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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

JOHN DEWEY'S CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY AS A THEORY
OF POLITICAL EDUCATION

by



MURINA MACLEAN BAUER

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
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ABSTRACT

The problem undertaken in this study is to examine the concept of "democracy" developed by John Dewey in his major inquiries, especially in relation to education; to analyze and to reformulate this configuration of ideas in a systematic manner; to appraise and test the resulting framework as useful (or otherwise) to educators; and to evaluate the position taking into account objections to it and alternatives to it. The purpose is to seek light upon the problem of political education, to try out the instrumentalist stance in the study of education, and to explore the relation of Dewey's political philosophy to his other philosophic writings which focus more explicitly on education. Each of these general avenues brings a distinctive approach to the position adopted here that John Dewey's political philosophy bears directly on current matters of importance to educators and merits attention in order to improve accessibility to his ideas.

The inquiry proceeds in three stages. The first stage is that of providing a context for the study, part of which is an analysis of the distinctive quality of Dewey's philosophizing. The second stage is an exposition of the distinctions and relations necessary to Dewey's concept of democracy. It proceeds by considering what is the good for each Deweyan type of grouping or phase of social life. The third stage is the critical analysis and evaluation of this concept, vis-a-vis both other theories of

democracy and of political education and possible problems with which it may be adapted to deal.

The study shows that to examine the education necessary to achieve Dewey's social ideal, democracy, is to examine political education. Carrying this out uncovered a threefold concept of political education which can be taken as Dewey's. The three phases of Dewey's theory of political education in democracy are: Learning group processes, acquiring knowledge and skill in communication and inquiry, and becoming wise in the ways of social organization and its management for democratic ends. The reformulation provides a strong theoretical justification for liberal education as political education, and for schooling as practical politics. As a concept of political education the theory is distinctive for its breadth, for its support of the school as a chief focus for political education, endeavours through a variety of empirical considerations, for its objectification of political affairs (thus making them materials of inquiry rather than of indoctrination), and for its reflexivity, (being tested, modified and reconstructed through use). Dewey's accounts of the empirical backing of his position appear to be well-grounded, and to be relevant contemporaneously, although the theory is open to criticism on other grounds. The strength of Dewey's theory lies in its generality and ideal quality. It serves inquiry in all the usual instrumentalist ways: it provides an orientation to problems, rather than problem solutions; it allows a gestalt of varied interdependent factors; it enables isolation of some distinctive variables; some of its implications are novel and unforeseen.

As an aid to political education inquiry, the chief of these is the first.

Some practical implications of Dewey's theory of political education are: that since political education occurs through a variety of informal and formal channels, it behooves the educator, the political scientist, the churchman, and the statesman to acknowledge their conjoint interests; that the open society must foster open institutions with ease of access and possibilities of participation; and that the school should be acknowledged openly as political, within the community, and within itself.

The study concludes with an acknowledgement that political education continues as a crucial and controversial problem area, both empirically and conceptually, and that Dewey's work remains relevant to these current concerns.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Several continuities facilitated completion of this study. Academic continuity was provided by Professors Allen T. Pearson, chairman of the supervising committee, and Professor Richard E. Baird. Professor Pearson consistently provided a unique blend of permissiveness and discipline, allowing me freedom to find my own ways to explore the subject-matter, while paying careful attention to the written results of such excursions. Professor Baird stood ready to guide me through the intricacies and subtleties of thought about politics. I acknowledge a debt of appreciation for these intellectual resources made available freely to me throughout the course of the study.

Psychic continuity came from family and friends. My husband, Milton, and my son, William, were flexible in plan and encouraging in spirit. Their attitude eased the tribulations of thesis-writing and provided ever more incentive to see it through to completion. The MacLean Clan had abounding faith in both my abilities and my perseverance. The Tsushimas indulged me in commiserations, practical advice, and an abundance of opportunities to regain perspective. Mildred Bazian has seen to the typing of the manuscript from the early stages to its final form. I have relied on her cheerfulness as much as on her meticulous work. I am grateful to all these friends, and to others who stood by.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

One assumes that behind every research there looms a 'why-would-anybody' question, a response to which justifies the inquiry (or not). The epithet comes from the communication psychologist George A. Miller, who introduces his seemingly whimsical "Project Gramarama" thus:

The interrogative mode is one of civilized man's most effective tactics for putting the other fellow on the defensive. Some questions don't, of course, but many do; their classification would provide suitable diversion for some quiet cocktail hour. There would be the contemptuous, so-what question; the teasing; you-mean-you-didn't-know question; the angry, what-are-you-doing question; etc. Personally, I am most vulnerable to the discouraging why-would-anybody question. I usually interpret it to mean that the questioner believes I couldn't possibly have known what I was doing. It is most annoying when I possibly didn't.¹

Of course, the ultimate answer to such a question is the investigation itself--completed, exhibited, evaluated. Closer to hand, however, are specific clumps of considerations which are at once efficient and final causes of the investigation, providing both impetus and a value context. Then 'why-would-anybody' undertake to study the relation of politics and education in John Dewey's philosophy? Most briefly: to seek light upon the nature of political education, to

¹George A. Miller, "Project Gramarama," in The Psychology of Communication: Seven Essays (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 125.

try out the instrumentalist stance in the study of education, and to explore the relation of Dewey's political philosophy to his other philosophic writings which focus more explicitly on education. More fully: through considering each of these responses we come to see that John Dewey's political philosophy bears on matters of current importance to educators.

Then let us start with political education as a problem for our time. In the first place, the political ramifications of education in the global village are seen to be extensive and often serious. For example some see the space race preference of sciences to humanities as potentially eroding democratic values. When such political questions about education arise they often imply further questions about political education. In pursuing these it makes a difference whether political education is construed narrowly (learning civics in school), broadly (socialization to political affairs); or even more broadly (becoming a good democratic citizen). Since politics and education are intertwined in infinitely more complicated ways than by financial support and government supervision, we need a range of ways by which to think clearly about their relationship. Political science is one such way. Political philosophy is another.

Perhaps the mushrooming "political socialization" movement among political science researchers dramatizes the contemporary need for study of political education by its very success. Roberta Sigel has this to say about it:

Why this sudden interest among political scientists in the topic of political socialization? Many reasons could be offered; but one in particular should not be overlooked,

namely the nature of the political world in which we live today. For one thing, the world today contains literally dozens of new states whose names alone were totally unknown thirty or forty years ago. Many are emerging from long-lasting colonial status; others are the result of a hodgepodge conjoining of formerly separate territories, tribal or otherwise. The first order of business for such new nations often is the creation of a sense of we-ness, national loyalty, and consensus; in short, they need to become political socializers. Another reason for the popularity of the topic of political socialization is that the twentieth century is the century of democracy. Countries of all types describe themselves as democracies and lay claim not only to the loyalty but to the approval of their people; for democracy after all is said to rest on the consent of the governed. And finally, this is also the century of unprecedented technological, social, and biological change. In the course of this change political systems can find their hold on people's loyalty weakening as these people find themselves dislocated by new machinery, threatened by new claimants to power, or lured by new political ideologies. The greater people's insecurity and/or dissatisfaction, the more they give the system cause to worry unless their loyalty to it overrides all momentary discomforts. It is there then that political socialization enters.¹

For these same reasons, political education is a current practical concern of educators who also seek to foster political identity, to vivify the democratic ethos, and to grasp stabilities within changing society.

Yet political socialization research does not solve all difficulties with political education. In the first place, its claims are empirical and not normative. It cannot help us decide between concepts or between practises. In the second place, the area suffers from what Jack Dennis calls "boundary indeterminacies,"

¹Roberta S. Sigel, ed., "Introduction," Learning About Politics: A Reader in Political Socialization (New York: Random House, 1970), p. xi.

and "indistinctness in field-specification."¹ As he says:

It is urged that researchers will soon arrive at some consensus about the scope of the general problem of political socialization and relate what they are doing to this or to some other general picture. It is hoped also that observers will more adequately take into account the multivariate complexity of political socialization phenomena and eliminate what has been a tendency to confuse the whole with one or two of its parts.²

There seems to be a need in the field of political socialization for more general, integrating theory, what David Easton³ would call "broad-gauge" theories. A similar need exists among educators. Political education is a general problem, since the potential range of political influence is great and may affect many aspects of society. To the extent that political education fosters certain modes of action and of thought as preferable to other modes, it is a normative affair. In trying to get clearer how he might think about questions of political education, then, it makes sense for the educator to seek out normative and general treatments of these questions, though not to the exclusion of other treatments.

In dealing with the problem of political education there seems room then for a generalist and normative bent. Yet this has not been the character of our times, in educational writings no less

¹ Jack Dennis, ed., Socialization to Politics: A Reader (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), pp. 24-25.

² Ibid., p. 27.

³ David Easton, The Political System: An Inquiry Into the State of Political Science (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959) pp. 56-58.

than in philosophy or in social science.¹ One need not join the controversy as to whether education is or can be a discipline to make the observation that generalist thinking in education is currently uncommon. Indeed, it is curious that the recent "structure of knowledge" approach in philosophy of education has not been tested re education as a field of study, to the possible advantage of educators. A relevant comment is David Goslin's on the "lack of a clear-cut conceptualization of the educational process, especially in the context of the social structure and functioning of the school and the nature of its response to external influences and pressures."² The specialist approach gathers status from research, tradition-sanctioned knowledge and modes of inquiry, whereas the generalist approach is vulnerable to criticism from any specialized point of view (the contrary does not hold). Although enormous benefits do accrue to the educational enterprise from "intellectual technology," which includes academic specialization, these bring with them certain discontinuities which make easy the mutual evasion of concerns and competencies of joint participants in the enterprise. Thus there is a need in education to take the generalist stance. In fact, Charles Brauner broaches the possibility of someone doing for education what Wellek and Warren did for

¹See such expressions of this as the following: Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action (New York: Viking Press, 1967), p. 9; and Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), pp. 1-24.

²David A. Goslin, The School in Contemporary Society (Glenview, Ill.: Scott Foresman & Co., 1965), p. 9.

literature in writing their Theory of Literary Criticism, namely, the provision of a rationale for the study of literature as a coherent tradition.¹ There is a similar need in education for normative emphases.

When Christian Bay calls for a return to normative theorizing in political science, he describes a situation true of education also.² For example, Kenneth Benne writes about what he considers to be a curious reluctance to project normative goals in education in his criticism and summary of a recent symposium on Philosophy and Educational Development.³ In summary, although generalist and futurist are acknowledged today as professions, they are not prevalent stances in writings on education. Yet some problems call for them. This study takes the problem of conceptualizing the relation of politics and education to be of that kind.

It is legitimate to look to philosophy as a possible source of frameworks by which to think about these matters, since there are

¹Charles Brauner, American Educational Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 305. Also see René Wellek and Austin Warren, Theory of Literature (New York: Harcourt Bruce & Co., 1956).

²Christian Bay, "The Cheerful Science of Dismal Politics," reprinted in Theodore Roszak, ed., The Dissenting Academy (Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1969), pp. 187-205. Also relevant here is Daniel Bell's account of the Futuribles movement, in which he points out ways of assimilating ideal-thinking to theory construction; Daniel Bell, "Twelve Modes of Prediction," in Julius Gould, ed., Penguin Survey of the Social Sciences, 1965 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1965), pp. 96-127.

³Kenneth D. Benne, "The Contribution of Philosophy to Educational Development: A Summary, Commentary, and Projection," in George Barnett, ed., Philosophy and Educational Development (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966), pp. 147-50.

philosophers who examine universals and weigh goods. Dewey's writings offer considerable promise, for Dewey is not only a systematic philosopher, but one who takes seriously both educational and social problems.

From this perspective, the concept of "democracy" merits major attention for two main reasons. In the first place, the importance of "democracy" to the problem of political education is clear from its ubiquity and the variety of roles it plays in discussion of the problem.¹ At different times "democracy" may be ambiguous, vague, "heterological," "essentially-contested," "essentially-uncontested," "multiply-stratified," a "convoy concept," an "accordion-concept," a concept used as a "persuasive definition,"² but it appears inevitably in any discussion of political education in a free society. In the second place, "democracy" is central to Dewey's theories of society and of education. It is a major evaluative idea for Dewey. To use it as a focus makes explicit his criteria of relevance. For Dewey, "democracy" is both general and normative.

A further narrowing of focus arises out of concerns centring

¹ See Pat White's lucid argument that political education is the one policy that must be in the public interest in a democracy. Pat White, "Education, Democracy and the Public Interest," Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain 5 (January 1971): 7-28.

² Without exhaustive documentation, we acknowledge the work of G. Ryle, W. B. Gallie, W. Weaver, F. Waismann, D. Braybrooke, W. Sellars, and C. Stevenson whose respective terms these are.

around the political aspects of knowledge,¹ language as political,² and, in particular, the role of querying³ or inquiry in society. Since, for Dewey too, democracy is impossible without full and free communication, it makes sense to focus on his notions of "language" and "inquiry" as handles by which to grasp "democracy" in the Deweyan system.

A second direction from which come answers to our 'why-would-anybody' question is the pragmatic temper. This outlook upon the world assumes that rational inquiry is problem-solving inquiry, and that rationality is to be assessed at least partly by judging the effectiveness of what is held to be rational for bringing one to the relevant goals. Similar pragmatic criteria, then, should be sought and applied for evaluating whether something said to be good, wise, sound, healthy, educative, etc., really does serve as an instrument

¹Of interest here are David Riesman, Individualism Reconsidered and Other Essays (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954), Richard Hoggart, The Uses of Literacy: Aspects of Working-Class Life, with Special Reference to Publications and Entertainments (London: Chatto & Windus, 1957), essays in Roszak, ed., The Dissenting Academy which deal with the social responsibility of intellectuals, and Edward Shils, The Intellectuals and the Powers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972).

²This has been broached recently in quite diverse ways by writers such as R. D. Laing, Norman Brown, K. Millett, and Margaret Atwood. An incisive and witty treatment is George Orwell's "Politics and the English Language," reprinted in Donald Hall, ed., The Modern Stylists (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp. 13-28.

³This point assumes dramatic form in Kenneth Burke's notion of democracy as the institutionalization of dialectic, and in R. G. Collingwood's idea of history as chronicling responses to the questions of an era. Much work relevant to it is found also in the sociology of knowledge, and in the history and philosophy of science.

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that helps one achieve what is appropriate to the activity... Hence, the study of sound political and social institutions can throw light on what would be sounder forms than some of those in current use. It is not necessary here to blur this common sense position with elaborations upon the role of non-descriptive theory in social inquiry. This may arise later in the course of evaluation and criticism. What we wish to emphasize is the usefulness of such an idealization as "democracy," as an analytic apparatus by which to think about school-society problems. Horace Kallen said: "As I see it Pragmatism is the philosophic expression of the sober faith in man and his works which the democratic ideal embodies, and John Dewey is . . . the greatest teacher of this American Faith."¹ To investigate Dewey's theory of democracy as an hypothesis would demonstrate its possibilities of use to educators. Moreover, when one considers the Deweyan notion of institutions as instrumentalities and language as a cultural institution, the approach narrows to focus on language as a prime consideration in the practice of pragmatism.²

The third avenue of approach to the position that Dewey's political philosophy merits study by educators is the relation which these writings bear to other parts of his philosophy. Perhaps because Dewey involved himself in the issues of his time by writing

¹Herbert Kallen, "John Dewey and the Spirit of Pragmatism," in Sidney Hook, ed., John Dewey, Philosopher of Science and Freedom: A Symposium (New York: Dial Press, 1950), pp. 13-46.

²See I. A. Richards, Speculative Instruments (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955).

polemical articles in addition to his academic philosophy, critics have paid more attention to the "historics" of his political philosophy than to the "systematics"--to use Robert Merton's distinction.¹ We take it as reasonable to treat his theory of politics and education apart from historical considerations. This is not to underestimate either the role of events in stimulating the growth of Dewey's ideas,² or the scope of Dewey's influence upon these events.³ It merely claims possible analytic usefulness in separating historical from theoretical questions in order to assess the intellectual contribution of a man's writings. In Deweyan terms, the usefulness inheres in a functional division of labour in inquiry, whereby the elaboration of an hypothesis is as necessary an action in problem-solving as is the ultimate use of the refined idea to guide practical operations. Within the continuity of inquiry, systematic abstraction and ordered reasoning make possible the widest application of intelligence to the control of events. Thus, although for Dewey theories ultimately exist for the sake of an enriched practical experience, their temporary separation from local affairs is necessary

¹ Robert Merton, On Theoretical Sociology (Toronto: Collier-Macmillan, 1967), pp. 1-38.

² A good account of this is found in C. Wright Mills, Sociology and Pragmatism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966).

³ One major kind of influence was in education. The story of Dewey's role in the Progressive Movement is told by Lawrence Cremin, in The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in American Education 1876-1957 (New York: Random House, 1961). C. A. Bowers deals with Dewey's more specific involvement in the Reconstructionist splinter group in Chester A. Bowers, The Progressive Educator and the Depression: the Radical Years (New York: Random House, 1969).

to their technical development as instrumentalities for this purpose. For our inquiry, we take the position that, since our intention is to formulate Dewey's theory of democracy, his more strictly theoretical writings are our first concern. Accordingly, Dewey's major technically philosophic inquiries form the core of our investigation.

Yet there are problems. For one thing, although Dewey was a systematic philosopher, there are gaps in the corpus of theory. For Dewey to be a systematic philosopher means that whether Dewey is ostensibly discussing education or science or logic or society, what he has to say is an expression of a single philosophic view and tacitly involves his commitments on other subjects. Different works, however, present the system from different points of view, depending upon the nature of the problem attacked; only by a study of his philosophic system, as revealed by its use upon different problems--i.e., as seen from several vantage points--can it be adequately comprehended. Hence a full understanding of his hypothesis concerning the nature of society is accessible through a group of his views on a number of apparently diverse subjects. Although Dewey did not develop a theory of self or a theory of group organization and development, such theory is often implicit and is found in scattered form throughout Dewey's writings. Some of it can be located and brought together. It may be that Dewey's technical political philosophy illuminates some of his other philosophic writings.¹ Equally, concepts

¹ A. H. Somjee, The Political Theory of John Dewey (New York: Teachers College Press, 1968).

developed in other works may deepen his political theory.¹ H. D. Aiken, for example, considers Dewey's esthetic theory to be his greatest contribution and the most useful, even for understanding social affairs.² But there is a need to relate these parts of Dewey's philosophy.

In the light of the above discussion, it seems a fruitful undertaking to examine the concept of "democracy" developed by Dewey in his major inquiries, especially in relation to education; to analyze and to reformulate this configuration of ideas in a systematic manner; to appraise and test the resulting framework as useful, or otherwise, to educators; and to evaluate the position, taking into account objections to it and alternatives to it. The purpose of the study, then, is to function as a bridge between the philosopher and the educator who is not a philosopher, and, via the construction and functioning of the bridge, to appraise the usefulness of the philosopher's hypothesis to the educator.

We start from the assumption that an analysis of a systematic theory of society and education is useful for educators who do not possess philosophic skills and knowledge. Knowledge on the part of educators concerning the meanings and interrelations of terms and distinctions constituting conceptual frameworks employed in the solving of educational problems is desirable. However, a bridge is

¹H. D. Aiken, "American Pragmatism Reconsidered: III John Dewey," Commentary 34 (October 1963): 334-44.

²Ibid.

useful or necessary between the educational philosopher and those who can make the most practical use of philosophic organizations of conceptual frames. That the comprehensiveness, precision, appropriateness, and accessibility of conceptual frameworks vary, poses problems for the unsophisticated practical user. Also, appraisal and evaluation of conceptual frameworks is difficult for persons without philosophic skills and knowledge, since, in the course of the reasoned development and test of frameworks, such skills and knowledge have been employed. We see, then, that the analysis and reformulation of competently planned and tested conceptual frameworks to establish a bridge between the educational philosopher and those who can use his products is both possible and profitable to education.

The legitimacy of this assumption derives from the epistemological position that a theory is a tool to be used, and is therefore adapted for particular purposes in the course of such use. It is to be expected, then, that the analysis and reformulation here would operate to make the theory more efficient where critical analysis brings to light defects and weaknesses.¹

The significance of such a study derives mainly from the assumption taken. That is, a fully functioning "bridge" between the philosopher and the educator who is not a professional philosopher would be a contribution to education as a field of study. There is

¹George E. Barton Jr., "John Dewey: Too Soon a Period Piece?" The School Review 67 (Summer 1959), pp. 128-38.

a scarcity of usable comprehensive frameworks by which to think about multiform relations of education and society taken dynamically and as in process. Dewey's hypothesis is such a framework, and its development in a usable form would help meet this need. The examination of the defensibility and utility of such complex hypotheses is important for school curriculum and planning: students exist in the context of both, the school constitutes a "furthering part" of society, and the possible relations of a "furthering part" to the whole of which it is a part are manifold. The use of non-descriptive theoretical constructs to investigate social phenomena is a relatively recent development in the social sciences. Dewey's social theory is taken as such a construct it may yield further fruitful hypotheses of which some may have direct empirical consequences.

The inquiry proceeds in three stages. The first stage is the one begun here, that of providing a context for the study. This is extended in the next chapter by a discussion of the distinctive quality of Dewey's philosophizing. The second stage is an exposition of the distinctions and relations necessary to Dewey's concept of democracy. It proceeds by considering what is the good for each Deweyan type of grouping or phase of social life. The third stage is the critical analysis and evaluation of this concept, vis-a-vis both other theories and possible problems with which it may be adapted to deal.

In order to appraise Dewey's concept of political education, the study draws upon three conceptual apparatuses each of which

distinctively serves comparative purposes. The first of these is R. P. McKeon's¹ concept of philosophy as a dynamic interrelation of a philosopher's first principles, philosophic method, and logical form. We use it to characterize Dewey's instrumentalism as a philosophic stance. The second is Stephen Toulmin's² concept of general philosophic method as being procedural as much as logical, analogous to presenting a case in a court of law. Using this concept shapes the development of discourse. Its use aids in determination of what is relevant material and the form suited to its presentation.

The third apparatus is Abraham Edel's coordinates of criticism in ethical theory.³ These are a guide for the larger anatomy of the problem. Edel devised this framework as a technique by which to explore and compare varieties of ethical theory in a systematic and comprehensive manner. The purpose here is similar--it is used as a programmatic schedule to insure adequate coverage of the problem and to facilitate critical comparison with other points of view. It is used in large--i.e., not to achieve a high degree of specificity, but to array and shape the conceptual material relevant to the problem of political education in Dewey's philosophy.

¹ Richard P. McKeon, Freedom and History: the Semantics of Philosophical Controversies and Ideological Conflicts (New York: Noonday Press, 1952), "Philosophy and Method," Journal of Philosophy 48 (October 1951): 653-82, and "Philosophy and Action," Ethics 62 (1952): 79-100.

² Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964).

³ Abraham Edel, Method in Ethical Theory (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963).

In McKeon's terms, his topics enable location of principles, whereas Toulmin's determine a method of procedure. The relevance of Edel's theory is to the larger logical form of the study.

In the next chapter, we use McKeon's characterization of philosophic method to appraise Dewey's philosophic character, and thus provide an orientation to Deweyan philosophy. Subsequently, we consider Dewey's political philosophy as exemplifying this character, while, at the same time, posing distinctive problems. Context having been provided by the first three chapters to the problem of political education in Dewey's philosophy, we proceed in Chapters IV through VII to an exposition of Dewey's concept of democracy and the education necessary to it. The task of Chapters VIII and IX is to clarify and to assess the Deweyan theory of political education arrived at through this exposition.

As recapitulation, let us recast our proposed inquiry in negative terms--its limitations, exclusions, and deferrals. As noted earlier, although we acknowledge the complementarity of the "historics" and "systematics" of theory, we orient this study towards "systematics", not "historics". "Historics" constitutes a separate, equally valid approach to the problem of establishing Dewey's concept of democracy and political education.¹ It would involve an investigation of the

¹Both approaches exclude psychologizing Dewey. "Concept" does not mean a mentalistic entity, but is a "phrasing for subject-matters designed to be held under steady inspection in inquiry." [John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley, Knowing and the Known (Boston: Beacon Press, 1949), p. 291].

causes Dewey worked for, his reactions to political events, the organizations he joined and supported, the controversies in which he was involved, as well as the major philosophical works that are our first concern here. This study explores one of these emphases, not both. To use the terms of Dewey's theory of inquiry, universal or ideational propositions have priority over generic or existential propositions in our immediate investigation of Dewey's democracy.

Our guide is Dewey's principle of the functional division of labour in inquiry. By this principle it is justifiable to place greater temporary emphasis upon one phase of inquiry, in order to develop its special function, and thus, potentially, increase benefits to the continuum of inquiry. Through its operation, Dewey's fundamental insistence upon relating one phase of experience to another, finds support through the mediating role of inquiry in instituting such relations. However, the principle legislates the need for distinctions within the materials of inquiry. In one sense, everything Dewey wrote of any social moment can be taken as philosophy, and, perhaps, as political philosophy. Such a notion rests on Dewey's concept of philosophy as social criticism, having political import in actual affairs, and on his dialectical emphasis upon the social continuities of all modes of experience and of all individual action. This interpretation abridges some customary useful distinctions¹--such

¹See Israel Scheffler, "Educational Liberalism and Dewey's Philosophy," Harvard Educational Review 26 (Spring 1956) 190-98. It is Scheffler's view that, in anti-dualistic zeal, Dewey sometimes attempts to eliminate distinctions that have not outlived their usefulness.

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as between technical philosophy and social commentary, or between political philosophy and other kinds of philosophy, such as aesthetics or logic. At its extreme, this interpretation makes Dewey's thought and action purely ideological, a reflex of history. However, the point of the current inquiry is to arrive at those factors in Dewey's theory of democracy and political education that are least tied to historical circumstance, in order to ready his hypothesis for possible contemporary use. For this study, then, it is important to separate "historics" from "systematics".

For the standpoint of our study, then, we move away from Dewey's anti-formalist concept of philosophy-in-general, and towards his functionalist concept of inquiry. We take as central Dewey's major philosophic works, and as peripheral his other theoretical writings that involve the relation of politics to education. The primary subject matter is not Dewey's life career, but his writings which bear upon the relation¹ of politics and education. Other writings by Dewey, or other facts about Dewey, are secondary for our purposes. This particular study does not undertake to give definitive answers to questions of whether the theory was adequate to events in

¹We use "relation" in the Deweyan sense, as connoting the theoretical and abstract.

. . . I shall reserve the word relation to designate the kind of "relation" which symbol-meanings bear to one another as symbol-meanings. I shall use the term reference to designate the kind of relation they sustain to existence; and the words connection (and involvement) to designate that kind of relation sustained by things to one another in virtue of which inference is possible.

John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Henry Holt, 1938), p. 54.

Dewey's life, or of how it corresponds to the actual stances Dewey assumed on particular political or educational issues. To give adequate answers to such related, but separate, questions, would constitute another project.

For this inquiry, we take Dewey to be a systematic philosopher, and, therefore, we make no attempt to trace development or changes in his thought. Nor is our concern the comprehensive collation of Deweyan treatments of democracy. Rather we attempt the systematic outline of the major concepts threaded through them. Our main effort is to present these concepts in their simplicity, rather than in their complexity, in order to make more visible the relations of politics and education within democracy. The major part of the study takes the form of what Dewey called "ratiocination," or "ordered discourse": exploration of meanings as such, within a system of meanings, and in such a fashion as to operationalize¹ them re a problem undergoing inquiry. For Dewey, the function of this phase of inquiry is to unfold the implications of meanings, in such a manner as to allow their reconstruction in new and efficient forms. The purpose is not primarily the construction of an elegant logical argument, nor is it to achieve an accurate description of reality. The important affair is to improve the potential consequences of inquiry into democracy and political education. As Deweyan, then, this study does not seek to establish the investigated concepts as

¹ Ibid., p. 14, n. 5.

"true"¹ in the two common senses of "true" mentioned: either as proved logically, or as corresponding literally to reality. Rather, validity resides ultimately in the consequences that flow from the concepts explored, when used in the active reconstruction of experience. Thus, to assess the validity of Dewey's democracy is not within the purview of this study.

In this chapter we have outlined the problems which give rise to the study undertaken, the plan of the study, and its limitations. We proceed now to the next chapter in which we consider Dewey's distinctive character as a philosopher; we thus provide orientation to his manner of work in the subject-matter of our investigation, Dewey's writings on democracy.

¹Ibid., p. 345.

CHAPTER II

DEWEY AS A PHILOSOPHER

Instead of the orthodox presentation of historical and bibliographical details as orientation to a philosopher's work, we undertake an analysis of Dewey's distinctive quality as a philosopher. This provides background and also serves heuristic purposes, since these insights prove useful in later stages of the inquiry. Before launching into the analysis, however, we look briefly at Dewey's place in contemporary philosophy.

Dewey's philosophic work belongs among the classics of philosophy of education and merits study first on that account.¹ More pertinently, his work not only bears upon a number of recent developments in philosophy, but very often bridges controversy surrounding them. There are two main thrusts to these bearings. In the first place, there are stirrings of movement toward a broader base than early linguistic philosophy permitted, yet one designed to avoid the worst vaguenesses of idealism and phenomenology. As Stuart Hampshire says:

... In philosophy, as in other inquiries, it has been the discipline of this time to answer separable questions separately, to analyze complex difficulties into elementary difficulties. The rewards of this discipline have been very great: accuracy, clarity, and sometimes even conclusiveness. But it is possible that there are purposes and interests which require that accurate

¹ Merton, On Theoretical Sociology, pp. 34-37.

and step-by-step analysis should not always be preferred to a more general survey and more tentative opinions, even in philosophy. It is possible that some moral and political interests, which, if pressed far enough, certainly lead into philosophy, are of this character: that they require more general statements of opinion, a summary of a philosophical position,¹ in addition to the detailed analysis of particular problems.

Dewey's philosophy may help meet requirements such as these. For Dewey, the context of any specific philosophic inquiry is a general one, the "biological-cultural matrix" of events.

A second main reason for Dewey's current relevance is a revived interest in naturalism. As Mary Warnock says: "Is it after all perhaps not so self-evident that empirical considerations about what does people good and what does them harm is irrelevant to deciding what is a moral principle and what is not?"² Recently in ethics, a small neo-naturalist movement has burgeoned into a defensible, though controversial, ethical position. Interest in naturalism has stimulated discussion concerning a wide range of technical philosophical problems, such as the is-ought controversy, the analytic-synthetic distinction, the possibilities of semantic ascent, the relation of Verstehen and Instrumentalism in the philosophy of social science, and even the relation of social study to philosophy. Since Dewey's long philosophic effort was to get rid of inert dualisms, his grapplings with classic problems often produce broad and deep contexts which transform the problem. Many of the issues of

¹ Hampshire, Thought and Action, pp. 9-10.

² Mary Warnock, Ethics Since 1900 (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 146.

recent controversy in philosophy were confronted by Dewey some years ago. Both his successes and his inadequacies reveal a great deal about the problems themselves. Thus a study of Dewey is important for many current controversies.

In The Uses of Argument,¹ Toulmin explores the usefulness of a jurisprudential analogy in understanding logic. Thinking of philosophy and method as analogous to arguing in a court of law demonstrates the primacy of procedural decisions, even to substantial or material evidence. In this case, the guiding question then becomes, what affairs deserve serious attention in order to arrive at a conclusion about a matter? In the light of this as a leading principle of inquiry, it is clear that, for the problem of Dewey's concept of "democracy," a discussion of Dewey's distinctiveness as a philosopher provides context and possible general relevancies which may prove useful in further specification of the problem.

In what follows, we make use of McKeon's² systematic, abstract, meta-philosophy. Since the original articles are condensed and tautly argued, what is presented here is a necessary abridgement of McKeon's theory. Yet, though perhaps somewhat unfair to McKeon,

¹Toulmin, The Uses of Argument.

²As general references for this chapter see the McKeon works already cited as well as Knox C. Hill and Joseph J. Schwab, "Philosophic Form and Method: An Introductory Comment," The Journal of General Education 7 (January 1953): 77-80, Warner A. Wick, "The Argument in Philosophy," The Journal of General Education 7 (January 1953): 81-88, and Joseph J. Schwab, "Dewey: The Creature as Creative," The Journal of General Education 7 (January 1953): 112.

