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HISTORY, CULTURE, AND NATIONHOOD UNDER HIGH STALINISM:  
SOVIET UKRAINE, 1939-1954

by

SERGUEI EKELTCHIK



A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

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
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
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
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
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
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
  
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## ABSTRACT

Building on archival research, this work examines how the Ukrainian past was represented in scholarly works, political pronouncements, novels, plays, operas, paintings, monuments, and festivals during Stalin's time. By analyzing the mechanisms of historical representation in one Soviet republic, this thesis argues that the Stalinist cultural and ideological discourse on the nationality issue should be analyzed precisely as "discourse," as the message that was produced, negotiated, and differently decoded in a society, even if all public interpretations were possible only within the limits marked by the Stalinist linguistic code. Thus, the Ukrainian intellectuals did not simply obey the authorities' *diktat*, but through their "dialogue" with bureaucracy, actively participated in shaping Stalinist culture. Chapter One examines how in the late 1930s, the Stalinist reinstatement of the "nation" as a subject of history led to the rehabilitation of the Ukrainian national patrimony. Chapter Two shows that, as the tension between class and national narratives of the Ukrainian past was suppressed during the war, another contradiction surfaced—that between the Ukrainian and Russian patriotic national histories. Although Stalinist ideologues had attempted to reconcile the two patriotisms within the narrative model of the "friendship of peoples," Chapter Three argues that the authorities ultimately used the postwar ideological purification campaigns to suppress the Ukrainian national interpretation. Nevertheless, as Chapter Four shows, the Ukrainian intellectuals could successfully exploit the official language in order to defend themselves during ideological campaigns. Chapters Five through Eight analyze how a complex interaction among the Moscow bureaucrats, Ukrainian ideologues, local intellectuals, and their audiences shaped

representations of the Ukrainian past in historical scholarship, museums, preservation of historic monuments, literature, cinema, painting, and opera. Chapter Eight demonstrates how the celebration of the Tercentenary of Ukraine's incorporation into Russia (1954) was used to reaffirm the official status of national patrimony in Stalinist culture. By reconceptualizing the interaction between ideological pronouncements from Moscow, their interpretation by republican ideologues, and the reaction of local intellectuals, this study reveals the subtle techniques of collaboration and resistance that defined the texture of Stalinist cultural life.



## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Looking back at the time when the first lines of this dissertation were being put on paper, I can now fully appreciate the guidance, assistance, and encouragement of my professors at the University of Alberta. My advisor, John-Paul Himka, counselled me over the years on a wide array of problems, ranging from the intricacies of modern Ukrainian history to the beneficial properties of red wine during times of uncertainty. He donated a 1982 IBM computer, which I used (and abused) to write these pages, and his clan has helped me and my family in meeting a myriad of other small and big challenges that every immigrant faces. If it were not for John-Paul, I would never have come to North America, let alone have completed this thesis.

Other members of my doctoral committee were no less generous with their advice and support. David R. Marples, with whom I have been working closely for years, has shown me how one can be an extraordinarily prolific writer without losing any cheerfulness and common sense. Stephen Slemon and Nicholas Wickenden brought valuable insights from their respective fields, post-colonial studies and Renaissance historiography. Oleh Ilnytskyj shared his expertise in Ukrainian literature and culture. During the last year of my Ph.D. program, Ronald Grigor Suny of the University of Chicago joined this impressive group as an external examiner and a recognized authority on the Soviet nationalities problem. I greatly appreciate the time and energy all of them gave to advising, criticizing, and encouraging me.

Over the years, the Department of History and Classics and the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta provided a hospitable and stimulating environment for my research. The department trusted me to develop and teach many interesting courses bringing me in touch with some of the most inquisitive young minds in Western Canada. At CIUS, I learned much from Zenon E. Kohut and David R. Marples, who employed me as a research assistant on their projects. In addition, in his capacity as the institute's director, Zenon taught me how to strike a balance between administration and research—a skill indispensable in today's academia.

This work is the product of my archival research in Ukraine and Russia, and I greatly appreciate the assistance of the archivists at the seven institutions where I worked,

but especially that of Viktor Oleksandrovych Tykhomyrov, Valentyna Vasylivna Serhiienko, and Antonina Lukivna Kraskivska at the Ukrainian Central State Archive of Civic Organizations (TsDAHO, former Party Archive) and Lesia Klymivna Zabarylo at the Ukrainian Central State Archive and Museum of Literature and the Arts (TsDAMLM). My research in TsDAHO furnished most materials for this thesis, while the files in TsDAMLM somehow seem to better preserve the unmistakable air of Stalinist culture.

Peter Klovan, whom I had originally hired as the language editor and who over the years became a friend, expertly edited the text of this thesis. On short notice, David Brandenberger and Marko Pavlyshyn volunteered to read the final draft, suggesting numerous stylistic improvements and posing serious conceptual questions. Many other colleagues and friends have commented on work in progress or helped in other ways, in particular Mark Baker, Peter Blitstein, Michael David-Fox, Yoshiko Mitsuyoshi, Karl Qualls, Don Raleigh, Roman Szporluk, Amir Weiner, and Myroslav Yurkevich.

I presented early versions of several chapters at the annual conventions of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies in Boca Raton, FL, and St. Louis, MO, as well as conferences and workshops at Harvard University, University of North Carolina, University of Chicago, and University of Maryland. My studies and research at the University of Alberta were made possible by a string of generous scholarships: the Alberta Ukrainian Centennial Graduate Scholarship, the graduate assistantship in the Department of History and Classics, the Izaak Walton Killam Memorial Doctoral Fellowship, the Ivan Lysiak Rudnytsky Memorial Doctoral Fellowship in Ukrainian History and Political Thought, the Dissertation Fellowship, and a research grant from the John Kolasky Memorial Endowment Fund at CIUS. I am grateful to all the people, organizations, and money-granting agencies named above, but must state that the mistakes and shortcomings of this work are mine and mine only.

My greatest, broadest, and oldest debt is to my parents and grandparents, whose stories gave me a sense of personal connection to Stalin's era and who—against many odds—made my school years in the Soviet Union under Brezhnev a time to remember. Finally, my wife, Olia, has been more than patient and supportive during all the years when I was completing my Candidate of Historical Sciences dissertation back in Kiev and my Ph.D. thesis here in Edmonton. Our daughter, Yulia, learned to walk and speak when

"daddy was writing a Candidate dissertation," and I will be happy to present my Doctor of Philosophy thesis to her at her tenth birthday.

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## INTRODUCTION

The spectacular ease with which the republics of the USSR converted themselves into nation-states in 1991 puzzled Western specialists on the Soviet nationality problem. Did this sudden transformation confirm the traditional view of the oppressive Soviet empire, which had imposed its ideology on preexisting nationalities and was finally undone by its peoples' long-suppressed national stirrings?<sup>1</sup> Or did it corroborate the emerging "revisionist" concept of the Soviet Union as creator of territorial nations with their own modern high cultures, political elites, and state symbols?<sup>2</sup>

Access to declassified Soviet archives allows researchers for the first time to examine in unprecedented detail the inner workings of Soviet nationality policy. Building on archival research, this study of the representations of the national past in Soviet Ukraine under High Stalinism (1939-1954) argues that the paradigms of the Soviet Union as "nation-builder" and "nation-breaker," although each supported by significant evidence, are both inadequate. First, instead of perceiving the USSR as having been a monolithic party-state implementing a supposedly coherent nationality policy, historians should think in terms of several actors with not entirely similar agendas: the Politburo, the central bureaucracy, Moscow's cultural elite, the party leadership in non-Russian republics, the local functionaries, and the local intellectuals. Second, the Soviet cultural and ideological

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<sup>1</sup> Examples of this approach include Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923*, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, *The Great Challenge: Nationalities and the Bolshevik State, 1917-1930*, trans. Nancy Festinger (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1992); idem, *The End of the Soviet Empire: The Triumph of Nations*, trans. Franklin Philip (New York: Basic Books, 1993); Robert Conquest, *The Nation Killers: The Soviet Deportation of the Nationalities* (London: Macmillan, 1970); idem, *Stalin: Breaker of Nations* (New York: Viking, 1991).

<sup>2</sup> See especially Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); Robert J. Kaiser, *The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Yuri Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism," *Slavic Review* 53, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 414-52; Francine Hirsch, "The Soviet Union as a Work-in-Progress: Ethnographers and the Category Nationality in the 1926, 1937, and 1939 Censuses," *Slavic Review* 56, no. 2 (Summer 1997): 251-78.

discourse on nationality should be analyzed precisely as "discourse," as the message that was produced, negotiated, and differently decoded in each society, even if all public interpretations were possible only within the limits marked by the Stalinist linguistic code.

Based on previously secret Soviet archives, this work examines how the past of the second largest nation in the USSR, Ukraine, was represented in scholarly works, political pronouncements, novels, plays, operas, paintings, monuments, and festivals during Stalin's time. By analyzing the mechanisms of historical representation in one Soviet republic, this study is seeking answers to two principal questions about the nature of Stalinism: whether the Stalinist Soviet Union was an ideologically coherent "imagined community" or a conglomerate of nations-in-making and whether the terrorized non-Russian intellectuals passively obeyed the authorities' *diktat* or actively participated in the shaping of Stalinist culture.

\* \* \*

By the mid-1930s, Stalin's "Revolution from Above" brought about a departure from Soviet identification with proletarian internationalism. Diagnosed by contemporary Western observers as the "Great Retreat" to pre-revolutionary Russian traditions, and by later scholars as the "Big Deal" between the authorities and the cultural tastes of the new Soviet middle class, this transformation included the state-sponsored rehabilitation of Russian patriotism, national pride, and tsarist heroes.<sup>3</sup> The reinstatement of traditional social hierarchies, gender roles, and cultural values symbolized Stalinism's return to a bourgeois "modernity" respecting stability and continuity. In this context, the transition from the "class history" emphasizing social divisions and the international solidarity of workers, to the "national history" valorizing past national unity and ethnic patriotism,

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<sup>3</sup> See Nicholas S. Timasheff, *The Great Retreat: The Growth and Decline of Communism in Russia* (New York: Dutton, 1946); Vera S. Dunham, *In Stalin's Time: The Middleclass Values in Soviet Fiction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); V. V. Volkov, "Kontseptsiiia kulturnosti, 1935-1938 gg.: Sovetskaia tsivilizatsiia i povsednevnost stalinskogo vremeni," *Sotsiologicheskii zhurnal*, no. 1/2 (1996): 194-213; D. L. Brandenberger and A. M. Dubrovsky, "'The People Need a Tsar': The Emergence of National Bolshevism as Stalinist Ideology, 1931-1941," *Europe-Asia Studies* 50, no. 5 (1998): 873-92.

appears natural. In their search for a unifying past, which would allow them to establish continuity with their project of "building socialism in one country," Stalinist ideologues brought back the nation-state, the principal historical agent of bourgeois "national history."

However, the Stalinist Soviet Union was a multinational federation. The Bolshevik anti-imperialist commitment to developing non-Russian high cultures during the "nativization" policy of the 1920s had turned the USSR into an "affirmative action" state, which promoted native cadres in their titular republics, encouraged the official use of native languages, and celebrated previously suppressed non-Russian cultures. To be sure, even in the heyday of "Ukrainization" in the Ukrainian republic, the party strongly condemned "bourgeois" patriotic sentiments and identification with great ancestors other than peasant rebels. Beginning in the early 1930s, the Stalinist centralization drive turned against the "excesses" of Soviet nation-building in Ukraine and other republics. The next decade saw perennial massive purges of "Ukrainian nationalists" in the republic's government, scholarship, and culture.<sup>4</sup>

Beginning in the late 1930s, Ukraine also experienced its own "Great Retreat." Before and during the war, Moscow's rehabilitation of Russian patriotism and the "heroic past" went hand in hand with similar processes in the non-Russian republics. In Ukraine, official propaganda exalted the Ukrainian equivalents of canonic Stalinist heroes Aleksandr Nevsky, Ivan the Terrible, and Peter the Great—Prince Danylo of Halych and the Cossack hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky. The official press and the arts taught the population to identify with their great ancestors, the Cossacks, and with nineteenth-century nation-builders, while Soviet ideologues attempted to reconcile the Russian and non-Russian patriotic mythologies within the overarching narrative of the "friendship of peoples."<sup>5</sup> The campaign's maximum extent became visible in 1943-44, when Moscow

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<sup>4</sup> See George O. Liber, *Soviet Nationality Policy, Urban Growth, and Identity Change in the Ukrainian SSR, 1923-1934* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Terry D. Martin, *An Affirmative Action Empire: Ethnicity and Soviet State, 1923-1938* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming); Iu. I. Shapoval, *Ukraina 20-50-kh rokiv: Storinky nenapysanoi istorii* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1993).

<sup>5</sup> See Lowell Tillelt, *The Great Friendship: Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), pp. 58-83.

indicated its unhappiness with the growth of non-Russian national histories by denouncing the *History of the Kazakh SSR* and Oleksandr Dovzhenko's novel *Ukraine in Flames*.

As the tension between class and national narratives of the Ukrainian past was suppressed, another contradiction surfaced—that between the Ukrainian and Russian patriotic national histories. Soviet authorities found Ukrainian "separatism" in history especially disturbing because Ukrainians could claim a number of the most impressive elements of the Russian "glorious past": medieval Kievan Rus', the sixteenth-century wars with Poland, and the 1654 union between Muscovy and Cossack Ukraine that created a mighty East European empire. Even well-intentioned Ukrainian historical mythology inevitably competed with Russian myths and thus endangered the very notion of Russian historical nationhood.<sup>6</sup> The incorporation of Western Ukraine and the persistent nationalist insurgency in the western oblasts further necessitated the ideological turnabout because the nationalists' propaganda offered a "reading" of the Ukrainian national past suspiciously similar to the wartime Soviet version, albeit without endorsing the friendship of peoples paradigm.<sup>7</sup>

The postwar purification campaigns in the republic ostensibly prescribed the suppression of Ukrainian national history in favor of the old class analysis. However, Russian ethnic patriotism persisted as the dominant ideology, enabling the Ukrainian ideologues and intellectuals to preserve a similar ethnic approach to their history. Rather than promoting proletarian internationalism as such, the Ukrainian establishment stressed the Russians' role as the "elder brother" in the history of two fraternal nations, Ukrainian and Russian. The republic's historians, writers, and artists rehabilitated Ukrainian national

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<sup>6</sup> See Roman Szporluk, "The Ukraine and Russia," in Robert Conquest, ed., *The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), pp. 151-82.

<sup>7</sup> On the changes that the addition of "nationalistic" West Ukrainians represented to the Soviet nationality policy, see Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Incorporation of Western Ukraine and Its Impact on Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine," in Roman Szporluk, ed., *The Influence of East Europe and the Soviet West on the USSR* (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 180-228; Roman Szporluk, "West Ukraine and West Belorussia: Historical Tradition, Social Communication, and Linguistic Assimilation," *Soviet Studies* 31, no. 1 (1979): 76-98. On the nationalist insurgency in postwar Ukraine, see John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 3rd ed. (Englewood: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1990); Jeffrey Burds, "Agentura: Soviet Informants' Networks and the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-48," *East European Politics and Societies* 11, no. 1 (1997): 89-130.



history by connecting it with the Russian grand narrative. Yet even if it was evoked as a tool to protect the Ukrainian mythology, the notion of the Russian-Ukrainian "historic friendship" guaranteed the subordinate position of the Ukrainian historical narrative. The republican political and artistic elites used the preparations for the 300th anniversary of Ukraine's "reunification" with Russia (1954) to restore the Cossack past as a legitimate part of their national heritage and to re-establish their own "nation-state" (in the form of the Ukrainian SSR) as the teleological outcome of the national history, but the Ukrainian nation was never again presented as an independent historical agent.

The Ukrainian case reveals a contradiction inherent in the Stalinist nationality policy. On the one hand, Moscow saw the nationalities' ethnolinguistic cultures without political nationalism as the only permissible, "healthy" form of nationhood.<sup>8</sup> On the other, contrary to a famous Soviet slogan, both the form *and* content of national cultures under Stalinism represented an alternative avenue of self-identification for the authorities. The architects of "socialist national cultures" failed to fashion a Soviet Ukrainian culture completely separate from "bourgeois" Ukrainian culture or to produce a Soviet Ukrainian national history entirely different from the "nationalist" myth of origins. In their frustration, the Moscow ideologues launched periodic campaigns against "nationalist deviations" in Ukraine, but republican bureaucrats and intellectuals shaped the extent of those campaigns at least as much as the central authorities did. The production of official discourse on the past did not lend itself to total regimentation: the republic-level ideologues adjusted the general guidelines to local realities, intellectuals consistently deviated from the politically correct course, and audiences occasionally declined to consume the final product or "read" it differently. Both real and imaginary nationalist interpretations surfaced regularly, thus underscoring the ultimate impossibility of total ideological control. The High Stalinist national identities remained frustratingly ambiguous.

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<sup>8</sup> Suny, *The Revenge of the Past*, 111-12.

This work proposes to analyze Stalinism as a system seeking to achieve total control over society but in reality often locked into a complex, if unequal, dialogue with its subjects. The notion of "dialogue" is used here in the sense it acquired after the work of Mikhail Bakhtin and Fredric Jameson. Bakhtin has argued that all language is expressive of social relations; hence, all texts are organized as a "dialogue" that takes account of their perception in a given society. At the same time, audiences can "read" a text selectively, thus negotiating its meaning and entering into dialogue with the cultural producers.<sup>9</sup> Taking Bakhtin's theory a step further, Jameson has shown in his analysis of seventeenth-century Anglicanism that the constant repetition of hegemonic discourse indicates the impossibility of achieving complete cultural hegemony in any society. Although we often "hear" only one hegemonic voice, the hegemonic discourse always remains locked in dialogue with suppressed counter-discourses. This is made possible by what Jameson calls the unity of a shared code—a shared language and a common set of assumptions.<sup>10</sup>

This concept's application to Stalinism opens up a new way to study the strategies of resistance *within* the official discourse, to analyze how various social or ethnic groups can "negotiate" the meaning of the official language to defend or promote their own agendas. Significantly, students of Soviet social history are also becoming attentive to the linguistic mechanisms of state-society interaction. For example, Stephen Kotkin has argued recently that the workers came to share Stalinist "civilization" by learning to "speak Bolshevik" and to express their interests in this acceptable language.<sup>11</sup>

The authorities' *diktat*, in the form of periodical campaigns against various

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<sup>9</sup> It is significant that Bakhtin developed the notion of dialogism in the Stalinist Soviet Union. Much of his work celebrated unofficial resistance to the authoritative discourses that attempt to limit the polysemous impulses of language. Since meanings cannot be fixed and made absolute, the hegemonic quest for order and stability is frustrated by the persistent residual otherness of subversion, irresolution, and ambiguity. See M. M. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, ed. Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981); V. N. Voloshinov, *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, trans. Ladislav Matejka and I. R. Titunik (New York: Seminar Press, 1973); Michael Holquist, *Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World* (New York: Routledge, 1990).

<sup>10</sup> Fredric Jameson, *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981).

<sup>11</sup> Stephen Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

"deviations" and close ideological supervision of major projects, has always seemed to be the most spectacular feature of Soviet cultural life. Nevertheless, interpreting cultural production under Stalinism exclusively in terms of the party's ideological dominion over the terrorized intelligentsia is simplistic. The researcher's true challenge is to recover the exact role played by the Moscow hierarchy, local functionaries, and intellectuals in shaping Stalinist culture. This dissertation proposes to analyze Stalinist cultural production as a complex amalgam of the state's *diktat* and the "dialogue" between the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia.

The state's *diktat* in Stalinist culture was limited by the irregular character of the central authorities' administrative interference. Although the periodic Moscow-initiated ideological campaigns undeniably defined the general direction of scholarship, literature, and the arts, the party leadership did not exercise total control over cultural production even after the late 1930s. High-level policy decisions interfered sporadically and often confusingly with public life far away from Moscow, and local functionaries had considerable autonomy in determining the limits of what was ideologically acceptable and unacceptable. In fact, the everyday "party line" in Soviet Ukrainian culture was formulated, negotiated, and maintained by republican bureaucrats and members of the intelligentsia themselves. They could either undermine or reinforce the Moscow policy, and more often than not, the intellectuals' dialogic responses were already infused with deference and servility. Following the authorities' lead or acting on their own, historians, critics, poets, artists, and composers evaluated their peers' work according to their own understanding of standards of Stalinist ideology and aesthetics. With or without Moscow's approval, local ideologues and intellectuals alike did not hesitate to denounce various "errors" and to develop brief and often confusing pronouncements from the center into full-blown ideological campaigns. At the same time, by expressing their opinions in the shared "Bolshevik" political language, the artistic community could successfully negotiate the meaning of Soviet Ukrainian culture with local functionaries. The Ukrainian intelligentsia skilfully used the official discourse of "ethnic flowering" to maintain the rights of the indigenous high culture, and both the republican political and artistic elites relied on the rhetoric of the "authentic cultural tradition" to defend their cultural domain

against Moscow's centralizing efforts. Although scarce, the surviving evidence indicates the active role that contemporary Ukrainian audiences may have played in their "dialogue" with the cultural producers.

The study of the declassified archives and propaganda discourse generated in a non-Russian republic provides a much more complicated picture of Stalinist patriotism(s) than was available previously. The Ukrainian materials document an impressive growth of a distinct ethnohistoric mythology, which subsequently had to be reconciled with the Russian grand narrative within the overarching framework of the "friendship of peoples." The new archival evidence reveals that holding the party hierarchy in Moscow solely responsible for all ideological mutations in Ukraine has been simplistic, for the local functionaries and intellectuals played an active role in developing new Soviet Ukrainian patriotism and harmonizing the Ukrainian historical mythology with the Russian one.

\* \* \*

This dissertation is based primarily on the materials from seven Ukrainian and Russian archives.<sup>12</sup> Most of the documents I used became available to the researchers only in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, during the "pre-archival age," Western scholars produced many insightful studies of Stalinism in Ukraine<sup>13</sup> and of Soviet attempts to redefine Ukrainian

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<sup>12</sup> This dissertation uses the following abbreviations for the names of the Russian and Ukrainian archives: RTsKhIDNI (Rossiiskii tsentr khraneniia i izucheniia dokumentov noveishei istorii), TsKhSD (Tsentr khraneniia sovremennoi dokumentatsii), GARF (Gosuderstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii), RGALI (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv literatury i iskusstva), TsDAHO (Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromadskykh obiednan Ukrainy), TsDAVOV (Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshchykh orhaniv vlady i derzhavnoho upravlinnia Ukrainy), and TsDAMLM (Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv-muzei literatury i mystetstva Ukrainy).

<sup>13</sup> See, for example, Hryhory Kostiuk, *Stalinist Rule in the Ukraine: A Study of the Decade of Mass Terror (1929-39)* (New York: Praeger, 1960); Robert S. Sullivant, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine, 1917-1957* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962); Borys Lewytzkyj, *Die Sowjetukraine 1944-1963* (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1964); Yaroslav Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine after World War II* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1964); Bohdan Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine* (London: Macmillan, 1985); David R. Marples, *Stalinism in Ukraine in the 1940s* (London: Macmillan, 1992).

history to fit the evolving official vision of Russian-Ukrainian relations.<sup>14</sup>

After ideological control over scholarship had disintegrated at the beginning of the 1990s and the declassification of the party archives began, Ukrainian historians also began studying the Stalin period and, in particular, the relations between the Stalinist authorities and the Ukrainian intelligentsia. During the last decade, the republic's historians produced two helpful documentary collections<sup>15</sup>, as well as several books and numerous articles relevant to my topic.<sup>16</sup> However, my interpretation contrasts sharply with those of contemporary scholars in the non-Russian successor states, who unproblematically demonize Moscow and its viceroys. Thus, Ukrainian cultural historians routinely concentrate on the black deeds of Stalin and his envoys, who are presumed to have successfully terrorized the Ukrainian intelligentsia into complying with the official "party line."

This work will offer a different, more complicated picture of Stalinist cultural

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<sup>14</sup> See, in particular, John Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1982), pp. 162-201; Roman Szporluk, "National History as a Political Battleground: The Case of Ukraine and Belorussia," in Michael S. Pap, ed., *Russian Empire: Some Aspects of Tsarist and Soviet Colonial Practices* (Cleveland: Institute for Soviet and East European Studies, John Carroll University, 1985), pp. 131-50; idem, "The Ukraine and Russia"; Stephen Velychenko, "The Origins of the Official Soviet Interpretation of Eastern Slavic History: A Case Study of Policy Formulation," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 46 (1992): 225-53; idem, *Shaping Identity in Eastern Europe and Russia: Soviet-Russian and Polish Accounts of Ukrainian History, 1914-1991* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

<sup>15</sup> V. A. Smolii, ed., *U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu: Pershe dvadtsiatyrichchia Instytutu istorii Ukrainy NANU Ukrainy (1936-1956 rr.): Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv* (Kiev: Instytut istorii Ukrainy NANU, 1996), 2 parts; Iu. Slyvka, ed., *Kulturne zhyttia v Ukraini: Zakhidni zemli: Dokumenty i materialy* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1995), vol. 1: 1939-1953.

<sup>16</sup> See Shapoval, *Ukraina 20-50-kh rr.*; idem, *Liudyna i systema: (Shtrykhy do portretu totalitarnoi doby v Ukraini)* (Kiev: Instytut natsionalnykh vidnosyn i politolohii NANU, 1994); I. P. Kozhukalo, "Vplyv kultu osoby Stalina na ideolohichni protsesy na Ukraini v 40-i-na pochatku 50-kh rokiv," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 2 (1989): 14-26; O. S. Rublov and Iu. A. Cherchenko, *Stalinschchyna i dolia zakhidnoukrainskoi intelihtentsii: 20-50-ti roky XX st.* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1994); L. A. Shevchenko, "Kulturno-ideolohichni protsesy v Ukraini u 40-50-kh rr.," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 7/8 (1992): 39-48; idem, "Kultura Ukrainy v umovakh stalinskoho totalitaryzmu (Druha polovyna 40-kh-pochatok 50-kh rokiv)," in V. M. Danylenko, ed., *Ukraina XX st.: Kultura, ideolohiia, polityka* (Kiev: Instytut istorii Ukrainy NANU, 1993), no. 1, pp. 119-30; V. I. Iurchuk, *Kulturne zhyttia v Ukraini u povienni roky: Svitlo i tyni* (Kiev: Asotsiatsiia Ukraino, 1995); O. V. Zamlynska, "Ideolohichni represii v haluzi kultury v Ukraini u 1948-1953 rr.," in Danylenko, ed. *Ukraina XX st.: Kultura, ideolohiia, polityka* (Kiev: Instytut istorii Ukrainy NANU, 1996), no. 2, pp. 144-56; idem, "Ideolohichni teror ta represii proty tvorchoi intelihtentsii u pershi povienni roky (1945-1947 rr.)," *Kyivska starovyna*, no. 2 (1993): 73-80.

production in the most important non-Russian republic of the Soviet Union. I argue that access to previously classified Soviet archives allows for a reconceptualizing of the interaction between ideological pronouncements from Moscow, their interpretation by republican ideologues, and the reaction of local intellectuals. While problematizing the traditional narratives of "monolithic" Stalinism, this study will attempt to reveal the subtle techniques of collaboration and resistance that defined the texture of Stalinist cultural life.

## Chapter One

### WORKERS' FATHERLAND

"Workers have no fatherland," pronounced Marx and Engels in the *Communist Manifesto*. The founders of Marxism did not ignore the existence of nation-states or nationalism, but considered them to be secondary and temporary phenomena. Marx understood the grand design of human history as the succession of distinctive "modes of production" determining the forms of social organization: Primitive, Slave, Feudal, Capitalist, and Communist. For the traditional nineteenth-century "National History" narrative of the rise of nation-states, Marx substituted the story of the struggle between exploited classes and their exploiters: according to the *Communist Manifesto*, "The history of all hitherto existing society [was] the history of class struggles."<sup>17</sup>

The early Soviet ideology identified with a past represented by the revolutionary battles of all peoples and in all times, from Spartacus to the Paris Commune to the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and 1917. The leading official historian of the time, Mikhail Pokrovsky (1868-1932), produced several Marxist surveys of Russian history, emphasizing economic structures, class struggle, and the tsarist empire's reactionary colonial policy. As a deputy people's commissar of education, director of the Institute of Red Professors, head of the Communist Academy, and editor of several journals, Pokrovsky presided over the first generation of Soviet Marxist historians.<sup>18</sup> The Pokrovsky school discounted

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<sup>17</sup> Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert C. Tucker, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1978), pp. 469-500, here 488 and 473. Following the 1888 translation by Samuel Moore, edited by Engels, "Die Arbeiter haben kein Vaterland" is traditionally rendered in English as "The working men have no country." I have slightly modified this sentence so that the subsequent translations of Russian and Ukrainian references to it will be clear. Both the Russian ("Rabochie ne imeiut otechestva") and the Ukrainian ("Robitnyky ne maiut vitchyzny") canonic translations better deliver the *Vaterland* of the original. For Marx's view of nationality and nationalism, see Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) and Roman Szporluk, *Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx versus Friedrich List* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

<sup>18</sup> On Pokrovsky as an organizer of Soviet scholarship, see O. D. Sokolov, *M. N. Pokrovsky i sovetskaia istoricheskaia nauka* (Moscow: Mysl, 1970) and George M. Enteen, *The Soviet Scholar-Bureaucrat: M. N. Pokrovskii and the Society of Marxist Historians* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978).

history concerned with great rulers, states, and nations in favor of the analysis of impersonal economic factors and class conflicts. Meanwhile, between the Revolution and 1932, traditional civic history itself had been dropped as irrelevant from the Soviet school curriculum, being replaced with such subjects as "social science" or "political literacy." Yet, until approximately 1928, the state did not enforce the Pokrovskian concept of history. The authorities tolerated non-Marxist historical scholarship, which flourished in the relaxed cultural atmosphere of the NEP. The "socialist offensive" in history began simultaneously with industrialization, collectivization of agriculture, and cultural revolution, resulting in a purge of "old specialists" during 1928-32. The practitioners of the Pokrovskian class history emerged triumphant, if only for a moment.<sup>19</sup>

By the early 1930s, Stalin's pragmatic doctrine of "building socialism in one country" replaced the early ideal of the world revolution as the core of Soviet ideology. In February 1931, Stalin publicly revised the *Communist Manifesto's* famous dictum in his address to the conference of industrial managers: "In the past, we did not have and could not have had a fatherland. But now, when we have overthrown capitalism and power belongs to the workers, we do have a fatherland and will defend its independence."<sup>20</sup> Soviet ideologues proceeded to rehabilitate the notion of "patriotism." While the early Soviet encyclopedias defined it as an "extremely reactionary ideology" serving the needs of imperialist great powers, the newspapers of the 1930s hailed "love for the Fatherland."<sup>21</sup> The fatherland in question was the Soviet Union in general, rather than Russia, but in a country ruled by a Russian or Russified bureaucracy, the patriotic

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<sup>19</sup> See John Barber, *Soviet Historians in Crisis, 1928-1932* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1981).

<sup>20</sup> I. V. Stalin, "O zadachakh khoziaistvennikov: Rech na pervoi Vsesoiuznoi konferentsii rabotnikov sotsialisticheskoi promyshlennosti, 4 fevralia 1931," *Voprosy leninizma* (Moscow, 1934), p. 445. Stalin rephrased the second sentence for the 1951 publication of his *Works*, where it appears as follows: "But now, when we have overthrown capitalism and power is ours, is in the hands of the people, we do have a fatherland and will defend its independence" (*Sochineniia* [Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo politicheskoi literatury, 1951], 13: 29-42, here 39). One should note, however, that in the same speech, Stalin opposes the "socialist Fatherland" to the tsarist Russia, whose "history consisted mainly of being beaten because of its backwardness." See *Voprosy leninizma*, 444-45 and *Sochineniia*, 13: 38-9.

<sup>21</sup> For a selection of revealing examples, see Erwin Oberländer, ed., *Sowjetpatriotismus und Geschichte: Dokumentation*, Dokumente zum Studium des Kommunismus, Bd. 4 (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1967), pp. 56-62.



pronouncements in the central press soon acquired clear Russocentric traits. For Ukrainians and other Soviet nationalities, however, restoring a nation as the subject of history posed a question: which nation?

### **Between Class and Nation**

The retreat from Pokrovskian class history developed gradually. In September 1931, civic history was reintroduced as a school subject. In 1934, the authorities specified that they expected teachers to offer a more traditional political history following the "historical-chronological succession in the presentation of historical events and making the memorization of important historical phenomena, historic figures, and chronological dates mandatory."<sup>22</sup> Beginning in 1936, the official press began denouncing the late Pokrovsky and his students for their preoccupation with "abstract sociologism." The Pokrovskian empire consisting of the Society of Marxist Historians, the Institute of Red Professors, and the Communist Academy was destroyed. The authorities restored the surviving old specialists to their positions, and the university history departments returned to their traditional structure and curricula. Historical research was concentrated at the Institute of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences and analogous institutions in the republics.<sup>23</sup>

At the same time, the state-sponsored rehabilitation of Russian patriotism, national pride, and tsarist heroes became perhaps the most visible aspect of the Stalinist "Great Retreat." Since 1937, the Russians had been elevated to the status of the "great Russian people" who led other nationalities in the struggle against tsarism and, subsequently, in the socialist construction.<sup>24</sup> Russian classical music and literature, previously labelled as "of the gentry" or "bourgeois," were also endorsed by the regime. An unprecedentedly

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<sup>22</sup> *Pravda*, 16 May 1934, p. 1.

<sup>23</sup> See M. V. Nechkina, "Vopros o M. N. Pokrovskom v postanovleniakh partii i pravitelstva 1934-1938 gg. o prepodavanii istorii i istoricheskoi nauke," *Istoricheskie zapiski*, 118 (1990): 233-46; A. N. Artizov, "Kritika M. N. Pokrovskogo i ego shkoly: (K istorii voprosa)," *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 1 (1991): 102-20; David Brandenberger, "Who Killed Pokrovskii? (The Second Time): The Prelude to the Denunciation of the Father of Soviet Marxist Historiography, January 1936," *Revolutionary Russia* 11, no. 1 (June 1998): 67-73.

<sup>24</sup> Gerhard Simon, *Nationalism and Policy toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union: From Totalitarian Dictatorship to Post-Stalinist Society*, trans. Karen Forster and Oswald Forster (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 149; Velychenko, *Shaping Identity in Eastern Europe and Russia*, 55.

extravagant celebration of the 100th anniversary of Pushkin's death (1937) marked the official appropriation of traditional Russian culture, while the former canonical tsarist opera, Glinka's *Ivan Susanin*, was edited and staged in 1939 as a Stalinist patriotic spectacle, a pompous celebration of Russian national pride.<sup>25</sup> Often acting on direct hints from the Politburo, Russian writers, filmmakers, and historians reinstated as national heroes Prince Aleksandr Nevsky, Tsar Ivan the Terrible, and Emperor Peter the Great.<sup>26</sup> Princes, tsars, and generals, previously condemned as defenders of their class interests and exploiters of the people, were now praised as great statesmen, patriots, and military leaders. In new historical narratives, the nation-state was at first studied along with classes as a subject of history and then later replaced them as the main focus of historical inquiry.

However, the students of the "Great Retreat" in Stalinist ideology have generally ignored the multinational nature of this transformation. In fact, during the first years of the Soviet ideological mutation, the Ukrainian ideologues, historians, and writers remained confused themselves. Was a retreat from class analysis a new official line? If so, were they supposed to join the Muscovites in composing paeans to the "elder brother," or were they to glorify their own national tradition and glorious past? The denunciation of both the dean of "bourgeois nationalist" Ukrainian historiography, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, and the leading Marxist historian, Matvii Iavorsky, during the late 1920s created confusing signals from above in Soviet Ukrainian intellectual life.

The Ukrainian republic had its equivalent of Pokrovsky in the person of Matvii Iavorsky, the highly-placed scholar-bureaucrat serving as the party's ideological mouthpiece. Developing his teacher's ideas, Iavorsky authored several Marxist surveys

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<sup>25</sup> Fitzpatrick, *The Cultural Front*, 9 (Pushkin); Robert C. Tucker, *Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1929-1941* (New York: Norton, 1990), pp. 554, 570-71 (opera).

<sup>26</sup> See Timasheff, *The Great Retreat*, 167-76; Bernd Uhlenbruch, "The Annexation of History: Eisenstein and the Ivan Groznyi Cult of the 1940s," in Hans Guthner, ed., *The Culture of the Stalin Period* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 266-87; Maureen Perrie, "The Tsar, the Emperor, the Leader: Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great and Anatolii Rybakov's Stalin," in Nick Lampert and Gábor T. Rittersporn, eds., *Stalinism: Its Nature and Aftermath: Essays in Honour of Moshe Levin* (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 77-100.

of Ukrainian history focusing on the economic processes and class struggle.<sup>27</sup> Just as Pokrovsky did on the all-Union level, Iavorsky attacked "bourgeois historians," represented in the Ukrainian case primarily by the former president of the "counter-revolutionary" Ukrainian People's Republic, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, who had returned from emigration in 1924.

As was the case elsewhere in the Soviet Union, Ukrainian historical scholarship flourished in the 1920s.<sup>28</sup> The non-party historiography of the 1920s in effect continued the work of its pre-revolutionary predecessors. Following Hrushevsky, the non-party historians endorsed the integrity and continuity of Ukrainian history, working within the master-narrative of a Nation. Numerous valuable studies of pre-historic times, Kievan Rus', the Cossack period, and nineteenth-century Ukraine appeared at the time. To appear politically correct, most scholars stressed their sympathy to the exploited masses, a *topos* that was, after all, not a Marxist invention but a part of the nineteenth-century Ukrainian populist historical tradition.

Meanwhile, Iavorsky and other party historians were developing a new official narrative of Ukraine's past. Iavorsky's interpretation of the pre-revolutionary history boldly developed Pokrovsky's views. His vision of the Ukrainian past concentrated on economic structures, exploitation, and class struggle. Like Pokrovsky, Iavorsky saw the social turmoil and political events of the ancient Rus' as reflecting the struggle of commercial capital against feudalism. He went far beyond his teacher in asserting that the

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<sup>27</sup> See M. Iavorsky, *Narys istorii Ukrainy* (Kiev: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo Ukrainy, 1923); idem, *Istoriia Ukrainy v styslomu narysi* (Kharkiv: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo Ukrainy, 1928); idem, *Narysy z istorii revoliutsiinoi borotby na Ukraini* (Kharkiv: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo Ukrainy, 1927-28), vols. 1-2. Recent Ukrainian works on Iavorsky include H. V. Kasianov, "Akademik M. I. Iavorsky: Dolia vchenoho," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 8 (1990): 75-80 and A. V. Santsevych, "M. I. Iavorsky—vydatnyi ukrainskyi istoryk," in V. A. Smolii and Iu. A. Pinchuk, eds., *Istorychna spadshchyna u svitli suchasnykh doslidzhen* (Kiev: Instytut istorii Ukrainy NANU, 1995), pp. 108-22.

<sup>28</sup> A considerable body of literature exists on Soviet Ukrainian historiography in the 1920s: Myron Korduba, *La littérature historique soviétique-ukrainienne: Compte-rendu 1917-1931* (Munich, 1972); Borys Krupnytskyi, "Die ukrainische Geschichtswissenschaft in der Sowjetunion. 1921-1941," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 6, no. 2-4 (1941): 125-51; Borys Krupnytskyi, *Ukrainska istorychna nauka pid Sovietamy (1920-1950)* (Munich, 1957); Oleksander Ohloblyn, "Ukrainian Historiography, 1917-1956," *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.* 5-6 (1957): 307-455; James E. Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine 1918-1933* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1983), pp. 232-63.

Tatar invasion in the mid-thirteenth century supposedly had unleashed a "civil war" of town bourgeoisie against the boyars. The Cossack War of the seventeenth century, which resulted in Ukraine's secession from Poland and union with Russia, was for Iavorsky "the Cossack Revolution" marking the final victory of commercial capitalism over feudalism. Nevertheless, the "Ukrainian toiling masses did not know then that life [under the tsars] would be worse than that under the Polish lords"; the peasants soon learned to hate the hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, who brought Ukraine under the tsars.<sup>29</sup> Like Pokrovsky's texts, Iavorsky's pre-revolutionary history was a narrative without heroes, focusing on faceless "objective" economic processes and social movements. The analysis of the nineteenth-century revolutionary movement was also uninspiring because of Iavorsky's preoccupation with proving the petit-bourgeois class character of each and every pre-Marxist group. Nevertheless, Iavorsky treated Ukrainian history as a distinct national historical process. His narrative claimed for Ukrainians the ancient Kievan Rus', condemned the sufferings of the Ukrainian people under the Russian tsars, and traced the growth of the "petit-bourgeois" Ukrainian national movement.

This approach to Ukrainian history made Iavorsky one of the primary targets during the crackdown on the "national communists" during the late 1920s.<sup>30</sup> The fierce campaign against Iavorskyism continued until 1931 and went hand in hand with the purge of Ukrainian non-party historians. Iavorsky launched the latter campaign himself in 1928 by accusing Hrushevsky of construing a "classless Ukrainian historical process" and stressing the national factor over the social one. The subsequent attacks, including that by the Central Committee's secretary Andrii Khvyliia and the gifted young unmasker of enemies, Mykhailo Rubach, openly denounced Hrushevsky as a "bourgeois nationalist." At the time, Hrushevsky published Volume Nine, Part One of his multi-volume history of Ukraine, dealing with the Khmelnytsky Uprising. Although the populist Hrushevsky did not stress the importance of the war for Ukrainian state-building, he was accused

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<sup>29</sup> Iavorsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy v styslomu narysi*, 55 (assessment of the union with Muscovy), 58 (the Cossack Revolution); idem, *Narysy z istorii revoliutsiinoi borotby na Ukraini*, 1: 15 (commercial capital and class struggle in the ancient Rus'), 19-22 (Tatar invasion as a civil war).

<sup>30</sup> Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation*, 253-9.

precisely of doing so with the aim of diminishing the significance of the peasant revolution. In the early 1930s, the official historians were already classifying his views as "national-fascist."<sup>31</sup> In 1930, the authorities transferred Hrushevsky to Russia where he died four years later. Many of his students were arrested for participating in the nebulous underground organization that he supposedly headed, the Ukrainian National Center, and disappeared into the Gulag.<sup>32</sup>

Iavorskyism, too, was universally condemned (Iavorsky himself being arrested in 1933 for his alleged participation in the subversive "Ukrainian Military Organization"<sup>33</sup>), but Pokrovskian sociological schematism still reigned supreme in Ukrainian history writing. The republic's intellectuals did not hasten to rehabilitate the state and military traditions of Kievan Rus' or those of the Cossacks. The event potentially connecting the Ukrainian national mythology with the Russian one—the Cossack War with Poland under the hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the 1654 union with Russia—remained interpreted in the spirit of class history. In 1930, the rising authority on the period, the historian Mykola Petrovsky, argued that, contrary to what was said in the *Eyewitness Chronicle*, the Ukrainian people could not rejoice at the news of the union.<sup>34</sup> Oleksandr Sokolovsky's novel *Bohun* (1931) presented Khmelnytsky as an archetypal feudal warlord, opposed by Colonel Ivan Bohun as a representative of the masses. Naturally, Bohun in Sokolovsky's novel did not consider union with the Russia of the boyars and serfdom;

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<sup>31</sup> A. Khvyliia, "Burzhuazno-natsionalistychna trybuna," *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, no. 6 (1931): 46-58; M. A. Rubach, "Burzhuazno-kurkulska natsionalistychna ideolohiia pid mashkaroiu demokratii 'trudovoho narodu'," *Chervonyi shliakh*, no. 5-6 (1932): 115-35; no. 7-8 (1932): 118-26; no. 11-12 (1932): 127-36; F. Iastrebov, "Tomu deviatoho persha polovyna," *Prapor marksyzma*, no. 1 (1930): 133-49; idem, "Natsionalno-fashystska kontseptsiiia selianskoi viiny 1648 r. na Ukraini," *Zapysky Istoryko-arkheohrafichnogo instytutu*, no. 1 (1934): 9-54.

<sup>32</sup> Recently, several Ukrainian scholars studied the campaign against Hrushevsky, using the newly available archival materials: R. Ia. Pyrih, *Zhyttia Mykhaila Hrushevskoho: Ostannie desiatylittia (1924-1934)* (Kiev: Instytut ukrainskoi arkheohrafii NANU, 1993), chs. 4-7; Volodymyr Prystaiko and Iurii Shapoval, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky i HPU-NKVD: Trahichne desiatylittia: 1924-1934* (Kiev: Ukraina, 1996), pp. 79-105.

<sup>33</sup> Hryhory Kostiuk, *Stalinist Rule in the Ukraine*, 93.

<sup>34</sup> Mykola Petrovsky, *Narysy istorii Ukrainy XVII-pochatku XVIII stolit*, vol. 1: *Doslidy nad Litopysom Samovydtisia* (Kharkiv: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo Ukrainy, 1930), p. 129, compare also 84 and 124-31. In 1947, Rubach used this "wrecking" quotation against Petrovsky during the historians' discussion (TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 753, ark. 59-62).

instead, he advocated dependence on Ukraine's "own forces."<sup>35</sup>

This essentially Pokrovskian view was as late as 1935 endorsed by the authoritative *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, which characterized the hetman as follows: "[A] traitor and ardent enemy of the risen Ukrainian peasantry. Kh[melnytsky] was a representative of the top Ukrainian feudal Cossack *officers*, who strove to obtain the same rights as the Polish feudals, the gentry." The 1654 Pereiaslav Treaty "marked the union between the Ukrainian and Russian feudals and, in essence, legalized the beginning of the Russian colonial domination in Ukraine."<sup>36</sup> Not surprisingly, during the mid-1930s, whenever the authorities organized mass celebrations of Soviet holidays at the Sofiiskyi Square in Kiev, where the equestrian statue of Khmelnytsky had been erected in 1888, the monument was covered with wooden panels. The Ukrainian functionaries even considered demolishing it altogether.<sup>37</sup> As late as 1936, the Ukrainian museums were ordered to stop "idealizing Cossack history."<sup>38</sup>

Meanwhile, the aftershocks of the Stalinist rehabilitation of civic history were also felt in Ukraine, initially in the realm of literature. During a meeting with a group of Ukrainian writers in 1935, the patriarch of Soviet literature, Maxim Gorky, reproved them for neglecting the national past and suggested that they choose the Ukrainians' heroic struggle against various foreign oppressors as the subject of their future works. In July 1936, *Pravda's* editorial stated that pre-revolutionary Ukrainian literature did not pay proper attention to the national past and that contemporary writers should compensate for

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<sup>35</sup> P. Ia. Korzh, *Otobrazhenie Osvoboditelnoi voiny 1648-1654 gg. i vossoedineniia Ukrainy s Rossiei v ukrainskoi sovetskoi khudozhestvenno-istoricheskoi proze: Avtoreferat kandidatskoi dissertatsii* (Kharkiv: Kharkovskii gosuniversitet, 1960), p. 10; Katrin Bertram, "(Re-)Writing History: Oleksandr Sokolovs'kyi and the Soviet Ukrainian Historical Novel," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 21, no. 1-2 (1997): 161-72.

<sup>36</sup> V. K[rut], "Khmelnytsky, Bogdan Zinovii Mikhailovich," *Bolshaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia*, 1st ed. (Moscow: OGIZ RSFSR, 1935), 59: 816 and 818. John Basarab first examined this encyclopedia entry in his *Pereiaslav 1654*, 164-5.

<sup>37</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 757, ark. 96.

<sup>38</sup> Bohdan Krawchenko. *Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine*, 141.

this error.<sup>39</sup> The Ukrainian litterateurs followed the cue, but were still confused about what kind of national history they were supposed to describe. Ivan Le commenced writing a seven-volume series of novels intended to cover the entire history of Ukraine. Characteristically, though, he began not with Kievan Rus', but with the late sixteenth-century popular uprising against the Polish lords, which was led by Severyn Nalyvaiko. Le originally entitled the first book of the series "Ukraine. Volume One: Nalyvaiko," while the next two volumes of this monumental narrative were intended to cover the uprisings of 1648 and 1768.<sup>40</sup> The class approach, however, no longer guaranteed historical work an official acceptance: by the time the first instalment of Le's "class version" of the national history was published in 1940, it was criticized for not stressing the connection between the Nalyvaiko rebellion and the social movements in Russia.<sup>41</sup>

At the same time, writers continued to be castigated for their "idealization" of the Ukrainian past. In 1937, the ideological establishment denounced *The Manhunters* by Zinaida Tulub as a "wrecking novel." This epic work allegedly idealized the Ukrainian Cossacks, ignored the plight of the toiling peasantry, and glorified the superior character of Polish culture. Subsequently, Tulub disappeared into the Gulag for almost two decades.<sup>42</sup> However, the signals in the official press remained confusing at best. In the same year that Tulub was denounced for her harmful fascination with the Cossack past, the newspapers criticized the Kievan production of Mykola Lysenko's opera *Taras Bulba* (1890) as an attempt to belittle Ukraine's heroic history. Left unedited by Lysenko at his death in 1912, this first national historical opera ended with the Cossack assault on the

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<sup>39</sup> Ievhen Kyryliuk, ed., *Istoriia ukrainskoi literatury u vosmy tomakh* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1971), 7: 104 (*Pravda*); M. Zak, L. Parfenov, and O. Iakubovich-Iasnyi, *Igor Savchenko* (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1959), p. 83 (Gorky).

<sup>40</sup> TsDAML, f. 1041, op. 1, spr. 2, ark. 15.

<sup>41</sup> M. I. Syrotiuk, *Ukrainskyi radianskyi istorychnyi roman: Problema istorychnoi ta khudozhnoi pravdy* (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo AN URSR, 1962), p. 139. Apparently, the Ukrainian historian Fedir Iastrebov wrote a negative "internal" review of the manuscript even before its publication (TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 1652, ark. 127).

<sup>42</sup> Mykola Syrotiuk, *Ukrainska istorychna proza za 40 rokiv* (Kiev: Radianskyi pysmennyk, 1958), p. 105; M. Soroka, "Zinaida Tulub," in O. H. Musiienko, ed., *Z porokha smerti: Pysmennyky Ukrainy—zhertvy stalinskykh represii* (Kiev: Radianskyi pysmennyk, 1991), pp. 426-9.

Polish fortress of Dubno, but the director of the 1937 production chose to be faithful to Gogol's famous story, closing the opera with the scene in which the Cossack Colonel Bulba is burned alive by the Poles. However, *Pravda* used the tragic finale of *Taras* to dismiss the work as an "anti-popular production" exuding the "spirit of the doom."<sup>43</sup>

Nor did the professional historians have a clear idea of the new orthodoxy relating to the national past. Following the all-Union reform, the Ukrainian authorities in 1936 abolished the Association of the Marxist-Leninist Institutes and, in 1937, the Institute of Red Professors. The study of history was concentrated in the Institute of History of the republican Academy of Sciences.<sup>44</sup> Nevertheless, this centralization effort did not lead to the production of a Bolshevik survey of Ukrainian history, which the party had urgently demanded. The historians were too confused about the current party line on history. The institute began preparing the draft of a survey that did not survive but seems to have followed the Pokrovskian line at least in the interpretation of the Khmelnytsky Uprising.<sup>45</sup> Moreover, the 1937 great purge of the "enemies of the people" hit the institute hard. Its first director, Professor Artashes Kharadzhev, Acting Director, Hryhorii Sliusarenko, and the researchers K. Hrebenkin, V. Hurystrymba, T. Skubytsky, and M. Tryhubenko were arrested and shot in 1937. The charges against them included Trotskyism, Rightism, Ukrainian nationalism, terrorist intentions, all crowned by participation in the "counter-revolutionary terrorist rightist-leftist organization, headed by the Ukrainian Center" that worked closely with both "the Trotskyist terrorists and the Ukrainian nationalists."<sup>46</sup> Their practical wrecking work, the accused confessed, consisted of idealizing the national past in a forthcoming textbook of Ukrainian history.

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<sup>43</sup> *Pravda*, 24 October 1937, p. 6; Iu. O. Stanishevsky, *Ukrainskyi radianskyi muzychnyi teatr: Narysy istorii (1917-1967)* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1970), pp. 160-62.

<sup>44</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 6, spr. 409, ark. 24; A. V. Santsevich, N. V. Komarenko, *Razvitie istoricheskoi nauki v Akademii nauk Ukrainskoi SSR: 1936-1986 gg.* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1986), p. 34.

<sup>45</sup> *U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu: Pershe dvadtsiatyrichchia Instytutu istorii Ukrainy NAN Ukrainy (1936-1956 rr.): Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv* (Kiev: Instytut istorii Ukrainy, 1996), part 1, pp. 65, 37.

<sup>46</sup> *U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu*, 1: 48-74, here 49; M. V. Koval and O. S. Rublov, "Instytut istorii NAN Ukrainy: Pershe dvadtsiatyrichchia (1936-1956 rr.)," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 6 (1996): 50-68, here 52-3.



The arrested "nationalist" Hurystrymba described his counter-revolutionary activities as follows:

In one of our conversations in June 1935, Hrebenkin told me openly that the Ukrainians who work at the institute should take the initiative in editing the *History of Ukraine* to make this textbook a true document of history reflecting the glorious past of the Ukrainian people. I agreed willingly and asked him how to accomplish this practically....While visiting the Kharkiv Party Archive in 1935, I met Iesypenko. During our conversation, I told him that we, the group of Ukrainian researchers at the Institute of History, had started working on the textbook *History of Ukraine*, and that we needed more people. I stressed that our aim was to make this textbook really accessible, understandable for the Ukrainian masses. We needed to show the entire heroic past of the Ukrainian people, their struggle for independence, their colossal creative potential, to show that Ukrainians have always striven for independence. That is, I made clear to him that we had decided to write this textbook in the spirit of idealizing Ukraine. Iesypenko agreed to participate in preparing the textbook with this goal in mind.<sup>47</sup>

Thus, at a time when the central press was exalting the great Russian people and their greatest national poet, Pushkin, the Ukrainian intellectuals remained, at best, confused about how to appraise their national past and, at worst, silenced by the indiscriminating repressions.

### **The Ukrainian "Great Retreat"**

However, already in 1938-39, when the terror subsided and the new Ukrainian party leader, Nikita Khrushchev, began to consolidate the republic's elites, the local intelligentsia was encouraged to valorize Ukrainian patriotism and ethnic traditions. The spectacular rehabilitation of the seventeenth-century Cossack hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky cleared the way for the restoration of other "great ancestors" such as the Ukrainian equivalent of Aleksandr Nevsky, Prince Danylo of Halych (1200-1264). The peasant-born Ukrainian bard Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861) had always been a Soviet icon as a "rebel poet." but from the late 1930s, he was increasingly cast as the father of

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<sup>47</sup> *U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu*, 1: 63-64.

the nation. Ukrainian media, literature and the arts began teaching the population to identify with their great ancestors, the Cossacks, and with nineteenth-century nation-builders.

The rehabilitation of ethnic heroes was not carried out by decree, but through the efforts of individual Ukrainian writers and historians who sensed new ideological currents and whose vision was open to public discussion.<sup>48</sup> Initially, the debates centered on the contradiction between the Marxist principle of class analysis and the statist or ethno-patriotic criteria by which the new great ancestors were chosen. The ideological reversal began with Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the Cossack leader who had created the first modern Ukrainian polity and, conveniently enough, presided over its union with Muscovy in 1654. As a "gatherer of Russian lands," the hetman had belonged to the old tsarist pantheon of great historic figures, but as a founder of the Cossack state, Khmelnytsky was also a hero of the Ukrainian nationalists. His ambiguous profile in the narratives of national history, however, was largely irrelevant for the class history of the 1920s, which had been denouncing him as a feudal seigneur who sold out the Ukrainian peasants to the Russian tsar and landlords.

The hetman's possible restoration as a national hero was first signalled in an official communique on history textbooks (August 1937). The Politburo commission had detected the following major flaw in the manuscripts submitted to the textbook competition:

The authors do not see any positive role in Khmelnytsky's actions in the seventeenth century, in his struggle against Ukraine's occupation by the Poland of the lords and the Turkey of the Sultan. For example, the fact of Georgia's passing under the protectorate of Russia at the end of the eighteenth century, as well as the fact of Ukraine's transfer to Russian rule, is considered by the authors as an absolute evil, without regard for the concrete historical circumstances of those times. The authors do not see that Georgia faced at the time the alternative of either being swallowed up by the Persia of the Shah and the Turkey of the

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<sup>48</sup> The work by Kevin M. F. Platt and David Brandenberger shows that the rehabilitation of Ivan the Terrible by the Russian intellectuals followed the same model ("Terribly Romantic, Terribly Progressive, or Terribly Tragic: Rehabilitating Ivan IV under I. V. Stalin," *Russian Review* 58, no. 4 [October 1999]: 635-54).

Sultan, or coming under a Russian protectorate, just as Ukraine also had at the time the alternative of either being absorbed by the Poland of the lords and the Turkey of the Sultan, or falling under Russian control. They do not see that the second alternative was nevertheless the lesser evil.<sup>49</sup>

Introduced here for the first time, the "lesser evil" formula would enjoy a long life in Stalinist history writing. According to the Soviet historian Militsa Nechkina, Stalin himself added the paragraph about Georgia and Ukraine while editing the communique's text.<sup>50</sup> The "lesser evil" paradigm represented a conceptual compromise between the traditional Marxist condemnation of imperial Russian colonialism and a new emphasis on a continuity of state tradition between the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. But the 1937 publication did not yet initiate the white-washing of Russian empire-building as such, nor did it define the imperial annexation of Ukraine and Georgia as historically progressive, as would the later Soviet ideological pronouncements. For the time being, union with Russia was still assessed with the interests of the non-Russian toiling masses in mind: for them, the union meant only exploitation by new, Russian, upper classes, but bad as it was, this exploitation was now treated as a priori "lesser evil" in comparison with Polish, Ottoman, or Persian domination. Thus, the new formula already implied the importance of ethnic criteria.

The winning textbook, *A Short Course of the History of the USSR* under the

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<sup>49</sup> *Pravda*, 22 August 1937, p. 2. The communique summarized the results of a contest for a standard history text for elementary school. The Kremlin's recommendations generally reflected the reevaluation of tsarist state-building and culture, stressing, for example, the progressive role of the church in medieval Rus' and the reactionary character of the rebellions against the "civilizing" reforms of Peter the Great. See A. N. Artizov, "V ugodu vzgliadam vozhdia (Konkurs 1936 g. na uchebnyk po istorii SSSR)," *Kentavr*, no. 1 (1991): 125-35; A. M. Dubrovsky, "A. A. Zhdanov v rabote nad shkolnym uchebnykom istorii," in A. M. Dubrovsky and S. I. Mikhalchenko, eds., *Otechestvennaia kultura i istoricheskaia nauka XVIII-XX vekov: Sbornik statei* (Briansk: Izdatelstvo Brianskogo gospeduniversiteta, 1996), pp. 128-43.

<sup>50</sup> M. V. Nechkina, "K itogam diskussii o periodizatsii sovetskoi istoricheskoi nauki," *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 2 (1962): 57-68, here 74, note 5 and M. V. Nechkina, "Vopros o M. N. Pokrovskom v postanovleniakh partii i pravitelstva 1934-1938 gg. o prepodavanii istorii i istoricheskoi nauke," 241. Recently, David Brandenberger and A. M. Dubrovsky have argued that this was not the first use of the "lesser evil" formula. Apparently, it first appeared in a memorandum written by the People's Commissar of Education, Bubnov, in December 1936 and representing a short-hand record of the directives formulated by the chief ideologue of the time. Andrei Zhdanov (D. L. Brandenberger and A. M. Dubrovsky, "'The People Need a Tsar'," 878 and 889, notes 46-47).

editorship of A. V. Shestakov, became a standard history text for Grade 4 for almost twenty years. This textbook rehabilitated the Russian statist tradition rather cautiously. The authors treated Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great in a balanced manner, paying attention to the two tsars' progressive and reactionary deeds, and presented Khmelnytsky and the incorporation of Ukraine in quite a traditional light. The revisionist "lesser evil" formula was quoted, but the class vision of history still reigned supreme: as a result of joining Russia, the Ukrainian people essentially substituted one form of social oppression for another. Khmelnytsky himself appeared to have been concerned only with the interests of the landowner class, and his turn to Russia was supposedly determined by political conjuncture rather than any ethnic or religious affinity between the two peoples.<sup>51</sup>

However, the communique also indicated a subtle, but important change in the official appraisal of Khmelnytsky. Not only was Ukraine's union with Russia partly rehabilitated as a "lesser evil" for the toiling masses, but the historians also were reprimanded for not seeing Khmelnytsky's positive role in the struggle against foreign aggressors. As had occurred with Peter the Great and Ivan the Terrible, writers took the lead in reinstalling Khmelnytsky as a national hero. The young Ukrainian playwright Oleksandr Korniiichuk, whose drama had already demonstrated his party loyalty, quickly completed a historical play, *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*, portraying the hetman as a great statesman and military leader, an essentially ethnic hero who had liberated Ukraine from Polish oppression.<sup>52</sup> But precisely because the ideological turn had been hinted at, rather than prescribed, Korniiichuk's vision of Khmelnytsky caused a debate.

In late 1938, when the prestigious Malyi Theater company in Moscow accepted the play and went ahead with dress rehearsals, Korniiichuk was suddenly summoned to Moscow to answer to accusations that he had distorted history. The reviewer of the

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<sup>51</sup> A. V. Shestakov, ed., *Kratkii kurs istorii SSSR* (Moscow, 1937), pp. 50-52.

<sup>52</sup> Although Korniiichuk's later biographer maintained that he had commenced working on the play in 1935 and even spent some time researching in the archives, the writer's personal archive does not support this claim. The first draft of the drama, entitled *Bohdan Khmelnytsky: Heroica. Ukraine in the Seventeenth Century*, survived among other materials from 1938. Neither the play's content, nor Korniiichuk's notebooks reveal any serious work with historical sources. The secret of the play's success was, rather, the result of a novel interpretation of familiar facts. See E. Gorbunova, *Dramaturgiia A. Korneichuka* (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1952), p. 133; TsDAML, f. 435, op. 1, spr. 33.

drama, the Russian Soviet historian Vladimir Picheta,<sup>53</sup> found that the text contained fictional characters and events and, more importantly, that the author did not present Khmelnytsky as a defender of landowners' class interests. The discussion of the play in the Malyi Theater on 16 October 1938 turned into a real battle over Khmelnytsky. Defending his emphasis on the national liberation rather than internal class struggle, Korniiichuk presented his work as a Soviet Ukrainian answer to Polish historical mythology. He reminded the audience about the famous nineteenth-century novel that had enshrined the Polish stereotype of the Ukrainian Cossacks, Henryk Sienkiewicz's *With Fire and Sword*: "That book argued that Ukrainians were beasts, infidels, that Poland was the master of Ukraine and that she should return to owning Ukraine....It is not for nothing that the Polish fascists made that book a school text." The likelihood of a new war with Poland and Germany thus justified the promotion of Ukrainian ethnic patriotism: "What other ideas do you want? And what kind of ideas are needed now, when the Polish gentry and the German fascists again intend to invade Ukraine, when the Ukrainian people might have to fight for their independence?"<sup>54</sup>

Korniiichuk prevailed over his critics. A further attempt by the literary critic V. Blium to derail *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* by informing Stalin that it ignored the class approach to history failed. The Central Committee's Department of Propaganda and Agitation concluded that Blium had misunderstood the notion of Soviet patriotism.<sup>55</sup> In the spring of 1939, both the Malyi Theater and several leading Ukrainian companies released the play. The republic's newspapers hailed *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* as a work developing in the spectator a "deep love, respect, and interest in our people's heroic past."

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<sup>53</sup> Picheta was originally a Belarusian historian who had been, moreover, during the late 1920s denounced as a "Belarusian bourgeois nationalist" before being exiled from Minsk to Viatka in the early 1930s as a "Russian monarchist." In 1935, he returned to Moscow and successfully continued his academic career there (Rainer Lindner, "Nationalhistoriker im Stalinismus: Zum Profil der akademischen Intelligenz in Weißrußland, 1921-1946," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 47, no. 4 [1999]: 187-209, here 199-201).

<sup>54</sup> The minutes of the discussion are held at the archives of the Malyi Theater Museum and were not available to me. Quoted after Gorbunova, *Dramaturgiia A. Korneichuka*, 135, 137 and Iu. Kobyletsky, *Kryla krecheta: Zhyttia i tvorchist Oleksandra Korniiichuka* (Kiev: Dnipro, 1975), pp. 133-34.

<sup>55</sup> RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 120, d. 348, ll. 63-71ob, 76-77. I am grateful to Karen Petrone and David Brandenberger for bringing this incident to my attention.

*Bohdan Khmelnytsky* earned official approval and was staged by theater companies throughout the Soviet Union, including almost every theater in Ukraine. In 1941, the play received the highest Soviet artistic accolade, the Stalin Prize, First Class.<sup>56</sup>

Other Ukrainian writers followed Korniiichuk's lead. In 1939, Petro Panch published excerpts from his new historical novel *The Zaporozhians*, which glorified the Cossack struggle against Poland in the decades immediately before the Khmelnytsky Uprising. Iakiv Kachura promptly completed the novel *Ivan Bohun* (1940), which followed the plot of Sokolovsky's earlier work without opposing the colonel to Khmelnytsky. The composer Kost Dankevych wrote music to Korniiichuk's play and was contemplating an opera about the hetman. However, the management of the Kiev Opera Company secured the consent of a much bigger celebrity: in the spring of 1939, it announced that Dmitrii Shostakovich had agreed to write an opera *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* based on Korniiichuk's libretto.<sup>57</sup>

The historians were slower in adopting the new patriotic paradigm. While the Learned Council of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences' Institute of History debated the new appraisal of Khmelnytsky, the resourceful Moscow writer Osip Kuperman (pen name, K. Osipov) stole the historians' thunder by producing the first laudatory biography of the hetman, although the book's lionization of Khmelnytsky remained conditional. Throughout the text, Osipov stressed the hetman's "class interests" as a landowner and his cruel treatment of the Ukrainian toiling masses. Portrayed as a progressive event, the union with Russia was still labelled the "lesser evil."<sup>58</sup> In 1940, the Ukrainian historian Mykola Petrovsky published the first scholarly revisionist account of the Khmelnytsky Uprising, *The Ukrainian People's War of Liberation against the Oppression by the Poland of the*

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<sup>56</sup> *Komunist*, 1 April 1939, p. 3; Kobyletsky, *Kryla krecheta*, 149-51.

<sup>57</sup> Syrotiuk, *Ukrainska istorychna proza*, 254-55, 154 (Panch and Kachura); M. Mykhailov, *Konstantyn Fedorovych Dankevych: Narodnyi artyst SRSR* (Kiev: Mystetstvo, 1964), p. 15 (Dankevych); Stanishevsky, *Ukrainskyi radianskyi muzychnyi teatr*, 177 (Shostakovich).

<sup>58</sup> On the prewar debates at the Institute of History, see TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 753, ark. 121; spr. 121, ark. 12. (These are the later references to the discussion of which no documentary traces survived.) Osipov's book appeared in prestigious series "Lives of Distinguished People" at the Komsomol publishing house Molodaia gvardiia: K. Osipov, *Bogdan Khmelnitsky, Zhizn zamechatelnykh liudei* (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1939).

*Gentry and Ukraine's Incorporation into Russia (1648-1654)*. The book downplayed the internal class struggle, speaking of the Ukrainian people in general, and portrayed Khmelnytsky as a leader of the nation. At the same time, Petrovsky presented the union with Russia as something like the teleological outcome of Ukrainian history: "The entire historical process, the entire history of Ukraine with inevitable logical succession led to the Ukrainian people's War of Liberation, to Ukraine's incorporation into Russia, to the union with the fraternal Russian people."<sup>59</sup>

In retrospect, this strategy of rehabilitating Ukrainian ethnic history by connecting it with the Russian grand narrative appears as a precursor of the later Soviet dogma. However, the leading Soviet historical journal, *Istoriik-marksist*, published a dismissive review of the monograph. Himself a Ukrainian historian, the reviewer A. Baraboi plainly announced that Petrovsky's theory "could not be characterized as Marxist." He doubted the Cossack-officer class's early commitment to union with Russia and, more importantly, saw the book as failing to provide a Marxist critique of this class. According to Baraboi, the class struggle was the "inner moving spring of all historical developments in 1648-1654," whereas Petrovsky turned a blind eye to the "class tensions" between Khmelnytsky and the "leader of the peasant masses," Colonel Kryvonis. The reviewer concluded by recommending a complete rewriting of the book.<sup>60</sup>

In the same year, 1940, the Institute of History finally published a 400-page collectively-written survey, *History of Ukraine: A Short Course*. Released simultaneously

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<sup>59</sup> M. N. Petrovsky, *Vyzvolna viina ukrainskoho narodu proty hnitu shliakhetskoi Polshchi i pryiednannia Ukrainy do Rosii (1648-1654)* (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo AN URSR, 1940), p. 4. Mykola Petrovsky (1894-1951) belonged to the so-called "old specialists." A priest's son, he received his education before the revolution, briefly worked with Hrushevsky during the 1920s, and was never admitted to the party. In 1942-47, he served as director of the Institute of History of Ukraine; in 1944-47, also as chair of Ukrainian history at Kiev University. See NAIU, op. 1L, spr. 115; V. A. Smolii, ed., *Vcheni Instytutu istorii Ukrainy: Biobibliohrafichniy dovidnyk* (Kiev: Instytut istorii Ukrainy NANU, 1998), pp. 245-50.

<sup>60</sup> A. Baraboi, review of *Vyzvolna viina ukrainskoho narodu proty hnitu shliakhetskoi Polshchi i pryiednannia Ukrainy do Rosii (1648-1654)*, by M. N. Petrovsky, *Istoriik-marksist*, no. 7 (1940): 137-40. Although historians were still debating the proper appraisal of Khmelnytsky in 1940, the NKVD sniffed the new ideological winds as early as the autumn of 1937. During the early 1930s, the historian Trokhym Skubytsky was denouncing Hrushevsky and other nationalists for idealizing the Cossacks and Hetman Khmelnytsky. In October 1937, though, Skubytsky was himself arrested for allegedly "idealizing the Cossacks and slandering Bohdan Khmelnytsky as a traitor for his union with the Muscovite state against the European barbarians" (*U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu*, 1: 65, emphasis added).

in Ukrainian and Russian, this work used traditional political criteria, rather than the Marxist economic structures, as the basis of periodization, an approach particularly noticeable in this text's account of Kievan Rus' and the Lithuanian period. However, the book's rehabilitation of Khmelnytsky remained cautious. The authors took their search for the "evil" in the "lesser evil" formula seriously by emphasizing the similar class interests of the hetman, the Cossack officer class, and the Russian boyars. In the end, however, the historians stipulated that Khmelnytsky's historic role in liberating Ukraine from Polish rule outweighed his services to the exploiting classes. Other chapters likewise attempted to strike a balance between class analysis and the grand narrative of the nation. However, the last chapter's last section affirmed the story of the Ukrainian people as the book's interpretive framework; the solemn account of the "great Ukrainian people's reunification within a single Ukrainian socialist state" portrayed this event as the apogee of Ukrainian history.<sup>61</sup>

While the advocates of the concept of class history were fighting back in the scholarly journals, those of ethno-history were triumphing in the mass media. In 1939-40, the director Ihor Savchenko was shooting at the Kiev Film Studios a full-length movie *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* based on Korniiichuk's play. Two prominent apologists for the hetman collaborated in the film's production; Korniiichuk wrote the script, while Petrovsky served as a scholarly consultant. Savchenko announced that his main aim was to "purify the image of Khmelnytsky from the coating of lies, to show him as a leader of the people."<sup>62</sup> The film, indeed, provided a powerful portrayal of Khmelnytsky as the nation's leader in its struggle against Polish oppression. (The theme of the subsequent union with Russia remained undeveloped.) Although Korniiichuk wrote the original script in Ukrainian, the film was first shot in Russian and dubbed in Ukrainian only after its approval by the central authorities. When the leading Soviet filmmakers gathered in

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<sup>61</sup> S. M. Bilousov, K. H. Huslysty, O. P. Ohloblin, M. N. Petrovsky, M. I. Suprunenko, and F. O. Iastrebov, eds., *Istoriia Ukrainy: Korotkyi kurs* (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo AN URSR, 1940), esp. pp. 25-55 (Kievan Rus'), 85-93 (Khmelnytsky Uprising), 388-94 (reunification of Ukrainian lands).

<sup>62</sup> RGALI, f. 1992, op. 1, dd. 75 and 76 (correspondence between Savchenko and Korniiichuk and variants of script); TsDAML, f. 435, op. 1, spr. 2137, ark. 3 (Petrovsky); Zak, Parfenov, and Iakubovich-Iasny, *Igor Savchenko*, 252 (Savchenko's quote).



Leningard in March 1941 to discuss the finished work, almost all of them stressed the topic's importance for fostering Ukrainian patriotism. L. Arnshtam observed that "Savchenko proved himself a real Ukrainian," and Fridrikh Ėrmler suggested that "The patriotic feeling that now grows in Soviet society will be understood and especially appreciated because of this historical film." Savchenko himself dismissed minor criticisms with a statement that "this movie was shot in Ukraine and is perceived differently in Ukraine."<sup>63</sup>

*Bohdan Khmelnytsky* was released in April 1941 to become a major event in Ukrainian cultural life. With the beginning of the Soviet-German war in June, the film passed for an important propaganda movie and was shown to the troops immediately before their departure for combat. (Conveniently, Savchenko and Korniiichuk presented the "enemies" as both the Polish nobles and their mercenaries, the German dragoons.) Interestingly, however, the film reviews did not reveal any emphasis on the resulting union with Russia. The critics and, likely, the general public, understood *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* primarily as a film about the "Ukrainian people's heroic struggle against the Polish gentry," a picture promoting "patriotism, love for the Fatherland, and hatred of the enemy."<sup>64</sup>

The film's impact on the contemporary historic imagination cannot be underestimated. The last prewar blockbuster of Soviet cinematography, *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* was repeatedly seen by tens of millions. In the early 1950s, party ideologues, writers, and composers, during the discussions of Dankevych's opera about the hetman, would time and again refer to Savchenko's film as a true or proper depiction of the heroic Ukrainian past. In 1952, the historian Vadym Diadychenko would go on record as acknowledging: "The people as a whole rarely read special sociological and historical books, whereas many are acquainted with Bohdan Khmelnytsky after the well-known

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<sup>63</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 66, ark. 6-7 (records of production and dubbing); RGALI, f. 1992, op. 1, d. 78 (discussion minutes, the quotations are on ll. 8, 15, 16).

<sup>64</sup> RGALI, f. 1992, op. 1, d. 80 (Savchenko's collection of newspaper clippings), here ll. 1-3; Iu. F. Holynsky, *Heroichna tema v tvorchosti I. A. Savchenka* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1982), p. 50 (use as war propaganda movie).

movie."<sup>65</sup>

The Soviet invasion of Poland in August 1939 profoundly influenced the shaping of a new Ukrainian patriotism. The Red Army's march westward was accompanied by a propaganda campaign structured along ethnic, rather than class lines. In his radio address on 17 September 1939, People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs Viacheslav Molotov presented the invasion as the protection of "our brothers of the same blood" in Western Ukraine and Belarus. *Pravda's* editorial on 19 September referred to the defense of "our brothers of the same nation [*natsii*]," while the commander of the Soviet invading troops, Marshal Semen Timoshenko, issued a leaflet ending with the appeal "Long live the great and free Ukrainian people!"<sup>66</sup>

As the tension between class and ethnic narratives of the Ukrainian past was being suppressed, another contradiction surfaced—that between the Ukrainian and Russian grand narratives of ethnic history. In addition to numerous newspaper articles, two brief surveys of the history of Western Ukraine had been published in 1940 in Moscow and Kiev. The pamphlets revealed that the Soviet historians in the center and in the Ukrainian capital understood the new Soviet patriotism differently—and confirmed that any official Soviet pronouncement had room for subtle interpretative debates. In Kiev, Serhii Bilousov and Oleksandr Ohloblyn created their narrative around the thesis of the "age-old Ukrainian land" and ethnic unity between Western and Eastern Ukrainians. In Moscow, Vladimir Picheta announced in the very first sentence of his pamphlet that Western Ukraine and Belarus were the "primordial Russian lands that had been part of the Rurikids' empire."<sup>67</sup> The contradiction between Russocentric statism and Ukrainian ethnic patriotism

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<sup>65</sup> TsDAML, f. 435, op. 1, spr. 1959, ark. 25, 35 (Diadychenko); f. 661, op. 1, spr. 130, ark. 4, 9; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1875, ark. 72; spr. 2775, ark. 58, 67.

<sup>66</sup> *Komunist*, 18 September 1939, p. 1; *Pravda*, 19 September 1939, p. 1. The relevant documents from the Soviet press from 1939-40 are conveniently collected in P. Hudzenko and F. Shevchenko, eds., *Vozziednannia ukrainskoho narodu v iedynii ukrainskii radianskii derzhavi (1939-1949)* (Kiev: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo politychnoi literatury, 1949), here pp. 23, 26, 103-04, 160. Timoshenko's leaflet is reproduced in V. Picheta, *Osnovnye momenty istoricheskogo razvitiia Zapadnoi Ukrainy i Zapadnoi Belorussii* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe sotsialno-ekonomicheskoe izdatelstvo, 1940), pp. 128-29.

<sup>67</sup> S. M. Bielousov [Bilousov] and O. P. Ohloblyn, *Zakhidna Ukraina* (Kiev: Derzhpolitvydav, 1940); V. Picheta, *Osnovnye momenty istoricheskogo razvitiia Zapadnoi Ukrainy i Zapadnoi Belorussii*, 3.

notwithstanding, both small books adopted a new term, then widely used by the press: the "great Ukrainian people."

Completely overlooked by scholars of Stalinism, this addition to the previous descriptions of the Russians as the only "great" people of the Soviet Union, signalled a remarkable change.<sup>68</sup> The official newspaper of the Ukrainian Communist Party, *Komunist*, first used this designation on 15 November 1939, in the text of the republic's Supreme Soviet letter to Stalin: "Having been divided, having been separated for centuries by artificial borders, the great Ukrainian people today reunites forever in a single Ukrainian republic." The letter also referred to the Ukrainians' homeland as "their mother, Great Ukraine." As well, the text of the law on the incorporation of Western Ukraine was peppered with the epithet "great."<sup>69</sup> The same term was used in Mykola Petrovsky's pamphlet in Russian, *The Military Past of the Ukrainian People*, commissioned by the Ministry of Defence and published in 1939 in the mass series "Library of the Red Army Soldier." According to Petrovsky, the Polish lords and their German mercenaries "were always beaten by our heroic ancestors. The secret of these victories was in their patriotism, in the spirit of independence and freedom that always characterized our great people."<sup>70</sup>

Western scholars have previously interpreted these Soviet pronouncements as purely instrumental propaganda rhetoric designed to justify new territorial acquisitions, rather than as appeals to Ukrainian national sentiment.<sup>71</sup> Yet, put in the context of the prewar rehabilitation of Khmelnytsky and wartime fostering of Ukrainian patriotism, the valorization of the Ukrainian national heritage emerges as a local version of the Russian Great Retreat and part of the larger Soviet ideological evolution. In fact, the official

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<sup>68</sup> On the Russians' official elevation to the "great people," see Simon, *Nationalism and the Policy Toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union*, 149-50; Velychenko, *Shaping Identity in Eastern Europe and Russia*, 55.

<sup>69</sup> *Komunist*, 15 November 1939, p. 1; 16 November 1939, p. 1.

<sup>70</sup> N. N. Petrovsky, *Voennoe proshloe ukrainskogo naroda*, Biblioteka krasnoarmeitsa (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe voennoe izdatelstvo Narkomata Oborony SSSR, 1939), here 78.

<sup>71</sup> See Ewa M. Thompson, "Nationalist Propaganda in the Soviet Press, 1939-1941," *Slavic Review* 50, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 385-99.

promotion of the Ukrainian language, culture, and scholarship in Western oblasts was too impressive to be just a propaganda trick. The authorities created a system of universal education in Ukrainian and Ukrainized the Jan Kazimierz Lviv University, renaming it after the Ukrainian writer Ivan Franko. New Ukrainian publishing houses, libraries, and museums were established, and the Lesia Ukrainka Ukrainian Drama Theater opened in Lviv. The institutes of history, archaeology, literature, linguistics, folklore, and economics of the republican Academy of Sciences set up their branches in Lviv. Most prominent Western Ukrainian scholars were given jobs as either professors or senior researchers; moreover, the authorities spent two million rubles on welcome bonuses for some of them. (Meanwhile, the local "bourgeois-nationalist" equivalent of the Academy, the Shevchenko Scientific Society, was closed down.) Overall, even anti-Soviet Ukrainian activists recognized that the Bolsheviks seemingly "carefully looked after" Ukrainian culture.<sup>72</sup>

The Soviet reforms of academic administration in Western Ukraine unwittingly revealed the growing role of the "national past" as an ideological tool. Ten days before the Soviet invasion of Poland, the devoted party member and young specialist on Cossack history, Mykola Marchenko, was commissioned as political officer and assigned to the army group on the Polish border. In less than a month, on 16 October 1939, he became the first Soviet rector of Lviv University. Presiding over the Ukrainization of this large institution, Marchenko found time to complete and, in May 1940, to defend a dissertation on the politically timely topic "The Polish-Russian Struggle for Ukraine in the First Decade after Ukraine's Incorporation into Russia: 1654-1664."<sup>73</sup> Practically all established West Ukrainian historians were given employment at either the university or

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<sup>72</sup> Milena Rudnytska, ed., *Zakhidnia Ukraina pid bolshevykami: IX. 1939-VI.1941* (New York: Naukove tovarystvo im. Shevchenka v Amerytsi, 1958), p. 107. This collection of memoirs represented the best account of Soviet cultural policies in Western Ukraine in 1939-41 before the appearance of new studies by Ukrainian scholars (O. S. Rublov and Iu. A. Cherchenko, *Stalinshchyna i dolia zakhidnoukrainskoi intelihentsii*, esp. pp. 184-210; Kostiantyn Kondratiuk and Ivanna Luchakivska, "Zakhidnoukrainska intelihentsiia u pershi roky radianskoi vlady [veresen 1939-cherven 1941]," *Visnyk Lvivskoho universytetu: Seriia istorychna*, no. 33 [1998]: 178-85) and a new valuable documentary collection (Iu. Slyvka, ed., *Kulturne zhyttia v Ukraini: Zakhidni zemli: Dokumenty i materialy* [Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1995], vol. 1 [1939-1953], pp. 52-136).

<sup>73</sup> O. S. Rublov, "Malovidomi storinky biohrafii ukrainskoho istoryka," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 1 (1996): 106-18, here 109-10 and 114.

the Lviv branch of the Institute of History. The leading specialist on the Cossack period, Ivan Krypiakievych, although no Marxist and a former student of Hrushevsky, became both the chair of Ukrainian history at the university and the head of the institute's branch, in addition to being elected a deputy to the oblast Soviet. In 1941, the then rare and highly prestigious Soviet doctoral degree in history was conferred on Krypiakievych without defence.<sup>74</sup>

Nevertheless, the authorities displayed natural selectiveness in their promotion of the national past. For instance, they immediately closed down two Ukrainian military-patriotic museums in Lviv as "nationalistic."<sup>75</sup> At the same time, the Soviet propaganda machine commenced massive ideological indoctrination of the locals. The materials on the "Stalin Constitution" were quickly shipped from Kiev to museums in the West. On 9 October 1939, the Ukrainian Politburo decreed the additional printing of 300,000 copies of the *Short Course* of the party's history in Ukrainian. In early December, 200,000 copies were shipped to Western Ukrainian oblasts where practically all the intelligentsia and professionals were enrolled in special after-hours circles to study what was then the canonical text on Soviet history.<sup>76</sup> Similarly, the media's message, although unprecedentedly sensitive to the questions of patriotism and national unity, never abandoned the rhetoric of class and socialism.

### **The Great Ukrainian People**

With the beginning of the German-Soviet war in June 1941, *patria* emerged as an even more important referent in Soviet ideology. In his famous first radio address to the population on 22 June, Molotov designated the war as a Patriotic (*otechestvennaia*) one, alluding to the tsarist name for the 1812 war with Napoleon.<sup>77</sup> The central press freely

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<sup>74</sup> Rublov and Cherchenko, *Stalinschchyna i dolia zakhidnoukrainskoi inteligentsii*, 198-9 and 320, note 14. To be sure, Krypiakievych already had a Ph.D. from Lviv University (1911).

<sup>75</sup> *Kulturne zhyttia v Ukraini: Zakhidni zemli*, 1: 61.

<sup>76</sup> Rublov and Cherchenko, *Stalinschchyna i dolia zakhidnoukrainskoi inteligentsii*, 204-6; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 6, spr. 564, ark. 134; op. 9, spr. 70, ark. 27.

<sup>77</sup> *Pravda*, 23 June 1941, p. 1.

evoked Russian pre-revolutionary martial traditions. On 7 November 1941, Stalin concluded his Revolution Day speech by appealing to the Soviet people to draw inspiration from the "brave example of our great ancestors, Aleksandr Nevsky, Dmitrii Donskoi, Kuzma Minin, Dmitrii Pozharsky, Aleksandr Suvorov, and Mikhail Kutuzov."<sup>78</sup> This list of the Russian princes, defenders of the monarchy, and tsarist military leaders seems to have provided the multinational Soviet state with a single heroic past to identify with—the familiar Russian tsarist historical mythology. The press took this refurbished list of pre-revolutionary great men as a new canon of national heroes, to supplement the Soviet catalogue of the Revolution's and Civil War's luminaries. In December 1941, *Pravda* published an unprecedentedly Russocentric article by Iemelian Iaroslavsky, "The Bolsheviks Are the Heirs of the Best Patriotic Traditions of the Russian People."<sup>79</sup>

Western scholars have long held that the Soviet authorities had installed Russian martial traditions and historic values as the dominant theme of wartime patriotic propaganda. As the leading authority on the subject put it, "Whatever the fine points of distinction may have been between the new Soviet patriotism and old Russian nationalism, they were soon lost sight of in the great emergency."<sup>80</sup> This conclusion, resulting from the Western researchers' exclusive concentration on the Moscow press, is commonly found in scholarly works. However, the study of the declassified archives and propaganda discourse generated in a non-Russian republic provides a much more complicated picture of wartime Soviet patriotism(s).<sup>81</sup> The Ukrainian materials document an impressive growth of a distinct ethno-historic mythology, which subsequently had to

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<sup>78</sup> *Pravda*, 8 November 1941, p. 1.

<sup>79</sup> *Pravda*, 27 December 1941, p. 3.

<sup>80</sup> Tillet, *The Great Friendship*, 60-70, here 61. See also Simon, *Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union*, 182-83.

<sup>81</sup> Also, one should not presume that the propaganda of tsarist heroes completely replaced Soviet topics. As Jeffrey Brooks has shown in his article about the wartime *Pravda*, the materials on Russian pre-revolutionary martial traditions were comparatively rare in this authoritative newspaper, compared to the flood of articles about the contemporary Red Army soldiers and officers (Jeffrey Brooks, "Pravda Goes to War," in Richard Stites, ed., *Culture and Entertainment in Wartime Russia* [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995], pp. 20-21). The reversal from blackening the princes and tsarist generals to elevating them was impressive nonetheless, signalling a substantial change in Soviet national ideology.

be reconciled with the Russian grand narrative within the overarching framework of the "friendship of peoples."

Although the Ukrainian press duly reprinted *Pravda's* lead articles, the local functionaries and intellectuals did not proceed to glorify Nevsky and Kutuzov. Instead, the republican media intensified the promotion of Ukrainian ethnic patriotism. References to Danylo of Halych, who had defeated the Teutonic knights, and the Cossacks, who had prevailed over the German mercenaries, appeared in the press from the first days of the war.<sup>82</sup> Moreover, just as the Russians had fought a Patriotic war against Napoleon in 1812, so had the Ukrainians against the Poles and their German mercenaries in the mid-seventeenth century. As the Ukrainian writers put it in their open letter to Stalin, "It will not be the first time that the Ukrainian people smash the insolent German hordes. Danylo of Halych had beaten the German mongrel-knights and, during the sixteenth-century Great Patriotic war, the abominable German mercenary cavalry learned well the strength of the Cossack sabre."<sup>83</sup> As early as 2 July, Petrovsky published a lengthy newspaper article, "The Martial Prowess of the Ukrainian People," which traced the Ukrainian military traditions all the way back to the tenth-century Prince Sviatoslav. The historian also coined a definition of Ukrainian history that did not refer to class struggle: "All history of Ukraine was filled with the people's heroic struggle for their freedom and independence against all kinds of foreign aggressors." The Institute of History of Ukraine announced on 28 June that its researchers were preparing a pamphlet series about Ukraine's heroic past. The first pamphlet was to valorize Prince Danylo's battles and the last one, the inevitable Soviet victory in the present war.<sup>84</sup>

The new canon of the republic's historic heroes affirmed the Ukrainian concurrent claim to the foundation of the Russian grand narrative, Kievan Rus'. No writer claimed an exclusively "Ukrainian" character for the large medieval empire of East Slavs, but the thirteenth-century Prince Danylo of Halych and his Galician-Volhynian Principality could

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<sup>82</sup> *Komunist*, 24 June 1941, p. 3; 28 June 1941, p. 1; 4 July 1941, p. 4; *Literaturna hazeta*, 28 June 1941, p. 2.

<sup>83</sup> *Komunist*, 4 July 1941, p. 1.

<sup>84</sup> *Komunist*, 2 July 1941, p. 3 (Petrovsky); 28 June 1941, p. 1 (series).

be designated publicly as the patrimony of the Ukrainian people. Given the principality's prominence in the nationalist theories tracing Kievan heritage through Galicia-Volhynia to the Great Duchy of Lithuania to Cossack Ukraine, the valorization of Danylo was fraught with controversy. Could Ukrainians glorify the southwestern princes of Galicia-Volhynia if the Russians were extolling the northeastern princes of Vladimir-Suzdal as the heirs to Kievan grand princes? If Kievan Rus' was a common heritage of the Russians and Ukrainians, where did their separate historical mythologies begin? For the moment, though, nobody objected to the "Ukrainization" of Prince Danylo.

On 7 July, the republic's government, parliament, and party leadership issued an appeal to the Ukrainian people, affirming the new pantheon of great ancestors, a pantheon modelled after the Russian one, yet unmistakably separate: "The fighters of Danylo of Halych cut the German knights with their swords, Bohdan Khmelnytsky's Cossacks felled them with their sabres, the Ukrainian people led by Lenin and Stalin destroyed the kaiser's hordes in 1918. We have always beaten the German bandits..."<sup>85</sup> Disproving this statement, the German advance, hurried evacuation, and the Kiev catastrophe in August left the republic's ideologues no time to refine the new patriotic canon. The next time the authorities organized a major ideological rally, the First Meeting of the Representatives of the Ukrainian People, was in Saratov, Russia, on 26 November 1941. The meeting adopted a manifesto to the Ukrainian people that spoke of the "sacred Ukrainian land" and appealed to the "freedom-loving Ukrainians, the descendants of the glorious fighters of our native land, Danylo of Halych and Sahaidachny, Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Bohun, Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko, Bozhenko and Mykola Shchors," never to submit to German slavery.<sup>86</sup>

As the Russocentric undertones of the central press matured during 1942-43, the Ukrainian patriotic propaganda in the local press was not suppressed but was actually

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<sup>85</sup> *Komunist*, 7 July 1941, p. 1.

<sup>86</sup> "Do ukrainskoho narodu: Zvernennia mitynhu predstavnykiv ukrainskoho narodu 26 lystopada 1941 roku v Saratovi," *Naukovi zapysky Instytutu istorii i arkeolohii AN URSR* (Ufa, 1943), bk. 1, pp. 5-7, here 6. Petro Sahaidachny: Cossack hetman in the early seventeenth century; Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko: two most prominent nineteenth-century writers and nation-builders; Vasyl Bozhenko and Mykola Shchors: Soviet heroes of the Civil War in Ukraine.



intensified. The Second (30 August 1942) and the Third (16 May 1943) Meetings of the Representatives of the Ukrainian People adopted manifestos that the war historians would be reluctant to reprint in 1948 because "they did not mention the Bolsheviks."<sup>87</sup> "The great Ukrainian people" endured as a legitimate term in the official discourse. This was the title of the editorial *Radianska Ukraina* published after the Third Meeting, while the 1943 pamphlet survey of Ukrainian history (discussed below) was entitled *The Inflexible Spirit of the Great Ukrainian People*. "The freedom-loving Ukrainian people have always striven toward the unification [of the Ukrainian ethnic lands], toward the creation of their mighty state (*derzhavy*) on the banks of the Dniester and the Dnieper, without lords and slaves," wrote the poet Maksym Rylsky in *Radianska Ukraina* in May 1943.<sup>88</sup>

During 1942, the Ukrainian State Publishing House in Saratov unveiled a series in Ukrainian of the pocket-size pamphlets "Our Great Ancestors," beginning with Danylo of Halych, Petro Sahaidachny, and Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Other pamphlets then in preparation featured portraits of Khmelnytsky's colonels Ivan Bohun and Maksym Kryvonis, the leaders of anti-Polish peasant rebellions Semen Palii and Ustym Karmaliuk, writers Shevchenko and Franko, and Civil War heroes Shchors and Oleksandr Parkhomenko.<sup>89</sup> The collected papers of the Institute's researchers, *The Ukrainian People's Struggle against the German Aggressors*, and the first issue of the institute's *Transactions* displayed the same pattern of surveying the heroic pages of national history across the centuries without much attention to class analysis of the past. This approach was also true of the scholarly work conducted by the united Departments of History of

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<sup>87</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 1154, ark. 15.

<sup>88</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 2 June 1943, p. 1 ("The Great Ukrainian People"); 8 May 1943, p. 3 (Rylsky). The first attempt to study the role of the Meetings was made in Ie. V. Safonova, "Antyfashystski mitynhy predstavnykiv ukrainskoho narodu u roky Velykoi Vitchyznianoï viiny," in M. V. Koval, ed., *Druha svitova viina i Ukraina: Materialy naukovoï konferentsii 27-28 kvinia 1995 r.* (Kiev: Instytut istorii Ukrainy, 1996), pp. 60-63.

<sup>89</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 48, ark. 6-7. See K. Huslysty, *Danylo Halytsky*, Nashi velyki predky (Saratov: Ukrvydav pry TsK KPU, 1942); idem, *Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny*, Nashi velyki predky (Saratov: Ukrvydav pry TsK KPU, 1942); M. Petrovsky, *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*, Nashi velyki predky (Saratov: Ukrvydav pry TsK KPU, 1942).

Kiev and Kharkiv Universities, which were now operating in Russia.<sup>90</sup>

Late in 1942, a 200-page collectively-written *Survey of the History of Ukraine* was published in Ukrainian in Ufa, replacing the 1940 *Short Course*, which became outdated with the escalation of patriotic propaganda early in the war. Conveniently for Soviet ideologues, two of the authors of the latter text, Oleksandr Ohloblyn and Natalia Polonska-Vasylenko, remained in Kiev and collaborated with the Germans, thus giving the authorities a pretext to remove the book from circulation. The *Survey* picked up the rhetorical device of the "great Ukrainian people," further downplaying the class approach and emphasizing state- and nation-building. The narrative especially exalted the Cossacks; the authors designated the Khmelnytsky Uprising a the "War of National Liberation" and made no mention of the disagreeable class profile of the Cossack officers. The *Survey* earned a positive review in Moscow's *Istoricheskii zhurnal*.<sup>91</sup>

The *Survey* was intended to serve as a reference book, unlike the four-volume *History of Ukraine*, explicitly conceived as a fundamental university textbook. Edited by the leading "rehabilitationist" Mykola Petrovsky, Volume One covered the period from ancient times until 1654. The book not only continued the valorization of the Cossacks. The chapter on Kievan Rus' also paid unprecedented attention to the princes, with separate sections devoted to Iaroslav the Wise and Volodymyr (Vladimir) Monomakh, primarily to their state-building efforts and the promotion of culture. The list of further reading contained many works of "bourgeois-nationalist" historians of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century: Mykola Kostomarov, Oleksandr Lazarevsky, and Mykhailo

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<sup>90</sup> See K. H. Huslysty and L. M. Slavin, eds., *Borotba ukrainskoho narodu proty nimetskykh zaharbnykiv* (Ufa: Vydavnytstvo AN URSSR, 1942); K. Huslysty, M. Petrovsky, L. Slavin, M. Suprunenko, and F. Iastrebov, eds., *Naukovi zapysky Instytutu istorii i arkheolohii AN URSSR* (Ufa: Vydavnytstvo AN URSSR, 1943), bk. 1 and a review by V. Picheta in *Istoricheskii zhurnal*, no. 9 (1944): 99-101; A. Vvedensky, "Dva goda raboty obedinennogo istoricheskogo fakulteta Ukrainskogo universiteta v usloviakh evakuatsii," *Istoricheskii zhurnal*, no. 5-6 (1944): 95-96.

<sup>91</sup> K. Voblyi, K. Huslysty, V. Diadychenko, F. Los, M. Petrovsky, L. Slavin, M. Suprunenko, and F. Sherstiuk, *Narys istorii Ukrainy* (Ufa: Vydavnytstvo AN URSSR, 1942), esp. pp. 61-75 on the Cossacks; S. Iushkov, review of *Narys istorii Ukrainy*, *Istoricheskii zhurnal*, no. 7 (1943): 89-90.

