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POLICY CONFERENCES OF MAJOR PARTIES IN CANADA

AS INNOVATING AGENCIES

by

CHARLES JOSEPH CLARK

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and

recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research,

for acceptance, a thesis entitled . Policy Conferences of. .

Major Parties in Canada as Innovating Agencies . . . .

. . . .

submitted by . . Charles Joseph Clark . . . .

in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts.

Supervisor

Date

"This is the price we pay for having

lost the last election."

      The comment of a delegate to
      the National Conference on
      Canadian Goals, on hearing the
      opening address, by Professor
      Marshall McLuhan.

ABSTRACT

This paper considers five national policy conferences
held in Opposition by the Liberal and Progressive Conserva-
tive parties of Canada, and their service as instruments of
innovation in those parties and, consequently, in the
Canadian political system. Innovation is defined as delibe-
rate self-conscious adaptation to new circumstances, and is
distinguished from invention. It is argued that innovation
is in the nature of Canadian national parties which, as
competitors, have the incentive to seek change and, as
institutions, have the power to make change legitimate,
and that this dual function of the parties is particularly
important in Canada because no other agencies perform them
consistently nationwide. Policy conferences have been
extraordinary instruments of innovation, which have emerged
when ordinary instruments have failed. They are considered
here as symbols of the regular process, valuable because
their genesis and function can be isolated and examined.
It is notable that none of the conferences contested the
right of the parliamentary caucus to decide policy, or

v

otherwise sought to displace existing internal party institutions. A major conclusion is that a recurrent important effect of the conferences was to make the host party itself function effectively as an innovative instrument in the larger political system.

PREFACE

Nobody much likes major parties. They are put up with,
like work or weather, but most people wouldn't want their
daughter to join one. The glamour is in movements, or
"third parties", especially if they're "new". The defence
of major parties--when it occurs--usually describes dull
workmanlike things that they do--they "organize" the
electorate, or "unite" the country, or do some other dogwork.
Most of all, the major parties are supposed to have no new
ideas, except those they steal from "movements" or "third
parties". So goes the calumny.

Yet, through its 104 years, Canada has been governed
exclusively by two major parties. And things have happened--
the CPR, the CBC, the Canada Council, medicare, ARDA, the
Official Languages Bill, even the rediscovery of mainland
China. Was this all due to accident--or theft? Would it
all have happened in 1905, if only a "movement" had won in
1904?

The major parties are full of faults--obviously. But
so is the casual slander of their critics. While professional
students of parties are usually more objective, I think that
on this subject, many of them work within the context of

prevailing public prejudice. If that is so, our under-
standing of the whole Canadian political system suffers.
And even if objectivity abounds, it has not focussed
enough on the innovative functions of the major
Canadian parties.

My own prejudices are known. I am active in one
of the parties studied, the Progressive Conservative,
which is a major party in history and aspiration, if
not always in behaviour. This paper will reflect that
association, at least in its reliance upon information
and impressions that came to me as a participant in
Progressive Conservative affairs and were not so
directly available concerning the Liberal party. In
addition, I think the self-advertised virtues of "third
parties" or "movements" are accepted far too uncriti-
cally, by professional and lay observers. However,
with a little help from my advisors, I have tried to
correct my own extravagances.

Nonetheless, the paper rests on the assumption that
a concern for policy and change is evident in the pro-
cesses and results of the major parties. This paper
examines one means by which major parties innovate--the
policy conference, held in Opposition. There are several
other instruments, many of them more productive than the
policy conference. This was chosen because I had the

good fortune to participate directly in the organiza-
tion of two of the conferences, at Fredericton and
Niagara Falls, and to have access to the records or
recollection of persons active in each conference.
Very helpful information and advice were provided by
the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, the Honourable
Robert L. Stanfield, Mr. N. K. Atkins, Mr. Robert Bedard,
the Honourable Richard A. Bell, Mr. Dalton Camp, the
Honourable Donald M. Fleming, the Honourable E. Davie
Fulton, the Honourable Walter L. Gordon, Miss Flora
Macdonald, Mr. Lowell Murray, and Professor T. H. B.
Symons. The national headquarters of the Progressive
Conservative Party and the office of the national leader
of the Progressive Conservative Party made available all
their official records of the conferences at Port Hope,
Fredericton, Montmorency and Niagara Falls. Further
records concerning Fredericton were provided by the
office of Mr. Dalton Camp. The Honourable Walter Gordon
provided extensive specific information, including some
records, concerning the Kingston conference. Newspaper
comment was acquired mainly through the library of the
House of Commons and the office of Mr. Camp.

The department of Political Science of the University
of Alberta has attended the gestation of this thesis with

uncommon patience. I am indebted to Dr. Richard Baird

and Dr. Peter Meekison, who were both briefly involved as

supervisors, and particularly to Dr. F. C. Engelmann, upon

whom that burden ultimately fell. Dr. Engelmann made

several important suggestions that are incorporated in the

final work, as did Dr. Edwin R. Black of the department of

Political Studies at Queens University. However, I did

not always take their advice, and neither should be

blamed for what follows.

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CHAPTER ONE:

INTRODUCTION

In September, 1942, several prominent members of the
Conservative Party of Canada met at Trinity School in
Port Hope, Ontario, to discuss various questions of
national policy. There were no Members of Parliament
present, and only one Senator and one member of a provin-
cial legislature. The organizers of the conference had
been careful to emphasise that the deliberations were
"unofficial" and did not necessarily reflect the views of
the parliamentary or official leadership of what was then,
in terms of parliamentary seats and popular vote, the
nation's "second" party. That Port Hope conference was
the first of five national policy conferences held by the
major Opposition party in the period 1942 to 1969. The
others were the Kingston conference of the Liberal Party
at Queens University in 1960, and the conferences of the
Progressive Conservative Party at the University of
New Brunswick in 1964, Maison Montmorency in 1967, and
Niagara Falls in 1969. This paper will consider certain
characteristics common to each conference, including the
functions each performed in the party and the party system.

The general hypothesis is that the major political
parties have a significant role as innovators in the
Canadian political system; more particularly, the paper
will argue that each policy conference was an important
agent of innovation within a party then in Opposition,
and enabled the party more effectively to perform its own
innovative role in the larger system. Although the subject
is relatively specific, its consideration involves several
assumptions about the Canadian political and party systems;
there is an attempt to justify those assumptions when
necessary. The paper will describe, in general terms, the
organization and composition of each conference and indicate
the conditions under which each met. However it is not
intended to be a history of policy conferences. The
consideration is analytical and selective, not chronological
nor complete.

Various other policy activities of the major parties
have been excluded from consideration. They include policy
discussions of elected caucuses, of constituent groups of
national party associations such as youth or women's groups
or policy advisory committees, of provincial parties, and
of national annual meetings. That should not be interpreted
to suggest that these other media of policy discussion are

unimportant. In fact, by the nature of the parliamentary
system, the elected caucus is probably the single most
important locus of policy discussion and decision. In
recent years particularly, the complexity and range of
public business has forced parties to rely extensively on
smaller groups with a particular interest or competence in
policy questions. The caucus, and advisory or constituent
groups, tend to influence party policy privately and
regularly. They are of a species different from public
conferences, held occasionally.

The annual meeting is excluded for other reasons. While
policy may be the dominant concern of some delegates to an
annual meeting, most delegates are more interested in
meeting old friends, exchanging party gossip, and becoming
"insiders" again. In Canada, the annual meeting of a
national party is best regarded as a family reunion, drawing
together scattered members to recall and reaffirm their
affinity and identity. Officers are elected and resolutions
passed, but the essential function of the annual meeting
has been to remind partisans that their common cause is
alive and more important than factional, regional, personal
or policy preoccupations. That is by no means a trivial
function; it is one of the most important a party performs
in a centrifugal country. A policy conference, on the other

hand, has a specific focus to which family gossip and
general business are secondary. Policy-related matters
are at the core of a policy conference and on the edge of
an annual meeting. Clearly the policy aspect of annual
meetings is not barren of significance, and it may be
that this aspect is more important recently than previously.
But policy sessions at annual meetings, in the period
considered here, have been sufficiently different in nature
from policy conferences to warrant exclusion from this study.

In addition, two policy conferences which might have
been considered were not examined: the study conference
held in 1933 by the Liberal Party at Port Hope under the
chairmanship of the late Right Honourable Vincent Massey,
and the Liberal Party meeting at Harrison Hot Springs,
British Columbia in November 1969. As well as having claim
to be the first instance of a major party resorting, in
Opposition, to a policy conference as a means of rejuvenation,
the Liberal conference at Port Hope was an initiative of lay
partisans about which the leadership was skeptical.[1] In
addition, the experience of that first conference influenced
the later decision of the Right Honourable Lester Pearson to
convene the Kingston conference.[2] It is omitted because

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1.   Vincent Massey, Whats Past Is Prologue: The Memoirs of
Vincent Massey, The Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd., Toronto,
1963, pp. 211-213.

2.   "...we naturally studied very carefully the organization
and proceedings of, and the reaction to, the earlier Liberal
Study Conference in the 30s at Port Hope of which Mr. Vincent
Massey was chairman." Mr. Pearson to the writer, January 25, 1971.

information is scarce, and in the knowledge that every
limitation is arbitrary. The meeting at Harrison Hot
Springs was convened by a Liberal party in power. Policy
conferences by government parties deserve examination, but
are treated here as a different species with a different
inspiration and effect than those held in Opposition.

A further limitation is the exclusion from considera-
tion of policy activities of Canadian "third" parties,
including the CCF/NDP. That too is arbitrary. However,
"third" parties, and particularly the CCF/NDP, conventionally
are assumed to encourage innovation internally and in the
political system. That assumption deserves close examination.
Relatively less attention has been paid the innovative capacity
and performance of the major parties whose influence upon
national policy has been direct, as governments. It is
important to examine whether innovation is in fact a function
of a particular kind of party, or of the Canadian political
system. Consequently the focus here is upon one instrument
of innovation which has worked within the two parties which
consistently have constituted the government and alternative
government of Canada.

The second chapter will consider the concept of innova-
tion. The third chapter will discuss certain institutional

influences upon innovation in Canada, including the
influence of federalism and the parliamentary system. The
fourth chapter will deal with the genesis and other aspects
of each of the five policy conferences. Chapter five will
examine various functions of policy conferences, both
functions intended and functions performed. The sixth
chapter considers two substantive examples of the innovative
role of policy conferences: the change in the official
attitude of the Progressive Conservative Party to issues
concerning Confederation and the development within the
Progressive Conservative Party of a commitment to a national
minimum annual income program. The final chapter states
certain conclusions about policy conferences and innovation,
and includes a note on the new limitations on the Official
Opposition in the Canadian political system.

CHAPTER TWO:

THE CONCEPT OF INNOVATION

Certain basic functions are shared by parties in all Western democratic systems, including Canada, although the peculiarities of each system naturally affect party functions. Broadly speaking, the Canadian parties organize public opinion, narrowing options so citizens can choose; educate, or at least inform, individual citizens so that some citizens at least are able to give reasons for their political behaviour; provide a responsive connecting link between government and public, so the citizen can feel he participates in, and at times can, in fact, control the government acting in his name; and regularly bring forward leaders, with whom the citizen can identify, and to whom he can delegate much of his active political responsibility. Those roles sound passive and mechanical, and at times they are. The system is itself dynamic, full of conflicting opinion and changing circumstance, and the party is a little like a gear box, responding to stimuli in predetermined ways. There is this difference: this gear box has a mind of its own, and while it responds mechanically to some basic stimuli, it evaluates others, ignoring some that seem strong, responding to others that seem feeble, and at times creating stimuli of its own.

"Mind" is misleading, suggesting a single mentality; "minds" is more apt, indicating that several different mentalities evaluate or create stimuli; the point is that the parties are mechanical and more, with an independent ability to move or stay static. This paper will consider one aspect of that "independent" ability--the capacity for innovation, as revealed in formal national policy conferences.

Innovation is not a "separate" function of parties so much as an incident of the elemental function of organizing opinion. Ideas that become "innovative" in the hands of parties are usually lying around somewhere in the polity, awaiting discovery. Often, however, they are far from view and would not appear in the normal balancing of strong interests or opinions. An example is the minimum annual income proposal, in 1967-68. At other times, they are an interest to which a particular party has not been in the habit of responding. An example is the claim of French Canada to which, between 1963 and 1967, the national leadership of the Progressive Conservative Party had deliberately not responded. Something causes the party to change to espouse interests which that party, or the system, had ignored before. Whatever the causes of that change, its result is "innovation".

The concept of innovation derives from the observation
that, in any organization, there are some forces which
encourage change and other forces which prefer a static
state; the forces of change are called "innovative", the
static forces "consolidative", and an organization is deemed
to be healthy when the two forces, innovation and consolida-
tion, are in rough balance. The concept has been applied
extensively to the study of organizations outside "politics",
and is obviously relevant to political institutions and systems.

.Theodore Lowi has written:

> All stable organizations are in a continual
> process of adaptation. Innovation is that
> part of the process which is deliberate,
> self-conscious adaptation. Activities are
> innovative if they are attempts to change
> the organization and its environment in
> keeping with policies thought out in
> advance of the attempt. Innovation is not
> to be confused with liberalism or reform.
> The antonym for innovation is "consolidation",
> not conservatism. Liberalism and conservatism
> are postures towards the kinds of change
> required. To have no policy at all for
> changing things or to have a policy against
> changing things is to be neither liberal nor
> conservative; it is to be non-innovative or
> consolidative.[3]

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3. Theodore Lowi, "Towards Functionalism in Political Science:
the Case of Innovation in Party Systems", American Political
Science Review, September 1963, p.570.

Lowis definition adequately describes the concept as it will be used here, although the adjectives "deliberate, self-conscious" should not be read too strictly. In the case of policy conferences at least it is not necessary that all of the participants, or even all the organizers, are aware of or intend an innovative role; the conference can achieve change even if some or all of the participants or organizers do not want or intend it to. Also there should be no suggestion that innovation requires an exact knowledge of the result in advance by anyone involved in the process. However the characteristic stands that an innovative influence is not accidental, and that it is set in motion by advocates of change.

It should also be clear that innovation is not invention: "Invention implies bringing something new into being; innovation implies bringing something new into use."[4] That is a distinction of particular importance in considering the innovative role of the political party. The party generally becomes engaged in the innovative process only after an invention--whether a new "thing", idea or attitude-- has gained a momentum of its own. The party responds to

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4. Lawrence B. Mohr, "Determinants of Innovation in Organization", *American Political Science Review*, March 1969, p. 112.

pressures generated elsewhere, either because influential
partisans respect the invention or because they are concerned
to incorporate the "new" thing into the system before the
pressures become too strong for the system to bear. That
response occurs in various ways, any of which can be called
innovative. That the focus here is on something as concrete
as a conference should not obscure the fact that innovation
is a process, not necessarily an act.

In any system of dynamism, innovation is always going
on. It is not necessarily dramatic. It is a particularly
central process in a dynamic political system, which by
definition involves a continuous balancing of demands and
responses. Several agencies perform innovative functions
within a dynamic political system. Probably the three most
important in Canada are the formal government bureaucracy,
interest groups[5] and political parties. Innovation is not
necessarily "discovery". The operative word in Lowi's
definition is "adaptation". While a social organization

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5.   What slight evidence is available at the moment suggests
that interest groups are much less influential in Canada than
in the United States. Limiting the effectiveness of interest
groups in Canada are, among other factors: the more strict
tradition of a professional public service; the more centra-
lized nature of parties in a parliamentary system; the
consequently weaker tradition of independent action by the
individual legislator; the relative sparseness and unsophisti-
cation of organized interest group activity on the national
level; and the allocation in Canada to provincial governments
of relatively extensive powers which require interest groups
to deploy scant resources among several strong governments.

also requires agencies which raise problems, and agencies

which propose solutions, innovation concerns the adapta-

tion of existing structure to take account of new reality,

including new problems and new responses, whether newly

emerged or merely newly defined. It follows that innovating

agents must have access to the means to modify the whole

system in which the adaptation must be made; and, to be

"innovating", they must have the incentive to change. As

indicated before, the national political parties are major

instruments of adaptation because they have both the

incentive to accept change, as a means of seeking or keeping

power, and they have the ability to make change legitimate.

CHAPTER THREE:

INNOVATION AND THE CANADIAN PARTY SYSTEM.

In a sense, it is the distinguishing role of Canadian parties to innovate. As well as functioning within the formal structure of Government and Parliament, and among the mass of interests and attitudes which seek occasionally to draw a response from the formal institutions, the party occupies the isthmus between. The party is the connection. More particularly, that is the role of the politician, but in Canada the politician still[6] works largely within a party, and not as an "independent". Of course, other agencies also "connect". But "connecting" is a larger part of the role of the party than of any other institution of politics; and the party is both more diverse and more permanent than the interest groups and issues which erupt irregularly from the public into Parliament or Government. Indeed, "connecting" is the vital life-giving role of the party; it is the one function of the party that, on the record, no other agency can perform as well.

The legislature, public service or other formal agent is usually very slow to respond to new public pressures or demands. If it is concerned with action, it is more

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6.　We should not assume either that the present close relation between party and politician will persist, or that it is necessary to parliamentary democracy.

concerned with process and is usually slow to establish new channels. Interest groups are much more responsive to new pressures, but they have the right only to go to the door of the institutions from which action can issue. There must be something which exists permanently on both sides of the institutional door, some agent with the incentive to seek out new demands and the right to bring them in to the institutions for action. That agent is the party. It may happen that some of the functions traditionally associated with the party will either be performed by other agents[7] or become irrelevant.[8] But there is no evidence so far that the "connecting" function can be performed by any other agent. Moreover, there is suggestive evidence in Canadian experience that when a party stops "connecting" it becomes something else--an adjunct of the public service,[9] an instrument of propaganda[10] or just another interest group.[11]

7. For example, the party rôle in "public education" is diminishing with the concurrent growth of pervasive media and propaganda agencies like Information Canada.

8. The "organization of the electorate", in Tammany terms, has been outmoded by the sophistication and scope of both the media and the population in much of the metropolitan United States, and the process is beginning here. In fact, it is already technically possible to eliminate legislatures and govern by computer referendum, in which case "organization of the electorate" would be left to interest groups or no one.

9. The St. Laurent Liberals, for example.

10. The Progressive Conservatives, under Diefenbaker and Grosart, for example.

11. The Creditistes, for example.

Conditions of Innovation.

Lowi argues that "in a party system, innovation is a function of the minority party."[12] He does not exclude the majority party absolutely from an innovative role, but argues that innovation is more likely to come from the "out" party, provided that party is close enough to being "in" to think experiment might win office yet not so close as to fear experiment would lose it. The logic is evident. Parties "in" office, and therefore themselves part of the societal status quo, will not be inclined naturally to heed or harbour people who would change an equilibrium of which the parties are part; and parties trying to change the status quo at least to the point of replacing an incumbent government with themselves should be more attracted to, or at least less repelled by, proponents of change in society at large.

The first proposition--that incumbency "consolidates"-- is easy to accept. Even then, however, certain parties might be innovative in office longer than others; for example, a British Labour government, both because of its long experience in Opposition and its relative (and related?) attractiveness to radical or reform elements, is

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12. Lowi, op cit, p. 571.

more likely to be more "naturally" innovative than a
Tory government.[13]   In addition, we are now in a phase,
which might prove prolonged, in which groups which
consider themselves disadvantaged are bringing public
pressure for change upon government, thus making
consolidation more difficult.

The second proposition is more tenuous. Lowi
himself suggests two conditions in which a two-party
system--and more particularly the minority party--will
not be innovative: when the party doesn't have to be,
or when it thinks it can't afford to be. The first
condition occurs when the "parties rest heavily upon an
earlier but now outmoded set of cleavages"[14]--in other
words, a system where party competition is determined by
the cleavages remaining from former political generations
may offer no option or appeal to a contemporary electorate.
Lowi argues that, in such situations, real conflict tends
to bypass the parties and seek other routes of access to

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13.   After a little more time has passed, it will be useful
to test this assumption against the performance of the Heath
government. Innovation is not ideological--eg. it is as
innovative to denationalize as to nationalize. If one takes
at face value the statements of Mr. Heath and his ministers,
they intend a great many changes. Their early action confirms
their statements. If the Heath government does prove innova-
tive that will suggest (a) that innovation owes more to a
party's experience in Opposition than it owes to party
structure, origin or reputed orientation, or (b) that innovation
begets counter-innovation.

14.   Lowi, op cit, p. 573.

authority or resolution. That would create a particu-
larly disruptive potential if other access routes did
not exist or were undeveloped. For example, in a
political system where organized interest groups are
known to be effective and held to be legitimate, as
in the United States of America, demands which can
find no expression in the party system can seek and
reasonably expect expression as an organized interest
group. Similarly, in a system with a sophisticated
and respected media, as in Great Britain, demands
shut out by the parties can be expressed effectively
in the press.[15] In Canada, neither the media nor
interest groups possess the legitimacy or the influence
to serve as effective alternate routes of access to
authority or resolution. Where the parties are unable[16]
or unwilling[17] to accommodate new demands, those
demands find expression outside the system.[18]

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15. It would be interesting to compare the campaign of
the opponents of the Common Market in Britain, whose
spokesmen include The New Statesman, among other influen-
tial journals, with the campaign of opponents of
Bilingualism and Biculturalism, who found little media
support beyond Flesherton.

16. As appears to be the condition of the Progressive
Conservative and New Democratic parties in Quebec.

17. As appears to be the condition of the federal
Liberal party in Quebec.

18. Once in the Creditistes, now in the Parti Quebecois,
or the Front de Liberation Quebecois.

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The second condition prejudicial to innovation occurs when the parties are

> too well balanced.... When party leaders
> think their party is within a few percentage
> points of victory, they are likely to see
> their rational strategy as one of intensifica-
> tion of existing commitments, tightening of
> ranks, activation of existing followings. In
> a sense....there is no incentive for great
> risk if all that is needed is just a small
> marginal gain.[19]

A third condition prejudicial to innovation may be
suggested. It occurs when significant elements in the
minority party don't want to win. It differs from the
first condition in that there is here a significant internal
disagreement about the appropriate course of the party.
The common assumption is that most partisans want to win.
There is evidence to suggest that this is not necessarily
true in Canada. For one thing, the Canadian party system
has been influenced heavily by so-called "parties of
principle", some of whose members, however they play the
political game, tend to define it in terms of morality
rather than power. In addition, one suspects that the
strength of sectionalism, and the relative weakness of
.nationalism in Canada encourage the belief among some
partisans that the expression of a sectional view is

19. _Ibid._, p. 575.

purpose enough for a so-called "national" party.[20]

Moreover, in any party there is always the possibility
that the party establishment, which is not always
synonomous or sympathetic with the party leadership,
will be unwilling to risk the personal prerogatives and
prominence which they know might be lost in the changes
associated with victory.[21] In any event, "out" parties
which are within striking distance of office but prefer
opposition have no incentive to innovate.

> Lowi concludes that innovation is most likely with

> an alternative modified one-party system
> ...where the second party is a clear
> minority for several elections...but has
> a chance...of becoming the majority
> party and always promises to become so
> again after eight to twelve years.[22]

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20. That is most clearly the case with the present
Creditistes. It is difficult to understand what other
view might have motivated some members of the PC federal
caucus when they prolonged the flag debate and on some
other occasions. While it might have been unconscious,
that seems to have been the assumption of the federal
Conservative caucus of 1942, from which J. S. Roy, MP for
Gaspe, resigned, saying a French-Canadian in the Conservative
Party "is and always will be a poor relation."

21. This can happen in at least three ways. The first is
a result of federalism and an example, described by
E. R. Black in "Federal Strains Within A Canadian Party",
Dalhousie Review, Vol. 45, 1965, p. 310, was the Progressive
Conservative Party of British Columbia, whose provincial

FOOTNOTE CONTINUED.

leaders were in coalition with a Liberal provincial
government while the national leaders vigorously opposed
a Liberal national government. The second case can be
stated hypothetically, since no researched example comes
to mind. It would occur when prominent members of a
minority party in a province drew their livelihood or
other prerogatives, in whole or in part, from an
association with a government to which their party
presumably was opposed. The third, and most common,
case results from the practice, endemic in parties, of
leaving moribund local organizations in the control of
demonstrated political incompetents, who are proud to
carry the party name but unable to carry it far. Often
their most signal contribution to the party would be to
leave it.

22. op cit., p. 575.

Lowi explicitly limits his analysis to "the American[23]
variant" of party systems. However he adds an obiter
dictum: "To include multiple party systems I would
probably broaden the formulation to 'the minority second
party'."[24] That suggests that party competition is the
decisive source of innovation in the party system, in
Canada as in the United States. While party competition
is an undoubtedly significant factor, the special nature
of Canadian political institutions and the Canadian
national community provide extra incentives for innovation
in and by Canadian parties. In particular, the parliamen-
tary system accentuates the "out" status of the minority
party, thereby creating a mentality more conducive to
innovation; and the weakness of other "nationalizing"
agencies in Canada forces the parties to be more responsive
to pressure's for change than parties need to be in more
integrated communities.

Innovation and the Parliamentary System.

The traditions of the parliamentary system require
Canadian Opposition parties to oppose virtually every
initiative the Government takes. In the United States,

23. by which he presumably means "United States".

24. op cit, p. 571 fn.

while party divisions are plentiful, there is more

cross-party co-operation, and less institutional pressure

on the individual legislator to oppose every measure

introduced by a member of another party. Indeed, the

separation of powers means that the conflict induced by

formal institutions is conflict between branches of

government, whereas in Canada the confinement of conflict

to one institution tends to make conflict partisan.

Moreover, in the United States it is possible, in an

important sense, for both parties to be "in" government

at the same time--one controlling the Presidency, one

the Congress. In such circumstances influential leaders

of both parties, as architects of current national policy,

develop a commitment to that policy and a consequent

suspicion of its critics. Whether or not power corrupts,

it certainly consolidates. In Canada, some members of a

party that is in opposition nationally hold office in a

province; that situation has some equivalents in the

United States. Naturally that establishes some connection

with a status quo and against innovation[25] as, more

powerfully, do other socio-economic influences on parties

or partisans. Nonetheless the exclusion of the minority

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25. It can have the opposite effect. Provincial and
federal wings of the same national party have disagreed
dramatically in Canada, and a successful provincial party
may keep its federal counterpart at arm's length and
therefore uninfected by the assumptions of government.
E. R. Black, op cit, p. 311, describes that condition as
"federal-provincial schizophrenia."

party from authority is an independent influence on

innovation, present in Canada, absent from the United

States. The participation of the United States minority

party in policy-making predisposes that party against

innovation from non-official sources. In Canada, the

institutional influence is the reverse. The minority

Canadian party has nothing to do with official policy

except to oppose it. Except in unusual circumstances,

of strong personal relations, it is denied the free and

frank access to public service collaboration that is

available to minority party leaders in the United States.

It does not become committed to current policy or

assumptions even by the osmosis of friendship nor does

it have the prejudicing burden of "insider" information.[26]

As a matter of practice it is the role of the Opposition

party in Canada to be "against" established policy. That

is more than a stance in Parliament; it becomes a habit

of mind. Instead of consorting with exponents of

existing policy, leaders of Canadian minority parties

tend to talk to its critics. Instead of enlisting their

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26. This exclusion from "official" assumptions is
mitigated somewhat when a national party in Opposition
recruits senior former federal civil servants, as has
been the practice of the Liberal party, or provincial
premiers, as has been the practice of the Progressive
Conservative Party.

intellect in defense of a policy, they direct their

attention to its weaknesses. Such parties, when they

come to power or when they speak frankly about policy[27]

tend not only to be free of many of the assumptions of

existing policy, but to be suspicious of them. Their

attitude, if not innovative, is at least anti-consolidative.

The initiatives of the Diefenbaker government deserve

examination in light of this argument. The critics of

that government argue, correctly, that the oppositionist

cast of mind of Mr. Diefenbaker and some of his principal

colleages and advisors was so strong and persistent that

it became arid and destructive, particularly near the

end. But the Diefenbaker government undoubtedly changed

the country much more than most governments. The

Agriculture Rehabilitation and Development Act, the

emphasis on regional development, the emphasis on social

justice in pensions and medicare, the recognition of

multi-ethnicity and even the invocation of Canadian

identity involved not only a change from existing policy

but a challenge of existing assumptions. What was the

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27. That is the case particularly when such parties speak
outside Parliament or on Opposition days in Parliament.
Regular parliamentary debate is controlled and structured
by the government, who determine the order of presentation
and, now, the duration of debate of legislation. One
consequence is that parliamentary debate tends to focus
on the details of disagreement and leave assumptions
unexamined.

influence of the Opposition experience upon the

inclination to challenge so many ruling governmental

assumptions? Would a minority party in the United States,

having shared power and therefor its assumptions, have

been as inclined to change? Perhaps. Certainly the

program adopted in 1933 by the Democratic Party under

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt reflected important

innovative influences; it was, however, a response to the

deepening crisis of Depression[28] which, late the next

year, broke the pattern of innovation in Canada too,

inspiring an incumbent Prime Minister to turn around his

own administration with the "Bennett New Deal." The

response to the Depression might indicate that, in Canada

as well as in the United States, crisis inspires innovation.

What is suggested here is a different implication that,

in normal times, the experience of a minority party in

parliamentary Opposition has an extra innovative

influence that is independent of the stimulus of crisis.