It seemed worthwhile to try to use these abridgements as a way to get at the scope and integrity of Dewey's many contributions to philosophy. McKeon's view of philosophic method enables us to orient ourselves towards Dewey and to get a feel for where he stands in the philosophic tradition. In the same way that McKeon's theory is an attempt to get outside philosophy in order to appraise it as a form of life, so our use of his theory is an attempt to get outside Dewey's philosophy.

We begin by considering McKeon's version of what distinguishes philosophy from other pursuits. According to McKeon, the standard view of philosophy is that it differs in scope from other kinds of inquiry. Its problems arise out of the objects and actions of human life, as do those of any inquiry, but philosophy attempts explanation of existence as a totality. Other forms of knowing, such as science and art, then appear as terms within the universal framework that is the domain of philosophy. The answers to primitive questions assign these terms their importance. That is, the answers philosophy seeks are more general than and determine the status of, other knowledge. The forms and procedures of other inquiry are not as well adapted to the purpose of dealing with universals. Consequently, philosophizing is a specialized process. Its extreme generality is, paradoxically, the ground of its specialization.

In thinking of philosophy this way, one distinguishes philosophies according to subject matters and procedures of inquiry. Manifestations of the whole process are distinguished from each other by refinements of these constituent bases. All philosophies

cope with the same ultimate subject matter, although they differ with respect to how they formulate it. Lack of consensus among philosophies stems from diversified presentations of reality, on the one hand, and variations in the interworking of principles, form, and method, on the other.

In the first case, disagreements about subject matter among philosophies are serious, but they also serve as evidence and test of universality for the field of philosophic inquiry. Because actual interrelations among things, men, and thought are complex and constantly shifting, what individual philosophers are able to see as "the whole" will vary. Even among those whose viewpoint is similar, there will be differences in the factors taken as central and generative, in the formulations of the view in discourse, and in the procedures by which the formulations are constructed. But the attempt of all philosophers is to order the universe of experience in some way. The many orderings, taken as a set, reveal "totality" more extensively and more clearly than does any one member. With respect to solving the problem of "the whole," philosophies, taken together, are more adequate than any single outlook. The organizing thought of each philosophy determines the adequacy of other philosophies with respect to it. Each reinforces some viewpoints, but excludes others. The overlappings and interrelations of the many approximations to "the whole" refine and extend each other. In the second case, differences of procedure among philosophies have two main kinds of consequences: (1) with respect to efficiency in communication, and (2) with respect to variation in structure.

This concept of philosophy helps us appraise Dewey's work as a philosopher. Thus, for Dewey, how well a philosophy communicates is a measure of the control of the philosophical inquiry. For the extent to which any philosophy can actually order things and events depends upon the extent to which men can accept it, and, with acceptance, act "as if" existence were so ordered, thus testing the hypothesis. Success in being accepted depends first on the existing "communities of thought,"¹ and second on the establishment of new communities of thought. From the existing communities of thought, the philosopher takes his starting points. Because these notions have become integrated into human experience, men are likely to assent to them as reasonable or self-evident. New communities of thought are generated by allowing the reader (the secondary constructor of the philosophy) to share in the process of development or construction from these starting points. If a reader is to share, then the starting points must be clear and acceptable, the mode of progress from them must be such that the reader can undertake it (i.e., the steps of reasoning must be explicit and grow out of each other), and the pattern of truths discovered in this way must have an organic relationship to both the starting points and the movement from them, so that the reader can test them in, and by, the argument. A philosopher tests his premises, whether generative or generated, by application and elaboration of them in discourse. In problems of everyday existence, solutions are tested by immediate application to

¹McKeon, "Philosophy and Method," p. 657.

existence. But the comprehensiveness of philosophy's problem complicates the possibility of direct test. Therefore, preliminary test by logical analysis and expansion is necessary. For the philosopher, this reasoning performs the function of both demonstrating and evaluating truths, and, for the reader, it provides an avenue by which to approach truths. If a reader is to estimate his commitment to a philosopher's conclusions, he must be aware of the process of arriving at these conclusions.

Logical validity is a measure of coherence and cogency and, as such, is a first standard for philosophizing. In its absence, full communication is impossible, and the test of universality breaks down. Coherence is a function of the interrelations among the primary assumptions taken, the manner of exploring or expanding them, and the intellectual construct that results from the investigation. Philosophies may be compared as to the quality of the weaving together of principles, method, and form. But even where the weaving is comparably tight, the pattern of interrelation may vary and, hence, will characterize distinctive philosophic styles.

McKeon separates methods of philosophizing into three major categories.¹ He designates them problematic, logistic, and dialectical. Philosophy, he holds, has a triple purpose, "in its final discursive form (philosophy) is the discovery, demonstration, or organization of truths and probabilities."² All valid

¹ Ibid., p. 662

² Ibid., p. 658.

philosophizing achieves all three purposes to some degree, but the major concern of problematic philosophizing is discovery, while logistic philosophizing produces precise and systematic demonstrations of truth, and dialectical philosophizing unifies differences. These predilections, and the philosophizing patterns, stem from what the philosopher sees as the universe to be exhibited.

According to McKeon's categorization, problematic philosophizing presents life as continuous inquiry. The first principle is the necessity of solving real problems of indefinite variety and complexity. Principles are multiple, since they must serve as starting points for particular problems and problems are manifold. A "proper" principle for problematic philosophizing is pivotal between analysis of the problem and translation of the problem-solution into action. The criterion is application. Methods, as well as starting points, grow out of problems and are again multiple. Criteria for methods are "novelty, relevance, discovery, and use."¹ That is, a method finely adapted to a unique problem is distinctive, penetrates to the basis of tension, allows progressive analysis, and operates to release tension. The constructs of problematic philosophizing vary with the kind of inquiry. They grow out of the particular starting points and methods found appropriate to the problem.

Simple, changeless elements constitute the universe for a second type of philosophizing, logistic. Organizations of elements are more complex than individual elements but equally firm. That

¹Ibid., p. 677.

part of existence worth analyzing is a highly differentiated system of things, thoughts, and symbols. Starting points for constructing this universe are "indivisible particles, simple ideas, or arbitrary signs"¹--the criterion is indivisibility. Methods devised to cope with fixity and to arrive at identity are necessarily precise. Moreover, they allow clear demonstration, that is, they break down and array the subject matter, and are also a system of proof. For example, mathematical models are logistic. The argument in logistic philosophizing emerges as an analysis and as a deductive chain of reasoning.

Dialectical philosophizing presents the universe as a growing whole. "All things, all thoughts, and all processes and statements are influenced by the organic wholes of which they are dependent parts and in which they are distinguishable only momentarily and as a consequence of analysis."² A part has meaning in relation to the whole, that is, in relation to all other parts that, with it, make up the whole. As the organic whole extends, so do its parts. Starting points then allow the possibility of both unification of parts and of change. Inclusiveness is the criterion. The attempt is to remove contradictions and to establish broader unities. Methods that can do this move towards certainty and universality, and express the necessity of the universe. They are the methods for dialectical philosophizing. The outcome of using these methods on the subject-

¹ Ibid., p. 663.

² Ibid., p. 662.

matter is an organic unity. The stages of argument are stages in the transcending of contradictions.

It is implicit in McKeon's analysis that the modes of philosophizing are distinguishable on the basis of relative priority ascribed to principles, method, or form. Logistic philosophizing is "pre-dependent" on its starting points, since their fixed, indivisible nature determine characteristics of method and form. Problematic philosophizing stresses refinement and adaptability of method to varied problems. In it, the starting points for, and framework of, reasoning grow from the enterprise of problem-coping. Dialectical philosophizing overviews the progressive interactions of starting points and method and emerges with an ultimate emphasis on form. Each mode has a distinctive function. Problematic philosophizing emphasizes methods of discovery of solutions to problems that lead to action and to the advancement of knowledge. From stable, simple principles, logistic philosophizing constructs demonstrations of truth. Dialectical philosophizing exemplifies in form the unifying growth of life experience. Each method of philosophizing produces differing results.

According to McKeon, problematic, logistic, and dialectical philosophizing are specialized in function; each has inherent strengths and weaknesses. Scattering of emphasis among principles, form, and method within the argument need not affect validity. However, such scattering does determine the strengths of the mode, that is, the purposes to which the argument is best adapted, as we shall see next.

To [redacted] matters to which the respective philosophizings are best suited involves noting, first of all, that the universe characterized may be either static or dynamic. For McKeon, the logistic mode is suited to fixities, while the problematic and dialectical modes encompass a changing existence. The logistic philosopher, treating a static universe, uses specific starting points, moves from them in a fixed manner, and shapes progress in an exact way. This analytic, usually deductive, procedure is adapted to dealing with reality as compounded of simply known, indivisible elements which are changeless. The philosopher who takes the universe to be dynamic may proceed in alternative ways. He may focus either on the hub of the process (problems), or on the overall unity which lends meaning to ongoing events. When problems are central, methods must be adaptive to them. Multiple starting points, protean ways in which to advance, and varied orders of movement are "problematic" philosophic procedures. These procedures are sensitive to the fact that problems are multiple in kind. They are analytic and practical. They direct discovery of particularized solutions to be applied in resolving real problems.

Procedures differ, however, when philosophizing is about reality as a dynamic unity which enriches as changes accrue. In this case, what is necessary are starting points in which there are contradictory elements, then a technique that allows these starting points to be examined, and a progressive organizing and homogenizing of the area surveyed. The "dialectical" philosopher removes contradictions and constructs increasingly broad and deep relations.

He does not assume a stable unity. On the contrary, things and events are influenced continuously by the organic whole of which they are dependent parts. Parts are modifiable in the direction of more meaningful integration with the persistent growth of the whole. Dialectical philosophizing reconciles oppositions in existence and synthesizes them. Logistic, problematic, dialectical--these are categories assigned to some of the more distinct, logically valid ways of interworking principle-form-method. That is to say, to manners of philosophizing.

Just as each kind of philosophizing is better suited to some purpose, one infers for each peculiar tendencies toward weakness. The abstract, formal logistic mode may lose touch with the realities of experience. Heterogeneity in the problematic mode may foster haphazardness and lack of system. In the dialectic mode there is a danger of over-simplification and hypospecificity. For instance, handling only major aspects of a complex problem neglects possibly important intricacies, while over-concern with specific minutiae hinders grasp of the problem as such.

In working out the interrelation of principle-method-form that is unique to his philosophy, Dewey shapes techniques that adapt to multiform purposes but that mutually compensate for fallibilities inherent in themselves. Because existence for him is not fixed, the logistic mode of philosophizing is not useful to Dewey. But both problematic and dialectical philosophizing are adapted to reality in change. Dewey uses both these methods. Respectively, they provide his means to cope with multiplicity, variability, and novelty on the

one hand, and, on the other, continuity, integration, and cumulation.

As a philosopher, Dewey's character derives largely from the fact that his world is ongoing, not fixed. There are no finalities. Everything is subject to reconstruction. There is persistent emergence of the fresh and novel. Even the things in the external world are not stable, for, as objects of knowledge, they may be modified in significance and even in existence by new experience. Nor is knowledge eternal, for it is knowledge only as long as it fits the facts of the case, and improved theories are always being constructed. Meanings are held and conveyed by language, but the thing or idea to which a static name refers need not be itself static. Connotations expand and contract with use of symbols. To develop a systematic philosophy in a manner logically consistent with a world-view of flux poses the problem of encompassing with language the constantly changing diversities--with precise language, as in the philosophic tradition. Dewey combines problematic and dialectical philosophizing for orderly flexibility, or, in his own phrase, for "rigorous productivity."

As a method of philosophizing, the problematic mode is consistent with Dewey's outlook, since, for him, life is continuous problem-solving. Everyday existence poses diversified problems of adapting the external world to human uses and desires. Knowledge is the cumulative fund of solutions to controlled problem-solving on the theoretical level and is advancing at unequal rates in many varied areas at once. "Problematic" not only describes the way the world is, and the way knowledge progresses, but also the way Dewey

philosophizes. The discovery of solutions to conflict and controversy in such different areas as art, politics, and education is the modus operandi by which Dewey constructs a many-sided world-view. Dewey finds both reality and knowledge to be problematic and; consistently, assimilates the problematic outlook to his philosophizing.

Dewey's problematic philosophizing derives from four assumptions. Basis to the Deweyan system are the notions that meaningful existence is a process of learning through continuously expanding experience, that knowledge in general is adaptable to individualized events, that the point at which conflicts arise is the point from which knowing is generated, and that knowing alters existence. (Thus, knowledge is its own test, and is constantly open to further test.) These principles of discovery, adaptability, conflict, and application justify inquiry into problem-solving as a philosophic pursuit in terms of concern for "universals," for, though integral in particular problems, the principles are generic for existence.

A consistent problematic method allows a wide range for exploration, grows out of generalized ways of thinking or acting previously found effective, but adjusts to the peculiarities of a particular problem, and is tested by existential consequences. For Dewey, intuition of disequilibrium and appreciation of a situation as problematic are first phases of the method in operation. Then interaction of observed and conceptualized evidence causes progressive enlightenment re the nature of the problem. Reasoning leads to hypotheses which are referred back to the data and found either to

encompass the "facts of the case" and resolve the problem, or not: if so, the situation is cleared up; if not, further evidence is sought to elaborate more meaningful ideas and hypotheses, until the problem is so clearly defined that the direction in which solution is to be sought is evident.

The form, also, that is, the arrangement of ideas brought under discussion by this kind of method, has characteristics which are consistent with the assumptions taken. The discourse is serial: phases grow out of each other, giving progressive precision of facts and ideas, and an increasingly incisive apprehension of the problem. Logical operations transform the subject matter from indeterminate to determinate. The pattern of relation among the relevant notions derives from combined identification of problem-in-general and discrimination of unique elements. The clarification of the problem raises new conflicts, which, in turn, must be resolved. Knowledge resulting from the investigation is tentative, subject always to test in further investigations. In the process of problem-solving, conceptual simplification arises from, and is persistently checked by, observational evidence, such that the final inclusive judgment "applies" completely to the problem and, by demonstration, resolves the problem. Both the way in which conclusions are laid out in problematic philosophizing, and the mode of arriving at truths, follow from taking discovery, adaptability, conflict, and application as principles of existence and of philosophizing.

One may describe the outcomes of Dewey's problematic philosophizing as (1) an analysis of subject-matter, (2) a problem

solution formulated in terms of a settling action, (3) the transformation of subject-matter, and (4) the projection of new possibilities in an ever-expanding future. Also, more generally, manners of discourse consistent with these outcomes are identifiable. These modes of analysis and argument are a major product of the philosophic enterprise. Distinction-relation as a technique of analysis, transformation and reconstruction as rhetorical devices to produce grounded novelty, are Deweyan logical forms ultimately dependent on a principle of difference as the hub of existence. By Dewey's conception of logic, logical forms are "formulations of ways of treating subject-matter that have been found to be so determinative of sound conclusions in the past that they are taken to regulate further inquiry until definite grounds are found for questioning them."¹

For Dewey, to sift out similarities while identifying differences is a mode of arriving at what is relevant to the problematic in the situation. In verbal discourse it is also a means of progressive specification of meaning. Thus relatedness does not obliterate distinction of terms. If a term is to be anything more than a variant shadow of some other term, it must have a distinct character of its own. While making precise and firm relationships between terms, Dewey clearly distinguishes each from others. The way in which an idea is distinct from, yet related to, other ideas

¹Dewey, Logic, p. 13.

defines that idea. Neither distinctions alone, nor relations alone, encompass the meaning: both are necessary. Similarity-difference need not always be expressed directly as "related-to-but-distinct-from." For example, analysis in terms of part-whole, or general-individual, accomplishes the same logical purpose. Dewey finds distinction-relation a useful logical form in his philosophizing, because, while it enables close analysis, the results of analysis do not violate the dynamic integration of either his system or of the world as he sees it.

An effective problem-solving process transforms a situation of disequilibrium into a settled state of affairs. The newly discovered factors which precipitated settlement inhere in the equilibrium reached, which is therefore novel and unique, never a return to any former equilibrium. The conversion of a given universe into a quite different universe which sets off a new level of operations is designated "transformation" by Dewey. It operates as a logical principle in problem-solving. The problem is converted to a non-problematic status. The principle is also significant in the clarification of theory. For example, association is transformed into community by language, organic behavior is transformed into intellectual behavior by the cultural environment, and conceptions transform existential material. Transformation creates a new order of being. The novelty and creativity arise from basic principles of ongoingness in problematic philosophizing. So, too, for reconstruction, which is but an internal aspect of transformation.

"Distinction-relation" and "transformation" are two.

generalized manners of argument which operate to create and maintain the flexibility valued in problematic philosophizing. . They appear not only as logic governing the progress of the argument, but also as factors operative in existence, and as realities in theoretical constructs.

As a mode of philosophizing, the problematic has some shortcomings. In the first place, the temporary character of solutions to problems makes for instability. New and better solutions may always displace established ways of doing and thinking. That the problems concern infinitely varied areas means disorganization, since the ordering of infinite variety seems impossible. Also, there is atomization in the total view, one problem and its solution apparently discrete from others. For example, resolutions of problems of the nature of science and of the process and function of education are quite separate matters. Dewey overcomes the diversities and uncertainties resulting from problematic philosophizing by a dialectical dimension in method which unifies his philosophy. To say Dewey is a problematic philosopher is a part truth only. He is also a dialectician, who persistently constructs more inclusive unities by resolving oppositions.

Actually, for Dewey, the dialectical emphasis is a requirement of the problematic context by its own terms. In the first place, the three kinds of problems (of doing, of knowing, and

of thinking)^{1,2} are organically interdependent. Also, perceptual and conceptual evidence are progressively ordered with respect to each other to arrive at a problem-solution. The solution is a unification of two kinds of data. It also resolves the contradictory constituents revealed by early evidence to be the problematic situation. The movement and the outcome of inquiry each unify. Dialectical philosophizing works to this end in individual problems. It also integrates phases and kinds of inquiry. To the extent that inquiry is organically unified, dialectical philosophizing becomes the context of inquiry. It is as correct to say that inquiry is for the sake of an enlarged (i.e., inter-related) experience, as it is to say that the essential unity of experience grounds inquiry. For Dewey, problematic and dialectical philosophizing are necessary to each other.

Dialectical philosophizing is useful to Dewey on varied levels of interpretation. Dewey's characteristic dialectical procedure is to define opposing things or ideas in terms of each other, and then in terms of a broader unity which includes them both. This constant integration is not, for Dewey, a mere rhetorical device for pulling together the argument. It reflects the necessary functions of existence and also the way in which we attain knowledge.

As people resolve common-sense problems, they integrate their cumulated experience with the environment, and thus grow. That

¹Schwab, "Dewey," p. 117.

²John Dewey, "By Nature and by Art," Problems of Men (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), pp. 286-300.

is, they consolidate experience of the immediate environment with cumulated previous experience. What is more, the settled state of affairs that comes with the solution of the problem has unity and stability. These states are arrived at by trying out possible alternatives, until one arrives at one which satisfactorily incorporates the elements of conflict. Even in pure trial and error, this process means examination and test with regard to the problem. Also, it is a manner of proceeding that allows new suggestions to arise and be considered.

So, too, science is progressively cumulated and advanced by testing established theories in re new data, or new theories in re previous knowledge. The process constantly fuses together the outcomes of competent inquiry and opens channels for new investigations. If these new inquiries are to be valid, they must take into account the available fund of results of past inquiry. Where inconsistencies are apparent, deeper insight is sought. We see in inquiry, then, a dialectical search for unity. Resolution of opposition inherent in practical and abstract problems means a unified state of affairs with respect to the problem-solver, the environment, the existing state of knowledge. In achieving this integration, contrarities are accounted for, and other solutions that are inadequate to the problem are shown to be so.

For Dewey, this dialectical progress towards unity is true not only in realms of common-sense and science. It is true also for the logical structure of his philosophy. This process provides contexts which enrich opposed ideas and make them more meaningful

by relating them. He orders his own subject-matter by persistently taking account of alternative standpoints--as material to be assimilated, not as viewpoints to be opposed. Thus, as Dewey incorporates and accounts for differences among other doctrines, he is constructing, testing, and integrating his own system. The philosophic inquiries undertaken (in art, political science, morals, education, logic, value, and so on) assimilate previous philosophic positions to Dewey's view. Also, Dewey employs a kind of pseudo-history of philosophical views, not as a rhetorical flourish but as a source of actual material for the philosophizing process.

Each inquiry into a different subject-matter considers some, or all, of the other areas of inquiry implicitly or explicitly. All, taken together, knit the intricate pattern of the total Deweyan system of thought. At the same time, each completed inquiry, that is, each major book, is a unity in itself and a microcosm of the whole system. The dialectical aspect of Dewey's philosophizing provides unities for the system, within which diversities arising from problematic philosophizing have relation and a kind of stability.

The method of dialectical philosophizing, as used by Dewey, is: (1) to separate sharply two contradictory elements, emphasizing the opposition; (2) to examine the implications and consequences of each in the light of the other; (3) in the course of examination, to arrive at a context which includes both elements; and (4) to relate them functionally to each other. Interdependence unifies: the original contradiction is eliminated. The chief purpose is to put together, rather than to break down into parts. Although highly

specific details may emerge as the argument proceeds, the method is synthetic, since all four stages--separation, examination, unification, and relation--are controlled by the search for unity.

The path of the argument both broadens and consolidates. In the first place, ideas and phases of argument are related in contexts progressively more fundamental. Secondly, the investigation of an idea is an evaluation of it in terms of the inquiry. The more significant consequences brought to light further the argument and inhere in it. Progression of the argument, therefore, means cumulation and weaving together of significances. These two "formal" characteristics of dialectical philosophizing are reciprocal: more inclusive unities are necessary to the integration of ideas, while the progressive consolidation of meaning insures relevant unities. The overall movement is towards breadth and unity.

Dewey's choice of dialectical method and form is reflected in the character of two of his primary assumptions. The first is a principle of sharing which operates in both thought and action. The understandings men share make community (society) possible. Since such likemindedness comes about only through communication, social life means dynamic sharing of action and thought. The second assumption is the organic unification of the universe of experience. Factors of sharing are continuously and cumulatively integrated. The two principles are related, for sharing provides the grounds and means of unification.

To discriminate and resolve factors, as does the method of dialectical philosophizing, furthers the creation of communities of

thought and action. Shared opinion grows out of probing contrarities. Discovery of a deeper context, which unifies distinctions in a relation of mutual dependence, generates mutual understanding. Inter-communication, as the means of both investigation and resolution of differing points of view, is necessary because of a sharing principle. As with method, Dewey's dialectical form is consistent with the principles of community and unification. Expansion of the argument arises out of, and depends on, creativity of communication in existential activities and demonstrates creation of a community of thought. Progressive consolidation of the argument is the principle of organic unification in operation. As a dialectical philosopher, Dewey produces synthesizing exposition by the intimate interdependence of principles, form, and method.

In constructing his argument, Dewey frequently puts together elements of theory or points of view in a relation of mutual implication. This dominant logical form results from the dialectical enterprise, but, as with the logical forms produced by problematic philosophizing—(distinction-relation and transformation), it is grounded in facts about doing and thinking. The world in reconstruction has an intricate and shifting interdependence of parts. Things in their connections depend upon human action for significance. Human actions, including thought, are channelled by significances already attached to things; significances can be derived by relating ideas, because ideas refer to existential connections; things, action, and thought are continuously referrable to each other. Dewey's/ world, though flexible, is systematic, being ordered such that any

part of it assumes every other part. In philosophizing, Dewey undertakes not only to describe reality, but also to make the manner of describing consonant with his view of reality. His philosophy emerges, therefore, as a systematic whole. The parts mutually imply each other. This mutual implication is a distinguishing characteristic of Deweyan logic. For some philosophers, constructing a cosmology is a semantic and syntactical process which involves putting together precisely defined, isolated notions to describe additively a fixed reality. Using this approach, Dewey could not develop for us an interconnected, interacting world which would be consistent with his outlook and principles. That terms colour and depend on each other in his writings reflects the reactive interdependencies of existence, the necessity of serial symbol relations in reasoning, and, ultimately, the dialectical procedures by which terms are developed.

The outcomes of dialectical philosophizing differ from, yet balance, those of the problematic mode. Specific results are (1) a communication, in other words, a universe of discourse that progressively arrives at a common basis for agreement and generates a community of understanding; (2) a meaning-giving relationship of parts; and (3) a synthesis of presumed irreconcilables. Whereas the problematic mode analyzes a problem into constituents, the dialectical synthesizes inherent oppositions. The problematic method moves toward unity through change. It "transforms" an unsettled situation to settled. But the dialectical method impels the movement by relating the parts of the situation. Dialectical philosophizing looks first to immediate internal integrity, while problematic

procedures aim at ultimate overall resolution. In general, problematic philosophizing anticipates the future. Dialectical philosophizing anchors the projection in the present by testing, extending, and consolidating present meaning. Both kinds of argument are necessary to Dewey, not only because the two kinds of outcome counter each other, but, more basically, because the logic of each reflects characteristics of human interaction and of the generation of knowledge.

Because the objects of knowledge in the universe and the intellectual constructs of it that Dewey takes as real are "in creation" and infinitely possible, they constitute an open-ended world. Dewey as philosopher of this world is multiple, flexible, and differential. Although the universe is infinitely variable, there are, nonetheless, definite tendencies in it towards order. The immediate quality of the ongoing flow of experience pervades, and thus unifies, simultaneous elements. Also, there is continuous progressive cumulation and organization of the factors of experience. Because his world is unified, Dewey's philosophizing is integrative, contextual, and organized dynamically.

The two chief principles, variety and unity, do not exclude each other. On the one hand, creativity is not random, but operates to maximize a given degree of integration. On the other hand, neither immediate nor ultimate fixity is implied by unity of experience. Rather the unity is that of a web of meaning from which new threads are spun, and which lends significance to, anchors, and projects the new thread. Variety and unity are reciprocal functions; integration accrues in the process of problem-

solving, and the oppositions that generate dynamic unity are located first by analytical operations.

As variety and unity imply each other in general, the problematic and dialectical are mutually dependent modes of philosophizing for Dewey. In problem-solving, dialectic creates a community of experience and consolidates what can be warranted as relevant to the problem--for Dewey, logic is a tool of scientific inquiry. Problem-solving, as dialectic, proceeds towards a unified situation. In the course of the progress towards unity, relevant subordinate problems are raised and resolved. For Dewey, inquiry is the root of problematic analysis, and experience the source of dialectical unification. The contexts of inquiry and experience are basic and interpenetrating. Inquiry into experience, and experience as inquiry, translate readily to the other. So also, problematic and dialectical philosophizing are not readily separable in the argument, but permeate each other.

Let us consider, briefly, how these characters of Dewey's philosophic method find expression with regard to the problem of the relation of politics and education in democracy. Later discussion will extend these points in various ways. Here, our purpose is simply to note that the characters apply to the problem being investigated, as they do to other problems of concern to Dewey. A clear manifestation of Dewey's problematic philosophizing with regard to our problem is his insistence upon specifics of time and place--democracy is ever to-be-worked-out, and in terms of local, concrete individual particulars. Hence, the unique constituents of politics and of

education in a society are the material of democracy, more properly than is a remote, abstraction expressing democracy ideally. The effect of dialectical philosophizing upon the problem can be seen as persistent emphasis upon continuities. For example, there is an anthropological emphasis upon taking the context of a social problem as unitary, having functional aspects, but a qualitative coherence. Thus for the problem of the relation of politics and education, the political and the educational aspects of the operation of the whole culture must be taken into account, and not only the relations of institutionalized politics and schools. Both dialectical and problematic philosophizing characterize Dewey's political philosophy, as they do his philosophy in general.

In the course of the above discussion, we set out McKeon's contemporary philosophy, and used it to show Dewey's method of operation and world outlook. This allows us to bypass the often inescapable step in dealing with Dewey as a systematic philosopher: elaboration of the part of his philosophy that is implicit in all of the special problems he investigates: This elaboration usually comprises the terms surrounding his concept of experience as process. Though certainly implied as background, these terms are not directly relevant to the problem of whether or not his political philosophy bears on current questions about political education.

Since our goal is clarification, rather than obfuscation with primary ontological terms, we follow Toulmin's procedural guidance and examine the serious claims on the subject-matter of the problem at hand. The question of Dewey as a political philosopher

is certainly one of these claims, especially in the light of his views on the relationship between education and politics. To some extent, this is simply another expression of Dewey as a philosopher, but there are special factors in the subject-matter and in his life career that make his political philosophy distinctive, or that set limitations to its use.

In the next chapter, then, we shall consider some problems posed by the relation of politics and education in Dewey's philosophy.

CHAPTER III

THE RELATION OF POLITICS AND EDUCATION

In the previous chapter we appraised Dewey's philosophic temper. In this chapter we focus on its manifestation in his political philosophy. As stated originally, our hope is that a configuration of Dewey's concept of democracy will provide a standpoint from which to evaluate empirical and theoretical work in terms of their usefulness in furthering general understanding of political education. However, such possible expositions reach beyond the goal of this study, which is to formulate and evaluate Dewey's concept of democracy as a theory of political education.

Dewey views human affairs as being generated within two inter-transactional matrices: the biological matrix and the cultural matrix.¹ In the biological matrix, democratic social conditions encourage expansion of the quality of experience and, hence, are educative. Also, in the cultural matrix, sharing enhanced perceptions (learnings) within a group fosters mutuality, thereby increasing the democratic quality of the group experience. Thus, in a multitude of ways, education and political affairs are important to each other in Dewey's philosophy.

¹Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, Chapters II and III. Together these two terms constitute Dewey's "existential matrix of inquiry."

Since "democracy" and "education" mutually imply each other, it seems reasonable to expect that these two basic categories would provide the ideas necessary to specify the meaning of the cross-term "political education." But it proves difficult to establish a pattern of relation among notions that one can label "political education" and investigate on its own account. Inquiry is not thwarted completely, however, for to analyze the difficulties does shed some useful light, albeit indirect, on the problem of political education in Deweyan democracy.

As an aid to understanding the nature of this illumination, it is useful to consider first the substantial and rhetorical hindrances in Dewey's philosophy to the accomplishment of the task originally projected. This analysis opens up the problem serially, for it first provides clues to categories by which to evaluate Dewey's democracy as a concept. Using these categories prompts a recasting of the original question in a form that is answerable, in part, from our later account of Dewey's social thought. The normative emphasis in this answer suggests the experimental formulation of a Deweyan theory of political education in primarily axiological, as opposed to ontological or epistemological, terms. We are reminded that Dewey explains his break with classical philosophy in terms similar to these--as a shift of framework from ontological to epistemological¹--and uses a mathematical analogy

¹Dewey and Bentley, Knowing and the Known, Appendix: "Letter from John Dewey," pp. 313-29.

involving the "transformation" of a set of elements by changing their frame of reference. Hence, we see the problem of political education recast in terms possibly more amenable to inquiry than at the outset of our investigation. Out of the three openings of the problem emerge questions formulated differently than initially, for which Dewey indicates at least the directions in which answers are to be sought, if not the straight answers themselves. These new questions ask what is involved in instituting the major phases of democratic life, rather than asking how democracy provides for political education.

However, before we subject the problem of political education to this seven-keys-on-seven locks¹ mode of analysis, we take another look (see Chapter I for a first look) at what kind of problem it is, both in general, and for Dewey. We shall argue that two main characteristics of the concepts involved, their openness and their epic-scale, are as great hindrances to manipulating Dewey's terms as are gaps or inadequacies in the substance of his thought. Consequently, when these characteristics are taken into account in appraising Dewey's democracy, the concept is opened to new possibilities of interpretation. It is to this second task that these beginning rhetorical considerations are propaedeutic. We do not wish to seem to skirt the rhetorical aspects with undue

¹For a provocative use (though different from that used here) of this idea in relation to understanding Dewey as a philosopher, see J. Ratner's "Dewey's Conception of Philosophy," in P. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of John Dewey, The Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. 1 (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1939), p. 72.

haste, since they are interesting on their own account and well worth pursuing elsewhere. But neither do we want to lose sight of the major point here, which is, that specification of the cross-term "political education" is not an automatic by-product of elaboration of its two base categories, "politics" and "education." Thus, although our first consideration is the nature of this obstruction to direct action, the purpose is to prepare the way for the further, and more important, treatment of the indirect ways in which meaning accrues to political education.

