

University of Alberta

Space Propaganda “For All Mankind”:
Soviet and American Responses to the Cold War, 1957-1977

by

Trevor Sean Rockwell

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

Department of History and Classics

© Trevor Sean Rockwell

Fall 2012

Edmonton, Alberta

Permission is hereby granted to the University of Alberta Libraries to reproduce single copies of this thesis and to lend or sell such copies for private, scholarly or scientific research purposes only. Where the thesis is converted to, or otherwise made available in digital form, the University of Alberta will advise potential users of the thesis of these terms.

The author reserves all other publication and other rights in association with the copyright in the thesis and, except as herein before provided, neither the thesis nor any substantial portion thereof may be printed or otherwise reproduced in any material form whatsoever without the author's prior written permission.

*For my father, Robert Rockwell, who taught me to reach for the satellites,
and my mother-in-law, Arlene Jenkins, who brought me to the University
of Alberta.*

Abstract

This study examines narratives about space exploration officially produced by government agencies of the Soviet Union and the United States between 1957 and 1977. It compares how space activities from the first Soviet Sputnik on October 4, 1957, to the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) in July 1975 were covered in two monthly magazines: the American-made Russian-language *Amerika Illiustrirovannoye* (*America Illustrated*, hereafter *Amerika*) and the Soviet-produced English-language *Soviet Life*. It seeks to understand how each country conveyed space exploration to each other, as well as why they chose to focus on certain key themes of peace, progress, and cooperation.

The main primary sources for this comparative analysis are the publications *Amerika* and *Soviet Life*. This study also considers the motivating context that shaped each publication. To assess the underlying motivations behind *Amerika* magazine's content, this study has relied upon the records of the United States Information Agency (USIA) held at the National Archives and Records Administration II in College Park, Maryland, as well as various volumes of documents from the State Department's *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) series. On the Soviet side, it analyzes various publications of the speeches and writings of the Soviet leadership to examine how Soviet officials' discourse treated the main themes of *Soviet Life*'s space propaganda.

Acknowledgments

Many people close to me have earned my profound appreciation for their abiding support and patience as this thesis was produced, but none have stood nearer nor deserve more gratitude than my wife Jennifer Jenkins and daughter Ella. Their love, understanding, and humour have weathered many storms, and been essential for me to finish what I started.

I would also like to thank my advisors Drs. Robert W. Smith and David R. Marples for their invaluable feedback, mentorship, and encouragement over the years. Robert also provided me with vital funding and experience working on a variety of research projects. I am especially grateful to Dr. Susan L. Smith, whose insightful critiques and compliments of early drafts made this thesis immeasurably better than it would have otherwise been.

Thanks are also due to the other members of my defense committee—Drs. Bruce Hevly and Greg Anderson—for their thoughtful and perceptive responses to my work. Dr. Michael J. Neufeld at the Smithsonian NASM and Stephen J. Garber at NASA also provided stimulating comments on an article drawn from this study. I am also grateful to the friendship, mentorship and employment experiences provided by Dr. Sarah Carter, Dr. Alvin Finkel, Peter Fortna, and others at the Department of History and Classics at the University of Alberta. I would especially like to thank the hard-working staff in the Department's office. I am similarly indebted to my colleagues in the Logistics Department at the Canadian Blood Services for their vital support, encouragement, and friendship.

Finally, I have not yet paid my debt of gratitude to my undergraduate Soviet history professor and MA advisor Dr. Serhy Yekelchuk whose passion for history led me further down this path and remains an inspiration.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

INTRODUCTION

- | | |
|---|----|
| 1. "The Biggest Story Told in Modern Times": Why Space Propaganda? | 1 |
| 2. "Polite Propaganda": <i>Amerika</i> and <i>Soviet Life</i> Magazines | 30 |

SECTION I: "FOR ALL MANKIND": PEACE

- | | |
|--|-----|
| 3. "To Expose the [Soviet] 'Peaceful Coexistence' Slogan as a Barren Promise":
Depicting the Peaceful Exploration of Space in <i>Amerika</i> | 69 |
| 4. "Forward to New Victories in the Name of Peace, Progress and the Happiness
of Mankind!": Depicting the Peaceful Exploration of Space in <i>Soviet Life</i> | 109 |

SECTION II: SMALL STEPS AND GIANT LEAPS: PROGRESS

- | | |
|--|-----|
| 5. "Please be informed there is a Santa Claus": American Scientific and
Technological Progress in <i>Amerika</i> | 138 |
| 6. "The story of the Soviet spaceships is one of continuous precipitate motion":
Soviet Scientific and Technological Progress in <i>Soviet Life</i> | 171 |
| 7. "Like sea creatures in a tide pool": The Past and the Future in <i>Amerika</i> | 206 |
| 8. "The boldest inhabitants of the sea": The Past and the Future in <i>Soviet Life</i> | 234 |

SECTION III: SHAKING HANDS IN SPACE: COOPERATION

- | | |
|---|-----|
| 9. "Soviet signals go the same way, only in the opposite direction": Space
Cooperation in <i>Amerika</i> | 268 |
| 10. "We regard each other as members of one crew": Space Cooperation in <i>Soviet
Life</i> | 304 |

CONCLUSION

- | | |
|---|-----|
| 11. Conclusion: Why Space Propaganda? To Lead "All Mankind" | 336 |
|---|-----|

- | | |
|--------------|-----|
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 354 |
|--------------|-----|

List of Illustrations

3-1: A symbol of American freedom to worship: Gordon Cooper in a Christ-like pose.	85
3-2: Robert McCall's illustrations often provided symbols of American freedom to worship.	87
3-3: Highlighting American openness. Cut-away illustrations were typical in <i>Amerika Illiustrirovannoye.</i>	91
3-4: Displaying American openness: spectators at Virgil Grissom's July 21, 1961 launch.	94
3-5: Pat Collins in a pose symbolizing American openness: such images of open mouths were very common.	96
3-6: The open mouths of American astronauts Edward White and James McDivitt.	97
4-1: Depicting worldwide interest in space exploration: Soviet children examine a globe.	129
4-2: Depicting worldwide enthusiasm for Soviet space exploration: a radio Ham operator tracks the sputniks.	131
4-3: A Soviet press conference for the Apollo Soyuz Test Project.	133
5-1: Showcasing American industrial development while highlighting the openness of its space program: the Saturn V launch platform.	148
5-2: Humanity uniting around a symbol of openness and material abundance: John Glenn's orbital flight being covered on a television screen in Grand Central Station.	160
5-3: Depicting American abundance: Soviet cosmonaut Georgi Beregovoi barbecuing steaks in San Diego.	162
5-4: American abundance on display: the large bold-faced text accompanying this image said "Space Food."	164
5-5: American affluence on display at a banquet honoring the Apollo 11 astronauts.	166
5-6: American affluence on display in Pat Collins' living room.	167
5-7: An aerial photo of an American yard used to show the fidelity of American photographs of the Moon.	168
6-1: Using space exploration to symbolize Soviet progress.	174
6-2: A photograph of the statue "To the Cosmos" and the text: "Soviet Science and Scientists: a look at the problems, research and prospects."	177

6-3: Visualizing Soviet technological progress: A view inside the Russian Mission	
Control Center used for ASTP.	189
6-4: Using space to depict the broad scientific base within Soviet society and associate	
Soviet culture with science: An amateur orchestra performs on “one of the	
Huge parabolic antennas” of the “research ship Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin.”	191
7-1: America’s ambitious future in space: Robert McCall’s “Moon Base.”	215
7-2: Future progress in American space exploration: Robert McCall’s “On Board the	
Orbiting Station.”	216
7-3: Future progress in American space exploration: Robert McCall’s “Skylab: Heavenly	
Laboratory.”	227
7-4: Future progress in American space exploration: A Robert McCall illustration	
depicting an American space station and other spacecraft in Earth orbit.	231
8-1: Using space images to depict the “flowering of progress” in the Soviet Union.	243
8-2: Depicting the Soviet future of progress and space exploration.	248
8-3: A typically highly stylized depiction of future Soviet interplanetary travel. Drawing	
by Robert Abotinas.	251
8-4: A stylized depiction of Soviet spaceships that also associated spaceflight with youth.	252
8-5: Associating the Soviet future (and youth) with spaceflight. The text in the top right	
corner says “Public Schools.”	253
8-6: Future progress in Soviet space exploration. “The Year 2000 Artists’ View,” on the	
April 1975 front cover.	254
8-7: The ambitious future of Soviet spaceflight: Close-up of a two-page photo spread	
showing a model from the Soviet EXPO-67 pavilion depicting an “earth	
travelers” view of a Soviet rocket on the surface of Venus.	258
9-1: Soviet cosmonaut Alexei Leonov at Disneyworld.	300
9-2: American astronaut Walter Cunningham at Disneyland.	301
10-1: Using the interpersonal relations of the ASTP astronauts and cosmonauts to depict	
Soviet progress, openness, and material abundance.	323
10-2: Introducing the American astronauts (and readers) to the noble suffering and	

human touch of the Soviet people, while using the interpersonal relations of ASTP astronauts and cosmonauts to depict “friendly relations” between the American and Soviet people.	325
10-3: Depicting “compatibility issues”: Thomas Stafford and Alexei Yeliseyev examine the ASTP docking mechanism.	331
11-1: A photo of Soviet cosmonauts (l. to r.) Valeri Bykovsky, Yuri Gagarin, and Gherman Titov reading <i>Amerika</i> ’s Kennedy memorial issue appeared in the October 1965 edition.	343

1. “THE BIGGEST STORY TOLD IN MODERN TIMES”: Why Space Propaganda?

The early space race was, amongst other things, a discursive battle over entitlement to represent universal Man in the biggest story told in modern times. Who was going to be the script writer and the protagonist of the master narrative of mankind’s cosmic exodus?¹

This study examines narratives about space exploration officially produced by government agencies of the Soviet Union and the United States between 1957 and 1977, the first two decades of the space age. It compares how space activities from the first Soviet Sputnik on October 4, 1957, to the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) in July 1975 were covered in two monthly magazines: the American-made Russian-language *Amerika Illiustrirovannoye* (*America Illustrated*, hereafter *Amerika*) and the Soviet-produced English-language *Soviet Life*.² It seeks to understand how each country conveyed space exploration to each other, as well as why they chose to focus on certain key themes of peace, progress, and cooperation. As such, this study is the first scholarly comparison of the two magazines, and perhaps the most in-depth analysis of the thematic content of the propaganda that the United States and the Soviet Union directed at each other’s publics during the Cold War. It also offers one of the only examinations of Soviet foreign propaganda of the post-Stalin period.

¹ Asif A. Siddiqi, “American Space History: Legacies, Questions, and Opportunities for Future Research,” in *Critical Issues in the History of Spaceflight*, ed. Steven J. Dick and Roger D. Launius, The NASA history series (Washington, DC: NASA, Office of External Relations, History Division, 2006), 462-463, 475-476; Mette Marie Bryld and Nina Lykke, *Cosmodolphins: Feminist Cultural Studies of Technology, Animals and the Sacred* (London: Zed Books, 2000).

² The Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) was known in the Russian context as *Ekspérimentalnyi polёт Soyuz-Apollon* (ESAP). For simplicity’s sake, this study refers to the mission by its English acronym ASTP.

This introductory chapter surveys the historiography on Soviet and American propaganda during the Cold War, and on the history of space exploration, and demonstrates how this research investigates the intersection of these two fields. Finally, it outlines the organization of what follows, describing how each section engages with the existing historiography.

It is first of all necessary to address this study's use of the term "propaganda," especially since the word carries completely different nuances in its Soviet and American usages. The term "propaganda" originated with the Vatican's creation in 1622 of the *Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide* (Sacred Congregation for Propagation of the Faith), a missionary arm set up to counter the appeal of Protestantism. During World War I, Western governments gave the term a pejorative connotation by using it to describe the information disseminated by their enemies. As Edward Bernays noted in 1928, they made it a "dirty word." A self-proclaimed propagandist, Bernays tried to salvage the term from its negative undertones in the 1920s, but failed to do so. Practitioners in the English-speaking world instead adopted Bernays' term "public relations" or Walter Lippmann's "manufacturing consent" to describe their efforts at influencing public opinion.³ Meanwhile, Soviet Communists considered propaganda a noble duty, and positively regarded its immense power to shape society.⁴

Definitions of "propaganda" have typically focused on its reliance on symbols, and its power to manipulate.⁵ In describing the material in the two

³ Edward Bernays, *Propaganda* (New York, NY: Ig Publishing, 2005), 13; Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922), 248.

⁴ Antony Buzek, *How the Communist Press Works* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), 28.

⁵ Harold Lasswell explained, for instance, that "[p]ropaganda relies on symbols to attain its end; the manipulating of collective attitude." See, for example, Harold Lasswell, "Propaganda," in E.R.A.

magazines as “propaganda,” this study recognizes that (despite American officials’ dislike of the term to describe the “information” activities of its government agencies) both publications relied on symbols, and were intended to manipulate foreign audiences. Like the Soviet Union, the United States created and disseminated propaganda; it only did so under different names. In using the term “propaganda,” this study neither employs it pejoratively, nor accepts its statements unquestioningly. It rather calls attention to the need for more critical examinations of the narratives and symbols manufactured by states.

The main primary sources for this comparative analysis are the publications *Amerika* and *Soviet Life*. A close reading of approximately twenty years of the two publications has yielded considerable insight into how the two governments viewed spaceflight’s meaning. This study also considers the motivating context that shaped each publication. To assess the underlying motivations behind *Amerika* magazine’s content, this study has relied upon the records of the United States Information Agency (USIA) held at the National Archives and Records Administration II in College Park, Maryland, as well as various volumes of documents from the State Department’s *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* series.⁶ On the Soviet side, it analyzes various publications of the speeches and writings of the Soviet leadership to

Seligman (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Social Sciences* (Chicago, IL: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1933), 12: 521; Harwood Childs, *Introduction to Public Opinion* (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1940), 86. In his study of Soviet propaganda Baruch Hazan similarly defined the term as “the preconceived, systematic and centrally coordinated process of manipulating symbols, aimed at promoting uniform behavior of large social groups, a behavior congruent with the specific interests and ends of the propagandist.” Baruch A. Hazan, *Soviet Propaganda*, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1976), 12, 29.

⁶ United States. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, various volumes (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987-2006).

examine how Soviet officials' discourse treated the main themes of *Soviet Life's* space propaganda.⁷

Although the documentary evidence examined here provides a far clearer picture of American motivations, it is still important to study the two magazines comparatively. After all, their publication took place within a carefully managed Soviet-American exchange of publications. In a very real sense, the two monthlies constituted a dialogue between the two countries—one that would be impossible to comprehend without hearing both sides of the conversation. A comparative framework provides the necessary context for understanding the American periodical by contrasting it with its Soviet counterpart.

Space Exploration as Propaganda

Encouraged by the sensationalism of the American media, a wave of self-criticism engulfed the United States following Sputnik 1. In the wide debate that ensued, it was often argued that the Soviets had humbled the United States with a major propaganda victory.⁸ In the late 1950s, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his administration attempted to downplay the significance of the Soviet success but their messages often contradicted one another regarding the gravity and extent of the consequences that Sputnik implied. Eisenhower's concern that the Soviets would build on Sputnik to achieve a series of "firsts" in space led him to urge his subordinates to follow his lead in exercising restraint when speaking publicly on

⁷ For example: Vladimir I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, trans. Julius Katzer, 4th ed. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965); Nikita S. Khrushchev, "On Peaceful Coexistence," *Foreign Affairs* 38, no. 1 (October 1959): 1-18; Leonid I. Brezhnev, *Selected Speeches and Writings on Foreign Affairs* (New York, NY: Pergamon Press, 1978).

⁸ McDougall, Walter A. "Sputnik, the Space Race and the Cold War." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 41, no. 5 (1985), 22; Sheehan, Michael J. *The International Politics of Space*. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), 26.

space issues. In spite of this, Eisenhower simultaneously supported—and exploited—American propaganda stunts in space, such as Pioneer I and Project Score.⁹ Eisenhower also took the stance that the American space program had “never been conducted as a race with other nations.”¹⁰ Disliking the idea of a space race, he worried that American space policy would be harmed by attempting to react to Soviet initiatives, rather than develop under its own enterprises.¹¹ His space policies specifically downplayed any notion of a space “race” with the Soviet Union.¹² He also kept secret the decision to grant “highest priority” to Project Mercury, the American effort to achieve a manned spaceflight before the USSR.¹³

International prestige was the central motivation for the American decision to pursue a Moon race with the Soviet Union. President John F. Kennedy acknowledged to Jerome Weisner that this was the reason he called for the Apollo program.¹⁴ Kennedy’s 1961 commitment to the manned Moon program did not commit the United States to NASA’s full long-term vision, only to the most dramatic

⁹ Pioneer I was a (failed) multi-million dollar attempt in October 1958 to orbit a television camera around the moon in order to transmit images of the opposite side of the Moon back to Earth. Project Score, launched on December 18, 1958, scored an American space first: the world’s first communications satellite, which beamed back to Earth a recording of Eisenhower conveying “to you and to all mankind America’s wish for peace on earth and good will toward men everywhere.” See also Osgood, Kenneth A. *Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad*. (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas, 2006), 350-352, fn. 56-59 p. 454.

¹⁰ T. Trux, *The Space Race* (London: New English Library, 1987), 14; Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 27.

¹¹ Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 42; W. D. Kay, *Defining NASA: The Historical Debate over the Agency’s Mission* (Albany, NY: University of New York Press, 2006), 57.

¹² Pentagon policy, for example, made it official that the Department of Defense was to make no mention of a “race” nor even admit the existence of a military space program. Day, “Cover Stories and Hidden Agendas: Early American Space and National Security Policy,” 162.

¹³ Osgood, *Total Cold War*, 351, fn. 58 p. 454.

¹⁴ Murray and Cox, *Apollo: The Race to the Moon*, 83; Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 49. A May 1961 joint report by NASA and the Department of Defense similarly concluded that the prestige factor alone justified the expense and effort involved in a manned lunar mission, even though the “scientific, commercial or military value” would be “marginal or economically unjustified.” Kay, *Defining NASA: The Historical Debate over the Agency’s Mission*, 75; Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 49.

aspect of it and the one with the most political propaganda benefits to be gained.¹⁵ Placing priority on the high-prestige Apollo program had a detrimental effect on the development of a balanced space program in the United States. Many useful missions in near-Earth orbit and many aspects of NASA's long-range plans were neglected in the rush to the Moon because they were of less propaganda value.¹⁶ Space technologies developed under the Apollo program were narrowly lunar-focused and proved a challenge to adapt to other uses once the Moon race was over.¹⁷

In a similar way, the Soviet focus on the propaganda benefits of space exploration meant that its space program failed to develop a cohesive long-term strategy for developing the next generation of space technology, and ironically contributed to the Soviet failure to be the first to put a man on the Moon.¹⁸ According to Asif Siddiqi, the Soviet leadership never gave the space program high priority. Space exploration advocates within the design bureaus won approval for their projects only grudgingly. The Soviet leadership's main interest in space exploration, then, was to exploit the success of the program for political advantage, and to use the various missions "as propaganda vehicles ... for selling the virtues of the socialist system."¹⁹ The prestige gains won by the Soviet Union with its early

¹⁵ Peter Fairley, *Man on the Moon* (London: Mayflower Books, 1969), 75; Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 51.

¹⁶ A space station, for example, had been NASA's primary objective in 1961 but was not approved until the Reagan era 23 years later. Howard E. McCurdy, *The Space Station Decision: Incremental Politics and Technological Choice* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 12; Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 51.

¹⁷ John Logsdon, "Evaluating Apollo," *Space Policy* 5, no. 3 (August 1989): 190; Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 51.

¹⁸ Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 32-33; T.A. Heppenheimer, *Countdown: A History of Space Flight* (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1997), 203-239.

¹⁹ Siddiqi, *Sputnik and the Soviet Space Challenge*, 351; Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 34. For more on the Soviet political leaders turning the failures of the Soviet space program into propaganda successes, and using its successes to direct attention away from deficiencies in other areas, see Boris E. Chertok, *Rockets and People*, vol. 2 (Washington, DC: NASA, 2006), 229, 450.

space feats proved to be short-lived, as the U.S. accelerated its program and eventually achieved its own dramatic propaganda victory with Apollo 11.²⁰

In response to the American achievement, the Soviet Union claimed that it had never sought to land a man on the Moon. In later years, participants of the Soviet space program admitted, and then documents became declassified to support their allegations, that the USSR was indeed engaged in a race to the Moon.²¹ After Apollo 11, the Soviet Union abandoned its manned lunar program. Since the expense of such a mission was no longer justified by the meager propaganda benefits to be won from being the second nation to visit the Moon, the Soviet space program shifted its focus to developing manned space stations in near-Earth orbit.²²

Space exploration had a significant impact on the United States Information Agency (USIA) as it responded to the challenge imposed by Soviet propaganda about the USSR's early victories in space.²³ After Sputnik 1, USIA Director George V. Allen noted that space exploration had "become for many people the primary symbol of world leadership in all areas of science and technology."²⁴ In an attempt to improve funding, Allen warned Congress in January 1960 about the threat that Soviet space successes posed to U.S. prestige.²⁵ Earlier, Allen had similarly used the peril of the USSR's "greatest propaganda effort history has ever known" for the same

²⁰ Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 32-33; Johnson, *Soviet Military Strategy in Space*, 9.

²¹ Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 32; John Logsdon and A. Dupas, "Was the Race to the Moon Real?," *Scientific American* (June 1994): 17. See also: Heppenheimer, *Countdown: A History of Space Flight*, 237-238.

²² Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 34-35.

²³ As Theodore Streibert argued in an Agency Infoguide in April 1956, Soviet propaganda now "radiated a vast confidence ... even arrogance" due to a number of factors, not least of which was its "impressive technological advances achieved in recent years." "Circular Airgram From the United States Information Agency to All USIS Missions, April 11, 1956," *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. IX, 570-571.

²⁴ Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 21; Ralph E. Lapp, *Man and Space: the Next Decade* (New York, NY: Harper, 1961), 35.

²⁵ John W. Finney, "Congress Warned on Space Prestige," *The New York Times*, January 23, 1960, 1; Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 152-153.

purpose of loosening congressional purse strings.²⁶ The USIA thus raised the menace of Soviet propaganda and supremacy in space to justify its own appropriations.

USIA international public opinion surveys also played a powerful role in shaping American foreign policy, and in gauging American prestige vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, these consistently showed that the Soviet lead in space had swayed international opinions of the superpowers' scientific, technological, and military capabilities toward a perception of Soviet supremacy.²⁷

The first Soviet sputniks and early American launch failures prompted a general shift in the tone of USIA materials, which responded by emphasizing American technological achievements in other areas.²⁸ The successful January 31, 1958, launch of Explorer 1, a U.S. Army satellite that discovered the belt of radiation around the Earth—the Van Allen belt—gave USIA something to boast about, as did Vanguard 1's successful launch on March 17, 1958.²⁹ Alan Shepard's first manned American spaceflight on May 5, 1961, also provided USIA with a positive story to rally behind at a time when one was sorely needed after Yuri Gagarin's April 12, 1961, first manned Soviet orbit and the failed Bay of Pigs invasion from April 17 to

²⁶ In September 1958 he cited a "conservative estimate" that the Soviet Union spent a record \$500-700 million on propaganda directed at the non-communist world in 1957—a twenty percent increase over 1956 spending. Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 155.

²⁷ Typical in this regard were polls taken in August and October 1961, when USIA researchers found that 56% of British polled believed that the USSR was militarily the stronger nation and 78% believed that the Soviets were ahead in space exploration. Ibid., 205-206.

²⁸ The day after an American Vanguard rocket launch scheduled for December 4 was postponed at the last moment, George V. Allen and Allen Dulles pressed Eisenhower to keep future launches secret, to avoid further public humiliation by waiting until success was certain before publicizing them. The NSC examined the possibility of adopting such a policy, but eventually decided against it. On December 6, a Vanguard exploded, having achieved a vertical lift of only four feet. The Soviet U.N. delegation offered technical assistance to the U.S. under a program of aid to "backward nations." Over the next months, newsreels across the world displayed a series of American failures on the launch pad. One such newsreel shown in Toronto was greeted by cheering, an incident that prompted Allen to reduce the level of boastfulness in USIA output. Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 149-151.

²⁹ The USIA celebrated American space achievements with VOA reports, press feeds to the world's news services, documentary films, leaflets dropped from helicopters in developing regions, and exhibitions complete with full-scale models.

19, 1961. The USIA aggressively covered Shepard's flight and, in response to the secrecy surrounding Gagarin's flight a few weeks earlier, it sought to make the American space program appear as open as possible.³⁰ The pinnacle achievement of Apollo 11 came virtually at the height of the American debacle in Vietnam.³¹ American space achievements thus not only allowed the USIA to portray to global audiences the United States keeping pace with and eventually overtaking the USSR in space, they also provided vitally upbeat stories in a period brimming with tension surrounding American foreign policy.

The USIA Director's role in the National Security Council (NSC) in the late 1950s even gave the agency a voice in the formation of American space policy. The close correlation between space exploration and international prestige gave the USIA perspective added weight in NSC discussions about space. Just after the launch of Sputnik, at an NSC meeting on October 11, 1957, USIA Director Arthur Larson warned against the "tremendous" damage to American prestige, if the country continued to "lose repeatedly to the Russians" as it had with Sputnik. He urged that the United States must "accomplish some of the next great breakthroughs first" and suggested a manned space mission or "getting to the moon." Eisenhower agreed but wished to avoid trying anything at which the United States did not have an excellent

³⁰ USIA materials included substantial packages of background information; wireless communiqués of Shepard's personal account of the flight distributed to ninety posts in 83 countries; extensive multi-language VOA coverage; two documentary films—*Shadow of Infinity* and *The Astronaut Landing*; and the public display of Shepard's capsule at an International Air Show in Paris and an International Science Fair in Rome. Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 152, 183-184, 186, 198.

³¹ The lunar landing came less than three weeks after the first phase of troop withdrawals began on July 8, 1969, and just two and a half months after *The New York Times* broke the story on May 9, 1969, of the secret U.S. bombing of Cambodia earlier that year. William Beecher, "Raids in Cambodia By U.S. Unprotested," *The New York Times*, May 9, 1969, 1; Kenton J. Clymer, *The United States and Cambodia, 1969-2000: A Troubled Relationship* (London: Routledge, 2004).

chance of succeeding.³² A USIA Director in the immediate wake of Sputnik was thus the first to table the lunar landing idea to the NSC.

The agency's Director also became a key advocate for NASA's creation. In early 1958 George V. Allen presented the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) with a recommendation on "regaining the initiative" in space. Allen urged divorcing the American space program from any military connections and creating a new Space Agency that would focus on using space "for peaceful purposes."³³ The impetus for a "peaceful" space agency led ultimately to NASA's establishment on July 29, 1958.

