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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

EDUCATION AND FRAGMENTATION IN ROUSSEAU, HEGEL AND DEWEY

by

HERMES H. BENITEZ

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN

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

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Only in social union is the individual complete,
for it is here that we cease to be mere fragments

John Rawls

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled:

EDUCATION AND FRAGMENTATION IN ROUSSEAU, HEGEL AND DEWEY

submitted by Hermes H. Benitez

in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in Philosophy of Education.

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September 05, 1989

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to all those whom, with their love, support, wisdom and understanding, have directly of indirectly contributed to make it possible:

My parents, Hector and Margot Benitez;

Humberto Giannini, Professor of the Old Department of Philosophy, Universidad de Chile at Santiago;

My friends Ted and Deanna Wall;

The Izaak Walton Killam Memorial Scholarship Foundation;

And above all my wife Alexandra.

ABSTRACT

This thesis presents a unified reading of the social, political and educational thought of Rousseau, Hegel and Dewey by means of the concept of fragmentation. By the term "fragmentation" is understood the process of progressive disintegration of the ties that once united man and his community, as well as the complementary dissolution of man's psychological unity. This thesis interprets the social, political and educational thought of Rousseau, Hegel and Dewey as three kindred philosophical responses to the effects of fragmentation in three different stages of development of modern society.

What these responses have in common is that all of them are based on a fundamentally similar communitarian view of man and society. All of them also tried to harmonize this view with their liberal acceptance of the social and economic principles of capitalism. It is the crux of this thesis that the tensions which affect the social, political and educational philosophies of Rousseau, Hegel and Dewey are the result of their failure to work out consistent communitarian solutions to the problems of modern capitalist-liberal society.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my most sincere appreciation to the members of my thesis committee for their sympathetic understanding, critical penetration, patience and scholarship. To Drs. Wesley Cooper and Bruce Hunter of the Department of Philosophy; to Dr. Raymond Morrow of the Department of Political Sciences; to Drs. Harry Garfinkle, Ivan DeFaveri and Eammon Callan of The Department of Educational Foundations; as well as to Dr. Walter Finberg of the College of Education, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaing, whose contribution as External Examiner underscored the correctnes of striving for the best.

It is fair to recognize that the more detailed critical and editorial work was done by Dr. Callan whose skilful and diligent supervision made him the ideal man for the job.

Publicly thanks here to the Izaak Walton killam Memorial Scholarship Foundation for its prestigious award.

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I. Introduction.

The central concern of this thesis is the social and individual malaise that at least since Schiller's ON THE AESTHETIC EDUCATION OF MAN has been identified with the name of "fragmentation". By fragmentation I understand the process and effects of the progressive disintegration of the ties that once united man and his community, as well as the complementary dissolution of man's internal psychological unity. Although this process of twofold disintegration seem to have been detectable throughout western civilization, in modern society its effects became more pronounced and more pervasive.

In this thesis I view fragmentation as one among many component aspects of a series of very complex social phenomena typical of modern society, which philosophers and sociologist have tried to capture by means of concepts as various as alienation and reification, anomia, transit from Gemeinschaft to Gesselschaft, disenchantment and rationalization of the world, massification of society, etc. Among these concepts perhaps none is philosophicaly more important and more commonly used than the concept of alienation. Currently this concept it is very often employed as an umbrella term to describe a variety of social and

psychological processes which now appear sufficiently specific and differentiated that can be identified and distinguished in a more precise fashion. For example, Alasdair McIntyre has shown that the term alienation covers a variety of distinctive processes:

> Alienation has at least four defining features. First of all men are divided within themselves and from each other, by not being able in their work to pursue ends that are their own, by having external ends imposed upon them. Secondly, means and ends are inverted. Where men should eat and drink in order to act, they have to work in order to eat and drink. Thirdly, men reify their social relations into alien powers which dominate them. In virtue of this reification they become involved in conceptual puzzles and confusions. And finally, men find life irremediably split up into rivals and competing spheres, each with its own set of norms, and each sphere claiming its own narow and therefore deforming sovereignty.(1)

In short, the idea of alienation captures at least four different processes which can be named as personal fragmentation, inversion of ends and means, reification of social relations and social fragmentation. In this thesis I will explore, within the complexity of the phenomenon of alienation, only those aspects indicated as first and fourth in McIntyre's definition, i.e., the internal division of man and the split up of his life into competing spheres, or which is equivalent, the twofold process of individual and social disintegration.

This thesis was initially conceived as a unified reading of the thought of three great liberal thinkers, who were also philosophers of education, in terms of the

idea of fragmentation. However, in the course of its writing the thesis evolved into a more complex critical argument aimed at explaining the tensions between atomistic and communitarian values in the social, political and educational philosophies of Rousseau, Hegel and Dewey. Certainly this is not a departure from that original conception of the thesis but it represent, rather, a further development of it.

The work of these three philosophers attests to a double tradition within liberal thought. These two traditions comprise opposing views on the nature of man and society. On the one hand there is the conception which, following Andrew Levine, I call "atomic-individualist", on the other it is the opposed one which I call "communitarian". For the atomic-individualist man is essentially selfish and makes but is not made by society, undergoing no essential change as a result of his association with other men. Furthermore, for this view society has been historically constituted by pre-existent and monadic individuals who came into association impelled by pure self-seeking egoism. In contrast, for the communitarian conception man is essentially a societal or communal being, who is constituted by his social relations. According to this view there are no pre-social individuals but they became such only thanks to society and civilization.

Thus, what Rousseau, Hegel and Dewey have in common (beyond the obvious fact they all are great liberal philosophers) is that all of them share basically similar communitarian views of man and society. And it is precisely the postulation of these views what distinguish Rousseau, Hegel and Dewey from other no-communitarian or atomic-individualist liberals, such as Hobbes, Locke or Bentham.

The postulation of a communitarian view of man and society dictates also some specific normative demands to a social and political philosophy. Namely, the communitarian view implies not only a certain anthropology and the rejection of the individualist account of the origin of society, but also determines that an ideal or improved society is going to be conceived in communitarian terms. In other words, the type of society that communitarians envisage as desirable is one in which the relationships among its members are of a cooperative and fraternal character, and where individuals find their personal fulfilment in solidarity, rather than in mutual competition. A communitarian society would be then one characterized by a high degree of harmony and cohesion. All this is equivalent to saying that for the communitarian view society cannot be the product of a purely contractual arrangement but a moral association of individual

collectively pursuing the common good.

The communitarian conception contains three coordinated aspects : a theory of the self, a theory of society, and a theory of the good. It is the main contention of this thesis that the tensions which affect the social political and educational theories of Rousseau, Hegel and Dewey can be explained as the result of a failure to work out a consistent communitarian approach to the problems they addressed. Each failed to transcend the influence of atomic-individualist liberalism because each abandoned communitarianism when considering the economic roots of social, political and educational problems.

Thus for example, in spite of the fact that Rousseau explicitly rejects the atomic-individualist account of the origin of the individual and society, he subscribes some of its pressupositions with regard to the essentially egoistic nature of man. Tensions arose within his thought when the communitarian aspects of his social philosophy collided with the atomic-individualist belief in the natural character of private property. A similar tension can be detected in Hegel's theory of the State and Dewey's social philosophy. In the pages which follow I have attempted to show some of the crucial points where those tensions become more pronounced.

It seems to me that a plausible explanation of

these tensions can be found in a certain characteristic insensitivity of our liberal philosophers towards the economic realities of modern society. In spite of the fact that all of them were deeply aware of the worse expressions of it. In particular none of them seriously addressed the possibility that the communitarian conception of the good could never be adequately realised under capitalist social relations, which have traditionally been associated with atomic-individualist liberalism. None seriously asked: How can solidary relationships flourish within economic structures which deny the centrality of such relationships to human nature and conduce to the pursuit of a narrow self-interest? They all thought possible the elimination of the more des-humanizing aspects of capitalist society without any fundamental change of its economic basis.

In this thesis I have tried to explain how the incapacity of these three great liberal philosophers to transcend fully the intellectual horizon of atomic-individualism make them to temper the radical implications implicit of their communitarianism, and finally opt for a purely political or educational solution to the economically induced fragmentation of modern society.

II. Fragmentation and the Idealization of Ancient Society.

One of the more insidious and pervasive realities of contemporary society is what I will designate throughout this thesis by means of the term 'fragmentation'. In spite of the prevailing imprecision in the use of the term to identify this omnipresent malaise of contemporary civilization, many philosophers and social critics have denounced the phenomenon of fragmentation as one of the distinctive concern of our time. To quote only a couple:

> Surely the outstanding characteristic of contemporary thought on man and society is the preoccupation with personal alienation and cultural disintegration.
> ... It is impossible to overlook, in modern lexicons, the importance of such words as disorganization, disintegration, decline, breakdown, instability and the like.(2)

> Today we are engulfed in the gravest of predicaments our lives, ourselves, our ways of being, are subject to dissolution.
>
> ... The culmination of our predicament is the disintegration of the individual man, the dissolution of the whole and unified person. This predicament in turn permeates all others.(3)

Undoubtedly, the existence of fragmentation is not only of contemporary occurrence. Its roots can be found in other societies and in remote historical times. It seems that, in its modern expressions, fragmentation can be traced back to the XVIth century in Europe or as far

back as the beginning of the Renaissance. Its more remote historical antecedents can even be found in ancient Greek Society.

But, what is fragmentation properly speaking? What are its defining characteristics? An answer to these question will be given, I expect, in the course of this thesis. In the meantime, a tentative definition will be given. Under the general name of fragmentation, I place all those phenomena which have as their central characteristics the separation of those individual or social aspects of man's reality originally unified(merely conceived as such or effectively unified). This brief initial definition shows that the phenomenon of fragmentation projects itself, as it were, in two opposite and complementary direction. On the one hand, towards a personal or individual direction, what I will call "personal fragmentation": on the other, towards the social or collective direction, what I will hereafter call "social fragmentation" The first type of fragmentation affects the individual as such by separating or disintegrating his personality into different and contradictory aspects or fragments. The second form of fragmentation separates or disintegrates the different aspects of society in opposed and contradictory spheres, lacking in any real unity or

harmony among them.

It is pertinent to observe that, in spite of the fact that the term fragmentation (or its many equivalents, such as: 'alienation', 'dividedness', 'disintegration', 'bifurcation', 'segmentation', 'atomization, 'dissociation', 'abstraction', 'dissolution', etc.)(4) has been widely used in modern and contemporary social and philosophical thought, as far as we know, little has been done to clarify or systematize its employment.(5) I believe that the concept of fragmentation can be understood in terms of Lovejoy's notion of "dialectical motive", namely as an implicit or incompletely explicit assumption operating in the thought of an individual or generation, as a belief tacitly presupposed and so naturally assumed that is not normally examined or criticed, but able to deeply influence and shape people's ideas.(6)

It is manifest that the concept of fragmentation and its many kindred ideas were constituted by direct opposition and contrast with a series of positively charged terms such as: 'unity', 'wholeness', 'totality', 'unification', 'reintegration', etc. In the social and philosophical vocabulary all these terms appear currently imbued with what Lovejoy calls "metaphysical pathos", namely, with the power to arouse a sort of

positive responce on the part of its users or addressees by the congeniality of its associations (see Lovejoy, op. cit. p.11). Seen under this light, the concept of fragmentation presents a fundamentally negative metaphysical pathos. This characteristic of the concepts makes it specially appropiated for a critical and denunciatory use, since to define or identify a social or personal reality as fragmented is almost always equivalent to passing a negative or condemnatory judgement. However, the term can also be employed with a purely descriptive connotation as, for example, when we describe the situation of a society which presents a distinctive dissociation of aspects which may have been originally unified, as it is the case with the rupture of the tribal unity of the Athenian kinship society in the sixth century B.C.; or when we talk of the "political fragmentation" of Germany in the eighteenth century(Plant); or the fragmentation of Hegelian philosophy into right and left-wing schools(Fackenheim); etc. In any case, as it is manifest , the descriptive and critical-denunciatory uses of fragmentation cannot be kept easily separated.

As far as this investigation is concerned, the concept of fragmentation and its many equivalents will be explored mainly in their critical and denunciatory employment. I believe that the theoretical importance of

these concepts stems fundamentally from their capacity to define and identify certain social and individual phenomena that have been affecting the very roots of human existence throughout the course of history, but specially and more drastically in modern society. From this perspective the decision to start with Jean Jacques Rousseau is not an arbitrary one, because in Rousseau we find the first articulated attempt to deal intellectually with the causes and effects of fragmentation in modern bourgeois society from a communitarian standpoint.

But Rousseau, as Hegel and Dewey later, was able to identify this social malaise as the main target of his extensive critique, and also to elaborate a series of intellectual attemps at solution, because he was deeply convinced of the de-humanizing character of fragmentation. His implicit conception of man's true existence was based on the belief that there is in man a true need for unity and harmony of his different intellectual and affective functions; that it is also more in conformity with with man's nature and aspirations to live in a society where the spheres of the personal and the social are in harmony; and that the fragmentation or dissociation of the many aspects both of man and society destroy in them something of a great moral value. In spite of the differences and historical

distance between them, this is a normative anthropological conception that Rousseau shares with Hegel as well as with Dewey. And aside of the fact that the three of them are great liberal philosophers, this intellectual affinity or commonality is what gives the ultimate unity to this thesis. Beyond their infinite philosophical and psychological differences these three thinkers felt and thought that the most important task for a philosopher to accomplish was to open the road to man's reunification, conceiving this as the creation of the intellectual tools for the understanding and subsequent transcendence of the social, political and economical conditions responsible for human disintegration.

The problem of fragmentation has been modernly expressed by thinkers situated both to the left as to the right of the political spectrum.(7) For instance, the Austrian marxist philosopher Ernest Fisher has described with great clarity some of the core meanings of the conceps of unity and totality that could may well be applied to the anthropologies of Rousseau, Hegel and Dewey:

> Evidently man wants to be more than himself. He wants to be a <u>whole</u> man. He is not satisfied with being a separate individual; out of the partiality of his individual life he strives towards a 'fullness' that he senses and demands, towards a fullness of life of which individuality with all its limitations cheats him, towards a more

> comprehensible, a more just world, a world that makes sense. He rebels against having to consume himself within the confines of his own life, within the transient, chance limits of his own personality. He wants to refer to something that is more than 'I', something outside himself and yet essential to himself. He longs to absorb the surrounding world and make it its own; to extend his inquisitive, world hungry 'I' in science and technology as far as the remotest contellations and as deep as the innermost secrets of the atom; to unite his limited 'I' in art with a communal existence; to make his individuality social.(8)

Certainly, the conception of individuality that this paragraph expresses is the absolute opposite of of the classical liberal view of the individual. Here the separate individual is conceived as a deficient, incomplete being, not as a self-sufficient monad. Only in unity and harmony with the natural and social world can man attain the complete realization of his essential being, and this unification has not only a cognitive and aesthethic meaning but also a moral one.

Speaking of the social criticism of the XIXth century, but applicable as well to the XVIIIth and XXth centuries, Paul Zweig observes in THE HERESY OF SELF-LOVE: A STUDY OF SUBVERSIVE INDIVIDUALISM, that the focus of his criticism varies , but it is always rooted in the common assumption that:

> ... there is a degree of harmony and wholeness to which men are entitled; yet modern society has consistently undermined every institution and social experience which could encourage such a flourishing of the individual. It has forced new conditions of life on its citizens _factory work, big cities, the cash nexus_which mutilate them in

> their innermost being. This modern industrial world has become, in fact , profoundly antisocial ... plunging its victims into an abyss of unsocial experience which cripples the humanity of those who succumb to it.(9)

Harmony and wholeness which can be understood in many different ways; for example, as harmony of man's faculties, and wholeness and integration of his different functions; social harmony and wholeness of personality, etc. But no matter how we see it, these two normative demands are always present in the critique of modern society. And they express the aspirations of social and personal unification and integration frustrated by the large-scale application of technology to material production, the crowdedness of modern metropolises and the reification of human relationships brought about by the corrosive power of money.

Certainly the more penetrating and farsighted critics of modern industrial civilization did no have to wait for the full development of capitalism in the XIXth and XXth centuries to be able to detect, understand and condemm its more deshumanizing effects. Among them, perhaps the more lucid was Schiller, (whose influence upon the early Hegel has been amply documented) who, in his sixth letter, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, written in 1795, gives the best synthetic expression of the concept of fragmentation. In that letter, Schiller counterpoints, ancient and modern societies in the

following terms:

> That zoophyte character of the Greek states where every individual enjoyed an independent life and when need arose, could become a whole in himself, now gave place to an ingenious piece of machinery, in which out of the botching together of a vast number of lifeless parts of a collective mechanical life results; State and Church, laws and customs, were now turned asunder; enjoyment was separated from labour, means from ends, efforts from rewards. Eternally chained to only one single fragment of the whole, Man himself grew to be only a fragment; with the monotonous noise of the wheel he drives everlastingly in his ears, he never develops the harmony of his being, and instead of imprinting humanity upon his nature he becomes merely the imprint of his occupation, of his science.(10)

This extraordinary passage contains practically all the basic components and motives of the critique of modern society, simultaneously with the normative conception which constitute its foundation. The belief in the existence of a non-dissociated state of humanity in the ancient Greek world, a state in which individuality and wholeness are not divorced; the view of modern social relations as being purely mechanical, lifeless arrangements, in total contrast with the alive and natural character of Greek social organization. Also the idea of a separation and ultimate opposition of the different aspects of moder social life; finally the idea of an internal dissolution of man himself, manifested in a desharmony of his many aspects, and the ultimate alienation of his entire humanity. What makes Schiller's critique even more trenchant is the fact that

all of these distortions of man's social and individual existence are seen as the result of the introduction of the great scale division of labour in modern industrial civilization. But that is not all, a little further ahead in the same letter Schiller, anticipating Hegel, interprets fragmentation as having a historically progressive character, when seen from the perspective of the species:

> ... Gladly I concede to you that, however little pleasure the individuals can feel in this fragmentation of their nature, yet the species could not have made progress in any other way. The appearance of Greek humanity was unquestionably a maximum that neither could tarry nor climb higher on this stage. It could not tarry there because the understanding one possessed even then could not possibly help separating itself from feeling and intuition to strive for distinctness of knowledge; and it could not climb higher because only a certain degree of distinctness can coexist with a certain fullness and warmth. The Greeks had reached this degree, and if they wished to progress to a higher form[Ausbildung] they, like we, had to give up the totality of their nature to pursue truth on separate ways. To develop man's manifold dispositions, there was no other means than to oppose them to each other. This antagonism of forces is the great instrument of culture".(11)

In more simple terms, fragmentation may be a painfull and unfortunate experience for the individual, but for the species was the only way to reach higher and more developed forms of sociability and knowledge. And this fact makes utterly unrealistic and utopian any attempt to return to a past golden age where men may have lived in a purely harmonious and unified community. Hegel did

not forget Schiller's discovery on this point.

Another interesting problem that Schiller's letter brings to a discussion of the problem of fragmentation is that of establishing to what extent Rousseau, Hegel, and in lesser degree Dewey,(12)and many other modern philosophers and poets, were justified in conceiving Greek society as the paradise of a unified, non-fragmented, community. In the first place, it is plain that that ancient Greek societies were not societies without fragmentation.(13) Actually, in its more developed form Greek society required, to be historically possible, a fundamental separation between the private and public spheres. As Werner Jaeger has pointed out, "... the rise of the city-state meant that man received besides his private life a sort of second life, his '<u>bios politikos</u>'. Now, every citizen belongs to two orders of existence; and there is a sharp distinction in his life between what is his own (idion) and what is communal."(W. Jaeger. PAIDEIA. Vol III, p.111). Or, as Hannah Arendt observed, "it is not just an opinion or theory of Aristotle but a simple historical fact that the foundation of the <u>polis</u> was preceded by the destruction of all organized units resting on kinship, such as the <u>phratria</u> and the <u>phyle</u>".(14)

As it is well known, this important historical

process took place in ancient Greece in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C., culminating first in the momentous Cleistenean reforms of 509 B.C. and then in the rise of the Athenian city-state. Therefore, not only was there fragmentation in ancient Greek society but fragmentation makes its historical entrance precisely with that specific social formation.

Another important reason that seems to contradict the belief in the unified character of ancient Greek society is the fact that Greek democracy was fundamentally a slave-owning democracy. If any kind of unified and unfragmented society ever existed there, it was enjoyed only by a relative small part of its population, i.e., its citizens. As Aristotle himself puts it in POLITICS (III, Bk. 9, 1280a32), "there is no polis for slaves". But slaves were not the only one excluded. Taking Athens as a representative case, "three major groups in Athenian Society were excluded from it. First of all, it excluded without question and as a matter of course half the adult population _women. Secondly, the citizen body excluded foreigners who lived and worked in Athens, the metics. It was, in other words, a body of insiders. Thirdly, it excluded slaves. It could only be a body of free, indigenous men. This meant that the citizens comprised a quarter or less of the total adult population".(15)

But that was not the only limitation of the ancient polis, as M.I. Finley has observed, speaking of the VIth century Greek society, "... the sense of community, strong as it was, clashed with the gross inquality which prevailed among the[polis'] members. Poverty was widespread, the material standard of life was low and there was a deep cleavage between the poor and the rich, as every Greek writer concerned with politics knew and said. This has been common enough in all history; what gave it an uncommon twist in Greece was the city-state, with its intimacy, its stress on the community and on the freedom and dignity of the individual which went with membership".(16) Undoubtedly these material deficiencies of ancient Greek society conspired powerfully against a true and effective social integration of his members.

In spite of all these obvious limitations of ancient Greek society, of which they were obviously aware, Rousseau, Hegel and Dewey, and many other modern philosophers and poets, conceived this social formation as the unparalleled model of the non-fragmented society. What probably prompted them to have this basically idealized view was the high esteem which they have for some other features of Greek society perceived by modern philosophers and artists as almost completely absent in their contemporary civilization. Among these features we

can include , in the first place, the holistic character of the Greek polis , which encapsulated their vision of a unified society. As D.F. Kitto has observed, "the polis was made for the amateur. Its ideal was that every citizen ...should play his part in all of its many activities _an ideal that is recognizably descended from the generous Homeric conception of arete as an all-round excellence and an all-round activity. It implies a respect for the wholeness or the oneness of life , and a consequent dislike of specialization. It implies a contempt for efficiency which exists not in one department of life, but in life itself".(17) Compared with the Greek polis, modern society appeared to modern philosophers as the very negation of those holistic ideals, a society where men were internally divided as a result of the introduction of the industrial division of labour and where individuals were, in fact, separated from society and condemned to a double existence. It is not surprising, then, that in their intellectual and political struggles against the more negative aspects of modern civilization modern philosophers an artists took ancient Greek society as the anti-model, as the paradigm of a unified, non-fragmented world.

The idea of wholeness appeared intimately associated with the ideal of unity, understood very

often in a triple sense, as unity of man with himself, (individualy and collectively speaking), with his products, and with nature as a whole. The Greek individual was thought of by modern philosophers and poets as one whose life concretely embodied these three different but correlative forms of unity. As J. Kain says in a recent book, "because of the agreement between general and particular interests; between principles and feeling and between duty and inclination, the activity of the individual Greek _his effort_ appeared as an end in itself; it was very satisfying and enjoyable. Due to this spontaneity and harmony the Greek was in unity with his object. He was at home, in control. His state, as Hegel suggests, appeared as the product of his own energies. It was his highest end, and he felt part of it. Additionaly, The Greek was in unity with nature. Instead of being dominated by it he was in harmony with it".(18) With his characteristic brillance H.S. Harris identifies Holderlin as the main intellectual influence within German Idealism, as far as the propagation of this beliefs in the harmony between Greek man and nature, is concerned. "...what impressed Holderlin was that the Greeks were originally in a kind of harmony with Nature. It is with Holderlin, if I'm right that it all starts. There's a perfect harmony between the life of lower nature and human nature as such, and the

fulfillment, even the political fulfillment, of human nature is viewed by Holderlin as natural, as part of Nature, as a second nature added to the first. There you have the doctrine of an absolute whole which we have obviously lost, but which we must somehow recover. Holderlin no more than Hegel, I take it, could have been ignorant of the fact that the Greek society he idealized so much involved slavery, and that that was contrary to his own conception of the moral dimension of human nature".(19)

This image of the Greek man presented itself to modern philosophers and poets in stark contrast to the reality of the modern fragmented individuality, in contradiction with its own products and also in opposition to nature. They, therefore, concluded that "the fundamental problem of their own world was precisely the absence of this humanistic wholeness, spontaneity and unity and instead the presence of alienation and estrangement (or more generally, fragmentation). This problem appeared in the political realm, in the social realm, and in art".(20)

Another important complementary reason which explains why modern philosophers and poets took the ancient polis as the model of a non-fragmented society has to do with the fact that they realized that beyond its evident limitations, there was an important sense in

which Greek society was unified. As it has been ably expressed by L.T. Hobhouse, when he explains that in the polis " ...the relation of the individual to the community was close, direct and natural. Their interests were obviously bound up together. Unless each man did his duty the state might easily be destroyed and the population enslaved. Unless the state took thought for its citizens it might easily decay. What was still more important, there was no opposition of church and state, no fissure between political and religious life, between the claims of the secular and the spiritual to distract the allegiance of the citizens, and to set the authority of conscience against the duties of patriotism".(21) But, undoubtedly, the most important explanation of why Greek society was seen for so many modern social philosophers and poets as the paradigm of a unified community, stems from the apparently contradictory fact that the ancient Greeks (who fluorished because of slavery) were, at the same time, the true discoverers both of the idea of individual freedom and of the institutional arrangements through which it could be realized. Paradoxically, the pre-Greek world was a world in which slavery played no significant historical role, but it was also a world without free men, in the sense in which western political tradition has come to understand this concept. Thus, the process of increasing

separation of the private and public realms, i.e., of fragmentation, which begins in the Greek world with the dissolution of the original tribal community, was simultaneously the process of constitution of individuality and individualism, with their corresponding notions of universality, political rights and freedoms.

