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Palestinian Civil Society and the Struggle for Self-Determination: the Impact of Donor Agendas

by

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Abstract

This thesis explores the ways in which international donors have attempted to shape and control civil society organizations in the occupied Palestinian territories. It employs Foucault's concepts of power/knowledge and disciplinary power to investigate and theorize the power-relations that govern the interactions of donors with civil society organizations. It contends that international donors have construed the concept of civil society in such a way that made it possible to partition social space into two incommensurable 'civic' and 'political' spheres. International donors have demanded that organizations limit their activities to the 'civic' sphere. Moreover, the thesis argues that per the requirements of discipline that the objects of its surveillance be rendered visible and subject to technologies of control, donors have used both statistical surveys and administrative techniques to classify, categorize, observe and monitor civil society organizations. These modes of surveillance are then used for locating civil society organizations in one of the 'civic' and 'political' spheres.

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I. INTRODUCTION

> Yet the question I raise here concerns the long-range strategy of these groups [Palestinian NGOs] and the kind of thing they do. Put very simply, are they a substitute for a political movement, and can they ever become one?
>
> Edward W. Said

The concept of civil society has become a mainstay of the democratization and development literatures. In part, its current popularity stems from the rediscovery and refurbishing of the idea in the 1980s. This was a result of the contribution that social movements agitating against communist authoritarianism in Eastern Europe and military dictatorships in Latin America made to democratization. Both the concept itself and supporting civil society groups became essential components of the many democracy promotion projects implemented in far-flung parts of the Global South form the early 1990s onwards. Broadly defined as those designed to enhance legislative, judicial and civic responsibilities, such projects are implemented by a mix of organizations. These organizations include: non-profit advocacy groups (such as the Ford and Soros Foundations), semi-autonomous specialized democracy foundations (such as the American National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the German *Heinrich Böll Stiftung*), and bilateral and multilateral aid and development agencies, (such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank).

The mandates of bilateral and multilateral aid and development agencies were especially emblematic of this new trend. Traditionally limited to extending economic and social development loans and grants to national governments only, these institutions no longer entertained qualms about actively promoting democracy by directly targeting civil society groups. USAID provided assistance under the heading of 'political development' for the first time in 1990. By 1994, it had put a great deal of emphasis on the 'development of politically active civil society' as a means of

building ‘sustainable democracies.’[1] By then the World Bank had already established its ‘Social Funds for Development,’ developed in a bid to ameliorate the deleterious effects structural adjustment programs had on vulnerable populations in poor countries. The Social Funds for Development worked to extend grants and small loans to women's groups, small farmers associations and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs).[2] Both USAID and the World Bank had extended grants to NGOs for many years, but they now did so on a much larger scale and under the rubrics of strengthening civil society and promoting ‘good governance’ (as opposed to ‘bad governance,’ the term used by the World Bank to explain why structural adjustment failed) and economic development.

This thesis takes as its focus the impact of such aid in the unique context of the occupied Palestinian territories (OPT). More specifically, it examines the ways in which international donors have influenced and shaped civil society organizations (CSOs) in the OPT.

In ‘promoting’ civil society in the OPT, USAID and the World Bank were joined not only by NDI and the *Heinrich Böll Stiftung*, but also by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), its counter-parts in Australia and Scandinavia, and the British, Dutch, French, Japanese and Italian foreign ministries, among others. These were, in turn, joined by dozens of international NGOs.[3] With few exceptions, these actors arrived in the OPT as the Oslo ‘peace-making’ process began following the official signing ceremony of the ‘Declaration of Principles’ (DoP) in Washington in September 1993. A strong interest in the viability of the Oslo process underpinned the many projects they implemented there. While foreign ministries and the aid agencies of donor states were themselves invested in the Oslo process, quasi- and non-governmental organizations relied on public funds made available by states and foreign ministries that also had a stake in the process. These agencies and institutions have promoted civil society as a vehicle for

'good governance' and economic growth, both of which are viewed as essential for the success of the Oslo process. They have also viewed civil society itself as means for bolstering the peace process, as exemplified by the many 'people-to-people' civil society initiatives and NGOs, promoted and financed by USAID, the European Commission, and CIDA.[4] It is this interest in the viability of the Oslo process that explains why almost 40 percent of all civil society 'promotion' funds and projects designated for the Middle East during the 1990s found their way to the OPT, leading to exponential growth in the number of NGOs there.[5]

Despite the proliferation of funding post-Oslo, OPT-based Palestinian CSOs are not a post-Oslo construct. Traditionally dominated by charitable, cultural and religious societies, civil society in the OPT was reinvigorated with the emergence in the 1970s of small and grassroots relief and voluntary work CSOs. Representing autonomous forms of sociopolitical organization and gradually coalescing into the mass-based movements known locally as 'popular committees,' these CSOs played an instrumental role in laying the conceptual and organizational grounds for civil disobedience and in generating and sustaining the high levels of social mobilization and collective action evident during the first intifada.[6] Because they were successful in making popular and civil society organizing the main thrust of the first intifada (1987-1993), these committees and organizations were harshly repressed by the Israeli military, leaving them severely weakened by the time the Oslo process began in earnest in 1994. Nonetheless, a World Bank study put the number of CSOs in the OPT in 1994 at 1400.[7] Despite the exponential growth in the number of CSOs that accompanied the arrival of international donors with the beginning of the Oslo peace process, by the time the second intifada broke in late 2000, 62.4 percent of the CSOs active in the OPT were created prior to 1993.[8] But, unlike the essential role they played during the first intifada, CSOs played a very marginal role or were completely absent during the

first years of the second intifada (Hammami and Tamari 2001; Picadou 2001; Kuttab 2001, 2008; Hanafi and Tabar 2003, 2004; Abdel Shafi 2004; Heacock 2007; Jad 2007).

This difference between the first and second intifadas demands analysis of the aid industry, and as importantly a theoretical framework that can enhance our understanding of the specific context of the OPT.

Already in 1995, Rema Hammami drew attention to the twin processes of 'depoliticization' and 'professionalization' that accompanied the arrival of international donors with the beginning of the Oslo process. This period, she noted, witnessed the decoupling of civil society from mobilizational politics and the transformation of 'mass movements into an NGO community, of mass-based, voluntarist organizations into more elite, professional and politically autonomous institutions.'[9] Other critical accounts converge with that of Hammami, highlighting how the new demands donors placed on local CSOs (proposal writing and professional management, accounting and reporting practices) established a hierarchy among organizations, privileging urban-based middle class organizations and marginalizing grassroots and community-based ones.[10] Moreover, the new donor-championed discourses centered on amorphous notions of individual 'empowerment' were in reality disempowering. This is because they dislodged earlier practices rooted in collective resistance and betterment.[11] Coupled with the donors' tendency to condition financial support on accepting the terms of the internationally-sponsored 'peace-making' process, it is not difficult to understand how these practices and discourses rendered civil society disengaged, disembedded from the local communities, and less representative and democratic.[12] In short, most critical accounts of the state of Palestinian civil society in the post-Oslo period stress that dependence on foreign funding impacted local CSOs negatively. This aid diminished the capacity of civil society actors to influence the Oslo process, undermined their ability to ad-

dress the realities of continued colonization and worsening socioeconomic conditions post-Oslo, and further weakened their capability to challenge the undemocratic political regime it put in place.[13]

This focus on the influence of international donors is not misplaced. It is, for example, estimated that between 10 and 20 percent of all international assistance to the OPT in the last decade was channeled through NGOs.[14] Nonetheless, these accounts address the relationships between international donors and local CSOs in generalized terms. Thus, although the impact of the new discourses and management practices introduced by international donors are discussed in great detail, the power-relations and associated mechanisms that govern the interactions of international donors with local CSOs have remained undertheorized. In this study, I will make use of Michel Foucault's categories of power/knowledge and disciplinary power to delineate the contours of and theorize these relationships and mechanisms.[15] My contention is two-pronged: First, international donors have construed the concept of civil society in such a way that made it possible to partition social space into two incommensurable ‘civic’ and ‘political’ spheres. Second, in accordance with the requirements of discipline that the objects of its surveillance be rendered visible and subject to technologies of control, donors have used statistical surveys and built networks of bureaucratic structures/administrative techniques to classify, categorize, observe and monitor local CSOs. These modes of surveillance, I argue, are necessary for locating local CSOs in one of two distinct ‘civic’ and ‘political’ spheres.

For Michel Foucault, disciplinary power is a ‘set of strategies, procedures and ways of behaving which are associated with certain institutional contexts and which then permeate ways of thinking and behaving in general.’[16] ‘How to keep someone under surveillance, how to control his conduct, his behavior, his aptitudes, how to improve his performance, multiply his capacities,

how to put him where he is most useful,' Foucault writes, 'that is discipline in my sense.'[17] Discipline incorporates certain aspects of biopower and shares with it its productive capacity, as manifested in both its concern with the general welfare and quality of life of a population and in its ability to generate particular types of knowledge and cultural order, which makes it difficult to manage or escape.[18] In a bid to provide tangible benefits to the population, through improvements in living standards, higher incomes and upgraded infrastructure, unprecedented levels of international assistance were channeled to the OPT after the beginning of the Oslo process. This made it difficult for CSOs competing for survival due to the new dearth in regional Palestinian and Arab funding—and Palestinians, under the demands of state-building and the pressures of economic development, poverty alleviation, health care provision, and so on, in general—to escape power's productive appeal. This was amplified because assistance was combined with an emphasis on instilling certain ways of thinking and behaving ostensibly in order to create a positive environment for an acceptable conclusion to the Oslo process. By working to mitigate the effects of the series of deep socioeconomic crises that befell the OPT without challenging the Israeli policies that instigated them, CSOs were utilized as agents of social pacification. In a similar manner, CSOs were afforded the chance to work in the fields of advocacy and political reform, the 'civic' sphere to which they were consigned, so long as this did not undermine the viability of the Oslo process.[19] In short, by controlling their conduct, behavior and aptitudes, donors put local CSOs where they deemed them to be most useful.

Foucault describes knowledge as being a conjunction of power-relations and information-seeking which he terms 'power/knowledge.' For him, 'it is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power.'[20] The surveying, classifying and categorizing, evident in the numerous studies and reports commissioned by inter-

national development institutions and the aid agencies of donor states, of civil society groups and organizations in the OPT is both a function of the power these actors have over the local population and an extension of that same power that is meant to ease and enhance its operation. Foucault argues that power constructs knowledge by creating an illusion of normality against which 'truth' can be judged. The illusion of normality is created via a process of normalization by problematization, whereby the 'norm' is defined by reference to the 'deviant' and then used to scrutinize, evaluate and judge. Because the norm is not seen as a product of power's operation, but as a 'true' measurement of the way the world is, the process of normalization serves the ordering function of power, confusing the 'normal' with the 'natural' and creating subjects of a certain type.[21] This norm/deviant binary is evident in the discourses on civil society championed by international donors. By putting forward a conceptual 'norm' of civil society as 'civic' and 'apolitical,' these discourses endorse the partition of social space into incommensurable 'civic' and 'political' spheres. As we shall later see, CSOs that combine civic and political work were rendered as 'problems' in need of 'solutions.' It is to a more detailed interrogation of these discourses that we must now, however, turn.

Theorizing Civil Society

Two dominant approaches have permeated the literature on civil society since the concept's rediscovery in the late 1980s. One approach focuses on the transformative effects of participating in civic organizations and the important role civil society plays in engendering good public policy, while the other conceives of civil society as a bulwark against the (autocratic) state. I will label the first as the 'associational approach' and the second as the 'oppositional approach.' Each will be discussed in turn, with a focus on their relevance for the OPT.

The associational approach views 'civic' organizations as both democratizing and empowering.

On this view, civil society is democratizing because participating in 'civic' organizations leads to the mushrooming of democratic norms and attitudes; it is empowering because associational life increases the levels of interpersonal trust necessary for collective action. This conceptualization of civil society is best optimized in Robert Putnam's reworking of the concept of 'social capital' in his influential 1993 book, *Making Democracy Work*. Relying on data collected over two decades of fieldwork in Italy, Putnam argues that participation in 'civic' associations produces norms, networks and levels of social trust—what he calls 'social capital.' Combined these facilitate coordinated action and empower individuals and communities to act on their own behalf, thus improving the efficiency of society and enhancing the performance of representative government. The same process also reinforces democratic attitudes, since increased levels of interpersonal trust augment moderate and tolerant attitudes and norms.[22]

Putnam's approach to civil society has been criticized for being rooted in social science discourses that espouse a deeply conservative investment in 'stability' and the status quo and are weary of social change and democratic resolutions to conflict.[23] Nonetheless, the publication of *Making Democracy Work* gave rise to an expansive literature professing to show that civic participation produces a convergence of changes in attitude among participants and nourishes responsive governance institutions. The adoption of Putnam's reworked version of social capital as an all-purpose resource—a cure to social ills ranging from poverty, crime, poor health and substandard education to the lack of democracy—was perhaps nowhere more evident than in the World Bank's championing of the concept as 'the glue that holds societies together' and the 'missing link' in the development process.[24] According to the Bank:

> *Social Capital and Civil Society Can Promote Welfare and Economic Development*
> When the state is too weak or not interested, civil society and the social capital it engenders can be a crucial provider of informal social insurance and can facilitate economic development.
> *Social Capital and Civil Society Can Strengthen Democracy or Promote Change*

> A strong civil society has the potential to hold government and the private sector accountable.
> *Civil society can be a crucial provider of government legitimacy*
> Putnam's seminal work *Making Democracy Work* (1993) shows that citizens who are active in local organizations, even non-political ones, tend to take a greater interest in public affairs. This interest, coupled with interpersonal social capital between government officials and other citizens which is fostered when both belong to the same groups and associations, renders governments more accountable.
> Civil society gives a voice to the people, elicits participation and can pressure the state. (emphasis original)[25]

This vision of civil society as a social lubricant easing and enhancing the functioning of representative institutions, expecting CSOs to act as agents of democratic socialization, encouraging civic engagement and funneling constituency preferences to policy makers and civil servants, is dominant within policy-making circles of development and aid agencies. More specifically, versions of it litter the publications of international organizations active in the field of governance in the OPT and the wider Middle East. In the words of the chief officer of one international NGO active in the field of governance in the OPT: 'NGOs are the incubators of democracy, providing structure for democratic society and a place where citizens can learn the necessary skills for such a society.'[26]

This celebration of CSOs as 'the incubators of democracy' overlooks the political context that shapes and limits their potential as engines of political change. In *Barriers to Democracy*, an extensive 2007 study of associational life in the OPT, Amaney Jamal cautions that the posited relationships between civil society and democracy and improved government performance may prove to be circular and self-reinforcing (especially since most of the research linking the effects of participating in civic associations to broader and more effective civic engagement assumes democratic preconditions and relies on evidence gathered in Western democracies).[27] In the OPT, she finds that participation in CSOs led to an increase in interpersonal trust and other measures of social capital only in pro-Palestinian Authority (PA) organizations, due to the patron-client relations that characterized their internal structures. As such, higher levels of interpersonal trust

were not directly related to other dimensions of civic engagement (such as political knowledge and community level engagement), nor were they directly related to support for democratic norms and institutions. These organizations are vertically linked to political power through clientelist networks and have very little interest in dismantling these networks in favor of more democratic and inclusive ones because this has the potential of diminishing their privileged access to the PA regime and the benefits such access garners. On the other hand, those organizations not aligned with the PA regime are excluded and marginalized and, especially in the case of the donor-sponsored organizations relying on a handful of professional staff, show low levels of interpersonal trust outside the confines of the organization itself even as they show high levels of support for democracy (contrary to what the expansive literature on social capital predicts).[28]

The oppositional approach to civil society, on the other hand, emphasizes the constraints it can impose on authoritarian impulses within state institutions and its importance for challenging state power and expanding the sphere of political freedom. This approach to civil society drew its inspiration from eastern Europe and Latin America, where associations with a strong social base and substantial membership were said to have had contributed to the demise of undemocratic regimes.[29] This approach to civil society does not presume democratic preconditions. Unlike the Putnam-inspired literature, therefore, it resonates with the real history of civil society activism in the OPT. Moreover, unlike the emphasis Putnam places on the apolitical nature of CSOs, the oppositional approach emphasizes the ability of civil society to pose a challenge to an autocratic state.[30] Since this approach builds, if sometimes only indirectly, on Gramsci's understanding of hegemony, and therefore posits the counter-hegemonic nature and potential of civil society, such an emphasis is not surprising.

In this thesis, I draw on this critical understanding of civil society for understanding the OPT historically. Specifically, I will argue that the open organizational structure, grassroots approach and substantial membership of the CSOs that emerged in the OPT in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as their quest for substantive social and political change, renders them more amenable to Gramsci's conceptualization of civil society as both the sphere of voluntary acceptance and of fostering solidarity and opposition to state or class hegemony.[31] In the OPT, CSOs emerged as response to the lack of institutional development under Israeli occupation. Focusing on decreasing the dependence of the local population on the Israeli military government and on the provision of basic social services and serving the needs and interests of ordinary people, these organizations played an important role in generating the high levels of social mobilization evident during the first intifada.

For now, it is important to emphasize that while seemingly consistent with this approach to civil society, donor support for advocacy organizations as a means of encouraging political liberalization falls short of meeting the minimum requirements for making these NGOs successful incubators of political change. As will be discussed in greater detail in chapter three, donors have done one of two things. First, some have treated local CSOs as 'efficient' mechanisms of service delivery. Second, in a bid to promote political participation and efficacy, some have either focused on implementing 'civic education' programs to transmit knowledge, skills and values to individuals (deemed to be lacking all three) or converged in supporting businesses associations, human rights, political reform and other specialized single-issue interest groups (which they tended to equate with civil society). While their impact in other areas is difficult to measure, it is important to emphasize that none of these strategies can produce the kind of CSOs with a strong social base and substantial membership that spearheaded political

change in Eastern Europe and Latin America. If anything, the literature on civil society in the post-Oslo period suggests that this approach to the 'promotion' of civil society have had exactly the opposite effect. In *Palestinian Civil Society*, an extensive 2008 study of the interactions between foreign donors and OPT-based CSOs, Benoît Challand emphasizes the inverse relationship between levels of donor support and the ability of local CSOs to engage in political mobilization. This, Challand suggests, reflects the donors' preferences with regard to which types of CSOs they choose to support. To quote:

> [O]ne could sustain that there is a *political paradox in the success of civil society promotion* by western donors: if success of civil society promotion is measured in terms of institutional strength of the NGOs (understood as its developed capacity to deliver a service or to promote a cause *from above*), then NGOs that receive most of the international aid earmarked for civil society promotion tend to have actually less impact and influence upon their beneficiaries in terms of political mobilization (which would then be the counter-measure of the success of NGOs, in terms of its capacity to organize social mobilization through a bottom-up mobilization force). On the contrary, NGOs with greater popular support (*from below*) are the less successful in terms of financial support from western aid. (emphasis original)[32]

Challand's conclusions restate a recurrent theme in the literature on civil society in the OPT in the post-Oslo period: instead of its proclaimed objective of increasing the capacity of civil society to contribute to democratization, donor involvement has led to the 'de-democratization' of civil society itself.[33]

Scope and Organization

This study is structured as a cross-time comparative analysis, contrasting the role civil society played in mobilizational politics during the pre-Oslo period (roughly defined as beginning with the Israeli occupation in 1967 and ending in 1993) and its role in the post-Oslo period (extending from the signing of the DoP in 1993 to the present). The study introduces and applies the analytical tools offered by Michel Foucault to the information made available in the publications of USAID and the World Bank, the two largest funders of CSOs in the OPT. Combined with the data and analyses offered by scholars and activists in a number of studies and first-hand accounts

(some of which have been referenced in this introduction), a critical analysis of this information allows for bringing to light and theorizing the power-relations, control mechanisms and other disciplinary strategies governing the interactions of international donors with local organizations.

A number of qualifications regarding the scope of this study should be made. First, one consequence of the Oslo process and the creation of the PA has been the growing tendency among donors, development organizations and scholars to overwhelmingly focus on the Palestinians living in the OPT. This focus leads to the marginalization of the majority of Palestinians (i.e. the Palestinian refugees living in neighboring Arab countries and the diaspora internationally). As such, it contributes to the fragmentation of the Palestinian body politic, in ways that are not matched by the ways this population is unified. The civil society-initiated call for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS), collaboratively launched in 2005 by over 170s Palestinian CSOs from the diaspora, the OPT, neighboring Arab countries and Israel, illustrates the restrictiveness of such an approach in light of the ways in which Palestinians, despite their regional and global dispersal, are a collectivity. The exclusion in this study of Palestinian CSOs outside the OPT, it should thus be noted, is a function of the donors' own overwhelming focus on the OPT, rather than a statement about the Palestinians as a people.

Second, civil society in the OPT comprises a diverse array of organizations, including: the charitable and religious organizations (some of which such as the Islamic Society, the Orthodox Club and the numerous *zakat* and a*wqaf* societies have a history extending as far back as the Ottoman period); organizations that have their roots in the popular committees established in the 1970s and 1980s; the organizations established by the Islamist political party Hamas in its efforts to emulate the popular committees; more recently established Islamic organizations not linked to

Hamas; and the advocacy organizations established in the post-Oslo period, among others. This study focuses on those organizations that became increasingly reliant on donor funding, namely, CSOs that have their roots in the popular committees and the advocacy organizations established in the post-Oslo period.

Third, it is important to recognize that donors themselves are not homogenous. This study focuses on the role of major international donors, such as major development organizations, the aid agencies of donor states and other quasi-governmental organizations. Palestinian diaspora and other community organizations that provide comparatively small amounts of solidarity assistance and the international NGOs that provide limited funding to CSOs in the OPT will not be discussed.[34]

This study comprises two main chapters. Chapter Two focuses on the pre-Oslo period. It begins with a brief discussion of the socioeconomic and political conditions that underpinned the emergence of the popular committees in the 1970s and 1980s. For ease of illustration, the discussion will then focus on one grouping of organizations: the medical relief committees. It will, however, also briefly touch on organizations working in other important fields including agricultural, women and labor organizing. This chapter highlights the conditions under which these CSOs emerged, the relationships that linked them to the local communities, their interactions with the Israeli military government in the context of the violences of colonialism and occupation, their role in intra-Palestinian social contestation, the role they played during the first intifada, and their gradual formalization and institutionalization. Although the term civil society—not yet *en vogue* internationally—was rarely used by the activists and intellectuals who pioneered what became to be locally known as the 'popular movement,' its content was demonstrably present. The striving for bringing about social and political change, the open organizational structure and the gras-

sroots mode of organizing of these organizations, it is further maintained, renders them more amenable to a Gramscian conceptualization of civil society.

Chapter Three focuses on the power-relations that govern the interactions of foreign donors with local CSOs in the post-Oslo period. It begins with a brief discussion of socioeconomic and political conditions in the post-Oslo period, highlighting the role international donors played in shaping them. The discussion then moves to investigating the power-relations, control technologies and disciplinary mechanisms that characterize the interactions of international donors with local CSOs. It proceeds to describe and analyze the discourses, the quantitative and statistical research, and the bureaucratic structures/administrative techniques deployed and built by international donors. This discussion focuses on the World Bank and USAID, the two largest funders of CSOs in the OPT in the post-Oslo period, both implementing multi-year wide-reaching civil society programs and projects. It is maintained that the discourses deployed by these institutions have the disciplinary function of partitioning social space into incommensurable 'civic' and 'political' spheres, while the statistical analyses and administrative techniques they utilize function to ease the enforcement of such partition of social space by what are powerful, resource-rich actors, wielding the power to instill and promote and to marginalize and exclude.

After restating the main arguments presented in the two previous chapters, Chapter Four, the concluding chapter, considers the implications these have for the process of repoliticization of civil society, exemplified in the civil society-initiated BDS campaign, which has gained support from civil society globally, and in the mushrooming of a new generation of community-based popular committees protesting Israel's encroachments and its construction of the 'Separation Wall.' In light of these and other important recent developments, venues for future research are identified.

II. CIVIL SOCIETY AND COLLECTIVE ACTION

It has become a constant refrain among observers and scholars that the important question to ask when it comes to the first intifada is not why it did happen but why it happened when it did and not before. Some scholars have pointed to a number of momentous local and regional political developments that left their mark on the OPT. These include the election in 1977 for the first time in Israel of a right-wing Likud government that took upon itself the tasks of deepening and entrenching the occupation, the so-called 'autonomy plan' Israel attempted to impose on the OPT as part of the Camp David peace accords it was negotiating with Egypt, and forcing the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) out of Lebanon in 1982.[1] Noting that the intifada did not come until years later, others have pointed to the Israeli policies of forced economic integration and large-scale land expropriation. By contributing to the rise of wage labor and the expansion of an Israel-dependent services sector, these policies contributed to depeasantization and the expansion of the middle class, giving rise to a 'changing social ontology', to use the words of Glenn Robinson, premised on the breaking of old forms of identity and creating new ones.[2] These developments are important. However, unless one subscribes to a strict structuralist reading, alone they cannot explain the unprecedented levels of political mobilization and collective action that observers unanimously agree permeated all sectors of Palestinian society during the intifada and distinguished it from the numerous civil insurrections that preceded it.[3] In this chapter, I argue that the CSOs Palestinians built in the 1970s and 1980s played an essential role in securing these high levels of collective action.

Collective action requires not only that perceptions of common interest reach levels sufficient enough to ignite and sustain a wide-reaching social movement, but also a politics of mobilization and well-thought-out recruitment and organization strategies.[4] This chapter delineates the processes through which the 'popular movement'—the term Palestinians used to refer to the

grassroots relief committees, voluntary work committees, women groups, labor unions and student groups that sprang up in the mid-1970s—actively sought mobilization politics and its attendant recruitment and organization strategies in the face of colonialism and repressive Israeli policies. The popular movement sought to translate *sumud* (steadfastness), the concept that had emphasized endurance and communal survival, into the more proactive concept of *sumud wa muqawama* (steadfastness and resistance), which denoted actively seeking to undermine Israeli control by building a power base that can effectively challenge the military government's colonial policies. S*umud wa muqawama* involved a two-pronged strategy: First, encouraging disengagement from the Israeli military government. Second, building an alternative Palestinian institutional infrastructure in order to take control of as many areas of human existence as possible.

With these objectives in mind, an emerging elite of university graduates and young professionals worked to build an expansive network of *utur jamahiria* (mass organizations). These organizations sought not only to serve the needs and interests of ordinary Palestinians and to provide them with the basic social services denied them by the Israeli military government, but also to help them overcome the social cleavages that were exploited by the occupying power.[5] Both the objectives the organizers and activists who build these organizations sought to accomplish, as well as the ways in which they utilized the same organizations to accomplish them are consistent with the oppositional approach to civil society discussed in the introduction. More specifically, they are consistent with Gramsci's understanding of civil society. Departing from orthodox Marxism, Gramsci conceived of civil society within the framework of his concept of hegemony.[6] He saw civil society as an important element in the superstructural realm of ideas and ideologies, theorizing it as the sphere of voluntary acceptance (as opposed to ‘political socie-

ty,' which he associated with coercion) in which counter-hegemonic social forces can cultivate the kind of solidarity and broad social consensus necessary for contesting a hegemonic class or state power.[7]

In the OPT, a new elite made up of university graduates and young professionals built and led the popular movement.[8] They consciously sought to undermine not only Israeli colonial control but also the social position of the traditional Jordan-allied elite, who were used by both Jordan and Israel as instruments of social control. Since the Israeli military government outlawed the main political parties and virtually all forms of political organizing, the new elite and the national movement chose to focus on building mass organizations to bring about a break with the status quo and introduce a new social cognitive state premised on the viability of Palestinian independence and self-organization.[9] These organizations allowed the new elite to initiate contact and build relationships with the OPT's rural population and underprivileged communities and start the work of forging the necessary social solidarity that Gramsci had identified with the ability to foster a coherent opposition to an ideological enemy or an oppressive state. As this led to the hegemony of the new elite by the mid-1980s, the stage was set for the shift from a war of position to a war of maneuver in the form of the intifada.[10]

This chapter contains five sections. It begins by describing the socioeconomic and political conditions that underpinned the emergence of the popular movement. The discussion then proceeds to tracing the emergence of one set of mass organizations, the medical relief committees. This section highlights how these organizations approached heath in the unique context of the OPT, shedding light on how organizers understood social and political conditions in the OPT and how they approached recruitment and organization. Next, the discussion moves to an analysis of their role, together with organizations working in the fields of agriculture, labor and

women organizing, in intra-Palestinian politics and social mobilization. The following section describes the role of mass organization during the first intifada. It also highlights how the intifada itself spawned the 'popular committees.' The final section recapitulates the main argument and sheds light on the re-orientation of OPT-based CSOs towards non-Palestinian and non-Arab sources of funding.

1. The Socioeconomic Backdrop

Preventing the division of the land between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River into two sovereign political and economic entities, while simultaneously negating the establishment of a single political and economic unit, has been the principle guiding Israeli policy towards the OPT since it took control over them in June of 1967.[11] The latter option would bring about the integration of Palestinians into the Israeli polity, generating a new and, from the Israeli perspective, undesirable political reality. In contrast, preserving the 'Green Line' and not annexing the OPT could lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state: another unacceptable outcome. Israeli policymakers chose to implement an alloyed set of policies that consisted of integrating the OPT into Israel economically and administratively, while keeping the Palestinian population deprived of any political rights. These policies sought to preclude the emergence of a Palestinian state and thwart the development of a supporting economic and institutional infrastructure. Nonetheless, the policies of economic and administrative integration existed in tension and their interface produced contradictions that undermined the Israeli military government's control over the Palestinian population and over what happens in the OPT.

The policy of economic integration was lauded by Israeli policymakers as a means for 'normalizing the occupation.'[12] It was expected to improve living standards, and by virtue of such improvement, decrease opposition to the occupation, making it easier for Israel to continue to hold onto the OPT. In reality, economic integration was premised on a combination of market

forces and coercive measures of administrative and legal nature that guaranteed the protection of Israeli economic ventures and interests in the face of vulnerable Palestinian producers and unprotected Palestinian labor. To begin with, Israel created a particular trade regime that worked against the interests of Palestinians. In order to preserve the advantage enjoyed by Israeli producers, the movement of Palestinian agricultural and manufactured goods into Israel was strictly controlled (although the Green Line was practically eliminated shortly after the beginning of the occupation). When movement controls were eventually eased, limitations were imposed on competing economic activities within the OPT, leading to a very slow rate of growth in productive capacity.[13] Meanwhile, Israeli goods had free access to Palestinian markets. In addition, Israel determined external trade arrangements according to its own interests, allowing Palestinians to import only through its markets and having full control over revenues from import taxes. As a result, the OPT became Israel's second largest export market (only after the United States and with an export value of $800 million by 1986).[14] Palestinian trade became heavily dependent on Israel for both imports and exports. With trade flows heavily weighted in Israel's favor, the Palestinian trade deficit reached 25 to 30 percent of GDP.[15]

With regard to labor policy, Palestinian laborers were allowed to work in Israel. However, lacking the benefits and securities Jewish labor enjoyed through its trade union federation, the *Histadrut*, Palestinian labor constituted an almost limitless pool of cheap labor that could be hired on a casual basis in response to the expansion and contraction of the Israeli economy. In the meantime, the better wages offered in Israel placed an obstacle in the way of local Palestinian industry, which did not benefit from state subsidies or other forms of assistance offered to Israeli industry.[16]

Within the OPT themselves, neither a monetary nor a macroeconomic policy aimed at serving the Palestinian economy was implemented. In fact, the local banking system was ordered to close in 1967 and not allowed to reopen until the 1980s—and even then it had to endure severe restrictions.[17] The dismantling of the local financial system denied the OPT the necessary instruments of capital accumulation, making it very difficult for individual savings to make their way into productive local investment. Coupled with the deficit in the balance of payments, with the Palestinians importing far more than they exported, this meant that almost all Palestinian earnings were channeled back to the Israeli economy. On the other hand, the Palestinian economic infrastructure suffered from years of purposeful neglect. The average annual spending on development by the military government did not exceed 12 percent of the total value of total fixed capital (even though it levied excessive taxes).[18] This low rate of investment in public development (3.5 percent of GDP compared to an average of 7.0 percent in comparable developing countries), which was unchanged in the period between 1967 and 1994, had an adverse impact on local infrastructure.[19]

Municipal planning and the creation of industrial zones and irrigation projects were strictly limited and the municipal water and electric enterprises were made dependent on Israel but continued to lack the necessary funds for expansion and modernization.[20] The development of the transport system in the West Bank reflected the transportation and communications needs of Israeli settlers rather than the Palestinian population. For example, it became increasingly easy to drive from Israel to Jewish settlements in the OPT without passing through Palestinian population centers.[21] Meanwhile, lack of investment in health facilities led to a decline in the number of available hospital beds and the decline in the square footage of schoolrooms contributed to crowdedness and a deteriorating educational structure.[22] The restrictions placed on Palestinian

use of land and water resources were even more damaging. Through land confiscation, either by declaring Palestinian land state land or by expropriating it for military purposes or settlement construction, the Israeli authorities seized more than 52 percent of the land in the West Bank and more than 30 percent in the Gaza Strip, contributing to a 22 percent decline in agricultural land cultivation between 1967 and 1984.[23] The military government also removed more than 78 percent of renewable waters in the West Bank and one-third of the renewable water supply in the Gaza Strip, directing it towards Israel.[24] As a result, Palestinian water consumption increased by only 10 percent in the period between 1967 and 1994, in spite of the fact that the population had doubled.[25]

Sara Roy describes the combined effects of these policies as a process of 'de-development', designed 'to ensure that there will be no economic base, even one that is malformed, to support indigenous existence.'[26] Still, due to external labor earnings, either from the remittances funneled back to the OPT by Palestinians working in the Arab Gulf States or the earnings of Palestinian day laborers working in Israel, growth rates and living standards improved substantially during the 1970s and early 1980s. Thus, improvement in the Palestinian's standards of living was concomitant with the degradation of their economy.

Economic integration existed in tension with the policy of administrative integration devised by Israeli policymakers to ease administering the OPT and ensure that Israel will be able to continue holding onto them. Israeli economic policies had the effect of undermining the Israeli-Jordanian power-sharing arrangement, one of the hallmarks of the Israeli policy of administrative integration. Shortly after the beginning of the occupation, Israel and Jordan agreed on an informal power-sharing arrangement that was viewed as mutually beneficial. Israel permitted Jordan to continue to pay the salaries of civil servants and bureaucrats in OPT's *awqaf* (public religious

trust), health and education departments, as well as to preserve the Jordanian dinar as one of the legal tenders. This gave Jordan the opportunity to capitalize on the institutional ties it had cultivated in the West Bank to compete with the PLO for influence and secure a role for itself in any political settlement. For Israel, in return, relying on the Jordanian administrative infrastructure allowed it to abdicate some of its responsibilities under international law to look after the interests of the Palestinian population under its control. Also, just as allowing Jordan to maintain its institutional ties with OPT created a sense of continuity consistent with the Israeli policy of normalizing the occupation, the power-sharing arrangement gave Israel the opportunity to capitalize on the Jordanian hopes of reclaiming control over the West Bank to undermine the PLO and undercut the emergence of a local-based Palestinian national movement.