It would also be worthwhile to consider, in the context of

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28. Charles A. and Mary R. Beard suggest the New Deal was
almost entirely imposed by "financial panic (which)...hit
the country with the force of a cyclone" between Roosevelt's
election and inauguration. They suggest that, while
Roosevelt the campaigner had endorsed specific programs
of relief for farmers, the poor and the unemployed, there
was no commitment to major reform until crisis forced it.
The Beards' New Basic History of the United States,
Doubleday and Co., Inc., Garden City, New York, 1960,
pp. 422-423.

innovation and consolidation, whether the resentment or

surprise of the consolidators at seeing so many of their

cherished assumptions rejected, or at least not honoured,

rushed the defeat of the Diefenbaker government and the

restoration of "normalcy".[29]

The case of the Trudeau government should also be

considered in this light, since it is dominated by a

single mentality to an even greater degree than was the

Diefenbaker government. Such changes of policy the Trudeau

government has sought to introduce--relating principally

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29. So far, there has been only one serious examination
of this theme. George Grant in <u>Lament For A Nation</u>,
McClelland and Stewart, Ltd., 1965, argued (explicitly at
page 8 but throughout) that "behind all the stories of
arrogance and indecision (of Mr. Diefenbaker), there are
conflicts--conflicts over principles. The man had a
conception of Canada that threatened the dominant classes.
This encounter is the central clue to the Diefenbaker
administration." The writer's own conversations with men
who were ministers in the Diefenbaker government suggest
there was sometimes extraordinary opposition, amounting
to obstruction, by senior public servants, when ministers
decided to change policy. Certainly there is some
significance in the fact that the group Mr. Pearson
assembled to oppose and replace the Diefenbaker government
drew so heavily upon former senior public servants.

to external, including military, affairs, the conscious

development of a French Canadian "federal presence", and

the reorganization of Government and Parliament in the

name of "efficiency"[30]--are largely personal preferences

of the Prime Minister, developed before he came to

Parliament and when he considered himself an opponent of

the majority party he now leads. It is to the point to

speculate how much more widely his reforms might have

extended had he been a product of Parliamentary Opposition,

and thereby forced to scrutinize critically all aspects of

Liberal party policy instead of only those which contested

views he had already developed in areas of his personal

interest. The outside critic imported into Government,

whether a Moynihan or a Trudeau, has only his intellect

to illuminate policies needing reform; the Opposition

Parliamentarian has, in addition, his institutional

experience as a required critic of virtually everything.

Balancing this to some degree is the fact that experience

in politics and Parliament, like any experience, applies

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30. This list excludes tax reform, which any government
would have introduced, and the response to inflation and
unemployment, the form of which reflects a narrow
political experiehce.

its own blinkers[31] which may shut out a reality which is

apparent to critics unencumbered by this institutional

involvement.

National Integration and Innovation.

> In a country lacking a strong national
> political culture and the institutions
> fostering it, political parties have a
> special role to play as agencies for
> the creation of national symbols,
> experiences, memories, heroes and villains,
> not to mention national favours, benefits
> and concessions.... An absolutely critical
> latent function of the party system in
> Canada is...the role it plays in the
> development and fostering of a national
> political culture; it must play a vital
> role, in fact, in generating support for
> the regime. So few other institutions
> do so and, in any event, few are as well
> suited for this task as the parties.[32]

We should distinguish between "generating support for the

regime" and forestalling serious attacks upon it. In

Canada the parties do both, but in different ways. They

"generate" support by operating nationwide, advancing

national figures and (whenever possible) national myths,

generally connecting the country. They forestall attack

by seeking out discontent and expressing it within the

system, leaving the aggrieved less cause to seek redress

outside the system. In Canada, no other institution performs

either function as consistently as the parties perform both.

31. "...the (Progressive Conservative) party acted in
government as if it were still in opposition." John Meisel,
"Recent Changes in Canadian Parties", Party Politics in
Canada, 2nd edition, edited by Hugh G. Thorburn, Prentice-
Hall of Canada, 1967, p. 38.

32. Meisel, op cit, p. 34.

Every community, to be effective, must have some
means to remind its inhabitants regularly that they are
part of a community. That is particularly important,
and difficult, in a country that is geographically
large and dissimilar, with scattered population, uneven
economic conditions and more than one active language
and conscious culture. Political parties in any country
generally play some role as informal "nationalizing"
agents. In other democracies, however, the party system
is only one of several agents active in developing a
sense of community--along with some or all of the media,
national economic institutions, national universities
and intelligentsia, a common sense of history, a common
religion, a common language and other unifying forces.
The parties are leading actors only occasionally as, for
example, during elections. Otherwise the parties only
augment the dominant nationalizing role of other dynamic
institutions, or give life to inherently nationalizing
institutions like legislatures or administrations. In
Canada the other nationalizing institutions are weak
relative to their counterparts in other countries;
therefore the parties, which are unique institutions in
being dynamic, decentralized and nationwide, assume an

unusually prominent and persistent role as nationalizing
agents. Quite probably, the national political parties
are the single most important active agent of national
unity and purpose in Canada. In any event, the absence
or incapacity of other normally nationalizing agents
leave Canadian parties with a larger share of that role
than parties in other democracies.

The problem is complicated in Canada by the fact
that many of the agents which in other countries would
perform a nationalizing function perform a regionalizing
function in Canada. The reputation of Canadian "big
business" as being concentrated and interested only in
Toronto and Montreal has contributed significantly to
regional resentments and therefore a feeling of "anti-
national community" in Québec, Western Canada and the
Atlantic region. Virtually all Canadian newspapers are
seriously parochial, some proudly so. With notable
exceptions, the Canadian intellectual community, when it
addresses public problems, is preoccupied with international
questions or, as in Québec, with the assertion of a
particularism which is anti-national in its effect. Much
popular culture is similarly anti-national, reflecting
either continental standards which obscure or frustrate

distinctive Canadian expression, or separatist sentiment
which attacks it. Indeed, one distinctive feature of the
Canadian party system is the frequency and strength of
regional parties, or regional caucuses within national
parties, which foster and feed upon particularist anti-
national feeling. It is, however, significant that the
only regional parties to endure have been those which
won power in a province, as did Social Credit and the
Union Nationale, or consciously rejected a regional
accent, as has the CCF/NDP.

That is because it is in the necessary nature of
parties, as it is not in the necessary nature of other
agencies, to seek the broadest possible active base.
Parties exist to win power--that is their elemental
organizing purpose--and if they are to achieve the goal
of power, and keep it, political parties have to seek
support all the time, in all the country--every region,
culture and occupation. On the other hand, a business
can find profit, an intelligentsia succour, a newspaper
circulation, a public servant security and even challenge,
with a much more specific clientele. Even if these other
agencies have the capacity to be "national" they lack the
incentive the parties have.

It must be added that the parties themselves do
not always feel or respond to that incentive. When one
party is firmly established, and its opponents are
scattered or weak, the majority party tends to become
indifferent to particular grievances and the minority
parties find themselves, or are found, ineffective. In
the long-run, once-established parties have been brought
down as a consequence of grievances which, while they
might have been articulated badly at their origin,
accumulated against the Government party.[33] Imbalance
has contained the seeds of its own correction, insofar
as party alternation is concerned.[34] That is rather
like acclaiming an operation to remove a lung by saying
that the surgeon's cut has healed. The important test
is the health of the organism, its capacity to continue.
The removal of a lung is a doctor's last resort; he
would prefer to diagnose the disease earlier and stop
it immediately, because the later operation, while it
may prolong life, nonetheless leaves the organism
weakened. Persons concerned to improve or recast the

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33. That seems to have been the case in New Brunswick
in 1952 and 1970, Nova Scotia in 1956 and 1970, Canada
in 1970.

34. That may change according to observers including
Professor Meisel, (op cit, p. 36) who argue that enough
groups with grievances are going around the parties that
they are marking out an alternative path.

Canadian party system must recognize that the present
system too often diagnoses too late, or is satisfied
too easily that the wounds seem healed though the
organism is weakened. However, the point this paper
seeks to emphasise is that, however imperfectly the
parties function, they are the only agencies which have
it in their nature to seek out dis-ease in every part of
the Canadian political system and to propose responses
which would keep the system whole.

Innovation is the other side of the coin of that
function. While some partisans innovate out of conviction,
parties innovate out of necessity. As the medical
profession would be nothing without illness, the
political parties would be nothing without grievances.
They need grievances to grow and perform best when they
seek and express instances of neglect and injustice and
proposals for improvement. The parties seldom originate
either the grievances or the reform--innovation is not
invention; their function is to carry grievance or
reform from its source into the system. In Canada, where
no other agency consistently shares that function and
where the system is too fragile to survive ruptures of
serious grievance, the innovative role of the party is
particularly critical.

Misleading Foreign Models.

That characteristic has not been emphasised adequately by students of Canadian politics. Indeed, that reality has been obscured by the inclination to apply foreign models and descriptions to the Canadian party system. For example, the term "brokerage" might describe the function of the national parties in the United States, but that is a society with a remarkable and unusual tradition of self-assertion which encourages the statement of grievances, and a national perspective which causes the aggrieved to seek their response from Washington. It is far too passive a description of the Canadian process where national parties, when they function as parties, must go out and dig up the issues, or at least strive to identify them as deserving a national response. And the "missionary" of the "missionary" party is a Mormon, not a Jesuit; Canadian theology encompasses living with pagans. The application to Canada of the continental European distinction between "mass" and "cadre" parties is even more misleading.[35] Among other effects, it has drawn attention away from distinctive attributes of the Canadian party system which make that system unusually innovative.

FOOTNOTE

35. Professors F. C. Engelmann and Mildred A. Schwartz
employ the "mass-cadre" distinction explicitly and
carefully in <u>Political Parties and the Canadian Social
Structure</u>, Prentice-Hall of Canada Limited, 1967, pp. 133-136.
The distinction as they use it is based on (a) a
difference in source of funds, by which one type of
party is said to rely almost exclusively upon membership
contributions while the other also has significant
contributions from other sources; (b) a difference in
the role of party members, in which one type of party
is said to generate and rely upon the extensive personal
participation of members while the other relies upon
professionals and party bureaucrats; and (c) the stated
commitment of the CCF, Social Credit, Progressive and
farmer parties to principles of mass or direct democracy.
     To take each basis in turn: (a) Sources of party
finance continue to be an area of mystery in Canadian
politics. Collectors for the major parties insist on
secrecy and critics of the major parties assume, or at
least argue, that anything secret must be both improper
and remunerative. There has been very little evidence of
impropriety, despite diligent inquiry, and, in the
experience of the writer, no evidence at all that this
secret system pays. The Progressive Conservative Party,
at least, lives in the red. By the same token, the NDP
and Social Credit have long since abandoned an exclusive
reliance upon voluntary contributions by members. The
only factors which keep this "distinction" alive are the
stubborn insistence on secrecy of major party collectors,
and the suspicions or propaganda of their critics. (b)
While all Canadian parties rely heavily on professionals
there is no doubt that parties claimed to be of the "mass"
type have been successful more consistently in mobilizing
their supporters. That is more likely a function of
campaign style than of party type. What excites member-
ship activity is the prospect of change not the nature of
party organization. The index of membership activity was
probably as high in the Progressive Conservative party of
1958 and the Liberal party of 1968 as it was in the
Saskatchewan CCF of 1944 or Social Credit in Alberta in 1935.
Parties described as being of the "mass" type maintain a
relatively high index because they state their electoral
goals more dramatically and achieve them more rarely than
other parties. Apart from that, in an era when professionals
are in every party headquarters and democracy is in every

Non-parliamentary influences in Canadian parties

have been strong since before Confederation; individuals

and factors outside parliament have been consistently

influential upon all Canadian parties, whatever their

particular origin or ideology. All Canadian national.

parties are "cadre" in that the influence of their

parliamentary members and permanent employees occurs

more frequently than the influence of groups or indivi-

duals for whom the party is not a full-time occupation;

and all national parties are "mass membership" to the

important degree that significant influences come

regularly and transforming influences come occasionally

from sources associated with the party but outside its

FOOTNOTE CONTINUED

party constitution, there is no significant distinction
in the relative roles of members. (c) The stated
commitment continues, and continues to beguile.
    Professors Engelmann and Schwartz admit that "mass-
party reality has suffered" (p. 136). The competitive
Canadian parties are structurally much the same, despite
different origins and advertisements.

parliamentary or staff personnel.[36]

The country is federal in law, which means that as many as ten other caucuses can intrude on the authority of the federal parliamentary caucus to act in the name of the party. That leaves aside the question of the authority, in theory and in fact, of defeated candidates, elected officers and other non-parliamentary officials of Canadian national parties who, as a class, show much less of the "deference" to leadership which Robert McKenzie describes as a source of power of parliamentary leadership in Britain.[37]

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36. The most dramatic recent example of a transforming influence was the decision of the annual meeting of the Progressive Conservative Association of Canada in 1966 to hold a leadership convention despite the evident reluctance of the incumbent to resign. As significant has been the persistent influence of groups which contest an official party position and draw their support if not their leadership from outside caucus--eg. the groups associated with Walter Gordon, Dalton Camp and Melville Watkins in the Liberal, Progressive Conservative and NDP parties respectively. When politics is competitive, parties in Canada are remarkably open. Witness the rise of Mr. Trudeau, the introduction of critical path planning into the office of the Premier of Alberta, the ability of Mrs. Walker-Sawka to contest the national leadership of the Progressive Conservative party, the ease with which anyone with a thousand friends can secure the federal or provincial nomination of a major party. There are not the characteristics of a closed system or a "cadre" party. They deserve more attention.

37. Robert McKenzie, British Political Parties, Heineman Group of Publishers, London, 1963, p. 638.

The country is also federal in fact which means
that a much broader variety of interests must be served,
and be seen to be served, than in a more homogenous
community. In a pluralist country like Canada, with a
small Parliament and an electoral system generally
weighted against minorities, parties would wither if,
they listened only to their parliamentary caucus or
the loyal constellations around caucus;[38] in fact, they
have remained dynamic by extending consistently beyond
the caucus.

All national parties have been most successful in
holding or seeking power when they have appeared to be
most broadly based, and least successful when they have
withdrawn to their "cadre". Of the ten national leaders
chosen by the three present national parties in the last
three decades, only Mr. Meighen, Mr. Coldwell and
Mr. Diefenbaker came principally from the parliamentary
caucus. The three most recent Liberal Prime Ministers
have all been drawn, more or less directly, from outside
the long-established leadership "cadre" of the Liberal
party, if not from outside the party itself.[39] During

38. Dalton Camp describes the gathering of limited
counsel in chapter 11 of Gentlemen, Players and Politicians,
McClelland and Stewart Ltd., Toronto, 1970.

39. All of them served a period of apprenticeship, but
with exalted status, and the persuasive epaulets were won
by Mr. St. Laurent at the bar and in the province of Quebec,
by Mr. Pearson in international public service and
Mr. Trudeau at Cite Libre and in the academy.
MacKenzie King, as someone said, was sui generis.

the last five decades the three prairie provinces have
been governed by parties which began as "mass movements"
and maintained the legitimacy of at least the idea of
"direct democracy" by continuing to describe themselves
as movements not parties;[40] in fact all the provinces
outside the Atlantic region have been governed in their
short history by parties which conceived, or advertised,
themselves as rising "from the people".[41] Open national
convention, not a "magic circle" has been the means
since 1919 of selecting the national leader of the most
successful national party, and since 1927 of its major
competitor, and there is no evidence that these conven-
tions have been bossed in the manner of United States
presidential nominating conventions.[42] There have been
bitter quarrels and frequent periods of coolness[43]

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40. In Alberta since 1921, the United Farmers of Alberta
and Social Credit; in Saskatchewan from 1944 to 1964, the
CCF; in Manitoba from 1922 to 1959, the Progressives and
Liberal-Progressives, and now the NDP.

41. The United Farmers of Ontario governed Ontario from
1919 to 1923. The Union Nationale was markedly populist
in its origins.

42. See Donald Smiley, "The National Party Leadership
Conventions in Canada: A Preliminary Analysis", reprinted
in The Canadian Political Process, Holt Rinehart and
Winston of Canada Limited, 1970, edited by Orest Kruhlak,
Richard Schultz and Sidney Pobihushchy.

43. See E. R. Black, "Federal Strains" etc., op cit.

between national and provincial leaders of the same

party, and these differences are of more significance

than in a federation with more parts; a provincial

premier or leader has more authority as one of ten than

he would as one of, say, fifty-one.

This is not the occasion to make the case that

Canadian national parties in fact have not been con-

trolled by a powerful parliamentary group, and do not

fit the "cadre" party model. However, the above

phenomena are prima facie evidence that Canadian

national parties, as a type, are characteristically more

open and responsive than "cadre" parties; that is a

characteristic of all Canadian national parties and of

the Canadian party system. The parliamentary party, as

the only element professionally in national affairs, has

taken most of the decisions in the case of every party;

that is not as significant, however, as the fact that,

on matters perceived to be important, the authority of

the caucus, and the authority of the cadre when they are

different, is always assailable, often successfully. The

people who challenge the caucus or cadre sometimes possess

their own prominence in the party, either as officials

or personalities. However, research would almost

certainly yield evidence of important challenges by people

previously anonymous in the party. Certainly there

have been several cases where the challenge has been

sustained only by the support of people without party

office or reputation.[44] By itself, that reveals a

disposition to challenge, an assumption that the

established leadership can be both accessible and wrong.

The strength of extra-parliamentary groups in every

party is so established now in Canada that no parliamen-

tary party can be confident it will prevail in a contest.

No leadership can assume it can command support. That is

significant not simply as a means of distinguishing the

Canadian party system, but because that greater openness

and responsiveness condition Canadian national parties

to welcome innovation.

Professor Donald Smiley has suggested two more

serviceable adjectives to distinguish between the two

major types of party operating in Canada: an "inclusive"

party seeks support everywhere; an "exclusive" party is

more particular.[45] Obviously "inclusion" is not

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44. For example, the "reassessment" of the leadership of
the Progressive Conservative Party of 1966, the rejection
of cabinet policy on welfare reform and foreign investment
by the Liberal party conference of 1970, the "Waffle".

45. Donald Smiley "Consensus, Conflict and the Canadian
Party System", Canadian Forum, v. 40, January 1961,
pp. 223-224.

synonomous with innovation. There are kinds of inclusion—
such as co-optation, where groups are adopted but their
goals are abandoned—which are anti-innovative. A good
example of consolidative inclusion was the practice of
both major Canadian parties, for as long as it worked,
of including French Canadians in high government office
as a means to avoid responding to the country's cultural
duality. To a degree, however, the very act of looking
for conflicts and constituencies to "include" is innova-
tive, because it forces an awareness of unfamiliar reality;
in addition, once co-optation has occurred, the co-opted
can change the nature of the party. Anywhere there is
competition among inclusive parties, the constituent
being wooed has leverage in demanding a change and
resisting co-optation.

However, with "exclusion" and "inclusion" Professor
Smiley is making the traditional sort of distinction
which, read in terms of result rather than motive, is
between parties of victory and parties of defeat. He notes:

> With few lapses, the successful leaders
> of our major parties have striven for
> tolerance and compromise when more
> "righteous" men (Brown, Bourassa,
> Meighen, Woodsworth) have tried to
> stimulate the divisive forces among us.[46]

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46. Ibid., p. 224.

So the "exclusive" party could as well be called "the
party which doesn't work". Perhaps if we must borrow
foreign terms, we could call it the Edsel. The important
question is whether the "exclusive" parties function to
create a system which doesn't work. The current conven-
tional wisdom is that multi-partyism is natural to the
Canadian system, and is the only way to ensure representa-
tion of diversity. The conventional argument also runs
that the CCF, for example, by its devotion to its mission,
"forced" the adoption of goals that would otherwise have
been ignored. In practice, that is not an argument but
a canon, and deserves as much skeptical examination as
any other article of faith.[47] Is it in fact aimless to
speculate whether Mackenzie King might have been just as
progressive without J. S. Woodsworth? How much more
progressive might King have been had Woodsworth sat
beside him in his cabinet, as an insistent colleague
rather than an untrusted adversary. How much more res-
ponsive might the Government of Canada have been in the
1940s and 1950s had the CCF not split the vote against
Mackenzie King? It is conventionally argued that the

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47. There is a disturbing odour of self-justification
about arguments that the multi-party model is natural and
necessary in Canada. It is true that a multiplicity of
parties has happened; it is far from certain whether this
multiplicity has helped improve either politics or
government, or whether it would survive without the
defamation of the major parties by conventional and
popular "authorities".

CCF brought conscience into politics, and thereby made morality irresistible. It can be argued, from the same facts, that by associating "conscience" with a permanent minority, the CCF made morality irrelevant. Indeed, anyone familiar with partisans knows that the surest way to give a good idea a bad name is to have it advocated by an opponent. It is not at all fanciful to suggest that the wearing of Charity like a banner by the CCF made the government more mean. At the least, the enemies of reform could disarm advocates of reform by accusing them of sympathy with socialism. If one accepts the possibility that the CCF, and the multi-party model, have made a negative contribution to the Canadian system, there is one other dimension to examine, the consequences of splitting the vote against the Government. Only in the general election of 1940 did the King-St. Laurent party win more than 50% of the popular vote. If most of the CCF and Social Credit vote was anyway anti-Liberal (and it probably wasn't) the third parties perpetuated Mackenzie King.[48] The matter is raised only because academic fealty to the multi-party model needs to be shaken before there can be a proper appreciation of the role and frequency of innovation in competitive major national parties.

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48. There was considerable assistance from the Progressive Conservatives of course, but that party might have become more progressive and competitive had it been the only beneficiary of grievances against the Liberals.

Innovation Within Parties

Before parties can propose innovations in the larger system, they often must approve them internally. As institutions, parties are probably more amenable to innovation than most organizations. They are open by nature. Samuel Eldersveld, after his study of parties in Michigan, argues that parties are "potential-clientele-conscious". At their base they are usually looking for recruits. And they are open to new people or proposals "at the higher levels also, indeed sometimes at the elite apex, if such a strategy will profit the party's power aspirations."[49] Innovation is a marginal concern of organizations with a limited clientele. It is the central concern of organizations, like parties, which must grow to survive; minority parties must grow to become majorities, and majority parties must grow to counter that attrition of support bases usually associated with holding office.

Just as the nature of the party role causes leaders to seek innovation, the nature of party membership probably makes party workers more inclined to accept innovation than are members of other organizations. For one thing, the party worker tends to share the party

49. Samuel Eldersveld, _Political Parties; A Behavioral Analysis_, Rand, McNally and Co., Chicago, 1964, p. 5.

leader's interest in victory, and to approve changes
which seem directed towards that goal. As significant
as this positive encouragement of innovation is a
negative factor. Most partisans belong to other groups
more salient or important to them than their party.
James Q. Wilson has hypothesised that a "voluntary
organization with broad diffuse goals (typically
associated with relatively low salience) will adapt more
readily to environmental changes than will organizations
with narrow, precisely stated goals (typically associated
with high salience)."[50] Partisans will accept quite
major changes without much fuss because, in effect, they
don't care enough to complain; besides, it might help
defeat their opponents.[51] This hypothesis, if true, does
of course raise important questions about the capacity for
innovation of a party of "principles" where salience to
members is probably higher and responsiveness or adapta-
tion consequently more difficult.

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50. James Q. Wilson, "Innovation in Organization: Notes
Towards a Theory", Approaches to Organizational Design,
James D. Thompson, (ed.), University of Pittsburgh Press,
Pittsburgh, 1966, p. 210.

51. One remembers how few Progressive Conservatives
became incensed when Mr. Diefenbaker grew suspicious
of nuclear weapons, and how few Liberals when Mr. Pearson
became fond of them.

Just as there are obstacles to innovation in the larger system, usually located in the institutions served or shaped by the status quo, so are there obstacles within the parties, often among their most institutionalized elements, including the parliamentary caucus. As argued above, a party will not be innovative when it thinks it does not have to be, or cannot afford to be, or when some of its influential members don't want to win. Generally, resistance to innovation is deliberate, not accidental. Eldersveld's study, among others, shows us that a party is not a monolith but a coalition of different people with different goals. Generally, although not always, they share the goal of wanting victory; even then there is a tension between that common goal and diverse competing goals of individual advantage, influence or ideology. Usually those conflicts can be resolved; politicians tend to be flexible because their work is conciliation and bargaining, although regionalism and ideology in Canada are factors which sometimes encourage inflexibility in some partisans. Even though they are flexible, politicians, like most people, react suspiciously towards anything that seems a personal threat, whether to their interests or values or those of their constituents. By its nature,

innovation often does seem such a threat, and so does

the source of innovation. The source of innovation is

a particular problem for Members of Parliament who tend

to regard the proposal of party policy as an exclusive

domain of those party members who have to defend what

is proposed in Parliament or before the press or

constituents. Reluctant to cede any part of that role

to any other group, the initial inclination of Members

of Parliament is sometimes to reject proposals which

arise outside their ranks. Occasionally, since caucuses,

like all groups, have factions, their first inclination

is also to reject proposals of certain of their colleagues.

Very often creative members of a party--even if they have

managed to win public election--come to be regarded as

eccentric by their colleagues. The people best able to

propose innovation are often those least able to

legitimize it. In the larger society, that legitimizing

function can be performed by the parties, which are

regarded as familiar, if not safe, by most of the elements

suspicious of change.[52] The process of legitimizing

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52. "Voters tend simply to follow their respective
parties on policy positions as on other matters."
Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies,
p. 272. As significantly, when parties don't embody
objections to change those objections have rarely been
influential.

innovative proposals within the party may well be more

difficult; although the parties, as competitive bodies

seeking power, have an incentive to welcome change

which the larger society generally does not.

Innovation in the Larger System.

The "legitimizing" role is the major contribution

of parties to the process of innovation in the larger

society. As argued previously, parties occupy a busy

isthmus, connecting the formal institutions with the

mass of interests and individuals seeking attention.

The parties have an obvious capacity to transmit a demand

from the public directly to the center of an institution,

and they have a constant incentive to use that capacity.

Within the public, they enjoy a semi-institutional

status, related directly to their capacity to get action

on a demand more quickly than any other agent. It has

been argued that there is a decline in the importance of

the party in this process. Professor John Meisel has

written:

> (Canadian party) policies have become
> extremely bland, so as to antagonize the
> smallest possible number of people... not
> only in the traditionally center parties
> but even among most of the more ideologi-
> cally inclined and more extreme parties.
> As a result the task of formulating new
> ideas, creating institutional "homes" for
> their development and propagation is no
> longer being performed by the parties on

> the same scale as before. Innova-
> tion, in this sense, has become
> the business not even of minor
> parties but of youth groups,
> temporary ideological groups
> emerging in response to parti-
> cular crisis, or pressure groups
> pursuing a particular interest.
> To the extent, therefore, that
> parties have formerly played an
> important role in the process of
> innovation, their role is being
> taken over by less partisan and
> often less permanent bodies.[53]

Whatever the consequences for the parties and the

system of a movement away from ideology or towards

timidity, it has not diminished, and certainly need

not diminish, the role of the party as a legitimizer

of innovation. Certainly other agencies exist, more

plentifully than before. But their influence upon

innovation is that they originate or popularize

proposals for change; the part of social innovation

which requires formal adaptation--the vital second

stage of innovation--still relies heavily upon the

public service and the parties, which are unique in

the permanence and nature of their connection with the

institutions capable of authorizing adaptation.

Parties have rarely been the original source of

proposals for change, or even of the pioneer pressures

to change; those have almost always come from outside

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53. Meisel, op cit, p. 36.

the parties, and the party role arose after invention

had been done and attention had been won. The processes

Professor Meisel notes are no doubt in train. Some of

these new bodies may well develop a more-or-less

formal capacity to force or channel adaptation; and

all no doubt have some influence upon public opinion,

and thus an indirect and informal influence on change.

But it is premature to suggest that they have

supplanted the role of the parties in achieving

adaptation in the political system. The increased cry

for change, rather than diminishing the role of the

party as innovator, can as easily increase it; the

party can achieve changes which "less partisan and

often less permanent bodies" can only propose, and the

parties are under the pressure of knowing that if they

fail, without a substitute succeeding, the regime is

endangered.

The Policy Conference Focus.

This study is especially concerned to consider one

means by which innovation becomes effective within

major Canadian national parties. The ideal means is

to have an innovator as leader since the Canadian

party leader possesses an institutional authority far

stronger than that of any other individual or

formal position in the party. While national

party leaders in Canada have been innovators far

more often than not, they can turn their authority

against innovation. Other sources are necessary,

to augment the influence upon innovation of the

leader in good times, to oppose it in bad. In

practice, these other sources range from the habit

of all parties to describe their own past as uniquely

innovative through to dramatic ministerial resignation

or insurrection. The greatest incidence of innovation

is probably achieved by party professionals, whether

oriented to policy or organization, who virtually

constantly urge or cause the party to move to meet new

opportunities; whether innovation from this source is

as significant as it is frequent is an important

question too large for this paper to pursue. The

focus here is upon the phenomenon of party policy

conferences, which have been undertaken by both the

Liberal and Progressive Conservative Parties precisely

to perform an innovative function, and which have no

counterpart in any other party system. Policy

conferences do not necessarily have more weight as

innovators than other agents. The conference

phenomenon is chosen solely because it is a concrete
and convehient example of the innovative function in
the parties and, through the parties, in society.

Theoretically, policy conferences can be sources
of innovation in a party in five ways. (1) The most
direct would be for a conference to actually propose
a specific new policy or change in policy in terms
which the party could not ignore. (2) A second would
be to turn public and party attention upon innovative
people or points of view which had existed within the
party but without adequate publicity. The role of the
conference in such circumstances would be to strengthen
the position of existing innovators inside the party.
(3) A third would be to focus party and public
attention upon innovative people or points of view
which had developed outside the party. In such
circumstances, the policy conference would be a bridge
by which an issue would cross into a part of the system
where authoritative responses are formed. (4) By
bringing together individuals from such different
realms as a parliamentary caucus and a University
faculty, for example, a policy conference could
encourage co-operation and understanding which would

be innovative subsequently. (5) Finally, a policy
conference could serve as a sign of open-ness which
could attract to party activity individuals whose
experience or personality would make them innovators
as partisans. As will be indicated, conferences in
fact innovate in all five ways.

CHAPTER FOUR:

ORGANIZATION OF THE CONFERENCES

This chapter will examine the organization of

five policy conferences, those held by a group of

Conservatives at Port Hope in 1942, by the National

Liberal Federation at Kingston in 1960, and by the

Progressive Conservative Association at Fredericton

in 1964, Montmorency in 1967 and Niagara Falls in 1969.

Each conference was an extraordinary function of the

sponsoring party and each was dedicated exclusively

to the consideration of national policy.

While they can be considered together, as policy

conferences, each of the five meetings had significant

distinctive characteristics. This study will consider

only those differences which related to innovation.

Clearly the conferences deserve more extensive treatment.

Each, in its way, travelled uncharted ground and, taken,

together, they are a Canadian phenomenon, without root

or counterpart in the United States federation or

British parliamentary democracy. Regrettably, such

full treatment is beyond the compass of this study

which seeks only to illuminate the relation between

the conferences and innovation in the sponsoring party.

The descriptions below will emphasise the organization

of each conference.

1942: Port Hope.