To finalize the first part of this section, I want to say that modern philosophers' idealization of ancient Greek society must be understood in the context of a general valorization of Greek civilization by western thinkers and historians in the XVIIIth century. This fact can be interpreted in terms of very specific historical reasons connected with the development of the ideology and political self-consciousness of the rising European bourgeoisie. As Lucien Goldmann has pointed out, "Likewise Renaissance humanism, the enormous importance that Greek culture assumed for Western European thought, is explained by the fact that a bourgeois society, no longer oriented towards the beyond, but towards man and the world, broke with the old feudal society and found in the writings of Graeco-Latin antiquity a culture and an art which were themselves oriented towards the world and especially towards man." And in the specific case of XVIIIth and XIXth century Germany, if classical antiquity continued

for so long to be existentially significant, says Goldmann,"... it [was] precisely because the weakness of the bourgeosie, the feeble development of capitalism and the absence of a bourgeois revolution, did not allow German thinkers to abandone antiquity in order to speak their own language, as did the ideologues of the Third state in France and in England".(22)

III. The limits of Hegel's and Rousseau's Liberalism.

In conexion with the question of why so many modern philosophers and poets idealized ancient Greek society, in spite that they knew its particularisms and deficiencies, is the question of establishing what kind of importance Rousseau and Hegel attached to the two most obvious particularisms of the polis: slavery and women's lack of political rights. Such an assessment is necessary in order to be able to determine the consistency of their liberal and communitarian views.

In a note to his influential book THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES, Karl Popper makes an interesting and suggestive observation on ancient society which can be used as a key to the solution of the question in hand:

> ...it must be admitted that the tribal 'closed' society had something of an 'organic' character, just because of the absence of social tension. The

> fact that such a society may be based on slavery (as it was the case with the Greeks) does not create in itself a social tension, because slaves sometimes form no more part of society than its cattle; their aspirations and problems do not necessarily create anything that is felt by the rulers as a problem within society.(23)

Applying Popper's observation to Rousseau and Hegel it seems as if, in their views of ancient society, they adopted very often the point of view of the rulers. This, of course, does not mean that they did no see the negative features of the polis, but that they judged them less significant than the positive ones. This applies particularly well to Rousseau who was very critical of Athenian society, but not of Sparta, whose primitivism and coarseness are manifest. To a great extent the philosopher's perception of ancient Greek society was predetermined by their particular conception of liberalism and democracy and therefore by their views of what a liberal society should be. As we will see in what follows, the tensions and limitations of Rousseau's and Hegel's liberal views reflect themselves with great clarity in their evaluation of the negative features of ancient Greek society.

It is, certainly, not surprising that neither Rousseau nor Hegel attached great political significance to the main moral defects of ancient Greek society, i.e., to the institution of slavery and women's lack of political rights in the polis. After all to Rousseau,

"both nature and reason demand of women a quiet life retired inside her home and family".(Quoted by R. Grimsley, LA FILOSOFIA DE ROUSSEAU, p.36) And "woman is made to yield to man and endure even his injustice". (EMILE,p.369) According to Rousseau women cannot think in terms of general principles. Or as he put it in the work already quoted: "The quest for abstract and speculative truth, principles and axioms in the sciences for everything that tends to generalize ideas is not within the competence of women"(Op.Cit.,p.386) In a similar fashion, in Hegel's rational state women, together with children and the "rabble", are excluded from any political participation, in so far as they are but the "irrational" part of the population. The rational part being, naturally, constituted by the adult males of the middle classes. For Hegel, as for Rousseau, woman's intellect cannot attain universality:

> Women are capable of education, but they are not made for activities which demand a universal faculty such as the more advanced sciences, philosophy and certain forms of artistic production. Women may have happy ideas, taste, and elegance, but they cannot attain the ideal.

This limitation of their nature would make women's political participation in the state's affairs, not only unadvisable, but even dangerous:

> ...when women hold to the helm of goverment, the state is at once in jeopardy, because women regulate their actions not by the demands of universality but by arbitrary inclinations and

opinion.(24)

A similar opinion is expressed in the PHENOMENOLOGY, where, describing the tragic conflict between Antigone and Kreon, or which is equivalent, between the individualism of the family and the universality of the state, Hegel declares the following:

> Womankind _the everlasting irony in the life of the community_ changes by intrigue the universal end of the government into a private end, transforms its universal activity into a work of some particular individual, and perverts the universal property of the state into a possession and ornament of the family.(25)

As far as women's education is concerned Hegel's view is consistently derived from the same male-chauvinist and undemocratic prejudices:

> Women can of course be educated,[but]...the education of women takes place one hardly knows how in an atmosphere of picture thinking as it were, more through life than throught the acquisition of knowledge" [whereas] "man attains his position only through stress of thought and much specialized effort.(26)

Rousseu's and Hegel's similar bias against women and low opinion of their intellectual capacity are, of course, morally apalling. It seems though, that the liberal-individualist ideology would contain an implicit bias against women, as Arblaster points out, its "male emphasis on "man", "mankind", etc., has usually been more than a verbal habit. Women have, until comparatively recently, been regarded as not full "individuals". "...It is true that the concept of "the

individual" is asexual: it makes no distinction between men and women. Yet it is extraordinary how few of the liberal champions of the rights of man have also been champions of the equal rights of women. John Stuart Mill stands out as an honorably consistent exception to the general rule."(27)

With regard to the second great deficiency of ancient Greek society, that is, slavery, Hegel, following Schiller, sees it as historically necessary, subcribing also his idea that what is unfortunate for some individuals may in fact serve the progress of humanity:

> [Slavery] was a necessary condition in an aesthetic democracy, where it was the right and duty of every citizen to deliver or to listen to orations respecting the management of the state in the place of public assemby, to take part in the exercise of the Gymnasia, and to join in the celebration of festivals. It was a necessary condition of such occupations that the citizens should be freed from handicraft occupations; consequently, that what among is performed by free citizens _the work of daily life_ should be done by slaves.(28)

Certainly Hegel may consider Slavery necessary for antiquity, but he should see it as utterly unacceptable in a modern society based on wage labour and climing respect for the values of individuality, freedom and rights. However his opinions on the African slaves of his time are totally at odds with those liberal-individualists principles. See for example the following passage of the ENCYCLOPAEDIA:

> Negroes are to be regarded as a race of children who remain immersed in their state of uninterested naivete. They are sold, and let themselves to be sold, without any reflection on the right or wrong of the matter. The higher which they feel they do not hold fast to, it is only a fugitive thought. ...They cannot be denied a capacity for education...but they do not show an inherent striving for culture.(29)

Or, as he put it even more blatantly, in speaking of the originary inhabitants of the New World, "the savage is lazy and is distinguished from the educated man by his brooding stupidity".(PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, Add. to paragraph 197, p.270 (Knox).

It is curious to observe how in Hegel male-chauvinism and Eurocentric bias are justified by means of a homologous argument. Thus, for instance, according to the German philosopher, Africa is not a historical part of the world in so far as spirit has not developed itself in that continent. This is so basically because rational principles have not taken real hold in african societies.The same applies, mutatis mutandis to women. Given the fact that, according to Hegel, they cannot attain universal knowledge, they are denied the possibility of participating in the universal affairs of the state.

In contrast to Rousseau and Hegel, if we are to believe his biographers, Dewey was a long and active supporter of the women's suffrage cause,(30) a position he would have adopted based on the belief that the

enfranchisement of women was a necessary part of the development of political democracy. Even in some of his letters he would have expressed feminist views. However, as Susan Laird has argued, in spite of expressing such views in his private correspondence, "in any of the canonical texts in philosophy of education [Dewey] never publicly, explicitly demostrated his privately claimed "feminism".(31)

To sum up the content of this part of the thesis. Rousseau's and Hegel's liberalism is inconsistent in so far as it is applied only to males. In denying women all political participation, leaving them in a position of total subordination vis-a-vis the males members of society, they contradict the principles of individuality, and individual freedom which define the liberal creed. In regard to Hegel's implicit justification of slave work in the XVIIIth century the contradiction is still more blatant. Hegel's European ethnocentrism makes him to devaluate the New World's inhabitants to the point that their nature appear lacking in the two main atributes of human dignity, according to liberal thought: the possession of reason and the appreciation of personal freedom. This would justify the nonapplication of the liberal principles to American indians and black slaves. All this is,certainly, unacceptable since these peoples,

as any other racial or ethnic group, share in our common humanity and therefore share also its dignity and value. What makes Hegel's views even more contradictory, is the fact that his opinions on black slaves and indians appear no more than a page away from the following statement:"Man is implicitly rational; herein lies the possibility of equal justice for all men and the futility of a rigid distinction between races which have rights and those which have none". (Hegel. PHILOSOPHY OF MIND, Zusatz to paragraph 393, p.41)

JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU.

> There are thousand ways of assembling men,[but] there is only one[way] to unite them.
>
> Rousseau, GENEVA MANUSCRIPT.

> It is a strange book, EMILE, one in which Rousseau expressed his inner self, a great book, but a monstrous book. Rousseau's cosmos is constellated with fragmented images of himself.
>
> Lester Crocker. J.J. Rousseau The Prophetic Voice. 1758-1778.

I. Rousseau and the Problem of Fragmentation.

As Karl Lowith was one of the first to underscore, "Rousseau's writings contain the first and clearest statements of the human problem in bourgeois society". According to the German professor this would consists "in the fact that man, in bourgeois society, is not a unified whole. On the one hand, he is a private individual, on the the other, a citizen of the state. ...Ever since Rousseau, the incongruity between them has been a fundamental problem of all modern theories of the state and society.(32) Lowith is certainly right in

considering Rousseau as the first critic of civil society. Where he falls short, thought, is in viewing in a too restrictive fashion the question of fragmentation in Rousseau's thought. It is plain that politics occupies a central place in his critique of modern society but that fact should not blind us to the complexity and richness of his critical assault on modern civilization. Rousseau approached those problems from a variety of angles and viewpoints and this is reflected in the introduction of a series of dichotomies, by means of which he tried to capture and understand the multidimensional nature of the malaise of the French society of his time. Among them the more important perhaps are the dichotomies between sincerity and insincerity ; authentic and inauthentic; real self and alienated self; amour de soi and amour propre; l'homme and le citoyen; etc., etc.

What all these oppositions meant to capture and identify were in fact different forms and manifestations of the same basic phenomenon, that is, the rupture and disintegration of the unity of human self originated in man's confrontation with a fragmented social reality. Implicit in these dichotomies can be found a normative conception according to which is better for man to be in unity with himself, rather than be fragmented; that is better for him to be in harmony with his world and

society, rather than in opposition to them. That is why the ideas of restoration of a harmonic relationship between the individual and his more authentic self, and between the individual and the other members of society occupies such a prominent place in Rousseau's philosophy. Certainly, these intentions are not always explicit in Rousseau's writings, but they function as one of the constant "motifs" which impel and give unity to them. Some of Rousseau's interpreters have tried to identify these main motifs in order to be able to present a unified view of his entire work. Thus, for instance Jean Starobinski has written one of the most interesting and influencial books on the Genevan philosopher,(33) using the idea of transparence as the central interpretative clue of Rousseau's life and work. Starobinski portrays Rousseau as struggling his entire life practically with a single problem: how to solve the contradiction between appearance and reality. The first expression of this struggle would be found in his DISCOURS SUR LES SCIENCES ET LES ARTS. According to the interpreter the initial motivating force of this lifelong struggle would have been a personal experience of Rousseau as a boy, in which he was unjustly accused of breaking a comb. In spite of the fact that he knows he in not responsible for that small destructive act the

appearances accuss him and he must confront the adults who do not believe in his innocence. In Peter Gay's words, the significance of this incident would consist in the fact that "Rousseau experiences in full force, for the first time, the pain of being separated from others; his first Discours then dramatizes this separation in his account of man's fall from innocence. The Discours does more than to describe man's fate: its sets man's task. For all of his nostalgia, Rousseau knows that man can never return to his original state; he must overcome separation and restore transparence by moving forward into a new society. This is the common theme of all of Rousseau's writings: their unity of intention, which aims at the safeguarding or the restitution of transparency'."(34)

I have prefered to quote Gay rather than use my own words because unconsciously he has given a clear expression to what I consider the main limitation of Starobinski's interpretation of Rousseau, namely, that the motif of transparency cannot be explained independently of the idea of separation from others and from one's own self. In a single word, from the idea of fragmentation as it is understood in this thesis. I believe that at the basis of the notion of transparency is the idea of a unified man living in a unified society. Rousseau's 'transparent' individual would

precisely be the non-fragmented man, the man without 'division interieur', in other words, the man in whom there is no rupture 'entre l'etre et le paraitre'. Similarly, a 'transparent society' would be one in which man's original unity with nature and society has been restored.

But it has been Starobinski himself who has uttered the clearest recognition of the insufficiency of the idea of transparency to capture by itself the complexity of Rousseau's ideas, when in the initial pages of his influential book, speaking a propos of the opposition between appearance and reality in the FIRST DISCOURSE, he declares the following:

> In spite of the emphatic character of the discourse a true feeling of division imposes and propagates itself in it. The rupture between being and appearing engenders other conflicts, like a series of amplified echoes: ruptures between good and evil (between the good men and the bad men), between nature and society, between man and his gods, between man and himself. In short, the entire history can be divided in terms of a before and an after: until now there were faterlands and citizens, now there are no more.(35)

I do not know whether or not Starobinsky realized the full implications of this recognition for his entire interpretation of Rousseau's work, but his declaration not only confirms the great explanatory power of the idea of fragmentation, it is also pointing directly to the ultimate limitation of a purely psychological

explanation. The theory of fragmentation is not a psychological but a historical explanation. And it doesn't require one to attach an ultimate motivating force to any particular psychological experience of Rousseau. What this explanation does is to interpret Rousseau's psychology in the light of his social and personal situation.

In the light of all that has been said above Robert Nisbet is right when he identifies as characteristic of modern sensibility the complex psychological experience that I call 'fear of fragmentation'. This experience can be characterized, according to Nisbet as "... the fear of social void, of alienation, of estrangement from others, even from one's own self, of loss of identity, of great open spaces of impersonality and rejection. ...And it is the fear, above other fears in the human condition, of the kind of aloneness that generates craving for community -for the sense of relatedness to others as persons that transcends all momentary isolation, separations, and other trails of life, endowing one with the sense of identity that can never come from germ plasm or from internal consciousness by itself."(36) There is no doubt that this fear of fragmentation was one of the propelling motives of Rousseau's many collective and personal attemps of reform that he developed throughout his life. But the

ultimate importance of this fear is not purely individual. In reacting to this fear he was giving a personal and particular expression to sentiments and conflicts that, in one way or another, were being collectively experienced by most of his contempraries, as a result of the social disintegration brought about by modern social and economic conditions.

I believe than among those who have tried to understand Rousseau's psychological make-up and reactions not enough attention has been paid to his particular social position of exiled and intellectual deracine.(37) Given the fact that in modern society the life of intellectuals has been so often one of uncertainty, hardship and misery, should not surprise anyone that among their ranks could appear the first and more extreme denunciations of modern civilization. It is an undeniable fact that the intellectuals "deprived of any recognized patronage and having to exist in the interstices of the market"(38), but always close to the privileged classes, were in an specially advantageous position to detect and experience even the more subtle expressions of social injustice and class discrimination. Especially in his early years, Rousseau had more than a fair share of experiences of demeaning and vejatory treatments, inflicted upon him by people of a superior social rank, not to feel alienated and

rejected by humanity as a whole. As Jean Guehenno has perceptively observed, Rousseau always perceived himself has a "man of superior ability who has been reduced to degrading circumstances."(39) Those degrading personal experiences will left in Rousseau's spirit a permanent deposit of resentment and frustration which inevitably will find their way into his general conception of society. Werner Stark is absolutely right when, speaking of the situation of European musicians in the XVIIIth century, points to something that it can be equally applied to Rousseau and his work. "A man's condition in life is, for better or for worth, his fate: his soul cannot escape its imprint. Many features in a work of art are rightly ascribed to the artist's personality: but this personality is formed in and by its clash with circumstances, and among these circumstances status, and even the conditions of employment, are very potent factors. Franz Schubert was born into a smiling world and reflected it in such jolly music as that of his fifth symphony: but soon tragedy looms up and sheds deep, dark shadows over his work, giving it a poignancy that is at times positively painful. This turn towards unhappiness is not unconnected with Schubert's inability to fit into the society that sorrounded him, and even, quite simply, with the impossibility of securing a job. ...Mozarts' case had been very similar.(40)

Rousseau's social position and the experiences and problems derived from it, were thus very important factors in the constitution of his thought. Perhaps in an even more profound way than XVIIIth century music was affected by the personal or class situation of musicians. After all, ideas are affected in a much more direct way than music by the social conditions prevalent in an epoch. Perhaps no better testimony of the exact nature of those conditions can be found than the one contained in a letter that Raynal wrote around the days when Rousseau has just entered the household of Madame Dupin.(1741) In this remarkable letter Raynal give us an insider's view of the situation of intellectuals during the times of Louis the XIVth:

> Here, the fashionable thing is to have writers in your employment. Wit has been for some time so much the rage in Paris that the house of even the most humble financier is filled with academicians or with men who aspire to that rank. Yet, in spite of this craze for wit and learning, the financier remains as stupid as ever, the writer as poor as ever. The part the latter has to play is truly agonising. If he wants to retain his post, he is obliged to applaud the dreary talk of his master and the bad taste of his master's wife; to think like the former and to talk like the latter; to endure the arrogance of the one and the whims of the other; to ingratiate himself with the time-servers or habitues of the household. In short, he has to flatter everyone, even the humblest servants the doorkeeper, so that he can have free access to the house at mealtimes; the footman so that he is not ignored at table when he ask for wine, and lastly the chamber-maid , because the fate of a book depends on the opinion she forms ot it as she reads it aloud while her mistress is at her dressing table. Such is, in truth, the lot of a

writer who frequents fashionable household in Paris."(41)

Reading this revealing letter is not difficult to figure where Diderot went for inspiration when he wanted to write his RAMEAU'S NEPHEW. Certainly, the problem for the intellectual class in those days was not one of transparency but basically one of complete contradiction between the image the intellectual has of himself as a man of letters and the low social consideration that his services have for the noble society. The resentment and frustration resulting from this situation of simultaneous dependency and deep hatred against their ignorant and rich employers, sooner or later had to find expression in the intellectual's creative work. For an unattached intellectual with a keen sense of the political reality such as Rousseau, was probably not difficult to identify the ultimate source of his fragmented and contradictory existence; the political, economic and social institutions of French society. The anti-model was not far to be found. His reading of Plutarch and other classic authors showed him the unparalleled models of ancient Greek and Roman societies. As the conversion experience of Vincennes shows it so dramatically, at one point of his life Rousseau decided to make of the struggle against social and personal fragmentation his life vocation. The

dimensions that this struggle in two fronts took must be explained not only as the effect of the powerfull psychological forces which set in motion, but also as the result of the tireless application of the highly creative and critical mind of a man of genius.

It seems to me that Rousseau's life and work can be understood as the two complementary sides of a lifelong struggle against fragmentation. From the psychological side this struggle is embodied in Rousseau's constant efforts to overcome his personal inadequacies and conflicts. Seen from the intellectual side the struggle appears as the theoretical elaboration and sublimation of those personal conflicts in his great autobiographical, political and educational works. From the perspective of this approach the relationship between Rousseau's psychological life and his ideas must be understood as a responce to his own personal needs an deficiencies. These translated themselves in two main categories of conflicts: a) Rousseau's search for his own identity; and b) his search for a stable and non-conflictive relationship with other human beings. Thus, for instance, the political conflict between individual and society, whose more elaborated solution is offered in the SOCIAL CONTRACT, can be seen as the theoretical refraction and sublimation of Rousseau's personal incapacity to develop a non-conflictive and

meaningful relationship with other human beings(friends, women, his own children, etc.). Any attentive reader of Rousseau's autobiographical writings cannot miss the direct and close connection that exists between his personal frustrating experiences and his many theoretical attemps at solving the collective conflict between individual and society. We find in Rousseau two contradictory tendencies he was never able to satisfactorily reconcile. On the one hand, a tendency towards self-sufficiency, solitude and self-centredness; on the other, an equally strong tendency towards sociability, self-transcendence and deep communication with others. Few of Rousseau's declarations express better this antinomy than the following passage of his Dialogues:

> I know that the noise of the world frightens the loving and tender hearts, that they clench and compress themselves in the middle of the crowd, that they dilate and expand themselves when they unbosom to each other, that there is no other true effusion than the one in the tete-a-tete, in essence, this delicious intimacy, which makes the true happiness of frienship, can hardly form and nourish itself but in seclusion. But I also know that an absolute solitude is a sad state and contrary to nature: the feeling of affection feeds the soul, the communication of ideas enlivens the spirit. Our sweetest existence is relative and collective, and our true self is not entirely in ourselves. In a word, such is man's constitution in this life that he can never enjoy himself without another's concourse.(42)

But in Rousseau these tendencies which, as he puts it, are "part of man'constitution", had the character of two

almost absolute and contradictory forces which pulled him, as it were, according to the "all or nothing" principle. In fact this duality or bipolarity is in itself an expression of the psychology of a fragmented personality in constant internal antagonism with itself and pulled by opposed forces which never find a point of unification. John McManners has cleverly shown how even Rousseau's favorite literary device, the 'dialogue', used by him in many forms, serves as vehicle of expression of his inner fragmentation: "...epistolary dialogues between his fictional characters, dialogues between himself and imaginary interlocutors, dialogues between contrasting selves within his own personality, dialogues between reason and emotion, heart and mind. In this continual internal dialectic, his own passions, uncertainties and divisions are present everywhere. The SOCIAL CONTRACT is no exception. Like his other great works it was written with passion, with himself and the contradictory selves within himself as the central point of reference. In the CONFESSIONS, Rousseau tells us how his imagination loved to work by contraries: to depict spring, he must be in winter, to describe a rustic scene, he must be indoors, 'if I were put in the bastille, I should paint a picture of liberty'."(43) Those critics and interpreters which have not simply dismissed Rousseau's bipolarities as pure

contradictions, have tried to find a satisfactory explanation of them. Some interpreters, specially those who have abandoned the old easy psychological readings, have even viewed Rousseau's dualities as the expression of a critical mind trying to pierce a reality contradictory in itself:

> [Rousseau's] peculiar genius lies in the fact that, when contradictory ideas are being dealt with, he rushes to both extremes. He presses the claim of unity just as clearly and passionately as those of diversity. He fights for individual freedom with an intensity and effectiveness which few man have equaled. But, on the other hand, his doctrine of the social authority of a General Will which is absolute, which is infallible, marks the outer limit of the belief in a "social control" to which human beings must submit themselves. This is the sort of mind which is needed as a disintegrating culture is torn to shreds, and preparation is made for the forming of a new culture to take its place.(44)

This is not a bad explanation but it is clearly insufficient. Especially because the referred to bipolarity can be found not only in his social ideas but in Rousseau's behavior as well. As we showed before, we find in Rousseau a longing for a deep communion with other individuals, but simultaneously he was a misanthropic "solitary walker"; he was the champion of reason, but at the same time the defender of the value of emotions; he was the declared enemy of the sciences and the arts; and simultaneously the artist, intellectual and the amateur scientist; Rousseau "l'homme vulgaire" was as well the refined musician and

the philosopher; The terrible father who sent five of his children to "les enfants trouves", who, however, was also the author of one of the greatest treatises on education ever written; Rousseau the Don Quixote of equality(Guehenno) who, in spite of having married his Dulcinea, dreamed of marrying an aristocrat woman(Sophie d'Houdetot, idealized in LA NOUVELLE HELOISE). Rousseau the mortal enemy of opinion, who was also deeply concerned with the frivolities of the literary fame(45); Rousseau the champion of individual freedom who however postulated a quasi absorption of the individual in the community, etc. Surely, some of these contradictory behaviors can be explained away as reflections of Rousseau's own personal conflicts and weaknesses. The point is, though, that these psychological conflicts began to constitute themselves as neurotic responses to social experiences and pressures. Undobtedly the psychological predispositions of an individual play an important role here,(different personalities react differently to identical conditions). The danger of a purely psychological interpretation is, however, that one may end up trying to explain Rousseau's ideas and conducts in terms of a purely internal causation. But ideas and behaviors are not psychologically (or sociologically) caused. Ideas and behaviors are actively, and to a great extent, freely produced by the

individual's mind in response to social and environmental influences. Thus, when Rousseau's critics claim that he "drew all his ideas from his subjective experience" (46), in fact they don't explain anything because ideas and subjective experiences do not keep a causal connexion to each other. Ideas, to be such, require some form of purely intellectual elaboration, and when they abandon the purely subjective realm, they must immediately submit themselves to the formal demands of his internal logic and dynamics. What constitutes an even more serious problem of this type of psychological reductionism is the fact that it is totally oblivious to the existence of the distinction between the origin and validity of ideas. In other words, those who desqualify or reject any of Rousseau's ideas or doctrines, because they were supposedly formulated by a neurotic or a psychotic mind are guilty of a fallacy, given the fact that the truth of any statement is totally independent of his origin.

Probably Rousseau's social position of intellectual deracine cannot ultimately explain why he reacted the way he did, when confronted with the conditions of his society and times. But neither can any psychological interpretation of his work and personality.(47) The reason of this lies in the productive and creative nature of human works.And this is even more so when they

are the creations of a man of genius. Perhaps one of the distinctive qualities of an intellectual genius, and Rousseau was undobtedly a genius, is his capacity to give universal stature to his(or her's) individual problems. This is so because together with an exalted sensibility the genius is endowed with great critical and creative powers. And are precisely these creative powers which allow him to respond actively and productively to his psychological conflicts. No reductionistic interpretation, be it psychological or sociological, can account for this productive aspect of Rousseau's intellectual accomplishment.

In the light of those facts all that can be done is to attempt to find the connections between Rousseau's life and ideas and try to explain how the latter may have been generated as responses to what was perceived by him as crucial personal and social problems. From this perspective I have tried to identify the central motif of Rousseau's work in terms of the idea of fragmentation. Thus, I have found that the idea of a restoration of an harmonic relationship between the individual and its self, and between the individual and other members of society occupies a central place in Rousseau personal and intellectual project.

II. Rousseau's Unified Society.

Starobinski identifies four different, as he calls them, "appels", in Rousseau's life and work. Namely, four distinctive projects of personal and social reform that he persued, successively or simultaneously, throughout his life. 1. Moral-personal reform; 2. Education of the individual; 3. Political reorganization of society; and 4. Escape into solitude. These are not exactly Starowinski's words but these four headings essentially reproduce the spirit of his ideas about the point.(48) According to Berman, another interpreter who identifies the loss of human authenticity as the central problem of modern society, Rousseau would have attempted also four distinctive solutions. 1. The search for an authentic man; 2. The search for the authentic citizen; 3. The totalitarian scape; and 4. The scape into solitude.(49) It is manifest that these two different ways of categorizing the many aspects of Rousseau's life and work correspond to two equalty justifiable interpretative approaches, and they have their own advantages and disadvantages. The main merit of these categorizations consists, though, in that they show in a very clear fashion the main intentions and motifs lying behind Rousseau's very complex and extensive creative life.