The traditional elite, made up of landlords and extended family notables, whose support Jordan had cultivated to strengthen its hold over the local population, came to play an important role in the Israeli-Jordanian power-sharing scheme. Following Jordan's *de facto* annexation of the West Bank in 1950, Jordanian policymakers had sought to strengthen their hold on society by replicating the political formula they believed had served them so well within Jordan proper. This meant reinforcing patriarchal structures, based on personalized ties with the local landlords and the notables of extended families, rather than building institutionalized relationships as the basis for political participation.[27] After 1967, both Jordan and Israel attempted to once again employ the same strategy, using political patronage, through employment in public institutions and other benefits, to win the loyalty of and lend support to the traditional elite.

However, the social position of the Jordan-allied traditional elite (together with the power-sharing scheme that was dependent on it) was undermined by the Israeli policies of forced economic integration and of confiscating and restricting the use of land and water resources. These

policies precipitated a pronounced decline in subsistence and traditional labor intensive agriculture and forced a large number of Palestinian peasants and small farmers to join the majority of Palestinian refugees in seeking employment in Israel, primarily as unskilled and semiskilled laborers in the construction, services and agricultural sectors.[28] At the same time, wide-scale land expropriation led to the gradual politicization of the Palestinian countryside. The decline of the traditional agricultural sector contributed to a process of ‘depeasantization’, which, combined with the lack of significant industrial development and the military government's tight zoning policies that inhibited urbanization, encouraged the migrant character of labor and the transformation of the peasantry into a rural proletariat.[29] This process of depeasantization contributed to the erosion of traditional land-owning elite's rural social base and helped undermine its social position, Jordanian and Israeli efforts to bolster it notwithstanding.

Simultaneously, the power of the traditional elite was being challenged from another social quarter. In spite of it being based on ominous sectoral imbalances and dependence on the Israeli labor market, the economic growth the OPT witnessed in the 1970s contributed to the expansion of the Palestinian middle class. As Salim Tamari noted at the time, it was this mostly urban class of traders and shopkeepers that spearheaded the strikes and similar acts of civil disobedience and resistance to Israeli occupation in the late 1960s through the late 1970s.[30] The middle class was more willing to identify with the PLO. The first major challenge it posed for the traditional elite, and by extension its Jordanian and Israeli patrons, came with the municipal elections of 1976. Since mayors and councilpersons in most West Bank townships were appointed by Jordan, extending their tenure was consistent with both the power-sharing arrangement Israel had with Jordan and its policy of normalizing the occupation. The municipal elections of 1972, the first since the onset of the occupation and boycotted by the PLO, reinstated the existing mayors and

were perceived as a victory by both Jordan, which accorded the elected mayors post facto recognition, and Israel. However, when the PLO endorsed the municipal elections planned for April of 1976, PLO-aligned middle class candidates swept away the traditional elite to become the mayors and councilpersons of most West Bank cities and townships.[31] The new mayors and councilpersons joined representatives of trade unions, professional associations and other political activists to form the National Guidance Committee (NGC), which called for a complete end to the occupation and opposed talks on Palestinian 'autonomy' between Israel and Egypt at Camp David.[32]

The Israeli military government responded by deporting some of the elected mayors and imprisoning other leaders or placing them under home arrest. Furthermore, in its efforts to undermine the NGC it fell back once more upon the Jordan-allied traditional elite. It created the 'Village Leagues': a network of landlords and notables aimed at undermining the credibility of the NGC's nationalist middle class leadership. The first Village League, headed by former Jordanian cabinet minister Mustafa Dudin, was established in the Hebron district in 1978. The military government issued a series of military orders authorizing it to form an armed militia and to arrest and detain political activists. Like the other leagues established in the following four years in the Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jenin, Tul-Karem and Nablus districts, it was also authorized to carry out administrative and bureaucratic tasks such as issuing work permits, driver's licenses and permits for family reunification.[33]

The Village Leagues experience was both short-lived, having completely vanished by 1983 thanks to fierce local resistance and PLO opposition, and counterproductive, since the highly publicized popular campaigns launched by the NGC and the PLO against the Leagues rendered the rural population more politically aware and involved. It, nonetheless, underscored the mar-

ginal role the Palestinian countryside played in previous strikes and civil disobedience initiatives and gave credence to the perception that rural areas remained unfazed by the inroads made by the PLO and the local national leadership.[34] As it became clear that mobilizing the countryside, where 80 percent of Palestinians lived, was essential both for undermining the hegemony of the traditional elite and for effectively counteracting Israeli policies and resisting the occupation, the emerging middle class leadership was encouraged to build networks of voluntary work and relief committees in order to establishing links with the rural population.

2. Civil Society at Work: the Case of Health

The military government's dismantling of the NGC and persecution of elected mayors convinced local leaders and activists that new strategies were needed and local national institutions had to be built not only to respond to the needs of the local population and ensure communal survival (the strategy of *sumud* adopted by the local urban leadership in the early 1970s and supported by the PLO), but also to proactively and more effectively counteract the policies of the Israeli military government and undermine its control (the strategy of *sumud wa muqawama*).[35] As noted by Liza Taraki, 'as the occupation encroached on the "national institutions" and targeted the political leadership, the national movement had two options: either confine itself to clandestine work but sacrifice a growing mass base; or evolve alternative, open structures that would be more difficult to destroy'. This led to the realization that 'efforts had to be directed to addressing the concrete needs of different sectors of society within the framework of mass organizations.'[36] The new strategy emphasized re-energizing the labor unions and professional associations that predated the occupation and instigated a new drive towards institution-building, which rested on building voluntary work and relief committees and women organizations. The discussion in this section will focus on the health relief committees.

A decade after the onset of occupation it was becoming abundantly clear that general health indicators were unanimously in decline. When examined in relation to comparable cases such as those of Jordan and Syria, it was quickly discovered that both the infant mortality rate and the physician-to-population ratio were slipping behind (the latter despite the availability of a large pool of unemployed Palestinian physicians).[37] The number of hospital beds was also in decline (from 2.6 hospital beds per 1,000 population in 1974 to 1.8 in 1985)[38] and morbidity levels, malnutrition and parasite infestation were high, reflecting the generally low health status of the population. The Israeli military government's expenditure on health services in the OPT amounted to US$30 per person (compared with US$350 government expenditure per person within Israel) and there existed severe imbalances in terms of expenditure, favoring hospitals over primary health care centers and towns over rural areas.[39] These conditions underscored the need for developing an alternative Palestinian health infrastructure that is independent of the Israeli military government.

Still, the founding of the first medical relief committee in 1979 was precipitated by events on the ground. The committee began as a mobile clinic intended to extend help to the residents of the city of Hebron, which the Israeli military had put under strict curfew, not allowing people to leave their houses except for a few hours each day, for more than a month. Since the Israeli military also barred Palestinians from entering or leaving the city, when residents did manage to get to hospitals and clinics during non-curfew hours, they found them severely under-supplied and understaffed because medical supplies and employees living outside the city could not pass through the Israeli military blockade. The mobile clinic was organized by a group of physicians, nurses, laboratory technicians and other health professionals who worked at the Jerusalem-based Augusta Victoria, St. Joseph's and Al-Maqasid hospitals. They gathered medical supplies from

local pharmacies and used their private cars to drive to the city of Hebron in a show of solidarity and with the objective of providing the city's residents with much needed medical care and supplies. When the Israeli military persisted in refusing to let them into the city, instead of giving up the organizers decided to take their expertise and medical supplies to the Dihishah refugee camp on the outskirts of the city of Bethlehem, on the road between Jerusalem and Hebron.

Encouraged by the positive response with which their efforts were met at the refugee camp, organizers began organizing other mobile clinics, relying on medical supplies donated by local hospitals and pharmacies and using their private cars to drive to remote and under-served villages. Within a year, the organizers and volunteers who worked in Jerusalem, but hailed from different areas in the West Bank, were able to treat more than 2,000 patients.[40] As they began to enlist the aid of colleagues and health facilities in various West Bank districts to contribute to the service of the local community, a number of localized volunteer groups emerged; each forming a ‘committee’ of active members that oversaw and coordinated local volunteer activities in different areas of the OPT. Nine such committees, operating in the areas of Jerusalem, Ramallah, Nablus, Hebron, Bethlehem, Gaza, Jenin, Tulkarem/Qalqilya, and the Jordan Valley, existed in 1982. In 1983, the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees (UPMRC) was established in order to link the various committees together, in a bid to coordinate the activities of the hundreds of volunteers who worked within these committees and build the necessary administrative and financial support infrastructure. The founding of the UPMRC was also encouraged by the growing realization, built on the practical experience of organizers and volunteers, that the existing health infrastructure and the situation on the ground ‘necessitated a fundamental structural change.’[41]

Three main types of health providers had existed in the OPT since 1948: the United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which provided primary health services to registered Palestinian refugees since its creation in 1948; the primarily for profit private sector (although some health-focused charitable societies did provide limited services); and the public healthcare system, where the majority of Palestinians had sought and received health care and which fell under Israeli control with the onset of occupation in 1967 and was rapidly deteriorating. Unlike all three, the founding of the UPMRC was grounded in the principle that the local community needed to own the various processes involved in the provision of health care by setting the agenda of priorities and participating in meeting them. The Union was established with the belief that

> the real measure of development is the ability of the people to build its own comprehensive and complimentary and independent infrastructure that is capable of dealing with its own problems, needs and aspirations.[42]

Israeli policies, which went beyond slashing health budgets to include the shutting down of many hospitals and health facilities, were understood as being aimed at the creation of a second-rate health care sector for the Palestinians, excluding them from a first-rate sector reserved for Israelis, while simultaneously claiming to have improved health conditions in the OPT.[43] Meanwhile, research also showed that infant mortality and malnutrition rates tended to be higher among girls than boys—a fact which the health professionals and activists that pioneered the mobile clinics and health relief committees argued reflected local traditional attitudes and could not be ascribed to the occupation. Thus, it was necessary to challenge not only Israeli policies, which reflected a desire to ensure dependence and control rather than a concern with the good health of the local population, but also dominant conceptions about health care and health care provision within the Palestinian society itself. According to Rita Giacaman and Mustafa Barghouthi, two founders of the UPMRC, prior to UPMRC's founding there had been two models of health care provision in

the OPT, but neither was capable of challenging or counteracting Israeli policies. The first model was based on adaptation. It was resigned to the reality of Israeli control of the public health care system, entertaining a belief in the possibility of improving it by abiding by military government regulations and dictates. This model also favored hospital-based and doctor-heavy healthcare with an emphasis on curative medicine at the expense of primary healthcare. Those who favored this model

> were primarily physicians who had dominated the old medical establishment and who have had considerable influence in shaping the medical care system in the country. Mostly members of the "old school" and graduates of the 1940s and 1950s, they constituted the medical elite and generally came from well-to-do backgrounds, with ties to the West, viewing the health services networks as another arena within which "development"—equated with Westernization—could be achieved. They understood health, disease, and medical care as simple and pure biological phenomenon, divorced from social, economic, and political contexts, and within a strict biomedical framework. Consequently, they equated health development with technical and medical development of premises, instruments, and procedures.[44]

The second model emerged in the early 1970s and was pioneered by nationalists advocating disengagement from military government-controlled public health system. Rooted in the concept of *sumud*, those who championed this model strove to build a Palestinian health care infrastructure independent of the Israeli military government. Charitable societies—such as Al-Maqassid Hospital in Jerusalem and the Red Crescent and Patient's Friends societies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip—which constituted the backbone of this model, were involved in intense struggles with the military government to obtain permits to build and operate health facilities. Although it was relatively successful in expanding the health care offered to Palestinians, this model still operated within the boundaries of military government's laws and regulations and risked allowing it to use health care provision as an instrument of social control. In many cases, even such an innocuous activity as holding a health education seminar required a permit from the military government. In order to be able to continue to operate some of the institutions based on this model had to distance themselves from the national movement. Others, like the Red Crescent

societies, faced such insurmountable difficulties when dealing with the military government that their efforts rarely led to any concrete results on the ground.[45] In addition, this model was largely urban-based and remained wedded to a centralized and biomedical approach to health care. Since it did not address the needs of the under-served sectors of the population, it could not effectively deal with the problems created by uneven development and social differentiation. By relying on charitable societies, this model risked strengthening personalized and clientelist networks at the expense of ones based on solidarity and egalitarian politics.

The model of health care provision introduced by the UPMRC sprang in part as a response to these two models and differed from them in its championing of four paradigmatic developments: First, although the founding of the Union signaled a shift from relief and emergency care to primary health care, it continued to empathize preventative, promotive and educational campaigns and activities instead of an excessive focus on curative measures. In the period between 1984 and 1987, it established 17 permanent health clinics, which functioned as 'health centers', focusing on 'prevention, education, first aid training, not just curative medicine.'[46] Second, the Union placed a great deal of emphasis on extending health care services to remote and under-served rural areas. A good number of the permanent health clinics it established were themselves located in rural areas and it supplemented the mobile clinics with health education campaigns that primarily targeted the population in rural and peripheral areas. Third, the model introduced by the Union was marked by decentralism and volunteerism. Even as the founding of the UPMRC signaled a shift towards institutionalization, a process was developed 'whereby each committee, often with one hundred or more members from the local communities, would elect a local executive committee to oversee activities in their region. These executive committees would then select representatives to the central board, many of whom sat on the organization's secretariat.'[47]

Two-thirds of UPMRC activities were carried out by 800 unpaid volunteers (nearly half of whom were physicians) and the Union insisted that each of the recipient communities established its own managerial committee and recruited candidates that it would train to function as local health workers. In 1984, it established its own School of Community Health to train the locally recruited candidates to become community health workers.[48] Finally, the UPMRC advocated total disengagement from the Israeli military government and noncompliance with its laws and regulations. It did not seek military government permits for the health clinics it established, nor were the mobile clinics and educational campaigns it ran authorized by the military government. The Union, according to Mustafa Barghouthi, was about two things:

> [S]elf-oragnization and defying the existing law. And in that sense, we created structures without even asking permission from the authorities.... I think we were an avant-garde in this field. We moved people around us. We showed them that it was possible to challenge the regulations and to change the behavior towards these regulations. What helped us was not only that we were fighting the Israeli occupation, but actually we were challenging a behavior that existed during Ottoman times, the British mandate and the Jordanian period.[49]

UPMRC's model of healthcare provision grew to become very popular, especially among the rural population, as it became not uncommon for rural communities themselves to approach people working with the Union asking them to extend their programs and services to their villages.[50] The UPMRC itself became particularly well-adept at mobilizing the local communities and encouraging them to participate in identifying and tackling health and social problems that had hitherto remained unresolved. That being said, it is important to situate the creation of the UPMRC within the local political context. Not unlike much of the grassroots organizing that went on during this period, the medical relief committees had began as a cross-factional project. Apart from institutionalization, the founding of the UPMRC also signaled a shift towards factionalization. The Union was established by organizers and activists affiliated with the Palestinian Communist Party (PCP—the Palestinian People Party after 1991).[51]

The popularity of the health care model the UPMRC championed, as well as its success in promoting community action and the drive towards institutionalization and factionalization at the heart of its founding, encouraged organizers and activists affiliated with other political parties to follow suit and establish other organizations that followed its lead. The first such organization was the Popular Committees For Health Services (PCHS), established by organizers and activists affiliated with the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) shortly after UPMRC's founding. Most of PCHS's founders were physicians and other health professionals employed at the Jerusalem-based Al-Maqassid Hospital. The concerns that galvanized them were the same as those behind the creation of the UPMRC, which the PCHS tended to mirror in both its social and political inclinations and mode of operation. According to one of PCHS's founders:

> In the 1970s Palestinian health care was in the hands of either reactionary elements in the Palestinian community [i.e., notables] or well-meaning but naive international organizations. For example, UN organizations dealt with Israelis when providing for Palestinians. Clearly, Israelis and Palestinians have different views of the needs of Palestinian health care. Besides, by dealing with the enemy, even these well-meaning organizations became suspicious in the eyes of many Palestinians. Also during the 1970s, about 70% of all health care personnel were in private practices. This was a problem because it meant that the overwhelming majority of doctors were either politically reactionary or too expensive for most Palestinians to afford, or both. As a result, Palestinians often would either not get proper care or would go broke getting it.[52]

The organization emphasized building links with local communities, championing primary and preventative health care and putting a great deal of emphasis on health education. In the words of one organizer:

> When we were working in hospitals, we were treating the symptoms of disease. But actually we learned about real disease in the field, in the village, in the house of the patient. We understood that we had to look for the sources of disease. … We understood that we can solve a lot of [health problems] by simply talking to the people, through health education.[53]

Like those of the UPMRC, PCHS's efforts were met with enthusiasm and grew in popularity. By 1987, the organization had established thirteen permanent primary health care clinics. Unlike the UPMRC, however, the PCHS had placed a greater deal of emphasis on meeting the health

needs of the population in the Gaza Strip. By 1989, the organization had nine Gaza Strip-based permanent health and dental clinics, which, according to PCHS's organizers, were the primary provider of health care services to more than fifteen percent of the Strip's population.[54] According to organizers, PCHS's volunteers numbered in the thousands and only two percent of the people working with the organization were paid staff.[55] While these numbers are plausible, given that the PFLP had a much larger mass following than that of the PCP, the organizers' claims that the recruitment of workers and volunteers did not follow factional lines ought to be taken with skepticism.

In 1984, health care professionals affiliated with the Democratic Front for Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) established the Union of Health Care Committees (UHCC). The UHCC was unique in that the Women's Action Committee, a women's organization affiliated with the DFLP, played a central role in its founding. It placed a great deal of emphasis on the health problems faced by women and linked health to the status of women within Palestinian society.[56] As with UPMRC and PCHS, mobile clinics were quickly supplemented with permanent clinics, 12 by 1988, that primarily catered for the population in rural areas. The clinics were staffed with 54 full-time employees and 450 unpaid volunteers who had been given medical and paramedical training.[57] In the same vein as UPMRC and PCHS, the UHCC did not shy away from explicitly linking the work it does to an overarching political agenda. According to the organization's charter:

> The UHCC is part of the national movement of our people fighting for their national rights, at the forefront of which are the right to return, to self-determination, and the establishment of an independent state.[58]

Like UPMRC and PCHS, UHCC linked health to socioeconomic conditions and the deprivation of Palestinians living in rural areas and the refugee camps. According to one of its founders,

> In the early 1980s there was a lot of thinking about general problems, especially medical problems, in Palestinian society. UNRWA and the government hospitals were only providing limited services, and, in a sense, were improper [i.e., politically]. The costs of private

> practices were very high in relation to Palestinian living standards so people just could not really afford them. The end result of this situation was that people were paying a very high price: their health. Some Palestinians were saying that big was better, that big machines and big hospitals were the solution. Others maintained that "only the end of occupation could bring about a solution to our problems. In the meantime, there is nothing we can or should do." We said that there is no end in sight to the occupation and to wait that long would be irresponsible. We have to do it ourselves. The problems we face—high mortality rate, family planning, hygiene, overcrowding, gastroenteritis, dehydration, infectious diseases, skin diseases, etc.—cannot wait for the end of the occupation.[59]

Organizers downplayed competition with other political factions as a motivating factor behind UHCC's founding. However, similarities in both ideological inclinations and mode of organizing, in addition to the fact that some of the founders of UHCC, like the founders of the PCHS, were among the organizers of the first mobile clinic organized in solidarity with the people of Hebron in 1979, underscore the role factional competition played. As alluded to above, the PCP played an important role in pioneering mass organizing as a means to broaden participation among wide sectors of the community in resisting the occupation. Given that it was outside the PLO and excluded from its structures in exile, the PCP deemed it necessary to strengthen its organizational structures and build grassroots support inside the OPT. Beyond working in the field of health, it founded voluntary work programs in the fields of agriculture and women organizing. It was also the PCP that initiated the organizing of labor and student movements, which enabled it to control labor and student unions and most professional organizations in the early 1970s.[60]

In response to the inroads made by the PCP, Fatah, the hegemonic political party within the PLO, played a pivotal role in the factionalization of student and labor organizations in the mid-1970s.[61] Still, motivated more by the requirements of intra-Palestinian political competition than conviction, Fatah's embrace of voluntary work and relief organizing was halfhearted and its efforts in the field of health work came relatively late. The Fatah-affiliated Health Services Committees (HSC) was the last to be established. HSC's first clinic was established in 1986, but the organization grew rapidly to encompass 85 clinics (largely due to the fact that it was joined

by many of the already existing Red Crescent and Patient's Friends societies). However, many of the services offered by HSC's newly established clinics were of questionable quality, prompting the organization to initiate a process of reorganization that ultimately led to greater centralization and the building of larger, more centralized and urban-based medical centers that did not rely on volunteerism in the provision of health care.[62]

Unlike organizations affiliated with the leftist parties, the HSC had no overt political agenda, viewing itself as a charitable organization and not as a grassroots popular organization. It was, in fact, officially registered with the Israeli Office of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (GOGAT) as a nonprofit NGO.[63] While HSC organizers claimed that more than 80 percent of the operating costs were recovered by the clinics themselves, others claimed that the organization relied on high rates of outside Arab funding. In 1978, the Arab League established the Palestinian-Jordanian Joint Committee (PJJC) to channel funds to the OPT in an effort to counter the Camp David 'autonomy' plan. Since Jordanian institutional and official ties with the West Bank were generally tolerated by Israel, Jordan's inclusion in the committee was necessary to make funding feasible. This inclusion, however, led to an uncomfortable working relationship between Fatah, which controlled the PLO, and Jordan, the result of which meant that most Arab funding found its way either to the more conservative institutions and charitable societies or to organizations affiliated with Fatah.[64] This situation suited Fatah, by nature an umbrella group that included notables and segments of the traditional elite within its ranks.[65]

Initially, health relief committees and mobile clinics relied on donations and locally-raised resources, but local fund-raising could not cover the rising operating costs associated with gradual institutionalization. While PLO funding was made available to the health organizations through their allied political parties in the early 1980s, PCHS and UHCC had a much diminished share of

the Fatah-controlled PJJC funds and the UPMRC was totally excluded (since the PCP did not join the PLO until 1986). Necessity demanded that the UPMRC would again lead the way in establishing contacts with donor NGOs. The organization received foreign funding for the first time in 1983, the same year it was founded.[66] PCHS and UHCC soon followed suit and subsidized PLO funding with international donor money. Initially, it was mostly Western humanitarian and faith-based organizations, such as Oxfam and Christian Aid, that provided funding to OPT-based organizations. After the break of the first intifada, a number of European solidarity organizations joined in providing funding to organizations working in the field of health. We shall return to disusing foreign funding later on. For now, the focus will turn to role the various health organizations—and the larger popular movement of which they were but one part—played in intra-Palestinian social contestation, political mobilization and resistance to Israeli occupation.

3. Civil Society and Social Mobilization

Since Israel outlawed the main political parties and virtually all forms of political organizing, it was inevitable that civil society and mass organizing will become a field of intense inter-party competition. The political parties had no choice but to fall back on the voluntary work, self-help and relief organizations—which for reasons discussed below were tolerated by the military government—as a means of recruitment and of cultivating and organizing a social base. In a narrow sense organizations functioned as a means of promoting a particular political faction or platform. Still, it was exactly the functions that the popular organizations performed in the stead of the various political parties during this period that gave civil society its legitimacy and quasi-representative stature.[67] Activists and organizers saw their activities and the services they provided as a means for achieving broader political ends. If the main goal was undermining Israeli

control, overlapping objectives enmeshed the voluntary work and relief committees in intra-Palestinian social contestation and the hard work of political mobilization. These required building relationships with local rural communities, necessitating a shift in focus from running mobile clinics to the building of permanent health facilities. According to one organizer in both the Women's Action Committee and the UHCC:

> There was a strong relationship between the women's committee and the village women, but we were more like outsiders. This is why we decided to change our policy from occasional visits to establishing permanent clinics. In this way we can cement the relationship between our union and the local population. Now, we are part of the community, can learn their needs and provide care appropriate for their situation.[68]

It is important to emphasize that it was new university graduates and young professionals that built the health relief committees and other *utur jamahiria* (mass organizations). Due to the expansion of the post-secondary education, these emerging elite were growing rapidly in the 1970s. While the actual building of Palestinian colleges and universities was entirely the initiative of Palestinian and international non-profit organizations, the Israeli military government permitted the expansion of post-secondary education in an effort to normalize the occupation and encourage Palestinians to seek jobs abroad, especially in the Gulf region.[69] The new colleges and universities provided a place for an emerging, mostly rural, though non-landed, generation of professionals to overcome the regional and class divisions that had historically fragmented Palestinian society and had been used by occupying powers to undermine collective national action.[70] More specifically, they played a pivotal role in the emergence of the mass organizations, which in many cases grew out of the community programs developed as part of the formal university curriculum to respond to concrete problems facing the local communities.[71] College and university-based voluntary and student groups also provided the pool of activists and young professionals who would later lead the mass organizations.

As the quotes provided in the previous section reveal, these young professionals were fully cognizant that their work in building the mass organizations was in part aimed at undermining the social position of the traditional elite. Going back to the Ottoman period, foreign powers—Turkey, Britain, Jordan and Israel—had fostered clientelist networks in an effort to use this class of local notables and land owners as tools of social pacification and political control.[72] The young professionals who made up the emerging new elite understood this very well. They aimed their efforts at superseding, and eventually supplanting, the services provided by the charitable societies, which were dominated by the traditional elite, who, with Jordan's support, used them as vehicles for the cultivation of patronage. This partly explains the emphasis the different health organizations placed on extending health services to the rural areas, where the traditional elite had its social base, and their focus on establishing regular contacts with the rural population and recruiting organizers and volunteers from the rural communities to work with the health organizations. The young professionals persisted despite being decried by the 'old school' medical establishment as being 'communists' and 'leftists' who 'sought to cheapen medicine by going to the villages.'[73] According to one physician working with PCHS:

> It was like a stigma asking my colleagues to participate in the [organization's] activities because they were hearing from the big doctors and specialists that we were cheapening medicine and ourselves. They could not understand why I would not open a clean orderly fancy clinic in Ramallah and let the patient come to me, instead of going to the village.[74]

Establishing contacts and building relationships with the rural population were also behind the building of the agricultural relief committees. These emerged in the early 1980s and witnessed a process of institutionalization roughly corresponding to the same timetable witnessed in the field of health.[75] They were established by young professional agronomists and agricultural engineers who provided agricultural extension services and technical advice to small farmers throughout the West Bank in an effort to reinvigorate the declining agricultural sector and to encourage Pal-

estinian self-sufficiency.[76] Beyond addressing the lack of agricultural extension services, the agricultural relief committees saw their work as a means of combating Jordan's alliance with the conservative wing of Fatah and its use of the JJPC to distribute agricultural support funds to traditional notables and landlords, in a process that was seen as giving precedence to the logic of political patronage over the requirements of development. In contrast, the new agricultural relief organizations encouraged self-reliance. The activists and organizers who established them saw their work as a means for undermining the monopoly the landlords, who were seen as benefiting from the system of occupation while small farmers suffered, had over the agricultural production process.[77] Small farmers had to face the many restrictions imposed by Israel (such as land expropriation, severe limitations on water use, production quotas and restrictions on the planting of fruit trees). Moreover, they did not benefit from state subsidies and were denied access to the Israeli market, while still having to compete in markets flooded with subsidized Israeli agricultural products. The new relief organizations set out to help small farmers overcome these hurdles through launching educational and pest control campaigns, improving farmers' access to credit facilities, supplying them with competitively priced tree seedlings, and introducing innovative marketing strategies. In the process, they facilitated the organization of farmers at the village level and encouraged the participation of the community in seeking solutions.[78]

The fact that rural Palestinians were increasingly employed in the construction and manufacturing sectors of the Israeli economy meant that the new elite's efforts had to be complemented with organizing in the field of labor. That Palestinians employed inside Israel paid dues to the Israeli trade federation, the Histadrut, but received no benefits from it, made reinvigorating Palestinian labor unions an even more pressing task. In the Gaza Strip, the six small labor unions that existed prior to the occupation had been shut down by the Israeli military government in 1967—and

even when allowed to reopen in 1979, they were not allowed to hold new elections or recruit new members. In the West Bank, the labor unions that existed under the umbrella of the labor federation prior to the occupation grew in number, but remained weak and the services they extended to workers were very modest. In fact, as early as in the mid-1970s, sociologist Salim Tamari had identified the weakness of labor unions and their failure to recruit effectively in the villages as one of the reasons behind the negligible contribution of peasant and migrant workers to the strikes and acts of self-disobedience that shaped Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation at the time.[79] In the late 1970s the situation began to change. Unions allied themselves with the national movement and existing political parties in the face of harassment and intimidation—which included the arrest or deportation of union leaders and the closing of union offices or completely banning them—employed by the Israeli military government in a bid to create an aura of fear to discourage new members from joining labor unions and keep the existing membership dormant. Nonetheless, in the West Bank, such unions as the Worker's Unity Bloc, the Progressive Workers' Bloc, and the Workers' Youth Movement—affiliated with the PFLP, the PCP and Fatah, respectively—grew in terms of membership and became more active. In the Gaza Strip, meanwhile, when Israel again shut down labor unions in 1986, two of the existing unions defied the orders of the military government and organized new elections early in 1987.[80]

It was clear that organizing Palestinian labor was inimical to the economic interests of Israeli businesses, which depended on cheap and dispensable Palestinian labor, especially since the unions fought for basic rights such as health insurance, worker's compensation and the right to organize. For its own reasons, the Israeli military government also took a dim view of re-energized labor unionism. The fact that Palestinian migrant laborers were not treated on an equal footing with Israeli labor, and sometimes subjected to mistreatment and abuse, gave them a set of

clear grievances against the occupying power. Meanwhile, the growing numbers of Palestinians seeking jobs in Israel (almost 50 percent of the Palestinian labor force by the mid-1980s) made it clear that the organization of this large social sector did not bode well for Israel's control of the OPT. The military government's reliance on repression to control and undermine labor unions was not always successful, however. Despite the arrests of leaders and activists following the decision taken by two Gaza Strip-based labor unions to defy the military government and hold new elections, the act of defiance had an electrifying impact, nourishing a growing readiness among laborers to defy military orders.[81]

In the meantime, Jordan was alarmed that the legitimacy the popular movement had accorded the new middle class elite was such that its growing power was threatening to eclipse that of its traditional elite allies. In 1986, with support from both Israel and the United States, King Hussein announced a five-year 'development plan' that was designed to cement the traditional elite's social position and strengthen Jordanian political control. With a proposed US$3 billion investment in the OPT, Jordan increased the salaries of public employees on its payroll, obtained the right to reopen the West Bank branches of the Cairo-Amman Bank (which had been shut down in 1967), established specialized regional development committees, extended financial aid to city and village councils, and established the Jerusalem-based An-Nahar newspaper.[82] Meanwhile, the military government accorded pro-Jordanian figures broad freedoms, allowing them to access Jordanian financing, establish a variety of institutions and hold public meetings.[83] But the break of the first intifada sealed the future of Jordan's 'development plan' and eroded the sliver of legitimacy still enjoyed by the traditional elite. In 1988, in a tacit acknowledgment of both the waning social position of his traditional elite allies and the inroads the popular movement and the PLO were able to make, King Hussein announced total Jordanian disengagement from the OPT.

By undermining the traditional elite, the mass organizations put an end to the Israeli-Jordanian power-sharing arrangement, used by both to control the Palestinian population and prevent the emergence of an OPT-based national movement.

The military government's tolerance for the voluntary work and relief organizations was informed by its strategy of ‘normalizing the occupation’. Israeli policymakers had hoped that by providing Palestinians with the basic social services the military government did not provide, these organizations would absorb their frustration. Furthermore, those organizations that were registered with the GOGAT—and, hence, subject to military government monitoring—functioned as a means of social control. As mentioned above, even the innocuous act of holding a health education seminar required the military government's approval. But, since the military government outlawed political organizing, dismantled the NGC and deported or imprisoned the elected mayors and other leaders, the medical and agricultural relief, voluntary work committees, women's organizations and labor unions became the sole venue available for political expression and organization. Organizers and activists combined the provision of social services with political activism, using the ‘parallel services’ as a means for initiating contact with potential constituencies and to organize a social support base. The same non-profit and service provision organizations that had been used by the military government as a means of normalizing the occupation were converted into a means of undermining Israeli control.