First, let us take note of conditions which, though external to Dewey's particular treatment of democracy and education, nevertheless are true for him as for others who raise problems in these contexts. It is not necessary here to construct yet another catalogue¹ of the multiplicity of meanings and functions of the term "democracy," or to provide a resumé of the varieties of past and present democratic theory. But it is necessary to draw attention to the ambiguity and vagueness of the terms of discourse surrounding political education. "The good citizen," "the state," "freedom," "equality," "individualism"--such terms are of the kind that Hampshire calls "essentially disputable--and over time." Yet all is not chaos,

¹For one such catalogue see Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 2. See also Richard P. McKeon, ed., Democracy in a World of Tensions: A Symposium prepared by UNESCO (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), passim, but especially Foreword; Chapter 3, by Quincy Wright; and Arne Naess and Stein Rokkan, "Analytical Survey of Agreements and Disagreements," pp. 447-512.

for the patterns of working of these terms are predictable to some extent, sharing characters with other materials of normative argument. For example, they are often frames readied for controversy and thus are "dialectical" terms, to use the language of Kenneth Burke and Richard Weaver,^{1,2} In W. B. Gallie's terminology, terms like "democracy" are "essentially contested"³ such that adherents of competing ideologies substantiate the term combatively to serve their different ideologies. In the words of C. S. Stevenson,⁴ the concept of democracy is a "persuasive definition" within which belief factors and/or attitude factors may be manipulated for special purposes. These several manners of handling general, vague terms are

¹ Burke and Weaver use the concept of "dialectical" terms in the same way, as standing for concepts which are defined by their negations or their privations and which consequently invite and require anti-theses and counter-positions. These terms are distinct from "positive" terms which state or describe in a neutral uncontroversial manner. Neither Burke nor Weaver acknowledge each other. Both treatments are useful. Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), pp. 93-94. R. M. Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953), p. 187.

² Please note that this use of "dialectical" is not the same as McKeon's which we used (supra) to appraise Dewey's distinctive quality as a philosopher.

³ W. B. Gallie "Essentially Contested Concepts" in Max Black, ed., The Importance of Language (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 121-46. Gallie gives seven requirements for "essentially contested terms": (1) that they are appraisive; (2) are internally complex; (3) are initially ambiguous; (4) are persistently vague; (5) are used aggressively against other uses; (6) that they derive from an original exemplar whose authority all users recognize; (7) and that it is probable that competitive uses sustain the tradition of this authority.

⁴ C. S. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 206-42.

demonstratedly useful, especially in appraising moral and political discourse. Each writer emphasizes the openness of such terms--the incompleteness that allows their flexible use, though, at the same time, creating ambiguities.¹ There is another mode of operation of vague terms less easily taken account of, partly because no labels exist for it. A. O. Lovejoy's concept of "plenitude"² points towards this dimension of operation by suggesting heroic proportions of scope and range of meaning.³ In this sense, at the upper levels of generality, general terms may be, in fact,⁴ "uncontested" and provide "spaciousness" and "opacity" in discourse. In these cases, the terms are used as ground rather than as substance of the argument; they are heroic in scale, and they are often used ceremoniously to make

¹ See also F. Waismann, "Language Strata," in Anthony Flew ed., Logic and Language: First and Second Series (Garden City, New York, Blackwell, 1965), pp. 226-47, for his account of kinds of ambiguity, for his warnings against confusing the logics of different strata, and for his notion that to describe the "texture" of a concept is also a way of describing the concept.

Abraham Kaplan sees four kinds of ambiguity, and two kinds of openness, in The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964), Chapter 2.

² A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950).

³ See also the Indian philosopher Mukherjee. His discussion of "fulness" is relevant. Himangshu B. Mukherjee, Education for Fulness (London: Asia Publishing House, 1962), pp. 266-70.

⁴ Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, pp. 164-85. Weaver does not address our problem, but his concepts are useful to us in understanding it.

appropriate gestures towards an occasion¹ or "to mark a progress through a subject-matter, like a mediaeval monarch through his kingdom. In these instances, such terms as "the state," "civilization," "culture," and "freedom" are used as resonant reminders of what all reasonable men believe, rather than as combative stances in argument.

Dewey's work shares these two conceptual characteristics with other treatments of political and moral affairs. But since for him the philosophic enterprise was holistic and dynamic, the possibilities of ambiguity in Dewey's writing are even greater than for many other philosophers. Dewey's terms are elastic and systematically mutually implicatory because of his problematic method, or, as Donald A. Piatt says, "because of the polarity of contextual and perspectival aspects of Dewey's philosophy."² This means that many-hued meanings play varying roles which depend on the occasions of argument or inquiry. So also, the second mode of operation of general terms is found in Dewey's political philosophy. In fact, to take Dewey's theory of politics as an "epic-thought-deed"³ is often more appropriate to his ideal-type conceptualizations than

¹ For a discussion of the ceremonial use of language in political discourse see Margaret Macdonald, "The Language of Political Theory," in Flew, Logic and Language, pp. 174-93.

² Donald A. Piatt, "Dewey's Logical Theory," in Schilpp, The Philosophy of John Dewey, p. 107.

³ Sheldon Wolin, Hobbes and the Epic Tradition of Political Theory (Los Angeles: William Andrews Clark Memorial Library, 1970), p. 2.

is Aristotelian analysis. Sheldon Wolin, the author of this phrase writes of the epic tradition in political theory as "inspired mainly by the hope of achieving a great and memorable deed through the medium of thought."

. . . In the structure of epical theory, concepts, symbols, and language are fused into a great political gesture towards the world, a thought-deed inspired by the hope that now or someday action will be joined to theory and becomes the means for making a great theoretical statement in the world.¹

This is consistent with Dewey's thought and action.

Although we might expect that investigation of democracy would uncover warrants by which to make claims about political education, the heroic scale and open texture of Dewey's concept of democracy creates difficulties. Consequently, we are led to consider these characters themselves, large-scaleness and openness, as manners of conceptual characterization. This leads to reformulation of the original question about political education in genetic and functional terms--focussing on how political education would arise and function, rather than on what entity it is or may be in "democracy."

Now, let us consider what each character suggests for our handling of the problem under investigation: first, large-scaleness; second, openness.

The large-scale quality may indeed place Dewey in the epic tradition of political thought that Wolin explores, the more so since the outlook described is consistent with Dewey's instrumentalist

¹ Ibid., p. 8.

theory of the relation of thought to action. In Wolin's view,

. . . Theories of this mold are forms of action and the actions at which they aim are expressions of a theory. For Plato, Marsilius, More, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Marx, theory is the means for making a great political gesture, and action is looked upon as a vehicle for rendering a great theoretical statement. In this they stand at the opposite pole from our contemporaries, whether it be the philosopher who believes that "philosophy leaves everything as it was," or the empirical political scientist who hesitates to cross the mythical line between fact and value.¹

This is close to Abraham Kaplan's account of instrumentalism:

This whole instrumentalist view of theories--that their significance lies in the actions they guide--is not to be confused with a vulgar pragmatism which conceives action so narrowly as to exclude the conduct of inquiry. . . . Theories are not just means to other ends, and certainly not just to ends outside the scientific enterprise, but they may also serve as ends to themselves--to provide understanding, which may be prized for its own sake.²

There is nothing unassuming about the scale of the philosophic problems Dewey tackled. Their resolutions, in theory are often, indeed, heroic "thought-gestures" of the same order as those of which Wolin writes.

This view suggests that Dewey's democracy will not be narrowly defined. And indeed, "democracy" is Dewey's "god-term,"³ to use Weaver's phrase, being both comprehensive and ideal. In P. H. Partridge's sense, Dewey is an ideological philosopher.

¹ Ibid., p. 8.

² Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, p. 310.

³ Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric, pp. 211-32.

Classical political theory has usually been a mixture of different kinds of inquiry or speculation. One could distinguish three different impulses--philosophical, sociological, ideological. . . . By the ideological impulse I mean merely the form of political thinking in which the emphasis falls neither on philosophical analysis and deduction, nor on sociological generalization--but on moral reflection--on elaborating and advocating conceptions of the good life, and of describing the forms of social action and organization necessary for their achievement.^{1,2}

Recognizing this moral dimension, in later chapters we give an account of the good life as we give an account of democracy.

What the character, openness, means for the concept of democracy must also be taken into account. We have noted Richard's emphasis upon the "resourcefulness" of words rather than upon their troublesomeness. In this sense, the richness and flexibility of "democracy" become similar assets of the concept "political education." Hence, we must come to terms with many, varied, changing, political educations, rather than with a block concept.

In his book The Five Clocks,³ the linguist Martin Joos identifies four essentially independent usage-scales of native central English and distinguishes five levels of each scale as follows:

¹P. H. Partridge, "Politics, Philosophy, Ideology," in Richard H. Cox, ed., Ideology, Politics and Political Theory (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 114-33.

²N. C. Bhattacharya develops this point in a review article on Somjee's book. N. C. Bhattacharya, "Philosophy, Ideology, and Political Theory," Educational Theory 21 (Winter, 1971), pp. 117-25.

³Martin Joos, The Five Clocks (New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1967), p. 11.

AGE	STYLE	BREADTH	RESPONSIBILITY
senile	frozen	genteel	best
mature	formal	puristic	better
teenage	consultative	standard	good
child	casual	provincial	fair
baby	intimate	popular	bad

One might pursue clarification of Deweyan "political education" through these four scales to demonstrate not only the range of usage of the term but also the variety of manifestations of it necessary in Dewey's world. We shall not undertake this demonstration here and now. Rather, we use the possibility of it to indicate the kind of systematic variability of significance that is appropriate to "political education."

In the next chapter, in our account of democracy, we shall see that Dewey interprets "politics" and "the state" dynamically and functionally rather than in traditional formal and institutional terms. Subsequently we use these dynamics as clues to the ranges of meaning of "political education" and find that what is necessary for democracy is the growth in quality of group action, the development and facilitation of all modes of communication, and the development of expertise in manipulating events for group ends. To describe the arrangements necessary to operationalize these three phases of democracy is to describe three modes of political education with interdependencies isomorphic to those of the phases.

In his article "How I See Philosophy,"¹ Friedrich Waismann

¹ Friedrich Waismann, "How I See Philosophy," in A. J. Ayer, ed., Logical Positivism (New York: Free Press, 1959), pp. 45-80.

argues that the function of philosophic argument is to bring about the clarification and reformulation of a question such that the possibility of an answer is increased. It is in this sense that our discussion here improves understanding of political education in Dewey's concept of democracy. It is not that analysis and collation of Dewey's writings evokes hitherto little known Deweyan insights about political education, desirable as that would be. Rather, in the course of sorting out for expository purposes the complexities of the concept "democracy," the original question becomes recast in terms of those complexities. The nature of the entity, political education, in Dewey's democracy becomes a matter of what Dewey sees to be the necessary organizations of experience to achieve democracy in its several ideal phases and aspects. It is some help here (and it is appropriate to what we have been saying about the large scale and the openness of Dewey's social categories) to use Burke's¹ "dramatic" approach to the semantics of philosophic and literary form, wherein materials under critical analysis are examined for dramatic alignments and for watershed moments or changes of slope. Burke says that, in seeking a man's burden, one finds the principle that reveals the structure of unburdening, that the answer gets its form by relation to the explicit or implicit question that is being answered. To take Dewey's political theory as his burden, since he was concerned to conceptualize politics as a dynamic quality of

¹Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form, pp. 3-117.

everyman's experience rather than as an inherited canon, political education is for him a matter of dimensions of change rather than of rigid, codified stabilities of practise. These dimensions of change conform to fundamental aspects of Dewey's democracy: primary group experience in community life, knowing and communicating, and participation in organizing the conditions of group life for the common good. The process of attaining the ideal in each case is the process of political education. In later chapters, then, our discussion of political education arises out of prior analysis of these three basic modes of democratic experience.

The range of meanings of "political education" raises difficulties similar to those raised by the multiple ambiguity of "democracy." Even a short and superficial look at contemporary writings shows a wide diversity of usage. Some of the strands in the knot of current meanings for "political education" are: political socialization, moral education, citizenship education, indoctrination, a knowledge of institutions and traditions, political activism, ideological commitment, or acquaintance with political affairs in current events. As we shall see, understanding Dewey's democracy helps to bring some order out of this assortment. Also, the three dimensions of operation of political education show us where to look for pertinent writings not explicitly labelled "political education." For example, we see that the individual-group-reciprocity vector consists of writings from varied outlooks and disciplines, each saying important things about political education. Some unexpected standpoints emerge, such as: small

group interaction (Bayles, Thelen, Homans, Lewin); political personality analysis (Lasswell, Adorno, Lewin, Bay); "self-actualizing" social psychology (Maslow, Fromm); evolutionary human advancement (Wagar, White, de Chardin). Since, for Dewey, democracy is an affair of group action, political education for democracy involves understanding and appreciating whatever may be the quality of shared experience.

Similarly, to conceive communication as a dimension of action, within which democracy becomes viable, is to see language as dramatic in political education. The far-reaching, serious and inescapable necessity for "languaging,"¹ in the broad sense, leads us in the direction of the traditionalism of Michael Oakeshott,² by no means an obvious ally of Dewey's. For Oakeshott, as well as Dewey, political matters arise out of, but are grounded in, a widespread web of commonly understood traditions of action. Then again, Dewey sees as a political necessity the deep need of society to forge and use multiple channels of communication, especially those that facilitate inquiry. Contemporary political scientists, among whom Karl Deutsch³ is a central figure, use general systems theory and communications theory to elaborate precisely this view.

¹This is Dewey and Bentley's term, from Knowing and the Known, and meant to be used transactionally.

²Michael Oakeshott, "Political Education," in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (New York: Basic Books Publishing Co., 1962), pp. 111-36.

³Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control (New York: Free Press, 1966).

Dewey's view that communication forms channel community thoughts and values directs our attention to the political significance of art, media innovation, and symbolism. All of these are powerful agencies of political education--to be understood and used in the cause of democracy. Dewey's theory of communication provides insight into some cultural cleavages which are of political significance, such as the humanist-scientist gulf described in C. P. Snow's writings. To use the Dialectical-Problematic distinction once more, we see the political necessity of understanding universals, in Dewey, as complementary to the political necessity of openness in personality and in society. In these several ways, Dewey's conceptualizing of communication as a realm of democratic action and the very substance of political education marks out important directions in which illumination about political education may be sought.

The third dimension of democratic action in Dewey's democracy is most straightforwardly political, in the usual sense. This is the realm of caring for and organizing the serious public consequences of actions. Yet, even here implications develop in somewhat unexpected ways to lead us to explore political education afresh. For example, by Dewey's theory of publics, every man acts politically and, therefore, must know and be able to operate the machinery available; he must also be able to modify the machinery when necessary. Hence, for Dewey, political education means knowing about protest movements and political activism, as well as about laws and official agencies. Dewey's social experimentalism implies a broad concept of citizenship education, and political socialization in

Dewey's democracy is an energetic enterprise rather than happenstance. Current theories of citizenship and of political socialization tend to be narrower and less flexible than those of Dewey.

From this discussion, we see that, in Dewey's democracy, political education is necessary to develop appreciation of group life and facilitate participation of a high quality. It is also necessary to foster full and free intercommunication, with its concomitant sharing of goods and valuing of the power and richness of all symbol-behavior. The third range of meaning matches some more familiar expectations of political education, yet goes beyond them. Here, political education is necessary to economize--that is, to make efficient--the management of public goods; it involves the development of widespread expertise in institutionalized politics, as well as in less formal modes of political action. The kind of focus and order that Dewey's thought brings to the problem of political education is (1) to explain some of the multiplicities of political education, (2) to mark out some ranges of dynamic continuity among these multiplicities, and (3) to emphasize the moral context of political education. We have discussed briefly how Dewey's political education relates to the first two of these factors. Earlier, we spoke of Dewey as an ideological political philosopher. In that sense, his life work concerns the third factor. The next four chapters discuss this in a more limited way by considering democracy as an ideal and the education appropriate to its several phases. Before proceeding to that discussion we explore some of the broader implications of Deweyan philosophy considered as

ideological.

Richard Cox maintains that "a persistent pattern of contemporary usage tends towards a double focus around the theoretical and political aspects of the term [ideology]:"¹

First, political leaders sometimes use "ideology" in an emphatically political way, to unleash polemical broadsides against the principles of an opposing political society. But they also use it impartially in describing both their own and their opponents' political principles, i.e. the "ideology" of democracy or the "ideology" of communism. Second, scholars either use "ideology" in a theoretical sense, to categorize a set of political principles or politically, to criticize these principles or political trends. Thus both groups use the term in polemical and impartial ways. It is one of the term's intriguing and perplexing qualities to be able to serve in all these senses. The extremes evident in usage, though, tend to be the poles of political and theoretical meaning.²

As explained in Chapter 1, our Deweyan principle of inquiry, the "category of the long run,"³ moves us towards theoretical treatments of our subject-matter as the primary material of inquiry. Thus, this study does not focus directly upon the relation of Dewey's technical philosophy to his political views and active social concerns, nor upon the relation of Dewey's thought to the social thought of his time. The study excludes consideration of Dewey's political philosophy as reflecting group interests, as a possible secular religion, as a rhetoric of persuasion to gain specific political goals.

¹Richard Cox "Introduction" in Cox, ed. Ideology, Politics and Political Theory, p. 4.

²Ibid.

³Dewey, Logic, pp. 140, 316-17, 470.

Dewey's theory of democracy in these "political" senses is not our central concern here. However, the "theoretical" pole of meaning of ideology does enter into our investigation.

Dewey's political philosophy is called ideology in both of Cox's "theoretical" senses--impartial, and polemical. First, it is clear that Dewey's theory of democracy is a rationale--a set of political principles by which to justify the values argued for, and by which to criticize opposing views. To take an extreme example of the second sense: certain Soviet critics claim Dewey's political philosophy to be ideologically charged, and thus suggest that he was a tool of American capitalism. The next several chapters set forth the Deweyan ideology in the first sense. The second sense of ideology enters into discussion later on, when we attempt a critical evaluation of the theory and its consequences.

This chapter has discussed distinctive characters of the material under investigation in terms of difficulties they present in their handling. At least one more character deserves mention, and that one involves ideology, with a connotation somewhere between the purely objective and the rabid polemical. We may approach the point by noting, first, that a theory of democracy is not ipso facto a theory of education or of political education. Therefore to imply, as does Dewey, a theory of political education within a theory of democracy has ideological import, for it concerns "the conversion of ideas into social levers."¹ Within this theory, philosophy itself,

¹ Daniel Bell, "The End of Ideology", in James A. Gould and Willis H. Truitt, eds., Political Ideologies (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 476-81.

as articulation and criticism of social values; also functions as this kind of ideology. For Dewey to expect education and philosophy to play the roles ascribed to them in his theory, is ideological, in Bell's sense, even though the politics Dewey advocates is "civil politica" rather than "ideological politics."¹ We are dealing with a kind of material that theorizes about that same kind of material, and so, paradoxically, we pursue the ideology of ideology. This reflexivity, which arises directly from Dewey's problematic mode of philosophizing, causes difficulties in inquiry. To sort out varying roles of "ideology" with reference to reflexive subject-matter is a complex problem. One consistent factor in this problem is how to separate the materials of this inquiry from the wider range of Deweyana within which they are embedded. Our principle of inquiry allows temporary and partial separation only.

The next stage of inquiry involves exposition of the terms involved in understanding what Dewey means by democracy and political education. A beginning is made with the concepts of "social" and "social process."

¹ Edward Shils, "Ideology and Civility: On the Politics of the Intellectual," in Cox, ed., Ideology, Politics and Political Theory, pp. 217-46.

CHAPTER IV

DEWEY'S CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY

I. THE SOCIAL AS IDEAL AND PRIMARY GROUPINGS

In the previous chapter, we saw some difficulties in the way of establishing directly what political education means in Deweyan terms. However, if we shift (as Dewey does) from an ontological to an epistemological frame of reference, we no longer ask what is the essential nature of political education, but how can we investigate it, under what circumstances does it arise, what purposes does it serve. Accordingly, performing that shift in our immediate inquiry, we see that to ask how democracy is achieved is to ask about political education, its origin and function in the social process. Our next step is to establish what Dewey means by democracy. Following this, we will examine more closely the question of how to encourage development of this ideal for society, that is, political education in a democracy.

At this point, our purpose is purely expository--to formulate Dewey's concept of democracy in such a way as to aid our understanding of political education. We aim at an overview, partly to bring together partial statements scattered throughout Dewey's writings, partly to emphasize the ideal-type nature of the concept, and partly to show the basic interrelation of the three modes of

political education which we consider more closely in later discussion. We take these modes to be the making of the moral man, initiation into "the conversations of mankind," and the politicization of the citizen. Respectively, the topics relevant to them in this exposition are social process and primary group experience, communication, and the dynamics of primary and secondary group management.

We intend Dewey's theory of democracy to be taken instrumentally, that is, as an hypothesis which is to be judged, not as true or false, but as a successful or unsuccessful instrument in inquiry. This follows a respectable tradition in both philosophy (Vaihinger, Schopenhauer, Bentham) and social science (Weber, Parsons). The instrumentalist question is what difference does the theory make to our grasp of the problem, rather than how extensive and/or well-founded are its empirical grounds. In order to keep theoretical points available, a summary manner is sometimes adopted in the presentation. Needless to say, what follows could be expanded and documented much more extensively if the primary aim were not an overview.

The Social as Ideal

The social is an ideal for Dewey in at least three distinct senses. Conceptually, it is the inclusive philosophic category, the limit of what is accessible to understanding. Experientially, to sense the social is to identify with the continuity of human experience as the ground and support of individual fulfillments. As a standard of value and a guide to action, social implies the

expansion of individual and group experience with concomitant increase in meanings grasped and goods shared. Whether conceptual, experiential, or moral, the social as an ideal implies democracy for Dewey.

The Social as the Inclusive
Philosophic Category

Dewey takes social to be the inclusive philosophic category, upon the basis of "the fact of association and of range of associations as determining 'degrees' of reality."¹ For him, human association is "the richest, fullest, and most delicately subtle of any mode (of association) actually experienced."² Philosophically, the social is the inclusive category, "continuous with and inclusive of the categories of the physical, vital and mental."³ Dewey comments: "I do not say that the social as we know it is the whole, but I do emphatically suggest that it is the widest and richest manifestation of the whole accessible to our observation."⁴ In addition, Dewey explores what community interaction would mean under ideal conditions. He calls the ideal projection "democracy"

¹ John Dewey, "The Inclusive Philosophic Idea," in Philosophy and Civilization (New York: Minton, Balch & Co., 1931), p. 79. In this chapter we forego the convention of "use and mention," and do not put quotes around Dewey's terms since we are building up his meanings and not opposing them to other meanings of the terms. Subsequent criticism and evaluation of the concepts elaborated here will make use of the convention where necessary.

² Ibid., p. 80.

³ Ibid., p. 83.

⁴ Ibid., p. 92.

and uses the concept as a guide to estimate the quality of all kinds and degrees of groupings: self-development, community life, political organization, social attitudes and customs, institutions, technologies, arts, cultivated skills of all kinds. In this way, the idea of democracy becomes a syndrome of critically sifted values rather than a single clear-cut concept. Thus, for Dewey, a full development of the meaning of democracy implies a whole hierarchy of notions, simply orderable from loose association to full face-to-face community. Moreover, this hierarchy constitutes an apparatus capable of assuming great intricacy; it is capable of accounting for, and putting into close coordinate relation, a host of matters which, in other views, are either disjointed (psychology, sociology, political science, art--as distinct and separate disciplines) or brought together by subordinating all or most of the members of the congeries to some one member (which cannot be defended as a principle against the claims of other members). For our purposes, it is important that it brings together politics and education in the context of democracy.

We take an oblique approach to the definition of Deweyan democracy. Since, for Dewey, "the only intelligible sense of an ideal . . . is the tendency and movement of something which exists carried to its final limit, viewed as completed, perfected,"¹ we build up Dewey's concept of society in ideal terms. The whole array provides his concept of democracy, and it includes a concept of education as social.

¹ John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems: An Essay in Political Inquiry (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1927; reprint ed., Chicago: Gateway Books, 1946), p. 148.

The Social Process as Ideal

It is Dewey's view that what distinguishes man from other animals is language. The human animal organizes living by using signs that cumulate his previous experience in a useful way. That he extends his environment by using signs and symbols, and that this makes possible direct control of social conditions are, for Dewey, the two facts general for all cultural improvements. On the one hand, imagination sparks discovery of novelty and encourages creativity. On the other, reconstruction of the environment unifies it, and the new unity is an integration of man's habitual relations with the environment and the harmonized environmental factors themselves. The reciprocal possibilities are: controlled experimental alteration of existential affairs, and creative organization of necessary relations to the environment. Expansion and consolidation of experience go hand in hand.

Men organize their relations to each other as to all other aspects of the natural environment. The whole range of multiple interactions and interrelations constitutes the social process. Society is not any one thing; rather, it is a multitude of variously overlapping groupings which continuously and simultaneously reconstruct each other. Society names a process, not an entity: it is the human process of associating in such a way as to share experiential goods and, in rarer instances, to enjoy the sharing for its own sake. The more widespread these conditions, the more democratic the quality of life. A sense of social process as ideal is a sense of its range and quality.

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Meaning, perceived as "harmony, unification," depends upon a sense of the indefinite natural potential of which it is a part. An intuition of this qualitative ground of experience, as such, probes the depth of meaning of human experience. This sense of the "ideal" is moral experience of the greatest degree.

For the sense of an indefinite context of consequences from among which the aim is selected enters into the present meaning of activity. The 'end' is the figured pattern at the center of the field through which runs the axis of conduct. About this central figuration extends infinitely a supporting background in a vague whole, undefined and undiscriminated. At most intelligence but throws a spotlight on that little part of the whole which marks out the axis of movement. Even if the light is flickering and the illuminated portion stands forth only dimly from the shadowy background, it suffices if we are shown the way to move. To the rest of the consequences, collateral and remote, corresponds a background of feeling, of diffused emotion. This forms the stuff of the ideal.

From the standpoint of its definite aim any act is petty in comparison with the totality of natural events. What is accomplished directly as the outcome of a turn which our action gives the course of events is infinitesimal in comparison with their total sweep. . . . Yet . . . in a genuine sense every act is already possessed of infinite import. The little part of the scheme of affairs which is modifiable by our efforts is continuous with the rest of the world. The boundaries of our garden plot join it to the world of our neighbors and our neighbors' neighbors. That small effort which we can put forth is in turn connected with an infinity of events that sustain and support it. The consciousness of this encompassing infinity is ideal. When a sense of the infinite reach of an act physically occurring in a small point of space and occupying a petty instant of times (sic) comes home to us, the meaning of a present act is seen to be vast, immeasurable, unthinkable. This ideal is not a goal to be attained. It is a significance to be felt, appreciated. Though consciousness of it cannot become intellectualized (identified in objects of a distinct character) yet emotional appreciation of it is won only by those willing to think.

It is the office of art and religion to evoke such appreciations and intimations; to enhance and steady them till they are wrought into the texture of our lives.¹

¹John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1922), pp. 262-63.

Experience of continuity is the sense of the infinite reach of the multitudinous interlocking and encompassing continuities of natural and social existence.

The Social as Moral Standard

Situations of conflict that call for choice between paths of action as better or worse are the subject-matter of morals for Dewey. Choice involves the weighing of alternatives in terms of adequacy to the needs of the situation. The process of valuation is both judgmental and practical. When the subject of judgment is the self in the situation, valuation is called moral. When a change in objective conditions rather than in the self will resolve conflict, valuation is termed appraisal or evaluation. When conditions that meet the need are enjoyed as consummatory, valuation is appreciation or prizing. The moral, logical, and esthetic emphases in the process of valuation fuse in varying ways. But, in each case, value accrues to things in experience only as they are investigated as means to resolution of a situation in which the path to a felt good is blocked or threatened. Thus, for Dewey, moral implies the progressive expansion of experience in significance. To take the social as moral is to bring under consideration the widest range of significances and the manner of their dispersal. Social then becomes an ideal, in the sense of a criterion of desirable action.

As ideal, "social" excludes all random and all mechanical behavior. Not even all dealings of men with each other are social; for they may use one another, as they would a tool or a machine, for personal ends, in which case there is no sharing of purposes

or communication of interests. Nor are associations social to the same degree, even if formed on the basis of shared interests. Any group that erects barriers to opportunities for its interaction with outside factors and groups is anti-social because members of the wider community are denied access to the possible good. Moreover, group members limit the range of their own benefits by limiting the expansion of the interest. Generally, whatever prevents the expansion of experience is anti-social--for an individual, a group, or a complex of groups and individuals.

Stated positively, conditions that promote the growth of meaning among men are social. The formal criterion of these conditions constitutes an ideal for community life, and is called democracy. Individuals partake of common goods according to their needs and contribute service to the group according to capacity; the group interacts flexibly with other groups to reinforce and diversify the body of shared interests. Democracy, as an ideal society, develops from the idea of communication as the precondition of sharing meaning and, hence, of any social life whatsoever. The consequences of communication, or language, are twofold: to increase the degree of coherence, and to open up new possibilities of increasing meaning. From the standpoint of process, these are the necessary criteria of growth. For the aggregate social process, they become an index of the quality of associated living.

How social process operates, and how it becomes organized, are facts about communication, since it is by virtue of language that felt or noted meanings are shared. Because communication is

integral to social process, facts about how communication operates and develops will have general significance for all aspects of the societal process. Conditions necessary to institute communication are conditions necessary to the development of society. For this reason, an adequate explanation of the complex of meanings implied by "social" includes treatment of persons per se, severally and in groups, and also a treatment of communication. We shall begin with persons, per se.

Persons

The Person: Severally

An idea frequently expressed by philosophers, in one way or another is that the individual and society are in conflict: the individual striving against the many, and the many urging conformity on the individual. Dewey's theory of society¹ takes the individual and

¹We emphasize, once more, that this exposition of the concept of democracy proceeds in ideal terms. In this sense, the conceptual inseparability of individual and group is a leading principle in Dewey's theory of society. He uses it as a standard in his analysis of social problems, often to reveal that a source of difficulty is discontinuity between individual and group considerations. For example, in Individualism Old and New (New York: Minton, Balch & Co., 1930; reprint ed., New York: Capricorn Books, 1962), Dewey explores the modern dilemma of alienation in terms of the "lost" individual, one who has been put out of touch with his transactional group life by the increasingly corporate nature of society. Again, in Liberalism and Social Action (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1935; reprint ed., New York: Capricorn Books, 1963), Dewey finds that to narrow individuality to one locale of group action (as the economic area), or to prevent its accommodation to changing conditions, is to provoke a crisis in liberalism, necessitating reconsideration such as to make freedom an affair of full continuity of individuality and culture. In Freedom and Culture (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939; reprint ed., New York: Capricorn Books, 1963), once more, Dewey analyzes certain social problems as generated from discontinuities caused by

society to be co-operative; rather than separate and opposing. For

Dewey,

the problem of the relation of individuals to associations-- sometimes posed as the relation of the individual to society-- is a meaningless one. We might as well make a problem out of the relation of the letters of an alphabet to the alphabet. An alphabet is letters, and "society" is individuals in their connections with one another. The mode of combination of letters with one another is obviously a matter of importance; letters form words and sentences when combined, and have no point or sense except in some combination. . . . It cannot be gainsaid that singular human beings exist and behave in constant and varied association with one another. These modes of conjoint action and their consequences profoundly affect not only the outer habits of singular persons, but their dispositions in emotion, desire, planning and valuing.¹

Consequently, the basic fact about a person per se is that he is, simultaneously, distinct from, and intrinsically related to, other humans. The distinction and the relation must be treated together. For instance, a person as an individual, is defined by his relationships to other persons, since he is the product of a complex of activities in a variety of groups.

We explore some implications of Dewey's method of defining the individual, by considering some limitations of the contrary notion: that persons are primarily private, mutually exclusive, and

the recent rapid rate of technological change, especially in communication processes. He elaborates the relativity of individualistic theories of human nature to theories of society, and of both to the actual social conditions of their origin and use. In this manner the concept of individual-group mutuality is shown to have ideological application; it is transformed into a thesis concerning the sociology of knowledge.

