NOTICE

AVIS

The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Previously copyrighted materials (journal articles, published tests, etc.) are not filmed.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30.

La qualité de cette microforme dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

Les documents qui font déjà l'objet d'un droit d'auteur (articles de revue, tests publiés, etc.) ne sont pas microfilmés.

La reproduction, même partielle, de cette microforme est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30.

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE HISTORIOGRAPHICAL TRANSFORMATIONS, THE HISTORY
CURRICULUM AND THE TEACHING AND LEARNING OF HISTORY
IN COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL TANZANIAN SECONDARY
SCHOOLS: THE CHANGING AND UNSETTLED QUESTION

by

SAMUEL CRISPIN NGUNI

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

OF MASTER OF EDUCATION

DEPARTMENT OF SECONDARY EDUCATION

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL, 1988

ISBN 0-315-45436-9

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

RELEASE FORM

NAME OF AUTHOR   Samuel Crispin Nguni

TITLE OF THESIS   The Historiographical Transformations,
                  the History Curriculum, and the Teaching
                  and Learning of History in Colonial and
                  Post-Colonial Tanzanian Secondary Schools:
                  The Changing and Unsettled Question

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS GRANTED   Master of Education

YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED   1988

Permission is hereby granted to THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA LIBRARY to reproduce single copies of this thesis and to lend or sell such copies for private, scholarly or scientific research purposes only.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's written permission.

(Signed)

PERMANENT ADDRESS:

Liuli Baraza

Hongi Village, P.O. Liuli

Mbinga District, Ruvuma Region

Tanzania, East Africa.

DATED 18th July, 1988 . 1988.

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled "The Historiographical Transformations, the History Curriculum and the Teaching and Learning of History in Colonial and Post-Colonial Tanzanian Secondary Schools: The Changing and Unsettled Question," submitted by Samuel Crispin Nguni in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Education.

.... J. Parsons ....
Supervisor

... C. Chamberlin ....

Date .. 15th July, 1988, 1988

This thesis is dedicated to my father,
Crispin Nguni, my mother, Winne Nyakondowe,
and my late sister, Kathleen Nguni, for
their life time love and care.

ABSTRACT

The research study points at the changes that have happened in the interpretation, teaching and learning of history in Tanzanian secondary schools over two prominent historical periods, namely, the colonial period and the independence period, covering the years 1885 to 1985.

The study points to the fact that under the colonial period (1885-1961) the interpretation, teaching, and learning of history was done from a Euro-centric racist (colonial) historiography. The attainment of independence in Tanzania, and indeed all over Africa in the 1960s, created a sudden need to counteract Euro-centric colonial historiography. Africanist (nationalist) historiography came to be used to interpret the history of Africa and, indeed, the history of the world.

However, at the end of the 1960s, the interpretation of history suddenly changed. During this period, the underdevelopment historiography came to dominate the interpretation of history. In the 1970s, there came the emergence of Marxist historiography. Marxist historiography interpreted history from the point of view of social relations as being exploitative.

In the end, however, the research study points to the fact that these various historiographies have been competing in an attempt to control the interpretation,

teaching and learning of history in Tanzanian secondary schools. In this competing struggle to dominate the interpretation of history, the phenomenon called the politics of the history curriculum in both colonial and independent periods are vividly exposed.

In short, the politics of curriculum points to the phenomenon of different social groups with varying levels of political power, as well as having different political, social and economic visions in Tanzanian society, whose intent it is to inspire their particular vision of historical understanding in the secondary school curriculum.

The research study concludes that the way to escape the phenomenon of competing groups and visions, each of whom intend to influence history curriculum, is to start teaching philosophy and methodologies of history in Tanzanian secondary schools. The teaching of philosophy of history would enable the representation of the various historical visions of these competing groups in the history curriculum. As well, students would be able to see the strengths and weaknesses of these various historical interpretations in the context of Tanzanian history.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to acknowledge the support and assistance of the many individuals who have helped and supported me in the realization of this thesis.

I am especially indebted to Dr. Jim Parsons, my supervisor, for his expert guidance throughout my graduate programme. His intellectual insight, encouragement and patience has brought the research to a completion. His insightful comments and enthusiastic support were especially appreciated.

I would like to express sincere thanks to Dr. Terry Carson. Apart from being on the thesis committee, he has as well contributed to my intellectual growth by engaging me in dialogue and posing challenging questions.

Gratitude is extended to Dr. Chamberlain for comments and serving on the thesis committee.

I wish to extend my special thanks to Dr. Carlos Torres and Dr. Raj Pannu of the Department of Educational Foundations for their interest in my work and their invaluable suggestions, comments and discussions.

Sincere thanks are also expressed to the following individuals and scholars whose comments and suggestions directly and indirectly influenced this thesis work:
Dr. T. Aoki of Vancouver; Dr. W. Werner of the University

of British Columbia, Vancouver; Dr. K. Egan of Fraser University; Vancouver, Dr. K. Osborne of the University of Manitoba, Winnipeg; Dr. C. Pratt, of the University of Toronto; Dr. D. Morrison of Trent University, Petersborough; Dr. C. Leys of Queens University, Kingston; and Dr. D. O'Meara of Montreal. To them I owe more than I can express here.

I also wish to thank the Canadian Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Administration for their financial support throughout my M.Ed. studies. Thanks also the Department of Secondary Education for hosting my studies and nurturing my intellectual growth as a Commonwealth scholar.

Finally, special thanks to my wife, Kate, and my children, Winne and Alatu, for their patience and understanding during the three years I have been away from Tanzania.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF CHARTS

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

Chapter I situates the question of historiographical transformations, the history curriculum, and the teaching and learning of history in the Tanzanian colonial and post-colonial secondary school context.

This chapter focuses on four important issues:

1. It introduces the area in which the discussion takes place, namely Tanzania. The short discussion about Tanzania's political and economic history appears at the outset of the historical setting.

2. The second section sets the structure of the Tanzanian educational system and the level of schooling on which the study will focus as its main objective for the study of the historiographical transformations.

3. The third focus of the chapter is on the origins of the study. This focus mainly sets the circumstances and experiences of this writer in the years of his teaching. This section explains why the study was undertaken.

4. The fourth section sets the focus on historiography itself. It tries to define what historiography is and why it should be critically studied. Historiography

1

has implications for both political and social life. The importance of historiography lies in its importance to affect the daily lives of men and women. Within this fourth section, the different meanings of history are defined. The section also defines historiography as it will be used in the pages of this research.

The Historical Setting

Tanzania, which in the political arena is known as The United Republic of Tanzania, is actually a composition of a political union of two independent African countries, Tanganyika and Zanzibar. These two countries had both been under colonial, experiences imposed by the German and British colonial states, in the case of Tanzania Mainland-- Tanganyika. Zanzibar was under the control of the British colonial state. Tanganyika got its independence in 1961. The TANU (Tanganyika African National Union) political party formed a nationalist government under the leadership of President Julius K. Nyerere, after winning a majority vote in the political elections held in the early months of 1961. Zanzibar (which comprises the two islands of Unguja and Pemba) got its independence through a revolution in January of 1964. The Afro-Shiraz political party formed a nationalist government under the leadership of the late President Abeid Karume.

However, under the influence of Pan-Africanist ideology which emphasized regional cooperation and encouraged political unity among the independent African states, the leaders of Tanganyika and Zanzibar held a number of political negotiations about the possibilities of a political unity and integration that would see their countries united as one country rather than remain two separate entities. These political negotiations and ideas for political unity materialized and were finally crystallized in 1964. By April 26, 1964, the two independent African countries of Tanganyika and Zanzibar formed a political unity which was then called The United Republic of Tanzania.

The political unity was at first arranged in such a way that the President of the Union was to come from the Tanzanian Mainland (Tanganyika) and the Vice-President was to come from Zanzibar. This arrangement has now been changed and the President and the Vice-President can come from any part of the United Republic.

The two political parties (i.e. TANU and ASP) at first had decided to maintain their separate identities in their respective political jurisdictions under the union. But these separate political party identities of TANU (for the Mainland) and Afro-Shiraz Party (for Zanzibar) were finally abolished when the two political parties decided to form a unity of one political party in 1977 and make

Tanzania a one-party state. The push for a political party unity led to the formation of one political party called a Revolutionary Party which was abbreviated as CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi), a Swahili word and a version of Revolutionary Party. As a result, since 1977, Tanzania has been ruled by a one-party political system under the Revolutionary Party (CCM).

In terms of political and economic policies before 1967, Tanzania had followed a capitalist pattern that was left almost entirely intact after the British had left the country after independence. The economy that the German and British governments had created and that was left behind after their departure was characteristic of all colonial economies. The Tanzanian economy had a very small industrial sector and a very large agricultural sector. The agricultural sector was mostly subsistence with a few large commercial enterprises scattered here and there and mainly controlled by foreign commercial companies and a few local commercial farmers.

The Tanzanian economy, as characteristic of all other colonial economies, was basically externally oriented to meet the demands of European metropolitan economies. The primary function of the economy was to provide agricultural and mineral commodities as raw materials for the expanding European manufacturing industries. Such agricultural and mineral commodities included cotton,

cocoa, sisal, coffee, tea, pyrethrum, oilseeds, groundnuts and rubber, as well as minerals such as gold and diamonds.

After independence, the international trade scene changed drastically in favour of European economies and against the newly independent states such as Tanzania. Unfavourable international trade crises of falling primary commodity prices together with internal production problems in Tanzania itself combined to pose a gradual downfall of the Tanzanian economy. The dependency on exporting primary raw materials began to show that, if the Tanzanian economy was going to survive, changes were required to make the economy internally viable, integrated, and strong. Diversification was needed to counteract internal and external pressures on the Tanzanian economy.

These economic misfortunes as well as political pressure from the various sections of Tanzanian social strata and the pressure from the international arena, especially from Britain, Germany, and the United States (who withheld economic aid for political reasons), began to fall heavily on the nationalist government. Finally, the nationalist government was forced to institute change in the economy.

In 1967, partly as a response to these internal and external pressures noted above, the Tanzanian government instituted new political and economic policies designed to create a different political and economic pattern. This

pattern was grounded on socialist content and a self-reliant economic vision. The Tanzanian government and the ruling political party anvilled what was called the "Arusha Declaration." The Arusha Declaration was nothing more than a declaration of the socialist path of political and economic development.

The nationalist government strongly declared that this socialist path and vision was somewhat peculiar to Tanzania's pre-colonial past and had nothing to do with the so-called European type of Marxist socialist ideas, ideals, or ideology, even though the two might have similarities. It was, so the nationalist government claimed, a unique socialism for Tanzanian society, inherited from her pre-colonial past of our forefathers before the coming of colonialism. German and British colonialism, so it was argued, had destroyed that African socialism. In the place of African socialism, the colonialists had implanted a capitalist individualistic pattern of social relations.

It was now the time, after independence, for Tanzania to rediscover the lost past of that African socialism and make it work for the independent Tanzania. Thus, in spite of the fact that not everybody had agreed with the particular version of socialism generally referred to as "African socialism," the nationalist government and the ruling party unanimously and unilaterally moved to

institute this political and economic vision in Tanzania from 1967 onward.

The socialist declaration had changed the political and economic scene in Tanzania in several ways. In the political scene, attempts were made to incorporate people into the decision-making processes through the villagization process, farmers' cooperatives, and various other forms of institutional frameworks. For example, in the economic scene, there was the creation of what was called "Ujamaa villages." These Ujamaa villages were to be both the center of economic production process and areas of democratic decision making by the farmers and their village governments.

These socialist declarations had also brought the need for nationalizations of foreign-owned commercial and business firms. The nationalization process needed to create more nationally oriented institutions like banks and insurance companies. These institutions would then be oriented to be more in line with national policies and national needs. These various firms and institutions, it was argued, would be easily oriented toward socialist policies, if they were to be under the control of the nationalist government as opposed to being foreign-owned. Although most of the nationalized firms and companies were made wholly Tanzanian-owned, most of the others were owned in partnership with foreign institutions and corporations.

In spite of all these changes from capitalist orientation of the economy to the socialist path of development, many observers of the Tanzanian situation have concluded that the Tanzanian economy was in deep crisis and somewhat in decline. Peter Marshall (1983), for example, sums up the political and economic crisis through which the country is going during the present decade. He writes:

> Tanzania is facing its most serious economic crisis since independence. Despite a bold attempt at self-reliant socialism, it has been unable to break out of the trap of selling cheap and buying dear. The dream of industrialization is as insubstantial as ever and agricultural production is stagnating. The country is increasingly dependent on foreign aid and remains one of the poorest countries in Africa. (Africa Guide, 1983:379)

The political and economic poverty which has engulfed Tanzania since independence has provided food for thought over several disciplines including history. History and historians, as well as other social scientists, have struggled and still struggle to explain the cause of this apparent demise. They have tried to offer prescriptive solutions that differ both in content and form. Part of this discussion by historians will be offered in Chapter III under the section dealing with the question of historiography and the way historical knowledge had been produced in Tanzania and Tanzanian secondary schools.

The Structure of the
Tanzanian School System

The school system in Tanzania is basically patterned after the British educational system. Although the school system has undergone several changes since independence, the basic structure of the school system left behind by the British colonial state has been maintained. The current system, therefore, which has been partly a result of the changes which have been instituted since independence, is depicted in Figure 1.

However, the number of students who get a place in secondary schools and higher educational institutions is very small in relation to the population of the country, as well as in relation to the school-going age who enter primary schools. Most of those who enter primary school at Standard 1 (One) finish their education at Standard 7 (Seven). Places for secondary education are strictly limited to a very few students who are selected through examinations done at Standard 7 (Seven). Table 1 shows statistics which testify to the problem of most of the primary school leavers who cannot find a place in secondary schools.

Stage of Schooling	Approximate Age	Explanation or Remarks

University (Degree) and Colleges (Diploma):

5th Year	23	Medical Doctor's degree (5 yrs.)
4th Year	22	Engineering degree (4 yrs.)
3rd Year	21	" " "
2nd Year	20	Arts & Science degree (3 yrs.)
1st Year	19	Depending on the Institution, it takes 2-3 years to get a diploma

Form

6	18	Senior Secondary School
5	17	Advanced Level (A-level) (High School)

Form

4	16	
3	15	Junior Secondary School
2	14	Ordinary Level (O-Level)
1	13	

Standard

7	12	
6	11	
5	10	Primary education consists of seven years
4	9	
3	8	Standard 8 was phased out in
2	7	1967 and 1968
1	5,6	

Figure 1. Structure of the School System.

Curriculum Development
and Examination

The school system in Tanzania is a centralized system. The Ministry of Education has the power and actual supervision and jurisdiction over the schools in such areas as curriculum, examinations, and funding. There are missionary owned schools, but these schools have been made to conform to and use the nationally centralized curriculum and examinations set by and administered by the Ministry of Education. Although the various missionary organizations own their respective schools, they must follow the government prescribed curriculum and examinations. As well as teaching their various religious work to students, these missionary owned schools have the task of producing pupils who have passed through the government secular curriculum.

The use of secular curriculum in missionary schools and other private owned schools, for all intents and purposes, is to have the missionary schools contribute to the production of manpower that could serve both in government institutions and in religious work. Thus, the dual system of education begun in the colonial period still continues, with public schools on the one hand and private schools on the other. The private schools include both missionary schools and other private schools owned by various organizations.

Table 1

Enrolment in Public Schools:
Primary, Secondary and University
Between 1967 and 1975

Enrolments and Years	Level of Schooling	
	Primary	University
1967	753,114	711
1968	765,169	964
1969	776,109	1,223
1970	827,984	1,313
1971	902,619	1,557
1972	1,003,596	1,481
1973	1,106,387	1,894
1974	1,228,886	
1975	1,589,008	

Source: Ministry of Education, Annual Reports, 1978.

Since the government cannot afford to provide education to everybody, the presence of private schools has provided a relief to many parents who can sent their children to private schools after failing to obtain places in public secondary schools. The difference is that, whereas the public system is free education, the private schools do institute fees. Few parents can afford to send their children to private schools.

The curriculum and examinations are developed by two separate parastatal institutions which have been set up by the government purely for these two respective purposes. However, these two separate institutions are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. As such, they answer to the respective departments in the Ministry of Education. The two parastatal institutions include the Institute of Education, which was created in 1964, and the National Examination Council created in 1971.

The Institute of Education deals with the development of curriculum and teaching materials such as textbooks. The creation of the Institute of Education in 1964 was intended for the replacement of institutions that had dealt with curriculum development during the colonial period. These colonial curriculum institutions which were replaced by the Institute of Education included the African Teachers Examination Board and its later version called Teacher Training Advisory Board. The Institute of

Education's curriculum jurisdiction covers all secondary schools, primary schools, and teacher training colleges and technical secondary schools.

The National Examination Council formed in 1971 deals with the development, the setting, the marking and the grading of examinations which cover secondary schools, teacher training colleges, and the technical secondary schools. The National Examination Council is also vested with issuing of certificates to those who pass the examinations.

Both the development of curriculum and the examinations are done in collaboration with three separate organs which also have a great impact on both curriculum and examination content and innovations. These organs include subject associations, curriculum panels, and various subject departments at the University of Dar-es-Salaam.

In the case of history curriculum and history examinations, the following three organs collaborate from time to time with the Institute of Education and the National Examination Council on the question of curriculum change and examination setting and grading. The history curriculum panel is composed of a Ministry of Education representative, the selected history teachers for secondary schools, and history teachers from the Department of History at the University of Dar-es-Salaam. The Historical

Association of Tanzania draws membership from both historians and other social scientists. Finally, there is the Department of History at the University of Dar-es-Salaam.

These three organs have the task to keep themselves up to date with current and changing advances in historical thought and subsequently transform and adapt these changes to the practicalities of teaching and learning of history in primary and secondary schools. However, the work done by these bodies, in the name of the Institute of Education and the National Examination Council, must be certified and rubber-stamped by the Ministry of Education before the, results are made public.

Origins of this Study
and Reason for the Study

The origins of this work and study go back to my personal years of teaching in an ordinary level and advanced level in secondary school where I worked for almost five years, teaching history. Apart from teaching duties for those five years, I was also involved extensively in curriculum development and the production of school teaching materials with the Institute of Education and the National Examination Council.

Teaching and the involvement in curriculum development with respect to the discipline of history

slowly began to offer new experiences and challenges. It shed light on the tough and divergent realities of being both a teacher and a curriculum developer. These new experiences, both in the classroom and outside the classroom, opened to view the various realities which were competing for dominance both in the classroom setting and in the textbooks which I was involved in developing through contributions of chapters to these various textbooks of history for use in primary and secondary schools in Tanzania.

Teaching the curriculum in the school and the classroom forced me to use the dominant paradigm or historiography of the day. I believed that these were the correct interpretations of the Tanzanian and international history at the present moment, or what is commonly referred to as present "historical conjecture." My task as a teacher, so one could argue, was not to open up students' minds to various interpretations of the history at hand, but to force into them the agreed upon or, in other words, an officially agreed upon historiography and interpretation which history experts and their counterparts in the Ministry of Education had agreed on was the one which most correctly interpreted the Tanzanian and international history.

In this case, other historiographical interpretations of history were either said to be incorrect

and at most bourgeoisie or imperialist in nature, given what was referred to as their tendency to conceal and falsify reality. Because of their tendency to conceal reality and falsify knowledge, so went the argument, these interpretations were not useful. They were not instruments or interpretations which could explain substantially and correctly the Tanzanian and international history.

From year to year in my teaching career, I worked hard to make sure that the students were well vested and that they understood the Tanzanian and international history from a Marxist historiography or, to be exact, from a Marxist interpretation of history. In short, I taught Historical Materialism. There was no need to venture far away from this particular sort of historical interpretation based on historical materialism. I was sanctioned. It must have been correct.

In fact, it began to be an accepted character and criteria that a good student of history was one who could substantially interpret history using the Marxist interpretation of history. Those students who, for one reason or another, dared to venture outside this paradigm or historiography were labelled as being dull. At the least, they were seen as rebels to the established and well respected Marxist paradigm and historiography.

The result of this apparent reluctant rebellion was to be awarded very low examination marks or grades which

either spelled failure or placed the student at the brink of failure. These low grades were partly intimidating tactics bent on forcing these students to realize that the school system was not there to tolerate rebellious or divergent thinking, but to conform to what the experts had agreed was the best way and maybe the only way of doing things.

To persuade the students to grasp the Marxist interpretation of history was perhaps the job for which I was employed and paid to do. But is this the only function of what a teacher or curriculum developer is employed to do? Is this not an "intellectual conspiracy" to force certain historiographies on the students at the expense of other historiographies? Can we really argue with certainty that social reality can be constructed and therefore understood from only one world view?

Apart from the teaching experiences in the classroom, I had a similar experience when it came to the task of developing curriculum materials for primary and secondary schools. Here the overt intellectual conspiracy was stronger and basically obvious. The curriculum developers and all authors of various chapters of textbooks struggled long and hard to make sure that the Marxist historiography was almost exclusively the one from which historical interpretation was to be made. This Marxist

historiography was what the students were supposed to know
and actually internalize.

Other forms of historiographical interpretations
were, as already mentioned above, declared redundant,
conservative, and of no use to the understanding of
Tanzanian and international history. Another
historiographical interpretations were seen as useless as
analytical tools because they falsified historical
knowledge for the purpose of the imperialists and their
supporters all over the world.

These experiences in themselves show how social
reality is basically a social construction which embodies
particular ideologies and world viewpoints. As such,
history is no value-free. The social realities which the
school textbooks describe, analyse, and interpret contain
their own assumptions of the world. These assumptions form
the basis of their social reality construction. The
competition which these constructed social realities do
pose in historical actuality is considerably immense as
they contain political and social implications once they
are applied practically in the struggle to create new
political and social relations.

Thus, given this fact of the political and social
implications carried by these various social knowledge
constructions, I would then argue that nothing is more
important than to expose students to the actual theoretical

basis in which these realities exist or have been socially constructed. Through this exposure, high school secondary students and university students in particular would get the challenges of exposing the demerits and merits of these various historiographies and social knowledge constructions. This exposure to various historiographies would give our students a divergent scope of thought about the production of historical knowledge and the possible truths each tries to expose about social reality, as well as the possible implication that each of these historiographies carries within itself.

As I considered how one particular historiography or paradigm was forced in the school history textbooks, I came to the realization that curriculum development, and in particular my own experience, was nothing more than deciding how to construct social knowledge that the experts agreed was correct and actual knowledge. In short, this socially constructed knowledge was the historical truth worth teaching the students. It was a question of choice and commitment to the task at hand. As such, it was a conscious commitment to advance a certain ideology at the expense of others.

Under such conditions, curriculum development was no longer a neutral affair. It was a task to convince students to take prescribed pills for a particular, ideological stance. In this case, the stance was the

building, and construction of socialist ideology and socialism in Tanzania. It was a task that provided all the facts to prove that socialist construction was the ultimate and the only good political and social organization which was humane and desirable and that would ultimately solve the problems of Tanzania.

I came to understand that, actually, in any curriculum development, the curriculum developers commit themselves to what I call "intellectual dictatorship and totarianism." Others have called this act the developing of a "committed historiography" (Ihebuzor, 1983:8). Clearly, such a historiography is bent on advancing certain ideologies at the expense of others.

The Importance of Historiography, What Historiography is and its Theoretical and Practical Political and Social Implications

The importance of historiography has been widely documented in various works of history. Historiography has simply been defined as "the craft of writing history and/or the yield of such writing considered in its rhetorical aspect" (Hexter, 1968:368). Hexter (1968) further considers the term "historiography" as being synonymous to the terms "the rhetoric of history" and "history writing" (p. 368).

At the same time, Beard (1946) has not only defined
the term "historiography" but has also shown the importance
of "historiography" when he wrote:

> If a desire to advance learning or increase the
> precision of knowledge requires any
> justification, practical as well as theoretical
> grounds may be put forward to warrant a plea for
> a reconsideration of historiography--the business
> of studying, thinking about, and writing about
> history. (Beard, 1946:1)

Both Hexter (1968) and Beard (1946) have adequately
pointed out that in fact, historiography communicates what
historians know or what they think they know. Hexter
(1968) points out that historiography is different from the
collection of historical evidence, the editing of
historical sources, the exercise of historical thought and
imagination, the criticism of historical writing, and the
philosophy of history. However, it is related to all of
them and overlaps some of them (Hexter, 1968:368).

The term "history" has been defined as "the study
of the past as a systematic discipline (Hexter, 1968:368).
Beard's (1946) definition of the term "history"
incorporates and makes several distinctions as to the uses
of the term "history." Beard writes:

> History-as-actuality means all that has been
> felt, thought, imagined, said, and done by human
> beings as such and in relation to one another and
> to their environment since the beginning of
> mankind's operations on this planet. Written
> history is a systematic or fragmentary narration
> or account purporting to deal with all or part of
> this history-as-actuality. History-as-record
> consists of the documents and memorials
> pertaining to history-as-actuality on which

> written history is or should be based. Of
> course, for recent history, a writer may use in
> part his own experiences and observations and
> oral statements by his contemporaries which he
> has heard and remembered or written down.
> (Beard, 1946:5)

The above definitions of "history" and "historiography"
will be used in the pages of this work.

To analyse historiography, so it has been argued,
one must first determine the relationship that exists
between knowing and communicating. Specifically, the
question becomes: "What is the relation between knowing
history and communicating in writing that which is
historiography?" (Hexter, 1968:370).

The process of knowing what goes on throughout the
historian's active professional life is not identical to
the process of knowing through experience which enables
most people to meet most of the contingencies of their days
on earth without continual bafflement, frustration, and
disaster; but, it is similar. It is not identical because,
in some measure, historians choose what they will confront,
while much of what people know through day-to-day
experience comes at them haphazardly by no choice of their
own.

Second, the layman's kind of knowledge is, in large
part, acquired through face-to-face confrontation with
persons and situations. The historian's confrontation with
people and situations of the past is mainly (in most cases,
wholly) indirect, mediated by the surviving of documentary

and archeological record. Nevertheless, the difference ought not to be exaggerated, for there is considerable overlap (Hexter, 1968:371).

Thus, historiography is the means of communicating in writing what historians think they know about the past. To this regard, therefore, efficient and effective communication requires historians, in writing history, to arrange what they know according to some principle of coherence. Insofar as historiography is the means of communicating, and the product of such work in the interpretation and writing of history, it goes without saying that the practices of historians in writing history may have peculiar and serious implications in that wide area of human concern in which all people struggle with the difficult problems of the meaning and nature of knowledge, understanding, and truth.

According to Hexter (1968), the principal relevant points that have emerged pertaining to arguments about historiography may be summarized as follows:

1. Historiography is a rule-bound discipline through which historians seek to communicate their knowledge of the past.

2. The relation of writing history (the rhetoric of history) to history itself is quite different than it has traditionally been conceived. Rhetoric is ordinarily deemed to be the icing on the cake of

history; but, rigorous investigation indicates that it is mixed right into the batter. It affects not merely the outward appearance of history, its delightfulness and seemliness, but it also impacts the inward character of history, its essential function and capacity to convey knowledge of the past as it actually was. If this second point is indeed the case, historians must subject historiography, the process of writing history, to an investigation far broader and far more intense than any that they have hitherto conducted.

