societies. Although there are significant differences in the above views on development, they all emphasize growth and economic development. These growth strategies required huge**



foreign investments which later contributed to the debt crisis of the 1970s and 80s (Payer, 1991).

The growth-oriented strategies that were the basis of development theories since World War II, however, did not achieve the desired results. Developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, grew poorer and their debt burden increased. The poor economic performance also coincided with a change in the intellectual climate which began in the late 1960s and gained momentum in the late 1970s. Economists such as Bauer, Krueger, Lal and Bhagwati attributed the abysmal economic performance in most developing countries to excessive government intervention (Colclough, 1991). Political scientists such as Bates (1981) also waded into the debate, arguing that governments were the source of the problem since they pursued irrational economic policies that rewarded urban residents and disadvantaged rural dwellers who produced the bulk of exports in those countries. Addressing the economic problems in developing countries involved the implementation of neo-liberal policies contained in the SAP.

For Leys (1996), the dominance of neo-liberalism in current development policy-making has more to do with changes in the global economy than a shift in the intellectual climate. Furthermore, Leys points out that:

The radical transformation in both the structure and the management of the world economy that had begun in the 1960s, and which finally seemed to offer the possibility of creating for the first time in history a truly unified global capitalist economy – and one regulated, if at all, only by institutions reflecting the interests of transnational capital. Neo-liberalism articulated the goal and beliefs of the dominant forces that stood to benefit from this process, and pushed it forward. (1996, p. 19)

Despite the impetus that the changing global economy provided for the ascendancy of neo-liberalism, the role of intellectuals was equally important. Some of them were directly

involved in designing economic policies for the World Bank. Economists such as Ann Krueger and Deepak Lal served on various World Bank advisory committees (Colclough, 1991). The move towards neo-liberalism was reflected in World Bank policies due to political changes in Britain and the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s, that brought Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan to office, both of whom held neo-liberal views. The World Bank came under pressure from both governments and other major shareholders, to pursue market-oriented economic policies (Escobar, 1995; Leys, 1996). The neo-liberal policies in the SAP can be situated within the New Political Economy (NPE) framework. In this chapter, I examine this perspective and its links with the SAP and the SOERP. I also discuss the literature on the SOERP and present my theoretical framework for the study.

### **The New Political Economy**

The development record in developing countries since the 1950s has been mixed. While some newly industrializing countries (NICs) in Eastern Asia have achieved growth in per capita income, the economies of sub-Saharan African countries have declined. In the wake of these mixed results, economists, political scientists, and policy-makers have been attempting to understand why some countries develop and others do not. Economists attribute the disparities in development outcomes to the refusal of governments to heed their expert advice (Meier, 1991). In other words:

Economists have urged export promotion, but countries continue to follow import-substitution policies. Economists have urged rural development and the removal of urban bias, but governments still emphasize industrialization and neglect agriculture. Economists argue for stabilization, but inflation still prevails. (1991, p. 4)

But economists were not the only people attempting to understand the situation; political scientists were also asking questions. For example, Bates (1981), a political scientist, wanted to find out why governments pursue economic policies that are detrimental to their societies. The academics from both disciplines found their answer in rational choice theory. Rational choice theory was probably attractive to them because it deals with actors and resources. Resources are things that actors control and in which they also have some interest. Rational choice theorists such as Coleman (1990) argue that individual actions have definite goals which are shaped by their values and preferences and they take actions that meet these needs and wants. Thus, individual actions are always motivated by the desire to maximize their utility. Drawing on rational choice theory, they developed a theoretical framework called the new political economy.<sup>15</sup>

The term political economy has often been associated with Marxian analysis. Recently, however, neo-liberal thinkers, who believe in the principles of the free market, have used it to analyse economic issues. The usage of the term within a neo-liberal context prompted Coleman and Halisi to describe it as an “ideologically nondenominational label” (cited in Lofchie, 1994 p. 145), which means that the term has been appropriated by both Marxists and Neo-liberal thinkers alike. Its usage in this study is associated with the latter.

The new political economy (NPE) is not a unified framework. There are distinctions within it. For the purposes of this study, I provide a broad description of the works of economists and political scientists within this framework. The focus on these two should not suggest that there is no variation within each discipline. The economists, (such as Bhagwati,

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<sup>15</sup> Judging from the title of one of Bates’ works, *Towards a Political Economy of Development: A Rational Choice Perspective*, one can argue that the development of this perspective is ongoing.

1982; Buchanan, Tollison, & Tullock, 1980; Colander, 1984; Findlay, 1991; Krueger, 1974; Lal, 1988; Srinivasan, 1991) view government intervention as detrimental to development because it distorts the operation of the free market. In other words, they think that governments impede development because they do not “get the prices right” (Lal, 1983, p. 107). Srinivasan (1991) defines the NPE as:

The axiom that agents behave rationally; that is, they have a consistent set of preferences over the outcomes of their actions, and they choose an action whose outcomes is preferable to the outcomes of other actions they find as feasible, given the constraints in which they act.... Agents are assumed to behave rationally, whether they are consumers using available information to form expectations about the future, bureaucrats fighting for turf or distributing publicly created rents, or lobbyists and voters. (p. 126)

The main focus in the above definition is self-interest. Self-interest is central to the analysis of the NPE because advocates of this perspective believe that individuals are rational and, therefore, they would always engage in behaviours that are beneficial to them. These rational individuals not only attempt to maximize their utility through economic interactions; they also use governments to protect their personal gains. For example, individuals in power develop policies that benefit them. Achieving individual goals sometimes requires cooperation with like-minded individuals, resulting in such group actions as lobbying (Alt & Chrystal, 1983).

While political scientists within the NPE tradition also focus on self-interest, they are critical of the economists for their narrow focus on market situations. For example, Bates (1988;1991) argues that the emphasis should be on the choices that are made within nonmarket settings. Bates is interested to know why governments behave the way they do and how public policies are chosen. Despite the divergent views of the economists and

political scientists, the centrality of economics and politics to the NPE makes it “a neoclassical economic theory of politics” (Meier, 1991, p. 5).

In analysing the issue of self-interest, adherents of the NPE wondered why authoritarian and democratic governments alike would not adopt economic policies that generate growth, especially when their economies were in crises. What baffled them most was that governments chose to continue with policies that created budget deficits, caused inflation, and created market distortions although their economies were experiencing a downturn. They argue that the irrational economic decisions of governments were driven by individual self-interest of politicians who hold on to power by making unsound economic decisions which reward their supporters (Findlay, 1991; Lal, 1988). For example, they claim that governments provide subsidies on goods and services in urban areas probably in an attempt to consolidate their support-base among the urban working-class. These practices ultimately discriminated against the rural population who produces the bulk of export crops in developing countries. The discrimination stems from policies which allow governments to pay significantly lower prices to farmers compared to the prices of their produce on the world market. Governments then use revenues made from underpaying farmers to subsidize social services in urban centres (Bates, 1981; Lofchie, 1994).

Closely related to the preceding point is the cynical view that advocates of the NPE hold about the state.<sup>16</sup> They do not see the state as an institution that is concerned about the welfare of its citizens. Instead, they describe it as an institution made up of self-seeking

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<sup>16</sup> There are variations in the way in which the new political economists conceptualize the state. Some view the state as autonomous while others see it as passive or as an institution which structures the behaviour of politicians and social groups (Haggard, 1991).

interest groups and self-serving politicians, who by their actions, harm public welfare. They use concepts such as the “predatory state” and “rent-seeking” to explain why states continue to pursue economic policies that increase distortions in the economy, increase inefficiency, and cause stagnation and inequality (Bhagwati, 1982; Conybeare, 1982; Krueger, 1974; Lal, 1988). The predatory state is a self-serving government that extracts resources for its own use and for its associates. Predators pursue policies that meet their personal interests, for example, they provide public goods by enlarging the public sector because of the benefits they derive from such policies (Lal, 1988).

Rent-seeking is the other concept that they concentrate on. The rent-seeking society was discussed by Krueger (1974) in her analysis of trade restrictions. According to Krueger, when governments impose quantitative restrictions on economic activities, the situation creates an artificial shortage. Governments then introduce a system that provides import licences for the importation of commodities that become scarce because of the imposition of import restrictions. The bureaucrats in charge of issuing import licences for the scarce commodities use their offices to enrich themselves by demanding extra money from the importers. Eventually, the importers include the cost of the bribes in the final cost of imported goods making them more expensive than they would have been had import restrictions not been imposed. Rent-seeking is costly for society because it leads to bribery, corruption, smuggling and the emergence of the parallel economy (Krueger, 1974). The new political economists establish a relationship between such policies as import-substitution industrialization and rent-seeking since such policies lead to foreign exchange controls which ultimately give rise to rent-seeking.

Advocates of the NPE also focus on distributional coalitions in their analysis.

Distributional coalitions include urban-based interest groups such as labour unions who lobby governments to implement policies in their favour (Alt & Chrystal, 1983). These policies are often supported by subsidies from farmers who produce for export, thus short-changing the farmers and other exporters (Bates, 1981). Therefore, proponents of the NPE are critical of interest groups because they argue that their lobby efforts force politicians to make irrational economic decisions. They do not, however, dislike all interest groups. They support groups whose interests are aligned with theirs. For example, they support farmers and those who produce for export because they argue that governments underpay them and use revenues accrued to subsidize urban dwellers, most of whom are public sector workers. Furthermore, supporters of the NPE note that because of these lopsided policies, politicians and bureaucrats are no longer value-neutral public servants but are motivated to stay in power for individual gains.

The solution to the above problems, from the perspective of the NPE, is limited government. A small government with limited activities would restrict the irrational behaviour of politicians because they will have less to reward their supporters. In his assessment of the NPE, Colclough (1991) points out that the fundamental message of neo-liberalism is that “in settling matters of resource allocation, imperfect markets are better than imperfect states” (p. 7). The SAP is a reflection of the NPE.

### **The NPE and Structural Adjustment Programmes: Exploring the Link**

The SAP requires the abolition of the import licensing system that breeds rent-seeking. It proposes the liberalization of the economy and the elimination of restrictive measures as a way of handling the problem. Also, since proponents of the NPE argue that

rent-seeking is promoted by a large public sector, the SAP proposes the privatization of this sector as a means of reversing the trend. A final link between the NPE and structural adjustment is the policy of open markets. Thus, the SAP framework is aimed at fostering foreign competition. The argument here is that if foreign competition results in the closure of local industries, then it means that the country in question does not have a comparative advantage in that industry and therefore has to fold-up its operations (Dasgupta, 1998). The foundation for the link between the NPE and the SAP, and its relevance to sub-Saharan Africa was laid by the work of two scholars, Elliot Berg, an economist and Robert Bates, a political scientist.

Elliot Berg is the principal author of the 1981 World Bank Report on Africa's economic crisis titled *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa* and popularly known as the "Berg Report." In 1979, the World Bank commissioned Elliot Berg to find the causes of Africa's economic stagnation and recommended possible solutions. The report outlines a number of proposals on how to solve the crisis. These proposals have some basic underlying themes which include the liberalization of trade and foreign-exchange policies, building a comparative advantage and export promotion, and a limited role for governments in the economy.

On trade and exchange-rate policies, the report notes that governments have used import restrictions, which were reinforced by import-substitution industrialization policies, to conserve foreign exchange, instead of devaluing their currencies. The result was rent-seeking and its concomitants of bribery, corruption and the growth of the parallel market. The proposed solution is the "correction of overvalued exchange rates...and reduced use of direct controls" (World Bank, 1981, p. 30).



The report also emphasized comparative cost advantage, especially for businesses in manufacturing and agriculture sectors. Past economic policies in many African countries focussed on diversifying the economy from primarily export-based to manufacturing-based industries. To support the manufacturing sector, governments implemented policies that protected infant manufacturing industries. With regard to agriculture, governments attempted to diversify exports so that their economies would not become too dependent on export crops because of price fluctuations on the world commodity market. The Berg Report saw these policies as counter-productive. In the case of manufacturing, the report saw protectionism as evidence of inefficiency in the manufacturing sector. Consequently, the report recommended market liberalization to provide a level-playing field for local industries to compete with their foreign counterparts.

The report was also critical of the state enterprise sector for being a financial burden on the government because most of the SOEs were poorly managed. According to the report the problems faced by SOEs stem from the fact that they are:

Not being treated as commercial enterprises. They should not be burdened by requirements to hire more people than they need, to provide services without payment, or to hold down prices of goods and services they sell...parastatals should be maintained as commercial enterprises. (World Bank, 1981, p. 96)

Thus, according to the World Bank, SOEs cannot perform social functions such as job creation or make services such as power, accessible by lowering prices. The solution to the problem with the state enterprise sector is reforms including the privatization, restructuring and liquidation of SOEs.

Robert Bates espoused his ideas on the failure of state intervention in Africa in his 1981 book, *Markets and States in Tropical Africa*. His focus was on the agriculture sector.

He notes that although research shows that physical, biological, environmental, social and economic factors are the major problems facing African farmers, he thinks the core problem is with prices offered by governments for cash crops. Bates argues that the problem stems from government policies that distort the operation of the free market. He wanted to find out why “reasonable men adopt public policies that have harmful consequences for the societies they govern” (1981, p. 3). His answer to the question is political, and he found it by examining the social reasons why policymakers intervene in agricultural markets. His main argument was that politicians make irrational economic decisions in order to reward their supporters, who will in turn help perpetuate their stay in office. Bates’ influence was evident in subsequent World Bank reports. For example, the World Bank’s 1986 *World Development Report*, that focussed on trade and pricing policies in agriculture, drew on Bates’ ideas especially in discussions about consumer subsidies and why governments intervene to set the prices of commodities. The report attributed their behaviour political factors. In other words, politicians set prices in order to meet the interests of the urban elites.

Based on their respective analysis, Bates and Berg concluded that free market principles should be fundamental to any economic reform programme in the sub-region. The above discussions show that there is a relationship between the NPE and the SAP. But why would the Bank commission Berg to be the principal author for the report? The answer is probably ideological because most institutions and organization that focus on global economic performance often employ experts who reflect their views (Colclough, 1991). The basic premise of the World Bank’s ideology is its commitment to the development of an international capitalist system based on free trade or economic liberalism (Onimode, 1988). The Berg Report enabled the World Bank and the IMF to identify the source of the economic

crisis and prescribe solutions that would further promote their free market ideology.

### **Criticisms of the New Political Economy**

The NPE is problematic because it assumes that self-interest is the sole determinant of human behaviour and it does not explain other positive human actions, such as philanthropy (Dasgupta, 1998). While self-interest cannot be overlooked as a motivating factor in explaining individual or group action in general, it is not the sole determinant of human action. Some politicians view their concern for others and the sense of belonging derived from such actions as “matters that go beyond personal book-keeping and cost-benefit analysis” (1998, p. 39).

Another shortcoming of the NPE is its assertion that all politicians are corrupt and rent-seeking. This claim is illogical because one cannot argue that all politicians are corrupt and then expect the same self-seeking and corrupt politicians to implement economic reforms that are not in their best interest (Dasgupta, 1998). This criticism implies that the NPE analysis is static because, although they provide tools for understanding bad situations and for recommending policies for better situations, they do not provide any means of moving from bad to better (Grindle, 1991). Ghana is a perfect example of the static nature of the NPE framework. Within the context of economic decline and considerable political instability, the government devalued the currency significantly, imposed an austerity budget, removed price controls on many consumer products, and privatized some SOEs. These policies had negative effects on important groups and imposed heavy social costs on broad sectors of the population, changes that politicians motivated by the desire to maximize their power would have avoided. Thus, the NPE, which explains economically irrational policy choices by

politicians, cannot explain why the same corrupt politicians made such drastic policy choices which alienated the urban population in the case of Ghana (Grindle, 1991).

The NPE framework also ignores the interdependent nature of the international economic and political systems in its analysis of economic problems in developing countries. In an interdependent world with an unequal distribution of political power, one would expect that some policy changes in developing countries will have an international dimension. The NPE framework, however, ignores global influences such as the oil crisis of the 1970s, reduction in foreign investment in sub-Sahara Africa during the same period, low commodity prices and the debt problem but concentrates instead on interest groups and corrupt politicians (Toye, 1991a). The NPE view of the state has also been criticized.

Some analysts are critical of the NPE's cynical view of the state and their concept of the predatory state (Dasgupta, 1998; Grindle, 1991; Mosley et al., 1991). Because of their view of the state, some critics characterize them as anti-statist and anti-government. But proponents of the NPE, disagree with this label and note that such characterization of the NPE is due to Bates' and Berg's criticism of the role that African governments played in the post-independence era. As Lofchie (1994) explains:

The issue is not whether there is a vital role for government, but rather what roles government can and must play well and what roles they cannot. The NPE calls for government to reduce its role dramatically in certain areas but at the same time to increase the scope of its activities dramatically in others. (p. 178)

This implies that the NPE endorses a limited role for government, but this role does not include state participation in the marketplace. Instead, governments should concentrate on providing an environment that is conducive to the operation of a free market system because the creation of a stable political and economic environment by the state is necessary for any

meaningful economic development activity. Thus, governments must protect people from loss of life or property due to war, ethnic strife, or the predatory activities of governmental agents.

The Bank's position on the role of African governments in the development process is indicated in the Berg Report (World Bank, 1981) and reiterated in the 1991 and 1997 *World Development Reports*. In both reports, the Bank repeated that the role of the state should be as follows: maintenance of law and order; the provision of public goods; investment in human capital; construction and repair of physical infrastructure; and protection of the environment. The World Bank's 1997 Report, however, included the protection of the vulnerable as the responsibility of governments. Exactly how the vulnerable are to be protected is unclear.

In criticizing the NPE, Evans (1997) situates the changing role of the state in a broader context by analysing some reasons for this change. He argues that in the golden age, economics did not necessarily focus on the state in its policy prescriptions. But when capitalist growth encountered some problems in the mid-1970s, this perception changed. State involvement in the economy was blamed for the economic downturn. The irony in this thinking, argues Evans, is that Britain and the United States, which are given as examples of big governments, are actually countries where state intervention was least extensive. Evans is also critical of the NPE's linkage of the expanded role of the state with rent-seeking. For him:

Reconceptualising the state as a vehicle for rent-seeking made it much easier to characterize state intervention as intrinsically pathological.... If the negative effects of state policies were a logical consequence of the nature of public institutions, then better information, more competent officials, and more knowledgeable advisors were not remedies. The only rational strategies for alleviating the problem were

then either reducing the resources allocated by these perverse institutions to an absolute minimum or somehow “marketizing” the administrative structure itself, replacing reliance on norms of public service with the hard constraints of marketlike incentive systems. (1997, pp. 75-76).

Although Evans did not make direct reference to developing countries in his argument, the above quote is relevant to the NPE’s argument about Africa because of its emphasis on the rent-seeking behaviour of politicians and bureaucrats. So far in this chapter, I have discussed the NPE and the reasons for its recent appeal to intellectuals and policy-makers alike. The relationship between the NPE and the SAP has also been explored as well as its shortcomings. One of the problems with the analysis of the NPE pointed out by Grindle (1991) is its static nature, meaning that, while this perspective explains the reasons for the success and failure of economic policies, it cannot explain the processes involved in implementing policies such as the SAP. Since this study seeks to examine the processes involved in implementing the SOERP, I adopt another theoretical perspective. But before discussing this perspective, I provide an overview of other studies that have examined the SOERP within the Ghanaian context.

### **The Literature on Ghana’s State-Owned Enterprises Reform Programme: A Critique**

Although the SOERP was implemented in the mid-1980s, there are no comprehensive sociological studies that explore how the programme operates within any specific SOE. That is, how the programme was implemented and employees’ responses to it. Disciplines, such as Economics, Political Science, and Sociology have all conducted research on the subject. Despite this diversity, the research in this area clusters around three broad issues: the historical background and policy framework of the reform; SOE

performance, successes and problems of the programme; and the impact of the reform programme on public sector workers. I discuss each of these three broad categories in turn.

### **Historical Background**

Studies on the historical background of the SOERP concentrate on the policy framework and the rationale behind the programme (Adda, n.d.; Dotse & Agbeko-Kra, 1990; Friedrich Ebert Foundation & the Republic of Ghana, 1994; Gyimah-Boadi, 1991; Hutchful, 1986 & 1996; State Enterprise Commission, n.d.). These studies address the social, economic and political context in which the State-Owned Enterprises evolved. These factors as well as the main components of the programme have already been discussed in Chapter 2. Also, most of the studies in this category focus on the privatization component of the programme including, the process, and problems hindering its successful implementation. This literature does not address what actually happened at the SOEs after the implementation of the reform programme. This is one of the reasons why I have decided to focus on the restructuring component of the reform programme, because it will provide insights into the reform process and highlight issues pertaining to the process at the micro-level. For this reason, the literature review for this study does not address issues about privatization in particular. Instead, I discuss the SOERP in general but concentrate on the restructuring component.

### **The Successes and Problems of the Reform Programme**

The second issue addressed in the literature pertains to the reform of SOEs. It addresses three themes: the financial performance of SOEs; the relationship between the government and SOE managers; and institutional impediments to the reform programme.

Regarding the financial performance of SOEs, the literature highlights significant improvements in SOEs' performance since the inception of the reform programme (Dotse & Agbeko-Kra, 1990). According to Dotse and Agbeko-Kra, the total net profit of SOEs increased from about 6 billion cedis in 1986 to about 40 billion cedis in 1989.<sup>17</sup> Also, some loss-making enterprises improved upon their financial performance by decreasing past losses. A World Bank (1995) study of selected countries undergoing SOE reforms confirmed the improvements in the financial performance of SOEs in Ghana. However, based on such indicators as financial returns, SOE productivity, and SOE savings-deficit investment, Ghana's performance was judged as mixed, compared with Korea and Chile, which the World Bank (1995) study described as the most successful countries. The improvements in the performance of Ghana's SOEs discussed above do not tell the whole story because they focus on the results and ignore the processes that led to these outcomes.

The reform also include the introduction of a "business culture" (Dotse and Agbeko-Kra, 1990) which requires SOEs to pay dividends to the state, the elimination of the noncommercial objectives, and workforce rationalization (Davis, 1991). But what is not known are the dynamics involved with the changes. For example, the workforce rationalization includes job reclassification and the elimination of grade-level distinctions. But little is known about the jobs reclassification process. Also, is the job reclassification

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<sup>17</sup>The official foreign exchange rate in September 1986 and September 1989 was 90cedis to \$1US and 280 cedis to \$1US respectively, making the profits in 1986 about \$66.7 million and 1989 about \$145.8 million. In September 1986, the government introduced a weekly foreign exchange auction system as part of the SAP. An official rate was used for imports such as crude oil and medical supplies, and debt service payments. There was also a weekly auction rate for all other transactions. In September 1986, the official rate was 90 cedis to \$ while the weekly auction rate was 128 cedis to the \$. In 1987, however, the government abandoned the 2-tier system and introduced forex bureaux in 1988 to eliminate the trading of foreign currencies in the parallel of "black market".



only about achieving efficiency or is it also designed to make the workers more governable? And how will the new commercial mandate of SOEs affect their relationship with the state? I examine these questions in Chapter 6.

The second theme addressed in the literature is the relationship between the government and SOE managers. The World Bank Report (1995) notes that the poor performance of SOEs is due partly to the reluctance of the government to give managers power or more autonomy. For example, SOE managers have been unable to respond to competition by laying off excess staff or halting the provision of money-losing services because they did not have the authority to make such decisions. With the reform, however, this has changed. The World Bank (1995) documents that since 1986, governments have given SOE managers increased managerial autonomy in decision-making. The World Bank's conclusion is based on an interview of a sample of SOE managers in selected countries including Ghana. The study shows that, all the countries in the sample, including managers from countries characterized as poor performers, reported increased autonomy in decision-making. What the literature does not address is whether SOE managers still experience some level of interference in spite of the changes. If interferences still exist how can it be interpreted sociologically?

Despite the positive outcomes of the SOERP, the process is still riddled with problems. Davis (1991) notes that problems with SOEs in Ghana go beyond the failure of the market to discipline the decision-making process at the organizational level. He argues that the problem is inherent in the institutional mechanisms and practices of SOEs. Institutional mechanisms refer to practices "governing relationships and transactions between workers and enterprise management on one hand and government and legal institutions on

the other”(Davis, 1991, p. 989). This includes questions about labour requirements and workforce distinctions. Labour requirements refer to the existence of an establishment list, that is, the number of positions within an organization or department, that the parent ministry has approved. The workforce distinctions are grade-level distinctions between and among junior and senior staff in the workplace (Davis, 1991). For example, the categorization of clerks into three or more grade levels.

Furthermore, the existence of an establishment list makes it difficult to determine the number of redundant employees within an organization because management often confuses labour requirements with workforce requirements (Davis, 1991). Therefore, management sees vacancies in the ministry approved establishment lists as positions to be filled even if they do not need to. Problems about workforce distinction, the proliferation of grade-levels, and annual increment schedules are related to the existence of an establishment list (Davis, 1991). The workforce distinctions create a highly fragmented and rigid structure in the workplace. The inflexibility in the structure makes it difficult to assign tasks from overloaded workers to those without a heavy workload, thus, contributing to inefficiency. A policy initiative implemented under the restructuring programme to address the problem includes an end to the workforce distinctions and grade levels. This change would have a significant impact on job titles, positions and possibly career-paths in the SOEs. But so far no study has documented how this change was implemented. Also, employees’ perceptions of the changes have not been explored.

Understanding the changes from the perspective of the employees is necessary because studies, such as Davis’ (1991), focuses on the problems with the restructuring programme from a policy perspective. Analysing the reform process from the perspective of

the workers not only provides us with another perspective on the changes, it would also highlight how the changes have redefined positions and career paths within SOEs. Besides, it will provide insights into how these changes are contributing to achieving efficiency and increased productivity. The two themes addressed so far in this section do not address the implications of the reform programme for workers. This is the focus of the next section. This literature, however, is not specific to SOE employees. It looks at the implication of the SAP on public sector workers as a whole with only cursory references to the SOEs.

### **The Reform Programme and Public Sector Workers**

Since the IMF and the World Bank experts attributed the country's economic crisis to irrational government policies that favoured the urban population, tackling the problem adversely affected this segment of the population. The currency devaluation, the withdrawal of subsidies for certain social services, the civil service reform and the SOERP had significant impact on public sector workers, who reside mainly in urban centres. For example, the layoffs by SOEs swelled the ranks of the unemployed. According to the 1984 census, SOEs employees accounted for about 28 per cent of the employment in the formal sector. By 1989, the government had laid off about 25 per cent of workers in the sector (Davis, 1991), that is about 50,000 employees (Adda, n.d.).

Despite the impact of these economic policies, the Trade Union Congress of Ghana could not put up any strong organized opposition against the changes. Their reaction was a far cry from the IMF riots reported in Zambia and the Sudan where similar policies were implemented (Herbst, 1991). The question is, why was there limited organized opposition from the union? Several explanations have been put forward, including various tactics that

the government used to discredit the union leadership, intimidation and oppression, and “divide and rule” tactics designed to break the ranks of the union (Gyimah-Boadi & Essuman-Johnson, 1993; Herbst, 1993; Ninsin, 1991).

The Rawlings government was sympathetic to the plight of the working class when it came to power on December 31<sup>st</sup> 1981. The following year it reinstated some SOE workers laid off under the dethroned civilian administration and ordered a freeze on further layoffs (Gyimah-Boadi & Essuman-Johnson, 1993). But it distrusted the union leadership, which it characterized as corrupt and undemocratic. The government had other reasons for its distrust of the union leadership—they were not radical enough to suit its populist orientations (Gyimah-Boadi & Essuman-Johnson, 1993). The government tried to weaken the power-base of the unions by establishing Workers Defence Committees<sup>18</sup> to represent workers on the shop-floor (Hansen, 1987; Herbst, 1993; Ray, 1986). The government infiltrated the union when it realized that the leadership wanted to maintain its autonomy from the government so it could fight for the interest of its members. By 1983, when the government announced the reforms, it had already discredited the union. The government employed various tactics from labelling the unions as unpatriotic for criticizing its attempts to address the country’s economic problems to appropriating such leftist symbols as “anti-imperialism” and “pro-liberation”, symbols traditionally used by unions to champion their political course (Gyimah-Boadi & Essuman-Johnson, 1993).

The most important tool, however, that the government used to contain labour

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<sup>18</sup>Rawlings’ military government established Workers Defense Committees (WDCs) as an attempt to introduce industrial democracy at the workplace. They encouraged grassroots participation of workers in management. Another function of the WDCs was to eliminate such anti-revolutionary practices as lack of discipline and inefficiency among workers. Later, the government used them as parallel organizations to the unions. For more discussions on WDCs and Rawlings’ military regime see Ray (1986) and Gyimah-Boadi, (1993).

discontent was intimidation and oppression (Gyimah-Boadi & Essuman-Johnson, 1993; Ninsin, 1991). It detained union leaders opposed to its policies, thus silencing others who were likely to openly criticize its economic policies. Interestingly, the World Bank (1995) cites the government's tactics to quell opposition to the reforms as an indicator of the success of the SAP, although it used a politically correct term: political feasibility. The World Bank used three main indicators to measure the success of the reform programme in its 1995 country case study. The indicators are: political desirability, which means that the benefits of the reform to the government and its citizens must outweigh the costs; political feasibility, that is, the government's willingness to implement the reform and quell any opposition; and credibility, which means the government must be able to fulfill all the promises that it makes to those that are disadvantaged by the reforms as well as to investors. With regard to political feasibility, the Bank notes that the Ghanaian Government met this precondition for success because it overcame opposition to the reforms by reducing the power of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union, the union which represents the SOE workers (World Bank, 1995).

Herbst, (1991) offered two other reasons for the acquiescence of organized labour to the reforms: luck and the flourishing of a parallel market in the country before the reforms. He argues that the government did not encounter union protests because it was lucky that mob action did not come together at the right time to trigger a mass popular protest. The parallel market system was probably a factor in the reaction of workers to policies such as currency devaluation. Past policies such as the fixed exchange rate system boosted the underground currency market because the Central Bank issues limited amounts of foreign exchange for the import of specific items. Therefore, import oriented businesses that did not

have access to foreign currencies from the Central Bank had to depend on the underground currency market. Consequently, prices of goods imported into the country were high, reflecting the parallel market rates. Herbst (1991) argues that because of the underground economy, the currency devaluation under the SAP (which brought the official rate close to the underground market rate) did not have a significant impact on the urban population to trigger any organized protest since they were already paying similar prices for imported goods.

While the reasons provided by Herbst and Gyimah-Boadi and Essuman-Johnson for the inability of the unions to protest against the government's economic reform policy cannot be ignored, they have a number of shortcomings. First, one tool used to measure opposition to the reform is the number of strikes reported since the implementation of the changes. For example, Gyimah-Boadi and Essuman-Johnson, (1993) noted that there were on average 79 strikes in 1971, 810 in 1978, and 66 in 1980. Between 1983 and 1989 however, there were, on average 16 strikes per year. Using the number of strikes to measure opposition to the government's economic policy does not provide an exhaustive analysis of opposition to the changes because it does not address unorganized protests at the workplace. Second, the authors do not address other factors at the workplace that could have played a role in the absence of organized protests. For example, workers could have had other reasons for not participating in organized protests that have nothing to do with intimidation or any of the reasons discussed earlier.

The literature on the SOERP focuses on the historical background of the SOERP, improvements in the financial performance of SOEs and the relationship between the state and SOEs since the inception of the programme, institutional impediments to the success of

the programme, and the absence of organized protests by public sector workers to the reform. While the literature highlights the impact of the programme since its inception, it does not explore the dynamics involved in its implementations. Also, if the restructuring programme is designed to achieve efficiency at SOEs, how is this being achieved? Another question that is not fully addressed in the literature is the reaction of organized labour to the changes. Does the absence of organized protests mean the absence of resistance to the reforms? What does the new role of SOEs as commercial entities mean for their relationship with the state and the consumers of their products? I adopted a case study approach to answer the questions raised above.

