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**“What’s Past is Prologue”: Canadian Intellectuals, the Tory Tradition and the Challenge of
Modernity, 1939-1970**

by

Philip Massolin



**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF
PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY**

Department of History and Classics

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
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
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

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

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ABSTRACT

Modernization changed the character of Canadian society. In a general sense, it entailed the alteration of historical circumstances, outlooks, and attitudes. Specifically, modernization was the replacement of Victorian values -- agrarian and religious, as well as rigid philosophical and moral codes -- with modern ones. It involved the advent of an urban-industrial culture that valued consumerism, science and technology, and democracy, and entailed also the triumph of the Liberal service state.

Harold Innis, Donald Creighton, Vincent Massey, Hilda Neatby, George P. Grant, and W.L. Morton, and, in a qualified sense, Northrop Frye and Marshall McLuhan -- the "critics of modernity" -- criticized modernization. More than challenging the fundamental premises of modernity, the critics also proffered alternatives, based in what they thought were the best Canadian and western traditions, to modernization. Remedies for the problem of modernity included the resurrection of traditions and orientations critical to the advancement of Canadian society. Through their social and philosophical criticism, these intellectuals established a link to social critics of former times and contributed to the development of the Anglo-Canadian mind.

The dissertation's main purpose, then, is to show how an "intellectual conservatism" endured the vicissitudes of modernization and came to express itself in the social criticism of several important critics. It attempts to understand the development of the "tory mind" -- a concern for the community over the individual, a concern with Canada's connection to Great Britain and its inherent "Britishness", and, conversely, a disdain for American politics and culture -- well into the modern era. Much has been written on the emergence of a class of liberal intellectuals in the twentieth century. This dissertation's chief task is to elaborate on the later development in Canada of "intellectual toryism". Hence, its main contribution is to address a neglected aspect of Canadian intellectual history.

A secondary purpose is to examine the modernization of Canada, and, most importantly, to assess the reaction of critics to profound societal transformations. This analysis examines the process of modernization and the development of a modern consciousness through the eyes of the social critics it studies. It is hoped that in so doing, it not only presents a study of the critique of modernity, but also contributes an understanding of the emergence of the intellectual underpinnings of modern Canada.

To my beloved mother, Norma Massolin (1939-1997)

“Out of the shadows and into the light”

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Introduction

The age after 1918 appeared substantially different from the Victorian-Edwardian period it had replaced. There were notable continuities in the so-called “Anglo-Canadian mind”, however, that persisted well after the Great War. Canadian social and intellectual historians have identified and studied these trends. They have focussed their attention, in part, on whether social and moral criticism, once merely a subset of Protestantism, continued in an increasingly secular age. In *A Disciplined Intelligence: Critical Enquiry into Canadian Thought in the Victorian Era*, A.B. McKillop argues that despite the movement away from an exclusively Christian moralism that defined Anglo-Canadian thought in the Victorian era, a “... broad strain of cultural moralism” persisted well into the twentieth century.¹ The moral dimension, he contends, has been the “central and continuous element” of Anglo-Canadian life.² Both Richard Allen and Ramsay Cook, in their studies of the social gospel movement and social regeneration, also examine the persistence of moralism in Anglophone Canada. In *The Social Passion: Religion and Social Reform in Canada 1914-28*, Allen contends that by the late nineteenth century, evangelical Christianity adopted a new social reform ethic. The new emphasis on social criticism and reform revitalized liberal Protestantism, enabling evangelical Christianity to gain a newfound relevance among Canadians. Cook disagrees with Allen’s main thesis. He argues in *The Regenerators: Social Criticism in Late Victorian English Canada* that the advent of the social gospel did not revive foundering evangelism, but rather contributed to the secularization of liberal Protestantism. Nevertheless, Cook does agree with Allen that the social gospel movement was the vehicle through which reformers expressed the moral criticism of society.³ Mariana Valverde’s *The Age of Light, Soap, and Water: Moral Reform in English Canada, 1890-1925* likewise investigates moral reform in Canada. Unlike Cook and Allen, who focus on the intellectual and “theological” elite of the social reform movement, Valverde studies the “social purity movement” from the perspectives of “popular educators, temperance activists, and pamphlet writers”.⁴ Nonetheless, her purpose is substantially the same: to analyze a movement that was dedicated social regeneration through the moral improvement of society. Valverde, and others who evaluate the moral reform movement,⁵ thus implicitly agree that the concern for an enduring moral imperative – itself a product of Victorian-Canadian values – continued on into the first two decades of the twentieth century and beyond.

A moral imperative, which McKillop defines as desiring the preservation of the total human community and a moral code to allay the dangerous effects of modernization, was thus central to the ongoing development of the Anglo-Canadian mind. This dissertation accepts the existence of a moral imperative. But it extends McKillop's conception forward in time. It argues that a group of prominent Canadian intellectuals brought forward the moral imperative into the mid-twentieth century. Through their social and philosophical criticism, these critics endeavoured both to understand the modern world and to provide alternatives, based in what they thought were the best Canadian and western traditions, to modernization. Their critique focussed on a lapse of the moral imperative and the concomitant modernization of Canadian thought and outlooks. It proffered an analysis of modern society reminiscent of the moralizing assessments of Victorian critics. Remedies for the problem of modernity entailed a resurrection of traditions and orientations critical to the advancement of society and the survival of the Canadian nation. As such, these intellectuals establish a link to their predecessors and contribute to the development of the Anglo-Canadian mind.

The interplay between modernity and the moral criticism of critics is, thus, a main leitmotif of this study. The attitudes and intellectual positions of critics are clearly revealed when juxtaposed with the various intellectual, social, and political trends of the modern century. This analysis examines the interpretation of modernization and the development of a modern consciousness through the eyes of the social critics it studies. A chief purpose is indeed to examine the critics' perceptions of the process of modernization. In so doing, this dissertation not only presents a study of the critique of modernity, but it also contributes an understanding of the emergence of the intellectual underpinnings of modern Canada.

This dissertation hence has two basic purposes. It argues that the moral imperative was increasingly reflected, as the twentieth century moved forward, by a group of conservatives who, as Canadian academics have often noted, were part of a "tory" tradition" in Canadian thought. Secondly, the thesis examines the modernization of Canada and assesses the reaction of critics to societal transformations behind modernism. The two concepts -- modernism and toryism -- require definition as they have been used so ubiquitously in the past.

"Modernity", "modernism", and "modernization" are fairly complex sociological terminologies, referring to profound societal, philosophical and ideological transformations. These terms, often used here interchangeably, are to be applied in their most general signification: that is, as indications of historical change. For the purposes of this study, they point out an alteration of historical circumstances, outlooks, and attitudes.

Specifically, modernization refers to the replacement of Victorian society -- agrarian, religious, adhering to a rigid set of philosophical and moral codes -- with the modern age. It therefore pertains to the arrival of an urban and industrial society that replaced a hoary agrarian-merchant system. Closely related to urban-industrialization, modernization also involves the rise of a consumer and technological society. Philosophically, it implies the subsuming of the moral and "humane" values of former times and the emergence of new attitudes and value systems consistent with an industrial, technological, and consumer age. While society secularized and the agrarian way of life eroded away, educational systems also modernized. In many ways, academic modernization is central to the genesis of the modern era. Lastly, politics and the national identity in Canada underwent revision. At its broadest, political modernization involves the alteration of colonial relationships and therefore the replacement of the central core of the Anglo-Canadian national identity with an autonomist-continentalist Canadianism. As such, no corner of Canadian society seemed to be exempt from the pressures of modernity.

The process of modernization, to be sure, is definable as a set of objective historical events and ideological changes. We are concerned with discussing it as such. This dissertation is more preoccupied, however, with understanding the critique of modernity. Harold Innis, Donald Creighton, Vincent Massey, Hilda Neatby, George P. Grant, W.L. Morton, and, with some qualifications, Northrop Frye and Marshall McLuhan⁶, among other social commentators, are studied here for their appraisals of modernization. These "critics of modernity" presented strong views on the nature and implications of the modern age. They are bound together as a group, as we will see, because of their concern over the issues of modernity.

The "anti-modernists" also shared certain characteristics that enables one to label them as conservatives. Their "toryism" must be explained, for it is eclectic and borrows from different political traditions. What is more, the conservative intellectuals must be seen in light of the Canadian tory tradition, which developed distinctly from British toryism and which is therefore substantially different from its British namesake. Three notions are essential to the toryism of the group. The first is the sense of community. Based in the loyalist tradition of the nineteenth century, the Canadian tories stressed the primacy of the community over selfish individualism. In this, they conceived of society as an organism of functionally related parts. The communitarianism enabled Canadian tories to denounce American individualism, Jacksonian democracy, and the violence of America's political past, while lauding the merits of the Dominion's peaceful, indeed evolutionary development. It is because of this emphasis on the organic nature of the Dominion that the Canadian conservatives adopted elements of Burke and Burkean conservatism. Unlike

American political history, which represented an abrupt and violent break with the past, the Canadian tradition had as a foundational element Burke's "partnership of the generations". "Society", as Donald Creighton indicated, quoting Edmund Burke is "'a partnership in all science, a partnership in all art, a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection. As in the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born'."⁷ Canadian society was organic, evolutionary, and anti-individualist, and therefore had Burkean overtones for the Canadian Tories.

Toryism also implies a sense of "Britishness", as defined from a Canadian perspective. Tories explained that Canada was an advanced political entity -- far superior to the Republic -- because of its British connection. The British nexus implied a set of moral virtues that placed the Anglo-Canadian world above other civilizations. This sense of Anglo-superiority is associated with, and, in part, grew out of, the nineteenth-century Canadian imperialist movement.⁸ The critics absorbed this ethic through their family ties and loyalist surroundings. The case of George Parkin Grant is illustrative. Both of Grant's grandfathers, George Munro Grant, and George Parkin, were ardent imperialists who greatly influenced their grandson. George M. Grant advocated continued British nexus, embodied in imperial federation, because he believed that the enduring association with Britain not only conferred on Canada political status, but it also gave Canadians a link to one of history's great civilizations. Through the British nexus, Canada could escape the crass materialism of North American society. Through imperial federation, moreover, Canadians could pursue righteousness at home and throughout the Empire. For Grant, the Empire was as much moral and spiritual in its goals as it was political and material.⁹

George Parkin, like Grant, also stressed the civilizing and Christianizing virtues of British imperialism. For Parkin, as for his fellow imperialist Grant, there was a moral necessity associated with the Empire and Anglo-Saxon dominance. For both, Britain had been imbued with a moral superiority that not only justified its political expansion, but also made that expansion morally compelling. The ultimate message was clear: Britain was not only the most powerful nation on earth, it was also the most virtuous. As such, Canada, a British nation, must never let its ties lapse.

George P. Grant's father, W.L. Grant, was yet another imperialist, although of a slightly later period. The elder Grant, like his father George Munro Grant, and Parkin, emphasized the spiritual and idealist aspects of British imperialism and British civilization more generally. For Grant, imperialism implied social service as well as strength. Through it, most importantly, Canadian society could be greatly ameliorated; it could be

transformed into a place “in which every man, woman, and child had the chance to develop the best that is in them, and the strength that would protect that society in a world of imperfect, anger, and unreason”.¹⁰ The Dominion, Grant went on, should take its cue from Great Britain, whose history showed that a great people was not made simply through the exploitation of natural resources. Only continued association with the Empire could curb these materialist inclinations of the new world. The example of Britain, Grant concluded, presaging his son’s later strictures, must be followed to foster a less mechanical and indeed more humane society in Canada.

The British nexus thus entailed for Canada participation in the advanced values and political traditions of the Empire. It also had nationalist overtones. As Carl Berger has pointed out, the Canadian imperialists, those ardent supporters of the imperial nexus and Anglo-Canadian cooperation, were also Canadian nationalists.¹¹ The Dominion, the tory version of Canadian nationalism instructed, was eminently better off tied to the advanced culture of Britain than being exposed to the fallacies of republicanism. The Anglo-Canadian connection was the way in which to defeat pressure from the Americans and enable Canada to develop as an autonomous community in North America. For the tory nationalists, “Canada represented a declaration of independence from the United States, an attempt to build a second community in North America outside the American republic, one marked off from it, indeed, by the longer persistence of the imperial tie”.¹² This group of conservative-nationalists contrasted starkly to a liberal-nationalist school, which grew to prominence in the twentieth century, and which argued that the imperial nexus was more a hindrance than a benefit to the emerging Canadian nationality. The anti-liberalism of the conservative-nationalists was a reaction against Canadian liberals’ view of the Canadian nation. What is more, tories’ opposition to the Liberal party was a response to the perceived continentalism and pro-Americanism of the federal Liberals. By the early part of the twentieth century, in brief, two basic and dialectical strains of Canadian nationalism had been established. Despite the increased popularity of the liberal-nationalists, the tory approach -- the “Blood is Thicker than Water School”¹³ of Canadian historians -- continued well into this century. The tory nationalism that had been found in the late eighteenth century found its modern expression in the ideas of Innis, Creighton, and the other tory critics.

The third element of Canadian toryism is eclecticism. Because the conservatives’ “toryism” was in part anti-American and in part anti-individualistic, they did not trace their roots to pure British Toryism. Certainly there were commonalities between the two traditions. Maintaining law and order and the institutions of the British Crown, opposition to *laissez-faire* economics, and the staunchly conservative and anti-revolutionary aspects of

British Toryism¹⁴ were all present, at least in some vague form, in the Canadian variant. The key difference, however, was that Canadian Tories were highly selective in adopting conservative ideas. In some cases they referred to the merits of Burkean conservatism, in others to Pittite and Peelite variants,¹⁵ and in another instance, Disraelite conservatism.¹⁶ What is more, on many occasions the British political tradition as a whole (Tory, Whig, or other) is juxtaposed favourably against the evils of American republicanism. In a sense, then, Canadian Tories considered the entire British political orientation as “conservative” just as they denounced American political culture as “liberal”. These monolithic understandings are why they would cite Matthew Arnold so freely, discuss Edmund Burke so selectively, and chastise Jacksonian democracy so completely. In essence, the group of conservatives studied here were not political theorists or party ideologues; rather, they were myth-makers and social critics who were coloured by current events and certain conceptions of history and the future. The perceived needs of the present and the future account for their selectivity and their imperfect understanding of theoretical antecedents.

The Canadian Tories thus advanced a very specific, perhaps peculiar idea of Toryism.¹⁷ The question now arises, how cohesive were the Canadian Tories? Generally speaking, Canadian conservative thinkers were drawn together because of their opposition to modernity. This dissertation emerged out of an analysis of the critique of technology and Canadian society. After the study of Innis, McLuhan, Grant and the other critics of the technological society, an effort was made to seek out a more “well-rounded” set of social critics -- a group of “critics of modernity” -- to see if such a coterie existed. As the analysis moved into a discussion of the university question, a coherent group began to take shape. As the more specific issues of culture and nationalism were broached, the critics became less a single group and more a series of overlapping alliances linked by a common resistance to modernization and the particular brand of Canadian Toryism.

Despite the rough coherence of the group, however -- their conservative outlook, their common views on the nature of the university -- there were qualifications. First, not each individual was concerned with every issue. For instance, W.L. Morton and Donald Creighton had little to say on the abuses of technology. Second, certain issues attracted critics who had a more ambivalent attitude towards Toryism and modernization. Marshall McLuhan and Northrop Frye are examples here. As noted, McLuhan’s postwar work on advertising and technology showed how he was a moralist and a burgeoning anti-modernist. By the mid-1950s onwards, however, McLuhan increasingly accepted modern technology, and endeavoured to demonstrate how technology could enhance, rather than detract from, the modern experience. While Frye criticized modern developments in the academic world, he too was much more amenable to the social-cultural change brought on

by modernization. What is more, both Frye and McLuhan had little to say on the “tory” character of Canada. Unlike the tory nationalists, they did not criticize Canada’s relationship with the United States, nor did they play up Canada’s “British nature”. For both, in short, toryism was less relevant to the development of the nation.

In spite of these differences of opinions and outlooks, there was a common set of assumptions that allowed the group of intellectuals to coalesce into a coherent group. The individuals under study here are unified in their intellectual and elitist critique of postwar Canadian society. They also denounced the advent of American-influenced mass society. Thus, they are brought together by common prejudices and biases. Their elitism and disdain for mass culture is came out, for example, in their condemnation of consumer culture. They believed not only that a consumer impulse pervaded modern society, but also that consumerism ultimately devalued true or “serious” culture. Modern society, the critics thought, was overly commodified, materialistic, and entailed a pecuniary culture concerned with “having” and acquiring rather than “being”. As chapter five shows, consumer culture became, to the dismay of critics, coextensive with modern culture. Most perniciously, it succeeded in crowding out the cultural trappings on which western civilization was founded. As the commissioners of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences (the Massey Commission) and like-minded observers demonstrated, consumerism was anathema to rightful cultural development.

Common world-views, such as the denunciation of mass culture, must be understood in light of the history of the periods in which the critics wrote. Anti-materialism must be considered in the context of the postwar boom, an era of unprecedented material prosperity and consumerism. The Second World War was also extremely important to the critique of modernity. During the war, critics discovered just how much society valued the university. The entire defence of the so-called “university tradition” emerged out of period that seemed to undervalue, if not scoff at, the contributions of the arts and humanities. Conversely, the war showed just how much Canadians had become enamoured of the “practical sciences” and the contributions of technicians to the war effort. The war also furnished the shock that galvanized the critics of modernity. First, it lay bare the deplorable conditions and decadent value system of western society, especially apparent after the holocaust. The war certainly aroused a crisis in values and beliefs. It led intellectuals to question the principles for which the war was being waged. More importantly, it drove them to explain the liberal and democratic institutions upon which the west had been founded. Social scientists had discovered that the war had resulted in the sundering of value and belief systems. They also understood that it had become their duty to articulate and defend these embattled principles. Historians, with their

unique orientation to the past, were particularly active here, explaining the origins and longevity of western values and institutions. With other humanists, they took it as their task to demonstrate the enduring relevance of these traditions by showing their centrality in the past.¹⁸ For the critics of modernity, then, the war had given humanists a strange opportunity: it enabled them to become spokespeople for civilization and defenders of the embattled systems of values and beliefs.

The Massey Commission was the historical event around which cultural critics rallied. The Commission raised awareness of the issue of cultural development in Canada. One of its main objectives was to underscore the cultural immaturity of the Dominion. Increasing emphasis on material prosperity, commercialism, and American mass culture combined with indifferent attitudes toward higher learning and personal intellectual development. Postwar Canada, according to the Massey Commissioners and other culture critics, was overwrought with anti-intellectualism and a corrupt notion of culture. The critics certainly articulated these views during the forum that was the Massey Commission; however, this cultural critique must be seen in light of the penetration into Canada of American culture. In part an effort to give force to their commission recommendations, the culture critics characterized the postwar age as one unduly influenced by homogenizing and indeed stultifying mass cultural influences emanating from the United States.

What is more, the Commission acted as a mouthpiece designed to articulate a particular vision of Canada's cultural development. The culture critics' idea of the good society was based on an Arnoldian view of the good life, one that was founded "in the love of perfection" and which "moves by the force, not merely or primarily of the scientific passion for pure knowledge, but also of the moral and social passion for doing good".¹⁹ As chapter five makes clear, the quest for perfection through personal intellectual development and critical awareness was indispensable to the good society. Matthew Arnold's humanism and the Arnoldian critical-moralist approach to cultural development permeated the outlooks of the critics. Following Arnold, anti-modernists stressed the preeminence of cultural over spiritual values. Christians themselves, they considered the social good as not rooted in a series of transcendental truths, but rather as part of functional values implanted in the history of western civilization.²⁰ Culture was for them what it had been for the late Victorian humanists: a beacon by which moderns could navigate through the darkness of the scientific-industrial society. The development of western culture -- embodied in the critics' defense of the university and the promotion of high culture -- seemed to be the only antidote to ineluctable modernization. The use of Arnold was thus an attempt to address the cultural "anarchy" of the postwar period.

The intrusion of American mass culture into Canada during the 1940s and beyond was really a perception of the culture critics themselves.²¹ However, there was tangible evidence in other fields -- trade relations and foreign and defence policy -- that Canada had come under the spell of the Americans. The critics' denunciation of American culture imperialism and their anti-Americanism more generally must be seen in reference to Canada's increasing trade and foreign affairs ties to the United States. From the Second World War onwards, Canada began trading more and more of its goods with the United States at the expense of trade relations with other nations, including Great Britain. Canadian exports to Great Britain and the United States were relatively equal throughout the 1930s. As an example, Canada traded 40.3 and 35.5 per cent of its total commodities to Britain for the years 1937 and 1939, while it exported 36.1 and 41.1 per cent of its total trade items to the United States for the same years.²² This tendency changed after the war, however, when the United States became Canada's single most important trading partner: for instance, Canada exported 56 per cent of its total exports to the United States in 1960.²³ What is more, American investment in Canadian industries intensified throughout the postwar age. The Trans-Canada Pipeline project, which contributed to the downfall of the St. Laurent Liberals, was an example of the seeming omnipresence of American investment in Canadian industry. Concern over American investment remained an issue throughout the 1960s and reached a crescendo in the latter part of the decade with the establish of the Watkins Report, which reflected discontent among the intelligentsia and Canadians at large with large-scale American intervention into the Canadian economy.

Canadian ties with the United States were not limited to trade and economics, however. From the 1940s on, Canada became entangled into arrangements with the Americans that firmly placed the Dominion within the American defensive sphere. Beginning with the Ogdensburg Agreement (1940) and continuing through the postwar period with a string of defence/foreign policy initiatives -- NATO, Canada's involvement in the Korean War, the North American air defense plan (NORAD), and the Distant Early Warning Line (DEW) -- Canadian governments presided over the Americanization of Canadian defence policy. The Liberals of Mackenzie King, St. Laurent, and Pearson, the critics claimed, were especially responsible for Canada's pro-American positions. Indeed, Liberal foreign policy of the postwar period established Canada's dependence on American defensive planning and on the American view of the Cold war world. In this set of circumstances, Canada was stripped of its autonomy in foreign policy matters and moved, in the words of Harold Innis, from colony to nation to colony.

The advent of an American controlled foreign policy and increased economic ties with the United States provides the background for much of the anti-Americanism of the

critics of modernity. Yet something more insidious, and indeed American -- a homogeneous, mass culture -- provided the backdrop for the intellectuals' social critique. The postwar era was marked by mass culture developments, including, as mentioned, a boom in consumer activity. The period was also the time of the "baby boom", a period during which young, middle class families were having babies in unprecedented numbers, buying houses and moving to the suburbs. This generation of Canadians put enormous emotional and financial resources into raising their children. It was perhaps the most child-focussed generation in Canadian history. Domesticity and child-centredness seemed the dominant mindset of most younger Canadians. In this environment, the critics suggested, the "higher values" of Arnoldian culture, intellectualism, and a true understanding of democracy were set aside.

Developments in the history of education provide a final historical context that influenced the anti-modernist critique. As mentioned, the war proved to the critics the low esteem in which Canadians held the arts and the humanities. The postwar period also saw an erosion of higher learning and intellectual and educational standards more generally. First, there was the influx of veterans, many of whom, once demobilized, enrolled in Canadian colleges and universities. Once the preserve of the social and intellectual elite, higher learning was now accessible to those who did not have outstanding intellectual credentials.

"Educational democracy" was also practiced in Canadian grade schools. When baby boomers reached school age, they were met with a changed educational philosophy: "democratic" or "Deweyite" education. Stressing the personal development of students as opposed to the development of critical and other intellectual faculties, democratic education was denounced by Hilda Neatby and other traditionalists. For Neatby and others, progressivist pedagogy and the sheer numbers of the baby boom lowered educational standards and reflected the anti-intellectualism of the age.

Democratic education also appeared in Canadian universities. When the baby boomers became university aged, they enrolled in huge numbers. The resources of existing colleges and universities were stretched to the limit; by the mid-1960s several new institutions had to be built to keep up with the clamour for post-secondary education. Higher education was considered a right, not a privilege. By the late 1960s, the democratic university -- a stark contrast to the privileged, elitist institutions in which the critics had been schooled -- had arrived.

Lastly, the utilitarian focus of Canadian universities that grew considerably during the war reached its logical conclusion with the advent of the so-called "multiversity". Unlike the university of the past that focused on the liberal arts, the multiversity was so

variegated as to have no single, unifying vision. Further, it was influenced to an unprecedented degree by the needs of the community and public funding requirements. Boards of governors and presidents attuned to the interests and desired of the public, and not out-of-touch scholars, were the main ambit of power in the modern university. By the late 1960s, the private liberal arts colleges of Canada's past had been thus transformed into massive public institutions with million-dollar budgets and enrolments into the tens of thousands. In this environment, the critics of the modern university lost all hope for the resurrection of academic traditions and the reinstatement of the liberal arts as the lifeblood of higher learning.

The critics of modernity thus reacted against certain social, political, and educational trends that they believed adversely influenced Canada's societal development. These common, historically-based concerns give coherence to the group. There are other common characteristics worth noting. The first and most obvious of these is the critics' staunchly Anglo-Canadian upbringing. Save for Hilda Neatby (born in Britain), the anti-modernists were all at least second generation Canadians. Nevertheless, they had strong familial connections to their British heritage. Even Vincent Massey, whose lineage traces back for several generations to New England, was fiercely proud of his ultimate ties to the old country.²⁴ Furthermore, the anti-modernists spent their formative years in areas where loyalty to things British was particularly strong. Innis, Creighton, Grant, and Massey were from "British" Ontario. Morton, who was from Manitoba, shared in this sense of Anglo-Canadian pride. Morton himself later acknowledged the "very British world" in which he matured. "Everything in daily talk, much in daily use, the whole reinforced and exaggerated by the illusion called prestige", he recollected,

was British -- the point of reference in politics and business, the seat of fashion, the school of manners, the centre of scandal. The table dishes were British made, both the cheap and the dear, the jackknives, the tea caddies, the aperients, the best boots, the heaviest coats, the finest hats. The yearly calendars tended to picture a heroic lion or an intimidating battleship. And over the little white schoolhouse ... the Union Jack staunchly flew -- a provincial statute had a few years before said it must, as it's done until this year²⁵.

Besides this inherent "Britishness", however, was a rural-agrarian bias. A common rural-agrarian experience bound critics together in much the same way as did shared British values. Harold Innis, Marshall McLuhan and Hilda Neatby all grew up on farms. W.L. Morton spent considerable time in his formative years working as a farmhand in rural Manitoba. Having no direct experience of the rural existence, the other critics nevertheless were attuned to the rigors and values of agrarian life. The Massey family

business, of which Vincent Massey became president for a time, was involved in producing farm implements. Although both were born in Toronto, moreover, Massey and Donald Creighton returned to their agrarian roots by spending much time in their later years in country homes east of the metropolis.²⁶ This background was augmented by the rural biases of the Edwardian period, an age during which most of the critics matured. Specifically, it was closely associated with the British country ideal,²⁷ represented in *Howards End* (1910) and other works of E.M. Forster, and in John Macdougall's *Rural Life in Canada* (1913), and Stephen Leacock's *Sunshine Sketches of a Little Town* (1912), both of which discussed the debilitating problem of rural depopulation. In these works, the authors eulogized rural lifestyles and values while they criticized industrialization and urbanization as disruptive and menacing. These attitudes not only reflected the profound social transformation of the Edwardian age; ultimately, they provided context to the anti-industrial strictures of the next generation of critics.

Social criticism was also important to the development of this coterie of commentators. Two anti-modernists, Creighton and Grant, had direct links to the social reform movement of the late-Victorian and post-First World War periods. Creighton's father, W.B. Creighton, a Methodist preacher and editor of *The Christian Guardian*, was at the forefront of the reform effort. Specifically, he was part of the Social Gospel movement,²⁸ which was composed of those who wished to make Protestant Christianity socially relevant. George Munro Grant, the philosopher's great ancestor, was likewise an advocate of liberal Protestantism and of de-emphasizing theology in favour of a practical, reform-minded Christian imperative. George P. Grant later rejected his grandfather's approach to religion. He denounced the progressivist tone of Social Gospellers and social reformers in general.²⁹ Nevertheless, the younger Grant, like his anti-modernist colleagues, continued to preach the good news of social improvement. Shorn of its religiosity, then, critics nonetheless employed the rhetoric of advancement and social amelioration that reflected the reform movement. Their ultimate purpose was the same as that of earlier social reformers: social betterment. Thus, they reflect the meliorative outlooks (if not the substantive recommendations) of the turn-of-the-century reformers.

The anti-modernists derive group cohesion from "elitist" attitudes and outlooks. Their elitism was not born of socio-economic or political privilege, however. In fact, all the critics, with the exception of Vincent Massey, were of humble origins.³⁰ The elitism of the critics was made manifest instead in their sense of intellectual superiority; it was a notion, more accurately, that they had an immutable awareness of the course of human history. More than this, it was derived from the presumption that the critics themselves were the individuals most able to remedy the ills of modern society. In many ways, the

critics considered themselves seers who had an almost oracular insight into cultural development. This sense of superiority is apparent in the cavalier manner in which they dismissed mass culture and denounced consumerism, Americanization, and the arrival of the mass society.³¹ It is most evident in the desire to establish a social hierarchy, not on the basis of class, but rather with social critics and moral philosophers, like the critics themselves, achieving a heightened societal relevance. Critics vied for an increased social status, which other educated groups³² were achieving, yet which was being denied them. Ultimately, the elitism of the anti-modernists was founded both in an exaggerated reckoning of their social function and in a desire to increase, in the tradition of Plato's *Republic*, their station in the modern world.

The sources of this elitism are not easy to pinpoint. The confident, moralizing tone is probably a remnant of the critics' evangelical Christian heritage.³³ Bereft of its religious content, many of the anti-modernists' strictures were suffused with evangelical fervour and puritanical righteousness. Although dealing with secularized subject matters, the rhetoric of the anti-modernists betrayed its evangelical origins. The "class" elitism of the critics, furthermore, was in part a reaction to the diminished social status of the academic in Canada. If salaries can be used to measure the worth of the professoriate, professors at Ontario universities after the Great War made considerably more than teachers or even engineers.³⁴ By the postwar period, however, professors' salaries reflected their relative decline. By 1945, the median salary of full-time instructors had increased by only about \$500 over the post-World War I period. Enduring a decade and a half of virtually frozen salaries, professors did gain small increases throughout the late 1940s and 1950s.³⁵ Yet their earnings decreased relative to other professionals. Realistically, most professors led lives of genteel poverty, something that reflected their diminished status among in Canadian society.³⁶ The anti-modernists, of course, wanted to redress society's iniquitous treatment of the intelligentsia. Banding together in a unified front against an uncaring, even ignorant, populous was one of the ways to achieve this end.

More fundamentally, the critics derived their sense of elitist identity because of their membership in a very small group of humanists and social scientists. As J.B. Brebner argued in 1945, Canada was in desperate need of scholars because of the debilitating loss of so many of the educated elite.³⁷ The war, and before it the Depression, resulted in scores of scholars leaving their academic posts and entering into government and private research projects. The exodus of many of Canada's brightest intellectuals to America and elsewhere further exacerbated this problem. A relatively small group of intellectuals was left, in consequence, to defend against the eclipse of the humanities in Canada and the erosion of Canada's academic tradition. Harold Innis displayed the embattled position of

Canadian humanists. When the University of Chicago tried to woo Innis away from Toronto in 1944,³⁸ the political economist found it impossible to leave his university after preaching loyalty to young scholars. He believed he had much work to do in combating the problems of monopolies and oligopolies of knowledge and in promoting the venerable university tradition. The same forces that held Innis in Canada, in short, also instilled a sense of commitment in the small but loyal coterie of humanists and social scientists in Canadian universities.

The critics were also brought together because of personal and professional ties. Innis, Creighton, Frye, and McLuhan all taught at the University of Toronto. Massey was also affiliated with Canada's most eminent post-secondary institution: he functioned as chancellor of the university, 1947-52. In addition, the anti-modernists were associated through personal connections and academic alliances. The relationship between Massey and Grant has already been noted. Massey also had a close working association with Hilda Neatby onwards from the Massey Commission years. Avid correspondents, intellectual collaborators, and, eventually, good friends, Massey and Neatby relied on each other for professional and personal advice and a mutual comradeship until Massey's death in 1967. Creighton and Innis also shared a close friendship and similar outlooks on academic and national problems.³⁹ Despite the occasional difference of opinion, Creighton and Morton often worked closely together.⁴⁰ While engaged in different academic disciplines, furthermore, Grant and Neatby, both involved in the Massey Commission, were correspondents and, at one point, like-minded co-religionists. McLuhan's intellectual dependence on Innis, lastly, needs no elaboration here. Not necessarily sharing similar disciplines,⁴¹ research interests, or collaborating as an academic body, thus, the critics had common outlooks, predispositions, and shared insights that were reinforced by a series of intertwining personal and professional bonds. As such, their status as a group of tacit intellectual collaborators is firmly established.

What follows is a dissertation on Canadian modernization as evaluated by some of the key intellectual figures of Canada's recent past. It is therefore as much a study of the mindsets and biases of a group of intellectuals as it is about the emergence of the modern age. Its intended contribution, in consequence, is to the development of an understanding of the so-called Anglo-Canadian mind. Much has been written on the emergence of a class of liberal intellectuals in the twentieth century. This dissertation's chief task is to elaborate on the

later development of “intellectual toryism” in Canada. Its main contribution is to address a neglected aspect of Canadian intellectual history.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

¹A.B. McKillop, *A Disciplined Intelligence: Critical Enquiry into Canadian Thought in the Victorian Era* (Montreal, 1979), 230

²Ibid., "Preface", ix

³Cook argues that a secular, social scientific approach to social reform overtook the Christian sociology of the social gospellers and other moral reformers. Hence, social criticism had become thoroughly modern. Until the sacred had become secularized, however, a Christian moralism continued into the post-First World War era. Ultimately, "secular humanism founded on social science" embodied the issue of social concern and Christian moralism that was once the sole domain of religious liberalism. See Ramsay Cook, *The Regenerators: Social Criticism in Late Victorian English Canada*. (Toronto, 1985), 198; 228-232.

⁴Mariana Valverde, *The Age of Light, Soap, and Water: Moral Reform in English Canada, 1890-1925* (Toronto, 1991), 17

⁵Among these, Carol Lee Bacchi has written on the moral reform inherent to the female suffrage movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in *Liberation Deferred: The Ideas of English-Canadian Suffragists, 1877-1918* (Toronto, 1983).

⁶Note that McLuhan's critique of modernity is limited to the early part of his academic career. Later, while still sceptical about the changes intrinsic to modernization, he came more and more to accept change and to leave behind his critical views of the modern world.

⁷Donald Creighton, "Education for Government", *Queen's Quarterly*, 61 (Winter 1955), 532
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⁸Carl Berger, *The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism 1867-1914*. (Toronto, 1970)

⁹Ibid. 31-2

¹⁰Ibid., 196. These are Berger's words.

¹¹See Berger, *The Sense of Power*.

¹²J.M.S. Careless, "Frontierism, Metropolitanism and Canadian History", *Careless at Work. Selected Canadian Studies*. (Toronto, 1990), 107

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴See Frank O'Gorman, *The Emergence of the British Two-Party System, 1760-1832*. (London, 1982), chapter two.

¹⁵See W.L. Morton, "Canadian Conservatism Now", in H.D. Forbes ed., *Canadian Political Thought* (Toronto, 1985)

¹⁶See Donald Creighton, *John A. Macdonald: Volume I: The Young Politician*. (Toronto, 1952) and Creighton, *John A. Macdonald: Volume II: The Old Chieftain*. (Toronto, 1955)

¹⁷Nonetheless, these aspects of Canadian Toryism are consistent throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. See Berger, *The Sense of Power*, and Gad Horowitz, *Canadian Labour in Politics* (Toronto, 1968), chapter one. A.B. McKillop and Paul Romney best express the nature of Canada's conservative culture in their introduction to S.F. Wise, *God's Peculiar Peoples: Essays on Political Culture in Nineteenth Century Canada*. For McKillop and Romney, Canada's "conservative tradition" "originated in British North America's confrontation with revolutionary America. Its earliest proponents", they continue, "were anti-democratic and elitist administrators and divines, who prized peace, order, and good government above the liberty of the individual and ... cherished the idea that the special destiny of Great Britain's North American subjects was to contain the expansion of the United States, the political embodiment of democracy and licentious individualism". See Wise, *God's Peculiar Peoples: Essays on Political Culture in Nineteenth Century Canada*, edited and introduced by A.B. McKillop and Paul Romney, (Ottawa, 1993).

¹⁸The vigorous, almost shrill, defense of institutions such as the university and "true" notions of democracy become comprehensible against the backdrop of the totalitarianism of the war and post-war periods.

¹⁹Quoted in A.B. McKillop, *Matters of Mind*., 219

²⁰In this way, the anti-modernists were as utilitarian in their application of functional values as were the proponents of the modern technological-scientific society.

²¹The penetration of American culture into Canada dates from an earlier period, at least from the post-First World War period. The culture critics argue, with some historical justification (although these things are hard to measure), that the American influence in Canada intensified after the second war.

²²William L. Marr and Donald G. Patterson, *Canada: An Economic History* (Toronto, 1980), 389

²³Ibid., 396

²⁴Massey's biographer, Claude Bissell, highlights Massey's Anglophilia in a second of two volumes tellingly called *The Imperial Canada*. Claude Bissell, *The Imperial Canadian: Vincent Massey in Office* (Toronto, 1986).

²⁵W.L. Morton, "Towards a New Conception of Confederation?" *An address to the Seventh Annual Seminar of the Canadian Union of Students*, unpublished address, draft copy (4 September 1964) W.L. Morton Papers Mills Memorial Library (MML), Box 6, Canadian Union of Students *The Dualism of Culture and The Federalism of Power*, 3-4.

²⁶Creighton spent his final two decades in a red brick farmhouse in Brooklin, Ontario, while Massey passed his time at his country estate, Batterwood.

²⁷Martin J. Wiener, *English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit: 1850-1980* (Cambridge, 1981)

²⁸See Richard Allen *The Social Passion: Religion and Social Reform in Canada, 1914-28* (Toronto, 1971) and Ramsay Cook, *The Regenerators: Social Criticism in Late Victorian English Canada*. (Toronto, 1985).

²⁹See chapter two.

³⁰Innis, Neatby, Morton, McLuhan, as noted, were all from small farms. Frye was the son of a struggling hardware salesman; Creighton and Grant also had few pretenses to high-class status.

³¹Despite assertions to the contrary, the Massey Commissioners abhorred all trappings of lowbrow culture. Although they attempted to hide their superciliousness, their disdain for the goals of modern democracy and the culture of "mass man" were made abundantly clear.

³²Engineers, professionals, technicians, and applied scientists generally.

³³There were a large number of Methodists among the anti-modernists. Creighton, Frye, and Massey were all Methodists; Innis was a Baptist, Neatby, a Presbyterian, and Morton an Anglican. Grant dabbled in several Protestant religions, while McLuhan, who was born a Protestant, converted to Roman Catholicism in the late 1930s.

³⁴Average professors between ages twenty-five and forty-nine made \$3,078 annually compared to teachers and engineers, who made \$2,119 and \$2,206 respectively.

³⁵McKillop, *Matters of Mind*, 551; Paul Axelrod, *Scholars and Dollars: Politics, Economics, and the Universities of Ontario 1945-1980* (Toronto, 1982), Appendix, table 1. See also Chapter four.

³⁶H. Blair Neatby, unpublished, untitled lecture given at the University of Alberta (on the development of the professoriate in Ontario, 1950-1970), (Fall 1993)

³⁷John Bartlet Brebner, *Scholarship for Canada. The Function of Graduate Studies*. (Ottawa, 1945), 13-19

³⁸Chicago offered Innis more money, a greatly reduced teaching load, and therefore freedom to pursue his new researches in the field of communication.

³⁹"In June 1950", Creighton wrote, "when the Korean War broke out, we discovered how nearly identical our ideas had become ..." Both Creighton and Innis were in Ottawa: Innis was busy with his work on the Royal Commission on Transportation, and Creighton occupied himself with the first volume of his Macdonald biography. They met for long talks on the Korean situation. "We both regarded the action of the United Nations in Korea as a very imperfect disguise for American military intervention in the Far East; but we were quickly made to understand that in Ottawa it was better to keep these reprehensible opinions to ourselves. The members of the Department of External Affairs were united in the exalted belief that the Korean War was a holy crusade in support of the collective system; and one of them informed me curtly that he wanted to hear no more of my sacrilegious aspersions on a noble cause". See Donald Creighton, "Introduction", *Towards the Discovery of Canada: Selected Essays* (Toronto, 1972), 8. Also, Innis dedicated his book, *Strategy of Culture*, to Creighton and his wife Luella. See Harold Innis, *The Strategy of Culture* (Toronto, 1952).

⁴⁰For example, Creighton and Morton differed on the issue Quebec nationalism and bilingualism and biculturalism. See chapter six.

⁴¹An inordinate number of anti-modernists were historians, however: Innis, Creighton, Neatby, and Morton, while Massey also studied history.

Science and Technique: The Critique of the Technological Consciousness

Canada in the late nineteenth century was in a period of transition. The traditionally rural and agricultural existence of many Canadians had begun to change rapidly due to the introduction of new technologies and industrial mass production. Despite an economic depression, production in the key economic sectors of the Canadian economy, and especially that of Ontario, Canada's most populous and industrially advanced province, increased considerably from 1870 through to the early 1890s. In Ontario, for instance, coal consumption increased more than 2,000 times over the years 1869-1900. Toronto, one of Canada's leading industrial cities, rapidly developed in the 1880s. In that decade "the total number of productive establishments in Toronto more than tripled, the number of workers doubled, capital invested increased roughly 265 percent ..." And while economic and industrial growth slowed somewhat in Ontario and elsewhere by the mid-1890s, an economic boom hit Canada between the later 1890s and continued on until 1912, and allowed a great deal of growth in machine technology, resource production, and fostered considerable expansion of industrial plant. Between 1890 and 1910 the number of workers employed in manufacturing increased 350 percent.¹ Because Canada still depended on the export of resources up until and beyond the Great War, however, it is difficult to characterize Canadian economic development in terms of an industrial revolution. But the Canadian intellectual and social experience of the late Victorian and Edwardian periods certainly had the hallmarks of such an economic revolution.

To accompany economic and industrial expansion, Canada experienced advances in science and technology that were bound up in the Victorian view of progress and national advancement. A key component of the Victorian idea of progress was the notion that through understanding the physical world one could exert control over it. Perhaps the most significant intellectual development of the Victorian age was the extension of scientific assumptions that nature was knowable (and hence exploitable) through the use of empirical methodologies. The consciousness of Bacon had clearly come alive in the minds of Victorians. The Victorians saw history as an organic process with laws ready to be discovered. Through the uncovering of historical laws, ran Victorian logic, society could be understood and reconstructed on a scientific basis. The progress of science and industrial production, in short, was the progress of civilization.²

The faith in science and technology to improve material conditions and to secure a bright future reached a high point by the 1890s. Canadians, for the most part, regarded

scientific and technological advancement in this period as key to the industrial and therefore the economic well-being of their country. A Queen's university scientist proclaimed in 1895 that the nineteenth century "may be described as a hundred years of human progress under the guidance of science."³ He argued that because science and industry had become wed, and therefore physical forces had come under a control never before experienced, the material well-being and, hence, the advancement of western civilization had been secured.⁴ For Victorian Canadians, material progress had become tied to advances in technique and the applied sciences.

The faith in science and technology was reflected as well in the increased importance Canadians gave to the applied sciences. This new appreciation of the practical sciences seemed to be centred about Canadian educational institutions. As historian A.B. McKillop has shown, education in Canada was being transformed by the late Victorian period from a liberal arts orientation to a type of education that strove towards a "healthy balance between culture and science".⁵ Canadian industrialists and educators led the campaign to lobby for the establishment of technical education at secondary schools in Ontario ever since John A. Macdonald's government put forth the national policy in 1879.⁶ This campaign intensified after 1896 as local boards of trade, the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada, and the Canadian Manufacturers' Association badgered the Laurier and later the Borden government to fund and coordinate applied sciences programs.⁷ But, despite receiving a sympathetic ear from William Lyon Mackenzie King, who became the Minister of Labour in 1908, and in spite of the creation of a Royal Commission on Industrial Training and Technical Education in early 1910, the cause of technical education would have to wait until after the war and the enactment of the Technical Education Act, which was to encourage the mechanical trades and increase the "efficiency and productive power of those employed therein".⁸

As with the advent of technical education in secondary schools in Ontario and elsewhere, the reorientation of the universities also reflected the emerging technological and scientific ethic. Arising early in the nineteenth century, the research ideal of the German universities had been foreign to Anglo-Canadian universities. Until the end of the nineteenth century, the main function of these institutions was to impart a general and liberal education. Instead of engaging in "research", generally speaking the extension of knowledge, Anglo-Canadian universities enabled pupils to partake in the "best that has been thought" without necessarily requiring students to add to that learning. By the late Victorian period, however, the research ideal began to insinuate itself into Canadian higher education. No individual was more active in the promotion of the research ideal in Canada than University of Toronto mathematics and physics professor James Loudon.⁹

Loudon's 1877 presidential address to the Canadian Institute is the first clear statement of the value of the German research ideal to the Canadian university.¹⁰ In the address, Loudon extolled the value of the specialization within the sciences. As much as possible, he wanted to see encouraged a specialized, professional research, based on the German model.¹¹ He advocated the German system wherein the teacher would engage only in very narrow topics so that his teaching would reinforce his research. Furthermore, for the German plan to work, "an enormous revenue must be available ...; also "there must be a small standing army of professors, and a highly trained body of recruits."¹² In Loudon's conception, scientific knowledge was not simply to be imported and then taught to so many students. Rather, the expansion of scientific knowledge was to be the main objective. As such, Loudon called for a fundamental reorientation of the way Canadian universities regarded scientific learning.

Loudon continued to lobby for the adoption of the German research ideal throughout the late Victorian period. With the changing social and diplomatic climate of the late nineteenth century he realized additional arguments in favour of adopting the new approach to scientific knowledge. With accelerating urban-industrialization, advances in industrial technology, the increase of commercial rivalries among industrialized nations, and a great rise in British imperial sentiment, Loudon identified an opportunity for the research ideal to gain greater currency among Canadians. Speaking to the Royal Society in the last year of the nineteenth century, Loudon showed the importance of research to the development of Anglo-Canadian society. Above all, he wanted to demonstrate how the adoption of the research ideal would mean industrial efficiency, material prosperity, and, ultimately, the continued moral and commercial leadership of the British civilization. He declared to his attentive audience that the "British nation [was] on the eve of an awakening"; the "British mind" understood, he continued, that "some vital connection really does exist between national progress and scientific discovery, and that the latter should be fostered in connection with the higher institutions of learning".¹³ He contended that the "spirit of research is lacking" within the Anglo-Canadian university, and, as a consequence, the British Empire's commercial supremacy vis-à-vis Germany and the United States was threatened.¹⁴ Through paying more attention to the advancement of knowledge, universities throughout the Empire could make a great contribution to maintaining British trade supremacy and, more importantly, to guaranteeing the material and moral advancement of British civilization. In concluding his speech, he commented on the "effect of research upon the national life" of Canada. The institution of the research would be integral to progress of Canada, for Canada could no longer rely on knowledge from abroad. Instead it had to develop a "spirit of originality" for which the universities

would be primarily responsible. The time has come, he ended, “when the research university must be regarded as the only university, and the task is incumbent on those in authority of elaborating a university system ... which shall have proper regard to the importance of this new factor as well as to the past and future of our country.”¹⁵ Knowledge was power and the development of new knowledge about industrial processes and technologies was the key to securing the material betterment of Canadian society and ensuring Canada’s place in the world in the twentieth century.

The significance of Loudon’s speech and his advocacy of the German research ideal more generally was twofold. First, Loudon’s desire to specialize and professionalize research reflected a change in the balance of Canadian scholarship away from the “gentleman scholar towards the laboratory of the professional researcher”.¹⁶ Whereas scientific inquiry in Canada had been the province of the amateur outside the university, the research ideal had no tolerance for such a haphazard and unproductive approach to new knowledge. Universities that continued to employ such outmoded practices lost credence from the newly scientifically-minded populous and the advocates of research ideal. With the acceptance of the research ethic the approach to science had changed irrevocably.¹⁷ Second, Loudon’s piece showed how the universities, through fostering scientific knowledge, could be the instruments of the advancement of British civilization. Whereas academics had in the past regarded science as an adjunct of metaphysics, Loudon denied as invalid the role of the scientist “to reconcile scientific theory with metaphysical or religious opinion ...”¹⁸ Instead, he insisted that scientific inquiry had a validity *per se* and part of that validity was that it was a means to an end. Indeed, a great part of Loudon’s contribution to Canadian science rested not only in his new approach to scientific knowledge, but also in attempting to put into practice the Victorian idea that progress occurred through the use and advancement of science. This progressivist, utilitarian conception was to persist well beyond the late Victorian age.

Not unlike Loudon’s linkage of science to cultural improvement, Anglo-Canadian researchers also assigned to science a vital role to perform in the war of 1914-18. Despite the realization that science and technology had contributed to the horrific carnage of the Great War, there was still a sense that scientific research could be a positive, constructive force. After all, Germany had put forth a formidable war effort largely on the strength of her industrial capacity and advanced research facilities.¹⁹ Despite German triumphs, however, the superiority of “British” science and industry was regained and, over time, helped the Empire prevail. Science again helped advance British civilization. In a speech delivered to the Royal Society entitled “The War and Science”, for instance, Dr. A. Stanley Mackenzie, President of Dalhousie University, epitomized this view. He indicated how the

“stresses of war” forced England to realize “the desperate situation in which she stood” due to the “past neglect of scientific method”.²⁰ Mackenzie’s basic message was that the research ideal that was indispensable to the advancement of civilization, especially in times of great national distress, had been lost in the lead-up to the Great War. The events of the war served to show how negligent English-speaking peoples had been to ignore the development of research. Yet the war also demonstrated how a free and democratic citizenry could recover and rediscover the centrality of science to the struggle for cultural supremacy.²¹ Despite a paucity of laboratories and a shortage of manpower, Mackenzie concluded, “the scientific men of Britain” succeeded in contributing greatly to the war effort.²² Ultimately, British science had been instrumental to victory.

For Mackenzie and others the Great War was a momentous period in the history of science, for it raised the status of scientific research to its rightful place. Mackenzie recommended that British peoples build on their triumphs and cultivate the pure and applied sciences. The “interaction of the ideal and the ... utilitarian”, he wrote, “spells progress”.²³ He was particularly hopeful about the war’s impact in Canada. “The effect of the war upon Science,” he argued, “should ... result in an industrial revolution”, which should be directed towards the proper utilization of natural resources and hence the “stoppage of wastefulness”.²⁴ Through the formulation of a national curriculum of scientific education for schools and colleges, and the consistent promotion of scientific research by Section II of the Royal Society of Canada, he hoped that the research ideal could become firmly entrenched into the national psyche. If the war did in fact show positive effects in scientific education and facilities, then all the carnage would not have been in vain.²⁵ Indeed, Mackenzie and like-minded colleagues detected hope and opportunity in the midst of destruction and despair.

Mackenzie’s remarks about science and the war effort along with Loudon’s strictures on Canada’s impoverished research facilities certainly made for good speech-making. Yet the case was overstated. Clearly by the Great War the research ideal already had become a prominent feature in Canadian universities. The war served merely to galvanize existing public opinion and private resolve to develop the sciences at Canadian universities. As McKillop argues, the Royal Commission on the University of Toronto (1906) was a watershed in that it marked the “triumph of the notion that science, research, and professionalism should have a vital place in the modern university”.²⁶ Furthermore, this turning point was accompanied by the Ontario government’s financial commitment to develop scientific and technical research. The provincial government allotted the University of Toronto \$15,000 a year for research, a sum that was augmented substantially to \$75,000 per annum in 1919.²⁷ In organizational terms, science and technical research were

entrenched at Toronto with the establishment of the School of Engineering Research in 1917. With the great demand for engineers and applied scientists during the war, the Faculty of Applied Sciences (of which the School was a part), initially reticent to pursue wholeheartedly industrial research,²⁸ devised a plan to train its most accomplished graduates. The School, in short, was to serve both research and training capacities. Most of all, it was to facilitate, in cooperation with industry, industrial and technical research.²⁹

The advances of industrial and applied sciences research at the University of Toronto notwithstanding, perhaps the most important and enduring example of the research ideal was the emergence of the National Research Council (NRC). The appearance in late autumn of 1916 of the Honourary Advisory Council (later to be named the NRC) created little fanfare.³⁰ The nation was busy with other things, not the least of which was the prosecution of the war. The establishment of the Council, nevertheless, had been a revolutionary achievement. Canada already had several scientific institutions that fitted into corresponding government departments and that were responsible for the development of her vast staples and mineral resources. But Canadians lacked an institution devoted to developments in secondary industry and general science. They required an institution, in short, more compatible with university research than with government sponsored and directed inquiry. The Council was unique in the sense that it enabled scientists themselves to devise and oversee research projects and advise government on their findings in a variety of fields. Examples of the types of projects the Council dealt with in the early years -- production of motor fuel from alternative sources, better ways to use peat, extraction of sugar from sulphite liquor, and the use of agricultural wastes such as wheat straw and fish wastes for fertilizer -- reflected the needs of wartime Canada and the drive towards efficiency or the 'scientific' use of natural resources. The Council's efforts to promote research and to tout the national importance of science endured well beyond wartime projects, however. Throughout its formative period, the NRC endeavoured "to create a background of public opinion throughout the country which would appreciate and support the idea of research in general and especially the idea of industrial research".³¹ Scientists such as Loudon and Mackenzie had toiled many years to raise the profile of research in Canada. With the help of total war and the NRC they could show Canadians that time was right to step up the crusade for research.

Evidence of the success of the NRC as the chief proponent of the research ethic is reflected in the Council's steady growth and in its contributions to scientific discovery. Despite the Council's humble beginnings and such concerns as the lack of research facilities³² in the large centres and a severe shortage of trained personnel, the Council soon began to address its deficiencies. The drive for the development of central laboratories, for

instance, began in the summer of 1918 when the Council recommended to the government the erection of a central scientific institute at Ottawa.³³ After a few failed attempts to pass a “science” bill in Parliament to establish a national scientific research institute, construction of the new “temple of science” finally began in 1928 on the banks of the Ottawa River. But Canadian science required scientists and technicians to staff the laboratories. The Council recognized early on the grave difficulties that would result from a lack of trained personnel and set out to remedy the problem by allocating \$10,000 to set up scholarships and fellowships. It realized, however, the limited impact of these measures and set out to improve matters. Within a decade of its creation, the Council had granted 344 scholarship and fellowships to 199 students. Sixteen departments of science at twelve universities participated in the grant program.³⁴ Perhaps the most impressive of the Council’s scholarship record, however, was that “no fewer than 155 students who had completed their post-graduate studies in science owed all or part of their science education to National Research scholarships”.³⁵ The Council also encouraged research in progress or pending projects. By 1926, the NRC had assisted about 120 projects. Several of these undertakings, such as health studies on tuberculous, vitamins, and insulin, as well as industrial fatigue and the study of way to stimulate the economy, were of major significance.³⁶ What is more, the NRC contributed greatly not only to the advance of scientific knowledge, but also in measurable, financial terms. Out of a half a million dollar investment, for example, in a post-war project dealing with wheat rust, the Council reckoned the long-term benefits in terms of increased yield of in excess than \$25 million per annum more than compensated for the initial outlay.³⁷ Similarly, it reported that a lobster discoloration remedy achieved at a cost of two to three thousand dollars in grants and nominal laboratory fees generated an additional annual income of around \$700,000 for the industry.³⁸ As always, the practical, utilitarian value of science was vital to the long-term promotion of the research ideal in Canada.

The emergence of the NRC culminated the efforts of scientific lobbyists to achieve public recognition of scientific research. In a symbolic sense, the Council performed a utilitarian role in aiding industrial development and in rationalizing Canada’s war production. Born largely in response to the material needs of war, it constituted a publicly-supported institution, founded intellectually on the notion that, if given enough resources, it could significantly contribute to Canada’s material advancement. It represented, in short, the triumph of the research ideal. In the minds of many Canadians and certainly in the scientific community, research institutions such as the NRC provided a means by which Canadians could survive in a world dominated by efficient, mechanized production. Indeed, the research institution was essential to the modernization of the nation. Through

the establishment of the NRC, as historian Frank Underhill was to put it, the Canadian government “undertook a new national responsibility, the fostering of scientific research for the purpose of making us a more competent people in the modern world ...”³⁹ A bastion of the research ideal, in brief, the Council assisted the Dominion’s quest to count itself among the modernizing countries of the western world.

The establishment of institutions of applied research was only one of the ways the scientific ethic was made manifest. The rise of the social sciences and the “social service ideal” also reflected the growing pervasiveness of the science ethos. As in other western countries, the social sciences emerged in Canada against the backdrop of a society that, although still largely rural and agricultural, was rapidly urbanizing and industrializing.⁴⁰ Their development must therefore be understood in light of the changing social and demographic of Canada in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The long-term trend towards urban-industrialization began during the so-called “Laurier boom”. In this period the countryside declined in population relative to urban areas, and the cities, especially Canada’s largest centres, absorbed much of the country’s overall population increase. Between the years 1891 and 1911, for instance, Canada’s urban population increased from 31.8 to 45.2 per cent of the whole.⁴¹ British Columbia and Ontario were more urban than rural by the start of the Great War. By 1921 Canada as a whole became a relatively urban society. This urbanization trend was also marked by a tendency towards the concentration of population in a few great cities. While population increases in smaller cities were insignificant in the Laurier period, the larger cities experienced rapid growth. Montreal grew from around 200,000 in 1891 to over half a million in 1911, Toronto increased from 180,000 to just under 400,000, and Winnipeg, recently a lonely outpost on the eastern prairies, expanded to 130,000.⁴²

Not without reason, the study of the causes of social transformation became important in the 1896-1911 period. Church groups, individuals, and the federal government all became concerned over the “rural question” and sought answers to overcrowding, poverty, and crime, among other problems associated with urbanization. The poverty, prostitution, and crime that seemed to exist unchecked in the growing urban areas appalled J. S. Woodsworth and others involved in the urban reform movement. Canadian social gossellers also railed against deplorable social conditions in Canada’s growing cities and focussed on the immoralities of increased crime, prostitution, and the evils of drink. The new breed of professional social analysts, who were emerging at Canadian universities, provided detailed accounts of the impact of rapid social change. Sir Herbert Ames’s *City Below the Hill* (1897), William Lyon Mackenzie King’s articles

exposing the appalling conditions in sweated industries, along with Queen's University political economist Adam Shortt's ideas on the urban question,⁴³ were a few academic studies of urban problems.

Like counterparts in the Anglo-American world, nascent Canadian social science sought to understand the economic forces that underpinned the urban-industrial problem. Social scientists not only observed the transformations associated with industrialization, they also tried to understand the root causes and future effects of industrialism on Canadian society. They employed social scientific methods as tools to comprehend change. Political economist Adam Shortt, for instance, showed how by controlling and understanding economic activities it was possible to achieve progress without overthrowing the industrial-capitalist system. He realized the abuses and inadequacies of the prevalent socio-economic system. He was certain, furthermore, that in exposing these deficiencies and suggesting alternatives the current system could be reformed and become an instrument in the movement towards human progress. Only through rethinking industrial-capitalist development and redirecting humankind's purposes and politics, he argued, could conditions be altered and destinies changed. First to observe and understand, and then to gain control over, the new material order of mankind was the formula for advancement. What was more, political economy, Shortt's own discipline, was best able to facilitate this twofold task. It enabled humankind's "understanding of social reality" and prepared "men and women to control their fate".⁴⁴ With other political economists, Shortt was convinced of the power of social science both to gain an accurate view of the material order and to help perfect humanity's secular existence. In the words of historian Barry Ferguson, Shortt's political economy "encompassed nothing less than the analysis of 'the material means of development of a civilization'. In this way, political economy could set about to devise a new understanding of the industrial capitalist order that was now dominant in Europe and the United States and that was about to reshape Canada ..."⁴⁵

University of Toronto political economist James Mavor echoed Shortt's views on the contemporary pertinence of the social sciences. To Mavor, who became chairman of Toronto's Political Economy department in 1892, modern society had advanced from feudal times into the twentieth century because of scientific and technological developments. Along with the material advances, however, came developments such as urban-industrialization, which, if left unchecked, could lead to revolution and the eventual overthrow of the industrial-capitalist system. By understanding material progress, Mavor averred, moderns could prevent social chaos and influence the direction of society. Political economy thus became important in Mavor's scheme precisely because it held the key to comprehending past and current socio-economic conditions. Through social

scientific enquiry solutions to societal problems became possible. The political economist, for Mavor, was like a “master mechanic tinkering with the machinery of society only to the degree required to maintain maximum stability and efficiency. Armed with an empirical knowledge of economic history ... the social scientist guided society to an orderly and rationalized technological future”.⁴⁶ To Mavor, the factual, social scientific understanding of the world was essential for society to progress in a measured and materially prosperous manner.

With social stability and material advancement, industrial efficiency was another objective of Canadian social science. Social scientists used it both to manage social development and, just as importantly, to enhance the credibility of the social sciences. Industrial efficiency implied the effective employment of resources in the productive process. Shortt was one of the first to recognize its central importance. Only through increased economic efficiency, he argued, could industrial society satisfy increasing human wants and needs. The benefits of efficient production and use of resources, moreover, were limited only by the finite nature of resources and productive capacity.⁴⁷ Shortt’s Queen’s colleague and fellow political economist Oscar Douglas Skelton went even further than Shortt in his advocacy of the efficiency ideal. Through ever-increasing efficiency the industrial-capitalist system could overcome the limitations of resources and the exigencies of the productive process. Indeed, Skelton believed that the industrial system was remarkably dynamic, so much so in fact that it would continually expand to meet increasing human needs. All that was required was the proper management of resources and industrial processes to increase efficiency and to ensure material advancement.⁴⁸ Most significantly, for both Skelton and Shortt, political economists were best able to suggest ways to increase production and make more effective use of finite resources. Comprehending the benefits of efficiency, they became responsible for discovering how the industrial system was to distribute wealth and goods over a wider body of people. Realizing the significance of industrial efficiency, their task was to solve the equation of increasing human needs and declining resources, the age-old problem of the dismal science. Far from isolating themselves in the cloistered surroundings of the ivory tower, thus, Canadian social scientists began to understand the relationship between their work and the emerging social order.

Closely allied to the ideal of efficiency was the notion of expertise. The story of the development of the “expert” within the Canadian intellectual circles is very much the story of the decline of amateur reformers and the emergence within academia and government of the professional social analyst. Reform movements before the Great War were oriented towards solving the myriad problems of urban growth, rural depopulation, and industrial

capitalism. Considered under the catch-all “urban reform”, urban beautification projects, campaigns against gambling and prostitution, and temperance movement, were all the province of the amateur social worker. But the nature of the reform movement was beginning to change. The social science community was developing structures to deal with social problems and to gain a greater significance in the field of social welfare.⁴⁹ Social scientists worked within the universities and professional organizations to change the nature of the reform movement into one in which the views of experts, the social scientists themselves, became increasingly important. Through their growing participation in the urban and other reform movements, they asserted the predominance of expert analysis and affirmed at the same time their own social importance. Their message was clear: while the amateur had little place in the serious business of social analysis, the expert had become an indispensable aspect of the age of transformation.

More than supplanting amateurs, the rise of expertise also involved changes within academic structures. Expert social scientists had to free themselves from the constraints of philosophy and theology before they could set about orchestrating reform. Again, Adam Shortt and O.D. Skelton led the way in accomplishing this goal. In 1913 Shortt and Skelton proposed the foundation of the Canadian Political Science Association (CPSA). Providing a forum for political economists, the CPSA showed that the social scientist had a special part to play in modern society. The mandate of the new organization was to enable enlightened intellectuals from across the country to express their views and study social problems. The CPSA was an incubator for new social policy ideas that hopefully would guide the social policies of governments. It was an instrument through which the new class of professionals could put forth their ideas and have their views integrated into social policy. Most of all, it was an example of the way expert opinion was made available to those in positions of power. Through their new organ, Shortt and Skelton demonstrated how political economy “had an important and practical role to play, not only within the university, but also in the outside world”.⁵⁰ Far from being concerned with moral, philosophical, or strictly academic questions, then, the social sciences began to extend themselves well beyond the walls of the academy and the limitations of scholarly inquiry.

Bureaucratic appointments of experts also reflect the shift towards the professionalization of reform and the wider applicability of the social sciences. W. L. Mackenzie King was one of the first social scientists to make it into government. Educated in the social sciences, King brought to the Labour portfolio a reforming impulse influenced by the latest social theories of Thorstein Veblen, Arnold Toynbee, and others of the new breed of international political economists. King’s industrial peace policy, embodied in the Industrial Disputes Act of 1907, was an important reform initiative. His early political

career, moreover, established a link between the state and the expert. Through the labour portfolio, King had gained an outlet to implement his theories on social interaction in the field of labour relations.⁵¹ His work as Labour Minister mirrored the new political economy trend that looked away from positivism and “deductivism” and emphasized instead “ameliorative social activism”.⁵² Through *Industry and Humanity* (1918), his main piece of scholarship, and his work in settling labour disputes, King demonstrated the new penchant of political economists to countenance, even prescribe, a positive role for the state in implementing social theories and policy recommendations. Although King’s entrance into government had more to do with politics than with his being an expert policy advisor, his appointment was nevertheless a significant step in the advancement of the professional social reformer.

Like King, Adam Shortt was active in establishing ties between the academic and governmental worlds. Also like King, Shortt endorsed the political economist’s function to provide expert council to government. In 1905 he wrote that he thought the “time was coming in Canada as in other countries ... when the Government should avail itself of the training and research of its university professors in various departments, thereby aiding their research and enabling them to bring back to their students some of the freshness and reality of concrete problems. In a sense this is what the Government has done in placing Mr. King at the head of the Department of Labour”.⁵³ King soon learned of Shortt’s views and it was not long before the Queen’s political economist became a labour conciliator in King’s department. In September 1908 Shortt left his academic post altogether and accepted an appointment as civil service commissioner. Shortt’s appointment, like that of King a few years before, was significant because it allowed him to put into practice his ideas on labour in industrial-capitalist society. It enabled him, above all, to fulfill the role of expert in government service. To underline the role of expertise in a changing society, Shortt, in a 1912 CPSA address, made clear the availability of a group of social scientists eminently capable of dealing with the exigencies of industrial development. He implored governments to take advantage of this pool of expertise. Governmental efficiency would not be served unless the official had access to expert information and judgment. The early twentieth century, Shortt ended simply, was, after all, “an age of experts”.⁵⁴

Besides the professionalization and attenuation into government of social experts, important assumptions and intellectual attitudes characterized the development of the social sciences. The most significant of these is the notion that society is knowable through the application of social scientific analysis. Through the social sciences and state interventionism, the social scientists averred, society became accessible to the individual and the group alike. In consequence, it could be altered, engineered so as to take advantage

of the positive effects of industrial-capitalism and avoid the more unsavory by-products of the modern industrial order. Industrial efficiency, labour dispute boards, and other manifestations of expertise showed how social change could be managed and the exigencies of industrial production controlled. They demonstrated how social science could come to terms with profound change. Social scientists contended that an understanding of economic behaviors, systems, and the way to adjust these factors to current socio-economic circumstances, comprised the greatest contribution of the social sciences to the modern social order. Knowledge, and, specifically, social scientific analysis, was, in a word, the means to deal with change, shape circumstances, and alter destinies.

Experts' involvement in government must be traced to the early efforts of King, Shortt, Skelton, and others to bring social scientific approaches out of the universities into the public realm. Problems associated with urban-industrialization and other difficulties tied to the modernization of the Canadian economy could not be dealt with by government alone. Only assisted by the expert could the government come to terms with modern social problems and avoid a descent into social chaos. While the first generation of social scientific reformers must be considered in light of the reform movement at large, it is nonetheless offset from other, amateur-oriented reformers in its consistent reliance on expertise as the foundation of reform. Subsequent generations of social scientists continued and intensified the trend towards expertise established in the pre-1914 era. Shortt may have been premature in terming the period the "age of the expert", but his was becoming a more accurate statement as Canadian society continued to modernize and Canadian social scientists struggled to keep up with changing times.

As elsewhere, in Canada the Great War of 1914-18 produced profound historical disruptions. Adding to the turmoil of industrial expansion during the boom period, the war came to symbolize a break with the past. Many Canadian social scientists agreed that, despite tremendous transformations, post-war society, like the social order that preceded it, was still accessible to the social scientist. Intellectuals such as Shortt and Skelton maintained the pre-war conviction that social scientists were those equipped to provide solutions and guide social development. Canadian society could deal with the economic problems and the social justice issues generated by the war by heeding social scientific reform principles and advocating state interventionism.⁵⁵ Moreover, the war did very little to disrupt the idea of the social scientist as social engineer. In fact, intensifying change, it reinforced the need for the social expert. It served, further, to interconnect the university and society and to make society more reliant on university personnel and other experts.

After 1918, for instance, there was increased demand for those trained in finance and commerce and industry. The establishment at Queen's of a new commerce department (1919), for which Skelton and W.C. Clark had lobbied several years before, exemplified the recognition of the universities' role in solving post-war problems. Canadians looked more than ever before to the universities as important resources to deal with accelerating change. This increased attention, in turn, encouraged the academic expert, already inspired by the pre-war economic expansion, to attenuate his involvement in managing society's transformations. Many academics now sat on boards, became Royal Commissioners, took part in official surveys, and provided expert testimony for committees.⁵⁶ In addition, in the important field of economics, there was a tremendous increase in the body of scholarship. In the 1920s scholars produced more than forty books while by the 1930s that number tripled again.⁵⁷ The postwar period was an age of ever-accelerating change, one ideally suited to the expansion of political economy and the extension more generally of the social sciences ideal.

Harold Adams Innis was one of the brightest of the interwar generation of social scientists in Canada. Innis's early scholarly career was very much a part of new social scientific trend which envisaged an expanded role for social science in understanding social developments. While he was to rail against the development of what historian Doug Owram has called the "government generation" later in his career, Innis comprehended the part the social scientist performed in mapping out Canadian economic development and how his own work in economic history helped clarify past and present socio-economic problems. His study of overhead costs, for example, and his concern more generally for Canadian marginal economic development, placed Innis along side Shortt, Skelton, and others in contributing to the new political economy tradition, one which emphasized the role of the social scientist to make sense of the industrial age. Agreeing with the need to comprehend the nature of industrial society and to suggest alternatives for economic development, Innis, perhaps unknowingly, made considerable contributions to the Canadian social sciences and to the tradition of expertise.

After being wounded in the Great War, Innis became interested in economics during a period of convalescence in England. He decided to enroll in political economy at the University of Chicago, a focal point of social scientific analysis since the turn of the century. He so enjoyed his summer session at Chicago that he opted to forego a career in law and pursue the burgeoning field of political economy. Innis acquitted himself well as a doctoral student. Soon after finishing his thesis, later published under the title *A History of the Canadian Pacific Railway* (1923), he gained an appointment in 1920 at the Department of Political Economy at the University of Toronto.

Although unremarkable in many ways, *A History of the Canadian Pacific Railway* is notable in that it demonstrated for the first time three basic concerns that were to characterize his later work: a concern over the way western civilization was spread to the new world; the importance of geography and especially drainage basins to early economic activity; and the significance of staples to regional economic development.⁵⁸ It was also important because Innis examined the building and operation of the CPR in terms of contracts, freight and passenger traffic, capitalization and profits, from “an evolutionary and scientific point of view”.⁵⁹ But most significantly, Innis’s earliest work emphasized the triumph of human ingenuity, most notably in terms of machine technology, over the forces of nature. The main conclusion of *A History of the Canadian Pacific Railway* was that the construction of the CPR “was the direction of energy to the conquest of geographical barriers”.⁶⁰ Innis regarded machine technology, in this case in the form of the railway, as the factor most responsible for economic change.

During his time at the University of Chicago, Innis also became concerned with the way technique influenced historical change. At Chicago, he came into contact with the thought of political economist Thorstein Veblen. For Innis, Veblen was the first political economist to take a “general stocktaking” of a society which had come under the influence of “machine industry”, a major contribution to the history of political economy.⁶¹ He accepted into his own thought Veblen’s concern with “laws of the growth decay” of socio-economic institutions and the impact of technology as key factors in institutional development.⁶² Perhaps most important to Innis’s understanding of the impact of technique on historical change were Veblen’s theories on the introduction of advanced economic structures to marginal, non-industrialized economies, in Innis’s case, that is, to Canada’s pre-industrial economy.

Innis’s early scholarly work, moreover, comprised an attempt to avoid well-trying European models of economic development. He wanted to construct instead a paradigm that suited Canada’s unique conditions. His “staples history” involved the interplay of economic, technological, and geographical factors. It focussed on the study of how the price system and technique of economically advanced countries adjusted themselves to their geographical surroundings and determined the economic growth of the new country. Most significantly, Innis’s view of economic development was predicated on the advancement of technology. Echoing Veblen, he argued that, as technology advances, there is a larger base of tools and know-how to build upon, increasing the effectiveness and general quality of the innovative process. Technical advance thus builds upon itself and uses the past as a basis for greater potential advance in the future at a quicker and more advanced rate.⁶³ The development of the staples economy, furthermore, was dependent on the application of this

ever-advancing technology to virgin natural resources. Indeed, in Innis's scheme, the limiting factor of geography could only be lessened, and, in some instances, overcome completely, through the emergence and the subsequent employment of advanced technique.⁶⁴ Technology allowed embryonic economies such as the fur trade to develop. For, in facilitating the elimination of barriers to economic progression, it provided the means by which new wealth could be created and accumulated.⁶⁵ Along with advances in the price system (which occurred fundamentally in the same way as technical advancement), technique became for Innis the basis of the system of economic change in marginal economies.⁶⁶

Innis, like Veblen before him, was a "technological determinist" in his effort to underline the significance of technique to the economic development of colonial economies. In addition to other contributory factors of economic development, such as geography and the availability of staples resources, by the early 1930s he focussed increasingly on the primacy of technology to the development of Canadian economy.⁶⁷ Against the backdrop of the ruinous Depression, Innis emphasized more than ever before how industrial-age technology was responsible for Canada's current economic situation. His books in the 1930s were filled not simply with references on how primitive technique fostered historical change; how, for instance, the York boat revolutionized the fur trade. Instead, Innis wrote about the fragility of marginal economies that relied on technological advancement for economic expansion. He explained that as technology became more sophisticated, it too became more costly. With increases in overhead costs associated with advanced technique, he warned that there was also a greater danger that entrepreneurs or governments might cease investment in further technological development. Depression occurred when technical advance was considered to be too risky.⁶⁸ It was the most devastating result, he argued, of the interruption in the price system. Cycles of boom and bust, growth and decay, predicated on the investment and development of technique, characterized Canadian economic development.⁶⁹ To Innis, the economic retraction of the 1930s was a "bust" period, a manifestation of the stranglehold technique and material development more generally had on Canadian development.

Faced with the vicissitudes of marginal economics, and armed with an understanding of cyclonics, Innis's work through the early 1930s was an effort to address the most pressing of problems of Canadian development. His emphasis on the economics of technology and his newfound concern for industrial technique both indicated his heightened concern for the economic direction of the Dominion. As Adam Shortt had done before him, Innis used economic history as a platform on which to build a conception of current economic development. Like many of his fellow political economists, moreover,

he devoted himself to the comprehension of Canada's material development. This knowledge, after all, was crucial to understanding the current economic malaise. In this sense, Innis must be placed along side his colleagues at Toronto and other Canadian universities, to whom the public and governments alike turned for answers. He worked hard to address economic problems which stretched back through time to the earliest phases of economic development but which at the same time impinged upon present economic circumstances. Through his writings on Canada's marginal economy, he made an effort to understand the nature of Canadian society. His understanding of the essentials of Canadian economic history also provided insight into current economic issues, the most significant of which was the Great Depression. As did his mentor Veblen, he used economic history as a tool to understand the advent of industrial capitalism. Like his colleagues, his scholarly efforts were directed in part towards addressing social problems and suggesting ways to liberate Canada from the exigencies of marginal economic development. Innis, in this early phase of his academic career, thus numbered among the new breed of Canadian social scientists.

Although his work in the 1930s must be regarded as part of the larger body of social scientific research of the period, Innis himself denied complicity in the developing of social sciences. He became disillusioned with political economy by the late 1930s, a field of study that had been beguiled by new trends in the social sciences: specialization, bureaucratization, and the employment of econometric models, designed to explain economic advancement. He rejected the new direction of political economy and found himself, in consequence, on the margins of his own field of inquiry.⁷⁰ This turn away from the mainstream of social scientific development owed much to his reaction against the methods and goals of late-1930s political economy in Canada. It owed perhaps still more to his questioning of the roles of science and technique as developmental influences in Canada's emergence as a nation.

The 1930s was a period of great transformation in the social sciences. Increased specialization was characteristic of this change. Political economy, for example, was still in Canadian universities of the 1920s and early 1930s a catch-all, which included sociology, political science, history, law, and, of course, economics. By the late 1930s, however, political economy had been transformed into the "science of economics." Other facets of the department developed into independent disciplines, largely divorced from their former associations. The fragmentation of political economy and other social sciences was due largely to current historical developments: the disastrous Depression and the pressing constitutional and foreign policy questions of the 1930s. Historians and political scientists studied proposed amendments to the federal constitution, discussed Dominion-provincial

relations, and debated the rights to neutrality in war. Economists, including Innis, felt themselves responsible for addressing economic problems, while debating commercial policies and public finance issues. Each segment of the social sciences thus had its own area of specialty. The time when university academics in the liberal arts dedicated themselves to philosophical absolutes had long since past. Gone also was the initial wave of intellectual reformers, who, through their scholarly work, attempted the moral uplift of society.⁷¹ A new era of specialized scholarship closely tied to the needs of government was in existence by the late 1930s, revolutionizing the nature of the humanities and the social sciences.

As a senior scholar at the University of Toronto, the most respected political economy department in the country, by the mid-1930s Innis was well placed to assess the transformation of the social sciences. Innis distrusted the specialization of the different branches of knowledge in the liberal arts and was unimpressed with the new-found prestige of the social scientist.⁷² He warned that any social scientist who purported to know the truth about the Depression or any other of the economic or social difficulties of the time was intellectually dishonest and “certainly wrong.”⁷³ Instead, he stressed that the economist must be aware of his limitations, especially in an era in which governments and the public relied heavily on his council. The social sciences had not developed yet to a stage where they could advise with assuredness proper courses of action or governmental planning. Innis urged caution and restraint. He implored the social scientist not to become too taken with his new celebrity and influence in government and bureaucratic circles. He did not want scholars to relinquish their pursuit of the ideals of truth and objectivity and instead recommended that social scientists continue their work until they were asked to participate in public debate. The social scientist should “render the best advice of which he is capable that [he] might not do more harm than good to the economic structure ...”⁷⁴ To Innis, he should only concentrate “on courses of disturbance and prepare himself for the occasion in which the politician may dare to consult him.”⁷⁵

Innis formalized his views on the transforming social sciences in a 1935 article written for the *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* entitled “The Role of Intelligence: Some Further Notes.”⁷⁶ The paper was a response to studies by E.J. Urwick and F.H. Knight, which dealt with the role of the intellectual in the social and political process.⁷⁷ It was an early statement of his opposition to specialization, the bureaucratization of academia, and other irksome developments in the social sciences. It was, in essence, a diatribe questing the function of the social sciences in the greater development of the Canadian state.

In "The Role of Intelligence," Innis highlighted the pitfalls faced by the modern social scientist. He warned that participation in government or business seriously impaired the social scientist's judgment and his ability to achieve truth and objectivity. In pursuing vested interests in outside projects, Innis argued that social scientists developed a bias because external endeavours limited the range of their thought and understanding to the short-term interests of government policy or business planning. Social scientists' intellectual capacity became rigid because they no longer concentrated their energies on larger issues, such as the effects of industrialization and technology on modern culture. Rather, they insisted solely on resolving narrowly-focused problems such as distribution and overcapacity difficulties, achieving the foreign policy goals of the political party in power, or increasing the profitability of a particular business venture. Innis was convinced, for instance, that the social scientists' penchant to act as business consultants invariably clouded their judgment, since they had a vested interest in the project they undertook. They became concerned with "increasing profits and the increasing sales of products irrespective of the wants of the community, and [acted] largely in a predatory capacity".⁷⁸ Social scientists involved in governmental activities also allowed vested interests, in the form of partisan politics, to taint their judgment. Government officials employed social scientists chiefly for political gain. In consequence, government experts became nothing more than handmaidens of partisan politics. For Innis, the basic problem of the modern social sciences and their adherents was that they were too bound up in the social circumstances they attempted to analyze to make their analyses effective or scientific. They lacked, in short, the requisite objectivity to make clear-headed assessments of social problems and community needs.

Innis deplored contemporary trends in the social sciences precisely because they detracted from an objective or "scientific" assessment of society. For Innis, the greatest irony of the modern social sciences was the implicit claim that through specialized methods and closer associations with business and governmental institutions social science could at once understand and attend to social needs. He argued, to the contrary, that only once the social scientist comprehended that narrow approaches and vested interests impaired his ability to address social problems could the social sciences begin to contribute to the welfare of society. "[P]aradoxically", he wrote, the innumerable difficulties of the social scientist, "once understood, also provided the starting point for "his salvation."⁷⁹ Tendencies toward specialization and vested interests would show the limitations of social scientists, namely that the social sciences could not achieve absolute truth or objectivity but instead that they were restricted by wrongheaded methodologies and biased by governmental and business interests. The quest for the truth could begin only once the

search for limitations was in process and biases became exposed.⁸⁰ Innis concluded that the “habits or biases of individuals which permit prediction are re-enforced in the cumulative bias of institutions and constitute the chief interest of the social scientist”.⁸¹

Through scholarly inquiries, social scientists, for Innis, had the ability to recognize and observe regularities of behavior. Through these observations they could begin to understand the relationships of the social process and, over time, discover bias and approach objectivity.⁸² The experience and diligence of the social scientist, Innis averred, were essential to the achievement of an objective, scientific analysis of society. “The never-ending shell of life,” he wrote, “suggested in the persistent character of bias[,] provides the possibilities of intensive study of the limits of life and its probable direction”.⁸³ The constant awareness of the existence of bias and its effects on scholarship was thus the most effective way not only to avoid it but also to attempt to overcome it. In understanding the function of bias social scientists could overcome deception and fallacy and discover the true nature of the social process.

Innis’s view of the social sciences thus centred on the identification and elimination of bias. The scientific aspect of social analysis was premised on the scholar’s ability to understand the limitations of his field of inquiry and to use that information as a means to comprehend social realities. Knowledge of those elements that seemed to impede an objective point of view was key to overcoming bias. While Innis did not deny the role of the expert in the social process, he was not prepared to accept the conventional view of the social sciences as a facile means to address problems and suggest social and economic policy alternatives. Rather, Innisian social science diverged from that of his contemporaries in its emphasis on the bias as the chief limitation on the social scientist and on the need to understand the effects of bias. It taught that awareness of one’s limitations as a social scientist was the first important step to comprehending social needs and contributing to social development in the industrial age.

Innis’s approach to social scientific inquiry was made manifest in his political economy of the 1930s. In the context of his work, Innis’s efforts to acknowledge and accept the immutable conditions of Canadian economic development was a crucial starting point. In assessing limitations, political economists understood that which could be done to alter economic realities and influence material growth. Comprehending the impact of technology and other uncontrollable factors enabled social scientists, by default, to gain insight into those elements in the historical process that could be changed. Grasping the nature of economic development, for example, Innis showed how there was a tendency to fall into the “staples trap”: that is, a movement towards economic expansion -- increased exploration and exploitation of resources; growth of foreign capital investment in

transportation technology -- at a time that simply could not support the growth of the staples economy. He urged the adjustment of the tariff to alleviate regional economic disparities and, most importantly, the focussed assessment of the debt problem that had plagued Canadian economic development from the days of the fur trade.⁸⁴ Debts and the tariff were fundamental problems during the 1930s. They were problems with which the political economist could deal without being called upon to do the impossible: that is, change the fundamental structures of Canada's marginal economy.

The Innisian concern for constraints was not limited to his political economy, however. Rather, Innis's later scholarship continued to be characterized by the attempt to identify and study those immutable features of historical process that determined change. He remained committed not only to the study of technology and industrialism as the fundamental aspects of development, but he also continued to suggest alternate modes of historical advancement. By the early 1940s what had changed in Innis's thought was that he awakened to the greater role of technology operating in society. Innis realized that far from merely affecting material growth and decline, technology, in the form of media of communications, had become the most pervasive force affecting social development. Unlike transportation technologies, media of communications not only influenced such mundane concerns as material advancement, but also they altered understandings and changed perceptions about the social-historical process. Above all, they distorted perspectives about the nature of society. Hence they led social scientists astray in their efforts to comprehend social development. For Innis, thus, communication technologies were the source of biased outlooks on the nature of society.

Innis's discovery of the media bias was highly significant. With this concept, he had found the quintessential limitation that had been imposed on his own and the work of his colleagues. To understand media theory was to identify the source of bias and therefore to fulfill the basic purpose of the social scientist. Ultimately, the social scientist's role was to attempt to deal with communications technology by understanding the nature and pernicious qualities of the media. The study of communications technology at once influenced historical change and altered perceptions of the social process. It therefore became the focus of his later work, just as staples history had dominated his earlier scholarship.

Evidence of Innis's shift away from the neutral, static analysis of technology of his earlier scholarship to his concept of the media bias existed in his work of the late 1930s and early 1940s. In an important paper entitled "The Penetrative Powers of the Price System" (1938), Innis illustrated the impact of the price system in the emergence of "neotechnic" industrialism and the several cultural developments the "new industrialism" spawned, the

most important of which were instruments used to propagate stereotypes, namely, media of communications.⁸⁵ For Innis, there was a reflexive relationship between communications technology and the new industrialism in which communications technologies tended both to reflect and facilitate the modern industrial capitalist state. The newspaper, for instance, had been co-opted in the new industrial order to foster the conditions (such as mass consumption) amenable to the growth of the neotechnic society. The print media in general created “patterns of public opinion or stereotypes” that fostered the conditions that “appealed to the business mind”.⁸⁶

In his work tracing the early development of the newspaper, furthermore, Innis expounded upon the pernicious effects of the printed word. Early this century, the print industry, according to Innis, had achieved unprecedented control over the flow of information because of its unequaled power to disseminate information. Due to technological advancements the newspaper became extraordinarily effective at “informing” populations about social environments.⁸⁷ It succeeded in “educating” humanity as to what was or was not valuable information. “In a literal sense,” Innis asserted, “wars are created as crime waves are created, by the newspaper”;⁸⁸ journalists and their editors printed stories because of the story’s marketability, not because of its accuracy or objective representation of reality. The proliferation of advertising, sensationalized and other forms of “soft” news, and increases in subscriptions,⁸⁹ were additional manifestations of the print media’s hold on the popular imagination. The print industry along with newer, electronic communications media imposed on an unsuspecting population a rigid understanding of the world by making available limited information. Science and technology, Innis added, not only improved the speed with which information was disseminated, but also selected the type of information distributed. “Mechanized knowledge”, in the Innisian lexicon, referred to standardized world-views and the inability to escape a media-induced distortion of reality. It meant, in essence, an absence of liberty to develop independent assessments of one’s environment. For Innis, then, the media curtailed understandings, outside and even within the academic world,⁹⁰ and entrapped populations into narrow assessments of reality. They represented the ultimate restriction on individual liberty to know and understand. Modern communications thus constituted the preeminent bias.

Innisian concepts of mechanized knowledge and the media bias find their origins in his early examinations of the printed word. The world that print media created and that Innis described -- a world in which the media interfered with the perception of reality -- is reminiscent of American journalist and social critic Walter Lippmann’s theories on the “pseudo-environment”. In *Public Opinion* (1922), Lippmann created a dichotomy between truth and the popular view of reality. The latter, for Lippmann, was one in which the

“world outside” rarely conformed to the “pictures inside our head” or “pseudo-reality”. Focussing on the world of perceived realities, Lippmann argued that the half-truths of journalistic statement, designed more to sell papers than to inform or educate, characterized these pseudo-realities. Newspaper journalism had the power to create perceptions and understandings. In effect, it mediated reality through the creation of false environments. Most importantly, it established these pseudo-environments by shaping public opinion, itself a means to clarify a complex world and to provide ideas and viewpoints without which people would likely have no conception at all about surrounding events and social conditions.⁹¹ Public opinion for Lippmann was representative of a common or “mass” world-view, “simply ... an important part of the machinery of human communication”.⁹² As in the mechanization of knowledge, the media created through public opinion fictions to help flesh out the mental images and interpreted events of those who had not experienced them. Thus, as in Innisian theory, they inserted “between man and his environment” a pseudo-environment.⁹³ For both Lippmann and Innis, then, the basic cultural problem of the modern world was one of communication: instead of enhancing one’s understanding of an increasing complex world, media interceded in social relations in such a way as not only to interfere with the correct assessment of one’s true environment, but also to dupe individuals into accepting mediated information as reality. Pseudo-environments fostered a false image of society. Because of the pervasiveness of modern media, they threatened to institutionalize pseudo-reality as a chief component of humanity’s world-view.

If Lippmann’s notion of public opinion anticipated Innis’s concept of the monopoly of knowledge, then it also provided a foundation of the fundamental aspect of Innisian social science: the identification and elimination of bias. Both *Public Opinion* and Lippmann’s *The Phantom Public* (1925) proposed that the most informed members of society, social scientists, had a duty to expose false perceptions of realities. Their responsibility, in effect, was to reveal pseudo-environments. Like Innis a decade later, Lippmann demonstrated how the comprehension of false reality was the starting point in the discovery of truth. “[T]he study of error”, Lippmann asserted, was the “introduction to the study of truth”.⁹⁴ “As our minds become more deeply aware of their own subjectivism,” he wrote,

we find a zest in objective method that is not otherwise there. We see vividly, as normally we should not, the enormous mischief and casual cruelty of our prejudices... There follows an emotional incentive to hearty appreciation of the scientific method, which otherwise is not easy to arouse, and is impossible to sustain. Prejudices are so much easier and more interesting. For if you teach the principles of science as if they had always been accepted, their chief virtue as a discipline, which is objectivity, will make them dull. But teach them at first as victories over the superstitions of

the mind, and the exhilaration of the chase and of the conquest may carry the pupil over that hard transition from his own self-bound experience to the phase where his curiosity has matured, and his reason has acquired passion.⁹⁵

As in the Innis's conception, eliminating individual subjectivism was central to the achievement of objectivity and therefore the scientific understanding of social conditions. And like Innis, Lippmann's ultimate purpose for the social scientist was to break down prejudices that sustain a limited world-view and thereby address the problems inherent to such aspects of modern culture as the press, propaganda, and ultimately, public opinion. Both Innis and Lippmann were bent on establishing an approach to ascertain the root causes of pseudo-environments. The quest for objectivity was the first important step in this mission.

For Innis, then, Lippmann's writings provided insight on the way entire cultures had been deceived and how social science played an important part in identifying and subsequently dealing with false perceptions of reality. Perhaps most importantly, the Innisian critique of modern media took from Lippmann's work its fundamental premise: that is, that media resulted in the inability to see the world as it truly was and that only by recognizing this fact could humanity escape the effects of the media bias. Indeed, Innis's later work in communications theory owed greatly to the insights he gained from Lippmann on how "media environments" became all-pervasive means of mediating and indeed distorting the truth.⁹⁶

Armed with Lippmann's insights on the impact of media and public opinion, Innis undertook in earnest his critique of media of communication, the most insidious and indeed pernicious manifestation of modern technology. True to his credo of avoiding limitations, he focussed on the impact of media on historic societies instead of concentrating merely on the effects of modern communications. The only way to understand the modern bias, and thus to avoid falling under its spell, was to analyze eras that the modern media did not influence. Assessing the historical function of the communications bias, he argued, "we [social scientists] are compelled to recognize the bias of the period in which we work ... The bias of modern civilization incidental to the newspaper and the radio presume a perspective in consideration of civilizations dominated by other media. We can do little more than urge that we must be continually alert to the implications of this bias and perhaps hope that consideration of the implications of other media to other civilizations may enable us to see more clearly the bias of our own."⁹⁷ For this reason, Innis became concerned with the history of communications. He devoted the remainder of his academic career to examining the impact of communications on cultures.