The December 23, 1960 report of the Sprague Committee had a profound and lasting influence on USIA, and illustrated the intersection between space exploration, propaganda, and American prestige vis-à-vis the USSR.³⁴ The Sprague report urged a vast expansion of USIA's effort and resources as part of a broader system of "total diplomacy" in which American diplomats, scientists, soldiers, and others would be trained and coordinated to communicate positive messages about American foreign policies. It sought to counter the Soviet propaganda effort to use the Americans' "specific inferiority" in outer space to depict its alleged "general inferiority" in science and education. At the least, the President should press for funding bodies to consider how the psychological implications of scientific breakthroughs affected national security, and the United States should better "dramatize" American scientific achievements with improved information programs

³² Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 148.

³³ An emergency committee in the Senate, chaired by Lyndon Johnson, the American Rocket Society, and an inter-agency Rocket and Satellite Research Panel all voiced a similar idea about a civilian space agency at roughly the same time. Eisenhower supported such an idea by April 1958. Ibid., 152.

³⁴ Officially called the U.S. President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad this was commonly known as the Sprague Committee after its chair Mansfield D. Sprague. It first met on March 1, 1960, having been established by Eisenhower to revisit America's approach to propaganda in response to "changes in the international situation." George V. Allen represented the USIA at the committee's eighteen meetings between March and December 1960.

and personnel.³⁵ It considered various ideas for restoring American prestige and concluded that a manned mission to the Moon or Mars would best achieve that goal. The advent of space exploration, it argued, brought a new era of international relations requiring new strategies of diplomacy based in large part upon increased reliance on propaganda.³⁶ The influential Sprague report illustrated how American bureaucrats' support for waging Cold War through propaganda furthered their advocacy of space exploration.

Aware of the Soviet public's interest in space exploration, American officials likely viewed space as an effective theme for *Amerika* to reach its target audience: scientific and cultural leaders and youth.³⁷ The USIA consistently targeted its materials at community elites, including a "scientific ... leader group."³⁸ *Amerika* targeted not only intellectuals but also young "opinion leaders" whose access to foreign publications was likely very limited.³⁹ A July 1969 memorandum specifically described the target audience of *Amerika* as: "the youth, intellectuals, or

³⁵ It put forward the possibility that government funding for basic research and development "should be directly influenced by psychological considerations."

³⁶ Ibid., 179-180, 183-184, 186.

³⁷ Max Frankel, a *The New York Times* correspondent on a sojourn through Siberia in early 1959 to uncover "what kind of people the distant Russians are" noted that interest in space achievements was widespread. A "power engineer" working on a Siberian dam project wanted Frankel's prognosis of the American space effort: "Just how many sputniks have you launched and how many succeeded?" is one of the power engineer's first questions. He knows about the United States satellite over the North Pole and thinks that was quite an achievement." Max Frankel, "Siberians, Proud of Gains, Found Ignorant of West," *The New York Times*, April 29, 1959, 1, 14.

³⁸ An April 1, 1955 "Outline Plan of Operations for the U.S. Ideological Program" penned by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles noted that American propaganda activities should "be concerned primarily with the leader group in each country (political, educational, labor, scientific)." "Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions, April 1, 1955," *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. IX, 522-23. In March 1967, Leonard Marks similarly stressed that the Agency's "primary audiences should be leaders, present and potential." Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 278.

³⁹ In 1964, USIA Deputy Director Don Wilson described the target audience for *Amerika* as the eight to ten million "young Russians who are educated, intelligent and presumably have an interest in the outside world but no access to it." "Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Wilson) to the Director (Rowan), June 1, 1964," *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. XIV, 80-81.

informational and cultural leaders.”⁴⁰ Such concentration on leaders, intellectuals, and scientists helps to explain the prevalence of science and space themed propaganda in *Amerika*.

Historiography – Cold War Propaganda

There are to date few scholarly studies of space propaganda. Most of those that do exist—such as James L. Kauffman, *Selling Outer Space: Kennedy, the Media, and Funding for Project Apollo, 1961-1963*; Jack Lule, “Roots of the Space Race: Sputnik and the Language of U.S. News in 1957”; and Cheryl L. Marlin, “Space Race Propaganda: U.S. Coverage of the Soviet Sputniks in 1957”—narrowly focus on domestic American propaganda or the U.S. media.⁴¹ Perhaps the most prominent historian to recently examine space propaganda is Kenneth A. Osgood, who has published several articles on American propaganda during the Cold War, and argued extensively that there is a need for more scholarly analyses of this topic. He has also devoted one chapter of his recent monograph *Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* to examining American space propaganda. In this chapter, Osgood convincingly argues that the U.S. government’s public relations efforts to counter the crisis brought by Sputnik unduly influenced subsequent historiography of the American space program. He also maintains that psychological

⁴⁰ United States Information Agency, “Romanian Language Version of America Illustrated - Primary Factors in the Decision,” July 23, 1969, 2, RG 306, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Director's Subject Files 1968-1972, A1 42, Box 3, NARA II.

⁴¹ James L. Kauffman, *Selling Outer Space: Kennedy, the Media, and Funding for Project Apollo, 1961-1963* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1994); Jack Lule, “Roots of the space race: Sputnik and the language of U.S. news in 1957,” in *Journalism Quarterly*, 68 (Spring/Summer 1991): 76-86; Cheryl L. Marlin, “Space Race Propaganda: U.S. Coverage of the Soviet Sputniks in 1957,” in *Journalism Quarterly*, 64 (1987): 544-549.

considerations shaped U.S. space policy.⁴² Both arguments emphasize the need for historians to examine space-themed propaganda.

To Osgood, “Psychological warfare”—American officials’ 1950s terminology for foreign propaganda—“had become, in essence, a synonym for cold war.”⁴³ Still historians have only recently begun to investigate Cold War propaganda in any focused way. Conventional historical narratives of American foreign policy in the period have generally overlooked the importance of propaganda. This oversight must be corrected, according to Osgood, since propaganda was “not a peripheral but a central aspect of the Cold War.”⁴⁴ In recent years, studies of Cold War propaganda have become more numerous, pointing toward a considerable degree of agreement with Osgood’s claims. Several rigorously researched works on this subject have appeared since the late 1990s.⁴⁵ This recent interest in the topic has been encouraged by the end of the Cold War, which has brought to light more declassified documents pertaining to American propaganda activities, which were mainly covert operations.⁴⁶

Several scholars have recently published monographs and articles on American domestic propaganda, but there is little engagement with its thematic

⁴² Kenneth A. Osgood, “The Power of Symbols: Psychological Strategy and the Space Race,” in *Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battles at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006).

⁴³ The term ‘psychological warfare’ has largely fallen out of use in recent decades but in the early years of the Cold War, as Osgood has observed, the broad definition of psychological warfare could include, “any nonmilitary action taken to influence public opinion or to advance foreign policy interests. Covert operations, trade and economic aid, diplomacy, the threat of force, cultural and educational exchanges, and more traditional forms of propaganda were all seen as important instruments of psychological warfare.” Osgood, “Hearts and Minds: The Unconventional Cold War,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 4, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 85-86.

⁴⁴ Osgood, “Hearts and Minds,” 95.

⁴⁵ See, for example, Nancy Bernhard, *U.S. Television News and Cold War Propaganda, 1947-1960* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Arch Puddington, *Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2000).

⁴⁶ Research problems persist, however, because while examples of actual USIA propaganda materials are relatively easy to come by, documents related to the operation of the Agency are available only through Freedom of Information requests. For more on the availability of USIA materials, see Osgood, *Hearts and Minds*, 87.

content.⁴⁷ Still, the numerous titles produced in recent years reflect a growing interest among historians in Cold War American propaganda. Although a number of scholarly studies of American foreign propaganda have been published recently, most of these focus almost exclusively on radio propaganda.⁴⁸

Some scholars have investigated American Cold War foreign propaganda more broadly, but have taken a different approach than that offered by this study. Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War* is probably the finest overview of the subject.⁴⁹ It covers forty-four years of American Cold War propaganda operations but still manages to offer many fascinating details. Scott Lucas, *Freedom's War: The American Crusade Against the Soviet Union* is likewise excellent but here the focus is on the “state-private network” of government and private propagandists.⁵⁰ Among the authors of other important recent monographs in this field, only Osgood engages directly with the thematic content of American propaganda, as this dissertation will do.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Notable examples include: Craig Allen, *Eisenhower and the Mass Media: Peace, Prosperity, and Prime-Time TV* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1993); Nancy Bernhard, *U.S. Television News and Cold War Propaganda, 1947-1960* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Thomas P. Doherty, *Cold War, Cool Medium: Television, McCarthyism, and American Culture* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2003); Richard M. Fried, *The Russians Are Coming! The Russians Are Coming! Pageantry and Patriotism in Cold-War America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Shawn J. Parry-Giles, *The Rhetorical Presidency: Propaganda and the Cold War, 1945-1955* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002).

⁴⁸ See, for example, Alan L. Heil Jr., *Voice of America: A History* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2003); David F. Krugler, *The Voice of America and the Domestic Propaganda Battles, 1945-53* (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 2000); Michael Nelson, *War of the Black Heavens: The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997); Arch Puddington, *Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2000).

⁴⁹ Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

⁵⁰ Scott Lucas, *Freedom's War: The American Crusade Against the Soviet Union* (Washington Square, NY: New York University Press, 1999).

⁵¹ Other important studies of Cold War propaganda include, for instance: Peter Grose, *Operation Rollback: America's Secret War behind the Iron Curtain* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000); Gregory Mitrovich, *Undermining the Kremlin: America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1956* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battles at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006); Frances Stonor Saunders, *The*

Studies of USIA activities written in the 1950s and 1960s provide some useful information about American propaganda operations but—understandably—these works fail to place the developments within a broad historical context, and do not consider materials declassified since the end of the Cold War.⁵² In a more recent study, *Cool Words, Cold War: A New Look at USIA's Premises for Propaganda*, Leo Bogart uncritically celebrates the triumphs of the USIA's programs.⁵³ Two recent books highlight the growing awareness of the significant role played by the USIA in waging the Cold War. Wilson Paul Dizard Jr., *Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the U.S. Information Agency*, provides an insider's account of the Agency's history.⁵⁴ Nicholas J. Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989*, is an excellent and independent scholarly overview of the agency.⁵⁵ The broad scope of both of these books prevents any detailed analysis of the content of the USIA propaganda, however. No significant scholarly studies exist that examine the publication *Amerika*. By pursuing a thematically based study of space exploration, one of the most significant propaganda themes of the Cold War, this study makes a significant contribution to the scholarly literature on American foreign propaganda during the Cold War.

Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters (New York, NY: The New Press, 1999); Nancy Snow, *Persuaders-in-Chief: The Presidents and Propaganda That Shaped Modern America* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005); Nancy Snow, *Propaganda, Inc.: Selling America's Culture to the World* (New York, NY: Seven Stories Press, 2002).

⁵² Of these, the best are Robert E. Elder, *The Information Machine: The United States Information Agency and American Foreign Policy* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1968); Ronald I. Rubin, *The Objectives of the U.S. Information Agency: Controversies and Analysis* (New York, NY: Praeger, 1968); Thomas C. Sorensen, *The Word War: The Story of American Propaganda* (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1968).

⁵³ Leo Bogart, *Cool Words, Cold War: A New Look at USIA's Premises for Propaganda* (Lanham, MD: University Publishing Associates, 1995).

⁵⁴ Wilson Paul Dizard, Jr., *Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the U.S. Information Agency* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004).

⁵⁵ Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989*.

Scholarly studies of Soviet propaganda are also numerous. Several important studies of the function and operation of the Agitprop apparatus—the network of offices and agencies implementing the directions of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda—exist but these date from before the dissolution of the Soviet Union.⁵⁶ Many excellent scholarly analyses of Soviet propaganda have emerged in recent years but these focus almost exclusively on early Bolshevik and Stalin-era domestic propaganda.⁵⁷ A few recent studies take a thematic approach to examining Soviet propaganda and culture—Kevin J. McKenna, *All the Views Fit to Print: Changing Images of the U.S. in Pravda Political Cartoons, 1917–1991*; and Karen Petrone, *Life Has Become More Joyous Comrades! Celebrations in the Time of Stalin* are both excellent examples.⁵⁸ Two exceptional and thematically driven recent monographs examine Soviet aviation propaganda and culture—John McCannon, *Red Arctic: Polar Exploration and the Myth of the North in the Soviet Union, 1932-1939*; and Scott W. Palmer, *Dictatorship of the Air: Aviation Culture and the Fate of Modern Russia*.⁵⁹ These two books especially point to the importance of aviation, and by extension outer space exploration, for Soviet culture

⁵⁶ These include: Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Soviet Foreign Propaganda* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964); Buzek, *How the Communist Press Works*; Ebon, *The Soviet Propaganda Machine*; Baruch A. Hazan, *Soviet Impregnational Propaganda* (Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis, 1982).

⁵⁷ Victoria E. Bonnel, *Iconography of Power: Soviet Political Posters under Lenin and Stalin* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997); Jeffery Brooks, *Thank You Comrade Stalin: Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Sheila Fitzpatrick *The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); Peter Kenez, *The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917-1929* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Kenneth M. Platt, *Epic Revisionism: Russian History and Literature as Stalinist Propaganda* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006).

⁵⁸ Two excellent examples are Kevin J. McKenna, *All the Views Fit to Print: Changing Images of the U. S. in Pravda Political Cartoons, 1917 – 1991* (New York, NY: Peter Lang, 2001); Karen Petrone. *Life Has Become More Joyous Comrades! Celebrations in the Time of Stalin* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2000).

⁵⁹ John McCannon, *Red Arctic: Polar Exploration and the Myth of the North in the Soviet Union, 1932-1939* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998); Scott W. Palmer. *Dictatorship of the Air: Aviation Culture and the Fate of Modern Russia* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

and propaganda. The thematic approach of this dissertation draws its stimulus from studies such as these.

There are as yet no significant scholarly studies of Soviet space exploration propaganda, *Soviet Life* magazine, or Soviet foreign propaganda during the post-Stalin era. This study thus contributes to the field of Soviet studies by examining official propaganda during the Khrushchev and early Brezhnev eras, by analyzing a significant example of published Soviet propaganda on a thematic basis, and by investigating one of the most important topics for Soviet foreign propaganda during this time period: space exploration.

Historiography – Space Exploration

The history of space exploration is a broad field encompassing many scholarly works, as well as numerous popular titles for lay audiences. While much of the scholarly historiography on the subject focuses on technical aspects of spaceflight, since the 1980s several authors have addressed the political dimensions of space exploration.⁶⁰ Several collections of conference proceedings published since 1999 reveal how historians are increasingly examining the political implications of space exploration and beginning to address the intersections between space exploration,

⁶⁰ The best of these include Walter A. McDougall, *The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1985); Asif A. Siddiqi, *Sputnik and the Soviet Space Challenge* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2003); Asif A. Siddiqi, *The Soviet Space Race with Apollo* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2003). For an excellent overview of the historiography of space exploration, see Siddiqi, “American Space History: Legacies, Questions, and Opportunities for Future Research,” 433-480. The historiography of spaceflight in the Russian language is less attuned to examining its political, social, and cultural dimensions. Recent sources on space exploration in Russian include the encyclopedia: Iurii M. Baturin, ed. *Sovetskie i rossiiskie kosmonavty: 1960-2000* (Soviet and Russian cosmonauts: 1960-2000), (Moscow: Novosti kosmonavti, 2001). Other recent titles include Iurii M. Baturin, *Sovetskaia kosmicheskaia initsiativa v gosudarstvennykh dokumentakh, 1946-1964 gg.* (The Soviet space initiative in state documents, 1946-1964), (Moscow: RTSoft, 2008); Serge M. Belotserkovskii, *Pervyi kosmonavt: Istoriia zhizni i gibeli* (The first cosmonaut: the story of his life and death), (Lewiston, KY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000); Iurii Ustinov, *Bessmertie Gagarina* (Gagarin’s Immortality), (Moscow: Geroi Otechestva 2004).

society and culture.⁶¹ A number of other monographs and collections support the argument that a growing intersection of space history with cultural and social history has been underway.⁶²

Two historiographical trends in the field suggest that this study is timely. First, historians' increasing recognition of the significance of national prestige as a rationale for space exploration intensifies the need for scholars to analyze official propaganda about space exploration.⁶³ The major propaganda themes identified in this study are recurrent in the historiography of space exploration, and in the documentary evidence upon which that literature is grounded, suggesting that propaganda provides an important avenue for understanding the prestige rationale. Space exploration was strongly associated with peace, progress, and prestige (i.e. propaganda) from its outset. Eisenhower's insistence, for instance, that the American satellite contribution to the International Geophysical Year (IGY) be scientific "in order to emphasize its peaceful purposes" and to accrue "considerable prestige and

⁶¹ Important examples of this trend include Roger D. Launius, John M. Logsdon, and Robert W. Smith, *Reconsidering Sputnik* (London: Routledge, 2000); Steven J. Dick and Roger D. Launius, *Societal Impact of Spaceflight*, The NASA history series (Washington, DC: NASA, Office of External Relations, History Division, 2007); Steven J. Dick, ed., *Remembering the Space Age* (Washington, DC: NASA, 2008).

⁶² James T. Andrews and Asif A. Siddiqi, *Into the Cosmos: Space Exploration and Soviet Culture*, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011); Maurer, Eva, Julia Richers, Monica Rütters, and Carmen Scheide, eds. *Soviet Space Culture: Cosmic Enthusiasm in Socialist Societies*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011; Howard E. McCurdy, *Space and the American Imagination* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997); De Witt Douglas Kilgore, *Astrofuturism: Science, Race, and Visions of Utopia in Space* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003); Martin Parker and Bell, ed., *Space Travel and Culture: From Apollo to Space Tourism* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2009); Robert Poole, *Earthrise: How Man First Saw the Earth* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008).

⁶³ Roger D. Launius, "American Spaceflight History's Master Narrative and the Meaning of Memory," in *Remembering the Space Age*, ed. Steven J. Dick (Washington, DC: NASA, 2008), 392, 393, 400, 402; Roger D. Launius, "Compelling Rationales for Spaceflight? History and the Search for Relevance," in *Critical Issues in the History of Spaceflight*, ed. Steven J. Dick and Roger D. Launius, The NASA history series; (Washington, DC: NASA, Office of External Relations, History Division, 2006), 659.

psychological benefits” from it, pointed to the strong connections that existed between space exploration, scientific progress, peace, and propaganda.⁶⁴

Secondly, space historians have expressed growing concern for considering space “narratives” and their impact on—and interpretation by—broader society. According to Roger D. Launius, “[p]erhaps the reality of what happened does not matter all that much; the only thing that is truly important is the decision about its meaning.” Noting the “intensely personal” process of constructing those meanings, Launius nonetheless asks: “When will historians begin to explore the process whereby this has taken place and seek to document and understand its evolution?”⁶⁵ The manufacture and dissemination of official narratives of space exploration was a key component in the production of spaceflight’s meanings.

In 2006, Asif Siddiqi recommended a number of areas for future research by scholars working in the field of space history, including reexamining space history in the context of historiographical debates about the Cold War, and reconsidering the American space program “as an adjunct for the less savory dimensions of American foreign policy.” He suggested exploring the relationship between American space policy and foreign policy, and in particular assessing what role ideological motivations played among spaceflight’s advocates and critics. This study contributes to the field of space history by beginning to address these inquiries into spaceflight’s meanings.

Organization

⁶⁴ Roger D. Launius, “What are Turning Points in History, and What Were They for the Space Age?” in *Societal Impact of Spaceflight*, ed. Steven J. Dick and Roger D. Launius (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2007), 30-31.

⁶⁵ Launius, “American Spaceflight History’s Master Narrative and the Meaning of Memory.”

After Chapter 2 briefly introduces the two magazines by describing their context within a publications exchange between the two countries' governments, the remainder of this study is organized into three sections based around their most prominent themes: peace, progress, and cooperation. Within each section, individual chapters divide the narrative to examine *Amerika* and *Soviet Life* separately and to explore some key sub-themes.

Section I deals with how the magazines associated the peaceful exploration of space with Soviet and American political rhetoric and discourse about peace. It thus discusses the two magazines' contribution to a broader 'peace race' that played out between the two superpowers in the dual context of the nuclear age and the Cold War. The rhetoric of Soviet and American political leaders does not, however, give a complete picture of their complex political goals and strategies. This study treats their words in a propaganda context by examining the key themes that they projected and the ideals upon which these themes were based. Furthermore, the superpowers' foreign policy actions often ran contrary to their habitual rhetoric about their desire for strengthening international peace. As the political leaders—and space explorers—publicly projected a peaceful face for their nations, both sides clearly had blood on their hands. Even a partial list of the superpowers' military entanglements during the period would belie the peaceful claims of their propaganda.

Nonetheless, each superpower wished the world to perceive it as the global leader in the search for peace. Both countries shared and promoted the perception that their ideologies were diametrically opposed to one another leaving little leverage for peaceful agreement and precluding—in the worldviews they expressed—either sharing or allowing the other (or a third party) to claim the 'lead' in the peace race.

This race pitting the two superpowers against each other to be perceived as the global leader in the search for peace was a centerpiece of the propaganda battles of the Cold War. Soviet and American discourse about peace was often deeply sincere, and the peaceful message of space propaganda exceeded its role as a weapon in the Cold War. Especially in the nuclear age, peace was not simply an effective propaganda strategy employed by cynical world leaders to enhance their prestige with international public opinion. It was quite possibly the single most popular aspiration of humanity. The introduction of nuclear arms to the world's war making capacities made finding and maintaining peace the top priority of the leaders of nuclear nations.

Space exploration played a vital role in encouraging an atmosphere of peace, and helping to assuage fears of technology in the nuclear age. As an American comparison of the effects of Sputnik and Apollo 11 on world opinion noted soon after the lunar landing:

No doubt that everybody in the world knows the US has done [the lunar landing]: estimated 650 million saw it, another 500 million heard it as it happened. In this case there is warmth and emotion in the reaction- no fear or surprise, or even politics.⁶⁶

Such an observation attests to the effectiveness of the propaganda under examination here, for both sides worked hard to associate space exploration with peace.

Section I engages with scholarly literature on political rhetoric during the Cold War, including Ronald R. Nelson and Peter Schweizer, *The Soviet Concepts of*

⁶⁶ The fact that “[s]pace probes have military potential” was considered a “negligible” negative response to the Apollo landing. “Looking Back to the Post-Sputnik Months and Years of 1957,” n.d., RG 306, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Office of Policy and Plans/Program Coordination Staff, Subject Files 1966-1971, P12 Box 9, NARA II.

Peace, Peaceful Coexistence, and Détente, and the collections edited by Klaus Larres and Kenneth Osgood, *The Cold War After Stalin's Death: A Missed Opportunity for Peace?*, and Martin J. Medhurst, *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology*.⁶⁷ Osgood's *Total Cold War* and Frederick Barghoorn's *Soviet Foreign Propaganda* also deal extensively with the two countries' widespread use of peace as a theme for their international propaganda.⁶⁸

These chapters argue that both magazines reflected the political discourse from which they emerged and were meant to serve. In doing so, they both produced space propaganda permeated with their government's highly ideological conceptions of peace. They each portrayed humanity uniting to watch space exploration, employed universal terminology to suggest such unity, and strove to imply that their nation led the world in both the space and peace races. The emphasis on "all mankind" in these chapters reflects how space exploration narratives, as Asif Siddiqi has noted, make "an appeal to a global imagination."⁶⁹ The ideological differences between the two superpowers produced certain differences in how they linked space and peace, however. The Soviet Union depicted its main peace slogan, "peaceful coexistence," as the ideal basis for relations between nations, while the United States associated itself with "openness" to portray itself as the leader of the "Free World."

⁶⁷ Klaus Larres and Kenneth A. Osgood, eds., *The Cold War After Stalin's death: A Missed Opportunity for Peace?* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006); Martin J. Medhurst, *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1997).

⁶⁸ Osgood, *Total Cold War*; F. C. Barghoorn, *Soviet Foreign Propaganda* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964).

⁶⁹ He has described elsewhere how Chief Designer Korolev was compelled—by Khrushchev's interest in using space exploration to enhance Soviet power and prestige—to "justify his projects not only in terms of their military utility, but also their appeal to the imagination of the people of the world." Asif A. Siddiqi, "Spaceflight in the National Imagination," in *Remembering the Space Age*, ed. Steven J. Dick (Washington, DC: NASA, 2008), 34, 215.

For propaganda magazines mandated to accentuate the positive and improve international relations, peaceful exploration of the cosmos presented a compelling theme indeed. But it was difficult to find concrete proof that space exploration actually had this effect on international relations, especially in a world still fraught with conflict and tension between the two superpowers. The theme of progress, on the other hand, lent itself far better to space exploration's narrative of discovery and invention. Evidence of scientific and technological progress could readily be found in space activities in terms of new data, new tools, improved accuracy and methods of scientific instruments and tests, or improved performance of space launch systems. Notions of progress thus took the central place in both Soviet and American official narratives of space exploration. Neither side limited their narratives of progress to the scientific and technological spheres, however. Both used space exploration to identify their nation with human progress broadly defined.

Section II explores how both sides' propaganda emphasized those aspects of space exploration that best demonstrated their countries' achievement of—and contribution to—human progress. It shows how both magazines' propaganda presented an optimistic and comprehensive account of the social benefits of space exploration, and predicted an ambitious program of future exploration to suggest that their respective countries were leading human beings into a promising future. In so doing, it engages with numerous space historians who have recently addressed how space exploration narratives utilized ideas of progress. Roger Launius has identified an “overwhelmingly dominant narrative” of American space exploration in

the United States that is strongly associated with notions of progress.⁷⁰ As Asif Siddiqi, Linda Billings, and Taylor E. Dark III have all shown, the identification of space exploration with progress underpinned the arguments of space advocates in both the Soviet Union and the United States.⁷¹ Section II interacts with these scholars' work and argues that both countries' space propaganda absorbed the basic assumptions and rhetorical strategies of space advocates.

One key facet of space advocacy has been to justify space exploration for the many benefits that advocates perceived it would bring to global society. Furthermore, since its benefits are not as self-evident as those of other major technological systems of the 19th and 20th centuries, space exploration has consistently needed to be justified. Roger Launius has classified the five most prominent rationales for space exploration—survival of the species; national pride; national security; economic competitiveness; and scientific discovery—to which list Siddiqi has added a sixth: “benefits to the populace.”⁷² These justifications shifted in prominence according to the historical context. In the immediate post-Sputnik period, national prestige and security provided the primary rationale for both powers to explore space. Later, and in the U.S. especially after Apollo 11, when significant debate took place on the costs and benefits of continued space exploration, the main justifications for exploring the

⁷⁰ “It is a classic story of American history,” he writes, “in which a vision of progress, of moving from nothing to something dominates the story.” Launius, “American Spaceflight History’s Master Narrative and the Meaning of Memory,” 353, 355.