Earlier in this chapter, I discussed the NPE and its static nature, which means that it cannot explain the dynamics involved in the implementation of the SOERP. Also, the literature on the SOERP is more descriptive than theoretical. The authors described the trends without providing any comprehensive theoretical analysis of the issues. Another limitation of the literature is the inattention to what happened inside SOEs since the beginning of the reforms. Furthermore, the literature does not focus on unorganized protest at the workplace. In light of these shortcomings, I draw on Michel Foucault's work on discourse, power and knowledge to examine the issues posed by this study. Michel Foucault's work covers a variety of subjects including madness (1973), the penal system (1979), sexuality (1990), and medicine (1994). Despite the diversity of subjects that he covered, his work has the following underlying themes: discourse, power, and knowledge. These themes are relevant to this study because they enable us to understand the processes involved in achieving the goals of the restructuring programme as well as the nature of opposition to the reform. Foucault often focuses on the *how* of issues, for example, how

social reality is constructed and represented and the underlying power-knowledge practices embedded in the process.<sup>19</sup> This insight enables us to examine how the goals of the reform programme are being achieved and the power-knowledge practices inherent in the process. Also, his view of power and resistance makes it possible to answer questions about the nature of opposition to the SOERP. Foucault's analysis of opposition is different from those discussed in this chapter because his view is not limited to organized opposition rather it includes different types of opposition such as organized, unorganized and solitary resistance.

### **Discourse, Power/Knowledge, and Resistance**

The term discourse is used in a variety of disciplines including sociology, social psychology, critical theory, history, linguistics and philosophy. Its meaning, however, varies from one field of study to another. For example, Wetherell & Potter, (1992), who are social psychologists, view discourse as a social practice. They focus on the action orientation of discourse and explain the term in relation to everyday conversation and text. The action orientation of discourse involves examining how text and talk are used within a specific context. They focus on issues of power, the analysis of text, and data gathering and analysis (Mills, 1997). Thus, their view of discourse raises theoretical and methodological questions.

Others, like Roger Fowler (1990) who writes from a critical theory background, incorporate ideology into the definition of discourse. For Fowler:

‘Discourse’ is speech or writing seen from the point of view of the beliefs, values and categories which it embodies; these beliefs (etc.) constitute a way of looking at the world, an organization or representation of experience – ‘ideology’ in the neutral, non-pejorative sense. Different modes of discourse encode different

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<sup>19</sup> This does not mean that Foucault does not believe in the existence of the real. Instead he argues that what we characterize as real is dependent on our interpretation of objects and events (Mills, 1997).



representations of experience; and the source of these representations is the communicative context within which discourse is embodied. (cited in Hawthorn, 2000, p. 90)

The above definition focuses on beliefs, values, and categories as constituting discourse. Fowler's view of discourse also concentrates on representations or meanings of speech text and speech within a given context. While Fowler mentions ideology in his definition, Mills (1997) argues that there is a difference between ideology and discourse. She points out that ideology is simplistic since it views agents as passive victims while within discourse agents are active participants in creating their own subjectivity.

Linguists such as Malcolm Coulthard and Michael Hoey use the term discourse analysis (Mills, 1997). Discourse analysis constructs meaning by focussing on structures of texts (Barsky, 1993). Discourse analysts concentrate on oral communication such as speech acts and every conversation within a specific context. Given the different meanings of discourse it is important to explain how Foucault uses the term.

Foucault (1972) acknowledges that discourse is a flexible term which he has "used and abused in many different senses" (p. 107). In describing the various ways in which discourse can be used, he points out that:

Instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the word 'discourse', I believe that I have in fact added to its meanings: treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizing group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a certain number of statements. (1972, p. 80)

Although Foucault points out that he uses discourse in different senses, he still attempts to define it. He writes:

By discourse, then, I meant that which was produced (perhaps all that was produced) by the groups of signs. But I also meant a group of acts of formulation, a series of sentences or propositions. Lastly – and it is this meaning that was finally used (together with the first, which served in a provisional capacity) – discourse is constituted by a group of sequences of signs, in so far as they are statements, that is, in so far as they can be assigned particular modalities of existence. And if I succeed in showing, as I shall try to do shortly, that the law of such a series is precisely what I have so far called a *discursive formation*,<sup>20</sup> if I succeed in showing that this discursive formation really is the principle of dispersion and redistribution, not of formulations, not of sentences, not of propositions, but statements (in the sense in which I have used this word), the term discourse can be defined as a group of statements that belong to a single system of formation; thus I shall be able to speak of clinical discourse, economic discourse, the discourse of natural history, psychiatric discourse. (1972, p. 107-108)

In other words, Foucault views discourse as ways of writing, talking and thinking about any social object within a specific historical period. For example, in his work on madness (Foucault, 1973), Foucault examined the different ways in which madness was seen and talked about historically. He argues that during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, society did not see the mad as a threat to society. Instead madness was perceived as a form of knowledge or ‘the truth of knowledge’ (p. 25). Since the twentieth century, however, society, especially the medical profession, began to perceive and talk about madness as an illness that requires intervention. Thus, the different ways of perceiving and talking about madness influenced society’s reaction to the insane.

Discourse operates via mechanisms known as discursive practices. Hawthorn (2000) refers to discursive as “the adjective form of discourse” (p. 89), that is, it describes or modifies the term. According to Foucault (1977), “discursive practices are characterized by the delimitation of the field of objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of the norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories” (p.

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<sup>20</sup> Emphasis in the original.

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Three main themes can be identified in the definition of discursive practices (Mills, 1997). First, discourse limits what we can see and say. This makes language crucial to the functioning of discourse. Discourse limits our view of reality by what it does not say. For example, if the IMF and the World Bank issue a report that attributes economic problems in Sub-Saharan Africa to poor economic policies and mismanagement, we would be more likely to perceive problems on the continent from that perspective. This is because our perception is more likely to be influenced by what we see and hear than what we do not. Alternative explanations for the continent's economic problems may be ignored because they are not often written or talked about by the experts.

The role of experts brings us to the second characteristic of discourse, which is relations of authority. This means that only certain individuals or groups within society have the right to speak on certain subjects. The right to speak gives legitimacy to whatever they say. These individuals and groups derive the right to make pronouncements on certain subjects from the authority that society gives them. Using medicine as an example, Foucault (1972) notes that:

**In the nineteenth century, medicine (as an institution possessing its own rules, as a group of individuals constituting the medical profession, as a body of knowledge and practice, as an authority recognized by public opinion, the law, and government) became the major authority in society that delimited, designated, named, and established madness as an object. (pp. 41-42)**

The same could be applied to academia or the media. When the media wants to provide the public with a better understanding of an issue, they often contact the experts in universities or other recognised institutions. These experts, supposedly, have acquired knowledge that gives them the right to speak about the issue.

The last theme in the definition of discursive practices is the way in which discourse establishes the framework for future statements to be made about a subject. The norms and the theories that are established by the functioning of the discourse set the guidelines for any future pronouncements or theorising on the subject.

Rules are embedded in discourses: “These rules define not the dumb existence of a reality, nor the canonical use of a vocabulary, but the ordering of objects”(Foucault, 1972, p. 49). The rules define, categorise, and influence ways of doing or organising things. They constitute the standard against which all things are evaluated. For example, rules distinguish between the good versus the bad, the normal versus the abnormal, and the rational versus the irrational. Any behaviour, thinking, or ways of doing things are, then, measured against the standard, which is the rule. Any deviation from the standard is abnormal, bad, unhealthy, or irrational. Therefore, individuals or groups strive to meet the standard.

Not only is discourse a way of thinking and talking about a social object, it also produces and serves as a conduit for power (Foucault, 1990). Power can be conceptualised in a variety of ways. Max Weber (1978) defined it as the ability to achieve one’s goals despite opposition from others. Marxists such as Poulantzas (1978) define it in terms of individuals’ relationship to the means of production. From this perspective, power is inextricably linked with economic and class relations. These definitions of power are narrow because the concept is characterised as something that can be possessed. Foucault (1990) was particularly critical of contemporary conceptions of power by groups that he described as the Left and the Right wing. He argues that the Left wing or Marxists’ view of power is problematic because, for example, they characterised the state as the instrument of power and domination. He was equally critical of the Right wing, which he felt viewed power in

juridical terms, that is, with reference to the constitution and sovereignty. For him, these perspectives on power are problematic because the concept is viewed in a unidimensional way. Foucault attempts to provide a broader view of the power. He did not define it. Instead, he described how it is exercised:

Power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies. (Foucault, 1990, pp. 92-93)

Foucault views power as a social relationship. Thus, power does not reside in any single individual or institution. His view challenges the unidimensional notion of power that has always presented power as a negative and a repressive force that resides in the state, in an institution, or an individual (Dubois, 1991). Foucault does not deny the existence of negative and repressive power, instead he de-emphasized it. He argues that our preoccupation with the negative aspects of power masks how it operates. For Foucault, power designates a set of relationships between partners and “what defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead it acts upon their actions” (Foucault, 1982, p. 220).

Foucault’s analysis of power is based on the historical differentiation of power. He looked at how power was exercised during medieval times and from the seventeenth and eighteenth century onwards. He argues that the type of power that existed in medieval times influenced how it was exercised. During this time power was vested in the sovereign and the exercise of power indicates a sovereign-subject relationship (Foucault, 1980). This meant

that the sovereign exercised power directly on the subject through an open demonstration of violence. Since the seventeenth century, however, a new mechanism of power emerged as a result of the Enlightenment. In fact, Foucault (1980) characterised this new type of power “one of the greatest inventions of bourgeois society. It has been a fundamental instrument in the constitution of industrial capitalism and of the type of society that is its accompaniment” (p. 105). This mechanism of power involved procedures and techniques which were incompatible with the principles of sovereignty. Power was no longer vested in a sovereign but its mechanism depended on bodies. Individuals became a part of how power operates. Foucault calls this non-sovereign power “disciplinary power” (1980, p. 105).

Disciplinary power depends on the active participation of subjects. It can only be exercised when the subjects are free. The individuals must have several options available to them to demonstrate a variety of behaviours and reactions (Foucault, 1982). Disciplinary power is not coercive. Rather, individuals behave in ways that conform to the prevailing discourse because they know that their actions are being watched. Thus, disciplinary “power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself unto their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives” (Foucault, 1980, p. 39).

The subject is central to Foucault’s view of power. In fact, he points out that “it is not power, but the subject” (1982, p. 209) that is the main theme in his research. Foucault (1982) provides two definitions of the subject: when an individual is subject to someone else by control or dependence; and when an individual is tied to his or her own identity through self-knowledge or consciousness. It is the second definition that is relevant within this context since power produces active and knowing subjects. Foucault’s definition implies that he does

not view the subject as autonomous and free or oppressed since the subject is constituted through power-knowledge practices. In other words, individuals turn themselves into subjects by participating in how power operates. Individuals construct their subjectivity through a mechanism known as technologies of the self. Technologies of the self constitute actions that people effect on their bodies, thoughts and way of being in order to transform themselves to conform to a discourse that is proposed, suggested or imposed by society (Foucault, 1988).

In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault (1979) shows how criminals were punished in the past using medieval power. He compares this with how criminals are punished in modern society using modern techniques of power. Modern techniques of power—disciplinary power—can be applied to such institutions as schools, hospitals, the military, and workplaces. Foucault used Bentham's Panopticon as a metaphor to show how disciplinary power operates.

The Panopticon is an architectural prison system created by Jeremy Bentham. It involves a large courtyard with a tower in the middle, surrounded by buildings which are divided into levels and cells. Each cell has windows that allow for the surveillance of cells. The Panopticon enabled the prison guard in the central tower to continuously observe inmates without supervising them directly. Foucault notes that the major effect of the Panopticon is:

To induce in the inmate a state of consciousness and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its actions; that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that this architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers.

(Foucault, 1979, p. 201)

This means that while in the past, prisoners felt the power of the sovereign directly, this is no longer the case in the modern era. The structure of the Panopticon creates a situation whereby the sovereign no longer exercises power directly. Instead, the criminals discipline themselves because they suspect they are being watched by their keepers. To avoid punishment, they discipline themselves, and in the process they become the embodiment of power. Rather than being repressed, they are involved in the process of creating power against themselves.

Foucault (1980) sees power and knowledge as integrated concepts because “the exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power” (1980, p. 52). In the Foucauldian sense, knowledge not only refers to such disciplines as medicine and psychiatry, it also refers to the social, political and historical conditions under which certain statements become regarded as true or false. Relations of power can only operate with the production, circulation and functioning of a discourse or a body of knowledge. In the same vein, the exercise of power also creates new objects of knowledge.

There is also a reciprocal relationship between power and truth. Truth is an idea, a belief, or a value that society accepts and make function as true. What counts as true is produced by people whom society has given the right to speak about specific topics or issues. For example, society accepts certain ideas as true because they are based on a scientific discourse (Foucault, 1980). When knowledge is characterized as scientific, it becomes legitimate thus unquestionable.

Foucault used *episteme* as a discursive apparatus to elaborate on his discussion of



truth. The *episteme* is the apparatus that makes it possible to separate statements that are considered scientific and therefore true, from those that are false. It is related to power relations because it focuses on what legitimizes a particular regime of truth. When discourses correspond to a particular regime of truth, they are accepted as true knowledge. Once a form of knowledge is accepted as the truth it causes other forms of knowledge to be discredited, ignored or disqualified.

Foucault's account of power goes hand in hand with resistance. Resistance occurs when one refuses to accept a truth constructed based on a specific body of knowledge (Foucault, 1990). Any total or partial refusal to participate in a way that conforms with the truths constructed by power relations is an act of resistance (Wang, 1999). In other words, resistance occurs when individuals or groups refuse to behave in accordance with a discourse that has been proposed, imposed, and accepted by society. According to Foucault, resistance is a necessary condition for power to operate, but resistance does not predate power rather power and resistance are coextensive. In fact, the very existence of power "depends on the multiplicity of points of resistance" (Foucault, 1990, p. 96). This means that there is no single source of resistance, instead, there is "a plurality of resistances"(p. 96). Resistance can be spontaneous, concerted, or solitary. Thus, while resistance can lead to the mobilization of groups, it does not necessarily involve collective action. It can just be individuals who refuse to change their behaviour to conform to a prevailing discourse. Foucault's analysis of the relationship between power and resistance means that agents cannot be completely powerless when power is being exercised.

Although Foucault did not specifically write about developing countries, there is a growing body of literature (Dubios, 1991; Escobar, 1984:1995; Ferguson, 1990 and others)

that have applied his work to explore issues in those societies. For example, Escobar (1984:1995) adopted the Foucauldian approach in analysing development as a discourse. He argues that to understand development we must focus on the relations of power, knowledge and the historical conditions under which the discourse of development arose. He notes that before 1945, there was no such construction as the undeveloped world. But the post-war reconstruction in Europe provided the context for the social construction of the underdeveloped world. The construction of the underdeveloped world was based on a new type of economic knowledge about development. This body of knowledge became the basis for intervention in developing countries. The first step, therefore, was to construct economies in developing countries as abnormal or backward based on a specific body of knowledge (economics). The abnormality had to be normalized with intervention by the multilateral agencies. Looking at development as a discourse enables us to examine the discursive practices involved in the invention of development as a concept as well as the power relations embedded in the process.

Dubois (1991) also adopted a Foucauldian approach in his analysis of the disciplinary effects of development projects. He points out that development activities demonstrate the effect of disciplinary power because they reshape the everyday activities of the beneficiaries. For example, agricultural development projects often involve the introduction of new farming practices and the transfer of western technology. Agricultural extension officers go to peasant farmers to teach them the new farming practices. If the project is about increasing crop yields then the agricultural extension officer trains farmers to increase their yields. If adopted, the new approach becomes part of everyday farming practice. The farmers' adoption of the new farming technique is an effect of disciplinary power because they choose

to introduce the changes themselves. Thus, they are constituting their own subjectivity by adopting the new approach. Agricultural extension officers, then, are the trainers who are supposed to ensure that the farmers measure up to the standards that they have been taught. They visit the farmers periodically to ensure that they are doing the “right thing”. The farmers also strive to meet the standards set by the extension officers by training themselves to conform. Both studies provide a different perspective on development by focussing on the micro-practices of power. These insights enable me to go beyond the impact of the reform and examine the SOERP as a discourse. Analysing it as a discourse focuses on how the programme was constituted, the language of the discourse and how it shapes our perception of problems with SOEs, the power-knowledge practices embedded in the reform, its disciplinary effects, and how the various parties affected by the SOERP participated in constituting their own subjectivity.

### **Summary**

In this chapter, I examined the factors that gave impetus to the current popularity of the new political economy. The NPE was discussed and its relationship to the SAP explored. I argued that the application of the NPE to economic policies in Sub-Saharan Africa was influenced by the works of Elliot Berg and Robert Bates. They both attributed the economic problems on the sub-continent to economic policies that favoured state intervention in the economy. The solution to the problem contained in the SAP is minimizing the state’s role in the economy and liberalization. This is because the state enterprise sector played an important role in post-independence development strategies of many countries on the sub-continent. Limiting state participation in the economy, therefore, requires restructuring the

state enterprises sector, hence the SOERP. The literature on the SOERP in Ghana was also examined. The absence of studies on how the SOERP is being implemented and how efficiency was being achieved led to this study. I draw on Michel Foucault's work on discourse, power/knowledge, and resistance to examine the SOERP because it enables me to explore the power-knowledge practices involved in the implementation process. Also, this approach shows the disciplinary effects of the SOERP. In the next chapter, I discuss the methodology adopted to answer the research questions raised in this chapter.

## Introduction

in the previous Enterprises Reform Program. In this chapter, I focus on the methods of qualitative research, an approach to its subject matter that seeks to understand their natural setting in terms of the meaning of the data. In contrast to quantitative research, which is based on a more objective and problematic view of the world, qualitative research is based on a more subjective and problematic view of the world. My experience in the field of research includes the element of the research process, however, can sometimes be difficult to understand. Despite these potential problems, qualitative research can provide a different perspective on the stages of the research process, from the sources of data and the research design to the dynamics involved in negotiating boundaries and data analysis.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **Methodology**

#### **Introduction**

In the previous chapter, I provided critical perspectives on the State-Owned Enterprises Reform Programme (SOERP) and raised a number of questions that guided the study. In this chapter, I focus on how I answered these questions using qualitative research methods.

Qualitative research is multimethod in focus, involving an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them. (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, p. 2)

Thus, qualitative research enables the researcher to gather empirical data that “describes routine and problematic moments and meanings in individuals’ lives” (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, p. 2). My experience in the field revealed that some of the merits of this method of inquiry include the element of discovery and the unpredictable nature of the process. These merits, however, can sometimes make qualitative research seem cumbersome and chaotic. Despite these potential problems, the element of discovery and unpredictability can enrich the data and take the research in directions that a researcher could not have anticipated and provide a different perspective on the issues. The purpose of this chapter is to chronicle the stages of the research process and how the element of discovery and unpredictability in qualitative research shaped and reshaped the focus of the study. Specifically, I examine the sources of data and the research method, sample selection and the interview process, the dynamics involved in negotiating access, the challenges involved in negotiating status and boundaries and data analysis.

## **Sources of Data and the Research Method**

I conducted the fieldwork for this study between January and June 1996 in Ghana. The main source of data was interviews and official documents. These sources were used in conjunction with observations. Interviewing is one of the major tools of data collection in social research. The major types of interviews are structured, group, and unstructured. Structured interviews involve a process where an interviewer asks a respondent specific questions with limited response categories. The questions are preestablished and every respondent or participant in the study is asked the same set of questions in the same sequence (Fontana & Frey, 1994).

Group interviews, also known as focus groups, is the systematic questioning of several respondents simultaneously within a formal or informal context (Fontana & Frey, 1994). The format for group interviews can be structured, semi-structured and unstructured depending on the purpose of the research. For example, a researcher conducting an exploratory study may use group interviews “to test a methodological technique, to try out a definition of a research problem, or to identify key informants” (p. 365).

The third major type of interviewing technique—unstructured interviewing—attempts to understand the issue being explored without imposing the researcher’s own pre-determined categories which may narrow the focus of the inquiry (Fontana & Frey, 1994). Unstructured interviews are open-ended. The researcher’s main goal here is to understand the issue being studied rather than looking for data to explain a social issue, using preestablished categories. The type of interview used for this research was on a continuum from semi-structured to unstructured, and group interviews. Using semi-structured and unstructured interviews allowed the issues to emerge in the field without any imposition of

categories on the respondents. This, however, does not mean that I had no research questions before the fieldwork. I based the interviews on research questions and issues relevant to the study but the responses were open-ended to avoid limiting the participants' responses.

Personal observations were an integral part of the research process because a researcher cannot conduct fieldwork without observing the context. Although personal observation was not a major tool for data collection, it provided me with an opportunity to verify participants' responses. It also provided insights into the social context thus facilitating an understanding of the setting. Observations are part of everyday life and everybody can make observations about events in society. A layperson can make an observation, so can a social scientist. But what differentiates these two observers is that the latter's approach to observing everyday life is systematic and purposive in nature and it raises theoretical questions about everyday human interaction (Adler & Adler, 1994). Although observation is used by both quantitative and qualitative researchers there is a difference in the scope of their observations. While quantitative observers focus on issues or "minute particles of the world that can be agglomerated into a variable" (p. 378) qualitative researchers look for larger trends and patterns within the issue under observation.

Observational researchers can choose to place themselves in a location where they can study their subject directly or they can observe participants' behaviour as it unfolds naturally around them. Observational researchers can adopt a number of roles in the field. These roles range from participating in the day-to-day activities of the participants and interacting with them closely to being a complete observer who is removed from the setting (Adler & Adler, 1994). I did not observe the participants from a distance, neither did I study them directly. Instead, I observed events as they unfolded naturally around me. With regard



to my role, I adopted a “peripheral membership” (p. 380) role by interacting closely with the participants to have an insider perspective on issues without participating in the core activities of the corporation.

Two major problems associated with observations are validity and reliability because the researcher provides subjective interpretation of his/her observations. There are potential difficulties with verifying the reliability of the data because trends and patterns cannot be confirmed (Adler & Adler, 1994). I addressed these potential problems by ensuring that observations confirm findings in the interview data or reflect broader trends that were probed further. Not all observations made sense when I was in the field, some of the observations only made sense when I was analysing the interview transcripts after the fieldwork. In these instances, reading through the transcripts triggered observations in the field thus, confirming the interview data. Therefore, the interviews and observations not only brought different pieces of the research puzzle together, but they also allowed for the corroboration of the data where necessary.

Since developing an interest in the SOERP in Ghana, two main questions lingered in my mind regarding the process: What is the nature of the reform process within a specific SOE? How was efficiency, a key objective, achieved? One way of answering these questions is by conducting a qualitative study, specifically, a study of a specific SOE using the case study approach.

### **The Case Study Approach**

A case study is an exploration of an issue/issues or a case or cases within a specific time and place through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of

information rich in context (Creswell, 1998). The context refers to the physical, social, historical and economic setting within which the case is situated. Case studies capture the particularity and complexity of a single or multiple cases, thus enabling the researcher to understand the activities and circumstances about a particular case (Stake, 1995).

There is often misunderstanding about whether case study is a method or an approach. Some argue that a case study is an approach and not a method because it employs various methods including observation and participant observation (Hamel, Dufour, & Fortin, 1993). Their argument is based the assumption that, since the goal of a case study is to analyse a case or cases from a sociological perspective, it would be more appropriate to refer to case study as an approach. In other words, a “case study is not a methodological choice, but a choice of the object to be studied” (Stake, 1994, p. 236). Thus, we can choose to study a case using variety of methods. In every case study it is important to distinguish between the object of study and the case selected for the purposes of observation (Hamel et al., 1993). In this context the object of study is the SOERP and the case selected for the purposes of observation is Cityline Corporation. The reason for adopting this approach was to find out what can be learned from this single case, that is, the restructuring of Cityline Corporation (Stake, 1994).

Case studies can be intrinsic or instrumental. Intrinsic case studies provide a better understanding of a particular case. This type of case study is used not because it represents other cases but because the case itself is of interest to the researcher (Stake, 1994; 1995). On the other hand, an instrumental case study uses a particular case or cases to provide insight into broader issues which may be of interest to a researcher. In an instrumental case study, a case is of secondary interest to the researcher because it only facilitates his/her

understanding of something else. This research is an instrumental case study because the findings at Cityline Corporation facilitates an understanding of the reform programme in general. The notion of generality here does not mean that the findings can lead to grand generalizations. Instead, they provide a better understanding of exactly what has happened within SOEs since the inception of the reform programme. The main reason for adopting this approach is that it allows for an in-depth exploration of research questions that could not be answered using a macro-level approach.

### **Case Selection**

The study in Ghana began with library research to get familiar with unpublished studies and government documents on the reform programme because there were few published studies on the topic. Most of the library research was carried out at the State Enterprises Commission Library where I reviewed government documents on the reform programme. These documents served as an important primary source for the study. They presented details of the reform framework as well as insights into corporation-specific studies. After a review of the documents on all restructured SOEs, I selected Cityline Corporation for the following reasons:

- It was one of the few SOEs slated for restructuring that had undergone structural and organizational change and improved its economic performance significantly;
- It was most likely that it would never be privatized, because privatizing it would lead to a lengthy litigation by the lessor. Cityline Corporation, therefore, provided a good example of the long-term impact of the reform programme;
- It was relatively accessible: the gate keepers were willing to provide access; and
- Cost was a factor. Although I had to commute over 40 kilometres daily to the site, it was cheaper because of access to free accommodation.

## **Stages in the Data Collection Process**

The fieldwork at Cityline Corporation was in three phases: The first phase entailed interviews with three members of management; the second was the focus group; and the third involved individual interviews with the rest of the management and staff. Each stage of the fieldwork played a significant role in how I uncovered the data. The first phase provided general information on the restructuring process within the corporation from the perspective of those involved directly with the decision-making process. The second stage, which was the focus group, provided the staff's perspective on the changes within the corporation but more importantly it helped with the formulation of the interview questions for the rest of the staff. Linking focus groups to individual interviews is important in developing interview schedules (Morgan, 1988). In an exploratory study, it is important to use focus groups in the "early stages of the research to guide the later construction of the interview questions" (p. 30). Focus groups are appropriate especially when the topic has not been extensively studied in the past as was the case with this study. The third phase involved individual interviews with the rest of the management and staff.

The questions for the first phase were based on questions formulated after the review of government documents during the first stage of the study at the State Enterprises Commission. The questions focussed on the following issues: the details of the restructuring programme, including who designed it and the role of management and the workers in the process; their understanding of the restructuring process; their response to the changes; and organizational culture and change. Details of the questions are in the appendix. Although, all the interviews were based on the questions above, some of the specific issues addressed varied depending on the rank of the respondent. For example, I did not ask the junior staff

who designed the restructuring programme. Instead, I asked whether they played any role in putting together the restructuring programme.

The first two members of management I interviewed mentioned problems about external controls on the corporation. The controls had to do with the autonomy of the corporation to make certain decisions, specifically their inability to solve an outstanding dispute with their tenants about rent increases. Initially I ignored this issue because I was not interested in the tension between the corporation and the tenants, on one hand, and the government, on the other hand, but rather what was happening at the local level as a result of the restructuring. But when the second informant mentioned the same issue again, I became curious. What does this tension between the various parties mean? Can it tell us anything about the effects of the restructuring programme on the tenants and the government? It became obvious these issues were worth exploring. The next step was to find out what the nature of the relationship between the corporation and the state was and what insights it provides into the government reactions to the programme. This discovery refocused the research and showed me that the interview format was achieving its goals.

The next phase was the focus group interviews. In order to have better insights about the change other than those provided by members of management interviewed earlier, the focus group had to be to be representative of the corporation and include both junior and senior staff, as well as reflecting a gender balance. But Mr. Joe,<sup>21</sup> who was my official contact person throughout the study, invited only senior staff or middle-level personnel to participate. Only three of the six workers I requested showed up for the interview. All three

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<sup>21</sup> Pseudonyms are used to ensure anonymity and confidentiality.

were male. My initial reaction was to reschedule the interview because the number of participants was too small. Participants in focus groups range from six to ten with a lower limit of four and a higher limit of twelve (Morgan, 1988). Thus, I had to deal with two main problems: the gender imbalance, and the size of the focus group. Despite these problems, the focus group proceeded because the participants present could not reach a consensus on rescheduling the meeting. Another reason for proceeding with such a small group was that the goal of the focus group was not to generalize or test hypotheses, but to “learn about others’ experiences and perspectives” (Morgan, 1988, p. 40) and have an insight into the issues in the field. During conversations before the interview, I realized that the participants were likely selected for the interview because Mr. Joe probably wanted to present a good image of the corporation. This conclusion was troubling because of its potential impact on the data. This fear, however, seemed to be unfounded by the openness of the participants.

The format for the focus group interview was semi-structured and dominated by the participants (Morgan, 1988). I began with broad research questions and allowed other issues to emerge during the discussion. During the interview, my role as a researcher was reduced to a moderator while the participants took over the discussion. One advantage of a researcher adopting a moderator’s role is that “participants’ interaction among them replaced their interaction with the interviewer, leading to a greater emphasis on participants’ point of view” (p.18). The following dialogue is an example of how participants’ interaction emphasized their point of view, and brought to light issues that would otherwise not have emerged. This part of the discussion started when Mr. Adam complained about low salaries, and I asked whether it affected morale. The dialogue continued:

**Mr. Coffie:** Most definitely. I will say that, I don't have to hide things. You see, there are a lot of professionals here at [Cityline].... People just won't sit down and go hungry because their salaries are too low.

**Edna:** Do you do other jobs apart from your regular job?

**Mr. Coffie:** Most definitely.... As [professionals] we can't starve and we won't steal too.

**Mr. Benuaku:** But we steal the time, because stealing means not just grabbing money. If you leave the office in order to attend to your own private affairs, you are stealing time.

**Mr. Coffie:** Sometimes there is no clear cut difference between what you're doing for [Cityline] and what you're doing for yourself. The thing is that it happens that people do other things. That is why a lot of people don't complain about remuneration here even though it is so low.

**Mr. Benuaku:** They complain.

**Mr. Coffie:** They complain but you can't get them to take overt action like strike, because the salary is low. The plumber can go away and do some work somewhere and make money.... Let us be honest with ourselves, some people even claim that being here and having the opportunity to meet people they can work for, may even be better for them than being better paid elsewhere. (Interview Transcripts, pp. 42-43)

The issues raised here were low salaries, complaining about low salaries without taking overt action, and how the organization is an informal labour market where employees meet their private clients. These issues emerged because of how the participants interacted with each other during the focus group discussion.

The issues raised during the dialogue made me wonder whether this could be a reason for the relative absence of organized protests by the workers to the restructuring programme. This question stems from an earlier criticism of the literature on the reaction of the labour movement to the SAP. My criticism was that existing studies focussed on organized protests and ignored unorganized forms of protests. To address this issue, one of the goals of the study was to find out if there were any forms of unorganized protests. But the issue raised

during the focus group interview about the reluctance of the employees to take overt action because the workplace provided an opportunity for them to meet people with whom they negotiate private businesses, made me rethink the whole issue about the absence of organized protests. I decided not to limit the research to explore the existence of unorganized protests, but also to find out if other factors motivated the staff not to engage in organized protests.

The focus group interview process was not without its challenges. Just before the session began, Mr. Coffie, (one of the participants) asked me where the questionnaires for the study were because for him, scientific studies always involve filling out questionnaires. I explained to him that questionnaires were not appropriate for the study because of the issues I wanted to explore. His question challenged my authority as a researcher and the validity of the methodology. To reassert my authority and defend the validity of the method, I explained various ways of conducting research and the need to choose the appropriate tool that could provide insights into the subject being studied. The issues and problems that emerged during the first two phases of the data collection process served as the basis for formulating questions for the third phase, that is, the interviews with the rest of the management and staff.

I obtained the names of participants for the final phase of the study from two sources: The list of employees with the corporation; and through names provided by members of the focus group. Using the latter source was necessary because the official list was dated. Some of the employees on the list were either retired or laid-off. This shortcoming of the official list of employees came to my attention before the commencement of the interviews.