In this section I am going to examine only two of these great projects, that is, the one dealing with the political reorganization of society, and the other dealing with the education of the individual.

In the final pages of THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, Rousseau has expressely enunciated the main intention of his political philosophy when he declares:

> Anything which breaks the unity of society is worthless; all institutions which set man at odds with himself are worthless.(50)

As it is plain Rousseau views the problem of social unity and the problem of internal unity of the individual as two aspects of the same phenomenon. Furthermore, He identifies the division between the individual and society in terms of the opposition of two different forms of existence: man's existence as an homme, and man existence as a citoyen. These two terms refer to a condition of double life that the individual lives in modern society. On the one hand he would be a private individual, concerned only with his own interests and welfare, on the other he would be a member of society and therefore supposedly concerned with its universal interests. But, one may wonder, can men satisfy simultaneously these two contradictory demands? Namely, can individuals compete and combat each other in one sphere and simultaneously cooperate with each other in another sphere? What kind of social unity can result

from this contradictory behavior of the individuals? Actually. Rousseau didn't believe in the possibility of building a true community on this basis, because, as Colletti pointed out, for him "...to create a society is to create a common interest, an association or real socialization of interests. If the common interests is restricted to the agreement by which all agree that all shall follow his own private interests, society does not exist(it is only formal), and man socialization has not taken place; he has remained in the 'state of nature', with the sole addition of the safeguard of the state." (51)

It is against the aggregative conception of society that Rousseau's main critical attack and theories will be directed. The aggregative conception is based on the kind of atomic individualism(Levinas)(52) that he systematically rejected. And it is in this rejection where, ultimately, lies Rousseau's rupture with the liberalism derived from Locke and also with the "philosophes." Thus, for instance, when in a polemical rejoinder Helvetius contends that without egoist personal interests there cannot be a general interest, and hence no just or injust actions, Rousseau replies that a society build basically upon relationships of pure self-interest, is neccesarily a weak society, because is a society without ties of mutual solidarity.

In different terms, the pursuit of purely personal interests is not a sufficient foundation upon which to establish a true community.(53)

In the preface to NARCISSUS Rousseau is very explicit in showing his dissatisfaction with the classic liberal belief in the existence of an "invisible hand" which would metamorphozise the egoism of purely self-seaking individuals into collective benefit:

> All our Writers regard the crowning achievement of our century's politics to be the sciences, the arts, luxury, commerce, laws, and all the other bonds which, by tightening the knots of society among men through self-interests, place them all in a position of mutual dependence, impose on them mutual needs and common interests, and oblige everyone to contribute to everyone else's happiness in order to secure his own. These are certainly fine ideas, and they are presented in favorable light. But when they are examined carefully and impartially, the advantage which they seem at first to hold out prove to be open to considerable criticism.
>
> It is quite a wonderful thing, then, to have placed men in a position where they cannot possibly live together without obstructing, supplanting, deceiving, betraying, destroying one another! From now on we must take care never to let ourselves to be seen such as we are: because for every two men whose interests concide, perhaps a hundred thousand oppose them, and the only way to succeed is either to deceive or to ruin all those people. That is the fatal source of the violence, the betrayals, the decits and all the horrors necessarily required by a state of affairs in which everyone pretends to be working for the other's profit or reputation, while only seeking to rise his own above them and at their expense.(54)

To this conception which views social harmony as the result of the automatic operation of market forces

Rousseau will oppose his conception of society as "a unity of mutually dependent parts, a corporate whole, not an aggregation of unchanged partners"(55) In order to explain the type of social and economic cohesiveness he had in mind, and knowing the inadequacy of all organic models, Rousseau even compared the body politic with a human body:

> The body politic, taken individually, can be considered to be like a body in that it is organized, living, and similar to that of a man. The sovereign power represents the head; the laws and customs are the brain, source of the nerves and seat of the understanding, will and senses, of which the judges and magistrates are the organs; commerce, industry and agriculture are the mouth and stomach that prepare the common subsistence; public finances are the blood that a wise economy, performing the functions of the heart, sends out to distribute nourishment and life throughout the body; the citizens are the body and members that make the machine move, live, and work, and that cannot be harmed in any part without promptly sending a painful response to the brain if the animal is in state of health.(56)

What Rousseau is defining here is a harmonic society where every part is organically(57) related to the other, and cannot exist independently of the others. The word 'harmonic' taken from the musical vocabulary is particularly adequate in this context because it compares the relationship of an individual and his society with the relationship that a note would keep with a melody. The individual finds his meaning in relation to the whole, as the note in the melody, and reciprocally, society, like a melody, is nothing without

the individual notes which constitute it. It is precisely a society like this that the SOCIAL CONTRACT would help to erect. What would be required to be able to build this new type of unified and harmonic society? Rousseau's answer is given in the section of the SOCIAL CONTRACT dedicated to the legislator:

> One who dares to undertake the founding of a people should feel that he is capable of changing human nature, so to speak; of transforming each individual, who by himself is a perfect and solitary whole, into a part of a larger whole from which this individual receives, in a sense, his life and his being; of altering man's constitution in order to strenghthen it; of substituting a partial and moral existence for the physical and independent existence we have all received from nature. He must, in short, take away man's own forces in order to give him forces that are foreign to him and that he cannot make use of without the help of others. The more these natural forces are dead and destroyed, and the acquired ones great and lasting, the more the institution as well is solid and perfect.(58)

Rousseau is saying here that in order to create a truly unified society what is required is a denaturalization of man. This is consistent with Rousseau's rejection of the natural law conception of a natural social instinct (appetitus societatis). This act of denaturalization would consists in the transcendence of man's original self-centered egoistic state, in order to make of him part of a social totality. Rousseau sees this process as the adquisition on the part of the individual of a sort of collective identity. The following lines from EMILE seem to have been especially written to clarify the

ideas expressed in the just quoted passage of the SOCIAL CONTRACT:

> Natural man is everything for himself: he is the numerical unity, the absolute whole who has relations only with himself or with those like himself. Civil man is only a fractional unity who depends on a denominator, his value is in relationship with the whole, which is the social body. Good social institutions are those which best know how to denature man, taking away his absolute existence in order to give him one that is relative, and transporting the <u>self</u> into the common unity.(59)

In short, the process of denaturalization would be equivalent for Rousseau to the reduction of the absolute natural man to a relative social being. Reduction in the sense that the social being is only a part of a larger whole, whereas in his presocial natural existence he was a totality in himself. In adopting a partial existence the individual will naturally tend to occupy himself with the collective interests rather than with his own:

> The better constituted the State, the more public affairs dominate private ones in the minds of the citizens. There is even less private business, because since the sum of common happiness furnishes a larger portion of each individual happiness, the individual has less to seek through private efforts. In a well run City, everyone rushes to the assemblies.(60)

At the bottom of all these considerations is the idea of the Social Contract. Its constitution would be brought about by the apparently simple operation consisting in that "each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the

general will; and in a body we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole."(61)

What is already beginning to emerge through the ideas presented so far is an implicit critical conception of bourgeois society, but one which takes as unmodifiables certain basic features of it. In THE SOCIAL CONTRACT Rousseau develops the idea of a political organization which would make reality his dream of a harmonic, non-fragmented society. But the fact that he sees the creation of a new society in these terms betrays a fundamental assumption, namely the belief in a basically political solution to the problem of fragmentation. In other words, Rousseau suggested that it is possible to create, mainly by political means, the unity and cohesion that by itself doesn't result from the economic relations of bourgeois society. This is expression of Rousseau's ultimate acceptance of private property. Bob Fine has correctly pointed out that in spite of the criticisms expressed about its historical appearance, Rousseau "was neither able nor willing to envisage an alternative to private property. His work was not aimed at abolishing but rather securing its existence and abolishing only its negative sides through the establishment of a bourgeois legal order and bourgeois state."(62)

In the DISCOURSE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY Rousseau

declares that,

> ...the right of property is the most sacred of all the rights of citizens, and more important in certain respects than freedom itself, ...property is the true foundation of civil society. ...the basis of the social compact is property.(63)

It is true that Rousseau's concept of property is not similar to Locke's. Rousseau was the proponent of a form of moderate and controled property, because he anderstood that unlimited and uncontroled property would only increase inequality, thereby making impossible the existence of the general will. As C.B. Macpherson has convincingly shown, Rousseau envisaged as the best economic order a society of small working proprietors. (64) This order would correspond to a pre-industrial economy, with little division of labour, and without marked differences in the levels of income and wealth. Given the fact that the means of production would be privately owned, this economic system would be capitalist. However, what would differentiate it from a common capitalist economy would be its egalitarian and one-class character.(65)

But, certainly, Rousseau didn't believe that the economic restrictions imposed upon the members of his ideal one-class society would be sufficient by themselves to curtail the formation of partial interests. That is why he assigned to the institutions of the state the function of fostering in the citizens

the spirit of community and social solidarity. This would be accomplished by means of the celebration of public spectacles, the organization to that effect of the educational system, and the establishment of a civil religion.

It seems to me that Rousseau's concern with these political, ideological and institutional aspects of his ideal society in the strictly regulated form portrayed in the SOCIAL CONTRACT is an expression of a deep mistrust in a capitalist economy. This fact betrays a true contradiction in Rousseau's socio-political thought. As Andrew Levine has correctly indicated, "Rousseau advocated capitalist social relations, but profoundly non-capitalists moeurs".(66) Precisely what has been considered by righ-wing interpreters as the totalitarian side of Rousseau's political ideas can be explained as the result of this constant tension between Rousseau's ultimate acceptance of private property and the realization that capitalist economic relations must necessarily induce inequality and therefore social and personal disintegration. I do not believe that behind Rousseau's political ideas there was any totalitarian intention, or as Berman put it, that "the desire to annihilate humanity, both other men's and his own, was one of the strongest and deepest undercurrents in the stream of his consciousness."(67) Or as Lester Crocker

claims, that totalitarianism was "a profound direction of his thought." (68) All these explanations seem to me to be nothing but ad-hoc attemps to understand in psychological terms what it cannot be explained in terms of the internal dynamics of Rousseau's own ideas. It is, in fact, very difficult to reconcile statements such as: "To renounce one's freedom is to renounce one's status as a man", or, "L'homme est un etre trop noble pour devoir servir simplement d'instrument a d'autres."(69), with any, implicit or explicit totalitarian intention on Rousseau's part. Some of the best Rousseau's interpreters have pointed to the fact that at the bottom of his political ideas lies a deep pessimism about the capacity of men to finally control the forces of passion and egoism. In other words, that he sees politics from a fundamentally a-historical perspective, as the eternal struggle between two immutable components of human nature: reason and passion. This pessimism is clearly at odds with the liberal faith in the inherent rationality of man. But is also at variance with one of Rousseau's more fundamental discoveries: man's perfectibility. If man is to a great extent what society makes of him, why cannot the creation of a society with different economic relations produce a new type of solidary and rational individual? But, certainly, Rousseau could not see the problem in these terms, in the first place because that

would have required not only a more developed capitalist economy, but also to conceive this social formation as historically "transcendible". The task that Rousseau set himself did not contemplate the abolition of private property, but the creation of a form of social organization which would be able to do away with its contradictions. That is why he saw the constitution of the general will as an act equivalent to a true denaturalization of man. Because he could not transcend the historical horizon of a capitalist economy he could not conceive man's ultimate motivations in any other way than as basically an unmodifiable selfish, and a-social. Given this fact the only alternative open for Rousseau was to "force men to be free", i.e., to make them artificially un-selfish, thereby capable of puting their particularist interests at the service of the interests of the whole community. The problem is, though, that this cannot be done without a great deal of open or concealed coercion. And thus what finally happened was that Rousseau could not accomplish a true organic integration of l'homme and le citoyen but only a forced reduction of one to the other. In this way Rousseau did not transcend the dissociation of man in two contradictory spheres, he simply made of all individual sphere a public one.

III. Rousseau and the Right-Wing Interpretation.

Finally I am going to criticize some of Lester Crocker's objections to some of the central Rousseau's educational and political ideas, in order to show the main biases of the standard right-wing commentary. This section will be closed with a brief general assessment of Rousseau's intellectual contributions to an understanding of the problem of fragmentation.

The first thing that any serious student of Rousseau's educational thought realizes is the continuity of the ideas presented in EMILE and those defended in the rest of his political works, particularly in the SOCIAL CONTRACT. This is not surprising since political and educational ideas are in Rousseau only different expressions of the same unificatory intention that propels his entire work. Thus, for instance, in the introduction to his excellent English translation of Rousseau's great educational treatise, Allan Bloom has underscored this fact in indicating that EMILE is an experiment in restoring harmony between man and his contradictory and incoherent world by "...reordering the emergence of man's acquisitions in such a way as to avoid the imbalances created by them while allowing the full actualization of

man's potential."(70) In other terms, that at the basis of Rousseau's educational plan there is a unificatory intention. As Bloom himself put it, "...The wholeness, unity, or singleness of man...is the serious intention of EMILE, and almost all that came afterwards."(71) The theme of unity between Rousseau's political and educational views is also important for the right-wing interpretation of his thought, but in a different critical sense. According to this interpretation the totalitarian methods and aims of Rousseau's educational philosophy would be nothing but the expression of his totalitarian political views. Thus, there even would exist a unity between totalitarian methods and totalitarian aims in Rousseau's educational project. Let us examine first what would be Rousseau's educational aims for Lester Crocker, the most serious and articulate righ-wing enterpreter of Rousseau's ideas: "...for what has Emile been educated? This is the first question we posed. Rousseau himself sees the dilemma in relation to present societies: Forced to combat nature or social institutions, we must choose between making a man or a citizen, for we cannot do both."..."Emile is educated for independence from other men; but beneath this inculcated belief in his independence lies the deepest, most permanent dependence from his guide. Rousseau's own dualism is replicated in his creation. It is the

underlying dependence that we make him a citizen which men in our society are not." "...Emile will be citizen because he has been indoctrinated to prefer duty to pleasure reflexively, to want all the things he should want and not to want those he should not want."(72) In other words, according to Crocker the main aim of Rousseau's educational experiment is not to create a truly free individual, capable of living in a real fragmented society, but a docile and manipulable human being. As Crocker himself puts it: "We must not forget that the most significant word in EMILE, repeated again and again, is "docile".(73) Furthermore Crocker contends that we should't believe Rousseau when he claims that the main purpose of Emile's education would be to make him free, because for Rousseau the word 'freedom' doesn't mean what most of us understand by it. What he would mean with the term would be rather a form of indirect dependency. Emile would be free in the sense of being dependent only of things, but we must not forget that things are always under the control of his guide who manipulates them in secret. When Rousseau remind his readers that it is of the greatest importance to educate the child without him realizing the real intentions of the his teacher, Crocker concludes that this would be expression of sinister manipulative intentions, as he puts it: "Here we have Rousseau's favorite technique of

la main cachee, which in all his writings underlies his programs for behavioral control."(74)

Commenting on a famous passage of EMILE where Rousseau says that "there is no subjection so complete as that which keeps the appearance of freedom"(75), Crocker ask himself: "Could there be a clearer affirmation of the doctrine of the 'hidden hand', of complete control by deception? "...Rousseau again relies on the apparent lack of contraint to induce the child to be completely open, for a purpose which he states unequivocally, in order that the child may be manipulated more surely without ever realizing it."(76) And then he concludes the following: "Social scientists of our time affirm that, throughout motivation research, a world of unseen dictatorship is conceivable, still using the forms of democratic government. This I believe was Rousseau's plan. In EMILE and LA NOVELLE HELOISE, he originated motivation research and behavioral engineering."(77) This type of comment is typical of the right-wing interpretation that Crocker so well represents. The method consists in associating Rousseau's political and educational ideas with the more terrifying Orwellian or Cold-War images. It is thus unnecessary to prove any real connection between Rousseau's ideas and the political nightmares of the twentieth century. It is enough to suggest an

imaginative association between Rousseau's theories and those modern political ghosts, to induce in the reader the impression that a true logical connection has been established between one and the other phenomena. There are many examples of this technique in Crocker's book. For instance in its second chapter entitled "La Novelle Heloise", he assimilates Wolman, one of the main characters of the novel, to 1984's Big Brother: "Wolmar is the 'penetrating eye', the omniscient eye, the prototype of Big Brother."(78) In another passage dedicated to the examination of Rousseau's statement according to which those who act as if they do not believe in the civil religion should be punished with death (SOCIAL CONTRACT, Bk.IV, Chap. VIII), Crocker says: "This is tantamount to the doctrine of arrest on suspicion of wrong thinking. We need take only one further step to punish people for lack of enthusiasm. The effect of such a state of affairs on people's conduct can only be imagined from the worst excesses of the Terror, or Stalinism or of Chinese communism."(79)

The cold-war concept of 'totalitarianism', defined by Crocker as "the attempt to impose a single pattern upon the thought, feeling and action of the community" (80), is clearly inadequate to explain eighteen century's ideas and ways of thinking. Twentieth century political experiences instead of helping us to

understand Rousseau's ideas put them under a distorting prism which make them appear as mere intellectual foreruners of the realities of Nazism and Stalinism.

But in spite of his contradictions and flaws, Rousseau's ideas represent a permanent contribution to modern political and educational thought. Perhaps, as John Dunn observed in a different context, "the greatness of a thinker is not always nest measured by the confidence and clarity of his intellectual solutions. Sometimes it can be shown at least as dramatically by the resonance of his failures."(81)

To sum up, in this second section I have tried to understand some of the main themes of Rousseau's philosophy from the unifying perspective of the idea of fragmentation. I have also attempted to use this interpretative key to clarify a few of the more contentious issues of Rousseau's interpretation. But the idea of fragmentation has demonstrated also its explanatory power in helping us to understand one of the more complex aspects of Rousseau's personality: his bipolarity.

I have attempted to show as well, that what has been termed by his right-wing critics as Rousseau's 'totalitarianism', is expression of a basic tension in his thought between a non-individualist(Ellenburg) anthropology and the ultimate acceptance of capitalist

economic relations. Not believing in an automatic coordination of individual interests within society through its economic mechanisms, Rousseau attempted to create a political structure which would act as a counterweight to the centrifugal forces of self-interest. But in doing so Rousseau contradicted his communitarianism and ended up puting in jeopardy the central liberal values of individuality and freedom, which he has defended in his early political works.

G.W.F. HEGEL.

> Once the social nature of man is distorted and compelled to throw itself into private particular concerns, such a radical perversion comes over it, that it spends its strength now upon this alienation from others, and in the maintenance of its separation it goes to the pitch of madness; for madness is nothing else but the complete separation of the individual from his kind.
>
> HEGEL, German Constitution.

> So great an influence...has education upon the general good of a state.
>
> HEGEL, Valedictory Address.

I. Fragmentation and the Paradigm of the Unified Society.

If Rousseau's political and educational doctrines can be considered as the first great theoretical attempt at dealing with fragmentation in modern society, Hegel's philosophy corresponds to an even more complex theoretical response, commesurate with the advanced historical unfolding of fragmentation in the the XVIIIth century. To dramatize the difference in historical setting it suffices to remember that whereas Rousseau was perceptive enough to anticipate for more than thirty

years the coming of the French Revolution, Hegel produced his more important works under the direct impact of this great historical process. As Pelczynski has pointed out "...he was just under nineteen when the Bastille fell, and under forty-five at the time of the battle of Waterloo. He died a year after the July Revolution. Thus he witnessed the destruction of the Ancien Regime, the restoration and the second overthrow of the Bourbons; the foundation of the Republic and its degeneration into the terror; the rise, apogee and fall of Napoleon; the collapse and reconstruction of Prussia; the death of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation."(82) There is nothing surprising, then, in the fact that the French Revolution was the center around which Hegel's philosophy, as well as German Idealism as a whole, revolved. And this is true not only in the sense that these philosophies tried to interpret theoretically this historical phenomenon, but also in the wider sense of responding to the revolutionary challenge of "reorganize the state and society on a rational basis, so that social and political institutions might accord with the freedom and interest of the individual."(83) But German idealism in general and Hegel in particular, conceived the idea of a rational organization of society as the solution to the main problems of modern society. The diagnosis of these

problems was formulated by Hegel and the other German idealist in terms of the theories of fragmentation and alienation.(84)

So central is the question of fragmentation in Hegel's thought that he even attributes the origin of philosophy to it.

> When the power of unification dissappears from the life of man and the antithesis lose their living connection and reciprocity ...the need of philosophy arises ...; its source is the "dichotomy", in its "fragmentation" lies the confusion of the times."(85)

Philosophy is thus understood by Hegel as the intellectual manifestation of the objective reality of fragmentation in ancient Greek society, an explanation which applies itself equally well to the constitution of modern thought, and particularly to Hegel's own philosophy. This conception of the genesis of philosophical thought contains implicit in it a theory of its historical role, in so far as it seems to imply that the ultimate social purpose and function of philosophy would be not only to understand the reality of a fragmented world, but also to contribute to its historical transcendence.(86) This conception, not surprisingly, Hegel shares with Rousseau and Dewey. Raymond Plant has convincingly shown how Hegel's philosophy began to take shape as a response to the new social and historical conditions created by the

development of a modern capitalist economy in a country politically fragmented and under the pressure of the French Revolution. As was the case with Rousseau, and as we will see later of Dewey as well, Hegel's reaction to those conditions crystallized around a deeply felt experience of personal inadequacy and dissociation. These feelings of the young Hegel would appear expressed, for instance, in a letter to Nanette Endel, a childhood friend, in which he writes, among other things, that he wishes to become "reconciled both with himself and other men". Writing years later on this critical period of his life, Hegel explains those feelings in the following terms:

> From my own experience I know this mood of the mind or rather of reason once it has entered with interest and with intimations into the chaos of appearance and yet, though inwardly sure of its goal, has not come through, has not attained the clarity and detailed grasp of the hole. I suffered for a few years from this hypochondria to the point at which I have been enervated by it. Indeed each person may have such a turning in his life, the dark point of the contraction of his nature...(87)

Some of Hegel's commentators have contested the interpretation subscribed to by Plant and according to which these letters would bear witness to a crisis in Hegel's life, and a crisis caused by his incapacity to overcome the psychological effects of fragmentation. For example, in the first volume of his monumental HEGEL'S DEVELOPMENT H.S. Harris contends that "it is not true

...that Hegel's 'psychological' preocupations at Frankfurt are the reflection of a crisis of his personal life". Calling the referred to interpretation a "rather strained hypothesis" he affirms that Hegel's 'bewilderment' of this period "was in actual fact almost, if not quite, irrelevant to the objective progress of Hegel's reflections' (88) Examining the above quoted letter he concludes that "the 'hypochondria' of which he speaks in the letter of 1810 is a peculiarly intellectual experience, rather than a psychological condition in any ordinary sense", although he recognizes that "Hegel suffered certainly, and he had fits of black depression; but he was always, probably, as much a master of himself as any man can reasonably hope to be."(89) I consider Harris's reading of the letter inadequate by being too literal. It seems to me that Hegel's decription of the whole episode in terms almost entirely intellectual made Harris believe that, in fact, the experience was purely intellectual. But one can reasonably suspect that what Hegel is describing in those letters was much more than a pure "crisis of confidence" (Harris). For one thing, why does Hegel call it 'hypochondria'? For another, why does not knowing how to get where he wanted to go in terms of his intellectual development manifested itself in depression and self doubt? To adequately answer these

questions requires to transcend a narrowly literal interpretation of the letter and search for deeper explanations. Hypochondria and depression are often much more than the simple expression of an individual's psychological problems. Actually, those experiences of inadequacy felt by Hegel, in different degrees and forms, affected his entire generation of philosophers and poets who were exposed to similar social and political conditions. It is by no means a coincidence that the best of German philosophy, music and letters, was produced during this extraordinary historical period. It is hard to believe that all this creativity may have sprang spontaneously from the mind of German intellectuals and artists, almost at the same time by pure chance.(90) Rather, what happened was that all of them were reacting, artistically or philosophically, to the same problems and conditions that were prevalent in Germany in those days.

In attempting to deal with the problem of fragmentation in his contemporary society, Hegel became deeply dissatisfied with the individualistic conception of natural law and morality, as well as with their corresponding conception of man. So he turned to the study of ancient philosophy, Greek society and its culture.(91) In Greek society, particularly in the Athenian city-state, Hegel found what he interpreted

as the image of a truly organic community. He found, in the first place, that in the polis there was no real opposition between the individual and the state, but an immediate, non-fragmented identity of the citizen and his social whole, or in Hegel's language, that in the polis there was a true harmony between the objective and subjective realities of man. Or as he explains in one of his early writings:

> As free men the Greeks... obeyed laws laid down by themselves, obeyed men whom they have themselves appointed to office, waged wars on which they have themselves decided, gave their property , exhausted their passions, and sacrificed their lives by thousands for an end which was their own. They neither learned not taught [a moral system] but evinced by their actions the moral maxims which they could call their own. In public as in private and domestic life, every individual was a free man, one who lived by his own laws. The idea of his country or of his state was the invisible and higher reality for which he strove, which impelled him to effort; it was the final end of his world or in his eyes the final end of the word, an end which he found manifested in the realities of his daily life or which he himself co-operated in manifesting and mantaining. Confronted with this idea, his own individuality vanished; it was only this idea's maintenance, life, and persistence that he asked for, and these were things which he himself could make realities. It could never or hardly ever have struck him to ask or beg for persistence or eternal life for his own individuality.Only in momentos of inactivity or lethargy could he feel the growing strenght of a purely self-regarding wish."(92)

As this beautiful passage testifies, in studing Greek society and culture Hegel also found that in the polis all the citizens shared a common set of values and beliefs, and that they were willing to abide by the laws

and customs of his community in the most natural and spontaneous fashion. In other words, what Hegel realized was that ancient Greek society represented almost the entire opposite of modern social and political realities.

