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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

LA FRANCE LIBRE, 1940-1944:

RESISTANCE AND EXILE JOURNALISM

BY

KATHRYN (CHASE) MERRETT

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

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
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
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Patricia E. Prestwich, Supervisor
(Professor)


Kenneth J. Munro, Committee Chairman
(Associate Professor)


Norman G. Ingraham, Committee Member
(Canada Research Fellow)


Lynn K. Penrod, Committee Member
(Professor)

Date: April 2, 1992.....

TO MY MOTHER, JEAN CHASE

ABSTRACT

La France libre, a review journal founded by French intellectual exiles in Britain, was published by Hamish Hamilton of London each month from November 1940 until the journal's demise in January 1947. Its founders intended it to be an organ of the French resistance and a vehicle for continuing the intellectual traditions which had preceded the occupation of France by Germany. La France libre and other exile journals have been all but ignored by historians who have accorded such publications a marginal role in the history of France during the Second World War. However, the French resistance had exile as well as internal dimensions. This thesis uncovers the circumstances in which La France libre was published, analyses its contents, and seeks to characterize exile resistance in one of its forms. By integrating the conditions of exile into the journal's operations, La France libre's directors converted the many contradictions of the journal's situation into advantages. While the contributors rejected their exile status as permanent, they made use of the new perspectives available to them in Britain. Propaganda, one feature of the journal's contents, was the means by which the exiles voiced their commitment to the idea of France and their right to be considered as French patriots. On the other hand, the criticism and analysis which appeared regularly in La France libre allowed these same exiles to assert their right as patriots to challenge the assumptions underlying the allied propaganda and to formulate their own agenda for reform. Exile journalism was more than an adjunct to the internal, clandestine press; it relied on foreign support and developed foreign points of view to express a distinctive vision of postwar France.

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INTRODUCTION

Histories of both the French resistance and the French press during World War II demonstrate a puzzling lack of interest in exile periodical publications and in the significance of these publications to an understanding of France and the Second World War. This thesis will examine one example of an exile publication with a view to assessing its particular character and its significance to the French history of the period. La France libre, a monthly review journal published in French from London, shows that for at least some French intellectuals, exile provided opportunities as well as constraints. By taking advantage of their physical distance from France and by reacting to the intellectual stimulation provided by wartime London, intellectuals who had been critical of their country's prewar institutions and policies promoted a conception of a postwar France which would be more technically and scientifically orientated, more outward-looking and less complacent about the eternal value of its cultural achievements. La France libre represents a dimension of the French resistance which, though it was different from either the internal resistance movement or that represented by orthodox Gaullism, exercised considerable influence during the period of postwar reconstruction.

On 15 November 1940 the first issue of La France libre was published by Hamish Hamilton in London. Although André Labarthe was named as the editor of the publication, it was René Avord (Raymond

Aron), a contributor to the first issue and thereafter the journal's editorial secretary who was, by all accounts, the driving force behind the production.¹ Speaking about his experiences at La France libre forty years later, Aron depicted the incident which resulted in his decision to take on the review as having permanently altered the direction of his own career:² from 1940 onwards it was as a journalist that he practiced his commitment "to combine the dual role of actor and spectator."³ His own claims for the journal--for the esteem in which its articles on military strategy were held,⁴ for its appeal to British intellectuals,⁵ and for the effort expended to render events taking place in France as objectively as possible⁶--have been reinforced by contemporaries. Robert Marjolin, for example, a sometime colleague of Aron's at the journal, claimed that "Raymond Aron had a simple and

¹ Raymond Aron wrote under the name René Avord until August 1943. (See Appendix 2 on the use of pseudonyms in the journal.) Jacques Soustelle describes La France libre as a venture of Labarthe's but a success "thanks to Raymond Aron." Jacques Soustelle, Envers et contre tout, vol. 1, De Londres à Alger. Souvenirs et documents sur La France Libre 1940-1942 (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1947), 48.

² Raymond Aron, Le spectateur engagé: Entretiens avec Jean-Louis Missika et Dominique Wolton (Paris: Julliard, 1981), 81.

³ Aron, Spectateur engagé, 307.

⁴ According to Aron, "The articles by Staro were the best military articles published in England. The specialists read them attentively." Aron, Spectateur engagé, 82. Robert Mengin describes the way in which the articles were put together by their author, Staro, and by Aron. He claimed that: "At the War Office they looked forward impatiently to this monthly article; they would send over for the proofs." Robert Mengin, No Laurels for de Gaulle, trans. Jay Allen (London: Michael Joseph, 1967), 188-89.

⁵ Aron cites the historian Richard Cobb as having claimed to have been an avid reader and admirer of La France libre. Aron, Spectateur engagé, 82.

⁶ Aron, Spectateur engagé, 98-99.

unique objective: to make of la France libre the great review of the French resistance in the world."⁷ The fact that Aron left the journal at the end of the war, although Labarthe kept it going until January 1947, supports Marjolin's emphasis on the pre-eminence of resistance in Aron's conception of La France libre. And yet, while Aron went on to become a well-known French intellectual and journalist, the publication over which he exerted the greatest influence in his lifetime appears to have fallen into obscurity. Perhaps this is because the France-centred mythology that developed around the resistance after the war excluded the exile perspective, treating it as either irrelevant or simply complementary to the outcome of events in France. As the production of a patriotic community in exile, La France libre deserves at least some of the attention which has been accorded its better-known contributors.

Although the memoirs of those who spent World War II in London suggest that several publications played a vital role in community life there, historians of the period have failed to articulate this role.⁸ References to La France libre usually appear in the context of the internecine quarrels among the French in London. Predictably, the review is labeled anti-Gaullist, a reputation derived from the well-

⁷ Robert Marjolin, Le travail d'une vie: Mémoires 1911-1986 (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1986), 115. Robert Marjolin wrote for La France libre under the pseudonym Robert Vacher. See Appendix 2 on the use of pseudonyms in the journal.

⁸ The three publications most often referred to in wartime memoirs are: the daily France, edited by Pierre Comert; the monthly review La France libre; and the Gaullist publication La Marseillaise, edited by François Quilici and appearing every two weeks.

known animosities between Labarthe and de Gaulle.⁹ Michèle and Jean-Paul Cointet's recent study, La France à Londres, credits La France libre with having achieved a standard of excellence but, otherwise, does not demonstrate more than a passing interest in the role played by the periodical in the internal politics of the London French.¹⁰ Perhaps the most surprising omission of reference to La France libre is in Claude Bellanger's Histoire générale de la presse française. One of two brief references by Bellanger to the review journal cites a specific article,¹¹ and the other notes that La France libre had published, in its August 1941 number, several facsimile reproductions of resistance papers.¹² That La France libre frequently published extracts from the internal resistance press as well as articles by internal resisters is never mentioned by Bellanger, whose unexplained exclusion of the exile French press from his study must be interpreted as arbitrary.

A debatable assumption may underlie the demonstrated lack of historical interest in the French exile press of the Second World War, especially in a review journal like La France libre which appeared to

⁹ See, for example, Michèle and Jean-Paul Cointet, La France à Londres: Renaissance d'un état (1940-1943) (Bruxelles: Editions Complexe, 1990), 125-26; Charles de Gaulle, The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, vol. 2, Unity 1942-1944, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), 96; and Henri Michel, Les courants de pensée de la Résistance (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962), 785.

¹⁰ Cointet, France à Londres, 126.

¹¹ Claude Bellanger and others, Histoire générale de la presse française, vol. 4, De 1940 à 1958 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1975), 338.

¹² Bellanger, Histoire générale, 168. This also appears to be Henri Amouroux's sole reason for mentioning La France libre. Henri Amouroux, La grande histoire des Français sous l'occupation, vol. 4, Le peuple réveillé, juin 1940-avril 1942 (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1979), 200-01.

enjoy for a time an international reputation for excellence. In their focus on the political aspects of the Second World War, including the struggle to liberate France, historians seem to assume a simple extension of French culture to the exile communities.¹³ But this assumption ignores the possibility that the condition of exile can nurture new perspectives on the exiled person's country of origin. La France libre, for example, while rightly regarded as the work of French patriots living in London, must also be regarded as the product of its British and international context. In ignoring the relevance of the exile press, historians have neglected a source of important influence on postwar thinking in France.

As the centre of the resistance to Adolf Hitler and to his fascist designs, London became the temporary residence of many official and unofficial governments in exile and of those Europeans who decided, for whatever reasons, to leave their countries.¹⁴ It was also a city which came to be admired world-wide for the courage, good temper and resolution with which its inhabitants stood up to the Nazis. For the French citizens who spent all or part of the war in London, their establishment of an exile community was bound to be affected by the culture and institutions of the host country and by the international

¹³ References to the French in London as a microcosm of society in the home country are not infrequent. See, for example, Cointet, France à Londres, 123; and Michel, Les courants, 16.

¹⁴ Michel stresses the role played by Britain in the resistance, going so far as to claim that in "everything to do with clandestine resistance, Great Britain played the leading role, largely because Churchill advocated a proper Allied policy on the subject." According to Michel, from "June 1940 to November 1942 London was the arsenal, the banker and the headquarters of European resistance." Henri Michel, The Shadow War: Resistance in Europe 1939-1945, trans. Richard Barry (London: André Deutsch, 1972), 52-53.

character it had taken on in response to the war.

The demographic characteristics of the French community in London during World War II are still matters for speculation.¹⁵ A nucleus had existed before the war, made up of members of trade commissions, educational institutions like the *Alliance Française* and the *Institut Français*, and journalists. General de Gaulle's decision to make London his headquarters was convenient for adherents from the French services who happened to be outside France when the armistice was signed. By the end of July 1940, about 7000 members of the armed services had joined the Free French forces, some of whom had stayed after the Dunkirk evacuation while others had returned to Britain from the Norway expedition.¹⁶ Many French citizens were attracted to London not by de Gaulle, but by Churchill and the allied cause generally. French Jews, and others whose lives were at risk in their own country, simply found London safer than France. The months of June and July 1940 probably saw the major consolidation of the French wartime community in London, although additions to it arrived throughout the war and a major change in its composition occurred in May 1943 when de Gaulle moved the Fighting French to North Africa. The newspaper *France*, which apparently

¹⁵ Douglas Johnson estimates the French Colony in Great Britain in June 1940 at 12,000 persons, to which he adds approximately 2500 refugees and an undetermined number of members of the French armed services. Douglas Johnson, "Les Britanniques et les Gaullistes," in Les Armées françaises pendant la seconde guerre mondiale (Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense) Colloque de 1985 (Paris: 1986), 171.

¹⁶ De Gaulle himself uses the figure of 7000 in his wartime memoirs, and it is a figure which is often cited. Charles de Gaulle, War Memoirs, vol. 1, The Call to Honour 1940-1942, trans. Jonathan Griffin (London: Collins, 1955), 98.

apparently sold out its run of 35,000 copies daily throughout the war,¹⁷ might provide as accurate an indication as any of the size of the French speaking community in London, a community which would doubtless have included French speakers of other nationalities and the francophile British.

The French in London were notoriously factious, with the figure of Charles de Gaulle at the centre of most of the conflicts. Many of them joined de Gaulle's Free French movement and were prepared to support its development from an organization of exile resisters with a quasi-official status to a comprehensive political and military organization which claimed, and eventually received, official recognition as the provisional government of France. Many of the London French, however, preferred either to join the allied forces or to carry on their resistance activities independent of de Gaulle. This latter group tended to be sympathetic to the British and suspicious of the motives and tactics of the General. However, the reputed factionalism of the French in London may have obscured both the cultural cohesiveness of this exiled community and the links which it forged with its host country.

Geographically, the French tended to congregate in South and West Kensington near both Hyde Park and St. James's Park, an area long reputed to be the home of well-to-do Londoners. De Gaulle's headquarters, Carlton Gardens, were in this area as was *Le Petit Club Français* which

¹⁷ André Gillois, wrote that the "first number, of which 35,000 copies were printed, was sold out at noon. Throughout the war it had the same printing and the same sale. It was thus, very much read, even by the English, since more copies were printed than there were French in Great Britain." André Gillois, Histoire secrète des français à Londres de 1940 à 1944 (Paris: Hachette, 1973), 91.

was a meeting place for Gaullists and non-Gaullists alike.¹⁸ The *Maison de l'Institut*, which accommodated many French intellectuals before it was destroyed in 1943 in a bomb attack, was at the corner of Queen's Gate and Prince Consort Road.¹⁹ The *Institut Français*, also located in South Kensington, provided La France libre with office space.²⁰ A number of French restaurants appeared to have established themselves in the area, including *L'Ecu de France*, run by a flamboyant M. Herbodeau who was known to welcome daring escapees from France with a free meal.²¹ Several such restaurants ran regular advertisements in La France libre, appealing, no doubt, to both French and francophiles of discriminating taste.

The nature and extent of relations between the community of French exiles and their British hosts have been somewhat overshadowed by the more sensational hostilities which marked the relationship between Churchill and de Gaulle.²² Certainly the memoirs of the period suggest that, in addition to the frantic behind-the-scenes diplomacy carried out by British and Free French officials who recognized the importance of preserving good relations between the two groups, there were frequent opportunities for intellectual, business, and purely social interaction

¹⁸ Many references to *Le Petit Club Français* appear in the memoirs of the French who lived in London during the war. See, for example, Mengin, No Laurels, 191.

¹⁹ Mengin stayed there at the same time as Aron and provides an account of their political discussions and evening bridge sessions. Mengin, No Laurels, 104.

²⁰ Mengin, No Laurels, 189.

²¹ Gillois, Histoire secrète, 181-83.

²² See, François Kersaudy, Churchill and de Gaulle (London: Collins, 1981).

between the French and the British.²³ La France libre itself developed a number of important links with the British community, both in relation to its production and through the interpersonal relations of its contributors, providing one concrete example of the complex and mutually reinforcing relations between the two cultures.

The indeterminate cultural status of La France libre had a particular effect on its personality, encouraging it to develop two sides which were reconcilable only as long as both exile and resistance were informing perspectives. This thesis will examine the journal with a view to determining how the concepts of exile and resistance met in its production between November 1940 and the spring/summer of 1944. Chapter One concentrates on how La France libre's articulated mission was adapted to its cultural context. An underlying assumption here is that a dynamic existed among the various parties involved in the production of the periodical, including its readers, and that no feature of the journal is irrelevant to the understanding of that dynamic.²⁴

Chapter Two examines the resistance function of La France libre as it was expressed through propaganda. In asserting their patriotism and

²³ Hervé Alphand makes frequent references to British business contacts and to his social acquaintances among the British. Hervé Alphand, L'étonnement d'être: Journal 1939-1973 (Paris: Fayard, 1977), 115, 120. Aron also mentions British contacts. Raymond Aron, Memoirs: Fifty Years of Political Reflections, trans. George Holloch (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1990), 116-17. Mengin, who describes having worked at Carlton Gardens for a little over a month, disapproved of de Gaulle's anti-British attitudes and worked for part of the war editing a leaflet which the R.A.F. dropped over France. Mengin, No Laurels, 119-21, 143 ff.

²⁴ A book by Louis Pinto has stimulated many ideas which have informed this thesis, particularly his emphasis on the complex dynamic which exists between a journal's contributors and its readers. Louis Pinto, L'intelligence en action: Le Nouvel Observateur (Paris: Editions A.-M. Métailié, 1984).

in rallying foreigners to their cause, those who produced and wrote for La France libre employed techniques which were somewhat at odds with the other--the detached and judgemental--side of the journal's personality.

Chapter Three deals with the intellectual goals articulated for La France libre by its editorial team. The model for this side of the journal's personality did not derive from the partisan view supplied by propaganda; rather, it was based on the quest for rational truth and on toleration of the inevitable conflict that attends such a quest. The condition of exile here was not a disability to be overcome but rather an aid to objectivity. Debate and diversity, not agreement and unity, were the desirable outcome.

La France libre ceased publication in January 1947, after approximately one and a half years under the sole direction of Labarthe.²⁵ Without Aron, the commitment to intellectual issues had dwindled; without the war, its commitment to the liberation was irrelevant; without the enforced condition of exile, the expressions of British francophiles seemed trite. La France libre's major achievement must be seen to derive from the way in which it converted the pain of exile and the stimulation provided by foreign influences into a new kind of energy for France.

²⁵ Aron's name appears for the last time in the June 1945 issue. He had been carrying out his duties for almost a year from Paris.

CHAPTER 1

CREATIVE CONTRADICTIONS: THE TEXT IN CONTEXT

*Exile is always a test: the writer needs a public to address, needs the secret inspiration which emanates from an accustomed milieu, from a community of friends. How many, under an unknown sky and in a strange society have been incapable of finding a reason for expressing themselves, the will to create.*¹ Raymond Aron

Nowhere is the relation between a text and its context as vital as in the case of an exile periodical publication. Arthur Koestler, while a political exile in France in the 1930s, had tried to set up a German language weekly which would oppose Nazi propaganda and would put forward an alternative program. Despite what Koestler described as a "good start," Die Zukunft [The Future] failed within a few months, "as sooner or later most emigré papers do, cut off as they are from their native country and without real contact with the country of their exile."² For Koestler, a solution, or at least a *modus vivendi*, was accomplished by converting his World War II asylum in Britain to British citizenship and by involving himself in literary circles there--by doing something

¹ Raymond Aron, "Pensée française en exil (I): Le message de Bernanos," La France libre, May 1943, 22.

² Arthur Koestler, The Invisible Writing, vol. 2, Arrow in the Blue, (New York: Macmillan, 1954), 406.

which exiles generally do not intend to do but sometimes do anyway: trade their status as exiles for that of émigrés.³

In November 1940, a group of French intellectual exiles in London found themselves in an analogous position to that described by Koestler, wanting simultaneously to oppose the occupation of France by Germany and to promote ideas which would be directly relevant to the anticipated period of postwar reconstruction. The decision of the French exiles to adopt the format of the monthly review constituted a declaration of their intellectual aspirations for the journal, for they clearly conformed to a trend in French society which had seen the locus of intellectual life shift from the university to the periodical press.⁴ In deciding to publish a monthly review from London in November 1940, La France libre's editorial team made a choice which was not available to its internal counterparts. Inside France, the control of German censors in the occupied zone, and of Vichy censors in the unoccupied zone, had effectively eradicated the freedom of the press. Under Drieu La Rochelle, La Nouvelle Revue Française, considered one of the most

³ Paul Tabori defines an exile as "a person compelled to leave or remain outside his country of origin on account of well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion; a person who considers his exile temporary (even though it may last a lifetime), hoping to return to his fatherland when circumstances permit - but unable or unwilling to do so as long as the factors that made him an exile persist." He then elaborates on this definition, emphasizing the dynamic and constantly evolving relationship between an exile and the host country. Paul Tabori, The Anatomy of Exile: A Semantic and Historical Study (London: Harrap, 1972), 27, 37-38.

⁴ According to Régis Debray the period between 1920 and 1960 in France was one in which "the review forum became the intellectual army's main mode of territorial organization and a support for the strategies known as schools." Régis Debray, Teachers, Writers, Celebrities: The Intellectuals of Modern France, trans. David Macey (Great Britain: NLB, 1981), 72.

important journals of the 1930s,⁵ ceased to be an open forum for French ideas, and meaningful political debate was effectively removed from the purview of culture. Internal resisters were reduced either to working for the legitimate press in the unoccupied zone, construing official versions of events to point motivated readers towards hidden messages, or to risking their lives working for a clandestine publication.

Ironically, it was only from a location outside France that the trauma created by contemporary events could be fully acknowledged and allowed to exercise its inevitable influence on the ideas which had preoccupied many intellectuals in the interwar period. La France libre's relative longevity as an exile periodical derived partly from the fact that the transient mentality associated with the condition of exile was upheld by the journal's readers and contributors and made integral to its editorial outlook.

La France libre survived the war and was read because its editorial team succeeded in exploiting the many contradictions and unresolved tensions which informed its production. At the heart of these contradictions was its directors' simultaneous adoption of a political program and an intellectual one, of an emotional response to the catastrophe of defeat and the alienation of exile, and a rational response to the problems of the postwar rebuilding of France. The directors' attempt to maintain this dual commitment and to make it mutually informing was facilitated--not inhibited--by the plurality of worlds which constituted wartime London. The remainder of this chapter, will demonstrate how La France libre's key personnel drew on these

⁵ Debray, Teachers, Writers, 67.

plural contexts, fashioning them into a point of view which constituted a distinctive dimension of the French resistance movement.

The opening number of La France libre provides ample evidence of the degree to which both its founders and early supporters attempted to balance a strong emotional commitment to the cause of the resistance with a potentially conflicting set of intellectual aspirations.⁶ It also provides evidence, in the publication of extracts from letters of support, of how wide a context and culturally diverse a constituency were envisioned for La France libre. A critical reading of the journal's first issue--including its opening statement and concluding letters of support--demonstrates the degree to which potentially contradictory influences and ideas were presented as the basis for an authentic representation of French culture.

The most documentary evidence to be found in La France libre of the degree to which its founders wanted it to be an intellectual journal with an international and multi-cultural readership is provided by the inclusion of extracts from letters of support, letters which had been solicited by William Bragg, President of the Royal Society. These extracts reveal that the intellectuals conscripted to the cause had a personal as well as a rational and detached appreciation of France. The thirty-six published responses came from three countries--Canada, the U.S.A. and Britain--and while the majority of respondents were

⁶ Only one name appeared on the title page of the opening number, that of its editor, André Labarthe. However, personal accounts of the period concur in associating Labarthe, Raymond Aron, Martha Lecoutre and Stanislas Szymanczyk (Staro) as both the founders of the journal and its ongoing editorial team. See, for example, Marjolin, Le travail, 114; Louis de Villefosse, Les îles de la liberté: Aventures d'un marin de la France libre (Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1972), 239; and Aron, Memoirs, 117-18.

academics, there were also business people, publishers and writers.⁷ Bragg's letter of solicitation, which was reproduced in the journal in English, confidently asserted that "the periodical is not to contain propaganda." Rather, he wrote, "the project if it is to justify itself must of course have such an intrinsic value that scholars will welcome it for its own sake."⁸ And yet, the tone of many of the responses indicated more than a disinterested stake in the cause of the resistance. Carleton Stanley, President of Dalhousie University, assured the founders that La France libre would be supported: "None of us here believe that French civilisation is at an end, much as we lament the unhappy plight of France in these days."⁹ And one Noel Streatfield, an apparent neighbour of the French exile community, with an address in Bolton Street, Picadilly, assured the new journal's founders that:

The horror which has engulfed your country is in many respects as though it were a horror which had engulfed our own; for to the average Briton France was a second home, a country just over the water where one could, with less trouble than going to Scotland, find oneself in a different world, soaking in all those qualities of gaiety and culture that we especially love in your people.¹⁰

Clearly, while Bragg had solicited the support of English-speaking intellectuals and had promised them a non-propagandistic treatment of subjects, most respondents understood that they were being asked to

⁷ See Appendix 1 for a list of those whose letters were quoted.

⁸ William Bragg, letter dated August 1940, La France libre, November 1940, 92.

⁹ Extract from letter by Carleton Stanley, dated September 1940, La France libre, November 1940, 95.

¹⁰ Noel Streatfield, extract from letter dated September 1940, La France libre, November 1940, 96.

endorse a political program, the liberation of France, and most, particularly the British, were moved to exercise their emotional rather than their rational sensibilities on France's behalf.

While it would be difficult to categorize the two-page statement opening the first issue of La France libre as other than propaganda,¹¹ its editorial stress on ideas as instruments of action was consistent with the later efforts of Aron and other journal contributors to re-define the role of the French intellectual and to insist that ideas cannot be separated from action. Emotional in tone and patriotic in emphasis, these first few pages introduced some of the basic themes of the allied propaganda, including the representation of France as the trustee of the concept of liberty, the characterization of the Germans as the stereotypical enemy, and the presentation of Great Britain as France's most steadfast ally and the leader of a world-wide struggle in the cause of peace and liberty.¹² Surprising as the tone may have seemed to those asked to support a non-propagandistic venture, the claim that ideas were equivalent to action was tantamount to admitting that propaganda, in some form, was required. For those who played a large

¹¹ In discussing the term propaganda in relation to La France libre, I have not relied on any narrow definitions of the term. A.P.Foulkes provides an excellent introduction to the basic ideas of propaganda and to its theorists. I also found Jacques Ellul's ideas useful, particularly his way of discriminating among different sorts of propaganda and his tendency to treat it as a social phenomenon. A.P.Foulkes, Literature and Propaganda, New Accents Series (London and New York: Methuen, 1983). Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes, trans. Konrad Kellen and Jean Lerner (New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 1969).