To simplify, Innis's basic premise was that the means of communicating information rather than the information conveyed was essential to determining the nature of western civilizations. Communications technologies became important to study for Innis precisely because they intervened more than any other form of technology in the structuring of political and economic relationships. Each civilization throughout the history of the west was organized in accordance with the qualities and values associated with the notions of space or time. These spatial or temporal orientations constituted the "media bias". If a civilization's chief means of communication were spatially-biased, for instance, such as paper, or the printing press, then that society's social and political organization would also be concerned with spatial orientations: for example, the maintenance of imperial control over vast reaches of geographical space. Similarly, if the dominant form of communication were a durable medium, such as stone tablets, or even the spoken word, the social organization of the culture would reflect a temporal bias, as in a religiously-oriented culture with time-biased institutions (churches). The dominant form of communication, in short, strongly influenced the social organizations, institutions, and cultural attributes of society.⁹⁸

Another fundamental premise of Innis's communication theory held that advances in technology of communication were main determinants of change. Since media of communication shaped social and political organizations, a change in the means of communication entailed a change in the very make-up of civilizations. Throughout the history of the west, Innis showed how time-based cultures, such as Hellenic Greece, eventually gave way to spatially-oriented civilizations, such as the Roman Empire, which, in turn, were submerged into the medieval world, all in accordance with the dictates of changing forms of communication technology. Similarly, spatially-biased modern society had emerged from medieval civilization due to the advent of the printing press. Innis demonstrated, in brief, how the historical process was characterized by the replacement of one set of media-influenced conditions with another, usually of the opposite nature. This shift in bias was cyclical in nature in that spatial or temporal "empires" rose and fell over and over again, rarely existing in a relationship in which spatial and temporal forces balanced each other off.

Whereas civilizations invariably decayed when new media were introduced, mid-twentieth century society proved anomalous. In the modern age, new media actually strengthened the existing monopoly of knowledge. To Innis, the most troublesome effect of modern communications media -- the newspaper, film and radio, among others -- was that they oriented cultural and political institutions solely in terms of spatial qualities. This overemphasis of "space" meant that "temporal" values -- the moral, the sacred, and the appreciation of the past -- were beginning to disappear. The result was that humans, who

had historically apprehended their social surroundings in relation to the interplay between spatial and temporal forces, could view their world only with reference to spatial concerns. Hence they were preoccupied with the present, the future, the technological, and the secular. Recent technological innovations in the field of communications effectively destroyed temporal cultural values and replaced them with spatial values. "The Western community," Innis declared, referring to the printing press's impact on the technical-social relationships of the twentieth century, "was atomized by the pulverizing effects of the application of the machine industry to communication".⁹⁹ "The overwhelming pressure of mechanization evident in the newspaper and the magazine", he continued,

led to the creation of vast monopolies of communication. Their entrenched positions involve a continuous, systematic, [and] ruthless destruction of elements of permanence [i.e., the values associated with time] essential to cultural activity. The emphasis on change is [now, with the advent of modern communications technology,] the only permanent character.¹⁰⁰

Innis lamented that technology, in the form of communications media, reduced humanity's appreciation of time and tradition. The emergence of the new spatial monopoly created a paradox. Change, which pervaded modern industrial society, became the core value of the modern age. For Innis, thus, modern communications were at the root of the moderns' "present-mindedness".

Nowhere was the impact of modern technology more evident than in the academic's understanding of modern social conditions. Innis thought that print technology influenced modern civilization to such an extent that an appraisal of the functioning of media bias throughout the centuries became extremely difficult. "The significance of a basic medium to its civilization," he asserted, "is difficult to appraise since the means of appraisal are influenced by the media, and indeed the fact of appraisal appears to be peculiar to certain types of media. A change in the type of medium," he continued, "implies a change in the type of appraisal and hence makes it difficult for one civilization to understand another."¹⁰¹ In other words, Innis argued that the impact of communications on each historical period distorted analysts' perceptions of the world. Because scholars fell prey to their socio-technical circumstances it became difficult for them to understand the true nature of the media bias. Academics were inextricably bound to the intellectual and cultural environment which the prevailing media bias fostered. "Media relativism" marred the efforts of intellectuals to comprehend past societies. It directed scholars to superimpose the values of their own culture on the civilizations under study. "[I]n using other cultures as mirrors in which we may see our own culture", Innis claimed, "we are affected by the astigma of our own eyesight and the defects of the mirror, with the result that we are apt to see nothing in

other cultures but the virtues of our own.”¹⁰² Modern scholars thus suffered from the acute deficiency of being unable to appraise their own culture for what it was: a civilization with its own biases, its own distinct means of socio-political organization, and its own patterns of information transfer. Intellectuals, Innis concluded, were “perhaps too much a part of the civilization which followed the spread of the printing industry to be able to detect its characteristics.”¹⁰³

The space-biased monopoly of knowledge, which distorted perceptions and influenced institutions and values, was clearly reflected in the turmoil of the 1940s. The modern knowledge monopoly was manifested for Innis in the creation of an illiberal and undemocratic atmosphere in Canada and the west. Innis reviled governments’ usurpation of additional “wartime” powers. He considered these acts egregious infringements of liberty. Special controls in Canada such as the War Measures Act limited individual liberties while increasing the centralized authority of the state. For Innis and a few of his colleagues, the talk of war aims and of a new order after the war, sensitive to the needs of democracy was nothing more than a smoke-screen that obscured the realities of increased governmental controls and a manipulated democracy concerned with government by the few for the few and privileged.¹⁰⁴ With the resort to force and militarism during the war, Innis argued, society was unable to uphold the principles of freedom and democracy. “We have resorted to force rather than persuasion,” he wrote in 1944, “and to bullets rather than ballots.”¹⁰⁵

Even worse than the increasingly illiberal atmosphere of wartime were governmental efforts to deceive populations into thinking that they contributed to the preservation of free and democratic societies. Through the vehicle of public opinion, Innis asserted, echoing Lippmann, government officials attempted to appeal to “slogans in the interest of mass support”.¹⁰⁶ In this rabble-rousing climate, toleration and respect disappeared and the “demagoguery of politicians” took over. Through the aid of the press, nationalist rhetoric intensified and destroyed internationalism, the capacity for toleration and restraint. Ironically to Innis, the rhetoric of politicians and propaganda machines “educating” against the evils of Hitlerism contributed to the development of an illiberal, even fascist-like state at home. Innis, to be sure, loathed the emergence of a state in which power and control were pervasive features, allowing no room for counterbalancing forces to offset an increasing intolerant, undemocratic polity. He was an individualist who abhorred the intervention of the state into the lives of individuals and a state, above all, in which bias and monopoly reigned supreme.

Most of all, he objected to the rise of a cultural environment in which state instruments such as propaganda and public opinion irrevocably influenced perceptions of

reality. Falling prey to the propagandist, individuals lost the ability correctly to perceive their environment and to comprehend the debilitating effects of the war. Governments in effect controlled not merely the distribution of information but also directed the citizenry's understanding of the wartime world. Innis was profoundly concerned that propaganda and misinformed public opinion promoted and institutionalized biased understandings of current events. Above all, he feared that governments and press agencies, the institutions that put forth partial truths and proffered tainted information, monopolized the distribution of information so that there could exist no balanced understanding of societal conditions.

The Second World War spurred Innis to action. It clearly showed the way modern technology promoted biased understandings of current circumstances. It constituted for Innis far more than the loss of life or even the rise of unethical conduct;¹⁰⁷ it was also associated with the rise of a monopoly of knowledge so pervasive that it interfered with moderns' freedom of thought and action. Innis comprehended that the mass media facilitated this anti-liberal wartime environment. He also knew that they made possible the widespread control over populations whether through economic and political policies, or more direct measures, such restrictions of personal liberties. Most significantly, however, the war represented for Innis a period in which the media was so profoundly influential that moderns lost all reckoning of what had happened to society. In this media-induced haze they had become completely enmeshed in their environment. That they accepted without question the validity of catch-phrases such as "making the world safe for democracy" exemplified this state of dissociation. Even the universities, the historic centres of creative thought, had failed to understand the all-pervasiveness of limitations placed on intellectual freedom. Academies, Innis declared, fell away even further from their old beliefs and yielded to the "evils of monopolies in commerce and industry."¹⁰⁸ All members of society had thus lost objectivity and the ability to comprehend what was happening around them. Summarizing the plight of the university and society at large, Innis wrote:

The mechanization of modern society compels increasing interest in science and the machine, and attracts the best minds from the most difficult problems of western civilization. The machine is devoted to the simplification of these problems. The technological advances in communication shown in the newspaper, the cinema, and the radio demand the thinning out of knowledge to the point where it interests the lowest intellectual levels and brings them under the control of totalitarian propaganda.¹⁰⁹

* * *

In the discourse on the impact of modern technology, the work of Harold Innis represents a departure. Concerned from the start with the role of technology in economic development, Innis soon realized the limitations of his earlier work, namely, the focus on material

developments. He expanded the analysis of technique to discover the ways communications influenced historical cultural developments. Reacting against earlier materialist approaches, he began studying media as keys to the historical process. He endeavoured to comprehend how communications shaped societies and hence abandoned his value-neutral assessments of his staples period. From a historical point of view, he demonstrated the paradoxical nature of communications technology. He showed that communications technique inhibited the growth of free institutions and democratic societies, the hallmarks of high civilization. Most importantly, he displayed how it stifled free thought and, in turn, an understanding of the way the modern media themselves function. Historically diverse and pluralistic, knowledge had now become limited, circumscribed by the dictates of a centralizing spatially-oriented bias. Akin to a commodity, it was accessible only through tightly limited channels. The modern media were thus for Innis ultimate instruments of control and centralization. As such, they constituted the bane of the modern age.

In its most advanced phase, Innis's technological critique centred about the pervasive and deceptive powers of communication technology. It involved a moral condemnation of both the type of society and the quality of thought that were produced in the modern, media-dominated civilization. Significantly, Innis's work departed from the common assumptions of the nature of technology according to which western society had developed. It indicted the will to technique, a central ideology of the west, that exalted material advancement and equated technological advancement with cultural progress. Innis railed against the notion that the expansion power of human knowledge and technical achievement necessarily implied the democratization of culture and the enlargement of freedom. Indeed, he vigorously opposed the prevailing view of communications technologies.¹¹⁰ Instead technology, for Innis, enslaved humanity and stifled human creativity. It wrested control of knowledge away from the individual and created a new dynamic inimical to human independence. It interfered in a most profound way with the individual and community consciousness and became, therefore, the most destructive cultural agent in modern times. To be sure, Innis saw little good in the "will to technique". For this reason he devoted much of his later scholarship to the study of the media of communication.¹¹¹

While Harold Innis may have overstated the case about the "de-liberalization" of western societies and the sweeping effects of the modern media, similar concerns emerged among other Canadian intellectuals. Among these critics, there was a sense that the war was an end-point in which arose a new control-oriented age. In a 1941 article historian Arthur

Lower wrote about this new period. To Lower, the war had resulted in a “vast increase in the edifice of control” over all aspects of life; “... at present,” he indicated, “we have a very complete degree of political control: control of opinion, of personal freedom, assembly, organization, movement, and residence, and no great reverence for due process of law.” “The innumerable boards and commissions thrown up by the war”, Lower continued, were responsible for “establishing mechanisms” to increase state control over the individual. The War Measures Act, moreover, “a law which bestows complete and absolute power upon the dominion government,” was the main tool by which the state gained power over its citizens.¹¹² Wartime restrictions on personal liberties signaled the emergence of a “new kind of state” “based upon control”. The “unresolved problem”, he concluded, was whether the type of state was to “permit a free enquiry”.¹¹³ Fellow historian Donald Creighton shared Lower’s concerns over the control-oriented state and the danger it posed to free thought. Writing in 1944, Creighton asserted that “the war appear[ed] to have revealed certain unexpected weaknesses in the foundation of free speculation in Western society; and the present intensification of political power, as well as the vast extension of planning, may suggest other impending difficulties for the future”¹¹⁴ Like Innis and Lower, Creighton thought that wartime controls had gone too far, so much so, in fact, that “the permanent values” were “somewhat distorted, minimized, or overlooked in wartime ...”¹¹⁵ Philosopher George Grant took an even more moralistic and fatalistic point of view. In a letter to his mother on the eve of the war he explained that “War is becoming more supreme. Evil is completely predominant if you look anywhere. Force is being used on every side and everyone is hopelessly lost. Perhaps (although this is impossible for any government) force should be given up ...”¹¹⁶ To several observers, thus, the war seemed a turning point, one in which force and control in the governments of the democracies rivaled the illiberality of the fascist regimes abroad.

Musings about the advent of the control-oriented state were not simply empty rhetoric or peripheral strikes of disaffected scholars against unpopular wartime educational policies, however.¹¹⁷ Canada had indeed become extraordinarily centralized as a result of the war. In addition to such overt measures as the War Measures Act,¹¹⁸ rationing, the regulation of wartime materials, and price controls, the government regulated businesses and labour,¹¹⁹ increased taxes, imposed controls on foreign exchange transactions, and gained control over the corporate and income-tax areas from the provinces (under Wartime Tax Agreements, 1941), among a litany of other control measures. The dominion government, moreover, employed an army of civil servants to administrate the new powers. Numbering 46,000 in 1939, the bureaucracy in Ottawa more than doubled to 116,000 by 1945.¹²⁰ Crown corporations were established to acquire war materiel such as

silk, uranium, and fuels, while they also ran such diverse enterprises as airplane factories and telephone companies.¹²¹

The infrastructure of wartime controls did not disappear at the cessation of hostilities, moreover. Most noticeably, clothing and food items such as butter, meat, and preserves continued to be rationed, and it took some time before the federal government restored taxation and other powers to the provinces. “Reconstruction” and “planning”, furthermore, watch-words in government and bureaucratic circles in an era of Keynesian post-war socio-economic development, protracted state control after 1945. Beginning in late 1943, it became clear that the central government would remain involved in key areas of social and economic planning. Fearing the resumption of the Depression and realizing the need to provide comprehensive social programmes the King government endeavoured to translate wartime powers into the reconstructionist period. Culminating in the Dominion-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction, King’s Liberals presented a plan to endow the central government with the financial power and legislative authority to guide Canada through the social and economic perils of the post-war period. Dissenting provinces charged that the dominion proposals were akin to the work of Hitler or Mussolini. Nevertheless, by 1947 the federal government gained the power to continue to collect income taxes, in addition to succession and corporation taxes.¹²² The federal government also enacted legislation in 1944 and 1945 to administrate demobilization grants to war veterans in such sundry fields as education, business development, and agriculture, while it also enacted housing legislation, previously an area of provincial jurisdiction. While many in government circles lamented that reconstruction measures had not gone far enough, especially in social policies, it was clear that the government succeeded in extending wartime centralization past 1945.

Perhaps most important to the critics of government were wartime policies on higher education. With total war came massive material requirements in terms of industrial and natural resources. There was therefore a great need for engineers and industrial technicians of all kinds to direct the war effort on the homefront. The clamour for trained scientists, engineers, and health-care professionals by the government and military, meant that disciplines of practical value, that is, those disciplines that had been deemed necessary to fight the war, rose in size and stature within university communities.¹²³ Governments facilitated the growth of these so-called “practical disciplines”.¹²⁴ Premier Drew, for instance, tried to alleviate from debt Ontario universities so that they could better serve the needs of industry. Grants to Toronto (\$816,000), Queen’s and Western (\$250,000 each) were made with the important message that they would become annual grants.¹²⁵ To government and university officials, the material requirements of Second World War

indicated without a doubt the crucial importance of the applied and natural sciences to an industrial society. To emphasize the rise of the sciences, Principal Wallace of Queen's declared in 1942 that "The trend today is to science, applied science and medicine, and our best students follow that path." "The humanities," he noted bluntly, "are in eclipse in university life".¹²⁶

Receiving great impetus from the war, a "culture of utility" had grown up around the modern university.¹²⁷ Eager to show their usefulness in a time of crisis, the universities themselves were wont to emphasize the indispensable contributions they were making to the nation. The war resulted, moreover, in unprecedented publicity for the nation's universities. In 1945 the news magazine *Saturday Night* concluded that "Learning as an end in itself [was] no longer valid in a nation which needs the minds of its youth for leadership in the rough new world to come ..."¹²⁸ The news media pressured universities to foster the training of technicians and business leaders. Most of all, they reflected the prevailing popular opinion that universities ought to focus on training personnel for industry, government, and the professions, and thus aid Canada's development both in war and peace.

This utilitarian view of higher learning was not universally appreciated, however. Concern had surfaced shortly after 1939 that university and governmental encouragement of the practical disciplines would erode the humanistic focus of Canadian universities. In late 1942 the Canadian Social Science Research Council (CSSRC) submitted to J.W. Pickersgill of the Prime Minister's office a brief outlining the effect of the war on higher education. Likely penned by Innis, the brief focussed particular attention on the rise of sciences at the expense of the humanities. Most directly, it was a response to governmental policy to protect university students, especially science students, from military service. Using classic rhetorical overstatement, Innis, in the brief, condemned a government that seemed to be solely concerned with the practical components of higher learning:

The Council strongly deprecates the tendency evident even in university circles to neglect the Humanities and to overemphasize the Natural Sciences. Recognizing the strong drift in that direction it appreciates its relation to the demands of the war effort, but wishes to point out the dangers of weakening the Arts tradition, the place of Humanities in modern democracy, and the possibility of losing on the home front as well as the war front in the struggle against authoritarian powers. Deterioration becomes rapid after the danger point has been reached and involved increasing problems with the continued length of the war. The neglect of the cultural standards of a generation of men in the war and in the post-war period is unfair to those who have participated and to the generation immediately following and has ominous implications for the whole future of civilization.¹²⁹

The CSSRC brief highlighted much more than the rivalry between university faculties for government funds and public recognition; it showed how the rise of technical education reflected the tendency to value material and technological advancement over equally important “humanistic” social values. The triumph of the applied sciences over the arts reflected a society that had begun to turn its back on the seemingly less relevant liberal arts. Most of all, the struggle for prominence between the two main approaches to knowledge indicated a greater crisis of values in the western world. Diplomat and quasi-intellectual Vincent Massey explained that this malaise had reflected a “crisis in education”. At the root of both crises, he reasoned, was the imbalance of the values of technological society, a predisposition to favour technical over humanistic learning. Massey wanted the balance redressed. The universities, he wrote, had a

very ancient and very vital function to perform in the field of the humanities. Technological and scientific progress had not made this function obsolete: it has made it more necessary ... It is obvious that technology is of tremendous importance in modern life, but while it is a good and necessary servant it must not be allowed to become our master. No one passing through a university should fail to come under the influence of the humanities, because it is in this field -- that of liberal education -- that the student is enabled to acquire a true sense of values, to understand something about the relation of man to society, to distinguish between the real things in life and the fakes, to put first things first, and to sharpen his mental curiosity ...”¹³⁰

Philosopher Grant also entered the debate, asking in 1950: “Can it be doubted that Canadian universities today exist essentially as technical schools for the training of specialists?”¹³¹ Even humanistic disciplines such as history, the classics, and European literature were treated as technical subjects with no regard for “the sweep of our spiritual tradition.”¹³² Institutions of higher learning could scarcely be called “universities,” in Grant’s opinion, given the preponderance of technical disciplines and the highly specialized nature of modern scholarship. In a paper tellingly subtitled “What Can the Humanities do for Government?”, Creighton, referring specifically to the role of the historian, added his to the voices of Massey and Grant. “Obviously,” he began, “in an age characterized by the enormous prestige of the physical and social sciences ... and what is reverently described as ‘know-how’, the claims made for the humanities can hardly be exclusive and monopolistic. But they are nevertheless very considerable, and it is perhaps not inappropriate that an historian should try to restate them ...”¹³³ “[O]ne sometimes wonders”, Creighton wrote, commenting on the importance of the humanities to the art of government, “whether the humanities would have lent themselves to such monstrous perversions” of the Second World War. “One sometimes wonders”, he added caustically,

“whether if the old liberal education had continued its old sway, the modern world would have had so many illiterate megalomaniacs as leaders, and whether such a cowed and intellectually humiliated civil service would have been tolerated, so often and in so many countries ...”¹³⁴ As for Massey, Grant, and the members of the CSSRC, Creighton comprehended the inestimable benefits of a “liberal education”. He understood, moreover, the impact of a system of “technical” learning and a society that championed the virtues of industrial-technological society over those associated with the liberal arts tradition. For these critics, in short, the culture of utility was further evidence of the predominance of the will to technique.

The debate over the validity of technical education was certainly not confined to Canada; it was very much alive south of the border. Robert Maynard Hutchins, President (1929-45) and Chancellor (1945-51) of the University of Chicago, was perhaps the most ardent critic of technical specialization in American universities. Like the Canadian critics, Hutchins maintained that education was incomplete if it did not refer to the humanity’s literary and humanistic inheritance.¹³⁵ He argued, furthermore, that specialized learning filled students with an ever-expanding body of facts while it precluded the opportunity to contemplate and judge. Specialization monopolized one’s intellectual outlook and hence made difficult, even impossible, open-mindedness, objectivity and, in its turn, a will to search for truth.¹³⁶ Scientific training was insufficient in understanding social conditions, for it directed students and scholars away from wider issues and emphasized instead technical knowledge and other narrow forms of inquiry. To escape the deleterious effects of specialization, he concluded, the educational system must be changed to promote “cultural courses” with the effect of counterbalancing the predominant scientific education. Like his Canadian counterparts, in sum, Hutchins was interested in a return to the values inherent in traditional liberal arts curriculum, and ultimately a reversal of direction of higher learning in North America.¹³⁷

Hutchins views on technical education were influential in the 1940s and the 1950s and resulted in the greater awareness of the plight of the humanities at Chicago and other American universities. They also had considerable currency among Canadian intellectuals.¹³⁸ Hutchins had a special impact on literary critic Herbert Marshall McLuhan. McLuhan, a humanist himself, appreciated Hutchins’s humanism. To McLuhan, Hutchins stood for the Ciceronian ideal: education was designed to produce citizens with a wide learning, alert to social problems.¹³⁹ He accepted Hutchins’s critique of specialization and his view that the individual had become nothing more than “a technological functional unit in the state”.¹⁴⁰ McLuhan’s affinity to Hutchins’s position reflected his own humanist and moralist leanings of the 1940s and early 1950s.

While Hutchins's humanism was more than palatable, McLuhan found the Chicago academic's educational approach unsatisfactory. In fact, he despised Hutchins's and Mortimer Adler's Great Books program because this approach overemphasized the study of literary classics while ignoring the "unofficial program of education", "carried on by commerce through the press, radio, and movies."¹⁴¹ Only through a study and critique of unofficial education could the scholar comprehend the "native and spontaneous culture in our industrial world" and, moreover, "effect contact with past cultures."¹⁴² The study of the greats was only "part of the solution";¹⁴³ it had to be supplemented with a study of modern culture replete with the analysis of contemporary cultural forces. Only by gaining insight into one's own culture could one become conversant with cultures of the past.¹⁴⁴ True to his own credo, McLuhan set about understanding the unofficial education of contemporary culture.¹⁴⁵

By the mid-1940s, McLuhan turned his attention away from literary studies and focused instead on a critique of the cultural role of technology.¹⁴⁶ Like Harold Innis, he presented a highly moralistic appraisal of technology and warned that the will to technique was at the core of the corruption of western values. Writing at the end of the war, McLuhan demonstrated the influence of technology to standardize human outlooks. Technology's most profound effect on modern society, he claimed, was the creation of "the common man", the unification of all human as basic consumers. Modern advertising, a salient factor in the emergence of the common man, established witticisms, symbols and behavior patterns, and a common language of discourse. It provided, in other words, a shared experience. Advertising also altered existing perceptions of reality to accord with advertising strategies. "The ad-man's rhetoric," McLuhan declared, "has knocked the public into a kind of groggy, slap-happy condition" in which "are cushioned" the "brutal shocks" of social realities. As evidence of this confused condition McLuhan showed how freedom for North Americans did not necessarily mean free and just government. Rather, according to the advertising ethos, liberty largely consisted of "ignoring politics and worrying about defeating underarm odour, scaly scalps, hairy legs, ... [and] saggy breasts ..."¹⁴⁷ Through educating humans as to what to eat, how to look, and what to do, print media advertising fostered a homogenized, "commercial culture". Above all, it facilitated totalitarian control, for it allowed advertising executives and others to engineer society, and, in a more insidious fashion, to alter perceptions and divert attention from pressing problems.¹⁴⁸ Echoing Lippmann and Innis, and alluding to the idea of pseudo-environments, thus, McLuhan expounded upon the pervasiveness of power and control in the industrial age.

For McLuhan, commercial culture concealed the cerebral needs of humankind. Reducing humanity to its “lowest common denominator as consuming animal”, technology thwarted rightful human pursuits, such as the cultivation of speech and culture, and, most broadly, the acquisition of the “heritage of our entire civilization.”¹⁴⁹ Nevertheless, McLuhan implored moderns to contemplate the humanistic virtues of literature and other artistic endeavours so as to establish a “sense of communion, and wisdom for the common race” and to regain the sense of true humanity.¹⁵⁰ Indeed, strictures such as *The Mechanical Bride: Folklore of Industrial Man* (1950) were efforts to understand the processes by which “the very considerable currents and pressures set up around us today by the mechanical agencies of the press, radio, movies and advertising”¹⁵¹ Only in accepting social forces, he reasoned, could intellectuals comprehend new realities with a view to overcoming them. In this way, moderns could realize the standardizing impact of the machine and begin to come to terms with “*Time, Life, and Fortune*” and other “sinister portents” in the “Century of the Common Man.”¹⁵²

In *The Mechanical Bride*, McLuhan further developed his notion of the cultural role of technology. Technology redefined human’s relations not only with one another but also to industrial society. Through mass media, it created a new, servomechanistic relationship in which man became servant and it, in effect, dictated the nature and pace of modern life. Technology was both invasive and enslaving. While it affected virtually every aspect of life, moderns neither understood nor cared about the effects of machine culture. Humankind simply unwittingly acquiesced to it. Commenting on the apathy expressed towards modern technology and the insidious and illiberal characteristics of the mechanized age, McLuhan declared:

A huge passivity has settled on industrial society. For people carried about in mechanical vehicles, earning their living by waiting on machines, listening much of the waking day to canned music, watching packaged movie entertainment and capsulated news, for such people it would require an exceptional degree of awareness and an especial heroism of effort to be anything but supine consumers of processed goods.¹⁵³

Through consumer conformity, technology, in its many guises, robbed humans of their individuality and freedom to understand the world.¹⁵⁴ It was an “abstract tyrant” that carried its “ravages into deeper recesses of the psyche than did [for primitive humans] the sabre-tooth tiger or the grizzly bear”.¹⁵⁵

For McLuhan technology was also responsible for profound social change. He argued that technology meant “constant social revolution”.¹⁵⁶ In the recent past, for instance, the two world wars “led to an unimaginable acceleration of every phase of

technology -- especially advancing the universal social revolution which is the inevitable result of the impact of machines on human rhythms and social patterns."¹⁵⁷ Although McLuhan failed to explain the interplay between technological and social transition -- his early studies were not much more than observations of the societal impact of technology -- he was certain that technological advancement implied a speed-up of social change. Further, he contended that the advancement of technology was so pronounced in the recent past and humanity so profoundly altered by technological change that humans existed in a "trance-like condition", unable to appreciate the social effects of technology. Unlike prior "social revolutions", where humans could at least identify the nature and impetus of social change, the mid-twentieth century was so mired in the conformity of consumerism and other homogenizing effects of modern technology that social realities were extremely difficult to comprehend. Because the dynamic of the modern world had changed to make life "increasingly a technological rather than social affair", there were no more "remote and easy perspectives". Ultimately, there was no way to understand reality except through comprehending the role of technology.¹⁵⁸ He concluded that humankind was embroiled in a "technological nightmare" from which the only hope of escaping was to be aware of the pervasive effects of the machine.

Lacking the same sophistication, McLuhan's view of "technology as tyrant" echoed the Innisian monopoly of knowledge and Innis's strictures on stultifying nature of modern technology. It reflected an Orwellian world-view in which a technologically dominated society was embodied in the omnipresent "Big Brother", in the triumph of technology, that is, to create a totalitarian existence. Technology for McLuhan, as for George Orwell and Innis, was a facilitator that made possible the imposition of totalitarian controls on an unsuspecting populous. Ultimately, like Orwell in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, McLuhan expounded on the need to change the course of history lest humanity lose its human qualities and become a mass of soulless automatons, perpetually ignorant of its new plight. As with other like-minded critics, his was a dire warning indeed.

Present in the works of Innis, Orwell, and other social commentators, McLuhan's cynicism reflected a world in which the horrors of totalitarian regimes were still fresh. More than this, his critique mirrored a post-war society concerned more with consumerism and consumption than with issues of enduring relevance. The post-war period into the 1950s was one of great material prosperity for North America. Not only had Canada escaped the ravages of another economic downturn, it had emerged from the war with a vibrant economy characterized in part by a boom in consumer consumption. Owing much to a large increase in population (due to immigration and the so-called "baby boom"), consumers found a release for the pent-up demand of the previous era and brought houses,

cars, and a plethora of other, smaller consumer items such as radios, television sets, and products that reflected the shift in demographics to a younger population -- hoola hoops and Davy Crockett hats. Suburbanization was also a new phenomenon and it led to the construction of malls, schools, and roads. It meant a boom in new and used car sales, for suburban neighbourhoods were often located far from the workplace and off major routes of public transportation. Aided by intense and sophisticated ad campaigns, "materialism", in a word, "became a deeply imbued social ethic ..." in post-war Canadian society.¹⁵⁹

While many Canadians basked in the warm glow of material prosperity, there emerged by the late 1940s a strong reaction against the increasingly material and secular outlooks of Canadians. For Vincent Massey, the great transformation that Canada had undergone in the post-war era was due in large measure to material growth and an economic resurgence. "We are no longer poor", he announced at one of his several post-war addresses as Governor General.¹⁶⁰ "Canada in truth has been passing through a period of economic expansion unparalleled hitherto in extent, diversity and duration ..." ¹⁶¹ The Dominion, he implied, verged on economic superpower status, which gave it international clout and helped build the nation. Massey was quick to note, however, that material expansion was only one aspect in Canada's post-war development. Growth in the "matters of mind and of the spirit", he commented, was the most significant aspect of national development.¹⁶² Indeed, Massey hoped that material advancement would be "matched by knowledge and wisdom"; that Canada, in other words, would be characterized as much by intellectual and artistic accomplishments as by economic prowess.¹⁶³

Massey had misgivings, however. The rightful balance between material and spiritual concerns had been gravely disrupted after the war. Materialism had been overemphasized at the expense of the intellect, free thought, and the other-worldly. For Massey evidence of this decline of spiritual values existed in the "humanities crisis". The sundering of the humanities and of the philosophic tradition were the direct results of the rise of the applied and pure sciences. The demise of the humanities, according to Massey, reflected greater social realities. "The neglect of the humanities[was] not a cause but a symptom of an age lured by science into the delights of materialism -- for those who regard the pursuit of the humanities as a luxury, consider the automobile, the frigidaire and the TV set as necessities which no self-respecting family would be without..."¹⁶⁴ The demise of humane values in relation to material concerns demonstrated with disconcerting clarity the "whole climate of opinion" of the consumer society.

In an unpublished paper in late 1949, Innis also questioned the advent of post-war materialism. His primary focus was to study the reasons for which western society had come to have such a "high regard for material things"¹⁶⁵ Tracing its historical origins, he

argued that, established as a “universal value in the nineteenth century”, materialism in North America had increased its scope through advertising and the media and due to the availability of resources. But, like Massey, Innis criticized the pervasive materialism of modern society. Exacerbated by the media and commercialism, the ever-increasing concern with materialism presented moderns with a grave problem: the consumer orientation of society had developed to such an extent that it had become “impossible [for moderns] to stop demanding new resources”.¹⁶⁶ Most importantly, materialism was such a part of the modern ethos that it threatened the existence of non-material values. Materialism, in other words, had become so much a part of the psyche of western humanity that a concern for opposite values -- tradition, beauty, and spirituality -- were being lost. Indeed, Innis’s admitted obsession with the values of “time” spoke to an age increasingly characterized by the drive towards material acquisition and resource exploitation.¹⁶⁷

Of the critiques of materialism, George Parkin Grant’s was one of the most detailed and profoundly thought out. Grant, Massey’s nephew, had picked up his disdain for industrial life during his time in England, where he saw first-hand the ravages of a long-lived industrial system on the population. Furthermore, his grandfather, George Munro Grant, had greatly influenced his perception of industrial development and materialism. Writing around the turn of the century, G.M. Grant acknowledged the great strides Canada had made economically, but he questioned whether too great an emphasis had been placed on economic development and not enough on the cultivation of the mind and souls of men and women. Is Canada to be a “city of pigs”, he wondered, or “is it to be a land of high-souled men and women?”¹⁶⁸ The elder Grant concluded that due to a “vulgar and insolent materialism of thought and life” Canada had lost its moral focus and had been reduced to a consuming, unreflective mass of humanity.¹⁶⁹ So akin to G.P. Grant’s social philosophy and so relevant to the ongoing struggle between matters of mind and the material world, the elder Grant’s comments could have easily been uttered a half a century later and have been attributed to his grandson.

More than his grandfather, his uncle, or any other observer, G.P. Grant expressed his critique of the material world in terms of the process of secularization. For Grant, the almost obsessive concern with things material resulted in a rejection of the otherworldly. Ironically, this concern for materialism had its roots in religion itself, namely puritan protestantism. Characteristic of protestantism in North America, Grant argued that Calvinism had originally promoted piety and biblical truth, but over time, “it destroyed its own spirit”.¹⁷⁰ Intended to marry the secular and the other-worldly, the reformist spirit eventually lost a sense of the transcendent. As it did so, it began to “take the world ever more as an end in itself”.¹⁷¹ As the Protestant vision of the Kingdom of God on Earth

declined, there remained only the idea that humanity can change the world for the better. Shorn of its religiosity, and its focus on the afterlife, the reformed protestant tradition was more akin to hedonism than a combination of the secular and religious. Lamentably for Grant, the hedonism of mid-twentieth century English Canada was in large part the product of reformed Christianity.

The most pernicious effect of reformed protestantism was a new concept of liberty. In "The Uses of Freedom", Grant explained that the basic conception of freedom of the reformed tradition -- the introduction of the truth of Christ in the lives of humans -- had been transformed into something different: simply put, "the ability to change the world" without reference to Christian beliefs.¹⁷² Instead of gaining liberation through communion with God and the mysticism of religion, secular-oriented humans sought to gain control over earthly circumstances. This was a main way to achieve liberty.¹⁷³ In mastering their physical conditions and therefore improving material circumstances, moderns, for Grant, believed that they had freed themselves from the exigencies of the natural world and had begun to solve the puzzle of human survival. Freedom was thus nothing more than liberation of humankind from the uncertainties of natural life and the imposition of order and control over material conditions so that they become accessible for human usage.

Essential to this liberal-secularist conception of freedom, science and technology were instrumental in gaining mastery over nature. A critical epistemological change in modern history, scientific knowledge displaced religion as "the only true knowledge"; "it teaches one", Grant claimed, "how to change the world".¹⁷⁴ To exploit natural resources and secure material growth, moreover, westerners had to alter their understanding of the uses of scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge, Grant explained, was not to be sought after for the pleasure of the mind; it was not an end in itself. Rather, this type of knowledge was a means of gaining practical benefits; above all, science was merely an instrument moderns used first to understand nature and then to gain a measure of control over it.

Grant realized that the knowledge of technique had become integral to the modern world-view. Moderns, he argued, defined themselves in relation to technological and scientific advances. "Technique comes forth and is sustained in our vision of ourselves as creative freedom," Grant later wrote, "making ourselves and conquering the chaos of an indifferent world."¹⁷⁵ Modern life was thus founded on the "technological myth," the idea that "man has finally come of age in the evolutionary process" since "he has taken fate into his own hands and is freeing himself for happiness against the old necessities of hunger and disease and overwork ..."¹⁷⁶ Society's ultimate "good", the moral conception upon

which philosophy in the mass age was based, was thus founded in the freedom that science and technology engendered.

Not only did moderns define themselves in terms of “technological freedom”, but they also propagated a technological world-view.¹⁷⁷ Like Innis and others, Grant attributed the rise of technical training to the perceived needs of government and industry. He realized that compared to the sciences, the humanities were neglected in funding and recognition. Above all, he criticized the penchant to prefer the study of the physical world over “the study of the deeper questions of human existence”.¹⁷⁸ Grant lamented the decline of the philosophical and artistic traditions of the university, a trend that indicated the pervasiveness of new forces in industrial society to emphasize the current and the active and to ignore spiritual aspects of humanity. Grant observed that the philosophic understanding of the good life

simply for its own sake ... was neglected as archaic. To see the world in its wholeness was the equivalent to many of seeing the progress in our mechanical inventiveness. The more Canada has become part of the scientific society of the west, the more it has partaken of the ideas such as these, and the tragedy of its youth has been that the bond of tradition have been less strong with us than elsewhere.¹⁷⁹

“Mass industrialism”, he went on to say, promoted certain ideas that had an “almost incalculable spiritual change in the west”.¹⁸⁰ Most irksome to Grant, moderns elevated materialist over contemplative values and hailed a life a action rather than one of thought and reflection. Like most pioneering countries, Canada had been predisposed towards material values and had little appreciation of philosophic inquiries.¹⁸¹

Despite efforts to understand this philosophic malaise, the “mass world” ultimately had forsaken a “philosophic approach”.¹⁸² Even philosophers themselves who had been entrusted to discover the good and God’s purpose in the world fell prey to the new technological ethic. According to Grant, philosophers abrogated their responsibility as social critics and of moral leaders of the community. Expounding on theories on positivism and pragmatism, and separating philosophy and theology, Canadian philosophers, like their counterparts elsewhere, effectively make “philosophy the servant rather than the judge of man’s scientific abilities”.¹⁸³ Becoming a “technical study”, philosophy forgot its historic origins and succumbed to the dictates of the mass society. Philosophy in Canada contributed to (instead of preventing) the development of universities as “technical institutes”. As such, it reflected the all-pervasive character of the modern technological imperative.

Like several of his contemporaries, George Grant bemoaned the centrality of technology in the lives of moderns. Defining “what we are” technology for Grant alienated the individual from his true self because it reduced his higher, philosophical goals to the mere objective of obtaining technological freedom. People had thus become servants to the machine. Indeed, technology re-defined the individuals’ outlooks and goals; most of all, it gave primacy to the singular objective of technological progress. People thus lacked liberty because the pursuit of technological advancement and scientific freedom became their “dominant activity”. That dominance, Grant concluded, “fashion[ed] both public and private realms” to the exclusion of the pursuit of other societal “goods”.¹⁸⁴ Describing the illiberalities of the technological society, Grant proclaimed:

every instrument of mass culture [was] a pressure alienating the individual from himself as a free being.... The individual [became] ... an object to be administered by scientific efficiency experts.... Modern culture, through movies, newspapers and television, through commercialized recreation and popular advertising, force[d] the individual into the service of the capitalist system around him.¹⁸⁵

Philosophically, moderns understood nothing more than the pursuit of the specious truth of technological freedom. Ultimately, this false world-view trapped them into a monolithic, stultifying, and necessarily limited view of themselves and of their society.

Grant also objected to the sway of technology over modern value systems. His greatest indictment of modernity was that technological liberalism had become the sole “truth” of modern philosophy. Uniquely modern, technological liberalism gained preeminence because it obscured other truths and philosophical traditions. It therefore stymied moderns’ contemplation of different systems of thought. Ultimately, it circumscribed what they could think or believe; indeed, moderns comprehended their world only in the narrow terms that the technological ethos had established. Emphasizing these points, Grant claimed that “... the drive to the universal and homogeneous state remains the dominant ethical ‘ideal’ to which our contemporary society appeals for meaning in its activity. In its terms,” he continued, “society legitimizes itself to itself. Therefore any contemporary man must try to think the truth of this core of political liberalism, if he is to know what it is to live in this world”.¹⁸⁶

As for Innis and others, moderns, for Grant, had become metaphorically entrapped within their age. The technological imperative, in whose development they contributed, debarred them from seeing beyond their own limited values and verities. Technological liberty had displaced the appreciation of timeless, transcendent truths. This philosophical transition had been so complete that society (including its scholars) mistook materialism

and secularization for transcendent truth. Because of the technological credo, Grant and other critics reasoned, moderns were living a pseudo-reality replete with an illusory set of values that championed technical advancement and material prosperity. In its most pernicious form, the technological imperative was thus much more than a physical transformation. Instead, it implied a profound epistemological transition. It created a climate of ignorance, a consciousness that incorporated outlooks that had sundered transcendent values and redefined belief systems. Consumerism, the culture of consumption, and ever-increasing exploitation of natural resources, were omnipresent reminders of the triumph of new values and false perceptions of reality. The technological consciousness, in a word, was indicative of the fall of western society.

* * *

At the turn of the century, a time of rapid economic and industrial expansion, most Canadians viewed science and technology as positive and progressive. The scientific-technological complex, modern Canadians thought, was integral to the betterment of civilization. Ideas of progress, expressed increasingly in the advancement of the human condition, were linked to material circumstances. Unphased by total war, a nineteenth-century view of technology continued to mark Canadians' attitudes towards science and technology. Reflected in growing consumerism and in a faith in expertise and social sciences, the technological imperative had come to characterize the modernization of Canadian society. Like other western industrial nations, Canada had gained all the ideological trappings of an urban-industrial society.

Reflecting on Canada's recent development, Malcolm Wallace, President of University College, characterized the modern era as one of change resulting from the "role which science had come to play in our daily lives".¹⁸⁷ He claimed that changes in government and educational standards, changes in daily routines, and indeed changes in values and outlooks, were all effects of science and technology on moderns. Science, he argued, had increased "human productivity of goods to an incredible extent" so that moderns could "enjoy comforts and conveniences hitherto undreamed of". Power and wealth, he hastened to add, the products of scientific materialism, "exercised a kind of intoxication over the imaginations of men". Indeed, while he understood the benefits of science, the "scientific society" definitely had for Wallace a foreboding quality. It had, after all, produced the holocaust and the atom bomb, and as such, guaranteed the ever-increasing and devastating scope of future war. Through providing more and better goods, and, most dangerously, providing access to the levers of power, science, despite appearance to the contrary, had become "the god of our idolatry".¹⁸⁸

Not all in Canadian society had come to accept without question Canadian cultural development. The social critiques and theories of such intellectuals as Innis, McLuhan, and Grant took pains to underscore the negative aspects of science and technology. Indeed, they constitute strident rejections of the prevalent view of science and technology. Such assessments objected to a modern condition that lauded technique as if it were a god. The technological critics acknowledged the role of science and technology to effect historical change and to facilitate a cultural of utility that began to characterize Canadian society. Surely, technology had determined in large measure the nature of the modern world. Yet critics warned against the will to technique. They challenged materialism, secularism, consumerism, and other values associated with the scientific society. Most of all, their critiques recognized that the insidious effects of science and technology created false impressions about the nature of "the world outside". Innis, McLuhan, and Grant so vociferously questioned modern technology not because they were technophobes, modern-aged Luddites who wanted only to turn the clock back to simpler times; they did not oppose technology *per se*. Rather, they preached against a force that they believed responsible for creating a false reality which drained from its adherents all recognition of truth and objectivity. They feared, above all, the consequences of technology-inspired false environments. They were afraid to exist in a world with no objective truth or way to circumvent technological environments. The technological society, in short, was a dismal "anti-utopia" in which its inhabitants submitted unquestioningly to the dictates of the machine.

Veracity of theories and points of view aside, it is possible to understand how a highly critical view of science and technology could emerge in Canada along side the more enduring "liberal" conception. The views of the technological critics truly reflected the rise of Canada as a materialist, secularist nation. Canada had indeed undergone a tremendous socio-economic transformation in the first half of the twentieth century. Concerns over material development had characterized in large measure Canada's quest for nationhood in this period and attitudes on the merits of economic advancement, carried over from previous times, began to intensify in a country increasingly preoccupied with its material circumstances. These concerns were manifested in terms of a preoccupation with practicalities in Canadian universities, and in the predominance of political economy in Canadian social science. With the Second World War, and the ever-increasing need for expertise to run a bloated bureaucracy and with the material requirements of modern warfare, it had become easy to neglect long-standing issues of cultural development and to focus instead on production and efficiency. After 1945, with attention turned towards reconstruction, and the application of Keynesian economic strategies, the time still did not

seem right to address the larger issues of cultural development. And finally, with unprecedented and prolonged economic expansion, a growing, and, for the first time ever, a largely well-off population, it had seemed to many that Canada had finally arrived as a nation, if it had not achieved a quasi-utopian state. The focus on the materialism of a culture, by now totally enmeshed in material progress seemed at last to have paid dividends. The post-war era was indeed a watershed period in the development of the materialistic element of the Canadian national character. This triumph of materialism was amplified in the views and thoughts of proponents, opponents, and the disinterested within Canada's burgeoning materialist culture.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

Bryan D. Palmer, *Working-Class Experience: The Rise and Reconstitution of Canadian Labour, 1800-1980* (Toronto, 1983), 97

¹Doug Owsram, *The Government Generation: Canadian Intellectuals and the State 1900-1945* (Toronto, 1986), 17

²W. E. Houghton, *The Victorian Frame of Mind, 1830-1870* (London, 1957), 33-36

³Quoted in A.B. McKillop, *Matters of Mind: The University in Ontario 1791-1951* (Toronto, 1994), 167

⁴*Ibid.*

⁵*Ibid.*

⁶*Ibid.*, 168

⁷Lobbying went on even in spite of the fact that education came under provincial jurisdiction (Section 93 of BNA Act). The advocates of applied sciences programs argued that technical education fell under Section 91 and that the federal government was responsible for the economic requirements (such as technical education) of nation-building. See *ibid.*

⁸Quoted in McKillop, 169

⁹*Ibid.*, 154

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 155. McKillop thinks Loudon's address was of "major importance for the history of science in Canada, for it was a manifesto declaring Loudon's complete commitment to the German research ideal as found in its universities."

¹¹156

¹²Quoted in 156

¹³James Loudon, "The Universities in Relation to Research", *Proceedings of the Royal Society of Canada* (1902), Appendix A, XLIX; cited in Trevor H. Levere and Richard A. Jarrell, eds., *A Curious Field-Book: Science and Society in Canadian History* (Toronto, 1974), 215-16.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 216

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 218

¹⁶McKillop, 158

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸Quoted in *ibid.*, 155.

¹⁹From the turn of the century scientists in Canada and members of the Empire often looked to Germany as an example of a nation that had achieved supremacy in many war-related industries (such as chemicals). They pointed out the woeful state of unpreparedness of their countries especially when compared to Germany.

²⁰Dr. A. Stanley Mackenzie, "The War and Science", *Proceedings and Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada*, Section 3, 12, (1918); cited in Levere and Jarrell, 184.

²¹*Ibid.*

²²*Ibid.*

²³*Ibid.*, 185

²⁴*Ibid.*, 186

²⁵*Ibid.*

²⁶McKillop, 175

²⁷Philip C. Enros, "The University of Toronto and Industrial Research in the Early Twentieth Century", in Richard A. Jarrell and Arnold E. Roos, eds., *Critical Issues in the History of Canadian Science*, Thornhill, Ontario, 1983), 159

²⁸John Galbraith, head of the Faculty of Applied Science, recognized as essential the role of his faculty in training graduates for research work in engineering. He was unconvinced, however, of the availability of positions for these graduates once they completed their studies.

²⁹Enros, 164

³⁰Wilfred Eggleston, *National Research in Canada: The NRC 1916-1966* (Toronto, 1978), 1

³¹*Ibid.*, 5

³²That the Council was a fledgling organization in its early years there can be no doubt. Its founders discovered soon after its establishment that they had very little to coordinate in terms of a system of nation-wide research laboratories. Scientific research, in words of R.F. Ruttan, was effectively "confined to the laboratories of two or three of our universities, and one or two departments of our government". See *ibid.*, 7.

³³The Council was mired by adverse timing, for by the time government officials received the

proposal, the war had ended. To complicate matters, the Council's chief advocate in governmental halls, the Minister of Commerce and Trade (?) Foster, had left with Prime Minister Borden for the Paris Peace Conferences. What little headway to be made materialized in terms of the creation of a special committee of parliament to study the proposal in April 1919. A bill was introduced in parliament on scientific research 8 April 1921, but was eventually defeated in the Senate. The bill was dead and not to be revived. Only later was the cause of the national research taken up again, this time by new NRC president H.M. Tory. The institute was finally realized when construction of the new "temple of science" began on the banks of the Ottawa River. For the origins of the Council, see Eggleston and Mel Thistle, *The Inner Ring: The Early History of the National Research Council* (Toronto, 1966).

³⁴Eggleston, 24

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid., 25

³⁷Ibid., 34

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Thistle, 14

⁴⁰While by the 1880s, British and American social scientists had already begun studying the socio-economic effects of urban-industrialization, social science in Canada had to await further industrial development. Clearly, the belated development of the social sciences in Canada compared to other nations, such as Britain and the United States, demonstrates how the emergence of Canadian social science was inextricably tied to Canada's delayed industrial development. See Owram, 13.

⁴¹Owram, 19

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³See, for instance, Adam Shortt, "The Influence of Daily Occupations and Surroundings on the Life of the People" Sunday Afternoon Addresses, Third Series (Kingston 1893); Shortt, "The Social and Economic Significance of the Movement from the Country to the City", *Addresses of the Canadian Club, Montreal 1912-13*; ;

⁴⁴Barry Ferguson, *Remaking Liberalism: The Intellectual Legacy of Adam Shortt, O.D. Skelton, W.C. Clark and W.A. Mackintosh* (Montreal and Kingston, 1993), 46

⁴⁵Ibid., 49

⁴⁶S.E.D. Shortt, *The Search for an Ideal. Six Canadian Intellectuals and their Convictions in an Age of Transition*. (Toronto, 1976), 134

⁴⁷Ferguson, 110

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Owram, 62

⁵⁰Ibid., 66

⁵¹King's Industrial Disputes Investigation Act (1907), in which strikes and lockouts were prohibited pending investigation by government board, had at its core the philosophy that the social anarchy that can result from labour strife must be avoided at all costs. The philosophical justification of this was that "there is no right greater to that of the Community as a whole". See Paul Craven, 'An Impartial Umpire': *Industrial Relations and the Canadian State 1900-1911* (Toronto, 1980), 71-3; 86-7.

⁵²Ibid., 31

⁵³Quoted in Owram, 69.

⁵⁴Ibid., 73

⁵⁵Ferguson, 240

⁵⁶Donald Creighton, *Harold Adams Innis: Portrait of a Scholar* (Toronto, 1957), 81-2

⁵⁷McKillop, 133

⁵⁸Carl Berger, *The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writing since 1900*. Second Ed. (Toronto, 1986), 89

⁵⁹Ibid., 88

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹Harold Innis, "A Bibliography of T. Veblen", *Southwestern Political and Social Science Quarterly*, v. 10, no. 1, (June 1929), 25.

⁶²Ibid., 24

⁶³Robert F. Neill, *The Work of Harold Adams Innis: Content and Context*. Ph. D. Thesis, Duke, 1966, 88

⁶⁴H.A. Innis, *Problems of Staples Production in Canada* (Toronto, 1933), 30; 94-7.

⁶⁵Technological improvements lower costs, extend the market, and restructure the time horizons of

the system. See Neill, 129

⁶⁶Ibid., 88

⁶⁷Berger, 101

⁶⁸For a country the size of Canada with its vast distances and its difficult terrain but small population, transportation costs remained high right down to the 1930s. It was no wonder that debt levels rose and further investment ceased.

⁶⁹Neill, 132

⁷⁰See Innis, "The Role of Intelligence: Some Further Notes", *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, v. 1, 1935, 280-6.

⁷¹Owram, 132

⁷²Creighton, 82

⁷³Quoted in *ibid.*, 83.

⁷⁴An address to the members of the Liberal-Conservative Summer School in Newmarket September, 1933. Quoted in *ibid.*

⁷⁵Quoted in *ibid.* In critiquing scholars' move away from academia into political life, Innis was referring especially to colleagues such as Frank Underhill and other members of the League for Social Reconstruction. The LSR represented for Innis exactly what Innis deplored: a group of intellectuals who had shunned university life and decided that the scholar's most appropriate role in society was active political participation in government.

⁷⁶Innis, "The Role of Intelligence", 280-7.

⁷⁷See F.H. Knight, "Social Science and the Political Trend" *University of Toronto Quarterly* (July, 1934), 407-27, and E.J. Urwick, "The Role of Intelligence in the Social Process" *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 1:1, (1935).

⁷⁸Innis, "The Role of Intelligence", 280-1

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, 284. The paradox was that bias changed the nature of the social sciences almost to the point of making the true role of the social scientist unrecognizable; yet, the proliferation of bias would make the social scientist aware of its existence and its effects on the social sciences and thus would restore her to her rightful role of seeking truth and eliminating bias.

⁸⁰*Ibid.*

⁸¹*Ibid.*, 283

⁸²Unlike Urwick, who advocated a highly relativistic approach to social scientific study, Innis still suggested that objectivity in scholarship was tenable, assuming the proper functioning of the university and the scholar within it. *Ibid.*, 283; see also Pal "Scholarship and the Later Innis," 34.

⁸³*Ibid.*

⁸⁴Berger, 102

⁸⁵Harold Innis, "The Penetrative Powers of the Price System", in Harold Innis *Political Economy in the Modern State* (Toronto, 1946), 160-61. See also Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York, 1922; reprinted in 1965).

⁸⁶Innis, "The Penetrative Powers of the Price System", 161

⁸⁷He showed how, with the development of the linotype, the telegraph, and other improvements in the way that news could be collected, newspaper editors and journalists were enabled to gather and distribute more and more news.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁸⁹The organization of news agencies was important, for it was through the structuring and packaging of the news in accordance with the perceived needs of the readership on the whole that larger circulations were achieved. "The application of steam power to the production of paper, and in turn of the newspaper", Innis concluded, "followed by the telegraph and the exploitation of human curiosity and its interest in news, created effective channels for the spread of information". See Harold Innis, "On the Economic Significance of Culture, "The Tasks of Economic History, Supplement IV to *Journal of Economic History*, (December, 1944), p. 86.

⁹⁰Innis writes "The significance of the newspaper to the social sciences has been evident in the deterioration, since Adam Smith, shown in the increasing obsession with facts and figures in relation to the short run immediate problems of bureaucracies, in the increasing specialization and departmentalization of the social sciences, and in their consequent divisiveness and sterility. Economic history has suffered either as a handmaiden of bureaucracy or a sink of antiquarianism". See Harold Innis, "Newspaper in Economic Development" in Harold Innis, *Political Economy in the Modern State*, n. 48, page 31.

⁹¹Lippmann, 8-9

⁹²Ibid., 8

⁹³Ibid., 10

⁹⁴Ibid., 257

⁹⁵Ibid.

⁹⁶Innis cited Lippmann directly only sparingly. See Innis, "The Penetrative Powers of the Price System", 160-1. Nevertheless, he shared considerable intellectual affinities with Lippmann. Lippmann's *Public Opinion* was inspired by Graham Wallas and the latter's work on the intrusion into the life of moderns of false truths. Innis also relied on Wallas's ideas. He admitted dependence on the work of Wallas in his 1948 piece entitled "A Critical Review". Like Wallas and indeed Lippmann, Innis also points "to the danger that knowledge was growing too fast for successful use in social judgment". See Harold Innis, "A Critical Review" in Innis, *The Bias of Communication*, (Toronto, 1951; reprinted 1973), 191.

⁹⁷Innis, *The Bias of Communication*, 33-4.

⁹⁸See Harold Innis, *Empire and Communication*, (Toronto, reprinted 1972).

⁹⁹Innis, *A Plea for Time*, Sesquicentennial Lectures, (Fredericton 1950), 11

¹⁰⁰Innis, *The Strategy of Culture*, (Toronto 1952), 14

¹⁰¹Innis, *Empire and Communication*, 9

¹⁰²Innis, *The Bias of Communication*, (Toronto, reprinted 1964), 132

¹⁰³Ibid., 139

¹⁰⁴E.J. Urwick to Innis (18 November 1940) Harold Innis Papers Box 011, file 15, B72-0025 and Urwick to Innis (30 December 1942) Box 011, file 15, B72-0025

¹⁰⁵Innis "This Has Killed That," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 12:5, (Winter 1977), 3

¹⁰⁶Ibid., 4

¹⁰⁷There can be no doubt that the Second World War repulsed Innis. A veteran of the Great War he was a converted pacifist who, in much of his correspondence or addresses of the 1940s, made unfavourable references to the current conflict. In "This Has Killed That," he called war a tragedy in terms of the loss of human life, the tolls of which were "never repaid." (Innis, "This Has Killed That", 4) Elsewhere, he referred to battles fought during the war as "massacres" or "atrocities" and the use of the atom bomb as an event so profoundly "disturbing to moral sense of Anglo-Saxons that Churchill [had] to say it was necessary." ("Values" Discussion Group, 5 April 1949, Harold Innis Papers, University of Toronto Archives, Box 030, file 06, B72-0003, 3-4.) Indeed, the massive slaughtering of the war resulted, to Innis's mind, in the breakdown of an international moral code. (Ibid.) While many of his contemporaries championed the economic benefits of the war and the need to combat fascism, Innis was convinced that the war was an event of no redeeming value whatsoever and contributed instead to the depletion of human resources and the dulling of moral sensibilities. (See Innis "This Has Killed That.")

¹⁰⁸Harold Innis, "A Plea for The University Tradition," *Dalhousie Review* 24 (1944), 299-300. Much more will be said on Innis and the university in chapter ?

¹⁰⁹Harold Innis "The University in the Modern Crisis," in *Political Economy in the Modern State* (Toronto 1946), 74

¹¹⁰See James W. Carey, *Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society* (London, 1989; reprinted 1992), 147.

¹¹¹Lewis Mumford wrote about the relationship between technology and culture. In *Technics and Civilization*, he showed how at present (1934), machine advancement outstripped social development. He was convinced, however, that machine development would slow down with respect to social development and that an equilibrium between technological advancement and social organization would be achieved. He implicitly agreed with Innis that modern society needed to "reorient technic" and that this "consists in bring it more completely in harmony with the new cultural and regional and societal and personal patterns we have coordinately begun to develop..."[434] But his view is alien to Innis's because he sees technology being controllable, and hence not dictating the structure of social organization. Mumford's view on the relation between society and technology is generally a positive one, while Innis's is most definitely not. See Mumford, *Technics and Civilization*, (?), 417-35.

¹¹²Arthur Lower, "The Social Sciences in the Post-War World", *Canadian Historical Review* 22 (March 1941); quoted in Welf H. Heick, ed., *History and Myth: Arthur Lower and the Making of Canadian Nationalism*, (Vancouver, 1975), 108.

¹¹³Ibid. Note, however, that unlike Innis, Lower had confidence in the traditional role of social scientists to take an active part in public life and in consequence to provide a check against the new state and protect against its abuse of social freedoms. In the end, the war represented both a period of great change and also an opportunity for Canada and its intellectuals; it was an opportunity for Canadian social

scientists to impress their understandings and outlooks of the future of a young, emerging nation. Lower writes: "A new order is struggling to be born among us, but in genetics as in other things we cling to *laissez-faire* ideas, none of us knows much about [the new age]. *The great problem [is] trying to divine the nature of the future, and as social scientists, perhaps even essaying to act as midwives.*" (Ibid., 106; my italics)

¹¹⁴Donald Creighton, "Memorandum for the Conference on American Thought", (no date – 1944), Donald Creighton Papers, Public Archives of Canada (PAC), MG 31 D77, v. 1, General correspondence, 1944, #2, 2

¹¹⁵Creighton to John Marshall (Associate Director of the Humanities, The Rockefeller Foundation), 21 February 1944, v. 1, Donald Creighton Papers, PAC, MG 31 D77, General correspondence, 1944, #2

¹¹⁶Grant to Mother, Easter [n.d. – 1939?], George Parkin Grant Papers, PAC, MG 30 D59, v. 38; Mrs. W.L. Grant Correspondence; file: Queen's University, 1

¹¹⁷Much more will be said on issues of free inquiry, the conflict between the humanities and the sciences, and the roles of government and war in the following chapter.

¹¹⁸The War Measures Act (WMA) was the operative instrument of the federal government's emergency power. The dominion government enacted 6,414 orders under the WMA. These orders had the force of law and circumvented parliamentary debate. See Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and John English, *Canada Since 1945: Power, Politics and Provincialism*, revised edition (Toronto, 1989), 53.

¹¹⁹The government brought war-related industries directly under its control. By war's end, eight-five per cent of all non-agricultural labour fell under its control. Ibid., 55.

¹²⁰Ibid., 53

¹²¹Ibid.

¹²²In return, the provinces were to receive grants, based on complex formulae, designed to provide per capita grants and statutory subsidies. This is genesis of transfer payments. Note that provinces of Ontario and Quebec established autonomous taxation systems.

¹²³McKillop, 529

¹²⁴McKillop outlines the views of educators who appreciated the 'training school role of the university, such as C.R. Young [dean of U of T's faculty of applied science and engineering]. Between 1931 and 1945, grads in applied science and engineering, he noted, increased by 81 per cent. In same period, graduates in arts only increased 23 per cent., See *ibid.*, 557.

¹²⁵Ibid., 558

¹²⁶Quoted in *ibid.*, 531

¹²⁷See *ibid.*, chapter 13. Much more will be said on change and the university in this period in chapters three and four.

¹²⁸Quoted in *ibid.*, 557

¹²⁹Canadian Social Science Research Council. (1942, November). *Brief to the Canadian Government* Donald Creighton Papers, Public Archives of Canada (PAC), v. 15, H.A. Innis, 1924-54, MG 31 D77

¹³⁰Vincent Massey, (1948, April 23), *Address by the Right Honourable Vincent Massey before the Graduate Organization of the University of Toronto for Kingston and District, Kingston, Ontario*. Vincent Massey Papers, University of Toronto Archives (UTA), 421(08), B87-0082, 5-6

¹³¹George P. Grant, "The Teaching of Philosophy in English-Speaking Canada," draft copy, (24 October 1950), Hilda Neatby Papers, Saskatchewan Archives Board (SAB), II. 93; file: Grant, Professor G.P., "The Teaching of Philosophy in English-Speaking Canada", 3. See also George Grant, "'Philosophy' in Canada", *Royal Commission Studies: A Selection of Essays Prepared for the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences* (Ottawa, 1948)

¹³²Ibid.

¹³³Donald Creighton, (n.d.) "Education for Government: What can the humanities do for government?", unpublished manuscript, Donald Creighton Papers, PAC, v. 15; Education for government, MG 31 D77, 1

¹³⁴Ibid.

¹³⁵Hutchins along with Mortimer J. Adler edited the 54-volume series called *Great Books of the Western World*.

¹³⁶Hutchins's views here are reminiscent of those of Innis on the role of the scholar. See Innis, "The Role of Intelligence".

¹³⁷See Bruce O. Watkins and Roy Meador, *Technology and Human Values: Collision and*

Solution, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1977), 87.

¹³⁸Make note of those with whom Hutchins came into contact, including Innis and especially Hilda Neatby.

¹³⁹Claude Bissell, "Herbert Marshall McLuhan" in George Sanderson and Frank Macdonald, eds. *Marshall McLuhan: The Man and his Message*. (Golden, Colorado: Fulcrum, 1989), 6

¹⁴⁰Ibid.

¹⁴¹Marshall McLuhan, *The Mechanical Bride: The Folklore of Industrial Man*. (Boston, 1951), 43

¹⁴²Ibid.

¹⁴³McLuhan to Clement McNaspy, S.J., Dec. 15, 1945 [Jan. 15, 1946?], *Letters of Marshall McLuhan*, eds. Matie Molinaro et al. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1987), 180. McLuhan was not opposed to the study of the classics in literature; rather, he welcomed it.

¹⁴⁴This is something the "medievalism" of Hutchins and Adler failed to provide. McLuhan, 44.

¹⁴⁵This rejection of the greats approach and propensity to study the salient feature of modern culture characterized McLuhan's shift from literary studies to his early work on the effects of technique. His first important book in this new field, *The Mechanical Bride: Folklore of Industrial Man*, (New York 1950), was an effort to analyze the impact of the so-called unofficial education.

¹⁴⁶Although scholars have acknowledged McLuhan's contributions as a media theorist during the height of his scholarly career in the late 1950s and 1960s, there is little study of his social critique of the 1940s and early 1950s and hence little sense of how McLuhan's pre-Innisian views emerged. An effort is made here to trace the early development of McLuhan's view of the technological society.

¹⁴⁷Marshall McLuhan, "American Advertising", *Horizon* (October 1947); quoted in Eric McLuhan and Frank Zingrone, eds., *Essential McLuhan* (Concord, Ontario: Anansi, 1995), 13.

¹⁴⁸Ibid., 14

¹⁴⁹Marshall McLuhan, "Education of Free Men in Democracy: The Liberal Arts," *St. Louis Studies in Honour of St. Thomas Aquinas* (1943), 49

¹⁵⁰Ibid., 50

¹⁵¹Marshall McLuhan, *The Mechanical Bride: The Folklore of Industrial Man*., quoted in McLuhan and Zingrone, eds., *Essential McLuhan*, 21.

¹⁵²McLuhan, "Education of Free Men in Democracy", 49

¹⁵³Marshall McLuhan, *The Mechanical Bride: Folklore of Industrial Man*, (New York 1950), 21

¹⁵⁴Ibid., 33

¹⁵⁵Ibid.

¹⁵⁶Ibid., 40

¹⁵⁷Ibid., 7

¹⁵⁸Ibid., 87

¹⁵⁹Kenneth Norrie and Douglas Owram, *A History of the Canadian Economy*, (Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 1991), 414

¹⁶⁰Vincent Massey, *Address to the Canadian Club of London, England*, 1 July 1953, draft copy, Hilda Neatby Papers, (SAB), A139, I.12, Massey, Vincent, 1951-1969, (1), 2. See also "Canada: Her Status and Stature" in Vincent Massey, *Speaking of Canada: Addresses by the Right Honourable Vincent Massey* (Toronto, 1959).

¹⁶¹Ibid.

¹⁶²Ibid., 6

¹⁶³Ibid., 5

¹⁶⁴Vincent Massey, "Useful Knowledge", Convocation of the University of Manitoba, Draft Copy, Hilda Neatby Papers, (SAB)A139, I.12, Massey, Vincent, 1951-1969, (2), 4. See also "Useful Knowledge" in Massey, *Speaking of Canada*.

¹⁶⁵Harold Innis, "Implications of the Interactions Between Values and Resources", unpublished address, (2 October 1949), Harold Innis Papers (UTA) B72 - 0003, Box 20, file 33, 1

¹⁶⁶Ibid., 9

¹⁶⁷Innis to Cole, 20 January, 1950, B 72 - 0025; 011, 01. Innis's "plea for time" and Massey's concern for the demise spiritual values were reflected in many other post-war social critics. Historian Hilda Neatby railed against "the age of scientific materialism" because it overemphasized presentist concerns as opposed to the concern with tradition and the historical, cultural, and religious inheritance of western humanity. See Neatby, "Special Study on Canadian History", Draft Copy, Hilda Neatby Papers (SAB), A139, II. 103, Special Studies: Neatby, Hilda, "Special Study on Canadian History"), 21-2. This crisis of values was reflected in the Massey Commission and the concern over the fate of higher learning after the

war. See chapters three through five.

¹⁶⁸Quoted in Owsram, 15

¹⁶⁹Quoted in *ibid.*, 15-16

¹⁷⁰George Grant, "The Uses of Freedom", *Queen's Quarterly* 62 (Winter 1955-6), 518

¹⁷¹*Ibid.*

¹⁷²*Ibid.*, 521

¹⁷³*Ibid.*, 520-1

¹⁷⁴*Ibid.*, 521

¹⁷⁵George Grant, *Technology and Empire. Perspectives on North America*, (Toronto, 1969), 137

¹⁷⁶*Ibid.* 28

¹⁷⁷Arthur Kroker, *Technology and the Canadian Mind. Innis, Grant, and McLuhan*, (Montréal, 1984), 18-19

¹⁷⁸Quoted in William Christian, *George Grant: A Biography* (Toronto, 1993), 143.

¹⁷⁹Grant, "The Teaching of Philosophy in English-Speaking Canada", 7

¹⁸⁰*Ibid.*

¹⁸¹*Ibid.*, 5-6

¹⁸²Grant does admit that there are scholars in Canada who, like him, identified a problem of philosophic values. The Massey Commission and scholarly efforts such as those of C.N. Cochrane and Harold Innis were efforts to pursue a "philosophical approach" to modern humanity's problems. They comprise hence a reaction against the advent of the technological imperative. See chapter four

¹⁸³Grant, "The Teaching of Philosophy in English-Speaking Canada", 8

¹⁸⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵George Grant, *Philosophy in the Mass Age*, (Toronto, 1959), 7-8

¹⁸⁶Grant, *Technology and Empire*, 88-9

¹⁸⁷Malcolm M. Wallace, "The Present Status of the Humanities in Canada", Study submitted to the Massey Commission by Malcolm M. Wallace. Hilda Neatby Papers (SAB) II. 110 (Special Studies: Wallace, "The Present Status of the Humanities in Canada", A139, 1. See also Malcolm M. Wallace, "The Present Status of the Humanities in Canada", *Royal Commission Studies: A Selection of Essays Prepared for the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences* (Ottawa, 1948)

¹⁸⁸*Ibid.*

The Modernization of Higher Learning in Canada

The 1890-1920 period was an era of considerable transformation for the university in English-speaking Canada. To the late nineteenth century, universities had been cultural outposts responsible for inculcating the values and virtues of “British culture” to students living on an American continent. They were denominational institutions whose main duty was both to help develop a “dutiful, morally sound social order” and to allow a certain class of individuals within society “access to the ‘higher’ forms of learning”.¹ While applied and pure sciences had gained in importance towards the end of the century, instruction in the liberal arts still dominated curricula. The study of the literary “greats” and the acquisition of a classical education more generally was the main objective of the vast majority of university students. The universities’ reason for being was, after all, “to provide a given generation access to the inherited wisdom of the ages and to the major branches of knowledge”.²

Universities changed substantially by 1920. Canadian society, as we have seen in the last chapter, quickly evolved from an agrarian, primary resource-based economy, to a relatively urban and industrial society, with manufacturing and service industries growing in significance. Institutional development reflected the profound socio-economic transition. The universities were no exception. Their development in the first two decades of the twentieth century mirrored the needs of an ever urban-industrializing nation. Commenting on the considerable change of the previous few decades, the University of Toronto Chancellor noted in the summer of 1921 that “the educational sky is thickly studded” to include “schools of agriculture, education, commerce, dentistry, pharmacy, journalism, [and] nursing ...”³ Sir Robert Falconer argued furthermore that several, newer professional schools, such as optometry and osteopathy, were also poised to be recognized as disciplines. While “the old-established faculties” gave the “University its character”, he concluded, extending the astronomical metaphor, “[n]ew stars being drawn into the orbit of older planets make an impressive constellation”.⁴ Through the incorporation of new programs and branches of knowledge the broadly based university increasingly whittled away at the liberal arts orientation of Canadian universities. As with other larger Canadian universities such as McGill and Queen’s, Falconer’s University of Toronto had to come to terms with the emergence of a multi-faculty university. With the growth of the scientific and professional schools, the introduction of commerce and extension programs, the building of new and elaborate research facilities, and a newfound focus on scientific research, Falconer accepted the fact that the Victorian university had

vanished, replaced by new-style educational institutions to meet the exigencies of a modernizing society. The age of the full service institution had begun.

No longer centres of moral guidance and classical learning, by 1914 university departments traditionally responsible for social issues took on a new, strictly utilitarian alignment. Although greatly underdeveloped by British and American standards, the Canadian social sciences emerged as a means by which scholars and researchers could dispassionately assess socio-economic change and remedy industrial problems. University officials recognized more and more that social studies could contribute to Canadian social development. Research on socio-economic issues, for instance, took up much time of O.D. Skelton of Queen's University. James Mavor, head of Toronto's Department of Political Economy, attempted to convince students and fellow faculty members of growing governmental reliance on social scientists to guide the policy making of government officials.⁵ McGill Principal Sir Arthur Currie, for his part, proposed the establishment at his institution of a public administration program that the dominion and provincial governments could go to for social service experts. At the University of Toronto, social scientists submitted a proposal to the senate to create a school of social service to "investigate the problems of poverty and philanthropy, crime and its prevention, and government and its administration".⁶ The members of the arts faculties were concerned about growing social problems and hoped to apply their training and expertise to "alleviating social misfortune and remedying social maladjustment".⁷ At the Second Congress of the Universities of the Empire, Currie best summed up the newfound willingness of universities to develop programs to deal with social issues. He declared that "times had changed" and that McGill's "educational system must change with them if it is to serve a new environment". Ancient knowledge must continue, he noted, but the new learning that changed "the face of the world" must be added to it.⁸ For Currie and others, social studies were a field through which principles and theories could be best applied to meet the exigencies of modern life. They were the foundations on which society could be understood and indeed transformed so as to create new and progressive social environments.⁹ Most significantly, they entailed the scientific appraisal of society and an efficient means of reconstructing it. Thus, the social scientist could help re-form society and give it the social stability it so desperately needed.

More important to the new utilitarian orientation of the universities was the advent of the applied sciences and scientific research. As we saw in the last chapter, the research ideal had become entrenched in Canadian universities by 1914. The Great War, had provided added impetus to augment industrial research at the universities. To many advocates of the research ideal, the war had demonstrated beyond doubt the significance of

scientific research.¹⁰ It also showed, however, that Canadian universities lacked the scientists and research facilities to provide for national security or to facilitate rapid industrialization. At McGill, for example, authorities concluded that science in all its branches must be taught to make up for the paucity of scientific specialists and research students killed in action.¹¹ The Registrar and Principal of Queen's argued moreover that the "Universities of Canada should concern themselves with research in pure and applied science", areas of inquiry that constituted "the basis on which all industrial research must be laid". "The ideal duty of the Universities," they contended, was to respond to the changing needs of industrial society by developing programs and facilities to contribute to new knowledge in the sciences. Lacking sufficient resources in the past, the "Universities should be equipped and staffed to train the new army of researchers who are to assist in the application of science to Canadian industry".¹² To meet the challenges on the new age, they concluded, Canada must be prepared to emulate Germany's unwavering commitment to pure and applied science. It must expand and create a centralized control over industrial research in the universities, further, so as to be counted among the great industrialized nations.¹³ Industrial research and development were not in the end merely issues that impinged upon the evolution of the universities themselves; they were matters that affected the entire pace and direction of national development.

Outside the universities people also stressed the practical functioning of the university. By the end of the First World War, Canadians began to weigh traditional academic values against the notion of the university as a bastion of industrial knowledge and technical personnel. The *Canadian Annual Review* [CAR], for instance, noted that while the Canadian university still retained its British liberal arts traditions, a "fabric of up-to-date, modern technical, commercial, industrial, agricultural and business instruction" had recently overlaid the older system of higher learning.¹⁴ Canadian universities, in the words of CAR editor Castell Hopkins, were attempting to "keep up with developments around them" in a rapidly changing commercial and industrial world, while maintaining Old World traditions and culture.¹⁵ He concluded that the universities were being "influenced by public opinion" now more than ever, and the Canadian population was much more interested in such activities as the development of agriculture, the building of railways, the sinking of mines, and the "transformation of the raw material into marketable, usable, products" than they were in "the mission of Oxford or Cambridge".¹⁶ As for a growing number of university authorities, Hopkins understood not only the ever-closer relationship between higher learning and industrial society, but also the impact of public perceptions on the university's development.

Despite the considerable advances of the scientific and technical schools, and the blandishments of Hopkins and others to the contrary, the humanities remained at the core of university throughout the interwar era. Nevertheless, technical and professional instruction became more and more central as the years wore on. As an observant *Toronto Mail* journalist indicated, Canadian universities after 1918 were torn between the British “cultural” model and the newer, American model of higher education, which increasingly facilitated technical education and produced the knowledge, personnel, and equipment to meet the needs of an advanced industrial society.¹⁷ Indeed, a struggle ensued between the two competing notions of higher learning, with individuals on both sides of the debate arguing the merits and demerits of “technical education”. The history of the Canadian university in the interwar period was, as a result, marked by an uncertainty as to the basic purpose of the university. As the next great war of the century approached, however, it became clear that the public, governments, and university officials increasingly accepted the social utility of higher learning in Canada. The inexorable reorientation of higher learning towards “operational utility”¹⁸ in the interwar era did much to shape the nature of the modern university in Canada. By the 1940s, the precarious equipoise between the competing visions had been destroyed and the balance tipped heavily in favour of scientific research and the professional ideal. The increasingly utilitarian orientation of higher education not only characterized the development between the wars, but it also constituted a key facet of academic modernization of the Canadian university.

As A.B. McKillop has pointed out in his history of Ontario’s higher education, developments in commerce, political economy, and the practical and medical sciences provided the best evidence of the emerging “culture of utility”.¹⁹ In commerce or business administration there was a very significant increase in the numbers of students throughout the interwar years. Enrolment in the finance and commerce portion of the University of Toronto’s Department of Political Economy rose almost six-fold, from 60 to 352 students between 1919 and 1932.²⁰ Student enrolments continued to increase at a rapid rate through the 1930s, even in spite of the ruinous Great Depression. An 1946 estimate put numbers of commerce graduates for the years 1937 to 1941 at three times (1065) the count of graduates for the 1922 to 1926 period (334).²¹ By 1921 in Canada’s most populous province, furthermore, there had already been a substantial number of people employed in the so-called white collar employment linked to trade and commerce. The count continued to grow at a gradually accelerating pace through the depression years into the 1940s. Most significantly, the percentages of those occupied in this type of employment increasingly

obtained their training in the province's colleges and universities. The "age of the self-taught, self-made entrepreneur," in McKillop's phrase, was drawing to a close.²²

The reasons for the rise of commerce and trade were clear. Individuals within and outside university circles began to realize that an industrializing nation needed university-trained personnel who could cope with the growing complexities of banking, investments, and trade and finance, as well as business management. In the postwar economic climate, government and industrial officials were agreed that there was a great need for expertise in the fields of taxation, trade, and socio-economic reconstruction generally.²³ They turned with growing frequency to the universities to address the problems of reconstruction and to meet the commercial and industrial exigencies of postwar Canada. Ever-increasing demands for experts in the areas of commerce, finance, and industry, furthermore, helped to gain legitimacy for commerce programs and aided in sustaining substantial student enrolments throughout the period.²⁴ Through participation in public hearings and inquiries, and extensive work for provincial and federal governments generally, government officials and the public at large could see the practical uses of university training.²⁵ Tangible solutions to real socio-economic problems in Royal Commission reports and government white papers were imminently more useful than the seemingly irrelevant strictures of an out-of-touch professoriate. Advancing specialization, meanwhile, helped to gain for academics added notoriety within the universities themselves. As it had in the United States and western Europe, the age of specialization and expertise had arrived in Canada. University commerce and trade programs (usually within the discipline of economics, or political economy), in short, merged ever closer to Canadian business and industry and achieved a hitherto unrealized regard, all within a postwar world that wanted to forget the trauma of total war and move on to the more prosaic concerns of building a strong industrial economy and a prosperous nation.

The economic downturn of the 1930s did little to interrupt trends towards operational utility. In fact, the Depression actually amplified the significance of programs and personnel concerned with economic issues. It demonstrated how economic events could profoundly influence the lives of Canadians. Most importantly, it showed that theories on economic trends and cycles were not remote, academic, or irrelevant, but rather that economic development issues were critical to assessing and potentially overcoming the economic malaise. Those equipped to broach the difficult questions of economic causation, in consequence, grew in prestige. They were the individuals, after all, entrusted with finding solutions to seemingly intractable problems. By the 1930s Canadian society found a new and important place for political economists and others involved in the application of knowledge and expertise to the resolution of the enduring economic crisis. In a decade of

economic despondency, economists and their social scientific brethren became the decade's new shamans, the only hope to set aright a failing socio-economic system.²⁶

Enhancing the prestige of economists and other social scientists, the Depression also accelerated the academic's role as governmental policy advisor. Most mainstream political economists agreed that the government ought to play a much larger part in the restructuring and direction of the economy.²⁷ Influenced to a considerable extent by Keynesian economic theory, they thought that academics should answer governments' calls for expert assistance. Political economists, they claimed, were those best qualified to advise on issues requiring special knowledge and insight. Despite a few dissenters such as Harold Innis, many scholars participated in public affairs in varying capacities. University scholars, for instance, prepared the vast majority of research reports written for the Royal Commission on Federal-Provincial Affairs, while a growing number of political economists participated in other governmental research projects or joined the civil service outright.²⁸ Continuing a trend begun in the 1920s, academics realized a growing opportunity to expand their social utility by rendering services to provincial and federal governments. The perhaps unnoticed consequence was the reinforcement of the utilitarian university.

As with developments in commerce and political economy, the evolution of the practical and medical sciences in the interwar years demonstrated the emergence of the ethic of utility. The rise of engineering is especially illustrative. Buoyed by the successes of the applied sciences during the first war, university representatives were confident that engineers could continue to provide for the material well-being of Canadians. Many within the applied science community considered engineering as sort of "public utility", responsible not only for the spread of acquired knowledge, but also the enhancement of living standards and the amelioration of material conditions.²⁹ Engineers considered themselves the "primary agents of industrial society", the "shock troops of British civilization", whose duty it was to propagate material progress stemming from the Industrial Revolution.³⁰ Civil engineers designed the bridges, planned the cities, and constructed the roads, factories, and office buildings, while mechanical, chemical, and electrical engineers discovered the processes, initiated the research, and compiled the knowledge on which current and future industrial development relied. Like political scientists or commerce students, then, the engineer, in the minds of the public and applied scientists alike, had a practical and very significant part to play in the material development of Canadian society.

Growth of engineering faculties and increases in enrolments reflected the engineer's newfound social status in Canadian society. Engineering enrolment at all Canadian

universities increased almost three-fold between 1920-1940 from 1500 to 4381.³¹ Establishing engineering schools only shortly before 1920, the four western provincial universities achieved the most pronounced increases. The University of Saskatchewan, for instance, saw numbers of engineering registrants increase from 36 to 503, while the University of Alberta experienced only a slightly lesser increase, from 71 to 311.³² All universities, save for the University of New Brunswick (113), boasted enrolments of over 200 students. Even through the ruinous Depression years, engineering schools churned out students at a slow, but ever-increasing rate.³³ Canadian universities remained ready to provide the vital human resource for industrial expansion, even during a period of socio-economic crisis.

As with engineering, medical training became more and more oriented towards public service and the betterment of living conditions. From around the turn of the century, medical practitioners in Canada and elsewhere increasingly applied scientific methodology to treat illnesses. Through medical researches, they achieved great successes in understanding the causes and natures of a variety of communicable diseases such as cholera, diphtheria, dysentery, tetanus and typhoid.³⁴ Many more advances, of course, were still to come as thousands continued to perish from pneumonia, polio, and tuberculosis, among other fatal diseases. There were many more advances than failures, however, and people everywhere began to tout the amazing innovations of medical science. Frederick Banting's discovery of insulin, for instance, provided ample evidence of the esteem in which the public held doctors and medical researchers. Canadians considered the discovery of insulin nothing sort of heroic, and the legend of Banting's 1922 triumph lived on well into the next decade.³⁵ Perhaps most significantly, the insulin discovery clearly demonstrated how the physician had been transformed in the twentieth century to a newfound status more akin to that of motion picture performers and other cultural icons than to that of other respected professionals such as lawyers, teachers, and clerics. The healing physician had captivated the public's imagination. Through the marvels of modern medical science, he was the one responsible for protecting Canadians from pestilence and for discovering the causes of, and providing the remedies for, the many diseases that had plagued humankind.³⁶

Like the engineer, the modern physician rose in prestige not only because of advances in medical science, but also because of the emergence of medical specialists. As with other practical sciences, the medical faculties of Canadian universities encouraged the growth of specialization and expertise. Medical experts began working in close association with university and other advanced research hospitals to take advantage of sophisticated equipment and large patient bases. In addition, advanced hospitals and medical faculties

developed new fields of expertise that they quickly subdivided into still narrower specialties.³⁷ Between the years 1913 and 1924, for example, the University of Western Ontario created eight specialized departments³⁸ and hired many full time staff. The University of Toronto reoriented its medical faculty away from the training of generalists, the emphasis on the teaching, and practice of medicine, and stressed instead research and full-time clinical instruction. By the 1920s, the medical faculty was training students to become clinicians and medical specialists as opposed to general practitioners.³⁹ The hour of the medical generalist as academic and the unsophisticated medical researcher had ended. Indeed, the medical scientist shed the “folksy image” and the outmoded equipment of the general practitioner of previous generations, and rose quickly to become a “symbol of supreme accomplishment” within the medical and university communities.⁴⁰

The growth of commerce and economics, engineering, and the medical sciences all illustrated the new direction of English-speaking Canadian universities in the interwar years. While retaining a focus on the liberal arts, higher learning in Canada emulated more and more the structures and orientations of American and Western European universities.⁴¹ Through an advancing concern for such practical considerations as industrial and medical research, and through providing expertise to deal with increasingly complex social issues, it became ever more responsive to the exigencies of the modern industrial society. The university became a focal point of practical research essential to the material development of the nation. Acknowledged by the public as storehouses of knowledge and expertise, institutions of higher education had begun their transformation from little-known cultural outposts to well-equipped research facilities, integral to the vitality of a modernizing nation. The utilitarian bent of the modern university owed much to a society that highly valued tangible applications for knowledge and that seemed indifferent to the spiritual and humanistic values of the traditional Victorian university. And while maintaining strong links to the past, the values and ideals of Canadian higher education were transforming to come to terms with new social, industrial, and other developmental concerns. Both university officials and the public at large considered service to society one of the university’s main functions. This new social service ethic was a chief aspect of the university’s development between the wars.

Along with these new perspectives on the functions of higher education, changing relationships with the modern state contributed to the modernization of universities. In an age of expansion, in which programs and facilities became ever more costly, and increased student enrolments required larger staffs and additional plant, universities came to depend on government funding. Financial assistance did not come cheap, however. The financial

nexus only amplified the social utility role of higher education, for governments and the public generally considered professors more and more as public employees as opposed to independent intellectual agents. Universities, especially the larger ones, became accountable to provincial treasuries as university administrators became less concerned with academic matters and more interested in finances and maintaining positive relations with provincial governments. They also became answerable to the public, who wanted their taxes put to effective use and who, therefore, reacted adversely to university men who deviated from their rightful roles as social servants. Indeed, governmental and public involvement in university life characterized the interwar era. In this period, the major universities, which only recently had achieved autonomy from their religious overlords, began to relinquish that newfound independence to a new master, the modern state. As they became integrated in the expanding state, academic freedom, which was often more an ideal than an actuality, had once more come under siege. The modern state had replaced the church as the main instrument of control.

The 1920-1 Royal Commission on University Finances was evidence of the new relationship between the university and the state. It demonstrated, above all, the solidification of the connection between Ontario's non-denominational universities -- Queen's, Western and Toronto -- and the provincial legislature. In a climate of growing postwar enrolments, the provincial Minister of Education, R.H. Grant, called a royal commission to address the question of financial aid to the universities. Sitting only a few short months, the Cody Commission (named after the commission's chairman, H.J. Cody) tabled a report that satisfied each of the universities. It recognized the advancing needs of higher education and the province's duty to provide funding for new facilities. The commissioners also noted that the annual grant of \$500,000 to the University of Toronto was inadequate and ought to be augmented. They also recommended continued and perhaps additional funds for Queen's and Western.⁴² Of twelve recommendations, Queen's Park adopted eleven, as the Cody Commission became "a vital blueprint for the renewal and expansion of higher education in Ontario for more than a quarter century".⁴³

Providing financial security when it was most needed, the Cody commissioners attached conditions to funding recommendations. Universities using provincial funds for campus construction had to gain provincial approval, and the Commission suggested that universities ought to "report on their work" during a regular "University Day" in the provincial legislature. The commissioners suggested that the Board of Governors continue to control the Provincial University, and that "such a Board be truly representative of the whole Province".⁴⁴ Significantly, this provision did much to eviscerate the spirit of the 1906 University Act, which wanted to avoid political intervention into university matters.⁴⁵

On the whole, the 1921 commission did much to take advantage of increased financial needs of the publicly funded universities. Financial entanglements with provincial legislatures, in short, entailed new controls and conditions to which universities had become bound to achieve financial viability.⁴⁶

The accommodation between universities and governments also impinged upon issues of academic freedom. Issues of academic liberty figured prominently in the interwar decades. The principal of Queen's University, for instance, expressed concern over the problem of maintaining freedom of expression in a climate in which business-oriented boards of governors had an increasingly influential role. In a speech to the University of Manitoba's convocating class of 1919, R. Bruce Taylor echoed American academic and social critic Thorstein Veblen's view that university administrations had taken up a "business-like expediency", and had sublimated all former interests to "pecuniary interests".⁴⁷ It is doubtful whether Taylor accepted the Veblenesque view that modern universities had become subject to management and bureaucratic structures of American business culture. Higher education in Canada had not yet reached the same accommodation with business as it had in the United States. Nevertheless, Taylor pointed to the difficulty of maintaining age-old codes of free speech in a university climate dominated by business-oriented boards of governors. He feared, above all, that board members had become inordinately concerned with expansion and financial security and that they were therefore destroying an academic milieu conducive to scholarly activity. Adding his voice to that of Taylor, E.E. Braithwaite, President of the University of Western Ontario, was concerned that some professors, especially political economists, might engaged in self-censorship, so as to make their "conclusions conform to the capitalists who might occupy a seat on the governing board". The usefulness of such scholars and the institutions they represented, he concluded, would be "seriously impaired" as a result.⁴⁸ For Braithwaite, as for Taylor, the transformation of universities into corporations and the demotion of the academic to the status of factory employee was well underway, a tendency that was both disquieting and indeed potentially harmful to an institution reliant on liberty of thought and expression.⁴⁹

Universities and their scholars also came under intense public scrutiny. The instance of Reuben Leonard, a successful businessman, philanthropist and member of the board of the University of Toronto, was a case in point. Leonard became enraged upon reading *Labour in a Changing World*, a work which Toronto Political Economist R.M. MacIver had published in 1919. The book offended Leonard's sensibilities precisely because it advocated, according to Leonard, social chaos and anarchy. It had been written in the Boleshevist tradition and as such was repugnant to the existing political order. Most of all, Leonard thought that the University of Toronto ought to muzzle MacIver to ensure

that additional subversive material be suppressed and that young minds avoid exposure to dangerous revolutionary philosophies.

