University of Alberta

Representing Pakistan through Folk Music and Dance

by

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Mein tā koī khayāl

I am just a thought

Hun milī sā nāl khayāl dey

Let my thought become a reality

(Sachal Sarmast)

Dedicated to the three most inspiring women in my life:
my mother, Regula and Veengas

Abstract:

Folk music is a site of contestation to define national culture and language amongst the cultural elites in Pakistan. The elites who established cultural institutions for the promotion of folk music represented Pakistan either as a cultural unit with Islam and the Urdu language as its unifying bond, or resisted this position by considering Pakistan as a culturally diverse unit, in which national culture could emerge only through a synthesis of regional cultures and not through the imposition of a single culture and language. I apply Pierre Bourdieu's theory of practice to situate my informants within the policies of three institutions: national media, Pakistan National Council of Arts (PNCA) and Lok Virsa, in the period between 1965 and 1985. This period covers three major political regimes, when my informants participated in establishing and maintain cultural institutions that were revived after 9/11 to showcase Pakistan in the international community.

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Parveen, Uxi Mufti, Khalid Saeed Butt, Baidil Masroor, Sattar Syed, Naeem Tahir, Zia Mohyeddin, Ibrahim Joyo, Shaikh Aziz and several others. Although one does not expect public officials to reveal information, I found that all my informants in various institutions such as Radio, PTV, Lok Virsa, PNCA, Federal Ministry of Culture, and Ministry of Culture-Sindh were very encouraging about a project on music of Pakistan.

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alghozā is a double duct flute usually made of wood. One flute may serve as a drone, or the melody may be played on both flutes. Traditionally the double flute is a herdsman's instrument in Sind and Punjab; professionals in Sind play it with great virtuosity, usually to the accompaniment of a *dillo* (clay water pot). (Qureshi, Grove Music Online)

benjo A keyed- zither, found in Baluchistan, derived from the Japanese *teshokoto*

bhawayyā is a musical form popular in Northern Bangladesh and sung by coachman, while driving their cow drawn cart. A popular *bhawayyā* song is *gariāl bhaī* (coachmen)

bhatīālī is a traditional boat song, sung by Bengali boatmen. A popular song is *Amay bhashaīlī re, amay dubailī re*

bhangrā is a folk dance of Punjabi farmers to celebrate the harvest season

borendo (ocarina) is a musical instrument that looks like a small hollow clay ball with three to four holes, and the wholes are arranged in an isosceles triangular form. It is regarded as the most ancient musical instrument of the Lower Indus Valley. (Baloch 1988, 111)

hamd refers to poems in praise of Allah

dās nātyam/bhārat nātyam is one of the classical dances of India and Pakistan

dohiro is the section of singing *kāfī* that comprises of rhythmically free improvisation (Qureshi, Grove Music Online)

ek tarā/yaktāro is a single-stringed instrument of wandering bards and minstrels from India and is plucked with one finger (Baloch 1988, 115)

faqīr literally meaning mendicants. These musicians (the *faqīr* and the *sāīn*) are individuals who have broken away from traditional village life to wander from shrine to shrine. They have usually memorized the poetry of Sufi poets and recite and sing it at religious festivals. They are distinct from the *Qawwāl*, who also perform in religious rituals; for one thing, they often rely on cannabis for mystical inspiration. (Nayyar 1999)

ghazal is a poetic form comprising of rhyming couplet and refrain, with each line sharing the same meter. It musical rendition also makes its a musical form and some famous *ghazal* singers of Pakistan include Noor Jehan, Mehdi Hassan, Farida Khanum, Ustad Amanat Ali Khan, Ahmed Rushdi

iqbālīāt sung poems of Allama Iqbal considered as the national poet, hence the name of the genre.

kāfī is the rendering of mystical poetry with musical accompaniment (Nayyar 1999) associated with Sindh and Shah Abdul Latif 's poetry

kāfirs literally means 'infidel**s**,' and it refers to an ancient tribe in Kalash Valley of Hindu Kush mountain range residing in Chitral District and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. The people practice polytheism, which is shunned by the Muslim law, hence the label '*kāfir'* to refer to them.

kathak is considered to be a 'classical dance' of North India, and dates back to nomadic bards of ancient northern India, known as *kathaks*, or storytellers.

khartāl (wooden clappers) is a rhythmic instrument played with ek tarā. It comprises of a pair of rectangular wooden pieces, about 6 inches wide and 3 cm in thickness. (Baloch 1988, 115)

khattak is a swift martial sword-dance performed by dancers in Pushtun areas in Afghanistan and Pakistan

jhūmar is a harvest dance performed in villages of the Punjab province

māhīyyā is a love song comprising stanzas of two rhyming lines, the first shorter than the second (Nayyar 1999)

malang refers to a wandering mystic

manganhār a community of hereditary musicians, who play at weddings in Sindh

murlī is a musical instrument of Lower Indus Valley and consists of two parts. The upper one is called *murlī* and lower one per (foot). Wind is blown by mouth into the *murlī* at the upper end, and to produce music the sound is regulated by adjusting finger-tips on the per. (Baloch 1988, 151)

marsīyyā is an elegiac poem written to commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, the second spiritual leader of the Sh'ite community.

manqabat is a Sufi devotional poem, in praise of Ali Ibn Abi Talib, the son-in-law of Prophet Mohammed or in praise of a Sufi saint

na't is a poem sung in praise of Prophet Mohammed

lehro refers to the instrumental style of music played on musical instruments such as *alghozā*, bin or *nar*. (Qureshi, Grove Music Online)

odīssī is one of the eight classical dance forms in India

qaumī naghme patriotic songs

qawwālī is a devotional form of music performed at Sufi shrines and the tradition is attributed to Amir Khusraw

qir'at refers to reciting of the Quran

sufyānā kalām devotional music of Sufis. In case of Pakistan, *kāfi* is at times interchangeably used with *sufyānā kalām*.

soz is a poetry of lament sung to commemorate martyrdom of Imam Hussain

tānbūrī/dambūr refers to the five-stringed lute attributed to the saint Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai (b. 1752). The music at the shrine of Latif is sung with *dambūr*.

tappā is the oldest and most popular genre of the Pashto poetry. The *Tappa* is a composition of two unequal meters, in which the first line is shorter than the succeeding one, and in music it is sung with the traditional Pashto musical instruments *rubāb* and *mangay rubāb* or *mangay* and/or *sitar*

tilāwat refers to reading of the Holy Quran

waī is a section in *Shah-jo-rāg* (poetry and music sung at the shrine of Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai) in which the musicians sing in chorus

Introduction

In the summer of 2009, after a year's graduate training in ethnomusicology at the University of Alberta, I travelled for fieldwork to my hometown of Karachi in Pakistan. My friend and collaborator, Veengas Yasmeen, at the Ibrat newspaper arranged an interview with Mr. Shams Jafrani, who was serving as the Secretary of Culture at the Ministry of Culture in Sindh. He invited me to attend a three-day music festival titled 'Sindh Sargam,' which was being organized by the Ministry of Culture in Sindh. The invitations for this festival were exclusive and Mr. Jafrani gave me additional tickets upon my request. These proved to be handy when I realized that none of my family or friends was interested in listening to the folk music of Pakistan. Since the festival was late in the evening and inappropriate for a girl to attend alone, I was accompanied by Veengas's friend Zoheb, who brought half a dozen of his camera crew from a newly opened Sindhi channel. Because the event was not publicized, Zoheb was unaware of it; with these extra passes, he and his crew were able to attend the event and document it for their channel. This event introduced me to both the field of ethnographic and cultural institutions at the national level.

When I entered the hall of the Arts Council of Pakistan-Karachi at 7:30 in the evening, it was half-empty; yet soon people started arriving until the entire hall was full and many people were standing near the staircase. I took a seat in one of the back rows. In front of me was a dimly lighted stage with a background made from a digitally printed poster showing the ancient site of Mohenjo-daro alongside monuments and scenery of camels and the Indus River from the

province of Sindh**.** Against this background stood a clay figurine that had been discovered at the ancient site of Mohenjo-daro.

A ticket for the music and dance festival, *Sindh Sargam* held in Karachi

The show started with a woman dressed in Sindhi traditional dress coming on the stage to initiate the show and introduce a dance named 'Mohenjo-daro dance,' with which I was not familiar.

> [Five thousand years ago, an artist created the Mohenjo-daro dance that has been re-discovered in the 20th century. This dance is a combination of *kathak*, *dās nātyam* and *odīssī*].

Against dark lighting and a slow *sarangi* solo, a girl stepped on the stage, her anklets ringing, and danced the so-called Mohenjo-daro dance to the accompanying beat of the *tablā*. This dance was followed by folk dances from different regions of Pakistan and the dancers included both males and females. While this evening was mainly arranged to showcase the folk dances by the National Performing Arts Group-Karachi, there were also guest performances by

well-known folk singers like Taj Mastani from Sindh and Arif Lohar (son of a legendary folk singer Alam Lohar) from Punjab. During their performances, the size of the audience thickened with many people dancing in front of the stage, as is the case with most music performances in Pakistan. This music festival continued for three days, but there was only one day dedicated to folk music and dances; and the other two days were dedicated to classical and semi-classical music, namely *khayal* and *ghazal.*

After the event, I bought a number of brochures and publications that were for sale outside the hall, and learned that the main organizer of the event was the Pakistan National Council of Arts (PNCA), a national cultural institution that represents Pakistan's image abroad through folk dances performed by National Performing Arts Groups. When I recounted this encounter to my own circle of friends and colleagues, I discovered that they did not know the PNCA institution or the National Performing Arts Group. One of the publications by PNCA also indicated that the National Performing Arts Group was revived after 9/11 when Pakistan was allied with the US in the War Against Terror. General Musharraf renewed Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with United States and several Western European countries in order to improve "international perceptions of Pakistan through the arts and engage in cultural diplomacy and building cultural relations" (2007, 111).

A number of questions emerged from attending this event and reading the publications that are fundamental to this study: How did Pakistan use folk music to construct its identity, and represent its identity to local and foreign audiences?

What were these representations of Pakistan and how were they produced? Who did the work of producing the folk music and representing Pakistan through its music? What are the goals of the agents who are involved in producing folk music and producing images of Pakistan through folk music?

In order to analyze the representations of Pakistan that were asserted through folk music and dance, I will explore the production and use of folk music by three institutions, namely: i) Pakistani media (Radio-Pakistan and PTV), ii) Lok Virsa, and iii) the Pakistan National Council of Arts (PNCA) by locating these institutions and their leadership in the field of cultural production in Pakistan. These institutions respectively represented images of Pakistan as i) a cultural unit, with Islam and Urdu as unifying bonds; ii) cultural diversity, where folklore is the basis for defining national culture; and as iii) a cultural unit which is 5000 years old. By studying the process of the construction of these representations, I will argue that the promotion of folk music is a site of contestation in the definition of national culture and language. The social agents who did not view Pakistan as a single cultural unit but rather characterized by diversity struggled to promote folklore and claim its significance for Pakistan's national identity and culture.

I will use Pierre Bourdieu's theory of practice to contextualize my informants in the field of cultural production, and to show that the struggles to define national culture were not merely discursive positions in the cultural field; they also had implications in the political field with regards to share of economic capital, demands for provincial autonomy, and claims in defining the political

leadership in the center. These positions stemmed from the informants' class-*habitus*, and in this regard the promotion of folk music served as both a social distinction in judgment of taste for the elites, as well as a point of resistance at multiple levels: to the state policy to define Pakistan as a cultural unit; to the Urdu-speaking elite and their promotion of Urdu musical genres as national music; and to the centralization of power by the civil-military bureaucracy.

This research study focuses on the cultural elites in the provinces of Sindh and Punjab, drawing a distinction between two groups of Lahori elite in Punjab. One group (associated with Imtiaz Ali Taj) was pro-establishment and supported the civil-military bureaucracy collaborating with the Urdu-speaking elite in Sindh. The other was a group of progressive writers (associated with Faiz Ahmed Faiz) who were leftists and collaborated with the Sindhi-speaking elite in Sindh. Therefore, while the former preferred the first position on national culture advocating Pakistan as a cultural unit, the latter advocated that Pakistan be seen as a cultural diversity and resisted the Urdu hegemony. While the former was situated in the PNCA and the media, the latter formed regional institutions in Sindh for promotion of Sindhi folklore and associated with Lok Virsa at the national level. I show that these elites interpreted folk music differently in their respective cultural institutions to advance their positions on national culture. The first group was most prominent under the military dictatorships of General Ayub and General Musharraf and used folk music and dances to show a colorful image of Pakistan to the international community. The second group was most

prominent under the regime of Z.A. Bhutto; however their position on the definition of national culture always remained marginal and anti-establishment.

I study the contribution of the three groups of cultural elites to promote folk music during the historical time-period between 1965 and 1985 that spans the three important political regimes of General Ayub (1958-69), Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1971-77) and General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88), when a pattern of cultural development emerged. General Ayub set the precedent for state patronage of arts and music at the national level and used folk music and dances for cultural diplomacy. These cultural activities were institutionalized during the time of Z.A. Bhutto when institutions such as the Pakistan National Council of Arts (PNCA) and Lok Virsa were established. The efforts to promote culture at the national level—specifically by the PNCA—was thwarted during the time of General Zia-ul-Haq and, even though the institution continued to be operated by cultural elites, it was after Pakistan's alliance with the US in the War Against Terror that the PNCA was rejuvenated to address the worsening image of Pakistan abroad, and individuals from the era under discussion (1965-1985) were recalled to head the cultural activities supported by the in-flow of foreign capital in Islamabad.

This thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter will illustrate the ways in which Pierre Bourdieu's theory of practice may be usefully employed to understand folk music in Pakistan as an area of contestation, and will become the basis for the following chapters. The second chapter will discuss how the Pakistani media—Radio-Pakistan and Pakistan Television Networks—constructed the 'regional-folk' genre in order to establish a Muslim culture for

Pakistan. The third chapter will interpret the formation of Lok Virsa as a contestation to define national culture and promote folklore. The fourth chapter will focus on the formation of the Pakistan National Council of Arts (PNCA) and its use of choreographed folk dances for the purpose of cultural diplomacy. I will discuss how PNCA strived to define Pakistan as a 'cultural unit' along with the national media, but also sought to recapture the pre-Islamic history of Pakistan in order to re-integrate those musical forms and practices that had been eliminated by the national media in its quest to establish an Islamic identity, namely the practice of women dancing *kathak* or *bhārat nātyam* on television and public performance. The concluding chapter will present questions for further study.

This work will contribute towards the study of national music in ethnomusicology in several respects. Although a body of scholarship exists that discusses the Indian state's patronage of arts and culture as well as the construction of classical music and dances, there are only two short articles on the Pakistani state's patronage of music. Jairazbhoy's (1993) article states that Pakistan did not promote music due to the presence of religious fundamentalism, whereas Qureshi (1999) shows an active use of sonic arts by the state to establish a Muslim identity for Pakistan. Drawing from the position of Qureshi (1999), I show that it was not religious fundamentalism but rather contestations in the political and cultural fields, as well as the willingness of political leaders, that inhibited the establishment of infrastructure for the promotion of music. At the same time, my reading differs from that of Qureshi (1999, 746), particularly regarding her interpretation of *qawwāli* as a form of national music of Pakistan,

especially after the success of Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan, because those informants who advocate Pakistan as a culturally diverse entity reject Urdu musical genres, such as *qawwāli*, as the national music of Pakistan. In the absence of a consensus to form a successful hegemony, the establishment's efforts to promote any music as 'national music' fails, since several groups from across different provinces of Pakistan diverge from the state's imposition of one-nation defined by the religion of Islam and the Urdu language. The provincial elites challenge this hegemonic discourse by sustaining nationalist movements in the political field, and in the field of expressive culture they promote folk music sung in regional languages to symbolize national identity.

In general, this work contributes to ethnomusicology by shifting the focus of musical research from musicians and performance to cultural elites, who are the patrons of folk music. By using Bourdieu's theory of practice, I identify the construction of folk music as a process of consecration similar to the consecration of 'Art,' and interpret different positions on national culture as resulting from the struggle for cultural capital that is played out by music patrons through their promotion of folk music.

This work also contributes to Pakistan Studies, which are mostly focused on contestations in the political field. Recently there have been studies that analyze the cultural politics in Pakistan, namely Toor (2005) and Rahman (1995, 1997) on contestations to define national culture and language respectively, and Qureshi (1999) and Rajput (2005) on the use of media to create a sonic culture. These studies do not discuss the use of folk music or its significance to elites who

struggle to define a national culture and language, and this work will provide a contribution in that direction. On the other hand, most studies on Pakistan presume that the state is an entity and discuss political struggles from a political science perspective not as an area of contestation amongst various elites. In performing an anthropological study of elites that is also referred to as a 'political ethnography,' I provide a methodological contribution to these studies. Moreover, these studies take 'class' as the primary unit of analysis, not the language-habitus of the agents, and the use of Bourdieu's theory of practice in the context of Pakistan serves to structuralize political and economic contestations in the language-*habitus* of cultural elites.

Methodology: A Political Ethnography

I situate my work as a political ethnography or historical-anthropology of cultural elites in Pakistan. Shore (2003) writes that the 'anthropology of elites' challenges our assumptions of what constitutes the 'field,' and that it involves "a promiscuous array of different research strategies, mostly qualitative, often anecdotal and invariably personal and subjective." Furthermore, an anthropology of cultural elites should not only be synchronic but also diachronic seeing its evolution and formation over time. In this respect, this research spans four regimes in Pakistan, namely that of General Ayub (1958-1969), Z.A Bhutto (1973-1977), General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) and General Musharraf (1999-2008). I use an array of different research strategies including using historical documents, analyzing songs, conducting interviews and visiting archival sites. Through my interpretation of data, I take the work from personal and anecdotal

accounts and the history of cultural institutions towards analytical study of constructing folk music and its use in representing Pakistan.

This research spans a period of four months in Pakistan between May and August 2009 during which I travelled to Islamabad, Lahore, Hyderabad and BhitShah to conduct interviews and to visit archival sites. I visited the Lok Virsa library and museum and the PNCA library in Islamabad; the Mumtaz Mirza Studio and bookstore in Karachi; as well as the Institute of Sindhology, BhitShah cultural center in Hyderabad and BhitShah, and bought local books. I conducted interviews with people who held key positions in these cultural institutions during several political regimes. They include Naeem Tahir, Uxi Mufti, Zia Mohyeddin, and Khalid Saeed Butt, to name a few individuals who served as heads of these institutions, and Hameed Akhund, Dr. Ghulam Ali Allana, and Mohammed Qasim Makka who were managing institutions such as the Institute of Sindhology and BhitShah Cultural Committee in Sindh. I also interviewed producers in the music unit at PTV-Karachi, PTV-Islamabad and Radio-Islamabad, and these include Sattar Syed, Baidil Masroor, Mr. Farshoori and others, as well as regional elites in Sindh including Shaikh Aziz, Ibrahim Joyo and the late N.A Baloch, who was a prominent musicologist. The interviews were conducted in both English and Urdu.

Access to some eminent individuals occurred only a week before I was to leave for Edmonton in August 2009. This caused a time lag between many interviews, which gave me the opportunity to think and frame further questions. The template of each interview was never the same, and differed from one

individual to another. I expressed my inquiry by relating that the process of cultural institutional formation had occurred during the time of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the 1970s, and asked the informant to talk about the role of their institution and their own contribution within that process. This worked as a useful and pivotal tool to explore the past and evoke memories. Many informants disagreed that the initiative started in the 1970s and would start relating the history of institutional formation since partition in 1947, or from the 1950s during the time of General Ayub. I used this primary information to ask further questions, and this would initiate a discussion and a kind of sharing which was mostly '*be-tartīb'* (unstructured or incoherent) as one informant said in disapproval. However, this conversational mode opened the space for informants to share interesting anecdotes from the past, which a structured questionnaire might not have allowed.

In order to situate myself among my informants, I use Tariq Rahman's (1997) linguistic grouping in Pakistan, which includes English, Urdu, and Sindhi speakers in urban centers such as Karachi, which is my hometown. My school education has always been in the English language, and I passed my high school through Education Board of University of Cambridge, that is referred to as Ordinary Levels and Advanced Levels in Pakistan and is parallel with matriculation and intermediate levels in government education boards. However, I do not consider all English-speakers in Karachi to be elites, since there is a burgeoning number of middle-class families who work hard to provide English-language education to their children, which is sometimes even beyond their

economic means. The maternal side of my family immigrated from the Kāthiyāwār village in Gujrāt in India; my paternal grandparents were residents of Agra at the time of partition, and both are part of the Ismaili community, which is a Sh'ite Muslim community who consider Aga Khan IV to be their spiritual leader. They migrated to Karachi, Pakistan in the 1950s amidst a growing understanding that a state for Muslims had been created as well as the promise of new economic opportunities.

From 2000 to 2006, I studied at an elite institution called the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) that had recently initiated an undergraduate degree in the Social Sciences. My education at this institution opened doors for me in both the newspaper and NGO sectors and my short internship at the *Daily Times* put me in touch with Veengas at the Takhleeq Foundation, and Mr. Shaukat Omari, who was serving as the head of Transparency International-Pakistan at the time. I contributed to this institution through a project on youth and governance which is currently implemented in the four provinces of Pakistan. Through this institution, I was also introduced to the group of elites who were fighting corruption in Pakistan, including lawyers, businessmen and public officials, and I also participated in having an anti-corruption pact signed by General Musharraf at a conference in Islamabad in 2003. Although my work at TI-Pakistan mainly brought me in touch with the political and economic elite, the broad understanding of the social networks that I gained from this work was tremendously useful for this research. It was during my interactions with Veengas as well as encounters with other people during

these internships, that I stepped out of the narrow world of students educated through O'levels and A'levels, whose social *habitus* is not backed by wealthy parents, who are active members of the so-called civil society of Pakistan.

The cultural elites whom I interviewed are not a group of people I had previously encountered. My informants were in the age group of 50+, which means that they were not only from a very different generation but had also witnessed a Pakistan that I knew only from textbooks. To understand Pakistan through the categories that my cultural elite used required a translation in many respects. There was historical distance, distance in categories and positioning, distance of age, as well as distance of gender since most of my informants were male and the activities to which they related took place within a male-dominated state bureaucracy.

The knowledge I gained from these individuals was not only about the formation of cultural institutions in Pakistan, but also about their experiences listening to music in different villages and interacting with folk musicians. Through this project I have developed a better appreciation of the folk music of Pakistan. These interactions, and my analysis of these interactions, also helped me understand why we do not have institutions for music education in Pakistan like there are in India. Unlike in India where musical nationalists succeeded in becoming part of the establishment and establishing the classical dances and music of India, the musical nationalists in Pakistan–mainly the progressives and regional elites—were marginalized and reduced to the category 'sub-nationalists,' or anti-Pakistanis.

The interactions with my informants provided only a fragmented understanding at the time. It is through an extensive period of analysis of documents, interviews, as well as absorption through listening to the folk music of Pakistan that I feel ready to go back to them and continue the conversation. I also find that these elites are a closed group of people; had it not been for my education abroad and some individuals who provided access, this research would not have been possible. I had to position myself strongly due to the fact that I do not emerge from their *habitus*. The people who are involved in writing about music in Pakistan and working on culture stem from the group of elites who do *culture kā kām* and maintain social networks that are difficult for an outsider to enter.

Some of the local books on institutions that I used include books such as *50 Years of the Lahore Arts Council* written by elites who were part of this institution for several years; *A Tribute* by Shaikh Aziz in which he publishes his profiles of prominent Sindhi musicians written during the course of his career as a journalist; *A History of Radio-Pakistan* by Nihal Ahmad (2005), which discusses Radio-Pakistan's policies; and *The Female Voice in Sufi Ritual* by Shemeem Abbas (2002) from which I borrow interview transcripts with musicians. There are also local books in both Urdu and English that discuss the discourse of Pakistani culture by Jamil Jalibi and Sibte Hassan and the writings by Faiz on one hand, and a book by archaeologist Sir Mortimer Wheeler that I use to situate how the representations of Pakistan evolved in the cultural field.

On the other hand, I use publications by the Pakistan National Council of Arts (PNCA) and Lok Virsa to support the interviews I conducted. In reading these publications, I have employed some techniques of analysis, which include asking fundamental questions such as: Under whose direction are these publications written and who is the audience? How are this institution and individual situated in the political and cultural fields? How are they using the category 'folk' and what image of Pakistan are they providing? What are the goals of the institution that are put forward? How do they relate to history? Is the history of the institution balanced or are there some political regimes that are not given a place in the publication? I also search for tone of voice, the interlocutors if any, and how the institution situates itself amongst other institutions. The interpretation of these documents has been informed by the interviews and vice versa.

An important source of my data was policy documents such as the Faiz Report and the inaugural speech of Lok Virsa, which explicitly shows contestations and addresses its contestants. For example, the Faiz Report refers to the civil bureaucracy and religious elite and Lok Virsa addresses the urban elites who are only involved in promoting urban arts. Toor (2005) and her discussion of responses by Jamāt-e-Islamī and Progressive elites also informs by analysis. Moreover, I place a number of musical objects within the field of contestation--from songs and musicians to local and international folk festivals, sound archives, museums, and parades—and pose these as examples of the policy of Radio-Pakistan and Lok Virsa and how these institutions define 'folk.'

One of the issues in doing historical-ethnography is the reliability of both written and oral sources. Individuals in state institutions prefer to take most of the credit for their activities, and as mentioned earlier, the publications they supervise have political biases, which only becomes obvious through careful analysis. One of the techniques I undertook to ensure reliability was to compare the interpretation of similar events through two or more of my sources. If one person referred to another in the interview, I analyzed how these two individuals related with each other to further locate their positions. Since these oral and written accounts written under a certain political climate by people who hold certain political beliefs, they are partial. However, it is this analysis of partiality that has become the focus of my work, and I study this partiality by analyzing the practice of producing folk music as contested.