The mass organizations functioned as an independent local institutional infrastructure—as a ‘shadow government,’ to use the term used by Manuel Hassassian—giving Palestinians not only a means to improve their lives, but also the parallel social support mechanisms used by them to ‘outadminister’ the occupation.[84] Outadministering the occupation, as noted by Joost Hiltermann, depended not on confronting its vastly superior military but on eroding the legitimacy of its gov-

ernment.[85] By allowing political parties to reach those areas of daily life that the military government could not reach, and by giving them the opportunity to mobilize people whose loyalty it could not win, the mass organizations made outadministering the occupation possible, creating a new level of consciousness which, with the break of the first intifada, culminated in a complete rapture with the status quo ante of dependence on Israel.[86]

4. Civil Society and the First Intifada

The mass organizations functioned as institutional support structure for resistance that was used by Palestinians to 'outadminister' the occupation. When the first intifada broke out in December of 1987, these same organizations became its source of direction and continuity. This took place on two levels: First, the mass organizations allowed Palestinians to sustain the intifada beyond the strikes and street demonstrations. To focus again on the health sector, just as they had to creatively respond to the exigencies of the intifada, health organizations had to fill the gaps created by the new obstacles—including the cutting of the health budget in half, raising the fees paid for health care and terminating patient transfers to Israeli hospitals—which the military government had imposed on the already underfunded and overwhelmed governmental health sector after the intifada began.[87] Health organizations focused on extending urgently needed health care to the injured in the villages and refugee camps who could not reach the hospitals in the main urban centers. During the first year of the intifada, there were over 20,000 causalities sustained as result of confrontations with the Israeli army. Within the same year, UPMRC established five first-aid centers, organized more than 1,000 first-aid training sessions, and distributed more than 19,000 first-aid kits. The Union also created the first computerized national blood donor system, which was direly needed due to the high rate of injuries requiring blood transfusion.[88]

The responses of the other health organizations were similar. In contrast with their earlier focus on extending health services to rural areas, PCHS and UHCC devoted their energies to first aid and focused on establishing permanent health clinics in the refugee camps, which became the main line of confrontation with Israeli soldiers. Meanwhile, the military government's insistence that government hospitals compile lists of the patients who were treated for injuries incurred as a result of confrontations with Israeli soldiers vindicated the drive for disengagement championed by the health relief organizations, prompting physicians working in the public sector to refuse to comply with the orders of the military government and participate in the relief campaign. According to Rita Giacaman and Mustafa Barghouthi, along with the organizations working in other sectors, it was

> precisely this infrastructure that succeeded in sustaining the uprising through the force of a strongly emerging collective consciousness, through the realization that health sector planning must take into consideration a balance between national and professional considerations and, in the end, through the sense of empowerment that was reinforced with the declaration of the Palestinian state on November 15, 1988.[89]

Second, emphasizing the role of the mass organizations as instruments of political mobilization, the intifada produced the 'popular committees.' Underscoring the need to expand their organizational base, these mirrored the mass organizations by combining providing the population with basic services, which became even more direly needed after the intifada began, with advocating total disengagement from the military government. The popular committees, which mushroomed in almost every locality, existing at the neighborhood level in the cities and refugee camps and the community level in the countryside, were designed to be democratic and non-factional. Usually, meetings for entire neighbor-hoods were held. After volunteers were recruited for committees specializing in the areas of education, health, food relief, agriculture and security, a follow-up committee, made up of one member from each of the five committees in addition to two or three other individuals were elected.[90]

The popular committees became essential to responding to the needs of afflicted communities and sustaining Palestinian day-to-day life. As food shortages became severe due to the long curfews imposed by the military government on refugee camps and some towns and villages, the food relief committees responded by collecting imperishable foodstuff donations and secretly distributing them in the areas under curfew. Similarly, the education committees responded to the closure of universities and the lack of access to schools in the areas under curfew by organizing informal classes that were usually held at the teachers' homes or in mosques and churches. The sheer number of the popular committees (estimated at around 45,000 by mid-1988)[91] and the speed with which they were created and mobilized, it is important to emphasize, owed to the fact that the vast network of organizers and activists who were active in student groups, labor unions, women and relief organizations prior to the intifada formed their organizational core. To give an example from the agricultural sector, by the beginning of 1989 the various agricultural relief organizations had helped establish and worked with more than 190 village-, camp- and town-level agricultural relief popular committees. These committees became the backbone of the intifada's 'back-to-the-land' self-sufficiency movement that contributed to a substantial rise in the OPT's agricultural output.[92]

The popular committees played an important role in promoting disengagement from the military government. They promoted self-sufficiency and the boycott of Israeli products, encouraged the whole-sale resignation of the police force and tax collectors, and advocated abstaining from paying taxes and the refusal to carry the military government-issued identity cards. They were able to bring about a successful break with the Israeli 'civil administration.' The military government was able to partially reverse these gains through launching campaigns of forceful tax collection and using other repressive measures such as issuing a military order in August of 1988

mandating that participation in popular committees of any kind carried a ten-year prison sentence. Nonetheless, as Salim Tamari noted at the time, a lasting rupture in the realm of consciousness was achieved that made the restoration of the pre-1987 relationship of dependence on Israel unthinkable.[93]

5. Final Assessment

The discussion in this chapter has emphasized the ways in which the popular movement and its constituent organizations were rooted in the concept of *sumud wa muqawama* (steadfastness and resistance). The two-pronged strategy of disengagement from the Israeli military government and building alternative Palestinian institutions was conceived of as a means of going beyond communal survival to the rooting of Palestinians in their land and encouraging active resistance to Israeli repression and colonialism. The popular movement made a valuable contribution to the political mobilization of the Palestinian population living under Israeli occupation. Having been established by an emerging elite of young middle class professionals, the *utur jamahiria* (mass organizations) were instrumental in enabling this new elite to establish contacts and build relationships with the Palestinian rural population. By doing so, they enabled Palestinians to overcome social fragmentation, an accomplishment amply demonstrated in the unprecedented widespread involvement by the rural population in resisting the Israeli occupation during the intifada. Moreover, by replacing the patronage and clientelism characteristic of the traditional elite-dominated charitable societies with an ethos of egalitarian solidarity, they enabled the new elite to undermine the hegemony of the traditional elite and to establish its own hegemony. The mass organizations laid down the organizational grounds for the first intifada and were essential to sustaining the high levels of collective action that ensured its continuity beyond the civil erup-

tions that took place on many previous occasions. While it might be an overstatement to say that the mass organizations produced the intifada, it is certain that they became its *modus operandi*.[94]

In the unique context of the OPT—defined by colonialism and violent repression—civil society did not reflect its traditional role of acting as a buffer between citizens and the state. To the extent that the Israeli military government assumed the role and the functions of a state, the Palestinian civil society was geared towards its negation and replacement. In the absence of a state and in light of the Israeli military government's dismantling of the NGC, banning of virtually all forms of political organizing and arrest or deportation of elected mayors and political leaders, Palestinian society was organized in and around the mass organizations. While the mass organizations allowed the PLO to maintain a concrete presence in the OPT and lay claim to the representation of the Palestinian people at large, the intifada bolstered the new elite, who played an important role in the leadership of both the mass organizations and the local political parties (largely independent of the PLO leadership in exile). During this period, as noted by Azmi Bishara, the Palestinian civil society was the Palestinian political society; the two were one and the same.[95]

The mass organizations nourished not only an atmosphere of social solidarity, but also participatory ethos and a democratic culture. By holding regular elections, they performed a semi-representative function and played an important role in sustaining critical debate over the course of Palestinian development.[96] However, being closely associated with the local political parties and deeply involved in the national movement meant that social change and specific issues were sometimes subordinated to the requirements of the national struggle. For example, the labor unions' all-consuming concern with the national cause sometimes distracted them from bread-and-butter issues and the long-term work of securing workers' basic rights.[97] Similar problems were

present in the field of women organizing. The women organizations' emphasis on the transfer of power to the community level, which they accomplished by building a vast network of community-based women committees, distinguished the services they offered—which included running daycare centers, literacy classes, income-generating projects and providing legal advice and employment support services—from those made available by urban-based charitable societies. The new women's organizations offered articulate critiques of gender inequality and broader development issues. Still, gender issues were more often than not subordinated to the national cause.[98] Also, there existed four networks of women's organizations, which triggered wasteful competition and duplication of resources and services. With the existence of four health relief organizations, four agricultural relief organizations, and three rival labor union federations, wasteful competition and duplication of resources were common in other fields. For example, the decision to establish a health clinic in one village instead of another was sometimes taken not on the basis of objective criteria pertaining to the needs of that particular community, but on the basis of political rivalry. This led to situation of uneven distribution in which one village might have two health clinics while many others had none.[99]

The above discussion has intimated that the mass organizations, especially those affiliated with the left-wing parties, were rooted in Third Worldism and its accompaniment critiques of development orthodoxies that emphasize centralized institutions with modern equipment over grassroots modes of organization and mobilization. International organizations such as USAID, UNDP and Unicef, among others, had for a long time been involved in providing money for projects that have been approved—and sometimes even selected—by the Israeli military government.[100] The organizers and activists who built the popular movement had done so partly in response to the practices of these organizations, which, they argued, rather than supporting inde-

pendent development had allowed aid to be used as an instrument of political control. Such misgivings notwithstanding, the considerable drop in regional funding levels witnessed in the late 1980s forced OPT-based CSOs to reorient themselves towards international—non-Palestinian, non-Arab and mostly western—sources of funding.

The drop in regional Palestinian/Arab funding levels had a number of reasons. With its 1988 disengagement from the OPT, Jordan put an end to the JJPC, making it difficult for the PLO to channel funds to the OPT. With the outbreak of the Gulf War two years later, moreover, the Arab Gulf states stopped making contributions to the PLO, further reducing its ability to support OPT-based organizations. The Gulf War also put an end to the Palestinian National Fund, which had enabled the PLO to raise five percent income tax on the salaries of Palestinians working in the Gulf States, channeling some of the proceeds to OPT. Meanwhile, the Gulf's Palestinian diaspora, which previously had independently financially assisted some of the organizations based in the OPT, was itself in need of assistance after the war.[101]

The resultant re-orientation towards non-Palestinian and non-Arab sources of funding had a lasting impact. It necessitated the creation of formalized executive structures and bringing in professional staffs to develop programs and secure the needed funding. Meanwhile, the new donors demanded that organizations be non-factional, initiating a drive towards less factionalism. At the same time, they emphasized accounting and reporting requirements and invested in improving managerial and technical capabilities (what they called ‘capacity-building’), reinforcing the drive towards more professionalization. This process led to the displacement of the concept of *sumud wa muqawama* with its emphasis on political mobilization and its replacement with new discourses centered on amorphous notion of ‘empowerment,’ which, while perhaps linked to individual betterment, said nothing about bringing about political transformation through mass

resistance. It was during this period that the focus on building health clinics, daycare centers, research think-tanks, etc., had completely displaced mobile clinics and voluntary work campaigns as the main methods of relating to the local population.[102] As would become clear in the years that followed, while a health care clinic may provide adequate and professional services, its mere existence is not an indicator of the presence of a social movement that embeds health in social mobilization, in resisting Israeli colonialism and in a new vision of development.

As a result of both the drive towards more professionalization and Israel's campaign of repression against the popular committees, only the institutionalized structures and physical buildings of the health clinics, agricultural research centers, daycare centers, etc., had survived by the time the Oslo process began. By then, these were almost completely dependent on the funding of the same international institutions whose problematic approach to development and complacency with the Israeli military government were subject to the critiques of the popular movement. As we shall see in the next chapter, Oslo brought with it not only unprecedented levels of funding but also new funding conditionalities and instruments of control that further reinforced the dis-embedding of the mass organizations—together with Oslo's own generation of NGOs—from the local population and their disengagement from mobilizational politics. As we shall also see, one of the new political realities brought about by Oslo was the institutionalization of the popular movement's gamble on Israel's desire of normalizing the occupation and its reluctance to invest in providing basic services to the Palestinian population under its control—which risked relieving Israel of one of its obligations, as an occupying power, under international law. While it brought Palestinians no meaningful independence from Israel, Oslo relieved it from the costs of occupation and, since it brought neither an end to the occupation nor a Palestinian state, made the

Palestinians almost completely dependent on international assistance. Aid once again became an instrument of political control.

III. CIVIL SOCUETY AND DISCIPLINE

Since the beginning of the Oslo 'peace-making' process in September 1993, international assistance to the OPT has been expended under the general headings of promoting 'democracy,' 'development' and 'peace.' These same agendas underpinned the financial support international donors extended to OPT-based CSOs: International donors supported advocacy groups and designed and financed numerous projects in the fields of elections, rule of law and civil society 'promotion.' They pressured the PA to privatize the delivery of basic social services, assigning the task of complementing its withdrawal to local NGOs.[1] They have also been engaged in promoting peace through the financing of 'people-to-people' NGOs and civil society initiatives.[2] However, as tensions and contradictions began to emerge among the 'democracy,' 'development' and 'peace' agendas, democracy and development were made subservient to safeguarding the viability of the Oslo process—a penchant, I maintain, that was reflected in donor support for Palestinian CSOs.

To be fully appreciated, the power-relations and associated mechanisms governing the interaction of international donors with local CSOs must be placed not only within the context of donor agendas themselves, but also within the context of the contradictions produced by the interface of the 'peace,' 'democracy,' and 'development' agendas. In a bid to safeguard the Oslo process, donors tolerated, sometimes even encouraged, the undemocratic practices of the PA. Importantly, because it had the potential of destabilizing the Oslo process, donor support to civil society groups and advocacy NGOs fell short of endorsing strategies that could induce a grassroots-based push for democracy. Under these conditions, the research think-tanks, human rights organizations, business associations and other advocacy groups they supported lacked the ability to meaningfully redefine formal politics. In the meantime, donors adopted discourses that emphasize the apolitical nature of civil society, extolling the virtues of 'civicness' and 'moderation.' By

so doing, they induced a partition of social space into two incommensurable ‘civic’ and ‘political’ spheres.

In like manner, as the OPT fell into a series of deep socioeconomic crises, international donors became concerned about Oslo's viability. Using the financial resources at their disposal, they utilized local CSOs not as incubators of real economic development, but as agents of social pacification. This desire to continue to use local CSOs as agents of social pacification, coupled with a desire not to support CSOs, constituencies or activities deemed threatening to the viability of the Oslo process, produced the need to limit and minimize uncontrollable social space. Disciplinary power derives from two things: the partition of space into surveillanble units and, then, making said units subject to administrative techniques and regulation. It is the desire on the part of donors to ensure that the space within which collective activities are performed is well-delineated and subject to effective surveillance and administrative regulation that underpinned their use of quantitative research and their construction of bureaucratic structures. In short, international donors employed disciplinary power to induce a double partition of social space, first, into incommensurable ‘civic’ and ‘political’ spheres, and, second, into surveillable social units more amicable to the requirements of management and control.

This chapter consists of three main sections. The first section discusses socioeconomic conditions in the OPT, highlighting the ways in which the donors' overriding concern with the viability of the Oslo process took precedence over any desire to see the emergence of a viable Palestinian economy or a more transparent and accountable PA. The next section constitutes the bulk of the chapter. Focusing on the World Bank and USAID, it presents evidence, in the form of discourses, survey research, and bureaucratic structures/administrative techniques, to support the contention that international donors used the power they had over the local population and the

resources at their disposal for the purposes of surveillance and political control. Concluding remarks are presented in a third and final section.

1. The Socioeconomic Backdrop

Just as the Oslo Accords created the PA, they delineated the powers and functions of what was expected to be a transitory governing structure.[3] The PA was varnished with executive, legislative and judiciary arms—the trappings of well-established states. However, its executive arm was granted a modicum of sovereign power (a contingent of nine thousand police personnel when it was first established) sufficient only for the proper policing of the population centers under its nominal control.[4] The Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), the PA's legislative arm, could debate policies and contemplate laws. Nevertheless, according to the Agreement on Preparatory Transfers of Powers and Responsibilities, whatever policies it wished to effect, or laws it wished to pass, must be 'secondary', consistent with existing agreements and laws, and subject to the approval of the Israeli authorities, which had the power to veto any proposed changes to existing laws.[5] In the economic field, the Paris Protocol on Economic Relations granted the PA limited economic powers (in such areas as finance, taxation, labor and agriculture), but these came at the expense of keeping the OPT's economy dependent on that of Israel and denying Palestinians free access to international markets.[6] In short, despite the creation of the PA, the Israeli military occupation, and the myriad of corresponding regulations and policies supporting it, continued to be the defining feature of the local context.

Since its creation in 1994, the PA has received an estimated US$15 to 20 billion in international assistance, making it the beneficiary of one of the highest and longest sustained levels of per capita multilateral foreign aid in the world.[7] Combined with the stronghold Israel has maintained over the Palestinian economy, which precluded economic independence and the emergence of a strong domestic productive sector, this level of foreign aid ensured that the PA will come to ex-

hibit the symptoms of a ‘rentier state’ without it being a state.[8] A rentier state has two defining features: First, the ability to survive and operate without having to negotiate with its own population issues of taxation and the allocation of resources. The PA's dependence on rent, in the form of foreign aid, enabled it to exist independently from society, with the freedom to implement unpopular polices without regard to public opinion. Believing it would enable the PA to be more accommodating in peace negotiations, donors encouraged the PA's unresponsiveness to the local population. Second, a rentier state employs rent for the production of patronage and political allegiance. In 2006, US$1.2 billion of the US$1.6 billion of the PA budget—underwritten by donors, except for the US$350 million of taxes collected by Israel—went to paying the salaries of its 160,000 employees.[9] While surely reflecting the PA's readiness to utilize employment to accrue political loyalty, this large public sector (an average of one public employee per 24 Palestinians) stands in marked opposition to the limited government orthodoxy generally pushed by donors. They, however, were ready to tolerate it, believing that it would consolidate support for the PA, equipping it to ‘carry the political tasks of the day.’[10]

Still, when it became clear that patronage politics alone did not produce the expected results, donors were willing to endorse repression (through rent-financed police and security organs) as they shifted to pressuring the PA to crack down on ‘militants’ and opposition to the Oslo Accords. The contingent of nine thousand police personnel first afforded the PA grew rapidly. By 2006, about 80,000 personnel, or half of the PA’s employees, were employed in its various police and security organs—a figure that translates to one security personnel per 48 Palestinians, perhaps the highest such ratio in the world.[11] This increase was necessary to meet Oslo's security prerogatives, which became more and more accentuated as new documents were added to the Accords. For example, the security provisions included in the 1998 Wye River Memorandum

created a framework that allowed torture, arbitrary arrests and unfair trials, resulting in increased human rights violations by the PA.[12] Endorsing repression produced a clear contradiction with the donors' ‘democracy’ agenda, centered on the promotion of the rule of law and human rights. As noted by Rex Brynen:

> The paradox of (donor supported) Palestinian NGOs criticizing (donor encouraged) security measures underscored the dilemmas of this entire sector. The maintenance of security was a fundamental part of any Palestinian-Israeli peace treaty. Although not all security measures involved human rights abuses, it was almost inevitable that any crackdown against radicals by the PA, would involve a substantial number of excesses. At the same time donors repeatedly emphasized the importance of human rights and democratic developments.[13]

Financing the PA's patronage networks also contradicted the donors' ‘development’ agenda. In the period between 1994 and 1998, the OPT's economic indicators were unanimously in decline: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell by 14 percent and, despite massive expansion in the size of the public sector, per capita income was falling and unemployment on the rise.[14] Even after the modest economic growth witnessed in 1998 and 1999, after Israel eased its closure of the OPT, in mid-2000 the World Bank estimated that it would take a decade before per capita National Domestic Product (GNP) reached its 1993 level if growth rates were sustained.[15] International donors blamed this unimpressive economic performance on PA corruption and mismanagement.[16] However, donors approached development in the OPT with a post-conflict paradigm, according to which the Israeli occupation had ended with the signing of the DoP in September of 1993. Of course, that the Israeli occupation remained the defining feature of the local context was nowhere more evident than in the Paris Protocol on Economic Relations. The donor-sponsored agreement codified the pre-existing asymmetrical custom union between the OPT's market and that of Israel. Moreover, since Israel retained control over import from third parties and export to the international market, the agreement entrenched the dependence of the OPT on Israel.[17] The PA had agreed to the continuation of the custom union with the expectation that it

would be rewarded with allowing Palestinian laborers continued access to employment inside Israel. However, the closure policy, which was implemented by Israel on a wide scale through 1995-1997, meant that this expectation never materialized.[18]

However, instead of challenging the closure policy, which violated the spirit if not the letter of the Paris Protocol, donors thought of it as an outcome internal to the Palestinian economy. USA-ID, the World Bank and the European Investment Bank responded by funding the construction of a series of industrial estates on the West Bank and Gaza Strip's borders with Israel, whose main purpose was to patch up the destructive effects of the closure policy without really challenging it. The industrial estates scheme—which was, if fact, first conceived by the Israelis when they initially imposed the closure policy on a wide scale in 1990 in an effort to reintegrate the OPT into the Israeli labor market in a more controlled manner—had produced one pilot estate on the Gaza border when the second intifada erupted. Although modeled after export processing zones (EPZs) found in other low and middle income developing countries, the Gaza pilot estate had two unique characteristics: First, it was so securitized—encircled with concrete walls, surrounded with watch towers, monitored by an electronic surveillance system, and housing a heavy security presence—that it was reassigned after the break of the second intifada as the Gaza Strip's only goods triaging facility.[19] Second, the pilot industrial estate allowed Israel to maintain its status as the only link between the OPT and the global market, with Israeli businesses commanding the higher value-added tiers of the productive process and the Palestinians providing the low-end labor. Thus, not only did the planned 'development' project not challenge the closure policy and Israel's control of the conduits for exporting and importing commodities, taking them instead as facts of life, its main effect was to reinforce the structure of Palestinian dependence on the Israeli economy.

Although primarily construed as a 'development' project, the industrial estates scheme had echoes in the 'peace' and 'democracy' donor agendas. When it first began, rationalization for the project was rooted in the discourse of regional cooperation and interdependence—*The New Middle East*, most fervently promulgated by the then Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and popular in the early Oslo years.[20] According to a 1997 World Bank report, for example, the scheme was expected to 'facilitate [Israel-Palestinian] joint ventures and other models of cooperation and confidence building.'[21] When the scheme was revived and resumed in the West Bank after Israel announced its unilateral 'Disengagement Plan' it remained virtually unchanged, although the discourse linking it to inter-dependence and peace was dropped and one more amicable to Israel's separation plan was adopted.[22] As noted by Peter Lagerquist, not unlike EPZs in other weak states, the pilot industrial estate was promoted as a privately managed heaven for 'good governance,' expected to provide international investors in search of low-cost labor with 'infrastructure and hospitable regulatory environments that developing states cannot furnish on a wide scale, allowing the outsourcing of many features of what both investors and development institutions view as "good governance."'[23] The project was rationalized as a development instrument designed to bypass PA corruption and mismanagement, deemed as too threatening to potential investors. But, these were in no small measure a result of the donors' interest in consolidating the power of the PA to ensure the viability of the Oslo process, which drove them to turn a blind eye to PA excesses in the early Oslo years. Other than the industrial estates scheme, investment in meaningful economic development was the exception rather than the rule.[24]

While international donors were willing to subsidize the PA's patronage networks, making the PA the largest employer and largest consumer of goods and services in the OPT, these resources

were rendered unproductive and meaningless, since they simultaneously pressured it to abdicate its responsibility for the delivery of social services. Instead, donors encouraged NGOs to step in and take responsibility in a temporary arrangement that was expected to change when the OPT's economy recovered—an occasion upon which the private sector could eventually assume its 'natural' responsibility for the delivery of social services. In the second half of the 1990s, donor funding enabled local NGOs to provide 75 percent of total health care services, 100 percent of rehabilitation care, 100 percent of preschool education, and significant portions of tertiary education, agricultural extension services and social welfare services.[25] These numbers only increased in 1999 when, with the intention of pressuring it to implement 'reforms' and be more accommodating in its negotiations of final status issues with Israel, donors drastically cut down the financial assistance they provided to the PA, knowing full well that this would undermine its patronage networks and weaken its domestic political position.[26] Instead, donors focused on extending funding to NGOs to mitigate the worsening socioeconomic conditions. International assistance to local CSOs increased even further after the break of the second intifada—especially after the PA institutional structure was destroyed in 2002 and 2003. As they took even more of the responsibility for the delivery of direly needed social services, CSOs were largely successful in mitigating the consequences of the collapse of the PA and the worsening socioeconomic conditions.

Still, it is possible to argue that with this increase in international assistance local CSOs grew to be as dependent on external rent as the PA itself. In the post-Oslo period it is possible to characterize civil society in the OPT as a 'rentier civil society'—interestingly, the NGO sector has become the second largest employer in the OPT after the PA.[27] Just as dependence on foreign assistance enabled the PA to exist independently from the local society (by not having to be res-

ponsive to its needs or negotiate with it issues of taxation and resource allocation), dependence on external assistance deprived the local civil society of its ability for auto-institution, rendering it accountable to its external benefactors, not the local population. This much is made clear in a number of scholarly studies that traced the transformation of CSOs, going back to the beginning of the Oslo peace process, into local subcontractors, implementing programs and projects designed in the capitals of donor states and financed by them.[28] With the break of the second intifada, it became clear that civil society in the OPT was unable to create a level of autonomy that allowed its constituency to work towards the definition of a common political project, one of the basic functions of civil society. Markus Bouillion contends that the second intifada has been a response not only to the expansionist and repressive encroachments of Israeli colonialism, but also a response on the part of disadvantaged Palestinian population to the abrupt ascendance of a nascent PA elite bent on entrenching its new found power and privilege but unable to cement its hegemony.[29] Unlike the pre-Oslo period, it is possible to argue, OPT-based CSOs found themselves on the side of the elite and not ordinary Palestinians.[30]

2. Discourse and Discipline: Two Case Studies

Increased dependence on international donor funding, a process that began in the late 1980s and was amplified after the beginning of the Oslo peace process, reinforced the position of local CSOs as the subjects of disciplinary power and its control technologies. Disciplinary power involves a two-pronged process: First, it involves the invocation of a norm/deviant binary and new knowledge claims that serve to partition social space into distinct and incommensurable 'civic' and 'political' spheres, implicitly demanding organizational conformity. This process involves marshaling discourses that emphasize the apolitical nature of civil society, making it possible to neatly demarcate the spheres of social action into the categories of the acceptable 'civic,' 'moderate' and 'developmental' modes of social action, on one side, and the recalcitrant 'political'

modes of social action, on the other.[31] Even in the 'very political' sphere of democracy promotion, international donors promoted interest and pressure groups—such as research think-tanks, human rights organizations, business associations and chambers of commerce—which they expected to act as intermediaries between citizens and the state by competing to advance particular interests and gain peaceful access to the political system. (In many cases, this was done in an effort to create a civil society that mirrors what is conceived of as civil society in the donors' home countries.) Meanwhile, politics in the form of social mobilization, social movements and collective endeavors was exiled from the political arena itself.

Discipline, secondly, requires the partition of social space into surveillable social units more amicable to the requirements of visibility, and, hence, management and control. This process embodies the enforcement dimensions of disciplinary power and is itself two-pronged: First, it requires collapsing social categories in an effort to ascertain to which of two distinct categories of 'civic' and 'political' modes of social action certain social actors and civil society organizations belong, and, subsequently, identifying them with these collapsed social categories. Quantitative research, including both survey research and statistical analyses, is often 'interest laden,' telling us more about the process of data production, the intentions of those in charge of information gathering, and how records are kept, than it does about the real world.[32] This study is interested in the ways in which data, aggregated, standardized, and produced in a documentary form, serves as a function of disciplinary power. Messiness and disorder hinder surveillance. The creation of databases and classificatory grids simplifies data, discarding or collapsing otherwise relevant information for the sake of a consistent representation. Classificatory grids and databases offer an accessible geometric order that allows for the surveillance of both aggregate trends and the minute details of CSOs in the OPT. Their ability to create order and predictability, mak-

ing it possible to institute disciplinary technologies and to regulate CSOs according to the conclusions drawn from the data, makes them indispensable for the enforcement of the distinction between 'civic' and 'political' modes of social action, reinforcing the former and excluding the latter. As will be shown below, quantitative research makes available such information as an organization's sectoral specialization, the constituencies it serves, its board members and employees, and what kind of activities it engages in or had engaged in previously, among many other things.

Second, given that knowledge is not self-enforcing, discipline requires that enforcement mechanisms be built and maintained. These enforcement mechanisms are embodied in the bureaucratic constructs and administrative techniques built and maintained by international donors. As a number of scholars have argued, communicating with international donors through purely bureaucratic practices, such as proposal writing, financial reporting, preparation of commissioned reports, etc., usually done in English, embodies a class bias that privileges social actors of certain socioeconomic backgrounds, while excluding others.[33] Going beyond this treatment of administrative bureaucratic processes as inadvertently problematic, this study conceives of them as the final link in the disciplinary power chain. They work to foster self-discipline by providing organizations deemed as conforming with the 'civic'/'political' binary—by limiting their activities to the narrowly defined spheres of 'social and economic development,' as put by the World Bank—access to international funds and resources, thus reinforcing their behavior, while excluding those deemed as recalcitrant and nonconformist. As will be shown below, to qualify for funding, CSOs must adhere to strict management standards and financial and procedural reporting requirements. Administrative networks allow the granting institution to utilize these standards and requirements to shape the specifics of organizational ac-

tivity and to direct CSOs into activities deemed appropriate, strictly prohibiting transgression into the political sphere. In short, administrative networks reinforce the compartmentalization and depoliticization of civil society in the OPT.

The World Bank: Civil society as social management

After the United Nations, the World Bank is the second largest multilateral organization involved in the OPT. Its involvement is relatively recent, going back to 1992 when it was tasked during the Madrid negotiations with looking into future Palestinian development and economic prospects. The result was six-volume study, *Developing the Occupied Territories: an Investment in Peace*, which was published within weeks of the signing of the DoP and provided the basis for the first donor pledging conference in October 1993. In the following year, the Bank opened an office in East Jerusalem and began to conduct its work in the OPT through the Trust Fund for Gaza and the West Bank (TFGWB). Due to restrictions on World Bank lending imposed by the legal status of the OPT, and since the PA is not a sovereign state Bank member, the Bank has never been a big financial player: Since it was established, the TFGWB allocated a total sum of US$510 million to the OPT.[34] Marketing its ability to distance itself from the overtly 'political' dimensions of the situation in the OPT, the Bank was, nonetheless, able to impose itself as the leading multilateral actor in donor coordination.[35] But a critical review of the Bank's record suggests that 'non-involvement' in politics has not always been the case: At the beginning of the Oslo process, the Bank suggested prioritizing investment in infrastructure in order to provide a 'peace divided' to the OPT's population; when the Israeli closure policy induced a socioeconomic crisis in the mid-1990s, the Bank encouraged donors to shift to emergency job creation so as to mitigate the closure policy's political repercussions; and going back to when the PA was first created, the Bank has continually supported using it as a job-creation machine—a scenario that is antithetical to the Bank's own Washington consensus-inspired conception of development—for

the purposes of social pacification. As argued by Anne Le More, whether acknowledged or not, such a record shows that the Bank's involvement in the OPT was deeply political.[36] Moreover, the Bank did not withdraw from the OPT after the break of the second intifada in September of 2000, opting instead to continue to classify its involvement in the OPT as 'post-conflict.' Also, when Israel announced its unilateral 'Disengagement Plan' in 2004, it was the only multilateral organization entrusted with the mediation between the various parties and the coordination of its implementation.[37]

The World Bank has used the TFGWB, whose resources were drawn from the Bank's own surplus, to commit funds to more than 30 projects (which, in turn, themselves mobilized high levels of donor funds in parallel co-financing).[38] The share of the Palestinian NGO Project (PNGO), which is now in its third phase, was a number of grants that add up to an estimated US$49.5 million, including additional co-financing provided by the Italian, Saudi, British, French, Swiss, Japanese and German governments.[39] PNGO, according to the Bank, 'is one of its kind in which the Bank is granting funds directly to NGOs and where the borrower/implementing agency is an NGO.'[40] The project began to be implemented in 1997 with the goal of accomplishing three key objectives:

1. To finance the provision of services to the poor and disadvantaged through Palestinian NGOs;
2. To upgrade skills and capabilities and to assist NGOs to adjust to a new configuration of public and private services; and
3. To strengthen cooperative relations between NGOs and the PA (including help with the development of an appropriate legal and regulatory framework for the NGO sector).[41]

After highlighting the important role played by NGOs in service delivery as part of its rationalization for the project, the Bank emphasizes that 'NGOs play another crucial role in the emergence of post-Oslo Palestinian society, through their efforts to help establish good governance and reinforce the concept of economic pluralism.'[42] In the OPT, it is important to note, 'good governance' is defined by the Bank as the 'passage of laws and implementation of policies

that promote transparent economic management and decentralization of responsibility for economic development.'[43] Since the project was intended to help strengthen the professional and technical capacities of the NGO sector in the West Bank and Gaza, US$1.5 million were set aside for discrete capacity-building and research activities intended to develop the competencies of NGOs in such skills as financial and organizational management, fund-raising, and strategic and project planning.[44]

Survey research and discourse

The World Bank published its first exhaustive study on CSOs active in the OPT in 1994. The study's main finding, namely that funding to NGOs has fallen from between US$170 and US$240 million to between US$100 and US$120 million, served as part of the Bank's rationalization for getting involved in such an unusual sphere of 'development' work. The published report, which put the number of CSOs active in the OPT at 1400, classifies the existing CSOs according to various criteria. First, organizations are classified according to 'type', with charitable societies, development NGOs, cooperatives, common interest trade unions, and service and consumer-oriented organizations serving as the main categories. 'Traditional vs. modern /westernized' serves as the second criterion that classifies organizations according to 'affiliation and constituencies'. A third criterion relies on the 'peripheral vs. central' dichotomy and classifies organizations according to location, access to outside funding and type of communities served. The report then goes into more detail surveying and sub-categorizing the basic four groupings. Thus, according to the Bank, 'there are over 500 charitable societies, most of them working in the health, education and social welfare sectors with annual budgets of under US$100,000. They tend to be welfare-oriented, relying in part on local charitable contributions; only a few have so far adopted modern management and consultative techniques.'[45] The report then goes on to state that

> [m]any of the older and more traditional social welfare NGOs, most notably the charitable societies, predate 1948. The greatest number are to be found in the West Bank, with a much smaller number in Gaza. Often without clear political affiliations, these grassroots NGOs are generally based on family, clan and parochial relationships. Formerly these associations were strongly linked with Jordan, but since Jordan's disengagement from the West Bank in 1988 have lost that connection—and simultaneously, an indeterminate but appreciable proportion of their funding. Although large in number today—approximately 385 of them are registered under the General Union of Charitable Societies—they are predominantly small organizations and their focus is largely on relief and charity rather than on development.[46]

Closely related to this category are the religiously-affiliated NGOs. These number around 400. They comprise 'another part of the older NGO community and provide services to local communities by raising funds both locally (for example through the Islamic *Zakat* committees, which generate donations from the community on a tithing basis) and from outside—particularly from Europe, in the case of Christian associations, and affluent Gulf countries in the case of Muslim associations.'[47] A third category consists of 200 'developmental' NGOs, which 'tend to be more recent in origin, more modern and professional in orientation, and deliver economic and social services to their client populations.'[48] A number of these NGOs have strong political affiliations and many 'stemmed directly from political parties—either PLO mainstream *Fatah,* or other PLO and non-PLO factions, including socialists, communists and militant Islamists.' While a number of these organizations have evolved into 'reliable service providers, some, 'particularly those with leftist or non-Fatah leanings, turned with success to Western donors for funding.' 'Today,' moreover, 'many of these PNGOs are viewed as among the more modern and professional of the service providers.'[49] A final category consists of about 300 'service and consumer-oriented co-operatives.' These are 'predominantly agricultural and provide a variety of savings and loans services.'[50] Many of the organizations in this category are linked to Fatah. They, and the large development organizations such as hospitals and universities, the report expects, will be assimilated into the PA.