In spite of his deep admiration for Greek civilization, Hegel's view of it was not without realism, for example, he did not conceive the classical polis as a purely positive social organization. For one thing, it lacked a true universality, a universality which can only be given by a universal normative system. For another, in the polis every important political decision was exposed to the irrationalities of the arbitrary will, to the whims of the populace. That is wy Hegel calls Greek society the "beautiful freedom", a society where only a primitive and undeveloped unity betwen the particular and the universal has been attained. Actually, according to Hegel, in the polis there is no real distinction between private and public spheres because the individual is still completely immersed in the community.(93) In order to historically transcend this primitive state, what was required was a higher degree of separation of the citizen from the community, in other words, a higher level of social and political fragmentation. It will be philosophy, according to Hegel, which will allow the fragmented

consciousness to begin to see itself as separate from the network of natural social relations within which it was hitherto immersed. This is equivalent to affirming that there is a necessary causal connection between the appearance of philosophy and the appearance of social and political fragmentation within Greek civilization. Thus, Hegel was able to see that fragmentation brings with itself it own solution, or that it is both the problem and part of the solution. Because when philosophy, engendered by fragmentation itself, allows the fragmented consciousness to begin to see itself as a distinctive individual and not as a simple member of the community, it has created the subjective conditions for the formation of a higher consciousness. Later the same fragmented consciousness will be able to reach an awarenes of its own freedom, precisely because it cannot see itself any longer as a simple an indifferentiated part of a larger social totality.

But as J.E. Toews rightly observed, even though Hegel emphasized the positive historical significance of fragmentation, he was also well aware of the grave implications that the transcendence of the original forms of social unity will have for humanity. "The development of self-conscious, critical rationality and recognition of universal laws that transcended the diversity of human experience had liberated at least

some of them from the limitations of the sensuous imagination and the authority of irrational myth an unquestioned dogma. At the same time, however, it had alienated them from the immediacy of concrete experience and the community of their fellow men." In other words, Hegel recognized here the existence of a historical conflict between "self-conscious autonomy and communal integration".(94) From this perspective his entire social and political thought may be interpreted as a systematic theoretical attempt at solving this fundamental historical conflict between autonomy and integration. Hegel's solution, in keeping with his dialectical approach, did not renounce any of the sides of the conflict, and he postulated the need to reinstate the spirit of the original unified community, but under the new historical and material conditions created by modern civil society, thereby reconciling the demands of autonomy and individuality characteristic of modern society with the values of social unity and integration found in ancient Greek city-states. It is precisely in the context of this problematic that the concept of Sittlichkeit comes to the fore.

II. Sittlichkeit, Volksreligion, Buildung.

The conclusions that Hegel extracted from his study of ancient Greek society and culture were that in order to have a true community under the present historical conditions, what is required is a sort of strong identification of the individuals with their society and that this identification can only be attained when they all share similar belief about the good life, and the same moral ideas of their community and culture. It is this kind of concrete communal spirit that Hegel has termed Sittlichkeit , a German word that can be translated as "ethical life", "social ethics", "concrete ethics", or "social morality."(95) Hegel believed that a people or nation can become a true community only when the actions and social relations of the individuals within it are the concrete expression of this collective spirit.

In spite of its undeveloped social and political nature the Greek polis was for Hegel the higher example of ancient Sittlichkeit. But Hegel was very realistic in his conception of a modern society animated by Sittlichkeit. True, the polis was a fine institution but it belongs to an early stage of human development; this means that it cannot be simply repeated or

reestablished under modern historical conditions because, among other reasons, of the great differences in the size of a modern state by comparison with an ancient city-state. What is even more important, though, Hegel says, is the difference between the respective principles of social organization of the polis and of a modern state. In the polis the citizen's identification with the community was unconscious and spontaneous, whereas in modern society individuals see themselves as moral agents who do not have to acknowledge any other authority than their own reason and consciousness. This being so, Hegel will need to conceive a social and political organization,a form of state, capable of making compatible the ancient Greek Sittlichkeit with the modern conception of individuality and reason. Or as Lucio Colletti puts it, "The task of [Hegel's] modern state ...must be to restore the ethic and the organic wholeness of the antique polis _were the individual was profoundly "integrated" into the community_ and to do this without sacrificing the principle of subjective freedom (a category unknown to the ancient Greeks , brought into the world by the reformed Christianity of the sixteenth century). Hegel's ambition is to find a new mode of unity which will recompose the fragments of modern society."(96)

Studing ancient Greek society and culture, Hegel

realized very soon the crucial importance that religion had for the constitution of a unified community. That is why, since his early days in the Protestant theological seminary of Tubingen, Hegel began to turn his attention to the study of the differences between Greek folk religion and modern Christianity, in order to determine the effects that religion may have had on their respective societies. The interpretation of the writings of this period of Hegel's life,(published by Richard Kroner under the somewhat misleading title of EARLY THEOLOGICAL WRITINGS) has mystified more than one good commentator. However, nowadays most of Hegel's commentators seem to agree in that what Hegel did in those early writings was not simply theology but civil theology.(97) As Plant accurately points out, in those early works Hegel's views on the social and...political dimensions of religious beliefs [show] that [he] was not concerned with the truth or falsity of Greek folk religion or contemporary Christianity, but that [he was] far more interested in their respective effects upon social and political culture-the way in which each tends or tended to promote communal ties."(98)

His study of Greek folk religion persuaded Hegel that ancient religion was almost the reverse of modern Christian religion, that whereas the first was the religion of the collective spirit, the second one is the

religion of individualism; that whereas the ancient Greek religion was the religion of the immanent God, modern christianity was the religion of the transcendent God. etc. As Colletti put it, "In ancient Greece, God is the polis itself. Far from appearing as a transcendent entity, the Spirit is here, as Hegel says, still in the form of natural or "substantive customary morality (Sittlichkeit). The divinity is the personified totality of the ethico-political community; a community that is founded in its turn on natural ties of blood ,i.e. on the natural commonality of descent. Not only is the rift between the terrestial world and extra-terrestial still not present, but for the same reason neither does there exists any separation between individul and community, between state and society. Everything holds together as in a perfect cosmos. The divinity is the very content of the spiritual life of the people, the substance and raison d'etre of its political existence." (99) So the problem that Hegel faced was to explain how Greek Volksreligion could have disintegrated and succumbed to Christianity. Hegel's explanation of this process was historical, not speculative. He found the reason of that desplacement of Greek religion in the concrete circumstances which disintegrated Greek society itself:

> ...the Greek ...religion was a religion only for a free people, and with the loss of their freedom, the meaning, the power and the suitability of their

> religion must also have been lost. The prime reason for this loss of freedom is economic and political; wars and the increase of wealth and luxury led to aristocracy and to inner decay. Loyalty and freedom, the joyous participation in a common life, all disappeared." "All activity, all purposes were now referred to individuals; no more was there an activity for the sake of a totality, for an Idee. (100)

In other words, Greek religion was the expression and the imaginative symbol of social institutions and values, and when those values and institutions disintegrated, and finally disappeared, also did the religion which expressed them. Under these fragmented circumstances a new religion make its entrance into history: that religion was Christianity. And this religion could not but to express the prevalent state of separation between man and nature, and between man and other men. Whereas the Greek Gods were in immediate connection with the individuals as members of the community, the Christian God was transcendent and, ultimately, could only be invocated by the individual in his atomistic separation. But Hegel sees an advance in all this. The emergence of Christianity, which shattered the original unity of the Greek polis, represented, at the same time, the process of liberation of man's subjective consciousness, as consciouness of his own inviduality, and the transcendence of the idea of a merely natural religion attached to the ethnic community. In Hegel own words:

> The Greeks, in other respects so advanced, knew neither God not even man in their true universality. The gods of the Greeks were only particular powers of the mind; and the universal God, the God of all nations, was to the Athenians still a God concealed. They believed in the same way that an absolute gulf separated themselves from the barbarians. Man as man was not then recognized to be of infinite worth and to have infinite rights. ...Christianity [is] the religion of absolute freedom. Only in Christendom is man respected as man, in his infinitude and universality.(101)

Now, the conclusion that the young Hegel draws from his comparative study of Greek Volksreligion and Christianity was of direct relevance for Germany, whose lack of religious unity could not but reflect its political fragmentation.(102) Given this fact, "for Hegel, then, the task of reviving humane community depended fundamentally on developing a religious life that gave a spiritual basis to human values rather than imposing transcendent divisive norms. Political community could only be achieved through free rationality and the religion that inspired it must purge itself of given or 'positive' dogma becoming a source of pure ethical values." (103) The Mature Hegel will abandon this hope in the capacity of religion to serve as society's centre of unification. In his later works only philosophy could perform this crucial task, because only philosophy can play the rational educative role required for an adequate comprehension of history's dialectic, thus demonstrating that "modern man can live

in an integrated political community so long as both his social and political and his religious experience is transfigured by philosophy."(104)

Hegel's philosophical reinterpretation of human collective experience finds its more systematic and articulate expression in the PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT. What is most significant from the perspective of this thesis, is the fact that the entire dialectic of Spirit towards self-knowledge and actualization is conceived as an educational or self-formative process. This is what Hegel characterizes with the German term "Bildung". In order to grasp the nature of this process we must previously explain what Hegel understands by spirit. The notion of Spirit is a dynamic category and the pivotal concept of his entire philosophy. And it is a dynamic notion in so far as it must reflect the essential mobility of reality itself. For Hegel reality is essentially spirit, the manifestation of Spirit which is inherently dynamic. This dynamism of Spirit is the expression of its perpetual need to attain higher degrees of reality and self-knowledge. Spirit cannot remain potentially what it is, being constantly impelled to overcome its immediate and undifferentiated states, as it were possessed by a true craving for actualization, "an absolute unrest not to be what it is", as Hegel calls it in the Logic of Jena. Unrest that

can ultimately be explained by Spirit's tendency to unification, to transcend all incomplete and undeveloped state. But in order to develop itself, Spirit requires to differentiate itself, to become other than itself. This is a process of rupture or fragmentation through which spirit can enrich itself by transcending its immeditate and undifferentiated unity, propelled, as it were, by the fuel furnished by its own finite manifestations: nature and individual human spirit. J.N.Findlay sees this dialectical process as a mystic game that the Spirit plays with itself: "Spirit <u>is</u> infinite, but it must pretend to itself to be finite, in order to overcome this pretence, to distinguish itself from everything finite, to become fully aware of its own infinity. Spirit is the only reality, but it must confront itself with something seemingly alien, in order to see through its own self-deception, to become aware that it <u>is</u> the only reality."(105) The point is, though, that this mystic game is absolutely necessary for Spirit's self-knowledge and actualization, in other words, the Spirit cannot do without the mediation and cooperation of its finite manifestations. This characteristics of Spirit immediately shows that it cannot be simply assimilated to the idea of a transcendent God. Now, obviously there is a deep

communality between the cosmic or absolute Spirit and the human'spirit.(106) The human spirit being nothing but the finite expression of the universal, infinite, Spirit. That is why the human self-formative process mirrors and it is, at the same time, the vehicle of absolute spirit'd Bildung. Or as Hegel says in the PHENOMENOLOGY:

> The task of leading the individual from his uneducated standpoint to knowledge has to be seen in its universal sense, just as it was the universal individual, self-conscious Spirit, whose formative education has to be studied.(107)

Or more simply expressed: man's education when seen in the perspective of the species, reproduces the dialectical movement of the absolute spirit struggling for its own self-realization. But there is an important difference between these two processes:

> The single individual must also pass through the formative stages of universal spirit so far as the content is concerned, but as shapes which spirit has already left behind, as stages on a way that has been made level with toil. Thus, as far a factual information is concerned, we find that what in former ages engaged the attention of men of mature mind, has been reduced to the level of facts, exercises, and even games for children; and, in the child's progres through school, we shall recognize the history of the cultural development of the world, has it were, in a silhouette.(108)

What Hegel is expressing here is the idea of the interrelation between ontogeny and phylogeny. In a manner reminiscent of Haeckel's conception of organic evolution, the self-formative process of the individual

would "recapitulate" the different stages of universal's spirit's Bildung. This view will have important implications for Hegel's educational theory. For one thing, the individual's formative process is going to be conceived as a process of progressive spiritualization, as a denaturalization where instinct is replaced by intellectual and moral behaviour,in Hegel's own words:

> Education is the art of making men ethical. It begins with pupils whose life is at the instinctive level and shows them the way to a second birth, the way to change their instintive nature into a second, intellectual, nature, and make this intellectual level habitual to them.(109)

The individual's education can be complementarily seen as a process of the progressive adquisition of freedom. At bottom the basic difference between the natural and the spiritual or moral man ammounts to one of freedom; the natural man is heteronomous in so far as his behavior is determined by purely natural forces, alien to his own will. Contrarily, the moral man is autonomous not only because he can command himself,but also because he can attain universal knowledge, and by identifying himself with the universal and the good he can enjoy true freedom. This is so, Hegel explains, because:

> The nature of man is essentially universal, potentially moral; so it is the essence of education and of thought... that the 'I' should be aprehended as a universal person.(110)

Universality is here understood in the double sense of man's essential communality with absolute spirit, and in

the sense of man's essentially social nature.

Hegel's idea according to which the individual must recapitulate in his personal education the different stages of spirit's self-formation, is also reflected in his belief that the school curriculum must reproduce, in its content and order, the formative stages of spirit. To this aim Hegel believed there is nothing more suitable than the study of Classics, and classical languages in particular. In the first place because the study of the history of antiquity can provide the students with the aesthetical, moral and intellectual examples they need to consolidate their moral education. At the same time, in the deeds of Greeks and Romans can be found the best examples of the community spirit that Hegel considers essential to become a true human being. Because, as Hegel repeatedly expressed, in a truly ancient fashion:

> In the spirit of a people each citizen has his spiritual substance. It is not alone the maintenance of the individuals which is dependent upon this living whole; but this latter constitutes the general nature of essence of each of us as an individual. The maintenance of the whole, therefore, is more important than the life of individuals as such; and all citizens should have this conviction.(111)

As far as classical languages and literature is concerned, Hegel thinks that one of their main merits stem from the fact that their study helps the pupil in the process of self-alienation, without which no true

education is possible. By this Hegel means the intellectual operation which consists in taking distance from one's immediate interests and particular historical situation in order to "seek one's own in the alien, to become at home in it..."(112) This intellectual operation of the individual mimics the Spirit's dialectical rythm of integration-disintegration and reintegration which characterizes its self-formation. The more direct appreciation of the Roman and Greek worlds can only be attained by means of a serious study and understanding of their languages. As Hegel says in one of his "School Addresses" speaking of Greek and Roman literature:

> The glory and perfection of their masterpieces must be the spiritual bath, the profane bautism, which gives the soul its earliest and most lasting taste for things of beauty and of knowledge. For this is not enought to have a mere general acquaintance with the ancient. We must live with them, imbibing their atmosphere, their ideas and ways, and even, if one will, their errors and prejudices. We must be at home in their world _the most beautiful that has ever been.(113)

According to Hegel, the more direct access to the spirit of the ancient Greeks and Romans is the mastering of their languages. The student must be able to see these cultures from an internal perspective, and this can only be attained by means of a profound knowledge of Greek and Latin.

In the PROPAEDEUTIC Hegel presents an interesting

philosophical explanation of man's need for education in purely anthropological terms, an explanation which complements his view of human education as a microcosm of the Spirit's Bildung. In the first place he conceives man has having two fundamental aspects, one individual, the other universal. This duality would determine two kinds of moral duties in man: duties to himself, and duties to towards other human beings. Within the individual's duties towards himself are included the care of his own physical preservation, and his duty to educate himself, and thus actualize his nature in conformity with universality. Hegel explains the human need to be educated in the following terms:

> Man is, on the one hand, a natural being. As such he behaves according to caprice and accident, as an inconstant, subjective being. He does not distinguish the essential from the unessential. Secondly, he is a spiritual rational being and as such he is not by nature what he ought to be. The animal stands in no need of education, for it is by nature what it ought to be. It is only a natural being. But man has the task of bringing into harmony his two sides, of making his individuality conform to his rational side or of making the latter become his guiding principle.(114)

In other terms, given the fact that in man existence and essence are not and cannot be immediately identical, as in the animal, he must attain this unification by means of the self-formative action of education. And since man's essence is potentially spiritual, education is equivalent to the actualization and development of his

rational powers. On the negative side the educative process corresponds, as I said before, to a progressive de-naturalization of man, to the transcendence of his original purely biological existence in order to become genuinely and properly human. Correlatively, this self-formative capacity gives man the freedom to determine his own nature according to the demands of reason, or, as Marcuse explains it; "Man alone has the power of self-realization, the power to be a self-determining subject in all processes of becoming. ...His very existence is the process of actualizing his potentialities, of molding his life according to the notion of reason, ...reason [which] presupposes freedom, the power to act in accordance with knowledge and truth, the power to shape reality in line with its potentialities. Freedom, in turn, presupposes reason, for it is comprehending knowledge, alone that enables the subject to gain and wield this power."(115) The importance of this philosophical account of man's self-formation can be gauged by its influence on the subsequent philosophical thought. For instance, it is manifest that this doctrine of human Bildung, as it was presented by Hegel in the PHENOMENOLOGY, constitutes the direct theoretical antecedent of Marx's doctrine of Praxis.(116)

III. Hegel's Reinterpretation of Modern Society.

The task that confronted Hegel after the close of his early studies on Greek religion and society was a difficult one. He has to find, within modern society itself, the elements of the solution to the problem of fragmentation. Once he has descarted some of his early reformist attempts, Hegel undertook a philosophical reinterpretation of modern industrial civilization. But as Plant has so convincingly shown, Hegel understood his own mature solution to modern fragmentation not as having a purely intellectual character, but as being a real and objective one.(117) Thus, Plant is perfectly justified in viewing Hegel's solution in terms of an educational function that philosophy should perform if it was going to be possible for man to "feel at home in the world, to secure harmony and reconciliation not by changing the world in any fundamental manner but by providing a reinterpretation of experience which would change men's perception of their environment."(118)

The problem with this solution was that it was expossed to the risk of interpreting all contradictory or negative features of modern society as rational and necessary, and in this way transforming a purely philosophical reconciliation (Versohnung) with reality

into a reactionary acceptance of any social positivity. The Left Hegelians immediately detected this potentially reactionary feature of Hegelian philosophy, and even singled out the PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT as the work where Hegel would have consumated his capitulation before the Prussian State. And there were sufficient reasons to be suspicious about the ultimate intentions of Hegel's political philosophy. In the first place, Hegel was very explicit about the conciliatory aims of his philosophy. Thus, for instance, in the introduction to the ENCYCLOPAEDIA he declares:

> ...it can be considered as the supreme aim of philosophy to create, by means of the consciousness of this agreement [with reality],the reconciliation of self-conscious reason with reason gua immediate, namely, with reality itself."(119)

Or as he poetically put it in the Preface to the PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT:

> To recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present and thereby to enjoy the present, this is the rational insight which reconciles us to the actual.(120)

This is why Hegel's philosophical reconciliation of modern man with his historically negative reality was immediately interpreted by Hegel's critics as an attempt at factual reconciliation of man with the reality of the Prussian state. But, certainly, the issue here was much more than a simple case of philosophical rationalization of political opportunism.(121) The idea of

reconciliation was deeply rooted in both Hegelian metaphysics and philosophy of history. What Hegel actually wanted to accomplish was not the reconciliation of Germany with any particular political regime, but to attain a new understanding of the social, economic and political forces that were shaping modern society. He believed that only through this new undestanding could man be restored to a state of unity with society and with other men.

In order to accomplish this, however, Hegel had first to submit the particular features of modern society to a process of detailed re-evaluation. This re-evaluation was facilitated by Hegel's study of British political economy, specifically in the works of James Steuart, Adam Smith, and Adam Ferguson.(122) In general terms what Hegel does here is to re-interpret the fundamental economic relations of modern commercial society in such a way as to reveal, behind their immediate unsocial and egoistic character, a supposedly deeper communal, unificatory and social meaning. Ultimately such a re-interpretation is based on Hegel's acceptance and subsequent philosophical re-elaboration of Adam Smith's theory of the 'invisible hand'. This theory contends that a man "by pursuing his own interest ... frequently promotes that of society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it"(123) In other

words, that in pursuing each individual his own egoistic interests he would be simultaneously ensuring the benefit of society as a whole. Thus, for instance, in the PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT Hegel explains this theory in the following terms:

> When men are thus dependent on one another and reciprocally related to one another in their work and the satisfaction of their needs, subjective self-seeking turn into a contribution to the satisfaction of the needs of everyone else. That is to say, by a dialectical advance, subjective self-seaking turns into the mediation of the particular through the universal, with the result that each man in earning, producing, and enjoying on his own account is eo ipso producing an earning for the enjoyment of everyone else".(124)

Yet, Hegel does not limit himself to a simple repetition of Adam Smith's words; he proceed to describe in full detail the way in which Smith's principle would work in some important institutions and economic practices of modern commercial society. In doing this Hegel wants to demostrate that many of those practices which seem to signify a deepening human differentiation and fragmentation, an erosion of the basis of communal life, would do in fact contribute to social integration and mutual dependence. The first text where Hegel attempted to show this hidden social character of capitalists economic relations was the Jenenser Realphilosophie, work in which he redescribes labour at follows:

> The work of each person in regard to its contents is universal labour, seeing the needs of all and also apt to satisfy the needs of an individual:

> otherwise stated, labour has a value. The labour and property of a single individual are not what they are to him, but what they are to all. The satisfaction of needs is a universal dependence of all particular individual in their relationship to others ... each person though an individual having needs become a universal.(125)

In other words, labour, in spite of its appearance of being at the service of the satisfaction of purely individual needs, would have an essentially universal dimension. Labour creates among men a system of mutual dependency, in such a way that in working for myself I am also unconsciously working for the satisfaction of the collective needs, and this apply to all members of society. Or has Hegel put it in another passage of the same work: In labour "man becomes a universal for the other, but so does the other."(126) Later, in the PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, Hegel will call this web of relationships of mutual dependency "the system of needs".

Hegel interprets in a similar fashion the invention and use of tools. In a manner that closely resembles Dewey's conception of the social nature of scientific knowledge (See part 4 of this thesis), Hegel reveals the social character of an apparently pure individual phenomenon: the invention of a new tool. The invention of a new tool would seem to be the result of a simple act of individual creation. But closely inspected this act contains an inherent social character, because

the invention necessarily occurs in the context of a labouring process that is always social, and secondly, because the invention of a tool presupposes the individual application and expansion of a previous social skill and knowledge, namely the existence of a technological tradition. Therefore the invention of a new tool is not the result of a purely individual act, but of a twofold social process. Thus, Hegel says:

> Faced with the general level of skill the individual sets himself off from the generality and make himself more skillful than others, invent more efficient tools. But the really universal element in his particular skill is his invention of something universal; and others acquire it from him and thereby annul his particularity and it [the tool] becomes the common immediate possession of all.(127)

Hegel's reinterpretation of the character of both labour and the invention of tools contains, though, a similar logical flaw. It is true that Hegel can demostrate the social nature of some basic forms of production in modern commercial society, i.e., the fact that there is a collective or social dimension in the apparently more individualistic form of economic activity. What he has not proven, however, is that the new material relations which have replaced in modern society the ancient or medieval forms of social intercourse, must necessarily have an organic or solidary character. In other words, as Marx would say, the problem with modern productive or economic relations is not that they don't have a

social character but that their social character is contradictory with the individualistic forms of apropriation characteristic of capitalism. That is why modern economic relations do not have fostered more organic or integrative forms of human intercourse, but on the contrary, have increased social and individual fragmentation. Thus, in re-describing capitalist economic relations, Hegel has inadvertently jumped from the idea of a social nature of production to the idea of organic, non-fragmented social relations. The example of the invention of tools chosen by Hegel to emphasize the collectivist nature of the apparently more egoistic productive process of modern commercial society, may serve to illustrate the generation and diffusion of inventions in the more primitive stages of capitalist development, but it cannot be applied to its developed forms. Already in the initial stages of industrial capitalism in England, the factory owners realized the crucial importance of mechanical inventions in their permanent struggle for higher productivity of labour and a higher rate of profit. That fact made every individual capitalist try to monopolize the application of any new practical invention in order to get an edge in the competition for higher rates of surplus value. In this century the generalization of the system of patents and royalties, industrial espionage, and the monopolization

of high electronic technology by a small group of superdeveloped countries, makes Hegel example appear even more simplistic and misleading, as little more than an idyllic portrait of the good old days of a capitalist infancy.

IV. Hegel's Rational State.

If a true reconciliation of modern man with his social reality, was going to be possible, Hegel would also have to demonstrate modern society's rationality in its directly political and not only in its economic dimension. In the PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT these two dimension of the economic and the political appear indissolubly tied, however for the sake of clarity, in this thesis they will be distinguished and independently examined.

As Hyppolitė has pointed out, "the strength and grandeur of the modern state _and its claim to rationality_ must lie in its ability to be the accomplished organic unity of political life even while allowing within itself the fullest exercise of individualism and particularistic self-seaking."(128) This is the internal criterion that the Hegelian state must satisfy if is going to be the modern equivalent of

the ancient Greek Sittlichkeit. In many respects this will be for Hegel an even more difficult task to accomplish, because a simple reinterpretation of social institutions and practices would not be sufficient here to demonstrate the cohesive character of modern society. What Hegel will have to do is to propose some form of political arrangement capable of ensuring integrative and communal forms of social intercourse. This political arrangement will also have to include special mechanisms to keep in check the disintegrative economic forces which constantly threaten the unity and stability of society.

The most obvious feature of modern society is the existence in it of two distinctive spheres of human action and interest: the sphere of the public or collective, and the sphere of the private. This duality is conceptually expressed in the distinction between "civil society" and "political society". This duality did not exist in ancient or medieval societies, but corresponds to a purely modern phenomenon. The polis, for example, knew not distinction between the private and the public, as Colletti explains: "In ancient Greece the estate and the community were identified within the polis: there was a substantial unity between people and state. The 'common interest', 'public affairs', etc., concided with the content of the citizens' real lives,

and the citizens participated directly in the city's decisions. There was no separation of public from private. Indeed, the individual was so integrated into the community that the concept of 'freedom' in the modern sense (the freedom of private individualism) was quite unknown. The individual was 'free' only to the extent to which he was a member of a free Community." (129) Medieval society was also a unified whole in the sense that in it political and economic structures were so closely integrated that socio-economic distinctions were there also political distinctions. The situation of modern society can be characterized, on the contrary, as one in which all immediate ties between the economic and the political have been severed. The individuals appear here in their purely atomic reality, separated and independent from each other. They are not members of a political comunity, as in ancient Greece, or participants in a corporation, as in medieval society. As a result of this drastic social fragmentation, the common or universal interest has to be assumed by a separate entity: the State. Historically the creation of the state was the result of the fact that in modern bourgeois society everybody needed to concentrate in his own private affairs. Once this exclusive dedication to private affairs reached a certain point it become necessary to create a special

and separate institution capable of taking care of the public interest, which otherwise would have been left unattended.

