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THE GOLDEN GLEAM, 1916 - 1920;
BRITAIN AND THE ORIGINS OF
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS



by

BRIAN McKERCHER

A THESIS

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
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
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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled "The Golden Gleam, 1916 - 1920; Britain and the Origins of the League of Nations" submitted by Brian McKercher in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.



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


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ABSTRACT

* This thesis examines British contributions to the creation of the League of Nations, from the first attempts at establishing the need for creating international peace keeping machinery in the autumn of 1916 to the end of the first session of the League Assembly in December 1920. Emphasis is placed on contributions of British statesmen, this to revise established interpretations which hold Woodrow Wilson to be the principal force underlying the making of the Covenant. The first chapter exposes the myths encrusting the history of the origins of the League, myths deriving from inaccurate assessment of Wilson's contributions. The second chapter concerns the formation of League policy within the British Government, specifically the Foreign Office and War Cabinet, in the midst of the Great War. By the time of the Armistice in November 1918 British League policy was the only one of consequence.

The third chapter examines the making of the Covenant during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and demonstrates that British ideas about how the League should be formed dominated those of the Americans and French. The lynch pin of the League, as perceived by the British, was to be its peace keeping role; peace keeping provisions incorporated into the Covenant derived solely from British initiatives, as did the seeds of less prominent League features: a general Assembly, an executive Council, disarmament provisions, mandates, an International Court, and a permanent organisation tied to a permanent Secretariat. The

fourth chapter analyses the American failure to ratify the Covenant, and centres on British efforts to dissuade the United States from this course. The fifth chapter outlines the progress attained by the League in its first year of operation. The Anglo-French decision to continue within the organisation after the American failure to join and the success of the Council and Assembly in fulfilling their mandates indicates American rejection was not fatal to the League's existence. Chapter Six summarises by removing the myths enshrouding the name of the League.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank those many people who suffered along with me in this endeavour, especially my wife, Cheryl, and Rod and Bonnie Kyle. I am particularly indebted to Professor C.J. Lowe for his guidance and for the critical evaluation given my work. I am grateful he has kept his sanity over the last almost two years.

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Ever drifting down the stream -
Lingering in the golden gleam -

Lewis Carroll

CHAPTER ONE

The Myth Encrusted League.

"I wonder, now, what the Rules of Battle are," she said to herself as she watched the fight, timidly peeping out from her hiding-place: "one rule seems to be, that if one knight hits the other, he knocks him off his horse, and if he misses, he tumbles off himself - and another rule seems to be that they hold their clubs with their arms as if they were Punch and Judy"

Alice

Revisionism exists as a fundamental component of historical scholarship. Quite simply, revisionist historiography fulfills the important function of bringing events in clearer focus by providing balance to their interpretations. A major dilemma perpetually confronting historians arises with a willingness, at times, to accept some interpretations of events without question. When challenge is never offered, there exists the unnerving possibility that untempered interpretations could easily be assimilated as universal truths when actually they are not. Difficulty occurs when these historical myths encrust events and, thus, distort their impact upon other factors in the period under consideration. A case in point concerns the origins of the League of Nations and the mythology which has grown up around its founding and the powers entrenched in the Covenant by its originators to diminish the probability of war.

In the estimation of Lord Robert Cecil, perhaps the most

prominent exponent of the League during its existence, the creation of that organisation constituted a "great experiment".¹ The League became the first real attempt at establishing a diplomatic mechanism for reducing the probability of war. No one ever claimed, except those undertaking to deride it, that the League was created to prevent the outbreak of war absolutely. Cecil never claimed this; neither did anyone else who gave it serious consideration. All that the League was designed to do was provide diplomatic machinery permitting "enquiry and delay" whilst sorting out differences between and among states. This constituted the raison d'être underlying its formation. Other duties ascribed to it at the time of its formation and after: disarmament, the disposition and orderly government of mandated territories, the supervision of certain terms of the Peace Settlement, and the like, were only of secondary importance.

That it ultimately failed in fulfilling its avowed goal is not in dispute. League inability and impotence in the late 1930s, despite constant public reference to the Covenant by the British and French governments of the period,² was spectacular. However, the Covenant cannot be faulted for this failure; responsibility clearly lies with the Powers which constituted the organisation in the period and which failed to honour their avowed obligations. The Covenant devised in 1919³ - and amended slightly in 1926 with the entry of Germany - possessed requisite power to lessen the probability of the outbreak of war. That League members, powerful ones such as

Britain and France, failed to utilize them is not the fault of the Covenant. This is a subtle but important distinction.

The heart of the problem lies with a correct assessment of the genesis of the League. Because of its ultimate failure myths have arisen encrusting its name and impinging upon its merits. Three fables exist, results of inaccurate assessment of League origins; it is from these that attacks upon the League are generally launched. To reassess accurately true League capabilities, from which a revisionist stance can be assumed, the crust of myth must be removed.

The most widespread misconception is that the League was the creation of Woodrow Wilson, the United States President during the Great War, the author of the idealistic "Fourteen Points", and the prophet of equality amongst states. Though some of Wilson's private utterances and actions at the Peace Conference did not always reflect his public attitudes, most people, and not a few historians, seem mesmerised by the visible Wilson.⁴ In terms of the League they are prepared to credit him as the sole architect of the League Covenant, a document owing far more to lesser known men who gave substance and form to his nebulous rhetoric. The second fable is really a corollary of the first: that idealism was the overriding factor in the making of the Covenant. This is generally accepted because the League is held to be essentially the main expression of cresting Wilsonian idealism.

Tied to these is the third myth, one adding tremendous fire to the guns of League critics. This is the failure of the

United States Senate to ratify the Covenant, contained in the Treaty of Versailles as the preamble. Wilson the great internationalist could not engineer a successful route through Congress for the Covenant - though this remained more the fault of the American isolationists than anyone else. Thus, there is the roundly held notion that the League, which came into official existence on 10 January 1920, was stillborn because of American failure to participate. It is unfortunate that these myths, which have gone almost unchallenged since 1920,⁵ are now approaching a state whereby they are accepted as truth.

The League of Nations was not the creation of Woodrow Wilson but the myth is perpetuated nonetheless. One of the simplest, yet most telling, examples of this can be found in Geneva, the former seat of the League and now the European headquarters of the United Nations. The old League Secretariat Building, sitting quietly off the busy Quai Wilson, looks southward across the placid waters of Lac Lemman. Set into the wall in front of this building is a now weathered stone tablet proclaiming to all who pass:

A la Memoire de
Woodrow Wilson
President des États-Unis
Fondateur de la Société des Nations

Nothing could be further from the truth.

The League of Nations developed out of expressions of concern by a number of statesmen who were so moved by the terrible cost of fighting the Great War, cost exacted in tremendous loss of life, the untolled destruction of property, and the threat

to political stability, that they advanced the need for a post-war diplomatic forum to prevent a future conflict of similar proportions. Another war on that scale would, they reckoned assuredly threaten the fabric of civilisation. First official moves to fashion postwar diplomatic machinery, as opposed to the flowery rhetoric of Wilson, occurred within the upper levels of the British Government, specifically within the Foreign Office and War Cabinet, in late 1916. Proposals emanating from here were not in the least idealistic; rather, they were both the reasonable and rational responses of realistic statesmen who knew the limitations of power and who saw in an international forum a means to lessen the probability of future great wars.

Foremost amongst British advocates was the above mentioned Lord Robert Cecil. By the time the Americans intervened in the war on the Allied side and joint war aims were developed, the promise for a postwar League was a prominent feature. Where Wilson, prior to the enunciation of war aims, had been convinced of the need for such a body, British leaders had to be persuaded of its possible efficacy. Successful lobbying by Cecil and Jan Smuts, the South African War Minister and a member of the War Cabinet, led to specific British proposals being formulated with respect to how the postwar machinery should be constituted. Indeed, by the time of the November 1918 Armistice, these British proposals were the only ones of consequence proffered from any quarter and they served as the basis of discussion in the pre Peace Conference period preceding the making of the

Covenant. Until almost the time the committee designated to devise the Covenant met, Wilson did not take his ideas much beyond the confines of his mind. When he did finally inform his Allies about the American position on the League, that is, his position, he had incorporated most of what the British had advanced since 1916.

The Covenant that left the Peace Conference and became an integral part of the Settlement was the result of efforts expended by lesser Anglo-American notables, for which Wilson took credit. Wilson wanted credit for devising the Covenant.⁶ Cecil and Smuts who represented Britain were willing to accord him this. However following the critical American debate over the ratification of Versailles and the Covenant, a debate which centred on Wilson as the founder of the League, the American Senate refused to participate in League activities. The British Government had attempted to persuade American opinion that the League was a workable institution but to no avail.

Instead of jumping out themselves and jettisoning the whole concept of a League, Britain and its Allies decided to make the organisation a viable proposition. The first year of League activity attests to this. Accordingly, a revisionist interpretation of the origins of the League of Nations is required.

CHAPTER TWO

War as a Catalyst,

September 1916 - November 1918.

"You know," he said gravely, "it's one of the most serious things that can possibly happen to one in a battle - to get one's head cut off."

Tweedledee to Alice

I.

A promise of postwar diplomatic machinery, designed "to limit the burden of armaments and diminish the probability of war", found definite form as a British war aim in David Lloyd George's speech to the Trades Union Congress of 5 January 1918.¹ The prime minister's public espousal of this particular aspect of British war policy, the foreshadowing of the eventual League of Nations, signalled fruition of lengthy official efforts in this direction by a small group of government leaders. Their labours, in January 1918 well over one year old, succeeded for two reasons: lobbying occurred at the highest policy making levels in both reasonable and realistic terms, offering a plausible alternative to the inhumanity of modern warfare; and official public endorsement of this concept tended to appease the desires of Britain's key ally in the struggle against the Central Powers, President Woodrow Wilson of the United States of America. Indeed, within three days of Lloyd George's speech, Wilson amplified the need for a general association of nations "formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording

mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small powers alike".² Thus, this area of distinct British interest expanded into a general Allied concern.

Promise of some sort of international diplomatic agency to promote peace and minimise war, an act of decided importance, in reality amounted to only the initial step in a lengthy political process. In January 1918 the concept had not yet reached much beyond the drawing board with the idea remaining essentially one without recognisable form. The goal of secure peace was plainly visible whilst the route by which it was to be obtained loomed obscure and uncertain.

At that juncture anyone seriously considering this idea, whether its advocate or not, perceived the final solution in strictly personal terms. Various interpretations of what the proposed body could be and should do accordingly resulted, with two principal schools of thought emerging to promote opposing images of what international peace keeping machinery portended. Categorising these two strains of opinion under Arno Mayer's rubrics of change and of order, his conclusions about the state of international politics in the latter stages of the Great War,³ appears sound.

The party of change believed unswervingly in the efficacy of the proposed body as an instrument to maintain peace. Within this forward looking division there existed variance of opinion as to whether the organisation should be fashioned to function as a vehicle of conciliation, or an instrument of deterrence. The former grouping held that any such body must

serve only as a forum by which every means, short of armed intervention, could be utilised to halt the outbreak of war. If conciliatory efforts failed to avert hostilities, events, including war itself, had to be allowed to run their course.⁴ The latter grouping felt the proposed machinery should be devised to enforce peace, to provide through possession of military power a deterrent to the use of force as an agency of foreign policy.⁵

The party of order, on the other hand, remained convinced that any proposal outlining the formation of international diplomatic machinery, either as an instrument of conciliation or of deterrence, embodied a threat to the sovereignty and independent action of states. Not unnaturally these people were "great Power nationals", but mistakenly identified pursuit of peace with weakness and reduced military capacity.⁶

Following official Anglo-American commitment to the idea of a League, it became necessary for its advocates in both governments to add substance to theory. Toward achieving this end British supporters were far more successful, working to attain their goal whilst the war raged and not postponing planning until it had ended. Since Britain acknowledged a League to be fundamental to any postwar settlement, the government characteristically formulated specific proposals for what precisely that should entail. Just two days prior to the T.U.C. speech the two chief supporters in the government, Lord Robert Cecil, at the Foreign Office and Minister of Blockade, and General Jan Smuts, the South African War Minister a member of

the British War Cabinet, and a confidante of the prime minister, reaffirmed to Cabinet the necessity of a postwar peace keeping apparatus in preserving the fabric of international peace.⁷

Cecil, using these Cabinet submissions, drafted Lloyd George's speech.⁸ Following this Cecil and Smuts worked hard to give amorphous League notions both substance and form before the war ended. They succeeded, expanding the original scope of the proposal, and their efforts, directed through reasonable, realistic suggestions, served as the bases of League discussion in the postwar period.

II.

The British Government's first official concern with the idea of postwar machinery for maintenance of international peace and security came with the spate of memoranda, called for by Prime Minister Asquith, concerning definition of war aims in the autumn of 1916. These papers were requested on the anticipation that, by December, Germany would sue for peace and were thus intended to lay the basis for British requirements at such a conference.⁹ In September Cecil circulated a memorandum entitled "Proposals for Diminishing the Occasion of Future Wars"¹⁰ within the Foreign Office. Purposely hoping to exploit passions raised fighting a total war, he summarised briefly the cost of the Great War to all belligerents up to that point: tremendous financial expenditure in supporting war effort, considerable loss sustained by both military and civilian popu-

lations, and the incalculable destruction of property. Though not in the least a wild eyed pacifist calling for immediate cessation of hostilities,¹¹ he argued that prevention of future warfare on that scale, or at the very least its diminution, could be attained if three basic goals were realised after the fighting stopped; these goals constituted his proposals.

The first concerned territorial settlements which would undoubtedly be reached during the course of the anticipated Peace Conference. Cecil suggested all of the signatory Powers to any settlement guarantee its territorial arrangements for a minimum of five years. After this hiatus, in essence a cooling off time, the Conference could reconvene and reexamine its initial decisions to redress, if necessary, any resultant grievances. Cecil assumed, and realistically so, that policies of revenge would emerge in the immediate postwar era but that with time the heat of the moment would be superceded by objectivity. If the Powers adopted this suggestion they could move to reduce a major area of expected postwar contention and, accordingly, diminish the probability of future hostilities.

Cecil's second proposal incorporated the notion of conciliation in resolving international disputes. He suggested some provision for convening all Powers signatory to the future Peace Settlement, to explore fully all conciliatory means for the peaceful resolution of any dispute amongst them. A minimum three month period, another cooling off time, was suggested in which the convention could exhaust a dual mandate of evaluating the problem and proffering suggestions to alleviate outstanding

ferences. Much later Cecil admitted that this second goal was a reaffirmation of Sir Edward Grey's, the Foreign Secretary's, July 1914 attempt to stem the international irritations following Serajevo.¹²

To ensure compliance with provisions of his second proposal, Cecil in his last suggestion advocated the threat of severe economic and, in the most extreme of crises, military sanctions against transgressor states. In assuming this stance he remained clearly influenced by Britain's relatively successful naval blockade of the Central Powers. As Minister of Blockade from February 1916, and before that head of the Foreign Office department dealing with this problem, he had occupied a vantage point from which he could accurately gauge the effectiveness of such action.¹³ If Britain could independently muster enough power to starve slowly the Central Power populations and impede their industrial activity, as was the case by late 1916,¹⁴ concerted action by many Powers against any transgressor in their midst offered real hope. Deterrence, residing in the combined commercial and military capabilities of the major Powers and supportive of the conciliation machinery, constituted the key to Cecil's peace keeping system. His juxtaposition of conciliation and deterrence represented a subtle blend of progressive thinking regarding reducing the chances of future war.

Cecil's memorandum received critical evaluation within the Foreign Office and his proposals entertained scrutiny at the highest levels. Within a month Sir Eyre Crowe, an Assistant

Under-Secretary, produced a paper analysing Cecil's concept of international peace keeping machinery.¹⁵ Crowe maintained that the scheme comprised four, rather than three, distinct areas of concern: a guarantee of the postwar territorial status quo as defined by the eventual Peace Conference; the notion of diplomatic machinery designed to permit peaceful iteration of this status quo; additional machinery for pacific settlement of other differences arising amongst the signatories; and last, and most important, the implied limitation of both armaments and production of war matériel. With his examination of these principal areas of concern, Crowe sought to indicate major weaknesses in the general format of the Cecil scheme; he succeeded. However, in desiring to achieve this end, actually trying to play down the idea of an international diplomatic forum, he made serious errors in criticism, over emphasising key areas and hence misinterpreting a great deal of what Cecil advocated. Although Crowe aimed at reducing Cecil's credibility in these matters, his inexactness in assessment undoubtedly aided the latter's cause. Later, in constructing their scheme and presenting it to their colleagues, British proponents of the League were able to incorporate the valid aspects of Crowe's criticism whilst discounting his mistakes.

The valid aspects of Crowe's criticism confined themselves solely to analysis of the scope and nature of the proposed convention. Quite correctly he indicated that its composition would be immediately restrictive. As proposed by Cecil, it would consist only of signatory Powers to the Peace

Settlement, the Belligerents, whilst ignoring completely important neutrals. Crowe contended that territory controlled by neutrals had to be allowed the protection of the Peace Conference, in the same way as the belligerents, "if universal peace is to be assured on the basis of a generally accepted territorial settlement". He followed this assumption by examining its corollary. He thought coöperation of the neutrals was essential for successful application of any deterrent element fashioned by the convention: "no Power can be asked to take coercive action, possibly against a formidable neighbour, without having a voice in decreeing coercion in the particular case as it arises". Key states, neutrals at that point in time, were implicitly omitted in Cecil's scheme, notably China, Holland, the Scandinavian countries, Spain, and the United States. Crowe argued that the viability of any postwar convention would depend closely upon its membership and that to ignore major states with vested interests in the international system, the neutrals, was to court disaster.

With respect to the nature of the proposed peace keeping machinery, Crowe speculated that it would not flourish unless equipped with both permanent head quarters and organisation. His rationale stemmed from a belief that its work would thus be greatly facilitated in terms of speed and convenience. However, as representative of the party of order, albeit an unknowing member, he assumed that such permanency would be too revolutionary for traditional diplomatists, and that by making this a sine qua non Cecil's case would be weakened.

Here occurred the British Government's first official confrontation with consideration of a possible permanent international peace keeping organisation. Cecil, after all, had proposed only a permanent peace keeping convention. The difference was basic. A convention simply provided provision for creation of ad hoc bodies designed to function only after problems had cropped up. An organisation, on the other hand, suggested a perpetual arrangement contrived to keep watch and isolate nascent difficulties before they escalated out of control. Such distinction was a watershed as far as Britain and the League idea were concerned. Crowe unwittingly assigned the notion of peace keeping machinery to a higher plane than was originally intended by Cecil, and League proponents, later recognising this, incorporated the concept into their general scheme.

The problem with Crowe's evaluation, as earlier mentioned, hinged on his tendency to misinterpret crucial portions of Cecil's proposals. These errors constituted sizable chinks in his assault upon the idea of a League and left his criticism open to question by both his adversaries and the uncommitted in government. As a case in point, in his initial summation of Cecil's memorandum where he discerned four rather than three chief areas of concern, Crowe stated as a matter of fact that these were designed "to prevent wars". Not even Cecil in his wildest imagination assumed the convention would prevent war absolutely; rather, he held the realistic view that the convention had only the potential to reduce the possibility

of an outbreak of hostilities. This discrepancy was relayed to his colleagues through marginal notes on the printed Cabinet copies of Crowe's "Notes". Similar inaccuracies and over-dramatisations of fact surfaced at pivotal points in Crowe's study, to the detriment of that evaluation, and Cecil indicated these to the Cabinet as well.¹⁶

When considering Britain's official commitment to the League idea the Cecil-Crowe antagonism is of real import and it epitomised the dichotomy of opinion within government concerning international diplomatic peacekeeping machinery. There is no doubt both groups, change and order, sought to initiate policy which they believed would benefit Britain after cessation of hostilities.

League supporters remained convinced that British involvement in another conflict, on the scale of the Great War, would serve only to weaken the country politically, economically, and socially.¹⁷ As soon as the principal threat to international peace and security could be removed - war mongering Prussianism - the world would be ready for a League. With this removal the sanctity of international agreements could easily be safeguarded and Britain's preëminent global status maintained.

Those opposed to the concept of a League, for example Sir Maurice Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary, were convinced new threats to international order would arise after the German menace had been removed. If a new threat to European stability emerged with a similar disregard for treaties, then Britain would be forced into confrontation with that threat whether a

League existed or not.¹⁸ For these people a League would ultimately serve no purpose.

In the autumn of 1916 it was a moot question whether or not a League could serve the best interests of peace, order, and security. The crux of the problem, though, rested with the way in which the opposing factions pressed their claims. Since in fact peace negotiation never did materialise at the end of the year, the urgency faded until late in 1917 when Czernin's, the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister's, peace speech of 25 December forced the British Cabinet to reformulate their war aims, this time for public consumption.¹⁹ In the interim between submission of Cecil's "Proposals" and Lloyd George's war aims speech, League advocates outdid their rivals in producing clear and reasonable alternatives to the reliance upon war as the ultimate instrument of foreign policy. By this means the concept of the League was kept alive in British government circles.

III.

One crucial development occurred following the Cecil-Crowe confrontation which, more than anything else, led to inclusion of the promise for a postwar League in Lloyd George's T.U.C. speech. This was the conscious and successful attempt at creating firm, responsive, decision making within the British Government, emerging in the form of the War Cabinet. Designed to deal principally with direction of war effort and

general strategy, as well as subordinate questions touching these areas, this body inadvertently became the vehicle which aided League advocates in their efforts.

By late 1916 British war effort appeared to be flagging.²⁰ The second anniversary of the July crisis had passed with little seemingly settled after two years of intense fighting. The Somme offensive during the summer had clearly failed and increased economic difficulties, resulting from expanding German submarine activity, conspired against Asquith's leadership. His ambivalent, compromise seeking style of political direction, perhaps suitable in peace time, undermined his position when the rigours of constant war crisis seemed to be more than he could handle. In the first week of December 1916 the crisis within Britain's leadership boiled to a head when Lloyd George, then War Minister and the most successful of British politicians, and Andrew Bonar Law, the Conservative Party chief and Colonial Secretary, confronted Asquith with a plan for initiating a new approach to develop war policy. Asquith balked at their suggestions, essentially a scheme for creating a small committee, independent of Cabinet, to coordinate war effort. Such a stance on Asquith's part, considering he presided over a tripartisan coalition government, was questionable in that he refused to lend support to key people backing him. With his rebuff, both Lloyd George and Bonar Law moved to oust him from office.²¹ Within one week of Lloyd George's subsequent rise to the premiership,²² the War Cabinet emerged at the apex of Britain's decision making apparatus.

The difference between the Asquithian Cabinet and Lloyd George's War Cabinet is striking. Asquith headed a twenty-two man behemoth, slow and unwieldy, which usually did not follow specific agendas nor keep adequate records of what had transpired at the meetings.²³ Ministers, thus, tended to leave Cabinet, conveniently forget its conclusions, and proceed on their own in establishing and conducting policy.²⁴ Attendant factors served to reduce the leadership capacity of the Cabinet. Ministers with little to contribute departmentally to war effort were permitted to debate important issues. Speedy decisions to crisis situations were, thus, hampered and, in the prime minister's attempt to preserve some Cabinet harmony, slaved to accommodate the wishes and dispositions of the various members. Slowly, a growing disillusionment evolved within the ranks of those most responsible for contriving war policy; this, evidenced by the Lloyd George-Bonar Law scheme concluding with the fall of Asquith.

With Lloyd George's rise to prime ministerial office the nature and scope of Britain's governmental leadership, for the duration of hostilities, altered. The War Cabinet emerged as the most important manifestation of this. The War Cabinet, a body of initially five men, concentrated solely on questions relating to British war effort: i.e. inter Allied relations, strategy, supply, peace terms, and war aims, though other subordinate areas of concern, as they touched upon the war, were also considered. Lloyd George gathered around him the most influential men in government whose inputs to policy, either

for political or other reasons, was judged essential to success.²⁵ Regular ministerial functions continued with the ministers and secretaries of state whose spheres of concern fell outside the scope of the inner group did not attend its meetings on a regular basis. They appeared only when their special areas of interest might have affected or been affected by proposed policy. The most intriguing aspect of this trend to exclusiveness is seen with the foreign secretary's absence from that august body. Only when questions of diplomacy and foreign policy had to be considered did the Foreign Office have a representative in the Cabinet Room at 10 Downing Street.

The most effective reform instigated by the reformers occurred with the establishment of a Cabinet Secretariat under Sir Maurice Hankey. Hankey had headed a similar administrative wing attached to the Committee of Imperial Defense since 1912 and the achievements of that important group were directly related to its secretarial section.²⁶ A good deal of what had been established as standard procedure in the C.I.D. day to day functioning was transferred to the War Cabinet. Agendas for each meeting were devised; minutes and attendant conclusions resulting from deliberations were copied by secretaries present, quickly printed for circulation amongst the upper levels of the government, and transcripts filed for future reference; all memoranda issued to the War Cabinet were immediately indexed and copies filed for future reference; and, ministers were accordingly less independent in their actions outside of the Cabinet Room.

Three events deriving directly from the existence of the War Cabinet arose which served both to encourage the idea of international peace keeping machinery and necessitate its inclusion in Lloyd George's T.U.C. speech. In December 1916 the new government had to reply to an American peace initiative in which, for the first time, their perceptions of what precisely Britain was fighting for had to be articulated. The small and cohesive nature of the War Cabinet permitted this with a greater speed and unity of opinion than would have been the case with its Asquithian predecessor. The success of the War Cabinet was mirrored in establishing, in the early spring of 1917, a direct offshoot to deal with the question of the Empire and the war, the Imperial War Cabinet. At its first session a myriad of issues, judged vital to the welfare of the Empire in the war and projected postwar periods, were decided upon. Last, and perhaps most important, Smuts' converted into a League supporter and, at the same time, was elevated to full Cabinet rank and an intimate association with those in positions to inaugurate policy. Each of these events aided the League concept.

On 20 December 1918, just three weeks after Lloyd George's rise to power, the War Cabinet received a peace note from the then neutral United States of America.²⁷ In a preamble addressed to all belligerents President Wilson made great truck of reminding them that his government was not intent on interfering in the affairs of the warring nations. He merely indicated that both war coalitions had professed war aims in only

the most general terms and, whilst not asking for immediate peace nor offering mediation, he proposed "that soundings be taken in order that we may learn . . . how near the haven of peace may be for which all mankind longs" He included the observation that each bloc of belligerents seemed "ready to consider the formation of a league of nations to insure peace and justice throughout the world". With this challenge Britain's new leadership rose to the occasion and, by chance, the greatest part of the task of drafting the British reply fell to Cecil.

With Asquith's removal, his foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, would not continue and resigned. Lloyd George invited Arthur Balfour, a former Conservative prime minister who had served as first lord of the Admiralty in Asquith's coalition, to replace Grey. Balfour, however, enjoyed notorious bad health so that when smitten and unable to perform his required duties Cecil, the next most important elected official in the Foreign Office, doubled for him. When Wilson's note arrived and it was decided the Foreign Office should draft Britain's response, Balfour could not attend. In the process of completing this important task Cecil, the principal League advocate in government, was provided with an ideal opportunity to promote his predilections within the apex of Britain's decision making apparatus.

Cecil indicated that the Cabinet had the choice of two responses in answering Wilson. One response was an evasive and circumspect one, the other a specific indication of what British

goals in fighting the Central Powers were. He included an outline of each in his submission along with scenarios of disadvantages incumbent with their acceptance.²⁸ The War Cabinet's selection of the latter course was not surprising, as the former was unquestionably advanced to enhance the benefits accruing to veracity and candour. As the United States, though a neutral, provided Britain with key war matériel, both commercial and otherwise, it would have been impolitic to endorse a reply which would have probably lessened pro Allied feelings by being evasive to the American President's query.

In the last paragraph of his discourse on general war aims Cecil advanced the notion of a postwar peace keeping forum. He wrote:

As to a league of nations for the prevention of war, our course is tolerably clear, whatever line we adopt on other questions. We should express the utmost sympathy with the proposal, and should ask what was exactly meant by the promised support of the United States.

Cecil's statement was a reasonable and realistic proposal and he supported it with a word of caution: Britain should ascertain as fully as possible what the contributions of the United States to this proposed body would entail. Other major questions such as the extent to which the sphere of League activity would extend to the Americas also had to be answered. If Britain could be satisfied on these points, an effort to ensure against London being committed to a concept less than universally accepted, it could more easily profess a readiness to participate in such a body.