Hrushevsky.<sup>92</sup>

The working conditions in Eastern Russia and Central Asia, where the Ukrainian intellectuals spent the first two years of the war, hardly encouraged a serious elaboration of the historical genre in literature and the arts. Not a single historical novel was written there; the authorities "planned" to arrange the writing of two patriotic historical operas, *Danylo of Halych* and *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*, but work apparently never moved beyond the planning stage.<sup>93</sup> However, in 1942, the poet Mykola Bazhan published a long patriotic poem "Danylo of Halych" depicting the prince as a great warlord and popular leader. Although the poem typically referred to the thirteenth-century ancestors of Ukrainians as Rus' or Slavs, twice Bazhan used the word "Ukraine": "All of Ukraine hears the tread of [Danylo's] troops" and "As the first warrior in Ukrainian fields."<sup>94</sup> Such appropriation of the Galician-Volhynian Principality as "Ukrainian" was apparently deemed acceptable during the war. Bazhan received the Stalin Prize, Second Class, for "Danylo of Halych" and his other wartime poems.<sup>95</sup>

The production of *Taras Bulba*, the only historical movie in progress at the Ukrainian film studios in June 1941, was suspended with the beginning of the war "because of untopicality" (the Poles suddenly became potential allies rather than enemies) and all wartime work of Ukrainian cinema concentrated on documenting the present war

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<sup>92</sup> S. Iushkov, L. Slavin, M. Petrovsky (ed.), and K. Huslysty, *Istoriia Ukrainy* (Ufa: Vydavnytstvo AN URSR, 1943), vol. 1, esp. pp. 38-97 on Kievan Rus' and 183-313 on the Cossacks. The archives of the CP(b)U Central Committee preserved the advance copy with the publication date "1942" (TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 50).

<sup>93</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 441, ark. 5zv. The Ukrainian composer Kost Dankevych would write the opera *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* in 1948-53.

<sup>94</sup> Mykola Bazhan, "Danylo Halytsky," *Ukrainska literatura*, no. 3-4 (1942): 47-59, here 52 and 53; also idem, "Danylo Halytsky," in *Ukraina v ohni: Almanakh* (Ufa: Spilka radianskykh pysmennykiv Ukrainy, 1942), no. 1, pp. 75-89, here 80 and 82. In all post-1946 editions, "Ukraine" is changed to "Slavic land" and "Ukrainian fields" to the "field at Drohochyn" (Mykola Bazhan, "Danylo Halytsky," *Virshi i poemy* [Kiev: Radianskyi pysmennyk, 1949], pp. 210-14, here 206 and 208). In the present-day historical literature, the name of the town where Danylo defeated the Teutonic knights and was later crowned king is usually spelled Dorohychyn.

<sup>95</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 4 July 1946, p. 1.

itself.<sup>96</sup> Some Ukrainian artists, however, proceeded to explore new historical topics. At the exhibition of Ukrainian art in Ufa in the summer of 1942, Ivan Shulha presented the sketch of his painting *The Pereiaslav Council*—the first ever attempt by a Soviet artist to portray the 1654 act of union with Russia. As early as 1942, the Artists' Union planned to organize a major exhibition of art to celebrate the republic's imminent liberation. The display's topic was to be "The Great Patriotic War and the Heroic Past of the Ukrainian People."<sup>97</sup>

Noticeable early in the war, the elevation of the Ukrainian "classical cultural heritage" constituted another significant dimension of the new patriotism. The party ideologues organized widely publicized celebrations of Shevchenko and the founder of the modern Ukrainian musical tradition, Mykola Lysenko, in Ufa and Samarkand in 1942-43. The republic's Academy of Sciences in 1943 considered the study of the Ukrainian cultural heritage—the legacy of Shevchenko, Franko, Lysenko, the writer Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky, the eighteenth-century philosopher Hryhorii Skovoroda, and the nineteenth-century philologist Osyp Bodiansky—its primary aim. As soon as the republic's opera companies had moved to Soviet Asia, they were ordered to start working immediately and to stage "as their first priority" such Ukrainian classical works as Petro Hulak-Artemovsky's *The Zaporozhian Cossack beyond the Danube* (1863) and Lysenko's *Natalka from Poltava* (1889).<sup>98</sup>

The patriotic writings of Shevchenko, Franko, and Lesia Ukrainka continued to be published in mass editions even when all the territory of Ukraine remained under the German occupation. Indeed, Shevchenko's poems and Franko's short stories appeared in special editions "for [distribution in] the occupied territories." In May 1943, the Ukrainian

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<sup>96</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 66, ark. 8 (*Taras Bulba*); *Istoriia ukrainskoho kino* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1987), vol. 2, pp. 155-201 (wartime cinema).

<sup>97</sup> A. Dmytrenko, *Ukrainskyi radianskyi istorychnyi zhyvopys* (Kiev: Mystetstvo, 1966), pp. 56-7; *Istoriia ukrainskoho mystetstva v shesty tomakh* (Kiev: Mystetstvo, 1968), vol. 6, p. 46.

<sup>98</sup> Iu. Iu. Kondufor, ed., *Kulturne budivnytstvo v Ukrainskii RSR: Cherven 1941-1950: Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1989), pp. 27, 32, 54, 64 (celebrations); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 441, ark. 5zv. (Academy of Sciences); TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 7, spr. 345, ark. 85-86 (opera companies).

State Publishing House (then operating in Russia), released a new edition of Shevchenko's canonic collection of poems, *Kobzar*, in 20,000 copies. The tribulations of war notwithstanding, the Moscow printing works ensured what a contemporary reviewer called "a luxurious quality of print."<sup>99</sup> During 1942-43, the celebrated artist Vasyl Kasian produced a poster series, "Shevchenko's Wrath Is the Weapon of Victory," combining portraits of Shevchenko and lines from his poetry with background images of warfare. The series was reprinted as leaflets and dropped from planes over the occupied Ukrainian territories.<sup>100</sup>

The Ukrainian ideologues and intellectuals had been well aware that their interpretation of the past was competing with the nationalist patriotic narratives of Ukrainian history that were circulating in the occupied territories. The activities of West Ukrainian historian Professor Ivan Krypiakevych particularly bothered the Soviet authorities. Having been a darling of the Soviet administration in Lviv before the war, he published a *Brief History of Ukraine*, hailed as a nationalist alternative to Soviet textbooks and even reprinted in some Ukrainian collaborationist newspapers. The *Brief History* itself represented quite an innocent cursory survey of the national interpretation of Ukrainian history. However, the collaborationist paper *Vinnytski visti* concluded its publication of the book with a statement that connected the past with the present and provided an alternative canon of national heroes:

Now the time comes when the Soviet Union—that terrible prison and torture-house of peoples—is weakened, primarily by the Ukrainian national-liberation movement, and is collapsing under the mighty pressure of the revolutionary-liberation forces and strong blows of German arms. Bolshevism is collapsing, our Fatherland is obtaining a new freedom. We must now build our life anew. We proceed to this aim by the path of our ancient heroes who constantly fought for Ukraine's freedom. From Sviatoslav and Volodymyr to Khmelnytsky and Mazepa, from Shevchenko and Franko to Mykola Mikhnovsky, Symon Petliura, Ievhen Konovalts and many others—all of them sacrificed their efforts for the Ukrainian

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<sup>99</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 451, ark. 1-3 (wartime publication of Ukrainian classical literature); *Radianska Ukraina*, 5 June 1943, p. 4 (review of *Kobzar*).

<sup>100</sup> Leonid Vladych, *Vasyl Kasian: Piat etiudiv pro khudozhnyka* (Kiev: Mystetstvo, 1978), pp. 75, 80.

cause....We go in their steps, we will win freedom, independence and unity for Ukraine!<sup>101</sup>

It is not clear whether the quoted paragraph was written by Krypiakevych himself or added by the editors. Later emigre editions of his *Brief History of Ukraine* contain a slightly different conclusion but preserve the same list of great ancestors combining the Kievan grand princes and the Cossack hetmans with the twentieth-century nationalist leaders. Besides this small book, the Ukrainian Publishing House based in Cracow and Lviv issued *The History of Ukraine from Ancient Times to the Present* by I. Petrenko (Krypiakevych) and reprinted his 1929 short *History of Ukraine for the People* under the title *History of Ukraine*. While Krypiakevych was also preparing a more substantial book under the same title, the publisher reprinted Dmytro Doroshenko's *Survey of the History of Ukraine*, a work by a revered Ukrainian activist and Foreign Minister of the Hetman State that was first published in Warsaw in 1932-33. All these surveys revived the traditions of pre-Soviet Ukrainian historiography and treated the nation as a subject of history.<sup>102</sup>

*Radianska Ukraina* was disturbed enough by the nationalist efforts to publish history books in Cracow and Lviv to ridicule them in a special article. In July 1943, the paper mocked the nationalist historian Ivan Pohanko (literally, the "Rascal"), who was allegedly writing Ukrainian history in response to Goebbels' orders. Unfortunately for Ivan, the paper reported, a certain older nationalist, Doroshenko, published an anti-Soviet account of Ukraine's past before Ivan managed to do so. The article ended with a satirical description of Ivan walking unhappily to report on the failure of his flunkey services to

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<sup>101</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 2858, ark. 2-23 (typescript copy of newspaper publication; the longer quotation is on ark. 22-3). Sviatoslav (ruled 962-72) and Volodymyr (Vladimir, reigned 980-1015): grand princes of Kiev. Ivan Mazepa: hetman of Ukraine in 1687-1708, who, in 1708, allied himself with King Charles XII of Sweden against Tsar Peter the Great. Ivan Franko (1856-1916): the leading Western Ukrainian writer and political thinker of the time. Mikhnovsky, Petliura, and Konovalets: twentieth-century nationalist leaders.

<sup>102</sup> See I. K., *Mala istoriia Ukrainy* (Feldkirch: Zahrava, 1947), pp. 47-8. Krypiakevych's publishing activities are discussed in detail in Iaroslav Dashkevych, "Ivan Krypiakevych—istoryk Ukrainy," in Ivan Krypiakevych, *Istoriia Ukrainy* (Lviv: Svit, 1990), pp. 5-21. On the Ukrainian Publishing House, see *Kulturne zhyttia v Ukraini: Zakhidni zemli*, 1: 208-9.

his master, *Reichskommissar* Erich Koch.<sup>103</sup> The paper might not have known that "Pohanko" was actually Krypiakevych, who carefully used different pen names for his publications. In fact, the postwar Soviet ideologues would claim that Krypiakevych wrote an introduction for a *Great Illustrated History* that "the nationalists distributed [among the population] during the war," whereas Krypiakevych never authored a work with such a name.<sup>104</sup>

Fighting on two fronts, Ukrainian Soviet intellectuals also rebuffed their nationalist compatriots in Canada. In April 1943, the Soviet All-Slavic Committee learned that the "pro-fascist nationalist organization," the Canadian Ukrainian Committee, presented Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King with a memo expressing the Ukrainians' desire to obtain "their own independent state in Europe." The Moscow-based Slavic Committee enlisted leading Ukrainian scholars and writers to prepare rebuttals for publication both in Ukraine and Canada.<sup>105</sup> The poet Pavlo Tychyna wrote a particularly amusing article, "Dirty Hands off Ukraine," trying to prove that "one cannot create a fully independent state in such a geographical setting." Even Danylo of Halych had to ally himself with Hungary and Poland. The Ukrainian Central Rada of 1918 did not last long as an independent government before inviting the Germans in. The Soviet Union, Tychyna implied, was by far the best deal for geopolitically challenged Ukrainians.<sup>106</sup>

Much more powerful, if long dead, competitors were close to home. The war destroyed the Soviet centralized book trade, leading to the revival of book bazaars. As the writer Petro Panch testified, pre-revolutionary books on Ukrainian history, especially the works about separatist hetmans Mazepa and Petro Doroshenko, enjoyed strong demand at bazaars. Panch particularly singled out the works by pre-revolutionary historians

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<sup>103</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 9 July 1943, p. 4.

<sup>104</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 436, ark. 226. Krypiakevych did edit the *Great History of Ukraine* in 1935. He also served as an editor of the journal *Illustrated Ukraine* in 1913-14. The *History of Ukraine* that he was preparing during the war was only published in West Germany in 1949: Ivan Kholmsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy* (Munich: Naukove tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1949).

<sup>105</sup> GARF, f. 6646, op. 1, d. 4, ll. 9-10.

<sup>106</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 16 May 1943, pp. 2-3.

Mykola Kostomarov, Hrytsko Kovalenko, Mykola Arkas and historical novels by Adrian Kashchenko: "[People] pay ten times more for these books than for our Soviet histories. Why is it so?" According to Panch, even poorly educated peasants read Arkas's one-volume *History of Ukraine* "with great pleasure because it is written in an overly popular style." In December 1944, the authorities began enforcing the state monopoly on the book trade, at least in big cities. Many books discovered at the bazaars were said to be "politically harmful."<sup>107</sup>

Serious concern with concurrent nationalist patriotic propaganda surfaced in the Soviet Ukrainian press and ideological documents during late 1942 and early 1943. However, neither the actual activities of the Ukrainian nationalists (who were discouraged and harassed by the Germans) nor the Soviet authorities' information about this "nationalist propaganda" seems to have justified such an alarm. Perhaps the Stalinist ideologues denounced Ukrainian nationalism so strongly precisely because they had been aware of the tensions within their own historical imagination: between the notions of "class" and "nation," as well as between those of the "great Russian people" and "great Ukrainian people." A fierce anti-nationalist rhetoric reflected the functionaries' and intellectuals' own inability to fashion a Soviet Ukrainian historical mythology that would be completely separate from a "bourgeois" notion of national patrimony. The simultaneous and poorly coordinated promotion of the Russian and Ukrainian ethnic patriotisms in the first period of the war soon led Soviet ideologues to realize that they were encouraging separate ethnic patriotisms and historical self-identifications, thus undermining the cohesiveness of the Stalinist "imagined community."

In his diary entry of 3 June 1942, the Ukrainian writer and film director Oleksandr Dovzhenko conceptualized the need for a patriotic turnabout in Soviet ideology, just after the Soviet counteroffensive failed at Kharkiv: "The tsarist army fought better. There was something eternal, high, something dear and comprehensible to everyone—faith and

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<sup>107</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 387, ark. 18 (Panch); TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 7, spr. 818, ark. 5, 9 (book trade). Arkas's *History* referred to by Panch is Mykola Arkas, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusi z 210 maliunkamy ta portretamy ta 9 kartamy* (St. Petersburg: Obshchestvennaia polza, 1912) or one of its two revised editions: Mykola Arkas, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusi z maliunkamy*, 2nd ed. (Cracow: Olha Arkas, 1912) and 3rd ed. (Leipzig: Ukrainiska nakladnia, 1920).



fatherland. They fought for God and Mother Russia. Now there is no God. Russia is a country of classes, all the people know is learned and rationalized, their feelings are uprooted and the human soul is worn out." Significantly, five days later Dovzhenko supplemented his thoughts on Mother Russia with a plan to write a history of Kiev and of Ukraine in general.<sup>108</sup> Seemingly, he did not sense the contradiction in the simultaneous fostering of Russian and Ukrainian national sentiments, but other Ukrainian intellectuals did. In November 1942, the writer Iurii Ianovsky reported from Ufa to Moscow, to the Secretary for Ideology of the Ukrainian Central Committee, Kost Lytvyn, a fragment of a conversation among unidentified Ukrainian scholars: "Ukrainian nationalism passes during the war for patriotism, but after the war [the authorities] will square accounts with it."<sup>109</sup>

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The Stalinist quest for a unifying past that would conjure up a sense of historical continuity led to the nation's reinstatement as a subject of history. However, Moscow's retreat from proletarian internationalism to Russian ethnic patriotism was followed by a similar process in Ukraine. The Ukrainians were not converted to "Russianness"; instead, the republic's cultural elites proceeded to revive Ukrainian national traditions, historic heroes, and cultural heritage. New historical narratives emphasized the growth and struggles of the Ukrainian nation and considered the unification of the Ukrainian ethnic lands into a "nation-state" as a teleological outcome of Ukrainian history. Individual

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<sup>108</sup> Oleksandr Dovzhenko, *Hospody, poshly meni syly: Shchodennyk, kinopovisti, opovidannia, folklorni zapysy, lysty, dokumenty* (Kharkiv: Folio, 1994), pp. 135, 139.

<sup>109</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 68, ark. 29zv. The NKVD had several informants among the Ukrainian scholars stationed in Ufa. Their reports open a rare window into the intelligentsia's real view of things during the war, providing a surprising picture of panic and disbelief. In the autumn of 1942, the physicist Loshkarev considered the creation of "free Ukraine" and secession of the Baltic and Northern Caucasus to the Germans the only solution. The historian Los and the writer Kundzich saw the situation as "hopeless," the historian Diadychenko hoped only for Western aid, while the composer Verykivsky praised England and the USA for their freedom of speech. The leading architect, academician Volodymyr Zabolotny, condemned the conformism of the court poets Rylsky and Tychna, while the philologist academician Bulakhovsky declined an offer to join the Party. Only the court historian of the Cossacks, Mykola Petrovsky, sounded optimistic and praised Stalin on every corner. (See the report to Khrushchev from the republican People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, Savchenko, in TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 125, ark. 1-17).

Ukrainian writers, historians, and filmmakers accomplished this change in public discourse with the party's encouragement, but not without opposition from their peers. During the Polish campaign of 1939 and the first years of the German-Soviet war, the authorities promoted the cult of the Ukrainian nation as a mobilization tool, and the republic's intellectuals took advantage of the license to produce patriotic historical mythologies, maintain the cult of ethnic tradition, and valorize the Ukrainian ethnic heritage.

However, as the official discourse suppressed the tension between the class and ethnic narratives of the Ukrainian past, the contradiction between the Russian and Ukrainian competing grand narratives of national history came to the fore. On the one hand, the Ukrainian historical mythology could claim the most impressive pages of the Russian "glorious past": the medieval Kievan Rus', the sixteenth-century wars with Poland, and the 1654 union between Muscovy and Cossack Ukraine that created a mighty East European empire. On the other hand, party ideologues soon became aware of the danger of promoting separate patriotic national histories for Soviet nationalities. As the rhetoric of Ukrainian ethnic patriotism exploded again with the Red Army's counteroffensive in the republic's territory in the autumn of 1943, Ukrainian bureaucrats and intellectuals were the first to realize the need to reconcile the Ukrainian and Russian heroic pasts within the hierarchy of the "friendship of peoples."

## Chapter Two

### THE UNBREAKABLE UNION

The retreat from proletarian internationalism reached its climax by December 1943, when the Kremlin dropped the "Internationale" as the Soviet anthem. Reflecting the new official blend of Russian and Soviet patriotism, the new anthem began with the line "The Great Rus' forever joined together the unbreakable union of free republics." Significantly, though, the non-Russian republics soon created their own anthems. As early as 21 February 1944, the Ukrainian authorities announced a competition for the best text and music. Most entries developed the lines of the all-Union anthem with an addition of two or three local themes: the great free Ukraine, the Ukrainians' reunification in one state, and their historic friendship with the Russian people. For instance, Tychyna contributed a poem with the refrain "Glory to brotherhood! Glory to freedom! / The Ukrainian land is reunited again. / In concord with the fraternal Russian people / The Ukrainian people achieved happiness." The first stanza of Bazhan's entry read: "Live, O Ukraine, blossoming and mighty / In the union of fraternal Soviet peoples. / Equal among equals, free among free, / Live, O Ukraine, forever and ever."<sup>110</sup>

Moreover, on 1 February 1944, the amendments to the Soviet Constitution gave the republics the right to establish their own armies and maintain diplomatic relations with foreign states. The most likely motivation for this new policy was Stalin's intention to claim a UN seat for each republic, although eventually, he had to settle for three seats: for the Union itself, Ukraine, and Belarus.<sup>111</sup> Nevertheless, recent studies by Ukrainian

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<sup>110</sup> *Kulturne budivnytstvo v Ukrainiskii RSR: Naivazhlyvishi rishennia Komunistychnoi partii i Radianskoho uriadu: Zbirnyk dokumentiv* (Kiev: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo politychnoi literatury, 1961), vol. 2, p. 17 (Ukrainian competition); RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 300 (competitions in other republics); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 1608, ark. 6 (Tychyna), 8 (Bazhan). The competition dragged on until mid-1946, when the Ukrainian authorities finally submitted the text and music for Moscow's approval. However, with the first signs of the *Zhdanovshchina* in the air, the head of the Administration of Propaganda and Agitation, Georgii Aleksandrov, suggested that the anthem should "show more clearly that Ukraine is a Soviet socialist republic" (TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 2782, ark. 2). Only after the ideological purge of Soviet literature and the arts abated in mid-1948, did the Ukrainian ideologues inaugurate the republic's anthem with a text co-authored by Tychyna and Bazhan (*Literaturna hazeta*, 24 July 1948, p. 1).

<sup>111</sup> Simon, *Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities*, 189-90.

scholars reveal that the republican functionaries actually took the constitutional amendments seriously. While the other republics established only People's Commissariats of Foreign Affairs, Ukraine created its own Commissariat of Defense. In the summer of 1944, Khrushchev and the People's Commissar of Defense, Lt.-General V. P. Herasymenko, developed a plan for a full-fledged ministry with impressive prerogatives and power. The first Commissar of Foreign Affairs, the writer Oleksandr Korniiichuk, also began building a bona fide ministry before being replaced by Dmytro Manuilsky in July 1944. Contemporary newspapers interpreted the amendments as a "new step in Ukrainian state-building."<sup>112</sup>

In November 1944, the Ukrainian ideologues inaugurated another imposing nation-building project, the preparation of a twenty-volume *Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia*. The designated editor-in-chief, Manuilsky, cleared this local initiative with Moscow, "with Comrade Aleksandrov, who expressed not only his opinion but also the opinion of Comrade Malenkov that such a Ukrainian Soviet encyclopedia was needed."<sup>113</sup> The joint decree of the Ukrainian party and government directed that the encyclopedia "portray comprehensively the heroic past and the cultural heritage" of Ukrainians, as well as highlight "the unbreakable union of the Russian and Ukrainian people, the inevitable victory of Soviet power in Ukraine, and the reunification of the Ukrainian people." The republican authorities elaborated an ambitious plan to complete a twenty-volume encyclopedia by 1955, but the project was discontinued in 1947, ostensibly for lack of

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<sup>112</sup> See V. A. Hrynevych, "Utvorennia Narkomatu oborony URSR u 1944 r.: Z istorii odniiei politychnoi hry." *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 5 (1991): 29-37; idem, "Utvorennia Narodnoho komisariatu zakordonnykh sprav Ukrainskoi RSR: Proekty i realii (1944-1945 rr.)," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 3 (1995): 35-46; *Radianska Ukraina*, 8 February 1944, p. 1 (editorial on state-building); 6 February 1944, p. 1; 5 March 1944, p. 1 (ministers appointed). The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense ceased to exist soon after the war.

<sup>113</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 4750, op. 1, spr. 3959, ark. 50. As a secretary of the Central Committee, Georgii Malenkov supervised the party's organizational work, but since Zhdanov spent most of the war in besieged Leningrad, Malenkov also spread his influence to ideological matters. Aleksandrov, himself Zhdanov's former protégé, was working closely with Malenkov as a rising heir apparent (Werner G. Hann, *Postwar Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, 1946-1953* [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982], pp. 19-66).

financing.<sup>114</sup> (The encyclopedia was subsequently issued in seventeen volumes from 1959 to 1965).

These three enterprises illustrate how, during the last years of the war, ambiguous signals from above, local initiatives, and the local élites' changing interpretations of the party line all influenced the Stalinist "nation-building" in Ukraine. The emerging historical myth of the "friendship of peoples" was likewise produced by the interaction between the center and the periphery, when local ideologues and intellectuals attempted to reconcile their people's heroic past with the official grand narrative of Russian guidance.

### **The Unifying Past**

The Ukrainian patriotic propaganda reached its wartime heights in the autumn of 1943. Although the easternmost Ukrainian city of Voroshylovhrad had been controlled by the Red Army since February, the liberation of Ukraine began in earnest after the Kursk battle, i. e., in late August-September 1943. According to a recent Ukrainian study, the advancing troops were overwhelmingly Russian by ethnic composition, but the mass mobilization of the population soon turned four Soviet groups of armies into the First, Second, Third, and Fourth "Ukrainian Fronts," and not only in name. From 1944 on, Ukrainians constituted up to 50-70% of the manpower in many Red Army units.<sup>115</sup> The westward advance gave the authorities the problem of securing allegiance and renewing the ideological indoctrination of Ukrainians both in the army and behind the lines. In October 1943, the creation of the Order of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the only Soviet military order named after a non-Russian hero, symbolized the official promotion of Ukrainian ethnic patriotism.

Declassified archival documents and recently published memoirs shed a new light on this interesting episode of Stalinist ideological evolution. They reveal that Ukrainian

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<sup>114</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 15 November 1944, p. 1 (aims of encyclopedia); TsDAVOV, f. 4750, op. 1, spr. 2, ark. 1-2; spr. 13, ark. 13-14 (number of volumes, schedules, and editorial board); spr. 17; f. 2, op. 7, spr. 2747, ark. 29; spr. 3927, ark. 54-55 (work accomplished by 1947).

<sup>115</sup> M. V. Koval, *Ukraina 1939-1945: Malovidomi i neprochytani storinky istorii* (Kiev: Vyscha shkola, 1995), p. 87.

intellectuals and functionaries, seeking to bolster popular patriotism, initiated the new order. The idea itself can be traced to the prominent film director and writer Oleksandr Dovzhenko. As the Red Army advanced into Ukrainian territory, Dovzhenko, apparently mindful of the creation of the Orders of Aleksandr Nevsky, Mikhail Kutuzov, and Aleksandr Suvorov in mid-1942, talked to Khrushchev on 29 August 1943 about establishing the Order of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. According to Dovzhenko's diary, the Ukrainian Communist Party's first secretary accepted the idea "with delight."<sup>116</sup> The archives have preserved Khrushchev's original letter to Stalin of 31 August concerning this matter:

In connection with the liberation of Ukraine that has now begun, I think it would be expedient to establish the military Order of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, to be awarded to the officers and generals of the Red Army [struck out: for services in liberating the Ukrainian land from the German aggressors]. The news that such an order has been established will raise the morale of Red Army fighters, especially Ukrainians. The Ukrainian people, the Ukrainian intelligentsia will greet the news about the creation of the Order of Bohdan Khmelnytsky with particular pleasure and enthusiasm. Bohdan Khmelnytsky is a statesman and military leader who is very popular and beloved in Ukraine, who fought for Ukraine's liberation, as well as its drawing together [with Russia] and the unification of the Ukrainian and Russian people. In this sense, establishing an order named after him would have a desirable political effect.<sup>117</sup>

Thus, the republic's functionaries and intellectuals evoked the notion of the Russian-Ukrainian friendship as a tool to promote the Ukrainian historical mythology. By so doing, however, they were also establishing the subordinate position of the Ukrainian historical narrative.

On 2 September, Khrushchev advised one of his deputies about Stalin's approval:

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<sup>116</sup> Dovzhenko, *Hospody*, 191. Compare the decrees in *Pravda*, 30 July 1942, p. 1, on establishing the orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov, and Nevsky. Dovzhenko belonged to a small group of leading Ukrainian writers who were commissioned to the army as senior political officers to produce propaganda materials.

<sup>117</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 355, ark. 21-22. The document is the original letter, signed by Khrushchev in Kharkiv on 31 August and transmitted to Stalin on the same day by "VCh," the high-frequency secure telegraph channel used by the Soviet military command during the war. The letter survived among the poorly organized wartime correspondence files of the Ukrainian Central Committee.

"I have received Comrade Stalin's consent in principle to establish the military Order of Bohdan Khmelnytsky."<sup>118</sup> During September, two groups of Ukrainian artists in Kharkiv and Moscow worked frantically to prepare sketches of the order. Interestingly, the Ukrainian leadership instructed them to use the Ukrainian, rather than the Russian, spelling of the hetman's name on the order. The winning project by the Moscow-based Ukrainian graphic artist Oleksandr Pashchenko represented a richly ornamented six-pointed star with Khmelnytsky's portrait in the center and the hetman's name in Ukrainian beneath.<sup>119</sup>

Before the order was unveiled, however, Stalin decided to magnify the propagandistic effect by simultaneous renaming the city of Pereiaslav to Pereiaslav-Khmelnytsky. Whether he made this suggestion in writing or over the phone is not clear. Stalin's letters to Khrushchev, if they survived, are not available, and Stalin's role is deduced from Khrushchev's reciprocal elaborations on when to announce the renaming "that you [Stalin] proposed."<sup>120</sup> Aware that the site of the 1654 Russian-Ukrainian union treaty, Pereiaslav, was about to be taken by the Red Army, Khrushchev instructed *Pravda's* editor, Petr Pospelov, to prepare the proper propaganda materials on Khmelnytsky in advance, by employing the group of leading Ukrainian writers then in Moscow: Pavlo Tychyna, Mykola Bazhan, Maksym Rylsky, and Oleksandr Dovzhenko.<sup>121</sup>

As soon as the Red Army took Pereiaslav, the central and Ukrainian newspapers unveiled a series of decrees and propaganda articles. On 11 October, *Pravda* published

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<sup>118</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 463, ark. 11; spr. 355, ark. 20.

<sup>119</sup> The sketches of the Kharkiv-based artists are in TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 355, ark. 26-42; the spelling is specified on ark. 12. On the additional competition in Moscow and Pashchenko's success, see A. Dmytrenko, *Ukrainskyi radianskyi istorychnyi zhyvopys*, 56.

<sup>120</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 355, ark. 15.

<sup>121</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 328, ark. 15. This story also provides an interesting example of how the Stalinist administrative system worked. The matter of renaming the city was decided between Stalin and his Ukrainian viceroy, Khrushchev, circumventing the apparatus of both the Ukrainian and All-Union Central Committees. Although himself one of the highest ideological bureaucrats, Pospelov learned about the decision from a handwritten note that Khrushchev dictated to his aide Lt.-Colonel Hapochka for delivery to Pospelov.

the decree (dated the previous day) establishing the Order of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Written by or with the participation of Ukrainian intellectuals, the accompanying editorial stressed Khmelnytsky's role in uniting Ukraine with Russia:

The Ukrainian people hold sacred the name of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the Russian people revere his name, all the peoples of the Soviet Union know his name and pronounce it with the greatest respect and love because this name is linked inseparably to the Ukrainian people's struggle for liberation from the foreign yoke, to the history of reunification of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, the brotherly union of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples....The greatest statesman of his time, [Khmelnytsky] understood well that the Ukrainian people could survive only in union with the fraternal Russian people....The unification of two fraternal peoples, Russian and Ukrainian, was the greatest historical service of Bohdan Khmelnytsky.<sup>122</sup>

Ukrainian newspapers offered a similar interpretation. Writing in the official *Radianska Ukraina*, Mykola Petrovsky exalted Khmelnytsky as an ethnic hero—the "great military leader, the liberator of all Ukrainian lands from Poland." However, the historian denounced the previously popular view that Khmelnytsky considered the Pereiaslav Treaty a temporary diplomatic maneuver and intended to break up with Muscovy in his later years. According to Petrovsky, the hetman sought the union with Russia from the beginning of the war, and this desire reflected the age-long strivings of the Ukrainian people.<sup>123</sup>

The archives reveal that the new official interpretation of Ukraine's union with Russia as the "only right path" instead of "lesser evil" was elaborated in the apparatus of the Ukrainian Central Committee and relied heavily on the writings of the court historian of the Khmelnytsky Uprising and the leading "rehabilitationist," Mykola Petrovsky. Moreover, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's draft decrees creating the Order of Khmelnytsky and renaming the city of Pereiaslav, as well as the accompanying propaganda materials, had been prepared in Kiev. All these texts featured the "only right

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<sup>122</sup> *Pravda*, 11 October 1943, p. 1.

<sup>123</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 12 October 1943, p. 3.



path" theme.<sup>124</sup> By establishing the connection between the Ukrainian and Russian national mythologies, the republic's ideologues found a license to continue the Ukrainian patriotic propaganda. On 13 October, both the central and republican press announced the rechristening of Pereiaslav as Pereiaslav-Khmelnysky "in memory of the great son of the Ukrainian people, statesman and military leader Bohdan Khmelnysky." While stressing the hetman's services in uniting Ukraine with Russia, *Radianska Ukraina* featured the most frenzied samples of patriotic rhetoric, elevating Khmelnysky to the stature of the father of the nation: "Bohdan Khmelnysky's ardent blood streams and boils up in our people's veins."<sup>125</sup>

On 26 October, the first three Orders of Bohdan Khmelnysky were conferred on the representatives of three different nationalities. A Jew, Lt.-Colonel Iosif Kaplun, and a Ukrainian, Major Borys Tarasenko, received the Order of Khmelnysky, Second Class, for "skilful and courageous guidance of the combat during the operation of crossing the Dnieper," while a Russian, Major-General Aleksei Danilov, was awarded First Class. All in all, the Soviet military command awarded 323 Orders of Khmelnysky, First Class, ca. 2400 of the Second Class, and ca. 5700 of the Third Class, as well as approximately one thousand orders symbolically conferred on Red Army regiments and divisions.<sup>126</sup> Although this decoration was not awarded exclusively to Ukrainians or for services in liberating Ukraine, the creation of the Order of Khmelnysky confirmed that the rehabilitation of Ukrainian historic mythology was irreversible. At the same time,

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<sup>124</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 328, ark. 1-7.

<sup>125</sup> *Pravda*, 13 October 1943, p. 1; *Radianska Ukraina*, 13 October 1943, p. 1.

<sup>126</sup> *Pravda*, 27 October 1943, pp. 2, 3; G. A. Kolesnikov and A. M. Rozhkov, *Ordena i medali SSSR*, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1978), p. 71. A British journalist in the wartime Soviet Union, Alexander Werth, wrote that the Order of Khmelnysky was not widely awarded and seemed to many an unnecessary rival to the orders of Nevsky, Kutuzov, and Suvorov, which had the prestige of Stalingrad attached to them. Moreover, he claimed that unveiling a new award "caused some embarrassment when a number of Russian officers of the Jewish race refused the Khmelnysky order on the grounds that the glorious Hetman had been guilty of a considerable number of pogroms" (Alexander Werth, *Russia at War, 1941-1945* [London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1964], p. 743, footnote). Werth's opinion is probably based on hearsay and is not corroborated by available documents. In fact, although it was established more than a year later, the Order of Khmelnysky was conferred on more people than those of Suvorov or Kutuzov (*Ordena i medali SSSR*, 53-58, 61-65, 68-72), and the very first officer to receive it was a Jew.

however, the image of Khmelnytsky in official discourse was evolving: the liberator of Ukraine was becoming Ukraine's unifier with Russia.

As the Red Army was taking one Ukrainian city after another beginning in September 1943, *Radianska Ukraina* featured articles on these cities' role in the national history. The pieces were filled with references to the "traditions of our freedom-loving ancestors," the princes of Kievan Rus' and the Cossack leaders.<sup>127</sup> On 31 October, the same authoritative newspaper allotted its entire page three to Mykola Petrovsky's long article "The Inflexible Spirit of the Great Ukrainian People." Also published as a pamphlet, the article surveyed the entire history of Ukraine from Kievan Rus' to the Great Patriotic War. The work designated princes Sviatoslav, Volodymyr Monomakh, Roman Mstyslavych, and Danylo of Halych as "great leaders" (*vozhdi*); presented the Zaporozhian Host as the "beginning of a new Ukrainian state"; and dropped any mention of the "lesser evil" theory in favor of a more optimistic construct: "In 1654, Ukraine concluded with Russia an unbreakable fraternal union." Finally, in the opening sentence of the article, Petrovsky coined a new Hegelian definition of the Ukrainian *Volksgeist*, a statement to be reworded often in subsequent Ukrainian scholarship and political pronouncements: "The history of the Ukrainian people is a history of the long and fierce struggle against various foreign invaders, against social and national oppression, for unification within the Ukrainian state, and for establishing the unbreakable union with the fraternal Russian people."<sup>128</sup>

After the Red Army took Kiev on 6 November, Khrushchev and other Ukrainian leaders issued a manifesto, "To the Ukrainian People," celebrating the liberation of the "glorious and ancient capital of Ukraine" and referring to the "glory of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Petro Sahaidachny, Taras Shevchenko, and Mykola Shchors"—an abbreviated, familiar Soviet Ukrainian canon of great ancestors. As Dovzhenko's diary

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<sup>127</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 24 September 1943, p. 3; 25 September 1943, p. 4; 29 September 1943, p. 3. The quotation is from the title of Petrovsky's article in the 24 September issue.

<sup>128</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 31 October 1943, p. 3 and M. N. Petrovsky, *Nezlamnyi dukh velykoho ukrainskoho narodu* (Kharkiv: Ukrainske derzhavne vydavnytstvo, 1943), pp. 4, 6, 10. The opening statement is on p. 3.

reveals, a group of Ukrainian writers headed by Iurii Ianovsky prepared the appeal.<sup>129</sup> In Moscow, the premier Ukrainian poet Maksym Rylsky gave a speech, "Kiev in the History of Ukraine," at a special convention of the All-Union Academy of Sciences. Rylsky's speech was nothing less than a comprehensive survey of the development of Ukrainian culture from ancient times to the present, particularly emphasizing the early modern period and the nineteenth-century national revival. Downplaying the post-1917 achievements, Rylsky spoke of the "uninterrupted development of Ukrainian culture" across the centuries. He praised the Cossacks as "Ukraine's sharp sword" and exalted the "brilliant representatives of Ukrainian historical scholarship": Kostomarov, Kulish, Antonovych, Lazarevsky, Levytsky, the fellows of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, and Hrushevsky with his "monumental" *History of Ukraine-Rus'*—all of whom had been stigmatized before the war as "bourgeois nationalists." *Radianska Ukraina* dutifully reported the speech in full.<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>129</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 18 November 1943, p. 1; Dovzhenko, *Hospody*, 195. Interestingly, Khrushchev felt that more intellectuals were needed to promote the state-sponsored patriotic revival. In October 1943, he requested from the NKVD information on forty-eight Ukrainian historians, writers, artists, and composers arrested before the war. The republic's party boss was specifically interested in learning "who could be returned to Ukraine" from exile or from the Gulag. Only a few actually returned; the sole known example of a person released from the Gulag was the enormously popular humorist, Ostap Vyshnia. None of the ten people I was able to identify as historians, most of whom in 1943 were in exile in Siberia, resumed scholarly work after the war (TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 699, ark. 1-15; Iu. Aksiutin and D. Tabachnyk, "Ukrainskyi synodyk Khrushcheva," in O. I. Sydorenko and D. V. Tabachnyk, eds., *Represovane "vidrozhennia"* (Kiev: Ukraina, 1993), pp. 28-52 [list]; O. Mukomola, "Ostap Vyshnia," in Musiienko, ed., *Z poroha smerti*, 101-03 [Vyshnia released in September 1943]). At about the same time, plans were made to locate two historians arrested in 1930 as members of the nebulous "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine," Mykhailo Slabchenko and Volodymyr Parkhomenko. The memo characterized Slabchenko as a "prominent scholar-historian, former full member of the Academy of Sciences," who now resided in Astrakhan. Another plan concerned inviting the Ukrainian specialists working in Russia; according to it, Professor Picheta was to be offered "an executive position" at the Institute of History and a chair at Kiev University, while Professors O. A. Savych and A. I. Kozachenko were also to be approached (TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 18, ark. 112-16).

Returning the republican Academy of Sciences to Kiev was also high on the list of Khrushchev's priorities. He personally approached the People's Commissar of Railroad Transport, Lazar Kaganovich, to give the Academy's train a priority passage. The Institute of Social Sciences, of which the Institute of History was part until July 1944, returned to Kiev in mid-May. The Ivan Franko Ukrainian Drama Theater Company, in comparison, arrived in the city only in late July (TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 18, ark. 22 [Kaganovich's reply]; NAIU, op. 1, spr. 56, ark. 1-4 [the Institute's annual report for 1944]; *Radianska Ukraina*, 25 July 1944, p. 3 [Franko Theater Company]).

<sup>130</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 10 December 1943, pp. 3-4.

Although they continued promoting Ukrainian patriotism, the republic's ideologues became aware of the need to reconcile their ethnic rhetoric with the Russocentric ideological rumblings from the center. In addition, they also felt obliged to stress that their own patriotic discourse differed from the nationalistic narrative of the Ukrainian heroic past promoted by the "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists" in the occupied territories. To map the direction of ideological change, the Ukrainian party leadership used an otherwise insignificant occasion, the 290th anniversary of the Pereiaslav Treaty in January 1944. In late October 1943, Khrushchev wrote to Stalin:

18 January 1944 will mark 290 years since Ukraine's incorporation [*prisoedineniia*] into Russia according to the Pereiaslav Treaty concluded by Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the city of Pereiaslav-Khmelnytsky [*sic!*]. The CP(b)U Central Committee asks that the celebration of this anniversary be permitted, given the furious anti-historical propaganda against the unification of the Russian and Ukrainian people that the German fascists and Ukrainian-German nationalists have conducted in Ukraine....During the entire period that Soviet power has existed in Ukraine, an anniversary of this event would be commemorated for the first time.<sup>131</sup>

The plans for an unprecedented celebration of a non-round number of years since the union were quite modest, being mostly limited to articles, leaflets, and meetings in major cities. Stalin had apparently approved the plan, and the Ukrainian authorities properly celebrated the 290th anniversary of Pereiaslav on 18 January 1944. While the rehabilitation of Khmelnytsky had national liberation and statehood as its principal referent, the renewed cult of Pereiaslav symbolized the eternal union with Russia. The media did not mention that in 1654, Ukraine had joined *tsarist* Russia, and the editorials entitled "The Sacred Union" seemed to revise the "lesser evil" theory irrevocably.<sup>132</sup>

On 8 July 1944, the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences held a festive convention and concert to commemorate an even less "round" jubilee than that of the 290th of Pereiaslav,

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<sup>131</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 91, ark. 44. This copy of the letter does not show the date, but the other materials of the file point to late October 1943. The list of the planned festivities is on ark. 45-47.

<sup>132</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 18 January 1944, p. 1; *Radianske mystetstvo*, 18 January 1944, pp. 1-2.

the 235th anniversary of the Battle at Poltava. Poltava, where Peter the Great and the Ukrainian Cossacks who were loyal to him defeated Charles XII of Sweden and his ally Hetman Mazepa in 1709, ideally suited the current ideological requirements. The speakers praised the unbreakable union of Ukrainians and Russians and condemned the contemporary "Ukrainian fascist nationalists."<sup>133</sup> In October 1944, *Radianska Ukraina* published a landmark editorial, "Great Rus'," elaborating on the first line of the new Soviet anthem and pledging "our love" for Great Rus', a term clearly connoting historic Russia. In November, the newspaper carried a long article by Moscow historian Anna Pankratova, "The Historic Friendship of the Russian and Ukrainian Peoples."<sup>134</sup> By late 1944, Ukrainian ethnic patriotism had become subordinated to the doctrine of Russian guidance within the new overarching interpretive framework of the "friendship of peoples."

Although the above analysis stressed the Ukrainian bureaucrats' and intellectuals' initiative in subordinating Ukrainian ethnic patriotism to the Russian one, Moscow did interfere on its own. After regaining the strategic initiative in the war by late 1943, the party hierarchy indicated its unhappiness with the proliferation of non-Russian patriotisms by denouncing the *History of the Kazakh SSR*,<sup>135</sup> but the press did not report the incident until 1945. The center condemned primarily the cult of the Kazakh national heroes who had fought against tsarist Russia, a crime that Danylo of Halych and Bohdan Khmelnytsky had never committed, but Moscow also demonstrated its dissatisfaction with the growth of Ukrainian mythology. After the liberation of Kiev, the Ukrainian authorities enlisted a group of writers to compose a solemn open "Letter from the Ukrainian People to the Great Russian People." Significantly, the text did not designate Ukrainians as the

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<sup>133</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 9 July 1944, p. 2.

<sup>134</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 17 October 1944, p. 3; 13 November 1944, p. 2.

<sup>135</sup> The classic account of the developments around the *History of the Kazakh SSR* is in Tillet, *The Great Friendship*, 70-83. The archives of the All-Union Central Committee confirm that the book was nominated for a Stalin Prize, but the reviewer Aleksei Iakovlev objected to its glorification of anti-Russian uprisings in Kazakhstan as heroic anti-colonial struggles. The book's co-editor, Anna Pankratova, complained to the Central Committee's Administration of Propaganda and Agitation, but its head, Georgii Aleksandrov, only condemned the work even more vigorously as "anti-Russian." See RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 224, ll. 4, 23-25, 36-43.

second "great" nation of the USSR, although it claimed that the two fraternal peoples had achieved all their historic victories together. A paean to Russian-Ukrainian friendship and Russian guidance, the letter attempted to present all the Ukrainian "great ancestors" as comrades-in-arms of the contemporary Russian heroes. However, Aleksandrov interpreted the text as presuming the existence of "two leading peoples in the Soviet Union—the Russians and the Ukrainians," while it was "known and universally accepted that the Russian people [were] the big brother in the Soviet Union's family of peoples." As well, Aleksandrov dismissed as fictitious the Ukrainian claims that Danylo of Halych had somehow assisted Aleksandr Nevsky in his victories over the German knights during the early 1240s. In the end, *Pravda* published a report about the mass meeting in a liberated Kiev, rather than the letter itself.<sup>136</sup>

Nevertheless, the signals from Moscow remained confusing. Just as Aleksandrov was criticizing the unfortunate letter for its insufficient worship of the great Russian people, Dovzhenko learned (on 26 November) that Stalin had banned his novel and film script *Ukraine in Flames*. In January 1944, the Politburo convened in the Kremlin with a group of Ukrainian functionaries and leading writers to discuss the faulty work. During the meeting, Stalin personally accused Dovzhenko of "revising Leninism" by emphasizing national pride over the principle of class struggle.<sup>137</sup> Although the national pride in question was Ukrainian, Stalin did not call it excessive or claim that it detracted from the Russians' greatness; instead, he resented the opposition of Ukrainian patriotism to allegiance to the working class, the party, and the kolkhoz system. The exact direction of ideological change remained unspecified.

### **The Reluctant Nation-Builders**

Watching for further signals from above, the Ukrainian bureaucrats and intellectuals

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<sup>136</sup> RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 190, ll. 25-37, here 26-27. Dovzhenko noted in his diary that the letter was prepared by the same group of Ukrainian writers headed by Iurii Ianovsky (Dovzhenko, *Hospody*, 195).

<sup>137</sup> The text of Stalin's comments has been recently published as I. V. Stalin, "Ob antileninskikh oshibkakh i natsionalisticheskikh izvrashcheniakh v kinopovesti Dovzhenko 'Ukraina v ogne,'" *Iskusstvo kino*, no. 4 (1990): 84-96. The novel's initial negative assessment by the Administration of Propaganda and Agitation is in RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 212, ll. 1-3.

groped their way to a new official interpretation of the national past. Striking the right balance between class analysis and national history, as well as between Ukrainian patriotism and servile bows to the elder brother, proved a difficult task.

The Ukrainian ideologues themselves discarded as a failure the first major attempt at a new history text. The CP(b)U Central Committee archives preserved the 1943 typescript of a school textbook of Ukrainian history that was never published. No party decisions on this book's preparation or abandonment can be traced, and its existence in itself is a puzzle. The history of Ukraine was first introduced as a separate school discipline only in the early 1960s, but the 1943 manuscript was written by the top Ukrainian historian, Mykola Petrovsky, edited by the republic's leading poet, Maksym Rylsky, and read by the powerful Oleksandr Korniiichuk, all of which suggests official sponsorship of the project. Although the Ukrainian party's wartime archives are incomplete, one can reasonably conclude that, during 1942-43, the republican leadership did entertain the idea of introducing the national history into the curriculum. Two surviving pieces of correspondence support this suggestion. In November 1942, Petrovsky reported to Secretary for Ideology Kost Lytvyn that the work on the textbook was almost completed, and in March 1943, Lytvyn informed him that the question of the textbook "would be definitively resolved in the nearest future."<sup>138</sup> Why exactly the project was abandoned is also not clear. The file contains a rather negative review by Mykola Bazhan, proving that, by 1943, the author of "Danylo of Halych" considered patriotic ethnic history suspicious and sought a new orthodoxy in the old class analysis. Bazhan underlined in red pencil statements like "We, the free children of the great Ukrainian people, are proud of their great deeds," criticized the positive portrayal of Russian tsars, and labelled Petrovsky's discussion of the Pereiaslav Treaty as forsaking "Stalin's notion of the 'lesser evil'."<sup>139</sup> Thus, the project could have been discontinued because of its patriotic Ukrainian spirit, but also simply because the Ukrainian ideologues had decided

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<sup>138</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 68, ark. 26-27 (Petrovsky to Lytvyn); spr. 46, ark. 117 (Lytvyn). Lytvyn's note has been published in *U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu*, 1: 116.

<sup>139</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 153, ark. 1-272. Bazhan's review is on ark. 1-3, the underlined sentence is on ark. 8.

that the political situation was not auspicious for raising the question of Ukrainian history's introduction into the curriculum, or because Moscow had indicated so.

A new and brief popular survey of Ukrainian history that won official approval, Mykola Petrovsky's *The Reunification of the Ukrainian People within a Single Ukrainian Soviet State*, appeared in early 1944, when the Red Army had crossed the old Polish border and entered Western Ukraine.<sup>140</sup> The official party journal *Bolshevik*, with a circulation of 100,000 copies, published a shortened version in Russian, while the complete text appeared in Ukrainian in the republic's major newspaper, *Radianska Ukraina*, as a separate pamphlet printed in 42,000 copies and, in Russian, in Moscow in an edition of 25,000.<sup>141</sup> Petrovsky's survey offered a slightly revised definition of Ukrainian history: "The history of the Ukrainian people is a history of the masses' age-old struggle against social and national oppression, for reunification within the Ukrainian state, for union with the fraternal, blood-related Russian people." Petrovsky's definition seemingly restored social struggles to their prominent position, yet in the text itself, the author highlighted three main themes: Ukrainian statehood, Western Ukraine as an age-old Ukrainian land, and Ukraine's historic ties with Russia. As the unabridged pamphlet version explained, union with Muscovy did not contradict the interests of Ukrainian state-building: although Khmelnytsky's Ukraine was an "independent state" in the form of a Cossack republic, "by joining Russia, Ukraine preserved its statehood." However, neither the union with Russia, nor the Revolution, represented a teleological outcome of Ukrainian history. Petrovsky reserved this role for the Ukrainians' historic reunification

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<sup>140</sup> Petrovsky had completed a longer monograph under the same title in 1941, but the manuscript and proofs perished during the evacuation of Kiev. In Ufa, the historian quickly restored an abridged version of the text in Russian and even suggested to Ideological Secretary Lytvyn that the work should be nominated for the Stalin prize. See TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 840, ark. 1-106 (the restored text in Russian; the story of the book is given in the footnote on ark. 1); spr. 68, ark. 26zv. (letter to Lytvyn).

<sup>141</sup> N. Petrovsky, "Vossoedinenie ukrainskogo naroda v edinom ukrainskom sovetskom gosudarstve," *Bolshevik*, no. 2 (1944): 42-55; *Radianska Ukraina*, 29 February 1944, p. 4; 1 March 1944, pp. 3-4; M. Petrovsky, *Vozziednannia ukrainskoho narodu v iedynii ukrainskii radianskii derzhavi* (Kiev: n.p., 1944); N. Petrovsky, *Vossoedinenie ukrainskogo naroda v edinom ukrainskom sovetskom gosudarstve* (Moscow: OGIZ Gospolitizdat, 1944).



within their own nation-state, which was accomplished in 1939.<sup>142</sup> Thus, all the bows to the big brother and socialism notwithstanding, Ukrainian history was cast as the grand narrative of a nation-state.

Petrovsky strengthened his reputation as a premier Ukrainian historian with two more influential publications. In January 1944, the Moscow *Istoricheskii zhurnal* (Historical Journal) published his article "Ukraine's Incorporation into Russia (1654)," which was more of a survey of the Ukrainian people's historic friendship with the Russians. The union itself was "determined by the entire previous history of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples." Far from being a "lesser evil," which Petrovsky was careful not to mention, it was the "only true path for the Ukrainian people."<sup>143</sup> The same year, a major all-Union publisher issued Petrovsky's pamphlet *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*. An expanded and revised version of the earlier Ukrainian text, the pamphlet reinforced the ethnic overtones and, interestingly, the "personality cult" features in the narrative. The author further exalted the Khmelnytsky Uprising as the "National War of Liberation" and the Cossacks as "bearers of the best heroic traditions of the Ukrainian people." At the same time, the characteristics of Khmelnytsky himself should have seemed immensely suggestive for contemporary readers: the hetman was called "the greatest statesman of his time," "a prominent military leader, a skilful organizer, and an eminent diplomat." The people revered him "as a leader [*vozhdia*]," his enemies organized an unsuccessful "terrorist act [*terakt*]" to kill him, he guided his armies with "iron consistency," he "crushed the oppositional group [*opozitsionnuiu gruppu*]" of the Cossack officers and executed their leaders; finally, Khmelnytsky "did not allow and suppressed any opposition to his power and authority." The language itself sent a powerful signal to Petrovsky's readers. Although no one used the abbreviation *terakt* or the idiom *opozitsionnaia gruppa* in Khmelnytsky's time, they were intimately familiar to Stalin's contemporaries. If one adds

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<sup>142</sup> See Petrovsky, *Vossoedinenie ukrainskogo naroda*, 31, 33. The pamphlet earned a laudatory review in *Istoricheskii zhurnal*: B. Grekov, review of *Vossoedinenie ukrainskogo naroda v edinom ukrainskom sovetskom gosudarstve*, by N. Petrovsky, *Istoricheskii zhurnal*, no. 12 (1944): 74-75.

<sup>143</sup> N. Petrovsky, "Prisoedinenie Ukrainy k Rossii v 1654 godu," *Istoricheskii zhurnal*, no. 1 (1944): 47-54, here 47, 52, 54.

Khmelnysky's alleged plans to reunite all Ukrainian ethnic lands and unite Ukraine with Russia in an early modern "Soviet Union" of sorts, the analogy between the Cossack hetman and Stalin becomes complete.<sup>144</sup>

Petrovsky's Russian-language pamphlet on "reunification" earned a laudatory review in the central *Istoricheskii zhurnal*. So topical was his work that the Moscow historian Vladimir Picheta literally imitated Petrovsky in an article on "The Reunification of the Belarusian People in the United Belarusian Soviet State."<sup>145</sup> Meanwhile, other Ukrainian intellectuals were preparing synthesizing works about their people's cultural heritage. The literary scholars completed the manuscript "Survey of the History of Ukrainian Literature" and were working on the first volume of a multi-volume history of the national literature. The December 1944 meeting of the republic's philosophers under the supervision of the Central Committee concluded that a history of the national philosophical thought, beginning with Kievan Rus', was also needed.<sup>146</sup>

Despite all the efforts to coordinate it with the new Russian national mythology, the "neo-national" narrative of the Ukrainian heroic past often competed with the Russian interpretation of the same events. In *Istoricheskii zhurnal* in 1943, the Russian historian Vladimir Pashuto presented Danylo of Halych as a "Russian [*ruskii*] prince" reigning over "Russian" people in "South Russian" lands.<sup>147</sup> The writer Aleksei Iugov similarly designated Danylo and his people as "Russian" in his 1944 pamphlet on the prince, claiming, moreover, that "the people of Galicia, Bukovyna, and Volhynia preserved and carried over as sacred their Russian language, fathers' faith, and unquenchable ardent love

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<sup>144</sup> N. N. Petrovsky, *Bogdan Khmelnytsky* (Moscow: OGIZ Goslitizdat, 1944), the quotations displaying the analogy with Stalin are on pp. 9, 13, 26, 29 ("terrorist act"), 38, 40 ("crashed the oppositional group"), 56-57 ("suppressed any opposition").

<sup>145</sup> B. Grekov, review of *Vossoedinenie ukrainskogo naroda v edinom ukrainskom sovetskom gosudarstve*, by N. Petrovsky, 74-75; V. Picheta, "Vossoedinenie belorusskogo naroda v edinom belorusskom sovetskom gosudarstve," *Bolshevik*, no. 12 (1944): 30-38.

<sup>146</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 22 November 1945, p. 3 (the *Survey* published in the autumn of 1945); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 203, ark. 11-12, 19-43 (philosophers' conference).

<sup>147</sup> V. Pashuto, "Daniil Galitskii," *Istoricheskii zhurnal*, no. 3-4 (1943): 37-44.

of Great Rus' through the crucible of all historic ordeals."<sup>148</sup> Boris Grekov wrote on the Polish period of Galician history without ever referring to the formation of Ukrainian or, at least, proto-Ukrainian nationality.<sup>149</sup>

The Ukrainian historians and intellectuals simultaneously advanced their interpretations, often on the pages of the same journals. Whereas their publications do not directly challenge the Russian grand historical narrative, the archives preserve the traces of a silent struggle around history. Thus, Oleksandr Korniiichuk in 1944 dismissed the manuscript of Picheta's pamphlet on Bohdan Khmelnytsky. In his review, the Ukrainian playwright demanded the revision of "South-Western Rus'" and "Russian" in the text to "Ukraine" and "Ukrainian" throughout, the portrayal of Khmelnytsky "not so superficially" as a great military leader and statesman, and the exaltation of the Pereiaslav Treaty. In his conclusion, Korniiichuk added sarcastically: "Comrade Picheta not long ago publicly argued that Khmelnytsky was a feudal lord and an ardent enemy of the people. Now he has changed his point of view." Instead of Picheta, the powerful writer recommended using Mykola Petrovsky, the "best Ukrainian specialist on this period," as an author.<sup>150</sup> During the Ukrainian historians' conference with the republic's ideologues in early 1945, Professor Kost Huslysty raised the issue of the "Russification" of Danylo of Halych in the central press. He particularly castigated Pashuto's 1943 article in *Istoricheskii zhurnal* and Iugov's pamphlet as perceiving the Galician-Volhynian Principality "through the lens of the 'indivisible Russian people' and not connecting it directly with the history of Ukraine." Both the Ukrainian party ideologues and fellow historians listened without objections to Huslysty's statement that "Danylo of Halych was one of the great ancestors of the Ukrainian people in the same way as Aleksandr Nevsky was one of the great

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<sup>148</sup> A. Iugov, *Daniil Galitskii* (Moscow: OGIZ Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo politicheskoi literatury, 1944), p. 55. Iugov would eventually publish an acclaimed historical novel about Aleksandr Nevsky and Danylo of Halych, *The Warriors*: A. Iugov, *Ratobortsy* (Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel, 1956).

<sup>149</sup> B. D. Grekov, "Sudby naseleniia galitskikh kniazheskikh votchinn pod vlastiu Polshi," *Istoricheskii zhurnal*, no. 12 (1944): 37-43.

<sup>150</sup> A copy of the review, dated 7 January 1944, is preserved in Korniiichuk's personal archives: TsDAMLM, f. 435, op. 1, spr. 508, ark. 1-3.

ancestors of the Russian people."<sup>151</sup>

The Russian "Great Retreat" included the rehabilitation of the legacy of prominent pre-revolutionary historians such as Sergei Solov'ev and Vasily Kliuchevsky. During the war, the Ukrainian intellectuals likewise proceeded to reinstall Mykhailo Hrushevsky to his stature as the patriarch of Ukrainian historiography, although in the 1930s, he had been denounced as bourgeois nationalist and even "fascist." The exaltation of Bohdan Khmelnytsky provided Petrovsky with an opportunity in 1943 to clear his teacher's name. Writing in *Radianska Ukraina* the day after the Order of Khmelnytsky had been unveiled, Petrovsky announced that Hrushevsky's works were "of great importance" for the study of the hetman's time. Hrushevsky allegedly concluded in Volume Nine, Part One, of his *History of Ukraine-Rus'* that the Cossack leader had no intention of ever breaking the union with Russia (as the Ukrainian nationalist historians claimed), a conclusion which would support Petrovsky's own idea that Khmelnytsky had always sought a union with the fraternal Russian people. In another article, Petrovsky claimed that Hrushevsky made this important conclusion in Volume Nine, Part Two, and Volume Ten, which was never published and the manuscript of which was subsequently lost.<sup>152</sup> Positive references to Hrushevsky found their way into the Moscow historical journals.<sup>153</sup>

In literature and the arts, the national narrative of the Ukrainian past developed further, acquiring some distinctive new traits in the process. In literature, by far the most important developments occurred in drama. Korniiichuk's *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* remained

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<sup>151</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 388, ark. 4.

<sup>152</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 12 October 1943, p. 3; Petrovsky, "Prisoedinenie Ukrainy k Rossii v 1654 godu," *Istoricheskii zhurnal*, no. 1 (1944): 52. The text of Volume Nine, Parts One and Two, of *History of Ukraine-Rus'* does not support Petrovsky's assertion. See Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1996-97), vol. 9, part 1, pp. 720, 784; part 2, pp. 1492-1508. On pp. 1494-95, Hrushevsky says that, for Khmelnytsky, the Pereiaslav Treaty was just a military union, "valuable in the given circumstances, one more [agreement] in addition to unions with the Tatars, the Turks, and Moldavia."

<sup>153</sup> See the positive references to Hrushevsky in B. D. Grekov, "Sudby naseleniia galitskikh kniazheskikh votchinn pod vlastiu Polshi," *Istoricheskii zhurnal*, no. 12 (1944): 37-43; S. Iushkov, review of *Borba Rusi za sozhdanie svoego gosudarstva*, by B. Grekov, *Voprosy istorii*, no. 1 (1946): 142-43. Although mainly known as professor of Moscow University and Soviet Russian specialist on Kievan Rus', Serafim Iushkov in 1939-44 worked at the Institute of History of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

the Ukrainian historical play for official purposes. The Shevchenko Kharkiv Ukrainian Drama Theater Company, the first company to return to Ukraine, on 11 January 1944 opened its season in Kharkiv with *Bohdan*, and on 6 April, the Kharkivans took the play to Kiev to open the theater season there.<sup>154</sup> Nevertheless, Korniiichuk's classic with its anti-Polish animus no longer possessed its previous political topicality. In early May 1945, the Ukrainian leadership actually suspended the performances of *Bohdan* in Kharkiv because the delegation of the allied Polish Provisional Government had arrived in Moscow, and meetings to celebrate Polish-Ukrainian friendship were being organized in major Ukrainian cities. Furious, Korniiichuk in vain complained to Khrushchev that in Moscow, nobody had suspended the notoriously anti-Polish opera *Ivan Susanin*.<sup>155</sup> At the same time, the 1938 play no longer satisfied the changing cultural tastes of High Stalinism. When the Kharkiv company presented *Bohdan* in Moscow in 1945, the critics in the capital saw "too much intrigue and too little grandeur" in the play.<sup>156</sup>

Ivan Kocherha wrote the play that replaced *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* as the Ukrainian historical drama. Writing only in Ukrainian and mainly in verse, he was well-known in Ukraine but lacked Korniiichuk's all-Union fame. However, the antiquarian genre of the verse play resonated well with the pseudo-classicism of High Stalinist monumentalist aesthetics. (At the same time, the Russian playwright Vladimir Solov'ev was completing his award-winning verse drama on Ivan IV, *The Great Sovereign*.) The Ukrainian leadership paid extraordinary attention to Kocherha's work. The only copy of the play's final draft dated 27 September 1944 survived not in the writer's archives, but in the archives of the republican Central Committee. The Foreign Minister and ideological *éminence grise*, Dmytro Manuilsky, took time to read the play, making numerous notes on the characters' historical and psychological credibility and demanding additional reviews by historians. Judging from his comments, Manuilsky was primarily interested in the "proper" exalted portrayal of Prince Iaroslav the Wise (978-1054) as the greatest

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<sup>154</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 11 January 1944, p. 4; 8 April 1944, p. 4.

<sup>155</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 1621, ark. 64-66.

<sup>156</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 18 August 1945, p. 2.

statesman of Kievan Rus'.<sup>157</sup>

Yet another copy of the manuscript from the party repositories reveals what was edited out from the writer's text. Beginning with the author's foreword, Kocherha repeatedly emphasized Iaroslav's Varangian background; his hero struggled with the contradiction between his foreign origin and princely status—and the interests of Rus', of the common people. To be sure, the play's main character finally chose the latter over the former, but the censors found it undesirable to stress the dilemma and downgraded Iaroslav's struggle with his "Varangianness" from the drama's principal focus to a mere passing reference. Other deletions concerned the incorrect glorification of "our stately and sacred Kiev" as the center of Rus', for this site now belonged to Moscow, albeit non-existent in Iaroslav's time. The play also included an untimely reminder about the rulers' duties to the people, whom Iaroslav "served faithfully / And only lived by their wisdom. / Nobody is wise by his own insight, / Only the people always take the true path." The anonymous ideologue's red pencil eliminated these lines as unnecessary.<sup>158</sup>

In late 1944, *Iaroslav the Wise* appeared in a literary journal, while the republic's newspapers carried excerpts from the work. *Radianska Ukraina* selected a longer scene containing the topical appeal for a "united Rus'." The play's somewhat belated premiere in Kharkiv on 17 September 1946 occurred in a much colder ideological climate, yet proved to be a success, earning Stalin Prizes for both Kocherha and the company.<sup>159</sup>

During 1943-44, the historical genre in Ukrainian literature flourished. Cashing in on the heroic past's wartime popularity, many Ukrainian writers quickly produced plays in which Danylo of Halych, or the Cossacks, or anyone else bravely defeated the Germans. The publishers and repertoire committee rejected a number of manuscripts

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<sup>157</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 837 (first draft); TsDAVOV, f. 4669, op. 1, spr. 124, ark. 1-3 (Manuilsky's notes).

<sup>158</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 836, ark. 1-6, 42, 54, 58 (the Varangian theme edited out); 41, 93 (Kiev), 77 (the people's wisdom).

<sup>159</sup> *Literatura i mystetstvo*, 23 November 1944, p. 3; *Radianska Ukraina*, 14 March 1945, p. 4; 16 March 1945, p. 2 (excerpts); 23 March 1945, p. 3 (positive review); *Radianske mystetstvo*, 17 September 1946, p. 1 (premiere); *Istoriia ukrainskoi literatury*, 7: 314-16.

because of historical inaccuracies or artistic feebleness.<sup>160</sup> A prominent novelist, Oleksandr Kopylenko, succeeded in pushing his historical play *Why the Stars Don't Go Out*, which depicted the Cossack takeover of the Polish fortress Kodak in 1635. However, to make the work more topical, Kopylenko staffed the fortress with a garrison of German mercenaries and rechristened its historic French commandant into a German racist, causing serious criticism.<sup>161</sup> In 1944, Petro Panch published in a literary journal his novel *The Zaporozhians*, initially welcomed by the critics. Several more authors worked intensely on historical novels.<sup>162</sup>

As had occurred previously, the figures of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Taras Shevchenko often appeared on posters and in leaflets, inspiring their "descendants" to free the native land, but at the same time, several more serious artistic representations of the past also materialized. Working in 1943 in Moscow, Ivan Shulha painted for the Central Historical Museum the canvas *Muscovite Ambassadors Present Charters to Bohdan Khmelnytsky*. In 1944, the artist returned to his native Kharkiv to complete two other epic canvases: *The Pereiaslav Council* and *The Cossack Duma* (also known as *The Zaporozhians' Song*). Shulha became a precursor of Stalinist monumentalism in portraying the past, a style that would flourish in the postwar Soviet Union. Less epic and more romantic was Mykhailo Derehus's vision of the War of Liberation in his series of small oil paintings, *The Khmelnytsky Uprising*. Derehus also completed an unusual "psychological" portrait of Khmelnytsky, initially praised by his fellow artists.<sup>163</sup> The newspaper of writers and artists, *Literatura i mystetstvo*, demanded more works in the historical genre, envisaging the publication of an album, *History of Ukraine in Works of*

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<sup>160</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 4763, op. 1, spr. 61, ark. 25-36zv, 40-50.

<sup>161</sup> Oleksandr Kopylenko, "Chomu ne hasnut zori: Piesa na 5 dii," *Ukrainska literatura*, no. 3 (1945): 2-52 (publication); *Literaturna hazeta*, 13 September 1945, p. 2; *Istoriia ukrainskoï literatury*, 7: 313 (criticism).

<sup>162</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 16 August 1945, p. 2 (review of *The Zaporozhians*); Syrotiuk, *Ukrainska istorychna proza za 40 rokiv*, 189-91.

<sup>163</sup> *Istoriia ukrainskoho mystetstva v shesty tomakh*, 6: 27-9 (Shevchenko and Khmelnytsky), 46 (Shulha and Derehus); Dmytrenko, *Ukrainskyi radianskyi istorychnyi zhyvopys*, 56, 75. Derehus's portrait of Khmelnytsky was reproduced in *Radianske mystetstvo*, 4 December 1945, p. 4, accompanied by a discussion of the portrait and the series in general.

Art.<sup>164</sup>

During the Eighth Exhibition of Ukrainian Art in November 1945, critics and the press paid special attention to historical paintings. Shulha's *The Zaporozhians' Song*; the painting by Lviv artist H. Rozmus, *Khmelnysky at Lviv*; and Derehus's series *The Khmelnytsky Uprising* and his portrait of the hetman were among the most discussed works. Of these, the "psychological" portrait of Khmelnytsky was clearly out of line: as one critic wrote, Derehus "quite unnecessarily stressed the nervousness, exhaustion, and even the physical sickliness [of the hetman]. This is not the image of the people's leader and the strong-willed person, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, that lives in the masses' imagination." In any case, the editorial in the artists' newspaper, *Radianske mystetstvo*, proclaimed that the works by Derehus, Shulha, and Rozmus "do not reflect even a small part of the Ukrainian people's history, which was rich with glorious events."<sup>165</sup> The young artists, indeed, answered the call. In January 1946, for example, the young painter Tetiana Iablonska, who would soon become famous for her images of working women, reported completing a large canvas, *Prince Askold's Campaign against Byzantium*.<sup>166</sup>

Soon after returning to Ukraine, the Kiev Film Studios commenced work on movie scripts based on Kocherha's *Iaroslav the Wise* and Panteleimon Kulish's historical novel *The Black Council* (1857), both projects later abandoned during the 1946 campaign against the "excessive infatuation with the distant past."<sup>167</sup> Overall, the literature and arts of the war's last years manifested all indications of the same harmful infatuation. In the autumn of 1945, the literary critic Semen Shakhovsky had enough material to produce a series of articles, "Notes on the Historical Genre." Shakhovsky approved of Kocherha's *Iaroslav the Wise* and Panch's novel *The Zaporozhians*, while criticizing Fedir Burlaka's

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<sup>164</sup> *Literatura i mystetstvo*, 23 April 1944, p. 3. Such an album never appeared.

<sup>165</sup> *Radianske mystetstvo*, 20 November 1945, pp. 1-2 (critic's review of the exhibition); 13 November 1945, p. 1 (editorial).

<sup>166</sup> *Radianske mystetstvo*, 1 January 1946, p. 3 (Iablonska worked on this painting with Serhii Otroshchenko).

<sup>167</sup> A. A. Romitsyn, *Ukrainske radianske kinomystetstvo 1941-1954 rr.* (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo AN URSR, 1959), p. 78.



novel *The Battle on the Kodyma* and Kopylenko's play *Why the Stars Don't Go Out*. More importantly, the critic attempted to formulate the secret of the historical genre's popularity in the postwar Soviet Union: "The content of a historical work usually consists of feats, heroic deeds, the majestic, the memorable. In this, the historical genre is kindred to the present."<sup>168</sup>

The nation's cultural heritage continued to be valorized in the last years of the war. In 1944, the republic celebrated the 130th anniversary of Shevchenko and, in 1945, the 150th of the philosopher Hryhorii Skovoroda and the 100th of the playwright Ivan Karpenko-Kary (Tobilevych).<sup>169</sup> The centenary of the founder of national music, Mykola Lysenko, was commemorated in April 1942 with a modest meeting and a concert in Ufa, but the authorities found it desirable to honour Lysenko again, on a wider scale. In January 1945, the republican Council of People's Commissars decreed the construction of a monument to Lysenko in Kiev, the renaming of the Lviv Conservatory and the Kharkiv Opera Theater after him, and the publishing of the thirty-one volumes of his *oeuvre* before the composer's 105th anniversary in March 1947. On the eve of Lysenko's 103rd anniversary in 1945, one article elaborated on the renewed cult of the National Composer: "All of Ukraine, united under the great banner of Lenin and Stalin, honors Lysenko's memory"; "In their own house, the Ukrainian people are looking at their invaluable cherished treasures."<sup>170</sup>

The Ukrainian intellectuals also pushed for the rehabilitation of such a confirmed nineteenth-century "reactionary" as Panteleimon Kulish, whose 125th anniversary was celebrated in August 1944. A Ukrainian nationalist in his youth and a Russian monarchist in his senior years, Kulish was beyond redemption as a historian, but he reemerged as the

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<sup>168</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 2 August 1945, p. 2; 16 August 1945, p. 2; 23 August 1945, p. 2; 13 September 1945, p. 3. The quotation is from the 16 August issue.

<sup>169</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 10 March 1944, p. 1; 11 March 1944, p. 1; 23 May 1944, p. 1 (Shevchenko); 11 July 1944, p. 3; 16 December 1944, p. 3; 17 December 1944, p. 1 (Skovoroda); *Literaturna hazeta*, 13 September 1945, p. 1 (Karpenko-Kary).

<sup>170</sup> *Kulturne budivnytstvo v Ukrainskii RSR: Cherven 1941-1950*, 32 (Ufa, 1942); *Literatura i mystetstvo*, 25 January 1945, p. 1 (decree on Lysenko); *Radianska Ukraina*, 21 March 1945, p. 3 (the laudatory article quoted). The expression *u svoii vlasnii khati*, "in our own house" had long been used by Ukrainian patriots as a metaphor of independent statehood.

revered author of the first Ukrainian historical novel, which was also the first national novel of any genre—*The Black Council* (1857).<sup>171</sup> In 1945, a Ukrainian literary critic suggested that the "time has come to reevaluate the legacy" of another prominent nineteenth-century historian and Romantic writer, Mykola (Nikolai) Kostomarov: "Under [tsarist] colonial oppression, the awakening of national consciousness, which the Romantic writers promoted in their works, represented a progressive phenomenon of public life."<sup>172</sup> Even more unexpectedly, the Ukrainians claimed the famous Russian "reactionary" writer of Ukrainian descent, Nikolai Gogol (Mykola Hohol). On his 135th anniversary in April 1944, *Radianska Ukraina*'s headline proclaimed Gogol a "great son of Ukraine."<sup>173</sup>

At the height of the "national heritage" campaign, in the summer of 1945, the Ukrainian Central Committee gathered the writers, critics, and managers of the republic's publishing houses to discuss the grandiose project of the "Golden Treasury" of Ukrainian literature. The three-year plan envisaged the publication of 148 volumes by twenty-one pre-revolutionary Ukrainian writers, while plans were also made for the immediate release of one-volume selected works of major classics.<sup>174</sup> The drive to promote the national history and cultural heritage continued in Ukraine until mid-1946.

### **Ukraine Reunited**

With the westward advance of the Soviet Army in late 1943 and 1944, the theme of reunited Western Ukraine reemerged triumphantly in the official discourse. The first powerful signal of its return came early in 1943, soon after Kharkiv's liberation. On 19 February, *Radianska Ukraina* published Korniiichuk's long article "The Reunification of

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<sup>171</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 8 August 1944, p. 2; 23 August 1944, p. 4; *Literatura i mystetstvo*, 7 August 1944, pp. 3-4. Interestingly, Petrovsky protested the commemoration of Kulish, who in his later years, wrote disapprovingly of such national icons as the Cossacks and Shevchenko (*U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu*, 2: 3).

<sup>172</sup> Ivan Pilhuk, "Mykola Kostomarov," *Ukrainska literatura*, no. 4-5 (1945): 122-31, here 122.

<sup>173</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 8 August 1944, p. 2; 23 August 1944, p. 4; *Literatura i mystetstvo*, 7 August 1944, pp. 3-4 (Kulish); *U leshchatakh totalitarizmu*, 2: 3 (Petrovsky's letter to the president of the Academy of Sciences advising against the celebration); *Radianska Ukraina*, 4 April 1944, p. 3 (Gogol).

<sup>174</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 1604, ark. 1-3.

the Ukrainian People within Their Own State." In an unprecedented move, *Pravda* reprinted the article in Russian on the very next day, and other central newspapers followed suit the day after. Korniiichuk's aim was ostensibly to rebuff some unnamed Polish emigre newspapers that allegedly had laid claim to Ukrainian territories "up to the Dnieper and the Black Sea," although the article's real importance was as an indication of the Soviet position on Eastern Galicia, annexed from Poland in 1939. Korniiichuk's statements left no doubts that the Soviet Union would stand by its territorial acquisitions. To defend the pre-war annexations, Korniiichuk referred to the ethnic and historical unity of Ukrainian lands, Khmelnytsky's campaigns in Western Ukraine, and the nineteenth-century Ukrainian revival in Galicia, personified by Ivan Franko.<sup>175</sup>

The Ukrainian leadership was also looking forward to annexing from Poland and Czechoslovakia the remaining territories with a Ukrainian population and was preparing historic arguments to support its plans.<sup>176</sup> In early March 1944, in his capacity as the Ukrainian Premier, Khrushchev made a report to the first wartime session of the republican Supreme Soviet. After the traditional opening statements on the party's leading role, and before moving on to discuss the heroic war effort and the requirements for an economic recovery, Khrushchev gave his audience a definition of Ukrainian history suspiciously similar to Petrovsky's: "The history of the Ukrainian people was the age-long history of struggle against social and national oppression, a history of continuous struggle

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<sup>175</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 19 February 1943, p. 2; *Pravda*, 20 February 1943, p. 2. *Izvestiia* and *Krasnaia zvezda* reprinted the article on 21 February, as subsequently did the journals *Slaviane* and *Ukrainska literatura*. The original manuscript in Ukrainian and the clippings are in Korniiichuk's archives in TsDAML, f. 435, op. 1, spr. 496. The Ukrainian press published follow-up rebuttals to the "émigré Poles" (*Radianska Ukraina*, 21 April 1943, p. 3; Ostap Vyshnia, "Usmishky," *Ukrainska literatura*, no. 5-6 [1944]: 44-54, here 50-52).

<sup>176</sup> Some surviving documents suggest that Khrushchev was also contemplating the incorporation of Crimea (then the Tatar autonomous republic within the Russian Federation), which he eventually accomplished in 1954. In October 1943, the experts of the CP(b)U Central Committee prepared for him an extensive memo on the peninsula's history, geography, population, and economy. The document emphasized the Ukrainians' influx to the Crimea at the turn of the century and stated that, geographically and economically, "the Crimean steppe [was] an extension of Southern Ukraine" (TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 636, ark. 1-104, here 20, 96). With the liberation of Crimea under way in April 1944, the Ukrainian republic created a new administrative unit on the peninsula's environs, the southernmost Kherson oblast (*Radianska Ukraina*, 22 April 1944, p. 1), but Moscow apparently did not favor the idea and Crimea remained part of the Russian Federation for another decade.

for the reunification of all Ukrainian lands in the united Ukrainian state." Having praised Stalin and the party for recovering Western Ukraine, Khrushchev announced:

The Ukrainian people will seek to complete the great historic reunification of their lands in a single Soviet Ukrainian state. [Storm of applause.]

The Ukrainian people will seek to include in the Ukrainian Soviet state such primordial Ukrainian lands as the Kholm region, Hrubeshiv, Zamostia, Tomashiv, Iaroslav. [Storm of applause.]<sup>177</sup>

The territories Khrushchev was referring to had once been part of the Galician-Volhynian principality and, with the exception of Iaroslav, in 1832-1917 had belonged to the Russian Empire, but after the Revolution, fell again under Polish control. Located beyond the Curzon Line, these lands were not claimed by the Soviet Union either before the war or in 1939.<sup>178</sup> The authoritative Moscow journal *Bolshevik* promptly reprinted Khrushchev's speech. The Ukrainian court historian Mykola Petrovsky speedily produced a lengthy article, "The Primordial Ukrainian Lands," which appeared in *Radianska Ukraina*. Petrovsky wrote that the Kholm land once belonged to the Galician-Volhynian principality, that Danylo of Halych died and was buried in Kholm, that Bohdan Khmelnytsky claimed this land and that, according to the 1897 census, the majority of the local population was Ukrainian.<sup>179</sup>

Nevertheless, after prolonged negotiations with the Western allies and the Polish government in exile, Stalin settled for the Curzon line as the border between Ukraine and Poland. Kholm was to remain in Polish hands.<sup>180</sup> Until the Ukrainian-Polish agreement

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<sup>177</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 6 March 1944, pp. 1 (definition of Ukrainian history), 2 (completing reunification).

<sup>178</sup> The cities named by Khrushchev are presently known by their Polish names: Chełm, Hrubieszów, Zamość, Tomaszów, and Jarosław. For an introduction to the history of the Kholm/Chełm region, see V. Kubijovyč, "Kholm Region," *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, 2: 480-85.

<sup>179</sup> N. Khrushchev, "Osvobozhdenie ukrainskikh zemel ot nemetskikh zakhvatchikov i ocherednye zadachi vosstanovleniia narodnogo khoziaistva Sovetskoi Ukrainy," *Bolshevik*, no. 6 (1944): 7-35, here 9. *Radianska Ukraina*, 30 April 1944, p. 2 (Petrovsky's article). See also Mykola Tkachenko, "Kholmshchyna, Hrubeshiv, Iaroslav—odvichni ukrainski zemli," *Ukrainska literatura*, no. 5-6 (1944): 122-29.

<sup>180</sup> See Vasyl Boiechko, Oksana Hanzha, and Borys Zakharchuk, *Kordony Ukrainy: Istorychna retrospektyva ta suchasnyi stan* (Kiev: Osnovy, 1994), pp. 80-85.

on population resettlement was concluded in Lublin on 9 September, and even afterwards, Khrushchev petitioned Stalin to reverse this decision. Some Ukrainians in Kholm were aware of Khrushchev's remarks about the "primordial Ukrainian land" and tried to reach the Ukrainian leadership for an explanation. Foreign Minister Manuilsky prepared a special memo answering a similar request.<sup>181</sup> Later, the underground Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) referred to Khrushchev's unkept promise as an example of Soviet betrayal of Ukrainian national aspirations.<sup>182</sup> The "primordial land" speech of March 1944 became a political embarrassment within less than six months. Naturally, it was omitted from the authoritative post-war collection of documents on the "reunification" of the Ukrainian people.<sup>183</sup>

In the meantime, Ukrainian politicians and intellectuals turned to another candidate for "reunification," Transcarpathia. This pocket of East Slavic highlander population, ruled since the eleventh century by Hungary and after World War I by Czechoslovakia, represented a challenge for the Ukrainian ideologues. What historical arguments could they muster to support the designation of contemporary Transcarpathians as Ukrainian? Turning to the land's pre-Hungarian past risked endorsing the nationalist idea that the population of eleventh-century Rus' was "Ukrainian." Nevertheless, the far-sighted Petrovsky as early as 1942 signalled to Ideological Secretary Kost Lytvyn: "When our military fortunes improve, the question of Transcarpathian Ukraine will be on the agenda. We, historians and propagandists, should be ready for this."<sup>184</sup> The Deputy Premier in charge of culture, Mykola Bazhan, demonstrated just how ready they were, denouncing

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<sup>181</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 790, ark. 1-2 (Khrushchev's letter to Stalin of 26 August 1944), 5-21 (appeal from Polish Ukrainians), 92-93zv (their request for an explanation, delivered by the deputy of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, Colonel A. M. Volkov); TsDAVOV, f. 4669, op. 1, spr. 12, ark. 1 (Manuilsky's memo); *Radianska Ukraina*, 10 September 1944, p. 1 (agreement). As the NKVD's later report to him reveals, Khrushchev still maintained keen interest in the "movement for the Kholm region's incorporation into the Ukrainian SSR" in late October 1944 (TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 787, ark. 1-2).

<sup>182</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 5027, ark. 36.

<sup>183</sup> P. Hudzenko and F. Shevchenko, eds., *Vozziednannia ukrainskoho narodu v iedynii ukrainskii radianskii derzhavi (1939-1949 rr.): Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv* (Kiev: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo politychnoi literatury, 1949).

<sup>184</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 68, ark. 26zv.

the "reactionary Carpatho-Ruthenianism" as a theory that Transcarpathians were part of the Russian people and always wanted to join Russia, rather than Ukraine. (What he actually described was Russophilism; the Carpatho-Ruthenians or Rusynophiles thought they were an entirely separate people.)<sup>185</sup>

As the Soviet Army approached the Carpathian mountains in the late summer 1944, *Radianska Ukraina* published an article by two historians proclaiming Transcarpathia "the westernmost outpost of the Ukrainian people," the land of "our dear blood brothers" who for a thousand years suffered from national oppression and yet preserved their identity.<sup>186</sup> In early November, Khrushchev visited Transcarpathia incognito, supposedly observed the mass enthusiasm for "reunification" with Ukraine, and secured Stalin's consent to begin "organizing" the appropriate petitions from the local population.<sup>187</sup> On 27 November, the Congress of the People's Committees of Transcarpathia adopted the reunification manifesto. The text unambiguously identified Ukraine as "our mother from whom we had been separated for centuries." The attendant letter to Stalin explained to "our dear father, Joseph Vissarionovich" that "in times immemorial, our ancestors lived in one united and stable family with the multi-million Ukrainian people."<sup>188</sup> Thus, in the frenzy of the propaganda campaign, the Ukrainian nation's unity was telescoped back as far as the eleventh century.

Articles in the republican press outlined Transcarpathian history as an age-long struggle for reunification with Ukraine. The Galician Professor Mykola Vozniak went even further than his Kievan colleague Petrovsky in calling Transcarpathia "the most

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<sup>185</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 153, ark. 2 (Bazhan). On the taxing question of the various national orientations within the Transcarpathian intelligentsia during the last two centuries, see Paul Robert Magocsi, *The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus', 1848-1948* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978); John-Paul Himka, "The Formation of National Identity in Subcarpathian Rus': Some Questions of Methodology," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 2, no. 3 (September 1978): 374-80; and Ivan L. Rudnytsky, "Carpatho-Ukraine: A People in Search of Their Identity," in his *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1987), pp. 353-73.

<sup>186</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 8 August 1944, p. 2.

<sup>187</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 937, ark. 58-61 (Khrushchev's correspondence with Stalin); spr. 787, ark. 3-288 (petitions). Interestingly, the local Orthodox clergy asked Stalin to establish the Carpatho-Ruthenian Soviet republic (*Kulturne zhyttia v Ukraini: Zakhidni zemli*, 1: 227-29).

<sup>188</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 788, ark. 1-5, 10-12; *Radianska Ukraina*, 23 December 1944, p. 4.

ancient Ukrainian land [that] was part of the Kievan state under Volodymyr the Great."<sup>189</sup> However, the flood of propagandist and historical materials on Transcarpathia started in earnest in the last days of June 1945. Only then, after the Potsdam conference, did the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty legitimize the transfer and the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet officially accept the Transcarpathians' plea for reunification. Addressing the legislature, Khrushchev announced: "For the first time in its history, from now and forever, the Ukrainian people are fully reunited in a single Ukrainian State." Mykola Bazhan wrote the principal propaganda piece on Transcarpathia, the article "Our Primordial Land." Whereas Bazhan also traced the Ukrainian unity back for a millennium, his article wisely hinted at the Russian brother's seniority in the Soviet family to which the mainland Ukrainians were bringing their Transcarpathian brethren:

For one thousand years, this small stream of people preserved faith in reunification with the great Ukrainian sea, with the great ocean of Rus'. For a thousand years—could one imagine, for a millennium—half a million people of Ukrainian kin, taken by history beyond the peaks of the Carpathians to south-west, did not lose the sense of unity with the mighty East Slavic peoples, with the Russian and Ukrainian peoples.<sup>190</sup>

The authorities sponsored a "Ukrainization" of Transcarpathian cultural life: in October, they opened Uzhhorod State University; in November, the Shchors Ukrainian Drama Theater Company was hastily relocated to Uzhhorod from Zaporizhzhia; in December, the oblast Ukrainian Song and Dance Ensemble was established.<sup>191</sup> However, the "historic reunification" posed all kinds of problems for the Ukrainian ideologues. On the one hand, those Transcarpathian teachers who welcomed the union were surprised to discover that Ukrainian history was not being taught in the schools of the united Ukrainian state.<sup>192</sup>

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<sup>189</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 22 December 1944, p. 3 (Petrovsky); 7 January 1945, p. 3 (Vozniak).

<sup>190</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 1 July 1945, p. 1 (Khrushchev), 3 (Bazhan).

<sup>191</sup> *Kulturne budivnytstvo*, 2: 86-87 (university); TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 7, spr. 2747, ark. 143 (drama company); I. Turianytsia, "Rozvytok kultury v Zakarpatti," *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, no. 7 (1949): 40-48, here 46 (ensemble). See also Magocsi, *The Shaping of a National Identity*, 255-71.

<sup>192</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 1652, ark. 103.

On the other, Kiev had to deal with the local "cultural separatists," such as the Transcarpathian folklorist Professor Petro Lintur, who "avoided" the term "Western Ukraine" and used instead the name "Rus'." Moreover, Lintur spoke imprudently of the Transcarpathian school of folklore studies, whereas the highlander traditions should have been studied "only in connection with Ukrainian folklore."<sup>193</sup>

In addition, the republic's authorities had to ensure the ideological re-appropriation of the two Western lands that had been "reunited" during 1939-40, but soon occupied by Germany and Romania, respectively: Eastern Galicia and Northern Bukovyna. Khrushchev and Manuilsky arrived in Lviv the day after the Soviet Army took the city on 27 July; in early August and again in October-November, Khrushchev toured Western Ukraine. In his secret reports to Stalin, he focused on undoing the Polish domination in the cities and fighting against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.<sup>194</sup> Using the argument of history, the reference to the Ukrainian Soviet nation-state would improve Soviet power's credentials in both cases. On 27 September, the plenary meeting of the Ukrainian Central Committee warned that "the fact of the Ukrainian lands' unification into a single Ukrainian Soviet state" was not being sufficiently utilized by Soviet propaganda in Western Ukraine.<sup>195</sup>

The Central Committee commissioned historians to write model lectures on "the Ukrainian people's struggle for reunification within a single state" and specifically on Western Ukraine's past. The resourceful Petrovsky promptly composed pamphlets on Western Ukraine and Bukovyna. Sensing the new ideological winds of the war's last years, he imputed to Galicians the eternal desire to unite not only with Eastern Ukrainians but also with the "fraternal [and] blood-related Russian people." Petrovsky went even further in undoing the wartime patriotic concepts when he criticized Mykhailo Hrushevsky and Stepan Tomashivsky for tracing "Ukrainian" statehood from ancient Kiev to Galicia-Volhynia. Until the fourteenth century, wrote Petrovsky, there was no Ukrainian, Russian

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<sup>193</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 326, ark. 74-6.

<sup>194</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 703, ark. 23-36; spr. 1060, ark. 1-18 (Khrushchev's letters to Stalin); *Radianska Ukraina*, 2 August 1944, p. 1; 13 August 1944, p. 1 (official announcements about Khrushchev's trip to Western Ukraine).

<sup>195</sup> *Kulturne budivnytstvo v Ukrainskii RSR: Cherven 1941-1950*, 157.



or Belarusian nationality—just the common Rus' people. Moreover, even before 1917, both Eastern and Western Ukrainians supposedly wanted to unite within a single "Ukrainian state, which would be part of Russia." In this scheme, not much changed after 1917, simply that the Soviet Union replaced tsarist Russia in the process of carrying out the ultimate historic reunification of Eastern Slavs.<sup>196</sup>

As usual, however, other intellectuals were late in accepting Petrovsky's far-sighted revisionism. In January 1945, Rylsky attended the teachers' seminar in Lviv and read there the following ultrapatriotic poem:

Dear mother, generous mother,  
Glorious Ukraine  
From the Donets to the Carpathians  
You are united now...  
What our great people  
Dreamt of for centuries  
Both Lviv and Kiev see  
Now and forever.<sup>197</sup>

Meaning to please the Soviet authorities, the revered Lviv literary scholar Mykhailo Rudnytsky read for local intellectuals a lecture on "Reunited Ukraine," which included an extensive historical survey and whose title alluded to two classic works of Western Ukrainian national ideology: Iuliiian Bachynsky's *Ukraina Irredenta* (1896) and Ivan Franko's famous review of this pamphlet. Both works had discussed the idea of a united, independent Ukrainian state, which the Soviet power presumably had just turned into reality.<sup>198</sup> Only the *Zhdanovshchina* ideological campaigns of 1946-47 would finally outlaw Ukrainian patriotic rhetoric in the republic's public discourse.

Occasionally, the republican functionaries and intellectuals united to rebuff the

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<sup>196</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 399; op. 23, spr. 860 (lectures); M. Petrovsky, *Zakhidna Ukraina (Istorychna dovidka)*, Biblioteka ahitatora (Kiev: Ukrainske derzhavne vydavnytstvo, 1945) and *Bukovyna (Istorychna dovidka)*, Biblioteka ahitatora (Kiev: Ukrainske derzhavne vydavnytstvo, 1945). The quotations are from *Zakhidna Ukraina*, 3, 4, 17.

<sup>197</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 31 January 1945, p. 1.

<sup>198</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 1625, ark. 11-4.

denials of Ukrainian unity. Sometime late in the war, Manuilsky reviewed the manuscript of Volume Two of *The History of Diplomacy*, prepared by the Moscow scholars. The Ukrainian foreign minister was outraged to find there a reference to the "Ruthenian part of Galicia." Ignoring the Galician Ukrainians' self-identification as "Ruthenians" until the turn of the century, Manuilsky wrote indignantly: "This is the German and Polish term, especially devised to prove that the Galician population is different from Ukrainians. Our Soviet political literature should not repeat this term since there are no Ruthenians, but there is a Ukrainian population of Galicia."<sup>199</sup>

In December 1944, the Moscow historian Boris Grekov received an anonymous letter from Lviv. The letter, composed in good Russian and signed by "a Russian Galician," appealed to the renowned scholar to stop the Ukrainization of the "primordial Russian" Galicia and Transcarpathia. The author argued that history had given Soviet power a chance to complete the gathering of Russian lands begun by the Muscovite prince Ivan Kalita. The Academy of Sciences took the matter with utmost seriousness, and the letter ended up on the desk of Georgii Aleksandrov, the head of the Administration of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee.<sup>200</sup> In 1946, "Ivan the Galician" (most likely the same person as "a Russian Galician") wrote to the Ukrainian Secretary for Propaganda, Ivan Nazarenko, that Russians, Ukrainians, Galicians and Transcarpathians were all parts of the same people, "Rus'." The author attached his manuscript "Open Questions to Professor Petrovsky," in which he accused the leading Soviet Ukrainian historian of falsifying the past, separating Ukrainians from the Russians, and, by extension, of fuelling the insurgent movement in Western Ukraine.<sup>201</sup>

Hardly any of the established scholars in Lviv denied the Ukrainian ethnic character of their land, but other potential complications existed. In December 1944, Petrovsky went to Lviv with a special mission to sound out the local historians and literary scholars. He reported the results directly to Secretary for Ideology Lytvyn, who

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<sup>199</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 4669, op. 1, spr. 47, ark. 7.

<sup>200</sup> RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 340, ll. 19-25.

<sup>201</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 326, ark. 64-73zv.

passed this apparently important document on to Khrushchev. The bulk of the report dealt with the ex-favorite of the Soviet authorities Professor Krypiakevych, who, while under the Germans, had published anti-Soviet books and was now eager to expiate his sins by producing ideologically correct works on Bohdan Khmelnytsky. He allegedly told Petrovsky: "In this question, I now see many things much more clearly after I explored Marxism and read your, Nikolai Neonovich, works on Bohdan Khmelnytsky, especially on his gravitation to the Russian people." The other five leading scholars were also most compliant, agreeing to write popular newspaper articles and read lectures on desirable topics. However, almost all surprisingly declined the offer to come to Kiev with the lecture tour. The insightful Petrovsky surmised that the Galicians must have been afraid of being exiled from Kiev, where their disappearance would not embarrass the authorities.<sup>202</sup>

Generally, the last year and the immediate aftermath of the war saw a renewed effort to study the past of Western Ukraine, as well as to popularize its "Ukrainianness." During 1945, two of the eleven archaeological expeditions in Ukraine headed for Galicia and Transcarpathia to look for ancient Slavic settlements in the area. The Institute of History hired the doyen of Lviv historians, Professor Myron Korduba, to study the history of the "Galician-Volhynian state" during the fourteenth century. Ivan Krypiakevych, besides editing the volume of Bohdan Khmelnytsky's correspondence, was preparing a long topical article on the historical western borders of Ukraine.<sup>203</sup>

The authorities reinstalled the official cult of Ivan Franko as the Western Ukrainian counterpart of Shevchenko—a forefather in two senses, as the father of the nation and as proto-socialist. Eastern Ukrainian court poets Mykola Bazhan and Andrii Malyshko led the first official pilgrimage to Franko's tomb in Lviv just ten days after the city's takeover by the Soviet Army. The state Franko museums in Lviv and in the writer's

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<sup>202</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 394, ark. 1-5; *U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu*, 2: 4-6. Although the report is written in Russian, one should assume that Petrovsky conversed with Krypiakevych and others in Ukrainian. The note on ark. 1 of the archival copy reads: "Com[rade] Khrushchev read. 27.II. [1945]."