The average duration of each interview was about 50 minutes. All interviews were



tape-recorded. Observations were also recorded. Not all observations were written in the field. Some field notes are recollections and were recorded during transcribing and data analysis when the themes became more coherent. There were 45 participants in the study. They included 7 members of management, 13 senior or middle-level personnel, and 25 junior employees. The gender breakdown was 32 males and 13 females. The high male representation was due to the technical nature of the corporation's operations and the under-representation of women within the technical occupational category. Sampling was purposive. It included only employees who had been with the corporation for at least 5 or more years before the restructuring programme in 1991. The rationale for limiting the sample to this category of employees was to obtain a first hand account of the operations of the corporation before the change. Focussing on this category of employees helped to construct a pre-restructuring picture due to the inadequacy of official documents on aspects of the corporation's operations before the restructuring. However, about half of the management did not fit this criterion but took part in the study because they provided valuable insights into the design and implementation of the programme.

The research process right from my visit to the State Enterprises Commission (SEC) and then to Cityline Corporation involved a series of negotiations. For example, the interview process was not just engaging in a conversation with the participants, posing questions, getting their response and probing further. It also involved negotiating my identity as a researcher, as an indigenous Ghanaian, and as a female. Before I discuss how the data was analysed, I chronicle the negotiation process, from gaining entry to negotiating status and boundaries in the field. Describing these processes not only tells the story about the research process but also it highlights how one's biography can influence the research

process and the data, and the steps taken to minimize this influence.

### **Negotiating Access and Gaining Entry**

I gained access to the SEC and Cityline Corporation through networking, face-to-face interaction, and following bureaucratic procedures (Johnson, 1975). Networking proved to be important for gaining access for two reasons. First, access to data in Ghana can be difficult especially if a researcher does not have personal contacts. Second, the SOERP is politically sensitive due to problems associated with its implementation. Consequently, some officials may be unwilling to discuss such issues publicly for fear of victimization. For example, days after my arrival in Ghana to begin the fieldwork, the SEC was in the limelight over allegations pertaining to the irregularities in the award of consultancy services by the Commission and the high salaries being paid to consultants hired to work on the reform programme. Under these circumstances there was no way the employees were going to cooperate with me, a total stranger, during the preliminary phase of my study. This does not imply that access would have been totally denied, but it would have been difficult to gather the necessary information needed to proceed with the research.

Since I did not know anybody at the SEC, my first point of contact was a professor at the University of Ghana who directed me to his friend, Mr. Kwesi, at the SEC. In addition to networking and face-to-face contact, I had to follow bureaucratic procedures at the SEC. This entailed submitting a two page summary of my proposal, and a letter of introduction from my supervisor indicating the purpose of the study to the Managing Director. The letter head from a recognized University and my supervisor's title lent academic respectability to the research (Johnson, 1975).

During the research at SEC, my identity as a researcher and my gender both had to be constantly negotiated. I also had to manage an inside “dopester.” A dopester “is someone who expresses an interest in directing the substantive concerns of a research project. He is the one with his own ideas about what the researcher should study” (Johnson, 1975, p. 122). With regard to negotiating my identity and gender, Mr. Kwesi, my main contact, often referred to me as his “daughter.” This situation presented problems because Mr. Kwesi’s continuous reference to me as his daughter made me unsure about exactly how to relate to him. As a researcher, my goal was the pursuit of knowledge, where decisive action and independence are held in high esteem. In another vein, being described as a daughter questioned my independence as a researcher (Kondo, 1990) because, culturally, being called a daughter meant I had to be respectful and acquiesce to my “father.” Being a daughter has its privileges as well. Culturally, my father had to provide for my needs. In this situation, this meant providing me with the necessary assistance during my research. I did not have any such expectations from Mr. Kwesi because he assumed a fatherly role. It is also possible that his willingness to assist me had nothing to do with his assumed fatherly role.

The way in which I handled Mr. Kwesi’s perception of me as a daughter was likely to have two effects: First, it may have an impact on the level of trust that developed between us; Second, it may also affect the way in which the research data could be collected. Because of these potential problems, I had to carefully negotiate this role without compromising my role as a researcher. I was, therefore, respectful to Mr. Kwesi as any daughter would be expected to behave while negotiating the cultural expectation of acquiescence by constantly asserting my independence and decisiveness as a researcher. For example, during discussions with Mr. Kwesi about the efficacy of performance contracts in ensuring the viability of

restructured SOEs, he indicated to me that performance contracts were good because they made SOEs more accountable to the state. His view was contrary to a World Bank Report (1995), which was critical about certain aspects of performance contracts. Initially, I was hesitant to challenge his view based on my knowledge of the report because I felt he might think I wanted to undermine his authority. Besides, as a daughter I could not undermine whatever he said directly. I was in a dilemma. In order not to compromise my role as a researcher, and a daughter, I told him his opinion was interesting, but mentioned the perspective in the report as something worth looking at. He then asked me for the title of the report and where he could get access to a copy. During my next visit, he showed me his copy of the report and added that the criticism of performance contracts in the report was worth considering. My approach to dealing with this problem not only strengthened the level of trust that developed between us, but it also demonstrated my independence as a researcher and my mastery of the subject matter of the research.

The second problem I confronted was managing an inside dopest. When I was introduced to one of the gatekeepers at the SEC, he read through my proposal and suggested that I incorporate the restructuring of SEC into my study because no such study had been done since the commission began its own reorganization as part of the reform programme. My initial response was fear and hesitation. Because I knew it was not possible to incorporate it. But an outright negative response could have jeopardized my research, since as a gatekeeper, he could do anything to frustrate or limit my access. In response to his suggestion, I indicated to him that it was a good idea but I could not incorporate it into the present study because it would broaden the focus of the study and lengthen my research, which I could not afford to do due to limited resources. Instead, I suggested that his idea

could constitute the next phase of my research and jokingly added that I hoped the SEC would not hesitate to provide the research funds.

The second stage of the study was at Cityline Corporation. Here again networking played an important role. Mr. Kwesi gave me a note to be given to a friend of his at Cityline Corporation. Upon receipt of the note, his friend expressed his willingness to assist but indicated that I had to go through certain bureaucratic procedures. These included meeting with the managing director and presenting a summary of the research proposal. Both demands had to be met before the study proceeded. I presented the director with a summary of my proposal and the letter of introduction from my supervisor. Once again, my supervisor's title and the content of the proposal lent academic respectability and importance to the study.<sup>22</sup> Also bringing a note directly from the SEC added credibility to the research because SEC is the umbrella organization for all SOEs. I was then directed to Mr. Joe, my main contact throughout the study.

For each department visited, I was introduced to the director, who in turn introduced me to his/her staff. Although the directors' introduction of me to the staff was aimed at giving legitimacy and credibility to the research, the process reinforced existing relationships of power within the corporation. I suspected that some employees felt constrained or unwilling to cooperate because I was introduced by a superior (Johnson, 1975). For example, I was introduced by one of the directors as "[the lady] sent by SEC to study the changes going on here." I was uncomfortable with such an introduction. On our way out, I asked the director why he introduced me that way. His answer was that the introduction was aimed at

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<sup>22</sup> The managing director noted that the study was important because no comprehensive study has been conducted since the inception of the restructuring programme.

giving legitimacy to the study. To paraphrase the director's response, "if I don't tell them that, they will not cooperate with you. If I tell them you are sent by the SEC, they will take you seriously."

For me, however, being associated with the SEC presented a potential problem because I knew it might affect the workers' perception of me (Reinharz, 1997). A researcher's association with someone or an institution which the participants in the study dislike can affect the relationship with the respondents and ultimately the data. When a researcher's guide in a research project is disliked by the people, the dislike can be extended to the researcher. In my case the dislike was for the SEC for supporting changes that some workers were unhappy with. At the time of this incident I had interviewed a few employees and I was aware that reaction to the restructuring programme was mixed. Consequently, I suspected that such an introduction might make the workers in that department view me with suspicion because of my association with the SEC, and the management of Cityline Corporation. In response to this problem, I had to assume my researcher identity that could function independently of "the lady sent by the SEC" (Reinharz, 1997). In order not to totally undermine how I was introduced, thus making the employees question the credibility of their superiors, before each interview, I informed the participants that the first phase of the research was conducted at SEC. I also informed them that it was my dissertation. These measures may have allayed their fears because most of them cooperated during the interview.

Existing power relations at the corporation also might be reinforced when a researcher is introduced by a superior because the power relations between a superior and his/her subordinates could be extended to the researcher. This can potentially affect a subordinate's perception of the researcher and ultimately the data collected. During the

individual interviews, Mr. Nkrumah, a junior officer, told me he was intimidated when I came with his superior and asked him to participate in the study. But he told me that he no longer felt intimidated because of how I related to him before the interview. The rapport coupled with the explanation of the study to him made him feel at ease with me. The negotiation process did not end with gaining access to the corporation, it continued throughout the research.

### **Negotiating Status and Boundaries in the Field**

As Kleinman and Copp (1993) suggest “the conventional image of a researcher is someone who neutralizes his or her ‘irrelevant’ identities and viewpoints while conducting research” (p.10). In social science research, a researcher is expected to be detached and objective, assuming only one identity, that of a researcher. For a fieldworker, however, this is an illusion because s/he cannot be totally detached from the context, or assume only one identity. The “selves which are coherent, seamless, bounded, and whole are indeed illusions-strained against one another” (Kondo, 1990, p. 14). Since researchers assume more than one identity in the field and cannot be completely detached from the context, how they represent and account for the experiences of others is intimately related to who they are. These connections need to be spelled out in any social research (Bolak, 1997).

In the field, I saw myself as, and was perceived by the participants, both as an insider and an outsider. I was an insider because I was born and raised in Ghana and lived there until 1991 when I travelled to Canada to pursue a graduate programme. My status as an outsider was defined by my living and studying abroad, and as a stranger at Cityline Corporation. Appearance also set me apart as an outsider. With the exception of the few women in middle-

level and management positions, all female staff at the corporation wore uniforms. This distinction made me visible as an outsider. The insider/outsider positions presented challenges that had to be addressed throughout the study.

One of the challenges presented by my status as a student studying abroad was the perception by some Ghanaians of the West as paradise and the impact of this perception on the interview process and the data. This perception presented two potential problems. First, there was a tendency to exaggerate problems in the country and probably anything related to the SAP in order to gain some sympathy. Second, the tendency to place those who have stayed outside the country on a pedestal. The reason they may have placed me on a pedestal was my status as a person studying abroad and my level of education. My educational status potentially created an artificial barrier that could have made it difficult to establish rapport with the participants. To counter these potential problems I adopted two strategies.

To break barriers created by the “been to”<sup>23</sup> label, I wore Ghanaian batik prints in order to look ordinary. Looking ordinary and not Western was strategic because personal appearance in the field helps to develop trust (Johnson, 1975). There was, however, one danger with this strategy. By attempting to look “native,” there was a danger of not being perceived as a legitimate researcher. This potential negative reaction by the employees at my attempt to appear native “is a product of the norms of the social setting” (Reinharz, 1997, p. 4). Ghanaians who travel abroad are often expected to dress in foreign clothes. Without such an appearance one would often be characterized as a failure, or as one who “really hasn’t been abroad.” To counter the potential downside of this strategy, I used visible symbols such

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<sup>23</sup> “Been to” is a term used to describe people who have traveled abroad.



as the tape recorder and file folders to reinforce my status as a researcher and an academic. The second strategy was to establish rapport with the participants. I had informal discussions with them before the interview. These strategies broke down barriers that might have hampered data collection. Some participants were so comfortable with me that they voluntarily asked for more interviews so they could discuss issues they had forgotten to mention during the original interview.

My indigenous status was advantageous but presented certain challenges as well. From the standpoint of understanding the wider social context, my insider status provided a better perspective on the issues within the corporation. On the other hand, this status could be detrimental because relevant data could be seen as familiar and therefore ignored. Besides, an insider status could create researcher bias. For example, before I left Ghana to study in Canada in 1991, I was hostile to the SAP because aspects of the programme required educational reforms and the introduction of user fees for services at the University which were previously free. My absence from the country from 1991-1995, however, enabled me to step back and take a critical look at the entire programme. I do not agree with every aspect of the adjustment programme, but I thought change was necessary to halt the economic deterioration. My experience abroad within a different socioeconomic context and my academic training made me “a natural boundary spanner in how I think and function” (Bolak, 1997, p. 99). My status as an outsider within thus provided a different lens with which to approach the study.

My identity as a female and a researcher also had to be negotiated throughout the interview process because “gender filters knowledge” (Denzin, 1989, p. 116). In social research involving face-to-face interviews, the sex of the researcher and of the respondents’

influences the process especially within cultural contexts “in which masculine identities are differentiated from feminine ones” (Fontana & Frey, 1994, p. 369). Being young, single, and female within a social context where single female university students are perceived as sexually available made my sexual availability open to negotiation (Bolak, 1997). I had to develop survival strategies to counter any negative impact that this perception might have had on the research. For example, earlier in the field, I was close to one of the male middle-level personnel at Cityline Corporation. I visited him regularly to say hello and to brief him on my progress. But a comment by another male employee implied that he and his colleagues might have misinterpreted our relationship. I therefore reduced the frequency of my visits as a means of redefining my boundaries with him in order to maintain the trust and respectability with the rest of the staff.

The boundaries created during the interview process varied by gender and the position of the participants within the organizational hierarchy. The nature of the dialogue between the only two female senior officers interviewed was professional. The atmosphere during these interviews was to a large extent tense and unsettling for me because initially rapport was almost non-existent. I raised women’s issues within the workplace to ease the tension but this strategy was not effective in one of the cases. Later during the interview, Ms. Smith mentioned that as the only woman among the men she had to be very tough. Due to her toughness her colleagues often characterized her as a man. Ms. Smith’s comment explained why the two senior female officers presented a professional image throughout their interviews.

Contrary to their senior counterparts, the junior female staff was relaxed and the interview process was more informal. Some of them had long chats with me after the

interview and they asked me to visit them whenever I was in the premises of the corporation. Unlike the other two senior level women whom I did not address by name or title, I called the junior employees Aunt so and so.<sup>24</sup> Addressing them this way created an informal and cordial atmosphere during the interviews.

The relationship with the men was cordial. Unlike the women, discussions were limited to the research and sometimes extended to Ghanaian politics. This boundary had to be maintained to counter any perceptions of my sexual availability. The above experiences and challenges taught me that as a sociologist it is important to learn how one is perceived in the field (Reinharz, 1997).

### **Data analysis**

Qualitative data analysis comprises data management and data analysis (Huberman & Miles, 1994; Miles & Huberman, 1994). Data management refers to data collection, storage and retrieval processes while data analysis involves making sense of the data after it has been “stored.” The data collection component of data management is not limited to data gathering but it extends to analysis as well. Thus, data analysis is an integral part of the data collection process. A researcher need not begin analysis after the fieldwork, the analysis begins in the field.

During or after the fieldwork, the data which exist in the form of tapes (audio or video), site documents and field notes are transcribed. This is the storage process (Huberman

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<sup>24</sup> In Ghanaian society, it is disrespectful to address an adult or one older than you are by his or her first name. Most married women who are Mrs. usually take offense when they are not addressed by the appropriate title. (Not every married woman is addressed by the title Mrs. because there are two types of marriages - customary and ordinance or western style wedding. In most cases both have to be performed before one can call herself Mrs.). To avoid any embarrassment, I preferred to call them Aunt which is informal and acceptable.

**& Miles, 1994). The researcher then proceeds to code and to make sense of the data by writing memos and other analytical material. This process entails reflecting on the data using data displays. Data displays can exist in the form of matrices, charts, or networks (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The above description only provides a framework for analysing qualitative data because qualitative research designs are not copyable and each design has to be revised and “choreographed” (Preissle, 1991, cited in Huberman & Miles, 1994, p. 431).**

**Data analysis for this study began in the field and ended with the analysis of the interview transcript and the write-up. Interim data analysis is advantageous because questions or themes can be added and deleted in the field (Huberman & Miles, 1994). It also shows a better understanding of the context and indicates the internal validity of the study. The data from the fieldwork or the “*raw materials*” (p. 432) existed in three forms: audio tapes; site documents; and documented field notes. The audio tapes were transcribed and edited after the field work. The transcribing process involved recording my questions and participants’ responses as well. This approach put respondents’ answers in context. I included speech errors and added commas and questions marks to “improve readability of the extracts while conveying their sense, as heard, as effectively as possible” (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 226). I also included my own words in square brackets to improve readability.**

**Data analysis was an integral part of the transcribing process. I wrote down issues that got my attention while transcribing. In some cases I incorporated personal notes in the transcript as a reminder of my thoughts when a respondent’s comment constituted part of the bigger picture that was developing. While transcribing, participants’ comments in some cases triggered observations made in the field that was not documented. These observations were**

either incorporated as personal notes or kept as research memo. The observations often confirm or clarify the data. This means that data clarification began in the field and continued with transcribing.

I printed out the transcript in hard copy and analysed each interview line by line with notes in the margin. I did not use any specific codes. Instead, I identified emerging themes and issues using concepts and phrases. Next, I reduced the data. This involved writing out all the concepts and phrases written in the margins of the interview transcript. I labelled the first reduced data Notes 1. An analysis of the notes revealed two levels of analysis: macro and micro. At the macro-level was the government and the World Bank and the micro-level was the process of change at Cityline Corporation and workers responses to it. The macro-level was multi-layered with the World Bank influencing policies about the restructuring and the government involved in the implementation process. This does not necessarily imply that the process was hierarchical. Officially, the relationship between the World Bank and the government was based on negotiations. The results of their negotiations influenced the restructuring process at Cityline Corporation. The themes in the data reflected these two levels of analysis.

While reading through Note 1, I wrote out the main themes, went back to the interview transcripts and recorded the respective pages where each theme appeared. I labelled this Note 2. Some of the themes and phrases from Note 2 are listed in the table below.

**Figure 2**

**Example of Themes from Notes 2**

- ~ Corporation more hierarchical than before restructuring
- ~Job reclassification: job evaluation new job titles, dead-end jobs, demotion, performance appraisal
- ~External controls: Government interference in the day-to-day operations of the corporation and conflicts with the Tenants' Association
- ~ Introduction of performance contracts
- ~Survival and power struggle to control one's turf
- ~Computers acquired-not available in all departments
- ~Corporation's financial success attributed to restructuring-view contradicted by other aspects of data
- ~Legitimacy for change: World Bank promised change and salary increase; presentation of change; workers understanding of change
- ~Use of office space to negotiate economic survival strategies
- ~Teamwork

The next step involved making sense of the data and attributing meaning (Denzin, 1994). The process entailed finding out how the various themes were connected, making decisions about what will be written about and what will be included as well as looking for emerging theoretical understandings (Huberman & Miles, 1994). The following factors influenced the themes and issues included in the write-up: the research questions; the themes and issues that emerged in the field; and the relationship between the themes. The themes included had to be connected and related to the overall picture that was emerging. The following themes emerged from the exercise: state/Cityline Corporation relations; (continuing political interference) job reclassification; job evaluation; and performance appraisal; presentation of restructuring and the legitimacy for change; work organizations and mobility structures; teamwork; use of office space to negotiate economic survival

strategies; and performance contracts.

### **Ethical Considerations**

Qualitative researchers face many ethical issues during data collection in the field and in the dissemination of their research findings (Creswell, 1998). These issues include getting informed consent, protecting the anonymity of participants and avoiding deception. To protect participants in a study from any possible negative impact of the study on them, all researches on human subjects have to be evaluated by the institution or University that a researcher is affiliated to. This study was reviewed in accordance with the University of Alberta ethical procedures. In the field, I informed all participants that they are being researched and about the nature of the research. I also explained their rights to them and I told them they had the right to leave anytime during the interview should they become uncomfortable with the questions being asked or the interview process without any reprisals. Although I had a consent form, most of the participants I interviewed earlier were unwilling to sign it.<sup>25</sup> Therefore, I explained the consent form verbally to each participant and his/her consent sought before each interview. Pseudonyms were used for anonymity and confidentiality. However, I maintained the original name of the umbrella organization of SOEs, the SEC for citation purposes. I recognize that although I have used pseudonyms, it is impossible to disguise everything.

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<sup>25</sup> Culturally, some Ghanaians are uncomfortable about signing documents. There is no sociological research that explains this phenomenon. I can only speculate that because most of the culture is based on oral tradition, requiring people to sign documents may be perceived as distrust in their verbal commitment. It could also be interpreted as making too much commitment for their voluntary participation.

## **Summary**

**In this chapter, I described the methodology used for the study, how the data was collected and the various stages in the data collection process. I also told the story about the research process, that is, the social dynamics involved in negotiating access in the field as well as managing my gender and identity. The story about the research process shows the social dimension of field research, which cannot be ignored because of its potential impact on the data collected. The next chapter provides a description of the SOE selected for the case study, Cityline Corporation.**



## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **Cityline Corporation: The Context of the Restructuring Programme**

#### **Introduction**

This chapter provides background information on selected aspects of Cityline Corporation that are germane to understanding the study. It focuses on the history of the corporation, highlighting the government's reasons for establishing it. Also discussed is a brief description of the residents of Citytown; the organization of the corporation before and after restructuring; and the problems that the World Bank's consultants identified as the source of the corporation's poor performance. Finally, the restructuring programme and the work environment are discussed.

#### **Historical Background**

The government of Ghana established Cityline Corporation in 1963 to succeed a series of organizations set-up since 1951 to develop Citytown<sup>26</sup> (Ministry of Works and Housing, 1991). The goal was to support development projects in the area by providing affordable housing for the residents. The government leased 63 square miles of land from the local people for a period of 125 years for the corporation to develop for housing and other building projects. It relocated the former residents of the land to a new site and provided new houses to compensate for their loss (Ministry of Works and Housing, 1991). The task of Cityline Corporation was twofold: to develop residential, commercial, and industrial properties; and to manage the city. The latter function was taken over by a municipal

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<sup>26</sup> Citytown is the pseudonym for the town that Cityline Corporation was established to develop.

government in the early 1970s. No private company or individual could develop any property in the acquisition area without permission from the corporation.

Official estimates show that Citytown has about 120,000 residents. A government-commissioned report about the corporation describes the residents as belonging to the middle and upper income group (Ministry of Works and Housing, 1991). This categorization could be misleading since the criteria for classification is unclear.<sup>27</sup> Besides, the physical condition of the properties and the immediate environments within these communities do not reflect the government's income groups.<sup>28</sup> Based on the appearance of the properties and the immediate physical environment, I have divided the city into three broad categories: upper; middle; and a mix of upper, middle, and low income groups. The city is divided into sub-divisions. Sub-division 1 and 2 are located in the central part of the city and are the longest established and the most heterogeneous. Its residents comprise people in the upper, middle, and low income categories. Most of the houses in these two sub-divisions are old compared to others in the city. Also fewer buildings on average in sub-divisions 1 and 2 have been remodelled by the tenants and owners than in divisions 4, 5, 8, and 9. The immediate environments of most of the buildings in these sub-divisions are not as neat as the others. Both areas are more densely populated compared to the others. They have a total of over 20,000 residents compared to sub-divisions 4, 5, 8 and 9 which have about 8000 to 12, 000 residents each (Ministry of Works and Housing, 1991). Residents of sub-division 4, 5, 8 and

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<sup>27</sup> The report did not discuss how it arrived at the classification criteria. However, the majority of the residents of the town are white-collar workers, who are mainly public sector workers and employees of large private or multinational corporations.

<sup>28</sup> I recognize that using physical structures and the immediate environment of residents as the criteria for classification might be problematic but in the absence of current data on their income, this approach provides a better description of the residents.

9 can be categorized as belonging to the middle income group. Most of the buildings in these areas have been remodelled by the tenants or owners and most of them are walled or fenced compared to those in sub-division 1 and 2. The majority of residents in sub-division 6 and 10 belong to the upper income group judging from the larger and more expensive houses in that area. Most of the houses here are privately owned and the majority of them are walled with gates. The residents in this area are about 2000 to 3000 each. At the time of the research there were 18 sub-divisions in all. Sub-divisions 1 to 12 were almost completed because they did not have any vacant plots while sub-division 13 to 18 were being developed. The corporation leased sites at sub-division 13 to 18 to public sector institutions to build houses for their workers and individuals who could afford to build their own homes.

One might ask, why should the state support a corporation that provides housing for predominantly middle and upper income residents? The establishment of the corporation has to be understood by focussing on the socioeconomic and historical context within which the government's housing policy evolved. When the Nkrumah government took over the management of Government Business from the colonial administration in 1951 to pave way for independence, the majority of Ghanaians did not have access to such basic social services as education, healthcare, and decent and affordable housing (Ninsin, 1991). During the independence struggle, Nkrumah's party, the Convention People's Party (CPP) made a lot of promises to the people including the provision of affordable housing. Thus, the idea to establish the corporation was not only an attempt to support development projects in the area, it was also an opportunity for the government to make good on promises it made during the independence campaign. Cityline Corporation was one of the many housing development corporations that the government established to fulfil this goal. Besides, this policy reflects

the dominant view in the emerging field of development studies, given the role of governments in rebuilding Europe after World War II.

Cityline Corporation not only supports the development of residential properties, it is also in charge of commercial and industrial properties. Its commercial properties include market stalls and shops rented to traders and small businesses. The industrial properties include land leased to companies to accommodate various industries in the area. As of 1991, the corporation had 6,355 rental housing units and 2,300 rental commercial units (Ministry of Works and Housing, 1991). The corporation's functions can be summed up as planning, regulatory and administrative services, real estate development, and property management. Specifically, the corporation performs the following activities: constructing roads, public buildings and markets; developing residential, industrial and commercial properties; and providing public utilities such as sewer and street lights (Cityline Corporation, 1994).

Since the corporation was established to perform a development function, the government subsidized its operations in the form of loans and grants. The corporation passed on this subsidy to tenants through low rents. The average rent charged by the corporation in 1991 was 3,800 cedis<sup>29</sup> (Ministry of Works and Housing, 1991). These rents were below prevailing market prices. For example, rents charged in the open market for houses of comparable size were about four times higher than that charge by the corporation (Ministry of Works and Housing, 1991). Because the corporation was subsidized, all major policy initiatives including rent increases were subject to the sector ministry's approval.

By 1979, however, the government could no longer provide any such assistance due

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<sup>29</sup> That is, about \$US10 at 1991 levels - in 1991 the average exchange rate of the cedi to the \$US was 360.

to the deplorable state of the economy. In order to keep the corporation functional the management moved away from the construction of houses for rental and instead assumed the role of facilitator. It leased land to institutions in the public sector that had the resources to finance housing units for their employees. The corporation built houses for individuals who could afford it upon request. This was how the corporation operated until the implementation of the SAP and the SOERP. The SOERP required changes in its mandate, organizational structure, and business practices.

### **Cityline Corporation: Before the Restructuring**

Before the inception of the restructuring programme in late 1991, Cityline Corporation was a state-subsidized real estate corporation. The government provided subsidies in the form of grants and loan guarantees. Since it was established to provide a social service, all policies about rent increases were subject to government approval. Like other SOEs, government bureaucrats had control over the preparation of business plans (World Bank, 1991b). Because of this, the corporation was not autonomous, especially with regard to making business decisions.

Organizationally, there were four departments: Estate; Development; Accounts; and Administration. The main function of the Estate Department was property management. It had two main sections—land and housing. The land section managed both allocated and unallocated land, commercial and industrial properties while the housing section was in charge of all rental units (Ministry of Works and Housing, 1991). The Estate Department kept records of the corporation's holdings and served as the first point of contact between the public and the corporation. It also had satellite offices in the various sub-divisions where

tenants could pay their rent and report problems about their buildings. The Development Department was the largest department within the corporation and the hub of its technical operations. Its sub-units included building inspectorate, town planning, architectural, maintenance, engineering, quantity surveying and construction.<sup>30</sup> The Accounts Department managed the corporation's finances and the internal audit unit while the Administration Department dealt with human resource, public relations and legal issues.

The organizational hierarchy had four levels. At the bottom of the hierarchy were junior officers. This group of employees can be sub-divided into two categories: clerical and technical staff. Most clerical workers performed secretarial and administrative duties. The technical staff was mainly architectural or geodetic draughtsmen. All employees in this category reported to their immediate superiors or supervisors in their respective departments. Next in the hierarchy was middle-level managers who supervised the junior officers and reported to various department heads. This was followed by a third level, the department heads. They managed each department and reported directly to the managing director. The department heads and the managing director constituted the management team. The management team reported to a government-appointed board of directors. However, after the 1981 military coup that brought the Rawlings government into power the board was abolished and replaced with a Joint Consultative Committee (JCC). The JCC was an attempt by Rawlings' military regime to introduce what could be described as a form of industrial

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<sup>30</sup> Since its establishment in the 1950s, the corporation was never involved in direct construction. Building projects were contracted out to private contractors. But during the early days of the PNDC government, the workers compelled management to experiment with direct construction, however, it was unsuccessful. Subsequently, the corporation abandoned this method, because the management felt it was neither cost effective nor efficient.

democracy. The JCC comprised all heads of departments, the managing director and three union representatives. The government wanted the JCC to give labour more say in the management of SOEs. It also reflected the left wing ideological orientation of the early phase of the Rawlings regime. Like the board, the position of the managing director was filled by a government appointee.

Although I have identified four levels within the organizational hierarchy, for the purposes of career mobility, there is another way to look at it: Junior staff; senior staff; and management. There were grade-level distinctions within the junior and senior ranks. For example, draughtsman grade 1, 2 and 3. The workforce distinction was not typical of Cityline Corporation it existed at most SOEs (Davis, 1991). The same grade level distinctions applied to the senior staff. There was no such distinction at the management level. The grade level distinctions created career paths within the corporation. For example, an employee hired at an entry-level position could eventually rise through the ranks to a supervisory position in the senior ranks through a system of promotions. Although a senior staff could be promoted into a management position, there was no evidence that any junior staff had ever made it all the way into a management position.

In principle, promotions at Cityline Corporation were to be based on merit and performance. In practice, however, promotions were “automatic”, meaning they were often based on years of service and not necessarily on performance. In most cases, promotions did not result in significant changes in tasks previously performed. The only promotion that involved a change in duties occurred when someone was promoted from a junior staff position to a supervisory position. It is unclear why promotions were not performance-based, however, some senior staff and members of management attributed it to inefficient

administrative practices.

At the time of the restructuring, the corporation had 615 workers (Ministry of Works and Housing, 1991) employed in clerical/administrative and technical units. This included typists, secretaries, drivers, cashiers, administrators, and professionals such as estate managers, accountants, and lawyers. There were also security guards or watchmen, as they are referred to in Ghana, within this category. Employees in the technical units included draughtsmen, architects, and engineers. With regard to labour relations, the corporation was unionized and remains so after restructuring. They are members of the commercial and industrial workers' union of the Trade Union Congress. Only the junior staff, however, belong to the union. The senior staff had their own association—the senior staff association. The association is still in existence.

So far in this section, I have described how the corporation was organized before the restructuring. The specific issues addressed include: the organizational structure; the job classification system; and mobility structures. According to the pre-restructuring diagnostic study the way in which the corporation was organized and the absence of autonomy for the management among others contributed to its inefficiency and poor performance (Ministry of Works & Housing, 1991).

### **Reasons for Restructuring Cityline Corporation**

In the 1960s and 1970s, Cityline Corporation developed many residential and commercial properties. They even had to hire more employees to keep up with the pace of projects. However, the economic downturn that began in the mid-1970s significantly affected its operations. The government, which was its main source of funding, provided only



negligible financial support, making it difficult to undertake new projects. Revenues from residential and commercial properties could not supplement the shrinking resources from the government because rents for these properties were low and, therefore, insufficient to give the corporation enough financial resources for building projects. Part of the problem was that the corporation could not increase the rents without government approval and the government was unwilling to approve any rent hikes. Due to falling standards of living, and the general economic decline in the country, a rent hike would have made an already unpopular government even less popular.