In the protracted series of events that followed, Leonard expressed his views to Falconer, among many others within the university community.⁵⁰ Unsatisfied, he continued his agitations against the MacIver and other incidences of scholarly subversion until 1922, when Falconer convened a meeting of Toronto's academic community, designed to put the issue to rest. The first part of Falconer's address was a conventional retelling of the uses and purposes of academic freedom, essentially a placement of scholarly free speech within the larger context of toleration and the "liberty of thought".⁵¹ While espousing such "sacred" principles as the universal enjoyment of academic freedom for all professors, Falconer went on to deal with the MacIver incident. The principle of academic liberty, he claimed, could not be questioned if scholars refrained from participation in partisan politics.⁵² If professors were indiscreet, however, and chose to make "political utterances" and to take part in party politics, then they exposed both themselves and the university they represented to public attack. Intemperate remarks, Falconer contended, might adversely affect relations between universities and the state; they might displease governments and induce them to cut financial and other support on which universities depended. Falconer's message was clear: academic freedom should not extend beyond the walls of the university, lest the individual professor endanger the liberty of his colleagues and the entire institution of higher learning. He recommended therefore that scholars desist from engaging in political activities and therefore avoid imperiling the good names of their universities.⁵³

From the perspective of achieving desired results, Falconer's address had been astutely formulated. He played to the audience in reaffirming the significance of academic liberty, while, at the same time, he silenced Leonard and other critics of outspoken academics. More importantly, in making clear that radical views impinged upon all within the university, Falconer induced academics to curtail seditious opinions and to engage instead in a type of self-censorship that encouraged compliance and conformity with current social standards.⁵⁴ The ultimate result was to avoid enflaming public opinion or creating adverse government reactions against academics and institutions of higher learning. Falconer's words had the desired short-term effect at Toronto, as professors heeded their President's injunctions and refrained from uttering impolitic remarks.⁵⁵

Falconer's talk was more than a stern warning to potentially wayward academics, however. It spoke not only to the problems of academic freedom but also to the shifting relationship between the university and society. The implicit goal of Falconer's address was to allay public concerns about the rise of Bolshevism and the possible emergence of

revolutionary dogma. In directing scholars to remain neutral on political affairs, and therefore requiring them to relinquish a wider conception of academic liberty,⁵⁶ it reassured government officials that the University had not developed into a hotbed of radical thought or had evolved into a potentially destabilizing social establishment. In doing so, Falconer unwittingly showed how the state-run University had become a political entity that had become responsible to the electorate and that therefore had to make concessions to popular opinion and influential members of the voting public. The Leonard-MacIver imbroglio, in brief, made manifest the willingness of state-affiliated universities to compromise fundamental principles in order to appease governments and powerful critics. The state's hold on the publicly funded university seemed never stronger.

Despite a successful resolution, the Leonard-MacIver affair signaled the beginning of a trend towards further attacks on the idea of university autonomy. G. Howard Ferguson's rise to the Ontario premiership, for example, provided further controversy on the issue of academic liberty. Ferguson took a particular interest in university affairs, especially those at Toronto. He even went so far as to declare that he was "the boss of the Toronto University".⁵⁷ Functioning as his own Minister of Education, he made sure to transfer public complaints concerning matters of academic performance and discipline to President Falconer for additional review. While ultimately supportive of the President's decisions, Ferguson's actions not only annoyed Falconer, but they also infringed on purely academic matters. Ferguson's meddling certainly mirrored the character of the man, his government, and his government's stable majority. It also reflected, however, the growing intrusions of governments into academic affairs.⁵⁸

Deeply suspicious of radicalism and foreigners and intolerant of political nonconformity, Ferguson posed greater problems to Falconer and the Ontario professoriate. Informed of a case in which a student of political economist Gilbert Jackson had been assigned to read the *Communist Manifesto*, an outraged Ferguson immediately wrote to Falconer. He reminded the President that the work had been a prohibited publication and that it should not therefore find its way either into the hands of an impressionable young student or onto the reading list of a political economy course. "[T]hese works should be exterminated", the Premier fulminated, and should "members of the staff either encourage or condone this kind of doctrine, they should be summarily dismissed." The "matter is too serious to be ignored", he concluded.⁵⁹ No sooner had the Jackson incident abated than did Ferguson accuse another Toronto political economist of inciting sedition. The Premier charged C.R. Fay of teaching Marxist dogma. As proof, he referred Falconer to a 27 November 1924 article in the *Financial Post*. Because of these seditious views, Fay should not be "the sort of man ... [we have] on the staff. Surely",

Ferguson continued, "our Educational Institution should not be ... encouraging the activities of a Communist".⁶⁰

The outspoken and iconoclastic Frank Underhill was the next University of Toronto scholar to languish in the intolerant climate of the Ferguson régime. Somehow Ferguson had been informed that the historian Underhill had taught, in one of his history courses, that the British had shared with Germany responsibility for causing the Great War. For the ultra-patriotic Ferguson, this interpretation was nothing short of blasphemy. He questioned Underhill's use of his personal interpretation of events when so much documentation as to the true origins of the war was freely available.⁶¹ He threatened, furthermore, to force the dismissal of the young historian. In a letter to crony H.J. Cody, he stated that if rumours had been true and Underhill was indeed disloyal, he would be "compelled ... to take the steps that might be thought drastic".⁶²

As with the Jackson and Fay incidents this first Underhill imbroglio quickly ebbed away as Falconer assured the bombastic Ferguson that the allegations against the historian were unfounded. But amid a political milieu that was increasingly inimical to errant professors and their dissenting views, it seemed only a matter of time before another episode of disloyalty or radicalism would spur Queen's Park to action. Indeed, only a few short months after his first clash with Ferguson, a piece in *Canadian Forum*, penned by Underhill, raised the ire of the Premier. The article, which exposed Underhill's aversion to the anti-Americanism of Canadian politicians, prompted Ferguson again to write Cody. Ferguson warned that Underhill exploit "his talents on the job he is being paid for" lest the Premier be "tempted to tick off a number of salaries of some men who seem to take more interest in interfering in matters of public policy and public controversy than they do in the work for which they are paid".⁶³ Unlike in past episodes, on this occasion members of the governing board and others wholeheartedly supported Ferguson's position and agreed with the Premier's views on the essential purposes of the university scholar.⁶⁴ Not even the temporizing of Falconer, should it have materialized, could have saved the Toronto historian from the wrath of the Premier and those responsible for a growing body of opinion directed against Underhill and other insubordinate scholars.

Issues of free speech came to a head early in 1931. As usual, Frank Underhill was at the storm's centre. Trouble began when the Toronto police force had persuaded owners of halls and other meeting places not to rent out their facilities to the Fellowship of Reconciliation, an international and interdenominational association formed to facilitate international class and racial fellowship.⁶⁵ Police officials claimed that the Fellowship was merely a front for communistic activities and played on the proprietors' sense of patriotism and anti-communism to gain compliance. The incident outraged Underhill, who, with

classicist Eric Havelock, drafted a letter that protested the actions of Toronto police. Underhill, Havelock, and the sixty-six other members of the University that had signed the note (including Harold Innis and Donald Creighton) argued that police actions threatened fundamental rights to free speech and assembly. Appearing in the four main Toronto dailies, the letters of the Toronto “sixty-eight” claimed that the activities of the Police Commission had nullified what “has for generations been considered one of the proudest heritages of the British peoples ... It is the plain duty of the citizen”, letters to the editor concluded, “to protest publicly against such curtailment of his rights, and, in doing so, we wish to affirm our belief in the free public expression of opinions, however unpopular or erroneous”.⁶⁶

The professors’ declaration elicited a strong reaction. The public response was best represented in the printed press. Motivated in large measure by a prime opportunity to sell papers, the Toronto journalists and editorialists denounced the professors’ stance. Taking advantage of the public aversion to the red menace, they characterized the Toronto “sixty-eight” as a group of burgeoning Bolsheviks bent on allowing leftist radicalism to gain a foothold in Toronto during perilous times. Influential private citizens also echoed this view. Sir John Aird, President of the Canadian Bank of Commerce, advised that the professors should “stick to their knitting”,⁶⁷ while Sir Edward Beatty, President of the CPR, denounced the penchant of scholars (especially young political economists) to teach socialism.⁶⁸ The reaction of university officials was likewise unsympathetic to the sixty-eight. After publication of the letter, the governing board moved to disassociate the University from the professors’ position. Board of Governors President Cody notified the newspapers that the professors did not speak for the university, while Board member Sir Joseph Flavelle declared that “every teacher is a trustee for the institution”, and that no hasty or impulsive act “shall jeopardize the progress and development of the University”.⁶⁹

No dismissals or public censure of professors ensued. Yet the official university position concerning academic liberty had been made clear. In failing to defend the professoriate, Toronto officials succumbed to popular sentiments and public pressure. Their unwillingness to anger the public or to draw the ire of an intolerant press showed just how much the university had become responsive to public perceptions. Indeed, they had become willing to undermine sacred university traditions so as not to jeopardize the public reputation of their institution and perhaps adversely affect its good standing at Queen’s Park. By failing to defend academic freedom, university leaders showed how they had become more concerned with the university’s public image and role as social servant than with the notion of academic free speech.

Underhill's clash with the Police Commission and subsequent incidents involving free speculation illustrate the nature of the period. More even than the 1920s, the 1930s was a repressive decade. In this climate of widespread economic malaise, many feared the emergence of left-wing movements that threatened the established order. The anti-Bolshevik campaigns that ebbed and flowed since 1918 seemed to intensify after 1930 as the new economic climate seemed to many to be conducive to the rise of revolutionary movements and the undermining of the established order.

The decade was especially troublesome for those associated with the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), and its intellectual offshoot, the League for Social Reconstruction (LSR). The Board of Governors at the University of Alberta, for instance, forbade the entire Arts Faculty from running for a seat in the House of Commons when it discovered the head of the Department of Classics had been nominated to represent the CCF in a west Edmonton riding.⁷⁰ The governing board at United Theological College, furthermore, disregarded recommendations and opted not to renew the appointment of King Gordon. It cited economic constraints for the decision. Many believed however that Gordon's affiliation with the CCF was the true reason for his ouster.⁷¹ Many critics saw past the reformist bent of the CCF and LSR and emphasized instead the revolutionary and radical Marxian orientations of the new left-wing movement. They opposed the CCF's mandate to establish "a new social order" in Canada, one that would substitute planning for "chaotic individualism".⁷² They feared that subversive groups might capitalize on adverse economic conditions and foment social upheaval. Bolstered by the prevailing political mood, critics and several university officials approached the CCF with caution. Not only did they oppose the CCF's program, but they also balked at the prospects of the insinuation of pernicious political dogmas into the universities. Ultimately, they abhorred the idea that the universities might be transformed into focal points of social revolution.

The CCF's isolationist, North American oriented foreign policy also angered opponents. The direction of Canadian foreign policy had become a rancorous issue as war neared. Outrage and calls for censure ensued after the University of Saskatchewan's Carlyle King made a 1938 speech urging that Canada not become embroiled in another war to defend British holdings.⁷³ Frank Underhill took a similar stance. When another critic of pro-British policy was not censured for his actions, Queen's Park went after Underhill.⁷⁴ Hepburn denounced Underhill's strictures on the foreign policy connections of Canada and Great Britain. A founding member of both the LSR and the CCF, Underhill staunchly opposed foreign policy planning that closely linked Canada to British foreign policy. He advocated instead an isolationist stance. His isolationism meant, of course, that Canada should balk at participation in future European wars. "[P]oppies blooming in Flanders

Fields”, he wrote caustically, had no more attraction for Canadians.⁷⁵ Underhill’s fractious statements infuriated Hepburn. For his part, Drew (the leader of the opposition) characterized Underhill’s utterings as seditious and demanded that Underhill be disciplined in a way that “befitting the crime he has committed”.⁷⁶

Although favourably resolved, this latest Underhill imbroglio highlighted the ease with which academics could be made to answer for contentious statements amid the paranoia of the 1930s. It showed the intolerance for dissent expressed at the highest levels of provincial governments and university administrations. Most of all, it lay bare the apathy, if not hostility, of government personnel, the news media⁷⁷, and the population at large⁷⁸ towards the issue of academic free speech. Speaking on the Underhill incident, B.K. Sandwell, editor of *Saturday Night*, expressed despair at the fact that no one rose in Queen’s Park to defend the fundamental issue of academic freedom. He chided the partisan Members of the Provincial Parliament who could not identify “the embryo of totalitarianism” that was implied in the denial of free speech. Responding to the suggestion that university funding be curtailed as a warning to errant professors, he remarked that “this is no time to be reducing grants to Provincial Universities”; instead, the “doors of a liberal education must be thrown wide open in the hope that at least one or two who have enjoyed its benefits will find their way into a future Provincial Legislature”.⁷⁹ For Sandwell and a growing number of scholars, the strengthening of academic freedom in all quarters had become the only way to cope with the erosion of the university traditions that seemed subjected, with growing regularity, to attacks. For the critics of the utilitarian university it had become vital.

Scholarly modernization was a main feature in the interwar development of the Canadian university. As such, its effects did not go unnoticed. A small but vocal group of critics of academic modernization emerged in Canada in this period. As with American opponents of the service oriented academy, Canadian observers, usually university professors, questioned specialization, practical training, and the state’s intrusion into academic life. Most of all, they criticized a higher learning that de-emphasized the traditional cultural role of the university and stressed instead the academy’s emergence as service institution, sensitive to the exigencies of an industrializing nation. In exposing the deficiencies of the modern academy, they worked to reverse current trends and preserve the university true social function: to ensure the vitality of the virtues of freedom, moral guidance, and the cultural traditions of western civilization.

Criticism of academic modernization emerged much earlier in the United States than in Canada. Owing largely to advanced industrialization and a growing commitment to the

principle of operational utility,⁸⁰ the modernization of American colleges and universities had been well advanced by the 1920s. Thorstein Veblen, as we have seen, presented a damning critique of higher learning that singled out as problematic the dominance of American business interests within university governing boards and the academy at large. *The Higher Learning in America* (1918), however, also highlighted the inadequacies of a system of higher education for which the “pursuit of matter-of-fact knowledge” and scientific and technological specialization had become paramount.⁸¹ Veblen objected to a higher education that had been more concerned with providing students mechanical and technical skill to deal with immediate concerns than with developing critical minds that could examine social and philosophical problems.⁸² Expedient interests, he averred, had come to “the forefront of academic policy” as the academy turned away from philosophical values and towards instead “transiently urgent matters of a more material and more ephemeral nature”.⁸³ Integrated in the capitalist structure, the American university had been transformed from an institution responsible for the purveyance of intellectual and cultural values to a training school devoted to “practical efficiency” and to the “needs of earning and spending”.⁸⁴ Most perniciously, it had begun a “long-term drift” away from “cultural interests” towards a vocational and wholly utilitarian character.⁸⁵ More than an indictment of the corporatization of the modern university, thus, Veblen’s work reacted against a nascent educational philosophy that, in adopting the notion of functional utility, had lost a sense of the academy’s historic mission and had therefore abdicated its true social role.

Like Veblen, educational critic and reformer Alexander Meiklejohn, of Brown University and, later, Amherst College, had grave concerns about academic modernization. In an important article entitled “The Aim of the Liberal College”(1921), Meiklejohn opposed the promotion in universities of “specialized knowledge” as a way to address “immediate practical aims” or the inclusion of vocational training in curricula.⁸⁶ While he did not object to practical training *per se*, he was convinced vocationalism had no place in liberal arts colleges. In addition, Meiklejohn urged academics and universities not to become involved in resolving social problems. Universities could best serve society by avoiding the vicissitudes of the world outside the academy and by performing their time-honoured function of providing the citizenry access to a liberal education.⁸⁷ Only in this way could liberal arts institutions contribute to the social order. Meiklejohn feared, however, that this basic objective had been ignored in favour of a new conception of the university in which vocationalism and involvement in extra-university affairs predominated. Echoing Veblen, he expressed concern that higher education increasingly reflected the secular and the materialistic bent of modern American society. Focussing more than ever on the material objectives of the modern world, it ceased to function as an

enclave of the liberal arts. It abandoned, in consequence, its historic role of proffering a philosophic understanding of the human condition. Universities and colleges had become bastions of specialized research and compartmentalized knowledge. As such, they relinquished their fundamental purpose, the search for “unified knowledge which is Insight”. They ultimately failed to serve as a beacon for a society that had lost its way.

Also a ardent critic of utilitarian higher learning, Irving Babbitt, like Meiklejohn, denounced the direction of the modern American university. Humanist scholar and Harvard lecturer, Babbitt deplored the rise of the scientific approach and the advent of the free elective system at Harvard and other institutions. To serve an industrializing society, the universities had begun to neglect their central function, the discovery and inculcation of cultural values.⁸⁸ Active in the New Humanism movement in the 1920s, Babbitt chided the technical orientation of American universities as the research ideal diverted academics away from their rightful social duties, the search for a consensus of values. Universities and academics alike ought to resist contemporary trends, according to the Harvard scholar, and not concern themselves with utilitarian matters such as engineering, medical research, or the other practical fields. They had a much more important function: to set societal standards, which could only be done through the preservation of the best that has been thought and said in the western scholarly tradition.⁸⁹

In stressing the secular and material conditions of human culture, moreover, technical education eroded the vital cultural role of the scholar. Higher learning, for Babbitt, was in crisis precisely because scholars and others in society had begun to devalue its crucial contributions to the development of culture. Most problematical, the degradation of the university and the decline of scholarship meant disaster for future cultural development. With the university’s transformation, cultural leadership would be lost and further growth of American civilization stunted. To Babbitt, the development of higher learning in the United States was of enormous importance to the evolution of American culture. “One is safe ... in affirming”, he wrote in the early 1920s, “that the battle that is to determine the fate of American civilization will be fought out first of all in the field of education”.⁹⁰ Peering over the edge of the precipice into the future of higher education in America, Babbitt sensed a fall was immanent.⁹¹

The issue of the social role of higher education continued to occupy the minds of educational critics into the 1930s. In a time of socio-economic decay, many gave renewed attention to the societal purpose of the university. In November 1932, for instance, about 1,100 professors, university administrators, and other interested parties gathered at the Waldorf Astoria to celebrate the two hundredth anniversary of Columbia University. The conference, tellingly dubbed “The Obligation of Universities to the Social Order”, not only

commemorated the anniversary, but also endeavoured to understand the university's contributions to modern social development. It tried to understand, in the words of Columbia's President, how the "universities of the western world" had been "in a measure directly responsible for the present chaos".⁹² Specifically, Nichols Murray Butler highlighted the function of the academy's practical disciplines in facilitating social progress. The natural sciences, he declared, which "flourished and developed so rapidly under the direction and encouragement of the universities", "contributed immeasurably to the material content and variety" of humanity's existence.⁹³ The modern university had thus fostered the development of tremendous material growth and indeed contributed greatly to the development of the modern industrial state. In so doing, however, it had "released social impulses for which no rational directions were indicated, and no adequate controls provided".⁹⁴ Academics and administrators, Butler suggested, had failed to take account of the social effects of the university's new utilitarian directions and close alliance to the modern industrial state. The social responsibilities of the university seemed to have lapsed at a time of profound socio-economic malaise, a time when society most needed guidance and a steadying influence. For Butler and others, the obligations of those involved in higher learning were clear: the balance between the social and practical functions of the academy had to be redressed.

The significance of Butler's recommendations had not been lost on the Canadian critics of higher learning. In a 1933 article appearing in *Queen's Quarterly*, P.E. Corbett (Professor of Law at McGill) identified "expansion" as the chief evil in the development of the modern university. Specifically, he lamented the mindless replication in Canada of the drive towards functional utility of American institutions. Canadians took it for "granted", he asserted, "that the fundamental problem with which they have had to deal was identical with the problem in the United States ..."⁹⁵ Canadian universities were, in consequence, subject to "American methods" and, most dangerously, an overexpansion to meet the needs of an industrialized, materialistic nation.⁹⁶ Corbett worried that they might thus fall prey to the forces of "mechanical standardization" that had "settled" upon peoples of the west "like a plague" in the nineteenth century.⁹⁷

Corbett most objected, however, to a system of higher education that was concerned with such new educational trends as adult learning, vocationalism, and an undue emphasis on the professions. He abhorred American educational progressivism, which legitimized these tendencies. In an attempt to reach the masses, progressivism undermined the fundamental purpose of the academy. Instead, "teaching on the highest plane and the search for new knowledge were the highest functions for the university." "The university belies its essential purpose," he added, referring especially to adult education and technical

disciplines, “when it steps down to the masses of the unprepared”.⁹⁸ There was no room, in Corbett’s conception of the university, thus, for a “democratic” approach to higher learning.⁹⁹

Exposing the fallaciousness of democratic higher education, Corbett went on to formulate a “test” designed to determine the value of new approaches to knowledge and to spell out the true function of the academy. The pursuit of new knowledge, he reasoned, could be furthered only if the work required “a liberally educated and scientific mind for its efficient prosecution”. The scientific and scholarly pursuit of knowledge was valid only if it “intensified” and “deepened” the university’s “intellectual and scientific life ...”¹⁰⁰ New studies, for Corbett, had to enhance existing “academic riches” of the university, for the academy had to combine an “ardent search” for new scholarly and scientific knowledge with the propagation of older learning.¹⁰¹ The search for new learning in the arts and science was doubtless important. Yet the academy was still entrusted with the task of expanding known knowledge. The maintenance of scholarly traditions and the transmission of older learning became the first great purpose of the academy, without which the acquisition of new knowledge could not be achieved. Higher education was above all a purveyor of knowledge and a custodian of societal customs and values. The academy must employ “scientists and scholars of the first rank”, Corbett concluded, with a “power and passion for original thought” and a penchant to preserve and transfer existing learning.¹⁰²

Emphasizing a balance between the pursuit of new knowledge and the conservation of older learning, Corbett’s musings took on a special importance during the interwar era. His comments reflected an early reaction against the development of an America-style, utilitarian educational system. They responded, above all, to the infiltration of American methods, focussed more on the development of practical training and the emergence of specialized studies than on the advancement of existing learning and the promotion of the humanities and the pure sciences. Like many of the American educational critics before him, Corbett highlighted the evils of the transformation of universities into training facilities and vocational schools. Essentially, Corbett’s declarations constituted a warning: they were a reminder to all concerned that the modern academy must reconsider current policies and directions and instead refocus on its historic functions and traditional social roles. Through intellectual discovery and the production of “cultural men and women”, Corbett hoped that Canadian academics would provide leadership for an imperiled industrial society.¹⁰³ Through the maintenance of older knowledge and wisdom, moreover, academics could assume their traditional roles as purveyors of social and intellectual values. The academy was thus for Corbett what it had been for Meiklejohn and others: a central

cultural institution within industrial society, responsible not only for the pursuit of truth and the discovery of new knowledge, but also for the maintenance of knowledge and the preservation of cultural standards.

Most Canadian universities ignored Corbett's warnings. A small coterie of academics accepted the need to reevaluate the direction of higher learning, however. Commenting on the function of modern social scientist, Harold Innis put forth a well considered reckoning of the university and its role in modern society. Like several other critics of higher education, Innis focussed on the modern academic's relationship to the state and society.¹⁰⁴ Responding to the prevailing intellectual climate of the 1930s, Innis argued that scholars had become enamoured of the intellectual's involvement in social and political affairs. Social scientists, for Innis, had succumbed to society's demands for answers to prevailing social and economic difficulties. They were given therefore to making pronouncements about how to ameliorate socio-economic conditions. In terms of public perception the scholar had become a central figure in the resolution of pressing social problems. Society had come to regard social sciences, such as economics, as panaceas, and economists as soothsayers, addressing prevalent socio-economic problems through the application of advanced mathematics or the latest econometric models. To many, higher learning had never been more socially relevant, and the ties between the social studies and the social order had never been so close.

Unlike those who relished the growing social prominence of the university, Innis chided the recent working relationship between the social sciences and the outside world. The "social sciences," Innis proclaimed in 1935, had become "the opiate of the people".¹⁰⁵ Innis meant here that undue faith had been invested in the ability of the academic to discover the truth and provide final answers. Indeed, the social scientific claim to objectivity and the unassailability of the scientific method were what rendered the social sciences incapable of discovering truth and solving deep-seated social problems. A product of the modern industrial world, the scientific approach in the humanities was merely one of many limitations that hindered the scholarly pursuit of truth.¹⁰⁶ In focussing academic inquiry on ever-more specialized subjects, it took scholars away from a general understanding of their social environment. It provided more and more detailed information on current social and economic issues, issues, according to Innis, of fragmentary importance in light of widespread socio-cultural development. Social scientists had become consumed with the minutiae of current economic and social problems and had lost a sense of Canada's place in greater evolution of western culture. "Intelligence in the social science", Innis declared, "tends to be absorbed in the abstruse and abstract tasks of adjustment and to be lost in specialization, with the result that it is unable to participate in

the endless and complex and possibly fruitless search for trends ...”¹⁰⁷ Society was ill-advised, in short, to place its trust in academics who, in their unbridled haste to implement current scientific methods, had rendered themselves incapable of examining broad events, and who failed, therefore, to fulfill their rightful social roles.

The “contemporary-mindedness” and academic fadism that Innis spoke about afflicted the university at large. Seemingly a bastion to which the scholar could retreat to avoid narrow approaches to knowledge, the universities had also fallen prey to narrow interests. Like the social sciences, the modern university had lost a sense of its historic purpose to discover truth and seek wider meaning. As Innis noted, instead of the search for the truth, departmental routines and other peripheral concerns seemed to occupy the time of university personnel.¹⁰⁸ University officials, furthermore, considered social scientists merely as those capable of achieving scientific advancement and material progress. Hence, there was little acknowledgment of the critical role they could play in understanding and in placing into greater philosophical and historical contexts “profound disturbances” such as the Great Depression.¹⁰⁹ Perhaps most importantly, Innis feared that free discussion in the university had become threatened. In “Discussion in the Social Sciences”, a *Dalhousie Review* article first read to summer session faculty of the University of British Columbia in 1935, he argued that while “mock battles have been fought in the defence of freedom of speech and freedom of the press”, no such rigorous defence of academic free speech had been mounted.¹¹⁰ He meant that although advocates of the liberal society had championed free speech, they presented no like recognition of academic “discussion”. To the contrary, modern democracies had become ever-more control-oriented, creating a climate inimical to free academic discussion. The problem had especially acute in Canada, Innis explained, a country whose history had been marked by political and economic centralization.¹¹¹ Canadian society was characterized by such measures of control as the establishment of a central bank, the growth of a vast federal bureaucracy, and the extension of federal controls over the provinces. In this environment, academics had abandoned their function as free thinkers and instead succumbed to the dictates of governments, politicians, the public, and university authorities. Intellectuals, according to Innis, had become a “tragi-comic group” used by political parties and governments for their own purposes.¹¹² In trying to satisfy the demands of the public to understand their immediate environment, they spouted important-sounding statistics to try to impress their audiences. They had thus been reduced to the status of “traveling comedians” “masquerading as economists and prophets”.¹¹³ Responding to the demands of governments, the public, and to find a niche within the industrial world, intellectuals had become, for Innis, the playthings of an increasingly tyrannical social order. In this climate,

the role of intelligence had been transformed. Once free to engage in the unremitting search for truth, it was now bound up in the immediacies of present circumstances. Discussion in the university wavered, for Innis, in a society bent on limiting free thought and imposing strict controls.

In spite of appearances to the contrary, Innis's commentary on the state of Canadian intellectual life represented much more than nostalgic beckonings for the resurrection of the university tradition. Instead, his writings tried to make clear the social relevance of intellectual life. While appearing arcane and outmoded, the traditional academy, understood in the correct way, could be a significant social force. Most of all, it could perform a vital role in counterbalancing the crass materialism that had beset Canadians. Like many American education critics, Innis understood the cultural role of scholarly activity. More than a cultural institution, the university was responsible for discovering the root causes of the contemporary problems. Its duty was to expose the effects of control through engaging in the inexorable quest for truth. Through unending scholarly toil, academics could provide a point of reference from which moderns could comprehend social developments. In a striking paradox, intellectuals could do vital service by *not* participating in public life or "vested interests", which clouded their judgment and undermined their true purposes. Freed from biases of this kind, Innis averred, universities could provide vital service to a society that had lost all perspective. Despite the seeming contradiction, the traditional "role of intelligence" had never been more socially relevant than at present. Aware of the futility of realizing this vital social role, Innis nevertheless had become devoted to illustrating for all to see the defects of the modern university and the academy's fundamental significance to the modern order.

Mirroring the reaction against academic modernization, Innis's remarks also referred very much to his personal academic circumstances. Innis's disdain for the new developments in the social sciences and the university at large reflected his disavowal of changes to political economy. In the revealingly entitled "The Passing of Political Economy"(1938), his distaste for the contemporary-mindedness of modern political economists generally was as much directed against narrow specialists as it was an indictment of his discipline on the whole.¹¹⁴ His discussion, moreover, of the decline of "philosophy and theology" by the "new dogmas" such as "fascism, communism, [and] democracy" for the political scientist, "occultism, ...practical affairs", banking and others for the economists, highlighted his dismay for the demise of political economy at Toronto and elsewhere.¹¹⁵ Above all, he lamented the passing of the social-philosophic function of political economy; that is, the traditional role of the political economist to understand the nature of a social good, promote social unity, temper scientific analysis with an

understanding of ethical and moral virtue, and, most of all, to comprehend great and subtle changes in civilization.¹¹⁶ He was concerned about a discipline that held little regard for such important scholars such as MacIver and Urwick, who maintained “an interest in the fundamental problems of civilization”, and that instead hired and promoted men who buried themselves in their narrow specialties.¹¹⁷ For an academic who considered himself within the older tradition of political economy and for whom the problems of civilization had taken on an urgent importance, developments in political economy had been disconcerting indeed. For a world mired in economic downturn, totalitarianism, and poised on the brink of a second great war, the passing of the political economy and social philosophy traditions was truly disastrous.

That the interwar period was one of transformation for the university in Canada there can be no doubt. Despite the academy’s evolution, however, there was little sense that the Canadian university was in crisis. Aside from the perspicacity of Corbett and Innis and the dissenting remarks of few others, who usually merely paid lip service to the virtues of academic free enquiry, most observers failed to address such issues of academic modernization as the advent of operational utility, vocationalism, or the social role of the modern academy. Unlike the many American critics of higher learning, only with the arrival of the second great war did Canadian critics fully realize both the changes that their universities had undergone and the vital importance of the academy to postwar developments. Indeed, the Second World War did much to rouse Canadian academics from their complacency. The period after 1939 was one of intense questioning of the function of the modern university. The war threw into question the purposes and objectives of key institutions such as the university. In a word, many observers perceived the war period as one of crisis for the Canadian academy.

Already by the late 1930s academics began to realize the impact that the war was to have on university life in Canada. Academic authorities seemed especially preoccupied with the potential contributions of scholars to a nation and indeed a civilization at war. In an address given to students of Queen’s university, for instance, Sir Edward Beatty explained that academics provided essential guidance for an emerging nation beset by socio-economic difficulties and threatened with political excesses from abroad. Anticipating the impending conflict, Beatty declared in his October 1937 speech that “the destiny of our nation depends ... on our qualities of national courage and wisdom”.¹¹⁸ Moral and intellectual leadership provided by academics was central to the achievement of these attributes. Indeed, humanity at large had, for Beatty, become increasingly reliant on

universities for guidance, leadership, and inspiration.¹¹⁹ “There can no more important task to-day”, he ended, “than that committed to the staffs of our universities”.¹²⁰

Writing early in the war, historian Arthur Lower provided a much more detailed assessment than did Beatty of the wartime role of the scholar. He contended that the second war, like the Great War, did much to hasten the historical process. Not only had the economic and political uncertainty that marked the interwar period ceased, but the Second World War also marked the end of the “old order”.¹²¹ With war, western civilization was at the end of an era. Lower was concerned, moreover, about the character of the impending era, a period, he was convinced, in which the scholar and the university at large had a crucial role to play. In the “The Social Sciences and the Post-War World” (March 1941), he argued that social scientists were responsible for “divining the nature of the future, perhaps even essaying to act as midwives”.¹²² The new order was in the process of formation and the academic, especially the social scientist, had the responsibility both of comprehending and moulding social transformations. “We are at present at an exciting experiment”, he wrote, referring particularly to the evolution of Canadian society; Canadians were at the “beginning of society”, and, realizing this fact, social scientists “would be less than human if [they] did not do something about determining its shape”.¹²³

Lower made clear, furthermore, that social scientists must be more than just observers and recorders of events. They must be, in a word, more than “mere scientists”. Academics must also avoid infusing students and citizens with culture and therefore renounce Victorian approaches to great social change. They must not be content “to sit and watch society go by ...” and allow it to “get so far past him that his observation” was of little value.¹²⁴ Rather, they must “create and affect society” and also describe it.¹²⁵ They must become, according to Lower, active agents in society to help shape and re-form it. For only in aiding in the direction of society could scholars explain the kind of world in which moderns lived. While maintaining the older function of promoting values and providing philosophic insights, social scientists now had to interpret and participate in the social process so as to make people “feel at home in it and make adjustments with it ...”¹²⁶

Lower thus placed the onerous responsibility of comprehending the social order on the shoulders of academics. The current socio-cultural crisis was, for Lower, an opportunity for academics to become involved in determining social directions and therefore an occasion to restore the social utility of scholars. He claimed that social scientists must become agents of society and actively participate in interpreting and changing the social order. They must do more than engage in scholarly activities; they must be “men of deeds” as well as men of contemplation.¹²⁷ Hence scholarship must not

be confined to the academy, but must be made accessible to all citizens. In this way, social scientists could fulfill their roles as scholars and citizens.

Writing during the first months of the war, James Thomson examined the more practical and immediate contributions of higher learning to the war effort. In the first part of "The Universities and the War", written for the spring 1940 issue of the *Queen's Quarterly*, Thomson explained the immediate assistance universities provided to help in the conflict. Applied scientists and especially engineers, whom Thomson considered as valuable as airmen, could provide essential service to the war effort. This "special category" of university men brought special attributes, such as research skills and technical know-how, that ought to be exploited. "Only a short-sighted policy", he concluded, "would deprive the men who have to do the actual fighting of the essential support the scientist can give".¹²⁸

Thomson was just one of several within and outside the university who were convinced of the fundamental importance of technical expertise that universities provided. From the war's outset, government and university authorities realized that the current conflict was one to be fought as much on the home-front as on the front lines. The outcome of war was to depend not just on fighting skill or military acumen, but also on the mobilization of scientific and technical personnel.¹²⁹ Unlike the Great War, or any previous conflicts for that matter, observers emphasized the highly technical nature of modern warfare and the need to develop a competent military-industrial complex. The creation of a great reserve of technically trained men and women to build and run factories and to develop new and more potent weapons of war had thus become essential to the war effort. The second world war, in short, was not to be merely a conflict of manpower and materiel but one in which scientific knowledge also figured prominently.

As chief production centres for technically trained personnel, universities had become nodal points of Canada's war effort. Realizing the crucial importance of technical and scientific expertise, universities and governments made special efforts to ensure that the faculties of applied sciences continued to provide competent scientists and other technical personnel for the duration of the conflict. Fearing that the National Resources Mobilization Act¹³⁰ of June 1940 might empty universities of male undergraduates, for example, the Department of War Services exempted all university students from service. Greeted most favourably by the National Conference of Canadian Universities (NCCU), this move was designed to keep undergraduates, especially those enrolled in the applied sciences, at their studies. Canada simply could not withstand the loss of thousands of students, especially engineers, medical professionals, and other practical scientists, to military service.¹³¹

The commitment of university and federal government officials to technical education continued throughout the war. Federal government leaders implored universities to maintain high levels of enrolments in the applied and medical sciences, especially after 1942, when the shortage of manpower was most acute. Unlike during the First World War, when universities encouraged students to enlist, university officials after 1940 maintained high registrations in the practical disciplines. Enrolments at the University of Toronto, for instance, in the applied sciences, engineering, and medicine, increased steadily through the war's early phases through to 1945 (with only a slight decline in 1943).¹³² Arts and sciences registrations, in contrast, had consistently declined from 1938 to reach a low in 1943-44.¹³³

University leaders thus had succeeded in their mandate to provide the human resources on which the prosecution of modern warfare relied. They had managed to assemble, in A.B. McKillop's words, "a trained domestic army of engineers, scientists, dentists, and doctors".¹³⁴ In so doing, however, they not only fulfilled the wishes of civil servants and other government officials, but also contributed greatly to the changing, increasingly utilitarian profile of the wartime university. For many, the war had made clear the university's main societal purpose: the academy was little more than a storehouse of technical personnel ready to be called upon to meet the exigencies of modern, industrial society. In making plain the university's wartime contributions, the war showed how universities and their men could render the ultimate social service. Above all, the 1939-45 war had allowed all to see the tangible results of technical education, how the seemingly esoteric academy had become relevant to the development of a nation struggling through the vicissitudes of war.

Not all accepted this view of the academy, of course. From early on in the war, in fact, academics had warned of the possible deleterious effects of overemphasizing scientific and technical training. Indeed, the majority of James Thomson's 1940 piece warned against the transformation of Canadian universities into schools of advanced technical training. As we have seen, Thomson did not discount the technical role of universities. Yet he thought that higher education should offer much more than technical expertise. The insights of humanists and social scientists, he argued, had to supplement the studies of the applied scientist. For the work of the technical expert contained "economic, political and psychological implications ... that can be grasped only by a mind that has moved through the kind of disciplines that are the fruits of historical, literary and philosophical training ..."¹³⁵ Technical and scientific aspects of the war effort, in other words, only formed a small part of what the current conflict signified. Humanists and social scientists were responsible for discovering this wider meaning; that is, that the war constituted a great tear

in the fabric of history. Academics' greatest responsibility was thus to place the current strife in philosophic and historical context in order to understand its greater cultural ramifications.

Thomson went on to explain exactly how enlightened intellectuals were to fulfill their obligations. Academics must "bring the old and intractable elements in human nature and its environment under the dominion of reason through understanding them and thus to become their master and not their slave ..."¹³⁶ Thomson advised scholars to be aware of propaganda and other pernicious aspects of the wartime world that clouded human actions and cultural change. There was an urgent need, Watson Kirkconnell of McMaster wrote in 1941, adding his voice to that of Thomson, to clarify the "realities of the situation" and the principles and ideals "for which we fight".¹³⁷ The best way to achieve these ends, Thomson claimed, was to bring "the experiences of history and the humane ideals of emancipated minds" to the fore. Indeed, contextualizing current events was necessary if moderns were to comprehend change. Through the broad comprehension of the current malaise, Thomson added, "the human scene is gathered into a wide vision, wherein results are assessed and conclusions reached by methods that lie beyond the heated excitements and prejudices of the moment ..."¹³⁸ Such "calm wisdom", "sure guidance" and, most of all, "enthusiasm for humanity", were the critical gifts that academics brought to the current malaise. Without academic aptitudes and insights, he implied, modern civilization might fall into an abyss out of which it had little hope of extricating itself.

The war constituted a warning for academics. It was, in Thomson's words, "a new summons to the universities" to compel them to do "constructive thinking about the future".¹³⁹ It made clear, moreover, the function of the university not only to assess great historical change but also to provide a counterbalance to the dangerous forces that threatened western civilization. "We must summon the teaching of history," Thomson asserted, "the variety of human life in literature, the patient processes of the sciences, and all the loveliness in art and music, blended with the wisdom of divine philosophy ..."¹⁴⁰ For these academic inheritances liberated scholars from propaganda campaigns and allowed intellectuals to focus on wider problems and to address the needs of the modern order. They enabled the current generation to understand its connections to the thoughts and ideals of bygone eras. For Thomson, the "great tradition" of the arts was thus central to the university's wartime role. It helped liberate universities from the present and allowed them to assist in shaping the future.

Harold Innis elaborated and expanded on much of what Thomson said. Like Thomson, Innis taught that only through advancing the scholarly approach could academics make a contribution to the current social order.¹⁴¹ The scholar's main duty had been for the

Innis of the 1930s to avoid vested interests and maintain the commitment to objectivity and truth.¹⁴² This axiom of academic obligation was even more true in the Second World War. Indeed, the war represented for Innis far more than the loss of life or even the disruption of ethical conduct; it was at the root of the university crisis. The conflict helped exacerbate the 1930s trend towards bureaucratization and precipitated what Innis saw as a mass exodus of intellectuals to the cause of “winning the war”.¹⁴³ Governmental incursions into academia, Innis wrote, led “to the withdrawal of social scientists from research work of a fundamental character” and lowered “intellectual achievements in academic work”.¹⁴⁴ Academic pursuits suffered because scholars in the employ of governments abandoned the “long run problems” that once engaged the social scientist. Indeed, the government advisor or researcher was the exact antithesis to Innis’s ideal scholar, who, unfettered by vested interests, involved himself in larger philosophical problems.¹⁴⁵ By the end of the war, furthermore, the “academic mind” would become used to government needs, and academia would be transformed into “a standing surplus reserve labour pool to meet the varying demands of government”.¹⁴⁶ University intellectuals would thus become merely a brain-trust of the party in power. Even more than in the 1930s, thus, Innis showed how the heavy demands of the war on human resources meant the degradation of a noble profession and the diversion of academics from their rightful roles.

The war, Innis averred, also created a climate inimical to the arts, humanities, and the entire university tradition. As with Thomson, who had warned the scholar against acting as the mouthpiece of Allied propaganda, and Lower, who held grave concerns about the future of free enquiry in the oppressive, illiberal atmosphere of the war,¹⁴⁷ Innis reacted as well to the attack on academic liberty. Innis’s views on this issue are especially evident in a wartime controversy involving none other than Frank Underhill.

In 1941, University of Toronto officials and the Provincial Legislature of Ontario threatened to dismiss historian Underhill for wartime statements which they believed to be offensive and contrary to the war effort.¹⁴⁸ Despite “crossing swords” with Underhill on various occasions,¹⁴⁹ Innis felt obliged to defend a colleague. He wrote an impassioned plea to the university’s president (H.J. Cody), heavy with symbolic references to both his and Underhill’s service in the Great War. He urged unity among university intellectuals to protect a “fallen comrade” in what he perceived to be the “war on the home-front”, that is, the fight to preserve the sacred medieval tradition of scholarly freedom. Innis objected strongly to the Ontario legislature’s censure of Underhill and was willing to resign to defend his principles. “If a man’s position is endangered because of reckless fearlessness” to speak freely about the war, he proclaimed, “I should be glad to run the risk of losing my own academic position to save him ...”¹⁵⁰ What was more, Innis disagreed with an outside

body adjudicating on an issue over which it rightfully had no jurisdiction. Underhill's alleged wrongdoings were the concern of the university and the university alone.¹⁵¹ Toronto had established an "enviable reputation in the maintenance of academic freedom", Innis concluded. If it damaged Underhill's reputation by not defending the Canadian historian, "we lose the respect of other institutions" throughout Canada, Great Britain, and the United States.¹⁵²

Innis's response to the Underhill affair was not merely an effort to support a censured colleague. Nor was it simply a defense of academic freedom. Rather, it called attention to a larger issue, an issue of "vital importance" to the maintenance of freedom in a society at war.¹⁵³ The issue of academic freedom acted for Innis as a prism through which were refracted problems associated with liberal-democratic principles. As an example, the usurpation of additional powers by "free" states was repugnant to liberal precepts. The rise of militarism and the increase of special controls, such as the War Measures Act, limited individual liberties and greatly burdened the free-thinking individual's understanding of current philosophical difficulties. Like Lower,¹⁵⁴ Innis was profoundly concerned that the historic protection afforded scholars to express themselves freely had eroded away. To Innis, the war represented the twilight of liberty not only for the academy, but also for western culture. In stifling free enquiry and redirecting scholarly attention away from academic obligations, academics had become part of the control apparatus of the modern state. In Innisian language, they were caught up in an intensifying monopoly of knowledge out of which there seemed little hope of escape.

In "A Plea for the University Tradition," his most succinct statement of the university problem, Innis demonstrated how the university had come under attack from political or religious institutions and how it was able to avoid the adverse effects of knowledge monopolies.¹⁵⁵ Innis reiterated that the university was an instrument that exposed bias and promoted truth. He showed therefore how it was the historical counterweight to bias. From the nineteenth century on, however, the western university had become less and less respectful of its central humanistic traditions and had thus succumbed to new scientific and empirical trends. In the mid-twentieth century, Innis added, the university fell away even further from its old beliefs and yielded to the tendencies of "bureaucracy and dictatorship", "the intensification of nationalism," and the "evils of monopolies in commerce and industry".¹⁵⁶ Indeed, by mid-century, the tradition of unbiased humanistic scholarship had clearly lapsed.

Innis went on in "A Plea for the University Tradition" and other writings of the 1940s to detail the effects of monopolies of knowledge on the academy. For example, he bristled at his own university's effort to streamline operations and eliminate courses

deemed non-essential to the war. In a memorandum to President Cody, he complained that these activities were not only a breach of academic freedom, but also a blow to the “prestige of the university” and a “dismantling and weakening of the [course] structure” that the President and others had worked so hard to establish.¹⁵⁷ Innis also bemoaned the scant teaching resources available at the University that resulted because of the flight of scholars to government bureaucracies. In a letter to G.M. Weir of the Department of Pensions and Health, he explained that the lack of personnel meant that the fledgling graduate programme at the University of Toronto was almost at a point where it had to cease work.¹⁵⁸ He also railed against the state’s ever-increasing role to “conserve knowledge”. With state intervention in higher education, he argued, the university became concerned with fact-finding to aid in the resolution of current problems and hence began to disregard longer-term cultural and philosophical difficulties. This tendency towards the conservation of facts, he wrote, was evident “in the lack of interest in educational philosophy and in the tendency of educational institutions ... to avoid major philosophical problems of western civilization”.¹⁵⁹ For Innis the penetration of outside groups into university life was deep indeed. Summarizing his contempt for the politicization of the university, he complained that governments and political groups have been

compelled to lend themselves to the systematic rape of scholarship ... Nothing has been more indicative of the decline in cultural life in Canada since the last war than the infiltration of politics in the Universities, and nothing has done more to hamper the development of intellectual maturity than the institutional framework of Canadian Universities which permits and encourages the exploitation of scholars, and plays the treasonable rôle of betraying the traditions for which we fought in the last war and for which we fight in this.¹⁶⁰

J.B. Brebner, Innis’s close friend, agreed wholeheartedly with Innis’s strictures on the state and scholarly life. In *Scholarship for Canada* (1945),¹⁶¹ Brebner argued that swollen by the demands of the war, the modern state had participated in what amounted to an attack on academics. The state, Brebner wrote, “conflict[ed] sharply with intellectual and other personal freedoms”, he wrote.¹⁶² The current war produced political, economic, and philosophical pressures that necessitated a strengthened state with an enlarged bureaucracy.¹⁶³ Requiring “expertness and specialized knowledge as never before”, governments “reached into the universities to obtain them, thereby often putting the blinders of specific political direction on eyes which serve wisdom better when they were able to look around freely”.¹⁶⁴ Public opinion, he added, became “less favourable to the scholar’s spirit of free enquiry”.¹⁶⁵ Echoing Innis’s sentiments in the aftermath of the Underhill affair, Brebner contended that the state persecuted scholars who presented ideas

or opinions that conflicted with the rhetoric of the party in power. This devaluation of academic freedom and scholarly insight, Brebner's report concluded, had plagued Canada throughout the course of the war.

Brebner, Innis, and others had recognized, then, the illiberal effects of war on scholarship and attempted to come to the aid a system of scholarship under siege. In addition to matters of state intervention and the impact of war on academics, however, scholars had also become gravely concerned about the academy's wartime reorientation. From early on in the war it had become apparent that while the applied sciences had increased in status among government and the public alike, the arts and humanities achieved no similar standing. On the contrary, as the conflict wore on, the relevance of the arts and humanities came into question. The situation came to a head in late 1942. By November 1942 academics across the country had heard of plans to curtail instruction in the arts for the duration of the war.¹⁶⁶ In response, Innis and other members of the Canadian Social Science Research Council (CSSRC) petitioned Prime Minister Mackenzie King to reconsider government plans. In its November memorandum, the CSSRC¹⁶⁷ stated its wish to "encourage in every possible fashion a continuation of the Arts tradition in Canadian universities".¹⁶⁸ CSSRC members also pointed out that Canadian arts faculties were few, had small numbers of faculty and students, and were hence easy to maintain. Most significantly, the memorandum emphasized that "the weakening of the Arts tradition" and the "place of the Humanities" in favour of the natural sciences was not only unfair to those who fought to defend Canada in the war, but also held "ominous implications for the whole future of civilization".¹⁶⁹

Innis and the others did not specify what exactly the "ominous implications" would be, but the message had been clear: the arts and humanities were of fundamental importance to the favourable outcome of the war. The war, the CSSRC implied, was as much a non-military struggle on the home-front as it was a struggle of men and materiel abroad. It was a conflict of "cultural standards" and beliefs that had become besieged in the current climate. CSSRC members accordingly implored the Prime Minister to maintain the existing policy on universities, thereby "ensuring the future health of our Canadian society".¹⁷⁰ Despite assertions to the contrary, in short, Innis and the CSSRC membership insisted that the humanistic tradition was of vital importance especially during a time of war.¹⁷¹

Despite failing health, Robert Falconer, the former president of the University of Toronto, offered a clear statement on the import of the humanities. In a 1943 piece, provocatively entitled "The Humanities in the War-time University", he responded to the recent issues involving the arts and humanities. Echoing Innis's earlier words, Falconer showed how scholars had relinquished their search for truth and objectivity and the role as

“neutral arbiters” and instead had been co-opted into the service of the state.¹⁷² The humanities, in consequence, failed, in this oppressive climate, to fulfill its chief purpose of providing spiritual and personal freedom. Due to the current focus on the conflicts of races, nationalities, and the preoccupation with the destinies of humankind, it had been unable to promote the intrinsic worth of the human character and to foster the conditions that had historically moulded the humanistic spirit. The war had resulted, in brief, in the stymieing of the university’s function to demonstrate the virtues of humanity and to explain the loss of the liberated human spirit.¹⁷³

Like Falconer, Innis also expressed his views on the state of the humanities in the war-time world. Characteristically, he focussed on the importance of the scholarly approach to knowledge and understanding. The humanities, he contended, were integral to the recognition of biased methods and to the adoption of a balanced approach. Humanistic scholarship effectively counterbalanced scientific approaches to knowledge, and highlighted instead the non-quantifiable, non-scientific aspects of human behavior. It was most useful in examining the philosophical and historical facets of human conduct while it provided a counterweight to newer mathematical and scientific models of learning. Indeed, Innis advocated the resurrection of the “Greek tradition of the humanities”, which had been marginalized in the modern university, but which had become integral to the “the constant avoidance of extremes and extravagance”.¹⁷⁴ As always, Innis was wary of bias and argued that the reversion to the intellectual principles of balance and proportion of the ancient Greeks was vital to understanding limitations of thought. Disdain for the Greek approach, moreover, was just another indication that modern scholars failed to appreciate the vital philosophical problems of bias and monopoly. Innis was convinced that the decline of the humanistic-classical tradition meant the loss of understanding of the true nature of cultural change. Perhaps most dangerously, it implied the loss of individual freedom to assess human conduct and to assert fundamental human qualities such as the autonomous individual spirit. Stating the “Greek problem,” Innis commented that

[w]e have been much concerned in academic circles with the decline of Greek, but I am afraid we do not realize that this is a symptom of an unwillingness to face the exacting demands implied in the study of Greek civilization. [As a result,] we have neglected the philosophical problems of the West ...¹⁷⁵

Perhaps Innis’s greatest lament on the university question, then, was the sundering of the balance and perspective of humanistic learning. Concern over the decline of the “Greek approach” was not peculiar to Innis’s world-view, however. Indeed, it resonated

throughout the Canadian humanistic community. In *The Humanities in Canada*, Watson Kirkconnell and A.S.P. Woodhouse published the results of a survey of the humanities faculties across Canada. They found that humanists were in “the midst of a movement that [was] reacting against excessive preoccupation with techniques divorced from humanizing influences ...”¹⁷⁶ Kirkconnell and Woodhouse discovered that scholars such as Innis disliked trends towards de-humanized scholarship and advocated instead a return to the humanist learning of the pre-modern university.¹⁷⁷ They asserted that association with poets, orators, and historians detached the academic “from the mere present, humanized his imagination and elevated his sentiments”.¹⁷⁸ Like Innis, they intimated that the humanities contained the eternal truths about the human condition. The purpose of the humanities was to aid in the development of intellectual faculties to appreciate the “full measure of humanity”.¹⁷⁹ As with the Greek humanistic tradition, Kirkconnell and Woodhouse championed the humanities as a balancing influence for moderns, enabling a complete understanding of cultural and human circumstances. Indeed, the humanities greatest role was to liberalize and to provide much needed perspective.

Kirkconnell and Woodhouse also argued that the humanities contributed to personal, intellectual development. They fostered “inner cultivation”.¹⁸⁰ Association with the beauty of art and the reason of philosophy would develop, for the two scholars, a “greater esthetic sensitivity, a purification and refinement of emotions, and a keener, more creative experience of beauty”.¹⁸¹ In addition, the humanities promoted the ethical and moral awareness of the individual. Kirkconnell and Woodhouse contended that a liberal education was essential in modern times rife with the perversity of war, for it embodied the moral values of goodness and beauty and confronted “the terror and cruelty of [the] contemporary world”.¹⁸² Liberal learning was, in short, much more than mere instruction in the arts and letters; it was the means by which human virtues could be realized and the human condition, corrupted by the immoralities of the present age, could be set aright.

Kirkconnell and Woodhouse thus implied that the academy functioned to enhance the “spiritual” elements of human existence. Indeed, for many scholars there was a strong sense that the university had become a centre of spiritual uplift during an age of deteriorating moral standards. More than an institution to promote research or even to preserve of old learning, it had become responsible for addressing such spiritual problems as totalitarianism and race hatred. Kirkconnell expounded on this fuller conception of higher education early on in the war. Along with contributing to human knowledge, and “providing intellectual leadership”, the university, and, specifically, the faculty of liberal arts, functioned to heighten “for each student the significance of life in its intellectual, aesthetic, and moral aspects”.¹⁸³ The liberal arts, for Kirkconnell, operated to evoke the

three basic “powers of personality”: the rational, aesthetic, and moral.¹⁸⁴ Along with developing rational faculties and cultivating the appreciation of the beautiful, the liberal arts brought out a “fundamentally religious principle in life”, an “enduring foundation” for all human thinking and activity.¹⁸⁵ They “consecrate[d] one’s will to the highest moral and spiritual principles ...”¹⁸⁶ Added to the purely rational-intellectual and cultural functions, humanistic scholarship enabled one to connect with the timeless and transcendent. It opened the individual to “the realm of truth, beauty, and goodness”.¹⁸⁷ Only through the realization of the artistic, moral, and religious heritages of the past, Kirkconnell added lastly, could one achieve the full expression of humanity, and, most importantly, free one’s soul. The university had been central, in short, to the realization of the true nature of humanity and, as such, the liberation of the human spirit.

While elaborating on no distinct spiritual nexus between the academy and the individual, Innis emphasized with Kirkconnell the significance of the university’s duty to cultivate values. Added to its “major role” of recognizing the collapse of western civilization, the academy, Innis declared, must make possible a life of study so as to enable the students or teachers to understand cultural change.¹⁸⁸ Although profoundly influenced by the effects of the industrial and communications revolutions, the university was key to reestablishing a universal point of view and therefore to understanding knowledge monopolies and control mechanisms inherent to the modern state.¹⁸⁹ Liberty to pursue truth, and hence the opportunity to gain universal insights, were most excellent qualities of the university tradition.¹⁹⁰ Without true academic freedom, Innis explained, there could be no understanding of past or present, no insight into the future. Perhaps most importantly, the decay of scholarly free enquiry reflected, for Innis, a society in decline, a social order that shunned the enduring virtues bound up in the university tradition and stressed instead the values of power, force, and control. Only with the revival of university traditions during the dark days of the war could there be hope for the resurrection of cultural traditions and a combating of activities inimical to the pursuit of truth. Scholars must therefore “dedicate themselves afresh”, Innis declared in May 1944, “to the maintenance of a tradition without which western culture disappears ...” Indeed, they had “an obligation of maintaining traditions concerned with the search for truth for which men have laid down and have been asked to lay down their lives”.¹⁹¹

Lacking the grandeur of Innis’s pleas for the university tradition, other humanists and social scientists nevertheless expounded on the role of the humanities and social sciences to promote values and to enhance cultural traditions. Responding to a letter from John Marshall¹⁹² in May 1943, for instance, Donald Creighton discussed the historian’s part in imparting cultural standards. Prompted by the spring collapse of the French,

Creighton related, a small group of social scientists met (including Creighton himself) “to discuss the subject of the social sciences in the postwar world”.¹⁹³ The problem of values and the academy was especially important to Creighton’s own discipline. Marked by such works as “The Failure of the Historian” (presented at the 1942 meeting of the CHA) and Queen’s historian R.G. Trotter’s piece on “Aims in the Study and Teaching of History in Canadian Universities Today”, there was no doubt, in Creighton’s view, “that the whole problem of aims and values in the study of history in general, and of Canadian history in particular, has been lying almost oppressively upon us ever since the summer of 1940 ...”¹⁹⁴ Historians, he implied, were not merely responsible for chronicling to the current generation the minutiae of bygone ages. Their duty, on the contrary, was to preserve and teach cultural standards. Through learning about past cultures, individuals could both appreciate and assert timeless historical values and ultimately help moderns cope with contemporary tragedies. Not simply a stuffy, esoteric study, history was instead of considerable contemporary importance.

Adding their voices to that of Donald Creighton, Innis, Tom Easterbrook, Carlo Ginsberg, Marshall McLuhan, among others of the so-called “Values” Discussion Group,¹⁹⁵ reflected on the question of values in the social sciences. They agreed that while the “physical scientist can take a stand from which to view his data objectively, the social scientist is unable to avoid identifying himself with the data”.¹⁹⁶ It was suggested, during the March 1947 meeting, that while the university should facilitate individual moral judgment and promote cultural values this role had languished during the war because of specialization, the rise of natural scientific methodology, and other manifestations of academic modernization.¹⁹⁷ Contributing the main topic for discussion in a subsequent meeting of the “Values” group, Marshall McLuhan contended that the Arts were “a storehouse of values”.¹⁹⁸ The liberal arts, he argued, must be considered a balancing force to the emerging social sciences and natural sciences. They were crucial, McLuhan and the others agreed, because they contained the grounding values, the traditions on which western society was built.¹⁹⁹ The arts “train perception and develop judgment”, it was concluded, and, ultimately, they armed individuals with a sense of timeless cultural standards.²⁰⁰ Education in the liberal arts, in brief, provided the essential skills with which moderns could cope in a postwar world that continued to lack absolute standards and an understanding of cultural demise.

For scholars such as Kirkconnell, Innis, McLuhan and other like-minded academic critics, in sum, the university tradition was as important to the mid-twentieth century as it had always been. The inculcation of virtues and the appreciation of the good life -- the nineteenth century conception of the university “to make men” -- had seemed for several

scholars to gain a new relevance in the 1940s. Amid the apparent “decay of morals” and the “breakdown of international codes”, a sense of “personal responsibility” and perspective had eroded away.²⁰¹ For the advocates of the university tradition, a rekindling of the arts and humanities was central to the restoration of a stable social order. The role of the academy to promote a moral, socially responsible culture had become essential to a civilization that verged on collapse.

Critics of academic modernization were thus convinced of the need for a resurgence of the traditional academy. As we will discover in chapter four, however, their view of the university was highly mythologized. While based in historical fact, the “university tradition” was more mythological in composition. The critics’ motives in creating a historical fiction were two-fold. First, as we have noted here, they wanted to bring into stark relief the current plight of the university. By contrasting modern institutions with the “university tradition”, they could effectively demonstrate the dire conditions under which academics suffered. Commentators thus used rhetoric and sometimes even blatant hyperbole to further their causes. Second, and perhaps most significantly, the university critics championed the plight of the scholar as a way to further their own ends. The 1940s was truly a period in which the prestige and utility of humanists had been called into question. Blandishments on the need for a rediscovery of “humane” values and philosophic insights helped critics gain a certain legitimacy and notoriety in a hostile age. Much more than the applied scientists, humanists, the critics pronounced, were the defenders of western civilization. They protected moderns from the inhumanities of war and, most of all, culture from outright collapse. This search for social pertinence and a “restoration” of the scholar’s traditional and indeed “true function” was an effort to amplify the voices of humanists, which had recently been drown out by the clamour of the war. Underpaid and clearly unappreciated, the critics perceived that the time was right to make their voices heard.

The Second World War was critical to the emergence of the modern Canadian university. While the war had no part in initiating trends in academic modernization, it functioned to accelerate existing tendencies. Most noticeably, the 1939-45 war showed to many the usefulness of universities as storehouses of technical personnel and centres for industrial research. Universities gained a newfound notoriety and prestige among government officials and society at large due to their contributions to the war effort. As a result of the efforts of practical scientists, economists, and other social scientists, they achieved for perhaps the first time in their existence a widespread social relevance. As interest grew on the parts of governments and the public at large, and as enrolments and funding for the

practical disciplines increased, Canadian academies shed their historic liberal arts orientation in favour of a technical and scientific direction that emphasized the social utilitarian function of higher learning. The siphoning off of scholars to various extra-academic posts and the imperilment of arts programs that many considered irrelevant to the prosecution of war, furthermore, provided striking evidence that Canadian society had shunned older university traditions and was developing new ones. The long transition away from the liberal arts and towards "technical education" had received a tremendous surge during the early 1940s.

Along with revealing to many the value and operational utility of higher learning, the war also provided impetus for critics of the modern university. The conflict showed the extreme peril of modern society, and, most importantly, it lay bare the critical significance of the scholar and the university to the social order. Some academics considered the wartime as a transitory period, one in which a new society would emerge phoenix-like out of the ashes of a razed culture. Other scholars contended that the immanence of cultural decay was manifested in the crisis of values and the decline of historic institutions such as higher education. Whatever the causes and effects of the great historical disruption, university critics realized that academics played a central role in addressing the current cultural malaise. Far from being merely a centre for technical study, the university, and in specific, humanists and social scientists, had a manifold part to play in contributing to the wartime world. Humanists and social scientists, in the minds of the critics of higher education, could see past the immediacies of war preparations, military strategies, and wartime politics and understand that the conflict had truly represented a disruption of western civilization. When the citizenry had been incapacitated by the propaganda and rhetoric of the war, for example, they perceived the withering away of liberties and the decline of democracy. Scholars had the insight, in other words, to recognize what others failed to see. Herein lay their ultimate worth to society. Indeed, the basic function of academics, according to the university critics, was to provide context and perspective and therefore allow a greater comprehension of cultural forces. Ultimately, the social role of intelligence had been clear to the critics of the modern academy: the uncovering of truth in the time of great peril.

More than understanding profound culture change, scholars also functioned to help the struggling social order in an extremely dangerous age. For some observers, such as Lower and Frank Underhill, university personnel ought to be able to access the levers of power in government and elsewhere and thereby operate as social agents, shaping the development of a young society. Other critics, most notably Innis, Watson Kirkconnell, and A.S.P.

Woodhouse, argued that scholars could provide essential service to the social order by remaining at their posts. Innis contended that the search for truth through tireless scholarly activity was the only means through which academics could help shape society. Kirkconnell and Woodhouse reasoned that humanistic learning was essential to understanding the realities of human interactions since it enabled moderns to connect with their true natures. Moreover, Innis, Kirkconnell, Woodhouse, Falconer, McLuhan, among other scholars, knew that the humanities were central to offsetting the modern trends towards practical, scientific education. The liberal arts tradition was the purveyor of the timeless values of western civilization. In preserving and conveying those virtues, humanists and social scientists could provide vital service to society by providing an alternative to the materialist values characteristic of the modern world. Humanist values could counterbalance a world obsessed with the scientific and the technological. Ultimately, they could help restore stability and make a fundamental contribution to a nation at war.

In extolling the inestimable merits of a humanist education, the critics of academic modernization not only wished to address pressing social problems and lament the decline of the liberal arts; they also wanted to reach out to a society that had turned its back on the traditional university. Above all, their strictures were designed to show the social relevance of the liberal arts to university officials, governmental authorities, and the public more generally. The university, in mythological form, was an essential institution without which Canadian society could not properly develop. In a world in which the academic was marginalized, and the value of scholarship was in dramatic decline, the university was much more than a social utility, a mere centre of research to be drawn upon for immediate developmental needs. Through the search for truth and the promotion of spiritual values, the academy, for the advocates of the university tradition, remained a beacon, an institution that was to guide society to safety during perilous times. The social function of the university had been made obvious during a period of despair.

The arts and humanities thus had a social relevance that surpassed that of the natural sciences and other practical disciplines. The crisis of war had made that fact painfully obvious. The war provided the opportunity for humanists to demonstrate how the liberal arts could address that crisis. Ultimately, advocates of the liberal arts wished to gain for their work and the humanities generally the same notoriety that society had afforded technical education. This was the main rationale for their inflated reckoning of the traditional academy. Lamentably, however, Canadian society had failed to understand the socio-cultural pertinence of the traditional university. Indeed, the flurry of writing on the humanities signaled the relative demise of the arts tradition as much as it marked an effort to

resurrect an institution undergoing profound change. And the continuation of writings after 1945 on the demise of the humanistic tradition indicated the ongoing march of academic modernization. The modernization of the academy, to be sure, did not end with the war. Rather, the 1939-45 period proved to be a mere starting point in the transformation of higher learning in Canada.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

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- ¹A.B. McKillop. *Matters of Mind: The University in Ontario 1791-1951* (Toronto, 1994), 101
- ²Ibid.
- ³Quoted in Robin S. Harris, *A History of Higher Education in Canada, 1663-1960* (Toronto, 1976), 259.
- ⁴Quoted in *ibid.*
- ⁵Quoted in McKillop, 200.
- ⁶Quoted in *ibid.*, 203.
- ⁷Quoted in *ibid.*
- ⁸Quoted in Marlene Shore, *The Science of Social Redemption: McGill, the Chicago School and the Origins of Social Research in Canada*. (Toronto, 1987), 31
- ⁹Ibid.
- ¹⁰Ibid., 31-2
- ¹¹Ibid., 31
- ¹²Quoted in Mel Thistle, *The Inner Ring: The Early History of the National Research Council* (Toronto, 1966), 53-4
- ¹³Ibid., 54-5
- ¹⁴Quoted in McKillop, 322
- ¹⁵Quoted in *ibid.*
- ¹⁶Quoted in *ibid.*, 322-3
- ¹⁷Ibid., 323
- ¹⁸At the core of this concept is the idea that the university's chief function is to serve the pressing needs of society. Higher learning is hence consumed not with producing thinkers or philosophers, but with students trained to perform specific tasks that ultimately further the ends of industrial society. See Michael R. Harris, *Five Counterrevolutionists in Higher Education: Irving Babbitt, Albert Jay Nock, Abraham Flexner, Robert Maynard Hutchins, Alexander Meiklejohn* (Corvallis, Oregon, 1970), 30-35.
- ¹⁹See McKillop, 322-61
- ²⁰Ibid., 329
- ²¹Robin Harris, 383
- ²²McKillop, 326
- ²³Ibid., 327
- ²⁴Ibid., 332-3
- ²⁵Paul Axelrod, *Making a Middle Class: Student Life in English Canada during the Thirties* (Montreal, 1990), 59
- ²⁶See McKillop, 331, and Doug Owrarn, "Economic Thought in the 1930s: The Prelude to Keynesianism", in Raymond B. Blake and Jeff Keshen, eds., *Social Welfare Policy in Canada: Historical Readings* (Toronto, 1995), 179
- ²⁷Axelrod, 58
- ²⁸Ibid., 59
- ²⁹McKillop, 335
- ³⁰Ibid., 338. See also J. Rodney Millard, *The Master Spirit of the Age: Canadian Engineers and the Politics of Professionalism, 1887-1922* (Toronto, 1988)
- ³¹Robin Harris, 403
- ³²Ibid.
- ³³There was a concern that engineering schools produced too many graduates for the economy to absorb throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Many indeed had to go to the United States to find work. See McKillop, 341.
- ³⁴Axelrod, 68
- ³⁵See Michael Bliss, *The Discovery of Insulin* (Toronto, 1982)
- ³⁶Axelrod, 68-9
- ³⁷Pediatrics, neurology, internal medicine, and surgery were refined into areas such as including psychiatry, orthopaedics, plastic surgery, and proctology. See Axelrod, 69.
- ³⁸These were: anatomy, gynaecology and obstetrics, medicine, pathology, physiology, surgery, pharmacology, and biochemistry. See McKillop, 356.
- ³⁹Ibid., 351-2

⁴⁰Axelrod, 69. Unlike engineering, medical faculties stagnated throughout the interwar period, with few full-time faculty appointments and few new research facilities. Enrolment numbers did not increase as readily as they did for engineering and commerce and political economy. The department of psychiatry, however, experienced a substantial increase in enrolment in the interwar period. See Robin Harris, 401.

⁴¹See Thorstein Veblen, *The Higher Learning in America: A Memorandum on the Conduct of Universities by Business Men*. (New York; reprinted 1994 [1918]) and James G. Greenlee, *Sir Robert Falconer: A Biography*, (Toronto, 1988), 138-9.

⁴²McKillop, 304

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴A Cody Commission recommendation, quoted in *ibid.*, 375

⁴⁵This was to be achieved through enlarging the powers of the president and creating a board of governors that was, in McKillop's words, "to act as a buffer between the presidency and the Ministry of Education". *Ibid.*

⁴⁶By 1920, the universities of western Canada had similar financial relationships with their provincial governments. The Norris government of Manitoba adopted the 1906 University of Toronto Act, which had given financial stability to the University, among other things, while the act had also served as the paradigm for the three provincial universities created after 1906. See W.L. Morton, *One University: A History of the University of Manitoba* (Toronto, 1957), 108.

⁴⁷Veblen, 63-4 and McKillop 364.

⁴⁸Quoted in McKillop, 365.

⁴⁹See McKillop, 364-5. The issue of academic freedom became prominent in the face of increased governmental involvement and the "corporatization" of the academy. Yet it must be noted, as stated above, academic freedom was often an unrealized ideal of Canadian academics. Overtures had been made to the concept, medieval in its origins, from the Victorian age. But the reality was that academic freedom was never a cornerstone of the Canadian university. Thus, the critics of the modern university often refer to idealized notions of academic liberty rather than to historical situations. See Falconer's remarks on the nature of academic freedom below. Also see the idealized conception of the university of critics in chapter four. Academic freedom is but one aspect of the mythologized university.

⁵⁰The Leonard incident was protracted and convoluted. See Greenlee, 275-84.

⁵¹Quoted in McKillop, 369.

⁵²*Ibid.*, 371

⁵³*Ibid.*

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, 372

⁵⁵See *ibid.*, 365-73.

⁵⁶In the wider, American idea, professorial utterances were afforded protection from censure both outside and within the walls of the academy. In debarring academics at Toronto from participating in politics (and therefore, to behave like judges or senior civil servants), Falconer eschewed the wider American conception. That he had to make these determinations, and that he decided against wider academic liberty, are both indicative of the nascent state of academic freedom in Canada. See *Ibid.*, 371.

⁵⁷Quoted in Greenlee, 284

⁵⁸*Ibid.*

⁵⁹Quoted in *ibid.*, 285.

⁶⁰Quoted in McKillop, 376.

⁶¹Greenlee, 286

⁶²Quoted in *ibid.*

⁶³Quoted in McKillop, 380.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, 381

⁶⁶Quoted in *ibid.*, 382

⁶⁷McKillop, 383

⁶⁸Carl Berger, *The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writing since 1900*. Second edition (Toronto, 1986), 79

⁶⁹Quoted in McKillop, 384

⁷⁰Berger, 79

⁷¹*Ibid.*

⁷²These phases are from the CCF's Regina Manifesto.

⁷³Berger, 79

⁷⁴Ontario Premier Mitch Hepburn and opposition leader George Drew denounced the foreign policy views of George Grube of the *Canadian Forum*. While vilified for asserting that funds directed towards a British-centred foreign policy was money wasted, Grube was not subject to disciplinary action. He worked for independent Trinity College and therefore the province could not officially reprimand him. Underhill's situation was different. See below.

⁷⁵Quoted in Berger, 78.

⁷⁶Quoted in McKillop, 397. Note also that several senior colleagues defended Underhill and threatened Cody with insubordination should the incident be unfavourable resolved. Once he had showed regret at the offending nature of the phrases and promised to be more careful in his rhetoric, however, Underhill again escaped without official censure. See Berger, 82.

⁷⁷The Toronto daily press did not defend Underhill. In fact, Underhill found his only support, aside from his own journal, the *Canadian Forum*, in B.K. Sandwell, editor of *Saturday Night*.

⁷⁸Several outraged citizens called for Underhill's ouster and indeed the muzzling of other disloyal professors. See McKillop, 396-7.

⁷⁹Quoted in *ibid.*, 398.

⁸⁰The concept implies that universities' basic *raison d'être* was to provide for the immediate needs of society and to prepare students to fulfill practical and technical duties within industrial society. See Michael R. Harris, 30-41 .

⁸¹Veblen, 76

⁸²*Ibid.*, 49

⁸³*Ibid.*, 47; 49

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, 42

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, 44

⁸⁶Quoted in Michael R. Harris, 181.

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, 170. Meiklejohn defined a liberal education, in the words of Harris, as "the cultivation of powers enabling citizens to order their relations with themselves, their fellows, and the world." *Ibid.*

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, 52

⁸⁹Babbitt was a disciple of Matthew Arnold, who argued that there was a cultural elite in society, the "saving remnant" in Arnold's phrase, responsible to preserve standards and provide guidance for society's lesser members. Babbitt very much shared in Arnold's cultural elitism. See *ibid.*, 58.

⁹⁰Quoted in *ibid.*, 65.

⁹¹The critics of American higher learning presented one resilient theme: that the university had become more of a reflection of a largely materialistic society and less of a beacon to the emerging social order. From Veblen, through Meiklejohn, Babbitt, the theme was clear. In the drive to settle, industrialize, and gain prosperity, issues concerning scientific or technical matters began to outstrip the objective of preserving cultural values and search for wisdom. Most of all, the university had failed to take a leadership role in terms of cultural development. The social function of the university was certainly not to provide the human resources to advance humanity's material conditions; rather, it was to enhance humans, spiritually, culturally, even morally.

⁹²*The Obligation of Universities to the Social Order. Addresses and Discussion at a Conference of Universities under the Auspices of New York University November 15-17, 1932* (New York, 1933), xiv-xv

⁹³*Ibid.*

⁹⁴*Ibid.*

⁹⁵P.E. Corbett. "The Function of the University", *Queen's Quarterly*, v. 40, (February 1933), 14

⁹⁶*Ibid.*, 14-15. Corbett's comments must be seen in light of the material, utilitarian culture that emerged after the war. Society treated scholars and scientists according to what they produced, not for their intrinsic worth. In the words of R.O. Earl, writing for a subsequent issue of the *Queen's Quarterly*, "people are [nowadays] becoming increasingly impatient. They want results which they can see and feel, and they are not disposed to continue feeding and clothing professors if they do not get their money's worth in return. The pressure of life is coming home to the universities ..." (R.O. Earl, "The Universities at Bay" *Queen's Quarterly*, v. 40 [February 1933], 291)

⁹⁷Corbett, 14

⁹⁸*Ibid.*, 18

⁹⁹See chapter four.

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*, 19

¹⁰¹*Ibid.*, 22

- ¹⁰²Ibid.
- ¹⁰³Ibid., 14
- ¹⁰⁴Harold Innis, "The Role of Intelligence: Some Further Notes", *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, v. 1, 1935, 280-7. See also chapter 2.
- ¹⁰⁵Harold Innis, "A Note on the Universities and the Social Sciences", *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 1 (1935), 286
- ¹⁰⁶Innis, "The Role of Intelligence: Some Further Notes", 284
- ¹⁰⁷Ibid., 285
- ¹⁰⁸Innis, "A Note on the Universities and the Social Sciences", 286
- ¹⁰⁹Ibid., 286-7
- ¹¹⁰Harold Innis, "Discussion in the Social Sciences", *Dalhousie Review* 15 (January 1936), 401-13; quoted in Daniel Drache, ed., *Staples, Markets, and Cultural Change: Selected Essays, Harold A. Innis* (Montreal, 1995), 446. Innis thought that university authorities had been concerned solely with the appearance of free thought within the university. They cared nothing about the problems of how to achieve free discussion and the wider, social function of academic discovery. See also Innis, "A Note on the Universities and the Social Sciences", 286
- ¹¹¹Drache, 455-58
- ¹¹²Ibid., 450
- ¹¹³Ibid., 451
- ¹¹⁴Harold Innis, "The Passing of Political Economy", *Commerce Journal*, 1938, 3-6; quoted in Drache, 440-441.
- ¹¹⁵Ibid., 440-1
- ¹¹⁶McKillop 509-10; , Harold Innis, "The Passing of Political Economy"; quoted in Drache, 438-40.
- ¹¹⁷Quoted in McKillop, 520.
- ¹¹⁸Sir Edward Beatty. "Freedom and the Universities", *Queen's Quarterly*, v. 44, (Winter 1937), 471
- ¹¹⁹Ibid., 466
- ¹²⁰Ibid.
- ¹²¹Arthur Lower, "The Social Sciences in the Post-War World", *Canadian Historical Review* 22 (March 1941); quoted in Welf H. Heick, ed. *History and Myth: Arthur Lower and the Making of Canadian Nationalism*. (Vancouver, 1975), 105-6
- ¹²²Ibid., 106
- ¹²³Ibid., 110
- ¹²⁴Ibid., 112
- ¹²⁵Ibid., 111
- ¹²⁶Ibid., 114
- ¹²⁷Ibid., 112
- ¹²⁸James S. Thomson. "The Universities and the War ", *Queen's Quarterly*, v. 47, (Spring 1940), 4
- ¹²⁹McKillop, 522
- ¹³⁰The NRMA required fit single men and widowers between twenty-one and forty-five to register for service in home defence.
- ¹³¹McKillop, 524.
- ¹³²Ibid., 529-30.
- ¹³³Ibid., 529
- ¹³⁴Ibid., 528
- ¹³⁵Thomson, 6
- ¹³⁶Ibid., 7
- ¹³⁷Watson Kirkconnell, *Twilight of Liberty* (London, 1941), xi
- ¹³⁸Thomson, 7
- ¹³⁹Ibid.
- ¹⁴⁰Ibid., 9
- ¹⁴¹In spite of the arguments of political scientist Daniel Drache, who calls an entire section of his edited collection of Innis essays, "The Intellectual as Citizen", the scholar's active participation in government and private interests repulsed Innis. See Drache *Staples, Markets and Cultural Change*.
- ¹⁴²See chapter two.

¹⁴³See Harold Innis, Untitled memorandum ["Rough draft"], (n.d.). Harold Innis Papers, UTA, Box 23, file 10, B72-0003 and Innis "Economics and Business", unpublished manuscript (n.d.), Harold Innis Papers, UTA, Box 012, file 47, B72-0003.

¹⁴⁴Innis, "Economics and Business," 1

¹⁴⁵Innis, Untitled memorandum ["rough draft"], 1

¹⁴⁶Innis, "Economics and Business," 2

¹⁴⁷Lower in Heick, 108

¹⁴⁸Donald Creighton, *Harold Adams Innis: Portrait of a Scholar* (Toronto, 1957), 109

¹⁴⁹Harold Innis, "Address to the President" (n.d. -- 1941) Harold Innis Papers, UTA, Box 005, file 18, B72-0003, 1. Innis was fundamentally opposed to Underhill's view that the scholar should take up positions outside academia. He urged the scholar to remain in the ivory tower, a notion which conflicted with Underhill's ideas. See note 141.

¹⁵⁰Ibid., 2

¹⁵¹Innis to Donald Creighton, (15 February 1941) Donald Creighton Papers, Public Archives of Canada (PAC), v. 1; General Correspondence, 1941, 31 D77

¹⁵²Innis, "Address to the President," 2

¹⁵³Ibid.

¹⁵⁴See chapter two.

¹⁵⁵Harold Innis, "A Plea for the University Tradition" *Dalhousie Review* 24 (1944), 298

¹⁵⁶Ibid., 299-300

¹⁵⁷Innis to H.J. Cody (3 December 1943) Harold Innis Papers (UTA), Box 005, file 18, B72-0003

¹⁵⁸Innis to G.M. Weir (8 March 1943) Harold Innis Papers (UTA), Box 005, file 18, B72-0003. See also an untitled memorandum concerning the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and the postwar problem of the University, (no date - 1948?) Harold Innis Papers (UTA), B72-0003.

¹⁵⁹Innis "Adult Education and Universities" in Harold Innis, *The Bias of Communication* (Toronto, reprinted 1973), 204

¹⁶⁰Ibid.

¹⁶¹*Scholarship for Canada* was a report commissioned by the Canadian Social Science and Research Council. Council officials chose Brebner to write the report because he was a scholar working in America (though Canadian born) and therefore had "no ax to grind." See John Bartlet Brebner, *Scholarship for Canada. The Function of Graduate Studies*. (Ottawa, 1945), 3.

¹⁶²Ibid., 13

¹⁶³Ibid., 13-14

¹⁶⁴Ibid., 14

¹⁶⁵Ibid.

¹⁶⁶Principals Wallace and James, of Queen's and McGill Universities respectively, were rumoured to have been poised to ask the NCCU for permission to close faculties of arts in Canadian universities, along with certain programs in other faculties. It was also rumoured that Prime Minister Mackenzie King was to put the plan immediately into effect. See McKillop, 533.

¹⁶⁷Although several members of the Council signed the memorandum it is evident from the style that Innis himself drafted all or most of the text.

¹⁶⁸Canadian Social Science Research Council. *Brief to the Canadian Government* (November, 1942) Donald Creighton Papers, (PAC), v. 15, H.A. Innis, 1924-54, MG 31 D77, 2

¹⁶⁹Ibid., 3

¹⁷⁰Ibid.

¹⁷¹Humanists rallied due to the threat of having instruction curtailed, and resolved, due to the initiative of Innis and R.H. Coats (Dominion statistician), to create an association of humanists similar to the CSSRC. Accordingly, the HRCC was created by the end of 1943, at the instigation of Innis, and under the initial leadership of Watson Kirkconnell and A.S.P. Woodhouse.

¹⁷²McKillop, 539

¹⁷³See *ibid.*

¹⁷⁴Innis "A Plea for the University Tradition", 299

¹⁷⁵Harold Innis, "The Church in Canada" in *Time for Healing*. Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Board of Evangelism and Social Service (Toronto, 1947), 2

¹⁷⁶Watson Kirkconnell and A.S.P. Woodhouse *The Humanities in Canada*, (Ottawa, 1947), 6

¹⁷⁷Ibid., 7

¹⁷⁸Ibid., 6-7

¹⁷⁹Ibid., 7

¹⁸⁰Ibid., 8

¹⁸¹Ibid.

¹⁸²Ibid., 11

¹⁸³Kirkconnell, 176

¹⁸⁴Ibid., 184

¹⁸⁵Ibid., 185. Note that Kirkconnell did not advocate the return of formal religion or the promotion of religious dogma of any kind. Instead, he wished to emphasize the need to evoke the spiritual part of the human psyche, for he believed that that aspect of humanity had been under siege in the recent past.

¹⁸⁶Ibid., 185-86

¹⁸⁷ibid., 187

¹⁸⁸Harold Innis "The University in the Modern Crisis," in *Political Economy in the Modern State* (Toronto, 1946), 80-1

¹⁸⁹See Harold Innis, *The Idea File*, William Christian, ed., section 2/19, p. 9 (Toronto, 1980). Here Innis writes: "Ivory tower is essential if [a] universal point of view [is] to be attained".

¹⁹⁰Innis "A Plea for the University Tradition", 65

¹⁹¹Ibid., 71

¹⁹²The Associate Director of the Humanities, The Rockefeller Foundation

¹⁹³Donald Creighton to John Marshall (10 May 1943) Donald Creighton Papers (PAC) v. 1, General Correspondence: 1943, 31 D77, 1

¹⁹⁴Ibid., 1-2

¹⁹⁵This group of Toronto scholars met at the University for a time in second half of the 1940s. The main goal of meetings, which were led in turn by one of the group's members, was to assess the role of values in modern life. Most importantly, the scholars wished to understand the part played by the university in influencing societal values.

¹⁹⁶"Values" Discussion Group, 22 March 1947, Harold Innis Papers (UTA), Box 030, file 06, B72-0003, 2

¹⁹⁷ibid.

¹⁹⁸"Values" Discussion Group, 8 March 1949, Harold Innis Papers (UTA), Box 030, file 06, B72-0003, 1

¹⁹⁹Ibid.

²⁰⁰Ibid., 2

²⁰¹"Values" Discussion Group, 22 March 1947

The Modernization of Higher Learning in Canada II: Academia after the War

Before 1939, the modernization for Canadian universities had been an evolution, beginning around the turn of the century and building momentum throughout the interwar period. The Second World War, as we have noted, provided an additional impetus to changes that had already been well underway. The war accentuated existing trends away from the traditional liberal arts orientation of higher learning towards a greater pragmatism. The applied sciences and practical disciplines flourished while the humanities and other studies deemed non-essential to the war effort seemed to languish. Once social critics and purveyors of cultural values, the universities had become by war's end renown for their contributions to a technologically intensive war effort. They had responded to the unprecedented need for technical expertise and practical "know-how", and had achieved, in consequence, an unparalleled utilitarian focus.

For those preoccupied with the future of higher learning in Canada the crucial question was whether or not wartime developments in higher education were merely an aberration or a dangerous intensification of an existing trend. Even by the latter stages of the war, the answer to the query remained unclear. Discerning the aims of higher learning, however, was again critical to understanding the direction of the university. The National Conference of Canadian Universities (NCCU) report on "postwar problems",¹ for instance, claimed that after the war "universities will have an unprecedented opportunity to render an essential service to the nation ..."² Certain problems had to be solved, however, before Canadian universities could "play their full part in the postwar world".³ Along with resolving immediate practical problems, such as returning veterans, finance, equipment and physical difficulties, the report recommended that Canadian universities reexamine the role of the liberal arts within the university. In appendix five of the report, R.C. Wallace urged that universities make an effort to reintegrate humane studies within the modern university.⁴ They must move away from their tendency to emphasize practical over humanistic learning and instead integrate "these two fields of knowledge into a unified whole".⁵ The reassertion of humane learning, Wallace suggested, was key to the postwar development of Canadian universities. In his contribution to the report, Harold Innis agreed with Wallace that the war contributed to the decline of the humanities and the social sciences.⁶ Like Wallace, he argued that the serious imbalance between the two main branches of knowledge weakened the university's service to society. Unlike his fellow committee

member, however, Innis urged that the primacy of the humanities and social sciences over the professions and the practical sciences be acknowledged. "Reconstruction", he concluded, would be futile without this critical first step.⁷ Echoing Wallace and Innis, W.R. Taylor, Principal of University College, summed up the postwar challenge of the Canadian university. "The university of today", he wrote in 1946, "is in a state of confusion ... To effect some measure of reform there must be born in each university a resolve to examine itself and to order itself in its several faculties in accordance with the demands of a common purpose. Practically this would mean ... that all specialized, vocational, and professional training would be projected on a broad base of cultural subjects ..."⁸ As with Wallace and Innis, Taylor's message was clear: to fulfill its educative role and to provide service to postwar Canadians the university must curtail specialized training and place technical knowledge under the governance of humane studies.

Scholars' preoccupations about the postwar development of the Canadian university were justified. As before and during the war, the ongoing development of the utilitarian university remained after 1945 a focal issue of higher education. Like concerned scholars, the public and the media also queried the direction of the postwar university. In 1944, *Saturday Night* asked "Will Canada's Universities Meet [the] Needs of the Post-war?", and responded to its own query the following year by stating that "Learning as an end in itself [was] no longer valid in a nation which needs the minds of its youth for leadership in the rough new world to come ..."⁹ Two years later, a national Gallup poll revealed the degree to which Canadians believed universities ought to maintain their utilitarian emphasis. Of those canvassed, sixty per cent indicated that education should focus on "practical subjects".¹⁰ In addition, newspaper editorials and magazine articles implored universities to focus on the training of financiers and business leaders.¹¹ Lamentably for the advocates of humanistic learning, they made no reference to the import of contemplation or humane values to postwar development.

Enrolment figures in the professional faculties also illustrate the increasing popularity of practical education. Of all professional programs only theology and agriculture did not experience growth in the 1940s and 1950s. Undergraduate enrolments in medicine in Canadian universities increased by 50 per cent (to 4244), while dentistry (to 1055), household science (to 1598) and veterinary medicine (to 466), all doubled. Student registrations in nursing (to nearly 1700), pharmacy (to nearly 1500) and occupational and physical therapy (to 476) tripled while engineering enrolments experienced the greatest overall increase: enrolments tripled to nearly 15,000 by 1960.¹² Enrolments in other professional faculties such as architecture, law, library science, education, and social work

also increased greatly. Graduate enrolments likewise experienced large growth. Full-time registration in graduate studies more than tripled to 6518 by 1960.¹³ While overall enrolments in the arts and sciences also tended to grow, numbers of undergraduates in these fields declined compared to student registrations in professional programs.¹⁴ The dominant status of the arts and pure sciences continued to be eroded in the postwar era as the long-term professionalization of Canadian universities continued unabated into the 1950s and 1960s.

The creation of Carleton College also symbolized the rise of the “professional” university. Responding to a perceived need for English language college instruction a group headed by Ottawa members of the YMCA, civil servant Hugh Kennleyside, and Henry Marshall Tory, applied for and received charter status under the province of Ontario’s Companies Act.¹⁵ Not only was Carleton the first institution to be chartered under Companies Act, which in itself symbolized new attitudes towards institutions of higher learning, it was also the first university not to have liberal arts departments at its centre. Carleton focussed on journalism and public and business administration rather than having English, philosophy, history, and the classics, along with the newer social sciences, as core disciplines. “Adult” or “continuing” education, which had been in existence for decades but which only emerged to prominence in Canadian after 1945,¹⁶ was also important to the new college’s educative mandate.¹⁷ Departing from earlier models, then, Carleton College was a new type of educational institution that provided an example for universities in the coming decades.

Other universities also struggled with the professionalization issue. In 1945 authorities at McMaster University stated that their institution would not succumb to current pressures and develop new schools of engineering, law, and medicine.¹⁸ Only a year later, however, McMaster chancellor G.P. Gilmour indicated that the Baptist Convention’s (McMaster governing body) desired to incorporate secular Hamilton College into the Baptist institution under the Companies Act. The move bound the university to the business world. Indeed, the wider implications of McMaster’s new course were also obvious: lured by large-scale corporate funding, the university had jeopardized its denominational identity and its historic orientation as solely a liberal arts institution in favour of a new accommodation with the secular world.¹⁹

In addition to the professionalization and secularization of higher learning, government funding of the postwar university became an important issue after 1945. First, very few Canadian universities stood outside the ambit of provincial government. The few universities that did not receive government funding by 1945 -- mostly denominational institutions such as McMaster -- secularized and therefore became eligible for state

funding.²⁰ What is more, government funds became increasingly important to those universities already reliant on the public purse. Because of vastly increasing enrolments²¹ in the demobilization period, Canadian universities required additional funds. Fortunately, provincial governments, assisted by buoyant revenues, recognized the dire need for money and made an effort to deal with the burgeoning funding malaise. The Ontario experience best illustrates how provincial governments participated in university finances. Acknowledging the importance of universities to winning the war and to achieving material prosperity in the postwar, Premier George Drew's government vowed to free universities "from the burden of their debts that is hampering their efforts", thereby allowing them to cope with increased costs of research and the exigencies of a multitude of new registrants.²² Accordingly, Drew's government resolved in March 1944 to distribute grants totaling \$1,316,000 to the three eligible universities – \$816,000 to Toronto and \$460,000 each to Queen's and Western.²³ Other funding initiatives supplemented these grants (which were to become annual operational funding), including special grants provided for an Institute of Child Study at the University of Toronto and Ontario medical schools. No longer strictly denominational, McMaster University was eligible for and received government financing, while the newly incorporated Carleton University (1952) now also received grants. Carrying out their earlier commitment to assist scientific research in agriculture, forestry, and mining throughout the province, the government also funded institutes of trade and vocational education, including the newly established Ryerson Institute of Technology (1948). Unlike his predecessor Mitchell Hepburn,²⁴ Drew understood the fundamental linkages between material development and adequately funded universities. Indeed, his efforts to increase public financing of Ontario's institutions reflected an age in which the merits of universities were adjudged according to their practical contributions to society.²⁵

Increases in public funding notwithstanding, concern over university funding became even more important as the new decade approached. As it stood, government financing often only partially defrayed rising costs associated with increased enrolments. Many universities had to finance increasingly costly capital expenditures in the absence of government aid. While some of them were able to gain private funding, the majority of institutions made economies in other areas such as professors' salaries to try to compensate for the shortfall.²⁶ Such efforts were only partly successful in freeing up funds necessary to cope with postwar expansion, however. Much more money would have to be infused into the universities to deal with the postwar boom. Hence, more than ever before university authorities made their way to provincial capitals with hands outstretched to secure additional grants. The ongoing quest for funds had reached a critical stage in the history of the Canadian university.