Following War Cabinet acceptance of Cecil's offerings a

decision was reached, with the encouragement of the prime minister, to amalgamate them with what the French had to say. Immediately after Christmas an Anglo-French conference convened in London to discuss problems with Allied war effort and Berthelot, the Quai d'Orsay representative, was entrusted with drafting the joint reply.²⁹ Though the notion of a postwar league received less emphasis by Berthelot, Cecil's opportunity to promote the idea within the War Cabinet had not been squandered. In confronting and not rejecting the suggestion, War Cabinet approval had been accorded to at least the theory of such a body.

The Imperial War Cabinet convened in London between 20 March and 2 May 1917, holding fourteen meetings. For the first time during the war crisis Dominion representatives attended meetings of the War Cabinet where those issues judged vital to the Empire's welfare were considered. Hankey's draft agenda, distributed on 17 March, suggested the proposed proceedings would fulfill four functions: they would be informative as leading British ministers directed statements and memoranda to their Dominion colleagues on crucial issues; they would provide bases for increased Imperial support of Allied war effort; they would allow for an expression of Imperial sentiment with regard to possible terms of peace; and, they would permit discussion of probable postwar questions directly related to Imperial well being.³⁰ Scheduled for the twelfth meeting was consideration of postwar international relations, with discussion centring around the question of the desirability of a

League of Peace.

When that twelfth meeting occurred, on 26 April, the Imperial War Cabinet was well prepared to consider the question. During the third meeting, on 23 March, a full discussion ensued over the possibilities of securing peace in 1917.³¹ There then followed cursory examination of the question of determining the "various desiderata in the Terms of Peace" and "the desirability of fixing upon a list of irreducible minima".³² On 17 April, at the ninth meeting, Lloyd George suggested formation of two Imperial War Cabinet sub committees to enquire into territorial and other questions, those considerations which would be inextricably bound to any postwar settlement.³³ Both committees were chaired by members of the British War Cabinet: that charged with examination of territorial matters was headed by Lord Curzon, the lord president; that designated to evaluate non territorial issues was led by Lord Milner, the colonial secretary. At the twelfth meeting the Milner sub committee findings played heavily on the decisions reached by the Imperial War Cabinet on the League.

On 26 April Milner's sub committee report was considered³⁴ and when discussion arrived at its sixth point, that concerned with postwar international organisation, Lloyd George retorted that it appeared to have "thrown cold water on the idea of a League of Nations";³⁵ as well, in his opinion, the Milner sub committee had neglected serious consideration of another crucial problem, that of the limitation of armaments. He presumed these separate issues, if left unattended, would serve only to disillusion

public opinion after the cessation of hostilities. The Imperial War Cabinet, during its twelfth and thirteenth meetings, moved to rectify these apparent deficiencies and in the process contributed immeasurably to the League idea by tying it to the notion of disarmament.

The question of disarmament experienced initial difficulty and surprisingly Cecil, the prophet of peaceful international relations, emerges most responsible for this. He began the discussion by noting that in a memorandum he had penned some time before, his "Proposals for Diminishing the Occasion of Future Wars", he had strongly advised that arms limitation be central to any postwar system but that, following persuasive criticism by Crowe, he had abandoned this position. His simple admission, unquestionably offered out of genuine conviction that disarmament was not a requisite condition for peace, was enough to stall decision within the Imperial War Cabinet. The remainder of disarmament discussion that day revolved around identifying snags which could develop with implementation of such policies. A consensus was attained in the identification of the principal stumbling block. There was general agreement that in the postwar period British naval power, allied to that of the United States, would serve as the "best guarantee of peace"; but, in the interests of general disarmament, the diminution of this important military arm would be called for. Stemming from this possible scenario was a fear that British naval preëminence would be eroded and, correspondingly, Imperial security would be jeopardised. An im-

passee had been reached.

With consideration of disarmament bogged down, attention shifted immediately to assessing the viability of a League of Nations. Cecil expressed the view that there existed only two legitimate options regarding postwar peace keeping machinery: an International Court of Arbitration, modelled on the existing Hague Conventions, or a system of International Conference and Consultation, the meat of his September 1916 memorandum. To enhance the latter Cecil pointed out that it would be questionable leadership for the Imperial War Cabinet to commit the Empire to the whims and caprices of an independent tribunal empowered to effect binding judicial decisions. Consultation with the Powers, across the conference table as equals, could only serve the best interests of peace and of the Empire. Milner concurred with this realistic assessment, adding that had such recourse been available in 1914 the July crisis would probably have been defused.

One fundamental Cecil proposal did not fare well; this concerned his advocacy of periodic conferences to alter territorial arrangements peacefully. He endeavoured to impress upon his colleagues his conviction that one of the principal causes of international discord resided in "treaty terms [attempting] to settle for all time matters that were inherently subject to variation and development". A system of conference and consultation would allow for some diplomatic flexibility in coping with international conditions transcending time in altered form. Nonetheless objections arose, stemming from

chiefly the supposition that such practice would raise as many problems as would be solved. Decision was made to circulate the Cecil-Crowe memoranda, as well as the minutes of the Milner sub committee, to serve as a basis for discussion of the League and disarmament at the next meeting.

At that meeting, held five days later, both issues were resolved, at least as far as prefacing the T.U.C. speech. The League policy which emerged from the thirteenth meeting derived from just three short statements made by Milner, Cecil, and Smuts, and all originating with Cecil's September 1916 memorandum. Milner asserted Cecil's established view that any League must derive from an agreement amongst the Powers signatory to the eventual Peace Settlement. His statement about the possible efficacy of such an arrangement in 1914, made on 26 April, undoubtedly stood foremost in his mind when he advocated "the Powers concerned in the Treaty of Peace to bind themselves not to go to war without previous conference, and to go to war against any Power that violated this agreement".³⁶ Cecil enlarged upon Milner's assertion by asking the Imperial War Cabinet to adopt his "Proposals for Diminishing the Occasion of Future Wars", after deleting that calling for periodic alteration of the territorial status quo. The watchwords of enquiry and ~~delay~~, coupled with sanctions to force compliance, were to be central to the scheme. Smuts offered a word of caution by suggesting that the exact nature of sanctions be decided later but, as long as the Imperial War Cabinet supported the principle, an important hurdle would be breached. These suggestions were

adopted.

Disarmament was not resolved as easily because the problems incumbent upon acceptance of such policy were still foremost in mind. Cecil reiterated his belief that Crowe's criticisms were substantially sound; Lloyd George countered they had not nearly exhausted the subject and debate commenced. The prime minister argued that the war had resulted from the existence of "a great, highly professionalised army exciting public opinion, and eager to test its strength".³⁷ He advocated the establishment of a non provocative militia system. It was pointed out that the lynch pin of world peace in the postwar period, the Royal Navy, would be highly professionalised and that his ideas on such a scheme would only endanger British sea power. Arthur Henderson, the Labour Party representative in the War Cabinet, had served on Milner's sub committee and he indicated that although that group had discarded complete disarmament as impracticable, they would consider all sensible proposals for diminishing arms and reducing the recurrence of war. He believed that any plan for disarmament would depend solely upon the character of postwar international relations. Austen Chamberlain, the Indian Secretary, scorned any disarmament scheme because of the possibility of fraudulent activity by those states intent upon arming at any cost. However, one possible way of dealing with the question would be to discuss disarmament with the United States in an effort to sound out American ideas on a workable arrangement. This seemed a rational choice and the Imperial War Cabinet concluded:

the question of the limitation of armaments should also be discussed with the United States in connection with any discussion of this question of a League of Peace.

In this manner disarmament and a League, as far as Britain and the Empire were concerned, were bound together.

Smuts' membership in the British War Cabinet contributed, perhaps, most heavily in encouraging the League idea within government prior to January 1918. Whilst representing South Africa at the 1917 Imperial War Cabinet, Smuts became convinced of a striking similarity between the established British commonwealth of nations and the proposed League.³⁸ International organisation hence was not that revolutionary and, although the commonwealth existed as a loose political union, he was inclined to think it was possible, with peace as the cement, to fashion a practicable association of independent Powers. Central to his fruitful promotion of these ideas was the development of an intimate political friendship with Lloyd George. Each man possessed admiration for the leadership qualities of the other, as well as being influenced to some extent by the beliefs of the other. With regard to the League of Nations, Smuts' adherence served to keep Lloyd George favourably inclined and to reaffirm the support evidenced during session of the Imperial War Cabinet.

Smuts' work during the Imperial War Cabinet had a great impact upon Lloyd George: "So deep was the impression that General Smuts made at this time upon his colleagues, nay upon the nation, that we would not let him leave us when the Conference was ended."³⁹ Though characteristically an overstatement

- Milner, who had served in South Africa during the Boer War, was not too keen - Smuts was subsequently asked by the War Cabinet to advance his opinions regarding the military position in Palestine,⁴⁰ the higher conduct of the war,⁴¹ and problems in general strategy.⁴² On 11 June 1917 the South African attended his first meeting of the War Cabinet as a full member, a minister without portfolio. He assumed his new duties with two conscious objectives: to contribute to fashioning a victorious British war effort as a means of shortening hostilities and to work at producing policies geared to prevent the recurrence of future war.⁴³ In the half year between his elevation to Cabinet rank and Lloyd George's war aims speech those efforts at promoting the League encompassed reasoned agitation within government.

One document most exemplifies Smuts' lobbying within government; this is the above mentioned "Draft Statement of War Aims" requested by the War Cabinet and distributed on 3 January 1918.⁴⁴ With Cecil's of the same day, this formed the skeleton of the T.U.C. speech, and like Cecil had so often done Smuts advanced his suggestions in rational and reasonable tones. Toward the end of this paper he brought up the question of postwar international peace keeping machinery:

There remains the most important but most difficult of all - the group of War Aims which are directed to the prevention of Future Wars and the settlement of International differences by pacific means. The measureless suffering and losses of this war have opened the eyes of mankind to the danger of self-destruction which threatens the future of civilisation and every wise expedient should be adopted to prevent a recurrence of war in future. To that end we consider it essential that the peace treaty shall include gen-

eral provisions which shall bind the Governments concerned to the abolition of Military conscription and the limitation of Armaments and the means and scale of future warfare, to the compulsory submission of future International disputes to arbitration, and to the institution of a regular Conference or League of Nations which shall control the execution of these general provisions and devise adequate machinery for the purpose.

Smuts was moved to plead his case before Cabinet out of the same compassion Cecil had earlier indicated concerning the fearful toll the Great War was exacting in soldiers, civilians, property, and the very existence of some states. Smuts worried about the effect of the war on political stability and a goodly portion of his memorandum directed itself to the nagging chance of Russia which had been torn apart by revolution twice in one year and forced to sue for peace with the Central Powers. Smuts advanced further than did the Imperial War Cabinet eight months before with his inclusion about the necessity of seeking the "abolition of Military conscription and the limitation of Armaments". Although the T.U.C. speech two days later did not include the conscription provision, the portion concerning arms limitation remained. There was a consensus within the War Cabinet that this be a fundamental component in the postwar international system after consideration of Smuts' draft.⁴⁵ Although his biographer believes Smuts "was at this time to put too much faith in the enunciation of points, particulars and principles",⁴⁶ the South African was clearly pleased with what had been accomplished by his presentation to Lloyd George and his associates.⁴⁷

In this manner, then, creation of Lloyd George's War Cab-

inet played the role in securing provision for a postwar League in the war aims speech. The Cecil-Crowe confrontation of the autumn of 1916, in essence one between change and order, saw success for the former, advocates of international peace keeping machinery; this as a direct result of the War Cabinet. In framing a reply to Wilson's December 1916 peace initiative, in contriving Imperial war policy, and with the rise of Smuts to power, the War Cabinet became a forum in which the party of change outdid their rivals in producing clear responsive alternatives to reliance upon war as the ultimate instrument of foreign policy.

IV.

The immediate result of the prime minister's war aims speech, concerning the proposed international peace keeping machinery, was the formation of a committee within the Foreign Office to investigate the concept. The suggestion for such a group had first been advanced by Cecil soon after the formation of the War Cabinet,⁴⁸ but Balfour did not act upon it until January 1916.⁴⁹ Seven members were appointed: Sir Walter Phillimore, Professor A.F. Rollard, Sir Julian Corbett, Dr. J. Holland Rose, Eyre Crowe, Sir William Tyrrell, and Mr. C.J.B. Hurst. Phillimore, the chairman and whose name the committee bore, was an international jurist of reputation. Rollard, Corbett, and Rose were eminent academics, historians who were collectively authorities on constitutional and naval subjects.⁵⁰

The remaining three were Foreign Office officials. Crowe was still an assistant under-secretary, as was Tyrnell; Hurst was the chief legal adviser. In total the Phillimore Committee produced two reports, an Initial Report published on 20 March 1918,⁵¹ and a Final Report published on 3 July 1918.⁵² These reportings were labelled by Cecil "the first British Draft of the Covenant".⁵³ Indeed, he points out that they contained the seeds of Articles 5, 7, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, and 20 of the eventual Covenant agreed to at the Paris Peace Conference. These provisions covered "Procedure and the seat of the League, as to arbitration and the submission of all international disputes either to arbitral decision or to the consideration and recommendation by the other members of the League". This is an important departure when considering Britain and the origins of the League; at this point consideration for such machinery left the drawing board and the realm of theorising and leapt into that of substance and concrete proposals.

The mandate of the committee was outlined in its initial submission: "to enquire particularly from a judicial and historical point of view into the various schemes for establishing by means of a League of Nations, or other device, some alternative to war as a means of settling international disputes".⁵⁴ From their deliberations the committee members were to report on the advisability of those schemes from a practical point of view, suggest any amendments, or elaborate any alternative they deemed both possible and expedient. An interesting aspect of the Phillimore reports was that the initial one provided the

Foreign Office with the suggestions for international diplomatic machinery and the second, over three months later, an elaboration of the reasons why.

The Initial Report informed Balfour the Committee had examined a number of early projects for an international peace keeping apparatus, that is those prior to 1800, which generally prescribed "a kind of European Confederation with a super-national authority". Deciding the temper of international opinion would not counsel such revolutionary departures, the only practicable solution would be through promotion of international coöperation or by conclusion of specific treaties or alliances along the lines of recent schemes that is post 1800 offerings. However, after examination of the newer proposals, notions which supplanted the earlier idea of confederation with a system of permanent conference and an arbitral tribunal, the Concert of Europe in expanded form, the Committee ascertained none of these would meet with government approval. The Committee consequently fell back on the last point of its mandate, the articulation of a plausible and feasible alternative, incorporating the better parts of those schemes whilst avoiding their "obvious stumbling blocks".⁵⁵ This emerged in a "Draft Convention" for a League of Nations, the heart of the Initial Report.

Phillimore's "Draft Convention" offered to aid the cause of international peace and security through the machinery of enquiry and delay. The crux of this machinery resided in Article I of the draft; it existed essentially as an amplification

of Cecil's September 1916 proposals:

Each of the Allied States (being parties to this Convention) agrees with the other Allied States collectively or separately that it will not go to war with another of the Allied States

(a) without previously submitting the matter in dispute to arbitration or to a Conference of the Allied States; and

(b) until there has been an award by the Conference . . . and also that it will not go to war

(c) with another of the Allied States which complies with the award or with the recommendation (if any) made by the Conference in its report.

Implementation of economic and military sanctions was advanced as the best method to ensure compliance with the mechanisms of enquiry and delay.

Controversy surrounds the Initial Report as its provisions eventually constituted the most important aspects of the later League Covenant, the enquiry and delay process supported with the threat of sanctions. One branch of opinion contends the Phillimore Committee did not proceed far enough in its handling whilst another holds it did. Alfred Zimmermann, a scholar who during the war served in the Foreign Office, is representative of the former and Robert Cecil of the latter. Zimmermann maintains the Committee plan took "the form of an 'Alliance', not of a 'League'."⁵⁶ His principal commentary is that there existed the implied intention to restrict the proposed body's membership and thus play down significantly any ideas purporting a universal character. Cecil readily admitted that the Phillimore scheme was merely a treaty but that such an accord, to be successful, required agreement amongst the signatories. The effectiveness of the proposed body, the gauge of success, would derive from a sincere conviction within the civilised world

about not continuing to condone powerful countries exploiting weaker ones with threats of force.⁵⁷ Cecil remained convinced that this conviction prevailed in 1918. Although retrospectively Cecil's observations lack credibility, the agitation initiated by League advocates at this time indicates the British decision making apparatus was in the process of assuming that conviction.

The Phillimore Committee's Initial Report was endorsed though not adopted by the War Cabinet and immediately despatched to Washington D.C.⁵⁸ With this the differences in effort expended by British League supporters and their American counterparts emerged; this, within government where the histrionics necessary in confronting public opinion do not count. Wilson, who had become recognised as the international leader of the League movement, by war's end did not progress beyond flowery rhetoric and had failed to articulate specific proposals when pressed by his British allies. Even the French Government, impressed with the implications of an international diplomatic forum, had seen fit to enunciate their ideas; Léon Bouregeois, a former premier and devoted League supporter, drafted the French scheme.⁵⁹ The work of the Phillimore Committee remained, however, the most exhaustive, contrasting heavily for the remainder of the war period with a lack of concrete American suggestions.

The problem resided with Wilson. Records left by his closest political associate, Colonel Edward House, indicate he came gradually to embrace the principle of international peace keeping machinery and that following public announcement of his

adherence to the belief in May 1916 he became its most ardent champion.⁶⁰ Nevertheless, Lloyd George was informed by the embassy in Washington in November 1917 that Wilson "thought it better that the Government of the United States should not in any way be committed to a cut-and-dried plan for the establishment of a League of Nations".⁶¹ Public endorsement of the idea was of course requisite, but any sort of elaboration beyond that would tend only to complicate matters. It would seem from this that inclusion of a statement supporting the principle of a League in Lloyd George's T.U.C. speech reflected to a degree British desires to mollify Wilson. Russian withdrawal from hostilities, coupled with Brest-Litovsk, made any contributions the United States could muster crucial to victorious Allied prosecution of war effort.⁶² But with British public commitment to postwar international diplomatic machinery, London decided to push forward and, with characteristic foresight, investigate what lay ahead. Foreign Office establishment of the Phillimore Committee directly resulted from this. An American counterpart to examine this most vital war aim, one which had assumed general Allied concern with Wilson's enunciation of the "Fourteen Points", was not forthcoming.

In fairness to Wilson, after American entry into the war on the Allied side his "one-track mind" became absorbed with the intricacies of directing war effort. He consequently entrusted to House the task of assembling all pertinent data for American participation in the eventual Peace Conference. Tied to House's chore lay consideration of the question of the

League. House conducted a lengthy correspondence with Cecil on a number of problems relating to the League⁶³ but, whenever definite American decision was sought on a specific point, House proved evasive. Wilson believed the "principle is easy to adhere to, but the moment questions of organization are taken up all sorts of jealousies come to the front which ought not now to be added to other matters of delicacy";⁶⁴ this obviously carried great weight with House.

When the War Cabinet despatched Phillimore's Initial Report to Washington it did so in order that the Americans could examine its contents, become conversant with them, comment, and offer meaningful suggestions for amendment. This would then free the report for publication. Examination and comment occurred but, under Wilson's instructions, it was recommended that there be no publication. He felt that if he was to take a public stand on the Phillimore proposals, which he believed he would have to, he could become a target for criticism. Rage from both pro and anti Leaguers would develop: the former because they would feel he had not gone far enough and the latter for the opposite reasons. He informed the British Government through Sir William Wiseman, the chief of British Intelligence in the United States, that he had not yet made up his mind about what the final form of the League should be.⁶⁵ Wilson said this although he had written an outline for a League earlier, though showing it to no one save House.⁶⁶ In dealing with the British in the matter of the League, House's hands were effectively tied.

House wrote Cecil in late June 1918 outlining a number of principles he considered essential to the proposed postwar League.⁶⁷ This was followed in mid July with a paper he labelled a "Suggestion for a Covenant of the League of Nations",⁶⁸ a document unquestionably based on Phillimore's Initial Report. The intriguing thing about House's draft vis-à-vis Phillimore's concerns Wilson's assessment of the British plan: "It has no teeth, I read it to the last page hoping to find something definite but I could not."⁶⁹ Wilson, however, thought House's "Suggestion" had merit. Comparison of the two, however, suggests Wilson was somewhat amiss in his appraisal as the only radical departure House took concerned the question of making the League a permanent organisation, replete with a secretariat, rather than an alliance;⁷⁰ this remained, nonetheless, a rehash of what Crowe had advanced almost two years earlier in rebutting Cecil's original memorandum. Unfortunately for British leaders, both the principles outlined to Cecil in June and House's "Suggestion" were not to be considered a reply to Phillimore or an elucidation of American goals. House's efforts were to be construed only as an intimation of his personal views on the subject.⁷¹ Meant to reassure London, this initiative failed. Intentional American circumspection regarding League matters continued until after the Armistice. However, American intransigence permitted British League proposals, the only ones of consequence devised by 1918, to emerge as the most important in the proximate postwar period. The efforts of Cecil and Smuts had not been wasted.

CHAPTER THREE

The Work of Covenant Makers,

December 1918 - June 1919.

"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less."

"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things."

"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master - that's all."

Humpty Dumpty and Alice

I.

The myth of Woodrow Wilson as the founder of the League of Nations began with the convening of the postwar Peace Conference in Paris. On 25 January 1919, at the second Plenary Session of the Peace Conference, the League Commission was created; a subordinate committee,¹ it was charged "to work out the details of the constitution and functions of the League".² All prominent pre-Armistice League supporters from the Allied Powers gained access to its ranks: Bourgeois, Cecil, House, Smuts, and Wilson. However, the lesser Anglo-American notables on the Commission, the realists: Cecil, House, and Smuts, whilst doing the lion's share of the work, allowed Wilson the credit for what evolved as the League Covenant. Two reasons for this exist. Wilson, by the end of the war and in spite of the lack of concrete proposals from him, had become the recognised international spokesman for the League through the rhetoric of his idealistic public utterances. International,

or at least European, public opinion in the immediate postwar period appeared especially supportive of what he had said during the fighting. His Parisian reception one month before the opening of the Conference was indicative; he travelled along the Champs Élysées in a "blaze of glory", confronting an enthusiastic crowd of supposedly two million Frenchmen.³ The effect of his European reception was not lost later on his Commission colleagues.

Wilson and Orlando, the Italian premier, joined the Commission, but Wilson was the only great Power leader who added the weight of his convictions, as called for as they were, to key negotiations before the opening session of the Commission.⁴ Wilson's active display of support for the League idea added an aura of credibility to Commission proceedings. This would have seemed much less promising had he chosen to act in the detached manner of the other three Allied leaders: Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando, with no one of significant stature actively participating in important pre Commission deliberations. Both these points determined that a goodly portion of the credit for the eventual Covenant would be tied to him.

Ambiguity surrounding American post Armistice League policy did not subside until the third week of January 1919. House's outline had, after all, been only a personal intimation of views, whilst Wilson's July 1918 sketch had not been exposed to anyone save House.⁵ American League policy hinged on Wilson and he was not ready to intimate his conception of the League until 19 January 1919.⁶ Alas, when these first Paris offerings

were finally presented to the Allies, they constituted nothing more than an amalgam of extant programmes penned earlier by Cecil, House, Phillimore, and Smuts. Wilson had merely amassed what others had written and edited them in an attempt to reach the best possible scheme.⁷ This pattern maintained itself during the existence of the Commission, from 3 February to 11 April 1919. Less notable men - Cecil, House, Smuts, Hurst, and David H. Miller, Hurst's American opposite - did most of the work of drafting the Covenant. These Covenant makers took what had been offered prior to February 1919 - chiefly by themselves - placed it in a suitable framework, and presented this, the Covenant, to the Conference. Wilson, who became chairman of the Commission through his rank and interest in the project, was permitted to take credit for these efforts. Coupled with public belief in his unparalleled support of the idea, the League became identified as his creation.

II.

Almost immediately following announcement of the defeat of the Central Powers and signing of the Armistice, Lloyd George called a general election. The war Parliament had outlasted its legal term by over three years; chosen in 1910, during the final throes of the Lords' crisis, the war had prohibited any chance of holding a normal general election in 1915. In the ensuing campaign Lloyd George decided to continue the alliance of his Liberal followers with the Conservative -

Unionists. The complex machinations of why he chose to follow this route does not concern the scope of this discussion;⁸ however, the net effect of this decision saw the coalition's receipt of landslide electoral support. Lloyd George, accordingly, possessed solid, near united domestic support when he participated in the high level diplomatic councils reestablishing order to Europe. His ministry had been provided with a mandate for producing crucial policies necessary in meeting anticipated postwar difficulties. Receipt of immense political support from the British electorate reflected on the refurbished coalition's efforts in the direction of the League.

In the interim between the Armistice and opening of the Peace Conference - some two months - British League efforts and policy crystallised around Cecil and Smuts. Lloyd George elevated both men to positions of influence in League matters when he secured places for them as the British representatives on the Commission.⁹ Phillimore's peace keeping proposals, the core of any postwar League, were taken by both and, in combination with other suggestions advanced from several quarters after the Armistice about possible League functions, fashioned into the official British position in the Commission. From British proposals came the impetus and form for what exited from the Commission in April as the League Covenant.

Cecil left the government prior to announcement of the election over Lloyd George's desire to disendow the Welsh Church; nonetheless, throughout the ensuing campaign Cecil remained a clear coalition supporter. He was reelected to the House of

Commons in this capacity following vote gathering efforts where the urgency of supporting the government in the vital questions of "peace, demobilisation, and reconstruction" were pounded home. In confronting his constituents he made reference to the impending Paris Conference and of the importance of a temperate and just settlement in achieving lasting peace. The League idea naturally assumed prominence in his pronouncements and the essence of his final ideas, advanced whilst British special adviser on League matters, derives from this time.

The speech he made in Stevenage, Hertfordshire in the last week of November illustrates this.¹⁰ Here, he pressed the notion that peace making had to be the government's "first and most important duty". Major questions relating to territorial arrangements, the reduction of enemy capacity, and compensation and reparation would have to be settled. Though mentioning he had broken with the government over Welsh disendowment, he emphatically held that Lloyd George had to be supported in Paris. Coupled with the necessity of British domestic unity was to be close coöperation with the United States. Support for the Lloyd George ministry at the polls would serve to promote better Anglo-American understanding, a situation Cecil believed would be of "priceless advantage". Remarking that international anarchy was no longer tolerable - it could lead to another Great War which would threaten the fabric of civilisation - he emphasised that a League of Nations, if correctly fashioned, could safeguard future peace. Whilst creation of

such a body would assuredly entail immense problems, these could be hurdled if its promoters showed not only "enthusiasm" but "circumspection". The intimation was that support for the coalition would imply British public enthusiasm.

Smuts resigned from the War Cabinet on 14 December, just a few days before the voting was to begin. Almost two weeks before, in an effort to change perceptions of the peace within the British Government - he was distressed that election speeches were centring on hanging the Kaiser and making Germany pay for the war - he had submitted notes on policy that should be pursued at Paris.¹¹ Central to his arguments sat the League and his views at this time are the antecedents of his more famous effort published on 13 December.¹² The first paper, like Cecil and his election speeches, set the tone for what Smuts finally advanced whilst a Commission member.

He observed that the "arena of the world" had suddenly been divested of half of its great Powers: Germany's defeat coupled with the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires bringing this about. Since the remaining great Powers, the victors, Britain, France, and the United States, were about to carry the burden of international responsibility, Smuts urged that Britain's "old historic policy" of maintaining the balance of power had to be reassessed. He begged caution and posed two questions:

The complete change which has come over the scene compels us to consider our future policy afresh and very carefully. What part are we going to play in this new tripartite game? Are we going to side with France or America as a matter of large policy?

He replied "that we should go with America", and the remainder of his note indicated why. Central to his argument stood close Anglo-American cooperation within the confines of the League.

The French, Smuts thought, were about to become Britain's principal adversary within Europe. With German defeat, the old "arrogant diplomacy" of pre 1870 would rear itself within France, a situation which would serve only to augment its ambitions, its militarist and imperialist temperament, and its foreign policies; these, to Smuts, had "a nasty trail of finance and concession hunting over them". He correctly forecast that Paris would attempt to entrench France as "mistress of the continent" by striving to keep Germany in "a state of humiliating subjection". Forecasting the entirety of the French situation did not augur well for future peace and international cooperation, Smuts offered that the United States could serve as the necessary block Britain could muster to aid in opposing French threats to the balance of power.