The corporation's precarious financial situation meant the underutilisation of its labour force. But excess staff could not be laid off because as Mr Afari, a senior official, put it:

I quite remember that prior to the restructuring, we had a bloated staff. A lot of the people were being paid for doing virtually nothing and then we had a very big maintenance yard. I forgot to mention that as part of our building maintenance section. We had a lot of artisans...sitting and doing virtually nothing. They come in the morning mark or clock their names and they find their way to town and you still have to pay them. (Interview Transcript, pp. 121-122)

Since the management did not have the authority to reduce the staff despite the economic downturn, the workforce remained overstaffed. Wages and salaries were also low, relative to the cost of living and low compared to the incomes of their counterparts in comparable public sector organizations. The government-commissioned report noted that a 30 per cent increase in the remuneration of Cityline staff at 1991 levels would not match salaries being paid in the private sector (Ministry of Works and Housing, 1991). While this is true, the comparative analysis is problematic because the authors of the report did not compare salaries of similar organizations in the same industry. They looked at salaries of

three private companies in the furniture, health care products and insurance industries. These industries were unrelated to the housing or real estate development.

Not only were the employees' salaries low, their pay cheques were often late. Naturally, the economic situation affected the morale of the staff. Motivation was low and this encouraged some employees to leave the corporation (Ministry of Works and Housing, 1991). Also, it was difficult to attract and to maintain qualified employees. Employees who remained sought other income earning activities to supplement their meagre income. Most of the participants in the study mentioned that due to low remuneration, underutilisation of human resources and the low capacity of the corporation, some staff reported to work, signed their names and left to seek other income generating activities. Some participants admitted that sometimes they did not stay in the office all day because they had nothing to do. Meanwhile, they still expected to be paid.

The behaviour of the staff reflects poor staff morale, weak leadership from management and the broader socioeconomic context. With regard to management, I did not ask the managing director why he did nothing about absenteeism.<sup>31</sup> However, based on the sector ministry's report (Ministry of Works and Housing, 1991) on the corporation, I can speculate that morale was low in the upper echelons of the corporation as well. The report attributed the corporation's inefficiency to management's morale. For example, it notes that the current managing director was appointed as an acting director in the 1980s but at the time of the report his appointment had still not been confirmed. This may have affected the managing director's morale and attitude towards work. Another explanation could be that

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<sup>31</sup> I deliberately did not ask the managing director to explain his inaction to absenteeism because I felt it might put him on the spot and make him reluctant to continue with the interview.

the managing director recognized the problem of underutilisation of human resources within the corporation but he could not do much about it because he did not have the authority to lay off excess staff.

The broader socioeconomic context probably played a role in the employees' attitude towards work. There is a common sense view among most Ghanaians that public sector workers are not hardworking because they are working for the state. In fact, if you are a hardworking public sector worker, some people might ask you "is the job for your father?" If the answer is in the negative they might say "Why then are you working so hard?" This view was confirmed by Mr. Adjei, a junior staff: "I was with [a foreign company] in fact you have to work according to your pay or something like that. But in the civil service or this quasi governmental [institutions], it is for the government, relax" (Interview Transcript, p. 226). This work ethic probably made matters worse in a corporation that was deteriorating due to the economic downturn. These were some of the problems Cityline's restructuring programme was designed to address.

### **The Restructuring Programme at Cityline Corporation**

The restructuring of Cityline Corporation is an integral part of the state-owned enterprises reform component of the SAP. According the consultants who prepared the diagnostic study (Ministry of Works & Housing, 1991), the corporation, like most SOEs, had saddled the government with increasingly heavy fiscal and managerial burdens. This led the World Bank to argue that the problem was a "lack of market discipline and the inability of state firms to respond to that discipline where it existed" (Shirley & Nellis, 1991, p. 1). As discussed earlier in this chapter, Cityline Corporation depended on government subvention

to support its operations because of the social function it performed. This situation was unacceptable to the World Bank because it felt the subsidies imposed heavy financial burdens on the government. Therefore, the Bank proposed that reform efforts should concentrate on making SOEs like Cityline Corporation more independent and entrepreneurial (Shirley & Nellis, 1991).

This independent and entrepreneurial component meant a shift toward market structures, thus, “governments with significant state-owned enterprises sectors must increase market forces, decentralize decision-making, [and] strengthen managerial capabilities and incentives throughout the economy” (Shirley & Nellis, 1991, p. 5). For Cityline Corporation, the shift toward market structures meant a move away from providing subsidized housing to providing housing at prevailing market prices. Also, the corporation needed to become more autonomous in its decision-making process. Before discussing the specific elements of the restructuring programme at Cityline Corporation, I provide a brief chronology of how the programme developed.

In April 1991, the government of Ghana hired a well-known foreign-based consultancy firm to undertake a diagnostic study, which would provide the basis for reorganizing the corporation. The World Bank’s Urban II Project funded the study. The consultants interviewed the management and senior staff employees at the corporation. Based on these interviews they wrote and submitted a report to the government in the middle of that year. The report described problems discussed earlier in the chapter. Proposed solutions to these problems were all in line with the World Bank’s policy on SOEs. For example, the report proposed a shift toward market structures and decentralization of the decision-making process within the corporation. There was, however, one note of caution

in the report on privatizing the corporation. The consultants strongly recommended that the corporation not be privatized because it might lead to a long and expensive litigation process with the local people from whom the government leased the land (Ministry of Works and Housing, 1991). Another recommendation of the report was that the corporation move away from direct development of residential properties and instead lease land to public institutions that provide housing for public sector workers. During an interview with the managing director, he was quick to point out to me that the corporation already had the consultants' recommendation about the corporation becoming a facilitator in place. It was initiated when the government could no longer support them financially. Therefore, the consultants' recommendation was not a new idea, or simply put, they presented what was already in existence.

After the government received the report, it hired three Ghanaian consultants in finance, human resources and engineering, respectively, to restructure the corporation. Although these are local consultants, their views reflect the market-driven philosophy of the World Bank. They would not have been hired had their philosophy been contrary to the Bank's goals. The financial consultant was in charge of reorganizing the accounting department as well as the finances of the corporation. The human resource consultant was responsible for the administrative aspect of the restructuring and the engineer was in charge of the technical division of the corporation. The consultants worked closely with the rest of management and the managing director. At the time of the study, one consultant was still with the corporation. He was a departmental head and, therefore, was in management. But unlike the rest of the management staff, the consultant's pay was quoted in U.S. dollars and it came directly from World Bank funds for the project. Given that this consultant was

recruited locally, I wondered about his higher salary especially because he was paid in \$U.S. Apparently, his remuneration was based on his expertise.<sup>32</sup>

The restructuring programme implemented by the consultants was a blue print of proposals put forward by the World Bank. Although the specifics may vary from one corporation to the other, the fundamental principle was the same: a move toward market structures. The main components of the restructuring programme implemented at Cityline Corporation can be summarized as follows:

- Transform Cityline Corporation from a government subsidized institution into a corporate entity that pays dividends to the state;
- Make the corporation autonomous;
- Change the corporation's organizational structure;
- Layoff excess staff; and
- Introduce a controlled asset disposal programme, and implement of a revenue generation programme (Ministry of Works and Housing, 1991)

#### **Cityline Corporation: After the Restructuring**

The restructuring is transforming the Cityline Corporation from a government-subsidized organization into a commercial entity. Like any corporate entity it is expected to pay dividends to its shareholder, in this case, the state. Also the corporation is now autonomous, which gives the management the authority to make such operational decisions as preparing corporate plans and hiring and firing staff. The increase autonomy limits government interference in the corporation's day-to-day operations.

The restructuring programme also entailed a change in the corporation's internal organizational structure. This aspect of the restructuring focusses on an increase in the

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<sup>32</sup> There was no open discontent among members of management about the salary differential. But the junior staff was concerned about the secrecy of salaries since the implementation of the restructuring. In response to this concern, some members of management told me that the secrecy was necessary to avoid friction because of the high salaries of the consultants.

number of departments, a change in the mobility structure that serve as career paths within the corporation, and the introduction of the concept of teamwork. The corporation now has six departments compared to four that existed before the restructuring. The Legal and Audit sections are now independent of the Administration and Accounts Departments respectively. The names of some departments and occupational titles changed. For example, the Accounts Department has been renamed Finance, and its head, formally known as the Chief Accountant is now called the Director of Finance or the Financial Controller. All departmental heads, formally known as Chiefs, now have the title of Director. A new position has been created for a Corporate Planner in line with the organization's new corporate mandate. The Corporate Planner with the six departmental heads and the Managing Director constitute the management team.

Jobs have also been reclassified to eliminate the partitioned grade-level distinctions. With the new job classification system, all jobs within the same occupational category have the same title. There are no more grade-level distinctions. This is a departure from the previous system of job classification based on seniority distinctions in job titles. For example, under the new system there is no longer clerical officer, grade 1, 2, 3 and so on. All clerical officers are just plain clerical officers. The change was designed to eliminate structural inflexibility in the workforce (Davis, 1991).

The job reclassification had implications for mobility and career paths within the corporation. Employees are no longer promoted periodically. Instead, they receive salary increments based on yearly performance appraisals. The salary increments, however, do not translate into changes in their title or status as was the case before the restructuring. Employees could be promoted only when there was a vacancy. However, the corporation

would have to advertise vacant positions publicly even if an employee within the organization was qualified to do the job. Although qualified employees are free to apply, they have to compete with prospective candidates from outside the corporation for the position. The rationale behind this decision was to recruit younger workers with higher educational credentials, who the consultants believe would be more innovative compared to employees already with the corporation. The consultants argue that the existing employees do not necessarily possess high academic credentials and current knowledge in their respective fields which the corporation needs to be competitive (Ministry of Works and Housing, 1991).

Another change was the introduction of the concept of teamwork. It was designed to facilitate the coordination of operations and cooperation among staff and between the various departments. Ideally, all departments within the corporation are to operate as an integrated whole. But the low salaries impacted how employees within each department perceived and related to their counterparts in other departments. Usually, individuals protected their interest by refusing to cooperate with their colleagues in other departments, so they could benefit financially. For example, employees at the Estate Department, serve as the first point of contact between the public and the corporation. Some employees in other departments believed that this exposure gave their counterparts at the Estate Department certain advantages. These advantages might include rewards from tenants or clients for services rendered. It is alleged that in the past some demanded money before addressing clients or tenant concerns. A junior employee noted that it is an open secret within the corporation that employees with the Estate Department always receive money from clients. Because of this they do not want to cooperate with their colleagues in other departments for fear that their



colleagues might also demand a piece of the pie. This is an example of corruption at the workplace. This practice occurs in other public institutions as well.

Research shows that administrative corruption in Ghana can be traced to two main sources, the extended family system and the colonial legacy (Price, 1975). Price's study on administrative corruption in Ghana was based on the civil service, but I think the findings are relevant to all public sector institutions. Price argues that the extended family system provides the basis for corruption because family members view the official positions of their members as possessions that must benefit the entire family. This means that there is no separation between the individual and his/her public office. The absence of such a distinction implies that if a civil servant uses his/her office for personal use such a practice is likely to have social support. For Price (1975) the extended family's perception of public office and its reaction to the personal use of public office provides the social basis for corruption.

Price's second reason is Ghana's colonial legacy and it is related to the first. He argues that Ghana's adoption of colonial bureaucratic structures was not limited to the institutional structures but included social emulation of Europeans life-styles as well. The extended family members expected their members to maintain the material life-style of the Europeans who held those positions. This includes owning a Mercedes-Benz or a Jaguar, wearing imported clothing and staying in a Western-style house. According to Price, the "imbalance between the material obligations placed on civil servants by their 'significant others' and the material resources available to them through their salaries" (1975, p.149) motivates them to meet these needs through illegitimate means. Price, notes that individuals who seek the assistance of the civil servants are aware of this social climate and therefore are willing to give civil servants monetary rewards for their services.

Price's cultural argument is problematic because it does not deal with current economic realities in the country. The second point, however, may be relevant to issues that Cityline Corporation but for different reasons. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Ghana's economy began to decline in the late 1960s and this downward trend affected salaries and wages. With low salaries and high cost of living the average worker cannot afford the basic necessities of life, such as food, shelter, clothing and the cost of education for his/her children. Some workers take up other jobs besides their regular jobs to make ends meet. Others resorted to corrupt practices at the workplace to earn extra money to support their families. With this background one can speculate that employees might be unwilling to cooperate with their colleagues in other departments for fear of sharing their illegitimate money with them.

Therefore, other employees who felt left out often tried to circumvent any assistance that an employee from the Estate Department might require to address a tenant or a customer's problem. For example, tenants' records sometimes got lost when action had to be taken on a particular problem. Employees in some departments were inclined to not cooperate with their colleagues. This resulted in apathy and the development of what I termed "empire building" as some employees tried to protect their interest. This not only hampered the operations of the corporation but it also created a public relations nightmare for the corporation. Tenants and the public often perceived the employees as corrupt. Teamwork was introduced to curtail such practices and create a more harmonious workplace.

Another reason for the introduction of teamwork was to stop some senior officials' use of arbitrary power within the corporation. Before the restructuring, some senior officers attempted to maintain power and control over their work by practising "level-jumping." Level jumping is a situation in which superiors by-pass their immediate subordinates and

delegate or hand over tasks to employees further down the hierarchy (Crook, 1983). This creates tension between the superiors and their immediate subordinates or the supervisors. The following dialogue illustrates how Mr. Benuaku, a middle-level manager described the problem:

There is this situation where the man at the top tends to by pass his immediate subordinate to work with someone lower down the scale without the knowledge of the immediate subordinate. At times it creates a lot of awkward situations. (Interview Transcript, p. 40)

While the introduction of teamwork might be a solution to the problem of level-jumping, other initiatives such as the adherence to hierarchical structure being enforced under the restructuring programme may have contradicted it. The meaning of teamwork and this contradiction are examined in Chapter 6.

There were also layoffs. The layoffs were concentrated in the lower hierarchy. This category of employees bore the brunt of the layoffs for two reasons: first, they were hired during the boom period of the corporation but were not laid off when development projects slowed down. Most of them were either underemployed or made redundant. Second, some professionals in middle level management positions left the organization, which created a shortage of personnel within that category. Thus, compared to middle level positions, the lower hierarchy was bloated, hence the layoffs.

The restructuring programme also required the corporation to sell some of its rental units in order to raise enough capital to finance the changes, and to be financially viable in the long-term. The corporation was also to increase ground rents and property rents to market levels. As discussed in Chapter 7, the sale of property and the rent increase became a flashpoint for conflict between the corporation and its tenants.

**So far in this chapter, I have provided a historical background of the corporation, discussed the structure and nature of its activities before and after the restructuring. Below is a summary of the corporation before and after the restructuring. The physical work environment, however, cannot be ignored in these discussions because it provides hints about the power structure and why some male employees resisted their new official dress code.**

**Figure 3**  
**A Summary of Cityline Corporation Before and After Restructuring**

<b>Before Restructuring</b>	<b>After Restructuring</b>
<p><b>Source of financial support and nature of operation</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Grants and government guaranteed loans</li> <li>• Rent, and revenues from leases and sale of houses</li> <li>• State-subsidized</li> </ul>	<p><b>Source of financial support and nature of operation</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Subsidies and government guaranteed loans cancelled</li> <li>• Rent, revenues from leases and sale of houses</li> <li>• Operates as a corporate entity</li> </ul>
<p><b>Level of autonomy</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of operational autonomy; the management could not hire or layoff staff; government interference commonplace</li> </ul>	<p><b>Level of autonomy</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increases operational autonomy; management has authority to hire and layoff staff; limited or no government interference</li> </ul>
<p><b>Number of Departments</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Four: estate, development, accounts and administration</li> </ul>	<p><b>Number of Departments</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Six: estate, development, finance, administration, legal and audit</li> </ul>
<p><b>Cooperation and Communication</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of cooperation: “empire building”</li> </ul>	<p><b>Cooperation and Communication</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Teamwork</li> </ul>
<p><b>Job classification system</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seniority-based grade level distinctions - grade 1, 2, 3 etc.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Job classification system</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seniority based grade level distinctions cancelled</li> </ul>
<p><b>Career-path and mobility</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In principle, promotions based on merit, in practice - promotions periodic and “automatic”</li> <li>• Promotions accompanied by a change in title but not necessarily job description.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Career-path and mobility</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Promotions based on yearly appraisal of employee performance</li> <li>• Promotions not accompanied by a change in title.</li> </ul>

## **The Work Environment**

My first visit to Cityline Corporation occurred when I arrived to conduct the research. The surroundings looked neat and the lawns well kept but compared to other SOEs in a similar category, the premises did not look like a professional building. The offices were clusters of about ten buildings within the same compound.<sup>33</sup> Most of the buildings were bordered on one side by an open verandah supported by iron rods. The buildings looked old. Some of them appeared to be in a poor condition but there was some evidence of renovation on others. The interiors looked newer than the exteriors. Later I was told that renovations were being carried out with grants allocated to the corporation for the restructuring.

Each department within the corporation occupied at least one cluster of buildings. Larger departments occupy two or more buildings. As I walked on the verandah, I noticed that some offices had their doors and windows shut while others were ajar. I later learnt that those offices that were shut either had computers and, therefore, required an air-conditioned environment or they belonged to departmental heads or middle-level managers. The rest of the employees, whose work did not require the use of computers, work in offices with or without fans. The heat becomes a significant issue in a place where the average daily temperature is about 30 degrees Celsius with high levels of humidity.

The heat sometimes affected productivity. A middle-level manager, Mr Odei, told me that before the installation of an air-conditioner in his office, he was unable to work most afternoons, especially when it was very hot. For male junior officers it was difficult to adhere to the official dress code, which is a shirt and a tie, when there was no cooling system in their

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<sup>33</sup> I learnt later that some of the buildings are occupied by other government agencies.

offices. Some employees who were uncomfortable with wearing ties in the heat refused to comply with the official dress code.<sup>34</sup> I witnessed an incident which further confirms the refusal of some employees to wear the tie due to the heat. While sitting in a waiting area to meet with a member of management, a junior employee entered the room and was not wearing a tie. When the member of management came out, he jokingly demanded to know why the junior employee was not wearing his tie. The member of management reached out to touch the collar of the junior employee's shirt in an attempt to put something around his neck although he had nothing in his hand. When the member of management left, the employee with whom he had the encounter said he felt uncomfortable with the tie on, because unlike their superiors, his office was not air-conditioned. Therefore, he could not be formally dressed in his tie and work in an office full of heat. The junior employee's refusal to adhere to the official dress code can be interpreted as a sign of resistance to directives from senior staff who work in more comfortable work environments.

Mr. Panyin, a junior employee who has worked with the corporation for over 20 years, is concerned with the heat not only because of the discomfort associated with it, but, more importantly, the damage it might do to the drawing materials. He pointed out that: "If you go to some drawing offices at other places, they have air-conditioners to protect the material. They actually have a nice office [but here] they concentrate on the heads" (Interview Transcript, p.106). Not only does the heat problem highlight the poor condition of the building and the physical environment at the workplace, it also provides hints about

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<sup>34</sup> Some of the male employees cited financial reasons for not wearing a tie. They argued that unlike the women whose uniforms are subsidized by the corporation, they do not receive any subsidies to purchase their ties.

the power structure and the benefits of being a senior staff. The more powerful you are the cooler your office is. This situation is typical of all government establishments in the country. I can only speculate that the reason why all offices are not equipped with a cooling system is because of the shortage of resources. The corporation chose to provide a cool environment for the senior staff and those who use such office equipment as computers.

Commenting on the state of the building, the managing director later remarked that their current accommodation was meant to be a temporary structure, but that it had become permanent for lack of finances to put up a permanent office building.<sup>35</sup> Aside from financial reasons another problem that prevented the construction of a new building was limited decision-making powers at the organizational level before the restructuring. While the corporation would have wanted to build a permanent office building in the past, it was impossible since they depended on financial support from the state for their development projects. With changes in its mandate from a state-subsidized entity to a commercially viable corporation, the management intends to build a new office complex to house the corporation. Also, management plans to rent out spaces in the proposed office complex to other organizations. According to the managing director, the proposed project would be financed solely from the corporation's own resources. This would have been impossible before the restructuring since the corporation did not generate enough revenue to support its projects.

Research suggests that organizational restructuring with its concomitant of layoffs and new ways of organizing work often created an atmosphere characterized by tension at the workplace. On my first visit to Cityline Corporation, however, I did not sense any such

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<sup>35</sup> During my fieldwork, some geodetic engineers came to survey the ground for its suitability for a proposed office complex.



tension, perhaps because my interaction was mainly with members of management. On subsequent visits, however, I became aware of the existence of some tension after conversations with a junior employee. He warned me that the junior employees might be unwilling to talk with me for fear of reprisals. His assertion was confirmed during the focus group discussion when Mr. Benuaku, a senior employee, said the lack of any form of organized action against the restructuring programme was due not only to the use of organizational space to negotiate private business, but also to the firing of some employees in the past after an industrial action.

During the individual interviews, however, some junior employees were vocal about their discontent with aspects of the restructuring programme. Ms. Hansen, who was unhappy about layoffs, and the rehiring of some laid off workers on a contract basis, said she was not afraid to speak out for fear of dismissal. She said: "Some people fear because they would be laid off, but I don't fear. If only I know I'm on my right path. I would not be harsh on you but if what I feel is right I would say it." (Interview Transcript, p. 62) This sentiment was shared by other employees. But most of the employees who were outspoken about their discontent with the restructuring programme had been with the corporation for 20 years or more. It appears that their long years of service and their age made them feel relatively confident about saying anything compared with their colleagues who have been with the corporation for a shorter period. Besides, older employees could easily approach their superiors probably because most of them were with the organization long before their superiors were hired. It was obvious that some workers were not happy about aspects of the restructuring programme. Their discontent, however, did not translate into organized protests against the changes. The reasons for their reaction are discussed in Chapter 7.

## **Summary**

**This chapter focussed on the context of the study. It sets the stage for the data analysis by describing the situation at the corporation before and after the restructuring, the reasons for the changes, and concrete steps taken by the corporation to redefine its role. For the World Bank and the Ghanaian Government, the restructuring programme at Cityline Corporation is an attempt to make the corporation more efficient by withdrawing government subsidies and allowing market discipline to prevail. The workforce rationalization which includes job reclassification and an end to periodic promotions are also aimed at achieving efficiency. However, looking at the restructuring programme from a Foucauldian perspective, I argue that the process involved in achieving these goals is producing a disciplined government and corporation, and a different kind of tenant. This is the focus of the next chapter.**

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **The Disciplinary Effects of Policies in the Restructuring Programme**

#### **Introduction**

In 1981 the World Bank published a report called *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action*, popularly known as the Berg Report, after its principal author Elliot Berg. The report examined the causes of the economic decline in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in the 1970s and recommended a number of policies that African governments must implement in order to address the problem. The recommendations are: “(1) a more suitable trade and exchange rate policies; (2) increased efficiency of resource use in the public sector; and (3) improvement in agricultural policies” (World Bank, 1981, p. 5). These proposals became the basis for the IMF and World Bank-sponsored Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) implemented by various Governments in the sub-region since the early 1980s.

The PNDC Government implemented Ghana’s adjustment programme in 1983. Commenting on the state of Ghana’s economy before the implementation of the SAP, the World Bank (1984) points out that the Ghanaian economy has been deteriorating since the 1970s. It attributes the decline to poor domestic policies and adverse external events such as poor commodity prices on the international market. Addressing the problem required fundamental changes to the country’s economic policies including exchange rate and public sector reforms. The SAP was implemented in several phases and the World Bank notes that:

Careful sequencing and phasing of the adjustment process is essential in the case of Ghana and the process of adjustment should entail three phases: (a) stabilization phase; (b) rehabilitation phase; and (c) liberalization and growth phase.<sup>36</sup> The first phase should result in reduction in price distortions, the second in improving the capacity utilization of existing capital assets and the third in trade liberalization and reducing government intervention in the economy.... The ... reforms constitute part of an economic recovery programme designed to...correct structural imbalances. (World Bank, 1984, p. xvii)

A major aspect of the of the SAP is the State-Owned Enterprises Reform Programme (SOERP). On the importance of reorganising the state enterprise sector, two World Bank experts, Mary Shirley and John Nellis (1991),<sup>37</sup> point out that:

To optimally allocate the resources of a country, governments with significant state-owned enterprise sectors must increase market forces.... Refashioning the policy environment to build a more open and competitive overall economy lets governments lighten their own administrative burden and simultaneously improve overall efficiency by applying market tests of viability and performance to its firms; it can allow or force nonperforming state enterprises to close, while carefully transferring many viable ones to the private sector, and grant more autonomy and entrepreneurial flexibility to those that remain public. (pp. 5-6)

In the above quotes, the World Bank and two of its experts, offer straightforward solutions to the country's economic problems in general and the state enterprise sector in particular. These policies appear rational and appropriate considering the magnitude of the country's economic problems. But a look at the quotes from a Foucauldian perspective reveals a different picture. It shows that these measures are more than economic policies, they also function as a discourse. This means that the policies in the SAP are a set of ideas that produce a specific reality (Foucault, 1972) about the country's economic problem. The SAP discourse provides a lens through which we can understand what is real about the

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<sup>36</sup> The three phases are not distinct due to overlaps in the implementation process (World Bank, 1984).

<sup>37</sup> Although Shirley and Nellis prepared their report after the SOERP was initiated in Ghana, they relied heavily on World Bank documents including their own work. Documents that outline the policies and the guidelines for implementing the SOERP.

country's economic situation, thus influencing what we can "see and ... say" (Foucault, 1994, p. xii). This discourse has created a space within which Ghana's sick economy can be located and treated to recover. The classification of Ghana's economic performance since the 1970s as poor and the economic structure as imbalanced represents a system of power relationships because "discourse transmits and produces power" (Foucault, 1990, p. 101).

To analyse the SAP as a discourse raises the following questions: What gives the World Bank the right to offer solutions to countries with financial problems? How does the language used in both quotes affect our perception of the economic problem? What rules are embedded in the quotes? What power/knowledge practices are evident in the policy prescriptions in both quotes? How does this power operate in both visible and subtle ways? Answering these questions involve focussing on the discursive practices or the institutional mechanisms by which the discourse operates. According to Foucault (1977) "discursive practices are characterized by the delimitation of the field of objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of the norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories" (p. 199). I begin by looking at the World Bank and the source of its power and legitimacy.

The World Bank is the most influential development finance institution in the world. Since it was founded at Bretton Woods in 1944, it has set the agenda for international development, first by supporting the rebuilding of Europe after World War II and later in other parts of the world, mainly in developing countries. Its influence is both financial and intellectual.

Financially, it serves as an intermediary between other regional banks such as Asian Development Bank and African Development Bank; commercial banking and financing

institutions; and international development agencies such as the Canadian International Development Agency and the International Development Association (Payer, 1982). The World Bank identifies and designs the projects that require funding and convinces these institutions to channel their loans through it. Effectively, the lending institutions do not have a lot of clout when it comes to the design, implementation, and supervision of the projects because these functions are executed by the World Bank.

The Bank disburses most of its loans through bidding. Most of these contracts are often won by multinational companies and experts from the west. The Bank does about \$60 billion a year in loans to developing countries. An estimated 80 per cent of this amount goes to the multinational companies and the experts (Escobar, 1995). This means that most of the money for projects in developing countries flows back into western economies.<sup>38</sup>

It also coopts any possible rival institution that is established to compete with it. For example, many developing countries saw the establishment of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in 1978 as an alternative to the World Bank because they controlled its agenda. But the World Bank coopted its new rival by signing a cooperation agreement with it and the IFAD has since funded World Bank projects (Payer, 1982).

In the intellectual realm the Bank commissions its experts to prepare reports which it uses for its policies in developing countries. The Bank views these reports as the most

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<sup>38</sup> One issue that the western media does not raise during discussions about foreign aid is that most of the aid is reinvested indirectly in the economy of the donor countries because the contracts are won by western-based companies and experts. For example, as part of the SOERP in Ghana, CIDA sponsored a programme to train the management staff of some SOEs. Some of the trainees in the petroleum industry came for a short summer course at the University of Alberta. They spent the money allocated for the project here in Canada and the expert professors who taught them were also paid. Although they may have acquired some knowledge, the financial resources that were disbursed in foreign aid were more beneficial to the Canadian economy than to the Ghanaian economy.

objective and rational economic policy documents that the developing countries should have to adhere to. An example of such reports is the Berg Report (World Bank, 1981) which became the basis for the SAP in Sub-Sahara Africa. The authority of the Bank to make statements about economies in the sub-region is bound up with its location within the global economy. This authority cannot be dissociated with the legitimacy that it receives from donor agencies and other international banks. Thus, the intellectual and financial aspects of the Bank's power are inextricably linked. As Payer (1982) puts it, "the intellectual hegemony of the Bank complements, and is dependent upon, its financial hegemony" (p. 17).

The operation of the World Bank's power through the SAP discourse is not simply about a powerful institution oppressing powerless nations, since the discourse cannot have effect without the participation of countries. Thus, a complex network of power relationship emerges at various levels in the implementation of the SAP. The language of the discourse is crucial to understanding how the Bank's power operates. I examine the two quotes at the beginning of the chapter, one by the World Bank and the other by its experts, Mary Shirley and John Nellis, to illustrate this point.

The language used in the quotes at the beginning of the chapter about the SAP and the SOERP create a specific reality about Ghana's economic problems. For example, in the quote on the SAP, the World Bank points out that the expected outcome of the various implementation phases is a reduction in price distortion, improving capacity utilization, liberalizing trade, and reducing government interference. These anticipated results suggests that the country's economic problems stem from such factors as poor domestic policies, price controls, trade protectionism, and government interventionism. But these are not the only causes of the problem. The World Bank (1984) recognizes that there were "adverse external

effects”(p. xv) such as a falling commodity prices on the world market. But the expected outcomes in the quote makes no reference to external outcomes. This omission is crucial to the functioning of the discourse because one way in which discourses influences what we can understand and interpret as real is by what they do not talk about. Thus, by concentrating on domestic policies and ignoring the external dimension, the SAP discourse presents a narrow view of the country’s economic problem and prescribes a solution that is amenable to this perspective.

The language of the second quote, by Shirley and Nellis (1991), also suggest a specific view of the reality about the economy and the SOE sector. To argue that an increase in market forces is germane to optimum allocation of economic resources means that the problem lies with Government policies that curtail such practices. According to this point of view, not only do these practices burden governments but they also make SOEs inefficient. This narrows the source of the problem to Government policies. But is it only state-owned businesses that are inefficient?

Apart from influencing “what can be thought and said” (Escobar, 1995, p. 40) both quotes outline policy initiatives that must be implemented in order to tackle the problem. These policies represent what can and cannot be done. For example, the various phases of the adjustment programme—that is, stabilization, rehabilitation, and trade liberalization and growth—not only represent the stages of the implementation process, but they constitute the rules embedded in the discourse. The same applies to the prescriptions for the state enterprise sector.

The various measures that the Government is required to implement—for example, allowing or forcing nonperforming SOEs to close, transferring viable SOEs to the private



sector,<sup>39</sup> and providing autonomy to those that remain public—all represent the rules of the discourse. These rules are categories that construct government participation in the economy as irrational and an increase in market forces as rational. Market forces may already be operational in the economy but from the perspective of the World Bank and its experts this may not be right so long as the Government remains a major player. The government has to abide by the rules in the discourse and increase market forces because this is the right way to organize and manage an economy.

Rules set standards by which performance can be measured. These standards govern individuals or groups to whom the rules apply. The standardization of the rules also makes them seem rational. For example, the SAP has three phases: the stabilization; rehabilitation; and liberalization and growth phases. The Ghanaian Government must implement all of these if it wants to achieve economic growth. The same applies to the SOERP. As stated by Shirley and Nellis (1991), governments with significant SOE sectors must liquidate unprofitable SOEs, privatize viable ones, and restructure those that will remain state-owned. These are universal policies that apply to all governments irrespective of their socio-economic, political and historical conditions. Underlying the standardized nature of these policies is the assumption that the SOERP is an objective universal science. This perceived scientific nature of the policies gives them a semblance of a truth.