Spellings, Translation and Transliteration

Most of my interviews were conducted in both English and Urdu; in Pakistan conversations in English are often not entirely in English. Several interviewees also switched from English to Urdu and back to English to express their ideas. Those who were speaking in Urdu would also use English terms, since English is the lingua-franca and some words such as 'terrorism' for example will have words in Urdu but are not always intelligible to speakers, whose first language is not Urdu. In this thesis, almost all of my interview transcripts should be understood as combining original passages in English with my English translation of passages originally in Urdu.

South Asian language words are transliterated in the standard romanization used in most Indian and Pakistani English-language publications, essentially a simplified adaptation of established Urdu-Hindi and English dictionary usage (see particulars in the classic Platt's Dictionary of Urdu, Classical Hindi and English, 1977). Long and short vowels are distinguished by diacritical marks which are used to represent the long vowels *ā*, *ī,* and *ū* while short a, i, and u remain unmarked (as in *kāfī* vs *ghazal).* Diacritics are applied to musical genres and performances, but not to personal names and proper nouns like place names--these retain their customary romanization. All non-English words are written in italics throughout the text.

Chapter 2: Folk Music as a Site of Contestation

Folk music as a site of contestation in Pakistan can be conceptualized through Pierre Bourdieu's theory of practice, which has the merit of reconciling the objectivism of structuralism with the subjectivism in phenomenological thinking and spatializing the relationship between structure and agent. I will refer to the following works of Bourdieu to conceptualize folk music as a site of contestation: *Outline of theory of Practice* (1977)*, The Field of Cultural Production (1993), Distinction: The social critique of Judgment of Taste* (1986) and an article titled *Re-thinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field* (1999), which will provide conceptual tools to map the field of cultural production of folk music in Pakistan and situate my informants and the cultural institutions under study.

This chapter will first outline Bourdieu's theory followed by a history of cultural politics analyzed through the lens of "homology" between cultural and political fields, and show how the establishment of national cultural institutions reflect the dominance of Punjabi elite analogous to its presence in civil-military bureaucracy. This discussion will be followed by a description of the three main positions to define national culture that the agents within the three cultural institutions sustain through their use of folk music. Finally I will show how the promotion of folk music in Pakistan is embedded in these positions, and becomes a site of contestation through which folk music emerges as an element of distinction for the elites reinforcing their anti-establishment position on national culture. This discussion will provide an interpretive framework to understand the

work of promoting folk music by specific institutions and contestations within them in the chapters to follow.

State as a Field of Contestation

Bourdieu interprets the concept of 'state' as comprising fields of contestation over different kinds of capital, such that the practices in these different fields show structural similarities, a feature that Bourdieu refers to as 'homology.' Bourdieu's conception of 'capital' is distinct from Marx's in that he does not only consider economic relations but also relations that pertain to other kinds of capital. These include 'economic,' 'juridical,' 'physical,' 'informational' and 'symbolic' capital[1]. Whereas physical capital refers to state's monopoly of legitimate violence in line of Max Weber, 'economic capital' refers to the tax-collecting function of the state; 'informational capital' refers to the state's ability to standardize and create uniform 'categories of thought' in the line of Michel Foucault's notion of bio-power. In Bourdieu's typology of different forms of capital, folk music can be categorized as 'symbolic capital,' which Bourdieu defines as follows:

> Any property (any form of capital whether physical, economic, cultural or social) when it is perceived by social agents endowed with categories of perception, which cause them to know it and to recognize it, to give it value. (1999, 62)

The history of cultural-politics in Pakistan can be analyzed by considering it as a *field,* where social, economic, and political values and meanings are created and contested. Bourdieu writes:

[1] For more details on the definition of each form of capital, please refer to Bourdieu's essay *Rethinking the State…* (1999)

> I define a field as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and potential situation…in the structure of the distribution of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions…(quoted in Jones 1992, 85)

With respect to Bourdieu's definition, I consider three fields: political field which is concerned with determining political leadership, balance of powers and structure of state and is a contestation over different forms of capital including juridical capital and economic capital. Second is cultural field which contests over education, language, promotion of arts and culture; and this field contests over definition of 'national culture' and consequently over cultural and symbolic capital. Third is the financial field that is related to control over economic capital. Bourdieu writes that these fields of the state are inter-connected and resemble each other, a characteristic that Bourdieu refers to as 'homology' (resemblance). In the following section, I will show the relationship of political field that involves contestations to define political leadership and cultural field that involves struggles to define national language and national culture.

A Brief History of Cultural-Politics in Pakistan

Pakistan is a multi-lingual state, with English as the lingua franca of the state and Urdu as the national language. However Urdu is not the mother tongue of majority of the people of Pakistan but rather that of a small minority of immigrants who migrated from Uttar Pradesh province in India in 1947. They are referred to as *mohājirs* (literally meaning immigrants) and comprise 7.6 percent of the population (Rahman 2002, 4556). In order to understand, language-politics

and its impact on political and cultural fields, I will present a brief history of cultural politics of Pakistan.

Pakistan had ideologically been formed on the basis of two-nation theory outlined by the founding father, Mohammed Ali Jinnah who stated that Muslims of India were a separate nation from Hindus because they have their own culture and way of life. The secularist leaders of the All-India Muslim League were not using religion to be the basis of nationhood but were rather emphasizing the communal identity of Muslims in the sub-continent. In her book *Self and Sovereignty* (2001), Jalal discusses how the shift from communal identity of Muslims towards the claim for nationhood occurred in the sub-continent in the decades after the Indian Mutiny in British India of 1857 that led to formation of Pakistan in 1947.

At the time of partition, the princely states such as Hyderabad and Kashmir that were under British control were given the choice of joining either Pakistan or India; however a dispute occurred over the region of Kashmir that remains unresolved till present, and has been a bone of contention between India and Pakistan that has led to a war in 1947 over Kashmir, then in 1965 during the time of General Ayub, and again over East Pakistan in 1971 whereby India assisted Bengalis in the civil and again in 1999. The partition also led to migration of Sikhs and Hindus from across Pakistan, especially Sindh and Punjab to Indian Punjab and Muslim migration to Pakistan that spurred inter-communal violence between Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims that resulted in heavy casualties and is part

of the historic memory of people on both sides of the border especially in the province of Punjab.

At the time of partition, there was also a division of Indian government assets, including the Indian Civil Service, the Indian Army, the Royal Indian Navy, the Indian railways and the central treasury, and other administrative services. However in terms of cultural infrastructure, Pakistan only inherited two radio-stations, in Lahore and Peshawar in 1947, and it was the task of post-partition nationalists to do the work of building cultural institutions for promotion of arts and music in Pakistan. Whereas India already benefitted from exhibiting tribal cultures in British colonial exhibitions, Pakistan had to initiate the work of using culture for diplomacy from scratch. This process occurred in the 1960s after Pakistan allied with China, and initiated the exchange of cultural troupes.

However, the formation of cultural institutions did not occur until the time of Z.A. Bhutto in the 1970s, when institutions under discussion namely Pakistan National Council of Arts (PNCA) and Lok Virsa were formed. The growth of cultural institutions was thwarted through the regime of General Zia-ul-Haq and this lost momentum in building cultural infrastructure could not be sustained during the unstable democratic regimes of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in the 1990s. After Pakistan allied with the US in the War Against Terror and Islamabad witnessed an inflow of foreign capital, the cultural institutions such as PNCA were revived by General Musharraf. On the contrary, Lok Virsa continued to survive through UNESCO's funding, despite the willingness or unwillingness of different Pakistani governments to patronize cultural activities.

In the founding years, Pakistan sought to establish itself as an Islamic culture according to the ideals of the secularist Indian Muslim nationalists, who led the struggle for partition. By 'Islamic culture' they meant considering Islam as the cultural identity of Pakistan with its

> distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, name and nomenclature, sense of value and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and tradition, aptitude and ambitions; in short…[a] distinctive outlook on life and of life (Jinnah–Gandhi correspondence 1945 [1944]) quoted in Toor 2005, 319).

This position also demanded Urdu to be the national language of Pakistan, which remains the dominant, yet contested position. At the time of partition, Jinnah defined Urdu to be the national language; however since Bengalis were in majority, they demanded both Bengali and Urdu to be national languages. Since Pakistan came into being through the claim that Muslims were a separate nation, the founding father Mohammed Ali Jinnah declared that Urdu should be the only national language of Pakistan. Moreover, he rejected the demand for making twin national language Urdu and Bengali, by controversially describing Bengali as a "Hindu language" (Speech on 21st and 24th of March 1948 at a public meeting at Dhaka University).

Since Pakistan had been established through distinction of Muslim from Hindus, Pakistan sought to differentiate itself from India. Urdu had become emblematic of Indian Muslim identity, particularly the *ashraf* elite in British India after the Hindi-Urdu controversy in 1867.[2] Urdu was taught in British schools and

[2] The subject of this Hindi-Urdu controversy that took place in colonial India in 1867 was the script of '*kharībolī*' (a Persianized dialect that had developed through the courtly influence of Delhi Sultanate and Mughals in India from 12th to 19th century). The Muslims claimed that the script of this language should be Arabic rather than Devanigri. This led to the birth of two

it was also used in lower domains of power-administration, judiciary, education and commerce in the centers of Muslim power, especially the United Province (UP). The Muslim clergy also used Urdu in the colonial period for the dissemination of Islamic literature, (Metcalf 1982, quoted in Rahman 2002, 4557) and is a language of examination at Islamic *madrassa* of groups such as Deobandis, Barelvis, Ahl-i-Hadith and the Shi'i.

However, after partition in 1947, it was not only the Bengalis who contested the definition of national language as Urdu and establishment of Muslim culture, but also the landed elite who owned land-holdings in their respective provinces. The success of Muslim League in obtaining for itself a new state had partially come about through support of landed elite who had been promised autonomy and control of their lands and power in the new state. However, Jinnah's speeches after independence considered Pakistan as not only a cultural unity that is fused by a common religion but also recommended the different groups within Pakistan to step out of "provincialism" and ways of identifying as Sindhis and Baluchis, and therefore associate themselves as *Musalmān* (Muslims).

Ironically this position also became the position of the civil-military bureaucracy interested in holding power in the center and denying provincial autonomy. Rais (2003) writes, "From the start, the state elite regarded even the voicing of regional interests as anti-state; they suppressed demands for regional autonomy instead of accommodating them" (Rais 2003, 9). Jalal (1990) identifies

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languages: while Urdu followed the Arabic script for the 'khariboli,' Hindi followed the Devanigri. Furthermore the future development by men of letters also followed different courses; new words in Hindi were taken from Sanskrit while those of Urdu were appropriated from Persian and Arabic. (Jalal 2000)

the ruling class to be the civil-military bureaucracy, which is also referred to as the 'establishment' (Toor 2005). In Bourdiean terms, this elite controlled the informational, economic and juridical capital of the state, and established the dominant position about Pakistani culture as a cultural unit with a single language.

This policy was particularly implemented during the time of General Ayub, when he introduced the One-Unit policy in 1951 that merged the four provinces of West Pakistan into a single cultural unit, 'West Pakistan' and titling East Bengal as 'East Pakistan.' This was a political device to counter the Bengali majority and its claims for equal share in the government. In order to justify the concept of One-Unit, the establishment introduced the Indus-thesis in their ideology in the national constitutional assembly, which proclaimed that East Pakistan and West Pakistan are two separate cultural units from "time-immemorial" since the history of West Pakistan is dated to 5000 year-old Indus Valley civilizations (Toor 2005). However One-Unit was not only opposed by the Bengalis but also by representatives from Sindh and North West Frontier Province (NWFP). As a result the regional assembly was dismissed and Sindh Assembly's speaker Mir Ghulam Ali Talpur was put under house arrest in a remote village in Sindh (Hassan 2007, 3030). This policy of centralization of powers created resentment amongst the regional elites, and the first resentment stemmed from West Bengal, that eventually led to its secession in 1971.

After General Ayub's resignation in 1969, the new Military President General Yahya Khan had held elections in 1970, in which Z.A. Bhutto's Pakistan

People's Party (PPP) won a large number of seats from constituencies in West Pakistan. However, Sheikh Mujib's Awami League (formed in 1949 in Dhaka) from East Pakistan won 167 of 169 seats in East Pakistan and secured a simple majority in the 313-seat lower house parliament. As a result, Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman presented the Six Points to the President of Pakistan and claimed the right to form the government; however Z.A. Bhutto refused to yield the premiership of Pakistan to Mujibur Rahman, and insisted on forming a coalition government. Therefore, President Yahya Khan called the military, dominated by West Pakistanis, to suppress dissent that led to the genocide of East-Pakistanis at the hands of Pakistani military. India supported the East Pakistani Liberation struggle that led to Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 that finally culminated in the secession of East Pakistan into a separate state Bangladesh in 1971.

The breakdown of the country challenged the established position of Pakistan as a single 'cultural unity' identified by the religion Islam. The Two-Nation Theory, espoused by Jinnah that had served as the theoretical base upon which Pakistan was established, was also challenged. As a result of General Ayub's policy of One-Unit and centralization of powers, the resentment of Baloch, Sindhi, and the Pashtuns had also peaked, and nationalist movements from provinces of Balochistan, Sindh and NWFP claimed secession. After 1971 the Sindhi nationalist elite under G.M Syed's Sindhi Awami Mahaz also referred to as Sindh United Front (SUF), and Baluchi nationalist movement under Mir

Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo also proposed alternative visions of the state[3] (Talbot 2003, 73). There were riots between Urdu-speaking Mohajirs and the Sindhi speakers in Sindh province between January 1971 and July 1972 (Rahman 2002, 4557).

Therefore the regime of Z.A. Bhutto, who became the first elected Prime Minister of Pakistan after the 1971 crisis, was a critical era in Pakistan's history, since he had the primal task of nation-building and countering the secessionist movements that emerged from Sindh and Baluchistan. Z.A. Bhutto had emerged from a landed elite family of Sindh, and therefore his mother tongue was Sindhi and not Urdu. He took the policy of promoting regional cultures and building cultural institutions. For this purpose he asked a prominent person, Faiz Ahmed Faiz, to build national institutions. Since Z.A. Bhutto had served as the Foreign Minister under General Ayub's period, he also continued the efforts of General Ayub towards establishment of infrastructure for promotion of arts.

The crisis of national identity that followed secession of East-Pakistan in 1971 also provided a need to open doors to regional elites from Sindh, Baluchistan and Frontier province to voice their position on national culture with the aim to suppress dissent from the spurring nationalist movements. As a result of these debates, alternative visions of Pakistan were articulated, primarily Pakistan as a 'culturally diverse unit' where unity can be brought about through integration of national cultures.

[3] At the time of partition, the nationalist movements from Sindh and Baluchistan demanded recognition of regional identity and share of power; it was after 1971 that G.M Syed claimed for a separate Sindhudesh.

However, the state's ideology of using Islam and Urdu as symbols of national integration did not change even after the loss of East Pakistan (Rahman 2002, 4558). Zia-ul-Haq also played against the Sindhi-Urdu divide between Mohajirs and Sindhi-speaking people by creating a political party Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) that played on the resentments of the immigrant elite and served to marginalize Sindhis from government posts. As a result, the tensions between the Mohajirs and the Sindhis have grown since the mid-1980s when Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) became a militant force to be reckoned with (Rahman 2002, 4557).

Despite a history of limited hegemony, the establishment or the civil-military bureaucracy considers the linguistic identities of people in Pakistan and its consequent Bengali, Sindhi and Baloch nationalism during Ayub era as a result of the fact that "these ethnic people were born with fixed identities. This was the reason why they could not become modern enough to identify with Pakistan as a whole" (Rahman 2002, 4557). In other words, these linguistic identities are denigrated as pre-modern and backward.

Contestations to Define National Culture

Sibte Hassan, a prominent intellectual who participated in the discussions on national culture during the regimes of General Ayub, Z.A. Bhutto and General Zia writes that there were two positions to define national culture at the time of partition. The first position stated that Pakistan is a 'cultural unit' defined by the common religion of Islam, and one national language, Urdu. This position defined Pakistan through the two-nation theory that was proposed at the time of partition

by Jinnah, and viewed Islam as binding forces for Indian Muslims to establish a secular state. Its challenger was specifically the feudal elites and literati in different provinces that accepted Pakistan as a single state but did not agree that it was a cultural entity. Those who held this position considered Urdu to be an alien language that was imposed on the people by the state. While the first position supported centralization of state power, the second position struggled for provincial autonomy (303).

The first position became the dominant position since it was the ideological position of civil-military bureaucracy that used it to keep the power centralized. However it is important to note that the use of religion 'Islam' was not in the way that orthodox Muslims or religious parties defined it, but rather Islam was used a binding factor for Pakistan to claim itself as a 'cultural unity' for Muslims, rather than give primacy to regional cultures and share powers with the regional elites. A derivative group of the first position - Pakistan as a 'cultural unity' - emerged in the 1960s during the time of General Ayub. This group traced Pakistan back to the Indus Valley civilization, and by doing so advocated inclusion of pre-Islamic history of Pakistani land as part of national identity. The established history of Pakistan at the time dated the history of Pakistan to Arab invasion of Sindh by Mohammed Bin Qasim in 712 A.D. The second derivative group was the Ulema stemming around the political party Jamat-e-Islami (JI) who aimed to establish Pakistan as a theocracy. While this group has remained an important stakeholder in defining the state, its presence in the political field was felt most strongly during the regime of Zia-ul-Haq, who allied with JI to impose

his conservative views on culture. On the other hand, the second position viewed Pakistan as a 'cultural diversity.' The next section discusses these positions in detail in order to situate the cultural institutions under study within these positions.

Position 1: Pakistan as 'Islamic Culture'

It was through the idea of 'Islamic culture' that Pakistan sought to invent both a history for the new state and a new tradition of Pakistani sound, to distinguish itself from India as well as to reshape its collective memory. The emergence of 'Islamic culture' in the sub-continent was dated to the time of Arab conquest of Mohammed Bin Qasim in 712 A.D[4]. The major architectural monuments that boasted Muslim dynastic contributions to Indic culture were left in India, and only the city of Lahore boasted Mughal architecture (Jalibi 1984, 54). In this respect the state made a "nationalist" use of archaeology to create monuments to build memory. A physical site in Sindh was discovered in 1951 and a mound known as Bhanbhore was imposed beside the Gharo creek nearly forty miles southeast of Karachi. It was established that there stood a Hindu capital,

[4] This history continues with Arab invasions including that of Mahmood of Ghaznavi, Shahabuddin Ghuri and other rulers of Delhi Sultanate. After the contributions of the Mughals, this culture declined (*zawāl*) and was saved through reformists such as Mujadid Alf Sani, Shah Wali Ullah. Despite the fact that Sir Syed was westernized (*nichrī aur maghrib parast*), he created national consciousness amongst Muslims of the sub-continent. Later through the vision of poet Allama Iqbal and Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Pakistan came into being, such that after 2.5 centuries, Muslims for the first time received an opportunity to practice their religion freely and develop their culture (Hassan 2007, 301). This is the story of Pakistan that students study in their history textbooks, and according to these positions, Urdu alone can be the national language of Pakistan, since it is the language of Islam. On the other hand, the second positions that promoted regional autonomy held that there is no Pakistani history before Partition, but rather regional histories alongside history of Indian Muslim nationalism. This group would rightly doubt that the invasion of Mohammed Bin Qasim led to the emergence of 'Islamic culture,' as would historians of South Asia.

which was captured by Mohammed Bin Qasim in 712, and hence this site was deemed a national monument" (Wheeler 1967, 198). While historians of South Asia would doubt that Mohammed Bin Qasim's invasion had any contributions towards the spread of Islam in the sub-continent, the archaeological material helped to fortify the idea of Pakistan as a cradle of Islam in the sub-continent. The ideological position to define Pakistan as a cultural unit with Islam and Urdu as its unifying bond became the dominant position in national media and the way media is used folk music is discussed in the following chapter.

Position 2: Pakistan as 5000 year Old

The representation of Pakistan as '5000 years old' was a derivative of the earlier position on Pakistan as 'Islamic culture' with the exception that it made nationalist use of archaeology in the line of Sir Mortimer Wheeler, who wrote a book, '5000 years of Pakistan' in 1947. Twenty years later, Wheeler justified his outrageous idea of 'Pakistan as 5000 years old' as an attempt to give the new state a history that it lacked.

> I told him [the publisher] that one of the first things, which a new State needed, was a sense of tradition as well as of aspiration, a sense of being simultaneously very new and very old…And so I wrote that book in an attempt to show both Pakistanis and the world beyond that the new Dominion, as it was then, was primarily a new phase in a long, continuous history and prehistory, and was not a mere isolated abstraction (Wheeler 1967).

The use of archaeological excavations to reinforce the national myths is typical of nation building, which Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) refer to as the 'invention of tradition,' whereby the past is invented through the selective use of symbols, myths and material remains. Wheeler's notion of 'Pakistan as 5000

years old' was not adopted since the archaeology department in 1951 was interested in Mohammed Bin Qasim and not Indus-Valley civilization. However, when the "Indus-thesis" became important to safeguard Pakistan as a cultural unity against the Bengal's majority, a section of the elite at the Lahore Arts Council shifted towards the idea of 'Pakistan as 5000 years old,' which also became the basis for Pakistan's identity abroad, in competition with India's projection as an ancient civilization. Jalibi (1984) writes,

> Since our rival and adversary, India had centuries old civilization and as the whole world was acquainted with its philosophy, civilization, social system and religion, we made attempts to trace our civilization and our history back to ancient times…In doing so, we hoped that as the world was already aware of the ancient civilization of which the archaeological remains in Pakistan are reminders, it would well appreciate the greatness and antiquity of Pakistan (55).

This image of Pakistan was projected in national museums by show-casing material objects from archaeological sites such as Mohenjo-daro, Harappa, Taxila, Gandhara and the remains of Buddhist civilization in Pakistan, to set it again the Muslim monuments left behind in India such as "the Taj Mahal, the Jamia Mosque of Delhi, and the Quwwat-ul-Islam, etc. which are living symbols of Muslims culture" (Jalibi 1984, 54). The Pakistan National Council of Arts (PNCA) used this position to showcase Pakistan's image for cultural diplomacy.

Position 3: Pakistan as a Cultural Diversity or Guldastā (Bouquet)

This is the second position that challenges the established position of Pakistan as a cultural unity. It states that there is no such thing as the Pakistani culture. In 1964, Dr. Jamil Jalibi wrote a book, *Pakistānī kalchar: Qaumi kalchar kī tashkīl ka mas'alā* (The Problem in the Creation of a National Culture), in

which this claim was overtly made:

> Let us look at Pakistani society from the standpoint and decide whether there exists on the national plan a culture, which we can proudly describe as national culture of Pakistan. We do have regional cultures that unite these regional cultures in a deep spiritual bond. At national level, there is no such a thing as the Pakistani culture (Jamil Jalibi, 1984: 46).[5]

After stating his position that Pakistan needs to develop a national culture, Dr. Jalibi analogized his position that a national culture can emerge by considering Pakistan as a *guldastā* or bouquet of different cultures. He writes:

> On the national level, the cultural spirit of the various regions form a *bouquet in which flowers* [my italicization] of different colors come together to present a multi-colored unity. This unity is named national culture. The national and regional cultures influence each other and enrich the blood in their veins through a two-way process of assimilation (1984, 51).

Dr. Jalibi was a native of Allahabad and Urdu was his native language, and therefore this is one of the first and few assertions emerging from within the Urdu-speaking elite that gives significance to regional cultures in defining 'national culture.' Dr. Jalibi's analogy of '*guldastā'* became a symbol through which the second position distinguished itself with regards to national culture. This is the position that I came across through my interviews with regional elite, especially Dr. G.A Allana in Hyderabad, and became the basis for questioning elites in Islamabad and Lahore. Progressive leftist elites in both Punjab and Sindh held this position, but upon a closer reading of Jamil Jalibi's book, I realized that he supported the established position. Dr. Jalibi in his book clearly advocates

[5] This quote has been taken from the English version of Dr. Jalibi's book "The Identity of Culture." (1984), but a similar quote has been published in Toor (2005) as well as papers of local scholars such as Dr. G.A Allana to show Dr. Jalibi's position, and these are dated to his 1964 book.

Urdu language as the only national language of Pakistan, whereas the leftists were arguing for multiple national languages parallel with the vision of Jawaharlal Lal Nehru in India. On the other hand, he also writes "Indeed, we have got to lift the Pakistani people above the regional level and put them on the level of a nation" (47).

Therefore, like the establishment, he considered regional identity to be parochial and secessionist. Furthermore, he considered the use of the Indus-thesis that considered Pakistan as 5000 years old as a failed "political device" that "weakened our connection with Indo-Muslim culture," reinforcing the established position of Pakistan as an Islamic culture. He goes further to assert that "Pakistani nationalism was founded on religion" (60), and therefore "Harappa or Mohenjo daro, even though within our own geographical boundaries, does not have the same meaning for us as does the *Ka'aba* in spite of being outside those boundaries"(56). This statement by Jalibi (1984) is contrary to the second position, namely because the people espousing regional cultures as the basis for national culture would argue that the spiritual symbol of Pakistani people is not Ka'aba but shrines in their own localities. Their models are not Mohammed or Ali, but the saints such as Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai or Bulleh Shah; and their heroes and heroines are not Arabs but belong to the local region, namely Sassui, Heer, Sohnī, Rānjhā, Dullāh Bhattī and other characters from folk narratives as Faiz Ahmed Faiz argued. Although the second position appropriated the analogy of '*guldastā'* espoused by Jalibi, the meaning it gave was distinct from what Jalibi was proposing.