¹² References were made in this article to France having been "struck down" and "profaned" by the Germans. The word "crusade" was used to describe the mission being set for La France libre, a mission which was to rescue France from "strangulation" and restore her "real voice." Untitled and unsigned article, La France libre, November 1940, 3-5.

part in the production of the journal throughout the war, accepting and then having to define a role for propaganda constituted a major challenge.

While La France libre's introductory issue contradicted itself on the issue of propaganda, it was similarly ambivalent with respect to its intended audience. While the editorial point of view was clearly that of the French exile, the journal's anticipated non-French constituency, many of whose letters were quoted in the issue, was not ignored in the rhetoric. To be a French resistant, it was necessary only to know France and to participate in the struggle to liberate the country. In fact, the impression left by the first issue, that English-speaking readers formed a significant proportion of the journal's audience, was corroborated years later by Aron, in conversation with Dominique Wolton and Jean-Louis Missika. Asked to defend his point of view in the "Chronique de France" feature, Aron insisted that he "was writing for the French who were outside France [and] for the English who wished to understand and who had no difficulty detesting all that was going on in France."¹³ That a publication of the French resistance should have relied so heavily on a non-French readership was just one of the contradictions which the journal supported by converting it from a liability to a virtue: by welcoming foreign readers as though they were French, La France libre's editorial team indicated its predisposition to welcome foreign ideas and to make them also French.

The group of four who founded La France libre--and who remained the core of its production team throughout the war--represented both the

¹³ Aron, Spectateur engagé, 98-99.

cultural diversity of London during this period and some of the conflicts which divided members of the French community. André Labarthe, scientist by training, depicted in the wartime memoirs of the period as quixotic in temperament, politically ambitious but largely unsuccessful in his ambitions, fervent Gaullist turned equally fervent anti-Gaullist, was the founder and titular editor of La France libre until its demise in January 1947.¹⁴ Despite the fact that Labarthe's decision to establish the journal was, apparently, made in response to a request by General de Gaulle,¹⁵ it was partly his siding with Admiral Muselier against de Gaulle in the disagreements between these two military leaders, and later his joining of the American-supported General Giraud in North Africa, which resulted in La France libre's anti-Gaullist reputation. However, neither the remaining three of La France libre's founding members, nor the approximately two hundred contributors to the journal between its inception and the liberation of Paris in August 1944, were forced into the mould which Labarthe established for himself. Ethnically diverse, trained in a variety of disciplines, and often more temperate or indulgent in their views towards de Gaulle than the editor himself, those who wrote for the journal or assisted it in some other way shared Labarthe's commitment to

¹⁴ Labarthe figures frequently in memoirs of the period but only as a cameo character. Duroselle and Soustelle both report him as having been head of de Gaulle's armaments service until their first falling out after Dakar. Alphand, L'étonnement, 89, 92; Aron, Memoirs, 119, 128-29, 143; Cointet, France à Londres, 126-27; Jean Baptiste Duroselle, L'abîme (Paris: Livre de Poche, 1982), 304-05; Gillois, Histoire secrète, 105; Soustelle, Envers, 46-49.

¹⁵ Aron, Memoirs, 118.

the liberation of France and his openness to the multiple influences of life as an exile in London.

Mme Martha Lecoutre, about whom very little can be gleaned from contemporary memoirs other than that she was female, Jewish, Polish by birth, French through a marriage alliance, formerly Communist in her political inclinations, and the only one of La France libre's founding members to have assisted in its financing, provokes a curiosity barely satisfied by understanding her to have represented many of the diverse influences which came to be reflected in the journal's pluralist stance.¹⁶ Although Aron described La France libre's business manager and public relations director as having been vital to the journal's success,¹⁷ and although she was characterized by one contributor as a woman of "feverish activity and masculine intelligence,"¹⁸ Lecoutre's name never appeared in print on La France libre's title page and the full nature and extent of her involvement with the journal remain obscure. The apparent contradictions in her background--female with business, Communist with wealth, Polish origins with a French name, and Jewish with influence--can be reconciled in relation to the period and to the prevailing culture in London. At the least, she can be seen as representing the cultural diversity and the plurality of ideas on which

¹⁶ Martha Lecoutre is mentioned in several personal accounts of the period in relation to the journal, though neither the details of her background nor her postwar activities are mentioned in any of these accounts. According to Gillois she brought two hundred thousand francs to the venture. See Aron, Memoirs, 117-19; Marjolin, Le travail, 114; Villefosse, Les îles, 239; and Gillois, Histoire secrète, 103.

¹⁷ Aron referred to Lecoutre as the "moving spirit" of La France libre. Aron, Memoirs, 119.

¹⁸ Villefosse, Les îles, 239.

the journal thrived. At the most, in light of the fact that she signed no articles herself, it is tempting to think of her as having attracted many of the Polish contributors to the journal, and as having had the requisite combination of left-wing thinking and aristocratic breeding to fulfill her public relations role with the British intelligentsia who provided so much support to the journal.

La France libre's third founding member, Stanislas Szymanczyk--a Pole known in exile circles in London as Staro--was unable to speak either French or English although a series of articles on military strategy are generally attributed to his authorship.¹⁹ These articles, which were written by Staro and translated by Aron, were claimed by the latter to have "made the reputation of the journal and [to have given] it its intellectual authority."²⁰ They also provided de Gaulle's staff at Carlton Gardens with an expertise which they apparently lacked.²¹ While it was the superficial incongruities of the situation which provoked Mengin into describing Aron's translation or mediation sessions with Staro as the practice of gynaecology,²² the real importance of these incongruities should not be overlooked. That German was the language in which Staro and Aron communicated in order to produce articles for a French intellectual journal of the resistance, and that these articles should have epitomized the journal's analytical and

¹⁹ See Gillois, Histoire secrète, 103.

²⁰ Aron, Memoirs, 118-19.

²¹ Aron noted that "specialists read them attentively," and Mengin described the eagerness with which the articles were awaited at Carlton Gardens. Aron, Spectateur engagé, 82; Mengin, No Laurels, 188-89.

²² Mengin, No Laurels, 188-89.

practical goals, suggest the degree to which this French exile publication succeeded in incorporating and appropriating non-French perspectives on French problems. In adopting a stance to his subject which relegated partisanship to the background and which cultivated an international view of events, Staro, about whom little is known as an individual, established one model of the kind of writing which La France libre's production team strove to achieve--writing in which ideas were made to serve practical ends without sacrificing rational principles.

Raymond Aron, the last of La France libre's founding members to be conscripted,²³ was also the most self-conscious of the four in his determination to validate the exile perspective in a French intellectual journal and to reconcile the frequently opposed stances of the emotional patriot and the disinterested critic.²⁴ Insistent on retaining his double identity as both Frenchman and Jew, Aron was empowered by a vision which Labarthe lacked, and was aided in realizing it by the editor's frequent abdication of his own editorial responsibilities. Aron's influence over La France libre, judged by his contemporaries to have been considerable, may very likely have been that of *de facto* editor.²⁵ Most obviously, it is in his own writing for the journal

²³ In his memoirs, Aron describes the occasion on which he was approached by Labarthe, Lecoutre and Staro and persuaded to take on the position of editorial secretary. His original intention had been to join the Free French forces and to return to France with the army. Aron, Memoirs, 118.

²⁴ In his memoirs, Aron recounts a personal decision, made while he was in Germany in the mid-1930s, to strive for objectivity but to do so without accepting the disengaged attitude of the spectator. Aron, Memoirs, 39.

²⁵ Memoirs of the period frequently mention Aron as a presence in the offices of La France libre and depict him in translation sessions with Staro or reviewing manuscripts. Labarthe, on the other hand, was often

that his endorsement of plural perspectives, and his belief in the virtue of balancing commitment with objectivity, can be recognized. In writing the unsigned "Chronique de France" series he demonstrated both that exiles could be patriots and that propaganda could be at the same time measured and effective: in writing and signing a very different set of articles on subjects related to French culture and society, he contended that patriots must also be critics and that propaganda must never be believed. The last of La France libre's founding members to be added to the team, Aron used his personal vision to create out of conflict and contradiction an authentic vehicle for the expression of the French resistance in exile.

The ideological differences and clash of personal styles which marked the long term relations between Labarthe and Aron, while they may have compromised the quality of some of the journal's contents and disaffected or confused some of its supporters, probably resulted in a wider circle of readers and contributors than could have been solicited by either one or the other.²⁶ Active in social and political circles, and trained in science, Labarthe likely enlisted the support of William Bragg and encouraged the several testimonies to the value of scientific

away and, when in London, tended to be preoccupied with his political intrigues. See, for example, Marjolin, Le travail, 114-15; Soustelle, Envers, 48; and Villefosse, Les îles, 239-40.

²⁶ Aron's references to Labarthe in his memoirs suggest that their relationship ended with a great deal of bitterness on Aron's side. While Aron acknowledges the fact that the journal would not have existed without Labarthe, he also suggests that it lost direction because of him. He explains his decision to leave the journal in 1945 by noting that they had serious "political and personal differences." When Gillois interviewed Aron on 10 February 1972 prior to writing his Histoire secrète, Aron said of Labarthe: "J'en pense trop de bien pour en dire du mal. J'en pense trop de mal pour en dire du bien." Aron, Memoirs, 119, 143; Gillois, Histoire secrète, 102.

exchange which appeared during the first year of the journal's operation.²⁷ It was almost certainly Labarthe who drew anti-Gaullists, such as his friend Admiral Muselier, into the circle of the journal's contributors. Aron, on the other hand, whose prewar friendship with Robert Marjolin was based on shared values and opinions, certainly influenced his friend's official involvement with the journal as its second editorial secretary, while it was differences between Marjolin and Labarthe that led to the former's leaving the journal to work for de Gaulle.²⁸ It was also likely to have been Aron who cultivated the minor but important involvement of British intellectuals--such as D. W. Brogan and Harold Laski--as contributors. However, despite occasional evidence that Aron objected to material which Labarthe wanted to publish,²⁹ the tensions between them appear to have been successfully managed until the end of the war. Whether by accident or by deliberate policy, the many contributors to La France libre during the first four years of the journal's publication were as varied and as incompatible in their backgrounds, styles and beliefs as those who founded and continued to produce the journal throughout the war.

As a group, those who contributed articles to La France libre during the period which preceded the liberation of Paris demonstrated

²⁷ See, for example, Sir Richard Gregory, "La communauté universelle de la science," La France libre, November 1940, 42-44; and William Bragg, "Paul Langevin," December 1940, 103-04.

²⁸ Robert Marjolin describes his association with the journal, referring to his differences with Labarthe as being one of the primary reasons for his departure. Marjolin, Le travail, 114-15.

²⁹ Villefosse recounts in his memoirs an incident in which an article which he had written was published by Labarthe despite Aron's criticisms. Villefosse, Les îles, 107.

that while they shared a commitment to the journal's resistance program, they did so with various and often conflicting notions of what that commitment entailed and with equally varied ideas about the importance and the ultimate shape of post-liberation France. Although these competing views were largely suppressed or smoothed over by the propagandistic emphasis on unity, an examination of the three main categories of contributors, the French themselves, their fellow European exiles, and their British hosts, reveals the degree to which conflict and diversity were made to work for La France libre, enabling its production team to make a coherent and appealing whole out of a potentially divisive program. In the end, what mattered was not whether contributors were pro- or anti-Gaullist, indulgent or harsh in their attitudes to Vichy, for a postwar planned economy or advocates of *laissez-faire*. Underlying these surface differences was the deeper issue of the way in which exile affected the contributors in carrying out their perceived responsibilities both as patriots and as intellectuals. Here there were some differences among the national groups.

For the French, for whom exile was a real and not an imagined state, and for whom the difficulties of postwar reconstruction were complicated by collaboration, maintaining an emotional commitment to France involved defining the entity to which they owed allegiance.³⁰ Because they were motivated by a belief that France was in need of

³⁰ According to Andrew Shennan the national humiliation suffered by the French in 1940 meant that, for them, postwar reform always had the underlying agenda of the "renewal of national power." Andrew Shennan, Rethinking France: Plans for Renewal 1940-1946 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 10-11.

renewal, it was the French contributors who most thoroughly engaged themselves with the problem of making their exile inform their nationalism.

Approximately eighty of the contributors to La France libre between November 1940 and August 1944 were French, living either in London, in America or in France.³¹ Their striking diversity, as regards age, gender, occupation, political and religious orientation, and location indicates the success with which La France libre was able to capture a constituency within its own exile community, despite that community's dispersion and differences. By being inclusive rather than exclusive in its selection of French contributors, La France libre made a case for the vitality of pluralism as a principle in society, requiring of its contributors only the patriotic gesture of declaring themselves for the resistance. That age, for instance, was no bar to uniting contributors in patriotism, even though it tended to divide them in their response to the condition of exile, can be seen by juxtaposing the contributions of Henri Focillon, an established medieval scholar whose hopes for the liberation were framed in the mythical rhetoric of nationalist propaganda,³² with those of Robert Marjolin, a young man at

³¹ Determining the precise number of contributors in any category is not easy and is complicated by the fact that pseudonyms were used, articles were anonymously authored and, in some cases, only initials were used. See Appendix 2 on the use of pseudonyms in the journal.

³² Henri Focillon contributed only two articles to La France libre. However, the respect in which he was held by the journal's directors can be deduced from the fact that his obituary was published in the March 1944 issue of the journal and in February 1944 his posthumously published book, Moyen Age, survivances et réveils, was reviewed by Denise Van Moppès (Denise V. Ayme). See, Henri Focillon, La France libre, "Vie d'une nation, 1919-1939," March 1941, 406-15; and "Fonction universelle de la France," May 1941, 19-25.

the beginning of his career, whose dedication to a postwar vision of France was cast in relation to international economic theory and an ardent desire for reform.

French women, as well as men, were conscripted into the circle of contributors, although their proportional representation probably did not exceed that of their representation in the exile communities. Denise Van Moppès, for example, who wrote for the journal under the name Denise V. Ayme, played a key role in developing the topic of propaganda analysis, writing a series of articles which aimed at demystifying the enemy's propaganda by analysing newspapers written in French, German and Italian. Like other French women who either found themselves in London for a period of time or who had some other connection with the journal--women like Eve Curie, Sadi de Gorter and Lucie Aubrac--the involvement of Van Moppès with La France libre suggests the degree to which the review was recognized in the exile community and known to be a vehicle for diverse points of view.³³ Unlike the other women, however, Van Moppès was, for a time, a major contributor, an indication that La France libre's commitment to pluralism was not, in matters of gender, restricted to the casual or occasional writer.³⁴

³³ Eve Curie, who was in London briefly at the beginning of the war wrote one article for the journal before she became a war journalist based in New York. Sadi de Gorter wrote three nostalgic and impressionistic articles for the journal. Lucie Aubrac, a resistance refugee in London at the end of the war wrote one brief testament. All that these women appear to have had in common was that they spent a brief period of time in London.

³⁴ In addition to reviewing books for La France libre, Ayme (Van Moppès) wrote eight articles for the journal between May 1941 and August 1942. This pattern of contribution, which was not untypical, suggests that she wrote for the journal while she remained in London. See Appendix 2 for the use of pseudonyms in the journal.

As was appropriate for an exile publication--even an intellectual one--the credentials of the contributors to La France libre tended to be confusing. For instance, was a naval officer turned broadcaster and aspiring to be a writer contributing in one of the above capacities or all three?³⁵ The mere fact that few of the contributors were writing in one capacity, even those who had been intellectuals by both training and profession before the war, was significant. In accepting authors with various academic backgrounds and from a variety of professions, La France libre's editorial team rejected too narrow or academic a definition of the qualified contributor.

Diversity was also welcomed where subtle or even pronounced differences of opinion on issues of a political or religious nature were at stake, although the journal tended to deflect confrontational debate. That Cohen should write as a Jew while Maritain and Bernanos wrote as Catholic Christians, for instance, was never as important as the fact that all three were writing as patriots. Similarly, the anti-Gaullism of Labarthe and Mengin was explicit in their articles--never explicit--while the Gaullism of Marjolin, Jean Oberlé or Denis Saurat, although rarely far beneath the surface of their articles, was never presented in a confrontational manner.

Even with respect to the geographical origins of its French contributors, La France libre maintained its commitment to be broadly representative. While the exile community in London made up the bulk of

³⁵ This was the case with Louis de Villefosse, who left the Free French Navy when de Gaulle and Admiral Muselier split and then joined the BBC French service. Villefosse wrote for La France libre under the name, Laurent de Meauce. (See Appendix 2 on the use of pseudonyms.) Villefosse, Les îles, 223-39.

the French contributors, its counterpart in America was represented by articles written by, among others, Focillon, Bernanos, and Maritain. The inclusion of articles by those who stayed in France, though obviously difficult to manage, appears to have been maintained throughout the war. In some cases these contributors were simply described as living in France and their articles appeared without signatures. In other cases, pseudonyms were apparently used, as is probably the case with a series of articles on the resistance which appeared under the name of Jean Castellane.³⁶ By maintaining a wide and varied representation among its French contributors, La France libre not only assured itself of an ongoing constituency of readers but enhanced its claim to represent the unconstrained spirit of the French resistance.

While all the French contributors to La France libre were committed resisters who accepted the idea that differences of opinion sometimes had to be subordinated to the drive for unity, they were deeply divided on the issue of how best to make their unwanted condition of exile serve both their personal and their professional interests. Many, for whom exile was a condition without benefits, rejected the possibility that distance could facilitate intellectual objectivity. Nostalgia was the predominant response of this group to their loss of country, and postwar concerns were less important than the political goal of liberating France. Albert Cohen whose four part "Song of Death" took the nostalgic response to exile to the extreme limit of reflective

³⁶ Castellane wrote six articles for La France libre between April and October of 1943, all on the resistance or the state of affairs in France. See Appendix 2 on the use of pseudonyms in the journal.

self-pity, and for whom patriotism demanded a purely visceral rather than intellectual response, epitomized this point of view.³⁷ Not all his fellow contributors were of the same opinion. Marjolin, for example, who wrote that he "was a resistant by [his] intellectual convictions," firmly believed that the concepts of intellectuality, resistance and exile were linked. For him, it was only from a location outside France that the intellect could be effectively applied as a tool to help bring about the liberation and, equally important, to plan for the period of postwar reconstruction.³⁸ Within the context of the journal, these radically different responses to the condition of exile did not represent warring factions; rather they represented the poles between which the French contributors struggled to comprehend and define their own positions. If it was those who rejected the informing capabilities of exile who were most comfortable with the mythic vision of France supported by the allied propaganda, it was those who accepted distance as an informing perspective who were in the vanguard of the postwar reformers. For the latter group, propaganda was a tool to aid in the recovery of France, while it was exile which had helped to define the direction of necessary reforms, both of institutions and of the intellectual élite who would run them.

The more than forty Europeans, including Scandinavians, who wrote for La France libre between November 1940 and the summer of 1944, and who faced many of the same problems of cultural displacement as did the French, also had to account for feelings of humiliation, anger and

³⁷ See Albert Cohen, "Chant de mort," La France libre, June 1943, 99-105; July 1943, 188-99; February 1944, 280-87; and May 1944, 47-54.

³⁸ Marjolin, Le travail, 116.

regret. By drawing extensively on the European exile community in London for contributors, La France libre's editorial team was able to accomplish two things: it extended its reading constituency to the exile communities whose own countries' trials received some coverage in the journal and, by demonstrating that many European countries shared problems similar to those of the French, it was able to imply the need for international solutions. A diverse group, composed of representatives of several European countries, the European exiles who contributed to La France libre tended to reinforce the view that insularity was a far greater liability than it was a virtue.

The European contributors, who came from countries such as Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Poland, Rumania, Serbia, and Czechoslovakia had, like the French, adapted their prewar educational and social backgrounds to a variety of wartime occupations. Many, having had political, military or diplomatic careers, attached themselves to one of the official governments in exile which had been set up in London. This was true, for example, of Marcel-Henri Jaspar, J. W. Beyen and Stanislas Mikolajczyk to name only three.³⁹ Others, like Matila Ghyka and Marie Kuncewiczowa appear to have arrived as

³⁹ Stanislas Mikolajczyk was identified at the beginning of the article he wrote for La France libre as Minister of the Interior and Vice-President of the Polish Council. In his memoirs Marcel-Henri Jaspar provides an account of both the political and diplomatic career which preceeded his arrival in London and his involvement with the Belgian and Czech communities during the war. J. W. Beyen, whose prewar occupations had been in banking and business, was made financial adviser of the Royal Netherlands Government in London. See Stanislas Mikolajczyk, "C'est en Pologne qu'on apprend à connaître l'Allemagne," February 1943, 261-67; Marcel-Henri Jaspar, Souvenirs sans retouche, vol. 2, Changement de décors: Londres - Prague - Buenos Aires - Rio de Janeiro (Fayard, 1972), 465-75; and J.W.Beyen, Money in a Maelstrom (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949), 141.

refugees with the means to support themselves.⁴⁰ While some of this group may have come from privileged and upper-class backgrounds, what brought them to London was their determination to resist Germany from a politically congenial location in exile and to make use of whatever tools they had at their disposal to bring about their desired goals. It is not surprising, then, that while they frequently wrote as devoted nationalists--attached to the literature and the customs of their own countries--their more noticeable effect on the journal was to add emphasis to the themes of internationalism and postwar reconstruction.⁴¹

The fact that La France libre incorporated into its structure so many contributions by non-French exiles, despite its declared goal of providing a forum for the continuation of French culture, represents the editors' desire to reject the "France alone" mentality which Aron, and others, believed had greatly undermined prewar France. In effect, the journal exemplified the model of international dialogue and cross-cultural influence which had arisen almost by accident in London during the war, and which the exiles found so personally stimulating. By representing European experiences of exile as similar to their own and by presenting ideas in an international rather than in a predominantly

⁴⁰ See, Matila Ghyka, The World Mine Oyster (London: Heinemann, 1961); and Maria Kuncewiczowa, The Keys: A Journey through Europe at War (London: Hutchinson International Authors Ltd., n.d.).

⁴¹ Some articles published in La France libre which deal with reconstruction issues include: Leon Baranski, "Esquisse des problèmes économiques polonais," May 1943, 62-68; Wilhelm Keilhau, "Les pays nordiques dans l'économie d'après-guerre," December 1942, 117-24; Arne Ording, "Le destin de la Norvège," September 1942, 340-47; Alf Sommerfelt, "La société Norvégienne et ses problèmes d'après-guerre," February 1943, 281-86; Stanislas Stronski, "Un fait nouveau dans le droit des gens: l'article trois de la Charte d'Atlantique," February 1944, 270-74.

French context, La France libre's directors implied both the inherent value of pluralism and the relevance of an international approach to the postwar reconstruction of France.

Underlying La France libre's relations with its approximately fifty British contributors were two contradictory notions. Firstly, the idea of France cherished by the many upper class British intellectuals who wrote for the journal was not that of the French reformers, who looked instead to the British economists--not necessarily francophiles--for inspiration. Secondly, by drawing on the moral support offered by British francophiles, and by incorporating their nostalgic expressions into its resistance program, the journal was able to secure a British constituency among intellectuals for whom exile was simply an extended exercise in imaginative sympathy. Underlying these contradictions, of course, are the historical stereotypes of British admiration for French culture and society and the more grudging French admiration for British enterprise. That La France libre's editorial team was able to rely on both these stereotypes without turning them into parody is a good indicator of their ability to establish their publication in a foreign context.

Like Noel Streatfield--whose letter was quoted earlier in this chapter--David Eccles, a Member of the British Parliament who contributed to the April 1944 issue of La France libre, claimed France as "my chief neighbor who lives in a beautiful house where I always feel at home."⁴² For these and many other of the journal's British contributors, a proprietorial attitude towards France, grounded in the

⁴² David Eccles, in "What France Means to You," La France libre, April 1944, 404.

education and travel which were part of their privileged upper class lives, was an indication that in desiring an alternative home, they did not want it to resemble Britain. The majority of these British intellectuals--such as Raymond Mortimer, Vita Sackville-West, Violet Trefusis, Harold Nicolson, H. G. Wells, Kathleen Raine, Herbert Read and Stephen Spender--were exempted from the full psychological effects of France's defeat and occupation by their British origins. If they saw a need for political and economic restructuring--and it is only fair to assume they did--the weight of their interests was certainly not on the side of reform. In fact, the degree to which the British aesthetic and material interests in France were potentially threatened by the ideas of the reformers was strongly conveyed in an article by Sir Kenneth Clark on "The Louvre." Worried that any change was bound to disturb the "venerable harmony" of the past, Clark put forward his belief that in a postwar planned economy the Louvre would simply be regarded as an extravagant anachronism.⁴³ Like many of his compatriots, Clark valued most in France what many of the French exiles viewed as anachronistic and he expressed himself in terms which were best represented by the allied propaganda. Not faced with either the reality of exile or the humiliation of defeat, the majority of British intellectuals who wrote for La France libre felt no need to question their aestheticism.