Two complementary reports were commissioned by the World Bank in the following two years: The first, 'A Report on Palestinian NGOs for the World Bank', was carried out in 1995 by Denis Sullivan, and the second, entitled 'The Changing Role of Palestinian NGOs since the Establishment of the Palestinian Authority,' and published in 1996. In 1996, Denis Sullivan also published an article in the *Journal of Palestine Studies* praising NGOs as 'agents of development and foundation of civil society' but reaching the conclusion that '[a] Palestinian civil society, perhaps, is in the process of being developed.'[51] This conclusion can only be understood within the context of the World Bank's championing of privatization and its support for NGOs as a form of private enterprise. What matters from this perspective is not the voluntary spirit of the organizations involved or their embeddedness in local social milieus, but that they assume a 'complementary' role as mechanisms for service delivery and adhere to acceptable management standards. These themes are more explicitly spelled out in the paper published by Sullivan in 1998 under the auspices of the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA)—whose own series of seminars on civil society empowerment at the time was bankrolled by USAID—showcasing the first phase of the World Bank's recently launched NGO project. The same themes are also present in Sullivan's 2001 book, which was published again under the auspices of PASSIA, and whose title, *From Service Delivery to Sustainable Development*, goes beyond highlighting the 'complementary' role NGOs play in service delivery to suggesting that they can actually function as a substitute to the PA. In the book one learns that NGOs have become a vital 'mechanism for service delivery' in a 'deteriorating socioeconomic situation for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza coupled with the Palestinian Authority's unwillingness or inability to take on most social service delivery.'[52] One also learns that for NGOs to be able to fully take on such responsibilities, more emphasis should be placed on in-

creasing the ‘professional credentials of the NGO movement.’[53] No mention is made of the voluntary spirit of local organizations; even social capital and the other ‘empowering’ benefits of associationalism usually championed by the Bank are nowhere to be found.

The themes highlighted by Sullivan have had already been present at the international conference, titled ‘Palestinian Governmental/NGO Relations: Cooperation and Partnership.’ Held in Ramallah in February 2000, the conference was fully financed and managed under the first phase of the World Bank's NGO project. It focused on relations between NGOs and the PA, which have had always been one of the Bank's main preoccupations. According to the World Bank, one of the conference's major accomplishments was that it ‘exposed the PA and NGOs to a wide range of other countries' experiences in NGO/Government relations.’[54] Beyond this, management techniques and complementing the PA's abdication of basic service delivery seem to have been high on the conference's agenda. Skimming through its proceedings one encounters such concerns as ‘the importance of maintaining a business-like approach in all aspects of development coordination’ and learns that NGOs are ‘innovative and frequently cost-effective in the delivery of services.’[55]

In 2001, the World Bank funded an extensive two-part study of CSOs in the OPT—with one part ‘mapping’ the existing organizations and the other dealing exclusively with the relations among NGOs, the PA and donors—that was carried out by the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS). The first part of the study was actually the second exhaustive ‘mapping’ of CSOs ever carried out in the OPT—the first was commissioned by the *Heinrich Böll Stiftung* and published by the Center for the Development and Study of the Palestinian Society (MADAR) in 2000.[56] It aimed at producing a ‘geographical and categorical mapping’ of existing organizations to allow for studying the role and efficiency of CSOs and providing guidance on

what can be done to move the sector forward. It produced very dense statistical tabulations and a computerized database with detailed classifications of existing CSOs according to an expanded set of criteria. These included: geographical distribution (specifying in which of the OPT's districts an organization exists); range of organizations (specifying the size of the area the organization covers through its activities); objectives of the organization; the nature of its work, main activities and the kind of services it provides; internal organization; legal status (specifying whether or not it was registered with the Ministry of Interior and/or one of the related specialized ministries); and financing and sources of funding. The study also categorizes organizations according to the date of their creation and the numbers of employees and volunteers working for them. Moreover, the study makes available the sectoral distribution of existing organizations (identifying the sectors, be they charitable, research, human rights, democracy and good governance, culture, training/ rehabilitation, youth and sport, etc., in which organizations work). Finally, it introduces a new differentiation system that distinguishes between four main types of organizations: Traditional organizations (charitable and similar organizations that rely on traditional administrative methods); new organizations (established in the late seventies/early eighties and rely on specialized professional staff and include full-time, part-time and volunteer staff); relief organizations (with programs that aim at covering immediate social needs such as food, shelter housing and other services); and development organizations (aiming to generate long-lasting impact on Palestinian society).[57]

Another exhaustive study of CSOs in the OPT, entitled ‘The Role of NGOs in Building Palestinian Civil Society’, was commissioned by the World Bank and published by the BISAN Center for Research and Development in 2002. Unlike the MAS report, which produced very detailed information that the various aid agencies and international development organizations planning

to extend financial aid to local organizations could find very practicable, the BISAN study was oriented towards the local CSOs themselves, focusing on management and institutional best practices. Like other World Bank publications, the study, authored by Izzat Abdel Hadi, the manger of the BISAN Center since it was established in 1989 and one of two co-contributors to Sullivan's 2001 book, underlines the role to be played by NGOs not only in relief and service delivery, but also in development. However, in concert perhaps with the Bank's aversion towards 'politics,' it avoids any discussion of the impact that the occupation and the structure of control and economic dependence linking the OPT to Israel might have on Palestinian development. How and under what macroeconomic and structural arrangements are NGOs to contribute to development is never really spelled out.

The study's theoretical discussion of the substance of civil society is telling: NGOs, one learns, are 'essential for managing [the] transition from relief to development, and from natural society to civil society.'[58] The peculiar contractualist terminology aside, it is clear that the study promotes a conception of civil society in line with the Bank's vision; a civil society consisting of apolitical, well-managed organizations delivering services and otherwise doing the business of private enterprise. The author's misplaced Euro-centrism becomes even more evident when he is asked to clarify his position:

> I don't think we have a civil society in Palestine and even in the Arab World. I think we are managing [the] transition from relief to development, from [a] natural society notion (which means factionalist, clannish, familial) into more democratic, accountable and transparent sector.[59]

The emphasis placed on factionalism, it must be noted, is also in line with World Bank policy. The Bank views factionalism—i.e., association with one of the political parties—as a 'problem.' It has been used by the Bank as a pretext in its efforts to emphasize apoliticalism and promote the idea that organizations that combine social and political work are inherently flawed. The

attributes of clanism and familialism, which are reserved for charitable societies, must be understood within the framework of the sharp distinction Abdel Hadi draws between what he calls 'civil society organizations' and 'community-based organizations.' Upon careful scrutiny, it becomes evident that the former grouping comprises the donor-supported professional NGOs. These exhibit less the attributes of factionalism and clanism and are 'managing' the transition towards 'civil society.' Unless they too come to benefit from the tutelage of foreign donors, the (community-based) organizations, which comprise the second grouping, are unsalvageable. This is the argument that underlies the entire study. Judging from the emphasis the Bank placed on incorporating the so-defined community-based organizations into the second and third phases of its NGO project, Abdel Hadi's warning seems not to have gone unheeded.

Bureaucracy and administrative techniques

The first phase of PNGO was designed as a three-year project (August 1997 through August 2000), but was extended until August 2001.[60] Reading the Bank's project completion report, one learns that the project 'had a positive impact in transferring to beneficiary NGOs new concepts and skills that were critical for upgrading their capacity. These skills included project proposal writing, maintaining systems of financial accountability; and undertaking participatory needs assessment and utilizing monitoring and evaluation techniques.'[61] One also learns that the project 'supported a momentum that was necessary to ensure the successful passing of the NGO Law that now regulates PA/NGO relationships and, to a large extent, guarantees NGOs the possibility of operating in a largely non-intrusive environment.'[62] The project, nonetheless, had a number of failings that the Bank intended to address through the initiation of a second phase of the project (PNGO II). This phase was proposed 'as a "transitional arrangement" that would provide for establishing more sustainable arrangement for maintaining and sustaining the services delivery role of NGOs' and slated to cover the period June 2001 through June 2004.[63]

Work on the design of PNGO II started few months before the break of the second intifada. It is, however, clear that the amount of financing allocated to the project (US$15 million) took into account the dire socioeconomic conditions in the OPT. The break of the intifada also had an impact on the design of the project. For example, the project included an 'emergency grants program' to function as a 'window for channeling emergency funds that may be made available to the Bank by other donors as part of their response to immediate emergency needs.'[64] Furthermore, when discussing the constraints hindering the optimal performance of the NGO sector, designers of the project put a great deal of emphasis on 'the concentration of NGO activities in urban areas, although a high percentage of the population continues to live in rural areas.'[65] Although not explicitly acknowledged by the Bank, concentration of NGOs in urban areas had major consequences during the intifada, since access to rural areas was greatly hindered due to the vast network of barriers and checkpoints erected by the Israeli army across the OPT. Designers of the project also made a great deal of the 'concentration of 50% of funds available to the NGO sector in the hands of a few NGOs.' Puzzlingly, however, they went on to stipulate that 'impact and sustainability are better served by concentrating funds in the hands of a few NGOs and by ensuring that the projects implemented through those NGOs carry enough elements of sustainability.' 'The experience of the first phase,' they added, 'will be extremely valuable in this process as the new project will have as a reference point in the selection a track record of NGOs and projects that have demonstrated success and effectiveness.'[66] Instead, the idea of wider reach, they suggested, 'will not be measured by the number of small NGOs receiving funds but by the degree to which those NGOs/CBOs [community-based organizations] are able to engage communities with the necessary support of more experienced NGOs. This necessitated that the

project 'drop' the principle of 'a piece for all' which has impacted considerably the outcome of the first phase of the project.[67]

Still, PNGO II emphasized encouraging 'partnerships' between small community-based organizations (CBOs) and larger professional and well-established NGOs. The project included a 'Partnership Grants Program' that awarded a number of grants for service delivery projects to be implemented by 'lead NGOs' in partnership with smaller NGOs/CBOs that they themselves would select.[68] In general terms, it was expected that 'PNGO II will build on Phase I's achievements and successes, and will also draw on the lessons from that experience.' The project also 'recognizes the needs of a sector which now enjoys greater access to donor funding, but which has still not confronted the issue of sustainability at the project, institutional and sector levels.'[69] The project was, thus, intended to be 'implemented as a comprehensive program of capacity building aimed at addressing the needs of the poor by improving the availability as well as the quality, impact and sustainability of service provision schemes.' It also intended to strike a balance between addressing short term vulnerabilities and building medium-term capacities to 'support a longer-term transformation of the NGO sector into one that is dynamic and able to respond to the changing needs of Palestinian society.'[70] Through its capacity building component, the program intended to address issues such as the promotion of a 'learning culture' and 'improved coordination' among NGOs. Failings such as 'inadequate NGO capacity' and the 'prevalence of conservative approaches to both service delivery and learning' were to be addressed by the 'introduction of a broader approach to capacity building that puts emphasis on strategic planning, scenario building, advocacy, learning and networking.' Accordingly, through 'the partnership/accompaniment model, rather than through formal class-room training,' the project intended to 'give an opportunity for experiential learning' and 'through the sector sup-

port component,' to 'empower the strong NGOs and networks to play a more active role in helping enhance the responsiveness and resilience of the sector.'[71]

PNGO II was distinguished by, for the first time, explicitly linking the Bank's good governance agenda to Palestinian statehood: 'By facilitating further clarification of a shared vision of the NGO sector and by enhancing its capacity to play its role more effectively,' the Bank's project appraisal document stated, 'the project will contribute to supporting the development of a sound civil society—a major element of good governance and of a healthy transformation towards statehood.'[72] Nonetheless, although it was implemented in a period that saw the second intifada intensify, and in which the Israeli military retook complete control of the OPT, the Bank continued to classify PNGO II as a 'conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction' project.[73]

On a different note, PNGO II saw the transformation of the Governance Committee—which was created mid-way through the implementation of PNGO I and included representatives of the PA and the various NGO networks, who were given an 'advisory and oversight role'—into a 'Supervisory Board.' The latter consisted of representatives of the five Palestinian NGO networks, five civil society independents, and three representatives of the Project Management Organization (PMO).[74] It was also during the implementation of PNGO II that the idea of transforming 'the project and its structures', including the Supervisory Board, into 'governance structures that will outlive the project' was proposed.[75] PNGO II was extended in August 2004, to allow for the completion of project implementation, and again in April of 2005, in order to 'allow for continuation of project activities, especially the project management structure, to carry over to the new project, the Palestinian NGO III.'[76] Overall, it 'successfully continued an innovative approach for the Bank to service delivery in a conflict-affected context' and 'successfully "passed the baton" on NGO work from PNGO I to PNGO III.'[77]

PNGO III continued to focus on service delivery—for which US$6.623 million of projects funds were allocated (in addition to Euro 6 million contributed by the *Agence Française de Développement* (AFD)). Like PNGO II, emergency job creation, through short-term employment in NGO-sponsored projects, to mitigate the OPT's prolonged economic crisis was expected to constitute one of its main components.[78] PNGO III, which was slated to run from January 2007 through December 2009, was not part of the original design of PNGO, which since the very beginning was conceived as a six-year project.[79] It was, thus, geared towards tying up the loose ends left over from PNGO II and securing an effective exit strategy for World Bank involvement. For example, the project continued to encourage partnerships between large NGOs and smaller CBOs. It also built on the NGO 'Code of Ethics' developed under PNGO II by setting aside US$0.6 million for the preparation and implementation of an NGO 'Code of Conduct' to improve governance, accountability and transparency standards.[80] Most importantly, the transformation of the PMO and its consolidation into a permanent governance structure in the form of the 'NGO Development Center' (NDC), which was created during the final stages of PNGO II and became operational in March of 2006, became one of the main objectives of PNGO III, which devoted US$2.277 to this end.[81]

The Project Management Organization (PMO) was the organization delegated by the World Bank to take charge of direct project implementation and management and to act as both recipient and administrator of Bank funds. While the Bank did not itself partake in the direct implementation and management of the NGO project, it had a number of reasons for not selecting a PA ministry or a local organization—or a combination of the two—to be in charge of direct project implementation: First, protecting the 'independence' of NGO activity from governmental 'control' mandated entrusting the management of funds to a non-governmental organization.[82]

Second, the ‘factionalized’ nature of the NGO community mandated protecting the neutrality of the project and its decisions from vested interests and ‘counseled against’ vesting decision-making with any one or combination of local NGOs.[83] Finally, ‘the importance of funding NGOs registered in Jerusalem, which provide important social and economic services and have been neglected by financiers in the early Oslo years, required that a visibly non-political decision-making structure be adopted.’[84] Although not explicitly acknowledged, distancing itself from the political implications of funding NGOs in Jerusalem might have been the most important from the Bank's perspective. It was, after all, due to a Palestinian presentation, made at a 1999 Consultative Group meeting of a development plan that made reference to borders and included East Jerusalem, that a huge row ensued between the Bank and the US delegation, costing the Bank continued US support and the opportunity to host such meetings from that moment onwards.[85] The decision was thus made to entrust direct project implantation and management in the hands of an internationally-recruited NGO. According to the Bank, this was a unique arrangement that ‘saw for the first time the allocation by the Bank of grant funding that was channeled through an NGO, and not a governmental agency.’[86] After being tendered for international bidding, the Welfare Association Consortium (WAC—consisting of the Welfare Association, the British Council and Charities Aid Foundation) won the bid for management of the project.[87]

During PNGO II the institutional set-up of the PMO, i.e. the WAC, was ‘embedded as the executive arm in the new NDC.’[88] (In fact, the PMO staff were made to resign from their positions on October 31, 2006 to be re-hired as NDC staff the very next day.) PNGO III is expected to ensure that the NDC is able to survive on its own after the Bank concludes its involvement.[89] The World Bank supported the establishment of the DNC to provide a ready-made channel for donors looking for providing financial assistance to OPT-based NGOs (in fact, the Euro 6 million in

PNGO III co-financing provided by the AFD was given directly to the NDC). It also expected the NDC to 'provide the institutional (with the accompanying technical and financial know-how) setting to ensure effective project continuity.'[90] The Welfare Association, the WAC's lead agency, could no longer take on this function because, as one Bank report notes, its long-term strategy is to evolve into a foundation making large grants (over US$500,000) for development projects and to devolve small grants activities (below US$500,000) to an institution like NDC.[91] Thus, although the legal signatory of the Trust Fund Grant Agreement and recipient of the Bank's Grant was the Welfare Association, actual project implantation during PNGO III was delegated to the NDC. This included such responsibilities as announcing and advertising each round of grants; signing grant contracts; disbursing awards and supervising the use of grants by recipient NGOs; and providing continuous hands-on training to grant recipients.[92] The NDC also took on the task, which since PNGO began had been the responsibility of the PMO, of selecting grant recipients in accordance with a set of 'basic principles' spelled out by the Bank (which also maintained 'the right of no objection' to override PMO decisions and turn down approved grants if it saw fit).[93] One of these principles merits being quoted at length:

> Because grants are intended to support social and economic development programs, they will not be awarded for projects which have as a principal objective the promotion of any particular political or religious viewpoint.[94]

These prohibitions against awarding grants for projects that promote political viewpoints and those that promote religious viewpoints are rooted in discourses and/or based on studies of civil society in the West (which civil societies in the South are expected to mirror).[95] Nonetheless, they need to be distinguished: while the latter is consistent with Bank and international donor practice in the region, the former is applied to the OPT exclusively.

To begin with the prohibition against the 'promotion of religious viewpoints,' the important question to ask here is why the Bank felt compelled to enforce it. One can argue that the prohibi-

tions against both politics and religion are intermingled in this case: the Bank might have wished to exclude organizations linked to Hamas from benefiting from the financing it provides to local organizations. Although never explicitly stated, given the Bank's precarious relationships with powerful donor states that list Hamas as a terrorist organization, this is not at all inconceivable. Still, while it is true that in 1990s Islamic organizations witnessed a resurgence that accompanied the rise of Hamas, not all religious organizations are linked to Hamas. Local religious organizations, such as the Muslim Society and the Orthodox Club, have a history that goes back to mandate Palestine and have been the precursor of the modern Palestinian civil society. These, and the more recently established religious CSOs, engage not only in relief and offering much needed social services to the poor and marginalized, but also organize and sponsor various cultural, educational and athletic activities and programs and engage in institution-building and development.

As alluded to just now, the Bank's exclusion of Muslim religious organizations from what it considers to be civil society is consistent with general donor practice in the region.[96] Religiously-oriented CSOs are, of course, by no means a unique Middle Eastern phenomenon. While it might be understandable that donors might not want to support religion-based, generally conservative associations, this practice of excluding Muslim CSOs is, more often than not, propped up by neo-Orientalist discourses. Neo-Orientalism differs from Orientalism in one crucial aspect. Classical Orientalists exhausted many decades postulating that CSOs with an adequate level of internal organization and assertiveness that enables them to check state power were missing in the Islamic world. This, they argued, compounded its ancient and persistent predicament of having societies that are too weak and states that are too strong. Neo-Orientalism shares with classical Orientalism its essentialism and alarmism but differs from it in the diagnosis it offers for Muslim

societies' perceived resistance to democratic governance: After the Iranian Revolution, and more so after Western triumph in the Cold War, neo-Orientalists began to argue that the problem with Muslim societies is that they have over-assertive social groups and associations. These groups, they argued, lack ‘civility’ and have the potential to undermine existing states and destabilize the region. They, it now seemed, compounded the persistent Muslim dilemma of having societies that are too strong and states that are too weak, making democracy and development unlikely, if at all possible. As Yahya Sadowski poignantly notes,

> [t]he irony of this conjecture needs to be savored. When the consensus of social scientists held that democracy and development depended upon the actions of strong assertive social groups, Orientalists held that such associations were absent in Islam. When the consensus evolved and social scientists thought that a quiescent, undemanding society was essential to progress, the neo-Orientalists portrayed Islam as beaming with bushy anarchic solidarities. Middle Eastern Muslims, it seems, were doomed to be eternally out of step with intellectual fashion.[97]

As the assertions of Abdel Hadi quoted above illustrate, vestiges of these neo-Oreintalist tropes can be traced in numerous of the studies and reports commissioned by international donors on the subject.[98]

The Bank's prohibition against the ‘promotion of political viewpoints’ is applied exclusively to the OPT.[99] It is open to four interpretations: First, it can be understood as a general ban on any and all involvement in politics. This interpretation is, however, unsustainable on account of the Bank's own rhetoric and the lip-service it pays to the role of civil society in ‘holding the private sector and government accountable’ and ‘pressuring the state.’[100] It is also inconsistent with the Bank's own record of involvement in the very political controversy over the PA-proposed NGO law. In this case, the Bank did indeed help local NGOs, which found the proposed law to be excessively restrictive, to pressure the PA. The Bank lobbied donor states to pressure the PA to adopt the friendlier version of the law proposed by local NGOs, which the PA eventually did.[101] Besides its involvement in coordinating PA-NGO relations and in advocating for the NGO law,

the Bank's involvement in advocacy was limited. Nonetheless, its approach to civil society in the OPT is underpinned by discourses rooted in the associational approach to civil society, premised on the benefits of social capital and the transformative effects of associational life. As discussed in chapter 1, this approach emphasizes the apolitical nature of civil society. It reflects a conservative interest in maintaining the status quo and does not challenge existing political and economic inequities. By promoting it in the OPT, the World Bank encouraged CSOs to view the challenges the OPT's inhabitants face as mere technical issues. Since it elides the reality of Israeli colonial control, development built on this basis brings negligible improvements and no changes in the formal structures of the existing social and political systems.

Second, the prohibition against the promotion of political viewpoints can be interpreted in view of the Bank's unwillingness to condone factionalism or to get involved in Palestinian inter-party politics. As shown in the discussion above, this point was emphasized in many of the publications commissioned by the Bank, which conceive of CSOs linked to political parties as ‘problems’ in need of ‘solutions.’ Still, given that the Bank has awarded grants to CSOs associated with Palestinian political parties, this interpretation is also problematic. It is, for example, well-known that almost all of the organizations that organized under the banner of the Palestinian NGO Network, and which launched the World Bank-supported campaign against the PA-proposed NGO law, were in some form or another linked to one of the Palestinian leftist movements.[102] Many of these organizations, moreover, list the Bank as a financial contributor.[103] Furthermore, as if to highlight that links between CSOs and political parties are not a unique Palestinian phenomenon, on many occasions the Bank did itself cooperate with many of the NGOs associated with Western political parties, such as NDI and *Heinrich Böll Stiftung*, and involved in civil society programs in the OPT.

Third, the ban on the promotion of political viewpoints can be understood as being designed to shield the Bank from the consequences of being involved in supporting Palestinian CSOs seen as opposing the Oslo process or as overtly critical of the Israel occupation. Given the World Bank's precarious relationship with powerful donor states—as mentioned above, the relatively innocuous act of allowing the Palestinian delegation to represent a development plan that made reference to borders and included East Jerusalem at a 1999 aid coordination Consultative Group meeting cost the Bank the privilege of hosting similar meeting—this interpretation is not implausible.

However, a final, more plausible, interpretation is offered by the Bank's own investment in the viability of the Oslo process. As noted by Anne Le More, the great interest in the high-profile Palestinian-Israeli conflict displayed by its senior management, exemplified by the personal commitment of its President, James D. Wolfensohn, between 1995 and 2005, coupled with a strong desire to be 'part of the process,' resulted in the Bank being very creative in devising ways to remain involved in the OPT (in spite of the fact that the Bank's 'economic clause,' which precludes it from getting involved in political conflicts, might have dictated that it should do everything it can to minimize its involvement).[104] This strong interest in the conflict was not accompanied with an innovative approach to the situation in the OPT. Very much like other high profile donors, by focusing on assuaging socioeconomic and humanitarian costs of the crisis without addressing its root cause, i.e., Israeli colonialism and its attendant encroachments, the Bank's investment in the conflict reflected the interests of its largest stakeholders, the US and the EU, and not its supposed beneficiaries, the OPT's population.

It is from this prism that the Bank's haphazard partition of social space into the distinct spheres of 'social and economic development' and 'politics'—which stood in marked opposition to the

Bank's overall record of involvement in the conflict and its practice of linking aid to the OPT with diplomatic and political agendas—should be understood. The quantitative research, in the form of survey research and statistical analyses, and the bureaucratic constructs and administrative networks, described in this section, serve the purpose of enforcing this partition, allowing into the sphere of 'social and economic development' only 'political viewpoints' in line with the donors' agenda of furnishing the PA with the tenor of legitimacy, yielded by responsive governance, necessary for legitimating the Oslo process. Thus understood, the Bank's exclusion of CSOs promoting a 'political viewpoint' and its promotion of an apolitical conception of civil society, consisting of organizations consumed by the requirements of management and cost-effectiveness, mirrors other donor efforts that seem to be aimed at allowing the inhabitants of the OPT to cope with the devastating consequences of the Oslo process, in the form of colonial settlements, fragmentation and cantonization, without affording them the opportunity to meaningfully resist them, all the while preparing the ground for them to acquiesce to a yet more unjust and disabling 'peace' arrangement. As will become clear in the next section, the aid agencies of powerful donor states did not feel as compelled to cloak too much same agenda under the rhetoric about development and good governance.

USAID: Civil society as social control

Unlike the Bank's, USAID's involvement in the OPT has a history that extends as far back as 1975. After the October 1973 war, US economic assistance policy in the region underwent changes that reflected the American desire of encouraging Arab-Israeli rapprochement. Since providing aid to Syria was unacceptable to the US Congress (unlike increasing aid to Israel, Egypt and Jordan), the Nixon administration created the US$100 million 'Middle East Special Requirements Fund' with the objective of identifying 'targets of opportunity' that would encourage a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.[105] When in 1974 Congress authorized the use of the

fund for providing economic assistance to Syria, authorization was also given to channel some fund moneys for providing economic assistance to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Still, since the United States government (USG) did not officially recognize Israel's sovereignty over the OPT, and since there was no sovereign Palestinian government, standard procedures for administering official aid programs were unattainable. The US State Department had to arrange for the program to be administered by USAID headquarters in Washington, which officially assigned responsibility for designing and implementing projects to American private voluntary organizations (PVOs) already operating in the OPT. These, in effect, led the US economic assistance program with limited input from the State Department and USAID in day-to-day operation.[106] Although the program was designed to provide more than traditional welfare relief and meant to be independent of assistance to Israel or any Arab state, its contribution to economic development during the first decade was negligible. The US, moreover, was the only donor to give the Israeli government a defining role in the project approval process.[107] A study of USAID projects implemented in the OPT between 1977 and 1983 found that 'Israeli intervention caused a major shift in the allocation of projects and budgets,' with the share of economic development-related budgets actually implemented 'reduced from almost half of the original programme (sic) to less than one third.'[108] Moreover, American PVOs did not coordinate among themselves and engaged in self-censorship, proposing only those projects seen as having a chance of winning Israeli approval.[109]

The first strategy statement for US economic assistance to OPT was issued in 1987, more than a decade after the US assistance program began. Although it emphasized export promotion, developing the internal capacities of Palestinian institutions and social services, the strategy statement lacked a coherent economic development framework.[110] Still, successive events, in the

form of the first intifada, the Gulf War and Israel's initiation of the closure policy, which worked to exasperate socioeconomic conditions in the OPT, contributed to a significant increase in annual allocations to the program, averaging at US$15.5 in the period between 1988 and 1991.[111] Overall, the program continued to have a record that did not reflect favorably on how Palestinians perceived US economic assistance. Instead of its declared objective of contributing to Palestinian development, US assistance was increasingly seen as being linked to Israeli policies aimed at preventing the emergence of a Palestinian state. This went beyond what was perceived in the late 1970s as American collusion with Israel's efforts to impose 'autonomy' as part of its Camp David agreement with Egypt—at the expense of meaningful Palestinian sovereignty—to include US economic support for Jordan's 1986 'five year development plan,' which was designed to strengthen Jordanian control by bolstering the traditional leadership loyal to Jordan rather than the PLO. Anthropologist Khalil Nakhleh captured accurately Palestinian perceptions when he wrote in 1989 that it was clear that US assistance was 'tied to nurturing Palestinian acceptance of a US "negotiated solution," and that the improvement of Palestinian quality of life under occupation is nothing more than an acceptable camouflage for the imposition of US-initiated solutions.'[112]

The Oslo years

In validation of Nakhleh's assessment, the US economic assistance program gained in significance with the start of Madrid peace talks and a new five-year (1993-1997) strategy was put in place. The new strategy focused on improving health care services and, in response to the economic downturn resulting from the Gulf War and Israel's closure policy, on employment generation. It also emphasized training and technical assistance to strengthen local human-resource and institutional development.[113] The signing of the DoP in September 1993 saw, once again, a considerable increase in the size of the US economic assistance program (which with an

annual budget of US$75 million in 1994 became one of the largest in OPT), compelling USAID to revise its strategy with the intention of placing more emphasis on 'building democracy and economic growth.'[114] The revised strategy furnished support for low and middle income housing and bankrolled high priority infrastructure activities that 'demonstrated on-the-ground progress under the accords.'[115] Its democracy and governance ('D&G') component consisted primarily of making available some of the financial resources needed to cover the start-up costs of the PA and its police force. In its published assessments of these activities USAID boasted that they 'enabled the U.S. to have a highly visible and substantive role in the West Bank and Gaza from the very first days of self-rule.'[116] However, an internal USAID document cautioned that 'deteriorating economic conditions threaten to undermine public support for the Israeli-PLO Accords.'[117]

The beginning of the Oslo process saw significant changes in the structure of the US assistance program. The most visible of these was the replacement of American PVOs, which previously had played an important role in project design and implementation, with a 13 member USAID field mission (henceforth 'the Mission') .[118] Less visible but as consequential was the centralization of program in the State Department, where it was put under the direct control of Dennis Ross, the Clinton administration's coordinator for the Middle East peace process. Ross's direct involvement in setting program parameters, coupled with his insistence on coordinating project design and implantation with Israel, quickly gave him a reputation for micromanagement and interference in program details.[119] If the preponderance of the State Department hinted at the continued privileging of political considerations over long-term development objectives, USAID's new five-year (1996-2000) strategic plan made it clear that the changes in program size and structure did not alter the conception of the program as an extension of a US-sponsored peace-making process. The drafter of the agency's new strategic plan began by emphasizing that

> USAID efforts to facilitate economic and democratic development in West Bank and Gaza contribute to regional stability and complement U.S. political leadership in the Middle East Peace Process. The overall goal of the USAID program is to strengthen Palestinian commitment to the process by helping them realize the tangible benefits of peace.[120]

Neither did the changes in program size and structure diminish Israel's role in setting its parameters: For example, the second of the new plan's three 'strategic objectives' emphasized conservation and 'more effective use of water resources', an area which has long been of direct concern to Israeli policymakers, whereas agriculture and manufacturing, sectors critical to long-term development and historically receiving little support because of Israeli intervention, continued to be neglected.[121]

The first of 1996-2000 plan's strategic objectives focused on 'expanded income opportunities.' Among other things, this took the form of providing financial support for the construction of the pilot industrial estate on the border between the Gaza Strip and Israel.[122] It was, however, the third strategic objective, 'more responsive and accountable governance,' that consumed 70 percent of program funds for the fiscal year 1996 (most of it going to providing ongoing budget support for the PA and financing electoral administration and the development of the PLC).[123] The achievement of this third strategic objective, the new plan posited, depended on accomplishing three intermediate objectives:

1. Increased participation of civil society in decision making and government oversight;
2. Enhanced capability of the PLC to perform the functions of a legislative body; and
3. More effective local government.[124]

USAID's involvement in these fields, it must be noted, began long before the drafting of the 1996-2000 strategic plan with a series of grants awarded, beginning in 1994, to the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) to work on the 'development of a credible election process' and the 'strengthening of citizen understanding and participation'.[125] NDI developed four programs, two of which supported domestic and international monitoring of the

elections scheduled for January 1996, and the other two focused on training in the techniques of political participation for young Palestinian women and the establishment of a civic education network. The programs were developed with the understanding that

> [d]emocratic Palestinian government is also a potentially important ingredient to peace between Palestinians and Israel. The legitimacy of an elected government and the development of transparent and accountable governing institutions could significantly strengthen relations between the two sides.[126]

As the 1996-2000 strategy went into effect, NDI was awarded two additional grants to provide advisory assistance to the PLC, establish a new advocacy program for NGOs, and continue its work on Civic Forum—the civic education network it had already set up in 1995.[127] Civic Forum involved training 22 Palestinian moderators and working with them to select a number of local CSOs to host—and encourage their members to participate in—a series of small civic education group discussions that covered such topics as the judiciary, general budgetary practices, local government, political parties, and the role of NGOs and the media in democracies. Overall, 1,800 such discussions, involving 5,000 Palestinians, were held. The program left participants with the feeling of 'playing a valuable role in creating a sustainable Palestinian civil society by learning to exercise their rights,' NDI vaunted. It also established a network of 440 local Palestinian organizations, 'through which information about draft laws, election procedures, and democratic systems in other countries has been efficiently disseminated.'[128]

However, a better grounded analysis suggests that NDI might have been overenthusiastic in selling the successes of Civic Forum. Although an assumption underlay the program that the targeted individuals either lacked knowledge, were politically passive or insufficiently civic minded, Civic Forum mainly reached those who were already, some indeed had been for decades, members of CSOs and better informed and more active than most. In addition, the discussions held managed to be both excessively theoretical and uncritical and simplistic. Whe-

reas an independent assessment could only find three examples of how lessons learned in the program led participants to find solutions to concert problems,[129] organizers of the program complained that working with 'urban' and 'intellectual' CSOs was difficult because 'these groups were less open to exploring new ideas.'[130] Some of the additional funding given to the program was, nonetheless, devoted to the creation of a 'wholly Palestinian group committed to grassroots civic education'—which on the ground was translated into transforming Civic Forum into a Palestinian NGO.[131]

In addition to Civic Activities—a program that was introduced by NDI in 1996 to provide advocacy and management skills to NGOs involved in the Civic Forum program—USAID's 1996-2000 strategic plan established an ambitious advocacy program that had as its goal:

> Increasing the participation of civil society in the public decision-making process to broaden debate on critical issues and establish an outside check on government performance.[132]

These parameters, together with the conceptualization of civil society underpinning them, were enough to distinguish USAID's work in this field from that of the World Bank. The Bank has focused on social services delivery and worked to ensure that a private enterprise-friendly environment is sustained through encouraging the PA to relegate such responsibilities to CSOs. To be sure, the same Washington consensus imperatives underpinned USAID's new strategy, which stressed that, together with the promotion of free and open markets, the 'promotion of democracy and improved governance' is 'a principle foreign policy objective of the United States government.' Both objectives, moreover, 'take the premise that democracy, while an important and desirable end in itself, is the political system most likely to provide the conditions necessary for the development of free markets and, hence, broad based economic growth and opportunities.'[133] Still, unlike the Bank, USAID shunned organizations whose main preoccupation is service delivery and basically defined CSOs as NGOs whose primary purpose is to influence

public policy (a category that the agency had estimated was in short supply).[134] The issue facing USAID as well as other donors 'who aim to be strategic in their programming,' as it was acknowledged, 'is which CSOs among the many that occupy this intermediary realm of voluntary associational life merit support.' Accordingly, the agency chose to 'support the creation and strengthening of civil society organizations which focus on democracy and good governance issues,' including advocacy groups, human rights and government watch-dog organizations, and research think-tanks.[135] The 1996-2000 strategy resolved to 'focus on building up the overall capacity of these organizations to fill an advocacy or government oversight role (including their ability to review legislation and policies and to draft their own suggested legislation and policies).'[136] It was not surprising, given the scope of these expectations, that USAID's interests extended to the creation of an 'enabling environment for civil society.' This effectively meant joining other donors in pressuring the PA, impressing upon it 'the need for a NGO law which enables Palestinian NGOs and other civil organizations to play an active role in decision-making processes'.[137]