¹Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 69.

self-sufficient entities. To do this, we construct an example, demonstrating the Deweyan concept of the inseparability of individuality from group life. Suppose that, in conversation, a name, J., is mentioned, and someone asks, "Who is he?" An attempt to answer by describing those behaviors of J. which do not involve other persons is of little value, for the kinds of behaviors that distinguish a person are characteristic of any singular animal. For example, we may describe the overall quality of J.'s behavior as, tensed, relaxed, alert; we may identify a persistent and generalized disposition towards action as timid, aggressive, agreeable; or we note details of physiological functions, such as rhythmic patterns in breathing, digestion, or sleeping. But all such descriptions might characterize a dog or a cat, as well as a man. As a further effort, then, we attempt to establish J.'s human reality by analyzing his emotional life and his cherished interests. These modes of behavior are taken generally to be distinctively human, and some take them to be the private possessions of a person. But here we come upon a threshold of group action, and, therefore, we abandon the notion of J.'s "owning" his feelings and directed actions in some internal, self-enclosed way. For Dewey, emotions and interests centre on subjects of some sort, and all existential objects are open to the possibility of many persons experiencing them, withal in varied ways. If facts about J. as human involve his feelings and values, and if these imply that other persons also may participate in their objective constituents, then to give a Deweyan answer to, "Who is J.?", we must start from some other basis for fact than that of singular J. exclusive of other

persons. Dewey proposes the direct antithesis: we look for facts about human individuality among those experiences that are shared and appreciated by persons who act with mutual reference. Thus J. begins to appear as an individual human, in the Deweyan sense, only as we glimpse the ways in which he is bound up in association with his kind.

J.'s desires and interests lead us directly to the associations in which he acts to maintain and to further them. We can trace the groupings that are most significant to him by identifying manifestations in group interaction of his known values and purposes; or we can locate J.'s desires and interests by examining the groups in which we find him. There are infinite common-sense identifications of J. The most general ones concern the groups he belongs to, his special skills and abilities, his group status, or the responsibilities he undertakes. The range of identifications parallels the varied roles he plays at different times with different persons and with groups in many different stages of organization. The appropriateness of any specific one will depend upon the context of discourse in which J.'s identification arises as a problem. The more one knows about the varied activities of the whole group of associations to which J. is identified as belonging, the more he gathers fullness and dimension as a human individual. In the Deweyan frame of reference, J.'s individuality is inextricable from the pattern of his associations.

Only in association does opportunity emerge for J. to take another's standpoint or to experience through other persons the reflections of his own actions. Thus J. identifies himself as human through associating with other persons, and, also, in this way, he

discovers and develops his own unique capacities. For Dewey, ideally, the "rugged individual" acts from a ground of group support.

But the fact that humanity accrues according to associations has an obverse, namely, that a person is able to associate in the way which leads to the emergence of humanity only because he is an organism who can employ symbols. By means of symbols, the meanings emergent in an experience of conjoint action are stabilized, stored, and conveyed. Even before they express significances, symbols are primary evidence of situations of value-sharings among human persons. Hence, for J., or any person, to be a distinctive human individual implies his symbol-using along with his acting conjointly.

The associations in which a person participates are groupings that cohere because of a common need or interest. This brings to a group an urge toward need-fulfilling action and, when his cumulated, and at least partially organized, deriving from other associative experience. Each person is thus as a resource to every other, and each, through symbols or communication, explores and utilizes resources according to his need and capacity. Also, the individual attempts to consolidate and to expand the welfare of the group as a unity, as much in his own interest as for other reasons; for each derives support from the whole for his personal activities and enjoyments.

If groupings arise around perception of common needs and recognition of the desirability of conjoint action toward meeting these needs, communication will also have its origin in these contexts; for communication is essential to the maintenance and furthering of a

group. For Dewey, the communication of and the organization of action are important aspects of communication in general, as they are of a developing group activity.

The perception of consequences which generates a public or a community (these and similar related terms are explained later) is an act on the part of the individuals, but the transformation into a public or community occurs because of their interconnections. Each individual person must learn to be a member of a community, but without the community he cannot learn it. The meaning of person, implies "a distinctive way of behaving in conjunction and connection with other distinctive ways of acting, not a self-enclosed way of acting, independent of everything else."¹

To realize what a person is, one must accept the fact of "an interconnected action which affects the activity of singular elements."²

Association in the sense of connection and combination is a "law" of everything known to exist. Singular things act, but they act together. Nothing has been discovered which acts in entire isolation. The action of everything is "along with" the action of other things. The "along with" is such a kind that the behavior of each is modified by its connection with others.

Thus, though "singular beings in their singularity, think, want and decide, what they think and strive for, the content of their beliefs.

¹ Ibid., p. 188.
² Ibid., p. 23.
³ Ibid., p. 22.

and intention is a subject matter provided by association."¹ This social influence on individual actions sets conditions for belonging to a community, for in order to develop "an effective sense of being an individually distinctive member of a community: one who understands and appreciates its beliefs, desires and methods, and who contributes to a further conversion of organic powers into human resources and values"² a person must learn what is in common and become, himself, a part of it. A person is a constantly learning being in communal life.

Individual persons constitute public and communities, and, in the last analysis, both a public and a community are differentiated from association by the perception of consequences on the part of some particular persons. Although an individual is both distinct from and connected with an association, a community, and a public, there is no antithesis such as the individual versus society. This type of antithesis disregards the fact that an individual is an integral part of the association and therefore cannot be opposed to the whole of which he is a part; it also disregards the fact that the association is an integration of members, and to be set against any one of them is a contradiction of itself.

A collective unity may be taken either distributively or collectively, but when taken collectively it is the union of its distributive constituents, and when taken distributively, it is a distribution of and within the collectivity. It

¹ Ibid., p. 25.

² Ibid., p. 154.

makes nonsense to set up an antithesis between the distributive phase and the collective. An individual cannot be opposed to the association of which he is an integral part nor can the association be set against its integrated members.¹

For Dewey, a person has the capacities and responsibilities he has by virtue of his status in a group, and some traits accrue to the group because this particular person is a member.

We turn now from emphasis on the person in his severalty to emphasis on the group which he helps to constitute.

Persons Grouped

... distinguish action in groups from isolated behavior of individuals on the basis of a wider range of consequences which accrue. Though all acts are performed by a particular somebody, the consequences of actions undertaken in association immediately involve more persons if only because of the fact of contiguity. Group action differs from the isolated action of a singular person in the range and complexity of ensuing consequences, though it is dependent upon individual human acts. It is in terms of these wider consequences that Dewey distinguishes different kinds of groups or qualities of group action. We may conceive these various accounts of group process to form a serial order, in accord with progressive increase of perception and appreciation of the continuities involved.²

¹ Ibid., p. 190.

² These five steps bring together ideas that are scattered throughout Dewey's writings. The ideas exist in various degrees of development, and, though recurring, are not found together. In Dewey's writings, the schema is not systematically explicit. However, we maintain that it is implicit, not only in the sense of Dewey extrapolated upon, but in the sense that these ideas are logically

First, only common consequences are enjoyed by members of a face-to-face group. The focus of attention is the distributed benefits in their immediacy, although the fact of joint participation is their acknowledged background. The grouping is merely "economic": an available good brings together diverse persons interested in enjoying it.

Secondly, a group becomes aware that it is such through mutual recognition of the commonality of enjoyments. The overflow of energy, the feeling of expansion of self, that goes along with a fulfilling experience radiates towards other participants in the shared good. To each other, participants represent the object of enjoyment in a transmuted form and the original enjoyment is deepened and re-enjoyed vicariously through its varied reflections. Because each person knows the texture of the thing enjoyed "from his own inside out," so to speak, the idea that another person experiences the thing similarly creates a personal identification from which sympathetic communication and a feeling of interdependence arise readily.

Thirdly, the group begins to change in quality when members undertake conjoint responsibility for maintaining the commonly appreciated conditions. There is greater investment of self and

implicit to each other and to other Deweyan subject-matter. Though never acknowledged explicitly, Dewey's debt to Mead is obvious here. Basic sources are: Human Nature and Conduct; The Public and Its Problems; Ethics (Revised edition. By John Dewey and James H. Hayden) Tufts. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1943); Experience and Nature (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1925, 1929); "Theory of Valuation" (International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science, Vol. 2; No. 4 Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), and Art as Experience (New York: Minton, Balch & Co., 1934).

energies, and wider ranges of mutual support. Realization of the facts of interdependence, and of sharing, qualify enjoyment in several ways: the conditions become more valuable--that is, the need to appraise them is greater--because of the range of demands and uses; the extent of appropriation by individual persons is inhibited somewhat by the general idea of communal reciprocity. These factors tend to stabilize the meaning of the conditions, both in terms of their concrete worthwhileness, and as reliably and generally productive of distinctive effects. Common efforts to secure efficient distribution of the good is thus the first active step in maintaining the preferred state of affairs. The principle of action here is economy of commonly valued consequences, rather than sheer altruism. Dewey formulates the principle as "equal opportunity in accord with individual need and capacity." When action is based upon this principle, patterns of action accrue in which an individual person tends to act in ways that, if others so acted, would give him opportunity to satisfy his need of the pooled good. Reflexively, each acts in mutual responsibility for the shared benefit.

Fourthly, in various ways, the communality of these consequences being perceived, they are planned for and sought after in concert. Principles of efficient action then accrue progressively. Operationally, this means that the consequences become increasingly organized and protected. Control of the consequences arises from deliberately invented and adapted procedures and tools, and from the analytic knowledge that results from continuous concerted planned action. Persons then assume their share of responsibility for a

common value on a functional basis; that is, according to differing necessary tasks, variant human skills, and differential personal interests and abilities. These varied responsibilities themselves involve distinctive satisfactions; but they also produce objects and processes which, in turn, are valuable in themselves as well as for their instrumental utility. Thus, when persons organize their joint action, they multiply material goods, they specialize individual action relative to particular goods; and they contribute distinctively to the overall unified action and its concrete outcomes.

Groups become more distinct as groups in this process, since the two processes, multiplication and organization of action, are reciprocal and dynamic. Points of contact between persons are both increased and ordered. Thus, from the inside of the group, the quantity and quality of interactions produce strong identification of members with the active group; while, from the outside, what appears is a consolidated process operating in a clearcut direction. When members begin to appreciate the distinctive solidarity of a group in terms of their own involvement in specific concrete interactions, attention is redirected towards maintaining significant and satisfying personal interactions, as much for their intrinsic value as because these provide the vitality and very texture of more complicated enterprises.

Fifthly, focus on the integral factors of group life means that enjoyment of the communal action is itself sought out--not just the ends or abilities which accrue. This means greater openness of group members to each other, and, therefore, it promotes release of

greater potentials of action and of organization. The maximization of values of individual-group reciprocity is then possible. The fifth stage is maximized ideally when man puts himself wholly into such an experience of interlocking and encompassing connections and involvements of natural existences. For Dewey, the significance of such a commitment is much more than reflective: it is primarily and strongly emotional since it involves man's biologic as well as cultural nature. Paradoxically, when a person identifies sympathetically and wholeheartedly with human kind and/or with the indefinitely extensive world of nature, the experience is intimately personal in quality though indefinitely broad in content. Art and religion are examples of generalized social forms through which persons may celebrate or discover these significances of continuity for humanity.

To clarify what is involved in being a member of a group, we have described five different Deweyan accounts of group process. These may be taken as stages in a group's development, although Dewey himself never presented them that way. These stages are schematic; they present an analytic breakdown of distinctive, but possibly coexistent, stages of group development, or of differential qualities of persons' experience within grouped transactions. Therefore, the different stages may be taken to represent different kinds of groupings, or they may be taken as tracing the potential developmental progress of a grouping in general. In either case, the schema presents the problem of groups as being multiphasic and complex. We undertake a flank attack on this problem by considering Dewey's concepts of primary and secondary groups and of democracy

as embodying an ideal for group life.

Accordingly, we now examine, in turn, these major aspects of the problem of groups: primary groupings, secondary groupings, and group life as an intrinsic value. However, after treatment of primary groupings, we shall need to digress at some length into a consideration of communication before treating the remaining aspects of the problem of groups:

Primary Groupings

Face-to-face community

For Dewey, social process is an intricate complex of many primary and secondary groupings. The essence of the process is to be found in the smallest, simplest form, rather than in the total complex or in large-scale involvements. This seems contrary to another Deweyan emphasis--that upon a developing intercommunication. But, for Dewey, even broad and deep continuities are meaningful only as persons make them tangible in their own concrete existence. Thus, it is face-to-face communication which is the vital kind, since oral and gestural meanings affect reactions objectively and immediately. It is the range of common meanings incorporated in an action which measures social significance, rather than size of group or degree of organization of the group. Since explicit incorporations of meaning arise from face-to-face communication, occasions for this are of primary importance to society. For this reason, immediate associations are basic to social process.

Though any aggregation of individuals constitutes a group in some sense, the most meaningful kind of human group is one in which

Individuals act together to achieve and to preserve the consciously and commonly appreciated goods held in common. We may distinguish two steps in this process, in terms of two kinds of groups: an association and a community.

Associated or joint activity is a condition of the creation of a community. But association itself is physical and organic, while communal-life is moral, that is emotionally, intellectually, consciously sustained. . . . Human associations may be ever so organic in origin and firm in operation but they develop into societies in a human sense only as their consequences, being known, are esteemed and sought for.¹

Association

Associations include all the varied ways that human beings come together. At one extreme, association means a mere aggregate of actions of persons existing side by side in physical and organic connection with each other, as with other natural things. The other extreme is that of a deliberately sustained and controlled complex of interdependent interactions. The latter extreme is what Dewey means by a community. The former, a mere association, is a limiting set of conditions for group behavior. This means that, as both a logical and existential limit, the haphazard connection and involuntary interaction of persons are to be accepted not only as general facts about existence, but also as describing conditions of origin of more enduring and stable organizations of human affairs. But association as random, combined-human activity will not of itself generate joint activity.

¹Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 151.

Combined activity happens among human beings; but when nothing else happens it passes as inevitably into some other mode of interconnected activity as does the interplay of iron and oxygen and water.¹

Signs or symbols of activity are the necessary happenings that enable arrest and control of events, through minimizing randomness and making possible shared experience.

Community

The key to the converting of an association into a community is the noting of consequences of acts.

For notice of the effects of connected action forces men to reflect upon the connection itself; it makes it an object of attention and interest. Each acts, in so far as the connection is known, in view of the connection. Individuals still do the thinking, desiring and purposing, but what they think of is the consequences of their behavior upon that of others and that of others upon themselves.²

In this way the conjoint activity acquires meaning. Since meanings are gained only through communication, they are learned, and learning is a continuous process. We are not born members of a community, but become so in

... the work of conversion of the physical and organic phase of associated behavior into a community of action saturated and regulated by mutual interest in shared meanings, consequences of which are translated into ideas and desired objects by means of symbols.³

In the process of communication we learn to be human.

¹ Ibid., p. 152.

² Ibid., p. 24.

³ Ibid., p. 153.

Let us turn now to examine the communication inherent in associations and communities. Individual persons exist in associations or communities through sharing ideas, sentiments, and values--that is, through communication.

Interactions, transactions occur de facto and the results of interdependence follow. But participation in activities and a sharing in results are additive concerns. They demand communication as a prerequisite.

Without communication there is no association, no community. Nor can secondary groupings develop. To nourish communication processes is to nourish democratic quality in social life.

CHAPTER V

DEWEY'S CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY

II. COMMUNICATION

Language as the Use of Signs and Symbols

Communication is the sharing of acts and meanings by means of language, that is, by signs and symbols. Communal life demands language as "the means of communication by which a fraternally shared experience is ushered in and sustained."¹ Language is necessary to note consequences, to share the noting, and to act on it conjointly, for "only when there exist signs and symbols of activities and their outcome can the flux be viewed from without, be arrested for consideration and esteem and be regulated."² The use of signs and symbols in this way "facilitates calculation, planning, and a new kind of action which intervenes in what happens to direct its course in the interest of what is foreseen and desired."³ Thus, the level of intelligent social action in a community depends upon the adequacy of its language; for "meanings run in the channels formed by instrumentalities of which, in the end,

¹Ibid., p. 217.

²Ibid., p. 152.

³Ibid., p. 153.

Language, the vehicle of thought as well as of communication, is the most important."¹ Language is important to communal life because it is the prime condition and the chief agency of that life.

In explaining this importance, Dewey distinguishes between natural signs and artificial signs, preferring to use the word "symbol" for the latter and to reserve "sign" for the former.

When it is said that smoke as an actual existence points to, is evidence of, an existential fire, smoke is said to be a natural sign of fire. Similarly, heavy clouds of given qualities are a natural sign of probable rain, and so on. The representative capacity in question is attributed to things in their connection with one another, not to marks whose meaning depends upon agreement in social use. . . . A "natural sign," by description, is something that exists in an actual spatial-temporal context. Smoke, as a thing having certain observed qualities, is a sign of fire only when the thing exists and is observed. Its representative capacity, taken by itself, is highly restricted, for it exists only under limited conditions. The situation is very different when the meaning "smoke" is embodied in an existence, like a sound or a mark on paper. The actual quality found in existence is then subordinate to a representative office. Not only can the sound be produced practically at will, so that we do not have to wait for the occurrence of the object; but, what is more important, the meaning when embodied in an indifferent or neutral existence is liberated with respect to its representative function. It is no longer tied down. It can be related to other meanings in the language-system; not only to that of fire but to such apparently unrelated meanings as friction, changes of temperature, oxygen, molecular constitution, and, by intervening meaning-symbols, to the laws of thermodynamics.

I shall, accordingly, in what follows, connect sign and significance, symbol and meaning, respectively with each other, in order to have terms to designate two different kinds of representative capacity. . . . Just as the sign-significance relation defines inference, so the relation of meanings that constitutes propositions defines implication in discourse, if it satisfies the intellectual conditions for which it is instituted.

¹Ibid., p. 210.

In order to avoid, negatively, the disastrous doctrinal confusion that arises from the ambiguity of the word relation, and in order to possess, positively linguistic means of making clear the logical nature of the different subject-matters under discussion, I shall reserve the word relation to designate the kind of "relation" which symbol-meanings bear to one another as symbol-meanings. I shall use the term reference to designate the kind of relation they sustain to existence; and the words connection (and involvement) to designate that kind of relation sustained by things to one another in virtue of which reference is possible.

From the basic distinction between signs and symbols follows the other important Deweyan distinctions: between significance and meaning; between inference and implication; and between connection, reference, and relation.

Language: Prime Condition of Group Life

To consider language as the sine qua non of human grouping, we analyze the associative conditions in which communication originates. (We shall return again to the matter of agencies of community.) Earlier we noted two factors which precipitate group coherence: perceiving common needs, and recognizing the efficiency of concerted action to meet such needs. It is in these contexts that communication arises, for, in them, meaning and sharing become reciprocal necessities. Therefore, our treatment of communication as inherent in human groups involves these contexts. We discuss communication in terms of: (1) the relation of need and meaning in associative experience, and (2) the genesis of action organization.

¹Dewey, Logic, pp. 51-55, passim.

The Interdependency of Need
Meaning and Value

Even at the preconscious or subliminal level, to perceive a need is to perceive lack of something, and, therefore, to perceive, even though vaguely, what is required to bring about satisfaction. The perception includes guesses about a possibly fulfilling object, and about necessary actions to attain it. Meaning is implicit in need-perception; for the need implies the lack of whatever will satisfy it, and the meaning of any projected object is as a potential reliever of a specific tension. Significance accrues to the object, and becomes refined, through all the actions that intervene between the feeling of deficit and the restoration of balance. The range, intensity, and duration of efforts necessary to restore the lack become measures of the value of the fulfilling object. Thus, for Dewey, need, meaning, and value imply each other, and their existential referents may overlap or even be identical. Hence Dewey defines the meaning of an object in terms of its potential as a need-fulfilling agency, the potential having been determined through prior experiences with the object. The simple biological process foreshadows the course of resolution of a problematic situation in inquiry, a more complex mode of experience. In the context of inquiry, "things exist as objects for us only as they have been previously determined as outcomes of inquiries." What the significance is of an object depends on what interactions have taken place.

¹ Ibid., p. 119.

An object, in other words, is a set of qualities treated as potentialities for specified existential consequences. Powder is what will explode under certain conditions; water as a substantial object is that group of connected qualities which will quench thirst, and so on. The greater the number of interactions, of operations, and of consequences, the more complex is the constitution of a given substantial object.¹

Thus, the meaning and value of an object involve its connections in experience, both past and prospective.

The meaning of any object, then, is the cumulation of consequences which it either has been already, or foreseeably may be, involved. These are consequences as much for the person using, as for the object acted towards. That is, a meaning in both objects and human behaviors, since the consequences of using a thing depends upon both the thing and the use. But, although meanings develop from the perception of connections between existences, their inception as ideational--that is, not as mere habitudes--happens only when persons share them.

Just as "objects are impassioned"² by persons' actions (meanings are what abstract and record this), so persons incorporate external objects as meaningful in the form of habitual patterns of behavior. A house becomes a home by virtue of the manifold ways a person is impelled to act in it, and the meaning of it as a home is a product of these many feelings and actions. Thereby a person behaves in his home differently than in a mere house. Speech itself

¹ Ibid., p. 129.

² Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 126.

is another explicit example. The vocalized sound that names an object is a physiological habit which embodies the active meaning of the object. The word itself then becomes "impassioned" through usage in shared action.

Signs and symbols of events are possible because values and habits are common. If the consequences of behavior patterns tend to agree, not only throughout one person's experience, but among many persons', then, to all these persons, an object can stand for the potential consequences of using it in a particular way. A round red object is a sign of a crisp sweet taste. When persons refer customarily to the object as "an apple," this vocalized or printed symbol itself signifies all the qualities of the fruit that a man may have incorporated into his experience. Thus, meanings include signs and symbols, as well as habits and active interests.

If a perceived need is a meaning, at least a tentative one, then to perceive a need as common is to recognize that the group shares this meaning; that is, their lacks are similar so they seek similar kinds of satisfactions. All act in the interests of gaining similar objects. Group members are thus disposed to use specific objects in similar ways. In other words, there are common habits of behavior, as well as common needs and common interests. The similar behavior patterns of persons converge when the same object is included in their several paths of action. This means that there is conjoint action and communication.

For Dewey, communication is possible only because there are

overlappings and blendings among persons' experiences. But the process of communicating develops because disparities exist in addition to coherences. For Dewey, the genesis of signifying acts is in a shared situation of disruption or threat. Initially, the conflicting factors are the undeniably common element to participants. Consequently, they constitute the material starting point for confirming and constructing values as common. When a person "signs" to another, he offers to the other his perception of what constitutes a desirable state of affairs, and he intends that the other person be a test and a support of his impulse to act in that direction. The sign is, then, an action invented for the purpose of making his meaning clear to another. In even the simplest communication, the participants judge, select, sympathize, and create. Such kinds of action are demanded by situations of conflict or obstruction, that is, by situations of changing values or meanings. The characters of communication therefore apply to all such situations. For this reason, Dewey views communication as a category of inquiry, of morals, of art, and of philosophy itself.

We see that communication occasions are always group occasions, and that, conversely, meaningful human groupings always imply communication. Also, we glimpse the sense in which distinctively human nature is co-emergent with, and actively conjugates, the use of signs and symbols. That is, the capacity to appraise and to reconstruct action goes along with the capacity to share the significance within a developing action.

The Organization of Action

In human experience, as in all organic life, the process of fulfillment of a want is a transition from one organization of energies to a new, incorporating organization. But only humans have the developed capacity to control the transition. This control inheres in acts of communication. For, when persons actively share a common need and mutually contribute to its alleviation, they act with a common purpose. The shared goal operates to order behaviors with respect to each other. Efficiency of action is judged on the basis of fruitfulness re the common need. When persons act on this basis, they tend to abandon behaviors detrimental to the end-in-view and to increase productive behaviors. Thus, there is progressive reinforcement and concentration of effort. Actions of group members are increasingly co-ordinated and increasingly effective.

For Dewey, to guide actions in this way is to act intelligently. Thus, intelligence is a quality of human experience manifest primarily in communication. The aspect of communication that is intellectual is: acting towards immediacies in terms of things absent in fact. Since signs and symbols enable persons to act this way, the devices of communication are the instruments of intelligent action.

When a developing action is so organized that the exercise of intellectual capacities is sustained, the process of transition is called inquiry. In inquiry, action becomes highly organized, for there is deliberate effort to articulate closely the available

means (material and conceptual), the concrete needs, and the projected outcomes. This articulation is a process of continuous testing of the situational factors against each other and against alternative paths of action. Inquiry and its products (knowledge, science) develop from, and in, the process of human communication. It is a phenomenon of group life.

To the extent that the process of communication is actually an organization of action, it is an esthetic experience for participants in it because integrity of development is esthetic quality. Art and communication are inherently the same process, the process of conveying meanings through a material medium. The creation of language is a core function in the process, but art develops this function specially, on its own account. That is, in works of art, there is technical exploitation of media to transmit experience.

Language as an Agent of Group Life

Language and Group Coherence

For Dewey, language is much more than speech. In its widest sense, it is

... wider than oral and written speech. It includes the latter, but it includes also not only gestures but rites, ceremonies, monuments, and the products of industrial and fine arts. A tool or a machine, for example, is not simply a simple or complex physical object having its own physical properties and effects, but it is also a mode of language. For it says something, to those who understand it, about operations of use and their consequences.¹

¹Dewey, Logic, p. 46.

In this broad sense, language is the vehicle and agency of all cultural products. Group coherences, therefore, achieve formulation in the materials that are media of languages. As concrete existences, and in their very operation, languages reticulate community values. Also, they evince and preserve the less tangible bonds among members, and stimulate possibilities of the new modes of association: Within any one communication mode, such as speech, music, or technology, manifestations will vary according to the differing cultural traditions in which they originate--hence, Chinese and Latin, fugue and rock, hammer and computer. Yet, for all, "genuine community of language or symbols can be achieved only through efforts that bring about community of activities under existing conditions."¹

Languages are as manifold as the media that have been appropriated respectively for different kinds of meanings. Each particular medium is "a special language having its own characteristics,"² but "what makes a material a medium is that it is used to express a meaning which is other than that which it is in virtue of its bare existence; the meaning not of what it physically is, but of what it expresses."³

Materials are not media of themselves. Rather, "pigments, marble and bronze, sounds . . . enter into the formation of a

¹ Ibid., pp. 50-51.

² Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 319.

³ Ibid., p. 201.

medium only when they interact with the mind and skill of the individual."¹ Humans adapt multifarious materials of nature and human association to be vehicles of meaning, and each adaptation is a special mode of language. Since each expresses a kind of meaning that no other material is as well suited to express, each is to some extent untranslatable. For example, although the arts (each a language, such as music, painting, architecture, literature) interpret each other to some extent, none, nor any combination, expresses adequately any other. To express the many-hued, multi-levelled significances of human existence requires manifold materials, forms, and skills. Yet, the function of symbolizing is common to each communication mode. The distinctions made earlier concerning the signs and symbols of speech apply no matter what physical material is adapted for the expression and storage of meaning.

Communication and Community Development

The kind of human grouping in which meanings are shared and transmitted is a community. To understand the origin and function of communication, then, is to grasp the inside story of a community. Dewey outlines the transformation of a simple association into a community as follows:

Symbols in turn depend upon and promote communication. The results of conjoint experience are considered and transmitted. Events cannot be passed from one to another, but meanings may be shared by means of signs. Wants and impulses are then attached to common meanings. They are

¹ Ibid., p. 287.

thereby transformed into desires and purposes, which, since they implicate a common or mutually understood meaning, present new ties, converting a conjoint activity into a community of interest and endeavor. Thus there is generated what metaphorically may be termed a general will and social consciousness: desire and choice on the part of individuals in behalf of activities that by means of symbols, are communicable and shared by all concerned. A community thus presents an order of energies transmuted into one of meanings which are appreciated and mutually referred by each to every other, on the part of those engaged in combined action.¹

Then, as a result of conjoint action, new wants and impulses arise, new meanings are generated, new action originates and becomes organized, and so on, in a potentially continuous development.

Language Systems in Speech
Common-Sense and
Scientific

As the most general of languages, speech is the most continuously effective, cohesive factor in community life. Dewey distinguishes two main systems of language, that is, of speech, on the basis of the difference in communication possibilities in situations that are near at hand and in situations that are remote. The former situation generates common-sense language, and, the latter, scientific language.

Scientific language results when, for someone, the activity of engendering meaning is itself enjoyed, rather than the used and enjoyed things to which the meanings are attached. Meanings are developed on the ground of their capacity and fruitfulness to serve in relation to each other. In this way, they are freed from the local, existential conditions to which they refer and become

¹ Ibid., p. 153.

available for dealing with distant and contingent conditions. Thus, generality and objectivity of meaning are possible. The language of science is devised specially to express precise relations among symbol-meanings. It is an artificial language, "not in the sense of being factitious, but in that of being a work of intricate art, devoted to a particular purpose and not capable of being acquired nor understood in the way in which a mother tongue is learned."¹

The controlling consideration in scientific language is coherence of relations of terms. What controls inclusion in common-sense language, however, is the generality of acceptance of a particular involvement among things, as to be taken, or used similarly, by other persons: "the customs, the ethos and the spirit of the group is the decisive factor in determining the system of meanings in use." Scientific terms measure correlations among changes, while everyday words embody qualitative strains in events that are essentially incommensurable. One experiences sights, sounds, emotions, desires so directly and wholly that there is no point to measuring them; moreover, qualities of existence are so evanescent that it is operationally impossible to delimit and identify them in the practical situation. The advantage of precise scientific terms is that they enable standardization and refinement of the conditions for investigation of facts. In comparison, the meanings of common-sense language are coarse, but they, and not

¹ Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 163.

² Dewey, Logic, p. 50.

scientific terms, are the meanings that are usable in practical, direct connections with actual persons and things.

These two language codes are distinguishable on the basis of differing subject-matters and of differing criteria of inclusion and organization. But in actuality, there are overlappings and reflexive actions of each on the other. A scientist, as much as other men, uses common-sense language, not only when he is involved in common-sense problems, but even when he applies his scientific knowledge to affairs. Only when engaged in the actual construction of that knowledge is he likely to restrict himself to his scientific language. And persons unfamiliar with bodies of scientific knowledge use its words freely, and even fairly accurately. For example, mothers know what vaccine is and what it will do for sick children; prospectors know what uranium is, and how to find it. But it is artificial to separate the interactions of these language systems from the reciprocity of the areas of experience embodied in them, that is, from the interaction of scientific inquiry with everyday human affairs.

Science originates in common-sense problems, but reacts into the latter "in a way that enormously refines, expands, and liberates the contents and agencies at the disposal of common-sense."¹ For example,

multitudes of new qualities have been brought into existence by the applications of physical science and, what is more important, our power to bring qualities within actual

¹Ibid., p. 66.

experience when we so desire, has been intensified almost beyond the possibility of estimate. Consider, as one instance alone, our powers with respect to qualities generated by light and electricity.¹

There is, in turn, a feedback from qualitative experience to scientific inquiry. The feedback takes such forms as support for ongoing research, for example, The Cancer Fund; presentation of new problematic conditions, as in the case where atomic fallout affects humans in serious ways that call for immediate intensive investigation and control; or projection of further improvements; such as widespread public satisfaction with jet transport and demand for safe commercial use. On the basis of the genetic and functional relationship of problems of inquiry with problems of use and enjoyment, the respectively adapted language-systems also react upon each other.

Communication, as language, vitalizes all human groups, not only associations and communities. It is equally significant, for example, in publics and states, the groups we examine next.

¹Ibid., p. 78.

CHAPTER VI

DEWEY'S CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY

III. SECONDARY GROUPINGS

The Nature of Secondary Groupings

Dewey's theory of secondary groupings constitutes a theory of the nature of politics. Since, for him, politics is a matter of group process and development rather than of institutional essences, his attempt is to demonstrate how political affairs begin and grow. We have indicated in early chapters some rhetorical problems associated with this task, the paradox of conceptualization and the need for openness of concepts. One statement of this paradox is Kaplan's: "The proper concepts are needed to formulate a good theory, but we need a good theory to arrive at the proper concept."¹ For this reason and for reasons inherent in the dialectical dimension of his philosophizing, Dewey's formulation of politics as dynamic has certain inadequacies. Nowadays, in empirical political science, statistical indices that express continua make the same attempt as did Dewey, and overcome his failings to some extent. The complex subject-matter poses conceptual problems; so do the concepts themselves. We have referred already to concepts as open, and referred

¹Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, p. 53.

to Kaplan's identification of four kinds of openness--systematic openness, vagueness, internal vagueness, and dynamic openness. The kind of openness particularly applicable to Dewey's theory of secondary groupings is internal vagueness, whereby "meanings are open not only at the edges, so to speak, but internally as well."¹

Kaplan has this to say:

Internal vagueness, therefore, stratifies denotations, according to whether they are central or marginal cases or something between. A variety of reconstructions of the situation are possible. New terms, for instance, can be introduced for each of these sorts of cases, yielding more homogeneous subclasses. Absolute terms may be replaced by comparatives, which call for a specification of degree, as "democracy" may be replaced by "(more or less) democratic". . . . And defining conditions may be explicitly treated as an open set of indicators . . . so that in each case a term may be expected to apply in one respect and not in another. In short, internal vagueness, while always present (to some degree!), can itself be made an instrument for conceptual clarification.²

The following exposition attempts a shortcut via Dewey's theory of politics by looking, first, at what characterizes political experience in its less organized phases, and, secondly, at what qualities accrue to it the more organized it becomes through the process of political development. Accordingly, the first part of the exposition focuses on publics, and the second part on states.