A few of the journal's British contributors brought to their articles the characteristics for which the French reformers were searching in a foreign intellectual tradition. D. W. Brogan, in the three articles he wrote for La France libre, dealt with the same

⁴³ Sir Kenneth Clark, "Le Louvre," La France libre, August 1942, 267-70.

subjects which preoccupied the French exiles, such as the meaning of the defeat and the future of France, and his analyses were both too complex and too critical to be categorized as propaganda.⁴⁴ Harold Laski, writing his "Reflections on the Future of France" in the October 1941 issue of La France libre, and relying on one of Aron's intellectual models, de Toqueville, argued much as Aron himself did that the Third Republic, despite its faults, had given "a social and political reality to the democratic principle" in France and that Vichy, on account of its historical anachronicity, was bound to fail.⁴⁵ In approaching French problems from a critical and non-aesthetic viewpoint, Brogan and Laski more closely resembled the British intellectual tradition which French contributors, like Aron and Marjolin, had discovered in the economists Ricardo, Marshall and Keynes.⁴⁶ By identifying with a British intellectual tradition--past and present--which supported its reform program without insulting or rejecting the upper class aesthetic intellectuals who had rallied to the journal, La France libre's production team guaranteed the journal an important constituency in its host country, one which was capable of supporting both its resistance and its intellectual commitments.

⁴⁴ See D. W. Brogan, "La tragédie du nationalisme intégral," La France libre, January 1941, 242-51; "Maurice Barrès: Formation et progrès d'un nationaliste," January 1942, 187-97; and "La France dans le monde," December 1943, 85-90.

⁴⁵ Harold Laski, "Réflexions sur l'avenir de la France," La France libre, October 1941, 486-91. Aron's argument on the inevitability of Vichy's failure is developed in the 'Chronique de France' series and is discussed in Chapter 2.

⁴⁶ Marjolin, Le travail, 117-23.

In order to manage the diversity and fluidity of their cultural context without sacrificing their dual commitment, La France libre's small production team devised at least two basic ways of dealing with its contributors. The first, which consisted of a form of extended collaboration, applied mainly to its French contingent, and gave rise to some of the most interesting evidence of how the events of the war were being processed and understood by the French exiles. The second, mainly evidenced in the way the journal dealt with its British contributors, involved publishing brief and occasional articles by well-known figures in British society, a device which must have appealed to its English-speaking readers at the same time as it upheld the allied propaganda of unity. That these patterns developed spontaneously and were not rigidly applied does not interfere with the insights they provide regarding La France libre's success in sustaining its concerns with audience.

The formal addition of Robert Marjolin to the team from December 1941 to October 1942--as its second editorial secretary--is the paradigmatic example of the first of these patterns. Marjolin's important collaboration with La France libre, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three, began with an article he wrote for the June 1941 issue and ended in July 1943, by which time he had written fourteen major pieces. Resident in London during the period of his intense involvement with the journal, and wondering how best to employ his talents on behalf of the resistance, he apparently found working with Aron, Lecoutre and Staro to be stimulating and rewarding. His decision to leave, probably based on a dislike of Labarthe, led him first to work with de Gaulle at Carlton Gardens and then to join Jean Monnet in America planning for the postwar aid which that country would supply to

France.⁴⁷ Marjolin brought to La France libre a combination of energetic patriotism, youthful optimism and a great enthusiasm for "anglo-saxon" economics, all of which were reflected in his articles. The period of his participation emerges--in retrospect--as a high point for the journal.⁴⁸ It also demonstrates the way in which the small core team which worked for La France libre was able to draw, for the period of their availability, on members of the French exile community whose personal views about the need to convert exile into a positive force for France resembled those of Aron in particular.

This pattern of collaborative participation--evidently extended to French exiles such as Pierre Maillaud, Albert Cohen and Denise Van Moppès, to European exiles such as Marcel-Henri Jaspar and J. W. Beyen, and to members of the internal resistance such as Joseph Kessel and Jean Castellane--may have arisen out of the informal debate and discussion which many of the contemporary accounts record as having been so stimulating. J. W. Beyen, for example, wrote enthusiastically about the excitement generated by the juxtaposition of so many allied governments and about the general predisposition for both official and unofficial groups to meet and discuss the anticipated economic and financial problems of postwar Europe:

⁴⁷ Marjolin, Le travail, 114-15, 120-22.

⁴⁸ In his own memoirs, Aron quotes at length from an article written by Jean-Paul Sartre for Combat after the war in which the articles written by Marjolin were singled out for favourable comment. It is interesting that Andrew Shennan referred to one of them in Rethinking France, commenting on the interest manifested by La France libre in postwar issues. Shennan uses Marjolin's pseudonym, Robert Vacher, indicating that he has not made the connection between the author of the article and Monnet's group. See Aron, Memoirs, 120; and Shennan, Rethinking France, 57.

Neither the black-out nor bombs prevented us from dining in small groups and meeting in large ones. We all had our offices and clubs on a territory of a few square miles: Piccadilly was our Main Street.⁴⁹

The possibility that informal collaboration among contributors may even have been extended to the creation of an editorial committee for La France libre is suggested by Cohen's biographer, who referred to his subject's having joined such a committee in May 1941.⁵⁰ What is clear from examining the patterns of contribution in the journal itself and from reading personal accounts of the period written by contributors is that by participating in many of the intersecting circles which comprised the exile community in London, La France libre's directors were able to draw on key representatives from these circles with whom to collaborate on their own production.

Personal accounts of the period, which indicate considerable support for La France libre from the British, may help to explain why the journal developed its second pattern of contribution, the publication of brief and frequently nostalgic articles written by members of the British upper class intelligentsia. Mengin, for example, referred to the former wife of H. G. Wells, the Baroness Budberg, as having "helped" La France libre, and Villefosse specified that her help was in the form of providing literary and political contacts in Britain.⁵¹ Other female names associated with the journal in accounts of the period were a Mme Michaelis and a devoted francophile by the name

⁴⁹ J.W. Beyen, Money, 141-42. Beyen goes on in this passage to refer to Labarthe as one of the people frequently involved in such meetings.

⁵⁰ Jean Blot, Albert Cohen (Editions Balland, 1986), 214.

⁵¹ Mengin, No Laurels, 189. Villefosse, Les îles, 239.

of Nancy Hecksher.⁵² That these apparently well-connected and wealthy women represented an important sector of La France libre's readership must be inferred from a casual perusal of the journal's contents. H. G. Wells, for instance, still apparently on good terms with his former wife, wrote three brief articles for the journal between December 1940 and December 1943 which probably served more to acknowledge a certain sector of La France libre's reading public than they did to further any of the themes treated more seriously by more serious writers.⁵³ Likewise, articles such as the one written by Rosamund Lehmann on Virginia Woolf or another by Harold Nicolson on his father's relationship with two well known French diplomats, seem either unrelated or only peripherally linked to the central concerns of the journal and would likely have appealed more to the British than to the French readership.⁵⁴ Another device designed to acknowledge the extent of British support for La France libre was inaugurated toward the end of the war with the "What France means to you" feature, in which brief statements by six or seven prominent intellectuals were published in each issue.⁵⁵ In many ways, the creation of this feature near the end

⁵² Mengin, No Laurels, 189. Villefosse, Les îles, 239-40.

⁵³ See H. G. Wells in La France libre: "A propos des anticipations," December 1940, 116-20; "Buts de guerre et carte du monde," May 1941, 26-29; "La grandeur essentielle de la France," December 1943, 91-92.

⁵⁴ Rosamund Lehmann, "Pour Virginia Woolf," La France libre, July 1941, 214-18; Harold Nicolson, "Les deux Cambon et mon père," La France libre, February 1942, 285-90.

⁵⁵ This feature first appeared in April 1944 and continued regularly for several months. The statements varied considerably in length and quality, with few treating the feature as an opportunity to be seriously challenged by the topic. It included many female writers, including Violet Trefusis, who is referred to in Hervé Alphand's account of the period as a continental Briton with a "nostalgia for France." Alphand, L'étonnement,

of the war, when issues which had once preoccupied the pages of the journal seemed less critical, might almost have been deliberately contrived to acknowledge this second pattern of contributor involvement, and to reflect back to the British readers their own motivations for having supported this particular publication of the exile resisters.

La France libre's multiple and often confusing sources of funding are yet another illustration of the success with which its directors located the publication firmly within its many contexts, all the time reinforcing the principle of plurality which the journal espoused and managing to escape a narrowing of vision by too great a dependence on a particular source. With expenditures relating to the publication of up to 76,000 copies per month, distributed mainly in Great Britain, North America and North Africa, La France libre cannot have been inexpensive to produce.⁵⁶ And, with revenue sources including an amount of two hundred thousand francs which Lecoutre was reported as having brought to the project,⁵⁷ subventions from both the British and the Free French information services, subscription sales, advertising, and both private and corporate donations, it seems likely that the journal's diverse constituency was financially as well as morally supportive.

120.

⁵⁶ La France libre was printed in a standard quarto format. Each issue was 80 to 100 pages in length and contained at least four high quality black and white photographic reproductions. The two references in personal accounts of the period to numbers of subscriptions vary dramatically. Gillois referred to international subscription sales of 76,000 while Villefosse notes that the journal's circulation reached 22,000. See, Gillois, Histoire secrète, 103; and Villefosse, Les îles, 239.

⁵⁷ Gillois, Histoire secrète, 103. Gillois is the only person to refer to this money and he either did not pursue the topic in his interview with Lecoutre on 1 November 1971 or chose not to expand on it in his text.

La France libre appears to have received funding from both de Gaulle's Free French movement and from the British Government, although the journal cannot be described as the official mouthpiece for either group. If, as one recent book reports, La France libre received £75,000 per year from the British government, this would have gone some way towards removing the journal from the pressures of orthodox Gaullism.⁵⁸ However, despite the apparent fact that de Gaulle's *Commissariat à l'Information* provided grants to La France libre until Labarthe left for North Africa to join General Giraud,⁵⁹ indicating a complete break between the journal and its first patron in early 1943, there is no evidence to suggest that La France libre's directors felt bound to disseminate a strictly Gaullist line.

Underlying the contradiction between Aron's assertion that La France libre "was never a Gaullist journal"⁶⁰ and de Gaulle's own claim, reproduced in the February 1941 issue, that the publication "will be one of the important elements in the success of our cause,"⁶¹ was a crucial misunderstanding between the two parties with respect to the problem of how to relate the concept of exile to that of resistance.⁶²

⁵⁸ Cointet, France à Londres, 126.

⁵⁹ Henri Michel, Histoire de la France libre (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963), 33. Michel does not provide any information regarding the amount of the grant.

⁶⁰ Aron, Memoirs, 123.

⁶¹ Charles de Gaulle, "Maintenir notre pays dans la guerre," La France libre, February 1941, 309-10.

⁶² Despite Aron's claim to have had no affiliation with de Gaulle, La France libre did publish in its second and third issues René Cassin's two-part article, "La soi-disant constitution de Vichy," which was an important declaration and explication of the official position of de Gaulle's movement regarding the Vichy government. It was this position

De Gaulle's belief that the French exile press and radio were often against him, made explicit in his War Memoirs, amounted to a kind of paranoia or a refusal to accept minor divergences from his own point of view.⁶³ Aron's belief that La France libre "served ecumenical Gaullism better, at least until 1943, than would have a publication composed in the style and the tone adopted by the General's faithful supporters,"⁶⁴ was based on an assumption which was different from de Gaulle's, namely, that rational detachment was a necessary check on the emotional and enthusiastic features of patriotism. While these differences were never resolved, with La France libre continuing to express doubts about de Gaulle as the postwar leader of France, Aron's phrase "ecumenical Gaullism" probably best captures the journal's voluntary but wary support of the leader of the Free French.⁶⁵

In addition to grants received from public sources, it seems likely that La France libre received an ongoing supply of revenue from its various reading publics through a combination of subscription sales, private donations and advertising. While the existence of subscription

which later justified the Provisional Government's legal proceedings against Vichy officials. René Cassin, "Un coup d'état, La soi-disant constitution de Vichy," La France libre, December 1940, 162-76; and continued January 1941, 252-59.

⁶³ In the passage referred to de Gaulle names many French exile publications, including La France libre, asserting that they depended on "foreign powers" and supported General Giraud against him. See Charles de Gaulle, War Memoirs, vol. 2, 96.

⁶⁴ Aron, Memoirs, 135.

⁶⁵ In his memoirs Aron attributes the final rupture between La France libre and de Gaulle not to Labarthe's editorials but rather to an article which he himself wrote and in which he deplored the French tendency to establish plebiscitary despotisms. Aron, Memoirs, 128; Aron, "L'ombre des Bonapartes," La France libre, August 1943, 280-88.

revenue can be inferred from the fact that rates for Britain were announced on the contents page from November 1940 onwards, for the U.S.A. from April 1941 and for North Africa from April 1943, there is little circumstantial evidence to prove that the journal received private donations. That it welcomed them was made clear on the contents page of the first issue by the inclusion of a benefactor/member rate of five guineas: that it received them is implied but never directly stated in personal accounts of the period. Advertising revenue, while obviously received throughout the period of the war, must have fluctuated considerably judging by the periodical variations in the number of advertisements appearing in each issue. While there were usually a few regular and probably lucrative corporate advertisers, such as Imperial Chemical Industries, the majority of the advertisements simply reflect the milieu in which the journal operated, with local publishers, booksellers, restaurants and shops most in evidence. What does seem likely, based on the observation that La France libre maintained its high production quality throughout the war despite the loss of de Gaulle's patronage, is that private funding, of all sorts, remained fairly constant, making up a significant portion of the journal's revenue. By ensuring--whether by deliberate policy or by instinct--that its funding sources remained diverse and that they represented the sometimes contradictory forces at work in the milieu in which the journal was operating, La France libre's production team was able to maintain a clear sense of its own dual commitment and to pursue it without undue restriction from one source or another.

The decision of La France libre's directors to adopt a dual program was sustained rather than thwarted by the many contexts within

which the journal operated. The directors managed to establish it as a credible publication within countries, such as Britain and the United States, and within enclaves made up of groups of exiles, physically dependent on one nation while defining themselves largely in relation to another. By remaining alert to the advantages of this complex situation La France libre developed a broad constituency of readers who appreciated an editorial stance which was neither fiercely ideological in its promotion of the resistance nor narrowly idealistic in its approach to postwar reform.

While France, as a physical entity, was not one of the contexts in which La France libre operated, the journal's editorial team worked hard to maintain uppermost in the minds of readers the insiders' acute sense that their culture and institutions were being violated: France was, for the journal, an important--if absent--context. For instance, by reproducing in seven of its own issues facsimile copies of resistance *feuilles*;⁶⁶ by publishing articles on the internal resistance, many of them probably written on the basis of first-hand experience; by publishing anonymously-authored articles, described as having been smuggled out of France and obviously intended to document the heroic qualities of day-to-day life under the occupation; and by demonstrating a familiarity with the legitimate press inside France, La France libre's directors sought to represent French culture under siege. The thirty-four "Chroniques de France," written but not signed by Aron, represent

⁶⁶ Extracts from internal resistance publications appeared in the following issues of La France libre; August 1941, 343-54; November 1941, 71-76; March 1942, 411-15; May 1942, 66-69; August 1942, 313-15; October 1942, 473-76; April 1943, 472-73.

the acme of this form of representation.⁶⁷ Proclaiming their solidarity with the insiders and validating the fear, confusion and deprivation which were the lot of their compatriots, the journal's contributors tried to prove how, by their interest in and knowledge of the context which was denied to them by their exile, they had not ceased to be French nationals.

On the other hand, these same contributors, eager to validate their status as patriots, needed to be able to prove that a viable manifestation of French culture could be created abroad. The French exile community in London--certainly La France libre's most immediate cultural context--appears to have been remarkable for the success with which it recreated some of the familiar elements of French culture and for taking advantage of the many opportunities presented to it by the established society of its British hosts. Advertisements showed the degree to which French restaurants, newspapers, manufactured products and books had become available in London, enabling the exiles to live in Britain and yet to be sustained partly by their own culture.⁶⁸ Complex interdependencies began to develop among members of the community, many of whom had more than one role to play in it. Louis Lévy, for instance, was involved in the publication of the French daily, France, while Pierre Maillaud and Jean Oberlé both worked for the BBC program "Les Français parlent aux Français." Denis Saurat, whose primary role in

⁶⁷ Aron claims authorship of these articles. See Aron, Memoirs, 120.

⁶⁸ French products advertised in La France libre included Dubonnet, Coty perfume, and Vogue magazine. Among several French restaurants which advertised regularly in La France libre was Chez Boulestin. It is probably not coincidental that one X. Marcel Boulestin published his Recipes of Boulestin (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971) and described its contents as "simple French cooking for English homes."

London was directing the *Institut Français*, must also have been the journal's neighbour, as they were housed in the same quarters. If, in many ways, the French exile community in London showed itself to be self-contained, reflecting the exiles' need to maintain the sense of their cultural distinctiveness, the ways in which they were assisted in this desire by interacting with their British hosts is also very evident.

In addition to drawing many of its contributors from British society, La France libre provides evidence that it was through English language publishers that the French exiles in London were given the opportunity to make their point of view known. La France libre itself was published, until its demise in January 1947, by Hamish Hamilton, and distributed in the U.S.A. and North Africa as well as in Britain. British publishers, Hamish Hamilton among them, took on books written by French exiles, books which were subsequently advertised and/or reviewed in La France libre.⁶⁹ Some publishers must even have discovered among the French exiles a market large enough to warrant reprintings of French classics, a fact deduced from the frequent advertisements in La France libre of the "Collection Nelson" which was said to consist of "The treasures of French literature." And finally, there appears to have been a collegial relationship between La France libre and some of the

⁶⁹ For example, Albert Cohen's Nailcruncher, a translated and abridged version of a novel previously published in French, was published in England by Routledge and reviewed in La France libre in April 1941. Louis Lévy's The Truth about France was published in London by Penguin in 1941 and reviewed in July of that year. In 1943 Victor Gollanz published Lévy's La France est une démocratie, reviewed in September of the same year. Denis Saurat's Watch Over Africa, probably published in London but with no publisher named, was reviewed in April 1942, and Pierre Maillaud's France, published by Oxford University Press, was reviewed in December 1942.

prominent contemporary British review journals. Horizon and Life and Letters Today were both advertised occasionally in La France libre, and at least one book, Louis Aragon's Le crève-cœur, was jointly published by Horizon and La France libre.⁷⁰ By taking advantage of the publishing opportunities available to them in Britain, the French exile community was able to demonstrate both its solidarity with France and its openness to its host country.⁷¹

In addition to relying on Britain for both moral and material support in carrying out its resistance program, many of the French exile contributors to La France libre drew from their foreign context some of the ideas which informed their attitudes to postwar reform in France. This was particularly true of contributors such as Aron, Marjolin and Maillaud, all of whom--as Chapter Three will discuss in detail--made conscious efforts to come to know and understand the British, their society, and their institutions. In his Memoirs, Aron recounts his conscious efforts in this regard, efforts he pursued in both social and

⁷⁰ Aragon's Le crève-cœur was advertised in the September 1942 issue of La France libre. The advertisement simply said that the book would be made available at a price of six shillings and six pence, including mailing charges. An edition of Aragon's Le crève-cœur was published in New York, probably in 1943, containing a preface in French by André Labarthe and one in English by Cyril Connolly. In his preface Connolly noted that a first edition of the book had been published in France but was suppressed for being too patriotic. According to him: "Art knows no frontiers, and in this roundabout way England has received its first war-poet." See Louis Aragon, Le crève-cœur (New York: Pantheon Books, n.d.), 11.

⁷¹ There is some evidence in La France libre that a similar pattern developed in the U.S.A., with American publishers assisting in the publication of works by the French exiles who spent the war in that country. La France libre reviewed many books published by Editions de la Maison Française in New York and written by French writers such as André Maurois, Georges Bernanos, Jacques Maritain and Antoine de St. Exupéry.

academic settings.⁷² For Maillaud, whose profound "sense of moral and sentimental dislocation" in June 1940 led him to the edge of despair, understanding British institutions became something of a mission, the results of which were published in La France libre and one of the effects of which may have been his decision to return to France after the war to enter politics.⁷³ Maillaud seriously attempted to discover what the publisher of World Review glibly promised in an advertisement for that British periodical--an understanding of what "goes on behind the English mask."⁷⁴ Attempting to locate themselves within their host culture while redefining their own, La France libre's contributors rejected none of the contexts available to them.

Until August 1944, when the external factors which had imposed the condition of exile on certain French patriots ceased to be fully operative,⁷⁵ La France libre's two primary functions, which could have been in conflict with one another, were held together by the exile perspective. The resistance function, which was driven by the desire to free France from its German occupiers, could only be fulfilled by some

⁷² Aron mentions, for example, his Thursday evening dinners with members of the Reform Club, and his friendship with the family of "A. P. Herbert, humorist, novelist, dramatist, sailor." Aron, Memoirs, 116-17, 133.

⁷³ Pierre Bourdan [Pierre Maillaud], Carnet des jours d'attente (Paris: Editions Pierre Trémois, 1945), 10. In his memoirs, Aron writes about Maillaud's brief postwar political career, cut short by his accidental death in 1947. Aron, Memoirs, 132.

⁷⁴ La France libre, September 1943, unnumbered page.

⁷⁵ The installation of a provisional French government under General de Gaulle on 31 August 1944 is probably the critical date from the point of view of French exiles. Aron says that he returned to France in the summer of 1944, about a year before he left La France libre. Aron, Memoirs, 135, 143.

form of propaganda, despite Bragg's protestations to the contrary. For La France libre, serving the cause of French unity involved maintaining the exile sensibility among its readers, aggravating their sense of loss at being separated from their homeland and depicting the French inside France as helpless victims of persecution, deprived of their own voice. Without maintaining an acute and painful sense of being in exile, La France libre's production team and contributors could not have continued to push for the cause of the liberation: had they not resisted so vigorously and for such a protracted period of time, they would have ceased to be exiles. Rejecting integration with their host community, those involved with La France libre maintained a sense of exile as separation by using propaganda to promote an emotional response to France's defeat and occupation and a corresponding commitment to their country's liberation. La France libre's second declared function, that of liberating France not from physical chains but from illusions and myth, came to rely on a sense of exile less as separation than as the more neutral distance. This function, which deflected attention from hyperbolic accounts of France's greatness, was directed to a rational understanding of the past and to an application of rational principles to hypothesizing the future. By the end of the war, exile as distance may have been converted to the metaphor which enabled France to venture beyond the isolationism and inwardness which had characterized its prewar political and economic structures. Exile as separation, on the other hand, officially died with the liberation. Until then, this dual perspective was maintained in La France libre, serving the resistance function with propaganda and the intellectual function with ratiocinative argument.

CHAPTER 2

PROPAGANDA IN LA FRANCE LIBRE: THE PATRIOTIC AGENDA

*There is no observer above the fray.*¹ Raymond Aron

*Propaganda ends where dialogue begins.*² Jacques Ellul

In his Memoirs, Raymond Aron admitted to being frequently troubled by what he referred to as "the antinomy, which I have never resolved, between the historical diversity of values and ways of being, on the one hand, and on the other, the vocation which I sometimes attribute to humanity."³ Unable and unwilling to resolve this conflict between historical circumstance and philosophical truth, Aron simply decided to allow the conflict to remain an informing paradox: "I have not given up the idea of a single destiny for the human race, nor have I given up the plurality of cultures, each one of which believes itself to be--correctly for those who are within it--irreplaceable."⁴ French by the circumstances of birth, language and upbringing, Aron welcomed the limitations his nationality imposed on his conduct as a political and social being while sustaining his quest for universal meaning and human

¹ Aron, Memoirs, 473.

² Ellul, Propaganda, 6.

³ Aron, Memoirs, 354.