Although seemingly consistent with the oppositional approach to civil society, USAID's proposed advocacy program built on a liberal understanding of civil society that tended to equate it with interest and pressure groups. These, it is posited, while competing to advance particular interests and gain access to the political system, act as an intermediary between citizens and the state.[138] According to this view, civil society represents a space for the peaceful mediation of social conflicts, which entails accommodating social protest to opportunities and constraints, protecting the individual from state repression and, above all, creating a climate of stability and peace, where the interface between government and civil society should be defined by cooperation rather than conflict.[139] This approach to civil society lacks the ability to meaningfully

redefine formal politics, especially in non-democratic or authoritarian contexts.[140] In the OPT, it became emblematic of USAID's approach to democracy purely as a matter of technical capabilities unrelated (with the exception of the expectation that democracy will somehow cement the Oslo peace process) to wider socioeconomic developments and the reality of occupation. According to the agency, the basic problem to be addressed 'is that the new Palestinian governing institutions (executive, legislative, and local level) and civil society have inadequate technical, organizational, and policy skills to effectively perform their respective roles in establishing more responsive and accountable governance.'[141] To help address these problems other donors extended public administration training to the PA and helped with developing the civil service, forming budget capabilities and revenue administration, and compiling legislation. USAID, for its part, resolved to 'concentrate on increasing participation of civil society in public decision-making, strengthening legislative and public policy capability and making local government more effective.'[142] As far as encouraging the participation of civil society in public decision-making was concerned, the agency intended to focus on increasing the 'institutional sustainability' of 'specialized civic organizations,' i.e. advocacy organizations, through 'more effective revenue generation, better management of resources, the adoption of internal democratic practices and improved relationships with their membership.'[143]

This narrow understanding of civil society aside, USAID's focus on advocacy—and indeed its entire D&G agenda—ran up against the obstacles produced by the role US economic assistance continued to play as a foreign policy-making tool. USAID overcharged the tenuous relationship between democracy and peace. However, instead of democracy contributing to peace, what became increasingly evident on the ground was that the USG's interest in the continued viability of the Oslo process counteracted and undermined the agency's democracy, rule of law and human

rights promotion efforts. This was exemplified by the praise heaped by the then American Vice President Al Gore, during a visit to the OPT in the summer of 1998, on the PA's so-called 'state security court'—an institution established at the behest of Israeli and American pressure and infamous for violating due process and condoning human rights abuses.[144] As acknowledged by an NDI staff member:

> The international community has had a very short-term perspective. It wanted to support the peace process. It never had the political will to promote Palestinian democracy. It is true, that money went to democratization projects, but at the end of the day, it is about foreign governments pushing issues forward politically. Civil society can implement projects but if the PA at the same time is executing citizens after a 20 minutes trial, the signal sent is very different.[145]

In like manner, although an important focus of USAID's 1996-2000 D&G strategy had been the extension of financial and capacity-building support to Palestinian municipalities with the aim of 'making local government more effective,' agency officials revealed that they had been instructed by Dennis Ross not to work with municipalities in areas that would strengthen them as autonomous organs of local government. The objective, according to one USAID official, was 'to preclude the emergence of competing centers of power and prevent any decentralization of control that would diminish the power of Mr. Arafat and the Palestinian Authority to carry out the political tasks of the day.'[146] It was perhaps these and similar contradictions between the USAID's stated goals and the wider foreign-policy interests of the US government that led the drafters of the agency's monitoring plan for the achievement of its 'more responsive and accountable governance' strategic objective to caution that although this objective is 'framed in traditional development terms, the goal to which it contributes is one promoting the continuation of a fragile peace process, not what would be considered a traditional development objective in other locales.'[147] 'It is important to keep in mind,' they went on to stress,

> that the Mission's 1996-2000 strategic plan's overall objective is strengthening Palestinian commitment to the peace process (and both internal and regional stability) as defined by

> the September 1993 Oslo Peace Accords, not the creation of an independent, well-governed and democratic Palestinian nation.[148]

The second intifada

As the 1996-2000 strategy was drawing to a close, the Mission asked for a two-year extension. However, due to the break of the second intifada, the USAID home office denied the request. Instead, it opted for devising a 'Transition Plan' that had an open-ended time frame that depended on 'both the outcome and timing of negotiations between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Government of Israel, and internal developments within the PA affecting the population of the West Bank and Gaza.'[149] Until such conditions obtain, the agency made it its primary objective 'to promote stability in the West Bank and Gaza' in the hopes that this 'will strengthen the political, economic and social underpinnings for an eventual resolution of the conflict, even if the peace process becomes moribund for a period.'[150] The Transition Plan, which began to be implemented in the spring of 2001, emphasized humanitarian assistance, especially emergency medical treatment and support for service provision by NGOs. It also introduced a new employment generation program that drew on the Mission's 'successful experience in creating jobs in the West Bank and Gaza in 1995 and 1996.'[151] Given that the 1996-2000 strategic objectives—namely, economic growth, sustainable access to water resources, a democratic system of governance, and adequate social services and infrastructure—'individually and together promote stability,' it was deemed that a major overhaul of USAID's strategic approach was unnecessary.[152]

It was, nonetheless, deemed that some of the intermediate objectives needed refinement. The agency, for example, found it necessary that its objective of 'increased participation of civil society in public decision-making and government oversight' be changed to 'increased participation of civil society in public discourse.'[153] Given the realities of constant conflict

throughout the West Bank and Gaza, specific references to decision-making and government oversight were found to be unhelpful. Instead, Palestinian CSOs, particularly those the Mission will support, were expected to 'play a leading role in public discourse, and indeed, to encourage stability and avoidance of a societal breakdown.'[154] The agency intended to both 'intensify' and 'expand' its support to CSOs, including to those which are equipped to provide essential services to vulnerable groups and are better placed to access Palestinian areas than USAID's international partners.

The Transition Plan came on the heels of significant changes in the way USAID conducted its business in the OPT. When, in February 2000, the agency wished to devise yet another project to increase the financial management capacity and internal democratic governance of CSOs, it awarded a grant to America's Development Foundation (ADF), an American PVO, to implement what the agency termed a 'civil society capacity building program.'[155] This choice was consistent with the agency's practice, dating back to the revampment of the US economic assistance program in the early 1990s, of relying for the implementation of its projects, especially those in D&G field, on American quasi-governmental organizations such as NDI, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) or, in the case of smaller projects, American PVOs. As its 1996-2000 strategy was drawing to a close, the agency introduced the practice of outsourcing the implementation of many of its projects to US-based management companies. On September 19, 2000, only ten days before the second intifada erupted, USAID awarded the Tamkeen contract—a five-year project dedicated to the increased participation of Palestinian CSOs in public decision making and government oversight—to Chemonics International Inc, an international development consulting company based in Washington, DC. As the contract title illustrates, the agency also introduced the practice of dubbing its

projects, together with the intermediate objectives they are expected to achieve, with Arabic names.[156] Tamkeen (in English, 'empowerment'), which was designed before the Transition Plan was introduced, was initially conceived as a project that would award grants that support CSOs to:

1. Effectively articulate citizen interests through various means
2. Disseminate information and/or advocate issues of interest to the public
3. Promote transparency and public participation in the public decision-making process
4. Build the capacity of other CSOs to hold government accountable to citizens[157]

It awarded grants in five sectors (D&G, health, education, water and environment, and economic development) and provided capacity building support, especially to CSOs working in the D&G field. The project's capacity building support was mostly geared towards helping CSOs with the development of grant proposals and the implementation of grants in a timely and effective manner. Tamkeen also contracted the Bisan Center for Research and Development to develop 'Training Best Practices' courses, and provided CSOs receiving Tamkeen grants with management and IT skills support and training in advocacy skills and techniques.[158]

In addition to outsourcing project implementation to US-based management companies, Tamkeen resembled other new projects introduced by the USAID in that it was endowed with a quasi-independent bureaucratic structure and a visible physical presence in the OPT. In fact, Tamkeen was so conspicuous in its visibility (with two main offices, one in Ramalla and one in Gaza city, and branch offices in a number of districts) that it incurred the anger of the PA which attempted to shut it down because it felt excluded from the project and the decision processes that went into choosing which organizations would get funding and for what.[159] Within a year of its commencement the project had developed a vast structure of administrative networks that, among other things, included an international management company, placed near decision centers in the US and tasked with providing strategic consultancy, financial reporting and related

management tasks, and a number of local offices with a locally-recruited staff assigned with the task of directly dealing with the local organizations applying for project funding. Put in place to facilitate the management of the funds earmarked for local organizations, a task for which USA-ID had previously been directly responsible, the new bureaucratic networks consumed US$ 9 million of Tamkeen's original US$ 33 million five-year endowment. Besides the usual administrative tasks, the new bureaucratic structure included provisions for maintaining a Web-enabled database, hosted in Chemonics home office in Washington, D.C., to be regularly updated with relevant grants-making information, including grant applications, awards, CSO profiles, communications with grantees, and disbursements.[160]

The changes in the way USAID conducted its business in the OPT became even more significant after the USG launched its 'war against terrorism,' a development that followed the introduction of the Transition Plan: First, after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the USAID West Bank and Gaza program was incorporated in the new region-wide aid programs established by the US to promote democracy and encourage socioeconomic reform 'in order to undercut the forces of radicalism in some Arab countries.'[161] Second, and more significant, in mid-2002 the USG introduced a new policy mandating that all organizations applying for USAID funding must submit personal information about board members for vetting to ensure that the applying organizations are not affiliated with any of the 'terrorist organizations' listed by the State Department.[162] In the case of Palestinian CSOs, they also had to submit such information as the type and location of the activities they planned to undertake and the personal details of board members and all the personnel expected to be involved, including the date and place of birth and the identification number issued to the OPT inhabitants by Israel. While it remained unclear whether the information compiled in the Tamkeen database was used for vetting local organizations to

ensure compliance with these requirements, the new policy did little to improve USAID's already unfavorable image in the eyes of many Palestinians. This perception has something to do with what many Palestinians view as American bias and unconditional support for Israel.[163] Still, USAID's unfavorable image in the OPT relates to the agency's own record, which, besides giving Israel a defining role in setting the agency's policy and program parameters, included its involvement in subsidizing Israel's construction of the segregated network of bypass roads that crisscrossed and fragmented the OPT.[164]

Demonstrating the extent to which Palestinians were becoming weary of this record, the Palestinian NGO Network, one of the largest civil society networks in the OPT, had already organized three public discussions on the possibility of boycotting USAID long before the new 'anti-terrorism' requirements were introduced. However, even though the discussions, which were held shortly after the break of the second intifada, seemed to acquire widespread approval, the proposal of boycotting USAID failed to garner broad compliance on the part of CSOs. After USAID introduced its new 'anti-terrorism' policy, a number of CSOs launched a petition calling for the boycott of all US financial support, and USAID financial support in particular. The petition, which was launched with a small newspaper ad with twelve organizations and public figures as signatories, grew into a full page ad with more than 500 signatories within three weeks.[165]

Nonetheless, in early 2003 the USG introduced what it called the 'Certificate Against Terrorist Financing' (variably referred to by USAID as the 'Anti-Terrorism Certificate' (ATC) or 'Declaration Against Terrorism'). The new procedures required an organization applying for USAID funding to certify that it had not and would not 'provide material support or resources to any individual or entity that it knows, or has reason to know, is an individual or entity that advocates,

plans, sponsors, engages in, or has engaged in terrorist activity.'[166] Organizations wishing to receive funding from the agency were also asked to 'provide an affirmative certification as to the accuracy of the information [they] provide for the purpose of vetting.'[167] This information was to be vetted against USAID's own newly established database of information on foreign persons and organizations, databases maintained by the US intelligence agencies and other sources such as the list of parties excluded from federal procurement and non-procurement programs (the suspended/debarred list) and the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) specially designated nationals and blocked persons lists.[168] In their defense of the new policies, Mission officials insisted that the new rules came from Washington and have been instituted without exception worldwide. However, in 2005 the Mission introduced two new rules (the 'naming' clause, prohibiting the use of US funds to recognize or honor 'terrorists', and the 'cash' clause, prohibiting the provision of cash to the PA) that were applied exclusively to the OPT.[169]

As public unease with the new requirements grew, it became increasingly evident that they interfered with the achievement of USAID's civil society program goals. This was especially the case since—per the changes introduced in the 2001 Transition Plan—Tamkeen's primary objective became

> to help Palestinian civil society organizations (CSOs) increase their voice in public discourse and preserve the critical 'space' occupied by Palestinian CSOs, placing them at the heart of the communications nexus between citizens and their public representatives at the local and national levels.[170]

Palestinian CSOs were increasingly reluctant to accept USAID funding, a tendency that was most acute among Tamkeen's primary target of CSOs working in the D&G field. A 2003 document prepared for USAID on the potential role for Tamkeen in the next Palestinian elections reported that CSOs involved in fields of public policy and advocacy 'expressed reservations about receiving Tamkeen funds for electoral projects' because they were 'concerned about how

it would affect their reputation and public image' or feared that doing so 'could lead to internal disagreement and fragmentation.'[171] According to the report, the only organization working in the D&G field that now seemed willing to receive Tamkeen funding was Civic Forum, the same organization USAID helped establish a few years before.[172] To deal with these problems USAID launched a number of media and 'branding' campaigns, which included TV, radio, billboards and newspaper ads, aimed at increasing the Palestinians' awareness of the assistance the US provides to the Palestinian people and improving the agency's image.[173] According to one USAID report, a poll conducted on the heels of the agency's 'aggressive public outreach program' revealed that 50 percent of those who were exposed to the outreach campaigns regarded USAID projects as important for their well-being, while 58 percent believed that USAID was sincere about assisting the Palestinian people.[174]

While it is difficult to approximate the accurateness of the poll results, evidence was also beginning to emerge that Palestinian CSOs could not easily dispense with USAID funding, especially since the agency remained the largest single financial contributor to civil society projects and Palestinian CSOs.[175] CSOs that did receive USAID funding went out of their way not to publicize their cooperation with the agency, with some publicly denying that they continued to accept USAID funding when in reality they did.[176] Still, the fact that many CSOs depended primarily on USAID funding made boycotting the agency unworkable. According to a 2004 USAID report, Tamkeen's grants program was slowed down because many CSOs remained reluctant to sign the ATC, but enough CSOs were willing to sign the document by the end of 2003 that the project was able to award 193 grants worth a total value of approximately US$10 million, a figure close to Tamkeen's original target.[177] The report also noted, however, that the high number of grants awarded was partly due to the decision to provide increased capacity

building assistance to the CSOs already cooperating with agency and to the ‘conscious decision’ made by Tamkeen, in accord with its assessment that smaller CSOs appeared more willing to accept USAID funding, ‘to target’ nascent, less experienced CSOs.[178]

This new focus on smaller organizations continued throughout the life of the Tamkeen project. It was also carried over into the new ‘interim strategy’ prepared in the first half of 2005 to respond to two recent developments: the opportunity presented by the Israeli decision to ‘disengage’ from the Gaza Strip, and the increased chances of Palestinian reform following the death of President Arafat. The interim strategy's new governance program, implemented in concert with the Mission by USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), had as its objectives increasing the ability of Palestinian national and local governments to respond to citizen priorities and increasing the participation of youth in social, political, and economic life.[179] Unlike previous USAID strategies, which made no mention of Palestinian statehood, in accord with President Bush's vision—outlined in his June 2002 Rose Garden speech and inscribed, later on, in the Road Map—USAID could now explicitly link its programs to the establishment of a ‘Palestinian State, living side by side in peace and security with Israel.’[180] USAID, nonetheless, made sure that the new interim strategy retained ‘all of the flexibility and innovative program management used over the past four years.’[181] The strategy, moreover, shared with its predecessor its four broad goals:

1. Achieve political stability;
2. Achieve economic stability;
3. Achieve social stability; and
4. Provide needed infrastructure.[182]

If ‘political stability’ was unattainable previously because in his Rose Garden speech President Bush stressed the need not only for ‘true reform,’ but also a ‘new Palestinian leadership,’ the Mission had great hopes that it could be achieved after the death of President Arafat. It, moreo-

ver, had expected its operating budget to double from form US$ 75 million to US150 million during FY2006, which reinforced its hopes of achieving its stated goals.[183] However, as of June 2006, USAID reported that it had promised just US$1.1 million and expended only US$139,000 because US assistance to the West Bank and Gaza has been frozen after Hamas' January 2006 electoral victory, bending a comprehensive review by the US Congress' Committees on Appropriations. It was only after the Secretary of State submitted her report, on July 21, 2006, to the US Congress on how the funds will be spent, which included a revised strategy ensuring that 'appropriate measures are in place to ensure that no funds will support terrorist activities' that USAID was able to redirect it overall assistance program.[184] Meanwhile, the US Congress passed the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006, which the US President signed into law on December 21, 2006. The law bars aid to the Hamas-led Palestinian government. It, however, exempts funds for 'humanitarian aid and democracy promotion.'[185] It also authorized US$20 million in funding to 'establish a fund promoting Palestinian democracy and Israeli-Palestinian peace.'[186]

With a revised assistance package totaling US$468 million for FY2006—including US$50 million 'for Israel's use in easing the movement and access of Palestinian people and goods, while improving its security'[187]—the agency focused it assistance on democracy support, health, education, private sector development and such activities 'that would not provide political or economic gain to, or require contact with, the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority.'[188] The OTI's Transition Initiative objectives were, moreover, changed:

1. Help emerging and democratic leaders establish community-based credibility; and
2. Strengthen the ability of constituencies for peace to generate grassroots demand for change in the West Bank and Gaza.[189]

One million dollars of the new funding allocated to the Mission went to financing USAID's own 'NGO Mapping Project.' The project, which 'was conceived and guided' by former envoy to the Middle East, Dennis Ross, with the assistance of Ziad Asali, president of the American

Task Force on Palestine, was implemented by the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress (CSPC).[190] It partly mirrored the NGO mapping research carried out by other international organizations. The team of American and Palestinian experts (the 'Ross team,' as it was dubbed by the CSPC) who supervised the research took into account such factors as the type of services and functions offered by the CSOs surveyed, their geographical location, specialization, levels of expertise, constituencies, and relationships with donors. It, however, had a better-defined objective: To 'strengthen a community of moderate Palestinian leaders who are responsive to the needs of their people through community-based NGOs.' This was a critical task given that, according to the CSPC, 'one of the most important but often underemphasized elements to advancing peace is the strengthening of political moderates and their ties to their communities'.[191] However,

> the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections demonstrated that Hamas, and not the moderate political parties, had developed stronger, better-organized followings. One of the means Hamas employed to increase its political support was the use of an active services network that attracted Palestinians in need of better educational services, health care and poverty relief.[192]

The methodology informing the project was three-pronged. First,

> identify a range of moderate, community-based Palestinian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working to provide services to their constituencies primarily in areas where the Palestinian Authority has limited reach and Hamas operates extensive charitable operations.[193]

In accord with this requirement, in the period between October 2007 and April 2008, the research team was able to 'identify' 56 different moderate, community-based NGOs operating a diverse range of services throughout the West Bank. Although far from comprehensive, the list of selected NGOs was intended to provide a representative sample 'highlighting the diversity of moderate, community-based Palestinian NGOs' (although the published report included an annex, titled 'A Guide to Moderate, Community-Based NGOs in the West Bank,' listing all the NGOs surveyed).[194] As part of the identification process, the research team had also conducted

an 'assessment of the current state of the Palestinian civil society and its relationship to the current political dynamics and challenges in the West Bank.' They supplemented the findings with twelve focus groups, conducted in every major community in the West Bank with more than 120 participants representing NGO experts, staff, and beneficiaries.[195] The focus groups, which were run by the political research firm AWRAD (Arab World for Research and Development), evaluated such matters as the current state of Palestinian civil society, the role of the non-governmental sector in Palestinian life, and the best practices of NGOs.[196] In the past, according to the published report, donor efforts supported Ramallah-based NGOs, which led to the cultivation of a vibrant but isolated 'elite' civil society with limited connections to the broader population. Taking a panoramic view of the West Bank, it was clear that although there existed a wide spectrum of NGOs, only a fraction are regularly engaged in implementing programs and activities. Of particular concern to the drafters of the published report was the fact that Fatah-affiliated NGOs accounted for the majority of organizations in most districts, but were 'largely inactive and poorly funded.'[197] On the other hand, 'while Hamas operates relatively few of these NGOs, they are invariably among the most active and professional in the field.'[198] One of the many examples given in the report should suffice here:

> [O]ur research team discovered that out of more than 200 NGOs in the Bethlehem district, only around 30—or 15 percent—are affiliated with Hamas. Yet these Hamas-run NGOs account for the majority of programs and activities sponsored by NGOs in Bethlehem. Only a handful of non-Hamas NGOs operate regular professional programs in the area.[199]

The report reached the overall conclusion that this pattern of Hamas's effectiveness in the NGO sector occurred throughout the West Bank, particularly in the movement's strongholds of Hebron and Nablus. It was, thus, hoped that the annexed guide to moderate NGOs would 'best serve donors seeking to expand the range of their grantees beyond Ramalla and into the Palestinian communities with the greatest needs.'[200]

Second, beyond conducting research, the project had 'the practical objective of initiating collaborative networks' among 'moderate' NGO.[201] Expanding cooperation among such organizations, it was expected, would achieve the two goals of limiting the influence of extremism by enhancing a culture of moderation and nurturing dynamic partnerships among Palestinian moderates. The latter objective would 'advance [the moderates'] collective projects and strengthen their positions as political actors and advocates in Palestinian society.'[202] Although the 'Ross team' convened initial meetings among 'moderate' national and local NGOs that generated great interest in cooperation and prepared the grounds for unprecedented networking, further development of this network was needed to 'help its member share experience, enhance their voices as political advocates, and expand the reach of their activities.'[203] Such efforts, it was hoped, would lead to creation of a functional, well-managed network, which ideally 'will include all NGOs that fall within the moderate stream of Fatah supporters and independents with democratic leanings.'[204]

Third, the project had the practical objective of bringing to the US a representative group of moderate NGO leaders to meet with potential donors and the policy community. A delegation of such NGOs' representatives, together with members of the research team, were hosted in Washington, DC, for an intensive week of meetings with, among others: three members of Congress; the president of the World Bank; Denmark's and Bahrain's ambassadors to the US; representatives from the embassies of Canada, Germany and Japan; senior State Department and USAID officials; and the staff of US democracy assistance organizations, including NED, IRI and NDI. Finally, before work on the above objectives was concluded in May 2008, the CSPC had proposed a number of 'next steps' to build on the project's achievements. Some of these tasks—which beyond establishing the NGO network, included providing capacity-building support to

‘moderate’ NGOs; enhancing their outreach and communication efforts; and the execution of at least one national level project, such as educational summer camps, through the proposed network[205]—were incorporated into USAID's ongoing two-phase ‘Civic Engagement Project.’

The first phase of the Civic Engagement Program (CEP I), which was implemented by ARD Inc., a consultancy company based in Burlington, Vermont, was intended to serve as the Mission's ‘rapid and flexible mechanism for responding to the political reform and humanitarian assistance needs of the Palestinian people.’[206] CEP I sought to support community-based CSOs, independent institutions, and selected democratic actors. Its objectives and methods of operation were simple: Development and implementation of small in-kind grants to support political reform at the community level; development and implementation of larger grants designed to enhance the capacities of the PA; and providing grant support and capacity building assistance to CSOs. Throughout its life, from December 2007 through June 2009, CEP I supported a wide array of projects, including the construction of public works, helping with strategic planning for the Ministry of Transportation and conducting research on trade and access, and the provision of office equipment for community groups, equipment for a judicial training center, and organizational capacity building for NGOs.[207] As ARD noted in its final report on CEP I, the 52 projects implemented under the program were diverse but

> similar in that they addressed immediate needs of the Palestinian people, supported [the] voice of moderation, and helped to create social and cultural opportunities to discuss and advocate for reform.[208]

CEP II, a 36-month US$20 million contract between USAID and ARD, was designed as a follow-on that continues programming undertaken from June 2005 until September 2008 under OTI's Transition Initiative and CEP I. Very much like CEP I, it seeks to ‘engage and promote moderate voices in the West Bank and Gaza (WB/G) to further the prospect for peaceful political solutions and economic development.’[209] According to ARD, CEP II will employ two primary

activities to achieve these objectives: responsive in-kind grants and longer-term capacity-building interventions. The grants to be awarded under the project, in the period between October 2008 and October 2011, will be designed to target and support diverse activities, including:

1. Projects that develop the capacities of Palestinian institutions, including ministries, local governments, service providers, and civil society and community-based organizations to respond to citizen priorities;
2. Interventions to develop the core capacities of Palestinian civil society organizations or other institutions;
3. Activities that strengthen constituencies for peace to generate grassroots demand for change in West Bank and Gaza;
4. Projects that incorporate strategic synergies with other USAID WB/G programs;
5. Small-scale reconstruction/rehabilitation projects (such as schools, sports facilities, and public and recreational programs); and
6. Other interventions that complement other USAID WB/G Mission programs that target critical, time-sensitive initiatives consistent with the Mission's transformational development goals and U.S. foreign policy objectives.[210]

CEP II is distinguished from CEP I by the expectation that it will gradually move away from the Transition Initiative's strategy of targeting individual moderate or emerging leaders and focus more on strategic institutional building. However, 'consistent with the emerging guidance from the Consulate General and the DGO, programming will continue to seek targets of opportunity, whether individual or institutional, in efforts to support improved service provision and increased responsiveness to citizen needs.'[211] In more general terms, in order to contribute to USAID's long-term strategic objectives, CEP II is expected to respond to a broad mandate and range of requests from the USG.[212] One of the shapes these requirements took on the ground was the linking of grant and funding decisions to PA security performance. For example, according to ARD,

> CEP II programming will complement the USG's activities in the Jenin region and across the North West Bank, where recent successes in the security arena can be balanced by assistance to local village and municipal councils, ministries, umbrella institutions such as chambers of commerce or unions/federations, civil society organizations (CSOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and like institutional entities, thereby creating a critical mass or momentum throughout the region. The same is true in the Hebron district, where a similar effort is being waged by the PA and USG to build upon security gains through developmental assistance.

Moreover, not unlike the Transition Initiative and CEP I, in order to be able to respond to political developments on the ground and to support USG objectives in a rapid fashion, it is expected that CEP II will have to forgo the usual grant making procedures such as requests for application or annual program statements.[213] As ARD explains,

> [t]he primary distinction of the CEP II program is its ability to be reactive to emerging political events, thereby providing the Consulate General or USAID with a mechanism to achieve forward momentum in terms of political objectives. For example, should a target of opportunity be identified by the Consulate General, like a village council that changes from a Hamas orientation to Fatah leadership, CEP II will continue to respond appropriately with material assistance to assist and strengthen the new leadership's position within the community.[214]

3. Final Assessment

This chapter has argued that CSOs in the OPT have been rendered the subjects of disciplinary power in the post-Oslo period. International donors, it has been argued, have deployed discourses that serve to partition social space into two distinct and incommensurable 'civic' and 'political' spheres. In the case of the World Bank, these discourses emphasize building the capacities of local CSOs to be able to contribute to 'social and economic development.' As we have seen, championing CSOs as 'agents of development,' the Bank discourages 'political' work that might undermine the 'stability' necessary for its achievement. This approach to the situation in the OPT is prevalent; it underpins the two-year program of the government of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad (who, significantly, is a former World Bank employee), premised on deemphasizing political developments and focusing on building Palestinian institutions. This approach can be approximated to the approach to Palestinian development rooted in the concept of *sumud*, which emerged in the early 1970s and entertained a belief in the possibility of improving living conditions and bettering the lot of Palestinians by working within the confines of the Israeli military government's dictates and regulations. Like that rooted in the concept of *sumud*, the Bank's approach avoids an important question: is 'social and economic development' possible without

challenging Israeli control, continued Israeli colonization and cantonization and daily encroachments on Palestinian collective and individual rights? Development projects premised on this approach avoid the defining feature of the socioeconomic context in the OPT: the Israeli occupation regime. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the Bank and other donors have been unwilling to challenge Israeli policies that make not only development but daily human life very difficult. While it is difficult to measure how much CSOs have contributed to development in the post-Oslo, it is, nonetheless, important to note that their dependency on foreign funding has become even more pronounced in recent years. Around 78 percent of CSOs' revenues came from foreign donors in 2009.[215] This trend indicates that rather than building the capacities of CSOs to be able to function as independent agents of development, the real interest of international donors has been in using them as agents of social pacification and control.

In the case of USAID, the distinction drawn between the 'civic' and 'political' spheres of social action is evident in the emphasis placed on 'civic' education, 'civic' engagement and 'moderation.' The term 'moderate' is increasingly used in agency parlance as a euphemism for Fatah-affiliated actors. In any event, for the agency, it is important to emphasize again, the value of 'civicness' and 'moderation' stems from the imperative to maintain 'stability.' As the quotes provided above illustrate, stability is deemed as important for the regional interests of the USG. It is a particular reading of these interests that determines the conceptual boundaries of 'civicness'/'moderation' and defines those deemed as conformist or recalcitrant.

This chapter has also argued that international donors made use of both quantitative research and administrative techniques in order to categorize, classify, observe and monitor local CSOs. These modes of surveillance were intensified following the break of the second intifada, as evidenced by USAID's Tamkeen project and the 'anti-terrorism' procedures and requirements, and

have become more pronounced in the period following the elections held in the OPT in January of 2006. The projects implemented by USAID after Hamas's 2006 electoral victory signal a reversal of the assumption, emphasized in earlier USAID publications, that democracy in the OPT will cement the Oslo process. Significantly, they embody a drive towards an intensification of surveillance. This is especially evident in the CSPC's NGO mapping project, at the heart of which lies a desire to avoid uncontrollable social space. The most serious challenge to a system based on visibility and predictability is presented by groups that remain outside the purview of its surveillance, thereby not conforming to its logic. While the position of Ramallah-based NGOs as the subjects of discipline is taken as for granted, smaller, peripheral, and community-based CSOs operate in an area outside of the purview of the bureaucratic constructs and administrative techniques put in place by USAID. Following the example of the Tamkeen project, the NGO mapping project worked to remedy this flaw.

The desire to incorporate smaller community-based organizations into both projects is underpinned by an urge to reinforce the demeanor of those deemed conforming with the perimeters of ‘correct’ behavior. In the case of CSPC's NGO mapping project, CEP and, above all, USAID's ‘anti-terrorism’ procedures and requirements, there is also a desire to identify, and to call attention to, those groups and actors that refuse to conform with the logic of the system. At best, these groups are unpredictable and, therefore, deemed as threatening. In the case of those thought to be linked to Hamas, they are labeled as ‘extremist.’ Extremist is the opposite of ‘moderate,’ which for USAID is synonymous with ‘correct’ behavior (i.e., that which does not undermine the ‘stability’ emphasized in many of the agency's strategy statements). Just as labeling them as ‘terrorist,’ labeling these organizations as ‘extremist’ is by no means inconsequential. These practices underpin the silence of international donors—who for years devised projects aimed at

strengthening civil society and instilling respect for the rule of law, diversity and human rights—in the face of the PA-led campaign of repression against Islamic CSOs. Launched after the break of the unity government in 2007 and meant to root out Hamas-linked organizations, the campaign has been extensive and wide-reaching; targeting organizations not linked to Hamas.[216] Islamic CSOs have for the most part remained outside of the purview of the disciplinary mechanisms deployed by international donors. The campaign of repression launched by the PA's internationally financed and trained security forces against them signals a lapse into coercion: a sovereign mode of power.[217]

USAID Mission officials continue to assert that the increasingly stringent 'anti-terrorism' vetting procedures come from Washington, underlining the hostility with which the US Congress has approached the West Bank and Gaza Strip program.[218] However, a review of the testimonies USAID officials regularly make before congressional subcommittees reveals that they tend to downplay how Palestinians feel about these requirements and the potential adverse impact they might have had on agency projects and programs. On the contrary, these testimonies signal approval and enthusiasm, expressing a readiness to go beyond what the US Congress requires. The testimony of Henrietta Fore, USAID Administrator and Director of US Foreign Assistance, before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs on February 27, 2008 is not atypical:

> Currently, the program that we have for the West Bank includes in it the vetting of the top few board members for any contract that is going to be receiving money. So the current vetting system has this in it, and your strong support and vigilance has encouraged that. The new vetting system that we are now talking with members of Congress, staff and the private voluntary organization community about would be even stronger, which is why our intention would be to begin a pilot, and to begin it in West Bank. It is important that we roll this out in the area of highest risk. Our current programs, the I.G. [Israeli Government] has come back to look at a second time, and feel that they are adequate currently, but we think that we would like to go a step deeper. We are also working with other agencies, Department of State and other federal agencies, because we, as the United States government, wish to have the same strong guidelines, so that we are being smart and capable in both

> searching our databases, as well in the restrictions that we are putting on for who gets funding within areas of highest risk. We need to have a full toolkit.[219]

The reference made here to the role the Israeli government may have played in pushing for more stringent vetting procedures is uncharacteristic. It, nonetheless, serves to highlight how a major international donor exhibits an interest in avoiding uncontrollable Palestinian social space—through the employment of surveillance—that is reminiscent of Israel's own efforts in this area during the pre-Oslo period. Despite being couched in the language of combating terrorism, like Israeli practices during that period, the real objectives behind these measures extend to controlling Palestinian expression and stifling legitimate non-violent resistance.

In like manner, the desire to avoid uncontrollable social space is evident in the emphasis the World Bank puts on the incorporation of community-based CSOs into PNGO II and PNGO III. Like those implemented by USAID, these projects emphasize 'capacity-building' and adherence to 'professional' management, accounting and reporting standards. These management techniques do increase the productivity of CSOs. However, it is important to note that the emphasis placed on 'capacity-building' disguises the potential that exists for the utilization of management techniques for the creation of more institutionalized and, hence, more readily visible, easily identifiable CSOs that can be more rigorously monitored and managed.