Interview with Dr. G.A Allana at his house in Hyderabad (Sindh) in 2009

In contrast Faiz challenged the dominance of Urdu as the national language since it was the not the mother tongue of the people of Pakistan. In the book, *Meezān*, he writes, 'Hardly any child sulked in Urdu, hardly any mother sang lullabies in Urdu' (1962, 104, quoted in Kazimi 2005). Unlike the establishment, which saw regional cultures as a threat to national unity, he opined that national unity would come about through development of regional arts and culture. Faiz contested the state policy of looking towards Saudi Arabia to construct an Islamic culture on one hand and, on the other, eliminating Hindu influences from local cultures, an example of which is Radio-Pakistan's policy to ban *rāgs* that included names of Hindu deities for example *Rāg Rāgeshwarī* and musical instruments that were associated with Hindu deities, for example *Saraswati vīnā*. His approach was inclusionary, such that non-Muslim elements of the local cultures as well as

Central Asian and Arab influences on the sub-continent were all accepted as Pakistani culture. He considered the basis for national culture to be i) the religion of Islam, ii) indigenous cultures of different linguistic regions, iii) elements of Western culture absorbed from British occupation, as well as d) cultures of minority groups who are part of Pakistani nation (89).

> This [national integration] is possible only if 'diversity' is not misinterpreted as disunity and the natural process of the growth of diverse elements is not perverted or stifled by an impatience for immediate results…If the creative potentialities of our regional arts and culture are allowed to wilt and die we shall soon find ourselves with nothing left to synthesize. The only alternative left to us will be to borrow a national culture wholesale from some alien source--a process, which is already piece-meal in progress (2004, 45-6).

Therefore the second position emphasized the place of regional cultures and was held by cultural elites led by Faiz Ahmed Faiz in the Lahore Arts Council, Lok Virsa and cultural institutions for promotion of folklore in the provinces.

Contestations to Form Cultural Institutions

One of the concrete examples of the way the positions on national culture impacted the cultural institutions can be gauged by the fate of Faiz Report. Toor (2005) writes that the Faiz Report[6] was the basis for cultural policy during Bhutto's regime; however, Mr. Khalid Saeed Butt, who chaired PNCA during the time of Z.A. Bhutto, informed me that the Faiz Report did not become the basis for 'national integration' in Pakistan. During the tenure of Z.A. Bhutto in 1972, J.Rahim who was then the minister for Presidential Affairs, called a conference in Islamabad, in which all the important people in culture and arts were invited,

[6] This report was commissioned by General Ayub and published during the time of Z.A. Bhutto. Details of the report and its producers are mentioned later.

including Faiz Ahmed Faiz. The participants of this conference discussed the Faiz Report since it had been published in newspapers and was the subject of controversy. Mr. Butt said that Faiz's views were influenced by Soviet socialism, in that he was claiming that Pakistan is comprised of four to five nationalities, and therefore is a federation of these nations.

> We were of the attitude that Pakistan is one nation; there is diversity in unity and diversity is different from 'nationality'...and upon this critique and that of other people it was decided by the committee that Faiz Report will not be the basis for cultural re-organization in Pakistan (Interview with Khalid Saeed Butt, June 2009).

Mr. Butt was of the view that he would agree with Pakistan as a 'Unity in Diversity,' but he considered Pakistan as a cultural unity; therefore when Faiz and the other people in the group Sibte Hassan considered Pakistan to be comprised of nationalities[7], he disagreed and wrote critical pieces in the newspaper about it. Therefore, the view to let national cultural emerge from promotion of regional cultures was never been implemented because the second position did not see Pakistan as a cultural unity.

It is important to note for the study of policy towards folk music in Pakistan that this report had detailed recommendations regarding how music education and the development of folklore could serve Pakistani nationalism. Since this was not just a set of recommendations but also an imagined nation in an alternate way, if implemented, it would have had the impact of establishing the place of arts in Pakistan as well as raised the status of traditional music and musicians to

[7] The two copies of Faiz Report that I found in translated writings of Faiz and another received from the office of PNCA does not mention regional cultures as nationalities. Since it is titled as 'excerpts' from the actual report, it is possible that the excerpts censor the claims towards regional cultures as nationalities.

'symbolic capital' of the state. However, its challenge to the established position was not accepted from within the secularist cultural elite.

Since the report was published closely after the national crisis of 1971, Faiz's critique of the established position is explicit. He states that Pakistani culture is not 'Islamic culture' and that, if local aspects of culture are ignored, the 'Islamic culture' of Pakistan would not differ from that of any other Muslim countries.

> Thus Sudan, Nigeria, Turkey, Iran and Indonesia are all Muslim States but a Nigerian unless he forfeits his nationality is not a Turk nor can a Sudanese claim to be an Indonesian. As they all profess Islam, what differentiates the identity of one from the other must be something other than religion. This something else is his nationhood and his culture, which are two sides of the same phenomenon (90).

Faiz Report clearly outlined its ambitions to promote both folk and classical music and establish government patronage for musical activities including establishment of music academies, which would train a new generation of Pakistanis in music and arts. However these goals were not achieved. Moreover, one of the other consequences of rejection of Faiz Report, was that the regional elites and their position of Pakistan as a cultural diversity was marginalized, and they were also marginalized from forming national institutions. This marginalization also occurred in the share of political leadership and provincial autonomy, and thus according to Sibte Hassan, the regional elite initiated a search for their own culture, that involved promoting the folklore without support of federal government. These developments in marginalization of regional elites can be related by contrasting the development of Lahore elite at Lahore Arts Council who formed national institutions such as Lok Virsa and PNCA in comparison to

Sindhi elite at BhitShah Cultural Center who formed Institute of Sindhology and Ministry of Culture, but were not part of regional institutions. These institutions also promoted folklore and in doing so were involved in the contestations to define national culture.

There were two main institutions that came about shortly after partition: Radio-Pakistan, established in 1947, and the Lahore Arts Council, established in 1949. These institutions were allied and promoted the position of Pakistan as 'Islamic culture.' Lahore Arts Council was established through private initiatives by a group of art lovers and artists who wanted to create a forum where artistic activities would be organized and presented in the new state, and the aim of the institution was to "strengthen cultural bonds and fraternal ties among Muslim countries and promote the arts of Pakistan in the wider context of Islamic civilization that had influenced the lives of millions in the sub-continent during the 800 year Muslim rule" (Saeed 2003, 21). A section of this group also turned towards the image of Pakistan as '5000 years old.' General Ayub asked this elite, namely Naeem Tahir, to represent Pakistan abroad. These details are discussed in chapter five on PNCA.

Whereas a significant part of the elite at Al-Hamra promoted the position of Pakistan as a cultural unit with Urdu as its national language, and mainly promoted urban arts and musical forms influenced by Mughal heritage of Lahore, another section comprising of progressive leftists departed from this position. This group led by Qudratullah Shahab who also conducted a grand folk festival

and exhibition of musical instruments at Lahore Arts Council in the 1950s (Interview with Khalid Saeed Butt, June 2009).

Qudratullah Shahab was an Urdu writer, and is known to have influenced a number of other writers towards Sufism and folklore including Mumtaz Mufti, the father of Uxi Mufti, who established the national institute to preserve Pakistan's folklore. Faiz Ahmed Faiz was also involved towards promoting regional cultures. While the first cultural group that went to China originated from the first position, the commission to research arts and culture, which led to publication of Faiz Report, was comprised of Progressive leftists. This shows how the social networks within Lahore Arts Council provide a *class-habitus,* whereby familial upbringing in the progressive literary environment and its leftist ideals were germinating positions on national culture.

The two standpoints at Lahore Arts Council also determined the leadership at national institutions such as PNCA, which was largely dominated by the Lahori cultural elite at the Al-Hamra. This revolved around two groups: one group was led by Faiz Ahmed Faiz and the other by Imtiaz Ali Taj, and they were both poles apart; while Faiz stood for second position, Imtiaz Ali Taj stood for Pakistan as an cultural unit. Therefore, when Faiz was in power, his son-in-law Shoaib Hashmi ran Lahore Arts Council, whereas when Imtiaz Ali Taj came to power, it was Naeem Tahir (Interview with Khalid Saeed Butt, June 2009).

The leftist elite at Lahore Arts Council did not only contest the position of secularist-liberals who viewed Pakistan as 'cultural unit,' but also with the civil bureaucracy and religious elite for the promotion of culture. These contestations

are obvious in Faiz Report, which uses vitriolic language towards different groups. The civil bureaucracy of Pakistan rejected the support for local arts and cultural activities on the basis that Pakistan is a Third World nation, and Pakistan rather needs to spend on economy and education. "Let the Harp and Fiddle wait until better days come around" (Faiz Report, 12). In response, the Faiz report stated that if the state was prioritizing spending on golf links, ski resorts and "prestige projects," such as banks and financial centers to improve its financial relations abroad, it also needed to emphasize the arts (10). Of course the golf links and ski resorts were mostly used by the wealthy groups, within which civil bureaucracy[8] alongside industrialists and landed elite would be situated.

> Prolonged colonial subjection subverted the native cultural patterns of our old society and the imperialist rulers sought to replace them by their own cultural imports. Everything 'native' by ways of culture and the arts was held up to contempt and ridicule and their western counterparts held out as the only models fit for imitation. The resultant disruption of national life and impoverishment of all the national arts robbed large sections of our people, particular the influential section called 'the Civil Lines' of all love, respect and understanding of their national arts (8).

It is interesting to note here that there was nothing such as the 'national art' in Pakistan until that point or even at present. The Faiz Report was an attempt to draft a cultural policy that would have led to the recognition of regional and classical art forms as national arts; however this position remained marginal.

[8] A significant part of the first generation of post-partition elite emerged from "salaried classes" produced by the British colonial systems of education directed by Lord Macaulay's education reforms. Macaulay believed that while India cannot be transformed into an English-speaking country, the required use of English language in all Indian higher education would inevitably promote Indian loyalty to British rule.
"We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern: a class of persons Indian in blood and color, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and in intellect. To that class we may leave it to ... convey knowledge to the great mass of the population." (quoted in Cutts 1953, 825)

Alongside criticizing the civil bureaucracy for its colonial attitudes that denigrates it own cultures, the Faiz Report also contests the position of religious right towards establishing Pakistan as a theocratic polity by addressing their claim that music and dancing are vulgar activities.

> Since independence, these antithetical attitudes inherited from past have been seized upon by certain faction in the country for topical political ends. They first sought to equate all music and dance with lewd vulgarizations of these arts by inept professionals. From these premises, it was easy to proceed to the conclusion, as has often been done, that all art is immoral, hence anti-religious, and hence ideologically unacceptable. It takes no great religious knowledge to rebut this thesis. Hamd, Na't Salam, Marsia, Qawwāli, even good 'Qirat' of the Holy Quran are all forms of musical expression. *Khattak, dhali, kathi, bhangra, jhoomar* are all dance forms. We doubt if many people, even among the most religious minded, would object to any of these forms of artistic expression on religious or moral grounds. Any ideological objection that can be brought against any art therefore, must relate to some particular form and content of a particular art and to the art as such (9).

By calling the religious genres 'musical forms' and juxtaposing them with *bhangrā* and *jhūmar,* the Faiz Report articulates the atheism of the elites that equated all religious music as musical on one hand, and shows progressive's contempt for religious right. The religious party Jamat-e-Islami did not support the idea that Pakistan should be defined through regional cultures since it considered music to be antithetical to the values of Islam. Toor (2005) points out that there were vitriolic exchanges between the members of the Jamat-e-Islami and Progressive writers in Lahore in the 1970s (Toor 2005). The following quotation is an example of how the members opposed the promotion of culture initiated by Progressives.

> This was the time when an army of so-called progressives had declared war on the fortress of the moral and spiritual values of Pakistan through the front of 'culture'. Those same 'great artists' who earlier used to conduct a trade in obscenity in the name of 'literature' [i.e. the Progressive

> Writers], had now, disappointed by the lack of interest shown by the people, taken on their 'delicate' shoulders the weight of the service of culture...In this mission these spirited ones threw away their pens and took up dhols and tablās instead. It was not mere accident that in this mission our progressives had the cooperation of those enemies of national unity who thought regional cultures were the easiest means with which to awaken regional hatreds...[this was the time when] our respected Progressives thought that the beat of tablās and the tinkling of ghungroos was enough to shake the foundations of this neophyte nation-state (Hijazi 1978, i-ii, quoted in Toor 2005).

This quote shows the stance of Hijazi towards promotion of music, whereby the pejorative reference to musical instruments '*dhols* and *tablās'* refers to his opposition towards the patronage of classical and folk music that was being promoted by the Progressive elite. The reference to *tablā* and *ghungroo* also refers to dancing, which the religious right strongly opposed. In this quote Hijazi not only points fingers at Progressives, who were also leftist and atheists, but also to the second position that views Pakistan as a "culturally diverse unit" or a *guldastā*, which they adhered to by stating that regional cultures promote 'regional hatreds.' While the party had lobbied and maneuvered for conservative policies since inception of Pakistan, their direct impact on cultural activities became more prominent during the time of Zia-ul-Haq, who promoted the Islamic injunctions of *shar'iā*. It was during Zia's time that the women were forbidden from dancing in the National Performing Arts troupe, and when they finally performed in Lahore Arts Council, Jamat-e-Islami protested against it (Interview Khalid Saeed Butt, June 2009).

On the other hand, the contestations of national culture definitions were also part of regional institutions. The regional elite was the nationalist elite who held the second position in concurrence with the Progressive leftists in Punjab;

however, they were not given power to define national institutions. As a result, this nationalist elite remained restricted within their own provinces. The process of building cultural institutions had already started during the time of General Ayub, and the main bodies that were in charge were elites at Lahore Arts Council (Al-Hamra) who led the cultural troupe as well as chaired the committee to research on arts. It is also unclear whether the meeting called by J. Rahim to discuss the Faiz Report even included the regional elite. This reflects marginalization of regional elites at several levels: firstly, that they had to promote their culture in a state that largely considered them as 'ethno-nationalists' or anti-Pakistan; and secondly, it shows their marginalization from defining national institutions such as the Pakistan National Council of Arts (PNCA) or Lok Virsa.

The cultural elite in Sindh initiated cultural institutions starting from Sindh the Adabi Board. The Board was originally set up by the Government of the Sindh in 1951 for promotion and development of Sindhi language and to collect and publish folklore. In 1964, the nomenclature and the status of Sindhi Academy were changed to the Institute of Sindhology to work on the patterns of Indology and Egyptology (Schimmel 1961, 225). This was also the time when Indus-thesis was prominent in national constitution Assembly debates (Toor 2005) and one sees the impact of discourse on national culture upon practice of promoting folklore.

In 1955, the BhitShah Cultural Center was established and this institution collected verses of Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai from Shah's *faqīrs* (hereditary

musicians who sing at the shrine) and publishing volumes of his poetry (Interview Hameed Akhund, Karachi August 2009). This institution also arranged conferences at the death anniversary or the urs of Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai, where local musicians were introduced to Radio-Pakistan (Aziz 2006 107). In 1975-1976, a Cultural Cell was established that took over the BhitShah Cultural Center alongside the Sindh Provincial Museum in Hyderabad. Then the Sindh archives were added to this along with other cultural centers (Interview Hameed Akhund, Karachi August 2009).

Some of the prominent figures in the promotion of folklore in Sindh included Mumtaz Mirza who alongside Uxi Mufti led Sindhi musicians for performance at Smithsonian Festival in Washington, Pyar Ali Allana who organized an international seminar called *Sindh through the Centuries* that led to establishment of Ministry of Culture Sindh, and Mohammed Qasim Makka, Dr. N.A Baloch and Dr. G.A Allana who formed Institute of Sindhology for the preservation of Sindhi music and folklore. These institutions also did the work of cultural diplomacy at the local level; for example, when Mohammed Khan Junejo was the Prime Minister in 1995, he would invite ambassadors to his hometown in Sindhri in the month of December to go hunting, and would insist that dinner should be followed by Sindhi music.

The regional ministry also established a school for teaching Shah-jo-Rāg (the music of the saint Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai) as well as offered the *faqīrs* free housing and a monthly stipend, which is a rare innovation, and has led to burgeoning of musicians who want to sing *Shah jo rāg*. UNESCO could have

sponsored the initiatives of Ministry of Culture, Sindh, but the international body mainly collaborates with federal institutions. Nevertheless, since Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai is such a prominent figure in Sindh's identity, his poetry and musicians have received immense support from governments in Sindh.

Contestations Amongst Cultural Elites: Folk Music and Cultural Distinction

The *class-habitus* of the agents determine whether they consider promotion of regional cultures and therefore folk music as essential for the establishment of national culture. Bourdieu writes that our value judgments are not 'personal' but rather structurated by *habitus.* In his work *Distinction*, Bourdieu challenges the idea of 'personal' by stating: "a whole range of institutional mechanisms, especially the intellectual and educational ones…encourage the cult and culture of the 'person' (1984, 414). He expands his discussion on "modes of production of opinions" (417), and argues that political opinions and value judgments stem from "*class-habitus*." Bourdieu writes that *habitus* is the "immanent law" that is "laid down in each agent by his earliest upbringing, which is precondition not only for the co-ordination of practices, but also practices of co-ordination…"(1977, 81). The examples of *habitus* that Bourdieu gives in Outline of theory of Practice include familial upbringing and schooling (1977, 87); therefore *habitus* is a kind of conditioning, inculcation and appropriation (1977, 85). In *Distinction*, Bourdieu defines *class-habitus* as "biologically synthesizing unity" such as gender or age alongside material conditions of existence, including occupation and working conditions that determine political opinions (1977, 87).

Since the second position on national culture that viewed Pakistan as a culturally diverse unit has been marginalized by the civil-military bureaucracy, this position is inculcated within certain groups of cultural elites. While an average Pakistani child goes through religious learning from early age, the children of these elite groups become well-versed in Marxist thought and are encouraged to read regional folklore and poetry. It is therefore the familial upbringing which encourages the child to learn his mother tongue namely Sindhi, Punjabi, Gujrati, Kacchi or disregard it as backward or insignificant for success in a modern world. Therefore it is the *class-habitus*, which inculcates the value of folklore and folk music.

Similarly, it is also the *class-habitus* in which the categories 'folklore' and 'folk music' are produced. For example although I grew up learning Ismaili *gināns* as part of religious training, the *ginans* were not presented to me as folklore, but rather *'ilm* (knowledge). However if verses of the saints Shah Lateef or Bulleh Shah are presented as 'folk,' this emerges from a *class-habitus* that includes a secularist familial upbringing. As will be shown later, the holders of the second position considered the Sufi religious saints to be models for social egalitarianism such that they interpreted their socialist ideals in their works. In this respect, how 'folklore' and 'folk music' are defined depends on one's familial upbringing and position on national culture.

The occupation and specifically employment at a particular cultural institution in also impacts how the agent defines 'folk.' I will show that each cultural institution under discussion constructed folk music according to its

ideological positions on national culture, and the impact of *class-habitus* on definitions of folk music becomes obvious in the following chapters as my informants Mr. Baidil Masroor, Mr. Sattar Syed, Mr. Naeem Tahir, and Mr. Uxi Mufti define folk music in distinct ways, showing ambiguities about whether folklore can be religious? These ambiguities in light of Bourdieu are not simply "personal opinions" but rather ideas that are structurated by interactions in the cultural and political field. I will show that as national media packaged devotional music as folk music that served as social entertainment for urban audiences, it constructed ambiguity about 'folk music' and its 'Muslim-ness' such that my cultural agents differentiate on whether folk music can be religious or not.

The progressives and nationalist elite who work on 'folk music' come under a larger network of elite associated as those who do 'culture *kā kām'* (work on cultural activities) in Pakistan. These include the members of major feudal families who still have control over land, as well as a circle of literati graduated from either local or foreign universities. Many members of this group are also trained performers of classical music and dancing, and thus maintain their distinction through their talent and achievements**.** However, it is not only the achievement but also access to the social network and the 'prestige' of an accomplished parent that positions the agent in the field.

When I questioned the former Secretary-Sindh, Hameed Akhund, who has played a prominent role in promoting folklore at the regional level, he stated that support for regional culture is determined by the position to define national culture.

> Mr. Akhund: I don't know whether you have touched this point or felt this or not. Basically there is no clear cut definition of Pakistan's cultural heritage and there is no such thing as regional cultures contributing to national culture in the thinking of those who sit in Islamabad and talk about Pakistan's culture. To them, Pakistan's culture is Pakistan's culture. It is like erecting a building and calling it Pakistani culture and this is not what it is. Unless you don't bring in the provinces together, you can not make what is called Pakistani culture. And I belong to that group, which says that it is the provinces that constitute towards Pakistani culture [9] (Interview conducted at Mohatta Palace, Karachi August 2009).
>
> SH: There is an interesting analogy of *guldastā* that I heard, that Pakistani culture...there is a group-- (affirms in the middle of the sentence).
>
> Mr. Akhund: Yes that is the group. It is of course a bouquet of different flowers… of different colors of its own. And they lead together to give you what is Pakistan. But if you do not accept that, and if you then talk of Pakistani culture and your Pakistani culture is then *qawwāli* and *ghazal* and Mehdi Hassan and Noor Jehan, then what is the difference between India and Pakistan? What is the difference between *ghazal* singers from India and that from Pakistan? What is the difference between Noor Jehan and Lata Mangeshkar? How do you draw a line? I personally believe that it is folk music that differentiates you from other cultures.

In this exchange Mr. Akhund not only pointed out a direct relationship between promotion of folklore and definition of national culture in Pakistan, but also referred to the distinction that the elite sought from the establishment elite who listened to Urdu genres of music namely *qawwālī* and *ghazal* as pointed out by Sibte Hassan as well (2007). The elites who proposed Pakistan as a cultural unit with Islam and Urdu as binding forces distinguished themselves through their tastes in urban musical genres such as *qawwālī* or *ghazal* as Pakistani music, and considered the work of urban elitist artists such as Abdur Rahman Chughtai to be Art of Pakistan; in poetry the work of Hafeez Jalandari; in novels Islamic history novels; in films people who address their parents as "a*bbā huzūr aur ammī huzūr wale raīs zāde*" (an expression that suggests Urdu elitist culture of Lucknow); in

architecture the *mihrāb* and domes of Mughal architecture; in men's clothes Jinnah cap, *sherwānī* and *chūrīdār payjāmā*; and in women's dress *gharārā*, (Hassan 2007, 301) and *shalwār kamīz*, the national dress.[10]

On the other hand, the elites of the second position distinguished themselves through their taste in folk music, and ethnic arts and crafts to decorate their houses. They also named their children in from local folk narratives and saints: for example, 'Sachchal' for a boy and 'Marui,' for a girl, in place of Arabic, Turkish and Central Asian names that are used by the majority of the Muslim population of Pakistan. Their attitude towards English-speaking westernized elite was also critical; even if they were well versed in English and Urdu, they respected the people who spoke their native languages. Their familial upbringing also encourages them to read regional poetry and epics such as *Hīr* by Waris Shah or *Shah jo Risālo* by Shah Abdul Latif. In dressing, they preferred the fabric of *khādī* in line of Gandhi, as well as certain local textiles such as the *ajrak* became the marker of their *class-habitus*. Even though the entire textile industry of Pakistan is based on locally produced machine-made and hand-made work, in one of my interviews in Karachi that I conducted with my friend Veengas, my informant pointed out that my friend's dress was Sindhi and mine was not, even though I was wearing a locally designed *shalwār kamīz* that a middle-class Pakistani would wear.

One marker of distinction for the second position is also secularizing the Sufi saints who took a socially egalitarian approach as people's heroes, and hence

[10] In Sibte Hassan's description of elite tastes, there is an element of sarcasm, since he does not belong to this position and he does not mention how progressive elites distinguish themselves.

aligned with the leftist ideals of the second position. In an essay titled 'The quest for identity in culture,' Faiz highlights two positions of the Muslim courts in the thirteenth century. One was the exclusive and elitist approach that believed in the purity of Turkish blood and avoided integration with local people, and the second was the integrationist and socially egalitarian approach, which is credited to Amir Khusraw, father of *qawwālī*, who started writing poetry in Indic languages. In this respect, Faiz's writings and position is set against the elitist approach of the establishment, which seeks to impose a culture on people and in doing so, excludes people's expressions. He, amongst a circle of progressive leftists including Qudratullah Shahab, created an appreciation for saints as people's leaders. Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai, Sachal Sarmast, Bulleh Shah, Shah Hussain, Waris Shah, Rahman Baba, Khushal Khan Khattak became models for Pakistan's elites since these saints did not take an elitist approach and communicated the message of Islam through folk heroes and heroines.

The conflation of devotional forms with folk forms or secularization of devotional forms is another marker of Progressive elites, a part of which rejects the poetry of Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai or Bulleh Shah as religious. Moreover, in response to attitudes towards religious clergy (mullāh) about music, this elite would respond by proclaiming the Islamic sonic genres of *na't* and *qir'at* as musical. Since the progressive elite is mainly atheist, Faiz left a contradictory legacy to the Lahori progressive elite in that he left socially egalitarian models, which were also religious saints and hence challenged their distinction from Sufi shrine that are feudalistic holdings and according to the perspective of educated

people inculcate superstitious. However, since Sufi religious saints admonish the *mullāh* (clergy) for imposing its religious views, the Sufi poetry and music is useful tools in hands of progressives to assert their position vis-à-vis the religious right. Some examples of Sufi poetry that criticizes the *mullāh* include: '*Mein Jānū Merā Khudā Jane'* by Abida Parveen, '*Manzil-e-Sufi'* by Sanam Marvi and poetry by Bulleh Shah and Shah Hussain. This use of Sufi poetry by Progressive leftist calls for a more comprehensive study.

In this light, the second position finds their leftist ideals furthered by promotion of folk (Hassan 2007, 302), which led to the establishment of institutes to promote folklore at regional and national levels in Pakistan, including the Institute of Sindhology in Sindh and Lok Virsa at the national level. The agents involved were coming from two sources: the progressives within Lahore Arts Council and nationalist elite that formed BhitShah Cultural Council.