⁴ Aron, Memoirs, 354.

truth. For him and other contributors to La France libre, writing propaganda constituted a form of political action which, among other things, demonstrated a strong will to be recognized as patriots. Yet, in accepting that "there is no observer above the fray" or, in other words, that complete intellectual detachment is impossible, they faced a dilemma: how to use propaganda to express solidarity with the idea of the French resistance without surrendering intellectual responsibility to criticize their homeland and promote change there. For intellectuals like Aron, who believed truth to have a relative and historical as well as a rational and objective dimension, promoting the allied propaganda helped them assert and maintain their right as patriots to serve their country as intellectuals.

In holding that words are a form of action, contributors to La France libre showed that they had been conditioned by a growing interest in the power of propaganda as a military weapon. Although historians still debate the role played by propaganda in determining the outcome of the Second World War,⁵ its importance to German strategy in the Great War ensured that propaganda would be given a high priority in the strategies of both sides during the conflict which finally erupted in 1939. Public awareness of the importance of propaganda extended to the common belief, frequently expressed in historical and personal accounts of the Second World War, that, in the early stages of the conflict, the

⁵ Anthony Rhodes, for instance, attributes France's defeat in June 1940 to the superiority of German propaganda. It is an interpretation of events which downplays the fact that both Britain and America had taken steps to counteract Hitler's propaganda before the war. Anthony Rhodes, Propaganda: The Art of Persuasion: World War II (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1976), 179-84. See also Robert Desmond, Tides of War: World News Reporting 1940-1945 (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1984), 53.

Germans were winning on the propaganda as well as on the military front and that the Allies had some way to go in countering this feature of the German campaign. Henri Michel, for example, describes this challenge to the Allies as it was probably perceived at the time:

The Nazis had presented the war as an ideological crusade and Goebbels had accordingly established a vast engine of deception. The Allies were forced to invent some counter-propaganda, explaining their own reasons for continuing to fight and refuting the enemy's arguments.⁶

For La France libre's contributors, who were keenly aware of the practical consequences of losing the propaganda war, the problem was not whether to engage in it but how to perfect their weaponry. La France libre may have published articles which variously approached the problem of defining a propaganda suitable to counter that of the Nazis, but the general character of its propaganda was marked by an ongoing conflict within the contributors between their intellectual principles and their need to be recognized as French patriots.

The range of approaches to the problem of defining an effective allied propaganda can be illustrated by reference to two of La France libre's contributors, Albert Cohen, the French novelist and Jewish activist,⁷ and Aron himself. Cohen, who believed that propaganda was necessarily anti-intellectual, conveyed a belief in the inspirational value of hatred and the importance of action over reflection. Aron, on the other hand, particularly in the "Chronique de France" series, developed a propaganda which was not inconsistent with rational

⁶ Michel, The Shadow War, 87.

⁷ According to Blot, in September 1940 Cohen took on the Jewish Agency which worked with de Gaulle's Free French organization. Blot, Albert Cohen, 210.

principles and democratic ideas. Cohen openly scorned what he described as Jean Giraudoux's "excessively cultured and well-written" prewar propaganda, adopting instead an emotional, anti-intellectual style which unabashedly promulgated hatred. He believed the French had been deprived of the "bloody sustenance" they needed in preparing for the present war: "We live in a time of hatred and it is necessary to hate."⁸ Aron, while prepared to acknowledge that propaganda served practical rather than theoretical goals, would not accede to Cohen's belief that it must be based on an entirely negative emotion. Rather, he held that behind the allied propaganda lay a "political and moral ideal" which derived from love of country and paid tribute to the values of Western tradition.⁹ Connecting these two contrary approaches to propaganda in La France libre is the figure of the intellectual in exile whose vocation urges against propaganda but whose situation demands it.

Torn between their patriotic instincts to liberate France at all costs and their intellectual conviction that the liberation itself would be only the first step in an arduous process of self-examination and reform, La France libre's contributors demonstrated varying degrees of self-consciousness and comfort with the over-simplification required of

⁸ Jean Mahan (Albert Cohen), "Salut à la Russie (II)," La France libre, July 1942, 177. Jean Giraudoux, who was made Minister of Propaganda shortly before the war, was frequently scorned by those who believed that the French government had failed to understand what was required to counteract German propaganda. Pertinax referred to Giraudoux as a "subtle and rather precious mind," going on to say that "in Goebbels' brutal universe how old-fashioned and obsolete seemed the elegance of this slender column of water rising from a chiseled fountain and ever falling back upon itself." Pertinax, The Gravediggers of France (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, 1944), 136.

⁹ René Avord (Raymond Aron), "Bataille des propagandes," La France libre, September 1942, 372-79.

the propagandist. Some contributors, including the editor André Labarthe, tended to focus on the military goal of liberating France, relying on cliché and overstatement to provoke readers to a sense of outrage against the enemy and to a reciprocal commitment to the allied cause.¹⁰ Others, like Aron, attempted to sustain their commitment to the immediate liberation of France without losing sight of their longer term interest in the shape of its postwar society, a more complex goal which required correspondingly complex rhetorical strategies.¹¹

Understanding that persuasion played an important role in winning the war, Aron and other colleagues recognized the potentially undermining effect it could have on La France libre's intellectual program. By attempting, in his unsigned chronicles of France, to write propaganda which was not inconsistent with the principles of democratic choice¹² and by cultivating an ambivalent editorial stance towards the more extreme forms of propaganda which were, nevertheless, published on the journal's pages, Aron made the paradox which informed his personal

¹⁰ Ellul would likely categorize as "political propaganda" many of the articles written to inspire a commitment to the liberation of France. He used the term, "agitation techniques," to describe those which rely on hatred as a resource and are aimed at obtaining sacrifices. These terms aptly describe the rhetoric employed by contributors to La France libre like Cohen and Labarthe. Ellul, Propaganda, 62-74.

¹¹ Ellul's category, "sociological propaganda," by which he means propaganda used to persuade members of a society from within to an ideology or an attitude, provides an insight into the difference between Aron's goals and those of some of his fellow contributors. Ellul, Propaganda, 62-74.

¹² Aron, himself, did not use the phrase "propaganda for democracy" as did one of his contributors, the socialist journalist Louis Lévy. Ellul questioned the concept, believing that by conceding some good faith to the enemy, by acknowledging that an issue always has two sides, and by standing up for the individual against the group, propaganda could not be effective. Louis Lévy, The Truth about France, trans. W. Pickles (Penguin Books, 1941), 189; and Ellul, Propaganda, 235-42.

philosophy the guiding principle behind La France libre's unique characteristics as a journal of the French resistance.

La France libre's suitability as a vehicle for propaganda was much facilitated by its format, adapted with significant changes from that of the intellectual review journal on which it was modelled.¹³ By including more short than long articles, by relying extensively on monthly feature articles, by including photographic material which had no obvious bearing on the text, and by reproducing articles from the internal clandestine press, the journal's directors signalled a preparedness to disseminate allied propaganda. The degree to which La France libre's format fitted it for propaganda--without restricting it to such a use--can be seen by looking at how the journal differed from its French intellectual forebears.

Contrasting the traditional format of the intellectual review with that of informational magazines, Régis Debray notes that "no serious debate about ideas is possible in 5 or 6 double-spaced sheets of typescript."¹⁴ By relying extensively on short articles, La France libre's directors limited the journal's function as a serious intellectual forum while increasing its effectiveness as a propaganda journal. Ideally suited to assertion rather than argument and to

¹³ For the purposes of comparison here, I am assuming a journal like La Nouvelle Revue Française to be the model of the French review journal.

¹⁴ Debray mentions Lire, Le Magazine littéraire and Le Figaro magazine as three examples which illustrate the distinction he wants to make between magazines and monthly reviews. According to him: "The review seeks influence, not an audience, coherence and not eclecticism, truth (its truth) and not affability. It works with quality, not volume, and takes orders only from the values it has chosen, not from the facts that besiege it. The difference lies not in its periodicity, but in its substance." Debray, Teachers, Writers, 73-74.

emotional rather than rational forms of expression, the short article flourished in La France libre from its inception in November 1940 and throughout its publication history. Although short articles differed in tone, style, and in the importance of propaganda to their content, they allowed key messages to be repeated in various ways in each issue of the journal, not absolutely prohibiting but certainly inhibiting the development of either a reflective or an argumentative approach to current events. Whether short articles took the form of inspirational messages from a contemporary or historical leader,¹⁵ accounts of the heroic exploits of the Free French or the allied forces,¹⁶ obituaries of individuals whose patriotism was presented as an unqualified and central feature of their lives,¹⁷ or as occasions to make extravagant and unprovable claims consistent with an emphasis on solidarity and resolve, La France libre's readers could count on finding a number of brief, undemanding, but predictably affecting, messages in each issue, the majority of which were calculated to maintain a sense of the urgency and importance of the allied cause.

¹⁵ See, for example, Maurice Barrès, "Les traits éternels de la France," La France libre, November 1940, 84; and "Lettre de M. Winston Churchill," La France libre, November 1941, 2-3.

¹⁶ Articles which were represented as having been written by members of either de Gaulle's Free French or of the allied forces appeared fairly frequently in La France libre. They varied in length and in style but generally attempted to convey some idea to the reader of the dangers and discomforts of active service.

¹⁷ For example, an obituary written for Henri Bergson had much more to say about his patriotism than his philosophy. The writer regretted that Bergson had died "at the most tragic moment in France's history," and that "he will not be permitted to live the hour of French resurrection." Unsigned article, "Henri Bergson," La France libre, January 1941, 211.

La France libre's directors again favoured propaganda over analysis by inclining their journal towards the inclusion of feature reports. The principle of repetition, crucial to the development of effective propaganda, was built into the journalistic column, with topical and authorial point of view being carried over from one issue to the next. By relying heavily on these repeated features, even Staro's articles on military strategy, which defy classification as propaganda by many criteria and were later praised by Aron for their high intellectual standards,¹⁶ could be counted on to emphasize the enemy's mistakes and to reassure readers of an ultimate allied victory. In addition to Staro's strategy articles, La France libre published regular editorials by Labarthe; a semi-regular feature by the writer, painter and broadcaster Jean Oberlé, designed to provide French readers with glimpses of British life; and Aron's unsigned series intended to chronicle life in occupied France. The degree to which these features differed in style and tone suggests how variously but effectively the feature article was used for propagandistic purposes.

Most obviously propagandistic were the editorials which appeared at the beginning of each issue and which were usually signed, though not always written, by Labarthe. Usually two to four pages in length, they tended to be animated in tone and logically incoherent. Their theme, which did not change from month to month, was supplied by the allied propaganda and construed from a French perspective: France, although crushed by an evil giant, would struggle to rise again and defeat the enemy. There was nothing to surprise, challenge or shock in these

¹⁶ See, for example, Aron, Spectateur engagé, 82.

articles: their function was to keep the readers constantly indignant and firmly committed to La France libre's major political goal--the liberation of France.

Similarly predictable, though hardly fiery and arousing, was Oberlé's series of fourteen articles which appeared between November 1940 and June 1944 under the title "Images Anglaises." Impressionistic word sketches, often accompanied by simple line drawings, they depicted various aspects of military or civilian life in Britain, all picked to show how well, cheerfully, and cooperatively the Allies were fighting the war. According to Oberlé, there were no national tensions among servicemen; every member of the armed forces was fearless and brave; allied bombers were careful never to bomb civilian targets; and civilian family members accepted the fate of their sons, fathers and husbands with stoical and patriotic resignation. Less hyperbolic than Labarthe's editorials, Oberlé's articles nevertheless offended rational principles by failing to question the blandly one-dimensional stereotypes of the allied propaganda.¹⁹

However, it was in Aron's "Chroniques de France" that the potential of the feature article as a tool for propaganda was most fully realized in La France libre. While Aron's monthly chronicles were as predictable and as repetitious as Labarthe's editorials in their exploration of the themes of French suffering and German exploitation,

¹⁹ Articles were sometimes published in La France libre which were an implicit challenge to Oberlé's depiction of the British and their Allies. For instance, John dos Passos suggested that the majority of the British were not so much rallying to a worthy cause as they were simply participating, in a non-thinking way, in daily life. Unlike Oberlé, Dos Passos's images were of the losers, the drunkards and the obsessed. John dos Passos, "Une voix dans le blackout à Londres," La France libre, December 1941, 111-15.

they were informative as well as inspirational. Readers, who may have gone directly to these articles both to fuel their indignation and to supply themselves with arguments to support their prejudices, would not have found them cool or nonpartisan. Keeping faith with the same traits of the allied propaganda that had informed Labarthe and Oberlé, Aron, in his persona of the chronicler, represented the French inside France as irreproachable in their attitudes and their values: they "especially know that the Germans are what they have always been, arrogant in success, avid for power, tyrannical; the occupied detest the occupiers because they love, above all, today more than ever, the supreme good that the occupier will never concede them, liberty."²⁰ Although he was meticulous and precise in his attention to the factual content of these articles, Aron did not hesitate to base them on the main characteristics of the allied propaganda, always representing the internal French as hostile both to the Germans and to Vichy, as inherently liberty-loving and as united with the Allies in the struggle to liberate France. Making conscious use of stereotypes, as did Labarthe and Oberlé, and relying, as they did, on the principle of repetition, Aron showed that he could use the feature article both to keep faith with the allied propaganda and, as we shall see later in this chapter, to challenge rhetorical formulae with rational principles.

While not obviously intended as a propagandistic device, the inclusion of photographs which were unrelated to the text--an unknown occurrence in the serious review--must have been expected by La France libre's directors to reinforce the readers' acute sense that their exile

²⁰ Unsigned article, "Chronique de France: Propagandes et opinion," La France libre, May 1941, 67.

from France was experienced primarily as deprivation.²¹ It was a device which served the allied propaganda well, reinforcing, at a subliminal level, the nostalgia for prewar France which was needed by those who continued to work for its liberation. By reproducing in each issue four full-page photographs of familiar aspects of the French natural or urban landscapes, La France libre drew attention to the plight of the French exiles and, by extension, to their sense of solidarity with their country of origin.²² It was a plight which the British author, Raymond Mortimer, writing as though inspired by these same photos, expressed with bathetic clarity:

... when at night, before sleeping, I recreate my trips in imagination, when I think of the happiness that one finds on the enchanting banks and rivers, when I ascertain to what degree I

²¹ That the directors of La France libre intended the photos to arouse nostalgia can be affirmed by reading Alice Jahier's, Inoubliable France. The book consists of forty-two of the photographs published in issues of La France libre, each of which is accompanied by a nostalgic text written by Jahier and printed in both English and French. T. S. Eliot, in his introduction, says of them: "They are of the present, and also of the permanent France; they will remind you that the France you loved did not die when you parted from her; and they will, I hope, help to span the gulf between the France you knew and the France you look forward to knowing. between the thoughts and sentiments and experience of the past and those of the future." Jahier herself, in her preface, refers to the photos as speaking to the exiles in their "heaviest hour." Referring to the exiles in London she comments that "as we look at these pictures of France, the smooth, glossy photographs with all their shades of grey, from warm black to the pearly tones of light, stab us to the heart with glimpses of the land which lives within us." La France libre is thanked on the title page for its assistance in publishing this book. Alice Jahier, Inoubliable France - France Remembered, trans. J. G. Weightman, Intro. T. S. Eliot (London: Sylvan Press, June 1944).

²² An article published in La France libre in December 1941 referred to these photos, singling out one of the Dordogne River. The writer, described as a Free French Naval Officer and likely to have been Louis de Villefosse (see Appendix 2 on pseudonyms), noted that the river could as easily have been another French river like the Marne, the Charente or the Loire, and that the point of view was that of every French person. Unsigned article, "Nostalgie de la France," La France libre, December 1941, 124-32.

miss France, I wonder how the French who are in England can support this exile. The English have the habit of living abroad--often we even prefer it. But, all you French who continue the struggle here, what must it cost you! Villages as smiling as those I named are mothers to you; you have been baptized in these Roman churches, and you have bathed, as children, in these sunny rivers. There are no words to describe your unhappiness and your resolve.²³

Mortimer clarifies a point implied by the photos: by refusing to adapt their behaviour and by continuing to identify with their country of origin, the French exiles determinedly asserted their patriotism and reaffirmed their commitment to the resistance.

In August 1941, La France libre began to incorporate facsimile copies of resistance *feuilles* in its issues. More clearly than the adaptations so far discussed, this practice illustrates the tensions which resulted from the attempt by La France libre's production team to use propaganda to support the internal resistance without sacrificing its simultaneous commitment to the validity of the external viewpoint. On the one hand, the brief introductory statement which preceded the first set of documents welcomed and praised them as testaments to the strength of the resistance in France, emphasizing the dangerous conditions in which they were produced and describing those who wrote them as "courageous patriots" and "unknown heroes."²⁴ On the other hand, by opening this same statement with the words, "Here stops La France Libre, written and published in London. On this page begin other works," the production team emphasized location and circumstance as critical to determining content and point of view. These clandestine

²³ Raymond Mortimer, "Souvenirs d'un touriste," La France libre, April 1942, 471-74.

²⁴ This statement appeared in the middle of an unnumbered and otherwise empty page. La France libre, August 1941.

documents were treated as artefacts rather than as texts: they were upheld as testimonies to the bravery and resolution of the internal resistants while their contents were allowed to stand without commentary. This shows the degree to which the exile intellectuals valued distance as an informing perspective on issues of concern to postwar France. Thus, while La France libre supported the allied propaganda by demonstrating solidarity with the clandestine press, it did so without sacrificing its distinctive viewpoint as a journal in exile.

Although modifications to La France libre's format enhanced its usefulness as a vehicle for propaganda, they alone do not account for the impression conveyed in the journal's pages that propaganda served a distinctive function for its contributors. An explanation of this function is to be found in the contributors' ambivalent response to propaganda and in their tendency to use and reject it simultaneously. In need of the emotional support that propaganda could supply and yet affected, as those inside France could not have been, by a wide range of influences deriving from their temporary environment, contributors to La France libre produced a unique version of the propaganda which supported the liberation of France.

The most important feature of the allied propaganda to which the exile contributors to La France libre reacted in an ambivalent manner was the assumption that the restoration of French national independence was critical to the survival of Western civilisation. For the Allies, France had become a symbol of an ideology in which concepts of personal and political liberty were primary. Most frequently invoked to support this view of the France which deserved allied support was an idealized

version of French republican history, with the centuries of absolutism prior to the Revolution and the more recent vicissitudes of the post-revolutionary period conveniently forgotten.²⁵ Represented as the epitome of civilisation and revered for its intellectual and cultural achievements, France was often described as being eternal or immortal, and was thought of as being opposite, ideologically, to Germany. Behind the allied support of the French resistance was the idea that German domination of France was a violation of the very principles for which Western civilisation stood. Contributors to La France libre, even those who wanted to challenge the complacency which underlay this idealizing of France, were bound by their resistance commitment to uphold it.

The considerable support given by La France libre's contributors to the view that France was the guardian of Western civilisation and a bulwark against fascism can best be explained by describing how the proposition was qualified even as it was promoted. Firstly, the idea that France was necessary or immortal was qualified by being upheld, not as a description of reality, but as a myth, a convenient fiction with which to galvanize potentially disparate groups into working for a common cause, in this case the liberation of France. As will be

²⁵ Boris Mirkine-Guetzévich notes that while the majority of internal and external resisters drew from the republican tradition in expressing their ideas, it was not obviously true of de Gaulle. He refers to de Gaulle as demonstrating a kind of "republican agnosticism." André Maurois, who did not write for La France libre but whose books were reviewed there, describes the difficulties he had representing his country positively when he was, in fact, appalled by the Vichy policies. His solution was to promote France's cause by emphasizing what he called her "durable features" rather than her "passing errors." See Henri Michel and Boris Mirkine-Guetzévich, Les idées politiques et sociales de la résistance: Documents clandestins 1940-1944 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1944), 45-47; and André Maurois, Mémoires 1885-1967, trans. Denver Lindley (London: The Bodley Head, 1970), 288.

demonstrated shortly, La France libre's contributors were aware that jingoism served their political goals better than admissions of national humiliation, despite the potential danger it posed to their intellectual integrity.

Secondly, although the exile contributors to La France libre were under no illusions as to the ability of Western civilisation to survive without France--a point which will be developed in Chapter Three--they were still emotionally predisposed to proclaim the eternal nature of their country's accomplishments. In fact, the idea so often emphasized in the allied propaganda--that France's contributions to civilisation had made her indestructible as a physical entity--expressed the authentic feelings of the French exiles in London, even those whose rational proclivities led them to opposite conclusions. That many of the non-French contributors to La France libre provided emotional support for the idea that France could not die reinforced the exiles' implicit claim that their patriotism had not been compromised by their foreign location.

And finally, although the logic of the proposition that France was eternal had to be, and was, challenged from a rational perspective, many contributors, eager to incorporate the best of France's intellectual heritage in its postwar structures, were intent on redefining revered concepts such as liberty, which played an important, but primarily rhetorical, role in the propaganda. If these contributors discounted propaganda as objective truth, they acknowledged its usefulness as myth and allowed it to inform the intellectual position they adopted after the war. The exiles who contributed to La France libre upheld the idea of an eternal and indestructible France, not because they believed it to

be objectively true but because it served their practical interests in the liberation, their emotional need to express their true feelings for France, and their intellectual interest in issues of postwar reform.

In its role as a resistance journal, La France libre relied on the myth that France was an eternal entity, diverting the manifestations of humiliated self-abasement which appeared in its first issues towards the practical goal of liberating France. Thus, the public humiliation expressed by Bernanos in a December 1940 article, which claimed that France's political heritage had been betrayed by the armistice,²⁶ was countered by the argument, presented in the first issue of the journal and reinforced by both Labarthe and Aron, that the "capitulation does not seal the destiny of our country. Meditation on the past must have no other goal than to give more force and lucidity to our action."²⁷ Indeed, as early as March 1941, Labarthe's editorial, appropriately titled, "Enough!" urged readers to give up introspection, arguing that it worked against allied interests and instead served the cause of the German propagandists.²⁸ Aron's agreement with Labarthe on this point was made clear in his signed article, "Propaganda Battle." Democratic traditions could, he believed, be intelligently promoted without weakening the essentially pluralist assumption on which they are based simply by, "as much as possible, emphasizing what unites and rejecting

²⁶ He referred to the "prodigious fall" of the French as being a "wound" to the world at large. Georges Bernanos, "Français, vos ancêtres ont été des hommes libres...", La France libre, December 1940, 125-27.

²⁷ Unsigned article, "La capitulation," La France libre, November 1940, 26.

²⁸ André Labarthe, "Assez!" La France libre, March 1941, 397-400. This was one of the articles collected and translated by J. G. Weightman. J. G. Weightman, French Writing on English Soil (London: Sylvan Press, 1945).

what divides."²⁹ As Aron well knew, the term liberation came to stand, in the propaganda, for the restoration of the traditional values for which France stood:

... the liberation would not be limited to expelling the Germans from France; it would liberate France from a bureaucratic and police-run despotism, installed by Germany and its instruments. At the same time the liberation would gather the best of the democratic heritage, the aspiration to individual and political liberty.³⁰

Prepared to accept that, in certain circumstances, a pragmatic notion of truth must be supported over an absolute one, and that "in times of war, propaganda has as its objective, to reinforce the unity of nations, to mobilise all its material and moral forces,"³¹ Aron argued in this article that--against reason--the liberation must come to stand for the restoration of France to its former greatness.

Advertisements, book reviews and photographs all helped to reinforce the message that readers were to associate references to the liberation of France with the automatic restoration of a virtuous and integral state. Advertisements, many of them by British companies, represented the liberation itself as the ultimate goal, implying that its achievement would automatically restore France to its former greatness. British Railways, for example, was always moving "forwards"

²⁹ René Avord (Raymond Aron), "Bataille des propagandes," La France libre, September 1942, 379. Aron's argument in this article comes very close to that advanced by Ellul, who suggests that "in view of the challenges democracies face, it is of supreme importance that they abandon their confidence in truth itself and assimilate themselves to the methods of propaganda." Ellul, Propaganda, 235.

³⁰ René Avord (Raymond Aron), "Bataille des propagandes," La France libre, September 1942, 378.