⁷¹ Asif A. Siddiqi, “Making Spaceflight Modern: A Cultural History of the World’s First Advocacy Group,” in *Societal Impact of Spaceflight*, ed. Steven J. Dick and Roger D. Launius (Washington, DC: NASA, 2007), 513-538; Linda Billings, “Overview: Ideology, Advocacy, and Spaceflight: Evolution of a Cultural Narrative,” in *Societal Impact of Spaceflight*, ed. Steven J. Dick and Roger D. Launius (Washington, DC: NASA, 2007), 483-500; Taylor E. Dark III, “Reclaiming the Future: Space Advocacy and the Idea of Progress,” in *Societal Impact of Spaceflight*, ed. Steven J. Dick and Roger D. Launius (Washington, DC: NASA, 2007), 555-572.

⁷² Launius, “Compelling Rationales for Spaceflight? History and the Search for Relevance”; Siddiqi, “Spaceflight in the National Imagination,” 27-28.

cosmos were scientific discovery, economic competitiveness, and survival of the human species. Section II argues that the two magazines emphasized the various benefits of space exploration to highlight their country's contributions to human progress.

Essential to the narrative of progress within Soviet and American space propaganda was the repeated statement that space exploration marked a “new era” in human history. Section II also explores how the two magazines exploited the “new era” motif. In so doing, it engages with several historians who have recently discussed how space narratives use “big history” or describe various space achievements as “turning points in history” in order to cast them as demonstrations of progress.⁷³ This study uncovers considerable evidence of such teleological thought about history and progress in both sides' space propaganda. Section II argues that the propaganda emphasis on proclaiming the arrival of a new era was meant to heighten the significance of space flight, and in turn raise the effectiveness of space propaganda. To demonstrate the new era's arrival, both Soviet and American propagandists depicted a future of continued ambitious exploration of space. The magazines rarely questioned that space exploration would continue apace and even accelerate; to consider otherwise would minimize the notion of an important new

⁷³ These include in particular: Roger Launius' examination of “turning points in history,” and J.R. McNeill's look at space narratives as “big history.” Launius, “What are Turning Points in History, and What Were They for the Space Age?”; J. R. McNeill, “Gigantic Follies? Human Exploration and the Space Age in Long-term Historical Perspective,” in *Remembering the Space Age*, ed. Steven J. Dick (Washington, DC: NASA, 2008), 3-16. Launius, in particular, warns: “Turning points most often signify a linear conception of history that rarely represents the reality of a complex, parallel, multicausal evolution of history.” He cites historian Richard P. Hallion's remark that the turning point notion “implies a teleological, linear, sequential ‘achievement of events’ leading inexorably in a certain direction, usually defined as progress.” Also see Walter McDougall's debate with himself over whether to describe man's entry into space as a “saltation.” McDougall, *The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age*; Walter A. McDougall, “Was Sputnik Really a Saltation?,” in *Reconsidering Sputnik*, ed. Roger D. Launius, John M. Logsdon, and Robert William Smith (London: Routledge, 2000).

era, and would diminish the effectiveness of space-themed propaganda and its powerful associations with national prestige.

Section II also examines how both magazines associated their achievements in space with the political progress of their respective nations. In so doing, it engages with tropes that Asif Siddiqi has identified were widely used in space narratives to associate spaceflight with national identity, such as the “myth of the founding father.” In this regard, *Soviet Life* gave special attention to Konstantin Tsiolkovsky and Sergei Korolev. Interestingly, although Siddiqi observed Von Braun’s central place in the American founding father myth, *Amerika* avoided this German-born rocket scientist and instead cast the American national Robert Goddard in a founding father role. Both magazines not only used founding father narratives to associate their respective nations with space and science, they also emphasized those aspects of these stories that were most suggestive of progress. For example, both magazines portrayed these founding fathers overcoming traumas in early life. Such struggles, as Siddiqi has observed, served as “metaphors for the uphill battles faced by the space programs themselves.”⁷⁴ Such narratives of trauma thus implied progress, and, as these chapters show, the metaphor extended beyond the individual and the space program to suggest that the nations themselves were on a forward and skyward trajectory.

Siddiqi has also explored how space exploration narratives identify spaceflight with national identity. This study engages with his work by discussing how the magazines sought to associate their space programs with their nations. To Siddiqi, American space narratives’ expressions of the frontier thesis—and its

⁷⁴ Siddiqi, “Spaceflight in the National Imagination,” 19.

associations with ingenuity, freedom, and exceptionalism—identified space exploration with the American national character. The motif of an “endless frontier” also implied continued and future progress by associating older notions of the American frontier with the boundless expanse of space.⁷⁵

Soviet space narratives, meanwhile, characterized space exploration as part of the fabric of Soviet national identity by finding deep origins in Soviet society for the urge to explore space. Soviet narratives commonly cited, for example, Tsiolkovsky’s writings, Marxist-Leninist utopian thinking, and the pre-Revolutionary Cosmism of Nikolai F. Fedorov as evidence that space exploration was a natural outgrowth of Russian and Soviet intellectual life.⁷⁶ Such arguments echoed what Siddiqi described as space narratives’ claims of “indigenous creation.” Siddiqi has also observed how space narratives’ emphasis on technological invention and innovation strongly implied progress, for they promoted:

pride in history, a consensus that the present is a moment to be celebrated, and a confidence in a brighter tomorrow.⁷⁷

As this study will show, celebrations of technological “triumphs,” nods to the broad base of industrial development that supported space achievements, and predictions of even greater successes to come, were basic elements of most space-themed articles in both *Amerika* and *Soviet Life* magazines. Section II examines how these themes

⁷⁵ Roger D. Launius, “Perfect Worlds, Perfect Societies: The Persistent Goal of Utopia in Human Spaceflight,” *Journal of the British Interplanetary Society*, no. 56 (October 2003): 338-349; Siddiqi, “Spaceflight in the National Imagination,” 25; Billings, “Overview: Ideology, Advocacy, and Spaceflight: Evolution of a Cultural Narrative,” 486-488.

⁷⁶ Asif A. Siddiqi, “The Rockets’ Red Glare: Technology, Conflict, and Terror in the Soviet Union,” *Technology and Culture* 44, no. 3 (July 2003): 470-501; Siddiqi, “Spaceflight in the National Imagination,” 25; James T. Andrews, “In Search of a Red Cosmos: Space Exploration, Public Culture, and Soviet Society,” in *Societal Impact of Spaceflight*, ed. Steven J. Dick and Roger D. Launius (Washington, DC: NASA, 2007), 41-52.

⁷⁷ Siddiqi, “Spaceflight in the National Imagination,” 20-21.

worked together to identify the Soviet Union and United States with the vanguard of human progress, and argues that they were essential for propagandists using space exploration to enhance national prestige.

Section III of this study examines how superpower dialogue on space cooperation evolved over the first two decades of space exploration and culminated with the “handshake in space” during the July 1975 Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP). In many ways, the course of space exploration paralleled a shift in superpower relationships from the late 1950s to the mid-1970s. The Nixon era’s emphasis on détente, multipolar geopolitics, and negotiation with the Soviet Union noticeably contrasted with the bipolar and adversarial views of earlier Presidents. Likewise, Soviet leaders’ speeches in the 1950s and 1960s frequently referred to economic, cultural, scientific, and technological competition with the United States, and gave propaganda a prominent role in this contest. Over time, “competition” gave way to a rhetorical emphasis on “cooperation” as the ideal of coexistence seemed, to Soviet leaders, to have become the basis of international relations. Likewise, an initial atmosphere of competition in space seemed to give way to one of cooperation, notably symbolized by the “handshake in space.” But the “spirit of cooperation” never fully replaced that of competition. Propaganda and space exploration together played a significant role both in superpower competition and in the gradual shift to greater—if mostly symbolic—cooperation.

Section III argues that the two magazines, both mandated to improve relations between the two countries, regularly presented the opportunity for space cooperation in positive terms, and thus promoted a shifting atmosphere. These chapters also argue that ASTP represented a propaganda victory for both sides. For

American officials, the mission revealed the Soviet Union following the lead of American “openness,” and for the Soviet leadership it provided a high-profile demonstration of Soviet “parity” with the United States in science and technology. Chapters 9 and 10 explore how the two magazines addressed space cooperation. They draw from scholarly historiography on space cooperation to put discussion of the magazines into a context of ongoing and developing dialogue on the subject between 1957 and 1975.⁷⁸

Chapter 11 summarizes the conclusions that can be drawn from this research, and explores the similarities and differences between Soviet and American space propaganda. Such an emphasis calls to mind an observation made by Soviet propaganda scholar David Wedgwood Benn in 1969: “The differences between American and Soviet propaganda—in regard to their scope, purpose and content—are too obvious to need pointing out.”⁷⁹ Though Benn addressed how Soviet propagandists recognized the necessity of learning from their American counterparts, he did not characterize Soviet and American propaganda as similar. The following study explores the converse of Benn’s observation by “pointing out” the less obvious similarities between Soviet and American propaganda. Mindful of the obvious differences, it nonetheless uncovers several themes that both sides’ propaganda shared.

⁷⁸ These include Michael J. Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space* (London ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2007); Matthew J. von Bencke, *The Politics of Space: A History of U.S.-Soviet/Russian Competition and Cooperation in Space* (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1997); Yuri Y. Karash, *The Superpower Odyssey: A Russian Perspective on Space Cooperation* (Reston, VA: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1999); Edward C. Ezell and Linda N. Ezell, *The Partnership: A History of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project* (Washington, DC: NASA, 1978), <http://history.nasa.gov/SP-4209/cover.htm>; Roald Sagdeev and Susan Eisenhower, “NASA - United States-Soviet Space Cooperation during the Cold War”, n.d., http://www.nasa.gov/50th/50th_magazine/coldWarCoOp.html.

⁷⁹ Benn, “New Thinking in Soviet Propaganda,” 57.

2. “Polite Propaganda”:

Amerika Illiustrirovannoye and *Soviet Life* Magazines

Amerika Illiustrirovannoye (*America Illustrated*, hereafter *Amerika*) magazine began its long publication history in 1944. Its genesis predated both the Cold War, and the establishment of the United States Information Agency (USIA), the agency that came to control its publication for four decades until its final issue in 1994. In the first year of its remarkable run, at that time produced by the Office of War Information (OWI), the magazine appeared in two alternating formats. Odd-numbered months saw *Amerika*—a pocket-sized version packed with educational and inspiring articles. Even-numbered months featured the pocket-book’s gleaming and attractive cousin *Amerika Illiustrirovannoye*—a large-format, glossy-paper, 80-page all-out effort inspired by *Life* magazine showcasing, as its alternate title suggested, colour and black and white design, illustrations, and photography. Grand, shiny, lush with images, the illustrated format proved seductive to Russian readers, and it soon became the only version produced. As *Time Magazine* reported in 1946, “Little Amerika left the Russians cold; America Illustrated was hot stuff.”¹

After the OWI ceased to exist in September 1945, the State Department took over publication of the magazine. Under the stewardship of the State Department, *Amerika* was written in English in a twelfth-floor Manhattan office, although it

¹ In its first year, *Amerika* had a paid circulation of 10,000 copies, and sold for 10 rubles (approximately 83¢ American at the time). The black market trade for the magazine was rumored to be high: According to *Time Magazine* Russians “eagerly paid” a hundred times the official rate to purchase a copy. See: “The Press: Amerika for the Russians,” *Time*, March 4, 1946, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,801770,00.html>. After numerous American requests for an expansion of the magazine’s circulation, the Soviets finally agreed, in June 1947 to allow 50,000 copies to be distributed. See: Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 6.

mostly featured reprints of articles from American publications. The editorial staff expended much effort trying to tailor the content of the magazine to have the greatest appeal to Soviet citizens.² After settling on the final drafts of the articles and captions in English, each edition of the magazine would then be sent to Russia for translation and approval by the Moscow Foreign Office.³ Finally, copies of the magazine were printed in the U.S. and shipped to the USSR. It was estimated that each edition's 50,000 copies would pass through the hands of approximately one million Soviet citizens.⁴

The popularity of *Amerika* with Soviet readers provoked Soviet authorities to contravene the 1944 agreement and choke off circulation of the magazine in the early 1950s.⁵ To protest the restriction of *Amerika*'s distribution, the State Department, on July 15, 1952, terminated the magazine and simultaneously ordered the Soviet Embassy to cease publishing journals and pamphlets—in particular the *U.S.S.R. Information Bulletin*—for circulation in the United States. *Amerika*'s initial run in the 1940s showed American officials that a propaganda magazine—especially a large format glossy one—could prove quite successful in reaching Soviet audiences. It also brought a net loss. Even in its second run beginning in the late 1950s, revenues from

² They combed through the Russian press, examined mail received at the American Embassy in Moscow, and analyzed reader's opinions with the help of State Department employees in the Soviet Union.

³ Approval at times meant censorship, although this was slight: By 1949 it was estimated that Moscow had struck out only about 50 of three million words.

⁴ "The Press: The Voice of Amerika," *Time*, June 6, 1949, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,801913-2,00.html>.

⁵ By June 1952 the State Department estimated that only about 15,000 copies of the magazine were reaching Soviet audiences. State Department bungling—forcing the magazine to relocate its editorial office to Washington D.C. against the vociferous resistance of its staff—only assisted the Soviet effort to reduce the magazine's impact. See: "The Press: A Red Victory?," *Time*, June 23, 1952, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,859806,00.html>.

the magazine's sales never came close to the expense of producing it.⁶ *Amerika* was not a profitable enterprise, but the tremendous outlay incurred to publish the magazine was more than offset by the opportunity to reach and influence Soviet readers.

In the context of the Khrushchev Thaw, a period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s that saw increasing openness in Soviet society accompanied by a temporary and limited relaxation of tensions with the West, the Soviet Union and the United States signed an agreement on October 9, 1956, allowing for a new publications exchange.⁷ Historian Walter Hixson called the agreement “[o]ne of the few concrete results of the ‘spirit of Geneva’.”⁸ It provided for the renewed circulation of *Amerika Illiustrirovannoye* in the Soviet Union as a premiere publication of the USIA, and the equal distribution of a Soviet-made English-language magazine in the United States. Published by the Soviet embassy in Washington, D.C., the Soviet magazine was called *U.S.S.R.* from 1956 to 1964 and *Soviet Life* from 1965 to its final issue in December 1991. (For the sake of simplicity this study will refer to

⁶ In 1952, *Amerika* cost approximately \$220,000 US annually to produce with \$100,000 revenues from its sales. See: “Soviet Periodicals In U.S. Are Barred,” *The New York Times*, July 16, 1952, 1; ““Reciprocity” With Russia,” *The New York Times*, July 16, 1952, 24; David Simon, “Decision to Suspend Amerika,” *The New York Times*, July 23, 1952, 22. The budgeted cost of *Amerika* in 1958 was \$889,356 US, while the net receipts expected from sales of the magazine was \$71,712 US. See: E. W. Kenworthy, “U.S. Set to Print Polish Magazine,” *The New York Times*, May 8, 1958, 12; Nicholas J. Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 141. John Jacobs *Amerika*’s Chief Editor from 1966 to 1969 estimated the cost of the magazine to be one million dollars annually, not counting salaries of the less than thirty-five Washington staff members who produced it. See: Yale Richmond, *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), 151; Hixson, *Parting the Curtain*, 117.

⁷ In December 1955 both sides agreed to permit the magazines to be circulated within each other’s borders. The first issues were printed in July, but discussions over the sale and distribution of the magazines delayed the circulation. There was considerable wrangling over how much the distributors could charge for their roles.

⁸ Hixson, *Parting the Curtain*, 117.

the Soviet magazine's entire run as *Soviet Life*, and for the sake of brevity, it will refer to the second run of *Amerika Illiustrirovannoye* as simply *Amerika*.)

Amerika adopted the full-size and lavishly illustrated format of its earlier illustrated edition as well as the habit of reprinting articles from popular American publications, such as, *Life*, *Look*, *Collier's*, *Readers Digest*, and others.⁹ *Soviet Life* assumed a similarly large, glossy, illustrated format. As the first edition of the new run of the magazine described itself, *Amerika* was intended as "a magazine about people of the United States: how they live, work, and play." Articles written especially for *Amerika* usually served a propaganda theme, but did not hit hard. The magazine's editors were careful to provide a balance between these propaganda pieces and stories on fashion and celebrity that they assumed would carry wide appeal with Soviet readers.¹⁰ Of course, images of the bountiful abundances of capitalist consumer culture were not apolitical, and this point was not lost on the magazine's editors.¹¹

Soyuzpechat, the distributing agency in the Soviet Union, delivered *Amerika* to eighty-four cities, many of which were officially closed to foreigners. Meanwhile, a private American firm, the American News Company, distributed the Soviet magazine in the United States. Each government was allowed to print a total of 52,000 copies of their respective magazines: 50,000 for subscription and sale at newsstands, and 2,000 distributed for no charge by each sides' embassy. At the exchange rates of the time, *Amerika* sold in the Soviet Union for approximately \$1.25

⁹ "The Press: Amerika for the Russians," *Time*, March 4, 1946, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,801770,00.html>.

¹⁰ Hixson, *Parting the Curtain*, 118.

¹¹ As then-editor Marion Sanders had described the magazine's approach in 1949: "We never preach, brag, quarrel or draw invidious comparison. Ours is not a frontal attack; it is a long-range campaign." See: "The Press: Amerika for the Russians," *Time*, March 4, 1946, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,801770,00.html>.

US, considerably more expensive than the price of the Soviet magazine in the United States.¹²

From the beginning, there was a marked contrast in the popularity of each magazine with their intended audiences. A novelty in the Soviet Union, *Amerika* enjoyed immediate success, consistently and swiftly selling out. Its Soviet counterpart, meanwhile, went largely unnoticed on American newsstands next to the attractive and voluminous output of the much larger American publishing industry. By early 1957, *Amerika* was one of the most popular foreign magazines on sale in the USSR, and Soviet officials were prompted to violate the agreement and restrict the magazine's circulation.¹³ The publication exchange's emphasis on reciprocity thus harmed American efforts to expand the circulation of *Amerika* so long as the Soviet counterpart failed to attract American consumers. In the spring of 1957, Soviet authorities tried to return several thousand copies of the magazine, claiming that Soyuzpechat had been unable to sell them. The claim proved difficult for American observers to verify. It was assumed in the U.S. that the "unsellable" magazines were in fact a ruse, designed by the Soviet authorities disgruntled with the poor success enjoyed by USSR magazine in the U.S.¹⁴

¹² The first issues of each magazine appeared on newsstands on October 23, 1956. Recipients of free copies of *Amerika* included government officials, universities, libraries, and teachers. Of the 50,000 sale copies, 5,000 could be distributed directly to subscribers, and the rest had to be sold monthly at newsstands. See: "Soviet Returning Amerika Copies," *The New York Times*, May 31, 1957, 9; Kenworthy, "U.S. Set to Print Polish Magazine," 12; William J. Jorden, "Soviet in Accord on U.S. Magazine," *The New York Times*, October 10, 1956, 3; "USSR on Sale Here Oct. 23," *The New York Times*, October 15, 1956, 52.

¹³ In October 1958 *The New York Times* celebrated the magazine's third year with an article and a prominent photograph of a long line of Muscovites lined up to purchase the magazine. See: "U.S. Monthly in Soviet Begins Third Year," *The New York Times*, March 3, 1958, 18. In 1959 the American Embassy in Moscow reported that long lines would form whenever *Amerika* hit the stands. Black market rates for the magazine were three times the cover price, which was set at five rubles (about \$1.25 US). See: Hixson, *Parting the Curtain*, 117-119.

¹⁴ While the American Embassy in Russia would print 50,000 copies at once, and would sell them almost as quickly as they were issued, the Soviets cautiously began with a run of 25,000, which sold

In fact, a secret Agitprop directive ensured that *Amerika's* distribution was limited to a level reciprocal with the sales of *Soviet Life*.¹⁵ In response, American officials kept close watch on *Amerika's* distribution, at times even following the Soviet delivery trucks.¹⁶ Cognizant that the magazine was frequently “passed around,” the USIA improved its durability with superior binding staples and heavier coated paper so it lasted longer, and reached more people.¹⁷

In July 1960, the arrests of several “young Americans” for handing out copies of *Amerika* on Moscow sidewalks illustrated not only the popularity of *Amerika* in the

out. Gradually increasing production, the Soviet Embassy had not reached the 50,000 copies it was allowed to print under the agreement before it ran out of buyers. Returns of small numbers of “unsalable” copies of *Amerika* began after the third issue, but gradually increased up to 6,000 copies of a single issue in the late 1950s. In Moscow, *Amerika* would consistently and rapidly be sold out, but Soyuzpechat claimed that the magazine had failed to resonate as strongly with Soviet consumers in other regions. See: “Soviet Returning Amerika Copies,” 9. By 1964, roughly 4,000 copies of USSR each month were returned to Moscow unsold, and Soviet authorities returned approximately the same number of copies of *Amerika*. See: Theodore Shabad, “Culture Parley Pressed in Soviet,” *The New York Times*, January 11, 1964, 14. By mid-1965 the returns of unsold copies of *Amerika* averaged 18,000 copies per month. See: Theodore Shabad, “Moscow Bans U.S. Magazine Over Cover Picture of Chinese Flag,” *The New York Times*, September 25, 1965, sec. SU2, 1.

¹⁵ Agitprop notified its staff that since the cultural agreement allowed returns of unsold copies, it was not necessary to try to sell all copies of the American magazine. The directive recommended that *Amerika* be sold at “closed” booths in workplaces, institutions and government buildings rather than in publicly located kiosks where other magazines were sold. Only a limited number of sales could be made at kiosks on main streets. Agitprop advised party units to allow only “politically literate and ideologically stable people” to subscribe to *Amerika*. To ensure even closer party control of the magazine’s dissemination, subscriptions were entered through “social organizations” such as work places and institutions instead of (as was customary) at a post office. See: F. Konstantinov, “O rasprostraneniі v CCCP zhurnala 'Amerika' (On the propagation of the journal 'Amerika' in the USSR),” July 30, 1956, fond 89, “Declassified Documents of the Communist Party, 1956,” no. 191, opis' 46, delo 11, Harvard University, Lamont Library; Richmond, *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain*, 150.

¹⁶ It was impossible, however, to maintain a perfect watch over the circulation, and this effort was hampered somewhat by the Soviet security police, who secretly followed the American officials as they tracked the movement of their magazines. See: Hixson, *Parting the Curtain*, 119. Hans Tuch, an employee at the American Embassy in Moscow in the late 1950s and early 1960s, monitored Soviet distribution of *Amerika*. Tuch would check Moscow newsstands each month to verify that each issue was indeed available. He reported long lines forming to purchase the magazine. Merchants would hoard copies behind their shop counters, presenting them only “reluctantly and secretively” to “favorite customers who often had made prior arrangements to obtain the magazine” usually by paying considerably more than the cover price. See: “It's Popular In the U.S.S.R. -But It's American,” *The Washington Post*, June 4, 1988, A25. See also: Hans N. Tuch, *Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas*, (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 1990), 52, 135-136,

¹⁷ Richmond, *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain*, 151; Marsha Siefert, ““From Cold War to Wary Peace: American Culture in the USSR and Russia,”” in *The Americanization of Europe: Culture, Diplomacy, and Anti-Americanism After 1945*, by Alexander Stephan (New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2006), 191.

Soviet Union, but also the length to which Soviet authorities would go to control the magazine's dissemination. According to one of those arrested, "[a]ll an American tourist has to do is grab a stack at the embassy, walk into a crowd of Russians and in seconds the magazines are gone." The giveaway of the magazines allegedly attracted the attention of Soviet authorities when a Moscow bus driver stopped his bus so that his passengers could obtain copies for themselves.¹⁸ Another incident occurred in December 1963 over the distribution of "souvenir" copies of *Amerika* at an American graphic arts exhibition in Moscow.¹⁹ Soviet vigilance against unauthorized distribution of foreign publications at times assumed absurd proportions. In the fall of 1966 a New Yorker visiting Moscow who accidentally left behind one issue of *National Geographic* magazine in a washroom was issued a formal warning for "distributing imperialist propaganda."²⁰

The cultural exchange agreements governing the two magazines were renegotiated every couple of years, offering a regular outlet for American negotiators to advocate for an increase in the circulation of the magazines, and for their Soviet counterparts to almost as regularly deny them. These agreements cleared the way for greater contacts between Soviet and American people and cultural products.²¹

¹⁸ See: Peter Flint, "Student Relates Incident in Soviet," *The New York Times*, 1960, 30; "Moscow Detains 3 U.S. Travelers," *The New York Times*, July 29, 1960, 5; "Soviet Lists 3 It Held," *The New York Times*, July 30, 1960, 5.

¹⁹ Opening on December 6, 1963, Soviet authorities blocked the entrance to the exhibit for approximately ninety minutes on December 30 to protest the magazine's distribution. After agreeing to suspend the *Amerika* dissemination, the exhibition was reopened, and the American Embassy issued a protest statement that night. See: "U.S. Protests in Moscow To Curbs on Art Exhibit," *The New York Times*, December 31, 1963, 7. Ironically, on February 16, 1964 the same exhibit—by this time in Erevan, the capital of Soviet Armenia—presented its millionth visitor, a 25-year-old toolmaker, with a complimentary copy of *Amerika*. See: "U.S. Show in Soviet Sets Mark," *The New York Times*, February 17, 1964, 4.

²⁰ Peter Grose, "U.S.-Soviet Exchange: The Communications Gap Is Widening," *The New York Times*, October 2, 1966, sec. E, 3.

²¹ They increased contacts between government representatives, scientists, educators, students, performers, artists, and athletes; created provisions for increased exchange of exhibits, films, and art;

American officials consistently sought more media penetration of the Iron Curtain while Soviet negotiators wanted greater access to American scientific and technical knowledge through increasing exchanges in these areas.²² U.S. officials also regularly complained about restrictions on the sale of *Amerika*, while Soviet negotiators routinely offered assurances that they would address the distribution “problems,” albeit “on the basis of reciprocity.”²³

To American officials, the magazine exchanges provided a rare opportunity to demonstrate American achievements to Soviet audiences. The exchanges in turn provided the Soviet Union an avenue to counter Western perceptions that socialist countries were uncultured and backward.²⁴ That both sides continued the exchanges throughout the period, and even slowly expanded them, testifies to their commitment to the goals of improving understanding between the two countries. But the uneven popularity of the two magazines became a point of tension, and at times even threatened to derail their exchange.

Considering the immense popularity of *Amerika* compared to the relative obscurity of its Soviet counterpart, a circulation increase would have benefited

increased exchanges of radio and television broadcasts; and even agreed “in principle” to the establishment of direct air flights between the US and Soviet Union.

²² The November 1959 agreement “for cooperation in exchanges in the scientific, technical, educational, and cultural fields in 1960 and 1961,” even changed the word order to reflect Soviet desires to emphasize science over culture in the exchanges.