The conference at Port Hope, Ontario, September 5
to 7, 1942 was described as "A Round Table on Canadian
Policy Convened by a Group of Conservatives."[54] It was
attended by 159 persons from all provinces, except
Prince Edward Island, although more than half the
delegates were from Ontario.[55] While most of those
attending were known supporters of the Conservative
party, there was a deliberate[56] and successful attempt
to ensure the participation of representatives of

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54. Major sources concerning Port Hope: Partial records
of the Port Hope conference, including a list of partici-
pants, are in the library of the Progressive Conservative
National Headquarters in Ottawa. In addition, ·
Hon. J. M. Macdonnell, a moving spirit in the conference
as in so much of the positive work of his party, wrote
"Amateurs in Politics" The Queens Quarterly, volume 49,
1964, pp. 385-393. Hon. Richard A. Bell prepared a
private memorandum "A Review of the 1942 Port Hope
Conference" for the party library. There is also useful·
reference to the conference in Arthur Meighen: No ·
Surrender, volume three of the biography by Roger Graham,
Clarke Irwin and Co., Ltd., 1965 and The Politics of
Survival, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1967 by
J. L. Granatstein. Valuable additional information was
provided this writer in correspondence from Hon.
Donald M. Fleming and Hon. Richard A. Bell. As well as
providing factual information otherwise unavailable,
these gentlemen provided a sense of the atmosphere in
which the Port Hope Conference was called and held.

55. That was due to the cost of travel, which was borne
by each participant, and to the restrictions of wartime.
Mr. Bell has reminded the writer that airlines were
unavailable for domestic travel and that "travel at that
time at all...could only be for essential purposes."

56. "...if we are able, as we hope, to gather together
say 150 men and women from across Canada, some of whom
will have been active party workers in the past.

agriculture, labour and the universities. There was

also a deliberate involvement of younger people and

others chosen with a view to future rather than past

service to the party.[57] Most notably, it was decided

by the committee planning the conference[58] that the

presence of Conservative Members of Parliament or of

the legislatures might give the impression that

conference conclusions were official party policy,[59]

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and other men and women who are now for the first time
taking an interest in politics...including among them
leaders in agriculture and labour organizations...it
will be a signal...that the Conservative Party stands
for something that commands the allegiance of a wide
diversity of people." Memorandum Covering the Aims of
the Port Hope Meeting, September 1, 1942, by
R. K. Finlayson, corresponding secretary, page 2.

57. Finlayson, Memorandum, op cit.

58. A representative national committee was struck
comprising H. R. Milner from Alberta, R. H. Tupper
from British Columbia, L. D. H. Baxter from Manitoba,
Hugh Mackay from New Brunswick, J. M. Macdonnell from
Ontario, W. Chester S. McClure from Prince Edward Island,
J. C. H. Dussault from Quebec and Arthur Moxon from
Saskatchewan, with R. K. Finlayson as organizer and
secretary. Mr. Finlayson had been private secretary to
Rt. Hon. R. B. Bennett and had helped write the speeches
proposing the Bennett New Deal. In fact, most of the
decisions were taken by a working committee, based in
Toronto, headed by Macdonnell, and consisting of
Macdonnell, Finlayson, Donald Fleming, Roland Michener,
Dana Porter, David J. Walker and, later, Cecil Frost and
Fred Gardiner. The working committee members were
identified by Mr. Fleming, in correspondence.

59. That was the official reason for excluding MPs.
Another reason is suggested in a letter of August 28, 1942,

or otherwise inhibit the discussion. Only one senator[60],
one member of a provincial legislature[61], and no Members
of Parliament attended. Many of the delegates were
prominent in party and public affairs in the various

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from Cecil Frost to George White, MP: "I am informed
that none of the Dominion or Provincial members are
being asked for the reason that although the convenors
were most anxious to have the younger members, they were
afraid to ask everyone."

60. Senator G. B. Jones, of New Brunswick, apparently
invited because it was virtually inconceivable to
New Brunswick Conservatives to hold any kind of conference
without him. Mr. Bell describes the late Senator Jones
as "the most politically-minded character I ever met."
which, from that source, is fortissimo praise.

61. G. S. Thorvaldson, then MLA, of Winnipeg, was a
confidante of both Rod Finlayson and Dr. Sidney Smith,
then president of the University of Manitoba, who
prepared the final conference report. There is also
some indication that a second conference planning
committee was established in Winnipeg, connecting
through Finlayson with the Toronto group. The
writer has been unable to verify this possibility,
but if such a group existed, Thorvaldson would have
been active in it.

provinces, and several subsequently became members of legislatures, Parliament, cabinet and other public bodies.

The conference occurred at a time when the Conservative party seemed as near to extinction as it ever has. The federal election of 1940 had been decisively lost. The only Conservative elected from a French-Canadian constituency in that election had quit the party to sit as an independent.[62] The Conservative party did not hold office in a single province. The Right Honourable Arthur Meighen had been defeated in his attempt to return to Parliament, in the by-election in South York. The uncertainty over the leadership and the virtual veto power of "traditionalists" in caucus and around Mr. Meighen immobilized reform elements in the parliamentary caucus.[63] The CCF, which had won the federal seat of South York was confident it would subsequently form

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62. J. S. Roy, of Gaspe, said in Parliament a French Canadian in the Conservative party "...is at best a tolerated stranger...he is and always will be a poor relation." Quoted in Granatstein, op cit, p. 88.

63. Members of caucus knew "the Conservative party had to be reorganized and provided with new policies... (but) Meighen could control caucus and block or delay its attempts to draft new policies." Granatstein, op cit, p. 125.

the government of Ontario and become the principal

alternative to the federal Liberal party of

Mackenzie King. It was this very bleak prospect for

the Conservative party which caused the Port Hope

Conference to be called. A small group of private

though prominent Toronto Conservatives[64] decided that

some extraordinary measure was required to invigorate

the party.[65] Since Port Hope was the seminal conference,

it is worth inquiring why practical political men,

facing crisis in their party, would choose a policy

conference, and not some other instrument, as their

means of response. In the view of the Honourable

R. A. Bell

> ...Jim Macdonnell and the others...
> believed that the survival of the Party
> depended upon the enunciation of dis-
> tinctive policies. The cult of leadership
> had been tried and found wanting. As well
> there was the natural revulsion during the
> war period to pinning the hopes of people
> upon leadership. Hitler and Mussolini
> were the reasons that we were fighting
> a war. If a political party was to

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64. Macdonnell, Fleming, Michener, Porter and Walker.
They became, respectively, a privy councillor and perhaps
the most respected parliamentary Conservative of his day;
the minister of finance and of justice for Canada and
twice a candidate for the national leadership of his
party; a Member of Parliament and Governor General; an
MPP, Cabinet Minister and Chief Justice of Ontario;
minister of public works for Canada and a member of the
Senate.

65. "...the Party was in a state of decline following
the shock of the crushing defeat of Arthur Meighen...

survive it must survive by reason of its
ideas and its philosophy... It must be
remembered that (Macdonnell) had tried
another technique of restoring the Party,
namely of holding private meetings of
financial groups in Montreal and Toronto
in the previous year and a few dollars
had been raised but little else
accomplished...there was an upsurge at
this particular period of belief in
political philosophy as a melding force.
The philosophies of communism and socialism
were on the upgrade, internationally and
domestically, and the belief clearly was
that there ought to be enunciated a
genuine philosophy of individual enter-
prise. On this basis it seemed that the
only type of project which could be
chosen would be a conference related
primarily to policy and one which sprang
from the reasonably intelligent rank and
file rather than from the leaders.[66]

J. M. Macdonnell discussed the proposal with

R. B. Hanson, the parliamentary house leader, and a

group in Winnipeg as well as Toronto.[67] Only when the

national committee was being established, and after the

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in February, 1942... Throughout the balance of the
winter and the spring of 1942 we held regular weekly
meetings, thinking through both questions of policy and
matters relating to the future of the Party. We came
to the conclusion that the survival of the Party was at
stake. Gradually the idea took root that a National
Conference was required..." Hon. Donald M. Fleming,
correspondence with the writer.

66. Correspondence with the writer.

67. According to Granatstein, who interviewed Macdonnell,
Macdonnell met in Winnipeg with Finlayson, E. G. Phipps
Baker, Dr. Sidney Smith, G. S. Thorvaldson, all of
Winnipeg, and H. R. Milner of Edmonton. Politics of
Survival, op cit, p. 127.

decision had been firmly taken to organize a policy
conference, was the matter raised with the party
leader. Mr. Meighen agreed not to oppose the conference.[68]
While the conference at no time claimed to speak for
the party,[69] a memorandum to delegates expressed the
expectation that the conference would "enunciate
principles which will make clear to the public that
those attending...are fully conscious of the problems
of the world of 1942 and are prepared to meet them."[70]

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68. Mr. Meighen wrote that Macdonnell "informed me
only after some Al'men refused to take part unless it
had my approval. I told him simply that I would raise
no objection." Letter to T. R. Meighen, September 12,
1942, T. R. Meighen Papers, quoted in Graham, No
Surrender, p. 140.

69. The foreword of the Report of the Round Table on
Canadian Policy read: "This is not a platform. It is
a statement of the aims and beliefs subscribed to by a
group of Conservatives from coast to coast in unofficial
conference at Port Hope...in an effort to formulate a
present-day political philosophy in terms of modern
needs and the best traditions of the Conservative Party;
we accordingly recognize that we do not speak for the
Party in any official sense." A copy of this document
is in the library of Progressive Conservative National
Headquarters.

70. Finlayson, Memorandum, op cit.

1960: Kingston.

The Kingston Conference of the Liberal Party was
~~ld~~ September 6 - 12, 1960 at Queen's University,
Kingston, Ontario.[71]   Described as a "study conference"
directed to Canadians who were liberal in aspiration
if not necessarily in party affiliation,[72] it was
organized at the request of the party leader, the
Honourable Lester B. Pearson, by a committee under the
chairmanship of Mitchell Sharp. Mr. Sharp had been an
influential senior federal public servant under Liberal
governments prior to his resignation after the election
of 1958 and, in 1960, was vice-president of a major
international corporation operating out of Toronto.
Prior to his agreement to chair the Kingston Conference
committee he had not been identified publicly as a
supporter of any political party. His "sponsoring
committee" included persons active in universities, the
professions, publishing and business. None of the

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71. Major sources concerning Kingston: Correspondence
from the Right Hon. Lester B. Pearson and the Hon.
Walter L. Gordon provided very helpful answers to
questions raised by the writer. In addition the book,
The Pearson Phenomenon, Duell, New York, 1964, by
John Beal and Jean Marc Poliquin contains some useful
references. Although the writer did not have the
advantage of partisan association with the principals
of this conference, as was the case with the others
considered, their response to questions was full and
apparently unreserved.

72. "We were anxious that the Conference not be
exclusively partisan, with invitations restricted to

committee came from caucus, and none had held

influential public position in the party when it

formed a government. Some were identifiable as

supporters of the Liberal Party but others had no

previous party identification.[73] Like the Port Hope

Conference, Kingston was neither asked for nor

authorized by the National Liberal Federation and

officers of the National Federation played as inciden-

tal a role in its organization as did officials of

caucus. However the national leader, Mr. Pearson,

involved himself actively in the Conference preparation.

He chose the members of the "sponsoring committee" and,

in conjunction with that committee, decided discussion

topics, speakers and the selection of conference

participants.[74] Participation was by invitation only

members or supporters of the Party. This, among other
things, would allow us to get viewpoints and ideas which
were not influenced by partisan considerations."
Mr. Pearson, to the writer, January 25, 1971.

73. Members of the "sponsoring committee" were:
Geoffrey Andrew, Vancouver; Frank Covert, Halifax;
Clifford Curtis, Kingston; Davidson Dunton, Ottawa;
H. A. Dyde, Edmonton; Jean-Charles Falardeau, Quebec;
Robert Fowler, Montreal; Walter Gordon, Toronto;
William Kilbourn, Hamilton; Michael Mackenzie, Toronto
(deputy chairman); William F. McLean, Toronto;
Jean-Marie Nadeau, Montreal; Hilda Neatby, Saskatoon;
Mitchell Sharp, Toronto (chairman); Victor Sifton,
Winnipeg; Renauld St. Laurent, Quebec.

74. Mr. Gordon, correspondence with the writer.

and invitations were issued after consideration of

particular party or regional factors. No formula

of representation was followed. While there was an

effort to attract university and labour leaders, the

conference was not designed specifically to attract

or represent any particular segment of the community.

"The main objective was to select people with ideas."[75]

·Some of the speakers were known to be supporters of

other parties[76] and some of the participants subse-

quently became prominent in another party.[77] The

Conference was also the first occasion for public

association with the Liberal Party of several of its

subsequent leaders.[78] Of the formal speakers, only

Mr. Pearson, the Hon. J. W. Pickersgill and

Maurice Lamontagne[79] had been formally associated

with the previous Liberal government.

Three years before Kingston, the Liberal Party had

been defeated, for the first time in 22 years, in an

75. Mr. Gordon.

76. Professor Frank Underhill, for example.

77. Alf Gleave, Dr. John Young, for example.

78. Walter Gordon, Mitchell Sharp, Jack Davis,
C. M. Drury, Otto Lang, Jean Marchand, Maurice Sauve,
John Turner, for example.

79. A former advisor to Mr. St. Laurent.

election in which its reputation for arrogance and

staleness was an important issue. That defeat was

followed by a rout.in 1958, in the first election

under Mr. Pearson's leadership. By 1960, the

parliamentary party was reasonably effective although

reminiscent in argument and personnel of the rejected

government. [80] Weaknesses had begun to appear in the

Diefenbaker government. Those weaknesses combined

with Mr. Pearson's strong personal reputation to

help generate a limited renaissance in traditional

sources of Liberal support in the media, universities

and corporations. The conference was designed to

demonstrate a vitality in the very fields in which

the "old" party had seemed rigid, and to attract

new people. "I had very much in mind new ideas, new

men, new approaches as I began the process of

rebuilding."[81]

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80. Its leading figures were the Hon. Paul Martin,
the Hon. J. W. Pickersgill, the Hon. Lionel Chevrier,
and Mr. Pearson.

81. Mr. Pearson, correspondence with the writer.

1964: Fredericton

The Fredericton Conference, formally entitled the
National Conference on Canadian Goals, was held at
Fredericton, New Brunswick, September 9 - 12, 1964.[82]
It was organized in response to a unanimous resolution
of the annual meeting of the Progressive Conservative
Association of Canada calling for "A study conference
in depth to develop a full, and comprehensive program
to present to the next Annual Meeting of the
Association."[83] The resolution itself was the result
of the initiative of various party activists,[84] who by
and large were not members of the parliamentary caucus.

The Progressive Conservative party had recently
re-entered Opposition after forming the government of
Canada for six years, four of them with a commanding
majority. The preceding two years had been marked by

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82. Major sources concerning Fredericton: The writer
was corresponding secretary of the conference and has
had the benefit of correspondence with its chairman
and organizer Dalton Camp, whose office also made records
and clippings available.

83. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Progressive
Conservative Association of Canada, Ottawa, 1964.

84. Several Progressive Conservatives disturbed about
the direction and future of the party tended, at that
time, to express their concern in policy terms. Some
few delegates to the Annual Meeting that year were
prepared to oppose the leader directly, but the great
majority chose instead to demand a role in policy-making.

serious internal conflict, including the resignation
from Cabinet or Parliament of five senior privy
councillors[85] and frequent criticism of the leadership
by spokesmen of French Canadian, urban and young
Progressive Conservatives. It should be noted that
at this time, the new president of the national
association, Mr. Camp, had neither publicly criticised
the leadership nor participated appreciably in internal
conflicts concerning policy or personalities. In 1963,
he had accepted the invitation of the national leader,
Mr. Diefenbaker, to serve as national director of the
federal general election campaign and, earlier in 1964
he had been elected unanimously association president.

Preliminary planning of the conference was by
members of the executive committee of the Progressive
Conservative Association, and subsequent planning by a
working committee of eleven members. That committee

The resolution was moved by E. A. Goodman, and also
proposed prominently by Dalton Camp in his uncontested
campaign for the Association presidency.

85. Hon. Donald Fleming, Hon. Davie Fulton,
Hon. Douglas Harkness, Hon. George Hees,
Hon. Pierre Sevigny.

included only one member of the parliamentary caucus,

a Senator,[86] the executive secretary of the national

headquarters[87] which was at that time an office

direatly responsible to the national leader[88] and

five[89] of the eight executive officers of the national

association, including the national president who

served as chairman. An office was established in

the Toronto business premises of the national

president, although much of the physical work was

shared with the national party headquarters in Ottawa.

86. Senator Jacques Flynn, Opposition leader in the Senate.

87. Miss Flora Macdonald.

88. By a constitutional amendment requested by the national leader and approved by the annual meeting in 1969, the senior officer of the national headquarters, the national director, is no longer the personal appointment of the national leader alone, but is appointed by and is responsible to a committee consisting of the leader, the president of the national association, and the chairman of party organization. That was not the case in 1964.

89. Jacques Bouchard, Dalton Camp, Egan Chambers, Joe Clark, and Finlay MacDonald.

Although the money was raised by regular party

fund-raisers, it is not clear whether the conference

was financed from existing party funds.[90] After the

decision to convene a conference had been firmly

taken, the national leader was advised and invited

to participate. Of the 200 delegates to be invited,

a formula developed by the chairman and approved by

the committee stipulated that eleven were to be

designated by the parliamentary caucus from among

their numbers, twelve by provincial caucuses on a

basis reflecting population, 63 by various arms of

the national association or by provincial associations,

and 114 by the working committee.[91] In choosing that

114 an effort was made to draw from groups not

normally associated with the Progressive Conservative

party and to select party personnel on the basis of

potential future rather than past contributions.

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90. Mr. Camp had requested support from regular
sources, but was turned down. A group of party
members associated with Mr. Camp then threatened to
raise the funds themselves, at which news the
regular fund-raisers changed heart. It is not known
if a special collection was made.

91. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee
of the Progressive Conservative Association of Canada,
Toronto, April 11, 1964.

Throughout the selection of delegates and the

development of the program, there was a particular ,

exertion to attract good French-Canadian participants.

In announcing the conference, the national

president specified that the originating resolution

of the national association was not being interpreted

in a literal sense.

> The Conference we are proposing will
> indeed be a study "in depth" of
> certain public issues, but this can
> lead to the development of a "full
> and comprehensive program" only to
> the degree that the study enlightens
> and informs those at the Conference
> to make their contribution more
> effective in future in the process
> of developing policy proposals for
> the consideration of the Annual
> Meeting and for the further
> consideration of the Parliamentary
> Party.[92]

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92. Mr. Camp, statement announcing the National
Conference on Canadian Goals.

1967: Montmorency

Unlike the other policy conferences, the policy discussion of the Progressive Conservative Party at Maison Montmorency, Courville, Quebec, August 6 - 10, 1967 was an adjunct to another formal undertaking of the party.[93] It was established to present recommendations to a policy committee of the Centennial Leadership Convention, which committee would itself submit policy recommendations to the full convention.[94] Montmorency was thus authorized indirectly by the

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93. Major sources concerning Montmorency: Correspondence with Robert Bedard, director of organization of the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, who was involved in organization of the Centennial convention. Some records are on file at the national headquarters of the party, and more information was gathered from newspaper reports and an article by Dalton Camp, "Reflections on the Montmorency Conference" in the Queen's Quarterly, Summer 1969, pp. 186-187.

94. This complicated procedure was designed to allow experts to recommend, and policy representatives from each constituency to consider, policy proposals at a convention that would be too pre-occupied with leadership to consider policy adequately. The minutes of the meeting of the Centennial Convention Committee of April 1, 2, 1967 read as follows: "...Mr. Goodman read a letter from the National President, Mr. Camp, suggesting that a Policy Advisory Committee be set up and hold a conference in late July or early August, preferably in Quebec City. This group would consist of 100 to 150 persons made up from members of the Caucus, academics and persons with special knowledge and expertise from the various fields in the business world...the deliberations of this group could then be turned over to a larger body called the Convention Policy Committee which would consist of one...

resolution of the Annual Meeting of the Progressive

Conservative Association of Canada of November 1966

requiring a leadership convention which would also

consider policy, and directly by the convention

committee established by the national executive of

the national association to organize a leadership

convention. Letters inviting participation at

Montmorency said:

> ...it is essential to the future
> success of this Party that we evolve
> an intelligent and comprehensive policy
> designed to meet needs of Canada and one
> that will merit the respect of all
> elements of our community.[95]

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constituency delegate from each riding, representatives
of the students, Y.P.C. and Women's Associations. This
latter group would total about 400 and would hold its
deliberations on Tuesday and Wednesday prior to the
opening of the full plenary sessions. Their report
would be presented to the convention at large.
  "Deliberations of the Convention Policy Committee
would be open to the press and to any approved delegate.
It was agreed that the report of the Convention Policy
Committee would constitute a statement of fundamental
principles and contemporary policies of the Conserva-
tive Party for the consideration of the Leader, the
Caucus, the President and Executive Officers of the
Progressive Conservative Party of Canada."

95. E. A. Goodman, Roger Regimbal, MP, standard letter
of invitation to participate at Montmorency.

The conference was budgeted as part of the leader-
ship convention and preparatory work was done in
the convention offices in Toronto. The annual
meeting which established the leadership convention,
and consequently the Montmorency conference was the
scene of a serious and public intra-party conflict
in which the majority of members of the parliamen-
tary caucus were on one side and the majority of
voting members of the national association on the
other. Although that antagonism was not forgotten,
it had been suspended temporarily in the campaigning
to elect a new national leader. A member of the
parliamentary caucus, who had sided with the majority
of caucus in November 1966, was co-chairman of the
convention committee[96] and the organization of the
Montmorency conference was left largely to a
committee of party employees under the co-ordination
of a university professor who had no previous
association with the party.[97] The formal chairman
was the Honourable William Davis.[98]

96. Roger Regimbal, then Member of Parliament for
Argenteuil-Deux Montagnes.

97. Professor Victor Valentine of Carleton University.

98. Then Ontario Education Minister. His responsibili-
ties did not include organization, but related exclusively
to conduct of proceedings at Montmorency.

Participation was by invitation of the conference committee[99] and was limited to 120[100] persons of whom 32 were Members of Parliament representing the parliamentary caucus. In addition the national leader was invited, as were declared candidates for the national leadership.[101] There was a deliberate attempt to attract participation by the Canadian academic community, particularly those who had shown some interest in the party, personally or professionally. A distinguishing feature of the conference was its emphasis upon the participation of persons already prominent either as partisans or specialists. This emphasis was made possible in part because a committee more representative of the party would receive the recommendations of Montmorency.

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99. The minutes of the planning committee reveal that the committee stipulated only that the conference should include representatives of caucus, constituency associations, party, women's or youth groups within the party and university and expert opinion outside the party. Mr. Bedard's recollection is that the particular decision as to invitations was made by the Convention co-chairmen, Messrs. Goodman and Regimbal, after consultation with members of caucus, the national association, the convention committee, and presidents of PC provincial associations.

100. 123 were listed as attending.

101. The leader and candidates for leadership were not invited for the whole conference, but each for one afternoon only. This procedure was designed to allow the candidates to meet the policy committee but not dominate or disrupt their proceedings.

1969: Niagara Falls

The Priorities for Canada Conference was held,
October 9 - 13, 1969 at Niagara Falls, Ontario.[102]
While the Port Hope and Fredericton Conferences were
designed in part to countervail positions taken by or
ascribed to the party leader, and Montmorency was held
in an inter-regnum, Niagara Falls, like Kingston, was
requested by the national leader. It was organized
by a committee under the chairmanship of the
Honourable Robert Stanfield, and was held at all only
because of his insistence.[103] A policy meeting had
been requested and authorized by a vote of the party
and association gathered in leadership convention in
1967 and in annual meeting in 1969. The initial
announcement was issued by the president of the
national association, Mr. Frank Moores, MP, acting
in that capacity. The parliamentary caucus, the
national association, and the national youth and
women's associations were represented on the committee,

102. Major sources concerning Niagara Falls: The writer
was active in the organization of the Conference, and has
had the benefit of correspondence or conversation with
others actively-involved, including principally-
Dr. E. R. Black and Robert Bedard.

103. Mr. Stanfield over-ruled the opinion that party
finances and other priorities should cause
postponement, and perhaps cancellation, of the
policy conference.

which functioned in fact as the working committee.
Funding was from regular party sources. Personnel
and facilities of the national headquarters, the
party research bureau and the parliamentary office of
the leader were seconded to the conference, and a
program staff was established at Trent University
in Peterborough, Ontario, under the direction of
the chairman of the Policy Advisory Committee, a
position appointed by and responsible to the national
leader directly.

Although the party had changed leaders, it had
been defeated decisively in the federal general
election of June 1968, and its representation in
Parliament was from the same kind of constituencies,
largely non-metropolitan and non-French-speaking, as
before the leadership convention. It was the largest
of the conferences, allowing participation by every
member of caucus, and a delegate of every federal
constituency[104] as well as delegates-at-large[105]

104. Constituency associations were specifically
requested to send delegates with a particular interest
in policy.

105. There were to be 152 delegates-at-large, chosen on
a rough population basis according to the following
formula: five each from Newfoundland and Prince Edward
Island, ten each from Nova Scotia, New Brunswick,
Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia,
40 each from Quebec and Ontario, and two from the Yukon
and North West Territories. The president of the

and resource persons.[106]   There was again a

deliberate attempt to secure representation of

groups not normally associated with the party, and

a particularly energetic involvement of advisors from

the academic community.

Inspiration and Organization of the Conferences

Three of the conferences were inspired by one

individual or a small group of persons--in the case

of Port Hope, J. M. Macdonnell; Kingston,

Lester B. Pearson; Fredericton, a group, including

prominently Dalton Camp, E. A. Goodman and the late

George Hogan was instrumental in achieving a resolution

calling for a "study conference" and Mr. Camp particu-

larly proposed the kind of conference Fredericton

became, with its emphasis on problems rather than

resolutions.   Montmorency was an incident of the

leadership convention, and owed more to the public

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Progressive Conservative Association in each province
and the representatives of each province on the national
executive submitted a list containing 50 per cent more
names than the number of delegates-at-large allotted
that province. From that list, the policy co-ordinating
committee made final selections.

106. They were selected and invited by the programme
committee.

expectation that a party would consider policy than
to a private conviction that, at that point in time,
it must. The persons most influential in the genesis
of the Montmorency conference appear to have been
Dalton Camp and E. A. Goodman,[107] and it is signifi-
cant that each had official responsibility for the
over-all leadership convention, the former as associa-
tion president, the latter as convention co-chairman.
The Niagara Falls Conference was authorized originally
by a Centennial Convention resolution, which probably
should be seen as reflecting a concensus that policy
conferences should be a regular activity of the party.[108]
However, the direct decision to call the Niagara Falls
Conference was made by Mr. Stanfield, against the
advice of some party officials who believed that other
priorities were more urgent at the time. In four
cases, then, the conferences resulted from the
initiatives of identifiable individual partisans--
J. M. Macdonnell, Lester B. Pearson, Dalton Camp,
E. A. Goodman and Robert Stanfield. It would be

107. Minutes of Centennial Convention Committee,
April 1, 2, 1967.

108. That the status of "policy" should have changed
so dramatically is itself significant.

interesting to examine the approach to politics of each, for evidence of the nature and role of the "innovative personality"[109] in Canadian politics.

Representative national organization committees were struck in the case of each conference; each represented each region of Canada, and the general organization committees of the Fredericton, Montmorency and Niagara Falls conferences also represented the various official constituent groups of the sponsoring Association or party.[110] In each case, smaller working committees were established, usually located in one city, and responsible to the larger group. The working committee for Port Hope was based in Toronto, and linked to the national committee by the membership in both groups of J. M. Macdonnell and the corresponding secretary,

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109. Students of innovation suggest certain characteristics recur in "the innovative personality." See Innovation: The Basis for Culture Change, Homer Barnett, McGraw Hill Book Co., New York, 1953; Theory of Social Change, E. Hagen, The Darsey Press, Homewood Illinois, 1962.

110. All three committees were drawn from the national officers of the Progressive Conservative Party. In the cases of Montmorency and Niagara Falls, special representatives of the parliamentary caucus were specifically included.

Rod Finlayson. The working committee for Kingston

was based in Toronto, under the active supervision

of Mitchell Sharp and Michael Mackenzie, chairman

and co-chairman respectively of the national

"Sponsoring Committee." The working committee for

Fredericton was based principally in Toronto, in the

offices and under the active supervision of the

chairman of the general conference committee,

Dalton Camp. The working committee for Montmorency

was based principally in Toronto, in offices estab-

lished for the organization of the Centennial

Leadership Convention, and under the active supervision

of the convention committee co-chairman, E. A. Goodman.

In the case of Niagara Falls, the planning committee

was based in Ottawa, in the national headquarters,

the research office and the office of the party leader,

Robert Stanfield, who was the active chairman of the

general conference committee, and the programme

committee was located at Trent University in Peter-

borough, under the direction of the chairman of the

Policy Advisory Committee, Professor T. H. B. Symons,

who was a member of the over-all committee and an

official directly responsible to the national leader.

Format

The Port Hope Conference was divided into sub-committees, each concerned with an aspect of national policy. J. M. Macdonnell delivered a keynote address to the plenary conference. Rod Finlayson prepared position papers in advance to provide a basis for discussion, and the sub-committee reports were brought together in "The Port Hope Proposals" by Sidney Smith. This document was approved as a statement of the conference but great care was taken to emphasise that the conclusions were "proposals" and the group was unofficial. The sub-committee discussions were closed, but a press conference was held after each session.

The Kingston Conference was also divided according to subject matter. Papers by invited speakers provided the basis of discussion and "a very valuable factor was the informal discussion which went on outside of the formal sessions and well into the night."[111] There were no resolutions and, while journalists were present and some of the papers became public, the conference was intended primarily to be private and advisory. Mr. Pearson, as national leader, delivered a keynote address to the plenary conference.

The Fredericton Conference met entirely in plenary session, with a different aspect of national policy

111. Hon. Walter Gordon, correspondence with the writer.

considered on each day. The emphasis was upon
exploration rather than resolution of new national
problems, and discussion each day was generated by
speakers reading papers or precis of papers prepared
and circulated in advance. There was extensive
informal discussion every evening. There was an
opening address by the conference chairman, Mr. Camp,
and an address by the national leader, Mr. Diefenbaker.
No resolutions were taken.