*The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary* (1990) defines truth as “agreement with fact” (p. 1059). But Foucault (1980) views the concept differently. His perception of truth is not

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<sup>39</sup> The idea of transferring viable SOEs to the private sector is ironic. But this irony is a reflection of the discourse. The discourse constructs government participation in the economy as the wrong way to create and manage an economy. So that even when SOEs are profitable they must be handed over because is not governments' business to be in business.

about integrity, honesty or facts. Instead, he conceptualizes truth as something that society constructs.

Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint.... Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. (1980, p. 131)

In other words, truths are ideas or values that a society or individuals accept as legitimate. However, it is not every idea that passes as truth. In order for certain ideas to be accepted as truths they must be based on a scientific discourse and be produced by certain individuals or institutions that society recognizes as possessing expert knowledge and therefore qualified to speak about certain topics. The expert knowledge which gives people the right to speak "constantly induces the effects of power" (p.52). Power only has effect when it produces truths that are accepted by society or individuals. This power cannot be exercised without the "functioning of the discourse" (p. 93) because discourse shapes our perception and interpretation of reality.

International institutions such as the United Nations, International Banks, and Western donor nations recognize the World Bank's expert knowledge on economic issues. The Bank's legitimacy gives it the right to speak about economic issues and formulate policies which recipient countries accept as the right way in which to organize their economies. These policies or rules in the SAP discourse then become truths because they influence the behaviour of Governments and shape the way in which they apprehend the reality about their economies. The Bank's power lies in the legitimacy of its ideas and the participation of Governments in the implementing the SAP. Thus, any government that

implements the SAP is allowing the Bank's discourse to function and therefore subjecting itself to the operation of its power. The Ghanaian Government not only adopted the SAP but it also followed all the policy measures for the SOERP discussed by Shirley and Nellis (1991). In fact, there are striking similarities in the language used in the World Bank's documents on the SOERP and the Government's own documents prepared by the State Enterprises Commission. This regularity in statements establishes a regime of truth about the SOERP.

Ghana's SOERP has a liquidation, privatization and a restructuring component. This study deals with the restructuring component which grants more autonomy and entrepreneurial flexibility to SOEs. The aim of the restructuring programme at Cityline Corporation is to make it efficient and profitable (Ministry of Works & Housing, 1991). Achieving these goals entail granting the corporation autonomy and reorganizing its internal organizational structure. Considering the corporation's poor financial performance before the restructuring, these policies may be perceived as the logical approach to address the problem. But I argue that these seemingly rational economic policies are not neutral because the institutional practices in the restructuring programme are transforming the Government's function in relation to the corporation, changing the mandate and business practices of the corporation, and redefining the corporation's policies with regard to the tenants. In other words, the policies are producing a certain kind of Government, corporation, and tenants. The formation of these subjects is possible because of the power relations embedded in the discourse.

These power relations "are often invisible precisely because [the policies] are seen as rational" (Escobar, 1995, p. 105). In this chapter, I unravel and explain these practices. I

draw on texts such as interviews and government documents to show the institutional practices involved in the functioning of the discourse. The chapter has three sections. The first part examines how granting Cityline Corporation autonomy is producing a disciplined Government. The disciplinary effect of the internal organizational changes, such as the introduction of performance contracts and workforce restructuring, is the focus of the second section. The final section is about the people who rely on the corporation's services or consume its products: the tenants. The move toward market structures in order to create a profitable corporation is also producing a different kind of tenant.

### **Producing a Disciplined Government**

As pointed out by Shirley and Nellis (1991), improving efficiency at SOEs requires granting them more autonomy. This involves the implementation of policies at Cityline Corporation that would "increase the operational autonomy of SOE managers and ... clarify the allocation of responsibility and accountability for SOE performance" (State Enterprises Commission, 1995, p. 1). Autonomy for SOEs touch on such issues as decisions to hire or lay off staff; price discrimination and control; operational autonomy; and loans and cash transfers or subsidies.

### **Undergoing Change**

Before the restructuring programme, the management of Cityline Corporation, like the management of other SOEs, had no authority to hire or discharge staff. Such decisions were subject to approval by the Government through its sector ministry, the Ministry of Works and Housing. A member of management at Cityline Corporation lamented that in the

late 1970s and 1980s when there was no money for projects, they could not lay off excess staff because the sector ministry was not in favour of such a decision. Granting the corporation autonomy gives management the authority to make such decisions. The World Bank (1991b) justifies this policy on the grounds that “over employment is one of the main reasons for PE [Public Enterprise or SOE] inefficiency” (p. 22). In 1991, the corporation had 615 employees (Ministry of Works and Housing 1991). This number was reduced to 465 in 1994 through layoffs (Cityline Corporation, 1994) and to 312 in 1996 (Cityline Corporation, Staff Position, May, 1996). For the experts, these layoffs were necessary to create an efficient corporation (Ministry of Works and Housing, 1991). But as I point out later in this section, this policy is about producing a certain kind of Government and a more rational workplace.

During the fieldwork, Mr. Brown, the head of a department, told me that he wanted to discharge an employee in his department who absented himself from work for several days without an explanation. But the Director of Administration told him that he could not proceed with his request because of certain provisions in the collective agreement with the local union. Mr. Brown’s desire to discharge the employee shows his acceptance of the World Bank’s discourse. At the same time the union’s reaction is evidence of their resistance to the discourse, an issue discussed in detail in the next chapter. But this incident illustrates the effects of language in the operation of a discourse. The way in which the World Bank presented inefficiency with regard to management’s inability to lay off inefficient workers probably influenced how Mr. Brown understood the source of the problem. By accepting this version of the Bank’s description of the perceived source of inefficiency, he was willing to implement the rules that would rid his department and the corporation of an employee who

engages in inefficient business practices.

Autonomy also touches on price discrimination and control. Because Cityline Corporation was originally established with a noncommercial objective, that is, to provide affordable housing, the rents that the corporation charges its tenants were controlled by the sector ministry. But World Bank's experts argue that this policy contributes to inefficiency because:

When state enterprises are required to keep prices artificially low, not only do budget deficits and debt grow and shortages worsen, but public and private investment decisions are distorted and the underpriced resources wasted. (Shirley and Nellis, 1991, p. 17)

With the restructuring, all rent increases are still subject to the sector ministry's approval but the corporation now has more leeway to recommend rents that are at par with or slightly below market prices. The corporation's relative autonomy to make pricing decisions is also because it is no longer obliged to fulfill its noncommercial objectives. It is now a commercial entity and required to pay yearly dividends to the state. The elimination of the corporation's noncommercial function became a flashpoint between the tenants and the corporation, an issue that is discussed in detail in this chapter and in Chapter 7.

Another issue that relates to autonomy for Cityline Corporation is management's ability to make business decisions. Before the restructuring, decision-making at SOEs was centralized at the sector ministries. The sector ministries did not allow them to "plan and manage basic business functions" (World Bank, 1991b, p. 20), such as corporate planning. At Cityline Corporation this meant that all business decisions had to be made in consultation with the sector ministry. Not only did this situation constrain management, but it gave some officials at the sector ministry the opportunity to interfere in the corporation's day-to-day

operations. Some Government bureaucrats, politicians and members of the military (during the military regimes) used the corporation to further their personal and political interests (Ministry of Works and Housing). Participants in my study cited instances when officials demanded houses without paying for them. These practices adversely affected the corporation's financial performance. The solution to this problem is to give management autonomy to make business decisions.

The final issue associated with autonomy is loans and cash transfers to the corporation. Since Cityline Corporation was established for noncommercial purposes, the Government guarantees loans that it obtains from banks and provides cash transfers as well. This financial assistance is a subsidy because the corporation passes it onto its tenants in the form of low rents. Although the Government has not provided any direct cash transfers to the corporation since the late 1970s, the World Bank and its experts find the framework that allows such practices unacceptable because of the financial burden that it places on the state (Shirley and Nellis, 1991; World Bank, 1991b). In a nutshell, granting Cityline Corporation autonomy in the restructuring programme requires it to operate at arms-length from Government bureaucrats and politicians. It also gives managers the freedom to lay off workers, seek lower cost suppliers, end unprofitable activities, and pursue new markets (World Bank, 1995). Management now has a free hand to "take actions that raise efficiency" (1995, p. 255). In theory, the above changes were supposed to make the corporation autonomous, but as I show in Chapter 7, these policies were not necessarily put into practice.

## **The Disciplinary Effects of the Change**

Giving Cityline Corporation the freedom to manage its own affairs is a judicious decision that few would question considering the negative consequences of government interference on the corporation before the restructuring. But when this policy is examined from a Foucauldian perspective a different picture emerges that hints at the World Bank's disciplinary power and the way in which it is producing a disciplined government. I have characterised the four issues relating to autonomy that I have examined above as discursive practices within the discourse. This is because they constitute the mechanisms through which the discourse operates. These policies on autonomy not only minimize the Government's participation at the corporation but also within the economy as a whole. If the Government, through the Ministry of Works and Housing, can no longer prepare the business plan or provide cash transfers then its role at the corporation is curtailed. This is the kind of government that the World Bank's policy hopes to produce. As stated in one of its documents, the goal of the liberalization and growth phase of the SAP is to reduce "[g]overnment intervention in the economy" (World Bank, 1984, p. xvii). But how could this seemingly realistic economic policy be producing a different kind of government? Looking at it through a Foucauldian lens, I argue that the SOERP is transforming the Government's behaviour because discourse "transmits and produces power" (Foucault, 1990, p. 101). This power operates in both obvious and subtle ways.

The conditions that the World Bank ties to its loans demonstrate an obvious way in which the Bank's power operates. All World Bank loans are subject to certain conditions. These conditions are standard practices such as preparation of periodic reports, audits and access which applies to all bank loans. But there are also special and policy conditions



(Toye, 1991). Special conditions are additional demands that the Bank makes on recipient countries, such as preparing extra project reports or a more elaborate form of accounting procedures. Policy conditions, however, refer to specific actions that the Government agrees to take to transform the economy (Toye, 1991b). These conditions can be coercive whether they are standard, special, or policy-oriented, since they outline what is expected of the Government should it accept the loans. For example, a government document on the SOERP states that: “The SOE Reform Programme is closely integrated with...conditionalities incorporated in the three IDA-financed structural adjustment credits (SAC I, 1987; SAC II, 1989; and SAC III, 1991)” (State Enterprises Commission, 1995, p. 12). Some specific policies that the Government is required to implement as part of the SAC I and II include:

Divestiture of 30 PEs [Public Enterprises] in the first phase of a rationalization programme, sector-wide staff reductions...preparation of up-to-date audited financial statements, medium term corporate plans, and performance agreements with Government...design and implementation of a performance monitoring and evaluation system..., and a review of the legal and institutional arrangements with a view of increasing PE autonomy and clarifying the respective roles of the SEC, MFEP [Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning], sector ministries and sector commissions...vis-a-vis the PE sector. (World Bank, 1991b, p. 17)

These are the conditions that the Government agreed to when it accepted the loans. Therefore, the Government is obliged to carry out specific policies or forfeit the Bank’s financial assistance. The power that was in operation during the negotiations may be characterized as sovereign power because it exercised it directly over the Government, giving it the option to either accept or reject the loans. It compels countries that receive World Bank loans to implement specific policies even if there is no evidence that such policies are efficacious. This is the kind of power that most analysts use in describing the Bank’s relationship with recipient countries.

But when one looks at the effect of the discourse in terms of how the Government is changing its policies in relation to granting Cityline Corporation autonomy, an invisible power relation emerges. From a Foucauldian perspective, I characterise this type of power as disciplinary power (Foucault, 1979; 1980). It operates when individuals or groups, change their behaviour to conform to a specific discourse because they know that they are being watched. By implementing the Bank's recommendation at the corporation, the Government is participating in the production and circulation the Bank's power.

Disciplinary power operates by means of surveillance. Surveillance is evident in the SOERP through the government's own monitoring mechanisms such as periodic reports that the State Enterprises Commission prepares on the sector's performance. One such report (State Enterprises Commission, 1995) provided a review of the SOERP from 1984 to 1994 and presented recommendations for 1995 to 2000. This report presents a general overview of the SOERP and the list of the SOEs participating in the restructuring programme. It also documents the overall financial performance of selected SOEs between 1987 and 1994. The Bank analyses this report and others that the Bank's resident representative prepares to determine whether or not the Government is following the rules of the discourse.

These Government-sponsored reports, which are then forwarded to the World Bank, provide the framework for "the examination" (Foucault, 1979, p. 170). The examination is a disciplinary technique that involves gathering information about the object of power and using this information for the purposes of governing. The information achieves two goals. It provides the Government with progress report about the performance of the state enterprise sector and meets a requirement in the loan agreement with the World Bank. Therefore, the reports provide the World Bank with information about the restructuring programme and the

SOERP on an ongoing basis. These reports turn the Government into an object of the World Bank's knowledge because they detail the policies that the government has implemented and the outcomes. The Bank then uses this information to evaluate the Government's performance to ensure that it is conforming to the rules of the discourse. The results of the evaluation determine whether it rewards the government by releasing more loans to support the ongoing adjustment programme or punishes it by withholding cash for noncompliance. Thus, the reports are "a means of control and a method of domination. [They are] no longer a monument for future memory, but a document for possible use" (Foucault, 1979, p. 191). The World Bank does not gather the information on the performance of SOEs for its own sake. Instead, it uses the knowledge to manage and regulate government policies.

The reports also make the Government visible to the World Bank and this visibility places it under surveillance (Foucault, 1979). The Government continuously examines its own conduct to ensure that it conforms to ideas in the discourse because it knows that it is being watched by the Bank. This process involves some self-training. The Government must change its behaviour with respect to policy-making in the state enterprise sector. It must give SOEs operational autonomy and stop the transfer of all subsidies. This self-examination and the consequent change in attitude to conform with the discourse are what Foucault (1988) calls technologies of the self. Technologies of the self is a disciplinary technique that makes individuals change their behaviour either on their own or with the help of others. It involves evaluating one's own behaviour "through the acquisition and assimilation of truth" (Foucault, 1988). The concept of self examination helps us to understand how the Bank's power operates through everyday practices such as documentation. Self examination is an ongoing process that makes the Government examine its own conduct to ensure that it has

accepted the truths in the restructuring discourse. This involves changing how it perceives and thinks about the economy, changing its policies to conform to the truths in the restructuring discourse, and constantly taking stock of its behaviour to ensure that it has assimilated the truths. Not only is the Government the object of knowledge but it is also the subject of power because of its participation in the functioning of the discourse.

Evidence that the World Bank is indeed using reports provided by the government to evaluate its performance is represented by *Bureaucrats in Business* (1995), a World Bank report on the SOERP in selected countries including Ghana. The document is based on data provided by the respective countries and other institutions such as the United Nations and the IMF. The report addresses various aspects of the SOERP including autonomy for SOEs. The Bank did not single out Cityline Corporation in examining this issue, instead it focussed on the restructuring programme in the entire country. It grouped the countries in the study into three categories: better performers; mixed performers; and poor performers. Ghana was in the category of mixed performers. But with regard to autonomy, the Bank's conclusion is that overall SOE managers now enjoy more autonomy than they did before the restructuring programme. This means that the Government is changing its attitudes to conform to the Bank's policies.

The final chapter of the report titled "Implications for Foreign Assistance" focuses on the rewards and punishment for compliance and noncompliance. In this chapter the Bank "*suggests that foreign assistance follow a different course of action in countries that are ready to reform from those that are not*"(World Bank, 1995, p. 259).<sup>40</sup> In other words,

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<sup>40</sup> Italics in the original.

countries that have demonstrated the desire to reform by following the rules should be rewarded with more financial assistance, and those that have not should be punished by withholding or limiting future financial assistance. Interpreted within a Foucauldian framework, the Government's consciousness about the possible reward or punishment for compliance or noncompliance makes it transform and improve its behaviour to conform to the Bank's rules.

Therefore, giving Cityline Corporation operational autonomy, the authority to hire and lay off staff, and the withdrawal of subsidies, is about creating an efficient corporation. But the policies are producing a disciplined government—one that is transforming itself through training because it is under the panoptic gaze of the World Bank. The periodic reports constitute apparatuses of social control that influence the Government's attitudes and behaviours towards the corporation. But the Government did not fully comply with requirements granting Cityline Corporation autonomy. Some government officials made decisions contrary to this policy and limited the management's ability to make certain business decisions. I interpreted this as an act of resistance to the rules of the discourse which I explore in Chapter 7.

The Government is both the object and an instrument of the World Bank's power, because it is responsible for monitoring the functioning of the discourse at the corporation. To this end, "the World Bank included government contractual obligations as covenants in its loans for SOEs in Ghana" (World Bank, 1995, p. 128). In the next section, I examine the institutional practices within the SOERP that is producing a different kind of corporation than the one that existed before the restructuring. Also discussed is how the Government is meeting its contractual obligations with the Bank to monitor the performance of SOEs.

## **Producing a Disciplined Corporation**

Embedded in the restructuring policy that grants Cityline Corporation autonomy are rules about ways of organizing the corporation's operations. According to the State Enterprises Commission, "the principal strategy for improving the efficiency and productivity of...SOEs...has been the introduction of systematic corporate planning, disciplined and monitored through annual performance contract agreements" (1995, p. 80). Therefore, the preparation of corporate plans and the signing of performance agreements are crucial to the functioning of the discourse at the organizational level.

Corporate plans provide information about business operations within a specific period. It is one of the functions that the World Bank required the sector ministry to transfer to the corporation through the granting of operational autonomy. Cityline Corporation prepared its first corporate plan in December 1993 for the three-year period, 1994-1996. The plan "seeks to emphasize principally [the corporation's] commitment to the culture of systematic planning and control, target setting, performance measurement and evaluation" (Cityline Corporation, 1993, p. iv). The corporate plan also outlines the corporation's mission statement and its objectives and strategies. The objectives focus on specific aspects of the corporation's operations including production and marketing, revenue collection, growth, productivity, and human resources. The systematic planning, control, and target-setting provide the framework for achieving efficiency while the various objectives specify how targets will be achieved. The corporate plan not only represents a rational way of organizing the corporation, it also shows the functioning of the restructuring discourse at the organizational level. The World Bank required the Government to transfer this function to the corporation and it complied.

Also included in the corporate plan are mechanisms for monitoring efficiency, that is, performance measurement and evaluation. These monitoring mechanisms are contained in performance contract agreements that the sector ministry and the State Enterprises Commission signed with the corporation on behalf of the Government. Performance contracts are “negotiated agreements between government and SOE wherein quantifiable targets are explicitly specified for a given period and performance measured against the targets at the end of the period” (World Bank, 1995, p. 171). Specifically, performance contracts contain the goals of SOEs or a mission statement, indicators of performance and annual targets, obligations of Government, incentives for achieving the goals, and reporting requirements (State Enterprises Commission 1995; World Bank 1991b). Performance contracts are important mechanisms for legitimizing corporate plans (World Bank, 1991b) because they make SOE managers take seriously, the contents of corporate plans.

Cityline Corporation’s obligations in the performance contract are contained in its corporate plan.<sup>41</sup> The management and senior officers like the idea about preparing corporate plans. For example, Mr. Benuaku, a senior officer, states that:

What I like about [the restructuring] is the fact that now we seem to be more organized than before. Previously, we did not have a document like the corporate plan.... So things were in arbitrary fashion. But now we have a corporate plan which we are using to *organize ourselves*<sup>42</sup> and to plan the future on periodic basis. (Interview Transcript, pp 78-79)

The above quote demonstrates that they have accepted the preparation of the corporate plan as the right way to organize their operations. This reaction gives the corporate

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<sup>41</sup> I did not have access to the corporation’s performance contract but the Managing Director confirmed its existence.

<sup>42</sup> Italics added for emphasis.

plan “a solidity and a normality which it is often difficult to think outside of” (Mills, 1997, p. 54). Their acceptance of the discourse is probably influenced by the language of the discourse which shaped how they apprehended the situation. The quote also shows that they are using the corporate plan to *organize themselves*. This is an example of technologies of the self. They are assimilating the truths of the discourse by changing their work practices to conform to the discourse. They no longer do things in arbitrary fashion, instead they are changing their work practices to conform to the discourse. Therefore, they are participating in the construction of their subjectivity and ensuring the effects of power on their bodies.

The acceptance by management and senior officers of the corporate plan does not necessarily mean that the World Bank’s consultants (one of whom was still in management at the time of the data collection) imposed this way of thinking on them. Their reaction could be a combination of factors, including institutional pressure and the intrinsic nature of the discourse (Mills, 1997). The discursive apparatus of the discourse is such that it separates an acceptable statement from one that is not (Foucault, 1980). Their reaction is probably as a result of the way in which the experts spoke about the problem. This made them perceive the issue in light of the utterances being made.

The reporting requirement in the performance contract obliges SOEs to present quarterly reports to the State Enterprises Commission within four weeks after the end of each quarter. The report is expected to include an operating statement showing actual performance against budget for the quarter, approximate earnings, cash flow and report on the achievement of agreed performance targets (State Enterprises Commission, 1995). At Cityline Corporation, the Department of Finance is responsible for preparing these reports. The Director of Finance describes the monitoring mechanism while explaining what his



**department does:**

**We prepare budgets, forecast, then monitor the performance of the corporation in financial terms and production terms.... Then monitoring of the budget and preparation of monthly reports, weekly reports, quarterly reports, bringing out variances and analysing variances, then reporting to the appropriate heads to take remedial action. (Interview Transcript, p. 384).**

**Based on these reports the Department of Finance then prepares the corporation's quarterly reports which are forwarded to the State Enterprises Commission and the sector ministry. The submission of these updates about the corporation's operations is crucial to monitoring its performance because the monitoring system that existed before the restructuring was very weak. In fact, the authors of the corporation's pre-restructuring diagnostic report "identified the lack of financial information as a serious weakness of [Cityline Corporation's] current operation" (Ministry of Works and Housing, 1991, Section 105). This view is reiterated by the Director of Finance. In an internal document prepared in for the corporation (Cityline Corporation, 1994), the director pointed out that when he assumed his position in October 1991, the latest audited accounts for the corporation was for 1987. These weaknesses reveal the wrong way of doing things since they made it difficult for the Government to keep track of the corporation's performance. The new reporting procedures are more than a set of policies designed to address the weakness in the system they also show the operation of disciplinary power by making business practices which were somewhat invisible before the restructuring now visible to the Government.**

**The preparations of the quarterly reports constitute a ritual of confession. Although confession is associated with religion, the practice is manifested in other spheres of life including medicine, education, family relationships, interviews, television talk shows and**

in autobiographies. Confession played an important role in Foucault's work on the penal systems and on sexuality. Work practices provide another example. A confession is "any statement, to a person in authority, which is regarded as a full account of motives, actions and events relating to behaviour which is regarded as untoward" (Hepworth and Turner, 1982, p. 85). Confessions are aimed at discovering a truth that the subjects of power possess. The subject always confesses to an authority who verifies the truth and passes judgement on the knowledge that is provided (Foucault, 1990).

Cityline Corporation is engaged in a ritual of confession when it presents its quarterly reports to the government, which is represented by the State Enterprises Commission. The reports provide the commission knowledge about the corporation's actions in the preceding quarter. The confession is the main ritual that the commission relies on for the "production of truth" (Foucault, 1990, p. 58). The identity of the corporation either as efficient and profitable, or inefficient and unprofitable, is determined by the truth that it tells about itself. This confession, however, is not voluntary since the preparation of the reports is a requirement in the performance contract. The production of truth through confessions occurs within a relationship of power.

For one does not confess without the presence (or the virtual presence) of a partner who is not simply the interlocutor but the authority who requires the confession, prescribes and appreciates it, and intervenes in order to judge, punish, forgive, console and reconcile. (Foucault, 1990, pp. 61-62)

The State Enterprises Commission the authority to whom the corporation confesses and the "master of truth" (p. 68). It examines and verifies the information to ensure that it is the truth. The veracity of the information in the reports depends on the obstacles that the corporation has to overcome in preparing the report. The State Enterprises Commission may

examine the day-to-day accounting records, the targets in the performance contract, details about how they were achieved and specific explanations for deviations where they exist. It then uses the reports to pass judgement on the corporation's performance. The power relationship that exists between the Government and the corporation through the ritual of confession is so invisible that even the World Bank does not recognize its effects. Commenting on governments' and SOEs' commitment to performance contracts, the Bank notes that "none of the contracts specify an enforcement mechanism in the sense of a neutral third party, insulated from politics, with the power and information to compel both parties to comply" (World Bank, 1995, p. 128). This quote makes reference to the absence of a third party who will ensure that both parties adhere to conditions in performance contracts. It is obvious from this comment that the effect of disciplinary power eludes the World Bank too. It does not recognize that disciplinary techniques embedded in the discourse may be as effective as the presence of a neutral third party who may be physically present, as a referee, but his/her recommendations may be ignored by both parties, especially by the Government.

The knowledge that the reports provide about the corporation becomes the basis for rewarding it for good performance or punishing it for poor performance. The management and staff receive bonuses if they meet or exceed their targets and get punished for poor performance. The State Enterprises Commission does not specify the nature of the punishment that will be meted out to the management of underperforming SOEs, but a member of management pointed out that "when we make losses for 3 consecutive years, the whole management will be sacked" (Interview Transcript, p.11). The incentives for management and staff in the performance contract make human resources an important aspect of the functioning of the discourse. In the rest of this section, I examine the work

practices that have been implemented to achieve efficiency. The discussions highlight the employees' role in accomplishing this goal, the processes involved, and their disciplinary nature.

### **Producing an Efficient Workforce through Administrative Restructuring**

Creating an efficient and a profitable corporation also requires significant changes to what the State Enterprises Commission (1995) characterized as “inappropriate workforce structures and work practices”(p. 77). Replacing these structures involves the “rationalization of work force structures” (World Bank, 1991b, p. 2) including job reclassification and the reform of pay and grading systems. Speaking about the pre-restructuring structures as inappropriate is just one way of perceiving problems with SOEs. But when this utterance comes from the World Bank and its experts, the State Enterprises Commission would have to agree that those structures are incompatible with business practices in the new rational economy that is being created. Rationalization of the work force is therefore a new way of seeing, speaking and organizing the workplace. The institutional practices associated with creating a rationalized workplace are changing the conditions under which the employees work. The workplace is being transformed from unproductive and abnormal into “a productive, normalized, [work] environment” (Escobar, 1995, p. 156). The practices that are needed to achieve a rationalized workplace are job reclassification and evaluation, performance appraisal, and teamwork.

## **Changing the Inappropriate Structures and Practices**

A task force established by the State Enterprises Commission and funded by the World Bank under the SOERP to study SOEs, identified a number of inappropriate workforce structures and work practices. They include:

- Inadequate job descriptions;
- Functionally meaningless distinctions in job or position titles that make effective work supervision very difficult;
- Inadequate procedures for determining job classification and remuneration; and
- Inadequate criteria and procedures for performance review and appraisal. (State Enterprises Commission, 1993, p. 1)

The above problems are not different from those identified at Cityline Corporation. This is how the Administrative Management Consultant, whom the World Bank hired to reorganize the workforce structures, described the situation at the corporation when he arrived:

There was a hierarchy, assistant this, assistant that. They attempted to describe what each of these positions involved and it wasn't quite satisfactory to me. For instance...the Principal Estate Officer assists the Chief Estate Officer in the execution of his functions, the Senior Estate Officer assists the Principal Estate Officer and so on, to the Assistant Estate Officer. I didn't find that satisfactory....It existed throughout the corporation, from department to department. (Interview Transcript, p. 374)

The above quote raised issues pertaining to inadequate job descriptions and meaningless distinctions in job positions or titles. Before the restructuring, all of the corporation's employees were divided into three broad categories: management; senior officers (middle-level personnel); and junior officers. There was a Managing Director, who was also a member of management. The rest of the members of management were heads of departments and they had the title "Chief". For example the head of the Accounting Department was called Chief Accountant. The senior officers within each occupational

category had such titles as Supervisors, Assistant Accountant, and Assistant Estate Officer. The junior employees were also grouped similar to their senior counterparts with such grade level distinctions as Senior Draughtsman, Assistant Draughtsman and Draughtsman.

Another issue that the task force touched on was inadequate criteria for determining job classifications. There was no clear mechanism for job classification before the restructuring but the participants claimed that it was based on educational qualifications and experience.<sup>43</sup> Also, the criteria for evaluating employees' performance were unclear, but there were periodic promotions. Theoretically, the system of promotions was based on performance. In practice, however, they were periodic and based on years of service. The periodic nature of promotions led to proliferation of grade-levels within the hierarchy. For example, if management decides to promote workers every five years, they did so even when there was no change in the job description of the workers being promoted. So if Ms. Y is a clerical officer grade 3, she will be promoted to clerical officer grade 2. But the promotion would not necessarily lead to a change in her job description. This is what the task force referred to as meaningless distinctions in job titles and positions. The lack of job distinctions and the proliferation of job titles created artificial salary distinctions with no job differentiation. The result was apathy among employees. In addition to these organizational problems, salaries were low. This caused some employees to carry-out other income earning activities during business hours (Ministry of Works and Housing, 1991)—an issue I examine below.

The proposed solutions to the above problems include:

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<sup>43</sup> There was no official document indicating the criteria used for job classification before the restructuring.

- Comprehensive review and revision of enterprise job descriptions and classification;
- Consolidation of workforce positions into job groups relevant to the enterprise so as to reduce proliferation of meaningless positions;
- Systematic evaluation for the purposes of individual placement on reformed salary scales; and
- Establishing and maintaining systematic procedures for performance review and appraisal. (State Enterprises Commission, 1993, p. 2)

These solutions are part of the workforce rationalization at Cityline Corporation. All jobs within the corporation have been reviewed and reclassified. Positions have been consolidated to reduce the proliferation of grades. For example, all draughtsmen are just plain draughtsmen. There are no longer grade-level distinctions that distinguished a senior draughtsman from his junior counterparts. Each employee's performance is also evaluated periodically using a performance appraisal form. This form has detailed information on targets for the year and a rating system that determines if employees have met average expectation, most expectations, or exceeded expectations. These solutions are designed to make the corporation efficient and profitable. However, a look at these policies from a Foucauldian perspective shows that there are power/knowledge practices embedded in them. In addition to transforming work practices, these policies also constitute disciplinary techniques that are making the workers known and governable (Townley, 1994).

### **The Disciplinary Effects of a Rationalized Workforce Structure**

The operation of the World Bank's power and its effects pre-dates the implementation of the rationalization process. It began with the Diagnostic Study. The study was conducted by a well-known international consultancy firm and funded by the World Bank Urban II Project (Ministry of Works and Housing, 1991). The metaphor, "diagnostic"

that is used to describe the pre-restructuring study fits perfectly into how discourse operates. The World Bank characterized the state enterprise sector as sick. Then it paid its experts to visit SOEs and locate the disease that is causing them to malfunction. After putting Cityline Corporation under the gaze, they were able to locate the problem. Their prescription for treating this sick corporation is contained in the recommendations that became the blue print for the restructuring programme. These recommendations happen to be similar to the World Bank's diagnosis of problems with SOEs in other developing countries. This means that the findings of the diagnostic study are not neutral because they are filtered through the World Bank's policy lens and fits into its broader economic objective of economic liberalization.

This diagnostic study provided knowledge about the corporation that became the basis for the restructuring. According to Foucault (1980), knowledge is the exercise of power since "the exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces the effects of power" (p. 52). One of the sources of data for the study was the staff of Cityline Corporation, mainly management and senior staff. It was the exercise of power that led to the collection of the information from the employees about the corporation but it did not end there. The information that the consultants collected provided knowledge about the workers and their work practices. This information was then used to ensure the hold of power by the implementation of the restructuring programme.

The implementation of the restructuring programme required more knowledge about the employees because the Diagnostic Study only provided general information about the corporation and its work practices. The technique used in knowing the workers is called the art of distributions (Foucault 1979). Foucault used this approach to examine schools, the penal system, and workplaces. But he focussed on the pre-twentieth century workplace.