Amid the prolonged funding crisis, interested observers became concerned over how funds were distributed within and among post-secondary institutions. As we have seen, provincial governments were predisposed to funding practical disciplines better than the arts and humanities. Academic councils devoted to the applied sciences and practical studies also tended to be better funded. The development of the National Research Council (NRC) was illustrative of the funding bias. As during the Great War,²⁷ the 1939-45 war greatly stimulated the development of the NRC. The staff and budget of the council sharply increased only a few months after the declaration of war, a trend that was to continue throughout the conflict. By 1943, for instance, the council's budget was five times that of 1939.²⁸ This wartime expansion continued in the postwar age. Because the postwar was a period of relative prosperity, and, most importantly, because the war demonstrated to governments and the public at large the merits of funding applied sciences, the federal government was both able and willing to continue to provide the NRC with stable funding. Large-scale funding meant, in turn, that the NRC could continue to contribute large sums to the universities, those institutions that continued in peacetime to train scientific personnel and undertake most of the country's fundamental and applied research. Indeed, the NRC granted almost \$1,000,000 to universities and colleges in 1947-48 compared to a relatively paltry \$200,000 a decade earlier.²⁹ It also had the financial wherewithal to introduce post-doctoral fellowships (1945) and to provide "consolidated grants" to establish research groups and institutes. By early 1950s budgets and NRC grants to universities continued their ascent. In 1960-61 grants-in-aid to Canadian universities increased almost ten-fold to \$9.5 million.³⁰ Under new president E.W.R. Steacie (president of the NRC 1952-1962), the bonds between the council and Canadian post-secondary institutions continued to strengthen.³¹ Faculties of applied science and research had, in short, secured increasingly high levels of funding from government councils such as the NRC and, by the late 1940s and early 1950s, from private agencies.³² In a word, increases in postwar funding showed the esteem that Canadians held for the utilitarian university.

If funding is the measure by which the relative merits of departments and faculties were judged then the humanities and social sciences stacked up poorly indeed compared to the practical disciplines. Whereas by the early 1950s the NRC provided grants-in-aid in the millions of dollars annually, the Canadian Social Science Research Council (CSSRC) received only \$718,850 from its inception (1940) until the creation of the Canada Council (1957).³³ What is more, American philanthropic organizations, and not Canadian governments or private corporations, provided the bulk of CSSRC grants.³⁴ Like the CSSRC, the Humanities Research Council (HRC) fared poorly compared to the NRC. Its total revenues from its establishment in 1943 until 1957 (the year before the inception of the

Canada Council) was a meagre \$356,423.³⁵ Like the CSSRC, the HRC relied heavily on the Rockefeller and Carnegie organizations for contributions.³⁶ Canadians seemed to have little money indeed for the development of the liberal arts.

The consequences of inadequate funding were manifold. In practical terms, Canadian universities lacked not only sufficient money to aid all aspects of scholarly research (everything from travel to photostat expenses) but they also harboured inadequate libraries and archival facilities. In 1947 Watson Kirkconnell lamented that “Only ten academic libraries of 124 in Canada report [100,000] books”, a minimum standard established in 1922. Only four or five Canadian libraries today, he added, “measure up to minimum American standards of twenty-five years ago”.³⁷ To remedy the situation the federal government needed “to take immediate practical steps towards the ultimate establishment of a National Library”.³⁸ A national research facility and “bibliographic centre” were essential, Kirkconnell concluded, to compensate for these deficiencies by making available extensive research resources to Canadian scholars.³⁹

More important than even library resources were scholars’ salaries. Scholarly remuneration at Canadian universities was well below that of academics of other western universities. J.B. Brebner, a Canadian who was working in the United States, complained that scholars’ salaries at Canada’s “elite institutions” – McGill and Toronto – “were at least 20 per cent below those of Boston, Chicago, New York” and comparable British institutions.⁴⁰ The salary issue, in consequence, impelled many of the brightest Canadian scholars to go south or to Britain. The leading universities had to take action, Brebner concluded in his 1945 report on the state of Canadian scholarship, to remedy this grave situation.⁴¹ Watson Kirkconnell concurred with Brebner’s assessment. He argued that “One of the most crying needs is for the general upward revision of salaries”.⁴² Kirkconnell characterized the “scale of academic salaries in Canada” as “calamitous” and warned that if universities did not soon augment salaries, then many promising young scholars would be diverted to other professions into the better paid colleges of the United States.⁴³ Looking back on the immediate postwar period, B.S. Keirstead and S.D. Clark concluded that, “[b]ecause academic salaries were low, many of the best men have gone to the US or to government or business. Canadian universities as a result ... are tending to attract second-rate men with inadequate training ...”⁴⁴

Other problems, less readily visible, but just as pressing, also flowed from the funding issue. For the critics of the modern university the most important of these was academic liberty. Just as the war had imperiled the free university, the postwar funding problem also threatened academic freedom. Critics pointed out that university administrators focussed far too much effort and time on securing funds for their

impoverished departments, faculties, or universities. As a result of this seemingly continuous search for funds, university officials of all stripes neglected their fundamental duties as scholars. University presidents, for example, involved in the past with academic issues, were now consumed with “raising money and giving speeches”.⁴⁵ Brebner, to take one critic, advised that presidents ensure that their institutions keep focused on their main objective: scholarship. Instead of fund-raising, speechifying, and administrating, the president’s role was to “forward and to express the intrinsic function of the university ...”⁴⁶ President G.E. Hall of Western proffered an even broader admonition of university administrators. “[P]residents, deans and other officials in our universities,” he declared in 1949, “have had to forsake education to become executive supersalesmen, leaders of delegations and beggars, so that universities [could] even remain in existence”.⁴⁷ Instead of being the chief spokespeople of the intellectual world, authorities were leading the modern academy astray. True to his pre-war and wartime positions, Innis also decried the “business and political exploitation of universities”. Universities, he complained, appeared to be up for sale to the highest bidder.⁴⁸ Ultimately, the infiltration of the pecuniary factor into academics would have dire results. “To buy universities is to destroy them”, Innis concluded abruptly, “and with them the civilization for which they stand”.⁴⁹

The increasingly intense competition for government grants and private funding indeed threatened the character and integrity of scholarly activity. Echoing Harold Innis’s strictures a decade earlier, Brebner argued that scholarship must be free from outside influences to flourish. Talents, abilities, and the social usefulness of the scholars, he averred in a section of writing tellingly entitled “Endowed and Free”, should not be wasted on “applied scholarship” (scholarship commissioned by government or private industry). Above all, Brebner wanted to ensure that scholars did not submit themselves to the “compromises, adjustments, and expediencies which are necessary in business, politics, and the professions”. For the association with these extra-academic groups would surely “impair the very capacity for unprejudiced scholarship” that made scholars so valuable and so rare.⁵⁰ Keirstead and Clark also waded into the debate. With promises of large grants and ample salaries research institutes seduced scholars away from their work to engage in “factual research” that was of “slight theoretical interest”.⁵¹ Much money and time were wasted as a result, resources that would be better spent on “creative scholarship”. “Only a real passion for scholarship”, Keirstead and Clark concluded, could protect scholars from the corrupting forces of money and notoriety.⁵² Only in focussing on unbiased academic inquiry, in other words, could scholarship remain pure and the university fulfill its fundamental purpose. In characteristically aphoristic style, Innis summarized the academy’s struggle for scholarly autonomy: “the university is essentially an ivory tower in

which courage can be mustered to attack any concept which threatens to become a monopoly".⁵³

Certainly, the critics of higher learning considered freedom from outside influences critical to the ongoing viability of universities. The struggle for scholarly liberty, moreover, remained as intense after 1945 as it had been during the war. But tainted scholarship and the undue emphasis on the funding game were only part of critics' concerns. Indeed, a wider crisis of academic freedom became a growing preoccupation of critics. By the mid-1940s scholars began to realize the enduring quality of academic change. The wartime assault on the humanities was not an anomaly, the temporary consequence of the war. Nor would universities necessarily revert to a prior stage of development once peace was restored. Rather, scholars recognized that the university had become an embattled institution and would continue to be held hostage by the society around it. As Innis claimed in 1944, higher education was "besieged on all hands by villains"⁵⁴, a "small and dwindling island surrounded by the flood of totalitarianism..."⁵⁵ The academy was indeed fighting for its very existence in the modern world. In the chaotic environment of the late 1940s and early 1950s the free existence of the academy in Canadian society seemed more than ever to be at stake.

The academic servility that Innis and others expounded upon was a complex phenomenon. More than merely the inexorable decline of the humanities and the rise to prominence of the utilitarian disciplines, the enslavement of the academy had wider implications. The most significant of these was the decline of the academy's "true" historic function as the central spiritual and cultural institution of society. As suggested in the last chapter, the critics of academic modernization coalesced as a group first in their assessment of the mytho-historic role of the university. Second, they acknowledged the contemporary decay of academic traditions and attempted to find remedies for this grievous development. Indeed, the demise of university traditions, such as academic freedom, philosophic contemplation, and the growth of the utilitarian university, signaled more than an evolution of higher learning. In the broadest sense, the decay of these traditions mirrored a profound change in Canadian society, the decline of its traditions of democracy and freedom, and an altered sense of cultural and moral values. Ultimately, the decay of the university implied, as Innis had suggested earlier, the decline of western civilization.

In an idealized conception of higher learning, critics claimed that the university's basic function had been to preserve knowledge and serve as a purveyor of the culture of the west. To use Arnold's phrase, the university was to preserve the best that has been thought and said throughout the ages.⁵⁶ Its primary function, in the words of Vincent Massey,

was to care for and preserve “the entire inheritance of our civilization”, to maintain, in brief, “the memory and evidence of ... accumulated cultural achievements, in the arts, and letters, in science, in philosophy and in religion”.⁵⁷ Universities, James S. Thomson claimed in 1945, “belong to an international world of culture and knowledge. They are heirs of all ages, and claim the universal attainments of man’s mind as their birthright ...”⁵⁸ Higher learning, Donald Creighton agreed, had a conservative, Burkean function. One of its main purposes was to conserve the past, to record society’s cultural inheritance, and “discuss” and “interpret” those achievements “in ways which are significant for new generations”. The emphasis of higher learning, he went on to conclude, “is necessarily in conservation rather than innovation; it is [the academy’s] business to guard against the nihilism of rootless and disinherited marauders, [while preserving] the great traditions of a culture and the great traditions of a state”.⁵⁹

More than serving simply as repositories for intellectual and cultural accomplishments, universities also had proactive functions. The first and perhaps most difficult to define of these was the academy’s role as purveyor of moral virtue. Historically a humanistic institution imbued with Christian ideals, the academy was well poised to influence moral standards of the Canadian community. Perhaps most importantly, it was positioned to aid a population whose faith in humanity had wavered and a society in which confusion about spiritual values was rife. Indeed, critics of the modern university emphasized the role of academics to inculcate “humane” and other quasi-religious and cultural values to bolster flagging faith in humanity. There was a need “for the reacceptance of what may be described as an academic faith”, James Thomson declared in 1945, discussing the role of the academy in the postwar world.⁶⁰ The last war destroyed faith in the human spirit through such perversities as the mass destruction of humanity, the predominance of fascist ideologies, and, most devastating of all, systematic racial extermination. The university, Thomson argued, could restore faith in humanity. One of its greatest responsibilities was to teach students and Canadians at large that there was something to live for in a callous era.⁶¹ In an age “when mankind has ... been brought face to face with evil horror, ugliness and perversity”, Watson Kirkconnell and A.S.P. Woodhouse also looked to the academy for help.⁶² The “ethical aspect” of a liberal education was essential in the 1940s, they averred, if Canadians hoped to attain maturity and “apprehend moral values while confronting unflinchingly the terror and cruelty of [their] contemporary world”.⁶³ The “will to good” that was inherent to a liberal education must be evoked so as counteract the evils of the current age. “The replacement of ignorance and brutality by knowledge, insight, taste and moral purpose” was indeed a crucial task for scholars. Just as Thomson had two years previously, Kirkconnell and

Woodhouse expounded upon the duty of scholars to the moral order. Simply put, they implored university men and women to recognize the moral dangers of the postwar era and to present humane alternatives.⁶⁴ Far from being irrelevant to the needs of a changing world, thus, academics performed a critical moralizing function for a society that was in dire need of guidance.

Closely related to this moralizing capacity was the university's function as social critic. Academics had an obligation, critics of academic modernization contended, to assess social change and understand how society evolved. They were far from aloof scholars whose work had little meaning to the society around them. To the contrary, they were obliged to observe and make sense of their surroundings. Their work, in short, judged societal change and provided insight into correct courses of action for the future. More than social critics, then, university intellectuals had to act as social philosophers who became responsible for giving meaning to the social process and conveying that meaning to the public at large.

At no time was this role more important than in the mid-1940s. In an era not just of material but also cultural and indeed "spiritual" reconstruction, the university critics put a heavy burden on the frail shoulders of academics. In a social climate increasingly inimical to "humane knowledge" they looked to the university for remedies. Writing near war's end Innis implored the university "to play its major role in the rehabilitation of civilization" which had "collapsed". The duty of scholars was, for Innis, to "discuss the strategy for recovery". Universities, he concluded, offered a "platform on which [academics] may be able to discuss the problems of civilization".⁶⁵ Richard M. Saunders, editor of a series of lectures on higher education, shared both Innis's sense of foreboding and his notion that educators were leaders in the effort to reconstruct society. "The basic aim of education," Saunders wrote in 1946, "has always been to convey to each succeeding generation a clear conception of the meaning of life, and of its part in it." Considering the current crisis, it was "clearly incumbent" upon educational leaders, "the guides and guardians of our youth", to "discover afresh the meaning and purpose of our life ..."⁶⁶ Modern society, he continued, had been set adrift in a "sea of chaos". Only with the aid of thoughtful scholars could it regain "intimate touch with sources of spiritual capital".⁶⁷ In 1947, in a convocation address, Chancellor Vincent Massey of the University of Toronto added his to the voices of Innis and Saunders. Massey warned that "Our humane Christian tradition is now imperiled as it has not been for 1,500 years; imperiled not so much by physical forces ... as by opposing philosophies, pagan, materialistic, tyrannical, ruthless. Should [these forces] prevail, human freedom would be extinguished and what we know as Western civilization would disappear ..."⁶⁸ In the defence of western culture, he added hastily, the

academy was key. "Our universities stand both as the exponent and guardians of our ancient way of life. They bear the very seeds of freedom. We look to them for guidance in this confused and troubled age".⁶⁸

How precisely were scholars to aid in understanding and providing remedies for a society in tumultuous times? How, moreover, were they to make their fundamental contribution to society without leaving the cloistered surroundings of the academy? The response to these critical queries lay in the manner in which scholars approached scholarship; put in another way, it relied on whether or not they adhered to the "philosophical approach" to scholarship.

In 1949 George P. Grant surveyed the development of philosophy in English-speaking universities for the Commission on the Developments of Arts, Letters, and Sciences (the Massey Commission). In a "special study" called "Philosophy", Grant, among other things, highlighted the importance of maintaining philosophy at the forefront of the academic enquiry.⁶⁹ As Innis and the others had argued earlier, Grant showed how universities historically had allowed scholars to "contemplate" and "partake of the wisdom of the past" and "to transmit this great tradition" to "certain chosen members of the chosen generation". The universities, he claimed, were society's "centres of philosophy".⁷⁰ As such, they facilitated the rational and epistemological enquiry into human existence and provided all-important insight into society's traditions and future directions. An important duty of humanist scholars, Grant summed up, was to study philosophy, understand its messages, and pass them on to society. "Such indeed must always be the role of significant philosophy -- to affect the spirits of the intellectually gifted and through them to filter down into society as a whole".⁷¹

Grant chose University of Toronto classicist C.N. Cochrane as an example of the type of "gifted individual" to whom he referred. Cochrane was an academic for whom the philosophical approach was central. Perhaps even more importantly, his scholarly insights provided information on current cultural problems. To read Cochrane's *Christianity and Classical Culture* (1940), Grant wrote, "is to understand that the history of the ancient world has been illustrated for him in the predicaments of his own society, and that he uses the example of the ancient world to throw his light towards the solution of modern predicaments. Clearly, what he says about Greece and Rome has been wrought in the furnace of what he has seen in his own civilization ..."⁷² Innis implicitly concurred with Grant's analysis. Indicating the value of Cochrane's study to modern social scientific research, he declared that

the significance of the volume for social scientists is in its philosophical approach. In classical civilization reason asserted its supremacy and in

doing so betrayed its insecure position with disastrous results The sweep of the Platonic state in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the spread of science has been followed by the horrors of the Platonic state. The social scientist is asked to check his course and to indicate his role in western civilization. His answer must stand the test of the philosophic approach of Cochrane.⁷³

For both Grant and Innis, then, Cochrane's book was a model for modern scholars. *Christianity and Classical Culture* showed how the study of past cultures could provide insight into current philosophical difficulties. As such, it was an example of the correct application of scholarship. Above all, Cochrane displayed the central importance of the scholar as social philosopher in his role to enlighten and to give meaning to the social process. Of all the other merits of Cochrane's book, its socio-philosophical relevance was of primary significance to both Innis and Grant.

Like the philosophical approach, academic critics also emphasized the merits of historical inquiry as an aid to understanding the social order. For, like the philosophical approach, historical inquiry further facilitated scholars' roles as social philosophers. It enabled them to see the present in light of the past and therefore to gain a wider understanding of contemporary socio-cultural tendencies. Historical perspective allowed scholars to escape "presentist" biases, to emancipate academics, in other words, from the restrictions of contemporary viewpoints. Innis, himself an economic historian, extolled the virtues of the historical approach to scholarship. The study of historical "empires" (socio-cultural organizations), he argued, compelled scholars "to recognize the bias of the period in which [they] write ..."⁷⁴ Couching his thoughts in the terminology of his later scholarship, Innis urged that scholars be "continually alert to the implications" of the media bias to contemporaneous and past societies. For through the examination of the impact of the media bias on past civilizations, academics might be enabled to see more clearly the effects of contemporary socio-cultural limitations.⁷⁵ Hilda Neatby, also an historian, implicitly agreed with Innis concerning the merits of historical perspective. History, Neatby suggested, enlightened as to the nature of common, accepted moral and cultural standards of the west. Through the study of the past, historians were able to compare past realities to the current "moral" conditions and convey their understanding to others outside the academy. Ultimately, they could provide the insight to enable modern humanity to overcome historical follies.⁷⁶ Vincent Massey also expounded upon the fundamental importance of history to understanding current socio-cultural difficulties. Borrowing from Shakespeare's *The Tempest*, Massey declared, "'What's Past is Prologue'. This I believe is true at any given moment in history. It is most of all true in times of crisis", Massey continued. "We are always moved by our own past. We act most surely and most

effectively when we are not slavishly, but consciously and intelligently aware of this fundamental fact.”⁷⁷ History and historical scholarship acted thus as beacons for a civilization that had been led astray. Expounding upon the wider merits of historical enquiry, historian W.L. Morton contended that scholars used history not only to “reinforce tradition” but also to open “new paths of thought”. The historian’s work, Morton argued, cannot but contribute to “the development of the thought of its time, spring from it, pushing it forward, and turning it into new channels”.⁷⁸ Historical scholarship, for Morton and others, stimulated new and creative thought while at the same time it provided perspective and (moral) guidance. Apart from all the relative merits of historical scholarship *per se*, historical inquiry, like the philosophical approach of Innis and Grant, had a very significant instrumentalist purpose: it had become a tool through which academics interpreted Canada’s place in the modern world.

Not an academic tool in itself, humanistic learning contributed nonetheless to the critique of mid-century society. The humanities – philosophy, history, the classics, and literary studies – not so much provided a precise methodology by which scholars could recognize the deficiencies of the current age as they presented an ideal to which moderns could ascribe. Most significant of all, the humanities were, for many critics, an essential counterweight to the increasingly “inhuman” modern world. Humanistic education could not only counteract the perversities of war, but it also aided in neutralizing the more insidious yet pernicious tendencies towards materialism, consumerism, and a general preoccupation with the present and the secular. Allowed to flourish, the humanities, according to their chief advocates, would expose the inadequacies of mid-century culture in Canada, thereby facilitating the development of the good society. As happened during wartime, the humanities continued their critical service to Canadian and western civilization throughout the postwar age.

In response to a perceived “crisis of values” stemming just as much from the decline of humanistic learning and the advent of technical instruction as from the shocking events of the war, critics turned to the humanities for guidance. Amid revelations about the holocaust and other wartime atrocities, and in the midst of academic confusion, especially in the arts and humanities, they turned to humanistic learning as a way to restore a sense of balance and stability. Again, the assertion of “humane” values was all-important. An article in the *Queen’s Quarterly* declared that there had been a “universal breakdown of values” and that it was incumbent upon humanists to “rebuild these shattered values”, to rediscover, most importantly, “the values implicit in the humanities”.⁷⁹ Another piece argued that humanities have a “place answering the practical problems of life and living”.⁸⁰ They provided humanity the “standards of conduct” and increased the individual’s “powers

of discrimination” so as to enable the achievement of “a synthesis of desirable goals and objects”.⁸¹ They could, in other words, allow the individual to achieve a “free personality” through the “contemplation of beauty -- beauty of conduct, beauty of form, beauty of sound and line and colour” and “above all beauty of soul”.⁸² Closely guided by the strictures of Matthew Arnold, humanists showed how the power of “beauty” and “conduct”, intrinsic to humane learning, were not only the hallmarks of the civilized personality but also a means by which to confront without recoil the terror and inhumanity of the modern world.⁸³ The rediscovery and reassertion of humane values therefore had become crucial; in building character and in civilizing the imagination, the humanities facilitated humankind’s capacity to understand itself and the world outside.

There was an even more practical, quasi-utilitarian function for humane knowledge. In practical terms, the humanities provided moral and “value” alternatives to the secular and materialist value system of the postwar age. Humane knowledge, in effect, functioned to counterbalance technical, scientific, and material values that had come to pervade modern society. In a piece entitled “The Conflict of Values in Education”, James S. Thomson, President of the National Conference of Canadian Universities, warned of the dangerous preeminence of scientific and technical values in the postwar world. Thomson criticized the prevailing intellectual milieu, one in which not only the modern mind had become divided between scientific and humane values, but also one wherein “science and the scientific method” assumed a “central place”.⁸⁴ As many others, he decried the fact that “education should be concerned with things useful” and that humane knowledge was considered to be of no practical value.⁸⁵ The humanities, to the contrary, *were* pragmatic. Unlike the sciences, they could “pronounce on values” and facilitate judgments on the human condition.⁸⁶ And, because the analysis of social interactions was never more important than during an “age of confusion”, and since values were “the very stuff of civilization”, their importance to society was difficult to dispute. “Any society must give practical expression to its values in its system of education”, Thomson concluded, “for education is nothing other than the self-perpetuation of any culture”.⁸⁷ In the 1947 NCCU Presidential Address, N.A.M. MacKenzie also assessed the pragmatic merits of humane and scientific knowledge. The humanities, like the sciences and the technical disciplines, had a tremendously significant contribution to make to postwar society. “If man is to be a happy balanced and fully developed individual living in peace and security with his fellow men,” MacKenzie declared, “he must find an important place in his scheme of things for ... the humanities”.⁸⁸ “[F]ood fuel, shelter, clothing, power transportation” and other material ends of life had been well taken care of, and considerable advances had been made in the areas of the physical and medical sciences.⁸⁹ The humanities must be stressed, MacKenzie

hastened to add, so as not to compromise the role of education to train the minds of young and old and “so that they can understand and know themselves, and their society”.⁹⁰ Assessing “The Present Status of the Humanities in Canada”, Malcolm Wallace also juxtaposed material advancement with the values inherent to humanistic learning. Material betterment, Wallace wrote in his special study to the Massey commission, “does not lead to the high satisfactions of the soul to which the arts and letters and speculation minister. It gives satisfaction, but it is an inferior kind of satisfaction, which excludes us from the society of good and great men ... whose achievements we might enter with a corresponding enlargement of our lives and characters. To cater to the growing capacity of these things,” he concluded, was the “function of the humanities. ...”⁹¹ In a 1948 address University of Toronto Chancellor Vincent Massey summarized the importance of the humanities in the scientific, materialistic age. Even in the modern age of utilitarian higher education, universities still had “a very ancient and very vital function to perform in the field of the humanities. Technological and scientific progress”, Massey added, did not make “this function obsolete: it ... made it more necessary ... No one passing through a university”, he averred, “should fail to come under the influence of the humanities, because [through] liberal education ..., the student is enabled to acquire a true sense of values, to understand something about the relation of man to society, to distinguish between the real things in life and the fakes, to put first things first, and to sharpen his mental curiosity ...”⁹² A life influenced solely by technological and material values, Massey implied, was truly an impoverished existence.

Finding its foundations in the humanizing function of the humanities, the ideal academy thus performed a broader, “civilizing” role in Canadian society. Transmitters of humane learning and values, Canadian universities had become responsible for “cultural activity” and for the spread of Canadian civilization. In a society that had been preoccupied with material and technological advancement, they had become, in the words of the Massey Commission Report, “nurseries of a truly Canadian civilization and culture ...”⁹³ Universities in Canada continued to be focal points of culture by mid-century because Canadians concentrated on material developments and hence ignored the cultural growth of their nation. Even by the early 1950s, as Vincent Massey, Hilda Neatby,⁹⁴ and the other “Massey commissioners” noted, universities remained as they had always been: islets of civilization awash in a growing sea of materialism. In this atmosphere it was critical that they continue their historic role as cultural outposts. Higher education, the commissioners and other like-minded critics stressed, enabled Canadian society “to strive for a common good, including not only material but intellectual and moral elements”. This over-riding civilizing function had to be maintained, for, if governments denied this purpose and with it

the general cultural education of Canadians, “the complete conception of the common good is lost, and Canada, as such, [would become] a materialistic society”.⁹⁵ Put in another way, if Canada was to grow up from a crass pioneer society into a mature civilized nation, governments would have to guarantee the security of the universities as garrisons of Canadian culture.

While academic critics lamented the decline of university traditions, in sum, they also put forth an idealized conception of higher learning which, they hoped, might replace the dying academy. But more than just the reassertion of historic traditions and attributes of the academy, critics assigned a detailed social function to this quasi-mythical entity. Whether enabling moral judgments, civilizing and “acculturating” Canadians, or affording historical or philosophical insights on contemporary cultural problems, the university had a vital, ameliorating function. Whereas the modern university had become responsible for the material betterment of Canadian society, the humanistic academy served society in a much more important way: it enabled humanity to remain tied to its traditions while helping moderns to cope with contemporary societal malaise. Indeed, critics countered notions of the modern, utilitarian university with their own practical, socially relevant conception of higher learning. In emphasizing the practicalities of humane learning, in short, critics endowed the idealized, “true” academy with a renewed sense of social purpose. In an age in which the civilizing and humanizing purposes of the university seemed to be in eclipse, they became vociferous proponents of vital academic traditions.

Critics of the modernizing university thus presented an idealized conception of the academy as a counterweight to the technical, utilitarian university that developed rapidly during and after the war. And they attempted to answer the ever-pressing question, “What is the use of an Arts education anyway?”⁹⁶ We have discussed in detail the modernization of higher education in the wartime and immediate postwar periods and how critics endeavoured to make the academy and its scholars socially relevant. We must now place the notion of the true academy into historical context to understand how critics’ analyses developed in relation to surrounding historical conditions. There were three main developments that influenced the postwar critique of academic modernization. The first of these was the perception of cultural crisis.

“Crisis”, “chaos”, and “upheaval” to be sure are overworked terms. They were frequently used nevertheless to describe and understand the socio-cultural climate of the 1940s. In 1941, as we noted, historian Arthur Lower announced that the old order was in its death throes and that a “new order” was taking shape.⁹⁷ Lower was referring not only to the modernization process but also to the disappearance of an Anglo-Canadian

civilization and its replacement with a new socio-cultural order. This sense of impermanence and immanent change increased during the latter stages of the war and the immediate postwar era. Writing shortly after the war's end in late 1945, J.S. Thomson claimed that the war promoted an "international revolution" marked by ever-increasing change and violence. It was, in his words, "a first-rate crisis in the development of civilization ...", one, he warned, that did not disappear with armed victory.⁹⁸ Inspired in part by Oswald Spengler⁹⁹ and Arnold Toynbee, Harold Innis became consumed with understanding the rise and fall of civilizations. He argued that by the mid-twentieth century the culture of the west, which had developed over thousands of years, was in its final stages of decay. In Innisian parlance, cultural decline implied the emphasis of "spatial" qualities -- a preoccupation with the present, the technological and the secular -- over time-biased values -- an appreciation of the moral, the cultural and historical. The entrenchment of spatial values involved "a continuous, systematic, [and] ruthless destruction of the elements of permanence essential to cultural activity. The emphasis on change," Innis added, was the "only permanent character" of the decaying west.¹⁰⁰

In some instances, cultural crisis was more fabrication than reality. Supporters and participants of the Massey Commission and others in the so-called "culture lobby", for example, highlighted the precarious status of culture so as to get governments involved in promoting cultural activities. As historian Paul Litt has argued, cultural pressure groups wanted to create an air of crisis "to spur the government into action".¹⁰¹ They wanted to show how culture in Canada was after 1945 at a "critical turning point" and how the "future of the arts in Canada hung in the balance: they could either flourish or collapse" depending on whether the federal government provided funding for the development of culture.¹⁰² "Lowbrow" culture such as hockey and mass media entertainment flourished in the postwar climate while such areas of high culture as Canadian publishing and, most importantly, the Canadian university, faltered.

Historical realities, however, were at the base of concern about cultural collapse. The holocaust was perhaps the starkest manifestation of the brutality of warfare, the inhumanity of mid-century society, and the expressions of general cultural decay. Only becoming apparent after the war had ended, Canadians and others in the western world were shocked at the extent of the campaign of racial extermination carried on by the Nazis. Indeed, memories of the holocaust were so powerful that they completely discredited theories of racial inequality as a subject of serious intellectual inquiry. Transmitted by educators and parents the holocaust would indeed make racism abhorrent to a future generation of Canadians.¹⁰³

By the late 1940s, “thermonuclear holocaust” had also become a grim reality for postwar Canadians. First, the threat of nuclear warfare showed that the callous disregard for human life readily apparent in the war had not ceased with the cessation of hostilities. For many observers humanity’s inhumanity continued unabated after 1945. Perhaps most significantly, the prospect of mass destruction made real the perilous state of western civilization. The sense of impending doom that the resort to weapons of mass destruction implied reflected profound social change and signaled great uncertainty for the future. As J.A. Corry later remarked, the concept of nuclear war represented “the crumbling of old verities and certainties”.¹⁰⁴ It was, as Hilda Neatby claimed, an “age without standards”.¹⁰⁵ Even more than the destruction of the traditional system of values, it also implied widespread hopelessness, a general sense of despondency that cultural rehabilitation had become impossible. Commenting on the plight of insightful, humanistic scholars -- those responsible for cultural regeneration -- and indeed the moral bankruptcy of a civilization that countenanced atomic weaponry, Innis verbalized this sense of despondency. “The middle ages,” he explained, “burned its heretics and the modern age threatens them with atom bombs”.¹⁰⁶ There was thus little hope for either the scholar or civilization at large. The problem of the university had truly become the problem of modern society.¹⁰⁷

As powerful as nuclear destruction was both as a dehumanizing force and as a symbol of impending cultural decay, many Canadians nevertheless looked past the broader implications of civilizational decline. Though certainly aware of surrounding political, military and social developments embodied most clearly in the rise of Soviet communism, Canadians focused instead on more prosaic concerns. Young Canadians married, started new families, and procured the material goods necessary to the establishment of a stable home life, while government officials increasingly became preoccupied with the material development of their country. The period after 1945 indeed can be characterized as one in which Canadian sought the security and stability that they had lacked throughout the war and the Depression years.¹⁰⁸ Whether at the individual or national level material prosperity was key to the search for stability.

Since Confederation Canadians had always been preoccupied with the material development of their nation. In times of peace, the tariff, free trade, and national policies that governed, among other things, the exploitation of national resources, were usually central political and economic issues. By the late nineteenth century, Canadians had decided no longer to be “simply the drawers of water and hewers of wood”;¹⁰⁹ rather, impatient with their country’s slow economic advancement, they opted to take control of their material development through policies of industrialization and general economic modernization. After initial successes before 1914, the uneven growth of the 1920s and

the economic malaise of the 1930s meant that the nation-building process was coming to a grinding halt. Would Canada be able to sustain the economic momentum established during the war, economists, government officials, and concerned Canadians asked, or would it revert to depression? Would Canada remain among the elite industrialized nations of the world, or would it lapse into second-rate status among the economic powers of the western world? The postwar era was potentially a critical turning point in the material progress of the nation.

Canada, as noted in chapter two, underwent a period of tremendous economic expansion after 1945. Rapid and sustained economic development quickly assuaged fears of economists and other governmental experts that Canada's economy would again slide into depression. Reductions in expenditures on military supplies were offset by mega projects such as the construction of the trans-Canada highway, and, later, the development of the St. Lawrence Seaway and the trans-Canada pipeline. By the late 1940s, furthermore, a resource boom contributed to the strong economy. There was expanded production of pulp and paper, lumber, asbestos, gypsum, aluminum and, most notably, oil and gas, throughout the period. Stimulated especially by the Korean War, exports of Canadian resource goods reached new levels and greatly contributed to economic prosperity through the 1950s and 1960s.¹¹⁰ Consumer spending also assisted the postwar boom. After 1945, there was considerable latent demand for consumer items because of government rationing and the general scarcity of consumer goods during the war. Due both to full employment and forced saving programs such as war bonds, moreover, Canadians had large savings available and used their extra money to buy automobiles, houses, refrigerators, and other consumer items that were not readily available before 1945. There was a "powerful demand", one article declared in 1946, "for everything one can eat, wear, read, repair, drink, ride, and rest in".¹¹¹

A shift in demographics known popularly as the "baby boom" did much to reinforce existing consumer trends. As Doug Owsram has shown, new families became preoccupied with the concept of home and the development of family life as a means of achieving the stability they had lacked throughout the war. To this end, Canadians not only married and had children at unprecedented rates, they also bought houses in vast quantities. For their new houses, which normally were situated in sprawling suburbs, they purchased household items of all kinds. Municipalities constructed new roads, sewers and other facilities while private firms built malls and other amenities to serve the new subdivisions. Car ownership also increased among new suburbanites, for private transportation became more of a necessity than ever before in the isolated suburbs. To be sure, the economic value of suburban phenomenon is difficult to over-estimate.¹¹²

More than preceding generations, the parents of the baby boom generation were preoccupied with the development of their children. Whatever the other implications of this “filiocentrism”,¹¹³ it can be asserted that parents of baby boomers provided as never before for the material welfare of their offspring. Manufacturers became rich on the success of such fads as hoola hoops, Barbies, and Davy Crockett hats. Others profited through furnishing the more mundane needs of babies and small children, such as baby formula, clothing, and toys. Parents also provided for leisure activities by enrolling their children in scouts and girl guides, taking them to movies, and buying television sets. Filiocentrism, modern advertising and marketing, and a relative affluence, in short, all combined to produce perhaps the best clothed and nourished and indeed leisured generation of young Canadians in history.

Whatever the relative benefits of material advancement, the critics of higher education uniformly rebuked the growing materialism of the postwar age. A common complaint was that Canadians were so preoccupied with material betterment that they ignored the spiritual and philosophical concerns of their nation. Discussing the postwar materialism of Canada, Hilda Neatby bluntly remarked: “At no time in western history has any nation totally ignored the importance of national recognition of, and support for, non-material values”.¹¹⁴ Less given to hyperbole, George Grant was nonetheless implicitly sympathetic to Neatby’s main point. Chronicling the deficiencies of Canada as a contemplative, “philosophical” country, Grant claimed that Canadians remained as it always had been: a pioneer nation concerned with materialism and material ends. As such, this dynamic, young country did not understand the “tragedy and complexity of maturity” and was thus “basically unphilosophical”. Ultimately, Grant wrote, Canada’s preoccupation with the material implied a “distrust of philosophy as taking men’s minds away from the obvious practical things that need to be done”.¹¹⁵ The neglect of the humanities and the humanistic traditions, Vincent Massey added, was “a symptom of an age lured by science into the delights of materialism”. The pursuit of new houses, larger and more luxurious cars, and more hours in front of the television set was demonstrative of the wrong-headed priorities of the Canadian people.¹¹⁶ Adding his voice to those of Grant, Massey and others, Wallace also railed against the obsession with the material. While material pursuits were necessary, he averred, the overemphasis of material betterment “does not lead to the high satisfactions of the soul to which a love of the arts and letters and speculation minister. It gives satisfaction, but it is an inferior kind of satisfaction, which excludes us from the society of the good and great men of the race into whose achievements we might enter [through the aid of a humanistic education] with a corresponding enlargement of our own lives and characters”.¹¹⁷ In stressing material gain,

the critics concluded, Canadians promoted only one small aspect of the national identity. Canada was prospering in a material sense; spiritually it was becoming increasingly impoverished.

An age in which material values were emphasized above all others, the postwar was, in addition, a time during which Canadians, especially social observers, were concerned with political values and the socio-political development of western societies. For many Canadians (and indeed their American counterparts) “democracy” became a watch-word, a term that connoted fair and just government and differentiated the political cultures of the west from those of totalitarian states, especially the growing Soviet bloc. It was associated with the political values of freedom, the rule of law, justice, and good citizenship, as well as a plethora of non-political virtues, including Christian values and the ideals of western culture more generally. But democracy was not to be taken for granted. The Second World War certainly proved the superiority and ultimate desirability of the democratic system. The emerging Cold War, however, showed that western democracy was still under attack. As External Affairs Minister Louis St. Laurent noted in a 1947 speech, Canadians realized that “a threat to the liberty of western Europe, where [their] own political ideas were nurtured, was a threat to [their] own way of life”.¹¹⁸ Canadians reviled communism not only because it was the postwar manifestation of twentieth century totalitarianism, but most of all because it represented a profound menace to Canada’s democratic existence.

Although Canadians on the whole were never as fervent cold warriors as were the Americans, they nevertheless denounced as evil the communist system while lauding the merits of democracy. Even Canadian scholars became embroiled in the ideological debate. A spate of articles appeared in learned journals, books, and other academic writings that pronounced on the democracy issue. The work of Queen’s political scientist J.A. Corry’s was perhaps the most significant of these compositions. The first edition *Democratic Government and Politics* (1946) was designed to provide an introduction to Canadian college and university students on the subject of democratic government. Corry’s work, declared one of the book’s reviewers, met an urgent need of the times. In explaining democracy both to students and the population at large, Corry made it much easier for Canadians to appreciate and indeed defend democracy. If the advocates of democracy had one or two more tracts like Corry’s, he concluded, then it would be much easier to defend the democratic faith. Like Corry, Watson Kirkconnell also wrote on the needs of Canadian democracy. His *Seven Pillars of Freedom* (1944) endeavoured to make prescriptions on how to maintain freedom and democracy. Notably subtitled *An Exposure of the Soviet World Conspiracy and Its Fifth Column in Canada*, it attempted both to expose the fallacies

of communist ideology while showing the importance of the western system of values -- including, among others things, religion, cooperation, education, and justice -- to support the “edifice of Canadian and world liberty ...”¹¹⁹ The whole tenor of Kirkconnell’s work was a warning: world citizens, including Canadians, must be ever-vigilant regarding the dangers of communism and other threats to democratic liberty; they must remain ever dutiful, moreover, to fight for their own liberty through maintaining an environment in which values fundamental to their liberty may be freely expressed.¹²⁰ The Canadian democracy that emerged after 1945 was frail indeed and must be protected at all costs.

Democracy was certainly a term used as a synonym for good and just government and juxtaposed with other ideologies, especially Soviet communism, to display their defects.¹²¹ It was a multi-faceted term, however; and it was not always used in a positive sense. Many mid-century social critics stressed democracy’s negative connotations, equating it with such mass movements of the postwar era as consumerism, materialism, and, perhaps most significantly, the emergence of a pervasive and uniform “mass” culture. The Massey Commission, for instance, was highly critical of “democratic” culture. In fact, members of the Commission despised mass culture because they believed that crass commercialism rather a communal or critical spirit inspired and informed it. Democratic culture was to be scorned, moreover, not because of the fear of mass participation in sundry cultural activities but because it implied a degradation of standards. In appealing to the greatest quantity of people, it sacrificed the intellectual improvement fostered by high culture, and, in consequence, broke the linkages Canadian society had with its cultural heritage. *Hockey Night in Canada*, *Gunsmoke*, *Leave It to Beaver*, and other manifestations of “lowbrow” culture dulled one’s sensibilities to the merits of high culture. Ultimately, democratic culture detached Canadians from their cultural inheritance by undermining the transference of the “best that has been thought and said”. For the Massey commissioners, then, democratic culture was truly a pernicious influence in postwar society. It was, in the words of the biographer of the Commission, “monolithic and menacing; it stultified and then manipulated a gullible public”.¹²²

Democracy also had important implications for postwar educational critics. Not only was democratic education, with mass culture, part of the general democratization of Canadian society, it also contributed to the educational crisis current in the postwar period. “Democratic” or “progressive” education, like mass culture, were pejorative descriptions used to indicate the decay of learning standards and educational systems. For educational critics, it symbolized the renunciation of an elitist, principled education and the adoption of one in which education standards were brought to the level of the lowest common denominator of the masses.¹²³ Vincent Massey put the issue in stark terms. Speaking

about the postwar expansion in university enrolments, Massey claimed that there were many students who ought not to be there. These students lowered standards. "It is surely inefficient and indeed undemocratic," he noted acerbically and not without irony, "to allow students not intellectually fitted for university work so to inflate our classes as to limit the opportunities enjoyed by those with a serious purpose, a desire to use their education, and real promise of giving some leadership in after-life".¹²⁴ Quoting educational critic H.A.L. Fisher, Massey summarized his position: the "university stands for quality; to perform its 'proper function it must safeguard itself against the admission of the unfit'."¹²⁵ "Mass education", he concluded, was surely "a contradiction in terms ..."¹²⁶

The critique of mass education of Massey and others had a practical historical base. The postwar period saw a tremendous strain on the Canadian educational system at large. This strain came primarily in the form of growing enrolments both for primary and secondary schools and for the universities. Canadian universities were the first to experience large-scale expansion after 1945. Assisted by the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA), which provided students with tuition fees and a living allowance, veterans flooded into the universities. By 1945-46 academic year, veterans comprised almost one-third of all university registrants, helping full-time enrolment jump to 61,861.¹²⁷ The following year they formed almost half the aggregate student body of nearly 80,000 students. Enrolment figures remained high until 1950-1, when only 6,126 DVA veterans enrolled.¹²⁸ Only by the end of the decade did enrolment numbers recover and surpass those of the postwar boom in registrations.

Just as the "crisis of numbers" in the Canadian universities subsided, primary and secondary schools experienced another difficulty. Largely because of the demographic impetus provided by the baby boom, enrolments across Canada vastly increased throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. Each year after 1952 in fact established a new record for enrolments. Registrations in primary and secondary schools by 1961 grew an astounding 1,200,000 over the 1950-51 academic year.¹²⁹ The increases were so large that Ontario and Alberta, two of the fastest growing provinces, opened a new school every day for a two-year period. Schools in southern Ontario used the innovative "split-shift" to cope with growing numbers. While new schools were being constructed, some students attended classes from 8:00 a.m. until noon while the second "shift" of students attended from 1:00 to 6:00 p.m. Teachers also had to be found to educate the growing masses of students. Provinces set up recruitment committees to visit high schools and get students to consider teaching as a career.¹³⁰ Despite the successes of recruitment campaigns and the employment of more and more married women,¹³¹ there was still a shortage of teachers. Only by making it easier and quicker for teachers to enter the classroom could provinces

obtain sufficient numbers of teachers. Educational standards dropped precipitously as a result. Boards of education required new teachers to study a reduced number of High School courses and then take a six-week summer school course before they could teach courses of their own.¹³² These less than qualified educators formed the core of the emerging educational system in Canada.

In this climate, Hilda Neatby, the foremost critic of educational democracy in Canada, pontificated on the detriments of democratic learning. Neatby's well-known tract, *So Little for the Mind* (1953), was indeed in part a diatribe against the "democratic method of education". Echoing Massey and other educational critics, Neatby argued that progressive education led to diminish standards by bringing the levels of overall instruction down to that of the poorest students.¹³³ To serve the whole child and indeed all children, as progressivists argued, implied mediocrity, laziness, and a lack of fulfillment.¹³⁴ But the problem of democratic education was even more fundamental than the decay of educational standards. Neatby most objected to progressive education because it was bent on developing a system of education in which students would develop their interests in concert with the common, "democratic" interests of society. She abhorred such platitudes as "democracy in the classroom meant democracy for the nation" and, by extension, the defeat of totalitarianism, and the notion that progressive education made good (i.e., democratic) citizens. On the contrary, she argued that, in indoctrinating students with the "values" of "democracy", progressivists prevented exactly what they hoped to gain: the search for liberty. In clouding young minds with the rhetoric of democracy, they blocked the quest for moral virtue, cultural beauty, and, most significantly, the attainment of personal liberty that all flowed from the traditional liberal education.¹³⁵ Far from being a liberator, then, democratic education was in fact a tyrant. "Progressive education", Neatby concluded, was not "liberation"; it was rather "indoctrination both intellectual and moral".¹³⁶

Discrediting the "false democracy" embodied by progressive education, Neatby was now prepared to demonstrate how traditional education fostered the liberation of students and moderns more generally. In *A Temperate Dispute* (1954), a follow-up tract to the highly controversial but best-selling book of the earlier year, Neatby showed that matters of mind and the enduring principles of western civilization were crucial to the maintenance of a true and free democracy. The "fervour of religious faith, the absolutism of moral principle, [and] the freedom of mind" were "a few priceless things" essential to democracy's struggle for survival in a "chaotic world". Democracy, Neatby declared, was the "fruit of these roots", and hence these essential principles must be "renewed with each generation or democracy will be destroyed". Without them, "mere happiness, interest, group integration, self realization" -- the trappings of false democracy or, alternately,

“democracy of the herd” -- prevailed and ultimately true democracy would be compromised.¹³⁷ Traditional, liberal arts education was critical to Neatby’s system because it proffered to students the freedom “to speak their minds on essential matters”.¹³⁸ Most importantly, it enabled moderns to seek out timeless moral and intellectual virtues and hence allowed them to avoid the “slavish conformity” that was so much a part of democratic education and indeed the entire postwar age.¹³⁹ Where progressive education was a tyrant, an illiberal instrument in an increasingly unfree age, traditional education, and its corollaries, contemplation, and free and critical inquiry, was just the opposite: it was an agent of liberty to be employed to combat the illiberalities of the period. On the centrality of traditional education to democracy, and the destructiveness of mass education to this educational principles and to democracy at large, Neatby concluded: We

possess [a] tradition of learning, deliberate, rational learning as one of the first values in life, as essential to our humanity and to our civilization. It has moulded the common life of the western world. Those who weaken the tradition, no matter how good their motives, are indeed committing a double sin against democratic principles. They are taking advantage of our ignorance and carelessness to deprive us of something that we truly value; and they are attacking the principle which has given life to democracy in the past and which can nourish it in the future.¹⁴⁰

The critique of “mass” education was not simply a response to the question of the uses and abuses of democracy that were *au courant* after 1945. Rather, it was a subset of larger concerns regarding societal attitudes towards scholarship and intellectualism more generally. Hilda Neatby’s educational critique is again illustrative. A chief theme of Neatby’s educational analysis was that progressive education was both anti-intellectual and, most significantly, representative of an age that increasingly ignored intellectual values. Ostensibly, the progressivist programme was for the all-round development of students. In reality, as Neatby explained, the progressivists addressed students’ physical and psychological needs but ignored their fundamental intellectual requirements. “Intellectual training”, she asserted, was “no longer the chief and special responsibility of the school”. Instead, progressivists assumed that ‘critical thinking’, ‘problem-solving’ and other intellectual attributes could be reduced to the level of technical instruction, and therefore had no value *per se*.¹⁴¹ These “dangerous assumptions” were significant, Neatby hastened to add, because they “emerged naturally from our modern way of life”.¹⁴² They reflected, in other words, a society that favoured material and technical values. Indeed, Deweyite education at large, with its emphasis on practical applications and instrumental knowledge, both symbolized and was the product of the greater anti-intellectualism of modern civilization.¹⁴³ Thus, not unlike the university critics, who likened the decline of the

humanities to greater civilizational decay, progressive education meant for Neatby and others¹⁴⁴ much more than the erosion of scholarly methods and standards; it signified the malaise implicit to a materialistic, anti-intellectual society. To criticize the defects of Deweyite education was therefore to criticize the deficiencies of modern society itself.

Informed by debates over values, whether democratic, material, “mass” or anti-intellectual, humanistic or “traditional”, and taking place in an age of “academic democratization” and (perceived) civilizational decline, the postwar period, in sum, was truly a tumultuous one for the modern university. It saw the continuation of the “academy in crisis” notion that had come to characterize the modern university’s wartime experience. Funding difficulties, increasing enrolments, and growing secular and governmental control, as well as the ongoing degradation of the university’s humanizing and civilizing functions, characterized this conception. Amid the turmoil of the post-1945 world, educational critics such as Neatby highlighted the inadequacies of modern higher learning while proffering a notion of the ideal university, an alternative, they hoped, to academic modernization. In spite of their efforts, however, Canadian universities continued to modernize throughout the 1950s and 1960s. As Canadians moved farther away from the crisis atmosphere of the 1940s, their voices, although never fully muted, became increasingly difficult to hear amid the clamour of the modernizing and democratizing academies.

Unlike the period that preceded it, the mid-1950s was a time of relative quietude for the modern Canadian university and its critics. While there were still those who depicted apocalyptic scenarios for the university and modern society at large,¹⁴⁵ informed critics of higher learning largely turned their attention to more prosaic concerns.¹⁴⁶ The 1956 meeting of the NCCU exemplified the shift away from the “crisis of values” and “decline of civilization” analyses of earlier critics and instead examined university problems in terms of practical considerations of money, numbers, and government and private funding. Like their predecessors, conference delegates were well aware of the impacts of technical education and the anticipated increases in enrolments -- issues that had preoccupied university critics now for some time. They were much more willing than pre- and postwar critics, however, to accept rather than overturn the process of academic modernization. The 1956 NCCU conference thus proffered a new breed of university critics whose willingness to accept the modern university showed just how far the process of academic modernization had progressed.

The “crisis of numbers”, as it became known, was the main theme of the 1956 meeting of the NCCU, which had been proclaimed “Canada’s Crisis in Higher Education”.¹⁴⁷ The NCCU’s executive committee called the conference to examine the

implications of a NCCU symposium held the year earlier on the topic of university expansion. At that symposium, Edward Sheffield, Dominion Statistician, announced alarming enrolment figures to his audience. University enrolments, he claimed, were likely to double by the mid-1960s. The 64,200 university students currently enrolled (1953-4) would likely increase to more than 130,000 registrants ten years later.¹⁴⁸ Outlining the anticipated increases in university enrolments, Claude Bissell, President of Carleton University, concurred with Sheffield's admonitions. Bissell cited statistics comparable to those proffered by the federal bureaucrat.¹⁴⁹ His paper at the 1956 conference did what it had set out to do: provide the statistics to substantiate the common cry that there was a wave of students ready to flood the universities. But neither Sheffield's nor Bissell's predictions proved accurate. They were in fact far too conservative. Unprecedented numbers of young Canadians, rising educational expectations, and economic prosperity all combined drastically to augment the numbers of students who would enroll in Canadian universities in the coming decade and beyond. Sheffield had to revise his enrolment estimates upward four times in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In 1964-5 178,200 students were registered in Canadian universities, nearly a ten per cent increase over the predictions of Sheffield, Bissell and others.¹⁵⁰ Enrolments increased so dramatically that the numbers of universities in Ontario, Canada most populous province, increased three-fold in the 1960s. Simon Fraser University, the Universities of Calgary, Lethbridge, Regina, Winnipeg, Brandon, added their numbers to Trent, Brock, York of the growing system of higher learning in Ontario. Once primarily for privileged members of Canadian society, the young Canadians that filled lecture halls by the 1960s by the tens of thousands no longer considered higher learning a privilege but a birthright. Referred to by critics and others since the early 1940s, the day of the "democratic university" in Canada had dawned at last.

While "Canada's Crisis in Higher Education" certainly had as its chief underlying theme the issue of growing enrolments, the NCCU committee that established it did not merely want to expound on statistical and demographic problems. Rather, committee members viewed the enrolment issue as a "vivid background for the analysis of fundamental educational issues".¹⁵¹ Along with the prosaic concerns of staffing and student problems,¹⁵² they identified two main educational problems that faced modern universities. First, and most broadly, they addressed the wide question of the "future of the educational structure, and the extent to which [Canadians] might expect radical alterations in the traditional make-up of [their] universities".¹⁵³ They realized not only that higher education was becoming democratized but also that Canadian universities were in a final stage of transition from liberal arts centres into modern research institutions largely

responsible for the material well being of the nation. It was the implicit mandate of the conference and delegates to expound upon this change and what it meant for the future of higher learning in Canada.¹⁵⁴

In a paper entitled “Educational Structure: The English-Canadian Universities”, Sydney Smith, President of the University of Toronto, endeavoured to elaborate on this transition, and perhaps most importantly, the adaptation of the traditional academy to the modern world. Commenting on the enduring structure of Canadian higher learning, Smith noted that even by the mid-1950s, universities were remarkably similar in that they consisted of a central faculty for arts and sciences along with one or more professional divisions.¹⁵⁵ They had therefore retained much of their historic character, even in spite of the development of an industrial-technological society and the ravages of two world wars. Despite this continuity, however, Smith argued that change was immanent. The historic structures of the academy had been retained, but society had become inimical to the traditional university. Many tell us, Smith declared, that “in the electronic age, when hundreds of traditional skills and attitudes are becoming obsolescent, the era of the expert has arrived and that of the scholar has gone; that a mechanized economy has no understanding of, or patience with, the ivory tower; and that frustration and defeat are in store for us if we oppose or attempt to modify the trend of the times ...”¹⁵⁶ “The ivory tower scholar”, he continued, quoting Claude Bissell, “is concerned with an intensive detailed analysis of something that is often remote in time, theoretical in nature, and apparently unrelated to any of the pressing, immediate needs and questions of man. He is paraded as the ultimate in ineffectual, a quaint survivor into this industrious age of a leisured and discredited past’.”¹⁵⁷ “Perhaps his attitudes and skills are already obsolescent”, Smith concluded despondently; “he should adjust to the pressures of contemporary society, abandoning the distant horizons for the immediate scene, the exactitude for the generalization, the individual insight for the Gallup poll, the silent study for the crowded round table or the wordy ‘workshop,’ the library for the television set”.¹⁵⁸

Smith was indeed less than sanguine about the continued persistence of traditional scholarship. He believed nevertheless that an accommodation could be reached between the university and its modern environment. The university and its scholars did not have to succumb to the “industrial and technological” motif. Rather, by asserting the intrinsic value of a liberal arts education, they could present an alternative viewpoint to modern instruction that was preoccupied with science and technology. They could help resist the “mechanization of universities” and society at large by curbing scholarly and societal penchants for technological, scientific, and instrumentalist knowledge. There was potential, Smith reasoned, for both instrumentalist and liberal arts learning alike. It was

dependent upon scholars, university officials, and Canadians at large whether or not the humane knowledge could continue its historic function.¹⁵⁹

E.W.R. Steacie¹⁶⁰ and others who discussed scientific and technological education, the second main theme of the conference, were even more willing than Smith to realize an accommodation between the two chief branches of learning. Unlike many university critics before him, President Steacie of the National Research Council did not value humanistic learning above other types of knowledge. Instead, he set out to show the inherent compatibility of the pure sciences as academic disciplines. To accomplish this end, he differentiated pure from applied sciences. Concerned with “development for practical purposes and the use of scientific information”, he claimed, applied science was instrumentalist knowledge and therefore “merely an adjunct to technology ...”¹⁶¹ In contrast, pure science was akin to humane knowledge because it was concerned with the “purpose of advancing knowledge for its own sake” and therefore, like the liberal arts, with the advancement of the truth.¹⁶² There was nothing therefore intrinsically flawed with scientific knowledge *per se*. Only when the “interests of individuals or bodies which furnish financial support, or society which furnishes pressure” or other outside interests interfered with the pursuit of scientific learning were the pure sciences compromised. Apart from instrumentalist or utilitarian applications, the sciences could therefore be rightly included amongst the pantheon of scholarly pursuits.¹⁶³

Although innately inimical to the university ethos, technical education could also be “humanized” and therefore become reconcilable with the modern conception of the academy. In a paper on the interrelationships of the humanities and sciences, John Ely Burchard demonstrated not only the compatibility of the two branches of knowledge, but also how when combined, they strengthened each other to develop insightful, well-rounded humanists and scientists. Referring to the crucial role played by scientists in Cold War arms race, Burchard expressed the necessity of developing scientists and technologists with a humanist conscience. Unaccompanied by humane values, he claimed, scientists’ concern for the welfare of the human state was in danger of being lost. While scientists had been “excellent Jeremiahs”, demonstrating the inadequacies of their science, they were “less effective as Moseses”, leaders of citizens. Only through the “right education” and through absorbing “the great truths of the humanities” was there “hope in finding a Moses among scientists”.¹⁶⁴ Humanistic learning, for Burchard, trained scientists “to be querulous about everything and not only about scientific truths”. In so doing, it enabled them to become “the leaders and not followers of men”.¹⁶⁵ Indeed, humane and scientific knowledge existed in a complementary relationship for Burchard. Neither the humanities nor the sciences alone could protect humankind against naïveté and wrongheaded thinking.

“Combined, they may sometime fail; but the man who has experienced both will have a better chance” at approaching truth.¹⁶⁶ “I had rather bet the security of the world on a substantial number of this kind of men,” Burchard concluded, commenting on the ultimate necessity of a “humanized science”, “than on a horde of skilled and obedient technicians”.¹⁶⁷

In spite of the efforts of Burchard and other critics to reconcile and accommodate humane and technological knowledge, by the late 1950s most Canadians preferred the “obedient technician” to the well-rounded intellectual. The modern university emerged fully fledged in Canada not long after the 1956 NCCU conference. It was marked as much by the rise of technical learning and the concomitant demise of the academic traditions of the academy as by the decline of all but a very few fervent critics of academic modernization.¹⁶⁸ Even those moderate critics who dominated the conference were largely to be muted by the time the NCCU convened its next major conference.¹⁶⁹ Their endeavours to conserve university traditions through the integration of humane values into modern academic structures largely failed as the new structures began to achieve the primacy once enjoyed by the liberal arts. Symbolic of the ultimate transition to the modern university, the appeal for a reaffirmation of university traditions and a sundering of the burgeoning “multiversity” seemed more than ever to be empty rhetoric to university authorities and Canadians at large. By the early 1960s, the words of the critics had become largely irrelevant to a society that had little regard for the traditional function of the academy.

The technological impetus created by the Cold War and the attendant arms race figured prominently in the emergence of the modern Canadian university. By the late 1950s, the second stage of the Cold War had arrived during which participants vied to become the world’s most prosperous nation and to develop the world’s most sophisticated weapons systems. Because engineers and technologists were critical to the achievement of both of these goals, higher education was again mobilized, as it had been in the 1940s, to win the new war. As during the Second World War, education in the sciences and technical disciplines was vital to victory in the arms race. Governments in Canada and the United States feared that unless universities upwardly revised the timetable for the production of technologists the Cold War would surely be lost. There was cause for concern as many within and outside academic circles felt that North Americans had lost their intellectual and technological advantage over the Soviet Union. The Russian launch of Sputnik in October of 1957 confirmed this concern. The Sputnik crisis amplified the inadequacies of the North American educational systems, while showing, at the same time, the superiorities of Russian technical education. It put tremendous pressure on university officials to revamp

their educational structures to produce more engineers, scientists, and technologists to catch up to the technologically superior Russians.¹⁷⁰ Ultimately, it resulted in a renewed sense of urgency to develop technologists to meet the immediate demands of the Cold War. Shortly after the Sputnik launch, for instance, the Ontario minister of education told the presidents of his province's universities "to reassure those of the public who are anxious about present conditions that everything is being done and will be done to strengthen and support the service rendered by the Ontario Universities".¹⁷¹ University reports issued throughout the late 1950s, furthermore, invariably discussed the desperate need for advanced research in science and technology.¹⁷² As the NCCUC President declared in 1961, no one denied the need for the very best professors and equipment in the pure and applied science laboratories of the country's universities.¹⁷³ Nor did governments deny the universities the support required to bolster the training of scientists and technologists. In the Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects (the so-called Gordon Commission of 1958) the Canadian government affirmed its commitment to establish a "more elaborate provision for research" so that Canada might accelerate its "rate of technical advance" and "maintain [its] position in relation to other countries".¹⁷⁴ Government support for fundamental scientific research was as logical as it was unequivocal. In the aftermath of Sputnik, the modern university had become responsible once again for the survival of the nation.

In addition to providing the crack, front-line troops to be deployed in the Cold War, universities also proved essential in furnishing society with highly educated work-force that was central to an advanced industrial economy. Scientific and technical training did not only have military applications but also was highly significant to the economic well-being of the nation. As the Gordon Commission noted in 1958, "the pace of growth and development depends largely on the ability to use the fruits of scientific reserve, technological improvements, and advanced mechanization". In the advanced economic world of the late 1950s, "the abilities of scientists, engineers, administrators, and skilled people of all kinds are being called increasingly into play".¹⁷⁵ More than training the engineers and other technical personnel, however, economic theorists considered modern universities focal points of economic growth. Citing Peter Drucker's *Landmarks of Tomorrow*, Claude Bissell showed how education was not an overhead cost (as conventional economic argument considered it), but rather a capital investment.¹⁷⁶ The development of educated people was, in Drucker's words, "the most meaningful index of the wealth-producing capacity of a country".¹⁷⁷ In the *Affluent Society*, J.K. Galbraith, as Bissell also indicated, came to the same conclusions. Galbraith argued that the universities were poised to produce a "new class" that was to have the knowledge and technical resources to strive towards economic prosperity and "peaceful survival itself".¹⁷⁸ Since

education was the “operative factor in expanding [this] class”, Galbraith concluded, “investment in education, assessed qualitatively as well as quantitatively, becomes very close to being the basic index of social progress ...”¹⁷⁹ In a more practical sense, furthermore, there was a tremendous expansion in administrative, finance, and public sector positions by the late 1950s and 1960s. Canadian society required teachers, lawyers, doctors, and bankers along with engineers and other trained specialists. Because of the large expansion in the numbers of white-collared jobs, the university was called upon now more than ever to satisfy the demands.¹⁸⁰ Ontario’s Minister of education, William Davis, put into perspective society’s reliance on the modern university. “Today as never before in our history,” Davis declared in 1963, “our very survival, our future development and prosperity as a nation depends on the proper education of our youth ...”¹⁸¹

The birthplaces of a new, educated class, the universities were regarded increasingly as centres of social and economic advancement. In assisting Canada to become a “noble and puissant nation”, as Claude Bissell put it in his keynote address to the NCCUC in 1961, society and the universities emphasized more than ever before the utilitarian aspect of higher education.¹⁸² Indeed, the “culture of utility”, which, as we have seen, reached back to the interwar period, achieved renewed precedence by the 1960s. Not only did the universities convince communities of their importance to the nation, but an increasingly heavy reliance on provincial largesse helped place the universities squarely within the public domain. Once largely privately funded, increasing capital expenditures and the continuing explosion in enrolments meant that universities had to look to government for hand-outs. Indeed, by the mid-1960s, governments (especially provincial governments) covered the lion’s share of university costs. Despite the protestations of scholars about infringements on academic autonomy, moreover, provincial governments were reticent “to sit passively on the sidelines and let each institution follow its own autonomously conceived fancies”.¹⁸³ Rather, they took an active interest in systems of higher learning that they funded, and, perhaps more importantly, that were increasingly considered by voting publics as integral to the well-being of their communities.

Aside from necessitating increased dependence on the public purse, massive expansions of the early 1960s implied a change in the very nature of higher education. This concept of change is perhaps best encapsulated in the term “multiversity”. President Clark Kerr of the University of California, who coined the word, meant by the term that the modern university was so variegated that there was no “single vision” to shape it.¹⁸⁴ For Kerr, the “intellectual world had been fractionalized”.¹⁸⁵ As the universities expanded, and interests continued to diverge, moreover, academics found that their utilitarian roles took on added significance. Only through functioning as economic and technical storehouses, and

by providing higher learning to the masses of young Canadians, could the universities find any unifying purpose. Presidents and boards of governors had to weigh the oft-conflicting interests of funding goals with the educational philosophies, and public demands, for the accommodation of larger numbers of students, with educational standards. Whereas smaller institutions could still claim that the “liberal arts constitute the centre of their educational offerings”,¹⁸⁶ universities large or small nevertheless had to be “guided by utilitarian considerations if they [were] to receive the understanding and support required from the community”.¹⁸⁷ Motivated by this new utilitarian purpose, the universities had become ensconced in the public ambit as the location of power, in Kerr’s words, “moved from inside to outside the original community of masters and scholars”.¹⁸⁸

Academic critics were divided on the issue of the so-called multiversity. Critics such as George Grant and Northrop Frye continued to denounce the demise of the traditional university and criticized the monstrosity that Kerr expounded upon. A key participant in the struggle against academic modernization during the war and postwar periods, George Grant continued to speak out against the advent of the multiversity. A subtext of his 1960s analyses on the predominance of technological liberalism was the decline of religious and contemplative traditions. In becoming the handmaiden of the technological society, modern universities had not been true to their role as spiritual and philosophical centres. Grant saw that the ultimate goal of North Americans was to build a “noble technological society of highly skilled specialists who are at the same time people of great vision”.¹⁸⁹ He did not dispute the magnificent results of the research orientation of the universities, especially in the natural sciences. But, in exchange for these great achievements, Grant realized that the universities lost something very important: justice; knowledge of the beautiful; and a notion of where people stand toward the divine. In short, Grant continued to lament the loss of the universities’ main purpose: the duty of its scholars to lead society in the pursuit of truth, justice and beauty.¹⁹⁰

Added to Grant’s imputations against the modernized university, Northrop Frye also provided a renewed perspective on old problems. For Frye, the university was not a mere extension of society’s social-technological aspirations (as it had become for many latter-day critics of the university) but instead stood outside society, analyzing it and assessing social interaction. It was a kind of “social laboratory” that provided “insights into the structure of society, nature, or the human mind” and thereby facilitated an understanding of the modern world.¹⁹¹ Higher learning’s defining function, according to Frye, was to evaluate and challenge the accepted views of society. “If one’s view of society has been formed by great philosophers”, he reasoned, “one cannot be satisfied with the view of it taken by luxury advertising ...”¹⁹² By challenging accepted views higher

education could assist in discerning, in other words, falsehood from reality. In a world dominated by the material and technological, it helped “awaken minds” and liberate students from prominent modern fallacies: thinking of education and life more generally merely in terms of the adjustment to a comfortable, material existence.¹⁹³

In exposing falsehoods and thus in fulfilling its critical function, Frye argued further, universities enabled students to pursue truth, and, ultimately, gain freedom. By discrediting the utilitarian objectives of the modern world, they allowed students to focus on the study of great art and literature and absorb “the discipline of the scientific method”, and understand “the wisdom of the ages”.¹⁹⁴ Academies were therefore society’s “powerhouses of freedom” because they exposed false thinking and directed their adherents to the truths inherent to the beauty of art, philosophy, and the good life.¹⁹⁵ But Frye did not limit the emancipatory function strictly to university students and teachers. Rather, the “free” university was symbolic of the achievement of a greater, societal emancipation. The university meant much more to society than its physical manifestation as a group of buildings, or as a main receptacle of knowledge. The university represented, Frye wrote, “what humanity ... is free to do if it tries ... Wherever there is respect for the artist’s vision, the scientist’s detachment, the teachers learning and patience, the child’s questioning, there the university is at work in the world”.¹⁹⁶ Academic freedom thus meant, for Frye, much more than liberation from outside interference; rather, the pursuit of academic truth implied the achievement of a greater social truth and, ultimately, the emancipation of humanity.

Academic liberty and the university’s function as critic thus were both central to Frye’s conception of higher learning. What is more, like earlier academic critics, Frye postulated a social mission for the university. He considered the university as central to the adaptation of modern humanity to changing social realities. Society, for Frye, was in “a state of process”, a revolutionary state striving towards future ideals.¹⁹⁷ Through its function as social critic the university was to make sense of the revolutionary process and therefore lead society through its perilous times. Against the backdrop of tremendous socio-economic change, expanding enrolments, the ongoing development of the multiversity, and student radicalism in the university, Frye singled out higher learning as a stabilizing force. In a society in a state of constant change and confusion, the university was a place of refuge. “The university,” Frye pronounced, “by virtue of its emphasis on the cultural environment, the supremacy of mental discipline over personality, and academic freedom, has the resources for forming a bridgehead of flexible and detached minds in a strategic place in society”. As for Innis and others, Frye’s academy was best able to perform its social function by serving as purveyor of cultural, moral, and humane

truths. Ironically, in presenting historic perspectives on society, the university was able to provide insight on modern problems. It best fulfilled its function, Frye averred, “by digging in its heels and doing its traditional job in its traditionally retrograde, obscurantist, and reactionary way. It must continue to confront society with the imaginations of great poets, the visions of great thinkers, the discipline of the scientific method, and the wisdom of the ages, until enough people ... realize that it is a way of life ...”¹⁹⁸

Problems arose, however, in that society in this revolutionary age was fraught with misconceptions, misunderstandings about what was happening to it and, perhaps most significantly, to the academy. Modern humanity, according to Frye, simply did not understand the civilizing and humanizing mission of higher learning. The immense perspective engendered by experiencing imaginations of great artists and scientists, in consequence, was in danger of being lost. Society was likewise in peril of misapprehending the revolutionary process of contemporary times, and, as a result, of regressing as a civilization. Present society, Frye asserted lugubriously, “is not predestined to go onward and upward ...” Reacting against the driving elements of mass culture, Frye claimed that society had been transformed into a mob culture; “hucksters”, “censors”, and “hidden persuaders” had turned “literature into slanted news, painting into billboard advertising, music into caterwauling transistor sets, architecture into mean streets”.¹⁹⁹ Most importantly, the academy itself -- the last refuge of civilization -- had become a reflection of this debased culture and therefore contributed to society’s demise. Frye harshly criticized the modern university because it became full of itself and excessively proud of the essential economic-technological role it performed in society. “If the university”, Frye warned, “like so much of the rest of our society, falls into the habit of rationalizing its prosperity as a kind of virtue, it will have been kidnapped by that society and will have betrayed its special function”.²⁰⁰ Alluding to lowered educational standards, the advance of technical instruction, and the triumph of Grantian technological freedom more generally, Frye made an even stronger statement on the deleterious effects of education in the age of mass democracy. The “beliefs and aims” of a democratic society, Frye asserted, scuttled the “attempt to give the university student a kind of perspective on what the whole of the learned human race” had achieved. Social pressures continued to endanger universities, he concluded, by forcing them “to work out and teach some kind of democratic philosophy ...”²⁰¹

In denouncing modern education trends and providing a justification for the enduring relevance of the traditional academy, Northrop Frye reacted against his social and intellectual milieus. Although not hostile to material advancement *per se*, Frye chided a society that had become obsessed with the material and the technological and which had

fallen prey to the trappings of mass culture. Intellectually, he distinguished himself from the growing numbers of academic observers who were willing to work within the limits of modernized and democratized higher education. Against advancing tendencies in higher learning Frye stood firm, a strong and loyal advocate of the merits of the traditional academy. In advocating traditional education, further, he provided a link to the academic critics of former times. Through Frye we see a connection to the university critics of the 1940s and early 1950s. Even more than George Grant and the dwindling numbers of other nonconformists, Frye's great success as university critic was to bring forth the tradition of dissent into a period that was increasingly inimical to the ideas and uses of traditional higher learning.

Despite the efforts of Grant and Frye, however, academic observers were not receptive to a reversion to the principles of the traditional university. While always paying lip service at least to the enduring benefits of the liberal arts and a classical education, commentators such as J.A. Corry were less willing than their colleagues to eschew the multiversity. In a group of addresses given throughout the 1960s and later published in 1970 under the apt title *Farewell the Ivory Tower*, Principal Corry of Queen's University presented his opinions on the process of academic modernization. While Corry was unwilling to concede that the universities were mere handmaidens of the state and therefore bereft of vision, the leitmotif of his addresses was that the universities found their focus through their service to society. Corry explained that the relation between the university and the state had recently changed. Whereas in a political climate in which laissez-faire attitudes and individualism predominated, the "medieval" university, aloof from society, could be justifiable; in a democratic society, it was not. The university, in other words, had to adapt to new circumstances and realities. While Corry was not averse to the traditional principles of the university -- scholarly freedom, tenure, and the importance of humane values and contemplative traditions -- he did object to ivory towerism and the aloofness of a system from the community that paid the bills.²⁰² Universities must be kept free, he claimed in 1964, for theirs was

essential work that can only be carried on in the flexible conditions of freedom. Governments in Canada affirm this just as strongly as anyone else. Equally, it will not be denied in any responsible quarter that governments which guard the public interest and provide increasingly heavy support for universities out of public funds need assurances. How can they claim the continued confidence of the taxpayer unless they can say with knowledge that his money is being wisely spent in the public interest?²⁰³

Linked through increasing taxpayer funds, then, the universities had a responsibility to the communities they served. For Corry this obligation to society was to

be fulfilled when the universities could “interpret the felt needs of society”, which included the “utilitarian interests” of the masses of new students. The universities ought to accommodate students harbouring these pragmatic inclinations as long as “their numbers do not overwhelm us”. “The world’s work,” he continued, “must be done”. “Much of that work requires knowledge and disciplined minds of an order that universities are best equipped to provide. The universities need to keep in close touch with the workaday world. Common sense and practicality never come amiss, even in universities...”²⁰⁴

Far from reforming society, making it aware of its inherent flaws (as Harold Innis and like-minded critics advocated), Corry thus implored the university to adapt to society, to fit into its fundamental structures and to aid in the achievement of its ultimate goals. Corry was not alone in his denunciation of the ivory towerism of the Canadian university. Arthur Lower, who had frequently spoken out against cloistered scholarship, implicitly supported Corry’s arguments. Society was now full of “plain, work-a-day people”, he claimed “getting ‘equaler and equaler’ as the days go by”.²⁰⁵ Scholars must not isolate themselves from these individuals but rather endeavour to understand the “people they are working with, their social and economic background”.²⁰⁶ Canadian universities, Lower suggested in conclusion, must work diligently to eliminate the remnants of nineteenth century elitism and thereby enable themselves to relate to the new and changing world. Claude Bissell, President of the University of Toronto, also expounded upon the modern university’s integration into society. For Bissell, society had accepted both scholars’ “assumptions about the importance of higher education and the necessity of meeting its enormous needs ...”²⁰⁷ The role of the university, he continued, could be “seen in different terms and [expressed in] a more elaborate and stimulating context. We can talk about universities not in terms of subsistence, but in terms of expansion; not as production lines for business and the state, but as a principal means whereby our economy, our political structure and our culture grow and change ...”²⁰⁸ Even Marshall McLuhan, in the context of his media studies, elaborated on the university’s new societal function. In the “electronic age”, McLuhan asserted, universities had relinquished their centuries old function as “the main processing plants for young minds”. Instead, they had become the means by which society could understand cultural change and social environments, which, for McLuhan, had become dominated by electronic media of communication. As highly decentralized institutions, able to access and understand the nature of electronic information transfer, universities became “the principal organs of perception for the entire society”.²⁰⁹ Neither simply a training ground for the elite of a bygone culture nor the ivory tower, the university had developed into the nodal centre of all society.

For McLuhan, Corry and the other interested observers, then, the university had become integrated into its social environment. While still hoping for the persistence of humanist and other university traditions, they accepted that the modern academy had become a reflection of broader social change. The academy had developed into an agent of society and most within and outside the academic world were willing to accept and accommodate this *fait accompli*. This willingness to accommodate the demands of the modern world and to abandon not only the ivory towerism but also the humanistic focus of past critics was a powerful manifestation of the sway of the modern university. As one critic declared in 1961, the days of supremacy for the humanist had passed. Humanist scholars can no longer “defend their right to a place in the sun”;²¹⁰ rather, “science, technology, and the humanities must cooperate and live in mutual dependence ...”²¹¹ While remaining true to their purpose and traditions, added another commentator, the universities had to address the “needs of government, of industry and of society over the long haul”.²¹² They must “move with the times” and “adjust to the changes in society”.²¹³ Once harshly opposed, there was somber resignation among academic observers that the day of the modern university had arrived at last.

By the 1960s, Canadian universities were completing a process of academic modernization begun several decades earlier. Modern institutions scarcely resembled their late-nineteenth-century forebearers, which had been cultural outposts responsible for inculcating the virtues of British culture and for helping develop a “dutiful, morally sound social order”. In an age of astonishing expansion, economic prosperity, and democratic ideals, they also shunned their former responsibility as access points for the sons of the elite to the higher forms of learning. Characterized by democratic education, a growing culture of utility, the advent of the multiversity, a more intimate relationship between universities and their government and private benefactors, the modern university was by the late 1950s staunchly ensconced in the modern realities of mass enrolments and million-dollar budgets. Inherently conservative institutions, universities did indeed retain some of the educational structures to meet the challenges of the new age. The arguments of George Grant and Northrop Frye and others are testaments to the strain of conservatism that marked academic life even into the 1960s and 1970s. Faced with the immutable forces for social change after 1945, however, a newfound willingness to accommodate modern exigencies sundered academics’ reactionary predilections. Critics such as Frye and Grant had been marginalized more than ever before amid a growing tide of “academic modernists” because they refused to accept the university’s modern societal role. Whereas critics wondered immediately after 1945 whether recent trends towards academic modernization were mere aberrations, their

counterparts a decade and a half later harboured no illusions about the fate of the traditional academy. The acceptance by scholars of academic modernization was, ultimately, the most telling of all manifestations that the end of the long evolution had been reached and that the modern university had been born at last.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

The Executive of the NCCU appointed this committee in 1942 to study postwar problems of Canadian universities. Four meetings of the committee were held in total and the report of the June 13 1944 meeting was published along with several appendixes on "special issues".

¹*Report of National Conference of Canadian Universities on Post-War Problems* (Toronto, 1944), 7

²*Ibid.*

³R.C. Wallace, "The Arts Faculty and Humane Studies", in *Report of the National Conference of Canadian Universities on Post-War Problems*, 54-57

⁴*Ibid.*, 57

⁵See 58-59

⁶Harold Innis, "The Problem of Graduate Work in Canada", in *Report of the National Conference of Canadian Universities on Post-War Problems*, 59

⁷W.R. Taylor, "The University and Education" in Richard M. Saunders, ed., *Education for Tomorrow: A Series of Lectures Organized by the Teaching Staff of the University of Toronto* (Toronto, 1946), 62. See also Hardolph Wasteneys, "Education for the Professions" in *ibid.*, 81-93 for a discussion of how humane studies should pervade professional education.

⁸Quoted in A.B. McKillop, *Matters of Mind: The University in Ontario 1791-1951* (Toronto, 1994), 557.

⁹Paul Axelrod, *Scholars and Dollars: Politics Economics, and the Universities of Ontario 1945-1980* (Toronto, 1982), 22

¹⁰*Ibid.*

¹¹Robin S. Harris, *A History of Higher Education in Canada, 1663-1960* (Toronto, 1976), 528

¹²*ibid.*

¹³*Ibid.*, 468; see also McKillop, 548.

¹⁴See McKillop, 559-60

¹⁵E.A. Corbett, "Adult Education" in *Education for Tomorrow*, 64-80

¹⁶McKillop, 560

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸Note that Gilmour later spoke on the need for McMaster to remain small and to retain its "community of spirit": i.e., Christianity should still remain an integral part of arts and science programs. He recommended that if new faculties "should be set up, their students should not be out of proportion" with the numbers of arts and science students. In response to profound change of his institution, Gilmour thus paid lip service to old values and ideals. See G.P. Gilmour, *Higher Education in the Canadian Democracy* (Hamilton, 1948), 18-19.

¹⁹Just a very few academies, such as the University of Ottawa, received only private funding by the early 1950s.

²⁰The so-called "veterans boom" will be discussed below.

²¹Ontario treasurer Leslie Frost's budget speech of 16 March 1944; quoted in Axelrod, 80.

²²Quoted in *ibid.*

²³Hepburn actually decreased grants to Ontario universities during the 1930s and was hesitant to increase funding during the war. The Drew administration, by contrast, greatly superseded the funding levels of its predecessor.

²⁴See Axelrod, 80.

²⁵McKillop, 559

²⁶See chapter two.

²⁷Harris, 564

²⁸*Ibid.*, 565

²⁹*Ibid.*

³⁰Steacie made existing alliances between the council and the universities stronger. He thus solidified the importance of Canadian institutions of higher learning as the focal points of fundamental and applied research.

³¹See Axelrod, chapters two and three.

³²Harris, 567

³³The vast majority of CSSRC funding for the period 1940-1957 came from private American foundations such as the Carnegie Foundation (which provided over \$100,000) and the Ford Foundation (which provided nearly a half a million dollars). Governments and private organizations, by contrast, only

provided \$82,525. See *ibid.*

³⁴Harris, 571.

³⁵The Rockefeller Foundation contributed \$150,648 while the Carnegie Foundation paid out \$137,130. See *ibid.*

³⁶Watson Kirkconnell and A.S.P. Woodhouse *The Humanities in Canada*, (Ottawa, 1947), 206

³⁷*Ibid.*, 207

³⁸*Ibid.*

³⁹John Bartlet Brebner. *Scholarship for Canada. The Function of Graduate Studies*. Ottawa, 1945), 45

⁴⁰*Ibid.*

⁴¹Kirkconnell and Woodhouse, 205

⁴²*Ibid.*, 206

⁴³B.S. Keirstead and S.D. Clark, "The State of the Social Sciences in English-Speaking Canada", Special Study to the Royal Commission on the Arts, Letters, and Sciences, draft copy, Hilda Neatby Papers, Saskatchewan Archives Board (SAB), II. 94, Special Studies: Keirstead, Professor B.S. and Clark, S.D. "The State of Social Sciences in English-Speaking Canada", 1; see also Keirstead and Clark, "The State of Social Sciences in English-Speaking Canada" *Royal Commission Studies: A Selection of Essays Prepared for the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences* (Ottawa, 1948). The deterioration of graduate and undergraduate teaching was the necessary concomitant of the exodus of scholars from Canadian universities. See also Harold Innis, "Memorandum for the sub-committee on social sciences" (n.d.), Harold Innis Papers (UTA) Box 012, file 47, B72-0025, 2

⁴⁴Brebner, 34

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 34-35

⁴⁶Quoted in Axelrod, 81

⁴⁷Harold Innis, "The University in the Modern Crisis", in Harold Innis *Political Economy in the Modern State* (Toronto, 1946), 75

⁴⁸*Ibid.*

⁴⁹Brebner, 73

⁵⁰Keirstead and Clark, 15; also see Keirstead and Clark, "The State of Social Sciences in English-Speaking Canada", *Royal Commission Studies*, 166

⁵¹*Ibid.*

⁵²Innis *Political Economy in the Modern State*, xvii.

⁵³Harold Innis, "A Pea for the University Tradition", in Innis *Political Economy in the Modern State*, 299.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, 73

⁵⁵See Malcolm M. Wallace, "The Present Status of the Humanities in Canada" Special Study to the Royal Commission on the Arts, Letters, and Sciences, draft copy, Hilda Neatby Papers, (SAB), II. 110, Special Studies: Wallace, "The Present Status of the Humanities in Canada", A139, 4; Malcolm M. Wallace, "The Present Status of the Humanities in Canada" *Royal Commission Studies: A Selection of Essays Prepared for the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences* (Ottawa, 1948).

⁵⁶Vincent Massey, "The Modern University: Progress and Digression", *Address to the 75th Anniversary Convocation of the University of Western Ontario, London*, in Vincent Massey, *Speaking of Canada: Addresses by the Right Honourable Vincent Massey* (Toronto, 1959), 83

⁵⁷James S. Thomson, "Canadian Universities Face the Future" *Queen's Quarterly*, v. 52, no. 3, (Autumn 1945), 264

⁵⁸Donald Creighton, "Canada in the World", draft copy, [1953?], Donald Creighton Papers, (PAC) v. 11; "Canada in the World", MG 31 D77, 8. See also Donald Grant Creighton, "Canada in the World", in G.P. Gilmour, ed., *Canada's Tomorrow: Papers and Discussion Canada's Tomorrow Conference, Quebec City, November 1953* (Toronto, 1954).

⁵⁹Thomson, 262

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, 262-63

⁶¹Kirkconnell and Woodhouse, 10

⁶²*Ibid.*, 11

⁶³The mechanism by which humanists could fulfill this goal was by accessing intellectual, esthetic, and moral systems of other cultures, past and present, and applying them to strengthen the current moral order. See Kirkconnell, 11-12 and Thomson, 263-4.

- ⁶⁴Innis, "The University in the Modern Crisis", 73
- ⁶⁵Richard M. Saunders, ed., "Introduction", *Education for Tomorrow*, xi
- ⁶⁶*Ibid.*, x
- ⁶⁷Vincent Massey, *Address by the Right Honourable V. Massey, C.H. to the Convocating Class, Convocation Hall, University of Toronto*, draft copy (21 November 1947), Vincent Massey Papers (UTA) 421(08), B87-0082, 8
- ⁶⁸*Ibid.*, 8-9
- ⁶⁹George P. Grant, "The Teaching of Philosophy in English-Speaking Canada", draft copy, (24 October 1950), Hilda Neatby Papers, Saskatchewan Archives Board (SAB), II. 93; file: Grant, Professor G.P., "The Teaching of Philosophy in English-Speaking Canada", 2-3. See also George P. Grant, "'Philosophy' in Canada", *Royal Commission Studies: A Selection of Essays Prepared for the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences* (Ottawa, 1948)
- ⁷⁰*Ibid.*, 2
- ⁷¹*Ibid.*, 19
- ⁷²*Ibid.*
- ⁷³H.A. Innis, "Charles Norris Cochrane, 1889-1946", *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, v. 12, no. 1, (February 1946), 96
- ⁷⁴Harold Innis, *A Plea for Time*. Sesquicentennial Lectures. (Fredericton, 1950), 1.
- ⁷⁵Harold Innis, *The Bias of Communication*, (Toronto, reprinted 1964), 33-4
- ⁷⁶Hilda Neatby, "Special Study on Canadian History", Special Study to the Royal Commission on the Arts, Letters, and Sciences, draft copy, Hilda Neatby Papers (SAB) II. 103 Special Studies: Neatby, Hilda, "Special Study on Canadian History", A139, 167. See also Neatby, "National History", *Royal Commission Studies: A Selection of Essays Prepared for the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences* (Ottawa, 1948).
- ⁷⁷Massey, "The Modern University: Progress and Digression", 87
- ⁷⁸W.L. Morton, "Clio in Canada: The Interpretation of Canadian History" *University of Toronto Quarterly*, xv, (April 1946) quoted in A.B. McKillop, ed. *Contexts of Canada's Past: Selected Essays of W.L. Morton* (Toronto, 1980), 104.
- ⁷⁹Desmond Pacey, "The American Scholar To-Day", *Queen's Quarterly*, v. 50, (Winter 1943-44), 357
- ⁸⁰N.A.M. MacKenzie, "Presidential Address", *National Conference of Canadian Universities Twenty-Third Meeting Held At McGill University, 22-24 May 1947*, unpublished report, (n.d. -- 1947), 10
- ⁸¹*Ibid.*, 11
- ⁸²Pacey, 354
- ⁸³Kirkconnell and Woodhouse, 11
- ⁸⁴J.S. Thomson, "Address by President J.S. Thomson", National Conference of Canadian Universities Twenty-Second Meeting Held at the University of Toronto, 27-29 May 1946, unpublished report, (n.d. -- 1946), 43
- ⁸⁵*Ibid.*, 45
- ⁸⁶See Donald Creighton, "Education for Government: What can the humanities do for government?", unpublished manuscript, (n.d.) Donald Creighton Papers, PAC, v. 15; Education for government, MG 31 D77, 8. Here Creighton writes that the humanities enabled humans "to evaluate, [and] to make judgments, in a realm where judgment can only be made by a nice discrimination born of experience and wisdom".
- ⁸⁷Thomson, "Address by President J.S. Thomson", 45
- ⁸⁸MacKenzie, "Presidential Address", 10
- ⁸⁹*Ibid.*, 9
- ⁹⁰*ibid.*, 11
- ⁹¹Wallace, "The Present Status of the Humanities in Canada", 5. Wallace makes an interesting about-face here. It was he, along with Cyril James of McGill, who wanted to halt instruction in the humanities for the duration of war in 1942. See chapter three, n.166.
- ⁹²Vincent Massey, *Address by the Right Honourable Massey before the Graduate Organization of the University of Toronto for Kingston and District, Kingston, Ont., 23 April 1948*, unpublished address, draft copy, Vincent Massey Papers (UTA) 421(08) B87-0082, 10-14.
- ⁹³Canada, *Report*. Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences (Ottawa, 1951), 143
- ⁹⁴Neatby wrote most of the report in 1949-50. She, of course, consulted many of the special

studies and other written submissions, and was influenced to a degree by the Commission's cross-Canada hearings. Ultimately, however, she wrote the Report and thus it reflects her biases.

⁹⁵Canada, *Report*, 563

⁹⁶Watson Kirkconnell, *Liberal Education in the Canadian Democracy* (Hamilton, 1948), 5

⁹⁷See chapter three and Arthur Lower, "The Social Sciences in the Post-War World", *Canadian Historical Review* 22 (March 1941); quoted in Welf H. Heick, ed. *History and Myth: Arthur Lower and the Making of Canadian Nationalism*. (Vancouver, 1975), 106.

⁹⁸Thomson, 260

⁹⁹Innis made reference to the importance of Spengler's thought on the rise and decline of civilization in *Empire and Communications* (Toronto, 1950), 3; in Harold Innis, *The Idea File*, William Christian, ed., in section 29/49, 264; and in *The Bias of Communication* (Toronto, 1951), 90; 132. In each case, Innis refers to the Spengler's concern for modern civilization, and in general terms, the latter's reasons for the decline of the West.

¹⁰⁰Harold Innis, *The Strategy of Culture* (Toronto, 1952), 14.

¹⁰¹Paul Litt, *The Muses, the Masses, and the Massey Commission*, (Toronto, 1992), 170

¹⁰²Ibid.

¹⁰³Doug Owrarn, *Born at the Right Time: A History of the Baby Boom Generation* (Toronto, 1996), 167. See also Angus McLaren, *Our Own Master Race: Eugenics in Canada, 1885-1945* (Toronto, 1990).

¹⁰⁴J.A. Corry. *Farewell the Ivory Tower: Universities in Transition*. (Montreal, 1970), 54

¹⁰⁵Hilda Neatby. *So Little for the Mind*. (Toronto, 1953), 3

¹⁰⁶Harold Innis, "Industrialism and Cultural Values", *Papers and Proceedings of the American Economic Association, American Economic Review*, v. 41, 1951, 208

¹⁰⁷MacKenzie, 12

¹⁰⁸Owrarn, chapters 1-3

¹⁰⁹An excerpt from 1878 federal budget speech; quoted in Wallace Gagne ed., *Nationalism, Technology and the Future of Canada* (Toronto, 1976), 19.

¹¹⁰Kenneth Norrie and Douglas Owrarn, *A History of the Canadian Economy*, second edition, (Toronto, 1991), 411

¹¹¹Quoted in Owrarn, 17

¹¹²Ibid., chapter three

¹¹³Ibid., chapter two

¹¹⁴Quoted in Michael Hayden, ed. *So Much to Do, So Little Time: The Writings of Hilda Neatby*. (Vancouver, 1983), 289.