³¹ René Avord (Raymond Aron), "Bataille des propagandes," La France libre, September 1942, 378.

and "towards victory."³² The assumption that a liberated France would automatically return to its prewar status allowed book tokens to be urged on exiles who "one day soon will be able to buy books in full liberty on the quays of the Seine, in the shadow of the Cathedral of Strasbourg or in the sun of the Midi."³³ Books selected for review were often discovered by their reviewers to reinforce the idea that the liberation of France would restore it to its former glories. The reviewer of a book written by a British author on Jean Jaurès, for example, noted that "Mr. Jackson has not only paid homage to French genius, but has made a pledge to the political future of France."³⁴ And Aron, in his review of Jean Schlumberger's Nouveaux jalons, wrote that "from one end to the other the book communicates the conviction that France will recover its power by the grandeur, cohesion and discipline of liberty, and its dynamism by the force of its moral fervour."³⁵ Even the monthly photographic feature tended to reinforce the presentation of France as a country waiting and ready to regain its former stature. Whether the subjects were scenes of French countryside, depictions of typical towns or buildings, recognizable shots of well-known architectural monuments, or portraits of oppressed citizens, the photos conveyed the impression of a country which was distinctive, resolute and worthy of being liberated.

³² See, for example, La France libre, May 1942, beside 80.

³³ See, for example, La France libre, October 1943, beside 478.

³⁴ E. M., review of Jean Jaurès: His Life and Work, by J. Hampden Jackson, La France libre, August 1943, 318.

³⁵ R. A., review of Nouveaux jalons, by Jean Schlumberger, La France libre, June 1944, 153.

The fact that propaganda was recognized, at one level, to be a convenient fiction--a means of focussing attention on the political goal of the liberation--did not preclude its being given validity in La France libre as an authentic expression of the strong feelings of the exile patriots. Far from being cynical in attitude, and genuinely disturbed by their own and their country's predicaments, La France libre's contributors did not doubt the truth of their emotions even as they acknowledged the pragmatic value of their emotional effusions. While the liberation of France was the public and political goal of the exile propagandists, their personal goal was to be recognized as French patriots, worthy of participating with their internal counterparts in the postwar planning which preoccupied all French resisters during the Second World War. Somewhat paradoxically, it was only by insisting upon the strength of their feelings that the exile intellectuals could gain credibility for the critical views which were informed by their location outside France. As we shall see in the following pages, La France libre's contributors felt, at an emotional level, that which many of them may not have believed, namely, that recovering France as an independent nation was essential to preserving Western civilisation.

Emotional overstatement was validated as a patriotic gesture by Labarthe himself, who set a tone for the journal which was to last throughout the war. He confidently promulgated the mythical version of France as the embodiment of all republican values by elaborating a heroic and extremely simplified version of the past, one which was stripped of all reference to the problems experienced during the later stages of the Third Republic and which unabashedly promoted the case for France's indispensability to Western civilisation. Avoiding reference

to aspects of the revolutionary period which would have undermined his case, Labarthe concentrated instead on the taking of the Bastille, an event which he suffused with symbolic meaning about the willingness of the French to die rather than sacrifice liberty to an arbitrary power.³⁶ His belief in France's unique mission, one which was shared by many who wrote for La France libre, was expressed with his usual supreme confidence and flamboyance:

Whether one wishes it or not, for our friends as for our enemies, modern France incarnates the ideal of human liberation, which tyrannies have sworn to take away but which the united nations are engaged in saving. In a world where the instinct of liberty will triumph, the values belonging to French culture will protect its radiance....

By rendering the ideology of the allied propaganda in a consistently emotional register, Labarthe conveyed the impression, almost universally supported by his colleagues, that propaganda was an appropriate means of expressing the strength of their commitment to France.

Labarthe's articulation of the exile's response to the occupation of France derived its authority from his editorship of La France libre, but most members of the exile community, despite their divergent interests and ideologies, spoke in a similar register. Their manner of professing their patriotism confirmed the journal's service as a medium through which all exiles could bear witness. Louis de Villefosse, for example, when speaking on behalf of the Free French forces, revealed how much propaganda was valued as testimony by the exile community. To him,

³⁶ See particularly André Labarthe, "Quatorze Juillet," La France libre, July 1941, 186; and André Labarthe, "Sans fanfares, sans flambeaux," La France libre, July 1942, 166.

³⁷ André Labarthe, "La France forte," La France libre, October 1942, 409.

France's role in the battle of Bir Hakeim constituted an "awakening of the military pride of our country." He traced the patriotic traditions of France to "the grandeur of the Roman Republic" and the noblest ideals of "service to country."³⁸ Other members of this community to offer similar testimony included representatives of the internal resistance like Jean Castellane;³⁹ journalists like Louis Lévy;⁴⁰ and, perhaps most particularly, intellectuals like Denis Saurat and Henri Focillon.⁴¹ In a manner similar to Labarthe, many respected members of the French exile community held that the "universal function of France is exactly opposed to that which is called imperialism."⁴² Voicing a creed against Nazism, they tended to draw on the symbolism of the French Revolution: they represented France as indomitable and endowed her

³⁸ Laurent de Meauce (Louis de Villefosse), "La revanche d'Afrique," La France libre, April 1943, 406.

³⁹ See, for example, Jean Castellane, "L'armée indissoluble," La France libre, June 1943, 93-98.

⁴⁰ See, for example, Louis Lévy, "Autour de Robespierre," La France libre, October 1942, 449-52.

⁴¹ Denis Saurat develops a picture of Victor Hugo as the ideal French citizen. Speaking about Hugo, Saurat said that it was his "faith in humanity, his love of liberty, his ardent desire for progress, and his generosity and his tolerance for others" which showed that he had the "positive qualities of the French soul." Henri Focillon, who died in America early in 1943, published two articles in La France libre which radiate emotional authenticity even as they astonish by their exaggeration. See Denis Saurat, "La poésie épique en France au XIXème siècle," La France libre, July 1941, 228-31; Henri Focillon, "Vie d'une nation, 1919-1939," La France libre, March 1941, 406-15; and Henri Focillon, "Fonction universelle de la France," La France libre, May 1941, 19-25.

⁴² Henri Focillon, "Fonction universelle de la France," La France libre, May 1941, 25.

citizens with "a profound taste for liberty."⁴³ Thus, all exile groups discovered in the forms of allied propaganda, and especially its ideological assumptions, a way to express their patriotism in a heightened, almost religious, tone. They developed an urgency of expression which, taken together with their grief and commitment, gave spiritual value to their condition of exile.

The support given by non-French contributors to the view that the continuation of Western civilisation depended on the restoration of France as a nation state reinforced the importance of propaganda as a way of expressing emotional realities. Charles Morgan, for example, assumed the role of spokesperson for the British point of view when he advised the exile readers early in 1941: "Have confidence in our affection and in our strength--as we have, on our side, inextinguishable confidence in the immortality of France."⁴⁴ And European contributors like Hubert Ripka--by accepting that France had played a leading role in the creation of the ideological framework which supported the allied cause--implicitly supported the claim made by the French exiles, that the idea of France was separable from French soil and could be represented from abroad as well as from the home territory:

France is necessary to Europe and the world because it is more than the national collectivity of the French. In the past, as in the present, France is, in some way, the symbol of a total conception of life. The disappearance of France would usher in the end of this civilisation.⁴⁵

⁴³ Jean Castellane, "L'armée indissoluble," La France libre, June 1943, 97.

⁴⁴ Charles Morgan, "La France est une idée nécessaire à la civilisation," La France libre, April 1941, 512.

⁴⁵ Hubert Ripka, "La France et l'Europe centrale," La France libre, August 1941, 291.

Clearly, non-French support for the notion that France was necessary to civilisation emphasized the relation which the exiles wanted to make between patriotism and ideology and de-emphasized the view that patriotism and location were inextricably linked.

Perhaps the most explicit indication in La France libre of the degree to which its contributors used propaganda to express emotional truths even when, on rational grounds, criticism would have been a more warranted response comes from the tendency on the part of certain contributors to suspend judgement on their colleagues. When Aron, for instance, reviewed Louis Lévy's The Truth about France--a book he might have been expected to find shallow in its analysis--he was content to emphasize that the "last pages of the book are an act of faith in the French people to which readers will subscribe with thankfulness."⁴⁶ And an anonymous reviewer, taking on another book by Lévy which, by any standards, could not be read as other than propaganda, praised the author's "conviction" over his analysis and emphasized the lessons for democracy which could be drawn from the text.⁴⁷ Aron's willingness to support views on the basis of their having been inspired by proper and valuable emotions was made explicit in his review of Bernanos's Lettre aux Anglais. Having laid out the book's major arguments, Aron made clear that, on several grounds, he could take issue with them and was predisposed to do so. However, crediting the correctness of Bernanos's moral impulses over the persuasiveness of his arguments, he declined to

⁴⁶ R. A., review of The Truth about France, by Louis Lévy, La France libre, July 1941, 273.

⁴⁷ Unsigned article, review of La France est une démocratie, by Louis Lévy, La France libre, September 1943, 397.

criticize, giving as his reason the fact that "such a controversy would seem to us improper because we refuse to place such a witness on the battleground between parties."⁴⁵ Aron's decision to honour Bernanos's feelings of outrage and humiliation and to elevate emotional integrity over logic as a criterion for judgement suggests how much La France libre's editorial team trusted feelings over reason as indicators of the true patriotic impulse of its contributors.

La France libre's French contributors, since they all experienced the indeterminacy of exile as a painful loss, found relief in professing their faith in the eternal nature of France. Propagandistic claims that France was essential to Western civilization, if not intellectually valid, met the contributors' practical and emotional needs. Seeking more than consolation, they were inspired by the propaganda of national glory to rally to the cause of the liberation, a cause they shared with the internal resisters and fellow expatriates. The notion that France was eternal also served their emotional needs because it constituted an argument from desire: believing and wishing France to have a civilizing mission, the contributors to La France libre acquired a credibility which authenticated their hopes for national reconstruction.

A second assumption underlying the allied propaganda, and one which strongly motivated the internal French resistance, was the notion that all Germans, as representatives of Hitler's totalitarian vision of society, were bent on destroying democratic ideals and individual liberty. They were depicted as dangerous, depraved and brutal. This stereotyping of the enemy--a tactic employed in all wars to maintain the

⁴⁵ René Avord (Raymond Aron), "Pensée française en exil: Le message de Bernanos," La France libre, May 1943, 28.

morale and resolution of the armed forces and the general populace--was adopted in La France libre. However, by according qualified support to the notion that all Germans were France's enemy, La France libre's contributors signalled their determination as intellectuals not to blame the enemy solely for France's defeat. Rather they looked inwards for explanations of their nation's collapse.

Two related factors account for the reluctance on the part of the majority of La France libre's contributors to express virulently anti-German sentiments. Firstly, the exiles' physical separation from their country exempted them from the day-to-day contact with the enemy which exacerbated the feelings of those who spent the war inside occupied France. And secondly, lack of direct contact with the enemy may have deflected the exile resisters' attention from the obvious and external enemy to the responsibilities which the French themselves would have to accept for both the defeat and collaboration. By dissociating the editorial point of view from extreme formulations of the allied anti-German propaganda and by cultivating purely formal or indirect ways of upholding stereotypes, La France libre's directors avoided disseminating a style of propaganda which would have been too much at odds with the self-critical requirements of its reformist agenda.

The most virulent of the anti-German propaganda to appear in La France libre was set apart from the central editorial position in two ways: either it was represented as the view of someone living inside France or, less frequently, it was advanced by someone who could only be

described as a marginal contributor to the journal.⁴⁹ Seemingly eager to acknowledge and support an experience which the exiles could not fully share, La France libre's directors often published graphic and reductive depictions of the enemy occupant, justifying such depictions as having been inspired by oppression.⁵⁰ The feelings of outrage and violation expressed by residents of France were never suppressed in the journal, although they were rarely endorsed by the exiles themselves.⁵¹ In fact, the most reductive example of the anti-German propaganda to be published in La France libre, a series of drawings of typical military figures, each one accompanied by a satirical verbal description, was usually preceded by the disclaimer: "By their sheer violence, these sketches seemed to reveal to us the unlimited hatred that the Germans have awoken in the hearts of the French, in the hearts of all the oppressed people of Europe."⁵² Lacking the provocation of daily contact with France's German occupiers, La France libre's directors were able to promote anti-German propaganda through the appropriated voice of

⁴⁹ Perhaps the most interesting example of the marginal contributor can be illustrated with reference to an article appearing under the name of Jean Mahan, a pseudonym for the writer Albert Cohen. (See Appendix 2 on the use of pseudonyms in the journal.) See Jean Mahan (Albert Cohen), "Salut à Russie (II)," La France libre, July 1942, 176-84.

⁵⁰ For example, two crude and satirical songs and a satirical anti-German tract were described as having been "composed by Parisian workers and sung in metal factories in defiance of the Germans." See "Monsieur Hitler, Le Grand [sic] Hitler, and Le Doryphore," La France libre, October 1941, 536-40.

⁵¹ For example, one article in La France libre was described as an extract from a novel which was written by someone inside France and dedicated to "all the men and women who will be obliged to kill tomorrow to liberate France." See A. P., "Sur la ligne de démarcation," La France libre, January 1943, 184-91.

⁵² Unsigned article, "Etudes racistes," La France libre, July 1943, 143.

the internal resistance while maintaining an aloofness from the implications of its most violent forms of expression.

The majority of La France libre's contributors relied less on the anti-German stereotypes than did their internal compatriots. Some paid superficial attention to the forms of the propaganda; others linked condescending views of the enemy to assumptions about the superiority of the French. Both Labarthe and Aron belonged to the first category; they routinely ascribed to the Germans acts of fierceness, cunning or exploitation, but did not personalize their invective or attempt to account for German behaviour by describing it as less than human. Other contributors, who accepted the stereotypical view of the German as different, linked their anti-German propaganda to their pro-French attitudes. Lévy's assertion that there were depths to the French character which derived from "old civilisations, those which Hitler's barbarians do not expect the existence of"⁵³ relied not so much on anti-German as on pro-French sentiments. And similarly, Focillon's purpose in contrasting the "gentleness of manners" and "demanding toughness of mind" which he ascribed to the French, with the "slackness of mind" and "harshness of manners" which he attributed to the Germans was not to incite hatred but rather to prove a point about the eternal nature of France.⁵⁴ On the whole, the half-hearted adoption by La France libre's contributors of the anti-German propaganda implied that dehumanizing the enemy was simply a gesture on behalf of the drive for unity, a myth to be put aside as soon as the French were prepared to

⁵³ Louis Lévy, "Toulon," La France libre, January 1943, 205.

⁵⁴ Henri Focillon, "Fonction universelle de la France," La France libre, May 1941, 20.

accept more responsibility for the past and adopt more initiative for the future.

The third feature of allied propaganda to receive a distinctive kind of support from the contributors to La France libre was the notion that unity of purpose and effort lay behind the allied actions against their enemies. To sustain morale and resolution for the war effort, the allied propaganda of unity was designed to mask tensions both within the French camp and among the Allies themselves. Contributors to La France libre, unlike either the internal resisters or the strict adherents of de Gaulle's Free French forces, tended to focus more on relations between the Free French and their Allies than on resolving the tensions among various and often opposing groups within France. For the French intellectuals writing for La France libre--many of whom believed before the war that political and economic realities would eventually force France to look outwards--the propaganda of unity offered opportunities to stress the possibilities for international cooperation.

The overwhelming degree of trust accorded by La France libre's contributors to the allied efforts on France's behalf suggests the extent to which the journal's directors wanted to challenge France's prewar isolationist attitudes and to see them replaced by a greater openness to international influences. It was a position which was not shared by de Gaulle, whose rejection of the idea that allied interests were consistent with those of France led him to a series of well-documented confrontations with the British and American governments.⁵⁵ Thus, while de Gaulle was forced to underrepresent his quarrels with the

⁵⁵ See particularly François Kersaudy, Churchill and de Gaulle (London: Collins, 1981).

British and the Americans as he struggled to uphold the propaganda of unity, La France libre's contributors found themselves having to underrepresent their quarrels with de Gaulle.⁵⁶

Labarthe's editorials developed a version of the allied propaganda of unity which held that the United States and Great Britain were both constant in their friendship for France and irreproachable in their motives for liberating her; it was a rendering of events which found echoes in the seriousness with which the institutions of these two countries were examined for their applicability to French postwar problems.⁵⁷ The United States was particularly revered by Labarthe for, as he believed, sharing important ideals and values with France,⁵⁸ although Britain was credited with having established a comparable political order "in a more religious way, less philosophical and less

⁵⁶ De Gaulle's name rarely appears in La France libre and, when it does, the reference is as likely to be complimentary as otherwise. While it is evident that many of the journal's contributors disapproved of the anti-British attitudes of the leader of the Free French, these attitudes were never directly confronted. Similarly, de Gaulle seems to have been cautious, particularly in his broadcasts to France, not to disparage his allies. This caution must have been affected by the fact that he was using the British radio system.

⁵⁷ The Soviet Union was not seriously treated as an ally in La France libre. Staro, in his strategy articles, admired the Soviet Union for its resistance to Hitler. The lack of references to the Soviet Union outside the strategy articles suggests an anti-communist bias on the part of the journal's editorial team.

⁵⁸ André Labarthe said that the French "will stay faithful to their ideals, which are and which always will be those which President Roosevelt, in a few classic lines, has formulated: to give to men freedom of thought and speech, to celebrate as they wish their belief in God, to liberate them from fear and from need. The French people will never renounce voluntarily any of these liberties which are for them the charge not of a particular political regime but of human civilisation." André Labarthe, "Fin d'année," La France libre, January 1941, 217.

revolutionary."⁵⁹ When the Americans and the British began to take initiatives in North Africa which angered de Gaulle, it was no great surprise that La France libre reacted to dissipate French suspicions that their Allies' interests might not benefit those of France. In an editorial published in September 1942, a stern warning was issued against sliding into the "France alone" mentality which had presided before the war: "France is not alone. She entered a war of coalition, she is fighting in the coalition, she will triumph in the coalition."⁶⁰ In November 1942, the theme was resumed by welcoming both the landing of American troops in North Africa and the creation of what Labarthe described as a united nations force which would enable France "to contribute to her own liberation and to recover her prestige and pride."⁶¹ And, the next month, in an oblique reference to the difficult relations between de Gaulle and the allied leaders, Labarthe warned that "unity is not possible in a climate of hatred and recriminations."⁶² In June 1944, with the fighting well underway and the liberation in sight, an anonymous author--in Labarthian tones--wrote that the "confidence of the French in their liberators is a blessing as precious as that of their vibrant patriotism, emerging from the crucible

⁵⁹ André Labarthe, "Sans fanfares, sans flambeaux," La France libre, July 1942, 167.

⁶⁰ André Labarthe, "Rythme de guerre," La France libre, September 1942, 329.

⁶¹ André Labarthe, "Une seule passion: La France," La France libre, November 1942, 5.

⁶² André Labarthe, "Armée de la République," La France libre, December 1942, 81.

of suffering and of combat."⁶³ Labarthe's vigorous promotion of the need for unity between the French and the Allies, and his concomitant lack of concern for the issue of unity among the French, was one manifestation of the journal's position that--paradoxically--France's independence could be regained only by acknowledging its dependence on trustworthy and ideologically compatible allies.

Not surprisingly, given both the strong predisposition among many La France libre contributors to admire British ideas and institutions and the many interrelationships forged between the journal and its host country, Britain was promoted as the most loyal of France's allies and as the country with the most to offer in the postwar period of reconstruction. Whether Franco-British relations were promoted for practical reasons, following the argument that historical and geographical factors made the alliance natural and mutually beneficial, or for more nebulous sentimental reasons, their predominance as a theme in La France libre testifies to the desire of the exiles to validate their wartime location and to give it a further postwar significance.

In an article which argued for the strategic importance of an alliance between Britain and France, Charles Morgan articulated the opinion of the majority of La France libre's contributors on the subject of relations between the two countries: he asserted that all "the English who speak against France, [and] all the French who speak against England, blaspheme civilisation."⁶⁴ It is an assertion implicit in the

⁶³ Unsigned article, "Pour ce jour là," La France libre, June 1944, 80.

⁶⁴ Charles Morgan, "L'Angleterre et les Français Libres," La France libre, December 1940, 114.

articles of other contributors, both French and British,⁶⁵ and evidence to prove that the two countries were not in any kind of antagonistic relation, such as the "side by side" fighting of the two countries in a battle at Saint-Nazaire,⁶⁶ was prominently featured on the journal's pages. Pierre Maillaud, acutely conscious of the degree to which the French community in London had been supported morally and materially by its British hosts, asserted categorically that, the "lesson which must be drawn from four years of war, for England as for France, is the critical importance of a close liaison."⁶⁷ And Aron, reviewing a book which celebrated the cooperative achievements of the two countries during the first years of the war, enthusiastically praised the author for "rendering a precious service to the cause to which he dedicated himself, that of the English/French friendship," and for doing much to dissipate the views of the enemy to the contrary.⁶⁸ Clearly, while La France libre's contributors often justified their promotion of Franco-British relations on strategic grounds, they had a personal and unannounced agenda--the justification such an alliance provided for their wartime location.

The extent to which La France libre came to represent a pro-British stance was further affirmed by the gestures of support and

⁶⁵ The same argument was made, for example, by Alexander Werth. Alexander Werth, "Remember France," La France libre, November 1940, 33.

⁶⁶ André Labarthe, "Saint-Nazaire: France," La France libre, May 1942, 5.

⁶⁷ Pierre Maillaud, "La politique du 'vieux mur de bois' au XX^{ème} siècle," La France libre, September 1943, 340.

⁶⁸ R. A., review of L'entente à l'épreuve by René Balbaud, La France libre, December 1943, 158.

mutual admiration which filled the pages of the journal. Charles Morgan's "Ode to France," for example, a poem which praised French culture extravagantly, was complemented in the journal by Cohen's equally extravagant praise of the English in "Angleterre."⁶⁹ While the British writer Storm Jameson agreed with Denis Saurat's judgement, as expressed in Watch over Africa--that de Gaulle was a modern version of the ideal man--it was probably a French contributor who described Churchill as a hero, a "poet and the engineer of victory."⁷⁰ And book reviewers like Robert Mengin, frequently touched by the insights and sympathies of British authors, found their books to be "a balm on the moral suffering of our country."⁷¹ Behind the desire on the part of La France libre's French contributors to be comforted by their British hosts and the obvious eagerness of the British to provide that comfort, lay a dilemma which could not be explored within the boundaries supplied by the allied propaganda. For the French, reconciling the material and intellectual benefits of life in Britain with the patriotism implied in their resistance commitment was a problem too complex to be treated simply within the confines of the propaganda of unity.

⁶⁹ Charles Morgan, "Ode à la France," La France libre, November 1942, 1-4; and Albert Cohen, "Angleterre," La France libre, June 1941, 114-23.

⁷⁰ Storm Jameson, review of Watch over Africa, by Denis Saurat, La France libre, April 1942, 512; and unsigned article, "Processional de la force Anglaise," La France libre, November 1943, 10.

⁷¹ Robert Mengin, review of I Came out of France, by Cecily Macworth, La France libre, August 1941, 364. Mengin used the word "balm" in the same context in writing a review article on three books by British authors. Robert Mengin, review of Britain and France - A Study of Twentieth Century Relations, by Catherine Gavin; A Friend of France, by Ian Black; France in Defeat, by Percy J. Philip, La France libre, June 1941, 179.

The series of articles written by Raymond Aron and appearing under the feature title, "Chronique de France," demonstrates clearly both the possibilities and the limitations of propaganda as the weapon of the patriotic intellectual in exile. Attempting, in this feature, to combine analysis with persuasion and to bring detached objectivity and emotional commitment to his writing, Aron did rely upon clichés and stereotypes to make his points but he did not relinquish his right to make subtle and precise discriminations. The result, which was intended to draw on both the rational and emotional faculties of the readers and to promote a cause without losing imaginative sight of the alternatives, took Aron to the point where his analytical skills were compromised by too rigid an adherence to the forms of the propaganda. Conscious that "propaganda ends where dialogue begins," Aron encountered the limits of propaganda as a patriotic gesture worthy of the exile intellectual.

The France chronicled by Aron throughout the years of the Second World War was made to conform, in all outward respects, to the model created and promoted by the allied propaganda: its inhabitants were depicted as suffering, valiant, united against the enemy and resolute in their determination to expel the enemy occupants. In the fourth issue of the journal, for example, the chronicler claimed that:

The French will never give themselves up to despair. Misery animates their generosity as it awakens their patriotism.¹²

And, more than a year later, Aron's summary of conditions in France was rendered with the aid of all the images and stereotypes supplied by the propaganda:

¹² Unsigned article, "Chronique de France: Organisation de la misère," La France libre, February 1941, 365.