The progressive leftist elite was mainly literati in Pakistan who were affiliated with the Progressive Writers Movement, which is a literary movement in Urdu and other languages of the sub-continent that started in 1936 and had come to be known in Urdu as *Anjuman-e-Tarraqi Pasand Mussanafin-e-Hind*, and it promoted ideals of equality and social justice. The people behind this movement stemmed from "aristocratic families" who had come back from Oxford and other prominent British universities and turned Marxists in 1930s (2005, 9). While this movement also spread in regional languages of Pakistan, especially Sindh, the progressives in Sindh were distinct from those in Lahore, since they were also allied with political thinking of G.M. Syed and were contesting their

positions as elites in a state apparatus, where power was not decentralized. Thus, whereas the Lahori elite retains the title 'progressives' for themselves, those in Sindhi refer to themselves as 'nationalists' (in contrast to the term 'sub-nationalist' given to them by the state) in homology with their position in the political field.

This chapter located the class-*habitus* of the cultural elite who formed national institutions that promoted folk music to contextualize that their practices of agents were defined by their position on the national culture that is structurated by the political and cultural field in Pakistan. The domination of the position to define Pakistan as a cultural unit is manifested in changing meaning of folk songs by national media. On the other hand, the marginalization of the second position becomes evident through contestations to form national institution for promotion of folklore, Lok Virsa. It is between these two positions that Pakistan conducted its work of cultural diplomacy and projected itself as a cultural unity with 5000 years of history, and these institutions will be the subject of following chapters.

Chapter 3: Broadcasting 'Islamic Culture' through 'Regional-Folk music'

In the founding years, Pakistan sought its cultural identity through two main paradigms: first, "the negation of anything identified with India, and second the affirmation of Muslim identity" (Qureshi 1999, 745). The main institution for promotion of music at the time was Radio-Pakistan and since 1950s, Radio-Pakistan carried out research on Pakistani and Indian music as well as music of Muslim countries, with the aim to "evolve a new kind of national music' (Ahmad 2005, 60). This Pakistani music was to be introduced under a short-term and long-term plan. The short-term plan would concentrate on the improvements of existing music programs, which took up about fifty percent of broadcast time, and the long-term plan would encourage the development of "Pakistani music" (61).

This development of 'Pakistani music' repertory was initiated from scratch as Sattar Syed, a Station-Director at Radio-Islamabad, pointed out "*Hamein kunwā khud khodnā hotā thā aur pānī bhī khud bharnā hotā thā*" ("We had to dig the well on our own and drink the water too"). He was referring to the way Radio-Pakistan had to start from scratch to build a national musical tradition and archive of Pakistani musicians. The instrumentalists for playing violin, guitar, *dholak* (double-headed hand-drum), *tablā* (a pair of hand-drums) and mandolin were at the radio station twenty-four hours a day, and each day, the radio sections across the country produced at least three new songs in each musical genre: namely 'light-classical' that included *ghazals*, 'heritage or folk music' and 'pop music' (Interview conducted in Islamabad, June 2009).

In the process of projecting Pakistan as a Muslim state, Radio-Pakistan also used folk music in a way that it not only produced rural musical traditions of Pakistan as regional-folk music and later Pakistani folk music, but also promoted the idea of Pakistan's folk music as 'quintessentially Muslim.' Whereas, Radio-Pakistan followed a deliberate practice of eliminating Hindu elements in classical music, its practice towards folk music has not been a subject of critical discussion in the ethno-musicological articles on Pakistan. The policy on folk music is significant since it not only went parallel with Radio-Pakistan's policy on classical music but also had long-term implications as follows:

i) It led to de-contextualization of devotional songs from their religious context.

ii) The secularization of folk songs led to ambivalence in its meaning, that was exploited by the political elite, specifically Z.A. Bhutto and later General Zia to propagate their position on national culture.

iii) The process of producing folk music itself placed regulations on the musicians such that their agency to contest the secularist and politicized meanings of devotional songs was marginal.

I will show the process of constructing the national repertoire of 'regional-folk music' and the above-mentioned implications by first giving a brief history Radio-Pakistan's policy towards folk music in the founding years and specifically during the time of Z.A. Bhutto and General Zia backed by musical examples that show transformation in its meaning. The second part of the chapter contextualizes

the process of constructing 'Pakistani folk music,' in order to situate the rural musicians in the structures of state institutions that made ideological uses of folk-songs, and discuss the power-dynamics between producers and musicians.

Constructing Regional-Folk in the Founding Years

Radio-Pakistan emerged from All-India Radio, which had been "a colonial version of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)" (Qureshi 1999, 745). At the time of partition, Pakistan had inherited two stations, Radio-Lahore and Radio-Peshawar, from All-India Radio, and by 1948 there were additional radio stations in Hyderabad and Karachi. The process of constructing Muslim culture for Pakistan had started before partition. A committee had been set up to select the verses of Muslim poets ranging from Wali Dakni, Amir Khusraw, Sultan Hussain Sharqi, Wajid Ali Shah to contemporary poets for music programs on radio, and therefore the Sufi texts and Urdu poetry were emphasized to give the sonic culture of Pakistan a 'Muslim' character. This committee consisted of Mahmood Nizami, Ansar Nasri (a broadcaster), and Hafeez Hoshiarpuri (an Urdu poet of *ghazals*; died 1973 in Karachi), and the selected list was sent to all stations and updated from time to time[11] (Ahmad 2005, 60). Another trend to Muslimize the sonic culture was also to draw influences from other Muslim countries into the music (Ahmad 2005, 60). Radio followed a strict practice on promoting only the poetry in the list and discouraged contemporary regional poetry that was leftist and revolutionary (Hassan 2007, 303).

[11] Ahmad (2009) mentions the people in the committee but not their designations, and these designations are my additions taken from the renowned daily, Dawn Newspaper online

In the early years of Pakistan, Radio-Pakistan followed a practice of eliminating any references to cultural symbols of the sub-continent that had references to Hindu gods and goddesses. Radio-Pakistan headquarters firstly discouraged the use of Hindu mythological traditions in Bengali poetry and attempted a "revival of folk music particularly *ma'arfatī* and *murshidī* types" akin to *qawwālī* in West Pakistan (Ahmad 2005, 61). It also introduced new sonic genres such as *tilāwat* (recitation of Quran), *millī-naghme* (patriotic songs), classical music and folk music, *ghazals, iqbālīāt, kāfī, gīts, community songs, hamd and na't, gīton bharī kahānī* (story with songs) in Urdu, and regional languages, with the aim to distinguish Pakistani sonic culture from India (Qureshi 1999, 745).

Moreover, names of a number of *rāgs* and *khayāls* were changed in order to remove the Hindu connotation (Ahmad 2005, 60). Not only were the references to Hindu deities in lyrics removed but some musical instruments as well as musical styles were also considered 'Hindu' and were prohibited from playing on Radio. Musical styles such as *thumrī*, *dadrā* and *dhrupad* were considered inappropriate for a Muslim culture, since the lyrics could be "sensuous and erotic" (Ahmad 2005, 60) or have references to Hindu deities. As a result, Radio-Pakistan banned these musical genres. Moreover, musical instruments such as *vīna* (which has association with Hindu goddess *Saraswati*), *pakhāvaj* (used for singing dhrupad), and *sarod* were also sometimes discouraged, on the pretext that these were "Hindu" (Basra 2001). As a result, musicians had to take up either a new instrument within the radio orchestra or work as composers, since not only the

radio but also the recording labels and films marginalized their specialization (Basra 2001). This had a major impact on the state of classical music in Pakistan, which had already lost much of its patronage due to migration of Hindu and Sikh patrons to India at the time of partition. In contrast, musical styles like *khayāl* and *ghazal*, which carried associations of Muslim contributions to Indian music, were emphasized.

Through the influence of Radio-Pakistan folk tunes became popular across regions and people across Pakistan acquired an appreciation for it. (Ahmad 2005) Programs such as '*Des Punjab*,' *'Chenāb Rang'* and '*Shabistān'* from Lahore, '*Naghmāt-e-Pakistān'* from Karachi, and '*Sargam*,' '*Darbāri'* and '*Aiman'* from Rawalpindi station were all part of the "national hook-up," such that a tune that became popular in one region would be played across other regions. Some examples of popularized folk tunes include: "*Mor to tillay rānā*" and "*Pawandīyān Sān*," from Sindh; "*Ho Jamalo*" and "*Chīro mile bilāl*;" "*Dānā ba Dānā*" and others from Baluchistan; "*Bājre dā sittā*," "*Merā long gawāchchā*," "*Jugnī*" from Punjab; "*Shinware Lawāgīna*" and "*Yā Qurbān*" from NWFP; and several others[12].

Regional-Folk as Quintessentially Muslim

'Folk music' is a modern European concept that emerged in the 17th century Europe through Romantic thinkers such as Gottfried Herder. This concept emerges in the sub-continent through colonial institutions such as All-India Radio that introduced a musical segment aimed at peasant audiences. Since Radio-

[12] These songs are searchable on Youtube.

Pakistan stemmed from All-India Radio, it inherited its vocabulary of 'folk' or 'heritage' music, and thus the idea of 'folk music' that Radio-Pakistan promoted was that it was rural. The later ideas of 'folk music' that developed in post-war era that associated folk music with a particular community of singers was not duly promoted by Radio-Pakistan, since it mainly promoted individual musicians rather than communities from which they emerged.

Interestingly Radio-Pakistan's definition of folk music does not only include life-cycle songs, but also musical rendition of poetry that was not in Urdu language. Thus the Muslim devotional musical genres that are sung at shrines including *kafī* or *waī* came under the category of 'folk music.' In contrast, an Urdu musical genre *qawwālī* that was also associated with Muslim shrines was not projected as 'folk' but has an identity as a separate genre alongside other Urdu musical genres such as *ghazals* or art-songs that are also referred to as 'light-classical' in contrast with the genre of *khayāl* that is considered 'classical music.' Thus non-Urdu poetry associated with saints found its place in 'folk music.' In this respect, 'folk' was considered as part of nation that was 'other' than Urdu and this position represented the first position of defining Pakistani culture as Islamic.

Moreover the use of Muslim poetry of Sufi mystics was a strategic tool to counter the Hindu mythology present in classical music that was banned. Since the Sufi mystics presented the message of Islam through narratives, the Radio sought to replace stories of gods and goddesses with folk stories such as *Hīr Rānjhā, Sassuī Panhun, Momal Rāno* and others. Therefore, the practice of promoting Sufi poetry played the dual role of gaining local audiences in villages

as well as creating a Muslim culture for Pakistan. Not only was the folk music used to create a Muslim culture but this practice also Muslimized folk music by considering it to have a common thread. A quotation from a book published by Radio-Pakistan in its initial years shows this:

> The Pushto *Tappā* and *Lobhā* with their zest and vigor, the Balochi ballad with its quick tempo over-flowing with valor, the Punjabi *Dholā* and *Māhīyyā* with their lyrical abundance, the Sindhi Lehro with its lilting cadence, the Bengali, *Bhawayyā* and *bhatīalī* with their gentle rise and fall and their noble magic, provide a feast for all lovers of music. Yet there is an underlying unity in the deeper emotional and spiritual experiences in our folksongs, which emanate from the common fountainhead of Islam, permeates this variety (quoted in Ahmad 2005, 61).

As the above quotation shows, folk music of Pakistan included life-cycle songs and traditional poetic forms and dances such as *tappā* and *bhangrā* that were presented as "quintessentially Islamic,' such that Islam was inseparable part of Pakistan. In doing so, what was foreign to Muslims nation i.e. the non-Muslim Other was silenced and made invisible. Ironically, the attempt to create a 'Muslim culture' was not stemming from orthodox Muslims but rather modern Muslim secularists, since the Indian Muslim nationalists who demanded Pakistan interpreted Islam as a cultural bond rather than a religious practice. Under this ideological position, the promotion of folk music to establish Muslim culture also ironically led to its de-contextualization from its religious practice and therefore secularized by transforming them into social entertainments that Nayyar (1988) also refers to in his discussion of secularization of *qawwālī* in 1980s.

Another implication of this process of considering folk music as 'quintessentially Muslim' was that musical genres that were broadcasted in the name of 'folk music' excluded musical expressions of non-Muslim religious

communities in Pakistan particularly *bhajans* of Hindus, or poetry by Kabir or Guru Nanak (even though this poetry is sung by Muslim musicians in Punjab just as Bulleh Shah and Shah Hussain are sung by Sikhs in Indian Punjab), hymns of Christians and Zoroastrian (Parsis). Moreover, it also did not include expressions of the third gender such as the *hijrā* community (transvestites, who have recently been officially recognized as the third gender) or *nāchū,* boys who dance while wearing *ghūngrū* (anklets) that are usually worn by women. These communities did not become emblematic of Pakistani folk. Was this exclusion questioned? Did the producers see their construction of 'folk' as a selection through their generative schemes? Did they see that they were constructing the category 'regional-folk' as Muslim in the eyes of population?

When I interviewed Sattar Syed's who was serving as the Radio-Islamabad's Station Director, he asked me how I would define 'folk music.' I asked him to define it to me and this question led him to reflect folk music from various dimensions. Although he was situated in Radio-Pakistan, I found that his ideas about 'folk' were also influenced by the leftist elite who takes the second position on national culture considering Pakistan as 'cultural diversity' and read socialist meanings in folk that were especially promoted during the regime of Z.A. Bhutto. He said,

> *Har zamāne kā folk us zamāne kee tarīf bhī hai* (Folk of a particular era is its history). In the history that kings write, they hide the facts or try to change it). The history written in folk is the original history. e.g. in the history written by the king, Dulha Bhatti, a Punjabi folk character was a rebel but for people he was a hero; Ahmed Kharral was a rebel for British but was a hero for people. In a similar way Heer who according to our tradition was a revolt and punishable person but when she was in *dāstān* (epic narrative), she became a heroine. *Dāstānein* (epics) are folk. Later

> different version of Heer-Ranja came out: Waris Shah's Heer, Damodar's Heer, and so on. They have their own styles of telling stories, their own tunes and in every generation, people add something new. (Interview conducted in June 2009)

Sattar Syed considered folk narratives as history written by the people and folk heroes as people's heroes. This contestation of meaning of folk music as 'quintessentially Islamic' or 'socialist' further creates ambivalence in its meaning such that whereas Radio-Pakistan placed poetry of saints under the category of 'folk,' the influence of the idea of 'Sufi music' today serves to influence a distinction between the two. For example, in a brief discussion with a very renowned folk singer Abida Parveen in Karachi, she mentioned that she sings *sufyānā kalām* (mystical songs), which is distinct from *lok gīt* (folk song), since the latter does not have any writer; it is rather owned by the people. In contrast, Sattar Syed whose situated in Radio-Pakistan and its categories suggested that the two are very inter-related.

> There is no *banāwat* (pretension) in it. It has the depth, which is in *tasawwuf* (Sufism or Islamic spirituality). It is very close to *tasawwuf*. *Tasawwuf* gets close to folk. The beauty is that it is communicated from heart to heart (Interview conducted in June 2009).

The use of folk songs to establish Muslim culture, and in turn labeling folk music of Pakistan as 'quintessentially Islamic' stemmed from a process of decontextualizing the music from the rituals of Muslim shrines. The rendition of folk songs through Radio-orchestra and its westernized musical instruments not only displayed of folk music to urban audience on concert stage, but also led to transformation of its function from being a devotional towards becoming socially entertaining. This secularization also created ambivalence in the meaning of folk song that was utilized by progressive elites who did a socialist interpretation of

sufyānā kalām to assert their position on national culture. These ambivalences were further utilized by political regimes especially that Z.A. Bhutto who brought a populist interpretation of folk music to project his ideology of Islamic socialism. In turn, General Zia sought to revert the populist meanings of many folk songs that had become symbolic of Bhutto's era by changing the words and transforming its meaning. I will provide two musical examples namely *Lāl merī pat* to show secularization of folk song that led to the ambivalence of its meaning and use; and *Hummā Hummā* to show transformation in meaning of folk brought about by the regime of General Zia-ul-Haq.

The Song Lāl Merī Pat

The song *Lāl Merī Pat* succinctly reflects the irony of Radio-Pakistan's policy that in the process of promoting folk music as 'quintessentially Muslim' served to secularize the song by de-contextualizing it from its ritualistic settings. It shows the ambivalence of its meaning as the song is used in film and other occasions for social entertainment by different singers as a 'hit-song.' Moreover its rendition by Urdu *ghazal* singers and *qawwālī* singers shows celebration of nation as a folk song is embraced across musical genres and language. Reshma is the first person to sing this song. She was a rural musician singing at the shrine of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar, and was accidentally discovered by a Radio-producer. This song became a national hit, and Reshma became the most prominent success story of Radio-Pakistan's initiative to hunt for new musical talent in small towns.

Reshma (b. 1937) was one of the most successful talent-hunts of Radio-Pakistan and she was discovered at the shrine of Lal Shahbaz Qalandar in Sehwan

Sharif, Sindh in the 1960s (Abbas 2002, 27). The producer Saleem Gilani at Radio-Hyderabad found her singing the song *Lāl merī pat*, which was later aired on Radio and gained nationwide popularity. Reshma was from a professional class of traders in Rajasthan who frequently attended shrines. Reshma would join the professional class of *lotevālī* or *challevālī*, women who would sing mystical poetry *sufyānā kalām*, while striking an aluminum pot called *garhā*, which is used as a rhythmic instrument. It is struck with a ring called a *challā* worn on the middle finger (Abbas 2002, 9).

Lāl merī pat became part of Radio-Pakistan's music unit such that it was performed live for entertainment by many renowned Pakistani *ghazal* singers including Runa Laila and Noor Jehan. Even though the song was originally in Siraiki, the Sabri Brothers, who are the famous *qawwāl bachche*, rendered the same song in Urdu, addressing it to *khwājāgan* or Khwaja Ghulam Fareed (from the collection of Professor Regula Qureshi). There are also versions of Sabri Brothers who address it to the saint Lal Shahbaz Qalandar, found on YouTube. The renditions of this song by *ghazal* and *qawwālī* singers who are part of the Urdu-speaking *habitus* of the cultural elites insinuates the "lifting of a class taboo on listening to low-status music" (Qureshi 1999, 749) that not only enables cultural elites from the Urdu-speaking *habitus* to listen to folk musicians but for light-classical or *ghazal* singers to perform a folk song. These covers improvise on introductory *ālāp*, adding *boltāns* and climactic phrases towards the end of the song, alongside adding a new *tihāī*, which involves stitching together instrumental

interludes and accompaniments. These are some of the ways a folk tune is rendered through urban-classical stylistic devices.

As Radio-Pakistan and Pakistan's film industry were well connected, this song made its way into a Punjabi film of the 1960s, *Dilān dey Saudā* that featured Noor Jehan's rendition. The song was visualized in a *tawāif's* (courtesan) salon, and a famous Pakistani actress Firdous ironically dances the *tawāif's mujrā* to this song. In another scene from the film, Naghma, dressed as a female *malang* (wandering mystic) is at the shrine of the saint and dancing *dhamāl* next to the big drums *nawbat*. Therefore, in the use of this song, the identities of a female mystic and a female courtesan are blurred, showing how Radio and films de-contextualized and secularized a devotional song by blurring the lines between sacred and profane.[13]

The emergence of Pakistani pop music in the 1980s and its growth in the 1990s has also witnessed renditions of folk songs by singers from upper middle class strata. Musicians such as Nazia and Zoheb Hassan, Alamgir, Hadiqa Kayani, Junoon have covered famous folk songs accompanied by Western popular and electronic instruments. This has also increased the tempo of the song from the earlier versions sung by Reshma. The so-called 'Sufi rock band' Junoon played a significant role in making this song popular amongst the urban youth. (For details on different rendition of the song, please see Appendix I) One of the reasons for

13 The urs (death anniversary) of the saint Lal Shahbaz Qalandar's at the shrine in Sehwan Sharif is known for hosting female courtesans from heera mandi, the red-light area in Lahore, because of the popular belief that the saint was a caretaker of the courtesans and would supplicate for forgiveness of their sins to God, and therefore it is possib*le that the film was playing in the* presence of *a* prostitute considered to be a profane person at a sacred shrine.

Lāl merī pat's immense popularity is that it is a '*dhamāl* tune,' that is a tune to which people dance '*dhamāl*.' *Dhamāl* is kind of a dance that comprises shaking the head right and left with the chant 'Allah Hu' or 'Ali.' Dancers also whirl their bodies in the manner of Mevlevi Sufis to express *kefiyat*, or spiritual ecstasy at the shrines in Pakistan. However, this became a "Hit song" and was played at all functions to get the audience dancing. The most ecstatic moment for dancers lies at the end of first line of the chorus, *Sindrī dā, sevan dā, sakhī bāz qalandar*, leading to the famous refrain *Damā dam mast qalandar*, which is repeated several times to accentuate the ecstasy. The lyrics of the song are as follows:

O Lāl merī pat rakhīyon bhalā Jhulelālan
O Lāl merī pat

[Chorus]
Sindrī dā, sevan dā, sakhī bāz qalandar
Dumā dum mast qalandar, Alī dum dum de andar
Dumā dum mast qalandar, Alī da pehlā number
O Lāl merī, lal merī

Chār charāg tere bāran hameshā
Chār charāg tere bāran hameshā
Panjwā mein bāran āyī bhalā Jhulelālan
Ho panjwā mein bāran
Ho panjwā mein bāran āyī bhalā Jhulelālan

[Chorus]

Har dum bīrā terī khair howe
Har dum bīrā terī khair howe
Nām e Alī bīrā pār lagā Jhulelālan
Ho nām e Ali
Nām e Alī bīrā pār lagā Jhulelālan
[Chorus] x 2

Oh Lord of Sindh, Jhulelal, and soil of Sehwan.
Red robed God-intoxicated Qalandar, glory unto you!
May I always have your benign protection?

Your shrine is always lighted with four lamps;
and here I come to light a fifth lamp in your honor
Let your heroic name ring out in Hind and Sindh,
Let the nawbat (drum) ring loud for your glory.
Oh Lord, may you prevail every time, everywhere
In the name of Almighty, I pray to you to help my
Boat cross (river of life) in safety.
(Abbas 2002)

The example of the song Lāl merī pat shows popularization of a Sindhi folk-song amongst Urdu-speaking audiences in urban towns, and the way the 'national hook-up' amongst Radio-stations not only popularized a folk song, but also how a folk song is shaped by different singers through their own musical styles using the idioms of more classical musical forms such as *khay*ā*l-g*ā*yakī or qawwālī*. The successive covers of *Lāl merī pat* blurs the line between devotion at a Sufi shrine and dancing for entertainment.

Contestations to define folk music by Ruling Heads: Bhutto Versus Zia

After the removal of so-called non-Muslim influences and interpretation of folk music as 'quintessentially Muslim' in the founding years of Pakistan, the regime of Z.A. Bhutto witnessed the use of 'folk song' as a symbol of socialist ideals by the People's Party democratic leader Z.A. Bhutto. Bhutto is also credited as the political leader who promoted 'folk music' the most. In 1971, Z.A. Bhutto emerged as a popular leader from the Sindhi landed elite and followed a practice of recognizing regional identities. For this he appropriated the singer Allan Faqīr as a cultural symbol, and Allan Faqīr's songs preceded Bhutto's speeches on television.

A PTV producer Baidil Masroor, who also sings for television, informed me that when he joined PTV network in 1974 during the time of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto,

there were many efforts being made to promote folk music. The regional music, instruments, history, literature and music were promoted, and some of the programs included: *Sindh Singhār*, which was about Sindhi music; *Magzan*, a literary program; and music programs including *Mehrān Rang, Sojro*, *Sur jān Safar*, in which music from Gramophone records were played with the actors and models lip-syncing to represent singers who were not alive. For example, in a serial about the folk singer Mai Jeevni, an actress dressed in Thar's local dress lip-synced against the gramophone recording. Another program by the name of *Lok Rang* (colors of folk) still runs on PTV, and every week a different province is showcased (Interview with Baidil Masroor, June 2009). Moreover Uxi Mufti, who later formed the institution Lok Virsa, also hosted a weekly television program Lok Tamasha . *Lok Tamasha* was the first program on television that popularized regional musicians at the national level and created the idea of 'Pakistan's heritage' and 'Pakistani folk' as opposed to categories such as 'Sindhi regional-folk' or 'Baluchi folk' that were publicized earlier by national media.

The imposition of martial law in 1977 brought General Zia-ul-Haq in power. His era is marked by political Islamization that had impact on sonic arts in the national media through "extensive patronage of religious genres" and "support for their musical "Arabization" through rapid spread of cassette recordings during the 1980s that led to standardization of Islamic recitation, especially the kind of highly elaborated Qur'ānic recitation (*qir'at*) cultivated in Egypt (Qureshi 1999, 747). The Islamized practice of media was most noticeable during the time of General Zia, who had taken a stringent censorship at different levels. During his

regime females were banned from dancing on Television; however he continued to promote female singers on media including Naheed Akhter, Farida Khanum and others. In contrary to the view of Jairazbhoy (1993), even the most conservative regime of Pakistan continued to promote folk music. During the tenure of Zia-ul-Haq, when the media experienced censorship, guidelines for Radio-Pakistan's music section were also drawn up. The "Guidelines for Music Programs" that Radio-Pakistan introduced in July 1977 were as follows: (Ahmad 2005, 28):

> 1) The Muslims of South Asia have made outstanding contributions to the development of classical music, which occupies a place of distinction in our national cultural heritage, 2) To preserve and promote this heritage along with other forms of popular and folk music, 3) To avoid scrupulously erotic and vulgar songs whether film or non-film; 4) To evolve through concerted efforts a distinct style of popular music in conformity with our national traditions of dignity and sobriety. To discourage cheap imitation of western music, while appreciating the need for introducing harmony in our music through orchestration (quoted in Ahmad 2005, 30).