The process of community interaction is one of discovering and confirming individuality. There are other kinds of collective human activities, however, in which distinctive personal qualities

¹ Ibid., p. 67.

² Ibid., p. 68.

are less important than actions and outcomes. Dewey calls such activities "secondary." He intends secondary not only in the sense of derivative from, and dependent upon, but also as contributory to, direct personal interaction. Therefore, Dewey's concept of secondary grouping implies such aspects as the following.

(1) Persons may be caught up in a complex and intricate transaction, and thereby constitute a group, without necessarily encountering and dealing with each other concretely or directly. Some of these persons perceive happenings similarly and therefore choose, though separately, similar behaviors. These persons involve each other in the aggregate force of their actions and so become distinctively a group, although still mutually anonymous. Such a group is, therefore, secondary. The persistent breakdown and reformation into sects among the widespread adherents of a religious faith illustrates this process at work.

(2) When the members of a secondary group act in view of their implication in the affair, they are depersonalized agents of the transaction. Members and their agencies influence, and are influenced by, agencies of other overlapping transactions. In this way the original transaction (and each other connected one) is modified, and the consequences of the several transactions involve each other in various degrees and ways. To say that groups interact, institutions interact, cultures interact, implies transformations through chain reactions of this sort.

(3) The effect of the interaction of this kind of group with persons and other groups is to enlarge and to organize the

external conditions of interpersonal experience, and so, in a sense, to stabilize the primary values of communal life. Stability, in this instance, is of the communal life's influence over the individual. That is, since these groups are, in turn, members of the community, they channel and hence stabilize the effective action of the community. Functional divisions of labour, such as farming, construction, marketing, within a community is a simple instance of such channelled action.

(4) A secondary group, in its own right, is not stable. The actual constituency alters as persons find themselves in changed circumstances, note different emphases and incentives for action, and, hence, either join or withdraw from the secondary group. When, for example, a vertically mobile person moves to a higher social class, he may cease to function as an interested consumer of the values of his former group. For a secondary grouping, the nature and scope of action shrinks, expands, or disappears with variations in material and social conditions. Since the interlocking consequences of members' behaviors redetermine the state of affairs which called forth the behaviors, maintenance of the grouping is contingent upon continuous adaptations.

As a character of groups, the term "secondary" connotes, then: (1) anonymity; (2) impersonality; (3) instrumentality; and (4) fluidity.¹ Dewey makes these distinctions in his account of secondary groups in The Public and its Problems, but he does not label them. However, we apply these labels to simplify our sub-

¹The numbers here parallel the preceding brief descriptions.

sequent discussion. We expand these four characters theoretically by discussing Dewey's meaning of public and of state. Before proceeding to this expansion, however, we ground the concept of secondary grouping with an example which presents the difference between primary interaction and secondary interaction.

A case of primary interaction between members of the University community is the daily, face-to-face cooperation of two specialists in carrying on research. By contrast, a case of secondary interaction is constituted by the competition between departments for available funds, when the competition consists of a vying of the departments as such with one another in the quality and quantity of research activity. In this latter case, two persons in different departments, unacquainted with one another, may affect each other's work; since each affects the status of his department, for better or worse, and this influences financial support for his own research and for that of the other. This effect may even go so far as to modify the choice of research problem or method on the part of the mutually anonymous, secondarily grouped researchers (1). Moreover, the accomplished research interests outside persons, such as specialists in other Universities, fund administrators in philanthropic foundations, or industrial technologists; thus, it is said that "science" interacts with other aspects of "culture" (2). An ultimate effect of departments vying with each other in this way is to deepen each person's commitment to a field of knowledge, since he promotes his own growth of insight into its relative significance

and range of implications (3). The competition for funds is a secondary interaction that facilitates operational development of a basic value which the several members of the University community are committed to as a primary personal motivation, namely: the importance of promoting inquiry and knowledge. Actual constituents of the secondary interaction will vary, since different members will be involved in the competition for funds at different times. Shifting participants means shifting patterns of effects of the secondary interaction upon primary communities. In this obvious sense the secondary interaction is a fluid grouping. Overall, instabilities such as these imply subtler mobilities also at work (4).

Major Secondary Groupings

A public and a state, taken together, are distinguished from associations and communities by the secondary character which we have described. The distinction between a public and a state is a matter of degree of organization. On the one hand, the character of a public or a state is understood by reference to the fact that both are, equally, secondary groupings. On the other hand, a state imposes upon a public a further and tighter mode of organization and operation. There are two questions, therefore, with which to deal: first, what relationships hold among members of a secondary grouping (this inquiry will be clearest if pursued by reference to a public, since it presents these relationships in their simplest form); second, what is the character of the comprehensive organization which transforms a public into a state? The first inquiry, into publics, will yield understandings which

apply equally to both publics and states in their characters as secondary groupings. The second inquiry, into the comprehensive organization which distinguishes states from publics, will yield insights primarily into the character of the state. Secondly, however, this inquiry will add to our understanding of publics as well as states, for it will reveal that it is that changes as secondary groupings undergo comprehensive organization. (A widespread public under such organization Dewey designates as "Public.")

Relationships Within a Public

In the following clarification of a Public, we shall identify the way in which it possesses the properties of anonymity, impersonality, instrumentality and fluidity. Within each of these heads, we shall distinguish one or more of the ways in which secondariness, as such, exhibits itself; namely, as arising from community, as depending on community for its continued effective existence and as feeding back upon community to modify it.

Anonymity. A public, as an anonymously grouped action, arises when persons act to establish control of particular kinds of indirect consequences in which they are involved, rather than with respect to each other as known participants in a common action. This kind of grouping comes about because of "the complex indirect expansion and radiation of conjoint behavior."¹ The effects of face-to-face interaction implicate and complicate each other in-

¹Dewey, Logic, p. 47.

definitely, to the point where an act has effects so extensive and so indirect that they are out of the range of the personal control of either the original actor or of those affected. Thus it happens that singular persons remote from the act, and possibly from each other, are affected by it and share concern about their involvement.

Consequences have to be taken care of, looked out for. This supervision and regulation cannot be effected by the primary groupings themselves. For the essence of the consequences which call a public into being is the fact that they expand beyond those directly engaged in producing them.¹

The technical definition of public, then, is that "the public consists of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared for."² What makes a person a member of a public is his awareness of a particular set of consequences and his efforts to secure their regulation. Membership is thus independent of the personalities of other persons, who, through their similar efforts, are participating in the same group action.

For this reason, a public is not the same as a community, even though it develops from originally direct communal actions. Rather it is a different kind of organization of persons. The criterion of a public is that persons share an interest in controlling the indirect consequences of acts which affect them, whereas the basis of a community is actual association in conjoint activity. Publics may exist, then, where communities cannot: the persons con-

¹ Ibid., p. 27.

² Ibid., pp. 15-16.

stipulating a public may be as scattered geographically, its consequences are extensive. In the case of such wide scattering, the face-to-face transactional experience of community life is impossible.

Both primary and secondary groupings may co-exist within a particular collection of persons. For example, communities may be publics to varying degrees. A group of persons becomes a community when common interests are generated through shared signs and symbols in conjoint activity. Since the acts of a community arise out of what members share, a community, as a group, acts on behalf of common interests in indirect consequences of acts which affect members. A community is thus a public, though it may be a partial one only. That is, the community may share concerns with individuals outside it and with other groups. From this point of view, a member of a public may be either a group or an individual person. In each case, however, the directive force of participation is unitary, independent, and therefore anonymous.

Impersonality. Anonymous groupings act on behalf of commonly desired objective conditions. Since behavior is objective in quality, it is also impersonal. But, although its members need not be "alongsided," as they are even in an involuntary association, a public is more, rather than less, of a group. For, although each may be unknown to every other, to the extent that each acts with the same goal of securing proper direction of the consequences, each acts on behalf of the others as well as on his own behalf. Thus it is that the persons who note kinds of serious consequences and seek their channelling, constitute a group with real bonds. For example,

the creditors of a bankrupt corporation (among which may be other corporations) act independently to compel limitation and distribution of the financial damage to be absorbed. Acts intersect within the legal channels used and produce the kind of compound force that insure, for example, the public accounting and liquidation of assets.

An impersonal group action does not preclude its being conjoint. Members of a public act conjointly, not in the literal physical sense, but through a many-jointed complex of interconnected actions in which members' roles vary. Members are related to one another in many varied and indirect ways, rather than being related through direct connections in immediate interactions. However, the "many-jointed complex" requires some clear channels to concentrate its force. When there is widespread agreement about its inception and use, such a channel constitutes the most direct mode of members' interrelations. Thus, action through invented agencies grows out of impersonal involvement in group action. Again, the conjoint action of creditors through the agency of a court is a case in point.

Appointing officials is a first means by publics for coordinating dispersed and discrete efforts to remake conditions. Officials serve a similar function for social organization as material media do for art; that is, an official is an intermediary through which a dispersed value achieves clarity and concentration, and through which this value becomes viable. Hence, the mark of a public is the existence of officials:

since those who are indirectly affected are not direct participants in the transactions in question, it is necessary that certain persons be set apart to represent

them, and see to it that their interests are conserved and protected.¹

Officials are agents, "in the sense of factors doing the business of others in securing and obviating consequences that concern them."² They are public agents, in the sense that they act for many, where, for these many, the only channel of intercommunication is the agent. The authority exercised by public officers is not a matter, then, of arrogation of power, but of "the authority of recognized consequences to control the behavior which generates and averts extensive and enduring results of weal and woe."³ Any act is performed by a concrete somebody, and, in that sense, the exercise of authority by an official is personal or private, but to the extent that his actions respond to the interests of the persons on whose behalf he acts, his conduct has public sanction and weight.

The function of a public agent is a representative one. Therefore, the arrangements by which officers are instituted create channels of responsibility. This is, in fact, the primary problem of a public: "to achieve such recognition of itself as will give it weight in the selection of official representatives and in the definition of their responsibilities and rights."⁴ The recognition desired is not that of mutual personal acquaintance but of the

¹ Ibid., p. 16.

² Ibid., p. 19.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., p. 77.

general validity and effectiveness of kinds of individually undertaken behaviors in terms of their regulative effects upon community interests.

Instrumentality. The notion of the instrumentality of a public refers explicitly to the sense in which publics arise from communities precisely for the purpose of benefitting that community, that is, feeding back upon and modifying its originating source.

A public requires agents and agencies for its organization and effectiveness. In this obvious sense it is a tool for forming social conditions. Publics are means rather than ends in their very origin. They arise because some consequences of human acts extend far, and because humans invent behaviors to absorb and to control such extensive consequences. For Dewey, when consequences of an act affect only those immediately concerned in the interaction, the act is private, while, when the consequences extend beyond the participants, the act assumes a public quality.

Thus two kinds of interests and of measures of regulation of acts in view of consequences are generated. In the first, interest and control are limited to those directly engaged; in the second, they extend to those who do not directly share in the performance of acts. If, then, the interest constituted by their being affected by the actions in question is to have any practical influence, control over the actions which produce them must occur by some indirect means.¹

What is public is concerned with control of conditions that are general, in the interests of the quality of personal life under

¹ Ibid., p. 35.

those conditions. Complex community transactions produce publics as the reflex coordinations of patterns of generalized behaviors. From the standpoint of this origin, publics operate, potentially, toward periodic integrations of the large-scale, overall transaction which constitutes the social process.

The coherence of a public, as a human grouping, depends upon the fact that members have a similar relation to a certain interest. Therefore, it is the depersonalized acts which cohere in patterns of varying strengths. The clusters of kinds of acts constitute tendencies to care for the interest in particular ways. Thus, patterns of action are built up which channel the indirect consequences in predictable ways. In this way, customs, traditions and institutions accrue. These regularize the human conditions within which action arises and enable control of the development of novel interactions.

Fluidity. Society is made up of multitudinous publics, in various stages of organization, and operating through a variety of agencies. The complexity of the machinery by which a public acts varies according to the importance of the consequences cared for. When consequences are far-reaching in space and in time, irreparable, and serious, an elaborate organization is necessary to care for them. This is the state. The agencies through which interests are protected, regulated, and investigated together constitute the government. Dewey calls the comprehensive group of persons caught up in the affairs which the state looks after "the Public." What is usually called political is the affair of looking after public

consequences in this way. To the extent that any public requires management of its interests, it is political in Dewey's sense.

Thus, all publics are potentially political, and the state is an organized, complex public.¹ Public and state are, nevertheless, two different groupings, for they accrue, respectively, as consequences of different human abilities. "The public depends upon consequences of acts and the perception of consequences, while its organization into a state depends upon the ability to invent and employ special instrumentalities."² With respect to each other, however, varied kinds of secondary groupings are fluid, mutually responsive, and mutually open to dynamic development.

It is from the standpoint of the interdependency of the less, and more, definitely structured publics that we approach definition of the state as a secondary grouping in its own right:

The State: Organizing
General Conditions
of Human Behavior

We have described the public as the human grouping that is in essence political, but we have not elaborated the meaning of

¹This concept of the state is in marked contrast to the Greek notion of the city state, which was necessarily a community, since restricted in ideal size to extend no further than a man's voice could travel. When Dewey locates essential political quality in dispersed and anonymous publics rather than in compact, intimate communities, he deviates radically from tradition in political philosophy. The importance of Dewey's approach is that it takes account of the magnitude of modern states and of facts of change and growth in political organization.

²Dewey, Logic, p. 65.

political quality. To do this is to define the nature of states, which now we undertake to do.

As distinct from other theories of the state, Dewey's theory is instrumental rather than institutional. Therefore, we shall discuss the state's relationship to less highly organized groupings under headings which name aspects of the instrumental character. These headings are: derivative, contributory, and dependent (see p. 113). Since the state is a developed secondary grouping, its possession of the secondary properties of anonymous and impersonal action and of dynamic instability is implicit in the discussion.

Derivative. For Dewey, political organization derives from simpler and regressively more direct interactions. He argues for this continuity of groupings by presenting numerous manifestations of the reciprocity of publics and states. Dewey arrives at a conception of the state via facts about publics. This mode of definition devolves from his basic view that wherever one finds political organization of any sort, one finds publics, that is, the widespread involvement of anonymous persons in the control of conditions. Consequently, Dewey (1) defines the state by analyzing the growth of publics, and (2) finds that the actual traits of the state "define the nature of the public and the problem of its political organization."¹ Dewey formulates the problem of definition of a public and state in these terms:

¹Ibid., p. 39.

If we do not ask what are the conditions which promote and obstruct the organization of the public into a social group with definite functions, we shall never grasp the problem involved in the development and transformation of states. If we do not perceive that this organization is equivalent to equipment of the public with official representatives to care for the interests of the public, we shall miss the clew to the nature of government.¹

Thus, the significance of "public" for "state" is a matter of what differentiates the publics that are capable of organization from those that are not.

Dewey accounts for the state as a seemingly natural and, indeed, a necessary kind of grouping which shares in the general conditions for all meaningful human interaction. The conditions of group coherence in community interaction are the perception of a general need and the desirability of organizing action to meet the need. Politically organized groups have similar bases of coherence. But the Public faces the need of generalizing or regularizing joint behavior itself. The things to bring this about, therefore, must be organized indirectly, through agencies and officials, rather than constructed dynamically in immediate experience. The bonds between members of a political grouping are similar to community bonds in their dependence upon shared interest. However, they differ from community ties in being relatively more objective, impersonal, and unstable. Political action arises out of less complex phases of existence, its justification being the benefits provided for those phases of existence.

¹Ibid., p. 37.

From the above, we see that political¹ means, in simple terms, intentionally looking after those things that affect the general community good. We stabilize this meaning somewhat by exploring briefly what it excludes. Dewey's concept of political organization implies that such organization is not primarily a power hierarchy, although this may result from the effective arrangements. Political control need not imply coercive force, though this is indeed one traditional measure of regulation. Still less for Dewey, is the state either all-encompassing, or ultimate, in any social sense. In the former case, "state" is not a blanket term for all associations collectively. Dewey acknowledges that state controls may affect all other forms of associated life. But each of these forms has its unique value, and the state, in turn, has its narrow but distinctive function. In the latter case, the state is not an inevitable, organic cumulation of ultimate human values, immanent and sacrosanct. For states, like other groupings, are good and bad, according to the quality of their functioning. Moreover, the values of the publics that a state articulates may have been formulated critically, or not; if not, then the political organization maintains conditions that are possibly improvable, and therefore not ideal. The respective criteria of those concepts of the state are privilege, influence, inclusiveness, and rightness. For Dewey, none of these is useful to evaluate statehood, for the reason that none represents

² Dewey used "political" in many other senses than this one but he rests his theory of politics on this technical meaning of political.

conditions that inhere actually in the development of states; none takes instrumentality as primary.

Dependent. Political action not only arises out of community affairs, but also depends on these simpler transactions for its continued, effective existence. As organization of the Public develops, operations are increasingly disjunctive, impersonal, efficient, and flexible. This is to say that the Public's secondary character is intensified. Even though remote from personal experience, the existence and form of the Public and the state depend, ultimately, upon the persons themselves who are members of the community of which the affairs are governed. Continuously, these persons test regulative machinery against new material conditions and express needs for reconstruction of controls where necessary.

Modifiable and altering human habits, sustain and generate political phenomena. These habits are not wholly informed by reasoned purpose and deliberate choice--far from it--but they are more or less amenable to them.¹

For this reason, the appropriateness to current needs of a political organization is constantly being redetermined by persons' everyday habitual actions. Therefore, to keep in touch with the current interests of community members is of crucial significance for any political organization of that community.

Inquiry itself, as well as communication of its results, are integral in the development of a state which supports the growth of primary association values. "An inchoate public is capable of

¹ Dewey, The Public and its Problems, p. 6.

organization only when indirect consequences are perceived, and when it is possible to project agencies which order their occurrence."¹ Knowledge of relevant facts enables members of a public to perceive these important consequences and to formulate realistic plans for the reformation of social conditions. Therefore, the organization of effective publics involves investigations and communications. In other words, for the existence of a public, an informed public opinion is necessary. This means that knowledge about public affairs must be accessible and freely distributed, and this, in turn, means that there must be inquiry into social matters and dissemination of the results. Opinion, knowledge, distribution, inquiry, and dissemination all involve the use of signs and symbols; the connections and relations of all these are developed through language. A public is dependent upon communication, since "genuinely public policy cannot be generated unless it be informed by knowledge,"² and knowledge is communication. That is, to be genuine, public policy must be based upon consideration of all available, relevant, valid facts, not least among which are the facts about the currency of this information among those to be affected by institution of the policy. Dewey considers the quality of politically operational society to be determined by the presence or absence of perception and communication of consequences. It follows that, for officials, it is

¹ Ibid., p. 121.

² Ibid., p. 179.

inefficient to ignore "the transformation which meanings may effect,"¹ since agencies "have a different outcome in the degree in which knowledge of consequences is equitably distributed, and action is animated by an informed and lively sense of a shared interest."²

For Dewey, political operations are thoroughly public, and therefore the fullest, most sensitive, and most skillful publicity about social affairs is involved in the efficient functioning of a state.

From Dewey's standpoint, politics is every man's personal concern, and, therefore, determination of the state is "a practical problem of human beings living in association with one another, of mankind generically,"³ and not exclusively, or even primarily, the problem of politicians and civil servants. Discovery of real common concerns must be an experimental process, continuously attempted. "Conditions make the consequences of associated action and the knowledge of them different. In addition the means by which a public can determine the government to serve its interests vary."⁴ Thus, "by its very nature, a state is ever something to be scrutinized, investigated, searched for."⁵ Political operations based on open acknowledgement of these facts would "aid in creation of methods such that experimentation may go on less blindly, less at

¹ Ibid., p. 156.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., p. 32.

⁴ Ibid., p. 33.

⁵ Ibid., p. 31.

the mercy of accident, more intelligently, so that men may learn from their errors, and profit by their successes."¹

Historically, need of such methods is demonstrated forthrightly by the recurrent difficulties caused by perpetuation of formal procedures and offices beyond their utility in everyday life.

Industry and inventions in technology, for example, create means which alter the modes of associated behavior and which radically change the quantity, character and place of impact of their indirect consequences.

These changes are extrinsic to political forms which, once established, persist of their own momentum. The new public which is generated remains long inchoate, unorganized, because it cannot use inherited political agencies. The latter, if elaborate and well institutionalized, obstruct the organization of the new public. They prevent that development of new forms of the state which might grow up rapidly were social life more fluid, less precipitated into set political and legal molds. To form itself, the public has to break existing political forms. This is hard to do because these forms are themselves the regular means of instituting change. The public which generated political forms is passing away, but the power and lust of possession remains in the hands of the officers and agencies which the dying public instituted.²

Rigid and empty regularities are pernicious to political organization because they disguise genuine public interests. They also create unrealistic expectations that favor clinging to institutionalism for its own sake in preference to developing potentials within human individuality. One of Dewey's favorite examples of this is the widespread reverence for established institutions such as the church, the law, or classical education, even when they have been outgrown by the march of events.

¹ Ibid., p. 34.

² Ibid., p. 30-32.

a criterion of statehood brings us closer to the actual state of affairs.

Our conception gives a criterion for determining how good a particular state is: namely, the degree of organization of the public which is attained, and the degree to which its officers are so constituted as to perform their function of caring for public interests.¹

Any facts presented are to be interpreted relative to this function; otherwise, catalogues and comparisons are dead-end inquiries. For example, from Dewey's standpoint, the multiplicity of states throughout the world and throughout history are merely manifold forms of operation of this function of caring for and regulating the shared, serious concerns of persons in associated life. There is no evolutionary pattern through which a state progresses; rather there is "a continuous redistribution of social integrations on the one hand and of capacities and energies of individuals on the other."² The significance of Dewey's criterion, that is, the state as a function and not an end in itself, is that even elaborately organized authority is then seen as a reflex of the human condition of conjoint behavior.

Contributory. Political authority "presupposes values due to non-political forms of living together"³ and is to be justified by the extent to which it enables support of these values. Thus, the state is "just an instrumentality for promoting and protecting other and more voluntary forms of association, rather than a

¹ Ibid., p. 33.

² Ibid., p. 193.

³ Ibid., p. 73.

supreme end in itself."¹ In fact, Dewey justifies the operation of the state in these kinds of terms, that is, in terms of the utility of political organization in promoting effective contacts between persons.

It is quite true that most states, after they have been brought into being, react upon the primary groupings. When a state is a good state, when the officers of the public genuinely serve the public interests, this reflex effect is of great importance. It renders the desirable associations solid and more coherent; indirectly it clarifies their aims and purges their activities. It places a discount upon injurious groupings and renders their tenure of life precarious. In performing these services, it gives the individual members of valued associations greater liberty and security: it relieves them of hampering conditions which if they had to cope with personally would absorb their energies in mere negative struggle against evils. It enables individual members to count with reasonable certainty upon what others will do, and thus facilitates mutually helpful cooperations. It creates respect for others and for one's self. A measure of the goodness of a state is the degree in which it relieves individuals from the waste of negative struggle and needless conflict and confers upon him positive assurance and reinforcement in what he undertakes.²

For these very reasons, the secondary or intermediate nature of the state as a human grouping cannot be construed as meaning of second rate importance. Rather, for Dewey, political organization is the crucially significant determinant of the quality of human experience possible in a society, because political action affects conditions in which arise all other forms of associated behavior, and because it is subject to human control in the special interest of developing humane values.

¹ John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, enl. ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948), p. 158.

² Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, pp. 71-72.

Culture and Politics

We have seen that political action owes its raison d'être to more informal patterns of action and to more direct, individual interests. But, for Dewey, "no social institution stands alone as a product of one dominant force. It is a phenomenon or function of a multitude of social factors in their mutual inhibitions and reinforcements."¹ Thus, political agencies are supported and tested within a wider network of institutions, a transactional system called "culture":

The state of culture is a state of interaction of many factors, the chief of which are law and politics, industry and commerce, science and technology, the arts of expression and communication, and of morals, or the values men prize and the ways in which they evaluate them: and finally, though indirectly, the system of general ideas used by men to justify and to criticize the fundamental conditions under which they live, their social philosophy.²

All cultural institutions are political to some extent, while, in their turn, political institutions have far reaching effects upon other aspects of culture. "Customs, or widespread uniformities of habit exist because individuals face the same situations and react in like fashion,"³ thus establishing "more or less deeply grooved systems of interaction,"⁴ which function as both group bonds and communication facilitators. "Cultural conditions tend to multiply ties and to introduce new modes of tying experiences together."⁵ Not only are conse-

¹Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 111.

²Dewey, Freedom and Culture, p. 23.

³Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 58.

⁴Ibid., p. 60.

⁵Dewey, Logic, p. 246.

quences of acts thereby increased, but their noting and organization becomes possible, for it is through cultural objects that intelligence is stored and enabled to develop. Thus, politics is one such possible additive affair which ties experiences together, since these factors describe conditions for the emergence of political action. Cultural institutions generate publics, since they constitute general and objective conditions in which all coexistent individuals participate.

Transformation from organic behavior to intellectual behavior, marked by logical properties, is a product of the fact that individuals live in a cultural environment. Such living compels them to assume in their behavior the standpoint of customs, beliefs, institutions, meanings and projects which are at least general and objective.

Although any custom or institution is modifiable through individual use, it constitutes a relatively stable aspect of experience, instrumentally valuable for that reason. For, customs and institutions, like habits, represent previously successful manners of managing experience. They are mechanisms, arts, and standards of action, available as instrumentalities to reconstruct experience in desired directions, and, therefore, of moral import.

For practical purposes, morals means customs, folkways, established collective habit. . . . But always and everywhere customs supply the standards for personal activities. They are the pattern into which individual activity must weave itself. . . . Customs in any case constitute moral standards. For they are active demands for certain ways of acting. Every habit creates an unconscious expectation. It forms a certain outlook.²

In all these ways, cultural institutions are vehicles of values in which individuals participate indirectly. They are thus candidates for

¹ Ibid., p. 45.

² Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 75.

involvement in management through political agencies in various degrees of organization. "The habits which form institutions are so basal that for the most part they lie far below conscious recognition. But they are always ready to shape conduct, and when they are disturbed a violent emotional eruption ensues."¹ These habits acquire political import when they are brought into consciousness as material of deliberate evaluation, and as the occasion of organizing action undertaken on their behalf. Since philosophy is that cultural activity that articulates and criticizes the most general habitudes or value-orientations of a people, philosophy, also, is political, in its very inception. Moreover, the obverse of culture is education, for the effect upon the individual of interaction with the network of cultural institutions is educative, and the degree of educative effect becomes a measure of the worth of any institution. Hence, ideally, democratic cultural institutions multiply opportunities for interaction of individuals and groupings and thus maximize growth of individuality. The integral relation of education to culture, of both to democracy, and of all these to politics and to philosophy becomes clear.

Political possibilities thus inhere in the web of culture. Political institutions, in their turn, have far-reaching effects upon other aspects of culture, for "political action provides large-scale models that react into the formation of ideas and ideals about all social matters."² In its ideal working, that is, in a democratic culture,

¹ John Dewey, "Nationalism and Its Fruits," in Joseph Ratner, ed., Intelligence in the Modern World, The Modern Library (New York: Random House, 1939), p. 468.

² Dewey, Individualism Old and New, p. 114.

no one phase has priority over any other phase, for "isolation of any one factor, no matter how strong its workings at a given time, is fatal to understanding and to intelligent action."¹ So also, politics, though important, is to be taken as one phase only of a broader framework of personal action.

While, as I have already said, political action is not basic, concentration of attention upon real and vital issues such as attend the public control of industry and finance for the sake of social values would have vast intellectual and emotional reverberations. No phase of our culture would remain unaffected. Politics is a means not an end. But thought of it as a means will lead to thought of the ends it should serve. It will induce consideration of the ways in which a worthy and rich life for all may be achieved.²

We have seen that in Dewey's ideal society, the State does not overpower individuality; rather, it provides security and support for its creative development. Nor does culture assimilate individual gifts to its patterns and traditions, even though its institutions undeniably modify individual characteristics. It is the case that

Culture as a complex body of customs tends to maintain itself. It can reproduce itself only through effecting certain differential changes in the original or native constitution of its members. Each culture has its own pattern, its own characteristic arrangement of its constituent energies. By the mere force of its existence as well as by deliberately adopted methods systematically pursued, it perpetuates itself through transformation of the original raw human nature of those born immature.³

Moreover, the transformations effected are thoroughgoing, for

Individuals who are not bound together in associations, whether domestic, economic, religious, political, artistic, or educational, are monstrosities. It is absurd to suppose that the ties which

¹ Dewey, Freedom and Culture, p. 23.

² Dewey, Individualism Old and New, p. 118.

³ Dewey, Freedom and Culture, p. 20.

hold them together are merely external and do not react into mentality and character, producing the framework of personal disposition.¹

Yet, for Dewey, "individuality is inexpugnable because it is a matter of distinctive sensitivity, selection, choice, response and utilization of conditions."²

When the patterns that form individuality of thought and desire are in line with actuating social forces, that individuality will be released for creative effort. Originality and uniqueness are not opposed to social nurture; they are saved by it from eccentricity and escape. The positive and constructive energy of individuals, as manifested in the remaking and redirection of social forces and conditions, is itself a social necessity.³

Thus, democratic culture, far from absorbing to itself whatever is unique and personal in experience, requires creative individuality as a necessary condition of its own operation. "'The connection of events' and 'the society of your contemporaries,' as formed of moving and multiple associations, are the only means by which the possibilities of individuality can be realized."⁴

Nature and Politics

An account of Dewey's theory of politics is incomplete until placed within the biological-evolutionary framework that is fundamental to his outlook. Easy access to this framework is through Dewey's concept of experience. For Dewey, "the significance of 'experience' for philosophic method is, after all, but the acknowledgement of the indis-

¹Dewey, Individualism Old and New, pp. 81-82.

²Ibid., p. 167.

³Ibid., p. 143.

⁴Ibid., p. 169.

pensability of context in thinking when that recognition is carried to its full term."¹ Hence,

Finally, there is the context of the make-up of experience itself. It is dangerous to begin at this point. Philosophies that have designated themselves empirical are full of warning to this effect. But the boundless multiplicity of the concrete experiences of humanity when they are dealt with gently and humanely, will naturally terminate in some sense of the structure of any and all experience.²

For our inquiry, too, as with philosophic method in general--as the above article develops--experience is a final, "inclusive and pervasive"³ context. It is difficult to abridge Dewey's theory of experience. We do not attempt to give a comprehensive précis. In what follows, our chief purpose is to show the continuity of the subject-matters of our inquiry, with each other, and with evolutionary nature.

Politics and Education in the Context of Experience

"Experience," and the terms which cluster around it, are Dewey's most general standpoint. The meaning of experience lends support to, and derives clarification from, all other facts of existence and, hence, from all other terms in Dewey's philosophic system. This is to say that the ground of other meanings which we have developed here is experience, while such meaning qualifies the basic connotations of the general term, experience. Hence, experience has generic rela-

¹ John Dewey, "Context and Thought," in Richard J. Bernstein, ed., On Experience, Nature and Freedom (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960), p. 108.

² Ibid., p. 109.

³ Ibid.

tion to politics and education, while these contribute distinctively to experience.

The facts of organic experience are, for Dewey, facts in general for all aspects of life. Primitively, all experience is biologic. Because of the fact of existential continuity, an account of biologic experience carries undertones of human behaviour, for "while man is other than bird or beast, he shares basic vital functions with them and has to make the same basal adjustments if he is to continue the process of living."¹ The undertones gain depth from the fact that whatever is distinctively human has generically biologic origins.