Hegel was the first political philosopher to conceive this radical separation between the spheres of the private and the public as distinctive of modern society,(130) even though Rousseau prefigured this opposition in his distinction between l'homme and le citoyen. In more specific terms, as Alvin Gouldner put it, "civil society is the sphere of the private, the egoistic and the particularistic; [whereas] the sphere of the state corresponds to the public, the altruistic and the universalistic. If civil society was riven, the state was the sphere of the communal; if civil society centered on interests, the state was the ethical ideal. In this dichotomous structure, civil society as the sphere of private interests is also the sphere of the economic, while the state is the region of the political."(131)

Now, implicit in Hegel's attempt to philosophically re-interpret the economic relations in modern commercial society, is a critical view of them and their detrimental effects upon human personality and social unity. In other words, in spite of his acceptance of Adam Smith's theory of the "hidden hand", Hegel did not believe in the ultimate harmonious nature of

capitalism's economic mechanisms. An economic system based on the competition of individuals looking egoisticaly after their own interests, could not so easily satisfy Hegel's unificatory and communitarian aspirations. Modern society based on industrial labour has not eliminated fragmentation, but only given it a new character:

> In no individual do we actually find either consciousness or activity for the whole. The individual acts so as to sustain the whole, but he does not know how; he is conccerned only with safeguarding his singular existence. It is divided activity of which each individual get only a piece, just as in a factory where no one makes a whole product, only a part, since he lacks the skill the others possess. Only a few individuals know how to assemble all the parts. Free peoples have a consciousness and activity oriented towards the whole. But modern peoples are, as individuals, unfree, civil(<u>(burgerlische)</u> freedom means precisely dispensing with the universal. It is a principle of isolation.(132)

As this passage testifies Hegel is not blind to the dissociating effects of modern economic relations. The point is, though, that in spite of that capitalism, when seen from a historical perspective, represents a great progression in the economic, social and cultural dimensions. At the same time Hegel was deeply aware of the futility of any attempt of reintroducing already superseded forms of social organization. In these circumstances Hegel arrived to the conclusion that any solution to the problem of man's fragmentation in modern society would not be feasible if were to reject or

disregard these fundamental historical contributions of capitalism. That is why it was so important, in terms of Hegel's project, to be able to show the existence of an implicit harmony of individual and collective interests under the surface of the apparently more egoistic economic actions within civil society. Had Hegel concluded that capitalist economic relations were essentially and irrevocably anti-social, the whole Hegelian solution to the problem of how to ensure for man a unified and harmonious social and personal existence would have presented itself in completely different terms.

Unfortunately for Hegel the ultimate acceptance of capitalists economic relations is not easily reconciliable with his own communitarian and unificatory ideas. This fact will express itself more dramatically in Hegel's properly political aspect of his solution, that is, in his theory of the state.

The problem that Hegel confronts at this stage may well be described in simple terms as the problem of how to design a political organization capable of representing the universal interest of society and at the same time keeping in check the more insidious expression of civil society's particularisms. However, to be consistent with his own realism, this design cannot be a simple creation of Hegel's imagination.

Hegel's state necessarily has to be constructed on the basis of the elements provided by real and existent forms of the state, forms which have to be consistent with the main economic realities of modern civil society, and also with the principles of ethical life. Or as Pelczynski put it, Hegel conception of the state "attemps to do justice to the two tendencies inherent in modern society: the main integrating one of a shared ethical life, and the mainly disintegrating one of 'subjectivity' and 'particularity'."(133)

One of the first things that must be said about Hegel's conception of the state as it is presented in the PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, is that in this work Hegel uses the word 'state' in at least three different senses, which must always be kept separated. The first sense refers to the state in a comprehensive sense, what Hegel calls "the actuality of the political idea".(134) The second refers to the state in its strictly political sense, what Hegel calls "Der politische Staat." And the third sense, the state as the idea of the state. Unfortunately Hegel himself fails to distinguish clearly these three different senses, being thus partially responsible for all the confusion and misunderstanding that his theory of the state has generated among many of his commentators, from Engels to Poppers.(135)

Hegel's state is a constitutional monarchy whose main institutional components are: at the top the monarch, appointed in an hereditary way; under him a bureaucracy salaried civil-servants(Hegel's "Universal Class", der allgemeine Stand); and an Assembly of Estates (stende) composed of representatives of the crown, executive power and the Estates(agricultural and commercial). What it is important from the perspective of this thesis is to determine the relative function of the different components of the state, how they contribute to its ultimate unity, not to detail its many intricacies.

According to Hegel the monarch represents the personification and the symbol of the universal character of the State. Hegel believes that his hereditary nature, and the fact that his decisions are final and groundless,(in the sense that they correspond to a simple fiat pronounced after all arguments and councels have been exausted), would guarantee that the monarch will serve only the general interest. The bureaucracy in Hegel's view would constitute a class whose interests are identical with the general interests of the state. In virtue of their higher education the civil servants would be able to understand the principles of ethical life, namely, the rational basis of the concepts, rules and mores characteristic of

their community. With the word estate (Stand in German) Hegel refers to the class or group of people having a similar profession or occupation, namely, to what is also called a corporation. Thus,the Assembly of Estates would reflect in the political realm the entire diversity of particular interests existing in society.

According to Hegel the estates would have already impressed a certain universality into the particular interests of the members of civil society, in helping to give the purely egoistic actions of the individuals an initial collective meaning. Seen from the opposite side, though the estates would prevent a complete politicization of human affairs in so far as they bring the concern of specific interests groups into the political realm. L.P. Hinchman calls aptly the states "the transmission belt between state and civil society."(136), because they play the mediating role between the goverment and the people, or which is the same, between special and universal interests.

Among the organizations of the state that must be mentioned here, besides those in charge of the administration of justice, the more important from our point of view is that which Hegel calls Polizei or Polizeistaat(137). With the term Polizei, Hegel is not mainly referring to what is currently understood by the police, but to an institution endowed with the power to

protect the public good specially in the economic sphere. This function would specifically consist in the control of the economic forces of civil society when they try to overstep their proper limits and menace the functioning and stability of society as a whole. Namely, as it is plain, Hegel understood that by itself the "invisible hand" is insufficient to ensure an automatic adjustment of the economic forces, and therefore, some kind of active agency is required to control them.

Even in this description of the bare essentials of Hegel's theory of the state it is possible to discern the main features of a system of political devices aimed at the control and restraint of the centrifugal forces of civil society. Certainly Hegel's theory of the state would have ben something completely different if he thought that civil society by itself could guarantee the integration of his members in a unified ethical community. In other words, the fact that Hegel conceived the functions of the state in the specific terms showed above, testifies to his implicit recognition of the fundamentally antisocial tendencies of capitalists economic relationships. But if the state is going to have the regulative and universalistic functions that Hegel wants it to perform, he has first to demonstrate that the monarch, the corporations and the class of civil servants are somehow internally programmed to

promote the universal, in such a way that they would be inclined, most of the time, to protect the collective interest rather than their own. Any of the reasons presented in the PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT have really demonstrated the essentially altruistic nature of these components of the state.

In the name of his original vision of a unified and harmonic society, Hegel tried, unsuccesfully in my opinion, to reconcile humanity with the more unsocial features of modern commercial society. And he did this not because he had abandoned his communitarian values, but because he expected to bring into existence a modern version of Greek Sittlichkeit, not by means of a factual modification of modern social and material conditions, but merely through a philosophical re-interpretation of them. Hegel believed that this re-interpretation would ultimately reveal that in the bottom all these relations were conducive to collective unity and personal integration. Unfortunately for Hegel, and for humanity as a whole, those material and social relations did not lend themselves that easily to this type of philosophical manipulation. Thus, Hegel ended up accepting even the more blatantly unsocial realities of modern society (such as the existence of classes, and structural poverty) because, in his own view, they were the purelly external manifestation of a deeper form of

social rationality. In other words, Hegel seems to have believed that the problem of social and personal fragmentation would have been solved, once this rationality has been deciphered and comprehended by philosophy, and subsequently found some kind of institutional expression in the organization of the state. Complementarily Hegel also assigned to the state the character of the real representative of the universal interests, when in fact, given its class origin an composition it cannot but represent the interests of a small section of the population, the interests of the wealthy and educated classes.

The main difficulty of Hegel's solution to the problem of modern civilization hinges in the fact that it is impossible to keep intact the fundamental economic and social relations of modern society and simultaneously expect that solidarity and integration is going to be generated among its members. Since those relations are constantly reproducing social and individual fragmentation any purely political or educational attempt to correct them is condemned, from the start, to utter failure. Namely, what Hegel didn't realize was the fact that modern individualism based on developed civil-society is basically incompatible with any form of ancient or modern communitarianism. Or as Marcuse put it so remarkably: "The general competition between free

economic subjects did not establish a rational community which might safeguard and gratify the wants and desires of all men. The life of men was surrendered to the economic mechanism of a social system that related individuals to one another as isolated buyers and sellers of commodities. This actual lack of a rational community was responsible for the philosophical quest for unity(Einheit) and universality (Allgemeinheit) of reason.

"...Can a universal rational order be built upon the autonomy of the individual? In expanding an affirmative answer to these questions [Hegel]...aimed at a unifying principle that would preserve the basic ideals of individualistic society without falling victim to its antagonisms."(138)

JOHN DEWEY.

> One of the only two articles that remain in my creed of life is that the future of our civilization depends upon the widening spread and deepening hold of the scientific habit of mind;and that the problem of problems in our education is therefore to discover how to mature and make effective this scientific habit. ...I would even go so far as to say that only the gradual replacing of a literary by a scientific education can assure to man the progressive amelioration of his lot.
>
> John Dewey.

> The spirit that pervades Dewey's entire philosophy and finds its perfect expression in his social philosophy is that of a reformer or reconstructor, not the revolutionary.
>
> Richard Bernstein.

> Dewey stands as the representative of American liberal Humanism, sharing its assumptions and its limitations.
>
> J.R. Randall,Jr.

I. The Sources of Dewey's Communitarianism.

Having been a Hegelian in his early student years (139)it is not surprising that Dewey was sensitive to the problem of fragmentation, this time in a American society going through the most revolutionary technological transformation of its history. Dewey's social and educational philosophies were meant to be a

direct response to the new problems posed by the gigantic industrial and urban expansion of the United States that took place during the course of his formative and mature years.

John Dewey lived ninety three years, from 1859 to 1952, and throughout these agitated decades "America was transformed from a country of farms, small towns, and an open frontier into a nation of factories, sprawling metropolises, and continental superhighways."(140) When Dewey was born in 1859 "many New England factories... still got their power from the water wheel invented in the third century B.C. But in the next fourty years, fourteen million immigrants were to come to the United States; tens of millions of acres of open country would be occupied by homesteaders and by Dewey's death in 1952 the general population would have doubled and more than doubled again, raising during his lifetime from 31 to 160 millions. Even before World War I the United States had become the leading manufacturing nation in the world, largely through the explotation of enormous coal and petroleum deposits and the development of machines, electric motors and the technique of mass production. The mechanical horse power available in 1952 was hundreds of times greater than that of 1859, and the yearly average of United States merchandise exports had mounted during this time period from some 239 millions

to nearly 12 billions; the yearly production of corn from more than 800 million bushels to better than three and a half billion."(141)

Dewey greatly welcomed and appreciated the new extension of human control over nature and the subsequent expansion of man's freedom that these mammoth economic changes were making possible. However, as his political and social writings testify, he was also deeply concerned with the negative social and human consequences of these unprecedented material changes. Dewey clearly perceived that beyond all this explosive economic growth and wealth, made possible by the large scale application of science and technology to the productive processes, there was something human of great moral value that was missing. As he put it in one of his books of 1920:

> The sciences have created new industrial arts. Man's physical command of natural energies has been infinitely multiplied . There is control of the sources of material wealth and prosperity. What would once have been miracles are now daily performed with steam and coal and electricity and air, and with the human body. But there are few persons optimistic enogh to declare that any similar command of the forces which control man's social and moral welfare has been achieved. Where is the moral progress that corresponds to our economic accomplishments?(142)

Dewey interpreted many of the negative social aspects of this new industrial civilization in terms very similar to his predecessors Rousseau and Hegel. This is

certainly not surprising given the similarities of their respective wholistic and unificatory social views.(143) Thus, in INDIVIDUALISM OLD AND NEW, Dewey identified the negative effects of the new economic conditions of capitalist America on human life as: loss of communal spirit, disintegration of social bonds and allegiances, impoverishment and destruction of the individual, impersonalization, massification, standarization, mechanization of human relationships, materialism, etc. In other words, he identifies these effects as manifestations of fragmentation. This is particularly evident in passages such as the following:

> Individuals do not find support and contentment in the fact that they are sustaining and sustained members of a social whole.

In the same book Dewey points to the fact that in American society men are brought together in great numbers by the forces of mass production, but their reciprocal relationships,

> ...are as inorganic as the ultimate human motives that operate are private and egoistic. An economic individualism of motives and aims underlies our present corporate mechanisms, and undoes the individual.

But, declares Dewey, perhaps the most serious damage done against social an individual unity stems from the fact that:

> Corporatedness has gone so far as to detach individuals from their local ties and allegiances but not far enough to give them a new center and

order of life.(144)

As it is revealed by the following extraordinary passage, Dewey was also aware of the alienating effects of the application of science in modern industrialized society;

> The use of science to regulate industry and trade ...has enormously enlarged [man's] physical energies without any corresponding ability to control himself and his own affairs. Knowledge divided against itself, a science to whose incompleteness is added an artificial split, has played its part in generating enslavement of men, women and children in factories in which they are animated machines to tend inanimate machines. It has mantained sordid slums, flurried and discontented careers, grinding poverty and luxurious wealth, brutal exploitation of nature and man in times of peace and hight explosives and noxious gases in times of war. Man, a child in undestanding of himself, has placed on his hands physical tools of incalculable power. He plays with them like a child, and whether they work harm or good is largely a matter of accident. The instrumentality becomes a master and works fatally as if possessed of a will of its own -not because it has a will but because man has not.(145)

Dewey's concern with man's loss of the sense of belonging to a meaningful totality in modern society has been traced back to his early formative experiences in the rural town of Burlington, Vermont, where he spent his childhood years. The communal spirit of this small town would have deeply influenced Dewey's social outlook and colored his critical views of urban society, as well as the communitarianism (146) of his socio-political and educational philosophies. Thus, for instance, Lucia and Morton White have observed that in most of Dewey's

educational and social writings it can be found a "preocupation with communication as the heart of social life and a preference for the small, neigbourly group as over against the overwhelming urban agglomeration. And while Dewey became in his long lifetime the country's simbol of an engaged urban intellectual, his thinking was deeply affected by a love of pre-industrial relations, by growing anxiety about modern man's loss of respect for the values that the small community supported and nourished, and by a growing fear that this loss of respect would undermine democracy."(147) There is no doubt that Dewey's early formative experiences in the town of Vermont can help us in explaining his preference for the values of the small community. However, the ultimate explanation of this preference must be theoretical rather than biographical. In other words, we have to examine the reasons offered by Dewey to justify this and any other value, and determine their place and function within his theories of man and society.

Lucia and Morton White contend furthermore that "Dewey formulated the problem of education with nostalgic attention to the way of life that preceded the Industrial Revolution in America, presenting an affectionate description of the household and neighborhood systems that lay behind the new factory

system." (148) If "nostalgic" here means reactionary or backward-looking the Whites are certainly wrong.(149) As happened also with Rousseau and Hegel(in spite of what some of their critics may say), Dewey did not see the face-to-face relationships of the small community with a reactionary or conservative eye, rather he understood that the possibility of reaching a stable, just and democratic industrial society depends to a great extent upon the elimination of its more de-humanizing features, and that this can only be accomplished by means of the re-establishment of the old values of cooperation, sympathy and spontaneity characteristic of small communities, but under the new material and social conditions created by the modern technological revolution. What is, however, valid in the observations made by the Whites is the fact that they indirectly reminds us that for Dewey the neighbourly or local communal experience plays a similar role to the one that the Greek <u>polis</u> plays in Rousseau's and Hegel's social and political views, namely, as the paradigm of a unified community. This is ultimately why Dewey declared, I believe without any reactionary nostalgia, but with a clear awareneness of the impossibility of restoring historically transcended forms of sociability, that

> in its deepest and richest sense a community must

> always remain a matter of face-to-face intercourse", and that "the Great community ...is conceivable, but it can never possess the qualities which mark a local community"(150)

How fundamental were for Dewey the communal values expressed in these face-to-face forms of social intercourse can be gauged by the moral tone of passages such as the following:

> ...there is something deep within human nature itself which pulls toward settled relationships. Inertia and the tendency toward stability belong to emotions and desires as well as to masses and molecules. That happiness which is full of content and peace is found only in enduring ties with others, which reach to such dephs that they go below the surface of conscious experience to form its undisturbed foundation.(151)

Or this other passage from a later work:

> There is the satisfaction that comes from a sense of union with others, a feeling capable of being intensified till it becomes a mystical sense of fusion with others.(152)

It is only in the context of these communitarian values that Dewey's particular conception of liberalism and educational philosophy can be properly understood. Many of his critics have shown their dissatifaction with what they have interpreted as Dewey's "tendency to dissolve the individual into his social functions."(Santayana)(153); or his supposed intent to "reduce individuality to public life"(Lilge)(154); or more recently for his "intolerance of human individuality"(Callan)(155). What these critics have apparently not sufficiently considered are the internal theoretical reasons of this

apparent devaluation of the individual in his educational and social philosophies. In the first place, Dewey did not share the classical liberal view of man as an atomic unity, and of society as an artificial and external convergence of basically egoistic individuals. As he puts it in his better known book:

> It is sometimes assumed, explicitly or unconsciously, that an individual's tendencies are naturally purely individualistic or egoistic, and thus antisocial.
>
> ...individuals are certainly interested, at times, in having their own way, and their own way may go contrary to the ways of others. But they are also interested, and chiefly interested upon the whole, in entering into the activities of others and taking part in conjoint and cooperative doings. Otherwise no such a thing as a community would be possible.(156)

Not believing in the classical liberal view of man as an atom, Dewey did not believe either in the possibility of building and harmonic and ethical community on the basis of the competition of the unfettered egoistic impulses of its members. Thus, in LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION, he writes:

> ...an enduring social organization cannot be established by an unplanned and external convergence of the actions of separate individuals, each of whom is bent on personal private advantage. (157)

In rejecting the theory according to which individuals would be essentially isolated non-social atoms,(158) Dewey rejects also its main possessive-individualist implication, namely the idea that the individual would

be "essentially the proprietor of its own person and capacities, owing nothing to society..."(159) But he also rejects the claim of this theory that the individual makes but is not made by society, and that the individual undergoes no essential change as a result of aggregation, in such a way that society appears as being simply the sume of separate, preexistent parts joined together. Contrary to that view the conception postulated by Dewey is that individuals are constituted as such by the social relations in which they are necessarily found and, therefore, that the essence of man is fundamentally social or communal. This conception is manifest in the following passages:

> The idea that human nature is inherently and exclusively individual is itself the product of a cultural individualistic movement. The idea that mind and consciousness are intrinsically individual did not even occur to anyone for much the greater part of human history.(160)

> The conditions of a vitally valuable experience for the individual are so bound up with complex collective, social relationships that the individualism of the past has lost its meaning. Individuals will always be the centre and consumation of experience, but what an individual is in his life experience depends upon the nature and movement of associated life.(161)

It is only when we have adequately understood the deep implications of this communal conception of man in Dewey's liberalism that we can begin to comprehend his educational theory. And in turn, Dewey's social and political theories can only be fully understood when we

see them as a philosophical attempt to deal with the reality and effects of fragmentation and alienation in modern capitalist America.

II. Between Capitalism and Socialism.

Dewey's first critical assessment of the classical individualist view of man and society can already be found in his first work on political philosophy: THE ETHICS OF DEMOCRACY, published in 1888. This little book contains already most of the themes which will later be the concern of Dewey's mature social and political philosophy: liberalism and democracy, the criticism of laissez-fair individualism, the theoretical attempt at defining a satisfactory relationship between the individual and society, etc., etc. In this book(written as a refutation of Henry Main's book entitled POPULAR GOVERNMENT) Dewey launched his first critical attack on what he calls "the aggregative conception of Democracy", and its foundation the theory of Atomic Individualism. For the first time Dewey will criticize liberal individualism from the perspective of an implicit communitarian or collectivist conception of man and society. He considered untenable Main's views according to which "democracy is only a form of government",

"nothing 'but a numerical aggregate, a conglomeration of units", and its corolary that the growth of democracy would consists in "the process of cutting political power into fragments."(162) Dewey immediately realizes that this aggregative conception of democracy which Main subscribed to, can only be based upon an aggregative conception of society. And this conception is for Dewey no other than the Social Contract Theory of State. What is essential in this theory, says Dewey, is not the idea of the formulation of a contract itself, but the idea that this contract would have been created by pre-social individuals. As he puts it:

> The notion, in short, which lay in the minds of those who proposed this theory was that men in their natural state are non-social units, are a mere multitude; and that some artifice must be devised to constitute them into political society. And this artifice they found in a contract which they entered with one another.(163)

Dewey considers this conception totally unacceptable and already wholly superseded by what he calls "the Theory of Social Organism", namely, the theory according to which "men are not isolated, a-social atoms, but that they are such only in intrinsic relationship to other human beings."(164) This organic conception of society, says Dewey, is the entire opposite of the aggregative theory:

> For, while in a mass, in a numerical aggregate, the ultimate reality is an individual unit...in an organism man is [conceived] essentially [as] a

> social being, ...the non-social being is an abstraction arrived at by imagining what man would be if all his human qualities were taken away. Society, as a real whole, is the normal order, and the mass as an aggregate of isolated units is the fiction.(165)

According to Dewey the aggregative conception cannot explain social facts such as the existence of a common will in a democracy, or the fact that, contrary to Main's conception, the State can represent the collective will of its members when they have become organically related, or attained unity of purppose and interest. Furthermore, Dewey challanges Main and those who understand democracy by means of the aggregative conception of society with the following query:

> There are still classes within society, circles within the classes and cliques within the circles. If it can be shown that democracy, more than other forms tends to multiply these subdivisions, that it tends to increase this opposition; that it strengthens their efficiency at the expense of the working force of the organism-in short, that its tendencies are towards disintegration, towards mere goverment by the mass, on the one side, and resolution into infinitesimal fragments, on the other, the case against democracy is simple made out.(166)

Evidently Dewey firmly believed that democracy not only did not increase social and political fragmentation, but on the contrary, is the only political arrangement and method capable of protecting society both from the disintegrative forces of atomic individualism and the inpersonalization of extreme collectivism.

THE ETHICS OF DEMOCRACY moreover, together with

prefiguring Dewey's mature political thought expresses also, though in an undeveloped way, the basic limitations and tensions of his later social and political doctrines. For in this early work it can be found the first expressions of what will become a permanent assumption of Dewey's social and political ideas, that is, that the more injust and inegalitarian aspects of liberal-capitalist society can be gradually corrected without a drastic transformation of its economic basis or the property relations which regulate, within it, the social distribution of goods and benefits. In seen the possible solution of capitalist's society irrationalities and deficiencies in these terms Dewey cirscumscribed his views to its purely superstructural level, never asking himself about what might be their ultimate material foundation. In other words, he never conceived modern social and political fragmentation as in any significant way generated by capitalist economic and social relations themselves, and therefore, he never understood the transcendence of fragmentation as directly dependent from the abolition or replacement of capitalist society.

On the negative side this fundamental political assumption of Dewey implied a systematic rejection of any form of radical-socialist remedy to capitalist's society illnesses. That is why no matter how devastating

his criticisms of the different negative aspects of liberal-capitalist society may appear in his subsequent articles and books,(specially those written during the thirties) Dewey will never abandon his invariable faith in the ultimate retrievability of capitalist-liberal society. Thus, is evident in Dewey's answer to Main's reactionary view that the introduction of social equality by means of democracy would imply the elimination of the incentives for economic progress, because, according to Main, the motives which have always impelled mankind to produce more and more material resources are such that necessarily imply inequality in their distribution.(167) Dewey's response to this was that Main's objection was beside the mark. That equality is not an arithmetical, but an ethical conception, and personality is a central value of Democracy. And then he goes on:

> One aspect of [Main's] indictment remains to be touched _the nature of industrial equality, or the supposed tendency of democracy towards socialism, if not communism. And there is no need to beat about the bush in saying that democracy is not in reality what it is in name until is industrial [or as Dewey will say later a democracy of wealth"] as well as civil and political.

A few lines down the page Dewey explains:

> What is meant in detail by a democracy of wealth we shall not know until is more a reality than it is now. In general, however, it means and must mean that all industrial relations are to be regarded as subordinate to human relations, to the law of personality_industrial organization shall be made a

social function.

> ...this, is precisely what is meant when we speak of industrial relations as being necessarily social; we mean that they are to become the material of ethical realization; the form and substance of a community of good (though not necessarily of goods) wider than any known; that as the family, largely in its best examples, the state somewhat, though in less degree, mean unity of purpose and interest, so economic society must mean unity of interest and purpose.(168)

Apparently Dewey did not perceive the important truth implicit in Main's reactionary view, namely, that modern capitalist economic progress is based centrally upon the development of individual's basically egoistic motivations and impulses. Because Dewey never assimilated this important fact in his social philosophy, he systematically demanded of capitalist society something that this could not deliver, namely, to produce, simultaneously with material progress, a unified community of non-fragmented and solidary individuals, or as Dewey says in INDIVIDUALISM OLD AND NEW:

> ...a type of individual whose pattern of thought and desire is enduringly marked by consensus with others, and in whom sociability is one with cooperation in all regular human associations...a new individuality intergrated [also] within itself.(169)

In view of all this is that the moralizations contained in the long passages of THE ETHICS OF DEMOCRACY above quoted appear as idealistic and utopian as the moral recriminations of the canonists against

usury in the late medieval times. Both reactions are equally oblivious to the economic realities of their respective societies; and both also try to impose moral standards upon economic relations, whose own logic of competition and profit maximization are essentially contradictory to any humanitarian or communitarian ethics. Thus, one may wonder, how the referred to industrial relations are going to become the material of the ethical realization of humanity? How, basically particularists economic relations are going to be reconciled with the universal interests of mankind? Is it really possible to infuse a social character into economic relations which are essentially egoistic in nature? Neither in THE ETHICS OF DEMOCRACY nor in any other of his many books and articles on political and social issues, was Dewey able to realize the importance of these fundamental questions.