Smuts' credo stated: "we must from the very start of the Conference co-operate with America, and encourage and support President Wilson as far as is consistent with our interests". The key to Wilson remained the League but Smuts recognised that the American President had not contributed one whit of concrete suggestion towards that body. He held that to guarantee Anglo-American cooperation London must support Wilson's League policy, "and indeed [go] further and [give] form and substance to his rather nebulous ideas". One thing remained clear and on this he

based his submission:

My suggestion is that we should tell him quite frankly at the beginning that we are going to support him most fully on the League of Nations, and that in our opinion the League will be valuable not only from the point of view of future world peace but also from the way it will enable us to solve some of the most difficult territorial and economic questions arising out of this war.

He followed this with a rough outline of proposals for the League, which were amplified in his 16 December paper.

Entitled "The League of Nations. A Practical Suggestion", that pamphlet's publication represents a watershed in terms of the League and subsequent Anglo-American joint effort at the Peace Conference. In depth analysis of this document has been conducted elsewhere;¹³ accordingly, a brief discussion of its salient points and their effect on later Covenant proposals will suffice. As important as the recommendations made was the manner in which they were presented. Smuts wrote with passion and conviction,¹⁴ and Wilson, after exposure to this paper, became smitten with admiration for the South African's vision of potential League contributions to future peace.¹⁵ These practical suggestions represented Smuts' avowed intent to take discussion of the League from the realm of generality to that of practical politics. He examined three areas he judged to be fundamental to a credible League: peace keeping, organisation, and mandates.

His peace keeping recommendations, the core of the "Suggestion", were almost Phillimore verbatim¹⁶ and Wilson, who had in the previous summer viewed these as lacking "teeth", accepted them in December as viable. Undoubtedly the President's

"one track" mind, which six months before had been grappling with the vicissitudes of directing war effort, could more easily focus on that particular aspect of the peace he had apparently made his personal cause. His acceptance of the Smuts-Phillimore peace keeping proposals indicates he did not really give them close scrutiny the first time he saw them.

As far as Wilson was concerned, the importance of Smuts' "Suggestion" also lay with the questions of organisation and mandate. Smuts submitted that the League had to become a permanent body. He believed its work would ultimately prove both weighty and voluminous and that this could be adequately handled with formation of three permanent organs: a Court of Arbitration and Conciliation, a General Conference, and an Executive Committee. Smuts' espousal of the need for the latter two components foreshadowed what later became the Assembly and Council. In particular the suggestion of a small, powerful executive, representative of greater and lesser Powers alike, constituted "a real advance to the final solution".¹⁷

Although such an organ had been advocated in discussion during the war,¹⁸ this occurred at lower government levels and hence was missing in the Cecil, Phillimore, and, even, House pre Armistice drafts. Since these lower level discussions occurred within the French and American governments, Smuts apparently struck upon this independently.

With regard to mandates Smuts submitted that to avoid international friction over division of the various territories formerly comprising the defunct Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and

Turkish empires, the League should become the reversionary of these lands. He saw German dismemberment as not yet apparent, indicating that some areas of the former Reich, for example Alsace-Lorraine, would be returned to those from whom they had been seized. Such would not, in his estimation, threaten the German heartland. With the League assuming responsibility for the political welfare of the newly independent states of central and southeastern Europe, squabbles amongst the victors could be effectively eliminated. Granted the League would assign blocs of territory to its members to watch over, but, the collective power of the organization would ensure against mandatory states abrogating their treaties. If a state did renounce its obligations to the detriment of the mandated territory, it would assuredly be branded "Covenant breaker" and face the peace keeping resources of the League rallied against it.

Smuts included some discussion and draft articles on disarmament; the intriguing aspect of this is its placement just prior to that relating to peace keeping.¹⁹ Such juxtaposition seems intended to enhance the importance of strong military capacity in realising League success. Smuts observed realistically: "The limitation of armaments in the general sense is impractical." Impracticability would assuredly become manifest: firstly, in attempting to devise a disarmament formula; and, secondly, assuming a number of Powers, great or otherwise, did succeed in disarming, in weakening the League's ultimate collective coercive capacity.

Smuts' eloquence and scope of argument, in spite of pessi-

mism over disarmament, captured Wilson. The effect of this paper proved positive and reflected in the official United States policy that Wilson advanced to the Commission. Smuts had, thus, achieved the goal outlined to the Cabinet two weeks before: to support the American President whilst providing substance to his hazy League ideas.

One other early postwar British document had a pronounced affect upon discussion at Paris; the day after Smuts circulated his "Suggestion" Cecil offered one of his own.²⁰ Not produced in response to Smuts - its polish indicates preparation took much more than a day - this is a distillation of the totality of Cecil's thoughts on the League: what he advanced before 11 November in tandem with what he had just finished preaching on the hustings.

He believed the League should possess a permanent basis but remained unwilling to accord it as much as Smuts. For Cecil, an international court, an assembly, and a council were envisaged; however, what he advanced about their composition and functions harkened back to the old Concert of Europe. His remained a cautious attempt at wedding new concepts about international cooperation to established notions about diplomatic activity. He proposed that the existing Parliamentary Union, a loose association of parliamentarians which met regularly and which did not possess any real power, could be transformed to "cover the ground that is at present occupied by the periodical Hague Conference". A "General Conference", his conception of the Assembly, would meet only once every four years whilst

an annual convention of great Powers - the Council - would provide for regular consultation. He made no real distinction between the functions of the quadrennial and annual conferences, though he believed real influence would reside with the great Powers:

These conferences would review the general condition of international relations, and would naturally pay special attention to any difficulty which might seem to threaten the peace of the world. They would also receive, and as occasion demanded discuss, reports as to the work of any international administrative or investigating bodies working under the League.

Reference to subordinate committees represented his attempt to give the League flexibility in dealing with crises arising between scheduled conferences. The only Cecil indication of legitimate permanence came when he proposed a Secretariat be fashioned and that this body, an administrative wing which would not disband between conferences, be presided over by a Chancellor appointed by the great Powers. Interestingly, Cecil proposed Geneva serve as the seat of the League, "the most suitable place". Switzerland's neutrality indicated it would be an admirable location and not bound by emotional attachments from the war; this contrasted favourably with Brussels which was also being mooted as a possible home of the League then. As earlier noted, Phillimore's peace keeping articles were incorporated without significant change.

In these early drafts Cecil and Smuts differed on a few fundamental points, emphasising different aspects of proposed League function. Most prominent amongst their differences was the concept of Council membership. Where Smuts advocated a body

comprised of Powers of both lesser and greater stature, Cecil desired only the great Powers, specifically naming the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States. It would seem that both men were intending to entrench the position of their rank of national power, i.e. a lesser Power and a greater Power, within the anticipated League machinery where true influence would reside. As well, Smuts devoted a goodly portion of his paper to the question of mandates whilst Cecil ignored this completely. Here it is evident Cecil beheld the League fulfilling solely a peace keeping role and, unlike Smuts, did not perceive of the organisation lessening international tensions by becoming the reversionary of the disintegrating empires. However, in terms of peace keeping, of general League organisation, and the need of a permanent Secretariat, both men were in accord.

The importance of these efforts to clarify League issues immediately after the cessation of hostilities cannot be denied. Because they were not offered as official proposals - for in fact they were Cecil and Smuts' opinions based upon discussion within government and observation concerning what would perhaps be most suitable - they have been laid open to criticism as not really representative of the British Government. 21

It seems, though, that Wilson's predilection not to advance his League ideas to his allies' scrutiny until his "one track mind" could cope with such matters had much to do with the articulation of this unofficial stance. Lloyd George retrospectively indicated both men had his confidence, and that

of his ministry and of the Empire Delegation to the Peace Conference; their zealotry in the advocacy of the organisation, together with records as "eminent jurists experienced in government" made them most satisfactory British representatives in League affairs.²² Although he made this observation fifteen years after the fact there is no real reason to doubt the sincerity with which he wrote.

Once the British became cognizant of Wilson's position, the unofficial suggestions were transformed, with little alteration, into official ones. What remains certain is that contributions made in these earliest postwar drafts provided the eventual Covenant with some of its most distinguishing features: the Assembly, Council, disarmament articles, the international court, mandates, and permanent organisation tied to a Secretariat. The process of Covenant making following these unofficial outlines, both before and during sessions of the Commission, concerned itself with refining and tempering their content, with only Phillimore's peace keeping proposals passing this rarefying process almost unaltered.²³ Immediately after Wilson exposed his ideas on 19 January the construction of the Covenant began in earnest.

III.

Wilson initially approached the Peace Conference with apprehension over the motives of the Allies; this surfaced prior to his reaching Europe when he conferred with members of

the American peace mission during their transatlantic cruise. According to the only notes made concerning that meeting, Wilson remarked that the Americans "would be the only disinterested people at the peace conference, and that the men whom [they] were about to deal with did not represent their own people".²⁴ Emphasising this point he added "this was the first conference in which decisions depended upon the opinion of mankind, not upon the previous determinations and diplomatic schemes of the assembled representatives". The American President, in believing he alone embodied "the opinion of mankind",²⁵ did not ascribe the same to those about to become his principal associates in reestablishing peace - Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando. He intended to utilise American power and influence during session of the Conference to ensure a just Settlement; naturally his brand of justice, that of mankind, would be advanced and this in terms of his noblest wartime phrases like "freedom of the seas", "open diplomacy", "equality amongst nations", and "impartial adjustment of all colonial claims".

His 19 January draft, the first the British saw, was actually the second he produced after landing in Europe; this had been preceded by one of 10 January,²⁶ which appears to be little more than his first attempt to edit what had already been devised. He submitted the 10 January effort to Miller for comment and all the American legal adviser could really find wrong with it lay in its neglect of safeguards for the Monroe Doctrine.²⁷ Miller did criticise, apart from minor details of form, problems he felt were incumbent with the questions of

territorial change and sanctions against transgressors, but, this he implied would be solved during negotiation of the Covenant. In any case, what emerges in Wilson's first two European drafts is the impression that his apprehension over British intentions abated somewhat. His exposure to Smuts' 16 December "Practical Suggestion" quite obviously had much to do with this.²⁸ The Phillimore peace keeping proposals were not that much altered from the way in which Smuts' had presented them. Additionally, Smuts' conception of a Council composed of lesser and greater Powers found inclusion, as did the notion of a permanent Secretariat tied to both the Council and Assembly, then universally referred to as the "Executive Council" and the "Body of Delegates", respectively.

Wilson differed with Smuts only over mandated territories, this arising from Wilson's desire to add flexibility and expand the scope of the programme. He indicated that former German colonial possessions in Africa and the Pacific should revert to the League, becoming a joint responsibility through the same mechanism applying to the former great Power territories within Europe. He sought, as well, that the League be given the right to substitute one mandatory Power for another.

Wilson did add some supplemental clauses with respect to "fair hours and humane treatment of labor" and guaranteed equality of treatment for "racial and national minorities". These, though, constituted only minor refinements to basic League concepts and did not touch upon the major ones relating to peace keeping, organisation, mandates, and the like.

IV.

Cecil arrived in Paris on 6 January to assume his responsibilities as British special adviser on League questions. On 8 January he met with House and Lansing, the American Secretary of State, and gave them a copy of three resolutions he was proposing to put before the Conference as early as possible. This served as the basis of the later decision by the Conference to create the League Commission. With slight alteration it read:

1. It is essential to the maintenance of the world settlement which the Associated Nations are now met to establish, that a League of Nations be created to promote international cooperation, to insure the fulfillment of accepted international obligations and to provide safeguards against war.
2. This League should be created as an integral part of the general Treaty of Peace, and should be open to every civilised nation which can be relied upon to promote its objects.
3. The members of the League should periodically meet in international conference, and should have a permanent organisation and secretariat to carry on the business of the League in the intervals between the conferences. The Conference therefore appoints a Committee representative of the Associated Governments to work out the details of the constitution and functions of the League.²⁹

After some discussion the only serious difference of opinion between the American and British concepts was the method of League conciliation to diminish the probability of war. This arose from House's desire to ensure "that in no circumstances should war take place in the future and that every dispute must be in the last resort submitted to arbitration".³⁰ The Phillimore Initial Report, and Cecil and Smuts in following it, had opted for only a promise by League members not to take up arms

until all avenues of enquiry and delay had been exhausted.³¹ Little headway was made during this meeting on the question; both House and Cecil, nonetheless, finished their conversation by agreeing that the Cecil resolutions did not rule out House's view any more than they did Cecil's. Both also agreed that Anglo-American differences on the League question should be resolved before their Allies were consulted.

House's advocacy of universal compulsory arbitration appeared to be one shared by a number of the American Delegation in Paris.³² Cecil realistically held that such a stance would be untenable and that it might lead to potential League members shying away from adhering to the Covenant. Cecil asked Eyre Crowe, then in Paris as a British Minister Plenipotentiary, to draft a memorandum outlining objections to the idea. On 9 January, the next day, Crowe's efforts were despatched to House and Lansing,³³ and this paper fully depreciated any provision for compulsory arbitration which might find its way into any League scheme.

Crowe dissented on four points. He argued cogently that international difficulties arising out of infringements upon rather abstract concepts - and he cited those questions involving national honour and vital interest - could not be submitted for arbitration. Tied to this was the corollary that national interests are not in subordinated to judicial processes. As well, in spite of the merits of the idea, there existed the real, and potentially dangerous, problem of not obtaining impartial awards. Crowe indicated that requisite impartiality would

be an impossibility in a majority of cases. Lastly, he remained wary of the critical "attitude of the American Senate in regard to their treaty-making powers"; Crowe observed that this branch of the American legislature guarded nothing as carefully as "its right to a voice in the making of treaties".

House fell ill on 9 January and for two weeks could not meet with Cecil.³⁴ With House incapacitated, Cecil met only a few Americans in Paris and the friction over Anglo-American differences about compulsory arbitration abated. The effect of Crowe's attack can be gauged a success as the American President omitted compulsory arbitration in his draft shown to the British on 19 January. Cecil's record of the Peace Conference indicates that a number of Americans in the United States Delegation came to adopt the British view and after 10 January makes no mention of it again.³⁵

For the ten days between the 9 January Cecil-House meeting and Wilson's release of his second Paris draft, Cecil busied himself with clearing his resolutions with Lloyd George and working on an official British draft convention with the staff assigned to him from London. Lloyd George gave tentative approval to the resolutions on 13 January but instructed Cecil to show them first to Balfour and Smuts. These two were inclined to support Cecil on this initiative and two days later the prime minister gave them his complete endorsement. It was Lloyd George, who after presenting these for acceptance by the Council of Ten, placed them before the second Plenary Session of the Conference on 25 January.

During their last meeting before his illness, House and Cecil agreed that Anglo-American experts should consult as soon as possible and frame a joint draft Covenant;³⁶ this document would then serve as the focal point of discussion once the Commission began its deliberations. Wilson's 19 January draft and that which Cecil and his staff - the League Section of the British Delegation - presented served as the base upon which that cooperative venture was created. Cecil's earlier submissions, his mid-December 1918 effort and two others derived from it,³⁷ were given to the Americans with the intimation they would constitute the skeleton of the first British official draft in Paris. Smuts' ideas, as well, were recognised to be a principal complement to any British outline to be produced.

On 19 January Cecil and Smuts were finally summoned to Wilson's quarters to discuss his scheme for the League. After three hours of examination, clause by clause, Cecil pronounced it "almost entirely Smuts and Phillimore combined, with practically no new ideas in it".³⁸ Ironically, the importance of this long awaited meeting lay not with Wilson's draft so much as with impressions of American attitudes relayed to Cecil. Cecil was informed of American desires for close Anglo-American cooperation on the matter of the League; where House had merely indicated this situation would be of importance, Wilson seems to have believed it was essential. Stemming from an increasing American disillusionment with the French and Italians, Wilson and his aides held their view of the League to be

most compatible with British proposals, except for some minor reservations. Miller noted this apparent congruence of American beliefs with British suggestions: "The Notes which accompanied the Draft Convention show how much the British were thinking of matters of international co-operation"39

It would appear that, in addition to the specific British proposals, the impact of personalities had much to do with this situation. Not in the least idealistic, Cecil and Smuts did favour a new international order, admittedly to be secure in the diplomatic, economic, and military capacities of the great Powers. Cecil's personal handling of the British case certainly impressed House,⁴⁰ whilst the presence and ideas of Smuts allayed Wilson's fears of British incapacity.⁴¹

Early Anglo-American collaboration in Paris contrasted heavily with conversations the United States Delegation was holding simultaneously with French and Italian leaders, notably Clemenceau and Orlando; there, the Americans believed they were confronting unmasked avarice in respect to reparations, territorial settlement, and the like.⁴² The French and Italians were, it seemed, only paying lip service to the League idea whilst the British and Americans persisted in making the only real contributions to the debate from which it was expected the Covenant would arise. Consequently, in the interim until 3 February, closer Anglo-American cooperation over the League occurred; this was ultimately encapsulated in the draft convention that served, as Cecil, House, and Wilson had hoped, as the basis for discussion within the Commission.

The labours of the British and Americans toward arriving at a workable draft Covenant had, prior to 19 January, been ostensibly directed toward working out technical details of the general form and function of the organisation. From Cecil's earliest memorandum in September 1916 to the Cecil-Wilson meeting of 19 January 1919, including the efforts of Phillimore, Smuts, and House in between, generalities and platitudes were given form and these then molded into and presented as policy. Once the rough details were hewn from the myriad of suggestions and the stage was set to contrive a workable Covenant, the process immediately assumed a political character. It was one thing to fret over the state of international affairs and postulate theory about how best to preserve peace, and quite another to fashion a fixed diplomatic instrument by which that peace could supposedly be maintained. Each delegation possessed definite ideas about how the proposed body should function; they interpreted key words and phrases differently; and intended, as was natural, to negotiate to the fullest in securing their scheme's adoption. By the time the Commission first set to consider "the details of the constitution and functions of the League", the above mentioned Anglo-American draft served as the sole basis of discussion. In arriving at that scheme British ideas dominated, mastering American ones.

All of the components of a League judged by Cecil and Wilson to be fundamental to its existence, in addition to the lynch pin of peace keeping - a general Assembly, an executive Council, disarmament, an International Court, mandates, permanent

organisation, and a Secretariat - found outlet in both drafts.⁴³ Discussion between each delegation's League experts, thus, constituted a process of negotiation in which, in most cases, the substance of the draft articles were not really questioned but, rather, their interpretations. In a somewhat involved procedure, discussion between these experts centred on clarifying specific proposals employing precise wording. Although Wilson wanted recognition as the prime motivator of the League in these early stages,⁴⁴ the bulk of the work fell to his subordinates, House and Miller, and British colleagues, Cecil and Smuts. These men were willing to accord Wilson credit for what transpired in negotiation; it is apparent, however, the American pair were outmaneuvered by their British counterparts. Wilson, therefore, took credit for what were British negotiation successes in most of the subtle changes affecting the draft Covenant. American weakness seems to have derived from the diversion of Wilson's attention to other Peace Settlement questions and House's illness, which prevented him consulting face to face with Cecil until the end of January.

Early League negotiation at Paris was involved and has been related elsewhere in copious detail.⁴⁵ Accordingly, an outline of the sequence of events and comparison of the final Anglo-American draft - framed by Hurst and Miller on the night of 1 - 2 February from negotiation agreements -⁴⁶ and the original proposals advanced by 20 January is all that is necessary.

Within two days of Wilson's first Paris meeting with Cecil,

Miller met the British League adviser in an attempt to sound him out.⁴⁷ Cecil entered the negotiation phase with the confidence of Lloyd George and conducted his task with relative independence; all he did was report the progress of his talks to the prime minister regularly over breakfast. For Miller, the lone American negotiator, such autonomy did not exist. Upon meeting with Cecil, he would report to House, who would then confer with the President. After Wilson and House reached a decision on the problem, Miller would receive his instructions. The day following his first meeting with Cecil, Miller reported to House and two days later, on 24 January, received his orders; these conformed with the verbal agreement of 9 January between Cecil and House, and reaffirmed on 19 January by Wilson: "to meet with Cecil and go as far as possible in having an agreement with the British on the basis of [Wilson's draft], supporting and getting them to accept it where possible, aside from questions where there were legal objections."⁴⁸ Within three days a preliminary Anglo-American draft had been hammered out in which sizable accord was achieved. Labelled for convenience the Cecil-Miller draft,⁴⁹ this paper became the focal point of discussion in two succeeding meetings Cecil had, first, with House and, then, with Wilson. From these discussions the Hurst-Miller draft evolved. It should be realised that the draft convention framed by the two delegations' legal experts served only to place decisions reached in negotiation into correct legal jargon.

In negotiation Cecil concerned himself chiefly with four

areas of endeavour: representation within the "Body of Delegates"; the composition of the "Executive Council"; "dignifying" the office of the Chancellor; and clarification of the role and function of the International Court. With respect to the "Body of Delegates", British and American outlooks coincided on most points: its scope of activity, functions, and degree of independence, that is its relative autonomy from the "Executive Council", in fulfilling those functions. Disagreement arose over the classification of national representative to be granted access to its chambers. Wilson envisaged the Assembly would be comprised of ambassadors appointed by each member state in the way that this rank of diplomat was selected to serve in foreign countries. Cecil objected, pointing out Britain could not accede to such a proposal as the independent Dominions, and possibly India, if permitted to join, would be unable to appoint their own ambassadors and ministers. The independent Dominions were utilising the Peace Conference as a means by which to secure more sovereignty in the conduct of their external relations and were putting pressure on London to this effect.⁵⁰ Cecil's attitudes toward the composition of the Assembly reflected his government's desires to mollify this Dominion agitation. At a meeting between Cecil and Miller on 21 January British concern on this issue was advanced, the result of which became inclusion in the Hurst-Miller draft of provision for "representatives" of each state.

In devising the 19 January draft, the main difficulty Cecil and the British League section faced concerned how the

"Executive Council" was to be constituted.⁵¹ The Section cast aside Smuts' notion of an executive comprised of lesser and greater Powers and retained Cecil's of just the great ones. Their perplexity concerned "how to provide for a working body of the League which would not expose [Britain] to the charge that the League was merely a device for putting the whole international power into the hands of the present Allies".⁵² Solution came with a proviso whereby the Council had to invite any non Council member to send representatives to those meetings where matters affecting that state would be discussed.

Wilson in his 19 January draft opted for the Smuts' notion and some members of the American Delegation took offense at the Cecil proposal. Lansing was particularly bitter and noted in his memoirs:

There was nothing idealistic in the plan of Lord Robert Cecil, although he was reputed to be an idealist favoring a new international order. An examination of his plan shows it to be a substantial revival of the old and discredited ideas of a century ago.⁵³

Lansing's assessment of Cecil indicates the realism with which the British League adviser attacked the problem of contriving sound international peace keeping machinery. Although Cecil advocated a new international order, he assessed the situation as a realist. As he mentioned to Miller when discussing this fundamental aspect of League organization, "the Great Powers must run the League and that it was just as well to recognize it flatly as not".⁵⁴ Lansing's vitriol about reviving "the old and discredited ideas of a century ago" seems misdirected. The last thing Cecil desired was a revival of international

anarchy; his numerous efforts from the autumn of 1916 attest to this. All he sought with his concept of a great Council was a more viable League: "an Executive Council representative of the five great Powers exclusively would be a much more workable instrument of administration than one to which minor powers were admitted on some arbitrary system".⁵⁵

This sort of argument he advanced in his meetings with Miller and later with Wilson. One incident illustrates clearly that he remained sincere in his advocacy of the great Power Council and that it would not suppress the interests of lesser Powers by eliminating them from Council consideration. On 5 February Hankey approached Cecil with the suggestion the League be organised exactly on the lines of the Versailles War Council.⁵⁶ His desire to perpetuate the wartime alliance was not new as he had advanced this same idea to the Cabinet one year earlier.⁵⁷ Cecil objected, however, noting the Versailles Council could be considered only a "moderate success" and, more importantly, the war had acted as cement holding it together. Cecil indicated a more solid organisation was requisite for League success and that its scope would have to be far greater than that of the War Council. A postwar alliance of wartime Allies would surely prove impractical.

A principal component of the "more solid organisation" Cecil sought was wrapped up in his vision of the Chancellor of the League. So strong was Cecil's desire to "dignify" this office that he had included in his 19 January draft a nine point plan,⁵⁸ not situated in the draft itself but in the supple-

mentary notes; outlining the duties and responsibilities of its holder. He attached heavy significance to this aspect of the proposed organization. To a great extent Cecil's plan merely gave international extension to the Cabinet Secretariat that had flourished under Hankey and provided substantial assistance in fashioning sound British leadership. Not unnaturally, it seems plausible that Cecil would attempt to duplicate one of Britain's most recent progressive modifications in its governmental system in the planning of an innovative League. Clearly copying what had been successful on a national level could hopefully instill the same in the as yet untried international venture.

In the Cecil scheme the Chancellor would, through the Secretariat, convene the meetings of both the general Assembly and executive Council, draft their respective agendas, and record and compile their minutes. Again through the medium of the Secretariat, the Chancellor would fulfill the same function in respect of various other organs and international committees established by the Assembly and Council. Cecil also hoped that as the League placed other international bureaux, previously established by treaty arrangements, under League control the Chancellor would be given a similar role. An important aspect of the Cecil view of the Chancellor's job related to those articles of the Covenant which dealt with peace keeping and the avoidance of war. Cecil advocated that the Chancellor take action in connection with international disputes as they were referred to the League. That is, for example,

if League members wished to refer a dispute to the International Court, it would be incumbent on the Chancellor to make the necessary arrangements for the dispute to be submitted, to informing the Court of such submission, and in preparing for the arguing of the case.

One minor inclusion in both the British and American drafts had been an article demanding that any international treaties already in existence, or negotiated after the Covenant came into effect, be registered and published by the League; this represented a bid to reduce those problems created by secret diplomacy. Thus, Cecil's fourth point held that the Chancellor "should register all international treaties brought to the cognisance of the League". Tied to the duties of the Chancellor would also be the collection of pertinent information affecting "the purposes and obligations of the League"; this would be transmitted to the Assembly and Council to aid in their deliberations.

Cecil indicated the Chancellor should serve as the "sole responsible channel" through which all correspondence affecting the League could be directed. This meant that the Assembly, Council, or other organs of the League wishing to contact member states, non member states, or other League organs, and vice versa, do so through the office of the Chancellor. Here Cecil strove to provide a mechanism of control whereby all League functions would be monitored at a central location and coordination of activities be made that much easier. The Chancellor would, through his office, maintain relations with

the representatives of the member states posted at League headquarters, make arrangements for international meetings at the request of two or more members, and make similar arrangements, at the request of the Council, for unofficial gatherings as they arose.

All of Cecil's ideas with respect to the Assembly, the Council, and Secretariat found form in the Cecil-Miller and Hurst-Miller drafts. As Miller reported to House on 27 January:

The British wish to make these changes with three ends in view

(a) The representation of the Dominions, which requires special representatives of the members of the League . . .

(b) The limitation of the membership of the Council to the Great Powers . . .

(c) Increased importance of the office of the Secretary of the League, who is called the Chancellor.

I thought it consistent with your instructions to accept these changes in order to reach agreement 59

The question of the International Court was one assuming different proportions. Whereas both Cecil and Wilson had provided for a general Assembly, executive Council, and Secretariat in their drafts, only Cecil had made specific mention of an International Court. Granted, Wilson did make provision in Article V of his draft for the process of arbitration, but this only alluded to the need for this procedure in settling disputes without resort to force. Cecil believed an International Court would be integral to the enquiry and delay provisions of the League and placed pronounced importance on its formation. Miller in meeting with Cecil recognised that the British were intent on creating this tribunal as an organ of the League and, upon reading a Cecil paper entitled "Notes on a Permanent Court", 50

became convinced of the soundness of the project.