The Montmorency Conference was divided into
subcommittees, according to subject, each under the
direction of co-chairmen designated by the planning
committee. There were not major speakers or papers,
although a compendium of existing relevant academic
and other writing was circulated to conferees in
advance. Each sub-committee prepared and approved
recommendations for consideration by the policy
committee of the Centennial Convention.

The Niagara Falls Conference was divided into
eight streams, each concerning a broad aspect of
national policy, each presided over by French-and
English-speaking co-chairmen, designated by the
conference chairman. Practice differed within each
stream, with some adopting a seminar approach and
others basing discussion on prepared papers. This
was the most comprehensive conference and dealt,

sometimes in detail, with a very wide range of questions. There were no resolutions. Instead, the co-chairmen prepared, and the sub-committees approved, a statement of the "consensus" of each stream, and these statements were directed to the national leader, the national association president and the parliamentary caucus for subsequent consideration. As conference chairman and national leader, Mr. Stanfield delivered keynote and concluding addresses to the plenary conference.

Finance

There is no record of the source of funds or cost of the Port Hope Conference. Funding would not have been from regular party sources, since the conference was unofficial; in any event "There were no such sources, and the Party had no income of any kind as such during the year 1942."[112] J. M. Macdonnell had sought to raise money for the party earlier that year, with a series of small fund-raising dinners in Toronto and Montreal. There was some carry-over from that canvass, and Macdonnell apparently raised the rest. The educated guess of the Honourable R. A. Bell is "that the budget for Port Hope was probably less than $10,000 but I have no information at all about it."[113]

112. Hon. R. A. Bell, correspondence with the writer.

113. ibid.

Nor was an official estimate available of the

costs of the Kingston Conference, although a special

fund was established to raise the money.[114] The

Fredericton Conference cost $35,000.[115] As indicated

above, that money was raised by regular party fund-

raisers, although it is not known whether they con-

ducted a special collection. The Montmorency

Conference was budgeted at $35,000 and cost $60,000.[116]

The money was drawn from funds raised in connection

with the Centennial Convention. The total cost of

the Niagara Falls Conference was $82,000,[117] which

was a draw upon regular party sources. It should not

need emphasis that the cost of the last two conferences,

at least, substantially limited the capacity of the

party to undertake other activities.

Delegate Selection and Characteristics.

Delegates to the Port Hope Conference were invited

by the conference working committee, on the basis of the

recommendations of the provincial representatives on the

national committee. Broadly speaking, participation wa

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114. Hon. Walter Gordon, correspondence.

115. Dalton Camp, correspondence.

116. Robert Bedard, correspondence.

117. ibid.

open to any "lay" Conservative--ie., anyone not a
member of Parliament, the Senate or a provincial
legislature--who wanted to come. The exception was
Ontario, where there was a definite effort to avoid
over-representation of that province, or of Toronto.
A special effort was made to attract French-speaking
Conservatives from Quebec. The two most important
considerations were to attract people whom it was
presumed would contribute actively to the party in
years to come, and to ensure representation of farm,
labour and other particular groups. "A balanced form
of representation" contributed to balanced thinking at
the Conference."[118] However, invitations were restricted
to people considered to be sympathetic to the Conserva-
tive point of view. The emphasis of the organizers of
the Kingston Conference was to attract "new" people
with ideas. Some regional representation was achieved,
through consultation with regional party officials and
with the sponsoring committee, which itself had represen-
tation from each region. Hon. Walter Gordon indicates
there was no particular attempt to achieve regional,
racial or geographic balance.[119] The authority to
choose delegates rested exclusively with Mr. Pearson,

118. Hon. Donald Fleming, correspondence with the writer.

119. Hon. Walter Gordon, correspondence with the writer.

who sought the advice of the sponsoring committee.
The presence at Kingston of so many people who sub-
sequently became prominent in the party suggests the
selectors at least knew the precincts where political
interest or ambition might reside. It seems likely,
indeed, that one function of the Kingston Conference
was to formalize the entry into active partisanship
of people who had been considering political careers
for some time.

The organizers of the Fredericton Conference
established a formula of representation[120] which
specified that 114 "at-large" participants would be
chosen by the committee. Those 114 were selected
after consultation with provincial and national party
officials, and others, including some persons
unassociated with the Progressive Conservative Party
at that time.[121] There was an attempt to attract

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120. Nine delegates were to be appointed by each of the
national student federation, YPC and women's associations,
three by each of the provincial associations except
Ontario and Quebec which would each appoint six, eleven
by the federal caucus, two by each Progressive Conserva-
tive provincial caucus, (there were then six) and 114 by
the working committee. Minutes of the Meeting of the
Executive Committee, PC Association of Canada, Toronto,
April 11, 1964.

121. Primarily people in the Universities or communication.

younger people and to repair "the alienation between the Party and the academic community."[122] The most strenuous special effort was to attract strong participation from French-speaking Quebec. The conference chairman sought help initially from French-speaking Progressive Conservative Members of Parliament and the Senate and, when that proved unproductive, went himself to Montreal, where he secured the agreement of Claude Ryan and Marcel Faribault to participate.[123] The Montmorency Conference was designed to bring together active politicians and academic and other experts. That guided the selection of delegates, who were chosen either for activity in the party at the time or for an expertise desired at the Conference. The "experts" were often chosen without regard to partisan affiliation. Rough regional balance was sought, and it was hoped that French-Canadian participation would be one side-effect of locating the conference at Courville. Invitations were issued by the convention co-chairmen.

Invitations to participate in the Niagara Falls Conference were extended to every Progressive Conservative member of the House of Commons, Senate or a

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122. Mr. Camp, correspondence with the writer.
123. Mr. Camp, correspondence with the writer.

provincial legislature, one delegate from each

Progressive Conservative federal constituency associa-

tion, representatives of the youth and women's associa-

tions, and 152 delegates-at-large.[124] In addition,

the programme committee was empowered to invite an

unspecified number of "resource people", usually from

universities. Association with the Progressive

Conservative party was not required of "resource people"

although care was taken to avoid inviting persons

associated with another political party. As indicated

above, delegates-at-large were chosen by the organizing

committee, from lists submitted by party officials in

each province. It was specified that at least 25 per

cent of the delegates-at-large from each province must

be under 30 years of age, and at least 25 per cent

must be women.[125]

It is difficult to generalize about the kind of

people who participated in these policy conferences.

Lists of participants at each conference are appended

to this paper. They suggest that most participants

brought to the conference some personal prominence,

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124. Minutes of the 1969 Policy Conference Coordinating
Committee, April 29, 1969, Ottawa.

125. ibid.

either in the party or in an area important to the party. They were "elite" groups in that sense, although the questions are open how or whether that affected the deliberations. There was a consistent endeavour, more pronounced in the case of some conferences, to achieve regional balance and representation of groups not normally associated with the sponsoring party. In one case, elected members of the party--the traditional "elite" in a parliamentary party system-- were virtually excluded, and in no conference were elected members dominant, either in number or influence. Some persons participated in more than one conference, which is not extraordinary considering that four of the conferences were in one party, three in a five-year period. It is interesting that at least two persons[126] attended both Liberal and Progressive Conservative conferences, while others[127] subsequently became prominent in parties other than the sponsor of the conference they attended.

<u>Physical and Media Considerations.</u>

Trinity College School was chosen for the Port Hope Conference because a school location provided

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126. Professor Walter Kontak, Mr. Bruce Whitestone.

127. Marc Lalonde, James Renwick, Alf Gleave.

privacy, relatively inexpensive accommodation, and
an atmosphere conducive to discussion. Sensitive to
suspicions about "Bay Street", the organizers deliber-
ately avoided a Toronto site, but wanted the conference
near that city, from which so much of the planning
emanated. In addition, it has been suggested that
Mr. Macdonnell might have been better acquainted with
Trinity than with other private school sites since he
frequently visited his brother-in-law, Vincent Massey,
at Port Hope. According to Walter Gordon, Kingston
was chosen as site of the Liberal conference "because
we were able to get accommodation at Queen's University."
Presumably a University site was chosen for reasons
relating to privacy, ease of accommodation and
congenial atmosphere. Several sites were considered
for the National Conference on Canadian Goals. The
original criteria stipulated cities small enough that
delegates wouldn't be distracted from the conference,
yet large enough to have adequate transportation access
and media facilities. For reasons of cost, accommodation
and congenial atmosphere, university campuses were
preferred. Since party meetings were regularly held
in Ottawa, and the party was ensconced in Queen's Park,
it was decided to locate the conference outside Ontario.

Sites west of Ontario were rejected because of
transportation costs and because the party did not
lack identification with Western Canada. The diffi-
culty in securing French-Canadian participation was
encountered early, suggesting that organization of a
conference in Quebec might involve special problems.
Nonetheless, Laval University was seriously considered,
and found unavailable. The advantages of Fredericton
were its availability, its adjacence to the summer
habitation of the conference chairman[128] and its
presence in a province where the provincial Progressive
Conservative Party was willing to assist materially in
conference organization[129] and would benefit from the
local publicity and good will a conference engenders.
The Montmorency Conference was held at Courville
because the organizers wanted a Quebec site and were

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128. "The fact that your...chairman was born sixty miles
from here, has a summer cottage thirty miles from here,
and graduated from this University, was not a signifi-
cant factor in the decision." Dalton Camp, Opening
Remarks to the National Conference on Canadian Goals,
Fredericton, September 9, 1964.

129. A large part of the physical organization of the
conference, at Fredericton, was done by Richard Hatfield,
MLA.

confident the party position in Quebec had improved.

While not a University, Maison Montmorency[130] offered

the same advantages of inexpensive accommodation,

meeting and media facilities, a contemplative

atmosphere and some distance from distractions. The

Niagara Falls site was chosen because transportation

costs dictated a central Canadian site, it was desired

to avoid a metropolis, and literally nothing else was

available for so large a gathering. The conference

was too large for small universities, and larger

universities were already booked. The conference

was held in two Sheraton hotels, which offered cut-

rates for lodging.

Two factors of unusual importance in selecting

sites were freedom from other distractions and,

especially in the case of later conferences, convenience

for the media, particularly television. National

conferences in large cities always suffer some

attrition because some delegates have never before

been that close to Jarry Park or Jarvis Street.

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130. It is a retreat house, of the Dominican order,
some of whose number provided spiritual ministration
by tending bar for the conferring Conservatives.

That danger diminishes in smaller centers. Television exerts 'an opposite pull, towards major centers, which are better able to satisfy its requirement of extensive studio and transmission facilities. Opposition parties have noticed that, while camera crews might follow a Prime Minister into Siberia, the amount of coverage of an Opposition policy conference is related directly to the ease of coverage. The print press also has special requirements, particularly for adequate telegraph facilities. These all influence site selection.

The Fredericton and Niagara Falls Conferences were completely open to the press, although it was understood that journalists normally would not participate in the formal discussions. Most of the Montmorency Conference was open, although some sessions met in camera. Certain journalists were invited to participate in the Kingston Conference, although there was some limitation as to what was on the record. The Port Hope discussions were closed, but a press conference was held after each session.

Contemporary Objections to the Conferences.

Each conference had its critics. Donald Fleming
recalls that Tommy Church, then a Toronto MP, spoke
of "the bright young boys who went down to Port Hope
and wrote a new Encyclopedia Britannica," and
Walter Gordon reports "some scepticism on the part
of the old guard in the caucus" about the Kingston
Conference.[131] George Drew, as provincial party
leader in Ontario, was openly hostile to some of the
principal organizers of the Port Hope Conference.[132]
Arthur Meighen saw "no harm" in the Port Hope ini-
tiative[133] but didn't expect it to come to much and,
as noted before, the Progressive Conservative fund-
raisers were sufficiently unexcited by the prospect
of the Fredericton Conference that they at first
refused funds for it. It is likely that there was
sometimes intense opposition to the conferences, not
just skepticism. However, in no case does there appear
to have been a sustained attempt to prevent or frus-
trate a policy conference.

131. Correspondence with the writer.
132. Hon. Donald Fleming and Hon. R. A. Bell, corres-
pondence with the writer.
133. Graham, No Surrender, op cit, p. 140, citing
correspondence, Meighen to his son.

Summary.

Certain important circumstances were common to all
five conferences. Each was held when the party was in
opposition in the country. In each case, the confer-
ence was called or organized by persons concerned
that other elements of the party in addition to the
caucus must be influential and be seen to be
influential, in order for the party to move out of
opposition. With Port Hope, Fredericton and Montmorency
the initiative for the conference came from persons
outside the parliamentary caucus; with Kingston and
Niagara Falls the initiative was from the leader who,
while a member of caucus, was also responsive and
responsible to other elements in the party. In the
case of Port Hope, Fredericton and Montmorency, no
authorization was sought from the leader or the
caucus, although they were advised in each case. In
both leader-sponsored conferences the caucus was
advised and some caucus members were involved in
planning, but it is important to emphasise that no
authority was sought from caucus in the case of any
of the five conferences. In principle, all conferences
were deliberate attempts to attract or publicize elements
not evidently associated with the parliamentary party.
In practice, in all conferences, the program and
discussion were dominated by non-caucus members of
the party. By the same token, it was made clear in

every case that the conference could not commit the
party--in no case was there an attempt to deny the
formal authority of the leader and caucus to
establish and state party policy.

In terms of informal power within the party two
significant functions were performed consistently.
While the power of the parliamentary party to establish
policy was not challenged directly, the capacity of
extra-parliamentary elements to influence policy was
enhanced. In effect, the successful assertion of the
principle that policy discussion belonged to the whole
party meant that, in practice, in exercising its
unquestioned right to decide, the parliamentary party
would have to consider party opinions and public
expectations generated outside the caucus. Second,
the policy conference was usually significant as the
instrument of one side in a factional conflict. This
was particularly true in the case of the Port Hope and
Fredericton conferences, which were conceived as means
of expressing and exposing a range of party opinion
different from, and even contrary to, that identified
with the parliamentary caucus. Had there been no
conflict, there would have been no conference. To a
substantial degree, this was also true of the Kingston
and Niagara Falls conferences. The difference was

that Port Hope and Fredericton were instruments

against the constituted authority in the party, while

the leader-sponsored conferences were instruments

used by a newly-constituted authority to demonstrate

the displacement of old styles. Whatever their other

aspects, these were all conflicts in which innovation

was a serious issue. In each case, innovators sought

to expand or assert their influence by means of a

policy conference. Even the Montmorency conference,

which differed significantly from the other four,

demonstrated an innovative spirit in a party whose

recent behaviour defined it rather as consolidative.

CHAPTER FIVE:

FUNCTIONS OF THE CONFERENCES

Policy conferences are not called or held in a vacuum. They occur in response to pressures, some- times problems within the party, sometimes opportunities in the larger political system, often both. These pressures can relate directly to policy development, but frequently they concern publicity, organization, morale, or a contest for influence within the party or the polity. They affect the decision to call confer- ences, the nature of each conference, and the functions each in fact performs. In the conferences considered here, some of these pressures have recurred or other- wise been of unusual influence. This chapter will review the major motives that influenced the calling of conferences and the degree to which these motives were satisfied.

The Desire for Ideology.

There is frequently a demand, within parties and outside them, for some statement of philosophy or principles which would distinguish one party from its rivals. That occurs particularly when a party is engaged in re-assessment, as it usually is after fresh or frequent defeat, or whenever policy is being considered. The demand often comes from rank-and-file

members who may feel impelled to justify their

partisanship in terms of "ideology", and from

influential institutional critics of the parties,

like newspaper editorialists.[134] Sometimes it is

shared by persons organizing conferences, and usually

it is recognized as a pressure requiring response.

That desire for distinction was manifest in the

official description of purpose of the Port Hope,

Kingston and Fredericton conferences. Port Hope was

conceived in part to begin the generation of a con-

temporary and viable alternative to "socialism".[135]

Kingston was described by its organizers as a con-

ference for "liberally-minded Canadians", emphasising

identification with the attitude if not the party.

One of the principal architects of the Fredericton

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134. The Toronto Globe and Mail, which considers the
Progressive Conservative Party its own except on election
day, chose the morning of the opening of the Fredericton
conference to urge it to "forget about policies and
platforms and talk exclusively about principles and
philosophies."

135. "The CCF is holding successful meetings because
right or wrong they have a creed. The Conservative
Party needs a creed and that is why I am anxious to see
the Port Hope conference succeed." Letter of
August 18, 1942 from Cecil Frost to Mr. A. D. McKenzie.
In addition, the keynote address of J. M. Macdonnell
emphasised the need for a response to "socialism".
Granatstein reports (p. 131) "when the floor was opened
to the delegates, speaker after speaker voiced an
insistence on free enterprise...however, the speakers

conference, the late George Hogan,[136] argued strenuously in committee for dedicating one day at Fredericton to the discussion of Conservative "principles". Responding to various influences, the chairman of the Fredericton conference did allow, as part of the program, a paper broadly concerned with philosophy[137] and referred in his own opening remarks to the need to "consider both ideas and principles together."[138] In all five conferences, contributions by delegates dealt rather frequently with different aspects of "principles" or "philosophy", and some of the formal papers set out goals couched in philosophic language.[139] However, in no conference was a statement of principle tabled, or even agreed upon. Only in the case of the Port Hope conference could the conclusions of the delegates be construed as a statement of a

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condemned the doctrinaire beliefs of the party elders and advocated a shift in party policy to a "middle way" course between the left and right extremes."

136. George Hogan wrote The Conservative in Canada, McClelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1963.

137. "The Responsibility of the Individual in Facing Political Questions" by Dr. Robert Clark of the University of British Columbia.

138. Dalton Camp, opening remarks, Fredericton, September 9, 1964.

139. For example, the Kingston paper of Tom Kent, which appeared subsequently as "Social Policy for Canada."

consistent approach to life or politics, and that was
a product of a wartime atmosphere which tended to
emphasise ideology. In considering the actual effect
of the policy conferences, the functions they in fact
performed, the definition of philosophy or ideology
seems to have had but slight importance, either in
terms of public perception or in terms of the
satisfaction of persons concerned with ideology in
that sense. However it is difficult, at this distance,
to determine how much of the momentum of the Port Hope
Conference was founded in a belief that new life had
been given a previously-beleagured set of principles.

Some conferences did serve to develop a party
statement or consensus on the principles which should
guide policy on particular broad questions. That is
a function different from developing an "ideology"
since it addresses a specific question, not a view
of life. The most obvious case concerns relations
between French- and English-speaking Canadians, on
which the organizers of the Fredericton Conference
set out to develop a relevant contemporary position,
which was achieved at Montmorency, and confirmed at
Niagara Falls. It is significant beyond its own
substantive importance as an example of a major

change in party attitude which consecutive policy
conferences functioned to achieve. A somewhat more
contentious illustration would concern the change in
approach to welfare policy which, while due principally
to other factors, was advanced at the Niagara Falls
Conference.

In terms of attitude, there is no doubt that the
discussion at each conference was more contemporary in
tone than the approach to policy generally associated
with the sponsoring party. Port Hope spoke in accents
different from Mr. Meighen, Kingston in accents
different from Mr. Howe or Mr. St. Laurent, Fredericton
in accents different from Mr. Diefenbaker. The
difference generally reflected a willingness to be
more open to more options. What is significant, in
terms of ideology, is the fact that the accents were
also different from those of Edmund Burke or Adam Smith
or, forthat matter, of George Hogan or Tom Kent. It
is as hard to define Canadian party ideology as it is
to discover it in practice; the policy conferences
made the task no easier. What marked each conference
was a desire to accord with contemporary attitudes
rather than to return to fundamental principles.

The Desire for Decentralization.

A classic concern of liberal democrats is that their parties tend towards oligarchy, and a classical response has been to decentralize power, even if only to other elites. The desire to decentralize tends to be strongest in defeat, when oligarchy seems ineffective as well as wrong. It is likely that certain kinds of partisans will especially resent oligarchy, particularly if they are not part of it. Specifically, policy-oriented partisans are probably more antagonistic to oligarchy than those whose satisfaction comes from simple party identification or combat. Among some policy-oriented partisans, oligarchy offends basic notions of democracy. Perhaps more generally, policy-oriented partisans see oligarchy impeding the natural buoyancy of their own good ideas. When a party loses, its oligarchy becomes vulnerable; doubts erode deference. A partisan who feels strongly about an issue, and believes his own position is muted, distorted or betrayed by his party's official spokesmen will have extra incentive to change the spokesmen. That would suggest that policy-oriented activities are particularly well-adapted to breaking down the oligarchy of a party in opposition. That

factor was probably influential in inspiring the
conferences at Port Hope and Fredericton and, in a
different way, the Kingston and Niagara Falls
Conferences. The organizers of Port Hope and
Fredericton were in opposition in the party as well
as in the country, and in a sense the policy conference
was one of their weapons in an internal war. The
leaders who inspired Kingston and Niagara Falls,
while in formal command of their parties, were
troubled still by oligarchies formed before their
coming, and used the conferences as both instruments
and evidence of change.

Policy conferences and decentralization are
associated in another way. Parties in opposition
need new supporters, and a policy conference demon-
strates that there is room in the party for new
people and new proposals. The Kingston Conference
was a signal that the Liberal Party, recently removed
from office as authoritarian and tired, was marching
to a different drummer and looking for recruits. A
similar signal had been sent out by the 1967 leader-
ship convention of the Progressive Conservative
Party, and the Niagara Falls conference was designed
in part to demonstrate that this attitude of open-ness

had survived the election. The Port Hope,

Fredericton and Montmorency conferences also

indicated that different drummers were at least

stirring in the party, and might begin a march.

It is difficult to assess whether parties which

are ventilated by policy conferences remain "open"

and, if they do, whether that is due to the policy

conference or other factors. Yet it is an impor-

tant question, if oligarchy is important. Techniques

are now available which would let party managers give

the appearance of membership participation while

retaining tight oligarchic control.[140] Most of

the paraphernalia of "participatory democracy" •

confirms the power of the oligarchy by disarming

its opponents. Yet the policy conferences this

paper considers gave real influence to the opponents

and helped them change the direction of the party.

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140. Modern technology makes it relatively easy for
a party or government with resources to circulate
computer questionnaires, dispense "information",
"visit" groups in mass meetings or individuals over
television, and bestow honours or encouragement
without paying the slightest heed to the substance
of a representation or complaint. What is new is
not the practice but the almost-total scale on which
it is now possible.

The means in every case was to affirm the legitimacy
of an elite other than the parliamentary caucus, an
elite which had the right to disagree with official
policy but not the power to change it. In effect,
the policy conference constituted an impermanent
"official opposition" within the party. Just as
the Official Opposition in Parliament has more
influence than the individual voter, the policy
conference had more influence and more ability to
effect change than the partisan invited to a banquet
or consulted by computer at an annual meeting. The
idea of an Official Opposition in Parliament is that
its existence restrains the natural oligarchic
tendency of the Government. The question concerning
policy conferences is whether they have impressed
into the consciousness of the parties the idea that
an alternative elite is legitimate.

As argued above, elites other than caucus have
always had substantial influence, whether potential
or exercised, in Canadian political parties. That
is one characteristic distinguishing Canadian parties
from the British, and it is unfortunate if a reliance
upon British-based descriptions of the parliamentary
process and parties has obscured that difference.

According to Robert McKenzie[141] "the distribution of
power within British political parties is primarily
a function of cabinet government and the British
parliamentary system." In Canada, that distribution
is also affected by the form of federalism and the
forces of distance and diversity which make a
federal system necessary. Consequently, the distri-
bution of power is more diffuse. The policy
conferences exemplified that distinction.but did not
create it.

It is important that another party elite is active
discussing policy. Far more relevant is the fact that
this "other" elite disavows any claim to declare a
policy which would bind the parliamentary caucus. In
fact, the real process of decision probably does lie
largely outside the parliamentary caucus--with public
servants and private advisors in the case of the
Government party, and public opinion and private
advisors in the case of Opposition parties. Professors
Engelmann and Schwartz suggest[142] that the professiona-
lization of policy-making concentrates the influence
over decisions with the elected or parliamentary

141. McKenzie, op cit, p. 635

142. Engelmann and Schwartz, op cit, p. 251.

leaders. The very opposite may be the case. The

practice of seeking external advice desanctifies the

tradition of exclusive reliance on caucus. To an

increasing degree parliamentary leaders rely upon

initiatives suggested by outsiders, or professionals,

and, in pursuing those initiatives rely largely upon

information provided and alternatives framed by

professionals. Even the power to choose the pro-

fessionals provides only partial control. Moreover,

the practice of seeking advice outside the parliamen-

tary elite generates a momentum of its own. Once

consulted on one question, activists or academics are

more likely to volunteer advice without invitation; on

the other side, parliamentarians who have found out-

side advice helpful in one instance will be inclined

to seek more of it. New patterns emerge in the

behaviour of both politicians and advisors.

As will be argued below, the exigencies of modern

Opposition demand more expertise of Opposition parties,

and therefor force open-ness upon their parliamentary

elite.[143] This is not to suggest that parliamentary

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143. Naturally enough the complexity and range of public
business in a modern nation had its first impact on
government parties. There are strong indications that
elected politicians in government parties have virtually
abandoned policy to the bureaucracy. One assumes that
is one factor which accounts for the preoccupation with
structures of the governments most recently elected in
Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. They
want to put the elected politicians--in Canada, the
cabinet, if not Parliament--back in control of policy
direction.

leaders are powerless--or even that they must cede

power--but rather to suggest their power should be

defined more precisely as the power to legitimize.

Parliamentary leaders retain the authority to state

and legitimize a position, as they have done nearly

always, whether directly on behalf of caucus, or

indirectly through dominance of conventions and

annual meetings concerned with resolutions and policy.

Of course, many members of a parliamentary elite

suggest and pursue initiatives, and the influence

of a Member of Parliament at any stage in decision-

making is enhanced by his status. The fact remains

that the parliamentary caucus is more important as

the locus rather than the inspiration of policy

decisions. That has been the case for some time.

Presumably, a radical decentralization would have

challenged the caucus' exclusive power to legitimize,

which, on the contrary, the policy conferences

consistently and explicitly have confirmed.

The Desire for New Policy.

A strong and necessary motive for policy confer-

ences is dissatisfaction with the existing or recent

policy of the party, and a desire to change it. That

is, there is an influential desire for new policy

per se, as well as new policy processes. In fact,
as just argued, no policy conference has claimed the
power or the title to declare official policy, new
or old. Moreover there is evidence to suggest that
many of the substantive recommendations of policy
conferences would have come to the party in any event.
For one example, the substantial and detailed recommen-
dations of the Niagara Falls conference on tax reform
were largely the result of the work of a committee of
experts appointed by the national leader and working
with the caucus well in advance of the conference.
In anticipating public attitudes on tax matters, the
committee also anticipated the attitude of conference
delegates, and proposed substantial reforms accept-
able to both the caucus and the conference. The
proposal for a reform of welfare policy originated
similarly, outside the conference and, indeed, a
variation of the policy had been advocated in the
1968 party election program. The "social policy"
proposals of Tom Kent were articulated at Kingston
but could have followed other routes to acceptance
by the party leader. Whether the organizers of the
Montmorency Conference had a specific formula in
mind, they went to the conference clearly intending
to develop a constitutional position more acceptable

to French Canada. That intention was shared by
all of those leadership candidates who were con-
sidered at the time of Montmorency and proved in
the ballotting to be serious contenders. Therefore
a different constitutional position would have
emerged in any event. The Fredericton conference
did not come to conclusions that could fairly be
called policy. The Port Hope "statement" reflected
a consensus the existence of which, though articulated
at conference, had in fact been the cause of convening
in the first place.

It can be seen then that much of the organization
and all of the authorization of party policy occurred
elsewhere than in the conferences. Nonetheless, the
conferences had a significant influence on the develop-
ment of new policy. There was some origination, if
not of themes, at least of details and approaches.
The affirmation of support at recent Progressive
Conservative conferences for a new approach to, for
example, the constitution, taxation and welfare
policy was strong enough to make it difficult for a
caucus to refuse authorization. In every case there
was a change in perception, both by the public and
by party members, of the importance of policy to

the party; the party subsequently became more policy-
oriented and more attractive to policy-oriented non-
partisans. But the fact remains that the direct
enunciation, or inspiration, of new policy was one
of the least significant functions in fact performed
by the policy conferences.

The Desire to Confirm Policy.

It was suggested earlier that, among other
functions, policy conferences were the instrument of
one side in an internal dispute. In every case under
consideration, different attitudes to policy were
involved in the dispute, although that probably need
not be the general case. To some degree, the
conferences were attempts to mobilize support for
one side in a dispute about policy or the approach
to policy. At Port Hope and Fredericton, the attitude
of the conference organizers was "against" that of the
parliamentary leadership. At Kingston and Niagara
Falls, the conference was an instrument of new
parliamentary leadership, "against" the re-assertion
of attitudes rejected when the leadership was changed.
Montmorency was a marginal case, reflecting an
attitude which was opposed by the departing leadership
but compatible with the newly-developing leadership.

The major discussion at Niagara Falls followed lines established in advance by the party leader. The most influential conclusion of the Montmorency conference, concerning the constitution, was consistent with reforms preferred by each of the serious new leadership candidates. The Port Hope conference reached conclusions, and the Fredericton conference had results, very close to those desired and foreseen by their respective organizers.

Confirmation of the policy or attitudes of their organizers is a recurrent function of policy conferences which the conferences generally perform effectively. Policy confirmation was most explicit at Niagara Falls, which was the only conference organized under the direct supervision of the leader; his positions on welfare reform, the constitution and tax reform were all adopted, although all were contentious. Does this imply that policy confirmation is a particularly significant function of leader-sponsored conferences? Possibly. It should, however, be noted that in the case of Niagara Falls leader-sponsorship of the conference did not stifle critics of the leader's position, particularly on welfare reform; neither did it inhibit discussion of contentious

questions such as drug use, and foreign economic influence. However, it is logical to assume that conferences sponsored by the leader are unlikely to challenge positions of the leader. That raises questions about the viability of the kind of conference this paper considers if a leader is in firm control of the party and is inclined to distrust or dislike free discussion.

Publicity.