Speaking from a different viewpoint, George Dykhuizen Dewey's best biographer, is right on the mark when he interprets the drift of the passages I am commenting on as a "pris de position" on Dewey's part, confronted with the alternative of choosing between liberal individualism and socialism: "In the conflict between individualism and socialism, Dewey sided with individualism, believing that the individual initiative and responsability that are at the very heart of modern

life' should remain there."(170) But in choosing individualism over socialism (individualism which has to be somehow commensurable with a communal conception of man) Dewey's social thought will be torn by an implicit tension between its communitarian and individualist components. It is precisely this inner tension of his social thought that gives Dewey's liberalism its particular physiognomy; and it is also this tension which has made so laborious for his commentators and critics to determine his specific political affiliation. So difficult it is in fact to determine Dewey's political affiliation that he has confused even such a sophisticated commentator as Charles Frankel, who in his skillful general reevaluation of Dewey's social philosophy declared with great sincerity that: "Even in regard to the point of view with respect to which almost every intellectual in the twenties and thirties thought that he has to define his position _namely, socialism_ it is uncertain where Dewey stood."(171) It is very significant that Dewey was conscious of the existence of this tension , at least as far as the history of liberalism is concerned. I do not know whether he believed to have transcended it in his own social philosophy or not. But he undoubtedly realized that he was the successor of a twofold and to some extent contradictory intellectual tradition. Thus, for

instance, in "The future of Liberalism", an article which repeats but also expands some of the themes touched upon in LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION, Dewey, in condensing the history of the liberal movement, says that as a conscious movement liberalism "arose in Great Britain as two different streams flowed into one." He calls one of these streams "humanitarian and philantropic" and characterizes the genesis of the other, the classic individualist, as springing "from the stimulus to manufacturing and trade that came from the application of steam to industry" and having as intellectual leader the great economist and philosopher Adam Smith. Among the influences which helped to give form to the "humanitarian" stream, Dewey includes Rousseau, and the Wesleyan religious movement in England. Dewey is very emphatic in declaring that "while the two streams came together they never coalesced", and that "there was from the beginning an inner split in liberalism", and that "the inner breach in liberalism has never been healed."(172)

But, in what specific way did that twofold tradition of liberal thought expresses itself in Dewey's social and political philosophies? It is fairly evident that Dewey took his conception of man from the humanitarian stream. As I have pointed out before, in rejecting the atomic-individualist anthropology Dewey

rejected also its social implications, adopting a communitarian conception of society. What Dewey took from the classic-individualist tradition was its acceptance of the capitalist market society. Dewey is not unique in this. As Macpherson has masterfully shown, Dewey belongs to a whole sub-tradition of liberal-democratic thinkers whom, from the middle of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth, "tried to combine an acceptance of capitalist market society with a humanist ethical position."(173) C.B. Macpherson calls collectively the members of this tradition "ethical liberal-democrats" and he includes in it the mames of: John Stuart Mill, L.T.Hobhouse, A.D. Linsday, Ernest Barker, John Dewey and R.M. MacIver. Certainly their acceptance of existing capitalist society was far from acritical or without reservations, that is precisely, according to Macpherson, what separate them from earlier liberals such as Bentham or James Mill. On the contrary all of them strongly deplored the prevalent relations between capital and labour, and recognized that modern liberal societies were divided into two classes with opposed interests, etc. Yet,in spite of all this,they ultimately accepted and supported the existing capitalist property relations. Another characteristic that distinguish this group of liberal thinkers from previous liberal

traditions is that they showed an increasing lack of interest in the analysis of the economic relations which underlie the political and social realities of modern society. Thus, for instance, John Stuart Mill was deeply interested in economic questions, he even wrote an important economic treatise, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, published in 1848), whereas Dewey(as all the other members of his tradition), in all his many works on social and political issues, perhaps with the sole exception of some sections of his ETHICS, never went beyond some cursory generalities on purely basic aspects of capitalist economy, or expressed the need of some form of "social control of industry". Not only did Dewey never attempted in his long years of productive work to seriously tackle the complexities of economic science, but even, as Frank J. Kurtz has shown with great brillance in a recent article, he substituted the analysis of capitalist economic and property relations, by a social psychology of capitalism.(174)

Dewey's ultimate faith in the feasibility of a gradual elimination of capitalism's more uncommunitarian and deshumanizing features seems to have stem from his apparent incapacity to perceive the inherent incompatibility existing between capitalist's economic relations and the realization of his communitarian and humanistic ideals on a universal scale. There is no

doubt that Dewey's unwillingness to accept or visualize this radical incompatibility was asociated in his mind with a deep distrust in the capability of revolutions to produce the required psychological and social transformations of modern industrial societies.

As I have shown earlier, Dewey opted for liberalism and against radical socialism, already in 1888, without offering at that time any elaborate theoretical justification for such an election. In his subsequent works on social and political matters Dewey's rejection of socialism appears always tied to a refusal to accept the morality and social efficacy of what he understood as the method of social change specifical to socialism, i.e., the drastic and violent transformation of the social and economic structures of society, subsequent to the take over of political power by a revolutionary class. In contrast to that method, Dewey says:

> The democratic method of social change is slow;[it is true that] it labours under many serious handicaps impossed by the undemocratic character of what passes for democracy. But it is the method of liberalism, with its belief that liberty is the means as well as the goal and that only through the development of individuals in their voluntary cooperation with one another can the development of individuality be made secure and enduring.(175)

In his appraisal of Dewey's social philosophy Charles Frankel argues that "Dewey's philosophy is distorted when it is treated as an American reply to Marx, or as an episode in the history of ideological

confrontation between liberalism and Marxism. His interests and ideas had matured long before the Russian Revolution, and he wrote with only occasional attention to the impact of that revolution on the evolution of events in other countries."(176) Frankel is, in general, right about this, but his words should not be interpreted as meaning that Marxism and the 1917 revolution did'n play a significant role in the constitution of Dewey'a own type of liberalism. This is specially important because Dewey's social and political views reached full maturity only some years after the Russian Revolution. In other words, Dewey'social and political ideas cannot be properly understood unless they are placed in the context of the intellectual and political challange launched by Marxism to capitalist-liberal societies.

III. Dewey's Communal Conception of Science.

One of Dewey's views which perhaps most clearly expresses the tension between his ultimate acceptance of liberal-capitalist society and his communitarian and humanist values, is his conception of the communal character of science. This is not an episodic or ephemeral idea of Dewey, but one that runs across his

entire mature social philosophy. It is somewhat curious that, as far as I know, none of Dewey's main critics and commentators have paid any attention to this important aspect of his views on science, despite the fact that it is of crucial importance for an adequate assessment of his entire social and political thought.

In one of the essays contained in PROBLEMS OF MEN this communal conception of science is presented by Dewey in the following terms:

> In spite of science's dependence for its development upon the free initiative, invention and enterprise of of individual inquirers, the authority of science issues from and is based upon collective activity, cooperatively organized. Even when, temporarily, the ideas put forth by individuals have sharply diverged from received beliefs, the method used in science has been a public and open method which succeeded and could succeed only as it tended to produce agreement, unity of belief among all who labored in the same field. Every scientific inquirer, even when he deviates most widely from current ideas, depends upon methods and conclusions that are a common possession and not a private ownership, even though all the methods and conclusions may at some time have been initially the product of private invention. The contribution the scientific inquirer makes is collectivelly tested and developed. In the measure that is cooperatively confirmed, it becomes a part of the common fund of the intellectual commenwealth.(177)

Dewey is referring here, in the first place, to the fact that science is a collective enterprise with respect to the validation of its knowledge, results and conclusions. In other words, any individual's claim to knowledge must be collectively confirmed by the

community of scientists working in the same field. Even research which conflicts with the collectively accepted knowledge presupposes the acceptation on the part of the individual scientist of a common method, even if the methods themselves may have originally been the creation of an individual. Now, Dewey claims, the collective character of scientific activity makes its conclusions and results the collective property of the whole community of scientists. But why, one may wonder, only the property of the community of scientists and not the property of the community as a whole? After all scientists do not work in a social vacuum. Besides, one may reasonaby expect Dewey to conclude that the results of science should belong to the whole community on the basis of what he has said in 1927:

> The notion that intelligence is a personal endowment or personal attainment is the greatest conceit of the intellectual class, as that of the commercial class is that wealth is something which they personally have brought and possess.(178)

To say nothing of what he has declared in DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION some years before:

> ...we lose rather than gain in coming to think of intelligence as an organ of control of nature through action, if we are content that an unintelligent, unfree state persists in those who engage directly in turning nature to use,and leave the intelligence which controls to be the exclusive possession of remote scientists and captains of industry.(179)

If intelligence, or science for that matter, since

science is the method of intelligence in action, is not a personal endowment, then it must be a collective one. If wealth should not be privately possessed, then it should belong to the whole society. This conclusion seems fairly obvious. Unfortunately Dewey did not carry his own claims to their evident ultimate implications, because if he had done so he would have ended up explicitly and categorically saying that capitalists have no right to the individual appropriation of wealth and scientific knowledge. But it is apparent that he cannot say that, because that would be equivalent to an outright rejection of a fundamental principle of liberalism, that is, the right to the private ownership of the means of production. However, in LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION Dewey seems to have taken his ideas on the communal character of scientific knowledge to their inevitable conclusion:

> Back of the appropriation by the few of the material resources of society lies the appropriation by the few ...of the cultural, the spiritual resources that are the product not of the individuals who have taken possession but of the cooperative work of humanity.(180)

In spite of the elusiveness of the passage, for the first time Dewey appears to be saying that the spiritual and material resources of society have been appropriated by a minority and that they righfully belong to the entire society. In A COMMON FAITH Dewey expresses

himself in a way that seems to confirm my interpretation of the above quoted passage:

> A one-sided psychology, a reflex of eighteenth-century individualism, treated knowledge as an accomplishment of a lonely mind. We should now be aware that it is a product of the cooperative and comunicative operations of human beings living together. Its communal origin is an indication of its righful communal use.(181)

And if anyone has any doubt that the minority referred to by Dewey, in the passage of LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION above quoted, is the dominant capitalist class, a couple of paragraphs down the same page he adds:

> But the values of freed intelligence are so precious to be sacrificed to a regimen of despotism, especially when the regime is in such a large measure merely the agent of a dominant economic class in its struggle to keep and extend the gains it has amassed at the expense of genuine social order, unity and development.(182)

And almost twenty pages further down, Dewey repeats the same indictment of the American capitalist class in even stronger terms, without realizing that his words betray an almost naive understanding of the legal an economic relations of capitalist society:

> Industrial entrepreneurs have reaped out of all proportion to what they sowed. By obtaining private ownership of the means of production and exchange they deflected a considerable share of the results of increased productivity to their private pockets.(183)

What exactly Dewey means in saying that the entrepreneurs have "obtained" private ownership of the means of production? Doesn't he know that capitalist

economy defines itself by the private ownership and appropriation of the means of production? Or is it simply that he would like to enssure, among workers and industrialists, a more equitable distribution, of the product of the increased productivity of labour, brought about by the modern technological revolution, without removing the legal and economic relations which determine the current and unjust distribution of collective resources?

Going back to the main question, if the owner of most of the resources of society is an economic elite, the solution in terms of Dewey's own communitarian and democratic ideals seem to be a returning of those resources to the entire society. Somehow Dewey appears to have reached that conclusion during the thirties and fourties. But once he has recognized the need of a collective control of social resources, how does he expect it to materialize? Let us see what he says about it:

> The only form of enduring social organization that is now possible is one in which the new forces of productivity are cooperatively controled and use in the interest of the effective liberty and the cultural development of the individuals that constitute society. Such a social order cannot be established by an unplanned and external convergence of the actions of separate individuals, each of whom is bent to personal private advantage. This idea is the Achilles heel of early liberalism. (184)

Dewey is certainly right in indicating that a

communitarian and cooperative social order cannot be implemented without the transcendence of the purely egoistic pursuit of private interests and wealth. But the problem is how that can be accomplished without the removal of the economic, legal and social institutions which constantly recreate such egoistic individualism. How can the social forces of production be cooperatively controled and used in the interests of the whole society without removing the property relations which regulate the economic transaction of its members? Apparently Dewey never asked himself any of these questions, and in so doing he expossed at the same time the Achilles heel of his own liberal position. Thus, whereas early liberals mistakenly believed in the preestablished harmony of the social monads, or which is the same,in the harmony between individual and social interests,in capitalist society, Dewey believed in something even more doubtfull, i.e. in the possibility of establishing such a social harmony in the same society, without touching its basic legal and economic structures. And if that were not difficult enough, he thinks that all these transformations can be accomplished by purely rational and educational means. In the second part of this section we will see in detail how, according to Dewey, this could be possible.

But, what exactly did Dewey understand by

"cooperative control of the economic forces of society"? A socialist planned economy? As he seems to imply in INDIVIDUALISM OLD AND NEW, such an economy could not be further from Dewey's mind. That Dewey doesn't envisage anything remotely similar to a true socialist economy can be gauged, for example, by the suggestion he made in the thirties that it would be possible to introduce "social responsibility" into the American business system by means of:

> ...a coordinating and directive council in which captains of industry and finance would meet with representatives of labour and public officials to plan the regulation of industrial activity.(185)

Thus, Dewey believes, that on the basis of this and other similar economic measures, will be possible for America to establish its own planned economy, "constructively and voluntarely" thus spearing itself all the destruction an coercion which the installation of a centrally planned economy demanded in Russia under Stalin's brutal rule.

But perhaps the clearest expression of what Dewey understood by social control of the capitalist economy is the one contained in the following passage of the 1932 edition of the ETHICS:

> The extreme individualism of <u>laissez faire</u>, with competition as the only regulator of the economic process, has been shown to be no longer tolerable in present conditions. Just as the congested traffic of a modern city demands a traffic officer to regulate the streams of rushing automobiles and

> to protect pedestrians-so the necessities of public welfare, and of the large numbers who are economically in the status of pedestrians, require the supremacy of an authority which aims at justice and not at profits: and which interprets justice, not merely at keeping order while the contestants fight it out, but as revising the rules of the contests in the interest of the common good when this is made necessary by the changed conditions of industrial life.(186)

The comparison between capitalist society and a traffic situation is very telling. The analogy between the state's function and the one performed by a traffic officer is also reminiscent of Hegel's conception of the state. Besides, Dewey here both affirms and acknowledges that the great mayority of the people who live in this society is in an economically disadvantaged situation. But what expresses even better Dewey's deep realization of the fundamentaly injust nature of capitalist economic relations is the way in which he conceives the function of his "traffic officer state", namely, as one which "aims at justice and not at profits". In other words, given the fact the capitalist economic mechanism by themselves cannot insure a just distribution of social wealth Dewey must postulate, like like Hegel, an authority placed above the egoistic interests and whose function would consist in "revising the rules of the contest in the interest of the common good". But, one may reasonably wonder, why this authority should simply revise the rules of the game and

not replace them by better and more just ones? Again, this is a question that apparently Dewey never asked himself.

Summing up the main argument so far developed in this part of the thesis. Dewey's views of the "social character of science", based in his communitarian conception, collide with the liberal conception of private ownership of the means of production. If Dewey's conception of the social character of science were carried to its logical conclusion, it would certainly imply the abandonment, on the part of Dewey, of a central principle of liberalism: that is, the idea of private property. And this must be so because the collective control of the economy, propposed by Dewey, when seriously implemented, would necessarily challange the right of some individuals to privately own and control scientific knowledge. Impeded by his liberal tenets to extract the radical anticapitalists conclusions that communitarianism implicitly contains, Dewey's views of the social character of science ended up practically denying his explicitly declared communalism.

IV. Social Reform through Scientific Education.

As I pointed out earlier, Dewey welcomed the gigantic economic expansion of American capitalism that took place between the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. He did so because he immediately perceived the great possibilities that such a tremendous growth of material wealth may imply for the realization of the old humanist dream of an integrated, rich and happy humanity. But pretty soon the explosive capitalist growth began to show on a world scale its politically explosive nature, as well as its internal negative consequences, such as massive unemployment and generalized economic crisis. For a man like Dewey, infected with an almost fanatical faith in the power of science and technology, the sudden realization of the contradictory character of capitalist expansion, must have deeply shaken his more cherished hopes and beliefs. The crisis of American capitalism in the twenties must have been experienced personally by Dewey as a crisis of confidence in the capability of science to solve humanity's more urgent problems. As Dewey's writings of the period testify, he did not give up his faith in science but searched for a deeper explanation of the crisis. Dewey's explanation of it was a kind of Copernican twist of the traditional criticism

of science. He turned around the claim of science's critics in stating that the crisis of modern civilization was not the consequence of too much science, but the effect of its limited use. As Dewey put it in one of his articles:

> The wounds made by applications of science can be healed only by a further extention of applications of knowlege and intelligence.(187)

The problem for Dewey was that so far science has been applied only to material production but has not affected the human ends and purposes at the service of which all that production is put. In Dewey's own words:

> Under present conditions scientific methods take effect in determining the concrete economic conditions under which the mass of men live. But they are not employed to determine freely and systematically the moral, the humane, ends served by engrossing practical conditions, the actual state of ends and values. Hence the most important things are left to decision by custom, prejudice, class interests, and traditions embodied in institutions, whose results are mostly fixed by the superior power in possession of those who manage them.(188)

Having claimed that a restrictive application of science was the explanation of the present social crisis, Dewey proceeds to investigate in more concrete terms the historical causes of this state of affairs. For Dewey was aware that even though science itself is not the ultimate responsable of modern crisis, its abuse contributed to it. Science and technology had been used for destructive and alienative aims. Thus, Dewey assumed

that science and technology were mere neutral instrumentalities, adapting themselves passively to any human wish or purpose, whether these were productive or destructive. According to Dewey the causes of the destructive and alienative application of science and technology can be found, ultimately, in two fundamental and coordinated facts; firstly, in what he calls the "immaturity of science" and its applications; secondly in the negative conditioning of science by a political and social milieu not conducive to the common betterment of humanity. Throughout his different writings Dewey presents different variations of these two explanations. For instance in the 1946 introduction to PROBLEMS OF MEN, defending instrumentalism of the charge of having an excessive confidence in science, Dewey declares the following:

> The acusation brought against [instrumentalism] of childlike trust in science omits the fact that it hold that science itself is still in its babyhood. It holds that the scientific method of inquiry has not begun to reach maturity. It holds that it will achieve manhood only when its use is extended to cover all aspects of all matters of human concern. It holds that many of the remediable evils of the present time are due to the unbalanced, onesided application of the methods of inquiry and test that constitute everything that has a right to the name of "science. It holds that the chief present task of philosophy is with issues and problems that are due to this state of things, including the projection of liberal hypotheses as to ways in which the required social change may be brought about.(189)

What Dewey is saying here is that science is still

immature because, so far, it has not been applied to matters of immediate and direct human concern, such as, the organization of the political institutions of society. But science's immaturity would also be expressed, according to Dewey, in the fact that it still performs a purely instrumental function and thus is unable to affect or influence human purposes or ends. As he put in a passage of his better known book:

> It must be admitted that to a considerable extent the progress...procured [by science] has been only technical: it has provided more efficient means for satisfying preexistent desires, rather than modified the quality of human purposes...Science is still too recent to have been adopted into imaginative and emotional disposition. Men move more swiftly and surely to the realization of their ends, but their ends too largely remain what there were prior to scientific enlightenment.(190)

What troubles me, though, is why Dewey keeps using the expression "immaturity of science" to refer to the fact of its limited and one-sided application. Would it not be more adequate to talk of the immaturity of the institutional conditions that have surrounded science's development, instead of talking of the immaturity of science itself? Or even, would it not be more to the point to say that science's immaturity reflects the immaturity of the social milieu in which it grows? After all, Dewey himself has said that science cannot be viewed in isolation, that sciences evolved and grew in the framework of institutional and social conditions

originated in pre-scientific days, conditions that obviously are not yet submitted to the influence of the methods of scientific inquiry. However, in reading this and other similar passages, one get the impression that Dewey tends to see these conditions as basically of an ideological or purely intellectual character, as mental habits, as old ways of thinking, even when he refers to them as "institutional". But most of all, he never sees these conditions as ultimately depending on structural characteristics of capitalist or industrial society. But, certainly, this way of understanding these conditions seems to be functional to Dewey's idea of social change. Because he sees these conditions as basically antiquated mental habits, they appear to be eliminable by educative action. As Dewey points out in a paper:

> ...change in the minds of great number of people, change in their habits of thought, in their beliefs, their desires and purposes, they hopes and fears, are prerequisites of change effected by political means. These necessary preliminary changes are brought about by education.(191)

According to Dewey, political revolutions cannot induce deep and permanent changes in a society, simply because they cannot change man's more entrenched habits:

> Any one with knowledge of the stability and force of habits will hesitate to propose or prophesy rapid and seweeping social changes. A social revolution may affect legal and political revolutions. But the habits that are behind these institutions and have willy-nilly, been shaped by

> objective conditions, the habits of thought and feeling, are not easily modified. They persist and insensibly assimilate to themselves the outer innovations. ...The force of lag in human life is enormous.(192)

Habits appear thus as the conservative force in Dewey's theory of social change, whereas the revolutionary role would be played by science and the educational dissemination of science. Since habits are so resistant to drastic change, he believes that they can only be modified by means of education. However, Dewey seems to have wavered at times in this belief. For instance in 1931, and evidently under the impact of the world crisis on capitalist America, his views seem to have undergone a significant change, as it can be gathered in the following passage:

> The entrenched and stubborn institutions of the past stand in the way of our thinking scientifically about human relations and social issues. Our mental habits in these respects are dominated by institutions of family, state, church and business that were formed long before men had an effective technique of inquiry and validation. It is this contradiction from which we suffer today. Disaster follows in its wake. It is impossible to overstate the mental confusion and the practical desorder which are bound to result when external and physical effects are planned and regulated, while the attitudes of mind upon which the direction of external results depends are left to the medley of chance, tradition and dogma.(193)

Here the connection between mental habits and institutions appears more direct than in previous statements. The antiquated customs and outdated ways of thinking seem to be now the intellectual expression of

institutions which made their historical appearance before the constitution of modern science, and these institutions are conceived as being dominant upon the different ways of thinking. Furthermore, the way in which Dewey argues his point here makes it considerably different from the position he took eleven years before. It seems as if now the solution to the referred to "contradiction" between scientific ways of thinking about society and the old mental habits, could be solved by means of fundamental institutional changes. Given the fact that the old ways of thinking are understood now as the expression of antiquated institutions, nothing could be more logical than to conclude that changing the institutions will subsequently change its correlative mental or intellectual manifestations. Undoubtedly education will play a significant role in the change of the old institutions, but the key transformative agency will be now direct political action.(194)

However, only four years later, Dewey will return to his original and most characteristic understanding of the relationship between mental habits, education and social change:

> Change in patterns of belief, desire and purpose has lagged behind the modifications of the external conditions under which we associate. ...This fact defines the primary, though not by any means the ultimate responsibility of a liberalism that intends to be a vital force. Its work is first of all education, in the broadest sense of the term.

> Schooling is part of the work of education, but education in its full meaning includes all the influences that go to form the attitudes and dispositions(of desire as well as belief), which constitute dominant habits of mind and character. (195)

Since mental habits always lag behind the changes of objective conditions any transformative attempt will have to be directly primarily to induce change of mental habits by means of education. This, of course, recognizing, says Dewey, "that the educational task cannot be accomplished merely by working upon men's minds, without action that effects actual changes in institutions."(op. cit., p.61) The point is, though, that the whole process of social transformation is conceived here by Dewey as one of a fundamentally educational nature.

Dewey apparently believed that the way to the social application of science consists in the introduction of the use of scientific method in the daily work of the school. Or as he himself says it: ...in making the method of intelligence ...supreme in education.(196) Dewey correctly understands that the applications of science may cover two distinct fields of human praxis. On the one hand the field of processes affecting the production and distribution of goods and services; on the other, the field of social relations. He seems to believe that teaching the

students the use of scientific method in one field will make them, somehow, understand the importance of the application of scientific intelligence in the field of social relations, as well. The following passage of EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION bears witness of Dewey's belief in this rather dubious spin-off effect of scientific education:

> It is a sound educational principle that students should be introduced to scientific subject-matter and be initiated into its facts and laws through acquaintance with everyday social applications. Adherence to this method is not only the most direct avenue to understanding science itself but as the pupil grow more mature it is also the surest road to the understanding of the economic and industrial problems of present society. For they are the products to a very large extent of the applications of science inproduction and distribution of commodities and services, while the latter processes are the most important factor in determining the present relations of human beings and social groups to another.(197)

Dewey seems to realize that by itself, the introduction of the scientific method throught its social applications would not be sufficient to induce in the student an awareness of the need of applying science to the realm of social relations. For this reason he goes on to place upon the learning of science an even more fantastic demand:

> Nor does the importance of the principle that a learner should be led to acquaintance with scientific-subject matter cease with the insight thereby given into present social issues. The methods of science also point the way to the measures and policies by means of which a better social order can be brought into existence.(198)

In other terms, if it is unrealistic to assume that the learning of science through its social applications may by itself led the student to discover that science can also be consciously applied to the organization of human relations, it is almost fantastic to suppose that the student of science could arrive at the idea of the need of actively improving the present social order my means of scientific intelligence.