Although the precise composition of the Court: how many members, the jurisdictional methods, terms, and its head quarters, was not resolved at this early stage, the functions it could fulfill indicated it would be a valuable adjunct to the conciliation and arbitration roles of the Council and Assembly. In his "Note" Cecil envisaged the International Court acting as an appeals tribunal in disputes occurring within international administrative unions. He made specific mention of the Universal Postal Union and International Railway Union. The same function, he felt, could be applied to the enforcement of conventions arising from the Peace Settlement and tied to the League. Cecil envisaged these conventions would cover a number of contentious issues from arms traffic to international labour legislation, and having the International Court as an appeals tribunal would only serve to strengthen them. Indeed, he was of the opinion that most of the conventions which might be tied to the League would only be practicable if there was recourse to an organ like the International Court.

Cecil also reckoned that the International Court set up under the League could serve as a supreme court on an international level. A number of minor international courts were contemplated at that time in order to expedite the actions of accessory commissions and conventions to be established in Paris: the Danube Commission Court, Sanitary Convention Court, and so on. The League's Court could readily assume the respon-

sibilities of an appeal tribunal for these less powerful bodies. Lastly, in the event of technical cases and claims for damage falling outside of the scope of the League, the International Court could be the ultimate court of summary procedure.

Cecil impressed upon Miller the likelihood that even in "normal times" the International Court would have a tremendous workload; if the above mentioned functions were ascribed to it, and even if they were not, there would assuredly be much to do "arising out of the Peace Settlement", it would assume permanent trappings. In his "Notes" Cecil took the liberty of labelling the organ the "Permanent International Court". In the Hurst-Miller draft an article was inserted which made provision for the establishment of a "Permanent Court of International Justice", the constitution of which was to be devised later by the Council after its formation. The American Delegation again followed the British lead.

Whilst Cecil got his way on the four issues he judged to be essential to the League, Wilson succeeded in extracting British concessions on the question of mandated territories. Wilson had made the question of mandates one of his principal concerns even before he read Smuts' 16 December "Suggestion".⁶¹ Although Smuts' efforts had clarified Wilson's thinking on the situation, Wilson proposed to expand and make more flexible the South African's original ideas.

Smuts had made no mention of placing the former German colonial possessions in Africa and the Pacific under the mandate system. According to his biographer, Smuts in this

early stage remained favourable to the direct annexation of the German colonies, though he later took a "leading part . . . in achieving an orderly retreat from this position".⁶² However, the British 19 January draft was purposely circumspect on the question of mandates and relegated its solution to one of those postwar conventions the likes of which were to control arms traffic and labour conditions. In meetings with the British delegation, the three southern Dominion leaders: Smuts, Massey of New Zealand, and Hughes of Australia, whose states had profited by annexing German colonial possessions, opposed the League making their newly acquired territories mandates.⁶³ Cecil, as a result, placed mandates amongst those issues to be resolved after the Peace Conference.

Wilson would not agree to shoving this important question under the rug for later leisurely perusal and, perhaps, no substantive solution. He demanded that mandates be integral to any final Covenant and that former great Power territories be transformed into mandated territories. By the latter half of January 1919, most of Smuts' original conception of European mandates had been made anachronistic.⁶⁴ The succession states to the Austro-Hungarian, German, and Russian empires had emerged and were not about to limit their autonomy by placing themselves under the benevolent wing of the League. By the end of January the only areas of the world where the mandate system could be applicable were the former Ottoman domains of the eastern Mediterranean and German colonial possessions in Africa and the Pacific; this, although the Italians were being

bothersome about the disposition of former Austro-Hungarian Alpine and Adriatic provinces.⁶⁵ In the non European areas it remained obvious that the Powers occupying them, and with vested interests, would become the League agent for mandate purposes. Britain and France sought spheres of influence in the eastern Mediterranean; France alone looked to expand into portions of Togo and the Cameroons whilst Britain cast its eyes on German East Africa; Johannesburg already controlled South-west Africa; Japan had occupied Shantung; the Australians had captured New Guinea; and, New Zealand had taken Samoa. Nonetheless, Wilson persisted in his demands for the mandates principle to be ensconced in the Anglo-American draft Covenant⁶⁶ and Cecil conceded this to him.

When Hurst and Miller devised the final Anglo-American draft Covenant on the night of 1 - 2 February, they merely placed decisions reached in negotiation into correct legal phraseology. In the whole process of negotiation British realism, the bid to create a workable, effectual international mechanism to diminish the probability of war, emerged dominant over American idealism. In terms of peace keeping functions, the original Phillimore proposals were never altered. In terms of the major questions of the general Assembly, the executive Council, permanent organisation tied to the Secretariat, and the necessity of a Permanent Court of International Justice, key British interpretations received emphasis. The only real American coup came with the recognition by Britain of the need for immediately administering former enemy territory under the

mandates principle. The day following finalisation of Anglo-American negotiations, embodied in the Hurst-Miller draft, the Commission convened and Covenant making entered its final phase.

V.

The Commission members were disposed to follow the Anglo-American lead in almost all areas where the draft Covenant led; only when proposals appeared to reduce defensive capabilities - a Franco-Italian worry - or seemed to impinge upon the rights of weaker states - a concern of the lesser Powers - did serious debate occur. In all the Commission held fifteen meetings between 3 February and 11 April, with the majority of its work completed during the first ten meetings held over the first ten days.

The Commission initially numbered fifteen members: two representatives from each of the five Great Allied Powers and one each from five lesser ones. Each Commission member had had experience in either, or both of, the diplomatic and legal fields and the selection of the lesser Power members gave the body wide geographical representation.⁶⁷ However, at the second Commission meeting, the lesser Power members agitated successfully in securing seats for four more of their number, a move which brought greater European dominance.⁶⁸ Thus, as deliberations were getting into full swing, nineteen Commission members took their places, a situation giving only

the slightest of voting margins to the great Powers if the five decided to vote as a unified bloc.

With regard to the Assembly, debate arose not over the proposed functions of the organ but concerning the admission of neutrals and former enemies.⁶⁹ The neutrals were not a party to the Peace Conference nor did they officially participate in its deliberations, but they recognised the importance the League would probably have in the postwar period and of the necessity of joining once it was formed.⁷⁰ One might argue over the sincerity of neutral adherence to the League idea: was it a result of genuine conviction or, more probably, a pragmatic appraisal of the new status quo coupled with a desire not to be isolated from the centre of international affairs? What is apparent, regardless, is that neutral Powers wanted to join the League and the British, especially Cecil, wanted them in. Just before the Commission drafting committee were to frame the final form of the Covenant, the neutrals were invited to express unofficially their views on the matter to the Commission. This occurred at Cecil's instigation,⁷¹ and there was as a result no opposition to neutral membership in the League.

The former enemy Powers, as a matter of Peace Conference policy, were not permitted to participate in discussions of any sort. The League Covenant was created simultaneously with the Treaty of Versailles, the first treaty of the Peace of Paris, formalising the November 1918 Armistice between the Allies and Germany. Though desirous of access to discussion

about the Covenant and the League organisation,⁷² German overtures were stymied by the anti German bias of the Conference. Interestingly, membership in the League lay not in the article outlining the function of the Assembly but in a separate one pertaining to the application process of prospective members. This provided that a two-thirds majority vote was requisite from the Assembly and that "no state shall be admitted to the League except on condition that its military and naval forces and armaments shall conform to standards prescribed by the League in respect of it from time to time". Cecil personally believed that, whilst the former Central Powers should not be allowed into the Council, they should have access to Assembly membership.⁷³ He decidedly opposed exclusion of Germany and its allies from the League but was outvoted by the French inspired anti Germans.⁷⁴ However, provision was not introduced which completely prohibited former enemy membership and the admissions article possessed enough loopholes so that such might occur when cooler heads prevailed. The universality that the pro Leaguers, led by Cecil, tried to inject into the organisation was temporarily stifled by anti German sentiment in Paris.

One other aspect of the Assembly composition concerned the Commissioners; this derived from the campaign engineered by senior officials in the British Government's India Office to secure India an Assembly seat.⁷⁵ There existed little doubt the independent Dominions had contributed substantially to Allied war effort and that their sacrifices, driven home by

competent Dominion ministers the likes of Borden and Smuts, were not lost on other Allied leaders.⁷⁶ However, the difference between independent Dominions, like Canada, and semi-independent colonial possessions, like India, was recognised to be fundamental. Canberra, Ottawa, Wellington, and Johannesburg were almost completely free of London in pursuit of political goals whilst the India Office wielded considerable influence in the determination of Indian Government policy. Cecil insisted that the Indian Government be granted a seat in the Assembly, but Wilson hedged on this, disagreeing, and indicating to House "that under no circumstances would he consent to the admission of a delegate from India, because it was not self-governing".⁷⁷ Smuts countered that India had been permitted with the independent Dominions, the right to sign the Peace Settlement, a situation giving it the "automatic" right to an Assembly seat. Accordingly, the admissions article applied only to those "subject states or colonies" which might seek membership in the future. Wilson bowed to this pressure, and House observed "rather gladly".⁷⁸ Cecil and Smuts succeeded in pressing the Indian case and forcing Wilson's acquiescence to their arguments.

The concept of the Assembly that received endorsement from the League Commission was then in essence an Anglo-American one, the arguments in favour of which were spear-headed by Cecil. The consideration of the neutralist attitude, of not barring completely the way of former enemies, and of allowing India access to its deliberations owe much to the two.

7
British representatives,

Debate within the Commission over the "Executive Council" saw Cecil's vision of the great Powers directing the affairs of the League dashed. Again, as with consideration of the Assembly, opposition did not mount over the proposed functions of the organ but over its composition. Wilson prefaced discussion with an outline of the reasons why the Anglo-American draft made provision for just great Power representation on the Council. He repeated Cecil's main argument about "the chief physical burdens of the League will fall on the great powers whether these burdens are military or economic".⁷⁹ Indicating sole great Power membership of the Council would not preclude interested parties from attending its meetings, he noted it would be possible for "any party interested to draw the matter away from the Executive Council back into the group of delegates where no group of powers can impose their will". Cecil added that in drafting Hurst-Miller the feasibility of maintaining a small, compact Council had been most appealing. If both lesser and greater Powers were to be considered equal in respect of Council membership, then it would occur that Council members would be elected from the Assembly; this could lead to one or more great Powers being voted down in the Assembly, not acquiring a Council seat, and, perhaps, having decisions made affecting it which were completely disagreeable. This sort of scheme would never meet with great Power approval.

The Belgian and Serbian representatives, Hymans and Ves-

nitch, indicated that if the Hurst-Miller proposals about the Council were adopted "the smaller powers would be dissatisfied". More probably, the lesser Powers would be unable to accept the Anglo-American draft article. They agreed that of necessity the Council should be small to add speed to its deliberations, but they reasoned that in addition to providing and supporting decisions affecting peace the Council "must inspire confidence". Confidence would not exist for the smaller Powers if they were not represented on the Council; Hymans illustrated this point: "If a small power had difficulty with a great power it would be at a disadvantage." He criticised the British inspired proviso about inviting the Council members to send representatives to those meetings where matters affecting that state were to be discussed. The crux of his critique fell on which organ of the League was to judge whose interests were affected.

Debate continued with the Brazilian, Chinese, and Portuguese Commissioners generally supportive of the Belgo-Serbian attack. This debate occurred before the expanded Commission was created; hence the lines of opposition were roughly the entire complement of lesser Powers against the Anglo-American position. The French and Italians had submitted their own schemes for the League, as a matter of record, at the first Commission meeting.⁶⁰ Both the French and Italian delegations had agreed to allow the Hurst-Miller draft to serve as the basis of Commission discussion, although they did want it realised they had made some progress in this direction then-

selves. The key here is that both the French and Italian schemes called for a Council composed of lesser and greater Powers. After debate within the Commission on this issue, the balance was struck in favour of the lesser Powers with Bourgeois' statement "that if too much power is given to the great powers they will act rather for peace rather than peace founded on justice". Orlando concurred, the Japanese did not utter a word one way or the other, and the Cecil concept of the Council received a death blow. In the final form of the Covenant, the Council was to be composed of both lesser and greater Powers, with the great ones possessing permanent seats and the lesser ones to be elected periodically to temporary ones. The lesser Powers, in combination with the French and Italians, had prevailed in enhancing some idealism within the League in concrete terms of Council membership, a situation irking Cecil the realist: "It is curious how all the foreigners perpetually harp on principle and right and other abstractions, whereas the Americans and still more the British are only considering what will give the best chance of the League working properly."²²

Franco-Italian worry over the need to maintain adequate military forces emerged in the discussion over disarmament. Both the British and Americans had agreed, during the period of negotiation leading up to Hurst-Miller, on the importance of disarmament in diminishing the probability of future war. Without any disagreement an article was placed in the Anglo-American draft Covenant providing for recognition of "the prin-

principle that the maintenance of peace will require the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety and the enforcement of common action of international obligations". It was to be left up to the Council to devise policies to this end and to consider supplementary questions such as the abolition of conscription, the feasibility of volunteer militaries, and the kinds of military hardware to possess. Also included was a clause by which each League member would undertake to provide "full and frank publicity" about the state of its national armory, military and naval programmes.

Both the French and Italians supported the idea of disarmament, but loudly disclaimed any notion of abolishing compulsory military service. Bourgeois was particularly piqued, indicating France could never accept this aspect of the proposed disarmament article.⁸³ He went so far as to equate compulsory military service as "a fundamental issue of democracy" and "a corollary of universal suffrage". In the face of such stiff opposition the conscription provision within the Hurst-Millier disarmament article was deleted.

French attempts to make inroads into this particular element of the proposed League surfaced with suggested amendments a few days after the attack on reducing compulsory military services.⁸⁴ Bourgeois advocated the formation of a general staff within the League and the formation of an international army. Although expressing his arguments in the most theoretical way, talking of "nations acting in bad faith", of

"honest nations", and of "failure in the organisation of law", there was no doubt such a military force envisaged by the French would be poised for utilisation against the Germans. Discussion of Bourgeois' amendment occurred two days later,⁸⁵ in between which time Cecil and Wilson lobbied against the suggestion. Cecil privately confronted the French representatives warning them that the League remained their only hope of getting Anglo-American assistance in the future.⁸⁶ He further cautioned that to wreck the League on this issue would leave them "without an ally in the world". The French were convinced into abandoning some of their harsher demands on Germany and calls to make the League an armed anti German coalition with the promise of an Anglo-American treaty of guarantee.⁸⁷ Cecil obviously was referring to this when indicating the French were imperilling future assistance. When the French amendment came to the vote within the Commission it was defeated.

The final form of the disarmament article embraced all that Hurst-Miller had proposed with the exception of attempting to enforce a system of non compulsory military service. The Council still retained the right to devise policy on disarmament issues, though not possessing powers making this obligatory on members, and a time limit of ten years was placed on their existence. After this period, the policy would be subject to a procedure of reconsideration and revision.

Mandates constituted a much more difficult proposition for the Commission. The Hurst-Miller draft appeared purposely

non committal on this question, as the difficulty lay not with the theory of mandates but how that theory could be transformed into an expression of practical politics. Wilson had secured British support of the mandate principle primarily because it would add window dressing to the fait accompli of some Powers having captured former enemy territory. Hurst-Miller echoed Wilsonian principles about maintaining secure government for the "peoples unable at present to secure for themselves the benefits of a stable administration". With stability these subject peoples could eventually rise and take their rightful place in the international community. In order to achieve this end, and in keeping with the best interest of the subject peoples, prohibitions were placed on economic barriers around mandates, on utilising this new pool of human resources as reserves for offensive military purposes, and on restricting access to mandated territories by other League members, a situation which would endanger the free exchange of ideas. Nowhere in Hurst-Miller was there reference to how such idealism was to be achieved, other than that the mandatory Powers were to behold their new responsibilities as "a sacred trust".

The British Delegation, through Smuts, proposed a complete overhauling of the Hurst-Miller mandates article.⁸⁸ The British amendment would break the mandates down into specific classifications based on their stage of political development. It was noted that this had passed the Council of Ten on 30 January - it had been introduced there by Smuts -⁸⁹ and that

as such the Commission was bound to accept it. The two British representatives argued that the development of certain communities which had formerly comprised the Turkish Empire had attained a higher level than those former German possessions in Africa or the Pacific. Accordingly, it would be careless to assess the entire problem of mandates as a singular one requiring one all encompassing answer. The British representatives felt the Hurst-Miller statement of principles was adequate but that the practical realities of administering former German and Turkish territories would be made far more difficult unless a more pragmatic appraisal of their varying levels of development was attempted.

Criticism hinged on the bid to define closely to which territories the principle under discussion was to be applied. Orlando objected on the grounds that this infringed upon "the sphere of the Conference" and that a simple statement of principles, as embodied in Hurst-Miller, was all that was required. Wilson pointed out that the British amendment found basis in a Council of Ten decision, but Bourgeois, whilst cognizant of this fact, supported Orlando. The difficulty lay with the British attempt to bring the Commission to define precisely which territories achieved what level of development. Franco-Italian criticism held the list of territories contained in the draft to be incomplete and the Commission agreed to strike out that list. After inconclusive discussion it was decided to refer the question to the drafting committee, which would frame a suitable amendment, after consultation with interested

parties, and resubmit it for Commission approval.

The next day, the committee's efforts successful, an amendment to the Hurst-Miller article on mandates was examined and passed by the Commission. This amendment closely followed the one the British representatives had proffered the day before, but was less specific. Instead of referring to precise mandated territories - Armenia, Southwest Africa, or Samoa - it differentiated only by general geographic areas - the Former Turkish Empire, Central Africa, and the South Pacific Islands. British initiatives had again provided substance for Wilsonian idealism, though this, admittedly, after the principle of mandates had been forced on them by the American President.

The two aspects of the proposed League organization which lay closest to Cecil's heart, the Secretariat and the International Court, passed through the Commission without difficulty. In assenting to the Hurst-Miller provisions for the Secretariat, minor changes were introduced to ensure Council control in confirming appointments to this key branch of administration. Otherwise, Cecil's desire to add dignity to the functions of this portion of League machinery was not impeded.

The selection of the Secretary-General - it was decided this title was apolitical whilst "Chancellor" was not -⁹⁰ reflected heavily British interest in the project. Although Cecil had approached some Commission members about the possibility of the Secretary-General being a lesser Power national,⁹¹ Hankey was the one most seriously considered as the best cand-

idate.⁹² After expressing initial interest in heading the Secretariat, he decided he could better apply his talents within the British Government. Curzon, after conferring with the British Cabinet Secretary, had a major influence on his turning the League opportunity down.⁹³ The position was next offered to Sir J. Eric Drummond, a British career diplomat, senior official in the Foreign Office, and a trusted associate of Balfour, Cecil, and Grey. As important as his connections with Britain's foreign affairs establishment was the confidence American leaders placed in his abilities.⁹⁴ One other factor which entrenched his nomination came when Clemenceau introduced his name for the office. The Italians and Japanese merely followed where their allies led them in this issue.

Establishment of the League head quarters and a permanent home for the Secretariat was also a task ascribed to the Commission. A number of cities came under consideration as the possible seat of the League,⁹⁵ but Brussels and Geneva were throughout the two strongest candidates. The original intention had been to place League headquarters in a national capital and then each state member would appoint an ambassador, accredited to the government of that state, as its permanent representative.⁹⁶ However, the British efforts in securing representatives rather than ambassadors and in dignifying the office of the Secretary-General altered this. League head quarters would possess an independent status, with all of the diplomatic privileges accruing. A tremendous campaign was undertaken by a variety of Belgian groups to enhance the posi-

tion of their capital as the best site for the permanent home of the League. A typical description of why Belgium ranked high included mention of Belgium's perpetual neutrality, its geographical position, and the "importance of [its] situation on historic, intellectual, and economic grounds".⁹⁷ The Belgian Government officially submitted that endorsement of Brussels "would offer the Belgian nation moral compensation for their part in the war", and would aid in reestablishing the city as "a centre of international commerce".⁹⁸ The Swiss, though equally eager for the honour of having the League based within their borders, did not mount as vociferous a campaign as the Belgians to influence the Commission.⁹⁹ They were content to press their case in an unassuming manner.

House, Makino, Orlando, and Smuts were appointed as a Commission sub-committee to enquire into the best location for League head quarters;¹⁰⁰ Geneva was recognised to be the most advantageous spot and the Commission was informed of this decision. Before voting on the selection committee occurred, Orlando spoke on the question, outlining the reasons behind Geneva's preference: "Switzerland was a quiet country, had long been neutral and would probably continue to be neutral." Within the Commission the Belgian Hymans strenuously argued against the choice with the core of his argument constituting an appeal to Belgium's wartime suffering. With obtuse logic:

Mr. Hymans thanked the Commission for the tributes which had been paid to Belgium, but he maintained that the foundation of the League of Nations was intimately connected with the war. We should not therefore seek to blot out its memories but, on the contrary, hold them as

example of the value to the cause of right and of
 humanity.

This had no influence with the Commission as it was to escape the emotional attachment of the war that the Commission turned favourably to Geneva. In debate Cecil pointed out that public opinion had to be convinced of League impartiality; selection of Geneva would add to this requisite impartiality. More importantly, the League was not being brought into existence to perpetuate "glorious memories of the war", a problem which would surely accompany selection of Brussels as the seat of the League. The Commission overwhelmingly voted in favour of their committee's decision.

Each Commission delegation acknowledged that work of an international judicial tribunal would expedite the peace-keeping efforts of the League. Because of the importance this wing of the organisation would contribute to the enquiry and delay mechanism, Hurst-Miller provided that the Council would:

Formulate plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice and this Court, shall, when established, be competent to hear and determine any matter which the parties recognise as suitable for submission to it for arbitration.

The suggestion was for a completely new body, a situation which particularly grated on the French, who believed the Hague Court could fulfill the required task.¹⁰¹ It was the French contention that decisions already reached by the Hague Court were precedents in international law and that it could prove detrimental to advances made in international arbitration

if the validity of those decisions were minimised. Cecil and House responded that this was not the intent of the Anglo-American desire but, rather, that the proposal was offered means to improve existing arbitration machinery.

A British memorandum on this subject, prepared by Ernest Pollock, the British Solicitor-General and a member of the British Delegation, is instructive.¹⁰² Pollock recommended the establishment of a permanent Court and offered three points in support. He contended that a legislative authority such as the existing Hague Tribunal would not suffice to rebuild and extend international law. He supported this point by noting formal "definition and enactment must be kept alive by constructive interpretation, to the end of producing a continuous tradition of doctrine, a 'jurisprudence' in the French sense of the word". This continuous doctrine would not arise if isolated "decisions of different and independent authorities, however respectable" were allowed to amass. Pollock also pointed out that resolution of actual disputes would be just one function of a "Court of Nations" and that continuous record maintained by a standing body would be advantageous. This was supported by the suggestion that "a standing commission qualified to give the Council expert and impartial advice would be no less qualified for the settlement of justiciable disputes". Lastly, in an effort to give the Court necessary impartiality, the problems in appointing impartial judges could be overcome if members of the Court were not nominated directly by the member states. He ended with the realistic

observation, that "the main object is not to create an infallible tribunal (which is impossible) but to provide for such administration of justice as will suffice to maintain peace and order". The bones of this argument were echoed in Commission and the Hurst-Miller proposal to allow the Council, once it was formed, to formulate the plans for the establishment of the Court, was adopted. The efforts of the Council in this direction are discussed below.

Wilson succeeded in getting two provisions into the draft Covenant which were purely his. The first was a clause which tied League members to a promise "to respect and preserve" the territorial integrity of all other League members. In spite of British rejection of such a provision prior to arriving in Paris - this from the first session of the Imperial War Cabinet in 1917 - Wilson remained adamant in his advocacy of this. He grandly perceived of the League as a Monroe Doctrine on an international scale and a not unfriendly student has written that "Wilson's conception was universal and idealist, generalizing the Monroe Doctrine as he conceived it into a world moral order".¹⁰³ In session of the Commission¹⁰⁴ the Italians sided with Wilson in placing the responsibility for guaranteeing territorial integrity on League members, a move heartily endorsed by the lesser Powers. Cecil was unable to stem the tide and Wilson's efforts were sustained.

Retrospectively, both Cecil and Wilson commented on this particular portion of the Covenant, which became in the final draft Article 10. Cecil contended that League guarantees

of this sort "seemed to crystallize for all time the position that then existed".¹⁰⁵ For Cecil the instrumentality of the organization "was not to punish the wrong-doing State, still less to oblige every state to make a demonstration of its hatred of aggression". The object of the League "was simply to stop war".¹⁰⁶ Wilson saw Article 10 as "the backbone of the whole Covenant" and believed that unless the Covenant possessed such a weapon the League could be "hardly more than an influential debating society".¹⁰⁷ In the Commission, Wilson found support and the British acquiesced gracefully. The only concession Cecil was able to extract on this point was inclusion in the Covenant of an article providing for "the reconsideration . . . of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world". This became enshrined in Article 19 of the Covenant.

Wilson was forced to include protection of the Monroe Doctrine in the Covenant, an inclusion he did not really want to suggest.¹⁰⁸ Wilson had left Paris after the tenth Commission meeting and returned to the United States for one month to attend to political business, address Congress on the progress of the Peace Conference, and build acceptance for the Covenant. One of the principal worries expressed concerned the Covenant abrogating or severely impinging upon the Monroe Doctrine. Such concern was manifest in both major American political parties, the Democrats and the Republicans, the result of which, in spite of his personal misgivings, was that

Wilson introduced an amendment to the draft Covenant offering protection of this important piece of American diplomatic heritage. Only the French opposed inclusion of such an article and this because they somehow believed the United States could utilise this provision as a means of ref. ing aid to Europe in the event of another Great War.¹⁰⁹ This opposition was advanced despite American support afforded the Allies after April 1917, when the Doctrine had been in de facto effect for about a century, though not de jure. The British and Italians supported Wilson's position (and the Monroe Doctrine received especial significance in the final form of the Covenant.

In making the Covenant, Anglo-American ideas about how the League should be constituted dominated overwhelmingly those of the other Powers. The other Powers, in spite of rear guard actions to transform the Covenant into a de facto perpetuation of the victorious wartime alliance, failed to budge the Anglo-American union in this regard. That union, however, was decidedly balanced in favour of the British proposals, which, from before the Conference convened, were the only ones of substance offered for consideration. By the time the one track mind of Wilson could concentrate on the League project, Cecil and Smuts had advocated and attempted to give form to organs and functions of the League which later became essential in its operation: the general Assembly, the executive Council, the need for disarmament, an International Court, mandates, and the need of a permanent organisation tied to a permanent Secret-

ariat. What followed in negotiation of a draft Covenant and in discussion in the Commission was only the attempt to refine what had been proffered by the British. Wilson made some unique suggestions of his own but they were not as far reaching as those of Cecil and Smuts.

VI.

On 28 April the Peace Conference approved the Covenant, which on Wilson's suggestion was to be made the first section of each treaty of peace emanating from Paris.¹¹⁰ Two days before, four resolutions were adopted by the Conference which were designed to initiate the establishment of the League;¹¹¹ this, so that when the ratification procedure of each signatory were dispensed with, the organisation would be in existence. Approval was given to the list of thirteen neutral states which were to be invited to accede to the Covenant. Belgium, Brazil, Greece, and Spain were approved as the first lesser Power members of the Council. Eric Drummond was officially appointed as the Secretary-General and asked to begin the work of organising the Secretariat. Lastly, an organising committee, to be composed of Drummond and representatives of the nine Council Powers, was charged with instituting planning for the first Assembly in Washington D.C. before the year was out. Ratification of the Covenant by the signatories was all that was required to bring fruition to the work of the Covenant makers.

CHAPTER FOUR

The American Key,

June - November 1919.

"The great art of riding," the Knight suddenly began in a loud voice, waving his right arm as he spoke, "is to keep -" where the sentence ended as suddenly as it had begun, as the White Knight fell heavily on the top of his head exactly in the path where Alice was walking. She was quite frightened this time, and said in an anxious tone, as she picked him up, "I hope no bones are broken?"

the White Knight and Alice

I.

With the signing of the Treaty of Versailles the great peace makers returned to their respective states to explain the provisions of the initial settlement and secure ratification through the necessary channels. Lloyd George, heading his seven month old coalition, experienced few problems as Parliament was disposed to accept the lead of the War Cabinet. Clemenceau, though encountering stiff criticism from within the ranks of the French militarists about possible German remilitarisation, worked successfully in gaining official French acceptance. In Rome, Nitti, Orlando's successor, also secured passage. Only Wilson experienced determined and powerful opposition and only in the United States did the attempt at ratification fail. Within the American legislative system, specifically the Senate, a conflict emerged over the propriety of future American involvement in international politics and central to this was the League Covenant.