Habit formation, moral action, intellectual activity, and social life are therefore rooted in generic facts about living things in general. Insofar as facts of biologic experience carry the undertones, organic experience describes the "problematic" and "dialectical" aspects of human behaviour that are ultimately basic for distinctively creative and integrative conduct. In general, what can be said about organic experience is basic to all human life. Habit, morals, inquiry, and society are aspects of human living for which facts of organic experience are general.

The function of education, for Dewey, is to select and guide experience. Basic notions are that learning is a by-product of experience and that learning enriches future experience. A simple extension of this yields the point, for Dewey, that deliberate teaching--for the sake of an ultimately broader experience--needs deliberate experience. The school is the chief agency for deliberate teaching. The subject-

¹Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 13.

matter of the school is drawn from experience. The whole enterprise is for the sake of an improved quality of experience. In this sense, experience is the basis of the school as an institution and of all educational endeavour.

Politics, too, has its foundations in experience, since it is an outgrowth of society. Society is people living together. For Dewey, the living together is active. It involves interweaving the experiences of many individuals. What is more, the shared experiences are of communal life. The sharing of experience provides the communal life that is the opportunity for further experience. Politics is that social affair that organizes general conditions of associated life. Therefore politics, as well as education, is rooted in experience.

The process of experience is primary, since gross existence underlies all refinements of it. The precedence arises temporally and is significant in an evolutionary context. At any cross-section of time, it means that communication presumes experience as an ultimate reference. Any vital sharing of meanings--whether by signs or symbols, whether oral or written, whether about objects or about ideas--has started from experience and will be applied to experience. For man, all significance is in, of, and for experience. The vitality of intellectual, moral, and social achievement is in the ongoing life flow.

Human Experience as Sharing in Organismic Traits

Distinguished from other organisms by consciousness of relations found in nature, man controls by converting natural relations of cause and effect into relations of means and consequence. In fulfilling this distinctive organic propensity (intelligence), man retains and

uses the natural continuities:

What was mere shock becomes an invitation; resistance becomes something to be used in changing existing arrangements of matter; smooth facilities become agencies for executing an idea. In these operations, an organic stimulation becomes the bearer of meanings, and motor responses are changed into instruments of expression and communication; no longer are they mere means of locomotion and direct reaction. Meanwhile, the organic substratum remains as the quickening and deep foundation. Apart from relations of cause and effect in nature, conception and invention could not be. Apart from the relation of processes of rhythmic conflict and fulfillment in animal life, experience would be without design and pattern. Apart from organs inherited from animal ancestry, idea and purpose would be without a mechanism of realization.¹

For any organism, fulfillment is a matter of actively permeating environment in whatever ways and to the extent that structure allows, and of taking environment into itself as far as is necessary for maintenance and growth. Human fulfillment, then, is in the deliberate, active organization of environment to support experience that is broad, rich, significant, and ever-expanding. Moral, as well as intellectual, behaviour has organic roots, for deliberately instituting means-consequence relations means evaluating goods, and acting to promote or maintain values. Balance and proportion in action (moral conduct), "can be present only when, as in the conduct that has grace or dignity, the act is controlled by an exquisite sense of the relations [sic] which the act sustains--its fitness to the occasion and to the situation."² Social life, too, is in ultimate organismic, for conjoint action and shared meanings emerge in immediate life-process--a sensible, physical affair, conducted through biologically given or inherited

¹ Ibid., p. 25.

² Ibid., p. 49.

channels. That inquiry, morality, society are possible for man, depends upon both common and distinctive organismic traits.

All life activity goes on in an environment, and is a matter of the interaction of the organism with the environment. For man, this activity constitutes experience, and an interaction tends to lead into or produce other different interactions such that experience is a continuous ever-renewing process. Every experience has an active and a passive element, that is, an active and an undergoing aspect. These aspects are essentially inseparable since they form a rhythm in alternation, whether experience is viewed as an interaction or a continuity. Acting and undergoing modifies the one who is experiencing and changes his objective environment. The modification affects the quality of subsequent experiences as habits are built up or altered. A habit is a manner of acting which is relied upon because of past experience to preserve or achieve equilibrium in relation to an environment. Thus, habit is a relatively stable or routine mode of response to a kind of situation. What makes habit intelligent and organic is the existence of impulses in the organism which, directed towards the environment, become desires, and by thought, become purposes or ends of action. As guides for the selection of means, these ends are themselves means; also, as attained, they become means towards new ends. Where old habits are not effective to gain ends, new ways of action are devised and tested, thus modifying old habits. Modification of a habit adapts means to an end. In the testing of a means by its consequences, it becomes intelligent or rational. When a habit is modified, learning occurs and the organism grows. The producing of organic growth is education. Educative experience is that quality of experience which encour-

ages growth in directions which are conducive to more growth, that is, conducive to the continuous extension, reconstruction, and refinement of habits.

Human Experience as Distinctive

The basis of distinction: language. The experience of an organism occurs along with that of other organisms such that the behaviour of each is modified by that of the others. Among men, language institutes communication which enables shared meanings and interests and conjoint action. Whatever is held in common because of language is part of the environment with which the human organism interacts, as is also the conjoint acting of others.

Apart from the main current of experience, "an" experience occurs when the organism and environment are so out of equilibrium that need is felt on the part of the organism. The environment is in this way unsettled in relation to the organism. In other words, the situation is doubtful. Then follows a period of search--for men, this is inquiry--ending in fulfillment of the need, or resolution of the doubt, thus attaining redintegration of the organism and the environment. From the new enviroing conditions new problems arise. Also, the changed organism makes new demands upon the environment because of its modifications. The process is continuous and increasingly complex.

Language, ultimately, provides the new dimension that distinguishes human from other organic experience. Communication provides the indefinite possibility of deliberate expansion and enrichment of experience in desired directions.

Modes of human experience. Qualitatively, experience is many-

hued and shifting. Men have developed some of the kinds of dominant qualities on their own account, as ways or modes of experiencing. These developed modes of experience, then, are useful as standpoints from which to look at the ongoing process and as bases for comparing unique experiences of distinctive quality. Some major standpoints are those of esthetic, reflective, and moral experience.

To the extent that an experience is integrated, it has esthetic quality. Insofar as there is experimental clarification of a confused situation, the experience is reflective. And when the experience involves deliberate choice between paths of action, it is moral. Each mode exploits its distinctive trait but assumes other modes as implicit background necessary to its own proper functioning. Thus, art is a product of intelligence, and its significance is moral, since the meanings expressed in the work of art are highly selective. So also, science is an artistic construction of hypotheses which enable such progressive control of the environment that some paths of action are made more reliable than others. And again, the basis of choice in a moral experience is the result of experimenting in imagination with the possibilities of the various paths of action; if the choice made satisfies the existing need, the integrated action has esthetic quality.

The modes are not separate entities in experience, but rather variant strains in one ongoing process. Thus, all experience that is neither random nor routine is esthetic, intelligent, meaningful; each to some degree. Each developed mode of experience is foreshadowed in organic life: art in the reintegration of organism and environment after a period of disequilibrium; reflection in the continuous needful-fulfillment rhythm; and morals in organic selection-rejection responses

to environmental material re a specific need.

Experience and democracy. A chief significance of Dewey's theory of experience for inquiry into political education is to demonstrate the practical character of political reality, that is, to show that the subject-matters are accessible as objects of empirical investigation and control. Moreover, the theory of experience animates the abstract, ideal theory of democracy with its wealth of concrete detail.

Democracy as an Ideal

We have taken an oblique approach to the definition of democracy: we began by investigating what "good" meant within the several kinds of Deweyan groupings. For Dewey, "the only intelligible sense of an ideal . . . [is] the tendency and movement of some thing which exists carried to its final limit, viewed as completed, perfected."¹ The essential nature of community is communication, of which the ideal limit is a state of "full and free intercommunication," within which the communicants achieve distinctive self-fulfillment, integrated personality, and whole-hearted service for broad group interests.

The prime function of the state is to regulate conditions of conjoint behaviour. A perfect political organization is one in which authorities and freedoms are so distributed that opportunities for individual development are fully protected, appropriately distributed, and so organized that the many separate selves involved mutually facilitate and encourage each other's growth. Since, for Dewey, "the local is the

¹Dewey, The Public and its Problems, p. 248.

ultimate universal and as near an absolute as exists,"¹ the "locale" of human experience, that is, the developing self, names the value central to his system of ideas.

The prime value of both community life and of political organization is self-development. Personal fulfillment as the product of group life is, therefore, the core idea of democracy, and a basic definition of democracy is in terms of this idea.

From the standpoint of the individual it consists in having a reasonable share according to capacity in forming and directing the activities of the groups to which one belongs and in participating according to need in the values which the groups sustain. From the standpoint of the groups, it demands liberation of the potentialities of members of a group in harmony with the interests and goods which are common. Since every individual is a member of many groups . . . fullness of integrated personality is therefore possible of achievement since the pulls and responses of different groups reenforce one another and their values accord.²

A democratic grouping further, equally both personal and general interests.

Earlier we distinguished three senses of the social as ideal: as an inclusive philosophic category, as bounding the experience of continuity, as a criterion of action. Democracy is ideal in each of these senses also, since it is the social viewed as perfected. Thus, to study democracy is to consider the many modes of experience of which philosophy treats. A measure of the democratic quality of experience is the range and scope of significances apprehended. And to act responsibly towards community goods is to act democratically. At its most general, political education in Deweyan democracy is the fostering of these ideals. Somewhat greater specification of political education is

¹ Ibid., p. 215.

² Ibid., p. 147.

achieved by considering how to bring about the democratic ideal in each of the three phases of democracy distinguished in exposition. Thus, in the individual-group reciprocity phase of democracy, the task of political education is to develop socially responsible, self-actualizing individuals who care about the group actions and the groups in which they are involved directly. To achieve democracy as communication requires not only "initiation into the conversations of mankind"--to use Oakeshott's phrase--but their appreciation, development, and invention. To educate for democracy as instrumental politics is to undertake the politicization of the citizen, the political participant. Hence, political education in Deweyan democracy has at least three aspects to be investigated. More specifically, and respectively, these are directed at character formation, social intelligence, and public action, which are the purposes political education serves. A concept of democracy as end includes a concept of means; therefore, democracy as ideal includes political education as part of the ideal.

Although, for Dewey, education as the manifestation of social intelligence is basic to all phases of democratic life, in the striving towards democracy as an ideal, the specially developed instrumentalities of education, such as schools, play a major role. The deliberate shaping of that role towards democratic ends is political education. In the next chapter, we survey Dewey's general concept of education, as a preliminary to appraisal of this theory of political education per se.

CHAPTER VII

DEWEY'S CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY

IV. EDUCATION AS SOCIAL

AND AS POLITICAL

Before we examine political education in Dewey's democracy it is important to be clear about what Dewey means by education in general, and especially its role in the social process and the agencies through which it operates. Our exposition roughly parallels the development of the previous chapter, considering education as an aspect of social process, as personal growth, as sharing and expanding community goods, as communication, and as participation in Dewey's Great Community.^{1,2} We then proceed to discuss political education itself, as implied by Dewey's theory of democracy in its three phases.

Education as Social Process

As Dewey sees it, the practical problem of social process rests on the fact that humanity is not an original endowment. Each person must learn (and earn) from association his human capacities of language, of thought, of instrumental and cooperative action, of

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 184.

² By "Great Society" Dewey means technological, industrial society, in its disintegrated form. It becomes a "Great Community" through democratic intercommunication.

self-direction and self-development, and of constructing consummatory experiences. Moreover, all such distinctively human capacities operate within an historically unique current of things, meanings and persons.

Man, as problem-solver, cumulates verified solutions (knowledge). These are available as guides for developing further knowledge and, as such, are subject to constant test with respect to both their usefulness in ordering the data of problems and their comprehensiveness (accounting for alternative solutions). Throughout the community of problem-solvers, there is constant integration of newly-arrived-at solutions with those in general that are taken tentatively to be fixed. The problem-solver, too, consistently integrates new knowledge with old, and thus grows in knowledge and in problem-solving skill. The knower and what is known are in themselves, and together, closely woven and unified. Each grows in the search for utility and comprehensiveness of knowledge.

Education as Personal Growth

For Dewey, the naturalistic ground of education is the possibility of organic expansion of experience. The transformation is educative in quality. But, for all organic life, education results from experience. It is the growth in desirable directions of an organism in interaction with an environment; an experience is educative when it contributes to more growth. To put it negatively, growing in directions which stunt the overall growth is mis-educative. For Dewey, education and experience, learning and living in ordinary life, are intimately connected; each is a part of, and mutually influences, the other. Learning may so alter living that new

and better kinds of learning take place, which make possible an improved quality of living: living and learning expanding each other in an endless chain reaction. Thus, a learning-experience is life being intensified, growing being focussed in such a way that more growing in more directions can occur. What is gained is an added power of adjustment re the interacting environment, an increased ability for reconstructing experience; this is incorporated as a flexible habit, a disposition to act in a particular creative way with respect to such an environment in subsequent interactions. Hence, meaning and order are given to previous experience and to the outlook for the future.

Communication as an integral factor in human learning indefinitely multiplies dimensions of possible growth. A multiplicity of communicatings are embodied in the objects, ideas and patterns of actions that constitute the cultural environment. As the cultural environment enters into a person's action, it determines what and how he learns. But it is active interests that give rise to meaningful experience, and not the reverse. The modified environmental objects' influence over future action concerning interests acted upon is what is learned, that is, incorporated into the interested person's behavior. The ability deliberately to institute such reconstructions itself may be incorporated as a habit, as a person learns to learn.

To use Dewey's own terms, an educative experience increases the possibilities for more growth, or for a greater variety and/or depth in experience which will increase the possibility of a greater variety and depth of education, and so on. Education means improving the quality of experience, that is, ever increasing the range and

intensity of experience. When an aspect of the ongoing process of organic life is experienced significantly, so that meaning and order are given to previous experience and to the outlook for the future, the experience has been educative. Educative experience is thus life being intensified, growing being focussed in such a way that more growing in more directions can occur.

Education and Community Life

Not only communication, but the community life implicit in it suggests a further distinctiveness about man's learning. In communication, he learns to be a member of the community. He learns to take the standpoint of others with respect to their behavior and to his own. He learns to feel and to think on behalf of others, and he becomes self-modifying in conduct regarding expected group reaction and demand. He learns patterns of action appropriate for a shared co-existence. He learns to associate.

Habit is the organic basis for reconstruction of experience. Education, in terms of the modifiability of habits, is the continuous building up and modification of habit, such that the organism is increasingly flexible and selective in habit forming. Reconstruction of habit involves the deliberate, intelligent formation of purposes and their pursuit through active interests. The choices made and actions undertaken have consequences that affect the character and self of the individual for better or for worse and thus have moral import, especially when the individual takes them into account in making his decisions. For Dewey, what is moral is the movement of experience towards the good, that is, towards greater meaningfulness

and control. Education is the continuous use and refinement of intelligence towards the end of more meaningful action and the control of the environment. It is thus both intelligent and moral.

Shifting from the individual to individuals in relation to each other, we see that men exist in association; therefore their education is a matter of their interactions, of communication among them. Growth depends upon being able to assume another's point of view, upon holding things and meanings in common and actively sharing them. Since each individual learns to be a member of his group or of society, education is social; it is the maintenance and improvement of group living and of a society.

For a society, education is the codification of its past and its guarantee of an intelligible future. The continuity of a society is insured by the communication of collective habits and of warrantedly assertible products of past inquiries, that is, by education. Ways of action and scientific knowledge are shared not only with the existing members of a society but also with succeeding generations. They are always tested by application to existing conditions and are perpetuated as long as they are useful, being continuously revised (though usually neither soon enough nor fast enough) and modified to meet this test. Education, for the individual, means a constant expansion of experience; for society, education means a continuous extension and refinement of communication, to the end that transactions make a smoothly geared continuity through both space and time.

In everyday usage, education refers most often to the process

of learning, to the products of an experience in which learning occurred, or to the deliberate influence of some individuals (teachers) on the direction of growth of others (pupils). An expansion of what Dewey would mean by these references follows.

Education as experience--that is, as learning, growth, or maturity--should be ever-present and ever-changing, having no end beyond itself, but never finished.

Our net conclusion is that life is development, and that developing, growing, is life. Translated into its educational equivalents, this means (1) that the educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end; and that (2) the educational process is one of continual reorganizing, re-constructing, transforming.¹

Continual reconstruction means continual increase of significance in experience; therefore "upon its intellectual side education consists in the formation of wide-awake, careful, thorough habits of thinking."² Learning to learn, or the desire to go on learning is crucial. A definition of education in terms of learning is:

... that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience.

(1) The increment of meaning corresponds to the increased perception of the connections and continuities of the activities in which we are engaged . . .

(2) The other side of an educative experience is an added power of subsequent direction or control . . . A genuinely educative experience, then, one in which instruction is conveyed and ability increased, is contradistinguished from a routine activity on the one hand, and a capricious activity on the other.³

¹ John Dewey, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education (New York: Macmillan Co., 1916), p. 59.

² John Dewey, How We Think (Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1910), p. 78.

³ Dewey, Democracy and Education . . . 90.

One must consider the reconstruction of experience to be social as well as personal: the overall quality of a society's experience is subject to modification as much as that of any individual within it.

Education as Communication

Education as a social process means the socialization of the individual and the persistent transmission of social life by communication. It is as important for the latter as for the former that an individual learn the ways of his group:

The continuity of any experience, through renewing of the social group, is a literal fact. Education in its broadest sense, is the means of this social continuity of life. Every one of the constituent elements of a social group, in a modern city as in a savage tribe, is born immature, helpless, without language, beliefs, ideas, or social standards. Each individual, each unit who is the carrier of the life experience of his group, in time passes away. Yet the life of the group goes on.¹

Communication is also essential to the life of an individual in society, for without it there would be no community, no understood commonality in action; life would then be chaotic, unpredictable, random, and irrational. Whatever else communication insures participation in a common understanding is educative, for

Not only is social life identical with communication, but all communication (and hence all social life) is educative. To be a recipient of communication is to have an enlarged and enriched experience. One shares in what another has thought or felt and, in so far, meagrely or amply, has his own attitude modified. Nor is the one who communicates left unaffected.²

¹ Ibid., pp. 2-3.

² Ibid., p. 6.

It is clear that teaching and learning are essential to the endurance of social life and that the process of living together is the process of education. The function of schools in this process is to economize and control it.

Without . . . formal education it is not possible to transmit all the resources and achievements of a complex society. It also opens up a way to a kind of experience which would not be accessible to the young, if they were left to pick up their training in informal association with others, since books and the symbols of knowledge are mastered.¹

It must be remembered, however, that

Schools are, indeed, one important method of the transmission which forms the dispositions of the immature; but it is only one means, and, compared with other agencies, a relatively superficial means. Only as we have grasped the necessity of more fundamental and persistent modes of tuition can we make sure of placing the scholastic methods in their true context.²

Schools are, nevertheless, instruments of society for its preservation and improvement.

Deliberate, Formal Education The School

We have seen that the relations between informal education and the wider social process are relations of continuity, interdependence, and active reconstruction. These also are ways in which the school (the official agency of education) and society are related and distinguished. There is the part-whole relationship: the school is included in the whole that is society and yet contributes to the whole

¹ Ibid., p. 9.

² Ibid., pp. 4-5.

in a special way that makes it different from society. There is a transactional relationship: each interacts with and reacts on the other, conserving and maintaining common values to facilitate continuity in the reconstruction of society. Also the two are continuous, having connections and relations with one another, both through time and at any moment in time.

In the context of experience, education is the process of growth in desirable directions through experience. Society is an aggregate of experiences, the complex interaction of individuals with other individuals and with groups, and of groups with groups. In a sense it is the sum of the educations of all its members. The school is the agency for transmitting those results of experience necessary to insure a high quality of experience in the future; it provides an environment where factors affecting growth may be channelled into directions which will insure the probability of more growth; in accord with these ends the school is a simplified model of society. Taken in the context of the school-society relation, education is the means to an improvement in the quality of associated living. However, society determines the form and the subject matter of education, particularly in the school. It is in the school that the products of social experience are extended and refined by applications to new problems. This new knowledge inevitably changes society, which, in its turn, affects education, and so on, in a continuous spiral of action and reaction. The school and society are thus interdependent, each shaping the other.

Education is the reconstruction of habit, and in schools the

environment is so manipulated that habits will be modified. Individuals that the school deals with are each bundles of inter-related habits, no bundle being the same as any other, since environments and interactions cannot be duplicated. One difficulty in the school, then, is to guide each separate bundle of habits, that is, each child, in the particular direction that will enable him to adapt to novel situations and reconstruct past experience ever more meaningfully. Schools focus and develop facility in selecting adequate ends and means to action, again modifying habit. In society, the conservative force of habit orders our channels of living. At the same time, the projective force of habit causes new and fresh consequences. Society, then, embodies the accumulated habits of mankind and the potential for whatever progress man is capable of achieving. Standards of conduct arise out of the continual sharing of conduct, and these morals also regulate action. The school transmits society's standards of action; it guides the development of those habits that have been found in the past to be either means of organizing experience or means of expanding and enriching the significance of life. The school's aim is to control the development of experience: it creates an intelligent society to the extent that it provides to individuals efficient means of such control.

In the remaking of the individual, the school is also remaking society, conserving and maintaining it on the one hand, modifying and improving it on the other. As some habits tend to be inert, others projective, so society generally tends to be conservative, and from the schools arise new channels of thought. Thus, ideally, the school

and society, united in the process of reconstruction, diverge in function within it. Divergence is another Deweyan expression of the continuity relationship. It states a simultaneous state of affairs, however, rather than an evolutionary emergence.

The School and the
Great Community

Education is also the creation of channels of communication such that the products of inquiry are shared and pave the way for new inquiry. In so doing, the school is creating the Great Community, one in which there will be full and free intercommunication; hence, the consequences of acts being known, publics will be self-conscious and will so act as to control the consequences. Then the school is both preserver and creator of knowledge--that is, warranted assertions--and creator also of social conditions such that the quality of experience is full and ever-expanding. Society is an association of men that language has transformed into a community. It is the function of language to carry meanings, and to pass along funded knowledge is a general aim of the school. By generating meanings, the school transforms a collection of individuals into a community, the members of which share interests and participate in each other's activities for mutual benefit. What is to be shared--that is, what the schools will transmit--originates in actions of members of society, either individually or in groups. In other words, the subject matter of education is the product of cumulative conjoint action. Moreover, scientific inquiry, a mode of resolving intellectual problems, arises out of everyday experience and is functionally related

to the common sense problem-solving of everyday existence. The realm of the mind, education, draws upon, and contributes to, the realm of existences, social life.

The relationship "transformation" is the same relationship as "reconstruction," except that it considers the product of an experience, while reconstruction considers the internal dynamics of guiding the development of the process. Both imply change to a new level of being, the creation of a new and better state of affairs. Through education, providing channels for full and free inter-communication, the Great Society may be transformed into the Great Community. The school, potentially at least, may elevate the quality of social living into something much more continuously significant.

To institute the conditions for effective interaction is a responsibility of the school more than of society. There are two special reasons for this: the school has identity while society is objectively unlimitable, and the institutional structure of the school insures a stability that the very multiplicity of social involvements forbids. The basis of the school's responsibility, however, is its distinctive role in social affairs. Since the special agency of educational institutions is to insure the continuity of society, effective continuity of the school with other forms of social interaction is necessary to the performance of the school's function. Conversely, it is in the interests of members of society, as such, to facilitate this continuity; consequently, the social responsibility of individuals and groups includes the kinds of active attitudes that operate to reenforce the efficiency of the educational enterprise.

Education grows out of whatever aspects of the social process that tend to order and maintain it. Any aspect of associative life that does this is educative. For an individual it means significance of experience, and, for the group, availability to all of the cumulative significances of many experiences. Meanings tend to fall into kinds, and therefore to become ordered and generalized, so that there is available for subsequent experience a possibility for emergence of an even greater significance. Education is integral to the process of communication as it is to the broader social context. As a society becomes complex, there is greater need of ordering the means by which it maintains itself. The school is a developed agency which has this specialized function. The school's task is to insure the future of a society. In complex societies, then, though all communicative factors educate, the school is charged particularly with the task and so is integral to the general communicative process. The effect of the ideal functioning of the school in a democratic society is the continuous organized expansion of human experience in significance. The school is only one of many agencies, however, that insure the continuity of society by educating the immature. Although part of a wider, more fundamental process, the school has a special role in the process. It validly simplifies the environment of a complex society and organizes it towards the needs of the immature. Thus, the school is internal to general educative growth and to the maintenance and expansion of cultural growth. The school is never separate from society; the conditions of its operation and its effects are social. The social as ideal defines the direction of operation of the relationship; the

cumulative progressive development of community goods coordinate with the reverse process, the focussing of individual capacities on enriching group goals.

Education as Democracy

Education serves democracy as an ideal in two chief ways: to coordinate the stabilities and the novelties within experience; and as a mode of experience within which converge moral, intellectual, and social qualities. These are the most general functions of education and schooling in Dewey's democracy. In the next chapter we shall look more closely at what political education means in the several phases of democratic life. But first we look briefly at these two chief general functions of education in democracy.

Throughout the infinitely varied range of events comprehended by social, there is one formal measure of quality: a compacting movement within a process which combines with some form of increase. Inasmuch as this is the form of all development of experience, that is, all "bettering," social quality is moral even superficially. But, since it is only through intercommunication that the power develops to choose a good and to direct one's actions towards it, social experience is the field of the essentially moral. The final measure of the good (or quality) of experience is its social consequences. Therefore, the primary consequences of communication are internal to the general criteria of experience (continuity and interaction), so that human experience is valuable in such communication terms as consciousness, meaning, imagination, sharing, participation, intelligence, purpose and control. Since social behaviors such as

these improve the very operation of the process of experience on its own account, events of social quality are moral through and through. As we have pointed out, these communication behaviors are the concern of education, and especially of the school. Consequently education and schools both express and further the democratic ideal.

A society organized around a democratic ideal must somehow provide and apply a political technology by which to achieve that ideal. In the process, it must contend with both diversifying and unifying tendencies. There are a multitude of fluid factors making for diversification: societies, democracy, even individuals are constantly in a state of flux and evolving along indeterminate paths. Individuals adapt cultural resources to their own unique purposes, thereby coming into conflict with other individuals and groups desiring the same resources for diverging purposes. Thus, social inquiry involves all the possible ways that men come together to share interests and the multiplicity of acts that generate the interests.

Unifying tendencies counter this precariousness and heterogeneity. For example, because habits are formed by community living, the individual shares general ideas and attitudes which bind him to other members. Also, group solidarity supports individualizing efforts, since full development and diversification of potentialities means a wider range of values for the whole group. Finally, sharing activity and purpose consolidates the awareness of directions of group living and, therefore, consolidates the directions themselves.

For each of these general conditions of group action,

democracy represents a goal to be striven for. For Deweyan democracy, education as an institution brings them together, providing stability and support for individuality.

Education as Political

As an aspect of experience, for Dewey, education is political in the fundamental, general sense of serving the democratic ideal. In Chapter Four, we indicated that "social" and "democracy" function as ideal in at least three senses. Education may be taken as ideal in the first sense, that of an inclusive philosophic category, to the extent that philosophy and a theory of education are taken as equivalents. Also, the second sense of ideal counts for education in the context of democracy, for education is that aspect of experience which provides access to the experience of continuity. But it is the third sense of ideal, as a standard of action, that applies most directly to Deweyan education. For it is the educative quality of an experience that measures its worth. Thus, if an experience provides to an individual expanded meaning and an added power of future control, if it multiplies communities of thought and action, if in short it is educative, then that experience tends towards the true social, towards democracy. In this basic sense, for Dewey, all education is political, since it is of the essence of democratic life, the experiential material through which to realize the ideal society.

Education is political also in the more technical sense of "political" developed in the preceding chapter--as fostering and organizing general conditions of associated life. In the first place, since all cultural institutions perform this ordering function to some extent

and are thus political, cultural education, as the net effect on the individual of all these relatively stable patterns of interaction, must also be political. In the second place, political quality accrues as education becomes deliberate, for deliberate education acknowledges the need for instituting control of the transactional contingencies of life. In the third place, as deliberate education is organized on its own account, it is clearly political, in the technical sense, for agencies and officials—schools and educators—become necessary to its functioning. The more widespread and complex is organized deliberate education, the more it becomes a general administrative matter, that is, a concern of government and, therefore, more distinctly political, in the usual common-sense meaning of political. Political education, then, means education become self-conscious and rationalized. There seems to be an increase here in the strength of meaning of political as applied to education, in moving from less formal to more formal education. However, Dewey would not acknowledge one stage as more important than any other, simply as more or less complex, and therefore having differing contributions to make and requiring differing management.

Another realm of meaning of political education comprises that education instituted to foster and to organize politics itself as a general condition of associated life. When such education is itself highly organized and developed, that is to say, when institutionalized education incorporates politics as a value and is organized as a political instrumentality, then political education achieves its most concentrated and intense form. This meaning of political education is perhaps the most useful to educators, since it is central to, and provides perspective for, their task. It is this main meaning that we

have in mind in essaying a Deweyan theory of political education, although, of course, the other meanings provide context and justification for it. The starting point of a theory of political education may be found in Dewey's concept of democracy. It is the notion of cultural education as a secondary grouping, and institutionalized education as a political instrumentality of the state. In this approach, the chief concern is how schools may work towards democracy as an ideal, in the several phases outlined in previous chapters.

Consequently, in the next chapter, discussion concerning political education takes as central the political education made possible by institutionalized education or schools, and, especially, by public institutions. We have seen that the value of secondary groupings lies in the quality of their reaction upon primary experience, so as to secure creative individuality and enhance shared enjoyments. The point of our discussion, then, concerns how these means--schools, politics--are adapted to serve the end, an enriched community life.

CHAPTER VIII

POLITICAL EDUCATION IN DEMOCRACY

Following Dewey's own dictum that "theory is in the end . . . the most practical of all things,"¹ we are concerned in this study to formulate the theory of political education that arises out of Dewey's technical political philosophy. We see such a theory implicit in Dewey's concept of democracy and, in this chapter, we unfold it somewhat. Arising in this way, as a theory among other theories of political education, its distinctiveness depends on characters of the Deweyan theory of democracy to a large extent. In the latter part of the chapter we develop this point.

But first we examine political education proper, that is, the education necessary to achieve Deweyan democracy. Previously, in surveying the concept of Deweyan democracy, we distinguished three interdependent ranges of democratic action--the community experience, the intercommunicating society, and the organization of public interests. We plan to consider the political education each range implies, and to weigh their consequences.

Taking in turn democracy as community, as the open society, and as the instrumental state, then, we consider the making of citizens. Some may object at the outset that we have stretched the

¹ John Dewey, The Sources of a Science of Education (New York: Horace Liveright, 1929), p. 17.

meaning of "political" and "education." Yet these are the Deweyan meanings, and their stretch may prove a strength as much as a vulnerability. C. S. Lewis once said, "The important thing about seeing through something is to see something through it." We are using Dewey's "Democracy," as a lens through which to look at political education. First we outline the theory. Then, we explore some implications of each phase, and, finally, we discuss how the theory relates to other theories of political education.

Political Education

A school prepares students for democratic community experience as political by providing a purified environment,¹ by being a democratic community itself,² by forging and incorporating continuities with the wider community of which it is a part,³ and, last, by fostering creative individuality. Each of these ways shows Dewey's principle of functionalism in action--a means (the school) being shaped to the end (democracy) and incorporating the end or purpose in its material structure. Thus, the simplified school environment clarifies democratic values. Its forms of action are those of democratic participation. Community continuities are idealized and democratized when incorporated within the school, and the capacity for socially responsible individual growth is encouraged. These functions of schooling are not continuously

¹Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 22-27.

²Ibid., p. 416.

³John Dewey, The School and Society, rev. ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943), pp. 6-29, and 63-94.

within direct awareness of the student, since they form the indefinite context of his learning career. However, they qualify and colour more direct experience. The functions become incorporated as habits of behaviour and thought, dynamic interests capable of reconstructing broader community and environmental ties. This is how the school educates for community experience as democratic--by shaping democratic habits, which eventuate in democratic patterns of action in community life. The school educates for community experience as political by encouraging awareness of the process on the part of participants. To thus grasp and to value basic conditions of political action is Deweyan political education.