Others, like Townley (1993a; 1994), have adopted a similar approach in examining the present day workplace. I draw on Townley's work to analyse disciplinary mechanisms in the restructuring programme. Two techniques of the art of distributions applied in understanding the restructuring of Cityline Corporation are enclosure and ranking. Enclosure is a specific geographic location while ranking is the place an individual occupies within a hierarchy (Foucault, 1979).

Enclosure, as used in this context, refers to the difference between official and unofficial business and the disciplinary effects of such a distinction. The aim of analysing work enclosure at Cityline Corporation is not to ascertain its efficiency. For example, it is not to determine whether policies in the programme about work enclosure are efficient, accurate and reflect reality, but rather a Foucauldian perspective enables us to understand how and why boundaries are imposed, maintained and breached (Townley, 1993a).

### **The Enclosure of Work at Cityline Corporation**

Enclosure is a disciplinary technique because discipline sometimes requires locating individuals within a specific geographical space (Foucault, 1979). Foucault characterized the 18<sup>th</sup> century workplace, specifically factories and manufacturing spaces, as enclosures because the buildings were walled and gated. The gates are opened:

Only on the return of the workers, and after the bell that announces the resumption of work has been rung; a quarter of an hour later no one will be admitted; at the end of the day, the workshops' heads will hand back the keys to the Swiss guard of the factory, who will then open the gates. (Aboise quoted in Foucault 1979, p. 142)

Such a measure was designed to get maximum productivity from the workers and to avoid inconveniences that may be due to work interruptions and theft (Foucault, 1979).

While many of the workplaces that Foucault described as examples of enclosures have either disappeared or have been modified the “conceptual enclosures they help erect still remain” (Townley, 1994, p. 26). Thus, enclosure is used in this context as an analytic concept to distinguish between official and unofficial business.

Low salary was one of the problems that the consultants identified. They concluded that this situation “distract[ed] staff to undertake other income earning activities in [Cityline Corporation’s] time” (Ministry of Works and Housing, 1991, section, 1029) thus further eroding efficiency. Employees’ pursuits of these activities were possible partly because of regulations governing corporation-tenant agreements and the professional background of most of the employees.

According to the corporation-tenant agreement, all remodelling of property either owned or rented within the corporation’s acquisition area is subject to its approval. Property owners who wish to do remodelling present their application to the corporation in person. Applicants who do not already have someone to do the technical aspects of the remodelling request for assistance from the corporation’s technical staff, comprised of masons, carpenters, architects and surveyors. The negotiation often takes place at the workplace. Some workers carried out these unofficial businesses during official business hours. The employees who participated in the study confirmed the existence of the problem but added that they were involved in such practices because there was not much work for them to do at the time.

With the restructuring, however, steps have been taken to address the underlying cause of the problem: low salaries. Between 1991 and 1994 salaries were increased by 104 per cent (Cityline Corporation, 1994). Supervisors closely monitor employees’ activities to

ensure that they complete tasks assigned to them on schedule. The monitoring process is facilitated by the seating arrangement in most offices. For example, in the technical section, the staff is located in large offices and their seating arrangement is such that workers' activities can be monitored by the supervisor who sits facing them. The windows on the offices are such that workers are visible to anyone walking in the hallway. This seating arrangement is not different from what existed before the restructuring. The difference with the restructuring, however, is that the workers know that their activities are being monitored and that any violations will be punished. The workers modify their behaviour because they know that there are being watched. For example, when I asked the participants if they do other jobs to supplement their income most of the technical staff responded in the affirmative. But they insisted that the job was not done during business hours.

Mr. Tim: Yes, I do, but not in the office. (Interview Transcript, p. 188)

Mr. Boye: Oh yes, as for jobs, yes. We handle some private business on our own accord. Not in the office. (Interview Transcript, p. 193)

What we see here is an admission that they do other income generating activities. But they always ended the answer by indicating that they did not do it in the office. Their response not only demonstrates a modification of behaviour or an attempt to do so, but it could also be an attempt to say the right things because they know that they are being watched. Their compliance could also be heightened by the fact that most of them were aware that there was likely to be another round of layoffs and they did not want to jeopardize their jobs by giving the impression that they perform unofficial business at the workplace.

The seating arrangement in the office, the workers' visibility from the hallway, and the fear of layoffs puts the workers into "a state of consciousness and permanent visibility

that assures the automatic functioning of power” (Foucault, 1979, p. 201). Their compliance draws them into the network of power relation which involves the World Bank, the Government and the management. But as I discuss in the next chapter, the compliance was not total.

There is a gender dimension to the above discussion. Although some of the women on staff said they also carried out income generating activities to supplement their income, they either did petty trading or typing. Only one female employee admitted that she typed exams for elementary schools but she never meets her clients at work or type at work. The rest of the women who do petty trading do not do it at the office. The gender difference exists because of the technical nature of the men’s jobs. This means that male employees are more likely to feel the disciplinary effects of the enclosure than their female counterparts.

### **Job Reclassification and its Power/Knowledge Practices**

Another element of the rationalization process that is embedded within power/knowledge practices, which have disciplinary effects, is the comprehensive review of job classification and the consolidation of jobs to reduce the proliferation of meaningless positions. There was a comprehensive review of all jobs through a system of job evaluation. Job evaluation is a systematic way to determine the relative value of jobs which in turn is used to create an equitable pay structure (Pendleton, 1996). Job evaluation attempts to rank jobs based on their relative value or importance to the organization (Townley, 1994). There are two main types of job evaluation schemes, the non-analytic and the analytic. Non-analytical approaches to job evaluation compares whole jobs against each other, such as comparing so-called “female jobs” with “male jobs.” The analytic approach uses a point

rating system. With this system, each job is broken down into constituent factors such as skill, job knowledge, and mental knowledge. Each factor is assigned points. In the end all the points are tallied and the jobs ranked according to the total points. The process also involves describing the job, choosing compensable factors, rating jobs based on these factors, assigning proportional value to each factor to get the total points for each job, and using the points to determine pay or salaries (Pendleton, 1996). Because of its quantitative nature it is often referred to as the quantitative job evaluation method (Townley, 1994). All jobs at Cityline Corporation were evaluated using the analytic approach.

The Administrative Management Consultant compared all jobs to determine the relationship of each position to other positions within the corporation. In doing this the consultant said he “determine[d] the relative value of jobs or ...compared [each job] with all other jobs in the organization” (Interview Transcript, p. 374). Based on this comparison he arrived at two categories which he classified as supervisory and non-supervisory. Supervisory jobs range from middle-level management personnel to the managing director while the non-supervisory positions are junior staff jobs. Next the consultant classified the jobs into classes using compensable factors in order to assign a salary scale to each (Townley, 1994). Examples of compensable factors used for non-supervisory jobs at Cityline Corporation included educational qualifications, previous experience, responsibility for tools and equipment, hazards, visual/mental concentration and job responsibilities.<sup>44</sup> These factors determined how each job was assessed relative to the others. The choice of factors was influenced both by the corporation’s objectives and by the factors that it value and wished

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<sup>44</sup> A sample of the criteria for the job evaluation is in the appendix.

to reward (Townley, 1994). Job evaluation is a system of ranking employees.

A rank indicates a person's place within a social organization. It corresponds to that individual's role in relation to the whole (Foucault, 1979). This is how the Management Consultant viewed the importance of ranking:

As the head of administration [I am] responsible for all human resource issues and they range from making sure that ... people had job descriptions so that each person doing a job in the corporation knows what his title is and what he is supposed to do. It also implies that [I]...put in place an organizational chart so [I] know how each department and even [how] the corporation as a whole is organized. (Interview Transcript, pp. 391-392)

The above quote shows that the essence of job classification is to know what each employee does in relation to others within the corporation. It also indicates that ranking involves classifying workers to accomplish specific tasks which are based on such factors as skill and ability.

This system of organizing jobs may appear neutral because it represents a means of classifying the workforce to accomplish tasks, however, these are not "self-evident analytical divisions" (Townley, 1994, p. 30). From a Foucauldian perspective, the process is a technique of power that makes it possible for the management to supervise each employee. The power operates through the formation of "*tableaux vivants*", (Foucault, 1979, p. 148). *Tableaux vivants* is a mechanism for ordering individuals into different hierarchies or levels of organization. This is demonstrated in the workplace by the arrangement of employees in a hierarchy that may be based on their knowledge or ability or any other criteria used by the employer (Townley, 1994).

As indicated in the above quote by the consultant, his goal within this context is to know how each department and the corporation as a whole is organized. But since it is

individuals who constitute these departments, one can argue that the process is designed to know each employee's position within the corporation. This ordering of the population enables management to supervise the employee because they know their location within the organizational hierarchy.

Jobs can also be classified using two systems of comparison called *taxinomia* and *mathesis* (Townley, 1994). Taxinomia is from the English noun taxonomy which is a method of classifying living organisms, in this context, workers. Mathesis refers to how order is established through measurement. Both mechanisms:

Provide for the arrangement of identities and differences into ordered tables and create a grid, a configuration of knowledge, which may be placed over a domain. There is an analytical distribution of identities and differences which separate and unite things. They state the conditions under which it is possible to know things. Both procedures define a relation, stating what is to be associated with what. They allow things to be placed in relation to one another, establishing relations of equality and difference. They constitute systems of recording, classifying, and measuring, and in doing so they provide the basis for the operation of governmentality.<sup>45</sup> (Townley, 1994, p. 32)

The analytic system of job evaluation illustrates how taxinomia and mathesis are used to assign numeric value to jobs (Townley, 1994). Both concepts further our understanding of how the job classification system provides the conditions for management to locate and supervise each employee. The compensable factors such as education qualifications, previous experience, visual/mental concentration and job responsibilities that the consultant used in classifying the employees constitute taxinomia. These factors are also used to assign quantitative factor points, which is mathesis. The consultant assigned factor points based on

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<sup>45</sup> Foucault coined governmentality when he conducted research into governmental rationality (Gordon, 1991). "Governmentality is about how to govern" (p. 7). Government, as used by Foucault refers to "a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons....Government as an activity could concern the relation between self and self, private interpersonal relations, involving some form of control or guidance, relations within social institutions and communities" (p. 2).

the relevance of the compensable factors to the corporation. In assigning the factor points, the consultant notes that “the corporation might say that as far as operations are concerned, responsibility for materials is the most critical of all these factors, so we will award it say 20 or 30 per cent” (Interview Transcript, p. 375).

It is worth noting, however, that taxinomia and mathesis are not just classification schemes. They also are disciplinary techniques and power/knowledge practices which create divisions. These divisions enhance the employer’s ability to know employees’ location within the organization. This is how Mr. Afari, a member of management, described the benefits of the job reclassification:

[Formally] there were a lot of people and for one particular activity we would have more than 2 or 3 people who were likely to do that job. So everybody was looking up to somebody. In the absence of clear cut job descriptions for everybody, there was that kind of, Kwesi will do it, or Kojo will do it and in the end nothing was done. But now you are there and you know what you are supposed to do and there is work for everybody to do. (Interview Transcript, p. 124)

This quote shows that while in the past it was a challenge to determine what each employee did, “making effective work supervision very difficult” (State Enterprises Commission, 1993, p. 1), this is no longer a problem because of the job reclassification. The change also allows for the operation of governmentality because members of management are now aware of each employee’s job description. This helps them better manage the workforce. The employees are also aware that their activities are being monitored because of a performance appraisal system which has been implemented as part of the rationalization process.



## **Performance Appraisal**

Performance appraisal is a strategy for developing performance criteria for a job and for evaluating employees' performance based on these criteria (Townley, 1994). Before the implementation of the restructuring programme, Cityline Corporation, like other SOEs in the country had "inadequate criteria and procedures for performance review and appraisal" (State Enterprises Commission, 1993, p. 1). The solution to this problem is the establishment of a performance review and appraisal system as part of the workforce rationalization process. This process is presented in the restructuring discourse as a normal way for the corporation to function. But the practices involved in the performance appraisal are not as neutral as they appear. An analysis of the process reveals its disciplinary effects. The process constitutes "the examination" (Foucault, 1979, p. 184).

The examination is a disciplinary technique that combines hierarchical observation with normalizing judgement. This technique "is a normalizing gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible to qualify, to classify and to punish. It establishes over individuals a visibility through which one differentiates them and judges them" (Foucault, 1979, p. 184). Individuals or people who are subjected to the examination become objects of knowledge because their actions are being studied. The knowledge assures the hold of an invisible form of power—disciplinary power. These individuals are aware that they are under surveillance and this makes them discipline themselves. I draw on a sample of the performance appraisal form and interviews to demonstrate how this disciplinary power operates, and the kind of worker that it is producing.

Figure 4 is a sample of Cityline Corporation's performance appraisal form. It represents the construction of the ideal worker. Although it has a rating guide that shows

gradations of performance, ranging from excellent to mediocre, the idea of evaluating employees presupposes that there is a standard for measuring every worker's performance. Every good worker is expected to strive to measure up to the ideal. The existence of the form fits into the goal of the restructuring programme because producing an efficient and a profitable corporation requires the kind of worker that the standards on the form represent.

The performance appraisal form has a top section that requires such basic personal information as employees' name, position, title, staff number, department, job class, and

Figure 4

CORPORATION  
**MANAGEMENT/SENIOR STAFF END-OF-YEAR PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL FORM**

Name: \_\_\_\_\_ Appraisal Year: \_\_\_\_\_  
Position Title: \_\_\_\_\_ Job Class: \_\_\_\_\_  
Staff Number: \_\_\_\_\_  
Department: \_\_\_\_\_ Section: \_\_\_\_\_

**PART I: RATING GUIDE**

- 5 = Exceeded all expectations
- 4 = Met all expectations
- 3 = Met most expectations
- 2 = Met average expectations
- 1 = Met minimum expectations
- 0 = Did not meet expectations

**PART II: PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT**

**JOB OUTPUT:** (This refers to the individual's actual performance in relation to set targets or performance standards)

Rating:  5  4  3  2  1  0

**Reasons for rating:** (Give specific evidence or highlights of actual accomplishments during the year).

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

**PART III: ASSESSMENT OF JOB COMPETENCIES:**

Rate the individual on 6 competencies relevant to the individual's job during the year.

1. **Competency:** \_\_\_\_\_  
(This refers to \_\_\_\_\_)

Rating:  5  4  3  2  1  0

**Reasons for rating:** (Give specific evidence of demonstration of this competency)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

2. **Competency:** \_\_\_\_\_  
(This refers to \_\_\_\_\_)

Rating:  5  4  3  2  1  0

**Reasons for rating:** (Give specific evidence of demonstration on this competency)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

3. **Competency:** \_\_\_\_\_  
(This refers to \_\_\_\_\_)

Rating:  5  4  3  2  1  0

**Reasons for rating:** (Give specific evidence of demonstration of this competency)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_



section. The personal information identifies employees and “introduces individuality into the field of documentation” (Foucault, 1979, p. 189). Each worker is now constituted as a case and an object of study by his/her superiors. The data makes the employees visible and situates them in a field of surveillance. These codes that identify them as individuals mark the “first stage in the ‘formalization’ of the individual within power relations” (p. 190).

Part one of the form provides a rating guide for evaluating workers performance within a given period. The rating guide is in a descending order from 5 to 0. Five means exceeded all expectations; zero means that expectations were not met. This guide is very quantitative. Its quantitative nature gives credence to the “numerical view of reality” (Townley, 1993b, p. 229), which may be perceived as scientific and therefore accurate. But this perceived objectivity can be problematic as demonstrated on many instances at Cityline Corporation. Many of the employees, including members of management, questioned the perceived objective nature of the process. Few questioned the system. It is the implementation process that most of them find problematic. Mr. Able, a member of management, points out that:

The appraisal system has been scientifically developed.... There are no two ways about it, it is fine. But my problem is with errmm it looks as if people who appraise their subordinates do not do it the way they should. They do not understand it.... I could see when we started that people were just giving 5. Five means he has exceeded all targets [but] the goal was not even achieved. So I ask myself how can one go beyond 100 per cent because to me 4 [means] ... met all expectations. (Interview Transcript, p. 388)

Thus, the quantitative nature of the rating guide does not necessarily mean that the process is objective. The rating guide also suggests that the ideal worker must exceed all expectations. But the quote above implies that if employees are evaluated objectively, it may

not be easy to meet such a standard because a worker must go beyond 100 per cent to measure up. Such a high standard will constantly make employees who strive for this goal work harder.

The rating of each employee is based on targets set at the beginning of every appraisal period. This is how Mr. Jonah, a member of management describes it:

We appraise people on targets. For instance at the beginning of the year, I call all my supervisors and give them targets. We agree on targets. You should be able to complete this thing within a year. And then some of them have even been broken [down] into quarters and then from time to time if you have any problem why you think you cannot meet your target, you come, we would discuss and make necessary adjustment. So at the end of the period ... I only have to pick your file, look at the targets we agree [on] and look at it and see whether you were able to meet your targets or not. (Interview Transcript, p. 332)

The heads of departments set targets with the supervisors who in turn meet with their immediate subordinates and do the same. The heads of departments and the supervisors can now watch and evaluate the performance of their respective subordinates based on the targets.

Part two deals with the measurement of actual performance while part three focuses on the characteristics that contributes to the overall job output in part two. Part three is divided into six segments, each with specific job competencies. The supervisor provides detail description of each competency and measures it against the set target. These segments provide details about what it means to do a good job or to be a productive worker. These detail descriptions are central to the examination because breaking the process into different segments makes every aspect of the job description visible. This process is associated with “the formation of knowledge [and] a certain form of exercise of power” (Foucault, 1979, p. 187). The knowledge that is acquired in the process is used to differentiate and grade them

according to the rating guide.

The supervision at various levels within the corporation makes the appraisal process similar to the Panopticon (Foucault, 1979). The Panopticon is an architectural prison system created by Jeremy Bentham. It has two main features: a tower; and buildings surrounding the tower. The buildings are divided into cells. Each cell has a window that allows for the surveillance of the cells. The Panopticon enabled the prison guard in the central tower to continuously observe inmates without supervising them directly. The effect of the Panopticon is:

To induce in the inmate a state of consciousness and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its actions;... that the architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers. (Foucault, 1979, p. 201)

The Panopticon can be applied to help understand the supervising process at Cityline Corporation. The supervisors may not be situated in physical structures similar to the Panopticon, but their position within the administrative hierarchy makes it possible for them to observe and evaluate their subordinates. The workers are visible to the supervisors because the identifiable codes on the performance appraisal form makes each employee an individual case. The effect of this visibility is that the workers internalize the consciousness of being watched. This consciousness ensures the automatic functioning of power because the workers discipline themselves by virtue of the knowledge that their actions are being watched.

The supervisors may not watch their every move but the targets that are set at the

beginning of the year makes them work harder. This is how a senior officer, who is also a supervisor, describes it: “somebody would have to monitor your activities to achieve something.... Now I have targets to achieve at the end of the year or the period. Previously, it wasn’t like that.... That is what makes me more committed to the system than before” (Interview Transcript, p. 67). In other words, without the targets nothing can be monitored. But with the targets he has become more committed to work because he knows that his performance is now visible to his superior. The workers are involved in the power situation by subjecting themselves to following the rules to meet their targets because they know that their performance is under the gaze of their superiors.

Disciplinary power functions as a network and not just from the supervisors to the workers because the supervisors are also “perpetually supervised” (Foucault, 1979, p. 177) by members of management. Hence they also have to work hard to meet their targets since they are also subject to surveillance. Thus, it is the entire *panoptic apparatus* that produces the power. The production and functioning of this power is made possible by the participation of the management, supervisors, and the workers in the functioning of the discourse.

The gradations of performance assessment, in part two and three of the performance appraisal form, are the means of measuring the gaps and placing workers into hierarchies (Foucault, 1979). When employees are rated four, three or lower then it means that there are gaps in their performance in comparison to those ranked highest or in relation to the ideal worker. The hierarchical ranking is also used for the purposes of rewards and punishment. At Cityline Corporation, the scores from the ratings on the performance appraisal form are summed and converted into cash awards. Mr. Able, a member of management describes the



process: “after appraising them departmentally, they [are all sent ] to administration where they translate these into scores [and] percentage scores. Each percentage [of] that score has got a financial side [to] it” (Interview Transcript, p. 388). These rewards are visible to the employees because they know about their performance appraisal from their superiors.

Just as there is a reward for good performance, there is also punishment for poor performance. Although some workers said they work hard in order to avoid being part of any future layoffs, the type of punishment being meted out does not necessarily lead to dismissals. The art of punishing within this context falls within the “regime of disciplinary power” (Foucault, 1979, p. 182). Employees who are ranked lower on the job competencies have gaps in their performance and they may strive to reduce the gaps by working harder to improve their ranking. This is a corrective form of punishment. Disciplinary power operates when the workers strive to improve their performance in order to meet the expectations that produce the ideal worker constructed by the performance appraisal form. Thus, this regime of disciplinary power is not aimed at repressing but rather it “*normalizes*” (Foucault, 1979, p. 183) the worker. In other words, the punishment is about making the workers measure up to the standards set by the discourse. This involves working hard in order to narrow any gaps that may exist due to past sub-standard performance.

Part four of the performance appraisal form requires general comments and the signature of the appraiser, the appraisee, and the head of department. This is how Mr. Red, a senior officer, describes it:

The accumulation of this points gathered at the end of the year would determine...my time management, my initiative, [and my] ability to organise the place well. He [the head of department] would at the end of the year assess me.... In the past it was confidential but this time they would call you to sit down with them and then discuss [it] with you. They would give you whatever [they] have

awarded. If you have any questions or criticisms about your awards there is a portion, you can also state [what your reasons are]. (Interview Transcript, p. 304)

Not only was the performance appraisal system that existed before the restructuring inadequate but it was also confidential. Workers did not have access to the criteria used to evaluate their performance. With the restructuring, however, the process has become transparent. There is even a column for them to state their disagreements with the appraisal or any concern that they might have. Disciplinary power operates where there is visibility. When the process was secretive, the employees did not know the details about the procedures required to receive a good assessment. Consequently, they could not fully put into practice the behaviours and attitudes that would help them achieve this goal.

The interview aspect of the appraisal is an example of this transparency. The supervisor or appraiser and the appraisee meet to discuss the latter's performance. Implicit in this process is an "assumption of 'objective' information external to the appraiser and appraisee, accessible through the appraisal process, the truth of which is more likely to be discerned by the appraiser" (Townley, 1993b, p. 230). The competencies that are assessed on the performance appraisal form represent this truth. A manual for a workshop on the strengthening of workforce management, prepared by the State Enterprises Commission (1993) states the following about appraisal interviews: "Don't take the standards of performance for use as a check sheet. The standard of performance is your evidence for the traits that you have appraised. It gives you 'for instances'" (p. 51). The appraiser is told here that s/he has the evidence that can be used to point out specific instances of performance. This evidence is presented as the truth that can only be determined by the appraiser.

The interview process may be designed to give the employees the chance to comment

or challenge their appraisal but the process is also a disciplinary technique. The appraisal interview has a confessional aspect which exemplifies the operation of disciplinary power. This type of “power cannot be exercised without knowing the inside of people’s minds, without exploring their souls, without making them reveal their innermost secrets. It implies a knowledge of the conscience and an ability to direct it” (Foucault, 1982, p. 214). The confessional involves the appraisee making self-assessments and discussing this with the appraiser. The State Enterprises Commission’s (1993) manual on strengthening workforce management states that: “To make the discussions more meaningful, every appraisee should try to appraise himself/herself before the meeting. This self appraisal should be based on the objectives and targets expected to be achieved during the assessment period” (pp. 51-52).

The essence of the discussions is for the appraiser to “access hidden knowledge” (Townley, 1994, p. 117) about the employee. Employees supposedly have some information hidden from the appraiser that has to be revealed. The appraiser assumes the role of the confessor in order to get access to this information. The State Enterprises Commission’s (1993) manual encourages the appraiser to listen during the interview. It states that “ask questions. This is the way you listen. Every chance you have to make a speech, ask a question. The most unfavourable climate you can create is where you make a long speech on when you<sup>46</sup> were starting out in the company” (p. 51). The appraiser is required to listen and discouraged from talking. S/he can only ask questions, probably probing questions that elicit more secrets from the appraisee.

The appraiser then plays a role which is similar to that played by the leader of a

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<sup>46</sup> Emphasis in the original

religious institution that practice's confession: the appraiser counsels the appraisee. The manual states: "every manager should see performance appraisal as complementing counselling, i.e. part of a continuous process to promote the improvement of current activity" (State Enterprises Commission, 1993, p. 51). After the appraisee reveals the hidden knowledge about his/her performance, the appraiser provides counselling based on the information that is provided. The process is aimed at helping the appraisee to do self-training in order reduce the gaps in his/her performance. The disciplinary nature of this process is individualizing (Foucault, 1982). By confessing to the appraiser and self-training to improve her performance, the employee is involved in the constitution of her own subjectivity. The process is no longer the dominator and the dominated. Rather, the employee is participating in the operation of the power embedded in the discourse willingly or unwillingly.

The confessional procedure also constitutes the production of truth about the appraisee that provides self-understanding (Townley, 1994). The confessional is "linked with a production of truth—the truth of the individual himself" (Foucault, 1982, p. 214). The production of this truth constitutes the ability of the employees to identify problems within their innermost beings that may be causing poor performance. After the truth has been discovered, here is what the appraiser is expected to do: "Establish development plans and controls, but don't force him to agree. He must want<sup>47</sup> to develop. A good appraisal interview helps him accept and want the programme you recommend"(State Enterprises Commission, 1993, p. 51). The revelation of the truth provides the appraisee with a better self-understanding which should be accompanied by the desire to change. This is probably why

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<sup>47</sup> Emphasis in the original.

the appraiser cannot compel the appraisee to change. The latter must be willing to do self-training and to identify what makes her an effective worker.

The above discussions on the gradations on the appraisal form, the specific job competencies and the appraisal meetings are more than a systematic appraisal process. They are power-knowledge practices that are producing a disciplined worker. The existence of the targets makes them aspire to meet these goals because the appraisal process makes them visible and their performance relatively easy to evaluate. When workers strive to meet their target, they are participating in the network of power relations.

Another aspect of the restructuring programme which emerged during the study is teamwork. Teamwork, however, was not in any government document on the restructuring programme. The only place where it appears is in the corporation's corporate plan, where it is characterized as a work value. I included it because the concept is in the corporation's corporate plan which is a requirement in its performance contract with the government. Next, I examine the concept as implemented at Cityline Corporation.

### **Teamwork: The Problem with "Empires"**

The hierarchical ordering of the workforce through job classification is crucial to the rationalization process because it enables management to locate each employee and determine their contribution to the corporation. During the early stages of the research, however, some participants mentioned teamwork as an element of the restructuring. This contradicts hierarchical ordering of the population. What was more confusing was that their explanation of teamwork was contrary to its current usage in the human resource literature.

Teamwork has assumed different meanings over the years. It was once "little more

than a number of people each doing similar tasks or even just pulling on the same rope, and thus combining efforts to achieve what could not be done by one person” (Sashkin & Sashkin, 1994, p. 9). But the ideas about improving the workplace put forth by advocates of socio-technical systems changed the meaning of the concept. In the 1950s these advocates argued for the need to design jobs that meet both the needs of employees as well as that of organisations (Shonk, 1992). This idea gave rise to teams as the basic work unit. Organisations that adopted the concept used teams for planning and decision-making. The team concept which adopts a horizontal system of decision making differs from the hierarchical structure put forward by Max Weber in his analysis of bureaucracy.

Although ideas about teamwork have been around since the 1950s they did not become popular until the 1980s and 1990s. The current impetus for teamwork is driven by two main goals: to contribute to productivity and to empower employees so they feel more committed to the organisation. Corporations began embracing the team approach to work because traditional hierarchical structures of administration were not flexible enough to respond quickly to changes in the marketplace. Teamwork also empowers employees to participate in the decision-making process, a feature that hierarchical structures do not necessarily provide (Shonk, 1992).

The meaning of teamwork at Cityline Corporation, however, differs from the above description. This is how some members of management and middle-level managers understood the concept:

First of all there should be a consensus among us. There should be a common goal towards which we all work. Then there are other aspects...there should be cooperation and understanding and we should be able to work as a team. (Interview Transcript, p. 27).

**Teamwork brings a series of ideas because two heads are better than one. Second, it brings coordination, in the sense that we have to set targets for ourselves. So the marketing man, [for example], would say I can market this number of houses within one year.... So we cooperate because at the end of the day we all want to win, and the bottom-line is the profit that we would make....Teamwork brings coordination. (Interview Transcript, p. 5)**

**My understanding of teamwork, is that, if there is a problem or an objective to be achieved, then, all must be involved in understanding the problem involved and the objective that has been set. So everybody's idea or effort counts. (Interview Transcript, p. 37)**

**Thus, teamwork at Cityline Corporation deals with consensus, cooperation, and working towards a common goal. Before examining the disciplinary effects of teamwork, I provide some context to the emergence and meaning of concept at the corporation.**

**The meaning of teamwork at Cityline highlights a problem that it was introduced to address—the lack of cooperation among employees and the absence of the same level of cooperation between departments. This is how Mr. Jonah, a member of management described what gave impetus to the introduction of teamwork:**

**In the past, I was told there were empires. Empires in quotes, were created here. For instance, Estates was an empire on its own, Development was an empire on its own, Administration was an empire on its own and so forth, with departments competing for resources within the same corporation. And we think that is not good because we are all contributing towards a common goal. If anything at all there should be cooperation, where it will be very easy for a supervisor from Accounts to walk to Estates and say I want the record on this tenant and he gets it very easily and vice versa....It use to be the case that somebody from Estates goes to Accounts for some information but he will never get it. Someone from Accounts goes to Estates [for information] and they will say I'm going to pay you back in your own coin, you can never have it. (Interview Transcript, p.17)**

**The competition between Accounts and Estate departments mentioned in the quote was an informal mechanism that some employees used to prevent their colleagues in other departments from carrying out their tasks. For example, it came to my knowledge during the fieldwork that some employees at the Estate Department benefited financially from their**

position more than employees in other departments because of their role within the corporation. The Estate Department is in charge of managing the corporation's residential, commercial, and industrial properties. This role makes them the first point of contact between the corporation and the public. There is a perception within the corporation that their position gives them unfair advantage over their colleagues in other departments with regard to direct access to clients. Due to this perceived advantage, some of their colleagues were unwilling to assist them when necessary. Employees with other departments, therefore, established their own informal "territories" which further led to the creation of what some participants described as "empires." The empires may not necessarily have anything to do with money but simply employees' attempts to play a power game.

The reasons that motivated them to create the empires have to be understood within a broader socio-economic context. The deplorable state of the economy led to a decline in real income and a high rate of inflation. Between 1971 and 1983, real income dropped by 80 per cent with the exception of 1972-4 when the trend was in the reverse (Rimmer, 1992, World Bank, 1984). This meant that salaries were low relative to the rate of inflation. Inflation rose from about 15 per cent in 1971 and peaked at about 120 per cent in 1978. It dropped again to about 30 per cent in 1981 peaked again at about 120 per cent in 1984 and dropped again to about 20 per cent in 1991 (IMF, 2000). Real income did not increase in response to the high and volatile rate of inflation and this pushed up the cost of living, causing people to adopt unorthodox survival strategies.

Some employees adopted subtle tactics to get the attention of the clients. For example, they delayed action on files. Desperate clients resorted to paying bribes in order to get their concerns addressed. The actions of some employees described above might create



**an impression that clients are always at the mercy of corrupt employees, but this is not always the case. In fact, some clients exploit the financial vulnerability of the workers for their own gain. For example, they offer employees money either to fast-track the solution to their problems or to ensure that files that have to be reviewed to resolve land disputes were not found. In describing how employees are sometimes used by their clients, Mr. Tettey, a senior officer noted that:**

**What normally happens is that, let's say this is your file, assuming we have a problem on it, maybe there is a problem with ownership between you and somebody else and the matter is being handled by the Legal Department or the Estate Department, an interested party, perhaps the other party, may pay money to somebody to hide the file so all that information which would be required to deal with the case would be [missing]....For example, when we give out land, we give conditions within which [tenants have] to operate. If they violate the conditions...we terminate the tenancy and the plot will be re-allocated to someone else. Maybe [ the former owner] would be aggrieved and may take the matter to court. Now the court would like to see the old file, to see what action went on to enable them to take a decision. This file can get lost. If the file is lost how can the court make a decision? (Interview Transcript, pp. 341-342)**

**Not all clients have ulterior motives for offering employees money. Some rewarded employees in cash or in kind in appreciation for their assistance. For example, a senior officer told me that some of the benefits he derives from his position are long-term relationships with clients he assists. Some of these clients, in turn, offer him financial assistance whenever he was in need.**

**According to Cityline Corporation's 1994-96 corporation plan (Cityline Corporation (1993), teamwork is a work value that is aimed at guiding the corporation in fulfilling its mission statement. The mission statement is a requirement in the preparation of performance contracts by all SOEs as part of the SOERP(State Enterprises Commission, 1995). This requirement makes teamwork an unstated goal of the restructuring programme. Teamwork,**

however, exerts disciplinary power since it involves changes in work practices.