One motivation for conferences is their great news value, which far exceeds that of most other activities of an opposition party or of a group in opposition to party leadership. Among those prerogatives of power which confirm power, publicity is very important, and often groups seeking power first seek publicity. The very necessity of publicizing their existence probably was influential in leading the "Port Hopefuls" to the little-precedented step of meeting in conference to discuss and express views on which most of them were already agreed. The Fredericton conference was the most effective available means of demonstrating the existence within the Progressive Conservative Party of a progressive and contemporary elite, concerned about both the

party's leadership and the country's future. The Montmorency conference also sought to demonstrate that the Progressive Conservative party, as well as electing leaders and feuding internally, could agree on contemporary policy. The Kingston conference sought to demonstrate that the Liberal party, recently thrown out of office for being arrogant and stale, was now open to new and progressive influences. The Niagara Falls conference sought to demonstrate that the attitude of critic, bestowed by the parliamentary system on an Official Opposition, was balanced by a taste and talent for positive proposal.

Party Morale.

For a party or a group in opposition, publicity has two targets. One is the public, whose attitude it is desired to change; the other is the membership of the group itself, whose morale it is desired to improve or maintain. At both Port Hope and Fredericton one purpose of the conference was to demonstrate to partisans who shared their view that their movement was numerous and worth sustaining. The Kingston conference was designed to encourage the progressive members of the Liberal party who had been disappointed

by the late government's conduct as well as by its defeat. Morale was a motive of the organizers of the Niagara Falls conference to at least as great a degree. In losing the 1968 general election, the Progressive Conservative party also lost the public service of many of its outstanding men, and it was consequently and obviously thin in parliamentary debate. Old divisions in the party had been reopened by the voting on the Official Languages Bill and were persistently exaggerated by the media. Morale was further jeopardized by the continued good standing in the public opinion polls of the Liberal Prime Minister, particularly since his style was close to that Progressive Conservative traditiona- lists had admired in their own former leader. As a consequence of being in Opposition, the party had next to no control over national events and must simply wait for opportunity. Virtually the only national event it could arrange was a policy confer- ence and that was done with an eye to the need, among others, to remind the party of its strengths and so to maintain morale. The factor of morale was of little influence in the Montmorency case.

Exposing An Unpublicized Elite.

James McCook, writing of the Fredericton conference, observed that: "Study conferences study men as well as...policies."[144] He was referring to the presence and performance there of men presumed interested in the national party leadership, should it ever become available. But if that was a special circumstance of Fredericton, it was a common characteristic of all the conferences that they revealed men as well as policies. A party in a parliamentary system and a scattered country is judged in terms of the handful of its men and women who are known to hold national office or local eminence. Many of its best people are simply unknown and they have neither the effective media and para-political organizations of the United States, nor Britain's size and practice of "finding" seats in Parliament[145] to help make them known as national figures. While other factors

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144. James McCook, The Ottawa Journal, September 16, 1964.

145. The size of Britain's Parliament--more than double that of Canada's, more than triple if you count the Lords and Senate--also provides a significantly larger pool of trained, able and interested politicians with a national point of view and a potential national following. Except for rare individual cases, the status of a Canadian provincial legislator is not comparable to that of a British backbencher in terms of potential impact upon national affairs.

contribute to the notable influence of provincial

party leaders in Canadian national politics, that

is also a result of the almost institutional anony-

mity of non-parliamentarians active in national

parties. That affects the perceptions of both the

public and the partisan who tend to identify a

party in terms of that minority of its actual elite

who serve in Parliament. As argued earlier, the

federal nature of the country and the necessity that

the party respond dynamically to a wide variety of

influences means that the Canadian party elite is

unusually broad; therefore the public identification

of the party solely with its small parliamentary

elite is seriously misleading. Party annual meetings

allow a certain exposure of this larger elite, but

the annual meetings of the Liberal and Progressive

Conservative Parties, at least, are oriented towards

office-holders to a degree greater than the annual

conferences of British parties or the presidential

nominating conventions of the United States. In

practice, one of the most significant functions of

the policy conferences of the Progressive Conserva-

tive party has been as the best instrument available

to the party to provide a public role and public

perception of able partisans who are otherwise
anonymous. That was also an important function
of the Kingston conference although the Liberal
party, with its connections with the media,
corporations and other institutions, has more
alternative outlets. However important to the
public at large, it is of critical importance to
the members of the party to witness a demonstration
of a wider range of party talents than is evident
in Parliament. In addition, and perhaps most
important, this experience in public national
discussion increases the general capacity of leading
non-parliamentary partisans to act in the party and
in the name of the party. By becoming better known
they become more effective, despite their exclusion
from caucus and customary attention. Writing in
The Toronto Star, Dalton Camp likened the names of
the participants at Port Hope to "an illuminated
scroll of the distinguished Conservatives of the
1950s and 1960s."[146] The Kingston Conference
launched Walter Gordon, Mitchell Sharp, John Turner,
Jack Davis, Otto Lang and others on their careers
as public notables in the Liberal party. Party
conferences were also the most important means by

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146. Dalton Camp, The Toronto Star, February 23, 1964.

which the Progressive Conservative Party came to

develop the influence of Mr. Camp himself, and of

Marcel Faribault, to whom the party owed so much

of its subsequent good credentials among previous

non-supporters or alienated supporters in English-

and French-speaking Canada respectively.

Recruitment.

As well as providing an otherwise unavailable

means of exposure of non-parliamentary members of

the party elite, policy conferences also function

importantly in the recruitment of persons who might

become members of the party elite, or simply supporters.

Most of the people who come to policy conferences are

already known to be interested in the party.[147] In some

cases the conference is a watershed, which makes

activists out of people who previously were only

interested. That can be considered direct recruit-

ment. It occurs at the conference. More signifi-

cant is indirect recruitment, achieved by changing

the perceptions of persons who had previously

considered the party uncongenial. This kind of

recruitment is not achieved at the conferences,

but because of them. General publicity or specific

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147. Prominent among the exceptions are experts whose
advice is available to any party and academics present
to observe the process.

proposals generated by the conference cause

individuals to revise their personal picture of

the party. This process can be seen to work

among journalists.[148] The same process occurs

among individuals, although it would be difficult

to document. Probably the cumulative effect of

individual re-assessments triggered by policy

conferences is among the most important conse-

quences of the conferences.

Generally the recruitment function has attracted

persons who can be broadly characterised as: (1)

"intellectuals" who are often expert in one or more

specific fields but have an overall interest in the

unison of ideas and effective action; (2) "experts"

who have a specific competence they want to put to

practical effect; and (3) "progressives" who want

to help meet contemporary problems. While effective,

policy conferences are not the only effective means

of recruiting "intellectuals" or "experts". Such

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148. Later citations in this paper demonstrate the
conclusion of journalists, after Fredericton, that
the Progressive Conservative attitude to French
Canada was not only not monolithic, but contained
strong strains of sympathy and understanding.
Similarly, "Kingston" became the code-word for the
"new" Pearson Liberalism. Other examples could be
cited.

persons are usually visible, and can be invited

by party leaders to assist directly in considering

specific problems.[149] The important function of

the policy conference is to help create a percep-

tion of the party which will encourage "visible"

potential converts to respond to invitations, and

"invisible" potential converts to recognize a

congeniality which might ripen into support.

The New Public Perception.

Probably the most important single effect of

the policy conferences on the system was that they

caused a change in the public perception of the

major Opposition party. They revealed the interest

of the party in an electorate and a range of issues

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149. The policy conference, while new as a form, was
not the first or only instance of direct recourse to
"experts" or "intellectuals" outside Parliament.
Indeed Canadian political parties have been remarkably
open to the participation of "outside"-specialists;
whether these specialists have been influential is
another question. Of the existing parties the CCF-
NDP was mid-wifed and sustained by "intellectuals";
Social Credit fought its first and formative campaign
on the promise to bring in technicians whose expertise
would solve problems mere people and politicians
couldn't comprehend; the Liberal Party, for some time
and successfully, regarded the establishment univer-
sities of central Canada as a sort of seminary, from
which it could draw properly instructed assistants
and advice; and even the Progressive Conservative
Party directed some of its limited funds to the main-
tenance of a research office before 1956, when it was
supplanted by Allister Grosart and, perhaps conse-
quently, Government.

broader than were currently perceived to concern

it. That made the party attractive to some people--

whether potential voters or advisors--who had

previously considered it inhospitable to their

attitudes or aspirations. It became a kind of

self-fulfilling perception, breaking old caricatures

and creating new opportunities for the party to

expand. In a sense, the policy conferences are

means by which the party changes its image. It is

more than imagery of course, because the image

must accord with reality or it will not endure.

But the balance between innovative and consolidative

forces in a party is always shifting, and the

infusion of innovators, attracted by the conference

image, can change the reality; it can make the

innovative attitude dominant in a party previously

consolidative. While not expressed in these terms,

that was the central motive of the persons calling

the conferences of Port Hope, Fredericton, Kingston

and Niagara Falls. It is more difficult to judge

how effectively each realized that intention. But

three years after Kingston, the Liberal party was

restored to office, and three years after Fredericton,

a candidate who embodied the attitude of that

conference was elected national leader of the

Progressive Conservative party. The Port Hope

conference was followed by fifteen years of

familiar defeat in federal politics. However,

it is worth conjecturing whether the federal

party would have survived at all without the

encouragement and incentive Port Hope gave the

people and attitudes represented there.[150] Port

Hope also had a direct and positive effect on the

momentum of the Ontario Conservative Party which

the next year formed a government which has yet

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150. Mr. Meighen asked Mr. Milner, the chairman of
Port Hope to chair the Winnipeg leadership conven-
tion in 1942 in the hope that this would indicate
to Premier John Bracken "that the spirit of Port
Hope was very much to the fore and not just a
peculiar aberration from the Conservative norm,
that it was, indeed, a progressive Conservative
party he was being asked to lead." Roger Graham,
No Surrender, op cit; p. 141. A remarkable number
of the participants at Port Hope subsequently became
leading Progressive Conservative Members of
Parliament, including: Richard A. Bell,
Donald M. Fleming, Hugh John Flemming, J. M. Macdonnell,
D. R. Michener, Dr. Sidney Smith, Frank Stanfield,
W. H. A. Thomas, and David J. Walker. Several
others sought election unsuccessfully.

to be defeated.[151]   Obviously the party's strength

in Ontario contributed to its survival nationally.

The Montmorency Conference had other motives more

dominant than exposing the changed nature of the

party, and the Niagara Falls conference is, at

this writing and by this writer, too close to

assess.

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151. Such Port Hope participants as Dana Porter,
Kelso Roberts, Cecil Frost and A. D. McKenzie.
played critical roles in the establishment of a
Conservative government and organization in Ontario.
According to a letter of October 5, 1942, from Frost
to Finlayson, the "Port Hope report was received with
enthusiasm" by the Ontario Conservative executive and
"we have decided to republish it and send thousands
of copies out among the Conservative organization
throughout Ontario" as a basis for provincial policy
discussion.   It is also suggested, by the Hon.
R. A. Bell, that the Ontario party's success owed
something to the impact upon rural Ontario of the
new national leader, Mr. Bracken, who might not have
come to the national party without the evidence Port
Hope provided of an influential contemporary menta-
lity.   "If you plot (Bracken's) voyages of discovery
as a new Party leader and the results of the 1943
Provincial election you will be able to establish
a definite connection." Letter to the writer.

CHAPTER SIX:

TWO EXAMPLES OF THE INNOVATIVE ROLE OF CONFERENCES.

This chapter will treat two instances of policy
change and indicate the influence of the policy
conference in each case. The first concerns the
attitude of the Progressive Conservative party to
the role of French Canada in Confederation. This
is an instance of an innovation which arose in
opposition to the party leadership and found both
expression and a thrust towards adoption in a
policy conference. The second concerns the
response of the party to welfare reform, and specifi-
cally to the proposal of a national minimum annual
income program. This is an instance of an innova-
tion which was proposed by the party leadership
and recommended to the larger party by discussion
at a policy conference, among other means. Two
disclaimers: first, neither case is typical, but
both demonstrate a role conferences play in the
process of innovation; second, the fact that each
instance concerns a specific policy change should

not suggest that conferences are innovative only
when associated with specific policy change.
Innovation is a process of which a changed policy
is only one part; indeed, changes in individual
and collective attitude might be more significant,
but are more difficult to document. This chapter
is intended to illustrate that innovation by
conference has some concrete effects, and is not
simply a theoretical construct.

It is difficult to determine precisely what
the Diefenbaker government's attitude towards
French Canada was in fact when it took office
in 1957. Few of the new ministers had much
exposure to French Canada before entering the
cabinet. Very few spoke or read French, and all
were pre-occupied by the unaccustomed responsibi-
lities of office. The consignment of Leon Balcer
to a minor portfolio was retrospectively regarded
as an act of malice[152] but was as likely due to
Mr. Diefenbaker's recollection of Mr. Balcer's

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152. Peter Newman expressed, and perhaps created,
that consensus. Renegade in Power, McClelland
and Stewart, 1963, p. 287.

convention opposition, or a simple under-
assessment of the importance of a "Quebec
lieutenant", as the phrase then was, or a
belief that someone better than Mr. Balcer
would arise in the imminent next election.
The attention of the country, and apparently
of the Progressive Conservative Quebec caucus,
focussed on other issues until the double
deaths of Premiers Maurice Duplessis and
Paul Sauve, the defeat of the Union Nationale
and the beginning of the "Quiet Revolution."
One tangible previous indication of the attitude
of the Diefenbaker government to French Canada
was the working out, by Premier Sauve and
Donald Fleming, of a university grants agreement
that had eluded the St. Laurent government.
Another, later, was the Fulton formula for
constitutional amendment, which briefly won
the agreement of the Lesage Liberal government
of Quebec. The Lesage election caused a certain
panic within the Progressive Conservative Quebec
caucus[153] but not many specific responses

153. Private correspondence with the writer.

were proposed. The Diefenbaker government's
introduction of bilingual cheques and simulta-
neous translation have been retrospectively
decried as tokenism but, without further
evidence, it would be wrong to interpret
that as the motive of their sponsors. Certainly
some ministers, and some Progressive Conserva-
tives outside Parliament, were urging a more
extensive recognition of the "French fact"
by the Diefenbaker government. It remains an
open question whether the failure to respond
more adequately was due to malice, as is
fashionably assumed, or simply to an ignorance
of French Canada which, though not excusable
in a national government, was widespread
among English-speaking Canadians at the time,
and had been as evident in the St. Laurent
government.

Whatever the reasons, the Progressive
Conservative party soon renewed a reputation

of lacking much sympathy for French Canada;[154]
by the time of the general election defeat
of 1963 a reputation for hostility was firmly
re-established. The reputation is itself
important. It influenced the response to
the party, positive and negative, of voters in
English-and French-speaking Canada; and it
became one of the cliches which the media
assumed into its coverage of the Progressive

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154. The extent of that reputation is evident
most graphically in the 1962 election results
in Quebec, where the Progressive Conservative
party fell from 50 seats to 14, lost votes in
every constituency, and saw their proportion
of the vote in Quebec province fall from
49.5 per cent to 30 per cent. Figures are
taken from "The Election in the Province of
Quebec", by Leon Dion, Papers on the 1962
Election, edited by John Meisel, University
of Toronto Press, 1964.

Conservative party.[155] Perhaps most important,
it informed the view the party took of itself;
many Progressive Conservatives were partisans
for reasons quite unrelated to French Canada,
and, having no particular personal opinion
on the questions that issue involved, were
as susceptible to public and media definitions as

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155. The bias of the media is often not inten-
tional. Although some journalists deliberately
distort the motives or actions of a party, most
of the bias derives from the nature of journa-
lism, which requires writing without adequate
research, and an unusual reliance upon "accepted"
assumptions. Once it became popularly assumed,
among the media, that the Progressive Conserva-
tive party was hostile to French Canada, facts
were sifted and presented selectively to support
that assumption, not necessarily out of malice,
but because a journalist needs some basic
assumptions to give coherence to his report, and
hasn't the time to assay the truth of each
assumption. Often the assumptions are accurate.
They might have been in this case. Nonetheless,
journalists began to treat as "significant" the
relatively junior status of Quebec ministers in
the Diefenbaker cabinet, and as "insignificant"
the very open and sympathetic attitude to French
Canada of ministers as influential and different
as Davie Fulton and Alvin Hamilton. And the
media, being in the business of communication,
implanted their assumption in the public mind,
where it fit into conventional wisdom about
the Progressive Conservative party and French
Canada.

any other innocents. Thus the reputation became the reality, as partisans increasingly comported themselves, and voters assigned their support, in response to what they understood to be the attitudes of the party.

Reputation was only one source of the position developed within the Progressive Conservative party towards French speaking Canada and Confederation. Of the other sources, four were particularly important. One was the simple rush of the "Quiet Revolution", which would have raised problems for any federal government; the difficulty was probably intensified by the absence of any intimate connection between the Progressive Conservative government and the architects of the "Quiet Revolution."[156] A second source was the lack of sympathy for French Canada, amounting to suspicion and prejudice, and the willingness in Opposition to exploit racial tension for partisan gain. But the balancing two sources--which in time combined to become innovative--

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156. Indeed, if one accepts the account of the Hon. Pierre Sevigny, This Game of Politics, McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1965, pp. 190-197, there was not much connection between the federal government and the leadership of the Union Nationale, and little or no attempt to establish an effective federal Progressive Conservative organization in Quebec Province.

were the awareness that hostility to French-
speaking Canada was simply not viable policy for
a national party, and the persisting empathy with
French-speaking Canada of influential members of
the party outside Quebec. This latter factor is
particularly important. The recognition of the
dual nature of Canada was not a transformation or
a turnabout of the party; there have usually been
influential Progressive Conservatives prepared to
support whatever arrangements were considered
feasible in their time to maintain a viable French-
speaking community in Canada, and this attitude
simply became ascendent again.[157] The policy
conferences, Montmorency and particularly Fredericton,
played an important role in this process. But they
did not create the policy; they were simply

157. Certainly, that attitude prevailed when the
party was formed, by Macdonald and Cartier, and later
it was reflected in the election of Balcer as associa-
tion president, the bilingualism of the two other
candidates in the 1956 convention (Fleming and Fulton),
the close friendship between some English-speaking
Conservatives and some Quebec bleus. Evidence is
difficult to gather retrospectively when it concerns
private attitudes not public acts. The writer knows
no "documentation" of this attitude but has encountered
it full-grown and assumes it had some parentage.
Documentation would be valuable, particularly against
the backdrop of known hostility or indifference to
French-speaking Canada, as an illustration that
Canadian parties are seldom monolithic.

instruments for its expression. Indeed, this

case suggests that innovation is instrumental,

not substantial, and that agents of innovation

are most effective in concert with other forces.

That return to ascendancy was gradual and

the Fredericton Conference was only one point

along the route. After it came the dispute over

the Fulton-Favreau formula;[158] the resignation of

Leon Balcer; the campaign attacks of 1965 upon

Guy Favreau, Maurice Lamontagne, Rene Tremblay,

and Lucien Rivard; the defeat of the Liberal

Lesage government and the election as Prime

Minister of Quebec of the Canadien bleu

Daniel Johnson; the public initiative on behalf

of reform and fraternity by the Progressive Conser-

vative Prime Minister of Ontario, John Robarts; the

public adoption of a "flexible" approach to the

constitution and French Canada by the four leading

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158. In late 1964 a memorandum to Mr. Diefenbaker
from Mr. Fulton was leaked to the press; Fulton,
recently Justice Minister, asserted that the Pearson
government proposal for repatriation of the constitu-
tion, which Diefenbaker was opposing, was in essence
the same as that the Progressive Conservative govern-
ment had itself recently proposed.

contenders for the national leadership of the

Progressive Conservative party;[159] the recommenda-

tion of Montmorency; and finally the election and

conduct as national leader of Robert Stanfield.

The movement began before the Fredericton conference.

It was evident in the Diefenbaker government, which

extended to the French language more recognition

than previous governments and briefly secured

agreement on repatriation. Some French-and some

English-speaking Quebecers were critical of the

leadership's response to French Canada almost from

the moment the "Quiet Revolution" began, and that

criticism increased as the general elections of

1962 and 1963 approached.[160] After April, 1963,

there was growing concern about the isolation and

humiliation of Leon Balcer in the Progressive

Conservative caucus and the nature of the Official

Opposition attack upon Prime Minister Pearson's

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159. Robert Stanfield, Duff Roblin, Davie Fulton,
George Hees.

160. Chapter 20 of Renegade in Power, and Sevigny's
This Game of Politics, though written from different
vantages, both indicate the estrangement between
Mr. Diefenbaker and some of his colleagues and
advisors in Quebec province.

constitutional policies and French-speaking

colleagues. Late in 1963, Davie Fulton began a

series of speeches on "The Canadian Union", in

which he discussed French Canada and Confederation

in terms notably different from those adopted by

Mr. Diefenbaker.[161] While not able to contest

the national leader directly, the four Progressive

Conservative provincial premiers[162] set themselves

apart from his position on the Canada Pension Plan,

opting out, the Fulton-Favreau formula, the flag,

and bilingualism federally and, in Manitoba and

Ontario, within their own jurisdiction. Three of

the premiers, at least,[163] went out of their way,

in public speeches, to advocate a more flexible

approach to French Canada.

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161. There were four main speeches, at Saskatoon,
Quebec City, Toronto and Vancouver.

162. Duff Roblin of Manitoba; John Robarts of Ontario;
Walter Shaw of Prince Edward Island; Robert Stanfield
of Nova Scotia.

163. In late June, 1965, Roblin, Robarts and Stanfield,
as well as other leading Progressive Conservatives,
addressed eight simultaneous banquets, on the Confedera-
tion theme, in a program organized by the Progressive
Conservative Student Federation to commemorate the
150th anniversary year of the birth of Sir John A.
Macdonald.

As suggested above, the Fredericton conference
was conceived, in part, to appeal to potential
Progressive Conservatives who could not support
the general interpretation of the party as then
expressed in Parliament. Naturally, in 1964, many
of this group were particularly concerned about
the attitude of the parliamentary leadership to
French speaking Canada and Confederation. One of
the four days of the conference was dedicated
entirely to discussion of the problems of Confedera-
tion. There was an extensive and energetic attempt
to attract French-speaking participation of a high
quality. It is a significant comment on the
reputation of the party in French speaking Canada
at the time that the response was so slight from
French speaking Canadians from Quebec, whether
prominent or not. Only 16 attended, out of a
conference total of 205; this figure included one
Member of Parliament and two Senators, an employee
of the party and three formal speakers or resource
people.[164] However, if the French-speaking partici-
pation was slight numerically, some of those who

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164. Proportionately, participation from French-
speaking Canada outside Quebec was much stronger,
with six francophone delegates from the Atlantic
region and two from the prairies.

came were highly articulate and able[165] and, more

significantly, their point of view was understood

and seemed to be shared. This was the substantive

issue on which the differences between the caucus

and the conference were most clear.

The newspaper commentary on the conference is

instructive.

> ...the closing day of the conference
> ..was devoted largely to exposition
> of Quebec's complaints about Confeder-
> ation and discussion of what must be
> done to preserve the union. With
> hardly a hesitation, the majority of
> delegates accepted the view that the
> Constitution must be revised or re-
> written to implement the French
> Canadian claim to equality in the
> partnership. They applauded the
> explicit rejection of the Diefenbaker
> theory that Canada can be governed
> without significant representation
> from Quebec.[166]

And
> While an observer at the conference
> had the curious feeling that French
> Quebec was under-represented, he also
> had the feeling that despite the great
> variety of topics under discussion,
> French Canada was topic number one.

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165. Hon. Leon Balcer, Marcel Faribault, Hon.
Jacques Flynn, Marc Lalonde, Claude Ryan.

166. Toronto Globe and Mail, editorial,
September 14, 1964.

It showed in many little ways; in the
immediate, and interested, speculation
that Marcel Faribault, president of the
Trust General du Canada, was offering
himself as a potential candidate when
he remarked that men with the ability
should give ten of their most produc-
tive years to politics.

The impact he made on many of the
English-speaking delegates, particu-
larly those who have little contact
with French Canadians, was profound.
Every time he gave a French Canadian
approach to a subject in his highly
literate and precise style, he had
the conference buzzing.

A comment by Gordon Fairweather, 41-
year old MP for Royal, was an indica-
tion of the fact that French Canada
was the main topic and that the reform
group has given a new direction to at
least part of the party.... There was
an immediate and prolonged burst of
applause when, in discussing the
philosophy of conservatism, he said:

"It may be, as some tell us, numeri-
cally possible to govern Canada
without strong representation from
Quebec. But, I suggest, it is an
objective unworthy of the attempt."

Interest might have been expected to
lag after three long days of confer-
ences on a variety of often profound
subjects. Yet fully 150 of the 200
delegates stayed on Saturday morning
mainly to hear Claude Ryan...and
Marc Lalonde.... There were still
100 interested listeners for the
afternoon discussion on their outlines
and to hear a closing statement from
Mr. Faribault.

> Egan Chambers captured the mood of
> the majority when he said that English
> Canada would be well advised to begin
> negotiating a new constitution with
> moderates such as the panel members
> before they were forced to negotiate
> with extremists.[167]

And,   First and foremost, a sharp turn of
> direction was signalled in the wide-
> spread demand that the party should
> at least try to restore good relations
> with French Canada. This bubbled up
> spontaneously throughout the whole
> four days....
>
> The spontaneous demand for better
> relations with French Canada at this
> conference can mean a vitally impor-
> tant gain for all Canada. Whether it
> succeeds or fails in producing any
> entente between the Conservative
> party and Quebec opinion, it is likely
> to influence the party leadership. It
> reduces the likelihood of a drive for
> power based openly or implicitly on
> reaction in the rest of the country
> against "Liberal pandering to Quebec.[168]

The question of the approach to the constitution

was innovatively important in a symbolic, as well as

a substantive, way. Quite apart from the motives

of empathy and strategy, many of the Fredericton

conferees, and other partisans who didn't attend

the conference but were impressed by it, wanted to

demonstrate their difference from the parliamentary

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167. Max McMahon, editorial report in _The Montreal Star_, September 14, 1964.

168. John Bird, _The Toronto Star_, September 14, 1964.

party. In that summer of the flag debate, when
the parliamentary party seemed to be isolating
itself deliberately in rural older English
Canada, the Confederation question was the
natural ground of dissent. This is not simply
to suggest that many partisans adopted a "flexible"
constitutional position for extraneous reasons;
of course they did, as many partisans on the
other side had come to an "inflexible" position
for extraneous reasons, as some partisans of all
positions always do. What should be emphasised
is that the instinct to change was abroad in the
party, and that instinct emerged at the Fredericton
conference, and focussed on the Confederation
question. The conference did not create the
innovative impulse but was, in a sense, created
by it. However, simply by happening, the con-
ference gave coherence and momentum to innovation,
most specifically on the issues of Confederation.

The attitude of the conference did not change
the policy of the leader, nor of the caucus. Only
three months after the conference, Claude Ryan
.wrote in <u>Le Devoir</u>:

La conférence de Fredericton, tenue en septembre
dernier, a confirmé l' existence, à l'intérieur
du parti, d'un important noyau d'hommes ouverts
à une compréhension généreuse des réalités
canadiennes d'aujourd'hui. L'accueil réservé à
Marcel Faribault et à d'autres porte-parole du
Québec n'était pas un accueil de façade. Il fut
chaleureux, et suivi d'ailleurs de multiples
contacts privés, d'une abondante correspondance
avec les intéressés et d'articles publiés dans
la presse d'a pou près tout le pays.

".... Mais les mots ont passé et, sauf quelques
rares interventions individuelles qui tranchaient
sur les déclarations du chef, la ligne 'dure'
de M. Diefenbaker a paru reprendre son emprise
sur le parti.... On ne saurait conclure, malgré
ces apparences, que 'l'esprit de Fredericton'
soit déjà enterré.[169]

That obituary was premature. The underlining of

the differences between caucus and conference on

this fundamental question speeded the confrontation

on the leadership. More significant for the purpose

of this paper, is the very real probability that

persons who wanted Mr. Diefenbaker to retire equated

a change in leadership with a change in party policy

towards French Canada. That equation, if not

inspired by the Fredericton conference, was fortified

by it. Consequently, once it was decided to call a

leadership convention, the decision to adopt a

different approach to French Canada followed naturally,

and virtually without debate. Montmorency discussed

169. Le Devoir, December 22, 1964.

details, and produced a resolution,[170] but the

new consensus had already been established, in a

process in which the Fredericton conference played

an important role.

That was the process of change within the

party. It might seem not to have had much conse-

quence for the larger political system. The change

in policy did not improve the electoral position of

the party, least of all in Quebec. Nor might it

appear to have reduced cultural tensions in the

country. In fact, it did both. There was a short

season, after the Progressive Conservative leader-

ship convention and before the Liberal, when

Mr. Stanfield, speaking about Confederation, in

the spirit of Fredericton and the name of the

Progressive Conservative party seemed to be

successful in reconciling English Canadians to the

prospect of change in national constitutional/and

cultural arrangements. That was his expressed

intention and there are reasons it should have

worked, principally the fact that no instrument

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170. "That Canada is and should be a federal state.
That Canada is composed of two founding peoples
(deux nations) with historic rights who have been
joined by people from many lands. That the Constitu-
tion should be such as to permit and encourage their
full and harmonious growth and development in equality
throughout Canada."

is better able to quiet suspicions than one which
has served recently to arouse them. That atmosphere
ended with the general election of 1968.