3. There is an irreducible divergence between the rhetoric of history and the rhetoric of science. The vocabulary and syntax that constitute the appropriate response of historians to data are neither identical with nor identifiable with the vocabulary and syntax that constitute the appropriate response of scientists to data. But the historian's goal in response to the data is to render the best personal account that can be made of the past as it really was. Therefore, by choosing to resort to the rhetoric of history, regardless of its divergence from that of the sciences, the historian affirms in practice and action the belief that history is more adequate than science as a vehicle to convey the kind of knowledge, understanding, truth, and meaning that historians achieve.

Indeed, there are instances where, in order to transmit an increment of knowledge and meaning, the very rules of historiography demand a rhetoric which sacrifices generality, precision, control, and exactness to evocative force and scope. Such a choice is entirely out of bounds according to the rules of scientific statement. However, such a choice implies that within the rhetoric of history itself there are embedded assumptions about the nature of knowing, understanding, meaning, and truth. There are also assumptions made about the means of augmenting knowledge which are not completely congruent with corresponding assumptions in the sciences, at least insofar as the philosophy of science has succeeded in identifying them (Hexter, 1968:371).

Statement of the Problem
The Guiding Research Questions

This research study is guided by the questions which follow. The research study is grounded on the argument that, over a period of time in Tanzanian history, and in the existence of secondary schools, there have been historiographical changes which have interpreted and, re-interpreted Tanzanian history differently at different specific historical periods. These different historical interpretations and re-interpretations have affected not only the construction of the history curriculum, but also

the type of historical knowledge that has been produced and the methodology of teaching and learning of history in Tanzanian secondary schools.

Assuming the above is true, the research study seeks to investigate and answer the following questions:

1. What are the actual historiographical changes, both in form and content, which have taken place in Tanzania and which have interpreted and re-interpreted Tanzanian history in different historical conjunctures both in the colonial and post-colonial period?

2. Second, what political and social forces have determined and influenced the emergence and prevalence of the different historiographical changes, and thus the necessity to interpret and re-interpret Tanzanian history?

3. Third, what political and social ideologies existed underlying each historiographical change? In other words, what were the political and social ideologies carried within each historiographical change that interpreted and re-interpreted Tanzanian history?

4. Fourth, what kinds and forms of problems in both theory and practice did these different historiographical changes pose to secondary school students in their struggle in the understanding of historical knowledge, as well as historical truth, about Tanzanian history?

5. Fifth, what implications exist in these various forms of historiographies? In other words, what vision and content do these different interpretations pose about practical historical life in Tanzania, as men and women and the country as a whole struggle to search for a model of political and social development which will be able to emancipate the country from the shadows of poverty and exploitation?

Methodology

The Nature of the Study

This study is both descriptive and historical in nature. Being a historical study, it attempts to explore and reveal the historiographical transformations that have taken place in specific historical epochs during colonial and post-colonial Tanzanian history. The major objective of undertaking this historical research was to gain a clearer understanding and perspective of the present political and social struggles of different social groups that intend to influence the interpretation, teaching and learning of history in Tanzanian secondary schools.

The purpose as well as the benefits of doing historical research are many and varied. However, Mouly (1978) summarized the benefits of historical research as follows:

> Most things have a history, and it is generally
> profitable to acquaint ourselves with this
> history if we are really to appreciate their
> nature. Historical research can provide us not
> only with hypotheses for the solution of current
> problems, but also with a great appreciation of
> culture and the role education is to play in the
> progress of society. An understanding of the
> historical background of education should enable
> the educator to recognize fads and frills, which
> are frequently advocated as "just discovered"
> cures for educational ills when in reality, they
> are simply rejuvenated versions of ideas tried
> years ago and found to be wanting. This does not
> mean that these ideas are not to be considered,
> since changes in the interim may have put them in
> a new light but it should still be noted that
> they are not new . . . . Thus historical
> research can act as a control of policy-making.
> (Mouly, 1978:78)

Methods and Source of Data

In doing this research study, two methods were used
to collect data and information. These two methods of data
collection included: (a) library research undertaken in
the library systems at the University of Alberta; and (b) a
recollection of first-hand personal experiences as a
student and as a teacher in Tanzania.

In regard to the first method--library research,
the researcher used traditional techniques in selecting the
literature relevant to the present study. Thus, the source
materials for this study consisted of a wide range of
published books and periodicals, as well as unpublished
papers. Journals, abstracts, and books were used as a
major source of information. These sources of historical
data consisted of both primary and secondary sources.

Finally, analysis of the literature relevant to the study was done to determine what books, etc., fell under the respective historiographies and historical epochs that are categorized in the research study.

The second method of historical data collection relevant to the study involved the recollection of my own personal experiences as a student in Tanzania secondary schools and university, and later as a teacher in Tanzanian secondary schools. The actual personal experiences are divided into two periods. First, I was a student in secondary schools and university between 1969 and 1981. As a student, I learned and was taught history which was interpreted from Africanist (nationalist) historiography, underdevelopment historiography, and later from the Marxist historiography.

Second, in 1981, after graduating as a teacher, I was posted to teach history at the secondary school level. From 1981 to 1985, the years when I was actually teaching, I taught history from the Marxist interpretation of history. Therefore, the historiographical transformations about which I speak were part of my experiences of being a student and a teacher in Tanzania.

Definitions of Terms

__History__. The term history will be defined as the study of the past as a systematic discipline (Hexter, 1968).

The term history, or written history, will also be defined as systematic or fragmented narration or account purporting to deal with all or part of history-as-actuality (Beard, 1964).

The term history-as-actuality will mean all that has been felt, thought, imagined, said, and done by human beings, in relation to one another and to their environment, since the beginning of humankind's operations on this planet (Beard, 1964).

History-as-record will mean the documents and memorials pertaining to history-as-actuality, on which written history is or should be based. Of course, for recent history, a writer may use in part personal experiences and observations, and oral statements by contemporaries which have been heard, and remembered or written down (Beard, 1964).

__Historiography__. Historiography will be simply defined as the craft of writing history and/or the yield of such writing considered in its rhetorical aspect (Hexter, 1968).

Historiography will also carry the following

definition, i.e. the business of studying, thinking about, and writing about history (Beard, 1964).

Curriculum. A curriculum is a program of activities designed so that pupils will attain, as far as possible, certain educational ends or objectives (Hirst, 1968).

Curriculum is a contrived activity and experience--organized, focused, systematic--that life, unaided, would not provide. Curriculum is properly artificial, selecting, organizing, elaborating, and speeding up the process of real life (Musgrove, 1968).

Syllabus. Refer to the definitions on curriculum, a program of activities designed so that pupils will attain, as far as possible, certain educational ends or objectives.

Junior Secondary School Level. In the Tanzanian secondary school system, the junior secondary school level comprises Form I to Form IV, i.e. Grades 9 to 12. This level is also called ordinary level, and is abbreviated as "O"-level.

Senior Secondary School Level. In the Tanzanian secondary school system, the senior secondary school level comprises Forms V and VI, i.e. grades 13 and 14. This level is also called advanced level, and is abbreviated as "A"-level.

Delimitations

This study concentrates on the study of Tanzania in its colonial and independence periods, covering the period between 1885 to 1985. The results of this study may not necessarily apply to other developing countries, especially after independence.

Second, within Tanzania itself, the study focuses mainly on the secondary school level historiographical changes in the interpretation as well as the teaching and learning of history covering colonial and post-colonial periods. Within the secondary school level, much emphasis is placed on the high school students, the advanced level (A-level) students. However, the conclusion and recommendations of this research can be extended to cover the higher education level, that is, the university level and colleges.

Third, within the secondary school educational system, the study focuses and looks at historiographical changes in the interpretation and the teaching and learning of history as a school subject. The study's arguments may not necessarily apply to other school subjects.

Limitations

The research study is mainly a library research and has been done or undertaken far from home (Tanzania)--where the study is based. As a result, some important documents which could offer much empirical evidence were not readily available. Government documents which would have further enriched the analysis include, for example, specific syllabuses used in both the colonial and post-colonial periods.

However, the absence of the above-mentioned documents may not have much impact on this study, since a review of the various textbooks used to teach the history curriculum points to much empirical evidence as to the changing nature of historiography in the interpretation as well as the teaching and learning of history in the various historical periods of Tanzanian history.

Organization of the Study

The study is organized as follows: Chapter II deals with the question of state and education in both the colonial period and the independent era. Chapter II argues that the centralized school system helped the various governments filter their ideology more easily as well as impose strict control of the history curriculum. As well, the governments decided and controlled the type of

historiography and history teaching methods by which history had to be taught. These struggles, in the end, were designed merely by the various governments to create a highly needed legitimacy among the people.

Chapter III deals with the central question of school curriculum. Chapter III asks whether, school curriculum is value-free or value-laden. In the end, the evidence points to the fact that school curriculum is value-laden. The chapter also, argues the question of the relevance of curriculum debates to the Tanzanian situation. It points out that, in Tanzania at present, the history curriculum is under great attack from the government. This attack is centered on the question of historiography in which history has to be interpreted, written, taught, and learned. Chapter III points to a direct control of government over curriculum.

Chapter IV points out the actualities of historiographical changes in Tanzania from the colonial period to the present time (up to 1985). The chapter does two things. First, it categorizes the periods of specific historiographical transformations. These categories are contained in Part I. Second, in Part II, the chapter points to empirical evidence that reveals the content of these historiographical transformations. As well, Part II reinforces the categories designed in Part I of the chapter.

Chapter V contains a summary, a conclusion, and a number of recommendations. The summary and conclusion calls for the introduction of the study of philosophy of history in secondary schools in Tanzania. Such a study will help, hopefully, to build broader-based graduates who will benefit from a more catholic study of different theories and knowledge production. In the end, the nation will also benefit and, in this case, be more clear about the social role of history in national building and development.

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORY OF THE MODERN STATE
AND WESTERN EDUCATION IN COLONIAL
AND POST-COLONIAL TANZANIA
(1885 - 1988)

The Colonial State and
Western Education (1885 - 1961)

The history and the establishment of what is characterized as the modern state and Western education in the case of Tanzania, and indeed Africa as a whole, dates back to the end of the 19th century. Institutional forms and frameworks which are described as the modern state and as Western education were introduced in Africa by what are generally known as imperialist colonial powers of western Europe. The most notable among these powers included Britain, France, Germany, and Belgium.

The establishment of the modern state in Tanzania by the end of the 19th century by the Germans and later the British was basically a historical necessity on the part of these colonial powers. Tanzania was established and patterned in the form of a colonial state as a necessary colonial instrument that ensured the administrative and policy making and implementation in the colonies. These

37

policies implemented by the colonial state were those locally decided by the colonial state itself within the colony or policies which were received from the colonial office in the mother country, i.e. Germany or Britain.

The modern state introduced in Tanzania was basically an extension of the metropolitan state in both its character and form. It was a state that oversaw the day-to-day running of the various activities in the colony on behalf of the metropolitan state. Because its origin was not in the colonies themselves, the modern state established in Tanzania, and indeed in any other country, was described as a colonial state.

The colonial state in both form and content was characteristic of a bureaucratic authoritarian state. Functions of this state were more in line with the political and economic interests of its father in Europe, the metropolitan state, than with the interests of the colonial subjects in Tanzania or any other colony for that matter. In the particular case of Tanzania, the colonial state did not function to uphold the interests of the colonial subjects in Tanzania.

The structure of the modern state introduced in Tanzania was patterned after a mirror image of the metropolitan state in Europe, particularly in the sense of bureaucratic structure and its functions. The head of the colonial government was the Governor, who was the

direct representative of the Queen of England. The Governor was directly answerable to the Queen and the colonial office in Britain or Germany.

Under the Governor, there existed a Legislative Council and the Ministers and Cabinet. Under them, the Provincial Commissioners and the District Commissioners functioned. These people or groups formed the upper strata of the colonial state in Tanzania. Under this upper strata were numerous other public servants who performed the bureaucratic functions in the various state institutions. Notable among these modern state institutions were the army, the police, the prisons, various ministries, etc.

In order for the colonial state to function properly in the colony, in the name of law and order, it created a host of state institutions which were given different areas of jurisdiction in the colony. These state institutions, which together characterize the modern state, included the army, the police, the prisons, the courts, the schools, the church and other religious bodies, and the various ministries, etc.

These state institutions were established in ways that ensured what the colonial government regarded as the smooth running of the colony and the keeping of law and order within the colonial political and economic relations. In other words, the function of these institutions was to ensure that what was required by the metropolitan state in

Europe was implemented by the colonial subjects in the colonies.

Activities of the colonial state were mostly geared to oversee that exploitative relations were maintained within the colonial political and social relations, as well as that the colonial subjects produced what was required by the metropolitan state in Europe, either in terms of engaging in wage labour or being involved directly in agricultural production.

The requirements of the metropolitan state in Europe changed over periods of time and necessitated a change in what the colonial subjects were required to do at various times. For example, when the metropolitan state demanded the production of lubricating oils and insulators, the colonial subjects were required to grow palm oil and groundnuts and rubber. At various times, the metropolitan state required colonial subjects to grow sisal for rope, cotton for cloth, etc. These varying demands reflected the changing pattern of industrial developments and industrial production in metropolitan Europe itself, which in turn produced different demands on the colonies.

During the colonial period, the political participation of the local people in government and public matters was highly restricted. Although the colonial state had created a number of avenues intended to form areas where people could participate in political affairs, these

areas turned out to be merely "buffer states" which stood between the colonial state and the people. At most, these avenues became points of brutal contact through which the colonial government meted out its colonial policies for implementation without question or opposition from the respective people involved in the implementation.

These avenues, intended to be areas for popular political participation, included the Native authorities, the agricultural cooperatives, the workers' unions, and numerous other organizations. The Native authorities, for example, turned out to be mere avenues through which the colonial state could collect taxes easily, recruit wage labour or forced unpaid labour as easily as possible, and dispense government law and legislation easily. These activities were mediated by local chiefs and headmen who became head of these Native authorities.

The agricultural cooperatives were easy avenues for the colonial government to introduce new crops, as well as to guarantee continuation of what was already produced and to control how much to be produced at a specific time. As well, the cooperatives controlled the prices of both agricultural inputs and the crops that were produced. Many of these agricultural cooperatives were organized to guarantee the continuation of the production of cash crops which were to be sent to Europe. Crops that had

cooperative organizations included cotton, coffee, and tobacco.

The workers' unions were basically avenues for the control of labour and labour demands. Labour unions were restricted in their demands. As a result, they were mainly required to demand wage increases, work for welfare or improved working conditions, etc. In short, labour unions were restricted to economistic demands and prevented completely from political demands of any dimension. If they dared enter the sphere of political demands, the labour unions could be banned through a no-registration legislation or by other means of repression.

Given the restricted political participation in the colonial political circles, the political participation of most groups consisted of overt political protest and demonstration to make their point. Farmers, for example, protested against changes in agricultural practices whenever they saw these changes as leading to a loss of their land or an erosion of "traditional forms of life," etc. The workers would, from time to time, protest if they perceived that their demands were not being met.

These various forms of political protest were made more bitter because no African represented African interests in the Legislative Council for the whole colonial period. This lack of African representation remained a fact until the 1950s after the Second World War. As a

result, the political character in which Africans had to get into the colonial state political structure was through overt protest and covert protest (what others would call passive resistance).

The point of restricted political participation is well expressed by Rodney (1980):

> As would be expected, striking differences
> existed between the political power of African
> peasants and that of the settlers and plantation
> owners. Indeed, peasants exercised no political
> power during the years in question (1890-1930).
> With regard to the other two groups, there was an
> interesting disparity in their relative access to
> power. Settlers wielded more political influence
> than their numbers would suggest. These
> communities were given legal status with
> representatives on District Councils from 1901,
> and they were represented on the Governor's
> Advisory Council and other boards. There were
> close ties between settlers, the colonial
> administration and the military; they were
> allocated half of the income from African hut
> tax, along with other subventions. (Rodney,
> 1980:133)

Introduction of Western Education

The activities of the colonial state required the constant production and reproduction of the required educated manpower to fill and run the ever-expanding activities of the colonial state and its institutions. To provide this manpower, the creation of a modern public school system was required. The need for the constant production and supply of educated personnel caused the

colonial state to establish what is called the public school system in Tanzania.

The establishment of the public school system had a two-fold purpose: (a) to produce technical and industrial manpower, as well as administrative personnel; and (b) to propagate the colonial state ideology, e.g. racial superiority of the white race, etc., among these educated personnel (Cameroon and Dood, 1970; Hirji, 1980; Mbilinyi, 1982). The intent of the second objective was to inculcate a strong sense of loyalty and submissiveness to the colonial state and thus induce the colonized educated subjects to a sense of commitment in the service of the colonial state. The colonial state provision of public schooling was not only intended to produce educated technical and administrative personnel; it was also to inculcate a sense of colonial ideology.

These objectives are clear for both German and British colonial states. Both colonial states declared openly their intended purpose of public education. The German colonial state that ruled Tanganyika (Tanzania Mainland) from 1885 to 1914 declared of its public schools:

> Colonial schools are the cradle of German culture
> in Africa . . . . The true process of civiliza-
> tion has to be internalized if it is to be
> effective. The purpose of the schools cannot be
> merely to teach a trade to a few people. Rather,
> it must be to bring up a new generation that will
> have accepted the new civilization internally as
> well as externally. (Mbilinyi, 1982:78)

The British objective for public schools was also similar:

> Our objective is . . . an educational system
> which will provide for African needs and at the
> same time produce a virile and loyal citizen of
> the Empire . . . where character, health,
> industry and a proper appreciation of the dignity
> of manual labour rank as of first importance. . .
> the school . . . is the centre of all government
> propaganda work. (Mbilinyi, 1982:78)

The new civilization which the Africans were
supposed to internalize, Mbilinyi (1982:78) argues, was
underdeveloped capitalism; and, the schools were to foster
internalization of bourgeoisie work ethics and racist
ideology. The ideological function of the schools was
quite clear in this respect (see Chapter IV).

There was, however, another system of education
apart from the public school system. This system had, in
fact, started earlier, before the establishment of the
public school system and even before the establishment of
formal colonialism in Africa. This other system was the
missionary school system, a system geared mainly to produce
educated manpower for the missionary religious institutions
in such jobs as priests, missionary primary school
teachers, bush school teachers, catechists, technicians,
carpenters, artisans, etc. (Cameroon and Dood, 1980; Hirji,
1980).

The colonial governments--both German and British--
intended, however, to control the curriculum of what was
being taught in these mission schools. The intent was to
make the mission schools teach the curriculum which was

approved by these colonial governments. This control was established so that the products (or graduates) of the mission schools could be used for government work if they had followed government approved curricula (Cameroon and Dood, 1970).

Those mission schools that agreed to follow government approved curricula received what were said to be grants-in-aid from the colonial government to help them in some of the needs of teaching government approved curricula. Those missions schools that refused to use government approved curricula were denied grants-in-aid from the colonial government and their graduates could not be hired by the government institutions.

The onset of subordinate control by the British colonial state over the mission school is said to have been more pronounced in the decades after the First World War. One reason for this increased control might have been due to the greater need for educated manpower to serve the increased activities of the colonial economy and colonial administrative machinery which was emerging and being reorganized after the destruction caused by the First World War. Thus, to fill some of these demands for education personnel, which the public school system could not provide alone, the British colonial government saw missionary schools as alternative avenues to solve the manpower equation.

The British colonial government control of mission schools in areas of staffing and curriculum is vividly expressed by Cameroon and Dood (1970), who noted:

> The second great change was that the peak of missionary endeavour and influence had passed. The Christian missionaries were to retain their predominance in education but it was to be a predominance increasingly underwritten by government money, not their own. By the end of the first world war, they were beginning to outrun their financial resources to support the huge education system they had created . . . In 1925, there was a conference between government officials and missionaries at which the government agreed to accept responsibility for financially aiding voluntary agency schools subject to certain mineral conditions regarding staffing and the curriculum. Government control had started. The first grants-in-aid, as they were called, were paid two years later. (p. 60)

The other reason for the German and, later, the British colonial governments' desire or need to control the curriculum and force the mission schools to use government approved curricula was what we could call the legitimization crisis on the part of the colonial government in relation to the presence of multiple missionary agencies of different European nationalities. These multiple missionary agencies were comprised of nationals from the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Belgium, etc.

As a result, the allegiance of the missionary agencies (which were not German in origin and later not British in origin, during the rule of these two powers in Tanzania) was not necessarily automatic to Germany or to

the British colonial state. Missionary agencies still harboured the nationalist sentiments of their countries of origin. Most of the missionary agencies were still strongly tied to their mother countries in Europe where they received financial help for their missionary activities which they did in Tanzania.

Because the nationalistic attitude of the missionary agencies was so strong, both the German and later the British colonial state had to ensure that the various religious groups had some allegiance to the colonial state. One way to ensure this allegiance was to force the various missionary agencies to adapt the government approved curricula in the missionary schools.

This legitimization crisis and the bitter relations between the colonial governments and the missionaries are partly outlined by Cameroon and Dood (1970):

> In German times there were three Roman Catholic
> Orders and nine Protestant denominations in the
> field, represented mainly by four nationalities--
> American, British, French and German, although
> there were others. This double multiplicity
> increased under British administration and is
> part of the background to the relations between
> government and non-government agencies in
> education right up to independence. In the
> 1930's, the British Director of Education could
> complain that 80 percent of the missionary
> expatriates were foreigners. In the two world
> wars, missionaries were interned because they
> became enemy aliens overnight--the British and
> French in the First World War, the Germans and
> the Italians in the second. (p. 52)

The German and later the British colonial states established in Tanzania faced not only legitimization

crises from the missionary agencies, they also faced a legitimization crisis from the Tanzanian colonial subjects. The legitimization crises of these colonial governments were largely the result of outside powers which had established themselves forcibly among the Tanzanian colonial subjects.

These legitimization crises of the colonial governments in relation to the Tanzanian colonial subjects were dealt with in different ways throughout the colonial period. One method of dealing with the crises was the use of force to neutralize and silence opposition from opponents among the colonized subjects. Three methods of force included the colonial army called KAR (Kings African Rifles), the police and the prisons. Another method of control was the use of ideological propaganda for which the schools and the Church and various religious bodies played a large role. Their role was essentially to create a good image of the colonial government (Hirji, 1980; Rodney, 1972).

In the school system, the legitimization of the colonial government came largely through the school subjects. In particular, the history curriculum and political education called "civics" taught students the good sides of the colonial state and why it was necessary for it (the colonial state) to be in Tanzania (Hirji, 1980; Mbilinyi, 1980; Rodney, 1972). The colonial state viewed

itself as a civilizing power whose mission was that of a civilizing master to bring to the colonials subjects the civilization and prosperity of commerce, literacy, and especially the 3 R's, i.e. writing, reading, and arithmetic.

In short, the colonial state saw itself as an "agent" of history and the colonized subjects were "objects" upon which the colonial state had to act to bring them from no civilization to civilization. The colonized were regarded as the "victims" of history, incapable of transforming themselves. This historical vision was posed by the colonial state and colonial racist historiography in the colonial school system in Tanzania (Cameroon and Dood, 1970; Coupland, 1938; Rodney, 1972). This part of history curriculum and legitimization of colonialism will be dealt with in Chapter IV under the section about colonial racist historiography.

The Nationalist Government and
Education (1961-1988)

The departure of the British colonial government at the time of independence in 1961 in Tanganyika and 1964 in Zanzibar meant that the activities of state administration, policy making, and implementation were left to the nationalist governments.

The nationalist government, in the case of Tanganyika, took over state administration and policy making in 1961. The institutional and legal emergence of the nationalist government goes back to 1954 when a number of Tanganyikan nationalists, notable among them Julius Nyerere, formed what was a political party called TANU (Tanganyika African National Union).

The origin of TANU goes back to 1929 when some Tanzanians formed what was a welfare party called TAA (Tanganyika African Association). The TAA was basically not a political party but an association that merely concerned itself with the welfare of its members. These members were mainly drawn from the working class in urban areas. As such, TAA's demands were largely economistic demands (e.g. pay rises and better working conditions).

However, in 1954, TAA was suddenly transformed into a political party. At this time, the most important goal became to demand independence for Tanganyika from the colonial government. The objective of this nationalist political party (TANU), like other political parties that were formed later, was to demand independence from the colonial government.

The impetus for these political demands was generated partly from the external factors and influences. The wave of nationalism and self-determination in the 1950s had increased considerably in several colonies. By waging

these nationalist movements, some countries were obtaining their independence. The success of other nationalist movements increased the confidence of TANU to fight for independence. Second, the role of the United Nations Organization (UNO) was considerable because Britain ruled Tanganyika as a "Mandated Territory" and later as a Trusteeship on behalf of UNO. Thus Tanganyika was not regarded as a British colony as was the case in Kenya or Zimbabwe. Britain was just a caretaker to prepare Tanganyika for independence.

Given the above conditions, TANU, like other political parties elsewhere in Africa, strongly demanded self-government and pressurized the metropolitan state in Britain and the colonial state to grant independence to Tanganyika as soon as possible. After considerable political pressure carried by TANU both to the UNO and within Tanganyika itself, the colonial state finally granted independence to Tanganyika in 1961.

TANU was then allowed to form the independent nationalist government, after winning a large majority of votes in the elections that were held in 1961. The other two political parties, namely ANC (African National Congress) and UTP (United Tanganyika Party), which also contested in the elections, lost the elections or at most received only minority support.

TANU went on to form a nationalist government. At the same time, TANU began to launch a systematic campaign to eliminate opposition from these other political parties. It (TANU) achieved its objective of eliminating legitimate opposition in 1965 when the TANU-dominated parliament passed a bill to make TANU the only political party in Tanganyika and to subsequently make Tanganyika a one-party state. Since 1965, Tanganyika has been a one-party state and TANU has dominated politics and political life in Tanzania. This one-party domination largely has come to determine the political and social relations in Tanzania.

In the case of Zanzibar, after the 1964 independence by revolution, the ASP (Afro-Shiraz Party) declared itself the only party and subsequently eliminated the other political parties from sharing political power. As such, Zanzibar was also made a one-party state.

There are at present no opposition political parties in Tanzania. Indeed, the lack of opposition seems to be the general character of "African politics" or "politics in Africa," whereby all African countries have been turned into one-party states. It is difficult to say whether "conspiracy theory" could be used to explain this form of political development among the African political leaders.

The TANU party president, who was largely a master-mind behind all party ideologies, was the person who

appointed a TANU Commission which looked after the proposal of a one-party state in 1965. His justification for a one-party state is justified by his argument that "there is no need for opposition if we can elect members in an election every five years."