The use of censoring language is quite prominent in this quotation that uses phrases such as "erotic and vulgar songs," "cheap imitation of western music," and the need for "dignity and sobriety" in relation to music, and insinuates the level of censorship that media experienced during General Zia's time. The most prominent visual symbol of Zia's regime was the use of *dopattā* (scarf) to cover head; while in Pakistani media women used to wear *dopattā,* they were not obliged to cover their heads. However in General Zia's time, women who featured on television news and plays were obliged to cover their heads. Zia-ul-Haq's regime is also known for creating an unfavorable environment for urban

popular musicians, and shifting the meaning of Sufi poetry, exemplified through the song, *Hummā Hummā.*

The Song Hummā Hummā

The devotional song *Hummā Hummā* shows a twin process of secularization and Islamization because of its fusion with a pop song on one hand, and shifts in meaning as the song is translated from Sindhi into Urdu. Allan Faqīr was a musician from the *manganhār* professional musicians' caste (Aziz 2006, 102) and started out his career as a *sehrā* musician singing at the weddings and later switched to singing Latif's poetry (Aziz 2006, 105). In 1962, he got the opportunity to sing at BhitShah Cultural Council's annual conference and festival, which introduced him to Radio and later TV. In contrast to Reshma, who appeared on television in the national dress, *shalwār kamīz*, Allan Faqīr appeared on television with Sindhi attire, wearing a special style of turban with a peacock like fan. This shows how the process of constructing 'folk' also included defining the visual attire that authenticates 'folk', as Mr. Baidil Masroor had pointed out.

Allan's song *Hummā Hummā* was produced during the regime of General Zia, when media followed stringent censorship policies and the meanings of many folk songs were changed. Nadeem Paracha[14], a columnist in Dawn Newspaper writes,

> Throughout Zia's regime, folk and national songs (created with the help of modern instruments) appeared frequently on state TV and radio but this time, instead of carrying 'socialist' themes or Sufi-folk imagery as it were during Bhutto's swinging '70s, it was heavily punctuated with

[14] While Paracha (2010) contexualizes the song in Zia's era, he does not show these shifts of meaning. This interpretation was accidental and was brought about through my own engagement with the lyrics of the song.

> conservative subject matter and imagery such as loud demonstrations of faith, family values, the glory of the armed forces, etc. (2010)

One of the reasons for suppressing Sufi imagery was that it was associated with "Bhutto's populism." Another reason was that the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) that opposed General Zia's rule in 1983 stemmed from Sufi shrines in Sindh, whereby the shrines had become hiding places and headquarters for many young PPP and PSF activists. The version of *Hummā Hummā* that was released in 1985 is emblematic of Zia's regime. This song is originally rendered in Sindhi and is dedicated to dedicated to the Sufi saint Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai; however its translation in Urdu eliminates saint Bhitai from the lyrics and shifts the imagery towards fear of Allah.

Lyrics of the Sindhi Version	**Lyrics of the Urdu Version**
Jete Mehar Mehar Kalerī Adī, *Ten khe Laher Luden dī Kīna kī,*	*Tere Ishq mein jo bhī dūb gayā,* *Use Dunyā kī Lehron se darnā kyā,*
Hummā Hummā O piyarī, Hummā *Hummā O Siyānī,* *Hummā Hummā Gujar Gū, Hummā,* *Hummā Bhīl Bhitai,*	*Allah Allah kar bhaiyyā,* *Allah hī se dar bhaiyyā,* *Hummā Hummā chal bhai chal,* *Thummak Thummak ta tahiyyā,*
Kārīoun Katīyūn, Kundīyūn Allah, *Kārīūn Katīyūn, Ho Oo Oo O Oo*	*Kalyān Bhūriān Kundhyān Bhūriān,* *Kālyān Bhūriān, Ho Oo Oo O Oo* *Teri jo kāli Karne Wālīyān,* *Jesay Daryā Ka Pānī Jīvan De,*
Sek wara Jīūn Adīyūn, *Ten khe laher ludīn di keenā kī*	*Apnay Daryā Kī Lahron Se Darnā Kyā,*
Hummā Hummā O piyārī, Hummā, *Hummā O Siyānī,* *Hummā Hummā Gujjar Gū, Hummā* *Hummā Bhīl Bhitāi,*	*Allah Allah kar bhaiyyā,* *Allah he se dar bhaiyyā,* *Hummā Hummā chal bhai chal* *Thummak Thummak ta tahiyyā,*
[Urdu]Gahrāī mein jitnā bhī jāūn *Tujh ko pās mein itnā hī pāūn* *Tere ānkhon mein jobhī dūb gayā use daryāon kī lehron se darnā kiyā*	*Gahrāī mein jitnā bhī jāūn* *Tujh ko pās mein itnā hī pāūn* *Tere ānkhon mein jobhī dūb gayā use daryāon kī lehron se darnā kiyā*

The folk-pop fusion 'Hummā Hummā' sung by both Allan Faqīr and Mohammed Ali Sheikhi was given the title in Urdu as *Allah Allah Kar Bhayyā*, or the first line of the song, *Tere ishq mein jo bhī dūb gayā*. While the first two lines of the Urdu verses allegorically refer to the fear of "oceanic waves of the world," that separate the lover from her beloved since she has to swim across, the Sufi theme of union with beloved is transformed in the last two lines of the verses from the reference to the saint Bhitai to an explicit moral didactic for 'fear of Allah,' which is a strong tenet of the Sunni orthodox interpretation of Islam. The original lines of this verse as rendered by Allan Faqīr are:

Hummā Hummā O piyārī, Hummā, Hummā O Siyānī,
Hummā Hummā Gujjar Gū, Hummā Hummā Bhīl Bhitāi

'Huma' functions as a calling vocable; '*piyari'* means beloved, and again '*siyani*,' '*gujjar gū'* are again ways of calling out to the beloved, which finally culminates with '*Bhīl Bhitāi*,' referring to the saint Bhitai. In other words, saint Bhitai is turned into a beloved, in a way that this love is metaphorized through words for a lover in Sindhi. In contrast, the Urdu version of these lines rendered by Mohammed Ali Sheikhi is as follows:

Allah Allah kar bhaiyyā,
Allah he se dar bhaiyyā,
Hummā Hummā chal bhai chal
Thummak Thummak tā tahiyyā

Brother remember God,
Have fear of Allah
Hummā Hummā, keep walking
Thummak Thummak tā tahiyyā

In the Urdu verse, the saint Bhitai is completely omitted, and instead the symbol of 'love' and mystical union emblematic of Sufi tradition is switched to

fear of Allah, which is in line with the Islamic principle of *taqwā*. The last two lines of the has a strange translation whereby the call to beloved and Bhitai is replaced by vocables that refer to secularist kinds of dancing such as '*thummak thummak'* or '*ta tahiyyā*,' making this song sound more like a dance number. However, this is also ironic since the religious right did not approve of dancing, especially westernized dancing. This Urdu version therefore has a very ambivalent meaning.

Since the song was released in 1985, its meaning can also be situated amidst the political clashes taking place between Deobandis and Barelvis, whereby the latter is a protector of mystical Islam and the former criticizes it. There were disputes regarding the Auqaf Department's (the government department that controlled the shrines) management of mosques and shrines at the BadShahi Mosque in Lahore on 21 May 1984. Talbot writes,

> The greatest tension of all however was between the state's legalistic imposition of Islam and the humanist traditions of Sufism. This was particularly explosive in Sindh, where Sufism had always been an integral component of regional cultural identity. Significantly, the *pirs* of Sindh played a leading role in the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy agitation of August and September 1983. Fifty thousand disciples of the Makhdum of Hala successfully blocked the national highway on one occasion (72).

Thus airing a *sufyānā kalām* and synthesized drum beat in Urdu version of the song challenges the authorities, and may have led to the song's Islamized lyrics. This song also does the work of turning a regional Sindhi into an Urdu-speaking Pakistani. For example, while the song starts with alternating verses of Sindhi and Urdu, sung by Allan Faqīr and Mohammed Ali Shaykhi respectively after 3:31, Allan Faqīr starts to sing in Urdu as well, and the same line of the Urdu

verse is repeated by Mohammed Ali Shaikhi until at 4:02, when both Allan Faqīr and Mohammed Ali Sheikhi are singing together in Urdu. This can be read as "uplifting the Pakistani people above the regional level and putting them on the level of a nation," as Jameel Jalmir (1984, 47) proposed that such differences are dissolved under the national banner. This represents the established position that media also promoted and is demonstrated by the verse from an army song:

> *Sindhi hum, Punjābi hum, Baluchi hum, Pathān hum*
> *Ek parcham hum sāth, fauj ke jawān hum,*
> *Pakistān Pakistān Pakistān, tujh par qurbān hum*
>
> We are Sindhi, Punjabi, Baluchi, Pathan
> We are together under a common flag, we are the army soldier
> Pakistan, Pakistan, Pakistan, we sacrifice for you.
> (URL:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nY2sI-LV3QI)

Another reading of the song is the merger between rural and urban divides, which was the policy of Z.A. Bhutto and could be the original motivation of the elites who produced the song. The producer of this video was Saira Kazmi, an "actress-turned-director" (Paracha 2010), who proposed the concept of folk-pop fusion to PTV. While Allan Faqīr is dressed in traditional Sindhi attire, Mohammed Ali Sheikhi is dressed in the western clothing of a shirt and pants. Alongside the alteration of language between Sindhi and Urdu, there was also an alteration of the sonic environment of the song. Allan Faqīr's Sindhi verses are accompanied by traditional musical instruments, such as *tabl*ā and *dholak*, and a drone, whereas Mohammed Ali Sheikhi's part is purely accompanied by synthesized string instruments, disco beats, synthesized claps and harmonic chord progressions.

While both the singers twirl like ecstatic Sufis during the instrumental interlude, Mohammed Ali Sheikhi's movement alternates between traditional dance and disco dancing, with him snapping his fingers and moving his head side-ways with the music. The song '*Hummā Hummā'* in an example of secularizing and urbanizing a folk song in a way that it became pleasing to urban ears. The song became a major hit and set a precedent for folk-pop fusions developed later by the pop band Junoon as well as a folk-pop fusion program on television *Coke Studio* sponsored by Coca Cola in recent years.

The secularization of folk song by national media as well as the policy of subsequent political regimes in Pakistan raises a number of questions: how were the musicians negotiating the way the state and specifically cultural elites were using their repertory and the idea of 'folk' to further their position on national culture? Did they have the agency to counter these imposed meanings on their devotional repertory? Qureshi (1999) and Jairazbhoy (1993) argue that folk musicians are considered lower-caste musicians in the feudal context of *jajmāni* system; however one may ask: what was the relationship between musicians and producers in the context of the state media? Was the relationship between feudal lords and folk musician replicated in national media? Did producers behave like neo-feudals? It is through understanding the status of folk musician within the context of the music-producing unit in the Radio that one can understand their agency to contest meaning of the folk song in the cultural field of folk-music production in Pakistan. The next section explores this dynamic by looking at the process of producing regional-folk music in Pakistan.

Production of Regional-Folk Music

The production of folk music involved talent hunting and bringing the rural musicians to radio stations in urban cities and small towns. Since the people in rural villages did not know about employment opportunities in national Radio in the founding years, producers were sent to different performance contexts to hunt for musicians. After these musicians were hunted, they were trained to perform with the Radio-orchestra. Under Lionel Fielden, the Controller of Broadcasting at All-India Radio, a radio orchestra was introduced that incorporated harmony and counterpoint to Indian melodies and pioneered a style of composing songs set to a western score, which musicians could read and play (Ahmad 2005, 59). This way of accompanying Indic melodies was then applied to folk songs in studio settings of Radio-Pakistan. The Radio-orchestra comprised of western instruments like violin and guitar alongside classical musical instruments such as the *tablā* and harmonium as well as folk instruments such as the *dholak.*

Therefore the rural musicians were placed in an unfamiliar environment that was structurated in modern ideas of 'talent,' 'quality-standards,' and standardizing tuning of musical instruments as well as folk tunes. In all these areas, it was the urban producers trained by students of Lionel Fielding and Z.A Bukhari who exhibited musical knowledge and expertise and therefore were dominant in decision-making in comparison to a rural musician. Therefore the agency of the folk singer to contest meaning of his repertory can only be understood by contextualizing the singer as structurated in the power-dynamics of an urban Radio-station, where his own hereditary musical training is challenged

by a producer trained in modern musical schemas of 'tuning' and 'quality standard.'

The Process of Hunting New Musical Talent

In the first few decades after independence, there was a permanent music section at radio stations where musicians for the orchestra were permanently employed. In order to find content for the musical programs, the radio stations made an attempt to discover new music talent and about 1500 auditions were held in the first three years of independence, out of which only 10 percent were selected for broadcast. In 1961 and later in 1963-1964, a Talent Finding and Talent Utilization Board was appointed by the Director General to tour radio stations in both East and West Pakistan and audition musicians and drama-artists (Ahmad 2005, 63). The process of hunting for new talent continued with PTV, and PTV also promoted singers and instrumentalists who became famous in Radio.

In order to understand how the process of hunting talent took place and what kind of venues were sought, I raised this question amongst various cultural actors who were involved in the process of discovering new talent. They consistently stated that the musicians who were discovered by the Radio were mostly those who were already popular in their own areas. They emphasized that these were "people's musicians;" people loved them and that's what made them popular. Baidil Masroor said, "We had roots in the village and when we would go with other PTV staff, the villagers would be happy that a producer has come to

their town and would get together and sing for the producers" (Interview conducted in June 2009).

Therefore, if the producers from Radio-Pakistan or PTV went to a village or town, they would ask the local people to bring together the popular musicians in their village or town. Sometimes *mehfils* (gatherings) were organized where different singers and instrumentalists performed and this became a site for auditions. The regional cultural institutions such as BhitShah Cultural Council in BhitShah organized a conference at the annual *urs* (death anniversary) of the saint Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai, which also gave opportunities to the local artists to perform. It was at a conference of this kind that Allan Faqīr, a singer from Sindh, made his debut and gained access to Radio and later PTV. Therefore, the Sufi Shrines and more importantly the annual *urs* of the saint were important sites for talent hunting. The most renowned discovery of Radio-Pakistan was Reshma, who was 'discovered' singing at a shrine with her community of *lotevālī* in the 1960s, and was asked by a producer from Radio-Hyderabad, Saleem Ghani to join the radio.

Apart from shrines, there were also traditional musical gatherings such as the *baithak* of the prominent Ustads, where they would teach their students (Basra 2001, 2). Such gatherings also took place in Sindh and were called *hāndā*. Alongside these gatherings there was also *kacherī*, where musicians performed *dāstān-go*ī (a tradition of singing epic tales), and local fairs like the Marvi fair in Sindh, local weddings, and Jamiat-i-Shoora Conference in 1950s where *yaktāro* faqīrs performed for the first time and were introduced to Radio (Ali 1985, 173).

The producers at Radio and TV were aware of these performance contexts and would attend these events to look for musicians. After visiting the sites of local patronage in villages, the producers would ask the talented musicians to come on Radio or PTV, where senior producers auditioned them.

One of the biggest achievements of Radio-Pakistan's talent hunt was to bring many females voices to the national media. A significant part of West Pakistan viewed music and dancing as "socially maligned activity," according to the Faiz Report; in such a milieu, the position of a female singer was contested. In Abbas's (2002) research on female folk-musicians in Pakistan, she argues that "*Izzat"* (honor) was a concern for women musicians and their families (50). In context of a society, where women's singing is contested on the basis of class, Radio-Pakistan contributed by continuing the practice of All-India Radio and British gramophone companies of promoting female voices. The promotion of female voices as well dancing is one strong reason to consider that the 'Islamic culture' that Radio-Pakistan was promoting was not 'Islamist' or religious fundamentalist as Jairazbhoy (1993) argues. In the case of Pakistan, in fact, one notices an irony that the state would secularize devotional music and challenge negative views about music and dancing by promoting female voices.

After the generation of pre-partition female singers in Sindh who were recorded by Gramophone companies, Radio-Pakistan generated a new generation of female voices. The famous female singers include Mai Bhagi, Reshma, Taj Mastani, Zarsanga, Abida Parveen, Fozia Soomro and many others. Mai Bhagi's song *Kharī Nīm ke nīche*; Reshma's *Lāl merī pat*;, Zarsanga's Pushto song

Shinwāre Lawāgenā are very renowned folk songs. The female singers sang both *lok gīt* and *sufyānā kalām*; however there are only a few female singers like Taj Mastani who also dances while singing and playing the musical instrument *ek tarā* in one hand and *khartāl* in the other.

While the early years of Radio-Pakistan brought many uneducated women from rural areas to the national media, the producer Naseer Mirza and Saleem Gilani assert that Radio-Pakistan's tradition of hunting new talent, as when producers would go to the *melas* (fairs) to hunt for talent, has died down, and now educated women are in the field who can access media on their own (Abbas 2002, 31). Abbas also writes that education facilitates access to the media as well as improves social acceptance of women in the music industry.

Disciplining Rural Musicians

The agency of the rural musician in an urbanized setting of the music unit of Radio-Pakistan can be gauged from the fact that he was not only dependant on Radio for employment, but also subjected to the modern categories about recorded sound that are not part of his traditional musical training. One of these categories was leveling the musician according to criteria that reflected their quality of performance: 'B' was for a beginner who is on a trial basis. If he was successful then he was promoted to the 'A' category. If the performance was better then the committee categorized him as 'double A,' and if the performance was excellent, then he or she was put in the 'Outstanding category' (Interview with Sattar Syed, June 2009). Mobility between these categories was possible, and the payment made to the musician was based on the category that he/she was in.

The in-house composers referred to as "Masters" trained the rural musicians, standardized the pronunciation, as well as helped the musicians in memorizing the poetry. Some of the folk tunes were also standardized, which is evident from the following two excerpts taken from articles on famous Sindhi musicians Zarina Baloch and Hussain Khadim, published in the newspapers Dawn (2002), and The Star (1985) by music journalist Shaykh Aziz, who comments on the training of a famous folk singer Zarina Baloch from Sindh:

> Folk songs…required more attention than the ghazals and gīts because the tunes of folk songs are not set to the scales of the art music. Her [Zarina Baloch] teacher, Jumman had to make extra efforts, re-compose various tunes and go them rehearsed by Zarina and finally put on air (Aziz 2006, 152).

> The other major influence on Hussain Buksh's stage performance is Mumtaz Mirza, who works with KTV and has played a vital role in the current development of Sindh folk music as a performing art. Hussain Buksh says he didn't know how to tune himself or fit in with other musicians before he started to learn from Mumtaz Mirza, and he attributes his success in this direction to his [Mumtaz Mirza's] training (Ali 1985, 175).

Initially there was a resistance to integrate rural musical instruments with the Radio orchestra. Instruments such as *ek tāro* were too soft to be played alongside violins; many folk instruments were also not made efficiently and would lose tuning very quickly. Secondly, not all folk musicians were aware of 'harmony' or were able to sight-read, and thus did not share the musical vocabulary with other session players. Sometimes they could only play the tunes and did not have the experience of coordinating with other musicians (Interview with a producer and 'Master' from PTV's Music Unit-Karachi, June 2009).

One exception was Bilawal Belgium, who played the *benjo*, a keyed-zither instrument found in Baluchistan. Bilawal was from the Sheedi community in

Mirpurkhas, Sindh, where ethnic communities such as Lasis, Makrani Balochis and Shidis lived. He started playing *benjo* because it was a cheap and easy instrument to play, and later approached Ustad Ashiq Ali Khan of Patiala *gharānā* to take him as his student in Hyderabad. With Ustad Ashiq Ali Khan, he started to play *rāgs* on *benjo* (Aziz 2006, 142). When he was introduced to Radio-Karachi, the Director-General Z.A. Bukhari initially opposed the introduction of *benjo* to the Radio Orchestra, but when he heard Bilawal play and realized his talent, he accepted him and appointed him as a staff artist in the 1950s. Here he not only performed with the orchestra, but he also composed tunes for various vocalists. It is related that Ustad Nathu Khan, the grandmaster of *sārangi,* once remarked, "Bilawals are not born like mushrooms" (Aziz 2006, 143).

The tuning of folk instruments was a 'quality standard' which the rural musicians was not always aware of, and they were scolded since their instruments lost their tuning very easily. Tuning was also a means of disciplining the rural musicians and making them obey the radio authorities, and one Radio-Producer told me that that the rural musicians loved to joke around and pass mocking remarks here and there (*jumla kass dete*). Therefore, when he first became the producer he was very nervous about how he would obtain their respect and submission to his authority. The Master-composer told him that a musician's weakness was tuning, because they cannot be in tune one hundred percent, and folk instruments would go out of tune very easily. So if you wish to exert authority, the Master would say, just ask them in a loud, confident voice, '*Ay Sur Ach kar le*" (Tune your instrument). The producer said he tried it and it really

worked (Interview Sattar Syed, Radio-Islamabad). Therefore, disciplining musicians did not only involve tuning but also schooling their behavior to conform to the urban etiquettes.

On the other hand, the criteria of selecting a folk musician differed between Radio and PTV. Since television visually broadcasts the musicians, their attire was also considered as a basis for selection and for maintaining quality standards. Another level at which 'pure folk' was defined was clothes. Baidil Masroor said,

> If somebody has come to sing a Sindhi song, we used to see what he was wearing? If the musician would ask, *Kapron se kyā hot hai* ('Why do you want to look at my clothes?'),
>
> We used to say, 'Folk has a symbol; what is your symbol?'
>
> He would say, 'We don't know.' We said, 'You should have a symbol. What is your symbol?' They would say, *Itnī to sakhtī hamein to patā nahīn*, ('Sir we are not aware of such strict regulations.) We said, 'since you don't know, then go to your village because you belong there and find a symbol. Folk does not happen with dirty clothes. Design of the cloth, a person's haircut, his turban, shoes, their way of talking and accent [these were all necessary criteria]. Folk evolves only with a person who is aware of his culture. Only the person who is aware of his folk heritage can come on TV' (Interview conducted in June 2009).

Apart from attire, Mr. Baidil Masroor remarked that one of the criteria was the musician's knowledge of *rāgs*, since according to him the knowledge of *rāgs* was a symbol of "pure folk." I asked him how they selected people and what were the criteria to ensure that it was 'pure.' He said, "We had know-how of folk. Folk has a base." He said the foundation of folk is Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai's work, which is three hundred years old and from there the development of folk occurred. Therefore, a person who did not know the "base" was rejected.

> We used to say this is not *gali* (street or lane) school or college. This is university, University. Your musical level should be at the level of

> university student…People would came to TV with the interest of being show-cased. We would ask them to sing Sohnī for us. [Sohnī is one of the *surs* of Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai's musical system] If he said 'Sir I don't know what is *Sohnī*,' I replied, 'If you don't then go away why have you come to television?' When he does not know about his own folk heroine and how she died for her beloved, how can we bring him on TV? We used to be *sakht* (hard). Then we would ask him "Do you know *Bhairvī*?" And if he replies, "Sir we don't know about *Bhairvī*" [he mocked], I would say 'If you don't then why have you come here, you should sing on the streets not here. We had strict regulations so that only 'pure folk' is promoted.

This implies that a singer who only knew his tunes, and did not have knowledge of any *rāgs* or *surs*, had less chances of being on TV. In Aziz's (2006) biography of famous folk musicians, one often encounters the name of an Ustad with whom the local musician took training. At first, I interpreted this inclusion of Ustad with a folk musician to be a method of gaining prestige, but the above comment shows that the regulations of state media obliged musicians from the otherwise professional castes like *manganhār* or *bhīl* to receive the know-how of the Shah's rāg if they wanted to gain employment and gain appreciation from the elite patrons. In fact, the *sur* of Shah Latif was considered the "base" of Sindhi folk, rather than the notion that I received from *faqīrs* who sing the *rāg*, which is that Shah Latif founded this system of *sur* after collecting folk melodies from different regions of Sindh and then synthesizing them (Interview with Faqīr Jumman Shah, BhitShah July 2009).

In this respect, the attitude of the producer towards the musicians depended on their know-how of classical music and their ability to project their music as the 'symbolic capital' of Pakistan. However, there were many musicians who were regionally very popular through the cassette industry, yet were not patronized by television. Mr. Hameed Akhund told me the story of a regional musician Jalal

Chandio who became popular through his theatre and also through selling cassettes. Although he had up to 200-250 cassettes to his credit, he did not become one of the national stars. He played the one-stringed lute *ek tarā* and would sing both *sufyānā kalām* as well as *lok gīt*, and whose popularity in Sindh can be akin to that of Ataullah Khan Esa Khelvi in Punjab.

> …As soon as he finished [performing] he ran out. He said 'I'm going because I'll be mobbed and I don't want to be here'. He lifted his *shalwār* [pants] and ran. People went mad, flocked behind him. That's how good and that's how popular he was. Jalal never went to the television. He wanted to. When he became very popular, he went there initially but they did not allow him to sing. Later they begged him. He did one or two programs and then he stopped going. So one of my friends asked me, if you see him in the *melā* [fair] please tell him [to come to TV]. I asked him, 'Jalal, why don't you go there?' He said, 'I once had a wish that I should be on television but now I'm not interested.' So these people suddenly sprout on their own and they became popular because people accept them.

This is an example of the conception of 'folk musician' as the popular musician who does not become part of the national tradition and its selection of 'folk.' One sees through the musicians and folk songs promoted by the media, as well as the beliefs of the producers towards folk, that whereas there was no formal policy towards 'folk music,' the musical expressions of Sufis were projected in such a way that Pakistani folk was considered quintessentially Muslim. Whereas Jalal Chandio was also singing *sufyānā kalām,* his case shows that the musicians' experiences of becoming part of Pakistan's representations are another history, which can be written through collective life histories and further interviews with folk musicians. This is one of the ways that the musical expressions of non-Muslim communities, especially Sindhi-Hindus, were made invisible through the creation of national identity as Muslim.