To Dewey, then, it seemed to exist a close, though unrealized connection between these three factors: science, social reform and education. This potential connection has been historically frustrated by the harnessing of science to the service of elitist interests, thus confining science to the solution of purely technical or instrumental problems. The educational systems and educational philosophies of the past cannot but to reflect this state of affairs. What is required therefore, Dewey claims, is to make reality the unity between science and social reform by means of the trandsformative power of education, or has he puts it in his own words:

> Society, in order to solve its own problems and remedy its own ills, needs to employ science and technology for social instead of private ends. This need for a society in which experimental inquiry and planning for social ends are organially contained is also the need for a new education. (199)

But, apparently, at times Dewey was not totally

sure of the capability of education to serve as the main instrument of social reconstruction. Having recognized both on empirical and theoretical grounds the resiliency of those mental habits contrary to the scientific ways of thinking on social matters, he came up with a rather original complementary solution to the problem of how to induce in people's mind the acceptance of the need for social change. Dewey's reasoning on the point seems to have been more or less the following: If habits or old ways of thinking are so resistant to modification it is because they are based on some form of emotional foundation. This is why any attempt at removing them by the pure force of reason is almost certainly condemned to failure. As Dewey observes in FREEDOM AND CULTURE:

> We are beginning to realize that emotions and imagination are more potent in shaping public sentiment and opinion than information and reason.(200)

Therefore what would be required in order to succeed is to infuse into scientific values some kind of emotional force or appeal. Thus, once this emotional force has been injected into the student's mind by means of education, and in such a way that it is sufficiently internalized, the old mental habits will be removed from their minds and replaced by scientific ones. After all, declares Dewey:

> There is nothing in the inherent nature of habits that prevents intelligent method from becoming

> itself habitual; and there is nothing in the nature of emotion to prevent the development of intense emotional allegiance to the [scientific] method. (201)

In A COMMON FAITH this doctrine of the emotional allegiance to the method of intelligence takes an openly religious form:

> Intelligence as distinct from the older conception of reason, is inherently involved in action. Moreover, there is no opposition between it and emotion. There is such a thing as passionate intelligence, as ardor in behalf of light shining into the murcky places of social existence, and as zeal for its refreshing and purifying effect. The whole story of man shows that there are no objects that may not deeply stir engrossing emotion. One of the few experiments in the attachment of emotion to ends that mankind has not tried is that of devotion, so intense as to be religious, to intelligence as a form of social action. (202)

It is very revealing that Dewey, as well as Rousseau and Hegel before him, tried to use religion, after being conveniently reinterpreted and modified, as the ultimate recourse against fragmentation. This is certainly not a mere coincidence. Religion is perhaps the last recourse left open to a communitarian to compensate for the loss of social unity that is constantly induced by capitalist economic relations. That is, if he happen to be a communitarian who, in spite of being conscious of the fundamentally disruptive nature of these relations, rejects any radical transformation of its economic and social basis. However, Dewey himself has perceived the ultimate inefficacy of religion to be the generator of a

genuine social cohesion, when in INDIVIDUALISM OLD AND NEW he criticizes those who put the blame for the lack of a true social unity in America on the loss of the religious feeling of his citizens. He replied to those who thus argue that they confuse the cause with its effects, because:

> religion is not so much a root of unity as it is its flower or fruit...The sense of wholeness which is urged as the essence of religion can be build up and sustained only through membership in a society which has attained a degree of unity. The attempt to cultivate it first in individuals and then extend it to form an organically unified society is fantasy.(203)

Therefore, men in a disintegrated society, as the modern American one, cannot find in religion more than an inadequate substitute for integration.

To recapitulate and close the entire argument of this section. Dewey's critical stance towards classical liberal individualism, based on a communitarian view of man, gave him a vantage point to detect some of the main contradictions of modern American capitalism. So much so that it is not always easy to differenciate Dewey's critique of modern capitalism from the socialist or Marxist critique. But, certainly, Dewey was far from being a radical socialist or a Marxist. For one thing, he never envisioned or proposed the abolition of capitalist society, or questioned its fundamental economic mechanisms; for another, he never believed in

the factibility of the introduction of revolutionary changes in American society. For Dewey the motor of history is not the class struggle but science and its technological applications. As he declares it in LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION:

> ...the rise of scientific method and of thechnology based upon it is he genuine active force in producing the vast complex of changes the world is now undergoing, not the class struggle..(204)

Dewey did not see any ultimate structural flaw in the economic foundations of capitalism, and for him there was no fault in it that could not be mended through a process of piecemeal social reconstruction. When closely inspected, those aspects of Dewey's social and political philosophy where the similarities with socialism or Marxism seem more pronounced, do not show any direct influence of these doctrines but correspond to critical conclusions extracted from his own theories and concepts. For instance, Dewey's main criticism of capitalism in the form it has taken in the America of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, is that is in conflict with the very forces which created it, i.e., modern scientific thought and technology. Thus, the problem with capitalism according to Dewey, is that it has been incapable of transfering the experimental and scientific ways of thinking into the organization and administration of society. In other

words, for Dewey capitalism would have been unable to harmonize the rationality of its social and political organizations with its scientifical and technological rationality. Regarding its social-political ideas and practices, capitalism, says Dewey, still lives in the pre-scientific and pre-technological age.

Dewey believed that this conflict between capitalism's social and scientific rationalities can progressively be overcome my means of education. He conceived education as the only agency capable of transferring the scientific habits of thinking into the sphere of the political and social relations. But Dewey's faith in the power of education to ultimately change the fundamental habits of thougt that would have given birth to the negative aspects of liberal-capitalist society, seem rashly optimistic. That is so because he never explained how the dissemination of scientific thinking could by itself overcome the problem of conflicting economic interests and cultural fragmentation which beset class societies. Because Dewey never seriously considered that the main problems of modern capitalist society were ultimately derived from flaws in its economic basis, he never envisioned the possibility that the communitarian values he favoured could not be adequately realised under existing economic structures.

In spite of some rather episodic declarations to the contrary, Dewey was all his life convinced that the key to social reconstruction and progress was in education. He so state it, for instance, in his famous Pedagogic Creed: "Education is the fundamental method of social progress and reform." From the perspective of this thesis, though, Dewey's whole reformist attempt appears somewhat utopian, in so far as it aims at the piecemeal instalation of an organic and unified society, i.e., a society without fragmentation, where its members are going to pursue basically collective interests. But he expects this to be possible without a change of the economical and social foundations of a society which conduces powerfully to the narrow pursuit of self-interest.

SUMMARY AND FINAL CONCLUSIONS

We have reached the end of this philosophical exploration of the ideas of Rousseau, Hegel and Dewey. Using the concept of fragmentation as an interpretative key I have tried to elucidate some of the main tensions which run through their social, political and educational philosophies. The use of this key has allowed me also to shed light on some of the more

contentious interpretative problems which beset these theories, such as the question of bipolarity of Rousseau's ideas and personality, the meaning of Hegel's early personal crisis and Dewey's preference for the values of the small community, etc.

Even though the term "fragmentation" has been used with a philosophical intent at least since the XVIIIth century, it is only recently, thanks to the work of some of the best Hegel scholars, and especially to Raymond Plant's contributions, that "fragmentation" has began to acquire its own distinctive philosophical status. In keeping with this interpretative trend in this thesis I have attempted to make explicit some of the specific analytic, critical and normative dimensions of the concept of fragmentation.

Exploring the origin of the concept of fragmentation I have found that it constituted itself in opposition to the idea of a unified society. To the great majority of modern thinkers and artists this idea would have found a concrete historical realization in the ancient societies of classical Greece and Rome. These social formations became the paradigm in terms of which modern industrial civilization was measured. Given the fact that none of these modern thinkers were ignorant of ancient societies' shortcomings, is necessary to explain the reasons for such an idealized

view. The fundamental limitation of ancient societies was their economic basis in slave labour; Yet in these social formations, modern social critics, preoccupied with the contemporary problem of fragmentation, believed they could see that the relation of the individual to his community was close, direct and natural. What was seen as most typical of these ancient societies was the absence in them of any separation or conflict between public and private life. In these societies individuals appeared as being in harmony with themselves, with other men and with nature. If to all these social positive characteristics we add the fact that the ancien Greeks were the true inventors of the idea of individuality, as well as the creators of the first democratic political system, it is not surprising that ancient society served so well as the anti-model of modern social, political and even economic conditions.

Subsequently, some attention was dedicated to an assessment of the position taken by Rousseau and Hegel with respect to the two most important limitations of ancient political and social organizations: the institution of slavery and women's lack of political rights. Various declarations found throughout their works testify that these thinkers believed in some kind of restrictive communitarianism. That in keeping with the apparent male-chauvinist bias of much liberal

political theory, Rousseau's and Hegel's political views contain inequalitarian elements which anticipate some of the tension and contradictions that can be found in their general social and political philosophies.

Already in the XVIIIth century the more radical of liberal thinkers began to denounce the new forms of social and economic intercourse, brought about by the rise of capitalism in Europe, as inimical to both individual integrity and social unity. Interestingly enough, the critique of modern society began to emerge even before its worst social and material consequences became evident. This is particularly true with regard to Rousseau's "attack on modern civilization". This fact is at odds with Hegel's view of philosophical consciousness as arising only when a historical stage has already come to its close.

Virtually all Rousseau's commentators recognize the close connection between his life and personality on the one hand and his ideas, on the other. The disagreements begin, though, as soon as this connection is concretely specified. For the standard right-wing interpretation Rousseau's ideas are the direct expression of his neurotic or psychotic personality. According to this view practically all that Rousseau postulated in his autobiographical, literary and theoretical works would be nothing more than the elaborated reactions of a

hypersensitive and contradictory individual dramatically struggling with his own personal problems. As I have shown in the third part of this thesis, what this reductionistic psychological interpretation fails to realize is the way in which Rousseau's ideas and personality are to a great extent the elaborated and creative responses of a man a genious faced with the realities of an inequalitarian and unjust society. Because of the contradictory character of his social position of intellectual deracine Rousseau was able not only to understand his society with great lucidity and penetration, but also to conceive a form of alternative unified social order.

Rousseau's emotional needs and experiences reflected themselves in his social, political and educational ideas. For instance, throughout his life he experienced feelings of almost complete social isolation Only he who has deeply suffered such experiences can write: "When [a man] is solitary, he is nothing; when he has ceased to have a fatherland, he no longer exists; and if he is not dead, he is worse than dead."(205) Those experiences of social isolation, certainly, did not directly cause Rousseau's social or political ideas but they help us to understand the deep motivations which propelled his search for a Utopia where the integration of the individuals to their community would

be institutionally assured. Unfortunately in the SOCIAL CONTRACT and EMILE this integration is conceived in such terms that the individuals seem to vanish into the collective totality.

If we look at Rousseau's entire life and work as it appears reflected in his last writing THE REVERIES OF THE SOLITARY WALKER, we can see him struggling intellectually with the same conflict between isolation and integration which run through his whole life. Finally he gave up all attempt at reaching a harmonious and integrated relationship with other human beings. Incapable of reconciling his self-centered and socio-centered impulses he ended up taking the route of a scape into "solitude absolue". This solution reveals itself as Rousseau's final personal defeat vis-a-vis the powerful forces of fragmentation.

Even Rousseau's attitude towards nature appears almost entirely determined by his need of scaping from the pressures of society and reaching his more intimate self. Thus, Rousseau's dislike for the big cities stems not only from the fact that he sees them as the realm of pure appearance, but mainly because city life distracts man from a direct and regular contact with the source of everything good and authentic in himself: his inner self.

Rousseau's political and educational solutions to

the problems of collective and individual fragmentation reveal with great clarity the tensions between communitarianism, and liberal views of man and society. Rousseau was never able to reconcile in his political and educational projects the contradictory demands resulting from the postulation of a communitarian conception of man and his ultimate acceptance of capitalism and private property. The-so called-"totalitarian" tendencies of his political thought resulted from Rousseau's desperate intellectual attempt at protecting at all cost the unity and stability of a society that, conceived as necessarily based on private property, was seen by him as being constantly under the menace of the disintegrative forces of egoism.

In terms of the main argument of this thesis Hegel's metaphysical conception of a dialectic of Absolute Spirit can be interpreted as a philosophical generalization of western man's historical experience. In conceiving humanity's historical unfolding as a triadic rhythm of original unity, fragmentation and reunification at a higher level, human reality is explained as part of a cosmic, universal process. History becomes the temporal manifestation of the process of Absolute Spirit's self-realization and self-formation. Human reality thus appears as a partial expression of a rationality which transcends finite

reason and which ultimately gives meaning to it. When conceived as a necessary yet only temporary stage in the dialectic of Absolute Spirit, the painful reality of human fragmentation and alienation appears to have a cosmic and positive dimension that otherwise it would not shown. Hegelian Philosophy performs in this way a conciliatory and unificatory function in a contradictory and disintegrated world, thus succeeding in its declared purpose of being not only a systematic interpretation of western man's historical experience but also the reconciliation of him with his historical existence.

The conciliatory and unificatory aims of Hegelian philosophy are certainly the expression of Hegel's communitarian ideals; the problem arises when the conciliation is conceived in fundamentally idealists terms. In the sphere of Hegel's theory of State these conciliatory aims show its conservative political implications. Hegel's philosophical reinterpretation of modern society revealed itself to be an ultimate failure. No philosophical reinterpretation could really transfigure commercial society's desintegrative economic mechanisms into their opposite, or change its main political defects to make them effectively serve the general interests of society.

Perhaps nobody among modern philosophers understood better than Hegel the importance of individuality and

individualism in the constitution of modern society, though he was also aware of the insufficiency of atomic-individualism as a basis for a truly unified and harmonic society. In spite of this double realization, Hegel ended up reconciling himself with the current economic and political structures of civil society. He believed, like Rousseau and Dewey, that it is possible to neutralize the centrifugal forces of self-interest, generated by the economic relations of civil society, by means of political arrangements which leave these economic relations untouched. In other words, that a modern version of Greek Sittlichkeit can be implemented without any fundamental change in the material basis of society.

As Rousseau and Hegel before him, Dewey was very sensitive to the de-humanizing effects of modern industrial society. And like his predecessors he was a liberal who saw the social disintegration and depersonalization characteristic of developed capitalism in patent contradiction with his communitarian ideal of a unified society. What distinguishes Dewey's communitarianism from Rousseau's or Hegel's, though, is the fact that he modeled his view of a unified society not after the image of an ancient polity but after the model of the small agricultural community in which he lived in his early

years. Many of his critics have taken his celebration of of the values of the small community as the expression of a reactionary nostalgia, basically foreign to Dewey's otherwise progressive political views. I have shown that there is nothing reactionary in this appreciation of the values of the small community, because what Dewey postulated was not a stoping or turning back of history's clock, but the preservation of the old communitarian values of the small town under the new material conditions of a technological society. Thus, there was nothing inconsistent in Dewey's preference for the values of the small face-to-face community. This was simply the expression of his communitarianism. The question is, however, whether he can be simultaneously a consistent communitarian and a consistent exponent of capitalism in some form.

I have shown in part fourth of this thesis that Dewey occupies a place at the center of a sub-tradition of nineteenth and twentieth centuries communitarian-liberal thinkers who, in spite of being highly critical of some capitalist economic relations, share a fundamental belief in the piecemeal elimination of its more negative features. As a representative of this tradition Dewey never relinquished his faith in the possibility of correcting the main des-humanizing features of modern industrial society through education

and reform. But this fact bears witness of an unresolved tension in his thought between his non-individualist anthropology and his liberal political beliefs. Dewey never believed that there may be a fundamental incompatibility between capitalist-liberal society and the communitarian values that he tried to inject into it by means of education. He certainly realized that the communitarian views of man and society that he subscribed to cannot be easily reconciled with an acceptance of the economic principles of capitalism. However, already in his early works on social and political philosophy Dewey rejected any radical socialist solution to the injustices capitalism had spawned. As a consequence of this he ended up dismissing the more radical implications of his own communitarianism and never abandoned his faith in a salvation through education for capitalist-liberal society.

In chapter three of part four of this thesis I have examined Dewey's conception of the communal character of science. The purpose of this examination was to show how the unresolved tensions of his social and political thought, made Dewey recoil from the more radical implications of the communal view. The examination of this rarely treated aspect of Dewey's philosophy has allowed me also to shed light upon some of his extremely

naive economic views.

But where science must play its more important role , according to Dewey, is in the process of piecemeal reconstruction of society. Dewey conceded that hitherto science has been the servant of the interests of a minority, but this situation was merely explained by the alleged "immaturity of science". Science had not been able to influence human ends. Instead, it has been reduced to nothing more than an instrument at the service of egoistic elites. Dewey's solution to this state of affairs was a complete transformation in the social view and use of science through education. The supposition at the basis of this solution is the belief that the learning of science in its social applications will inevitably lead the students to discover its socially reconstructive potentialities. I have shown that this claim is groundless not only because it involves implausible speculation about the empirical effects of scientific study upon the political imagination but also because presupposes science as desembodied process, without any substantive connection with the real class interests of society. Not a Marxist critic but Reinhold Niebuhr, a Protestant theologian and scholar, has correctly charged Dewey of totally ignoring the class realities of capitalist society, in his attempt at correcting its deficiencies by means of

the power of "freed intelligence":

> Not a suspicion dawns upon professor Dewey that no possible "organized intelligence" can be as transcendent over the historical conflicts of interest as it ought to be to achieve the desinterested intelligence which he attributes to it. Every such "organized inquiry" must have its own particular social locus. No court of law, though supported by age-old traditions of freedom from party conflict, is free of party bias whenever it deals with issues profound enough to touch the very foundation of the society upon which the court is reared.(206)

One of the things that strike any attentive reader of Dewey's writings on social matters is his second hand acquaintance with Marx's ideas. In the many passages scattered throughout his works where Dewey criticizes Marxism that I have found only one instance is a direct quotation from Marx's ideas. I consider this very significant because it helps to explains why Dewey missed in its entirety the philosophical core of Marx's critique of capitalism. I believe that these philosophical concepts would have help him to perceive the essentially alienative nature of the material basis of this society.

Even though, on occasions, Dewey paid homage to some of the pivotal insights of historical materialism, he not only rejected but never seriously considered Marxism's central thesis --i.e, that the economic relations of capitalism are the main culprits of modern fragmented and alienated conditions. Dewey seems to have

been totally unaware, for example, of the fact that modern fragmentation and alienation may be the expresssion of a proccess of real abstraction which takes place daily in the reified material relations of capitalist economy. As I have shown at the beginning of the part on Dewey, he correctly perceived that modern industrial society alienates and disintegrates men. What he did not appreciate was the possibility that this process is constantly generated by capitalist economic relations themselves.

Throughout this thesis I have explored the responses of three great communitarian liberal philosophers to man's predicament in modern society. Part of what these thinkers have in common is a diagnosis of this predicament in terms of the ideas of fragmentation and alienation. But as I have shown in some detail, the commonalities of Rousseau, Hegel and Dewey theoretical projects run even deeper. Their political, social and educational philosophies are affected by similar tensions as a consequence of an inadequate integration of their communitarian and atomic-individualist components.

In their own specific ways each one of these thinkers conceived political projects aimed at the unification of man's dissociated dimensions, and saw in education one of the most important agencies for the

creation of a harmonious society of unified men. In spite of the greatness of their efforts they were all ultimately defeated by the magnitude of the enterprise and the contradictory demands they tried simultaneously to satisfy. Perhaps this fact confirms once more the truth of John Dunn's assertion that "the greatness of a thinker is not always best measured by the confidence and clarity of his intellectual solutions. Sometimes it can be shown as least as dramatically by the resonance of his failures."(207)

I believe to have demonstrated in this thesis the critical penetration and theoretical fecundity of the idea of fragmentation in helping us to illuminate important aspects of modern man's predicament, and also to better understand the social, political and educational thought of three of the most sophisticated and influencial communitarian liberals the world has known.

FOOTNOTES.

1. Alasdair MacIntyre. "Marxist Mask and Romantic Face: Lukacs on Thomas Mann." Against The Self Images of the Age. New York: Schocken Books, pp. 65-6

2. Robert A. Nisbet. The Quest for Community. London: Oxford University Press, 1953, pp.3 and 7.

3. G.W. Morgan. The Human Predicament. Dissolution and Wholeness. New York: Delta, 1970, pp.XIII and 61.

4. Besides alienation, the most commonly used term to refer to the phenomenon under study is 'fragmentation', but other generic terms have occasionaly been used, such as 'segmentation'. See Yi-Fu Tuan. Segmented Worlds and Self: Group Life and Individual Consciousness. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1982.

5. Apparently not a single systematic study of the concept of fragmentation it has been done. Three more recent books which deal with the problem or make a prominent use of the term 'fragmentation' do not even attempt to define it. See Philip J. Kain. Schiller, Hegel and Marx; State, Society and the Aesthetic Ideal of Ancient Greece. Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Preess, 1982. Lewis P. Hinchman. Hegel's Critique of Enlightenment. Tampa: University of South Florida Press, 1984. Alvin Gouldner. Against Fragmentation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. Gouldner, following and old custom among Hegel's and Marx's commentators, uses the term as if it were nothing but a synonym for alienation. See especially chapter three of this otherwise interesting and original book.

6. Cf. Arthur O. Lovejoy. The Great Chain of Being. A Study of the History of an Idea. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1936, pp.7,10 and 11.

7. As R.P. Wolff has observed: "The severest

criticisms of liberal society, both from the left and from the right, focus on the absence of community in even the most efficient and affluent liberal capitalist state. Conservative critics bemoan the loss of tradition and look back longing for an earlier age when men where bound to one another by feeling ties of loyalty and trust; radical critics decry the reduction of human interaction to the exploitative rationality of the cash nexus, and look forward hopefully to a time when work will unite men in cooperative production rather than setting them against one another in destructive competition. Voices from the right evoke the political immediacy of the town meeting, while a cry goes up on the left for participatory democracy. R.P. Wolff. The Poverty of Liberalism. Boston: Beacon Press, Undated, pp.183-4.

8. Ernest Fisher. The Necessity of Art. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1964, p.8.

9. Paul Zweig. The Heresy of Self Love: A Study of Subversive Individualism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968, p.246.

10. Frederich Schiller. On the Aesthetic Education of Man. New York: F. Ungart Publishing Co., 1974, p.40.

11. Frederich Schiller. Ibid., p.43.

12. One of the few declarations of Dewey regarding this point was uttered in the context of an examination of the integrative function of religion in the ancient world vis-a-vis the disintegrative role of modern Christians religions: "Wherever religion has not become a merely private indulgence, it has become at best a matter of sects and denominations divided from one another by doctrinal differences... There is no such a bond of social unity that once united Greeks, Romans, Hebrews and Catholic medieval Europe." John Dewey. Individualism Old and New. New York: Minton, Balch & Co.,1963, p.63.

13. Besides, as Charles E. Larmore remind us: "...the polis was a historically limited and relatively marginal social form even in antiquity. A far greater part of the history of ancient society... took place under the quite different conditions of

the empire." Patterns of Moral Complexity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p.157, note 7.

14. Hannah Arendt. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958, p.24.

15. Anthony Arblaster. Democracy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987, p.23.

16. M.I. Finley. The Ancient Greeks. New York: The Viking Press, 1963, p.51

17. D.F. Kitto. The Greeks. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1957, p.161.

18. Philip J. Kain. Schiller, Hegel and Marx. State, Society, and the Aesthetic Ideal of Ancient Greece. Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1982, pp.8-9.

19. H.S. Harris. "And the darkness comprehended it not." Hegel. The Absolute Spirit. T.F. Geraets(ed.) Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1984, p.33.

20. Philip J. Kain. Op. Cit., p.9.

21. L.T. Hobhouse. Liberalism. London: Oxford University Press, 1964, p.11.

22. Lucien Goldmann. The Human Sciences and Philosophy. London: Jonathan Cape Ltd. 1969, pp.94-5

23. Karl Popper. The Open Society and its Enemies. Vol.1, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967, p.295.

M.I. Finley has shown, in an illuminating article, that the institution of slavery was so deeply entrenched in the Greek mind that it was practically never intellectually challanged, not even by its victims. Neither were the believers in the brotherhood of man, whether Cynics, Stoics or early Christians, against slavery. This observation seems to support Popper's suggestion. Cf. M.I. Finlay. "Was Civilization Based on slave work?"

Economy and Society in Ancient Greece. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1964, p.105.

24. G.W.F. Hegel. Philosophy of Right.(Knox's transl.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, Add. to paragraph 166, p.203.

25. G.W.F. Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit.(Miller's transl.) Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1979, p.288

26. G.W.F. Hegel. Philosophy of Right. Quoted by M.Mackenzie. Hegel's Educational Theory and Practice. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1970, p.77. See also Knox's edition(p.264) for a somewhat different translation.

27. Anthony Arblaster. The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1984, pp.15 and 91.

28. G.W.F. Hegel. The Philosophy of History.(Sibree's transl.) New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1956, pp.254-5

29. G.W.F. Hegel. Philosophy of Mind. (Wallace's transl.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973, pp.42-3.

30. See: Jane M. Dewey(ed.) "Biography of John Dewey". The Philosophy of John Dewey. P.A. Schilpp(ed). Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1939, pp.149-50.

31. Susan Laird. "Women and Gender in John Dewey's Philosophy of Education." Educational Theory, Winter 1988, Vol.38, No.1, p.112.

32. Karl Lowith. From Hegel to Nietzsche. Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1967, p.232.

33. "Starobinski's,[La Transparence et L'obstacle] one of the most sensitive and elegant books on Rousseau ever written." Peter Gay. The Party of Humanity. Essays in the French Enlightenment. New York: Norton & Co., 1963, p.233.

34. Peter Gay. Ibid., p.234.

35. "Malgre toute l'emphase du discours, un sentiment vrai de la division s'impose et se propage. La rupture entre l'etre et le paraitre engendre d'autres conflits, comme une serie d'echos amplifies: rupture entre le bien et le mal(entre les bons et les mechants), rupture entre la nature et la societe, entre l'homme et ses dieux, entre l'homme et lui meme. Enfin, l'histoire entiere se divise en un avant et un apres: auparavant il y avait des patries et des citoyens; maintenant il n'y en a plus." Jean Starobinski. J.J. Rousseau, La Transparence et l'obstacle. Paris: Gallimard, 1971, p.14.

36. Robert Nisbet. The Social Philosophers. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1973, p.1-2

37. "For the first thirty-seven years of his life, Rousseau had led an uprooted wandering existence." John Mc Manners. "The Social Contract and Rousseau's revolt against Society." Hobbes and Rousseau. M. Cranston and R.S. Peters(eds.) Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1972, p.295.

38. John A. Hall. Liberalism. London: Paladin, 1987, p.96.

39. Jean Guehenno. J.J. Rousseau. 1712-1758. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966, Vol.I.p.28

40. Werner Stark. The Sociology of Knowledge. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977, p.26.

41. Quoted by Jean Guehenno, op. cit. pp.130-1.

42. "Je sais que le bruit du monde effarouche les coeurs aimans et tendres, qu'ils se resserrent et se compriment dans la foule, qu'ils se dilatent et s'epanchent entre eux, qu'il n'y a de veritable effusion que dans le tete-a-tete, qu'enfin cette intimite delicieuse qui fait la veritable jouissance de la amitie ne peut gueres se former et se nourrir que dans la retraite: mains je sais aussi qu'une solitude absolue est un etat triste et contraire a la nature: les sentiments affectueux norrissent l'ame, la communication des idees avive l'esprit. Notre plus douce existance est relative et collective, et notre vrai moi n'est pas tout entier en nous. Enfin telle est la constitution de l'homme en cette vie qu'on n'y

parvient jamais a bien jouir de soi sans le concours d'autri." Jean Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau Juge de Jean Jacques. Oeuvres Completes. Paris: Gallimard, 1959, Vol.I, p.813.