²³ See, for example: Max Frankel, “U.S.-Soviet Accord in Cultural Field Extended 2 Years,” *The New York Times*, November 22, 1959, 1, 27; Richmond, *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain*, 2; Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 170; Max Frankel, “U.S.-Soviet Talks To Seek Renewal Of Cultural Pact,” *The New York Times*, November 12, 1963, 1, 4; “Editorial Note,” U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, vol. X, part 2, 51 (hereafter *FRUS* followed by years and volume number); “Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), April 12, 1972,” *FRUS*, 1969-1976, vol. XIV, 294-295, fn. 8; Bernard Gwertzman, “Nixon and Brezhnev View Signing of 4 New Accords,” *The New York Times*, June 20, 1973, 19; “Brezhnev Is Host to Congress Leaders,” *The New York Times*, June 20, 1973, 19.

²⁴ “Cultural Exchanges Go On Amid U.S.-Soviet Tension,” *The New York Times*, September 17, 1961, 1.

American interests almost exclusively. By 1962, American officials routinely asked for the circulation to double to 100,000 copies each month.²⁵ The 1962 agreement provided for an increase to 62,000 copies monthly.²⁶ By 1973, an agreement covering the period 1974-1976 maintained that level, but agreed that should “full distribution” of both magazines be achieved they would “examine the possibility” of enlarging the circulation to 82,000 copies by December 1976.²⁷

There were other examples of disequilibrium between the two countries in the cultural exchange negotiations. During talks in late 1963, Soviet negotiators asked to remove existing provisions requiring American government approval for exchanges of persons, publications, or exhibits. Seeking to take advantage of American “free-enterprise,” Soviet officials sought to negotiate exchanges directly with private American organizations, without the need for Washington’s sanction. Such access could never be granted on a reciprocal basis with the Soviet Union, however, since the “so-called ‘non-governmental’ organizations” there were in fact rigidly controlled and supervised by the Government and the Communist Party. The United States was already at a disadvantage in this regard, since Soviet publications and cultural products had long been sold in private American stores, while no such opportunity existed for American products in the Soviet Union, except through the narrow confines of the cultural exchange agreements. The American negotiating

²⁵ “U.S.-Soviet Talks Open Wednesday,” *The New York Times*, January 28, 1962, 27; Shabad, “Culture Parley Pressed in Soviet,” 14.

²⁶ Max Frankel, “U.S.-Soviet Talks To Seek Renewal Of Cultural Pact,” *The New York Times*, November 12, 1963, 1, 4.

²⁷ “Texts of U.S.-Soviet Accords on Exchanges in Technical and Cultural Matters,” *The New York Times*, June 20, 1973, 18-19.

party reaffirmed the need for U.S. government control of the exchanges, and even threatened to suspend the negotiations unless the Soviets dropped this demand.²⁸

Soviet authorities even employed Western marketing strategies to try and increase *Soviet Life*'s popularity with American readers. In 1965 the editors of *Soviet Life* tried a direct-mail advertising campaign to try and increase the magazine's subscription base, mailing 15,000 copies of a "Special Introductory Offer" to new subscribers.²⁹ According to *The New York Times*, the move signaled that "[a]nother capitalistic weapon has fallen into the hands of the Russians." The magazine thus joined the ranks of the only other Soviet body to engage in direct-mail promotional campaigns in the United States, the Soviet travel agency Intourist, which had begun sending out materials promoting travel in the Soviet Union earlier in 1965. In 1965 advertisements promoting *Soviet Life* were also placed in various American publications, including *The Kansas City Star*, *The National Guardian*, and *Editor and Publisher*. The results of the campaign were disappointing, however.³⁰ To increase its subscription base, in 1968 *Soviet Life* hired an American advertising agency to organize a series of massive direct mail campaigns in the late 1960s and early 1970s.³¹

²⁸ Frankel, "U.S.-Soviet Talks To Seek Renewal Of Cultural Pact," 1, 4.

²⁹ The deal offered one year's subscription for \$1.50, which was 40 cents cheaper than the regular yearly rate. At a cover rate of 35 cents per issue, this represented savings of \$2.70. By 1965 *Soviet Life*, out of its total allowed 62,000 copies, had a subscription base of 22,000, and distributed another 36,000 copies for newsstand sales through wholesalers. On average, 42 percent of these newsstand copies sold each month.

³⁰ According to *Soviet Life*'s managing editor A. Makarov, the effect of the campaign was "not very large" though he hoped "that the 62,000 should be—shall we say—sold out." In an interview with *The New York Times*, Makarov was less interested to discuss the promotional strategies of the magazine than to tell the reporter that the "main idea, the main hope of the magazine was to bring more understanding and better relations between the two countries." See: Walter Carlson, "Advertising: Russians Try a Capitalist Tool," *The New York Times*, June 18, 1965, 53.

³¹ *Soviet Life* hired Arau Associates, a firm founded in 1963 by Tony Arau who had previously worked with *Reader's Digest*. Arau commenced massive mail outs of 250,000 pieces "directed at subscription lists of liberally oriented magazines" twice-per-year. In the spring of 1970, searching for a more effective way to increase the subscription base of *Soviet Life*, Arau organized a direct mail campaign that saw 5,000 flyers sent directly from Moscow to American addresses. "Last Chance!" the flyer

Meanwhile, Muscovites in the late 1960s continued to endure hours-long queues to obtain copies of *Amerika*.³² By September 1976, *Amerika* sold 44,000 copies each month at Soviet newsstands, another 15,000 through subscribers, and gave away 2,000 free copies through the American Embassy in Moscow. In contrast, *Soviet Life* had 40,000 subscribers (who paid \$6 US per year) and only 3,000 sales per month at newsstands. Its total circulation including copies given away for free totaled only 50,000—far below the 62,000 it was allowed to distribute.³³

As part of the broader cultural exchange, both sides showed a propensity towards propaganda “lite,” a tendency that lessened the likelihood of either side engaging in much censorship. The prevailing political atmosphere thus kept both magazines polite.³⁴ They were both obliged to not deal with politics, though American officials read this rule as a ban against making statements offensive to the host nation. At times, they tested the limits of the permissible.³⁵

loudly proclaimed, “Prices are going up! Subscribe NOW and SAVE!” References to the rising cost of the magazine reflected the recent increase in the cover price from 35 cents to 50 cents, which would—by May 1970—see the yearly subscription rate go up from \$3.50 to \$3.95. For his part, Tony Arau felt that since increasing sales of *Soviet Life* would allow greater distribution of *Amerika*, his promotion of the Soviet magazine was his patriotic duty—“our contribution to cultural exchange.” See: Philip H. Dougherty, “Advertising: Mailing a Pitch From Moscow,” *The New York Times*, 1970, 77.

³² Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 281. The Voice of America would announce each issue’s arrival at Soviet newsstands a day or two in advance. Normally lines would form in anticipation, ensuring that all copies would be quickly sold out. See: Grose, “U.S.-Soviet Exchange: The Communications Gap Is Widening,” 3. A Swedish correspondent called the American Ambassador in Moscow in 1966 to tell him that the 150-meter queue outside a Gorky street bookstore to buy *Amerika* was the “longest line ... he had ever seen in queue-laden Moscow.” See: “Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, January 26, 1966,” *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. XIV, 373.

³³ “Notes on People,” *The New York Times*, September 16, 1976, 26.

³⁴ John Jacobs acknowledged in April 1987, for instance, that as chief editor of *Amerika* he had “kept a list of Americans from whom we were barred from commissioning articles – for ‘security reasons.’ It included a pantheon of our most distinguished artists, thinkers and writers,” including John Kenneth Galbraith who Jacobs called—tongue firmly in cheek—a “dangerous radical.” See: “Let’s Try an American Kind of Glasnost and Call It ‘Openness,’” *The New York Times*, April 24, 1987, Late City Final Edition, sec. Editorial Desk; A.

³⁵ The June 1960 edition of *Amerika*—a special issue paying tribute to Eisenhower—featured two photographs of the President with Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov, the former Soviet Defense Minister who in 1957 had been ejected from his post (and from the Presidium) on claims that he had resisted Party control of the Soviet military. American officials expressed surprise that they received no

Still, there were some notable instances of censorship of the two magazines. The Soviet government occasionally interrupted the production of its own publication in order to censor it.³⁶ The Soviet government detained the September 1965 edition of *Amerika* in the American Embassy in Moscow for nearly a month because its cover art depicting the United Nations founding members included the flag of Chiang Kai-Shek's Nationalist Chinese Government. American officials confirmed at the time that both the Soviet and American governments had "made observations" about various "politically objectionable" articles in each other's magazines, but this was the first time that either side had objected outright to the distribution of an issue of either magazine. It was also the earliest instance of either side altering the magazine's cover in order to earn approval.³⁷ Demands for censorship of the magazines were not one-sided, however. The December 1967 issue of *Soviet Life* appeared for sale with one page "neatly cut out" in response to a complaint from Washington regarding the content of an article defending the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia called "Why We Interfered."³⁸

objections to the pictures from Soyuzpechat or the magazine's readers, and interpreted the lack of complaint as a sign of Moscow's commitment to an uncensored *Amerika*. See: Max Frankel, "Eisenhower Issue of Amerika, Published by U.S. in Russian Language On Stand Near Kremlin as Khrushchev Speaks," *The New York Times*, May 29, 1960, 18.

³⁶ In early May 1960, for example, the Soviet Embassy pulled all articles about and pictures of Eisenhower from the June issue of *U.S.S.R.*, a move interpreted by American officials as an early sign that Khrushchev was planning to cancel Eisenhower's upcoming visit. See: "Soviet's Magazine Altered," *The New York Times*, May 29, 1960, 18.

³⁷ On October 19, American officials announced that the cover would be changed. The 60,000 copies of the magazine were sent from Moscow to Helsinki, Finland where they were refitted with a cover more acceptable to Soviet authorities. The magazine celebrated the UN's 20th anniversary with a wrap-around, full-color collage of the flags of all 51 nations in attendance at the 1945 founding meeting in San Francisco. The offending flag, a white sun in a blue upper left corner square against a red background, was the Chinese flag before the 1950 Chinese Communist Revolution, and had since been flown by Nationalist China. See: Shabad, "Moscow Bans U.S. Magazine Over Cover Picture of Chinese Flag," 1; "U.S. Alters Journal at Soviet Request," *The New York Times*, October 20, 1965, 19.

³⁸ The State Department argued that the offending article violated the cultural exchange agreements, which specified that each magazine should be "nonpolitical." On December 12 the Soviet Embassy in Washington announced that it would agree to censor the article. See: "Soviet, Yielding to U.S., Drops Magazine Article," *The New York Times*, December 13, 1968, 18.

Although both publications were overseen by a series of editors during their long publication histories, the change and leadership at the editorial level did not make an obvious impact on either magazine's content. Before July 1972, *Amerika* did not list the Editor's name. Ruth Adams was its Editor-In-Chief from at least July 1962, until at least June 1965.³⁹ John Jacobs served as Editor-In-Chief from 1966 to late 1969.⁴⁰ When Frank Shakespeare took over as USIA Director in late 1969, Leonard Reed became Editor-In-Chief where he remained until his retirement in 1973.⁴¹ Marjorie A. Yahraes took over as Editor-In-Chief until she retired in 1976.⁴² After her retirement, Robert A. Poteete took over as Editor-In-Chief.⁴³ *Amerika*'s last issue came in September 1994.

Soviet Life did not publish details about its editorship until 1964, only divulging that the Soviet Embassy in the United States published it. Enver N. Mamedov has since acknowledged that he served as Chief Editor from 1956 to

³⁹ Adams had worked for *Life* magazine in the 1940s before joining USIA's *America* (*Amerika*'s predecessor) in 1951. When *Amerika* started its second run in 1956, Adams signed on as a picture editor, and then briefly worked as chief editor of *Life In America* (another USIA publication for Arab audiences) before taking over as chief editor of *Amerika*. See: "Ruth Adams Paepcke," *The New York Times*, July 7, 1996, sec. Obituaries; "Ruth Adams Paepcke Dies; Retired Editor With USIA," *The Washington Post*, July 8, 1996, FINAL edition, sec. METRO.

⁴⁰ As press officer of the 1959 American Exhibition at Sokolniki Park in Moscow, Jacobs had been closely involved in the "kitchen debate" between Khrushchev and Vice President Nixon in 1959.

⁴¹ Reed had joined USIA in 1946, when he became editor of the Agency's magazine for India. He later became the European bureau chief for the VOA, and then in 1965 chief of VOA's worldwide English-language service. Controversy ensued in 1968 when VOA's level of support for American involvement in Vietnam was deemed insufficient, and USIA Director Leonard Marks removed Reed from his post. The State Department, John Jacobs recalled about the controversy, "decided we should parrot the administration line, but we were all newsmen, and there was always a big resistance to that." See: Joe Holley, "Leonard Reed; Voice of America Official," *The Washington Post*, August 1, 2008, B08; Greg Garland, *The Baltimore Sun*, "Leonard Reed," *The Baltimore Sun (MCT)*, July 28, 2008.

⁴² Yahraes had written and edited for the post-World War II U.S. military government in Berlin, and all told worked for USIA for more than 20 years. See: "Patricia Place Bethesda Libr ...," *The Washington Post*, May 12, 2009, FINAL edition, sec. Metro.

⁴³ Poteete had enjoyed a long career as a journalist and editor of various publications including the *Saturday Evening Post*, *Psychology Today*, and most recently as a senior editor at *Money* magazine. See: "Notes On People," *The New York Times*, March 3, 1976, 33.

1959.⁴⁴ The magazine began indicating its editors in its January 1964 issue, noting that the information was “required by Public Law.” Here, Boris V. Karpovich was listed as Editor. By 1965, the magazine clarified that Karpovich was Editor at the Washington Editorial Board, while Yuri S. Fantalov of the Moscow Editorial Board was the magazine’s Chief Editor.⁴⁵ In 1967, it only listed the one Editor from the Washington Editorial Board, a role Georgi I. Isachenko filled from January 1967 until April 1972. Anatoly A. Mkrtchian was then listed in that role until Isachenko returned to replace him in November 1976. Meanwhile, Oleg P. Benyukh was listed as Editor-In-Chief (in Moscow) from January 1970 to January 1972. In February 1972, Alexander L. Makarov became Acting Editor-in-Chief. After June 1973, Makarov graduated to Editor-In-Chief until at least the end of 1976.⁴⁶ The final issue of *Soviet Life* came in December 1991, the same month as the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union.⁴⁷

Exerting far greater influence on the magazines were the larger government propaganda agencies that created them. To situate the two publications within the proper context then, we must briefly look at the histories of the principal foreign propaganda agencies in the United States and the Soviet Union: the United States Information Agency and its Soviet counterpart Agitprop.

The United States Information Agency (USIA)

⁴⁴ “Legendary Inoveshchaniya. Beseda tret'ya: Golos Rossii (Legends broadcasted. Conversation three: The voice of Russia),” n.d., <http://rus.ruvr.ru/2009/10/28/2117792.html>.

⁴⁵ Typically, the Chief Editor belonged to the Moscow Editorial Board and was located at the APN offices at 2 Pushkin Square in Moscow.

⁴⁶ Makarov had also served since the mid-1960s as Managing Editor. This information was compiled from various issues of *Soviet Life*.

⁴⁷ The magazine resurfaced, however, in 1993 under different ownership as *Russian Life*, and continues publication to this day.

The American government first practiced international propaganda during the First and Second World Wars. The Committee on Public Information (CPI) directed by George Creel propagandized extensively overseas during World War I, and also worked domestically to “sell the war” to Americans.⁴⁸ Between 1942 and 1945, the Office of War Information, (OWI) centralized various American overseas information programs, and worked to promote American aims internationally.⁴⁹

The Eisenhower administration established the United States Information Agency (USIA) as an independent foreign affairs agency within the executive branch on August 1, 1953, a status it maintained until 1999. It was the first peacetime federal agency set up to propagandize to foreign audiences. Its creation centralized various international information programs formerly carried out by a number of offices, most of which had been overseen by the Department of State.⁵⁰ Though there were ups and downs, throughout its existence the agency enjoyed substantial funding; played a significant role in American foreign policy formulation through its relationships with the White House, the National Security Council, and the State Department; retained thousands of employees across a vast international network of offices; and oversaw the creation of a myriad of propaganda materials in a variety of media, including magazines, books, leaflets, photography, radio, and film.

The USIA’s mission statement described the agency’s primary “purpose” would be:

⁴⁸ See: George Creel, *How We Advertised America: The First Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on Public Information that Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe*, (New York, NY: Harper & Brothers, 1920); Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, eds., *Propaganda and Persuasion*, 5th edition, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2012), 166-167.

⁴⁹ Allan Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942-1945*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978).

⁵⁰ According to one agency observer, USIA had “complete responsibility for all United States non-military overseas information programs.” See: Ronald I. Rubin, *The Objectives of the U.S. Information Agency*. (New York, NY: Praeger, 1968), 120.

to submit evidence to peoples of other nations by means of communication techniques that the objectives and policies of the United States are in harmony with and will advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress and peace.

Meanwhile, the Cold War context of its creation meant that the USIA's role in countering the propaganda of its Soviet adversary was written into its founding statement.⁵¹

During the time period covered by this study almost all of the American presidents enthusiastically backed the agency and its activities (the exception being Richard Nixon). Eisenhower was a keen supporter of a strong overseas information program.⁵² His pursuit of an evolutionary approach to the Soviet Union meant an emphasis on Soviet-American cultural exchanges as well as propaganda aimed at the Soviet Union.⁵³ The “international prestige issue” became a significant point of debate in the 1960 presidential race between Democratic candidate John Kennedy and Republican Vice President Richard Nixon. Kennedy attacked his opponent by citing declining American prestige abroad. Kennedy's stance may have augmented his slim electoral margin; it certainly meant that he entered the White House publicly

⁵¹ The October 22, 1953, NSC document (NSC 165) containing the “Mission of the United States Information Agency” listed four methods for carrying out the above “purpose,” one of which was: “By unmasking and countering hostile attempts to distort or to frustrate the objectives and policies of the United States.” “Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay), October 24, 1953,” *FRUS*, 1952-1954, vol. II (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 1752-1754.

⁵² According to his Press Secretary, Eisenhower considered USIA appropriations a matter “very close to his heart.” See: “Diary Entry by the President's Press Secretary (Hagerty), March 22, 1955,” *FRUS*, 1955-1957, vol. IX, 521. He continued to support the USIA even after his retirement from political life. He invited Frank Shakespeare to visit him in Walter Reed hospital shortly after the later was appointed to lead the USIA. Eisenhower lectured the new Director for two hours on the agency's history, and enforced upon him that his new role was “one of the most important jobs in the entire United States Government” and that it was imperative that he attend NSC meetings. See: Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 293.

⁵³ Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961*, 32.

committed to enhancing America's image abroad.⁵⁴ For its part, USIA already had a high opinion of the incoming President.⁵⁵ After Kennedy's assassination, Lyndon Johnson showed that he, like his predecessor, understood well the important role that image played in domestic and international politics.⁵⁶

By the mid-1970s the agency had been overseen by a number of Directors, as each new President brought a new leader to the USIA. Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed Arthur Larson as the agency's second Director in December 1956. One of Eisenhower's responses to Sputnik was to try to invigorate the USIA by appointing George V. Allen Director in late 1957.⁵⁷ The White House announced Allen's departure from USIA on November 11, 1960, only three days after John F. Kennedy's election.⁵⁸ Edward R. Murrow officially became Director on March 15,

⁵⁴ See: "U.S. Survey Finds Others Consider Soviet Mightiest," *The New York Times*, October 25, 1960, 1; William J. Jordan, "Prestige Survey Remains Secret," *The New York Times*, October 26, 1960, 29; "Prestige Losses by U.S. and Soviet Shown in Survey," *The New York Times*, October 27, 1960, 1; Mark Haefele, "John F. Kennedy, USIA, and World Public Opinion," *Diplomatic History* 25, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 69; Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 182, 191-192.

⁵⁵ Kennedy's Pulitzer-Prize winning 1955 book "Profiles in Courage"—allegedly ghost-written by his speechwriter Ted Sorenson—was a favorite title in the Agency's "Books from America" campaign that sent American publications overseas. Allen considered it "one of the best vehicles we have found in our efforts to bring basic concepts of American history to foreign peoples." See: John F. Kennedy, *Profiles in Courage* (New York, NY: Harper & Brothers, 1955); Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 174.

⁵⁶ The USIA also played a major role in restoring America's international image and in introducing the new President to the world. USIA output related to the unexpected transition of power included special inserts on both Kennedy and Johnson in *Amerika* and other agency propaganda magazines. USIA research reports on editorials in international newspapers concluded that there was widespread sympathy for the fallen president, as well as approval of Johnson's foreign policy statements. Soviet propaganda, for example, seemed to accept Johnson's commitment to peace at face value and hung the blame for less peaceful American policies on hawks in his administration like Robert McNamara. See: Ann M. Sperber, *Murrow, His Life and Times* (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 1986), 685; Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 227-229.

⁵⁷ Shortly after the Soviet satellite flew on October 4, 1957, Eisenhower moved Larson, on October 16, to a new position as the President's Special Assistant on "international information matters," where he was to brief the President on possible responses to Soviet propaganda. Larson suggested—and Eisenhower agreed—to get Allen to take over as USIA Director. Allen officially took the post on December 3, 1957. See: Jay Walz, "Envoy to Succeed Larson at U.S.I.A.," *The New York Times*, October 17, 1957, 1; Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 148-149.

⁵⁸ See: Felix Belair Jr., "U.S. Urged to Act to Raise Prestige," *The New York Times*, January 12, 1961, 1; Felix Belair Jr., "Allen Quits as Head Of Information Unit," *The New York Times*, November 12, 1960,

1961.⁵⁹ On October 5, 1963 Murrow had his left lung removed after doctors detected a cancerous tumor. Citing his failing health, Murrow submitted his resignation in December 1963.⁶⁰ Lyndon Johnson selected Carl Rowan, who officially assumed the role on February 24, 1964.⁶¹ Rowan ended his USIA term prematurely on August 31, 1965, after his relationship with Johnson soured.⁶² Johnson offered Leonard Marks the job the day after Rowan announced his resignation, and he was officially sworn in on August 31, 1965. Johnson announced Marks' resignation shortly before the 1968 presidential election.⁶³ Soon after assuming the presidency, Richard Nixon

1; "George V. Allen Is Dead at 66; One of 16 Career Ambassadors," *The New York Times*, July 12, 1970, 64; Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 186.

⁵⁹ For more on Murrow's staff, and on the USIA Task Force that urged more funding for the agency, and for expanding the USIA Director's role in policy formation, see: Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 21, 193-194.

⁶⁰ Murrow wanted to leave the USIA in October, and approached ABC News for a position there. Evidence suggests he was increasingly dissatisfied with the Kennedy administration's policies, particularly in Vietnam, and that he was growing suspicious of Robert Kennedy's influence. See: Joseph E. Persico, *Edward R. Murrow: An American Original* (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1988), 487; Sperber, *Murrow, His Life and Times*, 681; Richard Reeves, *President Kennedy: Profile of Power* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 597; Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 224, 233.

⁶¹ Johnson announced his appointment on January 21, 1964. See: United States Information Agency, "Announcement: Effective Date of Appointment of the Director," February 26, 1964, RG 306, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Office of the Director, Historical Collection, Biographical Files Relating to USIA Directors and other Senior Officials, 1953-2000, Box 26, NARA II.

⁶² The President grew infuriated with Rowan when USIA followed the VOA line and forced its own commentaries onto the radio service during American intervention in the Dominican Republic in April 1965. The situation prompted a biting criticism in *Newsweek* that called Rowan's leadership of USIA "ham-handed." See: "His Master's Voice," *Newsweek*, June 7, 1965; "'Voice' Policies Disturb Aides; Rowan Denies News Is Slanted," *The New York Times*, June 6, 1965, 21; "America's Voice," *The New York Times*, June 11, 1965, 30; Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 253. In July, Johnson refused Rowan a trip to Thailand on USIA business, citing officials' habit of going abroad to buy carpets. Rowan promptly resigned, citing "personal and family reasons" in a July 8 letter to the President. See: Rowan, *Breaking Barriers*, (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1991), 275-278; Elaine Sciolino, "Carl Rowan, Writer and Crusader, Dies at 75," *The New York Times*, September 24, 2000, 54; Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 253; The White House, "Exchange of Letters Between President Johnson and Carl T. Rowan," July 10, 1965, RG 306, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Office of the Director, Historical Collection, Biographical Files Relating to USIA Directors and other Senior Officials, 1953-2000, Box 26, NARA II.

⁶³ On October 1, 1968, Johnson announced that Marks would resign from the USIA so that he could head the American delegation negotiating permanent arrangements for Intelsat, an International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium formed in 1964 to develop a global system of communication satellites. See: Office of the White House Press Secretary, "For Immediate Release," October 1, 1968, RG 306, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Office of the Director, Historical Collection, Biographical Files Relating to USIA Directors and other Senior Officials, 1953-2000, Box 11, NARA II.

appointed Frank J. Shakespeare Jr. as USIA Director.⁶⁴ After his second election victory in 1972, Nixon offered James Keogh the job of Director in December 1972. Keogh accepted on the spot, having expressed interest in the job when Nixon first became President in 1969. Once he met with the increasingly troubled and paranoid Nixon in the Oval Office, however, Keogh at once regretted taking the position, though he stayed on until 1977.⁶⁵

The men chosen to lead the USIA came from careers in communications industry, or in government posts related to public affairs and diplomacy, and often had worked on the incoming President's political campaigns. The first Director of the USIA, Theodore Streibert, was formerly a broadcasting executive.⁶⁶ George V. Allen had "more or less done the job [of USIA Director] before" as Harry Truman's Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from March 1948 to November 1949. When Presidents Kennedy and Johnson took the White House they each asked CBS President Frank Stanton to direct the USIA, but he twice declined the offer. Edward R. Murrow—a famed broadcast journalist, co-creator and host of CBS television's *See It Now*, and USIA's best-known Director—was actually Kennedy's second choice for the job. Carl Rowan had an extensive journalistic background and served a number of diplomatic postings.⁶⁷ As a lawyer specializing in communications,

⁶⁴ Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 293.

⁶⁵ Anahad O'Connor, "James Keogh, 89, Who Was Time Editor and Wordsmith for Nixon, Dies," *The New York Times*, May 14, 2006, sec. New York Region; Linda Charlton, "Keogh, Former Aide to Nixon, Is Chosen as Head of U.S.I.A.," *The New York Times*, December 14, 1972, 1; "America's New Voice," *The New York Times*, December 16, 1972; Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 321.

⁶⁶ For more on Streibert's staff, and their relationships with the State Department, the White House, and the NSC, see: Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 96-97.