One and a half million prisoners! A ruined country deprived of its wealth, underfed and, in some cases, on the edge of famine! Yet the Germans are still brandishing their weapons, more pitilessly as the Reich's war machine claims more men and as the menace of continental invasion grows. The hatred against the aggressor which unites and animates the French people, the deeply rooted hope of the liberation, the scorn for the collaborators, the willingness to fight, have served and will serve still more to counterbalance the German pressure. And the growing power of the Allies will come to the aid of the French resistance.⁷³

Wanting the journal's readers to assume that the internal French were predisposed in favour of resistance and therefore suspicious of Vichy, Aron assured those who read the "Chroniques" that the "great majority of the French" were "sure of their duty" and that they "live in the hope of the liberation and act for victory."⁷⁴ However, although Aron chose topics of everyday interest which lent themselves to propagandistic treatment, and rejected those which could be regarded as abstruse, philosophical or literary,⁷⁵ his focus on France made it impossible for him to avoid, even if he had wanted to, the complicating factor of Vichy.

Accounting for Vichy without undermining the allied propaganda of unity was the greatest challenge Aron faced in his role as an exile propagandist. He accomplished it by depicting Pétain's government as

⁷³ Unsigned article, "Chronique de France: Mise au pas?" La France libre, May 1942, 58.

⁷⁴ Unsigned article, "Chronique de France: Collaboration ou abstention," La France libre, February 1943, 309.

⁷⁵ In November 1942 Aron made the ideas of French writers who were supporting the German occupation the subject of one of his "Chronique de France" series. Having probably decided that the subject was not suitable for this feature, Aron picked up the topic in his signed articles. See unsigned article, "Chronique de France: Au service de l'ennemi," La France libre, 70-78; René Avord (Raymond Aron), "Au service de l'ennemi II," La France libre, December 1942, 138-45; and René Avord (Raymond Aron), "Au service de l'ennemi III," La France libre, January 1943, 195-202.

the manifestation of understandable but mistaken impulses, as a regime which was destined to suffer the consequences of its own faulty logic. Those who adhered to Vichy were eventually shown to be, at best, deceived, or at worst, traitors to France. In advocating--at least until November 1942--a cautious tolerance of Vichy, Aron avoided contradicting either de Gaulle's absolute intolerance of the regime or the allied, particularly the American, support of it. However, despite Aron's success in producing a perceptive analysis of a complicated political situation, one which has not lost its relevance for modern scholars,⁷⁶ as an analysis it avoided the most important questions.

In building up a picture of Vichy as a totally discreditable government, Aron steered a careful course, ensuring that even as he was exposing its evils he was deflecting the question of guilt and upholding the central tenets of the allied propaganda. In January 1941, possibly responding to Pétain's dismissal of Laval from his government, Aron referred to Vichy semi-respectfully as a "new regime." By August 1942, after the return of Laval, it had become a "political comedy," and, in March 1944, appalled by the rise to power of "bandits" like Darnand, he referred to Vichy as a collection of "gangsters in power."⁷⁷ In charting what he believed to be Vichy's inevitable course towards self-destruction, Aron was careful never to portray Pétain as a man whose

⁷⁶ Aron's analysis of Vichy, as it emerged over the years, bears some striking similarities to the one advanced by Stanley Hoffmann in his chapter, "Self Ensnared: Collaboration with Nazi Germany," in Decline or Renewal? France Since the 1930s (New York: The Viking Press, 1974), 26-44.

⁷⁷ Unsigned article, "Chronique de France: Le nouveau régime; les hommes et les idées," La France libre, January 1941, 288-99; unsigned article, "Chronique de France: La comédie politique," La France libre, August 1942, 303-10; and unsigned article, "Chronique de France: Les gangsters au pouvoir," La France libre, March 1944, 374-79.

intentions had been dishonourable; rather, he made oblique references to Pétain's apparent authority and actual powerlessness, leading towards a comment in January 1943 that those who once held Vichy to be the legitimate government "see the Marshal today as a prisoner, not the free head of a sovereign state."⁷⁸ Nor did Aron ridicule the motives which lay behind French popular support for the idea of a national revolution, motives with which he sympathized as he explained many years later.⁷⁹ Instead, he concentrated on exposing the logical contradiction at the heart of the Vichy regime--that of the essential incompatibility of collaboration with national revolution. In developing his case, he could not help but point out the different and conflicting views and expectations brought to the collaborationist government by those who participated in it, but he concentrated not on the French responsibility for their own self-deception and gullibility, but rather on the cunning way in which the Germans made use of these differences by supporting an institution which became a front for their own exploitative intentions.⁸⁰ Sidestepping the issue of institutional accountability, Aron identified certain French individuals as having been more responsible than others for concealing from the populace the fact that

⁷⁸ "Chronique de France: La désagrégation du régime de Vichy," La France libre, January 1943, 222.

⁷⁹ Aron suggested that his own sympathy for Vichy lasted until November 1942. He believed it had not been easy in May and June 1940 to decide what was the best course to take and that the majority of the French believed, at some level, that de Gaulle and Pétain represented the same choice. Aron, Spectateur engagé, 85-86, 88.

⁸⁰ See, for example, the unsigned article, "Chronique de France: Le nouveau régime; les hommes et les idées," La France libre, January 1941, 288-99; and unsigned article, "Chronique de France: Le gouvernement des notables," La France libre, March 1941, 449-60.

"[b]ehind the facade of collaboration, behind the reality of exploitation, points the menace of extermination."⁸¹ Pierre Laval was one of these villains, and in order to portray him in an unqualifiedly bad light Aron identified him with the Germans. In the May 1942 issue, for instance, just after Laval's reinstatement, Aron noted that his return signified the government's replacement of collaborators with "resolute agents of the enemy."⁸² Marcel Déat, another assigned by Aron to the role of villain, was first associated ideologically with the enemy and then described as having exercised increasing influence over the policies of the government. In the August 1942 chronicle, "The Political Comedy," the plot traced was essentially that of ousting the Maurassians from political influence and replacing them by, in Aron's opinion, the much more dangerous Déat.

In documenting the course of the descent of Vichy--from drama to comedy to farce and finally to cowboy melodrama--Aron introduced the actors, identified their roles in the plot, assessed their performances, but steadfastly refused to venture behind the scenes. His analysis, at the level of plot, was and still is very convincing, although the mass of detail with which it was substantiated--much of it coming from a careful and comparative reading of German and French newspapers of the time--could hardly have been fully accurate. However, in refusing to challenge the stereotypes supplied by the allied propaganda Aron was, as he knew, distorting a rational conception of truth. In March 1944, just

⁸¹ Unsigned article, "Chronique de France: Collaboration et exploitation; un an après l'armistice," La France libre, July 1941, 243.

⁸² Unsigned article, "Chronique de France: Mise au pas?" La France libre, May 1942, 63.

before the feature was brought to a close, he concluded his denunciation of gangsterism with the comments that the "Vichyism of 1940 reflected a French malaise [and that] the reign of Darnand is only the supreme expedient of the Gestapo."^{§§} Clearly, if there was a "French malaise" in 1940, only a propagandist could suggest that it had been cured in 1944 by a resurgence of French nationalism: while propaganda had served Aron well in exposing Vichy as a front for German exploitation, it was totally unsuited to any examination of Vichy as a French phenomenon. In deciding to chronicle France without violating the line put forward by the allied propaganda, Aron had abandoned some important analytical tools. This seems to have been a conscious choice, and one which may have been reflected in his decision not to sign this important feature. In any case, having paid his dues as a French patriot by employing propagandistic techniques to depict to the world at large the trials and tribulations suffered by the French over a period of almost four years, Aron may have felt that he had earned his right to venture behind the scenes of French society and to apply his talents as a critic and analyst both to diagnosing the malaise and to recommending a cure.

In retrospect, the desire of La France libre's founders to create a journal of the French resistance that was not propagandistic was naïve. World War II was a crisis of such magnitude and ideological issues were seen to be so central to it that commitment to a political position brought with it the obligation to endorse precepts which were largely delimited by propaganda. However, in upholding the allied propaganda, the exile intellectuals and their British supporters

^{§§} Unsigned article, "Chronique de France: Les gangsters au pouvoir," La France libre, March 1944, 379.

revealed an agenda which went beyond that of simply winning the war or, more specifically, of liberating France. Underlying the strong support they gave to the notion that France embodied the ideals for which the war was being fought lay the desire of the journal's contributors to validate their exile, to prove that it did not detract from but enhanced their claim to be patriots. Behind their weak and tentative endorsement of the anti-German element of the propaganda grew an insistence on the value of distance as a rational perspective. By stressing that unity was as an inter-allied rather than a national phenomenon, the journal's editorial staff indicated its stance on issues of postwar reconstruction.

By employing techniques of propaganda to gain credibility as true French patriots, La France libre's contributors earned the right to claim that exile was more than mere deprivation. A few contributors, determined that their vision of a liberated France should be expanded by their exile, took advantage of their enforced separation to gain new perspectives on their homeland. Distance for them was an enabling, not disabling, concept. In order to restore meaning to terms which had been over-simplified and even debased in the propaganda, some of La France libre's contributors used their physical distance from France to gain objectivity, to absorb new ideas, and to apply them both critically and constructively.

CHAPTER 3

ANTI-PROPAGANDA IN LA FRANCE LIBRE: THE PATRIOTS' AGENDA

*What we liked in this review, Cobb said to me, was that it wasn't propaganda.*¹ Raymond Aron

*A culture lives by its contradictions and therefore by debates and polemics.*² Régis Debray

*The articles and books that I place in the category of ideological criticism are related to the goal I had set myself when I was young: to compare ideas to the realities they express, deform or transfigure; to follow both the course of events and the course of ideas.*³ Raymond Aron

In recounting his years in London and work for La France libre, Raymond Aron mentioned two intellectuals who said they admired the journal for its non-propagandistic qualities: Richard Cobb, a British historian and ardent francophile, read it throughout the war, liking it because "it wasn't propaganda"; and Jean-Paul Sartre, the most renowned French intellectual of his time, praised its contents for their "objectivity" and "historical distance."⁴ But these personalities prompt questions about La France libre as a non-propaganda journal: Cobb portrayed himself as the epitome of the detached intellectual, resenting the war

¹ Aron, Spectateur engagé, 82.

² Debray, Teachers, Writers, 74.

³ Aron, Memoirs, 380.

⁴ Aron, Memoirs, 120.

for interrupting his research;⁵ and Sartre seems contradictory because, though he praised the journal's objectivity, he published an article on the occupation in La France libre in November 1944 which accused the journal of bias.⁶ Whom or what, we may ask, did La France libre represent as an intellectual journal? As intellectuals, La France libre's directors saw themselves as both participating in and carrying on a tradition of political influence; as exiles, they were ready to make assumptions held suspect by others sharing this tradition. Most importantly, they assumed that distance from France gave them an advantage in representing their country: as interpreters of events, as critics, and as generators of ideas meant to benefit the period of postwar reform. In holding this viewpoint, they implicitly rejected a notion which had had currency in France since the time of the *émigrés* from the French Revolution--that France could not be represented from abroad. Always insisting on their emotional commitment to France and their right to be considered patriots, the exiles strove to legitimate the concept of distance and to convert it to a metaphor for a more intelligent and more modern style of patriotism.

A small but important group of La France libre's contributors was responsible for defining the journal's intellectual stance. In doing so they reacted against the educational trends of the Third Republic and

⁵ Richard Cobb, French and Germans, Germans and French (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 1983), xvi-xx.

⁶ In an article Sartre wrote for La France libre after Paris had been liberated, he objected to a photograph which had been published in the January 1942 issue of the journal. He analysed both the photo and its accompanying text, accusing them of being prime examples of anti-German propaganda. Jean-Paul Sartre, "Paris sous l'occupation," La France libre, November 1944, 10.

welcomed the international influences provided by their London base. They deplored the lack of emphasis on science and technology which had characterized France's education system,⁷ criticized the corresponding over-emphasis on purely literary and philosophical subjects, and promoted the social sciences, especially economics. Advocating a form of intellectual pragmatism, they anticipated the transformation of French intellectual life later observed by Stanley Hoffmann, a transformation which saw the tradition of the generalist and humanist challenged by the influence of the specialist or expert.⁸ La France libre's directors decided to diverge from many intellectual norms which had characterized prewar France by giving their journal a political and economic bent, thus helping to establish a trend that was to continue in France after the war.⁹

⁷ According to Theodore Zeldin, "between 1900 and 1939, the number of students in the faculties of letters increased sixfold." He also noted that "[e]xcept for a brief period during and after the Second Empire, science ... was never given more than one-third of the pupils' time; and mathematics was always given at least half of this time, so that the bulk of scientific teaching was theoretical. "Theodore Zeldin, France 1848-1945: Anxiety and Hypocrisy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 362; and Theodore Zeldin, France 1848-1945: Intellect and Pride, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 251.

⁸ According to Hoffmann, the "French intellectual has been both the hero and the victim of the stalemate society" because he lost public prestige even as he gained administrative power. Hoffmann, Decline and Renewal, 128.

⁹ It would be wrong to assume that journals with an economic and political focus did not exist before the war. One example is L'Europe Nouvelle, which published its last issue as the Germans were entering Paris, and was described as having been modelled on British economic and political journals by its then "Directrice," Madeleine Gex Le Verrier. Aron commented, however, on the relative lack of prewar interest in the subject of economics in France, saying that it "is only necessary to compare the particular titles of journals in France or in Great Britain to be able to assert the inferiority of the French press in this matter." See Madeleine Gex Le Verrier, Une Française dans la tourmente (Paris: Editions Emile-Paul Frères, 1945), 12-14; and Raymond Aron, "Du renouvellement des

In promoting intellectual pragmatism over ideological purity, Aron and his colleagues at the journal tried to resist extreme views, convinced that the factional disputes between right and left which had marked French political and social life since the 1789 Revolution had contributed to both insularity and extremism in French thinking.¹⁰ Aron's brand of pragmatism stood for a conservative respect for tradition, a rejection of national insularity, and an openness to outside ideas. Philosophically, he and colleagues, such as Robert Marjolin and Pierre Maillaud, were liberals, concerned both to preserve individual liberties and to cultivate a strong sense of the individual's responsibilities within society. As this chapter will demonstrate, their liberal, pragmatic views led them to defend the accomplishments of the Third Republic, championing it as having furnished a solid basis for postwar reforms. To a great extent, it was also La France libre's intellectual stance which led to its reputation as an anti-Gaullist journal, a reputation earned by Aron and some of his colleagues who expressed their fears that de Gaulle was incapable of compromise and susceptible to despotism.¹¹

élites(11)," La France libre, December 1943, 117.

¹⁰ In an article published in February 1944, Aron remarked on the critical need in France "to create a government which is at the same time liberal and efficacious." Raymond Aron, "Remarques sur l'instabilité de la France," La France libre, February 1944, 262-69.

¹¹ Aron both admired de Gaulle and distrusted him. In December 1942, for example, Aron argued that it was "thanks to General de Gaulle and to the heroes of Bir Hakeim, thanks to the Free French empire, [that] France has never been absent from the allied camp." Aron's distrust of the leader of the Free French was based on a belief that the General tended to oversimplify complex moral issues. In a conversation between the two about Vichy Aron noted: "It was obvious, even in these informal conversations, that the General detested the role being played by Vichy as such, as though he wished that the situation were perfectly clear." See René Avord

While the commitment to liberal pragmatism adopted by La France libre's intellectual leadership originated as a reaction against prewar French intellectual life, it was a commitment which was nurtured and sustained in London. Contributors such as Aron and Marjolin, eager to make British economic ideas relevant to the reconstruction of postwar French institutions, were stimulated by the contacts available to them in London and the planning initiatives undertaken by members of their own and other communities. They believed their most valuable contribution to France, as intellectuals in exile, was not to support the illusions of their country's former greatness but to strip them away, replacing them with strategies for regaining power.

In the backgrounds and aspirations of Aron and Marjolin can be clearly seen the readiness of certain prewar French intellectuals to adopt new and even foreign approaches to old French problems. Both men reached intellectual maturity during the 1930s, believing France to be politically and economically decadent; both felt themselves "powerless" to effect change and "exasperated" by their lack of influence; and both were convinced that a Second World War was inevitable.¹²

Marjolin, only twenty-eight years old when the war broke out and having just completed his doctoral thesis in political economy, was transferred to London with the military to work with Jean Monnet as the

(Raymond Aron), "Au service de l'ennemi II," La France libre, December 1942, 138-45; and Raymond Aron, Memoirs, 169.

¹² Marjolin wrote "[a]t the end of the thirties I had only two things uppermost in my mind, the economic and political decadence of France on the one hand, and the increasing German threat on the other." Aron noted the same decline in the political situation when he said: "Powerless and exasperated we witnessed this suicidal aberration." Marjolin, Le travail, 49; and Aron, Memoirs, 92.

statistician for the *Comité de Co-ordination Franco-Anglais*.¹³ He was familiar with London, having visited it frequently while researching his thesis, and English was a language which he had learned in the United States, where he spent a year prior to embarking on his doctoral studies.¹⁴ He also knew German, which he had been taught by Eric Weil, a German philosopher who had been recommended by his friend, Aron.¹⁵

Aron himself, who was thirty-five at the outbreak of the war, had just passed the examination for his *Doctorat d'Etat*, and, although he was a more established scholar than Marjolin, had not yet become settled in a career.¹⁶ His own degree had been in the traditional subject of philosophy, but the two years he spent in Germany just prior to the coming to power of the National Socialist Party in 1933 had persuaded him of the need to engage himself in the issues of the day. It was in Germany that he decided to become an expert on his own age and that he formulated his personal code--to strive for objectivity without accepting the role of spectator.¹⁷ Aron's interests, which had never been narrowly philosophical, had expanded to include history, sociology, economics, and international relations.

¹³ Marjolin, *Le travail*, 49, 96-97.

¹⁴ Marjolin, *Le travail*, 50-52.

¹⁵ Marjolin, *Le travail*, 56-57.

¹⁶ Prior to the war, Aron had determined on an academic career. In August 1939 he was given a post at the University of Toulouse, the salary for which was paid to his wife between 1941 and 1943 when he was listed as officially missing. He had also done some teaching at the University of Bordeaux in 1938. Upon returning to France in 1944 he had the option of returning to Toulouse or accepting a Chair of Sociology at Bordeaux. He decided against both, believing that the war had "fundamentally transformed" him. Aron, *Memoirs*, 139-41.

¹⁷ Aron, *Memoirs*, 39.

Aron shared many interests with Marjolin, including "our hatred of fascism and of hitlerism and our indignation and consternation before the absurd political and economic policies of French governments, both of the right and left."¹⁸ Marjolin wrote of the basis of their friendship: "our moral and intellectual universe, our systems of values were the same, not only in their general outlines but even in the details."¹⁹ These two, whose views were supported and complemented by other contributors to La France libre between November 1940 and August 1944, established the intellectual position of the journal in a way which constituted an implicit rejection of the backward-looking and predominantly nostalgic style of patriotism which dominated propaganda. It was a position which held that it "is in turning one's eyes outwards, towards the world and towards the future, that the French will succeed in safe-guarding, amidst party struggles, the common sense of mission and the living consciousness of their unity."²⁰ The events of June 1940 provided these exiles with a perfect opportunity to make respectable the ideas which they held before the war. Idealistic but not naïve, motivated by a desire to come as close to the truth as possible,²¹ open to foreign ideas and influences but respectful of France's unique traditions, and neither anti-German nor anti-Anglo-American in their attitudes, Aron and Marjolin insisted that criticism

¹⁸ Marjolin, Le travail, 56.

¹⁹ Marjolin, Le travail, 56.

²⁰ Raymond Aron, "Remarques sur l'instabilité politique de la France," La France libre, February 1944, 262-69.

²¹ Marjolin said that if "I try to identify the thread which drew me along during this period, I would say, probably with much reason, that it was the search for truth." Marjolin, Le travail, 49.

and patriotism were not mutually exclusive terms and that the problems associated with rebuilding France required new intellectual perspectives.

While one can reasonably assume that other contributors shared the prewar frustrations and attitudes of Aron and Marjolin to some degree, in the case of Pierre Maillaud there is evidence that he developed such attitudes in response to exile and not prior to it. Maillaud, whose accidental death just after the war apparently interrupted a promising political career, was described by Aron as having been the "most gifted"²² of those who worked for the BBC French Service. Afflicted at the beginning of the war by a profound "sense of moral and sentimental dislocation,"²³ Maillaud described, through a visual analogy to film, his first painful sense that his exile from France had been made final and intolerable by the signing of the armistice:

We could only feel, and feel with a total consciousness which was precise and implacably keen since our eyes could take in the entire spectacle. Before us a film was unfolding which nothing in the world could re-touch. When it ended, the horizon closed over the cliffs of Dover.²⁴

Rejecting the limitations of despair, however,²⁵ Maillaud displayed in his writing a developing respect for and interest in British culture and institutions. In the liberal tradition promoted by his colleagues, he

²² Maillaud came to London as the second in command at Havas News Agency, but worked throughout the war for the BBC. His friend Mengin, who was anti-Gaullist, did not agree with Maillaud's conformity with the Gaullist propaganda disseminated to France from London. See Aron, Memoirs, 132; and Mengin, No Laurels, 67, 266.

²³ Pierre Bourdan (Pierre Maillaud), Carnet des jours d'attente (Paris: Editions Pierre Trémois, 1945), 10.

²⁴ Bourdan (Maillaud), Carnet, 10.

²⁵ Bourdan (Maillaud), Carnet, 12-13.

endeavoured to arrive at an understanding of what was unique and particular about his new environment and which of its institutions had potential as models for postwar reforms in France. Although he did not embrace the conditions of exile as willingly as his two colleagues, Maillaud came to appreciate the value of distance as a means of gaining new perspectives on France.

For the intellectual vanguard of La France libre, including Aron, Marjolin and Maillaud, the concept of distance meant both objectivity and openness to outside influences. Relying on distance as a synonym for objectivity, they implied that, to understand and address France's problems intelligently, they had to be free to analyse prewar institutions and to criticize them. History was their means of obtaining critical distance; it provided both an extended temporal framework and a host of historical illustrations with which to create comparisons and contrasts. Believing that historical consciousness was a benefit to objective thinkers and that it would free them "from naïve progressivism and also from facile relativism,"²⁵ the intellectual vanguard refused to be arbitrary in its choice of historical illustrations. Rather, it upheld Aron's belief that "the interpretation of events is only valid to the extent that it grasps both the originality of an event and its place in the whole, whether system or process."²⁶

To oppose propaganda, Aron and his colleagues employed rhetorical principles which matched their goal of objectivity, striving to achieve

²⁵ Aron, Memoirs, 474.

²⁶ Aron, Memoirs, 87.

"a certain decency of expression" in their writing and avoiding "facile passions" because they understood that "it was too easy to be heroic in London."²⁹ Their goal was not to render concepts in a simple and flamboyant style, but rather to problematize them, presenting complexity as a challenge which the resisters in exile were well placed to accept. Whether they were literary, philosophical, economic or strategic, their subjects were treated so as to emphasize information over inspiration and analysis over emotion. By stressing the validity of the detached or objective point of view, Aron and his colleagues also advanced their belief that criticism was an essentially patriotic activity.

Treating their temporary location in Britain as an opportunity to receive new ideas, contributors such as Aron and Marjolin advocated the relevance to postwar reform of concepts which had been neglected in France, either because they were considered foreign and irrelevant, or because they derived from fields of study which the French had ignored. As advocates of objectivity and intellectual receptivity, Aron and Marjolin rejected the preoccupation, so evident in the propaganda, with France as a threatened national entity. For them, contemporary events had rendered fatuous the claim that national self-determination and independence could be easily recovered. Critical of France's prewar insularity, they drew on the traditions and experience of other countries to create postwar options, believing that France could regain its stature as a world leader only by acknowledging its reliance on the larger international order and by embracing the concept of interdependence rather than the mirage of independence. For La France

²⁹ Aron, Spectateur engagé, 99.

libre's intellectual leadership, any genuine program for reform had to begin by acknowledging the importance of the social sciences and by ceasing to reject influential ideas generated in Britain and the United States.