The desire to avoid uncontrollable social space is also present in the statistical surveys commissioned by the Bank and other international donors, which grew to be more and more exhaustive over the years. In 2007, MAS published an update of its 2001 mapping of existing CSOs. Bemoaning the lack of quantitative research since the publication of the 2001 study, the aim was to 'establish a database of Palestinian NGOs and other Palestinian charitable societies.'[220] In particular, the study intended to remedy the shortcomings of the 'Guide to NGOs in the West Bank,' published by the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator in 2006. This guide 'presents

only basic information about each organization: the name of the organization, its objectives, a short summary about it, number of employees and volunteers, its programs and activities, and its publications.' It, however, 'does not assist in forming a clear picture about each individual organization, or about them as a sector.'[221] In contrast, MAS's 2007 study provides very dense, aggregated, tabulated and up-to-date information on the makeup and distribution of existing CSOs. It is the most comprehensive 'mapping' of CSOs in the OPT to date. In 2009, MAS, in cooperation with the NGO Development Center (the organization set up by the Bank as PNGO II was drawing to a close and meant to outlive PNGO), has also published a study on donor funding to CSOs. Titled 'Tracking External Donor Funding to Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: 1999 -2008,' the study's goal was to 'document' patterns of external donor funding by surveying both sides of the equation: Palestinian NGOs and external donors.[222]

IV. CONCLUSION

This study has traced the developments that shaped civil society in the OPT since its reinvigoration with the emergence of small voluntary work CSOs in the 1970s through the present. In particular, it has contrasted the role civil society played in mobilizational politics during the pre-Oslo period (extending from the beginning of the Israeli occupation in 1967 through 1993) and its role during the post-Oslo period (extending from the signing of the DoP in September of 1993 through the present). During the pre-Oslo period, CSOs provided much more than the needed social services denied by the Israeli military government; they represented fora for articulating the local population's political, social, and economic aspirations. Moreover, they played an essential role in laying the conceptual and organizational grounds for civil-disobedience and in generating and sustaining the high levels of collective action witnessed during the first intifada. This activism at the level of associational solidarity embodied a double shift within the Palestinian society inside the OPT: First, a sociopolitical shift within Palestinian society from a social hierarchy dominated by a land-owning traditional elite to new forms of sociopolitical organizing led by an emerging elite made of recent university graduates and young professionals. As noted by Glenn Robinson, the student blocs, relief committees, women's organizations, labor unions and professional associations that 'the new elite built in the 1980s were "the army" with which the new elite "took power"—that is, became the dominant political elite within Palestinian society in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.'[1] Second, the popular movement embodied a historical shift from external (Ottoman, British, Jordanian, Egyptian and, of course, Israeli) domination towards the coalescing of an endogenous and autonomous Palestinian national movement inside the OPT. This OPT-based national movement mirrored, acted as a counterpart to, and functioned in parallel with the PLO institutions in exile.

The open organizational structure and the grassroots mode of organizing of the mass organizations that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, coupled with the role they played in both intra-Palestinian social contestation and in undermining the control of the Israeli military government and the hold it had over the local Palestinian population, renders them more amenable Gramsci's critical understanding of the counter-hegemonic nature and potential of civil society. More specifically, the historical role these organizations played within the Palestinian society is consistent with the oppositional understanding of civil society inspired by the struggles of social movement against authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe and Latin America. By working to undermine the social position of the Jordan-allied traditional elites, the mass organizations helped put an end to the Jordanian-Israeli informal power-sharing arrangement. In like manner, by encouraging self-organization and self-reliance and by advocating disengagement from the Israeli military government and noncompliance with its laws and regulations, the mass organizations induced a lasting rapture in the field of consciousness, making the status quo of dependence on the Israeli military government unsustainable. In short, while it might be an over-statement to say that the mass organizations produced the first intifada, it is doubtful that without them it could have been as wide-reaching and enduring as it was.

The beginning of the Oslo process witnessed the transformation of OPT-based CSOs. As they grew to be increasingly dependent on international funding, CSOs have become disembedded from the local communities, disengaged from mobilizational politics and less representative. Crucially, they played a very marginal role during the first years of the second intifada. In understanding the transformation in the role of CSOs post-Oslo, this study has sought to go beyond the generalized descriptions of the new donor-championed management practices and development discourses prevalent in the literature. Focusing on the power-relations that govern the

interactions of international donors with local CSOs, it has theorized the discourses, survey research and administrative techniques deployed, conducted and constructed by foreign donors as mechanisms of disciplinary power.

More specifically, this study has drawn attention to the ways in which the discourses marshaled by donors served to partition social space into two distinct and incommensurable 'civic' and 'political' spheres. These discourses are underpinned by a deeply conservative investment in stability and the status quo. The associational approach to civil society—centered on the benefits of social capital and championed by the World Bank—conceives of democracy and improved governance as the indirect results of apolitical forms of association. In the same way, USAID emphasized the importance of civil society for democracy and political reform, but conceived of civil society as consisting of specialized interest and advocacy groups. These organizations lack the ability to meaningfully redefine formal politics in undemocratic contexts. Only CSOs invested in the hard work of social mobilization and collective grassroots organization have that ability. However, these groups can undermine stability and jeopardize the status quo. In the OPT, they were deemed as potentially distributive and uncontrollable. They threatened the viability of the internationally-sponsored Oslo process.

International donors drew a sharp distinction between 'civic' and 'political' modes of behavior. With social space thus partitioned, they used administrative techniques to channel collective energies into desirable non-distributive domains of social action. They reinforced the behavior of those CSOs which, by not getting involved in 'politics' and focusing on assuaging the worsening socioeconomic conditions in the OPT, were deemed as conformist. Wishing to exclude those CSOs deemed as non-conformist, recalcitrant and potentially distributive, they introduce modes of surveillance that can aid them in identifying, isolating and monitoring these. Both the World

Bank and USAID have made use of quantitative research and administrative techniques to categorize and classify and to observe and monitor local CSOs. The databases and classificatory grids they established allowed them to both access detailed information about specific CSOs and monitor aggregate trends. The administrative techniques they introduced gave them the opportunity to manipulate organizational behavior, steering CSOs towards acting in specific ways and in specific areas. The World Bank and USAID used discipline, to once again borrow the words of Foucault, to control the conduct of local CSOs, to improve their performance, to multiply their capacities, in short, to put them where they deemed them to be most useful.

This study makes a critical contribution to the growing literature on civil society. Chapter Two has reconfirmed the potential an egalitarian grassroots-based civil society has for expanding the sphere of political freedom and its ability to mount a credible challenge to an oppressive state. This is in concord with oppositional approach to civil society, inspired by the contributions social movements agitating against authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe and Latin America, which emphasizes the ability of civil society to act as a vehicle of collective empowerment. Chapter Three, in contrast, has underscored the limitations of development and aid institutions' appropriations of the associational approach to civil society, premised on the benefits of social capital and the transformative effects of associational life. Reflecting a conservative interest in maintaining the status quo, this approach does not challenge existing political and economic inequities. In particular, Chapter Three has drawn attention to the ways in which civil society can be utilized as an instrument of social and political control. The enthusiasm that permeates the literature on civil society with regard to the potential it has for collective empowerment and for democratization is not misguided. Still, the potential utilization of management techniques for the creation of institutionalized and, hence, visible CSOs that can be carefully monitored and

managed has been largely absent from the growing literature on civil society. This study has argued that this potential exists. It has sketched out the ways in which powerful resources-rich actors can utilize discourses, statistical analyses and management techniques to monitor and regulate the possible spheres of social action in order to encourage timidity and conformity and discouraging transgression into the 'political.'

Finally, the findings of this study have significant implications for the process of re-politicization of civil society in the OPT in recent years. The process of re-politicization is evidenced both in the mushrooming of 'popular committees' protesting Israel's construction of the 'Separation Wall' on Palestinian land and in the civil society-initiated call for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS). This study has argued that the disciplinary and control technologies employed by international donors have been pervasive. This process of re-politicization, it must be emphasized, indicates that they are by no means consummate.

The 'popular committees' trace their roots to the non-binding advisory opinion delivered by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, on 9 July 2004. The ICJ found that Israel's construction of the 'wall' in the OPT is 'contrary to international law.'[2] It advised that Israel is obliged to cease construction of the wall and to dismantle those sections that have already been built.[3] The Israel government has since continued its violations of international law with impunity. As a result, a new generation of popular committees sprang up in the various Palestinian villages and rural communities that lay on the land unlawfully appropriated by Israel for the construction of the wall. The community- and village-based popular committees have played an important role in organizing resistance and protest against the construction of the wall, which cuts through and appropriates agricultural land belonging to their communities. Some villages, as Bil'in, Jayyous, Ni'ilin and al Ma'asara, have attained inter-

national prominence for the non-violent weekly protests that they have continue to stage against the construction of the wall for the last five years. The popular committees have also been successful in recruiting international solidarity activists, who continue to join the weekly protests. With the help of international solidarity activists and activist from the Palestinian diaspora, they have initiated legal action against international companies involved in the construction of the wall or in the construction of Israeli settlements.[4] The popular committees have also called on governments and international civil society groups and organizations to divest from companies involved in the construction of Jewish-only settlements on illegally appropriated Palestinian land.[5] In many ways, these popular committees resemble the older generation of popular committees that sprang up during the first intifada and played an essential role in sustaining it. The Israeli government has once more used repression, including lethal force and the jailing of organizers and activists, in order to subdue the weekly protests and weaken the popular committees. The popular committees have, nonetheless, proven to be resilient; they continue to organize weekly protests and to resist Israeli encroachments on their land through all the available legal political protest channels.

The civil society-initiated BDS campaign also traces its origins to the ICJ's July 2004 advisory opinion. As the one year anniversary of the advisory opinion approached with no sign that the Israel government was being held accountable to its obligations under international law, a coalition of more than 170 Palestinian CSOs issued a call for the implementation of broad boycotts, divestment initiatives and sanctions against Israel in order to force it to comply with ‘international law and universal principles of human rights.’ The CSOs called for these non-violent punitive measures to be maintained until Israel recognizes ‘the Palestinian people's inalienable right to self-determination’ and ‘fully complies with the precepts of international law’ by:

1. Ending its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and dismantling the Wall;

2. Recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality; and
3. Respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN resolution 194.[6]

Initiatives similar to the BDS campaign have been a mainstay of the Palestinian struggle for self-determination. Palestinians implemented a six-month general strike and incorporated boycotts into their struggle against the British colonial government during the 1936-1939 revolt. The BDS campaign also resonates with the strikes, boycotts and disengagement campaigns organized during the first intifada. It, however, differs from these efforts in trying to establish links with international civil society organizations and social movements. In this, it is similar to the international boycott effort organized in the aftermath of the World Conference against Racism, held in South Africa in 2001. The BDS campaign was also preceded by a call for economic, cultural and academic boycott issued in August 2002 and by a statement issued by Palestinian academics and intellectuals calling for a boycott of Israeli academic institutions in October 2003.

The BDS campaign has been notable for unifying Palestinians across borders and political affiliations. The CSOs that issued the call represent Palestinian civil society in the OPT, in neighboring Arab countries, inside Israel, and the Palestinian diaspora internationally. The campaign was endorsed by all Palestinian political parties. Its significance, moreover, goes beyond pressuring Israel economically. As noted by Abigail B. Bakan and Yasmeen Abu-Laban, with its goals 'grounded in education and building an international culture that supports Palestinian human rights,' the BDS call is designed to 'disrupt hegemonic discourse that Israel is a progressive state.'[7] Indeed, Bakan and Abu-Laban theorize the BDS campaign as a counter-hegemonic movement intent on challenging 'an international racial contract which, from 1948, has assigned a common interest between the state of Israel and international political allies, while absenting Palestinians as simultaneously non-white, the subjects of extreme repression and stateless.'[8] It is exactly this potential of the BDS campaign and the headway it is able to make internationally—

despite considerable backlash, the call for BDS has gained widespread support from international civil society organizations, in churches and university campuses, and among trade unions and social movements[9]—that distinguish it from earlier Palestinian boycott and disengagement efforts.

Both the new generation of popular committees and the BDS campaign indicate that donors were not successful in instilling docility and passivity into civil society in the OPT. The popular committees and the CSOs that were on the forefront of the organizing for BDS call did not abide by the distinction these donors drew between the 'civic' and 'political' spheres of social action. Both movements, it must be noted, insist on adopting non-violent means to resist Israeli encroachments and to pressure the government of Israel to respect human rights and the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. This, nonetheless, does not square them with the donor-championed notion of 'civicness.' In the OPT, this notion of civicness amounts to nothing more than a euphemism for passivity and docility, where the only option open for Palestinians is to work on 'social and economic development' as if these were possible in socioeconomic context defined by a structure of oppressive military occupation and colonialism without challenging the very same structure that defines it.

Little is known about how international donors view the re-politicization of OPT-based civil society represented in the village-based popular committees and the BDS campaign. There are some indications that some donor states have taken a dim view of the call for BDS in particular. In late November 2009, CIDA cut funding to KAIROS, a Canadian church-based NGO that promotes social justice and had been receiving funding from the Canadian government for 35 years. The Canadian Ministry of International Development justified the decision on the basis of shifting aid and development priorities. However, the Canadian Immigration Minister Jason

Kenney had another explanation. On a trip to Israel in December 2009, he linked the funding cuts to the BDS campaign: ‘We have de-funded organizations, most recently, like KAIROS who are taking a leadership role in the boycott, divestment and sanctions campaign,’ he explained.[10] In a similar manner, a cursory review reveals that none of the OPT-based NGOs that depend on USAID funding to cover a substantial part of their operational costs were among the organizations that organized to issue the BDS call.

These indications—although significant—remain rudimentary.

Unraveling international donor views—and formal policies, if any—with regard to the process of re-politicization of CSOs in the OPT is a matter of obvious importance. If the conclusions drawn in this study offer any indication, multilateral development institutions, the aid agencies of donor states and quasi-governmental organizations can utilize the enormous resources and control technologies at their disposal to try to influence this process. As the KAIROS case indicates, their funding decisions, can have an impact not only on OPT-based CSOs but also on CSOs further afield, within the border of the donor states themselves. Since they are unlikely to be forthcoming with their views on such matters, field research might be required to investigate if OPT-based CSOs have had any communications with international donors regarding the BDS campaign. Ideally, this research would be situated within the context of the roles these actors have played in the OPT historically, taking into account the emphasis they have placed on safeguarding the viability of the Oslo process. It would also explore strategies that OPT-based CSOs can adopt to escape the control technologies adopted by international donors. In this regard, it is important to note that the community-based popular committees that sprang up to resist Israel's construction of the ‘Separation Wall’ do not depend on donor funding. In a pattern familiar to the OPT, these organizations have depended on solidarity assistance to cover the legal fees of

litigation against the Israeli government and the companies involved in the construction of the 'Separation Wall' in Israeli and international courts. Avenues for coordination and solidarity partnerships with sister grassroots civil society organizations and social movements internationally should be explored.

Notes

Chapter One

Epigraph: Edward Said, *The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2000), xviii.

[1] Management Systems International (MSI), 'Civic Education Programming Since 1990: A Case Study-Based Analysis' (December 1999), p. 3. See appendix 2 for full citation.

[2] For a detailed overview of Social Development Funds see Anthony G. Bigio (ed.), *Social Funds and Reaching the Poor: Experiences and Future Directions*, (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1998).

[3] It is estimated that 200 international NGOs were active in the OPT during the 1990s. As noted by Sheila Carapico, although classified as NGOs, the majority of these institutions are only quasi-non-governmental, relying heavily on public funds administered through grants and contracts and linked to the foreign policy adjectives of powerful states. Sheila Carapico, 'Foreign aid and promoting democracy in the Arab world,' *Middle East Journal*, 56: 3 (2002), 383-384.

[4] For more on 'people-to-people' civil society initiatives see Benoît Challand, *Palestinian Civil Society: Foreign Donors and the Power to Promote and Exclude* (London: Routledge, 2008), 156-159.

[5] Out of the 586 civil society and democratization projects surveyed by Sheila Carapico 216 were designated for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. See Sheila Carapico, 'Foreign aid and promoting democracy in the Arab world,' 386.

[6] The role of CSOs during the first intifada will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

[7] World Bank Report No. 16696 GZ, Annex 4 (see appendix 1 for full citation).

[8] 47.5 percent of CSOs active in the OPT in 2001 were created in the period between 1968 and 1993, that is, after the beginning of the Israeli military occupation in 1967. Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), 'Mapping of Palestinian Non-governmental Organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,' in Arabic, 2001, p. 20.

[9] Rema Hammami, 'NGOs: the professionalization of politics,' *Race and Class*, 37: 2 (1995), 56.

[10] Rema Hammami, 'Palestinian NGOs since Oslo: From NGO Politics to Social Movements?,' *Middle East Report*, No. 214 (2000), 17-19+27+48; Eileen Kuttab, 'Women and the Current Intifada, *Between the Lines*,' 2 (February 2001), 4-6; Islah Jad, 'NGOs: Between Buzzwords and Social Movements,' *Development in Practice*, 17: 4 (2007), 622-629.

[11] Hanafi and Tabar, 'The new Palestinian globalized elite,' *Jerusalem Quarterly*, vol. 24 (2004); Islah Jad, 'NGOs: Between Buzzwords and Social Movements'; Eileen Kuttab, 'Palestinian Women's Organizations: Global Cooption and Local Contradiction,' *Cultural Dynamics*, 20: 2 (2008), 99-117.

[12] Karma Nabulsi, 'The State-building Project: What Went Wrong?,' in *Aid, Diplomacy and Facts on the Ground: The Case of Palestine*, eds. Michael Keating, Anne Le More and Robert Lowe (London: Chatham House, 2005), 117-128. See also Islah Jad, 'NGOs: Between Buzzwords and Social Movements.'

[13] One or more of these themes are common to those referenced in notes 10 through 13, among others. The role donors played in shaping the PA will be discussed in chapter 3.

[14] According to the 2004 data of the Aid Coordination Department of the PA's Ministry of Planning, 20% of total official development assistance to the West Bank and Gaza is channeled through Palestinian NGOs (World Bank/Bisan Center for Research and Development, 'The Role and Performance of Palestinian NGOs in Health, Education and Agriculture' (December 2006), p. 8). However, according to both the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) and the World Bank, NGOs received 10 percent of total international assistance to Palestinians during the last decade. See MAS, Tracking External Donor Funding to Palestinian Non Governmental Organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 1999-2008 (2009), p. x. See also Work Bank Report No. AB2122, unnumbered.

[15] I am indebted to Quintan Wiktorowicz whose use of Michel Foucault's concept of disciplinary power to describe how the state in Jordan utilized civil society, together with related laws and regulations, as a means of social control was an inspiration for my own research. See Quintan Wiktorowicz, 'Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan,' *Comparative Politics*, 33:1 (2000), 43-61. I am also indebted to Hanafi and Tabar, whose work deals with the ways donors discourses functioned to partition social space in the OPT. See Hanafi and Tabar, 2003 and 2004.

[16] Sara Mills, *Michel Foucault* (London: Routledge, 2003), 44.

[17] Quoted in Clare O'Farrell, *Michel Foucault* (London: Sage Publishers, 2005), 102.

[18] Foucault describes the technologies used to manage populations as 'biopolitics' or 'biopower'. The focus of disciplinary power is the creation and the control of the individual via methods of training the body and behavior.

The focus of biopower, by contrast, is the life, death and health of entire populations. See Clare O'Farrell, *Michel Foucault*, 106. On the productivity of power see Samer Alatout, 'Towards a Bio-territorial Conception of Power: Territory, Population, and Environmental Narratives in Palestine and Israel', *Political Geography*, 35 (2006), 603-610. See also Sara Mills, *Michel Foucault*, 36.

[19] These aspects will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 3.

[20] Michel Foucault 'Prison Talk,' in Collin Gordon (ed.), *Power/Knowledge* (Brighton: Harvester, 1980), 52, quoted in Sara Mills, *Michel Foucault*, 69. 'There is not knowledge [connaissance] on one side and society on the other, or science and the state,' Foucault writes elsewhere, 'but the basic forms of "power-knowledge."' Quoted in Clare O'Farrell, *Michel Foucault*, 101.

[21] See David Owen, *Maturity and Modernity* (London: Routledge, 1994), 152.

[22] According to Putnam participating in civic associations has 'internal' effects on individuals—reinforcing the moderation and tolerance-friendly norms and habits of the heart of which Tocqueville spoke so favorably—and 'external' effects on the wider polity, i.e., the production and dissemination of social capital. Thus, a vibrant associational life engenders both the civic norms and the trust necessary for reaching consensus when faced with dilemmas of collective action. See Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work (*Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 153-82.

[23] I am grateful to Dr. Yasmeen Abu-Laban for drawing my attention to the work of Jane Jenson, which situates Putnam's work on social capital with the context of concerns about social cohesion and order in the work of Emile Durkheim in the nineteenth century and Talcott Parsons in the 1940s and 1950s. See Jane Jenson, 'Mapping Social Cohesion: the State of Canadian Research,' (Canadian Policy Research Networks Inc., CPRN Study No. F03, 1998), 8-12. <http://www.cccg.umontreal.ca/pdf/CPRN/CPRN_F03.pdf> (accessed 12 June 2010).

[24] Christiaan Grootaert, 'Social Capital: the Missing Link?,' Social Capital Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 3 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1998), p. iii. The series includes 24 entries, including 'Social Capital and Poverty' (by Paul Collier), 'Does Social Capital Facilitate the Poor's Access to Credit? A Review of the Microeconomic Literature' (by Thierry van Bastelaer), 'Social Capital and Rural Development: A Discussion of Issues' (by Casper Sorensen), 'Social Capital in Solid Waste Management: Evidence from Dhaka, Bangladesh' (by Sheoli Pargal, Mainul Huq, and Daniel Gilligan), 'The Nexus between Violent Conflict, Social Capital and Social Cohesion: Case Studies from Cambodia and Rwanda' (by Nat J. Colletta and Michelle L. Cullen), and 'What Determines the Effectiveness of Community-Based Water Projects? Evidence from Central Java, Indonesia on Demand Responsiveness, Service Rules, and Social Capital' (by Jonathan Isham and Satu Kähkönen).

[25] The original World Bank link is now deactivated, but the quote can be accessed at <http://web.archive.org/web/20041221025522/www.worldbank.org/wbp/scapital/sources/civil2.htm> (accessed 10 December 2009).

[26] Peter Gubser, president, American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA), speaking at a Capitol Hill conference sponsored by the Middle East Policy Council on February 27, 1996. See Lee Hamilton, Brian Atwood, Peter Gubser and Sara Roy, 'Symposium (Development Assistance to the Middle East: Critical Perspectives),' *Middle East Policy*, 4: 4 (1996), 22.

[27] Amaney Jamal, *Barriers to Democracy: the Other Side of Social Capital in Palestine and the Arab World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 3 & 94.

[28] The analysis presented by Jamal underlines the irreconcilability of civil society and democracy 'promotion' efforts with the donors' support for the undemocratic regimes in the OPT and the region.

[29] In Latin America, according to Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter (in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986)), professional associations, churches, human rights organizations, intellectual societies, and a host of other social institutions generated counter-hegemonic projects and criticism of authoritarian regimes, igniting social consciousness about the prospects for political change, inspiring the mobilization of social resources to combat repression, and pushing for democratization. Cited in Quintan Wiktorowicz, 'Civil Society as Social Control,' 45. In central and eastern Europe, on the other hand, civil society-initiated reform, exemplified most illustratively in the Solidarity movement in Poland, represented collective opposition to the state, giving society back its dependence and weakening authoritarianism. See Z. A. Pelczynski, 'Solidarity and "The Rebirth of Civil Society" in Poland,' in *Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives*, ed. John Keane (London: Verso, 1988), 361-80.

[30] Putnam emphasizes apolitical forms of associationalism and makes a point of excluding unions and political parties. 'Good governance in Italy,' he infamously wrote, 'is the by-product of singing groups and soccer clubs.' See Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*, 176. In contrast, in her study of the relationship between civil society and democracy in Italy, Margaret Kohn argues that it is not Putnam's social capital (linking an essentially apolitical and conflict free civil society to good governance) but the interaction between the strength of left parties and their

related associations (recreational societies, women's leagues, youth groups, cooperatives) that constitute the only significant predictor of regional success. Using a Gramscian approach to civil society, she argues that successful democracy in northern Italy was the result of ‘a politics based on a process of mobilization which integrated diverse elements of the subaltern classes into political life.’ The Italian socialist and communist movements, she writes, ‘pursued a Gramscian strategy of using cultural, social and political associations to integrate peasant, artisans, and workers into an oppositional bloc.’ See Margaret Kohn, ‘Civic Republicanism versus Social Struggle: A Gramscian Approach to Associationalism in Italy,’ *Political Power and Social Theory*, 13 (1999), 221.

[31] For more detailed discussions of Gramsci's conceptualization of civil society see Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London: Verso, 1985); Norberto Bobbio, ‘Gramsci and the Concept of Civil Society’ in *Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives*, ed. John Keane (London: Verso, 1988); Margaret Kohn, ‘Civic Republicanism versus Social Struggle’.

[32] Benoît Challand, *Palestinian Civil Society*, 15.

[33] De-democratization is the term used by Karma Nabulsi to describe how by excluding local party, grassroots and union platforms and community associations donors undermined democratic processes in the already existing structures of associational networks. Karma Nabulsi, ‘The State Building Project,’ 122-125.

[34] Although it would be interesting to investigate the relationships and interactions that link international NGOs to the governments on whose funding they are sometimes dependent, such an investigation is outside the purview of this study.

Chapter Two

[1] See the critiques of accounts that posit these developments as explanatory of the break of the first intifada in Joost R. Hiltermann, *Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movements in the Occupied Territories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 2-8 and in Samih K. Farson and Jean M. Landis, ‘The Sociology of an Uprising: The Roots of the Intifada’ in Nassar and Heacock, *Intifada*, 17-31.

[2] Glenn Robinson,‘The Role of the Palestinian Middle Class in the Mobilization of Palestinian Society: The Medical and Agricultural Committees,’ *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 25: 2 (1993), 301.

[3] According to Muhammad al-Azhari, seven major civil insurrections preceded the first intifada in the period between 1967 and 1987. In Arabic ‘The 1936 Rebellion, and the1 987 Uprising: A Comparative Perspective,’ cited in Salim Tamari, ‘Limited Rebellion and Civil Society: The Uprising's Dilemma,’ *Middle East Report*, No. 164/165 (1990), 8.

[4] See Joost R. Hiltermann, *Behind the Intifada*, 6-16

[5] Palestinians used the Arabic term *utur* (singular *itar*), literally frames or fronts, to refer to all popular/mass organizations (student, youth, laborers, women, and in the fields of health and agriculture). The term *utur jamahiria* (popular fronts) is usually counterpoised to the term *utur jamahiria* (political fronts), which refers to all the political factions that comprise the PLO.

[6] Gramsci distinguished hegemony from direct domination. Domination can be achieved through coercion and is dependent on formal state institutions (e.g. the bureaucracy, police departments, the military, etc.). Hegemony, on the other hand, is premised on creating ideological and cultural consensus and fostering acceptance of the prevalent power relations. It is contingent on the ability of the elites to exert moral and intellectual leadership in the civil society sphere. This distinction is relevant to our discussion of the situation that prevailed in the OPT. As will become clear in the discussion below, both Israel and Jordan used the hegemony of the traditional elites in the OPT to foster political patronage and control the Palestinian population.

[7] Gramsci drew a distinction between ‘the state-as-government’ and what he called the ‘integral state’, i.e. the state as ‘political society plus civil society, in other words, hegemony protected by the armor of coercion.’ See Antonio Gramsci, *The Prison Notebooks*, trans. And eds., Quintin Hoare and Geofray Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), 532. According to him, the integral state involved ‘the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only maintains its dominance but manages to win the consent of those over whom it rules’ (Ibid, 504). For more detailed discussions of Gramsci's conceptualization of civil society see Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985); Norberto Bobbio (1988) and Margaret Kohn (1999). All referenced in the introduction.

[8] The same young professionals were also the leaders of burgeoning locally-based national movement.

[9] In this context, the national movement is understood to refer to both the PLO and the emerging OPT-based national movement comprised of both OPT-based popular and political fronts.

[10] The links between civil society organizing and the building of mass organizations and between the hegemony

of the new elite and the shift from a war of position to a war of maneuver in the form of the intifada are among the main themes in Jamal Nassar and Roger Heacock's important book on the first intifada. See Jamal Nassar and Roger Heacock, eds., *Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990).

[11] Arie Arnon, 'Israeli Policy towards the Occupied Palestinian Territories: the Economic Dimension, 1967-2007,' *Middle East Report*, 61: 4 (2007), 573-96.

[12] The policy of normalizing the occupation was premised on making it as invisible as possible in the hope to decrease opposition to it and perpetuate it. For more on normalizing the occupation see Neve Gorodn, *Israel's Occupation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 19-20, 50, 74-78.

[13] Shlomo Gazit, who held the position of Coordinator of Activities in the Territories in the late 1960s, writes: 'As regards the manufacturing sector, it was decided not to encourage Israeli investors to establish factories in the Territories or to become partners in existing ventures ... The desire to protect Israeli-made products was so great that Israel even attempted to prevent the establishment or reactivation of Arab-owned factories if there was any danger that their products might compete with Israeli products.' In Hebrew, *The Stick and the Carrot: The Israeli Administration in Judea and Samaria*, 251, cited in Arie Arnon, 'Israeli Policy towards the Occupied Palestinian Territories,' 577.

[14] David McDowall, *Palestine and Israel: The Uprising and Beyond* (Berkely: University of California Press, 1989), 96.

[15] Rex Brynen, *A Very Political Economy: Peace Building and Foreign Aid in the West Bank and Gaza* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000), 39. To the degree it was accomplished, economic integration was premised on a combination of market forces and coercive measures of administrative and legal nature that guaranteed the protection of Israeli economic ventures and interests in the face of vulnerable Palestinian producers and unprotected Palestinian labor. According to Samir Abdallah Saleh , 'due to the enormous discrepancy between Israeli and Palestinian economic development, market integration took place under conditions of exchange even worse than those that existed between metropolises and colonies during the colonial era.' Samir Abdallah Saleh, 'The Effects of Israeli Occupation on the Economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip,' in Nassar and Heacock, *Intifada*, 42.

[16] David McDowall, *Palestine and Israel*, 95-96.

[17] Ibid, 39-40.

[18] For example, in 1984 revenues from income tax and net indirect tax on local production equaled 12 percent of the OPT`s GNP, governing all the military government's budget expenses. Budget revenues from other sources were transferred to the Israeli government treasury, a net gain of $150 million for 1984. Ibid, 42.

[19] The Israeli Civil Administration oversaw a recurrent budget that remained constant between 1967 and 1994, with virtually no capital investment component, and with a fiscal regime which oversaw a net drain on the Palestinian economy's domestic resources. See Anne Le More, *International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo: Political Guilt, Wasted Money* (London: Routledge, 2008), 54, note 63.

[20] Samir Abdallah Saleh, 'The Effects of Israeli occupation on the Economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip,' 41-2.

[21] A World Bank study conducted in the early 1990s found that 40 percent of the road network serving the West Bank's local population was in grave need of repair. *Developing the Occupied Territories*, vol. 5, 3-9, cited in Rex Brynen, A *Very Political Economy*, 42. Brynen also notes that, with the telephone network fully under Israeli control, 80 percent of rural villages had no telephone connection.

[22] The health infrastructure will be discussed in more detail below. For more on the state of the education infrastructure in the OPT see Atif A. Kubrusi, 'Jobs, Education and Development, The Case of the West Bank' in *The Palestinian Economy: Studies in Development under Prolonged Occupation*, ed. George Abed (London: Routledge, 1988).

[23] Samih K. Farson and Jean M. Landis, 'The Sociology of an Uprising,' 22. By the early 1990s approximately 60 percent of the territory of the West Bank and Gaza had been seized by Israel (Rex Brynen, A *Very Political Economy*, 40).

[24] Samir Abdallah Saleh, 'The Effects of Israeli occupation on the Economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip,' 39. The figures in this section reflect the situation prior to the first intifada. After the Oslo Accords, many have changed, often to the worst.

[25] Rex Brynen, A *Very Political Economy*, 41.

[26] Sara Roy, *The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-Development* (Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995), 4.

[27] See Ali Jarbawi, 'Palestinian Elites in the Occupied Territories: Stability and Change through the Intifada' in

Nassar and Heacock, *Intifada*, 291-3.

[28] There was a one-third decline in the number of persons employed in this sector between 1970 and 1991 (Rex Brynen, A *Very Political Economy*, 35).

[29] Joost R. Hiltermann, 'Work and Action: The Role of the Working Class in the Uprising' in Nassar and Heacock, *Intifada*, 144-5.

[30] Salim Tamari, 'The Palestinian Demand for Independence Cannot Be Postponed Indefinitely,' MERIP Reports, No. 100-101 (1981), 28-35

[31] Israel has allowed municipal elections to proceed under the pretense of introducing 'into the West Bank the Israeli norm of democratic elections' (Shimon Peres quoted in David McDowall, *Palestine and Israel*, 100). That it never allowed municipal elections to take place again and worked to dismantle the NGC, by deporting some of the elected mayors and imprisoning other leaders or placing them under home arrest, shrouded with serious doubts these proclaimed intentions, however.

[32] The first National Guidance Committee was established with the aim of coordinating resistance activities in 1967 only to be disbanded by the occupation authorities two years later and be replaced by the Palestinian National Front (PNF—established in the wake of the defeat of the Palestinian armed resistance in Jordan in 1970-1971), which was, in turn, gradually dismantled by Israel between 1974 and 1977.

[33] For a detailed discussion of the Village Leagues see Salim Tamari. 'In League with Zion: Israel's Search for a Native Pillar,' *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 12: 4 (1983), 41-56.

[34] Lack of rural engagement in the burgeoning local national movement was partly rooted in Palestinian history. Going back to the turn of the century Palestinian economic, social and political life had been noted for its localism, a distinction that carried over to the West Bank (and in some respects the Gaza Strip) and suited not only the traditional elites but also their political patrons, i.e. Jordan and the Israeli military government. During the Ottoman period, Palestinian townships and urban centers enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. Subsequent British, Jordanian, Egyptian, and Israeli rulers all recognized this tradition of localized self-rule one way or another—largely because they preferred to territorially fragment national sentiments and organizational structures.

[35] The new strategy was given further impotence by the PLO's 1974 adoption of a new political program calling for the establishment of a 'Palestinian national authority in any Palestinian areas liberated from Israeli control'—in effect, endorsing a two state solution to the conflict and encouraging the creation of local institutions and a local infrastructure that could carry over into an independent Palestinian state when such an event transpires—and, once again, after the PLO was driven out from Lebanon and the resultant shift in the locus of the national struggle to the OPT.

[36] Quoted in Rema Hammami, 'NGOs: The Professionalization of Politics,' *Race and Class*, 37: 2 (1995), 54.

[37] In 1985, while the infant mortality rate was 55 deaths per 10,000 live births in Jordan and 60 per 1,000 in Syria, it reached 70 per 1,000 for the West Bank and Gaza. On the other hand, while in 1986 the physician-to-population ratio reached the low level of 8 per 10,000 in the West Bank and Gaza, it was 22 per 10,000 in Jordan. See Mustafa Barghouthi and Rita Giacaman, 'The Emergence of an Infrastructure of Resistance: The Case of Health' in Nassar and Heacock, *Intifada*, 74-5.