However, the general arguments for a one-party state have been vividly stated by Kaniki (1974) when he wrote:

> The usefulness and relevance of unmodified western institutions had been questioned by TANU a early as the late 1950s. The need to act with greater initiative and originality after independence pushed TANU to make a closer critical examination of the usefulness of multiparty politics in an African country like Tanganyika. In this issue, as in many others, the views of TANU's President played a decisive role in opting for one-party politics. As early as January 1963, TANU had decided in principle to abolish opposition parties in Tanganyika. The most important argument given against multi-party politics is the rise of unnecessary factions and internal division in a young nation struggling to consolidate national consciousness and alleviate problems of poverty, ignorance and disease. The existence of a number of political parties, it was argued, would not facilitate the maximum utilization of the limited material and human resources in the country. (Kaniki, 1974:18-19)

From the above argument, therefore, one derives the fact that legal opposition is considered unhealthy for a country such as Tanzania, according to the TANU and ASP political parties. The monopoly of CCM (Revolutionary Party) in the state political and economic policies is highly overwhelming, and at times may be detrimental. CCM (formerly TANU and ASP) Central Committee, which is more or

less patterned after a Politiburo of some socialist countries, can propose policy matters for implementation without any meaningful discussion in the parliament.

The same is true for the CCM Central Committee itself in the sense that even in this organ the "unequal balance of power" among its members make it difficult to, have meaningful discussion. This fact is exemplified by the socialist Declaration of 1967, in which some of the CCM Central Committee members had no idea of this important policy change until it was made public.

Mwansasu (1979) made this point very clear when he wrote:

> A related procedural weakness was the fact that for a long time delegates and committee members went to their meetings without prior knowledge of the agenda. It is reported that even the National Executive Committee at its historic meeting at Arusha in 1967 did not begin with socialism and self-reliance as an agenda item of which members had foreknowledge. Instead, it was introduced at the meeting by the President. Even on an issue of this magnitude, members received no advance notice; they went to these meetings without having either thought about the issues or discussed them in local party circles. (Mwansasu, 1979:184)

The argument given to justify the fact that issues passed by the CCM Central Committee need not have the blessing of parliament is that the CCM Central Committee is considered to be at part with parliament. Moreover, since the CCM party is said to be supreme over the government, it is supposed to formulate policies and the government must take on the task of implementing these policies.

The tactics that were bent to make the CCM Central
Committee at par with parliament and thus give them a large
stake in formulating national policies were implemented in
1965. These tactics were recommended by the Presidential
Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic One-Party
State. Here again, Mwansasu tells us the story and the
facts of the case:

> The government provided the yardstick or point of
> reference against which other institutions could
> be compared. Thus, when recommending how to
> strengthen the party's National Executive
> Committee, the Presidential Commission on the
> Establishment of a Democratic One-Party State
> reported that the NEC should have "the power to
> summon witnesses and to call for papers which is
> conferred by Chapter 359 of the Laws of the
> National Assembly and the sessional Committees of
> the Assembly." In addition, the report went on,
> "those members of the National Executive who are
> not also members of the National Assembly should
> be paid the same salaries and allowances as are
> paid to Members of Parliament.". The idea here
> was to raise the NEC to be at par with the
> National Assembly. The implication clearly was
> that the status of the party would thereby be
> elevated. (Mwansasu, 1979:175)

In 1969, this emphasis (of the superiority of the
party and its central committee on formulating national
policies) was again reinforced by the President, Nyerere,
who put the facts and the case as follows:

> It is the feeling of the National Executive
> Committee that our Party is becoming more mature.
> This year we will be marking the 15th Anniversary
> of TANU. As the Party grows and becomes more
> mature, this change must also be reflected in its
> various organs. And the Central Committee is one
> of these main organs. As our party begins to
> involve itself seriously in various national
> activities, whether we like it or not, the
> Central Committee will of necessity assume

greater responsibilities and, hence, become more powerful. With this new status, it will have to derive its authority from the same source as the President. (in Mwansasu, 1979:185)

In any case, we can see that, although Tanganyika received independence under the "Westminster Model" of state and government in which multiplicity of political parties exist, Tanzania has been ruled under a one-party state political system. There has been, as the evidence above shows, an erosion of parliamentary democracy and a replacement by a one-party aristocracy. The one-party state political system can be considered somewhat "dictatorial" because many of the issues that affect the majority of Tanzanians are never fully or openly discussed in parliament or by the people themselves. This being the case, the implications of the policies which are issued are not seen.

Most issues tend to arise, get discussed and then get a go-ahead for implementation by the CCM Central Committee which hardly comprises 20 people. Most of these meetings, if not all, take place "behind closed doors." No-one knows what happens behind these so-called "closed doors." The few people who comprise the Central Committee issue sporadic policy declarations which are usually expected to be implemented without question. Many of the implications of these various sporadic policies are rarely foreseen.

The very lack of legal political opposition makes it even more difficult to get across divergent constructive views at the level of public national policies. This lack of opposition means that the ruling party has complete control of running the country and issuing policies in the way which it sees fit. Such policies and actions may not be a healthy situation for a country which has just come out of the colonial experiences and intends to build a better future for itself and its people.

Building a better future for people depends on pulling together the various viewpoints and weighing their possibilities and potentialities for a building of a better future for Tanzania. The idea of a one-party direction, in this writer's view, tends to narrow the gap of existing possibilities and choices for embarking on a determined and possible route for development. And worse, the question which arises here is: How would people, in absence of legal opposition, oust the party in power if the party submerges itself in arrogance and mismanagement?

It can be argued that, although one of the promises of the CCM political party was to get Tanzanians out of the dictates of the British colonial regime, the party has in fact wholely replaced these colonial dictates of the colonial power to itself, under the ideology of nationalism and one-party democracy.

Freedom of expression is not "wholly" restricted, but "somewhat" restricted just as under the colonial regime. This restriction of expression is enforced by various intimidating tactics. The colonial regime threw people in jail if they spoke against its authority. This tactic was one of many acts of repression available to the colonial government. The nationalist one-party state also has its tactics to silence people who question some of its policies. One such tactic is to oust vocal people from the party itself and to strip them of their membership in the party. As such, they can no longer engage in politics.

Kaniki (1974) tells us part of the story about these party tactics:

> To deserve a leadership position, a TANU member also needs to be a committed socialist. The acceptance of this fact exposed many Party leaders and members to new pressures. Some of those who failed to abide by Party discipline and Party ideology have lost their positions and Party membership. One of the most dramatic of such instances happened in October 1968, when the National Executive Committee of TANU, meeting in Tanga, expelled from the party seven MPs and two ordinary members. Ironically, all the people involved had at one time or another been quite active members or leaders in the Party. (p. 22)

The nationalist government and the CCM party control the major means of mass media in Tanzania. These means of mass media, as would be expected, to a larger extent carry and advocate the political and social versions of the party and government. In Tanzania, the media include the radio, television, and newspapers. The

newspapers include the <u>Daily News</u> and the <u>Sunday News</u>, which are owned by the government, as well as <u>Uhuru</u> and <u>Mzalendo</u> newspapers, which are owned by the Party. Radio and television (available only in Zanzibar) are also wholly government owned. Other newspapers carry news which is mostly regional, not national, in scale. In any case, they hardly carry any weight in influencing government political policy.

The avenues of political participation after independence in Tanzania, as opposed to the colonial period, have been somewhat expanded. CCM party branches have been opened in every Ujamaa village as part of the implementation of the Arusha Declaration that intended to make people participate in their own development needs. As well, district and regional level CCM party branches are mainly supposed to oversee the activities of government institutions in the proper implementation of socialist policies, etc.

However, in spite of the fact that these CMM party branches do exist, it is difficult to say how far and how effectively the so-called "ordinary man" really participates in influencing village, district, and regional policies. The opening of these Ujamaa villages was based on the theory of the possibilities of achieving change "from below," i.e. the grassroots level of the party organization. But most of the studies done on the

operation of Ujamaa village party branches have concluded that these party branches are largely places where the influential and clever people in the village have their personal interests supported (Mbilinyi, 1982; Mbioni, 1970-80).

In this writer's general view, having seen the concrete form of operation of these village party branches, the party branches have become more centres of party mobilization of the peasants for political elections, as well as supporters of different party policies issued by the Central Committee. As such, these grassroots level party branches have become strongholds where the party gets its support, especially when the party introduces policies which are generally unpopular.

It is indeed difficult to say whether the peasants' support of the party is done out of ignorance or out of high understanding of the issues at stake. Are the peasants being manipulated by the higher levels of the party? If so, are all the peasants merely "objects" to be manipulated? If not, are the peasants "subjects" who can decide whether a policy is good or bad for their daily lives? Where do we draw the line?

Most studies on villages suggest that the peasants' lack of "education" provides the evidence of their failure to engage in policy matters. These studies conclude that peasants, as such, are easily manipulated. If "lack of

education" is enough reason to suspect that the peasants are easily manipulated, how can peasant "passive" resistances in implementing some of the policy matters (even though at first they might have shown massive support by demonstrations) be explained?

Apart from the party branches in the villages, districts and regions, there are also other areas of political participation. These include the various party organizations which are almost independent but somehow affiliated to the party. Here villagers receive their ideology on how to operate their respective institutions. These organizations include the TYL (TANU Youth League), UWT (United Women of Tanzania), and the TAPA (Tanganyika African Parents Association). These are like the village party branches, insofar as they act as strongholds of the party. The party relies heavily on these institutions for political elections and support of its policies, both popular and unpopular.

Another institution closely affiliated with the CCM party is JUWATA, formerly known as NUTA (National Union of Tanganyika Workers). This workers' organization was formerly what was called the T.F.L. (Tanganyika Federation of Labour) and it operated during the colonial period. JUWATA, which is under the control of the Ministry of Labour and Welfare, is another tool for the party's support and stronghold.

There is no "conspiracy theory" to these developments between the party and the above mentioned organizations. What better describes these developments is the concept of "corporatism." The concept of "corporatism" has been used to describe similar developments of state and government institutional relationships in the case of Latin America. The concept of "corporatism" in Latin America was closely related to the rise to power of military bureaucratic authoritarian states or regimes in Latin America.

The concept of corporatism has been defined in various ways. However, these various definitions have one central focus. They all analyse the relationship that exists between the society and the state and how the two are linked to one another. In this respect, Guillermo (1977) defines corporatism in the following way:

> Corporatism should be understood as a set of structures which link society with the state. Therefore any examination of the actual operation and social impacts of corporatism must consider it with systematic reference to some of the main characteristics of the state and society it helps to link. In the final analysis, the study of corporatism is of the broader problem of inter-relationships between state and society. This means the concept of corporatism is useful when it is limited to certain linking structures between state and society. (p. 47)

Wiarda (1981) also defines and explains the concept of corporatism:

> Corporatism, we have discovered, is not merely a "smoke-screen" or "confidence trick" as the early literature on Italy sometimes argued, but a

complex and often quite rational way of
organizing diverse nations, of structuring both
political society and public policy, of
institutionalizing consultation between the state
and societal groups, of filling the
organizational void in fragmented transitional
societies, of integrating new groups into
political society and/or controlling their
participation, of serving as an alternative model
of national social and political development.
These functions can be neither ignored or easily
dismissed as anachronistic. (p. xi)

After independence, the political party TANU that

formed the government has built a relationship which

attends to controlling and co-opting these various organs

in form of a corporatist state. The result is that these

relations have brought about what is called a "gentlemen's

agreement" of mutual but antagonistic relations. This

agreement can again be described best as "scratch my back

and I'll scratch yours." The crisis of this type of

arrangement is obvious. The pattern of the way things are

done becomes the pattern of political life. Change of

political views, if it happens at all, comes so slowly as

to make one assume that there is no change at all. The way

things are done become a "tradition" which is hard to

change.

To this extent, one might then be tempted to

describe and characterize the Tanzanian CCM government as a

"dictatorship." This writer would argue that to

characterize the Tanzanian CCM government as a

"dictatorship" is to miss the point. And to say that the

CCM government is "democratic" is to take a leap in the

dark. There is a middle ground. The CCM government is best described as a "benevolent despot."

Throughout the independence period, and especially after 1967, the economic situation in the country has deteriorated considerably, prompting criticism of the nationalist government's handling of political and economic affairs. These criticisms came both from internal elements as well as from external ones. The nationalist government response was varied over time.

A major change in political and economic policy came in 1967 when the CCM party unilaterally promised to change things for the better under the ideology of socialist construction. This statement was to no avail. Time and concrete reality have proved to the party that it "wronged" in going the way it chose to go. Since 1967, the downfall trend of the economic slump has continued even faster than prior to 1967. The country has ultimately plunged into economic stagnation which has turned Tanzania from an independent economic giant to a desperate, shaky economy. Some of the reasons for the economic slump are as follows: drought, oil prices of petroleum imported from outside, bad trade imbalances of exported commodities in terms of low prices, etc.

To legitimize itself and restore confidence in the people, the nationalist government has tried to explain the sources of economic catastrophe in several ways. These

attempts to explain have meant political war on several
fronts, from public platforms to the schools. In the
schools, subjects such as political education and history
are vastly depended upon to defend the plight of the
nationalist regime. Such an active defense has meant the
dominance of nationalist and Africanist ideology both in
public arenas and in the schools.

Education under the Nationalist State

After independence in 1961, the Tanzanian
nationalist government instituted a few structural changes
to the inherited colonial educational system. Many of
these changes or reforms were a sort of re-organization of
the system rather than a total structural change of the
educational and structure. Thus, the educational
hierarchy as it had been under the colonial state.
crimination, which was characteristic of
the colonial education, was abolished after independence.
This meant that the racial divisions in the school system,
whereby each race had its own schools, i.e. European,
Asians and Africans, was abolished. This abolition
ultimately resulted in the racial school systems being
amalgamated into one school system which operated on a non-
racial basis.

The major intent of the nationalist state at this point in time, i.e. soon after independence, was to have the school system produce enough manpower to man the new nationalist state and party institutions. To attain this objective, the nationalist state embarked on increasing student enrolments at all levels of the school system, but especially secondary school enrolments. Under the same argument of increasing manpower, during the initial years of independence, it was no wonder that the nationalist government stressed and paid much attention, both in money and staffing as well as curriculum, to the secondary and tertiary levels of schooling.

However, after the Arusha Declaration of Socialism and Self-Reliance in 1967, the government support for and emphasis on schooling shifted from secondary and higher education to primary education and adult education. This priority shift was due to the government's argument that it needed to provide a "basic education" to the majority of Tanzanians, especially peasants, so that they could read and understand government development policies.

There were also in existence two systems of schooling as was the case in the colonial period--the state public school system and the missionary and other voluntary agency schools. The voluntary agency school system was categorized as the "private" school system.

The Nationalist state (as was the case with the colonial state), in its intent to control what was taught in these mission and other voluntary agency schools, began systematically to intrude into the mission schools. One government tactic was to force the mission schools and other voluntary agency schools, if they were to legally operate and be recognized by the government which they had, to accept and teach the government approved secular curriculum. Under various pressures imposed by the government, the mission schools were ultimately made to yield to government pressure to teach government approved curriculum on top of their religious curriculum and work.

The final crunch of the struggle between the nationalist government and mission and voluntary agencies came in 1969. At that time, the nationalist government passed the Education Act, No. 50 of 1969, which sought to provide education in Mainland Tanzania which would conform to the political, social, and cultural ideals of Tanzania. These political, social, and cultural ideals were those stipulated by the Arusha Declaration and contained in a pamphlet entitled "Education for Self-Reliance." Generally, they sought to create in Tanzania what was conceptualized as a "socialist man."

Part Four of the Education Act No. 50 of 1969 declared that all voluntary agency schools were "nationalized." These so-called "nationalizations" did not

imply government ownership of these voluntary agency schools. It was mainly the issue of curriculum that was to be taught in these schools.

The general story of these "nationalizations" and government control of voluntary agency schools is provided by Mohidin (1981), who wrote:

> Part four of the Act provided for the management and control of all schools in Mainland Tanzania. This meant that even those schools which were hitherto only assisted, and now owned, by the government would now be completely taken over by the state. They would be under the control of the Director of National Education, a new position, who would be responsible for the wholly owned and controlled government schools. It must be noted, however, that the transfer was only that of administration and management, and the schools still remained the property of the owners. What the Act aimed to achieve with the minimum of cost to the government was to control the curriculum in the schools. It was thus a control of use and not nationalization of assets. (p. 137)

The intent to control the voluntary agency schools in terms of the teaching of government approved curriculum was two-fold. One intent was to make sure that the voluntary agency schools helped the government produce needed educated manpower that would be able to be employed in government and party institutions. The second intent was to closely control the activities of the mission and voluntary agency schools, since these agencies were of different European origin (France, Britain, Germany, Belgium, etc.) whose political allegiance may have been or

was more tilted toward their countries of origin than toward the aspiration of the Tanzanian nationalist state.

From these struggles, we can deduce that the nationalist state, like its colonial predecessor, was facing legitimation problems with regard to its relation with the voluntary agencies. The nationalist state had to do something to make sure that these voluntary agencies, since they were in Tanzanian territory, had to perform their institutional duties as prescribed by the political and social ideology of the nationalist state.

Since the time of independence, the activities of education had been left in the hands of the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Education controlled all ers related to education including examinations, iculum, and administration. However, to make it easier for the development of curriculum and examinations, the Ministry, through the parliament, created two separate parastatal institutions vested with these two tasks. That is, the Institute of Education is vested with the task of curriculum development for the primary, secondary, and teacher training colleges; and the National Examination Council is vested with the task of developing examinations in such areas as setting and marking of examinations for the above-mentioned levels of schooling, as well as issuing of Examination Certificates for those who pass these examinations.

The nationalist state, like its colonial predecessor, continues to have a firm grasp and control on the education system in what is described as a "centralized system of education." The curriculum which is developed by the Institute of Education, as an example of centralized structure, has to pass through the "rubber stamp" of the Ministry of Education bureaucratic officials who act as government overseers evaluating the curriculum content which is being taught in the schools.

Conflicts between what should be the final and acceptable version of the curriculum, the methods of teaching, and what school textbooks should include as content have been critical bones of contention between the Ministry of Education bureaucratic officials and the curriculum developers in the Institute of Education.

Certainly, conflicts can be a desirable democratic activity; but, the point here is that there is a crisis of the existence of varying social and world views (interpretations) and a political battle about which ones of them should prevail in the school system. The "obvious" winner of these world view battles ultimately depends on the "balance of power." In other words, the institution that holds more power wins. The power scale in Tanzania is heavily tilted toward the bureaucracy in the Ministry of Education. They are the final determiners of the form of the curriculum and the content of the textbooks.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that serious and painstaking negotiations always go on between the Ministry officials and curriculum developers before the final version of the curriculum and the textbooks is issued or decided. These negotiations offer an opportunity for "give and take." There is always room for improvement and, in particular, a reaching of the "middle ground" in the curriculum and textbook content. But, when it comes to the "crunch," the "balance of power" theory tends to resolve the problem.

The nationalist government's ideological stances, especially in the areas of history and political education, become apparent in the school curriculum. The struggle for the government to legitimize itself using the school education system as a "stepping stone" or a "launching pad" has become of uttermost importance, just like its colonial predecessor.

President Nyerere and the political party TANU recognized the importance of the school educational system in propagating government propaganda when they issued the educational version of the Arusha Declaration, called "Education for Self-Reliance," in 1967. "Education for Self-Reliance" called for a change in the school curriculum and teaching methods in Tanzanian schools to conform to the ideology of socialism propagated by the party and by the government. At the same time, "Education for Self-

Reliance" condemned colonial ideological education as being totally irrelevant to the aspirations of the new nationalist state.

Part of this struggle by TANU and the nationalist government to change the curriculum and teaching methods to conform to the aspirations of nationalist state ideology is described by Kaniki (1974) thus:

> Another measure taken to implement the aspirations of the Arusha Declaration was the revision of the curricula and teaching methods in Tanzania schools and institutions of higher learning. Shortly after the publication of the Arusha Declaration, the President of TANU published a pamphlet entitled "Education for Self-Reliance." In this document, Nyerere critically examines the education system inherited from the colonial regime, and points out its unsuitability and irrelevance to a young nation struggling to develop along socialist lines. Nyerere has stressed the role of schools in shaping attitudes of any nation. (Kaniki, 1974:23)

The curriculum has been under constant transformation and has become one of the important areas of government ideological propaganda. The particulars of curriculum change and control and the legitimization crisis will be dealt with further in Chapter IV. The intention in this chapter has been to consider the conceptions and theorization of curriculum itself and whether it is value-free as conventional (traditional) wisdom would claim, or whether it is a value-laden structure as the radical theories propose.

CHAPTER III

THE THEORIES OF CURRICULUM AND THEIR
RELEVANCE TO THE TANZANIAN SITUATION

The Historical Emergency of
Curriculum as a Field of Study
and its Subsequent Theoretical Development

The emergency of curriculum as a field of study had a very loose starting point in this twentieth century. The starting point has been documented by people such as Taba (1962) as being as early as the 1920s, when one District school supervisor sought to put together a system of learning structures and school experiences in the school and classroom programs. This system was created merely as a way of making administration easy. The administration wanted to know, for example, how much students had learned and what students had covered (content) over a certain period of time.

The administrative need was to easily identify what was happening from one stage of the school system to another and from one class to another class in a continuous order. The curriculum defined and seen in this sense of being a catalogue of school and class-based learning experiences was developed further in the decade of the 1940s. People such as Tyler (1949) developed what has been

regarded as the Tylerian Model of Curriculum Development and Instruction, which simply modified and systematized the curriculum into four stages of development and plan of instruction.

The four Tylerian stages of developing curriculum and plan of instruction were simplified into the following linear model:

Objects or intents. That is, what educational purposes should the school seek to attain?

Selection of learning experiences. That is, what educational experiences can be provided that are likely to attain these purposes and objectives?

The organization of the learning experiences. That is, how can these educational experiences be effectively organized?

Evaluation. That is, how can we determine whether these purposes are being attained? (Tyler, 1949:1)

The Tylerian Model a rationale for curriculum development and plan of instru had profound effects on curriculum. And it was no er that, because of its simplicity as well as its popularity, the approach gained many followers. In the early decades of curriculum development, that is, from the 1920s to the 1940s, the idea of curriculum itself was thought to be merely the tasks of searching for objectives or intents and then finding the best ways to obtain these objectives in the classroom setting. This idea has been classified as the mechanical model of curriculum development by critics of the Tylerian

Model and Rationale for Curriculum Development and Instruction.

The Tylerian notion of curriculum and instruction, so it is argued, was developed and based on the idea of a factory production model which merely thought that the failure of students to understand the curriculum or lesson was largely because the methods used to teach the content to the students were wrong. Methodology was seen as the culprit in the problems and processes of student understanding.

For the most part, in the decades before the 1970s, the field of curriculum was dominated by the Tylerian Model of Curriculum Development and Instruction. Debates on curriculum mostly hinged around such things as the search for best ways to document school programs, to teach the content to the students, and to evaluate curriculum and instructional objectives and intents.

Some of these ideas can be extracted from the definition of curriculum which Tyler (1949) and his associates used. To this regard, Tyler (1949, and his followers such as Sayler and Alexander (1954), defined curriculum as "the total effort of the school to bring about desired outcomes in school and out-of-school situations" (p. 3). Others such as Smith, Stanley and Shores (1957) defined curriculum as "a sequence of potential experiences set up in school for the purpose of

disciplining children and youth in group ways of thinking and acting" (p. 3).

The trend of regarding curriculum as the mere sum total of school learning experiences and nothing more continued unchallenged until the early 1970s, when theoretical battles began to be waged as new social realities of school learning and school knowledge unfolded in the various political and educational arenas of different countries. People of different walks of intellectual life, particularly social scientists and sociologists in education, began to question different realities with regard to the school curriculum programs and the type of knowledge carried within them. At this stage, curriculum development and teaching methods as a whole were under attack.

A link between the political regimes and educational curriculum control was exposed. This linkage was reflected largely in the government control of curriculum knowledge and content and what was taught in the school. On several occasions, the political elite used this knowledge to its advantage in state power.

In less than a decade after 1960, huge amounts of data representing empirical evidence of the link between government control of curriculum and school knowledge as a whole began to appear in the form of books, periodicals, journals, etc. It was no surprise that old assumptions

underlying curriculum development and instruction as being merely a record of school programs were now coming under strong attack.

In the process of these attacks, different theoretical camps, all purporting to redefine and create new images of curriculum, began to emerge. Each of these presented its case as vigorously as possible so as to win supporters or at least sympathizers on its side.

The Conventional (Traditional) View of Curriculum

Those who supported the old view and order and who tended to view curriculum as merely a catalogue of school programs to be covered in a school year or in a certain level of schooling argued vehemently that curriculum had nothing to do with political or ideological factors. Curriculum was simply a value-free phenomenon and was intended to provide a certain amount of knowledge to students.

Knowledge, so the traditionalists would argue, had nothing to do with the allegiances of certain ideologists or social constructs and interests. Knowledge was, according to this conventional wisdom, value-free no matter what political regime or what form of social order did exist in a polity.

Curriculum development and instructional methodology was looked upon as an excellent intellectual work done by curriculum developers and educationists. As such, it had no trace of political or ideological underpinnings. It was intended only to be knowledge for the students' understanding of their social and natural world.

There were no questions about what sort of understanding the students got from the knowledge that was taught. The theoretical assumptions in the traditional view of curriculum is that there is only one social reality. At the least, it was assumed that the social world could be understood in one way and there were no other social realities from which the world could be understood differently. The argument that there was only one reality and that the curriculum intended to convey this single reality was conveyed very strongly.

Moreover, this traditional curriculum theory was not political. At least it was not interested in raising political or social questions about the aspects of schooling or the contents, uses, and implications of the curriculum in a particular polity. For example, there was no intent to question why certain forms of knowledge were advanced or contained in the curriculum at the exclusion of other forms of knowledge.

Traditional curriculum did not seek to understand whether all school children from all walks of life or from different social groups understood the curriculum as easily or at the same rate. It did not question whether curriculum imposed a legitimate form of selection mechanism for the few advanced in the school or educational ladder. And, it did not note if there was a difference between the schooling and curriculum processes in the case of capitalist as opposed to socialist societies or any other social forms of organization.

People such as Roger Dale (1978) have described this school of thought as dealing with the "politics of education" rather than "educational politics." Dale (1978) differentiates "politics of education" from "educational politics" by defining the "politics of education" as the strong attempt to deal with the systematic ways of achieving the objectives of education including their outcomes. In short, politics of education intends to find the best ways to achieve outcomes, objectives, and efficiency of the educational system. It has little or nothing to do with whether those educational outcomes are socially acceptable or politically desirable.

On the other hand, the so-called "educational politics," a Roger Dale (1978) argues, has more to do than seeking efficiencies of educational systems. It seeks to question the theoretical assumptions of setting such

educational objectives or outcomes and to define what the social and political implications of such educational objectives and outcomes are to a particular social and political system.

This school of thought about curriculum, which could be described as conservative or traditional in character, sought to put its major target and concerns on the sole questions of efficiency outcomes and objectives, and not on the ideological, social, or political questions about schooling and the curriculum (Pinar, 1977).

The Radical Theories of Curriculum

The prevalence of the conventional or traditional wisdom about curriculum and its role in the school system which had dominated the curriculum field for decades since the 1920s began to be challenged in the decades of the 1960s and especially in the 1970s.