⁶⁷ Rowan had most recently been Ambassador to Finland since March 9, 1963. See: For more on key changes in the agency's staff under Rowan, see: United States Information Agency, Office of Public Information, "News Release: Rowan Appoints Burnett Anderson USIA Policy and Plans Director," 1965, RG 306, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Historical Collection, Subject Files 1953-2000, Box 14, NARA II. Johnson also took the Director's race and cultural heritage into account

Leonard Marks had encouraged Johnson to run for the presidency in 1960 and organized his television image during the campaign.⁶⁸ Before becoming USIA Director, Frank Shakespeare had been the president of television services at CBS and had managed Nixon's television image during the presidential campaign.⁶⁹ James Keogh had an extensive background as both a journalist and a speechwriter for Nixon.⁷⁰

The Director's relationship with the White House had a significant bearing on the agency's role in policy formation. USIA was given a prominent role in the foreign policy framework. The USIA Director was part of the Cabinet, the NSC and the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB).⁷¹ In the late 1950s, in addition to its seats at NSC, Cabinet, and OCB meetings, agency representatives had bi-weekly appointments with the Secretary of State and meetings with the President at least once per month.⁷²

when he selected his appointments for the job. He hoped that, as an African-American, Rowan would enhance America's image abroad by demonstrating Johnson's commitment to civil rights, and be less likely to "rock the boat" than a less grateful white appointee. He later hoped that Leonard Mark's Jewish background would please the American Jewish community who, he worried, were "beginning to feel like they are neglected." See: Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 228, 233-234, 257.

⁶⁸ For more on Mark's staff, his relationship with the Johnson family, and his belief that international communications via satellites would powerfully transform humanity, see: Thomas C Sorensen, *The Word War; the Story of American Propaganda*, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1968), 275; Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 261, 264-265, 285; Michael Nelson, *War of the Black Heavens: The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War*, 1st ed. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997), 130.

⁶⁹ Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 293.

⁷⁰ Keogh had enjoyed a long career at *Time* magazine where he started as a reporter in 1951, attained a senior editor's role in 1956 and performed as Executive Editor for most of the 1960s. In 1959, *This Is Nixon*—his appreciative study of then-Vice President Nixon—earned Keogh an invitation to work on Nixon's presidential campaign. Lacking the financial security to accept the offer, Keogh deferred but later became chief of research and writing for Nixon's 1968 campaign for the White House. In 1969, Keogh worked as Nixon's special assistant, before becoming his head speechwriter in 1970.

⁷¹ "Voice' Director Named," *The New York Times*, July 18, 1956, 13; Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 134-137.

⁷² Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 187-188.

Murrow strove to include the USIA in the entire foreign policy process from its planning to its execution.⁷³ USIA, he often said, must be “in on the take offs as well as the crash landings.”⁷⁴ Unfortunately, crash landings were all too common during Murrow’s tenure as USIA head, including the blow to American prestige caused by the Soviet Union’s historic first manned spaceflight on April 12, 1961.⁷⁵ On January 25, 1963, Kennedy signed a new USIA mission statement that enhanced the USIA’s role within the foreign policy bureaucracy, and increased the use of psychological warfare, especially in Vietnam.⁷⁶

As a Democratic Senator under a Republican president Johnson had been frugal towards the USIA, but once in the White House, he acknowledged the value of a strong international information program and integrated Marks into the foreign policy structure more than any USIA Director previously.⁷⁷ Marks enjoyed a close personal relationship with the President, who invited the USIA Director to attend

⁷³ For White House debate on the USIA presence at NSC meeting, see: “Editorial Note,” *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. XXV, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), 2; “Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy, January 24, 1961,” *Ibid.*, 13-14.

⁷⁴ Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 21, 193-194. See also: “Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) to Secretary of State Rusk, June 14, 1961,” *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. XXV, 54-56; “Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) to President Kennedy, July 27, 1961,” *Ibid.*, 64-66; “Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) to Secretary of State Rusk, August 18, 1961,” *Ibid.*, 77-78.

⁷⁵ The April 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco also strained relations within the USIA and between it and other agencies. Ordered to leave the Agency “out of the loop” Murrow was not allowed to divulge to his staff what he knew about the planned invasion. See: Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 194, 196-197.

⁷⁶ It also gave the agency authority to cooperate with the CIA to “communicate with other peoples without attribution to the United States government,” and emphasized the agency’s advisory role. See: Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 220.

⁷⁷ Johnson also listened attentively to VOA, and installed a “Monitron” in the White House’s family reception hall to monitor the radio station in the fall of 1965. The President would personally telephone the VOA’s studios if displeased with what he heard. In February 1967 the Monitron was enabled to carry English-language broadcasts of Radio Moscow and Radio Peking as well.

both NSC and cabinet meetings. The close ties enabled Marks to get Johnson's support for his plans for the agency.⁷⁸

The Nixon administration's efforts to downgrade the USIA's role in foreign policy formation led to Shakespeare's (temporary) resignation as Director in December 1970. After Henry Kissinger agreed to let Shakespeare attend high-level policy planning meetings Shakespeare withdrew his resignation and remained at his post until February 7, 1973.⁷⁹

USIA funding hinged on the Director's capacities to convince Congress of the agency's worth.⁸⁰ Arthur Larson's Republican bias—far more pronounced than his predecessor's—caused the formation of a rift between the USIA and Democrats on Capitol Hill.⁸¹ Notably, the chairman of the Senate appropriations subcommittee, future president Lyndon Johnson proposed reducing the USIA budget.⁸² George

⁷⁸ Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 255-256, 258.

⁷⁹ For more on Shakespeare's struggle with Nixon and Kissinger over the agency's role in foreign policy formation, see: "Editorial Note," *FRUS, 1969-1976*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), vol. XIV, 252, 253.

⁸⁰ Theodore Streibert, the USIA's first Director, had the President's favor but struggled at presenting the case for USIA funding to Congress. See: Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 95. For more on Eisenhower's opinion of Streibert as an "excellent man," see: "Diary Entry by the President's Press Secretary (Hagerty), March 22, 1955," *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. IX, 521-522.

⁸¹ Earlier in 1956, Larson had articulated a vision of 'New Republicanism' in a bestselling book *A Republican Looks at his Party*, urging the Republicans to move to the political centre, and he had been instrumental in Eisenhower's reelection campaign. William Benton considered him, "perhaps the smartest ... propagandist ... that the Republicans have developed." See: David Stebenne, *Modern Republican: Arthur Larson and the Eisenhower Years* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006), 151-175; Arthur Larson, *A Republican Looks at his Party* (New York, NY: Harper, 1956); Bruce Lambert, "L. Arthur Larson Is Dead at 82; Top Eisenhower Aide and Writer," *The New York Times*, April 1, 1993, D.24; Special to The New York Times, "Egghead With Troubles," *The New York Times*, May 11, 1957, 11; "Information Post in Cabinet Urged," *The New York Times*, April 4, 1960, 4; Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 134-136, 141-142, 180-181.

⁸² He told Larson: "in my opinion more money is wasted by this agency than by any other agency I know of." See: "Johnson Assails U.S. News Unit As the Most Wasteful of Agencies," *The New York Times*, May 9, 1957, 14.

Allen was less partisan and politically divisive than Larson had been, and knew how to relate effectively with Capitol Hill.⁸³

The USIA's content was largely driven by its contacts with the White House, the State Department and the NSC. From its inception, USIA guidance for its output routinely called for emphasis to be placed on "positive concepts" such as "America's devotion to peace" and "human progress," as well as security, freedom, liberty, openness, democracy, wellbeing, economic strength, material abundance, "scientific and educational strength" and cooperation. Such ideals, agency directives frequently explained, were "in the interest of peoples all over the globe" and thus represented the common aspirations of "all mankind." These same directives also made clear that the American values opposed "force, terror and spiritual regimentation" of the "Communist program." The agency's purpose was thus to prevent "the spread of Communist influence," "to counter the attraction [of] the material advances made in the Soviet Union," and "to advance the basic U.S. national objective of reducing the relative power position of the Soviet orbit."⁸⁴ The USIA also strove to counter "neutralism" in uncommitted countries.⁸⁵ The agency was thus a key instrument of the United States' international anti-communist effort.

⁸³ He strove to respond to congressional priorities and concerns about agency wastefulness. At the May 1958 appropriation hearings the USIA received less than it requested, but unlike with Larson, Congress displayed little acrimony towards the agency. See: Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 150.

⁸⁴ "Circular Airgram From the United States Information Agency to All USIS Missions, April 11, 1956," *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. IX, 572-574; "Report Prepared by the National Security Council, March 2, 1955," *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. IX, 505, 509-511; "Report Prepared by the National Security Council, August 31, 1955," *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. IX, 529; Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1958), 1-27; "Information Post in Cabinet Urged," 4; Sperber, *Murrow, His Life and Times*, 685; Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 180-181, 227-228, 278.

⁸⁵ Neutralist "dissatisfaction" was seen as harmful to the USIA because it reflected the failure of Cold War propaganda to convince its objects that the bipolar ideological struggle was truly relevant, and worth fighting. NSC fear of neutralism helped induce American propaganda officials to articulate

The “basic tasks” of the USIA were not only to “expose Communist aims and adequately counter Soviet and Communist propaganda,” but also to “encourage evolutionary change in the Soviet system, along lines consistent with U.S. security objectives and the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of the USSR.”⁸⁶ USIA penetration of the Soviet bloc, for which *Amerika* played a central role, thus assumed that Soviet citizens shared the aspirations that American officials believed were universal. The Soviet adversary consumed a large part of the agency’s energies, as the “USIA developed its global theme designed to expose the true nature and intent of the international Communist conspiracy.” A December 1954 NSC report recommended several “concrete proposals” to achieve this goal. One of them was to revive *Amerika*.⁸⁷

Walter Hixson has described *Amerika* as “polite propaganda.”⁸⁸ In fact, the USIA continuously resisted having its work described as “propaganda,” and tended to use the term pejoratively to describe the information programs of its adversaries. In part, this tendency emerged in response to congressional critics who also used the term negatively to describe USIA activities. USIA Directors routinely deflected the pejorative label in their guidance for agency staff, and in their statements to the media.⁸⁹

contrasting American and Soviet conceptions of peace. See: “Report Prepared by the National Security Council, August 31, 1955,” *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. IX, 529-531.

⁸⁶ “Circular Airgram From the United States Information Agency to All USIS Missions, April 11, 1956,” *Ibid.*, 567-568, 570-574.

⁸⁷ “Report Prepared by the National Security Council, March 2, 1955,” *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. IX, 509-511.

⁸⁸ Hixson, *Parting the Curtain*, 118.

⁸⁹ Theodore Streibert, for example, in April 1956 directed Agency staff that their objectives should be “aimed at continuing, substantive progress, and not at mere propaganda victories.” See: “Circular Airgram From the United States Information Agency to All USIS Missions, April 11, 1956,” *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. IX, 571-572.

Often this involved pledging to uphold some form of journalistic integrity.⁹⁰

George V. Allen tried to counter the “suspicion ... that there is something fundamentally evil and un-American about a propaganda agency” by promising that the USIA would deliver “a straight story.”⁹¹ Edward R. Murrow similarly sought to distance the agency from the taint of propaganda by swearing to portray a “warts and all” vision of the United States.⁹² Lyndon Johnson admonished Carl Rowan to “[t]ell the truth ... about the good things and the bad things in our own country.”⁹³ He similarly advised Leonard Marks that the United States had “no propaganda to

⁹⁰ Arthur Larson promised reporters the agency would not engage in “preaching,” “bragging,” or “selling America.” The New York Times did not shy from calling the USIA a propaganda agency during Larson’s term as Director. An April 1957 article described the Agency’s “cold war role of dispensing American propaganda and information abroad.” See: “U.S.I.A.—Report on its Operations Abroad,” E8; Dana Adams Schmidt, “Voice’ Chief Sees U.S. Opportunity,” *The New York Times*, December 24, 1956, 6. Larson attempted to codify the move away from emotional or moral appeals, and to prove to observers that USIA was not “in the ‘propaganda’ business.” He directed the agency to identify the United States with the “aspirations of the other country for freedom, progress and peace.” In early 1959, after leaving USIA, Larson’s book *What We Are For* elaborated on these themes. One reviewer who wrote favorably about Larson’s book was future president John F. Kennedy. See: Arthur Larson, *What We Are For* (New York, NY: Harper, 1959); John F. Kennedy, “If the World’s to Know us Better; We Must Show Ourselves as We Are, Urges a One-Time Eisenhower Aide,” *The New York Times*, February 8, 1959, BR1; Lambert, “L. Arthur Larson Is Dead at 82; Top Eisenhower Aide and Writer,” D24; Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 136, 144, 145, 149.

⁹¹ Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 151.

⁹² Kennedy’s December 1960 USIA Task Force warned that “slogans or propaganda gimmick[s]” would not be enough to answer the crisis in America’s image abroad. See: Ibid., 191-192. The Americans’ pejorative interpretation of “propaganda” also colored their interactions with their Soviet counterparts. On January 29, 1962, Murrow met with Mikhail Khalarov, Chief of the Press Division of the Soviet Foreign Ministry in Paris, France. According to one observer, Khalarov “aimed ... a great many barbs” at Murrow including “accusing him of playing the role of a ‘master propagandist.’” Murrow answered that Khalarov should testify before the Senate Appropriations Committee: “such testimony,” he said, “would no doubt go far in increasing the USIA budget.” See: “Memorandum From the President’s Press Secretary (Salinger) to President Kennedy,” February 1, 1962,” *FRUS*, 1961-1963, vol. V, 363; Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 21, 193-194.

⁹³ At Carl Rowan’s February 28, 1964 swearing in, Johnson asserted: “The USIA is not a propaganda apparatus. It is, rather, an instrument for the communication of truth throughout the world.” See: Lyndon Baines Johnson, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1963-64*, vol. 1 (United States Government Printing Office, 1965), 321. When the Soviet Union ceased jamming Voice Of America radio signals in 1963, Rowan revamped the station’s Russian programming to feature more musical programming, less news, and a “less polemical” tone. (The Soviets would resume jamming VOA signals in the summer of 1968.) See: United States Information Agency, “USIA Director Leonard H. Marks Deplores Resumption of Soviet Jamming,” August 22, 1968, RG 306, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Office of the Director, Historical Collection, Biographical Files Relating to USIA Directors and other Senior Officials, 1953-2000, Box 11, NARA II; “Memorandum for the Record, October 16, 1964,” *FRUS*, 1964-1968, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), vol. XIV, 124-125; Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 236-237.

peddle.”⁹⁴ Marks strove to refashion perceptions of the USIA’s activities by using a freshly minted euphemism for propaganda: “public diplomacy.”⁹⁵ While American propagandists claimed to tell the truth *instead* of propagandizing, the two concepts—truth and propaganda—are both subjective terms, and are not necessarily diametrically opposed. Indeed, the American emphasis on “openness,” “facts,” “information,” and the “warts and all” approach, showed them using truth *as* propaganda.

Funding for the USIA increased substantially, if not steadily, over the first decade of the agency’s existence from \$84.2 million in 1954 to \$159.9 million in 1965. The most significant jump in USIA resources came in fiscal year 1957 when total appropriations leapt to \$113 million from \$87.3 million in 1956.⁹⁶ By 1960, the agency had 202 posts in 85 countries and several thousands of employees, including 6,881 foreign nationals.⁹⁷ Despite Murrow’s personal lobbying, funding for USIA programs fell far short of his repeated requests during his time as Director.⁹⁸ Under

⁹⁴ At Marks’ swearing in on August 31, 1965 Johnson declared: “We are neither advocates nor defenders of any dogma so fragile or a doctrine so frightened as to require propaganda.” See: Lyndon Baines Johnson, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*, vol. 2 (United States Government Printing Office, 1966), 955-956; Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 255.

⁹⁵ “Public diplomacy” perfectly described the work of the agency with more legitimacy and fewer stigmas than phrases like “propaganda” and “public relations” connoted. The term won ready acceptance within USIA but never found widespread use outside of the Agency until the 1980s. As historian Nicholas Cull, wrote, “it was a perfect piece of propaganda about propaganda.” The phrase emerged in the mid-1960s, making it easier for USIA to find supporters in Washington. Edmund Gullion, Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, who coined the term “public diplomacy,” wrote in 1967: “I would have liked to call it ‘propaganda’. It seemed the nearest thing in the pure interpretation of the word to what we were doing. But ‘propaganda’ has always had a pejorative connotation in this country. To describe the whole range of communications, information and propaganda, we hit upon ‘public diplomacy.’” See: Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 259-260, 278.

⁹⁶ Rubin, 51; “U.S.I.A.—Report on its Operations Abroad,” *The New York Times*, April 28, 1957, E8.

⁹⁷ Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 187-188.

⁹⁸ The House of Representatives appropriation committee chaired by John R. Rooney posed the main obstacle to increasing USIA monies. After Kennedy’s assassination, a very ill Murrow personally lobbied for an extra \$9 million for the USIA to respond to the tragedy, but the congressional subcommittee reduced the figure to \$5 million. Murrow personally confronted Rooney in the building where the House offices were located and convinced him to grant an \$8 million increase. See: Sperber,

Leonard Marks, shifts in the United States' relationships with the USSR, China, and the Middle East—but above all the agency's role in Vietnam—drove USIA budgets to the highest levels before or since.⁹⁹ The USIA's FY 1966 operating budget of about \$158 million supported an international staff of approximately 12,000 employees at 218 posts in 104 different countries.¹⁰⁰ By FY 1974, USIA's total appropriations of \$207,414,000 supported around 9,000 employees at 109 posts in 108 different countries.¹⁰¹

The Soviet Department of Agitation and Propaganda (Agitprop)

Though the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. physically published *Soviet Life*, all Soviet propaganda received direction and guidance from the Department of Agitation and Propaganda, which has been commonly known by the shorthand Agitprop. Agitprop had a long history. Bolshevik interest in the potential of propaganda to shape society predated the 1917 October Revolution. In 1903, the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Party adopted Lenin's resolution "On the Situation in Propaganda," providing the basis for what would become over the long term a highly organized and sophisticated apparatus dedicated to

Murrow, His Life and Times, 685; Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 191-192, 196, 221, 227-229, 260.

⁹⁹ The war in Vietnam also caused world opinion about the United State to plummet, however, leading Johnson in the fall of 1965 to direct the USIA to stop surveying global opinions of American prestige, a move that Marks resisted. Marks cultivated positive relationships in his dealings with Capitol Hill by adhering to the agency's budgets and returning any unspent funds at the end of each year. The appropriations committee, even Rooney, appreciated such an approach. See: Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 255-256, 258.

¹⁰⁰ United States Information Agency, "Fact Sheet." By FY 1969 the USIA's total budget authorizations of \$171,299,850 included \$14,148,266 for the Press and Publications Service. See: United States Information Agency, "31st Review of Operations: July-December 1968," n.d., 26, RG 306, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Director's Subject Files 1968-1972, A1 42, Box 2, NARA II.

¹⁰¹ United States Information Agency, "Facts About USIA," February 1974, RG 306, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Historical Collection, Subject Files 1953-2000, Box 1, NARA II.

propaganda, agitation, and ideological theory and practice. In September 1920, the secretariat of the Central Committee (CC) of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (VKP[b]) established the first Agitprop department. In the summer of 1921, it transferred the functions of the Governmental Press Bureau to Agitprop, which soon controlled all aspects of the Party's agitation and propaganda.¹⁰²

Several reorganizations and name changes over Agitprop's long history reflected the Party's interest in continuously fine-tuning the propaganda apparatus' power to shape society.¹⁰³ The fundamental principle of propaganda's importance remained consistent however. Another constant was that Agitprop was always an organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and was overseen by the Party's CC. Party members held all key leadership positions within Agitprop, not only as heads of the apparatus, but also as managers and editors of its various

¹⁰² A. Inkeles, *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 32; Hazan, *Soviet Propaganda*, 35. Georgi V. Plekhanov famously differentiated between propaganda and agitation: "the propagandist conveys *many* ideas to one or a few persons; an agitator conveys only one or a few ideas, but to a great mass of people." Under Khrushchev, the distinction between the two concepts became fairly blurred; the two terms became somewhat interchangeable and at times replaced by other euphemisms such as "Communist education" or "ideological work." A 1963 article described the conflation of the two terms: "Propaganda and agitation have come closer to each other." Agitation, it argued, had "become more profound" while propaganda was being aimed at narrower circles of people. "The Communist reality," it declared, "turned propaganda to something more massive and accessible." The *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* considered the two concepts only "relatively independent" of each other. At any rate *partiinost'*, the Leninist principle dictating "devotion to Party principles and total adherence to Party ideology and the current political line," minimized differences in propagandists' and agitators' basic content. See: Hazan, *Soviet Propaganda*, 53.

¹⁰³ The Soviet Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union operated under various names throughout the history of the Soviet Union. From 1929 to 1934 Agitprop was temporarily divided into separate agitation and propaganda sections. In 1939 Agitprop was made a Directorate, but was reinstated as a Department in 1948. Between 1948 and 1956 the department was known as the *Otdel propagandy i agitatsii TsK VKP(B) – KPSS* (Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union). From 1956 to 1962, the *Otdel propagandy i agitatsii TsK KPSS po soiuzyim respublikam* (Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union for the Union Republics) dealt with propaganda in the Soviet republics, while the *Otdel propagandy i agitatsii TsK KPSS po RSFSR* (Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union for the Russian Republic), handled propaganda in the Russian Republic between 1956 and 1965. After 1965, and until 1988, the department was called the *Otdel propagandy TsK KPSS* (Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union). See: John Clewes, *Soviet Propaganda Techniques* (London: Methuen and Co., 1964), 12-13; Hazan, *Soviet Propaganda*, 36.

publications, such as *Soviet Life*. A member of the Presidium of the CC CPSU normally supervised Agitprop's ideological aspects. The head of Agitprop was selected from only the most trusted members of the central Secretariat.¹⁰⁴

The heads of Agitprop typically held the post longer than USIA Directors did, though like their American counterparts they were often carried into the role by changes at the height of political power. Their lengthier careers as Agitprop heads thus reflected the authoritarian system, which did not submit its political leaders to popular elections at fixed intervals. Agitprop heads were also involuntarily removed from their posts more often than their American counterparts. Often their dismissals stemmed from their association with former political leaders, or from falling into disfavor with those above them in the hierarchy. Leonid F. Ilyichev, for example, became head of Agitprop in June 1958, replacing Fyodr V. Konstantinov, a leading theoretician. Ilyichev's close identification with Khrushchev did not serve him well after the latter's ouster in October 1964, however.¹⁰⁵

Ilyichev was removed from his position sometime in the spring of 1965 and reassigned as a Deputy Foreign Minister. On August 1, 1965 the Soviet press reported that Vladimir I. Stepanov would take over as head of Agitprop, though he had effectively taken control of Agitprop in June 1965, when he left his position as

¹⁰⁴ Priscilla Johnson, *Khrushchev and the Arts: The Politics of Soviet Culture, 1962-1964* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965), vii.

¹⁰⁵ Soon after his promotion Ilyichev became Khrushchev's press adviser on the leader's trips abroad. He played a key role in crafting and presenting Khrushchev's speeches during his 1959 tour of the United States. American observers often noted his sharp tongue, quick wit, and "sarcastic comments or repartee." See: "Ideological Expert," *The New York Times*, January 18, 1962, 10; "Soviet Party Names Propaganda Chief," *The New York Times*, June 15, 1958, 3; Seymour Topping, "Soviet to Widen Ideological Work," *The New York Times*, September 11, 1960, 14; Theodore Shabad, "Aide Says Khrushchev's Power Is Unlike Stalin Personality Cult," *The New York Times*, October 25, 1961, 4; Prokhorov, *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, 10:135d.

Editor of *Izvestiya*.¹⁰⁶ Stepakov was strongly associated with the post-Khrushchev leadership.¹⁰⁷ His removal in March 1970 came amid a shake-up of key information and propaganda posts in the spring of that year. Western observers interpreted the move as evidence that Stepakov had fallen out of favor with Brezhnev. At the time, Soviet officials announced that he would be replaced by Stepan V. Chervonenko, formerly a Ukrainian party secretary and at the time Soviet ambassador to Prague. By late 1970, however, Western observers concluded that the position had simply been left vacant.¹⁰⁸

Aleksandr Yakovlev, Stepakov's former deputy at Agitprop, was elevated to acting head. Yakovlev attracted attention in late 1972 for publishing a two-page criticism of Russian nationalism in the Soviet Writers' Union's weekly newspaper, the *Literary Gazette*.¹⁰⁹ His removal from Agitprop in May 1973 came amid a Politburo shake-up intended to consolidate Brezhnev's support there in advance of his June 1973 visit to the United States.¹¹⁰ Western analysts interpreted Yakovlev's removal as a result of his liberal and anti-Stalinist leanings. His ouster was seen as a victory for Mikhail Suslov, who exerted great influence over Agitprop in the 1970s.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁶ "Ideological Chief Named in Moscow," *The New York Times*, 1965, 6.

¹⁰⁷ See: David Wedgwood Benn, "New Thinking in Soviet Propaganda," *Soviet Studies* 21, no. 1 (July 1969).

¹⁰⁸ Stepakov was reassigned as ambassador to Yugoslavia. See: Yitzhak M. Brudny, *Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State, 1953-1991* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 90; Christopher Shulgan, *The Soviet Ambassador: The Making of the Radical Behind Perestroika* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2008), 121; Bernard Gwertzman, "Moscow Drops Criticism Drive; Key Officials Reported Ousted," *The New York Times*, April 10, 1970, 1; Bernard Gwertzman, "Press Agency in Soviet Gets New Chief," *The New York Times*, September 11, 1970, 6; "World: That Puzzling Politburo Plague," *Time*, April 20, 1970.

¹⁰⁹ Alexander Yakovlev, "Protiv antiistorizma (Against Anti-historicism)," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, November 15, 1972, pp. 4-5.

¹¹⁰ Petro Shelest and Gennady Voronov were also removed from the Politburo at this time. Yakovlev was sent to Ottawa to become Ambassador to Canada, a diminished appointment he held for the next ten years.

¹¹¹ "Man in the News; in the Gorbachev Mold: Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev," *The New York Times*, June 27, 1987, sec. World, 15; "Soviet Ideologist Loses Post for 'Liberalism,'" *The Times*, May 8,

Throughout the period that Yakovlev acted as head of Agitprop and beyond, the CC's Secretary for Ideological Affairs Petr N. Demichev exerted a powerful influence over the department. After Yakovlev's dismissal, Demichev filled the role of Agitprop head in deed, if not in name. Demichev, along with other Propaganda department deputies G. Smirnov, Y. Sklyarov and V. Medvedev sat together with other key information officials on a committee within the Propaganda Department that processed policy directives, translated them into propaganda policy, and coordinated guidance and specific instructions to the lower propaganda bureaus.¹¹²

Unlike their counterparts in the U.S., Agitprop's leaders did not typically come from backgrounds in journalism or broadcasting. Instead, they distinguished themselves as longstanding Party members who had moved up the ranks of the propaganda apparatus, and had often completed some ideological training. Ilyichev had been a Party member since 1924. He had worked as a film censor, a theater critic and an editor of *Pravda* for three years under Stalin. His influence rose steadily after Stalin's death, when he soon began handling Soviet press relations. In October 1953 he was promoted to head the Press Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, and was elected to the Secretariat in October 1961.¹¹³ A Party member since 1937, Stepanov rose through various political posts in post-war Moscow—from secretary of a city borough to second secretary of the Moscow party organization. In 1957 he graduated from the Party's top development program for ideologists: the Academy of Social Sciences attached to the CPSU CC. In 1961 Stepanov was assigned to do

1973, 9; James O. Jackson, "Soviet Union Not Just Another Pretty Face," *Time*, July 13, 1987; Mikhail Beloborodov, "Position of Strength," *The New York Times*, June 14, 1973, 47.