¹¹⁵George P. Grant, "The Teaching of Philosophy in English-Speaking Canada", 5

¹¹⁶Vincent Massey, "Useful Knowledge", *Address at the Convocation of the University of Manitoba*, draft copy, Hilda Neatby Papers (SAB), I. 12, (Massey, Vincent, 1951-69)(2) A 139, 4

¹¹⁷Wallace, "The Present Status of the Humanities in Canada", 5

¹¹⁸Quoted in Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and John English, *Canada Since 1945: Power, Politics and Provincialism*, (Toronto; revised edition 1989), 89

¹¹⁹Watson Kirkconnell, *Seven Pillars of Freedom: An Exposure of the Soviet World Conspiracy and its Fifth Column in Canada* (Toronto, 1944; revised 1952), ix

¹²⁰See also Kirkconnell, *Liberal Education in the Canadian Democracy*, 15-18

¹²¹Donald Creighton, for example, showed how individuals characterized the ideological nature of the "Free World" and the East. People, Creighton explained, considered the former to be free, democratic, Christian, capitalist, righteous in almost every regard; Communist countries are almost the exact opposite. See Creighton, "Canada in the World".

¹²²Litt, 85. Much more will be said on the impact of democracy on modern culture in the next chapter.

¹²³Taylor, 56

¹²⁴Vincent Massey, *Address by the Right Honourable Vincent Massey before the Chamber of Commerce, Hamilton Ontario, April 21st, 1948*, draft copy, Vincent Massey Papers (UTA) 421(08) B87-0082, 10

¹²⁵Quoted in *ibid.*, 5

¹²⁶Ibid.

¹²⁷Harris, 451

¹²⁸Harris, 457. The two-fold increase of full-time enrolments put a heavy strain on university resources. It is beyond the scope of this chapter, however, to outline the implications of the vast influx of new university students on staffs and infrastructures of the institutions. See McKillop, 550-54.

¹²⁹Owram, 113

¹³⁰Ibid., 117

¹³¹The educational system in most Canadian provinces shunned married women teachers and resorted instead to young, unmarried instructors or "spinster teachers". But by the mid-1950s, they became a very significant contributor to the overall numbers of educators. Married women, for example, comprised up to thirty per cent of the teaching population in Manitoba, while schools in Ontario would have had to close had it not been for the return of married teachers.

¹³²Ibid., 118

¹³³Neatby, *So Little for the Mind*, 15

¹³⁴Ibid., 12

¹³⁵Ibid., 43

¹³⁶Ibid., 42

¹³⁷Hilda Neatby. *A Temperate Dispute* (Toronto, 1954), 25

¹³⁸Ibid., 21

¹³⁹Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ibid., 85-86

¹⁴¹Ibid., 18

¹⁴²Ibid.

¹⁴³ Neatby charges that while Dewey eulogizes "the scientific, democratic, [and] materialist society", he forgets that this society was the production of "'passive' listeners, readers and thinkers", who are, for him, beneath contempt. Dewey is thus anti-intellectual and his anti-intellectualism leads him to an erroneous understanding of his world. See Neatby, *So Little for the Mind*, 25.

¹⁴⁴See also John K. McCreary, "Canada and Progressive Education", *Queen's Quarterly*, v. 56, no. 1 (Spring 1949), 56-67

¹⁴⁵See, among others, Russell Kirk, "Academic Servility: An Issue Beyond Politics", *Queen's Quarterly*, v. 62, no. 1 (Spring 1955), 1-11; J. Bartlett Brebner, "The Faith of a Scholar: Against the Sins of Pride", *Queen's Quarterly*, v. 62, no. 2 (Summer 1955), 184-87;

¹⁴⁶As early as 1951, Hilda Neatby remarked in a letter to Vincent Massey: "Canada seems singularly indifferent to her university question; the Americans, on the contrary, have produced two ten-column pages of lists of article titles [in periodical index or some such] in two years 1949-51 ..." Neatby to Massey, 9 November 1951, 451(05) B87-0082

¹⁴⁷This was the title given to the conference proceedings. See C.T. Bissell, ed. *Canada Crisis in Higher Education. Proceedings of the Conference Held by the National Conference of Canadian Universities at Ottawa November 12-14*. (Toronto, 1957), v.

¹⁴⁸McKillop, 565

¹⁴⁹Bissell claimed that the 130,000 figure that Sheffield cited was remarkably accurate since independently, the universities calculated a similar rate of expansion by the middle of the 1960s. See Bissell, 5.

¹⁵⁰McKillop, 566

¹⁵¹Bissell, v

¹⁵² The committee decided that the use of students and staff resources and the "securing of sufficient staff to meet the needs of the new student population" as well as the subsidiary problem of staff funding were two main difficulties with which modern universities would have to deal. Large enrolment increases required not only expanded university infrastructures -- residences, cafeterias, meeting halls, recreational and class room facilities -- but also enlarged teaching staffs. The University of Alberta, for example, expected its staff to grow by 100 per cent in its faculties of Arts and Engineering by 1965, while McGill anticipated an increase of 125 per cent in the Faculty of Arts and Science and 185 per cent in the Faculty of Engineering.(Bissell, 5) Other universities, especially in Western and Central Canada, anticipated similar expansions in staff. Since about sixty per cent of university operating expenses pay staff salaries, more staff meant that operating costs would at least double by the mid-1960s. Through capital and staffing costs the rise in enrolments entailed a great expenditure for Canadian universities.

¹⁵³Ibid., vi

¹⁵⁴Ibid., Conference "Resolutions", 244-46

¹⁵⁵Sidney E. Smith, "Educational Structure: The English-Canadian Universities", in *ibid.*, 8

¹⁵⁶Ibid., 11

¹⁵⁷Ibid.

¹⁵⁸Ibid., 11-12

¹⁵⁹Ibid., 8-12

¹⁶⁰ Steacie was himself a scientist and head of the NRC, the largest research organization in Canada. He was also, in Claude Bissell's words, an "instinctive humanist", very much attuned to the needs and goals of liberal arts learning. See Claude Bissell, *Halfway up Parnassus. A Personal Account of the University of Toronto 1932-1971* (Toronto, 1974), 34.

¹⁶¹E.W.R. Steacie, "The Responsibility of the University in the Training of Scientists and Technologists", in Bissell, *Canada's Crisis in Higher Education*, 41

¹⁶²Ibid.

¹⁶³Ibid., 43

¹⁶⁴John Ely Burchard, "The Role of the Humanities and Social Sciences: The Training of Scientists and Technologists" in *ibid.*, 55

¹⁶⁵Ibid., 57

¹⁶⁶Ibid.

¹⁶⁷Ibid.

¹⁶⁸Namely Northrop Frye and George Grant. See below.

¹⁶⁹See Davidson Dunton and Dorothy Patterson, eds., "Canada's Universities in a New Age". *Proceedings of a Conference of Canadian universities and Colleges at Ottawa, November 13-15, 1961* (Ottawa, 1961). The NCCU was renamed National Conference of Canadian Universities and Colleges (the NCCUC).

¹⁷⁰The CIA reported that the Soviet Union would graduate 1,200,000 students in pure science during the 1950s while the United States would only graduate 990,000. See Axelrod, 24.

¹⁷¹Quoted in Axelrod, 25

¹⁷²Owram, 179

¹⁷³H.F. Légaré, "Introduction to the Conference", in Dunton and Patterson, eds., *Canada's Universities in a New Age*, vi

¹⁷⁴Quoted in Harris, 587-88. Throughout the 1960s, moreover, the federal government was preoccupied with the search for a means of establishing and maintaining a national policy on research. Among other things, it succeeded in establishing the Science Council of Canada (1966).

¹⁷⁵Quoted in Bissell, *Halfway up Parnassus*, 49.

¹⁷⁶Claude Bissell, "The Problems and Opportunities of Canada's Universities", in Dunton and Patterson, eds., *Canada's Universities in a New Age*, 6

¹⁷⁷Quoted in *ibid.*

¹⁷⁸Quoted in *ibid.*

¹⁷⁹Quoted in *ibid.*

¹⁸⁰Owram, 179-80

¹⁸¹Quoted in Axelrod, 28.

¹⁸²Bissell, "The Problems and Opportunities of Canada's Universities", 10

¹⁸³J.E. Hodgetts, "Introduction: Higher Education in a Changing Canada" in J.E. Hodgetts, *Higher Education in a Changing Canada: Symposium Presented to the Royal Society of Canada in 1965* (Toronto, 1966), xi

¹⁸⁴Owram, 180

¹⁸⁵Quoted in *ibid.*

¹⁸⁶H.J. Somers, "Summation of Conference" in Dunton and Patterson, eds., *Canada's Universities in a New Age*, 150.

¹⁸⁷Hodgetts, "Introduction: Higher Education in a Changing Canada", xviii

¹⁸⁸Quoted in Owram, 180

¹⁸⁹Quoted in William Christian, *George Grant: A Biography* (Toronto, 1993), 328.

¹⁹⁰See *ibid.*, 328.

¹⁹¹Northrop Frye, "The Critical Discipline", *Address to the Royal Society of Canada's Symposium, Canadian Universities Today*, draft copy (1960?), Northrop Frye Papers, Victoria University Library (VUL) 88 Box 1, P, 5-6 See also Frye, "The Critical Discipline", in George Stanley and Guy Sylvestre, eds., *Canadian Universities Today: Symposium Presented to the Royal Society of Canada in 1960* (Toronto, 1961).

¹⁹²Northrop Frye, "By Liberal Things", Installation Address by Northrop Frye, Principal, Victoria

College, October 21, 1959, draft copy, Northrop Frye Papers (VUL) 88 Box 1, L, 6

¹⁹³Ibid., 6

¹⁹⁴Ibid., 110

¹⁹⁵Ibid., 8;11

¹⁹⁶Ibid., 8-9

¹⁹⁷Northrop Frye, "Preserving Human Values", *An Address by Dr. H. Northrop Frye, Principal of Victoria College, for the Annual Meeting of the Social Planning Council of Toronto*, draft copy, (27 April 1961) Northrop Frye Papers (VUL) Box 88/47, File #1, 2

¹⁹⁸Frye, "The Critical Discipline", 11

¹⁹⁹Northrop Frye, "Academy without Walls", unpublished draft copy, Northrop Frye Papers (VUL) 88 Box 1, N, 10

²⁰⁰Northrop Frye, "The Changing Pace in Canadian Education", unpublished paper, draft copy (24 January 1963), Northrop Frye Papers (VUL) 88 Box 1, Q, 5

²⁰¹Ibid., 8

²⁰²Corry, 19-21

²⁰³Ibid., 21

²⁰⁴Ibid., 54

²⁰⁵A.R.M. Lower, "The Canadian University: Time for a New Deal", in *Queen's Quarterly*, v. 62?, (Summer 1955), 256

²⁰⁶Ibid., 249

²⁰⁷Bissell, "The Problems and Opportunities of Canada's Universities", 5

²⁰⁸Ibid.

²⁰⁹Marshall McLuhan to John Bassett, 13 January 1964, H. Marshall McLuhan Papers (PAC) v. 18; reel 2055, MG 31 D156

²¹⁰Richard Schlatter, "The Ford Humanities Project at Princeton: The Job of the Humanist Scholar", (1961) W.L. Morton Papers, Mill's Memorial Library (MML) Box 1, File A (misc.), 3

²¹¹Ibid., 2

²¹²E.W.R. Steacie, "The Task of the University Today" in George Stanley and Guy Sylvestre, eds., *Canadian Universities Today: Symposium Presented to the Royal Society of Canada in 1960* (Toronto, 1961), 4

²¹³Ibid.

Battling the Philistines: The Quest for Culture in Postwar Canada

With academic modernization, social critics in Canada preoccupied themselves with the development of culture. Concern mounted among these intellectuals that culture -- defined broadly as the social, political, and artistic activities of a society, and in more narrow, Arnoldian terms as the pursuit of moral and social perfection, truth, and beauty -- had reached a cross-roads. After 1945 the nation achieved significant diplomatic recognition for its role in the war, and became one of the world's most prosperous countries. Yet, despite its military-diplomatic and economic triumphs, social observers realized that Canadian culture had not developed along with the material and political aspects of the nation. For some critics, Canada as a cultural entity had stagnated; for others, it threatened to regress, reflecting the wider cultural decadence of the western world.

The period 1945-1970 was marked by a consistent critique of cultural developments. This critique ebbed and flowed. It sometimes took on an utter despondency, reflected in critics' perceptions of the postwar crisis of values and in the eventual triumph by the 1960s of mass society. In between, cultural critics were less pessimistic; they held out hope that cultural decline could be reversed and that Canada might become an islet of civilization among a sea of American culture. The twenty-five year period after the war was indeed one of cultural reexamination, both of the nature of Canadian culture and of how that culture reflected a larger national identity. Centred about the Massey Commission, the cultural critique endeavoured not only to define and defend "culture" in Canada, but also to promote a cultural view that was unique to the Dominion. Critics thus tried to define and mould the Canadian identity from a cultural perspective. Against the historical backdrops of growing consumerism, materialism, and cultural "Americanization", critics embroiled themselves in what they perceived to be a death struggle to preserve older cultural forms and orientations. Moreover, in a period in which Canada's self-perception seemed ever-changing, they saw themselves as providing an understanding, based sometimes in historical fictions, of a young nation. As such, they attributed to themselves a similar social significance to that of their intellectual compatriots, the critics of academic modernization. For both groups, in some cases the same individuals, the betterment of society was the preeminent objective. Cultural amelioration was indeed a broader manifestation of humane values and the traditional university more generally. Along with the technological and academic aspects of modernization, in brief, postwar Canada, for the critics of modernity, faced crises of culture and of national

identity. It was the self-imposed responsibility of the cultural analysts to respond to these problems and suggest alternatives. They perceived themselves as an elite cadre of soldiers whose unwavering duty it was to repel the onslaught of the ignorant and uncivilized. For the critics of mass culture, the barbarians were at the gates.

The “crisis of values” that characterized the 1940s was an important point of departure in the analysis of cultural decline. Reflecting more than the embattled arts tradition in the academe, or the advent of a modern scientific and materialist society, the problem of values represented greater cultural decay. In a 1946 article entitled “The End of an Age”, for instance, W.H. Alexander expressed concern about contemporary attitudes towards moral and cultural values. Moderns, he explained, were “drawing towards an end of a period of about two thousand years” because, instead of allowing themselves to be guided and directed by ethical precepts, they showed little regard for “moral principles of action”.¹ Inspired by scientific and technological achievement, he added, they ascribed to a new, though false notion of morality. Alexander illustrated his point by discussing the impact of nuclear warfare and the horrors of Hiroshima. Outwardly, he wrote, the nuclear attack destroyed the city of Hiroshima and tens of thousands of people. Inwardly, “it destroyed the whole basis of mankind’s interrelations ...”² Leaders of nations and their peoples ignored the moral implications of mass destruction in favour of the higher “goods” of national survival and loyalty to the state. The achievement of victory by whatever means necessary became, according to Alexander, the greatest moral purpose of all. This new “moral” focus sublimated older moral principles, however, such as the sanctity of human life. Indeed, the attainment of military and economic power through scientific and technological expertise had replaced Judeo-Christian values as the hallmarks of morality.³ For Alexander, the lamentable reality was that although false, the scientific-technological ethic nevertheless characterized modern outlooks. Ultimately, this false understanding implied dire consequences for all of western civilization. Bereft of concern for the ethical and the transcendent, he concluded, modern civilization had become morally bankrupt and was decaying more quickly than any other culture in history.⁴

The connection between cultural decadence and the advent of a technological consciousness that Alexander expounded upon was also a theme on which other postwar observers commented.⁵ In a paper called “The Unbinding of Prometheus”, James Thomson also showed, among other things, the deleterious effects of the technological imperative on western civilization. Thomson’s piece presented a “Promethean” theme. While humanity gained a measure of control over its environment through technological innovation (thereby achieving liberty and becoming “civilized”), there were limits to

technological freedom. The gifts of civilization, in Thomson's words, "carry their own problems with them, from which as yet no way of escape has been found".⁶ As for Alexander, for Thomson the quintessence of these concerns was the problem of nuclear destruction. Through nuclear science humanity had discovered the ultimate means of controlling their environment. Yet, through weapons of mass destruction, atomic technology also implied a breakdown of morality and humanity. "A fearful conflict", Thomson wrote, discussing the current war and the prospects of nuclear annihilation, "now engages the energies of almost the entire human race. The tragic spectacle", he went on, "is rendered more terrifying by the scientific skill employed in the vast holocaust of destruction". Even the courageous and heroic activities of humans could not relieve moderns "from a sense of foreboding in the contemporary impasse". Modern humanity was "haunted by a conviction that war is an Apocalypse of civilization's diseased state now crying out for anxious thought and drastic remedy".⁷ Underlying the tragedies of nuclear warfare, however, was the most tragic reality of all. Humankind was unable to comprehend the need to reevaluate its current state; it was incapable of rectifying its own folly by understanding that it had become obsessed with science and technological advancement.⁸ Nuclear warfare was simply a manifestation of modern humanity's ultimate foolishness. It was the last in a chain of tragedies that began when Prometheus stole fire from the gods. Modern humanity, Thomson concluded, had begun to pay the penalty for its Promethean folly.⁹

As for Alexander, the technological ethic had thus become for Thomson a defining ethos of the modern west. It presented itself as the only true course to freedom and cultural progression, and, in so doing, deflected attention away from alternative cultural values. It thereby distorted the modern view of cultural advancement. In "The Influence of Science on the Cultural Outlook", S. Basterfield, like Alexander and Thomson before him, also elaborated on the interrelations between science and cultural development. Basterfield claimed that while the advance of science made for a financially "richer culture", it also narrowed the vision of moderns and catered to "a largely adolescent view of the world".¹⁰ He asserted that the technological ethic (the achievement of power and control, especially over nature), to which both Alexander and Thomson referred, negatively affected the appreciation of cultural and moral values. "The unprecedented success of technology, the anticipated power over nature, and the vast wealth from natural resources", he wrote, "have dimmed the vision of moral and aesthetic values to such an extent that while we may pay lip service to the matter of custom and tradition, we regulate life essentially by material values and those activities to which applied science so obviously ministers".¹¹ North Americans exalted consumerism, technological gadgetry, and the "magic of science" to provide

“know-how” and to enhance material development at the expense of cultural and spiritual values. Religion, Basterfield claimed as an example, was “no longer a matter of sincere belief” nor a matter of “personal experience and spiritual fellowship”. Rather, it had been transformed into “mainly a social activity and a community enterprise centred in a church ...”¹² In contributing to the eclipse of the humanities, the sciences had also undermined traditional values and ethics. They had come to embrace their role as initiators of material and technological progress.¹³ Once great philosophers, Basterfield asserted, scientists had estranged themselves from philosophy and attendant moral questions and therefore shirked their responsibilities to the social order.

The sundering of philosophical and other cultural values, however, had grave consequences for modern society. While Basterfield hoped that traditional values could be preserved by resurrecting the philosophical-humanistic approach, he was prepared to contemplate the worst. If left unguided by moral and cultural virtues, Basterfield warned, moderns might “prostitute science to the most evil purposes” and allow it to lead to civilization’s ultimate demise.¹⁴ Unless they recognize the implications of the assault on values for which “prophets, poets and artists have striven through the centuries”, the world “may decline into a technological barbarism”.¹⁵ Simply put, aesthetic and moral virtues were key to the enduring vitality of western civilization.

While commentators such as Basterfield and the others focussed on the effects of science and technology on cultural development, other critics used related, though slightly different explanations for the apparent decline of cultural values. In an article written for the *Dalhousie Review*, K. Rayski-Kietlitz of Acadia University examined the impact of the North American “utilitarianism” on cultural advancement. In Canada and the United States, Rayski-Kietlitz claimed, the emphasis on practical fields of education was out of proportion to other branches of knowledge that offered no “immediate and visible material gains”.¹⁶ This over-active pragmatism, moreover, directly influenced widespread indifference on the part of North Americans to cultural values. In focussing on material development and practical achievements, North Americans largely ignored cultural developments that were likely to have little practical use. Evidence of this lamentable reality, Rayski-Kietlitz added, existed in the esteem in which most Canadians held the “heroic business man” and, alternately, the “occasional contempt in which the intellectual professions [were] held”. Lacking a proper balance between practical and intellectual or cultural virtues, it was not surprising that North America had languished culturally compared to Europe and other “older” civilizations.¹⁷

Discussing the true nature of liberty in modern civilizations, Peter Viereck also railed against Canadians’ over-abundant concern with things practical and material. As

well, Viereck claimed that morality, and not a simplistic view of material progression, was the key to liberty and therefore the advancement of culture. In a piece entitled "Two Aspects of Freedom", he argued that "freedom rests not solely on the material basis of merely economic prosperity and merely political constitutions. Freedom, including the most material economic and political freedom rests ultimately on ethical values".¹⁸ A standard of morality was a precondition for the establishment of social and economic advances. Society could only achieve economic gains, Viereck explained, "by a credo that subordinates economic gains to individual freedom".¹⁹ Based solely on the idea of economic betterment, and therefore compromising freedom and justice "for the sake of organizing total tyranny", by contrast, society lost not only freedom but economic advances as well.²⁰ Without ethical and moral absolutes, both replaced with the transient "goods" of material growth, Viereck suggested, society was neither free nor capable of ameliorating.²¹

Also discussing the significance of ethical standards, philosopher John A. Irving asserted that the "problem of values" was the "central philosophical issue of the twentieth century".²² The basic purpose of Irving's article, aptly entitled "Moral Standards in a Changing World", was to comprehend why moderns had come to question eternal moral standards. Rapid technological and scientific development, growth in the medical sciences, and the "bitter controversies between capitalists and communists", Irving wrote, were among the important socio-historical factors that "produced the moral restlessness of our times".²³ In such an environment, moderns had begun to question "ultimate values". "Confronted with changing conventions in a changing world", he explained, "many people have come to feel that there are no universal moral standards at all".²⁴ The confusion of the modern age had led to moral relativism. Moderns replaced universal values with moral standards that were firmly rooted in the world of science and the material.²⁵ In shunning transcendent values, Irving hastened to add, they have brought themselves to the "rim of the abyss".²⁶ For, although deteriorating due to conditions of unprecedented change, universal moral standards were nevertheless essential to dealing with the current crisis of culture. In failing to realize this fundamental reality, Irving and the others implied, modern humanity contributed to its own demise.

For Irving as for Viereck, Rayski-Kietlitz, and the others, then, the sundering of values necessarily implied socio-cultural deterioration. Harold Innis was another of the social observers who became preoccupied with the vitality of western culture. Like his many co-critics, Innis considered "values" to be a key component in the disintegration of civilization. He cited the demise of the humanistic and arts traditions within Canadian universities as having "ominous implications for the whole future of civilization", as several critics of academic modernization had done.²⁷ He also wrote at length about the

demise of spiritual values within the increasingly materialist culture of postwar Canada.²⁸ As we have seen, the analysis of the decay of “philosophic” values was central to Innis’s social criticism of the later 1940s and early 1950s. The consideration of the importance of moral and spiritual values was never far beneath the surface of any of Innis’s later writings. Innis, however, went further than his colleagues in his critique of modern society. Although important as a concept *per se*, the decline of values was, for Innis, a way of broaching a subject of greater significance: the degeneration of modern western civilization. Whereas fellow critics preferred to expound upon the crisis of values rather than elaborating on the connection between values and cultural decay, Innis was intrigued by the intricacies of cultural development. An important paper entitled “Minerva’s Owl” (1947) illustrated Innis’s newfound preoccupation with cultural decadence.

Read before the 1947 meeting of the Royal Society of Canada, the piece expounded upon the processes of cultural transference and decline. Minerva, the Roman goddess of war, and her attending owl, representative of wisdom and intellectualism, symbolized the relationship between force and the flight of culture through time and over geographical space. Minerva’s owl took flight once conditions deteriorated and the protection of scholarship and cultural activity had been undermined. It sought out “new areas with possibilities of protection” so that cultural activity, reliant on organized force, could continue to flourish.²⁹ Once scholars and other cultural figures no longer received the protection they required from political or ecclesiastical organizations (centres of power), the new civilization declined and the symbolic bird of passage began its journey anew. Civilizations, Innis claimed, collapsed due to the “weakening of [the] protection of organized force”.³⁰ They were reestablished once the culture-force relationship had been revived and the nexus between cultural and political entities was renewed.

Originally, Innis went on with his analysis, Minerva’s owl took flight from classical Greece, where political and cultural forces first allied themselves. It then continued its journey through the ages, tracing a path through Europe, finally reaching the New World and the modern industrial period. At this point, however, Innis became concerned about the survival of things cultural and intellectual. Political organizations and other societal manifestations of “force” no longer concerned themselves with the protection of intellectuals but instead were “actively engaged in schemes for [their] destruction”.³¹ Obsessed with consumerism and technological advancement, Innis suggested, North American society had become hostile to intellectual and cultural activities. Once patrons of the arts and an intellectual life more generally, the holders of power within modern society ignored as irrelevant long-standing cultural and intellectual traditions. As such they undermined the critically important accommodation between force and wisdom.³²

Ultimately, in Innis's scheme, they threatened the safety of Minerva's owl and with it the survival of the ancient scholarly and cultural inheritance.

As discussed in chapter two, Innis detailed the effects of technology, and specifically of media of communication, on cultural change. We will not elaborate therefore on his notions of the emergence and decay of historic "empires". What is important here, however, is that Innis's was not a lone voice on the topic of cultural degeneration. Innis's ideas, to the contrary, fall within a broader socio-intellectual context. Along with the critics of modern values, Innisian thought reflected a growing body of literature on cultural development. Innis himself admitted that his essay "The Bias of Communication" relied heavily on the insights of A.L. Kroeber's *Configurations of Cultural Growth* (1946).³³ Elsewhere, he noted the influence on his writings of Oswald Spengler's³⁴ theories of cyclical cultural development. Arnold Toynbee also informed Innis's work,³⁵ as he did many of Innis's contemporaries. Indeed, Toynbee's "metahistorical" approach to the past (employed in *A Study of History*, reappearing in an abridged edition in 1946) proved to be very popular among postwar historians.³⁶ Toynbee's approach appealed to intellectuals such as Innis and others who viewed the past not as a simple linear progression from primitive to advanced forms, but rather as a cultural process that had its vicissitudes, none more discouraging than those expressed in the contemporary period.³⁷ *Civilization on Trial* (1948) and *The Prospects of Civilization* (1948) reinforced Toynbee's chief message for the modern world that forces such as democracy, technology, and material growth, interfered with the age-old struggle to develop an intellectual and spiritual life. Aphoristic, prophetic, and largely pessimistic, Toynbee's history captivated contemporary social observers who themselves were trying to make sense of the deepening crisis of civilization.

Even more influential than Toynbee was the thought and social criticism of Matthew Arnold. Although Arnold wrote in the mid-nineteenth century, the critics of the postwar era found his ideas to be pertinent to current circumstances. Like Spengler and Toynbee, Arnold was a prophet of cultural decline. The "anarchy" he referred to in his most famous tract, *Culture and Anarchy*, suggested two kinds of cultural malaise. First, mid-nineteenth century British society was mired in spiritual anarchy. The burgeoning middle class had developed, for Arnold, an untrammled preoccupation with the socio-economics of *laissez-faire* and also became increasingly disdainful of mainstream religious and intellectual activity. Arnold also connected spiritual anarchy with the inevitable advent of modern democracy in its various forms.³⁸ Indeed, Arnold deplored the materialistic outlook of his culture's "philistines", the *nouveaux riches* of the Industrial Revolution, and the vacuous self-indulgence of the "barbarians", the aristocracy. He dreaded the consequences of

current socio-historical realities. Democratic initiatives, such as the widening franchise and the introduction of a system of universal elementary instruction, preoccupied Arnold because they implied the massive disruption of Britain's political and educational systems. Most of all, Arnold thought that the growing materialist orientation of society meant an increasing disregard for the preservation of things spiritual and cultural. Mid-Victorian times were "anarchic" precisely because they failed to take account of the overarching significance of spirituality, and, just as importantly, of "sweetness" (beauty and artistic perfection) and "light" (critical thought and intellectual pursuits). Thus, democratic and populist tendencies, an anti-intellectual bent, and a pronounced disdain for cultural traditions, all combined for Arnold to produce a morally and intellectually vacuous culture, and signified in starkest terms the advent of a civilization in peril. In the end, culture and all its trappings had given way to anarchy.

The parallels between Arnold's observations and those of his mid-twentieth century progeny are unmistakable. The sundering of traditional, timeless virtues, and the expression of newer, but transient material values that J.S. Thomson and the others discussed, mirrored Arnold's trepidations about growing philistinism. One also notes the sharp criticism of anti-intellectualism common to both Arnold and his intellectual descendants. The failure to appreciate cultural and philosophical values signified for Arnold and later critics a profound disregard for intellectualism. Most striking, moreover, is the notion of the present as an age of enduring social change. For Arnold, the mid-Victorian period was one in which civilization languished amid the arrival of democratic education and a materialist, anti-intellectual culture. The modern materialist, consumer age was also "anarchic". Indeed, both critiques put forth the idea that the present was besieged by moral relativism and cultural philistinism. Forces of history had intervened to disrupt the perilous equipoise between culture and anarchy and thus to undermine the civilized way of life.

The notion of cultural decline must also be historically contextualized. Although increasingly prosperous economically, Canada, for the culture critics, readily displayed a "cultural poverty" after 1945. Despite considerable artistic achievement in the past, the accomplishments of the Group of Seven, and the triumphs of such authors as Frederick Philip Grove, Stephen Leacock, Hugh MacLennan and Frank Scott, among others, Canada, to the critics, had remained a cultural backwater. Culture (Arnoldian culture) was a matter of bookstores, a very few theatres, and literary salons. Canadian and American philanthropic organizations had constructed concert halls, libraries and other cultural amenities, and had provided aid to a few scholars through grants and scholarships. Yet in many regards, the complaints of culture critics were justified; cultural accouterments in

Canada compared poorly with those of the United States and countries in Europe. Canadian governments also had little to boast of in terms of promoting culture. In spite of aiding the development of the National Gallery, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), and the National Film Board (NFB), they had largely stayed out of the field of culture. Unlike their counterparts elsewhere in the western world, they were niggardly in funding cultural organizations, and focussed instead on more concrete initiatives such as immigration policy and maintaining full employment. Indeed, cultural policy not only belied Canada's origins as a pioneer colony but also reflected Canadians' pragmatism and penchant for material success. Summing up Canada's cultural plight in 1951, historian Arthur Lower asked: "[C]an anyone deny that ... Canada is still not far from a cultural and spiritual desert? Can it be denied that its people in the mass are highly Philistine, despising the intellect, able to understand only action, opaque to thought and to imaginative creative emotion?"³⁹

Editor, playwright, and humourist, Robertson Davies did not contest the thrust of Lower's queries. Davies, in fact, was one of the growing number of Canadian intellectuals who criticized Canada's cultural achievement. Unlike many of his fellow academic critics, he chose to express his criticism through the fictional realm of the theatre. Written during the final stages of the Second World War, *Hope Deferred* (1945) is the first of Davies's plays that deals with the topic of cultural impoverishment.

Davies's play is based on a historical situation in which Count Frontenac, the Governor of New France, attempts to bring to the New World some of the refinement of the French court by planning a production of Molière's *Tartuffe*. It develops when Laval and Sainte-Vallier, high-placed clergymen of New France, persuade Frontenac to abandon the production.⁴⁰ They argue that the "humble people of new France", and especially the Indians, would not understand that the piety Molière mocks is really false piety.⁴¹ They intensify their opposition by calling for the abandonment of all plays. It is at this point that Davies, through his fictional-historical characters, makes his most telling comments on the significance of culture to Canadians. The bishops want the inhabitants of New France to develop a religious piety first and foremost because this piety will make them a great people.⁴² They care little for artistic and cultural development; in their view, New France was to develop culture on its own over time. Frontenac and Chemène⁴³, the other main character of the play, vigorously oppose the bishops' position. Frontenac asks the bishops (without receiving a response), "Are you asking me to reduce the intellectual tone of this whole country to what is fit for the Indians and the shopkeepers?" Chemène also queries the objectives and outlooks of the clergymen. "Goodness without the arts", Chemène claims, "demands a simplicity bordering on the idiotic. A simple man without the arts is a

clod, or a saint, or a bigot: saints are very rare: [*sic*] clods and bigots are many. Are you trying to put my country into their hands?"⁴⁴ Like Frontenac's question, however, Chemène's query is also left unanswered.

In *Hope Deferred*, Davies comments on the values and inclinations of the postwar even though the play is set in the late seventeenth century. Frontenac's "shopkeepers" are reminiscent of the modern-day middle class who were concerned much more with material prosperity than intellectual pursuits. The Indians, for their part, the most populous group living in New France, remind the reader of the indifferent masses of modern times. Further, the efforts of Frontenac and Chemène against Laval and Sainte-Vallier symbolize the struggle for cultural development in a society that is colonial and primitive. Their defeat signals the sundering of cultural values and the enormous difficulty of establishing an appreciation of the arts in Canada. As Susan Stone-Blackburn has pointed out, moreover, Davies also makes direct references in the play to Canada's contemporary malaise. "Statements such as 'we are always twenty years or so behind the old world in our thinking, and I dare say we always will be' and 'it will be a thousand years before this country has such a quantity of brains that it can export them without causing a famine at home' point from the past to the present without seeming [to be] flagrantly anachronistic. This defeat for the forces of culture suffered early in Canada's history", she concludes, "appears to be an ill omen of things to come rather than a temporary loss on the way to victory ..."⁴⁵

Davies continued his criticism of the Canadian indifference to cultural values in *Overlaid*, the second of his one-act plays. Completed by the spring of 1946, *Overlaid* establishes a dramatic tension between two main sets of values: the pragmatism, Puritanism, and anti-intellectualism of Ethel (the daughter of an Ontario farmer) and George Bailey (an insurance salesman) versus the cultural vitality and *joie de vivre* of Pop, Ethel's father. In the play, Pop receives a twelve hundred dollar windfall, and he and Ethel discuss what to do with the money. A seventy year old farmer, Pop has worked hard to eke out a meagre living. He yearns for a greater existence than farm life could ever provide, however. Like his deceased wife had been, his entire community is "emotionally undernourished"; its people, Pop claims, lack "food for their immortal souls" and thus have "little shriveled-up, peanut size souls".⁴⁶ He wants to use the windfall to travel to New York City to flee the narrow pragmatism and antipathy to beauty of his community. Most of all, Pop wishes to partake of richness of the cultural life that had been left wanting throughout most of his existence. Ethel, a "hard-faced woman of forty", is appalled by the blatant waste and frivolity of her father's plans. She cannot comprehend at all Pop's desire to expand his experiences. She feels strongly that the money should be put to a more

practical use. She wants to use the windfall to purchase a large granite headstone to mark the grave of her mother. Above all, she desires to be remembered as a respected member of the community and the headstone is just the way to accomplish this objective.⁴⁷ *Overlaid* ends when Pop, responding to Ethel's emotional pleas, relents and grants his daughter her wishes.

Ethel's triumph, and her persona more generally, have considerable symbolic significance. Representing more than simply the parochialism of a rural community, Ethel's character reflects Canadians at large. She represents the penchant of Canadians to subordinate things cultural and spiritual to a life dominated by the practical. Like the compatriots she personifies, Ethel does not seem to be aware of any other mode of living. As Davies comments elsewhere, "Canada is a vast collection of Baileys and Ethels", overly concerned with the significance of living earnest and morally responsible lives.⁴⁸ Ethel's ultimate victory also represents the conquest of pragmatism over a life of cultural fulfillment. As in *Hope Deferred*, *Overlaid* also ends with the frustration of cultural aspirations. Although Davies endeavours to give voice to the merits of emotional and spiritual enlightenment, *Overlaid* ultimately reminds its readers of the intense difficulty of achieving a spiritually enriched life in Canada. Like its predecessor, Davies's play is ultimately concerned with the defeat of the forces of cultural edification.

Penned in 1949, *Fortune, My Foe* was Davies's most sophisticated treatment to date of the ongoing theme of cultural poverty. The play displayed an "overt Canadianism" in that its characters included new immigrants, long-time residents, and native Canadians who are all embroiled in a discussion of the merits of Canadian society.⁴⁹ Cultural destitution and artistic deprivation are again the themes of *Fortune, My Foe*. The play is set in a university town in the modern day and therefore speaks directly to the plight of culture in modern, urban Canadian. If culture could flourish in any area of the Dominion then surely it would prosper in an urbane setting, presided over by numerous intellectuals. That it does not demonstrates, for Davies, the pervasive indifference of Canadians everywhere to cultural activity.

There are two plots in this full-length piece. The main story-line is set in Chilly Jim Steele's establishment. The key interplay is between Nicholas Hayward and Idris Rowlands. Hayward is a young and promising English professor who is contemplating a move to the United States where his talents would be better appreciated and rewarded. Rowlands is a middle-aged professor from Wales, whose failure to foster in his students the same love he feels for the arts has made him cynical and bitter about Canada.⁵⁰ The play centres around Nicholas's decision to abandon Canada and take a job in the United States. Rowlands chastises his younger colleague for thinking about leaving a nation in

grave need of scholars and cultural leaders so as to make more money and achieve greater acclaim. While Canada's "raw, frost-bitten people have numbed [his] heart", and therefore left him a cynical and bitter man,⁵¹ Rowlands nonetheless attempts to persuade Nicholas not to quit his country in search of greater recognition and better remuneration. Canada, Rowlands argues, desperately needs its scholars and artists even if it does not appreciate them. Without these intellectuals to teach other Canadians the value of art and scholarship, there would be no hope for a better Canada. Ultimately, Rowlands hopes to convince Nicholas to make the same sacrifice he made for the greater good of expanding the country's spiritual and cultural outlooks. While the central conflict in the play is Nicholas's internal struggle to decide what course of action to take, thus, Rowlands nevertheless is important as a kind of alter ego through whom Davies expresses the plight of the intellectual and Canadian cultural activity more generally.⁵²

The secondary plot revolves around Franz Szabo and his story. Szabo, a recent immigrant from Prague, is a puppeteer who has recently fallen on hard times. Instead of prospering in his chosen field, he works at Chilly Jim's as a dishwasher. Szabo's storyline is much like that of the main plot. Common to both characters is the problem of finding in Canada an environment that will nurture artistic achievement. Indeed, Szabo's wonderful marionettes are as unappreciated by the unschooled masses as is Nicholas's literature. Davies demonstrates the antipathy to Szabo's art in a scene in which Szabo presents a part of a puppet show to Mattie Philpott and Orville Tapscott. Philpott and Tapscott are a locally influential duo who could gain funds for Szabo's productions if favourably impressed. But they are semi-educated and raise numerous infuriatingly mundane objections to the show. Rowlands, who is also present at the performance, can no longer bear Philpott's and Tapscott's insensitivity to Szabo's art. In a climactic moment, Rowlands, in a drunken rage, destroys the puppet show and drives the pair of "donkeys" out of "the temple of art".⁵³ While Rowlands, greatly embittered by the incident, warns Szabo that "Canada will freeze your heart with folly and ignorance",⁵⁴ Szabo is less pessimistic than the old professor. Szabo argues that he is an artist and that artists "are very very tough". "Canada is my country now", he declares, "and I am not afraid of it". While there may be "bad times" and "misunderstandings", he resolves to be "tough" and "hopeful too".⁵⁵

The scene provides considerable commentary on Davies's view of the cultural prospects of Canada. First, it is symbolic of the low regard in which the Canadian middle class, represented by Philpott and Tapscott, held highbrow culture. It also shows the growing impatience and frustration of the intellectual with the unwashed masses. Ultimately, however, Davies's message is one of toleration and restraint. Through Szabo,

he reaffirms his most important theme, brought out by Rowlands earlier in the play: Canadian scholars and artists must be committed to their country even in spite of the inhospitality its citizens have shown them. Canada, Davies suggests, continues to be a land of cultural philistinism. Yet in *Fortune, My Foe*, he acknowledges an increasing need to counter philistinism with a determined attempt to foster cultural growth. Through Szabo, Davies teaches that Canadians should be resolved to thwart the Baileys, Ethels, Philpotts, and Tapscotts of the world and instead continue the struggle for spiritual fulfillment. He sums up this sentiment in a final soliloquy by Nicholas, who is heartened by Szabo's resolve to endure cultural philistinism and help nurture Canadians' artistic sensibilities. "Everybody says that Canada is a hard country to govern," Nicholas pronounces,

but nobody mentions that for some people it is also a hard country to live in. Still, if we all run away it will never be any better. So let the geniuses of easy virtue go southward; I know what they feel too well to blame them. But for some of us there is no choice; let Canada do what she will with us, we must stay.⁵⁶

At its base, then, *Fortune, My Foe* was a play that countenanced dogged persistence in search of cultural enrichment. It is hence unlike *Overlaid* or *Hope Deferred*, which were much more pessimistic about the capacities of intellectuals and artists to overcome Canadian philistinism. Nevertheless, *Fortune, My Foe* advanced the leitmotif of cultural deprivation that characterized Davies's postwar plays. This theme was also readily apparent in the ideas emanating from the Royal Commission on the Development of Arts, Letters and Sciences, the so-called Massey Commission. Called in 1949,⁵⁷ the Commission was to examine broadcasting, federal cultural institutions, governmental relations with voluntary cultural associations, and federal university scholarships. It had a more general purpose, however. The Massey Commission was to investigate the current state of Canadian culture. Consistent with the widely-held notion that cultural values were in eclipse, it endeavoured to assess the reasons for cultural degeneration. The basic assumption of the commissioners⁵⁸ was that long-suffering cultural institutions, intellectuals, and advocates of culture more generally had to endure a period of heightened indifference to highbrow culture.⁵⁹ Like Innis, Davies, and others who commented on cultural decline, the propagation of the perception that Canada was embroiled in an acute struggle for culture was a main goal of the commissioners.⁶⁰

There is little doubt that cultural impoverishment was one of the central themes of the Commission. After discussing the goals of the inquest, the Massey commissioners turned to a discussion of the impact of geography on Canadian cultural activity. The

“isolations of a vast country”, they claimed in the Commission Report (1951), “exact their price”.⁶¹ Art was a form of communication. Through it, artists came together, maintained contacts, and hence facilitated cultural attainment on a national scale. National gatherings of voluntary societies engaged in the fostering of cultural activities were essential indeed. Problems arose, however, because often modes of nation-wide communications were prohibitively expensive. “Canada has bound herself together with expensive links of physical communication,” the commissioners argued, and “these exact a tax which the artist can bear less easily than can trade and industry”.⁶² Geographical isolation, they added, also deleteriously affected national cultural institutions. The problem was most acutely experienced in the fact that such nationwide institutions as the National Museum were located in Ottawa, far afield from most of the Dominion’s regions. Again, the forces of geography conspired against the cultural development that other civilized nations of the western world took for granted.⁶³

Aside from the handicap of geography and a small and widely dispersed population, the commissioners and their associates examined Canada’s cultural pedigree to gain clues into Canada’s cultural plight. In a “special study” on Canadian letters, Edward McCourt addressed the problem of literary development. Canadian writers, he asserted bluntly, had failed to “create a national literature of much significance to Canada or the rest of the world ...”⁶⁴ Four factors, he went on to argue, accounted for the paucity of literary works. The first of these was Canada’s colonial spirit. McCourt claimed that Canadian artists up to contemporaneous times “slavishly imitated” other greater works. “Such an attitude”, he warned, worked to the “discouragement of all creative writing; because creative writing, in its very name, implied a process which can have no truck with mere imitation”.⁶⁵ The Canadian publishing industry, McCourt asserted secondly, was also responsible for arrested literary development. Almost completely consumed by profitability, it was loath to “take a chance” on work that it deemed likely to be unprofitable.⁶⁶ Next, McCourt reproached the Canadian reading public. Canadian readers, he noted acerbically, were “ignorant”; they had “no tastes or opinions of [their] own” and were unable to “discover genius”.⁶⁷ Even in the mundane practice of purchasing books, Canadian fell far behind their counterparts in Europe and the English-speaking world. Because of “small size and wide dispersion” of Canadians, the reading public did not “buy enough books to make it even nearly possible for the Canadian writer to live on the proceeds of his work, or the Canadian publisher to profit much from the publication of Canadian books ...” Hence McCourt identified the “impossibility”, “under existing conditions, of creative writing becoming a full-time profession in Canada”.⁶⁸ Lastly, the critic bore responsibility for the neglected state of Canadian letters. McCourt argued that

aside from university quarterlies and “one or two newspapers and *avant-garde* publications”, “most literary criticism in Canada is beneath contempt”.⁶⁹ Reviewers of prose and poetry alike only gave attention to those works touted elsewhere, and their reviews were generally unsophisticated and formulaic. The retarded development of literary criticism did not surprise McCourt, however. The intelligent critique of literary works, he claimed, was usually the “concomitant of a mature culture”. Since criticism “grows on what it feeds on”, he concluded, it was inevitable that “in Canada its growth should be somewhat stunted”.⁷⁰

With McCourt, other contributors to the Commission’s special studies volume also acknowledged the “unripe state of national culture”.⁷¹ Along with Canadian letters, Canada, according to the critics, had lapsed behind other civilized nations in a diversity of “cultural” fields. In his special study for the commission, Robertson Davies commented on the status of Canadian theatre. Using theatrical dialogue to convey his ideas, he argued that Canadian theatrical development was in a perilous state. Serious theatre simply could not compete with newer entertainments such as the movies, and the failure of many a traveling company provided grim evidence of this reality.⁷² While acknowledging that there was an audience for familiar, “first-rate theatre”, Davies doubted the capacity of Canadians at large to appreciate “unfamiliar” classics. Canadians were an “illiterate people” in this regard, for they “fear[ed] the unknown as only the ignorant and truly lazy ... fear it ...” In this matter, he asserted, Canadian society “desperately need[ed] reform”.⁷³ Malcolm Wallace added his voice to those of McCourt and Davies on the matter of cultural development. Echoing the sentiments of the critics of academic modernization, Wallace claimed that the humanities had lost their “pride of place” in Canadian culture.⁷⁴ The humanities were not yet moribund, however men of intellectual inclinations were increasingly losing interest in the study of humanity. “The study of man, his origins and destiny, the values he should approve in life”, Wallace declared, “leave most men cold. They [*sic* -- these men] have no time or desire merely to stand and stare while they speculate on the meaning of the universe, its beauty and tragedy, its infinite complexity. Foolish thoughts of good and ill”, he ended, “seem to have lost their appeal”.⁷⁵ For philosopher George Parkin Grant, moreover, modern Canadian society had all but ignored the significance of contemplative and spiritual traditions. For Grant, as we have discovered, Canada was an “unphilosophical” country because it was concerned chiefly with “the practical business of a pioneering nation”.⁷⁶ In stressing the practicalities of nation-building, it had eschewed the contemplative and therefore compromised an appreciation of the beautiful, the cultural, and the transcendent.⁷⁷ Canada, in consequence, had failed to develop the philosophical maturity of older societies. Hilda Neatby implicitly

agreed with Grant on Canada's cultural immaturity. The basic Canadian problem for Neatby was the absence of a national consciousness of the past. Canada was an inexperienced nation that had not yet "contrived to explain itself to itself".⁷⁸ The reason for this lack of national self-appraisal, she continued, was that most Canadians were "indifferent to any history" and were content rather to live in the present and the future.⁷⁹ This ahistorical tendency was troublesome because, without a historical sense, Canadians would find it difficult to understand the fundamental character of their nationality. Under these circumstances, cultural development would be problematic indeed. No "community", Neatby concluded, "can achieve maturity without a sane and intelligent awareness of its past".⁸⁰

The theme of cultural impoverishment firmly established in the minds of critics, the Massey commissioners proceeded to assess the reasons for Canada's spiritual immaturity. Three interrelated forces affected the development of culture in Canada: the mass media, the rise of popular or mass culture, and, relatedly, the persistent "Americanization" of Canadian culture. In facilitating the rise of lowbrow culture, these factors, the commissioners argued, contributed greatly to the crowding out of serious culture. More fundamentally, they created an environment inimical to cultural activity. They so negatively affected cultural values that Canadians not only began to ignore and even revile high culture,⁸¹ but they also increasingly considered such fare as sporting events and radio soap operas as staples of their daily cultural diet. In accepting without criticism the trappings of mass culture, Canadians, the commissioners suggested further, were becoming more and more "American" in their cultural outlooks. In the face of the invasion of pervasive new communications media, they were losing a sense of who they were as a people at a time when the Canadian identity was just beginning to be fully expressed. Through the mass media, cultural Americanization caused Canada, as a cultural entity, to find itself in great peril.

In the introductory to the Report's section on the "mass media", the Massey commissioners discussed the potentially harmful impact of modern communications on cultural development. To illustrate their points, the commissioners juxtaposed the contemporary world to the world of Canadians "born earlier than 1923". One half of Canadians, they wrote, passed "their formative years in a society where radio was unknown, where the moving picture was an exceptional curiosity rather than a national habit, and where as a consequence the cultural life of most of the communities centred about the church, the school, the local library and the local newspaper".⁸² Aided by the church, there was a considerable musical tradition extant in the society of this period. In

literary matters, schools, teachers, libraries, and librarians “did much ... to create and to satisfy a taste for good books”.⁸³

Contemporary society provided a stark contrast to this bygone era, however. Dominated by the mass communications media, the commissioners suggested, the modern world contributed to the demise of the cultural traditions of the older period. While radio, film and the weekly periodical brought “pleasure and instruction” to remote locations, and “added greatly” to Canadians’ enjoyment, there was “some danger” that Canadians might forget that “music and drama and letters call for more than passive pleasure ...”⁸⁴ Canadians, in other words, might forget that culture was not an idle or frivolous activity, a matter of mere entertainment. They might neglect the fact that traditional cultural activity was a serious business and that it ought to remain the lifeblood of contemporary age just as it had in the past. It seemed to the commissioners that music, theatre, and other serious culture had little chance of influencing the present age as they had past eras. Currently, radio shows, movies, and other entertainments passed off as “culture” precluded participation in true cultural activities. Nowadays, the report complained, “opera has a rival in ‘soap opera’, and perhaps a ‘pin-up girl’ grins from the exact place on the wall where used to hang a portrait of a shy young woman of twenty ...”⁸⁵ “It will be unfortunate”, it concluded with a considerable sense of foreboding, if “in this new world of television, of radio and of documentary films..., we hear no more our choir and our organist in valiant and diligent practice of the Messiah ...”⁸⁶

The new mass society had done much, thus, to challenge older cultural values and to replace those virtues with new ones of dubious merit. But how precisely did the mass media contribute to cultural decline? Unlike Harold Innis, who, writing at the same time that the Commission sat, elaborated on how communications media influenced political and social structures, the commissioners were much less theoretically innovative. Unlike Innis, moreover, they believed that the content of the mass media, as opposed to the technology itself, was all-important. Indeed, Vincent Massey, Hilda Neatby, and the other commissioners did not object to the mass media *per se*. Rather, they deplored the fact that modern communications were being used improperly to further commercial and entertainment purposes and that, as a result, the dissemination of serious culture had been severely curtailed. The example of radio broadcasting is instructive. Appraising the history of broadcasting in Canada, the Commission Report remarked that the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC, established in 1936) had had “tolerable success in combating commercialization and excessive Americanization of Canadian programmes”. On the whole, the CBC had “performed its duties satisfactorily” and had fulfilled its original tripartite function: “an adequate coverage of the entire population, opportunities for

Canadian talent and for Canadian self-expression generally, and successful resistance to the absorption of Canada into the cultural pattern of the United States".⁸⁷

There were, however, a few major criticisms of the CBC. Not opposed to broadcasting's entertainment function *per se*, the commissioners nonetheless countenanced a reevaluation of commercial programming. In the opinions of the commissioners, the CBC had become too reliant on entertainment oriented commercial broadcasting.⁸⁸ What was more, this overemphasis on diversional programming implied a diminution in air time for cultural and educational programmes, the mainstays of public broadcasting. Commercialism, the Report argued, tended "to have an unfortunate effect on the content of many programmes. Commercial radio, it went on, stifled "original creative writing" and imposed "a dead level of mediocrity" on its broadcasts. It asserted, moreover, that very little "Canadian expression" could occur through commercial radio.⁸⁹ Indeed, the Massey commissioners associated commercialism with "Americanization" and argued that commercial broadcasts left little opportunity for the development of indigenous programming. Further, the commissioners considered "soap operas" as particularly offensive forms of American-style commercial programming. Referring to criticisms from "authoritative sources", the Report decried that most of the serials reviewed were unsatisfactory, "guilty of melodramatic exaggeration, unreality and an excessive use of commonplace and stereotyped forms".⁹⁰ Too many local stations, the Report indicated, referring to soap operas and other commercial shows, offered these types of unworthy broadcasts, "programmes", they concluded, "which must be described as regrettable".⁹¹

The commissioners were also concerned that the new medium of television might inundate Canadians with commercial programming. Taking advantage of a break in commission proceedings in the spring of 1949, Hilda Neatby went to New York to study the merits of television. After watching several hours of broadcasts, she reported to Chairman Massey that television was an unrewarding occupation because it was largely dominated by commercial programmes.⁹² "Television in the United States", the Report commented, reflecting Neatby's influence, "is essentially a commercial enterprise, an advertising industry. The sponsors, endeavouring to 'give the majority of people what they want'," it continued, "frequently choose programmes of inferior cultural standards, thinking to attract the greatest numbers of viewers. And as television greatly intensifies the impact of radio, so television commercials intensify the methods of appeal to material instincts of various kinds, methods which now disfigure many radio commercials ..."⁹³ Neatby suggested, however, that Canada need not succumb to "the television tyrants [private commercial broadcasters] of the United States". Aided by "public support", its stations did not have to be "on the air thirteen hours a day", showing a succession of soap

operas and other commercial broadcasts. Rather, Canadian television broadcasters could “follow the example of the BBC with fewer shows, more carefully chosen, rehearsed and produced”. For Neatby, in brief, the “great problem” of television was how to curtail commercialism and “to make television what it might be at its best – a remarkable means of instruction and entertainment for the whole family together at home”.⁹⁴

Commercialism was problematic, then, because it overemphasized broadcasting’s entertainment aspect and therefore excluded the other, more meritorious informational and didactic functions. Along with commercialization, the Massey commissioners also criticized national broadcasters for not exploring “more fully Canadian capacity and taste in purely intellectual matters”.⁹⁵ According to the commissioners, the CBC gave inadequate attention to “the serious intellectual needs of adults”.⁹⁶ It had not expended enough money or effort on worthwhile music and other intellectual pursuits. The commissioners also chided the CBC’s “radio talks” policy. This policy, they charged, often encouraged speakers to participate who had “no special knowledge or reputation in their fields”. Indeed, CBC authorities often chose speakers “because they [had] a natural facility for broadcasting” and “because the popular approach of the amateur [was] thought to have special appeal to the average listener”.⁹⁷ They objected to this policy because they thought that the Canadian listening public ought not to be sheltered from intellectual arguments and rarefied discussions. Canadians, on the contrary, ought to partake of the privileges of their French and British counterparts, who had the regular opportunity of listening to “talk shows” of “scholarly quality”. It should be a set principle, the Report asserted in summary, that all CBC talks, “even the most popular”, “should ... be acceptable to the expert and enjoyed by the layman”.⁹⁸

Repeatedly affirming their desire not to foist refinement on the masses,⁹⁹ the commissioners nonetheless wanted to ensure that broadcasting became a tool to promote serious culture. There was no reflexive disdain for communication technologies, even for the newer media of radio and television. Instead, the commissioners considered the electronic mass media as crucial to the betterment of Canadian culture. The mass media were, after all, the conduits through which cultural interests could reach the masses. They provided the means by which to disseminate information, while facilitating widespread education and cultural improvement. The Aird Commission (1929) on broadcasting became for the commissioners a template on how to employ the electronic media. In radio, the Aird Commission saw “a great potential instrument of general education and national unity”. To achieve this laudable end, the commissioners recommended that a national company “be founded to own and operate all radio stations” in Canada, that private commercial stations come under the control of this company or be eliminated, and that

eventually, high power stations be established to cover the whole country.¹⁰⁰ Making no direct connections between the objectives of the two inquests, the Massey commissioners nonetheless implied that the Aird Commission recommendations might be applicable to current circumstances. The broadcast media could become in the 1950s what the Aird commissioners of 1929 had hoped that they would be: instruments in the employ of the federal government to foster culture and the development of a national spirit. At a time when commercialism and lowbrow culture flooded the airwaves, the Commission recommended that government wrest control of broadcasting away from commercial interests so as to safeguard the proper educational and cultural function of broadcasting. In stymieing commercialism, the proliferation of inappropriate popular programming, and other pernicious manifestations of modern broadcasting, it would be able at last to harness the inestimable benefits of the modern media.¹⁰¹ Broadcasting was, after all, a “public service”, and not a commercial industry.

Like the commercialized, mass media, mass culture also threatened Canadian cultural development. While generally using the term *culture* in its positive, Arnoldian sense, essentially as an interchangeable term for “high culture”, the Massey commissioners also recognized a new form, *mass* culture. Mass culture differed from popular culture, which the commissioners associated with pastimes, folklore, customs and other cultural trappings, and which they considered positive and non-threatening. While popular culture was a manifestation of indigenous, often local, cultural expressions, mass culture was mass produced, packaged, and carefully marketed. It was a form of widely dispersed and consumed popular entertainment. Disseminated by the mass media, and inspired by ever-expanding commercial interests, it included such popular entertainments as movies, gossip columns, television shows, and the reviled soap operas, all made available in mass quantities to millions of people.

Whereas the commissioners tolerated popular culture as expressions of genuine cultural experiences, they reproached mass culture as a new and dangerous element in modern society. From a practical point of view, they thought that the majority of Canadians spent much more of their leisure time than ever before in listening to Charlie McCarthy, going to movies, or engaging in other fruitless pursuits. There was, as a result, much less time for the opera, the theatre, “serious music”, or other high culture activities. Mass culture caused even greater problems, however. In appealing to the greatest numbers of people it encouraged homogenized viewpoints and impaired critical thinking. Mass culture was repugnant to the sense of independent, individual exploration that characterized high culture because it repressed human tendencies towards intellectual growth. Most of all, it undermined the chief objective of high culture to foster individual intellectual self-

improvement.¹⁰² In presenting a new set of norms to which the “common man” was compelled to ascribe, mass culture distorted and devalued the existing set of cultural and intellectual virtues. In Arnoldian parlance, it hindered the pursuit of sweetness and light. For a country such as Canada struggling to attain a cultural identity, mass culture presented a grave threat. As one Commission brief summarized, in pursuing “escapist” entertainment, Canadians did nothing “to satisfy creative instincts, stimulate the imagination, or cultivate the mind ... The result [was] mental and spiritual lethargy[;] an empty life”.¹⁰³

Mass culture was thus, for the commissioners, monolithic, manipulative, and enfeebling. It symbolized a society that valued mindless entertainment over intrinsically meritorious intellectual and cultural pursuits. As such, it acted like a prism through which were refracted the attitudes of the commissioners toward greater socio-historical issues. The first of these was the perception that the fundamental values of democratic civilization were in crisis.

By 1945, the Allies had finally defeated the threat of fascism. Yet, almost immediately after the end of the war, a new form of totalitarianism, communism, had emerged to endanger western democracy. Democracy seemed yet again to be under siege. This time, however, it became embroiled in a battle of ideas, a war of ideologies. To win this new conflagration, citizens of the west had to reassess their very way of life. For many intellectuals, as we have seen, this reassessment involved a reassertion of age-old cultural values. Only through the rediscovery of these traditional virtues could the “scientific materialism” of postwar age be combated. As Anton C. Pegis asserted in a brief submitted on behalf of the Pontifical Institute for Mediaeval studies at the University of Toronto, modern civilization’s greatest problem was not merely to save itself from nuclear destruction. Rather, it was “to discover its own spiritual character or to discover, in other words, what it is to be a civilization ...”¹⁰⁴ In a statement reminiscent of the strictures of the prophets of cultural decline, Pegis pronounced that “the conditions of existence and the spirit which should animate [culture], and the meaning of law, and the meaning of government, and meaning of man [*sic*] ... are the questions which are ... in the balance today ...”¹⁰⁵ Expounding upon the relationship between the humanities and government and the role of humane values in the frightful age of power politics, historian Donald Creighton implicitly concurred with Pegis. At a time when “international politics seem to have degenerated into a species of brutal and provocative gangsterism”, he wrote,

... the real function of the humanities is the production of civilized men and trained and cultivated minds. Never before in the history of the world have there been such enormous accumulations of appallingly destructive power;

never before have international politics been carried on in such direct, simple and uncompromising relationship with power. And yet, at the same time, never before have there been so many, and such emotional appeals to vague and grandiose collective faiths, to so-called ideologies which are invested with all the sanctity of a revealed religion and to which we are all expected to yield a blind and unquestioning adherence. The humanities may help save us both from these delusions of moral grandeur [sic] and these brutal appeals to physical force. They serve constantly to remind us that our culture is not a creed which we are divinely justified in imposing force on other[s] ...¹⁰⁶

Intellectuals such as Pegis and Creighton stressed the spiritual and humane origins of western civilization. Ultimately, they urged, the west had to reexamine itself to have a chance at spiritual and cultural fulfillment.

The emergence of mass culture, according to the Massey commissioners, hindered the process of cultural self-examination, however. For them, mass culture was repugnant to the achievement of spiritual edification. They reviled mass culture precisely because it interfered with the spiritual introspection that the western world so badly required. Most dangerously, mass culture proffered a set of “false” values that crowded out essential cultural and humane virtues. As noted in chapter three, Massey and other intellectuals became concerned about the emergence in the postwar period of a consumer economy and an associated proliferation of materialist values. They worried that Canadians had become so preoccupied with material growth that they had ignored the transcendent spiritual and cultural values. Along with growing materialism, mass culture provided an added threat to this important objective of cultural self-examination. Through advertising, and an emphasis on commercialism and consumerism, it accentuated the development of the materialist society that Massey and others feared. As Hilda Neatby explained, mass culture was the handmaid of consumerism and commercialism. The mass cultural content of private broadcasts, she argued, tended to be “a mere by-product of the advertising industry”. “Radio”, she went on, “is not a public service: the radio man is not, and does not profess to be the counterpart of the journalist or the editor. He is an advertiser, employed by commercial companies for advertising purposes. The final criterion for his programme”, Neatby ended, “must be ‘will they sell the product?’”¹⁰⁷

In *The Mechanical Bride*, Marshall McLuhan also connected “mass” and “consumer” cultures. He showed, in addition, how advertising, merely another of the myriad forms of mass culture, gave genesis to a set of new and spurious consumer values. McLuhan pointed out, for instance, how magazine advertisements tried to show their audiences that consumerism was the sole definer of social status. Those who consumed certain products at the prompting of marketing executives, in other words, were perceived

as more “cultured” than those who did not.¹⁰⁸ Status was conferred on them not because of who they were as individuals or because of what they thought; instead they gained status because of what they purchased and how their consumer appetites qualified them to fit into a larger culture of consumers. Along with millions of other people, advertising agencies taught them that “culture and distinction” were matters of consumption alone.¹⁰⁹ Similarly, McLuhan continued, the Hollywood film industry encouraged consumerism. Hollywood’s “Love-Goddess Assembly Line”, he suggested, “educated” women on how to look and what to wear. Again, moderns achieved status by consuming a product, this time the ideal-types depicted in Hollywood films. Like the marketing agencies, Hollywood influenced moderns to conform to “universal” standards and to assert their identity not by being individuals but instead by harmonizing with the larger group. As such, it integrated women into a larger, increasingly homogenized culture.¹¹⁰

As McLuhan suggested, the rise of mass culture involved more than the acceleration of materialism or the establishment of a new set of consumer standards. It also impinged upon the debate on the intellectual values of modern civilization. As with the other critics of modernity, the Massey commissioners deplored the homogenizing effects of mass culture. Vincent Massey and Hilda Neatby especially disdained the conformity that “mass society” produced. Like Marshall McLuhan’s consumer, modern man, for Vincent Massey, had “lost all sense of individuality”. “His personality”, Massey wrote, was “allowed to express itself in customs, badges, metals or degrees ... but strong and disturbing characters [were] discouraged. Non-conformity [was] unwelcome; eccentricity [was] banned ...” With the hallmarks of individuality destroyed, Massey ended, the common man, to his great detriment, had been “gently absorbed [into] the mass”.¹¹¹

Hilda Neatby, who had a close intellectual collaboration with Vincent Massey,¹¹² also commented on moderns’ “neglect of the individual” and their “preoccupation with the mass”.¹¹³ She agreed that moderns had been losing their identity and individuality in the mass age. In accepting common points of view and adopting increasingly uniform outlooks on the world, they had succumbed to “group conformity”. Acceptance within the group, not “freedom or independence” from the collective, Neatby explained, was “now thought of almost as a positive good”; “withdrawal from the group or rejection by it is a corresponding evil”.¹¹⁴ Oddly, for Neatby, moderns had shunned self-discovery and instead had come to seek identity in conformity. They repudiated “formally imposed rules or duties” and resisted socio-cultural obligations and other manifestations of “external conformity”. Yet, at the same time, they desired an “essential unity” that was to be gained “through the common life of the group”.¹¹⁵ In other words, they sought their “individual” identity through group interaction. In so doing, however, Neatby warned that they had

eschewed one form of conformity for another. Ultimately, moderns denied themselves their inherent nature as individuals. More importantly, they undermined the individualist values that had been so much a part of the western tradition.¹¹⁶ Characteristic of the mass age, group conformity had, for the critics, yet again exacted a ruinous toll on modern humans.

Closely connected to “group conformity” was the idea of intellectual homogeneity. Like individuality, critical free thought also seemed, for the commissioners, to be in eclipse. As Vincent Massey explained, moderns had little regard for the “critical faculty” and had generally rejected “the guidance of reason”.¹¹⁷ They instead developed “irrational mental habits” consistent with what had been known as “the rule of the tribe”, but what was now euphemistically called “‘group integration’ or respect for the consensus”.¹¹⁸ Hilda Neatby also scorned intellectual homogeneity. As for Massey, the affinity for the “mass” had had, for Neatby, a profound effect in diminishing humans’ rational and critical faculties. Moderns valued neither the capacity to think and reason nor the distinction of the individual within the group, both of which Neatby claimed to be defining features of humanity. Rather, amid the growing tendencies towards mass culture, moderns had become increasingly “driven by common instinct or mass emotion”.¹¹⁹ Lacking a critical sense and rational capacity, Neatby concluded, humanity’s fundamental nature had been undermined. “Rejecting the guidance of reason,” as Massey put it, moderns have become “automata, ready to give an instant and uniform mechanical response to the man who presses the right button”.¹²⁰ Harold Innis put the matter in a slightly different way. “Modern civilization,” he argued, “characterized by an enormous increase in the output of mechanized knowledge with the newspaper, the book, the radio and the cinema, has produced a state of numbness ... and self-complacency perhaps only equaled by laughing gas”.¹²¹ For Lewis G. Thomas, Canada and the western world had been “overwhelmed by a homogenizing process that was reducing everybody to similarity and pushing down things of the mind rather than raising the ability of people to appreciate things of the mind”.¹²² The individual in this modern, Orwellian age seemed to have become merely one of the herd.

Hindering individual thought and human expression, the so-called “herd instinct” also had deleterious social and political ramifications. Ideologically, the twentieth century had been characterized by the emergence of totalitarianism and by a commensurate rise in ideological threats to liberal democracy. Propaganda and the mass media had greatly contributed to the rise of fascist governments and had continued after the war to strengthen worldwide communist movements. The holocaust and other barbarities of wartime further signified the masses’ susceptibility to campaigns of mass persuasion. Moderns, it

seemed, had been vulnerable more than ever before to participation in mass movements. In a climate of “group thinking” and homogenized viewpoints, the commissioners feared that they were prone to false ideas and pernicious political doctrines. The masses, in Neatby’s phrase, had exposed themselves “to manipulation and to misery”.¹²³ George Grant was particularly forthright on this point. “The effects of this surge of propaganda over the world”, he argued, had “devastated the human mind. Satiated with this cheapened drug”, Grant went on, “the appetite of the public becomes so deadened that it is unable to distinguish between the truth and lies concocted for political purposes. The process whereby the individual submerges himself into mass movements becomes accelerated”. Propagandists negated moderns’ individuality and their “finer sense” “so that their aims remain identical for long periods of time in those of their fellows” and so that “they accept easily the political ideas of their leaders”. “Propaganda, far more effective and far more insidious than physical force,” concluded Grant, became the “means whereby civilization may lose its finer instincts and political freedom may become the despised product of a past age”.¹²⁴ “Few Canadians go to college”, added one submission to the Commission, commenting on the effects of the herd instinct on democracy. “[T]he majority of them”, it went on,

do not attend high school ... They have fallen into the habit of accepting with too much credulity and too little critical evaluation the fare which the publishing houses, the press, the films and the radio send them ... Such an attitude of willing suspension of disbelief towards whatever appeals to their desires is dangerous to the success of the democratic state ...¹²⁵

Without “intelligent critical evaluation on the part of ... citizens”, the brief claimed in conclusion, liberal democracy would be in peril.¹²⁶

Exposing the masses to ideological fallacies, group thinking thus had actually endangered democracy. For the culture critics, there was another, more insidious assault on democratic principles, however. The rise of mass culture was tantamount to the development of a “false” sense of socio-political freedom. True democracy, the commissioners noted, did not imply, as was commonly held, unmitigated majoritarianism. Nor did it involve the sundering of individual or intellectual values. Instead, influenced by environmental conditions, moderns had misapprehended the meaning of liberal democracy. They had mistakenly identified group thinking, the participation in consumer and leisure activities and mass culture generally, as expressions of liberty. Yet, for critics, freedom clearly did not mean obeying the orders of consumer suggestion, nor the “right to be and to do as everybody else”.¹²⁷ It could not be achieved by being one of the herd. Rather, as Hilda Neatby stated, the principles of true liberty could be gained only through “the fervor

of religious faith, the absolutism of moral principle, the freedom of the mind".¹²⁸ These principles were those on which western democracy had been founded. Only through their preservation and the resistance of the spurious values of mass culture, she ended, could civilization endure.¹²⁹

People living in the mass age had hence been deceived, according to the critics, into thinking that mass culture offered true liberty. Importantly, this misapprehension had potentially perilous consequences. By adhering to a false idea of liberty, modern humanity, the commissioners claimed, had put democracy in peril. Group thinking and consensus generation entailed the abandonment of intellectual achievement and cultural and spiritual fulfillment, the true hallmarks of freedom. The triumph of the practical and present-minded over the contemplative and moral meant the sundering of liberty. Accepting "ignorance with complacency", renouncing "the contemplation of greatness for the worship of the common-place", and finding time "for everything except solitary thought", Massey declared, modern society had devolved into a "democratic barbarism".¹³⁰ In submitting to false democracy, Neatby added, modern humans jeopardized "the fervor of religious faith, the absolutism of moral principle, the freedom of the mind" -- the roots of which democracy was the fruit. In a turnabout tinged with irony, furthermore, mass democracy fostered the authoritarianism it so stridently opposed. Uniformity of thinking and action were more than intellectually and culturally stultifying; they also implied, for the critics, a conformity reflective of modern totalitarianism. "If we content ourselves with mere happiness, interest, group integration, self-realization," Neatby explained, "we are not bringing up free men and women. We are conditioning units for mass servitude ..."¹³¹ Commenting also on the pseudo-freedom intrinsic to mass democracy, Donald Creighton wrote: democracy had become "a vaporous, pervasive incense, floating in a supposedly edifying fashion over nearly everything, and yet, oddly enough, arousing its devoted worshippers to truculence abroad and illiberality [*sic*] at home".¹³² It had become, in Massey's mind, "that most abused of all words".¹³³ Once denoting individual and social liberty, mass democracy had become repressive and monolithic, the epitome of illiberality.¹³⁴

Challenging democratic and other core values, mass culture thus implied for the commissioners much more than simply the rise of popular forms of entertainment. What is more, it was joined by "cultural Americanization" as a leading factor imperiling Canadian culture. A good philanthropist, helping Canadians develop universities and other institutions, the United States had also become a leading world exporter of culture, inundating Canada with radio and television programmes, films, music, and other mass culture offerings. The influx of material of this sort concerned commissioners and like-

minded critics, however. The culture critics thought that it hampered the growth of an indigenous and autonomous Canadian civilization. More importantly, “cultural Americanization” meant the subsuming of cultural values and traditions. Since American culture was quickly becoming indistinguishable from mass culture, cultural Americanization implied a homogenous, mass civilization devoid of distinctiveness and connections to the cultural past. American culture therefore hindered the critical effort to maintain traditions as a means of building a strong civilization. Along with mass culture and the mass media to which it had been inextricably bound, it presented serious threats to Canada’s cultural future.

The Massey Report expounded upon the American fact early on. The commissioners highlighted Canada’s presence in North America as a chief factor influencing its cultural growth. “Canada”, the Commission Report noted, had a “small and scattered population”; Canadians were “clustered along the rim of another country many times more populous and of far greater economic strength”. The majority of Canadians spoke a language shared with the Americans, leading to particularly close ties. This series of conditions was significant because it made the Dominion especially susceptible to cultural invasion from south of the border. B.K. Sandwell encapsulated the culture critics’ position in his special study to the Commission. Canadians, “especially those of the English tongue”, Sandwell wrote, “must inevitably be highly receptive to every kind of communication from the United States”. Owing to Canada’s geographical proximity to the United States, and the size and wealth of America, it was equally inevitable that such communications should be very numerous”. Canada, Sandwell declared, “was the only country of any size in the world whose people read more foreign periodicals than they do periodicals published in their own land ...”¹³⁵

Particularly irksome to the commissioners were the effects of cultural Americanization. While some of what the Americans exported was positive, considerable American cultural produce had “no particular application to Canadian conditions”.¹³⁶ The commissioners singled out “children’s programmes of the ‘crime’ and ‘horror’ type”, as being “positively harmful”. “News commentaries” and “live broadcasts” emanating from the United States, they argued, were “designed for American ears”, and almost certainly had “an American slant and emphasis”. And, while stressing Canadians right to enjoy American cultural offerings -- “[c]ultural exchanges are excellent in themselves” -- the commissioners held deep reservations about the long-term merits of the flood of American culture into Canada. The “vast and disproportionate amount of material coming from a single alien source”, the Report announced, “may stifle rather than stimulate our own creative effort”. Passively embraced “without any standard of comparison”, it added,

making oblique reference to the stultifying qualities of mass culture, this influx might “weaken critical faculties”. Whereas the cultural connection had, on the whole, aided Canada, the Report stated in conclusion, Canadians “must not be blind ... to the very present danger of permanent dependence”.¹³⁷

While Canadians were mostly oblivious to American influences, the culture critics were keenly interested in the origins and spread of American culture. They deliberately overlooked Canadians’ participation in lowbrow culture and instead indicted the Americans for the growth of the mass society. Not only did the United States give genesis to mass culture, but it also foisted lowbrow culture on unprepared citizens in Canada and elsewhere in the western world. B.K. Sandwell, to take one example, blamed Americanization for the demise of high culture. Opera, serious music, theatre and other examples of high culture, he claimed, had declined because they were activities that appealed only to a segment of the populous. Amid pressures to gain the largest possible audience and therefore to generate the greatest amount of advertising revenue, broadcasters favoured lowbrow, popular entertainment over high culture alternatives. The American-inspired “tendency to cater almost exclusively to the mass”, Sandwell asserted, was “hardly favourable to a high cultural level in entertainment ...”¹³⁸ Canadians, he argued further, lived in a period “in which the number of [cultural] impressions received from a distance is vastly greater ... than was the case a generation ago ...”¹³⁹ These cultural incursions had dangerous implications. Owing to American mass cultural influences, Canadians had become practically indistinguishable from Americans in their cultural tastes. Through the homogenizing effects of mass communications, Sandwell concluded, their “mental attitude” had become so close to that of Americans that they received “American broadcasts and cinema productions with no sense that they [were] ‘foreign’ products”.¹⁴⁰ For Sandwell, the infiltration of American culture into Canada meant the alteration of Canadians’ cultural sensibilities.¹⁴¹ In a brief to the commission, the Mainland Branch of the Canadian Authors Association put the matter even more bluntly. “For years”, the brief argued, “Canadians have been flooded with American moving pictures, American radio programs, American magazines, American books ... We have become unsure of anything Canadian in concept Something should done”, the brief concluded, “before the Canadian viewpoint is lost entirely”.¹⁴²

Of all the commissioners, Vincent Massey, a former ambassador to the United States, was most passionate on the issue of Americanization.¹⁴³ Although the Canada of the postwar period had a stronger sense of national identity than in the past, Massey argued, external pressures, primarily from the United States, had also become stronger. At best, benevolent American influences -- mainly the generous support of universities and

other cultural institutions -- stymied Canadian initiative and the potential for growth. At their worst, American cultural activities saturated Canada's popular culture and transformed it into a duplicate of the American variant.¹⁴⁴ In a BBC broadcast dealing with the contents of the Commission Report, Massey summed up Canada's "external problem". There was "a danger", Canada's former High Commissioner to Great Britain announced to his British listeners, "of arresting the development of the Canadian national character". Only through the promotion of a "national, Canadian consciousness" could the harmful effects of the American cultural connection be allayed.¹⁴⁵ Philosopher George Grant used much more powerful rhetoric to denounce cultural aggrandizement of the United States.¹⁴⁶ Canada, Grant declaimed, was "being challenged to defend itself against a barbaric Empire that puts its faith in salvation by the machine".¹⁴⁷ Canadians, Massey's nephew implored, must "not simply accept their assumptions about human life from more important nations of the western world ..."; they must "realize ... how much of that tradition has already been trodden under foot [because of their] concentration on ... the mass society".¹⁴⁸ Indeed, by threatening traditions, the cultural imperialism of the United States had transformed Canadian society. Canada's "spiritual climate" was "largely formed by ... partaking in the ideas" of American civilization, which, "during the years of Canada's development, was being transformed by the new mass industrialism. With that industrialism", Grant continued, "went certain dominant ideas that effected an almost incalculable spiritual change in the west".¹⁴⁹ American culture thus had altered ideas and modes of living. Ultimately, it weakened "bonds of tradition". American-inspired mass society had, in short, fundamentally changed the cultural direction of the Dominion.

The media, cultural Americanization, and mass culture, then, all posed serious threats to Canadian cultural development for critics. While a main purpose of the Massey Commission was to expound upon these menaces, the commissioners also took it upon themselves to define culture and to aid in the process of cultural maturation. High culture was especially important here. Acting as a link to cultural traditions, it operated, in the minds of critics, as a counterweight to American cultural activities. Its preservation therefore became vital to a society increasingly enticed by mass culture. High culture also fostered the critical abilities that would help expose as false mass movements. Most importantly, it enabled an appreciation of moral and aesthetic values and the capacity for individual cultural improvement. As such, it was an all-important remedy to the modern crisis of values. The Massey commissioners and other critics of culture, in short, endowed high culture with a new moral authority that rivaled the importance of Christianity to past societies.

High culture had become for culture critics a panacea with which to address the ills of modern life. It helped shape tastes and inform opinions of “cultured” individuals. Not only that, it was the lifeblood of a nation’s cultural existence. As N.A.M. MacKenzie explained, “the refining of the emotions, the intellectual, and taste” was essential to the preservation of a country’s “cultivated life”. The best way to ensure that Canada’s cultural life grew in “the worthiest tradition” was to encourage individuals to be “cultivated people” -- “people in whom the habit of self-cultivation has created the capacity to respect and admire”. Responsible for transferring creative traditions and fostering cultural activity, MacKenzie argued, society must allow the cultured person to flourish, especially at a time when cultural traditions were at risk.¹⁵⁰ Unlike the culture of the masses, furthermore, high culture favoured quality and edification over sheer entertainment and universal appeal. “Canadian achievement”, the Massey Report asserted, depended mainly on the “quality of the Canadian mind and spirit”. This quality was determined “by what Canadians think, and think about; by the books they read, the pictures they see and the programmes they hear. These things”, it added, “whether we call them arts and letters or use other words to describe them, we believe to be at the root of our life as a nation”.¹⁵¹

High culture was indeed a foundation stone for the edifice of Canadian culture. In addition, advanced education, literature, the arts, and other forms of high culture performed, according to the critics, a didactic role in modern Canadian society. Through a variety of means they inculcated ideas, habits, attitudes, and sensibilities determined, over the ages, to be intrinsic to culture. In Arnoldian terms, they encouraged an appreciation of sweetness -- beauty, goodness, and other transcendent virtues -- and light -- enlightenment, education, open-mindedness, the acquisition of knowledge and insight. Partaking of high culture facilitated individual exploration, contemplation, and intellectual growth. The cultured individual, as Neatby indicated, was especially concerned about intellectual and contemplative matters. Self-realization, she argued, came not from group integration but from “losing oneself for a time in contemplation of something greater than and beyond oneself”.¹⁵² Agreeing implicitly, Grant championed the benefits of the “rational contemplation of the Good -- simply for its own sake”.¹⁵³ Participating in the contemplative life, for the philosopher Grant, enabled modern individuals to understand themselves more completely and to gain insight into the traditions and future directions of their society. Massey, for his part, argued that the “cultivation of the mind [was] to be valued for itself”. The “respect of ideas, intellectual honesty; mental alertness; clarity of thought and precision of expression; critical sense to detect the real from the spurious; awakened imagination; and the ability to discern beauty”, were all hallmarks of the cultivated imagination.¹⁵⁴ Malcolm Wallace perhaps best captured the resounding

significance of intellectual and spiritual edification. Humanity found “ultimate satisfaction ... in the world of beauty and of thought”, Wallace told the Commission in his special study.

Not to enter this world is to remain forever a child. It is to neglect the rich inheritances of the ages, which must be claimed before it can be possessed, the possibility of putting away childish things and sharing in the larger life of the race. It is to be content with stagnation in place of growth, to lose the seat for new experience in absorption in material pleasures.¹⁵⁵

Only through intellectual self-exploration, in other words, could modern humanity regain a sense of its past, its traditions, and its enduring identity. Cultural improvement thus led, in the words of Watson Kirkconnell and A.S.P. Woodhouse, to the “full measure of humanity”.¹⁵⁶

As Kirkconnell, Woodhouse, and others suggested, cultural development also implied the expression of “humane” values. For these and other intellectuals, individual edification implied the realization of the preeminent human purpose to search for truth and spiritual fulfillment. Humanity had to rise above the instincts it shared with the animal world. Instead, it must assert spiritual, intellectual, and other traits that made it unique in creation. Neatby, for instance, spoke of the need to maintain a “rational objective truth” and the “reverence for human personality as such” through “a continuing and increasing respect for matters of mind”.¹⁵⁷ Fervent religious faith, the belief in absolute moral principles, and free intellectual inquiry were all central components of the human character.¹⁵⁸ They transcended time and location, and, as such, formed the core of the western system of values.

Christian humanism was thus emerging as a main feature in the cultural critique of Neatby and the other anti-modernists. In an age that seemed increasingly hostile to individuality and humanity’s spiritual and cerebral objectives, the culture critics clung to humanism not only as a way to counteract materialism, consumerism, and other destructive forces, but more importantly as a means of self-realization. “The Humanities”, Malcolm Wallace proclaimed in his special study, gratified “some of the deepest human cravings -- to see and hear beautiful things, to understand the complexities of personal relations, and to speculate on the baffling origin and meaning of men's lives ...” They were concerned, he went on, “with beauty in all its forms, and with speculations regarding human relations and meaning and values in human experience”.¹⁵⁹ The humanities stimulated the individual’s sensitivity to the human values in art, morality, and religion.¹⁶⁰ They were the chief purveyors of the values intrinsic to the human condition. Hilda Neatby agreed wholeheartedly. A liberal education had as its highest goal the “gaining of a humble

conception of the greatness of human nature and human society, and of vastness and complexity of the universe ...”¹⁶¹ It “convey[ed] to all”, she continued, “the intellectual, cultural and moral training which represents the best in a long and honourable tradition of Western civilization”.¹⁶²

Like that of the critics of the modern university, moreover, Neatby’s educational ideal eschewed mere fact-finding and was concerned instead with developing well-rounded individuals. The preservation of ancient values and the development of the human character were indeed central to Neatby’s educative conception.¹⁶³ Vincent Massey also championed humanistic education. Instead of being preoccupied with know-how, the liberal arts sought after the cultivation of the individual’s “mental powers” and “the development of certain habits of mind”.¹⁶⁴ Facts and figures, he claimed, “must not be crammed into young minds, to be only of temporary use”. Rather, the individual should never be “taught more than he can think about”.¹⁶⁵ Contemplation and consideration were thus for Massey the most important aspects of the liberal education. In characteristically blunt fashion, Harold Innis encapsulated the basic purpose of liberal arts learning. Educational institutions, he wrote, should not consider students as “sausages to be stuffed” with facts and information. Rather, they must place less emphasis on “content and more on the character of instruction”.¹⁶⁶ Modern educators, Innis concluded, must be “fundamentally concerned”, like the ancient Greeks, “with the training of character”.¹⁶⁷

Inextricably tied to human individuality and the expression of human nature more generally, high culture, and specifically, the “cultured individual” contributed to the good society. High culture led not only to the development of good and moral individuals, but it also produced, according to the critics, good citizens who would make positive contributions to the social order. A familiarity with the various forms of high culture was the way to produce an aware and truly democratic citizenry. As Neatby remarked, civilization depended in large measure on the “creative minority”, who made “proper use of its leisure time”.¹⁶⁸ The responsibility of developing the good society, in other words, rested with the scholar, the artist, and other cultured individuals. In an age of “democratic barbarism” and “scientific materialism”, only the truly civilized, the culture critics argued, had the wherewithal to understand their ever-changing environment. Blessed with a liberal education and a civilized outlook, they were best able to comprehend the effects of an increasingly uncivilized age. As Neatby remarked, the “inner meaning” of education was to “create desirable social attitudes and intellectual appreciations” so as counteract the “moral confusion and intellectual barbarism” of present times.¹⁶⁹ The cultured individual, she noted, was the social figure who had “vision and insight” and who was, by definition, “a seer”. “He convey[ed] the truth by which, literally, men and nations live. He shows

what life is in all its aspects".¹⁷⁰ Lacking artists, philosophers, and scholars, western society risked "premature decadence and a relapse into barbarism".¹⁷¹

For Massey, as well, the liberally educated individual was well poised to lead. His education allowed him to comprehend and criticize the world in which he lived. Through it, Massey averred, he was enabled to "acquire a true sense of values, to understand something about the relation of man to society, to distinguish between the real things in life and the fakes, to put first things first, and to sharpen [his] mental curiosity ..."¹⁷² He was able to comprehend therefore the pernicious effects of mass society and form "a bulwark against standardization".¹⁷³ Cultured individuals, Massey asserted, employing militaristic imagery, were the "spiritual weapons" with which to defend against "pagan, materialistic, [and] tyrannical" assault on western culture.¹⁷⁴

Discussing the social contributions of intellectuals, the most important of society's cultured persons, the Massey commissioners wrote: "The philosopher with his contemplative and critical tradition may serve as a useful brake on the rightly impetuous man of action, a brake often needed in the world of today. Moreover, the man of letters can help to produce the atmosphere in which he can do his best work..." "The study of the arts and letters," the Massey Report concluded, as though to stress Massey's own views, helped "to form 'the citizens with trained minds, liberal and informed opinions, good taste, and critical judgment without whom a national civilization is impossible'."¹⁷⁵ While the masses had become increasingly confounded by the exigencies of mass society, creative individuals not only had comprehended their modern milieu, but also worked to create an environment in which cultural activity could flourish. As such, they had become, for the culture critics, the leaders of the modern world, indispensable agents in overcoming the pernicious effects of the mass age.

Taken out of context, the culture critics' blandishments on the cultivated mind and cultured individuals seem to be stark anachronisms. In an age dominated by materialist and pragmatic concerns and in which there was little use for intellectual values, they appear to be romantic yearnings for bygone eras and better times. There was, however, considerable affinity after 1945 for the "socially relevant" intellectual. As for the critics of modern academics, the culture analysts took pains to underline the social relevance of the humanist, the enlightened social prophet. The question now is, why were they so intent on advancing the cause of the "civilized" intellectual? Indeed, what was it about their social-historical environment that impelled them to undertake such a measured, articulate, and often highly passionate defense of humanists and other high culturalists? What, most significantly, made them, as humanists themselves, feel so marginal or even irrelevant?

The answers to these questions are manifold. Doubtless, critics were sincere in their ultimate objective to lead moderns to the good society. Their critique was nonetheless a response to prevailing social and historical circumstances. From a personal perspective, the culture critics were themselves the seers and artists that they described in their writings. Hence, in extolling the merits of academics and high culture, they were calling attention to themselves and, more importantly, their place within society's hierarchy. The increasingly vocal defense of high culture and humane values must be seen in light of a social climate in which the humanist was sorrowfully underpaid and lacked the status of scientists and technologists. Relatedly, the effort to raise public awareness of the social utility of humane learning reflected a period of crisis for the humanities. As we saw in chapter four, the war and postwar eras were times of great distress for the humanities in Canada. They were periods, most of all, in which governmental and university officials and indeed society at large questioned the social merit of the liberal arts and, by implication, the creative intellectual. In extolling the virtues of high culture and defending humane values, the critics were reacting against this callous new world. Explaining the merits of high culture, they attempted to show that like practical learning, high culture values too had an irreplaceable social worth. Like technological know-how, humane learning was truly, in Massey's phase, "useful knowledge".¹⁷⁶

The culture critics thus reacted against a social order that they perceived to be anti-intellectual and anti-cultural. Along with the demise of the humanities and university "traditions", the advent of a democratic, "mass" society reflected modern trends. Certainly, the emergence of the mass society was an evolution, a protracted process that took place over decades. The reaction against mass movements likewise went back before the war and beyond. North American social critics, especially Americans, responded to the "Babbitry" of mass society onwards from the late nineteenth century. For Canadian high culturalists, however, the post-Second World War period was exceedingly important in the rise of the mass society. For critics, especially the Massey commissioners, the postwar age evidenced an unprecedented growth of the materialism, consumerism, and anti-intellectualism that marked mass culture. Most irksome, a pervasive American cultural imperialism hung like a massive black cloud over an unsuspecting population. More than any other period in the past, American culture reached into Canada to influence the lives of more and more Canadians. Facilitated by the electronic media and an enfeebled populous, the era after 1945 thus promised to see the culmination of a trend generations in the making. Notwithstanding Canada's colonialism and hence the penchant of Canadians to borrow and absorb other cultural forms, cultural Americanization was, for the culture

critics, as uncompromising as it was inevitable. Only the supreme efforts of a few high culturalists could, in their minds, help redress this monstrous development.

The reaction against mass society was largely grounded, then, in the perceptions of critics. There are, however, a few tangible historical developments to substantiate the claim of a society that became increasingly inimical to high culture. There was, as we have indicated, the advent of the utilitarian university and democratic education. Exacerbated by the “veteran’s boom” and the threat of exploding secondary and post-secondary enrolments, critics feared that the academy, the last bastion of cultural refinement and philosophic analysis, would succumb to the dictates of the mass world. Just as importantly, modern Canada was overwrought with materialism and crass consumerism. Canada had achieved unprecedented economic development in the years after the war. And prosperity was spread over the vast majority of the population. Always a country that prioritized material development, to the critics Canada now seemed to be captivated by material progress and the growth ethic. As with the development of the mass society, the postwar era seemed a culmination to the long-term material development. As an economic world power, Canada had come of age.