The appearance of the group of curricularists, called the "Reconceptualists" and led by people such as Pinar (1977), began to set cracks in the well established traditional view of curriculum. These people began to press for answers to questions that went beyond the mere traditional view of curriculum. This rebellion by the reconceptualists slowly undermined the popularity of the Tylerian Model of Curriculum Development, which had guided

the image and vision of curriculum for several decades from
the 1920s onward.

However, the major blow to the Tylerian Model of
Curriculum Development was set by the emerging group of
sociologists in Britain in the decades of the 1970s. This
emerging group actively sought to question the social
realities of education and especially curriculum knowledge.
the energies of this group culminated and were consolidated
by the appearance of the book by Michael Young (1971)
titled Knowledge and Social Control. This book began the
continued attempt to criticize the taken-for-granted
assumptions about curriculum as posed by the traditional or
conventional view of curriculum.

Young (1971) and his associates produced a work
that, in many universities and educational curriculum
departments of universities and colleges, was seen as the
strong step taken to throw more light on the connection
between curriculum knowledge and political ideologies.
This connection focused on the intent of social control
which was grounded on the selection mechanism of school
knowledge. It was this form of social control that was
taught by schools. In the years that followed the
appearance of the works by Young (1971) and his associates,
many other works of a similar nature about curriculum had
appeared, both from educational sociologists and, in
particular, from those in the curriculum field itself.

Works by Paul Freire (1970), Michael Apple (1972),
Henry Giroux (1982), and others sought to go beyond the
confines of the taken-for-granted assumptions of curriculum
knowledge and its social role in society. The main thesis
of these works lay in the argument that no knowledge is
value-free. All knowledge, by implication arising from
such an argument, is value-laden. This is why, in school
settings, the curriculum is contaminated with certain forms
of knowledge that intend to produce a vision of a
particular kind about our world. Our social reality is
constructed from the content of such visions.

Other visions and other world views are either
suppressed, not included, or are seen to be poor tools for
the production of knowledge about our social reality. This
thesis continues, by implication, to argue that the forms
of knowledge advanced in the schools are indeed, to a
larger extent, determined or influenced by those in
political power or by the dominant ideology.

In the case of a capitalist society, the capitalist
class which controls the means of production and reduces
everybody else to a level of wage-laborer passes its forms
of world reality onto others as the curriculum to be
taught. Furthermore, it perpetuates this curriculum in the
schools and in society as a whole. Schools and school
curricula advance the interests of the dominant classes and
try to uphold the social order in question. Others have

referred to this domination as maintaining the "status quo."

Thus, this school of thought seeks to focus on more than the mere cataloguing of school programs and their efficiencies. It considers the political and social interests embodied in such school programs and whether these interests reflect the interests of the various social groups in a particular polity.

In other words, this radical school of thought about curriculum sought strongly to question and put to task the sociology of education in its relation to curriculum development and instruction, as well as the social and political bases of curriculum knowledge. In this case, then, the radical school of curriculum holds to the major premise that no form of social knowledge in any society is value-free.

The Relevance of the Theoretical Debates of Curriculum to the Tanzanian Situation

Curriculum debates which occur in the rest of the world, as partially described above, are not irrelevant to the curriculum development efforts in Tanzania and the forms of knowledge taught in the Tanzanian school system. These debates affect and influence the Tanzanian situation like they influence situations elsewhere in the world, as

people struggle to de-construct and re-construct social knowledge both past and present.

The relevance of these debates in the curriculum field can easily be seen for a country such as Tanzania, which has passed through various histories that are characterized by a colonial authoritarian era and now an independent nationalist era. The two different historical periods throw a different and interesting light on the question of schooling and curriculum under the colonial regime and now under a nationalist regime.

It goes without saying that the colonial regime sought to put a strong colonial stamp on the colonies, like Tanzania, so as to advance its own interests to the largest possible extent. To guarantee the various colonial interests, which ranged from human and material exploitation to political legitimacy, the colonial regime had to build and establish schools and other physical infrastructures that guaranteed articulation of colonial interests in the colonies.

Schooling and curriculum, therefore, were to a larger extent an important arm of the colonial regime. They functioned with the intent of posing a political and social vision and justification based on colonial relations upon the educated. Eventually, the educated took political and administrative office at various levels of the colonial government institutional and state structure. From these

government posts, the educated Tanzanians imposed, or were expected to impose, the colonial vision and colonial justification on their fellow Africans and to urge them to accept colonialism for their own good.

After all, the use of educated Africans in political and administrative posts made it easier to control the colony and gave colonialism a more humane face among the colonized Tanzanians. This posture was in line with the philosophy that one British colonialist had discovered earlier. This philosophy implicitly stated that "it is much easier to conquer the African continent by using Africans themselves as the conquerors."

The conquest of Africa and Tanzania was done through several fronts. These included the military front, the religious front, and the commercial front. However, the most important of these fronts was the school system through the forms of knowledge taught and contained in the school curriculum. The schools subjects of history and civics were taught from what is referred to as a Eurocentric colonial perspective which created and advanced the political and social vision of the colonial regime.

This vision included what forms of social relations were required and what political relations were appropriate in a colonial society. These appropriate actions included things such as the appropriateness and justification of

social and racial segregation and why colonialism, as such, was purely beneficial to the Africans.

The experience of Tanzania is an example supporting the argument that knowledge is not value-free. Colonialism clearly shows the seductive control of education and curriculum knowledge by the colonial regime for its own ends (we shall see more of this type of knowledge control and its intended political and social vision in Ch. IV).

The attainment of independence and the emergence to political power by the nationalist regime did not necessarily mean that curriculum knowledge in the school was going to be value-free. It was (as will be pointed out in Ch. IV) a new form of the development and implementation of a new ideology largely reflecting the interests of the few people who had grabbed political power. Colonial ideology was strongly challenged and, in some ways, was replaced by nationalist and Africanist ideology in what one could call a "mirror-image" sort of challenge and replacement.

The strong centralized school system, both in the colonial period and during independence period, ensured to a larger extent a government influence on what was to be taught in schools through the Ministry of Education, which oversees school activities.

The control of curriculum knowledge guarantees, as it did for the colonial regime, that the ideology of the

nationalist regime permeates the whole school system across the country. The ideology may not be what most people believe in; but, since political power is necessary to ensure the grip or influence on curriculum knowledge, government forms of ideology and knowledge do largely prevail in this respect to what is considered "true knowledge" to be taught in the school system.

CHAPTER IV

THE FACES AND PHASES OF
HISTORIOGRAPHICAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN TANZANIA
AND IN TANZANIAN SECONDARY SCHOOLS:
PERIODIZATION AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
(TO SHOW AND SUPPORT THE CHANGING NATURE
OF HISTORIOGRAPHY)

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter, which is divided into
two parts--Part I and Part II, is two-fold. The first
purpose is to examine and show the historiographical
transformations (that had been taking place in Tanzania and
in Tanzanian secondary schools) under which Tanzanian
history and, indeed, African history was conceptualized,
interpreted, and written. As well, the chapter will
consider the different forms of teaching and learning of
history, as a school subject, that were dictated by the
conceptualizations of history under these different
historiographies. These historiographies tended to define
the nature and purpose of history as a school subject and
its social role in colonial and post-colonial Tanzanian
society. These forms of teaching and learning history
implied also to a larger extent how the "man on the spot"
(the history teacher) had to handle the teaching of the
history subject in its concrete form (curriculum
implementation at the level of the school and classroom) as

they mediated between the historical material and the learners (students).

Second, the chapter will try to examine and identify the various political, social, and theoretical perspectives and forces behind these historiographical transformations that influenced school curriculum changes in the history subject. The political and historical conjecture at which Tanzania found itself came to affect the way history, as a school subject, was interpreted, re-interpreted, and written. And this conjecture involved partly the updating and redefining of the social (history) knowledge which the subject of history was supposed to produce and reproduce in Tanzanian colonial and post-colonial secondary schools.

In this case, the task will also be to identify and expose the political ideologies and social interests embedded in those various historiographies which dictated the interpretation and re-interpretation of Tanzanian, African, and the world history at large.

Part I

The Periodization of the
Historiographical Transformations:
Colonial Entrenchment and the
Intimidation Tactics of Colonial
(Racist) Historiography

Part I is intended to show that the political and social forces and theories which dictated and necessitated the changes in the interpretation and re-interpretation of Tanzanian history had not remained the same in the historical transformations of Tanzanian society.

It can be clearly observed that the political and social dictates and domination of colonialism grounded in its colonial bureaucratic authoritarian character, together with its search for political legitimacy among the colonized subjects, brought about a historiography grounded and hinged on Eurocentric and a somewhat racist view of history. In this view of history, the history of Africa and, indeed, the history of all colonies, was solely seen and interpreted as being composed of nothing more than the partial or sum total of white colonialist activities in Africa.

Thus, the history of Tanzania and Africa came to be written and understood only as the composition of the various activities of white colonialists and other outsiders in Africa. These "agents" of history were composed of missionaries, traders, explorers, politicians, etc., who were regarded as bringing civilization and

development to what was called "static and undeveloped African continent." As such, most of the history of Africa consisted of narrations of the activities of these various white colonialists in Africa.

Thus, apart from explaining and producing facts as to what white colonialists did in Africa, this type of Eurocentric historiography was also mainly used to legitimize the activities of these colonialist groups and, in particular, the legitimization of the presence of the colonial political system and social order. In short, this Eurocentric view of history came to see these colonialist groups as "vehicles" of civilization upon the so-called "static African continent."

Thus, a Eurocentric (racist) view of history, which on the one hand saw Africa as "static," and on the other hand saw a colonial state with a "civilizing" mission, became entrenched in the school history curriculum of colonial secondary schools. History as a school subject and the school history curriculum were considered to be two important means to advance the political interests and political legitimization of the colonial state as being a benevolent colonial power, whose major mission was to advance and develop the civilization of the colonized subjects in Africa.

Therefore, under colonialism, history as a school subject was supposed to inculcate into the learners

(students) subservience to the colonial political system. They had to be subservient because, so the colonial state and colonial historians would argue, it was only through collaboration, subordination, and subservience to the colonial state that the colonized subjects could achieve civilization and development like that of the metropolitan countries (Cameroon and Dood, 1970; Coupland, 1938; Robinson and Gallagher, 1961).

Teaching and learning history under this colonial political system was completed through the methodology of indoctrination, or what Paulo Freire (1970) called the "banking system of teaching and learning." In this case, the history teachers dictated history notes and facts to students. These notes and facts mainly consisted of the enumeration of the activities, attainments, and achievements of the metropolitan and the colonial state. The students were not supposed to raise questions as the nature and political and social purpose of the historical knowledge which was taught.

Under the colonial authoritarian political system of schooling, both teacher and students were required to consider the historical knowledge which they taught and learned as being pure and correct historical facts. These historical facts were then considered to be the "correct" and true interpretation of Tanzanian colonial history. The political and ideological interests implied and thus

imbedded within such forms of historical knowledge (interpreted from a Eurocentric and racist view of history) were considered to be unproblematic and therefore not to be problematized (Hirji, 1980; Mbilinyi, 1982; Rodney, 1972).

Nationalism and Independence and the Emergency of Africanist (Nationalist) Historiography

However, with the rise of nationalism in the 1950s, the conception of self-determination among the colonized subjects in Africa eventually culminated in the attainment of independence in the 1950s and 1960s. The political and social scene in Africa changed drastically. This change of political and social scene in Africa subsequently brought in new historical perceptions about colonialism, nationalism, and independence.

With the achievement of independence in Africa, the political and social forces which emerged at this historical conjuncture dictated a review of historiography. This review automatically called for a re-interpretation of Tanzanian and, indeed, African history as a whole. The demand was for a re-interpretation of history which would conform to the new political and social realities in Tanzania and Africa. It was a demand to deconstruct Eurocentric historiography and reconstruct history from a different type of historiography.

The new historiography that emerged out of the euphoria of independence could be characterized as nationalist historiography. It was highly Afro-centric in its analysis of African history. Can we characterize this Afro-centric view of history as being racist as well, such as the Eurocentric view of history? Whatever the answer, it is quite clear that Africanist (nationalist) historiography, although not the same as that of Eurocentric (colonial) historiography, was to a larger extent similar in form and character to that of Eurocentric (colonial) historiography. In fact, some historians feel it safe to argue that the Africanist (nationalist) historiography was almost a "mirror-image" of Eurocentric historiography in its form and content.

The difference, however, came to be seen in the political and social purpose to which history as a school subject and the school history curriculum were used during the colonial era and at the time of independence. In this case, under the nationalist state, school history and the history curriculum were used to advance the interests (perceived or real) of the nationalist or post-colonial state.

There was one major difference in the historiographies. In colonial historiography, the purpose of history was to uphold, advance, and ultimately legitimize the political and social position of the

colonial state upon the colonized subjects. The Africanist (nationalist) historiography, on the other hand, strongly emphasized the activities and achievements of the African nationalist leaders and their role in the independent state. The nationalist leaders, together with traditional chiefs, were raised to the level of heros almost overnight (Davidson, 1963; Ihebuzor, 1984; Kimambo and Temu, 1969; Ranger 1968). The Africanist historiography justified all that these leaders did (good or bad) as being necessary and for the interests and benefits of the whole nation.

Thus it can be argued that, since Africanist (nationalist) historiography did hold to a larger extent some similarities with Eurocentric (colonial) historiography, the methodology in which history as a school subject was taught in schools during the independence period could precisely be described and characterized as being that of an indoctrination which was partisan to the nationalist state ideology. There was, therefore, serious and at times excessive romanticism of African historical past. Almost all ills in Africa were blamed on the colonizers and not on the nationalist African leaders. Africanist (nationalist) historiography greatly emphasized the fact that, because Africans were now in political power, all the problems of Africa (such as political oppression, social instability, and economic

poverty which had existed under colonialism) would eventually disappear.

In other words, this implied that, since the Africans are capable of developing themselves (as opposed to colonial historiography that saw Africans as being incapable of developing themselves), then the attainment of independence would automatically bring in fast political and social development in Africa. In advancing this sort of new historical and social view of independent Africa, the Africanist (nationalist) historiography tended to draw its empirical evidence from the past glories of African Kings and how they were able to build huge prosperous empires and states. That is, before colonialism, Africans were already developed; Africans were also capable of developing further, given the concrete evidence of past African empires. From this sort of empirical evidence, Africanist (nationalist) historiography concluded that the African presidents and African independent states in the modern era would do the same as the precolonial African kings had done. In short, the African presidents would bring faster political and social development in Africa.

It can be argued that the major intent (conscious or unconscious) of the Africanist (nationalist) historiography was two-fold. One intent was to advance the view that Africans were, and always have been, agents of their own history. They were not victims. Also, Africa

has never been static as Eurocentric (racist) historiography has claimed it to be. Second, nationalist history was intended to bring to the surface what most historians, among them Thompson (1981), had referred to as "the forgotten factor in African history." This factor was the African people themselves.

The African people had been virtually neglected by Eurocentric (racist) historiography under the argument that Africans have not been agents of history; and, as such, Africans cannot be the subject of serious history. This view was partly advocated by the renowned bourgeoisie (colonial) historian Travor-Ropper who asserted that "since the African has never invented even a needle, then he cannot be the subject of serious history" (in Mlahagwa, 1983:5). Similar views were propagated by many other colonial historians as shall be seen from the empirical evidence in Part II of this Chapter IV.

However, the few years after independence that saw African leaders in political power began to show that the theoretical assumptions and premises—on which the Africanist (nationalist) historiography was grounded and strongly hinged were, in fact, terribly shaky and in bad shape. Furthermore, it was no wonder that these premises began to crumble against the mounting empirical evidence of the failure of the African regimes and governments to carry out and bring about political and social democracy as well

as economic development in the various independent African countries.

These new developments showed the actual inadequacy and limits of the Africanist (nationalist) historiography. Thus, this inadequacy demanded a historiographical transformation which would go beyond the confines of Africanist (nationalist) historiography and which would explain the dilemma of the failure of African independent governments to effect fast and genuine political and social development.

Political and Economic Crises in Africa and the Rise of Underdevelopment (Dependency) Historiography

The underdevelopment (dependency) theories and their subsequent historiography arose at the end of the 1960s with an intent to explain the dilemma of Africa's lack of political democracy and economic development after independence. Whereas Africanist (nationalist) historiography had promised and predicted that Africa would gain faster development under African leadership once independence was attained, underdevelopment (dependency) historiography was now employed to explain why that predicted fast development of Africa after independence had not occurred or at least had been hindered.

The underdevelopment (dependency) historiography came to emphasize the exploitation carried out by the

metropolitan and the colonial state on the African continent. This exploitation happened both in the colonial period and after independence and involved the exploitation of natural and human resources (e.g. slave trade), the trade imbalances between Europe and Africa, and the dumping of useless goods in Africa by Europe which had mostly consumption value as opposed to productive value. In the case of trade, the metropolitan countries took goods from Africa which had high productive value (slaves who produce sugar, cotton, etc., in the West Indies and Southern U.S.A.) and realized more developmental advantages than did Africa.

Through these processes of contact between Europe and Africa, from the pre-colonial era through the colonial era and now after independence, Africa was and is still being exploited by the metropolitan countries. These contacts have left Africa in the position of disadvantage. As a result, Africa has been left and continues to be poor. After independence, European countries had and still continue to maintain neo-colonial ties which ensure the exploitation of Africa and thus its continued poverty.

In this underdevelopment (dependency) historiography the African political governments were hardly touched in the dilemma. But when they did enter into the analysis of this underdevelopment historiography, they were heavily reduced to, and quickly dismissed as,

mere puppets and stooges of the colonial and imperialist metropolitan countries. The task of the African governments, as underdevelopment historians put it, was to help exploit the African people for the benefit of imperialist countries and "reserve a few crumpets for themselves."

The interpretation of African history from the underdeveloped (dependency) historiography soon began to face a dilemma as cracks began to appear on some of its major underlying theoretical premises. The major fallacy of underdevelopment (dependency) historiography was its strong emphasis on the external factors as opposed to internal factors as being mainly responsible for the poverty of Africa both in the colonial and independence periods.

Teaching and learning history under the influence of underdevelopment (dependency) historiography meant that both teachers and students were bent to externalize the problems which befell Africa both in the colonial period and in the independence era. In this case, the students were oriented to see their problems as being externally propelled and, therefore, beyond their capacity to change in regard to the situation in which they found themselves.

In this light, historians have argued that the "concrete" is only "concrete" because it is a product and result of many "determinations." However, the emphasis on

the "concrete" as a product is the internal dynamics of that concrete phenomenon. Whereas the internal dynamics or factors are of prime importance, external factors and forces act as "influences" in combination with the internal factors to give rise to a specific phenomenon which we regard as being concrete.

In the case of Tanzania, for example, the process of colonization and colonialism cannot be purely theorized as an "external" process alone. It has to be seen in its "internal" process of articulation in and within various colonies both in Africa and elsewhere. In other words, there are internal forces in the colonies themselves which made the colonial process easier and successful. Those same internal forces went on to "collaborate" with the colonial power thus making it easier to maintain the colonial relations and colonialism. These two processes must, therefore, be analysed and properly theorized to arrive at the "historical actuality." This analysis goes beyond the "facticity" and beyond the form of appearance which appears to us to be the "surface value" of a specific and complex concrete phenomenon.

The Search for a Socialist Model of Development and the Emergence of Marxist Historiography

To escape the theoretical poverty that had engulfed both Eurocentric (colonial) and Africanist (nationalist) historiographies, to go beyond the theoretical limits of the underdevelopment (dependency) historiography, and to come to grips with what was called "historical actuality," the movement of the 1970s in Tanzania, particularly among historians, led to an intense "intellectual revolt" or what was supposed to be an "intellectual revolution." This intellectual rebellion was bent on bringing a proper re-interpretation of Tanzanian and, indeed, African history as a whole. To this regard, some social scientists and historians strongly argued that the historiography in which Tanzanian and African history was being analysed, theorized, and interpreted resulted in the production of "romantic" nature and form of history. As such, this sort of interpretation and production of historical knowledge led to the falsification of historical knowledge.

These rebellious historians argued further that there was a need to develop a new historiography which would interpret and produce what they believed to be "correct" historical knowledge. This re-interpretation would involve both the colonial and post-colonial political and social concrete phenomena in the context of placing

Tanzania both by itself and in the context of the different historical conjunctures of world history.

The rebellious social scientists further argued that the interpretation of Tanzanian (African) history grounded in the other forms of historiographies, that is, colonial, nationalist, and underdevelopment, were all bent on falsifying historical knowledge, for certain ideological purposes. As such, these historiographies are not proper theoretical instruments which could produce "true" and "correct" insights into the African past as well as the present.

Neither can these histories be trusted to project viable solutions to the present historical conjuncture of Tanzanian and African political and social problems, especially at this time of the 1970s, when African governments were busy searching for the "correct" development model that would affect rapid political and social development. The African governments had to choose between a capitalist model of development, the socialist model of development, or something different.

The Marxist historians then continued to argue that the "only" theory and historiography that could prove useful to the correct re-interpretation and interpretation of African history was through the employment of historical materialism or, to be exact, the Marxist analysis of history and society. This Marxist historiography, so goes

the argument, would expose the "true nature" of African problems and provide correct solutions to these African problems (Mlahagwa, 1983; Mbilinyi, 1982; Saul, 1979; Shivji, 1973).

In this case, the Marxist analysis of Tanzanian (African) history came up with the solution of advocating a socialist path of development for Africa. The driving force for building this socialist path was what was referred to as "class struggle" and not "class collaboration." The building of a socialist path of development in Africa is viewed by this Marxist historiography as the ultimate political and social arrangement for Africa which would finally solve African political and social problems.

The emergence and the subsequent crystallization of this Marxist historiography in the school system and the secondary school history curriculum brought about a situation where teachers and students were supposed to engage in heavy and regular drills of teaching, learning, understanding, and, if necessary, cramming of terminologies and concepts which were central to the Marxist analysis of history and society.

In this regard, concepts such as modes of production, capitalist state, imperialism, finance capital, neo-colonialism, capitalist profit, social classes, dictatorship of the proletariat, appropriation and

expropriation, the socialist revolution, the international division of labour, relations of production, exploitation, etc., which are central to Marxist analysis of history and society, were now and then forced down the throats of students who had little choice but to cram these for reproduction on their national final examinations. Marxist historiography at this point in time (1970s and 1980s) was not only trying to entrench itself in the social sciences, including history, but at all levels of schooling in Tanzania it had become life itself in which students struggled to survive. Schools were at least partially turned into "armed" camps or "military" barracks for Marxist drills.

To come to grips with this sort of historio-graphical transformation and the forms of teaching and learning history that went with it in Tanzanian colonial and post-colonial schools, we will discuss and analyse the process under four main periods, as follows: (a) the colonial era; (b) the nationalist struggle and the early independence era; (c) the few years after independence; and (d) the later period to the present.

The Colonial Era

The colonial conservative Eurocentric (racist) historiography (1890-1961) period is characterized by factualization, counter-factualization, and romanticism of European achievements and suppression of Tanzanian and

African history. The colonial historiography was dominant and based on a Eurocentric racist view of history. The major impetus was the belief that Africa had no history, basically because Africa had no written sources on which to base the writing of history. The other basic belief was that the white man had a burden to civilize Africa and other races. Therefore, colonialism was necessary in order to fulfill that civilizing mission.

Justification of colonialism was derived from the theoretical constructs of the white man's racial superiority and the divine view of the white man's mission to civilize the other races. The resultant history was dominated by European activities in Africa. These European activities came to be the sum total of African history. According to the Euro-centric racist historiography, Africa was called the "Dark Continent." This term meant that the continent was "static" and had no evidence of any form of civilization and development compared to that of Europe.

The historical works that portrayed this Euro-centric (racist) view of history and that were used in teaching and learning of history at the secondary school level during this period in time included:

1. Coupland, Reginald. East Africa and its Invaders. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938.

2. Gann, L.H. and P. Duignan. Burden of Empire. London: Pall Mall Press, 1968.

3. Robinson, Ronald and John Gallagher. _Africa and the victorians_. London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1961.

4. Seligman, C.G. _Races of Africa_. London: Oxford University Press, 1957.

The Nationalist Struggle and the Early Independence Era

The Africanist (nationalist) Afro-centric historiography (1950s-1960s) period is characterized by factualization, counter-factualization, and romanticism of African history and the suppression of Euro-centric historiography. The nationalist historiography produced history which was dominated by Kings and Queens of Africa, as well as African empire building and state craft. The nationalist historiography greatly appealed to the African past as an example of good African leadership and political and social achievements.

The African achievements of the past, so the nationalists argued, could now be emulated in the post-colonial or independence era. This belief guaranteed fast political and social development. The nationalists also raised hopes and expectations that, once Africa was independent and under African leadership, political and social problems would disappear.

Nationalist historiography also strongly needed to redress the balance by bringing into African history the African actors who were considered to be "the forgotten

factor in African history." Thus, most historical works produced in this period showed the superiority of the African as an "agent" of history, and not as a mere victim of history as portrayed by the Euro-centric racist historiography. Africans were said to be capable of building empires and making conquests just as the white man did.

In the end, the nationalist historiography was intended to show that Africans were not inferior to whites or any other race for that matter. More than that, it was intended to create "African pride" as a race and to show the African as an agent of history and not as a victim of history.

The historical works which portrayed this view and which were used in teaching and learning of history at this period in time included:

1. Alpers, Edward A. <u>Ivory and Slaves: Changing Pattern of International Trade in East Central Africa to the Later Nineteenth Century</u>. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975.

2. Basil, Davidson. <u>Guide to African History</u>. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1963.

3. Kimambo, Isariah and Temu Arnold. <u>A History of Tanzania</u>. Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1963.

4. ox t, Bethel A. and J.A. Kieran (eds.). <u>Zamani: A Survey of East African History</u>.

5. Ranger, T.O. (ed.). <u>Aspects of Central African History</u>. London: Heineman, 1968.

6. Roberts, Andrew D. <u>Tanzania before 1900</u>. Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968.

7. Vansina, Jan., <u>Kingdoms of the Savanna</u>. Madson: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1966.

8. Were, Gideon S. and Derek A. Wilson. <u>East Africa through a Thousand Years</u>. New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1968.

The Few Years after Independence

The underdevelopment (dependency) historiography (mid-1960s and early 1970s) period was characterized mainly by the externalization of political and social problems of Africa. It struggled to explain why Africa was poor after independence. The crisis that engulfed Africa in the 1960s, both at political and economic levels, was explained from an outside view of "how Europe underdeveloped Africa."

Both in the past through classical colonialism and now in the present through neo-classical ties, Europe became the culprit. Europe was blamed for generating African problems because it had exploited Africa in the colonial period and continued to exploit Africa in the now independence era by maintaining economic ties.

In short, the historiography that arose in this period was based on the thorny issue of addressing the crisis that befell Africa as it was crippled into economic poverty. Thus, the emergence of underdevelopment historiography was based on the underlying philosophy that Europe exploited Africa--thus the African poverty. What emerged was a written history which purported to explain the source of African poverty and how to solve it. It was generally agreed that European exploitation was the major cause of African poverty; and, this exploitation continues after the independence era through neo-colonial ties.