The war, in bringing America substantial material and financial benefit and a preponderant influence in international affairs, had also produced an ironic twist in American foreign policy: it both served to bring the United States full tilt into the great affairs of the world whilst simultaneously challenging its most hallowed foreign policy goal, isolationism from those affairs. Handed down from Washington to Wilson, this was a supposed key stone of American success;

Isolationism could point to the greatest and most illustrious men in American history as its sponsors. The policy, moreover, was extraordinarily meaningful to the average man. He saw in it his own peace, convenience, prosperity, and even the safety of his household. It was associated with national pride and touched upon the same human emotions.⁴

Until the Great War this tradition had not confronted sustained, rigorous pressure. American imperial expansion, for instance, within the western Pacific at the end of the nineteenth century, had been conducted cautiously and astutely; the United States, a minor Power, managed to maneuver successfully and without incident amongst the European great Powers for a share of potential oriental riches. Outbreak of general war within Europe forced Washington to choose allies for the first time and then utilise its national power resources to aid in defeating its new enemies. Indeed, by the last year of hostilities, American economic and military resources contributed heavily in sustaining Allied war effort.

With the Armistice and return to relative normalcy, domestic American concern over isolationism, an issue which had been simmering for almost two years, boiled to a head. Central

to the whole question was the League Covenant which, if accepted, would discard the isolationist tradition and bring the United States into the main stream of international society with all the responsibilities attendant upon such a step. ~~The~~ United States appeared to be swinging ~~in favor of~~ ~~the~~ Versailles, Britain pushed its diplomatic strength ~~in favor of~~ ~~the~~ Versailles advocating acceptance. The Senate rejected ~~the~~ Versailles nonetheless.

From at least August 1914 London's perceptions of what precisely was occurring within the American political system, as it affected foreign policy, were hampered by receipt of an abundance of conflicting information. The great problem with accurate analysis lay in a plethora of very credible sources having contact with various levels of the American government. From the United States British diplomatic representatives, and to a lesser extent British and American businessmen, journalists, and other interested parties,² funnelled data into the British decision making apparatus. A glut of conflicting information, moving rapidly along transatlantic telegraphic wires,³ resulted in imperfect British judgments about domestic American political activity until after June 1919. Then the numerous complex issues were suddenly reduced to either American rejection or acceptance of the Peace Settlement, either continued American participation in the great affairs of the world

of isolation from them. British leaders, ignorant of the exact nature of the American legislative system, did not realise that determined opposition to Versailles, specifically the Covenant, was present until the revolt of the isolationists began in earnest.

In this equation the accumulation and analysis of data that occurred at the ambassadorial level was most crucial. At that level diplomatic representatives theoretically have access to the highest political circles of the accredited government. During the momentous five years following July 1914 two British ambassadors served in the United States, their separate assessments of domestic American political activity at variance. London was, hence, beset with difficulty in formulating necessary decisions with regard to both war and peace settlement policies; especially so was British League policy, as its consideration by the government overlapped both the war and Peace Conference periods.

From the spring of 1913 until January 1918 Sir Cecil Spring Rice, a career diplomat with wide service experience, held the American post. It was his misfortune to mark amongst his closest friends in the United States powerful Republican politicians, the likes of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and former President Theodore Roosevelt. These men, friends of the ambassador for a quarter century, were in opposition to Wilson's Democratic Administration, and Spring Rice's lengthy association with them, and subsequent social contact whilst in Washington, was common knowledge. Wilson who seemingly could have

no truck with opposition of any sort and who perceived of political opponents as the worst of enemies,⁵ appears to have placed the British ambassador with Lodge and company. This situation added considerable burden to Spring Rice's tasks as Wilson, as a matter of course, attempted to remain aloof from everyday political activity.⁶ Vital dialogue between the highest level of the British Embassy and the White House, one which increased in importance with the onset of war in Europe, remained courteous and formal but was seriously impaired by an icy temperament common to both sides. Spring Rice met with Wilson rarely and was forced to conduct the bulk of his work with house.

In retrospect a great deal of what Spring Rice wrote about the United States political climes and their effect upon various problems of the war and proposed peace, including the League, was correct. His accuracy in gauging American opinion seems the result of his observations coupled with his meeting Lodge as often as possible.⁷ The Foreign Office was informed as early as May 1915⁸ that there would exist major difficulty in persuading American public opinion to condone entering into postwar "entangling alliances". At that juncture Wilson was contemplating some sort of mediating role for his then neutral country; but, Spring Rice warned, American involvement in any peace conference would fail unless their government was prepared - which it was not - to enforce the decisions of a settlement. He remained convinced Wilson, the world's principal League spokesman, would be unable to muster requisite support from

Congress to break the isolationist shell and participate in postwar international politics. Even after the United States joined the Allies as an Associated Power, Spring Rice cautioned:

The war atmosphere only exists at present in isolated patches. There is still a strong undercurrent of disinclination to face facts. The old political antagonisms are still strong. The realities of war have not yet reached this country and it will take them some time to realise the true struggle as it affects America.

The problem with American public opinion, especially after August 1914, lay not so much in anti Allied sentiment as anti British; German-American and Irish-American voters constituted substantial blocs at the polls. London believed Spring Rice contributed much to these sentiments, as well as antagonising Wilson's Administration. When the United States became Britain's ally, and the importance of American resources toward underwriting Allied efforts realised, worry about Spring Rice vis-a-vis Wilson emerged. Sir William Wiseman, chief of British naval intelligence in the United States,¹⁰ exemplified this attitude with his observation that Spring Rice witnessed all through "jaundiced eyes" and "distrusted the President and the Administration and was not able to disguise it."¹¹

In an attempt at promoting better Anglo-American understanding, Spring Rice was replaced in early 1918 by Rufus Isaacs, the first Lord Reading, a lawyer and Liberal politician who had served as Lord Chief Justice. Where Spring Rice grated on American sensitivities and languished in the nether world of Wilson's supposed enemies, Reading was acknowledged as "one of the ablest Englishmen living"¹² and welcomed by the President

and his group. When asked by Cecil about what qualities a successor to Spring Rice should possess, House replied that "Lord Reading or someone like him, who had both a financial and political outlook" be sent to the United States.¹³ Though this exchange had occurred when the complexities of Anglo-American economic cooperation were being considered, this assessment undoubtedly weighed heavily in Reading replacing Spring Rice.

Following Reading's arrival in Washington, London's perceptions of domestic American opinion altered. Whereas Spring Rice embodied detached pessimism in reporting, Reading mixed well with Administration officials and this gave his despatches optimistic overtones. Augmenting his obvious rapport with American leaders, a growing conviction emerged within American public opinion that the country was at war and an all-out effort would be required for its successful prosecution.¹⁴ Virtually non-existent during Spring Rice's tenure, these pro war attitudes coloured Reading's perceptions, and thus London's, of where Wilson could direct American foreign policy.

On 28 July 1918 Reading and House discussed the proposed League and the legalistic problems which would probably crop up when the plan, in whatever final form, was implemented. In a note on that meeting Reading indicated, although difficulties would clearly arise, particularly if an unrepentant Germany gained access, the United States Government was committed to the project and would do its utmost to make it work.¹⁵ Reading was informed Wilson was far more worried about remarks Lloyd

George had made concerning crushing German trade after cessation of hostilities; no mention was made of any serious domestic opposition to the plan and this reflected in Reading's observations. The only real problem he had with Wilson was the latter's refusal to endorse publicly Phillimore's Initial Report. Wilson rationalised this position as a necessary precaution to stymie needless criticism from within his country which might jeopardise war effort.¹⁶ He also indicated he had not yet thought about the League in specifics; though, clearly, as he had written his first sketch,¹⁷ this was a stall. Wilson held that once Allied victory was assured he could present his plans for the League to the American people and convince them of their efficacy and necessity in preventing the outbreak of future Great Wars. His confidence reassured the British.

Reading left Washington in late July for consultations in London with Lloyd George and Balfour; he did not return for six months. The war ended a few months after he arrived in Britain and the government saw no urgency in sending him back. The reason was simple: it was presumed all American politicians of note would be in Europe for the Peace Conference and could easily be consulted.

When Reading did return to Washington, in late February 1919, it was for a six week stint of "farewell functions and speeches". Whilst wrapped up in these endeavours he met with a number of prominent Americans holding decided opinions on future United States participation in the League. In that short

time, in his estimation, domestic American opposition to the Covenant appeared lessened by the revelation that certain amendments safeguarding United States independence in its external relations had been adopted in Paris. Though not all were advised to guarantee American adherence to the League, Reading believed the sum total pacified legitimate American worries. He was able to cable on 7 April: "There is no doubt that the opposition here to the League is daily weakening by reason of the introduction of amendments."¹⁹

Initial meetings with Lodge and other politicians, soon after his arrival, had not permitted such optimism.¹⁹ When observing the vast majority of American opinion favoured the League, Reading remained wary of a small group of powerful politicians opposing it. Constituting the extreme view, they founded the basis of their arguments "upon the cry of nationalism, America for the Americans and no alliances with Europe". He ascertained, meeting with Lodge, that the Senator and some of his fellows were not pledged against the League, although they had signed the "Round Robin". This was a document in which forty-one Senators went on record as opposing the peace treaty if the Covenant was appended to it.²⁰ Forty-one negative votes would make the the requisite two-thirds majority for Senate acceptance of treaties unobtainable. All Lodge and his friends sought, so they intimated, was time in which to assess the Covenant and make amendments.

Reading informed his seniors of the main criticisms levelled at the draft Covenant: American sovereignty would be

impairing; the Monroe Doctrine endangered; Article 10 would commit the United States to military intervention in Europe; and, because dependent Dominions had been granted separate League representation, Britain would be able to muster six votes to the United States one. Over the next month these concerns and others were often repeated.²¹ As a case in point, Taft, the former Republican President and a staunch League supporter, represented substantial opinion when advocating provision for the right to withdraw from the organization after a specified time and to reconsider periodically disarmament proposals. He reaffirmed the necessity of protecting the Monroe Doctrine, as well as securing the unanimity principle for both the Council and Assembly in all except procedural matters. The latter suggestion would ensure the United States possession of veto power over any resolutions, perhaps instigated by an unfriendly combination - Britain's six votes - that would compromise American interests.

When the final draft of the Covenant was presented to the League Commission by its drafting committee, all of the American fears with the exception of that relating to Article 10, seemed allayed. The right of withdrawal was guaranteed, the validity of the Monroe Doctrine enshrined in Article 21, any disarmament resolutions had to be ratified by the home governments, and the unanimity principle was adopted.

The only problem the League now faced in the United States derived from personal and political opposition to Wilson; Reading had observed stirrings of this in early March 1919.²²

Wilson had made major errors in his management of American participation in the Peace Conference. His greatest blunder occurred when he refused to include notable Republicans in the delegation that travelled to Paris,²³ this particularly irked Lodge who had neither a liking for Wilson nor a desire to sit in Washington whilst major decisions were made in Paris affecting American external relations. The fear of cautious senators, as Lodge had indicated over the "Round Robin", was the possibility that Congress would be presented with the Covenant tied to the Peace Settlement. When Wilson secured such a happening in Paris, and the Allies agreed, he was not endeared to those cautious men in Washington. The Covenant threatened America's isolationist tradition and it needed, in Lodge's estimation, lengthier consideration than the peace treaty. Although Reading reported the amendments weakened domestic American opposition, Lodge intended to oppose a combined Treaty-Covenant. Compounding the entire situation was the fact that 1920 was a Presidential election year and, since contenders could get in the public eye and make points against the President before the election process began, the League, tied closely to Wilson, was his Achilles heel. Reading informed London that the possibility of refusal could not be ignored as the Senate would tend to reflect American public opinion.²⁴ This, though, was an aside and his caution was disregarded until Wilson's return to the United States in mid summer. When it became obvious in London that the American League supporters needed help in presenting their case to the American people, a decision was reached

to move to aid the League cause in the United States; Lord Grey, the former foreign secretary and president of the League of Nations Union, was offered the vacant Washington Embassy.

III.

Grey's nomination to the American post initially invoked some controversy in official circles in Washington. Wilson and House knew from at least the third week of July he had been approached to go to the United States; House had even aided Lloyd George in convincing Grey to accept.²⁵ Lansing, however, expressed complete surprise when, in August, announcement was made from London without benefit of clearance from the State Department.²⁶ Difficulty arose with Curzon and Lloyd George, anxious that Grey accept. They were publicly committed to endorse the Covenant and work toward securing parliamentary ratification. Grey made his acceptance conditional in the belief his stipulations would only work to the success of the mission. One condition was that the announcement would first be made in the Commons. Curzon informed the Washington Embassy of this, adding he and the prime minister felt "advantages of obtaining the services of so eminent a man greatly outweighed the drawbacks . . . and we thought, and still think, that America would be of the same opinion".²⁷ Within two days Lindsay, at the Washington Embassy, confirmed Curzon's confidence, reporting that American press reaction was most favourably inclined.²⁸

There can exist no doubt, Lloyd George and Curzon wanted Grey in Washington principally to add lustre to pro League endeavours. Opposition to Wilson appeared steadily mounting within the United States and this boded ill for the League, Wilson's "personal triumph" at Paris. Wilson, who certainly would never accept aid from British diplomatic sources in resisting his adversaries, regarded Grey as an individual who could do much toward ameliorating Anglo-American differences. House remained convinced "the relations between the two countries [were] beginning to assume the same character as that of England and Germany before the war".²⁹ Grey's prominence would aid in softening areas of contention, whilst no thought was given to his assisting League supporters. White House endorsement of Grey played into Lloyd George and Curzon's strategy of influencing domestic American political processes.

The conditions imposed on Lloyd George by Grey, before his agreeing to serve in the United States, indicate he too was anxious about the state of Anglo-American relations. Like Wilson and House, Grey unintentionally played into the prime minister's hands. Grey outlined his position in a memorandum submitted to Lloyd George on 29 July.³⁰ Here, he delineated his conditions. Besides that listed above, he declined to take a permanent post and instead opted out for a special mission. As a "Special Ambassador" he believed he could better serve Anglo-American cooperation by concentrating on and explaining British policy in the most contentious issues: the League, naval construction, and the Irish question. Addition-

ally, before he would serve he and the government had to agree on each issue. Meeting with Lloyd George on 4 August, the questions raised by his memorandum were discussed and agreement reached.³¹ His appointment as Special Ambassador would be announced first in the Commons. There existed no snags with regard to the League; both Grey and Lloyd George's ministry were committed to the concept of international peace keeping machinery which had been embodied in the Covenant at Paris. The question of naval construction was as easily resolved. Asquith's prewar ministry had agreed that Britain could not adequately build against the Americans and maintain its European and Empire commitments. Logistical difficulties of economics, strategy, and supply would be too much of a strain. Grey thought this policy to be still the wisest and Lloyd George, whilst unable to furnish the new naval estimates, concurred, pointing out his government was building and estimating cost on a standard of security which did not take American naval resources into account.³² Ireland, though, was a thornier issue. Without advances here, he anticipated his proposed mission could be seriously jeopardised by anti British sentiment amongst Irish-American voters. Irish policy under consideration at the time, policy two years old,³³ was viewed by Grey to be unacceptable to Irish nationalists and in need of revision. Lloyd George agreed but found the possibility of independent Ireland impractical. He did indicate that Grey's worries were realised by the government and that the question needed to be considered in the "light of changed conditions".

Grey agreed and, with his conditions met, prepared to travel to the United States.

IV.

Grey was unable to fulfill his anticipated three pronged task; he devoted almost all his time in the United States to the League question. When he disembarked in New York in late September, two events had occurred which threatened to enfeeble the American pro League position. On 10 September the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Lodge and, because of a Republican Senate majority, packed with his sympathisers, completed examination of the Versailles Treaty and the Covenant. In asking their colleagues to advise and consent to both portions of the Peace Settlement, the majority in committee, through Lodge's majority report, appended proposed amendments and reservations; these reflected a desire to maintain the isolationist principle.³⁴

Whilst an attempt at sustaining the supposed key stone of American foreign policy, this was additionally a ploy on Lodge's part to stall for time so that internal debate would mount over the provisions of the Covenant. Although the amendments did not really stand much chance of acceptance, the reservations question was another matter. When Grey reached Washington three weeks later, the proposed amendments were about to disappear with the crux of the debate turning to the reservations.³⁵ Grey's sole task became one of attempting to

lessen the impact of those reservations which, if accepted, would drastically alter American participation within the League.

It should be realized that three distinct groups of senators sat in opposition to Wilson's supporters in the congressional upper house. The largest group have been labelled the "strong reservationists" and, supporting Lodge, looked to force as many of the reservations through as they possibly could.³⁵ Though professing a desire to join the League, their activities were geared almost solely to undermining what had been agreed to at Paris. The second group were the "mild reservationists".³⁷ Legitimately desirous of American participation in the League, they realized acceptance of the Covenant would tend to disaffirm isolation; accordingly, they were willing to support the Peace Settlement in the Senate if the four key interpretive reservations, at a minimum, were appended to it. The third group was composed of those men who dogmatically opposed any provisions which threatened to crack the isolationist shell. Not unnaturally they were referred to as the "irreconcilables", opposing Wilson in any way they could.³⁸ From the outset of the debate in the Senate the irreconcilables avowedly intended to vote against ratification.

Complicating this entire situation was the onset of a serious physical infirmity which removed Wilson completely from the political arena. In the midst of a personal campaign of selling the League to his more conservative constituents in

the western states, Wilson collapsed on 25 September. A week later he suffered a stroke and his presence was eliminated. Isolated in his White House bedroom, he saw political colleagues rarely, advisers hardly ever, and foreign emissaries never.³⁹

Immediately upon his arrival Grey was put in an unenviable position: the Covenant was threatened with unilateral alteration which would undermine agreement reached at Paris; and, with Wilson indisposed, effective leadership for American pro Leaguers was significantly reduced. During the next three months it fell to Grey to represent the British case without raising the ire of anti League forces. If such anger did develop, accusations of British interference would only strengthen the opposition and reinforce the reservationists.

On 4 October Grey informed Curzon that Congress seemed disposed to ratify the Treaty, incorporating the mild reservations.⁴⁰ He cautioned that the President, only recently disabled, opposed this and noted London should avoid giving the "impression such reservations would be acceptable or even unobjectionable". Further cautioning that the reservations, though mild, might later be utilised to effect greater American independence from the League, he believed Wilson's illness would not impair the ratification process.

Grey's estimation of Wilson's capacity to influence Congress was incorrect and became glaringly apparent with debate over the reservation dealing with Article 10. Grey's dilemma in striving to lessen the impact of Lodge's third reservation

involved with London's inability to compromise. Sizable amounts of time and effort had been expended, privately and, more importantly, publicly, in fashioning theoretically complete machinery to support the diplomatic mechanisms of enquiry and delay. Britain could brook no tampering with fundamental League sanctions provisions. Accordingly, the onus for marshalling pro-League forces in the United States on this issue fell completely to Wilson; here the problem occurred. Grey had only to sit back and let the pro and anti-League forces rally against one another.⁴¹ Grey was forced to remain aloof from the ensuing debate, whilst simultaneously affording benevolent neutrality toward the President's cause. Unfortunately he was unable to lend any support of consequence to Wilson's efforts.

Wilson was not opposed to all reservations and reservationists; rather he objected to incorporating reservations into the Congressional Resolution ratifying the Peace Settlement. Such an act, if permitted, would place the Allies in an awkward position. Prior to departing on his western speaking tour, Wilson had drafted four interpretations of controversial articles, instructing Senator Hitchcock, the Senate Minority Leader, to use them in any way he saw fit.⁴² Later known as the "Hitchcock Reservations", from the attempt to hide their true authorship from Lodge, their interpretations paralleled almost exactly what the mild reservationists sought. They attempted clarification of American obligations in four key areas: withdrawal, Article 10, domestic questions, and the

the Monroe Doctrine.⁴³ Hitchcock, however, was unable to make the one requisite concession the mild reservationists wanted:

He could not say that Wilson would permit the interpretations or reservations to be included in the resolution of ratification. He could not say that Wilson was willing to make them binding upon the other signatories of the Treaty.⁴⁴

Wilson, through Hitchcock, was willing only to deposit his interpretations separately with the ratified Settlement, not including them in the resolution of ratification. In the following almost three months, until Senate rejection on 19 November, the President, from his bedroom, tried to separate the reservations from the Peace Settlement; he was unable to do so.

The bulk of Grey's work, being forced into silence on the question of Article 10, and not being allowed access to the stricken President,⁴⁵ concerned explaining his government's stance on the fifteenth reservation. By 11 October the tempo of debate within the Senate was rising over the Empire voting rights. Curzon was told two main criticisms of Dominion voting were being bandied about.⁴⁶ Firstly it was being contended that in any dispute involving a part of the Empire and the United States, subsequent League action would be unfair unless the six votes were reduced to one - the essence of the fifteenth reservation, this existed as an attempt to put Britain on an equal footing with the rest of the Assembly. The second point was somewhat more involved. Grey reported that questions were being raised in which the ethics of having more

than one member of the Empire on the Council at one time was considered. The assumption was, of course, that each independent Dominion possessed identical foreign policy goals and was to a great degree led by London. Grey, indicating personal objection to this second contention, enquired of the official British stance on these issues. In an aside he noted for the first time that Wilson's illness was prohibiting him from making positive contributions to the domestic debate. Grey fretted over the difficulties Wilson's supporters faced and the implications for the Peace Settlement.

Grey was not sent an adequate reply to his 11 October query until 18 November. In the interim he was continually confronted by pro League Americans: House, Lansing, and Hitchcock, of the need for London to explain its position on the six votes question. Curzon wrote on 24 October that the first point of the enquiry "presents no serious difficulty".⁴⁷ The British Government presumed that in any dispute involving a part of the Empire and the United States the entitled six votes would not be cast. This conclusion, so Grey was informed, derived from London's belief the Empire and its components comprised a single unit in the international community. Just as one portion of the Empire could not remain at peace whilst another warred, so in any justiciable dispute coming before the League, involving a part of the Empire, imperial unity was mandatory. Ensuing voting in the Assembly should reflect this attitude with only one Empire vote.

Unfortunately, London's appraisal of the situation

was not necessarily that of the independent Dominions, a situation unfathomable for most Americans. Before public utterances on Empire voting could emanate from London, the four Dominions and India had to be consulted. Grey was forced for the next six weeks to repeat this to his American hosts; he once noted wryly after seeing Lansing, "I hope he was more impressed with this reason than I was".⁴⁸

The ethics of more than one British state holding a Council seat was another question. Curzon strenuously opposed any hint that the Dominions be prohibited access to that central body.⁴⁹ He apprised Grey of the existence of written assurances, made by Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Wilson, to Borden, the Canadian prime minister, that the Dominions "might be selected or named as members of the Council". Curzon held that the British Government had to stand by those assurances absolutely. Curzon wrote Grey on 18 November, informing him the Australians and South African replies were unfavourable to a single Empire vote.⁵⁰ The Canadian position had also been negative but altered after Borden consulted Grey in New York.⁵¹ The two men agreed intransigence on their part might push the United States away from the League. For Britain, this could endanger the Peace Settlement and American participation in the postwar international system; for Canada, this could prove calamitous in its relations with the Americans, its closest neighbours. Nonetheless the feelings of Hughes and Smuts affected the British position, leading to a decision to keep silent of the six votes question. The rationale behind

this muted stance derived from the necessity of preserving Imperial unity and the hope of not further alienating the Americans with disclosure one Empire vote was not acceptable in all quarters. Lack of clarification on this point aided the opponents in the fight against ratification. Acceptance of the unanimity principle by the British, as indeed by all those who wished to ascribe to the Covenant,⁵² when voting on all but procedural matters, does not seem to have allayed fears of a British Empire anti American combination.⁵³

V.

When voting day in the Senate arrived, the four groups of senators: the Lodge reservationists, the mild reservationists, the irreconcilables, and Wilson's supporters, cast their votes. Lodge had succeeded in tying his reservations to the ratification resolution and Wilson, who had failed to effect a separation, ordered his followers to vote against it. Both groups of reservationists supported the resolution whilst the Wilsonian partisans and the irreconcilables, in the most unnatural of alliances, combined to prevent the requisite two-thirds majority.

In the two weeks following rejection, and in spite of apparently improved Anglo-American relations, Grey's mission altered perceptibly. In his eyes the original purpose behind his service no longer existed and his efforts as Special Ambassador were at an end. When the Senate votes were being cast in Wash-

ington, Grey was in New York accompanying the Prince of Wales on his state visit to America. He realised the Covenant would fail but that it would not be impossible for the Senate to reconsider its action, agree again to debate the Settlement, and, hopefully, secure ratification. Underscoring any advances pro League within the United States could hope to realise would, quite naturally, be improved Anglo-American relations. The Prince of Wales' visit, initially planned to occur after conclusion of congressional debate on the Peace Settlement, served to enhance British prestige within America after 19 November.

Guidelines respecting the Prince's public utterances whilst in the United States had been despatched to Grey in early November;⁵⁴ drafted by Reading, and endorsed by Curzon and Lloyd George, these had an obvious positive effect on the Prince's American reception. Scrupulous avoidance of personal references to Wilson, observations which might tend to his "personal glorification", was mandatory in the light of the political struggle then in progress. Reading postulated that, as an example, if the President's overwhelming reception

Europe were to be mentioned, it should be done attributing this to "the public desire of the British to manifest their affection for the American people". Accentuating this was to be emphasis on Anglo-American similarities, the common denominators of language, literature, and law, and ideals of freedom and justice, rather than attachments of blood. Discussion of the League was also to be avoided because handling of the topic

would necessitate singular caution. Reading expressed worry that reference to the organisation would result in either one of the two groups of American opinion on the subject feeling slighted. The result could be felt in the upcoming elections to the detriment of British interests.

The Prince was to stress the contributions made by the American public to war effort, indicating that the Allies, and especially the British, were both cognizant and grateful of the sacrifices endured. Reference to Anglo-American naval coöperation, enjoyed during and since the war, was also encouraged. Reading believed that some allusion "to the heroism and sacrifices of the French" would spawn some sympathy from the American public. As well, the common Anglo-American preference for international peace, supplemented with reliance upon justice, fair play, and a community of ideals, could serve as "the safeguards for the future". If increased transactions between both states could be secured, economic, social, and otherwise, a better understanding of each could result. Stronger ties would allow for more united efforts amongst peace and justice loving states to repair "the fabric of civilisation" and increase its strength. Lastly, mention of the British Government's firm resolve to unravel the Irish question, a major pitfall in Anglo-American relations, was necessary. The Prince's visit, and his public efforts based on Reading's guidelines, were judged successful by British representatives accompanying him.⁵⁵ Regrettably, these labours were for naught as the Foreign Office in viewing the Senate and reservations

felt a harder political line was necessary..

Grey had wired on 23 November that there existed the chance both he and the French ambassador would be consulted by the State Department about a compromise on the reservations.⁵⁶ He sought any observations or instructions London could make. Hurst was sought out by Philip Kerr, Lloyd George's private secretary, to reply to Grey's request. Both Lloyd George and Curzon had discussed the problem, with Kerr as the intermediary, and a decision had been reached to inform Grey fully of prevailing views.⁵⁷ In addition to supplying Grey with the government's observations, Hurst was to instruct him that it would be impossible for the British Government to agree to any reservations until their final form had been decided. Kerr indicated that the essence of the entire communication should constitute "a studied examination of the effect, both of the present reservations, and indeed of any reservations at all, in rendering nugatory the purpose and authority of the League". The basis of Hurst's reply to Grey was a memorandum on the American reservations he had circulated within the Cabinet on 19 November,⁵⁸ a document which had greatly impressed the prime minister.

The legal implications of the reservations, upon the basis of the Peace Settlement, received first handling. Most obviously the American request for all signatories of the Treaty to accept the reservations - reservation 1, the preamble - would create enormous difficulty for the Allied Powers. Hurst pointed out that the majority of states who attended the Peace

Conference would have preferred to draft reservations on points falling within their particular interests. However, since no reservations were permitted to either Versailles or Saint Germain - and Hurst pointed out some Powers were having, as a result, extreme difficulty in signing the Austrian treaty - it would be impossible for the Americans to do so now. The American request to alter the formalised articles of peace would lead to "a very bad impression", whilst possibly creating amongst the lesser Powers the belief that, within the League, equality between great and small Powers was a fantasy. More important, the American reservations threatened to undermine the guiding prescript of the entire postwar treaty system:

"Reservations by any power run counter to the principle adopted as the basis for the peace settlement that the external political obligations incumbent on civilised States should in future be shared in common and that this principle should be substituted for the disordered conditions which have prevailed hitherto in international relations." Acceptance of Lodge's reservations by the Allies would set a dangerous precedent in which other dissatisfied states could alter their status within the general Settlement, thus, shattering the unity exemplified in the unreserved treaties. Entry of the United States into the League, upon acceptance of reservations, would surely lead to an automatic breakdown of the Covenant.