<sup>203</sup> I. H. Shovkoplias, *Arkheolohichni doslidzhennia na Ukraini (1917-1957): Ohliad vyvchennia arkheolohichnykh pamiatok* (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo AN URSR, 1957), p. 24 (archaeology); NAIU, op. 1, spr. 65, ark. 42 (Korduba); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 394, ark. 1-2 (Krypiakevych).

native village were among the first cultural establishments to be open immediately after the war. The Eastern Ukrainian writer Leonid Smiliansky promptly composed the play *The Peasant's Deputy*, devoted to Franko's unsuccessful bid for the Austro-Hungarian parliament during the 1890s. In early December 1945, the Maria Zankovetska Lviv Ukrainian Drama Company premiered the play with moderate success. Characteristically, the reviewer regretted the somewhat insufficient depiction of Franko's "fortitude and greatness."<sup>204</sup> In contrast to theater life in the East, that in Western Ukraine displayed a greater sensitivity to the national cultural heritage. Unlike the Kharkiv Opera, which opened its 1945 season with the Russian patriotic classic *Ivan Susanin*, the Lviv opera stuck to *The Zaporozhian Cossack beyond the Danube* as a season opener.<sup>205</sup>

In August 1946, the Ukrainian press published the letter Bolesław Bierut had sent to Khrushchev to thank the "fraternal Ukrainian people" for the transfer of Polish cultural treasures from Lviv, most notably some holdings of the Ossolineum Library. At the same time, the Ukrainian authorities began preparations for the purge (discussed in Chapter Six) of the Polish monuments and memorials in the city. Khrushchev, however, expressed his desire to retain in Lviv a monument to the greatest Polish national poet, Adam Mickiewicz, "a writer popular among the Ukrainian people and loved by them."<sup>206</sup> At the same time, the local administration commenced the reorganization of the King Jan III National Historical Museum into a different type of museum suited for "conducting the mass-political and ideological work among the toilers" and promoting the Ukrainian past of the land.<sup>207</sup>

Following the Soviet Army's second arrival, developments in Bukovyna featured

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<sup>204</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 6 August 1944, p. 4 (pilgrimage); H. H. Mezentseva, *Muzei Ukrainy* (Kiev: Izdatelstvo Kievskogo universiteta, 1959), pp. 162, 163 (museums); *Radianske mystetstvo*, 4 December 1945, p. 3; *Literaturna hazeta*, 13 December 1945, p. 4 (the play; the quotation is from *Radianske mystetstvo*).

<sup>205</sup> Stanishevsky, *Ukrainskyi radianskyi muzychnyi teatr*, 211 (Kharkiv Opera); *Kulturne budivnytstvo v Ukrainskii RSR: Cherven 1941-1950*, 161; RGALI, f. 962, op. 11, d. 560, ll. 1-2 (Lviv Opera).

<sup>206</sup> *Radianske mystetstvo*, 6 August 1946, p. 1. The original letter is in TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 7, spr. 3078, ark. 61-2. It has been published in *Kulturne budivnytstvo v Ukrainskii RSR: Cherven 1941-1950*, 252-3 with Khrushchev's name edited out. Some other relevant official correspondence appeared in *Kulturne zhyttia v Ukraini: Zakhidni zemli*, 1: 304-05 (monument to Mickiewicz), 341-2.

<sup>207</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 883, ark. 39.

the now familiar "primordial land" propaganda and exaltation of the local nineteenth-century writer Osy Fedkovych, whose museum was opened in 1945, as was the museum of Olha Kobylanska, the survivor of the *fin de siècle* age of Ukrainian literature who lived to see the first Soviet "liberation" of her native land. Three departments of the Faculty of History at the local Chernivtsi university were soon working frantically on Bukovyna's history from ancient times to the present.<sup>208</sup> In April 1945, the republican Council of People's Ministers decreed that the palace of the Orthodox metropolitan in Chernivtsi be turned into a museum complex to house branches of the Lenin Museum, Historical Museum, and Museum of Literature. In the same month, the Chernivtsi State Theater became the first in the republic to stage Kopylenko's play *Why the Stars Don't Go Out*. The premiere of the symphonic cantata *Danylo of Halych*, written by the local composer Bohdan Kryzhanivsky to the text of Bazhan's poem, became the major musical event in Chernivtsi in July 1946.<sup>209</sup>

One cannot conclude that Soviet power was somehow imposing the Ukrainian identity—and the "Ukrainian" past—on the East Slavic population of Galicia, although the authorities were probably doing so in Transcarpathia and, to a degree, in Bukovyna. The level of national consciousness, social organization, and community ties among pre-1939 Galician Ukrainians, as well as their familiarity with the national history, far surpassed that of Soviet Ukrainians.<sup>210</sup> What made the difference, however, was the authorities' intention to educate the Galicians as citizens of a *Soviet* Ukraine, an inseparable part of the Soviet Union. Beginning in the autumn of 1944, Soviet army units

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<sup>208</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 31 March 1944, p. 3; 30 March 1945, p. 3 (patriotic rhetoric); 9 August 1944, p. 3 (Fedkovych); Petrovsky, *Bukovyna (Istorychna dovidka)*, 12 ("primordial Ukrainian land"); Mezentseva, *Muzei Ukrainy*, 163 (museums); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 463, ark. 219 (Chernivtsi University; the project was actually criticized as unrealistic during the 1946 meeting of propagandists in Kiev).

<sup>209</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 883, ark. 29-32 (museums); *Radianske mystetstvo*, 3 April 1945, p. 3 (play); 30 July 1946, p. 3 (symphony). Bohdan Kryzhanivsky was born in Lviv and educated in Vienna, but he lived in Soviet Ukraine between the wars and was in 1946 transferred to Chernivtsi as the artistic director of the local drama and music company.

<sup>210</sup> See John-Paul Himka, *Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1988); Alexander J. Motyl, *The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919-1929* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1980); and John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*.

were fighting the Ukrainian nationalist guerillas in Western Ukraine, and this struggle, rather than the economic recovery of the region, occupied the attention of the highest republican leadership.<sup>211</sup> At the same time, the official ideologues worked hard to undo the "bourgeois-nationalist propaganda" in the Western oblasts. Within a few years, 44,000 teachers from Eastern Ukraine arrived to staff the schools in the West, and thousands of administrators and propagandists went westwards to oversee the new ideological flock.<sup>212</sup> Dmytro Manuilsky attended the teachers' conference in Lviv in January 1945 to give a speech, *The Ukrainian-German Bourgeois Nationalists at the Service of Fascist Germany*. The text, promptly released as a pamphlet, portrayed the Soviet Union as a vehicle of modernization for the economically backward region. According to Manuilsky, some Galicians idealized the Austro-Hungarian past for the empire's encouragement of national autonomy, yet the Habsburgs had discouraged Eastern Galicia's economic development, whereas the Soviet power would "turn Lviv into one of the biggest industrial centers of Soviet Ukraine." Geopolitically, Ukraine could not be independent, nor could there be a union with "weak" Poland. The "bourgeois nationalists" talked of independence but in practice submitted to oppressive Nazi Germany, which did not allow for the free development of Ukrainian culture. Consequently, historically "the Soviet Union [was] the only guarantor of Ukraine's freedom and independence."<sup>213</sup>

While the suitable Ukrainian past was being promoted, the unsuitable one was suppressed or reinterpreted. During the first years after the reunification, Soviet ideologues were obsessed with fighting the cult of Hetman Mazepa in Western Ukraine. Again and again at conferences, the ideologists raised the problem of the proper blackening of this "traitor" who had attempted to separate Cossack Ukraine from

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<sup>211</sup> For the authorities' concerns in Western Ukraine during 1944, see TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 780, 889, and 890; Volodymyr Serhiichuk, *Desiat buremnykh lit: Zakhidnoukrainski zemli u 1944-1953 rr.: Novi dokumenty i materialy* (Kiev: Dnipro, 1998), pp. 10-184.

<sup>212</sup> Rublov and Cherchenko, *Stalinshchyna*, 211-41 (the number 44,000 is given on p. 211).

<sup>213</sup> D. Z. Manuilsky, *Ukrainsko-nemetskie natsionalisty na sluzhbe u fashistskoi Germanii* (Kiev: Ukrainske derzhavne vydavnytstvo, 1946), pp. 5-7, 9. The archival copy of the proofs is in Manuilsky's archive in TsDAVOV, f. 4669, op. 1, spr. 22.

Russia.<sup>214</sup> Another source of the Galicians' national pride, the Ukrainian Galician Army of 1918-20, was also singled out for suppression.<sup>215</sup> However, as early as 1943, the authorities realized that denigrating the Ukrainian Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church in the history books would alienate the West Ukrainian reader. When Stalin finally proceeded to destroy the Galicians' national church, the first direct ideological attack on it came in April 1945 in the form of a denunciatory article against the late head of the Church, Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky. The article, "With a Cross or With a Knife?", opened with a derogatory historical survey of the Church's "anti-people" activities. The Lviv authorities reported the public reaction to this "bomb of enormous force" directly to Khrushchev.<sup>216</sup> As the authorities suppressed the residue of the nationalist version of history in Western Ukraine, the codex of the unsuitable past would grow to include patriotic historical narratives, which remained acceptable until the end of the war.

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During 1943-44, the myth of the age-old Russian-Ukrainian friendship ascended to a dominant position in the republic's public discourse. Having been once understood as a peasant revolution, and then as the Ukrainian people's national War of Liberation, the Khmelnytsky Uprising was reinterpreted as a struggle for the union with Russia—an event no longer labelled as the "lesser evil" for Ukrainians, but as their dream come true. The republic's ideologues and intellectuals elaborated the friendship doctrine in order to reconcile the Ukrainian historical mythology with the Russian grand narrative. The new conceptual framework allowed for the further promotion of the national heritage, resulting in a flood of scholarly and artistic representations of the Ukrainian past. However, the

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<sup>214</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 385, ark. 212; spr. 539, ark. 6; op. 23, spr. 1652, ark. 83, 87.

<sup>215</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 1652, ark. 84.

<sup>216</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 153, ark. 2 (1943); op. 23, spr. 1605 (1945 article), here ark. 45. The report to Khrushchev was recently published in *Kulturne zhyttia v Ukraini: Zakhidni zemli*, 1: 267-76. Iaroslav Halan wrote the article in question, published in *Vilna Ukraina* in April 1945, under the pen name Volodymyr Rosovych. See Iaroslav Halan, "Z khrestom chy z nozhem?" in his *Lytsari chornoï ruky* (Lviv: Kameniar, 1974), pp. 49-62. For a comprehensive analysis of the Soviet anti-Uniate campaign of 1945-46, see Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, *The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State (1939-1950)* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1996), pp. 102-47.

doctrine of Russian guidance also dictated the subordinate position of Ukrainian historical narratives: the Ukrainians could valorize their past as long as it complemented, but did not compete with, the story of the Russian nation-state.

Nevertheless, the tension between the claims of Russian and Ukrainian national histories persisted during the war's last years. Some Ukrainian intellectuals ignored the ideological shift and continued to emphasize their people's primary allegiance to their own national patrimony. The final incorporation of Western Ukraine highlighted the inherent contradictions of the Russian-Ukrainian friendship myth. The official discourse presented the unification of all Ukrainian lands into a "nation-state" (in the form of a Soviet republic) as a teleological outcome of Ukrainian history. However, the Ukrainian people achieved this triumph only through accepting the Russian elder brother's guidance, first in 1654 and then in 1917.



### Chapter Three

## REINVENTING THE IDEOLOGICAL ORTHODOXY

Occasionally, a senior ideologue's rough notes can open an exciting avenue for contextualizing Soviet ideological processes. In the case of the Ukrainian Zhdanovshchina, for instance, a file in the personal archives of the Ukrainian Foreign Minister and ideological *éminence grise*, Dmytro Manuisky, is very revealing.<sup>217</sup> This file combines his drafts of the anti-nationalist resolutions with his extremely interesting pencil notes on the question of "national pride"—apparently the first draft of some article or speech. The notes show how the person who singlehandedly wrote most of the era's principal republican ideological pronouncements agonized over the definition of "Soviet national pride." In one paragraph, Manuisky begins by denouncing the national past but then later recognizes it as one of the pillars of national identity:

On the pride of history. When a nation has nothing in the present to be proud of, it appeals to the greatness of its history. (Italian Fascists [were proud] of Ancient Rome's greatness.) Frenchmen [are proud] of their bourgeois revolution. History is a cement that unites the past of the people with their present. History embodies the idea of the people's immortality.<sup>218</sup>

The notes open with a statement that the foreign minister apparently intended to develop: "What is 'national pride'? What we are proud of: our socialist construction, the Great October Socialist Revolution, the party, Lenin and Stalin." The title he gave the last section read, "On the National Pride of the USSR's Separate Peoples and that of the Multinational Soviet People in General." Manuisky's main thesis was that "love for one's

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<sup>217</sup> Dmytro Manuisky (1883-1959) belonged to a small group of well-educated "old Bolsheviks" who survived the Great Purges. Even within this handful of people, he was probably the only Lenin appointee still enjoying a position of authority after the Second World War. Manuisky studied at St. Petersburg University and received a law degree from the Sorbonne (1911). After briefly serving as the Ukrainian Communist Party's general secretary in 1921-22, he moved to Moscow as secretary of the Comintern's Executive Committee. In 1944-50, Manuisky served as the Ukrainian republic's minister of foreign affairs, deputy premier, and head of the Ukrainian delegation to the UN.

<sup>218</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 4669, op. 1, spr. 23, ark. 5. Underlining in the original.

country (Ukraine) should be developed on the basis of love for the whole Soviet Union" but he did not work out how to reconcile pride in one's nation and its history with "love" for the Russian-led Soviet Union and Stalinist model of socialism.<sup>219</sup>

Manuilsky's notes remained incomplete, but other publications in the official press of the time, such as I. Martyniuk's article "To Develop and Cultivate Soviet Patriotism" or the editorial "On the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic" in *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, confirmed that the Ukrainian ideologues were, indeed, attempting to suppress "ethnic" historical memory and promote pride in the Soviet present. Both articles stressed that the republic's population had pledged allegiance to Soviet Ukraine as a part of the Soviet Union, and both were silent about historic traditions and ethnic cultural identity. Criticizing several writers for references to Cossack glory in their works on contemporary subjects, the literary critic Ievhen Iuriev announced: "The idea of our vivifying Soviet patriotism comes not from the Zaporozhian Host." Then Iuriev traced the roots of Soviet Ukrainian identity to revolutionary struggle and the construction of socialism.<sup>220</sup>

Unlike the Russian *Zhdanovshchina*, which concentrated on purging literature and the arts of Western influences and "apolitical subjects," the postwar ideological purification campaigns in Ukraine focused on undoing the wartime ethnic patriotism. From its very beginnings, the Ukrainian *Zhdanovshchina* aimed at "nationalism," particularly in history. Evidence of the complex, multidimensional nature of Stalinist ideological processes, this difference determined both the unusual intensity and the ultimate inconclusiveness of cultural purges in the republic.

### **The Confusing Signals from Above**

Recently, Ukrainian scholars have identified two episodes of the republic's cultural life of 1943-44 as potential precursors of the postwar ideological purges: the denunciation of

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<sup>219</sup> Ibid., ark. 5, 7.

<sup>220</sup> See I. Martyniuk, "Rozvyvaty i kultyvuvaty radianskyi patriotyzm," *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, no. 8 (1947): 11-24; "Do trydtsiatyrichchia Ukrainskoi Radianskoi Sotsialistychnoi Respubliky," *ibid.*, no. 12 (1947): 1-9; *Literaturna hazeta*, 15 January 1948, p. 3 (Iuriev).

Oleksandr Dovzhenko for his novel *Ukraine in Flames* and the party functionaries' mixed reaction to Maksym Rylsky's speech "Kiev in the History of Ukraine."<sup>221</sup> Nevertheless, a close examination of both affairs shows that the first indications of the changing ideological climate were confusing at best. Moreover, the two episodes are hardly comparable.

In the summer of 1943, the leading Ukrainian film director Oleksandr Dovzhenko completed his new novel *Ukraine in Flames*. The work portrayed the tragic and heroic events of the war in Ukraine and was, like all his previous novels, intended to serve as a basis of a movie script; the author himself subtitled the work "A Cinematographic Novel." In the meantime, Dovzhenko submitted the Russian prose version entitled "The Victory" for publication in the Moscow literary journal *Znamia*. Dovzhenko was unaware that the Central Committee's Administration of Propaganda and Agitation had speedily produced a negative review of his novel's Russian version. On 9 July, Aleksandrov reported to Secretary of the Central Committee A. Shcherbakov that the military unit portrayed in the novel consisted of Ukrainians only, a description which "[did] not reflect reality and artificially separate[d] the Ukrainian people's struggle from the Soviet peoples' common struggle against the Germans." This error was the only ideological sin named in the document. Other critical points included the portrayal of too many deaths, too much attention paid to the Soviet retreat and panic, improper depiction of a general, etc.<sup>222</sup> Nevertheless, no immediate action against Dovzhenko (who had accompanied the Soviet army troops in Ukraine) was taken at the time. On 28 August, the writer read the novel to Khrushchev and won the first secretary's full approval, complete with the promise to publish the work as a separate book in both Russian and Ukrainian.<sup>223</sup> In early November, though, Dovzhenko complained to Khrushchev that some people in Moscow were "afraid to publish" *Ukraine in Flames*. When Dovzhenko arrived in Moscow on 26

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<sup>221</sup> See M. V. Koval, "Sprava Oleksandra Dovzhenka," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 4 (1994): 108-19, here 118; M. V. Koval and O. S. Rublov, "Instytut istorii Ukrainy NAN Ukrainy: Pershe dvadtsiatyrichchia," 56.

<sup>222</sup> RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 212, ll. 1-3.

<sup>223</sup> Oleksandr Dovzhenko, *Hospody, poshly meni syly*, 191 (the diary entry of 28 August 1943).

November, he learned from Minister of Cinema Bolshakov "bad news: Stalin did not like [Dovzhenko's] novel *Ukraine in Flames* and banned its publication and filming." On 28 November, Khrushchev spoke to Dovzhenko over the phone, sounding out an entirely new line of accusations, which Dovzhenko recorded in his diary as follows: "I insulted Bohdan Khmelnytsky, I spat on class struggle, I am preaching nationalism, etc."<sup>224</sup>

On 31 January 1944, Dovzhenko together with four Ukrainian party and state leaders and three other prominent writers was invited to the Politburo meeting in Moscow.<sup>225</sup> In his lengthy speech, Stalin accused the writer of "revising Leninism." Dovzhenko had allegedly discarded the principle of the class struggle, blackened the party line and the kolkhoz system in Ukraine, and overemphasized Ukrainian patriotism. Dovzhenko's novel, indeed, expressed and substantiated the Great Retreat from proletarian internationalism to patriotism, history, and the Nation. Its characters repeatedly attack the ideological device of "class struggle" and suggest substituting this principal paradigm of Soviet ideology with that of "national pride." For instance, the red pencil of Kremlin ideologues underlined the following words of the novel's two main positive characters, Zaporozhets and Kravchyna: "Today I do not know class struggle and I do not want to know it. I know the Fatherland!"; "We were bad historians, weren't we? We did not know how to forgive each other. National pride did not shine in our books [full of] class struggle"; "We are fighting for Ukraine. For the only forty-million people that through the centuries of European history did not find for themselves a life worthy of humans on their own land."<sup>226</sup>

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<sup>224</sup> Dovzhenko, *Hospody, poshly meni syly*, 191, 197, 200 (diary entries of 28 August, 26 and 28 November 1943).

<sup>225</sup> The Ukrainian participants were allowed to make notes and, during the ensuing ideological campaign in the republic, some of them publicly referred to Stalin's critique (TsDAML, f. 590, op. 1, spr. 39, ark. 20-22 [Korniichuk]). The archives of the CP(b)U Central Committee preserved an unfinished record of Stalin's speech, probably made by one of the republican dignitaries (TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 282, ark. 200-03). Dovzhenko's widow and Maksym Rylsky (who participated in the meeting) later shared their accounts of the event with family and friends, who subsequently published these stories (*Literaturna Ukraina*, 4 January 1990, p. 3; 21 June 1990, p. 4). Finally, the text of Stalin's comments has been discovered and published as I. V. Stalin, "Ob antileninskikh oshibkakh i natsionalisticheskikh izvrashcheniakh v kinopovesti Dovzhenko 'Ukraina v ognе'," *Iskusstvo kino*, no. 4 (1990): 84-96.

<sup>226</sup> RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 293, ll. 7, 14, 17.

During the meeting, Stalin quoted the fragment where Zaporozhets tells the orthodox partisan commander: "Go to hell with your [class] struggle.... You went mad, you grew addicted to class struggle as to moonshine. Oh, it will doom us." He also cited the tirades against the lack of patriotism in Soviet history books. Dovzhenko and his heroes saw the homeland and the national past as alternative foci of allegiance, but, according to Stalin, the novel failed to stress that "precisely Soviet power and the Bolshevik party cherish the historic traditions and rich cultural heritage of the Ukrainian people and other peoples of the USSR, as well as raise their national consciousness."<sup>227</sup> The Soviet dictator was especially infuriated by the novel's appeal to fight for Mother Ukraine:

If Dovzhenko wanted to write the truth, he should have said: wherever the Soviet government sends you, to north, south, west or east, remember that you are fighting and holding together with all fraternal Soviet people, in concord with them, [that you are fighting] for our Soviet Union, our common Fatherland. Because to defend the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics also means to defend and protect Soviet Ukraine. Ukraine as a sovereign state will survive, grow stronger, and flourish only if the Soviet Union exists.<sup>228</sup>

Together with Dovzhenko's failure to denounce the Ukrainian "bourgeois nationalists" for their collaboration with the Germans, the appeal to ethnic patriotism enabled Stalin to accuse the writer of "nationalism."<sup>229</sup>

At this stage, however, emphasizing Ukrainian patriotism and the national past over class ancestry was understood as only one of Dovzhenko's serious mistakes rather than as his principal mortal sin. Stalin himself said at the beginning of the meeting that he ("we") thought to publish the critique of the movie script in the press but then "spared the writer."<sup>230</sup> Nevertheless, in early 1944 the authoritative *Bolshevik* carried a critical

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<sup>227</sup> Stalin, "Ob antileninskikh oshibkakh," 90, 93.

<sup>228</sup> Ibid., 94.

<sup>229</sup> Ibid., 90, 92, 94.

<sup>230</sup> This introductory comment is absent from the edited version of the text, which was prepared for Stalin's *Collected Works*, but is found in the notes made by one of the Ukrainian functionaries (TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 282, ark. 200).

article about the novel, and a comprehensive persecution campaign against Dovzhenko developed in Ukraine. Khrushchev, who had imprudently approved the novel in August 1943, set an example by denouncing the writer for "revising Leninism," "slandering the socialist way of life," "attacking the party," and, finally, professing "militant nationalism."<sup>231</sup>

The accusation of the nationalist valorization of the past was not clearly formulated in the list of the writer's sins. In bureaucratic fervor, Ideological Secretary Lytvyn prepared the index of pages in *Ukraine in Flames* where various "deviations" surfaced. "Slandering the party" came first, with three page references; followed by the "hatred of the idea of class struggle," with six references; and "slandering Bohdan Khmelnytsky," with three references.<sup>232</sup> This last accusation was particularly misleading, since Dovzhenko actually attempted in the form of a conversation of four uneducated peasants to mock the pre-war "class history," which had blackened Khmelnytsky as feudal lord:

- Chubenko: Yes, it is said that not once in the past did they [the lords] impose a yoke on our brothers.  
Nekhoda: Who do you mean—they?  
Chubenko: Bohdan Khmelnytsky!  
Tovchenyk: Oh, he was a great villain. Before the war, the museum in Chernihiv displayed his sabre. And there was an explanatory note in big letters: "This is the sabre of a well-known butcher of the Ukrainian people, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, who suppressed the popular revolution in sixteen hundred and something. So his sabre was behind glass, while twelve of his portraits were locked in the basement. They were not shown to the people. It was said that they

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<sup>231</sup> For a scholarly account of the campaign against Dovzhenko, see Koval, "Sprava Oleksandra Dovzhenka." Khrushchev later testified that "This whole disgraceful affair was mostly the doing of Shcherbakov, who had wormed his way into Stalin's confidence and did everything he could to make life miserable for everyone else" (*Khrushchev Remembers*, with an Introduction, Comments, and Notes by Edward Crankshaw, trans. and ed. by Strobe Talbott [Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1970], pp. 172-73). During the war, as head of the Army Political Directorate and the Central Committee Secretary, Shcherbakov had exercised significant influence over ideological matters.

<sup>232</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 4504, ark. 1. The archives of the Ukrainian Central Committee preserve yet another copy of *Ukraine in Flames*, in which the incriminating passages were underlined by black and red pencils. (Khrushchev was fond of using a black pencil.)

created a haze in people's heads. That's what they say.  
 Nekhoda: What a villain!  
 Tsar: But who is the one on the horse, at the square in front of the church  
 in Kiev?  
 Chubenko: That's a different one.  
 Tovchenyk: So it is not him?  
 Nekhoda: They all were the same!<sup>233</sup>

Pretending not to recognize the mockery of their own past pronouncements, the Ukrainian bureaucrats adopted a peculiar "reading" of this dialogue in order to accuse Dovzhenko of slandering the hetman. Since the novel had not been published, dozens of Ukrainian intellectuals blindly repeated the same accusation at denunciatory meetings, with the result, ironically, of reinforcing Khmelnytsky's place in the Soviet Ukrainian canon of history. This was precisely the aim Dovzhenko had had in mind when he proposed the establishment of the Order of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and when he wrote *Ukraine in Flames*. This paradox aside, the critique of Dovzhenko signalled an emphasis on shared Soviet patriotism at the expense of separate ethnic ancestries, and on the restoration of the class struggle as the essence of the historical process. Nothing indicated the Kremlin's unhappiness with, say, the insufficient glorification of the Russian "elder brother" or the failure to depict the "friendship of peoples."

The second precursor of the postwar ideological shift in Ukraine seems to be mainly an invention of post-Soviet Ukrainian historiography. Mykhailo Koval and Oleksandr Rublov call the authorities' reaction to Rylsky's speech on the history of Kiev (11 November 1943) the "starting point of a new policy characterized by the suppression of national-patriotic components of the creative intelligentsia's activity."<sup>234</sup> However, the relevant archival documents do not support such a conclusion. As explained in Chapter Two, Rylsky's speech "Kiev in the History of Ukraine" was a brief survey of Ukrainian history with an emphasis on the uninterrupted development of the national

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<sup>233</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 4504, ark. 39-40. See also the first uncensored publication of the novel in Dovzhenko, *Hospody, poshly meni syly*, 451.

<sup>234</sup> Koval and Rublov, "Instytut istorii Ukrainy," 56.

culture before and after the Revolution. It contained positive references to nineteenth-century nation-builders and historians. Although the speech filled two full newspaper pages, the official *Radianska Ukraina* carried it in its entirety.<sup>235</sup>

In March 1944, when the Dovzhenko affair was developing into a minor denunciatory campaign, Fedir Ienevych, the director of the Ukrainian branch of the Institute of Marx, Engels, and Lenin (IMEL), submitted to the republican Central Committee a report accusing Rylsky of "nationalism." On the one hand, Ienevych charged the poet with seeing Soviet Ukrainian culture as simply an extension of pre-revolutionary, "non-Soviet" Ukrainian culture, and not sufficiently stressing the radically different "class character" of the new Ukraine. On the other, Ienevych decried the insufficient homage to the Russian elder brother in Rylsky's national narrative:

It was necessary to stress in this speech the importance of the union between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples and the most important, decisive role that the great Russian people played in liberating Ukraine from the German imperialists. Meanwhile, Rylsky avoided all these questions and, in fact, devoted the greater part of his speech to idealizing the Ukrainian past, hiding Russian culture's influence on Ukrainian culture, concealing Soviet power's role in the social and national liberation of the Ukrainian people—in the real revival of Ukraine.<sup>236</sup>

Leonid Novychenko, a literary critic and the Central Committee's expert charged with verifying Ienevych's report, seconded most of the accusations. He found that Rylsky had idealized the Cossacks and had used uncritically the works of Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalist historians, in particular Hrushevsky. All in all, the text of the speech was

imbued with the nationalist theory, according to which M. Rylsky sees in the history of Ukraine only struggle for national independence, the struggle conducted, in the author's view, by the Cossack officers, the gentry, and the bourgeoisie. [He] passes over in silence the struggle of the Ukrainian toiling masses for their social and national liberation that they pursued with fraternal support from the great Russian people....Rylsky hardly mentions the progressive historical importance of

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<sup>235</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 10 December 1943, pp. 3-4.

<sup>236</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 266, ark. 1.



Ukraine's incorporation into Russia; he rather stresses that, as a result of this incorporation, "Ukraine became a province of the Russian Empire, which Lenin has aptly called the 'prison of peoples'."<sup>237</sup>

However, the Rylsky affair remained an instructive example of an abortive denunciation. Although both the initial "signal from below" and its favorable assessment by the Central Committee's apparatus were in place, the campaign was not set in motion. The republican leadership apparently did not consider denouncing another high-profile Ukrainian litterateur timely. While the Dovzhenko affair represented a warning for the intellectuals who identified with the wartime ethnic patriotism, the Rylsky affair would have triggered a comprehensive purge of "nationalists" in the republic, with possible unpleasant consequences for the Ukrainian party leadership itself. To test this explanation, one may refer to the archival evidence from 1947, when the new Ukrainian first secretary Lazar Kaganovich was searching for errors in ideological work. Ienevych again sent his comments on Rylsky, although this time personally to Kaganovich, resulting in the poet's denunciation as "nationalist" in a special secret resolution of the Ukrainian Central Committee, "On M. T. Rylsky's Speech 'Kiev in the History of Ukraine'" (20 August 1947).<sup>238</sup> However, in March 1944 a similar "initiative from below" was ignored.

Likewise, the pronouncements from Moscow did not always define the party line on historical representations in the republics. Although, as explained in Chapter Two, the Administration of Propaganda and Agitation's internal correspondence criticized the 1943 patriotic *History of the Kazakh SSR* as "anti-Russian," the Moscow ideologues did not sponsor the book's public denunciation. In fact, the Central Committee functionaries were extremely displeased to find out that the book's co-editor, Professor Anna Pankratova, had made the story public in letters to her students. Pankratova took the issue to Zhdanov and subsequently to Stalin, Zhdanov, Malenkov, and Shcherbakov, protesting not only against the critique of the book but also against the entire ideological trend toward the

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<sup>237</sup> Ibid., ark. 10, 12.

<sup>238</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 621, ark. 93 (Ienevych's letter to Kaganovich of 31 July 1947), 94-122 (text of Rylsky's speech), 123-30 (Ienevych's comments); f. 1, op. 8, spr. 328, ark. 6-7 (secret resolution). The 1947 incident is discussed in Chapter Four.

rehabilitation of Russian state traditions at the expense of class analysis.<sup>239</sup> Combined with the previous calls to clarify the party line on history, Pankratova's protests resulted in a conference of leading Soviet historians and ideologues in Moscow. During the conference's five sessions on 29 May, 1, 5, 10, 22 June, and 8 July 1944, the proponents of Russocentric statism clashed with the defenders of the "class history." However, the party ideologues failed to declare the winner. Zhdanov first appeared to support Pankratova's call to return to "class approach," using it as a tool to restore his authority in Moscow (he had just returned to the capital from Leningrad) and as a weapon against his unfaithful client Aleksandrov. Zhdanov had spent several months writing and rewriting the draft decree "On the Shortcomings and Mistakes in Scholarly Work in the Area of the History of the USSR." He consulted Stalin several times but ultimately abandoned the project. In the end, a minor resolution to close *Istoricheskii zhurnal* and start a new scholarly periodical, *Voprosy istorii* (Issues in History), became the only Central Committee decree resulting from the conference.<sup>240</sup>

In July 1945, *Bolshevik* published Aleksandrov's speech before the conference of the department chairs in the social sciences. On the one hand, the head of the Administration of Propaganda and Agitation reproached those trying to revise the Marxist-Leninist definition of tsarist Russia as "gendarme of Europe" and the "prison of peoples." He also criticized attempts to present the Russian peasant wars as destructive to the tsarist state-building project. On the other hand, Aleksandrov demanded that textbooks of World History (and not just those of the History of the USSR) glorify Kievan Rus' for its great

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<sup>239</sup> RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 224, ll. 102-46ob (displeasure with Pankratova's letters and her repentance), 1-10 (Pankratova to Zhdanov), 66-75ob (Pankratova to Stalin, Zhdanov, Malenkov, and Shcherbakov).

<sup>240</sup> *Voprosy istorii* has recently published the conference's minutes: "Stenogramma soveshchaniia po voprosam istorii SSSR v TsK VKP(b) v 1944 godu," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 2 (1996): 55-86; no. 3: 82-112; no. 4: 65-93; no. 5: 77-106; no. 7: 70-87; no. 9: 47-77. An insightful introduction by Iu. N. Amiantov in no. 2: 47-54 provides a roadmap to the confusing proceedings. Kostyrchenko has unveiled Zhdanov's motivations in his *V plenu u krasnogo faraona: Politicheskie presledovaniia evreev v SSSR v poslednee stalinskoe desiatiletie: Dokumentalnoe issledovanie* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1994), pp. 21-22. See also S. V. Konstantinov, "Nesostoiavshaiasia rasprava (O soveshchaniia istorikov v TsK VKP[b] v maie-iiule 1944 goda)," in *Vlast i obshchestvennye organizatsii Rossii v pervoi treti XX stoletia* (Moscow, 1994), pp. 254-68.

role in the history of Europe, and ordered that unidentified Soviet historians cease their "slanderous fabrication" about slavery among the ancient Slavs. Thus, the ideological establishment made concessions both to the defenders of the "class approach" and the historians of the Russian nation-state. However, Aleksandrov did not display such flexibility in his directives on the history of non-Russian peoples. He sharply criticised the works on the history of Kazakhs, Iakuts, Tatars, and Bashkirs for "describing [events] that had opposed" them to the Russians and for valorizing the national heroes who had fought the tsars and the popular rebellions against Russian colonialism. According to Aleksandrov, "The history of the peoples of Russia was a history of overcoming this animosity and their gradual consolidation around the Russian people."<sup>241</sup> The influential ideologue chose to ignore the tension between this interpretation and the orthodox "class history" because reconciling the national pasts of the Russian and non-Russian peoples was emerging as a higher priority.

Nevertheless, the Ukrainian historians did not feel the need to modify their approach in the light of recent discussions in Moscow. In fact, Aleksandrov had mentioned approvingly Volume One of the *History of Ukraine* (1943).<sup>242</sup> The Ukrainian historians and writers were well ahead of their counterparts in other republics in exalting the historical events that "united" their people with the Russians. When, in May 1944, the CP(b)U Central Committee charged Ienevych with preparing a report on the work of the Institute of History of Ukraine, the skilled denunciator did not come up with any serious "ideological mistakes." He only listed thirteen problems of Ukrainian history that needed further study or new interpretation.<sup>243</sup>

### **An Indistinct Prelude**

Despite the peaceful mood within the Ukrainian historical profession, the republican

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<sup>241</sup> G. Aleksandrov, "O nekotorykh zadachakh obshchestvennykh nauk v sovremennykh usloviakh," *Bolshevik*, no. 14 (1945): 12-29, here 17. Although published in the July issue of the journal, the speech was actually delivered on 1 August 1945.

<sup>242</sup> Ibid.

<sup>243</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 864, ark. 5-27.

ideologues resolved to follow Moscow's example in organizing a conference of historians. (Unlike their Moscow superiors, the Ukrainian functionaries officially recognized the importance of artistic representations of the past by inviting a group of local writers to the conference.) However, by the time the first session convened on 10 March 1945, the Ukrainian functionaries were themselves disoriented by the Moscow meetings' inconclusive outcome. Ideological Secretary Lytvyn opened the proceedings neither with a call to denounce "nationalist deviations" in historical scholarship, nor with an appeal to return to the orthodox "class approach." Instead, he noted with uncharacteristic tranquillity that the conference was "unusual" and invited the participants to discuss "the differing points of view in our literature on the history of Ukraine."<sup>244</sup> During the five sessions that followed in late March and early April, Lytvyn rarely took the floor, instead encouraging the participants themselves both to ask questions and seek their answers. Not surprisingly, the Central Committee would soon be disappointed with the conference's inconclusiveness.

In the words of the Central Committee's internal memo, "Initially, the conference was spiritless and the speakers hardly mentioned troubling and disputable questions of history." Indeed, the minutes' first fifty-six pages feature mainly banal suggestions to publish more historical documents and research understudied problems of Ukrainian history. When the early modern Ukrainian nationality (*narodnist*) had emerged was perhaps the most challenging question asked at this stage.<sup>245</sup> Then Professor Mykhailo Rubach finally raised the important methodological (and ideological) issue of the "depreciation of class struggle."<sup>246</sup> His arguments closely resembled those advanced by

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<sup>244</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 1652, ark. 1; op. 70, spr. 385, ark. 1.

<sup>245</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 1652, ark. 146 (memo); 1-56 (minutes, 20-21 on the Ukrainian *narodnist*). The memo has recently been published in *U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu*, 2: 16-22.

<sup>246</sup> Mykhailo Rubach was born in 1899 in a Jewish merchant's family. He joined the Party in April 1917, but, in 1923, in the words of his personal file, "experienced hesitations" during one of the discussions. From 1924 to 1927 he studied at the Institute of Red Professors in Moscow and subsequently worked at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Kharkiv (1928-33) and also served as a head of Ukrainian Archival Administration. In 1933, he moved to the Institute of History of the Communist Academy in Moscow, where in 1935, he was arrested in the case of an unspecified "Ukrainian nationalist" organization. However, the case was closed in January 1936. Rubach lost his party card but was allowed to publish and continue his academic career. In 1940-42, he served as professor of Soviet history at Kharkiv University and, from

the Moscow proponents of the class approach, such as Pankratova, but were further complicated by the Ukrainian specifics:

It would be ridiculous to deny the great political importance of the Ukrainian people's reunification with the Russian people. However, when one begins to see the whole history of Ukraine from ancient times to the present through the lens of reunification, a Marxist, a Leninist, a Stalinist is prompted to ask some serious theoretical questions. Were the Ukrainian toilers and the Ukrainian people in general thinking only about the reunification during the sixteenth, seventeenth, or the eighteenth century? Did not they have more fundamental problems of social and political development [to think of]? I believe that they had. I believe the struggle against feudalism, against serfdom before it was abolished had been something serious and decisive.<sup>247</sup>

Nonetheless, the return to "class history" did not become the conference's principal motif, if only because this would have undermined the emerging "ethno-statist" myth of the Russian-Ukrainian unity. Several other participants seconded Rubach's call to revise the wartime patriotic narratives in the light of a proper class approach, yet their comments were few and far between. The historian Kateryna Stetsiuk proposed the uncovering of the class character of Khmelnytsky's decrees, the writer Petro Panch decried the hetman's idealization as "almost a Marxist," and the literary scholar Ievhen Kyryliuk expressed his satisfaction with the long-overdue discussion of the "mistakes made by some historians."<sup>248</sup> Only Rubach and Panch attacked Petrovsky by name. Rubach first tried to show that Petrovsky had used the term "people" to include the exploiting classes, while the proper Marxist connotation would allegedly exclude them. Later, he accused Petrovsky of presenting, in his 1944 pamphlet, the reunification of the Ukrainian lands in one state as the Ukrainian people's most important historic task, whereas building socialism in Ukraine was presumably far more important. Finally, Rubach charged Petrovsky with

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1942 until retirement in 1974, as senior researcher at the Institute of History in Kiev. In November 1943, Rubach defended his doctoral dissertation, "Essays in the History of the Agrarian Revolution in Ukraine (1917)" (NAIU, op. 1L, spr. 969, ark. 1-21; *Vcheni Instytutu istorii Ukrainy*, 273-74).

<sup>247</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 1652, ark. 57-66, here 64-65.

<sup>248</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 385, ark. 217 (Stetsiuk); spr. 387, ark. 11 (Kyryliuk), 15 (Panch).

relying heavily on the documentary base assembled by the "bourgeois nationalist" Hrushevsky: up to 90% of the materials Petrovsky published in his 1941 collection of documents were said to have been previously used by Hrushevsky.<sup>249</sup> However, Petrovsky successfully rebuffed the assault. He found an appropriate quotation from Stalin to support the all-inclusive notion of the "people" and pointed out that, as a young researcher, he had helped Hrushevsky to collect historical documents on the Cossack epoch, which fact was duly acknowledged in the preface to Volume Nine of the *History of Ukraine-Rus'*.<sup>250</sup> Thus, the test assault on the leading "rehabilitationist" Petrovsky did not develop into a denunciation. The Central Committee memo did not mention the attack on Petrovsky during the conference; just a month before the meeting, Petrovsky was elected a corresponding member of the republican Academy of Sciences and, in July, departed for San Francisco as a member of the Ukrainian delegation at the UN General Assembly.<sup>251</sup>

The interim memo produced by the apparatus of the Central Committee on 17 April 1945 concluded that "so far, none of the historians present at the conference has resolved the disputed questions" of Ukrainian history. The archives also preserved the draft resolution summarizing the conference's results. The document begins with the assumption that Moscow's recent resolutions on the shortcomings in the work of the Tatar and Bashkir party organizations "clearly mapped out the main tasks of the history of the USSR's peoples." (These decrees criticized local patriotic discourse as "nationalist deviation.") However, the memo did not suggest any radical revisions in Ukrainian

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<sup>249</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 1652, ark. 62-63; op. 70, spr. 385, ark. 247-59. Rubach apparently referred to the following publications: N. Petrovsky, *Vossoedinenie ukrainskogo naroda v edinom ukrainskom sovetskom gosudarstve* (Moscow: OGIZ Gospolitizdat, 1944); M. N. Petrovsky and V. K. Putilov, eds., *Vyzvolna borotba ukrainskoho narodu proty hnitu shliakhetskoï Polshchi i pryednannia Ukrainy do Rosii (1569-1654 roky)*, *Istoriia Ukrainy v dokumentakh i materialakh*, vol. 3 (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo AN URSSR, 1941).

<sup>250</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 387, ark. 46-58.

<sup>251</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 14 February 1945, p. 3 (elections to the Academy); NAIU, op. 1L, spr. 115, ark. 1 (trip to San Francisco, followed, in 1946, by those to London and Paris). According to his personal file, Petrovsky knew the French, German, English, Latin, Greek, Polish, and Czech languages. Most other contemporary Soviet Ukrainian historians claimed a reading knowledge of only one West European language.

historical scholarship. The "new" party line amounted to nothing more than a better depiction of the Ukrainians' and Russians' common struggle against tsarism, as well as the two peoples' fraternal cooperation during the Revolution and the reconstruction period. The comment on the lack of "class analysis of the complex and contradictory events of the seventeenth century" appeared far down the list. Generally, the memo presented a very positive picture of Ukrainian historical scholarship, definitely not accusing the republic's historians of nationalist deviations.<sup>252</sup> In any case, the resolution never moved beyond the drafting stage.

The Ukrainian ideologues proved reluctant to turn the conference into a forum proclaiming the reinstatement of the "class approach" or denouncing "bourgeois-nationalist" mistakes, thus leaving historians room to express their own concerns. Confusing and contradictory as they were, the participants' remarks reveal how the real producers of historical knowledge agonized over creating an "ideologically correct" narrative of the national past. Those who, like Rubach, advocated the return to "class analysis" soon discovered the dangerous tension between the notions of the "struggle for social liberation" and "fraternal union" with the ethnically related Russian people. To resolve the problem, Rubach resorted to the familiar interpretation of Ukraine's incorporation into tsarist Russia as a "lesser evil."<sup>253</sup> However, neither the ideologues nor the historians hastened to readopt this concept, which seemed to have been compromised by the official exaltation of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. The historian Vadym Diadychenko boldly attempted to advance "one of the most important questions, principal questions, that about the colonialist policy of Russian tsarism": "It is no coincidence that the Moscow conference of historians discussed this question all the time." In essence, however, Diadychenko's own comments reflected the trend towards balancing Russian colonial oppression with the advantages of being imperial subjects. He suggested that, although the rule of Peter I represented a "burden" for Ukrainians, the tsar's armies did

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<sup>252</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 1652, ark. 153 (memo); op. 70, spr. 390, ark. 1-2 (draft).

<sup>253</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 1652, ark. 73.

protect Ukraine from the Turko-Tatar invasions during the 1710s and 1720s.<sup>254</sup> Fedir Los seconded his colleague's interpretation: "When covering the second half of the seventeenth and the eighteenth century, we are stressing tsarism's colonial offensive against Ukraine. This is correct but we often do not point out the positive consequences of the union between the Russian and Ukrainian people."<sup>255</sup>

But the majority of participants did not heed the party's call for a theoretical debate. Instead, they spoke of the further promotion of the "glorious national past" and cultural heritage, even if these were meant to fit the master-narrative of historical Russian-Ukrainian friendship. Both historians and writers advanced far-reaching plans for the study of Ukraine's pre-revolutionary past and for the rehabilitation of more "great ancestors." The historian Kost Huslysty announced: "I believe that studying the heroic past of the Ukrainian people remains one of the most important tasks of Soviet Ukrainian historical scholarship." Then he called for more works on such national heroes as Prince Danylo of Halych, Hetman Petro Sahaidachny, and Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky. During a later session, he took the floor again to criticize the Moscow press's portrayal of Danylo of Halych as a Russian prince.<sup>256</sup> The literary scholar Ievhen Kyryliuk insisted on including in the national pantheon the nineteenth-century non-Marxist social thinker Mykhailo Drahomanov and his contemporaries, "bourgeois" historians and writers Mykola Kostomarov, Oleksandr Lazarevsky, and Panteleimon Kulish. The writer Ivan Senchenko supported the call to rehabilitate Drahomanov and suggested promoting more "national heroes" from the period between Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky (ca. 1595-1657) and the philosopher Hryhory Skovoroda (1722-94).<sup>257</sup> The archaeologist Lazar Slavin attempted to rehabilitate Hrushevsky by defending the late historian's views on the origins of Ukrainians: "I think those who discard all of Hrushevsky's writings on this problem, the

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<sup>254</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 385, ark. 210.

<sup>255</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 1652, ark. 50.

<sup>256</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 385, ark. 147-56 (heroic past, the quotation is on ark. 147); spr. 388, ark. 4 (Danylo of Halych).

<sup>257</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 387, ark. 1-6 (Kyryliuk); op. 23, spr. 1652, ark. 28-31 (Senchenko).



problem of ethnogenesis, are wrong. Actually, he was right on many points."<sup>258</sup>

Moreover, at one point during the session, an unidentified voice from the audience shouted: "You had better introduce a separate course of Ukrainian history at school!" The next speaker, a school teacher, Skrypnyk, actually supported this proposal: "There is a very great interest in the history of Ukraine [at school]. The students are interested in matters relating to the history of Ukraine." Skrypnyk explained that of the 65 hours of History of the Soviet Union in Grade 8, only 3 or 4 were devoted to Ukrainian material. The Grade 9 curriculum gave the history teacher some 2 to 4 hours out of 65 to explain the major events of Ukrainian history, and the Grade 10 curriculum, 8 to 10 out of 110. To supplement Shestakov's (Russocentric) textbook, the teachers were organizing readings of Bazhan's "Danylo of Halych" and Panch's *The Zaporozhians*. "Not once have our Grade 9 and 10 students asked why we are not studying the history of Ukraine," concluded the teacher.<sup>259</sup> At this point, the conference was clearly moving in a direction that the party functionaries found undesirable to explore. During the session on 14 April, Secretary for Ideology Lytvyn first announced that "We will be meeting on Saturdays from 12 to 4, as usual" but then disclosed that there would be no meeting on the next Saturday.<sup>260</sup> In fact, the conference never resumed its work. Its proceedings reflected the complicated interplay between power and knowledge in Stalinist society. Frustrated over the difficulties of constructing a "national past" in a multinational socialist society, the local authorities expected the intellectuals to work out a new official version of Ukrainian history. At the same time, the republic's ideologues were trapped between the confusing signals from Moscow and the subtle non-compliance of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. The bureaucracy preferred halting discussions altogether to taking the risk of acknowledging to its superiors in Moscow any problems in "ideological work."

The February 1946 incident at Lviv University revealed just how unwilling the Ukrainian party apparatus was to initiate a crackdown on the "nationalist" historians. At

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<sup>258</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 385, ark. 181.

<sup>259</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 1652, ark. 91 (shout), 102-5 (Skrypnyk).

<sup>260</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 387, ark. 59; spr. 388, ark. 130.

that time, the faculty there were a blend of the politically unreliable local old professors and the highly reliable party types who had recently arrived from Eastern Ukraine. Like many other newcomers, the new dean of the Faculty of History, Volodymyr Horbatiuk, was eager to demonstrate his zeal in eliminating the traces of bourgeois nationalism within the university walls. Together with the new rector, Ivan Biliakevych, he chose to target the Department of the History of Ukraine, then still dominated by Hrushevsky's students, professors Ivan Krypiakievych, Myron Korduba, and Omelian Terletsky. The university authorities organized three department meetings to condemn Hrushevsky and his school. Rector Biliakevych gave an introductory speech denouncing Hrushevsky's "bourgeois-nationalist concepts," while the professors were expected to uncover Hrushevsky's falsifications in the different periods of Ukrainian history. Krypiakievych obediently read a paper about Ukraine's union with Russia and its "misrepresentation" in Hrushevsky's works, Terletsky and Horbatiuk outlined Hrushevsky's "distortions" in modern Ukrainian history, and the newcomer Osechynsky elaborated on how Hrushevsky's nationalist theories contradicted Russian historiography of the nineteenth and twentieth century. Osechynsky went as far as to blame Hrushevsky's students for the continuing armed resistance of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.<sup>261</sup>

However, the oldest member of the department and the instructor responsible for the survey of Ukrainian history, Professor Myron Korduba, refused to comply. Dean Horbatiuk ordered him to read a paper with a title crafted in inimitable Soviet ideological parlance: "The Bourgeois-Nationalist Interpretation of Ancient Times, in Particular Kievan Rus' and the Period of Feudal Fragmentation, in Hrushevsky's Works." Yet Korduba began by saying that his topic would be "Mykhailo Hrushevsky as a Student of the Princely Period of the History of Ukraine." He continued:

Mykhailo Hrushevsky unquestionably occupies a place of honor in Ukrainian historiography. He was the first to provide his people with a vision of their past, of their historical development from ancient to modern times, with a vision based

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<sup>261</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 564, ark. 4-93 (minutes). For a more detailed description of the incident's beginnings, see Rublov and Cherchenko, *Stalins'hchyna*, 215-19.

on critically checked facts and compliant with the demands of modern scholarship. [In so doing, Hrushevsky] laid the new foundations of his people's national consciousness. ...

Hrushevsky is being called a nationalist. I have an impression that today this word has the same role that "heretic" had during the Middle Ages. When one is to be compromised, defamed in the eyes of the public, in other words, destroyed, this person is labelled as "nationalist" without considering the real meaning of this word, which can be diverse. If nationalism is understood as a firm consciousness of belonging to one's nation and the active struggle against national oppression, against the assimilationist policy of the aggressive peoples (and that is how we understood nationalism in Galicia before World War I) then, indeed, Hrushevsky should be recognized as "nationalist." But then Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Franko, Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky, Vasyl Stefanyk and many other progressive patriots, whose memory we revere, were "nationalists" as well. If "nationalism" is understood in the meaning that it has acquired in recent decades, that is as opium, as a morbid idea that one's people is the superior one and should dominate other peoples of the world by oppression and assimilation—this idea nurtures hatred and animosity between peoples and Hrushevsky never was a nationalist of this kind.<sup>262</sup>

Seditious as it looked to the contemporaries, Korduba's speech actually attempted to negotiate the meaning of such rhetorical devices as the terms "nationalism" and "patriotism." The elderly professor rightly noted that Soviet ideology tolerated the healthy ethnic patriotism of "progressive thinkers" who often expressed exactly the same views as those of their "bourgeois nationalist" contemporaries. A clear distinction between patriotism and nationalism could not be established because the party line kept changing the balance between the notions of "class" and "nation" within the Soviet historical imagination. The classification of specific historical actors was therefore negotiable, as was demonstrated by the changing Soviet views on hetmans Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Petro Sahaidachny, as well as the nineteenth-century thinkers Mykhailo Drahomanov and Panteleimon Kulish. As the former political enemy of the Bolsheviks, Hrushevsky was probably beyond redemption, but the Lviv and Kiev ideologues' reaction to the incident presented an interesting case of conflicting attitudes to "old specialists."

The Lviv city party committee supported the university's initiative to prepare a

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<sup>262</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 564, ark. 52, 57.

city-wide conference of scholars where the "Hrushevsky school" at the Faculty of History would be publicly denounced. The university also planned a separate meeting of its faculty and students under the slogan "Hrushevsky's Bourgeois-Nationalist Theory as a Weapon of Ukrainian Nationalist Counterrevolution." However, in March 1946, the CP(b)U Central Committee sent to Lviv a brigade of inspectors, who ordered that the campaign be terminated. The brigade concluded that the department conferences were ill-prepared, that Rector Biliakevych's and Dean Horbatiuk's speeches there were weak, and that the campaign against the Hrushevsky school was generally "untimely and unnecessary." Moreover, the powerful inspectors also reassured the local scholars who thought "that after discussions like this one they would be sent to Siberia." The brigade's report to the Central Committee recommended some degree of toleration toward the old specialists, as "ideological reeducation [was] a difficult thing for people who are in their 60s and 70s and who were brought up in the spirit of bourgeois ideology."<sup>263</sup> The brigade further suggested halting the critique of those Western Ukrainian scholars who, like Krypiakevych and Terletsky, were trying to master the Marxist-Leninist historical method, and recommended that Kievan historians be sent on lecture tours to Lviv.<sup>264</sup> In the end, although the materials about the Lviv incident occupy three thick folders in the Central Committee archives, the republican authorities effectively suppressed the local initiative to purge Hrushevsky's students in Lviv. Apparently, in early 1946 the Ukrainian leadership did not plan to turn the critique of the "Hrushevsky school" into a major ideological campaign.

### **The Ukrainian *Zhdanovshchina***

Nevertheless, beginning in June 1946, Ukraine became a testing ground for the all-Union cultural-ideological purification campaign associated with the name of the VKP(b) Central

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<sup>263</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 570, ark. 10-12.

<sup>264</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 571, ark. 14-15. The Ukrainian historians Mykhailo Koval and Oleksandr Rublov incorrectly presume that the initial conference of the Department of Ukrainian History was organized "according to the Central Committee's instructions" (M. V. Koval and O. S. Rublov, "Instytut istorii Ukrainy," 62).

Committee Secretary Andrei Zhdanov. The *Zhdanovshchina* is usually understood as a reaction to the widespread hopes for a freer and more prosperous life after the war, for a more tolerant and liberal cultural climate. The traditional accounts portray the *Zhdanovshchina* as a return to the prewar strident party line, the reassertion of ideological control over culture, and the purging of literature and the arts of Western influences. The campaign's beginning is usually dated as August 1946, when the Central Committee condemned two prominent Leningrad journals, *Zvezda* and *Leningrad*, for publishing ideologically harmful apolitical works, kowtowing to bourgeois culture, and disparaging Soviet values.<sup>265</sup>

However, a look at the new policy's refraction in a non-Russian republic opens a very different perspective on the postwar ideological processes. Although the purge of Leningrad writers in the late summer of 1946 continues to be widely understood as the real inauguration of the *Zhdanovshchina*, Werner G. Hahn has long suggested that the campaign actually began in late June in the Ukrainian capital, Kiev. That month, the deputy chief of the Administration of Propaganda and Agitation, Petr Fedoseev, arrived to coordinate the first salvos of the campaign.<sup>266</sup> Rather than being anti-Western, the Ukrainian *Zhdanovshchina* from its very beginnings clearly aimed at "nationalism," particularly in history. During the republican conference on propaganda on 24-26 June, Secretary for Ideology Lytvyn announced that "softness" on nationalism could no longer be tolerated in Ukraine, where the ideological climate had been already contaminated by German wartime propaganda, private landholding in the Western oblasts, population exchanges with Poland, and the return of POWs and *Ostarbeiter* from Germany. Although all these phenomena were manifestly recent, Lytvyn and other speakers concentrated almost exclusively on ideological mistakes in representations of the Ukrainian past in the republic's scholarship, literature, and the arts. In striking contrast to the subsequent

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<sup>265</sup> Recent Russian works on the *Zhdanovshchina* include Iu. S. Aksenov, "Poslevoennyi stalinizm: Udar po intelligentsii," *Kentavr*, no. 1 (1991): 80-89; Evgenii Dobrenko, "Sumerki kultury," *Druzhba narodov*, no. 2 (1991): 249-71; and Elena Zubkova, *Russia after the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945-1957*, trans. and ed. Hugh Ragsdale (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), Ch. 12.

<sup>266</sup> Hahn, *Postwar Soviet Politics*, 48. Unfortunately, the author did not attempt to follow the course of the *Zhdanovshchina* campaign in Ukraine or any other non-Russian republic.

denunciations in Leningrad and Moscow, the ideologues did not accuse the intellectuals of succumbing to Western influences or publishing ideologically harmful apolitical works. Instead, the republican functionaries concentrated on denouncing writers, artists, and composers who "escaped from our socialist reality" into subjects from the Ukrainian past. This "deviation" was said to reflect the lasting influence of Hrushevsky.<sup>267</sup>

Lytvyn dismissed a recent textbook, *Survey of the History of Ukrainian Literature*, as allegedly ignoring class divisions in pre-revolutionary Ukrainian culture and not paying sufficient attention to its ties with progressive Russian culture. However, he saw the general state of Ukrainian historical scholarship as satisfactory. The secretary cited only one example of Hrushevsky's influence on historians, the Lviv incident with Korduba.<sup>268</sup>

At this point, the Ukrainian functionaries apparently planned to limit the critique of historians to a handful of "old specialists" in Lviv. In early July, when a personal conflict between Rubach and Petrovsky resulted in an open scandal at the Institute of History, the party leadership did everything possible to stifle the squabble. Lytvyn and Manuilsky met with the institute's leading researchers to make them understand that the party was not interested in a purge of historians. However, Rubach used the opportunity to denounce Petrovsky for abandoning class analysis in favor of nation-centric theory, claiming that the critical review of the *History of the Kazakh SSR* in the official *Bolshevik* applied to Petrovsky's work as well: in both cases, "the popular struggle for national liberation was substituted for class struggle." Nonetheless, both the secretary for ideology and the foreign minister proved unwilling to start a debate. Lytvyn suggested ironically that "We could hold innumerable conferences of historians," but what mattered was practical work, and Rubach himself did not produce much. The secretary concluded, "Aside from Comrade Petrovsky, I do not see in Kiev another candidate for the directorship of the Institute of History." Likewise, Manuilsky stated that "Whatever had

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<sup>267</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 436, ark. 10-13 (the worsening ideological climate), 25-35 (Hrushevsky), 47-60 (escapism into the past).

<sup>268</sup> *Ibid.*, 35-39 (Lviv incident), 52-53 (textbook).

been done to criticize the Hrushevsky school, was done by Mykola Neonovych [Petrovsky]." At the end of a four-hour meeting, Lytvyn and Manuilsky stressed that their statements reflected the view of the "leadership of the Central Committee and Nikita Sergeevich [Khrushchev]."<sup>269</sup>

Yet the situation began changing within ten days. On 20 July, the new Moscow newspaper *Kultura i zhizn*, which was published by the Administration of Propaganda and Agitation, carried the article "To Correct Mistakes in the Coverage of Some Questions of the History of Ukraine." Written by the Administration official S. Kovalev, this piece reiterated the earlier criticisms of the *Survey of the History of Ukrainian Literature*, the Lviv incident, and other points made by Lytvyn during the June conference. At the same time, Kovalev noted that Volume One of the *History of Ukraine* (1943) also contained serious errors: in particular, its periodization allegedly rested more on the events of political history than on socio-economic formations. The article suggested that the republic's scholars had not made satisfactory progress in preparing a "scholarly history" of Ukraine.<sup>270</sup>

The Ukrainian bureaucrats immediately followed the newspaper's cue. During the plenary session of the CP(b)U Central Committee on 15 August, Khrushchev named the first volume of the *History of Ukraine* among the faulty works imbued with nationalistic deviations.<sup>271</sup> Elaborating on this statement, Nazarenko announced that a "Marxist history of Ukraine" had not yet been written. Moreover, Volume One of the *History of Ukraine* was based on Hrushevsky's theories: "It does not reflect the concept of class struggle. The first chapter is entitled 'The History of Ukraine before the Creation of the

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<sup>269</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 2849, ark. 6 (Rubach), 41, 45, 51 (Lytvyn), 57 (Manuilsky), 64 (opinion of the Central Committee).

<sup>270</sup> *Kultura i zhizn*, 20 July 1946, p. 2.

<sup>271</sup> The text of the speech is not available because, before leaving Ukraine for Moscow in 1949, Khrushchev had removed most of his politically sensitive documents from their files. The archival copy of the session's minutes contains a note: "The record of Comrade Khrushchev's speech has been withdrawn into [his] personal archive. 2 December 1949" (TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 1, spr. 729, ark. 3). The content of Khrushchev's report is deduced from the references to it made by other participants and from its abridged publication as an editorial in a Ukrainian party journal: "Rishuche polipshyty dobir, rozstanovku i vykhovannia kadriv," *Partrobitnyk Ukrainy*, no. 8 (1946): 4-11, here 8.

Kievan State.' How could one speak of 'Ukraine' at that time?"<sup>272</sup>

Nonetheless, the attack on historians remained a sideline in the ideological purification campaign of 1946. Most speakers at the plenary session focused their critique on the "nationalist deviations" in literature and the arts. Khrushchev, Lytvyn, and Nazarenko demanded that the intellectuals revise the public discourse of self-identification by emphasizing the common socialist present at the expense of a "separate" ethnic past. Nazarenko accused the republic's literary historians of the nationalist exaltation of the pre-revolutionary Ukrainian classics. Lytvyn pounced upon Bazhan's wartime poem "Danylo of Halych" for referring to the "Ukrainian people" and "Ukrainian army" as already existing in the thirteenth century: "Historical scholarship proved that the Slavic peoples were still united at the time of Danylo of Halych and separate nationalities (*narodnosti*) did not exist yet," whereas Bazhan had presumably borrowed his ideas from Hrushevsky.<sup>273</sup> The wartime allegiance to the united Mother-Ukraine was now denounced as something potentially uniting Soviet Ukrainians with nationalist emigres and insurgents in the Western oblasts. Lytvyn decried a poster released by one of the major publishing houses and featuring the portrait of Ivan Franko together with his stanza, "Our glorious mother Ukraine will become / Joyous and free, / From Kuban to the river San / One indivisible." "Any nationalist would put his signature under these lines," shouted the secretary for ideology.<sup>274</sup>

Most speakers dwelt on various "nationalist mistakes" in portraying the past. However, some, like the party boss in Stalino (Donetsk) oblast, Leonid Melnikov, complained that no Ukrainian writer had properly celebrated the republic's industrial growth under Soviet power. "I have not seen anything either," added Khrushchev. Time and again, the participants denounced the preoccupation with the past as ideologically harmful, but when in the end the poet Mykola Bazhan took the floor to apologize for the

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<sup>272</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 1, spr. 729, ark. 6, 7-8.

<sup>273</sup> Ibid., ark. 141. Lytvyn overreached himself in this statement. Soviet historiography postulated the ethnic unity of *Eastern Slavs*, not of all the Slavs, until the thirteenth century.

<sup>274</sup> Ibid., ark. 149. A neighbouring region of the Russian Federation, Kuban was heavily populated by Ukrainians.



mistakes of his historical poem, Khrushchev interrupted him: "No, you tell me why writers are opposed to the Donbas, to industrialization." Then the first secretary closed the proceedings with the appeal "to heat the ground so that our enemies will burn their feet."<sup>275</sup> From that time on in Ukraine, the critique of nationalism in literature was combined with the appeal to glorify the Soviet present.

The republican ideologues spelled out the campaign's message at several denunciatory meetings. During the writers' conference on 27-28 August, Lytvyn frankly defined the ideological turn in terms that did not appear in the official documents of the time:

Why did the comrades make serious mistakes? Because they proceeded from the wrong assumption that the party had changed its policy during the war. To foster popular patriotism, much was written about Aleksandr Nevsky, Suvorov, Kutuzov, Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Several patriotic manifestos to the Ukrainian people paid great attention to the heroic traditions of our people's past. Shevchenko's *Kobzar* was published in a pocket-size format and smuggled beyond the frontlines [to the occupied territories] together with many leaflets that used Shevchenko's poetry to achieve purely propagandistic goals. Some people wrongly interpreted this to the effect that the liberation of Ukraine was occurring under the banner of Shevchenko, under the banner of Kulish. Excuse me for the sharp words, but this is what happened. These comrades decided that all the previous critique [of "nationalist deviations"] should be abandoned because the party's policy had changed, because the party had conceded.<sup>276</sup>

The secretary for ideology suggested that all Ukrainian intellectuals, and especially writers, needed to "air out their brains" (*provetrivanie mozgov*). "Instead of infatuation with the reactionary romantics of the Zaporozhian Host, which in many respects differed

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<sup>275</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 1, spr. 729, ark. 10-11 (Nazarenko), 74 (Melnikov and Khrushchev), 138-41 (Lytvyn), 214 (Khrushchev). Interestingly, the editor of the Ukrainian komsomol journal *Dnipro* in the late 1940s, Mykola Rudenko, later testified that "Melnikov did not know the Ukrainian language at all, understood nothing about literature, and generally lacked culture." See Mykola Rudenko, *Naibilshe dyvo—zhyttia* (Kiev: Takson, 1998), p. 188. From December 1949 to June 1953, Leonid Melnikov served as first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

<sup>276</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 514, ark. 25-26.

from our times, the past should be interpreted through its connections with the present."<sup>277</sup>

The subsequent speakers attacked their fellow writers for even passing allusions to the Ukrainian past. Petro Panch labelled as a "nationalist diversion" Leonid Smiliansky's story "Sofiia" containing references to Kiev's ancient St. Sofiia Cathedral. Oleksa Kundzich's story "The Ukrainian Hut" was declared guilty of celebrating the traditional peasant hut as the primordial cradle of the Ukrainian nation. The writer Iurii Mokriiev examined his desk calendar and found a clearly heretical text printed under the date of January 18: "Ukraine's transfer under the authority of Russian tsarism represented for the Ukrainian people a lesser evil in comparison to the danger of Ukraine being absorbed by either Poland or the Turkey of the Sultan." To the conference participants, the "lesser evil" formula seemed so outdated that it deserved investigation as an ideological mistake. One writer after another rose to condemn the historical genre. The guilt-stricken Bazhan announced: "If all of us become enticed by historical subjects, we betray the cause of the Soviet people."<sup>278</sup>

Significantly, the Ukrainian equivalent of the principal ideological resolution of the *Zhdanovshchina*, Moscow's decree on the journals *Zvezda* and *Leningrad*, also differed from its model by an unusual sensitivity to questions of history. The Ukrainian Central Committee resolution "About the Journal *Vitshyzna*" denounced the periodical for publishing "nationalistic" articles on the founder of modern Ukrainian literature, Ivan Kotliarevsky, and on the first modern Ukrainian political organization, the Brotherhood of SS. Cyril and Methodius (1845-47). The editors were accused of neglecting Soviet subjects and encouraging their authors to elaborate on the national past.<sup>279</sup>

To distance himself from the newly uncovered deviation, Bazhan speedily produced a lengthy article, "To Carry Through the Rooting Out of the Bourgeois-Nationalist Views in Questions of Ukrainian History and Literature." Published by major

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<sup>277</sup> Ibid., ark. 34.

<sup>278</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 514, ark. 34 (Lytvyn), 84 ("Sofiia"), 29 (peasant hut), 134 (Mokriiev), 157 (Bazhan). See also the conference report in *Literaturna hazeta*, 29 August 1946, pp. 3-4.

<sup>279</sup> *Kulturne budivnytstvo v Ukrainskii RSR: Cherven 1941-1950*, 253-56.

republican newspapers and as a separate booklet under a slightly different title and in a print run of 75,000, this work effectively concentrated on the "nationalist deviations" in history. After dwelling on the nationalist sins of Hrushevsky and his teacher Volodymyr Antonovych, Bazhan turned to Soviet historical scholarship to find the traces of bourgeois theories in Volume One of the *History of Ukraine* and the *Survey of the History of Ukrainian Literature*. The poet added to the roster of erroneous works the prewar *Short Course of the History of Ukraine (1940)*: "One only has to look at its chapter about Kievan Rus' to realize that the chapter's authors were captivated by Hrushevsky's theories."<sup>280</sup>

On 9 September, Secretary for Propaganda Nazarenko gathered the leading specialists of the Institute of History to reprimand them for their "passivity." He complained that, when *Kultura i zhizn* criticized their work, none of the historians came to the Central Committee "to give their proposals." The secretary demanded that the historians "help [the Central Committee] to liquidate, to uproot the remnants of bourgeois-nationalist ideology." However, Nazarenko did not name anyone personally responsible for the past errors. The participants talked about completing the multivolume *History of Ukraine*, questioned the critique of Volume One as "superficial," and outlined the scholarly problems in need of further investigation. The meeting mapped out two urgent tasks: the development of a new periodization of Ukrainian history and the production of a collection of articles debasing Hrushevsky's theories.<sup>281</sup>

Meanwhile, the authorities began withdrawing from circulation all copies of the *Survey of the History of Ukrainian Literature* and the 1940 *History of Ukraine (Short Course)*. (Interestingly, the decision did not include Volume One of the *History of Ukraine*.) A few recent manuscripts on the history of Ukraine and Ukrainian literature also suffered at the hands of censors. During the summer and autumn of 1946, they forbade the publication of Kulish's letters in the journal *Radianska literatura* because the

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<sup>280</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 17 November 1946, p. 3; 19 November 1946, p. 3; *Radianske mystetstvo*, 26 November 1946, pp. 2-3. Mykola Bazhan, *Do kintsia rozhromyty i vykorinyty reshtky burzhuaizmo-natsionalistychnoi ideolohii* (Kiev: Ukrainske vydavnytstvo politychnoi literatury, 1946), p. 17.

<sup>281</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 459, ark. 1-12, esp. 9 (Nazarenko).

accompanying comments did not uncover the nationalist views with which "all the letters were saturated." The censors also banned Ivan Boiko's pamphlet *Ukraine's Incorporation into Russia*, which reportedly provided "historically incorrect" coverage of the topic, and Illia Stebun's book *The Militant Spirit of Ukrainian Literature*, which allegedly repeated all the worst mistakes of the *Survey of the History of Ukrainian Literature*.<sup>282</sup>

Whereas Kievan historians survived the 1946 purge without losses, their Lviv colleagues did suffer for their alleged Hrushevskian heresy. On 28 October 1946, the republican Council of Ministers closed down the Lviv branches of the institutes of history, literature, and economics, leaving the local scholars to find a new means of livelihood. Korduba died the next year. Krypiakevych was brought to Kiev as a senior researcher at the Institute of History, but not before he publicly acknowledged his nationalist mistakes at a meeting of the Social Sciences branch of the Academy of Sciences in Kiev on 13 September.<sup>283</sup> The Lviv oblast party committee commenced a close examination of historical research in the region. The local functionaries discovered the horrible fact that "During the last two years, not a single article was published on the history of the revolutionary movement in the Western oblasts." To counteract the influence of the bourgeois nationalists Krypiakevych and Korduba, the committee proposed the creation of a brigade of Marxist historians who would specialize in denouncing the Hrushevsky school. The next necessary steps were to be writing and publishing popular booklets on Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the Pereiaslav Treaty, the battle at Poltava, and Mazepa's treason. The authorities also discovered that the Lviv Historical Museum did not have a display on the battle at Poltava. Moreover, the museum's staff seemed unreliable. On 14 July 1946, the guide Iatskevych led a group of Soviet Army soldiers and students (most of them apparently Russians and Eastern Ukrainians) through the museum's exposition. Reaching the hall displaying materials about the union with Russia, Iatskevych

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<sup>282</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 2814, ark. 5-6 (*Survey and Short Course*), 11, 16 (Kulish, Boiko, and Stebun). The materials of the postwar Ukrainian censorship, if they survived, remain inaccessible. On rare occasions such as this one, we can learn about the censors' activities from their reports forwarded to the Central Committee during major ideological campaigns.

<sup>283</sup> Rublov and Cherchenko, *Stalinschchyna*, 219; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 540, ark. 90-94 (Krypiakevych).

announced: "So that was our history, and here is where your history begins." The oblast ideologues also discovered that the city art gallery had two entire halls devoted to Polish futurism and also had representative collections of "German Gothic, the French Renaissance, the Italian Baroque, and Dutch Realism, but [did] not [display] a single work of the Russian classical school."<sup>284</sup>

While Lviv was something of an extreme case, the ideologues throughout the republic were, nevertheless, lecturing the intellectuals on the proper new version of the Soviet Ukrainian "national imagination." Moreover, the seizures of the *Zhdanovshchina* occurred throughout the Soviet Union, although, as the following analysis will show, the Ukrainian bureaucrats could channel the ideological processes in their republic into a slightly different direction.

### **Fashioning an Acceptable Past**

On 26 August 1946, the All-Union Central Committee elaborated the *Zhdanovshchina*'s strategic aims in the resolution "On the Repertoire of Drama Theaters and Measures toward Its Improvement." The decree called for a purge of the theater repertoire, which was "littered" with "apolitical" Soviet plays, works idealizing the pre-revolutionary past, and Western plays that "popularized bourgeois morals," such as Somerset Maugham's *The Circle* or Arthur Morrison's *The Murder of Mr. Parker*. The resolution, which was not published at the time but was summarized in *Pravda*, categorically demanded staging more Soviet plays on contemporary subjects.<sup>285</sup> With characteristic blindness to the developments outside Moscow, William O. McCagg, Jr. has interpreted the decree as simply "demanding an end to laxity in the theater and, in particular, an end to the presentation of Western plays in the Moscow repertory houses."<sup>286</sup> Readers in the Soviet

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<sup>284</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 459, ark. 12-14 (Krypiakivych and Korduba), 15 (no studies of the revolutionary struggle), 16 (art gallery), 16-17 (Historical Museum), 18 (brigade of Marxist historians; booklets).

<sup>285</sup> *Pravda*, 2 September 1946, p. 2; *Radianske mystetstvo*, 1 Oct. 1946, p. 1.

<sup>286</sup> William O. McCagg, *Stalin Embattled, 1943-1948* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978), p. 251.

capital might well have understood the decree in this way. Nevertheless, *Pravda's* article also denounced the plays "idealizing the life of tsarist lords and Asian khans" and named five "faulty" productions: four historical dramas from the past of the Soviet Asian peoples and the nineteenth-century French comedy, Eugène Scribe's *Tales of the Queen of Navarre* (1850). Although the Soviet Russian playwrights had authored numerous dramas glorifying the lives of tsars, feudal lords, and military leaders, the resolution did not mention any of these works, nor were they criticized during the ensuing campaign for the "purity" of Soviet theater.<sup>287</sup> In Ukraine, the pronouncements from Moscow were clearly interpreted as aimed primarily against the glorification of the *non-Russian* past.

The Ukrainian Central Committee's attendant resolution displayed a peculiar refraction of Moscow's dictum. The republican ideologues did not dare criticise Stalin's pet playwright, Oleksandr Korniiichuk, who had authored the best-known Soviet Ukrainian historical drama, *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* (1938). Korniiichuk's privileged status left for denouncing only a few little-known historical plays such as Oleksandr Kopylenko's *Why the Stars Don't Go Out* or Mykhailo Pinchevsky's *I Live*. The hunt for "corrupting" Western plays did not produce sufficient prey either: of the four named in the decree, two were written by Alexandre Dumas  *fils* and the nineteenth-century Polish playwright Aleksander Fredro, and only two by contemporary "bourgeois" authors, including one drama reworked by a Soviet writer. Moreover, the republican theater companies seemed to perform relatively well in producing "contemporary" plays, since the powerful Korniiichuk wrote these with exemplary regularity. None of the companies mentioned by name had staged fewer than three *new* plays on Soviet subjects during the 1945-46 season, not to mention the plays already in the repertoire.

Accordingly, the republican ideologues adopted a strategy different from that deployed in Moscow. They broadened the scope of the critique to include opera, a genre traditionally preoccupied with the past. The Ukrainian Central Committee's resolution "On

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<sup>287</sup> In fact, in 1947, the most prolific Russian historical playwright, Vladimir Solovev, was awarded a Stalin Prize for his verse drama about Ivan the Terrible, *The Great Sovereign*. Solovev's historical plays included *Field Marshal Kutuzov* (1939), *The Great Sovereign* (1943), *Denis Davydov* (1953), and *The Victors Are Judged* (1953).

the Repertoire of Drama *and Opera* Theaters of the Ukrainian SSR and Measures toward Its Improvement" pounced upon the Ukrainian opera companies for not staging a single new opera on a Soviet topic during the last three years. As to the drama companies, they were guilty of giving disproportionate attention to pre-revolutionary Ukrainian classics, including numerous "untopical" plays on manners. These works could "only educate the spectator in the spirit of ethnic narrow-mindedness and alienation from urgent contemporary questions."<sup>288</sup> The Ukrainian authorities' initiative demonstrated that the local elites exercised considerable autonomy in shaping Stalinist ideological campaigns. The "mainstream" *Zhdanovshchina* did not envelop musical life until the 1948 attack on Vano Muradeli's opera *The Great Friendship* and the subsequent campaign against "formalism" in Soviet music.

In October 1946, the Kiev Opera Company premiered a new version of Mykola Lysenko's classic Ukrainian historical opera, *Taras Bulba* (1890). The result of several years of work, the ill-fated premiere came just a month after the decree on the repertoire of drama and opera theaters. The republican authorities immediately shut down the production. The reviewers announced that *Taras* did not create "an impression of Ukraine suffering under the yoke of the Polish lords," for in Act One, *Bulba* and other Cossacks were seen to be drinking too cheerfully in the orchard. The colonel himself looked "inactive," and the whole opera seemed "unfinished."<sup>289</sup> Kopylenko's play *Why the Stars Don't Go Out* also suffered a harsh critique, both as a falsification presenting the heroic Cossacks as passive drunkards, and as a work idealizing the national past and neglecting the class struggle within seventeenth-century Ukrainian society.<sup>290</sup>

In late 1946, as the Ukrainian press unveiled a campaign against historical topics, the newspaper of the republican Committee for the Arts, *Radianske mystetstvo*, focused

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<sup>288</sup> The resolution was published in *Literaturna hazeta*, 12 October 1946, p. 2; *Radianske mystetstvo*, 15 October 1946, p. 1; and *Kulturne budivnytstvo v Ukrainskii RSR: Cherven 1941-1950*, 271-76. Emphasis in the title added.

<sup>289</sup> TsDAMLM, f. 573, op. 1, spr. 46 (contemporary critical discussion); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3653, ark. 165-70 (later comments containing valuable insights into the causes of the 1946 fiasco); *Radianske mystetstvo*, 4 December 1946, p. 3 (dismissive review).

<sup>290</sup> *Radianske mystetstvo*, 8 October 1946, p. 4.

on uncovering the "unhealthy glorification of the past" in contemporary paintings. It denounced Ivan Shulha for expressing in his canvas *The Zaporozhians' Song* "morbid nostalgia for the past." Hryhorii Svitlytsky's painting *Native Land* depicting a young woman in traditional peasant dress against the background of a beautiful country landscape prompted the paper to ask: "What does it have in common with our Soviet Ukraine?" Mykhailo Derehus's series *The Khmelnytsky Uprising* was announced "clearly unfinished"—but not because of its morbid nostalgia: the artist "did not pay appropriate attention" to the Pereiaslav Council and historic union with Russia.<sup>291</sup>

Despite all this rhetoric and within weeks after the all-union decree, one of Ukraine's leading theaters premiered Ivan Kocherha's new grand historical drama, *Iaroslav the Wise*. Written in the antiquarian genre of the verse play, which apparently resonated well with High Stalinist aesthetic monumentalism, the work portrayed the life of the great statesman of Kievan Rus', Grand Prince Iaroslav the Wise (reigned 1019-54). At its inauguration in September 1946, the drama seemed doomed. As Kocherha would recall two years later at the writers' congress, after the resolution "On the Repertoire of Drama Theaters" appeared some two weeks before the premiere, the management of the Kharkiv Drama Company was about to cancel the performance.<sup>292</sup> Yet, while highly susceptible to the charge of fascination with the distant past, the play contained hardly any specifically Ukrainian historical references. Nothing identified the Rus' of the text as the predecessor of modern Ukraine rather than that of Russia or even the Soviet Union. Indeed, only the language betrayed the drama as a product of a Ukrainian writer. Ultimately, the strong princely power and the "united Rus'" that constituted the drama's principal ideological message seemed to reverberate mightily with High Stalinist ideological convictions. At the very last moment, the republican party authorities reluctantly allowed the premiere to proceed, albeit suggesting some eleventh-hour

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<sup>291</sup> *Radianske mystetstvo*, 17 September 1946, p. 4 (Shulha), 22 October 1946, p. 1 (Svitlytsky, Derehus). This accusation against Derehus's series surfaced again in 1951: TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2426, ark. 73.

<sup>292</sup> TsDAMLM, f. 590, op. 1, spr. 57, ark. 107-8. Significantly, this passage was edited out from the published version of his speech in *Literaturna hazeta*, 18 December 1948, p. 3.



insertions regarding the "class struggle" in Kievan times.

Premiered in Kharkiv on 17 September 1946, the play was reviewed in Ukrainian newspapers with unprecedented delay: *Literaturna hazeta* published a lengthy positive assessment on 12 December, while *Radianske mystetstvo* hesitated until 12 March 1947. In the end, amid public attacks on the historical genre as such and the promotion of Soviet subjects, *Iaroslav* won full approval in Moscow. In June 1947, the general public learned that the Kharkiv production of the play had earned the company the Stalin Prize, First Class. *Literaturna hazeta* credited the drama with educating the spectators "to be proud of the Fatherland, of the people, of the mighty united state."<sup>293</sup> The fate of *Iaroslav* highlighted the ambiguous nature of the anti-historical campaign in Ukraine. The executive ideologues targeted the works identifying with the "separate" Ukrainian national past, while those engaging with the past common for Ukrainians and Russians were still welcome. At the same time, local functionaries had considerable authority to interpret the official policy—and often did so more rigidly than their superiors. A curious episode underscored the lack of a single "party line" in the postwar cultural policy in Ukraine: not long before *Iaroslav* the play received the highest Soviet accolade, the Kiev film studios had cancelled their plan to shoot *Iaroslav* the movie because of its potentially problematic theme.<sup>294</sup>

The Ninth Exhibition of Ukrainian Art (November 1947) demonstrated the turn to portraying the Russian-Ukrainian friendship. While no picture celebrating an "exclusive" Ukrainian past was exhibited, Hryhorii Melikhov presented a large painting, *Young Taras Shevchenko Visiting the Artist K. P. Briullov* (2,89m x 2,95m). The canvas portrayed the young peasant lad—a future Ukrainian national bard and professional artist—gazing admiringly at the great Russian painter who would become his teacher at the Imperial Academy of Arts. Artistically accomplished as it appeared at the time, the work also served as a perfect illustration of the myth of the Ukrainian "small brother"

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<sup>293</sup> *Radianske mystetstvo*, 17 September 1946, p. 1 (premiere); *Literaturna hazeta*, 12 December 1946, p. 4; *Radianske mystetstvo*, 12 March 1947, p. 2 (reviews); *Literaturna hazeta*, 12 June 1947, p. 1 (Stalin prize), 4 (credit).

<sup>294</sup> Romitsyn, *Ukrainske radianske kinomystetstvo*, 78.

being taught and guided by the Russian "big brother." As the head of the Union of Soviet Ukrainian Artists, Oleksandr Pashchenko, announced, "Melikhov's canvas is a serious blow to the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists who sought to isolate Ukrainian culture from the wholesome influence of Russian culture."<sup>295</sup> The painting won the Stalin Prize, Third Class, thus proving that not all non-Russian historical works were doomed under the *Zhdanovshchina*.<sup>296</sup> Cultural agents were beginning to sense what would be acceptable according to the new version of the Soviet Ukrainian past and present.

The suppression of the Ukrainian national historical vision caused opposition among the republic's intellectuals, although only scattered evidence of it is preserved in the archives. Open non-conformism, as in the cases of Professor Korduba or museum guide Iatskevych, was rare. However, Stalinist subjects could also express their disagreement anonymously. In January 1947, the Ukrainian State Committee for the Arts announced a competition for the best play on a contemporary topic. The competition produced miserable results: the artistic quality of most entries was apparently poor, no first prize was awarded, and only one play subsequently was staged.<sup>297</sup> Moreover, a certain Ievhen Blakytyn (apparently a pen name) submitted to the jury a treatise entitled "Is the Ukrainian Nation Capable of Further Existence and of Actively Making Its History? A Reference for Those Studying the History of Ukraine." Judging from his style and argumentation, Blakytyn was an amateur non-conformist rather than a professional nationalist propagandist. Far from glorifying the Soviet present, he affirmed the nation as

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<sup>295</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2426, ark. 73.

<sup>296</sup> O. Pashchenko, ed., *IX ukrainskaia khudozhestvennaia vystavka: Katalog* (Kiev, 1948), 27, 31, 36; *Radianske mystetstvo*, 12 November 1947, p. 3 (exhibition); *Literaturna hazeta*, 22 April 1948, p. 1 (Stalin Prizes for 1947). Moreover, in 1950 the famous Tretyakov Gallery pressured the Museum of Ukrainian Art in Kiev to give up Melikhov's work in exchange for a less valuable painting from the Moscow gallery's collection. Kievans defended their property rights with help from the republican Central Committee (TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2041, ark. 36-38). See also an interesting analysis of Melikhov's painting in Hryhorii Hrabovych [George Grabowicz], "Sovietska albomna shevchenkiana: Kolazh, *bricolage* i kich," *Krytyka* 2, no. 3 (5) (1998): 24-29, here 27-28.

<sup>297</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 30 January 1947, p. 1 (announcement); TsDAVOV, f. 4763, op. 1, spr. 85, ark. 20-22 (the jury's deliberations); *Radianske mystetstvo*, 11 February 1948, p. 1 (decision announced). The jury awarded second prize to Liubomyr Dmyterko's heroic drama *General Vatutin*, which was subsequently staged by the Shevchenko Kharkiv Drama Company.

a principal agent of history. The author stressed that Ukrainians were not just "Moscow's eternal appendage," that his nation always had been and still was capable of independent existence.<sup>298</sup>

Another anonymous writer submitted a three-act farce, *Without an Idea*, mocking the campaign for contemporary topics itself. The plot depicts a theater whose administration is preparing feverishly for the 1 May holiday. The representative of the oblast party committee, with the telling Jewish name of Itsyk Pshenicher, laments the absence of Soviet subjects among "all those things historical or those from the decadent but not yet decaying West." A patently Ukrainian artistic director, Solopii Artemovych Bevz, seconds Pshenicher: "What are the censors watching for? How could they let in such poison of the capitalist encirclement as *Othello*, *Faust*, *Corneville Bells*, etc.?" The nameless director riffles through a pile of plays, mumbling: "The whole bunch of Ukrainian classics...mountains of paper written over but not a line about collective farms, about socialism." Only a bold young actor, Vladyslav Chubar, asks: "Why don't you simply reorganize our theater into a party school?" Here and there, the text pointedly reminds the reader about the postwar realities that were not reflected in the official literature: arrests at the railway station, denunciations, a shortage of sugar, bread rationing, waiting in lines from 5 AM, burglaries, etc.<sup>299</sup>

In the end, Pshenicher orders that the most "ideologically correct" Russian play, Konstantin Trenev's *Liubov Iarovaia*, be staged on the evening of 1 May. At the very last moment, however, the party representative has second thoughts about the appropriateness of *any* artistic representation of the most glorious present. Instead of allowing the performance of the play, he goes on stage himself to read a speech with the deliberately awkward title "The Leading Role of Communist Ideas in the Laws of the Development of Contemporary Society." As the public is leaving and as occurs in classical farce, a secondary comic character, the maintenance manager Mykyta Dohada, appears on the vacant stage to recite the rhyming moral: "What of the strength of Stalinist ideas? / The

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<sup>298</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 4958, ark. 27-31.

<sup>299</sup> *Ibid.*, ark. 34-44.

theater is empty. There are no people."<sup>300</sup>

The Ukrainian authorities did not have enough leads to locate the anonymous author who, like "young actor Vladyslav Chubar," apparently belonged to the new generation of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Having grown up during the Ukrainian "Great Retreat" when the local intellectuals were allowed to cultivate Ukrainian patriotism, the author (or authors) wanted to protest the recent devaluation of the national past and cultural heritage in favor of the Soviet present. Submitting an anonymous farce to the Ukrainian Committee for the Arts represented both an original method of communicating this opposition to the authorities and an effective deconstruction of the hegemonic cultural discourse through its "carnivalization."<sup>301</sup>

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A study of the *Zhdanovshchina*'s refraction in Ukraine provides a new perspective on the postwar ideological processes. While intellectuals in Moscow and Leningrad experienced the campaign as a crusade against liberalism and heterodoxy, the Russian national historical narrative was not attacked. In Kiev and Lviv, however, Ukrainian intellectuals were obliged to eulogize the shared Soviet present at the expense of the "separate" Ukrainian past. A close analysis of ideological pronouncements and cultural representations reveals the *Zhdanovshchina* as an attempt to redefine the postwar Soviet Union as a society identifying itself with the Soviet present and Russian past.

However, a study of the Ukrainian *Zhdanovshchina* also problematizes the traditional view of "monolithic" Stalinism. The attack on wartime ethnic patriotism began with confusing signals from above, which the local functionaries reluctantly followed, while the historians attempted to defend the national narrative. Even after Moscow inaugurated a full-scale ideological purge in the summer of 1946, the Ukrainian functionaries retained considerable autonomy in determining the limits and aims of the

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<sup>300</sup> Ibid., ark. 45-47.

<sup>301</sup> On carnivalization as a strategy of undermining the authoritative social discourses, see M. M. Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World*, trans. H. Iswolsky, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984).

campaign in their republic. The campaign did not lead to the suppression of the Ukrainian national narrative; rather, local intellectuals began working out its new acceptable version, which emphasized historic and ethnic ties to Russia.

Chapter Four  
THE FRUSTRATED CRUSADE OF 1947<sup>302</sup>

By January 1947, the purification campaign in Ukraine had clearly ended. No new ideological resolutions had appeared since early October, and the wave of criticism and self-criticism was dying out. The republic's ideologues and intellectuals seemed to have arrived at an understanding of what the new official discourse on Ukraine's past and present should be. Neither the republican leadership nor its Moscow bosses spoke of the further eradication of "nationalist deviations." However, an unexpected turn in Khrushchev's political fortunes and Kaganovich's arrival in Ukraine changed the situation dramatically.

In late February 1947, Stalin's trusted trouble-shooter Lazar Kaganovich arrived in Kiev as the Ukrainian Communist Party's new first secretary. Having served consecutively as the Soviet people's commissar of railway transport, heavy industry, and construction materials, the notoriously heavy-handed Kaganovich had earned the epithet of *zheleznyi narkom* ("iron minister"). His tenure at the head of the Ukrainian party organization in March-December 1947 was marked by intensified coercive intervention in the economy and ideological purges in culture and scholarship.

Kaganovich's appointment was determined by his reputation as a specialist on Ukraine. A Ukrainian-born Jew, Kaganovich began his revolutionary work in Ukraine and, in 1925-28, returned there to lead the Ukrainian Communist Party. Moscow sent him to the republic to enforce the official policy of Ukrainization, but while promoting the Ukrainian language and local cadres, Kaganovich also carried out a fierce campaign against "nationalist deviations" in culture and scholarship.<sup>303</sup> Likewise, Kaganovich's second brief rule in Ukraine in March-December 1947 is remembered primarily for his

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<sup>302</sup> A version of this chapter has been published as Serhy Yekelchuk, "How the 'Iron Minister' Kaganovich Failed to Discipline Ukrainian Historians: A Stalinist Ideological Campaign Reconsidered," *Nationalities Papers* 27, no. 4 (1999): 579-604.

<sup>303</sup> Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas*, 95-190; Iu. I. Shapoval, *Lazar Kaganovych* (Kiev: Znannia, 1994), pp. 5-34.

relentless attacks on the alleged remnants of "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism." In the works of post-Soviet Ukrainian historians, the 1947 crusade against "nationalism" appears as a comprehensive campaign master-minded by Stalin, planned by his envoy Kaganovich, faithfully implemented by the servile republican functionaries, and submissively endured by the terrorized Ukrainian intellectuals.<sup>304</sup> Clearly, modern Ukrainian historians have adopted the traditional Western concept of Stalinism as a successful totalitarian dictatorship, in which society was no more than the passive object of an all-powerful state.

However, the recently declassified archives of the Ukrainian Communist Party's Central Committee document the infinitely more complex dynamics of the state-society relationship in postwar Soviet Ukraine. This chapter questions both the planned character and the coherence of the 1947 campaign; the traditional "distribution of roles" among the party hierarchy, republican functionaries, and Ukrainian intellectuals; and the accepted view of the campaign's success. The archives of the Ukrainian Central Committee reveal the Kaganovich-led crusade as a characteristic example of how Stalinism functioned as a system seeking to achieve total control over society but in reality often locked into a complex, if unequal, dialogue with its subjects. The archival materials reveal the subtle strategies of resistance *within* the official discourse, showing how various professional groups could negotiate the official language's meaning in order to defend themselves during ideological campaigns.

### **The Enforced Dialogue**

As the Ukrainian party leader, Kaganovich replaced Nikita Khrushchev, who until then had held the positions of both first secretary and Ukrainian premier. (He retained the

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<sup>304</sup> See I. P. Kozhukhalo, "Vplyv kultu osoby Stalina na ideolohichni protsesy na Ukraini v 40-i-na pochatku 50-kh rokiv," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 2 (1989): 14-26; L. A. Shevchenko, "Kultura Ukrainy v umovakh stalinskoho totalitaryzmu (druga polovyna 40-x-pochatok 50-kh rokiv)," in V. M. Danylenko, ed., *Ukraina XX st.: Kultura, ideolohiia, polityka* (Kiev: Instytut istorii Ukrainy NANU, 1993), pp. 119-30; Olena Zamlynska, "Ideolohichni teror ta represii proty tvorchoi intelihentsii u pershi povienni roky (1945-1947 rr.)," *Kyivska starovyna* no. 2 (1993): 73-80; V. I. Iurchuk, *Kulturne zhyttia v Ukraini u povienni roky: Svitlo i tini* (Kiev: Asotsiatsiia Ukraino, 1995), pp. 26-27, 36-48.

second office.) Whatever the reason for Khrushchev's sudden demotion, it had nothing to do with "nationalist deviations" in the republic. Khrushchev himself claimed that his requests for food assistance for Ukraine during the 1946 famine caused Stalin's wrath. Scholars have argued in a similar vein that Khrushchev's powerful rival in Moscow, Georgii Malenkov, attempted to discredit the Ukrainian leader's agricultural policies in order to remove him from the succession line.<sup>305</sup> The minutes of the meeting at which the Politburo decided to stop combining the offices of Ukrainian first secretary and premier actually explain that this practice had been "dictated by the specific conditions of the war." A similar division of positions occurred in neighboring Belarus where Panteleimon Ponomarenko also lost the office of first secretary.<sup>306</sup>

Both Khrushchev and Kaganovich agree in their otherwise remarkably antagonistic memoirs that Kaganovich's main task was to revitalize Ukrainian agriculture, which had not yet recovered from wartime destruction. Nevertheless, the same Politburo decree also appointed a special Secretary for Agriculture of the Ukrainian Central Committee, Nikolai Patolichev. Agriculture was also a major area of specialization for Premier Khrushchev. Lacking their expertise and eager to demonstrate to Moscow his ability to ferret out and solve problems, Kaganovich began looking for errors elsewhere and especially in ideology, where he had found them so successfully in 1925-28. In Khrushchev's words, "From the very beginning of his activities in Ukraine, Kaganovich looked for every opportunity to show off and to throw his weight around."<sup>307</sup> This search soon led the

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<sup>305</sup> See Yaroslav Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine after World War II* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1964), pp. 234-35; David R. Marples, "Khrushchev, Kaganovich and the 1947 Crisis," in his *Stalinism in Ukraine in the 1940s* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 82-96; Iu. I. Shapoval, *Ukraina 20-50-kh rokiv: Storinky nenapysanoi istorii* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1993), pp. 265-67; idem, *Lazar Kahanovych*, 35-40.

<sup>306</sup> The photograph of Kaganovich's copy of the protocol is reproduced in Lazar Kaganovich, *Pamiatnye zapiski* (Moscow: Vagrius, 1995), between pp. 288 and 289. Ponomarenko recalled that Stalin had decided to divide the offices of party leader and premier in Ukraine, Belarus, and at the federal level because combining them was "no longer necessary" after the war. Then, however, Stalin announced that *he* would "temporarily" continue holding both positions. See "Otvety P. K. Ponomarenko na voprosy G. A. Kumaneva 2 noiabria 1978 g.," *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, no. 6 (1998): 133-49, here 148-49.