The major question to be answered in dependency historiography was: "Why is Africa poor after independence?" The answer was easy. Africa has been and is exploited by Europe. If exploitation by Europe was and is the problem, then what is the solution? The solution is again simple. In fact, it was more simple than the problem. The solution was for Africa to dis-engage from European imperialism and neo-colonialism. This meant mostly disengagement from economic ties with capitalist Europe and the forming of links with the socialist camp.

The major historical works that portrayed this underdevelopment (dependency) view of history and which were used in the teaching and learning of history at the secondary school level during this period included:

1. Arghiri, Emmanuel. <u>Unequal Exchange</u>. London: New Left Books, 1972.

2. Kay, Geoffrey B. <u>Development and Underdevelopment: A Marxist Analysis</u>. London: The MacMillan Press, 1975.

3. Rodney, Walter. <u>How Europe Underdeveloped Africa</u>. Bogle L'ouverture Publications, 1972.

The Later Period to the Present

The Marxist or Socialist Historiography (mid-1970s to the present) period is characterized by the production of "liberation" literature and the serious blaming of capitalism and capitalist social relations as being exploitative. The capitalist model of development was viewed as bad for Tanzania and Africa. A problem with this view was that there was too much romanticism of socialism and the belief that socialist social relations were the only viable solution for the economic problems which Tanzania and Africa faced.

During this period, the historiography that developed produced written history from the standpoint of the Marxist interpretation of history and human development. In many cases, this Marxist interpretation of history is referred to as historical materialism. The history it produces is referred to as materialist history. Marxist interpretation of history was widely considered to be a way toward the production of "scientific history," which is more "objective" than "subjective." It was, in

this case, a useful tool for analysing the sources of African poverty and answering the question of what should be done next to solve these problems of Africa.

The emergency of Marxist historiography at this period was partly due to the many political declarations made by African government leaders (e.g. Kenya in 1965 and Tanzania in 1967) to go socialist. The socialist model of development was considered by these African leaders to be a way of solving economic problems and an alternative to the capitalist model of development. In such a situation, there was an urgent need to produce various works of history which would historicize and project the form and character that this socialist transformation was to take.

However, the theorization of the socialist transformation had to be done from a socialist perspective. Thus, Marxist historiography with its strong socialist version seemed to be an answer on how to bring about socialism and to answer the question: "Why socialism for Africa at this point in time?"

Out of the rubble and dust which arose in the great rush to invent a "correct" socialist path for Africa, both Marxist historiography and non-Marxist socialist historiography appeared at this historical conjuncture in Tanzania. The various socialist works tried to address African problems from a certain version of socialist

theories; each offered a somewhat different sort of
solution to the problem at hand.

There were basically two main socialist versions of
the proper path to socialist transformation. One is the
socialist path based on "Fabian socialism." Fabian
socialism hinges its argument on an evolutionary and non-
violent path to socialist construction. This socialist
view is generally considered to be non-Marxist. It is the
socialist version that was held by most of the African
governments including the Tanzanian government.

Three quotations from J.K. Nyerere, in his book
entitled Ujamaa Essays on Socialism (1968), show the clear
vision of the Fabian socialist path and strongly oppose the
Marxist version of socialist path. To make his point
clear, Nyerere wrote:

> Socialism--like democracy--is an attitude of
> mind. In a socialist society it is the socialist
> attitude of mind, and not the rigid adherence to
> a standard political pattern, which is needed to
> ensure that people care for each other's welfare.
> (p. 1)

Then he continued to argue:

> European socialism was born of the Agrarian
> Revolution and the Industrial Revolution which
> followed it. The former created the "landed" and
> the "landless" classes in society; the latter
> produced the modern capitalist and the industrial
> proletariat. These two revolutions planted the
> seeds of conflict within society, and not only
> was European socialism born out of that conflict,
> but its apostles sanctified the conflict itself
> into a philosophy. Civil war was no longer
> looked upon as something evil, or something
> unfortunate, but as something good and necessary.
> As prayer is to a Christian or to Islam, so civil

war (which they call "class" war) is to the
European version of socialism--a means
inseparable from the end. Each becomes the basis
of a whole way of life. The European socialist
cannot think of his socialism without its
father--capitalism.

Finally, to show that he was actually serious about what he

was saying, Nyerere furiously concluded:

Brought up in tribal socialism, I must say I find
this contradiction quite intolerable. It gives
capitalism a philosophical status which
capitalism neither claims or deserves. First it
virtually says "without" capitalism, and the
conflict which capitalism creates within society,
there can be no socialism. This glorification of
capitalism by the doctrinaire European
socialists, I repeat, I find intolerable .. .) . .
African socialism, on the other hand, did not
have the "benefit" of the Agrarian Revolution or
the Industrial Revolution. It did not start from
the existence of conflicting "classes" in society
. . . . The foundation, and the objective, of
African socialism is the extended family. The
true African socialist does not look on one class
of men as his brethren and another as his natural
enemies. (Nyerere, 1968, p. 11)

The second path of socialist construction was based

on "the radical view of socialism which hinged on the so-

called "Marxist scientific tenets of socialism." The

central argument in this radical Marxist version was that

socialist construction had to be done through "class

struggle" which will result in the "dictatorship of the

proletariat."

These radical socialists called for the creation of

Marxist Revolutionary Vanguard political parties that would

only recruit correctly Marxist-oriented party members.

These members would come mainly from the working class and

the revolutionary peasantry; and, these members would lead the socialist struggle. This radical version of socialism hurriedly dismissed any possibility of socialist construction under the leadership of the existing African governments.

These radical socialists claimed that, because the present African governments were mostly products of colonialism and colonial capitalist ideology, they could not be proper vehicles through which socialism could be constructed. After all, the radical socialists continued, to argue, the "Fabian socialist view" is highly utopian. And, at most and at its worst, it does not recognize "class struggle" as the basis for socialist construction. Thus, the Fabian socialist view was dismissed by radical socialists as both utopian and idealist.

The plight of the radical Marxists that saw the existing African governments as improper vehicles for the building of socialism in Africa is clearly presented by one of the Tanzanian radical Marxists in his writings:

> The supremacy of the Party manifested through the
> ultimate control of the committed Vanguard is
> therefore a prerequisite for destroying the old
> social order and building of socialism . . . .
> The state power must be in the hands of the
> workers and peasants led by the present
> revolutionary leadership and not the bureaucracy.
> A class--in this case the workers and peasants--
> cannot build a society in its interest without
> wielding political power. Building socialism is
> the workers' and not the bureaucrats' business.
> (Shivji, 1973:37-9, in Pratt, 1979:195)

At the political arena, conflicts arose between the established nationalist African governments with their Fabian socialist view and the radical Marxist adherents with regard to the proper way of bringing about socialism in Africa. These conflicts began to create a crisis in the secondary school history curriculum. In Tanzania, for example, the conflict has brought a confrontation as to what version of socialism the students should be fed in the secondary school history curriculum. The present secondary school history curriculum is grounded on the Marxist version, with its radical view of class struggle, as the basis of socialist construction.

The nationalist government, through the Ministry of Education, intends to fight back to have its Fabian version of socialism taught in the secondary school history curriculum. The officials in the Ministry of Education have already referred to the radical Marxist socialist version as "communism."

Sago (1983) points to this struggle:

> There are individuals at the headquarters of the Ministry of Education who are opposed to the teaching of the history subject for reasons best known to themselves. Some look at history as a subject which is useless in the society. Others equate history to political education and therefore see no reason as to why there should be two separate subjects. But since political education is under direct protection of the Party, the tendency has been to eliminate altogether history as a subject. The worst elements, however, are those who equate history to communism: where communism to these elements means opposing Christian teachings, especially in

so far as the creation of man is concerned. To
them, fighting the teaching of history has become
a crusade against the spread of communism.
(Sago, 1983:4)

In the same light of the above-mentioned government
struggles, Mlahagwa (1983) also noted:

> what is the importance of all this to us
> today? It is true that the discipline of history
> is not regarded with esteem among the petty-
> bourgeoisie ruling circles, much as society in
> general cannot do without it. What the student
> of history should do is not to abandon his books
> and turn to the natural sciences; nor should we
> be pre-occupied with a long monologue within
> ourselves trying to prove to ourselves the
> indispensability of our discipline and at the
> same time pointing accusing fingers at the
> decision makers in the bureaucracy for their
> short-sightedness and self-centredness. None of
> these, we suggest, should be our business. Nor
> should we recoil into some rigorous study into
> the dialectics of nature and society and thus
> risk the danger of making the history discipline
> an undertaking for a select few individuals . . .
> Of course, correct understanding of social
> phenomena demands rigorous materialist historical
> analyses. Was it Marx who said the workers would
> demand nothing but the best from a committed
> proletarian historian? (Mlahagwa, 1983, p. 13)

The major historical works which portrayed this

radical Marxist view of socialism and which were used in

teaching and learning of history at this period in time

included:

1. Institute of Education. <u>Secondary History Book I: The</u>
   <u>Development of East African Societies up to the</u>
   <u>Nineteenth Century</u>, 1978.

2. Institute of Education. <u>Secondary History Book II:</u>
   <u>Development of African Societies up to the Nineteenth</u>
   <u>Century</u>, 1979.

3. Institute of Education. <u>Secondary History Book III:</u>
   <u>East Africa from 1850 to the Present</u>, 1983.

4. Institute of Education. <u>Secondary History Book IV:</u>
   <u>The Rest of Africa from 1850 to the Present</u>, 1983.

5. 'Institute of Education. <u>Secondary History Book IV:</u>
   <u>Pre-colonial African Societies</u>, 1979.

6. Marx, Karl. <u>Capital Vol. I-III</u>.

The above divisions and categorization of the
different periods of the historiographical transformations
are not as exclusive and rigid as they are shown here. The
periodization is mainly intended to show which type of
historiography dominated the thinking, interpretation, and
the writing of history at a particular point in time in the
course of Tanzanian historical development. In this case,
the categories are offered in an attempt to show the
character, form, and content of historical knowledge which
permeated the secondary school history curriculum, together
with its forms of teaching and learning of history in
Tanzanian colonial and post-colonial secondary schools.

It should be noted that all of these above
mentioned historiographies did and still do co-exist in one
form or another in all these periods of Tanzanian history.
At the same time, another aspect about these
historiographies is that they do have within them varieties
of small versions with regard to their theoretical

assumptions and premises on which they base their historical arguments.

For the sake of simplicity, however, I have shown the general picture of these historiographies particularly with regard to the basic theoretical assumptions and premises that these various historiographies share. These theoretical underpinnings are what might be called the "bottom line." They should be regarded as the general picture of those specific periods mentioned above. (See Chart 1 for the summarized general characteristics of the above-mentioned historiography.)

Chart 1

The Characteristics of Historiographies
(Chapter IV)

Colonial Historiography	Nationalist Historiography	Underdevelopment Historiography	Marxist Historiography
1885 – 1961	1950s – 1960s	1960s – 1970s	1970s – 1980s
Based on Euro-centric (Racist) view of history	Based on Afro-centric view of history	Based on the Imperialist and Neo-Colonial view of history	Based on the Imperialist and Neo-Colonial view of history
Dominated by the Supremacy of the white race and the divine view of the white man's 'civilizing mission upon other races. Also based on the view that all development in Africa can only be explained by appealing to an outside factor(s). Thus, the rise of Hamatic myth or hypothesis to explain any form of	Dominated by the need to reject the inferiority of the African and thus restore African pride that was distorted by colonial (racist) historiography. Africans as agents of their own history and not as victims was the general view that was advanced. In this case, Africans were capable of development as	Dominated by the need to show and prove that the poverty of Africa is a result of imperialist and capitalist European exploitation. This exploitation is both before, during and after formal colonialism in Africa. For example, through slavery before colonialism and then by direct material exploitation	Dominated by the need to show and prove that capitalist model of development was bad for Africa. Thus, the solution was to build a socialist model of development and this would eventually solve the political and social problems of Africa. Marxist road to the construction of socialist society through

.....cont'd

Chart 1 (cont'd)

development that was found in Africa before the arrival of the white man and formal colonialism. In this case people called Hamites were thought to be people from outside Africa who had brought development to Africa long before the white man set foot in Africa.	exemplified by the past achievements of African Kings in building huge Empires, states as well as conquests.	during colonial era and by unequal trade after independence through neo-colonial ties.	class struggle was seen as the best way to bring about the socialist political and social system in Africa. Rejected other socialist views as non-Marxist and Utopian.
History-as-record from which written history can be constructed was only through written documents and sources. For example, books, travellers' diaries, etc. Oral history was not history but mere myths and fables.	History-as-record from which history can be constructed is more than written documents and sources. Oral history was extensively used to reconstruct the African past. Other sources included archeology, languages, etc.	History-as-record is more than written sources. Oral history can be used to reconstruct the past. Others include archeology, linguistics, etc.	History-as-record is more than written sources. Oral history can be used to reconstruct the past. Other sources include archeology, linguistics, etc.
Emphasis was on the production of "facts" in the hope that "facts" speak for themselves.	Emphasis was on the production of facts. And most of the history that was produced was mostly	Emphasis was on the concept(s) building as a base of analysis to historical events. But to	Great emphasis was placed on concept(s) building that are the basis of Marxist historiography

......(cont'd)

Chart 1 (cont'd)

The positivist view of history was dominant in the hope that it was "scientific" and thus less subjective and more objective. The hope that history can be made "value-free" as the case in the natural sciences where the scientist is distanced from his object of study and thus does not influence the result of the study. Most of the history of the history written was full of chronologies and a succession of kings and queens of Europe.	to do with the building of states and state craft among the African kings. As a mirror image of colonial historiography it also dealt a lot on chronologies and succession of African kings and queens. Africanist historiography was also positivist in approach to the writing of history.	some extent there was too much emphasis on the production of facts to prove the underdevelopment case of Africa vs. Europe in the exploitation equation. There was high emphasis on the study of the dynamics and workings of capitalism and its ultimate motive of expansion outside Europe.	on the analysis of history and society. There was heavy study of the operations of capitalism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. The conception of socialist construction for the third world was the main agenda. Capitalist mode of development was said to be exploitative and loop-sided in development structure, i.e. it creates exploiters and the exploited. Much history was written in praise of socialism.

Part II

Empirical Evidence of
Historiographical Transformations

The Colonial Era and the Dominance of Colonial (Racist) Historiography

German and British Colonialism: Colonial Political and Social Relations and the Problems of Political Legitimization, 1885-1961

Colonialism set foot and became firmly established in Tanzania by the end of the 19th century. During the 1880s, Germany colonized the country and initially named it German East Africa. This was a time when the European nations, notably Britain, France, Belgium, and Germany, were undergoing a tremendous industrialization process. As a result, these nations were competing among themselves in a desire to obtain and acquire outside territories or colonial possessions, considered to be necessary given the specific economic circumstances of the European nations at this particular period of the 19th century.

The industrialization process brought about a huge demand for tropical raw materials, both agricultural and in the form of minerals--particularly lubricating oils and rubber products which could not be grown or obtained in Europe itself. The European nations' struggles for colonial possessions and the search for tropical products reached a crescendo at the end of the 19th century, and

finally culminated in the colonization of the African continent. It was during these struggles to colonize Africa that Germany finally acquired Tanzania in 1890 and soon, like other colonial powers, established economic and political superstructures which were necessary to uphold and advance colonial exploitation, which has been a product of forcible occupation.

Germany occupied Tanzania from 1890 to 1918. Britain took over the administration of Tanzania soon after World War I, in 1919. During both these periods of German and British occupation of Tanzania, the two colonial powers did have differences in economic and political policies. However, they shared one major similarity. They both worked to advance exploitative colonial relations of production.

The colonial conquest and colonial occupation of Tanzania and, indeed, of Africa was not a totally peaceful process. More often than not, and at most times, colonial occupation was a violent and destructive process in both human and material property. The colonial conquest was violent because the colonized societies did not accept colonialism as easily as the colonial powers had expected. At times the colonizing forces were caught unaware and, since some measure of military force had to be used in the colonial process, this ultimately opened up a chapter of

"Colonial Wars" in the early years of the colonial conquest of Tanzania.

In most cases, colonial conquest was settled on the battle field. The colonized societies refused to be colonized, and the colonial powers forced their way into the colonial territories. After conquest, colonial territorial boundaries were quickly drawn up both on maps and on the ground, so as to contain colonial territorial disputes and squabbles among the European powers. "Official" colonial territorial boundaries were also necessary to guarantee the sovereignty and the "legitimacy" of the rule of a particular colonial power over a specific colony. This guarantee was necessary not only to off-set the struggles among the colonial powers, but also to make sure that each colonial power undertook an "effective" economic and political stance in the development of the colony which could bring about or pay off the costs and purpose of colonial enterprise.

Therefore, after the colonial process was complete, colonial economic and political administrative infra-structures were firmly established and entrenched. However, the colonial powers had one major task. This task was to justify their forced political occupation of these conquered territories, so that the colonized societies would understand the purpose of colonialism, why they were

being colonized, and why they were forced to live under colonial relations of production.

Although colonial conquest was achieved largely through military force, colonial administration could not be carried out by sheer military force alone. This administration would prove to be an extremely expensive enterprise. Moreover, despite the establishment and imposition of the colonial state and government orders, there were still some pockets of resistance among the colonized societies. This resistance took different forms (both overtly and covertly). Therefore, something had to be done to contain and neutralize the evident contradictions and conflict of interests between the colonial government and the colonized societies.

As already noted, since colonial administration of the conquered territories could not be purely maintained through military force, some other forms of social control had to be employed to contain possible threats to the colonial state and to get the colonial societies to "accept" the colonial social relations. Under the above concrete circumstances of trying to guarantee viable economic production processes and peaceful political administration of the colonies, the colonial government in Tanzania (both Germany and Britain) established and employed various colonial administrative and ideological apparatuses to guarantee the subservience and subordination

of the colonial societies to the dictates and interests of the colonial governments.

The various colonial repressive and ideological apparatuses (sometimes known as "carrot and stick") which were used to advance and maintain the colonial social relations included the army, the police, the judicial courts, etc. (categorized as repressive apparatuses--the "stick") and the schools, churches, and religion, etc. (categorized as ideological apparatuses--the "carrot"). However, of all the colonial ideological apparatuses, the schools and the school system was of major importance to the colonial government in its struggle to maintain and reproduce colonial social and political relations. The school system and schools were important because, through the schools, the colonial governments were not only able to produce the much needed administrative cadres and personnel (e.g. clerks, teachers, etc.) used to man the different administrative posts in the colonial government structures, but the schools also provided the most reliable means through which the colonial government could perpetuate its own colonial propaganda and colonial ideology.

The school ensured the internalization of colonial values and colonial culture among the educated and the society as a whole. The central role played by schools in the colonial periods, both German and British, is clearly seen in their declared colonial educational objectives.

Germany declared that the objective of colonial schools was
to spread German culture. To this extent the government
noted (in 1890):

> . . . Colonial schools are the cradle of German
> culture in Africa . . . . The true process of
> civilization has to be internalized if it is to
> be effective. The purpose of the schools cannot
> be merely to teach a trade to a few people.
> Rather, it must be to bring up a new generation
> that will have accepted the new civilization
> internally as well as externally. (Mbilinyi,
> 1982:78)

The British government echoed similar types of
objectives for colonial schools when, in 1918, the
government declared that the objective of schools was:

> . . . an educational system which will provide
> for African needs and at the same time produce a
> virile and royal citizen of the Empire . . .
> where character, health, industry and a proper
> appreciation of the dignity of manual labour rank
> as of first importance . . . the school . . . is
> the centre of all government propaganda work.
> (Mbilinyi, 1982:78)

The Ideological and Legitimization Role Played by Colonial Schools and Colonial Historiography

The colonial governments perpetuated their colonial
propaganda through the school system by creating and
developing specific school curricula geared to achieve the
interests of the colonial government. The school
curriculum were mediated through the creation and
development of specific government-prescribed
teaching/learning materials (e.g. textbooks, newspapers,
etc.) and taught through a particular mode of instructional

methodology, which can be characterized as "production of facts" and "indoctrination" (Mbilinyi, 1982; Mlahagwa, 1983).

Of all the school subjects, history stood as the best tool through which colonial ideology could be taught and maintained. Thus the school curricula contained and, to a larger extent, was contaminated by topics and themes which were related to the history of the colonial power and taught from Euro-centric perspectives and colonial historiography (Mbilinyi, 1982; Mlahagwa 1983).

It was no wonder that the topics about the rise and fall of kings and queens in Europe and the general achievements of the colonial powers were the major topics in the history curriculum. Under such circumstances, the history of the colonial societies was, only mentioned in relation to the understanding of the colonial history in general, and/or if it had any relevance to the study of colonial history.

One of the arguments why African history was excluded from the school curriculum was posed by adherents of colonial historiography and colonial historians. These historians postured that the colonial societies had in fact "no history" worth studying. This belief was partly due to the fact that African history, prior to the coming of Europeans, was not recorded in books and documents and, as such, there were no written and reliable sources from which

historical study could be undertaken. colonial historians regarded "oral history" as being not history at all, but mere "myths and fables" which could not be subjected to rigorous study since it was an unreliable source of information.

The colonial historians' belief that African societies had no history worth studying is clearly shown by Mlahagwa (1983) who wrote:

> Perhaps it is in the discipline of History that we find vivid intentions and expressions of colonial education. The young were taught that African peoples have been out of the realm of history and that the proper history that is worth studying is the history of the achievements and activities of their masters in the metropole and in the colonies . . . . Renown bourgeoisie historians like Trevor-Ropper asserted that since the African has never invented even a needle then he cannot be the subject of serious history.
> (p. 5)

Within the same argument that African had no history worth studying or writing about, one of the renowned colonial historians of that time, Coupland (1938), confidently wrote:

> In Europe and Asia, wrote one of the ablest Englishmen who have taken part in the adminis-tration of East Africa, the work of man is to be seen whenever he exists. Whether he builds temples or factories, whether he makes or mars the landscape, we are conscious that the character and appearance of the country depend on him. Here in (Central) Africa, man . . . in no way dominates or even sensibly influences nature. His houses produce no more scenic effect than large birds' nests; he cannot lift himself above the scrub and tall grass; if he cuts it down it simply grows up and surrounds him again . . . . . This dense pall of vegetation has held the spirit of African man in bondage and deprived him of the

inventiveness, energy, and mobility which other races have attained. (Coupland, 1938:2)

Following closely in the footsteps of Coupland (1961) and using the racial categories to justify the inability of the African to be a subject of history, Robinson and Gallagher (1961) wrote:

> This was the authentic mid-Victorian outlook on the world. It was suffused with a vivid sense of superiority and self-righteousness, if with every good intention. Upon the ladder of progress, nations and races seemed to stand higher or lower according to the proven capacity of each for freedom and enterprise: The British at the top, followed a few rungs below by the Americans, and other "striving, go ahead" Anglo-Saxons. The Latin peoples were thought to come next, though far behind. Much lower still stood the vast Oriental communities of Asia and north Africa where progress appeared unfortunately to have been crushed for centuries by military despotisms or smothered under passive religions. Lowest of all stood the "aborigines" whom it was thought had never learned enough social discipline to pass from the family and tribe to the making of a state . . . . The Victorians aspired to raise them all up the steps of progress which they themselves had climbed. (Robinson and Gallagher, 1961:2-3)

Within the context of the assumption that Africa had no history, in the colonial period the school students were taught that African people have been out of the realm of history. Therefore, the only proper history worth studying was European history. Thus, the major landmarks in the school history curriculum included such topics as Magna Carta, the "Glorious Revolution," Expansion of Western Civilization, and the Industrial Revolution. There was no mention of the relationship and contribution of the

exploitation of the colonies, both in human labour and raw material production, that had contributed to the industrialization and prosperity of the European nations in the 19th century.

Mlahagwa (1983) noted this particular dilemma of colonial historiography when he wrote:

> Nothing would be said about the fact that the industrialization of Manchester was a consequence of the de-industrialization of India and other cotton producing areas of the world whereby Britain and, later, her Western capitalist neighbours imposed a world division of labour which relegated the vast majority of world nations to the production of raw materials while the Western capitalist nations specialized in the production of industrial commodities. (p. 5)

To a larger extent, and within the same context of trying to justify and legitimize colonial social relations, it was none other than through teaching of history that colonial governments endeavoured to inculcate into the learners the notion that colonization was part and parcel of the calling on the white race to shoulder the "white-man's burden" of opening up the "Dark Continent," i.e. Africa, to "Western civilization." The idea that Africans were incapable of developing themselves and, as such, the white man had the burden of opening up Africa for civilization and thus the necessity of colonial rule is well explained by Coupland (1938), who wrote thus:

> Sir Charles Eliot was writing, with a touch of exaggeration perhaps, about the heart of the continent. Nearer the coast, both West and East, Africans have proved themselves free-spirited, inventive and energetic. But, the race as a

whole, it is true, is more backward than any
other of the major races . . . . Throughout the
period dealt with in this book, therefore, the
East Africans must be conceived of as a primitive
people. Their society, it is safer to say, was
simple in character and limited in scope. Tribes
fought and conquered each other, but nothing came
out of it--no political agglomeration, harrowing
the field of war. (Coupland, 1938:13)

Coupland (1938) praises white colonial rule and
colonialism in Africa and justifies it as necessary for the
development of civilization in Africa:

. . . . If the European occupation could have
happened earlier and if--an essential condition--
it could have been disassociated from the slave
trade, the East Africans might likewise have
began earlier to emerge from their primitive
life, to combat more effectively their physical
environment, to grow in prosperity and
population. For while invasion and conquest in
backward countries may mean nothing but
degradation and destitution for their
inhabitants, they can mean, paradoxical thought
it sounds, a kind of liberation. (Coupland,
1938:13).

In the same light of seeing the white race as
having a civilizing mission in Africa, Robinson and
Gallagher (1961) wrote:

The Victorians regarded themselves as the leaders
of civilization, as pioneers of industry and
progress. Industry in Britain was stimulating an
ever-extending and intensifying development
overseas, as her investors and manufacturers,
merchants and colonists, railway builders and
officials opened up new continents. . . . The
actual powers of industry, however, were as
nothing compared with the expansive spirit which
their discovery inspired in the early and mid-
Victorians. They were sure that their ability to
improve the human condition everywhere was as
tremendous as their capacity to produce wealth
. . . . This spirit of progress no less than
the surpluses and shortages of the industrial
community drove Britons outward. Expansion was

not simply a necessity without which industrial
growth might cease, but a moral duty to the rest
of humanity. . . . Expansion in all its modes
seemed not only natural and necessary but
inevitable; it was pre-ordained and
irreproachably right.. It was the spontaneous
expression of an inherently dynamic society.
. . . . Exertions of power and colonial rule
might be needed in some places to provide
opportunity and to protect. (Robinson and
Gallagher, 1961:1-3)

Within the production of historical knowledge,
students were taught only the achievements of the colonial
government and were inculcated with the sheer fact that
they should be subservient to the colonial state. The sort
of instructional methodology under such a situation can be
characterized as being "indoctrination" in nature, in which
facts are delivered to students. There was little, if any,
mutual discussion between the teachers and the students.
In all cases of colonial relations, it was considered wrong
to ask questions regarding the "actualities" of colonialism
and the functions of the colonial state in the colonies.