[38] George Abed, *The Palestinian Economy*, 6.

[39] More than two-thirds of inhabited localities lacked such a fundamental health requirement as basic mother and child health facilities. UPMRC, 'Twenty Years of Occupation' (Ramallah, 1987), cited in David McDowall, *Palestine and Israel*, 114.

[40] UPMRC, 'Into the Third Decade: Building a Palestinian Health Movement' (2003), p. 9. The report is available at UPMRC's website: < http://www.pmrs.ps/content/publications/main.html> (accessed 21 April 2009).

[41] Ibid, 15.

[42] UPMRC, 'Twenty Years of Occupation,' p. 4, quoted in David McDowall, *Palestine and Israel*, 114.

[43] The number of governmental hospitals declined from 20 in 1968 to 14 by 1992—out of the six hospital closed down one was converted into a police station, one into a prison and another into a military headquarters. al-HAQ 'An Ailing System: Israeli Military Government Health Insurance in the Occupied Palestinian Territories' (Ramallah, 1993), 12; cited in Benoît Challand, *Palestinian Civil Society*, 131. For more on the second-rate health care sector reserved for Palestinians see Mustafa Barghouthi and Rita Giacaman, 'The Emergence of an Infrastructure of Resistance,' 75.

[44] Mustafa Barghouthi and Rita Giacaman, 'The Emergence of an Infrastructure of Resistance,' 76.

[45] Ibid, 77-8.

[46] Glenn Robinson,'The Role of the Palestinian Middle Class in the Mobilization of Palestinian Society,' 304.

[47] UPMRC, 'Into the Third Decade,' p. 15.

[48] Ibid, 21-2.

[49] Quoted in Dina Craissai, *New Social Movements and Democracy in Palestine: A Model for the Politics of Civil Society in the Arab World* (Munster: Lit Verlag, 2005), 75.

[50] David McDowall, *Palestine and Israel*, 115.

[51] Initially at least, the UPMRC's affiliation with the PCP might have spared the Union the wrath of the Israeli military government, which, at the time, was preoccupied with combating and undermining the influence of the PLO, which the PCP did not join until 1986.

[52] As quoted in Glenn Robinson,'The Role of the Palestinian Middle Class in the Mobilization of Palestinian Society,' 305.

[53] Quoted in Dina Craissai, *New Social Movements and Democracy in Palestine*, 74.

[54] Ibid, 306.

[55] Ibid.

[56] This was evident in the educational campaigns focusing on family planning and health problems related to child bearing run by the organization.

[57] Glenn Robinson,'The Role of the Palestinian Middle Class in the Mobilization of Palestinian Society,' 307.

[58] Ibid, 308.

[59] As quoted in Glenn Robinson,'The Role of the Palestinian Middle Class in the Mobilization of Palestinian Society,' 307.

[60] Salah Abdel Shafi, 'Civil Society and Political Elites in Palestine and the Role of International Donors: A Palestinian View,' EuroMeSCo Paper, No. 33 (Lisboa: EuroMeSCo Secretariat, 2004), 8.

[61] Rema Hammami, 'NGOs,' 55.

[62] Glenn Robinson,'The Role of the Palestinian Middle Class in the Mobilization of Palestinian Society,' 308.

[63] Ibid.

[64] David McDowall, *Palestine and Israel*, 101-2. For more on the JJPC see Nathan Brown, *Palestinian Politics after the Oslo Accords: Resuming Arab Palestine* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 149-151.

[65] Many claimed that it was the availability of outside funding rather than political activism that played the pivotal role in the rapid development of the HSC, especially since in spite of the fact that it had the largest number of followers, Fatah had the least developed human and institutional infrastructure in the OPT. See Glenn Robinson,'The Role of the Palestinian Middle Class in the Mobilization of Palestinian Society,' 309.

[66] UPMRC, 'Into the Third Decade,' p. 15.

[67] Karma Nabulsi, 'The State-building Project: What Went Wrong?,' 122.

[68] Quoted in Glenn Robinson,'The Role of the Palestinian Middle Class in the Mobilization of Palestinian Society,' 307.

[69] Remittances from Palestinians working in the Arab Gulf states contributed significantly to Palestinian earnings and underpinned a significant portion of the economic growth witnessed in the mid-1970s and 1980s. This economic growth was perceived as essential for the policy of normalizing the occupation.

[70] The impact these institutions had on the rural and refugee populations was such that by the mid-1980s, rural and refugee college graduate and young professionals had almost entirely replaced middle class urbanites as leaders of the popular committees that played an instrumental role in consolidating resistance to the Israeli occupation. See Glenn Robinson,'The Role of the Palestinian Middle Class in the Mobilization of Palestinian Society,' 301-3. This, in addition to the fact that students and student groups led many protests against the occupation and became a barometer of a rising local-based national movement, explains the harassment and restrictions, culminating in the closure of all universities during much of the first intifada, that Palestinian colleges and universities had to endure at the hands of the military government.

[71] The most illustrative example of this is perhaps the Women's Work Committee, the West Bank's first network of women groups founded by students and graduates of Birzeit University, educators and other professional women.

[72] Glenn Robinson, *Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997), 179, 196.

[73] Glenn Robinson, 'The Role of the Palestinian Middle Class in the Mobilization of Palestinian Society,' 305.

[74] Quoted in Dina Craissai, *New Social Movements and Democracy in Palestine*, 74.

[75] By 1989 there existed four agricultural relief committees. The first, the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committee, was loosely affiliated with the PCP and formalized in 1984. The Technical Center for Agricultural Services and the Union of Agricultural Work Committees were established in 1986 by organizers affiliated with Fatah and the DFLP in the case of the first and the PFLP in the second case. Finally, a branch of the DFLP established the Union of Palestinian Farmers Committees in 1989.

[76] Some of the founders of the agricultural relief committees had already been working with the network of 'voluntary work committees', made up of skilled and unskilled workers and operating since the mid-1970s. David McDowall, *Palestine and Israel*, 117.

[77] Not only were most Jordan Valley farmers sharecroppers, giving 50 percent of their produce to landlords, the latter usually purchased the remainder produce at very low prices to be exported to Jordan. Landlords were also the main dealers in seed, fertilizers and equipment. Ibid, 112-3.

[78] Ibid, 116-7.

[79] Salim Tamari, 'The Palestinian Demand for Independence Cannot Be Postponed Indefinitely,' 31-2.

[80] Samih K. Farson and Jean M. Landis, 'The Sociology of an Uprising,' 25-26.

[81] See David McDowall, *Palestine and Israel*,. For a detailed discussion of labor unionism during this period see Joost R. Hiltermann, *Behind the Intifada*, 56-125.

[82] Ali Jarbawi, 'Palestinian Elites in the Occupied Territories,' 300-1. Also see Sara Roy, 'U.S. Economic Aid to the West Bank and Gaza Strip: The Politics of Peace,' *Middle East Policy*, 4 (1996), 55.

[83] Ali Jarbawi, 'Palestinian Elites in the Occupied Territories,' 300-1.

[84] Manuel Hassassian, 'Palestinian Political Culture, Civil Society and the Conception of Citizenship' in *Citizenship and the State in the Middle East: Approaches and Applications*, eds. N. Butenschon, U. Davis and M. Hassassian (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 258.

[85] Joost R. Hiltermann, *Behind the Intifada*, 13-4

[86] Salim Tamari, 'Limited Rebellion and Civil Society,' 1-8.

[87] Mustafa Barghouthi and Rita Giacaman, 'The Emergence of an Infrastructure of Resistance,' 81.

[88] Glenn Robinson,'The Role of the Palestinian Middle Class in the Mobilization of Palestinian Society,' 322.

[89] Mustafa Barghouthi and Rita Giacaman, 'The Emergence of an Infrastructure of Resistance,' 83.

[90] Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, 'The Revolutionary Transformation of the Palestinians under Occupation' in Nassar and Heacock, *Intifada*, 198-203.

[91] *New York Times*, May 15, 1988, page 1, cited in Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, 'The Revolutionary Transformation of the Palestinians under Occupation,' 205.

[92] Glenn Robinson,'The Role of the Palestinian Middle Class in the Mobilization of Palestinian Society,' 313-318.

[93] Salim Tamari, 'Limited Rebellion and Civil Society,' 7.

[94] David McDowall, *Palestine and Israel*, 117.

[95] Azmi Bishara, in Arabic, *Civil Society: A Critical Review with Reference to the Arab Civil Society* (Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 1998), 18-24.

[96] Karma Nabulsi, 'The State-building Project,' 122.

[97] Joost R. Hiltermann, *Behind the Intifada*, 214.

[98] Rita Giacaman and Penny Johnson 'Palestinian Women: Building Barricades and Breaking Barriers', cited in Rex Brynen, *A Very Political Economy*, 50.

[99] Glenn Robinson,'The Role of the Palestinian Middle Class in the Mobilization of Palestinian Society,' 309-10.

[100] See the discussion of USAID in the next chapter.

[101] For more on the impact the Gulf War had on PLO funding of OPT-based organizations see Nathan Brown, *Palestinian Politics after the Oslo Accords*, 149-50.

[102] Rema Hammami, 'NGOs,' 57.

Chapter Three

[1] For example, before the break of the second intifada, the PA was able to muster the capacity to deliver 25 percent of total health services in the OPT, while the UPMRC, the largest health NGO in the West Bank, was able to deliver 30 percent. See Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar, 'The new Palestinian globalized elite,' *Jerusalem Quarterly*, 24 (2004), 29.

[2] See, for example, Sheila Carapico, 'Foreign aid and promoting democracy in the Arab world,' *Middle East Journal*, 56: 3 (2002), 386–87.

[3] In total there were eight agreements, the most important of which are: *The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements* (DoP—also known as Oslo I), which provided the overall framework for the sharing of power and responsibility in the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the five-year (1994-1999) transitional period and was signed in September 1993; *Protocol on Economic Relations Between the Government of the State of Israel and the PLO Representing the Palestinian People* (knows as the Paris Protocol), signed in Paris on April 29, 1994; the *Agreement on Preparatory Transfers of Powers and Responsibilities Between Israel and the PLO*, signed on

August 29, 1994; and the *Israel-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip* (known as the Taba Agreement or Oslo II) signed on September 23, 1995.

[4] The number of police personnel was expanded to 30 thousand under the 1995 Oslo II.

[5] According to the agreement, '[L]egislation promulgated by the Palestinian Authority shall be communicated to Israel which may, within a period of thirty (30) days, notify the Palestinian Authority that it opposes such legislation for any of the following reasons: a. it exceeds the powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinian Authority; b. it is inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement; or c. it otherwise affects legislation or powers and responsibilities which were not transferred to the Palestinian Authority.'

[6] The Paris Protocol established a custom union based on Israeli trade regulations, ensured Israeli control of labor flows and denied the Palestinians the right to introduce their own currency. For a more detailed discussion of the Paris Protocol see Arie Arnon, 'Israeli Policy towards the Occupied Palestinian Territories.'

[7] Most international assistance went to emergency assistance and budgetary support. The exact figures of overall international assistance to the OPT are difficult to estimate. Anne Le More estimates that the PA has received US$8 billion in the period between its creation in 1994 and Hamas' electoral victory in 2006. See Anne Le More, *International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo*, 1. According to the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), between 1999 and 2008, external aid to the West Bank and Gaza Strip increased by over 600 percent to reach US$3.25 billion per year in 2008. See MAS, 'Tracking External Donor Funding to Palestinian Non Governmental Organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 1999 -2008' (2009), p. x

[8] The discussion here builds on the approach to the rentier state developed in Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (eds.), *The Rentier State* (London: Croom Helm, 1987). Beblawi and Luciani posit that the abundance of rent can facilitate the emergence of inefficient socioeconomic structures, since the the future accumulation of rent does not depend on proper economic behavior. They also argue that rent facilitates the emergence of authoritarianism, since democratizing the political system contradicts the interests of the rentier elite of monopolizing a political system that privileges it.

[9] Majid Kayali, 'The Palestinian economy and the dilemma of dependency,' *Aljazeera Business and Economy* (in Arabic). <http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/29573A7F-FF2E-43C9-81C1-12686A3F5CC5.htm> (accessed 3 January 2010).

[10] For more on international aid and the PA's use of employment for the cultivation of patronage and political loyalty see Rex Brynen, 'Donor Aid to Palestine: attitudes, incentives, patronage and peace' in Michael Keating, Anne Le More, and Robert Lowe (eds), *Aid, Diplomacy and Facts on the Ground: the Case of Palestine* (London: Chatham House, 2005), 129-142.

[11] Majid Kayali, 'The Palestinian economy and the dilemma of dependency.'

[12] This is according to the Israeli human rights organization, B'Tselem. Cited in Neve Gordon, *Israel's Occupation*, p. 190. The Wye Memorandum Agreement, signed on October 23, 1998, emphasized reciprocity and addresses specific security concerns which had been raised by Israel in the past, stating, among other provisions, that '[t]he Palestinian side will make known its policy of zero tolerance for terror and violence against both sides.'

[13] Quoted in Amaney Jamal, *Barriers to Democracy*, 71.

[14] Ibid, 251-252.

[15] World Bank and Japan, '*Aid Effectiveness in the West Bank and Gaza,*' cited in Anne Le More*, International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo,* 58.

[16] By this time the PA-controlled monopolies network, developed in cooperation with key Israeli businesses in the hope that the PA would be able to sustain its patronage network independently of the increasingly judgmental and less forthcoming international donors, had matured. For more on the PA-controlled network of monopolies see Markus E. Bouillion, 'Gramsci, Political Economy, and the Decline of the Peace Process,' *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, 13: 3 (2004), 247-243.

[17] While most of the OPT's imports were either produced in or re-exported from Israel, Israel for absorbed 95 percent of OPT's exports in 1998. See Markus E. Bouillion, 'Gramsci, Political Economy, and the Decline of the Peace Process,' 250-252.

[18] According to the Paris Protocol, movements of laborers will be as 'normal' as possible and permanent blockage of the movement of labor will not be permissible. The agreement, however, does not clarify the implications of frequent limits on movement. In Article VII (Labor), Section 1, the agreement states that '[b]oth sides will attempt to maintain the normality of movement of labor between them, subject to each side's right to determine from time to time the extent and conditions of the labor movement into its area. If the normal movement is suspended temporarily by either side, it will give the other side immediate notification, and the other side may request that the matter be discussed in the Joint Economic Committee.' Before1994, 30% of the Palestinian labor force in the West Bank and

more than 40% in Gaza worked in Israel. In 1995-6 the percentage of West Bank workers in Israel dropped to 18% and those from Gaza to only 6%. See Arie Arnon, 'Israeli policy towards the occupied Palestinian territories,' 592.

[19] Peter Lagerquist, 'Privatizing the Occupation: the Political Economy of an Oslo Development Project,' *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 32: 2 (2003), 17.

[20] Shimon Peres and Arye Naor, *The New Middle East* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1993).

[21] Quoted in Peter Lagerquist, 'Privatizing the Occupation,' 9.

[22] At this stage, the World Bank and other international organizations reached the conclusion that economic integration was not the best option for the Palestinian economy. Instead, they advocated an economic arrangement called the 'Most Favored Nation,' a trade regime in which the sovereign states adopt independent trade policies but do not discriminate among trade partners. See Arie Arnon, 'Israeli policy towards the occupied Palestinian territories,' 590.

[23] Peter Lagerquist, 'Privatizing the Occupation,' 11.

[24] For a comprehensive overview of donor investment in economic development see Anne Le More, *International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo*.

[25] Except for the health services, these figures were reported by Mustafa Barghuti at a conference held in Ramallah in 2000. See Brown N. *Palestinian Politics after the Oslo Accords: Resuming Arab Palestine* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), p. 281, note 44. Barghuti puts the figure of health services provided by NGOs at 60 percent, Hanafi and Tabari (2004) and Gordon (2008) put the figure at 75 percent. See also the figures provided by Interaction Study West Bank/Caza NCO Support Group Study, 1995, cited in Yossi Shain and Gary Sussman, 'From occupation to state-building: Palestinian political society meets Palestinian civil society,' *Government and Opposition*, 33: 3 (1998), 286 note 29. It is important to note that these figures have increased after the break of the second intifada.

[26] Markus E. Bouillion, 'Gramsci, Political Economy, and the Decline of the Peace Process,' 254.

[27] MAS, 'Mapping of Palestinian Non-governmental Organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip' (2007), pp. 43-45.

[28] See, among others, Rema Hammami (1995, 1999), Hanafi and Linda Tabar (2003, 2004), Karma Nabulsi (2005), Islah Jad (2007), and Eileen Kuttab (2008). All referenced in the introduction.

[29] Markus E. Bouillion, 'Gramsci, Political Economy, and the Decline of the Peace Process.'

[30] Jamil Hilal, for example, lists directors of NGOs as the second best wage-earners in the OPT, right after the top PA civil servants. See Jamil Hilal, 'Problematizing Democracy in Palestine,' *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 23:1&2 (2003), 169. It is in this sense that Hanafi and Tabar speak of NGOs in the OPT as constituting a 'globalized elite". See Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar, 'The new Palestinian globalized elite.'

[31] As noted in Chapter One, many of these discourses are based on studies of civil society in Western democracies and take a particular conceptualizations of civil society in the West as a starting point. The relationships they posit between civil society, democracy and development tend to be circular and self-reinforcing.

[32] Elia Zuriek, 'Theoretical and Methodological Considerations for the Study of Palestinian Society,' *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 23:1&2 (2003), 152-154.

[33] See, for example, Sheila Carapico, 'NGOs, INGOs, GO-NGOs and DO-NGOs: Making Sense of Non-governmental Organizations,' *Middle East Report*, No. 14 (2000), 12-15, and Rema Hammami, 'Palestinian NGOs since Oslo'

[34]<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/WESTBANKGAZAEXTN/0,,menuPK:294372~pagePK:141132~piPK:141121~theSitePK:294365,00.html> (accessed 10 May 2010).

[35] As Le More notes, the Bank was a member of virtually all coordination bodies, and held key positions in most. In addition to the the Trust Fund for Gaza and the West Bank (TFGWB), which has been the cornerstone of the Bank's operational involvement in the OPT, between 1993 and 2004, the Bank acted as administrator to the multi-donor Holst Fund, devoted to financing the start-up and recurrent costs of the PA as well as job creation projects; the multi-donor Technical Assistance Trust Fund, which managed US$23 million from 12 donors between 1994 and 2001; the Public Financial Management Reform Trust Fund, which was established in April 2004 to once again provide multi-donor budget support to the PA. Anne Le More, *International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo*, 106-107.

[36] Ibid, 108-09.

[37] In fact, the World Bank's existing President, James D. Wolfensohn, was appointed as the Quartet's Special Envoy for Gaza Disengagement.

[38] For a list of active World Bank projects in the OPT, see
<http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=294396&pagePK=141155&piPK=141124&theSitePK=2

94365> (accessed 28 June 2010).

[39] Based on the figures reported in the following World Bank documents: Report No. PIC5210, Report No. PID10010, Report No. AB2535, and Report No. 37855 GZ. See Appendix 1 for a complete list of World Bank documents referenced in this section and for complete citation of World Bank reports.

[40] World Bank Report No. 26252, p. 11.

[41] World Bank Report No. PIC5210, p. 2. Elsewhere the Bank states that the 'objectives of the project are consistent with the Bank Group strategy outlined in Replenishing the Trust Fund for the West Bank and Gaza (R96-251) approved by the Board on December 19, 1996. Bank strategy stresses the need to complement continuing support for emergency rehabilitation and employment-generation with initiatives aimed at laying the basis for growth and employment of a sustained, medium-term nature. The strategy has three main aspects: (i) encouraging private sector investment (by the provision of new infrastructure, the creation of a legal and regulatory framework conducive to investment, and the strengthening of financial intermediation and risk-sharing mechanisms); (ii) investing in people and reducing inequalities (by modernizing education and health systems and enhancing official and non-governmental poverty alleviation programs); and (iii) developing good governance (by promoting sound and transparent fiscal management, helping create a lean civil service, supporting PA partnerships with NGOs, local government and the private sector, and encouraging the impartial administration of economic laws, regulations and procurement). The Palestinian NGO Project would actively support the second and third of these objectives.' See World Bank Report No. 16696 GZ, p. 5.

[42] World Bank Report No. 16696 GZ, p. 6.

[43] World Bank Report No. 26252, p. 43.

[44] World Bank Report No. PIC5210, p. 2. Some of these funds also went for capacity-building assistance the Project Management Organization (PMO), that is, the international NGO hired by the Bank to oversee project implementation. Of the total sum of US$16.9 earmarked for the first phase of the project US$11.7 went for service delivery and direct project implementation, while a number of block grants were awarded to 'experienced and professional NGOs, specifically for on-granting to smaller or newer organizations.'

[45] World Bank Report No. 16696 GZ, Annex 4, p. 1. The author was not able to gain access to the full text of *NGOs in the West Bank and Gaza* (John D. Clark and Barbara S. Balaj, World Bank, February 1994). The figures and quotes in this section are based on the summary of the study provided in annex 4 of World Bank Report No. 16696 GZ. The summary also includes information from two other studies commissioned by the World Bank: *A Report on Palestinian NGOs for the World Bank* (Denis Sullivan, World Bank, November 1995) and *The Changing Role of Palestinian NGOs since the Establishment of the Palestinian Authority* (Sophie Claudet ,World Bank, June 1996).

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid, pp. 1-2.

[48] Ibid, p. 1.

[49] Ibid, p. 2.

[50] Ibid, p.1.

[51] Denis Sullivan, 'NGOs in Palestine: Agents of Development and Foundation of Civil Society,' *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (1996), p 99.

[52] Denis Sullivan, *The World Bank and the Palestinian NGO Project: From Service Delivery to Sustainable Development* (Jerusalem, PASSIA, 2001), p. 1 & 5.

[53] Ibid, p. 49.

[54] World Bank Report No. 26252, p. 9.

[55] As quoted in Benoît Challand, *Palestinian Civil Society*, pp. 111-12.

[56] In 1999, the United Nations Office of the Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories issued an NGO directory for the West Bank that included the name, address, phone and fax numbers, officers, background and activities of each of four hundred NGOs in ten West Bank cities and towns in English and Arabic. See Sheila Carapico, 'NGOs, INGOs, GO-NGOs and DO-NGOs' 13-14.

[57] Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), 'Mapping of Palestinian Non-governmental Organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,' in Arabic, 2001.

[58] Izzat Abdel Hadi, 'The Role of NGOs in Building Civil Society: Executive Summary for the Welfare Association Consortium,' in Arabic, (Ramallah: BISAN Center for Research and Development, 2001), p. 6. Also see BISAN Center for Research and Development, 'The Role of NGOs in Building Civil Society,' in Arabic, 2002.

[59] As quoted in Benoît Challand, *Palestinian Civil Society*, pp. 113.

[60] Actual implementation of PNGO I continued until December 2002. See World Bank Report No. IRC 0000189,

p. 1. All World Bank reports referenced in this section are available online at the Bank's West Bank and Gaza Strip webpage.

[61] World Bank Report No. 26252, p. 4

[62] Ibid, p. 5.

[63] Ibid, p. 10.

[64] World Bank Report No. 22266 GZ, p. 6. ‘The proposed project,’ according to the Bank, ‘will also serve as an important channel for Bank emergency support if the months following its approval see a continued need for Bank engagement in this area. Over the past few months, the Bank has played an active role in mobilizing resources and in providing, through existing projects, mechanisms for channeling emergency funds to affected communities. As part of that process, the Bank has allocated USD 1 million of the recent Emergency Response Program to NGOs to support employment generation programs using the services of the PMO. The Bank has also put in place the PEACE Facility, which provides a framework for donors to fund emergency projects through existing and planned Bank projects. In this context, PNGO II will provide an essential instrument for supporting the Bank's engagement in an expanded emergency program and, more importantly, in supporting the key role played by NGOs in responding to community needs under circumstances of enormous economic and social difficulty’ (p. 3).

[65] World Bank Report No. PID10010, pp. 1-2. See also World Bank Report No. 22266 GZ, p. 3-4

[66] World Bank Report No. PID10010, p. 8.

[67] Ibid.

[68] World Bank Report No. 22266 GZ, p. 5. US$8.79 million of PNGO II's funds were allocated to the Partnership Grants Program (World Bank Report No. IRC 0000189, p. 2).

[69] World Bank Report No. 22266 GZ, p. 2. PNGO II also included a Development Grants Program, with the purpose of awarding grants (a total of US$2.5 million) to NGOs that ‘have demonstrated the ability to manage quality projects during PNGO I.’ Another US$1.33 million were allocated to the ‘Sector Support Program’ with the intent to provide support at the sectoral level, drawing on technical expertise of stronger NGOs and NGO networks. It would finance activities intended to: (a) promote information exchange and networking within the NGO sector; (b) support the elaboration of a stronger vision of the sector's role in development and its involvement in policy setting; (c) promote a positive working environment for PA/NGO dialogue and for enhancing complementarity between public and nongovernmental service delivery programs; and (d) support the capacity of NGO networks to provide leadership in the NGO sector and to better represent the needs and interests of their constituents/members. The program was to be implemented through a combination of grants and sub-contracts to finance research, advocacy work, data collection, discussion fora, seminars and technical expertise. See World Bank Report No. IRC 0000189, pp. 2-3.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Ibid, p. 4-5.

[72] World Bank Report No. 22266 GZ, p. 3.

[73] World Bank Report No. ICR 0000189, p. ii

[74] Two representatives from the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation and the Ministry of NGO Affairs were given observer status on the Board (See World Bank Report No. 22266 GZ, p. 8). According to the Bank, the Governance Committee had ‘focused on project management issues and played a minor role in advocating NGO issues and creating mechanisms for improving coordination and cooperation between the PA and NGOs.’ See World Bank Report No. 26252, p. 30. See also p. 9 & 15.

[75] Ibid, p. 5.

[76] World Bank Report No. ICR 0000189, p. 4.

[77] Ibid, p. 6 & 7.

[78] World Bank Report No. 37855-GZ, p. 6 & 15. PNGO III has main three components: (1) NGO Grant Facility, with a total grant value of US$2.7 million, consisting of ‘empowerment grants’ to support experienced NGOs providing basic social services; ‘mentoring partnerships’ to improve the quality of social service delivery by promoting knowledge sharing and networking between professionalized NGOs operating on a national scale with those that are community-based NGOs; ‘Piloting NGO-Local Government Partnerships’ through joint activities designed and implemented by municipalities and NGOs; and ‘Emergency grants to NGOs’ to support communities impacted by the current economic crisis through short-term employment generation (this sub-component is entirely funded by the AfD through Euro 60 million in parallel financing); (2) NGO Sector Development, with US$0.8 million in financing, consisting of the preparation and implementation of an ‘NGO Code of Conduct’ with an emphasis on accountability, transparency and governance; the establishment of a process of ‘NGO Coordination and Information Exchange’ and the preparation of a study which promotes areas of cooperation between NGOs and

the private sector; and (3) Institutional Development of NDC, with a total value of US$1.5 million dedicated to establishing 'Resource Mobilization and Communications Unit' to raise funds for the purpose of grant making to Palestinian NGOs creating a future mechanism to attract and funnel resources to the NGO sector; establishing an outcome-based monitoring and evaluation system; and the establishment of NDC and management of the overall program. See World Bank Report NO. AB2535, pp. 4-6.

[79] As of June 22, 2010, the World Bank's website listed PNGO III as an active project.

[80] Ibid, p. 5. Also see World Bank Report No. AB2535, p. 9.

[81] World Bank Report No. 37855-GZ, p. 6.

[82] Ibid, p.5.

[83] Ibid. Also see World Bank Report No. 16696 GZ, p. 7.

[84] World Bank Report No. 16696 GZ, p. 7. At pains to justify the decision but at the same time distance itself from the political consequences of funding NGOs in Jerusalem, the Bank had this to say: 'Due to ongoing bilateral disputes, the project's activities in Jerusalem could be misinterpreted by one party or another as a political statement by the World Bank on the status of the city--which would be incorrect. The Bank's sole objective, which has been carefully discussed with the PA, the Government of Israel and a wide range of NGOs, is to assist Palestinian NGO activities in Jerusalem designed to help the poor and socially disadvantaged, irrespective of bilateral political considerations. To this end, the Bank's purposes have been explained in local press interviews and in the Public Discussion Paper, available for many months in English and Arabic to all who have requested it. In recognition of the sensitivities involved, the Bank has also established special arrangements for the administration of project grants in Jerusalem, to consist of a distinct local consultation process and separate administrative arrangements between the PMO and the Bank' (p. 13). See also World Bank Report No. PID10010, p. 5.

[85] This happened after the Israeli delegation walked out of the meeting. See Le More 2008, p. 109. The Consultative Group is one of two main bodies (the other being the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC)) established by international donors to provide general direction to the aid effort in the OPT. It was established to deal with the actual coordination of donor programs, aid mobilization and broad-based discussion between the PA and its multilateral and bilateral donors. As Le More points out, Consultative Groups 'are a Bank mechanism at the capital level not unique to the WBGS but used in many aid-recipient countries as an all-donor forum to pledge funds and discuss policy options and particular project activities' (pp. 32-3).

[86] World Bank Report No. PID10010, p. 7.

[87] An agreement between the Welfare Association, as the lead agency of the WAC, and the Bank was signed on 11 July 1997. See World Bank Report No. 26252, p. 42. The Welfare Association was established by a group of diaspora Palestinians in Geneva in 1983. See the organization's website at <http://welfare-association.org/en/>.

[88] World Bank Report No. ICR 0000189, p. 4.

[89] World Bank Report No. ICR 0000189, p. 4.

[90] Ibid, p. 6.

[91] World Bank Report No. 37855-GZ, p. 8.

[92] World Bank Report No. PIC5210, p. 2.

[93] See, for example, Bank Report No. PID10010, p. 5.

[94] World Bank Report No. 16696 GZ, p. 4.

[95] As noted in the introduction, for example, in *Making Democracy Work*, a book that became very influential in World Bank circles, Putnam advanced a view of civil society as apolitical and conflict free and made a point of excluding political organizations, labor unions and church groups. The social capital model advanced by Putnam was later exported by the Bank to global south countries.

[96] Of course, many of the religious organizations in the OPT are Christian. The point I wish to make here that donor attitudes to Islamic organizations in the OPT and the region differs from the attitude they exhibit towards religious organizations in other regions, which they seem to have no qualms about furnishing with financial support.

[97] Yahya Sadowski, 'The New Orientalism and the Democracy Debate,' *Middle East Report*, No. 183 (1993), 19.

[98] For a similar view of Palestinian civil society, with a particularly dim interpretation of the role of religiously-oriented CSOs and Islamist political movements in the OPT, see Muhammad Muslih, 'Palestinain Civil Society' in *Civil Society in the Middle East*, Vol. 1, ed. Augustus Richard Norton (Leiden: EJ. Brill, 1996), pp. 243-269.

[99] That this rule was not applied on a regional level is not surprising. As noted in the introduction, much of donor support to civil society groups in the region was given under the heading of supporting democratization, a sphere that can hardly be classified as non-political.

[100] See the full quote in Chapter 1.

[101] For a detailed account of the controversy over the NGO LAW see the special issue of *Palestinian Policy* (in

Arabic), Vol. 6 No. 24 (1999).

[102] This was not unexpected since it was with an eye on curtailing these left-associated CSOs that the PA had designed its restrictive proposed law to begin with.

[103] It is also noteworthy that representatives of the five Palestinian NGO networks, which happen to be divided along political networks, with the Palestinian NGO network representing the leftist movements, and two other networks, one in the West Bank and one in Gaza, representing Fatah created specifically by the PA for this purpose, sat on the PNGO's Governance Committee, which was transformed during PNGO II into a Supervisory Board. Although the General Union of Palestinian Charitable Societies (GUPCS), the network representing charitable societies, was represented in Governance Committee, no network representing Islamic organizations or organizations linked to Hamas sat at the Governance Committee

[104] Anne Le More worked as a consultant in the Bank's East Jerusalem office. See Anne Le More, *International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo*, 105-110.

[105] Sara Roy, 'U.S. Economic Aid to the West Bank and Gaza: the Politics of Peace,' *Middle East Policy*, 4: 4 (1996), 54.

[106] Sara Roy speaking at a Capitol Hill conference sponsored by the Middle East Policy Council on February 27, 1996. See Lee Hamilton, Brian Atwood, Peter Gubser and Sara Roy, 'Symposium (Development Assistance to the Middle East: Critical Perspectives),' *Middle East Policy*, 4: 4 (1996), 24. PVOs included American Near East Relief Agency (ANERA), American Middle East and Training Services (AMIDEAST), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Save the Children Foundation (SCF), Cooperative Development Program (CDP), the YMCA, and the Society for the Care of the Handicapped (SCH), the only Palestinian organization included in the PVO structure. Each of the PVOs had to be registered with USAID and approved by the Israeli government. See Sara Roy, 'U.S. Economic Aid to the West Bank and Gaza: the Politics of Peace,' 54-7.

[107] PVOs had to submit all project proposals to the Israeli Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, which then channeled them to the Ministry of Defense, which was the ultimate authority, whose approval was required for any project to be implemented. According to Sara Roy, projects were often approved as a reward to Israeli-appointed municipal and village councils and other groups considered friendly to Israel and disapproved as punishment for groups and CSOs considered hostile and uncooperative. Overall, Israeli intervention meant that the approved projects were concentrated in domestic water and electricity, roads and health; generally oriented towards consumption rather than production; and supporting the status quo rather than changing it. See Sara Roy, 'U.S. Economic Aid to the West Bank and Gaza: the Politics of Peace,' 56-8.

[108] Meron Benvenisti, *US Government Funded Projects in the West Bank and Gaza,* Working Paper No. 13, The West Bank Data Base Project, Jerusalem, 1984, p. 14, quoted in Khalil Nakhleh, 'Non-governmental Organizations and Palestine: the Politics of Money,' Journal of Refugee Studies, 2: 1 (1989), 120.

[109] Sara Roy, 'U.S. Economic Aid to the West Bank and Gaza: the Politics of Peace,' 57.

[110] Ibid, 57-58

[111] Ibid, 55. This was a significant increase over the previous decade. In the period between 1975 and 1991 US economic assistance averaged at around US$8 million annually. See Lee Hamilton, Brian Atwood, Peter Gubser and Sara Roy, 'Symposium (Development Assistance to the Middle East: Critical Perspectives),' *Middle East Policy*, 4: 4 (1996), 24.

[112] Khalil Nakhleh, 'Non-governmental Organizations and Palestine: the Politics of Money,' 118.

[113] Sara Roy, 'U.S. Economic Aid to the West Bank and Gaza: the Politics of Peace,' 67.