The chief function of the school in preparing citizens of the intercommunicating society is as mediator, to immature members of society, of funded communities of thought and action. The educator, as vicar of community values and knowledge, promotes meaningful contact between the interests of a unique individual and cultural products, so as to multiply continuities within individual experience, and within shared experience, or society. Meanings are conserved, organized, channelled, and developed within two traditions, those of art and of inquiry, each of which has its own technologies and specializations. To initiate students into these traditions, as partakers and participants, is political education. It not only distributes social goods, but also potential power over future events, stored in intellectual instrumentalities and arts. For Dewey, intelligence, however manifest, is political in tendency, as potential control over a contingent environment. When more sophisticated--as science or as social inquiry, for example--intelligence has great political potential for Dewey,

especially when given an opportunity to react back into common-sense uses and enjoyments. For Dewey, whatever chance man has for organizing general conditions of society so that all may benefit rests with social intelligence. So also does the continuous creation and securing of human goods. Schools develop social intelligence on its own account, first, by maintaining the social as a continual point of reference for each subject-matter, and, second, by specific social study--as geography, history. Habits and skills in social inquiry pave the way for the experimental society--the continuously planning, intercommunicating society, in which all technologies are freely available for solving problems affecting general welfare.

Schools prepare for political participation in democracy, first, by monitoring their own function to ensure its relevance to, and effectiveness in, primary community life. A student's experience of involvement in an efficient secondary group transaction, especially the more aware he becomes of its functioning, is fundamental political education. Second, for potential political participants to learn to understand and to use cultural institutions as educational and as political instrumentalities is also political education. The school not only acknowledges the primary educative function of other aspects of culture, but also promotes their use to gain more formally educational ends. Third, the school fosters activism in managing its own affairs, both internal and external, so that students participate in the dynamic organization of interests. Fourth, participant democracy is encouraged by studying politics: (a) in the Deweyan sense of how to manage social concerns with efficiency and justice, and (b) in the sense of the intricate, interdependent, manifestations of management through governments,

nations, and trans-national organizations. In these four ways, the school, as a political instrumentality, both maintains itself as a tool and demonstrates the tool's use.

The concept of political education embedded in Dewey's concept of democracy in its several phases is multiple and complex, even when we restrict the locus of meaning to schools fostering politics as a value. To take the phases together, and as interdependent, unfolds more extensions of meaning. For example, throughout, Dewey's naturalistic postulate places man at the centre, and humanism is a continuous emphasis. In Deweyan democracy, all share the value that the life career of each individual is an end to be cherished. It follows that Deweyan political education promotes a classless society, socialistic political forms, equality of educational opportunity, a socially responsible individualism. Consequently, Dewey opposes democratic élitism, laissez-faire capitalism, the restriction of social mobility, and egoistic individualism. Another main thread is the central role of intelligence in human affairs, whether in conjoint cooperative action, scientific inquiry, or in organizing social action. A chief concern of all political education, then, is to foster the experimental attitude. Dewey thus favours a planning state, although he criticizes totalitarian regimes for not treating their plans as hypotheses to be tested, modified, and revised in action. For Dewey, liberalism means the freedom gained by control of the environment through intellectual instrumentalities. All knowledge is essentially political for this reason, and the patterns of its organization and dissemination are vital to all major political functions of a society. This is one major reason for the political importance of schools and of the political education they

conduct. Thus, we see that, in terms of traditional liberal rhetoric, Dewey's political education promotes liberty, equality, and fraternity -- each interpreted in the light of Dewey's democracy.

Education for Democracy
as Community

There are those who see Dewey's face-to-face community as a nostalgic harking back to the simplicities of frontier life, and, to that extent, believe him a naive optimist. But others see it as inexorable totalitarianism,¹ with individual rights swallowed up by community needs, and Dewey, therefore, an underminer of freedom. Bertrand Russell, for example, warns against the dangers of "cosmic impiety" and "the intoxication of power" that Dewey's democracy would promote.

To quote Russell:

Santayana, for instance says: "In Dewey, as in current science and ethics, there is a pervasive quasi-Hegelian tendency to dissolve the individual into his social functions, as well as everything substantial and actual into something relative and transitional."

Dr. Dewey's world, it seems to me, is one in which human beings occupy the imagination; the cosmos of astronomy, though of course acknowledged to exist, is at most times ignored. His philosophy is a power philosophy, though not, like Nietzsche's, a philosophy of individual power; it is the power of the community that is felt to be valuable. It is this element of social power that seems to me to make the philosophy of instrumentalism attractive to those who are more impressed by our new control over natural forces than by the limitations to which that control is still subject.²

¹ William T. Bluhm, Theories of the Political System: Classics of Political Thought and Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp. 419-20.

² Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1945), p. 827.

In this same vein, Morris Cohen¹ described Dewey's position as "anthropocentric naturalism" and Kallen² found himself unable to complete a collaboration with Dewey because of what he took to be Dewey's "blindness to the sheer individuality of individuals." More recently, however, Lewis S. Feuer,³ has argued that Dewey owes his singularity and force as a philosopher more strongly to his grounding of philosophic problems in the everyday affairs of community life than to his participation in the philosophic movement of pragmatism.

These currents of controversy warn us that democracy as community is not the simplistic and inoffensive theory it may seem on the surface. For Dewey, it is a way of personal life that is not sheer individualistic self-expression but is channelled by cultural patterns and caught up in complex interpersonal transactions. Yet, however inevitable the cultural content and form, democratic community experience is nevertheless an affair of individual prizings and choosings, and the individual life is the prime value. Critics like Russell and Kallen take Dewey's community to eclipse personal liberty. Yet Dewey said, in 1939:

I should now wish to emphasize more than I formerly did that individuals are the finally decisive factors of the nature and movement of associated life. . . . It has been shown in the

¹Morris Cohen, "Some Difficulties in Dewey's Anthropocentric Naturalism", Philosophical Review 49 (March 1940): 244-58.

²Horace M. Kallen, "Individuality, Individualism, and John Dewey", Antioch Review XIX (Fall 1959): 303-15.

³Lewis S. Feuer, "Dewey and the Back-to-the People Movement", Journal of the History of Ideas 20 (October 1959): 545-68.

last few years that democratic institutions are no guarantee for the existence of democratic individuals. The alternative is that individuals who prize their own liberties and who prize the liberties of other individuals, individuals who are democratic in thought and action, are the sole final warrant for the existence and endurance of democratic institutions.¹

Possibly Dewey was not fully successful in combatting the individual-social dualism. Yet his effort to do so is valuable in drawing attention to the interdependence of certain individualist and collectivist factors in democratic action. As a theory, from the side of the individual, important points are the material and social content of personality, the community representative character of the individual actor, the broadly moral dimension of personal choice, and the dependence of the individual on the community as the ground of his action and the source of his confirmation as an individual. From the side of the community, some significant elements of theory are the primacy of local group transactions in a complex society, the environmental channelling of thought and action, the natural mutual responsibility of group members, the origin of value and meaning in a situation of shared cooperative action, and the categories of communication and participation as primary in understanding all ranges of social life from simple to complex. In Dewey's democracy as community the mutuality of personal and group experience is thoroughgoing.

For political education, the chief lessons are that

¹ John Dewey, "What I Believe", in Clifton Fadimen, ed., I Believe (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1939), pp. 347-48. This article is a revision of "What I Believe," Forum 83 (1930): 176-82.

Individuality is the result of group membership rather than a privately owned gift of nature, that understanding group life facilitates its management, and that personal, moral choice is more fundamental to political life than are constitutions and laws. Then, to educate for freedom is to foster individuality via group transactions. To learn to act politically is to be group-task-oriented rather than self-striving. And the aim of political education is to develop individuals who are active vicars of community values rather than simply cogs in the machinery of government. Current echoes of such views as Dewey's on freedom are found in writings on third-world democracy.¹ Secondly, Dewey's views on group life have been extended and applied in various ways. For example, practical group dynamics is taken by a variety of disciplines to be the very essence of democratic action. For the third factor, the recent demand for psychocultural considerations in political science, and indeed much of the literature on civil disobedience, emphasize the origin of political importance in the acts of persons and the subsequent responsibility of the individual to act from a context of moral commitment and responsibility. Via Dewey's concept of democracy as community, then, we see political education as promoting the making of a social self, a group participant, and a civil actor.

Although Dewey is thought by some to be unduly optimistic about life there is an adamancy in his concept of freedom in community

¹For example, see Julius K. Nyerere, Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1968).

that is far from romantic or sentimental. He insists not only on the primacy of community life, but also on the empirical nature of habits, customs, and institutions. The problem of freedom then is also one of the material limits of the environment as well as of control of consequences. Not everything is possible to all people at all times. The operative patterns of action are what count as resources and opportunities for the exercise of freedom. To be free, then, is to have incorporated many patterns of action as available resources for future growth. For political education, this means it is necessary to encourage an awareness of shared traditions of behavior in order to foster democratic community life. It is this obdurate empiricism that led some to view Dewey as ultimately totalitarian, since the limits it sets to personal achievement involve the continuity of group life as much as unique individual endowments. But, for Dewey, the physical material of human aspirations was a brute fact, the inescapable starting point for reconstructing experience. Later behaviorists, like Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan in Power and Society¹, operationalized Dewey's insight that a political institution is an accretion of individual concrete acts, thus making Dewey's abstraction testable. Such operationalizations are useful to students of political education for empirical reasons similar to those which Dewey originally advocated, the understanding and management of practical political problems.

¹Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950).

Democracy as community carries overtones of existentialist commitment, in Martin Buber's sense. As the condition of humanity it is man's chief hope. A recent expression of this is found in Abraham Kaplan's contribution to a symposium on individuality.

It may be that the very concept of individuality must undergo transformation, so that the collectivization, as it were, of both action and conscience will not be seen as antithetical to individuality but as helping to constitute it.

The "I" that does not want to get involved is something less than an individual. If an individual is what has an identity and not just an identification, a personality and not merely a complex of data to be fed into a computer, it is not isolated from others but open to them, not encapsulated, but sharing common concerns--in a word, involved.

I am saying that the more we are involved with others the more of an individual we become. As the range of our fellow-feeling contracts, the boundaries of the self close in, and become at last the walls of a prison. As we withdraw from the problems of the aged, the young, the Negro, the poor, from suffering humanity in Vietnam or in any other part of the world, it is our own individualities that shrink. If anything human is foreign to me, I am myself, by just so much, less human. I believe it to be a fact of man's make-up and not merely a preachment of morality that I am indeed my brother's keeper; the voice of my brother's blood cries out to me from the ground because, in the most significant sense, his blood is my very own.

It is the predicament, the opportunity, and the glory of every man that he becomes an individual only as he reaches out to the rest of mankind.¹

This is a succinct reformulation of Dewey's theme of individual responsibility in democratic education.

Education for Democracy
is communication

We have seen that Dewey takes democracy to be coterminous with

¹ Abraham Kaplan "Perspectives on a Theme", in Abraham Kaplan, ed., Individuality and the New Society (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1970), pp. 4-5.

free inquiry, with full and free intercommunication throughout the Great Society. The fit citizen of the experimental, open society is in touch with its stored resources and human capacities and takes his place as participant in its problems and benefits. In the education of citizens, the role of intelligence in solving the problems of men is central, and especially as it enables access to common goods.

Political education for Dewey's experimental society involves recognizing first that all education is political to the extent that it fosters social intelligence and hence the management and expansion of human goods. All knowledge and forms of inquiry, as stored power over the environment, are political. But social intelligence reaches its most technical level in the sphere of the social sciences and in social policy planning and revision. Therefore, education towards these ends is most strongly political, since its potential range of influence is greatest.

Charles Morris¹ characterized Dewey's theory of intelligence as "mind as adjectival." This emphasizes the social and material nature of intelligence, embodied in the things and actions of the cultural environment more fundamentally than in private minds. Education for the fully democratic experimental society, where knowledge is accessible to all, takes account of all the channels in which meanings run, and not only the most technically developed ones such as academic subject matters. Hence, political education for democracy operates via the things and patterns of acts

¹Charles W. Morris, Six Theories of Mind (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1932), pp. 274-330.

widespread through a culture as much as via formulations of accumulated knowledge. This means that Deweyan political education, like that of Michael Oakeshott,¹ is an affair of practical tradition before it is an affair of more abstract conceptualization. Oakeshott makes the point in the following way:

Political enterprises, the ends to be pursued, the arrangements to be established (all the normal ingredients of a political ideology), cannot be premeditated in advance of a manner of attending to the arrangements of a society; what we do, and moreover what we want to do, is the creature of how we are accustomed to conduct our affairs. Indeed it often reflects no more than a discovered ability to do something which is then translated into an authority to do it.²

Oakeshott echoes Dewey's general message, the interpenetration of the spheres of action and of knowledge. Here is an example from Dewey to illustrate the consonance of his views with those of Oakeshott.

The level of action fixed by embodied intelligence is always the important thing. . . . Capacities are limited by the objects and tools at hand. . . . are still more dependent upon the prevailing habits of action and interest which are set by tradition and institutional customs . . . A more intelligent state of social affairs, one more informed with knowledge, more directed by intelligence, would not improve original endowments one whit, but it would raise the level upon which the intelligence of all operates. The height of this level is much more important for judgment of public concerns than are differences in intelligence quotients.³

For both Dewey and Oakeshott, habitudes are as important as ideas about them, for political education.

¹ Oakeshott, "Political Education."

² Ibid., p. 120.

³ Dewey, The Public and its Problems, p. 210.

Not only does Dewey's Great Community maximize intelligent action but communication as well. Hence, political education for democracy has a care for all modes, materials, and instrumentalities of communication. In this context, institutionalized education (schooling) acquires great political import since, as the formal conservation and expansion of the cultural heritage, it insures the continuity of communication through time and space. Also in this context we see the central importance of all modes of language to political education, since they are the channels of access to the goods of the open society.¹ E. A. Burtt takes Dewey's elaboration of the idea of the open society in terms of freed intelligence to be his most distinctive contribution, and to articulate most ably the democratic ethos of his age. In Burtt's words:

I believe it is not claiming too much for John Dewey to say that more than any other philosopher who has thus far appeared he conceived the essential foundations and formulated the rationale for the open society, and for the open world if that is destined in time to become actual. So far as any community of men and women and children can successfully function in full adjustment to the realities that surround it, it must realize the conditions that Dewey's philosophy has emphasized. This appears vividly, I think, if we return again to his central principle of responsibility. The great difficulty in establishing such a community and the basic requirement for maintaining it lie precisely in a live sense of responsibility in Dewey's sense of the word. This responsibility is two-fold: on one side, the responsibility of society to assure for all its members the positive conditions of freedom; on the other the responsibility of each member to be sensitively aware of the social consequences of his conduct and to act in the light of such awareness. Dewey saw that a community of this kind must be democratic, not in the sense of demanding any special political forms or practices but in the sense of expressing

¹ Dewey's major work on esthetics, Art as Experience, constitutes a comprehensive and flexible theory of communication.

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through whatever changes of form it undergoes, the guiding vision of the nature of man that underlies the democratic faith--of man as finding and fulfilling himself in the open society through the liberation and growth of wise understanding. True education as the continued process of such fulfillment is thus necessarily education in democracy .

Among both the Utilitarians and the Hegelians who preceded Dewey there were thinkers who clarified some of the conditions of the open society, but neither school recognized all the conditions that he saw to be necessary. The idealists, reacting against the atomic view of man typical of much modern thought, taught that the individual finds his good and realizes his freedom by fulfilling "his station and its duties" within an organic and well disciplined order of society. This philosophy does not really believe that all men are able to participate in the decisions affecting their destiny, nor that if they are given freedom they can be trusted not to abuse it. The Utilitarians, rebelling against entrenched institutions which prevented the common man from achieving his share of happiness, concentrated on sweeping away these unjust obstructions, confident that every man would be able to realize the joys of freedom once all such restraints were out. The society thus created is also not a truly open society, for most men lack the skill, understanding, and resources for the opportunity which freedom from external constraints provides; they will be exploited still, only it will be by a clever and resourceful new oligarchy rather than by some aristocracy of traditional privilege. It is realized that a society can become truly open, and can keep its openness from generation to generation in any era, only when it avoids both these mistakes. It must have real faith in the capacity of the common man; it must accept the responsibility of establishing for all its members positive conditions of freed intelligence, through wise democratic education and through the rebuilding toward this end of all social institutions. The open society in the open world can, I believe, only be more fully achieved as Dewey's central conception of man in community is more widely understood and more completely shared.

We quote Burtt at length, since he has brought together many insights relevant to questions of political education for the open society.

The open society means equality of access of persons to each

¹ E. A. Burtt, "The Core of Dewey's Way of Thinking," The Journal of Philosophy 57 (June 1960): 401-19.

other and to shared goods. Political education for equality implies maintaining the modes of access and the manners of use, as well as prizing not only the goods themselves but the conditions of their common use. It is in this sense that liberalism and reason go together, for Dewey. Liberalism as mediation is the operation of intelligence in social affairs, promoting the intercommunicant society and hence a secure individuality. Education for liberalism, then, is not sheer sentimentality, but a practical matter of agencies, instrumentalities, and media management. It is also a matter of translating knowledge into action. In one of his last articles, Dewey¹ made an eloquent plea against the value-free pretensions of social scientists, arguing for their responsibility to test their knowledge in the actual reconstruction of events. In this manner, he maintained, in the open society, knowledge will be made accessible to all through the changes effected in the environment.

Education for Democracy as the
Organization of Public Interests
The Instrumental State

The third range of democratic action we distinguish concerns the transactions of secondary groups, including those matters usually taken as distinctively political, the affairs of governments and states. As we have seen, Dewey's view of the state is dynamic and functional. He seeks to explain the concrete origins and directions of change of political action rather than to venerate an abstract

¹ John Dewey, "Liberating the Social Scientist: A Plea to Unshackle the Study of Man," Commentary 4 (October 1947): 378-85.

eternal verity. The fully functioning or democratic state is the instrumental state, and that is a condition of sensitive responsiveness of agencies and officials to the changing interests of the publics they serve.

Political education for democracy in this sense is education for political action. What this means is that citizens are to be prepared to take responsibility for the management of concerns in which they are caught up. To know and use the existing channels for managing public affairs is part of this. But that is more fundamental is a recognition and acceptance on the part of individuals of a share in responsibility for the public consequences of the acts in which they are involved. Hence Deweyan political education is citizenship education in the broad sense, education for life in civil society. It is political socialization in the sense used in recent political science, that is, learning the political milieu. But, for Dewey much more than assimilation of political regime norms is expected of the democratic citizen; he has an actual responsibility to influence the political milieu, to express himself, to participate in public affairs which affect him. Participation is the key category, and it follows from Dewey's theory of political life in terms of caring for the widespread consequences of acts.

Later we introduce Morton White's point about the "two Deweys"--the anti-formalist and the social engineer. In the same account White adapted an interchange between John Herman Randall

and Dewey¹ as follows:

Perhaps the most touching indication of the greatness and the defect of the old school is the following exchange adapted from one between Dewey and an impatient admirer:

THE ADMIRER: Instead of many fine generalities about "the method of cooperative intelligence," (you) might well direct (your) attention to this crucial problem of extending our political skill. For political skill can itself be taken as a technological problem to which inquiry can hope to bring an answer. It is obviously dependent on our acquiring the knowledge (of) how to get men to apply the techniques to enlist the cooperative support of men in doing what we now know how to do. Thus by rights (your) philosophy should culminate in the earnest consideration of the social techniques for reorganizing beliefs and behavior--techniques very different from those dealing with natural materials. It should issue in a social engineering, in an applied science of political education--and not merely in the hope that someday we may develop

on ~~the~~ ~~same~~ ~~line~~ ~~as~~ ~~fully~~ ~~in~~ ~~agreement~~ ~~with~~ ~~what~~ ~~you~~ ~~say~~ ~~about~~ ~~the~~ ~~importance~~ ~~of~~ ~~developing~~ ~~the~~ ~~skills~~ ~~that~~ ~~if~~ ~~they~~ ~~were~~ ~~produced~~ ~~would~~ ~~constitute~~ ~~political~~ ~~technology~~. The fact--which (you) point out--that I have myself done little or nothing in this direction does not detract from my recognition that in the concrete the invention of such a technology is the heart of the problem of intelligent action in political matters.

By this account Dewey (and Randall) must have meant by "an applied science of political education" something other than positive recommendations--such as for recognition of the school's active political function within the community, for encouraging social study and inquiry, for the democratization of school administration and control, or for social experimentalism. From the time of School and

¹ White made the adaptation from an article by Randall and Dewey's response to it. Both articles may be found in Schilpp, The Philosophy of John Dewey; see John Herman Randall, Jr., "Dewey's Interpretation of the History of Philosophy," pp. 75-102, and John Dewey, "Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder," pp. 515-600.

² Morton White, Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), pp. 243-44.

Society (1900) Dewey raised such topics in addresses and articles, with a persistent emphasis on individual conscience, civic responsibility, and public participation, as essential to democracy. Despite Dewey's misgivings, in this age of "true-believers" and "other-directed" men, it is no small contribution to erect responsibility and responsiveness as standards of action for public life.

Consequences of Democracy as Political Education

We have seen that, for Dewey democracy implies the social self, the experimental society, the instrumental state. The corresponding political education therefore encourages group responsibility, social knowledge, and political expertise. It remains to consider briefly how Dewey's theory relates to other theories of political education, and then appraise its adequacy. Our point of departure is to consider to what theoretical outlooks each of the three phases of Deweyan political education leads.

Education for democracy as community has much in common with the recent moral education movement, even apart from the obvious common emphasis on personal morality. In the first place, the developmental stages of growth originating with Piaget and Kohlberg are not dissimilar to Dewey's noting of developments in the quality of group action. For all, the best quality is the most responsible. Secondly, the emphasis in the new moral education on reasoning and decision-making is distinctly Deweyan. The "values approach" in social studies also, though construed variously by its proponents, is centrally concerned with inquiry and choice, as is Dewey. In a different vein,

the third-world democracies, such as Tanzania, that put sharing national goods before personal gain, have an authenticity similar to Dewey's democratic community life. Recently political theories have been developed that account for this unprecedented form of democracy in a much more analytically sophisticated manner than Dewey's--for example, Almond and Verba's The Civic Culture.¹ Yet the import is the same. As Joseph Metz² demonstrated in his article on democracy and the scientific method, democracy has for Dewey the same kind of neutrality re events as does scientific method. Hence, inevitably, democracy is relative to actual traditions and events, making comparisons possible, as does the conceptual framework of The Civic Culture.

Education for democracy as communication is an extremely broad category. However, if we take the key idea, social intelligence, as our guide, we see that Dewey's ideas have two chief kinds of parallels in contemporary political education: first, a major emphasis on social sciences, and, secondly, in the emphasis on the role of media in education.³ Theories of political education that emphasize inquiry epitomize the first, as do manifestations in the social studies of the recent structure-of-knowledge movement in education. Those who identify Dewey simply with the project method

¹Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

²Joseph G. Metz, "Democracy and the Scientific Method in the Philosophy of John Dewey," The Review of Politics 31 (April 1969): 242-62.

³Dewey, Art as Experience, pp. 195-202.

and enterprises may not recognize the Deweyan emphasis here. But, for Dewey, knowledge is for the sake of action, and to streamline the knowledge about social affairs is to ready it for use. For the second emphasis, we look to the political implications of the tremendous technological expansion in agencies of communication, such as have been developed in different ways by Marshall McLuhan, Paulo Freire, and Ivan Illich.

Currently, political scientists are paying considerable attention to education for democracy as the organization of public interests. Yet, the investigation of the politicization of citizens in the Deweyan sense has barely begun. These studies have sought to establish how informed and active citizens are in the political milieu. Deweyan democracy requires asking further how citizens can be enabled to participate most fully in civil life. That the Deweyan concept of political education as activism is not antediluvian can be seen from recent efforts such as that of Peter Bachrach¹ or Henry Kariel² to resurrect the category of participation in order to reconstruct democratic theory in a different direction from elitism. The idea that novel arenas of political action should be sought and used creatively to confront emerging problems is Deweyan in temper.

So far in this chapter we have been considering in what directions alliances in theory can be sought for a Deweyan theory of

¹Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967).

²Henry S. Kariel, Open Systems: Arenas for Political Action (Itasca, Ill.: F. E. Peacock Publishers, 1969).

political education arising out of a concept of democracy. Having established some directions of support, we undertake now to characterize more closely the theory as such, and then, later, to consider its usefulness to Dewey.

General Considerations
Factors Common
to all Phases

It is important to keep in mind such general characters of Dewey's political theory as his transactionalism, his empiricism, and his instrumentalism. These constitute the distinctiveness of his theory and hold for all phases of it. Transactionalism, the inclination to view affairs broadly and dynamically, is a manifestation of what is variously called holism, contextualism, or anti-dualism.

As Wayne Leys puts it:

In his social philosophy Dewey was moving, during the twenties and thirties, to a point of view which he finally called "transactional." The view was foreshadowed in a famous sentence in Human Nature and Conduct: "'It thinks' is a truer psychological statement than 'I think.'" In describing the conflicts and mal-functionings of society, Dewey was trying to get away from a conception of human beings as entities with a fixed nature that were adjusting to or manipulating an environment, another set of entities with a fixed nature. What he was talking about was a process, an interaction, a transaction, in which nouns referred to the changing features of a partially indeterminate situation.¹

Hence, for Dewey, the political actor is not a self-enclosed entity as he is in Locke or Hobbes. His actions embody past material experience and affect his current environment concretely.

¹Wayne A. R. Leys, "Dewey's Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy," in Jo Ann Boydston, ed., Guide to the Works of John Dewey (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972), p. 134.

Traditional ways of explaining politics via abstractions such as "the state" or "sovereignty" are not concrete enough for Dewey. Moreover, such ways as he does arrive at are to be taken as tentative, experimental and partial. Consequently, Dewey offers his theory of politics as much for its heuristic as for its descriptive or explanatory value. Battling the reification of theory, Dewey asks a question rather than states a truth: "If we think of it this way, what possibilities of action open up?" rather than "this is how it is." Ideas about politics are not the only instruments, but political affairs themselves are to be managed by understanding their functions and consequences. In these ways we see how political instrumentalism, empiricism, and transactionalism colour Dewey's social thought. Therefore they characterize political education in Deweyan democracy.

Earlier we noted that Dewey is an ideological political philosopher in the sense that he consistently aims at constructing the good life for society. Indeed, we made use of this tendency in developing the concept of Deweyan democracy in ideal terms. But it is also the case that although the ideological impulse is the more prominent, Dewey displays Partridge's¹ other motives for political philosophy, that is, the sociological and the philosophical.² On the part of the sociological impulse, we have seen that Dewey's theory of politics builds upon and extends his theory of social life. Inasmuch

¹Partridge, "Politics, Philosophy and Ideology."

²Bhattacharyya, "Philosophy, Ideology and Political Theory."

as the social is a basic category in Dewey's philosophic system, to elaborate the meaning of political democracy establishes the system to some extent. In this sense Partridge's philosophical impulse is served. It is seen to be served also in that Dewey's theory of politics depends on concepts of human nature and conduct developed in his other philosophic inquiries which do not directly treat political and social problems. To some extent, then, Dewey's political philosophy serves all three functions, ideological, sociological, and philosophical, but the ideological impulse is basic.

There is a paradox here, for although he himself spoke of democracy in ideal terms, Dewey inveighed against any logic of general notions in social affairs and called for specific, local, concrete problem-solvings. White explains the dilemma this way:

If we are to reorganize human beliefs and behavior by means of our technology, we must know how to reorganize it, and at some point or other we shall have to ask which beliefs and which behavior we want to encourage. The puzzling thing about Dewey's views on this subject is that sometimes he suggests that the fundamental task of philosophy is to build a political technology and at others suggests that even the modest theorizing, generalizing, and fixing of ends which a technology involves would lead us into rigidity and dogmatism. There are, I suggest, two Deweys. There is the Dewey who revolted against formalism and who feared the consequences of political and moral action. Then there is the Dewey who wanted to be a social engineer but did not succeed. One might have hoped that the second Dewey would stimulate students and disciples to build this technology, but where are they? I think the fact that there are few can be attributed, in part, to the first Dewey, the Dewey who inveighed against panaceas, programs, and fixed ends for two generations.

By refusing to formulate ends of social behavior for fear

of being saddled with fixed ends, Dewey hardly encouraged systematic political engineering.¹

Yet, as we have seen, by clarifying the values of democracy in ideal terms, Dewey did formulate general ends. Also, Dewey assumed certain consistent stances² towards political events, and thus had a

¹White, Social Thought in America, p. 244.

²As mentioned at the outset, the central subject matter of this study is Dewey's more technical philosophy, especially as it concerns politics. We discussed earlier, also, the sense in which almost anything Dewey wrote of social import can be taken as political philosophy, including his commentary on political events of his day. Although these materials are secondary for this inquiry, a survey of their range and scope indicates the comprehensiveness of affairs which Dewey considered subject to philosophic inquiry. Leys provides a succinct summary:

"It is, of course, possible to catalogue the positions that Dewey took with reference to the controversial issues of his time. He
Opposed American imperialism at the turn of the century,
Supported American participation in the two wars against
Germany,

Urged American participation in the League of Nations,
Rejected the claims of Marxism that a better world order
could be established by world revolution,
Opposed American isolationism.

Dewey came to strong convictions about what needed changing in American politics. He believed that:

-The power of well-organized industrial and financial interests should be countered by organized labor and improved organization of interests that were relatively inarticulate;

Government, responding to a wider range of needs, should be characterized by more publicity, greater use of scientific resources, less dependence on litigation and propaganda, and more deliberate and comprehensive planning;

Old "philosophies" should be re-examined; and that neither ancient religious beliefs nor the new totalitarian programs should be used as a justification of censorship or any restriction of inquiry (whether conducted in the schools or under other auspices)."

(Leys, "Dewey's Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy," p. 146). We shall explore some of these later in the chapter when we come to consider the practical adequacy of Dewey's theory of political education.

political program, which, since the stances advocated social inquiry and planning, called for a developing political technology. White faults Dewey for not coming through on the middle ground, theoretical development of how to implement results of social inquiry in the service of ideal ends. There does seem a need for what Arnold S. Kaufman¹ calls "intermediate ideals" to operationalize Dewey's "ultimate ideals," thus making his instrumental political theory a more explicit guide to action. This current study, as an exploration in theory of political education in democracy moves in that direction.

Perhaps it is a measure of Dewey's anti-formalist success that his political theory resists easy classification and often winds up with a hyphenated label such as "normative-empirical"² or "liberal-teleo-naturalist."³ It is not surprising that in philosophic controversy Dewey's position often bridges those of the major participants. For example, Dewey takes an organic view of society, but he is anti-historicist, in Karl Popper's sense. Again, although for him political life has empirical substance, reason is the very key to its control. Finally, though Dewey advocates improvement in both political techniques and political efficiency, in each case his concern is

¹Arnold S. Kaufman, "The Nature and Function of Political Theory," The Journal of Philosophy 51 (January 1954): 5-22.

²M. Rejai, Democracy: The Contemporary Theories (New York: Atherton Press, 1967), pp. 35-40.

³Bluhm, Theories of the Political System, pp. 410-20.

animated by humane ethics rather than a narrow Machiavellianism.

Despite classification difficulties, some distinctions can be made to point out what Dewey's theory of democracy and political education is like. In the first place it partakes of the ideological, transactional, empirical and instrumental characters of his more general social theory. Secondly, vis-a-vis other theories of democracy, Dewey's theory is populist, rationalist, and community oriented.