The students were forced, therefore, to accept the
facts and the context in which they were being taught and
to accept them without question. Moreover, since school
examinations determined how many "facts" one had learned,
it was then necessary for students to put all efforts into
cramming the facts for reproduction on the examination
papers. After all, under colonialism it was politically
safer to produce "facts" in praise of the colonial state
than to ask questions which might cause trouble with the

colonial power and authorities (Cameroon and Dood, 1970; Hirji, 1980; Mbilinyi, 1980; Rodney, 1972).

Examinations also did not encourage thought process, but merely existed to measure the production of facts produced from the colonial paradigm or colonial perspectives. Therefore, knowledge from above, that is from colonial authorities, whether contained in school textbooks, newspapers, or through the radio media and other mass-media, was considered to be sacred and true knowledge. It was not subject to question.

This sort of production of historical knowledge from the colonial historiography which regarded the colonialists or colonial state as the "subject" of history and the colonial societies as "objects of history" continued to be a dominant paradigm throughout the colonial period (Hirji, 1980; Mbilinyi, 1980; Rodney, 1972). Under colonialism, the philosophy of history as a discipline was grounded in an "empiricist" or "descriptive" type of history. Under such a philosophy, two things characterize vividly the empiricist type of history. These are: First, learning of history should be grounded in only giving out the "facts," since the facts speak for themselves. And, facts are "value-free."

Second, empiricist history argues that the study of history should only involve the study of "great men and women." History is only made by great men who have great

ideas. The common man or woman does not make history. Under this philosophy, history is the activity of great people. Therefore, teachers and students should only engage in the study of activities of great people--because that is "what is history"--no more, no less.

Summary

To sum up the dilemma and poverty contained in the colonial paradigm and historiography, the observations made by two historians are useful, namely Engels (1880s) and Ihebuzor (1983).

Engels (1880) observed that, under colonial relations, historical knowledge and the writing of history is often falsified and fetishized for the interests of the colonial government. He wrote:

> The bourgeoisie/colonialists turn everything in a commodity, hence also the writing of history. It is part of its being, of its condition of existence, to falsify all goods; it falsified the writing of history. And the best paid historiography is that which is best falsified for the purposes of the bourgeoisie/colonialists. (in Mlahagwa, 1983:4)

Along the same vein of accusing and showing the shortcomings of colonial historiography in relation to African history, Ihebuzor's (1983) observation sums up the case:

> The essence of colonial historiography on Africa was the denial of any African achievements prior to contact with Europe. Where any such achievements were noticed, they had to be interpreted in a manner consistent with the

denial of indigenous African achievements.
(Ihebuzor, 1983:8)

This further vivid denial of African historical development and achievements was posed through what was generally known as the "Hamatic hypothesis or myth." The Hamatic hypothesis simply but emphatically states that all good things in Africa, if indeed there were any, were due to the outsiders and not the Africans themselves. It states that anything of value ever found in Africa was brought there by the Hamites, allegedly a branch of the Caucasian race.

To this regard, Seligman (1957) formulates the Hamatic hypothesis:

Apart from relatively late Semitic influence
. . . the civilizations of Africa are the
civilizations of the Hamites, its history the
record of the peoples and of their interaction
with two other African stocks, the Negro and the
Bushman, whether this influence was exerted by
highly civilized Egyptians or by such wider
pastoralists as are represented at the present
day by the Beja and Somali . . . . The incoming
Hamites were pastoral "Europeans"--arriving wave
after wave . . . better armed as well as quicker
witted than the dark agricultural Negroes. (in
Sanders, E.R., 1969:521)

In the end, colonialism is praised as an agent of civilization through which the Africans have been able to make their own history both during the colonial period and after independence. In other words, colonialism has raised the Africans from being the "object" of history to being a "subject" of history.

Coupland (1938) states that the "object" to "subject" transformation of the Africans mediated through the colonial process, when he wrote:

> The present European occupation of East Africa
> had its drawback for the Africans, but also its
> advantages. It only began some forty or fifty
> years ago, yet already inter-tribal warfare and
> slave-raiding have been wholly suppressed; the
> country has been opened up by road and rail and
> air; its natural resources have been improved and
> exploited with the aid of modern science; in many
> areas new means of access to new markets have
> meant an increase in production and a rise in the
> standard of living; and for the country as a
> whole the framework of a modern state and nucleus
> of social services have been built up. More
> security for life and property, better crops,
> better health, better education--those are the
> ways in which the subjection of the East Africans
> have began to free them from the perilous,
> cramping, static conditions of tropical life
> secluded from all helpful contact with the rest
> of the world. And the sum of it is that the East
> Africans are now at least in a position to begin
> to make East African history themselves.
> (Coupland, 1938:14)

Coupland (1938) then, with the clear intent and notion of the fact that Africa had no history and could not make history on its own, states that his book, though it is on the history of East Africa, is a history of the East African invaders. Coupland then goes on to state why this is the case:

> But the period of East African history to be
> related in this book breaks off long before that.
> On nearly all, though not quite all, its pages
> the history of East Africa is only the history of
> its invaders. And the stage on which they play
> their part is only a narrow slice of huge East
> Africa . . . . . But the reader should remember
> that the East Africans, though invisible, are
> always there, a great black background to the
> comings and goings of brown men and white men on

the coast. In the foreground, too, on the
historical stage itself, the East Africans are
always the great majority; dumb actors for the
most part, doing nothing that seems important, so
eclipsed by the protagonists that they are almost
forgotten, and yet quite indispensable.
(Coupland, 1938:14)

It was this very "forgotten factor" in African

history (the African people themselves) that Coupland

(1938) and his fellow colonial historians had neglected

largely due to racial overtones that the Africanist

(nationalist) historians had intended to bring to the

foreground (or according to our friend Coupland (1938), to

the "historical stage itself") when they asserted

vigorously that Africa and all Africans had history.

Moreover, Africanist historians stated that African

history, contrary to the writings of Coupland (1938) and

his fellow colonial historians, cannot be understood as

being merely the activities of its invaders as Coupland

would claim.

During the 1950s and 1960s, the balance sheet

approach to the analysis of African history--which the

colonial historians had brought in the writing of history--

was not being taken over by the Africanist historians.

However, at this time, the balance sheet on African history

had to be filled by entries that were conceptualized from

the Afro-centric (nationalist) view of African history, and

not from colonial historiography as had been done before.

This activity gave rise to the allegation that Africanist

historiography was a "mirror-image" of colonial historiography.

The Independence Era and the Prevalence of the Africanist (Nationalist) Historiography

Nationalism, Independence and the Problem of Legitimacy of the New Independent Tanzanian State

The attainment of independence in 1961 meant that the new independent government in Tanzania, and indeed the African independent governments as a whole, had to create its own ideology. This ideology was one which would be acceptable and relevant to the creation of nationalist sentiments and African pride among the Tanzanian people. The new African (nationalist) ideology was also necessary so that the new Tanzanian nationalist government could legitimize its rule and create its own identity and acceptance among the Tanzanian people.

In the circumstances of this emphoria of independence, it was necessary, through all forms and by all means at the disposal of the new nationalist government, to counteract the colonial ideology which had been advanced in the colonial period by the colonial state. This counteraction was necessary because the colonial ideology was now irrelevant to the needs of the nationalist state after independence.

This counteracting of colonial (racist) ideology was particularly important with regard to the colonialists' allegation that the Africans could not be and had never been the agent of their own history. In this regard, therefore, the new independent African governments' capacities and capabilities to be proper vehicles for the promotion of political and social change in Africa was held suspect by many colonialists and probably the general Tanzanian population; especially those who have benefitted most under the colonial enterprise.

Kwame Nkrumah (1964), one of the first Presidents in Africa, noted this fact:

> The central myth in the mythology surrounding
> Africa is that of the denial that we are a
> historical people. It is said that, whereas
> other continents have shaped history and
> determined its course, Africa has stood still,
> held by inertia. Africa, it is said, entered
> history only as a result of European contact.
> Its history, therefore, is widely felt to be an
> extension of European history. Hegels authority
> was learnt to this historical hypothesis
> concerning Africa. And apologists of colonialism
> and imperialism lost little time in seizing upon
> it and writing wildly about it to their hearts'
> content. (in Dike, 1964:6)

This colonial ideology has permeated not only the colonialists but also some of the Tanzanian (African) people's thinking. It resulted in creating and cultivating a vision that only the white man had the power and the capacity to bring development. If such colonial ideology was to continue to be and form a central belief among the Tanzanian (African) people, it would prove very difficult

for them to accept and especially to have substantial confidence in the new African governments as being proper vehicles through which political and social development could be properly carried out in Africa.

Under these circumstances, the independent Tanzanian government had to prove to the people, as well as cultivate confidence among them, that the new government (as opposed to the colonial regime) was indeed the proper facet (or to use the colonial terminology--agent of history) through which Tanzania would develop faster than in the colonial period. This action was necessary because, so the new independent government argued, the interests of the colonial government were to exploit the Tanzanian people for the benefit of Europe. However, the new independent government had basically identical interests as the Tanzanian population. This government would therefore rule in the interests of the people of Tanzania.

To bring new hope after independence and to remove skepticism among the people, Africanist (nationalist) ideology was necessary to counteract the colonial ideology propaganda which Tanzanians had been fed and become accustomed to for 75 years of colonial rule. The task of Africanist (nationalist) historiography was to convey in all government and party infrastructure and structures of the new independent Tanzanian state the faith in Africans themselves.

Therefore, the repressive and ideological apparatuses created and inherited from the former colonial governments--the military, police, prisons, judicial courts, and school and school system churches, etc.--had to be transformed or re-oriented ideologically to advance the needs of the nationalist government. The ideology of nationalism, independence, and national development had to take a bigger share in the new dimensions of the nationalist government ideology and propaganda. The ideology and propaganda were aimed at cultivating a legitimization and identity of the new independent nationalist government among the Tanzanian populace.

Regarding the struggle to create legitimacy, hegemony, and an identity for the new independent Tanzanian government among the Tanzanian people, all historical and political works were required to interpret African history from an Afro-centric (nationalist) historiography, the "non-colonial viewpoint." It was no wonder that almost all historical and political works during this independence period clearly claimed that they were interpreting and writing African history from the point of view of the Africans.

The meeting of Africanist historians in Accra (Ghana) in 1964 clearly and emphatically postulated the aim of their enterprise. They noted:

> I hope this congress will mark the beginning of
> an era when African studies will become

progressively the concern of African scholars
themselves and when, without in any way
compromising academic standards, African history,
culture and development will be looked at from
the African point of view . . . . I am saying
this, I trust my colleagues from overseas will,
not think me chauvinistic. I am sure all of us
here are aware of the great debt we owe to men
like Heinrich Bath, Delafosse and Rattray, and to
the many other scholars who recorded with
objectivity so much of our history and culture at
a time, when, because of the existing colonial
system, many of us were unaware of our
obligations to our own heritage. (in Dike,
1964:4)

In the same light of interpreting African history
from the African point of view, Were and Wilson (1969) in
their book, <u>East Africa through a Thousand Years</u>, state in
the preface:

> This book has been written primarily with the
> requirements of East African candidates for the
> School Certificate History Examination in mind
> . . . . It has been necessary because no school
> textbook so far exists which, while covering the
> whole period 1000 to present day deals adequately
> with the years before 1800. In <u>East Africa</u>
> <u>through a Thousand Years</u>, we have tried to
> provide, in fairly simple form, an account of all
> the early years; years for which our evidence is
> almost entirely based on oral tradition and
> archeology. At the same time we have tried to
> see the more recent period from a fresh, non-
> colonial viewpoint. (Were and Wilson, 1969:v)

<u>The Changing Role of Tanzanian Secondary</u>
<u>Schools in the New Independent State:</u>
<u>The Prevalence of Africanist (Nationalist)</u>
<u>Historiography in School History Textbooks</u>
<u>and the Legitimization of the New Indepen-</u>
<u>dent Government</u>

The schools and the school system in the
independence era, as was the case in the colonial period,
continued to occupy a major importance ideologically and

therefore became an important infrastructure through which nationalist ideology relevant to the new government could be advanced and perpetuated. If the nationalist government, like the colonial government, were to achieve its objectives, the schools had to be under the tight control of the nationalist government, both in its curriculum and instructional methodology.

The schools remained an important infrastructure to the nationalist state because they produced educated people who were expected to occupy important positions in the nationalist state bureaucracy. As such, it was necessary to control the curriculum and teach what the nationalist government wanted. This tight control was the only way that the production of educated personnel who were in line with the requirements and political aspirations of the government could be guaranteed.

It was also obvious that the colonial school curriculum could not produce graduates with "nationalist" inclinations; and, as such, the colonial curricula were definitely out of tune with the environment of an independent state. If independence had to portray any meaning at all, so it was argued, some drastic changes had to take place. Among other areas, the educational curricula had to change. It was clear that the independent Tanzanian government realized the dilemma of colonial education and its objectives to the needs of the

independence era. The urgent search for new objectives of

education relevant to the new situation of independence

became necessary.

This realization by the independent Tanzanian

government is clearly presented by President Nyerere

(1960s):

> The education provided by the colonial
> governments in Tanzania had a different purpose.
> It was not designed to prepare young people for
> the service of their own country; instead it was
> inspired and motivated by the desire to inculcate
> the values of the colonial society and to train
> individuals for the service of the colonial state
> . . . . The educational system was modelled on
> the British system, with heavier emphasis on
> white collar jobs . . . . Therefore, the new
> independent state of Tanzania in fact had
> inherited a system of education which in many
> respects was both inadequate and inappropriate to
> the new state. (Nyerere, 1967:17)

Soon after independence, the history curriculum

underwent considerable change in terms of the content and

emphasis. The content and emphasis shifted from learning

about Europeans in Africa to learning about Africans in

Africa. However, in spite of the change of content and

emphasis bent on bringing new ideological conformity, the

methods of teaching and learning history underwent little

change. It was argued that age-old colonial institutions

could not be hurriedly dismantled immediately following

independence. Given these circumstances, it was not

surprising that some of the colonial educational structures

continued to operate for some time after independence in

1961 (Cameroon and Dood, 1970; Mbilinyi, 1982; Mlahagwa, 1983).

In spite of the history curriculum undergoing considerable content change, the teaching process continued to be similar to that of the colonial period. Processes of "factualization" and "counter-factualization" became prominent features in the teaching and learning of history. The conservative character of teaching history inherited from the colonial period is well noted by Mbilinyi (1982):

> In the new curricula developed after independence, national and African history and geography were given more attention, and the former study of "European Kings and Queens" was minimized. . . . there was no fundamental change, however, in the nature or method of the social science taught. Political education, history and economics were descriptive and historical, typical of the bourgeoisie ideology which permeated first the colonial and later the post-independence process. (Mbilinyi, 1982:100)

Knowledge taught in schools continued to be regarded by both teachers and students as being sacred and therefore authoritative and correct knowledge. Its main purpose was to reproduce that knowledge at the time of the examinations so as to obtain a pass which guaranteed a student a job in the employment sector. This history curriculum had little change in teaching and learning methodology. The only major face-lift in the curriculum was to inflate the curriculum with themes and topics of African history, which the nationalist leaders regarded as having been neglected in the colonial period.

It can therefore be argued that the history curriculum was far from being transformative in its philosophical stance, since it merely replaced "white faces" for "black faces." In this case the change, which is a change at the superficial level, merely involved the replacement of "white heroes" and the achievements of the colonial state for the creation of "African heroes" and the achievements of the nationalist government. Historical content and teaching stressed and heavily amplified the activities of African chiefs and raised all of them to the level of heroes.

The justification for writing mostly African political history in which African states and kingdoms as well as African chiefs and kings fared prominently is given by one of the famous Africanist historians, Jan Vansina (1966). Before going too far, Vansina first criticized the colonial historians for neglecting to write about the history of the Africans. Along this vein Vansina (1966) wrote:

> Relatively little is known about the history of
> Central Africa in pre-colonial times, and even
> today this part of the continent is the stepchild
> of African historiography. One reason for this
> seems to be that the sources at our disposal are
> often not the familiar written documents, and
> that even when written documents are available--
> for instance, as in the history of the coastal
> peoples during the eighteenth and nineteenth
> centuries--they were not always exploited.
> Because the sources are unfamiliar, the
> unfortunate result has been an unspoken feeling
> that there are no sources for a history of
> Central Africa, that such as history cannot be

written. This is of course not true. Actually, the overriding reason for this state of affairs is the general lack of interest in African history, as distinguished from a history of European endeavours in Africa. (p. 3)

Having said the above, Jan Vansina (1966) then tells us what his historical work, titled <u>Kingdoms of the Savanna</u>, attempts to do:

> This work does not cover the history of the whole of Central Africa, but is limited to the Savannas north of the Zambezi and south of the equatorial forest. This arbitrary limitation is based on the remarkable fact that all or almost all the peoples of this area have developed kingdoms or chiefdoms--that is, they have developed political systems which have centralized political structures and which are ruled by a single person. In the surrounding areas most populations are stateless: They have no centralized political structures and very often no single leader . . . . This book, therefore, is first a political history, a history of states, and mainly of Central African states. (p. 4)

Jan Vansina (1966) continued to offer reasons why he and other Africanist historians emphasized the history of states and state building as well as kings and chiefs in the pre-colonial period:

> The existence of kingdoms quickened the pace of change in many different aspects of culture: Traders were protected, items of material culture and economic techniques became widespread, languages of conquerors were diffused, social and political ideas as well as religious rituals and myths were disseminated, etc. There is almost a political determinism to cultural change in Central Africa from 1500 to 1900. Finally, while it remains true that a political history is a severely limited one, history with only occasional reference to political structures and developments would be most confusing; it is the

political history which provides chronology, and history without chronology ceases to be history. (p. 5)

After independence and under the banner of teaching "African history," all chiefs--no matter whether they collaborated or resisted colonialism--were considered to be "heroes" who rose and fell in defense of Africa. It was not problematized, for example, as to why some chiefs resisted colonialism while others collaborated with the colonial forces in the conquest of Africa. Did all those chiefs who resisted colonialism resist because they wanted to defend the general interests of Tanzanians or defend their own specific interests? These are some fundamental questions if the teaching and learning of history, in this case African history, is to be rescued from "romanticism" to the level of "actuality."

Apart from the stress and emphasis on the activities of traditional African chiefs, the leaders of the nationalist government or the ruling elite were also considered to be makers of history. They, too, were elevated to the level of "national heroes." It was assumed that all these ruling elite had fought for independence and, as such, they had advanced and defended the interests of all the Tanzanian people. There was hardly any theorization as to whether all these nationalist ruling elite stood for the interests of Tanzanians or for their own personal interests.

The methods of teaching, as was the case in the colonial period, stressed the facts without questioning the source of the facts. Thus, given the curriculum content of "heroes" who consisted of nationalist government leaders, the ruling elit the traditional chiefs, the teaching of history durin independence period was to relate the activities of these national heroes. The major purpose of teaching and learning history was to stress the "good side" of the activities of these leaders. This emphasis was considered "proper" history. It was assumed, under nationalist historiography, that the nationalist government's activities had no bad side. All activities were carried out for nationalist interest.

One reason for the dominance of the nationalist historiography at this point in time was the political nature of the time. The nationalistic sentiments and euphoria of independence favoured the teaching and learning of history from the point of view of the Africanist (nationalist) historiography. This teaching went hand in hand with the interests of the nationalist government of trying to justify its political and social policies at the same time. It also cultivated legitimacy among the people.

Dike (1964) justifies the need to interpret African history from an African viewpoint as well as the need and importance of African studies at this point in time:

> That so many scholars, from so many countries representing so many disciplines, have gathered

here tonight to discuss their wide experience in
this vital field is surely testimony enough to
the importance attached to African studies in the
world today. Yet I need hardly say this great
interest is of comparatively recent origin.
Undoubtedly the rise of African nationalism and
independence movements have stimulated the desire
to explore on a wide scale the culture and
history of the peoples of this continent. . . .
In the colonial period some attention was paid to
them, but much of what work was undertaken was
directed to justify the colonial policies of the
metropolitan countries. (p. 19)

Given the political climate at the time of
independence, teachers had no choice but to teach what the
nationalist state prescribed. If the teachers wanted to be
secure in their jobs and politically secure from government
force, repression, and intimidation, they had to teach what
was prescribed by the government, and, in the manner which
the government advocated.

To praise the nationalist government policies (both
good and bad) was a necessity in the teaching of history.
After all, history was considered to be an important
subject through which the ideology and interests of the
nationalist government could be advanced and maintained
(Davidson, 1963; Ranger, 1968; Mlahagwa, 1983). The
subject of history could not be taught from any other
viewpoint, apart from that of the nationalist paradigm. To
do so would automatically defeat the purpose of the
nationalist state--that of making sure that its state
ideology dominated and prevailed over other ideologies.

Given these circumstances, "thinking" processes in the history subject were thus highly restricted, if not non-existent. Learning was reduced to the level of cramming, narration, and the reproduction of "pure" facts, which were produced mostly for the sake of passing examinations (Hirji, 1980; Mbilinyi, 1982; Mlahagwa, 1983).

At the same time, when the nationalist government strongly controlled school curriculum and instructional methodology, the nationalist state was also busy trying to find out, retrieve, and expose all the faults of the old colonial government. This move was made in an attempt to discredit the old colonial state while at the same time entrenching the interests and ideology of the nationalist state. The nationalist state and the Africanist (nationalist) historiography, therefore, stressed with confidence that there had been "nothing good" done by the old colonial government. If there had been any good done, it was negligible.

Basil Davidson (1961) argues that colonial governments have done mainly destruction in Africa. Anything good was an accident rather than an intent on the part of the colonial government. To make his argument clear, Davidson (1961), one of the most prominent African historians, confidently asserts:

> Philanthropic individuals and institutions may have worked hard for the good of Africans; their saving labours, though often brave and even generous, could never be more than palliative and

peripheral. For while colonial rule built a few
roads and railways and opened a few mines and
plantations (though for its own convenience and
enrichment), dropping here and there a few crumbs
of educational and social enlightenment, its
central effect was one of dismantlement. Within
its new frontiers, it took apart, it did not put
together again. (p. 35)

This being the case, it was no wonder that most of the economic and social ills during the independence period were blamed on the old colonial government. Nothing was said about the ills and incompetencies of the nationalist government. Therefore, teachers and students were highly credited if they could find faults with the old colonial state or if they endeavoured to search for good actions by the new nationalist government (Davidson, 1963; Ihebuzor, 1984; Ranger, 1968).

The process of teaching and learning history, grounded in the fashion of finding good and bad sides to the colonial government as well as the nationalist government, is nothing more than "factualization" and "counter-factualization." It is a sort of "balance-sheet" approach to the teaching of history, which is a clear version of empiricist historiography (Ihebuzor, 1984; Mlahagwa, 1983). This history was nothing more than reversing the facts and believing that one has changed the content and form of the facts. In reality, one is still left with the same form and content. Nothing has changed except that an "illusion" of change has been created.

bringing about thereby a "false image" and "falsification" of the facts.

In this sense, whereas the colonial period was marked by factualization and the achievements of the colonial government, the independence era was characterized by the process of counter-factualization and the achievements of the nationalist government. These two types of presenting history are not different; they are similar. Both engage in a similar process of drawing a balance-sheet of the historical events and, as such, they are just mirror images of one another.

Both historiographies share the same aspirations and intentions. Colonial historiography and colonial school curriculum was there to justify and legitimize the colonial conquest and colonial domination, while nationalist historiography and nationalist school curriculum existed to justify and legitimize the rule of the nationalist state.

To conclude, nationalist historiography was just another version of empiricist history, which entailed to defend and advance the ideology of the nationalist governments and Africa. Perhaps it is none other than Ihebuzor's (1983) observation about the aims and purpose of the nationalist paradigm and historiography on African history that best sums up the scenario, when he wrote:

> The aim of Nationalist historiography is to
> combat and destroy what are considered to be
> deliberate distortions of the African past
> brought about by Euro-centric colonialist
> historiography . . . With the advent of
> independence, many African historians felt the
> need to redress the balance . . . The tasks
> facing these historians were two-fold: firstly,
> to stress African achievements in the past and,
> secondly, to debunk colonialist historiography
> . . . There was a hidden ideological
> component in the motivation of these historians.
> (Ihebuzor, 1983:11)

The Political and Economic Crisis of the 1960s and the Rise and Fall of Underdevelopment Historiography (1960s-1970s)

The praise of African leaders as agents of historical transformations, which was advanced by the Africanist (nationalist) historiography, began to fall apart in the 1960s as the political and economic poverty became an obvious phenomenon in Africa. A new explanation had to be invented to explain the dilemma. Underdevelopment historiography then came to that rescue and tried to explain why Africa was poor after independence.

During the few years after independence, the political and economic development which had been projected by Africanist (nationalist) historians did not come true. This failure to accomplish the projected national developments in Africa showed clearly that something, somewhere, somehow, had gone wrong. The struggle now became one of looking for a "correct" historical

explanation for this phenomenon of political and economic stagnation, called "underdevelopment," at this particular point of Tanzania's and Africa's historical conjuncture.

The underdevelopment (dependency) historiography which arose out of this period argued with full confidence that the underdevelopment and poor economic development in Africa was purely a product of colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism, and the colonial process. They argued further that, if African had not been colonized, the continent would have developed differently and much faster than had been the case under the colonial process. This assumption and its subsequent arguments prompted the belief that all economic and social catastrophes which had befallen Africa, both during the colonial and post-colonial periods, were the products of colonialism and the colonial process.

On the above argument which forms the central belief and assumption of underdevelopment historiography, Geoffrey Kay (1975)--one of the Underdevelopment Theory exponents--wrote:

> Merchant Capital discovered what subsequently became the underdeveloped world more than two and a half centuries before the first triumph of industrial capitalism in Britain at the end of the eighteenth century. The vast commercial empires set up first by the Spanish and Portuguese and later by the British, French and Dutch, established the basis of the modern economy. They concentrated vast accumulation of wealth in the form of capital, while overthrowing and pillaging whole civilizations. The creation of the World Market, "the starting point of the

modern history of Capital," was also a process of destruction. On the one hand, it drew the World together into a new global division of labour that opened the possibility of previously undreamt-of increase in men's productive powers; on the other hand, it split apart, turning this division of labour into a grotesque structure of exploitation and oppression. The foundations of modern development and underdevelopment were laid at the same time by the same process. (p. 96)

Taking this general idea of the underdevelopment historiography and applying it to the contemporary political and economic problems in Africa, the late Walter Rodney (1972) crystallized his ideas in a book titled How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, which he wrote when he was teaching at the University of Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. This book became one of the most read school textbooks in Tanzanian secondary schools and universities, as well as in colleges during the heyday of underdevelopment historiography. Moreover, in spite of the downfall of underdevelopment historiography, Walter Rodney's book is still one of the main textbooks in the Tanzanian secondary schools.