<sup>307</sup> *Khrushchev Remembers*, 242. Kaganovich's account of his second appointment in Ukraine is in *Pamiatnye zapiski*, 487-94.



new first secretary to the promising field of Ukrainian historiography.

The available archives of the All-Union and Ukrainian party Central Committees do not contain any hints regarding Moscow's master-plan to purge Ukrainian historians, nor do they confirm that Kaganovich himself had such a scheme. In fact, the first secretary's interest in historical scholarship first surfaced in a rather curious form in April 1947. As the Central Committee was reviewing the working plans of the republican Academy of Sciences, someone apparently brought to Kaganovich's attention that the Academy's Institute of History of Ukraine planned to publish a collection of articles, "The Critique of the Bourgeois-Nationalist Theory of Hrushevsky and His 'School'." Listed among the collection's authors was Professor Ivan Krypiakevych, who had not only been Hrushevsky's student but remained in Lviv under the German occupation and even published there anti-Soviet works on Ukrainian history. The indignant Kaganovich immediately arranged for an unusual resolution of the Central Committee. The Ukrainian party's highest body decreed the exclusion of Krypiakevych from the plan, denouncing him as "a student and epigone of Hrushevsky," as well as the "author of the spiteful anti-Soviet Fascist book *History of Ukraine*, which was published in Lviv under the German occupation."<sup>308</sup>

Although Krypiakevych continued working at the Institute after the resolution, this decree effectively buried the anti-Hrushevskian collection. While the Institute's working plan for 1947 had listed most leading researchers as preparing their articles, the five-year report for 1946-50 did not even mention the project.<sup>309</sup> Unaware of this effect of his intervention, Kaganovich meanwhile decided to look more closely into the state of Soviet Ukrainian historical scholarship. On 27 April, the Central Committee decreed the holding of a conference of leading historians, with the aim of "discovering the causes of the bourgeois-nationalist deviations" in their recent works. The conference opened on 29 April

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<sup>308</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 6, spr. 1036, ark. 17. It is not clear just how Krypiakevych managed to continue his career under the Soviet power after the war. A recent Ukrainian documentary publication suggests that either before or during the war, he had been the Soviet secret police's informant in West Ukrainian ecclesiastical and intellectual circles. In the autumn of 1944, the NKVD "re-established" contacts with him. See *Kulturne zhyttia v Ukraini: Zakhidni zemli*, 1: 217.

<sup>309</sup> NAIU, op. 1, spr. 95, ark. 3 (plan for 1947); spr. 215, ark. 1-13 (report for 1946-50).

with a two-day session and continued on 6 May.<sup>310</sup>

Probably because of Kaganovich's personal participation, the 1947 conference left a powerful impression on the postwar generation of Ukrainian historians. By the 1990s, their students would describe it as a major event in the party's ideological brainwashing of historians, during which Kaganovich intimidated Ukrainian scholars;<sup>311</sup> however, the conference's minutes reveal that historians themselves did most of the talking. The party bosses had neither the primary material, nor the knowledge necessary to analyze what they had designated as "nationalist errors" in historical works. With the expectation that the scholars would criticize themselves, they could, nonetheless, initiate an unequal dialogue with historians.

Although none of his official positions seemed to justify his doing so, the republic's foreign minister and ideological *éminence grise* Dmytro Manuisky served as the chair. In a brief introductory speech, he called upon those present to uncover the "bourgeois-nationalist" errors in Ukrainian historiography, the vice that had suddenly surfaced after thirty years of Soviet power. The first speaker, the historian Fedir Los, recited the catalogue of the principal "mistakes" of the Institute of History which its researchers were prepared to acknowledge. This attempt at self-criticism focused on the coverage of pre-revolutionary history in the Institute's wartime synthetic works: *History of Ukraine: A Short Course* (1940), *Survey of the History of Ukraine* (1942), and *History of Ukraine, Vol. 1* (1943). Significantly, though, Los did not designate the listed shortcomings as "nationalistic." The first major error was that the periodization of Ukrainian history was not explicitly based on Marxist-Leninist socio-economic formations such as Feudalism and Capitalism but relied instead on the evolution of state structures and events of political history. Second, instead of highlighting the historic ties with Russia both before and after Ukraine's union with Muscovy in 1654, the authors studied the Ukrainian history of the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries in connection with events in

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<sup>310</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 8, spr. 316, ark. 27. Interestingly, the same decree envisaged a conference of literary historians to be held in late May, but the authorities apparently abandoned the idea after the historians' meeting.

<sup>311</sup> Koval and Rublov, "Instytut istorii Ukrainy," 60-61.

Lithuania, Poland, and Western Europe. In this context, Ukrainian scholars had particularly "overestimated" the historic role of the Galician-Volhynian Principality. Finally, in their portrayal of the seventeenth-century Cossack wars and modern Ukrainian history in general, historians had forgotten that "the category of class is the principal one, and that the national factor is always secondary to the social."<sup>312</sup>

Then the Institute's director and authority on the Cossack period, Mykola Petrovsky, took the floor. He dwelt at length on Hrushevsky's heresy and, at the end, briefly repented not sufficiently stressing in his own works that the Cossacks and rebellious peasants had fought both the foreign oppressors and the native feudal lords. Professor Mytrofan Brychkevych then offered some general thoughts on the importance of education and hard work for combatting Hrushevsky's lasting influence. At this point, Kaganovich grew tired of waiting for the "real" confessions and interrupted the speaker with a suggestion: "Let us consider the errors of many of our people, who stand by Soviet power, the party, Marxism-Leninism with all their heart and politically [support them], but who are at the same time making mistakes in theoretical scholarship, drag behind Hrushevsky, and approach their subject incorrectly, not as Marxists."<sup>313</sup>

This remark should have lightened the participants' mood, for the first secretary clearly had modified Manuilsky's menacing introductory call to uncover "bourgeois-nationalist" deviations. Kaganovich seemed to accept the historians' basic loyalty to the party cause, but subsequent speakers also preferred to denounce the long dead Hrushevsky rather than acknowledge their own errors. Although Kaganovich and the historians used the same ideological lexicon, they pursued different agendas. As a result, the minutes feature some entertaining exchanges between the Ukrainian party leader and the conference participants:

Kaganovich: [T]here are some thin threads that connect [a historian] to the views

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<sup>312</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 753, ark. 1-2 (Manuilsky), 4-6 (Los). Excerpts from the conference minutes have been recently published in *U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu*, 2: 31-72, here 31-35.

<sup>313</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 753, ark. 14-27 (Petrovsky), 36-38 (Brychkevych), 37 (Kaganovich); *U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu*, 2: 38-40 (Petrovsky's speech is not published).

which were introduced by Hrushevsky and others. Therefore, to strengthen our position, these thin, invisible threads need to be...  
Lavrov: Cut.  
Kaganovich: To cut is easy. In this case, we must dissolve them chemically, not simply cut them. But first of all we need to identify them. What are these thin, invisible threads that remain? We have torn the ropes and the cords already. But there are still thin, invisible threads that confuse our people. Some people have good intentions but they cannot and do not want to act against their conscience. They studied history from the texts that were available then and the facts [from those books] filled their heads and confused them. Could you help us here? And I ask everybody to explain: what are those invisible threads remaining from Hrushevsky and his school, [please name] the credible ones.<sup>314</sup>

Kaganovich did not receive clear answers about the ideological ties to the past. The closest the participants came to locating these frightening invisible threads was in tracing the biographic connections of themselves and their colleagues to the Hrushevsky school and other non-party historians. (All this information was, of course, noted on their personal files and known to the party functionaries.) Some speakers noted that Petrovsky's "mistakes" betrayed him as a former student of Hrushevsky. Kost Huslysty told the audience about his studies under non-Marxist Ukrainian professors Dmytro Iavornytsky and Dmytro Bahalii during the 1920s. Mykhailo Rubach confessed to having experienced the influences of the Pokrovsky school and even Trotskyism during the 1920s.<sup>315</sup> Instead of looking for invisible threads to Ukrainian nationalist historiography, several historians directly traced the Institute's "mistakes" to wartime patriotism and the official elevation of national heroes, eliciting no comments from the party functionaries present.<sup>316</sup>

Amidst all the ideological rhetoric, the Ukrainian scholars acknowledged only a few conceptual "errors," all characteristic of the patriotic version of the Ukrainian past.

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<sup>314</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 753, ark. 47; *U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu*, 2: 41. Kaganovich had attended only the session on 29 April. Manuilsky and Secretary for Ideology Kost Lytvyn represented the Central Committee during the 30 April and 6 May sessions.

<sup>315</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 753, ark. 59-62, 82-83, 99, 166 (Petrovsky), 248-50 (Huslysty), 159-60 (Rubach).

<sup>316</sup> Ibid., ark. 113-15 (Rubach), 139 (Bortnikov), 254 (Huslysty).

They also indicated their readiness to modify the grand narrative of the nation's heroic exploits by using two principal strategies: foregrounding the ancient unity and subsequent close ties with Russia, and stressing that classes, rather than nations, were principal historical agents. Huslysty admitted to unwittingly "following the bourgeois-nationalist historiography" in his wartime pamphlet on Danylo of Halych, which described the prince as a "Ukrainian monarch, head of the Ukrainian nation-state." This interpretation, the historian confessed, contradicted the official view of Kievan Rus' as the common heritage of all Eastern Slavs. A professor of Kiev University, Arsen Bortnikov, acknowledged idealizing the Brotherhood of SS. Cyril and Methodius (1845-47) as a progressive organization of Ukrainian intellectuals. Now, however, he was aware of a class struggle within this first Ukrainian political organization, as well as of a "bourgeois-nationalist wing" among its members.<sup>317</sup>

The conference participants realized that the narrative strategies of emphasizing class struggle and "ethnic" ties with Russia were potentially contradictory. On some questions proposed for re-evaluation, historians and ideologues often saw the direction of interpretive change differently, even though both sides spoke in the ideologically correct language of class analysis and "friendship of peoples." For instance, Secretary for Ideology Lytvyn, who chaired the evening session on 30 April, warned the historian Huslysty not to engage in a re-evaluation of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the seventeenth-century Cossack leader who presided over Ukraine's incorporation into Russia but whose social background as a feudal lord obviously constituted a liability:

- Huslysty: We have not resolved the question of the War of Liberation yet, so we cannot provide a clear appraisal of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. One would think a number of works had been written about that epoch, yet the question is not solved.
- Lytvyn: What question about Bohdan Khmelnytsky is not resolved?
- Huslysty: The question about the class features in his activities is not resolved. Our previous profile of Bohdan Khmelnytsky went as follows: a great son of the Ukrainian people, a person who organized the Ukrainian people for a struggle against the foreign aggressors, who

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<sup>317</sup> Ibid, ark. 255 (Huslysty), 139-52 (Bortnikov).

united Ukraine with Russia, etc. When we started working to reveal the class aspects of his activities, we encountered difficulties. Mykola Neonovych [Petrovsky] wrote a section about this, and the situation only became worse. When he began clarifying the class factors, Bohdan Khmelnytsky appeared to have been separated from the people. A number of questions became muddled. I believe we will resolve all these questions. First, we ought to abandon the old theory, which was based on nationalistic factors, and move to the correct Marxist concept.

Lytvyn: Why are we, Ukrainian historians, debating about Bohdan Khmelnytsky and trying to define his role when the government has long defined it? It is enough that we have the Order of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Our soldiers wear the order, and we, the historians of Ukraine, are raising the question that the role of Bohdan Khmelnytsky is unclear.

Huslysty: This is exactly what is happening. When we read the section by Mykola Neonovych, we began wondering why the order of his name was established in the first place. (Laughter.)<sup>318</sup>

After a protracted discussion, the secretary for ideology made his audience understand that, in the case of the feudal lord Khmelnytsky, the class analysis should be subordinated to the glorification of the nation's great leader who united Ukraine with Russia.

Nonetheless, the historians openly challenged the ideological secretary's pronouncements on other issues. Just before the conference, Lytvyn published in the authoritative Moscow journal *Bolshevik* the article "On the History of the Ukrainian People." After dwelling on the sins of Hrushevsky and his school, the article provided a brief summary of the official model of Ukrainian history. Lytvyn pontificated that medieval Kievan Rus' was a common cradle of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, and that, since its demise, "the Ukrainian people have always striven to unite with the great Russian people."<sup>319</sup> But, for all its apparent clarity, this scheme did not specify when the Ukrainians as a separate people emerged from the cradle. In the postwar years, the seemingly scholastic problem of the emergence of Ukrainian ethnicity acquired the utmost importance because it underlined the limits of the nation's appropriation of the

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<sup>318</sup> Ibid., ark. 262-63; *U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu*, 2: 60.

<sup>319</sup> K. Litvin [Lytvyn], "Ob istorii ukrainskogo naroda," *Bolshevik*, no. 7 (1947): 41-56, here 52.

past. In 1946, the party ideologues criticized Mykola Bazhan's poem "Danylo of Halych" for presuming that the thirteenth-century Galician-Volhynian Principality was a Ukrainian land and that Danylo's regiments were "Ukrainian."<sup>320</sup> But just how far could one safely stretch the national historical self-identification? Both historians and Ukrainian party functionaries were reluctant to commit themselves.

In one ambiguous sentence, Lytvyn's article disposed of the problem of Ukrainians' origins as separate people: "The Ukrainian nationality [*narodnost*] began to shape itself in the fourteenth century, and by the sixteenth century the main features of the Ukrainian nation [*naroda*] (language, culture, etc.) had developed." The historian Huslysty pointed out that such a statement only obscured the problem. Also, it contradicted the assertion made earlier on the same page: "Three closely related nations [*naroda*], Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, began to take shape from a single root after the disintegration of Kievan Rus'," meaning during the thirteenth century at the latest. In addition, the Politburo-approved standard Soviet school textbook under the editorship of A. Shestakov stated that the Ukrainian nationality emerged in the thirteenth century, while other Moscow historians proposed, variously, the fourteenth century (S. Iushkov), the fifteenth (A. Pankratova), and the sixteenth (V. Picheta).<sup>321</sup> Embattled, the Central Committee's secretary snarled at his opponent:

- Lytvyn: Do you want a date?  
Huslysty: I believe the date is being provided by you. You say that the Ukrainian nationality began to take shape in the twelfth century, and at another place, you say in the fourteenth. Your article is published in [the party's] theoretical journal under your name and this [dating] will undoubtedly cause a debate. Some will say: in the fourteenth, the others [will say]: in the sixteenth.  
Lytvyn: And what do you think?  
Huslysty: I believe the Ukrainian nationality was emerging and taking shape during the fourteenth through the sixteenth centuries....This question is not clarified yet. I hope that you, Kost Zakharovych [Lytvyn],

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<sup>320</sup> See TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 1, spr. 729, ark. 138-41 (Lytvyn's speech at the August, 1946, plenary meeting of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee).

<sup>321</sup> Litvin, "Ob istorii ukrainskogo naroda," 51; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 753, ark. 260-61.

will participate in discussing this question.<sup>322</sup>

The argument ended in a stalemate. The historians had demonstrated their ability to fight back by questioning the possibility of clear ideological prescriptions on major problems of Ukrainian history.

At the end of the session on 30 April, Manuisky complained that he still had heard nothing about the notorious invisible threads. Moreover, on the evening of 30 April, two deputy premiers clashed in front of the audience on the question of which of them should sum up the proceedings. Manuisky invited the last speaker, Mykola Bazhan, to do so. But the poet who authored the faulty "Danylo of Halych" and who also served as deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers in charge of culture, sarcastically rebuffed the foreign minister: "I will end my speech here, using your proposal as my concluding words."<sup>323</sup> As a result, the second session ended abruptly.

The last session of the conference, on 6 May, also did not advance the search for invisible threads. Instead, two leading historians used this meeting as an opportunity to promote their personal agendas under the guise of uncovering "deviations."<sup>324</sup> The participants spent most of the day listening to Rubach's continuing attacks on Petrovsky as a student of Hrushevsky and a bourgeois nationalist, and Petrovsky's retaliatory tirades about Rubach's own past Trotskyist errors. Then both professors admitted their respective mistakes. The secretary of the Institute's party group, Kateryna Stetsiuk, had enough courage to say that the fight was of a personal, rather than theoretical, nature. A specialist on the Soviet period, Oleksandr Slutsky, wondered why the conference was concentrating exclusively on the pre-revolutionary period, given that the post-1917 period also contained

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<sup>322</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 753, ark. 261-62; *U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu*, 2: 59. During this argument, Lytvyn spoke Russian and Huslysty Ukrainian.

<sup>323</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 753, ark. 311; *U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu*, 2: 70-71.

<sup>324</sup> Alexei Kojevnikov has shown that Soviet scientists successfully used the official Stalinist rituals of criticism and self-criticism to advance their own scholarly or personal agendas. See his "Rituals of Stalinist Culture at Work: Science and the Games of Intraparty Democracy circa 1948," *Russian Review* 57, no. 1 (1998): 25-52.



many unresolved problems.<sup>325</sup>

On the evening of 6 May the conference ended in an impasse. No party functionary made a concluding speech, and no official resolution resulted from the meetings. The Central Committee's internal memo hinted at the desirability of replacing Petrovsky as the director of the Institute of History of Ukraine. During the first session, Kaganovich had kept in front of him resumes of the biographies of Rubach and the director of the Institute of Archaeology, Petro Iefymenko, but Petrovsky survived the April storm.<sup>326</sup>

### **From Dialogue to *Diktat***

One of the possible reasons for the impasse was that Kaganovich had been contemplating an ideological purge on a much greater scale. The formerly top secret working files of the Ukrainian Communist Party Politburo reveal that in May 1947 Kaganovich planned a major denunciatory session of the Central Committee. On 28 May, the Politburo approved in principle a draft resolution entitled "On Improving the Ideological and Political Education of the Cadres and on the Struggle against the Manifestations of Bourgeois-Nationalist Ideology." According to the handwritten note on file, the Ukrainian leadership sent this draft on the same day to the VKP(b) Central Committee. Another note in Kaganovich's hand read: "Do not send out [the draft to the members of the Ukrainian Central Committee]. Include in the minutes without the title." Yet another note explained that on 10 June the Ukrainian Politburo had decided to revise the draft, which had been itself removed from the file.<sup>327</sup> In the end, the "ideological" plenary session was never convened. Apparently, Moscow did not approve Kaganovich's plan to initiate a

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<sup>325</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 757, ark. 49 (Stetsiuk), 68 (Slutsky).

<sup>326</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 536, ark. 4 (memo); spr. 754, ark. 8-10zv (resumes).

<sup>327</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 16, spr. 32, ark. 47 (approved in principle, reported to Moscow on 28 May), 48 (title; decision to revise the draft), 49zv (Kaganovich's note). Manuilsky's personal archive preserved what seems to be the first working draft of the lost anti-"nationalist" resolution. The file contains Manuilsky's notes apparently made during the meeting with Kaganovich or the session of the Politburo and his later draft developing these ideas. Aside from general ideological pronouncements after the 1946 model, the text contains few concrete accusations. See TsDAVOV, f. 4669, op. 1, spr. 44, ark. 24-29 (draft), 30-39 (notes).

comprehensive purge of "bourgeois nationalists" in Ukraine. According to the legendary account circulating among the Ukrainian intellectuals, Stalin dismissed Kaganovich's plan by stating, "Comrade Kaganovich, you will not embroil me with the Ukrainian people."<sup>328</sup>

Having lost his bid for a major ideological purge, Kaganovich unexpectedly initiated a crackdown on Ukrainian historians. Again, no evidence exists that the Ukrainian Politburo planned a purge of historians in advance or that it represented a part of some larger master-plan. On the contrary, during July and early August, Ukrainian ideologues engaged in their usual languid "political education" of the republic's intelligentsia. Manuilsky spent considerable time preparing the Central Committee's "Directives for the Compilers of the *Short Course of the History of Ukraine*," as well as

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<sup>328</sup> See Shapoval, *Ukraina 20-50-kh rokiv*, 271-72 and *Lazar Kahanovych*, 40; Zamlynska, "Ideolohichniy teror," 79-80. No evidence exists of Kaganovich's visit to Moscow during his tenure as first secretary in Ukraine, and, if Stalin uttered these words over the phone, it is not clear how the Ukrainian establishment learned about them. However, a recent eyewitness's memoir reveals that, in October 1947, when the plans for the ideological plenary session had been long abandoned, Kaganovich and Khrushchev visited Stalin at his villa in the Caucasus to discuss the situation in Ukraine; moreover, after the meeting, Kaganovich was reportedly in bad humor (Oleg Troianovsky, "Vozhd krasnokozhikh," *Ogonek*, no. 36 [September 1997]: 41-44, here 43). Perhaps Stalin criticized Kaganovich in the presence of Khrushchev, who then related the leader's aphorism to selected Ukrainian functionaries and cultural figures.

At the XXII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1962, the then Ukrainian First Secretary Mykola Pidhirny gave the following account of the abortive plenary session:

As a great master of intrigue and provocation, [Kaganovich] had entirely groundlessly accused the republic's leading writers and also some top-rank party workers of nationalism. On his directives, the press carried annihilating articles against the writers, who were devoted to the party and the people.

But this did not satisfy Kaganovich. He began pushing for a plenary meeting of the Central Committee with the agenda "The Struggle against Nationalism, the Main Danger within the CP(b)U," although such danger did not exist at all. And could not have existed for, happily for us, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine had long been headed by the staunch Leninist Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, who educated the communists and the Ukrainian people in the spirit of internationalism [stormy applause], friendship of peoples, selfless devotion to the great ideas of Leninism. [Prolonged stormy applause.] (See *XXII sezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, 17-31 oktiabria 1961 g.*: *Stenograficheskii otchet* [Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1962], 1: 280.)

Pidhirny went on to say that Khrushchev had destroyed Kaganovich's evil plans. Ukrainian historians sometimes take Pidhirny's words at their face value. In contrast, David Marples treats Pidhirny's pronouncements judiciously and warns that the "image of a mild Khrushchev trying to prevent Kaganovich's repressive policies is essentially a myth" (Marples, "Khrushchev, Kaganovich and the 1947 Crisis," 90-96, here 90). In 1946, Khrushchev had presided over a similar ideological purge in the republic. In 1947, however, he was reluctant to support Kaganovich's crusade because it would have made him responsible for the "lack of ideological supervision" in the previous years.

similar instructions regarding the *History of Ukrainian Literature* and the *History of the Communist Party of Ukraine*. The detailed directives spelled out the party line in the humanities and social sciences: regimentation rather than denunciation. On 9 August, the Central Committee adopted the resolution "On the Textbook of the History of Ukraine," which unrealistically envisaged the publication of an ideologically correct textbook in November of the same year. The party expected historians to work out the Marxist periodization of Ukrainian history; to show Kievan Rus' as a common cradle of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians; and "finally to dethrone the reactionary romantics that Ukrainian nationalists had created around the Zaporozhian Host." In modern history, the authors had to pay special attention to the development of capitalism and the growth of the working class and, in the later times, to the leading role of the Bolshevik party. While discussing the reunification of Ukrainian lands during 1939-45, the authors should stress that this historic event had become possible only due to the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution.<sup>329</sup> In other words, the directive envisioned a further suppression of ethnic patriotism in the narratives of Ukrainian history.

However, the republican functionaries did not perceive any urgent ideological threat from historians. On 16 and 18 August, the Ukrainian Administration of Propaganda and Agitation held a staff conference to discuss a number of pressing practical problems of propaganda work. Nothing in the minutes indicates serious concern with the state of history writing. At the same time, the participants dwelt on a glitch in the work of the republican Institute of Marx, Engels, and Lenin (IMEL), and discussed the fact that the Politburo had made serious decisions concerning the Institute and fired its director, Fedir Ienevych.<sup>330</sup>

The archival evidence suggests that the ensuing purge of historians, no matter how pregnant the political atmosphere was with the desire for such a campaign, might have been initiated by a single chance denunciation. On 31 July 1947, the demoted Ienevych

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<sup>329</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 6, spr. 1130, ark. 4 (resolution), 8-23 (directive on history text), 24-73 (resolutions and directives on literature and party history). Manuilsky's notes and drafts are in TsDAVOV, f. 4669, op. 1, spr. 23, 43, 134.

<sup>330</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 618, ark. 1-125, here 1, 34.

attempted to restore himself to the Politburo's favor by sending Kaganovich information compromising the premier Ukrainian poet, Maksym Rylsky. Ienevych included a copy of Rylsky's 1943 speech on the history of Kiev, as well as the poet's introduction to the 1944 edition of Ukrainian historical folk songs, and the 1946 autobiographical article "From the Bygone Years." All these texts allegedly idealized pre-revolutionary Ukraine and did not discriminate between the progressive and bourgeois trends in Ukrainian culture. Somebody (Kaganovich and/or Lytvyn?) extensively underlined with red and black pencils all of Rylsky's writings and Ienevych's comments. On 20 August 1947, the Secretariat of the Ukrainian Central Committee adopted an unusual retroactive secret resolution, "On M. T. Rylsky's Speech 'Kiev in the History of Ukraine'," declaring that the 1943 text "in reality represent[ed] not a speech about Kiev but a statement on the history of Ukraine, in which M. Rylsky defends the nationalist mistakes that the party had condemned."<sup>331</sup>

The republican leadership at once abandoned the relatively constructive approach that characterized the directives of 9 August. Kaganovich charged Manuilsky with writing a new ideological document and, on 29 August 1947, the Politburo adopted the Central Committee resolution "On Political Mistakes and Unsatisfactory Work of the Institute of History of Ukraine of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences."<sup>332</sup> Although only twenty days before the Central Committee had given historians until November to publish the textbook, the new decree condemned them in advance for failing to produce a "scholarly seasoned, Marxist-Leninist History of Ukraine." Wartime publications of the Institute had been compiled in an "anti-Marxist spirit" and "contained gross political mistakes and bourgeois-nationalist distortions." The document condemned the historical narratives emphasizing the birth, growth, struggles, and victories of the Ukrainian nation, but the party directives on writing Ukrainian history remained rather confusing. On the

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<sup>331</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 8, spr. 328, ark. 6-7.

<sup>332</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 6, spr. 1073, ark. 16-24. Published in I. F. Kuras, ed., *Natsionalni vidnosyny v Ukraini u XX st.: Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1994), pp. 291-96 and *Uleshchatakh totalitaryzmu*, 2: 80-89. Manuilsky's drafts are in TsDAVOV, f. 4669, op. 1, spr. 23, ark. 47-55; the variants of the final draft prepared by the apparatus of the Central Committee, are in TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 980, ark. 3-9.

one hand, the resolution announced:

The principal mistake of the authors of works on the history of Ukraine is that, instead of considering the history of Ukraine in close connection with the history of the Russian, Belarusian, and other peoples of the Soviet Union, they follow Ukrainian nationalists in treating the history of Ukraine in isolation from the history of other peoples. In so doing, they begin and proceed by following the course of Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine-Rus'*. It is known that Kievan Rus' was a common cradle of three fraternal peoples, Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian, but Hrushevsky and other nationalists tried to prove that Kievan Rus' was an exclusively Ukrainian state.<sup>333</sup>

While this statement seemed to stress the essentially ethnic historic ties with Russia, the one on the Khmelnytsky War clearly demanded more "class history": "The authors of the works on the history of Ukraine should have explained the Ukrainian people's War of Liberation in 1648-1654 as primarily the peasant masses' struggle against the Polish aggressors and the feudal oppression in general." Moreover, historians failed to show that the whole "history of Ukraine is, first of all, the history of the class struggle, the peasants' struggle against the feudal lords, the workers' struggle against the bourgeoisie."<sup>334</sup> This definition of Ukrainian history was based on the classic words of the *Communist Manifesto*. The subsequent paragraphs, however, again requested attention to ties with Russia but this time in the ethnically neutral field of revolutionary movement and socialist construction.

The resolution explained these mistakes by the vestiges of "bourgeois-nationalist" views among the Institute's researchers, singling out the director, Petrovsky. Since the nationalist heresy had made its way into all existing texts on Ukrainian history, it presumably had spoiled the teaching of history in universities, colleges, and schools, even though not a single school and only a small number of colleges were offering the history of Ukraine as a separate course. The concluding part of the decree outlined the urgent measures aimed to remedy the situation, with the administrative changes at the Institute

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<sup>333</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 6, spr. 1073, ark. 16-17.

<sup>334</sup> Ibid., ark. 17, 18.

coming first. The resolution proclaimed the creation of the Marxist-Leninist *Short Course of the History of Ukraine* as the most important task of historians. By 15 October, the Institute should have delivered to the Central Committee the outline and theses of the *Short Course* that would follow "the Stalinist textbook of the history of VKP(b), the [1934] comments by comrades Stalin, Kirov, and Zhdanov on the questions of history, and the directives of this resolution."<sup>335</sup>

### **The Frustrated Crusade**

Although the decree was not published in full until 1994, the official party journal *Bilshovyk Ukrainy* carried a lengthy editorial, "To Carry Through the Liquidation of the Bourgeois-Nationalist Distortions of the History of Ukraine," which closely followed the original text. In addition, the official newspaper *Radianska Ukraina* published an even more verbose editorial, "To Create A Truly Scholarly, Marxist-Leninist History of Ukraine," which developed the decree's ideas at greater length.<sup>336</sup> However, Kaganovich wanted to make sure that the republic's intellectuals had received his message. He requested detailed reports on the party groups' meetings in all institutes of the Academy of Sciences and on the historians' conference held on 16, 17, and 19 September.<sup>337</sup> This meeting gathered the historians of the Institute of History, IMEL, Kiev University, and Kiev Pedagogical Institute to discuss the resolution. Kaganovich apparently never read the minutes of this conference, which would have upset him greatly. While all participants dutifully repeated the general ideological formulae of the decree, many questioned their practical application. Petrovsky acknowledged some mistakes but rejected accusations of "anti-Marxist" or "bourgeois-nationalist" views. The Institute's researchers Oleksandr Slutsky and Pylyp Stoian supported him, causing the Central Committee's Secretary for

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<sup>335</sup> Ibid., ark. 23. Ukrainian history was not offered as a separate school subject until the 1960s. However, the course of the "History of the USSR" covered the major problems of the Ukrainian pre-revolutionary past inasmuch as they related to Russian history.

<sup>336</sup> "Do kintsia likviduvaty burzhuzno-natsionalistychni perekruhennia istorii Ukrainy," *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, no. 8 (1947): 1-10; *Radianska Ukraina*, 3 October 1947, pp. 3-4.

<sup>337</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 621, ark. 166-208.

Propaganda, Ivan Nazarenko, to intervene:

I do not agree with Comrade Slutsky, who devoted his speech to defending Comrade Petrovsky. The Central Committee wrote down [its decision] pointing out serious mistakes that resulted from both the weak Marxist-Leninist education and the complacency of the Institute's director, Professor Petrovsky. He made these serious mistakes, he did not organize a struggle against the manifestations of bourgeois-nationalist trends and did not direct the scholarly work on the history of Ukraine sufficiently. This would appear to be perfectly clear....That is why I am bewildered by the speeches of comrades Slutsky and Stoian, who attempted to underestimate, to water down, the discussion of this historic document [of the Central Committee].<sup>338</sup>

There was, of course, a difference between the resolution charging Petrovsky personally with "vestiges of bourgeois-nationalist views" and "past serious mistakes of bourgeois-nationalist character," and Nazarenko's comments, where the historian appeared guilty of mere "complacency" and not organizing a struggle against "bourgeois nationalism." The secretary for propaganda himself seemed to have been captivated by the general tone of "negotiating" or "watering down" Kaganovich's resolution. However, the historian Kost Huslysty went further than anyone in challenging the authority of the Ukrainian party functionaries themselves:

It is known that during the 1946 conference on propaganda, the work of our Institute of History received a positive appraisal. It was noted that the Institute had done considerable work, that it had published the *Short Course*, the first volume [of the *History of Ukraine*], etc. That is, in June of 1946, nobody saw that glitch in historical scholarship in Ukraine.<sup>339</sup>

All of the participants knew full well that the party official who spoke so highly of the

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<sup>338</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 760, ark. 168-69. Petrovsky's speech is recorded on ark. 28-36, comments by Stoian on ark. 44-47, by Slutsky on 132-45. The archives of the Central Committee preserved no less than three copies of the minutes: see also op. 70, spr. 758 and 759.

<sup>339</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 760, ark. 76. Huslysty referred to the 1940 *Short Course*, not the new project under way in the late 1940s. See S. M. Bielousov [Bilousov] et al., eds., *Istoriia Ukrainy: Korotkyi kurs* (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo AN URSR, 1940).

Institute's work in June 1946 was Nazarenko himself. In his concluding remarks, the embarrassed secretary of the Central Committee sounded a call for collaboration, referring to both historians and ideological functionaries as "we": "We need to compile the outline and theses of the *Short Course* before the 15th, to develop several methodological directives for instructors, to publish the plans that will help our instructors to teach history properly....We need to roll up our sleeves and set to work."<sup>340</sup> Neither the incident with Huslysty nor the opposition from Petrovsky, Slutsky, and Stoian was recorded in Nazarenko's report to Kaganovich.<sup>341</sup>

On 22 and 23 September, the Institute's party group held a special two-day private meeting. The party members actually voted "to ensure that all works on the history of Ukraine are imbued with the idea of unbreakable ties with the history of the Russian, Belarusian, and other peoples of the Soviet Union." The meeting's resolution did not mention the further return to the "class approach," although it requested more attention to the great historic role of the October Revolution. The meeting decided that the authors of the faulty wartime publications—both party members and non-members—Huslysty, Mykola Suprunenko, Serhii Bilousov, Fedir Iastrebov, Lazar Slavin—expiate their errors by speedily producing a proper Marxist textbook. Amazingly, the text did not mention the primary target of the Politburo's critique, the non-party Petrovsky, who still remained the Institute's director.<sup>342</sup> Party meetings to discuss the political mistakes of historians were held at all institutes of the republican Academy of Sciences.<sup>343</sup>

Oblast party committees throughout Ukraine organized meetings of propagandists and lectures for local intellectuals to spell out the Central Committee's resolution.<sup>344</sup>

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<sup>340</sup> Ibid., ark. 170-71.

<sup>341</sup> See TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 621, ark. 166-74.

<sup>342</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 744, ark. 52-56; *U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu*, 2: 104-08. The party committee of Kiev University where Petrovsky served as chair of the History of Ukraine, reacted more eagerly: it "established control" over the professor's lectures (ibid., ark. 82-83zv).

<sup>343</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 621, ark. 175-86; spr. 1090, ark. 1-10; spr. 1494, ark. 1-10; spr. 1620, ark. 1-11.

<sup>344</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 4525, ark. 1-8; op. 70, spr. 761, ark. 36-41 (reports to Kaganovich); spr. 1095, ark. 1-11 (Kiev and Mykolaiv); op. 23, spr. 4526 (Poltava, Uzhhorod, Kirovohrad, Stalino). At one of the interoblast seminars, Ienevych was given his chance to denounce all "nationalists" from Dovzhenko



Understandably, the propaganda campaign targeted school teachers, as well as college and university professors. The newspaper of the Ministry of Education, *Radianska osvita*, dutifully carried articles explaining the danger of the "nationalist deviation" in Ukrainian history.<sup>345</sup> The ministry forwarded to all universities and colleges a lengthy circular letter regarding the "struggle with manifestations of nationalism" in the teaching of Ukrainian history. After repeating all the essential points of the Central Committee resolution, the letter requested that all course outlines in the history of Ukraine be revised accordingly by 1 October.<sup>346</sup> Aside from the obligatory theoretical condemnations of nationalism, the local conferences produced little of interest for the authorities. Local historians and educational administrators claimed that they were not involved in spreading the erroneous concepts and used the campaign as an opportunity to press for their own interests. At Poltava Pedagogical Institute, the rector clearly struggled to explain the resolution's relevance to the faculty: "Our Institute's program does not contain the History of Ukraine as a separate subject, but we should study it independently." At Zaporizhzhia Pedagogical Institute, where the subject was offered, its instructor Zhyhalov demanded more hours for the survey. At Uzhhorod University, the professors normally used the 1942 *Survey of the History of the Ukrainian SSR* as a text; when the resolution on the Institute of History appeared several days before the start of classes, the department decided not to risk using a potentially faulty text and simply cancelled the course. Both Kirovohrad and Stalino Pedagogical Institutes chose to stay on the safe side, reporting that, although they offered a course in Ukrainian history, they allegedly had neither the designated text nor the outline.<sup>347</sup>

School teachers used the occasion to criticize Moscow-approved standard history textbooks. Speaking at the teachers' seminar in Poltava, the teacher Morhulenko complained that Chapter Ten of Pankratova's school textbook of the history of the USSR

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and Rylsky to Petrovsky at great length (TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 620, ark. 1-34).

<sup>345</sup> *Radianska osvita*, 10 October 1947, pp. 1 and 2.

<sup>346</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 761, ark. 23-35; *U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu*, 2: 93-100.

<sup>347</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 4526, ark. 9 (Poltava), 22 (Zaporizhzhia), 37 (Uzhhorod), 46 (Kirovohrad), 53 (Stalino).

was entirely unsatisfactory: "[O]ne cannot give this material to the students. In the textbook, the personality of Bohdan Khmelnytsky is shown vaguely. Also, [the textbook] does not say that Kievan Rus' was the cradle of three fraternal peoples, Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian." A fellow teacher Meliavsky seconded her complaint that the central authorities did not provide coherent ideological directions in history. He said, "Secondary school teachers are experiencing great difficulties in teaching" because "the existing texts view many problems differently."<sup>348</sup> The School Department of the Ukrainian Central Committee inspected the teaching of history in several oblasts and did not find any nationalistic mistakes in the work of East Ukrainian teachers. The negative examples came from the Western oblasts where the students referred to Kievan Rus' as "Ukraine" and spoke highly of such "petit-bourgeois nationalist" pre-revolutionary parties as the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP) and the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers' Party. Even the specialists of the Lviv Institute of Teachers' Professional Development proposed such erroneous examination essay topics as "The Role of the Varangians in the Creation of Kievan State" and "The National Movement in Ukraine in 1905-1907 and the Activities of RUP." Nonetheless, the School Department defended Western Ukrainians, who were "not sufficiently familiar with the demands and principles of Marxist historical science." In any case, the Institute of History of Ukraine had been guilty of not developing model course outlines for school teachers.<sup>349</sup> An ideological circle closed: teachers were blaming all problems on textbook authors, historians accused the ideologues, and the local functionaries were tacitly downplaying the scale of ideological purification.

Meanwhile, Kaganovich appeared frustrated about the absence of concrete denunciations. On 3 October, the Secretariat of the Central Committee adopted yet another resolution on the progress of the discussion of the previous resolution about the Institute of History. The decree announced that the meetings in the republic's universities and colleges had reviewed the resolution only superficially without criticizing the

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<sup>348</sup> Ibid., ark. 25-26.

<sup>349</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 73, spr. 398, ark. 1-22, especially 12 and 19 on Western Ukraine.

nationalist mistakes of their own faculties. The decree demanded more denunciatory sessions in the capital and major cities, as well as a special conference at the Institute of History to discuss the outline of the future textbook.<sup>350</sup> Just a day before, on 2 October, Petrovsky (then still the Institute's director) forwarded the new prospectus of the *Short Course of the History of Ukraine* to the Central Committee. The prospectus was deemed unsatisfactory and, though the Central Committee received a new version on 11 October, Mykola Petrovsky finally lost his job, being replaced by the loyal party type, Oleksii Kasymenko.<sup>351</sup> This administrative solution might have satisfied Kaganovich's thrust for decisive measures, but the denunciation campaign did not regain momentum.

However, the August attack on historians also triggered the renewed purge of writers. The denunciation of "nationalism" in non-Russian literary works represented one of the ideological patterns of the late *Zhdanovshchina* period. The Ukrainian historian Lesia Shevchenko has rightly pointed out that the general call for a new attack on non-Russian literatures had been sounded in Moscow by the head of the Soviet Writers' Union, Aleksandr Fadeev. On 28 June 1947, Fadeev gave a highly publicised speech at the meeting of the Union's Presidium, hammering out the thesis that no decisive turn to Soviet subjects had yet occurred in literature. Fadeev named the "vestiges of bourgeois nationalism" as one of the causes of this problem. In particular, Fadeev criticized the non-Russian historical prose for excessive blackening of tsarist times: "In depicting the historical past, one should not show only tsarism's colonial deeds. It is much more important now to show those individuals in the past of your people who understood that your people should follow the lead of Russian culture...." In his speech at the same meeting, the head of the Ukrainian Writers' Union, Oleksandr Korniiichuk, enumerated the nationalist mistakes of his fellow writers. Almost all of these came from the

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<sup>350</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 8, spr. 340, ark. 13-14; *U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu*, 2: 119-20.

<sup>351</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 762, ark. 1-20 (draft); spr. 763, ark. 1 (Petrovsky's letter), 2-22 (draft), 24-35 (new draft), spr. 764, ark. 1-25 (another copy of a new draft). Kasymenko was appointed director on 25 October 1947 and remained at this post until 1964. He graduated from the Poltava Institute of People's Education in 1926 and before the war taught in Poltava and Zhytomyr. During the war, Kasymenko worked in the apparatus of the Ukrainian Central Committee and, in 1945-47, in the republican Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He published his first book, *The Reunification of Ukraine with Russia and Its Historic Significance*, only in 1954. See Smolii, ed., *Vcheni Instytutu istorii Ukrainy*, 124-25.

ideological decrees and denunciatory articles of 1946, the only new addition being Panch's faulty novel *The Zaporozhians*, which had been published in late 1946.<sup>352</sup>

As usual, the immediate impulse for a purge in Ukraine came from a timely denunciation, the letter sent to Kaganovich on 22 August by two literary critics, Ievhen Adelheim and Illia Stebun. The two critics castigated the "nationalist errors" of their enemies, most notably the deputy head of the Writers' Union party group, Panch, and the chief editor of the major publishing house Derzhlitvydav, Iu. Kobyletsky. The letter also reported the anti-semitic utterances of these and several other writers. Kaganovich read the letter on 1 September, making numerous notes on the margins: "Who allowed this to happen?", "Where was the leadership?", "Why the party group did not react?"<sup>353</sup> By mid-September, the authorities resumed the purging of Ukrainian literature, although not necessarily along the lines suggested by the two critics. (The theme of anti-semitism, for instance, never surfaced in public pronouncements.)

From 15 to 20 September, the republican Writers' Union held an extended session to uncover nationalist vices among its members. Some of "discoveries" went back to wartime period; others repeated the accusations of 1946. The head of the Union, Korniiichuk, gave in his speech a detailed account of the 1944 Politburo meeting where Stalin and Molotov condemned Dovzhenko's novel *Ukraine in Flames*. He also referred to Rylsky's 1943 speech on Kiev and Panch's novel *The Zaporozhians*, as well as to the new "nationalistic" works: Rylsky's versed memoirs "A Travel to My Youth," Iurii Ianovsky's novel *Living Water*, and Ivan Senchenko's novel *His Generation*. Rylsky and

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<sup>352</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 3 July 1947, pp. 2-4, here 3; 10 July 1947, pp. 1-2; L. A. Shevchenko, "Kulturno-ideolohichni protsesy v Ukraini u 40-50-kh rr.," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 718 (1992): 39-48, here 41. The first major postwar Ukrainian historical novel, *The Zaporozhians*, was an epic narrative set in seventeenth-century Ukraine. The work soon came under critical fire for "idealizing" the Cossacks. Panch allegedly did not sufficiently stress the tension between the rich and poor Cossacks; instead, he portrayed the wealthy Cossack Veryha positively and made one of the characters, the noble Buzhinsky, utter the incriminating words: "Cossacks have always fought for Ukraine, for our faith, for freedom!" See *Literaturna hazeta*, 17 April 1947, p. 2; Syrotiuk, *Ukrainska istorychna proza za 40 rokiv*, 257. Compare the original publication: Petro Panch, *Zaporozhysi* (Kiev: Radianskyi pysmennyk, 1946); Ostap Buzhinsky's phrase is on p. 23.

<sup>353</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 4515, ark. 3-12. Adelheim and Stebun were Jewish and both would later suffer during the campaign against "rootless cosmopolitans" (Shapoval, *Ukraina 20-50-kh rokiv*, 269-70).

Panch publicly acknowledged their sins. Mykola Bazhan, a poet who had once composed the patriotic "Danylo of Halych," gave a fierce, lengthy speech against nationalism in history, denouncing Hrushevsky, the "fascist" Krypiakevych, Petrovsky, and Rylsky. As soon as Bazhan finished a particularly angry tirade against Rylsky, the latter himself shouted: "Right!"<sup>354</sup>

The two newly denounced novels, Iurii Ianovsky's *Living Water* and Ivan Senchenko's *His Generation*, wrongly interpreted contemporary topics. Apparently, the much-scrutinized historical genre provided almost no suitable material for critique, for Fedir Burlaka's small novel *Ostap Veresai* was the only new historical work that the participants at the meeting condemned. (Its hero, the nineteenth-century peasant blind bard, performed before contemporary "bourgeois-nationalist" intellectuals and even tsar Alexander II.) Still, Bazhan demanded that the authorities "pay close attention to historical works of Soviet Ukrainian writers because we know and I have said already that the nationalist embryos felt too cosy in the womb of Ukrainian history." Petro Panch took the floor to repent his errors and promise a "party novel about Bohdan Khmelnytsky's time." The writer quoted two letters of support received from his readers after the press had dismissed *The Zaporozhians*. One reader from Lviv regretted that the witchhunt would prevent Panch from writing interesting works. Another, a 22-year-old disabled veteran, advised the writer not to bow before the ideological pressure: "The novels they would like you to write would be of low artistic quality and will find sympathetic readers only in a certain historic period and exclusively among a small group of people." Up to this point, Panch seemed to be defending himself with the evidence of his readers' support, yet the embattled writer suddenly shouted: "Together with my critics, I will slap these 'sympathizers' in the face."<sup>355</sup>

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<sup>354</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 4512, ark. 1-47 (Korniichuk), 48-54 (Rylsky), 171-83 (Bazhan, particularly ark. 177-79 on Rylsky), 260-68 (Panch). The original minutes with a slightly different pagination are in TsDAMLM, f. 590, op. 1, spr. 39 and 40. The newspaper of the Writers' Union published Korniichuk's speech and excerpts from the debates: *Literaturna hazeta*, 25 September 1947, pp. 1-2; 2 October 1947, p. 1.

<sup>355</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 4512, ark. 181 (Bazhan), 260-68 (Panch, the quotations are from ark. 267 and 268).

On 19 September, Kaganovich, Khrushchev, and Lytvyn invited a group of 105 leading writers to the Central Committee headquarters. There, Korniiichuk reiterated the accusations against Rylsky, Panch, Ianovsky, and others, while the accused apologized for their mistakes and their colleagues pledged loyalty to the party cause. Most speakers strongly condemned the historical genre for its harmful nostalgia for the past. However, the well-known novelist Natan Rybak, who had just completed the first part of an ideologically correct historical novel about Ukraine's incorporation into Russia, decided to test the waters. Phrasing his defense of the historical genre to resonate with the official anti-nationalist rhetoric, he remarked: "I do not know who could have a stake in the disappearance of historical novels....We Soviet writers should not leave [for the emigre nationalists] a topic of such importance as our people's history." Rybak also mentioned that he had discussed the idea for his latest novel with Khrushchev as early as 1940, and that the party leader had given him some helpful advice. Kaganovich and Khrushchev, however, made no comments in response, leaving the writer in uncertainty.<sup>356</sup>

Those literary figures who had previously been criticized for nationalist mistakes had little room to defend themselves when the press resumed its persecution of alleged nationalism in literature. *Radianska Ukraina* published a lengthy article by Fedir Ienevych, "On Maksym Rylsky's Nationalist Mistakes." *Literaturna hazeta* followed with a salvo of denunciatory articles on Panch, Ianovsky and others. Rylsky promptly published his confession, "On the Nationalist Mistakes in My Literary Work." As usual, the measures taken against Western Ukrainian writers exceeded the relatively mild administrative repression of their Eastern counterparts. In Lviv, the authorities expelled Petro Karmansky, Mykhailo Rudnytsky, and Andrii Patrus-Karpatsky from the Writers' Union, and even arrested Patrus-Karpatsky. (His arrest was highly unusual in the context of the 1947 ideological campaign.) The press continued to denounce writers until January 1948, a month after Kaganovich had left for Moscow.<sup>357</sup>

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<sup>356</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 4511, ark. 1-88 (Rybak's statement on ark. 41-43).

<sup>357</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 2 October 1947, pp. 2-4 (Ienevych); *Literaturna hazeta*, 11 December 1947, p. 3 (Rylsky); 13 November 1947, p. 2 and 20 November 1947, p. 4 (Rudnytsky, Karmansky, and Patrus-Karpatsky); 9 October 1947, pp. 1 and 4; 16 October 1947, p. 2; 23 October 1947, p. 1; 4 December 1947,

Meanwhile, novels about wartime heroism, industrial reconstruction, and the revival of agriculture were constituting the bulk of Ukrainian literary production. In 1947, the young writer Oles Honchar received the Stalin Prize, Second Class, for part one of his war trilogy, *The Standard-Bearers*. In the following year, the same award went to him for the second part of the work, while Ivan Riabokliach received the Stalin Prize, Third Class, for a short novel about the postwar collective farms, *A Golden Thousand*.<sup>358</sup> Nevertheless, Rybak's bulky novel *The Pereiaslav Council* was published first in a literary journal and then, in late 1948, separately, in due time bringing the writer the Stalin Prize, Second Class.<sup>359</sup>

Whatever the first secretary's intentions might have been, the drive for ideological purification under Kaganovich did not develop into a blanket cleansing of Ukrainian scholarly and cultural life. The republican bureaucrats and intellectuals alike did not want a self-destructive ideological battle, and Moscow did not request one. In mid-December 1947, Khrushchev resumed his duties as first secretary, and Kaganovich returned to Moscow as deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers.<sup>360</sup> The ideological campaign against "nationalist errors" in Ukrainian historiography and literature died out after Kaganovich's return to Moscow, although the ideological resolutions of 1947 were never formally revoked. Like Kaganovich, Khrushchev in his official speeches kept warning of the danger of nationalism. Nevertheless, as the next chapter will show, he emphasized that

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p. 3; 8 January 1948, p. 4; 15 January 1948, p. 3. For a more detailed account of the attack on Rudnytsky and Karmansky, see Rublov and Cherchenko, *Stalinshchyna*, 228-29 and *Kulturne zhyttia v Ukraini: Zakhidni zemli*, 1: 482-506. The arrest of Patrus-Karpatsky in October 1947 was probably connected with his wartime past, rather than his postwar activities as poet and editor. During the war, Patrus-Karpatsky remained in Transcarpathia under the German and Hungarian occupation, possibly as Soviet secret agent. Later, he made his way to Moscow and served in the Czechoslovak (pro-Soviet) army as aide-de-camp of the future Czechoslovak president, General Ludvík Svoboda. See O. Musienko, "Andrii Patrus-Karpatsky," in *Z poroha smerti*, 345-47 and *Kulturne zhyttia v Ukraini: Zakhidni zemli*, 1: 484-96.

<sup>358</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 8 April 1948, p. 1; 14 April 1949, pp. 1-2. For a comprehensive survey of contemporary subjects' proliferation in postwar Ukrainian literature, see Ievhen Kyrlyuk, ed., *Istoriia ukrainskoi literatury u vosmy tomakh* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1971), vol. 8.

<sup>359</sup> Natan Rybak, *Pereiaslavska rada* (Kiev: Radianskyi pysmennyk, 1948); *Literaturna hazeta*, 6 December 1948, p. 3 (shown on the list of new books); 9 March 1950, p. 1 (Stalin Prize).

<sup>360</sup> The offices of the Central Committee's first secretary and premier remained separated. Khrushchev's client Demian Korotchenko became Ukraine's new chairman of the Council of Ministers.

the party had corrected the intellectuals' past errors, and collaboration became the slogan of the day.

As happened elsewhere in the Soviet Union, seizures of the *Zhdanovshchina* recurred in Ukraine long after Zhdanov's death in August 1948. However, local intellectuals soon learned how to appropriate Moscow's ideological pronouncements to defend and promote their own agendas. For instance, they used the crusade against the "rootless cosmopolitans" to dismiss those (usually Jewish) literary scholars who had participated in the earlier attack on Ukrainian patriotism and pre-revolutionary classics. The secretary of the Ukrainian Writers' Union, Liubomyr Dmyterko, publicly denounced the "cosmopolitan" critic Oleksandr Borshchahivsky, who had allegedly "slandered *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* and other plays by O. Korniiichuk." Iukhym Martych (Finkelshtein) was accused of "stigmatizing Kocherha's *Iaroslav the Wise* as 'cloying'."<sup>361</sup> *Bilshovyk Ukrainy* denounced "a group of anti-patriotic theater and literary critics" that included "Borshchahivsky, Gozenpud, Stebun (Katsnelson), Adelheim, Starynkevych, Shamrai, Sanov (Smulson), and others" for maligning the Ukrainian classical heritage—"our pride, our national treasure (*sviatynia*)."<sup>362</sup>

### **The Campaign's "Nationalistic" Echoes**

No archival source contains a special survey of the ordinary citizens' reaction to the 1947 campaign against "nationalism." When average Kievans dared to communicate with the authorities anonymously by writing on the ballots during the elections to the Soviet Union's Supreme Soviet in December 1947 (and thus, conveniently for the electoral commissions, making the ballots invalid), they were usually concerned with pressing matters of everyday survival: bribery, speculation, low living standards, the alleged predominance of Jews, or, in the sphere of politics, one-party single-candidate

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<sup>361</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 5 March 1949, p. 2. Also compare *Radianske mystetstvo*, 16 February 1949, p. 4 and *Literaturna hazeta*, 24 February 1949, p. 1.

<sup>362</sup> Iu. Kostiuk, "Vysoka patriotychna rol radianskoho mystetstva," *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, no. 3 (1949): 40-51, here 40-41, 43.



elections.<sup>363</sup> However, as we have seen, the teachers, scholars, and even professional ideologues sometimes displayed attitudes that differed—from only slightly to very substantially—from the "party line" as formulated by the Politburo.<sup>364</sup>

When the wave of the "anti-nationalist" articles appeared in the press in the autumn of 1947, the official *Radianska Ukraina* started receiving readers' anonymous letters of protest. After the August-September series of articles explaining the resolution about the Institute of History, the paper received several letters specifically on this topic. By early October, *Radianska Ukraina* found it desirable to reply to its anonymous opponents with a spiteful article by L. Levchenko, "Into the Dustbin of History!" The piece defended the official view on the "nationalist traitors" Mazepa, Hrushevsky, Petliura, Dontsov, and Konovalts, who, according to the anonymous letters, actually "brought the Ukrainians [as a modern nation] to life."<sup>365</sup> Soon the newspaper received an unsigned letter from the Eastern Ukrainian industrial town of Dniprodzerzhynsk, arguing against Levchenko's article:

Good man, you have the right to write [this] in the newspaper, but no matter how much you swear that "Hrushevsky always held the Ukrainian people in contempt," who will believe you? Whoever raised a voice for our extremely oppressed people, you call this person a traitor and you would probably call me a traitor as well,

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<sup>363</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 4956, ark. 1-5.

<sup>364</sup> Occasionally the contemporary secret reports on the intellectuals' opinions are available providing a window into the real world in which the producers of discourse on the past lived. Thus, in July 1947, the historian Krypiakievych confided his frustration in the person whom he considered his friend: "[I am] very frightened and am constantly thinking that [I will be] exiled....I do not know what else can I do to stop accusations against me. I am working on the history of Ukraine in the required spirit, I moved to Kiev." The Western Ukrainian poet Petro Karmansky was saying goodbye to the friends and only regretted leaving his translation of Dante uncompleted. In contrast, the Lviv historian of literature Mykhailo Vozniak was saying steadfastly: "Whatever they do to me, I will not go public to humiliate myself." See TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 4559, ark. 1-3. For a similar report of April 1948, see *ibid.*, spr. 5073, ark. 23-24.

<sup>365</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 8 October 1947, pp. 2-3. Unfortunately, the first series of anonymous letters is missing from the folder in the archives of the Central Committee, being apparently forwarded to the Ministry of State Security. As more anonymous letters followed, the editor started making copies for his party superiors as well. Ivan Mazepa: the Cossack hetman who, in the early eighteenth century, concluded a union against tsar Peter I with the Swedish king Charles XII. Symon Petliura: one of the leaders of the Ukrainian revolution of 1917-20. Dmytro Dontsov: the leading theoretician of Ukrainian nationalism in the early twentieth century. Ievhen Konovalts: prewar head of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.

although I am not one of the nobility....And who are those "people" in whose name you speak and who "condemn" Mazepa, Hrushevsky and other glorious but unfortunate sons of Ukraine?<sup>366</sup>

Not a good writer and probably not a member of the nationalist underground, the author was likely an isolated home-grown Ukrainian patriot, one of the many who would be mobilized by the dissident movement a generation later. Another anonymous tract, signed "The Lviv Group of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine," displayed a more consistent nationalistic approach. The authors explained that the history of Ukraine as a state and as a nation could not be produced by the official historians because they wrote "from the colonizers' point of view." Moreover, such a history was not really necessary, as "the truly national history of Ukraine has long been created and written down in the way it should be by a prominent representative of Ukrainian scholarship, Citizen Hrushevsky." In general, history writing "should benefit the future development of the truly free and independent Ukrainian state, which should emerge in the near future with help from Western democracies."<sup>367</sup>

On 2 October, *Radianska Ukraina* also ran a lengthy article by Fedir Ienevych, "On Maksym Rylsky's Nationalist Mistakes." The newspaper soon received two very different anonymous responses from Western Ukraine, one non-conformist patriotic and another outright nationalistic. "Ten students from Lviv" wrote to the editor to let Ienevych know that "he is akin to that dog who killed Pushkin, not knowing at whom he was shooting. If Rylsky is a nationalist, then the non-nationalist is a person who has completely broken with his people."<sup>368</sup> Another "youth circle from the Western oblasts of Ukraine" took a rather bleak view of the poet: "Rylsky sold his soul and was made 'Stalin's laureate' for his black scribble." Moreover, Rylsky publicly renounced his

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<sup>366</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 4957, ark. 3. Incidentally, Dniprodzerzhynsk was known to be a heavily Russified industrial settlement with little if any Ukrainian cultural life. Leonid Brezhnev was born and started his political career there.

<sup>367</sup> Ibid., ark. 4-8.

<sup>368</sup> Ibid., ark. 2.

Ukrainianness in favor of "Soviet" identity when he coined the verse line "My fatherland is not the line of ancestors." The authors insisted that Ukrainian nationalism was born when the warriors of the Kievan Rus' raised their swords against the aggressors, that the Cossacks fought for the nation rather than for any "theory of production growth," and that Bohdan Khmelnytsky signed the treaty with Muscovy in order to break up with Poland and not to "sink in the Muscovite abyss."<sup>369</sup>

The "nationalist" response to party pronouncements on history demonstrated that the official narrative was not the only version of the past available in postwar Soviet Ukrainian society. As the writer Petro Panch testified during one of the ideological meetings, pre-revolutionary books on Ukrainian history, especially the works about hetmans Mazepa and Doroshenko, were much in demand at book bazaars. Panch particularly singled out the works by "bourgeois" historians Mykola Kostomarov, Hrytsko Kovalenko, and Mykola Arkas, as well as Adrian Kashchenko's historical novels: "[People] pay ten times more for these books than for our Soviet histories."<sup>370</sup>

The Soviet authorities were also concerned about the activities of the contemporary nationalists. Until the early 1950s, the Ukrainian nationalist underground conducted an intense propaganda battle against the "Muscovite occupants." Although scholars have focused primarily on the military and ideological resistance in Western oblasts, nationalist leaflets and pocket-size pamphlets were often discovered in the East. For instance, on the morning of the December 1947 elections in Kiev, a nationalist leaflet was found on the wall of St. Volodymyr cathedral in the center of the city.<sup>371</sup> In July 1948, the Ukrainian Second Secretary Leonid Melnikov received an alarmed report from a local party boss in Dnipropetrovsk oblast, whose name was Leonid Brezhnev. Brezhnev reported that a railway car carrying wooden construction materials had arrived at the Eastern Ukrainian Dnipropetrovsk oblast from Western Ukraine and appeared to contain an additional cargo of nationalist literature. A disturbed Brezhnev assured his republican

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<sup>369</sup> Ibid., ark. 10-21.

<sup>370</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 387, ark. 18. Both Doroshenko and Mazepa fought against Muscovy and were considered "traitors" in Russian historiography.

<sup>371</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 4956, ark. 6-7.

superiors that his ideological staff had "intensified the [propaganda] work among the workers and the peasants of the oblast."<sup>372</sup>

As is easily seen from the examples Brezhnev had attached to his report and from other nationalist publications, the topics of the nation's heroic past, Ukrainian statehood tradition, and tsarist and Bolshevik oppression occupied a strategic place in nationalist propaganda. Moreover, the nationalist writers seemed to have closely monitored the developments in official historical scholarship, often offering their alternative reading of the recent party pronouncements on history and culture. Thus, the October 1946 typewritten pamphlet of the Ternopil branch of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) attacked the notion of the elder brother, the great Russian people, in the process revealing a thorough knowledge of both the local Soviet press and the articles in the party's central theoretical journal, *Bolshevik*. According to the pamphlet's analysis, after the war,

[T]he Bolsheviks definitely returned to the ways of the old Russian tsarist imperialism. They did so because the idea of the prewar Bolshevik imperialism that was based on the so-called international proletarian revolution had exhausted itself. The Bolsheviks failed to establish [the rule of the proletariat] even in the USSR, not to mention the world. The peoples of the USSR did not merge into the "Soviet people" that was to become a prototype of a nationless society, whereas the peoples of the world preferred to create and defend their nation-states.<sup>373</sup>

During World War II, the author continued, the fighting was not along class lines, but along national lines, as the Bolsheviks themselves recognized by spreading the cult of Russian tsars and tsarist generals during the war. The pamphlet compared the postwar Soviet nationality policy to the colonization efforts of the *ancien régime* in France and the Turkey of the Sultans. The author appeared to have followed closely the 1946 campaign against the "Hrushevsky school," referring to the attacks on the *Survey of the History of Ukrainian Literature* and to Petrovsky's newspaper article against Hrushevsky.

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<sup>372</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 5072, ark. 13.

<sup>373</sup> *Ibid.*, ark. 24-25.

The party ideological decrees of 1946 imposed on Ukrainian culture a "programmatic idea," but, according to the nationalist propagandist, the Mongols, Pechenegs, Cumans, Turks, Tatars, Lithuanians, and Poles all had come to Ukraine over the centuries with the same "programmatic idea"—to destroy the Ukrainian nation—and failed. Even today, the traditions of the Ukrainian Cossack republic and the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 lived on in the armed struggle of the nationalists.<sup>374</sup> Another OUN communique, released in the spring of 1947, commemorated the battle of Hurby, a village in the Kremianets region where nationalist forces faced Soviet security detachments in April 1944. The pamphlet compared Hurby to the Cossack battles with the Poles at Korsun, Zhovti Vody, Pyliavtsi, Zbarazh, and Berestechko; to the Cossack action against Russia at Konotip in 1659 and Poltava in 1709; and to the twentieth-century armed encounter with the Soviet troops at Kruty (1918).<sup>375</sup> Yet another appeal to Ukrainian youth called "young scions of the Cossack tribe" to commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of the Ukrainian people's war against the Bolsheviks (a reference to the first Soviet invasion of Ukraine in 1918). Issued by the OUN Directorate for Eastern Ukrainian Lands, this leaflet mentioned the freedom-loving traditions of Shevchenko and the fighters at Kruty.<sup>376</sup>

In 1947, OUN issued a leaflet commenting on the new composition of the republic's Supreme Soviet. The author(s) noted the absence of many criticized writers, most notably of Rylsky, Panch, and Volodymyr Sosiura: "Among the historians, Petrovsky is not on the list of the deputies. Once the Bolsheviks had glorified him, but now he has fallen into disgrace for his *History of Ukraine*."<sup>377</sup> In the same year, a person using the pen name "Ievhen Blakytyn" sent to the republican Committee for the Arts the typescript "Is the Ukrainian Nation Capable of Further Existence and Active Making of Its History? A Reference for Those Studying the History of Ukraine." The text denounced the official historians for their conformism. The author stressed that Ukrainians were not just

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<sup>374</sup> Ibid., 26-28, 42.

<sup>375</sup> Ibid., ark. 46-48.

<sup>376</sup> Ibid., ark. 46-48, 14.

<sup>377</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 4958, ark. 22.

"Moscow's eternal appendage" and that his nation had always been and still was capable of independent existence.<sup>378</sup>

The republican authorities treated the nationalist "counter-discourse" on history with the utmost seriousness. Copies of all captured leaflets and anonymous letters were sent to the same senior ideologues who supervised the work of the Institute of History and who had demanded that the official historians rebuff the nationalistic interpretations. The nationalist and non-conformist response helps to contextualize the party line on Ukrainian history by showing that the hegemonic discourse on the past was indeed locked in a dialogue with a suppressed counter-discourse. The alternative interpretation of the Ukrainian past existed in the shadow of the official version, which was itself shaped by a complicated interaction between the ideologues and intellectuals.

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Although the authorities' ideological *diktat* has seemed to many to be the most spectacular feature of culture and scholarly life under Stalinism, a close examination of the 1947 assault on "nationalist deviations" in Ukraine has demonstrated the limits of the state's ideological control. It appears that the republican leadership initiated the campaign without Moscow's support, that at least some local functionaries were reluctant to sponsor a major ideological purge, and that the Ukrainian intellectuals could skilfully "speak Bolshevik" in their defense. While the writers were less successful in vindicating the national narrative, the historians generally succeeded in limiting the scope of denunciations and undermining the authority of their immediate ideological supervisors. The functionaries yielded to the historians' opposition and began downgrading the campaign, which stopped altogether after the changes in Ukrainian leadership.

More importantly, although the ideological campaigns of 1946-47 ostensibly prescribed the return to class history, Russian ethnic patriotism persisted as the dominant ideology, forcing the Ukrainian ideologues and intellectuals to adopt a similar ethnic approach to their past. Rather than promoting proletarian internationalism as such, the

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<sup>378</sup> Ibid., ark. 27-31.

republic's elites began subordinating the Ukrainian patriotic motifs to the dominant Russian ones in the new foundational myth of the friendship of peoples. At the same time, the postwar ideological campaigns in Ukraine emphasized that the production of the official discourse did not lend itself to total regimentation. The republic-level ideologues adjusted the general guidelines to local realities, intellectuals consistently deviated from the party line, and audiences occasionally either declined to consume the final product or "read" it differently. Both real and imaginary nationalist interpretations surfaced regularly, thus underscoring the ultimate impossibility of total ideological control.

## Chapter Five

### WRITING A "STALINIST HISTORY OF UKRAINE"

On 18 July 1946, former Ukrainian People's Commissar of Education Oleksandr Shumsky attempted to kill himself. The famous "national communist" leader of the 1920s tried to cut his veins in Saratov, on his way home from Siberian exile. The doctors saved Shumsky's life, and the local NKVD seized his papers, which included a letter to Stalin, protesting against the "new course of nationality policy, the course of Russian great power policy."<sup>379</sup> Shumsky felt obliged to put his objections on paper after listening to the radio broadcast of Khrushchev's speech, in which Stalin's viceroy in the republic, in the name of the Ukrainian people, humbly thanked the Russian "elder brother" for guidance. Shumsky was thinking in the clear-cut categories of the 1920s when proletarian internationalism was opposed to both non-Russian nationalism and Russian chauvinism, and when factional struggles within the party were not yet completely eradicated. He wrote:

The glorification of the Russian great-power heroes and Ukraine's oppressors, from Peter [I] to Brusilov, that began towards the end of the war and continues now, cannot help causing a reaction in Ukraine. [The reaction] may take the form of exalting the heroes of Ukrainian independence, from Mazepa to Petliura, and, in its turn, cannot help causing "deviations" within the CP(b)U. The wave of nationalism will sweep over some [party members], while others will mask themselves as internationalists but act according to the principle "Beat Ukrainians and save Great Russia."<sup>380</sup>

Having recovered in the hospital, Shumsky boarded the train to Kiev but died before reaching the Ukrainian capital. In 1992, the former head of the NKVD diversions department, General Pavel Sudoplatov, revealed that Shumsky was murdered by his

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<sup>379</sup> GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 138, ll. 256-7, 258.

<sup>380</sup> Ibid., l. 258.



organization, allegedly on direct orders from the Kremlin.<sup>381</sup>

Even if his outspokenness warranted such retribution, Shumsky was naive to expect that the official rehabilitation of the Russian grand historical narrative would cause a direct clash between "nationalists" and "Russifiers" in Ukraine. During the 1940s, the official pronouncements could no longer be openly challenged under High Stalinism, as they could be during the 1920s. Although no complete intellectual uniformity ensued, intellectuals could debate only various interpretations of a single doctrine. In addition, in order to fight their peers or subtly negotiate with the authorities, the participants needed to express their interests in language resonating with the hegemonic discourse.

### **The Eldest Younger Brother**

Postwar Ukrainian historians operated within the "friendship of peoples" paradigm modified by the doctrine of Russian leadership. Russian chauvinism and messianism had been increasing in the official discourse during the war, and they mushroomed after Stalin's famous nationalistic toast on 24 May 1945. At the Kremlin reception for victorious Soviet military commanders, the generalissimo announced:

I would like to propose a toast to our Soviet people, and, first of all, to the health of the Russian people. (Loud, continuous applause, shouts of "hurrah.")

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<sup>381</sup> Unless the contemporary secret documents are found, checking the credibility of Sudoplatov's story is impossible. One should note, however, that his statement varied on the question of who exactly had ordered the assassination of Shumsky. In his letter to the XXIIIrd party congress (1966), Sudoplatov claimed that he had received this order from the Minister of State Security, V. Abakumov, who referred to instructions from Stalin and Kaganovich. This version was reported in *Moscow News*, no. 31 (9-16 August 1992), p. 9, and adopted by the Ukrainian historian Iurii Shapoval in his *Liudyna i systema*, 151-2, and "Oleksandr Shumsky: His Last Thirteen Years," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 18, nos. 1-2 (Summer-Winter 1993): 69-84, here 83-84. In his later memoirs, though, Sudoplatov maintains that he was invited to the Central Committee offices, where Abakumov and he met with Khrushchev and another Central Committee secretary, A. Kuznetsov. The latter allegedly informed Abakumov and Sudoplatov that "the Central Committee had agreed to the suggestion of Comrade Khrushchev to secretly liquidate the leader of the Ukrainian nationalists, A. Shumsky, who was reported by the Ukrainian security service to have established contacts with Ukrainian émigrés." However, later in the same book, Sudoplatov mentions in passing: "I was also involved, under orders by Khrushchev and Kaganovich, in the operation to eliminate the Ukrainian nationalist A. Shumsky" (Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatoli Sudoplatov, with Jerrold L. and Leona P. Schecter, *Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness—a Soviet Spymaster* [Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1994], pp. 249 and 281).

I drink first of all to the health of the Russian people because they are the leading nation of all the nations of the Soviet Union.

I propose a toast to the health of the Russian people because in this war, they earned general recognition as the Soviet Union's guiding force among all the peoples of our country.

I propose a toast to the health of the Russian people not just because they are the leading people, but also because they have a clear mind, a firm character, and patience.<sup>382</sup>

Stalin's Kremlin toast, which the Ukrainian artist Mykhailo Khmelko portrayed in his monumental painting *To the Great Russian People!* (1947; 3m x 5,15m; Stalin Prize, Second Class, for 1947), inaugurated the unlimited celebration of Russian national greatness. Soviet media waxed rhapsodic about the Russians having always been the greatest, wisest, bravest, and most virtuous of all nationalities.<sup>383</sup>

In history, the notion of Russian superiority led to the reevaluation of the ancient Slavs, who could no longer be called in any respect inferior to their neighbours. The Norman theory had been finally rejected during the war, and proving the native origins of the Kievan Rus' became a matter of national pride. Stalinist ideologues, historians, and writers presented tsarist Russia's foreign and domestic policies in a positive light as contributing to the growth of the mighty state. As far as the much reinterpreted "friendship of peoples" paradigm was concerned, Moscow now wanted to ensure that the narratives of the non-Russian past were safely subordinated to the obligatory topos of "Russian guidance."<sup>384</sup>

Developments in Ukraine reflected the general Soviet ideological transfiguration. The Ukrainian Communist Party's newspaper, *Radianska Ukraina*, greeted Stalin's toast with a servile editorial, "Eternal Glory to You, the Great Russian People!" In the

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<sup>382</sup> *Pravda*, 25 May 1945, p. 1; I. V. Stalin, "Vystuplenie I. V. Stalina na prieme v Kremle v chest komanduiushchikh voiskami Krasnoi armii 24 maia 1945 goda," in his *O Velikoi Otchestvennoi voine Sovetskogo Soiuza* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1947), p. 197.

<sup>383</sup> On the growth of the Russian leadership doctrine, see Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Soviet Russian Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 26-66. Khmelko's canvas was first presented at the Ninth Exhibition of Ukrainian Art in Kiev in November 1947. See *Radianske mystetstvo*, 12 November 1947, p. 3 (exhibition); *Literaturna hazeta*, 22 April 1948, p. 1 (Stalin Prize).

<sup>384</sup> See Tillett, *The Great Friendship*, 83-92.

following years, similar articles appeared regularly in the republican press.<sup>385</sup> The Ukrainian state publishers duly translated and released two editions of the new canonic survey of Russian historical achievements, Anna Pankratova's *The Great Russian People*.<sup>386</sup> Generally, the obligatory paeans to Russian glory occupied a prominent place in Ukrainian public discourse of the first postwar decade, and in the works of Ukrainian historians.

At the same time, however, the ideological processes peculiar to the republic shaped the narratives of the Ukrainian past more directly and much more significantly. Several pronouncements and celebrations deserve particular mention. In January 1948, the republic commemorated the thirtieth anniversary of Soviet Ukraine, that is, of the proclamation of Soviet power at the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in January 1918. On this occasion, Stalin's deputy Viacheslav Molotov arrived in Kiev and announced at the jubilee session of the republic's Supreme Soviet that the great Russian people had led humanity to the communist revolution. He then added: "The Ukrainian people were the first to follow the Russian people on this path."<sup>387</sup> This compliment did not seduce the Ukrainian ideologues into calling their people "great"; in his reply speech, Khrushchev applied this term to the Russians, but not to the Ukrainians. However, the republican functionaries and intellectuals frequently evoked their people's official status as "second among equals" with a reference to Molotov. Later in 1948, the head of the Ukrainian Administration of Propaganda and Agitation, Pavlo Hapochka, lectured a meeting of republican propagandists and the intelligentsia: "How well are we developing the notion, articulated by Comrade Molotov, that the Ukrainian people were first among the world's nations to follow the Russian people in the struggle for communism?"<sup>388</sup> Ukrainian

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<sup>385</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 26 May 1945, p. 1. See also *Radianska Ukraina*, 16 September 1945, pp. 2 and 4 and *Radianske mystetstvo*, 28 May 1947, p. 2.

<sup>386</sup> A. Pankratova, *Velykyi rosiiskyi narod* (Kiev: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo politychnoi literatury, 1949, 2nd ed., 1952). Ironically, the book was written by the same Russian historian who in 1943-44, had defended the *History of the Kazakh SSR* and "class history" in general. The Ukrainian publisher did not even dare to deliver Pankratova's name in standard Ukrainian ("Hanna").

<sup>387</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 25 January 1948, p. 1. Khrushchev's speech is on p. 3.

<sup>388</sup> TsDAHO. f. 1, op. 70, spr. 1173, ark. 71.

historians eventually reinterpreted this official thesis to the effect that their people were second to Russians not only in the revolution, but in all other historical achievements as well.

Mid-1948 saw a rather low-profile celebration of the 300th anniversary of the beginning of the Khmelnytsky Uprising. Fresh from the Kaganovich-led crusade against "nationalist deviations" in history, the republican authorities limited the commemoration to newspaper articles, lectures, and a special conference at the Institute of History. The historians and experts had originally prepared a long list of prospective events, including a special manifesto to be issued by the Ukrainian party and government, and monuments to Khmelnytsky to be unveiled in several cities, but the Second Secretary of the CP(b)U Central Committee, Leonid Melnikov, radically shortened the schedule. He crossed out even the festive radio programs, adding instead a Moscow historian, Anna Pankratova, to the list of speakers at the Institute's conference. She was to speak on "The Importance of Ukraine's Incorporation into Russia for the History of the Russian and Ukrainian Peoples."<sup>389</sup> For some reason, however, Pankratova did not come to Kiev, and the local historians celebrated on their own, stressing the jubilee's relevance for the "friendship of peoples," since the uprising had "ended with Ukraine's voluntary incorporation into Russia."<sup>390</sup>

Although the ideological campaign against "nationalist errors" in Ukrainian historiography died out after Kaganovich returned to Moscow in December 1947, this did not mean that his pronouncements were rescinded. The Sixteenth Congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine (January 1949) praised the party's successes in fighting the "symptoms of nationalism" in the humanities. In his report to the congress, Khrushchev stressed:

The CP(b)U Central Committee was paying special attention to the struggle with manifestations of bourgeois nationalism, the most harmful and most tenacious

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<sup>389</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 1635, ark. 1-20 (Pankratova's topic on ark. 2).

<sup>390</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 3 June 1948, p. 4 (conference). See also an article on the Khmelnytsky Uprising in *Radianske mystetstvo*, 2 June 1948, p. 2.

capitalist remnant in the consciousness of some of our people. It is known that the nationalist errors and distortions appeared in the works of some Ukrainian scholars, particularly historians and literary scholars. The VKP(b) and CP(b)U Central Committees uncovered and strongly denounced these mistakes. Measures have been taken to strengthen the Institute of History of Ukraine and the Institute of History of Ukrainian Literature of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences. Now the researchers at the Institute of History of Ukraine are working diligently to produce *The Short Course of the History of Ukraine*. The Institute of Ukrainian Literature of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences is preparing the *Survey of the History of Ukrainian Literature*.<sup>391</sup>

Thus, the official denunciations and decrees of 1947 formally remained in force. Khrushchev continued to use the same anti-nationalist rhetoric as Kaganovich. However, the republican leadership clearly took a new course in emphasizing that the past problems had been eliminated and that the intellectuals were now engaged in useful, error-free work.

The fall of 1949 brought another ideologically sensitive celebration in the republic, which ten years previously had acquired Western Ukrainian lands from the divided Poland. The 1949 festivities were grandiose, albeit cast in a light much different from those of the 1939 celebration of the age-old Ukrainian desire for reunification and struggle against the Polish lords. On the one hand, the anti-Polish animus had disappeared completely. On the other, the republican media toned down the interpretation of the reunification as the crowning event of Ukrainian history, stressing instead what the Central Committee's internal memo defined as the decisive "help of the great Russian people."<sup>392</sup> Thirteen leading Ukrainian poets composed the lengthy verse address to Stalin, detailing all the historic incidents of Russian beneficial influence and guidance and thanking the elder brother and Stalin personally for uniting the Ukrainian lands. The collective poem completed its historic survey with the following lines:

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<sup>391</sup> *XVI zizd Komunistychnoi Partii (bilshovykiv) Ukrainy 25-28 sichnia 1949 r.: Materialy zizdu* (Kiev: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo politychnoi literatury URSR, 1949), p. 46. Note that Khrushchev misnamed the Institute of Ukrainian Literature when he first mentioned it. The editors apparently missed the discrepancy.

<sup>392</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1820, ark. 9.

You [Stalin] united the Ukrainian lands  
In one family and in a single state.  
You became Ukraine's dear father  
For its happiness, joy, and glory!

The Russian people helped as a true brother  
To realize what our people have dreamt of:  
To achieve the unity of all our lands,  
To unite Lviv and Kiev in one family.<sup>393</sup>

The Ukrainian Institute of Marx, Engels, and Lenin planned publishing a collection of articles, "Stalin and the reunification of the Ukrainian lands in a single Ukrainian Soviet state," which would have discussed this feat as having been accomplished by Ukrainians "in union with the great Russian people, under the guidance of the Bolshevik party and the genius leader and liberator of the Ukrainian people, the gatherer of Ukrainian lands, Comrade Stalin."<sup>394</sup> The editorial in the party journal *Bilshovyk Ukrainy* stressed that the republic owed its historic reunification to the great Russian people, other Soviet peoples, the party, and its leaders Lenin and Stalin. However, the journal also noted that Ukrainians were proud of being the *second* people after the Russians to enter the path to socialism. Moreover, the editorial extolled this status as the "highest national pride" of the Ukrainian people.<sup>395</sup>

The 1949 celebrations put the incorporation of Western Ukraine in a different historical context. The wartime patriotic history writing understood the reunification as the triumph of the Ukrainian nation, an outcome of its heroic history. Now this event appeared to be only one of the numerous fruits of the Russian-Ukrainian historic

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<sup>393</sup> See *Vsenarodne sviato: Materialy i dokumenty pro sviatkuvannia desiatyrichchia vozziednannia ukrainskoho narodu v iedynii ukrainskii radianskii derzhavi* (Kiev: Derzhpolitvydav URSR, 1950), pp. 141-57; *Literaturna hazeta*, 27 October 1949, p. 2.

<sup>394</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 1715, ark. 13, 16. This particular collection was never completed, but other scholarly publications made similar points. See, for example, S. M. Bilousov, *Vozziednannia ukrainskoho narodu v iedynii ukrainskii radianskii derzhavi* (Kiev: Tovarystvo dlia poshyrennia politychnykh i naukovykh znan Ukrainskoi RSR, 1949) and the positive pre-publication review of this booklet in the archives of the Ukrainian Central Committee: TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1381, ark. 15-16.

<sup>395</sup> "Velyka istorychna podiia v zhytti ukrainskoho narodu," *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, no. 9 (1949): 1-10, here 2-3, 7.

friendship and Soviet state-building, albeit with Ukrainians officially designated as the eldest of Soviet younger brothers.

Finally, in 1950, the worrisome ideological situation in the Western oblasts prompted the authorities to organize a historians' conference there.<sup>396</sup> Of course, the participants did not directly address the burning questions of nationalist insurgency, forced collectivization, and widespread anti-Soviet attitudes, but the highest leadership both in Moscow and Kiev understood the proper interpretation of the Ukrainian past as a key to securing the loyalty of the local Ukrainians. The Ukrainian Politburo adopted a special resolution regarding this conference and approved the list of reports to be delivered there.<sup>397</sup> After the conference, First Secretary Melnikov sent detailed information to Moscow, where the Central Committee secretaries Malenkov, Khrushchev, Ponomarenko, and Suslov personally examined the report.<sup>398</sup>

The conference was held in Lviv on 19-22 April 1950. The foreign minister and deputy premier Manuilsky opened the proceedings with a general political speech, "Lenin and Stalin as Founders of the Scholarly History of Soviet Society." Then two Moscow historians, M. Tikhomirov and S. Skazkin, elaborated on the history of Kievan Rus' and the progressive role of the Slavs in world history. The Ukrainian scholar Fedir Shevchenko spoke about the historic friendship of Russians and Ukrainians. Since "historical circumstances led the great Russian people to take up the primary place in the history of humankind," the union with Russia had proved to be extremely beneficial for Ukrainians. Shevchenko warned that the "lesser evil" theory could only be applied to a "certain moment in history" and not to the whole Ukrainian experience within the Russian empire, in which "the Ukrainian people saved themselves as a nation."<sup>399</sup>

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<sup>396</sup> Before that, in March 1950, the authorities dispatched to Western Ukraine a representative group of writers. In June, the Institute of Ukrainian Literature also organized a special conference in Lviv. See TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2042, ark. 1-36; *Literaturna hazeta*, 30 March 1950, p. 1 (writers); 22 June 1950, p. 1; 29 June 1950, p. 4 (Institute of Literature).

<sup>397</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 6, spr. 1375, ark. 32 and 218. This resolution of 27 February 1950 was published in *U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu*, 2: 133-4, albeit with an incorrect date of 25 February.

<sup>398</sup> RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 342, ll. 8-11.

<sup>399</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2029, ark. 38.

The director of the Institute of History of Ukraine, Oleksandr Kasymenko, reviewed in his speech the new concept of Ukrainian history that the Institute was developing for the envisaged *Short Course*. In line with the postwar Russian historiography, Ukrainian historians now sought to emphasize continuity rather than conquest in Ukraine's ancient past, looking for the links between the Trypillia settlements, the Scythian civilization, the Antes, and the Kievan period. They stressed that Kievan Rus' represented "a common period in the history of the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian peoples." Kasymenko demanded that historians "throw away the old bourgeois theories about Ukraine allegedly belonging to the Western sphere of influence" during the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries. The formation of a separate Ukrainian nationality was under way during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and the incorporation into Russia represented the "only true path" for Ukrainians. Besides the Russian-Ukrainian ties and the revolutionary struggle, the only post-1654 problem requiring further investigation appeared to have been Ukraine's transition from feudalism to capitalism. In particular, historians worked to demonstrate that Ukraine had its indigenous landlords and bourgeoisie and, thus, to undermine the "bourgeois-nationalist" theory of "eternal democratism" stressing the alien character of exploiting classes in modern Ukrainian history.<sup>400</sup>

In his conclusion, Kasymenko announced that the Institute had completed the textbook of Ukrainian history and that its manuscript has been sent to the publishers.<sup>401</sup> However, during the last day of the conference, Kasymenko and other visitors were apparently struggling to answer the local intellectuals' queries. The archives reveal that the Central Committee's experts had examined in advance the texts of 27 speeches by Western Ukrainians and banned five of them.<sup>402</sup> Nevertheless, the local teachers and propagandists pointed out the contradictions in various Soviet textbooks, especially

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<sup>400</sup> Ibid., ark. 61-83. Since most landlords in Ukraine were Polish and Russian, and most entrepreneurs Jewish and Russian, some nineteenth-century populist historians argued that the overwhelmingly peasant majority of Ukrainians reflected the nation's "democratic spirit."

<sup>401</sup> Ibid., ark. 87. Kasymenko envisaged that the book would appear in June 1950.

<sup>402</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1856, ark. 1-2; *U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu*, 2: 146-7.



concerning the origins of Rus', noting the absence of serious studies on the development of the working class in Ukraine, the ethnogenesis of ancient Slavs, Russian-Ukrainian relations immediately before and after 1654, and especially the history of Western Ukraine.<sup>403</sup> In the end, Secretary for Propaganda Nazarenko concluded, "In the light of the comments made during this session, we need to go through the manuscript of that textbook in a responsible manner before sending it to the publisher."<sup>404</sup>

This conference was not the first time, nor the last, when the republican ideologues "postponed" the publication of the long-awaited Ukrainian history textbook. Questions from confused (or tacitly non-conformist) audiences served as one of the warnings in the complicated system of interfering signals "from above" and "from below" that influenced the politics of history under Stalinism.

### **The Quest for New Synthesis**

The efforts to prepare a new Ukrainian history text should be seen in a wider context. The extraordinary proliferation of historical-synthesis projects in the post-war Soviet Union reflected Stalinism's continuing ideological evolution. Defying the hardships of the reconstruction period, the state financed dozens of historical surveys, from a multivolume history of the USSR from ancient times to the present day to one-volume histories of the minor Soviet nationalities such as the Buriats and Ossetians. In addition, Soviet historians started working on a multivolume survey of world history and several textbooks on the history of the USSR's new East European satellites, the "countries of the people's democracy."<sup>405</sup>

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<sup>403</sup> RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 342, ll. 9-10.

<sup>404</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1856, ark. 27; *U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu*, 2: 1-43.

<sup>405</sup> In 1950, the Soviet Academy of Sciences reported to the Central Committee that seven of ten volumes of the world history survey and ten of sixteen volumes of the *History of the USSR* would be ready by 1954 (RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 339, ll. 149-59). In fact, both targets were reached only in the 1960s. By the mid-1950s, Soviet historians produced the history of the Czechs (1947), the detailed prospectus (1951) and then the text of the history of Poland (1955), the draft history of Bulgaria (1953), and prospectus of the history of Czechoslovakia (1953). They also worked on the history of Mongolia and "helped" their East German colleagues to develop the prospectus of the history of the German people (1953). See RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 133, d. 4 (Poland and Mongolia); S. Nikitin and I. Miller, review of "Istoriia Chekhii," ed. V. Picheta, *Voprosy istorii*, no. 6 (1948): 108-12 (Czechs); W. Koroliuk, I. Miller,

This official quest for new historical synthesis demonstrated the authorities' awareness of the changes occurring in postwar Europe, Eurasia, and the world. High Stalinism's new geopolitical and ideological self-identification required (re)writing history books. According to the official Soviet view, the USSR occupied a prominent place on the post-1945 international scene, not simply as the first workers' state, but as the leading world power. The great Russian people grew in stature, practically superseding the working class as a historical agent. The non-Russians needed to revise their historical narratives to eradicate the elements of wartime patriotism and confirm their subaltern status as the Russians' "younger brothers." East European history had to be entirely rewritten from the point of view of both the class struggle and the beneficial ties with tsarist Russia.

However, the postwar drive for new historical synthesis produced mixed results. Moscow denounced several Soviet works for "nationalistic" mistakes. Many other projects became locked in a lengthy review-and-discussion process aimed to ensure that they were ideologically irreproachable, but because the party line itself was mutating, and because Moscow could not issue authoritative statements on all issues and personalities in non-Russian histories, defining the ideologically sound interpretation was often left to the local historians and ideologues. For them, the publication of a survey history entailed the danger of being denounced as "nationalists," while the endless revision process ensured safety.

The story of the Kazakh survey history reinforced the non-Russian ideologues' reluctance to issue their own national histories. After the official critique of the first edition in 1943-44, Pankratova and her Kazakh colleagues promptly prepared a revised variant of the text. The second edition of the *History of the Kazakh SSR* appeared in 1949. The authors revised their interpretation of Kazakhstan's conquest by the tsarist army to that of a progressive event connecting the Kazakh people to the forward-looking Russian

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Iu. Pisarev, "Obsuzhdenie osnovnykh problem istorii Polshi," *ibid.*, no. 1 (1951): 107-16 (Poland); I. I. Kostiusenko, "Obsuzhdenie knigi po istorii Polshi," *ibid.*, no. 10 (1955): 170-74 (Poland); G. Samchuk, "O prospekte uchebnika 'Istoriia Chekhoslovakii,'" *ibid.*, no. 1 (1954): 85-86; N. Bocharov, "Maket pervogo toma 'Istorii Bolgarii,'" *ibid.*, no. 1 (1954): 186-88; "Rabota nad uchebnikom po istorii germanskogo naroda," *ibid.*, no. 4 (1954): 189-90 (East Germany).

economy and culture. The Moscow reviewers noted, however, that the anti-tsarist rebellion led by Kenesary was still considered "liberational."<sup>406</sup> The book enjoyed success for more than a year until *Pravda* denounced Ermukhan Bekmakhanov's monograph on Kazakhstan in the 1820s-40s for idealizing the "reactionary and anti-Russian" Kenesary uprising. The Kazakh party leadership condemned "nationalism" in history, and the local scholars proceeded to prepare the third edition of the first volume of Kazakh history. The new edition's prospectus held that the "progressive" or "reactionary" character of all events in Kazakh history was determined by their relation to Russia.<sup>407</sup>

Other textbooks in preparation during the late 1940s also interpreted the incorporation into tsarist Russia as a defining moment in their people's history. The prospectuses of the Moldavian and Buriat history surveys stressed the historic ties with Russia and the "progressiveness" of joining the tsarist state.<sup>408</sup> The first volume of the *History of the Armenian People* appeared in 1951, but in February 1953, Moscow discovered that the book "idealized" the local feudal rulers, did not sufficiently emphasize class struggle, and incorrectly presented the country's incorporation into Russia. The Central Committee's experts found exactly the same errors in the *History of Georgia*, which received the Stalin Prize in 1946, and in the two-volume *History of the Peoples of Uzbekistan* (1947-50). The Georgian survey allegedly presented the "struggle of the united and monolithic Georgian people against foreign aggressors, for the preservation and well-

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<sup>406</sup> M. Kim, review of *Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei*, 2nd ed., ed. I. O. Omarov and A. M. Pankratova (Alma-Ata: Akademiia nauk Kazakhskoi SSR, 1949), *Voprosy istorii*, no. 6 (1949): 130-34.

<sup>407</sup> See RTsKhIDNI, f. 17. op. 133, d. 220, ll. 154-9; G. F. Dakhshleiger, "V Institute istorii, arkhologii i étnografii Akademii nauk Kazakhskoi SSR," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 2 (1952): 146-51; Tillet, *The Great Friendship*, 148-54.

<sup>408</sup> See N. M., "Rabota sektora istorii Instituta istorii, iazyka i literatury Moldavskoi nauchno-issledovatel'skoi bazy AN SSSR," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 4 (1949): 156-58; S. Volkov, "Obsuzhdenie maketa kursa istorii Moldavii," *ibid.*, no. 4 (1950): 156-58; V. Shunkov, "O razrabotke istorii Buriat-Mongolii," *ibid.*, no. 5 (1949): 87-89.

being of the independent Georgian state."<sup>409</sup> Significantly, all these books had been authored and edited exclusively by local historians.

In contrast, the work on the survey of Moldovian history proceeded unabated under the editorship of two Moscow specialists, A. Udaltsov and L. Cherepnin. Volume One, covering Moldova's history from ancient times until 1917, appeared in 1951, earning excellent reviews.<sup>410</sup> The Belarusian historians commenced work on a two-volume survey history in 1946. The local authorities invited Pankratova to co-edit this work with two prominent local historians, N. Nikolsky and V. Pertsev, but she was dropped from the editorial board by the early 1950s. In 1949, the text underwent comprehensive discussion at the Institute of History of Ukraine in Kiev and, during the next year, in Moscow. Apparently, no "nationalist errors" were uncovered. Nevertheless, the local authorities reported the project's completion to the VKP(b) Central Committee only in June 1952. The text then underwent one more lengthy review by the party ideologues and Moscow historians, and yet another round of revisions.<sup>411</sup> In the end, the Belarusian historians did not produce a finished product until Stalin's death. The first volume of the *History of the Belarusian SSR* was published in 1954, receiving very good press.<sup>412</sup>

Twice, in 1950 and 1953, the All-Union Central Committee reviewed the production of synthetic historical works. On both occasions, the Moscow historians

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<sup>409</sup> N. Smirnov and G. Arutiunov, review of *Istoriia armianskogo naroda*, pt. 1, ed. by B. Arakelian and A. Ioannisian, *Voprosy istorii*, no. 12 (1951): 183-86; RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 133, d. 303, ll. 14-9, 135-37 (Armenia), 81-4 (Georgia), 85-7 (Uzbekistan),

<sup>410</sup> See N. V. Ustiugov and V. K. Iatsunsky, review of *Istoriia Moldavii*, vol. 1, ed. by A. D. Udaltsov and L. V. Cherepnin, *Voprosy istorii*, no. 7 (1952): 130-34; D. I. Myshko and N. M. Tkachenko, review of *Istoriia Moldavii*, vol. 1, *ibid.*: 134-38.

<sup>411</sup> See A. Kozlov, "Nauchno-issledovatel'skaia rabota Instituta istorii AN Belorusskoi SSR za 1946-1949 gody," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 8 (1950): 157-59; "Ocherednye zadachi Instituta istorii Akademii nauk SSSR," *ibid.*, no. 1 (1951): 3-11, here 3; NAIU, op. 1, spr. 202, ark. 1-22 (discussed in Kiev); RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 220, ll. 207-8, 242 (reported to Moscow, new reviews).

<sup>412</sup> See V. M. Laiko and M. E. Streltsov, "Obsuzhdenie osnovnykh voprosov istorii Belorussii," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 5 (1953): 133-36; B. Rybakov, N. Ustiugov, S. Dmitriev, and N. Kamenskaia, "Tsennyi trud po istorii Belorussii," *Kommunist*, no. 14 (1954): 114-21; A. I. Baranovich, L. M. Ivanov, and O. A. Shekun, "Tsennyi trud po istorii belorusskogo naroda," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 2 (1955): 116-21; N. N. Leshchenko and D. I. Myshko, review of *Istoriia Belorusskoi SSR*, vol. 1, ed. V. P. Pertsev, K. I. Shabunia, and L. S. Abetsedarsky, *ibid.*: 122-24.

reported their achievements in discussing and editing the non-Russian histories but kept silent about their own multivolume projects. In fact, by 1953, not a single volume of the envisaged sixteen-volume *History of the USSR* has been sent to the printers. Nevertheless, the party leadership particularly stressed the mistakes that the Moscow historians had allegedly committed in commenting on the non-Russian past. The Central Committee blamed the Institute of History for incorrectly interpreting the national movements in the Caucasus and Asia, as well as for "failing to demonstrate the progressive character of the non-Russian peoples' incorporation into Russia."<sup>413</sup> When the authoritative *Bolshevik* reviewed the college text on nineteenth-century Russian history, most criticisms concerned the book's portrayal of the national movements in the Caucasus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.<sup>414</sup> In the postwar years, the revision of non-Russian history apparently took priority over the codification of the Russian ethnic past itself.