[114] The 1994 revised strategy, which itself was 'subject to revision as changes occur in the highly volatile political environment,' consisted of six strategic objectives: '[1] small and medium producers increase the sustainable and marketable production of goods and services; [2] Palestinian public and private sectors plan for and provide improved housing for low and moderate income groups; [3] Palestinians plan for and provide preventive and public-health services which promote appropriate roles for the public and private sectors and which can become sustainable; [4] Palestinians establish democratic and legal institutions to strengthen accountability; [5] [Palestinians pursue] improved [water] quality and more sustainable use of water resources; and [6] municipalities assume expanded responsibilities and perform their functions in an effective, accountable, and responsive manner.' As quoted in Sara Roy, Sara Roy, 'U.S. Economic Aid to the West Bank and Gaza: the Politics of Peace,' 68. Following a donors' pledging conference in October 1993, American assistance to the Palestinians rose dramatically from $25 million to $100 million per year, of which USAID was responsible for $75 million annually over a five-year period. See USAID, 'Democratic Understanding and Development Project for the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Project Paper' (1994), p. 8. Unless otherwise indicated, this and other studies and reports cited in this section are available at <http://dec.usaid.gov/> under the West Bank and/or Gaza sections. For a complete list of USAID documents

referenced in this section see Appendix 2.

[115] USAID, 'USAID West Bank and Gaza Strategic Plan: 1996-2000' (March 1996), Executive Summary.

[116] Ibid.

[117] As quoted in Sara Roy, 'U.S. Economic Aid to the West Bank and Gaza: the Politics of Peace,' 68.

[118] PVOs, however, continued to be among the many recipients of USAID funds.

[119] Dennis Ross was responsible for choosing in which sectors USAID was allowed to work and those in which it was not. He, according to one State Department official, 'often gets involved in a level of detail that is atypical if not unprecedented. For example, he—in consultation with the Israelis, of course—has decided how many wells should be built in Hebron and their location. He also is very interested in industrial estates. There is very little delegation of authority in this program.' Quoted in Sara Roy, 'U.S. Economic Aid to the West Bank and Gaza: the Politics of Peace,' 64.

[120] USAID, 'USAID West Bank and Gaza Strategic Plan: 1996-2000' (March 1996), p. 1. In a similar manner, 'We believe all our efforts should contribute to improving the plight of Palestinians in order to support the peace process. Our goal, then, is: Palestinians realize tangible benefits of the peace process,' a 1995 internal USAID report emphasized. Quoted in Sara Roy, 'U.S. Economic Aid to the West Bank and Gaza: the Politics of Peace,' 70.

[121] In its 1992 program strategy USAID explicitly acknowledges that Israeli policymakers have showed a particular interest in projects in the water sector. 'CIVCA [the Israeli/civil military administration] looks with particular favor on water projects (especially in Gaza), major infrastructure development and employment generation,' the program strategy paper in part reads. USAID, 'USAID Program Strategy for the West Bank and Gaza Strip 9993-1997' (November 1992), p. 1, quoted in Sara Roy, 'U.S. Economic Aid to the West Bank and Gaza: the Politics of Peace,' 71. As Roy notes, these same sectors remained the focus of USAID activities in the OPT under the 1996-2000 strategic plan. That changes in program size and structure did not fundamentally alter the conception of the program as an extension of a US-sponsored peace-making process or diminish Israel's role in setting its parameters is the main argument made by Roy in 'U.S. Economic Aid to the West Bank and Gaza: the Politics of Peace.'

[122] The new strategic plan also had two 'special objectives': 'Transition to Self-rule Facilitated' and 'Selected Development Needs Met'. See USAID, 'USAID West Bank and Gaza Strategic Plan: 1996-2000' (March 1996), p. 1.

[123] Sara Roy, speaking at a Capitol Hill conference sponsored by the Middle East Policy Council on February 27, 1996. See Lee Hamilton, Brian Atwood, Peter Gubser and Sara Roy, 'Symposium (Development Assistance to the Middle East: Critical Perspectives),' *Middle East Policy*, 4: 4 (1996), 27.

[124] USAID, 'USAID West Bank and Gaza Strategic Plan: 1996-2000' (March 1996), pp. 37-49.

[125] NDI, 'In Support of Palestinian Democracy: Final Report' (February 1997), p. 2. This project began with a sub-grant given to NDI under USAID's 'Democratic Understanding and Development Project,' and by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), whose programs focused on electoral monitoring. The American-Mideast Educational and Training Services (AMIDEAST), an American PVO, was also a recipient of funding under USAID's 'Democratic Understanding and Development Project.' In 1994, AMIDEAST implemented a 'public law project,' which took the form of holding workshops for legal professionals. USAID hoped it could help in identifying needs for training and areas for judicial and legal reform. The Democratic Understanding and Development Project was a five-year (1994-1998) project with an overall budget of US$20 million. It consisted of four components (elections, rule of law, governance and civil society) and took as its starting point the notion that democracy and governance issues 'lie at the heart of the Palestinian development problem.' See USAID, 'Democratic Understanding and Development Project for the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Project Paper' (1994), p. 5. Thus, in addition to the activities funded under the project, USAID planned 'to weave democratic governance themes throughout its West Bank and Gaza portfolio' (p. 7). The project envisions USAID's work in the fields of good governance and civil society to be interlinked:

The promotion of 'Civil Society' is critical to USAID's goal of sustainable, democratic development because non-state actors often function as a counter-balance to the power of the state and influence of private interests by 1) making them more accountable; 2) placing demands on them; and 3) providing services to its members independent of state or private sector involvement.

The promotion of 'good governance' is integral to USAID's goal of sustainable development. It assists in protecting resource allocations and encourages participatory decision making. When 'good governance' and 'civil society' obtain, the citizenry can expect a society where 'accountability' of all sectors—public, private, and non-state—becomes the norm. Thus, work in good governance and civil society is in some senses opposite sides of the same coin. (p. 21).

[126] 'Furthermore,' it was anticipated, 'a successful democratic experiment in the Palestinian territories could serve as an important precedent for other Arab countries in the region.' NDI, 'In Support of Palestinian Democracy: Final Report,' (February 1997), p. 4.

[127] According to NDI, its civil society program in the West Bank and Gaza had three goals: 1) an enhanced understanding among Palestinians of the role of citizens and civil society in the formal democratic decision making process; 2) an increase in the active participation of Palestinian citizens and civic groups in public policy processes; and 3), an expanded dialogue between Palestinian citizens and the officials they elected. See NDI, 'Building an Informed and Active Civil Society in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Final Report' (1999), p. 8.

[128] NDI, 'In Support of Palestinian Democracy: Final Report' (February 1997), p. 2 & 3.

[129] Imco Brouwer, 'Weak Democracy and Civil Society Promotion: The Cases of Egypt and Palestine,' in Thomas Carothers and Marian Ottaway (Eds), *Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 35. It also seems to have been an underlying assumption of the program that one cannot be civic minded or politically active unless she espouses a Western liberal political philosophy.

[130] Management Systems International (MSI), 'Civic Education Programming Since 1990: A Case Study-Based Analysis' (December 1999), p. 34.

[131] NDI, 'In Support of Palestinian Democracy: Final Report' (February 1997), p. 28. Civic Forum became a legally registered Palestinian NGO in June 1998 but NDI continued to support it with funds provided by USAID. It is important to also note that NDI later developed a manual to guide its staff in implementing Civic Forum programs, which it has since exported to the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere. See MSI, 'Civic Education Programming Since 1990: A Case Study-Based Analysis' (December 1999), p. 33.

[132] USAID, 'USAID West Bank and Gaza Strategic Plan: 1996-2000' (March 1996), p. 38.

[133] USAID, 'Performance Monitoring Plan for Objective Number 3: "More Responsive and Accountable Governance"' (December 1996), p. 4. With this established it is then stated that '[i]n addition to the political institutions of the state, a system of democratic governance posits a legitimate, if not equal, role for the institutions and organizations of civil society as well as empowered and autonomous local governments to participate in public decision-making.' Underlying this vision, the agency's plan for evaluating its performance in the promotion of its democracy and governance agenda goes on to state, 'is the understanding that by broadening participation in the Palestinian governance process to include non-central state actors, that the nature of public decisions will more closely reflect citizen concerns, in turn leading to more tangible results, and ultimately, increasing citizen commitment to the peace process as self-rule demonstrates the possibility of positive improvements in social and economic life' (p. 4).

[134] According to the agency '[a]lthough there is a relatively large number of Palestinian NGOs (estimated at over 1,200), there is a dearth of organizations falling into the category of public interest associations, such as advocacy or "good government" organizations.... However, since the basic institutions of a functioning democracy are just now being created, there is a unique opportunity for NGOs to influence the process of determining their future role in a democratic society.' USAID, 'USAID West Bank and Gaza Strategic Plan: 1996-2000' (March 1996), p. 40.

[135] USAID, 'Performance Monitoring Plan for Objective Number 3: "More Responsive and Accountable Governance"' (December 1996), p. 8. & USAID, 'USAID West Bank and Gaza Strategic Plan: 1996-2000' (March 1996), p. 43.

[136] USAID, 'USAID West Bank and Gaza Strategic Plan: 1996-2000' (March 1996), p. 43.

[137] Ibid, p. 42.

[138] USAID, for example, 'funds a Palestinian private trade organization' that, among other things, 'serves as an advocate on economic reform issues with the Palestinian Authority.' See USAID, 'USAID West Bank and Gaza Annual Report: FY2003' (March 13, 2003), p. 4.

[139] This is the view of civil society presented in Augustus Richard Norton's 1995 two-volume edited book on civil society in the Middle East. See Augustus Richard Norton (ed.), *Civil Society in the Middle East*, Vol. 1 & 2 (Leiden: EJ. Brill, 1996).

[140] It has also been criticized for neglecting wider socioeconomic and structural dynamics. See, for example, Amaney Jamal, *Barriers to Democracy*, and Imco Brouwer, 'Weak Democracy and Civil Society Promotion.'

[141] USIAD, 'USAID West Bank and Gaza Strategic Plan: 1996-2000' (March 1996), p. 41.

[142] Ibid.

[143] Ibid, p. 43. See also USAID 'Performance Monitoring Plan for Objective Number 3: "More Responsive and Accountable Governance"' (December 1996), p. 8.

[144] See Salah Abdel-Shafi, 'Civil Society and Political Elites in Palestine and the Role of International Donors: A

Palestinian View' (2004), 12.

[145] Anne Le More, 2008, p. 87.

[146] Sara Roy, 'U.S. Economic Aid to the West Bank and Gaza: the Politics of Peace,' 74. As noted by Sara Roy, Palestinian municipalities have historically stood alone as governmental institutions that were able to withstand the dislocating impact of Israeli occupation and weakening them by centralizing power in the PA was bound to undermine an essential institutional and developmental resource.

[147] USAID, 'Performance Monitoring Plan for Objective Number 3: "More Responsive and Accountable Governance"' (December 1996), p. 1.

[148] Ibid, 3.

[149] USAID, 'USAID West Bank and Gaza Transition Plan" (January 26, 2001), p. 1. The plan intended to address four main themes: responding to emergence needs, promoting reform, revitalizing the private sector and maintaining infrastructure and human capital development. Work in these areas was funded by an operating year budget of $75 million, $400 million which became available in 2000 as part of the Wye Supplemental, and $50 million which was allocated to the Mission as part of the Iraq Supplemental in 2003, primarily for emergency needs. The additional funding enabled the Mission to disburse more than $170 million in fiscal year 2003 and more than $150 million in fiscal year 2004. See <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/ane/wbg.html>.

[150] Ibid, p. 10.

[151] Ibid, p. 16.

[152] Ibid, p. 10.

[153] Ibid, p. 13.

[154] Ibid.

[155] ADF, 'Civil Society Capacity Building Program West Bank and Gaza Strip: Final Report' (October 2002), p. 2. The program, which focused on the development of financial management capacity and internal democratic governance, was meant to bypass the international donors' preferred interlocutors based in the central areas around Jerusalem and Ramalla by targeting twelve 'intermediate level organizations' located in the Gaza Strip or in the northern and southern areas of the West Bank and 'working for the general public interest or for the specific interests of the sectors they represented.'

[156] Other USAID programs included the 'youth development project' *Ruwwad* (in Arabic, 'pioneers'); 'rule of law reform' project *Arkan* (in Arabic, 'pillars'), the 'independent media' program *Aswatona* (in Arabic, 'our voice'), the 'local democratic reform program' *Tawasol* (in Arabic, 'ongoing communication'), among others.

[157] Tamkeen, 'West Bank and Gaza Civil Society and Democracy Strengthening Project: Quarterly Progress Report' (October 15, 2002), p. I-1.

[158] Ibid, I-4. See also Tamkeen, 'West Bank and Gaza Civil Society and Democracy Strengthening Project: Work Plan 2004' (January 2004), pp. II-2—II-11.

[159] The PA's anger might also have had something to do with Tamkeen's Arabic cognomen, since senior officials in the PA's Commission for NGO Affairs seem to have thought that it was an unregistered Palestinian NGO (a fact that in turn demonstrated the extent to which the PA was excluded from the project). See Challand, *Palestinian Civil Society*, 90.

[160] Tamkeen, 'West Bank and Gaza Civil Society and Democracy Strengthening Project: Quarterly Progress Report' (October 15, 2002), p. II-2.

[161] Congressional Research Services (CRS), 'US Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2010 Request' (July 17, 2009), p. 1.

[162] Charmaine Seitz, 'USAID, Palestinian Civil Society at impasse over anti-terror clause,' *Palestine Report*, 10: 28 (January 14, 2004). <http://www.palestinereport.ps/article.php?article=233> (accessed 12 April 2010).

[163] In a widely reported affair, for example, residents of the Jenin refugee camp refused to accept USAID humanitarian assistance (including food, medical supplies and blankets) after much of the camp was destroyed during an Israel invasion in mid-2002 because many of the weapons used against the inhabitants of the camp were supplied by the US.

[164] See, for example, Anne Le More, *International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo*, 132.

[165] The petition was published in the *Al Quds* newspaper, during May and June of 2002. The editions are accessible through the newspapers' online archive (in Arabic) at <www.alquds.com>.

[166] By 2005, the provisions that were in effect for assistance delivered through contracts, grants, and cooperative agreement included (1) the vetting of certain non-U.S. prime awardees and subawardees for terrorist connections; (2) certifications by all prime awardees and subawardees of grants and cooperative agreements that they have not assisted and do not assist terrorists; and (3) a clause in all awards and related subawards prohibiting the support of

terrorists (antiterrorism clause) and clauses in all prime awards prohibiting (a) the use of U.S. funds to recognize or honor terrorists (naming clause) and (b) the provision of cash to the Palestinian Authority (cash clause). See United Sates Government Accountability Office (GAO), 'Foreign Assistance: Recent Improvements Made, but USAID Should Do More to Help Ensure Aid Is Not Provided for Terrorist Activities in West Bank and Gaza' (September 29, 2006), p. 2.

[167] USAID, 'The Political, Economic and Security Situation in the West Bank and Gaza,' statement of Mark S. Ward, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Asia and the Near East before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and the South Asia Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives (May 23, 2007), unnumbered.

[168] Ibid. The US government was so adamant in its conditions that it required that UNRWA be vetted to ensure that it complies with these requirements. See GAO, 'Foreign Assistance: Measures to Prevent Inadvertent Payments to Terrorists under Palestinian Aid Programs Have Been Strengthened, but Some Weaknesses Remain' (May 2009).

[169] GAO, 'Foreign Assistance: Recent Improvements Made, but USAID Should Do More to Help Ensure Aid Is Not Provided for Terrorist Activities in West Bank and Gaza' (September 29, 2006), p. 11. West Bank and Gaza mission officials have had also likened the new paperwork to CSOs' commitment to equal opportunity and drug free workplace and complained that Palestinian CSOs were the only ones to object to new anti-terrorism policies. Palestinian CSOs argued that new need special treatment because the new rule can be easily manipulated by Israel. As Rana Bishara, spokesperson for the Palestinian NGO Network, put it, the new rules were 'part of a general campaign by pro-Israeli parties to put pressure on international NGOs not to support Palestinian development.' Quoted in Charmaine Seitz, 'USAID, Palestinian Civil Society at impasse over anti-terror clause.' The new additional clauses introduced in 2005 proved this perception not to be unwarranted. As the GAO report on the subject put it, the 'naming' clause 'was introduced in response to allegations that USAID was providing funding to institutions that were honoring terrorists.' See GAO, 'Foreign Assistance: Recent Improvements Made, but USAID Should Do More to Help Ensure Aid Is Not Provided for Terrorist Activities in West Bank and Gaza' (September 29, 2006), p. 11.

[170] Tamkeen, 'West Bank and Gaza Civil Society and Democracy Strengthening Project: Work Plan 2004' (January 2004), p. iii.

[171] Tamkeen, 'Potential CSO and Tamkeen Role in the Next Palestinian Elections' (December 2003), pp. II-3, II-4.

[172] Ibid, p. II-4. In fact, receiving assistance conditioned in this manner would also violate the provisions of the PA's NGO law. Many leaders of CSOs working in the fields of democracy and governance told Tamkeen' senior management that signing the ATC would make them a potential target for harassment by the PA as Palestinian law forbids the conditional receipt of donor funds. See Tamkeen, 'West Bank and Gaza Civil Society and Democracy Strengthening Project: Work Plan 2004' (January 2004), p. I-4.

[173] USAID, 'West Bank and Gaza Operational Plan: FY2006' (July 12, 2006), pp. 3-4. Also see USAID, 'The Political, Economic and Security Situation in the West Bank and Gaza,' (May 23, 2007), unnumbered. In 2005, USAID gave US$ 9 million to the PA to enhance its communication and outreach programs. See USAID, 'West Bank and Gaza Operational Plan: FY2006,' p. 3. According to USAID, after the agency was accused by a number of observers that its support for the 2006 Palestinian elections (USAID spent US$ 2.3 million in EFS support for the elections and used discretionary spending accounts to initiate various projects, including tree planting, schoolroom additions, a soccer tournament, street cleaning, and computers at community centers, that coincided with the elections) was designed to bolster the image of President Abbas and his Fatah party, it decided to remove its usual branding requirements for these activities. See USAID, 'US Aid to the Palestinians: Report for Congress,' prepared for Congressional Research Services (CRS), by Jeremy M. Sharp, Middle East Policy Analyst, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, (February 2, 2006), p. 3.

[174] USAID, 'The Political, Economic and Security Situation in the West Bank and Gaza,' (May 23, 2007), unnumbered. Another poll showed that whereas beforehand only 5 percent of Palestinians new of US assistance being provided by the agency, after one public outreach campaign 50 percent of those polled believed that the American people contribute to Palestinian development, while 61 percent changed their perception of the United States directly as a result of the campaign. See USAID, 'West Bank and Gaza Operational Plan: FY2006' (July 12, 2006), pp. 3-4.

[175] Although the EU is largest donor to the OPT, with regard to civil society USAID contributions are much more substantial. See Challand, *Palestinian Civil Society*, 224, note 40.

[176] According to Challand 29 of the organizations he interviewed stated that they do not accept USAID funding. Upon further investigation, however, it was revealed that 4 of these did in fact continue to accept agency funding. Ibid, 119-20.

[177] Tamkeen, 'West Bank and Gaza Civil Society and Democracy Strengthening Project: Work Plan 2004' (January 2004), p. I-1—I-2. As of January 1, 2004, Tamkeen had approximately US$3.3 million in grants in the pipeline to CSOs that stated they were willing to sign the ATC, US$1.8 million in grants to CSOs stating that they would not sign the ATC, and US$1.6 million in grants to CSOs that were, as yet, undecided on the issue (p. II-4).

[178] Ibid, pp. II-3 & V-5. The 2003 report on the potential role for Tamkeen in the next Palestinian elections had already indicated that in contrast with Ramallah-based organizations, small, service delivery, and locally-based CSOs are more open to accepting Tamkeen grants and assistance to support election projects. See Tamkeen, 'Potential CSO and Tamkeen Role in the Next Palestinian Elections' (December 2003), p. II-4.

[179] These are the program objectives listed by ARD, Inc, the consultancy company that won the contract for implementing the program. See <http://www.ardinc.com/projects/detail_region.php?id=110>.

[180] See the agency's website at <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/ane/wbg.html>.

[181] Ibid.

[182] Ibid.

[183] Ibid.

[184] GAO, 'Foreign Assistance: Recent Improvements Made, but USAID Should Do More to Help Ensure Aid Is Not Provided for Terrorist Activities in West Bank and Gaza' (September 29, 2006), p. 8.

[185] Congressional Research Service (CRS), 'U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2010 Request' (July 19, 2009), p. 17.

[186] bid. This funding was authorized for FY2007

[187] Ibid. This practice was not new; in 2005 USAID gave money to assist with the relocation of settler greenhouses as part of the Israeli disengagement plan. See, for example, USAID, 'USAID West Bank and Gaza Operational Plan: FY2006' (June 12, 2006), p. 4.

[188] Ibid, p. 9.

[189] Again, these are the changed objectives according to ARD, the OTI's implementing partner. See the company's website at <http://www.ardinc.com/projects/detail_region.php?id=110>.

[190] The project was one component of the initiative Advancing Trust and Reconciliation among Palestinians and Israelis sponsored by the Center for the Study of the Presidency and financed by USAID. See Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress (CSPC), 'The NGO Mapping Project: A New Approach to Advancing Palestinian Civil Society' (May 2008), p. 4.

[191] CSPC, 'Advancing Trust and Reconciliation among Palestinians and Israelis: A Socioeconomic Development and Interfaith Cooperation Initiative' (Undated), pp. 3-4.

[192] Ibid, p. 4.

[193] CSPC, 'The NGO Mapping Project: A New Approach to Advancing Palestinian Civil Society' (May 2008), p. 4.

[194] Ibid, p. 6-7. The annex provided a brief profile on each of the organizations listed which included: the organization's mission statement; its geographical location (in which district); the date it was established; a list of its board members; how many employees and/or volunteers it had; recently implemented programs; and current or past donors.

[195] Ibid, p. 7.

[196] It was pointed out that from a political point of view; the participants came from moderate and independent backgrounds. Ibid, p. 22.

[197] Ibid, p. 9. Most of these, moreover, rely on funding from the movement itself rather than outside sources.

[198] Ibid.

[199] Ibid, 8.

[200] CSPC, 'Advancing Trust and Reconciliation among Palestinians and Israelis: A Socioeconomic Development and Interfaith Cooperation Initiative' (Undated), p. 4. According to CSPC's published report, as a resource for donors, the sample was intended to serve two functions: 1) To offer donors information about particular organizations operating in communities in the West Bank to help facilitate the identification of partners for future projects; and 2) to present donors with a model of the types of moderate, community-based NGOs requiring additional outside support as donors design future civil society initiatives in the West Bank and Gaza. See CSPC, 'The NGO Mapping Project: A New Approach to Advancing Palestinian Civil Society' (May 2008), p. 12.

[201] CSPC, 'The NGO Mapping Project: A New Approach to Advancing Palestinian Civil Society' (May 2008), p.6.

[202] Ibid. Also see CSPC, 'Advancing Trust and Reconciliation among Palestinians and Israelis: A Socioeconomic Development and Interfaith Cooperation Initiative' (Undated), p. 4.

[203] Ibid.

[204] CSPC, 'The NGO Mapping Project: A New Approach to Advancing Palestinian Civil Society' (May 2008), p. 33. Meanwhile, a proposed main coordinating office to help facilitate the work of the network, it was suggested, should be designed to provide services to the NGOs (rather than serving as an alternative to them) by facilitating contacts and fund raising with donors, capacity-building, and public relations. It was also suggested that a steering committee should be established consisting of professionals approved by the members of the network who will help the office staff to identify donors, design training programs, and provide advice, resources, and expertise to members. The office staff and steering committee are to continuously assess the needs of the member NGOs and design their activities accordingly.

[205] See CSPC, 'Advancing Trust and Reconciliation among Palestinians and Israelis: A Socioeconomic Development and Interfaith Cooperation Initiative' (Undated), p. 3.

[206] CEP I began as part of the OTI's Transition Initiative and was initially designed as a two-year, US$15 million program (June 2005 through June 2007) and later extended to June 2009 with an added US$10 million in funding. In December 2007, the project was transferred from the OTI to the USAID/West Bank and Gaza's Democracy and Governance Office (DGO) and renamed the Civic Engagement Program (CEP I). The only grant activities that were formally classified as CEP I grants were those that were approved from December 2007 when the contract was transferred to the DGO, to January 2009 when all activities were classified as CEP II. During that period (December 2007 through December 2008), 52 projects were implemented for a total of US$4,347,209. See ARD, 'West Bank and Gaza Civic Engagement Program I: Final Report' (August 2009), p. 1-2.

[207] Ibid.

[208] Ibid, p. 2

[209] ARD, 'Civic Engagement Program II (CEP II): First Annual Work Plan' (December 2008), p. 1.

[210] Ibid.

[211] Ibid, p. 3.

[212] Ibid, p. 1 & 3.

[213] 'In most instances,' it is explained, 'CEP II staff will identify discrete activities that will contribute to the overall project objectives. These grants will often result from technical studies identifying specific activities and partners. In other instances, USAID may have pre-identified grantees that are needed in order to achieve time-sensitive tasks. Finally, ARD will develop the core capacities, as directed by the CEP II contract, of selected institutions and will use the provision of grants with technical assistance activities to these institutions to reach project goals. In all three cases, ARD will work with the potential grantee to develop the project proposal in order to provide a more tailored, pinpointed intervention.' Ibid, p. 5.

[214] Ibid.

[215] This is the main finding of MAS's 2009 study on donor funding to local CSOs. Ibid, p. x.

[216] Reliable data is hard to come by but journalistic reports emphasize the wide reach of the campaign whose main target is ostensibly Hamas' social welfare organizations. Launched after the break down of the unity government in 2007, the camping continues unabated. See John Elmer, 'A Prescription of Civil War,' *Aljazeera*, February 8, 2010. <http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/2009/12/2009121311331278355.html> (accessed 24 May 2010). Also see 'PA Orders 40 Hamas-linked Charities Closed,' *Haaretz*, June 24, 2010. <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/pa-orders-4-hamas-linked-charities-closed-1.251523> (accessed 27 June 2010). There are reports, it is important to note, of Hamas launching a similar camping against rival organizations in the Gaza Strip. On the similar developments in both the West Bank and Gaza see Nathan Brown, 'Palestine: The Schism Deepens,' *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, August 20, 2009. <http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=23668> (accessed 12 February 2010).

[217] Also, it is important to note that the Israeli army employs force against NGOs in the OPT, rampaging through and ransacking schools, charities, sports clubs, medical centers and other NGOs it claims are linked to Hamas. For the details of such a rampage in the city of Nabuls, see Khalid Amayreh, 'Under the pretext of fighting Hamas: Israel launches all-out war on Islamic institutions in the West Bank,' *The People's Voice*, July 09, 2008. <http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/cgi-bin/blogs/voices.php/2008/07/09/under_the_pretext_of_fighting_hamas_isra>. (accessed 27 June 2010).

[218] The hostility of the US Congress, which both authorizes and appropriates foreign assistance and conducts oversight on agency's management of the aid program, is deep-rooted, going back to the beginning of the Oslo process. Both the PLO Commitments Compliance Act of 1993 and Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1994 required periodic certification by the State Department of Palestinian compliance with the terms of the Oslo agreements. In the years that followed, further legislation was introduced to restrict direct aid to the PA. Annual

Foreign Operations Appropriations measures ban direct US assistance to the PA unless the President submits a waiver to Congress citing that such assistance is in the interest of national security. The waiver can be for up to one year, and must be accompanied by a report to the appropriate congressional committees on PA actions to stop terrorism. See CRS, ‘U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2010 Request’ (July 19, 2009), p. 16. USAID officials have also had to physically appear before Congress to notify it of any plans to spend money in the OPT (which Congress had 15 days to approve or disapprove) and are often asked to appear before congressional subcommittees to answer questions about the various aspects of the West Bank and Gaza Strip assistance program.

[219] Ibid, p. 16.

[220] See MAS, ‘Mapping of Palestinian Non-governmental Organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,’ (Ramallah, 2007), p. 5. The study, which was conducted in cooperation with Cordaid, is available in English at <http://www.pal-econ.org>.

[221] Ibid, p. 4. In 2007, MAS also published a study entitled ‘An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Palestinian Organizations Working in the Fields of Women’s Affairs, Democracy, Good Governance and Human Rights’. The main finding of the study was that ‘the social impact and effectiveness of the organizations in all four fields is below that anticipated.’ See MAS, ‘An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Palestinian Organizations Working in the Fields of Women’s Affairs, Democracy, Good Governance and Human Rights’ (Ramallah 2007), p. ix. The study is available in English at <http://www.pal-econ.org>.

[222] MAS, ‘Tracking External Donor Funding to Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: 1999 -2008’ (Ramallah, 2009), p. 1. The study is available in English at MAS's website at <http://www.pal-econ.org>.

Chapter Four

[1] Glenn Robinson,‘The Role of the Palestinian Middle Class in the Mobilization of Palestinian Society,’ 322.

[2] See International Court of Justice (ICJ), ‘Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Advisory Opinion,’ (Press Release 2004/28, 9 July 2004), <http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/85255e950050831085255e95004fa9c3/3740e39487a5428a85256ecc005e157a?OpenDocument> (accessed 28 June 2010).

[3] The ICJ also advised that Israel must compensate for damage caused; and, return Palestinian property or provide compensation if restitution is not possible. Ibid.

[4] Bil'in, a village of Palestine <http://www.bilin-village.org/> (accessed 28 June 2010).

[5] For example, see the letter sent by the Municipality of Jayyous, the Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign, Jayyous, and the Land Defense Committee, Jayyous, to Norwegian government officials asking the Norwegian government pension fund to divest from the company Africa-Israel for its involvement in building Israeli settlements in the OPT. ‘The village of Jayyous asks Norway to divest from Lev Leviev’s Companies’ (4 May 2009) <http://bdsmovement.net/?q=node/393> (accessed 28 June 2010). See also the letter on the same subject send by the The Popular Committee Against the Wall and Settlements, Bil'in Village, ‘Village of Bil’in asks Norway to divest from Leviev’s Africa-Israel’ (21 April 2009), <http://adalahny.org/index.php/letters-a-statements/17-letters/298-bilin-norway-africa-israel> (accessed 28 June 2010).

[6] See Global BDS Movement <http://bdsmovement.net/> (accessed 28 June 2010).

[7] Abigail B. Bakan and Yasmeen Abu-Laban, ‘Palestinian Resistance and International Solidarity: the BDS Campaign,’ *Race and Class*, 51: 29 (2009), 42.

[8] Ibid, 29-30.

[9] See Ibid, 42-46. For a more recent update of the response with which the call for BDS has been met, with a focus on North America, see Adam Horowitz and Philip Weiss, ‘The Boycott Divestment Sanctions Movement,’ *The Nation* (28 June 2010), <http://www.thenation.com/article/boycott-divestment-sanctions-movement> (accessed 29 June 2010).

[10] Les Whittington, ‘“Anti-Semitic” Charge Angers Aid Group,’ *Toronto Star* (18 December 2009), <http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/article/740510---anti-semitic-charge-angers-aid-group> (accessed 28 June 2010). KAIROS, it is important to note, has not endorsed the BDS campaign.

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Appendix 1: World Bank Documents

This list of World Bank documents and publications on civil society, NGOs and the Palestinian NGO Project is not meant to be exhaustive. Most of the listed documents can be found under West Bank and Gaza at <http://www.worldbank.org/>.

Date	Document
February 1994	*NGOs in the West Bank and Gaza* (John D. Clark and Barbara S. Balaj)
November 1995	*A Report on Palestinian NGOs for the World Bank* (Denis Sullivan)
June 1996	*The Changing Role of Palestinian NGOs since the Establishment of the Palestinian Authority* (Sophie Claudet)
22 April 1997	Report No. PIC5210: *West Bank and Gaza-Palestinian NGO Project: A Grant to a Non-governmental Organization*
19 June 1997	Report No. 16696 GZ: *Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Trust Fund Grant in an Amount of US$10 Million to West Bank and Gaza for the Palestinian NGO Project*
January 2001	MAS, *Mapping of Palestinian Non-governmental Organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip*, in Arabic.
24 May 2001	Report No. 22266 GZ: *Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant in the Amount of US$8 Million to the Welfare Association- West Bank and Gaza for the Palestinian NGO Project (II)*
21 June 2001	Report No. PID10010: *West Bank and Gaza-The Palestinian NGO Project (II)*
August 2001	PASSIA, *The World Bank and the Palestinian NGO Project: From Service Delivery to Sustainable Development* (Denis Sullivan)
December 2001	BISAN Center for Research and Development, *The Role of NGOs in Building Civil Society: Executive Summary for the Welfare Association Consortium,* in Arabic (Izzat Abel Hadi)
January 2002	BISAN Center for Research and Development, *The Role of NGOs in Building Civil Society*
30 June 2003	Report No. 26252: *Implementation Completion Report on a Grant in the Amount of US$10 Million to the West Bank and Gaza for a Palestinian NGO Project*
21 October 2006	Report No. AB2535: *Project Information Document (PID) Appraisal Stage: Palestinian NGO Project III*
November 2006	NGO Development Center (NDC), *Proposed Strategy for the Development of the Palestinian NGO Sector* (Danilo A. Songco, Kahlil Nijem and Majed El Farra)
14 November 2006	Report No. 37855 GZ: *Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant in the Amount of US$10.0 Million to West Bank and Gaza for a Palestinian NGO III Project*
December 2006	Bisan Center for Research and Development, *The Role and Performance of Palestinian NGOs in Health, Education and Agriculture*
3 April 2007	Report No. IRC 0000189: *Implementation Completion and Results Report on a Grant in the Amount of US$8.0 Million to West Bank and Gaza for the Palestinian NGO Project II*
July 2007	MAS, *An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Palestinian Organizations Working in the Fields of Women's Affairs, Democracy, Good Governance and Human Rights*
July 2007	MAS, *Mapping Palestinian Non-governmental Organizations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip*
March 2009	MAS, *Tracking External Donor Funding to Palestinian Non Governmental Organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 1999-2008*

Appendix 2: USAID Documents

This list of USAID documents on the agency's civil society and democracy promotion efforts in the occupied Palestinian territories is not exhaustive. Most of the listed documents can be found under West and/or Gaza at <http://dec.usaid.gov/>.

November 1992	USAID, *USAID Program Strategy for the West Bank and Gaza Strip 9993-1997*
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2 February 2006	USAID, *US Aid to the Palestinians: Report for Congress* (prepared for Congressional Research Services (CRS), by Jeremy M. Sharp, Middle East Policy Analyst, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division)
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August 2009	ARD, *West Bank and Gaza Civic Engagement Program I: Final Report*