Aside from historical conditions, the critique of culture must be grounded intellectually. Put simply, the culture critics owe much to the thought of Matthew Arnold. In *Culture and Anarchy*, a gospel for many culture critics,¹⁷⁷ Arnold explained that the chief defects of mid-Victorian society could be remedied by redressing the balance between material and commercial and cultural aspects of life. There were two ways to restore the equilibrium. First, one could try “to give the masses ... an intellectual food prepared and adapted in the way they [thought] proper for the actual condition of the masses”.¹⁷⁸ While laudable, this attempt to indoctrinate the populous in the ways of culture was nonetheless intrinsically flawed. Culture, Arnold claimed, did not attempt to “teach down to the level of inferior classes”; nor did it “try to win them for this or that sect of its own, with ready-made judgments and watchwords”. Rather, it sought to make all citizens regardless of social distinction “live in an atmosphere of sweetness and light, and use ideas ... freely, to be nourished and not bound by them...”¹⁷⁹ Society’s cultivated persons, not representatives of specific classes or social-political interests, Arnold added, had the greatest role to play in promoting this “social idea”. Society’s cultured individuals were not merely those who possessed certain knowledge, or those simply aware of the importance of culture pursuits. Instead, they were defined in part by their affinity for spreading sweetness and light. “The great men of culture”, Arnold explained, were “those who have a passion for diffusing, for making prevail, for carrying from one end of society to the other, the best knowledge of their time; ... to humanize it, to make it efficient outside the

clique of the cultivated and learned, yet still remaining the *best* knowledge and thought of the time, and a true source, therefore, of sweetness and light”.¹⁸⁰ The creative individual was for Arnold, as for his intellectual descendants less than a century later, essential to social advancement. In establishing a milieu suitable for cultural flourishing, he facilitated humanity’s march towards social perfection. In fostering cultural activity, itself the chief bulwark against anarchy and tantamount to “the pursuit of perfection”, the cultured individual performed his most vital social role: the pursuit of the good society. “[H]e who works for sweetness and light,” Arnold declared in conclusion, “works to make reason and the will of God prevail”.¹⁸¹

Arnoldian high culture, for the culture critics, was central to the achievement of the good society. As important as liberal humanist values were, however, they realized the unpopularity of high culture among the Canadian population at large.¹⁸² Realists, they recognized the seductive qualities of science and materialism and the quasi-hypnotic effects of mass culture on the Canadian populous. They understood, consequently, the difficulty of creating a society in which the cultured individual figured prominently, one which was as preoccupied as they were themselves with the attainment of “sweetness and light”.

The critics proffered two remedies to the cultural quandary that faced them. First, they proposed the heretofore uncommon remedy of state intervention in cultural affairs. Knowing the ravages of a commercial, foreign-based mass culture, the commissioners made, as their chief recommendation, public support of culture. Indeed, the majority of Part II of the Massey Report dealt with the commissioners’ “view on how the national government may appropriately advance [Canada’s] cultural and intellectual life”.¹⁸³ The Dominion government, the commissioners stressed, must follow the example of European countries and even Britain, which had recently allowed cultured individuals the financial freedom to pursue their work.¹⁸⁴ Canada had to endure strains imposed upon it by demographic and geographical factors. Government provided aid in commercial, transportation, and other fields of endeavour to overcome these limitations. Similar assistance ought to be given to “companies of players”, “orchestras”, and “concert artists”, “whose regular and frequent appearances in the great and small communities of Canada [were] of importance to our well-being as a civilized community”.¹⁸⁵ The commissioners urged furthermore the federal aid of radio and television broadcasting. Essentially a public service and therefore in need of considerable increases in funding, the CBC ought also to be in receipt of public funds.¹⁸⁶ That broadcasting would function as a powerful tool in the promotion of Canadian culture was adequate justification for the use of public revenues. Along with museums, libraries, archives, and other national cultural organizations, lastly,

the commissioners advocated public funding for the most important of cultural institutions: Canadian universities and a proposed council for the promotion of the arts, letters, humanities, and social sciences. Reflecting the common cry of the university “funding crisis” of the later 1940s, they proposed that the federal government “make annual contributions to support the work of the universities” on the basis of provincial populations.¹⁸⁷ Equally important to the funding of universities was the creation of the so-called “Canada Council”. The Report made clear that the council would need considerable federal support to finance its operation. Money grants were required to diffuse the arts, letters, and sciences at home, and promote knowledge of Canada abroad. The commissioners, in their own words, “were under no illusion that the results that ... may be achieved from the creation of the Canada Council can be obtained cheaply ...”¹⁸⁸ The critics understood that the expansion of culture was an expensive proposition. It was nevertheless an activity crucial to the well-being of the Canadian nation. As such, its merits far exceeded the monetary values that the commissioners and others placed upon it. “If we in Canada are to have a more plentiful and better cultural fare”, the Massey commissioners reasoned, “we must pay for it. Good will alone can do little for a starving plant; if the cultural life of Canada is anemic, it must be nourished, and this will cost money ...”¹⁸⁹ The investment was “modest”, they ended, “in relation to the returns which ... [Canadians] could reasonably expect.”¹⁹⁰

More intangible than government interventionism, the Massey commissioners enlisted the support of cultural nationalism to achieve their ends. The commissioners dovetailed the growing sense of Canadianism of the post-1945 period with their own ideas on Canadian identity. Specifically, they integrated concerns for national development with their own preoccupations about the Dominion’s cultural state. In consequence, they grafted onto Canadian nationalism issues of personal edification and cultural development. In the words of the Massey Commission’s biographer, “Liberal humanism and nationalism combined to form a high-minded and defensive strain of Canadian cultural nationalism”.¹⁹¹

The first notion basic to cultural nationalism was a sense of cultural uniqueness. In a climate wherein pernicious ideas and social influences easily crossed frontiers, especially undefended ones, culture critics found it necessary to articulate and thus bolster Canadian values and cultural characteristics. Canada’s distinctiveness vis-à-vis the United States was among the most important of these cultural attributes. Vincent Massey, the most vociferous proponent of “Canadianism”, was the commission member who most eloquently expressed Canada’s cultural distinctiveness. The effort to keep Canadianism in tact, he wrote, “could only be successful ... if [we Canadians were] aware of the differences which distinguish[ed] us from the United States and [gave] us our significance here in North

America ...”¹⁹² While there were similarities between the two cultures, he continued, there were “certain principles” that contributed to Canada’s uniqueness. Canadian society, for instance, did not share in the intolerance of an American society that countenanced “racial discrimination and third degree police methods”.¹⁹³ More fundamentally, Canada also had patterns of ideas and culture of its own.¹⁹⁴ Owing much to the British connection, Canada was culturally distinct from the United States and other foreign states. Politically, Canada’s tolerance, liberal-mindedness and its respect for the rule of law all emanated from the political values of the Empire.¹⁹⁵ In “cherish[ing] law and liberty”, Massey declared, Canada held the same basic political values as the United States. Its “manner of cherishing”, its “constitutional and symbolic expressions”, Massey hastened to note, were different. Rather than through republicanism, Canadians “express[ed] the common good, the public welfare in parliamentary institutions” that had always derived their authority from the Crown.¹⁹⁶ The interactions between the Crown and parliament showed how “liberty can be enjoyed without disorder, and that authority can be exercised without tyranny”.¹⁹⁷

In addition to British political values, Canada benefited intellectually and culturally from its historic nexus with Britain. Britain was, for Massey, the conduit through which humane values were passed to Canadians. Cultured individuals in Canada had greatly benefited from British academic and spiritual traditions. Unlike their American counterparts, Massey wrote, quoting Dr. Dodds, the President of Princeton, they appreciated “the ‘power of ideas and spiritual values in history, literature, and philosophy ...’”¹⁹⁸ They have received “from across the water the belief that education is primarily a spiritual matter; that it must be concerned with the individual; that the humanities must hold their old pride of place in its pattern; that the university is no place for the pedant, for it has always been the glory of learning in the British Isles that its virtues have been closely woven into the stuff of daily life. All this,” he stated in conclusion, was “part of a great inheritance”.¹⁹⁹

Massey and his fellow commissioners also endeavoured to explain how, through cultivating things of the mind and spirit, Canada might develop as a united culture. They acknowledged Canada’s cultural duality as a factor that ranked with mass culture as an obstacle to accomplishing this objective. There were two Canadian cultures, B.K. Sandwell declared in his special study for the Commission. They were “almost wholly separate one from the other ...” “[O]nly after making very large allowances for this limitation”, he continued, echoing the “two solitudes” thesis that was gaining currency after 1945,²⁰⁰ was it “possible to speak of a Canadian culture at all”.²⁰¹ Massey agreed that there were “natural differences between Canadians of French and Anglo-Saxon origin ...”²⁰² He stressed however that Canada’s dual culture was a strength and not a liability. The French

and English languages had given “the world its present civilization”. A Canadian with both languages, Massey continued, “not only contribute[d] to the unity of his country, but he add[ed] to his equipment as a civilized person”.²⁰³

Despite differences, Canada’s two cultural groups had much in common. Most significantly, they shared a common system of values that was especially important to the modern age. English Canadians, Massey wrote, had “come to respect more and more the standards and values” which they found among Quebeckers.²⁰⁴ “In a world which seems given more and more to materialism”, he added, “they hold to religion as the guiding force of life. As education appear[ed] to become increasingly mechanistic they still give culture and the humanities an honoured place in their schools and colleges ... [S]urely there is much that each of us can learn from the other ...”²⁰⁵

Neatby concurred with her friend and mentor concerning the transcendence of cultural values across linguistic, religious, and cultural boundaries. She focussed, however, primarily on religious virtues. In a letter dated 13 August 1953, she asked fellow commissioner Reverend Georges-Henri Lévesque to expound upon the spiritual affinities of the two cultures. In a breathless barrage of questions, she queried how an accord between French- and English-speaking Canadians on spiritual values would be an invaluable tool to fight the abuses of modernity:

Would it be right and suitable to suggest that there is in Canada a most hopeful and heartening tendency for serious members of the Protestant and Roman Catholic communions to come together in the realization that the whole fate of society depends on the application of Christian principles and Christian dogma to current problems and that we may hope to suggest that a Protestant democracy which is degenerating into license can learn much from a Roman Catholic society which has never lost sight of the divine principle of authority and that, on the other hand, the Roman Catholic society may, in association with Protestants, gain a fresh recognition of one of your favorite maxims, that liberty as well as authority comes from God?²⁰⁶

For Neatby and Massey, thus, Canada’s two cultures had many similarities and, most importantly, mutually reinforced each other and the goals of liberal humanism. As such, they contributed to the emergence of a single civilization within the Canadian state. There really could be “unity in diversity”, as one brief from Quebec pointed out.²⁰⁷ Summarizing the idea of a common culture out of which developed an interest in a shared cultural life, the commissioners declared:

We thought it deeply significant to hear repeatedly from representatives of the two Canadian cultures expressions of hope and of confidence that in our common cultivation of the things of the mind, Canadians --- French and

English-speaking -- can find true 'Canadianism'. Through this shared confidence we can nurture what we have in common and resist those influences which could impair, and even destroy, our integrity. In our search we have thus been made aware of what can serve our country in a double sense: what can make it great, and what can make it one.²⁰⁸

The optimism that underpinned the notion of cultural unity arose in the unique circumstances of the postwar age. The post-1945 period was an era during which Canadians had become more aware of their accomplishments as a nation. Canada had emerged victorious from a war in which it made a fundamental contribution to the Allied cause. It had emerged economically prosperous and had gained increased recognition among international powers for the critical role it had played in achieving peace. For the culture critics in particular, Canada was in a state of becoming, almost a blank slate upon which to inscribe recommendations for the achievement of cultural improvement. In its broadest sense, the Massey Commission wished not only to defend civilization, but to build up Canadian culture almost *ex nihilo*. It engaged ultimately in the intrinsically positive task of constructing a national good society. Despite fears of nuclear annihilation, burgeoning totalitarianism, and cultural imperialism, then, there was considerable optimism about the future of Canadian "civilization". For most Canadians, the critics of culture included, the Dominion was coming of age.

The idea that, as a nation, Canada had reached a critical mass was also reflected in a larger intellectual context. Put simply, the postwar period was one in which Canadian intellectuals at large, and especially historians, became preoccupied with defining and expounding upon the Canadian identity. For Harold Innis, the development of Canada as a national cultural entity hinged on the Canadian relationship with Great Britain and the United States. In "Great Britain, Canada, and the United States" (1948), Innis argued that Canada had shunned its British affiliations and fell into the American military, economic, and cultural spheres of influence. Parodying A.R.M. Lower's recent work, Innis wrote that Canada had "moved from colony to nation to colony" during the prime ministership of W.L. Mackenzie King.²⁰⁹ Nevertheless, Innis implored Canadians to overcome American imperialism in seeking out a "third bloc", separate from the American Empire and Soviet communism. Canada had the potential of acting as a marginal entity because it existed on the periphery of the United States. It could therefore produce, in Innisian terminology, a monopoly of knowledge to counter that of the two main power blocs. Canada, Innis added, further benefited from its ties to Europe and Great Britain, areas that were, like Canada, peripheral to the American Empire, yet had come under the increasing threat of American domination. Historical cultural-political connections could allay the effects of burgeoning cultural realities. "The future of the West depends on the cultural tenacity of

Europe”, Innis concluded, in characteristic dramatic terms. “Canada must call in the Old World to redress the balance of the New, and hope that Great Britain will escape American imperialism as successfully as she herself has escaped British imperialism”.²¹⁰

In censuring American imperialism, Innis advanced ideas on the dangers of cultural dependency that resembled those put forth by the Massey commissioners. In *The Strategy of Culture* (1952), “A Footnote to the Massey Report”, Innis showed how Canadians were in a death struggle to preserve their culture amid the “pernicious influence of American advertising” and the “omnipotence of American commercialism”.²¹¹ Cultural continentalism, he suggested, threatened Canada both with the destruction of British cultural ties and the demise of cultural independence. Canadians were indeed “fighting for [their] lives”.²¹² Like the Massey commissioners, Innis beseeched Canadians to respond to American imperial incursions. Specifically, he advocated an “energetic programme” designed to offset “dangers to [Canada’s] national existence”. He applauded such national cultural efforts as the establishment of the National Film Board “to weaken the pressure of American films” and the efforts of universities and other educational and cultural organizations to advance Canadian culture.²¹³ He praised the “appointment and report” of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences. The Massey Commission was vital to the cultural life of Canada because it gave voice to cultural concerns and it strengthened the position of cultural institutions.²¹⁴ Above all, Innis lauded government broadcasting policies that were intended to mitigate the influences of American radio and television programming. One of the very few tools available to Canadians, he claimed, was a nationalized system of communication. “By attempting constructive efforts to explore the cultural possibilities of various media of communication, and to develop them along the lines free from commercialism, Canadians might be able to make a contribution to the cultural life of the United States ...” and, perhaps, to that of the world at large.²¹⁵ To put the matter in Innis’s theoretical parlance, to escape the pervasive influence of advertising, popular culture, and the electronic media not only implied the avoidance of the modern, “American” monopoly of knowledge, but it also implied an opportunity for cultural development. Only by deflecting American cultural imperialism could the Canadian identity survive and potentially flourish. Thus, for Innis, as for the Massey commissioners, the struggle for cultural autonomy in North America was the *sine qua non* of Canadianism; it had become indispensable to the development of a distinct Canadian identity.

Innis’s close friend and fellow historian Donald Creighton was also preoccupied with Canada’s relations with the United States. By the late 1940s and early 1950s, Creighton, like Innis, worried that Canada was awash in an enlarging sea of American

imperialism. In an age of close military and diplomatic ties with the United States, Canadian foreign policy was the focal point of his critique. Since the Ogdensburg agreement of 1940 and the establishment of the Permanent Joint Board of Defense, Canada had increasingly succumbed to continentalist pressures and had evolved American-oriented defensive and foreign policies.²¹⁶ Its deference to American foreign policy decisions increased under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and during the Korean War. Canada, in consequence, was in danger of becoming a mere colony of the Americans, “a kind of northern ‘banana republic’”.²¹⁷ “In the north”, Creighton wrote to emphasize American defensive supremacy in Canada, “Americans build and man our radar installations ...; in the east ... they hold and occupy military bases. The foreigner sits firmly astride the eastern approaches to our country; and the base, a primitive form of military imperialism, grimly questions Canada’s claim to control her own destiny”.²¹⁸

Like Innis, Creighton implored Canadians to find an alternative to this acquiescent relationship. “Good relations with the United States must continue to be an important objective of our foreign policy,” he stated in 1953, “but good Canadian-American relations will not necessarily enable Canada make its own contribution to the solution of the world’s crisis, and may actually prevent it from doing so”.²¹⁹ Canada, he added, had “outgrown North American solidarity as an end in itself”.²²⁰ Again like Innis, he urged Canadians not only to evade the perils of the American connection, but also to steer a course between communism and American imperialism, avoiding the shoals of either revolutionary system. Autonomy in foreign policy meant for Creighton that Canada should accept and seek accommodation with communist regimes, while, at the same time, working with NATO, the Commonwealth, and the United Nations.²²¹ Canada, in brief, had to counterbalance its continentalist orientation with an external policy that both recognized the destructive character of the power blocs and worked towards the unification of cultures and ideologies.

To overcome a shortsighted external policy Creighton urged Canadians to look to the past for guidance. Only through a better understanding of Canadian history and a renewal of the principles that guided past leaders could continentalism be identified and defeated. Specifically, Creighton saw the nation-building and foreign policies of John A. Macdonald as having a resounding relevance, especially for Canadians of the 1950s.²²² For Creighton, Macdonald realized the threats of continentalism to Canadian sovereignty that manifested themselves once again in the postwar period. His basic objective was to establish a transcontinental nation which would have an autonomous existence in North America. “His fundamental aim”, Creighton continued, “was to protect Canada from the dangers of continentalism; and it is the dangers of continentalism, economic, political, military, which now seem to be pressing in upon us steadily and from every side”.²²³

Creighton hoped for the resurrection of the spirit, if not the substance, of Macdonald's approach to Canadian-American relations. He hoped that Canadians would understand that Canadian autonomy implied not merely a separation from Great Britain, but, most importantly, independence in North America. Above all, Macdonald's approach would demonstrate the "essential character" of Canada, a country that had gained independence from the British peacefully, and that continued to derive strength from its traditional affiliations with Britain and the Empire-Commonwealth. Ultimately, Macdonald's work had shown that "for a whole generation Canada had been fighting the wrong kind of imperialism".²²⁴ As Innis had argued previously, Canada's struggle for distinctiveness was in reality, for Creighton, a struggle for survival on the North American continent.

Reflecting the travails of the Cold War and concerns about continentalism and American imperialism, Creighton's musings on postwar Canada also reflected a deeper desire to contribute to a still-evolving sense of nationality. Even as late as the mid-1950s, Canada, for Creighton, as for others, was in a state of becoming. Canadians stood in the mid-twentieth century where they had a half-century earlier. Materially, the postwar boom in minerals, petroleum, and other natural resources paralleled the prosperity of the Laurier wheat boom. And Creighton queried how these resources should best be used. "Upon what national plan should [Canada] try to develop this second huge bounty of good fortune?", he asked.²²⁵ More fundamentally, Creighton realized that Canada was at a cross-roads not only because of burgeoning continentalism but also because it was struggling to find its own identity. Unsure of itself, its character, and the principles that should underpin its future development, Canada, for Creighton, was a nation in danger of drift. Recently emergent into nationhood, yet threatened by continentalist colonialism, it was indeed a "young country" "clamouring for interpretation".²²⁶

Recognizing the nation's plight, Creighton set about explaining the Canadian psyche. Characteristically, he turned to history for answers. Canada, Creighton taught, had developed in contradistinction to its geographical proximity to the United States. Historically, Canada was different from the United States. It lacked a revolutionary tradition and tried to remain entirely separate from America culturally as well as politically. "British North America had sought to achieve a distinct and separate political existence in the Western hemisphere", Creighton declared in 1957; "she had tried to preserve her identity against the leveling, standardizing impact of American continentalism."²²⁷ The British connection was key to Canada's struggles, moreover. Only through "the maintenance of her vital connection with Europe", Creighton averred, could Canada succeed in this effort.²²⁸ Initially, after 1867, Canada relied on Britain for military and diplomatic support. By the late nineteenth century, she depended on intangible cultural and

spiritual connections to the Empire. The Anglo-Canadian alliance served Canadians just as well after Confederation as it had before 1867. It enabled Canada to develop on an autonomous course, for it forestalled the ever-present sway of American continentalism. It had helped to achieve the singular great goal of the Canadian nation: the maintenance of a separate political and cultural existence in North America. "For Canada", Creighton concluded, "the imperial connection was not a parent-child relationship which ended in an appalling row, but an adult partnership which was prolonged more at the instance of the junior than of the senior partner".²²⁹

Far from being a historical process remote in time and contemporary relevance, Creighton wanted to show Canadians the enduring pertinence of the Canadian identity. The postwar age was, for Creighton, not only a period of growing American influence, but it was also an era in which policy makers, intellectuals, and many Canadians at large had lost an understanding of the true nature of Canada. This trend towards the sundering of the Canadian character was encapsulated in the "authorized version" or "Liberal Interpretation" of Canadian history, terms of derision Creighton used to refer to what he saw as Liberal apologists and Grit historians and their writings. According to the authorized version, Canadian history was not a struggle for autonomy on the continent, but instead an effort to gain independence from Great Britain. For historian Arthur Lower and others, Canada, as a nation, was defined in terms of the abandonment of British ties. As Creighton lamented, there was no recognition of the critical role that the Empire played in curbing American influence; most perniciously, there was no appreciation of the dangers of creeping continentalism. The necessary corollary of severing ties with Britain was, moreover, a growing affinity to the United States. The Liberal historians had simply replaced one brand of imperialism with another. Indeed, for Creighton, the authorized version had got it all wrong. It completely misconstrued the nature of the Canadian nationality. It denied Canada's fundamental links to the British Crown, and misunderstood Canada's evolution towards autonomy. As such, Creighton suggested, the Liberal view misrepresented Canada's relationship among the English-speaking peoples of the North Atlantic, denied Canada's traditions and heritage, and, ultimately, willfully mislead an entire generation of Canadians.²³⁰

Despite the discouraging vicissitudes of Canadian-American relations, Creighton and others remained sanguine about opportunities to interpret and define the Canadian identity. Creighton believed that a good many Canadians began to realize what Innis and he himself had recognized: the deleterious effects of American economic and military preponderance in Canada and North America generally. Amid the climate of political change of 1957-8,²³¹ a few even began to realize that Canadian "misconception[s] had

[their] origin[s] in a totally mistaken historical theory, the Liberal Interpretation, which misrepresented Canada's essential character, ignored her basic necessities, and altered the direction of her principal trend ..."²³² Indeed, Creighton took solace in the fact that the influence of the pernicious doctrine of Canadian history was coming to an end. Although Canada's "tribulations" were not over, the "delusions which created them [were] gone, and ... the authors of the delusions [were] no longer unquestioned oracles".²³³ "A definite epoch in the history of Canadian history [had] come to an end", he continued. "A new generation of professional historians [had] arisen", one that would have "more respect for the manifold facts of the Canadian experience".²³⁴ Freed from the fetters of Liberal myth-making, the work of defining the Canadian character and making the nation could proceed.

William Lewis Morton was one of the new generation of historians to whom Creighton referred. By the late 1950s, Morton's conception of the Canadian character reflected many of Creighton's biases. Morton agreed with Creighton that the Liberals, especially Mackenzie King and O.D. Skelton, had destroyed Canada's relationship with the Empire-Commonwealth. Canada's position in the North Atlantic triangle had been "so irradiated by the American presence", Morton wrote, employing graphic imagery, "that it sickens and threatens to dissolve into a cancerous slime".²³⁵ In response to this deplorable state of affairs, Morton urged the resurrection of the imperial connection. Like Creighton and Innis some time before, Morton considered the association with Great Britain vital to Canada's effort not only to define a national identity, but also to defend Canadian autonomy. He emphasized that ties to Britain allowed Canada to be distinct from America and, therefore, to maintain a separate national existence in North America. Politically, Canada derived its distinctiveness from its monarchist inheritance. For Morton, the monarchy provided the checks and balances necessary to avoid the inadequacies of Jacksonian democracy and to afford, moreover, a more advanced conception of political freedom. Whereas republicanism tended to level citizens, to individualize and free them, Morton argued, it bound them nonetheless through "social conformity" and "an inherent social intolerance".²³⁶ In ensuring that legal sovereignty rested on foundations independent of the results of the last election", the monarchy ensured that "however political sovereignty might be diffused through the electorate", "the last essential of government, the maintenance of peace and order, would be independent of popular impulse".²³⁷ To Morton, there were higher principles to which the monarchical system aspired -- namely, peace, order and good government -- which were not necessarily guaranteed by the republican system. From these political precepts Canada ultimately derived its political liberty.²³⁸ For Morton, as for Creighton, in brief, Canada's freedom emerged because of, not in spite of, colonial ties.

Owing to Canada's political traditions -- "freedom through evolution in allegiance", not "revolutionary compact" -- the nation was in a state of evolution. Canada, Morton explained, sprang forth from harsh geographical and climatical conditions, in accordance to French traditions, "nourished by British freedom", and "fortified by American experience".²³⁹ Yet, unlike the Republic, its destiny was still to be worked out. The Canadian experience was different from the American in that it was a "Burkean partnership of the generations". Instead of a revolutionary compact on which to build a sense of liberty, Canadian society depended on "the historical and objective reality of law personified by the monarchy and modified as need arises by the Crown in Parliament".²⁴⁰

Based on these few important political principles, Morton observed, Canada was ever-developing, ever in search of fulfilling its destiny.²⁴¹ This basic fact was true even in the postwar age, an era during which globalization threatened Canada's future. Indeed, in response to continentalism, Morton implored Canadians to rediscover their political traditions and to extend them to current relations with the United States. Canadians, he argued, "must bring to the working out of the American alliance the same persistence in freedom and the same stubborn ingenuity" that gave genesis to the nation's free institutions and characterized the free association of Canadian culture.²⁴² Ultimately, he advised Canadians to build on the sense of identity and purpose established through the long association with Great Britain. Although the national destiny was as yet undetermined, Canadians could help ensure the future of their nation by remaining true to their traditions and inheritances. Like Creighton, then, Morton looked to the past not only as a source of national identity,²⁴³ but also as a beacon to guide Canada past the numerous perils of the second half of the twentieth century.

For Creighton, Morton, and others of the new breed of historians,²⁴⁴ thus, conserving traditions and learning the lessons of history were critical both to defining Canada's cultural identity and to contributing to the future of the nation. Contextually, the work of these intellectuals developed in relation to a changed political milieu; the reaction against American imperialism (in all forms) was certainly strengthened by the development of postwar political conservatism. Morton and the others also extended the work of the Massey commissioners. Their historical writings and nationalist myth-making responded not only to the menace of Americanization, but also constituted, like the Massey Report, a corpus of writings that provided insight into Canada's nature as a nation and civilization. Just as importantly, their writings were concerned with building "spiritual" (cultural) structures that seemed to be losing ground to materialism. Canada, by the late 1950s, was rapidly modernizing. The country's gross national product had grown from almost twenty-five billion dollars in 1954 to over thirty-one billion dollars just three years later.²⁴⁵ With

the tremendous surge in new wealth arose once more the issue of the country's cultural progress. Would Canadians parlay their increased prosperity and leisure time into cultural activities and "cultural nation-building" as the culture critics had hoped, or would they ignore cultural issues and focus instead on material advancement? The attitudes of the Massey commissioners, the historians, and other culture critics, had been abundantly clear on this point. Of course, they all believed that the development of cultural forms -- structural, intellectual, or otherwise -- to be vital to the progress of the nation. This objective underpinned the Massey Commission and was the implicit purpose of the writings of Morton, Creighton, and other conservative cultural nationalists. The federal government's position, by contrast, was uncertain. Despite the positive initial reaction to the Massey Report, the Liberal government delayed in implementing almost all of the Commission's recommendations. Pipelines, highways, seaways, and economic nation-building took precedence over cultural developments. The government's attitude towards culture seemed ambivalent at best.

Only by late 1956 did government policy on culture seem to leap forward. In an address to the National Conference on Higher Education entitled "Cultural Progress in Canada", Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent announced his decision to recommend to Parliament the creation of the Canada Council. The Council was to help administer grants and scholarships in the fields of the arts, humanities, and social sciences, to foster Canada's cultural relations abroad, and to establish a national commission in conjunction with UNESCO. Just as significantly, however, St. Laurent discussed his government's newfound commitment to cultural advancement in reference to the broader scheme of nation-building. "In the cultural field", he noted, Canadian development was "much slower than in the economic field". Like other modern nations, Canada had become preoccupied with material and technological growth. It had subordinated spiritual development to economic advancement. Echoing the deeply-held sentiments of the culture critics, St. Laurent advised that Canadians redress the balance. The time had arrived, he declared, for national development "to parallel what has taken place in the economic field ..."²⁴⁶ In achievement of this important goal, Canadians must foster the development of cultural institutions both at home and abroad. Canada, St. Laurent advised, ought to become a source of culture, of spirit, and a haven for a world that was in need of cultural regeneration. "With that purpose in mind", he concluded, "[Canadians] must further develop and enrich our national soul; [they] must achieve ... that broader outlook and that deeper insight into the things of mind which will enable them better to deal with problems of the present ..."²⁴⁷ Not only was spiritual growth as important to national development as material advancement, cultural edification allowed the insight to identify and, ultimately,

to come to terms with the problems of modern society. Culture, in the Prime Minister's view, was the very lifeblood of the modern Canadian nation.

Despite the Prime Minister's assurances to the contrary, doubts remained as to whether culture had really become a national priority.²⁴⁸ St. Laurent and the Liberals' became enthused about the Canada Council only on the eve of a general election and only when a windfall of several million dollars became available to the federal government.²⁴⁹ Without political pressures and financial resources, it is doubtful whether St. Laurent would have made his pro-culture speech at all. Whatever the motives of the Liberal government, the creation of the Canada Council nonetheless was highly significant both to the culture critics and in objective terms. Culturally speaking, the Council was of great symbolic as well as practical importance. Financially, it had been a "revolutionary departure" in Canadian intellectual life. Through the Council, intellectuals and artists received the state support for which they had longed for decades.²⁵⁰ The establishment of the Council was important to critics, moreover, because it brought the issues raised by the Massey Commission into sharp focus.²⁵¹ No longer was culture the concern of a few out of touch professors or longhaired artists. Through the Canada Council, culture was to become a matter of national concern. Indeed, through the federal government, the culture critics believed that they had achieved a major triumph. They could now use the state to further the ends of culture and promote the development of Canada's spiritual life.²⁵² After a long wait, it seemed as though Canada's cultural progress might indeed keep pace with material development.

Significantly, the Canada Council had achieved what the culture critics had wanted. It presided over a good percentage of viable projects, and there can be no doubt that it succeeded in its mandate -- to "foster and promote the study and enjoyment of, and the production of works in[,] the arts, humanities and social sciences". Through the remainder of the decade and throughout the 1960s, the Council played a large role in the country's growth in the arts, academic developments, and the persistence of such cultural institutions as the National Ballet.²⁵³

Despite these triumphs, however, the concerns of the culture critics were not allayed. By the late 1950s, the second stage of the Cold War had come into effect. The period, initiated by the flight of Sputnik in 1957, was one that emphasized global competition in which "all the prizes went to the most prosperous country and the most sophisticated weapons system ..."²⁵⁴ Winning the arms race meant gaining the crucial advantage in the Cold War. Accomplishing this feat, meant that North Americans had to place even greater emphasis on the advancement of science and technology. Education, as indicated in the last chapter, was essential to this objective. Indeed, the production of

engineers, scientists and technically educated workers -- not the establishment of theatre companies or the endowment of scholars -- was critical to the well-being of the nation. The Canada Council was certainly a significant accomplishment. In the rarefied atmosphere of the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, it could not compete with the exigencies of modern warfare and the rhetoric of Cold War politicians. Guns and technology, not culture, had captivated the public's imagination.

Sensitive to Cold War propaganda, culture critics denounced what they considered one of its most pernicious products: the acceleration of the technological imperative. George Parkin Grant, as we noted in chapter two, was a vociferous critic of the "technological society". He acknowledged the impact of the nuclear arms race on the attitudes towards technology of North Americans. "It is only necessary to see how rocked our society was when the Russians got that piece of metal up into the sky", he declared in 1959. "They had beaten us at our own game [the advancement of technique] -- a game that we consider important". In response to this deplorable set of circumstances, he continued, business and military leaders cried for tougher "history makers". Those individuals were charged with the responsibility to build more efficient weapons of mass destruction and to develop the technology to defeat the Soviets. "It is of supreme importance that we beat the Russians to the moon".²⁵⁵ Grant realized, however, that the North American "will to technique" was not a recent phenomenon, a mere product of the ideological and imperialist rivalries of the Cold War. Rather, for Grant, the technological imperative characterized the entirety of the modern history of the west, and of North America in particular. The arms race simply gave emphasis to what had existed all along -- the development of the scientific society. Although it seemed as if the Soviets had "caught up with and in certain fields surpassed" North American society, Grant claimed, "modern scientific civilization has been most extensively realized in North America".²⁵⁶ What is more, this scientific culture entailed far more than the use of advanced machinery and the existence of a large corpus of technically educated individuals. It implied, on the contrary, an entire culture entranced and indeed dominated by the will to technique. Above all it led to the emergence of a conformist civilization, devoid of independent thought or individuality. "Ours is a world of mass production and its techniques", Grant explained, "of standardized consumption and standardized education, of wholesale entertainment and almost wholesale medicine. We are formed by this new environment at all the moments of our work and leisure -- that is, our total lives".²⁵⁷ As Grant would later remark, Canadian society in North America had evolved into the "universal and homogeneous state".²⁵⁸

Grant's message was thus not only that technology had come to predominate in the contemporary world, but also that technique had gravely affected western culture. Seduced

by the glories of “big department store civilization”, Grant argued, moderns lost interest in important philosophical concerns. Instead of contemplating the true effect of science and technology on the modern world, they were content to live a life of material fulfillment and increase their wealth and power through technique. Homogenization -- the greatest effect of the will to technique -- stymied cultural creativity and impaired the expression of individuality. So great was the “power that society can exert against the individual”, Grant asserted, “that it even subjects to dominance those very elites that seem to rule”.²⁵⁹ Few escaped the conformity of mass culture for Grant. Moderns, indeed, had little hope of comprehending what was happening to them because they were so bound up in the increasingly enfeebling milieu that was developing around them. Modern society, according to Grant, was beginning to lose a sense of itself, and, in consequence, was heading towards disintegration.

Nowhere was cultural homogenization more evident than in the emergence of the American Empire. And nowhere were the effects more perilous for the Canadian culture. Grant interchanged “Americanization” with modernization, homogenization, and the mass society. He blamed Canada’s demise as a “local culture”, moreover, on the rise of the American cultural monolith. American culture had penetrated Canada through the “movies, the newspapers, and television, through commercialized recreation and popular advertising”. The media “described and exalted” American life, “which is so perfectly adjusted to the world of life insurance, teen-age dating, and the supermarket ... Here is the way all decent Americans live and here is the way that all mankind should live ...”²⁶⁰ In this climate of mass communications, conformism, and consumer values, Canadians were losing their sense of distinctiveness and were becoming a part of an all-encompassing American value system, all in an attempt to modernize. Modernization, Grant concluded, entailed the demise of the Canadian nation. “Our culture floundered on the aspirations of the age of progress”, he announced, explaining Canada’s “three-step” cultural decline.

First, men everywhere move ineluctably toward membership in a homogeneous state. Second, Canadians live next to a society that is the heart of modernity. Third, nearly all Canadians think that modernity is good, so nothing essentially distinguishes Canadians from Americans. When they oblate themselves before ‘the American way of life,’ they offer themselves on the alter of the reigning western goddess.²⁶¹

Like the Massey commissioners, Morton, Creighton, and the other nationalist culture critics, then, Grant drew attention to the ruinous effects of American culture. Unlike these critics, however, Grant saw little hope for Canadians to overcome Americanization. The “technological society” was inimical to cultural development; it was an inexorable process

that destroyed the values on which the Canadian nation had been built. Modernization had become a *fait accompli* by the mid-1960s. Canadians, even if they tried, would have difficulty resisting its lure. Thus, for Grant, the Canada of the postwar age was to be lamented, for, by the mid-1960s, it was, as a nation, already dead.²⁶²

Although not as pessimistic as Grant, Northrop Frye echoed the philosopher's concerns about technological modernization. Frye, like Grant, saw the technological imperative and the "progress myth" as central to the modern societal quagmire. Progress, for Frye, was a constant unveiling of the individual and communitarian identity. It was, in a word, the progressive uncovering of truth. In the technological age, however, progress had been misapprehended and had become increasingly bound up in the destruction of the human identity. A progress myth emerged, according to Frye, based on the notion that progress involved material and technical advancement. Spiritual and intellectual developments, in the modern system, were secondary to material growth. Ultimately crowding out the world of the intellect and the spirit, the myth of technological progress became all-pervasive. Frye used the educational experience of modern students further to illustrate his points. Educational institutions, he claimed, performed a conflicting role in the social development of modern individuals. While enabling an understanding of where the student fit in society, they also were increasingly preoccupied with conditioning moderns to cope with the demands of modern society. On the one side of the student existed "the ordinary social environment, the world of his television set, his movies, the family car, advertising, entertainment, news and gossip. On the other side," Frye asserted, was "the school, and perhaps the church, trying to dislodge him from this lotus land and prod him into further voyages of discovery. On the one side of him," he went on, was "a difficult theoretical world of art and science, the principles of which he has not begun to understand; on the other side [was] a fascinating world of technology and rhetoric, which he can already handle with some competence, and in which he must live in any case ... As a rule, therefore, the world of technology and rhetoric [won] out ..."²⁶³

The will to technique thus interfered with the capacity of individuals to think broadly and instead seduced moderns into living in an intellectually impoverished environment of convenience and gadgetry. For Frye, the restrictive effects of the "technological consciousness" on the modern mind were most disquieting. The technological imperative was at odds with the creative or "educated" imagination, the very lifeblood of any culture, for it inhibited the expression of cultural creativity both at the individual and societal levels. Nowhere was this distressing reality more apparent than in the world of the arts. The "arts reflect the world that produces them", Frye declared in 1961. Ironically, the modern arts represented a society that had become hostile to the spirit

that underpinned the creative process. "Painting, music and architecture", Frye explained, "not less than literature, reflect an anonymous and cold-blooded society, a society without much respect for personality and without much tolerance for difference in opinion, a society full of slickness, smugness and spiritual inanity".²⁶⁴ Thus, the modern arts reflected a society bent on the destruction of the western imagination.

In analyzing Frye's view of the demise of the west, the decline of the "educated imagination" is critical. Society's fundamental problem was that increasingly, it failed to provide the conditions conducive to creative activity, the "depowered site where 'the poets can be heard'."²⁶⁵ As Frye later explained, modern civilization suffered the ill effects of an imbalance between the "myth of concern" -- the "conservative myth" on which the traditions and customs of society relied -- and the "myth of freedom".²⁶⁶ A myth of concern, dealing with science and technology and a gradualist, progressive mythology that surrounded it, characterized the twentieth century. It was growing so large and unwieldy, according to Frye, that it threatened the existence of the myth of freedom. The technological myth so blunted perceptions of the world that moderns ignored the impacts of the modern mythology. The perception of "the world out there", Frye wrote, became "habitual", and "hence a pernicious mental habit develop[ed] of regarding the unchanging as the unchangeable, and of assimilating human life to a conception of a predictable order".²⁶⁷ Inured to the technological society, moderns ignored the creative sides of their psyches. Most lamentably, they disregarded their creative abilities and hence lost their power to alter their environment, for the "imagination is the source of power to change ... society".²⁶⁸ Of all the deleterious effects of the technological order the harshest, for Frye, was that the contemporary myth of concern had become so entrenched that it had become extremely difficult to supplant.

Although hopeful that the technological mythology might be defeated, Frye was greatly impressed by the pervasiveness of the modern myth of concern.²⁶⁹ And while expressing general concern about the sway of the technological imperative, he was especially preoccupied with the "onslaught of the myth of concern" on the Canadian mindset. Canadians' relationship with the natural environment is vital here. Canadians, Frye claimed, had come to dominate nature. In Canada, there had been "little adaptation to nature: in both architecture and arrangement Canadian cities and villages express rather an arrogant abstraction, the conquest of nature by an intelligence that does not understand it".²⁷⁰ Expressed through literature, Frye showed how the Canadian imagination developed an awkward, even strained relationship with nature. The Canadian imagination, Frye wrote, developed in "small and isolated communities surrounded with a physical and psychological 'frontier', separated from one another and from their American and British

cultural sources ...” Strongholds of human values and laws, these communities were “confronted with a huge, unthinking, menacing, and formidable physical setting”. Such communities, Frye concluded, employing his most famous phrase, were “bound to develop ... a garrison mentality”.²⁷¹

Canadians organized into a “closely knit” societies, Frye continued, to develop the moral and social values necessary to cope with their foreboding surroundings. Yet, such communities, he hastened to add, were hostile to the development of the Canadian culture. In providing the safety of the group, security from individuality and distinctiveness, they were the embodiments of the “herd mind”, which stymied toleration and dissent and therefore killed the intellectual environment that the creative imagination required to grow. Indeed, they furnished the solitude of mind in which condition “nothing original can grow”.²⁷² With the spread of garrisons, the results of hostile relations with nature, “something anti-cultural comes into Canadian life”. The alienation from nature reflected, for Frye, the separation from the imaginative process. Garrisons deprived the freedom inherent to individualism, and hence the creativity of individual thought. The chief battle in North American society -- the struggle between “the domination of the individual by the technological materialism which has led to the conquering of space, and the attempt to order an inner space in the individual through the power of the imaginative vision” -- was being won by materialist forces.²⁷³ It seemed to Frye that the technological imperative had undermined the world of the poet and the artist, leaving little opportunity for the creative process to develop. Although culture was the ultimate authority in society, it was impotent, according to Frye, to assert its supremacy in a civilization that shunned it. In culture’s battle against the philistines the Canadian garrison proved unyielding indeed.

“The mood in which Canadians reached and passed the mid-point of the 1960s was troubled, disillusioned, and baffled”, Donald Creighton wrote in 1970, looking back on the latter stages of “Canada’s century”.²⁷⁴ For Creighton, as for Frye and Grant, Canada had languished as a cultural entity owing chiefly to the growth of the heretical notion of progress. Creighton agreed that the “rapid growth of industrialism and urbanism in Canada and the increasing dependence of the Canadian people [would] gradually weaken and break down the native Canadian moral standards and cultural values, and undermine the inherited Canadian belief in an ordered and peaceful society and simple way of life”.²⁷⁵ Like Grant, he believed that the American civilization had been responsible for the pervasive materialist ethos of modern times. The Americans had abandoned “mythical and religious explanations for existence”, and had developed a religion of their own, founded on the belief that “progress is the only good in life, and that progress means the liberation of man

through the progressive conquest of nature by technology".²⁷⁶ The decline of Canada involved, for the culture critics, much more than poor policies and a wrongheaded allegiance to American imperialism. Canada's demise stemmed from the adoption of a modernist mindset and the acceptance of American values. Canadians had accepted the American credo of "continual economic growth". "To achieve economic growth", Creighton concluded, "they are prepared to sacrifice their independence, pillage their natural resources, contaminate their environment, and endure all the hideous evils of modern industrialization and urbanization. The American Empire is taking over the birthright of Canadians; and its imperial religion has taken over their minds".²⁷⁷

Creighton's pessimistic musings about Canada's bleak future were perhaps extremist, but they conveyed nonetheless the mood if not the substance of the culture critics by the late 1960s. For most, Canadians had failed to meet the challenges of the postwar era. The 1960s were the critical years in which the drama of Canadian destiny was played out. "The decade which began in 1961", W.L. Morton wrote, "tested every assumption of the Canadian identity and tried every fiber of the national body".²⁷⁸ Of the three great challenges to the national identity, including the growth of Quebec nationalism and the "end of Britain as the exemplar and inspiration of Canadian life", continentalism was for Morton by far the most dangerous. "American protection, investment, and friendship", he asserted, "carr[ied] with them a price, neither stated nor demanded but inevitable, of the complete Americanization of Canadian thought, government, and national purpose".²⁷⁹ To survive, Canadians must "reforge their unity" and repeat once again "the historic Canadian rejection of external control, imperial and continental ... putting forth limits on a continentalism ... which bade all too easily to become unlimited". If Canadians failed, and hence if the "frictions of the past decade continued and combined", Morton closed, "they might well destroy Canada".²⁸⁰

For Morton and the others, then, the cautious optimism of the 1950s had ended in Canada's centennial decade. Canada had endured the discouraging vicissitudes of the nation-building process, and had emerged after the nation-building era in a dire state. As a cultural entity, it had yielded to the attractions of the mass media and lowbrow culture. Failing to realize the stultifying effects of consumerism and cultural Americanization, Canadians allowed themselves to succumb to the lures of the technological society. The greatest objective of the Massey commissioners -- to build the spiritual identity of the nation on the basis of the Arnoldian ideal -- had disintegrated in a milieu increasingly hostile to order, stability, and beauty. A new age of Arnoldian anarchy was prevailing. In it, the battle against the philistines had been lost. For the cultural nationalists, Canada suffered the supreme indignity of losing a sense of its history, its tradition, and its destiny. The

Canadian identity had been challenged on all fronts. As an autonomous nation-state, and as a distinct cultural entity, Canada was a nation in decline. For the culture critics, the bitterest reality was that, while Canada showed enormous promise, the forces of modernity proved too strong to resist. Culturally, Canada had left behind its conservative inclinations and had been transformed into a modernist state.

The quest to formulate a Canadian cultural identity had thus ended in failure. Culture critics identified Canadian cultural poverty, and through instruments such as the Massey Commission, presented their findings to the Canadian public. Embroiled in other concerns, however, Canadians seemed largely to ignore the overtures of the high culturalists. With the triumph of the mass society and the will to technique, blandishments on the importance of high culture seemed quaintly anachronistic. And although the cultural nationalists succeeded in raising awareness concerning the inherently “tory” and anti-American identity of the Dominion, their efforts were largely limited to the cloistered environment of the Canadian intelligentsia. As we will discover in greater depth in the next chapter, the Canada of the ‘sixties had little sympathy for the tory interpretation of Canada. Rooted in the past, the strictures of tory scholars were anathema to an age embroiled in intense social and political change. Conservative cultural nationalism simply did not accord with the increasingly plural outlooks of Canadian politics and Canadians at large. Confronted by a modernized world-view, anti-modernists became more acutely aware of their own marginality. As Davies’s character lamented, Canada truly was a “hard country to live in”.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

¹W.H. Alexander, "The End of an Age", *University of Toronto Quarterly* v. 5 no. 2 (January 1946), 109

²Ibid., 111

³Ibid., 110-11

⁴Ibid., 112

⁵ Harold Innis, Marshall McLuhan, and George Grant also discussed the emergence of a technological imperative that characterized modern cultures in the west. See chapter 2.

⁶James S. Thomson, "The Unbinding of Prometheus" *University of Toronto Quarterly* v. 15 no. 1 (October 1945), 1

⁷Ibid., 2

⁸ibid., 1-2

⁹See also George Grant, "The Minds of Men in the Atomic Age" in H.D. Forbes ed., *Canadian Political Thought* (Toronto, 1985), 284-89.

¹⁰S. Basterfield, "The Influence of Science on the Cultural Outlook" *University of Toronto Quarterly* v. 23 no. 2 (January 1954), 179

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid., 180

¹³Ibid., 181-83

¹⁴Ibid., 184

¹⁵ibid.

¹⁶K. Rayski-Kietlitz, "The Canadian Cultural Pattern", *Dalhousie Review* v. 30 (1950-51), 173

¹⁷Ibid., 173

¹⁸Peter Viereck, "Two Aspects of Freedom" *Dalhousie Review* v. 32, no. 1 (Spring 1952), 4

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid., 12-14

²²John A. Irving, "Moral Standards in a Changing World" *Dalhousie Review* v. 24 (1949-50), 121

²³ibid.

²⁴Ibid., 124

²⁵Ibid., 122-23

²⁶Ibid., 124

²⁷Canadian Social Science Research Council, *Brief to the Canadian Government* (November, 1942) Donald Creighton Papers, Public Archives of Canada (PAC), v. 15, H.A. Innis, 1924-54, MG 31 D77. See also Harold Innis, Harold Innis, "A Plea for The University Tradition," *Dalhousie Review* 24 (1944), 303 for a discussion on the infiltration of government into politics. Here, Innis wrote: "Nothing has been more indicative of the decline in cultural life in Canada since the last war than the infiltration of politics in the Universities ..."

²⁸See Harold Innis, "Implications of the Interactions Between Values and Resource", unpublished paper, (2 October 1949), Harold Innis Papers (UTA) B72 - 0003, Box 20, file 33

²⁹H.A. Innis, "Minerva's Owl" in Harold Innis *The Bias of Communication*, (reprinted Toronto, 1973), 5

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid., 30-1.

³²Ibid., 31

³³Ibid., 33

³⁴See n. 99, chapter four.

³⁵Innis, *The Bias of Communication*, 34

³⁶Frank Underhill called Toynbee "the most fashionable historian of our day". Yet, he went on to denounce Toynbee and the latter's approach to history. See F.H. Underhill, "Arnold Toynbee, Metahistorian", *Canadian Historical Review* v. 32 no. 3 (September 1951), 201.

³⁷Ibid., 207; 202

³⁸Matthew Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy*, Samuel Lipman, ed. (New Haven, Connecticut, 1994), 166

³⁹Arthur Lower, "I Came Back and I am Content" *Maclean's* (1 July 1951); quoted in Welf H. Heick, ed. *History and Myth: Arthur Lower and the Making of Canadian Nationalism* (Vancouver, 1975),

101-02

⁴⁰Note that Davies make little attempt to ensure the historical veracity of his play. Sainte-Vaillier and not Laval was actually the Bishop of New France during the period in question. Davies substituted Laval for Sainte-Vaillier because he was a better known historical figure and was a more effect foil to Governor Frontenac. See Susan Stone-Blackburn. Robertson Davies, *Playwright: A Search for the Self on the Canadian Stage* (Vancouver, 1985), 12.

⁴¹Ibid., 13

⁴²Ibid., 14

⁴³Chemène is a Huron waif whom Frontenac had sent to Paris to be educated and trained as an actress. Purely the creation of Davies's imagination, she, along with Frontenac, are the chief proponents of cultural development.

⁴⁴Quoted in Stone-Blackburn, 14

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Robertson Davies, *Overlaid* in Robertson Davies, *Two Plays: At My Heart's Core and Overlaid* (Toronto, 1991), 106-7

⁴⁷Ibid., 113-14

⁴⁸Stone-Blackburn, 18

⁴⁹Ibid., 52

⁵⁰Rowlands, in Stone-Blackburn's words, "speaks despairingly of the twenty-five years he has spent trying to share with Canadian students 'the treasures of a great literature,' when only three among them all could recognize the wealth he offered, and these three have all left Canada for the US. 'God, how I have tried to love this country! ... How I have tried to forget the paradise of Wales and the quick wits of Oxford! I have given I all have to Canada - my love, then my hate, and now my bitter indifference. This raw, frost-bitten country has me wrung out, and its raw, frost-bitten people have numbed my heart.'" Quoted in *ibid.*, 55-6; see below.

⁵¹Quoted in *ibid.*

⁵²See Robertson Davies, *Four Favourite Plays* (Toronto, 1949), 20-22. Note that Nicholas endeavours to defend his contemplated move to the United States by describing the relative merits of the United States and Canada as cultural entities. He says (with considerable passion) to Rowlands in defense of his prospective homeland: the United States is a place where a "... high standard of living means something more than merely a high standard of eating --" "... [B]ehind all the commercialism and vulgarity, there is a promise, and there promise here, as yet, for men like me. I am not patient! But I am not unreasonable! I can live on a promise, but in a country where the questions that I ask meet only with blank incomprehension, and the yearnings that I feel find no understanding I know that I must go mad, or I must strangle my soul with my hands, or I must get out and try my luck in a country which has some use for me." *Ibid.*, 21

⁵³*Ibid.*, 95

⁵⁴*Ibid.*

⁵⁵*Ibid.* Heartened by Szabo's bravado, Nicholas also resolves to remain in Canada. "If you can stay in Canada, I can, too." *Ibid.*, 98.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*

⁵⁷It is beyond the scope of this chapter to outline the genesis of the Massey Commission. See Paul Litt's *The Muses, the Masses, and the Massey Commission* (Toronto, 1992) for a discussion of the commission's origins.

⁵⁸Vincent Massey, N.A.M. MacKenzie, Arthur Surveyor, Henri-Georges Lévesque, and Hilda Neatby were the commissioners in question. Neatby prepared most of the *Report*.

⁵⁹Brooke Claxton, the chief initiator of the commission, experienced this indifference first hand when his proposal for a commission on culture was rejected at the Liberal Convention of 1948. Later, he drew up a memorandum to Prime Minister Mackenzie King dated September 29, 1948 outlining the terms of reference of such an inquest and suggesting that Massey should be its head. King, who cared little for matters cultural, rejected Claxton's overtures. And although Claxton finally succeeded in having the commission called under the new Liberal government of Louis St. Laurent, St. Laurent told Pickersgill, a key advisor to King during the 1940s, that he was sceptical about "subsidizing 'ballet dancing'". See Bernard Ostry. *The Cultural Connection: An Essay on Culture and Government Policy in Canada* (Toronto, 1978), 56-7; Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and John English, *Canada Since 1945: Power, Politics and Provincialism* (Toronto; revised edition 1989), 154.

⁶⁰Canada's retarded cultural development was no doubt real. As stated in chapter four, however, the

Massey commissioners and others forming cultural “pressure groups” wanted to exaggerate Canada’s cultural deprivation so as to develop a popular opinion favourable to their goals of cultural advancement. Above all, they wanted to show that Canadian culture was at a critical juncture and that it could only be advanced through the aid of the government purse.

⁶¹Canada, Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, *Report* (Ottawa, 1951), 12

⁶²*Ibid.*

⁶³*Ibid.*, 12-13

⁶⁴Edward McCourt, “Canadian Letters”, *Royal Commission Studies: A Selection of Essays Prepared for the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences* (Ottawa, 1948), 67

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, 68

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, 69

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, 70

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, 73

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, 74

⁷⁰*Ibid.*

⁷¹Canada, *Report*, 10

⁷²Robertson Davies, “The Theatre”, *Royal Commission Studies: A Selection of Essays Prepared for the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences* (Ottawa, 1948), 371

⁷³*Ibid.*, 373

⁷⁴Malcolm Wallace, “The Humanities”, *Royal Commission Studies: A Selection of Essays Prepared for the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences* (Ottawa, 1948)

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, 114

⁷⁶George Grant, “‘Philosophy’ in Canada”, *Royal Commission Studies: A Selection of Essays Prepared for the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences* (Ottawa, 1948), 5. Chapter two contains a discussion of G.P. Grant’s “Philosophy”. The main thrust is Grant’s juxtaposition of the contemplative and the active, the philosophical and the scientific, and how, ultimately, Canadian society had come to favour the latter, “technological” values over their philosophic counterparts. See chapters two and four.

⁷⁷Note that Grant “loathed” the term “culture” or the appellation “cultural” courses. He did acknowledge the contemplative approach to life as the focal point of any civilization. “Culture”, for Grant, was therefore inextricably linked to continuous pursuit of a philosophical understanding of one’s environment. Philosophy was not merely a subject of theoretical enquiry, a topic to be forgotten once it had been taken out of the academic world. It was rather, “a way of life that all must strive for.”(2) See Grant to Mother, (n.d.) George Grant Papers (PAC) v. 39; Mrs. W.L. Grant Correspondence; file: Dalhousie University, MG 30 D59.

⁷⁸Hilda Neatby, “National History”, *Royal Commission Studies: A Selection of Essays Prepared for the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences* (Ottawa, 1948), 216

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, 215-16

⁸⁰*Ibid.*, 216

⁸¹See Litt, 53; 70-71; 76-77.

⁸²Canada, *Report*, 19

⁸³*Ibid.*, 20

⁸⁴*Ibid.*

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, 22

⁸⁶*ibid.*, 20

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, 40-41

⁸⁸Arthur Surveyor disagreed with the other commissioners on the CBC and broadcast policy generally. Accordingly, he wrote a dissenting report on the issue. See Litt, 216-20.

⁸⁹Canada, *Report*, 35

⁹⁰*Ibid.*

⁹¹*Ibid.*, 39

⁹²*Ibid.*, 42. George Grant lauded Neatby’s analyses. He wrote: “Your proposals about television and broadcasting seemed to this layman particularly intelligent and courageous”. George Grant to Hilda Neatby (17 June 1951) Hilda Neatby Papers (SAB) v. II. 36 (General Correspondence, 1949-51), A139. See

also Hilda Neatby, *Memorandum to Chairman on an Informal Investigation of T.V. Programmes Made in New York* (May 1949) Hilda Neatby Papers (SAB) II. 37, Memoranda to Chairman, 1949-1951, A139.

⁹³Canada, *Report*, 47. On this point, Harold Innis added: "The mass media of the twentieth century have entrenched materialism". The "subjection of individual minds to unification and standardization by mass media cannot lead to the reflection of other values than those that the people already have; materialism can only be a more general belief as a result of the actions of the press, motion pictures, radio and television. These media are interested in following public opinion because they must appeal to the largest common mass of the people in order to make their advertising effective ... Mass media and advertising have grown out of materialism and support the further existence of materialism ... [They] are not conscientious intelligences any more than are the values judgments of a society, and it is equally difficult in each case to imagine a way out of the dilemma which our demand for non-existing resources is creating". Innis, "Implications of the interactions between values and resources", 8-9. For a further discussion of intellectual conformity and mass culture, see below.

⁹⁴Neatby, *Memorandum to Chairman on an Informal Investigation of T.V. Programmes Made in New York*, 11

⁹⁵Canada, *Report*, 39

⁹⁶Ibid., 38

⁹⁷Ibid., 296

⁹⁸Ibid.

⁹⁹The commissioners were extremely careful in not touting culture during their country-wide tour (in 1949). They worried that they would alienate the people they encountered by introducing foreign elements into their lives. During the promotional tour, they were hasty to play up the nation-coming-of-age notion as a means to explain the need to expand cultural activities. All the while, in short, they maintained a sort of "low-brow pretense". See Litt, 65. Elsewhere, Vincent Massey demonstrated his willingness to achieve middle ground between the highbrow and lowbrow. In a 1948 address to business leaders on the ties of education to business, he characterized a "highbrow" as a "man whose education has outstripped his intelligence", and one who "does education no good".(2) He seems "to have forgotten the very simple purpose which education should serve ..."(2) Massey continues, arguing that this is "where the layman comes in". Indeed, the layman believes that education would benefit from "the closer attention of the average citizen to this all-important activity".(3) Clearly, Massey was playing to a non-academic audience. Again, he played up the importance of the "common man", although it is doubtful he truly believed what he was saying. See Vincent Massey, *Address by the right Honourable Vincent Massey before the Chamber of Commerce*, Hamilton Ontario, April 21, 1948, Vincent Massey Papers (UTA) 421(08), B87-0082

¹⁰⁰Canada, *Report*, 24

¹⁰¹See Litt, chapter six, "The Battle for the Airwaves", for more. Litt asserts that the commissioners' recommendations on media rested on their "perceptions of the electronic media as the primary means of informing and educating Canadian citizens". They wanted to make the CBC the single greatest agency for national unity, understanding and enlightenment'.(214) The commissioners supported their desire by arguing that there was a "demand ... that national radio be used as an instrument of education and culture came from every section of the country". Canada, *Report*, 36.

¹⁰²Litt, 85.

¹⁰³Quoted in *ibid.*, 88

¹⁰⁴Ibid., 86

¹⁰⁵Ibid.

¹⁰⁶Donald Creighton, "Education for Government: What can the humanities do for government?", unpublished paper (n.d.) Donald Creighton Papers (PAC) v. 15; Education for government, MG 31 D77, 9

¹⁰⁷Hilda Neatby to T.J. Allard (12 October 1954) Hilda Neatby Papers (SAB) VI. 175, *So Little for the Mind: General Correspondence, 1953-71* (5), A139, 2

¹⁰⁸Marshall McLuhan, *The Mechanical Bride: The Folklore of Industrial Man*. (Boston, 1951), 58

¹⁰⁹Ibid., 58-59

¹¹⁰Ibid., 94-97

¹¹¹Vincent Massey, "Christian Social Order in a Changing World" *Address to the Montreal Council on Christian Social Order, 5 November 1953*, draft copy, Hilda Neatby Papers (SAB) I.12 (Massey, Vincent, 1951-1969)(4), A 139, 4. See also Vincent Massey, "Christian Social Order in a Changing World" in Vincent Massey, *Speaking of Canada: Addresses by the Right Honourable Vincent*

Massey(Toronto, 1959).

¹¹²In a March 18, 1954 letter to Neatby, Massey asked Neatby's advice on the "Montreal Address". Massey wondered whether "the neglect of the individual and the preoccupation with the mass" would be irrelevant to his main arguments on the "new barbarism". Massey to Hilda Neatby (18 March 1953) Hilda Neatby Papers (SAB) I.12 Massey, Vincent, 1951-1969, (3), A 139. See Neatby's response below.

¹¹³Hilda Neatby to Vincent Massey (23 March 1953) Vincent Massey (UTA) 585(07), B87-0082

¹¹⁴Hilda Neatby. *A Temperate Dispute* (Toronto, 1954), 30

¹¹⁵Ibid., 30

¹¹⁶Ibid., 34

¹¹⁷Vincent Massey, "Some Lions in the Path", *Address to the Alumni of the Collège de Montreal, Wednesday 27 October, 1954*, draft copy, Hilda Neatby Papers (SAB) I.12 Massey, Vincent, 1951-1969, (5), A 139, 4. See also Vincent Massey, "Some Lions in the Path", in Vincent Massey, *Speaking of Canada*.

¹¹⁸Ibid.

¹¹⁹Neatby. *A Temperate Dispute*, 34

¹²⁰Massey, "Some Lions in the Path", 4

¹²¹Harold Innis. "The Church in Canada" in Daniel Drache, ed., *Staples, Markets, and Cultural Change: Selected Essays, Harold A. Innis* (Montreal, 1995), 459

¹²²Quoted in Campbell A. Ross, "The Neatby Debate and Conservative Thought in Canada", Ph.D. Thesis (University of Alberta, 1989), 147-48.

¹²³Hilda Neatby to Vincent Massey (23 March 1953) Hilda Neatby Papers (SAB) I.12 Massey, Vincent, 1951-1969, (3), A 139, 2-2a

¹²⁴Quoted in William Christian, *George Grant: A Biography* (Toronto, 1993), 45-6.

¹²⁵Brief of the Fiddlehead Poetry Society to the *Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences*; quoted in Litt, 89-90.

¹²⁶Ibid., 90

¹²⁷As Marshall McLuhan queried in 1951: "... Does 'freedom' mean the right to be and do exactly as everybody else? How much does this kind of uniformity depend on obeying the 'orders' of commercial suggestion? If it takes a lot of money to conform in this way, does conformity become an ideal to strive for?" McLuhan, *Mechanical Bride*, 117.

¹²⁸Neatby, *A Temperate Dispute*, 25

¹²⁹Ibid. Malcolm Wallace agreed implicitly with Neatby about the origins of democratic freedom. He also concurred that "group thinking" not only engendered the common conception of "true liberty", but it also hindered the pursuit of real democracy. "[H]ating and fearing Communism", he wrote in 1951, was "a sterile creed and [hence] inadequate to live by ..." Canadians should instead "decide to make [their] practice of Democracy correspond more closely to the noble [humanist] principles on which it was founded. [They] may then recover the initiative in the cold war ..., and find [themselves] committed to a constructive programme which will absorb all our energies ..." Malcolm M. Wallace, "The Present Status of the Humanities in Canada" *Royal Commission Studies: A Selection of Essays Prepared for the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences* (Ottawa, 1948), 118.

¹³⁰Massey, "Christian Social Order in a Changing World", 4

¹³¹Neatby. *A Temperate Dispute*, 25

¹³²Creighton, "Education for Government", 5

¹³³Vincent Massey, *Address by the Right Honourable V. Massey, C.H. to the Convocating Class, Convocation Hall, University of Toronto*, draft copy of an unpublished address (21 November 1947) Vincent Massey Papers (UTA) 421(08) B87-0082, 5

¹³⁴N.A.M. MacKenzie, Neatby's and Massey's colleague, also warned Canadians about the menace of mass society to liberal democracy. While Canadians appeared free from totalitarianism in the political sense, they were not free "from many of the challenges posed by the new techniques devised to influence and control the great masses of people ..." They were thus like their counterparts elsewhere in the world in that they were prone to the "development of standardization in all its phases" and hence subject to a different, more insidious variety of totalitarian control.(See Norman A. MacKenzie, "The Challenge to Education" in G.P. Gilmour, ed., *Canada's Tomorrow: Papers and Discussion Canada's Tomorrow Conference, Quebec City, November 1953* (Toronto, 1954), 161) Adjustment to the group, MacKenzie added, could not be equated to "democratic living". For, he continued, "one can have the most satisfactory adjustment to groups within the framework of the most deadly totalitarian systems. To be well adjusted to a maladjusted society is therefore not a democratic virtue but the road to democratic ruin."(Ibid., 176)

¹³⁵B.K. Sandwell, "Present Day Influences in Canadian Society", *Royal Commission Studies: A*

Selection of Essays Prepared for the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences (Ottawa, 1948), 6-7

¹³⁶Canada, *Report*, 18

¹³⁷*Ibid.*

¹³⁸Sandwell, "Present Day Influences in Canadian Society", 5

¹³⁹*Ibid.*, 6

¹⁴⁰*Ibid.*

¹⁴¹*ibid.*, 5-8

¹⁴²Quoted in Litt, 171.

¹⁴³Claude Bissell, *The Imperial Canadian: Vincent Massey in Office* (Toronto, 1986), 218

¹⁴⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵Vincent Massey, *Broadcast by the Right Honourable Vincent Massey for the Home Service of the BBC, 1 July 1951*, draft copy, Vincent Massey Papers (UTA) 424 (04) B87-0082, 4

¹⁴⁶As Bissell claims, Massey and the other commissioners did not deserve the charge of being "anti-American". Yet, while the commissioners attempted to be as objective as possible in their strictures on American influence, there can be no doubt of their opposition to the penetration into Canada of American culture. See Bissell, 218

¹⁴⁷George P. Grant, "The Teaching of Philosophy in English-Speaking Canada," draft copy, (24 October 1950), Hilda Neatby Papers, Saskatchewan Archives Board (SAB), II. 93; file: Grant, Professor G.P., "The Teaching of Philosophy in English-Speaking Canada", 28-9. Note that in the draft copy, Neatby highlighted this passage indicating that it should be quoted in the *Report*. The Report did indeed cite Grant's words.

¹⁴⁸*Ibid.*, 19-20a

¹⁴⁹*Ibid.*, 7. Note again that Neatby marked "Quote" on this passage.

¹⁵⁰Norman A. MacKenzie, "The Challenge to Education" in G.P. Gilmour, ed., *Canada's Tomorrow: Papers and Discussion Canada's Tomorrow Conference, Quebec City, November 1953* (Toronto, 1954), 171-72

¹⁵¹Canada, *Report*, 271

¹⁵²Neatby, *A Temperate Dispute*, 25. Submission to "providence and [the] love of God", for Neatby, enabled the individual to partake in the freedom inherent to the transcendent and therefore to escape the narrowness of modern society. See also Neatby to Massey (23 March 1953) Hilda Neatby Papers (SAB) 585(07) B87-0082.

¹⁵³Grant, "The Teaching of Philosophy in Canada", 7. Like Neatby, Grant advocated rationale contemplation combined with religious faith. Indeed, faith in the transcendent was, for Grant, the precondition on which the philosophic approach rested.

¹⁵⁴Massey, *Convocation Hall Address*, 6

¹⁵⁵Wallace, "The Present Status of the Humanities in Canada", 6

¹⁵⁶Watson Kirkconnell and A.S.P. Woodhouse *The Humanities in Canada* (Ottawa, 1947), 7

¹⁵⁷Neatby, *A Temperate Dispute*, vii

¹⁵⁸*Ibid.*, 25

¹⁵⁹Wallace, "The Present Status of the Humanities in Canada", 4

¹⁶⁰Kirkconnell and Woodhouse, 7

¹⁶¹Neatby, *A Temperate Dispute*, 38

¹⁶²Hilda Neatby, *So Little for the Mind*, (Toronto, 1953), 13

¹⁶³Neatby, *A Temperate Dispute*, 38

¹⁶⁴Vincent Massey, "The Crisis in Higher Education", *Address by Vincent Massey, C.H., at a meeting held under the auspices of the Synod of the Ecclesiastical Province of Canada*, draft copy (18 May 1949) Vincent Massey Papers (UTA) 392(05) B87-0082, 5

¹⁶⁵*Ibid.*, 6

¹⁶⁶Harold Innis, unpublished address [title unknown] (n.d.) Harold Innis Papers (UTA) Box 22, file 11, B72-0025, 7-8

¹⁶⁷Innis, "The Church in Canada", 461

¹⁶⁸Quoted in Michael Hayden, ed. *So Much to Do, So Little Time: The Writings of Hilda Neatby*. (Vancouver, 1983), 295

¹⁶⁹Hilda Neatby, "The Pragmatic Paradox: A Traditionalist Looks at Canadian Education", unpublished paper, draft copy, n.d. [1951?] Vincent Massey Papers (UTA) 409(16) B87-0082, 2; 9

¹⁷⁰Hilda Neatby, "Cultural Evolution", in G.P. Gilmour, ed., *Canada's Tomorrow: Papers and*

Discussion Canada's Tomorrow Conference, Quebec City, November 1953 (Toronto, 1954), 222

¹⁷¹*Ibid.*, 223. In the discussion that followed, Jean-C. Faladreau, Chairman of the Department of Sociology of Laval University, provided a powerful statement in support of Neatby's views. He declared: "The artist of the age of the atomic bomb, of the age of imperial totalitarianism ... cannot feed on the fatness of 'material encouragement', nor on the idealized memories of a Victorian childhood ... He must wrestle *alone* with Fate, through Hell and Purgatory. If he can, he must also remember that Paradise can be conquered by spiritual violence".(316-17)

¹⁷²Vincent Massey, *Address by the Right Honourable Vincent Massey before the Graduate Organization of the University of Toronto for Kingston and District*, unpublished address, draft copy, (23 April 1948) Vincent Massey Papers (UTA) 421(08) B87-0082, 5-6

¹⁷³*Ibid.*, 13

¹⁷⁴Massey, *Convocation Hall Address*, 8

¹⁷⁵Canada, *Report*, 167

¹⁷⁶See Vincent Massey, "Useful Knowledge", *Address at the Convocation of the University of Manitoba*, draft copy, Hilda Neatby Papers (SAB), I. 12, (Massey, Vincent, 1951-69)(2).

¹⁷⁷Arnold's name and famous phrase resound in the writings of the culture critics. Arnoldian thought was especially prominent in the Commission Report and in the work of Massey and Neatby.

¹⁷⁸Matthew Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy*, 47; 48-49

¹⁷⁹*Ibid.*, 48

¹⁸⁰*Ibid.*, 48-49

¹⁸¹*Ibid.*, 47

¹⁸²See Litt, 104

¹⁸³Canada, *Report*, 273

¹⁸⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁸⁶*Ibid.*, 293-95. The CBC needed \$3,000,000 over and above its \$7,500,000 annual income. The commissioners argued that shortfalls arising from production increases and other factors should come from the federal government.

¹⁸⁷*Ibid.*, 355

¹⁸⁸*Ibid.*, 381

¹⁸⁹*Ibid.*, 272

¹⁹⁰*Ibid.*, 382. Vincent Massey outlined the dire need for government funding of the arts, letters and sciences in his prior work, *On Being Canadian* (Toronto, 1948). The chapter on the "Threads of National Unity" served as a precursor to many of the recommendations on federal funding for culture. See 45-66. Also note the way that the commissioners attempted to shame the federal government into sympathizing with its proposals. Referring to the quasi-obsessive preoccupation of governments in military concerns and enlarging defence budgets, the Report asked: "Are not tanks more needed than Titian, bombs more important than Bach?"(274) The repost to the rhetorical question had become by now blatantly obvious to the observant reader. While "military defenses must be made secure", the commissioners argued, "cultural defenses equally demand national attention ..." (275) Indeed, cultural concerns constituted "spiritual weapons" and only on "spiritual strength" could lasting peace be secured. Canadians, for these reason, "must strengthened those permanent institution which give meaning to our unity and make [them] conscious of the best in [their] life .."(274)

¹⁹¹Litt, 104

¹⁹²Vincent Massey, *On Being Canadian*, 128. Canada could preserve its cultural traditions "[o]nly by reason of constant and unremitting effort, and back of this effort must be the awareness of [cultural] differences ..." Vincent Massey, "Foreign Policy Begins at Home", *Address by the Right Hon. Massey at MacDonal College*, draft copy (26 February 1947) Vincent Massey Papers (UTA) 421(09), B87-0082, 29. See also Massey, *On Being Canadian* .

¹⁹³*Ibid.*, 128

¹⁹⁴By culture, Massey meant not only "those concrete institutions, parliamentary and judicial which we have inherited, which are lasting things, but to those more intangible ways of thinking which we also have from Great Britain which will evaporate if we do not remain aware of them..."(Massey, "Foreign Policy Begins at Home", 29) He added that institutions of higher learning "should help keep Canada Canadian ..." This did not mean that they should promote jingoism, but rather that the university should "interpret and represent the spirit of our country in its highest sense and help us withstand those subtle forces which would lead to the erosion of our Canadianism." Vincent Massey, *Kingston Address*, 8.

¹⁹⁵Vincent Massey to Evelyn Wrench (21 May 1929) Vincent Massey Papers (UTA) 032(06) B87-0082

¹⁹⁶Vincent Massey, "Canadian Club Speech", at Niagara, draft copy (13 March 1953) Hilda Neatby Papers (SAB) I.12 Massey, Vincent, 1951-1969, (3)A 139, 4

¹⁹⁷*Ibid.*, 3. Massey added on the importance of British political values to the cultural life of the nation: "And it is true to say of all our leaders that the more profound their belief in Canada as a nation, the more insistent have they been in supporting the Crown and in developing its Canadian character" (*ibid.*, 2).

¹⁹⁸Quoted in Vincent Massey, *Kingston Address*, 4.

¹⁹⁹Massey, *Convocation Hall Address*, 2.

²⁰⁰Hugh MacLennan, *Two Solitudes*, (Toronto, 1945).

²⁰¹B.K. Sandwell, "Present Day Influences on Canadian Society", 2

²⁰²Massey, *On Being Canadian*, 20

²⁰³*Ibid.*, 21

²⁰⁴*Ibid.*, 20

²⁰⁵*Ibid.*

²⁰⁶Hilda Neatby to Reverend Georges-H. Lévesque (13 August 1953) Hilda Neatby Papers (SAB) I. 3 General Correspondence, 1914-75, (4), A139, 2

²⁰⁷See Litt, 112

²⁰⁸Canada, *Report*, 271

²⁰⁹Harold Innis, "Great Britain, the United States, and Canada", in Drache, 281; Harold Innis, *The Idea File*, William Christian, ed., Line 43, 16. See also A.R.M. Lower, *Colony to Nation* (Toronto, 1946)

²¹⁰Innis, "Great Britain, the United States, and Canada", 287-8. Innis was ultimately pessimistic about the outcome; he thought it unlikely that Canada would be able to effect this third bloc.

²¹¹Harold Innis, *The Strategy of Culture* (Toronto 1952), 1; 19

²¹²*Ibid.*, 19

²¹³*Ibid.*

²¹⁴Donald Creighton, *Harold Adams Innis: Portrait of a Scholar* (Toronto, 1957), 19

²¹⁵Innis, *The Strategy of Culture*, 20

²¹⁶Donald Creighton, "Doctrine and Interpretation of History, in Donald Creighton, *Towards the Discovery of Canada: Selected Essays* (Toronto, 1972), 40.

²¹⁷Donald Creighton, "Canada in the World" in G.P. Gilmour, ed., *Canada's Tomorrow: Papers and Discussion Canada's Tomorrow Conference, Quebec City, November 1953* (Toronto, 1954), 248

²¹⁸Quoted in Carl Berger, *The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writing since 1900*. Second edition (Toronto, 1986), 226-27.

²¹⁹Creighton, "Canada in the World", 248

²²⁰*Ibid.*, 249

²²¹Berger, 226. Note that Creighton stressed the importance of maintaining the British connection as a means of surviving amid the main power blocs of the Cold War era. While France might join Italy, divested of its great power status, he claimed that Great Britain would persist and "recover a good deal of its old authority". And while Great Britain and other potential leader-nations in Asia may be second-rate powers compared to the superpowers, especially the United States, they still may exerted "a secondary leadership of great importance". "It is in their company that Canada might aspire. She is not of their stature yet. But in fifty years time, how far away will she be from it? Power may become multiple again, and this would encourage the rise of new states to eminence. Power is at present dual -- the prerogative of the United States and this duality is prolonged and strengthened by the fact of the Cold War". See Donald Creighton, "Canada in the World", draft copy, [1953?], Donald Creighton Papers, (PAC) v. 11; "Canada in the World", MG 31 D77, 6.

²²²Berger, 221-22

²²³Quoted in *ibid.*, 227

²²⁴Donald Creighton, "Introduction" to Creighton, *Towards the Discovery of Canada*, 10. For Creighton, few Canadians had realized what Macdonald, Innis, and Creighton himself had understood: the inestimable dangers of American imperialism to Canada's national development.

²²⁵Donald Creighton, "Macdonald and the Anglo-Canadian Alliance" in Creighton, *Towards the Discovery of Canada*, 222

²²⁶Donald Creighton, "Towards the Discovery of Canada" in *ibid.*, 48

²²⁷Donald Creighton, "Doctrine and the Interpretation of History" in *ibid.*, 43

²²⁸*Ibid.*

²²⁹Ibid., 44

²³⁰See Creighton, *Towards the Discovery of Canada*

²³¹The Progressive Conservative party, under the leadership of John G. Diefenbaker, made a resurgence in this period. See chapter six.

²³²Creighton, "Introduction", *Towards the Discovery of Canada*

²³³Creighton, "Doctrine and the Interpretation of History", 45

²³⁴Ibid.

²³⁵Quoted in Berger, 252

²³⁶W.L. Morton, *The Canadian Identity*, second edition (Toronto, 1972), 106

²³⁷Ibid. According to Morton, Canada rejected both popular sovereignty and majoritarian democracy. Political loyalty, in consequence, rested with the Crown, not with the state as an expression of the popular will. Canadians were loyal to the monarch and hence did not have to conform politically. Because they did not foster conformist impulses, monarchical institutions were central to a pluralist and, ultimately, a free society .

²³⁸See W.L. Morton, "Canadian Conservatism Now", in Forbes, 303-05

²³⁹Morton, *The Canadian Identity*, 86

²⁴⁰Ibid.

²⁴¹Ibid. Those monarchical principles already express along with the "moral precept" that "societies may in free association, by careful definition and great patience, make mutual accommodations of sovereignty without loss of independence".(87) Morton here was referring to Canada bicultural circumstances and the accommodation of French- and English-speaking Canadians. For Morton, the Canadian experience was sort of an analog of the Commonwealth experience in that there is a free association in self-government among both the two founding peoples of Canada and the members of the Commonwealth. "[The Commonwealth spirit] was the work of Canadians of both the major stocks, it is the outward expression of our domestic institutions, and its spirit informs Canadians of all other origins with an equal pride in free institutions elaborated by the Canadian political genius".(112-3)

²⁴²Ibid., 113

²⁴³Morton singled out other elements that both differentiated Canada from the United States and that were important to the Canadian identity. Canada's northern character, for instance, formed a significant part of the Canadian identity. Neither a "a second-rate United States" nor "a United States that has failed", Canada was "separate and distinct in America" because its history was marked by "a distinct and even a unique human endeavour, the civilization of the northern and arctic lands."(ibid., 93) Its "separate origin in the northern frontier", Morton went on, meant that "Canadian life to this day is marked by a northern quality, the strong seasonal rhythm which still governs even academic sessions The line which marks off the frontier from the farmstead, the wilderness from the baseland, the hinterland from the metropolis, runs through every Canadian psyche".(ibid.)

²⁴⁴See Roger Graham, *Arthur Meighen: A Biography* (Toronto, 1960) and John Farthing, *Freedom Wears a Crown*, Judith Robinson, ed., (Toronto, 1957) as other examples of conservative historians. Much more is said on conservative views of the nation and Canadian history in the next chapter.

²⁴⁵Bernard Ostry. *The Cultural Connection*, 73

²⁴⁶Louis St. Laurent, *Address by the Prime Minister the Right Honourable Louis St. Laurent to the National Conference on Higher Learning* (12 November 1956) Vincent Massey Papers (UTA) 370(14) B87-0082, 2. See also C.T. Bissell, ed. *Canada Crisis in Higher Education*. 'Proceedings of the Conference Held by the National Conference of Canadian Universities a Ottawa November 12-14. (Toronto, 1957).

²⁴⁷Ibid., 17

²⁴⁸Clearly, St. Laurent catered his address to his audience of humanists and humanist sympathizers. Furthermore, The Canada Council had been given only grudging assent by Parliament, and Canadian artists and intellectuals were still suspicious of the idea of state support for theatre, music, films and literature.

²⁴⁹Due to the Killam and Dunn endowments -- a \$100 million bonanza.

²⁵⁰Berger, 179

²⁵¹Litt writes that the process of lobbying "hastened the arrival of a new era in which culture was recognized as a legitimate concern of government, and as such, one that required serious attention, coordinated management, and a comprehensive strategy. Through its public hearings, the Massey Commission expedited an incipient change of attitude within Canadian political culture [remember the luke-warmness and sometime hostility of King's government to government policy on culture.]" Litt says that this was hardly revolutionary, and criticizes historians of the Commission who say it was, but highly

it was significant nevertheless. See Litt, 248

²⁵² Litt ends with the idea that the arts council was the bureaucratic embodiment of the cultural elite because: first, the council was to be a well connected organization of those in the elite, but still well-insulated from popular criticism; second the elite saw it as a base for the improvement of the masses and Canadian liberal democracy. The culture critics did not think of the council as a way to aggrandize their own power (though this is what opponents charged), but rather, as a way to encourage rather than direct cultural development. "This stipulation was rooted in the liberal conviction that a centrally directed culture would be both politically dangerous and culturally artificial, but it also reflected the nationalist imperative to create an indigenous culture with popular appeal. Suspended somewhere between government and the people and belonging wholly to neither, the arts council proposal was the bureaucratic embodiment of the cultural elite and its liberal humanist nationalism." (185) Frye argued in "Culture and the National Will" (Ottawa, 1957): "With the Canada Council Act, federal aid for universities is linked with federal aid for culture. The principles involved for culture are precisely the same.... It is logical to link the university and culture: in fact it could almost be said that the university today is to culture what the church is to religion: the social institution that makes it possible. It teaches the culture of the past, and it tries to build up an educated public for the culture of the present." (4)

²⁵³ J.L. Granatstein, "Culture and Scholarship: The First Ten Years of the Canada Council", *Canadian Historical Review* v. 55, no. 4 (1984), 474

²⁵⁴ Claude Bissell, *Halfway up Parnassus. A Personal Account of the University of Toronto 1932-1971* (Toronto, 1974), 48

²⁵⁵ George P. Grant, *Philosophy in the Mass Age*, (Toronto, 1959), 37

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 15

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁸ George Grant, *Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism* (Toronto, 1965), 53

²⁵⁹ Grant, *Philosophy in the Mass Age*, 16

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 20

²⁶¹ Grant, *Lament for a Nation*, 54

²⁶² This is the broadest theme of Grant's *Lament for a Nation*.

²⁶³ Northrop Frye, "The Critical Discipline", *Address to the Royal Society of Canada's Symposium, Canadian Universities Today*, draft copy (1960?), Northrop Frye Papers, Victoria University Library (VUL) 88 Box 1, P, 3-4

²⁶⁴ Northrop Frye, "Academy without Walls", unpublished paper, draft copy, Northrop Frye Papers (VUL) 88 Box 1, N, 9

²⁶⁵ David Cook, *Northrop Frye. A Vision of the New World*. (Montreal, 1985), 18

²⁶⁶ Northrop Frye, *The Critical Path: An Essay on the Social Context of Literary Criticism*. (Bloomington, Indiana, 1971), 49

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 97

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁹ Frye argues first that the myth of freedom is hard to sustain given the 'narcotic attraction' of a closed mythology of concern. The study of literature is the first step to counter-effect the suffocating effects of the myth of concern. (*ibid.*, 157) What Frye advocates to prevent the destruction of western imagination is to reeducate society as to its mythological heritage. He believes that poetry exists in part to take on and create a new mythology. "... [T]here are two cultures in society, one in the main area of sciences, the other an area covered by something that we are calling mythology. They co-exist, but are not essentially interconnected". (*ibid.*, 96)

²⁷⁰ Northrop Frye, "Conclusion to a *Literary History of Canada*" in Northrop Frye *The Bush Garden: Essays on the Canadian Imagination* (Toronto, 1974), 224

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 225

²⁷² *Ibid.*, 226

²⁷³ Cook, 12

²⁷⁴ Donald Creighton, *Canada's First Century, 1867-1967* (Toronto, 1970), 344

²⁷⁵ Donald Creighton, "Canadian Nationalism and its Opponents" in Creighton, *Discovery*, 280

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 281

²⁷⁸ Morton, *The Canadian Identity*, 115

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 116

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 150

The World We Have Lost: Conservatism and the Revolutionary World

What I am going to say is the result of prolonged exposure to the continuing crisis of our western society -- to the crisis of the democratic governments and free institutions during the wars and revolutions of the twentieth century. Now it does not come easily to anyone who, like me, has breathed the soft air of the world before the wars that began in 1914 -- who has known a world that was not divided and frightened and full of hate -- it does not come easily to such a man to see clearly and to measure coolly the times we live in. The scale and scope and complexity of our needs are without precedent in our experience, and indeed, we may fairly say, in all human experience. -- Walter Lippmann, 1954.¹

To societal critics such as Walter Lippmann the age after 1914 was a era of revolution unparalleled in the history of the west. The Second World War and the postwar periods, moreover, culminated the epoch of unprecedented social chaos and strife. Juxtaposed against the old order the modern age was, as we have witnessed, an era of human tragedy and moral malaise. The world that had emerged after the Great War had indeed proved to be little like the world it succeeded. It constituted a sharp break with the traditions and outlooks of the old order and proffered instead a new world-view that bared little resemblance to that of former times. For Lippmann and others, the social order of the pre-1914 period seemed like a world lost for all time.

Facing the extraordinary exigencies of the twentieth century, social critics and like-minded intellectuals looked to themselves as those most capable of addressing the problems of modernity. Their self-appointed task was to assess reasons for cultural decline. It was also to aid a society that had been besieged by revolutionary forces. To achieve this most important objective, the social critics endeavoured to conserve the old order whose remnants were rapidly disintegrating. Not reflexive reactionaries who disdained change and all that supplanted the ancient, they nonetheless wanted to preserve the values and traditions that they believed formed the core of western civilization. They wished, furthermore, to counterbalance the current world-view that was utterly ensconced in the modern age with views of universal and enduring significance. Above all, they desired to stabilize the social order by adhering to the Burkean precept that progress is achievable only in reference to past successes; advancement, in other words, relied on the slow, but inexorable building on past accomplishments, physical, moral, philosophical, and intellectual. Their ideal social conception, in short, looked as much to the past as it did to present and the future.

Fundamentally, then, the critics of modernity were conservatives. Their social criticism, their view of the prospects of their culture, and their conception of the ideal social order, in which the scholar-cum-social philosopher played an integral role, were all informed by their inherent conservatism. Their perception of the mid-twentieth century as a revolutionary period and a time of ceaseless change, moreover, demonstrates their respect for the cultural and intellectual characteristics of the past as much as it displays their anti-modernist predispositions. The criticism of modernity, in other words, implied also the reassertion of the attributes of the old order in place of the new. It entailed, at bottom, the attempt to forestall the demise of the old structures in favour of novel ones. The focus here, therefore, is not just on the critique of the various aspects of modernism, but also on the societal critics' intrinsic conservatism. The effort to preserve the "good society" unified the critics of modernity as much as did pessimistic attitudes towards science and technology or views on cultural and academic modernization. The repeated reference to the "living past", though often mythologized, was the main response to the question of modernity.

Equally important to social order was the role of the intellectual. Through the capacity to take the long view of cultural problems, the scholar was key in solving the riddle of modernity. Implicit to the conservative response to modernism, thus, was the critic's effort to exalt the intellectual and himself as enlightened citizen. Societal critics endowed themselves with the quasi-Platonic responsibility of acting as prophets of the new age. They wanted to reassert the relevance of the social philosopher and show how, as intellectuals, they occupied societal positions of crucial significance. Above all, theirs was an attempt to restore intellectuals to a rightful place within the social hierarchy. The conception of the intellectual's role in society, in short, was vital to the conservative response to the modern world.

Ultimately, however, the modern age marginalized and eventually displaced the enlightened intellectual. For the anti-modernists, the greatest irony was that the individuals best capable of allaying the effects of modernity were those whom moderns disdained and eventually peripheralized into irrelevance. The triumph of modernity, in other words, was embodied not merely in the arrival of the mass society or the predominance of the will to technique. It was also encapsulated in society's disregard for truth and conservative values. Most of all, it was symbolized in the displacement of the enlightened intellectual. Although characterized by objective developments and historical realities, modernity was linked inextricably to anti-modernists' perceptions of their own social demise.

For many critics of modernity, the mid-twentieth century was an era fraught with paradox. There had been vast advances in science and technique, abundant material wealth, and

higher standards of living than ever before. Yet, at the same time, the period after the war was one of great distress. It was not surprising, British political economist Harold Laski wrote in 1952, that “in a period like ours of insecurity, of violence, and of deep distrust, the prevalent mood everywhere should be one of somber pessimism and bitterness ... There is a fear of communism, fear of war, fear of depression, fear of a growth of doubt about the values inherent in [our] way of life”.² For Laski, there was a growing chasm between “traditional values” of the former social order and the way in which moderns currently lived.³ This rift was the cause of the tensions and insecurities of the modern world. Vincent Massey also identified the stunning incongruities of the modern period. “On the one hand”, Massey declared in a 1953 address, “we seem to have at our disposal power and wealth, knowledge and freedom hitherto undreamed of; on the other hand we see, if not among ourselves, among other peoples ... mass ignorance, mass slavery, mass poverty, misery and cruelty on which even in imagination we cannot bear to look ...”⁴ In the midst of the confusion and anxiety of the modern era, one thing for critics such as Massey and Laski had been abundantly clear: something had gone terribly amiss in the so-called “age of progress”.

Several factors accounted for the rise to prominence of a mistaken notion of progress, the concept, that is, that advancement was reducible to material and technological growth. Perhaps the most fundamental of these elements, according to the critics of modernity, was the demise of freedoms intrinsic to the advent of mass or “false” democracy. We have already discussed the role of democracy in educational reform.⁵ And, in the last chapter, we also explained critics’ views on the deleterious effects on Canadian culture of “mass democracy”. It remains for us to understand the role of modern democracy, in the minds of critics, to function as an illiberal and destabilizing force.

From the early 1940s on a growing debate emerged as to the nature and impact of democracy, and, even more importantly, the essence of true democratic freedom. For many social observers, democracy had devolved into unrepentant egalitarianism. As such, it undermined the aristocratic conception of democracy: the notion that freedoms were not only unfettered by a hierarchical social order, but that they were fostered by an inegalitarian social framework. Social observers, moreover, agreed that mass democracy cultivated a close-minded, uncritical stance concerning fundamental social problems. It produced another potent societal paradox; purporting to be a crucial source of freedom, modern democracy actually stifled human creativity and hindered individuality of thought and character. Democracy, it seemed, was contributing to a period already marked by propaganda, rhetoric, and dangerous totalitarian ideologies. Only through educating the masses as to the inveterate character of democracy, the critics argued, could the freedom-

destroying affinities of modern ideologies be curbed. The common man had to be guided from the folly of his own socio-political beliefs. It was the duty of the enlightened individual to perform this vital task. Indeed, true freedom relied both on the intellectual and the application of intelligence to the social process.