In the Ukrainian case, no Moscow historian formally served on the editorial board, although the drafts of the history survey were repeatedly sent to Moscow for review. In April 1952, the prominent Russian historian Militsa Nechkina noted that she was reading the typescript *History of the Ukrainian SSR* for the fifth time.<sup>415</sup> During the 1947 campaign against "nationalist deviations" in history, Kaganovich personally arranged for two other leading Moscow specialists, Anna Pankratova and Isaak Mints, to comment on the book's prospectus. During the special meeting in the Institute of History in Moscow, the metropolitan luminaries voiced somewhat contradictory suggestions. Pankratova wanted to see more history of class struggle, asking the authors to "demonstrate that, in the pre-October history of Ukraine, there was indeed a force capable of leading the Ukrainian people to victory and to their national accomplishments. This force was the proletariat of Russia, the Russian people and their best part, the Russian proletariat." In contrast, Mints deemphasized class analysis in his comments. He did not like Bohdan

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<sup>413</sup> RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 339, ll. 147-59; TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 39, ll. 11-21 (the quoted sentence is on l. 17).

<sup>414</sup> L. Ivanov, "Ob uchebnike istorii SSSR," *Bolshevik*, no. 14 (1951): 70-80. The textbook under review was M. V. Nechkina, ed., *Istoriia SSSR*, vol. 2, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1949).

<sup>415</sup> NAIU, op. 1, spr. 355, ark. 16a.

Khmelnysky's class characterization as a feudal lord who suppressed peasant rebellions. Instead, the Moscow historian favored the hetman's portrayal as a statesman and patriot who built "Ukrainian statehood." Mints also wanted to see more on Russian culture's beneficial influence on Ukraine during the nineteenth century.<sup>416</sup>

In January 1948, the Ukrainian authors completed the first draft in Russian of what was then called the "Short Course of the History of Ukraine." Eighty-five reviewers provided detailed comments on this 32-chapter draft, which was then discussed at a special meeting at the Ukrainian Central Committee's Department of Propaganda and Agitation. In December 1948, the Institute of History of Ukraine published a limited edition of the revised version.<sup>417</sup> The second draft circulated widely, and, by the spring of 1949, the authors had received over one hundred reviews and discussion minutes from major research and educational centers in Ukraine and other republics. All evaluations were generally positive.<sup>418</sup> More importantly, back in December 1948, the Ukrainian Politburo established a special *troika* to review the second draft. The Politburo commission consisted of Foreign Minister Manuilsky, President Hrechukha, and Ideological Secretary Lytvyn. On 7 April 1949, the three reported to Khrushchev their conclusion: "Pending the final editing, the course can be printed in a mass edition by September 1949."<sup>419</sup>

Nevertheless, the book did not go to the printers. Apparently being mindful of Kaganovich's recent "discovery" of nationalism in history, the Ukrainian leadership sent the text for another round of extensive reviewing. On 27 December 1949, the Institute of History's director, Kasymenko, reported to the party meeting at the Academy of Sciences that the work had been finally completed. According to him, the Institute "received final

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<sup>416</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 823, ark. 1-2 (Mints), 10 (Pankratova).

<sup>417</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 714, ark. 9-10; op. 30, spr. 1832, ark. 1 (reports to the Central Committee); NAIU, op. 1, spr. 134 (the Institute's report for 1948); spr. 140 (minutes of discussion at the Department of Propaganda and Agitation).

<sup>418</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1832, ark. 1-3 (report).

<sup>419</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 985, ark. 66 (*troika*); op. 23, spr. 5664, ark. 6-7 (conclusion). Mykhailo Hrechukha served as the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

instructions to send this material to the printers for issuing as a mass edition."<sup>420</sup> But just ten days before this announcement, Khrushchev left Ukraine for Moscow, leaving Leonid Melnikov as the new first secretary. Although the *History* had been translated into Ukrainian and the proofs were printed in both languages, the new party boss appeared reluctant to take responsibility for such a potentially compromising publication. Instead, in June, the republican authorities ordered for the fourth time that the *History of the Ukrainian SSR* should be issued in a limited edition: 1,500 copies in Ukrainian and 500 in Russian. By then, the bulky survey was divided into two volumes, with the first covering pre-1917 history and the second devoted to the Soviet period. Given the book's size, the subtitle "Short Course" had been dropped.<sup>421</sup>

In June 1950, a set of the two-volume fourth limited edition arrived at the desk of the VKP(b) Central Committee secretary Mikhail Suslov. The chief Soviet ideologue decided to forward it for yet another examination by Moscow scholars, but since the Institute of the History of the USSR had already reviewed the book several times, Suslov assigned the text to the Institute of Marx, Engels, and Lenin (IMEL). Meanwhile, work in Ukraine had stalled. Moscow specialists on Marxism and party history took five months to study the survey of Ukrainian history. On 30 December 1950, they reported to Suslov that the history of Ukraine and its culture were presented in the book "in some isolation from Russia." The review demanded that the book demonstrate the influence of the Russian progressive culture in Ukraine and objected to applying the very name "Ukraine" to pre-revolutionary Ukrainian lands.<sup>422</sup>

A puzzling episode followed. Within twelve days, including the New Year holiday, the Ukrainian historians reported to Moscow that they had made all the necessary changes. Suslov received the IMEL's review on 30 December, the authors first saw it on

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<sup>420</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 1787, ark. 197; *U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu*, 2: 129.

<sup>421</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2030, ark. 172 (limited edition). The June 1949 limited edition was entitled *The History of Ukraine*, and the 1950 edition, *The History of the Ukrainian SSR*. The work on translating the text into Ukrainian began only in early 1950. See NAIU, op. 1, spr. 215, ark. 4-8.

<sup>422</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2806, ark. 72 (Suslov's decision); RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 132, spr. 503, ark. 1-4 (IMEL's review).

5 January, and on 11 January, the All-Union Central Committee functionaries Iu. Zhdanov and A. Mitin related to Suslov that the changes have been made and that Volume One would soon be published.<sup>423</sup> In all probability, the Ukrainian authors resolved to ignore the principal criticism that they had "isolated" Ukrainian history from Russian and limited the changes to replacing the word "Ukraine" with "Ukrainian lands" and the like.

This time, Volume One of the *History of the Ukrainian SSR* finally made it to press. The proofs were signed on 8 February, and the printing began in April, but the republican authorities suddenly halted it in May.<sup>424</sup> Possibly after learning about the IMEL criticisms, the Ukrainian Central Committee created a new commission of nine prominent local historians, philosophers, and literary scholars, none of whom was associated with the Institute of the History of Ukraine. The commission examined Volume One for two months and made numerous critical suggestions, which the authors promptly implemented. They produced the new version of the text by early August 1951, but the commission continued finding new faults with the book. After a meeting with the commission members, Secretary for Propaganda Nazarenko concluded that the present draft could not be published.<sup>425</sup>

Thus, at a time when the apparatus of the Central Committee in Moscow was reminding them about the need to produce the survey of Ukrainian history,<sup>426</sup> the republic's functionaries and intellectuals further postponed this project. Their decision should be put into a wider political context. On 2 July, *Pravda* unexpectedly published a long editorial, "Against Ideological Distortions in Literature," seemingly devoted to just one "distortion," Volodymyr Sosiura's short poem "Love Ukraine" (1944), which had appeared in Russian translation in Issue No. 5 (1951) of the Leningrad journal *Zvezda*. *Pravda* accused the wartime patriotic poem of glorifying "some primordial Ukraine,

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<sup>423</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2360, ark. 8; spr. 2806, ark. 72 (5 January); RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 503, l. 5 (11 January).

<sup>424</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2360, ark. 8 (proofs); spr. 2806, ark. 72 (printing halted).

<sup>425</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2806, ark. 74-109 (commission and its criticisms), 73 (new version ready in August); spr. 1891, ark. 1-35 (more criticisms), 37-88a (minutes of the meeting), 85-7 (Nazarenko's conclusion).

<sup>426</sup> RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 133, d. 311, l. 47.



Ukraine in general," rather than Soviet Ukraine. The editorial triggered a comprehensive campaign of self-criticism in the republic. Writers, artists, composers, journalists, and party functionaries all repented their "ideological blindness." The campaign reached a high point in November, when the plenary meeting of the Ukrainian Central Committee was in session for three days, unmasking "nationalism" in literature and the arts.<sup>427</sup> Nazarenko and the commission members realized that, in the late summer and autumn of 1951, the Ukrainian bureaucracy would be expected to carry out a search for "nationalism" in the humanities. Publishing a history textbook under such conditions would have been self-destructive. In this light, the decision to pursue further revisions appears as an effective defensive strategy.

At the November, 1951, plenary meeting, First Secretary Melnikov criticized the delay in producing a survey history. He claimed that the drafts of Volume Two insufficiently stressed Soviet Ukraine's ties to the Russian Republic, and that Volume One did not incorporate Stalin's recent discoveries in the field of historical linguistics. Still, compared to Melnikov's tirades against "nationalism" in literature and the arts, this was a mild criticism. The first secretary then switched to a more constructive tone and announced that "For our people, the History of Ukraine is very much needed. Everyone needs it, from an old man to a child....There is no doubt that we can create a good Stalinist textbook of the History of Ukraine."<sup>428</sup>

### **Defining the Ancient Past**

Creating a "good Stalinist textbook" required bringing historical narrative in accord with recent Soviet ideological transmutations. In the immediate postwar years, partly as a belated reaction to the Nazi theories of Slavic inferiority and partly as a component of Zhdanov's new anti-Western campaign, Soviet ideologues extolled the ancient Slavs. The

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<sup>427</sup> See *Pravda*, 2 July 1951, p. 2; Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic*, 15-7; Volodymyr Baran, *Ukraina 1950-1960-kh rr.: Evoliutsiia totalitarnoi systemy* (Lviv: Instytut ukrainoznavstva im. I. Krypiakevycha NANU, 1996), pp. 60-5. The campaign is discussed in more detail in Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight of this dissertation.

<sup>428</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 1, spr. 976, ark. 84-88, here 88; excerpts in *U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu*, 2: 152-55, here 155.

editorial in the first issue of the new Moscow historical journal, *Voprosy istorii* (Issues in History), announced in 1945 that the war had prioritized some historical problems, which had until then been seen as unimportant. The journal's first example concerned the origins of the Slavs.<sup>429</sup> Irrelevant in the histories of class struggle, this search for the ancestors' greatness symbolized a new Stalinist historical narrative highlighting the development of the Russian people and their state. However, Ukrainians shared the same ancestry and, unlike Russians, still populated the heart of the ancient East Slavic domain. After the war, the republic's archaeologists immediately commenced the study of the Slavic past. In the spring of 1946, Khrushchev requested Stalin's permission to convene the First Ukrainian Archaeological Congress. The letter explained:

The scholarly agenda of the congress will be subordinated to the further and more profound Marxist-Leninist interpretation of two problems. The first central problem will be the origins of Eastern Slavs and the second will be the study of the relics of ancient cultures between the Dnieper and the Danube, which relics clearly testify that an advanced ancient culture already existed on that territory during the late Stone Age and the Bronze Age.<sup>430</sup>

Moscow issued its permission, and the Congress convened in Odessa in August 1946. Predictably, the participants claimed that the Slavs did not settle in Eastern Europe in the fifth or sixth century as had been previously thought, but descended from autochthonous agriculturalists. The archaeologists also denounced the Norman theory of the creation of Kievan Rus' and stressed the ancient roots of the native Slavic state tradition.<sup>431</sup> During the postwar decade, the Institute of Archaeology of the republican Academy of Sciences promoted further research along these lines, earning in 1950 the praise of the Academy's

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<sup>429</sup> [Editorial], *Voprosy istorii*, no. 1 (1945): 3-5, here 5.

<sup>430</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 7, spr. 3927, ark. 124-5. I am not suggesting here that Khrushchev personally composed this particular letter or that Stalin even read it, but the Ukrainian ideologues communicated with the apparatus of the All-Union Central Committee by addressing their letters to Stalin and having them signed by the first secretary.

<sup>431</sup> *Ibid.*, ark. 123 (permission), 125 (Odessa); spr. 553, ark. 173-79 (congress).

presidium and the Ukrainian Central Committee.<sup>432</sup>

Nevertheless, draft Chapter One of the *History of Ukrainian SSR* suffered harsh criticism precisely because it "muddled the question of the Slavs' origins." The author, a senior archaeologist, Lazar Slavin, wrote that the Soviet archaeologists "were proving" the native roots of Slavs, while the Politburo commission thought that this had been proven already.<sup>433</sup> As late as 1952, Slavin was replaced with two younger archaeologists, who wrote the chapter anew. The new version stressed that the Slavs were natives of Central and Eastern Europe but that Hrushevsky was wrong to see in the ancient Antes the ancestors of the Ukrainians: the sources "undeniably attest to the common origins, as well as the linguistic and cultural unity of all southern and northern East Slavic groups." By comparing Ukrainian archaeological data with the results of excavations in Pskov and the upper Volga region, the authors sought to confirm the cultural unity of "proto-Ukrainians" and "proto-Russians" in the fifth and sixth centuries.<sup>434</sup>

Presenting the ancient sedentary agricultural Trypillian culture (ca. 3500-1400 BCE) as proto-Slavic offered perhaps the single biggest temptation for the authors. Even members of the Politburo commission suggested stressing that the relics of the Trypillia culture were found both in the Kiev region and in Bukovyna, thus underscoring the "cultural unity of the population of Ukraine's Eastern and Western oblasts." Some reviewers, like Professor of the Dnipropetrovsk Party Academy D. Poida, openly insisted that the Trypillians were the ancestors of the Slavs.<sup>435</sup> The 1953 edition of *History*, indeed, pointed out that the Trypillians settled mostly in the Right-Bank Ukraine from the Dnieper to the Carpathian mountains. However, the text made no statements about the

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<sup>432</sup> See I. H. Shovkopliias, *Arkheolohichni doslidzhennia na Ukraini (1917-1957)*, 17-24; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2003, ark. 112.

<sup>433</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 1577, ark. 3, 6; op. 30, spr. 1919, ark. 26-8. Compare A. K. Kasymenko [Kasymenko], ed., *Istoriia Ukrainskoi SSR* [Limited Edition] (Kiev: Izdatelstvo AN USSR, 1951), vol. 1, p. 20.

<sup>434</sup> See O. K. Kasymenko, ed., *Istoriia Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo AN URSR, 1953), vol. 1, pp. 29, 31-3.

<sup>435</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 1577, ark. 1 (commission); op. 30, spr. 2339, ark. 32 (Poida).

settlers' relation to the Slavs. Unlike the 1951 limited edition, though, the final version claimed that the Slavic archaeological relics in Eastern Europe dated as far back as the second millennium BCE. If true, this claim would have made the Slavs at least junior contemporaries of the Trypillians, but the authors did not risk elaborating on the possible connection.<sup>436</sup>

Discussing the non-Slavic ancient past presented another problem. In its treatment of ancient history, the survey generally adopted a territorial approach based on the post-war borders of Soviet Ukraine. The republic's historians covered the Greek colonies on the Black Sea coast because they connected Ukraine's past to classical Mediterranean civilizations. Moreover, the Greek colonies also represented a perfect example of the slave "mode of production," the essential stage in the Marxist scheme of historical progress that the Slavs had seemed to skip. Slavin's draft Chapter One also contained a detailed account of the nomadic Scythians who successfully fought off the great Persian king Darius I, but the Politburo commission felt that this narrative made the Slavs "look like barbarians" in comparison. The final text talked less about the Scythians and did not glorify their martial prowess so unreservedly.

Preparing the chapter on Kievan Rus' presented a different problem because the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences did not have senior specialists on this period. This topic had remained problematic ever since the authorities denounced Hrushevsky as a "bourgeois nationalist" for reclaiming Kievan Rus' for Ukrainian history. The authority on ancient Kievan law, Serafim Iushkov, formally remained a member of the Institute of History of Ukraine until 1950, but from 1944 he had taught at Moscow University and had not written much for the Kievans.<sup>437</sup> The institute usually assigned chapters on Kievan Rus' to Kost Huslysty, whose own scholarly interests concentrated on the formation of Ukrainian nationality during the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries. Whereas the institute's working plan for 1949 still showed Iushkov as working on a book about

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<sup>436</sup> See *Istoriia* (1953), pp. 20-21 (Trypillia culture), 29 (Slavs).

<sup>437</sup> See Smolii, ed., *Vcheni Instytutu istorii Ukrainy*, 376-7.

Kievan Rus', the report for 1946-50 did not list any monographs or articles on this topic.<sup>438</sup>

In 1950, Volodymyr Dovzhenok of the Institute of Archaeology published a pioneering book, *Military Arts in Kievan Rus'*. The book concentrated on the history of the Dnieper region, although the last two pages contained a brief account of Aleksandr Nevsky's victories over the German knights in the North during 1240-42. However, a reviewer for the Moscow journal criticized Dovzhenok for neglecting the military skills of the Grand Prince Andrei Bogoliubsky of Vladimir-Suzdal. The reviewer felt that the prince's marches on Novgorod and the Dnieper area had been particularly important because the "Grand Prince engaged in the national defence of the Russian land."<sup>439</sup> Of course, the Kievan archaeologist had intentionally suppressed in his narrative Prince Andrei's march on Kiev in 1169, when the north-easterners captured the city, pillaged and burned its churches and monasteries, and killed many of its inhabitants. Astonishingly, the Moscow reviewer wanted this episode not only restored but glorified. However, the Ukrainian historians never extended their praise to the Muscovites' "great ancestor" Prince Andrei Bogoliubsky. Even the much-edited Volume One of the *History of the Ukrainian SSR* characterized his march as a "feudal internicine war" resulting in the "ransacking" of Kiev. At the same time, the text cautioned against interpreting this war as a conflict between the Russians and the Ukrainians: "it was a feudal war between the princes who belonged to the same Old Rus' nationality."<sup>440</sup>

In his chapters on Kievan Rus' and its break-up, Huslysty succeeded in portraying this state formation as the "common cradle" of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians. He even published the chapters' summary as a separate booklet, *Kievan Rus' as the Cradle*

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<sup>438</sup> NAIU, op. 1, spr. 166, ark. 4 (Iushkov); spr. 215, ark. 1 (report).

<sup>439</sup> See V. I. Dovzhenok, *Viiskova sprava v Kyivskii Rusi* (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo AN URSR, 1950); N. Voronin, review of *Voennoe delo v Kievskoi Rusi*, by V. I. Dovzhenok, *Voprosy istorii*, no. 1 (1951): 139-40.

<sup>440</sup> *Istoriia* (1953), pp. 91-2.

*of Three Fraternal Peoples*.<sup>441</sup> Most criticisms concerned the taxing question of how Kievan Rus' should be categorized in terms of Marxist-Leninist "socio-economic formations." With no definitive evidence of the existence of private ownership of land until the eleventh century and only elements of slavery, the old Rus' did not fit into the dogmatic Soviet scheme of historic progress: Primitive Commune, Slavery, and Feudalism. The 1951 version of *History* followed the then established view of Kievan Rus' as a pre-Feudal state, where the Feudal mode of production did not predominate until the eleventh century.<sup>442</sup>

Meanwhile, during 1949-50, *Voprosy istorii* sponsored a discussion on this question. The Ukrainian archaeologists Dovzhenok and Mykhailo Braichevsky participated actively, supporting the revisionist view of Kievan Rus' as a Feudal state. They argued for the "Feudal" nature of the tribute the princes collected from the peasant communes and insisted that the growth of cities indicated the advent of Feudalism even in the absence of private ownership of land.<sup>443</sup> Finally, in March 1951, a lengthy editorial in *Voprosy istorii* affirmed the new periodization "proposed by historians and archaeologists from Moscow and Kiev." According to the new orthodoxy, the Feudal "mode of production," classes, and the state were taking shape among Eastern Slavs from the sixth to the eighth centuries, whereas the Kievan Rus' of the ninth to the eleventh century represented an "Early Feudal state."<sup>444</sup> Quite in line with the official extolling of the ancient Slavs, the new scheme made Kievan Rus' look less backward in comparison to its West European neighbors.

Practically all reviewers of the 1951 limited edition of the *History* demanded that the text conform to the new periodization, a demand that the authors satisfied in the 1953

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<sup>441</sup> NAIU, op. 1, spr. 216, ark. 7 (published in 1950); G. [H.] Shevchuk, "Nauchno-issledovatel'skaia rabota Instituta istorii Ukrainy Akademii nauk Ukrain'skoi SSR za 1950 god," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 2 (1951): 156-58, here 158 (listed as the Institute's achievement).

<sup>442</sup> *Istoriia* (1951), p. 45.

<sup>443</sup> See "Obsuzhdenie voprosov periodizatsii istorii SSSR v Institute istorii AN SSSR," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 4 (1949): 141-52; V. Dovzhenok and M. Braichevsky, "O vremeni slozheniia feodalizma v drevnei Rusi," *ibid.*, no. 8 (1950): 60-77.

<sup>444</sup> "Ob itogakh diskussii o periodizatsii istorii SSSR," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 3 (1951): 53-60, here 56.

mass edition.<sup>445</sup> In 1952, a new commission of the Ukrainian Central Committee found the revised chapter on Kievan Rus' highly satisfactory. Some questions, such as the formation of classes and ethnicity, remained insufficiently explained, but this reflected the general state of Soviet historical scholarship.<sup>446</sup>

The official discourse saw Hrushevsky's main sin as suggesting that the southwestern Galician-Volhynian Principality, rather than the north-eastern Vladimir-Suzdal, was the true successor of Kievan Rus'. After the war, the Ukrainian ideologues displayed extraordinary sensitivity to any scholarly work on Galicia-Volhynia. In 1951, the censors banned the article "On Some Questions of the History of Ukraine," which the historian Fedir Shevchenko wrote for the *Bulletin of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences*. Shevchenko allegedly proposed that the "origins of Ukrainian statehood [were] in the principalities of South-Western Rus', and especially in the Galician-Volhynian Principality."<sup>447</sup> Unaware of these charges, Moscow reviewers of Volume One sometimes wondered why the "great international role" of the principality was not highlighted in the text.<sup>448</sup> Significantly, though, the sole postwar book on the Galician-Volhynian Principality was published in Moscow by the Russian historian V. Pashuto. The reviewers justly hailed it as the "first serious monograph on the history of Western Ukrainian lands during the period of Feudal fragmentation."<sup>449</sup>

But if Kievan Rus' was the "common cradle" of three East Slavic nations, when exactly after its demise did they develop into separate ethnic groups? The prewar Politburo-approved school text under the editorship of A. Shestakov dated the beginnings of this process back to the thirteenth century when the Mongols conquered the East Slavic principalities. Based on the linguistic data, the Ukrainian historians proposed that the three

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<sup>445</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1891, ark. 2, 17; spr. 1919, ark. 59; spr. 2810, ark. 21; *Istoriia* (1953), pp. 41, 45, 48, 63.

<sup>446</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 1577, ark. 8, 27, 30; op. 30, spr. 1902, ark. 3.

<sup>447</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 784, ark. 25.

<sup>448</sup> NAIU, op. 1, spr. 103, ark. 56 (Academician Boris Grekov).

<sup>449</sup> See V. T. Pashuto, *Ocherki po istorii Galitsko-Volynskoi Rusi* (Moscow: Izdatelstvo AN SSSR, 1950); V. Koroliuk, review of *Ocherki po istorii Galitsko-Volynskoi Rusi*, by V. T. Pashuto, *Voprosy istorii*, no. 8 (1951): 132-36, here 136.

separate nationalities (*narodnosti*) were taking shape later, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The Moscow reviewers had long noted this suggestion as valuable. The discussion in *Voprosy istorii* finally affirmed that the Mongol invasion did not play a decisive role, as previously had been thought, and postdated the shaping of the three nationalities to the fourteenth to fifteenth centuries.<sup>450</sup> This new interpretation eventually predominated in the Russian and Belarusian historical surveys as well.<sup>451</sup>

### **The Ukrainian Road to Modernity**

The topic of Ukraine's union with Muscovy in 1654 dominated the debates on Early Modern Ukrainian history. Having no access to the Soviet party archives, John Basarab explained the postwar Soviet theories on "reunification" as having been dictated to the scholarly community by the party ideologues: "In this manner, the Communist party's intensified Russocentric historiography was presented to Soviet historians."<sup>452</sup> The declassified archives confirm that the party hierarchy, indeed, had the final word in questions of history. However, the ideologues depended on the historians in preparing the "selection menu" for their pronouncements, and the scholars could argue for a different selection even after the republican party apparatus announced its decision.

The terminological discussions focusing on Ukraine's incorporation into Russia could serve as the best example of interaction between the historians and the ideologues, as well as of the importance that language held in the Stalinist discourse on history. Interestingly, when Ukrainian dissidents raised the issue of "incorporation" versus "reunification" again during the 1960s, they did not mention (or did not know) how

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<sup>450</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 823, ark. 16 (Nechkina); NAIIU, op. 1, spr. 103 (Grekov); *Istoriia* (1951), pp. 101-2; "Ob itogakh diskussii," 57. In 1952, Nechkina acknowledged that, unlike her own textbook, the *History of the Ukrainian SSR* offered an innovative and sophisticated interpretation of the origins of the Russian and Ukrainian nationality (NAIIU, op. 1, spr. 355, ark. 16a-17).

<sup>451</sup> See B. Rybakov, et al., "Tsennyi trud po istorii Belorussii," 117.

<sup>452</sup> Basarab, *Pereiaslav 1654*, 175-87, here 179.



opposed their senior colleagues had been to the term "reunification" in the early 1950s.<sup>453</sup>

Until approximately 1950, both Soviet official pronouncements and scholarly works usually defined the events of 1654 as Ukraine's "incorporation" into Russia. In Russian, the established term was *prisoedinenie*, and in Ukrainian, *pryiednannia*.<sup>454</sup> Scholarly surveys of Russian and Ukrainian history up to and including the 1951 draft of the *History of the Ukrainian SSR* strictly observed the "incorporation" paradigm.<sup>455</sup> Popular works like K. Osipov's biography of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, which appeared in its second edition in 1948, used a confusing array of terms: *vossoedinenie* (reunification), *soedinenie* (union), and *poddanstvo* (subjection).<sup>456</sup> The appearance of the term "reunification" in Osipov's work was not incidental. Osipov freely borrowed facts and descriptions for his popular biography from nineteenth-century Russian historiography and especially from Mykola Kostomarov and the conservative Russian historian Gennadii Karpov. On many occasions, Osipov is betrayed by his language. A Soviet historian of the 1930s would hardly say that Ukraine had "surrendered herself into [Russian] subjection" (*otdalas v poddanstvo*)<sup>457</sup>, but this expression would have been fairly standard in nineteenth-century Russian history writing. The notion of "reunification"

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<sup>453</sup> The reference here is to the work of Ukrainian dissident historian Mykhailo Braichevsky, *Pryiednannia chy vozziednannia? Krytychni zauvahy z pryvodu odniiei kontseptsii* (Toronto: Novi dni, 1971), translated into English as *Annexation or Reunification: Critical Notes on One Conception*, trans. and ed. by George P. Kulchycky (Munich: Ukrainisches Institut für Bildungspolitik, 1974).

<sup>454</sup> Ukrainian emigre historians in the West typically preferred to render *prisoedinenie/pryiednannia* as "annexation," but, in the Soviet Ukrainian official discourse of the time, *pryiednannia* meant rather "incorporation."

<sup>455</sup> See B. D. Grekov, S. V. Bakhrushin, and V. I. Lebedev, eds., *Istoriia SSSR*. Vol. 1: *S drevneishikh vremen do kontsa XVIII veka*, 2nd ed. (Moscow: OGIZ Gospolitizdat, 1948), pp. 494-502; *Istoriia* (1951), p. 163-6.

<sup>456</sup> Basarab has explained this confusion by the hasty ideological editing in 1948: "After a hurried re-editing of Osipov's text, the revised edition substituted "reunion" (*vossoedinenie*) for "union" (*soedinenie*) on the chapter's title page; in the body of the chapter, however, it is unchanged" (*Pereiaslav 1654*, 177). However, in both the first (1939) and second (1948) editions of Osipov's *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*, the chapter on the Pereiaslav treaty is entitled "The Reunification" (*Vossoedinenie*). See K. Osipov, *Bogdan Khmelnytskii* (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1939), p. 347; 2nd ed. (1948), p. 379. In both editions, Osipov prefers to use "union" (*soedinenie*) throughout the text.

<sup>457</sup> Osipov, *Bogdan Khmelnytskii*, 2nd ed., 385 and 394.

comes from the same source. Russian imperial historiography understood the Pereiaslav treaty as the return of Russia's age-old possessions. Ukrainians were considered simply the "Little Russian tribe" of the Russian people. Hence, in many pre-revolutionary works consulted by Osipov, Ukraine's incorporation into Muscovy appeared as "reunification."<sup>458</sup> Thus, the "new" Soviet notion of "reunification" represented, in fact, a refurbished tsarist concept.

In early 1950, the Great Soviet Encyclopedia solicited from Mykola Petrovsky a long entry on Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Given the ideological importance of the hetman's deeds, the encyclopedia editors requested that the CP(b)U Central Committee approved the text. The Ukrainian ideologues sent the entry to the Institute of History and to the chair of history at the republican Party Academy, Ivan Boiko. In his article, Petrovsky twice used the term "reunification." The Institute wrote back that "instead of 'Ukraine's reunification with Russia', one should use the term 'Ukraine's incorporation into Russia'." Boiko also spotted this deviation: "Both at the beginning and at the end of his article, the author introduces the term 'Ukraine's reunification with Russia.' I think using here the term 'union' (*obedinenie*) or 'incorporation' (*prisoedinenie*) would be more correct. Only two branches of one and the same nation can reunite."<sup>459</sup>

In early 1951, the Institute of History of Ukraine reported that it was still studying the history of "incorporation."<sup>460</sup> However, the use of this concept in the 1951 limited printing of the *History* unexpectedly prompted critical comments from the Institute of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences in Moscow. Interestingly, the Moscow historians were reacting to the *Pravda* article "On the Opera *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*," which criticized this recent production of the Kiev opera company for minor faults of the libretto and musical form. Although *Pravda's* comments did not touch upon the portrayal of the Russian-Ukrainian relations in the opera, the article's second sentence read: "This opera, as is known, is devoted to the events connected with the Ukrainian people's struggle for

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<sup>458</sup> See, in particular, P. A. Kulish, *Istoriia vossoedineniia Rusi* (St. Petersburg: Obshchestvennaia polza, 1874), 2 vols.

<sup>459</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2034, ark. 130 (Institute), 138 (Boiko).

<sup>460</sup> G. Shevchuk, "Nauchno-issledovatel'skaia rabota," 157.

liberation from the yoke of the Polish gentry and for Ukraine's reunification with the Russian people." The Moscow historians' critical comments apparently suggested adopting this term instead of "incorporation." In any case, their Ukrainian colleagues directly linked the criticisms to the *Pravda* article.<sup>461</sup>

In July 1952, the Ukrainian side sent to Moscow the author of the chapter on the War of Liberation, Ivan Boiko. During a special meeting at the Institute of History of the USSR, Boiko outlined the arguments against "reunification." The Kievans went as far as digging up Stalin's 1918 interview with *Pravda*, where the future father of nations characterized Ukrainians as the people most oppressed by tsarism. Boiko argued that only two parts of one and the same nation can reunite, whereas by the mid-seventeenth century, Ukrainians and Russians were definitely two separate peoples. An animated discussion followed. Some Moscow historians, like E. Kusheva and N. Pavlenko, insisted that one could speak of "reunification" because the territories of seventeenth-century Muscovy and Cossack Ukraine were once included in Kievan Rus'. In addition, both peoples had descended from a single old Rus' nationality. This position was shared by a leading specialist on the nineteenth century, Academician N. Druzhinin. However, the majority seemed to be in favor of "incorporation." L. Ivanov inquired sarcastically whether one could speak of France's "reunification" with Germany just because both countries were once included in the empire of Charlemagne. N. Ustiugov supported Ivanov, while the authority on the fifteenth and sixteenth century, Academician L. Cherepnin, went as far as announcing that *Pravda's* formula was "illiterate" (*negramotno*).<sup>462</sup>

The historians' conference in Moscow closed with the apparent victory of those favoring "incorporation." Nevertheless, Propaganda Secretary Nazarenko and the CP(b)U Central Committee's special commission overruled this conclusion in favor of

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<sup>461</sup> *Pravda*, 20 July 1951, pp. 3-4. The *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* affair is treated exhaustively in Chapter Eight. I was not able to locate the Moscow historians' initial dispatch objecting to the term "incorporation." However, Boiko referred to the incident as caused by something "the Institute of History of the USSR had sent us." See TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3597, ark. 19.

<sup>462</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3597, ark. 22-4 (Boiko), 28 (Kusheva), 30 (Ivanov), 33 (Pavlenko), 38 (Cherepnin reporting the opinion of the absent Druzhinin), 33 (Cherepnin).

"reunification." A group of Ukrainian historians then challenged this decision. The available archives preserve only circumstantial evidence about the ensuing conflict. On 28 October 1952, Nazarenko announced to the conference of the *History* authors and the commission members that "Boiko and Holobutsky notified the VKP(b) Central Committee that they do not agree with the formula we have adopted: 'The reunification of the Ukrainian people with the Russian people at the Pereiaslav Council.'" According to Nazarenko, the All-Union Central Committee did not support the protestors. However, Boiko took the floor to summarize the arguments against "reunification," again stressing that the whole affair had started with a largely irrelevant *Pravda* article about the opera *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*. Boiko announced that such leading Ukrainian historians as Fedir Shevchenko and Fedir Los advocated the notion of "incorporation," while the Institute's director Kasymenko supported "reunification." Then Kasymenko and the commission members argued for "reunification" on the grounds of the "historic kinship" between Russians and Ukrainians.<sup>463</sup>

The debate flared up again during the commission's meeting with the authors on 22 November. This time, Fedir Ienevych proposed accepting that the word "reunification" had a "second meaning," that of the union between fraternal peoples. An unidentified voice from the audience shouted: "Ushakov's Dictionary [of the Russian Language] says that one can reunite [only a part] which was previously separated [from the whole]." Nazarenko immediately intervened: "There can be a reunification of two nations as well. Let us leave it [at that]." The commission member O. Koshyk seconded, "And this is how *Pravda's* article put it."<sup>464</sup> In late November and December of 1952, the commission continued meetings with the authors. At these gatherings, historians read the manuscript aloud paragraph by paragraph, changing "incorporation" to "reunification" throughout.<sup>465</sup>

The Ukrainian historians accepted without much debate another conceptual change that had caused some controversy at the all-Union level. By the early 1950s, scholars and

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<sup>463</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1922, ark. 1 (Nazarenko), 2-3 (Boiko), 8 (Kasymenko).

<sup>464</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1924, ark. 2 (Ienevych), 4 (comment from the audience, Nazarenko, and Koshyk).

<sup>465</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1925; NAIU, op. 1, spr. 353 and 354.

ideologues who extolled the progressiveness of all Russian territorial acquisitions considered the "lesser evil" theory increasingly outdated. Although elaborations on the negative effects of incorporation into tsarist Russia occupied less and less space in historical works, the formula itself continued to be cited almost ritualistically. Because the "lesser evil" theory was originally announced in an official communique, the 1937 directive on history textbooks, abandoning this concept also required an announcement in an authoritative publication. The party did not hasten to rescind the concept reportedly coined by Stalin himself. At the same time, historians were becoming increasingly frustrated by the need to reconcile the "lesser evil" theory with the Russians' benevolent influence on other peoples.

Finally, the Moscow historian Militsa Nechkina published a letter to the editor in *Voprosy istorii*, suggesting that this formula should be either dropped or reinterpreted as referring to the tsarist colonial policies rather than to incorporation into Russia in general.<sup>466</sup> In their replies to Nechkina, the historians of Soviet Asia overwhelmingly supported her proposal and hailed the progressiveness of their lands' inclusion into the Russian state. Only the Russian historian of Kazakhstan, A. Iakunin, pointed out that the party communique originally applied the "lesser evil" concept only to Georgia and Ukraine, the two countries that had undeniably lost their independence by entering into agreements with Russia.<sup>467</sup>

*Voprosy istorii* did not run an editorial summary of the discussion. Moreover, *Bolshevik* soon criticized the historical journal for initiating discussions on problems that were "not debatable and have long been resolved in the Marxist-Leninist scholarship," such as the "lesser evil" theory.<sup>468</sup> Then, however, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan and the party authority on the nationality question, M. D. Bagirov, overturned this criticism in his speech at the Nineteenth Party Congress in October 1952.

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<sup>466</sup> M. Nechkina, "K voprosu o formule 'naimenshee zlo' (Pismo v redaktsiiu)," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 4 (1951): 44-48. See Tillet, *The Great Friendship*, 161-67.

<sup>467</sup> See four replies in *Voprosy istorii*, no. 9 (1951): 97-118 and A. Iakunin, "O primenenii poniatiiia 'naimenshee zlo' v otsenke prisoedineniia k Rossii nerusskikh narodnostei," *ibid.*, no. 11 (1951): 83-87.

<sup>468</sup> L. Maksimov, "O zhurnale 'Voprosy istorii'," *Bolshevik*, no. 13 (1952): 60-70, here 62.

Bagirov also found fault with *Voprosy istorii*'s confusing discussion, but he expected the journal to make a clear statement on the "progressive and fruitful nature of the incorporation of non-Russian peoples into Russia."<sup>469</sup> This was the announcement the historians had been pushing for. After the Nineteenth Congress, the "lesser evil" theory disappeared from both scholarly and journalistic works.

The 1951 draft of the *History of the Ukrainian SSR* dutifully cited the 1937 communique and explained why Ukraine's incorporation into Russia represented a "lesser evil."<sup>470</sup> However, even before the outcome of the discussion in Moscow became clear, some Ukrainian reviewers had suggested abandoning this term. The historians of Dnipropetrovsk University in particular insisted on revising the notion of "lesser evil." Instead, they wanted the authors to stress the "great historically-positive role of this event" and proposed the use of "reunification" instead of "incorporation."<sup>471</sup> The final version, indeed, did not even mention the "lesser evil" theory, elaborating instead on the union's beneficial consequences for Ukraine. In so doing, the text also justified the then innovative usage of the "reunification" concept:

The reunification of Ukraine with Russia was prepared by the whole history of the two fraternal peoples. Their common origins, closeness of languages and literatures, and religious unity all determined the Ukrainian people's striving to be together with the Russian people. The two fraternal peoples were united by their common historic fate and age-long struggle against foreign aggressors.

The reunification of Ukraine with Russia fulfilled the cherished aspirations of the Ukrainian people. Constantly fighting the foreign oppressors, the Ukrainian people, having their very survival threatened, for centuries strove to unite with the Russian people, whom they always saw as their elder brother, reliable defender, and loyal ally.

Both peoples' common origin from the old Rus' nationality and the unbreakable unity of their subsequent historical development determined the constant and truly popular desire to reunite all lands that from ancient times bore the name Rus'.<sup>472</sup>

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<sup>469</sup> *Pravda*, 7 October 1952, p. 5.

<sup>470</sup> *Istoriia* (1951), 164-65.

<sup>471</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2339, ark. 34-35.

<sup>472</sup> *Istoriia* (1953), 258.

No post-1654 topic caused serious disagreements between the authors and their ideological supervisors. All variants of the survey routinely denounced as "traitors" the Cossack hetmans who attempted to break Muscovy's hold over Ukraine. A standard formula explained that this or that hetman betrayed the interests of the Ukrainian people by allying with Poland, Turkey, Sweden or any other foreign power. Hetman Demian Mnohohrishny (ruled 1669-72) created a minor problem, though. The 1951 *History* held that he intended to break faith by establishing contacts not with a foreign power, but with the concurrent independent Ukrainian ruler of Right-Bank Ukraine, Hetman Petro Doroshenko. The Politburo commission found such an explanation unacceptable, resulting in the charge against Mnohohrishny being altogether dropped from the 1953 *History*.<sup>473</sup>

In February 1952, the Politburo commission considered the accusation of plagiarism against Professor Vadym Diadychenko. The commission members Kravchenko and Rumiantsev had discovered that Diadychenko's chapter on Ukraine in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century relied heavily on the pre-war writings of the Nazi collaborator and nationalist emigre Oleksandr Ohloblyn. In addition to borrowing facts and descriptions, Diadychenko had allegedly "snuck in Ohloblyn's concept of Ukrainian statehood." After a prolonged investigation, the authorities shelved the accusation of plagiarism, while Diadychenko added more black paint to his already loathsome portrait of the "traitor" Hetman Mazepa.<sup>474</sup>

The discussion of the rest of Volume One revealed no significant interpretive changes or problematic points until the description of the Brotherhood (or Society) of SS. Cyril and Methodius (1846-47), the first modern Ukrainian political organization from which both the nationalists and the Ukrainian socialists traced their ideological pedigree. The 1951 version claimed that the Brotherhood was organized by student youth influenced by Shevchenko. Although Kostomarov, Kulish, and some other participants professed "liberal" views, the "political direction of the society was determined primarily by the revolutionary views of Shevchenko and the members close to him." The Brotherhood

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<sup>473</sup> *Istoriia* (1951), 191; *Istoriia* (1953), 287; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1924, ark. 185-90.

<sup>474</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1920, ark. 1-4; *Istoriia* (1951), 209-11; *Istoriia* (1953), 308-10.

demanded the abolition of serfdom and "raised the issue of creating the Ukrainian state within the federative republic of Slavic peoples." These progressive demands testified to the "growth of national-liberation aspirations."<sup>475</sup>

The reviewers noted that such an interpretation contradicted the 1946 party resolution about the journal *Vitshyzna*; this decree warned against presenting the Brotherhood as a revolutionary-democratic body with no internal struggle between true revolutionaries and bourgeois liberals. Following this line, the Politburo commission concluded in April 1952 that the text "did not reveal the political profile of the Cyril and Methodius Society and the political struggle within it."<sup>476</sup> The Ukrainian functionaries and intellectuals knew well when the time was right to protect themselves. Just a few months after the decision, in July 1952, the official *Bolshevik* attacked *Voprosy istorii* for a wide array of ideological errors. In particular, the party journal denounced the article by Ukrainian historian Leonid Kovalenko, "The Historical Views of the Revolutionary Democrat T. H. Shevchenko," which appeared in issue 7 (1951): "One should strongly object to Kovalenko's article presenting the Cyril and Methodius Society as a revolutionary democratic organization and portraying Shevchenko as its head." Instead, attention should have been paid to the struggle between the revolutionary and liberal wings within the society.<sup>477</sup>

The 1953 *History* presented the Brotherhood as an organization created by liberals, albeit later joined by Shevchenko and some other radical members. Now, the official line was that the two groups had clashed over how to implement the peasant reform and to liberate Ukrainians from tsarist oppression. As well, the liberals were also bourgeois nationalists who treated Ukrainians as an egalitarian nation without class antagonisms. "Reflecting the interests of the emerging Ukrainian bourgeoisie, which was commencing its struggle for the national market," the liberals advanced the idea of Ukrainian statehood

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<sup>475</sup> *Istoriia* (1951), 314-15.

<sup>476</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1925, ark. 127-28; spr. 2339, ark. 118; op. 70, spr. 1173, ark. 14 (reviews); op. 30, spr. 1902, ark. 4 (commission).

<sup>477</sup> L. Maksimov, "O zhurnale 'Voprosy istorii'," 63-64; the article in question is L. Kovalenko, "Istoricheskie vzgliady revoliutsionera-demokrata T. G. Shevchenko," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 7 (1951): 26-44.



(no longer the progressive concept it had been in the previous draft). Shevchenko and his fellow revolutionary democrats denounced nationalistic theories, advocating instead a "united republic of Slavic peoples."<sup>478</sup>

Thus, the Soviet survey of Ukrainian history charted two lines of succession in the national history: from the revolutionary democrats to the Soviet power and from bourgeois liberals to present-day nationalists. Occasionally, the question as to which camp to which this or that figure belonged caused a minor debate, as in the case of Mykhailo Drahomanov,<sup>479</sup> but the historians usually successfully followed this general ideological scheme. The Politburo commission requested only that the bourgeois nationalists of the nineteenth-century *hromady* movement be condemned more explicitly or that the revolutionary democrats Ivan Franko, Lesia Ukrainka, and others be portrayed as their staunch opponents.<sup>480</sup> The last four chapters covering the years 1900-1917 (up to and including the February Revolution) elicited no criticisms other than a comment about the abundance of "literal quotations from the *Short Course* [of the party history] without references."<sup>481</sup>

During 1952, the text of Volume One underwent its final round of extensive reviewing resulting in an array of minor comments, but not a single major criticism.<sup>482</sup> Nevertheless, the Politburo commission produced a long list of "insufficiently explained" problems and demanded another level of revisions to be followed by the publication of a limited edition in January 1953 and subsequent public discussion. The commission's major recommendation was to present Ukrainian history as an "organic, integral, and inseparable part of the history of Russia."<sup>483</sup>

In the end, the Ukrainian bureaucrats and historians postponed the publication of

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<sup>478</sup> *Istoriia* (1953), 429-30.

<sup>479</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1926, ark. 94-97.

<sup>480</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1902, ark. 5.

<sup>481</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 2714, ark. 10-14, here 10.

<sup>482</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1916-1919, 1921, 2806, 2811; NAIU, op. 1, spr. 363 (parts 1 and 2).

<sup>483</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1902, ark. 2-8, here 7; published in *U leshchatakh totalitaryzmu*, 2: 155-61, here 160.

the *History of the USSR* until the first signs of political liberalization after Stalin's death. Volume One was formally approved for publication on 23 December 1953 and appeared in the bookstores in the spring of 1954.<sup>484</sup> As Chapter Nine will show, the text and especially the public reactions to its publication combined old attitudes with those of the transition to a post-Stalinist society.

### **The Limits of Reaching Out**

The preparation of a "Stalinist textbook" of Ukrainian history consumed the time and energy of the republic's leading historians for almost a decade. By 1950, the project's base institution, the Academy of Sciences' Institute of History of Ukraine, had grown to eight departments and more than one hundred full-time researchers.<sup>485</sup> During the postwar years, historians several times proposed using their research expertise for other major projects in Ukrainian history, yet every time, the bureaucrats rejected their initiatives. In 1949, the Academy of Sciences petitioned the Central Committee to approve the preparation of a 25-volume corpus of sources, "History of Ukraine in Documents and Materials." The project was conceived as a grandiose collaborative effort of the Institutes of Archaeology and History, several leading universities, and the Archival Administration. The scholars planned to produce the first seven volumes during 1949-50, adding six more volumes in each subsequent year until 1953. Although the Academy submitted an advanced prospectus of the edition, the Central Committee simply shelved the matter.<sup>486</sup>

The Ukrainian functionaries could have had various reasons for not approving this imposing enterprise. The perceived need to concentrate all efforts on the survey, financial constraints, and unwillingness to accept ideological supervision of (and responsibility for)

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<sup>484</sup> O. K. Kasymenko, ed., *Istoriia Ukrainskoi RSR* (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo AN URSS, 1953), vol. 1. The imprimatur date is on p. 783. The first Ukrainian edition had a print run of 70,000.

<sup>485</sup> Santsevich and Komarenko, *Razvitie istoricheskoi nauki*, 62-63; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 1788, ark. 22. New units included the departments of world history, international relations, and the "countries of people's democracy"—all established in 1949. Given the widening scope of the institute's research, the Ukrainian government decreed in March 1953 that the institution's name be changed to the Institute of History (TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 8, spr. 7730, ark. 2).

<sup>486</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 1788, ark. 38-48.

another major project could all have contributed to such an outcome. The authorities similarly turned down—twice—the request for a Ukrainian historical journal. Since 1943, the Institute of History published, rather irregularly, its *Naukovi zapysky* (Scholarly Transactions), with only three volumes appearing by 1950. In 1948, the Institute reported to the Central Committee that it was ready and willing to publish as many as 5-6 issues annually, perhaps under the title *Pytannia istorii Ukrainy* (Issues in the History of Ukraine). The party functionaries rejected this proposal outright. The head of the Publishers' Section of the Press Department of the Central Committee, D. Hnatiuk, attached the following resolution: "To file [*V arkhiv*]. I recommend creating a more modest title for the transactions."<sup>487</sup>

The Institute renewed its request in late 1950, but the Central Committee again concluded that the "creation of a journal is completely unjustified" and suggested that the historians submit their papers to Moscow's *Voprosy istorii*. In the end, the Ukrainian historians were not allowed to start their own journal until 1957, long after the completion of the *History* and the beginning of de-Stalinization.<sup>488</sup> The authorities designated the forthcoming two-volume *History of the Ukrainian SSR* as the sole ideologically approved source to which teachers, propagandists, and general readers should turn for the proper interpretation of the Ukrainian past.

However, it is important to stress that the "Stalinist textbook" of Ukrainian history was not intended for use at school. The History of Ukraine did not exist as a separate subject. Had it been introduced, it would have presented such landmarks of "all-Russian" history as Kievan Rus', the Cossack Wars, and the revolutionary democrat Taras Shevchenko as stages in a continuous narrative of the Ukrainian past. Significantly, the non-Russian republics whose histories did not compete with the grand narrative of the Russian past were allowed to teach them as separate school disciplines. Thus, in 1950, Armenian schoolchildren were spending 114 hours in Grades 8, 9, and 10 studying their

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<sup>487</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 1494, ark. 11. The functionary was apparently displeased with the word "Ukraine" in the title.

<sup>488</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2003, ark. 128-31, here 128 (1950); M. V. Koval, "Flahman ukrainskoi istoriografii," *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 4 (1997): 11-18, here 12-13.

national history from a 1942 textbook.<sup>489</sup>

Ukrainian history teachers did discuss the republic's past, but only briefly and when Ukrainian subjects surfaced in the general course of the History of the USSR. This practice was what the participants of the 1950 Lviv conference were referring to when they proposed "increasing the number of hours for the History of Ukraine."<sup>490</sup> The teachers relied on the material offered in all-Union standard textbooks under the editorship of Shestakov (Grade 4) and Pankratova (Grades 8, 9, and 10). The Ukrainian publisher Radianska shkola translated these texts into Ukrainian and published them in mass editions. In 1951, this publisher released 370,000 copies of Shestakov's *History of the USSR: A Short Course* in Ukrainian, 150,000 copies of the textbook for Grade 8, 50,000 for Grade 9, and 20,000 for Grade 10.<sup>491</sup>

Although in brief and often confusing form, the standard texts reflected the evolution of the Soviet concept of Ukrainian history. In 1948, a section of Shestakov's textbook was entitled "Ukraine's Struggle against the Polish Domination and Its Incorporation into Russia." In the 1955 edition, the same section was called "Ukraine's Struggle for Its Liberation from the Oppression by the Polish Gentry and [for] Reunification with Russia." The two editions also offered differing explanations of the union. The 1948 version read: "The end of the war was nowhere in sight. The Poles were plundering Ukraine. To escape from the difficult situation, Khmelnytsky in 1654 made an agreement [*dogovorilsia*] with the Muscovite tsar Aleksei that Ukraine be accepted under the Russian authority [*v russkoe poddanstvo*]." The 1955 variant put this in one sentence: "Expressing the Ukrainian people's striving for union with the fraternal Russian people, Khmelnytsky approached the Russian government with the proposal to reunite

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<sup>489</sup> RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 372, l. 4. In December 1952, the CPSU Central Committee finally discovered that the Armenian textbook contained numerous interpretive differences from the standard textbook on the History of the USSR (*ibid.*, ll. 59-60).

<sup>490</sup> RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 342, l. 11.

<sup>491</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2360, ark. 129, 133-34. In addition, the numerous Russian schools in Ukraine were using the texts published in Russian in Moscow.

Ukraine with Russia."<sup>492</sup>

While studying Ukrainian topics, teachers were encouraged to take their students on tours of local historical monuments and to performances of Kochevra's *Iaroslav the Wise* and Korniiichuk's *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* in regional theaters, as well as to rebuff the falsifications of the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists.<sup>493</sup> It is not clear to what degree the average teacher followed these prescriptions. In any case, the republic's ideologues seemed to presume that the teachers followed the Moscow-approved textbooks and did not need much political guidance. After 1947, the authorities did not express any concern about possible "nationalistic" interpretations at the school level. The ideological audits of history teaching appeared to have been uniformly positive; the inspectors were not paying special attention to Ukrainian issues, and the mistakes usually concerned the intricacies of the contemporary international situation.<sup>494</sup>

When First Secretary Melnikov needed an example of a gross mistake in school teaching of history for his report at the November 1951 plenary meeting of the Ukrainian Central Committee, the party apparatus provided him with the following story. The history teacher at Zhydachiv secondary school in Drohobych oblast, Comrade Mashko, asked a student, "Tell me about the Mongols and their great military leader Ghengis Khan." This, Melnikov concluded, was "not an anecdote, but a bitter truth."<sup>495</sup> The Western Ukrainian teacher was clearly at fault in reconciling the heroic pasts of various fraternal peoples, and the great Mongol military leader should have been characterized as a plunderer and the founder of the empire that subsequently conquered Rus'. Importantly, however, this error had nothing to do with Ukrainian nationalism. At the forum where

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<sup>492</sup> A. V. Shestakov, ed., *Istoriia SSSR: Kratkii kurs* (Moscow: Uchpedgiz, 1948), pp. 62-63 and (Moscow: Uchpedgiz, 1955), pp. 62-63. The textbook for Grade 8 also changed its more sophisticated interpretation of Pereiaslav along the same lines. Cf. A. M. Pankratova, ed., *Istoriia SSSR: Uchebnyk dlia VIII klassa srednei shkoly*, 5th ed. (Moscow: Uchpedgiz, 1946), pp. 184-97 and 14th ed. (Moscow: Uchpedgiz, 1955), pp. 189-203.

<sup>493</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 1886, ark. 38-40, 136 (tours); *Radianska osvita*, 14 March 1947, p. 1 (theater).

<sup>494</sup> See TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 73, spr. 585, ark. 1-57; spr. 592, ark. 2-8 (1948); op. 30, spr. 2328, ark. 1-130 (1951).

<sup>495</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 1, spr. 976, ark. 100.

"nationalist deviations" were denounced in all fields of culture and scholarship, school teaching of history was spared.

Little evidence exists of the party's direct interference in historical scholarship and the teaching of history at provincial universities. The Central Committee remained ever suspicious of Lviv historians, but no new denunciations occurred in the capital of Western Ukraine during the 1951 campaign. The ideologues criticized such "fruitless" topics of historical research as "Joseph II's Reforms in Galicia." One dissertation topic was changed from "Culture and Customs of the Population of Subcarpathia during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century" to "The Life of the Boryslav Workers in the Past and the Present."<sup>496</sup>

Since their unsuccessful attempt to purge Ukrainian historians in 1947, the authorities seemed to have relied on the scholars' internal censors. In late 1951, the Central Committee inspected the work of the 58 departments of history at various Ukrainian universities and colleges without discovering any nationalistic errors. But since giving the historians a clean bill of health was ideologically risky, Melnikov announced that most departments shared the same shortcomings. The instructors "denounced bourgeois nationalist theories superficially and without real passion [*bez bolshoi strastnosti*]," occasionally relied on old textbooks or interpretations, and presented the Ukrainian's past "in isolation from the history of the Russian people."<sup>497</sup>

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The High Stalinist quest for a new historical synthesis reflected the authorities' awareness both of the USSR's new status as a great power and the nation-state's ascent to the status of principal category of historical analysis. In the Ukrainian case, the unification of all Ukrainian ethnic lands and the new doctrine of Russian guidance also prompted the revision of history, albeit along somewhat contradictory lines. A mirror reflection of the regime's totalitarian aspirations, the Stalinist idea of history called for a totalizing,

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<sup>496</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 785, ark. 8, 54.

<sup>497</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 2677, ark. 3-5.

definitive, and ideologically irreproachable account of the Ukrainian past. However, the historians used the party-sponsored scholarly debates to stress the provisional nature of historical interpretations. The contradiction between the nature of historical knowledge and the system's totalizing expectations, as well as the frequent purges of "nationalist deviations" in culture and scholarship, led the republic's ideologues to lock major scholarly projects into a lengthy review-and-discussion process.

Until Stalin's death and beyond, the uneasy symbiosis between the Ukrainian functionaries and historians displayed the same entanglement of control, denunciation, and collaboration that allowed both parties to survive within the Stalinist society and produce ideologically correct narratives of the Ukrainian past. Significantly, however, their cooperation in the major project of the postwar decade, a fundamental survey of Ukrainian history, did not produce a published text until the first signs of political liberalization after Stalin's death. Although the ideologues and scholars clashed over some interpretive points, both groups ultimately preferred discussing work-in-progress to taking responsibility for the finished product. Paradoxically, a "Stalinist history of Ukraine" was not published under Stalin.

Chapter Six  
DEFINING THE NATIONAL HERITAGE

In March 1951, Soviet Ukraine mourned the ninetieth anniversary of Taras Shevchenko's death. The innumerable speeches, meetings, newspaper articles, and radio broadcasts glorified the nineteenth-century Ukrainian bard as the nation's founding father, with the expression "our father" (*nash batko*) often being slipped in among the official designations of "revolutionary democrat" and the "founder of Ukrainian literature." In the newspaper of the republican Writers' Union, *Literaturna hazeta*, materials on Shevchenko occupied the entire first two pages. The front-page headline read "Forever Alive"—an epithet usually exclusively reserved in Soviet public discourse for the founding father of the Soviet State, Lenin.<sup>498</sup> The annual imposing Shevchenko celebrations highlighted the ambiguity of Soviet Ukrainian collective self-presentation. Although the official discourse stressed Shevchenko's radical views and ties to Russian culture, the poet remained primarily a common great "ethnic" ancestor of all Ukrainians. Unlike the Russians or Uzbeks, Soviet Ukrainians identified themselves as his posterity, as did the emigre nationalists and the Western Ukrainian insurgents.

The High Stalinist idea of a "nation" required, among other things, the possession of a great cultural tradition. Yuri Slezkine has shown that the First Congress of Soviet Writers (1934), which launched High Stalinism as a cultural paradigm, witnessed the non-Russian delegates boasting of the antiquity and vitality of their literary traditions. The Armenian delegate spoke of his culture as one of the most ancient in the Orient, with an alphabet predating Christianity. The Georgian representative claimed that the twelfth-century Georgian poem *The Man in the Tiger's Skin* was superior to Dante, centuries ahead of West European literatures, and generally the greatest literary work of the "so-called medieval Christian world." Not to be outdone, the Ukrainian delegate announced that Shevchenko's role in the creation of the Ukrainian literary language was probably

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<sup>498</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 8 March 1951, pp. 1-2.



greater than that of Pushkin for the Russian.<sup>499</sup>

After 1945, the celebration of non-Russian Great Traditions became increasingly subordinated to the Russian grand narrative, but the danger of exclusive ethnic self-identification always remained inherent in the cult of local traditions, warranting the extraordinary attention of Soviet ideologues.

### **The Ukrainian Classics**

The discussions of the *History of Ukrainian Literature*, Volume One, went hand in hand with the editing of the survey history. Significantly, the ideological editing focused on the perceived danger of presenting the literature of Kievan Rus' as exclusively or primarily "Ukrainian." At the end of the republic-wide discussion of Volume One in June 1950, Academician N. K. Gudzii had to conclude: "Many comrades have been worried that the [analysis of the] literature of the Kievan period occupies too much space." Historians were particularly anxious about having a separate chapter, "The Literature of the Galician-Volhynian Principality," which allegedly presented that polity as the "only heir of Kievan Rus's great culture." Although the later chapters appeared less problematic, the gathering suggested further developing the theme of beneficial ties with Russian literature.<sup>500</sup> However, in the same manner as the history survey, the *History of Ukrainian Literature* underwent many more rounds of discussion and editing before being finally published in 1954.<sup>501</sup>

An occasion for celebrating the ancient roots of Ukrainian culture presented itself in December 1950 in connection with the 150th anniversary of the discovery and first publication of the *Lay of Ihor's Campaign*. This patriotic poem depicting the exploits of

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<sup>499</sup> Yuri Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment," 446-47; The original speeches were published in *Pervyi vsesoiuznyi sezd sovetskikh pisatelei: Stenograficheskie otchet* (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1934), here pp. 104, 136, 142, 77, 43, 49.

<sup>500</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 1948, ark. 284 (Gudzii), 9 (the historian Boiko), 287 (ties with Russian literature).

<sup>501</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 12 April 1951, p. 2 (discussion in the Institute of World Literatures in Moscow); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2823 (proofs of Volume One, 1952); *Istoriia ukrainskoi literatury* (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo AN URSSR, 1954), 2 vols (publication).

Prince Ihor of Chernihiv, who in 1185 fought the nomadic Polovtsians (Cumans), represented the highest achievement of old Rus' literature and was included in the Soviet canon of Russian literature as an original twelfth-century work.<sup>502</sup> However Ukrainian intellectuals also claimed the poem as a part of their own Great Tradition. The festive meeting of the republican Academy of Sciences and the Writers' Union featured speeches on the poem's greatness, the advanced culture of Kievan Rus', and the work's language (said to demonstrate its relation to both modern Russian and Ukrainian), as well as Maksym Rylsky's recital of his Ukrainian translation of the *Lay*.<sup>503</sup>

However, the notion of the "national classics" referred primarily to the nineteenth century, when the local intelligentsia began developing modern Ukrainian high culture based on the peasant vernacular and folk traditions. Soviet ideologues and intellectuals basically adopted the pantheon of national classics established by the Ukrainian pre-revolutionary intelligentsia. Shevchenko topped the pantheon's structure as the "nation's father," although Franko implicitly represented a somewhat junior father figure specifically for Western Ukrainians.

To be sure, Soviet representations of these and other classical writers emphasized their political radicalism and connections to Russian culture. During the postwar decade, some figures like Kulish or Borys Hrinchenko, who had been valorized during the war, came to be suspected of "nationalism" and were dropped from the canon of Ukrainian classics. The newspapers no longer claimed Gogol as a "great son of Ukraine" but, rather, hailed him as a "great Russian writer" with the "closest of ties to Ukraine."<sup>504</sup> The author of the first literary work in modern Ukrainian, Ivan Kotliarevsky, preserved his traditional place of honor, although his biographers now highlighted Major Kotliarevsky's service in the volunteer corps during Russia's war with Napoleon.<sup>505</sup>

The authorities continued promoting the national cult of Shevchenko. Every year

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<sup>502</sup> This was the official Soviet position. Many scholars have argued that the poem was an eighteenth-century forgery and that a work of such literary quality could not have been written in the twelfth century.

<sup>503</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2003, ark. 186-96.

<sup>504</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 28 February 1952, p. 1.

<sup>505</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 30 December 1948, p. 3.

in June the party and state officials together with prominent intellectuals led the solemn pilgrimages to Shevchenko's tomb, a tradition established by Ukrainian "nationalists" in the late nineteenth century. Moreover, in 1951, the Central Committee's internal memo stated approvingly, "The annual trips of the capital's intelligentsia and students to Shevchenko's tomb are highly popular." The commemorative meetings featured unreserved glorification of the "great father" whose "image lives and will always remain in the hearts of Ukrainian people."<sup>506</sup> At the same time, the ideologues asserted that Soviet Ukraine embodied Shevchenko's dreams of the "new free family" and denied the emigre nationalists' claim for his spiritual inheritance. Postwar Soviet statements on Shevchenko presented him as a "revolutionary democrat" who headed the revolutionary wing of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood. The bard also allegedly maintained close contacts with Russian radicals, admired Russian culture, and despised contemporary Ukrainian "bourgeois nationalists."<sup>507</sup>

The official discourse also increasingly cast "junior" classical writers like Franko and Lesia Ukrainka as revolutionaries and friends of progressive Russian culture. Depending on the current political atmosphere, Franko was presented as a fighter against either "bourgeois nationalism" or "rootless cosmopolitanism," and occasionally against both these opposite trends simultaneously.<sup>508</sup> At the same time, the CP(b)U Central Committee banned V. Diachenko's book *Mykola Lysenko* because it highlighted the classical composer's role in the Ukrainian national movement, speaking "too much about Ukrainian culture and too little about the friendship [of peoples]." As it turned out, the author was killed in action during the war and his book had been submitted to the

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<sup>506</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2325, ark. 112 (memo); *Literaturna hazeta*, 24 June 1948, p. 1 (speeches). On the origins of the ritual pilgrimage, see my "Creating a Sacred Place: The Ukrainophiles and Shevchenko's Tomb in Kaniv (1861-ca. 1900)," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 20, nos. 1-2 (Summer-Winter 1995): 15-32.

<sup>507</sup> F. Ienevych, "Amerykanskyi falsyfikator ideinoi spadshchyny Shevchenka," *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, no. 8 (1949): 26-40; idem, "Velykyi syn ukrainskoho narodu." *ibid.*, no. 3 (1951): 20-29; *Literaturna hazeta*, 8 March 1951, pp. 1-2.

<sup>508</sup> S. Shakhovsky, "Suspilno-politychni pohliady Lesi Ukrainky," *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, no. 4 (1951): 33-45; M. Klymas, "Ivan Franko—neprymyrennyi borets proty natsionalizmu i kosmopolityzmu," *ibid.*, no. 8 (1951): 28-39.

publisher back in 1941, when its Ukrainian focus did not appear heretical.<sup>509</sup>

The Ukrainian functionaries and intellectuals proceeded carefully to build the cults of several "junior" classical writers who had lived during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. On 6 May 1949, Khrushchev wrote to Stalin, asking for permission to celebrate the centenary of the writer Panas Myrny (1849-1920):

In his novels *Do Oxen Bellow When the Cribs Are Full*, *Fallen Woman*, and others, he vividly described the process of class differentiation among the peasants, the exploitation of the poor by the landlords and kulaks, and the growth of revolutionary movement in the countryside. In his creative work, Panas Myrny demonstrated close links to progressive Russian writers of the nineteenth century.<sup>510</sup>

The Department of Propaganda of the All-Union Central Committee replied that the Ukrainian authorities did not actually need Moscow's permission to celebrate this anniversary in the republic. In any case, the Department approved of the proposal.<sup>511</sup> Then the Ukrainian press extolled Myrny as "our national pride," the "realist" writer and democrat who, however, "did not rise to Social Democracy." The government decreed the publication of his works, the naming of a street in Kiev after him, and the construction of a monument to Myrny in Poltava.<sup>512</sup>

The populist poet Pavlo Hrabovsky, who had been involved in the Russian *narodniki* revolutionary movement and died in Siberian exile in 1902, appeared to have been a more promising candidate for the role of a classical writer linking the ethnic tradition with the revolutionary present. On the 50th anniversary of his death, the Ukrainian Central Committee's internal memo proposed that the poet be designated as a

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<sup>509</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2357, ark. 206-09.

<sup>510</sup> RTsKhIDNI, f. 1, op. 17, d. 232, l. 47.

<sup>511</sup> *Ibid.*, l. 49.

<sup>512</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 12 May 1949, p. 1 (editorial); *Kulturne budivnytstvo*, 2: 196-98 (decree); *Literaturna hazeta*, 17 May 1951, p. 2 (monument unveiled). One could hardly imagine Myrny evolving toward Social Democracy, as the revolution had caught him in the position of the Head of the State Properties Office in Poltava province, with the title of "His Excellency."

thinker who had "accepted Marxism and became its propagandist." However, this claim was edited out, and the official pronouncements honored Hrabovsky as simply a revolutionary poet.<sup>513</sup>

Ukrainian intellectuals pushed for the canonization of the famous nineteenth-century blind peasant bard, Ostap Veresai (1803-1890). In 1950, the Institute of Ukrainian Art and Folklore, the Writers' Union, and the Composers' Union proposed the commemoration of the 60th anniversary of his death. However, Veresai had the misfortune of being admired by the "nationalists" and even invited to perform before the tsar. Accordingly, the Ukrainian party functionaries advised against this "untimely" celebration. In 1952, the Central Committee agreed to celebrate the 150th anniversary of his birth (1953), albeit "on a more modest scale than the authors had proposed," without convening an official festive gathering or erecting a monument.<sup>514</sup>

During the postwar decade, the Ukrainian functionaries and intellectuals collaborated in a peculiar "codification" of the national classics. On the one hand, they attempted to collect the surviving manuscripts of all the prominent nineteenth-century literary figures in one Kiev depository. In 1949, Korniiichuk submitted to Khrushchev the proposal to declare the heritage of several most eminent writers state property. Private persons possessing manuscripts by Kotliarevsky, Shevchenko, Franko, Lesia Ukrainka, and Kotsiubynsky would then have been required to surrender them to state organizations. The Politburo rejected this idea as "infringing on the right of personal property guaranteed in the Constitution."<sup>515</sup>

Nevertheless, the republican Central Committee supported the Institute of Ukrainian Literature in its efforts to retrieve some valuable manuscripts from the Russian depositories. As a result of Nazarenko's letter to Suslov, the Theatrical Library in Leningrad turned over the originals of many Ukrainian classical plays from the files of

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<sup>513</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2755, ark. 53-61, here 59; V. Bezpalchy, "Suspilno-politychni pohliady P. A. Hrabovskoho," *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, no. 7 (1952): 51-62; *Literaturna hazeta*, 11 December 1952, p. 3.

<sup>514</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1990, ark. 40-44 (1950); spr. 2756, ark. 69-74 (1952).

<sup>515</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 1917, ark. 22-23.

the Kiev Censorship Committee.<sup>516</sup> The republican authorities also backed up the plan to concentrate all manuscripts of Ukrainian classical writers in the Manuscript Section of the Institute of Ukrainian Literature. By 1950, this depository held "practically all" surviving writings by Shevchenko, Franko, and Myrny, as well as the majority of the other classics' manuscripts. With help from the party and the government, the Institute sponsored major efforts in 1950 and 1953 to purchase or otherwise obtain the remaining originals from the Russian archives and personal collections.<sup>517</sup>

The Institute's depository enriched itself at the expense of other Ukrainian museums and scholarly institutions. In 1950, the entire archives of Ivan Franko were moved from Lviv to Kiev, where a twenty-volume collection of the writer's works was then in preparation. Three years later, Lviv inquired about the archives' fate, but the Central Committee apparatus advised First Secretary Kyrylenko that Franko's manuscripts should remain in Kiev. When the NKVD audit of the Lviv depositories revealed the documents of Hrushevsky, Vynnychenko, and other "nationalist" authors, these holdings were also moved to Kiev and sealed there, although this time for security reasons, rather than for prestige considerations.<sup>518</sup>

The second stage of the "codification" concerned the editing and publication of the national classics. Several grandiose projects were initiated during the late 1940s. In May 1948, the governmental commission ruled that the publication of Taras Shevchenko's complete works, two volumes of which had appeared before the war, be resumed. The commission's original decision envisaged, during 1948-49, issuing the remaining literary works and letters in another four volumes. Shevchenko's *Complete Works* were indeed published in October 1949, but in a different format, in three large volumes that purported to include all of the poet's *oeuvre*. Three luxurious volumes with numerous color illustrations and in a case costing just 50 rubles had an impressive print run of 100,000. However, this edition was complete in name only, as it included only "selected letters"

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<sup>516</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 8, ark. 1-9; RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 416.

<sup>517</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 1948, ark. 1-5 (report for 1950); TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 8, spr. 9504, ark. 233-37 (1953).

<sup>518</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3308, ark. 68-70 (Franko); op. 23, spr. 4517, ark. 1-4 ("nationalists").

and reproduced only some of Shevchenko's artwork.<sup>519</sup>

By the end of 1951, the Institute of Ukrainian Literature prepared five of the envisaged ten volumes of Shevchenko's *Complete Works*. The researchers sought to undo the editorial changes introduced by the poet's "bourgeois-nationalist" mentors and, in particular, substituted the original draft of Shevchenko's autobiography for the traditional version edited by Kulish. The Institute also prepared new ideologically correct commentary for the edition. The first six volumes went to print during the early 1950s, whereas the color reproduction of Shevchenko's artistic works in the last four volumes required a sophisticated polygraphic base and had to be printed in Moscow.<sup>520</sup>

In May 1950, the Institute also prepared for publication the twenty-volume *Works* of Ivan Franko, with the intention of having the entire series published during 1950-51. Although the newspaper did not report any omissions, the editors excluded several of Franko's political articles and poems espousing what might be perceived as his "nationalistic" views. In any case, the publication of both the ten-volume works of Shevchenko and the twenty-volume *oeuvre* of Franko remained incomplete by 1954.<sup>521</sup>

As early as 1945, the republican authorities announced a plan to publish a 31-volume complete works of the "founder of Ukrainian national music," Mykola Lysenko. By 1950, this project had shrunk to 20 volumes, although their publication was nowhere in sight. In 1951, the Central Committee considered plans to establish a commission on the Ukrainian musical heritage or a special museum on this theme, but these projects were similarly shelved.<sup>522</sup>

The drive to codify and canonize the national classics by subsidizing luxurious multivolume editions of all prominent writers posed a financial problem. When the 75th

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<sup>519</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 27 May 1948, p. 3 (commission); *Kulturne budivnytstvo v Ukrainskii RSR: Cherven 1941-1950*, 423 (publication).

<sup>520</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 27 December 1951, p. 4 (ten-volume edition); TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 8, spr. 9503, ark. 153; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3662, ark. 41, 228-29 (artwork).

<sup>521</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 11 May 1950, p. 4; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3662, ark. 45 (incomplete).

<sup>522</sup> *Radianske mystetstvo*, 19 March 1947, p. 4; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2030, ark. 36-38zv. (Lysenko); op. 24, spr. 784, ark. 68-73 (commission and museum).

anniversary of Lesia Ukrainka was celebrated in 1946, the republican authorities decreed the publication of her complete works in fifteen volumes. However, when her 80th anniversary was commemorated five years later, the apparatus of Central Committee tacitly suppressed that plan and recommended instead publishing her selected works in three volumes. In 1954, the Institute of Ukrainian Literature reported that a five-volume edition of her *oeuvre* was being prepared.<sup>523</sup> As of August 1954, the publication of the works of Panas Myrny in 5 volumes, Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky in 5, Marko Vovchok in 6, Vasyl Stefanyk in 3, and Pavlo Hrabovsky in 2 volumes remained unfinished.<sup>524</sup>

During 1948-49, the authorities succeeded in publishing one-volume mass editions of the selected works of the majority of Ukrainian classical writers. The selections appeared in two popular series, "The Ukrainian Classical Novel" and "Kolkhoz Library." However, selling the books from the kolkhoz series for profit proved unrealistic. For instance, in 1949, the bookstores of Drohobych oblast in Western Ukraine received 990 copies of Franko's one-volume works and sold 175 copies, or 17.68 percent. Other Ukrainian classical writers had similarly poor sales: Kotliarevsky—80 of 400 (20 percent) and Kotsiubynsky—95 of 975 (9.74 percent), but these figures actually represented success compared to the sales of the Soviet literary works from the same series: Fadeev's *The Rout* (35 of 930, or 3.76 percent) and Furmanov's *Chapaev* (36 of 856, or 4.21 percent).<sup>525</sup> Given that the state already kept book prices artificially low, publishing the classics presented a heavy financial burden.

The literary scholars carefully edited out ideologically problematic passages from the classical works before sending them to print. As the Institute of Ukrainian Literature reported to First Secretary Oleksii Kyrychenko in 1954,

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<sup>523</sup> *Kulturne budivnytstvo*, 2: 90-91 (1946); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1990, ark. 168 (1951); spr. 3662, ark. 45 (1954).

<sup>524</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3662, ark. 45, 231-32.

<sup>525</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 1334, ark. 1-2a; *Literaturna hazeta*, 12 January 1950, pp. 2-3 (classical novel series); spr. 1768, ark. 7 (kolkhoz series). Amazingly, in the city of Drohobych, none of the 400 subscribers to Lenin's multivolume *Collected Works* in Ukrainian showed up to pick up vols. 1 and 2, and only 9 out of 350 cared to collect the seven available volumes of Stalin's *Works* (*ibid.*, spr. 1768, ark. 15-16). Thus, the Ukrainian classics appeared to have been far more popular than the writings of the Soviet leaders.



Literary works and other materials of Ukrainian classical writers (some letters, notes, etc.) are not being included in their collected works if these materials are of no socio-political and literary-historical importance, or if they can prompt in the present-day reader a reaction incompatible with the Soviet policy of mass education. By the way, the number of such materials in Ukrainian classical heritage is insignificant.<sup>526</sup>

The literary critics openly expressed similar views in print, as did Olena Shpylova when she argued that the mass editions of the classics should exclude works "uncharacteristic" of a particular writer. Applying this rule to Lesia Ukrainka, Shpylova proposed that the drama *The Boyar Lady* depicting the life of the ruling classes be dropped from the mass edition.<sup>527</sup>

However, one should not presume that the party apparatus fully relied on the Ukrainian literary scholars' "internal censors." In 1951, the experts of the Central Committee halted the publication of Volume Four of Kotsiubynsky's *Works* because some of his letters "contained certain mistaken statements, fortuitous in the writer's *oeuvre*," while other intimate letters represented "no historical-literary interest." The functionaries demanded the exclusion of the letters in which Kotsiubynsky had referred to his literary "European school" and the influence of Ibsen and Maeterlinck, as well as the letters to the "nationalists" Mykola Shrah, Borys Hrinchenko, Mykhailo Komarov, and others, in which the writer had approved of their activities, mentioned Hrushevsky, and made problematic comments about the Russians.<sup>528</sup> In a communication to Nazarenko, the director of the Institute of Ukrainian Literature, Oleksandr Biletsky, strongly defended the original selection of letters, but to no avail. The debate between the Institute; Derzhlitvydav, the state publishing house; and the Central Committee lasted exactly ten months, and the completion of Kotsiubynsky's five-volume *Works* was delayed for

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<sup>526</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3662, ark. 46.

<sup>527</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 6 August 1953, p. 4.

<sup>528</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 72, spr. 1, ark. 18-19 (halt); ark. 91-94 and op. 30, spr. 2357, ark. 112-15 (incriminating letters).

years.<sup>529</sup> The censors likewise banned the publication of Myrny's letters to the publishing house Vik (The Age) simply because they were addressed to the "bourgeois nationalist" director of Vik, Serhii Iefremov. The Institute of Ukrainian Literature proposed dropping Iefremov's name and including the valuable letters in Myrny's *Works*, but the Central Committee shelved the matter. Eventually, Myrny's *Works* were published without his letters to Iefremov.<sup>530</sup>

The question of ethnic terminology in nineteenth-century literary works created another controversy. Many leading lights of Ukrainian literature referred to their Jewish fictional characters as *zhyd*, the word customary in nineteenth-century Ukrainian but used in a pejorative sense in modern Russian. In Soviet Ukraine, the word *zhyd* eventually came to be outlawed in favor of the Russian *ievrei*, with *zhyd* now being understood as "Yid." However, Shevchenko, Franko and other classical writers used *zhyd* in all their works. Some of them, like Shevchenko and Myrny, also referred to the Russians as *katsapy*, a term that was then and still remained definitely offensive. The Ukrainian censorship did not question these words in Shevchenko's poetry, where changing them would destroy the metre, or in the twenty-volume works of Franko. Despite that, in 1953, the censors banned the mass edition of Franko's *Boryslav Stories* as "anti-Semitic." The printing of the first two volumes of Myrny's *Works* was also halted because of the references to *katsapy* and *zhydy*. The Institute of Ukrainian Literature defended the authentic terminology, and the matter went to the Central Committee.<sup>531</sup>

The controversy ended up being reported to First Secretary Kyrychenko. The Institute argued that the Soviet editions of Pushkin, Gogol, Turgenev, Tolstoy, and Gorky preserved the original ethnic terminology even when it appeared to have been used in a derogatory sense. The Russian classical works were full of references to *zhidy* and *khokhly* (Russian pejoratives for Jews and Ukrainians). The discussion ended in a

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<sup>529</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 72, spr. 1, ark. 95-100 (Biletsky protesting); op. 30, spr. 3662, ark. 231 (Volume Four still not published in 1954).

<sup>530</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3662, ark. 191-93.

<sup>531</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 3510, ark. 81-85, 118-22.

compromise. The Central Committee allowed the preservation of the original terminology unless it was used in clearly derogatory sense, in which case it was desirable to edit or eliminate the whole sentence.<sup>532</sup>

As the Ukrainian authorities supervised the codification of the "national heritage," they also ensured that the intellectuals in the newly reunited Western regions adopted the same cultural canon. Consequently, the Galicians needed to revise the familiar "nationalistic" list of Ukrainian cultural patrimony in accordance with the new Soviet version, and the Transcarpathians and Bukovynians occasionally required tutoring in their "Ukrainianness."

In 1947, the republican Central Committee noted serious mistakes in the ideological work of the Chernivtsi oblast party organization. The memo charged Bukovynian party cadres with promoting local patriotism at the expense of a common Soviet Ukrainian identity:

The notions of the "Bukovynian people," "green Bukovyna," "our Bukovyna," "Bukovynian culture," etc. are constantly invoked and valorized by the local leadership and residents during the meetings and in the press. The designation "Chernivtsi oblast" is used rarely, being forced out by the names "green Bukovyna," "Northern Bukovyna," or just "Bukovyna." This creates a propitious ground for the cultivation of a peculiar Bukovynian narrow-mindedness in the oblast. A section of the [party] activists and intellectuals of local background claim that they are "not Ukrainians but Bukovynians" and that "Ukraine is not here but over there, beyond the Dniester."<sup>533</sup>

The Central Committee demanded that the oblast party organization educate the locals as "citizens of Soviet Ukraine." Afterwards, Ukrainian ideologues went on the alert in case Bukovynian regionalism surfaced again. In 1954, the republican leadership suppressed local plans to commemorate the 120th anniversary of birth of the Bukovynian writer Osyp Fedkovych by naming Chernivtsi University after him and erecting a monument to him

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<sup>532</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3662, ark. 43, 47.

<sup>533</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 4063, ark. 2-3.

in Chernivtsi.<sup>534</sup>

In 1948, the Ukrainian Central Committee sent to Transcarpathia two inspectors, the historian Serhii Bilousov and the literary scholar Mykola Pyvovarov. Bilousov arrived to illuminate the local functionaries on the questions they found confusing: the "national origins of the Transcarpathian people" and the proper appraisal of the nineteenth-century *moskvofily* (Russophile) writers, who could be seen as either "reactionary" because they denied a separate Ukrainian national identity and idealized tsarist Russia, or as "progressive" since they considered themselves as belonging to Russian culture as it was then conceived. Bilousov supported the position of the oblast first secretary, I. D. Kompaniiets, who decided to halt the "harmful spontaneous discussion" of these matters by local intellectuals. After delivering eleven lectures and contributing an article to the local newspaper, Bilousov returned to Kiev, where he recommended that the Central Committee strengthen the propaganda of Ukrainian history, culture, and classical heritage in Transcarpathia.<sup>535</sup>

Pyvovarov arrived in Transcarpathia to help the local cadres define the role of three nineteenth-century local writers: Oleksandr Dukhnovych, Oleksandr Pavlovych, and Oleksandr Mytrak. All three were Russophile priests of the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church, whom the local authorities initially profiled as "progressive" but later, in the wake of the anti-Uniate campaign, reclassified as obscurantists and paid agents of the Vatican. In contrast, the local intellectuals considered the three "popular poets and the people's leaders." What was more, the head of the oblast administration's Department of Art, Petro Lintur, insisted that Transcarpathia had its own Ruthenian or Carpatho-Ruthenian literary tradition and "ignored any connections with Ukrainian literature." Pyvovarov recommended that Dukhnovych, Pavlovych, and Mytrak be adopted into the canon of Ukrainian classical literature and into college courses in Ukrainian literature. He also suggested publishing their best works in contemporary Ukrainian and preparing a

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<sup>534</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 3503, ark. 37-48.

<sup>535</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 1441, ark. 1-2; spr. 1509, ark. 1-12, 13-17zv.

collection of "Ukrainian folksongs of Transcarpathia."<sup>536</sup>

### **In the House of History**

During the postwar decade and especially after 1950, Ukrainian authorities paid extraordinary attention to the republic's museums as sites where ordinary citizens encountered the past. Already in 1945, Ukrainian museums registered more than one million visitors. In 1949, 1,939,700 people visited 27 major museums financed from the republican budget, while another 326,200 came to the oblast-level museums and 709,100 attended the district museums.<sup>537</sup> From 1945 most museums were supervised by the republican Committee on Cultural and Educational Institutions, although some remained under the Committee for the Arts. Of the twenty-five major museums under the former Committee's administration in 1947, one was classified as "historical-revolutionary," fourteen as "historical," and ten as "literary-memorial." The Committee, however, had neither the financial means nor the cadres necessary to oversee the museums' work.<sup>538</sup>

In February 1950, the republic's Council of Ministers issued a crucial decree on museums. Aside from organizational restructuring, it envisaged a total audit of all existing museums and an ideological revision of their expositions, which had to be approved by special commissions. The decree expected historical museums to "display the heroic history of the Ukrainian people in connection with the history of the great Russian people and other fraternal peoples of the USSR." Western Ukrainian museums were required to "stress the common origins and historic unity of the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian peoples, as well as the toilers' struggle for their social and national liberation, against the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Poland of the gentry." The decree directed that all

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<sup>536</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 1521, ark. 1-9. This was the same Professor Lintur who was accused in 1945 of avoiding the term "Western Ukraine" and referring to Transcarpathia as "Rus'." See Chapter Two and Magocsi, *The Shaping of a National Identity*, 254, 268.

<sup>537</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 4762, op. 1, spr. 15, ark. 2 (1945); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2047, ark. 104 (1949).

<sup>538</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 4762, op. 1, spr. 172, ark. 1 (statistics); S. Z. Zaremba, *Ukrainske pamiatkoznavstvo: Istoriiia, teoriia, suchasnist* (Kiev: Lohos, 1995), pp. 404-05 (Committee). In what follows, I will refer to the museums financed from the republican budget as "national."

historical museums open separate sections devoted to the Soviet period.<sup>539</sup>

The 1950 decree, however, did not resolve the problem of standardizing museum practices and controlling the expositions. Rather, it highlighted the enormous financial and human effort involved in such a project. Republican authorities could bring together museum administrators from oblasts to discuss principles of restructuring, but could not offer additional jobs or financing. The Academy of Sciences charged its Institute of History of Ukraine with reviewing new exposition descriptions for the national museums, but this task had a low priority compared to that of the completion of a survey history.<sup>540</sup>

In June, the head of the Committee on Cultural and Educational Institutions, Iakiv Sirchenko, reported to Nazarenko on the measures taken by local museums. Although the memo was written to show how the decree had changed museums' work, this document actually portrayed the field in a state of disarray. Local museums reported on whatever they had accomplished, rather than on how they had implemented the party's directive. The Dnipropetrovsk Historical Museum described developing its section on the Zaporozhian Host "and its importance for the Ukrainian people's struggle for liberation." The Lviv Historical Museum boasted of its new archaeological section, which "proved that the Slavs were autochthonous settlers of Western Ukrainian lands." While the Dnipropetrovsk museum planned to create a separate Soviet history section, its Lviv counterpart did not even have a display on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Moreover, the Central Committee commission found that materials on earlier times did not uncover the reactionary role of the Uniate Church and the region's historic ties with Russia.<sup>541</sup>

The Lviv Literary-Memorial Museum of Ivan Franko reported revising its exposition "in the spirit of Soviet literary scholarship," but an exhibition in the writer's small museum in Franko's native village was deemed "unacceptable." Republican

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<sup>539</sup> *Kulturne budivnytstvo*, 2: 213-20.

<sup>540</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 4762, op. 1, spr. 449, ark. 3-9 (museum workers); NAIU, op. 1, spr. 216, ark. 4; spr. 357, ark. 1-16 (historians).

<sup>541</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2047, ark. 54-55.

ideologues focused their attention on the shortcomings of museum work in Western Ukraine, although museums in Eastern and Central Ukraine were also not reporting impressive achievements. The only breakthrough in the East seemed to be the accelerated construction of the Museum of the Battle at Poltava. However, the February decree specifically demanded that attention be paid to this museum commemorating Peter the Great's victory over the Swedish army and the "traitor" Hetman Mazepa in 1709.<sup>542</sup>

What was more, the 1950 decree and subsequent reports neglected to mention a disturbing fact looming large in archival correspondence. In mid-1950, the Central Committee apparatus reported to First Secretary Melnikov statistical data on museums attendance, showing that the Kievan Caves Monastery was the most popular historical museum in Ukraine. In 1949, it registered 110,700 visitors, compared to 73,100 at the Shevchenko Museum in Kiev and 70,200 at the new Museum of Odessa's Defense in Odessa. During the first ten months of 1950, the Caves Monastery reported 137,000 visitors, compared to 80,000 at the Shevchenko Museum, and 49,835 at the State Historical Museum in Kiev.<sup>543</sup>

The Kievan Caves Monastery was more than simply a cluster of museums or an "historical-cultural preserve." Occupying a picturesque site in a park high on the Dnieper hills, the golden-domed churches of this eleventh-century monastery embodied the history of church architecture from Kievan Rus' to Cossack Ukraine. The ancient caves and churches represented a vivid material link to Kievan Rus', whose first known chronicler, artist, and doctor all were monks in the Kievan Caves. The monastery's many other monuments attested to the Ukrainian cultural revival of early modern times, particularly the development of printing and establishment of higher learning. For centuries, the Kievan Caves Monastery with its relics and tombs of holy hermits served as one of the most popular places of pilgrimage in the Russian Empire. Soviet authorities used its

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<sup>542</sup> Ibid., ark. 56-63. The Museum of the Battle at Poltava opened in September 1950, but the pre-revolutionary monuments on the battlefield still needed repair in 1953 (ibid., op. 30, spr. 2047, ark. 101; spr. 3261, ark. 11-13; TsDAVOV, f. 4762, op. 1, spr. 343, ark. 1-150).

<sup>543</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2047, ark. 104. The Lenin Museum in Kiev reported 186,836 visitors during 1950, but the authorities were sending students and soldiers in the tens of thousands for obligatory homage there (ibid., spr. 1989, ark. 36).

buildings to house the Museums of Historical Treasures (primarily church antiquities provided with materialistic interpretations), the Book and Book Printing, Theater, Ukrainian Decorative Folk Arts, and others.

Visitors, however, were apparently attracted primarily to the historic site itself. Some complained that none of the museums featured a coherent display on the history of the Kievan Caves Monastery; others regretted the absence of postcards with views of the monastery's golden domes.<sup>544</sup> Public interest forced Ukrainian functionaries to pay special attention to this museum complex, which was, ideologically, not on their lists of priorities. To complicate matters further, the wartime rapprochement between the Soviet leadership and the Orthodox Church enabled a small community of monks to return to the Kievan Caves. Purely religious pilgrimages to the monastery resumed as well, to the consternation of Ukrainian ideologues.<sup>545</sup> Nevertheless, the republic's leadership demonstrated great concern about the proper maintenance and renovation of the Kievan Caves Historical-Cultural Preserve.<sup>546</sup>

Ukrainian authorities realized that the Kievan Caves Monastery as a historic site had Kiev's past religious glory as its primary referent and instructed the museum guides to cast its buildings and treasures as "history of East Slavic material culture."<sup>547</sup> Periodic "cleansings" of museum holdings aimed primarily at church history and religious art. Thus, a 1953 act on writing off the "decrepit and less valuable" engravings lists the eighteenth-century portraits of bishops, metropolitans, Prince Volodymyr the Saint, as well as a depiction of Christ's interment and other religious works.<sup>548</sup> The authorities closely supervised the "political education" of museum staff. When the research fellow

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<sup>544</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2047, ark. 145.

<sup>545</sup> In 1952, a rumor spreading among the pilgrims put the Ukrainian Central Committee on alert. The monks were allegedly telling visitors that the hermit Archbishop Antonii, who was buried at the entrance to the Near Caves, had been Comrade Stalin's teacher at the Gori Church Seminary and until the end of his life corresponded with the Soviet leader (TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2769, ark. 158).

<sup>546</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2047, ark. 37-46, 83-85; spr. 3655, ark. 144-52. Renovations of this large complex of historic monuments were extremely costly. In 1950, only the most urgent maintenance work required was estimated at 12 million rubles (TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 8, spr. 2040, ark. 243).

<sup>547</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2047, ark. 145.

<sup>548</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 5116, op. 10, spr. 20, ark. 6-12.



Slobodianiuk announced at a staff meeting in 1951 that "political education is the responsibility of the deputy director, secretary of the party group, and party members; we, the specialists, should engage in scholarship and not in politics," this incident was reported to First Secretary Melnikov himself.<sup>549</sup>

In July 1951, *Pravda's* editorial "Against Ideological Distortions in Literature" triggered a comprehensive campaign of ideological purification in Ukrainian literature, scholarship, and the arts. However, the search for "nationalist deviations" did not envelop the republic's museums until the late autumn. On 13 September, *Pravda's* Lviv correspondent M. Odinets initiated the critique with his article "What Do the Lviv Museums Popularize?" The authoritative newspaper's envoy announced that the Lviv Historical Museum had indulged in undue glorification of princes, lords, sultans, Cossack colonels, and bishops. Most disturbingly, the display on Kievan Rus' featured an unidentified twelfth-century princely skull on a stand covered with a glass bell. The exposition in general allegedly downplayed such major themes as class struggle and the Ukrainian people's efforts to reunite with their Russian brethren. The Lviv State Museum of Ukrainian Art emphasized the old Ukrainian artistic tradition over achievements of the Soviet period. The Lviv Art Gallery featured an impressive collection of Polish, German, Austrian, Italian, and Dutch paintings "in splendid frames," but the Russian nineteenth-century classics were represented by a mere thirty-two works out of five hundred. The gallery had no more than a dozen Soviet paintings.<sup>550</sup>

The *Pravda* article resulted in heightened attention to Ukrainian museums in the latter phase of the ideological purge during October and November 1951. On 15 October, the CP(b)U Central Committee adopted a resolution calling for better portrayal in the republic's museums of the friendship of peoples, class struggle, and Soviet achievements.<sup>551</sup> The Kiev party authorities reacted by firing several employees of the

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<sup>549</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 785, ark. 141.

<sup>550</sup> *Pravda*, 13 September 1951, p. 3. Odinets was relying on the results of a museums audit organized by the Lviv oblast party committee, but his *Pravda* article made the state of Ukrainian museums a major political issue in the republic.

<sup>551</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2769, ark. 1.

State Historical Museum who had remained in the city under Nazi occupation, had been POWs, or had relatives in the Gulag. The document did not clarify the connection between these people's tainted pasts and the museum's failure to develop a proper exhibition on the Soviet period. The Kherson oblast party committee requested that the local historical museum create a display on the ancient Slavs, add more materials on the union with Russia, and drastically improve the display on Soviet history. The Vinnytsia authorities requested from their museums a better portrayal of historic ties with Russia, as well as of the Soviet present. In Drohobych and Chernivtsi, the local functionaries also focused on the depiction of Russian-Ukrainian friendship and Soviet achievements.<sup>552</sup>

Not surprisingly, the errors of the Lviv museums received special attention. At the November, 1951, plenary meeting of the Central Committee, Iakiv Sirchenko stated that "it would not be enough to put away the princely skull and the portraits of the lords," and that the Lviv Historical Museum needed a radical review of its whole exposition.<sup>553</sup> The museum did not close its doors, receiving during 1951 more than 55,000 visitors. At the same time, its staff proceeded to create a new exhibition on prehistoric times, to dismantle a display on Greek and Scythian cities of the Black Sea coast, and to prepare a new exhibition on Kievan Rus'. Given the *Pravda* critique, the museum submitted the new plan of its Kievan Rus' section for approval by the Ukrainian Central Committee. The display on the early modern period was revised to highlight the cultural ties with Muscovy during the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. The work started on the exhibitions devoted to the periods of Capitalism and Socialism. These, however, were not opened until late in 1954.<sup>554</sup>

Before the historians at the Lviv Historical Museum began working on new displays, the local functionaries had "removed the documents and exhibits distorting the

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<sup>552</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 1090, ark. 42-45 (Kiev), 57-60 (Kherson), 72-57 (Vinnytsia); spr. 1105, ark. 86 (Drohobych), 124 (Chernivtsi).

<sup>553</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 1, spr. 972, ark. 234. Sirchenko was chairman of the Ukrainian Committee on Cultural and Educational Institutions, which supervised historical museums.

<sup>554</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 4762, op. 1, spr. 562, ark. 1-12 (1951); spr. 669, ark. 4-6 (1952); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3655, ark. 179-90 (1954).

history of the Ukrainian people, as well as reviewed the whole exposition and cleared rubbish (*khlam*) from it."<sup>555</sup> During 1952, a similar purge of expositions continued in other Ukrainian museums under the guise of "removing the exhibits without historical value." These included the remnants of the nation-centric narrative of Ukrainian history. For instance, the regional historical museum in Poltava wrote off the engraving of Hetman Mazepa, portraits of princes and nineteenth-century "nationalists" such as Kulish and Pavlo Chubynsky, photos of Ukrainian icons and traditional peasant costumes.<sup>556</sup> In Lviv, the former ideological secretary of the Central Committee and now the first secretary of the oblast party committee, Lytvyn, personally supervised the destruction of "nationalistic and anti-Soviet" holdings of the State Museum of Ukrainian Art. Portraits of the Habsburgs, hierarchs of the Greek Catholic Church, and the Ukrainian Sich Sharpshooters were burned, and the sculptures broken with a hammer.<sup>557</sup>

In February 1952, the Rivne party authorities reviewed the exposition of the local historical museum. They criticized the painting *Pope Innocent III Asks Prince Roman of Halych to Accept Catholicism* (1206) as reflecting the influence of Catholicism and Polish bourgeois historical concepts, complete with "diminishing Russia's historic role." The museum did not sufficiently highlight the emergence of Moscow, paid too much attention to the 1569 union between Poland and Lithuania, and did not show Shevchenko's ties with Russian revolutionary democrats. The museum's display on Soviet Ukraine incorrectly concentrated on the Ukrainian people's struggle against the Polish oppression and German invasion, rather than presenting the 1939 "reunification" and victory in the war as fruits of a general effort by all Soviet peoples.<sup>558</sup>

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<sup>555</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2769, ark. 26. In the process, the Hermitage Museum in Leningrad secured for itself a valuable collection of ancient Assyrian cuneiform writings held in the Lviv Historical Museum (ibid., ark. 11-13).