The following two quotations portray the basis of Walter Rodney's (1972) argument about the causes of underdevelopment in Africa. First, and at the outset, he tells us what he sets out to do in his book:

This book derives from a concern with the contemporary African situation. It delves into the past only because otherwise it would be impossible to understand how the present came into being and what the trends are for the near future. In the search for an understanding of what is now called "underdevelopment" in Africa,

the limits of inquiry have to be fixed as far
apart as the fifteenth century, on the one hand,
and the end of the colonial period on the other.
Ideally, an analysis of underdevelopment should
come even closer to the present than the end of
the colonial period in the 1960s. The phenomenon
of neo-colonialism cries out for extensive
investigation in order to formulate the strategy
and tactics of African emancipation and
development. This study does not go that far . .
. . (p. vii)

Having said the above, Rodney (1972) then tells

what he believed to be the actual causes of

underdevelopment in Africa:

During the remainder of this study, a great deal
of detail will be presented to indicate the grim
reality behind the so-called slogans of
capitalism, imperialism, colonialism, neo-
colonialism, and the like. For the present
moment, the position to be adopted can be stated
briefly in the following terms: The question
which is to who, and what, is responsible for
African underdevelopment can be answered at two
levels: firstly, the answer is that the
operation of the imperialist system bears major
responsibility to African economic retardation by
draining African wealth and by making it
impossible to develop more rapidly the resources
of the continent. Secondly, one has to deal with
those who manipulate the system and those who are
either agents or unwitting accomplices of the
said system. The capitalists of Western Europe
were the ones who actively extended their
exploitation from inside Europe to cover the
whole of Africa. (p. 27)

This argument was not only a fallacy in itself, but

it was also the intent on the part of the underdevelopment

historiography to externalize African political and

economic failures as being caused by the dictates of the

old colonial state and neo-colonialism of the Western

capitalist countries. Under this argument, therefore, we

can argue that the underdevelopment historiography wants us to believe that the fate of Africa--being in economic and social problems--had already been determined long ago by colonialism and now by neo-colonialism. Nothing could be done to reverse or change the situation for the better.

This belief is also to argue that, if Africa is still economically poor (and indeed it is) after twenty years of being independent, this is not due to the incapacity and incompetence on the part of the new independent African governments to bring meaningful change, but due to the colonial process which had already determined this situation of poverty in Africa.

This type of thinking propagated by underdevelopment historiography is not only a grave mistake in itself, but it also conditions people to think that their problems are beyond their scope and capacity to solve, because someone external to them had already determined their fate. If all problems are caused by external forces, the people themselves are incapable of solving their problems unless an external force comes by to help them.

This type of thinking grounded in underdevelopment historiography and the dilemma posed by it is best described by Ihebuzor (1983):

> The externalization of responsibility for negatively judged events and internalization for positively judged events becomes the dominant feature of this type of historiography. This is

dangerous since it could teach children always to
seek external causes when things go wrong. They
could transfer this to everyday dealings with
people. When things go wrong they are not
responsible. Such an attitude may prevent an
adequate level of emotional and moral
development. (Ihebuzor, 1983:10)

It is not wrong to observe and take note of the
crisis brought about by colonialism and the colonial
process, but to argue that all economic and social ills in
Africa have been a product of colonialism and are thus
already determined by colonialists, leaving no room for
improvement, is not only beyond the conception of everyone
in their right-mind, it is also like taking a leap in the
dark. Can it really be argued that the independent states
in Africa are not capable of developing after independence?
Are there no internal constraints in Africa itself that
hinder development efforts? The independent governments in
Africa, backed by various historiographies--notable among
them is the Africanist (nationalist) historiography and the
underdevelopment historiography, have always attempted to
search for external factors to explain economic problems in
Africa. In this way they have been able to escape being
responsible to effect genuine national economic
developments in Africa.

Underdevelopment historiography did retain much of
the philosophy of both the colonial and the nationalist
historiographies, that of seeing and producing historical
knowledge grounded in empiricism, factualization, and

counter-factualization. The major emphasis in this case is placed on the production and reproduction of facts about the amount of trade goods and their values traded between Africa and Europe, the amount of slaves taken to the Americas, as well as different countries per capita incomes, etc.

The provision of these stark facts was considered by underdevelopment historiography as its major empirical evidence to prove the phenomenon that was referred to as underdevelopment. The provision of these statistical facts, so it was argued, showed the actual differences in economic growth between and among different nations. These statistical facts also provided the grounds for making a clear distinction between the so-called "developed" and "underdeveloped" countries.

Underdevelopment historiography did not venture into the study of the internal political economy of the different African countries and other underdeveloped countries to see whether there were any internal restraints which might have hindered the political and economic development in these countries. This was not the major issue of underdevelopment historiography. It is also the weakness of underdevelopment historiography.

The major task of underdevelopment historiography was to prove the exploitation between nations and continents mediated through capitalism, colonialism,

imperialism, neo-colonialism, and trade. Such being the case, underdevelopment historiography spent huge amounts of ink, paper, and time trying to retrieve huge amounts of data pertaining to trade imbalances between nations and continents.

As well, they searched for "actual" culprits in an attempt to show who stole what, where, when, and if possible why? Provision of statistics to prove cases is not bad in itself, but it is only part of the whole story. The question is, therefore: Where is the other part of the story that could make the whole? This other part was nowhere to be seen in the writings of underdevelopment historiography.

In this regard, Rodney (1972) shows clearly that the major concern of underdevelopment historiography is the study of the economic comparison and exploitation of one country by another country. On this issue, Rodney (1972) wrote:

> Obviously, underdevelopment is not absence of
> development, because every people have developed
> in one way or another and to a greater or lesser
> extent. Underdevelopment makes sense only as a
> means of comparing levels of development . . . .
> A second and even more indispensable component of
> modern underdevelopment is that it expresses a
> particular relationship of exploitation; namely,
> the exploitation of one country by another.
> (p. 14).

Then Rodney argues that one means of exploitation of one country by another, and which is relevant to the explanation of the African underdevelopment context, is

explanation of the African underdevelopment context, is

international trade., Rodney wrote:

> Man has always exploited his natural environment
> in order to make a living . . . . Then a stage
> was reached by which people in one community
> called a nation exploited the natural resources
> and labour of another nation and its people.
> Since underdevelopment deals with the comparative
> economies of nations, it is the last kind of
> exploitation that is of greatest interest here,
> i.e. the exploitation of nation by nation. One
> of the common means by which one nation exploits
> another and one that is relevant to Africa's
> external relations is exploitation through trade.
> When the terms of trade are set by one country in
> a manner entirely advantageous to itself, then
> the trade is usually detrimental to the trading
> partner . . . . The whole import-export
> relationship between Africa and its trading
> partners is one of unequal exchange and of
> exploitation. (p. 22)

Furthermore, Rodney (1972) argues that, because of

colonialism and the subsequent exploitation of the labour

and the natural resources of Africa and Asia by imperialist

countries, Africa and Asia have been rendered incapable to

develop after independence. Rodney, states:

> All of the countries named as "underdeveloped" in
> the world are exploited by others; and the
> underdevelopment with which the world is now
> preoccupied is a product of capitalist,
> imperialist and colonial exploitation. African
> and Asian societies were developing independently,
> until they were taken over directly or indirectly
> by the capitalist powers. When that happened,
> exploitation increased and the export of surplus
> ensued, depriving the societies of the benefit of
> their natural resources and labour. That is an
> integral part of underdevelopment in the
> contemporary sense. (p. 14)

The above argument supports the idea that present

independent African governments are incapable of bringing

change for a better economic development in Africa. In
fact, underdevelopment historiography has crudely reduced
these independent African governments as being largely
"puppets" and "stooges" of the imperialist powers. Their
role in the system, which is referred to as "nation to
nation" exploitation, is largely that of "facilitating" the
process of exploitation between African countries and
Europe.

Here again, Rodney (1972) poses the argument:

> During the colonial period, the forms of
> political subordination in Africa were obvious.
> There were governors, colonial officials and
> police. In politically independent African
> states, the metropolitan capitalists have to
> ensure favourable political decisions by remote
> control. So they set up their political puppets
> in many parts of Africa who shamelessly agree to
> compromise with the vicious apartheid regime of
> South Africa when their masters tell them to do
> so . . . . The importance of this group cannot
> be underestimated. The presence of a group of
> African sell-outs is part of the definition of
> underdevelopment. Any diagnosis of under-
> development in Africa will reveal not just low
> per-capita income and protein deficiencies, but
> also the gentlemen who dance in Abidjan, Accra,
> and Kinshasa when music is played in Paris,
> London, and New York. (p. 27)

Because Africa was exploited by Europe, the
solution to escape this exploitative relationship of
underdevelopment is for Africa to disengage from the
imperialist camp and create ties with the socialist camp.

Here, once again, Rodney (1972) presents the case
as he sees it:

> Ideally, an analysis of underdevelopment should
> come even closer to the present than the end of

the colonial period in the 1960s. The phenomenon of neo-colonialism cries out for extensive investigation in order to formulate the strategy and tactics of African emancipation and development. This study does not go that far, but at least certain solutions are implicit in a correct historical evaluation, just as given medical remedies are indicated or contra-indicated by a correct diagnosis of a patient's condition and accurate case history. Hopefully, the facts and interpretation that follow will make a small contribution toward reinforcing the conclusion that African development is possible only on the basis of a radical break with the international capitalist system, which has been the principal agency of underdevelopment of Africa over the last five centuries. (p. vii)

After breaking ties with the capitalist system, Africa should then forge ties with the socialist camp. why should this be the case? Because the socialist camp, according to underdevelopment historiography, is not as exploitative as the capitalist one.

The point is clearly expressed by Rodney (1972):

Africa trades mainly with the countries of western Europe, North America and Japan. Africa is also diversifying its trade by dealing with socialist countries, and if that trade proves disadvantageous to the African economy, then the developed socialist countries will also have joined the ranks of exploiters of Africa. However, it is very essential at this stage to draw a clear distinction between the capitalist countries and the socialist ones, because socialist countries have never at any time owned any part of the African continent nor do they invest in African economies in such a way as to expatriate profits from Africa. Therefore, socialist countries are not involved in the robbery of Africa. (p. 23)

Because of this emphasis of nation to nation exploitation, underdevelopment historiography worked mostly to provide statistics to support the relationship between

development and underdevelopment both within nation states and between different countries. This work resulted in the process of factualization and counter-factualization in the study of Tanzanian and African history, particularly when these national entities were placed in the global context of international relations.

The type of historical knowledge that school students will get out of this type of underdevelopment historiography is quite clear. At most they will create an image that Africa cannot develop at present because someone out there in Europe is conspiring against Africa's development. Furthermore, African governments are mere stooges in the exploitation process of Africa by Europe and are thus incapable of bringing development to Africa. At this point, the legacy of colonial historiography--that of emphasizing the incapacity of Africa to develop by itself-- is clearly seen. The real issue has been hidden by the vision of African governments as being mere "puppets." Again, Africans are reduced to being still "objects" of history.

The Socialist Model of Development and the Entrenchment of the Marxist Historiography (1975-1985)

It was the topic of history curriculum content and the teaching and learning of history grounded in the processes of "romanticism," "factualization," and "counter-

> University. It is this kind of methodology that
> has enabled historians to expose the fallacies
> and fetishism of bourgeois history. (Mlahagwa,
> 1983:9)

The Marxists demanded a review of the secondary school history curriculum in order to create a "proletariat" history. This proletariat history would form the basic historical knowledge for the construction of the socialist model of development in Tanzania. The proletariat history would further be used to liberate the workers and peasants from the political, social, and economic exploitation in which they were imprisoned both internally by the present Tanzanian political regime and the outside imperialist forces.

The interpretation, teaching, and learning of history based on Marxist historiography, so it was argued, would eventually create, for both teachers and students, a broader base of historical understanding of Tanzania and world history than had hitherto been the case. In this so-called broader outlook, both teachers and students would be able to see the actual realities of the relations of production and exploitation carried out both within the country and between Tanzania and the outside imperialist world. Marxist historians who developed the new secondary school history curriculum explicitly stated that one of the main objectives of the history curriculum was:

> To impart into the students the tools and
> abilities of analysing, evaluating, and solving
> problems in their proper context; and therefore

to encourage historical research and purposeful
use of a wide variety of source material.
(Mlahagwa, 1983:9)

However, the bases for the understanding of the
operations of Marxist historiography hinged on the mastery
of what were regarded as essential Marxist categories and
concepts. These concepts were central to the "correct"
analysis of history, society, and nature. These concepts
included modes of production, production relations,
capitalism, imperialism, neo-colonialism, surplus value,
profit labour and labour power, socialist state, economic
base, superstructure, etc.

The new secondary history curriculum which was
constructed and developed in the 1970s and which as based
on Marxist interpretation of history came to be used in
secondary schools as early as January 1978. This new
history curriculum was emphatic in its version of the
necessity and hows of constructing socialism. It also laid
huge blames on capitalism as an exploitative system of
social and production relations. Because it saw capitalism
as exploitative, the history curriculum eventually came to
see international relations between Tanzania and western
Europe largely from an imperialistic and exploitative point
of view.

The new secondary school history curriculum's
emphasis on socialist construction was no surprise at this
point in time, given the historical developments in

Tanzania. In the decade of the 1970s, the national development policy declared by the independent Tanzanian government, and contained in the "Arusha Declaration" of 1967, declared a national struggle to build a socialist nation by following a socialist model of development.

The Arusha Declaration of 1967, with its intent and objective of going socialist, prompted the re-organization of the country's educational institutions. This re-organization of the educational institutions was intended to create a reflection of the cries and objectives of the independent Tanzanian government as it (the government) struggled to construct a socialist path of development in Tanzania.

Mlahagwa (1983) documents this change of government national policy and, the necessity to re-organize the school structure, as well as changes in the secondary school history curriculum.

> Before we come into a short review of the "A"
> level history syllabus, it is probably
> appropriate we periodize the efforts geared
> towards the writing of a new history syllabus.
> The rethinking about the necessity to make a
> thorough review of the curricular in the various
> institutions of learning came in the wake of a
> shift in major policy enunciated by the 1967
> Arusha Declaration and the accompanying blueprint
> of Education for Self-Reliance. Apart from the
> education policy guidelines envisaged in the
> blueprint, the Arusha Declaration itself posed an
> important theoretical as well as a practical
> issue: How to re-organize institutional
> structures and the ideological superstructures to
> conform with the declared economic objectives.
> In so far as the Arusha Declaration purported to
> fundamentally change the course of the country's

development from a neo-colonial capitalist
economy to a socialist oriented economy it
amounted to a declaration of change in the mode
of production. (Mlahagwa, 1983:1)

In this type of change in national development policy from a capitalist model of development to a socialist model of development, schools were expected to produce and, if possible, create a "socialist man" in Tanzania. History teaching and learning in Tanzanian secondary schools, grounded in Marxist historiography with its strong socialist version and socialist construction, became one possible way for the government to produce and create a socialist man in Tanzanian secondary schools as well as in Tanzania as a whole.

The secondary school history curriculum, at this point in time, stressed the building of socialism through class struggle rather than class collaboration. In this sense, the Marxist historiography saw the present political party as not being a vanguard party because it was purely a mass party that drew its membership from all classes and from committed and non-committed socialist members. Because it was a mass party rather than a vanguard political party, it was therefore not a proper vehicle for the building of socialism in Tanzania.

The political party, according to the Marxist arguments, was a petty-bourgeoisie political party. It was an instrument that ensured that the petty-bourgeoisie could continue to stay in power rather than pass over political

power to the workers and peasants. The Marxists continued
to argue that the petty-bourgeoisie wanted to continue
staying in power because they wanted to continue their
capitalist exploitation under the slogans of socialist
construction.

The following two quotations from Shivji (1973)
reveal the concerns of the Marxists about the inability of
the TANU (now CCM) political party to lead the socialist
struggle in Tanzania. In the first quotation, Shivji
(1973) tells why the TANU (CCM) party is not a proper
vehicle for socialist construction in Tanzania:

> It also follows from the above analysis that a
> revolutionary vanguard is a prerequisite. This
> question, Tanzania has not yet resolved. TANU,
> the present political party, began as a mass-
> party, fulfilling successfully its primary aim of
> overthrowing the colonial power. It was not
> meant for socialist construction. Thus after the
> "Arusha Declaration" the nature of the party has
> to change. (Shivji, 1973:321)

In the second quotation, Shivji (1973) argues that
socialist construction is the workers' and peasants'
enterprise and not the job of the petty-bourgeoisie who are
presently in political power:

> But for a strategy like this to succeed, the
> working class must be surely and firmly in
> political power. This can be ensured only if the
> working class is guided by a revolutionary
> vanguard party of dedicated cadres. Without
> this, the bureaucracy can easily isolate the
> revolutionary leadership from the masses--a fate
> which befell Nkrumah's Conventional People's
> Party. The state power must be in the hands of
> the workers and peasants led by the present
> revolutionary leadership and not the bureaucracy.
> A class--in this case the workers and peasants--

cannot build a society in its interests without
wielding political power. Building "socialism"
is the workers' and not the bureaucrats'
business. (Shivji, 1973:322)

Apart from moving away from the so-called
historical romanticism and mystification of Tanzanian and
African history by the other historiographies (colonial,
Africanist, underdevelopment), the Marxist historians
argued that, since knowledge production was not a neutral
affair, their intent was to produce a "scientific" and
correct historical knowledge that would enable the workers
and peasants of Tanzania to build socialism and liberate
themselves from the yoke of exploitation both internally
and externally. In short, the Marxist historians were
going to produce what they called a "proletariat" history.

Marxist historians saw other historiographies,
especially Africanist and underdevelopment, as being
paternalistic to the African governments in power. As
such, the historical knowledge produced by Africanist and
underdevelopment historiographies served to hide the
incompetencies and political injustices which were the
makings of these African independent governments.
Therefore, the historical knowledge produced by the
Africanist and underdevelopment historiographies was a mere
echo of the independent African governments bent on
falsifying reality and perpetuating the power of these
African political regimes.

The urgent need to produce a "proletariat" history which would represent the "forgotten" voices of the mass of workers and peasants on building of socialism and call for changes in Tanzania and Africa was felt to be a necessity at this point in time. This type of proletariat history, so the Marxists argued, would provide a viable counter-balance (or referred to by others as "balances and checks") to the historical knowledge produced by the Africanist and underdevelopment historiographies which represent the voices of those in political power. At the same time, proletariat history based on Marxist analysis would expose the fallacies of Africanist and underdevelopment historiographies.

This argument of producing proletariat history from the Marxist point of view about society and counter-balance the existing forms of historical knowledge was hinged on the following theoretical construction about the relationship between social knowledge and society at large (Mlahagwa 1983):

> What this means in effect is that the production and propagation of knowledge is not a neutral affair, divorced from the major currents premised on the relations of production. Knowledge is a form of catalyst in the field of power relations; it can be used to exploit and oppress a people or the workers and peasants can use correc knowledge to liberate themselves from the yoke exploitation and oppression. It means also th just as ideas are not in an objective neutr environment so also is the fact that not a knowledge is correct knowledge. Knowled emanating from the dominant exploiting class i often falsified and fetishized, just as commodit

relations under bourgeoisie rule are always fetishized. It therefore means that it is always pertinent to ask oneself, in facing any organized form of ideas or knowledge, in whose interest are these ideas propagated and under which circumstances are they, in fact, produced. (p. 3)

Under the cover of this theoretical argument, the secondary school history curriculum and historical knowledge stressed the question of class-struggle as the only means through which socialism could be built in Tanzania. The history curriculum further portrayed the present independent African governments as being a hinderance to development efforts in Africa. It called for the workers and peasants to build socialism, in Africa, by overhauling or overthrowing the present power structures in the different African nations.

In Tanzania itself, as argued earlier, the Marxists considered the ruling political party as a mass party and not a vanguard party. The political party was not seen as a proper revolutionary vehicle through which socialism could be built in Tanzania. The Marxists argued that if the present political party was to lead the socialist revolution in Tanzania, the party needed to recruit more committed socialist members in its ranks, especially in the top ranks. If this was not done, then the petty-bourgeoisie in power would be more committed to stay in political power than to build socialism in Tanzania.

However, the Marxist paradigm itself, like its predecessors (the colonialist and nationalist

historiographies), did have its own shortcomings as it struggled to analyse the African past as a stepping stone to the understanding of the present situation in Africa. Some serious problems were noted in this regard. the critics of the Marxist paradigm have thus asserted that the paradigm (i.e. the Marxist paradigm) analysis of the African past, particularly colonialism and neo-colonialism, has serious problems. It also saw all problems of Africa as caused by the external forces as opposed to internal forces.

Apart from that, the critics continue to argue, the solutions given by the Marxists to get out of these economic problems is to effect a "socialist transformation." According to the critics, such a solution is nothing more than a "romantic idea" rather than a reality. To argue that socialism (in whatever form) is the only solution to the economic problems of Africa is to engage into fallacies and to mystify reality.

This point is elaborated upon by one of the critics of the Marxist paradigm, who wrote:

> Another type of committed historiography can be observed in the writings of certain historians with Marxist inclinations. It is most readily observable in their writings on colonialism and neo-colonialism. Basically the thesis is this: Colonialism and latter neo-colonialism are responsible for all the ills in African society today . . . . Implicit in this is the view that progress can only be achieved in Africa through a radical transformation of the political structure . . . . . If we are to become socialists, all our problems would disappear . . . . . This type of

historiography then sets about interpreting the
past to suit this view of things. (Ihebuzor,
1983, p. 10)

The problems encountered in the process of
establishing the Marxist paradigm and the new methodology
of teaching and learning history in the Tanzanian school
system were many. They ranged from political problems to
problems of instructional materials (e.g. textbooks, etc.).
First, teachers were of the old cadres who have been raised
and groomed in the old colonial and nationalist paradigms.
As such, they saw such change of content and teaching
methodology and an additional new paradigm (i.e. Marxist)
as conflicting with their "freedom" and the interests which
were grounded in the easy work of merely searching for
facts and transferring them to students for passing
examinations.

The teachers, it could be argued, did not have time
to engage in thinking about how to theorize. After all, it
consumed time given to many other extra-curricular
activities. Therefore, there was not enough time to carry
out such theoretical processes and activities, as required
by the new methodology. This problem was further
aggravated by the fact that the old teachers were not given
refresher courses which would make it possible for them to
understand the new methodology and the Marxist paradigm.
The Ministry of Education did not provide funds which could
be used to arrange such refresher courses for teachers.

Coupled with the above problem was the fact that, because of a lack of sufficient funding, the development and availability of teaching materials written in the new teaching methodology was a slow process in reaching the schools. As a result, most of the teachers resorted to teaching by using the old paradigms and methodology to which they were accustomed and capable of doing. They paid only "lip service" to the new methodology. The general legacy of the old historiography (nationalist and underdevelopment) was largely reflected and detected in the final National Examination papers which secondary school students wrote at the ordinary and advanced levels.

Third, although the nationalist government initially had encouraged the process of teaching history by using the new methodology and Marxist paradigm, they had recently come up against this type of teaching. The government's resistance to allowing the teaching of history based on the Marxist historiography was because the government had come to consider this type of teaching as being contrary to its (the government's) belief in bringing about socialist construction by class collaboration or evolutionary means and not by class struggle as the Marxist pose the question and solution.

The conservative elements in the nationalist government bureaucracy, who have mostly been the products of colonial schools and nationalist paradigms, continued to

consider history as the "production of facts" and not theoretical debates. They regarded content (facts) as more important than the way one arrives at the facts, thus the assertion of "give or teach the facts for they speak for themselves." As a result of criticism of the government by opposing its position of evolutionary socialism, the government has stated its intent to contain the notion of class struggle, as well as to question the role of history as a discipline in the Tanzanian society.

The government wants to curtail and stop the enlightenment and to go back to the basics of teaching and learning history—i.e. the production of facts and not questioning the facts. Thus, since 1985, the battle of which paradigm should be supreme in the teaching of history has become a preoccupation of historians and those in power—the ruling elite. These battles have moved from being mere fallacies to now being a reality.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The above discussed historiographies and the historiographical transformations do hold and possess the following characteristics:

1. They all have their individual form of historiography which was more or less dictated and influenced by the political ideologies and social circumstances of their day.

2. They all have arisen from the theoretical underpinnings which guided the interpretation and writing of history at these particular historical conjunctures. They also contain the belief of what was to be the political and social role of history at the time in question, especially with regard to the school system. In this case, the question centered on the form and character of the secondary school history curriculum. Part of this social role could be extracted from the objectives of the curriculum, e.g. to create "African pride" or to cultivate "socialist values" in the students, etc.

3. They all purport to explain the problems of the day by drawing empirical evidence from the past; and they try to offer solutions to those problems. For example,

colonial historiography poised and struggled to show that Africa had to be developed by Europeans, as it was incapable of developing by itself. The civilizing mission of the white race and the static state of Africa were weapons used by the colonial historiography to justify colonialism.

4. They all contain theoretical and practical implications about historical thinking and historical understanding. Therefore, they beg the question of "What is to be considered and regarded as being true historical knowledge?" They also provide insights into the fact that, to a larger extent, school knowledge is a consciously produced historical knowledge, socially constructed and ideologically laden. Thus, implications for teaching and learning history lie in the questions "What constitutes true knowledge?" and "Is school knowledge value-free?"

5. They have political and social implications as well with regard to policy matters as African governments make decisions as to what is to be done to solve the African problems, as well as the Ministries of Education making decisions about what is to be taught in schools both for individual student intellectual development and for the benefit of society as a whole. That is to say, the knowledge provided in schools should be useful for national development.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The above discussions have shown how the interpretation, teaching, and learning of history has been changing and the crisis which has been precipitated by changes in paradigms and historiographies in those different periods of Tanzanian history.

I intend to argue that, at the present time, the "crisis" has reached serious proportions. Governments intend to decide under what form of interpretation history should be taught--so as to coincide with the interests and ideology of the independent Tanzanian government. This being the case, the questions which arise at the outset are: What is the social role of history in Tanzanian society at any historical conjuncture, and especially at the present historical conjuncture? And what is the educational role played by history as a school discipline in the production of historical knowledge in Tanzania secondary schools and in society as a whole? A third question would then be: What can we learn from history past, present, and future, as Tanzanians struggle to go forward and build a strong, prosperous nation?

These questions, as they are, are considered to be very important given the historical conjuncture which Tanzania now faces, both in its own history by itself and within the general global relationship with the rest of the world.

Given these circumstances, I would argue that history has a social role to play in the independent Tanzanian society and nation. This role is particularly crucial because the nation is currently struggling, as it has always struggled, to come to grips with the possible ways to organize the resources of the nation (both human and natural) to achieve national political, social, and economic development.

The role of history is important if the nation is to develop national self-determination to achieve genuine and fast development. To achieve fast, but genuine, development involves seeking and utilizing a particular organization (as well as looking for other possible forms of social organizations) and the proper use of available resources. This, then, involves (as we have argued above) a particular organization and use of available national resources to achieve development. In this case, the role of history both as a school subject and as a particular form of inquiry has a role to play by producing historical knowledge about how we can possibly organize the national resources and how best these national resources can be managed so as to achieve effective development.