Although Aron demonstrated his patriotism by supporting, in his chronicles of France, the idea that his country was necessary to the perpetuation of Western civilisation, why did he then consider it ~~his~~ patriotic duty to undermine the same proposition? Believing, as he did, in the informing character of paradox, Aron could uphold propaganda for pragmatic and emotional reasons even while he contended that a rational refutation of its central tenets was a precondition to restoring France to some measure of its former greatness. While the full impact of his refutation was not made evident until September 1944--the month after Paris had been liberated and intellectuals had begun to feel released from their self-imposed obligation to respect the rhetoric of unity--he had continuously written about civilisation, culture and history so as to challenge the clichéd proposition and to reformulate it at a deeper level of meaning. By refusing to accept the progressivist assumption which underlay the allied propaganda and by challenging the naïve and historicist version of history upon which it relied, Aron represented many of his French colleagues in exile when he articulated his personal version of the proposition--that France was unique but not immortal and that its future as a world leader could be achieved only by abandoning the anachronistic view that it would continue forever in its role as the emblem of Western civilisation. His position, which shared with the propaganda only a sense of dedicated patriotism, was developed over the four year period from November 1940 to September 1944.

As a propagandist, Aron may have successfully exonerated France from responsibility for the defeat and the collaboration, but he clearly believed--well before 1940--that the prevailing complacency about the superiority of French culture had been disabling. In his Memoirs he recounts having scandalized Paul Fauconnet, one of the examiners for his *Doctorat d'Etat* in March 1938, with those parts of his Introduction to the Philosophy of History which challenged the notion of progress.²⁵ It was, he suggests, his rejection of "rationalist progressivism" which shocked the academic community and put him on the "fringe" of those who "still believed in 'the civilizing mission' of France or the Western countries."²⁶ Having rejected so early the notion that France had a civilising mission, Aron was circumspect about when and how he declared his position in La France libre. His technique was to introduce his criticisms indirectly. In his signed articles, he returned frequently to the theme that history evidences the rise and fall of nations and civilizations. He also stressed that history, as long as it is not made to distort the relation between general and particular truths, repeats its lessons and so makes them relevant. By such themes and strategies, Aron was able to imply, well before he was ready to make explicit, his belief that France must be scrutinized critically by its citizens.

In his signed articles Aron assumed the role of constructive critic, using history as a tool with which to build, obliquely at first, a picture of France which was different from the one celebrated in the propaganda. Careful, in the early articles, not to undermine directly

²⁵ Aron, Memoirs, 75-76.

²⁶ Aron, Memoirs, 81.

the notion that France was a mythical, glorious and coherent entity, he gradually introduced a picture of a complex, contradictory and precarious nation, one whose future depended less on a specific event, the liberation, than on how the complex social, political and economic challenges to follow would be handled.

In his June 1941 article for La France libre, "The Birth of Tyrannies," Aron rejected the theory of historical determinism and insisted on the relevance and applicability of historical knowledge, implicitly attributing guilt to the French for having allowed the defeat and the collaboration to occur:

Historical comparisons are always incomplete, and each civilisation must understand and resolve its own problems. But, the comparisons can be instructive if they reveal the essential character of ever present menaces to which regimes, which try to maintain simultaneously individual liberties, popular sovereignty and the rule of law, are exposed.

To understand how tyrannies are formed is neither to concede them a fatal character nor to acknowledge that they are politically or historically necessary: it is only to notice that the succession of constitutions is not entirely random and does not result from pure accident. It is also to identify the faults to avoid and the needs which have to be satisfied if the free regimes which follow the defeat of Hitler's imperialism are to succeed.³¹

Gradually, but insistently, the point that even brilliant cultures and civilisations had proved ephemeral was reinforced in La France libre. Aron himself, many years later, summarized his opinion on the subject by asserting brusquely: "The history of humanity is strewn with dead cultures, sometimes even cultures that have vanished in living memory."³² But, by February 1943, the point that mortality must be

³¹ René Avord (Raymond Aron), "Naissance des tyrannies," La France libre, June 1941, 132, 140.

³² Aron, Memoirs, 474.

reckoned with was made explicit, not by Aron, but by an anonymous author whose article was signed simply, "Etiemble." This article warned readers to heed "the lesson of Byzantium: that all civilisations are perishable, and their notion of the eternal merely a reflection of their nothingness." For the French, the article went on to suggest, "it is not necessary to believe [France] dead. It will suffice to believe it to be mortal."³³

In September 1944, the month after Paris had been liberated, Aron finally made explicit his version of Etiemble's warning. His article on how France could regain its stature as a world power, which relied on his readers' familiarity and comfort with the rhetoric of the propaganda, systematically ridiculed the simplistic version of history which had been promoted to sustain the war effort.³⁴ His theme in this article--that complacency was the most serious obstacle France faced in attempting to regain a measure of its former stature--was conveyed mainly by recasting the central myths of the propaganda, satirizing the easy assumptions which had informed them while retaining and reformulating many of their key concepts.

In Aron's recasting, France was depicted not as the victim of others' crimes but as the agent of its own problems. Dealing first with the matter of the defeat that was attributed primarily to "the isolation of France in the spring of 1940," Aron attributed this isolation to an intense preoccupation with internal conflicts which had characterized

³³ Etiemble, "Pour une France mortelle," La France libre, February 1943, 260.

³⁴ Raymond Aron, "Redevenir une grande puissance," La France libre, September 1944, 322-30.

all aspects of French society before the war: "torn apart by internal conflicts [France] failed to notice that the stakes of this struggle were its continued existence." He criticized what he believed had been a willful "blindness" or refusal on the part of the French to realize that their position in the 1930s had changed, particularly in relation to more populous and industrialized European neighbours. Countering the inflated assertions made in the propaganda with pragmatic arguments made in a prosaic style, Aron stated that to "maintain the position formerly occupied in the strategy of world powers, in human civilisation, France must have the number of children and factories without which its will to act will be paralysed by insufficient means."³

Aron's greatest scorn in this post-liberation article was reserved for the claims, many of which had been voiced in La France libre, for France's pre-eminence as a spiritual power. He suggested that, by limiting itself "to being a spiritual power," France had abandoned its international responsibilities, leaving "to others the care of guarding the Maginot line of Western civilisation." He argued that it was France's reliance on literature and philosophy as the primary measure of greatness which had put it "on the margins" of world events and he referred sarcastically to "the littlest France" as that in which "men of letters continue to declaim on the universal function of France." However, re-asking the question answered so smugly by the propaganda-- "What is the idea of France in our century?"--Aron did not reject the notion that the French could choose as a mission the preservation of the

³ Raymond Aron, "Redevenir une grande puissance," La France libre, September 1944, 322-23, 325.

human measure in society. He did, however, reject the methods which many of his compatriots intended to follow in order to fulfill it:

... it would be too easy to preserve this measure in a garden maintained in the French formal style, in the shadow of the cathedral at Chartres or in the sun of Saint-Tropez. Withdrawn into a morose solitude, satisfied to live without risks and without adventures, sheltered by a comfortable mediocrity, France would no longer signify anything. It would have to play its part among the leaders of industrial civilisation to be productive, using techniques of mass production and according to the law of efficacy.³⁶

Clearly, for Aron, while nostalgia for the old France and inflated ideas about the superiority of French culture had helped to coalesce and focus the war effort, the liberation brought with it a need to confront incapacitating divisions and outmoded ideas if France's future as a world power was to be a vision of substance.

Although La France libre supported, throughout the war, the idea that the Germans were the enemy because they stood for totalitarian rather than democratic forms of government, Aron, relying again upon history as a means of distancing himself from contemporary events, wrote several articles on the theme of tyranny: in these articles he gradually developed his view that the Germans had no monopoly on the phenomenon of despotism and that, in searching for an enemy to democracy, the French had to look within as well as without.³⁷ In the first issue of La

³⁶ Raymond Aron, "Redevenir une grande puissance," La France libre, September 1944, 328, 330.

³⁷ Tyranny is the subject of the following articles, all written by Raymond Aron and all published in La France libre: "Le Machiavélisme, doctrine des tyrannies modernes," November 1940, 45-54; "Naissance des tyrannies," June 1941, 131-41; "Mythe révolutionnaire et impérialisme Germanique," July 1941, 219-27; "Tyrannie et mépris des hommes," February 1942, 291-300; "La menace des Césars," November 1942, 24-31; "L'ombre des Bonapartes," August 1943, 280-88; and "Remarques sur l'instabilité politique de la France," February 1944, 262-69.

France libre, implying but not labouring the point that the French had received fair warning of the threat posed by Hitler, Aron wrote an article in which he traced Machiavelli's influence on Vilfredo Pareto and the latter's influence on Hitler's Mein Kampf. In it he made clear that there was no valid excuse for ignorance as to Hitler's intentions: "There is no other example in history of an imperialist enterprise which, after having been so boldly announced in advance, has taken its designated victims so much by surprise."³⁸ Significantly, however, Aron's main purpose in this article was not the purely rational or academic one of proving his personal theory of cause and effect; in claiming that the "enemy is not invincible" and that one must understand history "in order to vanquish,"³⁹ he urged that ideas must be related to practical consequences and that the responsibility of the intellectual is to draw lessons from history.

While Aron's early articles on tyranny were directed either to historical theories about the development of the phenomenon, or to accounting for the rise of German fascism, his growing confidence in an allied victory caused him to inquire directly into French forms of despotism.⁴⁰ Impelled by patriotism, Aron assumed that to understand and articulate the potential for danger might help avoid it. He

³⁸ René Avord (Raymond Aron), "Le Machiavélisme, doctrine des tyrannies modernes," La France libre, November 1940, 54.

³⁹ René Avord (Raymond Aron), "Le Machiavélisme, doctrine des tyrannies modernes," La France libre, November 1940, 54.

⁴⁰ See, for example, the following articles by Raymond Aron, all of which were published in La France libre; "Naissance des tyrannies," June 1941, 131-41; "Mythe révolutionnaire et impérialisme Germanique," July 1941, 219-27; "L'ombre des Bonapartes," August 1943, 280-88; and "Remarques sur l'instabilité politique de la France," February 1944, 262-69.

believed the French to be predisposed to their own brand of political despotism--one which conferred power on national heroes and was best exemplified by Napoleon Bonaparte--and he was inspired by his love of the country from which he was conveniently separated to anticipate and thus help to evade a relapse into an undemocratic form of government.

Like many of his compatriots, both inside and outside France, Aron feared what he regarded as de Gaulle's despotic tendencies. Motivated by this fear, Aron looked to French history for practical guidance. In August of 1943, when de Gaulle was consolidating his influence over the National Committee of the Resistance (C.N.R.) and when the French Committee for the National Liberation (C.F.L.N.) was recognized by the Allies, Aron published an article which depicted Bonapartism as the French tendency to create despots at times of national stress. He presented this tendency as a uniquely French manifestation of tyrannical government. Although de Gaulle was not identified in the article, which concentrated for illustrative purposes on the Second Empire and the career of Louis Napoleon, Aron obviously believed that conditions in France were propitious for the creation of a new despot and he was not sure that de Gaulle would not take advantage of any opportunity to seize power.

In "The Shadow of the Bonapartes" and in "Remarks on Political Instability in France," Aron traced this particular tendency of French politics back to the gulf which, since the French Revolution, had separated monarchists from republicans: "France has oscillated between monarchical regimes, more or less balanced with representative institutions, and a republican regime, without finding either on one

side or the other a definitive equilibrium."⁴¹ According to Aron, the accidental conjunction of specific conditions--national humiliation, a revival of patriotism, a recognition of the need for efficacious government, and great uncertainty about the future--had resulted in the development of despotisms in France's post-revolutionary past. All these conditions he believed to be present in the France of 1944, making the country vulnerable to a repetition of an established historical pattern.⁴² Because Aron's intellectual commitment to a form of liberal republicanism would have recognized in despotism a step backwards for France, he took advantage of his exile location in London to explain the dangers he saw looming and, thereby, to forestall their realization. Read within the context of his other articles on tyranny rather than as an isolated commentary, "The Shadow of the Bonapartes" is not simply anti-Gaullist; his insistence on undermining the rhetoric of heroism must also be considered anti-propagandistic. By suggesting that France was as prone to despotism as Germany--but for other reasons and in a different way--Aron addressed issues of national responsibility which he steadfastly avoided in his own propaganda: if he displayed patriotism by supporting propaganda, he articulated his own patriotic vision by refuting the old stereotypes.

While Aron shared the prevailing view that intellectuals should play an important role in society, it was his belief that they should be effective--not simply ideological--which lay behind his determination to

⁴¹ Raymond Aron, "L'ombre des Bonapartes," La France libre, August 1943, 288.

⁴² Raymond Aron, "L'ombre des Bonapartes," La France libre, August 1943, 280-81.

use his historical understanding to effect change. It was because he believed that many of France's prewar intellectuals had failed in their responsibilities that he wrote several articles criticizing the prewar model of the intellectual and proposing an alternative--one which recognized and valued the traits which he and his colleagues had cultivated in exile. Relying again upon history to provide insights into contemporary problems, Aron argued that the split in French society which had been given its political formulation at the time of the French Revolution had been prefigured in the ideas of thinkers like Montaigne, Descartes and Pascal.⁴⁵ He recognized in Montaigne's scepticism, Descartes's rationalism and Pascal's belief in religious revelation, the legacy of polarized ideas and irreconcilable views which had informed France's political institutions and made it vulnerable to extreme solutions. Following a line of argument which had informed Julien Benda's Treason of the Intellectuals (1927), Aron was severely critical of French intellectuals who presented extreme ideas in a polemical fashion only to dissociate themselves from the logical extension of these ideas in everyday life.

Alain, one of Aron's teachers and an intellectual whose ideas had greatly influenced contemporary French society, was seriously criticized by his former pupil for having promoted the notion that elected leaders were never to be supported and that a citizen's primary duty was to be subversive. For Aron, who rejected Alain's scepticism, judging it to be incapacitating, "the real citizen wishes to choose his leaders, not to

⁴⁵ See René Avord (Raymond Aron), "Aux sources de la pensée Française," La France libre, October 1942, 441-48; and René Avord (Raymond Aron), "A propos de la morale Cartésienne," La France libre, October 1941, 492-501.

chain them in a perpetual suspicion; he wants the grandeur of the nation as well as his own personal security; he wants those in power to be legitimate but capable of action."⁴⁴ He saw Alain's refusal to imagine from the viewpoint of those in political power to be a fundamental error which, once exposed, left nothing but "a fairly crude sociology and an attractive but illusory ethics."⁴⁵

Other French intellectuals were criticized in La France libre's pages for valuing individual liberties above the well-being of society as a whole, figures such as the collaborators Drien La Rochelle, Fabre-Luce and Montherlant about whom Aron wrote a series of articles called "In the Service of the Enemy."⁴⁶ Aron saw these intellectuals as out of touch with the issues of the modern world and therefore unable to affect it. Fabre-Luce, for example, was depicted as a person who was "caught in a narrow circle, the prisoner of French quarrels, more enraged against those who would fight the Germans than against the Germans themselves, more familiar ... with the corridors of the *Palais Bourbon* than with the unfolding of universal history."⁴⁷ Behind the fact of their collaboration Aron recognized in these intellectuals an inability to learn from history; he saw them as self-deceived in

⁴⁴ René Avord (Raymond Aron), "Prestige et illusions du citoyen contre les pouvoirs," La France libre, September 1941, 425.

⁴⁵ René Avord (Raymond Aron), "Prestige et illusions du citoyen contre les pouvoirs," La France libre, September 1941, 425.

⁴⁶ Unsigned article, "Chronique de France: Au service de l'ennemi," La France libre, November 1942, 70-78; René Avord (Raymond Aron), "Au service de l'ennemi II," La France libre, December 1942, 138-45; and René Avord (Raymond Aron), "Au service de l'ennemi III," La France libre, February 1943, 268-74.

⁴⁷ René Avord (Raymond Aron), "Au service de l'ennemi II," La France libre, December 1942, 145.

believing they could promote the idea of personal liberty within a fascist state.

Another intellectual criticized in La France libre was the well-known Catholic reactionary Charles Maurras, whose nationalistic anti-republicanism was deplored by D. W. Brogan in an article which attempted to demonstrate the inward-looking and non-progressive influence Maurras had exerted on French society before the war. Brogan's argument, that by promoting nationalism as a primary value Maurras's *Action Française* had prevented France from creating links with other countries and had, ironically, increased its dependence on Germany, was generally upheld by La France libre's contributors.⁴² Maurras's influence on the policies and appointments of the early Vichy regime was noted and ridiculed by Marjolin who viewed as indulgent and self-deceived any proposed solution to France's prewar problems which was naïve enough to imply that replacing a society's institutions could redeem its prewar decadence:

Vichy has attracted all the adventurers and all the failures of France. What a marvellous chance for those who have not succeeded in a normal career, this national revolution which lacks men to carry it out and ideas to give it soul.⁴³

In asserting that the majority of French intellectuals had failed their society--as had the French political élite, neither group having been able to translate their ideas into efficacious practice--Aron and his colleagues implied that intellectuals had made themselves irrelevant. Only by adopting new intellectual approaches could France's educated élite restore themselves to positions of social and political influence.

⁴² D. W. Brogan, "La tragédie du nationalisme intégral," La France libre, January 1941, 242-51.

⁴³ Robert Vacher (Robert Marjolin), "Vichy," La France libre, July 1941, 270.

Aron's belief that French intellectuals were out of touch with their society's most important contemporary issues was made clear in two articles published in 1941, one on "The Philosophy of Pacifism," and the other on "The Romanticizing of Violence."⁵⁰ In these articles, he intentionally linked pacifists with those who romanticized violence, criticizing both groups for the extremity of their views and their failure to take responsibility for the logical consequences of their positions. Because Aron believed that the term civilisation could be strictly applied only to social institutions and structures, he deplored the tendency of an advocate of violence, like Sorel, to refer beyond the rational universe to justify his ideas. According to Aron: "[e]very citizen has the duty to reflect on the effects of his conduct and not only on the abstract obligations of a divine or human code."⁵¹ He believed that: "[t]o refuse all use of force or to exalt violence in itself, is always to place total confidence in nature, it is to misunderstand the truth of civilisation, the necessity of justifying force by the end to which it is put, the duty of engaging oneself entirely in a cause recognized as valuable."⁵² For Aron, who was implicitly defending intellectual pragmatists like himself and his exile colleagues, ideas were relevant only if they could be tested against the practical realities they were intended to serve. In making a case

⁵⁰ René Avord (Raymond Aron), "Philosophie du pacifisme," La France libre, January 1941, 267-74; and René Avord (Raymond Aron), "Le romantisme de la violence," La France libre, April 1941, 559.

⁵¹ René Avord (Raymond Aron): "Philosophie du pacifisme," La France libre, January 1941, 267.

⁵² René Avord (Raymond Aron), "Le romantisme de la violence," La France libre, April 1941, 559.

against purely mental constructs, Aron both criticized the intellectual tradition from which he had come and indicated the position he would take on issues of postwar reform.

Although Aron and his colleagues criticized prewar French society and politics, their criticisms were intended to support--not undermine--their defence of the Third Republic's important accomplishments and their contention that these accomplishments should form the basis of the restored state. They adopted a cautious and yet deliberate approach to reform, one which balanced an openness to outside influences with a conservative approach to change. Unlike some of their fellow resisters, particularly those inside France, Aron and his colleagues wanted to retain conservatism as an active force in society and were, therefore, against the disenfranchisement of groups accused of collaboration. Maillaud, for example, who wrote about the need to re-establish "healthy institutions, each with its own place and limits," cautioned against devising new structures, suggesting that the process of reform must be both "revolutionary" and "conservative."¹¹

Marjolin too, while critical of France's prewar agricultural policy and an advocate of changes to it, acknowledged and respected the way in which the dictates of geography and the evolution of values in French society had combined to encourage the development of a rural, agricultural economy over an urban, industrial one. Consequently, he recommended that what was practical and valuable in the prewar policy be retained in the new one. For example, although he argued against the prewar policy of providing subsidy protection for agricultural products,

¹¹ Pierre Maillaud, "Nation, Assemblée, Armée," La France libre, March 1944, 341.

he did not want to see a decline in the rural population, believing that France's relatively high rural population could be made consistent with increased production.⁵⁴ Critical of policies which had favoured agriculture over industry, he nevertheless believed that some equilibrium could be established between these two sectors of the economy, an equilibrium which would "conserve to the culture of the soil an important place among the activities of the nation."⁵⁵

Aron, perhaps the most insistent of La France libre's intellectual vanguard that reform could best be accomplished without revolution, wrote about the need to renew the French élite, but cautioned against the purge as a means to change:

In France it is extremely important to continue and to renew at the same time - to continue because we must not disown the great work of the Third Republic; to renew because, if French democracy has, in the end, been able to resist the attacks of extremists, it was carrying on during its last ten years amidst profound conflicts which compromised its effectiveness.

La France libre's contributors differed from many of their compatriots in maintaining that the legacy of the Third Republic contained as much good as bad. It was a position which must have been influenced by their respect for the British parliamentary system, one which they knew had evolved over centuries and within the confines of one constitution.

Unlike de Gaulle, whose experiences in Britain aggravated rather than assuaged a tendency to anglophobia, La France libre's intellectuals

⁵⁴ Robert Vacher (Robert Marjolin), "L'avenir de l'agriculture française," La France libre, February 1943, 293-302.

⁵⁵ Robert Vacher (Robert Marjolin), "L'avenir de l'agriculture française," La France libre, February 1943, 299.

⁵⁶ Raymond Aron, "Du renouvellement des élites (II)," La France libre, December 1943, 112.

returned to France at the end of the war imprinted with foreign ideas and ready to defend their openness to international influence as an affirmation and not a denial of their patriotism. For Aron, Marjolin and Maillaud, understanding foreign cultures and drawing ideas from them posed no threat to the cultural uniqueness of their own country. On the contrary, seemingly untempted to exchange their exile perspective for that of the potential immigrant, they were stimulated by their forced separation to consider the institutions of their host country as models for the reforms which they had so long considered necessary in France. Impressed by the way in which Britain had mobilized in response to war and conscious of France's failure to resist the occupation at an institutional level, they were prompted by their admiration to a serious scrutiny of British ideas and institutions, all the time diverting the stimulus derived from their exile towards the prime object of their concern--France.

Robert Marjolin, one of the most anglophile of La France libre's contributors, described in his autobiography the extent to which he had been inspired by British examples. Insisting on the opportunities for learning afforded him by his time in London, he claimed of his British hosts that they "showed, during this dramatic period in their history, qualities of courage, of endurance, of resistance to defeat which provoked the astonishment and respect of those who, like me, lived the life of this nation without being part of it."⁵¹ In a testimonial published in La France libre in September 1941, in which he compared Britain during World War II to Periclean Athens, Marjolin articulated

⁵¹ Marjolin, Le travail, 119.

the lesson which he believed France should draw from this British example: "that one can be free and not fear death; that to remain free it is not possible to fear death; that the love of liberty is the strongest and most durable foundation of a scorn of death."⁵⁸ In what could be described as Marjolin's aggressive openness to the influence of British ideas and experience one can see, in its most straightforward manifestation, the conviction of many young French intellectuals that their particular contribution as resistants was to make use of the advantages inherent in their exile location to re-infuse France with the ideas and energy which it lacked before the war.

Aron, Marjolin and a few of La France libre's less frequent contributors, believing that a healthy economy was a prerequisite to political and social change, took advantage of their foreign location to increase their understanding of the economic ideas and practices of their host country and to promote the case for economic reform at home.⁵⁹ Having been converted to British economic ideas and policies before the war, Marjolin and Aron had their faith confirmed by living in Britain. They more strongly believed that the Third Republic's many governments had failed to confront the realities of twentieth-century economic life and that these governments' ignorance of economic issues

⁵⁸ Robert Vacher (Robert Marjolin), "Témoignages sur l'Angleterre en guerre," La France libre, September 1941, 383.

⁵⁹ See, for example, Hervé Alphand, "Les problèmes économiques d'après guerre," La France libre, February 1942, 317-23; and J. W. Beyen, who wrote the following articles on economic subjects for La France libre: "La reconstruction matérielle de l'Europe après la fin de la guerre," November 1940, 55-59; "Le système économiques après la guerre," January 1941, 236-41; "L'organisation de la future bataille contre le chômage," August 1941, 301-05; "Le rôle de l'état dans l'économie de paix," March 1942, 367-70; and "L'économie et l'homme," December, 1943 101-05.

constituted a greater long-term threat to the nation than the political tendency to lapse into stalemate. Aron, convinced that France's neglect of her economy was bound to have repercussions, suggested that "[l]ike a man in good health who doesn't feel his stomach, France has ignored its economy and abandoned it to itself."⁶⁰

In his autobiography, Marjolin described the conjunction of circumstances which had crystallized his thinking and confirmed his belief that France's economic future would depend on ideas formed outside his country. He admitted that for himself and like-minded French intellectuals who had despaired in the 1930s of making economic reform a subject of political concern, the outbreak of war and the resulting dependence of France on Britain had had some advantages: while "it had required a crisis and the war to reach an understanding of the phenomena of production and exchange," he believed that he could not have achieved such an understanding "without the scientific British tradition, which had persisted without interruption from Adam Smith to Marshall and to J. M. Keynes, and [which had] furnished the conceptual instruments indispensable to interpreting economic experience."⁶¹ Stimulated by the "milieu" in which he "was operating" and by the ideas which had impressed him as having value for France, he admitted that: "coming after a long economic decadence and a crushing military defeat, [these concepts] assumed the value of a manifesto prepared by a young technocrat taken with the ideas of growth, of rigour, and of power

⁶⁰ Raymond Aron, "Du renouvellement des élites II," La France libre, December 1943, 113.