<sup>556</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 5116, op. 10, spr. 20, ark. 13-20.

<sup>557</sup> Rublov and Cherchenko, *Stalinshchyna i dolia zakhidnoukrainskoi intelihentsii*, 238. On the ideological control over the Museum of Ukrainian Art see also *Kulturne zhyttia v Ukraini: Zakhidni zemli*, 1: 671-74.

<sup>558</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2769, ark. 16-19. This file also allows a glimpse into the attendance of regional museums. During 1951, the Rivne museum registered 9,046 visitors, including 3,480 schoolchildren (ibid., ark. 21).

By March 1952, several leading Ukrainian historical museums (in Kiev, Kharkiv, and Chernivtsi) reported completing their revisions of the pre-revolutionary sections and building comprehensive expositions on Soviet Ukraine. Others were still restructuring their displays. In May, a special conference of museum workers from the Western oblasts took place in Chernivtsi, discussing primarily the new focus on the Soviet period. In July, the Central Committee reiterated the same directives in another resolution on museums and, in 1953, ordered one more survey of the museums' compliance.<sup>559</sup>

At least in some cases, however, the party's ideological regimentation of Ukrainian museums led to ambiguous results. Before the campaigns of the early 1950s, the State Museum of Ukrainian Art in Kiev did not have an exhibition on Kievan Rus'. The exposition began with the sixteenth-century Ukrainian folk art and icons, whereas the State Museum of Russian Art in Kiev boasted a collection of ancient Kievan icons, including the famous thirteenth-century image of SS. Borys and Hlib.<sup>560</sup> In early 1951, the Museum of Ukrainian Art was closed for renovations and exposition restructuring aimed to prove the "beneficial influence" of Russian art. In practice, this reorganization resulted in an imposing display of ancient Kievan art as a part of Ukrainian culture. The authorities transferred to the museum numerous ceramic bowls and jewelry from the Archaeological Museum, as well as low-relief carvings of Samson and Delilah from the Kievan Caves Monastery. While reviewing the new exposition in 1952, the members of the governmental commission recommended "collecting more art of Kievan Rus'." The press also suggested building up the Kievan Rus' section.<sup>561</sup>

The artist Mykhailo Derehus, who was known for his work on the Cossack epoch, proposed the removal from the museum's exhibition, for "not presenting significant interest," of the portrait of the Russian imperial bureaucrat Prince Dolgorukii, painted in the characteristic Cossack style of the early eighteenth century. The commission members

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<sup>559</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2769, ark. 23-27 (March 1952); 56-59 (May 1952); spr. 3261, ark. 87 (July 1952), 74-75 (1953).

<sup>560</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 4763, op. 1, spr. 58, ark. 27, 28zv (Ukrainian art), 16 (Russian art).

<sup>561</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2769, ark. 64 ("beneficial influence"), 69 (Kievan art), 88 (more needed); *Radianske mystetstvo*, 14 May 1952, p. 4.

supported Derehus's suggestion to display instead a "unique" portrait of the Cossack nobleman Myklashevsky. First Secretary Melnikov himself demanded the exhibition of more "Ukrainian classical paintings."<sup>562</sup> As a result of such a restructuring, the new exposition claimed Kievan Rus' for the history of Ukrainian art and boosted national pride by presenting a comprehensive display of Ukrainian artistic accomplishments during the Cossack period and the age of national revival.

Memorial museums of Ukrainian classical writers also experienced perennial ideological audits during the early 1950s, but the authorities never seemed satisfied with the revisions. These museums' primary referent was writers' contribution to Ukrainian culture, that is, to the development of the nation. Some writers proved difficult to fit into the "Soviet" line of ancestry. For example, Kotliarevsky, who was the first to write literary works in the peasant vernacular, could not be cast as a "revolutionary" of any kind. Still, in May 1950, the authorities opened a museum in his Poltava house. Second Secretary Kyrychenko paid homage to the museum during his visit to the city in January 1953.<sup>563</sup>

The nineteenth-century literary giants Shevchenko, Franko, and Lesia Ukrainka could, with different degrees of success, be cast as revolutionaries and friends of progressive Russian culture.<sup>564</sup> In 1952, the Committee on Cultural and Educational Institutions reported to the Ukrainian party leadership that the restructuring of expositions in literary-memorial museums

was directed to portray more profoundly the ideological content of a writer's works, a writer's role in the development of progressive Ukrainian literature, [a writer's] struggle for social and national liberation of the Ukrainian people, for

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<sup>562</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2769, ark. 85 (Derehus), 119 (Melnikov).

<sup>563</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2047, ark. 14-17; *Kulturne budivnytstvo*, 2: 221-22 (opened); TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 8, spr. 2531, ark. 12. After reviewing the exposition, Kyrychenko suggested that the home of the classical writer lacked quality carpets.

<sup>564</sup> Although plans existed to open the Lesia Ukrainka Museum in Kiev, this was not accomplished during the postwar decade due to the lack of financing (TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 8, spr. 9503, ark. 139, 148). The Franko Museum in Lviv operated since 1946, and a new museum in Franko's native village was opened in 1951 (G. G. Mezentseva, *Muzei Ukrainy*, 162; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 774, ark. 11-12).

strengthening friendship with the great Russian people and against the enemies of the Ukrainian people, the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists.<sup>565</sup>

The question remained whether this interpretation would sufficiently modify classical writers' primary symbolic role as the great builders of the national culture.

In addition to the museums in Shevchenko's native village and on the poet's tomb in Kaniv, the State Shevchenko Museum was solemnly opened in Kiev in April 1949. As noted earlier, it soon became the second most attended historical museum in the republic after the Kievan Caves Monastery. During 1949-1954, more than 542,000 people visited the museum.<sup>566</sup> However, the Ukrainian ideologues were constantly worried about proper presentation of Shevchenko in the museum's exposition, which had to connect Shevchenko's life and thoughts to the Soviet present. In 1953, the apparatus of the Central Committee did not allow the museum to commission a painting entitled *T. H. Shevchenko among the Members of the Brotherhood of SS. Cyril and Methodius*, because such a canvas would inevitably have portrayed the "bourgeois nationalists" Kulish and Kostomarov as the great poet's comrades-in-arms.<sup>567</sup> After all the ideological audits of the early 1950s, the Central Committee concluded in 1954 that the museum did not "sufficiently present Shevchenko as revolutionary and depict his ties with Russia." In order to connect the "nation's father" to Soviet Ukraine, halls 16 to 22 of the museum showed how the poet's legacy was being cherished after the revolution, yet even this emphasis was not considered adequate.<sup>568</sup>

The Soviet Ukrainian ideologues were well aware that their image of Shevchenko still had too much in common with the one treasured by the "bourgeois nationalists." The "nationalistic" Shevchenko was also the father of the nation, the greatest poet, and radical

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<sup>565</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 4762, op. 1, spr. 669, ark. 6-7.

<sup>566</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 28 April 1949, p. 2 (opened); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3674, ark. 95 (number of visitors).

<sup>567</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3261, ark. 33.

<sup>568</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3674, ark. 95-97 (1954 audit); Mezentsseva, *Muzei Ukrainy*, 134 (halls 16 to 22).

social thinker. He did not, however, admire Russian culture or emulate the Russian revolutionary democrats. In 1952, the Soviet authorities attempted to impose their vision of Shevchenko on the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada by donating the exposition to the Shevchenko Museum in Palermo, Ontario. The exhibition constituted an abridged version of the Kiev museum, intended to fit into four halls. The ideologues decided further to strengthen some elements of the Soviet image of Shevchenko so as to highlight its difference from nationalistic interpretations. They suggested that the museum "emphasize Shevchenko's role as a fighter for the best dreams of the toiling people, while stressing [his] love of the great Russian people and their best representatives." The exposition's prospectus presented the October Revolution and the great construction sites of Soviet Ukraine as Shevchenko's dreams come true.<sup>569</sup>

Finally, mindful of the forthcoming tercentenary of the 1654 union with Russia (January 1954), both Ukrainian functionaries and museum workers became concerned about rebuilding museum exhibitions on the early modern period. During 1952-53, the republic's museums acquired and put on display hundreds of exhibits pertaining to the Cossack period. The new expositions ostensibly highlighted the friendship of peoples and the Ukrainians' desire to unite with the Russian brethren. Nevertheless, the new museum displays also rehabilitated the cult of the glorious Cossack ancestors, which had remained largely suppressed after the campaigns of 1947 and 1951. The Kiev Historical Museum bought three original *universaly* (decrees) of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. The Chernihiv museum displayed the hetman's sabre, numerous historic documents, and authentic Cossack clothing and arms. The Pereiaslav-Khmelnytsky museum acquired three seventeenth-century cannons and a Tatar sabre, sculptures of Khmelnytsky and his colonels Kryvonis and Bohun, and copies of several historical paintings. The Ukrainian authorities solicited the authentic arms for Pereiaslav-Khmelnytsky from the holdings of the Moscow Historical Museum. The Kharkiv museum purchased Cossack arms,

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<sup>569</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 1890, ark. 1-155, here 4; RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 133, d. 378, ll. 1-334. In 1954, the Soviet authorities begun preparing a similar Franko Museum for Canada. The exposition's main ideas were formulated as follows: the beneficiary influence of Russian culture on Franko, his acquaintance with the ideas of scientific socialism, his struggle against bourgeois nationalists and for reunification with Russia (GARF, f. 6646, op. 1, d. 360, l. 2).

sculptures and portraits of the Cossack leaders, and numerous historical paintings. The Kharkivans could afford the originals of seven canvases, including both Soviet works and pre-revolutionary paintings such as Feodosii Krasysky's *A Guest from the Zaporozhian Host* (1901, variants 1910 and 1916), the work previously cited as an example of nationalistic "romantic idealization" of the Ukrainian past.<sup>570</sup>

### **Sites of Remembrance**

The Soviet authorities' management of historical monuments and memorials during the postwar decade revealed both a desire for total ideological control over historic sites and a lack of financial and administrative means for such supervision.

In April 1946, the Ukrainian Committee on Cultural and Educational Institutions established a special Administration for the Preservation of Historic and Cultural Monuments. The Administration announced the creation of its sections in all Ukrainian oblasts. At the same time, in August 1946, the republic's government created a parallel *ad hoc* structure, the Commission on the Preservation of the Monuments of Culture and Antiquity, which was headed by Deputy Premier Mykola Bazhan. The Administration's sections in most oblasts stopped functioning by the end of 1946, whereas the Commission lacked full-time staff and never established its local representations. As a result, compiling the inventory of monuments proceeded in a haphazard manner and lasted well into the 1960s.<sup>571</sup>

Financial constraints severely limited the authorities' plans for maintenance and restoration work. As explained above, Ukrainian functionaries paid special attention to two large historic sites that also functioned as museums: the Kievan Caves Monastery and the Poltava battlefield. The republic's leadership repeatedly ordered urgent renovations at both sites, yet it did not have the means to afford extensive restoration work, requiring at the Kievan Caves an estimated 12 million rubles, and at Poltava, 2 million.

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<sup>570</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 5116, op. 10, spr. 16, ark. 19 (Kiev), 20 (Chernihiv and Pereiaslav-Khmelnytsky), 39-46 (Kharkiv); f. 4762, op. 1, spr. 669, ark. 11 (Chernihiv).

<sup>571</sup> S. I. Kot, *Okhorona, vykorystannia ta propahanda pamiatok istorii ta kultury v Ukrainskii RSR* (Kiev: Instytut istorii NANU, 1989), pt. 3, pp. 106-08.



Consequently, work at both sites was limited to the most urgent maintenance measures. As late as 1954-55, the republic's government kept postponing the implementation of its own decisions on extensive renovations there.<sup>572</sup>

Nonetheless, the authorities remained committed to the idea of the comprehensive catalogization of historical monuments. By January 1953, the still incomplete all-Ukrainian inventory included 43,206 historical and 4,002 archaeological monuments. Although the overwhelming majority of "historical monuments" represented the wartime graves of Soviet soldiers, the effort was impressive nonetheless.<sup>573</sup> In 1946-47, the republic's government established two major historical preserves in the south, the Olbia and Bilhorod-Dnistrovskiy Fortress. Both contained the ruins of ancient Greek colonies on the Black Sea, Olbia and Tira, while Bilhorod also featured a thirteenth-century Genovese fortress.<sup>574</sup> However, the Ukrainian and all-Union governments did not have the financial resources to maintain these preserves. When, in 1954, archaeologists from Heidelberg University asked for a permission to visit Olbia, Tira, and Chersonesus, the experts of the CPSU Central Committee reported to their superiors that "most excavation sites of these ancient cities are not preserved well because they have not been guarded and the foreign scholars' visit to these excavation sites is undesirable."<sup>575</sup>

The plight of historical monuments far from the capitals was illustrated by the Zbarazh fortress (1631), a witness of the Cossack wars and a registered historic site, where a Soviet Army unit was nevertheless stationed in 1950 and some unidentified persons, apparently soldiers, were dismantling parts of the fortress and using the bricks

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<sup>572</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2047, ark. 37-46, 83-85 (Kievan Caves), 101-04 (Poltava); spr. 3655, ark. 144-52 (Kievan Caves, 1954-55); TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 7, spr. 9494, ark. 10-78; f. 4762, op. 1, spr. 669, ark. 20 (Poltava, 1949-53).

<sup>573</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 4762, op. 1, spr. 669, ark. 19. In Kharkiv oblast, the local authorities registered by 1950 5,900 historic and archaeological sites, but more than 5,500 were mass and individual graves of Soviet soldiers. The list of monuments shrunk dramatically during the late 1950s, when the authorities "consolidated" the wartime burials into a smaller number of large mass graves (Kot, *Okhorona, vykorystannia ta propahanda*, 119).

<sup>574</sup> *Kulturne budivnytstvo*, 2: 98 (Olbia); TsDAVOV, f. 4762, op. 1, spr. 164, ark. 3-5 (Bilhorod-Dnistrovskiy).

<sup>575</sup> TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 17, d. 470, ll. 265-73, here 272. In addition, all these historical preserves were located in the border security zone.

for construction. Acting on a message from local intellectuals, Deputy Premier Bazhan was able to stop the destruction, but not to restore the damage or relocate the military detachment.<sup>576</sup>

The Ukrainian authorities struggled to maintain at least the most famous historic monuments in the largest cities. Even the minor maintenance work on Kiev historic sites forced Bazhan to search for unorthodox financing solutions. In 1947, he was able to allocate modest funds for strengthening the walls of St. Cyril's Church and financing excavations on the territory of St. Sophia Cathedral, but failed to persuade the city council to finance the maintenance work in the tenth-century Zvirynets caves. The city provided 47,000 rubles to strengthen the ruins of the eleventh-century Golden Gates "with the aim of preventing their further deterioration," but this sum covered only the purchase of the bricks, cement, and sheet iron, while the actual work had to be postponed until 1949. In 1948, the Commission on the Preservation of Historical Monuments approved the lease of the landmark eighteenth-century St. Andrew Church to the Orthodox Church, which had promised to make renovations there.<sup>577</sup>

By 1951, another symbol of Kiev, the monument to Prince Volodymyr the Saint (1853), also needed urgent renovations. The bronze statue standing with a cross high on the Dnieper hills had become covered with rust, the low relief carvings on the pedestal were damaged, and the monument itself was leaning forward after a landslide. The city authorities fully co-operated with Bazhan's Commission, but the Kiev Administration of Architecture declined to finance renovations because the statue turned out to be absent from the list of architectural monuments. Instead, it was found on the list on historical monuments, which typically included authentic old buildings and a handful of later

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<sup>576</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 7, spr. 9527, ark. 120. The Soviet military was repeatedly upsetting the Ukrainian authorities with similar acts of vandalism in Western Ukraine. In 1946, the cadets of the military cooks school in Lviv destroyed dozens of sixteenth- to eighteenth-century books and two fourteenth-century charters during a drunken debauch (Rublov and Cherchenko, *Stalinshchyna i dolia zakhidnoukrainskoi intelihentsii*, 236-37).

<sup>577</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 7, spr. 5568, ark. 35 (St. Cyril's Church); spr. 5553, ark. 98 (St. Sophia), 212-19 (Zvirynets caves); spr. 9527, ark. 1-12 (Golden Gates), 46-53, 67 (St. Andrew Church), 123-28 (Zvirynets caves).

monuments commemorating momentous historical events.<sup>578</sup> Since the statue's point of reference was the baptism of Kievan Rus', its place on the Soviet Ukrainian register of historic monuments was significant in itself.

For the moment, though, it created only more bureaucratic confusion. Fortunately, the statue of St. Volodymyr by the famous sculptor, Petr Klodt, was also on the list of all-Union architectural treasures and, in 1953, the Ukrainian functionaries cleared the question of renovations with the USSR Ministry of Culture. The work was to be financed from the funds of the Kiev oblast Soviet executive committee, which technically had no authority over the city of Kiev and no responsibility whatsoever for the city architecture, but happened to have some spare money in its budget.<sup>579</sup>

The incident with the monument of St. Volodymyr raises the question of whether ideological control over the registering of memorial sites existed and to what degree it was efficient. Thus, the 1953 inventory of Kiev's historic monuments and memorials included the entry no. 21, "a memorial building at 22 Zhadanivsky St. where the historian Antonovych lived and died in 1908," although the official press had long denounced Antonovych as a "staunch bourgeois nationalist," racist, and teacher of Hrushevsky. The register also included Antonovych's tomb, as well as those of other outcast Ukrainian nation-builders: Pavlo Zhytetsky, Oleksandr Konysky, Borys Hrinchenko, and the millionaire art collector Mykola Khanenko.<sup>580</sup>

Several surviving documents suggest that the public pressured the Ukrainian authorities to care for historical monuments. Scholars have identified public concern for the preservation of Russian historical monuments as one of the early manifestations of

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<sup>578</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 4762, op. 1, spr. 566, ark. 44; RGALI, f. 2329, op. 4, d. 101, l. 2.

<sup>579</sup> RGALI, f. 2329, op. 4, d. 101, ll. 2-4. Amusingly, in his letter to Moscow, the official of the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture, V. Iatsenko, confused Prince Volodymyr I the Saint, also known as the Great or the Baptizer (ca. 956-1015), with Volodymyr II Monomakh (1053-1125). Within two weeks, the ministry discovered the mistake and send a correcting note. In order to prevent further confusion, yet to avoid using the religious epithet "Saint," the Moscow bureaucrats put the prince's patronymic on the cover of the file: Vladimir Sviatoslavovich.

<sup>580</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 5116, op. 10, spr. 19, ark. 16 (Antonovych), 18-20 (graves).

popular Russian nationalism in the Soviet Union during the 1960s.<sup>581</sup> Although similar Ukrainian evidence dating from the late 1940s and early '50s is too scarce to permit this kind of conclusion, it is nevertheless interesting to see how the representatives of various social strata expressed their concerns about the preservation of Ukrainian historical monuments.

On 31 August 1950, a group of farmers from the state farm "Red Miner" in the Dnipropetrovsk oblast, S. Shevchenko, V. Stepanenko, H. Kolisnychenko, I. Shulha, and I. Bondar, sent a letter to the Chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, Demian Korotchenko. The villagers were concerned about a neglected old tomb on the steppe that they attributed to the eighteenth-century Cossack rebel Sava Chaly, the main character of Taras Shevchenko's popular drama *Sava Chaly*. The Ukrainian farmers deemed it proper to address the republic's premier in Russian. They wrote: "We love our glorious ancestors, we love our history and our people, and we are asking you, Demian Sergeevich, to share our resentment at the destruction of the monuments of historic past and listen to us." The five farmers were asking the government to restore the tomb and the cross and to erect in their district a monument to the central figure of Cossack myth, Bohdan Khmelnytsky.<sup>582</sup>

The subsequent investigation revealed that the cross could not have marked Sava Chaly's tomb, because the Cossack chieftain died in 1741 and the year carved on the cross was 1783. Nevertheless, the oblast authorities reported their intention to unveil a memorial stone with a dedication to the Ukrainian Cossacks by the time of the tercentenary celebrations.<sup>583</sup>

The republic's intellectuals sometimes created *ad hoc* voluntary committees to examine the state of a particular historical monument. In May 1948, the actor Amvrosii

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<sup>581</sup> Yitzhak M. Brudny, *Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State, 1953-1991* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); John B. Dunlop, *The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 32-36, 63-92.

<sup>582</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 8, spr. 2040, ark. 233-35, here 235.

<sup>583</sup> *Ibid.*, ark. 237. The cross could have been erected to mark Potemkin's 1783 conquest of what is now Southern Ukraine and the Crimea.

Buchma, the writer Petro Panch, and the historian Olena Apanovych designated themselves as a "public commission" (*hromadska komisiia*) and prepared a report on the decay of the eleventh-century Vydubychi Monastery in Kiev. Bazhan was sympathetic to their cause but unable to arrange for any immediate restoration work.<sup>584</sup>

In 1952, the Ukrainian Central Committee's inspector V. Stetsenko reported to First Secretary Melnikov that the construction of a hydroelectric dam near Nikopol would result in an eighteenth-century Cossack hut and the tomb of the seventeenth-century Zaporozhian chieftain Ivan Sirko being submerged. Sirko, the inspector argued, was a "progressive person who continued Bohdan Khmelnytsky's policy on reunion with the great Russian people." In addition, Sirko wrote a famous mocking reply to the sultan that provided subject matter for one of the most popular Russian historical paintings, Ilya Repin's *The Zaporozhian Cossacks Write a Letter to the Sultan* (1880-91). In the end, the oblast authorities assured the Central Committee that both the tomb and the hut would be moved to another location nearby. In fact, by 1953, they even planned to build a monument to Sirko at the same place.<sup>585</sup> Stetsenko had not indicated his source, but it was probably a local functionary or intellectual who brought the endangered historic sites to his attention.

In other words, requesting the protection of historical monuments in the Ukraine of the early 1950s was not understood as a "nationalistic" opposition to the party line. Rather, it became an aspect of the official discourse that Ukrainian intellectuals and common people could exploit to express their identities or promote their agendas. During the postwar decade, even the authorities distanced themselves from their prewar predecessors, who unceremoniously destroyed the most ancient monasteries to create space for new squares and avenues.<sup>586</sup>

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<sup>584</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 4906, op. 1, spr. 35, ark. 42; Kot, *Okhorona, vykorystannia*, 166.

<sup>585</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2756, ark. 80-82; spr. 2768, ark. 126-28; TsDAVOV, f. 5116, op. 10, spr. 16, ark. 31-33.

<sup>586</sup> In 1952, the Ukrainian Academy of Architecture transferred the surviving ancient Kievan mosaics and frescoes from the St. Michael's Golden-Domed Church to St. Sophia Cathedral Historical Preserve for public exhibition. The St. Michael's Church was destroyed during the "reconstruction" of Kiev in the mid-1930s, and the authorities expected some visitors to ask difficult questions about this event. The apparatus

The Ukrainian functionaries did not even press on with the purge of Austrian and Polish monuments and memorials in Western Ukraine. The Central Committee first raised this question in 1947 by way of requesting the opinion of the republic's Committee on the Cultural and Educational Institutions. The Committee dispatched the historian Mykola Petrovsky to Lviv for research and, based on his report, submitted the following cautious suggestion:

to remove in Lviv and Lviv oblast the monuments built to commemorate the Austrian and Polish reactionary political, military, and civic figures, as well as the memorial plaques honoring certain events and the activities of some persons who played a mostly reactionary role in the history of Poland and [whose actions] were directed against the interests of the Ukrainian people.<sup>587</sup>

Petrovsky proposed that "the people of the Polish Democratic Republic" could consider interesting and valuable only the following monuments: the statues of King Jan III Sobieski and the seventeenth-century military leader Stanisław Jabłonowski, both of whom represented Polish military glory, and the statues of the prominent writers Kornel Ujejski and Aleksander Fredro.<sup>588</sup> Nevertheless, the Ukrainian leadership resolved to shelve the question of the Polish monuments in Lviv for almost two years.

In 1949, the secretariat of the Central Committee finally approved a detailed list of undesirable monuments. Statues of Jan Sobieski, Stanisław Jabłonowski, Kornel Ujejski, Aleksander Fredro, and nineteenth-century Polish politicians in Austro-Hungarian Galicia Agenor Gołuchowski and Franciszek Smolka disappeared from the streets. Also gone were the memorial plaques honoring Polish kings and politicians, the Polish

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of the Central Committee provided the following standard explanation to be repeated by the museum guides: "In 1935, the monument was barbarously demolished by the enemies of the people, the monsters of the Bukharin-Trotsky gang, and the lackeys of the foreign bourgeois intelligence services, who intended to destroy the party and the Soviet state, as well as to annihilate the achievements of our people" (TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 777, ark. 157-68, here 165). Indeed, the head of the official commission on the reconstruction of Kiev during the mid-1930s, the Ukrainian SSR Commissar of Internal Affairs, Vsevolod Balytsky, and many commission members during the great purge were executed as enemies of the people.

<sup>587</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 4762, op. 1, spr. 164, ark. 15.

<sup>588</sup> Ibid., ark. 15zv.

constitution of 3 May 1791, Polish defenders of Lviv against the Red Army (1920), as well as "the Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalist historian Hrushevsky."<sup>589</sup> (The Polish government subsequently reclaimed the statues of Sobieski, Ujejski, and Fredro. Khrushchev favored the transfer, but deemed it necessary to receive Stalin's personal approval in this matter.<sup>590</sup>)

The list of proposed new memorial plaques demonstrated a characteristic High Stalinist mix of Ukrainian, Russian, and Soviet historical mythologies. The Ukrainian ideologues intended to honor Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Cossack colonel Maksym Kryvonis, the *haidamaka* anti-Polish rebellion of 1768, Ukrainian classical writers and composers (Ivan Franko, Vasyl Stefanyk, Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky, Filaret Kolessa), and the reunification of 1939. At the same time, the authorities did not forget about such visitors to Lviv as the sixteenth-century printer Ivan Fedorov "the Muscovite," tsar Peter the Great, and the Russian heroes of World War I General Aleksei Brusilov and the pilot Petr Nesterov. Finally, the interwar workers' rallies, three Galician Communist writers killed by a German bomb on the first day of the war, and the civic victims of the Nazi occupation were also to be commemorated.<sup>591</sup>

The authorities characteristically limited their immediate plans for the ideological appropriation of history in Lviv to installing cheap memorial plaques, rather than expensive statues. The republic's share of the all-Union culture budget could support the building of approximately two major monuments annually. As late as 1953, the apparatus of the Central Committee made the following calculation: "The Ukrainian SSR has been allotted 2,350,000 rubles for the construction of monuments during 1953. Of these, 1,111,000 rubles have been earmarked for the monument to Shchors in Kiev and 1,239,000 for the monument to Bohdan Khmelnytsky in Pereiaslav-Khmelnytsky, so that

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<sup>589</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1370, ark. 1-7. A similar purge, albeit on a lesser scale, apparently took place in other Western Ukrainian cities. According to the 1953 audit of monuments there, the Polish past was represented only by statues and busts of the poet Adam Mickiewicz (TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 8, spr. 9496, ark. 29-34).

<sup>590</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 23, spr. 6259, ark. 205.

<sup>591</sup> *Ibid.*, ark. 9-12.

financing the monument to Shevchenko in Stalino [Donetsk] is not possible."<sup>592</sup>

Operating under such financial constraints, the Ukrainian leadership carefully considered the ideological implications of every decision on erecting new monuments. In 1950, after consulting local intellectuals and architects, the Lviv party authorities finally selected the best place for the envisaged majestic monument to Ivan Franko: in the park facing the square before the main building of the Franko Lviv State University (former building of the Galician legislature). However, a note on the file reads: "Reported to the secretariat [of the CP(b)U Central Committee]. Received a directive to postpone the final decision until the completion of the monument to Lenin [in Lviv]."<sup>593</sup> This decision was a policy-setting precedent. In the following years, the apparatus of the Central Committee would routinely turn down local proposals to erect monuments to Ukrainian classical writers if the city in question did not have a monument to Lenin. In 1951, the Odessa and Dnipropetrovsk party authorities petitioned Kiev for permission to construct monuments to Shevchenko. Although the bronze statues of the poet were ready, the Central Committee postponed the decision on the same grounds.<sup>594</sup> This practice highlighted a curious implicit symbolic hierarchy of monuments in Soviet Ukraine: Lenin came first, followed closely by Shevchenko in the East and Franko in the West. Stalin and the Unknown Soldier were losing the race to the Ukrainian fathers of the nation.

The "junior" classical writer Lesia Ukrainka advanced within the Soviet Ukrainian canon of great ancestors in 1951, when the republic's ideologues approved in principle the creation of the Lesia Ukrainka Museum in Kiev. In the same year, a new monument

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<sup>592</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2756, ark. 158. Mykola Shchors: a Soviet hero of the Civil War in Ukraine, who entered Soviet Ukrainian mythology as the local equivalent of Chapaev.

<sup>593</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1990, ark. 81-107 (minutes of discussions in Lviv), 108 (proposal and the Central Committee's reaction). The story of Lenin's monument in Lviv is a testimony to Soviet bureaucratic inefficiency even in the matters of ideological priority. The all-Union government originally decreed its construction on 6 September 1940, with the statue to be unveiled in 1941. On 20 March 1945, the Ukrainian government ruled that the construction should be completed by 1948. The official commission approved the design of the modest half-length bronze statue in 1947, but the monument was unveiled only on 20 January 1952 (RGALI, f. 962, op. 3, d. 1995, ll. 29-62; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2757, ark. 1-2; *Literaturna hazeta*, 24 January 1952, p. 2). A much more imposing monument to Franko was unveiled in Lviv in 1956.

<sup>594</sup> *Ibid.*, ark. 206-07.



was built on her tomb in Kiev and a memorial plaque was unveiled on the building where she lived. Significantly, the Central Committee apparatus changed the wording of the inscription from the "great Ukrainian classical writer," as suggested by the Institute of Literature, to "prominent" writer and "revolutionary democrat."<sup>595</sup> In 1953, the Ukrainian government confirmed the plan to open the museum and approved the construction of a monument to Lesia Ukrainka in Kiev. The writer's estate in the village of Kolodiazhne underwent extensive renovations in 1954.<sup>596</sup>

As was the case with the heritage sites, the authorities had to seek unorthodox financing solutions for new monuments. Although the republic's budget had no money to erect a monument to Shevchenko in Stalino, the bureaucrats in charge of the arts discovered a spare bronze statue of the poet. This statue had been created as a gift to Ukrainian Canadians, but for some reason remained in Kiev. The oblast authorities, on their part, found the money to build a pedestal, and the monument was unveiled in 1954.<sup>597</sup> To erect a bust of Panas Myrny in Poltava in 1951, the government had to allow the local functionaries to use 50,000 roubles from the oblast's reserve investment fund.<sup>598</sup> When the 1939 monument to Shevchenko on his tomb in Kaniv needed renovations in 1954, the authorities found the required money in the Academy of Sciences's budget, although Shevchenko's tomb was a state preserve presumably financed from the republic's budget.<sup>599</sup>

During the early 1950s, the Ukrainian authorities turned to renovating the tombs of the national classical writers and erecting monuments to them. The archival documents suggest that the functionaries did so not without some public pressure. In particular, Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky's neglected gravesite in Chernihiv became a public issue in 1950,

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<sup>595</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2325, ark. 80-82 (museum, plaque); *Kulturne budivnytstvo*, 2: 240 (monument).

<sup>596</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 5116, op. 10, spr. 16, ark. 10 (1953); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3655, ark. 108-11 (1954). The museum was opened only in 1962, and the monument in 1973.

<sup>597</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 8, spr. 9486, ark. 29; *Kulturne budivnytstvo*, 2: 280.

<sup>598</sup> *Kulturne budivnytstvo*, 2: 197-98.

<sup>599</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 3508, ark. 25-28.

when the official *Radianska Ukraina* received several letters demanding immediate action from the authorities. The Kievan historian Professor Holobutsky; the chief curator of the Chernihiv Historical Museum, V. I. Murashko; and numerous tourists signed those letters, prompting Propaganda Secretary Nazarenko to report the matter to the Central Committee secretariat.<sup>600</sup> However, no renovations were done at the time. In August 1951, the writer's granddaughter and a student of Kiev University, Mykhailyna Kotsiubynska, submitted to *Literaturna hazeta* a poem bemoaning the decay of the tomb. Nazarenko again requested that the Council of Ministers take the appropriate measures.<sup>601</sup> As well as providing a new tombstone, the Ministry of Culture subsequently approved the renovations at the Kotsiubynsky's memorial museum and the construction of a monument on the writer's grave.<sup>602</sup>

By 1954, the Ukrainian Writers', Artists', and Composers' Unions had collected information about the graves of 143 prominent cultural figures on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR and petitioned the government to restore the neglected tombs. The Council of Ministers created a special commission, which examined 156 tombs and recommended renovating 49 of them. The resulting decree obliged the oblast authorities to build 37 new tombstones.<sup>603</sup> In Western Ukraine, new monuments on the tombs of the local classical writers Vasyl Stefanyk, Osyp Fedkovych, Marko Cheremshyna, and Les Martovych were considered a priority. The oblast authorities raised this question and offered financing even before the decree, during 1952-53.<sup>604</sup>

This drive to honor the Ukrainian classical writers coincided with the beginnings

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<sup>600</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1990, ark. 154-56.

<sup>601</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 72, spr. 1, ark. 71-73.

<sup>602</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 8, spr. 11406, ark. 194; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3655, ark. 108-11; *Kulturne budivnytstvo*, 2: 314-15. The renovations at the museum and the construction of the monument began in 1954.

<sup>603</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 8, spr. 11407, ark. 34-44; f. 5116, op. 10, spr. 44, ark. 8-31, 85-87, 93-99; Kot, *Okhorona, vykorystannia*, 167; *Kulturne budivnytstvo*, 2: 315-18. Of the total 37, 19 were the tombs of Ukrainian pre-revolutionary writers, artists, and composers; 6 were the graves of the Russian cultural figures; and 12 were those of Soviet Ukrainian celebrities.

<sup>604</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 8, spr. 9496, ark. 34, 171-73; spr. 11406, ark. 4-12.

of another campaign, which is discussed in Chapter Nine. Already in 1952, the Committee on Cultural and Educational Institutions proposed to "survey and restore the monuments of the War of Liberation and to place memorial plaques and monuments on the sites of victories."<sup>605</sup> During the subsequent lavish celebrations of the tercentenary of Ukraine's union with Russia, the Ukrainian leadership, local functionaries, and the public combined their efforts to commemorate the sites of Cossack glory and rehabilitate Cossack myth in the Ukrainian national consciousness.

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All in all, High Stalinist ideology did not deny the Ukrainians' right to cherish their ethnic historic and cultural heritage. The republic's bureaucrats and intellectuals worked to define and promote the national Great Tradition, and then to co-ordinate its glorification with the simultaneous valorization of historical ties with Russia, as well as with the worship of Soviet achievements. Both parties collaborated in the national classics' "codification," which involved the gathering of manuscripts and recasting Ukrainian writers as revolutionaries and friends of Russian culture, although the intellectuals sometimes also acted as custodians of the national tradition, opposing the excessive ideological editing. The public at large could express its identification with the national past within the acceptable preservationist discourse by pressuring the authorities to restore historical monuments.

In any case, Stalinist ideologues could not invent a specifically Soviet Ukrainian tradition, which would have been completely separate from the national heritage treasured by nationalists. The danger of exclusive ethnic self-identification remained inherent in the cult of the Ukrainian national patrimony. Literary classics, museums, monuments, and memorials were repeatedly reviewed and purged of all traces of "nationalism," although in some cases, the authorities' efforts had a minimal or even the opposite result. During the Stalin period, the Ukrainian museums in particular ever remained under suspicion for allegedly preserving elements of the "bourgeois-nationalist" historical narrative. Financial

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<sup>605</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3597, ark. 52.

constraints prevented the local ideologues from manipulating the cult of great ancestors to reflect the ever-changing party line on history. At the same time, the intellectuals and the public could also use the official notion of ethnic tradition to lobby for the preservation of historical monuments or for honoring pre-revolutionary cultural figures. In the end, the Stalinist idea of national patrimony remained inherently ambiguous.

## Chapter Seven

### WRITERS, FILMMAKERS, AND ARTISTS IMAGINE THE PAST

In June 1951, hundreds of Ukrainian writers, actors, musicians, and artists arrived in Moscow for the *dekada* (ten-day festival) of Ukrainian art. This grandiose exhibition of Soviet Ukraine's cultural achievements appeared to have been a huge success crowned by the decoration of 669 Ukrainians with various orders, medals, and honorary artistic titles. *Pravda* provided extensive enthusiastic coverage of the festival, expressing only minor criticisms regarding the opera *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*, which, according to the newspaper, did not sufficiently portray the Polish gentry as the enemy and did not have a single battle scene.<sup>606</sup>

The ambassadors of Ukrainian culture left Moscow in high spirits, sending telegraphed expressions of gratitude to Stalin, the party, and the government. On 2 July, however, *Pravda* unexpectedly fired a devastating ideological salvo in the form of the editorial, "Against Ideological Distortions in Literature." This long article was ostensibly devoted to just one "distortion," Volodymyr Sosiura's short poem "Love Ukraine" (1944), which had appeared in Russian translation in the Leningrad journal *Zvezda* (no. 5, 1951). Written during the patriotic fervor of 1944, the poem was now accused of glorifying "some primordial Ukraine, Ukraine in general," rather than Soviet Ukraine. In an aside, the article cryptically referred to other serious shortcomings in the ideological work of the Ukrainian party's Central Committee.<sup>607</sup>

*Pravda's* archives remain inaccessible to researchers, as do most of the important working files of the Stalinist Politburo that are housed in Russia's Presidential Archive. The available documents of the Central Committee's ideological and cultural departments do not contain any hints as to who initiated the critique or why. Although they have been entirely declassified, the archives of the Ukrainian Politburo and the Central Committee

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<sup>606</sup> See *Pravda*, 14-27 June 1951. This and the subsequent critique of Kost Dankevych's opera *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* is discussed in detail in Chapter Eight.

<sup>607</sup> *Pravda*, 2 July 1951, p. 2.

do not hold any relevant directives from Moscow. The origins of the 1951 ideological purge remain obscure, but its course and significance can be examined in detail.

### **The Primordialist Deviation**

The Ukrainian ideologues did not wait for a special directive from Moscow to start their campaign. These well-tempered Stalinist functionaries had clearly understood the long critical editorial in *Pravda*, and, moreover, an editorial making judgements about the work of the republic's Central Committee, as *the* voice of Stalin and the Politburo. At the November, 1951 plenary meeting of the Ukrainian Central Committee, First Secretary Meïnikov announced that "*Pravda's* statements represented invaluable assistance to the Ukrainian party organization from the VKP(b) Central Committee and Comrade Stalin in person."<sup>608</sup>

To put the Ukrainian developments in a broader perspective, "Against Ideological Distortions in Literature" provoked denunciations in other republics as well, and, while the 1936 Ukrainian *dekada* in Moscow was followed between 1936 and 1941 by nine celebrations of non-Russian art—Kazakh, Georgian, Uzbek, Azerbaijani, Kirgiz, Armenian, Belarusian, Buriat, and Tadzhik—no festivals followed immediately after the ill-fated Ukrainian *dekada* of 1951. (They resumed in 1953-56.) Thus, the Moscow-initiated campaign of ideological purification in Ukraine can be seen as the beginning of a general effort to force non-Russian cultures onto the periphery of Soviet cultural life, promoting the increasingly Russocentric character of mainstream Soviet culture. In a separate, albeit closely linked campaign, the party leadership discovered the "poison of nationalism" in Azerbaijani, Turkmen, Uzbek, and Kirgiz traditional epic poems. Moreover, given the harshness of the ensuing "anti-Zionist" campaign of 1952-53, scholars speak of apparent preparations for a general crackdown on nationalities during Stalin's last years.<sup>609</sup>

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<sup>608</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 1, spr. 976, ark. 12.

<sup>609</sup> See Simon, *Nationalism and the Policy toward the Nationalities*, 206-09; Hann, *Postwar Soviet Politics*, 149-50.

Within days after *Pravda's* publication, Ukrainian authorities developed a comprehensive ideological purge in the republic, complete with denunciations of "nationalist deviations" in all areas and genres of creative activity.<sup>610</sup> This media campaign closely followed the 1947 model. The official press demanded more works explicitly glorifying Ukraine's Soviet present and searched eagerly for any traces of "primordialism." However, after the incriminations began, even *Pravda's* chief correspondent in Ukraine, Evgenii Kiselev, felt that the campaign had gone too far. On 10 July, he submitted to the editor-in-chief, Leonid Ilichev, a special internal memo:

Following the publication of *Pravda's* editorial, "Against Ideological Distortions in Literature," the editors of national Ukrainian newspapers received a directive from the CP(b)U Central Committee to immediately intensify their critique of Ukrainian writers' work. The editors understood this as a signal to develop a campaign of sorts and directed the critical fire against any [writer] they came across.

After reviewing several cases of the Ukrainian press's unfounded attacks on writers, Kiselev concluded, "One can easily think that such a non-discriminating drive to criticize as many people as possible can only help the real nationalists by weakening any attack on them and causing confusion among the many honest writers."<sup>611</sup> *Pravda's* editor-in-chief forwarded the memo to the All-Union Central Committee, where it was subsequently "filed." Moscow party authorities had no intention of inhibiting the development of the ideological purge in Ukraine.

Back in Kiev, the campaign quickly grew from a repetition of *Pravda's* critique of Sosiura to a comprehensive search for ideological errors. Dozens of Ukrainian poets, artists, and composers were soon found guilty of not properly celebrating Soviet Ukraine's achievements. Painting "melancholic" Ukrainian landscapes without tractors or other such

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<sup>610</sup> The critique of Sosiura's poem has long attracted Western scholars' attention. Recent Ukrainian research properly contextualizes this episode as a prologue to a wider ideological purge of Ukrainian culture. See Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic*, 15-17; Baran, *Ukraine 1950-1960-kh rr.*, 60-65. However, the campaign's significance for Soviet Ukrainian identity remains unexplored.

<sup>611</sup> RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 133, d. 311, ll. 9, 12.

markers of Soviet modernity warranted the denunciation of the artists F. Samuiev and F. Hlushchenko as "primordialists." V. Enke's opera *Wealthy Bride* and V. Nakhabin and D. Klebanov's musical comedy *A Toast to Your Health* were both found guilty of distorting the reality of kolkhoz life. The press and denunciatory meetings also dug up the past "nationalistic" mistakes of such prominent writers as Maksym Rylsky and Iurii Ianovsky.<sup>612</sup>

While *Pravda* had spoken of one poem's failure to stress love for Soviet Ukraine, the republic's authorities shifted the critique's emphasis toward what they perceived as the main threat to the Soviet version of Ukrainian identity: a "harmful obsession" with the Ukrainian past and insufficient portrayal of historic ties with Russia. This subtle but important shift of emphasis could be detected in the reports First Secretary Melnikov was sending to Moscow. On 2 August, he reported to Stalin's deputy for party affairs, Georgii Malenkov, on the mistakes being made by the Ukrainian intellectuals who, "in their creative and scholarly work, often idealize the old times, the Ukrainian past, when the people suffered under the oppression of the landlords and capitalists." Melnikov also assured Moscow that his subordinates would educate the intelligentsia to portray Ukraine as an "inseparable part of our great fatherland."<sup>613</sup> Writing to Stalin on 14 August, Melnikov further specified the campaign's main target. He regretted that the republican leadership had overlooked "attempts to portray the historical process in Ukraine as separate from the history of the peoples of the USSR."<sup>614</sup> During the Central Committee's November plenary session, Ukraine's nominal president, Mykhailo Hrechukha, in his usual macaronic Ukrainian, summarized the shift in emphasis: "This deviation from contemporary topics and pottering about in those histories of ancient

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<sup>612</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 5 July 1951, pp. 1-2; 13 July 1951, pp. 1, 3; *Radianske mystetstvo*, 11 July 1951, p. 1; 1 August 1951, p. 2; "Po-bilshovytskomu keruvaty ideolohichnoiu rabotoiu," *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, no. 7 (1951): 6-17. Nakhabin and Klebanov were Russian composers, but the libretto of *The Toast to Your Health* was authored by two Ukrainian writers, Ihor Muratov and Iukhym Martych.

<sup>613</sup> RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 133, d. 311, ll. 34-50, here 38-39; a draft in TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2423, ark. 49-50.

<sup>614</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 785, ark. 61-67.



times—it should be considered as a certain manifestation of nationalism."<sup>615</sup>

Between 28 and 31 July, the Union of Soviet Writers of Ukraine held a special meeting to discuss the "nationalistic" errors of Sosiura, as well as of others. The head of the Writers' Union, Oleksandr Korniiichuk, denounced practically all references to "Ukraine in general" and the Ukrainian past found in recent Ukrainian literary works. However, discovering credible recurrences of nationalism in literature proved very difficult because after the 1946–47 campaign against the historical genre, writers had been exercising extreme caution. To provide representative examples, Korniiichuk had to dig up old accusations against the *Survey of the History of Ukrainian Literature* and Ianovsky's *Kievan Stories*. Moreover, he had no choice but to acknowledge the mistakes of his own libretto for *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*: these were not "nationalistic," but they had, nevertheless, acquired a larger ideological significance. Korniiichuk even suggested that Bazhan's series of poems *At the Spasskaia Tower* could be seen as ideologically problematic. The collection exalted the history of Moscow, and even minor artistic imperfections were perceived as unacceptable in such a work.<sup>616</sup>

The reports from the Ukrainian oblasts suggest local authorities struggling to find credible examples of ideological deviations. The Lviv ideologues denounced A. Shmyhelsky's poem "Galicia," which implied that Western Ukraine had once been "free" until its incorporation into Poland, spoke of the Ukrainians' heroic resistance to foreign enemies, and did not mention class struggle,<sup>617</sup> but, aside from the problems in the Lviv Historical Museum (discussed in the previous chapter), Shmyhelsky's errors were, apparently, the only significant find. Sosiura had written his "Love Ukraine" back in 1944, and discovering similar works after the ideological campaigns of 1946–47 presented a trying exercise. The local manifestations of "nationalism" reported to the Central

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<sup>615</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 1, spr. 973, ark. 208: "Tse ukhyliannia vid suchasnykh tem i koposhinnia v tsykh istoriakh drevnosti—tse tezh slid rozhliadaty iak svoieridnyi proiav natsionalizmu."

<sup>616</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2424, ark. 4-76; O. Korniiichuk. "Ideolohichni perekruchennia v literaturi, vykryti v statti hazety 'Pravda' i chervovi zavdannia pysmennykiv Radianskoi Ukrainy," *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, no. 8 (1951): 10-34; *Literaturna hazeta*, 9 August 1951, pp. 1-4.

<sup>617</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 785, ark. 2-4; op. 30, spr. 2330, ark. 103; *Literaturna hazeta*, 18 October 1951, p. 3.

Committee were typically not just insignificant, but clearly far-fetched.

The Kirovohrad party authorities, for instance, found fault with the article on Ivan Franko in the oblast newspaper and with the local theater company's production of Mykhailo Starytsky's play *Marusia Bohuslavka* (1897). Writing in *Kirovohradska pravda*, a professor of Ukrainian literature at the Kirovohrad Pedagogical Institute, Oliinichenko, stated that Franko "fought against the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists opposing the friendship of peoples and the venal hypocrisy of the Polish nobility." This awkward sentence could have been interpreted to the effect that the nationalists, rather than Franko, had fought against the Polish nobility (which they had done, incidentally). The oblast ideologues labelled this simple syntactic mistake an ideological deviation. As for the production of Starytsky's historical play about the legendary Ukrainian folk character who was captured by the Crimean Tatars and became a beloved wife of the khan, the report stated:

In the play *Marusia Bohuslavka*, Khan Girey is portrayed incorrectly. Instead of being presented as a plunderer and an enemy of the Ukrainian people, he appears to have been genuinely in love with Marusia Bohuslavka, preferring her to all other wives. The actors do not deliver Marusia's hatred toward the Turkish oppressors. In the scene of her release, she expresses a certain indecisiveness about her return to her native land.<sup>618</sup>

Notwithstanding the lack of real denunciations, all oblasts reported organizing numerous ideological meetings and strengthening the intelligentsia's political education. The local ideologues sought to eliminate "nationalism" from literature and the arts by tightening ideological control over culture and lecturing the local intellectuals on such topics as "The Friendship of the Soviet Peoples" or "Soviet Patriotism."<sup>619</sup>

The November 1951 meeting of the CP(b)U Central Committee crowned the campaign for ideological purity in the republic. In his speech, First Secretary Melnikov

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<sup>618</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 1105, ark. 23-24, 28 (Franko), 27 (play). The issue of returning or not returning to Ukraine from foreign captivity was perceived as politically significant because it resonated with the postwar situation of Ukrainian "displaced persons" in Germany and Austria.

<sup>619</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 785 and 1574.

reviewed the uncovered mistakes and summarized corrective measures. The Ukrainian party chief demanded that the cultural agents increase their coverage of Ukraine's Soviet present and past ties with Russia. Other speakers applied this general recommendation to their respective fields, from scholarship and museums to opera and painting.<sup>620</sup>

The archives of the Ukrainian Politburo suggest that the republic's party leadership was satisfied with the campaign. From November 1951 to May 1952, no ideological decrees or major public statements indicated the party's concern with any "nationalist deviations" in culture. However, the Ukrainian leadership soon discovered that Stalin himself remained suspicious of Ukraine's ideological situation. In May 1952, Melnikov disclosed to members of the Ukrainian Central Committee,

On 14 April, I and Comrade Korotchenko were received by Comrade Stalin. In a conversation that lasted approximately four hours, Iosif Vissarionovich showed great interest in the state of Ukrainian industry, agriculture, and culture. [...] Comrade Stalin was keenly interested in the state of ideological work in Ukraine and expressed the opinion that things are not going well in this field [*chto zdes delo u nas obstoit neblagopoluchno*].<sup>621</sup>

Melnikov did not specify whether Stalin had elaborated on the problems causing his concern. In any case, the May 1952 plenary meeting of the CP(b)U Central Committee demanded that the party ideological apparatus supervise the political education of writers and scholars even more closely. Melnikov cited errors committed during the preparation of the collected works of several Ukrainian classical writers. Lacking party supervision, the scholars had included statements "uncharacteristic" for given writers and, in the editorial comments, presented Ukrainian literary figures as living "in a nationalistic milieu." The gathering did not accuse any Soviet Ukrainian writer, artist, or composer of nationalist deviations. Still, Melnikov reminded them of their duty to "portray the

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<sup>620</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 1, spr. 972, 973, and 976.

<sup>621</sup> TsDAHO, op. 1, f. 24, op. 1605, ark. 19, 23. Demian Korotchenko at the time served as the Ukrainian premier.

present."<sup>622</sup>

The 1951 campaign of ideological purification, thus, had no perceptible closure. Until Stalin's death, Ukrainian functionaries remained on alert for a possible command from Moscow, *Pravda* article, or any other signal to renew denunciations. However, the ensuing liberalization found its expression in the imposing celebration of Ukrainian culture during the tercentenary festivities of 1954.

### **The Writers' License**

The Dovzhenko affair (1944) and the campaign against the "idealization" of the Ukrainian past (1946-47) resulted in tightened ideological control over the historical genre in literature and the arts. The republic's ideologues, censors, and critics subjected each new work to such scrutiny that some writers found it easier to publish in Moscow.

In late 1945, Moscow publisher Sovetskii pisatel released the Russian translation of Oleksandr Ilchenko's novel *St. Petersburg Autumn*. This was the revised version of the author's 1939 novel *The Heart is Waiting*, which depicted Shevchenko's life in the imperial capital during 1858-59. The new version emphasized the poet's contacts with Russian "revolutionary democrats" and featured new scenes describing Shevchenko's cordial meetings with Chernyshevsky. In two years, the book went through two more printings in Russian. The novel turned out to be such a success that, in August 1947, the secretariat of the Ukrainian Central Committee decided to investigate why its original Ukrainian text had never been published in the republic. As it happened, Ilchenko did not even submit the original text for publication until after the Moscow publisher had released the Russian translation and the Ukrainian press had run positive reviews of the book. Only then, in November 1946, did Ilchenko give the Ukrainian version to Derzhlitvydav. However, with the attacks against the historical genre at their peak, the leading Ukrainian publisher did not hurry to print Ilchenko's novel, the Russian edition's success notwithstanding. The Central Committee ordered that *St. Peterburg Autumn*, which "correctly presented [Shevchenko's] friendship with prominent progressive Russian figures

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<sup>622</sup> Ibid., ark. 98 (supervision, to portray the present), 111-13 (classical writers).

and his differences with Kulish," be published as soon as possible. The party leadership also requested that steps be taken to "ensure the publication of positive reviews."<sup>623</sup>

The Ukrainian edition of *St. Petersburg Autumn* appeared in late 1947. Because of Shevchenko's importance as a national symbol, his official biography continued to be redefined in the following years to highlight his ties to progressive Russian culture. In 1951, Ilchenko completed the next, even more pro-Russian, version of the novel, which then underwent extensive reviewing. The Ukrainian leadership closely followed the course of the revisions. When First Secretary Melnikov saw *St. Petersburg Autumn* in the list of publications planned for 1952, he made a note on the margin: "Is the mistake corrected?"<sup>624</sup> The final Ukrainian version of the novel was released in 1952 as an "updated edition."<sup>625</sup>

After Kaganovich's departure for Moscow, Ukrainian writers began pushing for the rehabilitation of the historical genre. As seen in Chapter Four, Natan Rybak first raised this issue during the writers' meeting with Kaganovich and Khrushchev in September 1947. At the writers' congress in December 1948, Petro Panch called upon his fellows to depict the Revolution, the Civil War, the Great Patriotic War, and—"to some degree"—the distant past. He went on to explain:

Let me stress this: to some degree, our history [must be portrayed] as well. I think such topics as the Ukrainian people's War of Liberation, the reunification with the Russian people, and patriotism born in the common struggle of the Russians and Ukrainians against foreign encroachments on our lands should receive much wider coverage in Ukrainian literature.<sup>626</sup>

The playwright Kocherha supported this appeal and recalled how the premiere of *Iaroslav*

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<sup>623</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 8, spr. 330, ark. 13-14. The Moscow edition was reviewed in *Literaturna hazeta*, 5 September 1946, p. 4. On the differences between *The Heart is Waiting* and *St. Peterburg Autumn*, see *Istoriia ukrainskoi literatury*, 7: 117.

<sup>624</sup> TsDAML, f. 590, op. 1, spr. 163, ark. 7 (new version); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2357, ark. 242 (Melnikov). It is not clear what mistake the first secretary was referring to.

<sup>625</sup> O. Ilchenko, *Peterburzka osin: Dopovnene vydannia* (Kiev: Derzhpolitvydav Ukrainy, 1952).

<sup>626</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 23 December 1948, p. 2.

*the Wise* was almost canceled in 1946 because of its problematic historical topic, although the work later earned a Stalin Prize.<sup>627</sup> The Ukrainian ideologues did not rebuff the writers' call, thus opening the door for the historical genre's revival.

Natan Rybak broke a new trail with his epic novel *The Pereiaslav Council*. Although one could hardly find a more timely historical topic than Ukraine's union with Russia, the press welcomed the novel rather reservedly. In August 1947, *Literaturna hazeta* responded with approval, albeit without enthusiasm, to the journal publication of several chapters of the novel. The book edition appeared in late 1948 in a relatively modest printing of 20,000 copies. Rybak prefaced the text with an epigraph from *Pravda*'s 1943 laudatory article about Bohdan Khmelnytsky as proof of his topic's ideological appropriateness. The publisher took an unusual step by listing Professor Mykola Petrovsky on the title page as the book's editor, thus guaranteeing the correctness of the writer's historical interpretations. On 6 December 1948, in the list of new books, *Literaturna hazeta* noted *The Pereiaslav Council*'s publication, but did not run a book review for several months.<sup>628</sup>

The novel presented an epic picture of the War of Liberation, ending with the Pereislav Council of 1654. Although Rybak combined several narrative lines featuring main characters from various social strata, all developing the theme of Russian-Ukrainian friendship, his main emphasis was clearly on the Cossack leader's deeds. Like many other positive historic characters in Stalinist literature, Rybak's Khmelnytsky appears as an ideal ruler imbued with Stalin's own traits. The hetman is portrayed as the omniscient and omnipotent father of the people, using an iron hand to manage his administrative apparatus:

Only a short time had passed, but he accomplished much and he had the right to credit himself with having done so. All land was divided into regiments and

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<sup>627</sup> TsDAMLM, f. 590, op. 1, spr. 57, ark. 107-08. This passage was not included in the abridged text of his speech that appeared in *Literaturna hazeta*, 18 December 1948, p. 3.

<sup>628</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 7 August 1947, p. 2 (first chapters published); Natan Rybak, *Pereiaslavska rada: Za redaktsieiu doktora istorychnykh nauk M. N. Petrovskoho* (Kiev: Radianskyi pysmennyk, 1948); *Literaturna hazeta*, 6 December 1948, p. 3 (publication noted).

colonels were elected in each regiment. He often suggested who should be elected, but his suggestions were necessary. He had to dismiss those who thought independently [*myslyly svoieumno*] and moved slowly, he had to threaten some, to exile others to Crimea and order them to stay there until he recalled them. Yet others he removed in such a way that nobody knew what happened to them, and only [the head of secret police] Lavryn Kapusta lifted his hands mysteriously when someone talked about those people.<sup>629</sup>

Rybak's Khmelnytsky is not a feudal lord; like the Stalin of postwar propaganda, he stands above all social strata, wisely guiding the whole Ukrainian nation to reunion with Muscovy, while at the same time expressing his care for the common people by periodical ruthless cleansings of the upper classes.

More importantly, Rybak struck a fine balance between "ethnic history" and "class history" by showing the reunification as being beneficial for both the Ukrainians as a nation and the Ukrainian toiling masses. The critics hailed Rybak's treatment of the controversial Colonel Bohun, who was not present in Pereiaslav and did not take an oath to the tsar. Pre-revolutionary Ukrainian belletrist Adrian Kashchenko, in his *Fighters for Freedom*, portrayed Bohun as an opponent of the union with Russia. Early Soviet Ukrainian writer O. Sokolovsky, in his novel *Bohun* (1931), depicted the colonel as a true representative of the masses and the enemy of the feudal lord Khmelnytsky. Korniiichuk chose not to mention Bohun in his description of the Pereiaslav Council and the subsequent events. Rybak became the first writer to claim that Colonel Bohun, in fact, had always supported Khmelnytsky and had even taken an oath to the tsar.<sup>630</sup>

Finally, Rybak attempted to make his epic narrative of state-building more readable by peppering it with the elements of spy intrigue and romance. He made the Cossack intelligence agent Maliuha one of the novel's central characters, and although contemporary critics disliked the use of mystery motifs in "serious" historic prose, Rybak

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<sup>629</sup> Natan Rybak, *Pereiaslavska rada* (Kiev: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo khudozhnoi literatury, 1949), p. 45.

<sup>630</sup> On Bohun's portrayal by different writers, see Syrotiuk, *Ukrainskyi radianskyi istorychnyi roman*, 295-99. On p. 295, Syrotiuk announces that "*The Pereiaslav Council* conclusively disproved the statements of some bourgeois historians and belletrists about acute contradictions and conflicts between Ivan Bohun and Bohdan Khmelnytsky."

sensed his readers' interest and actually intensified the features of adventure and mystery in the second volume (1953).<sup>631</sup>

The secretary of the Writers' Union Liubomyr Dmyterko, in his report to the writers' congress in December 1948, first indicated official acceptance of the novel. After praising all of the republic's writers who answered the party's call for new novels about the Soviet present, Dmyterko added: "Together with the works on contemporary subjects, and I repeat that there are dozens of them, Natan Rybak's large historical novel, *The Pereiaslav Council*, stands at the vanguard of Soviet Ukrainian prose." Dmyterko went on to approve of the topic and the style and to quote the novel's description of the Pereiaslav Council.<sup>632</sup>

In March 1950, all Soviet newspapers announced the Stalin Prize winners for 1949. The list included *The Pereiaslav Council*, which earned its author a Stalin Prize, Second Class, and a monetary award of 50,000 rubles.<sup>633</sup> This accolade not only catapulted Rybak's novel into the canon of Soviet Ukrainian literature, but also confirmed that the Ukrainian historical novel was not doomed as a genre. The heroic narrative of the national past proved acceptable as long as the elements of Ukrainian patriotism remained subordinate to the predominant theme of Russian-Ukrainian friendship.

The official media began promoting *The Pereiaslav Council* as a work educating Ukrainian youth "in the spirit of friendship of peoples." Libraries and schools organized readers' conferences and public readings of the novel.<sup>634</sup> The now-encouraged Rybak commenced work on the sequel volume, almost completing the first draft as early as September 1951.<sup>635</sup>

Anton Khyzhniak's novel *Danylo of Halych* (1949) also did not elicit major

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<sup>631</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 12 November 1953, pp. 3-4; Syrotiuk, *Ukrainskyi radianskyi istorychnyi roman*, 303-04.

<sup>632</sup> The Ukrainian party's official journal, *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, carried the speech's complete text: L. Dmyterko, "Ukrainska radianska literatura pislia postanovy TsK VKP(b) pro zhurnaly 'Zvezda' i 'Leningrad'," *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, no. 1 (1949): 72-80, here 74-75.

<sup>633</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 9 March 1950, p. 1.

<sup>634</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 13 July 1950, p. 3; 9 November 1950, p. 4.

<sup>635</sup> TsDAMLM, f. 590, op. 1, spr. 163, ark. 7.



criticisms. The influential editor of a Lviv newspaper had succeeded in producing an ideologically impeccable picture of the thirteenth-century Galician-Volhynian Principality. Danylo appears in the novel as a great statesman and military leader, albeit a defender of the upper strata's class interests. Khyzniak carefully balanced his narrative of Danylo's great feats with a portrayal of class struggle and ties with other Rus' principalities. The resulting work escaped accusations of being "nationalistic."<sup>636</sup> In 1951, the Ukrainian party's Central Committee deemed it safe to bring *Danylo of Halych* and *The Pereiaslav Council* to Moscow for the *dekada* and to sell these books to Ukrainian readers in the capital.<sup>637</sup>

By marking new limits for what was permissible and what warranted success, the plots of two historical plays, both completed in 1949, highlight the direction in which literary representations of Ukrainian history were evolving. Leonid Smiliansky's drama *Sahaidachny* attempted to recast this Cossack leader as an early promotor of the reunion with Muscovy. Doing so, however, appeared difficult. Although Sahaidachny sent a friendly embassy to the tsar in 1619 or 1620, he had joined the Polish army on its march on Moscow during the previous year. The Central Committee's expert felt that even the passing references to the war with Russia were inappropriate and that the whole last scene, where Sahaidachny dies with the words "Bells, bells..." was ambiguous: "Is he referring to the bells greeting the Cossack embassy in Moscow or to the bells sounding alarm when Sahaidachny together with the Polish prince invaded the Russian lands?"<sup>638</sup>

Although Smiliansky revised his drama, renaming it *Rus' is Rus'* and adding as an epigraph a quotation from the 1943 manifesto that listed Sahaidachny among progressive historic figures, the Department of Propaganda did not issue its approval.<sup>639</sup> The ideology of the "friendship of peoples" demanded that the fact of the direct military

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<sup>636</sup> Syrotiuk, *Ukrainska istorychna proza za 40 rokiv*, 211. For the second edition in 1954, Khyzniak further developed the the depiction of the working classes and the "friendship of peoples." See *ibid.* and TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 1573, ark. 57.

<sup>637</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 72, spr. 4, ark. 3.

<sup>638</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1416, ark. 8.

<sup>639</sup> *Ibid.*, ark. 1-3.

clash between the Cossacks and the Muscovites be suppressed and that Hetman Sahaidachny not be valorized unreservedly as a great ancestor of Soviet Ukrainians.

In contrast, Liubomyr Dmyterko's *Forever Together* proved to be a success. The play depicts events in Ukraine after the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1657), when Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky attempted to break with Muscovy. Dmyterko discredits Vyhovsky and his followers, who appear not to have any support from the masses and are opposed in the play by the pro-Russian Cossack leaders: Ivan Sirko, Martyn Pushkar, and Khmelnytsky's widow Hanna. The play was published in June 1949 and immediately earned good reviews. The Sumy Oblast Drama Theater premiered *Forever Together* as early as November 1949.<sup>640</sup>

Ukraine's leading drama company during the postwar decade, the Shevchenko Theater in Kharkiv, requested revisions before premiering *Forever Together* in February 1950. The company worked with Dmyterko to eliminate "needless emphasis on psychological factors," to further develop the main positive character, Ivan Sirko, and to make the arrival of the Muscovite forces in the last scene more impressive. The company also engaged the prominent composer Iulii Meitus to write music for the play. The press hailed the Kharkiv premiere as a success of national significance.<sup>641</sup>

However, in contrast to Korniiichuk's *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*, *Forever Together* had a considerably shorter theatrical run. Staged by practically all Ukrainian companies in 1950, by 1952 it was no longer produced in Kiev, Kharkiv, or Lviv. Of the major theaters, only the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Drama Company performed *Forever Together* in that year. Contemporary theater critics explained the quick decline of the play by the lack of developed and vivid positive characters, and its undue concentration on the upper classes. Dmyterko attempted to eliminate these shortcomings in the play's second variant (1951), but a smaller number of companies expressed interest in the revised drama, and

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<sup>640</sup> *Radianske mystetstvo*, 13 July 1949, p. 2 (review); 12 November 1949, p. 3 (premiere in Sumy); *Literaturna hazeta*, 14 July 1949, p. 2 (review). Dmyterko was a Western Ukrainian who adopted well to Stalinist cultural life and made a career as a literary functionary in Kiev. During the readers' conference on his visit to Western Ukraine in 1950, Dmyterko received an anonymous note asking, "What sickness did you have when you wrote *Forever Together*?" See TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2042, ark. 13.

<sup>641</sup> *Radianske mystetstvo*, 1 March 1950, p. 3.

by 1952 it had practically disappeared from production.<sup>642</sup>

Meanwhile, two principal Ukrainian historical plays, Kocherha's *Iaroslav the Wise* and Korniiichuk's *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*, remained in the repertoire of the republic's companies. Three and a half years after the premiere, in June 1950, the Kharkiv Shevchenko company took *Iaroslav* to Kiev on a highly successful tour.<sup>643</sup> After the war, Korniiichuk revised *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* to eliminate the play's anti-Polish animus by changing "the Poles" to "the gentry" throughout.<sup>644</sup> In 1951, when *Pravda* criticized Korniiichuk's libretto of the opera *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*, some companies put the play on hold, but they promptly renewed production after the success of the opera's second redaction in 1953. Several local companies requested the author's permission to apply the changes made in the libretto to the drama as well.<sup>645</sup>

In early 1952, Ukrainian functionaries and writers were already thinking about the production of new literary works to celebrate the reunification's tercentenary. A conference at the major publishing house Radianskyi pysmennyk called upon the litterateurs to compose new paeans to the "age-old friendship" with Russia. The Writers' Union proposed that the leading poets be mobilized to create a monumental collective poem about the said friendship.<sup>646</sup>

However, the two major historical novels published during 1953-54 had been in progress long before the authorities issued this appeal. The topicality of Pereiaslav enabled two authors to reinstall Cossack glory as a major element of the Ukrainian national past. Petro Panch revised his 1946 novel *The Zaporozhians*, adding two more books and publishing the resulting bulky volume under the title *Ukraine Was Humming*. The Ukrainian ideologues did not notice until it was late that Panch "did not eliminate

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<sup>642</sup> *Radianske mystetstvo*, 30 July 1952, p. 3.

<sup>643</sup> *Radianske mystetstvo*, 5 July 1950, p. 3; 19 July 1950, p. 2.

<sup>644</sup> Compare Oleksandr Korniiichuk, *Bohdan Khmelnytsky: Persha chastyna trylohii* (Lviv: Radianskyi pysmennyk, 1939), pp. 31, 53, 59, 76 and idem, *Bohdan Khmelnytsky: Piesa na piat dii* (Kiev: Mystetstvo, 1954), pp. 23, 31, 33, 43.

<sup>645</sup> TsDAMLM, f. 435, op. 1, spr. 1577, ark. 1-5.

<sup>646</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 24 April 1952, p. 3 (conference); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3597, ark. 71 (collective poem).

properly" the mistakes for which the party had denounced *The Zaporozhians* in 1947.<sup>647</sup> The publication of Volume Two of Rybak's *The Pereiaslav Council* became the major event in Ukrainian literary life of 1953. Contemporary critics agreed that the sequel was artistically superior to the original volume, even though Rybak had further developed the elements of adventure and spy intrigue.<sup>648</sup>

Numerous readers' letters are included in Natan Rybak's personal archive, allowing a fascinating insight into how the postwar public perceived his novel. The reactions varied from that of the anonymous note saying that reading the epic narrative of the Cossacks' heroic deeds and resulting incorporation into Russia "left a sense of both elevated pride and burning bitterness in the heart" to lengthy tirades that seemed to confirm the novel's desired educational impact. Thus, Petro Zhytnyk from the village of Mykolaivka of Nekhvoroshcha district in Poltava oblast wrote on 27 February 1952:

The history of Ukraine and in particular the life and activities of the great statesman Bohdan Khmelnytsky has interested me from childhood. Under the influence of Kulish's *Black Council*, I had formed wrong conceptions about Ukrainian history and the role of Hetman Khmelnytsky, and I was not able to free myself from those ideas for long time. Much later, in 1943, having read O. Korniiichuk's play *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*, watched the film of the same name, and read your novel *The Pereiaslav Council* for the first time in 1949, I deeply understood the age of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, his services in liberating Ukraine from foreign oppression and uniting it with Russia.

I should credit these wonderful works that allowed me, a common citizen, to see the great truth!<sup>649</sup>

Ideologically correct as it was, this interpretation also shows that this reader was overlooking the notions of the friendship of peoples, class struggle, and the fraternal aid of the Russian elder brother—all ideas dear to Soviet ideologues' hearts and planted

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<sup>647</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 24 December 1953, p. 3 (excerpts from the novel); Petro Panch, *Homonila Ukraina* (Kiev: Radianskyi pysmennyk, 1954); *XVIII z'ezd Komunistychnoi partii Ukrainy 23-26 bereznia 1954 r.: Materialy z'yzdu* (Kiev: Derzhpolitvydav URSR, 1954), p. 157 (Nazarenko on the insufficient revisions).

<sup>648</sup> TsDAMLM, f. 590, op. 1, spr. 204, ark. 3; *Literaturna hazeta*, 12 November 1953, pp. 3-4.

<sup>649</sup> TsDAMLM, f. 687, op. 1, spr. 47, ark. 23zv (anonymous note), 29 (Zhytnyk).

abundantly throughout the novel. Instead, Zhytnyk understood the great hero Khmelnytsky as a historical agent who liberated Ukraine and brought it to its beneficial union with Muscovy.

Other Ukrainian readers apparently perceived *The Pereiaslav Council* as simply a work glorifying their nation's heroic past, as if the "friendship of peoples" paradigm never existed. Ivan Burlaka from the village of Erazmivka of Oleksandrivka district in Kirovohrad oblast wrote to Rybak in December 1950: "Khmelnysky the Cossack leader and the liberator of the whole Ukrainian people is shown so forcefully. A truly patriotic book that explains the state-building aims and human ideals of the national liberational movement of the heroic Ukrainian people."<sup>650</sup>

Most striking were the number of letters Rybak received from ethnic Ukrainians living in other Soviet republics. His correspondents from Kuban, Sverdlovsk oblast, and Georgia all spoke proudly of their Ukrainian or even Cossack roots and complained about the difficulties of obtaining Ukrainian historical novels in Russia. Dmytro Krykun from Kuban informed the writer that the local bookstore had sold out its allotment of *The Pereiaslav Council* in a week. Krykun considered himself lucky to have obtained a book at the second-hand shop; although only Volume One was available, it was in Ukrainian.<sup>651</sup>

Having read the first volume in its Russian translation, Colonel Hryhorii Bludenko, who was stationed in Bukhta Olga in the Primore region in the Russian Far East, wrote to Rybak in Ukrainian in May 1951: "I am sure that your *Pereiaslav Council* reads much better in Ukrainian. I am serving here on the Pacific Ocean among many other Ukrainians who do not want to ever forget their people, their language, and their glorious ancestors such as Bohdan Khmelnytsky."<sup>652</sup>

The readers apparently could interpret selectively even the most ideologically correct historical novel, overlooking its descriptions of class struggle and friendship with

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<sup>650</sup> Ibid., 11-12.

<sup>651</sup> Ibid., ark. 7, 9-9zv, 20-20zv, 21zv, 37-38 (Krykun), 54zv.

<sup>652</sup> Ibid., ark. 18.

Russia and "reading" it instead as a fascinating narrative of their ancestors' glorious past. Perusing a Ukrainian historical novel did not mean consuming a text ideologically seasoned with the right balance of class and ethnic history. For many, reading such a work was an act of discovering or reaffirming their national identity.

### **History at the Movies**

The late Stalinist understanding of history as a series of events initiated and controlled by great men caused the genre of film biography to proliferate during the postwar decade. Between 1946 and 1953, the Soviet film industry produced seventeen full-length movies about great military leaders, scientists, composers, and writers.<sup>653</sup> Significantly, not all High Stalinist heroes were Russians; the list of seventeen films included *Rainis* (dir. Iu. Raizman, Riga, 1949), *Taras Shevchenko* (dir. I. Shevchenko, Kiev, 1951), and *Dzhambul* (dir. Ie. Dzigan, Alma-Ata, 1952). These popular versions of the biographies of three revered Latvian, Ukrainian, and Kazakh literary figures provided not only the officially sanctioned accounts of their lives, but also a condensed visual narrative of their nations' pre-revolutionary pasts stressing their ties to "progressive" Russian culture.

By the late 1940s, the canonic film biography of the "nation's father" was long overdue. The previous version, the 1926 *Taras Shevchenko* (dir. Chardynin, Odessa Film Studios) was produced at the height of the Ukrainization campaign and reflected the contemporary nationalizing and anti-colonialist ethos. In 1937, the authorities denounced the film as counter-revolutionary, Fascist, and nationalistic.<sup>654</sup> The new *Taras Shevchenko* was the first major project the Kiev Film Studios contemplated after the war. Because of the centralized planning and the large costs involved, starting a new movie project required Moscow's approval, but the usual procedure—a letter from the Ukrainian ministry of cinema to the all-Union ministry—did not succeed in this case. Given the ideological importance of the topic, the Moscow bureaucrats requested that the Ukrainian

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<sup>653</sup> Peter Kenez, *Cinema and Soviet Society, 1917-1953* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 239-40.

<sup>654</sup> S. V. Dubenko, *Taras Shevchenko ta ioho heroï na ekrani* (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1967), pp. 31-32.

Central Committee clear the matter with Zhdanov, and it did so in May 1946.<sup>655</sup>

Oleksandr Ilchenko wrote the initial script based on his novel *St. Petersburg Autumn*. The director I. Annensky began filming *Taras Shevchenko* in the summer of 1947 but, in late August or early September, the ever-suspicious Kaganovich ordered a review of the script's ideology.<sup>656</sup> The Central Committee set up a special panel, which convened on 8 September 1947, just days after the resolution about the Institute of History and with the purge of litterateurs in full swing. Ideological Secretary Lytvyn informed everyone present of Kaganovich's desire to ensure that the script portrayed Shevchenko as democrat and revolutionary. Apparently quoting the first secretary, Lytvyn sounded aphoristic: "Ukraine of that time was Shevchenko and Shevchenko meant Ukraine." When he began listing concrete suggestions, the secretary for ideology revealed that the party leadership desired a truly comprehensive picture of nineteenth-century Ukraine, complete with a portrayal of social oppression, peasant rebellions, friendship between the Russian and Ukrainian revolutionaries, and vilification of the "bourgeois nationalists."<sup>657</sup>

Since the previous draft basically followed the lines of the *St. Petersburg Autumn* in dealing with only one year of the poet's life, the panel requested that Ilchenko prepare a new script to include a depiction of social oppression and the peasant rebellion. Lytvyn also wanted the new version to show Shevchenko as "a rebel, a revolutionary," who completely disagreed with the nationalist Kulish and was mentored by the Russian revolutionary democrat Chernyshevsky.<sup>658</sup> The documents relating to the discussion of Ilchenko's final draft are missing. It is known, however, that the panel rejected the script for not satisfactorily portraying Shevchenko's achievements. The personal archive of the film director Ihor Savchenko preserves what seems to be his comments on Ilchenko's

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<sup>655</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 7, spr. 3927, ark. 1-4, here 4.

<sup>656</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 3 April 1947, p. 1 (script completed); 28 August 1947, p. 4 (filming began). According to Dubenko (*Taras Shevchenko ta ioho heroï na ekrani*, 42), the studios had already spent 2 million rubles of the film's budget by the time of the review.

<sup>657</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 689, ark. 1, 4, 9-10.

<sup>658</sup> *Ibid.*, ark. 1, 9-10.

script. Savchenko accused the writer of succumbing to nationalism and offering a wrong interpretation of the Cyril and Methodius Society. In the end, he called upon the authorities to "make a political appraisal of this scribble."<sup>659</sup>

In the spring of 1948, the authorities designated Savchenko as both the film's new director and script writer. Since the success of *Borhdan Khmelnytsky* and Dovzhenko's fall from grace, the younger and more politically reliable Savchenko had enjoyed the reputation of being the premier Ukrainian movie director. He promptly produced a new script portraying Shevchenko as more of a social activist and student of Russian revolutionaries. After suggesting some minor improvements, the Ukrainian Central Committee approved the text, authorizing Savchenko to begin filming in early 1949.<sup>660</sup>

The party leadership also made another important decision, albeit one not reflected in the available documents. Ilchenko and Annensky were working on a black-and-white film, but Savchenko commenced filming an expensive color picture. As Propaganda Secretary Nazarenko would reveal later, this upgrade required Khrushchev's personal intervention with Stalin, who "allowed us to make this movie in color [and] gave us the [required] color film."<sup>661</sup> Clearly, the republic's leadership wanted to make *Taras Shevchenko* a signature Ukrainian motion picture. Significantly, though, the film was made in Russian, because Moscow was to issue the final approval of it.

The CP(b)U Central Committee supervised the smallest details of the film's production, all the way down to the duration of sick leaves and the quality of the dressing-rooms. On 21 April 1950, Ukraine's Minister of Cinematography, O. Kuznetsov, reported the completion of filming to First Secretary Melnikov.<sup>662</sup> Technical editing

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<sup>659</sup> Dubenko, *Taras Shevchenko ta ioho heroï na ekrani.*, 42 (script rejected); RGALI, f. 1992, op. 1, spr. 128, ark. 1-10, here 7 (Savchenko's notes). The archive curators dated Savchenko's manuscript "1950" apparently because it was found among other materials pertaining to *Taras Shevchenko*. However, it could not have been written later than the spring of 1948, when the Ukrainian ideologues rejected Ilchenko's script and offered Savchenko the supervision of the project.

<sup>660</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1377, ark. 1-114 (the 1949 script after the revisions). At about the same time, Savchenko began working on the novel "Taras Shevchenko," which never advanced very far (RGALI, f. 1992, op. 1, d. 129, ll. 1-16).

<sup>661</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1850, ark. 108.

<sup>662</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2056, ark. 1-5 (supervision), 6 (report).



took several more months, and the first screening of *Taras Shevchenko* took place in late June. On 26 June, the Politburo-appointed commission, including Nazarenko, Kuznetsov, and Korniiichuk, gathered a group of the leading Ukrainian writers, artists, and scholars to discuss the film. Even before the debates began, Savchenko suffered a mild heart attack and had to rest on a couch in another room.<sup>663</sup>

The discussion opened with careful criticisms from historians and literary scholars. The historian Mykola Tkachenko suggested nothing less than showing the poet preparing the peasant rebellion, thus connecting the scene of Shevchenko's arrest with the following episode of the uprising. (The whole story had no basis in reality.) The literary historian Novikov wanted to see more social context and also complained that the film's image of Shevchenko did not do justice to his alleged intellectual powers or "his understanding of the historical process and his comments [on social progress], which made such 'scholars' as Kulish and Kostomarov feel embarrassed and remain silent." At this point, however, Korniiichuk interrupted the speaker:

- Korniiichuk: Why were quotation marks used when referring to Kostomarov as a scholar?
- Novikov: Because his understanding of these matters and the historical process in general was completely erroneous.
- Korniiichuk: But he understood many things correctly.
- Novikov: As a historian, he was a scholar in quotation marks. I think he understood the historical process incorrectly and, to some degree, this is shown in the film. And besides, I believe one should talk about Kostomarov in more modest terms.<sup>664</sup>

Following Korniiichuk's defence of the "bourgeois historian" Kostomarov, Ukraine's leading theater artist, Anatol Petrytsky, took the floor to rebuff the demands for a larger social context in the film:

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<sup>663</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1850, ark. 1-3. A copy of the minutes is in RGALI, f. 1992, op. 1, d. 124, ll. 1-41.

<sup>664</sup> Ibid., ark. 11.

I see things differently from the previous speaker [Novikov]. Perhaps this is because he is a critic and I am a practitioner with a first-hand understanding of the artistic problems involved. Even Repin complained that the spectators often expected from his paintings more that these works could have possibly contained. For instance, the artist is painting a canvas about the Zaporozhian Cossacks. He captures only one moment when they are writing the letter to the Turkish Sultan. But no, that is not enough, some begin demanding that he also portray the emergence of the Zaporozhian Host, what happened to it, how Catherine was involved, etc. [Laughter, applause.] They even want to see the Zaporozhians beyond the Danube. [Laughter.]<sup>665</sup>

The poet Maksym Rylsky, the artist Oleksandr Pashchenko, and the writer Wanda Wasilewska all praised the film. Then, however, Nazarenko and the Central Committee expert O. Rumiantsev elaborated on the earlier criticism. (One might conclude that they had coached Tkachenko and Novikov before the meeting.) Nazarenko demanded more scenes of exploitation and a clear connection between Shevchenko's arrest and the peasant revolt. Rumiantsev seconded him, while also wanting to delete the scene of Shevchenko's reception at Countess Tolstoy's home, where the poet seemed to enjoy mixing with the upper classes.<sup>666</sup>

Although the discussion ended inconclusively, Nazarenko ordered the conformist literary critic Illia Stebun and the head of the Administration of Propaganda and Agitation, Davyd Kopytsia, to write critical reviews of the film. Both suggested numerous radical changes to the screenplay that would fill Savchenko's visual narrative with one-dimensional ideological statements. Stebun proposed beginning the movie with Lenin's statement about serfdom in Russia, as well as adding more scenes of exploitation and class struggle. He also questioned the portrayal of Shevchenko's ties to the Russian utopian socialist group of the 1840s, the so-called Petrashevsky Circle: "In fact, one cannot speak of his wide contacts [with the circle] because he had no contacts at all."

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<sup>665</sup> Ibid., ark. 13. Petrytsky was referring to Illia Repin's famous painting *The Zaporozhians Writing a Letter to the Sultan* (1880-91), the destruction of the Zaporozhian Host on the orders of Catherine II in 1774, and Semen Hulak-Artemovsky's popular comic opera *The Zaporozhian Cossack beyond the Danube* (1863).

<sup>666</sup> Ibid., ark. 18 (Rylsky), 21 (Pashchenko), 26 (Wasilewska), 24 (Nazarenko), 33 (Rumiantsev).

Instead, Stebun suggested connecting Shevchenko more with the Russian revolutionary democrats of the late 1850s and early '60s, although the critic must have been aware of the equally fictional nature of such a connection. Stebun wanted to cut salon conversations with the nobles, adding instead Shevchenko's remark about industrial progress, as well as his positive comment about Bohdan Khmelnytsky and a condemnation of Hetman Mazepa. Kopytsia basically repeated Nazarenko's comments during the discussion. He also suggested highlighting ties with the Russian revolutionary democrats.<sup>667</sup>

Armed with these critical reviews, the Ukrainian Politburo established a new supervisory commission, now composed exclusively of senior politicians and ideologues: Central Committee secretaries Nazarenko and Ivan Senin, President Hrechukha, Minister of Culture Lytvyn, and Kopytsia.<sup>668</sup> On 1 July 1950, the members of the Politburo watched the film and proposed further improvements. First Secretary Melnikov was left unhappy with the young Shevchenko's "fussiness" and the lack of Ukrainian songs. In particular, he wanted to include *Oi zakuvala ta syva zozulia*, describing it as "Comrade Stalin's favorite song." Second Secretary Kyrychenko requested that stress should be placed on "Shevchenko's ties to the people" and the poet's "warm meeting with the Russian revolutionary democrats after his return from exile."<sup>669</sup>

After Savchenko made changes to the screenplay, the commission gathered on 18 July to discuss further corrections. Nazarenko suggested downplaying the role of the Polish revolutionary Z. Sierakowski, for otherwise, the "Ukrainian-Polish connection would appear more prominent than the Ukrainian-Russian one, which was in reality decisive both in Shevchenko's life and in history." In addition, Kopytsia wanted to cut episodes including Dobroliubov so that the viewer would clearly understand that

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<sup>667</sup> Ibid., ark. 36-46; copies in Savchenko's personal archive in RGALI, f. 1992, op. 1, d. 125, ll. 1-6, 14-17.

<sup>668</sup> Ibid., ark. 55.

<sup>669</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2056, ark. 8-20, here 9, 16 (Melnikov), 11, 13 (Kyrychenko). In the end, Melnikov made an unusual acknowledgement: "Our people, our intelligentsia, are so permeated with the deepest love for Shevchenko that they would have accepted enthusiastically even an imperfect film about him" (ark. 20).

Chernyshevsky was the sole head of the revolutionary democracy. Savchenko opposed the cuts, offering instead to film more episodes and make *Taras Shevchenko* a two-part movie. Lytvyn claimed that the "formalist" Borys Liatoshynsky had written a pessimistic musical score, but Savchenko defended the composer. The party ideologues and the director did not reach an understanding.<sup>670</sup>

On 14 July, Nazarenko reported to Suslov in Moscow on the changes already made to the screenplay and the new corrections proposed.<sup>671</sup> During this stage, however, the apparatus of the All-Union Central Committee did not get involved in the discussion; instead, the initiative passed to the Minister of Cinema and Stalin's confidant, Leonid Bolshakov, who organized a new discussion of Savchenko's film at the All-Union Committee for the Arts in Moscow. Although many comments paralleled those made in Kiev, and Bolshakov himself summarized the Kievans' commentary, the participants were generally approving and their criticisms constructive.<sup>672</sup>

On 17 August, Bolshakov wrote to Nazarenko, sending a copy of his memo to the VKP(b) Central Committee, about the changes to be made in the film. Major alterations included filming a connecting scene between Shevchenko's arrest and the peasant rebellion, replacing the actor playing Chernyshevsky with one with a more imposing appearance, eliminating the "fussiness" in the young Shevchenko, and refilming the final scene without Sierakowski. In addition, the film needed a more energetic overture based on Shevchenko's revolutionary poem *Testament*, and the final scene was to portray Soviet youth reading the poet's works.<sup>673</sup>

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<sup>670</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1850, ark. 55 (Nazarenko), 79 (Kopytsia), 69 (Lytvyn), 56, 69, 88 (Savchenko).

<sup>671</sup> RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 427, ll. 82-89. Incidentally, the same file contains the correspondence with the Central Committee of the Kazakh Communist Party regarding the film *Dzhambul* (ark. 121-24).

<sup>672</sup> RGALI, f. 1992, op. 1, d. 124, ll. 44-72. During the conference, the prominent Russian literary scholar Boris Shcherbina notified the participants: "Korniichuk said that he supports [the film] unreservedly" (ark. 57). Apparently, the backing of Stalin's pet playwright made a difference.

<sup>673</sup> RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 427, ll. 90-91. This whole episode testified to Bolshakov's unique status in the Stalinist hierarchy of power, based on his personal connections to Stalin. Bolshakov's official position as a lower-level minister by no means entitled him to give orders to ideological secretaries in the republics or to forward copies of his letters for the information of the chief ideologue, Suslov.

Interestingly, even though Moscow now assumed responsibility for the film, the Ukrainian ideologues insisted on implementing all their suggestions. Perceiving the interpretation of the Ukrainian past as the prerogative of the republic's functionaries, Nazarenko kept sending telegrams to Bolshakov. In October-November 1950, the Ukrainian ideologue repeatedly suggested cutting the scene in Countess Tolstoy's salon and adding the episode of the "progressive Russian people buying Shevchenko out of serfdom." Nazarenko also inquired whether the beautiful Ukrainian landscapes were presented properly in the new version, and requested a new musical score.<sup>674</sup> Bolshakov ignored the appeals from Ukraine. Accordingly, in October, the Ukrainian authorities sent to Moscow the chief editor of the republican Ministry of Cinema, Oleksandr Levada. He attempted to visit Bolshakov during regular office hours, but was referred to the minister's deputy, who told the Ukrainian envoy that the "question is settled; the plan of revisions has been cleared with the Central Committee and with Comrade Suslov in person." Then Levada sneaked into the Central Committee's Department of Propaganda, where the functionary Groshev "guardedly advised [him] that revising the plan of the film's alterations appeared difficult" since Bolshakov's plan had been already approved.<sup>675</sup>

Aside from their feeling of being excluded, the Ukrainian ideologues had little reason to complain. The new episodes included Shevchenko's fiery speech before the peasants, prompting them to rebel, the scene of the Russian revolutionary democrats discussing their plans to bring Shevchenko back from exile, and the poet's cordial meeting with Chernyshevsky, who in another episode referred to Kulish in passing as "that pig good only for lard."<sup>676</sup> The additional scenes were filmed during December

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<sup>674</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2056, ark. 26-31.

<sup>675</sup> Ibid., 32-33: "On v ostorozhnykh formulirovках zametil, chto peresmotr programmy dorabotki filma predstavliaetsia emu zatrudnitel'ny, tak kak etot vopros uzhe rassmatrivalsia v TsK VKP(b) ranshe."

<sup>676</sup> RGALI, f. 1992, op. 1, d. 116, ll. 1-30, here 13, 19-20; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1850, ark. 90-100. The public subsequently came to believe that the fictional appeal to the peasants was, indeed, the cause of Shevchenko's arrest. In 1952, the history instructor at the Novhorod-Siverskyi Teachers' College V. S. Samardina wrote to the authors of the *History of the Ukrainian SSR*: "The limited edition claims that Shevchenko was arrested after his return from exile because of a denunciation, while in reality, he was arrested as a result of his ardent public speech against serfdom and against the Ukrainian bourgeois liberalism. This moment of his struggle is wonderfully shown in the film *Taras Shevchenko*, and I think it should be documented equally vividly and convincingly in the textbook of Ukrainian history" (TsDAHO,

1950, but it is not clear whether Savchenko agreed to implement the revisions. On 14 December, the 45-year-old director died from a heart attack. Korniiichuk prepared the final version of the screenplay, while several of Savchenko's students at the Institute of Cinema took over the filming of the new scenes.

On 11 July 1951, the new Ukrainian Minister of Cinema, I. Mazepa, related to First Secretary Melnikov: "I hereby report that, according to the information from the USSR Minister of Cinema, Comrade Bolshakov, the full-length color film *Taras Shevchenko* after the completion of revisions was presented for the government's private viewing in Moscow and was approved without corrections."<sup>677</sup> Stalin and his inner circle, which now included Khrushchev, did not even bother to ask the republican leadership's opinion about Ukraine's national icon. Soon after the film's release, the Ukrainian ideologues made a weak attempt to reclaim their right to interpret Shevchenko. The Russian writer Marietta Shaginian asserted in her *Izvestiia* review of the film that the Cyril and Methodius Society had been a bourgeois nationalist group, which Shevchenko joined by accident and which used his talent to its advantage. Nazarenko ordered the preparing of a refutation and draft of Melnikov's letter of protest to Suslov, but the matter was eventually shelved.<sup>678</sup>

*Taras Shevchenko's* simultaneous release in Russian and Ukrainian in December 1951 became a major event in Ukraine's cultural life. The largest theaters held exhibitions on the poet's life, inviting scholars to give lectures about Shevchenko before the screening of the film. The newspapers hailed the picture as a great success, a "work of enormous impact" that created a "majestic image" of the "immortal poet-fighter."<sup>679</sup> In March 1952, the film received the Stalin Prize, First Class—the first postwar work of the Kiev

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f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2339, ark. 88).

<sup>677</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 777, ark. 101.

<sup>678</sup> *Izvestiia*, 20 December 1951; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2056, ark. 21-25.

<sup>679</sup> *Radianske mystetstvo*, 19 December 1951, p. 3; 26 December 1951, p. 2; *Literaturna hazeta*, 27 December 1951, p. 3. As mentioned earlier, the film was shot in Russian and subsequently dubbed in Ukrainian (TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3656, ark. 267-69).

Film Studios to earn this most prestigious Soviet accolade.<sup>680</sup>

Like similar grandiose undertakings in other fields, such as the *History of the Ukrainian SSR* or the opera *Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Taras Shevchenko* drained the republic's financial and human resources, so that the simultaneous production of another historical film was impossible. In fact, the whole Soviet film industry produced only ten full-length movies in 1951.<sup>681</sup> Although the Kiev Studios renewed plans to shoot *Iaroslav the Wise* after the play's astonishing success in 1946-47 and, in the autumn of 1948, Kocherha even wrote the screenplay, this project was eventually abandoned.<sup>682</sup>

After the completion of *Taras*, the Ukrainian authorities briefly entertained the idea of making a film biography of Gogol in time for the writer's jubilee in 1952. Iurii Ianovsky produced several script drafts during 1951, but none of them earned the CP(b)U Central Committee's approval. The internal reviews reveal that the republic's ideologues were struggling to find an appropriate definition of Gogol's ethnic identity: was he a Ukrainian cultural figure writing in Russian or a Russian writer working with Ukrainian topics? In the end, the propaganda functionaries resolved that the "Ukrainian school" in nineteenth-century Russian literature "reflected the Russian writers' fraternal love for the Ukrainian people."<sup>683</sup> Applying this description to the biography of the Ukrainian-born and ethnically Ukrainian Gogol proved difficult. As the jubilee approached, the Ukrainian bureaucrats abandoned the project.

Ever since Stalin had denounced Oleksandr Dovzhenko's *Ukraine in Flames* in 1944, Dovzhenko had been working in Moscow and was not allowed to return to Ukraine. In fact, Bolshakov told him that staying in Moscow would save him from being persecuted as nationalist by the eager Ukrainian functionaries: "You will work in Moscow. I do not recommend that you move to Ukraine. You better not go there. There you were denounced so thoroughly that [undoing this] would take time or a change in

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<sup>680</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 8, spr. 9496, ark. 131 (the studios' report for 1951-53).

<sup>681</sup> A. A. Romitsyn, *Ukrainske radianske kinomystetstvo: 1941-1954*, 129.

<sup>682</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 6 December 1948, p. 3; Romitsyn, *Ukrainske radianske kinomystetstvo*, 78.

<sup>683</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2348, ark. 1-51, here 3; spr. 2349, ark. 1-64.

circumstances. Your old friends did their best."<sup>684</sup> During the postwar decade, Dovzhenko repeatedly returned to his idea of making the film *Taras Bulba* and even privately wrote a complete script. Given his reputation as a "Ukrainian nationalist," though, the authorities never allowed this project to fly.

With the tercentenary of Pereiaslav looming large, the Ukrainian functionaries began in the early 1950s to consider a relevant, imposing new film. In mid-1952, the CP(b)U Central Committee developed a preliminary plan of celebrations that included shooting the film *The Pereiaslav Council*. At the last moment, however, Melnikov realized that the list had grown long and expensive enough to cause Moscow's dissatisfaction. (In the Soviet system of centralized financing, the center was to pick up the bill for the festivities.) The movie was crossed out from the list, leaving future researchers to wonder whether *The Pereiaslav Council* was meant to be a screen version of Rybak's novel or a new interpretation of Korniiichuk's play.<sup>685</sup>

Both choices appear to have been possible. In 1951, the Kiev Film Studios listed *The Pereiaslav Council* in its long-term plan, naming Rybak as a prospective scriptwriter,<sup>686</sup> but the Ukrainian bureaucracy also entertained plans of refilming *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* in color. As Nazarenko reported to Pospelov in Moscow in 1953, the Ukrainian film circulation division had only 54 copies of the old *Bohdan* (24 of them "worn out") while the movie was still very much in demand. The Ukrainian ideologue was requesting the printing of another 250 copies.<sup>687</sup> At the same time, the republic's authorities realized that the Soviet ideological transmutation of the last decade had generated an interpretation of Ukrainian history different from that offered in the 1941 *Bohdan*. In March 1953, the Ukrainian Minister of Cinema, Mazepa, proposed to Korniiichuk that the film be remade in color after revising the old script. Korniiichuk

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<sup>684</sup> Dovzhenko, *Hospody, poshly meni syly*, 255 (diary entry from 11 July 1945). Dovzhenko interpreted his "old friends" as referring primarily to Khrushchev and Bazhan.

<sup>685</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3597, ark. 73.

<sup>686</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2347, ark. 18.