One historian voiced the role of history in national development when he noted:

> We should begin to pose broader issues and the solutions suggested should also have a broad perspective. Consider the theme of self-determination, for example. This deals with such

important questions as what is society and how
can society be organized to suit our declared
objectives. The task of the historian in this
case is to see how we can organize the process of
knowledge for the achievement of self-
determination. The main objective here is to
show how history has a specific role to play in
furthering definite objectives. (Mlahagwa,
1983:14)

If the above dream is to be concretely achieved,

schools have to produce able, capable, and theoretically,

as well as practically, broader-based graduates who would

later occupy government positions and thus work to develop

the nation. The nation, we would argue, needs graduates

(from various levels of schooling), who have broader

outlooks of the various social theories and how they go

about suggesting how society should or can be organized to

achieve fast development.

The teaching of broader-based historical knowledge

would result in a process which will enable students to see

how different theories view the world, what assumptions

they make about the world, and subsequently their view of

how the world could best be organized and how development

takes place or can take place. The teaching and learning

of the historical inquiry process would involve a synthesis

of the possibilities which exist in each theoretical

construction and which can help formulate the possible

conceptual and practical possibilities for a national

development process.

The study of different historiographies would change student minds from thinking that one theoretical construct is enough to understand a phenomenon. Students would be helped to understand that any social theoretical construct has its own problems and that these problems can be avoided if we look at other available theoretical constructs. The theory of "balances and checks" in various social views can be relevantly employed here to illuminate concerns.

Within these lines, I seriously advocate that the past and present narrow perspectives of teaching and learning history in our schools and school system must change. It must change from its now narrow perspective of producing historical knowledge from "consciously" selected historiography at the exclusion of other historiographies to their inclusion in the secondary school history curriculum.

The teaching and learning of history based on informing students of the various available forms of historical interpretations and historical knowledge production would provide the much needed broader-based character of history teaching and learning in which students will be both thinkers and producers of knowledge. The general intent of the teaching and learning of history, according to this argument, has to result and make students think on their own and thus enable them to make decisions

and choices out of the many theoretical and practical exposures so far available and known.

If we (Tanzania) go about implementing and doing what we have so far suggested above; then we would probably be nearer to meeting our own constructed objective of the present Tanzanian secondary school history curriculum which says as follows:

> To impart into the students the tools and abilities of analysing, evaluating, and solving problems in their proper context; and therefore to encourage historical research and purposeful use of a wide variety of source material. (Mlahagwa, 1983:9)

The questions that arise out of the above history curriculum objective are: How can students develop the ability of analysing, evaluating and the use of a variety of source material if under the present circumstances we feed them only one type of theoretical thinking to the exclusion of other forms of historical knowledge derived from other theoretical constructs? What and how can our students make analyses and choose if they are presented one type of possibility?

I would argue that people make choices only when they are faced or presented with many possibilities as opposed to one possibility. This is because, by presenting only one possibility to the students, the other possible and potential choices are already closed to them, and students have no choices from which to make a decision. The choice has already been made for the students through

the process of curriculum development and a choice of a
particular historiography from which historical knowledge
would be interpreted, taught, and learned.

To continue, any society always develops forward
(except in cases of disaster). In the process of
developing, new questions should and do tend to arise as
that society encounters new forms of constraints in the new
development processes. History has a role to play in such
development processes. History must be rewritten so as to
be relevant to the present situation and at the same time
project the future. In every generation, so it has been
argued, history must be rewritten to explain the new
realities of the new experiences.

This is the case in Tanzania at the present
historical conjuncture, where we intend to write a new
history relevant to the new generation and its subsequent
future struggles for development. We have tried to write
that new history; but, as the circumstances change, we are
forced to write and rewrite it again, and still write it
again when the situation demands.

The point of rewriting history now and then is made
clear to us by an observation made by Christopher Hill, a
prominent British historian:

> History has to be re-written in every generation,
> because although the past does not change, the
> present does; each generation asks new questions
> of the past, and finds new areas of sympathy as
> it relives different aspects of the experiences
> of its predecessors. (in Mlahagwa, 1983:1)

That is exactly the kind of struggle faced by the Tanzanian historians and the independent Tanzanian government today--the battle to rewrite Tanzanian history relevant to the present struggles of Tanzanian society. the only question that remains and one which has become the "bone of contention" is the following: From which point of view and from what theoretical paradigm and historiography is that history to be rewritten, produced, taught, and learned in our schools?

The battle is yet to be won and lost by any of these contenders. Yet, despite the bitter struggles in the field of history, we are still committed to rewrite that history, no matter what shape it takes. However, first we must ask ourselves: Are we trying to suggest that the question of merely rewriting and writing history relevant to the present struggles is enough by itself? The possible answer would be a resounding "No!" Again, no it is not enough by itself because it still hides questions and concerns. What about the question of struggles of the conflicting paradigms and historiographies which have so far analysed Tanzanian history? How will resolution by these contending parties, that is, the Tanzanian historians and the independent Tanzanian government, be resolved?

Therefore, given the above-mentioned circumstances, we hereby strongly intend to argue that the agenda and the question of rewriting and writing history alone by itself

is not adequate at the present stage of Tanzanian historical conjuncture. It is a historical stage in which several clashing historiographies which all (as well as each of them) purport to reconstruct "true" Tanzanian history and claim to produce "correct" historical knowledge have been witnessed.

We would argue that our major agenda and task as Tanzanian historians at the present time is not so much the rewriting and writing of history, as such, but the reconsideration and study of historiography in which history is to be rewritten and written. The reconsideration of historiography will possibly enable us as historians to actually represent, reconstruct, and project the Tanzanian history in its truest picture, given the present struggles of Tanzanians in their quest for genuine development, as well as the quest for historical knowledge, truth, and understanding.

The question of reconsideration for the rigorous study of historiography has been seriously pointed out by several historians. For our relevance here, however, we would like to borrow Beard's (1946) warning about historians and the historical knowledge which we produce. Beard (1946) argues that for the interest of historical knowledge precision, we should reconsider the question of historiography.

Beard points out his concern about historiography and historical knowledge and he warns:

> If a desire to advance learning and increase the
> precision of knowledge requires any
> justification, practical as well as theoretical
> grounds may be put forward to warrant a plea for
> reconsideration of historiography--the business
> of studying, thinking about, and writing about
> history. (Beard, 1946:1)

From the above warning we would then argue that the introduction and emphasis of the study of historiography itself in our Tanzanian school system would be of greater importance to the expansion of knowledge among our students. This introduction will involve the general study and slow introduction of the philosophy of history at different levels of the school system. The study of the philosophies of history would mean that students would be introduced to the basis upon which historical knowledge is produced as well as the assumptions contained in such knowledge and the ideological interests in which such knowledge is produced.

To clarify our above argument, we would here borrow from Patrick Gardiner (1968), with his definition of and what is involved in the study of the philosophy of history. He put it thus:

> In any case, projects of this kind must be
> sharply distinguished from the type of inquiry
> that will be chiefly considered here, and which
> is sometimes referred to as "formal" or
> "critical" philosophy of history. Philosophy of
> history in this sense has developed comparatively
> with the decline of its speculative counterpart.
> It has its subject matter not the course of

historical events, but rather the nature of history conceived as a specific discipline and branch of knowledge. In other words, it may be said to be concerned with such topics as the purposes of historical inquiry, the ways in which historians describe and classify their material, the manner in which they arrive at and substantiate explanations and hypotheses, the assumptions and principles that underlie their procedures, and the relations between history and other forms of investigation. Thus, while the problems of with which it deals are not speculative problems of the sort previously mentioned, neither are they problems of the type to which practicing historians typically address themselves in the course of their work: The questions involved arise from reflection upon historical thinking and reasoning and are primarily of an epistemological or conceptual character. (Gardiner, 1968:428-9)

We can also seriously note the arguments that Mlahagwa (1983) employed about social knowledge, when he argued that social knowledge is not a neutral phenomenon. He argued that any social knowledge produced in society has its ideological condommitants and commitment to the historian and, as such, no social knowledge is value-free.

To make the above argument clear, Mlahagwa (1983) wrote:

We started off by noting that the production of knowledge or ideas is dialectically related to the material conditions of life as these are articulated in the realm of the relations of production which in turn give rise to determinate ideological positions. It is on this premise and for this reason that the notion of the existence of ideas independent of the strains and tresses prevailing within society is untenable and fallacious. The dominant ideas in society are essentially the expression of the prevailing material production relations. It therefore means that it is always pertinent to ask oneself, in facing any organized form of ideas or knowledge, in whose interest are these ideas

> propagated and under which circumstances are they, in fact, produced. (Mlahagwa, 1983:11)

Before we conclude, we should again ask ourselves the following question: Why do we so emphatically provide arguments for the study of historiography or philosophy of history for that matter? The answer and the importance of the study of historiography is further provided by Tim Clark and Ron Westrum (1987) who, in their study about the conservation of animals called ferrets in the United States, encountered the question of paradigmatic conflicts and how these paradigms tended to differently see and solve the problem at hand. These ideas and problems were crystallized in their article titled "Paradigms and Ferrets" which appeared in <u>Social Studies of Science</u> (February 1987), <u>17</u> (1).

I apologize and ask the reader to bear with the following lengthy note containing the argument provided by Clark and Westrum (1987) about the subject of conflicting paradigms and the production of knowledge. This argument is important for the understanding and strengthening of our arguments which were presented above about the importance of the study of historiography or philosophy of history:

> In 1803, after the impressive fall at L'Aigle, most of the European scientific community accepted the reality of meteorites. Many years later their discoverer, Ernest Friedrich Flourens Chladin, reflected upon the earlier time when these strange objects had struggled for acceptance. It was a time, he said, when people thought it necessary to throw away or explain as error everything that did not conform to a self-

constructed model. In many respects the problem
we shall discuss here falls along the same lines.

It too concerns the refusal, in the face of
contrary evidence, to give up one's conceptions
of the way things are. Human action responds to
a self-constructed world, a world seen through
the filter of concepts we use to interpret it.
This conceptual grid shapes our perception and
actions. Its sophistication and accuracy have
important consequences for the success of the
projects we undertake, and its inaccuracies cause
us serious problems. It might seem, therefore,
that we should have a strong interest in making
it as adequate as we can. Yet there are always
other factors which shape it:

As Freud observed for individuals and Janis for
groups, emotional as well as cognitive pressure
influence our map of the environment. Wishes,
fears, defense mechanisms and tendencies toward
"group think" are examples of these emotional
forces. Concern for external accuracy must
compete with concern for internal coherence,
stability and calm. At the level of larger
social units and complex organizations, these
same conflicts reappear in different forms.
Established organizations struggle to maintain a
previously negotiated reality against new
organizations that seek to erect new systems of
belief. New evidence must fight for acceptance
against institutionalized "truth."

The struggle has particular salience for resource
management organizations which depend heavily on
scientific personnel. The very process of
constructing organizations to carry out such
responsibilities may mean the development of
powerful intellectual and organizational
interests which will jealously defend the points
of view they develop. In designing their social
"inquiring systems" we should take care to resist
inappropriate pressure, but flexible enough to be
self-correcting. Strength and flexibility are,
however, somewhat contradictory requirements, and
we can expect few scientific organizations to
meet both of them. As Robert Michels found with
political parties, the decision to organize for
an activity always carries a danger: that the
organization may become more concerned about its
own survival than the goals for which it was set
up. In science, as with human activities, the

organization's welfare can become more important
than fulfilment of its mission. (pp. 3-4)

Taken together in their totality, the above
arguments about the question of historiography and
knowledge production highly reinforced as well as justify
our cry for the introduction of the study of the philosophy
of history in Tanzanian secondary schools.

Finally, our formulation of the study topic--The
Historiographical Transformations, the History Curriculum
and the Teaching and Learning of History in Colonial and
Post-colonial Tanzanian Secondary Schools: The Changing
and Unsettled Question--becomes very clear in the present
circumstances of the Tanzanian context and historical
conjuncture.

REFERENCES

Ajay, Ade J.F. and Michael Crowder. <u>History of West Africa</u>, Vol. 1. London: Longmans, 1971.

_____. <u>History of West Africa</u>, Vol. 2. London: Longmans, 1974.

Ajay, Ade J.F. The place of African culture in the process of nation building in Africa south of the Sahara. <u>Journal of Negro Education</u>, <u>30</u>: 206-213.

Alpers, Edward A. <u>Ivory and slaves: Changing pattern of international trade in East Central Africa to the later nineteenth century</u>. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1975.

Apple, Michael. <u>Ideology and curriculum</u>. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979.

_____. <u>Cultural and economic reproduction in education: Essays on class, ideology and the state</u>. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982.

_____. <u>Education and power</u>. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982.

_____. <u>Ideology and practice in schooling</u>. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983.

Arghiri, Emmanuel. <u>Unequal exchange</u>. London: New Left Books, 1972.

Babu, R. <u>African socialism or socialist African</u>. London: Zed Press, 1981.

Barkan, Joel and John Okumu (eds.). <u>Politics and public policy in Kenya and Tanzania</u>. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979.

Beard, Charles. "Historiography." In <u>The social science committee for the study of historiography</u>. New York, 1964.

Bernstein, B. Codes, modalities and the process of cultural reproduction: A model. Lund: University of Lund, 1980.

Bernstein, Henry. Underdevelopment and development. London: Penguin Books, 1973.

Bernstein, R.J. The restrictions of social and political theory. New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1976.

Blakemore, K. A sociology of education for Africa. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981.

Bourdieu, P. and J.C. Passeron. Reproduction in education, society and culture. London: Sage Publications, 1977.

Brent, Allen. Philosophical foundations for the curriculum. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978.

Brett, E.A. Colonialism and underdevelopment in East Africa: The politics of economic change, 1919-1939. London: Heinemann, 1973.

Broady, D. Critique of the political economy of education: the Prokla approach. In Reports on education and psychology, No. 5. Stockholm Institute of Education, 1980.

Cameroon, J. and Dood. Society, schools and progress in Tanzania. London: Pergamon Press, 1970.

Carnoy, Martin. The limits of educational reform. New York: David MacKay Company, 1976.

Clark, Tim and Ron Westrum. Paradigms and ferrets. In Social Studies of Science (February 1981), 17(1).

Collier, D. (ed.). The new authoritarianism in Latin America. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979.

Coupland, Reginald. East Africa and its invaders. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938.

Crowder, Michael. West Africa under colonial rule. London: Hutchinson, 1968.

Crozier, M.J. et al. The crisis of democracy: Report on the governability of democracies to the Trilateral Commission. New York: New York University Press, 1975.

Dahllof, U.S. Ability grouping, content validity and curriculum process analysis. Teachers College Press, 1981.

Dale, Roger. The capitalist state and education. In Michael Apple (ed.), Cultural and economic reproduction in education: Essays on class, ideology and the state. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982.

Davidson, Basil. Guide to African history. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1963.

_____. Which way Africa? Middlesex, Eng.: Penguin Books Ltd., 1964.

_____. Africa in history. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968.

Devlin, Tim and Mary Warnock. What must we teach? London: Maurice Temple Smith Ltd., 1977.

Dike, K.O. and J.F. Ajay. Historiography: African historiography. In International encyclopedia of social sciences. The MacMillan Co. and the Free Press, 1968.

Eisner, Elliot and Elizabeth Vallance (eds.). Conflicting conceptions of curriculum. Berkeley, Calif.: McCutcheon Publishing Company, 1974.

Engels, Friedrich. The origin of the family, private property and the state. New York: International Publishers, 1942.

_____. On historical materialism: A collection. New York: International Publishers, 1974.

Feyerbend, P.K. Against method: Outline of an anarchist theory of knowledge. In Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science, Vol. 4. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970.

Fyfe, Christopher. African studies since 1945. London: Longman Group Ltd., 1976.

Gann, L.H. and P. Duignan. _Burden of empire_. London: Pall Mall Press, 1968.

Giroux, Henry. _Ideology, culture and the process of schooling_. Brighton: Falmer Press, 1981.

_____. _Education under siege: The conservative, liberal, and radical debate over schooling_. South Hadley, Mass.: Bergin and Garvey, 1985.

Greene, M. Choosing our future. _Educational Researcher_ (1982), _11_.

Gutkind, Peter C. and Immanuel Wallerstein (eds). _The political economy of contemporary Africa_. Beverley Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1976.

Habermas, J. _Legitimization crisis_. Boston: Beacon Press, 1975.

Hexter, J.P. Historiography. In _International encyclopedia of social sciences_, Vol. 6. The MacMillan Co. and Free Press, 1968.

Hinzen, Herbert (ed.). _Education for liberation and development: The Tanzanian experience_. London: Brollers Ltd., 1982.

Hirji, Karim H. The development of education in Tanganyika during the German and British Colonial period 1885-1961. In M.H.Y. Kaniki (ed.), _Tanzania under colonial rule_. London: Longman, 1980.

Ihebuzor, N.A. Committed historiography and history teaching in Nigerian secondary schools. _Teaching History_ (October 1984), _40_.

Institute of Education. _Secondary history book I: The development of East African societies up to the nineteenth century_. Tanzania, 1978.

_____. _Secondary history book II: Development of African societies up to the nineteenth century_. Tanzania, 1979.

_____. _Secondary history book III: East Africa from 1850 to the present_. Tanzania, 1983.

_____. _Secondary history book IV: The rest of Africa from 1850 to the present_. Tanzania, 1983.

_____. _Secondary history book IV: Pre-colonial African societies_. Tanzania, 1979.

International African Seminar, Fourth, Dakar, Senegal. The historian in tropical Africa. London: Oxford University Press; 1964.

Iweriebor, G. The impact of colonialism in Africa: A critique of historiography. Essays in History (1982), 2(1).

Kallos, D. and U.P. Lundgren. Educational psychology: Its scope and limits. British Journal of Educational Psychology (1975), 45.

Kaniki, M.H.Y. The twenty year history of TANU. In Gabriel Ruhumbika (ed.), Towards ujamaa: Twenty years of TANU leadership. Kampala: East African Literature Bureau, 1974.

_____. Tanzania under colonial rule. London: Longman, 1980.

Karabel, J. and A.H. Halsey. Power and ideology. London: Oxford University Press, 1977.

Kay, Geoffrey B. Development and underdevelopment: A Marxist analysis. London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1975.

Kearney, W. and W.W. Cook. Curriculum. In Encyclopedia of educational research. New York: MacMillan Co., 1969.

Kimambo, Isariah and Arnold Temu (eds.). A history of Tanzania. Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969.

Kirst, M.W. Loss of support for public secondary schools: Some causes and solutions. Daedalus (1981), 10.

Kivukoni College. Mbioni. Dar-es-Salaam, 1970-80.

Lampi, F. Problems of enquiry teaching in history in Zambian secondary schools. Teaching history (October 1982), 34.

Legassick, Martin. Class and nationalism in South African protest: The South African communist party and the "native republic" 1928-1934. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1973.

Lenin, Vladimir I. <u>Materialism and empirio-criticism:
Critical notes concerning a reactionary philosophy</u>.
London: M. Lawrence, 1927.

_____. <u>Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism:
A popular outline</u>. Peking: Foreign Languages
Press, 1965.

Leys, Colin. <u>Underdevelopment in Kenya: The political
economy of neo-colonialism, 1964-1971</u>. London:
Heinemann, 1975.

Lindensjo, B. and U.P. Lundgreen. <u>Evaluation as politics:
On the evaluation of public programs</u>. Stockholm:
Institute of Education, 1982.

Lundgreen, U.P. <u>Model analysis of pedagogical process</u>, 2nd
ed. Lund: CWK/Gleerup, 1981.

_____. Social reproduction and reproduction as a con-
text of curriculum theorizing. <u>Journal of
Curriculum Studies</u> (April-June 1983); <u>15</u>(2).

Malloy, J.M. (ed.). <u>Authoritarianism and corporatism in
Latin America</u>. Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1977.

Marks, Shula. <u>The ambiguities of dependence in South
Africa: Class, nationalism, and the state in
twentieth-century Natal</u>. Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 1986.

Marx, Karl. <u>Capital: A critique of political economy</u>.
Chicago: C. H. Kerr, 1915.

_____. <u>Capital: A critical analysis of capitalist
production</u>. London: Allen and Unwin, 1971.

_____. <u>The grundrisse</u>. New York: Harper Torch
Books, 1972.

Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. <u>Manifesto of the com-
munist party</u>. New York: International Publishers,
1948.

_____. <u>On colonialism: Articles from the New York
Tribune and other writings</u>. New York:
International Publishers, 1972.

Mbilinyi, Marjore. The development of education in
Tanganyika, 1961-1975. In M.H.Y. Kaniki (ed.),
Tanzanian under colonial rule. London: Longman,
1980.

_____. History of formal schooling in Tanzania. In
H. Hinzen (ed.), Education for liberation and
development: The Tanzania experience. London:
Brollers Ltd., 1982.

Mbwiliza, Joel. A decade of history teaching and research
at Dar-es-Salaam, 1964-1983. A paper presented at
the History Teachers' Conference in Dar-es-Salaam,
May 1983 (Unpublished).

Mlahagwa, Josiah. The struggle for the production of his-
torical knowledge: A-level syllabus in history. A
paper presented at the History Teachers' Conference
in Dar-es-Salaam, May 1983 (Unpublished).

Mohiddin, A. African socialism in two countries. London:
Croom Helm; Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble Books,
1981.

Monica, Wilson and Leonard M. Thompson (eds.). The Oxford
history of South Africa. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1969.

Morrison, David. Education and politics in Africa: The
Tanzanian case. Montreal: McGill-Queens
University Press, 1976.

Mouly, George J. Educational research: The art and
science of investigation. Boston: Allyn and
Bacon, Inc., 1978.

Mouzelis, N. Politics in the semi-periphery. New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1986.

Mwansasu, Bismarck U. The changing role of the Tanganyika
African National Union. In B.U. Mwansasu and
Cranford Pratt (eds.), Towards socialism in
Tanzania. Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1979.

Mwansasu, Bismarck U. and Cranford Pratt (eds.). Towards
socialism in Tanzania. Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1979.

Nguni, Samuel C. Neo-colonialism in Tanzania: The case of
the Tanzania rural development bank. A B.A.
dissertation, University of Dar-es-Salaam,
Tanzania, 1981 (Unpublished).

_____. A look at the ordinary level and advanced
level history syllabuses and the teaching of
history in Tanzania. Recommendations to the
Minister of Education, for and on behalf of the
Historical Association of Tanzania, Dar-es-Salaam,
May 1984.

_____. The dark side of action research. In Colla-
borative action research: Experiences and
reflections. Edmonton: Alberta Teachers'
Association Monograph, 1988.

Nkrumah, K. Consciencism: philosophy and ideology for de-
colonization. Panaf Books, 1964.

Nyerere, Julius K. The Arusha Declaration. Dar-es-Salaam:
Government Printers, 1967.

_____. Ujamaa essays on socialism. Dar-es-Salaam:
Oxford University Press, 1968.

Ole Kambaine, Priscilla E. The problems in the teaching
and learning of history in Tanzanian secondary
schools. M.A. dissertation, University of Dar-es-
Salaam, June 1977 (Unpublished).

O'Meara, Patrick. Southern Africa in crisis. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1977.

_____. International politics in Southern Africa.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982.

O'Meara, Dan. Volkskapitalism: Class, capital and
ideology in the development of Africaner
nationalism, 1934-1948. Cambridge, New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1983.

_____. The struggle for South Africa: A reference
guide to movements, organizations and institutions.
London: Zed Books, 1984.

Pachai, Bridglal. The early history of Malawi. London:
Longman, 1972.

Parsons, Jim. The folly of facts. Alberta Social Studies
Journal, Edmonton, 1987.

Pinar, W.F. The reconceptualization of curriculum studies. Curriculum Studies (1978), 10(3).

Radnitzky, G. Contemporary schools of metascience. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1973.

Ranger, T.O. (ed.). Aspects of Central African history. London: Heinemann, 1968.

Reid, W.A. The changing curriculum theory and practice. In Reid and Walker (eds.), Case studies in curriculum change. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975.

Roberts, Andrew D. Tanzania before 1900. Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968.

_____. A history of Zambia. London: Heinemann, 1976.

Robinson, Ronald and John Gallagher. Africa and the victorians. London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1961.

Rodney, Walter. How Europe underdeveloped Africa. Bogle L'ouverture Publications, 1972.

_____. The political economy of Tanganyika. In M.H.Y. Kaniki (ed.), Tanzania under colonial rule. London: Longman, 1980.

Rotter, J.B. External control and internal control. Psychology Today (June 1971).

Ruhumbika, Gabriel. Towards Ujamaa: Twenty years of TANU leadership. Kampala: East African Literature Bureau, 1974.

Sago, L. The teaching of history in Tanzanian primary schools. A paper presented at the History Teachers' Conference in Dar-es-Salaam, May 1983 (Unpublished).

Sanders, E.R. The Hamatic hypothesis. The Journal of African History. London, 1969.

Saul, John S. The state and revolution in Eastern Africa. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979.

Schwab, J.J. The practical: A language for curriculum. In I. Westbury and N.I. Wilkof (eds.), <u>Science, curriculum and liberal education: Selected essays of Joseph J. Schwab</u>. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.

Seligman, C.G. <u>Races of Africa</u>. London: Oxford University Press, 1957.

Shivji, Issa G. <u>Tanzania: The silent class struggle</u>. Dar-es-Salaam, 1973.

Silverman, D. <u>Reading castaneda: A prologue to the social sciences</u>. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975.

Slater, J. Contribution to the debate on the question of history syllabus for Tanzania secondary schools. A paper presented at the History Teachers Conference in Dar-es-Salaam, May 1983.

Social Science Research Council. <u>Theory and practice in historical study: A report on the committee on historiography</u>. New York: Bulletin 54, 1946.

Taba, Hilda. <u>Curriculum development: Theory and practice</u>. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962.

Taylor, P.H. and Johnson, M. (eds.). <u>Curriculum development: A comparative study</u>. London: NFER Publishing Company Ltd., 1974.

Temu, A.J. History for liberation and development. <u>Essays in History</u>. (1982), <u>2</u>(1).

Temu, Arnold and B. Swai. <u>Historians and Africanist history: A critique: Post-colonial historiography examined</u>. London: Zed Press, 1981.

Thompson, Leonard M. <u>Politics in the Republic of South Africa</u>. Boston: Little, Brown, 1966.

_____. <u>The political mythology of apartheid</u>. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985.

_____. <u>The frontier in history: North America and South Africa compared</u>. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981.

_____. <u>Southern African history before 1900</u>. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institute Press, 1971.

Tyler, R.W. *Basic principles of curriculum instruction*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950.

Van Manen M. Linking ways of knowing with ways of being practical. *Curriculum Inquiry* (1977), 6(3).

Vansina, Jan. *Kingdoms of the Savanna*. Madson: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1966.

Webster, J.B. and Adu A. Boahen. *History of West Africa: The revolutionary years - 1815 to independence*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967.

Weiler, H.N. Education, public confidence and the legitimacy of the modern state: Is there a crisis somewhere? *Journal of Curriculum Studies* (April-June, 1983), 15(2).

Were, Gideon S. and Derek A. Wilson. *East Africa through a thousand years*. New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1968.

Wi████, H.J. *Corporatism and national development in Latin America*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1981.

Young, Michael (ed.). *Knowledge and control: New directions for the sociology of education*. London: Collier-MacMillan Publishers, 1971.