43. John McManners. op. cit., p.311.

44. Alexander Meiklejohn. Education Between two Worlds. New York: Atherton Press, 1966, p.71.

45. Speaking of the Renaisance's man craving for fame, Erich Fromm points to its compensatory function in providing a substitute for the loss of primary human ties brought about by the demise of the medieval world. This observation may be also applied to Rousseau's search for fame: "If the meaning of life has become doubtful, if one's relations to others and to oneself do not offer security, then fame is one means to silence one's doubts,...it elevates one's individual life from its limitations and instability to a plane of indestructibility; if one's name is known to one's contemporaries and if one can hope that it will last for centuries, then one's life has meaning and significance by the very reflection of it in the judgements of others." Erich Fromm. Escape from Freedom. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976, p.49.

46. J.C. Herold. "The Solitary Wanderer [illegible].96. Quoted by Lester Crocker. Rousseau. The Profetic Vision 1758-1778. Vol II. p.3

47. Peter Gay says the following about this important methodological point: "To be sure, the genetic explanation, the biographical approach will give insight into the motives of the writer and aid inquiry into the personal and social origin of his doctrines. It will help to explain why an author writes a certain book, and why he holds certain beliefs _but the objective validity of his doctrines is unaffected by the personal history of his creator." Gay's introduction to Ernst Cassirer's The Question of Jean Jacques Rousseau. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975, p.15.

48. Jean Starobinski. op. cit. pp.24-5.

49. Marshall Berman. The Politics of Authenticity.

New York: Atheneum, 1970, Chapters 3 and 4.

50. J.J. Rousseau. The Social Contract(Watkins' transl.) Edinburgh: Nelson, 1953, p.148.

51. Lucio Colletti. "Rousseau as Critic of Civil Society". From Rousseau to Lenin. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972, p.173.

52. For the term "atomic individualism" See note 158.

53. See Mario Einaudi. The Early Rousseau. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967, p.252

54. J.J. Rousseau. "Preface to Narcissus". The First and Second Discourses.(Gourevitch's transl.) New York: Harper and Row, 1986, pp.104-5.

55. Stephen Ellenburg. Rousseau's Political Philosophy. An Interpretation from Within. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976, p.101.

56. J.J. Rousseau. Discourse on Political Economy.On the Social Contract with Geneva Manuscript and Political Economy. (Roger D. Masters(ed.), Judith R. Masters (transl.) New York: St. Martin Press, 1978, pp.211-12.

57. Rousseau knew perfectly well that any comparison between society and a human body was inadequate and ultimately misleading. See, for instance, the following statement: "Citizens may well call themselves members of the state. They will never be able to join themselves to the state as eal members are joined to the human body; it is impossible to avoid a separate and individual existence for each of them and through which alone he can suffice to his own conservation." J.J. Rousseau. "Que l'Etat de guerre nait de l'etat social.", O.C. III, p.606. Quoted by Mario Einaudi. The Early Rousseau. New York: Cornell University Press, 1972, p.171.

58. J.J. Rousseau. The Social Contract.(J.D. Masters' transl.) New York: St. Martin Press,

1978, p.68.

59. J.J. Rousseau. Emile or On Education. (Bloom's transl.) New York: Basic Books, 1979, pp.39-40.

60. J.J. Rousseau. The Social Contract. (J.D. Masters' transl.) New York: St. Martin Press, 1979, p.102.

61. J.J. Rousseau. Ibid., p.53.

62. Bob Fine. Democracy and the Rule of Law. Liberal Ideals and Marxist Critiques. London: Pluto Press, 1984, p.26.

63. J.J. Rousseau. Discourse On Political Economy. On the Social Contract with Geneva Manuscript and Political Economy. (J.D.Masters' transl.) New York: St. Martin Press, 1978, pp.224, 229-30.

64. C.B. Macpherson. The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979, pp.15-16-17.

65. Andrew Levine is wrong when he claims, in a recent book, that the type of society which Rousseau had in mind in the Social Contract would have been a classless society. C.B. Macpherson has conclusively demonstrated that Rousseau's as Jefferson's models of a just society were rather one-class society. Cf. Andrew Levine. The End of The State. A Marxist Reflection on an Idea of Rousseau's. London: Verso, 1987, p.42. This book contains one of the finest analysis of the Social Contract.

66. Andrew Levine. Ibid., p.46.

67. Marshall Berman. The Politics of Authenticity. Radical Individualism and the Emergence of Modern Society. New York: Atheneum, 1970, p.275.

68. Lester Crocker. "Rousseau et la voie du totalitarism". Rousseau et la Philosophie Politique. (Annales de philosophie politique, #5); Institut international de philosophie politique, Paris, 1965, p.99.

69. J.J. Rousseau. The Social Contract. On the Social Contract with Geneva Manuscript and Political Economy.(D.Masters'transl.) New York: St. Martin Press, 1978, p.50; Julie ou la Nouvelle Heloise. Paris: Garnier, 1960, p.521.

70. Allan Bloom. Introduction to Emile or On Education. New York: Basic Books, 1979, p.3

71. Allan Bloom. Ibid., p.4.

72. Lester Crocker. J.J. Rousseau. The Prophetic Voice. New York: MacMillan, 1973, p.160-1

73. Lester Crocker. Ibid., p.165

74. Lester Crocker. Ibid., p.136

75. J.J. Rousseau. Emile or On Education. New York: Basic Books, 1979, p.120.

76. Lester Crocker. op.cit., p.139.

77. Lester Crocker. loc.cit.

78. Lester Crocker. Ibid., p.75

79. Lester Crocker. Ibid., p.184.

80. Lester Crocker. Introduction to the Social Contract. The Social Contract and Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. New York: Washington Square Press, 1967, p.XXIII.

81. John Dunn. Locke. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984, pp. VI-VII.

82. Z.A. Pelczynski. Introductory essay to Hegel's Political Writings. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964, p.9.

83. Herbert Marcuse. Reason and Revolution. Boston: Beacon Press, 1960, p.2.

84. It is somewhat curious that, in spite of the importance of the problem of fragmentation in Hegel's political philosophy, a full and systematic

understanding of the meaning and function of this problem within his thought has began to emerge rather recently in Hegel's scholarship. Among some of the books dealing partially with the question of fragmentation must be included: Joachim Ritter. Hegel and the French Revolution. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1984(first ed. 1957); Shlomo Avineri. Hegel's theory of Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972; and Charles Taylor's Hegel. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983. The only extensive treatment of the question of fragmentation in Hegel's philosophy has been done by Raymond Plant in his Hegel, An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell, 1983. Subsequently has appeared Lewis P. Hinchman's Hegel's Critique of Enlightenment, 1984.

85. G.W.F. Hegel. The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy. Quoted by Ritter in Hegel and the French Revolution, p.63.

86. Hegel's views on this contribution evolved from an original social-reformism to what became later, as characterized by Raymond Plant, "a philosophical description of experience, a redescription with transfigures the world and enables men to live at home in it." R. Plant, op. cit. p.76.

87. Briefe von und an Hegel. Letter to Nanette Endel, July 1797, and letter to Windischmann, May 27 of 1810. Both letters are quoted by Plant, Op. Cit., p.77.

88. According to Hyppolite there would be a close relationship between Hegel's philosophy and his early personal development: "Hegel's entire youthful itineray reappears in the Phenomenology in a rethought and organized form. Everything that Dilthey and Nohl found in the note books of Hegel's youth, everything Hegel wrote in Sttutgart, in Bern and in frankfurt about the ancient world and about Christianity and its destiny, everything that he elaborated in Jena about the life of a people and its organization: all these developments which led him to his philosophic thought... reappear in the Phenomenology." Jean Hyppolite. Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974,

p.47.

89. H.S. Harris. Hegel's Development. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983, Vol 1, pp.264-5.

90. "Hegel's contemporaries formed the elite of classical German Idealism, literature and music: Kant, Schiller, Fichte, Schelling, Holderlin, Goethe, Beethoven, and others were among his coevals and some were his personal friends." David MacGregor. The Communist Ideal in Hegel and Marx. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984, p.258.

91. I follow here Pelczynski's description of Hegel's early development as presented in his article entitled: "The Hegelian Conception of the State". Z.A. Pelczynski(ed.) Hegel's Political Philosophy. Problems and Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1976, pp.1 to 29. See also Shlomo Avineri. Hegel's Theory of Modern State. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1972, Chapters 1 to 5.

92. G.W.F. Hegel. Early Theological Writings.(Knox's transl.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971, p.154.

93. "For the philosophers of the Greek polis, it was meaningless to speak of an antithesis between society and the individual, since the part cannot logically be antithetical to the whole. As well one might talk of an opposition between a person and his finger. The Greek language _that complex instrument for conveying the subtlest nunances of thought_ does not even have a term that precisely corresponds to "individual". A person is either a polites(member of a polis) or an idiotes (private to oneself). Society's concern is with the polites. The idiotes, as Pericles said of him, is useless; and, as the English derivative suggests, an "idiot". Leslie Lipson. The Democratic Civilization. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, p.47.

94. J.E. Toews. Hegelianism. The Path Towards Dialectical Humanism, 1805-1841. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p.29.

95. See, Z.A. Pelczynski. op. cit., p.6.

96. Lucio Colletti. Introduction to Karl Marx Early

Writings. New York: Vintage Books, 1975, p.31.

97. "The fundamental theme of Hegel's youthful writings is the attempt to discover the spiritual basis for authentic human community, conceived of as a revival of the immediate and beautiful unity of the Greek Polis. Robert Gascoigne. Religion, Rationality and Community. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985, p.1.

98. Raymond Plant. op. cit. p.32.

99. Lucio Colletti. Marxism and Hegel. London: Verso, 1979. p.252.

100. G.W.F. Hegel. Early Theological Writings. Quoted by G.P. Adams. The Mystical Element in Hegel's Early Theological Writings. New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1984, p.83.

101. G.W.F. Hegel. Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Quoted by Lucio Colletti. op. cit., p.249.

102. "At this period Germany was ...a very loose confederation of states ...There were ninety-four spiritual and lay princes, 103 counts and forty prelates presiding over virtually sovereign states, in addition to fifty-one free towns - altogether some 300 separate territories, each persuing its own particular and isolated interests. There was therefore no shared political tradition in Germany and, given this situation, is not surprising that the Grecian polis with its ideal of community predicated upon a shared political culture should make such a wide appeal." Raymond Plant. Op. Cit., pp.25-6.

103. Robert Gascoigne. Loc. cit.

104. Raymond Plant. op. cit., p.182.

105. J.N. Findlay. Hegel: A Re-Examination. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970, p.38.

106. We must not forget that Hegel's concept of spirit is a kind of metaphor for the collective mind of society, and being so it presupposes an identity of subject and object.

107. G.W.F. Hegel. Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit.(Miller's transl.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979, p.16.

108. G.W.F. Hegel. Ibid.

109. G.W.F. Hegel. Philosophy of Right.(Knox's transl.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977. Add. to paragraph 151, p.260.

110. G.W.F. Hegel. Werke. VIII, p.209. Quoted by Millicent Mackenzie. Hegel's Educational Theory and Practice. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1970, p.123.

111. G.W.F. Hegel. The Philosophical Propaedeutic. (Miller's transl.) Oxford: Basic Blackwell, 1986, p.47

112. H.G. Gadamer. Truth and Method. New York: The Seabury Press, 1975, p.16.

113. G.W.F. Hegel. Gymnasialrede. 29 Sept. 1891. Quoted by F.L. Luqueer. Hegel as Educator. New York: MacMillan & Co., 1896, p. 157.

114. G.W.F. Hegel. The Philosophical Propaedeutic. Paragraph 41.

115. Herbert Marcuse. Reason and Revolution. Boston: Beacon Press, 1960, p.9

116. See, for instance, the following passage: "Only through developed industry, i.e., through the mediation of private property, does the ontological essence of human passion come into being, both in its totality and in its humanity: the science of man is therefore itself a product of the self-formation of man through practical activity." Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. Karl Marx Early Writings. New York: Random House, 1975, p.375.

117. The point has been well taken by Trent Schroyer: "For Hegel...philosophy is a reconciliation of the objective conflicts inherent in the institutions of society (objective spirit) and the forms of consciousness (absolute spirit) basic to the historical activity of man. Ultimately the role of

philosophy is the critical comprehension of the historical genesis of these conflicts; and the resulting mediation will be the basis for a reunification which effectively "respiritualizes" that which has become comprehensible. Of course, Hegel assumed that the philosophical mediation would eventually be concretely universalized by the actions of the men aware of this truth." Trent Schroyer. The Critique of Domination. Boston: Beacon Press, 1973, p.29.

118. Raymond Plant. op. cit., p.78.

119. G.W.F. Hegel. Enciclopedia de las Ciencias Filosoficas. Mexico: Juan Pablos Editor, 1974, p.15.

120. G.W.F. Hegel. Philosophy of Right.(Knox's Transl.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, Preface, p.12.

121. Contrary to what some critics claim Marx knew this very well, as it is expressed in the following passage of the "Notes to the Doctoral Dissertation": "In regard to Hegel, it is out of mere ignorance that his disciples explain this or that determination of his system by accommodation and the like or, in a word, morally...It is conceivable that a philosopher commits this or that apparent non-sequitur out of this or that accommodation. He himself may be conscious of it. But he is not conscious that the possibility of this apparent accommodation is rooted in the inadequacy of his principle or in its inadequate formulation. Hence, if a philosopher has accommodated himself, his disciples have to explain from his inner essential consciousness what for him had the form of an exoteric consciousness." Karl Marx. "Notes to the Doctoral Dissertation", (1839-41). Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society.(Easton and Guddat eds.) New York: Doubleday, 1967, pp.60-1.

122. See Georg Lukacs. The Young Hegel. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1976, Chapter 5.

123. Adam Smith. The Wealth of Nations. London: Dent & Sons., 1957, Vol II, Bk.4, Chapter 2, p.400.

124. G.W.F. Hegel. op. cit., Paragraph 199, p.129.

125. Raymond Plant. "Economic and Social Integration in Hegel's Political Philosophy." Hegel's Social and Political Thought. D.P. Verene (ed.) New Jersey: Humanity Press, 1980, p.70.

126. G.W.F. Hegel. Realphilosophie II. p. 428. Quoted by Shlomo Avineri. Hegel's Theory of Modern State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972, p.89.

127. Raymond Plant. op. cit., p.72

128. Jean Hyppolite. "The Hegelian Conception." Studies on Marx and Hegel.(J.O'Neill's transl.) New York, 1969, p. 124-5.

129. Lucio Colletti. Introduction to Karl Marx Early Writings. New York: Vintage Books, 1975, pp. 33-4.

130. See Manfred Riedel. Between Tradition and Revolution. The Hegelina Transformation of Political Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, Chapter 6.

131. Alvin Gouldner. Against Fragmentation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985,

132. G.W.F. Hegel. Lectures on the History of Philosophy. (Haldane's transl.) Vol.1, p.209.

133. Z.A. Pelczynski. "The Hegelian Conception of the State." Hegel's Political Philosophy: Problems and Perspectives..Pelczynski(ed.) Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964, p.17.

134. See paragraph 257 of Hegel's Philosophy of Right.

135. See Pelczynski. op. cit. pp. 11-12. See also J. Ansbro. "Individual Freedom in the Hegelian State" Philosophical Studies. Vol. XVIII, 1969, pp.48 to 57.

136. L.P. Hinchman. Hegel's Critique of Enlightenment. Tampa: University of South Florida

Press, 1984, p.243.

137. See F.R. Cristi. "La Estructura de la Sociedad Civil en la Filosofia del Derecho de Hegel." Escritos de Teoria, Diciembre 1978-Enero 1979, pp. 235-6.

138. Herbert Marcuse. op. cit., pp. 17-18.(Emphasis added)

139. "Hegel's thought, he tells us in an autobiographical essay ["From Absolutism to Experimentalism"], "supplied a demand for unification that was doubtless an intense emotional craving, and yet was a hunger that only an intellectualized subject-matter could satisfy". It helped him to overcome the painful sense of divisions and separations that were, he says, borne in upon him "as a consequence of a heritage of New England culture, divisions by way of isolation of self from the world, of soul from the body, or nature from God." He adds that "Hegel's synthesis of subject and object, matter and spirit, the divine and the human was...no mere intellectual formula; it operated as an inmense release, a liberation." Quoted by Beatrice H. Zedler. "Dewey's Theory of Knowledge." In John Blewett(ed.). John Dewey: His Thought and Influence. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1960, p.60

140. A.G. Wirth. John Dewey as Educator. New York: John Wiley & Sons., 1966, p.IX.

141. J.W. Donahue. "Dewey and the Problem of Technology." John Blewett. John Dewey: His Thought and Influence. New York: Fordham University Press, 1960, p.119.

142. John Dewey. Reconstruction in Philosophy. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1920, p.125.

143. Dewey's somewhat sarcastic denunciation of American society presented in the first chapters of Individualism Old and New in many ways bears a close resemblance with Rousseau's indictment of eighteenth century French society. The title of the first chapter of Dewey's book is "The house divided against itself", and as in Rousseau's First Discourse its main theme is "the contradiction between our life as we outwardly live it and our thoughts and feelings.", or as Dewey calls it:

"a situation which defines an individual divided within himself." Individualism Old and New. New York: Minton, Balch & Co. 1930, pp.15-16 and 50.

144. John Dewey. Individualism Old and New. pp.56,59,61

145. John Dewey. The Public and Its Problems. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1927, p.175. Emphasis added.

146. Among Dewey's early experiences which might have contributed to his communitarianism may be included the intellectual and moral influences of liberal evangelicanism. In his youth Dewey was a member of Burlington's First Congregational Church. The communitarian values of the church are clearly expressed in the following words of the reverend Lewis O. Brastow: Liberal evangelicanism taught that "to be Christian is to accept Christas an ethical ideal, as a master and a redeemer, and to grow in Christian perfection. To be redemed is to be delivered from the dominating lower life of the flesh, to be rescued to the higher life of the spirit and to be shaped into spiritual manhood. The rescue and reconstruction are not wholly of individual men in their isolation from their fellows, but of men in their associated life. It is the building in and the building up of men into the body of christ...No man ever finds completeness in himself. ...We come to the perfect man, to the perfect stature in Christ, only in associate life. Men must be won to the common life and build up together in it." Quoted in George Dykhuizen's The Life and Mind of John Dewey. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1973, p.8.

147. Lucia and Morton White. The Intellectual versus the City. Toronto: New American Library, 1964, p.171.

148. Lucia and Morton White. op. cit., p.172.

149. In a more recent article on Dewey's social philosophy, Charles Frankel rises a similar point when he declares that "...although Dewey is commonly regarded, both by supporters and opponents, as the prototype of the "progressive" and "liberal" thinker, one finds in his pages outright conservative ideas. In the last chapter of Freedom and Culture, for example, he espoused the

cause of the small face-to-face communities and paid tribute to the principles of Jeffersonian democracy." "John Dewey's Social Philosophy", New Studies in the Philosophy of John Dewey. Steven M. Cahn(ed.) New Hampshire: University of Vermont, 1977, p.8.

As far as Jefferson is concerned Dewey's anticipated rejoinder to Frankel's accusation is contained in the following passage: "The social philosophy of Thomas Jefferson is regarded as outmoded by many persons because it seems to be based upon the then existing agrarian conditions and to postulate the persistence of the agrarian regimen. It is then argued that the rise of industry to a position superior to that of agriculture has destroyed the basis of Jeffersonian democracy. This is a highly superficial view. Jefferson predicted what the effects of rise of the economics and politics of an industrial regime would be, unless the independence and liberty characteristic of the farmer, under conditions of virtually free land, were conserved. His predictions has been realized. It was not agrarism per se that he really stood for, but the kind of liberty and equality that the agrarian regime made possible when there was an open frontier." John Dewey. "Liberty and Social Control." Problems of Men. New York: Philosophical Library, 1946, p.117. See also C.B. Macpherson's interesting observations on Jefferson's social views as compared with Rousseau's in The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979, pp. 17 to 19.

150. John Dewey. The Public and Its Problems. p.211.

151. John Dewey. Ibid., pp. 213-14.

152. John Dewey. Freedom and Culture. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1939, p.36.

153. George Santayana. "Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics" in The Philosophy of John Dewey. P.A. Schilpp(ed.) Evanston: Northwestern University, 1939, p.247.

154. Frederic Lilge. "The Vain Quest for Unity. John Dewey's Social and Educational Thought in Retrospect." Dewey on

Education. Appraisals. New York: Ramdom House, 1968, p.67.

155. Eamonn Callan. "Education for Democracy: Dewey's Iliberal Philosophy of Education." Educational Theory. Spring 1981, p.167.

156. John Dewey. Democracy and Education. New York: The Free Press, 1916, pp.23-24.

157. John Dewey. Liberalism and Social Action. New York: Capricorn, 1963, p.54.

158. Andrew Levine calls this conception "atomic individualism" and he define it as follows: "For atomic individualists, the ultimate constituents of social reality, the atoms, are individual men and women, essentially independent of one another and of society, bearing only extrinsic relations to one another. Like atoms in an enclosed space, individuals in society do come into contact with one another. But this contact is in no way constitutive of the individual's nature. Society no more constitutes individuals than space constitutes atoms. Physical space is just where atoms are collected. Society is no more a part of social reality than physical space, in the traditional atomist view, is part of matter." A. Levine. Liberal Democracy. A Critique of its Theory. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981, p.45. Levine's denomination is particularly fitting because Dewey, following an old tradition in political theory, uses himself the expression "atomistic individualism" in at least two of his main Works, Reconstruction in Philosophy and Liberalism and Social Action. In "The Future of Liberalism" Problem of Men, p.135, Dewey even declares: "The individual of earlier liberalism was a newtonian atom having only external time and space relations to others individuals, save in that each social atom was equipped with inherent freedom."

159. C.B. Macpherson. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism. London: Oxford University Press. 1967, p.3

160. John Dewey. Freedom and Culture. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1939, pp. 21-23.

161. John Dewey. "What I Believe." The Later Works.

Vol.5. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984, p.275.

162. John Dewey. The Ethics of Democracy. Ann Arbor: Andrews & Co., 1888, pp.3-4.

163. John Dewey. Ibid., p.6.

164. John Dewey. loc. cit.

165. John Dewey. op. cit., p.7. (Emphasis added.)

166. John Dewey. op. cit., p.8. (Emphasis added.)

167. John Dewey. op. cit., p.24.

168. John Dewey. op. cit., pp.25-26-27.

169. John Dewey. Individualism Old and New. New York: Minton, Balch & Co., 1930, pp.89,90,93.

170. George Dykhuizen. The Life and Mind Of John Dewey. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1973, p.52.

171. Charles Frankel. "John Dewey's Social Philosophy." New Studies in the Philosophy of John Dewey. Steven Cahn(ed.) New Hampshire: University of Vermont, 1977, p.7.

For a recent attempt at establishing Dewey's political affiliation see Eamonn Callan. "John Dewey and the Two Faces of Progressive Education." Xerox copy of an unpublished paper, Department of Educational Foundations, University of Alberta, 1988, 28pp.

172. John Dewey. "The Future of Liberalism." Problems of Men. New York: Philosophical Library, 1946, pp. 126-7.

173. C.B. Macpherson. The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979, p.21.

174. F.J. Kurtz. "Political Technology, Democracy and Education: John Dewey's Legacy." Democratic Theory and Technological Society. R.B.Day et al.(eds.) Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1988, pp. 204 to 226.

175. John Dewey. op.cit. p.133.

176. See Charles Frankel. "John Dewey's Social Philosophy." New Studies in the Philosophy of John Dewey. Steven Cahn(ed.) New Hampshire: University of Vermont, 1977, pp. 40-41

177. John Dewey. "Authority and Resistance to Social Change." Problems of Men. pp. 106-7.

178. John Dewey. The Public and Its Problems. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1920, p.211.

179. John Dewey. Democracy and Education. New York: The Free Press, 1916, p.256.

180. John Dewey. Liberalism and Social Action. New York: Capricorn, 1963, p.53.

181. John Dewey. A Common Faith. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934, p.86.

182. John Dewey. Liberalism and Social Action. p.54.

183. John Dewey. Ibid., p.75

184. John Dewey. Ibid. p.54.

185. John Dewey. Individualism Old and New. New York: Minton, Balch & Co., 1930, p.118.

186. John Dewey & J.H. Tufts. Ethics.(1932 edition.)John Dewey. The Later Works. Vol.7. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985, p.428.

187. John Dewey. Education Today. J.Ratner(ed.) New York: Greenwood Press, 1969, p.284.

188. John Dewey. Introduction to Problems of Men. New York: Philosophical Library, 1946, p.8.

189. John Dewey. Ibid., p.11.

190. John Dewey. Democracy and Education. New York: The Free Press, 1916, p.224.

191. John Dewey. "Education and New Social Ideals". The Later Works, Vol.11, Carbondale:

Southern University Press, 1987, p.170

192. John Dewey. Human Nature and Conduct. The Meddle Works, Vol.14. Carbondale: Southern University Press, 1983. p.77.

193. John Dewey. Philosophy and Civilization. New York: Minton, Balch & Co., pp.328-9.

194. Actually the few declarations of Dewey recognizing this fact correspond to the years of the Great Depression. See for example the following statement: "...the schools ...are the formal agencies for producing those mental attitudes, those modes of feeling and thinking which are the essence of a distinctive culture. But they are not the ultimate formative force. Social institutions, the trend of occupations, the pattern of social arrangement, are the finally controlling influence in shaping minds." Individualism Old and New, p.128.

195. John Dewey. Liberalism and Social Action. p.58.

196. John Dewey. The Educational Frontier. Quoted by J.L. Childs. The Philosophy of John Dewey. P.A. Schilpp(ed.), p.64.

197. John Dewey. Experience and Education. New York: Collier Books, 1938, p.80.

198. John Dewey. Ibid., p.81.

199. John Dewey. The Educational Frontier. Quoted by J.L. Childs in The Philosophy of John Dewey. P.A. Schilpp(ed.), p.443.

200. John Dewey. Freedom and Culture. New York: G.P. Putnam's sons, 1939, p.10.

201. John Dewey. Experience and Education. p.80.

202. John Dewey. A Common faith. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934, p.79.

203. John Dewey. Individualism Old and New. p.64.

204. John Dewey. Liberalism and Social Action. p.74.

205. J.J. Rousseau. Considerations on the Government of Poland. Rousseau, Political Writings.

(Watkins transl.) Toronto: Nelson, 1953, p.176

206. Reinhold Niebuhr. The Nature and Destiny of Man. Vol.1 New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964, p.111.

207. John Dunn. Locke. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984, pp. VI-VII

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