Although by the interwar period debate over mass democracy had already begun, the crisis atmosphere of the 1940s stimulated discussion over the basic socio-political features of western societies. By the middle phase of the war onwards, a spate of publications appeared in Canadian learned journals and elsewhere, all concerned with the fate of "democracy".⁶ While the tracts responded to the growing political-ideological crisis, they wished to do more than merely criticize totalitarianism and point out the inestimable merits of democratic societies. The Second World War and, subsequently, the Cold War, were not merely conflicts for territory, or efforts to "make the world safe for democracy". Instead, the major conflagrations were more important, authors argued, in terms of their effects on western civilization. They marked an end-point in the centuries-old development of what Hilda Neatby called the "democratic cycle".⁷ The student of western history, Neatby commented in 1942, "finds himself faced with a strange and startling contrast. The eighteenth century was an Age of Reason, or the Age of Enlightenment. We do not yet know what title posterity will bestow on our age", she continued, but "it can hardly be flattering. We seemed to have passed from the age of reason to the age of madness, barbarism, and anarchy".⁸

What Neatby meant by this "unflattering" epithet was that the fundamental principles of democracy -- individualism, freedom from governmental arbitrariness, and a rational world-view -- had all been threatened in the age of world wars. By the 1940s, the scientific, economic, and political developments that contributed to a free and peaceful order in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries seemed to be irrevocably imperiled. Supposedly gone forever, the worst abuses of the ancient régime had reappeared, for Neatby, by the middle of the twentieth century. The western world's most enlightened men had ceased their search for a resolution of the greatest philosophical malaise of the century. Instead, "the mind of the age" had evolved into mere technical knowledge, engaged in the "production of instruments of death and destruction".⁹ Even more worrisome was the fact that the fundamental precepts of democracy had been undermined. By the close of the nineteenth century, Neatby argued, the democratic "ideal of reason" was "rapidly giving way to the ideal of force".¹⁰

The demise of democracy continued, Neatby went on, even in spite of the western democracies' triumph in the Great War. The war in fact accelerated the process. It was the "first round" that pitted "the new doctrine of force and race and the old one of reason and

humanity".¹¹ Subsequently, the victors attempted and failed to "organize society on the principles in which they professed to believe". They were unsuccessful, Neatby hastened to add, due to an overarching complacency. Leaders of western nations watched in apathy the rise of totalitarian states, the growth of the masses, the sundering of the individual, and the "degeneration of eighteenth century idealism".¹² In a time of renewed conflict, it seemed that they were now active participants in the decline of democracy. The democratic cycle had passed from a faith in human reason to a form of organized mob rule.

Not content merely to chronicle the decline of democracy, Neatby ended her article by proffering insight on the decay of democratic principles. The reasons for decline were quite simple. The introduction of democratic precepts had not come gradually, allowing the integration of older ideas into the new society. It had come, on the contrary, in "revolutionary fashion". The old régime had been violently overturned. Through the revolution, Neatby stressed, not only tyranny but also discipline, religion, and respect for order and hierarchy had been destroyed.¹³ The democratic upheaval was thus not entirely "progressive". While Neatby did not dispute the fundamental soundness of democratic theory -- she deeply appreciated the merits of individualism, especially in the "mass age"¹⁴ - - she objected to the revolutionary penchant to discard all that passed before in the name of progress. Only through a combination of the best of the old and new orders, by contrast, could humanity hope to extricate itself from the perils of the democratic cycle. At its best, she explained, the

old régime stood for absolutism along with common moral standards accepted and enforced; the nineteenth century antithesis was liberty, with the assertion of the dignity of the free individual. The danger of one is tyranny, and of the other, anarchy. If twentieth century democracy cannot produce a synthesis in the form of freedom and individual worth translated in terms of common moral standards accepted and enforced, it will suffer annihilation, and justly.¹⁵

In spite of Neatby's admonitions, however, it appeared as though modern democracy had failed in this quest for balance. For many, it seemed as though the true democratic spirit, which Neatby sought after, had been lost. Force and power and man's penchant to dominate seemed to have prevailed over idealism. These realities became especially apparent during the Second World War. In 1941, historian Arthur Lower argued that there was a great increase in political control made manifest in restrictions of individual freedom, organization, assembly, and due process. A new type of control-oriented state, Lower averred, was coming into existence in Canada.¹⁶ As Harold Innis put it simply, "centralization and force" had come to "dominate the Anglo-Saxon world".¹⁷ As noted in

chapter two, Lower, Innis, and others deplored the rise of wartime controls and the sundering of free institutions. Even more disquieting, however, was the modern state's inclination to use democracy as a means of hiding the illiberalities of the age. Modern governments endorsed propaganda, censorship, and a more general restriction of free thought and belief all in the name of "winning the war". For Lower, the greatest irony of the war, a confrontation designed to guard freedom, was that it led to the denial of freedom. Echoing Neatby, Lower argued that the war threatened the emergence of a new state with little concern for the liberties on which Canadian society had been built. War is the "most awesome" of all man's "mass actions", Lower declared. It "overwhelms us by the magnitude of the experience it threatens to impose upon us and prevents objective thinking".¹⁸

H.W. Wright put the plight of modern democracy even more cogently than did Lower. In a 1940 article entitled "The Values of Democracy", Wright showed how many moderns claimed that, given the "present emergency", "democracy" "would be justified" in employing unusual means to protect itself from the perils of the wartime world. It could resort to "every device of early education and adult propaganda supplemented by drastic censorship", he continued, "which would implant in the minds of its citizens that form of religious belief, of social philosophy and of nationalistic sentiment allied to, or consistent with, its aims".¹⁹ Importantly, Wright identified a critical inconsistency with the wartime purposes of democracy. In establishing an ideology, modern democracy not only abandoned its fundamental values of free thinking, but it also threatened its citizens with the rigidities and conformities of the totalitarian régimes. "If the purpose of democracy is to establish freedom of individual thought and utterance, of individual initiative and enterprise in the practical sphere, and of individual taste in aesthetic enjoyment and recreation", Wright reasoned, "it is impossible to see how democracy could impose, or even undertake to teach any specific religious belief, cosmic philosophy, historic or economic theory, standards of artistic excellence or social propriety, without stultifying its own aims and betraying its own values".²⁰

A restrictive yet nominally "democratic" socio-political order was thus anathema to observers such as Lower and Wright. This criticism of wartime democracy also resonated throughout the work of Harold Innis. As indicated in chapter two, Innis's concepts of the "monopoly of knowledge" and media bias referred as much to current governmental trends and the suppressive climate in Canadian universities as they were central aspects of his new communication theories. As with Lower and Wright, Innis was concerned to the point of obsession with the maintenance of the indispensable elements of democratic societies: free thought and critical enquiry. The concept of bias, and, more accurately, the identification

of the limitations of thought, was vital to his social critique. Understanding bias and maintaining free thought were the means by which individuals and societies could help preserve liberal values. They were key, most of all, to avoiding the transgressions of “wartime democracy”. “Oral and written words”, Innis wrote in 1946, “have been harnessed to the demands of modern industrialism ...”²¹ “[W]ords [i.e., propaganda] have carried a heavy additional load in the prosecution of war and have been subject to unusual strains”.²² “The first essential task” of moderns, Innis resolved, responding to the extraordinary exigencies of the mid-1940s, was “to see and to break through the chains of modern civilization”.²³

Doubtless the effects of the war greatly influenced critics’ perceptions of liberal democracy. The end of the war, however, did not result in a cessation of scepticism and, indeed, outright hostility to modern democracy. The postwar in fact evidenced a heightened anxiety about the plight of democratic principles. The power and force inherent to totalitarian régimes abroad and control-oriented democracies closer to home continued to plague the postwar world. As Lower indicated, humanity’s “desire for power” did not die out with the end of hostilities; people could fight each other through “advertising campaigns rather than bullets”. The satisfaction of their “primitive urges, whether [they] win or lose, is just as great”.²⁴ For Lower and others, modern humanity seemed predisposed towards the expression of force.

Postwar society was marked by an even greater threat to liberal democracy, however. In addition to the political-ideological organization of force, the advent of “mass democracy” posed, for the anti-modernists, a daunting challenge to traditional democratic ideals. For many critics, democratic societies degenerated not merely because of the rise of authoritarianism and other external forces; rather, civilization had been uprooted from within. The rise of the philosophy of “mass man” contributed greatly to this upheaval. As Walter Lippmann argued, problems arose with the new, “democratic” image of humankind. The modern “conception of human nature – one in which desire is sovereign and reason is the instrument for serving and satisfying desire”, Lippmann wrote, “has become increasingly the accepted image of man in the modern world. It is upon this image of man”, he added, “that our secular education had been based, and our social philosophy and our personal codes. Our world today is in the hands of masses of people who are formed in this image and regard it as indubitably the true and scientifically correct conception of human nature ...”²⁵ The “fashionable image” of humankind, Lippmann announced, was “the image of an uncivilized barbarian”.²⁶

While seemingly benign, the advent of barbarism actually posed a grave menace to society. This threat arose, Lippmann argued, precisely because moderns wished only to

see themselves in terms of their newfound acquisitive image. They rejected the spiritual and contemplative side of the human psyche and instead reduced human happiness to a Hobbesian quest for the satisfaction of an endless list of wants and needs. The “secular man”, Lippmann declared, is the individual who “obeys his impulses and knows no reason that transcends his wishes”.²⁷ Disquieting in and of itself, this monolithic and indeed distortive view of humanity implied further problems. Most problematic, according to Lippmann, was the penchant to avoid the deeper issues of human existence and instead to seek solace en masse in the acquisitive ethos. The sundering of individualism and the advent of a herd mentality were, for Lippmann, basic to the destruction of the west. Entrapped by a narrow definition of material progress and lacking a refuge in individual contemplation, moderns sought sanctuary in “the masses of their fellow beings, becoming anonymous, faceless, and no longer persons ...”²⁸ “They are a horde,” Lippmann concluded, discussing the contribution of mass men to societal decay,

arising within our civilization rather than invading it from without. They are a horde of beings without autonomy, of individuals uprooted and so isolated and disordered that they surrender their judgment and their freedom to the master of the horde ... The dissolution of Western society -- as we have seen it demonstrated in the lands where it is totally advanced -- in an organized barbarism which makes the lives of all who fall within its power ‘poor, nasty, brutish, and short’.²⁹

Lippmann’s strictures presaged a postwar onslaught against mass man.³⁰ Writing soon after the war’s end, for example, H.W. McCready contended that a lack of regard for the values of individualism marked the current “crisis of tradition”. The tradition of individualism, McCready asserted, that “had built our western civilization certainly appears to be moving fast towards extinction. The fundamental value of the individual person”, he went on, “and his welfare, rights and liberty ... are increasingly surrendered to the new gods of the mass age -- Community, Nation, Efficiency, Power and Plan”.³¹ Malcolm Muggeridge, the editor of *Punch*, echoed Lippmann’s and McCready’s concerns on the demise of individualism. In a piece entitled “Farewell to Freedom?: The State, the Person, the Faith” (1954), Muggeridge claimed that the individual, in both totalitarian and democratic communities, had “withered away”.³² He argued that in the “Free Societies”, of which politicians and common folk were so proud, “the same drift of servitude is apparent as in the Slave Societies across the Curtain”. Indeed, the “great Leviathan” was “waxing ever fatter” all over the globe.³³

Muggeridge identified a more fundamental reason, however, for the attack on the individual and person liberties: the press. Reflecting the criticisms of Innis, Marshall

McLuhan, and others, the press, for Muggeridge, had “increasingly become more a purveyor of orthodoxy than an expression of individual views”. It was “in the process of succumbing to the collective zeitgeist”.³⁴ Accounting for the emergence of the mass society in Canada, W.B. Munro blamed the rise of American mass culture. “‘American’ influences on Canadian ways of life have been expanded by the vogues of the automobile, the motion picture, and the radio”, Munro wrote to Donald Creighton in 1948. “These influences are not usually apparent in the laws of the land or in the formally-announced procedures; they creep in from below and affect the tastes [*sic*] of the people without their knowing it ... And the strength of these influences, for good or evil, is not surprising when you remember that such a substantial fraction of Canada’s population lives within fifty miles of the border”.³⁵ Whatever the causes, the culture of the common man, in the words of Muggeridge, “incorporate[d] [moderns] in a herd”, made them follow “the herd destiny”, and, ultimately, “destroy[ed] the purpose of [their] being”.³⁶

The critique of the “culture of the masses” reflected the ideological battle of the 1940s and 1950s. Nazi Germany and Stalinist Soviet Union demonstrated for the critics of modernity, among others, just how fragile modern democracy was. As noted in chapter five, critics were preoccupied not only with the effects of ideologies of mass persuasion, but also with the rise of new doctrines of “false” democracy. These dogmas pervaded the postwar period. Postwar Canadians became ensnared, for instance, in the quest for material improvement and consumer enjoyment. As George Grant observed in 1955, the act of consuming had become an “end in itself”.³⁷ Canadians of the postwar age identified themselves as “consuming animals”. As such, they became enslaved by a materialist society for which spiritual goods had little meaning. Materialism, Grant declared, “so sets the tone and pattern of our society that the standards it imposes close people off from knowing what life is for ... The boom world creates like an aura its own standard of success -- of what really matters in life -- and that aura lies over everything, choking people with the fear of failure in terms of those standards, and cuts us off from any truer vision of life”.³⁸

The standardizing effects of consumerism were matched, moreover, by the democratic ideal in education. With Hilda Neatby, Vincent Massey, and others, Grant argued that mass education was integral to “mass democratic society”. Parents and “progressivists” alike were not interested in the education of children, but rather that students “should be fitted for success and adjustment”. Most of all, they “accepted the philosophy of worldly success and adjustment as a true account of what the schools are for”.³⁹ Modern education, thus, for Grant, adapted the masses to the exigencies of the postwar world. Ultimately, it was a means of making “democratic” citizens.

For many Canadians, the democratic ethos even extended to the family. Postwar authorities warned that Canadians must practice the values of democracy if Canada were to ward off the errors of totalitarianism and build a strong and free society. They emphasized that as a pioneer society, Canada was different from its European predecessors.⁴⁰ Indeed, the Canadian family derived strength from the fact that it lacked the patriarchal structures of its European counterparts. Canadians must capitalize on their advantages, the experts reasoned, by further democratizing family life: budgeting and activity planning should be open to all family members, while family councils should be encouraged to promote a cooperative familial environment.⁴¹ The family, in other words, must mirror the egalitarianism and toleration of society at large. That hierarchy and overt control had little place in the democratic family reflected the postwar predisposition against authoritarianism. Like education, then, the democratic family became essential, for Canadians after the war, to a postwar world order beset by totalitarian heresies.

Many Canadians thus emphasized the merits of democratic leveling. This democratic ethos was not simply a response to authoritarianism, however. It was also a response to the insecurities of the postwar age. For Canadians, postwar society was mired by a multitude of lurking threats: inflation, unemployment, juvenile delinquency, Soviet expansionism, and most lamentably, nuclear annihilation. The "cult of domesticity", suburbanization, materialism, and mass consumption -- all assertions of modern democratic values -- were ways of assuaging the uncertainties of the postwar age. The democratic, progressive life was a means to achieve the control and stability that the modern age lacked. Indeed, it provided Canadians an escape from a manipulative and unstable world. Far from merely being a liberty-engendering political doctrine, then, democracy touched every aspect of modern Canadian life. Ultimately, in proffering the means of liberating moderns from uncertainty and instability, it seemed to hold the key to broader societal freedom.

As we have seen, the critics of modernity vociferously denounced modern democracy. They believed that moderns were led astray by false notions of progress and erroneous doctrines of freedom. They realized that the obsession with "democracy", in its many forms, prevented moderns from seeing the world as it truly was. If moderns were consumed with buying cars, moving to the suburbs, and denouncing the unredeemable evils of communism, then how could they transcend the narrow limits of the modern value system and thus see the true problem of modernity? Indeed, a main reason that critics despised mass democracy was that it was inimical to a measured, humanistic critique of modernity. It precluded, in other words, the sage advice of humanists and therefore marginalized some of society's most important individuals. Under these conditions, it is

not surprising that the critics saw themselves as increasingly peripheralized, even irrelevant in the “democratic” society.

Critics also reviled mass democracy because it upset the balance of modern societies. In considering all humans equal, modern democracy failed to account for the different roles of the various strata of society. Above all, it ignored the value of the intelligentsia to the social process. Showing their tory affinities, the anti-modernists were convinced of the enduring social benefits of privilege. Hence, it was their self-appointed duty to reassert the social relevance of the intellectual to society, even if that meant inflating the importance of the intellectual class. Indeed, critics advanced an alternate view of the free and democratic society, based in part on historical precedent and in part on an idealized conception of the intellectual as citizen. Their purpose was both to overcome the unmitigated leveling of the modern world and thus to restore intellectuals to their appropriate social standing. Countenancing the creation of a hierarchical, quasi-Platonic social structure to which the social philosopher would make key contributions, they hoped to secure for themselves a place in a hostile democratic world.

There were several uses for the intellectual in the social process. In an era of unprecedented socio-political strife, the most pressing of these was the role of intelligence in achieving peace, liberty, and social stability. According to many social observers, the world must be re-educated for peace. In an article written for the *Canadian Forum*, Nora McCullough argued that there was much more to the reconstructionist phase of postwar development than a balanced economy and full employment. She argued that moderns lacked a “real knowledge of our own society” and indeed of the entire world. This dearth of information combined with a growing apathy towards the exigencies of the postwar world. Both drawbacks had to be remedied before moderns could be prepared for the challenges of peace. Educators, McCullough indicated, had an important role to play in effecting these changes, and indeed in laying the groundwork for peace.⁴²

Other observers envisioned a more integral purpose than did McCullough for educators and the educational process. In “Education for an Enduring Peace”, for instance, philosopher John A. Irving claimed that “educators should lead in creating the intellectual atmosphere conducive to social change”.⁴³ He advocated the creation of “a new educational outlook”, which would help develop not only “facility in the investigation of social facts, but also the capacity to formulate rational value-judgments based ... on sound philosophical analysis”.⁴⁴ The social sciences, which were central to understanding the postwar age, must be tempered with an emphasis on social ethics and social philosophy. As such, social scientists might foster the social awareness and responsibility necessary to deal with the tumultuous change of the post-1945 epoch. In Irving’s view, thus, educators had a

responsibility both to students, and, most importantly, to the society in which they worked and thought. The achievement of peace and stability was perhaps their most important obligation to the social order. Writing about the place of education in a democratic society, Robert Wallace agreed with much of the substance of Irving's strictures. He argued that a democratic and peaceful society was realizable only through the attainment of common societal values and ideals. Education and the achievement of an intellectual life were, in turn, indispensable to the fulfillment of these objectives. Wallace touted the benefits of liberal education to present "knowledge as a unity", and to develop "intellectual interests which may persist though life".⁴⁵ For these elements not only contributed to the intellectual existence of western man, but they also strengthened "common experience", and with it, the "forces that make for freedom".⁴⁶ The "real life" of democracies, Wallace concluded, "consist not in things with which we are surrounded, but in our efforts ... to reach out to the highest truths we know", and to realize "the great end which mankind may serve".⁴⁷ Liberation, both on a personal and societal level, was the ultimate result of this quest for truth.

The search for values clearly had implications that resounded through the ages for Wallace and others. Although always related to this quest, the liberal education had a more direct role to play in the lives of individual citizens. In *Twilight of Liberty* (1941), for example, classicist Watson Kirkconnell discussed the role of educational institutions to develop a responsible citizenry. He derided modern education because it debased standards and endeavoured to fit society's youth into the industrial-democratic order. This system of education, Kirkconnell remonstrated, provided students with "a minimum of knowledge, skill, and manners". Students received "some rudimentary training in the use of tools and baking-dishes. They are also taught to cooperate with the laws of the state ..."⁴⁸ Contemporary education, Kirkconnell concluded, was merely a means of adapting "young barbarians" for life in the social order "of which they form a part".⁴⁹

More than simply denouncing mass education, however, Kirkconnell provided insight into the higher functions of education. True education, he argued, attempted to develop "in the minds of young men and women ... that the true end of existence lies ... in personal self-realization, partly through the social services of their employment, partly through the happy cultivation of their [intellectual] powers, and partly through a devotion to domestic and social relationships".⁵⁰ In other words, it enabled students to transcend the minimalist goals of democratic education and to see instead the "greater significance of life in its intellectual, aesthetic, and moral aspects".⁵¹ In developing the whole individual, it followed that education and the intellectual life more generally facilitated the creation of a knowledgeable and dutiful citizenry. Quoting Julius Caesar, Kirkconnell stated that it is "a

nobler thing to remove the barriers of intellectual life than to extend the boundaries of an empire'."⁵²

Other observers agreed with the spirit of Kirkconnell's pronouncements. Hilda Neatby, for instance, argued that education was central to the creation of a true democracy. Like Kirkconnell, she attempted to expose the fallaciousness of "democratic equalitarianism" in education. Foreshadowing what she was to write a few years, Neatby denounced democratic education's "stress on group activity" and its commendation of "team work and cooperation".⁵³ These fallacies ignored the truth that "democracies live by the achievements of solitary original thinkers. Without these", she added, democratic societies were "bound to collapse into the mass hysteria that throws up a Hitler". Indeed, Neatby argued for a reassertion of the "essentials of a liberal education", and a "new interpretation" of these attributes "in relation to democratic life".⁵⁴ Above all, she advocated a comprehension of democracy as a reflection of the "development of all human faculties not excepting the highest of all -- the power of creative thought".⁵⁵ In enabling creativity and critical thought, and, by implication, in creating a responsible and intelligent citizenry, education helped create a truly free democracy.

Even more forthright on the role of a liberal education in establishing a democratic citizenry was Northrop Frye. Like Kirkconnell and Neatby, Frye castigated "progressive education" primarily because of its stifling effect on moderns. For Frye, the Deweyite ideals of "invulnerable wisdom and backslaphappy sociability" simply prepared individuals for complacency and mediocrity. Most of all, "progressivism", whether it be embodied in education theory or in the materialist ideal of modern society, ignored the greater objective of establishing "[high] standards of human mentality".⁵⁶ It disregarded, in other words, the fact that social improvement came not from adjusting humankind to its social surroundings but rather from the liberation of human thought and creativity. A liberal education, Frye argued, as Kirkconnell and Neatby had done before him, was instead "designed to produce the democratic gentleman". Rightfully conceived, education exposed individuals to "the great works of culture", and created the realization that in these great works resides the "mainspring of all liberal thought".⁵⁷ Through liberal education, then, individuals gained access to the modes of critical and creative thought. As such, they became, for Frye, endowed with the capacity to identify and avoid progressivist and other fallacies of the modern age. Those with a liberal education were hence the true democratic citizens of modern society. The "purpose of liberal education today", Frye claimed, "is to achieve a neurotic maladjustment in the student, to twist him into a critical and carping intellectual, very dissatisfied with the world, very finicky about accepting what it offers

him ...” “The man with a liberal education will not have an integrated personality or be educated for the living: he will be a chronically irritated man ...”⁵⁸

Harold Innis echoed Frye’s view of the liberal education and its relationship to the democratic social order. Modern society, Innis asserted, ought to be “concerned with strengthening intellectual capacity, and not with the weakening of that capacity by the expenditure of subsidies for the multiplication of facts...” Educators should be “concerned like the Greeks with making men, not with overwhelming them with facts ... Education”, he continued, “is the basis of the state and its ultimate aim and essence is the training of character”.⁵⁹ To Innis, the purpose of education was to cultivate integrity and dedication and to encourage moderns to serve society. Education was not intended merely to prepare the learned for scholarship in specialized fields of knowledge; rather, it encouraged personal qualities of wisdom and judgment, balance and perspective. It therefore allowed moderns to contribute to the culture of which they formed a part. Instead of merely moulding individuals for acceptance among the masses, liberal education, for Innis, recognized the value of personal character and thus enabled humankind to resist the drudgery and standardization of everyday industrial-democratic life.⁶⁰ Liberal education was vital for Innis, Frye, and the others, to the preservation and perseverance of the free civilization.

Liberal learning was thus key to creating an “anti-environment” to the modern industrial-democratic order. Critics also advanced a vision of the rightful social order, one which stressed the critical importance of intelligence and an “intellectual class”. In this conception, the intellectual played the role of sage patriarch to the unwashed masses. The intellectual had become the savior of postwar society. Through his understanding and benevolence western culture had the opportunity to progress and overcome its current travails. Through his wisdom, society would save itself from itself, and regain the values, ideals, and freedom that had gone absent. For critics, the intellectual held the answers for the problems of social instability that mass democracy and other mistaken ideologies had tried to address. The enlightened individual, in consequence, must occupy a place of importance in modern society. More than the aristocrat, the businessman, or even the scientist, he was, for the critics, society’s most capable leader. He took on quasi-mythic proportions. As such, his social significance, and indeed that of his entire class, ought to be guaranteed.

In a tract entitled “Are Men Equal?”, Robert M. Ogden captured the essence of this idealized vision. Ogden argued here that humans were simply not equal in terms of their “potentialities of service”.⁶¹ Some were more apt than others to lead. In the past, those who “fortuitously achieved rank, wealth, or intellect”, were the ones who led society.⁶² In

the modern era, by contrast, the “true aristocrats” were those “whose service [had] earned for them the right to be so called”. “The true aristocrat”, Ogden continued, “is a catalyst, and his service is a meliorating influence among those with whom he works”.⁶³ The modern age, he declared, must be one in which emerged an “Aristodemocracy”, a society in which prevailed “a few persons whose intelligence has brought them rank and wealth to catalyze the ways of common men into friendly channels of behaviour”. While the “masses” must be “adequately fed and housed”, and have “the freedom to move about”, society must be led by those individuals capable of “‘correct’ leadership” -- those who are motivated by a “bid for perfection” and therefore in working for the best interest of their fellows.⁶⁴

Poet T.S. Eliot concurred with this notion of a hierarchical social order. Writing in 1948, Eliot discussed the “doctrine of élites” and how it constituted a “radical transformation of society”.⁶⁵ He advocated the establishment of a society in which “all positions ... should be occupied by those who are best fitted to exercise the functions of the positions”.⁶⁶ Indeed, Eliot defended aristocracies and argued against the creation of a classless society. Echoing Plato, he claimed that the truly progressive society was one in which “an aristocracy should have a peculiar and essential function”.⁶⁷ Like Ogden, he believed that an elitist society was the precondition of a free society. “What is important”, he reasoned,

is a structure of society in which there shall be from top to bottom a continuous gradation of cultural levels; it is important to remember that we should not consider the upper levels as possessing *more* culture than the lower, but as representing a more conscious culture and a greater specialization of culture. I incline to believe that no true democracy can maintain itself unless it contains these different levels of culture ... [I]n such a society as I envisage, each individual would inherit greater or lesser responsibility towards the commonwealth, according to the position in society which he inherited -- each class would have somewhat different responsibilities. A democracy in which everybody had an equal responsibility would be oppressive for the conscientious and licentious for the rest.⁶⁸

Abhorred by the idea social leveling, Eliot believed instead in the fundamental importance of a hierarchical society, particularly one in which the intellectual élite played a vital role.

The notion of a quasi-Platonic society had adherents among many of the critics of modernity. Donald Creighton, for example, illustrated the relationship between humanistic education and the leadership role in western societies. In Britain, at the beginning the nineteenth century, he wrote, the “humanities remained subjects of central importance”, and “were now accepted as the appropriate training grounds for statesmen ... A first class in ‘literae humaniores’, in ‘greats’”, Creighton continued, “was a clinching demonstration of

talent which opened all careers in politics and administration, as well as in the church, the law, literature and the press".⁶⁹ "[I]t is not too much to say", he added, "that the Modern Commonwealth, east and west, and [Canada] as one of its greatest realms, are the creations of men who were trained in language and literature, in history and philosophy".⁷⁰ Indeed, some of the great governors of the Dominion -- Bond Head; the Marquis of Lansdowne; Baldwin, Draper, Howe, Brown, Macdonald, and Laurier -- were "university men" brought up on the classics.⁷¹ Watson Kirkconnell agreed with Creighton on the importance of liberal arts learning to leadership. "If the civilized values of the race are to survive", he asserted in 1952, "we shall need to have a fair number of men in our communities who have a strong grasp of moral principles and whose minds ... can rise above those details to a sense of their broad human significance".⁷² "Much of the greatness of Britain's political life," Kirkconnell stated, "lies in the fact that so many of the nation's leaders -- men like Burke, Fox, Peel, Gladstone, Asquith, Grey and Balfour -- have been classical scholars or philosophers, or have, like Bright and Churchill, steeped themselves in the finest of English literature".⁷³

The liberal arts did not simply prepare individuals for political leadership of society, however. Instead, the intellectual played an even more important role, according to critics, as a cultural beacon. As Harold Innis argued, as we have noted, western cultures ought to value humanist intellectuals because they were those individuals capable of leading society out of socio-cultural malaise. Humanists were able to discriminate between timeless values, and values that were bound to specific "empires" or cultural-historical contexts. In Innisian parlance, they were able to expose and perhaps correct the effects of bias and monopolies of knowledge. Through the acknowledgment of cultural biases Innis believed that intellectuals could transcend their limiting effects and go on to attempt to resolve the pressing philosophical problems their society faced. Humanists, society's "creative individuals", were, in consequence, vital contributors to the social order. Innis cited classicist and mentor C.N. Cochrane to illustrate this point. "Men will fail", he wrote, "unless they prove themselves capable of energy and initiative, of intelligence and moral daring, comparable with that displayed by [intellectuals] of the past'."⁷⁴ The intellectual, for Innis, was the inheritor and indeed purveyor of the two great forces of European civilization: the Christian religion, for the development of the individual, and the Greek tradition, "for the mind and intellect". Society must remain vigilant, he concluded, in "emphasizing the importance of the individual and of attempting to effectively maintain [*sic*] the spark of civilization ..."⁷⁵

American political philosopher Peter Viereck also discussed the wider import of the intellectual. In *The Unadjusted Man: A New Hero for Americans* (1956), Viereck

ennobled the “unadjusted man” – “the humanist, the artist, the scholar”.⁷⁶ Unlike the “well-adjusted” or the so-called “common” man, the unadjusted individual was distinct in that he did not conform to the modern industrial-democratic order. Rather, he was the “final irreducible pebble” that “sabotages the omnipotence of even the smoothest-running machine”. His values were not determined by “democratic plebiscite” but rather were the product of his classical education, his wisdom, and his philosophical understanding of the world. The unadjusted man was indeed the “new American hero” precisely because he was “the prophet and seer, the unriddler of the outer universe”.⁷⁷ As for Innis, thus, the intellectual was for Viereck indispensable to comprehending and rectifying the defects of the modern world.

In a letter to Hilda Neatby, Massey commissioner and President of the University of British Columbia N.A.M. MacKenzie best summarized the chief “worth” of this unadjusted individual. “I believe very strongly”, he wrote in 1950, “that if the humanities are to count for anything in this day and generation they will have to be associated directly with the lives that we lead and with the lives of our citizens in all walks of life. The ancients whom we now study and admire lived in and made their contribution to contemporary society ... I would like to think that our humanists, including those in our universities, were doing the same for their society”.⁷⁸ Through these contributions, MacKenzie stressed in concluding his letter, intellectuals derived their fundamental social import. Humanists, he urged, must be encouraged “to keep in touch with their society and with the forces of a cultural kind, even though these be vulgar that are shaping it and influencing it”. For, through this effort, “the rest of the community will realize that they exist and will attach some importance to them, even though they disagree violently with some of the things they say and do”.⁷⁹ For MacKenzie, Viereck, and the others, in short, intellectuals, by virtue of their humanist training and cultural outlooks, had an undeniable and enduring social relevance.

The heightened awareness of the role of intelligence came against the twin backdrops of academic modernization and the quest for the revitalization of Canadian culture.⁸⁰ It was also the product of the disdain that intellectuals felt for the masses and mass society more generally. Intellectuals reviled “mass men” because commoners formed a social constituency very different from that of the intelligentsia. They feared the masses because of their function to disturb social equilibria and to disrupt the orderly unfolding of history. Critics viewed the mass society as a force with profound revolutionary implications. Their effort to reassert the social importance of the intellectual was in part an attempt to allay the effects of mass culture and thus to stabilize civilization. More fundamentally, their conservative predispositions reflected a greater desire to reassert the

aristocratic significance of the intelligentsia. The postwar age was one that presented, for critics, a grave threat to the social positions of the intellectual élite. In a word, the all-pervasive doctrine of democracy and material process threatened their social status. Thus the period after the war was one in which critics endeavoured to subdue the masses and to reestablish themselves as vital components of the modern order. As Neatby argued, there was a need “to lay down a programme for the elite and the many”, and to issue “a blue print for a platonic society with gold, silver and brass carefully distinguished from each other”.⁸¹ The dire need for stability was to be met through reaffirming the foundational hierarchical basis of western societies, and, most significantly, through placing the intellectual at the top of a new social order.

Socio-cultural paternalism was just one aspect of the conservative impulse. The Canadian critics of modernity responded to the exigencies of the postwar age also by proposing cultural-intellectual constructs that challenged those of the modern period. The re-emphasis of the Crown, the Commonwealth, and the Anglo-Canadian constitutional inheritance, along with other elements of the British cultural nexus, characterized their efforts to contest Americanization, the Liberal interpretation of Canada’s past, and other aspects of modernity. Critics endowed Canada with conservative qualities to strengthen the nation as a cultural entity and also to allay the pervasive influence of modernization. Their underlying purpose was to contribute to a national culture resistant to revolutionary transformations, and capable, at the same time, of sustaining conservative values and outlooks. Not simply a means of creating a national identity, thus, Canadian conservatism was a powerful ideological tool used to stabilize a national culture in a time of profound change.

The war sparked considerable debate on Canada’s relations with Great Britain, and, specifically, with the Empire/Commonwealth. Many question the endurance of the Commonwealth as an important international organization. Given the weakened condition of postwar Britain and the dubious prospects of the Commonwealth in an era of declining imperialism, there seemed little hope that Britain, the Dominions, and her colonies could recapture past glories. Yet, for the anti-modernists, much rested on the continuing significance of the Commonwealth. They believed that the Commonwealth was critical to the development of Canada and a Canadian national identity. The connection to Britain and her dominions served the time-honoured function of combating the American influence on Canada. In the end, it was the key to the Dominion’s autonomous development on the North American continent.

George Grant's 1945 pamphlet *The Empire, Yes or No?* typified this pro-imperialist bent. Here, Grant assessed Canada's prospects in a world dominated by a burgeoning American imperialism. Canada, he reasoned, could only survive as an autonomous country within the Commonwealth. Otherwise it would "soon cease to be a nation and become absorbed into the U.S.A."⁸² Canadians had succeeded in establishing an independent state only by balancing their "geographic North Americanism" with their "political Britishness". In the postwar age, Grant counseled, Canada would maintain her independence by retaining her links to the Commonwealth, thereby avoiding integration into the two great continental empires. As Innis was to remark three years later, Canada must encourage a political-cultural association separate from American or Soviet imperialism. This "third bloc" was to be based on Canada's European cultural inheritance and was embodied in the concept of the Commonwealth.⁸³ For Grant, Innis, and others, the Commonwealth was central to evading American imperialism in all forms. Britain, in short, must function as she always had: as a crucial counterweight to inexorable continentalism.

The Anglo-Canadian nexus was a complex phenomenon, however. Its preservation implied, for critics, more than simply avoiding American political, cultural, and economic influences. Rather, it was inextricably linked to the growth of the Canadian national identity. As Grant claimed in a tract entitled "Have We a Canadian Nation?", there were positive reasons why Canada ought to cultivate relations with Britain. Canada, after all, was historically a "British nation", and it ought to remain so. Canadians could no longer defend the British heritage by appealing to tradition alone, however. Instead, Grant urged that they discover the foundations on which Canada's British heritage rested. The nation's identity was based "on certain conscious ideas", one of the most important of which was that unlike the United States, Canada never severed its ties with western Europe.⁸⁴ It was a conservative country, in other words, whose connections to Europe were vital to its identity. In addition to its anti-revolutionary tradition, Canadian conservatism implied a notion of responsible freedom in which personal liberties ought not conflict with the freedom of others nor disturb the social order. Regard for law and order, Grant noted, was firmly rooted in Canadian political culture. It was a natural element of the Canadian concept of liberty. These "values and traditions of decency, stability and order", Grant declared, "have been the best basis of our national life". They must be preserved if Canada was to continue as a nation.⁸⁵

For Grant, then, Canadians had qualities that made them special because of their British heritage. Perhaps most representative of Canada's distinct tradition was the British monarchy. The Anglo-Canadian Crown was a powerful symbol for conservatives. Set

against the historical backdrop of the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II in 1953, for instance, Vincent Massey explained the importance of the Crown to Canadians. In his Coronation Day Broadcast, Governor General Massey demonstrated the unifying purpose of the monarchy. “A Coronation”, he announced to his audience, “is the greatest and most moving historical pageant of our time”. But to Canadians, he hastened to add, “it is something more even than that”. “It was part of ourselves”, and “represents in a very special way our national life.”⁸⁶ It stands for qualities and institutions which mean Canada to every Canadian”, he went on, echoing his nephew Grant’s observations of a few years earlier,

which for all our differences and all our variety have kept Canada Canadian. How much the Crown has done to give us our individual character as a nation in the Americas. It shapes our contribution to Western democracy. The Crown itself, as a golden object, may repose in London, but as a cherished symbol it plays and has played a unique role in our national life long before our Sovereign became officially the Queen of Canada. Great truths have been brought home by what we have seen and heard today -- the sense of continuity, of oneness with the past derived from our ancient monarchy; the unifying force which comes from that something in our Constitution which stands above all our differences and dissensions, and which everyone of us can respect. The Queen wears ‘the Sign which unites us all’.⁸⁷

According to the conservative critics, then, the Crown was a potent, unifying symbol for Canadians. Aside from its symbolic function, however, the monarchy also characterized the greater British tradition in North America. As Massey remarked, the Crown was central to the emergence of a free and tolerant society. Since the Glorious Revolution, Massey stated, it had been associated with parliamentary government, and had “achieved its greatest dignity and power through Parliament”.⁸⁸ Canadians retained this link. They have embraced the principles of constitutional monarchy, and with these, the notion that the rule of law was the means of gaining freedom.⁸⁹ Canada therefore had a very different conception of freedom from that of the United States. Canadians, Massey added, did not oppose the American conception of liberty that was bound up in “the ideals of human dignity, human equality, and human well-being in a material sense”. Yet, their political values revolved around toleration, peace, order, and good government, and other principles of the constitutional monarchy. For Massey, in short, this political inheritance was the chief contribution of the English to Western civilization.⁹⁰

Elaborating on the importance of the Crown to the Dominion, economist John Farthing concurred with many of the governor general’s contentions. In a book provocatively entitled *Freedom Wears a Crown*, he showed how the Crown was “not

merely a far-off institution ... but [rather] holds a place of primary significance in our own established order of democratic government".⁹¹ That Canada had a royal as opposed to a republican democracy was "no idle distinction" for Farthing. Being loyal to the throne was more than a "mere matter of sentiment". Instead, "it had to do with a basic ideal of social life, and with a fully enlightened attachment to the highest ideal of democracy that the life of man has ever known ..."⁹² In the "British monarchical order", Farthing concluded, this "universal ideal has been preserved and most highly developed".⁹³

Friend and erstwhile scholarly collaborator Eugene Forsey enthusiastically agreed with Farthing's assertions.⁹⁴ Forsey, a former politician and party ideologue, scholar, and political activist, declared that the Crown was the "centre and symbol" of the "real heritage of all Canadians": parliamentary responsible government.⁹⁵ The monarchy was indispensable to the British democratic order, and was the guardian of the Constitution. As such, it represented the sole protection of the people.⁹⁶ The Queen, Forsey wrote, encapsulating his view of the Anglo-Canadian monarchical tradition, "is the guardian of our democratic constitution against subversion by a Prime Minister or Cabinet who might be tempted to violate that Constitution and deprive us of the right to self-government ..." At the same time, the Crown ensured that people "are not prevented from governing" themselves.⁹⁷ The Crown acted as a key counterweight to executive power, thus enabling the proper and free functioning of the constitution. For Forsey, as for Massey and Farthing, liberty did indeed emanate from authority.⁹⁸

Along with the monarchy, conservatives stressed the significance of the Commonwealth of nations. Despite long-term decline and partial dissolution,⁹⁹ the Commonwealth nonetheless had much to offer the Dominion and indeed the entire postwar world. The Commonwealth was a template for a new and peaceful world order. As Donald Creighton remarked in a letter to the president of the Ford Foundation, it afforded "a unique example of the working of democracy through cooperation. Internally and externally", Creighton went on, "the Commonwealth has developed democratic institutions and advanced international peace. Studies of the cultural, social, economic, military and political relations within the Commonwealth are studies of democracy in the strategy of peace".¹⁰⁰ There was a need therefore to "make known" "the genius for co-operation" and the other freedom-engendering attributes of the Commonwealth throughout the world.¹⁰¹ The socio-political and cultural organization of the Commonwealth was thus, for Creighton, truly sublime.

Vincent Massey also praised Canada's membership in the Commonwealth, calling it "our greatest achievement".¹⁰² Massey emphasized the role of the Commonwealth as a "countervailing force against the erosion of our sense of identity".¹⁰³ Commonwealth

association, he argued, was a way to maintain the already strong attachment most English-speaking Canadians had to the ideals of the mother country. It fostered unity, moreover, in countering the arguments of those “suspicious of the imperial connection -- ardent Canadian nationalists of the 1930s active on the western prairies, and some of the intellectuals of French Canada”.¹⁰⁴

More than functioning merely as an agent of true Canadianism, however, the Commonwealth had a wider, international purpose. Following Creighton, Massey demonstrated how it had become an exemplar to the international order. It was a diverse, yet tolerant and cooperative organization that provided important policy alternatives in an era of growing power blocs. “[A]s a grouping of friendly nations making widely differing responses to the Cold War”, Massey explained, Commonwealth nations have “cut across the frozen configuration of international politics...” Member nations, he added, have to consult each other and have “regard for the interests of the whole”.¹⁰⁵ This sense of internationalism was indispensable to a postwar world in which bridges between nations had been destroyed. The Commonwealth was emblematic of international toleration and entente. Against a background of international, even racial strife, Massey declared that “the ideal of a multiracial Commonwealth offers ... an object lesson in tolerance and understanding between white and non-white peoples. Canadians in all walks of life are attracted to this aspect of the Commonwealth, even if they know (or should know) that in practice the ideal has been sadly tarnished”.¹⁰⁶

Massey, Creighton, and the others, were thus very concerned over the fate of the Anglo-Canadian alliance. While informed by the economic and political circumstances of the post-1945 period, their preoccupations must be first seen as outgrowths of the pro-British, pro-Empire sentiments that characterized the history of Canadian “toryism”.¹⁰⁷ Specifically, the nationalist views of the postwar conservatives closely parallel those of the Canadian imperialists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. George Parkin, George Munro Grant (both G.P. Grant’s grandfathers), George Denison, Stephen Leacock, among other imperialists, realized that as a national entity, the Dominion had languished since Confederation. It was one of their main purposes to revitalize Canadian nationalism by explaining and establishing a conception of Canada of their own. Central to their view was that Canada derived its strength, its cultural identity, its entire “sense of power”¹⁰⁸ from its association with Great Britain. More than that, Canadian imperialists believed that due to its northern climate and vast resources Canada was to become in the near future the seat of the Empire. The last Anglo-Saxons to toil in a harsh northern climate, out of which always emerged superior civilizations, English-speaking Canadians were prepared to lead the Empire into the next century. By assisting the Empire, and

strengthening not lessening ties to Great Britain, the Dominion would, in essence, be helping itself. Indeed, the imperialists thought that imperial unity would be a cure-all for the problems of economic downturn, ethnic tension, provincialism, and, most worrisome of all, American continentalism.

As Carl Berger has shown, ideas on imperial federation and Canadian imperialism more generally died out after 1914. The anti-materialism and jingoistic pro-British ideas of the imperialists simply became irrelevant in the industrial age.¹⁰⁹ The imperialist idea took much longer to decline, however. Specifically, while the agrarianism, Social Darwinism, and intense British nationalism were eliminated, there remained a core of toryism that persisted well into the twentieth century. The imperialists' toryism – “a total acceptance of assumptions which underlay their admiration for the British constitution and the agricultural economy, their belief that in national and individual affairs the acceptance of duties was more important than requesting privileges, and their insistence on abiding by tradition and precedent”¹¹⁰ -- continued to be the guiding principles of the latter-day conservative nationalists. Indeed, Massey's, Creighton's, Farthing's, and the others' reverence for the Commonwealth and the British political tradition bore a close resemblance to the Anglophilia of the Canadian imperialists. The notion that Canada was, and should remain, a “British nation” was fundamental to both groups of ideologues. The imperialists' contempt for democracy and their respect for the role of privilege was also passed on to later tory critics. George Grant's *Lament for a Nation*, furthermore, in the words of Berger, was merely a “depressing footnote” to imperialist thought. Thus, while much time had passed and the historical circumstances were different, there was in the core ideas and key outlooks of both groups considerable continuity. The British nexus remained central to the conservative vision of the nation.

Contemporary historical conditions also influenced the view of the conservative nationalists. By the 1950s, Canada had modernized both economically and politically. Since the early twentieth century, the Dominion had become increasingly dependent on the United States as trade partner and foreign investor. The interwar period amplified this long-term trend as American investment in Canadian industries reached unprecedented levels. Canada's “branch plant” economy continued to be Americanized throughout the Second World War and postwar periods. In 1940 trade with Britain exceeded trade with the United States.¹¹¹ By 1948, however, exchange with the United States had increased to \$1.5 billion, almost fifty per cent of the Dominion's annual trade. Two years later Canadian-American commerce accounted for sixty-four per cent of all Canadian trade. Trade with Britain, by contrast, decreased to twenty-two and twenty per cent of the nation's total trade for 1948 and 1950. In 1957, furthermore, the United States invested

\$8.4 billion of \$10 billion foreign direct investment into Canada. As economic activity with Britain waned, the Dominion increased its reliance on the United States. Economically and financially, Canada had fallen into the American orbit.¹¹²

Perhaps more important than the nation's economic dependency, the Canadian government also gravitated, for critics, towards an "Americanized" external policy. During the war, Mackenzie King's administration, partly of necessity, had become closely tied to the United States in the defense of North America.¹¹³ This close military relationship continued under Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) exemplified this persistent tendency. Originally conceived as a means of lessening military dependence on the United States,¹¹⁴ NATO expanded the military predominance of the United States in the North Atlantic and much of Europe. Instead of allowing Canadians freedom to pursue foreign policy alternatives, however, it bound Canada to an American-led anti-communist bloc.¹¹⁵ As historian Kenneth McNaught decried, NATO meant for Canada "acquiescence [to] Washington's ideological anti-communism".¹¹⁶ A year after NATO had been signed (April 1949), moreover, Canada became embroiled in the Korean War. Ostensibly under the auspices of the United Nations, Canada's participation in Korea was, in reality, a response to the American presence in East Asia. As Creighton remarked, "the action of the United Nations in Korea [was] a very imperfect disguise for American military intervention in the Far East".¹¹⁷ The advent of the North American air defense plan (NORAD) and the Distant Early Warning Line (DEW) later in the decade simply continued the Americanization of Canadian defense policy.¹¹⁸ As the decade wore on, the prospects of an autonomist defensive and foreign policy seemed improbable. The Canadian government appeared to have abdicated control to its American counterpart.

Conservative critics implored Canadians to look beyond American imperialism as the sole explanation of Canadian dependency. They themselves blamed Liberal leaders for Canada's pro-American policies. George Grant, for example, chided the Liberals for failing to understand the importance of the British nexus. The Liberals denied Canada's British character and wanted to sever ties with the Commonwealth, he remonstrated, and therefore were "bad Canadians". They had contravened the work of Macdonald, Laurier, and Borden, all of whom had fought hard to make Canada a separate entity.¹¹⁹ Furthermore, they had allowed Canada to become "a mere satellite like Bulgaria on the borders of a great Empire".¹²⁰ Yet, they still deceived the Canadian public in saying "sovereign, independent nationalist Canada is playing its fine and noble role in the U.N."¹²¹ Grant best summarized the anti-Liberal position in a letter to his mother. "[O]n the level of Canadian foreign policy", Grant declared, hardly concealing his vitriol,

I have nothing but contempt for the successors of Mackenzie King. Pearson now gets up and says that we must guard against Canadian dependence after years of the party he serves selling out this country to the Americans by weakening the only alliance that we could possibly have that would give us even a modicum of independence [i.e., alliance with Britain]. The Liberal Party has gained votes in this country by appeals to nationalism for two generations first by a refusal to be close to the power that once could have maintained peace and now by attacking the Empire that has taken its place. Oh how I find democratic nationalism contemptible.¹²²

Grant was not alone in his contempt for “democratic nationalism”. Harold Innis distrusted the motives behind the American involvement in Korea. He also scorned the whole idea of the NATO alliance. He wrote that “Pearson seems to be as active as possible in selling us down the river to the United States”.¹²³ Donald Creighton was just as vociferous as Grant and Innis in his denunciation of the Liberal party’s pro-Americanism and the Grit’s distrust of the British nexus. More than any other Liberal William Lyon Mackenzie King was the subject of Creighton’s vituperation. Writing in 1954, shortly after the former Prime Minister’s death, Creighton attacked King and his external policies. At a personal level, Creighton charged that King was without passion of any kind. He wrote that “[King] united a grey colourlessness of style, a grey ambiguity of thought, and a grey neutrality of action. He became an acknowledged expert”, Creighton reproached, “in the difficult business of qualifying, toning down, smoothing out, and explaining away ... With his squat, solid, unremarkable presence, and his earnest rather whining voice he became the veritable embodiment of the uncertainties, the mental conflicts, the parochial terrors of the Canadian people between the wars”.¹²⁴

In addition to his penchant for obfuscation, Creighton went on, King drew up damaging external policies. Specifically, he presided over the dismantling of the Anglo-Canadian connection. Up until 1919, Creighton explained, Canada and the other members had worked hard to maintain the diplomatic unity of the Empire. After King’s accession to power, however, Canada set about formulating and implementing “her own foreign policy separately from the United Kingdom”.¹²⁵ King and the Liberals were bent on achieving complete autonomy within the Empire, a pursuit that ended successfully in the “resounding declaration of the Balfour Report of 1926, and the Statute of Westminster of 1931”.¹²⁶ Under King’s directorship, in short, Canada gained full autonomy within the Empire.

Despite the seeming triumph, Creighton urged caution. Achieving independence within the Empire was in fact King’s most egregious contribution to the Canadian nation. Instead of developing new initiatives, King’s Liberals established an external policy that was “derivative, imitative, and lacking in conviction”.¹²⁷ The PJBD, NATO and other defense agreements of the 1940s, exemplified, for Creighton, King’s penchant to unite

Canadian interests with those of the United States. Under King's guidance, Canada had become a *de facto* colony of the United States, "accepting a position not very different from that of Panama or Cuba".¹²⁸ Creighton reviled King and the Liberals for allowing Canada to fall into the American orbit. He also vilified the Liberals for enabling the British connection to lapse. Without Britain's guidance, Creighton asserted, "Canada instinctively fell back on the old habits of colonialism".¹²⁹ Without the British counterweight, it fell prey to the "continental imperialism of the United States".¹³⁰ In severing imperial ties with the United Kingdom, King ensured that Canada failed to establish itself as a "separate and distinct" identity on the North American continent. Ultimately, the Liberals had contributed to the disintegration of the Canadian nation, and had done a grave disservice to all Canadians.

Liberal complicity in the destruction of the Canadian nationhood was, for Creighton, confined not merely to external policy. Rather, it extended to the so-called "Liberal" interpretation of the Canadian character. As noted in the preceding chapter, what Creighton derisively termed the "authorized version" of Canadian history was deceptive because it portrayed Canada's struggle for nationhood simply as the gaining of autonomy from Great Britain. It therefore obscured the very real "British" origins of the Canadian nation. More than that, it concealed the enduring relevance of the British connection for Canada in the postwar world. The Liberal nationalist ideology of historians such as Lower and Underhill, and pseudo-academics such as Skelton and Dafoe, were for Creighton and the others stultifying, monolithic, and false. It presented a fallacious picture of the emergence of the Canadian nation and created a mythology that did not befit the needs and circumstances of Canadians. Most of all, it destroyed a true understanding of the Canadian nationality, to which Creighton, Grant, Massey, and the others made fundamental contributions. For this reason it was despised. John Farthing captured the essence of the impact of Liberal nationalism. "A very real distinction exists between our present pure-Canada nationalism and a true Canadian nationhood", Farthing wrote.¹³¹ "At the root of the distinction", he continued,

lies our attitude to what had been known in Canada as the British tradition. According to our new nationalists this tradition is something that belongs only to the British Isles and is therefore an alien influence in the life of the people who should have their own traditions and should admit nothing in their national life that is not wholly and purely of Canada.¹³²

Along with identifying the perfidy of the Liberal nationalists, critics also wanted to express the righteousness of a conservative-nationalist mythology. The conservative strictures of the postwar period were designed in large measure to counterbalance

wrongheaded Liberal ideologies.¹³³ They were meant to disseminate truths about Canada's historic relations, and therefore to provide insight for a nation mired in an identity crisis. Ultimately, Canadian conservatism was a means of counteracting such disturbing modernizing trends as American imperialism by articulating and recording the "true" nature of the Canadian experience. Just as significantly, conservative doctrines intended to contribute to a "true" social order built on truth, freedom, and social justice. As Farthing declared, affiliation with the British monarchy gained for Canadians access to the "highest ideals" of democracy ever known.¹³⁴ British democracy was not merely a means of deflecting the influence of American political dogmas; it was a means to a positive definition of political freedom. Indeed, the expression of Canada's conservative nature was essential for Farthing and others to the achievement of the good life.

Whatever their motivations and aspirations, then, conservative intellectuals did precisely what their detested Liberal counterparts had done before them: they established a mythology that was congruent with the perceived needs and circumstances of the present age. Like the Liberals, they set about defining the Canadian experience both in historic terms and, more significantly, in reference to the needs of the Dominion in the postwar era. Both mythologies, in short, purported to proffer the truth about Canada's historic experience and the nation's true character. The main difference was that the conservative myth-makers endeavoured to undermine the reigning Liberal mythology and replace it with their own version of the Canadian reality. In this objective, they achieved a degree of success. As the 1950s progressed and as the conservatives themselves gained confidence through the triumph of Diefenbaker conservatism, their mythology grew in stature. By the end of the decade, Canadian conservatism appeared to have come of age.

Probably the most articulate myth-maker, W.L. Morton made it his purpose to define and apply the idea of Canadian conservatism. As explained in the previous chapter, in such works as *The Canadian Identity*, Morton elaborated on Canada's British character, her conception of freedom, and other aspects of the Canadian experience. Integral to his view of Canadianism, however, was political conservatism. The Dominion, Morton stressed, was "not founded on a compact". As such, "the final governing force in Canada is tradition and convention. Self-government came to Canada", he continued, "by administrative change gradually worked out rather than by the proclamation of principles ... [N]o one could declare what the Canadian destiny was to be ..." Rather, Canadians wished to develop their country in relation to past triumphs. For Morton, Canada was not a revolutionary nation, but rather one that maintained a deep, quasi-Burkean respect for the successes of prior generations. "[I]f among the spiritual forefathers of America were John

Calvin, Robert Browne, and John Locke”, he ended, “those of Canada were Bishop Bossuet, Edmund Burke, and Jeremy Bentham”.¹³⁵

In the spring of 1959, Morton encapsulated his thought on Canadian conservatism. In “Canadian Conservatism Now”, he set out the first principles of the conservative phenomenon. First, he emphasized the need for “law and order” and “civil decency, without which society dissolves in anarchy”.¹³⁶ Next was a respect for tradition. Morton urged deference for the “experience of the race” or “the wisdom of our ancestors”. He did not countenance “ancestor worship”, but instead “the realization that, important as the individual is, he is what he is largely in virtue of what he is in blood and breeding, and of what he has absorbed, consciously or unconsciously, formally or informally, from home, church, school and neighbourhood. He subscribes,” he went on, “to Burke’s definition of the social contract as a partnership in all virtue, a partnership between the generations, a contract not made once for all time, but perennially renewed in the organic processes of society, the birth, growth and death of successive generations”.¹³⁷ Loyalty and the “need for continuity in human affairs” were the next first principles. Echoing Edmund Burke, Morton showed that conservatives appreciate elements of permanence in their lives. And while they did not dismiss change outright, transformation “should come by way of organic growth, not deliberate revolution or skillful manipulation”. “Such change leads to the continuity that makes permanence possible”. Lastly, conservatism implied for Morton a communitarian spirit -- an appreciation of family, kinships, neighbourhood life -- that were vital to the “organic” nature of the society.¹³⁸

Moving from the generalized descriptions, Morton next expounded upon the origins and, most importantly, the relevance of Canadian conservatism. He first stressed the significance of French-Canadian conservatism. He showed how many observers failed to recognize the continuing impact of the Roman Catholic tradition in Quebec and the whole of Canada.¹³⁹ Nevertheless, Morton placed greater emphasis on the “Loyalist strain of Canadian conservatism”, chiefly because of its “extraordinary [relevance] to the circumstances of our ... day”.¹⁴⁰ The Loyalists brought to Canada a tradition of constitutionalism. Their political heritage, he claimed, accepted the role of the monarch as well as the people; it involved “three divided powers of king, courts, and parliament each checking and balancing each other so that the authority of the government was maintained while the liberty of the subject was assured, the greatest miracle wrought by English political genius”. Loyalists, Morton stressed, were not only champions of the balanced constitution, but they also stood against the greatest abuse of the emerging American political order: mass democracy. Herein lay for Morton the historic and indeed the contemporary pertinence of loyalism. Loyalists “refused to see the king struck from the

constitution, to be replaced by an elected democrat”, Morton announced; “they refused”, he went on, citing Chief William Smith, “to see ‘all America abandoned to democracy’. How right they were”, he concluded simply.¹⁴¹

The loyalist inheritance was certainly important to combating the misapprehensions of American political dogma. Yet, Canadian conservatism had for Morton an even greater contribution to make to mid-century society. The utility of conservatism, he explained, its contribution to the good society, was predicated upon the conditions of modernity. Society at mid-century was in a state of flux. Urban-industrialization, the rise of “scientific research”, the “enormous acceleration of the pace of social change”, and the demise of “philosophic individualism”, all characterized this period of transformation.¹⁴² Conservatism, and specifically, “a conservative philosophy for our times and circumstances”, Morton argued, would allay the effects of modernization. It was to provide a remedy for the impermanence, confusion, and instability that infected western societies. A purveyor of “absolute values” and “the established norms of our western tradition”, Morton explained, it was to work against the “relativism of liberal thinkers” for the “infection it is”.¹⁴³ Based on humanist ideals, he went on, making reference to the inhumanity of the machine age, conservatism would never forget that “people are themselves of absolute value”, and that “they are ... the test of justice, of the good life, and of all social and economic values”.¹⁴⁴ Following Hilda Neatby and the other “restorers of learning”, it insisted that “among men as endowed by nature, there is no equality”, and that “there is liberty in men to realize what is in them”. It restored, in other words, the primacy of the individual, the personality, and the intellectual as the core of the collectivity. Conservatism, Morton suggested, was to champion the individual, and, particularly, the intelligent individual to combat an age of standardization and anti-intellectualism. It was, in short, the invaluable alternative to the ever-growing scourge of modernity. To lose the “contest” for conservatism, he ended dramatically, “would be not only a tragedy ... [i]t would be a betrayal, of past, of future, of the soul of man”.¹⁴⁵

Other conservative intellectuals did not advance such a detailed conception of Canadian toryism. Nonetheless, Morton must be seen as part of a small group of thinkers who denounced Liberalism and put forth instead a “tory” vision of the nation.¹⁴⁶ Although the views of Morton and Creighton sometimes deviated on issues of national unity and the Canadian identity,¹⁴⁷ Creighton was a foremost member of this coterie. He was a key contributor to the burgeoning conservative movement of the 1950s. Creighton’s toryism came out in his historical writings, and, specifically, in his work on John A. Macdonald. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Creighton was consumed with a biographical reassessment of Canada’s pre-eminent statesmen. As he later admitted, such works as *The*

Young Politician (1952) and *The Old Chieftain* (1955) were efforts to rehabilitate Macdonald, whom “Liberal” historians, in Creighton’s words, had denigrated as “easy-going, convivial, bibulous, none too scrupulous ..., [a] master of the dubious arts of political expediency”.¹⁴⁸ For Creighton, however, Macdonald was little like the Liberal caricature. Instead he was a master politician, statesman, and, most importantly, a paragon of Canadian toryism. Macdonald’s conservatism, Creighton explained in 1957, was a “moderate or liberal Conservatism”. “He believed firmly in the monarchy, the British connection, the parliamentary system, [and] responsible government”¹⁴⁹ Indeed, Macdonald was the political embodiment of the loyalist principles of which Morton spoke so highly.

More than a theoretical conservative, Macdonald’s toryism was embodied in a vision of Canada’s nationhood. Most fundamentally, it was expressed, for Creighton, in one supreme political purpose: the creation of a transcontinental union in North America. Macdonald’s initiatives -- the protectionist tariff, the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway, and the National Policy generally -- extended the historical geo-economic realities of Canada: the Laurentian and Saskatchewan River systems. Canadian federation in 1867 constituted the logical conclusion to this process of development. It involved, most significantly, the preservation and expansion of the Canadian fact in North America. Historically, Creighton contended, Canadians “persistently followed policies devised to strengthen our unity from ocean to ocean and to maintain our separateness in North America. Our defences against the ‘continentalism’, which has so often threatened us from the South, have been based on the east-west axis provided by nature ... Confederation gives us our transcontinental political union. Sir John A. Macdonald’s national policy”, Creighton stressed, “provided the framework for an integrated transcontinental economy”.¹⁵⁰ Through union and the national policy, then, Canadians could realize their common traditions and inheritances; they could work to “expand, develop, preserve, and defend” their distinctiveness in North America.¹⁵¹ Macdonald’s programs were indeed much more than notable political accomplishments; they were enduring national triumphs, core elements, according to Creighton, in achieving the Canadian destiny.

For Creighton, Macdonald was a great leader, a man not only for his contemporaries but also for subsequent generations to appreciate and emulate. He had the rare quality of greatness, Creighton suggested, because he understood the essential conditions of the Canadian nationality. Through his actions, he taught Canadians to be true to their character and their past. He showed that Canada’s destiny was achievable only by realizing Canada’s defining qualities. Indeed, Macdonald was, for Creighton, a paragon of Canadian conservatism. He subscribed to Burkean precepts in agreeing that progress could

only be attained in reference to the past and in relation to those characteristics, such as Canada's British heritage and its geo-economic characteristics, which made the nation distinct. He saw the St. Lawrence system¹⁵² and the British nexus as the ancestors of modern Canada. Importantly, he made it his main purpose to put forth policies that would preserve the Canadian character. Macdonald's nation-building policies, Creighton asserted, and his Conservative approach to the future, were his enduring legacies. It was left for future Canadians to understand their nationality in the way that Macdonald did. It was their chief duty, Creighton claimed, to build on the work of Canada's great first prime minister.¹⁵³

While rooted in mid-Victorian Canada, Macdonald's conservatism indeed had a transcendent quality. Macdonald was, in Creighton's words, "as vividly contemporary as any Canadian politician now living".¹⁵⁴ His vision of the nation transcended time and therefore applied as much to the historical conditions of late nineteenth century as to those of the late 1950s. Creighton expressed the relevance of Macdonald in an address to Prime Minister John Diefenbaker on the importance to Canada of a national broadcasting system. "Canadian strength and Canadian unity", Creighton began, citing Macdonald's great purpose, "ultimately depend upon Canada's maintenance of her autonomy and spiritual independence on the North American continent ... A national broadcasting system can do for us", he went on, "in the realm of mind and the spirit, precisely what ... old and tested national policies [of Macdonald] have done in the political and economic sphere. A steady flow of live programmes along the east-west life line will express Canadian ideas and ideals, employ Canadian talent, and help unite our people from sea to sea and from the river unto the ends of the earth".¹⁵⁵ Elsewhere, Creighton commented on Macdonald's nation-building qualities of the CBC. "The cultural and intellectual advancement of our people", Creighton wrote in 1957, "is surely just as essential to the national well-being as are our political sovereignty or our economic prosperity. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation not only gives scope to the talents of our musicians, actors, playwrights, authors, commentators, and scholars: it also enables Canadians to maintain their intellectual freedom and to express their own interests and their own points of view in the realms of politics, economics, and society ... Canada", Creighton summed up, "should surely hold fast to every means of maintaining its intellectual independence and promoting its cultural maturity. Surely these things are essential to the populous, prosperous, and successful Canada of which Sir John A. Macdonald dreamed nearly a hundred years ago."¹⁵⁶

In addition, Creighton emphasized the necessity at mid-century of a Macdonald-like approach to defense and external affairs. As noted in the last chapter, Creighton was preoccupied with the menace of continentalism. In particular, he loathed the continuing

subjugation of Canadian foreign policy to that of the United States. He urged Canadian decision makers to relinquish reliance on American policies and develop instead an independent approach to foreign relations. "Canada's first duty is to remember that she is a separate and autonomous nation in North America", Creighton announced at the Couchiching conference of 1954.¹⁵⁷ "Her most important contribution" in international politics "will be to speak her own mind politely but firmly on all occasions ..." "North America is not the world", he added resolutely; "and the world will not willingly accept North American domination".¹⁵⁸ Although the nation-building and the Cold War eras were worlds apart, continentalism was still a threat to be identified and overcome. The lessons of Sir John A., for Creighton, never lapsed. Whether in broadcasting or defense or foreign policy, indeed, Creighton measured Canada's success in relation to the inestimable achievements of Canada's greatest statesman. Although dead for nearly three quarters of a century, Macdonald continued to embody in the second half of the twentieth century the essence of the Canadian identity.

Creighton's view of Macdonald's vision inspired the historian and influenced his own view of the nation. In a word, it inspired Creighton's conservatism. Although distinct, Creighton's toryism, like Morton's, was part of a greater whole. Creighton must be considered with fellow historians Morton and John Farthing, journalist Judith Robinson, constitutional expert Eugene Forsey, and philosopher George Grant, as intellectuals who criticized the Liberals for their contribution to the sterile political milieu of the early 1950s. The crux of these critics' complaints was that the Liberals under King had undermined traditional Canadian institutions and had abandoned traditional orientations. As Forsey took pains to point out, for instance, King had little regard for parliamentary responsible government. Through his use of plebiscites and his "presidential" practices of governance he had subverted the Anglo-Canadian parliamentary tradition. Further, in attacking the monarchy in Canada, as Morton, Farthing, Creighton and others emphasized, the Liberals had undermined the British connection and threatened potent national symbols and identities. As Forsey noted, Canadians debated the retention of such affectations as "Royal mail" and "Dominion". The British tradition was "attacked venomously", he declared, "by people who thought it was dying and wanted it dead". Prompted by the Liberal government, "[they] demanded a clean break from the past".¹⁵⁹ More than simply initiators of ill-conceived policies or corrupt governmental practices, then, King and his colleagues committed a much graver set of transgressions; the Liberals, for their conservative critics, had done the unthinkable -- they had sundered the conservative heritage of the country.

Ensnared within the tradition of Tory thought (as we saw with the imperialists), the conservatism of Creighton and the others was also firmly rooted in the political history of the 1950s and early 1960s. Politically, the Liberal party dominated the 1950s as it had presided over the 1940s. When it came time to call another election, the St. Laurent Liberals seemed the likely choice for another term in office. Yet, the 1957 election did not provide the expected result. The Canadian electorate turned out the Liberals and voted in a Progressive Conservative government under new leader John G. Diefenbaker. After twenty-two uninterrupted years of Liberal rule, Canada's political landscape had at once been drastically altered.

Although the defeat of the Liberal party came seemingly without warning, the demise of Liberalism can be traced back a few years before the election defeat. Debate in the House of Commons in 1955 over the renewal of the Defence Protection Act of 1951, for instance, revealed the stubborn arrogance of the government. Perhaps more importantly, it exhibited the increasingly effective opposition of the Conservatives. Devised during the Korean War, the Act gave C.D. Howe, St. Laurent's "minister of everything", extraordinary potential powers over the economy. In 1955, Howe vied for the Act's restoration even though the war had ceased and despite the fact that these powers seemed excessive. The Act stirred Opposition reaction and public concern. So too did Howe's public defense of the Act and of his own ministerial powers. Through leader George Drew, and frontbenchers Donald Fleming, Davie Fulton, and Diefenbaker, the Conservatives harassed the government, delayed other government business through filibuster, and made public the Liberals' transgressions. The first cracks in the foundation of the fashionable Liberal house had appeared.¹⁶⁰

While discussion over the Defence Protection Act exposed Liberal hubris, the so-called "pipeline debate" of 1956 was even more damaging to St. Laurent's government. With an affinity for mega-projects, Howe became convinced of the need to build a pipeline to carry natural gas from Alberta to central Canadian markets. The first problem was that an American-controlled company was to construct the pipeline. This issue was particularly irksome in a period when Canadians were becoming concerned with growing American investment into Canada. Further, Trans-Canada Pipelines, the corporation charged with building the pipeline, was near bankruptcy. It needed governmental financial assistance if the project was to be realized on time. Most Canadians did not understand the intricacies of pipeline building. What they did understand, however, and what the opposition Conservatives and CCF'ers made them understand, was that the Liberals were using improper methods to expedite the passage of the pipeline bill. To protest Liberal duplicity, the opposition parties delayed a variety of legislation. Despite the efforts of the Progressive

Conservatives and the CCF, however, the Liberals invoked closure and handily won a vote on the bill. C.D. Howe and the Liberals had prevailed.

The Liberals' victory was a pyrrhic one. Their highhandedness shocked the country. Embodied by Howe, they seemed to abuse power and injure the democratic process.¹⁶¹ Most perniciously, the Liberals showed themselves as friends of American interests. For their detractors, moreover, the pipeline debate was a turning point not only in the fortunes of the Liberal party, but also in the course of political events in the postwar era. It "revealed to an astonished nation", Creighton later remarked, "just how far the St. Laurent government was prepared to go in subsidizing American corporations and transferring important Canadian public utilities into their control".¹⁶² More than that, it revealed to Canadians the injustices of Liberal rule. Most of all, for Creighton, it showed the wrongheadedness of the Liberals approach to nation-building. During the pipeline debate, he claimed that "A great many Canadians came to the angry conclusion that their leaders had betrayed them ..." "[I]ntimidated by the strength of the public protest", Canadians "began to show a new concern for the protection of Canadian interests and the preservation of the Canadian identity".¹⁶³ Ultimately, they turned the treacherous Liberals out of office and elected a government that seemed more amenable to the goals of the nation. Implicitly agreeing with Creighton, Morton also argued that Canadians felt mistreated by the Liberals. The election showed their distrust for a government that had taken national sovereignty issues for granted and that neglected Canadian interests more generally. "Everything from the Arctic bases and the Trans-Canada Pipeline to the Suez crisis," Morton asserted, "was taken as proof of negligence by the Liberal government in protecting Canadian interests".¹⁶⁴ The Liberals had failed the Canadian people. The time was ripe, in Morton's phrase, for Canadian conservatism now.

The 1957 election interrupted the grievous rule of the Liberal government. Just as significantly, it augured in what Morton, Creighton, and others hoped was a new age of conservatism. At least at the beginning, leading tory thinkers expected Diefenbaker's Conservatives to correct the wrongs of the Liberals.¹⁶⁵ They hoped furthermore that the Tories would reestablish and strengthen Canadian traditions and reaffirm the Canadian identity. The 1957 election was a significant phase in the development of the postwar tory mythology. It was a flashpoint in the history of the country for the conservative critics, because it marked the triumph of the tory vision of the nation. Canadians had finally chosen correctly. For one brilliant (albeit brief) moment in postwar Canadian history, it seemed, to the tory critics, that the forces of good had prevailed.

John Diefenbaker was so important to conservatives because he embodied several of the key principles of Canadian toryism. The first of these was Canada's British

orientation.¹⁶⁶ An ardent monarchist, Diefenbaker made it the responsibility of his government to reinvigorate the imperial connection. One of his first acts was to attempt to increase trade with the British. On 7 July 1957, he announced his government's intention to divert fifteen per cent of Canada's imports from the United States to the United Kingdom. Although the plan was ill-conceived,¹⁶⁷ it indicated Diefenbaker's desire not only to increase interactions with the British and the Commonwealth more generally, but also to use the imperial nexus as a way to counterbalance Canada's increasing dependence on American goods and markets. True to the tory credo of Macdonald, Creighton, and the other modern conservatives, Diefenbaker employed Britain and the Commonwealth as a means to deflect the ever-present threat of continentalism.

Just as significant as Diefenbaker's Anglo-affinities was his notion of northern development. The new prime minister was enthused about developing the Canadian North because he saw Canada's northern reaches as the source of Canada's future economic and national growth. Echoing the tory nationalism of turn-of-the-century Canadian imperialists, and, more recently, historians Creighton¹⁶⁸ and Morton,¹⁶⁹ he presented a view of the country that intended to transcend the narrow-minded nation policies of the Liberals -- prosperity through economic continentalism. He "advocated a twentieth-century equivalent to Sir John A. Macdonald's national policy", he later wrote; "a uniquely Canadian economic dream".¹⁷⁰ The Liberals offered policies which stated that "what was good for General Motors was not only good for the United States but good for Canada".¹⁷¹ "In contrast," Diefenbaker continued, "we offered a policy of positive government" that had as its "historical origins" "in the first Conservative ministry in Confederation".¹⁷² Indeed, the Diefenbaker government intended to emulate the positive state action and nation-building that were intrinsic to the political programmes of Macdonald. It "offered a new national policy of regional and northern development".¹⁷³ Its main "objective", ultimately, was "to continue Macdonald's historic task of nation-building within the context of modern requirements and circumstances".¹⁷⁴ Of all the governments after 1918, one had finally emerged, in the minds of the tory critics, that recognized the significance of Macdonald's approach to building the nation.¹⁷⁵

Despite the Tories' best efforts, however, Diefenbaker's governments failed, by and large, to implement conservative principles. Diefenbaker's British trade scheme was a non-starter. His attempt, furthermore, at revivifying Canadian participation in the Commonwealth likewise achieved little success. Trade between the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth members was threatened as Britain looked more and more to Europe for its economic future. Without Britain as its focal point, the Commonwealth was doomed as an influential economic unit. In addition, Diefenbaker's endeavours to establish a more

independent defensive stance also failed. Intended to give Canadians equal voice in the air defense of the continent, the North American Air Defense agreement (NORAD) proved inadequate in guaranteeing Canadian interests during the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962).¹⁷⁶ Endeavouring to be resolute, even defiant, Diefenbaker came off as weak and indecisive on the issue of nuclear weapons. Instead of engendering widespread support, Diefenbaker's tough stand on atomic weapons not only decreased his popularity, it proved to be his undoing. Lester Pearson, now the leader of the Opposition, capitalized on the issue of nuclear armaments on Canadian soil and defeated the Conservatives in the election of 1963. Diefenbaker's tenure as the leading advocate of toryism had come to an end.

Leading conservative thinkers acknowledged that Diefenbaker had erred during his time in office. As early as October 1959, Morton, a long-time Conservative and supporter of John Diefenbaker, bemoaned the inabilities of the new Tory government. "The country seems to be prospering while its political life goes to the dogs", he wrote to Murray S. Donnelly, Provost of United College at the University of Manitoba. "... I think Diefenbaker is proving most inadequate as a prime minister, if only because he cannot shake the fear of defeat. We are going to pay long and bitterly", Morton closed his letter, "for the 22 years of Liberal rule ..."¹⁷⁷ Donald Creighton, for his part, described as "ill-fated" Diefenbaker's efforts "to escape from the domination of American defence and foreign policy, and to make an independent Canadian decision in the controversial issue of nuclear disarmament".¹⁷⁸ On the overall achievement of the Tories, Creighton declared: "The Progressive-Conservatives had fought Howe's Pipeline Bill to the last; but though much was expected of the Diefenbaker government, it failed to adopt a positive policy of economic nationalism".¹⁷⁹ George Grant also criticized the Tories. He believed that Diefenbaker proffered muddled approaches to Canadian-American relations. Further, the prime minister was, for Grant, unsure of what Canada ought to be. Hence his vision of the nation foundered. More than proving deficient in economic and defensive policies, Diefenbaker confounded rhetoric and policy. Most problematic, he continued to use rhetoric even when it failed to produce favourable results.¹⁸⁰ Like Morton and Creighton, then, Grant understood that Diefenbaker the politician and the policy-maker proved incapable of meeting the exigencies of the modern Dominion.

Although critical of Tory failures, conservative intellectuals nonetheless applauded Diefenbaker's unswerving advocacy of Canadian interests. Creighton, for instance, celebrated Diefenbaker's guile. He called him "The only Canadian in power who dared seriously to question the wisdom of American leadership in defense and foreign policy ..."¹⁸¹ He lauded Diefenbaker's defiance amid the crisis environment of October 1962. The prime minister "declined to make the automatic response to American initiative in the

Cuban crisis ..; he dared to postpone the adoption of nuclear weapons against the wishes of the Kennedy administration ...”¹⁸² Unlike Pearson and the Liberals, he was no lackey of the Americans. Creighton thus acknowledged the enduring message of the Diefenbaker régime.¹⁸³

Perhaps even more than Creighton, George Grant also emphasized Diefenbaker’s resolve. Grant, for example, was firmly behind the Progressive Conservatives during the nuclear arms controversy. He wrote to Tommy Douglas, imploring the New Democratic Party (NDP) leader not to combine with the Liberals, defeat the government, and vote “Diefenbaker out in the name of a servant of the United States like Lester Pearson”.¹⁸⁴ Whatever the inadequacies of John Diefenbaker, Grant had “never felt such political loyalty for [External Affairs Minister Howard] Green and Dief”.¹⁸⁵ He praised the nationalism of these Tory statesmen. Green and Diefenbaker, in Grant’s words, took the position of “neutralism, a simple refusal to accept any demand from the present imperialism”.¹⁸⁶ Indeed, Grant looked beyond Diefenbaker’s political style and his ill-considered decisions. Instead, Diefenbaker’s conservatism was to be commended; it was essential, after all, to Canada’s struggle against the onslaught of “imperialism”. The Tory leader’s inabilities notwithstanding, Diefenbaker was the “apotheosis of straight loyalty”.¹⁸⁷ Ultimately, he remained the best hope for Canadian independence in the universal and homogeneous state.

The 1950s thus were an era of conservative myth-making. Blandishments on relevance of the Crown and the British connection combined with strictures on the nation’s conservative heritage to produce a modern tory firmament. Postwar conservatism culminated late in the decade in the defeat of the Liberals and the rise to power of Diefenbaker nationalism. For the movement’s intellectual leaders, Canadian toryism seemed at last to have arrived.

The tory triumph was all too brief, however. Whereas the late 1950s was a period of promise, the 1960s proved to be just the opposite. The 1960s was a time of profound transformation for Canadian and western societies. The decade was indeed reminiscent of the tumultuous 1940s. It was for many a revolutionary age in that, unlike the years that preceded it, it brought agitation, excitement, challenges to authority, and quests for ideological renewal. The era was fraught with social reevaluation: student protests, burgeoning feminist and environmentalist movements, and profound social upheaval embodied by the development of the “counterculture”. With students demonstrations, Vietnam and nuclear weapons protests, and, in Canada, the arrival of the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ), it was a particularly violent period. Compared to the staid 1950s, the sixties were a time of socio-political fractiousness and dismay.

A crisis of authority in western social and political institutions was the root cause of the tumult of the 1960s.¹⁸⁸ The quest for stability, embodied in the cult of domesticity, materialism and democracy, provided for a period of calm in the 1950s. Politically, the Cold War climate marginalized the radical movements of the interwar era, and the St. Laurent Liberals provided a business-like sort of government. Socially, Canadians were still reacting against the disquietude of almost forty years of war, depression and then war again. For the most part, they were too caught up in raising families and improving material conditions to embroil themselves in larger political and ideological issues. Most bought into the rhetoric of democracy and anti-communism, although this visceral and largely unreflective participation in world politics was as far as they went.

The 1960s disrupted the stolid calm of the fifties. In foreign policy, more and more citizens across the continent questioned the policy directions of the Cold Warriors. In America, nuclear strategies and East Asian policies came under increasingly close public scrutiny. In Canada, many joined the small circle of critics (including Creighton and the other conservatives) who criticized monolithic approaches to international politics. Established in November 1959, the Combined Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CUCND) represented new attitudes towards the Cold War. Although small in membership, the CUCND (with the Voice of Women) managed to get 142,000 signatures on an anti-nuclear petition.¹⁸⁹ The newly formed NDP, moreover, took as its foreign policy stance a basically anti-nuclear position.

Added to growing political dissent was the reaction against the social authority of the 1950s. As Doug Owram indicates, the civil rights movement of the United States was vital in shaping the sixties. It made an "indelible mark on the postwar generation" because it demonstrated that "a belief in racial inequality was so unacceptable as to not be [*sic*] a subject for serious intellectual discussion".¹⁹⁰ Thus, in the context of socio-ideological upheaval of the 1960s, the impact of the civil rights movement was two-fold. First, it showed that the old political order, embodied in the fascist-like tactics and segregationist politicians of southern governments, was simply out of touch with current movements towards racial harmony and equality. As such, it legitimized resistance to civil authority.¹⁹¹ Second, and relatedly, it greatly reinforced the postwar ethic of democracy. It affirmed that all citizens, regardless of colour, creed, or ethnicity, ought to be treated the same. In pointing out glaring socio-economic and racial disparities, the movement made clear that much work needed to be done to safeguard the democratic society. Indeed, the democratic spirit of the civil rights movement combined with such later movements as Women's Liberation, urban poverty, native rights, and, of particular note to Canada, the Quiet Revolution to reinforce the democratic-egalitarian tenor of the decade.

Lacking the same explosive and violent tensions, Quebec's Quiet Revolution came closest to the civil rights movement in its idealist grandeur and high moralism. At its basis, the Quiet Revolution was about modernization and reform. On the one hand, it involved overturning the highly conservative and sometimes repressive *Union Nationale* government of Maurice Duplessis. The Duplessis régime was symbolic of all that was corrupt and anti-progressive about Quebec. Replacing it, along with church-dominated social and educational institutions, meant that Quebec had rejected a highly conservative socio-political structure, and could therefore completely modernize. The Quiet Revolution was as much about forsaking old institutions and indeed an entire conservative era as it was becoming *maitre chez nous*.

More than social and political modernization, the Quiet Revolution was bound up in the ideological rhetoric of reform and oppression and implied the need for social equality and economic parity. Like the civil rights movement had done for the United States, a modernizing Quebec gave Canadians a cause. As separatist Pierre Vallières claimed, the Québécois were the "White Niggers of America". Vallières was trying to claim the moral high ground for French-speaking Quebecers as had been done for the blacks in the south. That he succeeded among the many Canadians who were sympathetic to the modernizing plight of Quebec indicates the importance of the "Quebec issue" to the 1960s. Indeed, led by Prime Minister Lester Pearson, most English-speaking Canadians wanted to understand the Québécois in the hope of resolving the Quebec problem. Their end goal was to address the needs of an important minority and thus to achieve the objective of national unity. In the spirit of the democratic age, they believed that the Québécois deserved to gain the equality that had been denied them for generations.

With the Quiet Revolution and other social-political movements, the 1960s had become a democratic-reformist age. Hence, even more than the 1940s, the 1960s engendered bitter disillusionment for conservative intellectuals. Rather than expanding on the tory mythology or proffering advice on how to apply conservative principles, academics such as Creighton and Grant renewed their critique of the country's development. If not utter despair then alienation and disappointment characterized the mood of conservatives. The tory ideologues considered themselves marginalized in an increasingly egalitarian society (one that applauded "democratic nationalism" in all its forms, especially the accommodation of Quebec). If the late 1950s was conducive to the development of the tory mythos, in brief, then the decade that followed contributed greatly to the sundering of Canadian conservatism.

Extant before the Diefenbaker years, the critique of modernity and the attendant dirge for Canadian conservatism erupted after 1963. George Grant's *Lament for a Nation*

was perhaps the most devastating commentary on these baneful developments. Meaningfully subtitled *The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism, Lament for a Nation* was a political lamentation, a mourning for “the end of Canada as a sovereign state”.¹⁹² Written in the months after the 1963 Tory defeat, Grant demonstrated the symbolic value of the Diefenbaker administration. He admitted that inconsistencies and confusion bedeviled Diefenbaker’s government. To be sure, his long essay indicted the policies and approaches to governing of the Diefenbaker Conservatives.¹⁹³ Nevertheless, Grant stressed the nobility of Diefenbaker’s political objectives: the winning of Canadian independence and the strengthening of Canadian nationalism. In spite of Diefenbaker’s defects, the Tories were Canada’s last hope. “The 1957 election”, Grant explained, “was the Canadian people’s last gasp of nationalism”.¹⁹⁴ With the defeat of the Tories, so too came the demise of Canadian sovereignty in North America. Most perniciously, Diefenbaker’s downfall signaled the death of the Canadian idea, which was “grounded in the wisdom of Sir John A. Macdonald ... that the only threat to nationalism was from the south ...”, and was embodied in the notion that “to be a Canadian was to build, along with the French, a more ordered and stable society” than the United States.¹⁹⁵ This reality had passed; Canada, Grant claimed, was at a new stage of its existence.

Diefenbaker’s fall was thus of tremendous symbolic significance for Grant. Grant lamented more than the advent of continentalism, however, and the decline of the British nexus -- the nationalist-political components of the Canadian conservatism. *Lament* was also a commentary on Canada’s fate -- the inexorable and irrevocable integration into the American empire. This integration meant more than the union of economic, defensive, or foreign policies; it implied Canada’s merger into what Grant’s termed the “universal and homogeneous state”.¹⁹⁶ Grant showed that it was absurd to expect that Canada, a nation that existed next to an empire that was the core of modernity,¹⁹⁷ could avoid absorbing American attitudes and ideological trappings. Canada’s assimilation into the American empire was represented not merely in the triumph of continentalism, but also in the acceptance of the doctrine of liberalism. As evidenced in chapter two and five of his book, the liberalism that had engulfed all of North America was the crux of modernity. North American liberalism entailed above all the pursuit and augmentation of individual freedom. As Grant wrote, it allowed no “appeal to the human good” “to limit [individuals’] freedom to make the world as they choose”.¹⁹⁸ “Social order”, he continued, “is a man-made convenience, and its only purpose is to increase freedom. What matters is that men shall be able to do what they want when they want ... ‘Value judgments’ are subjective”, he argued; the human good is what we choose for our good”.¹⁹⁹ Liberalism was thus completely subjectivist and relativist except for one overriding *bonum* -- the unremitting

struggle to safeguard individual liberty against the combined tyrannies of revealed truth, philosophical constants, and enduring moral verities. It offered a tightly circumscribed and indeed erroneous view of the “good life”. As such, it characterized, for Grant, the turpitude of modernity.

Bereft of moral standards and objective judgments, liberalism was not simply a depraved ideology. It was also a profoundly deleterious aspect of modernization, for it interfered with moderns’ understanding of themselves, their worldly objectives, and their place in the universe. In a word, liberalism undermined an independent, philosophical understanding of the world. With no conception of the good life, nor any preconceived system of values, modern liberalism implied the “end of ideology” for Grant. The quest for progress alone -- material and technological progress -- characterized the dogma, making irrelevant all other approaches that did not include a similar vision of reality. Liberalism marginalized and subsumed other appeals to human freedom. It taught that no freedom could exist outside its bounds. Its only “good”, Grant claimed, was to increase individual liberty as it saw fit.²⁰⁰ Modern liberalism stultified moderns’ perceptions of society because it crowded out competing views, denied the existence of absolute values, and presented itself as the only viable approach to individual and collective freedom. With mass culture and modern technique, it contributed the ideological core of Grant’s universal and homogenous state.

A profoundly influential and burgeoning ideology, liberalism also impinged upon conservatism. For Grant, the growing predominance of liberalism meant the demise of the doctrine of conservatism. The “impossibility of conservatism as a viable political ideology”, Grant wrote, marked the modern era.²⁰¹ Modern conservatives, he explained further, faced a dilemma; “if they are not committed to a dynamic technology [i.e., to the concept of technological freedom], they cannot hope to make any popular appeal. If they are so committed, they cannot be conservatives”. Beset by the inexorable forces of modernity, thus, “conservatives” cannot conserve; they can be no more than “defenders of whatever structure of power is at any moment necessary to technological change”.²⁰² Indeed, there was no such thing anymore as an integral conservative. Contemporary conservatives, Grant noted, “are not conservative in the sense of being custodians of something that is not subject to change. They are conservatives, generally, in the sense of advocating a sufficient amount of order so that the demands of technology do not carry society into chaos”.²⁰³

Thus, no longer true to its original purposes and objectives, traditional conservatism had disintegrated. Its demise, Grant added, was particularly lamentable for Canada. While Diefenbaker attempted to realize Canadian tory traditions and orientations,

for instance, he ultimately succumbed to the ineluctable allure of mid-twentieth century liberalism. Like so many other conservatives, he was fated to perform the emasculated role of the modern conservative. The Diefenbaker débâcle, moreover, was simply a microcosm of the sundering of Canadian conservatism at large. Like Diefenbaker, Canada could not meet the expectations of its tory heritage. The vast majority of Canadians, in consequence, were destined to live entirely within the forms and assumptions of liberalism. Canada as a corporate entity was fated to be a second-rate member of the liberal-industrial order centred in the United States. For Grant technological liberalism destroyed the Canadian nation just as it had moral philosophy. With the disintegration of nationalism, ultimately, came also the demise of Canada's distinctiveness, its outlooks, and perspectives. Canadian toryism, for Grant, was dead.²⁰⁴

Less given to philosophical observations, Donald Creighton concurred nonetheless with the general tenure of Grant's arguments. As the 1960s wore on, Creighton devoted more of his energies to analyzing in a bitter tone the defeat of Canadian conservatism. The dismantling of the Canada's tory identity was understandable, for Creighton, in the decline of the "Empire of the St. Lawrence"²⁰⁵ and the concurrent rise of continentalism. Unlike Grant, who highlighted 1963 as a year of tremendous symbolic significance, Creighton claimed that the decline of the "Empire" -- the apotheosis of Canadian economic and political integration -- dated from 1940.²⁰⁶ Since that momentous year, "Canada has been exposed to the irresistible penetrative power of American military and economic imperialism". Beginning with the Ogdensburg Agreement of 1940, Canada's "subordination to American foreign policy and American capital had continued progressively with scarcely a serious interruption".²⁰⁷ Its participation in NATO, its acceptance of American leadership in the Korean War, and its willingness to permit its defensive policy to be determined by American anti-Communist mania, all indicated the tendency towards a more complete continentalism. By the post-Diefenbaker era, Creighton claimed, Canada's continentalist orientation was fully realized. The real leader of the Liberals during the party's re-ascent to power was not Lester Pearson but John F. Kennedy.²⁰⁸ American press agents and presidential advisors worked closely with the Liberals, according to Creighton, to defeat the Progressive Conservatives, and to claim Canada as the northernmost extension of the American realm. "About the only manifestation of American power that was spared Canada in the [defense -- Bomarc] crisis [of 1963]", he remarked acerbically, "was the sight of tanks rolling up Parliament Hill in Ottawa".²⁰⁹ Canadians, in short, had surrendered to the American eagle.

What was worse about Canada's growing subservience was that it appeared irreversible. Due in large measure to Canadian neglect, the British Empire had dissolved

after 1945. Not only was its military power gone forever, but its “moral influence” in international affairs and its considerable potential economic clout had also ended. The Korean War and the Suez Crisis crises, Creighton proclaimed, “dealt it blows from which it could not recover”.²¹⁰ The upshot was that Canada now stood alone. Shorn of its historic partnerships, the Dominion lacked the means of counterweighing the growing influence of the American Empire.