To say Dewey's democracy is populist is to set it against elitist theories of democracy. As we saw in Chapter VI, Dewey did not burke the inevitability of elites in the management of mass society but he insisted upon their openness, public responsibility, and responsiveness to changing conditions and needs.¹ For Dewey, every citizen has a similar responsibility to use social intelligence to foster growth of the community good. If he does not accept the responsibility, the citizen becomes alienated, and bonds of communication must be forged to reconnect him with the vital interests of community life. Recent political science research suggests that voter apathy serves a positive system-maintenance function in the political system. In Deweyan terms, however, voter apathy contradicts democracy and therefore is not to be taken positively. Secondly, to

¹Predictably, Dewey argued against whatever divided acts from the care and organization of their consequences, be it out-moded structures, government by experts remote from the masses, non-representative officers, or dislocations caused by rapid industrialization. However, the existence of officials, agencies and organization are essential in Dewey's ideal state, which is protected from misuse of power by representativeness, and by openness of access to the cared-for good. See Dewey, The Public and its Problems, pp. 65-109.

say Dewey's democracy is rationalist is to set it against neo-Freudian and traditionalist theories which minimize the role of reason in political life. For example, Herbert Marcuse and Oakeshott, each in different ways, seek to explain politics in terms of more primitive dynamics of social action than those of the operation of social intelligence. Of course, as is clear from Chapter V, Dewey's concept of intelligence includes much more than reasoning, in the sense of mentalistic calculation and analysis. It is practical, and operates in all modes of experience, in art and morals as well as in inquiry. Thus, intelligence provides a wide-ranging explanation of what holds groups together, and one which dignifies the role of man in nature. Moreover, for politics, intelligence ultimately makes possible the experimental society, in which human goods are maintained, shared, and expanded. Finally, to say that Dewey's democracy is community-oriented is to emphasize that it differs from "possessive individualism" theories which take the self-contained individual as the unit of society, and the defense of his rights as the essence of politics. C. B. Macpherson,¹ in tracing the idea that each person "owns" himself, through Hobbes and Locke, has pointed out that the idea is a post-feudal development, and therefore not ingrained in nature as some modern proponents of natural rights tend to argue. For Dewey, although the continuous enlargement of personal experience is its goal, democracy must take account of the inescapable

¹C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).

bio-cultural fact that each self is social before it is individual, thus it is to be formulated in terms of obligations more than of rights. In Dewey's democracy, problems revolve around how to increase and disperse community goods, rather than around how to politicize an assortment of discrete individuals.

From this short account, we get an idea of the emphasis in Dewey's theory relative to other theories of democracy. Different theorists of democracy vary in the values they take as central. Let us consider some representative values. For E. E. Schattschneider¹ democracy is the institutionalization of conflict, whereas Bernard Mayo² undertakes its justification in terms of popular control, political equality, political freedoms and the majority principle. David Braybrooke³ explores the nature of rights, welfare and collective preference as "tests" of democracy. For Thomas Thorson⁴ as for Mayo, democratic rhetoric involves political equality, majority rule, and minority rights. Anthony Downs⁵ starts from the rational,

¹E. E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960).

²H. B. Mayo, An Introduction to Democratic Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960).

³David Braybrooke, Three Tests for Democracy: Personal Rights, Human Welfare, Collective Preference (New York: Random House, 1968).

⁴Thomas L. Thorson, The Logic of Democracy (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1962).

⁵Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957).

choice-making individual seeking to maximize his goods, whereas John Hallowell¹ takes democratic freedom to be essentially moral and religious in character. Dewey's democratic theory is more like that of Dennis Thompson² or Rejai³ than any of those mentioned so far. Thompson takes autonomy and improvability to be the standards for democratic citizenship, while Rejai finds responsibility-responsiveness to be the thread of continuity running through his comprehensive typology of definitions of democracy. That is, Dewey emphasizes the mood or temper of democracy more than its mechanisms. Thus, political education for Deweyan democracy involves a range of institutions, not only those that are technically political or educative. The aim is taken to be broader than to smooth the machinery of government. It is to promote the moral advancement of mankind wherever increments of expanded experience are possible.

Dewey's Theory of Political Education as Ideological

Earlier, in Chapter III, we discussed Dewey's political philosophy as ideological in the senses of value-laden (Partridge's use), as action-incipient-idea (Wolfe's heroic thought-gesture), and as containing a reflexive ideological principle which generates study of the ideology of ideology. We indicated that Dewey's political thought is

¹ John H. Hallowell, The Moral Foundations of Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

² Dennis Thompson, The Democratic Citizen: Social Science And Democratic Theory in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1970).

³ Rejai, Democracy.

Ideological in Cox's first theoretical sense, that of a systematic set of ideas by which to justify a position and to criticize opposing views. Dewey's theory of democracy is a Weltanschauung,¹ a rationale; it is critical thought with historical structure, saturated with respect for the power of ideas in action. However, Dewey's political theory is not an inherent ideology² to be set up once and for all and followed with dedication; it is a positional ideology which provides a consistent approach to new situations, the approach being the gesture of questioning, inquiry, problem-solving, evaluation.³ The theory of society outlined in Chapters IV through VII constitutes an ideology in these senses. How Dewey used this ideology is another question. C. Wright Mills says:

To those who are truly possessed by a political philosophy, what is happening in the world in which they live seems altogether clear. An issue arises, or an issue is raised: the correct and proper view leaps readily to mind. By means of their philosophy, they are persuasively oriented. The positions they hold are easy to communicate. On various levels of sophistication, "the ideological message" seems obvious and compelling. The ideals in which

¹ John Dewey, "Nature in Experience," Problems of Men (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), p. 193.

² Samuel P. Huntington develops the notions of inherent and positional ideologies in his article, "Conservatism as an Ideology," in Gould and Truitt Political Ideologies, p. 158. The basic idea is that an inherent ideology is "the theoretical expression of the interests of a continuing social group" which generates a school of thought, while a positional ideology depends upon the relations existing between groups. "Inherent ideologies are functions of groups no matter what their positions; positional ideologies are functions of situations no matter what groups occupy those situations" (p. 158).

³ Compare the Polish philosopher Kolakowski's characterizing of the ideology of the New Left as negation. Leszek Kolakowski, "The Concept of the Left," in Gould and Truitt, Political Ideologies, pp. 300-307.

they believe seem closely connected with the agencies of action they have chosen. And both ideal and agency fit into their theories of society and into what they imagine is going on within society.¹

Quite often Dewey's use of his political theory to interpret and to analyze social issues seems to be of this kind. Cox's second theoretical sense of ideology is a derogatory one: it implies reduction. Alan Ryan says of this use:

We can now see what is being said when proffered explanations in social science are characterized as ideological; they are being explained or explained away, as beliefs held only because of their social origins or purpose, because some prior examination is thought to have discredited their status in terms of the reasons logically supporting them.²

In Sociology and Pragmatism, C. Wright Mills examined the publics of which Dewey was a part and the audiences his work addressed, thus putting Dewey's work in this kind of ideological perspective in an objective, but positive manner. Some negative critics of Dewey use the "ideological" label in an extreme reductionist way to dispose of his theories altogether, as manifestations and expressions of powerful social forces at work. These uses merit critical attention, evaluation, and refutation where necessary. As a theory of political education, Dewey's theory of democracy is ideological in these many senses.

In this chapter, we have considered the political education that Dewey's theory of democracy implies, and the directions in theory

¹C. Wright Mills, The Marxists (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1962), p. 17.

²Alan Ryan, The Philosophy of the Social Sciences (Glasgow: Macmillan, 1970), p. 223.

to which it leads, for support and for further inquiry. In the following chapter, we assess Dewey's theory through an analysis of criticisms of his positions.

CHAPTER IX

IMPLICATIONS OF DEWEY'S THEORY OF POLITICAL EDUCATION FOR CURRICULUM AND FOR PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EDUCATION

The early chapters of this study provided a context for the study of Dewey's philosophy and of his concept of democracy in terms of problems in education and politics. Then, discussion established the Deweyan concept of political education via an exposition of ideas clustering around democracy. Now, this third and final stage deals with the relevance of the Deweyan subject-matter to the original problem context.

At the outset the proposed answer to the "why-would-anybody" question was threefold: to seek light on the nature of political education and on political education problems; to try out the instrumentalist stance in education inquiry; and to consider Dewey's political philosophy as bearing on education, in at least some of its aspects. In Deweyan order, the discussion originated in problems that provided an occasion for inquiry, and now, accordingly, moves in reverse from the subject-matter of inquiry back to the problem context. What is to be discussed are matters concerning, in order, the philosophic material, its general usefulness to educators, and its more specific implications for the theory and practise of political education. These matters are not discrete, but bear upon

each other. First, consideration is given to the relation of Dewey's political philosophy to education.

Dewey's Political Philosophy and Education

Some initial questions that prompted study of Dewey's political philosophy concerned its consistency with his philosophy of education. In the context of democracy as an overarching ideal of both politics and education, the relation is clearly one of complementarity and consonance. There are two chief outcomes of the reformulation of Dewey's concept of democracy as political education. As a theory of political education, the thrust of these ideas constitutes a strong argument for liberal education as basic to active democratic citizenship, and, hence, to a viable political technology. Moreover, the reconstructed theory provides context and first principles for education in participatory politics. Thus, the reformulation provides a strong theoretical justification for liberal education as political education, and for schooling as practical politics.

Considerations of coherence and comprehensiveness, such as these, are matters of internal criticism, as are the linguistic and logical factors discussed in Chapter III. It is important to take into account such stress-engineering tests of a theory, even though the critic of Dewey's philosophy runs the risk of appearing like Samuel Johnson's fly. ('A fly, Sir, may sting a stately horse and make him wince; but one is but an insect, and the other is a horse still.') External criticism of an ideological pragmatist is more to the point. As Hendrik Hart puts it, near the close of his examination

of Dewey's verification theory:

It is not unusual to open a statement of critique with so called internal criticism. Some authors bungle up their views so badly that they need to be taken to task within the limits of their own writings. Further, internal criticism of an author whose viewpoint is sympathetic to the critic is a never failing necessity for the members of a community of scholars working in the same general direction. For the progress of research within such a group partly depends on the success of efforts at mutual correction. However, inside the limits of his own conception Dewey presents a generally consistent and clear statement of his philosophic intentions without really disturbing contradictions or obvious fallacies. Of course one has to allow for some measure of development. Dewey would have been an insignificant figure indeed if there had not been any more or less important shifts in his work. If one were to attempt an internal critique it would have to be directed at, e.g. looseness of terminology, insufficient documentation of both the polemic and thematic writings, the failure sometimes to carry through new developments in aspects of his thought also to other parts of it. A penetrating analysis of these shortcomings considering both their background and their consequences would not be without fruit. But if one has an eye for Dewey as a philosopher who set himself the task of criticizing past and present values for the sake of the reconstruction and development of instrumentalities fit to carry out a program of social action with important future consequences at stake, then these points are minor and relatively unimportant and criticism should be directed at the big issues only. . . .

As Hart sees it, criticism "directed at the big issues" is of two main kinds, which he identifies on the basis of "the fact that a philosophy has both fruits and roots."² Thus, critical alliances and oppositions to Dewey's theory of political education can be viewed as originating in agreement or disagreement over either first principles or what follows from them. Using Hart's idea, then, first we consider the

¹ Hendrik Hart, Communal Certainty and Authorized Truth: An Examination of John Dewey's Philosophy of Verification (Amsterdam: Swets & Feitlinger, 1966), p. 110.

² Ibid.

root of Dewey's theory of political education, as generative of critical opinion. Then we look to the theory as a finished product in order to judge its utility.

"Root" Criticism

Earlier we quoted Piatt's characterization of Dewey's philosophy as exhibiting the polarity of the perspectival and the contextual aspects of existence. These basic stances show up in Dewey's political philosophy as homiocentrism and systematic transactionalism, and each stance has implications for a theory of politics. Homiocentric theories of politics tend to be personalist, rationalist, and pluralist: that is, politics is taken to be a human predicament subject to control through intelligent action as are other human problems. Institutional, sceptic, and monist outlooks are then in opposition. Transactional theories of politics are system-oriented, are "mythic" in the McLuhan sense, and arise out of an evolutionary world-view. In contrast are theories which ascribe immanent or transcendental value to human capacities and institutions.

Some theories of democracy or of political education support or conflict with Dewey's because of either homiocentric or transactional root agreement or disagreement. For example, to take Hart again, his criticism of Dewey's doctrine of freedom depends upon his theological commitment: for Hart, (as for Niebuhr and some other theologians) a homiocentric theory of society and politics is mistaken from the start. Similarly, the criticisms of natural-law theorists tend to be root criticisms. Leo Strauss, for example, denies the application to political affairs of Dewey's first principle, biological

evolution; he maintains that "the political is sui-generis and cannot be understood as derivative from the sub-political."¹ In contrast, one can argue that the political education of Rousseau's Emile, or of a Summerhill child, is antithetical to Dewey's concept, since it neglects contextual (transactional) elements such as the existent wider communities of thought and action. As well as oppositions, some unusual alliances can be traced to root positions. For example, a shared perspectival outlook generates similarities between Alfred Schutz, a phenomenologist, and Dewey, leader of science. Both Schutz and Dewey start from the "problems of men," though their resulting theories of knowledge have different emphases--subjective on the part of Schutz, and objective on the part of instrumentalist Dewey. Similarly it can be said that a common contextualism leads to likenesses in Marxist and Deweyan social theory though their ideologies contrast in other respects. For both Marx and Dewey the wider range of human events is essential for understanding any particular one. Each, reinterpreting Hegel, subscribes to an evolutionary principle to explain man's progress and probe his future. For Marx the principle assumes an inexorable quality, not apparent in Dewey's open ended "universe-in-the-making." Characterized as both homiocentric and transactional, Dewey's theory of politics emerges as one opposed especially to block universe and conservative theories.

Moreover, as discussed in Chapter VIII, contextualism or

¹Leo Strauss, "An Epilogue," in Herbert J. Storing, ed., Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1962), p. 311.

transactionalism engenders theory that seems to bridge some otherwise mutually exclusive positions. For example, Dewey's concept of science as the organized body of warranted assertions generated by cumulative inquiry includes both the unique problem that is the occasion of inquiry and its many continuities. The concept is broad enough to include social inquiry, yet rigorous enough to be used as a standard for inquiry even in areas of experience other than science, such as philosophy and art. Hence when Peter Winch¹ argues that philosophy includes social study, and David Braybrooke² argues the reverse, the Deweyan concept of inquiry allows exploration of bases of agreement and disagreement. For similar root reasons, Dewey's theory of political education accommodates seeming extremes--for example, both those who identify political education with the pursuit of individual freedom and those who take it to be acquiring knowledge of the webs of custom that enmesh individual action. Concerning all root criticism Hart points out that:

Of course, the finding of the roots and the confrontation of them does not necessarily and automatically lead to the solution of the problem or to the end of the debate. In all probability there will not even be a getting closer to one another. As a matter of fact, it may imply getting farther away from each other. But it will at least clarify the issues and draw the lines where they run anyway.³

¹Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science.

²David Braybrooke, Philosophical Problems of the Social Sciences (Toronto: Collier-Macmillan, 1965).

³Hart, Communal Certainty, p. 111.

For political education theory, the lines run through issues concerning the nature of man and society.

"Fruit" Criticism

The standpoint from which criticism is made also enters into assessment of criticism of the theory itself, the "fruit" of philosophic analysis, especially since criticism from one point of view need not invalidate the theory's usefulness in other respects. Edel¹ has used four categories as "coordinates of criticism" for comparative purposes in a variety of anthropological and philosophical studies: the logical-analytic, the scientific-descriptive (or empirical), the causal-explanatory (or historical, genetic), and the evaluational. These serve as standpoints from which to survey some critical alliances and oppositions to Dewey's theory of political education.

To recapitulate, Dewey's theory of political education in democracy involves three chief phases: learning group processes, acquiring knowledge and skill in communication and inquiry, and becoming wise in the ways of social organization and its management for democratic ends. As a concept of political education the theory is distinctive for its breadth, for its support of the school as a chief focus for political education endeavours through a variety of

¹Edel, Method in Ethical Theory. Also see Abraham Edel "Science and the Structure of Ethics," in Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap and Charles Morris, eds., Foundations of the Unity of Science: Towards an International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 2: 273-377.

empirical considerations, for its objectification of political affairs (thus making them materials of inquiry rather than of indoctrination), and for its reflexivity, (being tested, modified and reconstructed through use). The civics teacher or the political socialization investigator may argue on logical-analytic grounds that the range and generality of matters comprehended by Dewey's view of political education obviate concrete guidance. Yet, the looseness itself constitutes a strength, for it forces recognition of continuities in different spheres of education and opens up new possibilities of cooperation and reinforcement. This is particularly important in the light of recent discussions of deschooling; for, to recognize the existence of many possible agencies, avenues, and modes of political education may enable streamlining of the task, especially if, as does Dewey, the acquisition of knowledge is itself taken to be a political act. Some critics may question the empirical backing of Dewey's theory of political education, or at least its empirical relevance to current problems. Nevertheless an accumulation of evidence backs up Dewey's account of the making of citizens in a democracy. Nowadays, such investigators of equality of educational opportunity as Christopher Jencks and James Coleman would agree with Dewey that political education for a free enterprise system requires some degree of democratic socialism to offset the "neighborhood effects" (Milton Friedman's term) of a complex institutional life. Through quite different arguments,¹ Pat White, R. S. Peters, and J. J. Schwab,

¹Pat White, "Education, Democracy and the Public Interest"; R. S. Peters, "Education as Initiation," in Reginald D. Archambault,

arrive at essentially the same position as Dewey--that liberal education of its citizens is essential to democracy--and at similar concepts of liberal education.¹ Dewey's view of schools as focal to political life because they are instrumentalities of the state is echoed by Ivan Illich, for the media centres he envisages have this same vital role, in spite of his call to "deschool" culture. Post student-protest, civil-disobedience literature amasses an array of facts that buttress the political importance of Dewey's man of social intelligence. Dewey's theory of political education constitutes a strong argument for all of these: democratic socialism, liberal education, the school as a chief agency of political education, and deliberate training in political activism. Dewey's accounts of the empirical backing of his position appear to be well-grounded, and to be relevant contemporaneously. However, not all would agree that the

ed., Philosophical Analysis and Education (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 87-111; and J. J. Schwab, "The Impossible Task of the Teacher in Progressive Education," School Review 67 (Summer 1959): 139-59.

¹Dewey's political education implies liberal education (See supra pp. 164-68), but not for a special elite class, nor with an esoteric subject matter. Hence,

Liberal education becomes a name for the sort of education that every member of the community should have: the education that will liberate his capacities and thereby contribute both to his own happiness and his social usefulness. It has value as a limiting concept to criticize various educational schemes. Thus an education in Latin and Greek may be quite illiberal if pursued by methods which restrict the play of imagination and sympathies, and bind down mental appreciations to one limited sphere. The same is obviously the case with education for law, medicine, engineering, or the clergy. In short a liberal education is one that liberalizes.

John Dewey, "Liberal Education," in Paul^a Monroe, ed., A Cyclopaedia of Education (New York: Macmillan, 1918), 4:6.

theory as an hypothesis presents a vera causa, or true account of origins and causes of political education. In opposition, Edward Shils,¹ for instance, maintains that the life of civil society is quite apart from that of primary group life; both natural and social positivist scientists insist that getting and communicating knowledge is a value-free enterprise and not political in any sense; and elitist² democrats argue that to educate for massive participatory democracy would seriously undermine the health of the body politic. Two related general criticisms of Dewey's philosophy also are sometimes presented as undercutting his veracity: his relatively unsophisticated psychology and his optimistic outlook.³ However, the contribution of Dewey's theory is to make education and politics matter to each other in empirically accessible ways. That this is unusual can be seen from the fact that, although recent major advances in political science have been via group process theory, communication theory, and investigation of politicalization (parallel

¹Edward Shils, "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties," British Journal of Sociology 8 (1957): 130-45.

²The whole of the Peter Bachrach book cited above deals with elitist democracy, which Sheldon Wolin defines in the foreword as follows:

. . . Some contemporary political and social scientists have exactly reversed the traditional democratic argument concerning what maintains and what threatens a democratic system. The former contend that the perpetuation of democracy depends on the ability of the elite to protect the system against the masses, while the traditional democratic argument identifies elites as one of the main dangers to the system. . . .

Sheldon Wolin, Foreword to The Theory of Democratic Elitism, by Bachrach, p. ix.

³On Dewey's behalf, it should be noted that the recent "pro-life" emphasis in psychology (A. Maslow, E. Erikson, E. Fromm) supports his outlook.

to the three phases of Dewey's democracy), the role of education has been usually only a background factor for the political scientist, as has politics for the educator. The comprehensiveness, dynamic quality, and empiricism of Dewey's theory bring politics and education into a relationship that allows their joint study and development. Finally, from an evaluational standpoint, some critics argue that the implicit and explicit values of Deweyan democracy and their methods of test are non-operational. For instance, when White decries Dewey's recommendation of the scientific method at large as a remedy for all social problems¹ and James Ward Smith² denies experimentalism as the only alternative to absolutism in social affairs, they are calling into question the concrete applicability of the Dewey ideal of social intelligence, that is, the study and management of human problems. Similarly, those who consider Dewey's faith in humanity to be more than is warranted,³ in fact are doubting the application of his ideal.

¹ Morton White, Social Thought in America, pp. 253-54.

² James Ward Smith, Theme for Reason (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 22.

³ Among those who comment on Dewey's optimism as being somewhat naive are Irwin Edman, Lewis S. Feuer, and Yervant H. Krikorian. John J. McDermott, however, makes a case for Dewey's being well acquainted with "the tragic sense of life" but deliberately choosing to celebrate its vitality in an almost existentialist act of commitment. See Irwin Edman, "Introduction," in Irwin Edman, ed., John Dewey: His Contribution to the American Tradition (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), pp. 34-35; Feuer, "Back to the People"; Yervant H. Krikorian "Dewey and the Ethics of Naturalism" in Recent Perspectives in American Philosophy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), pp. 6-13; John J. McDermott, "Introduction," in The Philosophy of John Dewey: Edited with an Introduction and Commentary (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1973), pp. 1-35. As support for McDermott's position see also Sidney Hook, "Pragmatism and the Tragic Sense of Life," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 1959-1960, pp. 5-26.

notions to everyday life. From an instrumentalist perspective these kinds of criticism are essential tests of the consequences of use of theory, although to the instrumentalist they are misguided to the extent that they judge on the basis of representational accuracy rather than of guidance given to problem-solving. The nature and quality of this guidance constitutes the second main consideration of this chapter.

Dewey's Theory of Political Education as Instrumental

Special difficulties surround both "black box" and ideal-type" theories¹ since, although explicitly non-descriptive, they do shape eventual descriptions of reality through their conceptual apparatus, and bias action towards the acknowledged ideals, thus complicating falsifiability. This is the case also with instrumentalist theories, such as Dewey's theory of political education, and these have an additional onus--to advance inquiry and to reconstruct practical experience.

Dewey's theory serves inquiry in all the usual instrumentalist ways: it provides an orientation to problems, rather than problem solutions; it allows a gestalt of varied interdependent factors; it enables isolation of some distinctive variables; some of its implications are novel and unforeseen. As an aid to political education inquiry, the chief of these is the first. This comes through the main

¹Ryan, The Philosophy of the Social Sciences, pp. 92-93.

message that social inquiry is both possible and urgent. Dewey's "big idea," even as an ideological political philosopher, is the interpenetration of knowledge and action. Dewey's concept of politics allots the educator a responsible role in civil society, the chief part of which role concerns this "big idea," that is, political education in the most basic sense. To have this open outlook upon political education is of first importance. In addition, Dewey provides an analytic apparatus that enables the educator to conceptualize his role vis-à-vis others in society. This can be seen by his casting of perennial questions (such as the nature of politics, of the good citizen, of freedom, of individuality, of group process and learning). As an analytic tool, Dewey's theory of political education, as reconstructed here, does not allow close specification of problems, since it is formulated in terms of ultimate rather than of intermediate principles (see Chapter III). These principles are meant to be taken as principles of inquiry and not as ethical imperatives, but the question does arise as to how well these functions can be separated, and this question arouses echoes of naturalistic fallacy arguments. Many political theorists make some sort of distinction along these lines, between what is believed to be the case and what is admired or hoped for, whereas Dewey blurs the distinction. For Dewey there is no inconsistency between the use of a theory, such as the theory of democracy, to locate relevant information and its use as a standard of right action. For some critics, the usefulness of any such theory is flawed by what they take to be a basic confusion. On such grounds, Dewey's theory of political

education is vulnerable to negative criticism of its usefulness as an analytic tool.

There are also problems of constituting in reality the ideal defined. For example, there is the difficulty of really sharing meanings and goods, especially since humanity is not an original endowment, but "ever to be learned." There is the question of variable democratic guarantees, since democracy is achieved differentially in each grouping, and its form and fulfillments vary. To take the school as central to political education involves further complex considerations: for, although it is an instrument of the state, artificially devised for ease of access and of control, the school itself has an internal political life, and participates politically in community and social affairs. Moreover, in spite of the transformation of communication by electric technology, there is still a dearth of instrumentalities and arts appropriate to sharing the democratic life. Exactly how to provide equality of opportunity to individuals, a share in both unique and dispersed goods, a distribution of freedom and restraints in an orderly way, accessibility to knowledge and other communication products, is a continuing problem. Hence, Dewey's theory of political education is not an entirely firm guide to the reconstruction of society, since it poses many practical problems.

Implications for the Theory and Practice
of Political Education

As a general theory, Dewey's conceptualization of political education offsets to some extent possible tendencies toward hyper-factualism in recent empirical political socialization studies.

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Among theories of democracy, Dewey's provides an alternative to Western possessive individualism, one that accommodates to different economic and political structures and to new ideological developments.¹ Dewey's categories are more appropriate than narrower positivist frames to the scale of some contemporary political education problems such as those of the Zero Population Growth issue, or the role of individual freedom in the Technostate. Even though, as this study underlines, Dewey himself does not always elaborate these categories in detail, they point towards bodies of theory that do, such as group process theories, theories of the sociology of language, learning and knowledge, and behavioral theories of political action. The strength of Dewey's theory lies in its generality and ideal quality. It follows that, whenever political education is conceived as primarily moral, intellectual, or activist, it is important that its interdependence with the other two phases also be kept in mind.

The most obvious practical implications of Dewey's theory follow from this strength: that since political education occurs through a variety of informal and formal channels, it behooves the educator, the political scientist, the churchman, and the statesman to acknowledge their conjoint interests; that the open society must

¹C. B. Macpherson argues for the stringent need of expanded and flexible democratic theory in contemporary world affairs. See, his The Real World of Democracy (Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1965); and also C. B. Macpherson "Post-Liberal-Democracy?", The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 30 (November 1965) 485-98.

foster open institutions, with ease of access and possibilities of participation; that schools are crucial institutions in modern society; that the school be openly acknowledged as political, within the community, and within itself; that "political" in education need not connote only the doctrinaire and manipulative. Implications for the practice of political education within the school proper are somewhat more indirect, but Deweyan nonetheless. To acknowledge politics as a central mode of experience rather than a remote abstraction necessitates its explicit incorporation into school affairs so that participatory democracy inform student life from within. To favour the life of reason along with the importance of politics is to suggest both the extension and the intellectual up-grading of curriculum in the social studies.

First, since there is so much to be learned to be a functional member of world society, so many channels of information to be taken account of, so many levels of understanding possible, as much time is needed as can be spared. Second, since social inquiry is a serious, disciplined affair, and not mere opinion-pooling, approaches to social study that play down the role of knowledge as a social product do not promote Deweyan social intelligence in democratic action. Further implications follow from considering the three phases of Dewey's democracy as political education. To educate for democracy as community requires some degree of radicalism: perhaps T-groups, or a social studies curriculum based on some such comprehensive rationale

as Edward Hall's¹ Primary Message System or Lasswell and Kaplan's value-based preference charts. Education for the inter-communicant society involves awareness of the human role of knowledge itself. This suggests a possible balancing of the recent emphasis on problem solving in social studies with a developing awareness of structures of knowledge and their use. Moreover, in the interests of efficiency, changing technologies of communication should be incorporated continuously into the modes and techniques of political education. In an early article, less cryptic than those later, McLuhan suggests a new concept of war in terms of information and education:

. . . It will be hard for educators to face up to a situation of electronic configuration in which civil defense becomes simply protection against media fallout, around the globe and around the clock. To put it in Meier's terms again, with the rise of information levels and speeds, war may cease to be the exchange of bulk or heavy goods, and may become an information exchange before a global public.

If adjustment (economic, social, or personal) to information movement at electronic speeds is quite impossible, we can always change our models and metaphors of organization and escape into sheer understanding. . . .³

This 'sheer understanding' would be political education in a new guise. To educate for democracy as political participation implies exploration and development of the many avenues to participation other than verbal, for example the empathic, cooperative, artistic, or technological. It

¹ Edward T. Hall, The Silent Language (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, 1963), pp. 173-76.

² Kaplan and Lasswell, Power and Society, pp. 72, 87, 99.

³ Marshall McLuhan, 'Effects of the Improvement of Communication Media,' Journal of Economic History 20 (December 1960): 566-75.

implies for educators some comprehension of the school's publics, of its participatory rights and privileges with respect to them, and of its role in the politics of education.

Concluding Remarks

The study has shown that a theory of political education is embedded in Dewey's theoretical writings on politics and on society, and that to examine the education necessary to achieve Dewey's social ideal, democracy, is to examine political education. Carrying out the examination uncovered a threefold concept of political education which can be taken as Dewey's. Chapter VII began testing this formulation by considering the direction and the domain of the outlook of each of three aspects of political education, and by indicating some general mutualities and contrasts with other purviews of political education. The purpose was to clarify Dewey's theory by indicating what it was like and unlike. This current chapter extends that discussion somewhat but with a different purpose in mind, that of assessing the viability of Dewey's concept of political education. In terms of Toulmin's procedural logic once more, the function of this chapter is to establish warrants to back judgments about Dewey's concept of democracy as political education. To that end, the foregoing discussion surveyed strengths and weaknesses of the theory, where it was useful and where it was not.

To conclude, political education continues as a crucial and controversial problem area, both empirically and conceptually. John W. Kehoe, in a recent critique of the new social studies, comments on contradictory empirical results as follows:

Putting all these results together, it seems that nothing works in citizenship education, that the task is a hopeless one. Yet there is evidence to the contrary which leads to the conclusion that the matter is not as clearcut as the above discussion would suggest. For example, public-opinion surveys have found education to be the most successful background factor in explaining differences in attitudes. It is also apparent that different authors have come to opposite conclusions. Hess and Torney state that, "the public school is the most important and effective instrument of political socialization . . ." Herbert Hyman, however claims that most political values of any importance are passed on from generation to generation. There is also disagreement about the age of socialization. Hess and Eaton claim that by the time high school teachers begin their attempts to transmit political attitudes, the child is already well socialized politically. Litt, however, found that high school civic courses can have substantial effects. He found that a significant increase in agreement with the democratic creed and a rejection of political chauvinism resulted from civic education programs in three communities. Maccoby et al., apparently concur, suggesting that public education encourages political change by forcing students to reconsider the political predispositions they bring with them from home. Davis found that providing students with specific information about race could encourage greater tolerance. If, then, these contradictory results mean the matter is not clearcut, further exploration of this area is needed and justified. Examination of existing investigations seems to indicate the existence of few, if any, carefully controlled or systematically evaluated studies on the effectiveness of various strategies for teaching acceptance of pluralism.¹

That Dewey's work remains relevant can be seen by an even more current comment reported by James Cass, education editor of the Saturday Review World. Cass summarizes an as yet unpublished report of the National Panel on High Schools and Adolescent Education sponsored by the U.S. Office of Education:

¹John W. Kehoe, "The New Social Studies and Citizenship Education: A Critique," in Terence Morrison and Anthony Burton, eds., Options: Reforms and Alternatives for Canadian Education (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart & Winston of Canada, 1973), pp. 190-98.

Two of the basic missions of the comprehensive high school-- education for citizenship and vocational training--are manifest failures. The authoritarian and bureaucratic rigidities of the typical school do not provide an environment conducive to training for democratic citizenship. And vocational education characteristically trains young people for jobs that no longer exist instead of for a future in which most individuals are likely to have a variety of occupations.

The panel, therefore, calls for a shift in emphasis from the comprehensive school to "comprehensive education" and argues that "the confines of one building [can] no longer contain all the valuable and necessary experience for today's young person." It would decentralize secondary education by moving part of it out into the community and by bringing more of the community back into the school in programs for the joint participation of "adolescent and other interested . . . adults in the community."

For citizenship education, the panel recommends that academic study of the social sciences should be supplemented by direct involvement of students in all the appropriate agencies of government within geographic reach. The involvement should offer such varied opportunities as voluntary interns and aides part-time employment at adult wages¹ and short-term observation tied to school seminars and classes.¹

John Dewey would agree wholeheartedly.

¹ James Cass, "Focus on the High Schools," Saturday Review World, October 19, 1974, p. 49.

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