Teamwork within this context is about cooperation, coordination, and working towards a common goal. The management included it in the corporate plan because they had identified the lack of cooperation as an anomaly that has to be corrected if the corporation is to be efficient. However, only the management and senior officers were aware of it but not the junior staff. A member of management recognised this problem and said: “I think we have a lot to do about teamwork here, I must confess. One training programme is going to be to take up that aspect very soon—working as a team” (Interview Transcript, p. 17).

The above quote also suggests that the employees have to go through a training programme to be taught how to cooperate and work towards a common goal. But training is a disciplinary mechanism. One aim of disciplinary power is “to train” (Foucault, 1979, p. 170). Training always involves a trainer, who also serves as a judge, and the trainees. The role of the trainer is to ensure that the trainees change their work practices. Training the employees to adopt teamwork is directed at correcting an anomaly at the corporation, that is, lack of cooperation. Therefore, the training is designed to change their everyday business practices that obstruct cooperation. Some senior officers and members of management seem to be changing their work practices accordingly:

Okay, I realised that bureaucracy, through this teamwork, has died out. Because presently, it is a matter of, if I have to channel a memo or a paper up somewhere...downwards somewhere, to another department, [it] normally takes time. Now with teamwork, I will only go to my colleagues in other departments and may be discuss the issues...and just go and brief the man at the top...so a procedure which would have taken two weeks will take 2 or 3 days and the objective is met. So teamwork is working. (Interview Transcript, p. 36)

The corporate plan is teamwork. It is not one person that brings change. We all decide that our way of doing things is not good so we all agree that there is the need for change. I'm referring to our culture, for example, what do we believe in? You see, we believe in teamwork.... Whatever we are doing, we have to put down//these

are [our] targets, these are strategies we are adopting. “So Mr. [X], what we have put on paper, are we on course”? If we are not on course, which area is bringing us down? We even make certain assumptions, [for example], we expect the exchange rate to be so and so, we expect the inflation rate to be so....we all contribute about the various objectives that we have. It might fall withing someone’s department but we talk about it. (Interview Transcript, p. 5)

Teamwork may not have eradicated red tape at the corporation but the changes described above are indicative of disciplinary power. For the senior staff, cooperation is a necessary step in achieving their targets, which are evaluated periodically. The performance appraisal process makes them conscious of being watched. Consequently, they strive to change their work practices to conform to the rules. Since the management, who are the trainers and the judges, are also being watched by the government, they do their best as a team to achieve their goals by changing their practices as well.

The effects of the restructuring programme are not limited to the government and the corporation, it extends to the corporation’s tenants. The move to create an efficient and a profitable corporation means changing it from a noncommercial entity into a commercial business. Next, I examine the effects of this change on the tenants.

### **Producing a Different Kind of Tenant<sup>48</sup>**

Cityline Corporation was one of many SOEs with noncommercial objectives operating in Ghana since the 1950s. Noncommercial objectives are reasons for establishing SOEs that are unrelated to financial returns. They include job creation, promoting development and boosting strategic sectors of the economy. The corporation’s role was to

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<sup>48</sup> The original research design did not include tenant interviews. With the benefit of hindsight, this was a miscalculation.

provide housing for the residents. Because of its noncommercial function, the Government supported its housing projects by providing financial assistance in the form of loan guarantees and cash transfers. The corporation passed on the Government's financial assistance to the tenants in the form of low rents. In short, the Government subsidized the rents.

This financial dependence meant that it was not autonomous. All major business decisions including rent increases were subject to government approval. But when the economy began to decline in the 1970s the Government could no longer support the corporation financially. By 1978 the government withdrew funds for capital projects. Hence the economic reform which includes the SOERP entails "policy reforms to ensure that PEs [SOEs] operate in a commercial manner, including decontrol of prices" (World Bank, 1991b, p. 16). In fact, Shirley and Nellis (1991), who are World Bank experts on state enterprises, point out that "a critical element of any reform in the state-enterprise sector is the move to market pricing where competition is possible"(p. 10).

### **Undergoing Change**

For Cityline Corporation, this policy means a transformation from a government-subsidized SOE into a commercial entity that pays dividend yearly to the Government. Some of the specific policies implemented as part of the commercialization process is the sale of rental properties, leasing land to private developers, and "charging of economic rents" (Cityline Corporation, 1993, p. vi).

The sale of rental units is called the controlled assets disposal programme (Ministry of Works and Housing, 1991), because the Ministry authorized the corporation to sell the

rental units to only two categories of people: tenants and institutions. Tenants could purchase their rental units as could institutions interested in purchasing the houses to rented out to their employees. But the houses could not be sold on the open market to the highest bidder.<sup>49</sup>

The corporation can also lease land to private developers. According to the Managing Director, the corporation initiated this policy in the 1980s, before the formal implementation of the restructuring programme, to support its operations after the government stopped providing financial support for capital projects.<sup>50</sup> This project became a major source of revenue for the corporation and was incorporated into the restructuring programme. The category of institutions that could lease the lots has been broadened. Before the restructuring, it was limited to government or quasi government institutions, but now members of the Ghana Real Estate Developers Association (GREDA) have been included.

Tenants who could not afford to buy their rental units have to pay “economic rents.” The new rents are expected be higher than current rates, a policy which is in line with the corporation’s new corporate mandate. The average rent in 1991 was 3,800 cedis.<sup>51</sup> Members of management pointed out that the price on the open market is about four times higher. In 1990 the corporation increased rents as it has done periodically in the past. But this increase was blocked by a court injunction brought by the tenants (Ministry of Works and Housing,

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<sup>49</sup> The Managing Director said he had been lobbying the Government to change the policy so they would be able to sell more houses to increase the corporation’s revenue but the Government had refused. The reasons are unclear. One can only speculate that the Government does not want individuals with the means to buy the houses, increase the rents, and evict tenants who cannot afford it.

<sup>50</sup> They leased out “unserviced” sites or lots without infrastructure, (for example, water, electricity, and drains) to prospective homeowners. The absence of infrastructure became an environmental problem. So the government issued a directive that all sites must be developed before they are leased.

<sup>51</sup> That is about \$US10 at 1991 levels. In 1991 the average exchange rate of the cedi to the \$US was 360 cedis to \$1.

1991).<sup>52</sup> This issue is discussed in detail in Chapter 7. Ultimately, these policies are aimed at creating a viable corporation that does not burden the government. But the change is also producing a tenant that is different from the one that existed before the restructuring.

### **The Effects of the Change**

The policy on the sale of the rental units reconstitutes the tenants as property owners. As I discussed in Chapter 5, private property ownership within the city is not new but this mass sale of rental units is producing a new category of property owners that have probably lived in their units for a long time and never would have been able to own it without this change. This may be advantageous to those who can afford it and disadvantageous to those who cannot. But the emphasis here is how the subjects are being reconstituted.

The tenants who cannot afford to buy their units have to pay a higher rent because of the commercialization. The subsidies that the tenants received before the change in policy in the form of low rents were designed to deal with social inequality. But the experts who prepared the corporation's pre-restructuring diagnostic study questioned this rationale (Ministry of Works and Housing, 1991). The critics point to the development of a squatter settlement outside Citytown as an example of a social inequality that the Government's subsidy policy has not addressed. Furthermore, they argue that most of the corporation's tenants either belong to the upper or middle class and therefore the Government's financial support to the corporation does not benefit the people most in need of social assistance.

While this criticism cannot be disputed, the solution is a representation of the SAP

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<sup>52</sup> Although the restructuring programme officially began in 1991 some of the policies such as the rent increases were implemented earlier.

discourse and does not necessarily address the problem of social inequality. This discourse is situated within the New Political Economy framework, a perspective that characterizes urban dwellers, especially those working in the formal sector, as a drain on governments (Bates, 1981:1990; Lofchie, 1994). Adherents of this perspective argue that governments make unsound economic decisions such as the provision of subsidies on goods and services that favour urban dwellers in order to consolidate their support-base. They claim that these practices discriminate against the rural population that produces a bulk of the exports in developing countries. The discrimination stems from policies that pay significantly lower prices to farmers compared to the prices of their produce on the world market. Governments then use revenue made from underpaying farmers to subsidize services in urban centres. The farmers either became less motivated to produce more or smuggled their produce through the underground economy for export, eroding the revenue base of governments (Bates, 1981; Lipton, 1976; World Bank, 1986). In Ghana, the government's poor pricing policy contributed to cocoa smuggling to neighbouring countries (Leechor, 1994).

As urban dwellers, Cityline Corporation's tenants constitute the population that is perceived to have benefited from such policies. The rent controls sheltered the tenants from the high rents charged by private property owners on the open market.<sup>53</sup> The policy of market pricing in the restructuring programme is changing the tenants from sheltered subjects to individuals who have to respond to market forces. Thus, although the pricing policy is aimed at creating an efficient and viable corporation, it is also producing a different kind of tenant.

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<sup>53</sup> The owners of privately owned properties have always charged prevailing market prices for their rental units despite a government rent control law that forbids them from increasing rents without approval from the Ministry of Works and Housing (Tipple, Korboe, Garrod, & Willis, 1999). Government-owned real estate corporations, however, did not charge prevailing market prices and could not increase their rents arbitrarily.

**This policy draws tenants into the network of power that is operating through the circulation of the discourse.**

**Other policies, such as the introduction of a new computerized accounting system and the closure of satellite offices in the subdivisions, which were implemented as part of the restructuring programme make it easier for the corporation to better monitor tenants to ensure that rents are paid promptly. Before the restructuring, the accounting system was not computerized. Also the Estate Department had satellite offices in most of the subdivisions where tenants could pay their rent and put in requisition for repairs. The Estate Department received the rent and forwarded the receipts to the Accounting Department to update tenants payment records. It took a longer time for the Accounting Department to reconcile tenants' accounts because they had to wait until they received the receipts from the Estate Department. Since the restructuring, the corporation has closed most of its satellite offices. Now tenants have to pay their rents at the corporation's main office. Mr. Able, a member of management, explained the reasons for the change:**

**The rationale behind was that there were too many of them [workers] scattered and looking at the rate of collections we realised that...if you are a tenant and you want to pay your rent...no matter the distance you would go and pay...so we realised that it would not make any difference....Erm, indeed that job itself is to me, a duplication of efforts....Before anybody is given a house, they have the necessary forms. They prepare an offer letter and a copy comes to accounts. What we do is to open ledger accounts. With the computers...accuracy will be enhanced and therefore we have to limit the level of human intervention. (Interview Transcript, p. 385)**

**While some members of the Estate Department are unhappy about the changes, the computerization of the accounting system helps the corporation to better monitor the payment records of tenants because they are now permanently visible (Foucault, 1979). To further enhance the monitoring system, a task force was set up in November 1991 to collect**



rent arrears (Cityline Corporation, 1994). This task force was found to be effective and has remained in action since. These changes ensure the hold of power because the tenants are constantly under surveillance. Thus, they will have to subject themselves to the new rules or face possible eviction. Therefore, while the restructuring discourse is aimed at creating an efficient and viable corporation, the rules embedded in it (such as market pricing) are producing a different kind of tenant than one that existed before the restructuring programme.

### **Summary**

In this chapter I have looked at the SAP as a discourse. The discursive practices of this discourse include the restructuring component of the SOERP. Drawing on Foucault's work on discourse and power/knowledge, I argue that although the restructuring of Cityline Corporation is aimed at creating an efficient and a profitable corporation, there are power-knowledge practices embedded in the process that are producing a disciplined government, corporation and tenants. The discussions highlight a complex network of power relationships involving the World Bank, the Government, the corporation and the tenants. The complexity of the power relationships goes beyond the binary view of power that characterizes the World Bank as oppressive and the recipient countries as victims. This is because the complex network of power relationships is produced by the active participation of the various parties in the functioning of the SOERP. Although the functioning of the power appears hierarchical, power is produced by the "apparatus as a whole" (Foucault, 1979, p. 177). Power is produced only with the participation of the Government, the corporation and the tenants.

However, the Government, the corporation, and the tenants are not necessarily acting out of free will, nor are their actions completely dominated by the World Bank because according to Foucault, there is a dialectic relationship between power and resistance (Wang, 1999). Therefore, “where there is power, there is resistance” (Foucault, 1990, p. 93). In the next chapter, I look for compliance to the rules of the discourse. I interpret the absence of compliance as resistance because if active participation in the functioning of a discourse produces power, then refusal to engage in the process thwarts the operation and effects of power.

## **CHAPTER SEVEN**

### **Compliance and Resistance**

#### **Introduction**

In the previous chapter, I examined the discursive practices of the restructuring programme and their disciplinary effects as well as the products of the discourse. However, in achieving these goals, the restructuring programme is producing a different kind of government, corporation, and tenants. Specifically, it is producing a non-interventionist government, a rationalized corporation, and tenants who are no longer sheltered from the free market by government subsidies. In this chapter, I focus on whether or not the actions of the subjects are in accordance with the rules of the discourse. The rules or the expectations of the various parties spell out what is permitted or forbidden. Since the full participation of the Government, the corporation, and the tenants are required for the discourse to be both “an instrument and an effect of power” (Foucault, 1990, p. 101) any actions by these parties that are contrary to expectations is resistance.

The findings of the corporation’s pre-restructuring diagnostic study (Ministry of Works and Housing, 1991) which became the basis of these expectations constructed the appearance of a certain reality about the corporation’s problems that required specific policy remedies. The government’s acceptance of the findings and the subsequent implementation of the restructuring makes the policy appear as a truth. This is because the government accepted them as the right way to deal with the corporation’s poor financial performance. Thus, the restructuring programme is not just a set of policies but is also a discourse that “transmits and produces power” (Foucault, 1990, p. 101).

The conceptualization of power within this context as a social relationship means that

discourse can only produce power when others participate in how it functions. But the type of power that is being transmitted through the functioning of the discourse is not absolute because one cannot be in total control of the actions of others. This absence of total control makes room for resistance. Therefore, resistance is any action by individuals or groups that is contrary to the rules of a discourse. In other words, resistance occurs when individuals or groups totally or partially refuses to act in accordance with the rules of a discourse (Wang, 1999).

However, resistance and compliance are not binary concepts because they are characterized by tension. Individuals' resistance to a prevailing discourse may be part of a negotiation process. For example, people may comply with a dominant discourse in order to protect themselves or for pragmatic reasons but not necessarily because they agree with it. Also compliance may be due to multiple interpretations of a discourse. Resistance can take various forms. It can be spontaneous, organized, unorganized, solitary and violent (Foucault, 1990) implying that the manifestations of resistance can be visible and invisible.

The organized, spontaneous and violent forms of resistance may be visible. An example of organized resistance could be a crowd of anti-globalization activists who march at a gathering of the G7. Their demonstrations are visible, collective and require coordination and planning and usually result in confrontation with authority. But individual or unorganized resistance lacks coordination and does not necessarily result in confrontation with authority (Scott, 1985). For example, if an agricultural extension officer visits a farming village in Ghana and educates the farmers about the benefits of genetically modified seeds and gives them the seeds to plant but each farmer decides to not plant the seeds, their action will constitute individual resistance. This type of resistance is not visible, unlike the actions

of the anti-globalization activists. In order to look for compliance and resistance to the restructuring, I determined if the tenants, the Government, and the corporation's employees conform to the rule. Any action that is in conformity with functioning of the discourse is indicative of compliance while those to the contrary constitute resistance. The chapter is divided into three sections, each section focuses on evidence of compliance and resistance.

### **Tenants: Compliance and Resistance**

A discursive practice that is involved in producing a viable corporation is the sale of rental houses to the tenants and rent increases for those who cannot afford to purchase their rental units. Some of the tenants participated in the functioning of the discourse by buying their rental units while others paid the revised rent. Between 1991 and 1994 the corporation sold 112 houses (Cityline Corporation, 1994). However, some tenants who could not afford their rental units resisted the change and the situation became a flashpoint between the corporation and the tenants (Cityline Corporation, 1995). This is how Mr. Jonah, a member of management described the conflict with the tenants:

There are a lot of external controls on us. There are a lot of things we do not have absolute control over. For instance, we have houses, rental houses and we have tenants who have come together calling themselves tenants association and they can decide [how much] rent they want to pay and under what conditions. We can't even sell our own property....Based upon expert advice [our houses] were valued so much. Anybody who wants to buy will have to buy it at this price.... For certain reasons we cannot even collect our rent from tenants. Courts can also put an injunction on our actions and it can delay us. You send cases to court and the courts will never dispose of the case and once the injunction still stands you cannot act....We have even gone to report to our sector Ministry and the Minister concerned is taking steps to try to resolve the problem out-of-court. But we have to agree with the tenants association that we are going to do this and that...but we have not agreed with the tenants' association yet. (Interview Transcript, pp. 23-24)

This quote raises two main issues: the formation of a tenants association to challenge

the sale of the rental units and the rent increase; and the Government's response to the dispute. In order to fight the sale of the houses and the rent increase, some of the tenants formed an association to fight the corporation by seeking a court injunction to stop the corporation from proceeding with the policies. A judge granted the injunction. I did not see the documents filed by the Tenants Association to ascertain the exact reasons for the injunction. But some of the employees said the tenants claim that as taxpayers and stakeholders in the corporation, they did not think they should have to pay the prevailing market price to rent state-owned property. The tenants also claim that the corporation does not have the right to sell rental houses that they regard as "theirs." Before examining reasons for the resistance, I provide the political context within which the Tenants Association evolved.

The formation of the Tenants Association and their success in getting the court injunction is significant because access to the legal system would have been impossible before the late 1980s when the PNDC government began political reforms. These reforms were due to internal and external political pressures. The internal political pressures, especially from urban residents were consequences of the social cleavages created by the effects of the SAP (Callaghy, 1990). Unlike their urban counterparts, most rural residents benefited from SAP policies, such as increases in the producer price of cash crops. In order to build upon the rural support while attempting to gain legitimacy among the disaffected urban population, the government initiated political reforms that culminated in local elections in 1988 (Callaghy, 1990, Chazan, 1992).

There were also external pressures from International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the IMF and the World Bank (Hyden, 1992; Kapur & Webb, 2000). Such pressures

stem from the perception of institutions such as the World Bank (1989) that the continent's economic problems were due to a crisis in governance. The Bank asserts that the presence of unelected governments which are unaccountable, corruption, and the absence of the rule of law are partly responsible for the continent's economic problems. Financial assistance to developing countries became tied to good governance ( Gillies, 1993; Kapur & Webb, 2000). The political reforms in the country also increased the independence of the judiciary and this made it possible for the tenants' case to be heard in court. Thus it can be argued that the IFIs are partly responsible for the political changes in the country that created the space for the tenants to demonstrate their resistance to the restructuring programme.

The action of the tenants is organized resistance because of the formation of the association to respond to the policies. Their actions resulted in the court injunction that prevented the corporation from enforcing payment of the new rent. Rent increases by the corporation, however, are not new. If there have been rent increases in the past without any organized protests from tenants, why did they decide to come together to protest this increase? Their reaction is indicative of their resentment towards the restructuring. Underlying this anger are competing meanings about Cityline Corporation's role, as an SOE, before and after the restructuring. The competing meanings can be analysed by focussing on the prevailing development discourse when the corporation was established and the current development discourse. Both discourses address the state's role in the economy, a pivotal issue in the corporation's conflict with its tenants.

Two main phases of development discourse can be identified since the end of the

Second World War: state-led and market-led (Moore, 1995).<sup>54</sup> During the state-led phase, which began in 1945, the emphasis was on the state as an agent of development. This view of development was influenced by the modernization and dependency theories discussed in Chapter 2. Although both theories are different in many respects they had one thing in common, that is, to achieve economic growth through industrialization (Kiely, 1995). Unlike modernization theorists, dependency theorists such as Prebisch (1959) were critical of the international economic order. This criticism stems from worsening terms of trade between the poorer countries whose main exports were primary products and the richer countries who produced manufactured goods. Addressing this discrepancy led to import-substitution industrialization (ISI). ISI is often state-led, hence the growth of SOEs in developing countries including Ghana.

It was during this period that the Nkrumah government established Cityline Corporation and other housing corporations. The prevailing development discourse at the time also shaped the tenants' perception of the corporation's role. Characterizing the corporation as state-owned and having noncommercial objectives may have influenced the tenants perception of the corporation's role. The discourse therefore provided a certain reality of the corporation, that is, state-subsidized. The tenants accepted this view as the way the corporation ought to function.

But the discursive practices of the prevailing development discourse minimizes the state's role in the economy. This change eliminates the corporation's noncommercial

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<sup>54</sup> Both state-led and market-led discourses of development have existed since the invention of development after the second world war. However the state-led discourse dominated from 1945 until the late 1960s when its influence began to wane. But it was during the 1980s that the market-led discourse became dominant (Escobar, 1995; Leys, 1996; Moore, 1995).



functions. Consequently it now provides a product and not a service. In conformity with this market-oriented approach, the corporation has created a marketing unit to advertise its product. It printed glossy and colourful brochures to promote its product. The prices of their products are quoted in U.S. dollars due to the volatility of the local currency.<sup>55</sup> The new role of the corporation is different from the tenants' perception of its function—hence the conflict and the ensuing legal action.

Since the policies that the tenants are resisting, are crucial to creating a viable organization, the corporation approached the sector ministry for assistance in resolving the dispute. The ministry refused to be directly involved, instead asking the corporation to seek an out-of-court settlement with the tenants. The corporation claimed it made a lot of offers that the tenants rejected. In frustration the corporation felt “isolated and abandoned in...implementing a major restructuring objective” (Cityline Corporation, 1995, p. 11). Eventually, the case was settled out of court in 1997. The person who told me about the settlement did not disclose the terms, citing a confidentiality clause.

While the Government did not provide any reasons for its unwillingness to be directly involved in resolving the dispute, its inaction can be attributed to the kind of government that the SAP discourse is producing. In fact, some of the workers speculated that the sector ministry refused to intervene because there was an upcoming election and the government did not want to alienate the voters. If this was the reason, then it can be argued that this is an effect of the SAP since the political reforms in the country are due in part to the World Bank's governance project. However, one can also attribute the sector ministry's

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<sup>55</sup> Clients can pay the local currency equivalent.

unwillingness to intervene to policies in the restructuring programme that require it to operate at arms-length from the corporation. This may appear contradictory because it is the government's responsibility to oversee the implementation of the SOERP. Whatever the reasons for the government's inaction, one cannot ignore the effect of the SAP in explaining the government response to the corporation's conflict with the tenants.

The incident with the tenants and the subsequent court settlement suggests that, the restructuring programme "can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy" (Foucault, 1990, p. 101). Although the tenants did not have the authority to stop the restructuring, their resistance led to an alternative way of viewing the programme. The details of the court settlement remain secret but it can be perceived as a modification of the restructuring programme. Although the restructuring programme cannot be reversed, their resistance shows that "hegemony is more unstable, vulnerable, and contested than previously thought" (Escobar, 1995, p. 95). Certainly, the World Bank-sponsored restructuring programme can be contested; it is not a model that can be accepted by the people as it is. The tenants' resistance is organized and visible but the resistance from the sector ministry and the employees is subtle and invisible.

### **Compliance and Resistance by the Government**

The Government's role in creating a viable corporation not only involves overseeing the implementation of the restructuring programme but also giving the corporation the authority to lay off staff, avoid price discrimination and control, stop loans and cash transfers, and grant the corporation operational autonomy. There are no indications that the

government interfered with hiring decisions. The government's unwillingness to be involved in the dispute with the tenants is a sign that it wants to limit its involvement with the corporation. With the loan and cash transfers, it is certain that the corporation has not received any direct cash transfers from the government since 1978, that is, almost 20 years before the implementation of the restructuring programme. As for the loans, the Government's compliance could not be ascertained. But the World Bank (1991b) reports that there are equity transfers from the government to SOEs. However, this report was prepared in late 1991 so it is uncertain if this is still the case.

The World Bank's (1995) own assessment of autonomy for SOEs since the beginning of the SOERP indicated that the Government of Ghana had given SOE managers more autonomy in decision-making at the organizational level than was the case before the restructuring. An unpublished government document confirms this. The document prepared by the State Enterprises Commission (SEC), states that: "from the perspective of SOE managers, the system is proving to be a useful means of formalizing, and thus reducing, ministerial interventions in day-to-day operations"(State Enterprises Commission, 1995, p. 85). But the Ministry of Works and Housing did not give the management the operational autonomy when it came to making a business decision regarding leasing land to a group of foreign investors.

A confidential file that I saw while conducting the research indicated evidence of continuing interference by the sector ministry.<sup>56</sup> The issue addressed in the document was

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<sup>56</sup> An employee called me to his office, days after our interview session and showed me the file. I saw the correspondence between the sector ministry and the corporation. But the employee declined my request to photocopy it. His reason was that the matter was confidential and very few of them had access to such files. Therefore, any leakage could easily be traced. The secrecy surrounding this file is demonstrated by the fact that he had to sneak into his boss's office to pick it up and the letters were in a folder marked "confidential."

about the leasing of land under the jurisdiction of the corporation to a group of foreign real estate developers after the restructuring programme began. Given the corporation's operational autonomy, it should have handled this transaction. But the sector ministry wrote to the corporation saying that it wanted to deal directly with the foreign investors. The file showed a series of correspondence between the corporation and its sector ministry in which the corporation explained why it was inappropriate for the sector ministry to handle the transaction. The sector ministry's response implied that because the corporation is state-owned, the Government could decide arbitrarily on policies even when it contravenes provisions in the restructuring programme.

It is not clear whether the sector ministry transferred revenues from the transaction to the corporation. But since there was no reference to the transfer of money in the letters and memos on the file, one can infer that no such transfer took place. For Cityline Corporation, this meant lost revenues, in spite of the fact that the corporation is expected to be self-financing and commercially viable. This problem indicates that the sector ministry violated a fundamental policy in the restructuring programme. The sector ministry's action constitutes resistance to the Bank's power to determine what it can and cannot do at the corporation. In other words, the sector ministry's involvement in this transaction meant that it did not fully comply with the Bank's policy which limits its role at the corporation. Although, the corporation bore the brunt of the government's action in lost revenues, the sector ministry's involvement disrupts the functioning of the World Bank's power. One can only speculate that the sector ministry was not in agreement with this aspect of the Bank's policy but

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accepted it because of the conditions that were attached to the loans. Analysing the sector ministry's continuing interference as resistance provides better insights into opposition to the SOERP because it moves away from the binary view of power which views opposition only in terms of the ruler and the ruled and instead addresses the multiplicity of points of resistance that exists within any network of power relations. Another group of people that demonstrated opposition to the functioning of the World Bank's power was the corporation's employees.

### **Compliance and Resistance at the Workplace**

The workers' reaction to the restructuring programme ranged from acceptance and justification to resistance. They accepted the changes as necessary for the corporation's viability. Some were even critical of their poor work attitudes and work practices that contributed to inefficiency before the restructuring. Here is a sample of the comments from by junior staff:

I think it [the restructuring] is good. Formally, we were many and we don't do the work which we were supposed to do to collect our salary. You see, some people, even though we don't do construction work, people were employed as construction workers and they don't do any work. They only come and book their name and go and do their own work. So this restructuring, I feel it is good even if I'm also affected ....Now I know I'm working and I'm being paid. (Interview Transcript, p. 49)

I like the change.... Before [the restructuring] people did not want to work because were many, but now we work better because we are few. (Interview Transcript, p. 89)

What I like about the changes is that it is good. We need productivity for people to work hard. There were times when you see our attitude towards work, we don't deserve what they paid us. (Interview Transcript, p. 95)

At least it has brought some discipline into the system. My main concern was with punctuality and time management. Formally, we were having problems with that.

Now we still have it, but it has improved. It is better. At least by 8 a.m., when you go round, you would see that almost all the offices are full. (Interview Transcript, p. 383)

It was not just the junior staff that accepted the restructuring as a necessity. The senior staff and the members of management also expressed similar sentiments. Some junior employees even attributed the corporation's success to the consultant who was still on staff. Their reaction indicates their acceptance of the discourse. Consequently, they cannot just be seen as victims of the SOERP because they felt the change was crucial for the corporation's survival.

If attempts to reform the SOE sector by previous governments were shelved due partly to opposition from workers, why the acceptance this time?<sup>57</sup> Some have attributed the absence of opposition to such factors as intimidation and oppression by the government, luck and the absence of mob action at the right time (Gyimah-Boadi & Essuman-Johnson; Herbst, 1991: 1993). Although these issues cannot be ignored, I think the reasons are more complex and go beyond those mentioned above. The complexity of the reasons can be examined by looking at the way in which the restructuring was presented by the management at Cityline Corporation as well as the workers' perceptions of the World Bank.

### **Language, Perceptions of the World Bank, and Legitimacy for Change**

During the field work I tried not to impose my own categories on the participants. I adopted a strategy of emphasizing my role "as an *active learner* who can tell the story from

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<sup>57</sup> As I discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, attempts by past governments to fundamentally reform SOEs were unsuccessful because of opposition from the Labour Movement and also the potential impact of the massive layoffs on workers and their families.

the participants' view rather than as an "expert" who passes judgement on participants" (Creswell, 1998, p. 18). This role was put to test in the field. When I began the interviews, I assumed that because the restructuring had resulted in significant changes within the organization, everybody will be familiar with the word "restructuring." But after interviewing a couple of the participants, I realized that most of the employees—especially the junior staff— used redundancy to describe the process instead of restructuring. For example, in discussing how she became aware of the changes, Ms. Hanson, a junior staff, said "management called us and said there will be restructuring, even we call it redundancy" (Interview Transcript, p. 59). With that comment, it dawned on me that I was doing exactly what I wanted to avoid. In subsequent interviews I used neutral words like *change* and *reorganize* to describe the process.<sup>58</sup>

Redundancy was widely used in government documents on the SOERP but its use was with reference to layoffs. The way in which the workers used the word could probably be attributed to how the management presented the restructuring to them. Consider the following comments by some junior staff:

They said they were doing redundancy and in that redundancy people left. And what they did was that, it was put on the notice board for us to see. So those of us not affected are the ones left. (Interview Transcript, p. 88)

What has worried me about the redundancy, the restructuring, is that they made us aware that we are so many that is why they carried out the redundancy. But you could see that even the number here is almost the number sent home or even more and we are arguing that we don't want it that way. [They] are saying we are too many, [they] can't pay that is why [they] made redundancy so that [they can] increase our pay. (Interview Transcript, pp. 141-142)

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<sup>58</sup> I did not ask them why they used redundancy instead of restructuring for fear of creating an impression that I was more knowledgeable about the process than they were. Presenting myself as the expert would have created a barrier between the participants and me especially when I use words they do not use in their everyday speech.

We heard that there will be changes. Initially they didn't tell us they were going to bring computers but we heard that some people will be laid off and those of us left will be given facilities to work with and better salaries. (Interview Transcript, p. 72)

All they told us was that they wanted us to work hard and they would pay us. But what is happening is that [they] have laid people off and [they] said we are too many in the system...but later [they] started employing new hands and they say they are on contract. (Interview Transcript, p. 57)

The main theme in these quotes is redundancy indicating that the management made this the overriding issue in explaining the restructuring to the workers. Although this is just one aspect of the restructuring, the workers viewed the whole process as lay off excess staff, increasing their salaries, and improving their working conditions. Thus it can be argued that the language influenced what they could see and think about the restructuring. Their perception of the problem as overstaffing probably made them accept the restructuring as imperative and inevitable, since they were aware that the corporation was overstaffed.