This chapter has demonstrated that music was an important means through which Pakistan created its national identity. Radio Pakistan was the primary institution in the founding years and it sought to project Pakistan as a Muslim culture in order to distinguish Pakistan from the India and to promote the established position of Pakistan as a cultural unit with Islam and Urdu language as its unifying bonds. In doing so, it banned musical instruments, musical genres or poetry that had any associations with Hindu deities. It in turn used folk music to create this Muslim culture and in doing so projected the idea of Pakistani folk music as quintessentially Muslim. This not only eliminated the devotional expressions of other religious groups but also ironically secularized the Muslim devotionals through its performances for social entertainment. The secularization of Muslim devotional songs and shifts in its meaning was further exploited by the political regimes of Z.A. Bhutto who used 'folk songs' for a populist idea of Islamic socialism. The idea of folk song as socialist was in turn reverted by General Zia, who shifted its meaning alongside his policy of Islamization. The construction of 'folk music' as non-Urdu genre further became a tool to use folk songs to perform the nation, as Urdu *ghazal* and *qawwāli* singers and later pop singers started to sing folk songs through the musical idioms of their own genres. This secularization of folk song further led to its socialist interpretation by progressive leftist elites.

Whereas in the founding years of Pakistan, Radio-Pakistan projected folk songs through its respective regions, Uxi Mufti through his program *Lok Tamasha* on PTV served to create the idea of Pakistani folk music by popularizing folk

musicians at national level. The next chapter serves to position his work on folk music that led to establishment of the institution Lok Virsa, and discusses double-edged contestations to represent Pakistan abroad through rural folk musicians on one hand, and to promote folklore in Pakistan.

Chapter 4: Representing Pakistan as 'Unity in Diversity' through 'Pakistani Folk'

Lok Virsa was established as a national cultural institution to preserve and promote Pakistan's folklore in the attempt to challenge the establishment's attention to urban art forms only and its record of ignoring the expressions of majority of people in Pakistan. The name 'Lok Virsa' is a unique name for a government institute in Pakistan; the word *lok* is a Sanskrit word that means 'folk' or 'people,' and *Virsa* is a Persian word for 'heritage.' The name serves to combine the two distinct heritages, Indian and Persian that are part of the cultures of Pakistan. Its founder, Uxi Mufti, identifies this institution as part of his vision that the Pakistani state would own its regional heritage and serve to establish a national culture based on regional diversity; thus Lok Virsa represented Pakistan as 'Unity in Diversity.' This chapter focuses on the work of promoting folklore by Lok Virsa, and its role in contesting the definition of national culture as a 'cultural unit.' By relating the formation of this institute and its struggles with the civil bureaucracy, I will show the ways in which the progressive leftist elites fought for the position of Pakistan as a 'culturally diverse unit.'

Contestations to Promote Folklore and Formation of Lok Virsa

The establishment of Lok Virsa actually dates back to a UNESCO project that was given to Pakistan's Education Ministry (in the absence of a Ministry of Culture) between 1968-1969 under the regime of General Ayub. In order to undertake the UNESCO project, the Ministry of Education established a Popular

Music Research Cell, which employed Mr. Uxi Mufti, who had then returned from Romania after completing his PhD, and Samir Nagheeb from Santa Cecilia academy in Rome, who was sent by UNESCO. They together established an office in Model Town, Lahore and started to travel across different villages in Pakistan in order to collect folk expressions such as hand-made textiles, artifacts, and music. This mission of UNESCO was supposed to be the basis for an extended project to preserve folk music in the world. While Mr. Mufti and Mr. Naghib were away in the villages for this work, the government of General Ayub fell (Interview with Uxi Mufti, June 2009).

When they returned, the Ministry of Education told them that Popular Music Research Cell did not exist anymore, and the UNESCO project had been withdrawn. As a result, Mr. Naghib left the country. Mr. Mufti tried to tell the ministry staff that they had collected about 200 hours of music as well as samples of traditional arts and crafts, which could be come the basis for establishing an institution for folklore funded by UNESCO; however, the bureaucracy's attitude towards rural traditions was condescending. Mr. Mufti states that the reply he received was:

> This is 1969. You want to get paid for this job! What kind of job is this? I'm sorry; we have disbanded your salary. Pakistan Popular Music Research Mission has been disbanded (Interview with Uxi Mufti, June 2009).

Mr. Mufti notes that the civil bureaucracy at the time did not view the promotion of regional music as significant because of their colonial attitudes and their thinking that regional cultures are not important in the formation of national culture. This is one of the junctures in Mr. Mufti's interview that shows how he had to struggle with the civil bureaucracy as well as groups within cultural elite to

promote his national vision of recognizing regional cultures as part of national treasure (Interview with Uxi Mufti, June 2009).

After the UNESCO project was abandoned, Mr. Mufti took his regional music collection to Pakistan Television Networks (PTV) that had recently started its transmission. Since Mr. Mufti had briefly worked as a producer for TV before he had left for Romania, he was able to get employment. Mr. Mufti said that when he first proposed to conduct television programs of folk music to PTV, the idea was immediately rejected. At the time the PTV elite did not even know the names of the regional musicians who later became nationally popular; such as Khamisu Khan, Akhtar Channal, Allan Faqīr, and nor were they interested in knowing regional musicians. Regional musicians at the time were only popular within their local regions (Interview with Uxi Mufti, June 2009).

Moreover since PTV had recently started its transmission, it catered to a narrow urban elite audience, which was more drawn to programs such as "Zia Mohyeddin Show," which was about Urdu poetry. Therefore at that time, PTV was not interested in promoting regional musicians. When Mr. Mufti proposed the idea to the managing director of PTV, Aslam Azhar, he replied, "*Mufti Tamātar khāo ge Tamātar stage ke ūpar*." (Mufti, people will throw rotten tomatoes on you on stage). However, Mr. Azhar agreed to have a pilot show, which Mr. Mufti made. It was shown at General Manager's conference but was rejected on the pretext that the musicians were "unworthy stuff" for national television. Since television was aimed at urban audiences, the bureaucracy did not consider regional music fit for urban tastes. Since PTV was more focused on satisfying

urban elitist tastes, it imported most of its programs, such as 'Dennis the Menace,' and the 'Lucy Show.' PTV transmission would begin at 6'o'clock in the evening and end at 10 o'clock at night and was only about four hours long, in which only one hour was allocated to locally produced shows (Interview with Uxi Mufti, June 2009).

However, one day the program 'Dennis the Menace' did not arrive on time, and having nothing to air, the PTV producer by mistake aired the pilot program of folk musicians that Mr. Mufti had produced.

> When the program went up on air, the TV was amazed. They got so many letters from such far-off places and they had never received from such far-off places such as D.G Khan, interior Baluchistan, interior Sindh, Tharparkar. The general manager and the managing director television were surprised because they had never received letters from such remote village. These people mostly said that 'It's for the first time that we have a feeling that the television belongs to us too. We saw this program and we were enthralled. We want to have more of this.' So I was called back. Mr. Aslam Azhar said Mr. Mufti please do the program for us. And I started a weekly musical show, a folk music show called Lok Tamasha. I started that program in the year 1971 and it went on till 1978 (May 2009).

The television program *Lok Tamasha* had great implications for the popularity of folk musicians nationally, and led to the formation of Lok Virsa. According to Secretary-Culture Mr. Hameed Akhund, when *Lok Tamasha* was aired, it also created awareness about Sindhi music and the need for an institution at the regional level for promotion of regional music that led to the formation of the Ministry of Culture in Sindh. Whereas Nihal Ahmad's work on Radio-Pakistan (2005) credits it with having popularized regional musicians nationally, Mr. Uxi Mufti stated that the musicians at the regional level were only known within their provinces, and were not known across other regions. Therefore, the category 'Pakistani folk' did not exist, and Mr. Mufti's program *Lok Tamasha* and

later the institute Lok Virsa established the category 'Pakistani folk,' and popularized the regional musicians nationally with the goal that the leftist position to define national culture will be taken seriously, and the state will initiate a policy to integrate regional languages and traditions as part of national heritage.

Therefore Mr. Mufti hoped that the work of consecrating 'folk' as national that he had initiated would become state's cultural policy, and moreover further his position that folklore is necessary for national integration. Mr. Uxi Mufti's work to promote folklore is situated in within the context of progressive leftist position that aspires Pakistani culture to be defined as a 'culturally diverse unit,' and critiqued the dominance of the Urdu language and urban cultures. This position opposed the colonial attitudes of civil-bureaucracy and the urbanized cultural elite that considered regional cultures and traditions as 'backward.'

This attitude of the civil bureaucracy continued after the establishment of Lok Virsa, and it was difficult to receive funding for a government institution with a unique name, and between 1975 and 1982, he did not receive any funds from the government to do the work. When he finally raised his voice in front of the bureaucracy telling them that they should be aware of the institution, which works towards preserving nation's heritage, he received a very impolite reply. During the interview, Mr. Uxi changed his voice to imitate him in the squeaky and subdued tone of a stereotypical government clerk, saying, "This Lok Virsa! Is it in Islamabad? *Sir isay kesī chichchū kī malyā mein honā chāhiye* (Sir, an institute like this should not be in the center but in a remote corner)." *Chichchū kī malyā* is a colloquial expression used when you want to remove someone from

the main site and you say go to *chichchū kī malyā* to suggest its insignificance or to show condescension, more aptly demonstrated in the next sentence). He further stated, "You should go to some village. Why have you set this up here' (Interview with Uxi Mufti, June 2009).

In 1972 Lok Virsa started as small folklore research cell at Pakistan National Council of Arts (PNCA). After Mr. Mufti had become renowned through his work on TV as the "Lok Tamasha man," he approached Faiz Ahmed Faiz



A Brochure of Lok Virsa

(who had established PNCA), and Faiz integrated him into the folklore research cell at PNCA. However, the preservation of regional cultures was a low priority at PNCA, since the institution was mostly associated with doing the work of cultural diplomacy through urbanized versions of folklore dances. Mr. Mufti also faced issues in funding activities, and in order to generate funds, he started to host the folk festival *Lok Mela* after 1974, which was also broadcasted on television. *Lok Mela* was distinct from *Lok Tamasha* in that the former included not only musicians, but also artisans. The folk festival was held at Islamabad club, and improved the awareness of regional cultures within Islamabad's elites.

Mr. Mufti's activities were not received well within the PNCA, and with the support of the Minister of Education, Hafiz Pirzada, he established an autonomous institution to promote folklore, which was first called National Institute for the promotion of Folk and Traditional Heritage (NIFT) and later named *Lok Virsa*. Mr. Mufti said that the NIFT was a name chosen for "the consumption of UNESCO because we were trying to tap UNESCO for equipment," but side-by-side, he was looking for a name which would appeal to the people of Pakistan. At *Lok Virsa's* inaugural ceremony in 1974, the speech delivered by Hafiz Pirzada on the national vision of Mr. Mufti is very clearly explicated.[15]

The speech is directed at the cultural elite groups who do not value regional arts and music, and promote only the urban arts. The speech states that Pakistan's folk arts and music belongs to "the neglected majority of Pakistan in rural areas;

[15]When I showed the desire to meet with Hafiz Pirzada regarding the speech in conversation with Mr. Mufti and Mr. Akhund, they mentioned that Mr. Mufti would have written the speech for him.

the urban population in Pakistan hardly comprises 15 to 20 percent of the entire nation, but in patronage and recognition of arts there is an urban monopoly" (Pirzada 1974, 5). It also states that industrialization and the fall in feudal patronage had placed the regional traditions in danger, and that there had not been any attempts made by the state to preserve the regional traditions, since there was no cultural policy to protect the interests of these rural artists and to perpetuate these traditional skills and arts. In these respects, the inaugural speech of *Lok Virsa* continues the precedent set by the government document, the Faiz Report, to formulate a cultural policy.

> One reason why indigenous art has not been able to grow in Pakistan is that the rural population has been denied any hand in the organization of art activities. Therefore, we must begin at the roots. The task of rediscovery, research reinterpretation, systematic collection and preservation of the true identity of Pakistan is obviously fundamental (Pirzada 1974, 5).

The speech's content is also highly influenced by the lingua of UNESCO towards developing countries. The use of words such as 'impact of industrialization,' 'Afro-Asian countries,' and 'impact of colonial rule,' as well as explicit reference to a UNESCO meeting show that Lok Virsa was not positioning itself entirely as a nationalist institution, but also a state institution that would represent Pakistan's folklore abroad. One of the obvious reasons for this positioning is that UNESCO was primarily funding *Lok Virsa*'s activities.

Some people credit the emergence of *Lok Virsa* to the regime of Z.A. Bhutto, who was promoting regional folk music on national television. However, Mr. Uxi Mufti denied that *Lok Virsa* had any association with Bhutto's regime or that Bhutto directly supported him. My interview with Mr. Mufti took place in a group, and a lady questioned Mr. Mufti on this point by first questioning the

reliability of his statement that he had never met Z.A. Bhutto. He later clarified that he had met him but not known him intimately, and that his main contact person was Hafiz Pirzada. What followed was a politically charged conversation, which shows how Mr. Mufti was attempting to legitimize Lok Virsa as national cultural institute.

While the lady made connections between the regime of Bhutto and emergence of *Lok Virsa*, Mr. Mufti denied that *Lok Virsa* was part of Bhutto's ideology of promoting regional cultures. He stated that Bhutto did not make use of regional cultures and that *Lok Virsa* remained an unrealized national vision, since the position to make regional cultures the basis for national culture had been marginalized during the time of Bhutto. Mr. Mufti also stated that due to American pressure, Bhutto's regime lost the leftist bent that it started with, and that Faiz Ahmed Faiz, who had created the national institutions, also grew out of favor.

Nevertheless, the institution that started out as a vision for national integration was reduced to an image-building institution. The image that Mr. Mufti presented was that Pakistan was a 'Unity in Diversity,' with Sufi mystics giving it an overarching unity of Islam, which stemmed from the *class-habitus* of progressive leftists who were promoting Pakistan as a *guldastā.* The efforts of Lok Virsa, primarily Lok Mela, Lok Tamasha and music publications, made the elites in Islamabad aware of their regional heritage. Internationally, Lok Virsa mainly presented its work at the international conferences, seminars and festivals organized by UNESCO, ICTM and other cultural institutions.

Folk Music as 'National Heritage' of Pakistan

Lok Virsa under Uxi Mufti attempted to raise the status of regional cultures in the eyes of the established elite, and pushed forward to consider the music and musicians to be valued as the 'symbolic capital' of the state.

Smithsonian Festival in 1976

One of the occasions at which Lok Virsa presented 'Pakistani folk' internationally is at the Smithsonian folk-life festival in 1976. The late Professor Nazir Jairazbhoy, a prominent ethnomusicologist from the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), came to Pakistan for fieldwork in 1976 and collaborated with Lok Virsa. Since Professor Jairazbhoy was working with the Smithsonian Institute at the time, he invited Lok Virsa to host a Pakistani troupe at the "Old Ways in the New World" segment of the Smithsonian folk-life festival organized at the at the bicentennial celebration of US. This troupe was prepared and rehearsed by Uxi Mufti. This then became the first opportunity for the rural musicians of Pakistan to represent Pakistan abroad, and the performances at Smithsonian festival were followed by performances in Boston, Philadelphia and New York (1976, 73).

The folk-life festival was a five-day presentation consisting of about twenty-six performers selected from different provinces in Pakistan, and included musical performances by prominent folk musicians of the time including Faiz Mohammed Baloch from Baluchistan, Allan Faqīr, Khamisu Khan from Sindh, and some female dancers from Punjab, to name a few. Some of these musicians had never travelled beyond their villages, and had visited the federal capital of Islamabad for

Allan Faqīr at the Smithsonian Festival in 1976, from Catalogue of Lok Virsa (1976)

the first time for rehearsals (1976, 73). While the PNCA had led troupes consisting of urban dancers trained to dance folk dances since the 1960s, this was the first time that a troupe comprising entirely folk musicians had represented Pakistan internationally. The image of Pakistan presented by Mr. Uxi was distinct from the one presented by the PNCA. The PNCA represented folk dances in a sophisticated, stylized manner, but folk musicians and traditions were not

promoted. The image it presented was Pakistan as 5000 years old. In contrast, Lok Virsa presented Pakistani folklore as based on oral, ancient and rural traditions, and Pakistan as 'Unity in Diversity.'

> The paradox of Pakistan, culturally speaking is that it is a nation of 'unity in diversity.' In spirit of all divergences in culture and races, it is the contribution of the mystics to the soil of Pakistan that gives the nation its over-arching unity. Consequently many performances by ascetics and mystics were included in the program (Bader 1976 quoted in Lok Virsa manual 1976, 78).

In the interview with Mr. Mufti, I found out that sending rural musicians to represent Pakistan only happened after a struggle with the civil bureaucracy, who regarded the musicians as belonging to lower caste. However, according to Mr. Mufti, the civil bureaucracy has always shown resistance towards promoting rural traditions, since these musicians were considered lower class.

> Shumaila: Can you tell me how were folk musicians considered worthy enough to represent Pakistan, since they are usually condescended upon and considered 'lower-class' people?
>
> Uxi Mufti: You are right. The problem is with our mindset. I led the first folkloric cultural troupe in 1976. The very first one! This was to celebrate the Bicentennial celebrations of US. I was the leader of the delegation. I have still maintained a group photo of these. I was given permission only because we were supposed to participate in the folk-life festival of the Smithsonian Institute. The festival was folk-life, so I got away with the idea of being a folkloric dance group. But when I was leaving, I was asked by Hafiz Pirzada to do a rehearsal of the show. And I did that.
>
> In this group there was a singer and dancer from Sindh. He was a *nāchū*. There is a *nāchū* tradition in Sindh where full-grown men wear *ghūngrū* [anklets] and dance and sing like girls. They also dress like girls. He was a tremendous performer and I included him. I thought he would be a sensation in America in folk-life mall. But at the preview show there were politicians, ministers and they severely criticized it. They said 'Mr.Uxi Mufti, who are you taking with you? You will take a *nāchū*! He [Mr. Mufti] will present our culture through these people! [They said amongst

themselves]. These people are *faqīr.*[16] Half *faqīr*, half *nāchū*! Who is this Allan Faqīr?' [Mr. Uxi Mufti imitated their mocking tones]

Our own attitudes were not right and so I had to drop him [the nāchū singer] in the end. I didn't take him. He was heart-broken and I had to fight to take Allan Faqīr and Khamisu Khan, musicians who are big legends now. But it was initially very difficult to take them to America to represent Pakistan because Pakistani government's ministers who had come from the same regions would look down upon these traditions. 'Hey, he is the *mirāsī* (musician) from my village' [they snickered]. Hey he's taking a *dolī*. Village's musician would go to *Amrīkā* (United States), he'll represent us, Ha!' The *dolī wālā* used to touch their feet and ask for money. He could not sustain himself economically. He was dependent on the feudal lords! Our own attitudes were not right (Islamabad, June 2009).

This is only a glimpse of the way the rural musicians were treated by the state bureaucracy, and many other events and stories remain concealed. Alongside Mr. Mufti, the Faiz Report (1975) also referred to the "colonial" attitudes of civil bureaucracy; moreover Jairazbhoy (1993) and Qureshi (2004) have also referred to the low status of musicians in feudal settings of India and Pakistan. This example shows how the condescending attitude towards musicians is perpetuated in national institutions when civil bureaucracy comprising of landed elite continue to run national institutions as feudal lords. One does not only find condescending attitudes by the civil bureaucracy but also contentions about who can represent Pakistani folk. Whereas the national media defined regional-folk as strictly Muslim, this practice continued in cultural institutions that represented Pakistan abroad. As pointed out by Lok Virsa's inaugural speech, such attitudes towards rural musicians emerge from the first position that considers urban musical forms to be sophisticated, and those from rural areas to be backward.

[16] Since *faqīr and mirāsī* are considered lower-class, in this context it is used to show the denigration towards the rural musicians.

Virsa *Museum As Shuttle Diplomacy*

A part of folklore collection made by Lok Virsa over three decades is showcased at the *Virsa* Museum in Islamabad, which was funded by General Musharraf to facilitate shuttle diplomacy after. "*Jab sānp nikal āyey to āp sapere dhūndte hain nā* (When a snake comes out, you look for snake-charmers, don't you?)," said Mr. Mufti while sarcastically alluding to General Musharraf's need to present a soft image of Pakistan 9/11, and in general referring to how the ruling heads of Pakistan only patronize arts and music for political expediency. General Musharraf convened a meeting, which consisted of many prominent people, including Uxi Mufti, and he stated that there were foreign guests coming to Islamabad every day, and there were no museums or sites to project Pakistan's image. The nearest museum was that in Taxila. When Mr. Mufti suggested building a Heritage museum, the General was pleased with the idea and commissioned the construction. In May 2009, I visited the *Virsa* Museum and noted that most of the placards in the museum were in English, which shows that it was directed towards the world dignitaries.

Bohlman (2004) writes that folklore and ethnology museums contain a section devoted to music, and that these museums "weave myth and history together" such that the musical museum of the nation not only "celebrates its heroes, the great composers and performers whose artistry conveyed the nation's story to the world, the favorite sons and daughters whose achievements have acquired mythic proportions," but it also tells us much about "its forms of nationalism" (25). While the Virsa Museum does not celebrate the famous singers

and musicians from Pakistan's folk heritage, it has one gallery dedicated to folk musical instruments and another to Sufi mystics. The music gallery tells the origins of Pakistani music, as follows:

> The origins of our music can be traced back to 5000 years of history of the Indus Valley Civilization of the archaeological excavations of the musical instruments borendo and the [figure of] dancing girl and other archaeological excavations of Gandhara civilization of 2000 B.C. (See Image 19).

The "Virsa Museum" (Heritage Museum) in Islamabad

While the museum does not reflect Mr. Mufti's position of Pakistan as 'Unity in Diversity' as is the case elsewhere in Lok Virsa manuals and publications, the museum reflects the established point of view in peculiar ways: for example, the photograph of A.R. Chughtai amongst Muslim mystics and intellectuals. A.R. Chughtai was one of the pro-establishment artists in Pakistan

who designed the logos of Radio-Pakistan and PTV and represented his artwork for diplomacy. He was emblematic of the position of the 'establishment;' Sibte Hassan sarcastically pointed out that those who held the established position of Pakistani culture as Muslim distinguished themselves as fans of "Chughtai-art" (2007, 301). Moreover, the museum also had portraits of General Musharraf and his wife that were removed after the fall of his regime (Interview with Hameed Akhund in Karachi 2009).

A placard from Virsa Museum that ironically portrays photo of A.R. Chughtai amongst sketches of Muslim mystics

This story is in line with the earlier thesis by Wheeler; however, the difference is that it serves to conjoin the Indus Valley tradition with the present practices of people, by making the ancient past living and continuous. In *Invention of Tradition*, Hobsbawm (1983) refers to the contemporary nature of the

traditions, which are claimed to be ancient; however in this case it is a reversal. It is by finding evidence of the present practice of the playing of the musical instrument, *borendo*, which was also discovered at the site of Mohenjo-daro, that the elite put forth the ancient heritage of Indus-Valley as "Pakistani." The evidence of forging continuity is evident in *Lok Virsa*'s publications:

> The wind instrument *borendo* was originally excavated from the ruins of Mohenjo-daro and is still blown by many a shepherd of Dadu district. The famous Mohenjo-daro bullock-cart is still in use amongst the farmers of the valley. The beautiful Gandhara jewelry is to the present day a living tradition. Continuity of Pakistan's folkloric heritage is perhaps its most amazing and remarkable aspect lending it unbelievable richness. Piling, so to say, the folk wisdom of its people over centuries and transmitting it on to the coming generations. Innumerable invasions enriched it. Colonial rule could not disrupt it. Modern technological onslaught has not erased it (Mufti 1977 29).

The following placard refers to two uses of archaeological objects: i) the dancing girl, and ii) the musical instrument *borendo*, and projects a romanticized idea of Pakistan's rural life as unchanged by historical encounters and completely pure.

Another placard refers to the "Vedic Origins" of Indian classical music and refers to Indian rāgs that are named after Hindu deities such as *durga* and *shantra*. Considering that the names of rāgs were changed by Radio-Pakistan shortly after independence in order to eliminate any associations of Pakistan's culture with India, this is a stance by the cultural elite, who subverted such attempts by claiming the non-Islamic past of the regions comprising Pakistan and gave primacy to regional identities. Other evidences of this position are the placard showing Sufi contributions to Pakistan's music and the gallery devoted to Sufi



A Placard showing Ancient Origins of Pakistan's Music

poets of different regions of Pakistan, which alludes to the quintessentially Islamic nature of Pakistani folk celebrated by institutions such as *Lok Virsa*.

Heritage sites are fundamental but contested resources for both established and emerging national elites. Shore (2002) writes that monuments (which include everything from statues and cenotaphs to museums, mausoleums, and the Millennium Dome) not only "venerate and commemorate the rulers and 'great men'" but also construct those histories by which people shape subjectivities by choosing what societies to remember and what they choose to forget (Forty and Kuchler 1999 quoted in Shore 2002, 13). The Heritage Museum represents the invented ancient past of Pakistan to the world dignitaries. In doing so, it is emblematic of the way General Musharraf's regime positioned Pakistan as 5000 years of Pakistan, more than the way Lok Virsa positioned itself as a nationalist vision. However, since the museum is open to general public, it also reinforces Lok Virsa's ideals of creating awareness about folklore and advocating the

position of making folklore and regional cultures as the basis for creating the Pakistani nation.

National Sound Archive

Lok Virsa established a national sound archive that boasts the largest collection of recorded songs, ballads, epics and interviews pertaining to Pakistan's folk music. Mr. Mufti said that it is bigger than the music archive in India, which only has collections from All-India Radio-Delhi and the collections concentrate more on classical music, i.e. classical music. He said that the tapes used for Lok Virsa recordings are open reel tapes, which have life of about 25 years if preserved very well in an air-conditioned and moisture-free environment and if they are run twice a year and lubricated with graphite. He says the maintenance of these tapes is not very good but better than that of India's, and that *Lok Virsa*'s archives are also air-conditioned.