¹¹² "The World/Continued," *The New York Times*, November 17, 1974, 245; Hazan, *Soviet Propaganda*, 80; Prokhorov, *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, 8:113b, 31:595b.

¹¹³ "Ideological Expert," 10; "Soviet Party Names Propaganda Chief," 3; Topping, "Soviet to Widen Ideological Work," 14; Shabad, "Aide Says Khrushchev's Power Is Unlike Stalin Personality Cult," 4; Prokhorov, *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, 10:135d.

ideological work within the CC as Khrushchev made him head of the Ideological Department for the Russian Republic. After Khrushchev's ouster, Stepakov had replaced Khrushchev's son-in-law Alexei Adzhubei as *Izvestiya* editor. Stepakov became a CC member in 1966.¹¹⁴ Yakovlev had risen through various Party positions between 1962 and 1973, from an Agitprop instructor, to chief of the broadcast section of the Propaganda Department, then to an editor of the journal *Kommunist*.¹¹⁵ Demichev had been a CPSU member since 1939, a member of the CC since 1961, a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet from 1962 to 1966, a candidate member of the Politburo since 1964, and served as CC secretary from October 1961 to December 1974.¹¹⁶

From the 1950s to the 1970s Agitprop's periodic reforms and personnel changes were often intended to strengthen Party control of propaganda. Its leadership was often directed to intensify the effectiveness of propaganda. In doing so, they often introduced techniques borrowed from the West.¹¹⁷ A four-day conference of leading party propagandists in September 1960 responded to CC criticisms that Agitprop's "dogmatic" techniques had divorced propaganda from daily life. A January 1960 CC decree directed Agitprop to intensify its ideological work. The September meeting's report cited the need for a "creative approach in

¹¹⁴ "Ideological Chief Named in Moscow," 6; Prokhorov, *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, 24:529d.

¹¹⁵ "Man in the News; in the Gorbachev Mold: Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev," 15; "Soviet Ideologist Loses Post for 'Liberalism,'" 9; Jackson, "Soviet Union Not Just Another Pretty Face"; Beloborodov, "Position of Strength," 47.

¹¹⁶ "Ukazom Prezidiuma Verkhovno Soveta SSSR Naznachenije tovarishch P.N. Demichev SSSR ministra kul'tury (Decree of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet Appointing Comrade P.N. Demichev U.S.S.R. Minister of Culture)." *Pravda*, November 15, 1974, 1; "The World/Continued," 245; Hazan, *Soviet Propaganda*, 80; Prokhorov, *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, 8:113b, 31:595b.

¹¹⁷ As the head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Press Department, Ilyichev introduced journalistic techniques borrowed from the West such as holding frequent news conferences and press releases. At the 1955 Geneva conference he briefed reporters on Soviet policies and views. See: 14; Shabad, "Aide Says Khrushchev's Power Is Unlike Stalin Personality Cult," 4; Prokhorov, *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, 10:135d.

accordance with new historical conditions” – a euphemism for Khrushchev’s peaceful coexistence policy. As head of Agitprop, Ilyichev also oversaw a strengthening of Party control of the propaganda apparatus.¹¹⁸

In his 1967 book *Partiinoye propaganda—nauchnye osnovy* (Scientific Principles for Party Propaganda), Stepakov argued that Soviet propagandists should learn from their counterparts in the West.¹¹⁹ Writing in 1969 about Stepakov’s work, the scholar of Soviet propaganda David Wedgwood Benn argued that, contrary to Western perceptions, Soviet propaganda was not as sophisticated as its Western counterpart. Greater willingness in the West to utilize social science research to improve methods of persuasion had given Western propagandists—and particularly Americans—an advantage in their techniques. Stepakov’s attempt to address Soviet shortcomings in this area showed Agitprop pursuing a “more sophisticated approach” partly in response to Western “bourgeois” propaganda.¹²⁰

Both Stepakov’s and Yakovlev’s removals as heads of Agitprop can be interpreted as attempts to tighten Party control of Soviet propaganda. The fact that the post was left vacant after Yakovlev’s dismissal, and its role filled by Demichev (a

¹¹⁸ Theodore Shabad, “Soviet Revises Propaganda Unit,” *The New York Times*, April 6, 1963, 2. Speaking to the delegates at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in October 1961, Ilyichev attacked the “cult of personality” while defending the “cult of authority,” arguing that criticism of Stalinist excesses should not diminish the current leader’s authority. See: “Ideological Expert,” 10; “Soviet Party Names Propaganda Chief,” 3; Topping, “Soviet to Widen Ideological Work,” 14; Shabad, “Aide Says Khrushchev’s Power Is Unlike Stalin Personality Cult,” 4.

¹¹⁹ Stepakov argued that Soviet propagandists needed to put more focus on propaganda methods like the persuasion techniques long-studied in the West but overlooked by the Khrushchev era resolutions, which addressed content but not techniques. While literature on the methods of propaganda, persuasion and advertising had proliferated in the West—and particularly in the United States—similar Soviet works on propaganda theory and methods were, Stepakov regretted, “extremely few.” He urged increasing study of propaganda techniques in order to increase the emotional appeal of Soviet propaganda, to exercise greater “influence on people’s emotions and feelings.” He also called for closer examination of the methods of persuasion employed by “bourgeois ideologists” in the West. See: V. Vladimir Stepakov, *Partiinoye propaganda—nauchnye osnovy* (The scientific foundations of party propaganda) Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1967), 86-87, 266-267.

¹²⁰ Benn, “New Thinking in Soviet Propaganda,” 52, 54-55, 61-63.

national party secretary with a reputation as an “orthodox ideologist and a conservative man,” who had been overseeing the arts and propaganda for the better part of a decade) points to such a conclusion. Though he already held a higher rank than minister, Demichev’s November 1974 appointment as the USSR Minister of Culture was also seen in the West as sign of tightening party control over the government and over cultural affairs.¹²¹

Agitprop did not directly engage in the day-to-day operations of creating and disseminating propaganda but instead oversaw and directed those agencies—both governmental and “independent”—that did. In essence, Agitprop was a many-armed organism with the CPSU as its head.¹²² The central Agitprop department attached to the CC Secretariat translated directives from the Party’s Presidium into propaganda policy—the general line that channeled out to lower level Agitprop offices and to the various agents producing propaganda. The higher-levels of Agitprop’s structures were generally headquartered in Moscow, and from there oversaw various lower-level regional and local organizations throughout the USSR’s administrative territorial divisions.¹²³

After Stalin’s death in 1953, his successors almost immediately began reinvigorating the propaganda apparatus and addressing weaknesses that had emerged under his leadership, including thematic simplification.¹²⁴ A series of

¹²¹ When he became Minister of Culture in 1974, Demichev succeeded Yekaterina Furtseva who had filled the role for the previous fourteen years but committed suicide in October. See: “The World/Continued,” 245; Hazan, *Soviet Propaganda*, 80; Prokhorov, *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, 8:113b, 31:595b.

¹²² At the Nineteenth Party Congress in the fall of 1952, VKP(b)—the Bolshevik Party—was renamed the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

¹²³ Buzek, *How the Communist Press Works*, 32-37.

¹²⁴ Khrushchev addressed the “firmly rooted stereotypes” and “single pattern” of Soviet propaganda at a CC conference in late 1953, and called for “more varied ... content and form of presentation.” See: *Ibid.*, 84.

resolutions on propaganda and agitation issued by CC Plenums and Congresses over the next several years sought to reform Agitprop. These reforms injected new methods and technologies to revitalize the effectiveness and reach of Soviet propaganda.¹²⁵ The Twentieth Congress in 1956 ignited a campaign to “brighten up” Soviet propaganda by assailing the influence of “dogmatists” within Agitprop. By 1960, the Party openly assaulted Agitprop’s lack of perspicuity and narrow influence.¹²⁶ Throughout the late 1950s, the Soviet press was instructed to use more pictures and photographs, though in February 1958 Agitprop denounced the use of “content-less” images. Soviet propagandists were required to concentrate on material that had social or political value and employed a perspective of class analysis.¹²⁷

The central themes of Agitprop’s international propaganda revolved around the ideological struggle against the “bourgeoisie,” and in particular against “imperialist” propaganda. Agitprop’s leadership, and its materials, claimed that the scientific basis of Marxist-Leninism made the Communist Party the sole guarantor of mankind’s aspirations for peace and progress. In the period under review in this study, the theme of peaceful coexistence occupied a primary position in Agitprop materials, as leading Soviet propagandists’ speeches and reports essentially echoed the ideas of the Soviet leadership.¹²⁸

¹²⁵ The Twentieth Congress in 1956, for example, directed a rebirth of the cult of Lenin (in part to “liquidate” the Stalinist “cult of personality”), focused energies on mobilizing the masses through ideological education, and called for a new Party Program—the first since 1919. See: Grey Hodnett, ed., *Resolutions and Decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Volume 4, The Khrushchev Years, 1953-1964* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 13, 52, 70, 81.

¹²⁶ David Wedgwood Benn, *Persuasion and Soviet Politics* (Oxford, UK: B. Blackwell, 1989), 135-136.

¹²⁷ Buzek, *How the Communist Press Works*, 48-49, 56-57.

¹²⁸ Agitprop head Leonid Ilyichev, for example, opened a June 1963 Ideological Plenum with a report that, while signaling a renewed strengthening of Party control over ideology in the arts and letters, also reaffirmed “the concept of political peaceful co-existence” and called “repeatedly” for the persistence of the ideological struggle against the “bourgeoisie.” See: Office of Research, “M-279-63, The Soviet Attack On USIA,” August 29, 1963, RG 306, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Office of Research, Research Memorandums 1963-1982, Box 1, NARA II; Office of Research, “M-174-63,

To support the argument that the Soviet Union was the best-suited social, political and economic system for advancing human progress, Agitprop propaganda routinely emphasized the rapid pace of Soviet scientific, technological, and industrial development. Tying it back to the ideological struggle, Agitprop just as regularly claimed Marxist-Leninist “science” as the source for Soviet progress.¹²⁹

In its “struggle for peace” against Western “imperialist” propaganda, Agitprop viewed the USIA as its principal adversary not only domestically in the Soviet Union—where USIA activities like the Voice of America (VOA) radio service targeted Soviet audiences without approval from the Soviet government—but also internationally where both superpowers extensively targeted the rest of the world with their propaganda. Agitprop often campaigned against the USIA in major Soviet publications and key speeches by its leadership.¹³⁰

Upon its founding on April 3, 1961 the “public information service” Agentstvo Pechati Novosti (APN) (or Novosti for short) took over publication of *Soviet Life*.¹³¹ Novosti essentially played the same role as USIA by operating as the primary Soviet information service for foreign consumption. Its creation was

Memorandum: Ideological Plenum Ilichev Report,” June 21, 1963, RG 306, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Office of Research, Research Memorandums 1963-1982, Box 1, NARA II.

¹²⁹ Honoring Lenin’s anniversary in an April 1965 speech, Petr Demichev, for example, argued that Lenin’s “scientific approach” to the “correlation of class forces”—which he called the “soul of Marxism”—had led the Party and Soviet government “to put the fruits of scientific work at the service of the interests of the people, the interests of peace and progress.” See: *Pravda*, April 23, 1965 (Lenin Anniversary speech); George W. Breslauer, “On the Adaptability of Soviet Welfare-State Authoritarianism,” in *The Soviet Polity in the Modern Era*, ed. Erik P. Hoffmann and Robbin Frederick Laird (Hawthorne, NY: Aldine Transaction, 1984), 225-226.

¹³⁰ In the spring and summer of 1963, for instance, in what one USIA report called “the longest and, comparatively, most intensive propaganda campaign against USIA since its inception in 1953,” an article in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* called USIA a “gigantic factory of lies,” and a “truly tremendous monster of the cold war,” while Agitprop head Ilyichev reserved particular scorn for USIA at an Ideological Plenum in June where he denounced the American agency as the United States’ “primary instrument of ideological subversion.” See: Office of Research, “M-279-63, The Soviet Attack On USIA”; Office of Research, “M-174-63, Memorandum: Ideological Plenum Ilichev Report.”

¹³¹ Novosti was established on the basis of the Soviet Information Bureau (Sovinformburo), an information service created on June 24, 1941 to direct press and radio coverage of international and domestic news during the Great Patriotic War.

intended “to get away from the gray, dour image presented to the world by the TASS news service,” to exploit “new and imaginative forms of propaganda,” and to appear as an independent agency ostensibly less closely associated with the Soviet government than TASS had been.¹³²

Boris Burkov headed Novosti from its 1961 inception until he was dismissed in 1970.¹³³ Under Burkov, Novosti earned reputation for being the most “western” of Soviet media organizations, its foreign outlook allowing it to touch on a wider variety of topics than other Soviet publications. Ivan I. Udaltsov headed Novosti from 1970 to 1975, during which time CC appointees replaced much of Burkov’s staff of experienced journalists.¹³⁴ From 1975 to 1983 Lev N. Tolkunov headed the agency.¹³⁵ Novosti’s mandate noted that:

Expansion of the exchange of various types of information will contribute to establishment of a spirit of mutuality and cooperation in the struggle for peace and friendship between peoples.

Novosti’s motto—“Information for Peace, and for the Friendship of Nations”—assumed the view that propaganda could positively transform international relations. Its “primary task,” Burkov later recalled, was to promote the USSR internationally. With its own television service and publishing house, Novosti’s propaganda reach

¹³² Novosti’s claims to independence from the Soviet government rested on the fact that it was governed by a “Council of Founders” made up of various “non-governmental” organizations including the Union of Journalists, the Union of Writers, the Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and the Znanie (Knowledge) Society. These societies all engaged in propaganda activities, and none operated outside of the final authority of the Party. Khrushchev’s son-in-law Aleksei Adzhubei was a foremost member of the Council. Boris Burkov was the board’s first chairman. See: Martin Ebon, *The Soviet Propaganda Machine* (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 1987), 205; Hazan, *Soviet Propaganda*, 43.

¹³³ Burkov had been Chief Editor of the newspaper *Trud* (Labor) from 1954 to 1960.

¹³⁴ Udaltsov was a graduate of Moscow University and Candidate of Sciences in History. See: Christopher S. Wren, “Russian’s Curiosity About U.S. Is Rising,” *The New York Times*, June 26, 1974, 16.

¹³⁵ Gwertzman, “Press Agency in Soviet Gets New Chief,” 6; Prokhorov, *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, 1:642c, 1:647a; Ebon, *The Soviet Propaganda Machine*, 205; Hazan, *Soviet Propaganda*, 43.

was enormous.¹³⁶ In the United States, Novosti publications were sold through select book sellers, including New York's Four Continent Book Corporation, Chicago's Imported Publications, Inc., and San Francisco's Znanie Book Store. *Soviet Life* was one of the marquee Novosti publications.¹³⁷

¹³⁶ Taking over the operations of the Foreign Language Publishing House, the Agency increased Soviet production of foreign-language books from 40 million to 44 million copies between 1960 and 1965, while expanding the number of languages on offer. APN produced more than 35 million books, newspapers, magazines, albums, and other items between 1965 and 1967 alone. The Agency's photo service also supplied the Soviet press with an extraordinary number of photographs. It had offices in 73 different countries (as well as all of the Soviet Republics) and published materials in 56 languages for circulation in 110 foreign countries by 1968.

¹³⁷ Ebon, *The Soviet Propaganda Machine*, 206-207, 210; Prokhorov, *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, 1:652; Hazan, *Soviet Propaganda*, 62-63.

SECTION I: “FOR ALL MANKIND”: PEACE

3. “TO EXPOSE THE [SOVIET] ‘PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE’ SLOGAN AS A BARREN PROMISE”:

Depicting the Peaceful Exploration of Space in *Amerika*

This chapter examines American political leaders’ discourse on peace, as a context for understanding *Amerika*’s depiction of space exploration as a peaceful endeavor. It seeks to explain how the magazine implemented official narratives that strongly associated space exploration with peace to advance broader American propaganda objectives.

Alarmed at a Soviet “peace offensive” launched in the mid-1950s, American foreign policy makers sought an effective theme to counter Soviet peace propaganda. By the early 1960s they decided to utilize an image of an “open world,” then, more specifically, to contrast an American “world of free choice” against a Soviet “world of coercion.” First emerging in response to Soviet peace propaganda, the new strategy was soon adopted in American international discourse and USIA output. Space exploration perfectly suited the universal terms of American discourse on peace, which envisioned a struggle between two “worlds” for the hearts and minds of “all mankind.” Just as American leaders routinely exploited space themes to support their discourse on peace, so did USIA propaganda use space to demonstrate the “open world” and “world of free choice” counter themes.

Amerika vigorously associated American space exploration with openness. Its space reports showcased the American space program’s accessibility to the media, and highlighted an unrestricted American society tuned in to view space events. It especially used Apollo 11 to explicitly cast exploration of the Moon as a symbol of

the global search for peace. It routinely depicted humanity uniting to watch space exploits to imply that American leadership of the space race meant that it also led in the so-called peace race. This chapter first examines the most salient aspects of American political discourse and propaganda policy to assess how American officials sought to use space exploration to project an image of global leadership. It then closely examines *Amerika* to demonstrate how these goals influenced the magazine's portrayals of the U.S. space program.

The Soviet Peace Offensive

Eleven days after Stalin's March 5, 1953 death, Georgi Malenkov signaled a dramatic shift in Soviet foreign policy toward improving relations with the West. Before the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Malenkov delivered a major speech on peace, and captured world attention. Over time, Soviet de-Stalinization would continue to enhance Soviet prestige internationally. But even before Stalin's body was laid to rest, many observers in Washington began to view a Soviet peace initiative as a threat to American interests. CIA analyses of world opinion confirmed American officials' fears: that Soviet peace propaganda left many viewing fierce American anticommunism as the greatest threat to peace.¹

Dismayed by Soviet pronouncements on peace, Eisenhower made ideological competition and psychological warfare with the Soviet Union central to his New Look foreign policy. In the weeks after Stalin's death, American officials moved "to seize the initiative" with a coordinated political warfare attack designed to create friction between Stalin's potential successors and strain Moscow's relations with

¹ Kenneth Alan Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence, KA: University of Kansas, 2006), 61, 69.

other communist states. Central to this strategy was a high profile peace campaign that they hoped would disarm the Soviet peace offensive and “unite humanity, especially the free world, with us.” Eisenhower’s April 16, 1953, speech on “A Chance for Peace,” and the massive propaganda campaign that followed, was crafted to put the Soviets back on the “peace defensive.”²

Eisenhower and his advisors viewed the Soviet “peace offensive” as a “menacing political warfare tactic.” Questioning the sincerity of the Soviet call for “peaceful coexistence,” they feared that it was simply a tactic to legitimize the bipolar status quo, or worse, to subdue the Western world without resorting to war. Such cynicism led them to view the important 1955 superpower summit at Geneva with similar foreboding. The “new spirit of amity” post-Geneva was considered a “danger” to USIA propaganda efforts.³ The agency directly confronted the Soviet peace offensive. Its semi-annual report for the second half of 1954 noted that its activities aimed:

To expose the ‘peaceful co-existence’ slogan as a barren promise ... to convince peoples abroad that the U.S. stands ... for a peace which is more meaningful than simple coexistence of two blocs of nations.⁴

² Lloyd Gardner, “Poisoned Apples: John Foster Dulles and the “Peace Offensive,”” in *The Cold War After Stalin's Death: A Missed Opportunity for Peace?*, ed. Klaus Larres and Kenneth A. Osgood (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006); Osgood, *Total Cold War*, 56-59, 62-66, 71-74; “Circular Letter From the Acting Director of the United States Information Agency (Washburn) to all USIS Posts, August 24, 1955,” U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, vol. IX (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), 526 (hereafter FRUS followed by years and volume number).

³ Raymond L. Garthoff, *Assessing the Adversary: Estimates of the Eisenhower Administration of Soviet Intentions and Capabilities* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1991), 9; Osgood, *Total Cold War*, 68, 70, 73-74; “Report Prepared by the National Security Council, March 2, 1955,” U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. IX, 506; “Editorial Note,” U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. V, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998), 405; “Circular Airgram From the United States Information Agency to all USIS Missions, April 11, 1956,” U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. IX, 567-568, 570.

⁴ “Report Prepared by the National Security Council, March 2, 1955,” U.S. Department of State, FRUS, 1955-1957, vol. IX, 504-521, quotation from page 506.

Fear of the Soviet Union had been crucial to cementing relationships between the United States and its allies, and to maintain the American public's support for the vast armaments industries necessary to contain the communist menace. A peaceful Soviet Union might reduce the cohesion of American alliances and disrupt the American economic order. The American peace counteroffensive aimed to maintain fear of the Soviet menace by depicting Soviet peace propaganda as insincere and treacherous.⁵

USIA came into existence just months after Stalin's demise and defined its priorities largely in response to the Soviet peace offensive and new political order. Key figures in the new agency recognized that the Cold War was increasingly being fought in the psychological arena, and that peace propaganda would be its most decisive battle.⁶ Peace figured prominently in Eisenhower's discourse, and the USIA gave wide publicity across the globe to his statements on the theme.⁷ Agency directives regularly quoted his speeches to guide staff on their "general tone and approach," while a complex system of communication channels between USIA and the State Department ensured that American propaganda supported its foreign policy objectives.⁸

⁵ Osgood, *Total Cold War*, 62-63.

⁶ "Circular Letter From the Acting Director of the United States Information Agency (Washburn) to all USIS Posts, August 24, 1955," U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. IX, 526, 528.

⁷ Nicholas John Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 163; "Report Prepared by the National Security Council, March 2, 1955," U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. IX, 506-507; "Diary Entry by the President's Press Secretary (Hagerty), March 22, 1965," *Ibid.*, 521.

⁸ United States Information Agency, "Procedures By Which the U.S. Information Agency Receives Foreign Policy Guidance," December 22, 1958, RG 306, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Historical Collection, Subject Files 1953-2000, Box 14, NARA II; "Circular Airgram From the United States Information Agency to all USIS Missions, April 11, 1956," U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. IX, 572-573.

The changes in Moscow challenged the USIA, which proved unreceptive to the shifting Soviet outlook.⁹ The Eisenhower administration noticed that Soviet discourse was evolving, but focused on finding the Cold War advantage, they chose to ignore the changes and instead concentrate on the ideological differences between the two superpowers. USIA was instructed to expose Soviet peace initiatives as disingenuous.¹⁰ Simply dismissing Soviet peace propaganda by raising suspicions about Soviet motivations was insufficient, however, for projecting an image of American leadership on the peace front. It was thus vital to elucidate an American conception of peace.¹¹ As Eisenhower told a meeting to discuss USIA appropriations on March 2, 1955:

We are trying to convince the people in the world that we are working for peace and not trying to blow them to kingdom come with our atom and thermonuclear bombs.¹²

USIA officials responded by helping to define an American conception of peace associated with freedom and material prosperity and by subsequently exploiting these themes to portray the widest contrast between American and Soviet conceptions of peace.¹³ They articulated this propaganda ideal of peace in response to—and opposition to—their Cold War adversary.

⁹ “Circular Airgram From the United States Information Agency to all USIS Missions, April 11, 1956,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. IX, 572, 575-576; Harry Schwartz, “The Talks: Unanswered Questions,” *The New York Times*, October 4, 1959, E5.

¹⁰ “Circular Airgram From the United States Information Agency to all USIS Missions, April 11, 1956,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. IX, 572, 575-6.

¹¹ As Nelson Rockefeller argued to Eisenhower, “the U.S. must find some other motivation than fear with which to inspire the efforts of free men for the long pull.” See: Osgood, *Total Cold War*, 69.

¹² “Report Prepared by the National Security Council, March 2, 1955,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. IX, 506-507; “Diary Entry by the President’s Press Secretary (Hagerty), March 22, 1965,” *Ibid.*, 521.

¹³ “Circular Letter From the Acting Director of the United States Information Agency (Washburn) to all USIS Posts, August 24, 1955,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. IX, 527-528. Post-Sputnik, American officials continued to forcefully insist that the American conception of peace was

The fundamental concern with communicating an American conception of peace shaped USIA's space propaganda. Two USIA planning papers in 1958 advocated an increased role for science and technology themes to address explicitly tensions between the two superpowers. One argued that Eisenhower's "science for peace" initiative, which called for increased international scientific cooperation, could be used to counter perceptions that American scientific and technological advancements were primarily applied to militaristic ends. The other paper similarly stressed that science and technology themes should occupy an ever more prominent role in USIA output, and be linked intently to popular aspirations for "freedom, progress, and peace." Such a strategy would entail emphasizing how American promotion of freedom would aid "all mankind" to benefit from scientific and technological progress.¹⁴

The USIA was quite commonly directed to depict American foreign policies and actions benefiting "all mankind."¹⁵ Space exploration, which inspired visions of the globe as a single sphere, provided an ideal topic for a propaganda strategy seeking to associate American science and technology with the hopes of all mankind.

Promotion of an American conception of peace also shaped the direction of American space policy. With the creation of NASA in 1958, the United States

"not passive" nor the status quo, but was defined by conformity to "moral law." See: "Circular Airgram From the United States Information Agency to all USIS Missions, April 11, 1956," U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. IX, 567-568, 570; "Texts of U.S. and Soviet Statements at Talks on Cultural Exchanges," *The New York Times*, October 29, 1957, 14.

¹⁴ H. L. Goodwin, "Development of a USIA Program in the Fields of Science and Technology," March 18, 1958, RG 306, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Historical Collection, Subject Files 1953-2000, Box 14, NARA II; United States Information Agency, "Basic Guidance and Planning Paper No. 4, Subject: Science and Technology," November 18, 1958, RG 306, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Historical Collection, Subject Files 1953-2000, Box 14, NARA II.

¹⁵ "Circular Airgram From the United States Information Agency to all USIS Missions, April 11, 1956," U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1955-1957*, vol. IX, 572; "Editorial Note," U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1958-1960*, vol. II, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 345; "Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts, February 15, 1958," *Ibid.*, 471.

separated its military and civilian space programs to simultaneously appear at the forefront of peaceful space exploration, while quietly continuing to investigate and exploit the military potential of outer space through the Department of Defense.¹⁶ That same year, while American representatives effectively encouraged a Soviet boycott of the UN body to address peaceful space exploration—the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS)—State Department circulars reassured its foreign diplomatic missions of America’s commitment to assuring that “outer space be used only for peaceful purposes.”¹⁷

The American Counter Offensive

Compared to *Soviet Life*, *Amerika*’s space propaganda did not very often make explicit links between space exploration and peace. Instead, its coverage of space was implicitly associated with concepts like “open world” and “world of free choice”—themes that American officials very consciously embraced in order to counter the Soviet peace offensive. An “Open World” campaign first surfaced in the summer of 1959 as a major initiative for American contributions to the 14th General Assembly of the United Nations. State Department officials considered the theme an appealing

¹⁶ Dwayne A. Day, “Invitation to Struggle: The History of Civilian-Military Relations in Space,” in John M. Logsdon, ed., *Exploring the Unknown” Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume I: Organizing for Exploration* (Washington, DC: NASA History Office, 1995), 233-282; Eilene Galloway, “Organizing the U.S. Government for Outer Space, 1957-1958,” in *Reconsidering Sputnik*, ed. Roger D. Launius, John M. Logsdon, and Robert W. Smith (London: Routledge, 2000), 309-326; Peter Hays, “NASA and the Department of Defense: Enduring Themes in Three Key Areas,” in *Critical Issues in the History of Spaceflight*, ed. Steven J. Dick and Roger D. Launius, (Washington, DC: NASA, 2006), 199-238.