The remainder of Hurst's discussion indicated that, with a few exceptions, they were not at all favourable to any success the League could hope to enjoy. The reservation to Article

10 would permit the United States to abstain in certain instances, with the obligation for settlement falling to Britain. Additionally, American abstention would only reënforce the belief amongst lesser Powers that their reliance upon the League to resolve disputes was misguided. American desires to maintain independence in domestic affairs was admirable, but the reservation dealing with this, as it stood, was unacceptable. Hurst indicated that the state of the 3,000 mile Canadian-American border was a domestic American concern as far as the fifth reservation went. Protection of the Monroe Doctrine affected Latin American states far more than it did Britain; but, Hurst warned, friction between the Americans and other Powers outside of Latin America might cause some qualms within the southern American countries about participation in the League. Shantung, American representation, and expenses did not pose much inconvenience. The disarmament reservation - 11 - was another question. Hurst shared the popular opinion of the time that increases in armaments were a principal cause of war. The eleventh reservation would provide the Americans an avenue for unilateral increments in their defensive and offensive arsenals, hence, endangering peace. Again the likelihood of an American precedent augured ill for the League: "If every nation after accepting the agreed limitation is entitled to increase armaments whenever it considers itself threatened, the effect for states on the continent of Europe must be to render Article 8 of the Covenant worthless." The boycott reservation was viewed by Hurst as again an Ameri-

can attempt to circumvent the Covenant to the detriment of the League. Without American participation in an economic embargo against a Covenant breaking state, the effectiveness of a boycott, though not unfeasible, would be reduced substantially. Although Hurst saw no problem with the reservation dealing with debts of nationals, he held the working of this portion of the Treaty would assume greater difficulty.

Conspicuously absent from Hurst's telegram were observations on withdrawal, mandates, reparations, the International Labour Organisation, and Dominion voting rights. These areas had either been decided upon already, as in the case of Dominions voting, or were scheduled for future discussion, for example the reparations question.

Hurst concluded by repeating Kerr's instruction that the British Government would be unable to make final decisions on the reservations until the final text had been received. Grey's personal observations of the situation in America was also required in this equation. Hurst ended on a sour note by adding that if some accommodation could not be reached with the reservationists, and the United States entered the League with its unilaterally amended Covenant, the British Government would have to consider the real possibility of giving its notice to withdraw.

Grey immediately replied that he had been in contact with numerous American leaders, impressing upon each the burden the preamble to the reservations placed on the British Government. 59 Although he could report that there was a good possibility the

preamble could be dropped or amended, there was little hope with respect to other reservations. He ended his telegram with the grim note:

His Majesty's Government must therefore be prepared either for definite failure of American ratification altogether or for ratification without alteration of any reservations It is very doubtful whether President will accept such a one-sided compromise. He may probably hold the same view expressed in [Hurst's] telegram and regard Senate reservations as destroying Treaty and Covenant.

In the next ten days Grey became completely disenchanted with what was occurring in Washington. Not only was the Covenant endangered by the Senate, but the Anglo-American guarantee to the French was jeopardised. Wilson had not yet seen Grey, nor would he be able to whilst Grey remained in the United States. On 6 December Grey wrote Curzon that Wilson was unable to be consulted on any issue and that his chances of seeing the President were non-existent.⁶⁰ Reporting the Senate was not about to make concessions on Lodge's reservations, he lamented his inability to speak out on the League and Peace Settlement. Fully frustrated, he wrote: "There is no one with whom I can discuss anything effectively in Washington." Convinced his time and efforts were "useless", he informed Curzon he would return to London in early January. The purpose underpinning his mission had vanished. The isolationist tradition was in the process of regaining lost ground and the internationalist impulse within the United States, the key to American participation in the League, had apparently fallen.

CHAPTER FIVE

A Glimmer of Promise,

December 1919 - December 1920.

"Don't let us quarrel," the White Queen said in an anxious tone. "What is the cause of lightning?"

"The cause of lightning," said Alice very decidedly, for she felt quite certain about this, "is the thunder - no, no!" she hastily corrected herself. "I meant the other way."

"It's too late to correct it," said the Red Queen: "when you've once said a thing, that fixes it, and you must take the consequences."

the White Queen, the Red Queen, and Alice

I.

American withdrawal from the League before it ever met did not cripple the organisation. That fable concerning the stillborn League is one deriving from retrospective analysis of the organisation's activity during its interwar existence, especially after 1935, and regarding the failure of American participation as its major weakness.¹ Although Lloyd George claimed in the mid 1930s that the Senate's action seriously impaired the performance of the League,² he did not hold that view in the immediate post rejection period. On the contrary, the British decision to go on within the League found basis on a rational appraisal of the functions of the organisation as empowered in the Covenant. Especially weighty in Britain's decision not to opt out were the responsibilities with respect to mandated territories which were intimately connected to the Covenant, the portions of the Peace Settlement which had

been tied to anticipated League activity, and, perhaps most important, the support bestowed upon the whole concept of international peace keeping machinery by public opinion. Under scoring all of these simple political factors lay a belief that the American Senate's decision was not unchangeable, and that over time the isolationists could be defeated and United States participation easily arranged.

The first year of League activity attests to the potential power the organisation possessed and that this power resided in a realistic rather than idealistic assessment of the international system. Too many historians are ready to give Wilson credit for founding the League, for imbuing its Covenant with idealism, for losing the crucial domestic American debate over ratification, and, thus, for preventing United States participation in the League, the supposed reason for the organisation's ultimate failure.³ Blaming Wilson is not at all difficult; pinning the failure of the League on American rejection of the Covenant even more so. What remains, nonetheless, is that the first year of League activity indicates that its members, particularly Britain, did not regard the organisation as impotent and that they worked toward establishing it as a viable proposition. Potential League capabilities, by the end of the first Assembly in 1920, showed a glimmer of promise.

II.

The failure of the ratification process within the United

States apparently took Lloyd George and Clemenceau by surprise.⁴ The decision to go on with the League naturally resided with the great Powers, chiefly Britain and France, but there existed little difficulty in selecting which route to follow.

An Allied Conference was held in London in mid December 1919 in an attempt to settle problems of the Middle East. In separate Anglo-French discussion Clemenceau expressed interest in accepting American entry into the League based upon the Covenant incorporating Lodge's reservations. This interest originated with Clemenceau's ministry not wishing to imperil the proposed Anglo-American guarantees to France.⁵ Lloyd George refused to consider this possibility. Hurst's memorandum on the American reservations, still fresh in the minds of British leaders, undoubtedly played heavily in maintaining this position. Unilateral reservations, though clearly desirable on each signatory's part to safeguard individual national interests, would only detract from collective League capabilities. As well, Lloyd George made much of some recent reports from Grey, then still in Washington, which indicated that external pressures of any sort, whether favourable or not, would merely lend support to the isolationist case. It was resolved that nothing would be done about American League participation until the situation within the United States cooled.⁷

The French decision to go on with the League centred on their perceptions of the organisation affording France security,

which the now questionable Anglo-American guarantees would not, it seemed, be able to muster. Whereas before mid December 1919 the French had been reluctant League advocates, after these Anglo-French discussions they looked to the Covenant as a means of protecting their sovereignty.⁸ League provisions to safeguard member states' rights whilst at the same time diminishing the possibility of war suddenly appealed to Paris.

Britain's decision to continue within the League had been reached prior to Lloyd George's conversations with Clemenceau. Three factors influenced that decision: mandates, those portions of the Peace Settlement tied to the Covenant, and public opinion's acceptance of the need for a League. As early as 19 November, Milner circulated a memorandum within Cabinet which brought attention to the question of mandates. He pointed out that Germany, by endorsing and ratifying the Versailles Treaty, had given up all claim to and rights in their former colonial possessions. Balancing the German position was an Allied pledge to deal with those colonies within the context of the Covenant and as defined by Article 22. Milner warned that it would be best for the Allies to honour their pledge as soon as possible, "instead of leaving the Administration of these territories, whose ultimate destination is certain, in a prolonged welter of indefiniteness and of temporary and provisional arrangements".⁹

Milner advocated that mandates machinery should come into force before the Peace Conference finally disbanded. He contended that the Conference should pen the necessary documents

as soon as possible and sign them, despite uncertainty about American ratification of the Peace Settlement. Once the other Allied Powers found agreement amongst themselves - which had actually already happened by ratification of the Treaty and Covenant - the American government could accede to this whenever and if ever it wanted.

On 29 November, ten days later, Lloyd George, Milner, Curzon, Balfour, and Montagu, the core of the Cabinet, met to discuss problems accruing from American rejection of the Versailles Treaty. After much consideration, in which Milner's memorandum served as a focal point, decision was reached whereby the Foreign Office would take the initiative in preparing for the orderly transfer of captured German colonies into mandated territory. Central to this was the eighth paragraph of Article 22 of the Covenant: "The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council." Therefore, specific conventions were required to provide such definition and Curzon, now foreign secretary, was instructed that his department devise necessary drafts for later presentation to the Allies. Because the question had to be resolved quickly, if full Cabinet approved, the draft conventions could be submitted at the first session of the League.¹⁰

The League had been tied to a number of provisions within the Peace Settlement and its action was to provide the means by which those provisions could be enacted and carried out.¹¹ The

portions of the Peace Settlement dealing with Danzig, the Saar, and the problem of minorities were inextricably linked to the proposed Covenant. Because of anticipated League permanence, contrasting with the recognition of the temporary nature of the Supreme Council in Paris, the organisation was empowered as the body designated to appoint commission chairmen and select the members of ad hoc arbitral tribunals, if agreement on such matters could not be achieved in any other way. The League also received power to be the final arbiter in settling disagreements between states arising in establishing national borders. The only area in which the League did not make inroads concerned the monitoring of German military capacity. The Peace Conference fashioned the Inter-Allied Commission of Control, a body established specifically to supervise German disarmament and to ensure that German armament levels adhered to the guidelines incorporated in the Treaty of Versailles.

The Anglo-French problem, supposing decision was reached to opt out of the League, concerned what would replace the organisation in carrying out the above treaty provisions. Compounding the issue by late 1919, Drummond had already arrived at a schedule of work his section had to do and within this were the divisions of the Secretariat to deal with Danzig, the Saar, and minorities.¹² The Danzig and Saar questions had required great effort in resolving, without soothing German sensitivities over the loss of those parts of the Reich.¹³ To reopen negotiations in the attempt to achieve another settlement would serve only to inflame further German resentment.¹⁴ League

investment in the minorities issue stemmed from the recognition that in redrawing the map of Europe numerous minority groups would be included within states dominated by other ethnic majorities.¹⁵ As the League had been the only appointed guardian of minority rights, difficulty could arise if the organization were dropped and nothing of consequence established quickly to replace it.

Those portions of the Treaty empowering the League to appoint commission chairmen and select members of ad hoc committees would be completely undercut if Britain and France left the organization. So too would those relating to the adjudication of border disputes. The problem in both instances arose with the possibility that a joint Allied committee would have to be formed to fulfill these functions. Where the League would impart a measure of impartiality in attaining decisions on the above matters, those reached by any joint Allied effort would entertain the possibility of charges of lack of objectivity. Such charges were later levelled on the Inter-Allied Commission of Control.¹⁶ Detachment in formulating important decisions was necessary and the League provided this through collective responsibility. In these instances, it remained preferable to have the League exist as a viable institution.

Gauging the effect of public opinion on the Anglo-French decision to continue within the League is not at all easy. Although Wilson was the only great Power leader to actively work in the League Commission, the others paid public lip service to its ideals. Lloyd George, as an example, after the

creation of the League, made much of the few public demonstrations of support he had bestowed upon the nascent idea during and immediately after the Peace Conference period.¹⁷ The question which immediately arises is, of course, why? Why would these men offer praise for an organisation they, personally, were only marginally interested in?

The answer lies with those numerous unofficial groups which had sprung up during the war preaching the need for post-war international peacekeeping machinery. Public opinion, as a result of their efforts, would not condone the abandoning of the League because of reluctant American attitudes. The Great War and its immeasurable toll in human, political, and economic terms had acted as a catalyst in hastening the formation of an international forum to diminish the probability of similar conflagrations. Efforts expended by these various groups, from the American League to Enforce Peace to the British League of Nations Society to the French Organisation Centrale pour une Paix Durable, did much to rally international public opinion around the cause of international peace keeping machinery. Whilst it has been demonstrated above that concerned statesmen like Cecil and Smuts were not much influenced by these unofficial bodies, instead arriving at the need for League type machinery independently, such bodies did have an affect on public opinion. There exists little doubt, as an example, that the British League of Nations Society did much to determine a positive League influence within British public opinion.¹⁸

When the activities of the pro League bodies are weighed

against those of their opponents, one is confronted with a lack of any organisation whatsoever amongst those opposing the League. Privately Curzon never really much cared for the organisation: he after all had the greatest influence in convincing Hankey against taking the Secretary-Generalship in Paris. Indeed, Curzon once remarked that he held the League to be "an appendage of the Foreign Office".¹⁹ However, he would never say a thing like this publicly: when he knew his words were going to be assayed by the public, he had only good things to say about it.²⁰ One understands why, therefore, leader-politicians like Lloyd George could not easily opt out of the League following American rejection. Practical political reasons: mandates, the Peace Settlement tied to the League, and the sympathy of public opinion, mitigated against withdrawal.

III.

The work of the Council throughout 1920 serves to illustrate that in spite of American failure to ratify the Covenant the British and French endeavoured to establish the League as a practicable alternative to international anarchy. During session of the League Commission, the Council had been directed to establish the Permanent Court of International Justice; this by virtue of Article 14 of the Covenant. In 1920 the Council undertook this task and laid the foundation for the International Court, apportioning it with requisite arbitral powers to resolve justiciable disputes whilst ensuring it possessed independence

in its deliberations. The Council moved to resolve a number of international ruptures between minor states, with perhaps the most important efforts directed toward preventing the outbreak of war between Finland and Sweden over possession of the Baltic Aaland Islands. Council activity during 1920 served both to strengthen League peace-keeping machinery, by laying the basis of a sound International Court, and by successfully experimenting in resolving international disputes with its revolutionary powers of enquiry and delay.

Article 14 of the Covenant provided that the Council devise plans for the International Court and then submit these to the Assembly. In June 1919 the organising committee for the League, Drummond and the Council members, decided that formation of an advisory group of jurists would expedite the work of Council in planning the Court. Drummond was requested to undertake the task of finding personnel to staff the advisory committee,²¹ and at the second session of the Council, held on 11 - 12 February 1920, his efforts were encapsulated in a memorandum presented to his superiors.²² All of the advisers who were asked to participate and who agreed to serve were eminently qualified for their task; there were ten of them, representing the five great Powers and five lesser ones, all either jurists or diplomats.²³ The Council allocated funds to facilitate committee investigations and assigned a mini Secretariat to assist the advisers in their work.

The advisory committee held thirty-five meetings in the summer of 1920, from 16 June to 24 July, from which a draft scheme for the Court was unanimously approved.²⁴ The intense

six weeks of negotiation in the summer followed a period in which all available information on the subject was gathered. The basis of discussion within the group was "a valuable synopsis of various proposals", including numerous existing schemes dating back to the Hague Conference of 1907, which had been drafted by the mini Secretariat. Initially, the committee split over how the synopsis should best serve the interests of the group. One half wanted the 1907 Hague Conference decisions to become "the basis of consideration", whilst the other sought a more independent tack. Compromise occurred with a resolution stating "the Committee starts its deliberations by paying homage to the work of the two Hague Conferences". By the time of the Council's eighth session, held between 30 July and 5 August 1920, the Committee of Jurists was able to present its draft scheme.²⁵

Two major problems confronted the advisers in fulfilling their mandate: the mechanism of selecting judges and the question of compulsory jurisdiction. The Committee recommended that members of the Court be elected by the Assembly and Council of the League following nominations to vacant positions by those states members of the existing Hague Court of Arbitration. Safeguards were included so that only a maximum of four nominations could be made and that only two of the four could be of the nominators' nationality. This passed Council without change.²⁶

The question of compulsory jurisdiction remained another matter and on this point the Council, on British initiatives, completely changed the advisers' suggestion. The draft scheme

presented to the Council made specific provision for the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court. This is to say, that in a justiciable dispute, the advisers were willing to permit any disputant the right to call his adversaries before the International Court. The Council could not accept compulsory jurisdiction and amended the advisory opinion so that the Court could judge a case only if both parties to a dispute agreed that such judgement would be the best method of resolving their differences.

Balfour provided the rationale for this Council decision by noting that the drafters of the Covenant had rejected what the advisory committee were now offering: "Evidently the framers of the [Covenant] never intended that one party to a dispute should compel another party to go before the tribunal" ²⁷ Such an observation remained clearly realistic. The International Court was not in possession of powers to force compulsory arbitration: if it were given such a capacity, the reasons underpinning the foundation of the Assembly and Council would be cast aside. The whole question of forming the Court had been to provide an adjunct to Assembly and Council arbitration and conciliation procedures so that these two important League organs would not have to consider resolving justiciable disputes. Cecil's "Note on a Permanent Court" and Crowe's memorandum on compulsory arbitration ²⁸ outlined the scope of compulsory arbitration that had been accepted at Paris. This British position called for only the exhaustion of all avenues of enquiry and delay before the resort to arms. The advisory

committee's push for compulsory jurisdiction threatened this; if one party to a dispute placed its problem before the Court and its opponent refused to follow suit, there would assuredly arise problems in enforcing the Court's decision. More important, unless the Covenant was amended to provide for enforcing the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, such action would clearly contravene the peace keeping function of the Assembly and Council. The Committee of Jurists' recommendations concerning compulsory jurisdiction were consequently revised in the spirit of the British objection.

The effectiveness of the Permanent International Court of Justice, as devised by the Council through its advisory committee, has been assessed as successful in a wide range of historical study.²⁹ Especially significant are those analyses conducted by lawyers and jurists whose careers were intimately connected with the work of the Court.³⁰ In formulating both advisory opinions and judicial decisions the Court, based at the Hague, continued the tradition of international jurisprudence begun prior to the war,³¹ expanding the original purpose of the international judicial tribunal. Its connexion with the League brought this about. The achievements this arm of the League enjoyed during the interwar period owes much to the endeavours of the Council in 1920 toward fulfilling its mandate to devise plans for the International Court. In solving the difficult issue of selection of judges, which had actually escaped everyone else until 1920, and ensuring the Court's domain entailed solely the distribution of advisory opinion and

judicial decision, in the event of voluntary arbitration, the Council laid the basis of a sensible adjudicative arm of League peace keeping machinery.

In 1920 the Council used its enquiry and delay capabilities for the first time; it attempted to ameliorate differences between the Poles and Lithuanians and between the Finns and the Swedes. The greatest danger to peace occurred with the latter situation, a dispute arising over the sovereignty of the Aaland Islands.³² These islands, strategically clustered at the nexus of the Gulfs of Bothnia and Finland, guarding the approaches to the eastern Baltic, had been under nominal Finnish control since the nineteenth century. Finland had then constituted a component of the former Russian tsarist Empire, the Grand Duchy of Finland, and, upon realising independence after 1917, assumed control over those former Russian territories it had administered for St. Petersburg.

Finnish-Swedish animosity threatened to escalate into war in 1920 when the Aalanders, the ethnically Swedish majority of the island population, petitioned Stockholm to annex their islands as part of Sweden. The Russians had seized this territory from Sweden in 1809, which had been occupying it since the twelfth century. Swedish public opinion appeared to support annexation whilst that of Finland favoured retention. In early 1920 the Aalanders were offered greater autonomy in the conduct of their internal affairs by Helsingfors but this was not enough and, when in March 1920 a new Swedish government took office, one headed by Karl Branting and possessing a more active

Foreign policy than its predecessor, the possibility of a serious Finno-Swedish rift threatened.

The Aalanders were openly courted by Branting. They made numerous trips to Stockholm, met with the Swedish king, and appeared in public with important government officials. By late May the Aalanders announced they wanted a plebiscite to decide the issue of which state should control their islands but, because of the dominant Swedish majority there, the Finns would not agree. Stockholm made public its desires that the issue be resolved by the Supreme Council in Paris; the Council had met, however, several times in 1920 without Sweden taking the initiative. Because the situation deteriorated rapidly after Aalander announcement of the desirability of a plebiscite, and since the Supreme Council would not meet again until late July, the British government, through Curzon, worked to have the matter brought before the League Council.³³ Although Finland did not yet belong to the League, it agreed to allow the Council to resolve the issue. On 19 June Curzon, through Drummond, referred this dispute to the Council under Article 11:

It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstances whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

At the seventh Council meeting, held in London between 9 - 11 July, the Finnish and Swedish representatives argued their cases; it was the first time disputing states presented a bilateral problem for resolution by League, peace keeping

machinery. The Finns argued, interestingly, that the League had no real competence to consider the question. As far as Helsingfors regarded the situation, it remained a purely internal matter with the Aalanders being citizens of Finland and their affairs a domestic Finnish concern. Sweden, by supporting Aalander secessionists and publicly espousing support for their case, was meddling in a purely Finnish matter.³⁴ The Swedes maintained that the right of self determination should predominate in this matter. As a matter of course, Sweden proposed that a plebiscite be administered within the Aaland Islands to determine if the inhabitants favoured remaining under Finnish control or sought to reestablish their severed ties with Sweden.³⁵ Branting, who argued Sweden's case, was accompanied by two Aalander representatives.³⁶

The Council decided that a legal opinion had to be given in this matter and, because the International Court remained in its formative stages, invited three international jurists to advance an opinion on the situation.³⁷ This enquiry took over two months to complete and in the interim between the seventh Council meeting and the presentation of the advisory opinion,³⁸ the probability of war diminished.³⁹ When the jurists reported they indicated that the issue was far more complex than originally suspected. Far from being a purely Finno-Swedish entanglement, the Russian Soviets were apparently interested in the affair. Complicating the entire matter was existence of an Anglo-Russo-Swedish Treaty of 1856 in which the signatories agreed to keep the islands demilitarised. Although

the advisory committee sympathised with the Finnish declaration that the entire question remained one of purely domestic concern, its members believed that this was not borne out by the international implications. The jurists, thus, recommended that the Council appoint a commission of enquiry, composed of neutrals, to investigate fully the entire problem and report back with suitable advice from which the Council could frame a decision. Both Finland and Sweden agreed to this course of action and the intensity of their disagreement died down completely.⁴⁰ When the commission of enquiry reported back to the Council, advising a decision favouring Finland,⁴¹ Sweden publicly castigated the findings but accepted them. War had been prevented.

The Council succeeded in its efforts by implementing the enquiry and delay provisions of the Covenant, specifically Article 11. The significance of this resides in the interesting point that this mechanism had been proposed over two years before in Phillimore's Initial Report⁴² and that its practical application had proven to be a realistic method of resolving international dispute. League peace keeping machinery had demonstrated that it could serve the best interests of peace after its initial employment by the Council.

IV.

The League Assembly held its first session in the autumn of 1920 at Geneva. Lasting five weeks, from mid November to

mid December, the importance of this event lay in its role of bringing together for the first time a congress of lesser and greater Powers as equals in debate. The frank exchange of ideas and the opportunity of informally presenting various national policies did much to foster better international cooperation and understanding. The first Assembly worked hard to fulfill a dual mandate of completing the League organisation and of discussing and considering the state of international affairs. It successfully grappled with this, indicating the general Assembly showed as much potential as the executive Council within its defined sphere of operation and that the organisation which entered 1921 a completed entity showed promise.

The Assembly convened under the spectre of complete American rejection of the Covenant for the foreseeable future. The Republican W.G. Harding had just been elected the American President prior to the opening of the Assembly; his principal support derived from a core of conservative isolationists within the American Congress.⁴³ Although American participation as a full League member remained within the realm of possibility, Harding's Administration could not accept League responsibilities as long as its domestic political support was based on the isolationists. Four years at the very least would have to pass before the American internationalists could again make an attempt at gaining American accession to the Covenant. In fulfilling its dual mandate, the League Assembly indicated that American participation in the League was not requisite for any success that body could hope to achieve.

The programme of the Assembly began with the selection of a president. By prior arrangement this office fell to the Belgian foreign minister, Paul Hymans, and, in the view of a contemporary, he "performed his part admirably".⁴⁴ Assembly committee work divided into six general areas: general organisation; economic, social, and technical work; the establishment of the International Court based on the Council draft convention; budget and staffing; the admission of new members; and, mandates and disarmament. The composition of the committees constituted a revolutionary development.⁴⁵ Previously, in general international conferences of this sort, committee membership found basis with those states touched by the matters under consideration or with those states powerful and influential enough not to be left out. The organising plan of the Secretariat proposed that every League member have the right to sit on each principal committee; attendance was not considered mandatory but, if a matter under discussion concerned or interested any state member, it could participate. The coordination of committee work, under the aegis of the Assembly President, would be handled by an executive composed of each committee chairman and six vice presidents elected from within the Assembly at large. This system of Assembly organisation continued for the existence of the League, though some committees were dropped and others formed.

F.P. Walters, a member of the British Foreign Office who joined the League Secretariat soon after its formation, has pointed out that the supposed flaw in the Assembly committee

system, that debate in the Assembly would merely be a repetition of that in committee, did not materialise.⁴⁶ Repetition did not result because the committee deliberations were held in camera and the posturing, the rhetoric, and the formality which marked the public session of the Assembly as a whole was not necessary in committee to get a point across. When, a few years later, the committees were opened to the Press, so claims Walters, the informality and businesslike approach which emerged in the first session of the Assembly had become established. League delegations met, talked over their difficulties, and came better to understand their colleagues point of view.

Cecil, who attended the first session of the Assembly as a representative of South Africa, noted that the effect of the American elections had been to bring disunity within the Assembly.⁴⁷ This, he believed, stemmed from the jubilant cries of the anti-Wilsonian forces that the League was dead without American participation. Such an egotistical and self centred stance had an initial impact on the League membership; there is no question of this. However, once the Assembly began its deliberations, began to work toward fulfilling its mandate, the situation changed. At the end of the five week period, pessimism had been replaced by optimism and debate within the plenary session of the Assembly contributed heavily to this shift.

Assembly debate revolved around the state of international affairs. This had not been the intention of the Secretary-General's organising committee but, following political maneuvering in bringing debate about, its occurrence instilled a confidence in the

League American rejection had temporarily expelled. Debate focused on the Council's report of its work thus far, which had been tabled only to provide information about Council activities.⁴⁸ Walters has observed that the Assembly immediately sought to assert its independence and "hit upon the ingenuous expedient of treating the Council's report as having been laid before it for consideration and even for approval".⁴⁹ Though never intended, each delegation subsequently voiced its official stance on the report, touching upon any situation it believed concerned the topic being considered. Such latitude permitted debate to range on the widest selection of subjects and, as long as ostensibly related to the meat of the report, gave consideration to much of the state of international affairs. Inevitably the Council had to explain, and at times defend, its work. The Assembly, hence, acquired a greater share in the consideration of the League's work and more responsibility in evaluating the efforts of Council conducted in its name. Potential Assembly capabilities, exhibited during its first session, contributed to enhancing further the promise ascribed to League activity which had already been realized by the great Power decision to go on and the success enjoyed by the Council in 1920. The first year of League activity indicated the organization could withstand, and function in spite of, American refusal to join.

CHAPTER SIX

Removing the Crust of Myth.

The sun was shining on the sea,
Shining with all his might
He did his very best to make
The billows smooth and bright -
And this was odd, because it was
The middle of the night.