In order to analyze how Lok Virsa consecrated categories as 'folk,' in the line that Bourdieu discusses the process of consecrating objects as 'Art.' I asked Mr. Mufti what kind of music did Lok Virsa record. He said that all kinds of folk music from remote regions of Pakistan as well as classical music and *qawwālī* were recorded. Lok Virsa did not consider folk and classical to be dichotomous but considered them part of a common Muslim heritage. However, religious genres were not recorded. Mr. Mufti said:

> We overlooked religious lore because I deliberately did not lead people towards religion because there are many different kinds of music, which are religious. Don't call *qawwālī* as 'religious'. *Marsīyyā, manqabat, hamd* na't. These are religious music. We did not record them. But we recorded everything else otherwise (Interview Islamabad, May 2009).

This is significant since it refers to another level of contestation in defining 'Pakistani folk,' such that religious expressions were not considered 'folk,' and Sufi devotional songs such as *qawwālī* were not considered religious. The use of Sufi devotional songs as representations of 'Pakistani folk' by both the national media and Lok Virsa serves to create this ambivalence between the categories 'folk,' 'Sufi,' and 'religious,' whereby intersection of these categories and placing a song in one or more of these categories is contested. Yet it also shows that the cultural elite was so invested in the idea of Pakistan as a Muslim state that promotion of non-Muslim, as Pakistani folk was not considered.

The last chapter had shown how media secularized devotional songs as social entertainment, and one can see another attempt to secularize 'folk:' firstly, by not recording non-Sufi religious genres and then calling the Sufi devotional genres non-religious. Another level of contestation can be deduced from Mr. Mufti's choice of not recording religious lore, which alludes to the vitriolic exchanges between the progressive leftist and religious right, and how they both sought to define national culture through their own symbols. While the religious right used the religious genres, progressive leftists combated with folk music.

It is important to notice the other genres that were included in 'Pakistani folk.' The 1976 catalogue of Lok Virsa mentions some of the musical forms that were recorded as folk; this included the tradition of *dāstān-goī*, which relates epic narratives through music. These epic narratives included tales such as *Do Do Chanesar*, *Pūran Bhagat*, *Shah Dāwūd Dī Wār*, *Dhol Sammī*, *Bātan* and various bedtime tales and popular tales. These were sung by prominent folk musicians

such as: Umar Din and party; Ghulam Mohmamed Rulia and party; Baba Ismail from Punjab; Faqīr Dost Ali, Mohammed Jumman and Mohammed Yousuf from Sind; Baba Ismail; Saeed Hassan Shah; Alla Rakha; Ismail alias Saela; Mubarik Ali; Syed Hassan Shah; and women singers such as Najma Begum and Sakina Bibi from Punjab.

Another genre recorded was the *sufyānā kalām* of Shah Latif Bhitai, Bulleh Shah, Khwaja Ghulam Farid and Sachal Sarmast. Allan Faqīr, Waheed Ali, Mohammed Yousuf, Misri Faqīr, Ustad Manzoor Ali Khan, Dhol Faqīr, Bhagat Theomal and Party, Saeein Akhtar, Roobina Qureshi were a few prominent singers who were recorded.

Moreover, "love songs" and marriage songs, such as *sehrā*, *rukhsatī*, *gīch*, *phūl chūndan*, *mor bhandan*, *menhndī*, *sithnī*, *dolī*, and *ghorī*, were also recorded. The interesting aspect of this catalogue is that it mostly has recordings from Sindh and Punjab, and other areas are not a part of it. Mazhar-ul Islam, who served as a director of Lok Virsa in post 9/11 mentioned to me that after the war against the Taliban in NWFP Swat, there was an attempt made to preserve the musical traditions of the region.

My expectations that Lok Virsa as an archival site for research were reduced when I realized that apart from the 1974 catalogue that was published, Lok Virsa does not have a catalogue through which researchers can search to find a tape. This catalogue also shows the regional bias towards recording of Punjab and Sindh. There is an entire building dedicated to the sound archives at Lok Virsa and recorded material is stored in good conditions. However, the material is not

accessible and a researcher must ask people to get tapes. When I did ask for a recording for Shah Abdul Latif 's faqīrs, Master Chandar and other Sindhi musicians, the people around showed surprise and showed me videos of those musicians, whose work was already published and available for sale. The bulk of Lok Virsa recordings remain shelved in a showcase and most are not accessible to people, as is the case with many archival sites.

Lok Virsa also published cassettes based on its recording but due to copyright issues, the publication section of Lok Virsa went into a loss and did not publish thereafter. Due to lack of cultural policy and copyright laws, many recording labels such as EMI, Shalimar recording, and Avitronics had run out of business. Initially Lok Virsa continued its 1000 cassettes in the market but it also endured severe losses and closed down its production. Many Lok Virsa recordings are available outside Pakistan and they have a list of selected famous musicians or communities, whose music they still sell in CD and DVD format. These DVDs, titled "Folk Fiesta," have performances as well as short interviews with musicians. Musicians such as Reshma, Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan, Mohammed Jumman and others had been invited to perform at Lok Virsa hall within the premises, and this is where the interviews were conducted.

Alongside *Lok Mela* and *Lok Tamasha*, Mr. Uxi Mufti also organized a *Lok Parade*, or cultural parade at the Constitutional Avenue in Islamabad. This was arranged during the tenure of Benazir Bhutto and supported by Organization for Islamic Countries (OIC), UNESCO and other major world organizations. All the Central Asian countries participated in this parade, and musicians from different

provinces of Pakistan were also represented. Mr. Uxi Mufti says that he thought the government would stop its military parade on Pakistan Day and continue to do this cultural parade, but this did not occur again.[17]

Lok Virsa contributed immensely towards the creation and preservation of Pakistani folklore through a variety of mediums to disseminate its work, including television programs, local and international folk festivals, conferences, museums, the sound archive, published CDs, and the folk parade to name a few. Some of the employees of Lok Virsa have now initiated programs to preserve folk musicians, such as the establishment of an institute by Fouzia Saeed and Yasser Noman who work with *manganhār* communities in Sindh. Lok Virsa also conducted depth studies on Pakistan's folklore some of which were conducted by ethnomusicologists including Dr. Lorraine Sakata.

The struggles of Mr. Mufti in forming a national institution to preserve and promote Pakistan's folklore reflects the attempt to define national culture through regional cultures, which was resisted by the civil bureaucracy who looked at regional traditions with disdain. While Lok Virsa was formed at the same time as the PNCA, it did not witness contestations with the ruling elite in the same way that PNCA did. Mr. Khalid Saeed Butt, who headed PNCA during the time of Z.A. Bhutto and General Zia, mentioned that since Lok Virsa had become independent from the PNCA, it remained in the background and was not targeted by military censorship the way the PNCA and its staff had been (Interview with

[17]To see this parade please click: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4KVOMGGlq_4&feature=channel and go to 4:09-4:99 minutes

Khalid Saeed Butt, June 2009). As a result, Lok Virsa's work flourished despite political upheavals and through UNESCO funding. Unfortunately, although this institute was a vision for Pakistan and the progressive leftist elite, its impact as an institution was restricted to representing 'Pakistani folk' abroad and raising cultural awareness amongst elites in Islamabad and Lahore. However, at these occasions, the position to represent Pakistan as 'cultural diversity' and a living ancient civilization was projected, with the aim to value traditions consecrated as 'folk' as national symbols, and national treasures.

Chapter 5: Representing Pakistan as '5000 Years Old' through Folk Music and Dances

Pakistan did not promote itself to the international community as a cultural unit with Islam and Urdu as its binding force. It rather projected itself as a cultural unit with 5000 years of history to compete with ancient views of India. Who could do this work of representation and what kind of music and dancing was considered appropriate for an elite gathering comprising of diplomats and foreign officials?

In this chapter, I will show how Pakistan created a repertory of choreographed folk dances to present a colorful image of Pakistan's culture to foreign officials for cultural diplomacy especially at times of political crisis such as after 1971 or after, when Pakistan's image in international media exposed the violence of its military establishment. Since such a repertory would be beneficial to the ruling elite, one would think that such a repertory would gain a healthy state patronage by all the political regimes; however I will show that institutionalizing this repertory and its dances has been a contestation to define national culture.

The process of promoting urbanized folk music and dances as a means of cultural diplomacy started in the 1960s during the Cold War, when Pakistan, under General Ayub, was establishing alliances with other countries. This was also a period of high tensions between India and Pakistan, which had culminated in the 1965 war. Many bilateral pacts and Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) were signed to facilitate cultural exchange. This chapter will relate how Pakistan used 'folk music and dances' to represent its image abroad under different

regimes, and describe the levels of contestations between the cultural elite and ruling elite to form permanent institutions that would arrange cultural activities for diplomatic exchanges.

The Mohenjo-daro dance that I had seen in Karachi in May 2009 led me to the office of Mr. Naeem Tahir in Islamabad, then head of the Pakistan National Council of Arts (PNCA). After a difficult process of networking, an interview became possible with Mr. Tahir, and I waited in his office for an hour and a half before Mr. Tahir, who was busy in a meeting with UNESCO delegation, arrived. He left in about ten minutes and after another hour of waiting came in for further questions for twenty more minutes. During these succinct conversations, however, I gathered the perspective of a person who was closely involved with heads of state such as General Ayub in the 1960s and General Musharraf after 9/11, and who was actively involved in promoting Pakistan's national image in diplomatic circles both within Pakistan and abroad. Mr. Tahir stated:

> That was in fact the beginning of a serious realization about the importance of cultural relations between two countries and the support that the assets or cultural expressions give to diplomacy. The creation of cultural relations between two people provides the necessary depth to cultural diplomacy. Because you see an ambassador may change, another person may come in but if there is goodwill in the community say Chinese community or Turkish community with us, then that becomes the goodwill upon which the ambassador can build. So this is the kind of structure that is necessary and has been missing for a long time" (Interview with Naeem Tahir, June 2009).

Mr. Naeem Tahir's reflection on the 1960s is important since he was directly involved in putting together the first cultural troupe that went to China in 1965. Mr. Tahir, who had become known through his work at Lahore Arts Council and his education abroad, was appointed in 1964 as the Resident Director

of Punjab Arts Council by General Ayub Khan, and instructed to put together a cultural troupe to tour China. Naeem Tahir describes General Ayub as a "moderate man, who realized the urgent need to introduce the customs and cultures of Pakistan, abroad" (PNCA publication, 2007).

Interview with Mr. Naeem Tahir at the office of Pakistan National Council of Arts (PNCA) in Islamabad

Formation of National Performing Arts Group

The cultural troupe that was sent to China was situated in the context of Cold War, when India and Russia were seeking alliance and General Ayub tried to position Pakistan in the international community by allying with India's enemy, China. For the preparation of this troupe, there was already a group of "like-minded people" comprising artists, musicians, and dancers, who had initiated the Lahore Arts Council (Al-Hamra) in 1949 to host musical events and train people

for Radio-Lahore. Bul Bul Academy in Dacca and radio stations in other cities was also contacted. In this manner, a troupe of approximately 50 artists, plus musicians from both wings of the country, was gathered.

The people who were part of this troupe were urban classical singers, dancers and composers: for example, Firoze Nizami (served as a composer for All-India Radio, pre-partition Indian film industry and Pakistani film industry); Raffi Anwar, dancer and choreographer; and Roshan Ara Bokhari (1917-1982). Therefore, the group involved in preparation of 'folk dances' stemmed from an urban clique, who choreographed the ethnic dances of Pakistan for the purpose of presenting them on a concert stage.

Alongside the folk dances that were performed by urban males and females, this troupe also included classical and folk musicians, including Misri Khan Jamali, who played *alghozā* (double-reed flute) and was from Sindh, and Saeein Akhtar, a *qawwālī* singer from rural Punjab known for singing the famous Sufi poetry by Bulleh Shah, 'Tere *ishq nachayā kar ke thayyā thayyā*,' for the 1964 Pakistani film, *Waris Shah*. (2007, 112)

The troupe was a great success in China, and according to an article in a Chinese newspaper, "The Pakistan Folklore Troupe…had a specific national flavor" (2007, 117), and it gave an opportunity for Chinese artists to learn from Pakistani artists. The Chinese hosts learnt a Pakistani dance, which was later presented in front of Begum Aurangzeb, the daughter of General Ayub. Some poems were also written down and were recited over Peking Radio during President Ayub's visit later in the year (2007, 117).

However, when this troupe returned from China, there was no infrastructure or any institutions in Pakistan to ensure its survival. Although it was formed with the help of the Lahore Arts Council, the Council did not have funds to sustain this troupe (2007, 5), and it would have disappeared had it not been for Pakistan International Airlines (PIA). Fortunately, after the troupe performed in Geneva in the presence of Air Marshall Asghar Khan (then head of PIA), he saw their potential and on his return, established PIA Arts Academy in 1966. This academy was located in Karachi, which was then the city where all embassies were located. Shamsul Huda Chaudry was appointed the Director of the Ensemble, Samar Das was the Music Director, and Mehr Masrur, who had experience of classical dance, became the director/choreographer of the Academy (2007, 7).

PIA took this arts academy along the routes where it had started flying, and within Pakistan, this academy became very popular in high-profile venues such as foreign embassies. During General Ayub's tenure, there was an influx of diplomats and foreign guests at the foreign embassies, and the academy performed at these high-profile events, as well as travelling to Canada, the US, China, North Korea, Russia, the UK, Japan, France, Spain, Malta, Greece, Iran, and in the Middle East (2007, 5). The troupe was on a heavy schedule and was touring at least seven months of the year. This academy also became a means of secure employment for some of the most renowned musicians and dancers in the country, such as Sheema Kirmani, Naheed Siddiqui, Roshan Ara Bokhari, to name a few (2007, 5). However, after the independence of Bangladesh, the Bengali artists left for Dacca. Due to political unrest in the country, PIA decided

to close down the academy and the National Dance Ensemble was closed down until the Pakistan National Council of Arts (PNCA), the national institution established under the regime of Z.A. Bhutto, became its permanent home.

Folk Dances for Cultural Diplomacy During Z.A. Bhutto's Regime

Although it was during the time of Z.A. Bhutto that the PNCA was formed, it is quite ironic that while PNCA publications from 2007 mention the time of General Ayub, they do not shed much light on this era. Written under the tenure of General Musharraf, they give the impression that the democratic regimes did not accomplish much for the promotion of arts. Bhutto's era is mentioned under the heading "An Era of Problems" with the following description: "Hard days were to follow. The company carried on for a while, but the political climate of the country was changing" (5). This shifts the focus to General Zia's tenure, titled "Entering a Restricted Scenario," whereby women were forbidden to dance in public, and then finally "An Era of New Hope" referring to General Musharraf's revival of the troupe (5).

This history seeks to conceal many details of the era of Z.A. Bhutto and General Zia, some of which are mentioned in the PNCA's extended publication, but most of which I gathered from interviewing Khalid Saeed Butt and Zia Mohyeddin. Cultural diplomacy was in fact a major concern during the tenure of Z.A. Bhutto, when due to the secession of East Pakistan in 1971; Pakistan's image in the international community had worsened. In the words of a British historian, Hugh Trevor-Roper, "In December 1971, Pakistan was divided, defeated, demoralized and in the eyes of the world, disgraced" (quoted in Amin 2000, 75).

Moreover, Dr. Hameeduddin, a Pakistani professor at Harvard University's Middle Eastern Studies Department read a paper at a conference titled, "The Quest for Identity," held in Islamabad in 1973. The paper was titled, 'Pakistan's Image Abroad,' and it asserted that the New York Times had declared Pakistan as "a state that was not to be' assailing the very ideology on which Pakistan was based" (19), and that Americans were of the view that East Pakistan was never a part of Pakistan, but rather a colony which had been ruled by "Punjabi butchers" (21). What he suggested was to train Sufi saints to do cultural diplomacy for Pakistan.

> The common people in the [United] States...are being swayed by the hypnotic influence of the Yogis and Maharishis who flock the land every where and present India as a country of the pacifists who are incapable of any aggressive action...who had always been threatened by the Pakistani bullies who were supplied with US arms...(1974, 24) Could Pakistan catch up with this Yogi influx in America by sending a stream of Sufi saints? It would be unthinkable to train the Sufis on the line of Yogis to take over the bulk of Public Relations work (Hameeduddin 1974, 25).

Perhaps Mr. Hameeduddin's proposal would have been peripheral to Bhutto's policy, however his remarks give a perspective about the crisis of identity that Pakistan faced in 1971. Ironically, however, Dr. Hameeduddin's suggestions show the secular positions of de-contextualizing the yogis and Sufis from their religious environment, having them become trump cards for cultural diplomacy, and expressing a need to compete with India. The need to repair the image of Pakistan was also found in the Faiz Report (1975), which stated that Pakistan's "identity has yet to be securely established on the cultural map of the world, many parts of which still regard Pakistan as a cultural appendage of its bigger and better known neighbor" (Faiz Report in Majeed 2006, 102-3).

After the National Performing Arts Group came under the PNCA, Zia Mohyeddin, who had completed his education in theatre at Royal Academy of Dramatic Arts, was asked by Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto to join the institution and lead the National Performing Arts Troupe. Zia Mohyeddin was known for the role of Dr. Aziz in *A Passage to India*, and was enormously popular on TV for his show called *Zia Mohyeddin Show*. In the 1970s, Zia Mohyeddin extended the repertory of the cultural troupe by adding "folk ballet" or "folk opera," and wrote two to three folk ballets, one of which was based on a famous folk tale Heer Ranjha. The ballet comprised of "four movements" (Tahir 2007, 74) or acts. Nazir Ahmed choreographed this ballet and Laila Shahzada designed the costumes. These were received well both at home and abroad (Tahir 2007, 8).

When I interviewed Mr. Moheyuddin in Karachi in August 2009, he mentioned that when he led the cultural troupes, he always included some regional musicians including Faiz Baloch, Khameesu Khan, Zarsanga and other musicians from different provinces. He mentioned that he wanted to make this performing ensemble into a well-knit performing company like the Royal Ballet Company, for example, "A company that is always ready to perform." Nevertheless, when the troupe performed abroad, it was received extremely well. During this period, the classical dancers Naheed Siddiqui and Perveen Cassim also joined the National Performing Arts Troupe.

In the 1970s, cultural diplomacy through this folk music ensemble played a huge role in building relationships with the Soviet Union, China and North Korea. (Interview Khalid Saeed Butt, June 2009). However, in Z.A. Bhutto's later years,

Pakistan became closely allied to US, which was pressuring states of the alliance to de-scale socialist initiatives. Although Bhutto's regimes claimed to be leftist, Pakistan was still allied to the United States, and his dismissal was probably because of growing American pressure (Interview with Uxi Mufti, June 2009). On the other hand, the PNCA publication notes that in the later years of Bhutto's rule, the academy performed "The White Haired Girl," which is a famous Chinese socialist-revolutionary play that expresses the oppression of a landlord. The report says that this play was:

> Vetted by the serving ministers before being handed over to the academy; it was a dreadful faux pas. The Ensemble, innocent of the political implications of the story, worked enthusiastically to prepare for the show. But the first performance before the President and his party was received with displeasure. From then on, lack of interest from the establishment was evident and deterioration quickly set in (2007, 16).

Since Z.A. Bhutto was from a landed family and positioned himself as a socialist, this play in a way challenged him to expose his position, and it was not taken well by the authorities.

Folk Dances for Cultural Diplomacy during General Zia's Regime

The coup d'état in 1977 brought General Zia-ul-Haq's martial rule, which introduced conservative measures on Pakistani media, especially for music and dancing. General Zia aligned with the religious party Jamat-e-Islami (JI) and the predominant position on national culture at the time was that Pakistan is not only a cultural unit with Urdu as its national language, but also the unifying bond of Islam was distinct from that espoused by leaders of Indian Muslim nationalist movement, especially Jinnah. This position viewed enforcement of Islam through

denial of Indic culture and increasing Arabization to authenticate true Islam in Pakistan. This position also took an antithetical position on dancing by women.

For example, a TV program, *Pāyal*, about *kathak* dance, was banned. Naeed Siddiqui, a renowned dancer of *bhārat nātyam* was being featured when this program was banned, which caused her to flee to the United Kingdom, signing a document stating that she would not dance on Pakistan's behalf abroad (2007, 18). Naheed continued to study *kathak* in Britain and received many honors. Naheed Siddiqui (2006) recounts those times in the following words:

> I remember being banned from dancing during General Zia ul-Haq's regime. I was doing a television serial on *kathak* at the time. The Minister of Culture said that this was the most vulgar program and we must stop it immediately. I remember reading in the newspapers that Nahid Siddiqui is ruining our generation. And as a result of Zia's purge of pure classical dancers, we have the baseless, rootless, vulgar dancers that most feared.

Alongside the censorship of dancing, the martial law regime also sacked prominent people from the cultural elite on fraudulent charges. Mr. Khalid Saeed Butt was suspended for two and a half years, and about forty-two charges were placed against Mr. Khalid Saeed Butt by accusing him of being a member of French Communist Party. "When they want to annoy people, then they can place any strange charge on you" (Interview Khalid Saeed Butt, June 2009). Mr. Uxi Mufti also mentioned that there were charges for corruption placed on him by the martial law regime, which were unwarranted. The charges on Mr. Butt continued for two and a half years, during which "the PNCA was completely dead." Later Zia-ul-Haq, the chief martial law administrator "called me and said we're sorry. We are sending you to your post again" (Interview Khalid Saeed Butt, June 2009).

During the time of General Zia, men continued to dance and represent Pakistan abroad in the performing arts group, but most artists looked for employment elsewhere or abandoned their professions. "The dancers were embarrassed when on tours abroad they were asked, 'Don't you have any girls in your troupe?'" (Tahir 2007, 18) Around 1976, Pakistan had initiated puppet theatre, and Zia-ul-Haq asked Mr. Butt to prepare a puppet show relating the story of Pakistan. Mr. Butt notes,

> Zia and his experts were of the view that the history of Pakistan begins with Mohammed Bin Qasim; they refused to believe that we have a really long tradition that start from Mohenjo-daro, Harappa, Muslim influences, then British, Quaid-e-Azam and so on.... We had a rehearsal performance but only the next day in Nau-e-waqt, an article was published that claimed that music is not *halāl* (legal according to Muslim law) and so on...Zia was an innocent person; his bureaucrats would put stories in his ears (Interview Khalid Saeed Butt, June 2009).

Due to this, Mr. Butt said he was suspended again for two weeks. On the one hand, Mr. Butt's remarks show that the conservatism of Jamat-e-Islami had become predominant in guiding Zia's policy; on the other hand, the above quotation reflects how the narrative of Pakistan as '5000 years of Pakistan' had been absorbed in the cultural institution PNCA by that time. While Mr. Butt sympathizes with General Zia twice during the course of the interview, he rejected him as a "hypocrite" the third time, which reflects his ambivalence regarding conservatism of Zia. His words seem to reflect that it may not be General Zia, but rather his alliance with the religious party Jamat-e-Islami, which established the conservative trends in Pakistan, since General Zia promoted music; it was only the women dancing in public, which was banned. While PNCA publications relate that during Zia's regime, no women danced in the troupe, Mr.

Butt relates two events with regards to Zia's patronage of music and dancing, which point towards gray areas in Zia's era (Interview Khalid Saeed Butt, June 2009). Mr. Butt said General Zia asked him to prepare a cultural troupe that would go to London. Khalid Saeed requested for a music troupe to which Zia said:

> '*Merī bachīyān nāchen gī nahīn.*' [Our women will not dance]. Don't talk about dance,' he said.
> I said, 'You watch dance in Punjabi films too, ' to which Zia said, 'We condemn that too.'
> I said, 'Dance is an art form. It is a means of expression. When I visited China, I could not understand their language but I was so inspired by their dance that I was crying after that.'
> He said '*Dekhāo pehle banā ke* [First present it to me].
>
> So we trained a group for a theme dance, in which a Pakistani wedding was presented according to the tradition. It was a two-hour long dance program. Zia's entire cabinet came to watch it for approval. This was in mid-80s. We designed loose clothes for the female dancers. And this was the first problem that Zia picked on. He said, 'Mr. Butt are not the costumes a little too loose?' I said, 'If you could accept this, it would be an honor.' Then Ghulam Ishaq Khan [then Chairman of Senate in Pakistan] remarked, 'When the bridegroom's family came to bride's house [*barāt*] and people were going to welcome them, the bride's friends were dancing. Were not those dance steps that of *kathak*? I said yes. He asked, 'Where are the *ghūngrū* [anklet/metallic bells]? I said 'If we would have let them wear *ghūngrū* then you would have refused it completely. He laughed and became silent. (Interview with Khalid Saeed Butt, June 2009)

According to Mr. Khalid Saeed Butt, this was the first time that dance was accepted during General Zia's regime. Having banned programs of *kathak* and exiled the *kathak* dancer Naheed Siddiqui, what we see here is a classic example of how the political authority enforced its view on national culture and conservative views about permissibility of music and dancing in Islam. The Faiz Report had referred to these antithetical attitudes that regarded music and dancing to be vulgarized attitudes. This *kathak*-styled theme dance with loose clothes and

no *ghūngrū* was indeed a dance of mockery, a kind of resistance to authority, which ridicules the sensibilities of even those who put the restrictions in the first place! Mr. Khalid Saeed Butt told me that when this dance was performed at the Lahore Arts Council, the religious party Jamat-e-Islami, with which General Zia had allied, took out a long protest and burnt the effigies of Khalid Saeed Butt calling him "*fahāshi"* (vulgar). Sadequain, a renowned painter who painted nudes and wine bottles in his work, was also displayed at the Lahore Arts Council under Mr. Butt, and was rejected by Jamat-e-Islami (Interview Khalid Saeed Butt, June 2009).