⁶¹ Marjolin, Le travail, 123.

derived from effort."⁶² Obviously excited by the relationship between the economic strength of a country and its relative power, Marjolin became an expert on the functioning of both the British and American economies and then devoted his entire postwar career to rebuilding the French economy.⁶³

Influenced by the assumption underlying Keynesian ideas that economic health is related to growth, several of La France libre's contributors represented France's low and falling birth rates as the cause of their country's current economic problems and the effect of policies in need of reform.⁶⁴ In his post-liberation attack on the notion that France was an idea necessary to Western civilisation, Aron described how "little" France had become in relative terms since 1815, when its population of thirty million had--on its own--guaranteed it power in Europe.⁶⁵ It was a point he had made in an earlier article in which he identified population growth as one of several preconditions to renewing the administration, a renewal which he considered crucial to

⁶² Marjolin, Le travail, 126.

⁶³ Three articles which demonstrate the depth of Marjolin's understanding of British and American economic structures are: Robert Vacher (Robert Marjolin), "L'effort de guerre de l'Angleterre en guerre," La France libre, August 1941, 333-42; "L'effort de guerre aux Etats-Unis," La France libre, October 1941, 506-15; and "L'Empire Britannique dans la guerre," La France libre, February 1942, 307-16.

⁶⁴ Shennan suggests that between 1940 and 1946 the falling birth rate was frequently cited as a simple explanation for a generally perceived decline which was, in fact, very complex. Shennan, Rethinking France, 202-03.

⁶⁵ Raymond Aron, "Redevenir une grande puissance," La France libre, September 1944, 326.

achieving economic, social, and political reforms.⁶⁶ Marjolin--critical of French agricultural policy and sure that its protectionist features had prevented the restructuring of the economy to the detriment of industry, thus limiting the internal capacity of the country to act as its own market--implied that the predominant effect of French economic policy on population growth had been negative.⁶⁷ In thus implying that power and influence in France were more dependent on numbers than on cultural reputation, La France libre's contributors may not have been original, but they clearly aligned themselves with the competitive ethic which informed *laissez-faire* capitalism.

Impressed with how the British and American economies had been mobilized for war, despite the *laissez-faire* ideology upon which they were based, La France libre's contributors were among those resisters who, while they admitted the need for more state control of the economy during the period of postwar reconstruction, were somewhat reluctant to interfere with a free market system.⁶⁸ In the journal's first issue, for example, J. W. Beyen, a Dutch businessman and banker who wrote

⁶⁶ Raymond Aron, "Le renforcement du pouvoir II: De l'efficacité gouvernementale," La France libre, April 1944, 447-54.

⁶⁷ While Marjolin believed that agricultural policy had worked against the development of French industry, he did not believe that industry should be favoured over agriculture. Robert Vacher (Robert Marjolin), "La politique agricole française," La France libre, November 1942, 56-63.

⁶⁸ Shennan classifies those who took a stand on the issue of a planned economy as belonging to one of three groups: those who wanted no state intervention at all; those who, like Mendès-France, were very interventionist; and, in an intermediate category, the "neo-liberals" such as Hervé Alphan and Jean Monnet. It is to the last group that contributors to La France libre such as Aron, Marjolin and Beyen would belong. Shennan, Rethinking France, 266.

several articles for La France libre,⁶⁸ warned his readers against resorting to a planned economy after the war. According to Beyen "it is in times of war that the state becomes confused with the nation, that it comes to represent all that it is permitted to represent, even if it abuses its privilege."⁶⁹ It was a theme to which he returned in subsequent articles, and one which was much debated--both formally and informally--by exile intellectuals of all nationalities who were interested in the options facing postwar governments.⁷⁰ Marjolin addressed the subject in July 1943 when he wrote about the kinds of problems which would be faced by nations attempting to balance a *laissez-faire* approach to their economies with the immediate problems of postwar reconstruction. Backing away from his predisposition towards a free market, he advocated in his article a form of "compensatory intervention" as a means of providing incentives to enterprise after the war.⁷¹ Thus, a committed group of La France libre's contributors were decidedly critical of France's economic backwardness; these contributors clearly envisioned reforms within an international context. For these

⁶⁸ J. W. Beyen wrote seven articles for La France libre--all on economic or banking subjects--between November 1940 and December 1943. See also J. W. Beyen, Money in a Maelstrom (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949).

⁶⁹ J. W. Beyen, "La reconstruction matérielle de l'Europe après la fin de la guerre," La France libre, November 1940, 57.

⁷¹ Hervé Alphand, who was involved in much of the postwar economic planning carried on in London for de Gaulle, wrote one article for La France libre in which he laid out some of the issues which he believed had to be confronted by planners. See Hervé Alphand, "Les problèmes économiques d'après-guerre," La France libre, February 1942, 317-23. See also Alphand, L'étonnement, and Shennan, Rethinking France, 236, 238-39.

⁷² Robert Vacher (Robert Marjolin), "La science économique nouvelle, les industriels et l'état," La France libre, July 1943, 216-21.

exiles, the importance of economic factors constituted an international reality which defied a reliance on narrow, nationalistic policies.

Like the majority of the French, La France libre's contributors believed that the prewar system of education had produced a generation which valued material comforts over their country's ideals.⁷³ However, there is little evidence in the journal that these contributors were preoccupied with the same issues which had motivated the reforms of the National Revolution, namely, Vichy's objection to the secular basis of the system as it had operated under the Third Republic and its concern with the absence of a collective sense of nationalism. Rather, because their ideas about educational reform were influenced by a belief in the critical importance of economic factors to society, their vital interest was in seeing a new emphasis on science, technology and administration.

Thus, because Marjolin faulted French agricultural policy for subsidizing farmers who produced low yields with outmoded techniques, it is not surprising that he urged government to support agricultural research and to invest in technical training.⁷⁴ Similarly, Aron's criticisms of the lack of intellectual and political leadership in France were informed by general guidelines for educational reform. Promoting an idea which had some currency at the time--particularly in resistance circles--he recommended the creation of a Faculty of Social

⁷³ Few articles in La France libre were devoted entirely to the subject of educational reform. An exception is one by Denis Saurat in which he praised the system established by the Third Republic for its openness to all students, its high standards and its national control of the curriculum. He recommended broadening the options available to students and encouraging a tolerance for diversity. Denis Saurat, "La réforme de l'éducation nationale," La France libre, February 1941, 327-35.

⁷⁴ Vacher (Marjolin), "L'avenir de l'agriculture française" 28 (February 1943): 293-302.

Sciences to provide more appropriate training to administrators and professionals.⁷⁵ He also suggested that the recruitment base for administrative positions be enlarged and that the pay scales for administrators be increased to reflect their importance.⁷⁶ Believing that effective administrators require specific expertise as well as general qualifications, Aron argued that "before everything else, we have to create a new type of administrator."⁷⁷ It is probably significant that even Maillaud, whose literary and cultural interests should have predisposed him to prewar educational policies, commented in an article that the "revolution which France needs most of all is competence."⁷⁸

The French exiles who wrote for La France libre found in British economic traditions and policies much which was applicable to France. But, despite their evident and sincere admiration for the British model of parliamentary democracy which provided a rich source of stimulus to those interested in constitutional reform, they understood this model to

⁷⁵ While the creation of a Faculty of Social Sciences was not often discussed as a means of improving the training of senior administrators, the formation of a high level school of administration was frequently mentioned. Shennan provides some background to the *Ecole Nationale d'Administration*, noting that it had been proposed before the war by Jean Zay and discussed in the Gaullist paper published in London, La Marseillaise. Shennan, Rethinking France, 178, 185, 187.

⁷⁶ Raymond Aron, "Du renouvellement des élites (II)," La France libre, December 1943, 118.

⁷⁷ Raymond Aron, "Le renforcement du pouvoir (II): De l'efficacité gouvernementale," La France libre, April 1944, 453.

⁷⁸ Pierre Maillaud, "Nation, Assemblée, Armée," La France libre, March 1944, 339.

be inextricable from the social fabric of Britain itself.⁷⁹ Pierre Maillaud determined to shift the focus of his thoughts from a "sad national egocentrism" to a Britain which "deserved more than to be treated as a simple context for mourning."⁸⁰ He struggled harder than most to grasp the social complexities underlying British institutions and had, therefore, the strongest sense of their important but limited applicability to France. For instance, although Maillaud was fascinated by the way in which Britain's social hierarchy had been preserved in its parliamentary system to sustain and not undermine liberal and democratic principles, he was under no illusions about the transposability of a British system of parliamentary democracy to his own country.⁸¹ Indeed, he seemed to believe that while the British system had so far functioned to preserve individual rights and civil liberties, there were signs that these values were being displaced or threatened by an obsession with notions of social security.⁸² Whereas he was never the spontaneous and enthusiastic anglophile that Marjolin became in London, Maillaud took advantage of the opportunities provided to him by his exile to gain an understanding of the country which he believed should

⁷⁹ Shennan suggests that, as a model for the Fourth Republic, British parliamentary democracy was favoured by the French over either the American presidential system or that provided by the Third Republic. He notes, for instance, the fact that so many of the French in London, including Aron, favoured a system which encouraged the development of a small number of political parties organized around ideological positions. Shennan, Rethinking France, 117-18.

⁸⁰ Bourdan (Maillaud), Carnet des jours, 15-16.

⁸¹ Pierre Maillaud, "Reflexions sur les institutions anglaises," La France libre, June 1943, 118-23.

⁸² Pierre Maillaud, "La guerre et le problème social," La France libre, April 1943, 447-52.

be France's first ally and to extract from this new knowledge any principles which could be applied to a reform of French political institutions.⁸³

Two features of British parliamentary democracy impressed La France libre's contributors as applicable to France. One of these, the party system, was much discussed at the time and may well have affected de Gaulle's decision to retain traditional French political parties, despite contrary advice received from leaders of the internal resistance.⁸⁴ The second, more complex feature, the way in which British parliamentary democracy incorporated conservative principles without sacrificing either democracy or economic competitiveness, was considered by Aron and Maillaud to be a key to social stability. This feature seems not to have received much attention during the war in either Gaullist or resistance circles.

Aron and Maillaud, who disclaimed being conservatives, believed that, because conservatism had been an influential force in French society and had "roots in the past of this country,"⁸⁵ it could not be simply discarded. Maillaud's research into British institutions had revealed what seemed to him a surprising paradox--that not only had the

⁸³ Pierre Maillaud, "La politique du 'vieux mur de bois' au XX^{ème} siècle," La France libre, September 1943, 335-40.

⁸⁴ Shennan notes that there was considerable interest among the internal resisters in forming a 'resistance party' after the war. He also says that the British model of parliamentary democracy was the one most admired by those involved in various planning initiatives on behalf of the Free French, mentioning Raymond Aron as one of many in London who supported the idea of parties formed around "ideological positions." Shennan, Rethinking France, 41, 117-18.

⁸⁵ Raymond Aron, "Remarques sur quelques préjugés politiques," La France libre, October 1943, 432.

British aristocracy come to be the defenders of individual rights and civil liberties,⁸⁶ but also that conservatism in Britain had not always been allied with non-progressive or absolutist forms of government. Aron attempted to articulate the value of the conservative tradition in France. He deplored the seeming inability of French conservatives to present a program within the framework of a representative and democratic form of government: "If the French conservatives remain attached to this group of prejudices--preference for the peasantry, hostility to the worker's world, indifference to industrial development, nostalgia for pre-revolutionary France--they are signing their act of abdication."⁸⁷ Maillaud's and Aron's recognition of the value and importance of French conservatism, while it must have been an unpopular stance at the time, shows the degree to which they distrusted the influence of Communism on the internal resistance.

Aron recognized in the British and American style of political parties a potential solution to the problem of making French conservatism viable as a political force. He knew that governments tended to have greater stability when they were run by parties which had strong popular support, and that the way in which ideological positions were fragmented in French politics worked against stability and effective government.⁸⁸ However, if living in Britain had increased

⁸⁶ Pierre Maillaud, "Reflexions sur les institutions anglaises." La France libre, June 1943, 122.

⁸⁷ Raymond Aron, "Remarques sur quelques préjugés politiques." La France libre, October 1943, 432.

⁸⁸ See Raymond Aron, "Le renforcement du pouvoir I: L'instabilité ministérielle," La France libre, March 1944, 342-49; and Raymond Aron, "Le renforcement de pouvoir II: De l'efficacité gouvernementale," La France libre, April 1944, 447-54.

the exiles' appreciation of how to make opposing ideological positions constructive forces in society rather than incapacitating ones, the exiles warned about the need to devise reforms which would recognize the uniqueness of French society. Therefore, while Aron and his colleagues favoured any constitutional change which would improve the functioning of the party system in France, they made no specific recommendations for reform.

As La France libre's editorial secretary and *de facto* editor, Aron defined the journal's intellectual orientation through his personal vision. His efforts to compare ideas with the institutions in which they were embodied and his endeavours to understand contemporary events in relation to historical tradition marked the journal with his brand of intellectual pragmatism. His work established standards of both personal commitment and detached objectivity for fellow contributors in exile. To Aron and his colleagues, if not to de Gaulle and many of the Free French, exile stood for creative as well as challenging opportunities. Distance from France allowed those in exile to express the view that severe criticism was a warrantable patriotic action because it cleared the path to reform. In addition, their cosmopolitan setting was rich in ideas and examples that encouraged them to nurture their predisposition to internationalism and to recommend reforms partly inspired by their knowledge of other societies and cultures. The exiled intellectuals who wrote for La France libre strove to legitimate the distance perspective: they endowed it with the values of constructive criticism and creative open-mindedness, setting an agenda that transcended the restrictiveness of the propaganda which as patriots they had both to support and resist.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has shown how a group of French intellectuals, resident in London during the Second World War, explored, adopted and transcended the contradictions which inhered in their exile situation to create a journal that significantly increases our historical understanding of the French resistance. Struck by the contrast between La France libre's promotional and propagandistic features and its analytical methods and critical intelligence, I have tried to account for the seeming lack of integration in the journal's character: the journal's distinct but not essentially opposing styles convey the struggles of its contributors to remain committed to the resistance and to develop a critical outlook. The exile intellectuals relied on propaganda to emphasize their claim to be French patriots while employing criticism and argument to propose, more or less specifically, a postwar agenda for reform in France.

The directors and contributors of La France libre expressed, with a force and passion little recognized by historians, a desire not simply to restore their native land but to make it a country that matched their ideals. My argument has depended--not unquestioningly--on the assumption that the propagandistic and intellectual facets of the journal can be conceived of independently and that they reflect separate sources of inspiration. This assumption, while demonstrably useful, must also be recognized as an intellectual construct.

Certainly, for Raymond Aron it was not the opposition between propaganda and reasoned argument that sustained La France libre and that explained its considerable achievements. Rather, what drove the journal were the creative tensions and reciprocal conflicts between propaganda and argument. In his roles as propagandist and critic, Aron performed with true virtuosity: he was unique in his insistence that the principle of intellectual detachment must be simultaneously upheld and denied. He powerfully validated the tenet that moral contradictions are necessary if action is to coexist with the search for absolute truth. The journal of which he was the inspiring force thrived on such contradictions. But the unresolved tensions which lie behind La France libre's vitality do not reveal themselves according to conventional hypotheses: they require types of historical research that more fully locate La France libre and other exile journals in their times.

Further research on La France libre and other French publications could be directed to a study of the complexities of Franco-British relations during the Second World War. Traditionally, relations between Britain and France have been explored in the context of political and diplomatic history: journalism, however, provides insights into a dimension of this compelling subject which is rarely explored. For instance, while Andrew Shennan demonstrates that Britain was the greatest influence on the ideas which affected the planning of postwar France,¹ his terms of reference do not allow him to explore the reasons for this influence or the process by which it occurred. Within La

¹ Shennan notes particularly the influence of the British model on ideas for constitutional reform in France. Shennan, Rethinking France, 117-18.

France libre, however, there are clues to the many social, intellectual and business links between the French and the British during World War II. These need to be further uncovered if the complex relations between the two nations are to be understood better.

If La France libre provokes questions which highlight the need for cross-cultural research, it raises questions about the historiography of the French resistance, too--particularly about the role of the press. The extent to which the French resistance has been treated as a national phenomenon--with national implying a residence on French soil--can be illustrated with reference to the definition of resistance press given by two historians who have made the French resistance, including its press, their specialty. Henri Michel and Boris Mirkine-Guetzévich offer the following working definition of the resistance press:

It is, in general, an arm of combat rather than an instrument for the diffusion of ideas; it communicates news and orders, it relates the exploits of the Resistants and their martyrdom, inspires confidence, provokes enthusiasm, recruits adherents, sets out to discourage the adversary at the same time as it confirms the ardour of the Resistants. Political articles are rare.

This definition, applied to La France libre, is surprisingly accurate but also strikingly inappropriate. La France libre was conceived by its directors as an arm of combat; it related exploits of the resistants and told of their martyrdom; it provoked enthusiasm and tried to discourage the adversary while uplifting the spirits of the resistants. That La France libre contained political articles and served as an instrument for the diffusion of ideas cannot be explained simply in terms of the freedom it derived from its London location. The exile suffered by the French in London during World War II was also to a degree self-imposed.

They believed they could resist better from abroad than at home, and the ideas which they explored in La France libre marked the evolution of French society and politics after the war. Surely, what remains to be further explored and more satisfactorily determined is the relevance of La France libre and other exile French periodicals published during the Second World War to the French resistance and to the history of modern France.

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APPENDIX 1 *

SUPPORT LETTERS RECEIVED AND PUBLISHED BY LA FRANCE LIBRE, NOVEMBER 1940

A.C. Hunter, Memorial University College, St. John's, Newfoundland.

Robert G. Caldwell, Dean of Humanities, Institute of Technology, Massachusetts.

D. Van-Slyke, Hospital of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, New York

Dr. E. Berl, Research Professor, Carnegie Institute of Technology, Pittsburgh, Pa.

Laurence A. Hawkins, General Electric Co., Schenectady, New York.

Nathan W. MacChesney, Chicago.

R. A. Millikan, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena.

R. E. Swain, Stanford University, California.

R. R. Lillie, President of the Marine Biological Laboratory, Massachusetts.

Linus Pauling, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena.

I. M. Kolthoff, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.

M. Ross Livingstone, State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa.

Mrs. T. Frank, Professor of Old French Philology at Bryn Mawr College, Penn.

Harold C. Urey, Professor of Chemistry, Columbia University in the City of New York.

C. Tolman, Vice-Chairman of the National Research Committee, Washington.

Dr. H. Ploté, Harvard University Medical School, Boston.

Carleton Stanley, President of Dalhousie University, Halifax, N.S.

Edmond Cloutier, Le Droit, Ottawa [sic], Canada.

F. G. Keyes, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Mass.

John Farrar, Publisher, New York.

- Noel Streatfield, 11 Bolton Street, Picadilly, W.1.
- J. Mair, The Master's Lodgings, University College, Oxford.
- S. T. Farquhar, Manager of the University of California Press, California.
- E. A. Benians, Vice-Chancellor of the University, St. John's College, Cambridge.
- G. Trevelyan, Professor of Modern History, Cambridge.
- H. S. Canby, The Saturday Review of Literature, New York.
- Mrs. S. K. Underwood, New York City.
- W. Somerset Maugham.
- D. Brynmor Anthony, University of Wales, Cardiff.
- F. T. Brooks, F.R.S., Professor of Botany, University of Cambridge.
- S. E. Sheppard, D.Sc., Assistant Director of Research, Eastman, Kodak Co., Rochester, New York.
- P. Mandell Jones, University College of North Wales, Bangor.
- A. W. Hill, Director of the Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, Surrey.
- J. I. O. Masson, M.B.E., D.Sc., Vice-Chancellor of the University of Sheffield.
- W. F. Bragg, Cavendish Laboratory, Cambridge.
- Thomas Mann, Los Angeles.

* Names, titles and addresses taken word for word from La France libre, November 1940, 92-98.

APPENDIX 2

NOTE ON PSEUDONYMS USED IN LA FRANCE LIBRE

The majority of La France libre's contributors appear to have written under their own names. This was certainly true of the British and American contributors and seems to have applied to those from European countries other than France. Where pseudonyms are known to have been used, the rationale behind their use is not always clear. In most cases, the desire for anonymity must have reflected a belief on the part of the contributor that attaching his or her real name to an article would put at risk family members in France. In a few cases, pseudonyms may have been used by contributors to create a distinctive authorial point of view, particularly one which was not entirely in the character of the contributor. By far the most usual means of achieving anonymity in La France libre was to publish unsigned articles, a technique which extended to the almost monthly chronicles written by Aron and the monthly strategy articles written by Staro. Below are a few notes on contributors who were known to have used pseudonyms in La France libre and on one whose use of his own name constituted a form of dissembling.

RAYMOND ARON wrote for La France libre until August 1943 under the name René Avord. He also frequently signed book reviews with his initials and is the acknowledged author of the unsigned 'Chronique de France' feature. He collaborated with Staro on the writing of the unsigned series of articles on military strategy and, from time to time, wrote editorials which appeared under the signature of the editor, André Labarthe. He accounted for his own use of a pseudonym, saying that the French Administration must not be allowed to know that he was in London because his wife was still in France living on his salary from the University of Toulouse. In August 1943, after the arrival of his wife in London, he reverted to his own name. See Aron, Spectateur engagé, 85; and Memoirs, 120.

ALBERT COHEN wrote several articles for La France libre under his own name but, according to his biographer Jean Blot, also wrote for the journal under the name of Jean Mahan. In this case, the pseudonym appears to have enabled Cohen to express his very strong anti-German sentiments. See Blot, Albert Cohen, 117.

PIERRE MAILLAUD wrote for La France libre using his own name. It is curious, however, that he was known in London under the name Pierre Bourdan, a pseudonym which he used for his broadcasts on the BBC and under which he published Carnet des jours d'attente (juin 40-juin 44) in 1945.

ROBERT MARJOLIN wrote for La France libre under the name Robert Vacher, the only occasion on which he appears to have used a pseudonym. He never explains or even mentions this in his autobiography, though he refers to his mother's maiden name as 'Vacher.' Jean-Paul Sartre made direct reference to Marjolin's use of the pseudonym Vacher in an article

written for Combat after the war and quoted by Aron in his own memoirs. See Marjolin, Le travail, 9; and Jean-Paul Sartre, as cited in Aron, Memoirs, 120.

DENISE VAN MOPPES wrote for La France libre under the name Denise V. Ayme. André Gillois refers to Van Moppès having come to London in 1941 via Lishon and mentions that she was a translator of Hemingway who married an American soldier. In Audre Hanneman's Ernest Hemingway: A Comprehensive Bibliography (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), Ayme is cross listed with Van Moppès. It appears that she first translated For Whom the Bell Tolls under her pseudonym but, after the war, reverted in subsequent editions to her real name. See Gillois, Histoire secrète, 252.

LOUIS DE VILLEFOSSE wrote for La France libre both anonymously and under the name Laurent de Meauce. In his memoirs of the period he mentions having given a speech to the French Club at Balliol College, Oxford, and to publishing this in La France libre. In fact, this article appeared in the December 1941 issue under the title "Nostalgie de la France" and was described as having been given as a lecture at Oxford University and written by an officer of the Free French Naval Forces. Between June 1942 and April 1943 Villefosse contributed to the journal under his pseudonym. See Villefosse, Les îles, 107, 239.

It must be assumed that other pseudonyms were used in La France libre and remain to be confirmed. One of these is undoubtedly the contributor who wrote articles on the resistance under the name 'Jean Castellane.' This was, in all likelihood, the philosopher and resistance worker, Jean Cavaillès, who was arrested by the Germans in August 1943 and executed by them in 1944. He was, according to de Gaulle's biographer, Jean Lacouture, in London the spring before his arrest, a time which corresponds with the articles written for La France libre. See Lacouture, De Gaulle, 488-89.