"The Walrus and the Carpenter"

recited by Tweedledee and Tweedledum

The League of Nations was not the singular creation of Woodrow Wilson but, rather, the culmination of great efforts expended by a small group of Anglo-American statesmen. Wilson had only been one of many concerned leaders who had expressed worry about the future of civilisation if the seeds of another Great War were allowed to germinate unchecked. The League remained essentially a diplomatic mechanism to be employed to lessen the probability of war, to confer by means of enquiry and delay a facility for cooling inflamed national tempers, and to provide for the peaceful arbitration of international controversy instead of falling back on the resort to arms. League powers were, at least theoretically, potent in that the Covenant provided for the application of severe economic and, in the most extreme of crises, military sanctions against transgressor states to enforce decisions of the organisation. In devising this formula for resolving international disputes without reliance on war, Wilson made little valuable contribution. The mantle of responsibility for devising practical and realistic League policy,

which when incorporated became the League Covenant, falls to lesser Anglo-American notables: Cecil, House, and Smuts.

Where Wilson continually spoke in only the most general of terms, never advancing specific proposals of his own, the other three made solid contributions toward giving substance to their expressions of concern. Within the British Government during the war period, Cecil, later joined by Smuts, lobbied successfully in demonstrating the efficacy of the proposed League in terms of peace keeping. By the time of the November 1918 Armistice the British Government, again on the pressures exerted by Cecil within the Foreign Office, had developed a specific set of League proposals, those of the Phillimore Committee. Phillimore and his associates, three Foreign Office officials and three academics, formulated a bloc of peace keeping articles that wound up in the eventual League Covenant with little alteration. Phillimore's proposals became the heart of the Covenant and Wilson had nothing to do with their production. Indeed, he accepted them as the core of League peace keeping machinery.

At the Peace Conference British League ideas dominated American ones. In the pre League Commission negotiations those British components judged fundamental to League existence: a general Assembly, an executive Council, disarmament, an international Court of Justice, and a permanent organisation tied to a permanent Secretariat and powerful Secretary-General, found inclusion in the draft Covenant which served as the basis of discussion. Two Wilsonian inclusions were accepted under pressure. One concerned provision by which former enemy lands would revert to League con-

control in the form of mandated territories. However, Allied acceptance of this, which actually was an expansion of an original idea of Smuts, only provided a means by which territory captured from the Central Powers during the war was not to be regarded as booty. The American President also managed to secure passage of an article which made the League membership responsible for guaranteeing the territorial integrity of each other. This too had been originally proposed by Cecil, in late 1916, and had been cast aside as dangerous. However, the lesser Powers contributing to the making of the Covenant quite naturally supported Wilson on this point.

At Paris the League became tied to Wilson's name and the myth of Wilson "Fondateur de la Société des Nations" began. Wilson had captured public opinion with his rhetoric about a new international order emerging after the ravages of the great War, and the League, which he never took beyond nebulous phrases, would be basic to this. Wilson wanted the League to be linked intimately with his name and Cecil, House, and Smuts were willing to accord him this. It was realised that domestic American opposition to participation in the postwar organisation had been mounting and that, perhaps, the League tied to Wilson would ensure its acceptance by Congress. In the critical debate within America over accepting or rejecting the Covenant, League opponents based their attacks on the havoc membership would bring to the United States isolationist tradition. In presenting the case for membership, Wilson worked extremely hard and his health broke as a result. Because his breakdown occurred before the

final stage of the debate, his opponents were able to defeat Treaty ratification within the Senate and the United States did not join the League. Lloyd George had even attempted to aid American pro Leaguers in their struggles by enticing Lord Grey, one of Britain's principal advocates, into serving as special Ambassador to Washington D.C. This was to no avail. The Allies were suddenly confronted by the proposition of continuing within the League or jettisoning the Covenant and reverting to the old pre 1914 system of diplomatic activity. They opted to remain.

The League's first year of activity attests to the potential power the organisation possessed and that this power resided in a realistic rather than idealistic assessment of the international system. The work of the Council throughout 1920 serves to illustrate this. At Paris, the Council had been entrusted to create the Permanent Court of International Justice, an organ of the League held to be a fundamental adjunct to the Covenant's peace keeping proposals. The Council gave the International Court requisite powers to resolve international disputes by arbitration and relative independence in its deliberations. The Council also resolved some difficulties between minor states; perhaps the most important settlement achieved concerned the Aaland Islands dispute, a Finno-Swedish conflict. Efforts of the Council to reduce friction between these two northern European states were conducted fairly and serious disruption was averted.

The Assembly met for the first time in the autumn of 1920 and for the first time a congress of lesser and greater Powers sat as equals in discussing current difficulties. Although the

real power was firmly lodged within the Council; session of the Assembly allowed for a frank interchange of ideas and the opportunity for national representatives to meet with those of other states. The seeds of future international cooperation were planted within the confines of the League in 1920, and the Covenant, assuming it was to be earnestly and honestly adhered to, offered protection of this. However, that the League ultimately failed in its principal objective was not the fault of the Covenant; states members who chose to circumvent League procedures, who refused to employ available League machinery, and who perceived unilateral action as the best method of resolving their problems failed the League.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter One.

¹Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, A Great Experiment. An Autobiography (New York, 1941).

²See, for example, Earl of Avon, Facing the Dictators (London, 1962), pp.56-57 et passim.

³"The Covenant of the League of Nations" - 28 June 1919: Cmd.154. Though this copy of the Covenant will be utilised in this paper, suitable facsimiles can be found in any number of secondary studies dealing with the League.

⁴For example, Roy Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement (Garden City, 1922); Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal (New York, 1945); Seth P. Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the Peace Conference of 1919 (Princeton, 1961).

⁵A few scholars have made mention of Wilson's lack of concrete proposals with regard to the League, but this only in a passing reference lacking indepth analysis. For example, A.J.P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945 (Harmondsworth, 1970), p.181.

⁶Diary entry - 19 January 1919, Cecil: British Museum Additional Manuscripts [hereafter B.M.Add.MSS.] 51131.

Chapter Two.

¹Times, 7 January 1918.

²Ibid., 9 January 1918.

³Arno J. Mayer, Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918 (New Haven, 1959), p.vii.

⁴For example, L.S. Woolf, The Framework of a Lasting Peace (London, 1917).

⁵For example, Edward Grey, The League of Nations (London and New York, 1918).

⁶For example, letter - 31 October 1917, J. St Loe Strachey [owner of The Spectator] to Cecil: F.O.800/196.

⁷"Draft Statement of War Aims" - 3 January 1918, Smuts (G.T.3180); "Draft Statement of War Aims" - 3 January 1918, Cecil (G.T.3181): Cab.24/37.

⁸Sargon Hankey, The Supreme Command, 1914-1918, Vol.II (London, 1961), p.737. Cf. Lloyd George's T.U.C speech: Times, 7 January 1918, and, G.T.3180, G.T.3181, and G.T. 3182: Cab. 24/37.

⁹G.J. Lowe and M.L. Dockrill, The Mirage of Power, Vol.II: British Foreign Policy 1914-22 (London, 1972), pp.244-246.

¹⁰"Proposals for Diminishing the Occasion of Future Wars" - n.d., Cecil (G.T.434): Cab.24/10.

¹¹For example, telegram - 27 December 1916, Cecil to Lord Bryce [President of the British Academy and former British ambassador to the United States]: F.O.800/197. A recent character study is also illuminating, Hugh Cecil, "Lord Robert Cecil, 1864-1958; a Nineteenth-century Upbringing" History Today Vol.25 (1975), pp.118-127.

¹²Cecil, A Great Experiment, p.47.

¹³Letter - 18 July 1916, Cecil to Coudert [British legal adviser in the United States]: F.O.800/242; see also, "Summary of Blockade Information, 2-8 March 1917" - 9 March 1917, War Trade Intelligence Department (G.T.133): Cab.24/7.

¹⁴There was a great deal of correspondence regarding the effect of British blockade activity between Cecil and Herbert Hoover, the head of the Belgian Relief Commission: April-May 1916: F.O.800/195. See also, Archibald C. Bell, A History of the blockade of Germany and the Countries associated with her in the Great War, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, 1914-1918 (London, 1937), pp.567-574.

¹⁵"Notes . . . on Lord R. Cecil's Proposals for the Maintenance of Future Peace" - 12 October 1916, Crowe (G.T.484A): Cab.24/10.

¹⁶Ibid., p.4 et passim.

¹⁷For example, H.A.L. Fisher, James Bryce, Vol.II (New York, 1927), pp.136-137.

¹⁸Stephen Roskill, Hankey Man of Secrets, Vol.I: 1877-1918 (London, 1970), p.276.

¹⁹Lowe and Dockrill, Mirage, Vol.II, pp.266-267.

20 Cf. diary entry - 1 December 1916, Lord Riddell [Chairman of the News of the World], in G.A.R. Riddell, Lord Riddell's War Diary 1914-1918 (London, 1933), pp.225-226; and Hankey, Supreme Command, Vol.II, pp.553-570.

21 A great deal of controversy surrounds Asquith's fall and Lloyd George's subsequent rise to power and it strangely hinges on Lloyd George's activities and not Asquith's. Cf. Donald McCormick, The Mask of Merlin. A Critical Biography of Lloyd George (New York, Chicago, and San Francisco, 1963), pp.108-116, and Kenneth O. Morgan, The Age of Lloyd George (London, 1971), pp.62-67. An interesting view of a contemporary is Lord Beaverbrook, Politicians and the War 1914-16 (London, 1928).

22 For a succinct examination of Lloyd George's rise to power, see Taylor, English History, pp.105-106.

23 The Records of the Cabinet Office to 1922 (London, 1966), pp.1-4.

24 A number of examples exist indicating this independent activity occurred: Lloyd George, whilst minister of munitions, attempted to curtail more and more the war secretary's responsibilities; Taylor, English History, pp.64-66; likewise, Lord Kitchener, the war secretary, preferred to keep his intentions and activities hidden from his Cabinet colleagues until the last possible minute, Boskill, Hankey, Vol.I, pp.212, 216, 222.

25 For an examination of this, see Taylor, English History, pp.111-112. His "Lists of Cabinets 1915-1945", contained in the same volume, provides a list of personnel changes. Ibid., pp.772-773.

26 F.A. Johnson, Defence by Committee. The British Committee of Imperial Defence 1885-1959 (London, 1960), pp.80-81.

27 "Note communicated by the United States Ambassador" - 20 December 1916, W.H. Page [U.S. Ambassador to London]: War Cabinet 10, Appendix I: Cab.23/1.

28 "Proposed Action in regard to the American Note" - 23 December 1916, Cecil: War Cabinet 16, Appendix I: Cab.23/12.

29 For an excellent discussion of all aspects of the joint reply to Wilson's note, from the British point of view, see David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, Vol.III: 1916-1917 (Boston, 1934), pp.61-67; and S. Kernek, "The British Reactions to President Wilson's 'Peace' Note in December 1916" Historical Journal Vol.13 (1970).

30 "Provisional Agenda for the Imperial War Cabinet" - 17 March 1917, Hankey (G.I.193): Cab.24/8.

- 31 Imperial War Cabinet 3, Minute 6: Cab.23/40.
- 32 Ibid., Minute 7.
- 33 Imperial War Cabinet 9, Minute 14: Cab.23/40.
- 34 The non territorial desiderata considered by Milner's group were: (i) the Paris Resolutions; (ii) Control of Imperial Resources; (iii) Renewal of Treaties; (iv) Indemnities; (v) Settlement of private claims arising from the War; (vi) the League of Nations; and (vii) the Freedom of the Seas. For a summary of this report, see Lloyd George, War Memoirs, Vol.IV: 1917, pp.63-64.
- 35 Imperial War Cabinet 12, Minute 19: Cab.23/40.
- 36 Imperial War Cabinet 13, Minute 3: Cab.23/40.
- 37 Ibid., Minute 4.
- 38 "A League of Nations" - 14 May 1917, Smuts, delivered to the League of Nations Society; quoted in Jan Christiaan Smuts, War-Time Speeches (London, New York, and Toronto, 1917), pp.55-67.
- 39 Lloyd George, War Memoirs, Vol.IV, p.36.
- 40 War Cabinet 124, Minute 6; War Cabinet 126, Minute 15; War Cabinet 136, Minute 6: Cab.23/2.
- 41 War Cabinet 124, Minute 6: Cab.23/2.
- 42 War Cabinet 126, Minute 3: Cab.23/2.
- 43 W.K. Hancock, Smuts, Vol.I: The Sanguine Years 1870-1919 (Cambridge, 1962), p.438.
- 44 "Draft Statement of War Aims" - 3 January 1918, Smuts [G.T.3130]: Cab.24/37.
- 45 War Cabinet 314, Minute 2: Cab.23/5.
- 46 Hancock, Smuts, Vol.I, p.471.
- 47 Letter - 9 January 1918, E.F.C. Lane [Smuts' secretary] to Mrs. Smuts, in W.K. Hancock and J. van der Poel, Selections from the Smuts Papers, Vol.III: June 1910 - November 1918 (Cambridge, 1966), p.590.
- 48 Alfred Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law 1918-1935 (London, 1936), p.179.
- 49 Memorandum - 29 January 1918; Cecil [G.T.3489]: Cab.24/40. Lloyd George mistakenly recorded in his memoirs that the Philli-

more Committee was called for and established in January 1917 and that it proffered its Initial Report on 20 March 1917. There appears to be no real reason for this oversight on his behalf; see David Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, Vol.I (London, 1938), pp.606-607.

50 For examples of their work, see Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London, 1911); A.F. Pollard, Thomas Crommer and the English Reformation, 1489 - 1556 (New York, 1906); and, J. Holland Rose, Dumouriez and the Defence of England Against Napoleon (London, 1909).

51 Initial Report - 20 March 1918, Phillimore Committee: F.O.800/249.

52 Final Report - 3 July 1918, Phillimore Committee: Ibid.

53 Cecil, Great Experiment, p.60.

54 Initial Report, Phillimore Committee.

55 These "stumbling blocks" received critical evaluation in the Committee's Final Report, an area in which Phillimore himself did most of the work. For a summary of the salient points of the various schemes, see Appendix I. The development of the League idea within Britain during the war in unofficial circles has been traced in a somewhat older study; see Henry R. Winkler, The League of Nations Movement in Great Britain, 1914-1919 (Metuchen, 1967 [originally published in 1948]).

56 Zimmern, League of Nations, p.180.

57 Cecil, Great Experiment, pp.58-59.

58 War Cabinet 412, Minute 7; Cab.23/6.

59 "Textes adoptés par Commission Ministère de la Société des Nations" - n.d.: David H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, Vol.II (New York, 1928), pp.403-411.

60 Charles Seymour, ed., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Vol.IV: The Ending of the War (Boston and New York, 1928), pp.1-4.

61 Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, p.606.

62 Lowe and Dockrill, Mirage, Vol.II, pp.310-313.

63 Seymour, House Papers, Vol.IV, pp.8-9 et passim.

64 Letter [extract] - 2 March 1918, Wilson to Marburg [Chairman of the American League to Enforce Peace], in Ray Stannard Baker, ed., Woodrow Wilson. Life and Letters, Vol.VIII: Armistice,

March 1 - November 11, 1918 [New York, 1939], p.17.

65 Telegram - 16 August 1919, Wiseman to Reading: F.O.800/225.

66 "First draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations" - July 1918, Wilson; in Baker, Wilson and the World Settlement, Vol.III, pp.68-93.

67 Letter - 25 June 1918, House to Cecil; in Seymour, House Papers, pp.18-20.

68 "Suggestions for a Covenant of a League of Nations" - 16 July 1918, House, in Ibid.; pp.28-36.

69 Telegram - 16 August 1919, Wiseman to Reading: F.O.800/225.

70 Cf. Article I of the Phillimore Initial Report: F.O.800/249; and, Article 9 of House's "Suggestions"; in Seymour, House Papers, p.30.

71 Telegram - 17 July 1918, Wiseman to Cecil: F.O.800/223.

Chapter Three.

¹ F.S. Marston, The Peace Conference of 1919: Organisation and Procedure (London, 1944), pp.75-76; H.W.V. Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, Vol.I, (London, 1920), pp.236-278.

² Resolution - 25 January 1919; in F.P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (London, 1960), p.32.

³ Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, Vol.I, p.23; Denna F. Fleming, The United States and the League of Nations 1918-19 (New York, 1932), pp.67-68. For his influence on certain sectors of European opinion, see L.W. Martin, Peace without Victory. Woodrow Wilson and the British Liberals (New Haven, 1959); and, L.W. Martin, "Woodrow Wilson's Appeals to the People of Europe" Political Science Quarterly Vol.74 (1959), pp.496-516.

⁴ "The President had given the impression that the League of Nations was the only thing he really cared much about." Baron Hankey, The Suvereign Control at the Paris Peace Conference 1919. A Commentary (London, 1963), p.15. "Wilson made plain in his first conference with the House . . . that he intended making the League of Nations the center of the whole programme and letting everything revolve around that."; diary entry - 14 December 1918, House; in Seymour, House Papers, Vol.IV, pp.251-252.

5 "Draft" - July 1918, Wilson; in Baker, Wilson and World Settlement, Vol.III, pp.88-93.

6 "Third draft of the Covenant" - 20 January 1919, Wilson; in Ibid., pp.117-129. Although it is dated 20 January, the British representatives, Cecil and Smuts, were shown it on 19 January. Throughout, this draft will be identified as the "19 January draft".

7 Ibid., Vol.I, p.214.

8 Cf. Trevor Wilson, The Political Diaries of C.F. Scott 1911-1928 (London, 1970), pp.351-362; Thomas Jones, Lloyd George (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1951), pp.156-164; Roy Douglas, "Background to the Coupon Election arrangements" English Historical Review Vol.86 (1971), p.507.

9 Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, Vol.I, p.260; letter - 8 December 1918, Smuts to Cecil: B.M.Add.MSS.51076; letter - 4 December 1918, Cecil to Smuts: Ibid.; Hancock, Smuts, Vol.I, p.507.

10 Draft for a speech - 26 November 1918, Cecil: B.M.Add.MSS.51162.

11 Note - 3 December 1918, Smuts: enclosed in a letter - 3 December 1918, Smuts to Cecil: B.M.Add.MSS.51076.

12 "The League of Nations. A Practical Suggestion" - 16 December 1918, Smuts; in Miller, Drafting the Covenant, Vol.II, pp.23-60.

13 Ibid., Vol.I, pp.34-33.

14 Hancock, Smuts, Vol.I, p.503.

15 Baker, Wilson and World Settlement, Vol.I, p.265; Miller, Drafting the Covenant, Vol.I, p.34; George Curry, "Woodrow Wilson, Jan Smuts, and the Versailles Settlement" American Historical Review Vol.66 (1960-1961), pp.966-986.

16 Cf. Articles 3-12 of Phillimore Initial Report:F.O.800/249; and Articles 18-21 of Smuts' "A Practical Suggestion"; in Miller, Drafting the Covenant, Vol.II, pp.53-59.

17 Ibid., Vol.I, p.36.

18 Ibid., p.36.

19 Articles 13-17 of Smuts' "A Practical Suggestion"; in Ibid., Vol.II, pp.48-53.

20 "Draft Sketch of a League of Nations" - 17 December 1918,

Cecil: F.O.608/1639/1/1.

- 21 Miller, Drafting the Covenant, Vol. I, p.39.
- 22 Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, Vol. I, p.280.
- 23 See Appendix II.
- 24 Note - 10 December 1918, Isaiah Bowman [member of the American Peace Mission]; in Miller, Drafting the Covenant, Vol. I, pp.41-44.
- 25 Baker, Wilson and World Settlement, Vol. I, pp. 2-265.
- 26 "Second Draft of the Covenant" - 10 January 1919, Wilson; in Ibid., Vol. II, pp.100-109.
- 27 Miller, Drafting the Covenant, Vol. I, p.45.
- 28 Baker, Wilson and World Settlement, Vol. I, p.265; Curry, "Wilson, Smuts, and Versailles", p.370.
- 29 Walters, A History, p.32; Cecil, A Great Experiment, pp.66-67.
- 30 Diary entry - 8 January 1919, Cecil: B.M.Add.MSS.51131.
- 31 Cf. Articles 1-12, Phillimore Initial Report: F.O.600/1919; Articles 18-21, Smuts, "A Practical Suggestion"; in Miller, Drafting the Covenant, Vol. II, pp.53-59; and Chapter II. Cecil, "Draft Sketch": F.O.608/1639/1/1.
- 32 Diary entry - 9 January 1919, Cecil: B.M.Add.MSS.51131.
- 33 Memorandum on "Compulsory Arbitration" - 9 January 1919, Crowe: F.O.608/240/1607/1/1.
- 34 Seymour, House Papers, Vol. IV, p.297.
- 35 See diary entries - 9-31 January 1919, Cecil: B.M.Add.MSS.51131.
- 36 Diary entry - 9 January 1919, Cecil: Ibid.
- 37 Cf. "Draft Sketch of a League of Nations" - 14 January 1919, Cecil: Miller, Drafting the Covenant, Vol. II, pp.61-64; "League of Nations Draft Convention" - 16 January 1919, Cecil: Ibid., pp.106-116.
- 38 Diary entry - 19 January 1919, Cecil: B.M.Add.MSS.51131.
- 39 Miller, Drafting the Covenant, Vol. I, pp.54-55.
- 40 Seymour, House Papers, Vol. IV, p.308.

- 41 Curry, "Wilson, Smuts, and Versailles", pp.968-969.
- 42 Diary entries - 13 and 19 January 1919; Cecil: B.M.Add. MSS.51131.
- 43 "Draft Convention for a League of Nations" - 20 January 1919, Cecil: F.D.608/1641/1/2; and "Draft Covenant" - 20 January 1919, Wilson: in Baker, Wilson and World Settlement, Vol. III, pp.117-129
- 44 Diary entry - 19 January 1919, Cecil: B.M.A. MSS.51131
- 45 Miller, Drafting the Covenant, Vol.I, pp.40-79.
- 46 "Draft Covenant" - 2 February 1919, Hurst and Miller: Ibid., Vol.II, pp.231-237.
- 47 Cf. Ibid., Vol.I, pp.52-54; and, diary entry - 21 January 1919; Cecil: B.M.Add.MSS.51131.
- 48 See Seymour, House Papers, Vol.IV, p.288; and Miller, Drafting the Covenant, Vol.I, p.54.
- 49 "Draft Covenant" - 27 January 1919, Hurst and Miller: Ibid., Vol.II, pp.131-141.
- 50 See Hankey, The Supreme Control, pp.32-41; Hancock, Smuts, Vol.I, pp.496-497; and F.S. Northedge, The Troubled Giant. Britain Among the Great Powers 1916-1939 (London, 1966), p.116. For a specific study, see G.P. de T. Glazebrook, Canada at the Peace Conference (Toronto, 1942).
- 51 Diary entry - 13 January 1919, Cecil: B.M.Add.MSS.51131.
- 52 Ibid.
- 53 Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations. A Personal Narrative (Boston and New York, 1921), p.89.
- 54 Miller, Drafting the Covenant, Vol.I, p.53.
- 55 Diary entry - 4 February 1919, Cecil: B.M.Add.MSS.51131.
- 56 Diary entry - 5 February 1919, Cecil: Ibid.
- 57 "Observations . . . on the Proposed League" - 16 January 1918 (G.T.3344: Cab.24/39).
- 58 Note - 20 January 1919, Cecil: Miller, Drafting the Covenant, Vol.II, pp.114-115.
- 59 Report - 27 January 1919, Miller: Ibid., Vol.I, pp.56-57.

60. "Notes on a Permanent Court" - n.d., Cecil: Ibid., pp.63-64.
61. Baker, Wilson and World Settlement, Vol.I, pp.9-10.
62. Hancock, Smuts, Vol.I, p.507.
63. W.M. Louis, "Great Britain and the African Peace Settlement of 1919" A.H.R. Vol.71 (1966), pp.875-892; W.R. Louis, "Australia and the German Colonies in the Pacific, 1914-1919" Journal of Modern History Vol.38 (1966), pp.407-421.
64. Arno J. Mayer, "Post-War Nationalisms 1918-1919" Past and Present No.34 (1966), pp.114-126.

65. René Albrecht-Carné, Italy at the Peace Conference (New York, 1938), pp.96-103; C.J. Lowe and F. Manzari, Italian Foreign Policy 1870-1940 (London, 1975), pp.164-169.

66. House's memo: are instructive on this point and contain many sources of valuable information; see memorandum - 27 January 1919, Wiseman; letter - 27 January 1919, House to Wilson; letter - 28 January 1919, House to Wilson; diary entries - 27-31 January 1919, House: Seymour, House Papers, Vol.IV, pp.294-300.

67. In addition to the Anglo-Americans: Bourgeois and Larnaude, the Dean of the Faculty of Law of Paris, represented France; Orlando and Scialoja, a senator with interest in foreign affairs, represented Italy; Baron Makino, a former Foreign minister and sitting member of the Emperor's Diplomatic Council, and Viscount Chinda, Ambassador to London, represented Japan; Hymans, the foreign minister, represented Belgium; Senor Passa, a former justice minister, represented Brazil; Wellington Koo, ambassador to London, sat for China; Senor Batala Reis represented Portugal; and Vesnitch, minister plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference, represented Serbia.

68. Minutes: Second Meeting of the Commission - 4 February 1919: Miller, Drafting the Covenant, Vol.II, p.256. The new Commission members were: Veniselos, president of the Council, representing Greece; Omowski, head of the National Committee, sitting for Poland; Kramer, the prime minister, representing Czechoslovakia; and Diamandy, minister plenipotentiary, representing Rumania. The effectiveness of the lesser Power members can be gauged by glancing at Cecil's memoirs, where he only notes Hymans and Veniselos as offering anything of consequence: Cecil, The Great Experiment, p.70.

69. This was not, of course, unique with the Commission. See Marston, The Peace Conference, pp.41, 63, 91, 178, 189-191.

70. "Report of the Swedish Commission on the League of Nations",

in letter - 19 February 1919, Curzon to Balfour; "report of the Danish Committee on the League of Nations", in letter - 27 February 1919, Curzon to Balfour: F.O.608/243/1646/1/1. Also see S.S. Jones, The Scandinavian States and the League of Nations (Princeton, 1938), pp.47-80.

71 Draft telegram - 15 March 1919, Cecil to H.M.G. representatives in neutral states [Chile, Columbia, Denmark, Holland, Norway, Paraguay, Persia, Salvador, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Venezuela, Argentina]: F.O.608/240/1614/4/2. Also see Minutes: Meetings with the Neutral Powers - 20-21 March 1919: Miller, Drafting the Covenant, Vol.II, pp.692-645.

72 Unofficial German probes were made by intermediaries of Commission members. See letter - 7 February 1919, George Lansbury [editor of the Daily Herald] to Cecil: F.O.608/241/1621/1/1.

73 Cecil, A Great Experiment, p.85.

74 Ibid., p.85.

75 See letter - 23 January 1919, Edwin Montagu (Indian Secretary) to Cecil; memorandum - n.d., Lord Sinha [parliamentary under-secretary, India Office]: F.O.608/241/1627/2/1.

76 Hancock, Smuts, Vol.I, pp.496-497.

77 Diary entry - 6 February 1919, House: Seymour, House Papers, Vol.IV, p.311.

78 Ibid., p.311.

79 Note on the Second Meeting of the Commission - 4 February 1919, Shepardson [member of the American delegation]: Miller, Drafting the Covenant, Vol.I, p.146.

80 "Draft adopted by the French Ministerial Commission for the League of Nations": Annex 2 of Minutes: First Meeting of the Commission - 3 February 1919: Ibid.; and "Draft Scheme [Italian] for the Constitution of the Society of Nations": Annex 3 of Ibid., pp.246-255.

81 House and Cecil had met with the two delegations prior to the first Commission meeting: diary entry - 30 January 1919, House: Seymour, House Papers, Vol.IV, pp.298-299.