In electoral terms, the Progressive Conserva-
tive proportion of the vote in Quebec Province in
1968 was down only very slightly from the party's
1965 proportion. In 1965 Progressive Conservative
candidates received 21.3 percent of the total vote;
in 1968, 21.1 percent. Studies of the motive and
pattern of voting in Quebec in those two elections
have not yet been published. However, it seems
logical to assume that the incentive for French-
speaking Canadians to vote for the Liberal party
was much higher in 1968 when such a vote would
mean a French-speaking Prime Minister. Of more
significance is the strong prima facie evidence
that English-speaking Quebecers found in
Mr. Trudeau's candidacy and position, an extra-
ordinary incentive to vote Liberal in 1968. Rough
evidence, drawn from vote totals in Quebec
constituencies with a high or predominant English-
speaking vote, suggest that Mr. Trudeau's party
won almost all the English-speaking Quebec vote
in 1968, a good portion of which had been won in

1965 by Mr. Diefenbaker's party. The Liberal
proportion of the vote in predominantly English-
speaking Westmount rose from 55.4 percent in 1965
to 78.4 percent in 1968; in predominantly English-
speaking Notre Dame de Grace from 39.8 percent in
1965 to 78.4 percent in 1968; in largely English-
speaking Mount Royal, from 57.3 percent in 1965
to 90.7 percent in 1968; with the same Liberal
candidates running, against respectable opponents.
At least two Progressive Conservative incumbents,
who had traditionally won a good share of the
English-speaking vote in their constituencies, lost
their seats to what they believe was an English-
speaking shift.[171] If there was in fact a massive
English shift to the Liberals in Quebec in 1968,
the fact that the Progressive Conservative pro-
portion of the total remained virtually unchanged
suggests that the Progressive Conservative Party
won a larger proportion of the French-speaking
vote in Quebec in 1968, even against Mr. Trudeau.
In any event, the Progressive Conservative party
was the only Opposition party to hold its own
proportion of the total vote in Quebec against the

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171. Heward Grafftey in Missisquoi and
Roger Regimbal in Argenteuil.

Trudeau Liberals in 1968. The NDP fell from 12 per-
cent to 8 percent, and the Social Credit and others
from 21.2 percent in 1965 to 17.6 percent in 1968.
That suggests that a process in which policy con-
ferences played a central role was on the very
brink of changing one of the most significant and
stubborn features of the Canadian political system,
the dominance in Quebec of a single federal party
and the consequent absence of a federal option there.
Had the federal Progressive Conservative party not
faced Trudeau it might have buried Riel.[172] That
would have been an innovation of incalculable con-
sequence. It is arguable whether the emergence of
Mr. Trudeau was a consolidative response to innovative
influences engendered in the political system at
Fredericton and elsewhere; as it is arguable whether
this innovation has now spent its force. Clearly,
however, within the smaller system of the Progressive
Conservative Party, a significant change did occur
in the policy towards Confederation, and policy

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172. It is possible that some of the Progressive
Conservative support in 1968 in French-speaking
Quebec was due directly to a reaction against
Mr. Trudeau, since his views on federalism were
regarded as so inflexible and wrong by some leading
then-moderate French-speaking Canadians that they
would actively support the party that seemed best able
to oppose him. Even given their opposition to the
Trudeau doctrine, however, it is likely they would
not have joined the Progressive Conservative party

conferences contributed importantly to the change.

There is an important historic division within

the Progressive Conservative Party about the extent

and nature of government involvement in social

services. Prior to the 1956 leadership convention,

the party had the reputation of opposing the elabora-

tion, if not the principles, of the welfare state.

Changing that reputation was among the most drama-

tic and immediate changes wrought by Mr. Diefen-

baker's leadership. The Liberal government became

"the six buck boys"[173] and the Progressive Conserva-

tive leader campaigned on a platform of "social

justice." As the national government, the

Progressive Conservatives substantially extended

pensions and unemployment insurance, introduced

Winter Works, the Atlantic Provinces Adjustment

grants, and ARDA to combat unemployment and

regional depression, and established the Hall Royal

Commission which recommended medicare. However

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without the changes associated with the Fredericton
and Montmorency conferences.

173. That was Mr. Diefenbaker's campaign response
to the 1957 Liberal government proposal to increase
old-age pensions by $6 a year.

contentious other aspects of his legacy,

Mr. Diefenbaker's commitment and contribution

to social reform is generally acknowledged.

Clearly, however, not all members of his own

party approved that commitment and critics of

the party assumed that, when Mr. Diefenbaker was

gone, they could re-apply the old stereotype.

In fact, the commitment to social issues in

the party extended well beyond Mr. Diefenbaker.

That was due partly to the influence of the new

constituency Mr. Diefenbaker had won for the party,

partly to the process of self-fulfilling percep-

tions discussed above, and partly to the general

inaccuracy of the reactionary caricature. Of

the leading candidates to succeed Mr. Diefenbaker,

at least three[174] were clearly in the progressive

tradition. Mr. Stanfield[175] in his major address

as a candidate to the convention said explicitly:

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174. Robert Stanfield, Duff Roblin, Alvin Hamilton.

175. As well as having been premier of a province
preoccupied with poverty and disparity, Mr. Stanfield
had been minister of education, where he had become
impressed by the inadequacy of manpower retraining
programs; although less publicized than the proposed
income guarantee, reform of retraining was a twin
pillar of the proposal for welfare reform.

In my opinion, whatever cause we
serve, we have a responsibility to
the disadvantaged and the poor. As
a Nova Scotian and a Maritimer, I
have known something of the problems
created by chronic poverty...we in
Eastern Canada have no monopoly on
this aspect of the Canadian society.
Education and technology and the
rush of change are making two
communities within Canada, one is
comfortable and secure, and the
other is not. I cannot conceive
of a political party, whose purpose
must be to make democracy a meaning-
ful expression, that would not view
with concern the growing separation
within Canada of those with oppor-
tunity and those without it.[176]

So when the leadership changed, the commitment

remained. Mr. Stanfield recognized, however, the

need to re-assert the commitment, partly to head

off internal critics of the policy, but mainly

to prevent external critics of the party from

re-applying the Bay Street stigma.

Other factors contributed to the determination

to identify the Progressive Conservative party

with a strong and positive response to poverty in

Canada. The situation offered a unique opportu-

nity to unite behind one platform both party

progressives, who wanted to extend social justice,

and traditionalists, who wanted to change a welfare

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176. Progressive Conservative Centennial Convention,
September 8, 1967.

system they considered inefficient and too

expensive. There was a growing public consciousness of poverty and a concern to attack it.

However, the issue was not a priority of the

Liberal government. In addition, it appeared in

late 1967 and early 1968 that the economy was

going to be the issue on which the Progressive

Conservatives would win the impending general

election; a Progressive Conservative party,

campaigning on its superior capacity for economic

management would be particularly susceptible to

caricature as reactionary, so the determination

to attack poverty would have to be explicit.

Finally, even before Mr. Trudeau's selection as

Liberal leader, Mr. Stanfield hoped to avoid a

campaign which would focus on Confederation

questions; he believed such a focus would disrupt

the consensus then developing in English-speaking

Canada and hoped an emphasis on the economy,

including an attack on poverty, would deflect

debate from Confederation and the constitution.

The explicit proposal for a minimum annual

income had two specific sources, beyond the

general concern to respond to poverty and reform

the welfare system. The most substantial was research being done by the Canadian Welfare Council, whose officials had proposed a variant of the negative income tax. Also influential was research, and particularly debate, occurring in the United States; the fact that the concept of a minimum income was acceptable for public discussion in the United States encouraged the Progressive Conservative leadership to raise the question in Canada. After consultations with the Canadian Welfare Council, and others, Mr. Stanfield proposed:

> ...to set out, consciously and
> deliberately and in good faith, to
> eliminate poverty and provide the
> means and the incentive for all
> Canadians to live full lives.
> ...There are certain steps which
> it makes sense to take as a start.
> For instance, it is sensible and
> just to pay a guaranteed annual
> income to that group of Canadians
> who need help and are unable to
> earn an income of their own... and
> who today live below the poverty line.
> This is our firm objective although it
> cannot be accomplished immediately.[177]

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177. Speech to the Western Ontario Progressive
Conservative Association, London, Ontario,
May 4, 1968. Delivering the speech in London had
the incidental advantage of directly notifying one
of the most traditional centers of the federal
party, of the determination to maintain a progressive
stance in social policy.

Almost immediately party canvassers reported a

strong reaction against the adjective "guaranteed".

The party was by that time engaged in a losing

semantic argument on another front[178] and did not

need to cultivate confusion about the meaning of

"guaranteed" as well. The issue was pressed in

only one other major speech in the campaign,[179] and

then in the context of general welfare reform.

That was a tactical withdrawal because the

proposal was too unfamiliar to broach in an election

campaign and required explanation and discussion in

calmer atmosphere.[180] When it was decided to

convene the Niagara Falls Conference, the organizers

determined to emphasise two policy areas particular-

ly: tax reform, because a government white paper

was imminent; and poverty. By that time, Parlia-

ment had granted funds to establish a small

Official Opposition research bureau, whose first

178. About the meaning of "deux nations".

179. Edmonton, June 11, 1968.

180. It is perhaps historically interesting that
Mr. Trudeau served early notice of his concept of
rational debate when, in response to the Stanfield
proposal, he promised to "cut out the free stuff."

major assignment was to prepare a minimum income

proposal, for discussion purposes only. During

the month before the Niagara Falls Conference, for

which this proposal was published in advance,

Mr. Stanfield again discussed the issue in public

speeches.[181] While he deliberately did not advo-

cate a particular form of program, he stated, as

leader of the party, the goals he believed welfare

reform should achieve.[182] He imposed the issue,

but not the response. That was also the effect of

specifying that one of the eight discussion "streams"

at Niagara Falls would discuss poverty, yet arrang-

ing in the program that more than one possible policy

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181. That was the theme of speeches to the "Life
After Birth" Conference of the Young Progressive
Conservatives and the Progressive Conservative
Student Federation, Queen's University, Kingston,
Ontario, August 23, 1969, and a meeting of PC
constituency associations of Vegreville, Battle River,
Battleford-Kindersley and Meadow Lake constituencies,
Lloydminster, Saskatchewan, September 8, 1969.

182. "...any good welfare program must work toward
three objectives. First, it must try to see that
every Canadian will have the opportunity of a decent
standard of living. Second, it must make sure that
public welfare funds are not given away to people who
don't need help. Third, it must incorporate a system
of incentives, a plan that positively encourages a
man to get out and work as soon and as much as
possible." Lloydminster, Saskatchewan, September 8,
1969.

response would be considered. The "stream" was
divided into five half-day sessions, two of which
were virtually unstructured and encouraged exten-
sive discussion. No formal vote was taken, since
the conference had no authority to make policy,
but the consensus expressed by the co-chairman[183]
was subject to discussion and amendment in a morning
session the last day of the conference. In the
event, her consensus was accepted, although there
had been extensive debate and disagreement. In his
own closing remarks, Mr. Stanfield announced that
the agreed consensus would be referred to a policy
committee within the caucus.[184] That has been done,
and the committee has adopted the practice of
regularly inviting participation of non-parliamen-
tarians. Mr. Anthony Westell, a newspaper columnist,
syndicated, wrote that this result was a major defeat
for Mr. Stanfield.[185] What it meant instead was that

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183. In this case the active co-chairman was
Mrs. Jean Wadds, former Member of Parliament. Her
co-chairman was Fernand Alie, then president of the
Progressive Conservative Association of Quebec.

184. Speech to conclude the Niagara Falls Conference,
October 13, 1969.

185. The original column ran in The Toronto Star,
October 13, 1969. Its significance is only that
Mr. Westell's professional preference for drama over
fact encouraged a public impression that was the
opposite of what happened. However, the impression of
a column is as ephemeral as the opinion of a columnist.

a contentious proposal originated by the leadership
and which the rank-and-file at first reacted against,
has been discussed and embraced by a representative
body of the whole party. Since it was not, by mid-1971,
official party policy and the sponsoring party had
not, by mid-1971, formed the government, the innova-
tive effect on the larger political system cannot
be clearly assessed. However, at the least, the
process had a high educative value. Most of the
discussion was public, occurring in a way that would
inform partisans and non-partisans about the proposal,
and thereby reduce to some degree the suspicions which
might deter an innovative response to poverty. If
some form of minimum annual income proposal is
adopted, the innovative impact of this process on
the system will be even more pronounced.

CHAPTER SEVEN:

CONCLUSIONS.

This paper has considered five national party policy conferences, in the context of the require- ment and performance of innovation in the Canadian political system. Certain general conclusions can be stated;

1. The Party as Innovator.

Although there is dispute about their effective- ness, parties are generally acknowledged to play an important innovative role in systems which feature active party competition. At the least, when competition exists, parties make it possible period- ically to change the personnel of government. Usually they do more. When it faces criticism and the prospect of displacement by an alternative party, the majority party tends to stay responsive to public attitudes. A minority party tends to embrace new people and proposals as a necessary means to win office. The unique function of the party is to provide a dynamic connection between the citizens and the state; the party is the isthmus on which public institutions and private attitudes most regularly meet. Consequently one innovative function of parties is to reflect changes in public attitude and

thereby contribute to changes in public policy.
That happens most dramatically when one party
replaces another in government, but the process is
more regular than that.

It should be emphasised that the critical change
discussed here is change in attitude, rather than in
the detail of policy. The concept of "policy-making"
is misleading. Parties are competent only to deal
with the general direction of a policy. Its
specific detail must be worked out by other agents
in another atmosphere. Leon Epstein correctly
observes that "parties, given their electoral functions,
are not especially well qualified to assume the
additional functions of policy-making."[186] Support-
ing that observation is extensive evidence, which
it would be perverse to interpret simply as proof
of bad faith, of specific proposals made in opposi-
tion and modified or abandoned in office. The
significance of "party policy" is not its substance
or sophistication but rather the degree to which it
represents new attitudes which will be acted on.
The element of "action" is crucial. It is what

186. Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western
Democracies, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1957,
p. 269.

distinguishes the party from the seminar. The
function of the party is not to give ideas birth,
but to give them effect. Even then, in formal terms,
the party is only an intermediary, whose power con-
sists in its capacity to force the formal institu-
tions to respond.

2. The Particular Need for Party Innovation in Canada.

Party innovation is particularly important in
Canada where it is necessary not simply to maintain
the socio-political system, but also to maintain an
awareness of the national community. In other
countries geography, culture or history relieve
national institutions of some of the burden of uniting
the nation. In Canada, that role rests more exclusively
with institutions, which must more frequently prove
the relevance of the whole system to each of its
parts. To an unusual degree, the Canadian national
state must be active to survive. Nations stronger in
history or homogeneity can rely on those strengths to
resist particularist internal attacks and to respond
to expensive national challenges. Canada cannot,
and is further disadvantaged by the weakness of many
agencies which in other societies play uniting and
innovating roles. By default, the burden of that
role falls disproportionately upon the national

political parties, which alone among national
agencies combine both the incentive to propose
change and the ability to legitimize its implemen-
tation.

Canadian national unity depends upon political
innovation. As in every country new grievances
constantly emerge. In Canada if a grievance goes
without response, there is the danger that the anger
of the aggrieved will focus on the regime, not just
the government of the day. If inaction is attributed
to regional or racial or other persistent prejudice
there is no Canadian myth strong enough to protect
the regime. Virtually the only way to maintain the
regime is to make it responsive. That is the function
of the parties--and a function which no other national
agency performs so consistently and broadly.

The formal policy conference is not necessarily
the most important instrument of innovation in a
national party, but it is symbolic of the process.
Indeed the conference phenomenon indicates that
innovation is so central a function of parties that
if existing agencies fail to perform it, new agencies
will be created. Policy conferences developed when
traditional instruments of innovation stopped
innovating, as in the cases of Port Hope and

Fredericton, or needed help, as in the cases of
Kingston and Niagara Falls. The conference form
was chosen precisely because of its capacity for
innovation. It is important to emphasise that only
the form of the conferences was new; the function is
traditional and elemental to a competitive party.
The participation in policy discussion of partisans
from outside caucus was well-established before the
conferences, and every conference explicitly
respected the exclusive power of the caucus to
legitimize policy. In traditional fashion again,
the policy conferences adopted proposals for change
but did not "originate" them. As with the party in
the larger social system, the function of policy
conferences is not to pull ideas new-born from the
womb and slap them into life but, after they have
gained a little strength, to propose them for
adoption by un-natural parents. Even then, the
policy conference cannot sign the papers to authorize
adoption; that remains a prerogative of the parliamen-
tary leadership. The conference can, however,
indicate whether the child would be welcome.

It could be argued that conferences in fact stifle innovation, by deflecting innovators into a side room where they can rejoice in one another's company, perhaps add some numbers to the total occupancy of the party house, but still command only the room, not the house. This may have been the sort of view taken of the Port Hope and Frederic-ton conferences by Mr. Meighen and Mr. Diefenbaker respectively. Mr. Meighen thought Port Hope "did no harm or very little"[187] and Mr. Diefenbaker used the occasion of his speech at Fredericton both to lambast the Liberals and observe that he didn't really need the Beatle wig proposed by Daniel Cappon, a McLuhanite, as a means of identifying with the "new" electorate. The evidence indicates, however, that the conferences served to bring the innovators into the main rooms of the party house, and made the party itself more competitive in the larger system.

3. <u>Innovation and Independence.</u>

It would be highly contentious, and virtually impossible, to attempt to rank the policy conferences in terms of their importance as innovative instruments.

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187. Roger Graham, <u>No Surrender</u>, <u>op cit</u>, p. 140, citing correspondence, Meighen to his son.

One would be involved in trading card computations:
one Dalton Camp for two Tom Kents, "deux nations"
for economic continentalism. However it is possible,
and useful, to distinguish among the conferences in
terms of the independence of their innovative function.
Three categories seem reasonable: (1) conferences
which were independent sources of innovation; (2)
conferences which were part of a larger process of
innovation; and (3) conferences largely unrelated to
innovation.

The conference held by the Liberal party at
Harrison Hot Springs belongs in the last category.
It was sponsored by a party which was not only in
government but firmly and relatively freshly there.
Ministers were prominent and proselytizing at and
before the conference and, in at least one case,[188]
the author of a conference paper which disputed a
government policy was called to Ottawa for advance
dissuasion. The Harrison Hot Springs experience is
interesting because, while it was described as a
policy conference, it was conducted in an atmos-
phere very much more like that of resolutions

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188. Mel Hurtig, chairman of the conference foreign
relations subcommittee.

sessions of annual meetings of the two major

parties. It is customary, at those meetings, to

encourage the appearance of passionate discussion

while carefully avoiding the embarrassment of disa-

greement with the leadership. Given the diverse and

centrifugal nature of the nation, annual meetings

are generally designed to reinforce the feeling of

family in a party; while discussion is encouraged,

disagreement is not. Their general purpose has

been to consolidate, not innovate. Such meetings

are of course legitimate, as education programs in

parties of ideology are legitimate, but they conflict

as directly with free or innovative policy discussion.

To a degree that same criticism applies to the

Montmorency conference, which was more interested in

unity than enquiry. Montmorency occurred, however,

during an inter-regnum, and there was no established

leadership to articulate or enforce a party line.

The contribution of Montmorency was explicitly to

extend to policy the innovative thrust inevitably

associated with a change in leadership, particularly

a forced change. Montmorency was an incidental

result of innovative forces already in motion, and

it belongs just inside the door of the second

category of conference, those which are part of a

process of innovation. In the center of that cate-

gory are the two leader-sponsored conferences,

Kingston and Niagara Falls. In both cases, the

leader-sponsors were innovators and chose the

conference as one instrument, among others; these

conferences were instruments of innovation, while

Montmorency was an incident of the changes associated

with the leadership convention. In conferences of

this second category, discussion is less fettered,

but not completely free. While discussion is not

forced to follow lines favored by the leader-sponsor,

it is encouraged to. That would logically apply

also to conferences sponsored by innovators who

were not party leaders; there would be an inclina-

tion for the direction of discussion to conform with

the direction of innovation.

The Port Hope and Fredericton conferences are

in the category of independent sources of innovation.

They occurred because something had to or the system

(in this case, the party) would break down. In a

sense, they were the purest or freest agents of

innovation because, while their participants and

organizers knew what kind of consolidative forces

they were "against", they were not bound by an

existing direction of innovation. That was particu-

larly so at Fredericton which, with Marshall McLuhan

as its theme speaker, ranged more widely in its

discussion than any other conference. Port Hope

did operate within a semantic framework of develop-

ing a viable "free enterprise" alternative to

"socialism", but in fact discussion was not canalized

in advance. Port Hope occurred during a time pre-

occupied with ideology. A lot was allowed in the

name of "free enterprise", including ideas which many

"socialists" of the day could espouse and which some

"free enterprisers" found anathema.

In effect, these three categories reflect three

different conditions of freedom of discussion: at

Harrison Hot Springs there was not much freedom; at

Port Hope and Fredericton, virtually no limitation;

and in the middle category an implicit but not

stifling limitation in that the route of discussion

was suggested by the sponsors. Obviously, discussion

was not absolutely free at any conference; every

administrative decision imposed some limitation,

as of course did every prepared paper. The degree of

freedom is germane because free inquiry and comment

are essential to innovation. A builder ordered to

innovate with stone is less likely to find new forms

than an innovative builder who has his choice of materials,

That helps focus attention on a dilemma of

parties. Just as they require innovation to succeed,

they have required preconceptions to survive.

Partisanship is based on the preconceived view that

"your" party will be right on an issue and its

opponent wrong; because of such preconceptions,

there are people to man polls in an election, or

to respond with skepticism to plausible panaceas

when an opponent offers them. The dilemma derives

not only from the necessity of weaning your partisans

from their preconceptions very gently. A habit

develops, of imposing preconceptions, in such a

way that policy conferences are policed at Harrison

Hot Springs, or directed towards pre-ordained topics

at Niagara Falls. Institutions become socialised

too and it is significant that, in both parties,

the first conferences were the freer. Perhaps the

innovative policy conference is already a whooping

crane, being extinguished by people who claim to

prize it.

4. <u>Innovation and Third Parties.</u>

By focussing upon formal policy conferences this

paper has excluded consideration of the CCF-NDP which

did not have policy conferences per se. · That

omission should not suggest that the Progressive

Conservative and Liberal parties innovate in ways

basically different from the CCF-NDP. Such an

interpretation would not only be wrong, but would

contribute to the mistaken view that they are signi-

ficantly different kinds of parties. A great deal

more attention should be paid to the open-ness of

all the national parties, and to their service in

seeking interests and aspirations which, if left

untended, might explode into conflict particularly

destructive to a country as loosely-bound as Canada.

It is understandable that the "third-party" phenomenon,

with its roots in ideology and eccentricity, should

attract more attention than the conventional parties--

particularly from academic observers. However that

has contributed to the false impression that innova-

tion is a particular function of third parties and

is performed only irregularly by the major parties.

A similar misconception prevailed about the

British parties, deriving from an assumption that

a left-wing party is somehow, naturally, more

responsive. Robert McKenzie[189] observes that

189. British Political Parties, op cit, p. 15.

Robert Michels, who originated the "mass-cadre"
distinction and inspired the confusion that causes,
assumed right wing parties were by definition undemo-
cratic and that left wing parties, because of their
natal association with "mass" movements were
democratic, indigenously and indestructibly.
McKenzie has shown that as the British Labour party
grew beyond its populist origins and became competi-
tive it became organizationally almost indistinguish-
able from the Conservative party. McKenzie particu-
larly emphasises that the similarities persist
despite their denial by Labour party spokesmen and
despite the appearance of greater constituent partici-
pation in the Labour party--an appearance probably
sustained because Labour partisans believe they are
more effective, not because they are in fact.[190]
Clearly there is membership influence in both British
parties, in that only at its peril would either party
ignore the strong opinion on an issue of its

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190. The Labour party Blackpool conference of 1970
voted, over the direct objection of Harold Wilson,
to instruct the parliamentary party to pay more
attention to Labour party resolutions. That the
conference should vote confidence in itself is hardly
surprising; Mr. Wilson's attitude was much more
significant, reflecting the reality that was and
will be.

constituents. Just as clearly, in any crunch the

leadership decides. That can be called "oligarchy"

or not, but it is as much a feature of so-called

"mass" as of so-called "cadre" parties, and as much

a feature of Canada as of Britain. The former

national leader of the Canadian CCF, Mr. M. J. Coldwell,

acknowledged as much when he told the party's 1948

national convention:

> [The electoral promises], and the
> manner of fulfillment, must be left
> to the judgement of the Parliamentary
> group whose activities will be assessed
> by the Canadian electorate to whom in
> the final analysis under our democratic
> and parliamentary system they must
> always be responsible.[101]

McKenzie uses a similar argument, of responsibility

to electorate and Parliament, to justify the limits

on membership control.[102] While that justification

seems to involve another fiction[193] it is beside the

point. What is important is to recognize that the

claim that responsiveness of parties varies directly

with their origin or form of organization is no more

than a myth. The determinants of innovation are

elsewhere, and should be examined.

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101. Quoted in F. C. Engelmann, "Membership Participa-
tion in Policy-Making in the CCF", Canadian Journal
of Economics and Political Science, vol. 22, no. 2,
p. 173.

102. McKenzie, op cit, pp. 587-588.

193. It is difficult to determine the extent to which
a sense of "responsibility" to the electorate impinges
on practicing parliamentarians. The writer's impression

5. Innovation and Party Competition.

Necessity is the mother of innovation. Parties accept or propose changes because that is the best way to win or keep office. When the party system is imbalanced, between one strong party and one or several weak parties, there is often less incentive to innovate. That can be for three reasons. First, the majority party can consider itself safe without innovation. Second, the minority parties can think they are so far behind nothing will help. Third, minority parties accustomed to losing sometimes develop goals other than competition for office; by draining off part of the vote against the government they can in effect protect the majority party and relieve it of the necessity to innovate. It would be very useful to have an objective study of the effect upon innovation of third parties whose existence makes the system uncompetitive.

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is that it is an argument to be used when it serves, but not an article of faith, and that not many practicing parliamentarians exert themselves to know what "the public" wants on ordinary issues. They consult their friends and partisan advisors rather more closely, or they consult their conscience, or nothing at all. That impression is generally confirmed by the interviews reported in Allan Kornberg: Canadian Legislative Behaviour: A Study of the 25th Parliament, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967, pp. 126-129. The motive for heeding public attitudes is probably more often an interest in re-election, rather than a belief the public is, or has a right.

6. <u>Innovation and Federalism.</u>

Whenever power is shared, something must force the sharing. The most significant influence in Canada is federalism, which requires a division of official powers and functions, and reflects a diversity of interests which must constantly be mediated. The form of federalism imposes decentralization on national parties and accustoms parties and governments to living with a knowledge of their formal limitations. The fact of federalism, or diversity, means there will always be a demand for modification, at least, of some national policies. Both conditions encourage innovation. Decentralization means there are other avenues to reform than through the parliamentary caucus or party leadership. Dissatisfaction with existing policy means there is always an incentive for parties or governments to consider changing policy.

7. <u>Innovation and the Parliamentary System.</u>

In practice in Canada innovation has been a particular function of opposition parties. Government parties also innovate, but they tend naturally to be less critical of policies enacted in their name. Their innovative role tends to become incidental both to the innovative activities of the formal institutions of government and to the educative and affirmative activities of a party in power.

A party in opposition, on the other hand, is usually preoccupied with the necessity of winning new support. In addition, the parliamentary system encourages innovation in opposition parties, by isolating them from power, by requiring them to criticize every proposal and by ranging them generally "against" official policy. Further the requirement of immediate and reasoned response to government initiatives, and the pay-offs in morale and publicity for catching the government out, require that opposition parties anticipate develop- ments, a process which increases their reliance on dissident or expert opinion in the community.

8. Conferences and Internal Conflict.

Parties are not monoliths. They contain most of the factions and divisions of the larger society. Conflict is as natural and continuous within a national party as it is within the nation. From one perspective, each policy conference can be seen as the instrument of one side in a factional dispute. Sometimes it was an instrument against the constituted authority in the party, sometimes an instrument employed by that authority. In each case, however, the conference was an instrument of an innovative

faction in conflict with a consolidative faction.
The conferences were extraordinary instruments
resorted to when traditional instruments of innova-
tion needed bolstering or else were controlled by
consolidators. In effect, they were born to
innovate.

What is important to emphasise is that the
conferences are symbols of a conflict that is
always going on in a dynamic party. There have
always been, in all dynamic Canadian parties, parti-
sans outside Parliament who influenced the course of
the party. In other words, the parliamentary caucus
has always shared influence with groups outside
caucus. The one special and distinguishing power
of the leader and caucus is the formal right to
declare party policy; that was consistently respected
and never disputed by the policy conferences. A
useful analogy is to compare the party to Parliament.
The caucus is the "government" and has the power to
decide. The other faction, represented in policy
conferences, the national association and elsewhere,
is the "official opposition" with the right to
discuss, the ability to influence and the power,
ultimately, to change its governors.

9. A Note on the New Limitations of Opposition.

Certain serious electoral disadvantages attach
to the role of Official Opposition in the Canadian
parliamentary system. There are undeniable advan-
tages as well, involved in the status and visibility
of some parliamentary leaders, but probably too
little attention has been given to the institutional
disabilities of that role, and their implications
for the party in the role and for the system. It
is, for example, difficult to cite a single case,
in any of the eleven jurisdictions of Canada, where
the performance by a party of its responsibilities
as Official Opposition was the primary source of its
success in forming the government in a subsequent
general election. So far as parliamentary perfor-
mance is concerned, the truism holds that office
has been often lost but seldom won. This is not
to deny that the campaigns conducted by former
Opposition parties have sometimes been the critical
factor in changing governments, but those have been
campaigns in which the parliamentary performance of
the challenger has been largely irrelevant. An
inept performance in Official Opposition might

prejudice a party seeking to mount a successful
campaign outside Parliament, but there is little
evidence to suggest that the effective performance
of the role of Official Opposition has had any more
than a marginal influence in campaigns which
succeeded in changing governments. This does not
deny the importance of an effective Official Opposi-
tion in parliament or legislature, but is simply to
affirm that the importance of that role is institu-
tional, not electoral; its effect is to criticize
governments but not to change them. The important
point is that the very effectiveness of the Official
Opposition party in parliamentary politics can inhibit
its effectiveness in electoral politics. Classically,
the Official Opposition has two roles in Parliament,
as critic and alternative. In practice in Parlia-
ment, the role of critic is paramount. The idea
that the Governor-General could call upon the
Official Opposition party to form an "alternative"
government had little life after King-Byng, and
virtually none after Mr. Pearson's retroactive

redefinition of the nature of non-confidence in
1968. It offends notions of popular democracy
anyway. Any government which came to office in
that way would meet immediate and virtually irresis-
tible pressures to have the judgement of Her
Majesty's representative confirmed or rejected by
that of the people. The limitations inherent in
the role of critic are two, one traditional and
one emerging. The traditional limitation is that
the party is habitually off-balance, responding
and bound to the initiatives and priorities of the
Government. It can occasionally flush a hare and
chase it, but that is more diverting than decisive.
Not only is the Official Opposition party precluded
from making its own issues, it is often so pre-
occupied with Parliament that it fails to see the
issues developing in the country.