<sup>687</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3268, ark. 107. Petr Pospelov was the secretary of the VKP(b) Central Committee in charge of propaganda and culture.



suggested the following changes: showing the tsar accepting the hetman's ambassadors, portraying the Pereiaslav Council itself, and refilming the battle at Batih by adding to this scene the fraternal Russian Don Cossacks.<sup>688</sup>

The Kiev Film Studios planned to start working on the new *Bohdan* in late 1953, but as usual, producing an ideologically seasoned script proved trying. The studios eventually postponed the work to 1954. In the meantime, Korniiichuk dumped from the project the local directors Marian Krushelnytsky and Tymofii Levchuk, securing instead the Russian director Vladimir Petrov, who had produced the celebrated historical movie *Peter the First* (Leningrad Film Studios, Parts I-II, 1937-38).<sup>689</sup> Korniiichuk did not just restructure the narrative to emphasize the role of Russia and Russians; he also inserted scenes showing that from the very beginning of the war, all the film's characters had dreamt of uniting with Muscovy. As a final coup, Korniiichuk wrote an entirely fictional speech for Bohdan Khmelnytsky at the Pereiaslav Council:

Among her mortal enemies lies our tormented mother Ukraine and only one nation, great Russia, has always helped us in unequal bloody struggle. Many times we have asked [the tsar] that our Ukrainian people be forever united with their [Russian] brethren in one state, great Russia. This was what our grandfathers and greatgrandfathers wished, this is what we want to accomplish firmly, forever. Great Rus', our most glorious brother! Ukraine bows to the ground before you. Together with you, our people, our land, and our state are invincible, from now and for the ages to come!<sup>690</sup>

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<sup>688</sup> TsDAMLM, f. 435, op. 1, spr. 766, ark. 1.

<sup>689</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 8, spr. 9496, ark. 135 (the Kiev Studios plan to start in 1953 with Krushelnytsky and Levchuk); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3268, ark. 88 (postponed because of the lack of a script); RGALI, f. 2329, op. 12, d. 237, ll. 1-4; TsDAMLM, f. 435, op. 1, spr. 2137, ark. 13 (Petrov).

<sup>690</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3657, ark. 142. Other examples are in spr. 3268, ark. 94; TsDAMLM, f. 435, op. 1, spr. 1846, ark. 22-26; RGALI, f. 2329, op. 12, d. 237, ll. 10, 35-36, 115-16, 124-26. The Muscovite ambassadors provided the only surviving account of the hetman's real speech in Pereiaslav. According to them, Khmelnytsky described the oppression of the Orthodox in Poland and lamented the six years of war and destruction. Then he proposed that assembled public choose a sovereign: the Muslim Turkish sultan and the Crimean khan, the Catholic Polish king, or the Orthodox Muscovite tsar. On the hetman's urging, the assembly accepted the tsar's offer of protection (*Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei: Dokumenty i materialy v trekh tomakh* [Moscow: Izdatelstvo AN SSSR, 1954], 3: 460-61). Korniiichuk rewrote the speech completely.

As the celebrations of the tercentenary approached, the Ukrainian cinema bureaucracy began worrying that it would have nothing to report. In April 1954, the Ministry of Cinema petitioned the CP(b)U Central Committee to allow a quick low-cost filming of Dmyterko's play *Forever Together*, but the party leadership decided against simultaneously undertaking two similar projects.<sup>691</sup> Meanwhile, the work on the new *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*, now called *The Great Brotherhood*, did not start until August 1954, well after the celebrations. Petrov made an imposing and expensive picture, parts of which were shot in the Kremlin, but which took almost two years to complete. The Soviet film industry released the movie as *Three Centuries Ago* in the autumn of 1956, when Soviet political and cultural life was no longer the same as it had been under Stalin.<sup>692</sup>

In the end, a Soviet scholar rightly pointed out that the Ukrainian film industry had failed to produce a historical movie for the jubilee.<sup>693</sup> Of course, he did not dare to blame the Stalinist system for that deficiency.

### **Ukrainian Artists Delineate the Past**

Ukrainian artists were the first among the republic's cultural elite to recover after the Kaganovich pogrom. As explained in Chapter Four, Hryhorii Melikhov's award-winning painting *Young Taras Shevchenko Visiting the Artist K. P. Briullov* (1947) perfectly illustrated the new official vision of Ukrainians as having been always guided by the Russian "elder brother." Other artists emulated Melikhov in portraying Russian historical and cultural figures visiting Ukraine and/or tutoring their Ukrainian contemporaries. Notable among the works on this topic were the following paintings: M. Dobronravov's *Peter the First in Lviv* (1947), H. Svitlytsky, *The Composer P. I. Tchaikovsky in Ukraine* (1947), K. Trokhymenko's *Gorky Reading Shevchenko to the Peasants* (1949), M. Khaertinov's *After the Battle at Poltava* (1950), V. Puteiko's *Maksim Gorky and Mykhailo Kotsiubynsky on the Island of Capri* (1951), P. Parkhet's *The Assault on Khadzhibei*

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<sup>691</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3656, ark. 8. The Kiev Studios eventually filmed Dmyterko's play in 1956-57 (ibid., ark. 197).

<sup>692</sup> TsDAML, f. 435, op. 1, spr. 2137, ark. 15, 23-25, 40-45.

<sup>693</sup> Romitsyn, *Ukrainske radianske kinomystetstvo*, 210.

(1953), V. Zabashta's *P. I. Tchaikovsky and M. V. Lysenko* (1953), and F. Shostak's *The Printer Ivan Fedorov in Lviv* (1954).<sup>694</sup> Graphic artists and sculptors also produced numerous works on the topic of the Russian-Ukrainian friendship, such as O. Kulchytska's lithograph *Ivan Fedorov among the Lviv Townspeople* (1949), M. Vronsky's sculpture *T. H. Shevchenko and N. G. Chernyshevsky* (1954), and S. Besedin's drawings *Pushkin in Ukraine*, *T. H. Shevchenko among the Progressive Cultural Figures*, and *P. I. Tchaikovsky Visiting M. V. Lysenko* (all 1954).<sup>695</sup>

At the same time, the artists shied away from the portrayal of the Ukrainian heroic past as such. For instance, until 1954, when S. Adamovych displayed his canvas *Danylo of Halych* at the Tercentenary Exhibition, no painter dared to work on the history of the Galician-Volhynian Principality. Depicting the prince at the battlefield after his victory over the German knights, this painting did not develop the theme of the Russian-Ukrainian friendship and was soon dismissed as "empty (*bezzmistovne*)."<sup>696</sup> The rehabilitation of Cossack glory as a topic also proved difficult. After Mykhailo Derehus's series about the Khmelnytsky Uprising was dismissed in 1946, the artist concentrated on illustrating historical novels, including Gogol's *Taras Bulba* and Rybak's *The Pereiaslav Council*.<sup>697</sup> During the *dekada* of Ukrainian art in Moscow in June 1951, Derehus first exhibited his large painting *The Pereiaslav Council* (on which he was assisted by S. Repin and V. Savenkov). This work was mildly criticized for its lack of action and dramatic tension.<sup>698</sup> Nevertheless, the work's topic probably protected Derehus during the ensuing purge of "nationalist errors" in Ukrainian culture.

Later in 1951, the young Mykhailo Khmelko, who had already earned two Stalin

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<sup>694</sup> Dmytrenko, *Ukrainskyi radianskyi zhyvopys*, 80, 88; *Istoriia ukrainskoho mystetstva*, 6: 125-26.

<sup>695</sup> H. M. Iukhymets, *Ukrainske radianske mystetstvo 1941-1960 rokiv* (Kiev: Mystetstvo, 1983), pp. 96, 112, 140.

<sup>696</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 17 June 1954, p. 4; TsDAMLM, f. 665, op. 1, spr. 167, ark. 4.

<sup>697</sup> M. Kholodkovskaia, [Introduction], in *Mikhail Gordeevich Derehus* (Moscow: Sovetskii khudozhnik, 1954), pp. 5-40, here 19-22, 30-33.

<sup>698</sup> TsDAMLM, f. 196, op. 1, spr. 26, ark. 19; "Za novye uspekhi izobrazitel'nogo iskusstva Ukrainy," *Iskusstvo*, no. 4 (1951): 3-10, here 7; *Vystavka izobrazitel'nogo iskusstva Ukrainskoi SSR: Zhivopis, skulptura, grafika: Katalog* (Kiev: Mystetstvo, 1951), p. 17.

Prizes for his paintings on the Soviet subjects, presented his monumental canvas *Forever with Moscow, Forever with the Russian People*. This large and magnificent painting portrayed Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Russian ambassador addressing the cheering crowd before the cathedral in Pereiaslav. Khmelko put the Cossack colonels, Muscovite boyars, and church hierarchs in the foreground, picturing every detail of their decorative garments and gonfalons.<sup>699</sup> However, the republic's artistic community, apparently upset with the success of Khmelko's decorative monumentalism during a time when lyric and genre works on Ukrainian topics were being dismissed as untopical, used the language of class to attack the authorities' favorite. As soon as the painting was first exhibited in Moscow, the republic's critics accused Khmelko of indulging in "excessive theatrical splendor."<sup>700</sup> Soon Lidiia Popova published a more damaging objection, namely, that the artist had ignored the "representatives of the common people." During the artists' conference, Serhii Hryhoriev lectured Khmelko that a historical painting "should depict not a farce or parade, but the drama of history."<sup>701</sup> In January 1953, the newspaper of the Artists' Union, *Radianske mystetstvo*, went as far as publishing satirical verses addressed to Khmelko:

Rubies, steel, enamel, and cut glass;  
Satin, brocade, and a sledge with fretwork.  
This is all good, but one thing is unfortunate,  
That the people are in the background.<sup>702</sup>

The critic Valentyna Kuryltseva summed up that Khmelko had not studied history

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<sup>699</sup> The painting was first displayed at the All-Union Artistic Exhibition in Moscow in December 1951 (*Radianske mystetstvo*, 26 December 1951, p. 1; 1 January 1952, p. 3). Nazarenko was personally supervising Khmelko's progress and reprimanded the Artists' Union party group for having sent "Comrade Khmelko, who [was] working on an important painting *The Pereiaslav Council*, to Molotov District with the aim of counting the people who signed the appeal for preserving peace" (TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1893, ark. 11).

<sup>700</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 31 January 1952, p. 4.

<sup>701</sup> *Radianske mystetstvo*, 14 December 1952, p. 2 (Popova); TsDAMLM, f. 581, op. 1, spr. 343, ark. 9 (Hryhoriev).

<sup>702</sup> *Radianske mystetstvo*, 14 January 1953, p. 4.

thoroughly enough and, being fascinated with the ruling classes, "failed to show the role of the Ukrainian people" in the historic reunification.<sup>703</sup> For lack of another depiction of the event portrayed by Khmelko, the authorities by 1953 adopted the unsophisticated *Pereiaslav Council* by Derehus, Repin, and Savenkov as the reunification's principal official image that later was most often reproduced on stamps, tapestries, and vases.

In early 1954, however, the industrious Khmelko presented a new variant of *The Pereiaslav Council*.<sup>704</sup> Most changes were purely cosmetic: dressing some personages in dark clothes instead of gold-embroidered garments, making the colors less bright, and adding in the foreground an old bandura player in rags. Although the revised painting was not praised as the definitive account of the council or nominated for any prizes, it was widely exhibited during the Tercentenary celebrations.<sup>705</sup>

Nevertheless, the critics' sympathies went to three new, artistically superior works by young artists. Oleksandr Khmelnytsky's *Forever Together* (1953) portrayed the Ukrainian and Russian masses rejoicing outside the cathedral in Pereiaslav, V. Zadorozhnii's *Bohdan Khmelnytsky Leaves His Son Tymish as a Hostage with the Crimean Khan* (1954) depicted the human side of the hetman, while Mykhailo Kryvenko's lyrical *When the Cossack Went to War* (1954) illustrated a folksong about a girl bidding farewell to a young Cossack.<sup>706</sup> The rehabilitation of the Cossack glory as a referent of Ukrainian historical memory led Derehus to rework one of his illustrations to *Taras Bulba* into the painting *Taras at the Head of the Army* (1952). The graphic artist Oleksandr Danchenko produced a remarkable and highly acclaimed etching series with a title reminiscent of Derehus's 1946 series, "The Ukrainian People's War of Liberation (1648-1654)." The centerpiece of the series, *The Feat of Three Hundred at Berestechko*, glorified the heroism of the nation's great ancestors with enthusiasm unseen since the war

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<sup>703</sup> *Radianske mystetstvo*, 25 March 1953, p. 3.

<sup>704</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3634, ark. 11.

<sup>705</sup> *Vystavka izobrazitel'nogo iskusstva Ukrainskoi SSR posviashchennaia trekhsotletiiu vossoedineniia Ukrainy s Rossiei: Zhivopis, skulptura, grafika: Katalog* (Kiev: Mystetstvo, 1954), pp. 37-72.

<sup>706</sup> TsDAMLM, f. 581, op. 1, spr. 440, ark. 6-9; *Radianske mystetstvo*, 9 June 1954, p. 2.

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The 1951 ideological campaign and the subsequent tightened control over the representations of the past in Ukrainian culture raises the question of whether Ukraine represented a special case among the Soviet republics. The incorporation of Western Ukraine and the persistent nationalist insurgency there necessitated the purge of "nationalist deviations" in the official discourse because the nationalist propaganda offered a "reading" of the Ukrainian heroic past suspiciously similar to the wartime Soviet version, albeit without endorsing the "friendship of peoples" paradigm. However, just as the Dovzhenko affair had coincided with the denunciation of the *History of the Kazakh SSR* for its "anti-Russian mistakes," so the postwar campaigns in Ukraine went hand in hand with uncovering the "poison of nationalism" in Azerbaijani, Turkmen, Uzbek, and Kirgiz traditional epic poems, as well as in Armenian, Georgian, Kazakh, and Turkmen history works. Having read *Pravda's* editorial "Against Ideological Distortions in Literature," Moscow historian Sergei Dmitriev noted in his diary: "To be understood properly, this article needs to be compared to and analyzed together with the articles and resolutions on the Mongol and Tatar epics, Armenian literature, Shamil and Muridism, Kenesary Kasimov, etc."<sup>708</sup> Thus, rather than being a special case, Ukraine appears to have been the touchstone of Stalinist nationality policy, a place where new limits of acceptable ethnic patriotism were being developed and tested.

This chapter, however, was less concerned with the aims and mechanism of Stalinist ideological purges than with their consequences for Ukrainian culture and the role played by the local ideologues and cultural agents in the shaping of the Stalinist "national imagination." Considering Stalin's April 1952 statement about unidentified problems in the ideological work in Ukraine, one is tempted to construe that the

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<sup>707</sup> Iukhymets, *Ukrainskeadianske mystetstvo*, 100; *Istoriia ukrainskoho mystetstva*, 6: 229-30.

<sup>708</sup> "Iz dnevnikov Sergeia Sergeevicha Dmitrieva," *Otechestvennaia istoriia*, no. 4 (1999): 117. I am grateful to David Brandenberger for bringing this memoir to my attention.

omniscient "father of peoples" realized that his viceroys had failed to fashion a Soviet Ukrainian culture completely separate from non-Soviet Ukrainian culture or to produce a Soviet Ukrainian national mythology entirely different from the nationalist myth of origins. Perhaps Stalin bemoaned the limits of the state's ideological control and the major role of the local bureaucrats and intellectuals in shaping his many "imagined communities," or regretted how the cultural agents could use the official linguistic code to defend and promote their agendas. Similarly, perhaps he suspected that the resulting cultural products could be "read" selectively, being interpreted as heroic narratives of the national past.

## Chapter Eight

### HISTORY AT THE OPERA<sup>709</sup>

An in-depth look at the genre of historical opera is particularly rewarding for a student of Stalinist cultural paradigms. The role of historical opera in the European national revivals of the nineteenth century inextricably tied this genre to the emergence of modern national identities and mythologies.<sup>710</sup> The reinstatement of traditional social hierarchies and cultural values in the Soviet Union during the mid-1930s pushed the "bourgeois" art of opera to the foreground. The state-sponsored rehabilitation of patriotism, national pride, and Russian national heroes was another aspect of the same "Great Retreat." The genre of historical opera afforded a unique opportunity to combine the Stalinist quest for monumentalism, respectability, and "classics" in the arts with the system's new regard for the Russian national past and cultural heritage. Russian classical opera, both tuneful and patriotic, made a spectacular comeback on the Soviet scene from 1935 to 1937. The rehabilitation of the genre reached its apogee in 1939, when the Bolshoi lavishly produced the canonical tsarist patriotic opera, Glinka's *Ivan Susanin*, which had remained untouchable for twenty-two years after the revolution. With a heavily edited libretto, *Susanin* became *the* Stalinist patriotic spectacle, an unprecedentedly pompous celebration of Russian national pride.<sup>711</sup>

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<sup>709</sup> A version of this chapter has been accepted for publication. See Serhy Yekelchuk, "Diktat and Dialogue in Stalinist Culture: Staging Patriotic Historical Opera in Soviet Ukraine, 1936-1954," forthcoming in the *Slavic Review*.

<sup>710</sup> Benedict Anderson has alerted students of nationalism to the genres of modern high culture best suited to conveying the nationalist message. He particularly emphasizes the novel and the newspaper as best embodying "[t]he idea of a sociological organism moving calendrically through homogeneous, empty time [and representing] a precise analogue of the idea of the nation, which is also conceived as a solid community moving steadily down (or up) history". (Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. [London: Verso, 1991], p. 26). In addition, national historical operas could be seen as occupying a prominent place among the scaffolding of the cultural construction of a modern nation.

<sup>711</sup> A. A. Gozenpud, *Russkii sovetskii opernyi teatr (1917-1941): Ocherk istorii* (Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe muzykalnoe izdatelstvo, 1963), pp. 212-19, 252-64; Boris Schwarz, *Music and Musical Life in Soviet Russia, 1917-1981*, enlarged ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), p. 122; Tucker, *Stalin in Power*, 554, 570-71.



However, the students of the "Great Retreat" in Stalinist ideology and culture have generally ignored the fact that this transformation occurred in a multinational state. The non-Russians did not simply join the Muscovites in singing paeans to "elder brother." Instead, the non-Russian composers turned to refurbishing or writing their own patriotic operas in order to glorify their own national traditions and glorious pasts. Late in the war and especially after 1945, the promotion of local ethnic patriotism in the arts became increasingly subordinated to the glorification of the "great Russian people" and the "friendship of peoples." Nevertheless, Stalinist ideologues never condemned the idea of producing a classical Ukrainian patriotic opera that would provide Soviet Ukrainians with a truly imposing representation of their heroic past, just as *Ivan Susanin* had done for the Russians. The national grand patriotic opera represented an important element of the ethnic "great tradition" required by the High Stalinist idea of a "nation."<sup>712</sup>

Still, like the historical novel, the Ukrainian historical opera remained the genre ever suspected of "harmful nostalgia" for the national past and criticized during periodic campaigns against "nationalist deviations" in Ukrainian culture. For two years after the authorities in 1946 dismissed the third revival of Lysenko's *Taras Bulba*, no composer—with a single exception—attempted to work on a historical opera in Ukraine. The exception was a professor at the Kiev Conservatory, Mykhailo Skorulsky, who had received his musical education before World War I and apparently had never adjusted to the changing Soviet ideological prescriptions for musical works. In 1948, Skorulsky completed a grand historical music drama, *Svichka's Wedding*, which clearly imitated Wagner's musical language. Given the unofficial ban on the "Hitlerite" Wagner in the postwar years, Skorulsky could consider himself fortunate that his opera was never staged.<sup>713</sup> Although in Ukraine the 1948 campaign against "formalism" in music focused on the prominent symphonist Borys Liatoshynsky, the local authorities and cultural figures

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<sup>712</sup> On the Stalinist notion of "great tradition," see Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment," 446-47.

<sup>713</sup> L. Arkhimovych, *Shliakhy rozvytku ukrainskoi radianskoi opery* (Kiev: Muzychna Ukraina, 1970), p. 290; M. Mykhailov, *M. A. Skorulsky: Narys pro zhyttia i tvorchist* (Kiev: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo obrazotvorchoho mystetstva i muzychnoi literatury URSR, 1960), p. 71.

ritualistically repeated the old accusations against Verykivsky, himself no modernist, but presumably guilty of "idealizing the past."<sup>714</sup> After 1946, Ukrainian composers seemingly abandoned their attempts to create (or recreate) a national historical opera. In those years, the Kiev Opera twice (in 1947 and 1949) planned guest performances in Moscow. Both times the republican functionaries "postponed" the tours indefinitely—the second time for the explicit reason that the last redaction of *Taras* remained "unsatisfactory from an ideological and artistic point of view."<sup>715</sup> A strange impasse ensued: on the one hand, official ideology dictated that Ukrainians create a fully developed high culture, including patriotic historical operas, and Moscow indicated no dissatisfaction with Ukrainian historical operas after 1937. On the other hand, the republican functionaries remained unsupportive of any attempt to portray the nation's past, and local composers themselves shied away from problematic historical topics.

### **The Dialogic Dimensions of Cultural Production**

The unpublished memoirs of the Kiev opera company's artistic director, Nikolai Smolich, provide extraordinary details of the struggles and negotiations within an artistic community allegedly terrorized and completely controlled by the party, as well as between the intelligentsia and the local authorities.

Transferred from the Bolshoi in 1938, Smolich soon found himself in a difficult situation when the republican leadership put pressure on him to produce a new version of *Taras*. The director himself felt like an outsider in Ukrainian artistic circles. He disliked Lysenko's music and had grave doubts about staging the opera in a language he did not understand well, especially in an unfamiliar cultural and political milieu:

[*Taras Bulba*] was considered a Ukrainian classic, although Rimsky-Korsakov assessed it with laconic causticity in his *Chronicle*. Without even having seen the previous production, before assimilating local tastes, trends and conditions, it was

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<sup>714</sup> *Radianske mystetstvo*, 18 February 1948, p. 2; *Literaturna hazeta*, 4 April 1948, p. 2; 27 May 1948, p. 1.

<sup>715</sup> See TsDAMLM, f. 573, op. 1, spr. 144, ark. 15 (1947); spr. 93, ark. 52-3 (1949).

quite difficult and even dangerous for me to approach this task. However, the circumstances and my situation left me no choice. I began by planning a new redaction, eliminating "anti-popular" aspects and shaping the action along more logical and generally more patriotic lines. When I submitted this sketch to the Glavlit, the council members called me a "miracle-worker."<sup>716</sup>

Smolich's scorn for Lysenko's music soon antagonized his Ukrainian colleagues, who strongly identified themselves with the promotion of indigenous high culture. Two episodes from the Kiev Opera's residence in Irkutsk and Ufa during the war illustrate the point well. First, after consuming hard liquor at a party, the premier Ukrainian poet and the company's dramaturge, Maksym Rylsky, pointedly announced to Smolich that "Ukrainian culture was older and more developed than Russian, that this was particularly true of music, and that Rimsky-Korsakov was not fit to hold a candle to Lysenko." On another occasion, Smolich publicly suggested that *Taras* might be improved by a new orchestration. The company's leading bass, Ivan Patorzhynsky, "turned pale and, twisting his mouth, sharply announced, 'If you, Nikolai Vasilevich, treat the Ukrainian classics this way, you are not fit to head Ukraine's leading theater.'"<sup>717</sup> The remainder of Smolich's tenure at the Kiev Opera was marked by perennial clashes with Rylsky, Patorzhynsky, and others over politically sensitive questions of national musical heritage. At one point immediately after the war, Smolich complained to the first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party that he could not work among "people with nationalistic tendencies." "Then Khrushchev delicately interrupted me and said in a confidential tone: 'Do you think I am in a different situation, surrounded by different people?'" Nevertheless, he gave the embattled artistic director valuable tactical advice—to join the party in order to obtain advance information about the intrigues within the company's party group.<sup>718</sup>

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<sup>716</sup> TsDAMLM, f. 71, op. 1, spr. 20, ark. 206. *Glavlit* was the Soviet censorship office. In 1895, Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov wrote about *Taras* as follows: "In Kiev I met with my former students Ryb and the composer Lysenko. At Lysenko's I ate dumplings and listened to excerpts from his *Taras Bulba*. Didn't like it—that is, *Taras Bulba*, not the dumplings." N. A. Rimsky-Korsakov, *Letopis moei muzykalnoi zhizni* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe muzykalnoe izdatelstvo, 1955), p. 197.

<sup>717</sup> TsDAMLM, f. 71, op. 1, spr. 20, ark. 237, 241.

<sup>718</sup> *Ibid.*, ark. 270zv-271.

Of the problems creating controversy at the Kiev Opera, the issue of staging Russian classical operas in Russian best underscored the "negotiability" of High Stalinist culture. Since the 1920s, producing the Russian and West European operas in the various national languages had remained an important symbol of the "flowering" that major non-Russian cultures were said to be experiencing in the Soviet Union. Ukrainian intellectuals considered the linguistic "nativization" of the previously Russian opera theaters one of the most obvious gains of the Ukrainization campaign of the late 1920s.<sup>719</sup> However, performing *Ivan Susanin* and *Eugene Onegin* in Ukrainian caused displeasure among numerous Russian and Russified professionals residing in Ukraine. According to Smolich, immediately before the war the Central Committee's new chief of the Department of Culture, a certain Lysenko, inquired about the possibility of reinstating the Russian libretti of Russian classics because of the "popular demand among Kievans." (As one may conclude from this inquiry, Comrade Lysenko was not related to the famous composer and staunch nationalist Mykola Lysenko.) As Smolich heard later from Comrade Lysenko's successor, Kost Lytvyn, and from the Chairman of the Ukrainian Committee for the Arts, M. P. Kompaniiets, discussion of this issue was halted by Bazhan, who served during the war as deputy premier in charge of culture.<sup>720</sup>

After the company returned to Kiev in 1944, Khrushchev raised the language question once again. Speaking to Smolich in the presence of three other key members of the Ukrainian Politburo, he complained that the Central Committee was receiving numerous letters demanding the production of Russian classics in Russian: "Perhaps this is right. This is what is being done in other republics and [other] Ukrainian cities. Is [returning to Russian] possible theoretically, and how much time would it take?" It would appear that Smolich supported the idea wholeheartedly. When he left Khrushchev, the matter seemed decided. The next day, together with the Ukrainian composers Revutsky and Liatoshynsky, Smolich attended a party at the Rylskys'. There, Kompaniiets broke

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<sup>719</sup> See George O. Liber, *Soviet Nationality Policy, Urban Growth, and Identity Change in the Ukrainian SSR, 1923-1934*, 112, 176; Myroslav Shkandrij, *Modernists, Marxists and the Nation: The Ukrainian Literary Discussion of the 1920s* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1992), p. 92.

<sup>720</sup> TsDAML, f. 71, op. 1, spr. 20, ark. 216, 272.

the news about the forthcoming language reform at the Kiev Opera. Rylsky reacted immediately:

He jumped to his feet, saying:

"What is this? Doesn't Ukraine have the right to possess at least one opera theater of its own? Would Russian or foreign operas be staged in the language of the original somewhere in Spain or France? I will call Nikita Sergeevich [Khrushchev] at once."

However, since it was late, Rylsky's wife kept him from dialing.

He concluded, "Tomorrow we will all protest to Nikita Sergeevich. And as for you, Nikolai Vasilevich [Smolich], I volunteer to teach you literary Ukrainian within several months. You will manage it quickly."

After this, there was no subsequent instruction on staging Russian operas in Russian, and everything was left without change.<sup>721</sup>

The republican authorities returned to the language question many times, without ever resolving it. In Kiev, Western operas continued to be staged in Ukrainian without provoking much public discontent. Meanwhile, the 1950 audit of the leading companies revealed that the Odessa and Kharkiv operas each performed 11 Russian classics in Russian that season, including in both cases *Ivan Susanin*, *Prince Igor*, *The Tsar's Bride*, *Eugene Onegin*, and *The Queen of Spades*. In Lviv, a Western Ukrainian city presumably sensitive to the rights of the national culture, most Russian operas were staged in Russian, while such a signature Stalinist spectacle as *Ivan Susanin* was sung in Ukrainian.<sup>722</sup> Interestingly, *Susanin* was the most popular Russian classical opera in Lviv. In 1950, the average attendance at Russian-language productions of *Eugene Onegin* and *The Queen of Spades* in Lviv was 550, or about 100% of the "plan," while attendance at the Ukrainian-language production of *Susanin* was 970, or 180% of the "plan."<sup>723</sup> (Aside from the

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<sup>721</sup> Ibid., ark. 272zv. Today, to be sure, Russian classical operas are customarily performed in Russian both in France and Spain. It should be remembered, however, that staging operas in the language of the original is a relatively recent innovation in Western musical theater.

<sup>722</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2051, ark. 176-7 (audit); RGALI, f. 962, op. 11, d. 560, ll. 51-3 (*Susanin* in Lviv). The ostensible aim of the 1950 audit was to ensure that Ukrainian opera companies were complying with the rule on performing Russian operas in Ukrainian translation. Nevertheless, the republican officials did not seem overly concerned about poor compliance on the part of opera companies outside Kiev.

<sup>723</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2015, ark. 185.

factor of better comprehension, almost a non-issue for educated Western Ukrainians, these attendance figures suggest that at least part of the public was boycotting productions in Russian.) Only one company, the Kiev Opera, presented all Russian classical operas in Ukrainian translation, which irritated some visiting Moscow critics as an affront to Russian culture. In 1952, the Moscow inspector Igor Belza found it outrageous that the Kiev company had staged *The Queen of Spades*, *Ivan Susanin*, and *Eugene Onegin* in Ukrainian. Although Belza did not object to the quality of Rylsky's translations, he questioned the very need for Ukrainian libretti: "Why could one not use the Russian text and, indeed, the text by Pushkin?"<sup>724</sup> Nevertheless, the practice of performing the Russian classics in Ukrainian held good, at least in Kiev. The Rylskys, Patorzhynskys, and Bazhans proved their ability to exploit the Bolshevik discourse of ethnic "flowering" to defend their cultural domain.

By the late 1940s, both the republican authorities and the local artistic elite came to understand that they should resolve the impasse involving national historical operas, if only to display the "flowering" of Ukrainian culture to outsiders. In a manner characteristic of the idiosyncratic and confusing late Stalinist "dialogue" between the party hierarchy and the local elites, the impetus prompting them to start working on a Ukrainian historical opera came unexpectedly, indirectly, and rather enigmatically. To reconstruct the event, we have only a stenographic record of the amusing remarks made by Kompaniiets at a meeting at the Committee for the Arts in Moscow sometime in the early 1950s. The story goes as follows. In May 1948, the Soviet president, Marshal Kliment Voroshilov, visited Kiev. Known for his love of opera, Voroshilov asked Khrushchev to arrange for him to attend performances by two prominent Ukrainian singers, Mariia Lytvynenko-Volhemut and Ivan Patorzhynsky, whom the marshal remembered from the 1936 *dekada*. For the marshal's benefit, the Kiev Opera changed its schedule on short notice to put on Hulak-Artemovsky's *The Zaporozhian Cossack* with Patorzhynsky and Volhemut. Deeply moved by the performance, Voroshilov issued an invitation to the

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<sup>724</sup> RGALI, f. 962, op. 11, d. 558, l. 82. Of course, "Pushkin's text" did not refer to *Ivan Susanin*.

Kievans: "Come to Moscow." After he left, the Ukrainian ideologues and artistic elite plunged into a feverish discussion of what to do. "Korniichuk was there and, properly speaking, that [comment by Voroshilov] became the impetus to write *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*, for we needed to bring something to Moscow; one could not go up against the Bolshoi Theater with *Faust*, *Ivan Susanin* or *The Tsar's Bride*. We needed to bring national art—national in form and socialist in content." Significantly, with the postwar cult of the "elder Russian brother" on the rise, the Ukrainian side preferred writing a new work celebrating the union with Russia to reviving a classical *Taras Bulba* that did not explicitly conform to the rhetoric of the "friendship of peoples." In two months, the resourceful Korniichuk produced a verse libretto of *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* co-authored with his wife, Wanda Wasilewska. In July, the press reported that the composer Kostiantyn Dankevych was already working on the score.<sup>725</sup>

Although Voroshilov's spur-of-the-moment invitation did not specify any date, the republican functionaries and cultural figures turned the writing of *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* into an affair of state. As soon as the Odessan Dankevych completed the first draft of the score on 27 January 1950, he telegraphed the news to both the Second Secretary of the republican Central Committee, Oleksii Kyrychenko, and the Secretary for Propaganda, Ivan Nazarenko. As early as 15 February, the newspapers announced that the first audition of the score at the Ukrainian State Committee for the Arts was a success. By August, the final version of the score was ready.<sup>726</sup> *Bohdan* turned out to be a grand historical opera, a work having little in common with the conventions of twentieth-century Western musical theater. Although the work was based on national motifs, it imitated the form and dramatic structure of nineteenth-century Russian and West European operas. *Bohdan* also contained direct musical quotations. Glinka's "Glory" from *Ivan Susanin* reverberated as the theme of the Muscovite ambassador and sounded again in the finale. The plot, based

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<sup>725</sup> RGALI, f. 962, op. 11, d. 558, ll. 21, 48, 17. At the time, Kompaniets served as Head of the Administration of Theaters at the Ukrainian Committee for the Arts. The first draft of the libretto is in TsDAML, f. 435, op. 1, d. 297. On Dankevych, see *Radianske mystetstvo*, 28 July 1948, p. 3.

<sup>726</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2041, ark. 1 (telegram to Nazarenko); spr. 2051, ark. 1 (telegram to Kyrychenko); *Radianske mystetstvo*, 15 February 1950, p. 3 (first audition); 23 August 1950, p. 3 (score ready).

on Korniiichuk's own play, developed against the background of the Cossack war with Poland, ending with the decision to ask the tsar for protection (but not with the act of union itself). Both Ukrainian newspapers and internal memos characterized the Kiev premiere of *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* in January 1951 as a great success. The critics hailed the opera as a true "popular drama," as Mussorgsky once defined his own operatic works.<sup>727</sup>

An opportunity to take up Voroshilov's invitation and bring the Kiev opera company to Moscow soon presented itself. By February 1951, the republican and central bodies were already planning a new *dekada* of Ukrainian Art in Moscow for the coming summer. The directives issued by the republican Committee for the Arts envisaged a triple aim for the *dekada*: 1) to demonstrate "the Ukrainian people's deepest love and gratitude to their father, comrade, and teacher—the leader of the peoples, Comrade Stalin"; 2) to reflect the flowering of Soviet Ukrainian culture, "socialist in content and national in form"; and 3) to manifest the deepest love and devotion to "the elder brother—the great Russian people."<sup>728</sup> Every version of the Moscow repertoire of the Kiev Opera included *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* and *The Zaporozhian Cossack*. Reluctant to compete with the Bolshoi's spectacular production of *Ivan Susanin* ("We cannot rival the Bolshoi"), the Ukrainian functionaries in charge of the arts chose *The Tsar's Bride*, which was then absent from the Bolshoi's repertoire, as Kiev's representative production of a Russian classic.<sup>729</sup> Although no official document mentions this, Stalin apparently expressed a desire to see *Taras Bulba* during the Ukrainian *dekada*. This presumably verbal suggestion could not be accommodated in time, and our only source for it is a chance remark made by the Ukrainian director Marian Krushelnytsky in 1952: "We failed to

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<sup>727</sup> *Radianske mystetstvo*, 31 January 1951, p. 1; *Literaturna hazeta*, 8 February 1951, p. 3 (the quotation is from the second article); RGALI, f. 962, op. 2, d. 2336, l. 13; op. 3, d. 2306, l. 6. Even such a discriminating and cultured singer as Borys Hmyria genuinely liked his role of Colonel Kryvonis. After reading the score in October 1950, he immediately wrote to a friend: "A good role—both for singing and acting." In February 1951, he again characterized this role as "significant both musically and artistically." See TsDAMLM, f. 443, op. 1, spr. 58, ark. 105, 108.

<sup>728</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2050, ark. 3.

<sup>729</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2050; RGALI, f. 962, op. 3, d. 2306; d. 2336.



fulfill Comrade Stalin's wish to bring *Taras Bulba* for the *dekada*."<sup>730</sup>

On 27 May 1951, the entire Politburo of the Ukrainian party's Central Committee attended the performance of *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* in Kiev. Propaganda Secretary Ivan Nazarenko and the nominal Ukrainian president, the chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet, Mykhailo Hrechukha, joined the lesser administrators on the following day to discuss the changes that had to be made before taking *Bohdan* to Moscow. Although banal, many of the hierarchs' observations were actually just. Like the critics and the general public, the members of the Politburo felt that Mykhailo Hryshko was a gifted singer but a poor actor; his *Bohdan* seemed too static, especially when compared with Borys Hmyria's inspired portrayal of Colonel Kryvonis. The party bosses noted that the opera's monumental finale was suspiciously reminiscent of that of *Ivan Susanin* ("Was it staged by the same director?"). They also felt that four and a half hours was too long for an opera, but were reluctant to cut anything, suggesting instead that even more ideologically correct statements be inserted into *Bohdan*'s lengthy arias. Most of all, however, the local hierarchs concerned themselves with appearances and good impression. They suggested putting the prettiest girls in the first row of the chorus, including more picturesque scenery, making the hetman's study more luxurious, and rolling out a finer carpet before the tsar's ambassadors. "President" Hrechukha, whose impromptu speeches were always entertainingly illiterate, asked: "Why are all the Cossacks dressed so badly? One might think that they were poor." Significantly, nobody objected, while Dankevych himself made an argument for "the element of pomp that is required for historical veracity." Nazarenko expressed the party line on *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* in the most telling words: "[I]t is our signature [*koronna*] performance.... We want this opera, after being approved for staging, to become an opera for everyone."<sup>731</sup> The secretary for propaganda did not utter the bourgeois-sounding term "Ukrainian national opera," although that is apparently what he had in mind.

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<sup>730</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 4763, op. 1, spr. 360, ark. 25; TsDAMLM, f. 573, op. 1, spr. 171, ark. 25.

<sup>731</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1875, ark. 47-94, esp. ark. 73 (Hrechukha), 88 (Dankevych), and 75 (Nazarenko).

## Mechanisms of Criticism and Self-Criticism

The *dekada* of Ukrainian Art opened in Moscow on 15 June 1951. In the evening, the first performance of *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* (in Russian) took place at the Bolshoi Theater. Nazarenko's daily reports to First Secretary Leonid Melnikov, which for some reason were sent by the VCh, the secure high-frequency telegraph channel used by the Soviet military command during the war, allow us to reconstruct the sequence of events blurred in other sources by the subsequent criticism of the opera. Nazarenko considered the Moscow premiere a success. Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, and Khrushchev were present from beginning to end. The public applauded after many arias, clapping enthusiastically and shouting "bravo" after the finale. On 17 June, the Kievans repeated *Bohdan* to a less blue-ribbon audience, which "received [the opera] warmly, much better than on the 15th." Altogether, the company performed *Bohdan* four times, *The Zaporozhian Cossack* thrice (the Muscovites reportedly complained that three times was not enough), and *The Tsar's Bride* twice. All three operas were broadcast by all-Union radio and television at least once. On the last day of the *dekada*, 24 June, Nazarenko concluded that *Bohdan* had "earned the approval of the metropolitan audience" and ordered that selected arias from the opera be included in the final concert.<sup>732</sup>

This account mysteriously passes over in silence a critical remark that appeared in *Pravda* on 16 June. After discussing the launch of the *dekada* and the merits of *Bohdan*, the unsigned article, entitled "The Opening of the *Dekada* of Ukrainian Art in Moscow," announced:

Its virtues notwithstanding, the opera has serious shortcomings, stemming primarily from the weak libretto (written by W. Wasilewska and O. Korniiichuk).

One of the major drawbacks of the libretto is that it departs from historical truth. It does not reflect the struggle between the Ukrainian people and the Polish gentry, the enemy camp is not shown on stage, and the Polish gentry is not depicted, but hidden from the spectator for some reason.

Another serious drawback. The events portrayed in the opera take place

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<sup>732</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2428, ark. 3-85. Compare the official chronicle of the decade in *Pravda*, 16-28 June 1951 and in *Dekada ukrainskoho mystetstva u Moskvi 15-24 chervnia 1951 r.: Zbirka materialiv* (Kiev: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo khudozhnoi literatury, 1953).

during the Ukrainian people's war for independence from the Polish gentry, yet the spectator does not see a single battle scene in this production.

The opera also has other drawbacks that will be exposed in due course.<sup>733</sup>

This critique appeared in *Pravda* the morning after the performance, apparently having been written after *Bohdan* ended (toward midnight) and before the newspaper went to print in the early morning hours. The telegraphic style also seems to suggest that we are dealing with a brief record of someone's impressions, hastily written down by a senior ideologue. Strong circumstantial evidence points to Molotov as the source of the critique.<sup>734</sup> It might have appeared at that point that the attack on *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* was nothing more than an isolated low-key critique of insignificant errors in an otherwise laudable work. It might appear, furthermore, that Molotov simply wanted to tone down the anti-Polish animus of the opera by specifying that the Cossacks fought the Polish gentry and not the "fraternal" Polish peasantry.

As there were no other signals from above after the premiere, the middle-level bureaucracy remained somewhat confused. *Bohdan* was not banned immediately after its first performance in Moscow. Moreover, as we have seen, Nazarenko effectively ignored *Pravda's* intervention, claiming the performance as a success and planning to include

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<sup>733</sup> *Pravda*, 16 June 1951, p. 1.

<sup>734</sup> In 1958, the Khrushchev leadership would officially annul the Party documents denouncing the Soviet operas *The Great Friendship*, *With All One's Heart*, and *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*. Subsequently, *Pravda* would announce that its denunciatory articles on those operas had "reflected the subjectivist approach of I. V. Stalin" and had been "published on his instructions." "And it is known that Molotov, Malenkov, and Beria exerted rather negative influence on Stalin in deciding these issues." (*Pravda*, 8 June 1958, p. 3.) Unlike many other post-1957 accusations against Molotov and Malenkov, this one can actually be proven. The archives of the Central Committee reveal that in 1952 the party's chief ideologue, Mikhail Suslov, reported on the new libretto of *Bohdan* directly to Molotov. The latter read the libretto and approved it "in general." (RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 133, d. 369, ll. 20, 22-3). Supervising the arts was not exactly Molotov's area of competence as a member of the Politburo and deputy premier. Yet he, a relative of a great composer (Molotov's real name was Skriabin) and reportedly an accomplished violinist, was known to have a long-standing interest in the theater. In 1936, Molotov accompanied Stalin to the Moscow premiere of Ivan Dzerzhinskii's *And Quiet Flows the Don* and the performance of Shostakovich's *Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk District*, both resulting in important ideological pronouncements. In the same year, he attended the premiere of *The Epic Heroes* by himself—and initiated the relentless criticism of that production. See Leonid Maksimenkov, *Sumbur vmesto muzyki: Stalinskaia kulturnaia revoliutsiia 1936-1938* (Moscow: Iuridicheskaiia kniga, 1997).

excerpts from the opera in the final concert of the festival.<sup>735</sup> The all-Union television channel showed *Bohdan* in full on 15 June, but cancelled *The Zaporozhian Cossack beyond the Danube* on the next day, citing technical problems, but probably just playing safe ideologically.<sup>736</sup> However, the all-Union government went ahead with awards and honors for Ukrainian artists. On 30 June, Orders of Lenin were conferred on Mykhailo Hryshko (Bohdan) and Mykhailo Romensky, who sang the role of the Muscovite ambassador in *Bohdan*. Dankevych received the Order of the Red Banner for Labor, while Honored Artist of Ukraine Borys Hmyria (Colonel Kryvonis in the opera) skipped a step in the hierarchy of Soviet actors to attain the highest rank of People's Artist of the Soviet Union.<sup>737</sup>

On 26 June, the Union of Soviet Composers held a conference to review the works performed during the *dekada*. Although some participants repeated *Pravda's* criticisms, the discussion did not turn into a denunciation. The Moscow critics noted that *Bohdan* had an effective "operatic" subject, that "the opera [had] considerable material for voice, and that of high quality, which immediately attract[ed] the attention and interest of the listener." They found fault with the plot, with devices borrowed from the "old romantic opera," with too many (five) arias for Bohdan and too few (one) ensembles—although the musicologist V. Kukharskii pointed out that *Boris Godunov* also has no ensembles. In the end, Dankevych thanked the participants and announced that he, together with Kornichuk and Wasilewska, would prepare a new redaction of the opera.<sup>738</sup>

On 2 July, however, *Pravda* published an editorial "Against Ideological Distortions in Literature," which triggered a comprehensive campaign of ideological

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<sup>735</sup> As both the printed program of the concert of 24 June 1951 and the transcript of the television coverage attest, no arias from *Bohdan* were performed that evening. The archival materials do not reveal who overruled Nazarenko on this matter or when the decision occurred. See TsDAMLM, f. 146, op. 1, spr. 215, ark. 1-3zv (program); GARF, f. 6903, op. 26, d. 21, program listing for 26 June (this folder has no continuous pagination).

<sup>736</sup> GARF, f. 6903, op. 26, d. 21, programs for 15 and 16 June. Interestingly, the record shows that *Bohdan* was planned to end by 11:30 p.m. on 15 June, but continued until midnight.

<sup>737</sup> *Pravda*, 1 July 1951, pp. 1-2.

<sup>738</sup> TsDAMLM, f. 661, op. 1, spr. 130. To be sure, *Boris* had some ensembles, but apparently not enough for the 1950s notion of a classical opera.

purification in the republic, complete with denunciations of "nationalist deviations" in all areas and genres of creative activity. While the ideological offensive in Ukraine was just beginning, *Pravda* intervened again on 20 July with an equally long editorial, "On the Opera *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*." However, even then the authoritative newspaper did not classify the opera's shortcomings as "nationalistic," nor did it demand a better portrayal of the Russian "elder brother." The article praised the opera's subject and music, as well as the singers' performances. Yet it also repeated the earlier comments of the Politburo and developed the critical points in greater detail: no proper depiction of the enemies, no suffering of the popular masses, no battles, and no more than one duet. Moreover, Khmelnytsky was too static and the plot was too traditional. Colonel Bohun was depicted not as a swordsman but as the romantic male lead—"a Lenskii of sorts." Khmelnytsky and Kryvonis sang their arias about the people while facing the audience and not the "people" of the chorus, etc.<sup>739</sup> In short, the editorial accused the opera of being operatic, of presenting only a pale reflection of "historical truth." As the following analysis will show, Ukrainian functionaries and intellectuals themselves developed the critique of *Bohdan*, interpreting the pronouncements from Moscow to mean that the opera was guilty of insufficiently glorifying the eternal Russian-Ukrainian friendship.

Meanwhile, the campaign against *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* proceeded according to the well-established rules of the Stalinist ideological game.<sup>740</sup> Dankevych wrote a penitential letter to *Pravda*, promising, together with Korniiichuk and Wasilewska, to eliminate all the opera's faults. At a meeting of the Union of Soviet Writers of Ukraine hastily convened in the last days of July, Korniiichuk acknowledged his "errors" and those of his wife. He then concentrated on denouncing Sosiura and Ukrainian writers working in the historical genre for their supposedly inappropriate infatuation with the national past.<sup>741</sup>

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<sup>739</sup> *Pravda*, 20 July 1951, pp. 3-4.

<sup>740</sup> Which is not to say that the games themselves were ideologically coherent. See an excellent recent study: Alexei Kojevnikov, "Rituals of Stalinist Culture at Work: Science and the Games of Intraparty Democracy circa 1948."

<sup>741</sup> *Pravda*, 24 July 1951 and *Literaturna hazeta*, 26 July 1951, p. 4; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2424, ark. 5-76 (Korniiichuk, esp. ark. 13-14, on his own mistakes).

The First Secretary of the Ukrainian party organization, Leonid Melnikov, diligently reported to Moscow on the measures taken against the newly discovered ideological deviation. On 27 July, the republican Central Committee hurriedly adopted a resolution condemning its own negligence and duly repeating all the critical points made in *Pravda's* editorial "Against Ideological Distortions in Literature." Melnikov immediately couriered the resolution to Stalin's deputy for party affairs, Georgii Malenkov. Two weeks later, the republican party chief wrote to Stalin, reporting on the course of the ideological campaign in Ukraine. A subtle but important shift of emphasis could be detected in these documents: while *Pravda* spoke of the poor depiction of "historical truth" in one opera and the failure to stress love for *Soviet* Ukraine in one poem, the republican bureaucrats read larger ideological significance between the lines. In his report to Stalin of 14 August, Melnikov regretted that the Ukrainian leadership had overlooked "attempts to portray the historical processes in Ukraine as separate from the history of the peoples of the USSR."<sup>742</sup> Generally, the ideological rallies held in the republic rejected the "harmful obsession" with the Ukrainian past and culture in favor of glorifying the eternal friendship with the great Russian people.

At the November plenary session of the republican Central Committee, Melnikov announced that *Pravda's* articles represented valuable assistance from Moscow's Central Committee "and from Comrade Stalin in person." This applied especially to *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*, which the members of the Ukrainian Politburo had "heard and discussed, but proved unable to uncover its vices." Korniiichuk again reproached himself, Wasilewska, and Dankevych (absent owing to illness) for the opera's grave shortcomings.<sup>743</sup>

### **Reinventing the Classics**

At the November 1951 plenary session, First Secretary Melnikov offered the

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<sup>742</sup> RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 133, d. 311, ll. 34-39 (26 July); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 785, ark. 61-67 (14 August).

<sup>743</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 1, spr. 976, ark. 12, 18-20 (Melnikov), 227-29 (Korniiichuk).

intensification of party propaganda as a universal remedy for "ideological distortions." However, he also had a more specific prescription for Ukrainian opera. Predictably, the First Secretary suggested turning to contemporary subjects, but also recommended reviving the classics, especially Aleksei Verstovskii's long-neglected *Askold's Tomb*, a nineteenth-century Russian opera set in ancient Kiev. Lysenko's *Taras Bulba* had "not yet been presented in its true form," while the works of Petro Sokalsky, that "Ukrainian follower of Glinka, [who was also] close to the Mighty Five," had been completely forgotten.<sup>744</sup>

But the classics were by no means a safe haven. Even Hulak-Artemovsky's politically harmless and genuinely entertaining *The Zaporozhian Cossack beyond the Danube* (1863) caused the Ukrainian functionaries and artistic elite a good deal of trouble. The story is worth elaborating upon, since it once again highlighted the "dialogue" and compromises inherent in Stalinist cultural production. On 11 October 1950, the jubilee 500th performance of the opera in Kiev was broadcast throughout the Soviet Union. Although *The Zaporozhian Cossack* was performed in Ukrainian, sensitive bureaucratic ears in Moscow detected several ideological heresies. The opera's plot concerned Cossacks who fled to Turkish-controlled territory after Catherine II ordered the destruction of the Zaporozhian Host in 1775. After some humorous and romantic adventures, which are actually central to the plot, the Sultan allows the Cossacks to return home in the finale. To a Moscow official, all this was a "slanderous story." Moreover, it was discovered that the "bourgeois historian" Mykola (Nikolai) Kostomarov, who wrote the dialogue for Hulak-Artemovsky's opera, had "distorted historical reality." In particular, Kostomarov portrayed the Cossacks as mercenaries of the Sultan and made the main character, Ivan Karas, boast of bloody Cossack victories over the *Arnauts*, who unfortunately turned out to be the ancestors of the fraternal modern-day Albanians. The libretto inappropriately represented the Sultan as a magnanimous ruler, friendly to the Cossacks, while "in reality, the Cossacks had been returned to their country thanks to the intervention of the Russian ambassador in Turkey." It appeared, furthermore, that although

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<sup>744</sup> Ibid., ark. 77-82.

Soviet censorship had banned the *Russian* text of *The Zaporozhian Cossack's* libretto in 1948, the Kiev, Kharkiv, Lviv, and Odessa opera companies were continuing to use a slightly edited version of an old *Ukrainian* text, presumably because of a bureaucratic error.<sup>745</sup>

Meanwhile, and also in October 1951, the Stanislavsky and Nemirovich-Danchenko Musical Theater in Moscow premiered *The Zaporozhian Cossack* "in a new Russian translation by G. Shipov." The newspapers advertised the new redaction as "prepared on the basis of historical documents."<sup>746</sup> A closer look at the new Russian libretto, approved by the censors for publication and staging throughout the Soviet Union three months after the premiere, reveals heavy-handed editing and rewriting. What Ukrainian bureaucrats and intellectuals presented as their "first national opera," Shipov rechristened "popular musical comedy." He introduced a negative Cossack character, the clerk Prokop, as if to set off the new positive one—the Russian ambassador who sings the aria "The hour of liberation approaches." Throughout the libretto, Shipov skillfully cast aspersions on the Turks and made the Cossacks complain of their life in the Ottoman Empire. To improve Hulak-Artemovsky's work, he also included several of the most popular Ukrainian folk songs as additional arias.<sup>747</sup>

The "musical comedy" ran in Moscow with considerable success for two and a half years until the Ukrainian Secretary for Propaganda, Ivan Nazarenko, attended a performance during one of his visits to the capital in April 1953. The theater-loving Ukrainian ideologue stormed out of the house in indignation and immediately submitted a report to the Central Committee of CPSU. The production, he wrote, had "little in common with the authentic version presented in Ukrainian theaters." The inclusion of new and improbable characters, together with well-known folk songs absent from the original score, turned the Moscow production into the "crudest falsification of the widely known

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<sup>745</sup> RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 419, ll. 219-21.

<sup>746</sup> *Radianske mystetstvo*, 24 October 1951, p. 4. The party's Central Committee requested a copy of the libretto for review and approved it. See RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 419, ll. 222-52.

<sup>747</sup> RGALI, f. 962, op. 11, d. 613, ll. 1-47. The censorship permit stamp no. Sh-00125, dated 30 January 1952, is on l. 1.



and beloved opera." Applying the official rhetoric of "authenticity" to this Ukrainian operatic classic, Nazarenko demanded nothing less than the banning of the new Russian libretto. However, the Moscow functionaries justified the company's right to "adjust" (*podvodit*) classical opera by referring to the precedent of Russian works—*Ivan Susanin*, *Boris Godunov*, and *Khovanshchina* in the Bolshoi. At the same time, the Central Committee's functionaries also saw the staging of two different versions of *The Zaporozhian Cossack*—one in Ukrainian in Ukraine and another in Russian in Russia—as inappropriate. They suggested that a joint commission be appointed to work out a standard synopsis and libretto.<sup>748</sup>

Nonetheless, the archives preserve no trace of such a commission. Ten months later, the artistic director of the Kiev Opera referred at the local meeting to certain "discussions about a macaronic approach to the classics" provoked by the Moscow production of *The Zaporozhian Cossack*, but that was all.<sup>749</sup> Nazarenko's motivation bears closer scrutiny. He was surely aware of the various adjustments made in the opera's libretto and score by Ukrainian companies. In the mid-1930s, when Nazarenko served as secretary for propaganda of the Kharkiv oblast party committee, the local company made Ivan Karas curse Catherine II and Prince Potemkin, who had ordered the destruction of the Zaporozhian Host. During the 1936 *dekada* in Moscow, the Kievans' Karas also condemned that "oppressor of the Zaporozhian Host," Potemkin, although apparently not the tsarina. This cue was, of course, absent from the original libretto and soon disappeared from the text with the rehabilitation of the Russian state tradition in the late 1930s.<sup>750</sup> In 1934-36, the Kiev Opera staged *The Zaporozhian Cossack* with the additional Act Three, "At the Sultan's Palace," written especially for that production. Even the postwar

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<sup>748</sup> TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 17, d. 445, ll. 35-8. As an example of the "Ukrainian reading" of *The Zaporozhian Cossack*, Rylsky wrote in 1949 about the "lofty patriotism that permeates this opera from first note to last." See TsDAMLM, f. 146, op. 1, spr. 192, ark. 2.

<sup>749</sup> TsDAMLM, f. 573, op. 1, spr. 216, ark. 5.

<sup>750</sup> S. Hulak-Artemovsky, *Zaporozhets za Dunaiem*. Kharkivskiy akademichnyi teatr opery ta baletu: Sezon 1935-36 r. (N. p., n. d), p. 10; *Zaporozhets za Dunaiem: Postava Derzhavnoho akademichnoho teatru opery ta baleta URSR*. Kyiv. Hastrol u Moskvi 11-21 bereznia 1936 roku (N. p.: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo "Mystetstvo," 1936), p. 52. The copy of the original libretto from 1860s is in TsDAMLM, f. 1106, op. 1, spr. 22, ark. 166-94, here 172.

Ukrainian "authentic version" was subject to minor ideological editing from time to time, of which Nazarenko must have been aware. In other words, the secretary for propaganda was defending not so much the "authenticity" of Ukrainian cultural heritage as the exclusive right of local ideologues, poets, and musicians to edit "their" classics.

Significantly, the clash between Moscow and Kiev concerning *The Zaporozhian Cossack* ended in an implicit compromise. The Stanislavsky and Nemirovich-Danchenko Theater staged the "new" version of the opera, in which the Russian ambassador liberated the Cossacks, while the Ukrainian companies stuck to the traditional plot, with the Sultan performing this feat. Rylsky made only two changes to the libretto, eliminating the mention of the Arnauts and making one episodic character hint that the Cossacks had received letters from Muscovy.<sup>751</sup> However, when in that same year, 1951, the Kiev Film Studios commenced work on the film version of *The Zaporozhian Cossack*, which would be seen in every corner of the Soviet Union, Rylsky had to produce a very different script. Although the Russian ambassador did not put in an appearance, the overture was accompanied by the following explanatory text: "Realizing that Russia would support the Cossacks' demands and that the Zaporozhians were preparing an armed mutiny, the Turkish Sultan was forced to allow them to return to their homeland." In this script, Ivan Karas marks his first appearance with the announcement that "we and the Muscovites are of the same faith and blood, so perhaps we will attain a better life together." (Ironically, just before making this important ideological pronouncement, Karas complains about having a terrible hangover and drinks hard liquor.) Furthermore, even the Sultan acknowledges that "It is not easy to rule over [the Cossacks]. They have a mighty defender."<sup>752</sup> The Kiev Film Studios released the film in the summer of 1953, thus giving birth to a third version of the popular opera, a strange hybrid of the Kiev and

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<sup>751</sup> TsDAMLM, f. 573. op. 4, spr. 17, ark. 17 and 25. Compare the 1949 libretto in *ibid.*, f. 146, op. 1, spr. 192, ark. 5-39. Interestingly, after Ukrainian independence, the Kiev Opera restored some elements of *The Zaporozhian Cossack's* original score, including the references to God—but not the Arnauts. The 1951 prohibition of Moscow ideologues was still in force as late as May 1999.

<sup>752</sup> TsDAMLM, f. 1106, op. 1, spr. 22, ark. 1-166, here 1a, 9-10, 21.

Moscow productions.<sup>753</sup>

Desperate for more "classics," republican bureaucrats examined the most promising candidate for revival, Verstovskii's *Askold's Tomb*, with disappointing results. The work required an entirely new libretto and extensive editing of the score to fit the Stalinist ideal of programmatic grand historical opera. The same applied to Sokalsky's little-known *Siege of Dubno* (1878), also written on the subject of Gogol's *Taras Bulba*. The functionaries of the Ukrainian Committee for the Arts even unearthed the libretto of Vladimir Aleksandrov's musical play *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* (1892). Although no musical score survived, and Aleksandrov was better known for having sued the prominent Ukrainian writer Mykhailo Starytsky for plagiarism than as a dramatist in his own right, Nazarenko took time to read the text attentively. The secretary for propaganda even made a couple of thoughtful remarks in the margins, e.g., "These are very forceful and important words," beside the sentence "Glory to the Russian people, glory to the Russian tsar!" or "important" next to the description of taking a solemn oath to the tsar.<sup>754</sup>

As late as August 1954, *The Zaporozhian Cossack* and Lysenko's lyrical *Natalka from Poltava* remained the only two Ukrainian classical operas in the repertoire of the Kiev opera company. While the newspapers labeled the situation "intolerable" and published long lists of "forgotten treasures," the two operas with their unsophisticated plots were probably more than adequate to satisfy the public interest in celebrating accessible ethnic music. Khrushchev listened to *The Zaporozhian Cossack* with delight during his visit to Kiev in October 1953. The theater's manager sedulously wrote to him afterwards, reminding the party chief of his pleasant evening at the opera and asking for more financing. As a result, the Kiev Opera was rated equal to the Kirov Opera in Leningrad (the Union's second-ranking opera house) in actors' salaries and authorized

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<sup>753</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3268, ark. 29 (released in July 1953).

<sup>754</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3266, ark. 117, 120-7 (*Askold's Tomb*), 119 (*The Siege of Dubno*); spr. 3265, ark. 96-138 (Aleksandrov's libretto; Nazarenko's quoted notes are on ark. 133 and 136).

production costs.<sup>755</sup> Yet neither *The Zaporozhian Cossack* nor *Natalka* offered an appropriately serious, programmatic, and magnificent depiction of the national past. The quest for a national historical grand opera continued. As other options fell away, the authorities returned to the familiar dilemma of either reviving *Taras Bulba* or revising *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*.

In late 1951, the Kiev opera company was feverishly preparing yet another revival of *Taras* for the 1952-53 season. The management intended the premiere both to mark the 100th anniversary of Gogol's death (1952) and to satisfy the need for a "classical spectacle [that would] constitute the jewel of our repertoire." A brigade of leading Ukrainian writers, composers, and theater directors examined the production history of *Taras Bulba*, as well as the different versions of the score and libretto. All agreed that the opera needed a new imposing and "optimistic" finale, probably developing Lysenko's original ending, with the Cossacks storming the Polish fortress. Maksym Rylsky complained about Ostap's aria, "What have you done?," sung over the body of his dead brother, the traitor Andrii. When someone in the audience termed this episode "ideologically harmful," the poet shouted in puristic fervor, "This is an Italian aria. What is the need of it?" However, Ostap's "non-Ukrainian" bel canto aria was one of the parts of Lysenko's original score most beloved by the public, and the musicians successfully defended it. In the end, the manager of the Kiev Opera, Pashchyn, informed the gathering that Lev Revutsky was to be charged with the final polishing of the score, and Rylsky with the libretto.<sup>756</sup>

However, during the same meeting of 15 January 1952, several Ukrainian intellectuals expressed serious reservations about the revival of *Taras Bulba*. The theater director Marian Krushelnytsky suggested that "after *Pravda*'s article about *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*, we should be in no hurry" with *Taras*. The leading Kievan specialist on

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<sup>755</sup> *Radianske mystetstvo*, 11 August 1954, p. 1 ("intolerable situation"), 2 ("forgotten treasures"); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 3528, ark. 21-22 (Khrushchev at the opera and the consequences of the director's letter).

<sup>756</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 4763, op. 1, spr. 360, ark. 1-55 (Rylsky on ark. 50); TsDAMLM, f. 573, op. 1, spr. 171, ark. 2-56.

nineteenth-century Russian literature, Professor Nina Krutikova, cautioned that the "motif of unity of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples should be clearly heard in your redaction."<sup>757</sup> The Ukrainian bureaucrats, who had initially pressured the company to produce *Taras* in time for the Gogol anniversary, immediately relented. On the next day after the meeting, the company's leading bass-baritone, Hmyria, wrote to a friend in Kharkiv: "I cannot help telling you the astonishing news. Yesterday, it was decided to halt work on *Taras Bulba* and proceed to stage *Boris Godunov*. How do you like that?"<sup>758</sup>

The decision to produce *Boris* reflected a general postwar drive to stage more Russian classics in the republics. Although staging a Russian historical opera seemed to ward off accusations of nationalism, *Boris Godunov* created unexpected problems. The company had not presented this work by Mussorgsky since the early 1930s. The Kievans had originally intended to produce *Boris* in 1941, but then decided to await the Bolshoi's "ideologically correct" new redaction of the opera.<sup>759</sup> After careful editing, the Bolshoi finally staged *Boris* in 1947 and again in 1948. As a notable innovation, the producers restored the "Scene at Kromy," which the composer had edited of from his final score. This scene presumably shifted the listener's attention from the personal tragedy of Tsar Boris to the suffering and protest of the masses. The production earned the Stalin Prize, First Class, and the Moscow bureaucrats in charge of the arts proudly reported to chief ideologue Mikhail Suslov that "in staging *Ivan Susanin* and *Boris Godunov*, the theater accomplished significant and successful work in interpreting the composer's intentions in

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<sup>757</sup> TsDAMLM, f. 573, op. 1, spr. 171, ark. 23, 47.

<sup>758</sup> TsDAMLM, f. 443, op. 1, spr. 58, ark. 115-16. Previously, the Ukrainian Committee for the Arts had wanted the Kiev Opera to renew *Taras* for the 1951 *dekada* in Moscow. The management avoided the issue, arguing that only Patorzhynsky could sing *Taras*, but was too busy with other roles. See TsDAMLM, f. 573, op. 1, spr. 141, ark. 5. In fact, the republican artistic elite was simply reluctant to become involved with much-criticized work. The prominent theater artist Oleksandr Khvostenko-Khvostov openly told the company's director that "he would not like to be held responsible for this spectacle." See TsDAMLM, f. 573, op. 1, spr. 171, ark. 4. After three more years of heavy editing, the Kiev Opera finally produced a successful *Taras Bulba* in 1955. See TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3653, ark. 165-70; TsDAMLM, f. 573, op. 4, spr. 26; op. 1, spr. 241, ark. 10-22; spr. 250, ark. 3-4zv; E. N. Iavorsky, "*Taras Bulba*": *Opera M. Lysenka* (Kiev: Mystetstvo, 1964).

<sup>759</sup> *Radianske mystetstvo*, 1 March 1950, p. 4; 2 April 1952, p. 3 (since the early 1930s, literally "for exactly twenty years"); Smolich, "Roky zrostantia teatru," p. 4 (1941).

a more progressive light."<sup>760</sup>

Although the Kiev Opera closely followed the Moscow example, the young expert of the Literature and Art Department of the Ukrainian Central Committee, Volodymyr Nadolny, found serious fault with the Kiev production. The recent philosophy graduate felt that "the people had not been placed at the center of the production," which appeared instead to be "the tragedy of Tsar Boris," unfortunately sung quite impressively by V. Matveiev. In addition,

the portrayal of the False Dmitrii by the Honored Artist Kozeratsky is arresting, winning a sympathy that contradicts historical truth. The finale is resolved incorrectly: the False Dmitrii, mounted on his horse, exhorts the people to take Moscow by force of arms, and the people rally to him with the words, "Glory to you, our father-tsar." (In Pushkin's drama, the people remain silent.) But the people would not have followed the aggressors and the impostor.<sup>761</sup>

Moreover, the Kiev Opera staged *Boris* in a Ukrainian translation by a certain I. N. Zakharovsky, the company's prompter. Rendered in Ukrainian, the libretto's call to make war on Moscow—"to ravage the nest of the Muscovites (*hnizdo moskaliv*)"—suddenly resounded with the familiar terminology of the nationalist underground. Fortunately for the company, the denunciatory memorandum somehow failed to reach Nazarenko's desk until after the premiere, which took place in late March 1952 with considerable success. Still, the Central Committee apparatus forced the Kiev Opera to solicit a new translation from Rylsky and to revise the "Scene at Kromy," where the people appeared to lend

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<sup>760</sup> RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 132. ll. 144-46. See also *Boris Godunov* (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1951), pp. 21-22. The Bolshoi originally premiered *Boris* in the spring of 1947, but the newspaper of the Administration of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee, *Kultura i zhizn'*, denounced the addition of the "scene at Kromy." Soon, however, *Pravda* reaffirmed the appropriateness of the scene in a long article. (*Pravda*, 13 July 1947, p. 2.) This clash between different branches of the central bureaucracy over a classical opera still awaits the attention of Russian historians. The Ukrainian director of *Boris*, Stefanovych, often referred in his working notes to *Pravda*'s intervention. See TsDAML, f. 146, op. 1, spr. 42, ark. 15zv-16, 23zv.

<sup>761</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2773, ark. 52-4.

support to the False Dmitrii.<sup>762</sup>

### **The Ultimate Patriotic Opera**

Mindful of the imminent 300th anniversary of Ukraine's reunion with Russia (January 1954), the republican authorities resolved by early 1952 to make *Bohdan* a priority. But Korniiichuk, Wasilewska, and Dankevych had not yet completed the revisions. The Kiev opera company then proceeded to determine the amount of work that would be required on *Taras*, with the understanding that "should the theater receive the score of *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*," this work would be halted.<sup>763</sup> However, *Bohdan* again became the center of attention in mid-April 1952, when the All-Union Central Committee finally issued its approval of the new libretto. In fact, Korniiichuk and Wasilewska had produced a new libretto as early as January of that year, but several exhaustive discussions of the text at the republican Writers' Union, the Academy of Sciences, the Committee for the Arts, and the Composer's Union—both before and after the Moscow resolution—took months, as each resulted in dozens of minor critical comments and new revisions. The first draft of the new libretto contained a new Act One, Scene One portraying the execution of Cossack rebels and the people's suffering under the yoke of the Polish lords. Another addition, Act Two, Scene Two, showed the Polish gentry hatching its evil plans and Cossacks storming a Polish castle. Finally, the fraternal Don Cossacks appeared on the scene, and a whole new Act Four depicted the Pereiaslav Council of 1654 as the apotheosis of eternal friendship with the Russian people.<sup>764</sup>

Critical comments on the draft libretto in Ukraine revealed just how unanimously republican officials and intellectuals had "developed" Moscow's vague critique. The apparatus of the Ukrainian Central Committee, in particular, demanded more depiction

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<sup>762</sup> Ibid., ark. 54-5; A copy of the new translation is in TsDAMLM, f. 573, op. 4, spr. 18. See also *Radianske mystetstvo*, 2 April 1952, p. 3 (premiere).

<sup>763</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2773, ark. 97-98.

<sup>764</sup> TsDAMLM, f. 435, op. 1, spr. 305 (manuscript changes to the libretto); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2747 (printed copy from the archive of the Central Committee, dated January 1952); TsDAVOV, f. 4763, op. 1, spr. 357, ark. 2-5, 44; TsDAMLM, f. 435, op. 1, spr. 304, ark. 1-8 (outline of changes); N. Pirogova, *Opera "Bogdan Khmelnytsky" K. Dankevicha: Poiasnenie* (Moscow: Sovetskii kompozitor, 1959), pp. 8-9.

of fraternal assistance from the Russian people (the librettists decided to show the arrival of a cart with Russian weapons). The quoted list of flaws also included such gems as "the word 'Ukraine' is used too often" and "Bohdan's aria shows him as a weak man with no will."<sup>765</sup> "Starless Night," the Hetman's aria that opens the second scene of Act One, caused Korniiichuk and Wasilewska very considerable difficulty. All critics agreed that it was Dankevych's greatest musical achievement. However, the text of the anguished soliloquy did not correspond to the critics' idea of what the great military leader should be thinking about before the decisive battle. The playwright and head of the republican commission on theatrical repertoire, Oleksandr Levada, shouted during the discussion: "This is a decadent aria!" and contrasted it with the "optimistic" aria sung by Prince Igor in captivity. The composer Pylyp Kozytsky and the writer Iurii Dold-Mykhailyk supported him. Salvaging the well-turned musical fragment, Korniiichuk and Wasilewska rewrote the aria at least twice.<sup>766</sup> Less subtly, the Ukrainian reviewers suggested changing the last words of the final chorus from "Glory to Bohdan Khmelnytsky!" to "Glory to the Russian people!," which was duly implemented. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian Composers' Union

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<sup>765</sup> TsDAMLM, f. 435, op. 1, spr. 2012, ark. 5-6, 8.

<sup>766</sup> It is interesting to compare the original and final texts:

Starless night, this prophetic silence  
 Quietly brings thoughts about the future.  
 A windless night, but the candles are twinkling.  
 What disturbs their peace,  
 And that of my heart before the battle?  
 Candles flicker out in my tent,  
 It is dark and quiet as in the grave.  
 Dark night, in its slow flight,  
 Frightens my poor soul  
 Or predicts my fate.  
 Candles flicker out and a swarm of ghosts  
 Emerges from the dark corners.  
 My heart grows still, embraced by sorrow.  
 The dawn, where are you, early dawn?  
 The implacable night predicts my fate.  
 Darkness and silence. The dawn is late,  
 Sorrow and silence surround my heart.  
 Why does this last night disturb me,  
 Why does it so disturb  
 My heart before the battle?

Starless night, this prophetic silence  
 Quietly brings thoughts about the future.  
 A windless night, but the candles are twinkling.  
 What disturbs their peace,  
 And that of my heart before the battle?  
 How long did you spill your holy blood,  
 My land, invincible in battle?  
 Yet you have no happiness, no calm.  
 Enough! Today our path  
 Leads to victory, O land of mine!  
 Rise, stand up from the ruins, Ukraine,  
 Immortal, redoubtable in battle,  
 My own mother, my motherland.  
 I am ready to accept death as my fate  
 If only it brings you freedom!  
 Darkness and silence. The dawn is late,  
 And my heart is anxious.  
 Why does this last night disturb me,  
 Why does it so disturb  
 My heart before the battle?

See TsDAMLM, f. 673, op. 4 (10), spr. 16, ark. 19 (old text); *ibid.*, f. 146, op. 1, spr. 194, ark. 22 and TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2851, ark. 23 (new text). While the final version definitely seemed more "optimistic," it also acquired more patriotic, almost "nationalistic" overtones—hardly the critics' intention.



still demanded "a more powerful representation [of the Ukrainian people's] striving to unite with the great Russian people."<sup>767</sup>

In late March 1952, three experts on the arts at the Central Committee in Moscow, Vladimir Kruzhkov, Boris Tarasov, and Boris Iarustovskii, finally expressed their opinion of the new libretto of *Bohdan*. They felt that the "direct clash of the Ukrainian people with the Polish gentry" was still not dramatized appropriately, while the depiction of the siege was clearly weak and the hetman still static. The Muscovites suggested avoiding the anti-Polish animus by including a scene of Polish peasants rebelling against their co-national lords. Echoing the criticisms from Ukraine, they wanted to see "the theme of the unity of the Russian and Ukrainian people" developed further, "one of the best melodies of the first version, the theme of Bohun's love for Solomiia" restored, and the whole libretto significantly shortened. All in all, the review effectively killed the new redaction of the opera. The chief ideologue, Suslov, forwarded both the new libretto and the comments of the three critics to Molotov. Surprisingly, the latter disagreed. Molotov replied that Korniiichuk and Wasilewska had "generally" succeeded in reworking the libretto, while the critique of Kruzhkov, Tarasov, and Iarustovsky "exaggerated its shortcomings." The libretto needed to be abridged, hence Molotov recommended "not becoming obsessed with [implementing] the suggestions of the three." After reading this reply, Suslov made his own comments on the margins of the report. Next to the proposal to include the rebellion of the Polish peasants, he noted: "Do not exaggerate"; beside the demand to develop the notion of Russian-Ukrainian unity, "One should not permit the obtrusiveness that would be felt if one were to follow these suggestions." On 15-16 April, Central Committee secretaries Malenkov, Khrushchev, and Ponomarenko read the file and agreed with Suslov's proposal to proceed with completing the score of the opera, to be followed by its "audition and discussion."<sup>768</sup>

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<sup>767</sup> TsDAMLM, f. 435, op. 1, spr. 1959, ark. 25 (Levada), 31 (Kozytsky), 57 (Dold-Mykhailyk), 15 (Composers' Union); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2851, ark. 23 (second draft of the aria submitted to the Ukrainian Central Committee); TsDAVOV, f. 4763, op. 1, spr. 357, ark. 95 (concluding words).

<sup>768</sup> RTsKhIDNI, f. 17, op. 133, d. 369, ll. 14-24. Molotov's note is on l. 20, the decision on ll. 22-24. By 1952, the ailing Stalin had fully entrusted Malenkov with running everyday party business. As the party archives reveal, Malenkov normally circulated documents among the other secretaries of the Central

The supportive attitude of the highest leadership may be ascribed to two considerations, pragmatic and strategic. On the one hand, the Ukrainian ideological purge of 1951 had passed, and the increasingly influential Khrushchev probably wanted to avoid a new blow to the republic that was his power base. Furthermore, Korniiichuk and Wasilewska were known to have strong personal connections in the Soviet hierarchy. In February 1952, Korniiichuk announced at the Ukrainian Committee for the Arts that he and his wife planned to bring the new libretto to Moscow themselves "in order to receive a 'blessing' for the work there."<sup>769</sup> On the other hand, the Politburo had never accused *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* of serious ideological faults to begin with, and the search for "nationalist errors" in an opera that glorified the union with Russia was actually initiated by the Ukrainian functionaries and intellectuals themselves. The "dialogue" between the authorities and the intelligentsia did not necessarily undermine ideological hegemony. The local elites could be more "Stalinist" than the Soviet hierarchy. The party leadership could not have banned (nor did it intend to ban) all non-Russian historical operas as a genre, for that would have contradicted the "flowering" of the Soviet national cultures. In this case, the *diktat* of the party hierarchy overruled a more conservative consensus among the reviewers and experts.

In mid-June 1952, Nazarenko reported to First Secretary Melnikov that the libretto of *Bohdan* would be ready on 26 June, and the score on 15 August. The Kiev Opera was immediately ordered "to concentrate all efforts on *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* with the aim of staging the premiere by 1 October."<sup>770</sup> Meanwhile, the republican functionaries were also preparing appropriate "scholarly" and ideological indoctrination for the artists. All the actors engaged in *Bohdan* took part in a special tour of the Historical Museum in Kiev to study the Cossack epoch. The Committee for the Arts reported to the Central Committee that fourteen groups for the study of party history and one for the study of Stalin's biography were active within the company. In addition, thirty people attended

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Committee (Stalin not included, although he was probably consulted verbally on major questions), reaching a decision by consensus.

<sup>769</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 4763, op. 1, spr. 357, ark. 44.

<sup>770</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2773, ark. 124-25.

evening classes at the University of Marxism-Leninism, and thirty-four participated in a seminar on dialectical and historical materialism.<sup>771</sup> Ironically, no republican bureaucrat went so far as to check what historical sources the stage director, M. Stefanovych, had used in developing his ideas. As it turns out, he relied exclusively on the 1857 article, "The Commemoration of Bohdan Khmelnytsky," by the Ukrainian historian Mykhailo Maksymovych.<sup>772</sup>

On 3 November 1952, a select 115 Ukrainian bureaucrats, scholars, writers, and composers attended a private performance of *Bohdan*. The next day, they offered final minor suggestions on ways to stress that the Cossacks had fought the Polish lords but not the Polish peasants, on choreography, and on the appropriateness of kissing the cross in Act Four. On 15 November, the Politburo of the republican Central Committee gathered at the theater at 11:00 a.m. for a final check of the opera's ideological acceptability. By then, some of the plot lines had undergone confusing metamorphoses. The producers first entirely eliminated the traits of a young lover from the role of Colonel Bohun, but then reinstated his romance with Solomiia, following a suggestion from Moscow Committee for the Arts. Since the historical Colonel Kryvonis had died before the Pereiaslav Council, considerations of "historical truth" prompted his removal from Act Four. Yet this change prompted "the question of 'What happened to him?'," for listeners could have interpreted it to mean that the colonel disapproved of union with Russia. The director resolved to revive Kryvonis for Act Four. The zealots of operatic form were satisfied with "two duets and several distinct ensembles with chorus," even if these made *Bohdan* almost unbearably long. The members of the Politburo were satisfied as well, perhaps also because they attended a private matinee performance and did not have to sit in the theater past midnight.<sup>773</sup>

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<sup>771</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 4762, op. 1, spr. 669, ark. 27 (Historical Museum); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2773, ark. 199 (ideological indoctrination).

<sup>772</sup> See his extensive handwritten notes in TsDAMLM, f. 146, op. 1, spr. 46, ark. 1-10.

<sup>773</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2775; TsDAVOV, f. 4763, op. 1, spr. 356 (discussion on 4 November); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2773, ark. 165, 167 (the logistics of two closed performances), 165-66 (summary of opinions), 166-67 (Bohun), 175-76 (Kryvonis).

To be sure, the plans to stage the premiere of such a monumental work in October were completely unrealistic. The Kiev Opera presented the new redaction of *Bohdan* on the last two days of its 1952-53 season, 21 and 22 June. The Ukrainian newspapers reported the premiere in an unusually laconic manner.<sup>774</sup> Finally, on 27 September 1953, the Kiev opera company opened its new season with *Bohdan*. This time, with the old friend of the Kiev Opera, Khrushchev, installed as First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the republican authorities went ahead with unreserved glorification of the work. The flood of lengthy reviews promptly announced a "great achievement" of the Soviet Ukrainian musical theater.<sup>775</sup> The subsequent lavish celebration of the 300th anniversary of the Pereiaslav Treaty in May-June 1954 cemented the opera's place in the canon of Soviet Ukrainian culture. The Kharkiv, Odessa, and Stalino opera companies staged *Bohdan*—reportedly with phenomenal success—in the spring of 1954. In May, the Kiev Opera went to Moscow again for the *dekada* of Ukrainian art and presented *Bohdan*,

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<sup>774</sup> *Radianske mystetstvo*, 24 June 1953, p. 1; *Literaturna hazeta*, 25 June 1953, p. 3 (premiere). Apparently, after Stalin's death in March, the Ukrainian functionaries were unsure what to expect from Moscow, especially as the central authorities had just halted the last of Stalin's ideological campaigns, the "Doctors' Plot" affair, and denounced the penultimate one, the Mingrelian affair. Moreover, Beria (himself to be arrested on 26 June) was leading an unexpected crusade to promote the status of the non-Russian peoples, hoping to build a political base among the republican elites (see Amy Knight, *Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993], pp. 186-91). Interestingly, the pertinent archival documents show that Iarustovskii, present as Moscow's inspector at the 21 June premiere, wrote an extremely dismissive report to the new secretary of the all-Union Central Committee, Petr Pospelov. Iarustovskii recognized that "almost all of *Pravda's* principal criticisms had been taken into account," yet he thought that "the theme of Ukraine's union with Russia" was still too superficially expressed. He also complained about "too many similar choruses of exaltation [and] routinely noisy finales," the "deafening" overuse of the brass section in the second half of the opera, and the poor set design. The four-and-a-half-hour opera now also appeared to have two musical and logical finales: the victory over the "Polish gentry" in Act Two and the reunion with Russia in Act Four. Still, Iarustovsky ended his report with a proposal to approve the new redaction. Pospelov took almost two months to make up his mind. On 21 August, the secretary of the Central Committee appended his decision: "Agree." See TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 17, d. 445, ll. 43-44, 66-68. A former protégé of Zhdanov, Pospelov allied himself with Khrushchev in the succession struggle after Stalin's death. See Hahn, *The Postwar Soviet Politics*, 31-32.

<sup>775</sup> *Radianske mystetstvo*, 30 September 1953, p. 3 (*Bohdan* as season opener); 14 October 1953, p. 3 and *Literaturna hazeta*, 1 October 1953, p. 3; 29 October 1953, p. 2 (reviews). Apparently, Khrushchev did not attend a performance of *Bohdan* during his visit to Kiev in October 1953. As noted earlier, he definitely went to see *The Zaporozhian Cossack beyond the Danube* and possibly indicated his general approval of the theater's work.

*Prince Igor*, and *Natalka from Poltava*.<sup>776</sup> Soviet television broadcast *Bohdan* live from the Bolshoi on 10 May. Dankevych made the introductory comments, claiming that the Kievans had come to the Bolshoi to express "the feelings of brotherly love and boundless gratitude" to the Russian people. The opera was also repeatedly broadcast in full on all-Union and republican radio and released on gramophone disks. The festive concert to celebrate the 300th anniversary of the union in Kiev included no less than three arias from Dankevych's work. The composer himself became a People's Artist of the Soviet Union.<sup>777</sup>

The lack of reliable sources makes it difficult to reconstruct the role of the audience in its "dialogue" with cultural producers. Tens of thousands of Soviet Ukrainians attended performances of *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*, and millions heard the opera on radio. Yet nobody carried out an objective independent poll of the listeners in 1954 to determine just how they "read" this cultural product. In January 1954, the Paris correspondent of the Ukrainian emigre newspaper *Novyi shliakh* (Toronto) was allegedly told by visitors from Soviet Ukraine that

One must buy tickets to the Kiev Opera three or four weeks in advance to attend *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*. The public enthusiastically applauds the excellent Ukrainian settings and costumes; Ukrainians serving in the military greet the Cossack banners loudly. And the whole house listens as if in a trance to Bohdan's boring aria on the need to "reunite" [with Russia].<sup>778</sup>

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<sup>776</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3632, ark. 20-22; Ts-DAVOV, f. 5116, op. 4, spr. 19, ark. 1-2 (*Bohdan* produced in Ukrainian theaters); TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 17, cl. 402, l. 71; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 3504, ark. 24; TsDAVOV, f. 5116, op. 4, spr. 15, ark. 44; spr. 20, ark. 1-7, 25.

<sup>777</sup> GARF, f. 6903, op. 26, d. 39, TV program and transcripts for 10 May (no pagination); TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 17, d. 402, ll. 76-77 (all-Union radio); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3631, ark. 25 (republican radio); spr. 3633, ark. 47-54 (gramophone disks); spr. 3632, ark. 180-86 (major concert in Kiev to celebrate the anniversary); *Radianske mystetstvo*, 17 November 1954, p. 1 (Dankevych's accolade).

<sup>778</sup> *Novyi shliakh*, 15 January 1954, p. 4. The reference to Bohdan's "boring" aria on the need for reunification seems to add some credibility to the story. Indeed, two of the hetman's arias were devoted to this subject.

Although some Canadian informants deemed this passage important enough to report it to the Soviet All-Slavic Committee, which supervised contacts with foreign Slavs,<sup>779</sup> the emigre newspaper's information is not corroborated by any other source. Reading both the Soviet archival documents and the press of the time, one might just as easily arrive at the conclusion that *Bohdan* was popular precisely because it embodied the idea of a union of Russians and Ukrainians. However, the archives shed interesting new light on the extent of the opera's popularity. A participant in the Moscow discussion of the first redaction of the opera in 1951 said that "Kievan listeners are eagerly seeking tickets for *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*."<sup>780</sup> While considering the opera's revisions, Ukrainian functionaries and intellectuals often referred to its "great success" with the public and even to women weeping in the audience during a tragic scene.<sup>781</sup> The attendance records of the Kiev Opera for 1954 show that *Bohdan* was the absolute public favorite: the company performed it 36 times that season with a total of 52,768 tickets sold, that is, to an average audience of 1,466 people. That same season, the company performed the "official" Russian patriotic opera *Ivan Susanin* 8 times for a total of 6,950 listeners (an average of 869 at each performance), *Boris Godunov* 7 times for a total audience of 7,183 (an average of 1,026), and *Carmen* 9 times for a total audience of 9,894 (an average of 1,099).<sup>782</sup> A general statistical survey of all Soviet opera companies in 1954 revealed that 7 theaters—Kiev and six other smaller oblast houses, all of them in Ukraine—staged 129 performances of *Bohdan* for a total of 136,123 spectators, an average of 1,055. No Russian classical opera enjoyed such an average attendance Union-wide that year. *Ivan Susanin*, staged by all the largest theaters, came close, with 15 theaters, 126 performances, and 128,276 patrons (1,018). *Eugene Onegin*, *The Queen of Spades* and other classics

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<sup>779</sup> GARF, f. 6646, op. 1, d. 356, ll. 14-18.

<sup>780</sup> TsDAMLM, f. 661, op. 1, spr. 130, ark. 42. Compare another statement to this effect, *ibid.*, f. 573, op. 1, spr. 188, ark. 81.

<sup>781</sup> RGALI, f. 962, op. 3, d. 2306, l. 7; d. 2336, l. 13; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 1875, ark. 79 (women weeping).

<sup>782</sup> RGALI, f. 2329, op. 3, d. 168, l. 35ob. Only a rarity, Puccini's *Tosca*, surpassed the record average attendance: 2,959 people showed up at a mere two performances of this opera in Kiev.

lagged far behind. The most often performed opera on a Soviet subject, Iulii Meitus's *The Young Guard*, incidentally also a work by Ukrainian composer, scored 9—87—49,980 (574).<sup>783</sup>

These statistics are convincing: *Bohdan* enjoyed unprecedented popularity in Ukraine. How many listeners craved a Ukrainian patriotic opera, and how many the authorities "organized" to hear to a new and topical musical work about the Russian-Ukrainian friendship, is open to discussion. But for all practical purposes, *Bohdan* did become *the* Ukrainian national historical opera for the 1950s. Whatever its intended propaganda message, the operatic synthesis of the representation of the nation's past with the grand spectacle and ritual of theatrical tradition filled an important institutional niche among the vehicles of the national imagination. While *Bohdan*'s content duly glorified the "elder brother," the opera also exalted the heroic Cossack past and the liberation of the homeland from foreign oppression. Thus, *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* offered Ukrainian listeners the experience of identification with their heroic national ancestors. In an angry and touching letter to Khrushchev, Mykhailo Hryshko, unhappy with critics' comments about his "static" portrayal of Bohdan, expressed this sense of belonging to a historical community. The singer had read the scholarly books, chronicles, and historical novels, sometimes almost feeling as if he were meeting Khmelnytsky's colonels on the street. Hryshko thought of himself as "a son of [his] people, in whose veins runs the blood of ancestors who passed into eternity and dreamt of seeing their Fatherland free and independent."<sup>784</sup> The students of a small-town school wrote to Korniiichuk in 1954 that his play *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* "teaches us to love and be proud of our people, who defended their independence in arduous struggle."<sup>785</sup> It was precisely the possibility of such a selective "reading" of non-Russian Soviet representations of the national past that undermined the principal message of the Russian-dominated "friendship" encoded in the authoritative discourse.

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<sup>783</sup> RGALI, f. 2329, op. 3, d. 111, ll. 1-3.

<sup>784</sup> TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 17, d. 445, ll. 85-6. Amusingly, there is every likelihood that Hryshko met Borys Hmyria (Colonel Kryvonis) regularly on Pasazh Street, where both men lived.

<sup>785</sup> TsDAML, f. 435, op. 1, spr. 1302, ark. 1-2.

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The production of patriotic historical operas in Soviet Ukraine underscored the lack of uniformity—indeed, the abundance of irregularities—in Stalinist culture. The Moscow authorities sought to achieve total control over cultural production, but their efforts were frustrated by the relative autonomy of the local bureaucracy and intellectuals. The state's *diktat* in Stalinist culture was limited by the irregular character of the central authorities' administrative interference. Although the periodic Moscow-initiated ideological campaigns undeniably defined the general direction of literature and the arts, the party leadership did not exercise total control over cultural production even after the late 1930s. High-level policy decisions interfered sporadically and often confusingly with cultural life far away from Moscow, whereas local functionaries had considerable autonomy in determining the limits of what was ideologically acceptable and unacceptable. In fact, the everyday "party line" in Soviet Ukrainian culture was formulated, negotiated, and maintained by republican bureaucrats and members of the intelligentsia themselves. They could either undermine or reinforce the Moscow policy, and more often than not, the intellectuals' dialogic responses were already infused with deference and servility. Following the authorities' lead or acting on their own, critics, poets, and composers evaluated their peers' work according to their own understanding of standards of Stalinist ideology and aesthetics. With or without Moscow's approval, local ideologues and intellectuals alike did not hesitate to denounce various "errors" and to develop brief and often confusing pronouncements from the center into full-blown ideological campaigns. At the same time, by expressing their opinions in the shared "Bolshevik" political language, the artistic community could successfully negotiate the meaning of Soviet Ukrainian culture with local functionaries. The Ukrainian intelligentsia skilfully used the official discourse of "ethnic flowering" to maintain the rights of the indigenous high culture, and both the republican political and artistic elites relied on the rhetoric of the "authentic cultural tradition" to defend their cultural domain against Moscow's centralizing efforts. Although scarce, the surviving evidence indicates the active role that contemporary Ukrainian audiences may have played in their "dialogue" with the cultural producers.

Moreover, contrary to a famous Soviet slogan, both the form *and* content of



national cultures under Stalinism represented an alternative avenue of self-identification for the audiences. The architects of "socialist national cultures" never quite succeeded in separating their constructs from the old "bourgeois-nationalist" cultures of the same nationalities. The goal of creating a "healthy" ethnolinguistic Soviet Ukrainian culture not identified with the non-Soviet Ukrainian ultimately proved unattainable. In their frustration, the authorities launched periodic campaigns against "nationalist deviations," but republican bureaucrats and indigenous intellectuals shaped the extent of those campaigns at least as much as the Moscow functionaries did. In their "dialogue" with Moscow, the republican elites sometimes demonstrated extreme servility by inflating ideological campaigns and pushing for more denunciations. At other times, they skillfully "spoke Bolshevik" in defense of their cultural domain. In both cases, the local functionaries and the intelligentsia acted as historical agents who shaped the very nature of Stalinism by negotiating the meaning of the official discourse.

Chapter Nine  
CELEBRATING THE GREAT FRIENDSHIP

Stalin died on 5 March 1953, but the Stalinist models for narrating the "friendship of peoples" remained in force for several more years. Scholars have long known that the de-Stalinization of non-Russian historiographies did not begin until 1956.<sup>786</sup> Indeed, when the 300th anniversary of the Pereiaslav Treaty was celebrated with unprecedented pomp in May 1954, the official pronouncements, scholarly works, and artistic representations all elaborated upon the previous decade's ideological *topoi*. Only in rare cases did new approaches surface, to be suppressed by the establishment in Kiev and Moscow.

Meanwhile, the Soviet nationality policy was experiencing confusing metamorphoses. In the succession struggle following Stalin's death, the powerful secret police chief and deputy premier, Lavrentii Beria, attempted to build a political base among the elites of the non-Russian republics.<sup>787</sup> Condemning the bureaucratic Russification as a distortion of Leninist nationality policy, he proposed measures resembling those of the nativization drive of the 1920s: the promotion of local nationals, the use of local languages in official business, and the removal of functionaries lacking the required language ability. In May 1953, Beria pushed through a relevant resolution of the Central Committee's Presidium. As Khrushchev testified later, Beria used Ukraine as an example of Russification:

The Presidium began to discuss a memorandum by Beria about the ethnic composition of governing bodies in Ukraine. Beria's idea was that local officials should be kept in positions of leadership in their own republics and shouldn't be promoted to the central organizations in Moscow. As a result of this memorandum, it was decided to release Melnikov from his duties as first secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee and to put Kyrychenko in his place. [...] Then a memorandum appeared concerning the Baltic states, followed by another concerning Belarus. Both stressed the principle of drawing the republican leadership from the local population. We passed a decision that the post of first

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<sup>786</sup> Tillet, *The Great Friendship*, 198-204, 222-49. Specifically on Ukraine, see Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic*, 206-09.

<sup>787</sup> See Amy Knight, *Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant*, 186-91.

secretary in every republic had to be held by a local person and not by a Russian sent from Moscow.<sup>788</sup>

An ethnic Russian who could not speak Ukrainian, Melnikov lost his position to a Ukrainian, Oleksii Kyrychenko. As ethnic background could not have been cited as a reason for dismissal, Beria charged Melnikov with failing to promote the native cadres in Western Ukraine and authorizing the adoption of Russian as the language of instruction at local universities. On 2-4 June 1953, the plenary meeting of the CP(b)U Central Committee condemned Melnikov's "mistakes" and elected Kyrychenko as first secretary. Other pro-Ukrainian personnel changes included Korniiichuk's elevation to the Presidium and the appointment of S. V. Stefanyk, the son of the classic of Western Ukrainian literature, as deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers.<sup>789</sup>

In a spectacular political reversal, soon after Beria's arrest on 26 June, Moscow condemned his efforts involving the nationalities policy as subversive. On 29-30 July 1953, the plenary meeting of the Ukrainian Central Committee denounced Beria's memo, which it had approved a month before, as an attempt "to undermine the friendship of the peoples of our country, to oppose the Ukrainian people to the great Russian people, to oppose Western Ukrainians to Eastern Ukrainians, and to revitalize bourgeois nationalists."<sup>790</sup> None of the personnel changes was undone, though. Within less than a year, under Khrushchev's protection, the Ukrainian party leadership underwent impressive consolidation. The XVIIIth congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party (March 1954) affirmed the Ukrainians' dominant position in its Politburo and the Central

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<sup>788</sup> *Khrushchev Remembers*, 329-30, with changes in the spelling of some names.

<sup>789</sup> The minutes of the plenary meeting are in TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 1, spr. 1120. Long before the opening of the Soviet archives, two Western scholars had offered an insightful interpretation of this episode (Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic*, 237-40; Lewytzkyj, *Die Sowjetukraine*, 87-91; idem, *Politics and Society*, 3-5). New Ukrainian studies confirm that, in an attempt to establish control over the republic, Beria also replaced practically all senior secret police officers in Ukraine (Shapoval, *Ukraina 20-50-kh rokiv*, 291-99).

<sup>790</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 1, spr. 1139, ark. 8.

Committee.<sup>791</sup> But, as the May 1954 celebrations confirmed, the implications of this political turmoil for the ideology of friendship and the notion of Soviet Ukrainian patriotism were not immediately obvious.

### **The Last Stalinist Festival**

The Ukrainian establishment had long been aware of the need to mark the tercentenary of Pereiaslav with imposing celebrations. For example, as early as May 1951, the republic's Academy of Sciences developed plans for festive conferences and publications.<sup>792</sup> Individual writers, artists, and composers had long been preparing works glorifying the historic Russian-Ukrainian friendship in general and the 1654 union in particular. However, the political leadership failed to plan or coordinate the festivities in advance. On the one hand, late Stalinist aesthetic taste demanded that the glorious jubilee be commemorated by erecting majestic monuments requiring years of construction; on the other, the politicians were accustomed to relegate the celebration arrangements to ad hoc committees, which were usually created at the last moment. Although the tercentenary jubilee was to be celebrated on 18 January 1954, no coordinating committee existed until mid-1953.