The metaphors that the management used in describing other aspects of the restructuring may also have influenced their acceptance of the discourse. For example, members of management described the job evaluation and performance appraisal process as scientific:

Whereas on the surface a job [may appear] crucial, looking at it *scientifically*,<sup>59</sup> against these factors that I have enumerated, you...find that may be that job is not as crucial as you thought it was. I'm not saying that one job is more crucial than the other, but looking at it *scientifically*, looking at it critically and putting weight on the various aspects of the jobs that are performed in that area, you find that one job weighs heavier than the other. (Interview Transcript, p. 328)

So the staff was cut, pay was restructured, positions were also ermmm there was job evaluation on a very *scientific* basis. I must say I was fortunate to serve on the job evaluation committee. (Interview Transcript, p. 122)

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<sup>59</sup> Italics added for emphasis.



**The Administrative Management Consultant who was among the team of consultants that the Government hired to implement the restructuring also used similar language in describing the job evaluation process:**

**The corporation might say that as far as our operations are concerned responsibility for materials is the most crucial of all the factors, so we would award say 20 or 30 per cent...but whatever the percentage weighting that we agree on, the total will be 100....[then] we multiply it by a constant number. (Interview Transcript, p. 375)**

**Probably they used these mathematical and scientific language in order to facilitate the workers' understanding of the process. However, these terms are not neutral. They are embedded with assumptions that create a certain regime of truth (Foucault, 1980) about the job evaluation. Truth is not intrinsic to an utterance (Mills, 1997); instead it is produced by how the management spoke about the process. Using the mathematical terms and the word scientific produces a discourse of truth about the entire job evaluation process that limits workers' perception to only one way of viewing the issue, making it difficult for them to question these truths.**

**Even when the workers questioned the process, management responds by directing the workers to the instruments of power, that is the World Bank and the Government. For example, this is what Mr. Adam, a senior officer, said about the management's response to concerns he had about the restructuring:**

**Initially, some of us stood against some of the changes but we realized that there was nothing we could do to convince them because they were hiding behind the World Bank and the Government. [They would say] it is a government directive it is a World Bank programme and this is what should be done. So we realized that there was no way we could convince management to alter the changes. So we had to adapt ourselves to the situation. (Interview Transcript, p. 243)**

**Thus, the employees resigned themselves to the situation because there were no avenues for them to communicate their grievances to the Government or to the World Bank.**

In spite of their resentment towards the World Bank, the workers also had some positive comments about the Bank. This may have contributed to their acceptance and justification of the restructuring. The entire staff, from the management to the junior staff, welcomed the World Bank's support. They attributed the corporation's improved financial performance to the Bank's intervention. Some point to new equipment such as computers that they now work with which they did not have before the restructuring. Most credit the Bank for the "site and services" project, the most successful venture that the corporation has ever undertaken. Here are a few examples of their comments:

I think...the World Bank...brought certain material support, computers etc to the development section....Formally we were [drawing] them manually. This time we can draw it on the computers. I can do it myself so I use the computers a lot instead of [drawing] manually. (Interview Transcript, p. 108)

Because of the World Bank [Cityline Corporation] is going high. Previously it wasn't so. We are building a lot of buildings nowadays. (Interview Transcript, p. 234)

And with the World Bank so many jobs have been introduced like these new communities. We do site and services, so there is more work all the time. (Interview transcript, p. 178)

Although many of the employees attribute the success of the "site and services" project to the World Bank, the project was not part of the restructuring programme. In the 1980s, the corporation sought permission from the sector ministry to lease land to prospective homeowners because they did not have the finances to construct the buildings. The sector ministry granted them the permission. But the absence of basic infrastructure, such as water, electricity, roads and drains at the sites created environmental problems. Therefore, the Government ordered them to provide the infrastructure before leasing the land. The management decided to provide the infrastructure and charge the prospective

homeowners for the services. The project provided work for the employees and generated revenue for the corporation. But because the project began shortly after the restructuring, many of the workers felt it was part of it; hence their praise for the World Bank. Thus, the employees view the World Bank's assistance as crucial to the corporation's survival and its improved financial performance. Despite the workers' acceptance and justification for the restructuring, there was also resistance.

### **Resistance at the Workplace**

As I discussed in Chapter 6, the functioning of the restructuring discourse at Cityline Corporation is producing a disciplined worker. But the workers are not just objects of power. They are also subjects because the operation of the power depends on their participation in the discourse. Their active participation in achieving the goals of the workforce rationalization process produces subjectivity that they are expected to assume. Due to the relational nature of power, any action by the workers that is contrary to the functioning of the discourse is a sign of resistance. I look for signs of resistance by examining compliance with the main aspects of the rationalization process, specifically, the enclosure of work, job reclassification, performance appraisal, and teamwork.

The enclosure of work is aimed at improving efficiency by ensuring that workers do not breach the boundary between official and unofficial work. Most of the workers confirmed that they still do private jobs to supplement their income but they do not conduct such businesses at the corporation's expense. For example, when I asked Mr. Noxy, a senior staff, whether he does private jobs to supplement his income this was his response: "As for that I do. Just last [week] a man brought me a feasibility study and I did it. These are some

of the things we do to supplement our income....I use weekends for my private jobs and I work on the computer” (Interview Transcript, p. 111-112).

Some workers continue to negotiate private business at the workplace. This is how Mr. Coffie, a senior staff describes what happens:

But sometimes there can be no clear cut difference between what you’re doing for Cityline and what you’re doing for yourself. The thing is that people do other things...*Let us be honest with ourselves, some people even claim that being here and having the opportunity to meet people they can work for is<sup>60</sup> even better than being paid well elsewhere.* If a plumber is here or a carpenter is here he can get jobs from here, ... it helps, it supplements [the income]. (Interview Transcript, pp. 42-43)

Most of the employees admitted that they have ready access to clients because the workplace provides a space for them to meet and negotiate the deals. For example, in discussing why he continues to be with the corporation despite the low salaries, Mr. Boye, a junior employee, points out that, he prefers to be with the corporation because he gets the opportunity to meet his clients:

I don’t think it would help any of us if we actually want to quit and go on our own. Just because we give the land...people come here to give us the money to handle their private jobs for them. So going home or going on your own won’t help just because nobody may know [me]. Okay, like I said, I have been here for the past 20 or 24 years so may be I know some few friends who may know...that I have been doing a few jobs when I’m home. Otherwise since I’m here even the friend who is at accounts or a friend at may be Legal [Department], may even be contacted by a friend that ‘I want somebody to do something’ and he would recommend me. So this is how we find our private business. (Interview Transcript, p. 193)

Despite this admission by Mr. Boye and other employees, they insisted that they never do private business at the workplace. This is probably true because since the restructuring began, they have been careful to not violate any of the rules for fear of being discharged whenever there was to be another round of layoffs. But the employees’ admission

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<sup>60</sup> Italics added for emphasis.

that they still negotiate unofficial business at the workplace shows that the boundary between official and unofficial work is still being breached. This is a sign of resistance to the enclosure of work. Since the conditions that create the space for the clients to meet the workers still exist one can argue that the boundary will continue to be breached.

With regard to the job reclassification that ended seniority-based title distinctions, there was evidence of compliance. All jobs have been reclassified and members of management and the senior staff used their new titles. But most of the junior staff did not use their new titles when I asked them of their title/position. Most of these workers were hired at entry level positions and were promoted based on experience and years of service. Before the restructuring promotions were accompanied by a change in title. The titles became visible symbols of their status at the workplace because it differentiated between junior and senior employees within a specific occupational category. The job reclassification ended the seniority-based titles. All draughtsmen, for example, now have the same title—draughtsman—irrespective of seniority or years of service.

Although the junior employees did not openly say that they used the old title differentiation as an act of resistance, various factors led me to conclude this way. For example, why would data entry clerks whose positions have been renamed from machine operators remember to use the new name for their positions but adhere to the old seniority-based titles? One could argue that they maintained the old titles because they were not accustomed to the new ones. But I wondered, why would they remember to use the new name for their position but add the old seniority-based titles? Another factor that confirms this analysis is that most of the employees who used the old titles said they were unhappy about the cancellation of the seniority-based titles. Here are some examples of their

**discontent which may be interpreted as reasons for holding on to their old titles:**

**I'm not happy. Calculating from [the 1960's] I haven't reached a supervisory grade. Now I will be going home soon [retirement], what do you want me to do?...I had a letter from personnel, that due to long-service I have been put on the supervisory grade and just around that time they started the changes. They said all of us have been turned senior draughtsmen which meant reduction [in my position] and these are some of the problems. (Interview Transcript, p. 104)**

**I have worked for about 24 years [and] I'm not even an ordinary draughtsman, I'm a technician with certificate backing it....I have taught about 2 people who were employed recently.... I've also served about 24 years, others have served 20 [years, but] they have classified us all as draughtsmen, how? (Interview Transcript, p.192)**

**Under the old system, to become the head of a section you start at a particular level. Maybe, from grade 3, or 2 up to the time you get there. But now even if I pick someone from the survey school, he would be a geodetic assistant. When I pick someone from the roadside who has been trained by somebody [that is someone who learnt the trade through apprenticeship] he too, would be a geodetic assistant. Then what is the essence of going to school? (Interview Transcript, p.161)**

**The cancellation of the grade-level distinctions does not mean that all workers within the same occupation category are on the same salary scale. However, they were still unhappy because the title differentiation that distinguished between them based on years of service no longer exists. Their action can be described as an everyday form of resistance because it was not “necessarily directed at the immediate source of appropriation” (Scott, 1985, p. 33), that is, the instruments of power. This type of resistance is not visible, does not make headlines, and does not involve any confrontation with authority. Thus, not only does the use of the old titles reflect the workers' rejection of the new titles, it is also an attempt to keep the old titles which are symbolic representations of their cherished status that is no longer recognized.**

**The new performance appraisal system has also been implemented. But not all the appraisers, mainly members of management, are evaluating the performance of their**

subordinates according to the objective criteria on the appraisal form. This is how Mr. Wayne, a senior staff, described the problem:

About a year ago the guy at accounts...the director of finance, he is a very strict man...he took these evaluation or what do you call it, assessment forms...from other departments and he was very mad. While he was looking objectively at his people's performance and awarding 3 and 2 points, others were giving 4, 5, 4, 5. Meanwhile 5 points is supposed to be exceed all expectations. So the justification for exceeding all their expectation wasn't even there. So why 5? And people who are supposed to be in responsible positions wrote the 5 there. You see the problem. Here is the case he could not talk because he was from a different department and this thing [forms] had come from a different department and he was expecting that people would look objectively at the issues. (Interview Transcript, p. 291)

The issue that was raised in the above quote has to do with objectivity of the appraisers. In fact a member of management also raised similar concerns. While it appears that the appraisers did not adhere to the rules, the problem may be due in part to the perception of the process as rational and objective. However, we can also view this lack of objectivity in the appraisal process as an act of resistance. If the functioning of the discourse requires that the appraisers assess the performance of their subordinates using specific criteria and this standard was not adhered to, then it means that their attitude is thwarting the power that is operating through the discourse. It may be argued that the lack of objectivity arose because they were not accustomed to the new process. However, since we are looking at power as social relationship, the subjectivities that are being produced by the discourse are only possible with the full participation of the subjects. Thus, any behaviour contrary to the rule is resistance.

As discussed in Chapter 6, teamwork is a work value that was emphasized in the corporation's corporate plan for 1994-96. Unlike the management and the senior staff, the junior staff knew nothing about it. The management said they were in the process of

organizing training seminars to educate the rest of the workers about the importance of teamwork in ensuring the corporation's viability. Despite its limited implementation, a report by one of the consultants suggests that there is some resistance to the idea. The report (Cityline Corporation, 1994) states that:

While *management by participation*<sup>61</sup> can be positively used in the interest of the organization's short and long-term survival and progress, the situation was the contrary. The long period within which such management practices continued has enabled such culture to be so much deeply lodged in the minds of staff that it has seriously affected the success rate of the on-going restructuring programme. It has been the practice that any change which does not directly and immediately benefit the staff is resisted, no matter its short-term or long-term benefits to the Corporation. Even where a few staff will not benefit, the solidarity is such that the group they belong to will block such a change.... In brief, the existing culture is not conducive to commercial and competitive operations. (Cityline Corporation, 1994, p. 9)

During the fieldwork, the author of the report confirmed that not much has changed.

The quote hints at resistance to change but it also emphasized management by participation. This can be interpreted as teamwork since the application of the concept within this context is about cooperation. Other aspects of the report made reference to formal bodies such as the Local Union and the Senior Staff Association resisting change. If the corporation is to be viable then the formal bodies and the informal "empires" that have been created must cooperate. But their refusal to cooperate is a sign that they are not in favour of all aspects of the change. The author of the report is one of the consultants hired to implement that change, and therefore, part of the management team. Not only is he a member of management, he is also a "trainer" and a "judge", who is supposed to make sure that the workers change their work practices. The training process involves the workers putting an end to all work practices that contribute to lack of cooperation. The "judge's" observation of the absence of

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<sup>61</sup> Emphasis in the original.



cooperation among the employees is a sign of resistance.

The workers may not have resorted to industrial action, but they have succeeded in thwarting the full implementation of the programme. This type of resistance may have been influenced by an existing form of labour control and by employees' perceptions about the probability and severity of the management's reaction. Some workers told me that their unwillingness to participate in organized protests was because of the fear that they might be included in future layoffs.

So far, the discussion has focussed on unorganized and individually-based resistance. This does not mean that there was no open confrontation between the management and the staff over the restructuring. There was one major incident with the employees in which they reportedly marched into the office of the Director of Administration. The director was frightened and thought he was going to be assaulted by the workers so he locked himself in his office. The incident was about severance pay that the corporation had to pay to employees who were laid-off. The union representing the employees wanted the severance pay to be calculated based on an old formula which would have required the corporation to pay them based on their years of experience. But management used a new formula introduced by the Government which resulted in a significantly lower severance pay than the former. The employees did not go on a strike over this incident, but some members of management described their actions as disruptive. Throughout the implementation of the restructuring, the workers had no direct confrontation with the Government.

## **Summary**

In this chapter I examined “a plurality of resistances” (Foucault, 1990, p. 96) to the restructuring of Cityline Corporation. Some were organized others were unorganized and solitary. While some tenants mobilized themselves into a group and resorted to legal action, the Government simply chose to violate the rules. The workers also complied but not fully. Most of their resistance was unorganized and individually-based. However, there was one open confrontation with management but it did not result in an industrial action. All these forms of resistance existed at different points in the network of power relations and disrupted the functioning of the discourse.

The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have been castigated by many for imposing draconian economic policies on developing countries and rightly so. But the power relations between the IFIs and the recipient countries is more complex than the common characterization of the oppressed versus the oppressor. The analysis in this chapter shows that the various parties involved in the restructuring of Cityline Corporation participated in functioning of the discourse. But the subjects also resisted the Bank’s power. This resistance did not lead to the abandonment of the restructuring but it disrupted the functioning of the discourse. Some might argue that if the resistance does not lead to a significant change in the Bank’s policy then the responses are not formidable. However, I think that the different kinds of resistance examined are indicative of the impact of human agency. Their resistance may not be enough to stop aspects of the restructuring programme but it shows that the Government, managers, workers and tenants are not passive, helpless victims.

## **CHAPTER EIGHT**

### **Concluding Comments**

**This study examined the restructuring of Cityline Corporation, a state-owned real estate corporation. My goal was two-fold. First, I analysed how the World Bank-sponsored SOE restructuring programme is being implemented, specifically, exploring the practices involved in creating an efficient and a profitable SOE. Second, I examined the nature of opposition to the implementation of the reform. This is because some studies (Gyimah-Boadi & Essuman-Johnson, 1993; Herbst, 1991; Ninsin, 1991) have argued that the Government's ability to carry out the economic reform, despite its draconian nature, could be attributed to such factors as the relative absence of organised opposition. My argument was that, the policies that have been implemented to create an efficient and a profitable corporation are producing a disciplined government, corporation and employees, and a different kind of tenant. Rooted in the process, is a complex web of power relations involving the World Bank and the other parties involved.**

**Two main analytic themes emerged from the study: the micro-practices of disciplinary power; and a broader view of the nature of opposition to the restructuring. An analysis of the implementation of the restructuring at Cityline Corporation reveals that, although the restructuring is aimed at creating an efficient and a profitable corporation, the discursive practices are producing a disciplined government and a corporation, and tenant. The way in which the restructuring discourse is producing these subjects is evidence of the World Bank's power. How this power operates is so subtle that it is invisible. This invisibility is probably because we often perceive structural adjustment economic policies as rational economic policies (Escobar, 1995). But as I have demonstrated in this study, once**

we begin to see power as an integral part of everyday practice and not as something that resides in an institution, its disciplinary effects become obvious.

A significant contribution of this study is that it details the ways in which the Government, the corporation, and the tenants are turning themselves into subjects. In other words, the parties involved in the restructuring are not and free or oppressed. Instead, they have turned themselves into subjects by participating in the functioning of the SOERP. Thus, the emphasis is not on the impact of the policies per se but rather how these parties are using the policies to change their everyday behaviour and work practices. This is a departure from existing studies on the SAP (discussed in Chapters 2 and 3) that focus on such issues as the successes and failures and the social and political implications. This does not suggest that the World Bank and the IMF are not powerful institutions. What I have unravelled is the complexity of power relations that exist between these institutions and the recipient countries and how their power operates through everyday practices.

I have also argued that the over-emphasis on organised opposition as an indicator of resistance to the SAP is problematic. The findings of this study suggest that opposition can be organised or unorganised, collective or solitary. This is because resistance does not necessarily mean workplace strikes or organised protests. Instead, resistance is the total or partial refusal of individuals or groups to cooperate in the functioning of a discourse. This finding is significant because it recast existing analysis of recipient countries of IMF and World Bank loans as passive victims of these institutions. The solitary acts of resistance—such as breaching the boundary between official and unofficial business, employees' refusal to use their new titles, and the lack of objectivity of some members of management in completing the performance appraisal forms—may not necessarily lead to abandoning the

restructuring programme. Nevertheless, these acts disrupt the Bank's power because from a Foucauldian perspective any act of resistance, whether it leads to policy change or not, disrupts power (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982).

As I pointed out in this study, the language of a discourse can influence people's perception of reality. This was evident in the workers' positive comments about the restructuring despite their reservations about it. I argue that metaphors, such as scientific and redundancy, that management used to communicate the changes to them may have influenced their acceptance of the programme. While this may be an unintended consequence, this finding shows that people in general, and workers in particular, do not have to be coerced to accept a discourse because the language of the discourse can shape and influence what they think and talk about.

Contrary to the perception among government bureaucrats at the State Enterprises Commission and Cityline Corporation's employees that improvements in the corporations' financial performance is due to the restructuring programme, I argue that this is not necessarily the case. Although this study did not evaluate the restructuring programme, my findings suggest that improvements in the corporation's financial performance since the initiation of the restructuring cannot be attributed solely to the programme. This is because the corporation's "site and services" project, which began during the early phase of the restructuring, increased the corporation's revenue. The rationale for raising this issue is not to undermine the achievements of the restructuring. Rather this finding should enable government bureaucrats and researchers who evaluate World Bank projects to look for extraneous variables that may be difficult to account for when using quantitative measures, such as financial indicators, to evaluate SOE performance.

## **Theoretical Implications**

When I began this research, one thing that was clear to me about the literature on SAP and SOERP. These studies addressed the policy framework of the IMF and World Bank-sponsored programmes and described their successes and failures. In short, they were evaluation studies. The studies that concentrated the successes of the programme implicitly reinforced the New Political Economy (NPE) perspective, which views the achievements of the SOERP and the SAP as the best approach to deal with the country's economic problems. Studies that focussed on the negative aspects of the economic reforms viewed the World Bank and the IMF as the source of the problem. Such analysis casts these financial institutions as powerful symbols of Western domination and instruments of capitalism.

What I have demonstrated by drawing on Foucault's work on discourse, power and knowledge is how the successes are being achieved. The process shows a complex web of power relations and the subtle ways in which power operates. This analysis goes beyond the notion that recipient countries of international financial assistance are simply victims of these powerful institutions. Instead the study demonstrates the dynamics and complexity of power relations at the micro-level. Thus, this study suggests that extant theoretical perspectives on economic reforms in Southern countries to be broadened to include the nuances and complexity of the effects of such policies at the micro-level. The discussions on resistance also provide a broader framework within which to analyse resistance to the SOERP at the workplace.

## **Limitations and Substantive Contribution**

Some limitation of the study should be noted. Excluding the bureaucrats at the sector ministry (Ministry of Works and Housing) and the tenants from the original research design

made it difficult to provide a stronger analysis of those sections. However, the workers and official documents provided us with some hints into the disciplinary effects of the restructuring and their reaction to it.

A major criticism of Foucault's work is that, it is not relevant to Southern countries because his analysis of power is so diffuse and his view of discourse is so abstract and as such does not address the material effects of dominant economic discourses on individuals or groups. While this is a valid criticism, I think this shortcoming can be addressed by thinking of possible ways to deal with the problem instead of totally ignoring this perspective. This can be done by pushing the boundaries of his work to make it relevant to the Southern context. After all Foucault does not view his work as a theory. This allows for flexibility in its application. Despite this criticism, I think Foucault provides us with a provocative analysis of power that enables us to see the complexities of power and how discourses exhibit and sustain power.

On a more substantial level, this study facilitates our understanding of power-knowledge practices at the workplace within the context of restructuring. It also highlights employees' attitudes and the nature of resistance to the programme. There is a potential danger that management may use the findings on unorganised and solitary resistance to circumvent all types of resistance at the workplace. However, I do not think management can completely eliminate resistance because noncompliance at the workplace can be manifested in other ways, such as getting extended sick days, which management cannot stop.

## **Directions for Future Research**

As an instrumental case study, this research provides insights into the restructuring programme that requires further research. Although the World Bank (1995) claims that SOE managers have been granted increased autonomy, the findings at Cityline Corporation suggests that this is still an issue. Therefore, further research in this area should address the following questions: Does the nature of political interference vary from one SOE to another depending on the type of service being provided? In what ways does the continuing political interference affect the viability of the restructuring programme in SOEs? Also, are there different national contexts which affect how much government managers and workers accept the neo-liberal agenda?

This study also shows that the presentation of the restructuring programme may have influenced the staff's perception of the programme. Since this is an inference from the data, further research is needed to validate this finding. With regard to the disciplinary effects of the restructuring, future research should focus on whether or not the workers see themselves as participating in constituting their own subjectivity. Surveillance at the workplace is another topic that requires further study. What types of surveillance do other SOE managers use to monitor employee performance? And how do workers respond to surveillance at the workplace? More research is also needed on other forms of unorganised resistance and whether workers' view noncompliance as an act of resistance.

This study also questioned the objectivity of the performance appraisal process. One senior officer even suggested that Ghanaians do not have the ability to be objective. But is objectivity culturally-bounded? Are there socio-cultural factors in so-called rational economies and economies in transition that impact objectivity of the appraisal process? This



requires a cross-cultural analysis of the appraisal process in Ghana and a Western country to identify what those factors might be and what impact if any, they may have on the appraisal process. Also, since appraisals are the basis for rewarding workers, future research has to focus on workers' perception of the objectivity of the process and how the lack of objectivity may affect their productivity. Since government bureaucrats at the Ministry of Works and Housing and the tenants were not interviewed for this study, another research project has to examine their perceptions of the disciplinary effects of the programme as well as issues about resistance.

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## **Appendices**

### **Appendix A: Consent Form**

I, Edna Demornam Djokoto guarantee confidentiality and anonymity to \_\_\_\_\_ with respect to interview data while conducting research related to by doctoral dissertation on State-Owned Enterprises Reform in Ghana. No reference will be made to location in attribution of excerpted responses. I also guarantee that any comments used from the interview will be assigned a pseudonym.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Edna D. Djokoto (signed)

\_\_\_\_\_ (dated)

## **Consent Form**

Thank you for your willingness to participate in this research project. Your participation is very much appreciated. Before we start the interview, I will like to reassure you that as a participant in this study you have several rights. These are spelt out below. I will read them to you and I would be grateful if you would sign the form to show that you agree to its contents.

I am the principal investigator of this project and I may be contacted at this address, Department of Sociology, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada T6G 2H4. Phone (office) (780) 492-5234, Fax (780) 492-7196, e-mail: [edjokoto@gpu.srv.ualberta.ca](mailto:edjokoto@gpu.srv.ualberta.ca) should you have any questions or concerns.

I, \_\_\_\_\_ Do hereby agree to participate in your doctoral research. This agreement is made subject to the following terms and conditions:

That the study is conducted as per the Ethics of Research as developed by the University of Alberta and as per the material found within the approved Research Ethics Review Application of the Department of Sociology. The data collected will be used for academic purposes only. The following points are relevant to this approval, and it is to reassure you that as a participant in this project you have several definite rights:

(a) My participation in this interview is entirely voluntary, and as a participant, I am guaranteed confidentiality and anonymity and any comments which are excerpted from the interview data for use in the study will be attributed to a pseudonym known only to the researcher. Under no circumstances will my name or identifying characteristics be included in this report.

(b) I may, at any time, decide to opt out of the study despite my initial agreement to participate, and refuse to answer any question at any time.

(c) Arrangements for interviews can be made to suit my schedule and commitments.

(d) approval is given subject to the signed guarantee to confidentiality and anonymity noted at the bottom of the

**form. I will sign this form to show that you have read to me its contents.**

**(e) The interview will be tape-recorded to facilitate transcription and data analysis.**

\_\_\_\_\_ (signed)

\_\_\_\_\_ (printed)

\_\_\_\_\_ (dated)



## **Appendix B**

### **Interview Schedules**

**(All Interviews were semi-structured)**

#### **Interview Schedule One**

**(Interview conducted at State Enterprises Commission: 1 Participant)**

1. How long have you been with the State Enterprises Commission?
2. How long have you held your present position?
3. Who put together the reform programme?
4. Did the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have any input?
5. Has the World Bank ever put any pressure on you to conform to elements of the reform?
6. Is it the goal of the World Bank to ultimately privatize all SOEs.?
7. I have read that some of the SOEs that were doing fairly well were privatized and I want to know why they will be doing well and still be privatized?
8. Doesn't it contradict the whole notion that SOEs are a drain on the economy?

**Interview Schedule Two: Focus Group Interview**

**(3 participants all participants were middle-level personnel and male)**

1. **Introduction**
2. **What did you do before the restructuring? Has it changed?**
3. **What was the rationale for the restructuring?**
4. **What new work values have been introduced as a result of the restructuring?**
5. **Who determines how much you are paid?**
6. **Does your remuneration affect your attitude to work?**
7. **Do you do other jobs apart from your regular jobs?**
8. **Are there any other issues that I haven't mentioned that you want to raise?**

**Interview Schedule Three: Members of Management - 7 Participants**

**(A) Social Demographics**

- (a) Rank/Qualification
- (b) Gender
- (c) Age
- (d) Marital Status
- (e) Number of Children

**(B) Restructuring and changes in tasks performed**

1. How long have you been working here?
2. Could you please tell me your understanding of the restructuring programme?
3. What was the rationale for restructuring this organization?
4. Who put together the restructuring package, was it initiated here or from outside?
5. Did you have to change any of their recommendations?
6. Can you give me some details of the restructuring programme, what were some of the things that they were looking at?
7. Can you briefly tell me changes that have occurred in your department as a result of the restructuring?
8. I understand that as a result of the restructuring exercise, all occupations have been reclassified to reflect modern trends, how were the jobs reclassified? What is the nature of the salary structure that supports this system?
9. My next question is with regards to the appraisal system, how does it work? And what is its essence? How does it motivate people to work? Do you have any comments about how it works?
10. Has any new technology been introduced as part of the restructuring?
11. What is your understanding of the teamwork concept? Do you think it is being practised in this organization?
12. How many people were laid-off? What criteria were used in selecting those who were laid-off?
13. Has any specific management style been adopted as part of the restructuring process? What are the characteristics of this management style? What is the

rationale for adopting this approach to management?

14. What are the criteria for promotion?
15. Is this new approach part of the restructuring programme?
16. How did the workers react to it?

**(C) Work values, corporate culture and workers attitudes**

17. According to SEC documents reviewed, all restructured SOEs are expected to introduce a corporate culture as part of the day-to-day administration of their organization to ensure efficiency. Has any such culture been introduced here at Cityline? Could you please provide me with the details of this culture?
18. How would you define corporate culture?
19. What was the ideal work culture before the restructuring? How different was it from the work culture that existed in reality?
20. How would you describe the current work culture?
21. What is the attitude of workers towards the current work culture?
22. How was the work culture communicated to all staff members?
23. Who put together what you define as the current work culture?
24. In your opinion, how did the workers perceive the restructuring process?
25. What strategies do you adopt to ensure that workers carry out their specified tasks?
26. What do you think are the problems inhibiting the restructuring of this corporation?

**(D) Salaries and other income generating activities**

27. What is your salary range:

220,000 - 239,000

240,000 - 259,000

260,000 - 279,000

280,000 - 299,000

300,000 - 349,000

350,000 - 399,000

**400,000 - 449,000**

**450,000+**

- 28. Do you do other things to supplement your income?**
- 29. Would you work harder if you were working in a private organization and not an SOE?**
- 30. Are there any other issues that I haven't talked about that you want to raise?**

**Interview Schedule Four: 38 middle-level and junior employees**

**(A) Social Demographics**

- (a) Rank/Qualification
- (b) Gender
- (c) Age
- (d) Marital Status
- (e) Number of Children

**(B) Restructuring and changes in tasks performed**

1. How long have you been working here?
2. What job do you do in this department?
3. Are you aware of the restructuring programme going in the corporation?
4. Were you consulted before the introduction of the changes?
5. What specific changes have been introduced in your department?
6. Has your job changes since the restructuring? Do you have more responsibilities now than before?
7. What do you think about the restructuring programme? What do you like about it? What do you dislike?
8. I understand all jobs have been reclassified, tell me about this change?

**(C) Communication and work culture**

9. How were the current changes communicated to you?
10. I understand some new work values have been introduced, how did you hear about them?
11. What do you think about these new work values?
12. Are they too strict for you to follow?
13. How often do you meet with your supervisors in a month?
14. Has your supervisor ever talked to you about teamwork?

**(D) Salaries and other income generating activities**

15. **What is your salary range:**

100,000 - 119,000

120,000 - 139,000

140,000 - 159,000

160,000 - 179,000

180,000 - 199,000

200,000 - 219,000

220,000 - 239,000

240,000 - 259,000

260,000 - 279,000

280,000+

16. **Do you do other things to supplement your income?**

17. **Would you like to quit and do another job, instead of working here?**

18. **Would you work harder if you were working in a private company?**

**(E) Power and Resistance**

19. **In the past what did you do if you were not happy about decisions made by management?**

20. **Do you fear speaking out because you think you might be dismissed?**

21. **If you don't like something new that has been introduced what do you do?**

22. **How do you make management aware of your grievances? What do you do when those grievances are not acted upon?**

23. **Do you sometimes resort to your old ways of working because you are more used to it than the new ways you've been taught?**

**(F) Other**

24. **What types of training programmes did you participate in before the restructuring? What about after the changes, which programme did you take? Are you utilizing what you've been taught?**

25. **Are there any other issues that I haven't talked about that you would like to raise?**

**NON-CLERICAL JOBS**

1. Educational Qualification
2. Job Responsibilities
3. Mental/Visual Concentration
4. Responsibility For Materials/Documents
5. Responsibility For Tools/Equipment
6. Physical Effort
7. Work Environment
8. Hazards

**CLERICAL JOBS**

1. Educational Qualification
2. Previous Experience
3. Post Employment Training
4. Job Responsibilities
5. Mental/Visual Concentration
6. Responsibility For Materials/Documents
7. Discretion
8. Contacts