The other limitation is that the stance of a
critic is necessarily negative. This is a particu-
lar burden in modern circumstances, when develop-
ments in education, information and the scope and
complexity of public business have changed public
perceptions and expectations of Parliament and
parties. There is reason to believe that an
increasing proportion of the Canadian electorate

perceives the function of Parliament to be legisla-
tive and the function of parties to be the proposal
of "positive" policy for public consideration. That
change, from classical perceptions of Parliament as
a place of debate and parties as the major partici-
pants in debate, creates particular problems for
Opposition parties, whose institutional role is to
be critical or "negative". Changes in the scope of
public business and the rate and speed of media
transmission to the public also squeeze the Opposi-
tion, who must counter considered statements of
Government policy, often with little warning, prepara-
tion or assistance, first in Parliament, and
immediately thereafter in capsule form on national
television. The traditional "negative" requirements
of the system are reinforced by the instinct to be
cautious and critical in short-notice response to
complex announcements. So each night on television,
the image goes forth of well-prepared ministers
trying valiantly to act, and uninformed Opposition
leaders trying stubbornly to stop them. It is like
a formula Hollywood Western, with the Opposition
playing Indian.

Devices are available to help Opposition
parties balance some of the disadvantages inherent
in the parliamentary role: speeches, publications,
tours and television outside Parliament, "Opposition
days" and general debate inside Parliament. These
devices are ineffective, in electoral terms, to a
party locked in to Parliament by the parliamentary
preoccupation of its leadership, as was the case
with the parliamentary leadership of the Conserva-
tive party in 1942 and the parliamentary leadership
of the Progressive Conservative party in 1964. In
such cases the devices of balance are used to
confirm, not countervail, the image established in
Parliament. Even when the parliamentary leadership
seeks to be effective in the country as well as in
Parliament, the cumulative effect of these devices
of balance is seldom sufficient to offset the
"negative" impression communicated by the media
covering Parliament daily, and cultivated by
traditionalist members of the party's parliamentary
elite. A more dramatic device is required to demon-
strate the positive or progressive commitment of the
party. It is the argument here that the most

significant function performed by the five policy

conferences considered was as such a device.

Although other important functions were also per-

formed--recruitment, policy development, mainte-

nance of morale--none had the independent signifi-

cance of this demonstration of a progressive

dimension capable of attracting previous

non-supporters.

APPENDICES

The following appendices are the official lists
of persons registered as attending the five policy
conferences. Inevitably, such lists miss some
participants and designate as attending persons
who were expected but didn't appear. A rough attempt
has been made to indicate the auspices under which
each participant came. Those who were known partisans
when they came, or quickly identified as partisans,
are identified by a "P" for partisan. Those who came
as resource people or invited program participants are
designated "R" for resource. Those who came as journa-
lists or other observers are designated "O". Where
there is no designation, the writer does not know
the appropriate category. There is no attempt to
apply this designation to the Port Hope Conference,
because of its distance in time, although it is
understood that all participants were active in the
party and could be designated "P" by this system.
The designation is based only upon the impressions
of the writer, which are least reliable for the
Kingston Conference. The participants are listed
alphabetically by province.

APPENDIX A:

PARTICIPANTS IN THE PORT HOPE CONFERENCE

Alberta

A. L. Burrows	Edmonton
Hugh C. Farthing	Calgary
H. A. Friedman	Edmonton
M. E. Manning	Calgary
R. Martland	Edmonton
H. R. Milner	Edmonton
F. J. Mitchell	Edmonton
Dr. G. D. Stanley	Calgary
Andrew Stewart	Edmonton
John Sydie	Edmonton
Mrs. W. H. A. Thomas	Olds
W. H. A. Thomas	Olds

British Columbia

A. C. DesBrisay	Vancouver
C. B. Garland	Nelson
A. E. Jukes	Vancouver
R. H. Tupper	Vancouver

Manitoba

E. G. Phipps Baker	Winnipeg
Lieut. Col. L. D. M. Baxter	Winnipeg
Ald. James Black	Winnipeg
R. K. Finlayson	Winnipeg

Manitoba. (Cont.)

J. D. Henderson	Winnipeg
Ald. Hilda Hesson	Winnipeg
Harley M. Hughes	Winnipeg
W. W. Kennedy	Winnipeg
G. W. Northwood	Winnipeg
Charlie D. Roblin	Winnipeg
Dr. Sidney E. Smith	Winnipeg
G. S. Thorvaldson	Winnipeg

New Brunswick.

K. B. Carson	
Hugh John Flemming	Saint John
Senator G. B. Jones	Juniper
Hugh Mackay	Apohaqui
Mrs. Hugh Mackay	Rothesay
C. F. Phinney	Rothesay
Mrs. C. F. Phinney	Saint John
D. G. Robertson	Saint John
W. J. West	Plaster Rock
	Fredericton

Nova Scotia

D. J. Buckley	
George S. Dickie	Sydney
L. W. Fraser	Middle Stewiacke
D. G. Grant	Halifax
F. H. Patterson	Sydney
A. S. Pattillo	Truro
C. B. Smith	Halifax
C. W. Stairs	Halifax
Frank T. Stanfield	Halifax
	Truro

Ontario

George Atkins	Oakville
John Alton	Lorneville
William Broder	Ottawa
A. L. Brooks	Welland
Robert A. Bryce	Toronto
R. A. Bell	Ottawa
Ed. W. Bickle	Toronto
L. E. Blackwell	Toronto
J. Talmadge Bryan	Sunderland
Floyd S. Chalmers	Toronto
W. S. Christie	Ottawa
Lt. Col. Alan Cockeram	Toronto
Mrs. C. Cockshutt	Brantford
G. R. Conquergood	Toronto
T. K. Creighton	Oshawa
J. H. Dempsey	Stratford
T. R. Dent	Woodstock
M. Desbrisay	Toronto
G. M. Dix	Toronto
A. R. Douglas	London
N. S. Dowd	Ottawa

Ontario (Cont.)

R. R. Evans	Hamilton
Stanley E. Fennell	Cornwall
Ald. Donald M. Fleming	Toronto
Dr. D. R. Fleming	New Liskeard
C. G. Frost	Lindsay
Professor Grenville B. Frost	Kingston
F. G. Gardiner	Toronto
K. C. Gray	Kirkland Lake
John Grudeff	Toronto
Mrs. E. J. Hallett	Oakville
John C. Halliday	Thorold
Mrs. W. S. Haney	Sarnia
Thomas J. Hannon	Kitchener
W. I. Hearst	Toronto
Sydney Hermant	Toronto
Bert Hicks	Lindsay
Douglas G. Higgins	Toronto

Ontario (Cont.)

G. M. Hobart	London
Harry Hopper	Hamilton
Clifford H. Howard	Toronto
A. H. Humble	Port Hope
John A. Huston	Toronto
Alfred Kennard	Bartonville P.O.
T. Ashmore Kidd	Kingston
Watson Kirkconnell	Carnarvon
Robert A. Laidlaw	Toronto
John L. Lang	Sault Ste. Marie
Dr. H. A. Logan	Toronto
Dr. James McClinton	Timmins
Spencer McConnell	Port Burwell
Miss Evelyn McDonald	Toronto
A. D. McKenzie	Toronto
J. M. Macdonnell	Toronto
Major Alexander MacKenzie	Woodbridge
Argue Martin	Hamilton
N. R. Martin	St. Thomas

Ontario (Cont.)

Mrs. R. J. Meggs	Gore's Landing
D. R. Michener	Toronto
W. K. Molson	Port Hope
T. H. Moorehead	Brampton
Hon. Dr. Raymond D. Morand	Windsor
D. R. Morand	Windsor
Mayor William Morrison	Hamilton
W. R. Milton	Port Hope
Thomas Oakley	Toronto
Mrs. George Otton	Woodstock
Dana H. Porter	Toronto
Rev. Norman Rawson	Hamilton
Frank O. Reeves	Weston
Ernest Reynolds	Brantford
Dr. John M. Robb	Blind River
A. Kelso Roberts	Toronto
R. C. Rowland	Toronto
James A. Sanderson	Oxford Station
Dr. H. A. Skinner	London
George D. Stevens	North Bay

Ontario (Cont.)

J. H. Stevens	London
T. H. Stinson	Lindsay
W. R. Strike	Bowmanville
Dr. R. Hobbs Taylor	Dashwood
R. H. Thomson	Toronto
Peter Tully	Hamilton
W. Merion Vickers	Toronto
Dr. R. P. Vivian	Port Hope
David J. Walker	Toronto
George E. Wallace	North Bay
O. M. Walsh	Hamilton
A. G. Walwyn	Toronto
Howard R. White	London
G. W. Wigle	Hamilton
A. R. Willmott	Cobourg
R. F. Wilson	Toronto
H. Kennedy Wood	Hamilton

Prince Edward Island

Quebec

J. H. Bender	Outremont
J. C. H. Dussault	Montreal
John Farthing	Lennoxville
Hon. Lucien Gendron	Outremont
Hon. Sam Gobeil	Gatineau
John T. Hackett	Montreal
D. H. McDougall	Montreal

Quebec (Cont.)

Leon Methot	Three Rivers
G. Monette	Outremont
J. O. Montplaisir	Drummondville
J. Panneton	Montreal
Philias Pare	Montreal
J. G. Porteous	Montreal
B. Panet Raymond	Montreal
Ivan Sabourin	Montreal
G. S. Stairs	Montreal

Saskatchewan

Mrs. J. O. Begg	Swift Current
Mrs. J. H. Currie	Vonda
Cecil G. Schmitt	Saskatoon

Territories

Foreign Addresses

APPENDIX B:

PARTICIPANTS IN THE KINGSTON CONFERENCE

Alberta

Professor Grant Davy	Edmonton (P)
James H. Gray	Calgary
J. M. Hope	Edmonton
Mrs. Faith King	Edmonton
D. N. McColl	Edmonton

British Columbia

Dean G. C. Andrew	Vancouver (P)
John Davis	Vancouver (P)
Donald Moir	Vancouver
Nathan Nemetz	Vancouver
Hume Wright	West Vancouver
Professor John Young	Vancouver (R)

Manitoba

J. Comeau	Winnipeg
Lorne W. J. Hurd	Winnipeg (O)
Dr. Alan Klass	Winnipeg
Barrie Knight	Winnipeg
John Lamont	Winnipeg
Shane Mackay	Winnipeg (O)
J. F. O'Sullivan	Winnipeg
Stewart A. Searle, Jr.	Winnipeg
Alan Sweatman	Winnipeg

New Brunswick

David M. Dickson	Fredericton
Professor A. L. Levine	Fredericton

Newfoundland

John C. Crosbie	St. Johns (P)
Hon. J. W. Pickersgill, MP	Ottawa (P)

Nova Scotia

Professor John Graham	Halifax	
Guy Henson	Halifax	
Professor Walter Kontak	Antigonish	(R)
O. J. T. Troy	Halifax	

Ontario

Anthony Abbott	Oakville	(P)
John Aird	Toronto	(P)
David A. Anderson	Toronto	(P)
A. Andras	Ottawa	(R)
George Bain	Toronto	
Michael Barkway	Ottawa	(O)
Mayor Vincent Barrie	St. Thomas	
Allen Beckett	Toronto	
Fred Belaire	Ottawa	(P)
Russell Bell	Ottawa	(R)
Mrs. Anne Francis Bird	Ottawa	(O)
John Bird	Ottawa	(O)
Gordon Blair	Ottawa	(P)
W. Buchanan	Ottawa	
Robert H. Carley	Peterborough	
Miss E. S. Carscallen	Ottawa	
William J. Cheesman	Ancaster	
Hon. Lionel Chevrier	Ottawa	(P)
Hon. John J. Connolly, Senator	Ottawa	(P)
Professor C. A. Curtis	Kingston	
Arthur Davies	Kingston	(P)
Kildare Dobbs	Toronto	
Gordon Dryden	Toronto	
A. Davidson Dunton	Ottawa	(P)
Professor James Eayrs	Toronto	(R)
Marvin Farrell	Hamilton	
David Ferguson	Toronto	
Alistair Fraser	Ottawa	(P)
Professor G. French	Hamilton	
Royce Frith	Toronto	(P)
H. F. Gibson	Kingston	
Alastair Gillespie	Toronto	(P)
Marcel Gingras	Ottawa	(O)

Ontario (Cont.)

Walter Gordon	Toronto	(P)
Miss Therese Goulet	Toronto	
David B. Greenspan	Toronto	(P)
Harold Greer	Toronto	(O)
D. Hardtman	Kingston	
Hon. Walter Harris	Markdale	(P)
Mark Harrison	Toronto	(O)
Dr. R. H. Hay	Kingston	
Hon. Paul Hellyer, MP	Toronto	(P)
W. J. Henderson	Kingston	
Larratt T. Higgins	Toronto	
Professor W. C. Hood	Toronto	
Alan Jarvis	Ottawa	
Roger Jeanty	Toronto	
Professor Pauline Jewett	Ottawa	(P)
G. B. Johnston	Ottawa	
L. F. Jones	Ottawa	(P)
Franc Joubin	Toronto	
H. E. Kidd	Ottawa	(P)
Professor William Kilbourn	Hamilton	(P)
Mrs. R. A. Kinnear	Port Colborne	(P)
Archibald Laidlaw	Ottawa	
Miss Julia V. LaMarsh	Niagara Falls	(P)
Maurice Lamontagne	Ottawa	(P)
D. A. Lang	Toronto	(P)
J. D. Leitch	Toronto	
Douglas LePan	Kingston	
Professor Marcus Long	Toronto	
Professor Peyton Lyon	London	
William Mahoney	Toronto	(R)
Frederic S. Martin	Ottawa	
Hon. Paul Martin, MP	Windsor	(P)
Victor V. Mason	Burlington	
General A. Bruce Matthews	Toronto	(P)
Vladan Milic	Toronto	
Jim Moore	Ottawa	(P)
Professor John Morgan	Toronto	
William J. Morris	Toronto	
W. A. Macdonald	Toronto	
R. A. MacDougall	Woodstock	

Ontario (Cont.)

Allan MacEachen	Ottawa	(P)
Michael Mackenzie	Toronto	(P)
R. M. MacIntosh	Toronto	
W. A. Mackintosh	Kingston	
Gordon MacLeod	Downsview	
D. K. MacTavish	Ottawa	
Dr. E. A. McCulloch	Toronto	
Miss Alice McKeown	Kingston	
Miss Catherine McLean	Toronto	
A. N. McLeod	Toronto	
Father Peter Nearing	Ottawa	
Professor E. P. Neufeld	Toronto	
Peter C. Newman	Ottawa	(O)
R. O'Hagan	Toronto	(P)
Earl Orser	Toronto	
John C. Parkin	Don Mills	
Professor John Paul	London	
Hon. L. B. Pearson, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Miss Annette Perron	Ottawa	
Harvey Perry	Toronto	
Bruce Powe	Toronto	(P)
Morgan Reid	Toronto	
James Renwick	Toronto	
Ronald S. Ritchie	Toronto	
Edward Roberts	Toronto	(P)
Professor Albert Rose	Toronto	
Douglas C. Rowland	Toronto	
Edward Saunders	Toronto	
Miss Mildred Schwartz	Toronto	
James Scott	Ottawa	(P)
Mitchell Sharp	Toronto	(P)
Vern Singer, MPP	Toronto	(P)
Mrs. Nancy Sleeswijk	Toronto	
David Stanley	Toronto	
Stefan Stykolt	Toronto	
R. A. F. Sutherland	Toronto	
Kurt Swinton	Toronto	
Andrew Thompson, MPP	Toronto	(P)
Professor Frank Underhill	Ottawa	(R)
Boyd Upper, MPP	Toronto	(P)
Dr. Claude Vipond	Oshawa	
William Wilder	Toronto	
Hon. Robert Winters	Toronto	(P)
Harry Wolfson	Toronto	

Prince Edward Island

Quebec

Andre Bachand	Montreal	
Marc Briere	Montreal	
Jacques Brillant	Rimouski	
Lucien Cardin, MP	Sorel	(P)
John Claxton	Montreal	(P)
F. E. Cleyn	Huntington	
Mrs. Dian Cohen	Montreal	
Dean Maxwell Cohen	Montreal	
Jean David	Montreal	(O)
Jean de Grandpre	Montreal	
Monteath Douglas	Montreal	
Brig. C. M. Drury	Montreal	(P)
Yves Dube	Quebec	(P)
George Ferguson	Montreal	(P)
R. M. Fowler	Montreal	(P)
L. -G. Giguere	Montreal	
Carl Goldenberg	Montreal	
Jean-Paul Gregoire	Montreal	
Hubert Guindon	Montreal	
T. W. Kent	Montreal	(P)
Leon Lalande	Montreal	
Andre Laurendeau	Montreal	(O)
Jean Marchand	Quebec	
Hon. George Marler	Montreal	(P)
Roy Matthews	Montreal	
Francois Mercier	Montreal	
Claude Morin	Quebec	
David L. MacFarlane	Montreal	
R. B. MacPherson	Montreal	
Jean-Marie Nadeau	Montreal	
John Payne	Montreal	
Mme. Jeanne Sauve	Montreal	(P)
Maurice Sauve	Montreal	(P)
Rt. Hon. Lord Shaughnessy	Montreal	
Arthur Smith	Montreal	
Edward Stamp	Montreal	
James L. Thom	Montreal	
Douglas Thomas	Montreal	
P. N. Thorsteinsson	Montreal	
John Turner	Montreal	(P)
Mr. H. P. van Ginkel	Montreal	
Mrs. H. P. van Ginkel	Montreal	
Bruce Whitestone	Montreal	

Saskatchewan

Charles Gibbings	Regina	
Alfred Gleave	Saskatoon	(R)
Otto Lang	Saskatoon	(P)
Dean J. Wendell Macleod, MD	Saskatoon	(R)
F. Von Pilis	Saskatoon	

Territories

Foreign Addresses

Dr. Doris Boyle	Baltimore
Professor Harry G. Johnson	Chicago
Peter Regenstreif	Ithaca

PARTICIPANTS IN THE FREDERICTON CONFERENCE

Alberta

Senator J. A. Buchanan	Edmonton	(P)
Mrs. J. A. Buchanan	Edmonton	(P)
Joe Clark	High River	(P)
Neil Crawford	Edmonton	(P)
Jack Davis	Calgary	(P)
Roy Deyell	Calgary	(P)
Mrs. Roy Deyell	Calgary	(P)
Hon. Marcel Lambert, MP	Edmonton	(P)
William McVeigh	Drumheller	(P)
Dr. John Porter	Calgary	(P)
Miss Lynn Smith	Calgary	(O)

British Columbia

Dr. E. R. Black	Vancouver	(P)
Gary Boyd	Victoria	(P)
Dr. H. A. C. Cairns	Vancouver	(R)
Stuart Fleming, MP	Vernon	(P)
Mrs. E. D. Fulton	Kamloops	(P)
Hon. E. D. Fulton	Kamloops	(P)
Bill Macadam	Campbell River	(P)
Harold Marshall	Winfield	(P)
Mrs. Dorothy Smith	Kelowna	(P)
Miss Mary Southin	Vancouver	(P)
John Taylor	West Vancouver	(P)
Malcolm Wickson	Vancouver	(P)

Manitoba

Mrs. Alta Atkinson	Lac du Bonnet	(P)
Charles Birt	Winnipeg	(P)
James Burns	Winnipeg	(P)
James Doak	Virden	(P)
Mrs. James Doak	Virden	(P)
S. J. Enns, MP	Portage la Prairie	(P)
Hon. Olive Irvine	Winnipeg	(P)
Duncan Jessiman	Winnipeg	(P)
Remi Lafreniere	St. Boniface	(P)

Manitoba (Cont.)

G. Campbell MacLean	St. Boniface	(P)
Joe Martin	Winnipeg	(P)
Arthur V. Mauro	Winnipeg	(P)
Professor W. L. Morton	Winnipeg	(R)
James Shore	Winnipeg	(P)
Robert A. Steen	Winnipeg	(P)
Mrs. Robert A. Steen	Winnipeg	(P)
Professor T. S. Webster	Winnipeg	(P)

New Brunswick

Fred J. Arsenault	Bathurst	(P)
Tom Bell, MP	Saint John	(P)
Mrs. Russell Bennett	Moncton	(P)
Ian Brown	Fredericton	(O)
Paul Creaghan	Moncton	(P)
Gordon Fairweather, MP	Rothesay	(P)
Mrs. Gordon Fairweather	Rothesay	(P)
Hon Hugh John Flemming, MP	Fredericton	(P)
Wendell Fulton	Fredericton	(O)
Graham Galloway	Fredericton	(O)
Dr. W. E. Hale	Fredericton	(P)
Roger Harley	Fredericton	(P)
Richard Hatfield, MLA	Hartland	(P)
Ralph Hay	Fredericton	(P)
Don Hoyt	Fredericton	(O)
Larry Knowles	Fredericton	(O)
Alfred Landry	Shediac	(P)
Euclide Leger	St. Anthony	(P)
Frank E. Lutes	Berry Mills	(P)
J. Chester MacRae, MP	Fredericton	(P)
Professor George McAllister	Fredericton	(P)
Lorne McGuigan	Saint John	(P)
Fred Nicholson	St. Stephen	(P)
Donald Patterson, MLA	Saint John	(P)
Bernard Poirier	Moncton	(O)
Roger Savoie	Rogersville	(P)
C. B. Sherwood, MLA	Norton	(P)
Mrs. Owen Smith	Fredericton	(P)
Richard Steeves	Saint John	(P)
Wallace Turnbull	Rothesay	(P)
Brig. Michael Wardell	Fredericton	(O)
Professor Aurele Young	Moncton	(R)

Newfoundland

Hon. W. J. Browne, MHA	St. Johns	(P)
A. B. Butt	St. Johns	(P)
W. S. Perlin	St. Johns	(P)

Nova Scotia

Norville Balch	Halifax	(O)
Dave Bazay	Halifax	(O)
John O. Bower	Shelburne	(P)
Dr. William Dalton	Dartmouth	(P)
Art Donahoe	Halifax	(P)
Hon. R. A. Donahoe, MLA	Halifax	(P)
Maurice Flemming	Shelburne	(P)
Professor Duncan Fraser	Wolfville	(R)
Walter Goodfellow	Halifax	(P)
John Kerr	Halifax	(O)
Dr. Paul Kinsman, MLA	Aylesford	(P)
Professor Walter Kontak	Antigonish	(R)
Mrs. Alex MacAulay	Halifax	(P)
Finlay MacDonald	Halifax	(P)
Ronald MacDonald	Halifax	(O)
Dr. Lewis Matheson	Sydney	
Lowell Murray	Dartmouth	(P)
Hon. George Nowlan, MP	Wolfville	(P)
Miss T. Pullen	Halifax	(O)
Hon. Robert Stanfield, MLA	Halifax	(P)
R. J. Thornhill	Dartmouth	(P)

Ontario

Professor John Abrams	Toronto	(R)
Gordon Aiken, MP	Gravenhurst	(P)
Bruce Alexander	Toronto	(O)
Norman Atkins	Toronto	(P)
Douglas Auld	Toronto	(P)
Miss Bonnie Bayne	Toronto	(P)
Jack Beal	Ottawa	(O)
Gilles Belanger	Ottawa	(O)
Elmer D. Bell	Exeter	(P)
Hon. R. A. Bell	Ottawa	(P)
Mrs. Ruth Bell	Bell's Corners	(P)
Kenneth C. Binks	Ottawa	(P)
Mrs. Kenneth C. Binks	Ottawa	(P)

Ontario (Cont.)

John Bird	Ottawa	(O)
Marcel Bureau	Ottawa	(P)
John Buss	Ottawa	(O)
Duncan Cameron	Ottawa	(O)
Dalton K. Camp	Toronto	(P)
Grant Campbell	Almonte	(P)
Dr. Daniel Cappon	Toronto	(R)
Dr. Robert M. Clark	Toronto	(P)
Ron Collister	Ottawa	(O)
Greg Connolly	Ottawa	(O)
Dr. John Conway	Toronto	(R)
Kenneth Cork	Toronto	
David Crane	Toronto	(O)
Fred Dawes	Chatham	
Norman DePoe	Ottawa	(O)
Dean Richard Dillon	London	(P)
Dean A. R. C. Duncan	Kingston	(R)
E. A. Dunlop, MPP	Toronto	(P)
Mrs. E. A. Dunlop	Toronto	(P)
Roy Faibish	Ottawa	(P)
Mrs. Laura Ferrier	York Mills	(P)
Douglas Fisher, MP	Ottawa	(O)
Meredith Fleming	Toronto	
W. W. Foot	Kitchener	
Mrs. W. W. Foot	Kitchener	
Tom Ford	Toronto	(O)
Dr. Eugene Forsey	Ottawa	(R)
E. A. Goodman	Toronto	(P)
Cameron Graham	Ottawa	(O)
Hon. Allister Grosart	Ottawa	(P)
Dr. J. R. W. Gwynne-Timothy	London	(P)
Mrs. J. R. W. Gwynne-Timothy	London	(P)
Dr. Phyllis Hanley	Toronto	(P)
David M. Harley	Toronto	
Hon. Irwin Haskett, MPP	Ottawa	(P)
Mrs. Irwin Haskett	Ottawa	(P)
Alan Heisey	Don Mills	(P)
George Hogan	Toronto	(P)
John W. Holmes	Toronto	(R)
Warren Hurst	Toronto	(P)
H. N. R. Jackman	Toronto	(P)
Don Johnston	Port Credit	(P)

Ontario (Cont.)

Ken Kelly	Ottawa	(O)
Claude Lajeunesse	Ottawa	(O)
Peter Leslie	Kingston	(O)
Charles Lynch	Ottawa	(O)
Flora MacDonald	Ottawa	(P)
H. Ian Macdonald	Toronto	(P)
Professor D. C. MacGregor	Toronto	
Mrs. Ward Markle	Willowdale	(P)
Ed Maynerick	Toronto	(P)
Jim McCook	Ottawa	(O)
Mrs. Jim McCook	Ottawa	(O)
Fred McCord	Ottawa	(O)
Hon. M. W. McCutcheon	Toronto	(P)
Clyde McDonald	Toronto	(R)
Mrs. Clyde McDonald	Toronto	(O)
Kaye McFarland	Napanee	(P)
Dr. A. N. McLeod	Toronto	(R)
Dr. Marshall McLuhan	Toronto	(R)
David B. Meynell	Toronto	(P)
Mrs. David B. Meynell	Toronto	(P)
Francois Morriset	Ottawa	(O)
W. B. Nesbitt, MP	Woodstock	(P)
Professor David Nowlan	Toronto	(R)
Del O'Brien	Westmeath	(P)
B. T. Richardson	Ottawa	(P)
E. S. Rogers	Toronto	(P)
Richard Rohmer	Toronto	(P)
Gordon Ross	Toronto	(P)
Lionel Schipper	Toronto	(P)
Douglas S. Scott	Hamilton	
A. E. Sheppard	London	(P)
Sant Singh	Ottawa	(P)
Alan Smith	Ottawa	(P)
D. S. Stephens	Hamilton	
Mrs. D. S. Stephens	Hamilton	
Professor Alastair Taylor	Kingston	(R)
Jim Taylor	Ottawa	(O)
Dr. E. Llewellyn Thomas	Toronto	(R)
William Thomson	Oakville	(P)
R. D. Thrasher	Ottawa	(P)
Professor S. G. Triantis	Toronto	(R)
Warner Troyer	Ottawa	(O)
John Vivash	Oshawa	(P)
Mrs. Jean Wadds, MP	Prescott	(P)
Robert Welch, MPP	St. Catharines	(P)
Anthony Westell	Toronto	(O)
Bill Whiteacre	Toronto	(P)

Ontario (Cont.)

Mrs. Bill Whiteacre	Toronto	(P)
James Williams	Ottawa	(O)

Prince Edward Island

Fred Arsenault	Mount Carmel	(P)
Bennett Carr	Charlottetown	(P)
Hon. L. G. Dewar, MLA	O'Leary	(P)
Heath Macquarrie, MP	Victoria	(P)
Arthur McInnis	Charlottetown	(P)
Dr. Cyril Sinnott	Charlottetown	(P)
Arthur Wright	Charlottetown	(P)

Quebec

Maurice Allard	Sherbrooke	(P)
W. David Angus	Westmount	(P)
Hon. Leon Balcer, MP	Trois-Rivieres	(P)
Marcel Belanger	Montreal	(O)
Claude Bigue	Amos	(P)
Arthur Blakely	Montreal	(O)
Joyce Blond	Montreal	(P)
Jacques Bouchard	Amos	(P)
Egan Chambers	Montreal	(P)
Mrs. Gretta Chambers	Montreal	(P)
Dr. Rosario Cousineau	Sherbrooke	(R)
Dr. Edward English	Montreal	(R)
Marcel Faribault	Montreal	(R)
Bernard Flynn	Baie Comeau	(P)
Hon. Jacques Flynn	Quebec	(P)
Heward Grafftey, MP	Knowlton	(P)
Peter V. Gundy	Montreal	(P)
Richard B. Holden	Montreal	(P)
Ernest Kockeritz	Montreal	(R)
Marc Lacoste	Outremont	(P)
Paul-E. Lafontaine	Montreal	(P)
Marc Lalonde	Montreal	(R)
Mme. J.-Rene Lessard	Montreal	(P)
Claude Leveille	Granby	(P)
Ronnie Luttrell	Montreal	(O)
William J. Mandzia	City of St. Laurent	(P)
Max McMahon	Montreal	(R-O)

Quebec (Cont.)