In the summer of 1952, the CP(b)U Central Committee requested that major Ukrainian cultural institutions provide their proposals on how to mark the Tercentenary. The Academy of Architecture suggested erecting a monument to Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the city of Pereiaslav-Khmelnytsky. The Writers', Artists', and Composers' Unions all reported numerous works in progress on the subject of the Pereiaslav Treaty. The Committee on Cultural and Educational Institutions proposed that the monuments of the Cossack era be restored, that special expositions be created in the museums, and that popular lectures be organized about the Russian-Ukrainian friendship.<sup>793</sup> The party

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<sup>791</sup> The representation of ethnic Ukrainians in the Central Committee increased from 62 to 72 percent. All eight full members of the Politburo and all four Central Committee secretaries were Ukrainian (Krawchenko, *Social Change*, 244).

<sup>792</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 2325, ark. 131-32.

<sup>793</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3597, ark. 40-71.

functionaries, however, did not issue any clear instructions on what would be implemented and when.

On an ad hoc basis in early 1953, the Central Committee was still collecting information about the preparatory work. The Archival Administration reported the completion of a three-volume documentary collection about the Khmelnytsky Uprising. The Artists' Union acknowledged its failure to approve a standard portrait of Bohdan Khmelnytsky for reproduction on postcards. The Writers' Union was preparing a large collection of stories and poems, *The Chronicle of the Great Friendship*. The Architectural Administration reported on the state of historic monuments in Pereiaslav-Khmelnytsky and desirable restoration measures.<sup>794</sup> Some of these projects had been initiated on different occasions in the previous years; none was part of a centralized plan to celebrate the Tercentenary, nor could there have been a meaningful plan, because the Ukrainian authorities did not even apply for centralized financing of the festivities, and the republican budget could not have supported them in any case.

In fact, the republic's leadership was agonizing over a letter to Stalin, seeking his approval of the celebrations. The draft letter outlined the proposed festivities: opening a monument to the hetman in Pereiaslav-Khmelnytsky, constructing a Triumphal Arch in Kiev, establishing a medal "300 Years of the Reunification of Ukrainian People with the Great Russian People," producing a film *The Pereiaslav Council*, renaming the city of Proskuriv and Kamianets-Podilsky oblast after Bohdan Khmelnytsky, organizing a festival of Ukrainian culture in Moscow and one of Russian culture in Kiev, etc. The letter was still at the draft stage when Stalin died on 5 March 1953. Ukrainian functionaries then drafted a similar letter to his apparent successor, Georgii Malenkov, adding a new first point: "To erect monuments to the gatherer of the Ukrainian lands into a single Ukrainian Soviet state, Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, in the cities of Kiev, Kharkiv, Lviv, and Stalino."<sup>795</sup> It is not clear whether the letter was mailed at the time, for the available Moscow archives do not include it.

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<sup>794</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3599, ark. 7-42.

<sup>795</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3598, ark. 2-4, 5-6; spr. 3597, ark. 73-77.

In early June, First Secretary Melnikov lost his job during what then appeared to be a Moscow-sponsored Ukrainization of the republic's leadership. Significantly, the Ukrainian authorities immediately intensified their preparations for the tercentenary festivities—an event that could also be construed to celebrate Cossack glory and Ukrainian historical patrimony. On 25 June, the Central Committee held a conference with leading intellectuals to discuss the commemoration program. As a result, the first coherent plan of celebrations was produced.<sup>796</sup> On the next day, the Ukrainian ideologues composed a new letter to Moscow, addressed this time to Khrushchev at the All-Union Central Committee. (On second thought, they added another addressee: Malenkov at the Council of Ministers, but the republic's bureaucracy clearly sensed who was emerging as the main decision-maker in Moscow.) The plan contained all the previous events and monuments minus the statues of Stalin and plus the dedication of the foundation stone for Kiev University's new campus and the construction of a panorama, "The Ukrainian People's War of Liberation and the Reunification of Ukraine and Russia."<sup>797</sup>

At the last moment, the Ukrainian ideologues revised the letter one more time, substituting a monument to the Reunification for the envisaged statue of Khmelnytsky in Pereiaslav and changing the Tercentenary medal to the Order of the Friendship of Peoples. In addition, the new Point Three read: "To prepare for publication in the press theses on the 300th anniversary of Ukraine's reunification with Russia, explaining the historical significance of the friendship between the Russian and Ukrainian people...." The proposal also envisaged a joint declaration of the Ukrainian and Russian governments and a letter from the Ukrainian people to the Russian people.<sup>798</sup>

In Moscow, Khrushchev ensured the speedy processing of the Ukrainian proposals.

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<sup>796</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3598, ark. 12-18 (conference), 19-44 (plan).

<sup>797</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 3504, ark. 121-23. Constructing a special building to exhibit a large panorama of the war and the union was Kornichuk's idea. The estimated cost of this project approached 13 million rubles, but the powerful writer felt that the panorama would "survive for centuries" (TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3598, ark. 14, 46).

<sup>798</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 3504, ark. 163-67.

By 19 August, Suslov and Pospelov sent him the draft resolution of the All-Union Central Committee on celebrating the Tercentenary. The central bureaucracy rejected the panorama in Kiev, the Order of the Friendship of Peoples, and the joint governmental declaration. The task of preparing the *Theses* was assigned to two departments of the VKP(b) Central Committee, the Department of Propaganda and Agitation and the Department of Scholarship and Culture, resulting in this document's elevation to a major ideological pronouncement on history. In the Central Committee's resolution of 21 September 1953, Moscow sealed its approval of the other Ukrainian proposals.<sup>799</sup> The republican functionaries then requested 47,824,000 rubles from the central budget to finance the celebrations in Ukraine. The USSR Council of Ministers, however, allotted them only 37,600,000 from the national reserve fund.<sup>800</sup>

Although the Moscow ideologues were officially supervising the jubilee preparations, they made few constructive contributions.<sup>801</sup> The Central Committee apparatus did formally release the most important ideological document of the time, the *Theses* on the Tercentenary, but the Ukrainian historians apparently played a major role in its preparation. The Central Committee resolution of 21 September 1953 obliged its apparatus to produce the *Theses* within two months. The Department of Scholarship and Culture appointed its officials F. D. Khrustov, I. Khliabin, and A. V. Lykholat (Likholat) to coordinate the project and complete it by the New Year.<sup>802</sup> In practice, the project organizer's role passed to Andrii Lykholat, a Ukrainian historian specializing in the Revolution and Civil War period.

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<sup>799</sup> TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 9, ll. 51-64.

<sup>800</sup> TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 52, ll. 96-99, 127-29; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3613, ark. 3-6.

<sup>801</sup> In December 1953, the functionaries suddenly realized that none of the official announcements specified the exact date of festivities. Since the Pereiaslav Treaty's 300th anniversary was to fall on 18 January, the local officials in Ukraine and Russia were becoming concerned about the brief period remaining for organizing the commemorative events. Moreover, the middle of winter did not seem an appropriate time for festivals and parades. On 14 December, Pospelov and Kyrychenko finally reported the problem to Khrushchev. The resulting official announcement in the press explained that the authorities "accepted the proposal of the party, Soviet, and civic organizations" to move the festivities from January to May 1954 (TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 9, ll. 115-16; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 3504, ark. 186).

<sup>802</sup> TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 9, l. 55 (resolution); op. 17, d. 402, l. 26 (appointment).

Lykholat enlisted the services of the leading historians in Kiev (Boiko, Holobutsky, Huslysty, Kasymenko, Shevchenko) and Moscow (Bazilevich, Cherepnin, Pankratova, Picheta, Sidorov, Tikhomirov) to produce draft materials. He then compiled the text's final version in consultation with Pospelov and the head of the Department of Scholarship and Culture, Oleksii (Aleksei) Rumiantsev, a transplanted Ukrainian economist. Lykholat also consulted with Nazarenko, Korniichuk, and the Ukrainian counterpart of Rumiantsev, S. Chervonenko.<sup>803</sup> On 5 January 1954, the Central Committee's senior functionaries P. Pospelov, V. Kruzhkov, and O. Rumiantsev submitted the final draft to Khrushchev. Neither Khrushchev's copy, nor the copy sent to the Ukrainian Politburo have significant marginal notes; the Lykholat draft appeared practically unchanged as the Central Committee's authoritative pronouncement.<sup>804</sup>

The *Theses* (analyzed in more detail later in this chapter) affirmed the strategy for interpreting history that the Ukrainian establishment had been developing during the previous decade. Nations, rather than classes, were presented as subjects of history, and the mighty Russian-dominated Soviet Union, rather than the victory of socialism, as history's teleological outcome.<sup>805</sup> The *Theses* were published in the major Russian and Ukrainian newspapers on 12 January and reprinted in practically all Soviet papers,

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<sup>803</sup> This narrative is based on Lykholat's own recollections. From 1961 until his death in 1993, he worked at the Institute of History of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, the institution I joined as a junior researcher in 1989. Andrii Vasylovych was fond of sharing his reminiscences with younger colleagues. However, forty-five years after the events, his chronology was sometimes unreliable. Stephen Velychenko interviewed Lykholat in 1988 and published a similar account of the preparation of the *Theses*, albeit asserting that Suslov ordered Lykholat to prepare this document in mid-1952 and that the final draft was ready by mid-1953 (Velychenko, *Shaping Identity in Eastern Europe and Russia*, 59). The archival materials unavailable to Velychenko at the time do not support such a dating.

<sup>804</sup> TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 52, ll. 1-2 (submitted), 3-29 (Khrushchev's copy); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3642, ark. 35-70 (Ukrainian copy). The original draft was entitled "The Tercentenary of Ukraine's Reunification with Russia (1654-1954)" and signed "CC CPSU Department of Scholarship and Culture; CC CPSU Department of Propaganda and Agitation." The published version bears the name *Theses on the Tercentenary of Ukraine's Reunification with Russia (1654-1954)* and the imprimatur "Approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union."

<sup>805</sup> *Tezisy o 300-letii vossoedineniia Ukrainy s Rossiei (1654-1954 gg.)* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1954). Yaroslav Bilinsky observes that, in the *Theses*, "even the 'class' character of history is not stressed; the Ukrainian and the Russian people are essentially depicted as single units and not aggregates of warring classes" (*The Second Soviet Republic*, 205).



magazines, and journals immediately afterwards. As if this wide distribution were not enough, they also appeared as a separate booklet in Russian in 1,000,000 copies and, in Ukrainian, in 400,000 copies.<sup>806</sup> On 13 and 14 January, party activists at most enterprises, collective farms, schools, and organizations throughout Ukraine organized the public reading of the *Theses*.<sup>807</sup>

The preparations for the jubilee began in earnest only in January 1954. The Ukrainian authorities announced the creation of an organizing committee of 89 people, chaired by First Secretary Kyrychenko.<sup>808</sup> A special resolution ensured that the Ukrainian workers and collective farmers participated in a mass "socialist competition" marking the glorious anniversary with the exceeding of their normal production quotas.<sup>809</sup>

Meanwhile, the authorities concerned themselves with the production of various memorabilia. These included a souvenir medal depicting two men, a Russian and a Ukrainian, holding the Soviet coat of arms against the background of the Kremlin wall. Aside from being male, the ideal Russian was taller than his Ukrainian younger brother, on whose shoulder he patronizingly put his left hand. The Russian also represented Soviet modernity by wearing a formal suit with a tie, while the Ukrainian wore an "ethnographic" embroidered shirt. The reverse side of the medal depicted the Pereiaslav Council.<sup>810</sup> The medal was intended for the Ukrainian establishment and distinguished

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<sup>806</sup> *Pravda*, 12 January 1954, p. 3; *Radianska Ukraina*, 12 January 1954, p. 3; *Tezisy*, 32 (print run); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3600, ark. 10 (print run in Ukraine).

<sup>807</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 14 January 1954, p. 1; 15 January 1954, p. 1.

<sup>808</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3602, ark. 1-5; *Radianska Ukraina*, 7 January 1954, p. 1.

<sup>809</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3619, ark. 2-14, 16-18. The same document demanded a more extensive press coverage of the "socialist competition." From January to May, the official *Radianska Ukraina* published hundreds of materials about this campaign, although, beginning in January, the articles appeared at longer intervals and no longer on the front page. See especially 9 January, p. 1; 14 January, p. 1; 16 January, pp. 1-2; 17 January, p. 1; 19 January, pp. 1, 2; 23 January, p. 2; 27 January, p. 2; 5 February, p. 2; 12 February, p. 2; 19 February, pp. 1-2; 3 March, p. 2; 16 March, p. 3; 18 April, p. 3; 21 May, p. 3.

<sup>810</sup> The sample medals are in TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3605, 3606. Their design by the Ukrainian artists A. Riznychenko, O. Khotynok, and the Russian sculptor V. Akimushkina was approved by the Ministry of Culture in Moscow (RGALI, f. 2329, op. 4, dd. 245, 252; TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 8, spr. 98882, ark. 96-101, 205).

guests. For the general public, the authorities ordered 2 million copies of a simpler badge picturing the Kremlin tower, the flags of Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine, and the number "300."<sup>811</sup> Special-edition stamps were released featuring Derehus's painting *The Pereiaslav Council*, the Order of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and the hetman's statue in Kiev.<sup>812</sup>

To ensure that the ordinary citizen embraced the notion of the historic friendship, the Ukrainian ideologues ordered a long list of products to be sold in festive wrappings featuring the monument to Khmelnytsky in Kiev, the Kremlin, and the words "300 years." The list included such unexpected items as womens' bras and silk nightdresses (200,000); stockings (250,000); men's socks (200,000); cigarettes of the "Zaporozhians" brand (2,000,000 packages); wine glasses with the inscription "Reunification"; and a special beer, "Pereiaslavske" (27,000 decalitres). This strong beer was allegedly developed especially for the jubilee; such "historic" ingredients as honey and rice were used in the brewing.<sup>813</sup>

The anniversary date itself, 18 January 1954, was not marked by any special events. The day before, the authorities announced the renaming of the Ukrainian city of Proskuriv to Khmelnytsky and the Kamianets-Podilsky oblast to Khmelnytsky oblast. The old Moscow Maroseika Street became Khmelnytsky Street.<sup>814</sup> On 19 February, the Russian Federation presented the Ukrainian Republic with a precious festive gift: the Crimean oblast. Although Crimea was historically Tatar and ethnically Russian, Mykola Bazhan claimed at the USSR Supreme Council Presidium meeting, which formalized the transfer, that "close economic and cultural ties between Ukraine and Crimea had emerged in ancient times."<sup>815</sup> In April, festive sessions of the Ukrainian and All-Union

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<sup>811</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 3504, ark. 37-38. The list of 1,188 people presented with the desk medal is in op. 30, spr. 3620. In fact, less than 250,000 badges were produced on time (ibid., spr. 3607, ark. 1-5).

<sup>812</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3621, ark. 6.

<sup>813</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 8, spr. 10237, ark. 65-85; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3601, ark. 15-37 (the list); *Radianska Ukraina*, 5 February 1954, p. 2 (beer).

<sup>814</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 17 January 1954, p. 1.

<sup>815</sup> GARF, f. 7523, op. 57, d. 963, ll. 1-3 (the original decree); op. 58, d. 19, ll. 2-21 (speeches, here 9).

Academies of Sciences took place in Kiev and Moscow, featuring numerous speeches about the historic Russian-Ukrainian friendship. On 24 April, an imposing Ukrainian concert was held in Moscow, followed from 6 to 16 May by the *dekady* (festivals) of Ukrainian art in Moscow and Russian art in Kiev.<sup>816</sup>

The celebrations reached their apogee in late May 1954. On 22 May, a festive session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet opened in Kiev, with delegations from all other Soviet republics and the Polish Sejm in attendance. First Secretary Kyrychenko gave a lengthy speech elaborating on the *Theses*.<sup>817</sup> Hundreds of organizations—from the Mongolian parliament to obscure collective farms—telegraphed their congratulations to the Ukrainian people.<sup>818</sup>

On 23 May, military and civilian parades were held in Kiev, Kharkiv, Lviv, Sevastopol, Odessa, and Pereiaslav-Khmelnytsky, followed by twenty-gun military salutes in the evening. In Kiev, 500,000 people marched down Khreshchatyk Street, many wearing Ukrainian ethnic costumes. The column of the Molotov District paraded a huge picture, *The Pereiaslav Council*, mounted on a truck. The central Khmelnytsky Square was decorated with a gigantic copy of Khmelko's *Forever with Moscow, Forever with the Russian People*.<sup>819</sup> In the evening, an imposing fireworks display took place on the Dnieper. Three barges carried large illuminated pictures of Khmelnytsky, the Pereiaslav Council, the Kremlin, and the Dnieper Hydroelectric Dam.<sup>820</sup>

On 24 May, the sites were dedicated for monuments to the Tercentenary in Pereiaslav-Khmelnytsky, the Triumphal Arch in Kiev, and Kiev University's new campus

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<sup>816</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 6 April 1954, p. 1; 7 April, p. 1; 8 April, p. 1; 13 April, p. 1; 15 April, p. 1 (Academies of Sciences); 25 April 1954, p. 1 (concert). The scholarly sessions are described in more detail in "Iubileinye nauchnye sessii. posviashchennye 300-letiiu vossoedineniia Ukrainy s Rossiei," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 5 (1954): 184-86. On the *dekady*, see *Pravda* and *Radianska Ukraina*, 6-18 May 1954.

<sup>817</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 22 May 1954, p. 1; 23 May 1954, pp. 2-4 (speech).

<sup>818</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3608, 3611, 3612; TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 8, spr. 10238. Some addresses were eventually published in *Radianska Ukraina*, 27 May 1954, p. 2; 29 May 1954, p. 2.

<sup>819</sup> *Vechirni Kyiv*, 24 May 1954, pp. 1, 3 (parade); 20 May 1954, p. 3 (Molotov district); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3600, ark. 58-59; spr. 3636, ark. 6-7 (Khmelko).

<sup>820</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3630, ark. 19-22.

in the city's suburbs.<sup>821</sup> (None of the projects was completed during the 1950s.) Innumerable parades, speeches, receptions, concerts, and lectures were held in all Ukrainian oblasts. Local celebrations highlighted the official discourse's use of a new term to define the jubilee—*natsionalne sviato* or *natsionalnyi prazdnik* (national holiday). A rarity in the Soviet catalogue of proletarian holidays, this "ethnic" designation did not appear in the *Theses*, but was used widely in jubilee propaganda materials. *Radianska Ukraina* published the editorial "The Great National Holiday of All Peoples of the Soviet Union." Many Ukrainian oblasts used the term "national holiday" exclusively in the festive propaganda, although some stuck to the safer "popular holiday."<sup>822</sup>

To mark the anniversary, Russia and Ukraine exchanged symbolic gifts, including historical paintings, especially decorated boxes, vases, statues, carpets, and albums. Among the Ukrainian gifts were Khmelko's *Forever Together, Forever with the Russian People*, a tapestry version of Derehus's *The Pereiaslav Council*, numerous boxes and vases with portraits of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, and an imitation of the Cossack colonel's mace. (In addition, the Ukrainian authorities presented 18 Soviet marshals and generals with copies of the mace.) The list, however, also included such manifestly modern items as a TV set, a recorder, and a camera.<sup>823</sup> Russia responded with pseudo-antique caps, heavily decorated boxes, sculptures, and carpets, as well as some modern items. Other republics also presented gifts to both Russia and Ukraine.<sup>824</sup> After the celebration, State Historical Museums in Moscow and Kiev held exhibitions of the gifts representing a bewildering mix of historic pageant and Soviet modernity, itself allegedly an end result of the seventeenth-century union.<sup>825</sup>

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<sup>821</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3621, ark. 5; *Radianska Ukraina*, 25 May 1954, p. 1; 26 May, p. 1; 27 May, p. 1.

<sup>822</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 22 May 1954, p. 1; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 2247, ark. 18, 36; op. 46, spr. 6822, ark. 33.

<sup>823</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 16, spr. 74, ark. 104-11; op. 30, spr. 3622, ark. 1-48 (list and pictures); op. 16, spr. 74, ark. 111 (marshals). One mace cost as much as 5,601 roubles (*ibid.*, op. 30, spr. 3613, ark. 46).

<sup>824</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3623, ark. 1-19 (gifts to Ukraine).

<sup>825</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3601, ark. 87-90; spr. 3641, ark. 138-39; *Radianske mystetstvo*, 9 June 1954, p. 1 (Kiev); *Literaturna hazeta*, 1 July 1954, p. 1 (Moscow).

The Ukrainian ideologues had proposed that the city of Kiev and the Ukrainian Republic be honored with the Order of Lenin. This recommendation was implemented, but Moscow toned down the accolade suggested for Kiev. The Ukrainians had suggested presenting the award "on the occasion of the tercentenary of Ukraine's reunification with Russia and given Kiev's great historical role as the most ancient city of Rus'." Instead, the decree credited Kiev for its "prominent role in the history of the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian peoples."<sup>826</sup> On 29 May, the Russian Federation also received the Order of Lenin on the occasion of the Tercentenary.<sup>827</sup>

In the last days of May, the celebrations moved to Moscow. The Russian Republic's Supreme Council opened its jubilee session on 29 May, and military and civic parades took place at Red Square the next day.<sup>828</sup> The Moscow festivities added a new symbolic dimension to the holiday; it was the first time that the Soviet authorities officially celebrated the anniversary of a tsarist territorial acquisition as a national holiday. Speakers in both Moscow and Kiev completely suppressed the class analysis of the Pereiaslav union and presented the Russian and Ukrainian nations as subjects of history.

### **The Ukrainian National Holiday**

The Tercentenary of Pereiaslav also provided Ukrainians with an opportunity to celebrate their historical patrimony. Aside from the annual Shevchenko days (the poet's birthday on 9 March and the day of his reburial in Ukraine on 22 June), no specifically Ukrainian holidays were observed in the Soviet Union. The principal component of the traditional national myth, Cossack glory, remained largely suppressed in the official discourse. Despite all the bows to the elder Russian brother, the Tercentenary reestablished the Cossack past as the Ukrainians' symbolic heritage. Ukraine's national past became as legitimate a subject of the celebration as the historic Ukrainian-Russian friendship.

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<sup>826</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 8, spr. 98882, ark. 22; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 3504, ark. 60 (Ukrainian proposal); GARF, f. 7523, op. 72, d. 63, l. 2; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 3504, ark. 65; *Radianska Ukraina*, 23 May 1954, p. 1 (final text).

<sup>827</sup> GARF, f. 7523, op. 72, d. 66, l. 72.

<sup>828</sup> *Pravda*, 30 May 1954, pp. 1-2; 31 May 1954, pp. 1-2.

Although the *Theses* and other principal ideological pronouncements of 1954 did not restore the wartime expression "the great Ukrainian people," Thesis One indicated that it was permissible to speak of the "two great fraternal Slavic peoples," the Russians and the Ukrainians. The republican functionaries occasionally used this term in their festive speeches.<sup>829</sup> In addition to the traditional talk of Ukrainian indebtedness to Russia for its guidance in the revolution, economy, science, and culture, Ukrainian functionaries also stressed Ukraine's contribution to the growth of Russian (and later Soviet) statehood, international prestige, economy, and culture.<sup>830</sup>

The celebration exalted Russian-Ukrainian relations as a model of the socialist friendship of peoples extended back into the past, a model applying not just to the peoples of the USSR, but possibly also to the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe. The press reported on the festive meetings, concerts, and lectures in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.<sup>831</sup> The Ukrainian functionaries planned to invite all leaders of the socialist camp—including Mao—to the festivities in Kiev.<sup>832</sup> In the end, Moscow approved the invitation only for the Polish delegation, but even this concession was at the time an unprecedented bilateral contact between a Soviet republic and an East European satellite.<sup>833</sup>

Ukraine's former master, Russia's traditional enemy, and a recent addition to the socialist camp, Poland represented a special case. The official Polish party newspaper, *Trybuna ludu*, marked the Tercentenary (18 January 1954) with an important editorial

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<sup>829</sup> *Tezisy*, 5; *Pravda*, 10 March 1954 (Kyrychenko). This fact is noted in John S. Reshetar, Jr., "The Significance of the Soviet Tercentenary of the Pereiaslav Treaty," *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.* 4, no. 3 (Winter-Spring 1955): 981-94, here 992-93.

<sup>830</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 23 May 1954, pp. 2-4; N. Podgorny [M. Pidhirny], "Sovetskaia Ukraina v bratskoi seme narodov SSSR," *Kommunist*, no. 8 (1954): 23; S. Chervonenko, "Velyke sviato druzhby narodiv," *Komunist Ukrainy*, no. 5 (1954): 30-42.

<sup>831</sup> See *Radianska Ukraina*, 16 January 1954, p. 4; 18 January, p. 4; 30 January, p. 4; 5 February, p. 4; 13 May, p. 4; 19 May, p. 4; 25 May, p. 4.

<sup>832</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 8, spr. 9880, ark. 34-38, 69-75.

<sup>833</sup> This visit was approved by a special resolution of the All-Union Central Committee of 24 April (TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3600, ark. 83-85). The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs elaborated a formal welcoming ceremony at Kiev Airport that included raising the state flags of Poland and Ukraine (ibid., spr. 3614, ark. 17).

summarized not only in the Soviet press, but even in the principal Soviet historical journal, *Voprosy istorii*. The editorial condemned traditional Polish historiography for not recognizing the Ukrainians as a separate people. While denouncing the aggressive Polish nobility, the newspaper claimed that the Polish peasants fought against their lords together with the Ukrainians.<sup>834</sup> This class interpretation did not quite fit the ethno-historical principle on which the new vision of the Russian-Ukrainian friendship was based, so the head of the Polish delegation, deputy chairman of the State Council, Stefan Ignar, corrected it in his speech in Kiev. He condemned the Polish magnates for betraying the tradition initiated at the Battle at Grunewald (1410), that is, the tradition of the (ethnic) Slavic alliance against foreign invaders.<sup>835</sup>

The Polish leadership effectively used the Tercentenary to deconstruct their nation's traditional historical mythology and establish the historic roots of new Polish-Ukrainian-Russian friendship. As the archives show, the initiative to participate in the celebrations in the Soviet Union belonged to the Polish side: the Polish ambassador in Moscow inquired at the Soviet Foreign Ministry whether Poland's participation would be desirable.<sup>836</sup> The Polish party leader Boleslaw Bierut, in his speech at the Second Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party, stressed the new Polish friendship with Ukraine; Korniiichuk attended as a guest and was pleased to report his impressions at the XVIIIth congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine.<sup>837</sup> Bierut also became the only foreign dignitary who sent his salutatory telegram directly to Kiev.<sup>838</sup>

The Tercentenary thus affirmed the Ukrainian historical mythology's victory over the opposing Polish myths. More importantly, the festivities restored the Cossack past to

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<sup>834</sup> "Polskaia gazeta 'Trybuna ludu' o znachenii vossoedinenia Ukrainy s Rossiei dlia polskogo naroda," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 5 (1954): 186-88; *Radianska Ukraina*, 19 January 1954, p. 4; 13 May 1954, p. 4. In 1949, *Voprosy istorii* had criticized Polish school textbooks for their colonialist, nationalistic portrayal of Ukraine and the Khmelnytsky War (N. Dairi, "Oshibochnye uchebniki," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 4 [1949]: 99-104).

<sup>835</sup> *Radianska Ukraina*, 24 May 1954, pp. 5-6.

<sup>836</sup> TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 52, ll. 114-15.

<sup>837</sup> *XVIII zizd*, 127-28.

<sup>838</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3609, ark. 203.

its wartime position at the heart of the Ukrainian historical imagination. As the rest of this chapter will show, the authorities sponsored numerous scholarly, literary, and artistic works about the Cossack period; historic monuments were restored and new memorials unveiled. However, the degree to which questions of Cossack heritage came to occupy the attention of the highest Ukrainian leadership is astonishing.

In early 1954, the Ukrainian Politburo ordered a search for the authentic Cossack insignia and banners, which the party document designated as the "historic patrimony (*relikvii*) of the Ukrainian people." The Cossack artifacts had been kept in the Russian museums until the revolution, when the Soviet government promised to return them to the Ukrainian people. Nevertheless, as late as 1932, only a few items—regimental banners, maces, Khmelnytsky's sabre, historic documents—had been handed over. Most of the collection was destroyed or disappeared during the evacuation in 1941, when German bombs hit the train of the Kharkiv Historical Museum. The museum still possessed one seventeenth-century banner, a cup of Hetman Samoilovych, and the charred head of the hetman's mace. Propaganda Secretary Nazarenko reported the results to First Secretary Kyrychenko, and the matter was dropped.<sup>839</sup> The remnants were apparently not enough for a representative exhibition, but the Ukrainian museums held sufficient other Cossack artifacts for this purpose. Given previous requests for Ukrainian classical writers' manuscripts held in Russia, one can speculate that the Ukrainian functionaries wanted to check whether the insignia had ever been transferred to their republic.

At about the same time, the Central Committee secretariat investigated the question of where Bohdan Khmelnytsky was born. An attentive district-level functionary in Kirovohrad oblast, a certain V. Horbenko, noticed that the Central Committee resolution of 6 November 1953 spoke of Chyhyryn as the hetman's birthplace, while the 1943 decree on renaming Pereiaslav as Pereiaslav-Khmelnytsky held that the hetman was born in that city, and so said the Great Soviet Encyclopedia. The Institute of History reported that dissenting sources did not allow for a definite conclusion, but Chyhyryn or

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<sup>839</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3640, ark. 17-20; spr. 3655, ark. 26-30; TsDAVOV, f. 5116, op. 10, spr. 16, ark. 61-65.



a nearby village, Subotiv, seemed a likely place. The secretaries of the Central Committee considered the matter twice: on 1 December 1953, when the party leadership requested scholarly expertise, and in early 1954, when the party bosses, according to the minutes, "concluded that the most probable birthplace of Bohdan Khmelnytsky was Chyhyryn or Subotiv."<sup>840</sup> Aside from "establishing" the birthplace of the nation's father, the resolution had immediate practical significance. With the Tercentenary looming large, the state financed the restoration of the historic monuments in Chyhyryn and Subotiv.

As the wave of historical articles overwhelmed the republican media, the Ukrainian ideologues struggled to ensure all the texts' ideological appropriateness. In December 1953, the official Russian-language paper *Pravda Ukrainy* published "The Holiday of All the People," an article by the writer Liubomyr Dmyterko. In this article, which was also read on the radio, Dmyterko pontificated: "The reunification of Ukraine with Russia that occurred three hundred years ago became an event of worldwide importance that defined the lines along which our country and all humankind developed." The Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee noted that this statement contradicted the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of history and was characteristic of other "serious mistakes" found in Ukrainian propaganda writings. However, Nazarenko shelved the Department's proposal to condemn Dmyterko in a special Central Committee resolution.<sup>841</sup>

Nevertheless, the bureaucrats were concerned with the media's preoccupation with the Ukrainian past. Another Central Committee internal memo warned in February 1954:

The majority of propaganda articles depict the past, narrating in detail how Bohdan Khmelnytsky received the Muscovite officials and what wine he offered them. Only in passing do these articles discuss the fruits of the unbreakable friendship among the peoples of our country or mention the fact that, because of this friendship, the Ukrainian people preserved themselves as a nation (*natsiia*), reached impressive achievements in all fields of communist construction, and

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<sup>840</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 3504, ark. 173-82; op. 30, spr. 3672, ark. 6-36; NAIU, op. 1, spr. 407, ark. 1-22.

<sup>841</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3599, ark. 104-11 (Dmyterko's mistakes); spr. 3640, ark. 118 (read on the radio).

entered the international scene.<sup>842</sup>

Again, however, Nazarenko took no action. The valorization of the Ukrainian Cossack past could not be stigmatized precisely because it connected Ukrainian mythology to the grand narrative of Russian history. This connection also meant, of course, that paeans to Ukrainian glory and statehood had to be subordinated to the reunification myth. In January 1954, the apparatus of the Central Committee censored a proposed public lecture topic that failed to make the connection clear: "The Ukrainian People's Struggle for the Creation of Their Statehood during the War of Liberation (1648-1654)."<sup>843</sup>

Some Ukrainian reactions to the *Theses* demonstrated, nevertheless, that local intellectuals could use this official pronouncement on the Russian-Ukrainian friendship as a tool to promote their national past. A senior researcher at the Institute of Ukrainian Literature, a certain Savchenko, stated that the *Theses* did not "sufficiently elucidate the role of the progressive Ukrainian cultural figures" and did not even mention such classical writers as Skovoroda, Franko, Hrabovsky, Kotsiubynsky, and Lesia Ukrainka. At the Institute of History, the researcher Oleksii Voina subtly questioned the binary opposition of "elder brother-younger brother" by restoring the third historical actor. According to Voina, the document did not stress the historic "importance of the cooperation among the Russian, Ukrainian, and Polish peoples." At Drohobych Pedagogical Institute, a group of students was disappointed that the *Theses* did not restore the controversial Hetman Sahaidachny to the Ukrainian historical pantheon: "The Institute's students Comrades Dyky, Puchkovsky, Kochmar, and others, while approving the *Theses*, expressed the wish to see clarified the role of Hetman Sahaidachny—a native of Sambir district of Drohobych oblast—during the Ukrainian people's struggle for their liberation."<sup>844</sup> The Ukrainian functionaries carefully edited their reports on the popular reaction to the *Theses*. The selected feedback they were forwarding to Moscow created the impression that

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<sup>842</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3644, ark. 1.

<sup>843</sup> Ibid., spr. 3635, ark. 46.

<sup>844</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 46, spr. 6822, ark. 105 (Savchenko, Voina), 40 (students).

nobody had ever doubted the document's perfection.<sup>845</sup>

Finally, Soviet ideologues had been well aware of the furious counter-propaganda campaign in the emigre nationalist press. In early 1954, the anti-Soviet wing of the Ukrainian diaspora organized numerous publications, meetings, and marches protesting "300 years of Russian oppression" or celebrating the tercentenary of "struggle against Muscovite occupants."<sup>846</sup> As the nationalist insurgency had been largely suppressed by 1954, the party authorities' concern could not be attributed to a serious fear of the propaganda war in Soviet Ukraine. However, the "ethnic" historical mythology presumed its acceptance by all parts of the Ukrainian nation, including the diaspora. To this effect, the bureaucrats in Moscow and Kiev observed with satisfaction how "progressive" Ukrainians and Russians in Canada were organizing festive meetings and concerts to mark the Tercentenary. The Canadian festivities were even reported to Khrushchev.<sup>847</sup> A representative delegation of pro-Soviet Ukrainian Canadians was invited to the celebrations in Kiev. Its head, Ivan Boichuk (John Boyd), gave a speech at the jubilee session of the Supreme Council, claiming that progressive Ukrainians in all countries honored the Tercentenary as their national holiday.<sup>848</sup>

## History in an Ethnic Key

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<sup>845</sup> TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 52, ll. 101-07 (report to Khrushchev); TsDAHO, 1, op. 46, spr. 6822, ark. 1-7 (draft).

<sup>846</sup> See, for example, "Declaration of Ukrainian Americans," *The Ukrainian Review* 1, no. 1 (December 1954): 68-69; *Three Centuries of Struggle: Addresses on the Occasion of the 300th Anniversary of the Treaty of Pereiaslav between Ukraine and Russia* (Winnipeg: Ukrainian Canadian Committee, 1954); *Pereiaslavska lehenda* (London: Komitet dlia vidznachennia 300-littia borotby Ukrainy proty Moskovshchyny, 1954); *Novyi shliakh* (Toronto), 28 May 1954, p. 2; 31 May, pp. 2-3; 28 May, pp. 4-6. In Canada, the biggest rallies of protest took place in Winnipeg on 20 June and Toronto on 27 June (*Ukrainskyi holos* [Winnipeg], 23 June 1954, p. 1; *Homin Ukrainy* [Toronto], 17 July 1954, p. 2).

<sup>847</sup> TsKHSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 52, ll. 131-32; op. 17, d. 470, ll. 137-39 (reports to Khrushchev); GARF, f. 6646, op. 1, d. 355, ll. 1-26 (preparatory material by the Soviet Slavic Committee); d. 356, ll. 1-44 (reports on emigre nationalists).

<sup>848</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 3504, ark. 83 (delegation); *Radianska Ukraina*, 24 May 1954, p. 6 (Boyd). The Presidium of the CP(b)U Central Committee decided to present each member of the Canadian delegation with an expensive camera, traditional embroidered Ukrainian shirt and blouse, and a gift set of liquor, tobacco, and sausage (TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3600, ark. 134).

The *Theses* did not impose on Ukrainian historiography an alien interpretive model; rather, this document enshrined the approach that Ukrainian ideologues and intellectuals had been developing for at least a decade. Installing Russian-Ukrainian friendship as the main theme of the Ukrainian historical process could be achieved only by rehabilitating nations as subjects of history. Conversely, the ethnic narrative of Ukrainian history could be rehabilitated only within the framework of the Russian-Ukrainian historic friendship. The *Theses* and other official pronouncements of the time thus had an inherently double-edged nature. They both restored the Ukrainian nation as a historical agent and limited its agency by acknowledging the lead of the Russian elder brother.

The *Theses* affirmed that the Russians and the Ukrainians had descended from the common Old Rus' nationality and, despite their ethnic distinctiveness, had always harbored fraternal sentiments. The third thesis attempted the difficult trick of connecting the themes of Ukrainian ethnic revival and the reunification with the Russian brethren. In the early modern period, the Ukrainian people constantly fought "against the yoke of alien oppressors, for their freedom and independence, and at the same time, for reunification with Russia." The reunification did not result in the loss of Ukrainian ethnic identity or historical agency. On the contrary, the sixth thesis explained that the Russian people became the Ukrainians' "great ally, faithful friend, and defender in the struggle for [the Ukrainians'] social and national liberation."<sup>849</sup>

Ukrainian history had not yet fulfilled its teleological purpose with the "reunification" of 1654. Reinstalling the Ukrainian nation as a subject of history inescapably meant returning to the Hegelian linear progression of each ethnos toward a nation-state. According to the tenth thesis, the Russian brother was actually assisting the Ukrainian struggle for national independence:

Despite the reactionary tsarist policy of harsh colonial oppression of nationalities, the best sons of the Russian people had always recognized Ukraine's right to national independence. Together with progressive Ukrainian activists, they fought against the shameful policy of setting the peoples of Russia against each other that

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<sup>849</sup> *Tezisy*, 5, 11.

was conducted by the Russian and Ukrainian landlords and bourgeoisie, as well as their underlings, [Russian] great-power chauvinists and Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists. While always recognizing the Ukrainian people's right to free national development, the Russian revolutionaries connected it to the overthrow of tsarism and the liberation of the Russian, Ukrainian, and other peoples of our country.<sup>850</sup>

In this scheme, the October Revolution appeared to have been an important landmark in the ethnic history of the Ukrainians. With help from their Russian brethren, they "achieved their age-long dream of establishing a truly free and sovereign national state occupying a prominent place in the family of Soviet republics." Moreover, in 1939, their membership in the Soviet family allowed Ukrainians to unite all their ethnic lands in one polity, which became "one of the largest states in Europe" with economic powers surpassing those of France or Italy. World War II confirmed that Ukraine needed the union with Russia and other Soviet republics to defend itself.<sup>851</sup>

The *Theses* thus essentially sanctified the narrative of Ukrainian history in which the nation, rather than classes, appeared as the primary historical agent and the nation-state as the teleological purpose of historical progress. A flood of popular and semi-popular articles reiterated the *Theses* without adding much of original thought.<sup>852</sup>

The Tercentenary was marked by the publication of an impressive number of historical works. Speaking at the XVIIth congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party in September 1952, First Secretary Melnikov called on the republic's scholars to show in their works the "historical importance that the Ukrainian people's friendship and brotherly relations with the great Russian people had for the fortunes of Ukraine."<sup>853</sup> In fact, since January 1952, historians had already been working on two major projects: a three-volume

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<sup>850</sup> *Tezisy*, 13.

<sup>851</sup> *Tezisy*, 18 (Thesis Fourteen), 23 (Thesis Nineteen), 25 (Thesis Twenty).

<sup>852</sup> See, for example, M. Tikhomirov and A. Likholat [Lykholat], "Trekhsotletie vossoedineniia Ukrainy s Rossiei," *Kommunist*, no. 1 (1954): 52-69; F. Shevchenko, "Velyka druzhba dvokh bratnikh narodiv," *Komunist Ukrainy*, no. 1 (1954): 14-26; *Radianska Ukraina*, 15 January 1954, p. 1; 18 January, p. 1; 29 January, pp. 3-4.

<sup>853</sup> *XVII zizd Komunistychnoi partii (bilshovyktiv) Ukrainy 23-27 veresnia 1952 r.: Materialy zizdu* (Kiev: Derzhpolityvydav URSR, 1953), p. 66.

collection of documents about the War of Liberation and a collectively-written book, "The Historical Importance of Ukraine's Incorporation into Russia." The Institute of History also envisaged the preparation of several popular pamphlets and the publication of Ivan Krypiakievych's monumental biography of Khmelnytsky, then still in preparation. In connection with the first two projects, the Academy of Sciences petitioned the authorities to arrange a research trip to Poland for two historians, Oleksii Kasymenko and Pavlo Pavliuk. (As no precedents existed for foreign research trips by Ukrainian historians, the republic's authorities shelved this request.)<sup>854</sup>

*The History of the Ukrainian SSR*, Volume One, became the first major jubilee book. Although it went to print before the publication of the *Theses*, the *History* displayed basically the same approach to the Ukrainian past. It opened with a statement, "The Ukrainian people have their centuries-old heroic history, connected inseparably with the history of the great Russian people and other peoples of our Fatherland." The monumental 800-page survey paid considerable attention to the development of "productive forces," but the story of the nation-state remained the principal narrative line. The text extolled Kievan Rus'—a common heritage of Ukrainians, Russians, and Belarusians—as the "biggest and mightiest state in medieval Europe."<sup>855</sup> The Pereiaslav Treaty reunited "two great Slavic peoples." By joining Russia, the Ukrainians did not endanger their ethnic identity; on the contrary, this act "furthered the development of the Ukrainian nationality and its transformation into a nation."<sup>856</sup>

Other jubilee publications of 1953-54 shared this ethnic interpretation of Ukrainian history. Ivan Boiko's popular pamphlet *The Tercentenary of Ukraine's Reunification with Russia*, which had an impressive print run of 300,000 in Ukrainian and 230,000 in Russian, spoke of the "great national holiday of two great Slavic people" long before the

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<sup>854</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3597, ark. 1, 7, 14-16.

<sup>855</sup> *Istoriia* (1953), 5 (opening sentence), 84 (Kievan Rus').

<sup>856</sup> *Ibid.*, 258, 259. The section on the union's importance resembles the text of the *Theses* so closely that one suspects that the authors made last-minute changes to the *History* proofs after the party document appeared in the press in mid-January 1954. On the other hand, the Ukrainian historians had participated in the preparation of the *Theses* and could use in the *History* variants of their own contributions.

publication of the *Theses*. Like many other writers, Boiko praised such "wonderful fruits" of the Russian-Ukrainian friendship as Ukrainian statehood and the reunification of all Ukrainian lands in one polity.<sup>857</sup> The authors of the collection *The Age-Long Friendship of the Russian and Ukrainian Peoples* similarly spoke of *two* great nations, at the same time extolling Kievan Rus' as a state that had played a prominent role in *world* history and boasting that Ukraine's achievements allegedly had "universal significance (*vsesvitnoistorychni*)." The union between Russia and Ukraine resulted in a notable strengthening of the former's international authority and prestige. As for the Ukrainians, they were ultimately rewarded with their "sovereign nationhood" within the USSR.<sup>858</sup>

The Tercentenary prompted the final parole of Professor Ivan Krypiakevych, the only remaining Ukrainian authority on the Khmelnytsky period. In 1953, the former "nationalist" and "fascist" published such ideologically sound works as *The Contacts between Western Ukraine and Russia until the Mid-Seventeenth Century* and "Bohdan Khmelnytsky as an Advocate of Ukraine's Reunification with Russia." In the same year, he was promoted to the directorship of the Institute of Social Sciences in Lviv.<sup>859</sup> Krypiakevych's monumental biography of Khmelnytsky appeared in a luxurious edition in 1954. The reviewers in Kiev found many ideas of this book disturbing, exceeding the limits of the established compromise between the national myth and Russian "guidance." The colleagues denounced as idealization of the Cossacks Krypiakevych's designation of them as a "central progressive force" in early modern Ukraine. Krypiakevych failed to

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<sup>857</sup> I. D. Boiko, *300 rokiv vozziednannia Ukrainy z Rosiieiu* (Kiev: Tovarystvo dlia poshyrennia politychnykh i naukovykh znan URSS, 1953), p. 1; I. D. Boiko, *300-letie vossoedineniia Ukrainy s Rossiiei* (Moscow: Obshchestvo "Znanie," 1954), p. 1. The Ukrainian version went to print on 26 November 1953.

<sup>858</sup> O. K. Kasymenko, ed., *Vikovichna druzhba rosiiskoho i ukrainskoho narodiv: Zbirnyk statei prysviachenykh 300-richnomu iuvileiu vozziednannia Ukrainy z Rosiieiu (1654-1954)* (Kiev: Radianska shkola, 1954), pp. 7, 113 (great), 17 (benefits for Russia), 35, 179, 216 (Ukrainian statehood), 52 (Kievan Rus'), 348 (global significance). Compare similar interpretations in V. A. Diadychenko, O. K. Kasymenko, and F. P. Shevchenko, eds., *Vyzvolna viina 1648-1654 rr. i vozziednannia Ukrainy z Rosiieiu* (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo AN URSS, 1954); D. I. Myshko, "Pereiaslavskaia rada 1654 goda," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 12 (1953): 19-28; and V. A. Golobutsky [Holobutsky], "Rossiia i Osvoboditelnaia voina ukrainskogo naroda 1648-1654 godov," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 1 (1954): 80-95.

<sup>859</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3652, ark. 58, 60; I. P. Krypiakevych, *Zviazky Zakhidnoi Ukrainy z Rosiieiu do seredyny XVII st.* (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo AN URSS, 1953).

stress that Khmelnytsky wanted to reunite Ukraine with Russia from the very first days of the war. Moreover, he suggested that the Cossacks could have defeated the Poles on their own, while the reviewers felt that this could have happened only with Russian assistance. Finally, Krypiakevych failed to provide a detailed critique of bourgeois-nationalist concepts and did not sufficiently elaborate on the Ukrainians' ethnic and historic proximity to the Muscovites.<sup>860</sup>

On a related note, the Ukrainian historian Vadym Diadychenko criticized in print his colleague Mykola Marchenko for referring in his pamphlet to the "Ukrainian state" in Khmelnytsky's time. According to the reviewer, one could speak only of the "elements of statehood."<sup>861</sup> At the same time, the Ukrainian intellectuals were sensitive to the infringement on their patrimony within the officially-accepted limits. When the publisher of one pamphlet inadvertently changed the designation of Kievan Rus' from "Old Rus' state" to "old Russian state," a scandal resulted.<sup>862</sup>

The Ukrainian historians also used the Tercentenary to secure financing for a publication of a large corpus of historical documents, the three-volume collection *The Reunification of Ukraine with Russia*. Despite its rather narrow title, this monumental publication began with documents from 1620 and provided an unprecedented insight into the Cossack epoch. More than half of the documents in the collection (466 out of 747) were published for the first time.<sup>863</sup>

The collection was a result of painstaking work in Ukrainian and Russian archives. In the process, the Ukrainian historians requested that the Lenin Library manuscript division return to Ukraine six thousand files containing the seventeenth- and eighteenth-

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<sup>860</sup> I. P. Krypiakevych, *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo AN URSS, 1954); I. Boiko and K. Huslysty, "Monohrafiia pro Bohdana Khmelnytskoho," *Komunist Ukrainy*, no. 11 (1954): 76-80.

<sup>861</sup> V. A. Diadichenko [Diadychenko], "Nauchno-populiarnaia literatura o vossoedinenii Ukrainy s Rossiei," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 4 (1954): 127-32, here 130-31.

<sup>862</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 4618, op. 1, spr. 218, ark. 10-11.

<sup>863</sup> *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei: Dokumenty i materialy v trekh tomakh* (Moscow: Izdatelstvo AN SSSR, 1953), vols. 1-3 and the following reviews: I. Boiko, K. Huslysty, B. Datsiuk, and S. Kalashnikova, "Sbornik dokumentov o vossoedinenii Ukrainy s Rossiei," *Kommunist*, no. 2 (1954): 108-16 and A. I. Kozachenko, "Tsennoe sobranie istochnikov po istorii vossoedineniia Ukrainy s Rossiei," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 5 (1954): 145-51. The numbers come from TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3599, ark. 7.



century documents pertaining to the history of Ukraine, documents that had been collected by the historian Mykola Markevych (Nikolai Markevich, 1804-1860). Nazarenko supported the request, but the Lenin Library secured the backing of the All-Union Central Committee and agreed to transfer only the microfilms.<sup>864</sup>

The Polish side, in contrast, proved eager to establish scholarly contacts with Ukrainian historians. In October 1953, Polish archivists sent to Kiev more than 2,500 microfilmed pages of historical documents on the Cossack period, many of which were subsequently published in the three-volume collection.<sup>865</sup> On 18 January 1954 (the day of the Tercentenary), the Polish side presented the Ukrainian republic with thirty original historical documents. In May, the delegation of the Polish Sejm brought as a gift another seventy-seven documents pertaining to Ukrainian history, including thirteen original decrees of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and one letter by Shevchenko.<sup>866</sup> Although the jubilee session of the Polish-Soviet Institute in Warsaw was held without Ukrainian participation, Moscow included Kasymenko in a three-person delegation of Soviet historians to the festive meeting of the Polish Academy of Sciences in November. Later in the same month, the director of the Institute of the History of the USSR in Moscow, Arkadii Sidorov, visited the Polish party leader Edward Ochab to discuss the preparation of the *History of Poland*. During the meeting, Ochab complained that "he [had] not seen the *History of Ukraine* yet." Polish historians also bemoaned the lack of scholarly contacts with their Ukrainian and Belarusian colleagues. As a result of these developments, Moscow ideologues for the first time raised the question of whether the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences should be allowed to send books and materials directly to Poland, as well as to arrange for its scholars to go there on research trips.<sup>867</sup>

The anniversary of such a major historical event as the Pereiaslav Treaty passed

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<sup>864</sup> NAIU, op. 1, spr. 352, ark. 1, 10-41 (search for documents); TsKHSD, f. 5, op. 17, d. 427, ll. 173-74 (Markevych's collection).

<sup>865</sup> TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 17, d. 470, ll. 125-28; "Khronikalnye zametki," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 5 (1954): 190-91; *Literaturna hazeta*, 3 December 1953, p. 4.

<sup>866</sup> NAIU, op. 1, spr. 478a, ark. 13-20 (January); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3629, ark. 1-13 (May).

<sup>867</sup> TsKHSD, f. 5, op. 17, d. 470, ll. 250-51, 273-77.

without causing any serious debate among Soviet historians. The speakers at the jubilee scholarly sessions all belaboured the *Theses*, but the sessions had been carefully planned by the ideology departments in Moscow and Kiev.<sup>868</sup> Only one incident with the *History of the Ukrainian SSR*, Volume One, highlighted the persistent tensions within the "friendship of peoples" paradigm.

Volume One generally received a good press. Both scholarly and political journals published highly positive reviews of the work, as did *Pravda*. At the XVIIIth congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party in March 1954, Nazarenko praised the book ex cathedra as a work demonstrating that the Ukrainians' past had been "connected inseparably with the history of the Russian people."<sup>869</sup> However, the first signs of political liberalization after Stalin's death emboldened those Ukrainian intellectuals who saw the *History* as a retreat from wartime ethnic patriotism. One of them, the decorated partisan commander and writer Petro Vershyhora, attacked the *History* in print.<sup>870</sup> In his article about the partisan movement that appeared in No. 4 (1954) of the Moscow literary journal *Oktiabr*, Vershyhora criticized the Ukrainian historians for not sufficiently glorifying the Cossacks as a "patriotic and freedom-loving element":

For example, an evasive *History of Ukraine* (Kiev: The Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences Press, 1953) is, in my opinion, a disgraceful attempt to write history with the history left out by portraying the people's development without the brightest page of their early life—a page embodying the creativity of the masses and, most of all, of the toiling peasantry, which expressed its patriotism in the Cossack partisan war. This book is an example that should not be followed, a

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<sup>868</sup> TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 17, d. 427, ll. 213-33; d. 469, l. 4; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 24, spr. 3506, ark. 4-7; TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 8, spr. 11378, ark. 13-17 (plans and reports).

<sup>869</sup> A. A. Zimin, V. D. Mochalov, and A. A. Novoselsky, "Tsennyi trud po istorii Ukrainskoi SSR," *Voprosy istorii*, no. 6 (1954): 128-32; Iu. Bilan, A. Butsyk, V. Kozynets, V. Kotov, and O. Koshyk, "Knyha pro slavne mynule ukrainskoho narodu," *Komunist Ukrainy*, no. 3 (1954): 70-80; *Pravda*, 18 April 1954, reprinted in *Radianska Ukraina*, 20 April 1954, pp. 2-3 (reviews); *XVIII zizd*, 156 (Nazarenko).

<sup>870</sup> Petro Vershyhora (1905-1963) before the war worked as a rank-and-file actor and assistant film director in Ukraine. The fortunes of war brought him into a large partisan detachment, where he unexpectedly rose through the ranks as a popular commander. Major-General and Hero of the Soviet Union at the war's end, Vershyhora turned to writing and earned a Stalin Prize for his novel *People with Good Conscience* (1946).

telling example of bureaucratic "double insurance" lacking the principal kernel of a historic study—patriotism.<sup>871</sup>

Vershyhora did not stop there. In April, he submitted to *Pravda* a dismissive article about the *History*, accusing the book of "watering down everything heroic in the history of the Ukrainian people." No wonder that Soviet readers continued to be attracted to the works of old "nationalist" historians: "I personally heard many times from our honest Soviet people, both in Ukraine and in Moscow, whose interest in the history of the fraternal commonwealth was ignited by the Tercentenary celebrations, that they were reading Hrushevsky, Kulish or, at least, Kostomarov, but not our Soviet historical works."<sup>872</sup>

Functionaries and historians united to rebuff the patriotic Ukrainian writer. Vershyhora was invited to the Central Committee headquarters in Moscow, where Rumiantsev and Lykholat denounced his views in the presence of four leading Russian historians (M. Tikhomirov, N. Druzhinin, A. Novoselskii, and A. Sidorov) and three Ukrainian specialists on the Cossacks (I. Boiko, V. Diadychenko, and K. Huslysty).<sup>873</sup> In addition, the reviews of the *History* in *Pravda* and *Voprosy istorii* cryptically referred to his "irresponsible riposte" in *Oktiabr*.<sup>874</sup> The survey itself was meanwhile nominated for the Stalin Prize.<sup>875</sup>

### People's History

As soon as the press published the *Theses* in January 1954, the party mobilized tens of thousands of activists for public readings of this document. In the city of Stalino (Donetsk), more than 17,000 propagandists read the *Theses* section by section at all industrial enterprises and organizations. A similar effort was under way in other Ukrainian

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<sup>871</sup> P. Vershyhora, "Bratia po oruzhiiu (O narodnykh formakh vooruzhennoi borby russkogo i ukrainskogo narodov)," *Oktiabr*, no. 4 (1954): 110-36, here 118.

<sup>872</sup> TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 17, d. 470, ll. 171-84, here 172, 177.

<sup>873</sup> *Ibid.*, l. 169.

<sup>874</sup> See note 83 above.

<sup>875</sup> NAIU, op. 1, spr. 467, ark. 1-16.

cities and villages.<sup>876</sup> This curious one-day operation was part of a larger lecturing campaign occurring throughout the Soviet Union during 1953-54.

On 25 December 1953, the apparatus of the All-Union Central Committee instructed all oblast party committees to organize public lectures on the following topics: 1) "The Historical Importance of Ukraine's Reunification with Russia," 2) "The Friendship of Peoples of the USSR as a Source of Its Strength," 3) "CPSU as a Force that Leads and Inspires the Friendship of Peoples," 4) "The Triumph of the Leninist-Stalinist Nationalities Policy," 5) "The Ukrainian Socialist Nation in the Fraternal Commonwealth of Soviet Peoples," and 6) "The Fraternal Cooperation of the Peoples of the USSR in the Communist Construction."<sup>877</sup> However, the central bureaucrats issued this directive late, when the lecturing campaign was already under way in many localities, and lecture topics in Ukraine gave much greater emphasis to the national history.

The Ukrainian branch of the Society for Promotion of Political and Scholarly Learning (later renamed the Knowledge Society, *Obshchestvo "Znanie"*) began as early as May 1953 to offer mass lectures on the Tercentenary. The most popular topics included "The Historic Importance of Ukraine's Reunification with Russia," "The Ukrainian People's War of Liberation and the Reunification of Ukraine with Russia," and "Bohdan Khmelnytsky as a Prominent Statesman and Military Leader." Leading specialists of the Institute of History developed model lectures that were sent to provincial branches. By the end of 1954, the Society had organized 35,000 lectures that were usually given by professional historians.<sup>878</sup> After receiving Moscow's six prescribed topics, the Ukrainian party ideologues developed their own list of thirty-two topics including several lectures on the War of Liberation and Khmelnytsky, as well as "The Zaporozhian [Cossack] Host and Its Role in the Ukrainian People's Struggle for Liberation," a subject that had not

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<sup>876</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3618, ark. 3 (Stalino); *Radianska Ukraina*, 14 January 1954, p. 1; 15 January, p. 1 (Kiev and other regions).

<sup>877</sup> TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 16, d. 596, ll. 77-78.

<sup>878</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 4618, op. 1, spr. 177, ark. 14 (May 1953); spr. 218, ark. 1-5 (topics and authors); spr. 196, ark. 28 (35,000 lectures).

been offered since the war.<sup>879</sup> Furthermore, local party authorities and historians developed their own lectures or pet topics. In Lviv, Krypiakevych toured the factories, lecturing the workers on "Bohdan Khmelnytsky as an Exponent of the Ukrainian People's Striving to Reunite with Russia." In Dnipropetrovsk oblast, of all the approved topics, "The Pereiaslav Council" seemed to have been the most popular. Elsewhere in Ukraine, the lecture campaign emphasized history, rather than the Soviet present.<sup>880</sup>

Not surprisingly, this campaign stimulated the Ukrainian public's interest in the national past. The republican bureaucrats did not publicize the questions that the audiences were asking after the lectures or after the reading of the *Theses*. In Pidhaitsi district of Ternopil oblast, the questions were: "Why is Ukraine called Ukraine?," "When did Ukraine organize itself as a nation (*natsiia*)?," and "How many times did Khmelnytsky send his ambassadors to Moscow?" Typical questions asked after the Knowledge Society lectures included: "What other issues, aside from the reunification, were considered at the Pereiaslav Council?," "Why do we speak of 'reunification', rather than 'incorporation'?", "Why did Shevchenko call Bohdan Khmelnytsky an 'unwise son' [of Ukraine] and speak of him negatively in certain poems?"<sup>881</sup>

Some contemporaries hailed the *Theses* for providing schoolteachers and college history instructors with clear guidelines in Ukrainian history. The teacher Kobylfa from Bobrynetsky district of Kirovohrad oblast announced at a festive conference: "The Central Committee's *Theses* unmasked the bourgeois theories and put an end to idle talk about Ukraine's reunification with Russia." A middle-rank ideologue from Chernivtsi oblast, a certain Fesenko, specified who had been confused about the proper appraisal of Pereiaslav: "The *Theses* about the Tercentenary of Ukraine's Reunification with Russia put an end to the different interpretations of this problem by the instructors in educational

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<sup>879</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3626, ark. 13-16.

<sup>880</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 2247, ark. 1-141 (Krypiakevych on ark. 16); op. 30, spr. 3618, ark. 24-25 (Dnipropetrovsk oblast).

<sup>881</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 46, spr. 6822, ark. 83; op. 30, spr. 3626, ark. 18-19. None of these questions were relayed to Moscow, but when the instructor of the Ukrainian Knowledge Society I. V. Vakhutynsky blurted out that "Kievans should not obey Moscow's orders," this indiscretion was reported all the way up to the Central Committee secretary Pospelov (TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 16, d. 596, l. 79).

institutions." According to the teacher Kolesnyk from Kirovohrad, the *Theses* revealed to him and his colleagues that the "need to reunite Ukraine with Russia had represented the law governing all the previous history of the two fraternal peoples."<sup>882</sup>

The discovery of this new and distinctly un-Marxist law of human development prompted the preparation of new methodological instructions for Ukrainian teachers. Even before the inauguration of the *Theses*, the republican pedagogical journal *Radianska shkola* had asked them to update the interpretations found in the standard textbook:

The textbook of the History of the USSR for Grade Eight, edited by Professor A. M. Pankratova, presents the Ukrainian people's War of Liberation that began in the spring of 1648 under the leadership of the prominent statesman and military leader, intelligent and far-sighted politician Bohdan Khmelnytsky, as a war against "landlords' oppression and Polish power." In reality, the Ukrainian peasantry, which represented the main force of the liberation movement, fought not only against feudal oppression in all its forms and manifestations, but also for national independence (*za natsionalnu nezalezhnist*). A teacher should stress that, in the course of the War of Liberation, it was precisely this factor that contributed to the Ukrainian people's increasingly insistent demands for reunification with the Russian people.<sup>883</sup>

With the *Theses'* publication in January 1954, numerous conferences, methodological seminars, and articles in the teachers' newspaper *Radianska osvita* made sure that the teachers adopted the "ethnic" model of the Russian-Ukrainian friendship—and the national history.<sup>884</sup>

The Tercentenary also provided the Ukrainian authorities with an opportunity to update the official pantheon of monuments and memorials. What Soviet discourse termed "monumental propaganda" usually accurately reflected the evolving official notions of historic patrimony, but the archival materials on the Tercentenary enable researchers to

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<sup>882</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 46, spr. 6822, ark. 53 (Kobyfa, Kolesnyk), 104 (Fesenko).

<sup>883</sup> O. O. Ivanov, "Istorychne znachennia vozziednannia Ukrainy z Rosieiu," *Radianska shkola*, no. 9 (1953): 19-28, here 22-23.

<sup>884</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 73, spr. 672, ark. 33-36; op. 30, spr. 3643, ark. 24-26; *Radianska osvita*, 14 January 1954, pp. 2-3; 18 January, p. 2; 30 January, p. 3; 17 April, p. 3; 22 May, p. 4.

separate the input of the Ukrainian intellectuals, oblast functionaries, and individual enthusiasts. Already in 1952, the republic's Academy of Architecture proposed erecting a monument to Khmelnytsky in Pereiaslav-Khmelnytsky. The Ukrainian Committee on Cultural and Educational Institutions suggested inspecting historic places and buildings from the times of the Khmelnytsky War, restoring them, and providing them with obelisks or memorial plaques.<sup>885</sup>

The local authorities and intellectuals zealously elaborated upon these proposals. (In fact, the Committee's suggestion was probably formulated by Kievan historians, who usually served as this organization's consultants.<sup>886</sup>) In April 1953, the Volhyn oblast sent the first local feedback requesting the construction of a monument to Khmelnytsky and an obelisk to the fallen Cossacks at the site of the Battle at Berestechko. The Institute of Architecture proposed restoring the church in Subotiv where Hetman Khmelnytsky was buried and installing there a luxurious symbolic sarcophagus.<sup>887</sup> Other oblasts and institutions followed suit. In November 1953, the Institute of History submitted a list of twenty-five sites of battles and other important events of the War of Liberation where obelisks could be constructed or memorial plaques placed. Later in the same month, the writer Ivan Le supported this idea at the writers' conference in Kiev. Zaporizhzhia oblast wanted to build an obelisk to the Zaporozhian Host on its famous seat, the Dnieper island of Khortytsia. Dnipropetrovsk oblast requested four obelisks and a monument on the grave of Ivan Sirko. Lviv authorities planned to install four memorial plaques in the city and enlisted Krypiakevych to prepare their texts. A railway employee from Zhmerynka, Hrushchynsky, proposed that Vinnytsia erect a monument to Colonel Bohun "for his services to the Ukrainian people." Hrushchynsky himself drew a sketch of the statue. Moreover, as a head of the material management section of the Zhmerynka station, he

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<sup>885</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3597, ark. 43-44, 52.

<sup>886</sup> See Kot, *Okhorona, vykorystannia*, 157-58.

<sup>887</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 8, spr. 9486, ark. 20-21 (Volhyn), 26-27 (Subotiv). That was not the original wooden church, but a later brick structure under the same name and in the same place. Also, Khmelnytsky's ashes had been missing for almost 300 years.

assured the party ideologues that the proper pedestal was already available.<sup>888</sup>

Some local functionaries did not wait for an authorization from Kiev. The executive of the Kirovohrad oblast Soviet financed the production of the pedestal for the Khmelnytsky statue, which the Ministry of Culture had not approved. In the end, the Ministry refused to reimburse the Soviet the 40,000 rubles spent on the pedestal. Citing the lack of finances, the republican bureaucrats denied requests for a Khmelnytsky monument in Korsun-Shevchenkivskiyi and Krolevets.<sup>889</sup> The Uman authorities supported their plea for a monument by referring to the local museum's materials, the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, and even Rybak's novel *The Pereiaslav Council*. They correctly pointed out that Khmelnytsky had visited their city, but the Central Committee denied their request nevertheless.<sup>890</sup>

The number of requests and the ideologues' reaction suggest that the local functionaries wanted to distinguish themselves as the promoters of the newly rediscovered Ukrainian patriotism, while Kiev attempted to check the growth of Khmelnytsky cult, wary of the potential accusation of abetting nationalism. At least in two cases, the Central Committee turned down proposals for Khmelnytsky monuments when sculptures were already available: in Stanyslaviv (since 1956, Ivano-Frankivsk) and Cherkasy.<sup>891</sup> In one outstanding case, however, the Konotip branch of the Moscow-Kiev railway volunteered—and gained permission—to build a monument to Khmelnytsky at the Khutir Mykhailivskiyi station at the Russian-Ukrainian border, thus marking the first mile of Ukrainian territory with a statue of the nation's founding father.<sup>892</sup>

In April 1954, the Ukrainian leadership finally produced a list of approved

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<sup>888</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3640, ark. 54-70 (list); TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 8, spr. 11407, ark. 4-5 (Khortytsia); spr. 11406, ark. 48-49 (Dnipropetrovsk), 228-32 (Hrushchynsky); f. 5116, op. 10, spr. 16, ark. 22-24 (Lviv); *Literaturna hazeta*, 3 December 1953, p. 3 (Le). In the end, Kiev downgraded the obelisk on Khortytsia to a memorial plaque and a monument to Sirko to a mere tombstone on his grave (TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 8, spr. 9880, ark. 29, 31).

<sup>889</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 8, spr. 11406, ark. 15-17 (Kirovohrad); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3628, ark. 1-2 (Korsun), 91 (Krolevets).

<sup>890</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3628, ark. 102-12.

<sup>891</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3628, ark. 114 (Stanyslaviv); op. 24, spr. 3503, ark. 13-21 (Cherkasy).

<sup>892</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3628, ark. 97.



memorials. Instead of a statue of Khmelnytsky, the authorities decided to erect in Pereiaslav a monument to the Reunification, while they planned a Khmelnytsky monument for the Zamkova Hill in Chyhyryn. (The former was unveiled only in 1961, and the latter never built.) The Ukrainian functionaries accepted the plan to renovate St. Illia Church in Subotiv and install there a labradorite tombstone dedicated to the "great son of the Ukrainian people" Bohdan Khmelnytsky. They also approved six obelisks on the battlefields of the War of Liberation and a number of memorial plaques on historic buildings.<sup>893</sup> One of the principal memorial projects, the Triumphal Arch in Kiev, was quietly abandoned after the celebrations. The party hierarchy duly dedicated the place for it in May, but, having considered 257 drafts and 61 proposals, the competition jury decided not to award the first prize or recommend any project for implementation.<sup>894</sup>

The state allotted considerable sums for the restoration of historic monuments and street improvements in Subotiv, Chyhyryn, Pereiaslav, and Kiev.<sup>895</sup> In Kiev, the work included the restoration of the Khmelnytsky monument and extensive renovations of the St. Sophia Cathedral.<sup>896</sup> In Pereiaslav, the whole city center was rebuilt to create the Khmelnytsky Square, the site of the future Reunification monument. The authorities installed a bronze bas-relief, "The Pereiaslav Council," on the Kiev-Kharkiv highway near the turn-off to Pereiaslav and a bust of Khmelnytsky at the Pereiaslav pier on the Trubizh river.<sup>897</sup> The authorities also organized public excursions to the historic places of Kiev, Pereiaslav, and the battlefields of the Khmelnytsky War. The press recommended that

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<sup>893</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3600, ark. 74-77 (monument, tombstone, obelisks, memorial plaques), 118 (statue in Chyhyryn); TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 8, spr. 9880, ark. 29-31 (summary); spr. 11408, ark. 2-5 (tombstone and obelisks).

<sup>894</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3627, ark. 4-10; *Radianska Ukraina*, 25 May 1954, p. 1 (dedication); *Radianske mystetstvo*, 14 July 1954, p. 1. Apparently, most good projects were much too monumental and expensive to build. The arch was finally erected in Kiev on the 325th anniversary of the union, in 1979.

<sup>895</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 8, spr. 10237, ark. 38-39, 56-60, 88-90; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3600, ark. 36-38.

<sup>896</sup> TsDAMLM, f. 119, op. 1, spr. 168, ark. 1zv. (monument); TsDAVOV, f. 2, op. 8, spr. 10237, ark. 145-46 (cathedral).

<sup>897</sup> O. M. Apanovych, ed., *Pereiaslav-Khmelnytsky i ioho istorychni pamiatky* (Kiev: Vydavnytstvo AN URSR, 1954), pp. 112, 120.

teachers take their classes on these trips.<sup>898</sup> The Ukrainian ideologues proposed that excursions to Kiev start at the Lenin statue, move to the monument to Shevchenko, and then proceed to such memorial sites as the Golden Gate, the St. Sophia Cathedral, the Desiatynna (Tithe) Church, a monument to St. Volodymyr, the statue of Khmelnytsky, Askold's Tomb, the Caves Monastery, the Vydubychi Monastery, the Shevchenko Museum, and several monuments and buildings of the Soviet era.<sup>899</sup> The excursions thus tied together the four periods of Ukrainian history past—the Kievan Rus' period, the Cossack times, the nineteenth-century national awakening, and the era of Soviet Ukraine—into an implicit narrative of national history.

All Ukrainian museums held special displays about the War of Liberation and the reunification; many acquired new exhibits and, in particular, new historic paintings, which proliferated at the time. The government upgraded the Pereiaslav-Khmelnytsky regional museum to a republican museum status, provided it with spare Cossack artifacts from Moscow, Lviv, and Kiev collections, and with enough money to purchase Mykhailo Derehus's monumental painting *The Pereiaslav Council*.<sup>900</sup> Most regional museums, as, for example, the one in Mykolaiv, had to limit themselves to displaying photographs of Cossack arms and paintings of local artists.<sup>901</sup>

The Tercentenary celebrations completed the rehabilitation of the historical genre in Ukrainian literature and the arts. The text best embodying the new historical vision, Rybak's *The Pereiaslav Council*, was elevated to the near-sacred status of work that the authorities organized the populace to "study," not unlike the *Communist Manifesto* or the *Short Course* of the party history. During January-May 1954, all Ukrainian oblasts reported organizing public readings, readers' conferences, study workshops, and amateur

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<sup>898</sup> *Radianska osvita*, 19 December 1953, p. 1; I. P. Naulko, "Vyvchennia periodu Vyzvolnoi viiny ukrainskoho narodu 1648-1654 rr.," *Radianska shkola*, no. 3 (1954): 13-17, here 16-17.

<sup>899</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3640, ark. 71-79 (Kiev), 80-86 (Pereiaslav, Chyhyryn, and the battlefields).

<sup>900</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 5116, op. 10, spr. 16, ark. 19-21, 34-46 (museums); f. 2, op. 8, spr. 10237, ark. 134; *Kulturne budivnytstvo*, 2: 219 (Pereiaslav); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3640, ark. 100-103 (museums), 106 (Derehus's painting).

<sup>901</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 2247, ark. 10-11.

dramatizations of the novel. In Stanyslaviv oblast alone, more than a hundred readers' conferences took place. The village of Vovkovyi in Rivne oblast, where a readers' conference with 190 participants was preceded by a lecture "The Pereiaslav Council and Its Historic Importance" and followed by the screening of *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*, could serve as a typical example.<sup>902</sup> As if all this propaganda was not enough, the Ukrainian radio broadcast the novel chapter by chapter and dramatized selected fragments as a kind of historical soap opera.<sup>903</sup>

*The Pereiaslav Council* went through several mass editions during 1953-54, including a luxurious Ukrainian two-volume impression with numerous color illustrations by A. Riznychenko. Three central publishers planned to issue the novel's Russian translation in 1954, so that the VKP(b) Central Committee had to intervene and decide that the jubilee edition would be printed by Goslitizdat. In January 1954, the Ukrainian Writers' Union nominated Volume Two for a Stalin Prize. (Volume One received this accolade in 1949.)<sup>904</sup>

A score of new historical works appeared before the Tercentenary celebrations. The jubilee publications included the mass edition of Petro Panch's historical novel about the Cossack times, *Ukraine Was Humming*, and excerpts from Ivan Le's new novel about the reunification, *Sworn Brothers*. The All-Union Central Committee ensured that such leading Russian literary journals as *Novyi mir* and *Zvezda* publish these works in translation.<sup>905</sup> Among other novels about the Ukrainian—mostly Cossack—past were Iakiv Kachura's *Ivan Bohun*, Vasyl Kucher's *Ustym Karmaliuk*, Ivan Le's *Nalyvaiko* (2nd version), and Iurii Mushketyk's *Semen Palii*.<sup>906</sup> The premier author of literature for

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<sup>902</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 2247, ark. 11, 17, 22, 39, 44, 51, 60-61, 67-68, 93, 101, 123; op. 30, spr. 3618, ark. 7, 20, 25, 29-30, 113 (Stanyslaviv oblast), 124 (Vovkovyi).

<sup>903</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3631, ark. 4, 8; *Literaturna hazeta*, 6 May 1954, p. 3.

<sup>904</sup> Natan Rybak, *Pereiaslavska rada* (Kiev: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo khudozhnoi literatury, 1953), 2 vols.; TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 17, d. 454, l. 1 (three publishers); TsDAMLM, f. 590, op. 1, spr. 204, ark. 1-4 (nomination).

<sup>905</sup> TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 17, d. 454, l. 4 (translations); *Literaturna hazeta*, 25 November 1954, pp. 2-3 (review of Panch's novel).

<sup>906</sup> Conveniently grouped together in a report to Moscow in TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 17, d. 454, l. 11.

children, Oksana Ivanenko, published a biography of Bohdan Khmelnytsky for young readers. The leading poet and Minister of Education, Pavlo Tychyna, wrote a very plain poem, "At the Pereiaslav Council," which was immediately included in the elementary school curriculum.<sup>907</sup>

The Writers' Union submitted to the Ukrainian authorities a plan for a collection of novel chapters, stories, and poems depicting the history of the Ukrainian-Russian cooperation. Duly published as a bulky volume under the title *The Chronicle of the Great Friendship*, this anthology included excerpts from Kocherha's *Iaroslav the Wise*, Khyzhniak's *Danylo of Halych*, Korniiichuk's *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*, and Rybak's *The Pereiaslav Council*. Some selections had little or nothing to do with the Russian-Ukrainian friendship, and more than anything else, the collection resembled a good anthology of Ukrainian historical writing.<sup>908</sup>

Dmyterko produced a new version of *Forever Together*, which was staged by many theater companies, including two leading ones in Kharkiv and Kiev.<sup>909</sup> Some other companies chose to renew Korniiichuk's *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*, which also was included, together with Rybak's novel, in the school curriculum for senior grades.<sup>910</sup> The Zankovetska Theater Company (Lviv) for the first time in Soviet theater history staged Ivan Franko's mystic drama *The Dream of Prince Sviatoslav* (1895), substituting the "voice of the common people" for that of the ghost in the original. As early as 1945, some Ukrainian intellectuals had proposed the production of this patriotic drama, but the Zhdanovite reaction curtailed those plans. This time, however, the intellectuals managed to bring in this pre-Soviet Ukrainian interpretation of the Kievan heritage. Following

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<sup>907</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 73, spr. 672, ark. 1 (Ivanenko); *Radianska osvita*, 10 April 1954, p. 3 (Tychyna).

<sup>908</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3599, ark. 38-42 (prospectus); M. Bazhan et al., eds., *Litopys velykoi druzhby* (Kiev: Radianskyi pysmennyk, 1954).

<sup>909</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3632, ark. 22, 24, 26, 29-30, 33 (Kharkiv, Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk, Rivne, Stanyslaviv, Ternopil, Nizhyn); op. 70, spr. 2247, ark. 30 (Voroshyl'ovhrad); *Literaturna hazeta*, 29 April 1954, p. 4 (review of the Kharkiv production).

<sup>910</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3632, ark. 27, 30 (renewed in Drohobych and Kherson); *Radianska osvita*, 3 October 1953, p. 1; 9 January 1954, p. 2; 15 May, p. 4; 22 May, p. 2; 14 August, p. 3 (studying *Bohdan* and *The Pereiaslav Council*). Some leading companies, like Kharkiv, did not need to renew *Bohdan* because it had remained in their active repertoire ever since 1939.

Lviv's lead, many other companies produced the play.<sup>911</sup> During this same time, the writer Semen Skliarenko began working on the first postwar Ukrainian novel about Kievan Rus'. According to his 1953 report to the Writers' Union, Skliarenko was composing the novel "The Great Rus'"—the first stage of the project that would eventually result in two bestselling historical novels: *Sviatoslav* (1957) and *Volodymyr* (1963).<sup>912</sup>

The Ukrainian writers had so successfully recovered from Kaganovich's pogrom that, in May 1954, the Institute of World Literature in Moscow could convene a special conference on the Ukrainian historical novel.<sup>913</sup> At the Third Congress of Ukrainian Writers' Union in October 1954, nobody had to defend the historical genre. The organization's head, Mykola Bazhan, praised the recent works of Rybak, Panch, Le, and others as the most notable successes of Soviet Ukrainian prose. He declared, "The important role of contemporary subjects for the successful development of Socialist Realism literature does not at all diminish the significance of historical subjects."<sup>914</sup>

As explained in Chapter Eight, the Tercentenary celebrations also confirmed the final rehabilitation of Dankevych's opera *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*. In May 1954, the Kiev Opera Company brought the second version of *Bohdan* to Moscow for a highly successful *dekada* of Ukrainian art. The Kievans sang *Bohdan* there four times to great acclaim, with the second performance being broadcast live on central television.<sup>915</sup> All Ukrainian opera companies premiered the opera's new version.<sup>916</sup> Moreover, the All-Union

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<sup>911</sup> *Literaturna hazeta*, 13 June 1945, p. 4 (1945); TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3618, ark. 93; *Literaturna hazeta*, 22 January 1954, p. 4 (Lviv); spr. 3632, ark. 26-33 (six other companies).

<sup>912</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3599, ark. 46.

<sup>913</sup> TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 17, d. 402, l. 78; *Literaturna hazeta*, 22 May 1954, p. 4.

<sup>914</sup> TsDAMLM, f. 590, op. 1, spr. 199, ark. 23-24; *Literaturna hazeta*, 28 October 1954, p. 2.

<sup>915</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 5116, op. 4, spr. 20, ark. 1 (performances); GARF, f. 6903, op. 26, d. 39 (television transcript for 10 May 1954, no pagination).

<sup>916</sup> TsDAVOV, f. 5116, op. 4, spr. 19, ark. 1-2; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3632, ark. 20-21 (staged in Kiev, Kharkiv, Odessa, Lviv, and Stalino). Curiously, the overzealous Odessan functionaries reported to Kiev that the actor Savchenko, who had sung *Bohdan* in the local production of the opera, praised the *Theses* as a key to his role: "I have read the *Theses* with great attention. An in-depth study of this document will help me to create a proper image of the fighter for the Ukrainian people's happiness, *Bohdan*

Ministry of Culture recommended that companies in Russia and other republics consider *Bohdan* in their long-term repertoire planning. (Indeed, during the 1950s, *Bohdan* was staged in Saratov and Tbilisi.)<sup>917</sup>

In early 1954, the CP(b)U Central Committee decreed that in May, all 4,009 of the republic's cinema theaters and all 3,823 mobile film projectors should show a series of thirty Soviet films opening with *Bohdan Khmelnytsky* and *Taras Shevchenko*. For this purpose, the authorities ordered 200 new copies of the former film and 347 of the latter.<sup>918</sup> *Radianska osvita* advised teachers to take their classes to see *Bohdan* and *Taras* as a part of the history curriculum.<sup>919</sup>

Two leading artists, Derehus and Khmelko, produced portraits of Bohdan Khmelnytsky that the authorities intended to publish as postcards in two runs of 100,000 copies of each. In the end, however, Chairman of the Artists' Union Khmelko secured for his work an astonishing print run of 650,000. Color reproductions of Khmelko's *Forever with Moscow* and Derehus's *The Pereiaslav Council* were released in editions of 50,000 and 20,000, respectively.<sup>920</sup> Various Ukrainian factories and amateur craftsmen produced desk busts of the hetman, ceremonial vases decorated with Khmelnytsky's portrait, his embroidered and poker-work portraits, and special carpets with his image woven into them. For larger tapestries, they usually used either Derehus's *The Pereiaslav Council* or Khmelko's *Forever with Moscow*.<sup>921</sup>

The influential Khmelko used the jubilee to maneuver his monumental painting

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Khmelnytsky." Although Savchenko apparently made this remark at the jubilee meeting and no matter how formulaic his statement sounded, the Kievan authorities reported it to Moscow as an example of popular reactions to the *Theses* (TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 52, l. 106; TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 46, spr. 6822, ark. 6, 68-69).

<sup>917</sup> RGALI, f. 2329, op. 2, d. 247, l. 7. The Ministry also recommended the classical operas *The Zaporozhian Cossack beyond the Danube* and *Natalka from Poltava*, as well as the plays *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*, *Iaroslav the Wise*, *Forever Together*, and others (ibid., ll. 7-15).

<sup>918</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3633, ark. 2-3, 10-11.

<sup>919</sup> *Radianska osvita*, 19 December 1953, p. 2.

<sup>920</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 30, spr. 3599, ark. 78, 80; spr. 3643, ark. 112.

<sup>921</sup> TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 70, spr. 2247, ark. 93 (vases), 140 (busts, tapestries); op. 30, spr. 3684, ark. 27 (poker-work); TsDAMLM, f. 119, op. 1, spr. 168, ark. 1 (tapestries); *Literaturna hazeta*, 7 January 1954, p. 1 (embroidery).

back into the official canon. In spite of how much this work had been criticized in previous years, First Secretary Kyrychenko on the XVIIIth Congress of CPU named it, alongside Rybak's novel and Dankevych's opera, as being among the highest achievements of contemporary Ukrainian culture.<sup>922</sup> The second version of *Forever with Moscow* was recommended to teachers as an important visual aid. A color reproduction of the painting was included in *The History of Ukrainian SSR* over the objections of the artist Vasyl Kasiian, who punned that this work "did not receive an appraisal warranting for it a place in history."<sup>923</sup>

Khmelko's work was also displayed at the jubilee exhibition of Ukrainian art in Kiev. The mammoth exhibition at the State Museum of Ukrainian Art included frescoes from Kievan times, icons from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, Cossack portraits, Shevchenko's historical drawings, as well as pre-revolutionary historical paintings that had been previously deemed ideologically harmful: Feodosii Krasysky's *Guest from the Zaporozhian Host* (1901) and O. Murashko's *The Funeral of the Chieftain* (1900). The display also featured numerous Soviet works on subjects from the Ukrainian past and particularly the Cossack times.<sup>924</sup>

The archives preserved the book of visitors' comments and, although some entries had been painted over with black ink, the remaining remarks shed an interesting light on the public reaction to the historical works. Thus, many visitors were disappointed with Khmelko, whose work allegedly "looked better on the postcards." Another anonymous spectator noted: "The more I look at Khmelko, the more I like Velazquez." The visitors Koptilov and Koptilova suggested: "Many paintings depicting Bohdan Khmelnytsky would have benefited if he were dressed more modestly." Another spectator with an unreadable signature found Ie. Bilostotsky's bust of Khmelnytsky scandalous: "Why, then,

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<sup>922</sup> XVIII zizd, 34.

<sup>923</sup> I. P. Naulko, "Vyvchennia periodu vyzvolnoi viiny ukrainskoho narodu 1648-1654 rr.," 16 (Khmelko); NAIU, op. 1, spr. 550, ark. 21 (Kasiian).

<sup>924</sup> See *Vystavka izobrazitel'nogo iskusstva Ukrainskoi SSR posviashchennaia trekhsotletiiu vossoedineniia Ukrainy s Rossiei: Zhivopis, skulptura, grafika: Katalog* (Kiev: Mystetstvo, 1954); *Radianske mystetstvo*, 5 May 1954, p. 2; *Literaturna hazeta*, 17 June 1954, p. 4.

all these radio programs [about Khmelnytsky]? A stupid expression, a weak-willed lower lip. The spirit of history is totally absent."<sup>925</sup> Several visitors singled out Kryvenko's lyrical painting *When the Cossack Was Going to War* as the work into which the author had "put his heart." At the same time, many notes expressed unreserved delight with the exhibition, while one visitor was even moved enough to cite the final chorus of Dankevych's *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*: "For Kiev and the golden-domed Moscow! / Glory to the great Russian people!"<sup>926</sup> Significantly, however, both monumentalist and lyrical, unappealing and appealing representations of the past all related to the nation-centric vision of Ukrainian history.

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The Tercentenary celebrations completed the evolution of the Ukrainian historic imagination under Stalinism. The official pronouncements extended the notion of the Russian-Ukrainian friendship back into the past, establishing an interpretive model that would also apply to other Soviet peoples and East European satellites. At the same time, Soviet ideologues approved of a historical narrative that saw the Ukrainian nation, rather than social classes, as the subject of history, even if the Ukrainian "younger brother" was not presented as a historical agent equal to his Russian "elder brother." One of the most important ideological documents of the time, the CPSU Central Committee's *Theses on the Tercentenary*, had an inherently double-edged nature, both rehabilitating the "ethnic" interpretation of the Ukrainian past and presenting it as inseparably connected to the dominant Russian grand narrative. Stalinist ideologues put considerable effort into subordinating the Ukrainian patriotic topos to the doctrine of friendship, yet with the first signs of de-Stalinization, the innate "nationalist" tensions surfaced within a Stalinist model of Ukrainian history.

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<sup>925</sup> TsDAML, f. 665, op. 1, spr. 169, ark. 16, 30 (Khmelko), 18zv (Khmelnytsky's clothing), 46zv (Bilostotsky).

<sup>926</sup> Ibid., ark. 2, 7, 19 (Kryvenko), 17zv (chorus).



The Tercentenary gave Ukrainian intellectuals an opportunity to reestablish the Cossack past as the nation's symbolic patrimony and to rehabilitate the historical genre in Ukrainian literature and the arts. Having been shelved for a long time, many large projects related to national history in Ukrainian scholarship, archival research, historic preservation, museum development, creative writing, and opera could now be implemented under the label of works celebrating the reunification. The republic's intelligentsia had to pay for the authorities' approval of a national narrative by accepting the doctrine of Russian guidance, but in the end, during the Tercentenary festivities, the Ukrainian national past became as legitimate a subject of celebration as the historic Russian-Ukrainian friendship.

## EPILOGUE

Although the Soviet authorities maintained the "friendship of peoples" ideology until the USSR's very last days, they never fully reconciled the Soviet peoples' multiple national histories.

In Ukraine, the beginnings of de-Stalinization were marked by the scholars' drive to undermine the Stalinist concept of their history. During the historians' conference in the summer of 1956, Huslysty proposed that the contribution of the "bourgeois" specialists be reexamined and criticized the recent glossing over of the tsarist colonial policies. Boiko suggested that Drahomanov's legacy be studied, Los termed the nineteenth-century Ukrainian national movement "progressive," and two other scholars demanded that a Ukrainian historical journal be established. In the same year, the historian M. Lysenko published an article suggesting that recent scholarship had overstressed the historical progressiveness of Ukraine's union with tsarist Russia.<sup>927</sup> The Ukrainian literary scholars, meanwhile, proceeded to deconstruct the Stalinist orthodoxy on Shevchenko. Ieremiia Aizenshtok dismissed the myth of the poet's friendship with the Russian radical thinkers as a subjectivist interpretation "in some instances bordering on a fantasy." Oleksandr Biletsky questioned Shevchenko's label as "revolutionary democrat" and the use of his texts to "prove" his socialist views.<sup>928</sup>

While the established scholars criticized only the excesses of Stalinist myth-making, some student youth were exploring the border between the official and the "nationalist" versions of the Ukrainian past. Vasyl Kushnir, the Komsomol organizer in the Faculty of History of Uzhhorod University, in February 1956 wrote in his private diary about his conversations with fellow students: "We discussed the question of whether Ukraine could be independent and what could have happened if it had been independent for a long time. I think by now it could have been among the world's most developed states." In June 1956, he wrote: "Today we had a discussion about nationalism. I, together

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<sup>927</sup> Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic*, 206-07.

<sup>928</sup> *Ibid.*, 193-94.

with the group of comrades, was defending Mazepa and other national heroes."<sup>929</sup>

During 1956-58, the authorities officially revoked the Stalinist critique of Sosiura's poem "Love Ukraine" and Dankevych's opera *Bohdan Khmelnytsky*. Dovzhenko was allowed to publish and, following his death in 1956, was idolized as a film director of international stature. The Ukrainian cultural revival in the "Thaw" period emphasized the national heritage, cultural authenticity, and pride in the national history. The literature and the arts turned to folk and historical themes, and both establishment intellectuals and young radicals publicly articulated their spiritual bond to the Ukrainian past. Thus, a senior writer, Oles Honchar, published the allegorical novel *The Cathedral* (1968), valorizing the Cossack past and criticizing the state's destruction of Ukrainian historical monuments, while a young poet, Vasyl Symonenko, celebrated in his *samizdat* poems the nation's eternal life and the Cossack blood pulsing in its veins.<sup>930</sup> Reclaiming Shevchenko as the symbol of the nation, rather than of socialism and Ukraine's ties with Russia, young intellectuals established their own alternative to the official pilgrimages to the poet's tomb. On 22 May, from 1966 to 1971, they gathered at Shevchenko's monument in Kiev to mark the anniversary of the poet's reburial in Ukraine.<sup>931</sup>

Similarly, the return to "national history" originated within the official historiography, and only later did the authorities' reaction channel this interpretation of history into dissident self-publishing. In an article apparently written for publication in 1966, the established historian Mykhailo Braichevsky disputed the official interpretation of the "reunification," arguing that the Cossack leadership had regarded the Pereiaslav Treaty as merely a military union, while the tsarist administration had understood it as an act of annexation. Never published in Soviet Ukraine, Braichevsky's *Annexation or Reunification?* circulated widely in samizdat and was published in the West. The literary critic Ivan Dziuba likewise had written his *Internationalism or Russification?* with an establishment audience in mind, attempting a Marxist critique of the Russian and Soviet

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<sup>929</sup> Iurchuk, *Kulturne zhyttia v Ukraini u povoieni roky*, 61.

<sup>930</sup> See Kenneth C. Farmer, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the Post-Stalin Era: Myth, Symbols and Ideology in Soviet Nationalities Policy* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980), pp. 78-121.

<sup>931</sup> Baran, *Ukraina 1950-1960-kh rr.*, 146.

colonial policies in Ukraine.<sup>932</sup>

Although the republican authorities periodically suppressed "nationalist deviations" in scholarship and culture, their own position on the national patrimony remained deeply ambiguous. In fact, in Ukraine of the 1960s there probably existed a "*de facto* community of interest between political elites interested in decisional autonomy and cultural elites interested in expanded cultural expression."<sup>933</sup> The crackdown on Ukrainian dissidents in 1971-73 was followed by Petro Shelest's removal as the CPU first secretary and the subsequent critique of his book *Ukraino nasha radianska* (Our Soviet Ukraine) as allegedly idealizing the Cossacks, minimizing the importance of the reunification, and promoting Ukraine's economic self-sufficiency. Western scholars interpreted accusations of local nationalism as the public excuse, rather than the real reason for Shelest's demotion, which was the result of his opposition to renewed economic centralization and of Brezhnev's political games. Nevertheless, Shelest also supported Ukrainian cultural interests and was credited with tolerating dissidents.<sup>934</sup>

Shelest's removal was followed by a new campaign against the remnants of "bourgeois nationalism" in Ukrainian historiography and culture. After 1973, the Soviet ideologues closely supervised the intellectuals' activities to ensure that the national narrative remained safely subordinated to the doctrine of Russian guidance. Nevertheless, the tension within the official discourse of self-identification remained suppressed but unresolved. When the ideological control over society began disintegrating in the late 1980s, the return to the national version of Ukrainian history became a major political

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<sup>932</sup> See Braichevsky, *Annexation or Reunification*; Ivan Dziuba, *Internationalism or Russification?* 3rd ed. (New York: Monad Press, 1974).

<sup>933</sup> Farmer, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the Post-Stalin Era*, 95. This is also Bohdan Krawchenko's argument in his *Social Change and National Consciousness*, Ch. 5.

<sup>934</sup> When Shelest in 1973 confronted Brezhnev, asking for the reasons for his removal, the Soviet leader explained: "You displayed too much independence in decision-making, often not consulting with Moscow. [Also, in your work] there were localistic tendencies and manifestations of nationalism." See P. E. Shelest, *Da ne sudimy budete: Dnevnikovye zapisi, vospominaniia chlena Politbiuro TsK KPSS* (Moscow: Edition q, 1995), p. 564. On Shelest, see Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Mykola Skrypnyk and Petro Shelest: An Essay on the Persistence and Limits of Ukrainian National Communism," in Jeremy R. Azrael, ed., *Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices* (New York: Praeger, 1978), pp. 105-43; Lowell Tillet, "Ukrainian Nationalism and the Fall of Shelest," *Slavic Review* 34, no. 4 (1975): 752-68

issue. The rehabilitation of Hrushevsky, valorization of the Cossacks, and reevaluation of the Pereiaslav Treaty rivalled in public attention such issues as the Stalinist crimes and Chernobyl. The emergence of independent Ukraine in 1991 led to the collapse of the friendship myth and the "separate" national history's reinstatement as the official pedigree of the Ukrainian nation.<sup>935</sup>

What Stalinist ideologues had once condemned as "nationalism" became the official ideology of the independent Ukrainian state. However, having reinstated in the national pantheon such great ancestors as Mazepa and Hrushevsky, the present-day Ukrainian leadership still embraces such "Stalinist" heroes as Danylo of Halych and Khmelnytsky, as well as the linear narrative of the nation's "natural" historical development toward its nation-state—a vision that the Stalinist ideologues shared with nationalist theoreticians and which they taught to Soviet Ukrainians.

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<sup>935</sup> See Zenon E. Kohut, "History as a Battleground: Russian-Ukrainian Relations and Historical Consciousness in Contemporary Ukraine," in S. Frederick Starr, ed., *The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 123-45; Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine: State and Nation Building* (New York: Routledge, 1998); Frank Sysyn, "The Reemergence of the Ukrainian Nation and Cossack Mythology," *Social Research* 58, no. 4 (Winter 1991): 845-64; Catherine Wanner, *Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1998).

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### TsDAHO

#### **Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromadskykh obiednan Ukrainy (The Central State Archive of Ukraine's Civic Organizations, former Party Archive, Kiev)**

##### f. 1 (Communist Party of Ukraine)

op. 1 (*opysy* 1 through 9 contain minutes of the Central Committee's plenary meetings and other party forums): spr. 729, 972, 973, 976, 1120, 1139

op. 6: spr. 409, 564, 1036, 1073, 1130, 1375

op. 8: spr. 316, 328, 330, 340

op. 9: spr. 70

op. 16 (Minutes of the Politburo's and Secretariat's Meetings, Secret Files): spr. 32, 74

op. 23 (Special Section, Secret Files): spr. 125, 328, 355, 441, 451, 463, 623, 699, 703, 780, 787, 788, 790, 860, 864, 883, 889, 890, 937, 1060, 1604, 1605, 1608, 1621, 1625, 1652, 2756, 2768, 2782, 2814, 2849, 2858, 4063, 4504, 4511, 4512, 4515, 4517, 4525, 4526, 4559, 4956, 4957, 4958, 5027, 5072, 5664

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<sup>936</sup> The works by Patricia Kennedy Grimsted provide the best guide to the archives of the former Soviet Union. See, in particular, her *A Handbook for Archival Research in the USSR* (Washington, DC: Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, 1989); *Archives and Manuscript Repositories in the USSR: Ukraine and Moldavia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); and idem, ed., *Archives of Russia: A Directory and Bibliographic Guide to Holdings in Moscow and St. Petersburg* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2000). On the opportunities and challenges that the newly opened archives present for students of Soviet nationality policy, see Terry Martin, "Interpreting the New Archival Signals: Nationalities Policy and the Nature of the Soviet Bureaucracy," *Cahiers du Monde russe* 40, no. 1-2 (janvier-juin 1999): 113-24 and Peter A. Blitstein, "Researching Nationality Policy in the Archives," *ibid.*: 125-37.

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