Perhaps even more irksome than the decline of the Empire-Commonwealth was Canada’s integration into the American ideological realm. Echoing Grant, Creighton explained the penchant of Americans to conquer nature and harness natural resources for unending human consumption. Creighton agreed that North Americans had come to ascribe to what Grant called technological liberalism. “The United States”, he wrote in 1971, “has become the most advanced technological society of modern times. The American people subscribe, with fewer reservations and qualifications than any other people on earth, to the belief that progress means the liberation of man through the progressive conquest of nature by technology. The possibilities of the future, it has always been confidently assumed, are infinite; there must be no limitations on the satisfaction of whatever human wants industry decides to create by modern advertising ...”²¹¹ This line of thinking proved particularly problematic, according to Creighton, because it had now become the credo of Canadians. Not only have the Americans “stripped what the most richly endowed half-continent in the world can provide”, but they also influenced Canadians’ view of progress and imbued them with a stridently modern vision of freedom. “Canadians, like Americans”, he explained, “have been brought up to believe, as a cardinal article of national faith, that their natural resources were unbounded and inexhaustible ...”²¹² Although this “dictum” had proven false, many Canadians still believed it. Canadians compromised their values, their very identity to the American way of life. “If Canada had decided to reserve its inheritance for its own people,” it might have had an almost limitless supply of resources. “But we have now denied ourselves this choice”, Creighton lamented; “it will never be open to us again. We have come close to admitting that Canada is expendable in the service of the American technological empire”.²¹³

Continentalism was a formidable, perhaps even an insurmountable, foe in Canada’s history. There was also an internal threat, for Creighton, to the Canadian tory character. By the mid-1960s, Creighton began to rail against a growingly prominent and, what he considered, erroneous, view of the nation. He denounced as sheer fantasy the notion that Canada was a bicultural country and that the Dominion’s fathers had created the nation out of a bicultural compact. In an article tellingly entitled “The Myth Of Biculturalism” (1966), Creighton took pains to undermine the position of those Canadians who put forth a

fallacious understanding of the nation's heritage. The Confederation conferences, he explained, "were not organized on ethnic or cultural lines, and their purpose was not a bilateral cultural agreement. On the contrary, their purpose was a political agreement between Canadians, both English-speaking and French-speaking on the one hand, and Maritimers on the other. It must always be remembered", Creighton advised, "that the great aim of Confederation was a strong federal union of all the British provinces" in North America.²¹⁴ "[T]he discussion of ethnic and cultural questions occupied a very minor part of the proceedings ... There was nothing that remotely approached a general declaration of principle", he declared emphatically, "that Canada was to be a bilingual or bicultural nation".²¹⁵ The implications of Creighton's statements were clear. While Canada had always been linguistically and ethnically diverse, that diversity did detract from its singular purpose and its common destiny. Far from being legal recognition of Canadian diversity, Confederation was in fact, for Creighton, an acknowledgment of the new country's Laurentian heritage and its British traditions. It was a highly significant precondition, in short, in the realization of Macdonald's vision of the nation.

Creighton's pronouncements on Confederation, then, were efforts to clarify history from a conservative perspective. His strictures were also vividly contemporary. Confederation, for Creighton, gave force to his own vision of Canada. His interpretations were also designed to discredit a movement gaining prominence in the 1960s. Creighton castigated French-Canadian nationalism precisely because nationalists reinterpreted Canada's past for their own political purposes. For the nationalists, Creighton argued, Confederation was not a matter of good government, or of economic growth; it was instead an instrument to satisfy French-Canadian cultural needs and to fulfill French-Canadian cultural aspirations. They "grotesquely exaggerated the importance of language and culture" in Canadian history. Owing to Canada's newfound bicultural and bilingual heritage, they emphasized that Canada's "real essence" "must henceforth lie in the formal recognition of Canadian cultural duality".²¹⁶ Predicated on a skewed vision of Canadian history, Creighton declaimed, they attempted to redefine the essential components of the Canadian nationality. The recent obsession with reforming Canada according to its bicultural and bilingual pedigree was nothing more than a slick propaganda campaign to mislead a gullible public.²¹⁷ The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, moreover, reflected the widespread sympathy, especially on the part of the ruling Liberals, that the promotional campaign had garnered. French-Canadian nationalists had thus, according to Creighton, misrepresented history and used the past to hoodwink a growing number of Canadians in the present. Above all, they distorted Canada's origins and destinies and thus had betrayed the Canadian identity.

Canada had evolved by the late 1960s and 1970s into what Creighton termed a "Divided and Vulnerable Nation".²¹⁸ The incessant continentalization of Canada's economy and culture and the growth of liberalism combined with internal strife to engender a country unsure of its beginnings and its future direction. As for Grant, the 1960s were for Creighton a decade of decline for the Canadian nation. What was more, there was little hope for the resurrection of a true and honest Canadianism. Canada's future prospects for both commentators were indeed bleak. Perhaps not as pessimistic, W.L. Morton nevertheless agreed with the substance of Grant's and Creighton's message: Canada had experienced enormous strains in the 1960s. "Canada", Morton wrote in 1964, "is at a crossroads. Either we go forward in the community that has come into being over three and a half centuries ... or we disappear as Canada and as Canadians".²¹⁹ As the decade continued, however, he became less sanguine about Canada's future prospects. As Creighton argued, Canada, for Morton, emerged in the 1970s as a weakened, insecure nation.

Morton claimed that there were three great challenges to the Canadian identity in the 1960s: the Quiet Revolution and the growth of Quebec nationalism; the decline of Great Britain as a Great Power and the "end of Britain as the exemplar and inspiration of Canadian life"; and "the realization of Canadians that American protection, investment, and friendship, carry with them a price, neither stated nor demanded but inevitable, of the complete Americanization of Canadian thought, government, and national purpose".²²⁰ First, concerning French-Canadian nationalism, Morton put forth a critique similar to that of his colleague Creighton.²²¹ Morton disdained Quebec nationalists' misuse and distortion of Canadian history.²²² Like Creighton, he argued that Quebec nationalists ignored or willfully distorted historical fact. As a consequence, they advanced a misleading notion of cultural duality. "They are asking us to resume the dualism", he explained, "the duality of political sovereignty that ... was deliberately and emphatically discarded by both English and French in the confederation scheme of 1867".²²³ While Morton was more willing than Creighton to recognize minority rights,²²⁴ the two historians concurred on the "cultural" implications of Confederation. The fathers of Confederation "liquidated" dualism, Morton declared in favour of "a vast new combination of the Canadas and the Maritimes".²²⁵ Any claim to the contrary was clearly a distortion of the past. Although a historic fallacy, Morton condemned dualism not just for historic reasons. Like Creighton, he feared that the assertion of the myth of Canada's cultural duality would poison the contemporary climate and undermine the Canadian identity. Cultural and linguistic duality, he wrote in 1964, "destroy the civil and economic significance of the Canadian unity. [They] blight the significance of the Canadian experiment".²²⁶ Intended to strengthen the Canadian nation,

dualism instead obscured historical realities and hindered the development of a strong, centralized nation with common goals and purposes. To include dualism as a tenet of modern Canadianism was “folly” for Morton.²²⁷

Morton’s and Creighton’s comments on Quebec and national unity came within the context of the Quiet Revolution and the federal government’s response to the Quebec issue. Sensing a great danger to national unity, the Liberal government of Lester B. Pearson reacted quickly to the Quiet Revolution. Upon taking office in 1963, Pearson called a Royal Commission to investigate the status of bilingualism in the federal government bureaucracy as well as in the provinces and the minds of Canadians at large. The preliminary report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism was not promising. Canada, in the words of Davidson Dunton, chairman of the Commission, was passing through the greatest crisis of its history without being fully conscious of the fact. The Commission found furthermore that Quebecers had seriously rejected for the first time the agreement of 1867. And it made two important preliminary recommendations: it advised that English-speaking Canada abandon its attitude of superiority towards Quebec; and it advocated instead a “equal partnership” between the two majorities of Canada.

Despite these dire realizations and recommendations, however, there was some optimism. The Commission reported that unlike in the recent past, Canadians outside Quebec were no longer oblivious to Quebec issues. As the Quebec issue gained momentum in Quebec, Canadians throughout the country seemed concerned about what Quebec wanted and about what it would take to accommodate Quebec to make the Québécois feel at home within Canada. There were additional reasons for optimism. Reaction to the report was generally favourable. There was certainly denunciation of the Report -- some newspapers and citizens complained that French Canada had yet again governed the national agenda. It seemed also that the farther one got from Quebec that criticism for the Report grew. But most Canadians seemed to understand Quebec’s plight and accepted that change was needed. They realized, moreover, that Quebec was the key to national unity; if Quebec was not brought in as a full partner in Confederation, then national unity would suffer, and, ultimately, the country might be torn asunder.²²⁸

Morton and Creighton numbered among the Royal Commission’s chief detractors. As we have noted, they chided the Commission for presenting a bastardized view of Canada’s past and current constitutional status. Most of all, however, the Commission was important because it placed Quebec at the top of the national agenda. Indeed, the conservative-nationalists objected to the Commission not simply because of its inaccurate views and tainted recommendations; they despised it because it took precious attention away from the imperial nexus, Macdonald’s nation-building, Canada’s tory heritage, and

other aspects integral to the conservative vision of the country. The Quebec issue had derailed the momentum of the tory freight train of the late 1950s. Through the liberal nationalists, Quebecers were holding the nation hostage with grave consequences, namely the demise of tory nationalism. Against the backdrop of the Quiet Revolution and the liberal nationalism of the 1960s, feelings of frustration and alienation grew among the conservative nationalists. In a few short years Quebec had not only radically altered the issue of national unity, but also stifled the prospects of tory nationalism.²²⁹

The Quebec problem was worrisome, for the conservative nationalists, in large measure because it deflected attention from vital issues such as the demise of the British connection. The decline of “British” Canada was indeed as important as the Quiet Revolution. As noted, Morton was an unabashed supporter of the imperial tie. The British nexus, he argued, “had always added to the momentum of [the] Canadian nationality”.²³⁰ Britain had been “the brightest of Canada’s windows on the world. It was a prime Canadian interest to keep that tie strong, the window clear”, Morton continued, extending the metaphor. Yet, after a brief period of regeneration during the war, “the tie had weakened, the window darkened”.²³¹ The British Empire had become for Canadian nationalists such as Morton “little more than an academic concern” and “a vague racial sentiment”.²³²

For Morton, then, the ending of the British Empire affected Canada in an “ultimate [and] fundamental way”.²³³ It meant above all that Canada was alone in North America. Uncontested Americanization was indeed the chief impediment to the development of the Canadian nation. As Morton pointed out, continentalism was a constant feature of Canada’s national existence.²³⁴ The pressures of Americanization continued to build into the postwar era. “After 1961”, Morton explained, Canada experienced “ever-growing dependence on American investment, accompanied more and more by direction of the Canadian economy by Americans and the steady vitiation of American technology and its inevitable running dog, American advertising”.²³⁵ The unabated continentalism of the 1960s, Morton went on to argue, manifested itself in “a crescendo of apprehension about the fate of Canada”.²³⁶ Through James E. Coyne, governor of the Bank of Canada, Walter Gordon, and economist Melville Watkins, Morton claimed, Canada’s plight was realized. Gordon and Watkins, for instance, had exposed “the extraordinary degree to which American capital had .. come to dominate Canadian life”.²³⁷ George Grant’s *Lament for a Nation* and Donald Creighton’s *Canada’s First Hundred Years* (1970), moreover, were well-rounded commentaries on the plight of modern Canada.

Morton’s own essay, “Canada Under Stress in the Sixties” (1971), among others, can also be added to this list. Less pessimistic than Grant or Creighton,²³⁸ Morton emerged

from the 1960s hopeful that Canada's destiny was realizable. He hoped that continentalism, separatism, and other modern "frictions" might be controlled.²³⁹ Morton was a realist, however. Like Grant's and Creighton's, his work in the 1960s was also a somber warning that continentalism and other forces threatened the Canadian identity. As for other Canadian nationalists, Canada, for Morton, was at a crossroads. To survive, Canadians must realize their corporate identity and understand the threats to that nationality. "Either we go forward in the community that has come into being over three and a half centuries", he remarked, "or we disappear as Canada and as Canadians".²⁴⁰ Morton, in short, understood the realities of the last third of the century. If the impediments to Canadian nationalism persisted unchecked, Canada would suffer grave consequences. If the discords of the 1960s "continued and combined", he stated forebodingly, "they might well destroy Canada".²⁴¹

The 1960s were thus inimical to the development of the Canadian identity. The decade did more than undermine Canadian traditions, however. It also represented for conservative critics the emergence of the fully modernist consciousness, a new world-view that embraced change as a defining characteristic. As such, the age was hostile to the values of permanence and stability. For the conservative critics, the 1960s were indeed an age of revolutionary transformation, a profound rejection of values, traditions, and continuities. They represented not only a break with the past, but more importantly, the sundering of preservationist tendencies and traditional orientations. They demonstrated that the transition between the Victorian order and the new world had finally come to a close. In a word, the 1960s represented the triumph of modernism.

That the decade distressed the critics of modernity like no other is clear. W.L. Morton, for instance, although engrossed in the task of nation-building, had the opportunity to reflect on the greater implications of modernity. In 1964, he discussed a "time of great depression" that was as much a part of his growing disenchantment with the modern era as it represented his concern over the plight of the nation. "[S]uddenly I realized with the rush of an avalanche", Morton intimated, referring to the despair that overcame him after the symbolic defeat of 1963, "and with all the clarity of loss that the world in which we live, the world I had bothered with and had tried to keep in modest repair, that world no longer existed. It was no longer there", Morton went on, -- "it had vanished. I was like a man alone in the Artic [*sic*] waste, in the twilight and with no landmark".²⁴² A "collapse of assumptions", a "desiccation of values", characterized, for Morton, this dolorous period. Indeed, the 1960s signaled the end of the Victorian world of Morton's upbringing. Most significantly, they symbolized the rupture of outlooks and socio-cultural values centuries in the making.²⁴³

Even more direct than Morton on the tumultuous nature of the 1960s was Northrop Frye. For Frye, the “sixties” was an era of unmitigated change, “an age of undirected revolution”.²⁴⁴ “All kinds” of revolutionary movements distinguished it: blacks, women, students, unions, or any group distinct from the “establishment”, Frye claimed, developed movements.²⁴⁵ The revolutionary age penetrated deeper, however; it also impinged on the intellect, and, specifically, on one’s perception of reality. The sixties were “the McLuhan age”; they were a period of “becoming adjusted to new techniques of communication, more particularly the electronic ones”.²⁴⁶ The “news media” were particularly important to Frye in this new technological period. They exemplified the turbulence of the age. Whereas life consists generally of routine and continuity, Frye explained, “news” is that which breaks the routine. Through the fabrication of “issues”, the news media polarizes debate and forces people to come down on one side or the other.²⁴⁷ “Thus”, Frye explained further, “the new media have, already built into them, as a necessity of their existence, the quality of undirected revolution”.²⁴⁸ Along with the myriad socio-political reactions against the established order, they contributed to the anarchy of the age.

Frye went even further, however, claiming that the revolutions of the 1960s had become a defining feature of the age. To illustrate his point, he likened the tumult of the decade to a war. The penchant to pit the “counterculture” against the “establishment”, he explained, resembled a battle as between two nations or two fighting factions. Previous generations had the First or Second World War that defined their formative periods; the generation growing up during the sixties also had its own defining event: the “revolutionary” struggle against the oppressive establishment. This “war”, he added, also took on “warlike manic depressive qualities”. “As in war, where carnage and exhilaration can stand side by side, in the 1960s it [was] permissible to tout the moon landing as the greatest event since creation, and yet still have the depressive side of self-destructive activities of the youth”.²⁴⁹ The 1960s, for Frye, thus made manifest the incongruities of war. For the “combatants”, however, the age afforded no such clarity of vision. Instead, it only demonstrated the virtue of the fight and the importance of revolution. The period had indeed a powerful hold on the minds of those who lived through it.

Perhaps not as reflective as Frye, or even Morton, others commented nonetheless on the distinct, volatile nature of the 1960s. Hilda Neatby, for example, saw the decade as a culmination of several long-term trends. By the late sixties, civilization, according to Neatby, was in grave danger. Western civilization, which Nazism and later communism had imperiled from without, and which scientism and false ideas of democracy had endangered from within, now faced its greatest challenge because of “a failure to teach the young to love religion, learning and books”.²⁵⁰ As her biographer writes, Neatby “had

been warning of the possibility of collapse of civilization for thirty years. The rise of student power now seemed to be a clear sign of the coming end -- the rising up of the unlearned against those who were failing to teach".²⁵¹ Like Neatby, Creighton considered the sixties the culmination of an epoch, the epitome of modernity. The decade evidenced an acceleration of modern materialist tendencies: industrialization and urbanization "moved forward with increasing speed"; "the building of houses, 'high rise' apartments, hotels shopping plazas, and city-centres never seemed to catch up with the demand"; technology "lightened the business of living to an extent which would have seemed miraculous only thirty years before".²⁵² "The average Canadian of the 1960s", Creighton concluded, "had the benefit of services which, in ancient times, could have been provided only by about four hundred slaves".²⁵³ Expressed in a different manner, Claude Bissell concurred with Neatby's and Creighton's views on the sixties' changeability. For Bissell, President of the University of Toronto, change at his institution and Canadian universities generally reflected greater social transformation. The Canadian university, he asserted, continued to be "feudalistic" in structure into the early part of the decade. Despite intrusions of the state and private business, the university's hierarchical structure had been maintained so that "initiatives could be strongly exercised at the top", while the faculty could retreat to the "safety, security, and the illusion of freedom in a separate, protected kingdom".²⁵⁴ After 1968, however, the edifice collapsed:

the hierarchical separation was challenged, first by the staff and then by the students; the alliance of the university with business and government was attacked, on the left from staff and students, who saw it as corrupting, and on the right by government, who rejected an alliance of partners and called for a master-servant relationship; the sanctity of knowledge was questioned and new qualities were exalted -- sensitivity, involvement, a feeling of community solidarity. University education was thought of not as something to be earned by the sweat of the brow or by superior performance in examinations; it was a natural right, and, therefore, should be subsidized.²⁵⁵

Sit-ins, students disorder, and occasional violence on campuses, furthermore, reflected the demands of an increasingly vocal youth and the growingly politicized environment of decade. The venerable academy had become a sounding board for the stresses and strains of life in the late 1960s.

Whether manifested in student unrest, material and technological advancement, or in national-cultural change, the sixties were a period of transformation. As such, they provided the backdrop for the decline of Canadian conservatism. Conservatives

themselves suggested that the age contributed to the demise of conservatism in its many guises. They were right. Conservatism simply could not withstand the centrifugal forces of the decade. With the 1960s, the critics saw the development of trends inimical to the concept of "aristodemocracy". Indeed, the sixties evidenced the fruition of a democratic culture that had little association with intellectual democracy. Concern for the American civil rights movement, a growing concern for gender parity, and, specifically in the Canadian context, sympathy for goals of linguistic and cultural equality, all characterized the modernist concept of democracy and freedom. Dissent movements of all kinds added to the burgeoning democratic culture. Protests such as those over the Vietnam War, nuclear armaments, student power, the role of women and others engendered discord. Yet, they also symbolized the willingness of Canadians to voice concern over pressing issues. Perhaps most indicative of this tendency towards democratization was the advent of the democratic universities. As explained in chapter four, the university moved from being an institution for the education of the elite to a community-oriented facility designed to provide a training that most young Canadians had now come to expect, even demand. With growing numbers of Canadians attending universities, the prospects of establishing a Platonic hierarchy were becoming remote indeed. The fight for educational democracy, which had been initiated with Deweyite educational concepts, had now penetrated all levels of the system. From the perspective of conservatives, the universities had been lost to the masses.

The notion of intellectual democracy thus could not survive the hostile sixties. It languished in the hothouse environment of modern democracy, equalitarianism, and most of all, the "revolutionary" movements of protest, student discontent, and separatist nationalism. The tory-nationalist mythology suffered a similar fate. As we will see next, the later 1960s saw a resurgence of nationalist sentiment. The New Left and other nationalist groups embraced the nationalism of Harold Innis, Donald Creighton, George Grant, and others. Thus they seemed to resurrect a dying tradition. Yet, the new nationalism stressed primarily the anti-American implications of tory nationalism. As such, it largely ignored Canada's tory heritage, its enduring conservative character, or its inherent "Britishness". There was thus very little sense of a positive Canadian identity based on the traditions of Canadian toryism. The remnants of tory nationalism had been co-opted to service the needs of a class-based ideological movement. The death of the new nationalism by the 1970s was nonetheless the final blow for the conservatives. Although different from the tory vision of Creighton and the others, it represented an opportunity for conservative nationalists to influence Canadians and to show them the importance of a

conservative-nationalist vision. As national fervour faded, however, the last chance of the intellectual elite for real relevance to the new generation also diminished.

The sixties were, in sum, markedly different from the age that preceded them. The postwar period was to be sure a tumultuous time. Yet it seemed to have connections with past values and orientations that made possible the rise of such mythologies as intellectual democracy and the tory identity. With the 1960s, these links seemed to be disappearing for good. Canada was in stage of cultural and intellectual redefinition and re-formation. Amid the chaos and intellectual ferment of the age, Canadians became inured to values rooted in history and tradition. Ties to the past had been severed and new identities and orientations were being established. With the triumph of modernist outlooks came the ultimate sundering of traditional perspectives. By the 1970s, as we will see next, rarely did intellectuals criticize society and proffer conservatism as a means to counteract the abuses of the modern age. When they did, they could be sure that their voices were marginalized and, worse still, that their thoughts were not taken seriously. The ascendancy of modernity was thus complete. As its natural and inevitable corollary was the demise of Canadian conservatism.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

¹Walter Lippmann, "The Shortage of Education", *The Atlantic Monthly*, CXCIII (May 1954); quoted in Clinton Rossiter and James Lare, eds., *The Essential Lippmann: A Political Philosophy for Liberal Democracy* (New York, 1963), 29.

²Harold J. Laski, *The Dilemma of Our Times: An Historical Essay* (London, 1952), 53

³*Ibid.*, 53-54

⁴Vincent Massey, "Christian Social Order in a Changing World" *Address to the Montreal Council on Christian Social Order*, draft copy (5 November 1953) Hilda Neatby Papers (SAB) I.12 (Massey, Vincent, 1951-1969)(4), A 139, 2. See also Vincent Massey, "Christian Social Order in a Changing World" in Vincent Massey, *Speaking of Canada: Addresses by the Right Honourable Vincent Massey* (Toronto, 1959).

⁵See chapter four.

⁶See H.W. Wright, "The Values of Democracy", *University of Toronto Quarterly* 10 (1940-1), 68-88; Hilda Neatby, "The Democratic Cycle", *The Dalhousie Review* 22 (1942-43), 470-75; Harold Innis, "Democracy and the Free City", in Citizen's Research Institute, *Bulletin, The Importance of Local Government in a Democracy*, 84, 3, (May 1945); J.A. Corry and J.E. Hodgetts, *Democratic Government and Politics* (1946); Robert C. Wallace, "Education in a Democratic Society", *Queen's Quarterly* 53 (1946-47), 430-36; A.R.M. Lower, "Why Men Fight", *Queen's Quarterly* 54 (1947-48), 187-200; H.L. Stewart, "The Superseding of Democracy", *The Dalhousie Review* 30 (1950-51), 145-58; Rodney Grey, "Korea and 'Western Values'", *Queen's Quarterly* 57 (1950-51), 281-91; John A. Irving, "The Manifesto of Democracy", *Queen's Quarterly* 58 (1951), 312-26; among others.

⁷Neatby, "The Democratic Cycle"

⁸*Ibid.*, 470

⁹*Ibid.*, 472-73

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 474

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²*Ibid.*

¹³*Ibid.*

¹⁴See chapter four.

¹⁵Neatby, "The Democratic Cycle", 475

¹⁶Arthur Lower, "The Social Sciences in the Post-War World", *Canadian Historical Review* 22 (March 1941); quoted in Welf H. Heick, ed., *History and Myth: Arthur Lower and the Making of Canadian Nationalism*, (Vancouver, 1975), 108.

¹⁷Harold Innis, "Preface", *Political Economy in the Modern State* (Toronto, 1946), xv

¹⁸Lower, "Why Men Fight", 190

¹⁹H.W. Wright, "The Values of Democracy", 84

²⁰*Ibid.*

²¹Innis, "Preface", *Political Economy in the Modern State*, vii

²²*Ibid.*, viii

²³*Ibid.*, vii

²⁴Lower, "Why Men Fight", 191

²⁵Walter Lippmann, "Man's Image of Man" *The Commonweal* 35 (1942); quoted in Clinton Rossiter and James Lare, eds., *The Essential Lippmann*, 163;

²⁶*Ibid.*

²⁷*Ibid.*, 165

²⁸*Ibid.*, 167

²⁹*Ibid.*, 167-68

³⁰In addition to the works cited below, see Stewart, "The Superseding of Democracy"; Irving, "The Manifesto of Democracy"; and Wallace, "Education in a Democratic Society".

³¹H.W. McCready, "The Defence of Individualism", *Queen's Quarterly* 52 (1945-46), 71

³²Malcolm Muggeridge, "Farewell to Freedom?: The State, the Person, the Faith", *Queen's Quarterly* 61 (1954), 305

³³*Ibid.*, 306

³⁴*Ibid.*, 307

³⁵William B. Munro to Donald Creighton (15 June 1948) Donald Creighton Papers, Public Archives of Canada (PAC) v. 2, General correspondence, 1948, 31 D77

- ³⁶Muggeridge, 311
- ³⁷George Grant, "The Minds of Men in the Atomic Age" in H.D. Forbes ed., *Canadian Political thought* (Toronto, 1985), 286
- ³⁸Ibid.
- ³⁹Ibid., 287
- ⁴⁰Doug Owram, *Born at the Right Time: A History of the Baby Boom Generation* (Toronto, 1996), 45
- ⁴¹Ibid., 46
- ⁴²Nora McCullough, "Education for Peace", *The Canadian Forum* 26 (September 1946), 133
- ⁴³John A. Irving, "Education for an Enduring Peace" *Queen's Quarterly* 52 (1945-46), 401
- ⁴⁴Ibid., 403
- ⁴⁵Wallace, "Education in a Democratic Society", 435
- ⁴⁶Ibid., 436
- ⁴⁷Ibid.
- ⁴⁸Watson Kirkconnell, *Twilight of Liberty* (London, 1941), 175
- ⁴⁹Ibid.
- ⁵⁰Ibid., 176
- ⁵¹ibid.
- ⁵²Ibid.
- ⁵³Hilda Neatby, "Education for Democracy", *The Dalhousie Review* 24 (1944-5), 47. See also chapter four.
- ⁵⁴Ibid., 47
- ⁵⁵Ibid., 50
- ⁵⁶Northrop Frye, "A Liberal Education" Part II, *The Canadian Forum* 25 (October 1945), 163.
- ⁵⁷Frye, "A Liberal Education" Part I, *The Canadian Forum* 25 (September 1945), 135
- ⁵⁸Frye, "A Liberal Education" Part II, 164
- ⁵⁹Harold Innis, "Adult Education and the Universities", *Report of the Manitoba Commission on Adult Education* (Winnipeg 1947); quoted in Harold Innis, *The Bias of Communication* (Toronto, 1951; reprinted 1973), 203.
- ⁶⁰Ibid., 203-7
- ⁶¹Robert M. Ogden, "Are Men Equal?" *Queen's Quarterly* 55 (1948-49), 431
- ⁶²Ibid., 432
- ⁶³ibid.
- ⁶⁴Ibid.
- ⁶⁵T.S. Eliot, *Notes Towards the Definition of a Culture* in T.S. Eliot, *Christianity and Culture* (New York, 1940; reprinted 1949), 109
- ⁶⁶Ibid.
- ⁶⁷Ibid., 121
- ⁶⁸Ibid.
- ⁶⁹Donald Creighton, "Education for Government: What can the Humanities do for government?", unpublished manuscript, (n.d.) Donald Creighton Papers (PAC) v. 15; Education for Government, MG 31 D77, 4
- ⁷⁰Ibid.
- ⁷¹Ibid., 4-5
- ⁷²Watson Kirkconnell, *Seven Pillars of Freedom* (Toronto, 1944; revised 1952), 102
- ⁷³Ibid.
- ⁷⁴Harold Innis, "Charles Norris Cochrane, 1889-1945", *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, v. 12, no. 1 (February, 1946), 97.
- ⁷⁵Harold Innis, Memorandum to President H.J. Cody (? , 1943); quoted in Robert F. Neill, *The Work of Harold Adams Innis : Content and Context*. Ph. D. Thesis, Duke, 1966.
- ⁷⁶Peter Viereck, *The Unadjusted Man: A New Hero for Americans. Reflections on the Distinction Between Conforming and Conserving* (New York, 1956; reprinted 1962), 5
- ⁷⁷Ibid.
- ⁷⁸N.A.M. MacKenzie to Hilda Neatby (20 February 1950) Hilda Neatby papers (SAB) v. II. 36 General Correspondence, 1949-51, A139, 1
- ⁷⁹Ibid.
- ⁸⁰See chapters three and four.

⁸¹Hilda Neatby to W.W. Robinson, [Editor, Clarke, Irwin & Co. Ltd.] (31 August 1953) Hilda Neatby Papers (SAB) I. 6, Clarke, Irwin & Co., 1952-1969, A139, 1

⁸²Quoted in William Christian, *George Grant: A Biography* (Toronto, 1993), 109

⁸³See Harold Innis, "Great Britain, Canada, and the United States" (1948) in Daniel Drache, ed., *Staples, Markets, and Cultural Change: Selected Essays, Harold A. Innis* (Montreal, 1995), and chapter five.

⁸⁴Quoted in Christian, 108

⁸⁵See *ibid.*, 108-9

⁸⁶Vincent Massey, "Coronation Day Broadcast", draft copy (2 June 1953) Hilda Neatby Papers (SAB) I. 12, Massey, Vincent, 1951-69, (3), A 139, 2; See also Vincent Massey, "The Meaning of the Coronation", *Coronation Day Broadcast, 2nd June 1953* in Vincent Massey, *Speaking of Canada: Addresses by the Right Honourable Vincent Massey* (Toronto, 1959).

⁸⁷*Ibid.*

⁸⁸Massey, Vincent, "Canadian Club Speech", Niagara, Ontario (13 March 1953), I.12 (Massey, Vincent, 1951-1969)(3) A 139; 2

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, 3

⁹⁰*Ibid.*

⁹¹John Farthing, *Freedom Wears a Crown*, Judith Robinson ed., (Toronto, 1957), 27

⁹²*Ibid.*, 27-8

⁹³*Ibid.*, 28

⁹⁴Forsey had been working with Farthing and mutual friend Judith Robinson (who went on to edit *Freedom Wears a Crown* after Farthing's death in 1954) on a book that was to be entitled *The British Tradition in Canada*. The project faltered, however, and each went on to complete other projects. Note also, Forsey referred to Farthing's work as that "precious little book". See, Frank Milligan, "Eugene A. Forsey: An Intellectual Biography", Ph.D. Thesis, (University of Alberta, 1987), 394, n.3.

⁹⁵Forsey, "Crown, Parliament and Canadian Freedom", unpublished article (1952); quoted in *ibid.*, 402.

⁹⁶*Ibid.*, 402

⁹⁷Quoted in *ibid.*, 412-13

⁹⁸Other conservatives such as W.L. Morton were staunch monarchists. Along with Eugene Forsey ("Monarchy in Government"), Gad and Jean Horowitz ("Charles Bonenfant"), Morton was to write "The Monarchy as a Symbol" as his contribution to a collection of essays on the monarchy in Canada. No compilation was ever produced, however. See W.L. Morton Papers, Mills Memorial Library (MML) Box 56; "Monarchy in Canada". Morton's affections for the Crown and the British tradition were well-known. See below and see Morton, *The Canadian Identity* and W.L. Morton, *The Kingdom of Canada: A General History from Earliest Times* (Toronto, 1963).

⁹⁹Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Burma, and Israel seceded from the Commonwealth in 1947.

¹⁰⁰Donald Creighton to Paul G. Hoffman [President Ford Foundation] (24 January 1951) D.G. Creighton Papers (PAC) v. 10, HRCC, 1949-52, 31, D77, 1

¹⁰¹*Ibid.*

¹⁰²Vincent Massey, "Canadians and Their Commonwealth", *68th Romanes Lecture Delivered at Oxford*, draft copy, (1 June 1961) Hilda Neatby Papers (SAB) I. 12, Massey, Vincent, 1951-69, (8), A 139, 91. See also Vincent Massey, "Canadians and Their Commonwealth" in Vincent Massey, *Confederation on the March: Views on Major Canadian Issues During the Sixties* (Toronto, 1965), 85-101. 1 June 1961,

¹⁰³*Ibid.*, 93

¹⁰⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.* Canadians at large prided themselves on the fact that the Commonwealth was transformed from a purely white organization into a multi-racial body. They regarded Canada's participation in it as a noble contribution to international harmony. See Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and John English, *Canada Since 1945: Power, Politics and Provincialism* (Toronto, 1989; revised edition), 125.

¹⁰⁷See chapter one.

¹⁰⁸See Carl Berger, *The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism 1867-1914*. (Toronto, 1970)

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*, 263-64

¹¹⁰*Ibid.*, 261

¹¹¹Trade was \$508 million, forty-three per cent of all Canadian exports to Great Britain, compared to \$443 million in trade with the United States.

¹¹²See J.L. Granatstein et al., *Nation: Canada's Since Confederation*, third edition (Toronto, 1990), 406-09; Kenneth Norrie and Douglas Owram, *A History of the Canadian Economy*, second edition, (Toronto, 1991), 411; Bothwell et al., 189.

¹¹³The establishment at Ogdensburg, New York of the Permanent Joint Board of Defence (PJBD) coordinated the defensive strategies of Canada and the United States. J.L. Granatstein, *How Britain's Weakness Forced Canada into the Arms of the Americans*, (Toronto, 1989). This piece shows how Canada had no choice but to abandon Britain and rely more heavily on the Americans for defense.

¹¹⁴By preserving a democratic and friendly Europe, Canadian NATO negotiators thought that Canada could avoid becoming reliant on the Americans

¹¹⁵Canada, moreover, had hoped that NATO would be a means of extending cultural and economic relations between member nations. The Americans, in contrast, viewed the agreement simply as a military alliance. As the Cold War threatened to devolve into open hostilities by 1950, it became apparent that the American conception had triumphed.

¹¹⁶Quoted in Bothwell et al., 263

¹¹⁷Donald Creighton, "Introduction", *Towards the Discovery of Canada: Selected Essays* (Toronto, 1972), 8

¹¹⁸NORAD was a North American air defense plan. Canadian and American officers would jointly administer an integrated defense force under supreme American command under NORAD. The DEW Line was chain of more than forty stations built across the Canadian and American Arctic from 1954-1957 to warn North Americans of an impending Soviet air attack. The significance of both is the integration of defensive strategy under American initiatives and leadership.

¹¹⁹Christian, 110

¹²⁰Quoted in *ibid.*, 138

¹²¹*Ibid.*

¹²²G.P. Grant to Mother [late 1940?] George Grant Papers (PAC) v. 39; Mrs. W.L. Grant Correspondence; file: Dalhousie University, MG 30 D59, 1

¹²³Quoted in Bothwell et al., 90

¹²⁴Donald Creighton, "Canada in the World", in G.P. Gilmour, ed., *Canada's Tomorrow: Papers and Discussion Canada's Tomorrow Conference, Quebec City, November 1953* (Toronto, 1954), 228.

¹²⁵*Ibid.*, 229

¹²⁶*Ibid.*

¹²⁷*Ibid.*, 231

¹²⁸*Ibid.*, 248

¹²⁹*Ibid.*, 230

¹³⁰*Ibid.*, 229

¹³¹Farthing, 13

¹³²*Ibid.*, 14

¹³³Harold Innis summarized the meaning of Creighton's first volume of his Macdonald biography both to the writing of Canadian history and the expression of the national psyche in declaring: "I need hardly say that judging from these chapters alone [of the biography which Creighton gave him to read], it is clear to me that this will be the most significant work we have had in biography and the most important work in the field of history within the last half century. The book will compel a re-writing of Canadian history. It makes one realize the extent to which Canadian history has been dominated by the liberals and raises suddenly the question as to why another approach has been completely neglected until the second half of this century... All I can say is that it will be the most significant work in Canadian historical writing for a long period". Harold Innis to Donald Creighton (6 June 1952) Donald Creighton Papers (PAC) v. 2; General Correspondence, 1952, file 1, MG 31 D77. In a similar vein, historian G.F.G. Stanley congratulated Creighton for the latter's CBC addresses [June 1959]. He remarked to Creighton that "much of my enthusiasm for your remarks stems from the fact that I am so wholeheartedly in sympathy with them. You have advanced points of view which I think should be given wider publicity among historians and students of Canadian History. Too long have we been exposed to the 'Whig' interpretation of Canadian History". G.F.G. Stanley [Head of the History Department at the Royal Military College] to Donald Creighton (5 October 1959) Donald Creighton Papers (PAC) v. 9; Television Broadcasts, 1959, MG 31 D77. Vincent Massey, for his part, denounced as fallacious and indeed more myth than reality the notion that Canadian national development was that of a struggle for autonomy against the "forces of darkness in

10 Downing street". He objected to the interpretation of the development of "dominion status" as a sort of liberation. See Massey, "Canadians and Their Commonwealth", 92.

¹³⁴Farthing, 27-8

¹³⁵W.L. Morton. *The Canadian Identity*. Second edition (Toronto, 1972), 86

¹³⁶W.L. Morton, "Canadian Conservatism Now", in H.D. Forbes, ed., *Canadian Political Thought* (Toronto, 1985), 301

¹³⁷Ibid.

¹³⁸Ibid., 302

¹³⁹Ibid., 302-3. Morton outlined the other contributors to the tradition of Canadian conservatism. Through the Loyalists, the Earl of Shelbourn, "the founder of British Canada", and the Pitts, he argued, the main constituents of modern Canadian toryism had been put in place.(304) It was left to John A. Macdonald, a conservative "inspired through Elgin by the Peelites of the Pittite tradition", to unify the diverse strands of toryism.(306-7) The toryism of Macdonald constituted a historic conservatism on which all, even modern Canadians, could rely.

¹⁴⁰Ibid., 303

¹⁴¹Ibid.

¹⁴²Ibid., 306

¹⁴³Ibid., 307

¹⁴⁴Ibid.

¹⁴⁵Ibid., 309

¹⁴⁶Again, see chapter one.

¹⁴⁷Creighton, for instance, implicitly disagreed with Morton's efforts to systematize and find the origins of conservative precepts. "It is not necessary", he wrote in 1957, "to trace an idea back through Edmund Burke to Charles I in order to prove that it is a Conservative political principle ..."(See Donald Creighton, "Macdonald and the Anglo-Canadian Alliance" in Creighton, *Towards the Discovery of Canada*, 216). Rather, Canadian conservatism in the nineteenth century was "not what Burke and his successors and commentators thought it ought to be in theory, but what Macdonald and his principal associates made it in practice".(Ibid.) Indeed, the political practice of John A. Macdonald was the focal point of Canadian conservatism for both the nineteenth and for the mid-twentieth century. See below.

¹⁴⁸Ibid., 211

¹⁴⁹Ibid., 217

¹⁵⁰Donald Creighton, *Address to the Prime Minister* [John G. Diefenbaker], unpublished address, draft copy [n.d. -- Spring 1958] Donald Creighton Papers (PAC), v 8, Canadian Broadcast League, file 1

¹⁵¹Creighton, "Macdonald and the Anglo-Canadian Alliance", 218

¹⁵²According to Creighton, the attributes of the Empire of the St. Lawrence formed the basis of what emerged as the Canadian nation. These are basically the economic-financial aspect, the geographical East-West orientation of the system, an associated impulse towards westward expansion, and a political, Anglo-Canadian connection which evolved into Canadian Confederation. This system lasted for many years, fully sixty years after 1867. But it began to break down in the 1920s. From the 1920s on, "the familiar distinguishing characteristics of the Canadian nation began to weaken; and the historic themes of its history lost their old dominance. Up until the beginning of the Second World War the decline was gradual and slow; from that time on it has hurried forward, with steadily increasing rapidity, towards what now looks like its inevitable and final fall. What has happened to Canada? Why did it change direction so decisively? And where is it now bound?" See Donald Creighton, "The Decline and fall of the Empire of the St. Lawrence" in Creighton, *Towards the Discovery of Canada*, 164

¹⁵³Macdonald, of course, is the main leader because of the vital decisions he made and the directions he set for national development. Creighton adds that Laurier and others picked up on the national policy style of Macdonald and hence that there is continuity in Canadian leadership. Of Macdonald, he writes that "he developed policies which the country needed. I think he saw what the country needed and had a superb conception of the future of this country and what is necessary to achieve it." Donald Creighton, "A Long View of Canadian History" [The text of two half-hour programs originally presented on the CBC television Network, June 16th and 30th, 1959] (June, 1959) Donald Creighton Papers (PAC) v. 9; Television Broadcasts, 1959 MG 31 D77

¹⁵⁴Creighton, "Macdonald and the Anglo-Canadian Alliance", 218

¹⁵⁵Creighton, *Address to the Prime Minister*

¹⁵⁶Donald Creighton to ?, Nowlan (25 November 1957) Donald Creighton papers (PAC) v. 8; Canadian Broadcasting League, file 1, MG 31 D77, 1-2.

¹⁵⁷Donald Creighton, "Canada in World Affairs: Are We Pulling Our Weight?", unpublished address given at the Couchiching Conference, (13 August 1954) Donald Creighton Papers (PAC) v. 11; "Canada in World Affairs" MG 31 D77, 4.

¹⁵⁸Ibid. Creighton added that Canadians' aim "ought to be to enlarge the circle of nations which maintain ordinary diplomatic relations with each other, just as it is our natural human impulse to keep on speaking terms with those with whom we have to live and work. The Geneva Conference effectively dispelled the self-righteous fiction [of the Americans] that Chinese are diplomatic untouchables, and the acceptance of the government of the Chinese Republic as the effective government of China and its admission to the morally vacant seat in the Security Council of the United Nations are decisions which Canada and the rest of the world cannot afford to postpone much longer. Canadian opinion is something which the world now regards with a measure of interest and respect; and in the United Nations, in NATO, and in the Commonwealth, Canada occupies positions in which she can bring considerable influence. NATO links us with Europe: the Commonwealth brings us in touch with the East. And it is vitally important for Canadians to use and rely upon associations which unite contrasted cultures and bridge continents". Ibid., 5

¹⁵⁹Eugene Forsey, *The British Tradition in Canada*, draft copy of an unpublished manuscript, Hilda Neatby Papers (SAB) I. 7 (Forsey, Eugene, 1953-1970), A139.

¹⁶⁰Prime Minister St. Laurent finally acquiesced to the Conservatives, limiting powers in the Act. The political damage was already done, however.

¹⁶¹Closure was a legal procedure, although its use was rare and highly unpopular because it curtailed debate and hence offered the perception that it offended the democratic process.

¹⁶²Donald Creighton, "Canada: A Divided and Vulnerable Nation", *Address to the Men's Canadian Club*, draft copy of an unpublished paper, (6 May 1970) Donald Creighton Papers (PAC) v. 32; "Canada: A Divided and Vulnerable Nation", MG 31 D77, 11

¹⁶³Ibid.

¹⁶⁴Morton, *The Canadian Identity*, 82

¹⁶⁵In a letter to good friend and key Diefenbaker advisor Derek Bedson, George Grant heralded the "wonderful news of the elections". "What a wonderful victory", he went on; "What a joy that the Canadian people were not so bemused that they could throw the rascals out". "Rarely in this life", Grant concluded, "do the loyal and the principled have their triumph in this world ..." Indeed, he considered the 1957 Conservative victory as a "triumph for loyalty, courage and principle". See George Grant to Derek Bedson (13 June 1957) in William Christian, ed., *George Grant: Selected Letters* (Toronto, 1996), 192

¹⁶⁶The prospects of renewing ties with the Empire-Commonwealth, for example, exhilarated Diefenbaker. At the 1957 Prime Ministers' of the Commonwealth Conference (at Accra, Ghana), Diefenbaker made clear his affection for the British and the imperial connection. In the words of Graham Spry, who went to the conference, Diefenbaker made "a very favourable impression by his energy and directness ..." His comments were so ebullient that "to read some of the cheaper newspapers one would think that Canada had not only rejoined the Commonwealth, but was almost going to amalgamate with the United Kingdom". Quoted in J.L. Granastein, *Canada 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation* (Toronto, 1986), 43-4.

¹⁶⁷It would have required that approximately thirty-five per cent of Canadian imports (provided by the Americans) would have now to come from the United Kingdom. This expectation was wholly unrealistic; British exporters simply did not have the capacity to increase their exports to Canada at this rate. See *ibid.*, 44.

¹⁶⁸See Donald Creighton, *Dominion of the North: A History of Canada* (Boston, 1944)

¹⁶⁹See Morton, *The Canadian Identity*, among others.

¹⁷⁰John G. Diefenbaker, *One Canada: Memoirs of the Right Honourable John G. Diefenbaker. The Years of Achievement, 1957-1962* (Toronto, 1976), 11

¹⁷¹Ibid.

¹⁷²Ibid., 15

¹⁷³Ibid., 15-16

¹⁷⁴Ibid., 16

¹⁷⁵Conservative intellectuals, such as Creighton, openly encouraged Diefenbaker's Macdonald-like approach to state-building. In a letter to McDonnell, Creighton proffered advice on the upcoming election strategy (1957) by giving an historical summary of Conservative and Liberal approaches to British import preference. He claimed: "It would seem to me -- if such a suggestion is not an impertinence -- that the conservative party might do better to continue along the course which it began last year by directly

attacking the encroachments of the United States from a nationalist point of view rather than by seeking to appeal to the benefits, either economic or political, of the old Anglo-British alliance. The importance of British markets and of British diplomatic and military support has undeniably declined; but, on the other hand, Canada itself is definitely stronger than it used to be; and the defense of our boundary waters, our sources of fuel and power, our military and diplomatic autonomy, has become a matter of major concern to Canadians who are, unless I am greatly mistaken, full of worries and misgivings about our subordination in a continental ...” empire. Donald Creighton to ?, McDonnell (25 February 1957), Creighton Papers (PAC) v. 3; Gen. Correspondence 1957, file 3

¹⁷⁶See Granatstein, chapter five.

¹⁷⁷W.L. Morton to Murray S. Donnelly (6 October 1959) W.L. Morton Papers (MML) Box 8; Donnelly, Murray, Provost of United College, University of Manitoba, 1.

¹⁷⁸Creighton, “Canada: A Divided and Vulnerable Nation”, 12

¹⁷⁹Ibid., 12

¹⁸⁰See George Grant, *Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism*(Toronto, 1965), chapter one.

¹⁸¹Donald Creighton, “Canadian Nationalism and Its Opponents”, in Creighton, *Towards the Discovery of Canada*, 274

¹⁸²Ibid.

¹⁸³Although critical of Diefenbaker a few years earlier, W.L. Morton was more sympathetic to the Tories in 1963. In a letter to Creighton, Morton argued that the Liberals may not win the upcoming election.(2) The “civil service mandarins”, he claimed, “have failed to measure up to the expectation of victory. So the country is faced ... with the demonstrated inadequacy of both the conservatives and the Liberals ...”(2) In these conditions, he goes further, the NDP thrives. But Morton blamed the political climate of the 1960s (and not Diefenbaker specifically) for the degradation of Canadian political life. “The mood of the country”, he continued, “is becoming more and more grave and reflective. I think a realization is growing as to how shallow, mediocre and ineffective Canadian politics have been. The country is not ready to entrust anyone with power ...” W.L. Morton to Creighton, Morton Papers, 28 March 1963, Box 6; Creighton, D.G. 1962-64; 2.

¹⁸⁴Quoted in Christian, *George Grant*, 241 When the NDP proceeded, however, Grant termed them a “kind of vacuous extension of the Liberals” and regretted his “small association” with them. See George Grant to Derek Bedson (February 1963) in Christian, *George Grant: Selected letters*, 215.

¹⁸⁵Ibid.

¹⁸⁶Quoted in Christian, *George Grant*, 245

¹⁸⁷Quoted in *ibid.*, 247

¹⁸⁸Owram, 161

¹⁸⁹Ibid., 165

¹⁹⁰Owram, 167

¹⁹¹Ibid.

¹⁹²Grant, *Lament for a Nation*, 2

¹⁹³Ibid., 5. Grant claimed that “American control [in Canada] grew at a quickening rate” during Diefenbaker’s years in office.(15) Until Diefenbaker decided to defy the Americans first in the Cuban crisis and later over the nuclear arms issue, the Tory Prime Minister committed many acts that failed to allay the American influence in Canada. See *ibid.*, chapters 1-3.

¹⁹⁴Ibid., 5

¹⁹⁵Ibid., 3-4

¹⁹⁶Ibid., 53

¹⁹⁷Ibid., 54

¹⁹⁸Ibid., 57

¹⁹⁹Ibid.

²⁰⁰Ibid., 56

²⁰¹Ibid., 67

²⁰²Ibid.

²⁰³Ibid.

²⁰⁴See *ibid.*, chapter 5.

²⁰⁵See Creighton, “The Decline and fall of the Empire of the St. Lawrence”.

²⁰⁶Ibid., 169.

²⁰⁷Ibid.

²⁰⁸Ibid., 170-71

²⁰⁹Ibid., 171

²¹⁰Ibid., 169

²¹¹Donald Creighton, "Continentalism and the Birthright of Canadians", in Creighton, *Towards the Discovery of Canada*, 289

²¹²Ibid.

²¹³Ibid.

²¹⁴Donald Creighton, "The Myth of Biculturalism" in Creighton, *Towards the Discovery of Canada*, 261

²¹⁵Ibid., 262

²¹⁶Ibid., 257

²¹⁷Ibid., 256

²¹⁸See Creighton, "Canada: A Divided and Vulnerable Nation".

²¹⁹W.L. Morton, "Towards a New Conception of Confederation?" *An Address to the Seventh Annual Seminar of the Canadian Union of Students*, unpublished address, draft copy (4 September 1964) W.L. Morton Papers (MML), Box 6, Canadian Union of Students The Dualism of Culture and The Federalism of Power, 2

²²⁰Morton, *The Canadian Identity*, 116

²²¹It is important to note, however, that unlike Creighton, Morton "welcomed heartily" the Quiet Revolution, but only inasmuch as it enabled Quebec to release itself from the medieval fetters of the past – the socio-political constraints of the Roman Catholic church and so forth. What he disliked about the Quiet Revolution was that it undermined Canadianism. Morton, "Towards a New Conception of Confederation?", 8-9. See below.

²²²He wrote: "I repudiate the seeming belief on the part of many of my contemporaries, of the separatists in Quebec, like my friend Professor Michel Brunet, of the supporters of the new flag of the composition and spirit of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism as first conceived, that the past can be ignored. I deplore this frantic pretense that the past if it exists is regrettable and best forgotten, the frantic pretense that history can be swept aside and forgotten". (Ibid., 9)

²²³Ibid., 10. The new arrangement "would be tolerable", Morton explained, "because it would not be a final majority or minority of French or English but a changing and varying, and therefore tolerable majority".(ibid.)

²²⁴Confederation, Morton wrote, involved "the balancing of guaranteed provincial and minority rights with the creation of a new political majority".(ibid.)

²²⁵Ibid.

²²⁶Ibid., 11

²²⁷Ibid. Morton also argued that Canada was a political nationality of "no political duality, no associate, separate, or special political status for any province, or any cultural nationality. None can be tolerated because the Canadian community is made up of citizens equal in right and in status. Political duality in any form is denied and rejected in these remarks; cultural duality is urged both as a matter of doing justice to French Canada, and as needed for the maintenance of the political unity of the community". See W.L. Morton, "Brief to Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism", draft copy, W.L. Morton Papers (MML) Box 1; Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 2.

In addition to denying the doctrine of cultural duality, Morton spoke against the divisiveness and the chauvinism of the Quiet Revolution. The propagandist tactics of the Quebec nationalists frustrated Morton as much as they had Creighton. Not only had the nationalists misapprehended their history, thereby misrepresenting the nature of Canada, they also made English-speaking Canadians scape-goats for the internal socio-political problems. Anglophones, the line of reasoning went, failed to honour their commitments and create a nation that safeguarded minority rights and that entrenched the principles of biculturalism and bilingualism. They also interfered with the social development of Quebec. They kept Quebecers ignorant, denied French Canadians the opportunity to control their economic and cultural affairs, and, ultimately, made the Francophones subservient to English Canada. Morton had little sympathy for this mythologized account of the development of modern Quebec. He denounced Quebec nationalists for blaming the ills of French-Canadian society on English-speaking Canadians. In a letter to Michel Brunet, a historian and leading Quebec nationalist, Morton urged French Canadians to take responsibility for their current plight. "The circumstances of Quebec before 1960", he wrote to Brunet in late 1964, "were almost wholly the consequence of French Canadians wishing it so and keeping it so. French Canadians simply failed to use the weapons that were theirs at any time since Confederation. It is nonsense", he stated firmly,

"to suggest that a democratic majority with an unrestricted franchise is not master in its own house except by its own fault".(W.L. Morton to Michel Brunet (28 December 1964) Morton Papers, Box 2; Brunet, Michel (1956-1973), 2. On the Québécois rejection of English Canada, Morton wrote: "This rejection, as it seems, of what we value and to which we are committed, is what causes our reserve towards the Quebec revolution today. We have been ignorant of the realities of French Quebec, of course, and are at fault in being ignorant. But that at least is equaled by the French ignorance both of English Canada and of our common history. What does irritate us and cause us to lose patience now – a process that has gone very far, I am afraid – is the implication, some time made explicit, that English Canada [willfully] perpetuated the pre-1960s régime in Quebec".(Ibid.)

The implications of Morton statements are clear. To deny Quebeckers' complicity in the socio-political and economic development of their province was, at best, inaccurate. At worse, the indictment of English-speaking Canadians for the problems of modern Quebec fostered ill-will among Canadians. The Quiet Revolution, was damaging and divisive. Instead of forging greater understanding, the Quiet revolutionaries succeeded in isolating Canadians. The Quiet Revolution was, for Morton, a marked tragedy for English-French relations.

²²⁸See Bothwell et al, chapter 23

²²⁹As Creighton wrote in 1970: "Susceptible to injury, open to attack; and, in my judgment, Canada was vulnerable in the 1960s in large measure because it was divided ..."(Creighton, "Canada: A Divided and Vulnerable Nation", 1) There are hopeful signs for a strengthening of unity (Quebec's recent election 1970), "but for ten long years [Quebec] monopolized the attention and aroused the concern of a great many Canadians. It diverted them from the task of national defence and weakened their defensive powers at the very moment when external pressure from the United States was increasingly threatening the independence and integrity of Canada. When the decade of the 1960s opened, American influence on almost every phase of Canadian life, already great, was rapidly growing. In 1957, Canada had accepted a subordinate position in a continental defence system. The progressive takeover of Canadian resources and industry by American capital has placed Canada very firmly in a continental economy dominated by the United States. The persistent, uninterrupted hammering of the American mass media - radio, television, motion pictures and periodicals - was gradually but surely transforming the nation into a cultural colony of the Republic".(1-2)

²³⁰Morton, *The Canadian Identity*, 125

²³¹Ibid.

²³²Morton, "Towards a New Conception of Confederation?", 7

²³³Ibid.

²³⁴Morton, *The Canadian Identity*, 125-30

²³⁵Ibid., 130

²³⁶Ibid.

²³⁷Ibid.

²³⁸Morton believed that increased American investment into, and control of, the Canadian economy awakened nationalist sentiment. Morton claimed that "... exercises in continentalism helped provoke the resurgence of national feeling [of Watkins, the Waffle movement, and others] and an analysis of continentalism for what it was, a betrayal of Canadian destiny and identity".(Ibid., 133-4) See the epilogue.

²³⁹Ibid., 150

²⁴⁰Morton, "Towards a New Conception of Confederation?", 2

²⁴¹Morton, *The Canadian Identity*, 150

²⁴²Morton, "Towards a New Conception of Confederation?", 2

²⁴³Morton went on to explain the world that had been lost. "It was, I suppose, a very narrow world, [sic] Narrow, that is, because it was although lived in rural Manitoba, a very British world. Everything in daily talk, much in daily use, the whole reinforced and exaggerated by the illusion called prestige, was British - the point of reference in politics and business, the seat of fashion, the school of manners, the centre of scandal. The table dishes were British made, both the cheap and the dear, the jackknives, the tea caddies, the aperients, the best boots, the heaviest coats, the finest hats. The yearly calendars tended to picture a heroic lion or an intimidating battleship. And over the little while schoolhouse was the Union Jack staunchly flew - a provincial statute had a few years before said it must, as it's done until this year".(Ibid., 3-4)

²⁴⁴Northrop Frye, "The Quality of Life in the 1970s", *Address to the University of Toronto Alumni*, ?, 1971, draft copy, Northrop Frye Papers Victoria University Library (VUL), 88 Box 4, File e, 8

²⁴⁵Ibid.

²⁴⁶It also was "the age of intense preoccupation with the effect of communication on society, and with the aspect of life that we call news". Ibid., 8-9

²⁴⁷Ibid., 10

²⁴⁸Frye added: "The emphasis on 'confrontation' and similar words, the obsession with the discontinuous and uninstructed, the tendency to argue automatically that whatever one disagreed with was 'out of date', show how the anarchism and the preoccupation with media in the late sixties were aspects of the same thing".(Ibid.)

²⁴⁹Ibid., 11-12

²⁵⁰Quoted in Michael Hayden, ed. *So Much to Do, So Little Time: The Writings of Hilda Neatby*. (Vancouver, 1983), 287

²⁵¹Ibid.

²⁵²Donald Creighton, "The Future in Canada" in Donald Creighton, *The Passionate Observer: Selected Writings* (Toronto, 1980), 21

²⁵³Ibid.

²⁵⁴Claude Bissell, *Halfway up Parnassus. A Personal Account of the University of Toronto 1932-1971* (Toronto, 1974), 189-90

²⁵⁵Ibid., 191

Epilogue:

The Sundering of the Conservative-Nationalist Vision of Canada and the Triumph of Modernity

When in 1965 Dalton Camp became president of the Progressive Conservatives, the end of the old-style conservatism of the party was near. Camp was elected on the strength of his desire to review the leadership of John Diefenbaker. At the subsequent leadership convention, held in Toronto in September 1967, Diefenbaker went down to an ungracious defeat. After ranting at his detractors and vigorously defending his policies and political visions, he finished a humiliating fifth on the first ballot. Diefenbaker continued to sit in the House of Commons as a bitter critic of Liberalism and in defiance of his own party and its new leader Robert Stanfield.

In spite of this political tenacity, however, Diefenbaker's ousting from the party was fraught with significance. Camp's triumph resulted in a deeply divided party. More than that, it ushered in a new era for the Progressive Conservatives, one in which the party embarked on a new direction, a firm departure from the policies of the past. Stanfield endeavoured to develop policies to move the party away from Diefenbaker's curious amalgam of prairie populism and traditional conservatism. In doing so, he tried to court the young and the urban-dweller.¹ More fundamentally, Stanfield initiated important changes in party doctrine. He moved the party away from Diefenbaker's "un-hyphenated Canadianism". Instead, Stanfield tried to ensure that his party would reflect current political realities and address the concerns of a wider sweep of the Canadian populous. In a few short years, then, he extricated the party from the policies and outlooks of Macdonald, Borden, Meighen, Diefenbaker, and their like.

In a much larger sense, thus, Stanfield's emergence symbolized the demise of the Canadian tory tradition that had been decades in the making. It also mirrored the fundamental changes that were occurring in Canadian society. The transformation of the tory national-political vision -- in part, the belief in the Dominion's inherent British character and in an unified, pan-Canadian culture -- showed how issues of pluralism and Quebec's place in the federation had come to overshadow conservative-nationalism. More distressing, it indicated how the Conservative party, the historic bastion of tory values,² had succumbed to the pressures of modern social and political realities. For the tory critics, the Conservatives were becoming like their despised Liberal rivals. The early Diefenbaker period had brought considerable promise; the period that followed brought despair and succeeded in further marginalizing the voices of the spokesmen of Canadian toryism.

The death of the old Conservative party dealt a severe blow to traditional conservative nationalism. After the party's demise, this form of nationalism continued on only in fragmented form in the theory and rhetoric of the New Left. Despite certain affinities, the new nationalism of the radical youth was not compatible with the values of the old movement. Whatever the similarities between the two types of nationalism, by the mid-1970s the nationalism of the New Left also waned. When it failed, the remnants of traditional nationalism failed along with it. Ultimately, the tory vision of Canada was vanquished while the Liberal service state prevailed.

Vital to the new direction of the Conservative party was an acceptance of Canada's bicultural nature. Unlike under Diefenbaker, when the question of French-Canadian nationalism was largely ignored, Stanfield's Conservatives made Quebec an important issue. As the 1968 party platform indicated, while "Canada is, and should be, one nation", it was nevertheless foundationally a bicultural entity. The country was comprised of "two founding peoples with historic rights to maintain their language and culture".³ Party platforms and electoral strategies were supplemented with political action. Stanfield's selection of Marcel Faribault as his Quebec lieutenant in 1968 was an acknowledgment of the electoral importance of the province. It also demonstrated the Tories' rejection of the pan-Canadian cultural nationalism of Diefenbaker and that of the party's forebearers. For, as Faribault himself stated, the *deux nations* idea was a historic reality and "should always be remembered, the more for being so often ignored in the past".⁴ In an April 1972 speech delivered in Toronto, the heart of old "British" Ontario, but now a symbol of the ethnic diversity of the new Canada, Stanfield reaffirmed his rejection of a monolithic national vision. Canada, he claimed, was not a nation that "believed in the philosophy of the melting pot". Nor was it a country "where it is necessary to submerge your national origins, or forget the language of the country of your birth in order to function as a good citizen".⁵ Unhyphenated Canadianism and an overarching Britishness were dead as first principles of Canadian Conservatism.

The marginalization of old policies and party attitudes symbolized the country's newfound mood. The Conservatives' new Quebec policy reflected the country's generally accommodating attitude towards French Canada. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, as we noted in the last chapter, had made English-speaking Canadians aware of the issues of the Quiet Revolution. As the centennial decade moved on, the political mood favoured a resolution to the increasingly troublesome Quebec question. 1967, Canada's centennial, was a particularly important year. Under the leadership of Ontario Premier John Robarts, for instance, representatives of provincial governments

were summoned to Toronto to try and resolve the Quebec question. The meeting, more a think-tank, was called the Confederation for Tomorrow conference. At the conference, which took place in November 1967, the premiers were able to convince Quebec Premier Daniel Johnson that the Canadian house could indeed be refurbished and modernized so as to accommodate a wayward son. Pearson's government followed Robarts's example. It called a constitutional conference for February 1968 to gather information on how to change the BNA Act. This meeting was tacit acknowledgment that the structures of the country required fundamental change if Canada was to survive into its next century. The election of a new prime minister in June was perhaps most significant of all. As historian Ramsay Cook has argued, the election of Pierre Trudeau was the culmination of a growing, though very fragile, national consensus. Trudeau's promise to reform the federal system to allow for a truly equal partnership between French and English Canada was palatable to most segments of Canadian society. With Trudeau's electoral triumph, the federal government had for the first time in a long while legitimate claim to the broad support of Canadian opinion.⁶

Through the beginning of the new decade, additional constitutional dialogues, such as the Victoria conference in 1971, provided further testimony to the willingness of Canadian politicians to resolve the Quebec question. The English-speaking provinces continued to be open to a pluralistic view of the nation. The Québécois, for their part, were also pressing for change. Much had changed in the province in last decade and a half. As late as the Tremblay Report (which reported to the Quebec government in 1956), the hoary pre-modernist, pre-industrial character of the Quebec people was emphasized. Specifically, the Commission Report railed against industrialization. "If the Conquest put French Canadians out of tune with the political institutions", the Tremblay commissioners reasoned, "the industrial revolution put them out of harmony with social institutions".⁷ Here the Commission echoed the arguments of the old French-Canadian nationalists: modernism, in the forms of the materialism, born of industrialization, it contended, detracted from the fundamental spiritual virtues of the French-Canadian people. The industrial process, it asserted, was "in complete disaccord with the Catholic French Canadian culture".⁸ It fostered materialism and individualism over spiritualism and communalism; it was technical and scientific rather than humanist. Quebeckers, the Commission concluded, had to choose between "the Christian concept and materialism, either in its pragmatic or philosophic form".⁹ The options were clear: to choose the modern world was to ensure the demise of the race; to opt for traditional French-Canadian values would help safeguard *la survivance*.

In the years following the Tremblay Commission, however, the province underwent a tremendous transformation. The urban-industrial process, which had begun decades earlier, intensified throughout the late 1950s and 1960s. More importantly, French-speaking Quebecers experienced a revolution in outlooks and attitudes. According to historian Michael Behiels, they underwent a “revolution of mentalities”.¹⁰ Led by the intelligentsia, the Québécois (as they were now calling themselves) began to de-emphasize the all-encompassing role of the church and spirituality in their lives. Instead, they began to place emphasis on the material conditions of French-speaking Quebecers and agitated in favour of becoming the financial “masters of their own house”. In addition to material betterment, they sought such liberal and modern reforms as the separation of church and state and increased democratization. Thus, new values and outlooks combined with the nationalization programmes of the Lesage government to ensure that by the late 1960s, Quebec had become fully modern.

This “quiet revolution” was, as we saw, indicative of the change of the 1960s. More fundamentally, it proved to be a microcosm of modernization for the country at large. Within a decade Quebecers had undergone the ideological (if not the scientific and industrial) transformations that English Canada had been experiencing for decades. Events in Quebec were, in consequence, fraught with meaning, especially for the critics of modernity. At best, critics considered pre-modern Quebec a bulwark against the intrusion of modernity. George P. Grant, for instance, considered Roman Catholicism and the social structures of French Canada as barriers to the development of the universal and homogeneous state. Through the conservatism of Catholicism, Grant explained, French Canadians could find their salvation.¹¹ Adding her voice to Grant’s, Hilda Neatby stressed the cultural values inherent to the French Canadian civilization. “Looking at each culture [French- and English-speaking]”, Neatby asserted, “the English have much to learn from Quebec on appreciation of intellectual and artistic values, of general culture as distinguished from specialization, of the value of family ties, of a community as well as an individual expression of religious belief”.¹² At worst, critics saw Quebec as a quaint, pre-modern society that had withdrawn into itself and therefore posed little threat to the development of a wider, pan-Canadian nationalism. Indeed, Donald Creighton intimates throughout his writings of the postwar period the subservience of French Canada and the French Canadian identity to the greater goal of national unity.¹³ Even as his colleagues began to become sensitive to the issue of the Quiet Revolution, Creighton’s position remained unchanged: Canadians must avoid bilingualism and biculturalism and remain true to the great nineteenth century nation-state. The establishment of a pan-Canadian identity

was, for Creighton and the other conservatives, central to the development of an enduring Canadianism.¹⁴

Given these views of Quebec, the disruptions of the 1960s were highly significant. First, they symbolized, for the anti-modernists, the end of an alliance to past traditions and values. The advent of a modern, technocratic state exemplified the triumph of political modernization. Second, the Quiet Revolution challenged the conservative vision of the nation. The new Quebec nationalism simply could not be reconciled with the older strain of Anglo-Canadian nationalism. As such, modernized Quebec detracted from one of the most fundamental objectives of the conservative nationalists: the development of “one Canada”, a vision based in historical formulations and steeped in traditional national outlooks. Along with continentalism and an accommodating national mood towards Quebec, then, Quebec modernization erected a massive, perhaps even insurmountable, barrier to conservative nationalism.

Aside from the problems posed by Quebec and the Quiet Revolution, developments in English-Canadian nationalism also contributed to the demise of Canadian toryism. Whereas in the 1950s and early 1960s conservative-nationalist history had been vibrant under the guidance of Creighton, Morton, and Grant, by the mid-1960s, this approach was disappearing. The reorientation of the Progressive Conservative party accelerated this trend. Once the domain of conservatives, nationalism and nationalist history were co-opted by the New Left.

Comprised chiefly of students and young professors, the New Left was an amorphous movement preoccupied with students' issues, the Vietnam war, civil rights, and the bureaucracy of the multiversity. Among the intellectual leadership of the movement, however, foreign investment, and specifically, increased American involvement in the Canadian economy, became key issues. At the end of the 1960s, corporate America had penetrated deeply into the Canadian economy. 1972 was the peak year for foreign ownership in Canada, with the petroleum industry (ninety-nine per cent foreign ownership) and the manufacturing industry (seventy-two per cent foreign ownership) leading the way. Furthermore, “foreign”, predominantly American, investment continued to flood into Canada. Even Canadian universities, which had grown so much in the previous few years, were comprised of many American scholars.¹⁵

The New Leftists responded to these distressing developments. Using Marx, they argued that Canada had historically developed as a “continentalist” and “liberal” entity, dependent on American capital. More significantly, they employed the theories of the conservative nationalists to explicate the plight of modern Canada. Through the latter half of the 1960s, New Left theorists carefully studied the strictures of the tory nationalists.

From Harold Innis, who had laid bare Canada's character as a marginal economy, they showed how Canada lived in a subservient, peripheral arrangement vis-à-vis the United States.¹⁶ From George Grant, they stressed that Canada was developing, under the influence of its technologically advanced southern neighbour, into the universal and homogeneous state.¹⁷ Using Innis, Grant, Morton and Creighton, they provided a devastating critique of the historic liberal hegemony in Canada.¹⁸ Like their intellectual antecedents, they railed against the pro-Americanism of the Liberal party. And, as the critics of academic modernization had done, they even denounced the growingly technocratic, Americanized, and anti-humanist bent of the multiversity.¹⁹

Gad Horowitz went further than merely co-opting the ideas of the conservative nationalists. He endeavoured not only to define Canada's "un-American" political culture, but also to make a theoretical link between Canadian toryism and socialism. In *Canadian Labour in Politics* (1968), Horowitz argued that unlike the political culture of another new society, the United States, Anglophone Canada did not develop a monolithic liberal mythology that was exclusive of other ideologies. Instead, toryism and socialism were very much aspects of Canada's political traditions. He contended that English-speaking Canada is characterized by non-liberal elements -- i.e., tory and socialist "touches".²⁰ One of the most important un-American characteristics of English Canada, he wrote, was the "... failure of English-Canadian liberalism to develop the one true myth, the nationalist cult, and the parallel failure to exclude toryism and socialism as 'un-Canadian'; in others words [it did not exclude] the legitimacy of ideological diversity in Canada".²¹

Having established Canada's tory and socialist elements, and hence Canada's political distinctiveness in North America, Horowitz went on to demonstrate the interrelationship between the two ideologies. He argued that the "corporate-organic-collectivist ideas" inherent to toryism were vital to the development in Canada of socialism; they combined with the "radical rationalist-egalitarian" component of liberalism to establish the preconditions for socialism. In short, Horowitz claimed that in toryism, itself a remnant of pre-Enlightenment political culture, were contained the very seeds of the modern ideology of socialism.²²

More than a theoretical relationship, however, Horowitz demonstrated the socialist precursors of Canadian conservatism. As one example, he cited the willingness of the Conservative party -- a main repository of Canadian toryism -- to "use the power of the state for the purpose of developing and controlling the economy".²³ Unlike American conservatism, which had no tradition of using public power in aid of national purposes, Canadian Conservatives were willing to restrain individual rights to serve the common good. The best example of the interplay of the tory and socialist ideologies, however, is

the phenomenon of “red toryism”. Horowitz defined the red tory as an individual who has affinities both to conservative and socialist ideas, whether in a vague or casual sense, or as a “conscious ideological Conservative with some ‘odd’ socialist notions (W.L. Morton) or a conscious ideological socialist with some odd tory notions (Eugene Forsey)”.²⁴ More than this, red toryism implies the sharing between “tory and socialist minds” of “*some* crucial assumptions, orientations, and values” to such an extent that the two ideologies seem “not as enemies but as two different expressions of the same ideological outlook”.²⁵ It entails a world-view that shares tory and socialist elements so thoroughly that it is impossible to say that its proponents prefer one ideology over the other. For Gad Horowitz, George Grant epitomized this highest conception of red toryism. Indeed, Grant political ideas, his associations both with the Conservatives and the NDP, his defence of Diefenbaker and the British tradition, and his attack on liberal individualism and Americanization were all proof, in Horowitz’s mind, of the interconnectivity of toryism and socialism.

As Gad Horowitz and others attempted to show, there seemed to be considerable intellectual affinities between the old conservative nationalists and the New Leftists, between toryism and socialism. Both groups were drawn together not only as a result of a shared world-view, but also due to a common reaction to certain historical realities. They both profoundly distrusted Liberal foreign policy and the technocratic state. In the minds of the members of both groups, the Liberal technocrats were the real enemies of Canada. Further, old and new nationalists alike shared an aversion to the values and ultimate objectives of the “American Empire”. They despised the fact that America had become Canada’s national ideal. What is more, they both wanted much more than simply to explain the historical conditions of Canada or to theorize about current predicaments. They desired, on the contrary, to counter the unprecedented influence of the United States in Canada. Above all else, like the tory critics, the New Left wanted to extricate Canada from the clutches of American cultural and economic imperialism. As for Creighton, Morton and the others, nationalism was the way to resolve this most pressing problem. Thus, despite the differences of the intellectual movements, many of the key tenets and objectives of traditional nationalism lived on in the new variant. The New Left provided consolation for a failing tradition; it provided a glimmer of hope in a desperate age.

Traditional nationalism, especially its anti-continentalist, anti-liberal aspects, was popular among members of the New Left for a variety of reasons. American foreign policy seemed increasingly disquieting, especially in light of American involvement in Vietnam. Domestically, urban riots, campus violence, and a spate of political assassinations, all showed that the American concept of democracy was not one to imitate. More importantly,

members of the New Left were attracted to nationalism because the expression of a national identity was a way in which to allay the intrusion of American capital as well as pernicious American political and philosophical doctrines. As one proponent of the New Left put it in 1970, the purpose of Canadian nationalism must not be doctrinal, but must oppose the liberal individualism and the “democratic capitalism” of the United States. “[I]ts purpose”, the author continued, “must be to preserve on the northern half of this continent, a society which does not share the liberal conformitarianism, the isolationism and the messianism of the United States”.²⁶

Like conservative nationalists, nationalism for the New Leftists had a very specific role to perform. It functioned as the main means by which Canada had staved off the continentalizing United States. Thus it was vital to maintaining the integrity and indeed the very independence of the Canadian nation. Even a cursory reading of any one of a variety of issues of *The Canadian Dimension*, the New Left’s main forum, revealed this basic utilitarian purpose. While dubious of the outcomes, George Grant, the old tory nationalist, urged advocates of nationalism to “preserve ... what is left of Canadian sovereignty” in an article in *The Canadian Dimension*.²⁷ For Grant, as for the New Leftists, economic and ideological continentalism was a blight on modern Canada, a condition for which nationalism seemed to be the only cure.

Despite considerable similarities and some common purposes, however, there were fundamental differences between the conservative and New Left nationalism. The most important of these is the two groups’ divergent definition of the character of Canadian nationalism. Whereas the Canadian tory identity was crucial to conservative-nationalism, socialism was the *sine qua non* of the New Left nationalists.²⁸ While humanist traditions, a British heritage, and tory values differentiated Canadians from Americans for the conservative nationalists, the New Leftists quantified Canada’s distinctiveness chiefly in terms of its socialist affinities.²⁹ Canadian nationalism had little to do with Canada’s tory orientations and its colonial outlooks. Instead, Canada, the New Leftists insisted, was offset from its American neighbour because of a history of state involvement in directing the economy and in building the nation more generally.³⁰ State interventionism must persist, they advised, into the 1970s and beyond. For through a “new National policy not of cultural tarriffs [*sic*], but of cultural bounties and subsidies”, Canada might defend itself against cultural imperialism.³¹ Likewise through the restriction of American investment and the “Canadianization” of industries and businesses, Canada could evade continental assimilation. In a word, socialism was co-extensive with nationalism, for the New Left, and Canadian socialists were, by definition, Canadian nationalists. As Gad Horowitz

remarked, "We are nationalists because, as socialists, we do not want our country to be absorbed by the citadel of world capitalism".³²

There were further differences. Radical social activism and civil disorder were anathema to traditional toryism. The revolutionary climate in which the New Left was ensconced was the very environment against which the conservative critics reacted. Conservatives simply could not countenance the social utopia that was central to the New Left. Similarly, the New Left's sympathetic attitudes towards Quebec were repugnant to the old nationalists, especially hard-liners such as Creighton. Lastly, the New Left's "socialist egalitarianism" did not accord with the anti-modernists' indictments of democracy or the idea of an aristodemocracy. The youth-academic movement of the late 1960s was never truly representative of the values of traditional nationalism. In spite of commonalities, thus, the movements' incompatibilities proved to be too formidable to overcome. And despite New Leftists' ongoing reliance on traditional nationalism as the intellectual core of the movement, the New Left proffered a fundamentally different national vision from that of the tory nationalists.

By the late 1960s, this new vision, shorn of its colonial orientation yet preserving an anti-American, anti-Liberal perspective, was beginning to build momentum. New nationalism became increasingly important outside the New Left, among students, academics, and urban, middle class supporters of the New Democratic Party (NDP). For these groups socialism, radicalism, and left-wing nationalism all merged as a means by which to forestall the inexorable American advance and thus safeguard Canadian independence. The Waffle movement epitomized burgeoning anti-American nationalism. A Marxist-nationalist movement, the Waffle developed as a subset the NDP. Growing in support, it almost overwhelmed the forces of moderate social democracy in the party. Waffle owed its widespread appeal to its basic socialist and anti-American position: Canada could not develop unless it promoted government control over its economy and thus avoided the allure of American bourgeois capitalism. In addition to youth and university radicals, Canadians at large seemed receptive to Waffle's message. In a poll taken in 1967, for example, sixty per cent of Canadians indicated that foreign ownership endangered political autonomy. Almost half of those polled thought that foreign control of Canadian industry was an issue of major concern.³³

Although Waffle leader, James Laxer, failed in a bid to become leader of the NDP, and although in June 1972 Waffle members were expelled outright from the party, the movement's eventful history reflects the popularity of a virulent strain of anti-American nationalism. Also indicative of Waffle's most popular cause was the spate of Marxist-nationalist publications that appeared in the period. John Porter's *The Vertical Mosaic*

(1965), Kari Levitt's *Silent Surrender* (1970), and Malcolm Reid's *The Shouting Signpainters* (1972) were some of the more prominent examples of this trend.³⁴ In the writing of Canadian history, to take another instance, some historians and many graduate students discovered the merits of neo-Marxian analysis and the applicability of Marx to the Canadian condition.³⁵ Socialism and nation-building seemed a natural fit for this generation of students and academics, just as had been the maintenance of colonial ties for the previous generation of tory nationalists.

Despite the Waffle's rapid rise and a widespread recognition of the merits of anti-American nationalism, the new nationalism failed to endure as a central, Canadian mythology. The rhetoric of anti-American nationalism and the rhetoric of the New Left more generally certainly persisted into the mid-1970s. As a former President of the University of Toronto acerbically put it, these years continued to be "drenched in the jargon of the New Left".³⁶ Nevertheless, by mid-decade, the advocates of the new nationalism failed to keep hold of their supporters. Just as Creighton, Morton, and the others had done before, they failed in making nationalism a widespread doctrine to which all Canadians could subscribe and which would guide national policies.

The reasons for the waning of new nationalism are manifold. Part of the demise of nationalism was associated with the decline of youth culture and youth issues. Socially and culturally, the Canada of the period 1968-1973 experienced rapid change. The end of the sixties meant the waning of the war in Vietnam, minority oppression, and student radicalism as causes around which the youth of the late 1960s had coalesced. In addition, issues such as environmentalism, women's equality, and minority rights became increasingly mainstream and therefore not simply the cause of the radical youth. Demographically, moreover, by 1975 the leading edge of the baby boom generation was approaching the magic age of thirty. With demographic change and through the mainstreaming of social issues, the 'youth revolution' of the 1960s was in eclipse.³⁷

Even more fundamental was the political decline of youth movements and specifically of the New Left. The period 1968-1973 was a tumultuous time for youth organizations such as the Company of Young Canadians (CYC) and the Canadian Union of Students (CUS). Whereas both organizations were garnering considerable media coverage in the late 1960s, by the mid-1970s they became mere remnants of a youth radicalism that was well passed its prime.³⁸ The decline of the New Left best illustrates the decline of youth politics. Through increasingly radical tactics, even an advocacy of violent protest, the New Left was becoming discredited among Canadians at large. Most significantly, it was losing the sympathy of the generation of youth from whom it drew most of its support.³⁹ The decline of the Waffle movement simply added to the waning fortunes of

the New Left. While the rise of Waffle indicated a greater concern over nationalist issues, the demise of the movement also represented contemporary trends. The defeat of Waffle meant the triumph of old-style, mainstream socialism and therefore the sundering of radical socialist-nationalism. The old guard of the NDP was able to cleanse the party of radical, youth-oriented socialism. Indeed, Waffle's failure proffered a "dose of reality" to youth interested in reform.⁴⁰ Most of all, it signaled the effective end of the New Left and new nationalism in Canada. Although the rhetoric persists, academic pieces on neo-nationalism continue to be written, and elements of the New Left continue on in the NDP, the 1972 demise of Waffle meant the end of a widespread acceptance of the doctrine of new nationalism.

The rise and functional death of new nationalism is significant for two reasons. First, the neo-nationalists took away from conservatives control over the nationalist movement. Indebted to some of the interpretations of traditional nationalism, but never enslaved by them, the new nationalists presented a notion of Canada that was socialist and anti-continentalist. Yet they made little room for the "tory" vision of the nation. Thus, the new nationalists did much to supplant older doctrines and orientations that they deemed immaterial or irrelevant to Canadian circumstances. The incompatibilities between the two movements ultimately overcame any of the commonalities they had, and resulted in the sundering of the older tradition.

Second, and paradoxically, new nationalism constituted the last chance for a unifying Canadian mythology that was linked, however tenuously, to traditional nationalism. While the conservative nationalists may not have agreed with the socialist underpinnings of new nationalism or with the latter's failure to rest on conservative-historical foundations, it was, for the conservative-nationalists, the last remaining opportunity for Canada to avert continentalism and preserve its independent position. George Grant's dabbling in the movement exemplified the faint hopes of a generation of tory nationalists.⁴¹ With the waning of new nationalism, however, even this less-than-satisfactory option had been closed off. With the election of Pierre Trudeau, Canadians seemed to be concerned with less rather than more nationalism.⁴² Even Canadian historians, moreover, who had traditionally been responsible for defining the nation, its myths, and identities, had moved from writing national histories to publishing materials that stressed Canada's "limited identities": regionalism, and a concern for ethnic, labour and women's history.⁴³ In the last analysis, then, the marginalization of the New Left sounded the death knell of traditional nationalism. Even in a corrupted form, old-style nationalism had failed to create a niche among Canadians. The New Left's decay thus marked the terminus of a nationalist tradition that traced its origins from the loyalists,

through the imperialists, and Tory leaders such Macdonald, Borden, Meighen, and Diefenbaker.

* * *

In 1966 Charles Hanly queried, "Will America replace Great Britain as our national ideal?" The fact that he asked the question at all indicated that there was at least a residual of tory nationalist sentiment among academics and Canadians at large. In responding to his own query, however, Hanly was less than hopeful. He knew that Canada was gravitating towards a new empire and that the nation was about to reassert its colonial tendencies. The failure of traditional nationalism only a few years later seemed to confirm Hanly's prophesies and Canada new directions. The battle for Britain had been lost. Canada had become a fully North American nation. Traditional Canadian nationalism was dead.

Like the rise of Quebec nationalism, the death of traditional nationalism constituted a severe blow to the cause of the anti-modernists. It implied the end of the last opportunity to appeal to any widespread popular mood that favoured the development of an enduring Canadianism. Once vigorous critics of the national-social order, and always seeking a greater social significance, by the mid-1970s the anti-modernists became marginalized and largely irrelevant. With Innis and Massey long dead and Grant, Neatby, Morton, and Frye turning to other concerns, Donald Creighton was the sole remaining voice of conservative dissent. In *The Forked Road: Canada 1939-1957* (1976) he continued his bitter denunciation of liberal Canada, those who had sold out the nation to American interests. At its core, the book displayed the hopelessness of Canada's plight. Through it, Creighton finally admitted that there was no possibility of returning to the Anglo-Canadian virtues of former times. The title of Creighton's last book was also highly symbolic. For, in his book, Creighton, who was dead of cancer a few years after writing it, never really explains the other option for Canada. Rather, he simply focusses on the last formative stage of a triumphant liberal Canada. Creighton, like the branch of criticism he represented, was devoid of solutions for the problems that beset modern Canada. His work thus highlighted the ultimate peripheralization of the tory vision. As such, it comprised a fitting epitaph for a group of scholars whose criticism simply did not accord with modern realities and whose complete marginalization had left them bereft of all hope. And Canadian toryism, established so long before, died with those who, like Creighton, had guided it through the modern age.

NOTES TO EPILOGUE

¹William Christian and Colin Campbell, *Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada: Liberals, Conservatives, Socialists, Nationalist*, second edition (Toronto, 1983), 119

²Gad Horowitz, *Canadian Labour in Politics* (Toronto, 1968), 19

³Quoted in *Ibid.*, 119-120. There was also recognition of Canada's growing multi-culturalism. The platform document added that the founding peoples were "joined and continue to be joined by people from many lands who have a right to play a full part in Canadian life".(120)

⁴Quoted in *ibid.*, 120.

⁵Quoted in *Ibid.*

⁶Ramsay Cook, *The Maple Leaf Forever: Essays on Nationalism and Politics in Canada* (Toronto, 1971), 20-2

⁷Quoted in Ramsay Cook, *Canada, Quebec, and the Uses of Nationalism* (Toronto, 1986), 73.

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰Michael D. Behiels. *Prelude to Quebec's Quiet Revolution: Liberalism Versus Neo-nationalism, 1945-1960* (Montreal, 1985), chapter 4.

¹¹See William Christian, *George Grant: A Biography* (Toronto, 1993), 248-49, and George Grant to "Mother" [Mrs. W.L. Grant] (n.d.) George P Grant Papers (PAC) v. 39; Mrs. W.L. Grant Correspondence; file: Dalhousie University; MG 30 D59.

¹²Michael Hayden, ed. *So Much to Do, So Little Time: The Writings of Hilda Neatby*. (Vancouver, 1983), 116-17. Neatby went on to say that "[I]t does us Canadians small credit as a 'middle nation' defending the values of the western world if we do not consider it pure gain to be invited to take possession of the keys of a culture whose greatness will not be forgotten while western civilization remains. It is a pity that a country endowed with two such cultures should find bi-lingualism and biculturalism a problem rather than an opportunity".(117) Neatby's comments were, of course, written in response to the "Bi & Bi" issue of the mid-1960s. Clearly, she is amenable to the issue of bilingualism and biculturalism.

¹³Note that the tacit alliance between French and English Canada to which Creighton and others referred was more a idealized perception of French Canada than an historical reality. With the possible exception of Hilda Neatby, who studied French-Canadian history, few of the anti-modernists had much to do with French Canada.

¹⁴See Donald Creighton, "Introduction", *Towards the Discovery of Canada* (Toronto, 1972), 14-15. On this point, there was much disagreement among the anti-modernists. Specifically, Creighton disagreed with the position of Morton that "language is the one indispensable element in that identity and that biculturalism is therefore 'the very essence of Canadian national aspirations'".(14) By contrast, Creighton remain trenchant. He stuck to his earlier position on bilingualism and biculturalism (see chapter six). He showed that "At a moment when national unity was more necessary than ever before to resist the weight of American continentalism, Canadians had permitted themselves to become involved in a divisive cultural problem; and the time and effort which might have gone into defense against the invader was likely to be sacrificed in a prolonged and vain effort to remake Canada and transform its constitution in the interest of cultural dualism ... These were the chief themes of the epilogue of *Canada First Century* and of several talks given in 1970-1".(15)

¹⁵Robert Chodos, Rae Murphy, and Eric Hamovitch *The Unmaking of Canada: The Hidden Theme in Canadian History since 1945* (Toronto, 1991), 53

¹⁶See, for instance, M.H. Watkins, "A Staple Theory of Economic Growth", *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* v. 29 (May 1963), 80-100; Abraham Rotstein, "Innis: The Alchemy of Fur and Wheat" *Journal of Canadian Studies* v. 12 (Winter 1977), 5; and, for a more recent example, Daniel Drache, "Introduction", *Staples Markets and Cultural Change. Harold A. Innis: Selected Essays* (Montreal, 1995)

¹⁷See, for example, Melville Watkins, "Technology and Nationalism", in Peter Russell, ed., *Nationalism in Canada*, (Toronto, 1966), and James Laxer, "The Student Movement and Canadian Independence", *Canadian Dimension. Kit No. 3: Canadian Nationalism*, (n.p.), (n.d.).

¹⁸See, for instance, James Laxer, "The Search for Canadian Nationalism" in *Canadian Dimension. Kit No. 3: Canadian Nationalism* (n.d.); reprinted from *The Canadian Dimension* v. 5, no. 7. Laxer's historical analyses closely parallels those of Creighton, Morton, and Grant.

¹⁹See, as examples, Robin Matthews, "The Americanization of Canadian Universities", and Melville H. Watkins, "Education in the Branch Plant Economy" both in *Canadian Dimension. Kit No. 3:*

Canadian Nationalism (n.d.).

²⁰Horowitz, *Canadian Labour in Politics*, 7

²¹Ibid., 9

²²Ibid., 5. Horowitz also suggested that as a purely liberal "fragment", the United States eliminated any remnants of toryism. This lack of tory ideas ultimately implied the incomplete development of American socialism.

²³Ibid., 10

²⁴Ibid., 23

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Gad Horowitz, "On the Fear of Nationalism. Nationalism and Socialism: A Sermon to the Moderates", in *ibid.*, 2

²⁷George Grant, "Canadian Fate and Imperialism" in *ibid.*, 26

²⁸For a discussion of the leftist nature of the new nationalism, see Gad Horowitz, *Canadian Labour in Politics* (Toronto, 1968).

²⁹Despite Horowitz's blandishments about the way in which Canadian toryism developed as a unique aspect of Canadian political culture, he was primarily interested in facilitating the development of Canadian socialism. He cared little for the advancement of the British connection or other traditional tory values.

³⁰See *ibid.*

³¹Horowitz, "On the Fear of Nationalism. Nationalism and Socialism: A Sermon to the Moderates", 2

³²See *ibid.*, 3.

³³Owram, 300

³⁴There was also a bevy of articles on this topic, such as Daniel Drache, "The Canadian Bourgeoisie and Its National Consciousness" in Ian Lumsden, ed., *Close the 49th Parallel Etc.* (Toronto, 1971), and edited collections such as Lumsden's work, Gary Teeple, ed., *Capitalism and the National Question in Canada* (Toronto, 1972), and Abraham Rotstein and Gary Lax, *Getting it Back: A Program for Canadian Independence* (Toronto, 1974).

³⁵See Berger, 264; and Stanley Ryerson, *Unequal Union* (1968).

³⁶Quoted in Owram, 286.

³⁷Ibid., 281

³⁸See *Ibid.*, chapter 11.

³⁹Ibid., 289

⁴⁰Ibid., 303

⁴¹See Grant, "Canadian Fate and Imperialism".

⁴²Cook, 7; 20-22

⁴³J.M.S. Careless, "'Limited Identities' in Canada", *Canadian Historical Review* 50 (March 1969), 1-10. The term "limited identities" actually originated in the mind of Ramsay Cook, to whom Careless himself gives credit for the idea. See J.M.S. Careless, *Careless at Work: Selected Canadian Historical Studies* (Toronto, 1990). See also G.R. Cook, "Canadian Centennial Celebrations", *International Journal*, 22 (Autumn 1967), 663.

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





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