David Nathanson	Montreal	(O)
Hon. Josie Quart	Sillery	(P)
Claude Ryan	Montreal	(R-O)
Tom Van Dusen	Alymer	(P)
Mike Vineberg	Montreal	(P)
B. A. Warkentin	Montreal	(P)
Bruce Whitestone	Montreal	(R)
W. A. Wilson	Montreal	(O)

Saskatchewan

Hugh Arscott	Saskatoon	(P)
Dr. Lewis Brand	Saskatoon	(P)
Rt. Hon. John G. Diefenbaker, MP	Prince Albert	(P)
Fred Dunbar	Meadow Lake	(P)
Professor Roger Graham	Saskatoon	(P)
Hon. Alvin Hamilton, MP	Fort Qu'Appelle	(P)
Orris Keehr	Regina	(P)
Dr. J. B. Leishman	Regina	(P)
Don McGowan	Swift Current	(P)

Territories

Mark de Weerdt	Yellowknife	(P)
Gene Rheaume, MP	Yellowknife	(P)

Foreign Addresses

Tom Hockin	Cambridge, Mass.	(R)
Professor William Hull	Durham	(R)
Dr. Burton Weisbrod	Madison	(R)

APPENDIX D:

PARTICIPANTS IN THE MONTMORENCY CONFERENCE

Alberta

G. W. Baldwin, MP	Peace River (P)
Jack Davis	Calgary (P)
Jack Horner, MP	Pollockville (P)
Marcel Lambert, MP	Edmonton (P)
Peter Lougheed, MLA	Calgary (P)
B. D. Patterson	Calgary (P)
Erick Schmidt	Edmonton (O)
Eldon Woolliams, MP	Calgary (P)

British Columbia

Professor Robert Clark	Vancouver (P)
John de Wolf	Vancouver (P)
Dr. R. M. Kaplan	Burnaby (R)
Richard B. Simmins	Vancouver
Professor Donald Smiley	Vancouver (R)
Mary Southin	Vancouver (P)
Professor Neil Swainson	Victoria (R)

Manitoba

Hon. Walter Dinsdale, MP	Brandon (P)
S. J. Enns, MP	Ottawa (P)
Hon. Gurney Evans, MLA	Winnipeg (P)
Hon. Thelma Forbes, MLA	Winnipeg (P)
Hon. Sterling Lyon, MLA	Winnipeg (P)
L. R. Sherman, MP	Winnipeg (P)
Professor Norma Walmsley	Brandon (R)

New Brunswick

Gordon Fairweather, MP	Rothesay (P)
Dr. W. E. Hale	Fredericton (P)
Richard Hatfield, MLA	Hartland (P)
Alfred Landry	Moncton (P)
D. D. Patterson, MLA	Saint John (P)

Newfoundland

Gerald Ottenheimer, MLA	St. Johns (P)

Nova Scotia

Hon. Gerry Doucet, MLA	Halifax	(P)
Professor D. Hugh Gillis	Antigonish	(P)
J. M. Forrestall, MP	Dartmouth	(P)
Professor Duncan Fraser	Wolfville	(P)
Mrs. Ray Jefferson	Wolfville	(P)
R. J. McCleave, MP	Halifax	(P)
Hon. T. McKeough, MLA	Halifax	(P)

Ontario

Gordon Aiken, MP	Gravenhurst	(P)
Professor Bill Baker	Ottawa	(R)
Professor Eric Beecroft	London	(R)
Richard Bell, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Dr. W. A. Benson	Victoria	
Professor Henry Best	Toronto	(P)
Professor R. M. Burns	Kingston	(R)
Robin Bush	Don Mills	(R)
Dalton Camp	Toronto	(P)
Professor Dan Cappon	Toronto	(P)
Dr. D. W. Carr	Ottawa	
C. D. Crenna	Guelph	(P)
Walter Currie	Willowdale	(R)
Harold Danforth, MP	Ottawa	(P)
•A. E. Diamond	Toronto	
Mrs. Edward A. Dunlop	Toronto	(P)
Edward A. Dunlop, MPP	Toronto	(P)
Professor Stephen Dupre	Toronto	(R)
Professor Donald Eldon	Peterborough	(P)
Mrs. Laura Ferrier	Willowdale	(P)
Professor Jack Granatstein	Ottawa	(R)
Professor John Gwynne-Timothy	London	(P)
Alfred Hales, MP	Guelph	(P)
Albert Hearne	Toronto	(R)
Professor Tom Hockin	Toronto	(R)
Mr. D. M. Johnston	Toronto	(P)
Mark Kellow	Peterborough	
Professor William Kilbourn	Toronto	(R)
Jules Kronis	Toronto	(P)
Professor Arthur Kruger	Toronto	(R)
Dr. Dorothy C. H. Ley	Toronto	
M. T. McCutcheon, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Professor John C. MacDonald	Peterborough	(R)
E. R. McEwen	Toronto	(R)
Hon. C. S. MacNaughton, MPP	Toronto	(P)

Ontario (Cont.)

David Meynell	Toronto	(P)
Phil Mitches	Toronto	(P)
J. H. Moore	London	(P)
Wallace Nesbitt, MP	Woodstock	(P)
Professor G. Pacquet	Ottawa	(R)
Mrs. Ada Pritchard	Hamilton	(P)
Richard Rohmer	Toronto	(P)
Rev. Gordon Ross	Toronto	(P)
Ald. David Rotenberg	Toronto	(P)
Lionel Schipper	Toronto	(P)
Sheldon Silvers	Toronto	(P)
Alex Sim	North Gower	
Heber Smith, MP	Barrie	(P)
L. A. Soden	Sudbury	(R)
Dr. P. D. Stevens	Manotick	(R)
Hon. William A. Stewart, MPP	Toronto	(P)
Professor T. H. B. Symons	Peterborough	(P)
Professor S. Triantis	Toronto	(R)
Gerald Townsend	Toronto	
Mrs. Jean Wadds, MP	Prescott	(P)
Patrick Watson	Toronto	(R)
Hon. Thomas Wells, MPP	Toronto	(P)
John White, MLA	London	(P)

Prince Edward Island

David MacDonald, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Heath Macquarrie, MP	Ottawa	(P)

Quebec

Martial Asselin, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Jean Bazin	Montreal	(P)
Paul Beaulieu, MP	St. Jean	(P)
Egan Chambers	Montreal	(P)
Marcel Faribault	Montreal	(R)
M. Gerald Filion	Montreal	(R)
Professor Jacques Gagne	Sherbrooke	(R)
Heward Grafftey, MP	Knowlton	(P)
Hubert Guindon	Montreal	(R)
Russell Keays, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Dean Mordell	Montreal	(R)

Quebec (Cont.)

D. A. H. Newman	Montreal	(R)
T. J. Plunkett	Montreal	
Theo Ricard, MP	St. Hyacinthe	(P)
Tom Sloan	Montreal	(O)
Paul O. Trepanier	Granby	(P)
Georges Valade, MP	Montreal	(P)
Peter G. White	Knowlton	(P)
Bruce Whitestone	Montreal	

Saskatchewan

Dr. Lewis Brand, MP	Saskatoon	(P)
Reg Cantelon, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Jack McIntosh, MP	Swift Current	(P)
Dean T. H. MacLeod	Regina	(R)
Edward Nasserden, MP	Saskatoon	(P)
Lawrence Watson, MP	Abonlea	(P)

Territories

Erik Nielsen, MP	Whitehorse	(P)

Foreign Addresses

A. N. McLeod	Trinidad	(R)
Professor Michael Stein	Princeton	(R)

APPENDIX E:

PARTICIPANTS IN THE NIAGARA FALLS CONFERENCE

Alberta

Elmar Abele	Edmonton	(P)
Professor Harvie Andre	Calgary	(P)
G. W. Baldwin, MP	Peace River	(P)
Len Berg	Sedgewick	(P)
G. M. Burden	Calgary	(P)
Vincent Dantzer	Edmonton	(P)
Roy Deyell	Calgary	(P)
Cliff Downey, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Hon. D. S. Harkness, MP	Calgary	(P)
Mrs. Roy Henderson	High River	(P)
Peter Horcica	Edmonton	(P)
Jack Horner, MP	Pollockville	(P)
David Jenkins	Calgary	(P)
Hon. Marcel Lambert, MP	Edmonton	(P)
Larry Lang	Lethbridge	(P)
Dan A. Lawrence	Red Deer	(P)
Peter Lougheed, MLA	Calgary	(P)
Ken Lutes	Brooks	(P)
Hugh Lynch-Staunton	Lundbreck	(P)
D. R. Matheson	Edmonton	(P)
Don Mazankowski, MP	Vegreville	(P)
Donald McDougall	Edmonton	(P)
Donald McKenzie	Edmonton	(P)
Charles McMillan	Edmonton	(P)
C. J. Meagher	Medicine Hat	(P)
Carl O. Nickle	Calgary	(P)
Steve Paproski, MP	Edmonton	(P)
David Parsons	Calgary	(P)
W. D. Piechotta	Calgary	(P)
Ronald Powell	Calgary	(P)
Mrs. Jean Roen	Duchess	(P)
Professor Rodney Schneck	Edmonton	(R)
Stan Schumacher, MP	Drumheller	(P)
Anthony A. Taylor	Calgary	(P)
Robert Thompson, MP	Red Deer	(P)
W. R. Watson	Edmonton	(P)
Ed Wensell	Camrose	(P)
Eldon Woolliams, MP	Calgary	(P)
Professor Peter Woolstencroft	Edmonton	(P)
Dr. Paul Yewchuck, MP	Lac La Biche	(P)
Carl Youngren	Calgary	(P)
William J. Yurko, MLA	Edmonton	(P)

British Columbia

Professor H. A. Cairns	Vancouver	(R)
Professor Robert Clark	Vancouver	(P)
D. Denholm	North Vancouver	
		(R)
Mrs. Lorraine Devries	Kamloops	(P)
John de Wolf	Vancouver	(P)
Mrs. John de Wolf	Vancouver	(P)
Mrs. N. M. Drysdale	Vancouver	(P)
Chris Dumfries	Vancouver	(P)
J. A. Fraser	Vancouver	(P)
Gordon Hall	Sardis	(P.)
Roff Johannson	Vancouver	(P)
Tom Johnstone	Port Alberni	(P)
L. P. Linstead	Comox	(P)
M. A. Lundeen	Dawson Creek	(P)
William Macadam	Campbell River	
		(P)
Professor Bruce Nesbitt	Burnaby	(R)
Winston Newman	Vancouver	(P)
John Pearkes	Vancouver	(P)
Miss Jane Ritchie	Victoria	(P)
J. T. Saxelby	West Vancouver	
		(P)
John M. Sherman	West Vancouver	
		(P)
Professor Donald Smiley	Vancouver	(R)
Douglas Smith	Victoria	(P)
Malcolm Wickson	Vancouver	(P)
Sam W. Wilson	Dawson Creek	(P)

Manitoba

Don Baizley	Winnipeg	(P)
Mrs. Joan C. M. Campbell	Transcona	(P)
Rev. Adam Cuthand	Winnipeg	(R)
Hon. Walter Dinsdale, MP	Brandon	(P)
Leonard Domino	Transcona	(P)
Floyd Evenson	Winnipeg	(P)
Professor W. Fox-Decent	Winnipeg	(P)
Morley Greene	Winnipeg	(P)
Duncan Jessiman	Winnipeg	(P)
Dr. George Johnson	Winnipeg	(P)
Warner Jorgenson, MLA	Winnipeg	(P)

Manitoba (Cont.)

Robert E. Lane	Winnipeg	(P)
Jay Livingstone	Swan River	(P)
Mrs. D. McConnell	Hamiota	(P)
David McCormick	Winnipeg	(P)
Bruce Miller	Portage la Prairie	(P)
Mrs. Bruce Miller	Portage la Prairie	(P)
Nathan Nurgitz	Winnipeg	(P)
Dr. Gordon Ritchie, MP	Dauphin	(P)
Walter Ritchie	Winnipeg	(P)
Mrs. Annis Shaddy	Winnipeg	(P)
Lee Southern	Winnipeg	(P)
Sidney Spivak, MLA	Winnipeg	(P)
Craig Stewart, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Roy Vogt	Winnipeg	(R)
John Williamson	Sinclair	(P)
Don Zizzi	Brandon	(P)

New Brunswick

John Baxter, MLA	Easter Riverside	(P)
Mrs. John Baxter	Easter Riverside	(P)
T. M. Bell, MP	Saint John	(P)
Guy Charest	Edmundston	(P)
Gordon Fairweather, MP	Rothesay	(P)
Edward Harley	Kinghurst	(P)
Richard Hatfield, MLA	Hartland	(P)
Professor Robert Kerr	Fredericton	(P)
Charles E. Leger	Moncton	(P)
Paul McIntyre	Bathurst	(P)
David C. Nicholson	Fredericton	(P)
D. D. Patterson, MLA	Saint John	(P)
Mrs. D. D. Patterson	Saint John	(P)
Dr. John E. Rigby, MLA	St. Andrews	(P)
Mrs. John E. Rigby	St. Andrews	(P)
C. B. Sherwood, MLA	Norton	(P)
Jean Maurice Simard	Edmundston	(P)
Horace B. Smith	Fredericton	(P)
John Smith	Hillsborough	(P)
Ralph Sykes	Bathurst	(P)
Claude Taylor, MLA	Riverview	(P)

New Brunswick (Cont.)

Mrs. Wynnifred Taylor	Riverview	(P)
Charles Thomas, MP	Moncton	(P)
Mark Yeoman	Moncton	(P)

Nova Scotia

Professor Agar Adamson	Wolfville	(R)
Mrs. Douglas Bowen	New Glasgow	(P)
John O. Bower	Shelburne	(P)
Robert Coates, MP	Amherst	(P)
Louis R. Comeau, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Professor John Connor	Wolfville	(R)
George T. H. Cooper	Halifax	(P)
David Covert	Halifax	(R)
A. William Cox	Halifax	(P)
Lloyd R. Crouse, MP	Lunenberg	(P)
Arthur Donahoe	Halifax	(P)
C. Hanson Dowell	Middleton	(P)
Hugh Farin	Wolfville	(P)
Maurice Flemming	Shelburne	(P)
Donald Haggert	New Glasgow	(P)
Charles Haliburton	Digby	(P)
Robert Levy	Halifax	(P)
Mrs. Isobel MacAulay	Halifax	(P)
R. L. MacDougall	Truro	(P)
Professor A. H. MacLean	Wolfville	(R)
Robert McCleave, MP	Halifax	(P)
Robert Muir, MP	Ottawa	(P)
J. Patrick Nowlan, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Harpell Power	East Jeddore	(P)
James Russell	Halifax	(P)
Chris Sabean	Halifax	(P)
J. B. Sawyer	Halifax	(P)
Mrs. Monica Scott	Lower Sackville	(P)
C. William Singer	Yarmouth	(P)
Hon. G. I. Smith, MLA	Truro	(P)
T. W. Sommerville	Halifax	(P)
Hon. Robert Stanfield, MP	Halifax	(P)
Kenneth Streatch	Elderbank	(P)
David Stuewe	Halifax	(P)
Robert James White	Stellarton	(P)
Dr. Russell Zinch	Lunenburg	(P)

Newfoundland

R. J. Greene	St. Johns	(P)
Frank D. Moores, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Bob Nutbeem	Harbour Grace	(P)
Gerald Ottenheimer, MHA	St. Johns	(P)

Ontario

John Adams	Toronto	(P)
Mrs. John Adams	Toronto	(P)
Michael Adams	Toronto	(P)
Gordon Aiken, MP	Gravenhurst	(P)
Bruce Alexander	Toronto	(R)
Lincoln Alexander, MP	Hamilton	(P)
Miss Georgia Allen	Ottawa	(O)
J. R. Allan	Toronto	(R)
Robert Amaron	Renfrew	(P)
Jill Armstrong	Toronto	(P)
J. E. Armstrong	Cobalt	(P)
Ronald Atkey	London	(P)
Professor A. D. Auld	Guelph	(P)
Reuben C. Baetz	Ottawa	(R)
Robert Baksi	Windsor	(P)
John Barker	Scarborough	(P)
Leonard Beaton	Toronto	(R)
Robert Bedard	Ottawa	(P)
Professor Eric Beecroft	London	(R)
Miss M. Beer	Peterborough	(O)
Elmer Bell	Exeter	(P)
Hon. R. A. Bell	Ottawa	(P)
Mrs. R. A. Bell	Ottawa	(P)
Harold Berry	Toronto	(P)
Mrs. Peggy Berton	Ottawa	(P)
Professor Henry Best	Toronto	(P)
Dr. Ed Black	Ottawa	(P)
Professor Ronald Blair	Toronto	(R)
Professor Marvin Blauer	St. Catharines	(R)
Donald A. Blenkarn	Port Credit	(P)
Stan Boivin	Hanmer	(P)
Richard Boraks	Toronto	(P)
Mrs. G. Bower-Binns	Ottawa	(O)
Mrs. Joyce E. Bowerman	Oshawa	(P)
Professor Alexander Brady	Toronto	(R)
Bruno Bragoli	Hamilton	(P)

Ontario Comm...

Mrs. N. Buchanan	Peterborough	(O)
Barbara Buck	Toronto	(R)
Macdonald Campbell	London	(P)
Mrs. Leslie Campbell	London	(P)
John Canning	Willowdale	(P)
Dr. Daniel Cappon	Toronto	(P)
Professor Glen Carroll	Waterloo	(R)
Mrs. Glen Carroll	Waterloo	(O)
Murray Chercover	Toronto	(R)
Dr. D. A. Chisholm	Ottawa	(R)
Joe Clark	Ottawa	(P)
Professor R. T. Clippingdale	Ottawa	(R)
Dr. Bruce Connell	Ottawa	(P)
Mrs. Bruce Connell	Ottawa	(P)
Professor G. E. Connell	Toronto	(R)
Clare Copeland	Toronto	(R)
Professor David Cox	Kingston	(R)
Vicki Cripps	Guelph	(P)
Professor R. W. Crowley	Kingston	(R)
Walter Currie	Toronto	(R)
Professor J. W. Daly	Hamilton	(R)
Harold Danforth, MP	Ottawa	(P)
George F. Davidson	Ottawa	(R)
Ross Degeer	Toronto	(P)
Hugh Doig	Sudbury	(P)
Mrs. Jean Douglas	Chippawa	(P)
Mrs. Fred Dreger	Breslau	(P)
Edward A. Dunlop, MLA	Toronto	(P)
Mrs. Edward A. Dunlop	Toronto	(P)
R. Alan Eagleson	Toronto	(P)
Joe Eisenberg	Toronto	(O)
Stuart Ellis	St. Catharines	(P)
Maurice English	Ottawa	(P)
Professor K. B. Farquhar	London	(R)
Eugene Fedak	Hamilton	(P)
Donald M. Findlay	King City	(P)
Mrs. Donald M. Findlay	King City	(P)
Ron Fisher	Windsor	(P)
Eric Ford	Toronto	(P)
L. D. Foreman	Toronto	(R)
William C. Frank	Hyde Park	(P)
Mrs. William C. Frank	Hyde Park	(P)

Ontario (Cont.)

Dexter Geddes	Toronto	(P)
Dr. W. H. Gerhart	Parry Sound	(P)
Mrs. G. M. Gerrie	Hamilton	(O)
Dr. James Gillies	Downsview	
E. A. Goodman	Toronto	(P)
Lee Grills, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Senator Allister Grosart	Ottawa	(P)
H. Donald Guthrie	Toronto	(P)
Professor John Gwynne-Timothy	London	(P)
Alfred Hales, MP	Guelph	(P)
Hon. Alvin Hamilton	Manotick	(P)
S. B. Handleman	Bells Corners	(P)
Arthur Harnett	Toronto	(P)
Dr. J. E. F. Hastings	Toronto	(R)
Dr. Lionel E. Hastings	Fort William	(P)
Paschal Hayes	Toronto	(P)
Jack Heath	Toronto	(O)
Hon. George Hees, MP	Ottawa	(P)
G. R. Heffernan	Whitby	(R)
Alan Heisey	Don Mills	(P)
Kenneth Higson	Grimsby	(P)
Mrs. Maurice Holt	Peterborough	(P)
Ted Horton	Weston	(P)
R. Michael Huckson	Waterloo	(P)
Joe Hueglin	Niagara Falls	(P)
Professor W. N. H. Hull	St. Catharine	(R)
Professor C. W. Humphries	Toronto	
G. Gordon Hurlburt	Willowdale	(P)
Warren Hurst	Toronto	(P)
W. W. Ince	Kitchener	(P)
Jack Ireland	Belleville	(P)
H. N. R. Jackman	Toronto	(P)
D. M. Johnston	Toronto	(P)
Douglas Jure	Islington	(O)
Brian Kappler	Windsor	(P)
Allan B. Kennard	Kingston	(P)
John Ker	Fingal	(P)
Graham Kidlark	Toronto	(P)
Edward Kowal	Toronto	(P)
Orest M. Kruhlak	Toronto	(R)
Dr. P. A. Lapp	Malton	(R)
A. B. R. Lawrence, MPP	Ottawa	(P)
Allan F. Lawrence, MPP	Toronto	(P)

Ontario (Cont.)

Bob Lee	Toronto	(P)
Mrs. Glenda Lewe	Ottawa	(P)
Mrs. Dorothy Lichty	Welleby	(P)
Professor I. A. Litvak	Hamilton	(R)
Professor Colin Lock	Hamilton	(R)
Barry G. Lowes	Toronto	(P)
D'Arcy Luxton	Hamilton	(P)
Flora MacDonald	Kingston	(P)
Mrs. K. E. MacIntosh	Kitchener	
Elwood Madill	Orangeville	(P)
Arthur Maloney	Toronto	(P)
Mrs. Karl Manner	Sudbury	(O)
Lauren Marshall	Waterloo	(P)
Dennis Martin	Don Mills	(P)
Joe Martin	Toronto	(P)
Donald Martyn	Sutton	(P)
Miss Deb Matthews	London	(O)
Miss Joyce Matthews	London	(O)
Mr. Don Matthews	London	(O)
Professor C. J. Maule	Hamilton	(P)
Murray Maynard	Toronto	(P)
Ernie McCullough	Willodale	(P)
Vera McCullough	Willowdale	(P)
Robert McKinnell	Binbrook	(P)
Robert McKinley, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Mrs. Robert McKinley	Ottawa	(P)
Roy McLaren	Toronto	(O)
Ian McPhail	Willowdale	(P)
John McPhail	Sault Ste. Marie	(P)
Peter McWilliams	Oakville	(P)
David Meynell	Toronto	(P)
Professor T. Miljan	Waterloo	(R)
Philip Mitches	London	(P)
Ralph S. Misener	St. Catharines	
Dr. S. F. Monestime	Mattawa	(P)
Professor W. L. Morton	Peterborough	(R)
Clark Muirhead	Claremont	(P)
Robert Mummery	Port Lambton	(P)
Donald Munroe	Renfrew	(P)

Ontario (Cont.)

Brian Near	Kingston	
Wallace Nesbitt, MP	Woodstock	(P)
Professor W. F. W. Neville	Peterborough	(R)
G. E. Nori	Sault Ste. Marie	(P)
George C. Norrie	Oakville	(P)
Wayne Nyomtato	St. Catharines	(P)
Del O'Brien	Pembroke	(P)
Mrs. Del O'Brien	Pembroke	(P)
Liam S. O'Brien	Waterloo	(P)
Peter O'Rourke	London	(P)
Professor Robert J. D. Page	Peterborough	(R)
T. R. Parker	Ingersoll	(P)
Professor J. C. Parr	Windsor	(R)
Mrs. Dorothy Patterson	Ottawa	(R)
H. R. Patterson	Toronto	(P)
Ed Paul	Kingston	(P)
R. Penney	Toronto	(P)
John Pentall	Peterborough	(P)
Professor George Perlin	Kingston	(P)
Mrs. E. H. Phinn	Ancaster	(P)
Rodney Pinkney	Mississauga	(P)
Alan Pope	Toronto	(P)
Mrs. Nancy Powis	Toronto	(P)
Joseph L. Reid	St. Catharines	(P)
Professor J. A. Rendall	London	(R)
Bob Richardson	Toronto	(P)
Burt Richardson	Toronto	(P)
Garnet B. Rickard	Bowmanville	(P)
Lynda Rivington	Ottawa	(P)
Jean-Paul Roberge	Ottawa	(P)
Dr. Hedley Roy	Toronto	(P)
Clayton Ruby	Toronto	
Professor D. E. Sanders	Windsor	(R)
William J. Saunderson	Toronto	(P)
Dan Scott	Toronto	(R)
Graham Scott	Toronto	(P)
William Scott, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Gordon Sedgewick	Toronto	(P)
C. E. Shand	Toronto	(P)
Sheldon Silver	Toronto	(P)
Professor Richard Simeon	Kingston	(R)

Ontario (Cont.)

Professor George Sinclair	Toronto	(R)
Professor David Slater	Kingston	(R)
David E. Smith	Burlington	(P)
Professor Denis Smith	Peterborough	(R)
Professor David Staeger	Toronto	(R)
William D. Stowe	Dunnville	(O)
David Surplis	Toronto	(P)
John W. Sutton	Simcoe	(P)
James R. Swanborough	Burlington	(P)
Mrs. Yvonne Szilagyi	Welland	(P)
Professor Alastair Taylor	Kingston	(R)
Professor F. M. Tierney	Ottawa	(R)
B. Treister	Hamilton	(O)
Professor V. F. Valentine	Ottawa	(R)
Patrick Vernon	Toronto	(P)
Audrey Voice	Ottawa	(P)
Mrs. Jean Wadds	Prescott	(P)
David Ward	Toronto	(R)
Joseph Wearing	Peterborough	(O)
Harry Weihs	Don Mills	(R)
Mrs. Ronald P. Williamson	Peterborough	(P)
Jack K. White	Brantford	(P)
Professor J. W. Wilson	Waterloo	(R)
L. R. Wilson	London	(R)
Professor David Winch	Hamilton	(R)
David Wood	Thamesford	(P)
Robert Wood	London	(P)
Larry Zolf	Toronto	(O)

Prince Edward Island

Ben J. Gallant	Charlottetown	(P)
Claude Ives	Summerside	(P)
George Key	Charlottetown	(P)
Rev. David MacDonald, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Hon. J. Angus MacLean, MP	Charlottetown	(P)
Heath Macquarrie, MP	Charlottetown	(P)
Professor Saul Silverman	Charlottetown	(R)

Quebec

John Aimers	Montreal	(P)
Fernand Alie	Montreal	(P)
Hon. Martial Asselin, MP	La Malbaie	(P)
K. G. Bernhardt	Lennoxville	(P)

Quebec (Cont.)

David M. Bernstein	Montreal	(P)
Fernand Bouchard	St. Felicien	(P)
Eugene Boudreault	Westmount	(P)
Pierre Boutin	Quebec	(P)
J. Patrick Boyer	Montreal	(P)
Michael Caren	Quebec	(P)
Egan Chambers	Montreal	(P)
Professor Michel Chevalier	Montreal	(R)
Michel Cogger	Montreal	(P)
George Daigle	Levis	(O)
Mme. Germaine Daigle	Levis	(P)
Roma Dauphin	Sherbrooke	(R)
Marc DeGoumois	Quebec	
Jacques Desroches	Laval-des-Rapides	(P)
Rev. Gerard Dion	Quebec	(R)
Dr. John H. Dirks	Montreal	(P)
Jacques Dufresne	Montreal	
Roland Dugre	Asbestos	
Claude Dupras	Montreal	(P)
Bernard Flynn	Dorval	(P)
Hon. Jacques Flynn	Ottawa	(P)
Andre Gagnon	Montreal	(P)
Michel Gagnon	Montreal	(P)
Heward Grafftey	Knowlton	(P)
D. C. Hannaford	Town of Mount Royal	(P)
Claude Harari	Montreal	(P)
Professor Benjamin Higgins	Montreal	(R)
Richard Holden	Montreal	(P)
Mrs. Richard Holden	Montreal	(P)
Henry Horner	Shawville	(P)
Margaret Jones	Montreal	(P)
Dr. Alexandre Kindy	Sherbrooke	(P)
Mme. Irene Laflamme	Montreal	(P)
Dr. Gilles Lalande	Montreal	(R)
Andre Lalonde	St. Bruno	(P)
Victor Lambert	Ottawa	(R)
Dr. Levis Larocque	Pointe Gatineau	(P)
Roch Lasalle, MP	Crabtree Corners	(P)
Clement Lauziere	Quebec	(R)

Quebec (Cont.)

Michael Layton	Montreal	(P)
Francine Lessard	Ste. Foy	(P)
Mme. J. Rene Lessard	Montreal	(P)
Professor Michel Lincourt		(R)
Jean Yves Lortie	Montreal	(P)
Peter Lyman	Montreal	(R)
Professor Noel Lyon	Montreal	
Hon. Paul Martineau	Lucerne	(P)
Jean-Baptiste McLeod	Montreal	(P)
Michael Meighen	Montreal	(P)
Armand Miron	Valleyfield	(P)
David A. H. Newman	Montreal	(P)
Gary Quart Ouellet	Quebec	(P)
Donat Piette	Joliette	(P)
Paul Pouliot	Sherbrooke	(P)
Mme. Paul Pouliot	Sherbrooke	(P)
John R. Pratt	Dorval	(P)
Andre Prud'homme	Montreal	(P)
Mme. Andre Prud'homme	Montreal	(P)
Hon. Josie D. Quart	Quebec	(P)
Professor Serge Racine	Sherbrooke	(R)
Keith Randall	Montreal	(P)
Hon. Theo Ricard, MP	St. Hyacinthe	(P)
Roland Richer	Quebec	(P)
James W. S. Saunders	Ste. Foy	(P)
John Sedley	Montreal	(P)
Gordon Simons	Pointe Claire	(P)
Mrs. Sue Simons	Pointe Claire	(P)
Gord Sinclair	Montreal	(P)
Mme. Paul-O. Trepanier	Granby	(P)
Paul-O. Trepanier	Granby	(P)
Bob Valcov	Baie d'Urfe	(P)
Miss Cornelia Vaughan	Montreal	(P)
Lawrence I. Weiser	Place d'Armes	(P)
George Wright	Pointe Claire	(P)

Saskatchewan

Ken Black	Regina	(P)
Bert Cadieu, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Professor J. C. Courtney	Saskatoon	(R)
Walter Deiter	Regina	(R)
Charles Irving	Wadena	(P)

Saskatchewan (Cont.)

Orris Keehr	Regina	(P)
Stanley Korchinski, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Larry Kyle	Regina	(P)
Dr. Alan Matthews	Fort Qu'Appelle	(P)
Jim Ormiston	Cupar	(P)
Ernie Pascoe	Moose Jaw	(P)
Peter Russel	Saskatoon	(P)
Ken Sunquist	Regina	(P)
Lawrence Watson	Avonlea	(P)

Territories

Foreign Addresses

David Alexander	London	(O)
Professor James Duran	Buffalo	(R)
Gordon Galbraith	New Haven	(P)
L. I. Golden	New York	(R)

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