Although General Zia's time is largely associated with the censorship of cultural activities in the country, it was mostly dance and women's dancing onstage that was the subjects of censorship. Mr. Butt said that during Zia's regime, folk and local musicians were promoted. At a National Rockefeller banquet, Mr. Butt was asked to arrange a program of music in which Iqbal Bano (a renowned *ghazal* singer from Lahore) and some folk musicians (he did not name them) were also invited, which the President liked, and asked for another program. When Mr. Butt insisted on calling Farida Khanum (another renowned ghazal singer), General Zia strongly disapproved and said that she was not a good singer. Mr. Butt argued that she was the best singer in the country and got into an argument with General Zia, and was therefore escorted out by his guards. Mr. Butt notes that he found out later that General Zia wanted to invited Naheed Akhtar instead:

> He was an extreme hypocrite. He liked music a lot. He was a co-commander in Multan and was a fan of Naheed Akhtar, who is also from Multan. Farida

> Khanum's style of singing is such that when she is singing her head scarf (*palloo* of *dopattā*) falls down her shoulders and she wears low-neck suits, and he disapproved of that. If you think of such matters, then you notice these things. If you are hearing her voice, then these things will not enter your head (Interview Khalid Saeed Butt, June 2009).

While the views of Mr. Butt and other cultural actors I interviewed place Zia's character and policy in ambivalence, it was conceded by even Mr. Butt that aside from these sporadic events to promote musicians, the process of building infrastructure that leads towards formation of infrastructure for promotion of arts and music as Faiz Ahmed Faiz envisaged, truncated. The short and unstable democratic regimes of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in the 1990s were not able to rejuvenate the patronage of arts and music after the cultural policy of General Zia (Interview Khalid Saeed Butt, June 2009).

After 9/11 and Pakistan's alliance with United States in the so-called War against Terror, General Musharraf had an urgent need to present a soft image of Pakistan to the world. Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz formed an inter-ministerial committee for the promotion of culture, sports, tourism and trade, with special focus on projecting Pakistan's soft image abroad. General Musharraf convened a meeting, which consisted of many prominent people including Uxi Mufti, Naeem Tahir, Zia Mohyeddin and others. While Uxi Mufti received funds for construction of a state of the art Heritage Museum, Naeem Tahir was allotted the revival of the Pakistan National Council of Arts (PNCA) and the cultural troupe. Zia Mohyeddin became the head of the National Academy of Performing Arts (NAPA) in Karachi, which initiated a music diploma alongside a degree in theatre. General Musharraf also provided funds for the establishment of the

Archaeology Museum in Islamabad. A new series of Memoranda of Understandings (MoUs) were signed with Western European countries and the United States, and an active process of cultural exchange was revived. The idea of 'Pakistan as 5000 year old' became a useful tool for the state to showcase a 'soft image' of Pakistan after 9/11. When I asked Mr. Naeem Tahir, head of Pakistan National Council of Arts (PNCA), which had organized the folk festival in Karachi, how Pakistan wanted to project its image to the world after 9/11, he replied:

> You see Pakistan has inherited as part of heritage 10,000 years of civilization. What people were like...that book [my italicization] narrates history of the people and what they achieved, and what is its significance? We were human's first civilization! We would like the world to understand that we have a very rich background of civilization and we are very civil people. And I would like to project this side of our nature and our society: the courteous, polite, hospitable, peaceful image of us. Humility and peacefulness have been very significant characteristics of our people for thousands of years, and that side is completely missed out right now. And there is aggressive killing, self-destruction, suicide bombers…this kind of image is coming up…We have never been promoting the real cultural side, the softer side of this nation. We have not placed enough emphasis on the cultural side…(Interview with Mr. Naeem Tahir, PNCA-Office Islamabad, May 2009).

Mr. Tahir is pointing towards the work of Wheeler (1947), and it is this reference that became my lead towards discovering the book by Sir Mortimer Wheeler in the first place. However, one interesting thing to note is that although this image of Pakistan resists the established point of view of Pakistan as 'Islamic culture,' namely through Mohenjo-daro dance, most of the people involved in the PNCA emerged from the Lahore Arts Council (Al-Hamra) elite who advocated for Pakistan as an 'Islamic culture' in the founding years of Pakistan. Therefore, this shows a shift in the position of the Lahori elite, and reflects that the PNCA's

rhetoric of 'Pakistan as 5000 year old' is not a leftist rhetoric but part of the established point of view about national culture.

Mr. Naeem Tahir, who had led the first cultural troupe of Pakistan abroad in 1964, became the chairman of Pakistan National Council of Arts (PNCA) after 9/11. The National performing Arts Group that had originated from the cultural troupe in 1964 and and later patronized by the PNCA in 1972 was now revitalized by the post 9/11 PNCA under Mr. Naeem Tahir. Today this group boasts more than a hundred dances in its repertoire, and arts groups have been formed in Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad to extend participation and incorporation of new and younger talent. This appears to be the beginning of the democratization of music and dance in Pakistan (2007, 111).

The Repertory of the National Performing Arts Group

The repertory of the national performing arts group includes the Pushtun community's *Khathak* dance, the *Kalash* community's dance, the Sindhi community's fishermen dance, *bhangrā* and *jhoomar* from Punjab, to name a few. The troupe also invented "theme dances" by choreographing movements related to a profession; for example, the movements of harvesting crops are used in theme dances such as the "*Bhangrā* and Tea Picker's Dance" or "Dawn to Dusk" in a Punjabi village (2007, 114). When I asked Naeem Tahir what are "theme dances," he replied,

> By theme dance I mean you pick up a theme for example morning to evening in a Punjab village. How the ritual works in a cotton-growing area? Like what are the fishermen's routines? What do people in the desert do? But they are also localized folk dances but we choreograph them and give nicer, authentic costumes and give it music and make it more presentable (May 2009).

While the PNCA presented Pakistan as 5000 years old, this narrative does not come forth in their publications, which gives romantic and picturesque ideas about 'folk.'

> In Pakistan folk dancing has always been an integral part of rural life; a way of celebrating fine harvest, gathering courage for battle and welcoming the seasons. The folk dances of the various regions vary according to the climate of the area. The wild tribal *Khattak* dance, as powerful as the rugged mountainous land that bred it, is a battle dance. The warriors from a circle gyrate to the rhythm of the drummers who stand in the centre of the ring, increasing the tempo of the music till the dance reaches its frenzied climax. The Kafirs from the mystic Kalash Valley have a style of dancing completely unique. Their movements portray closeness to nature and the elements are a heritage from their forefathers…Different though the dances may be, they all share a basic simplicity, depending on the music for the mood and the mounting excitement. Even today this link with the past is faithfully maintained in the countryside of Pakistan (2007, 37).

It is interesting to note how the PNCA's publications claim authenticity in representing Pakistani folk; it is the classical singers and dancers who choreograph these folk dances. Therefore, the rural dance movements are given a cosmopolitan look to make them presentable and prestigious for the Pakistani elites to use them to represent Pakistan. The dance trainers in this academy are mainly trained in classical dancing. The main choreographers of these dances were renowned classical dancers of *kathak*, such as Amy Minwala, Raffi Anwer and presently Sheema Kirmani and Roshan Ara Bokhari, who are the top cultural elites in Pakistan, who interacted with world dignitaries. Since their training is in classical dancing of *kathak* and *bhārat nātyam*, the ideas of 'folk' that they present are not only to showcase Pakistan's soft image, but also to align the cultures of the country with the elite's tastes.

The *Mohenjo-daro* dance is a unique dance form invented by classical dancers in this group, which contests the established notions of music and dancing in society. It was because of the censorship of dance under the time of Zia-ul-Haq and a continuous policy of the establishment to eliminate non-Muslim influences from Pakistani culture, which challenges the legitimacy of an art form such as *kathak* and *bhārat nātyam,* that one can view the emergence of Mohenjo-daro dance as a way of folklorizing classical dances in order to make them 'Pakistani.'

Mohenjo-daro Dance

Mohenjo-daro Dance is emblematic of the position on national culture that considered Pakistan as a cultural unit, whose history went back 5000 years. Thus after the conservative turn in the ruling elite brought about by General Zia, the cultural elites in PNCA use history and archaeology to resist the stance of the establishment that defines Islam a unifying factor for Pakistan culture, such that art forms associated with Indic culture are eliminated and Arabic influences are encouraged. This dance was choreographed and added to the repertory of National Performing Arts Ensemble (discussed in detail in the next chapter) as early as the 1970s during the regime of Z.A. Bhutto. After 9/11, this dance was revived by the Pakistan National Council of Arts (PNCA) to present a 'soft image' of Pakistan abroad. Mohenjo-daro dance was also a means for classical dancers in Pakistan to make a claim for the sub-continental heritage, which the regime of Zia-ul Haq deprived them of by censoring women from classical and folk dancing on media



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Mohendjodaro Dance and The Clay-Figurine taken from *Rainbow of Music and Dance: National Performing Arts Group,* a publication by Pakistan National Council of Arts (2007, 62)

and public spaces (Kirmani 2009). Today a renowned *kathak* dancer, Sheema Kirmani, conducts performances of this dance with her students, and these are garbed under the title of 'ballet,' to avoid its association with Indian dances. The creator of this dance form is contested since many people, including Mr. Tahir, Ms. Sheema Kirmani and others, take credit for choreographing it.

When I interviewed Mr. Naeem Tahir in Islamabad, he referred to the fact that there were two clay figurines discovered at the site of Mohenjo-daro before partition; one was given to Pakistan at the time of partition and division of assets, and another was retained by India. Mr. Tahir, who claimed to be the creator of this dance, remarked that the *Mohenjo-daro* dance came about through careful study of this clay figurine and its "poses," which he took as an "indication that reflects certain traditional dances and certain selected dance movements that I put in Mohenjo-daro dance." (Interview with Naeem Tahir, June 2009) This is one of the ways that the authenticity of the 'Mohenjo-daro dance' was established – that is, by establishing its links with the discovered archaeological object of a clay figurine. The dance movements are interestingly do not emerge from traditional folk dances of Pakistan, but rather the classical dances such as *kathak* and *bhārat nātyam*.

On the other hand, the PNCA publication also refers to a sacred ritual of a Priest-King that this dance narrates, raising the question of whether the *Mohenjo-daro* dance that foreign audiences see is distinct from the one I saw in Karachi, or whether it has different versions that are being performed by different cultural actors in Pakistan. The publication asserts that two excavated seals were also discovered from the site of Mohenjo-daro, which "depicted seven votaries who appear to be performing a ritual before a sacred tree." (2007, 92) In the dance created for the Arts Academy, the figure of the Priest-King has been combined with the votaries. The story contained in the Mohenjo-daro dance is related as follows:

> The Priest-King is shown in a state of deep meditation. Fleeing from the raging elements, his votaries gather before him and beg for guidance. Touched by their fears, the Priest King emerges from his trance-like state and performs a ritual. Reassured by his benediction, the votaries perform a dance before their Ruler and leave him to resume meditation. This extravaganza of dance and music retraces the origins of classical dancing to the time of Mohenjo-daro, where 'The Dancing Girl,' 'The Mother Goddess,' 'The Priest-King" all become real characters depicting the life of the people of the Indus Valley Civilization (2007, 92).

Within the context of the Muslim public spaces of Pakistan, where God is male and where conservative groups condemn women dancing on the stage as the work of *tawāifs* (courtesans), the characters "The dancing girl" and 'Mother-Goddess" subvert the dominant patriarchy as well as the Islamic idea of one male God, Allah. By referring to pre-Islamic heritage, the cultural elites firstly put forward their position to define national culture, whereby Pakistan is not only an 'Islamic culture.' Secondly, through this dance they subvert the rightist views on dancing as 'un-Islamic,' and thirdly, challenge the patriarchal concepts of male strength in society. With the help of archaeology, they aspire to legitimize their arts in a state where the future of their art forms is always in danger.

In the dance I saw at the arts council in Karachi in May 2009, this story of the mother-goddess or the dancing girl was neither mentioned by the host, nor came forward in the dance. The dance was performed solo, and the story of votaries and these various figures were completely absent. Since this was the time when the Pakistani military was fighting the war against terror against the Taliban and since conservative elements in the society have always been very strong, it is possible that they were avoiding direct backlash. According to the host a dance show like this was happening in Karachi after a fifteen-year period.

Therefore, it is possible that in this version of the dance, the subversive aspects were censored.[18]

In fact new myths were projected; for example, when the host said that this dance is a mixture of *kathak*, *dās nātyam* and *odīssī*, what was being referred to in '*dās nātyam*' was the dance of '*bhārat nātyam* ' (dance for Mother-India), but the word '*bhārat'* (India) was changed to *Dās*, which means 'servant.' Not only does 'das' fit with the new name, making it a 'dance of a servant,' but it also revives the image of courtly patronage of dance by the *dasi* in the temples and Mughal courts. Therefore, by giving the dance the name of 'Mohenjo-daro,' the creators had transformed the meaning of a courtesan's dance that is maligned by the religious right, and reclaimed their tradition by transforming it into an ancient dance form alluding to Pakistan's territory. Whereas classical dancing and music had been condemned as 'Hindu' in the initial years, folk music was considered quintessentially Pakistani. 'Mohenjo-daro dance' is an interesting invention of tradition, since it not only constructs and performs an imagined history of Pakistan, but also folklorizes a classical tradition in order to legitimize the practice of dancing in a Muslim context. Thirdly, it is a way for Pakistani cultural elite to reclaim the position as the culture bearers of this tradition that is not only Indian and Hindu, but is shared between Indians and Muslims on both sides.

While in the 1970s the creation of this dance paralleled the construction of a new imagination of Pakistan that sought to integration regional cultures, its performance today appears to be an attempt by the cultural elite to reenact the

[18] It would be one of the tasks for future to inquire from Mr. Naeem Tahir about why the entire version of this dance with Priest King and Mother-Goddess was not performed in Karachi at the time.

heritage that they have been deprived of due to both the ban on dancing and continuous conservative pressures in the society on music and dance. It was through the performance of the Mohenjo-daro dance that Pakistan initiated a new trend in cultural diplomacy that competed with India's ancient roots and presented Pakistan as 5000 years old.

The position that Pakistan was 5000 years old became part of the PNCA's policy, such that Mr. Khalid Saeed Butt informed me that when General Zia asked him to prepare a dance relating Pakistan's history as dating back to 712 A.D, he informed them that Pakistan's history actually dates back to the Indus-Valley, which is 5000 years old. This amazed Zia's cabinet at first but was accepted and presented through folk dances during General Zia's regime (Interview Khalid Saeed Butt, Lahore 2009).

Even though the Pakistan National Council of Arts represented Pakistan as 5000 years old, which became the established position about national culture under the regime of General Ayub and continued through Z.A. Bhutto and even General Zia, it received state support mostly in times of political crisis and urgent need for cultural diplomacy. This shows that even the pro-establishment cultural elite in Pakistan struggled for their cultural forms within the changing political field. However, the PNCA cannot be completely localized as pro-establishment, since it resists the ways in which the state media eliminated non-Muslim influences from music. By presenting cosmopolitan and sophisticated versions of folk dances, the PNCA attempts to bring the rural traditions to urban elite audiences in folk festivals of the kind that I attended in Karachi in 2009.

Conclusion

I flip over the ticket of *Sindh Sargam* that I had saved from attending the three-day festival. I have finished writing the final draft of the thesis, and I am glancing once more at the program note of *Sindh Sargam* that initiated my inquiry, when I notice an exclusion that I had not noticed before. Why does a three-day music festival that refers to the province 'Sindh' in its name, and visually showcases the clay-figurine and ancient site of Mohenjo-daro consist of only one day dedicated to folk music? The other two days are dedicated to urban musical forms: *ghazal* and classical music. Even the one-day event of folk music and dances I attended mainly consisted of urbanized folk dances by the National Performing Arts Group with only two performances by regional singers, Taj Mastani and Arif Lohar. Why aren't regional musicians of Sindh promoted in a musical event that was taking place after a decade?

Folk music, I have argued, is a site of contestation to define national culture and language in Pakistan. Since this festival was arranged by PNCA, a pro-establishment cultural institution that posits Pakistan as a cultural unit, the cultural elites prefer Urdu musical genres to assert their position in the cultural field. However, this elite differs from the media's position to define Pakistan as an Islamic culture, and instead claims 5000 years of Pakistan in order to save the art dance forms by folklorizing them as Mohenjo-daro dance. This position does not reflect the aspirations of political elites in the provinces, who prefer their own mother tongues and prefer folk music not only to distinguish themselves through their taste but also to assert their position with regard to the definition of national

culture. This provincial elite, as I have argued, has been marginalized by the state apparatus because of their leftist views and their resistance towards the imposition of Urdu language.

While the second position on Pakistan as 'cultural diversity' has been marginalized, it continues to be inculcated within the *class-habitus* of specific elite groups who have Marxist leanings. The *class-habitus* also determines how folklore is defined; while the elites at PNCA are content with promoting choreographed versions of folk dances to show-case Pakistan as 5000 years old, Lok Virsa and the Institute of Sindhology are interested in preserving folk music in archives, as well as promoting living traditions to promote a multi-lingual and multicultural definition of Pakistani culture. In contrast, the national media defined folk music as 'quintessentially Muslim" and in doing so it marginalized the expressions of non-Muslim religious communities in Pakistan, who were not included in 'regional-folk.' This policy also led to the secularization of Muslim devotional sung at shrines and creating ambivalence of meaning, which was in turn exploited by political regimes to forward their ideological position on national culture.

The absence of cultural policy on music and arts has debilitated the patronage of cultural activities and left it to the vagaries of political regimes. Since Pakistan did not successfully invent a 'national music,' it did not initiate a process of democratization of music-education in modern schools, as has been the case in India through the work of Indian music nationalists (Bakhle 2005). Such

efforts could not be envisaged in a state that is in perpetual political and social turmoil.



Sindh Sargam

Music & Dance Festival

DAY-1
Tuesday, 26th May, 2009
An Evening of Ghazal & Classical Music

Programme

Ishtiaq Basheer (Ghazal)
Mazhar Umrao Bundoo Khan (Classical)
Salamat Ali & Azra Salamat (Ghazal)
Zafar Ali (Ghazal)
Nafees Ahmed (Sitar-Solo)
Ghulam Abbas (Ghazal)
Ustad Bashir Khan (Tabla-Solo)
Hamid Ali Khan (Ghazal)

DAY-2
Wednesday, 27th May, 2009
An Evening of Folk Music & Dance
Performed by
National Performing Arts Group, Karachi

Programme

Moenjodaro (Solo Dance)
Khatak (Group Dance)
Sindhi Jhoomer (Group Dance)
Balochi Folk Songs (Aziz Baloch)
Lewa (Group Dance)
Tarana (Solo Dance by Huma Naz)
Cholistan (Group Dance)
Pushto Folk Song (A. R. Anwer)
Snake Charmer (Duet Dance)
Fisher Men (Group Dance)
Arif Lohar (Punjabi Folk Songs)
Kalash (Group Dance)
Sindhi Folk Songs (Taj Mastani)
Mela Bhangra (Group Dance)

DAY-3
Thursday, 28th May 2009
An Evening of Classical Music & Ghazal

Programme

Zulfiqar Ali & Mazhar Hussain (Classical Vocal)
Salman Alvi (Ghazal)
Ustad Buland Iqbal Khan (Sarangi-Solo)
Mehnaz (Ghazal)
Abdullah Khan (Shahnai-Solo)
Ustad Gulzar Ali Khan of Gawaaliyar (Classical Vocal)
Ustad Salamat Hussain (Flute-Solo)
Fateh Ali Khan of Gawaaliyar (Classical Vocal)

Program note of Sindh Sargam

While Indian Muslim nationalists did not have surrogates of Bhatkhande or Paluskar who would place classical music as a marker of national identity, Pakistan's progressive elite in both Lahore and the provinces advocated folk music nationalism. This culminated in the Faiz Report that urged the government to design a cultural policy on arts and culture in 1972. However this report was dismissed because its position towards national culture defied the established idea of Pakistan as a cultural unity.

Further work in this direction could compare how nation is imagined in post-partition Urdu poetry in Pakistan with that of poetry and music of other languages in Pakistan. Another direction is studying evolution of the Radio-

orchestra in post-partition Pakistan and experiences of regional musicians with regulations of the Radio-orchestra. This work could also extend towards analysis of the program Coke Studio that produces fusion of folk and pop, and towards the cassette industry where many independent folk musicians in the line of Jalal Chandio and Ataullah Khan Esa Khelvi have become prominent.

This work has shown how different groups of cultural elites in Pakistan established cultural institutions for the promotion of folklore and used folk music and dance to represent Pakistan locally as a performance of the nation as well as internationally as cultural diplomacy. They did so according to their positions with regard to defining national culture and language in Pakistan, both in the political and cultural fields. The challenges the cultural elite encountered with the ruling heads not only shifted the meaning of folk songs, but also disrupted their efforts to build infrastructure for the promotion of arts and music, and to establish a 'national music' for Pakistan that could be transmitted through modern schooling or national musical academies.

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[19] This document was obtained from Widener Library, Harvard. The library had a photocopy of the article and did not have the correct date and citation. It is not a widely disseminated article. The date 1967 is derived from Wheeler's comments that reflect on partition in 1947 as "twenty-years earlier."

Appendices

List of Cultural Institutions and Date of Formation

National Media:
Radio-Pakistan (1947)
Formation of Radio in main Cities of each Province: Radio-Lahore (1947) and Radio-Peshawar in (1947); Radio-Karachi (1948) Radio-Rawalpindi (1948)
Formation of Radio in Cities in Sindh: Radio-Hyderabad (1951); Radio-Khairpur (1974) and Radio-Bhawalpur (1975)
Lahore Arts Council (1949)
Pakistan Television Networks (1964)

Cultural Institutions
Sindh:
Sindh Adabi Board (1951)
BhitShah Cultural Center (1955)
Institute of Sindhology (1964)
Ministry of Culture, Sindh started as Culture Cell established in Education Department in Sindh in 1976. It was given status of an Administrative Department in 1988.

Punjab:
Lahore Arts Council (1949)

National Institutions
Performing Art Academy formed (1964)
PIA Academy (1966)
Pakistan National Council of Arts (PNCA) (tentatively 1972: ironically PNCA does not mention a date for establishment neither in publications nor on website)
Lok Virsa (1974), separated from PNCA in 1976
Faiz Report (commissioned in 1964, and officially published in 1975)

Festivals and Events
Smithsonian Festival (1976)
Sindh Through the Centuries Seminar (1975)
Lok Tamasha Program: (Started between 1970 and 1971 and continued till 1978)
Lok Mela (Folk festival) (1974 continues till present).

List of Interviews

Abida Parveen (Sufi/folk singer): August 2009 at Hindu Gymkhana in Karachi
Anonymous PTV producer in Islamabad**:** May 2009 at PTV headquarters in Islamabad
Baidil Masroor: June 2009 in Karachi at his home
Faqīr Jumman Shah**:** (folk musician singing Shah-jo-rāg) at the shrine of Shah Abdul Latif Bhitati in May 2009 in BhitShah
Fauzia Saeed at her home on 16 June 2009 in Islamabad.
Ghulam Ali Allana: 30th May 2009 in Hyderabad at his home
Hameed Akhund (former Secretary-Cultural Sindh): August 2009 at Mohatta Palace in Karachi
Ibrahim Joyo: 29th May 2009 at his home in Hyderabad
Khaled Javed (current head of Lok Virsa) at Lok Virsa 16th June 2009
Khalid Saeed Butt: June 2009 at his home in Lahore
Mohammed Qasim Makka (former head of Institute of Sindhology): 31st May 2009 at Institute of Sindhology in Jamshoro
Nabi Bux Baloch: 30th May 2009 at his home in Hyderabad
Naeem Tahir: 16th June 2009 at PNCA in Islamabad
Omar Sheikh (Head of EMI corporation that released folk instrumentals cd for PIA airlines in 1960s): 9th July 2009 at EMI office in Karachi
Shams Jafrani*,* Secretary-Culture at Ministry of Culture, Sindh. May 27th 2009 at Sindh-Secretariat
Shaikh Aziz*:* 31st May 2009 at his home in Hyderabad
Sattar Syed: 21st June 2009 at Radio-Pakistan headquarters in Islamabad
PTV (2 producers): May 2009 at PTV's station in Karachi
Uxi Mufti: 18th June 2009 at his home in Islamabad
Zia Mohyeddin**:** August 2009 at NAPA in Karachi

Various Renditions of *Lāl Merī Pat*:

Musicians: Reshma and chorus; the names of other musicians is not mentioned on the rpm disc notes
Date: 1970s
Source: 78 rpm record from the collection of Professor Regula Qureshi
Musical Instruments: ghara or matka (pot struck with the ring), bansuri (Indian flute), violin, jaltarang, clarinet, tablā
Function: originally sung for the saint Lal Shahbaz Qalandar at the shrine, but was used for folk music entertainment for Pakistani media.

Musicians: Noor Jehan (vocal) and the group of accompanying musicians
Date: 1960s
Source: Youtube; from the film Dilan dey Souda
URL:http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=LPnnYpA7DeI ; http://www.youtube.com/watch?gl=US&feature=related&hl=uk&v=2kXYsJxqJjs
Musical Instruments: *ghūngrū, dholak,* clarinet*, flute, tablā, harmonium, nawbat*
Function: Social entertainment

Musicians: Sabri Brothers
Date: 1960s-70s
Source: Two versiosn of the song from a) Youtube and b) 78 rpm record from Professor Regula Qureshi's collection
URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wCAt7XrAV1A
Musical Instruments: Harmonium, *tablā*, rhythmic clapping, *dholak*

Musicians: Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan (vocal) and group of qawwal bachche
Date: Unknown
Source: Youtube; a concert in UK and in a traditional setting in Punjab
URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ybMK36Vyagc&feature=related ; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ps56rR4pqG8
Musical instruments: Synthesizer, tablā, harmonium, tanpura
Function: Social entertainment
Musicians: Abida Parveen
Date: Unknown
Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MpsbuZpAEX8
URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MpsbuZpAEX8
Musical Instruments: nawbat, harmonium clarinet, dholak, Sindhi benjo, tablā, *ghūngrū*

Musicians: Junoon (Ali Azmat, Salman Ahmed, Brian O'Connell and musicians playing tablā and *dholak*
Date: Unknown
URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ybMK36Vyagc&feature=related
Source: Youtube
Musical Instruments: electric bass, electric guitar, tablā, dholak
Function: Social entertainment