¹⁷ “Circular Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions, *July 28, 1958*,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1958-1960*, vol. II, 36, 148-149.

alternative and response to peaceful coexistence because it starkly contrasted the political systems of the “free world” with the secrecy of the Soviet system.¹⁸

Peaceful coexistence still generated a “favorable worldwide ‘echo’” as Kennedy presented himself as a “man of peace” at his first face-to-face meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961.¹⁹ Four days after the Vienna meeting, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and USIA Director Edward R. Murrow wrote a memorandum for Kennedy proposing an “effective countertheme” to peaceful coexistence. Rusk and Murrow outlined how USIA propaganda already conducted a thorough and extensive negative strategy focused on discrediting and emphasizing the “hypocrisy” of the Soviet peace offensive. The USIA now needed, they argued, a powerful positive counteroffensive based on clearly differentiating Soviet and American conceptions of peace. “In the field of propaganda,” they wrote, “one simply cannot beat something with nothing.” Over the next several days, USIA and State Department officials debated the merits of various slogans before settling on the phrase “world of free choice.” The President’s Special Assistant Arthur Schlesinger Jr. supported the phrase because, in his view, it vividly opposed peaceful coexistence and provided an “an immediate antithesis: the pluralistic world vs. the monolithic world.”²⁰

¹⁸ “Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Walmsley) to the Secretary of State, *August 13, 1959*,” *Ibid.*, 169-170.

¹⁹ “Current Intelligence Weekly Review”, U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. V, 40-44; “Memorandum of Conversation, June 3, 1961,” *Ibid.*, 173.

²⁰ One phrase “peaceful world community,” Schlesinger argued, was a poor choice because it failed to differentiate an American concept of peace from the Soviet one. Furthermore, the American and Soviet slogans would be too similar when translated into other languages, especially in Russian (*mirnoye miroye obschestvo*) where the words “peace” and “world” have the same root. “Community” also posed challenges, Schlesinger pointed out, often translating as “village” or closely resembling “communism.” See: “Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and the Director of the U.S. Information Agency (Murrow) to President Kennedy, June 8, 1961,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. V, 239-242; Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 199; Cull,

They extracted the phrase from a recent statement made by Rusk to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that contrasted “the world of coercion” against “the world of choice.”²¹ Foreign policy makers approved the phrase on June 29 and instructed Murrow to have USIA aggressively disseminate it on a global scale. Rusk soon used the phrase again in a major address titled “The Underlying Crisis: Coercion vs. Choice,” and it subsequently became common in speeches and press releases throughout the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.²²

By the middle of July, “all offices in Washington” including USIA, the State Department, the White House staff, as well as diplomatic posts abroad were instructed to utilize the phrase widely.²³ The slogan appeared in a renewed USIA mission statement in September 1962, and by December the agency could report that the dichotomy between “world of free choice vs. a world of coercion” had received “heavy, all-media emphasis throughout the year.”²⁴ The USIA continued to prioritize the theme even after Murrow’s tenure as Director had ended.²⁵ The Kennedy

“The Man Who Invented Truth’: The Tenure of Edward R. Murrow as Director of the United States Information Agency During the Kennedy Years,” *Cold War History* 4, no. 1 (October 2003): 29.

²¹ Ibid. Elsewhere, Schlesinger would concede that “free world” did not adequately describe countries like Spain, Portugal, Haiti, or Taiwan, but he nonetheless advocated associating American ideals with a “world of free choice” as a strategy to counter peaceful coexistence. See: Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 200.

²² Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 199; Cull, “The Man Who Invented Truth’,” 29; U.S. Department of State, *Department of State Bulletin*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961) vol. 45, pp. 177, 272, 362, 451, 549, 601, 703, 747, 885, 888, 916; vol. 46, pp. 172, 454, 640, 826, 910; vol. 47, pp. 690, 699; vol. 48, pp. 383, 450; vol. 49, pp. 286, 434, 775, 786; vol. 52, pp. 543.

²³ “News Policy Note”, No. 114-61, July 13; “National Security Action Memorandum No. 61, July 14, 1961,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. XXV, 244; *Infoguide*, July 17, 1961.

²⁴ “Memorandum From the Director of the U.S. Information Agency (Murrow) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith), September 26, 1962,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. XXV, 262; “Memorandum From the Director of the U.S. Information Agency (Murrow) to the President’s Press Secretary (Salinger), December 19, 1962,” Ibid., 265-66; “Memorandum From President Kennedy to the Director of the U.S. Information Agency (Murrow), January 25, 1963,” Ibid., 267.

²⁵ Murrow streamlined the content of the USIA Press and Publications Service to emphasize “five major themes” as “the framework for the bulk of the service’s output.” Identifying the American conception of peace with the “free world” took up two of the five “media priorities.” Agency

administration thus moved quickly in the summer of 1961 to develop a strategy for American peace propaganda. Devised to counteract the Soviet peace offensive, and chosen for its power to distinguish American and Soviet conceptions of peace, the phrase “world of free choice” became a cornerstone of American international discourse and propaganda for years to come.

Kennedy’s and Khrushchev’s Cold War discourse envisioned the United States and Soviet Union engaged in a remarkable triathlon entailing an arms race, a space race, and a peace race. In a September 25, 1961, address to the United Nations that also warned against “seeding new battlegrounds in outer space,” Kennedy challenged the Soviets “not to an arms race, but to a peace race.”²⁶ That the challenge was accepted is borne out in both sides’ discourse and propaganda on outer space. Both the Americans and Soviets sought to disassociate the space race from the arms race in the public imagination, while exploiting the space race to improve their standing in the peace race. The two sides differentiated themselves via the key issues with which they bridged the three races. While Soviet discourse most often used “disarmament” as the glue to bind the arms, space, and peace races, Americans

propagandists had to convey that the U.S. “has no more urgent task than the PURSUIT OF PEACE,” and stress that the U.S. “seeks a world of FREE CHOICE in which peaceful diversity among individuals and nations is possible.” See: Office of Public Information, “Memorandum: Some Changes In USIA Since March, 1961,” October 28, 1963, RG 306, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Historical Collection, Subject Files 1953-2000, Box 1, NARA II; United States Information Agency, “USIA CA-2852, Subject: Implementation of the Five Media Priorities,” March 17, 1964, RG 306, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Historical Collection, Subject Files 1953-2000, Box 14, NARA II.

²⁶ “John F. Kennedy: Address in New York City Before the General Assembly of the United Nations,” n.d.,

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=8352&st=&st1=#axzz1MZxrGfOk>.

Kennedy also took practical steps to distance the space race from the arms race on April 18, 1962, when the U.S. proposed a UN agreement on keeping “weapons capable of producing mass destruction” out of orbit. See: “Editorial Note,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. V, 406.

habitually employed “freedom.” The two leaders’ congratulatory exchanges on space achievements were particularly telling in this regard.²⁷

All three races continued after Kennedy’s death, and so did the American practice of using freedom to delineate its conception of peace.²⁸ Depicting America as a peaceful nation remained a paramount objective, although the Vietnam War caused Johnson considerable difficulty in fulfilling it. Vietnam virtually overwhelmed his administration’s foreign policy focus.²⁹ Still, in its information policy and Soviet relations, Johnson’s administration continued to place highest priority on fostering an image of the United States at the forefront of the effort to secure global peace.³⁰ Johnson’s discourse on peace continued to be articulated in response to the “peace offensive” of Soviet propaganda.³¹

The Peace that Comes with “Healing in its Wings”

Nixon continued to distinguish the American concern for “preserving peace and freedom in the world” from the Soviet “kind of peace that suffocated freedom.” He

²⁷ For examples see: U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. VI, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 4-5, 148, 150, 162, 288-289, 297-299.

²⁸ “Memorandum for the Record, December 18, 1963,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. V, 848; “Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg), September 18, 1965,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXIII, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 802-803.

²⁹ As Nicholas Cull has observed, it struggled to “pursue both war and peace simultaneously, and expected the USIA to reconcile any contradictions.” See: Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 286.

³⁰ Johnson urged the American Representative to the UN to “try to be on that front page every morning right along with the Russians ... in language that the cab driver can understand better than he can the Russians about how much you want peace.” See: “Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg), September 18, 1965,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXIII, 805.

³¹ Johnson’s 1965 speech on “Peace Without Conquest” launched his own “peace offensive” largely in response to public pressure for peace in Vietnam, but also to counter Soviet propaganda. His administration continued and expanded the “peace offensive” by citing the speech and elaborating on its main points. See: Dror Yuravlivker, ““Peace without Conquest”: Lyndon Johnson’s Speech of April 7, 1965,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 3 (September 2006): 469, 478.

routinely evoked the planetary terminology of the space age to discuss Soviet-American relations in terms of great consequence for “the planet.”³²

Nixon’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger exercised enormous influence on the new administration. Kissinger believed that the Cold War had “lessened” as the bipolar global political order had distinctly moved towards multi-polarity.³³ In spite of this shift in the international balance, he upheld the view that “ideology is not dead.”³⁴ Kissinger perceived a need to elucidate “a concrete idea of what we understand by peace.”³⁵ His report “U.S. Foreign Policy For The 1970s: A New Strategy For Peace”—which both he and Nixon considered a definitive and “watershed” statement—clarified the administration’s conception of peace.³⁶ Noting the challenge posed by the competing idea of coexistence, the report stated three essential principles of a “durable peace”: “partnership, strength and willingness to negotiate.”³⁷

Although Nixon’s administration sought to build peace through negotiations with the Soviet adversary, his vow to “always negotiate from strength and never from

³² “Address by President Nixon, June 4, 1969,” *Ibid.*, 86-88; “White House Background Press Briefing by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), February 16, 1970,” *Ibid.*, 186-187; “Editorial Note,” *Ibid.*, 1; “Address by Richard M. Nixon to the Bohemian Club, July 29, 1967,” *Ibid.*, 2-4, 9; “Address by President Nixon, June 4, 1969,” *Ibid.*, 86-87.

³³ Henry Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy: Three Essays* (New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 1969); “White House Background Press Briefing by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), February 16, 1970,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1969-1976*, vol. I, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003), 188-190.

³⁴ “White House Background Press Briefing by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), February 16, 1970,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1969-1976*, vol. I, 188-190.

³⁵ “Essay by Henry A. Kissinger,” *Ibid.*, 42-44.

³⁶ Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 1st ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 185; “White House Background Press Briefing by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), February 16, 1970,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1969-1976*, vol. I, 188-190, 195.

³⁷ “White House Background Press Briefing by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), February 16, 1970,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1969-1976*, vol. I, 188-190.

weakness” revealed how much a competitive spirit still prevailed.³⁸ Nixon fretted over international perceptions that America’s relative military strength was in decline, and always made clear that his vision of peace meant maintaining defense spending to ensure a strong military.³⁹

Nixon reasoned that recent history had made some institutions like USIA “obsolete and inadequate.” But Kissinger, and others in the administration, argued otherwise, claiming an increasingly important role for the agency in increasing American global prestige and influence.⁴⁰ As a sort of compromise, USIA was directed to answer Nixon’s call for Americans to “lower our voices.”⁴¹ As part of a general move from hostility to diplomacy, he advised his administration to be “calm, courteous and non-polemical” in its interactions with—and statements about—the Soviet Union.⁴² USIA guidance followed the shift towards the Nixon administration’s “New Direction” marked by a multi-polar view of geopolitics, and by December 1969, agency staff was urged to “lecture less and listen more.” Meanwhile, reports

³⁸ Richard M. Nixon, *Nixon on the Issues* (New York, NY: Nixon-Agnew Campaign Committee, 1968), 1-2; “Editorial Note,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1969-1976*, vol. I, 48-50; “Address by Richard M. Nixon to the Bohemian Club, July 29, 1967,” *Ibid.*, 2-4, 7-8.

³⁹ “Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant (Butterfield) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), April 12, 1969,” *Ibid.*, 77. Although his first administration undertook “the most thorough review of worldwide military strategy and force options ever undertaken,” the results were ambiguous: Nixon “neither cut the defense budget recklessly nor protected it thoughtlessly.” See: “The Nixon Administration: A New Direction For America (A Summary Of A Year Of Reform).”

⁴⁰ “Address by Richard M. Nixon to the Bohemian Club, July 29, 1967,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1969-1976*, vol. I, 2-4; “Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, October 20, 1969,” *Ibid.*, 139; “Essay by Henry A. Kissinger,” *Ibid.*, 23-24, 40; Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy: Three Essays*.

⁴¹ Richard Nixon, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), 3-4; “Editorial Note,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1969-1976*, vol. I, 53-55.

⁴² Some key figures in his administration responded favorably to the call, including Secretary of State William P. Rogers who urged Nixon in late 1969 to continue to encourage a quieter tone. Noting that the U.S. had diminished its diplomatic presence abroad by 8,000 employees, and “reduced the hyperbole in our speeches,” Rogers argued that the gentler tone should be fundamental to a Review of American Foreign Policy being discussed at the time. See: “Letter From President Nixon to Secretary of Defense Laird, February 4, 1969,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1969-1976*, vol. I, 56-57.

prepared for the agency also used space exploration to elevate the significance of the Nixon administration's reforms.⁴³

Nixon, who came to the White House just as the Apollo program prepared to accomplish its most significant milestones, drew strong links between exploring space and searching for peace. In his January 20, 1969, inaugural address, Nixon employed metaphors drawn from space exploration to illustrate his vision of peace.⁴⁴ Invoking at length the Apollo 8 mission's live Christmas Eve 1968 broadcast from lunar orbit, when astronauts read aloud from the Book of Genesis to a captivated television audience back home, Nixon contemplated the unified Earth "as God sees it, as a single sphere reflecting light in the darkness." Amidst this meditation on the power of space exploration to inspire unity, he envisioned peace with a metaphor of flight:

the peace we seek is not victory over any other people, but the peace that comes 'with healing in its wings'.⁴⁵

In a June 4, 1969, speech, Nixon used astronauts as models of "vision " and "courage" to implore Americans to exhibit collectively the qualities of "great

⁴³ The culmination of reform came with the opening of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and the ratification of the treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, late in November. That time, the report pointed out, "coincided with the second landing on the moon in human history. The first landing on the Moon, in late July, also came at a time of significant Administration accomplishments." See: "The Nixon Administration: A New Direction For America (A Summary Of A Year Of Reform)," December 1969, RG 306, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Director's Subject Files 1968-1972, A1 42, Box 4, NARA II. See also: Henry Owen, "Memorandum: Long-Term Papers for the New Administration" (Department of State: Policy Planning Council, January 9, 1969), RG 306, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Director's Subject Files 1968-1972, A1 42, Box 4, NARA II.

⁴⁴ "[R]eaching with magnificent precision for the moon, but falling into raucous discord on earth. We are caught in war, wanting peace," he observed. Asking Americans "to go forward together with all mankind," he foresaw a "world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isolation." New worlds found in space, he added, were not to be "conquered" but "shared."

⁴⁵ He meditated further on the symbolism of light and dark to contrast "despair" with "opportunity," "fear" with "gladness," and "dangers" with "confidence in the will of God and the promise of man." Nixon, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*, 3-4; "Richard Nixon: Inaugural Address," n.d., <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=1941>; "Editorial Note," U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1969-1976*, vol. I, 53-55.

leadership” and embrace their role as global leaders. Nations, he argued, should reach out beyond themselves to achieve greatness. He asked Americans to believe in themselves, as had Golden Age Athenians and Renaissance Italians. He called for “a resurgence of American idealism,” which he believed would lead to a “modern miracle” that he described as “a world order of peace and justice.”⁴⁶

American space achievements often provided Nixon with opportunities to publicize the peaceful aspects of his foreign policies by associating them with the “peaceful exploration” of outer space. Nixon timed a July 1969 tour of Asia to coincide with the Pacific Ocean splashdown of the Apollo 11 astronauts returning from their historic voyage to the Moon. He was aboard the *USS Hornet*—the recovery ship that picked up the astronauts and their capsule after splashdown in the Pacific Ocean—to greet the astronauts and the press. On the same trip, he articulated the Nixon Doctrine to reporters on July 25, 1969.⁴⁷

From the late 1950s to the 1970s, American officials thus turned to ideas of openness and freedom to articulate an American conception of peace. These ideas formed in response to the challenges posed by Soviet peace initiatives, and were drawn up purposefully to differentiate the American and Soviet worldviews. USIA played a key role in disseminating the American vision of peace. Space exploration provided an ideal theme for conveying such global ideas, and may have played a part in inspiring them. It also presented an ideal opportunity for American propagandists to show Soviet readers the American government’s perspective on the ‘universal’ search for peace and freedom.

⁴⁶ “Address by President Nixon, June 4, 1969,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1969-1976*, vol. I, 86-88.

⁴⁷ “Editorial Note,” *Ibid.*, 91-92.


Depicting Peaceful Exploration

Amerika published only a handful of space-themed articles in the late 1950s, and these did not forcefully associate American space exploration with peace. Space articles in these years commonly associated the U.S. space program with scientific and technological progress, a theme discussed in Chapters 5 and 7. Peace figured strongly at this time, however, in the magazine's other articles.⁴⁸ Space-themed articles appeared more frequently in the early 1960s.

By 1962, *Amerika* regularly featured more than a dozen substantial articles on space themes each year. Direct links between peace and space exploration also became increasingly common, but seemed practically unnecessary, since they were always embedded within layered messages implying peace. A 1962 article's remark that the Goddard Space Flight Center had been "designed to study the peaceful use of interplanetary space," for instance, only accentuated the message of peace already conveyed in its lighthearted depiction of friendly intercourse between Soviet and American scientists. The article's depiction of visiting Soviet scientists also demonstrated American openness.⁴⁹ Such indirect associations between space, peace, and openness were routinely made. Meanwhile, statements directly linking peace with American space exploration regularly referenced other indirectly peaceful themes, such as the unity of mankind. An August 1962 article, for instance, described the

⁴⁸ David O. Woodbury, "Peacetime Atom," *Amerika*, January 1957, 3; "In Search Of Peace," *Amerika*, March 1960, 42; "Eisenhower, Man of Peace," *Amerika*, May 1960, 44.

⁴⁹ Richard Montague, "Watching the Weather," *Amerika*, 1962, 151.



American space program's "truly peaceful purposes and work for the benefit of all mankind."⁵⁰

The designations of the space capsules used in American human spaceflights implied key concepts, such as peace and freedom. Images of the capsules published in *Amerika* habitually showcased their designations, and the captions nearly always translated them into Russian. An article on cosmonaut Gherman Titov's visit to

the United States featured a large image of the capsule used for the first manned U.S. sub-orbital flight. Boldly painted in large letters across the ship's exterior, the words "Freedom 7" occupied front and center in the photo. Titov and Glenn were shown looking into the capsule's hatch together, imparting a further suggestion of peace and friendship.⁵¹ Articles and images of *Friendship 7*, the spacecraft used in John Glenn's orbital flight, also obliquely linked American space exploration with the promise of peace.⁵² Such images directly associated the American space program with freedom, an essential characteristic distinguishing an American conception of peace.

⁵⁰ Jay Holmes, "Relay Stations In Space," *Amerika*, August 1962, 6.

⁵¹ Anthony J. Bowman, "Space Travelers Meet," *Amerika*, August 1962, 3.

⁵² Bowman, "Space Travelers Meet," 2-3.

Amerika frequently employed religious metaphors and symbols that could be interpreted to signify peace, but that also suggested American freedom to worship. The October 1967 front cover featured a painting of American astronaut Gordon Cooper with arms half-extended in a Christ-like pose in a style clearly evoking a stained glass window. (See Figure 3-1)⁵³ An illustration for an Arthur C. Clarke article discussing human exploration of the planets similarly showed a man with arms outstretched floating above some planet-like orbs. Although in this instance the figure resembled the Vetruvian Man with which Leonardo Da Vinci demonstrated the Golden Ratio it also recalled Christ on the Cross.⁵⁴ Other illustrations by Robert McCall unquestionably suggested the crucifixion. (See Figure 3-2)⁵⁵

Amerika's most frequent explicit associations between space exploration and peace came with its coverage of the Apollo program. Apollo 8 reports stressed the unity of humanity with words from the poet Archibald MacLeish, whose reflections on the mission to orbit the Moon appeared on the front page of *The New York Times* on December 25, 1968.⁵⁶ MacLeish wrote that the vision of Earth from a distance, caused humanity to:

⁵³ Mitchell Jamieson, "Painting of Astronaut Gordon Cooper," *Amerika*, October 1967, f.c.

⁵⁴ Arthur C. Clarke, "Next - The Planets," *Amerika*, November 1969, 33.

⁵⁵ "Man's future in space. Painting by Robert McCall." February 1971, f.c. Also see McCall's lithograph "Lunar Landing" which graced the back cover of the July 1975 issue, and: "Space Artist (Robert McCall)," *Amerika*, July 1975, 29. Robert McCall (1919-2010) was a well-known American illustrator and space artist. He was among the first group of artists to participate in NASA's art program, which provided selected artists with behind the scenes access to NASA facilities beginning in 1962. His images of space exploration often appeared in *Life* magazine; he contributed to Stanley Kubrick's *2001: A Space Odyssey* and the *Star Trek* movies; and he has created many space exploration themed murals including at the National Air and Space Museum, the National Gallery of Art, and the Pentagon.

⁵⁶ Archibald MacLeish, "A Reflection: Riders on Earth Together, Brothers in Eternal Cold," *The New York Times*, December 25, 1968, 1.

see ourselves as riders on the earth together, brothers on that bright loveliness in the eternal cold—brothers who know now they are truly brothers.⁵⁷




Figure 3-2: Robert McCall's illustrations often provided symbols of American freedom to worship.
 "Man's future in space. Painting by Robert McCall." February 1971, f.c.

Nixon quoted the same passage in his January 20, 1969, inaugural address.⁵⁸ *Amerika* used the poem to introduce the November 1969 special issue marking Apollo 11. It was thus widely disseminated in the American press, used in a presidential speech, and twice featured in *Amerika*. MacLeish's vision of brotherhood explicitly linked space exploration to a new era of peace on Earth, suggesting that the Moon landing

⁵⁷ "Apollo 8: Now Man Has Circled the Moon," *Amerika*, May 1969, 43-46.

⁵⁸ Richard Nixon, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (United States Government Printing Office, 1972), 3-4; "Richard Nixon: Inaugural Address," n.d., <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=1941>; United States. Dept. of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972*, ed. Louis J. Smith and David H. Herschler (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003), 53-55.

would mark the end of the period when “millions could be killed in worldwide wars ... without a thought for reason but the reason—if we call it one—of force.”⁵⁹

Amerika Editor-in-Chief John Jacobs introduced MacLeish’s piece with similar hopes. He argued that space exploration had brought a sense that mankind is capable of ending “petty factionalism” on Earth. Like MacLeish, Jacobs perceived space exploration uniting humanity and he put a perceived universal concern for peace on Earth ahead of any ideological (or other) divisions. More important than the supremacy of this or that ideology, was the simple question of human survival in the nuclear age.⁶⁰

Amerika detailed the several symbolic objects placed on the Moon by Apollo 11 to associate the mission explicitly with peace. In one article, four of the five commemorative items mentioned projected a peaceful message. One in particular—a plaque inscribed with the words “We came in peace for all mankind”—also depicted the unity of humanity.⁶¹ Wherever it could, *Amerika* reported comments made by notable figures involved with the American space program to associate American space exploration with peace. It reported, for example, on Nixon’s conversation with the Apollo 11 astronauts on the Moon, when he told the astronauts that their achievement united humanity and “inspires us to redouble our efforts to bring peace

⁵⁹ MacLeish’s “reflection” appeared on page 25, directly across from the 1791 Bill of Rights on page 24. The text of his piece was also printed in a significantly larger font than normal articles. See: Archibald MacLeish, “A Reflection (Introduction to Special Section on Apollo 11),” *Amerika*, November 1969, 25-26.

⁶⁰ “[W]hat came to their minds,” he wrote of the astronauts, but implying that all of mankind was of similar mind, “was the life on that little, lonely, floating planet: that tiny raft in the enormous, empty night. ‘Is it inhabited?’” Ibid.

⁶¹ A photo of the plaque showed its markings depicting the earth’s two hemispheres viewed from space. Besides the plaque, the other items discussed included a “patch with an olive branch,” a “disc of goodwill messages from 73 nations,” both of which clearly evoked peace. A set of “medals honoring their dead space colleagues of two nations—Grissom, White, Chaffee, Komarov and Gagarin” symbolized peaceful relations between the superpowers. Another ‘item’—the “two sets of footprints” of the Apollo 11 astronauts—only obliquely suggested peace.

“Special Report: Man on the Moon,” *Amerika*, November 1969, Insert between pp. 28-29.

and tranquility to earth.”⁶² Space exploration, and especially the spectacular lunar landing, inspired lofty visions of human capacities to overcome great difficulties. These were no doubt sincere expressions of human wonder, amazement and hope, but they also perfectly suited *Amerika*’s goals of promoting an image of a peaceful United States, and the magazine quoted them often.

Depicting The Openness of the American Space Program

Amerika’s space coverage went beyond these overt statements associating the American space program with peace to depict American openness forcefully in a variety of forms. Expressed both explicitly and implicitly, openness was a key motif, and one that conveyed the notions of an “open world” and a “world of free choice” that had been chosen to characterize the American conception of peace.

One way that *Amerika* emphasized openness was by routinely portraying the many obstacles faced on the difficult journey to space. Such anecdotes suggested that the American media enjoyed open access to NASA, which kept few, if any, secrets. By highlighting American willingness to acknowledge its failures, as well as its successes, they reflected Larson’s insistence that USIA present ‘facts’ and not just positive stories about the U.S., and especially Murrow’s desire for the agency to be “in on the take offs as well as the crash landings.”⁶³ It openly acknowledged Gus Grissom’s “unforeseen accident,” John Glenn’s “unexpected crisis,” and Scott Carpenter’s “continuously troubled flight.” It even supplied a photo of Grissom’s

⁶² Ibid. Armstrong expressed a similar idea in a piece written for *Life* magazine and reprinted in *Amerika*. “I felt a successful lunar landing might inspire men around the world to believe that impossible goals really are possible, that there really is hope for solutions to humanity’s problems.” See: “Our Impossible Goal, by the Apollo 11 Astronauts,” *Amerika*, April 1970, 40.