82 Diary entry - 4 February 1919, Cecil: B.M.Add.MSS.51131.

83 Minutes: Fourth Meeting of the Commission - 6 February 1919: Miller, Drafting the Covenant, Vol.II, p.264.

84 Minutes: Eighth Meeting of the Commission - 11 February 1919: Ibid., p.292.

- ⁸⁵Minutes: Tenth Meeting of the Commission - 13 February 1919: Ibid., pp.317-319.
- ⁸⁶Diary entry - 11 February 1919, Cecil: B.M.Add.MSS.51131.
- ⁸⁷Louis A.R. Yates, United States and French Security 1917-1921 [New York, 1957], pp.44-97.
- ⁸⁸Minutes: Sixth Meeting of the Commission - 8 February 1919: Miller, Drafting the Covenant, Vol.II, p.272.
- ⁸⁹Minutes: Council of Ten - 30 January 1919: Ibid., pp.194-203. Cf. Smuts, "A Practical Suggestion", Ibid., pp.27-37. See also Hancock, Smuts, Vol.I, p.501; Hankey, The Supreme Control, pp.61-63; diary entry - 29 January 1919, House: Seymour, House Papers, Vol.IV, p.298.
- ⁹⁰Minutes: Third Meeting of the Commission - 5 February 1919: Miller, Drafting the Covenant, Vol.II, p.260.
- ⁹¹For example, diary entry - 8 January 1919, Cecil: B.M. Add.MSS.51131.
- ⁹²Letter - 13 April 1919, Hankey to Cecil: Hankey, The Supreme Control, pp.104-105.
- ⁹³Letter - [probably] early April 1919, Curzon to Hankey: Roskill, Hankey, Vol.II, pp.65-66.
- ⁹⁴Walters, A History, p.75.
- ⁹⁵Paris and Tangiers were two places proposed by unofficial groups in letters to the British delegation; see F.O.608/241/1632/1/1.
- ⁹⁶See Cecil's "Draft Sketch" - 17 December 1918: F.O.608/1639/1/1; and Wilson's "Second Draft" - 10 January 1919: Baker, Wilson and World Settlement, Vol.III, pp.100-109.
- ⁹⁷Letter - 19 February 1919, Secretary-General of the Peace Conference to the British Delegation: F.O.608/241/1632/1/1.
- ⁹⁸Letter - 17 March 1919, Hymans to Balfour: Ibid.
- ⁹⁹Letter - 25 March 1919, Secretary-General of the Peace Conference to the British Delegation: Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁰Minutes: Thirteenth Meeting of the Commission - 25 March 1919: Miller, Drafting the Covenant, Vol.II, pp.354-355.
- ¹⁰¹Minutes: Tenth Meeting of the Commission - 13 February 1919: Ibid., pp. 321-322.

102. Memorandum on "A Permanent International Court" - 10 February 1919, Pollock: F.O.608/240/1607/1/1.

103. Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, p.103.

104. Minutes: Fourth Meeting of the Commission - 6 February 1919: Miller, Drafting the Covenant, Vol.II, pp.263-264.

105. Cecil, A Great Experiment, p.77.

106. Ibid., p.76.

107. Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, p.126.

108. Baker, Wilson and World Settlement, Vol.I, p.329.

109. Seymour, House Papers, Vol.IV, p.427.

110. Walters, A History, pp.31-32.

111. Ibid., pp.37-38.

5

Chapter Four.

¹ Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse. Its Twentieth-Century Reaction (New York, 1957), pp.30-31.

² Balfour's correspondence whilst he was foreign secretary is particularly rich in information submitted from unofficial sources: F.O.800/211. Some of the people who wrote him about what was occurring within the United States were: J.A. Baker, a businessman, the Bishop of Birmingham, James Bryce, the former ambassador, Frederick Dixon, the editor of The Christian Science Monitor, who met often with Wilson, and Theodore Marburg, the guiding light of the American League to Enforce Peace.

³ Although no figures for the number of despatches exist for the period just before and during the war, it is known that in 1898 the Foreign Office handled 102,000 despatches and by 1905 111,000 despatches. It has also been ascertained that the size of the Foreign Office staff did not grow proportionately to meet the demand of increased information flow. On the eve of the war, "the Foreign Office staff numbered 176 persons including some forty door-keepers, cleaners, and other staff." Zera Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (Cambridge, 1969), pp.3-4.

⁴ Stephen Gwynn, ed., The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice, Vol.I (London, 1930), pp.46-49.

⁵Alexander and Juliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House. A Personality Study (New York, 1964), pp.11-12.

⁶"But the mysterious way in which he moves makes everything a matter of divination rather than diplomacy It is impossible even for his closest associates to foretell what he will do, for even his most intimate advisers do not know what other advisers had access to him and his left hand knoweth not what his right hand doeth," Letter - 19 January 1917; Spring Rice to Balfour: Gwynn, Spring Rice, Vol.II, p.372.

⁷Ibid., p.215n.

⁸Letter - 20 May 1915, Spring Rice to Grey: Ibid., pp.268-271.

⁹Letter - 18 May 1917, Spring Rice to [?] Cecil: Ibid., p.400.

¹⁰Wiseman was a most important liaison between the White House and London during this time. He had the confidence of a great many American leaders and, after the war, resigned his post to pursue business interests in the United States. See A.C.Murray, At Close Quarters. A Sidelight on Anglo-American Diplomatic Relations (London, 1946), pp.1-12; and A. Willert, The Road to Safety. A Study in Anglo-American Relations (London, 1952), pp.15-94.

¹¹H. Montgomery Hyde, Lord Reading. The Life of Rufus Isaacs, First Marquess of Reading (New York, 1967), p.234.

¹²Letter - 16 January 1918, W.H. Page [United States Ambassador to London] to Wilson: Ibid., p.236.

¹³Seymour, House Papers, Vol.III: Into the World War, pp.118-119.

¹⁴Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, pp.8-14.

¹⁵Note - 28 July 1918, Reading: Montgomery hyde, Reading, p.294n.

¹⁶Telegram - 16 August 1918, Wiseman to Reading: F.O.800/225.

¹⁷"Draft" - July 1918, Wilson: Baker, Wilson and World Settlement, Vol.III, pp.68-93.

¹⁸Telegram - 7 April 1919, Reading to Balfour and Cecil [Paris]: F.O.800/223.

¹⁹Telegram - 9 March 1919, Reading to Lloyd George and Balfour [Paris]: Ibid.

20 For discussion of the origins of the "Round Robin", see Ralph Stone, The Irreconcilables. The Fight Against the League of Nations (Lexington, 1970), pp.70-71.

21 For example: telegram - 23 March 1919, Reading to Balfour [Paris]; telegram - 2 April 1919, Reading to Balfour [Paris]: F.O.800/223

22 Telegram - 9 March 1919, Reading to Lloyd George and Balfour [Paris]: Ibid.

23 Cf. George and George, Wilson and House, pp.204-208; Stone, The Irreconcilables, pp.34-36.

24 Telegram - 9 March 1919, Reading to Balfour and Cecil [Paris]: F.O.800/223.

25 Letter - 30 July 1919, House to Wilson: Seymour, House Papers, Vol.IV, pp.494-498.

26 Telegram - 16 August 1919, Lindsay [Embassy staff, Washington] to Curzon: F.O.800/158.

27 Telegram - 19 August 1919, Curzon to Lindsay: Ibid.

28 Telegram - 21 August 1919, Lindsay to Curzon: Ibid.

29 Letter - 30 July 1919, House to Wilson: Seymour, House Papers, Vol.IV, p.495.

30 Keith Robbins, Sir Edward Grey. A Biography of Lord Grey of Falloon (London, 1971), pp.351-352.

31 In reconstructing what occurred at this meeting, Curzon's instructions to Grey about the positions he was to assume on the three areas of contention is instructive; letter - 9 September 1919, Curzon to Grey: F.O.800/158.

32 Lloyd George and House had already settled Anglo-American naval questions, by agreement, the preceding November. See A.J. Marder, - From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol.V (London, 1970), pp.238-247.

33 See D.G. Boyce, "How to Settle the Irish Question: Lloyd George and Ireland 1916-21" in A.J.P. Taylor, Lloyd George: Twelve Essays (London, 1974).

34 Henry Cabot Lodge, The Senate and the League of Nations (New York, 1925), pp.165-177.

35 For the list of reservations, see Appendix III.

36 Fleming, The United States and the League, pp.205-208.

- 37 Ibid., pp.267, 297.
- 38 The Irreconcilables, pp.52-74.
- 39 For an interesting analysis of Wilson's illness, see George and George, House and Wilson, p.300.
- 40 Telegram - 4 October 1919, Grey to Curzon: F.O.800/158.
- 41 See John Chalmers Vinson, Referendum for Isolation. Defeat of Article Ten of the League of Nations Covenant (Athens, Georgia, 1961), pp.66-132.
- 42 Fleming, The United States and the League, p.494.
- 43 Suggestion - n.d., Wilson: Ibid., p.493.
- 44 George and George, Wilson and House, pp.292-293.
- 45 Leon E. Boothe, "A Fettered Envoy: Lord Grey's Mission to the United States, 1919-1920" Mid-America Vol.51 (1969), pp.73-94.
- 46 Telegram - 11 October 1919, Grey to Curzon: F.O.800/158.
- 47 Telegram - 24 October 1919, Curzon to Grey: Ibid.
- 48 Telegram - 6 November 1919, Grey to Curzon: Ibid.
- 49 Telegram - 24 October 1919, Curzon to Grey: Ibid.
- 50 Telegram - 18 November 1919, Curzon to Grey: Ibid.
- 51 Telegram - 14 November 1919, Grey to Curzon: Ibid.
- 52 See C.A. Riches, The Unanimity Rule and the League of Nations (Baltimore, 1933), pp. pp.1-36.
- Curzon received information on this from many sources, though most indicated that the Covenant would pass regardless; For example, see Letter - 26 November 1919, Murray of Elibank to Curzon: F.O.800/151.
- 54 Telegram - 7 November, Reading to Grey and Tyrnell [Grey's private secretary whilst in Washington]: F.O.800/158.
- 55 Telegram - 25 November 1919, Tyrnell to Wiseman: Ibid.
- 56 Telegram - 23 November 1919, Grey to Curzon: Ibid.
- 57 Letter - 25 November 1919, Kerr to Hurst: Ibid.
- 58 Both Hurst's memorandum and a telegram were despatched to

Grey to explain fully the British official position; see memorandum - 19 November 1919, Hurst: Ibid.; and letter - 27 November 1919, Hurst [is Curzon's name] to Grey: Ibid.

⁵⁹Telegram - 28 November 1919, Grey to Curzon: Ibid.

⁶⁰Telegram - 6 December 1919, Grey to Curzon: Ibid.

Chapter Five.

¹For example, Walters, A History, pp.72-74; and Ruth B. Henig, ed., The League of Nations (Edinburgh, 1973), pp.13-15.

²Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, Vol. II, pp.1411-1412.

³George and George, Wilson and House, pp.196-198, 208-209; Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, pp.101-102; Boothe, "A Fettered Envoy", pp.76-84.

⁴Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, Vol. II, p.1412.

⁵Yates, United States and French Security, pp.146-152.

⁶Letter - 11 December 1919, Grey to Curzon: F.O.800/158.

⁷Cabinet 14(19), Appendix I: Cab.23/18.

⁸René Albrecht-Carrié, The Meaning of the First World War (Englewood Cliffs, 1965), pp.128-129.

⁹Memorandum - 19 November 1919, Milner: Cabinet 10(19), Appendix: Cab.23/18.

¹⁰"Notes of a Conference" - 29 November 1919: Cabinet 10(19), Appendix: Cab.23/18.

¹¹CF. Articles 45-50, 100-108, 231-244: "Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany" [The Treaty of Versailles] - 28 June 1919: Cmd.454.

¹²Walters, A History, pp.89-91.

¹³Temperley, The Peace Conference, Vol. II: The Settlement with Germany, pp.277-280, 291-293.

¹⁴The Cabinet worried over the ability of the Allied armies to hold against the Germans if trouble should arise. The Cabinet was informed on 6 December 1919, the "Chief of the Imperial General Staff had reported from Paris to the Secretary of State

for War that the Allied Forces were not adequate to enforce a strong military policy". Cabinet 12 [19], Appendix VI: Cab.23/18.

¹⁵Temperley, The Peace Conference, Vol. IV, pp.137-138; Ibid., Vol.V, pp.136-143.

¹⁶The interest, though, of the Allies in binding themselves to the German disarmament programme is seen in Ibid., Vol.II, pp.136-140.

¹⁷Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, Vol.I, pp.619 et passim.

¹⁸Henry H. Winkler, "The Development of the League of Nations Idea in Great Britain, 1914-1919" J.M.H. Vol.20 (1948), pp.95-112.

¹⁹D.C. Watt, Personalities and Policies (London, 1965), p.242n.

²⁰Procès-Verbal of the First meeting of the Council: League of Nations Official Journal [hereafter L.N.O.J.] Vol.I (1920), pp.17-25.

²¹Manley O. Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice. A Treatise (New York, 1934), p.106. See, for example, letter - 14 June 1919, Drummond to Fodd [British Ambassador at Rome]: F.O.800/400.

²²"Biographical material on Jurists entrusted with preparation of a Permanent Court of International Justice" - February 1920, Drummond: L.N.O.J. Vol.I (1920), pp.71-72.

²³The members were: Mr. Adachi, Minister of Japan at Brussels; Senor Altamira, Professor of Law, the University of Madrid; Baron Descamps, Minister of State for Belgium; Mr. Fernandes, Brazilian delegate to the Peace Conference; Dr. Hagerup, former Prime Minister of Norway; Monsieur de Lapradelle, legal adviser to the French Foreign Office; Mr. Loder, judge of the Netherlands Supreme Court; Lord Phillimore, member of the Privy Council of Great Britain and former chairman of the Foreign Office Committee on the League of Nations; Senor Ricci-Susatti, legal adviser to the Italian Foreign Office; and, Mr. Root, the American Secretary of State.

²⁴The remainder of this paragraph borrows heavily from Hudson, A Treatise, pp.106-109.

²⁵"Report of the Committee of Jurists": L.N.O.J. Vol.I (1920), pp.319-320. The "Report" was made public in September 1920: "Draft Scheme for the Institution of the the Permanent Court of International Justice": L.N.O.J. Special Supplement No.2 (September 1920).

26 Article 9, Ibid.; and Articles 3-8 "Statute For the Permanent Court of International Justice": C. Howard-Ellis, The Origin, Structure and Working of the League of Nations (London, 1928), pp.50-53.

27 Extract of a report n.d., Balfour: Ibid., p.366n.

28 "Notice on a Permanent Court" - n.d, Cecil: Miller, Drafting the Covenant, Vol. I, pp.63-64; and memorandum on "Compulsory Arbitration" - January 1919, Crowe: F.Q.608/240/1607/1/1.

29 See Walters, A History, p.813; J.P. Fockema Andraea, An Introduction to International Law: The History of Legal Interpretation. The Jurisdiction of the First Permanent Court of International Justice (Leyden, 1948), pp.7-8.

30 C. Banks, The Prospects of International Adjudication (London, 1964); J.H.W. Verzijl, The Jurisprudence of the World Court. A Case by Case Commentary, Vol.I: The Permanent Court of International Justice [1922-1940] (Leyden, 1965).

31 Howard-Ellis, The Origin, pp.378-391; Hudson, A Treatise, pp.122-179.

32 This brief history owes much to James Barros, The Aaland Islands Question: Its Settlement by the League of Nations (New Haven, 1968), pp.1-101.

33 Ibid., pp.249-258.

34 "The Finnish Case": L.N.O.J. Special Supplement No.1 (August 1920), pp.3-14.

35 "The Swedish Case": Ibid., pp.1531.

36 Walters, A History, p.104.

37 L.N.O.J. Vol.I (1920), pp.246-249.

38 "Report on the International Committee of Jurists entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations with the task of giving an advisory opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands Question": L.N.O.J. Special Supplement No.3 (October 1920).

39 Barros, The Aaland Islands, pp.282-293.

40 Ibid., pp.300-319.

41 "The Aaland Islands Question; report submitted to the Council of the League of Nations" - 16 April 1921: quoted extensively in Ibid., pp.300-333.

42 See Appendix II.

⁴³Fleming, The United States and the League, pp.471-472.

⁴⁴Walters, A History, p.117.

⁴⁵Ibid., pp.117-118.

⁴⁶Ibid., p.118.

⁴⁷Cecil, A Great Experiment, pp.112-113.

⁴⁸Walters, A History, pp.118-119.

⁴⁹Ibid., p.118.

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APPENDIX I.

1. Lord Bryce's "Proposals For the Prevention of Future Wars":

[Phillimore listed the four main proposals.]

"Art. 17. Every signatory Power to agree not to declare war or begin hostilities or hostile preparations against any other signatory Power before the matter in dispute has been submitted to an arbitral tribunal, or to the Council, or within a period of twelve months after such submission; or, if the award of the arbitral tribunal or the report of the Council, as the case may be, has been published within that time, then not to declare war or begin hostilities or hostile preparations within a period of six months after the publication of such award or report.

Art. 18. The signatory Powers to agree that no signatory Power commencing hostilities against another, without first complying with the provisions of the preceding clauses, shall be entitled, by virtue of any now existing or future treaty of alliance or other engagement, to the military or other material support of any other signatory Power in such hostilities.

Art. 19. Every signatory Power to undertake that, in case any Power, declares war or begins hostilities or hostile preparations against a signatory Power, without first having submitted its case to an arbitral tribunal or to the Council of Conciliation, or before the expiration of the prescribed period of delay, it will forthwith in conjunction with the other signatory Powers take such concerted measures, economic and forcible, against the Power so acting as in their judgement are most effective and appropriate to the circumstances of the case.

Art. 20. The signatory Powers to undertake that, if any Power shall fail to accept and give effect to the recommendations contained in any report of the Council or in the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal, they will at a Conference to be forthwith summoned for the purpose consider [sic], in concert, the situation which has arisen by reason of such failure, and what collective action, if any, it is practicable to take in order to make such recommendations operative."

2. The British "League of Nations Society":

"1. That a Treaty shall be made as soon as possible whereby as many States as are willing shall form a League binding themselves to use peaceful methods for dealing with all disputes arising among them.

2. That such methods shall be as follows:-

(a) All disputes arising out of questions of International Law, or the interpretation of Treaties, shall be referred to the Court of Arbitration, or some other judicial tribunal, whose decisions shall be final and shall be carried into effect by the parties concerned.

(b) All other disputes shall be referred to and investigated and reported upon by a Council of Inquiry and Conciliation; the Council to be representative of the States which form the League.

3. That the States which are members of the League shall unite in any action necessary for ensuring that every member shall abide by the terms of the Treaty; and in particular shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility against another, before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing Articles.

4. That the States which are members of the League shall make provision for mutual defence, diplomatic, economic, or military, in the event of any of them being attacked by a State not a member of the League which refuses to submit the case to an appropriate Tribunal or Council.

5. That conferences between the members of the League shall be held from time to time to consider international matters of general character and to formulate and codify International Law, which, unless some member shall signify its dissent within a stated period, shall hereafter govern in the decisions of the Judicial Tribunal mentioned in Article 2(a).

6. That any civilised State desiring to join the League shall be admitted to membership."

3. The American "League to Enforce Peace":

"1. All justiciable questions arising between the signatory Powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject to the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and judgement, both upon the merits and upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question.

2. All other questions arising between the signatories and not settled by negotiation shall be submitted to a Council of Conciliation for hearing, consideration and recommendation.

3. The signatory Powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing.

4. Conferences between the signatory Powers shall be held from time to time to formulate and codify rules of international law, which, unless some signatory shall signify its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern in the decisions of the Judicial Tribunal mentioned in Article 1."

4. The Fabian Society:

"1. The obligation to refer all disputes and differences not settled by negotiation either to a tribunal or to a Conference.

2. The obligation in certain defined disputes and differences referred to a Conference, to accept and abide by the decision of the majority of the representatives.

3. The obligation to accept and abide by the judgement of a tribunal.

4. The obligation of a State to abide by every general rule of law and every decision made by a Conference and agreed to or ratified by that State.

5. "The obligation to abide by certain defined general rules of law made by a majority of the representatives in a Conference."

5. The Union of Democratic Control:

"1. No province shall be transferred from one Government to another, without the consent by plebiscite, or otherwise, of the population of such province.

2. No Treaty, Arrangement, or Undertaking shall be entered upon in the name of Great Britain without the sanction of Parliament. Adequate machinery for ensuring democratic control of foreign policy shall be created.

3. The Foreign Policy of Great Britain shall not be aimed at creating Alliances for the purpose of maintaining the Balance of Power, but shall be directed to concerted action between the Powers, and the setting up of an International Council whose deliberations and decisions shall be public, with such machinery for securing international agreement as shall be the guarantee of an abiding peace.

4. Great Britain shall propose as part of the Peace settlement a plan for the drastic reduction, by consent, of the armaments of all the belligerent Powers, and to facilitate that policy shall attempt to secure the general nationalisation of the manufacture of armaments, and the control of the export of armaments by one country to another.

5. The European conflict shall not be continued by economic war after the military operations have ceased. British policy shall be directed towards promoting commercial intercourse between all nations and the preservation and extension of the principle of the open door."

6. The Organisation Centrale pour une Paix Durable:

"1. No annexation or transfer of territory shall be made contrary to the interests of the population concerned. Where possible their consent shall be obtained by plebiscite or otherwise. The States shall guarantee to the various nationalities included in their boundaries equality before the law, religious liberty, and the free use of their native languages.

2. The States shall agree to introduce in their colonies, protectorates, and spheres of influence, liberty of commerce, or at least equal treatment for all nations.

3. The work of the Hague Conferences with a view to the peaceful organisation of the Society of Nations shall be developed. The Hague Conference shall be given a permanent organisation and meet at regular intervals. The States shall agree to submit all their disputes to peaceful settlement. For this purpose there shall be created, in addition to the existent Hague Court of Arbitration,

(a) a permanent Court of International Justice, (b) a permanent International Council of Investigation and Conciliation. The States shall bind themselves to take concerted action, diplomatic, economic or military, in case any state should resort to military measures instead of submitting the dispute to judicial decision or to the mediation of the Council of Investigation and Conciliation.

4. The States shall agree to reduce their armaments. In order to facilitate the reduction of naval armaments, the right of capture shall be abolished and the freedom of the seas assured.

5. Foreign policy shall be under the effective control of the parliaments of the respective nations. Secret treaties shall be void."

From the Rt. Hon. Lord Phillimore, "Recent Schemes of Federation", appended to the Final Report of the Committee on the League of Nations, pp.10-16: F.O.800/249.

APPENDIX II.

The heart of the League Covenant was its peace keeping articles: 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17. The peace keeping functions for any postwar diplomatic organisation were first outlined in the Phillimore Committee's Initial Report; adopted by Lloyd George's ministry as its official position on this matter, the Phillimore proposals were taken by each of the Anglo-American notables: Cecil, House, Smuts, and Wilson, in the preparation of their various drafts of the Covenant preceding the fashioning of the Hurst-Miller draft. Although each notable altered Phillimore's proposals slightly, their substance never really changed. Accordingly, the final draft of the Covenant contained the original British suggestions regarding peace keeping as codified by Phillimore in early 1918. The following comparison demonstrates:

League Covenant	Original Phillimore Antecedent
Article 11: (i)	Article 4
(ii)	Article 4
Article 12: (i)	Article 1
(ii)	Article 1
Article 13: (i)	Article 3
(ii)	Article 3
(iii)	Article 3
(iv)	Article 3

Article 15: [i]	Article 4
[ii]	Article 9
[iii]	Article 8
[iv]	Articles 8 and 11
[v]	Article 11
[vi]	Article 1(c)
[vii]	Article 11
[viii]	Article 3
[ix]	Article 4
[x]	Articles 1 and 8
Article 16: [i]	Article 2
[ii]	Article 2
[iii]	Article 2
[iv]	Article 2
Article 17: [i]	Articles 13 and 16
[ii]	Articles 13 and 16
[iii]	Articles 13 and 16
[iv]	Articles 13 and 16.

APPENDIX III.

The Lodge Reservations to the Treaty of Versailles:

1. Allied Acceptance: "The reservations adopted are hereby made a part and condition of this resolution of ratification, which ratification is not to take effect or bind the United States until the said reservations and understandings adopted by the Senate have been accepted by an exchange of notes as a part and a condition of this resolution of ratification by at least three of the four principal Allied and Associated Powers, to wit, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan."
2. Withdrawal: "The United States so understands and construes Article 1 that in case of notice of withdrawal from the league of nations, as provided in said article, the United States shall be the sole judge as to whether all its international obligations, and all its obligations under said covenant have been fulfilled, and a notice of withdrawal by the United States may be given by a concurrent resolution of the Congress of the United States."
3. Article 10: "The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any country or to interfere in controversies between nations - whether members of the League or not - under the provisions of Article 10, or to employ the military and naval forces of the United States under any article of the treaty for any purpose

unless in any particular case the Congress, which under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war or authorize the employment of the military or naval forces of the United States, shall by act or joint resolution so provide."

4. Mandates: "No mandate shall be accepted by the United States under Article 22, Part 1, or any other provision of the treaty of peace with Germany, except by action of the Congress of the United States."

5. Domestic Questions: "The United States reserves to itself exclusively the right to decide what questions are within its domestic jurisdiction and declares that all domestic and political questions relating wholly or in part to its internal affairs, including immigration, labor, coastwise traffic, the tariff, commerce, the suppression of traffic in women and children and in opium and other dangerous drugs, and all other domestic questions, are solely within the jurisdiction of the United States and are not under this treaty to be submitted in any way either to arbitration or to the consideration of the council or of the assembly of the league of nations, or any agency thereof, or to the decision or recommendation of any other power."

6. The Monroe Doctrine: "The United States will not submit to arbitration or to inquiry by the assembly or by the council of the league of nations, provided for in said treaty of peace, any questions which in the judgement of the United States depend upon or relate to its long-established policy, commonly known as the Monroe Doctrine; said Doctrine is to be interpreted by the United States alone and is hereby declared to be wholly outside the jurisdiction of said league of nations and entirely unaffected by any provision contained in said treaty with Germany."

7. Shantung: "The United States withholds its assent to Articles 156, 157, and 158, and reserves full liberty of action with respect to any controversy which may arise under said articles between the Republic of China and Empire of Japan."

8. Appointment of Representatives: "The Congress of the United States will provide by law for the appointment of the representatives of the United States in the assembly and the Council of the league of nations, and may in its discretion provide for the participation of the United States in any commission, committee, tribunal, court, council, or conference, or in the selection of any members thereof and for the appointment of members of said commissions, committees, tribunals, courts, councils, and conferences, or any other representatives under the treaty of peace, or in carrying out its provisions, and until such participation and appointment have been so provided for and the powers and duties of such representatives have been defined by law, no person shall represent the United States under either said league of nations or the treaty of peace with Germany or be authorized

to perform any act for or on behalf of the United States thereunder, and no citizen of the United States shall be selected or appointed as a member of said commissions, committees, tribunals, courts, councils, or conferences except with the approval of the United States."

9. Reparations Commission: "The United States understands that the reparation commission will regulate or interfere with exports from the United States to Germany, or from Germany to the United States, only when the United States by act or by joint resolution of Congress approves such regulation or interference."

10. Payment of Expenses: "The United States shall not be obligated to contribute to any expenses of the league of nations, or of the secretariat, or of any commission, or committee, or conference, or other agency, organized under the league of nations or under the treaty or for the purpose of carrying out the treaty provisions, unless and until an appropriation of funds available for such expenses shall have been made by the Congress of the United States."

11. Arms Limitation: "If the United States shall at any time adopt any plan for the limitation of armaments proposed by the council of the league of nations under the provisions of Article 8, it reserves the right to increase such armaments without the consent of the council whenever the United States is threatened with invasion or engaged in war."

12. The Boycott: "The United States reserves the right to permit in its discretion, the nationals of a covenant-breaking state, as defined in Article 16 of the covenant of the league of nations, residing within the United States or in countries other than that violating said Article 16, to continue their commercial, financial, and personal relations with the nationals of the United States."

13. Debts of Nationals: "Nothing in Articles 296, 297, or in any of the annexes thereto or in any other article, section, or annex of the treaty of peace with Germany shall, as against citizens of the United States, be taken to mean any confirmation, ratification, or approval of any act otherwise illegal or in contravention of the rights of citizens of the United States."

14. The International Labour Organisation: "The United States withhold its assent to Part XIII (Articles 387 to 427, inclusive) unless Congress by act or joint resolution shall hereafter make provision for representation in the organization established by said Part XIII, and in such event the participation of the United States will be governed and conditioned by the provisions of such act or joint resolution."

15. The British Dominion Votes: "The United States assumes no

obligation to be bound by any election, decision, report or finding of the council or assembly in which any member of the league and its self-governing dominions, colonies or parts of empire in the aggregate have cast more than one vote and assumes no obligation to be bound by any decision, report or finding of the council or assembly arising out of any dispute between the United States and any members of the League if such member, or any self-governing dominion, colony, empire or part of empire united with it politically has voted."

From Henry Cabot Lodge, The Senate and the League of Nations (New York, 1925), pp. 190-192.