⁶³ Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency*, 191-192.

rescue from the ocean. A chart of American and Soviet space missions in the November 1969 issue recounted these difficulties and further enhanced the image of American openness by providing a degree of detail about Soviet missions. So did a similar “Calendar of Spaceflight,” in the April 1970 Apollo special edition. Interestingly, by covering only manned missions the calendar neatly avoided reminding Soviet readers of the spectacular American failures in the late 1950s when the U.S. space effort lagged furthest behind that of its Soviet rival.⁶⁴

Amerika exhibited American openness in other ways as well. An article describing the October 1969 visit of cosmonauts Georgi Beregovoi and Konstantin Feoktistov to the U.S. showed the two men freely visiting many sites across the country. When they toured the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston for six hours, they were allowed to “see just what they want to see.” According to the article, the cosmonauts had also been “scheduled to... inspect Cape Kennedy” and speak with the crew of the planned Apollo 12 mission. Forced to decline because they did not have any “authority” to reciprocate by inviting U.S. astronauts to Baikonur, the episode contrasted American openness with Soviet restraint.⁶⁵

Amerika also regularly depicted an insider’s view of Cape Canaveral and Cape Kennedy. It openly provided full disclosure of their locations, noting cities, states, and nearby communities, and even visually reinforced this information with maps.⁶⁶ Even though such details were often imprecise, they helped to give the American


⁶⁴ Jeff Stansbury, “On Target: Flight of Second U.S. Astronaut,” *Amerika*, December 1961, 9; Jeff Stansbury, “John Glenn ... In Orbit,” *Amerika*, May 1962, 2-7; “Pioneers Together – Astronauts and Cosmonauts (Chart of Space Achievements of US and USSR),” *Amerika*, November 1969, 30-31; “A Calendar of Space Flight: Man’s Countdown For the Moon (U.S. & U.S.S.R. Missions),” *Amerika*, April 1970, 44.

⁶⁵ “Here Come the Cosmonauts! (’69 U.S. Visit of Beregovoi & Feoktistov),” *Amerika*, March 1970, 48.

⁶⁶ Charles Gregory, “As a Nation Watched ... ‘Lift Off,’” *Amerika*, August 1961, 36-39.

space program an air of openness. Such insights into Soviet launch facilities were unheard of, or were completely vague, in *Soviet Life* magazine. During ASTP, *Soviet Life*, for example, described how the Soyuz spacecraft would be “controlled from a space center near Moscow.”⁶⁷

It would be naïve to characterize the American space program as fully accessible to public view. Many American space activities were conducted under a shroud of secrecy.⁶⁸ Nonetheless, openness played an important role in *Amerika*’s overall treatment of the space theme. Images suggesting open access were given prominent size and placement in the magazine, and often reproduced in color. Wide-angle photos and cut-away illustrations of the exteriors and interiors of American



space vehicles and facilities were common in *Amerika* but nonexistent in *Soviet Life*. (See Figure 3-3) Such images showed off the scale and extent of the American space program while contrasting

⁶⁷ Alexei Leonov, “Challenging Space: Soviet-American Docking Experiment,” *Soviet Life*, July 1975, 16-17.

⁶⁸ See, for example: Dwayne A. Day, John M. Logsdon, and Brian Latell, *Eye in the Sky: The Story of the Corona Spy Satellites* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Books, 1999); Jeffrey T. Richelson, *America’s Secret Eyes in Space: The U.S. Keyhole Satellite Program* (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1990). For more on the secrecy within the American space program including NOTSNIK a “secret competitor” in space designed to put tiny satellites into orbit via rockets launched from U.S. Navy aircraft, see: Matt Bille and Erika Lishock, *The First Space Race: Launching the World’s First Satellites* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2004), 140-150.

American candidness with the closed Soviet space program.⁶⁹ By contrast, Soviet space launches were kept secret from both domestic and international audiences. Only successful launches, and not setbacks or failures along the way, were announced publicly, and only after the fact. Similarly, the design and purpose of satellites, as well as the location of launch facilities, were closely guarded state secrets.⁷⁰

To accentuate this difference, *Amerika* cultivated an appearance of complete candor when discussing the American space effort. Its frequent insights into future American space missions also contrasted with Soviet secrecy about the direction of their space program.⁷¹ A 1967 article, for example, complemented its open discussion of the Gemini program by providing plans for the future Apollo program.⁷² A May 1969 article previewed what the first American manned lunar landing would be like, describing various components of the astronauts' Extravehicular Mobility Units (the spacesuits worn when walking on the Moon's surface). It detailed the various stages of the journey to the Moon and back, explained the separation of the Lunar and Command Modules, and described the various operations, experiments, and tools to

⁶⁹ See, for example: Virginia Evans, "James Van Allen: He Keeps His Head in the Clouds," *Amerika*, January 1959, 47-51; Laura Winslow and John Winters, "Satellites Aid Meteorology, Navigation," *Amerika*, February 1960, 12-14; Stansbury, "John Glenn ... In Orbit," 2-3, 5; Rowe Findley, "Telstar," *Amerika*, September 1962, 16-20; "Close-ups of Moon Show Three-foot Craters," *Amerika*, November 1964, 60; Sherwood Harris, "Cape Kennedy: The Moon Has Changed the View," *Amerika*, October 1967, 20-22; "Apollo: Preparations for Moon Flight," *Amerika*, October 1967, 24-29; Ralph Segman, "Gemini: Beginning and Successful Ending of a Project," *Amerika*, October 1967, 30-35; Jim Schefter, "Our First Day on the Moon – What Will It Be Like?," *Amerika*, May 1969, 48-50; "A Day in Outer Space," *Amerika*, November 1969, 27-28; "First Stop For Men and Rocks (Lunar Receiving Lab)," *Amerika*, April 1970, 54-55; Philip Eisenberg, "The Making of an Astronaut," *Amerika*, April 1970, 56.

⁷⁰ G. Perry, "Perestroika and Glasnost in the Soviet Space Programme," *Space Policy* (November 1989): 283; Michael J. Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), 32.

⁷¹ See, for example: John F. Kelly, "Plan for Developing Space," *Amerika*, July 1963, 17-23; Tom Buckley, "Thomas Paine's Arena Is the Universe," *Amerika*, September 1970, 18-20; Thomas O. Paine, "Next Steps in Space," *Amerika*, September 1970, 21; "Space Station '75," *Amerika*, November 1970, 14-15; James J. Haggerty, "The Giant Harvest From Space – Today and Tomorrow," *Amerika*, February 1971, 22; Krafft A. Ehricke, "Extraterrestrial Imperative," *Amerika*, March 1973, 44-48; "Is Anybody Out There?," *Amerika*, March 1973, 49-50; "Space Artist (Robert McCall)," 26-29.

⁷² Segman, "Gemini: Beginning and Successful Ending of a Project," 30-35.

be used to explore the lunar surface.⁷³ *Amerika* did not give any design secrets away, but it created an impression that the American space program was open and held no secrets. Such details were notably absent in *Soviet Life*.

Amerika articles routinely included statistics, measurements, and other types of data to help to illustrate the stories. Some technical details were intended simply to impress by conveying the incredible speed, power, and great distances involved in space travel.⁷⁴ The magazine commonly provided exact timings of various events, to the precise minute or even second, to portray spaceflight as a technical accomplishment requiring tremendous orderly precision.⁷⁵ Other timing details accentuated the historical significance of key moments; the LM touched down on the moon at “4:17:40 p.m.,” for instance, and Armstrong’s first step came at “10:56:20 p.m.” Some timing details though were almost arbitrarily defined and seemed contrived to sound scientific.⁷⁶

Mundane details, such as what times astronauts fell asleep or awoke, further demonstrated American candidness.⁷⁷ One Apollo 11 article, in addition to giving the capsule’s dimensions in meters to the first decimal place, detailed the astronauts’ sleeping arrangements, the methods used to dispose of their waste, and various equipment aboard the ship. One apparently informative paragraph even discussed

⁷³ Schefter, “Our First Day on the Moon – What Will It Be Like?,” 47-51.

⁷⁴ One typical example noted how Apollo 11 “slowed down” from “38,945 kilometers an hour ... to 5,936 kilometers an hour,” for example. See: “Apollo 9: Giant Step In Space,” *Amerika*, August 1969, 2-7.

⁷⁵ Apollo 11 entered earth orbit, for example, “slightly less than 12 minutes” after launch, its third-stage engine fired at “12:16 p.m.,” and its “main rocket, ... fired for the planned 6 minutes 2 seconds.”

⁷⁶ Apollo 11 “entered the moon’s sphere of gravitational influence ... at 11:12 p.m.,” for instance. See: John Noble Wilford and James T. Wooten, “To the Moon and Back (Excerpt From Apollo 11: On the Moon),” *Amerika*, April 1970, 2.

⁷⁷ Gregory, “As a Nation Watched ... ‘Lift Off!’,” 36-39.

the programming language for the ship's onboard "Display-Keyboard".⁷⁸ Such details gave the readers a sense of being on the inside of the U.S. space program, enjoying open access to important information. One chronicle of space accomplishments even gave Soviet readers access to technical information on the Soviet space program, listing all known Soviet and American manned spaceflights, their number of orbits, flight time to the nearest minute, the personnel aboard, and other data.⁷⁹ Emphasizing such technical details offered *Amerika* an excellent way to depict American openness.

Depicting the "Open World"

The desire to demonstrate American openness can explain some conspicuous details in *Amerika's* space propaganda. The largest and most prominently placed image in a January 1962 article on Grissom's spaceflight featured a crowd of onlookers at the launch, many holding binoculars. The photo showed



Figure 3-4: Displaying American openness: spectators at Virgil Grissom's July 21, 1961, launch.

Jeff Stansbury, "On Target: Flight of Second U.S. Astronaut" *Amerika*, December 1961, 9.

⁷⁸ "In DSKY's window, VERB-50, NOUN-25 flashes. A look at the code book shows that DSKY is telling the astronaut: SIGHT ON A STAR." See: "A Day in Outer Space," 27-28.

⁷⁹ "Pioneers Together – Astronauts and Cosmonauts (Chart of Space Achievements of US and USSR)," 30-31.

the American space program open to public view, unlike the Soviet program. But there was another detail in the foreground of the scene: a young woman's bare stomach was exposed from under her shirt as she stretched to view the rocket flying above. (See Figure 3-4)⁸⁰ Photographs elsewhere similarly featured women's exposed skin. A woman's backless dress occupied front and center in one large image of an audience celebrating Apollo 11, for instance.⁸¹ Pictures of the astronauts' families and friends routinely showcased the sleeveless tops and short skirts contemporary to American feminine fashion. Often, these frames provided a full body view, accentuating the women's bare legs. Such a relatively more relaxed approach to portraying sexuality may have been intended purposely to symbolize American freedom and openness.

Also common, and subliminally evocative of American openness were photographs showing Americans in moments of excitement, with mouths open wide. (See Figures 3-5 and 3-6)⁸² It is unclear whether such recurrent images of open mouths were consciously intended to signify the openness of American society, but *Amerika* used the pose regularly.

⁸⁰ Stansbury, "On Target: Flight of Second U.S. Astronaut," 9.

⁸¹ "Welcome Back! (Apollo 11)," *Amerika*, April 1970, 60.

⁸² "On the Moon (Apollo 11)," *Amerika*, April 1970, 16-39. See also: Gregory, "As a Nation Watched ... 'Lift Off!'," 39; Stansbury, "John Glenn ... In Orbit," 7; "Happy End to a Successful Space Flight," *Amerika*, November 1965, 34-35; Wilford and Wooten, "To the Moon and Back (Excerpt From Apollo 11: On the Moon)," 4; "On the Moon (Apollo 11)," 36-37. Ubiquitous photographs of astronauts' wide smiles expressed another sort of openness by suggesting their friendly characters. See, for example: Gregory, "As a Nation Watched ... 'Lift Off!'," 39; Stansbury, "John Glenn ... In Orbit," 2, 5; Bowman, "Space Travelers Meet," 3; Parsons, "'Faith-7' in Space," 12-13; Segman, "Gemini: Beginning and Successful Ending of a Project," 34-35; "Apollo 8: Now Man Has Circled the Moon," 45-46; Frank Borman, "A Special Message to the Readers of Soviet Life," *Amerika*, June 1969, 40; "On the Moon (Apollo 11)," *Amerika*, April 1970, 30-31, 39; Jay Holmes, "Apollo 12: Why Go Back to the Moon?," 46; Arthur Pariente, "Apollo 15: Touchdown for Science," *Amerika*, December 1971, 30; "Picture Parade," *Amerika*, April 1975, i.f.c.; "Apollo Soyuz Project: First International Manned Spaceflight," *Amerika*, July 1975, 22-23.

Also of interest, and as difficult to ascribe motives to, is the treatment of race in images accompanying space-themed articles. A photo of a generously mixed-race crowd of spectators accompanied an article on Shepard's inaugural manned U.S. spaceflight, for example.⁸³ A lone African-American occupied the foreground center of a shot of approximately thirty onlookers



Figure 3-5: Pat Collins in a pose symbolizing American openness: such images of open mouths were very common.

"On the Moon (Apollo 11)," *Amerika*, April 1970, 36.

at Grissom's launch. (See Figure 3-4)⁸⁴ It is difficult to assess what motives led *Amerika's* staff to select these photographs. Nonetheless, the mixed race crowd in them countered both the American media's wide exposure of negative images from the Civil Rights Movement, and Soviet propaganda disparaging American racism.

Amerika strongly emphasized the media's role in sharing space exploration with the American—and world—public. Articles on spaceflight typically emphasized how the U.S. space program operated in "full view" of a vast number of reporters of diverse origins from all over the world.⁸⁵ Such a focus underscored the global appeal of spaceflight while showcasing America's 'free press.' One article articulated some of the "downsides" of such an open press. In spite of these challenges, it offered a validation for openness that could be read as a defense of a complex, open and free society:

⁸³ Gregory, "As a Nation Watched ... 'Lift Off!'," 36-39.

⁸⁴ Stansbury, "On Target: Flight of Second U.S. Astronaut," 9.

⁸⁵ Gregory, "As a Nation Watched ... 'Lift Off!'," 36-39. See also: Bowman, "Space Travelers Meet," 2; "Saturn V Takes a Giant Step Toward the Moon," *Amerika*, April 1968, 48-49.

But the American program of space exploration is based on the profound belief that all are entitled to a full awareness of both our successes and to the difficulties.⁸⁶

In the context of celebrating the successful Apollo program, frequent reminders that the U.S. space program “had all been done in public” suggested that the open American system was superior to the closed Soviet system hiding its failures behind a veil of secrecy.⁸⁷ The prime example of a widely publicized American flop was the botched—and televised—Vanguard TV3 launch on December 6, 1957.

Members of the press seemed ever-present in *Amerika* photographs accompanying a wide array of space-themed articles. They were often shown, with their large cameras, being informally greeted by American astronauts.⁸⁸ Similarly,



Figure 3-6: The open mouths of American astronauts Edward White and James McDivitt.

“Happy End to Successful Space Flight” *Amerika*, November 1965, 34-35.

television cameras often appeared in photographs of space-related events.⁸⁹ In one shot showing cosmonaut Gherman Titov on the modern set of a television studio, audience members took up more than half of the photo’s

⁸⁶ Stansbury, “John Glenn ... In Orbit,” 2-7.

⁸⁷ “00:4; 00:3; 00:2; 00:1; 00:0 (Apollo 11 Lift-Off),” *Amerika*, April 1970, 9. See also: “Saturn V Takes a Giant Step Toward the Moon,” 48-49.

⁸⁸ Gregory, “As a Nation Watched ... ‘Lift Off!’,” 36-39; “Apollo 8: Now Man Has Circled the Moon,” 43-46; Stansbury, “On Target: Flight of Second U.S. Astronaut,” 9.

⁸⁹ Gregory, “As a Nation Watched ... ‘Lift Off!’,” 37; Stansbury, “John Glenn ... In Orbit,” 5; “On the Moon (Apollo 11),” 36-37; Wilford and Wooten, “To the Moon and Back (Excerpt From Apollo 11: On the Moon),” 2-7.

frame, suggesting the free American media was open to public participation.⁹⁰ In these images, the American and world media starred in major roles supporting the lead roles played by the space explorers themselves. They not only functioned as symbols of American openness, they also acted as messengers, conveying space stories to another key group depicted in *Amerika* space propaganda: the global public.

Amerika regularly emphasized the vast audience—stateside and global—who united to view space exploration events. Many articles focused specifically on the crowds on hand to observe particular launches, and portrayed them as exciting subjects in their own right.⁹¹ As one Apollo 11 article reported, “those who could tear their eyes away found the crowd itself an amazing sight.”⁹² The April 1970 special issue on the Moon landing argued:

what most sharply set off man’s leap into space from previous exploration was the participation by millions upon millions of people in the adventure ... before television sets in almost every corner of the globe.⁹³

The special importance given to depicting the worldwide audience consuming the American space narrative conveyed American leadership of the “open world.”

Images of an immense audience for spaceflight figured prominently in *Amerika*’s space propaganda. Typically the magazine portrayed the American public as a unified body. As the title of a 1961 article on Shepard’s flight put it: the “nation watched.” Such depictions of the entire country acting as a group—following,

⁹⁰ Bowman, “Space Travelers Meet,” 2-3.

⁹¹ See, for example: Gregory, “As a Nation Watched ... ‘Lift Off,’” 39; Stansbury, “On Target: Flight of Second U.S. Astronaut,” 9. Images of crowds gathered to meet the astronauts after their spaceflights performed a similar role. See: Stansbury, “John Glenn ... In Orbit,” 6.

⁹² “00:4; 00:3; 00:2; 00:1; 00:0 (Apollo 11 Lift-Off),” 9.

⁹³ “A New Frontier (Apollo 11 Moon Landing),” *Amerika*, April 1970, i.f.c. See also: Wilford and Wooten, “To the Moon and Back,” 2.

waiting, or turning upward as one—were typical.⁹⁴ Various articles repeated the claim that a million strong crowd was on hand to glimpse the Apollo 11 launch, or that similar sized masses attended post-flight celebrations in New York and Chicago.⁹⁵ Quotations were gathered from people of many different cities and walks of life to express the nation-wide excitement.⁹⁶

Amerika frequently noted how U.S. space exploration not only held the attention of Americans, but attracted the “focus of the whole world.”⁹⁷ One article colorfully sketched how residents of Perth, Australia, stayed up late into the night and had “lit all the street lights, all the neon signs” in anticipation of John Glenn’s over-flight.⁹⁸ The anecdote highlighted the vast international audience for American spaceflights, as well as the cordial relations between citizens of the ‘free world.’

Frequent photos of celebrations around the world honoring the Apollo 11 astronauts suggested that world united to follow American space exploits.⁹⁹ One photo showed a group of young people in Copenhagen huddled close together to read some of the “extensive coverage” of Apollo 11 in local newspapers. Another showed four people crowded together to view an Apollo 11 exhibit at a USIS library in Dakar. Images of families crowded around television screens in Tel-Aviv and Elkhart, Iowa, were surrounded by photos of crowds assembled around large screens, or stacks of televisions, in Oslo, Paris, London, Canberra, Rabat, and

⁹⁴ Gregory, “As a Nation Watched ... ‘Lift Off!’,” 36-39; “Special Report: Man on the Moon,” Insert between pp. 28-29; Mailer, “A Fire On the Moon (Excerpt),” 40.

⁹⁵ Wilford and Wooten, “To the Moon and Back,” 2; “Welcome Back! (Apollo 11),” 60.

⁹⁶ “Special Report: Man on the Moon,” Insert between pp. 28-29.

⁹⁷ Gregory, “As a Nation Watched ... ‘Lift Off!’,” 36-39. As the large bold-faced type accompanying one article proclaimed: “Around the World, Millions Watched History (As It Was) Made by Apollo 11.” See: Wilford and Wooten, “To the Moon and Back,” 2. See also: Ibid.

⁹⁸ Stansbury, “John Glenn ... In Orbit,” 2-7.

⁹⁹ “Welcome Back! (Apollo 11),” 60.

Tokyo.¹⁰⁰ These photos were often taken at a distance to accentuate the size of the audiences.¹⁰¹

The historic import of space exploration, *Amerika* commonly stressed, united people and overrode their differences. The excitement of Apollo 11 reached everyone.¹⁰² Just as the American people acted in unison, so did a unified capitalist world. The whole world watched Armstrong step onto the lunar surface, one photo caption declared.¹⁰³ At times, humanity even breathed together, waiting “with baited breath” for Alan Shepard’s launch, or exhaling as one when the Lunar Module touched down safely on the Moon.¹⁰⁴ As they watched American spaceflights, the people of Earth felt shared emotions: they felt anxious together, sat up in their seats together, and felt the tension slip away together.¹⁰⁵ To *Amerika*, the Apollo 11 landing was “a moment for sharing” without par. As one observer reportedly commented:

The astronauts haven’t just gone to the moon. All our minds went to the moon.¹⁰⁶

The process of sharing, *Amerika* repeatedly stressed, was made possible via television, radio, and space satellites that served to unite the global population. Texts repeatedly mentioned how millions of people in America and elsewhere “followed” spaceflights on television. These were visually reinforced by photographs depicting

¹⁰⁰ Wilford and Wooten, “To the Moon and Back,” 2.

¹⁰¹ “A Calendar of Space Flight,” 44.

¹⁰² “Even those who had grown blasé over the years,” or “had at first felt little excitement” became exhilarated with the lights, sounds, immense crowds, and historic significance of the moment. See: “00:4; 00:3; 00:2; 00:1; 00:0 (Apollo 11 Lift-Off),” 9.

¹⁰³ Wilford and Wooten, “To the Moon and Back,” 2. See also: Norman Mailer, “A Fire On the Moon (Excerpt),” *Amerika*, May 1970, 40.

¹⁰⁴ Gregory, “As a Nation Watched ... ‘Lift Off!’,” 36-39; “Special Report: Man on the Moon,” Insert between pp. 28-29.

¹⁰⁵ Wilford and Wooten, “To the Moon and Back,” 2.

¹⁰⁶ “Special Report: Man on the Moon,” Insert between pp. 28-29.

large crowds assembled around giant screens erected in public spaces or on television sets in classrooms and homes. (See Figure 5-2)¹⁰⁷

The pinnacle of televised American space exploration came with Apollo 11. *Amerika's* descriptions of television uniting global audiences also reached a peak.¹⁰⁸ Citing estimates made by “TV officials,” *Amerika* reported that: “600 million persons—one-fifth of the earth’s population—were united by the magic of communications satellites that night.” Television signals from space, it described, were sent down to receiving stations in Spain, Australia, and California, then transmitted to Houston for conversion into a format suitable for international broadcast by three “commercial television networks.”¹⁰⁹ The communications systems necessary for international television broadcasts thus showcased the vast reach of American television and commerce, while demonstrating its power to unite the world.

But television was not the only tie that bound humanity for the event. “Even above the Arctic Circle,” *Amerika* alleged, “Norwegian Laplanders tended reindeer with transistors hugged to their ears.”¹¹⁰ Such details heightened the overall message that American space exploration had touched the farthest reaches of humanity. Everyone on Earth, it seemed, had tuned in to follow the American journey.

Television served not only to unite humanity in *Amerika* space propaganda, but also worked as a potent symbol of American openness. Putting the television experience front and center in its depiction of Apollo 11, *Amerika* regularly discussed

¹⁰⁷ Stansbury, “John Glenn ... In Orbit,” 2-7. See also: Gregory, “As a Nation Watched ... ‘Lift Off!’,” 36-39; “Apollo 8: Now Man Has Circled the Moon,” 43-46.

¹⁰⁸ Wilford and Wooten, “To the Moon and Back,” 2; “Special Report: Man on the Moon,” Insert between pp. 28-29; Schefter, “Our First Day on the Moon – What Will It Be Like?,” 47-51.

¹⁰⁹ “Special Report: Man on the Moon,” Insert between pp. 28-29.

¹¹⁰ “Special Report: Man on the Moon,” Insert between pp. 28-29.

American efforts to ensure the world's open access to the historic flight. Even before the mission, a May 1969 article detailed the astronauts' planned set-up and operation of television cameras on the lunar surface so that viewers around the world would have access to events on the Moon as they took place.¹¹¹

Once Apollo 11 had flown, *Amerika* narratives of the flight continued to present television broadcasts from the mission as symbols of American openness. The magazine gave special attention to television cameras in its narratives of the historic lunar landing. It frequently described televised "inspections" and broadcasts made during the flight and on the Moon. It reported how, on just his second step down the ladder to the lunar surface, Armstrong pulled a cable to deploy a camera automatically so that viewers on Earth could witness his milestone first step.¹¹² It repeatedly printed photos of the television camera on the Moon (conveniently placed next to the American flag). References to the device neatly framed one article's narrative. It began by noting how "millions of earthmen watched" Armstrong step "[i]nto the bright slash of moonscape on the television screen," and ended by describing the astronauts leaving the "lonely camera, to remain forever on the moon."¹¹³ To *Amerika*, the television broadcast from the Moon was one of the most important features of the mission. In a chart depicting all Soviet and American manned spaceflights, a brief one-sentence description of Apollo 11's highlights noted its "telecast from lunar surface."¹¹⁴

Amerika coverage of the later Apollo missions continued to stress the impact of television on reporting space exploration to a worldwide audience. Since global

¹¹¹ Schefter, "Our First Day on the Moon – What Will It Be Like?," 47-51.

¹¹² Wilford and Wooten, "To the Moon and Back," 2.

¹¹³ "Special Report: Man on the Moon," Insert between pp. 28-29.

¹¹⁴ "Pioneers Together," 30-31.

attention for these later missions was not as readily justified as the historic milestone of Apollo 11 had been, the magazine used other lesser firsts—such as “the miracle of color television”—to revisit the global excitement of television broadcasts from space.¹¹⁵ *Amerika* tried to prolong the narrative of Apollo 11’s triumph, but it proved difficult to maintain the same acute level of excitement.

Its emphasis on television led *Amerika* regularly to depict what was seen on the screen. This was especially helpful for Soviet readers who had far less access to television coverage of American space exploration. One photo showed a family viewing “brief (taped) excerpts” of the moonwalk being shown on Moscow television, a non-descript blur of light across the screen. The following page gave a clearer picture of the broadcast with a close-up photo of a television screen showing Armstrong descending the ladder.¹¹⁶ Several articles either showed photographs of space activities on television screens, or drew their textual narratives extensively from what the authors had witnessed “on the TV screen.”¹¹⁷ One article on Apollo 14, for example, featured 20 full-color photographs of television screens to give Soviet readers a taste of what they most likely had missed.¹¹⁸

Amerika cited a recent “proclamation” by President Nixon emphasizing how space exploration encouraged global sharing, and acknowledged the special role played by television, which “brings the moment of discovery into our homes and makes all of us participants.” He proposed that the Apollo astronauts “represent all

¹¹⁵ “Live From the Moon in TV Color (Apollo 14),” *Amerika*, July 1971, i.f.c.

¹¹⁶ Wilford and Wooten, “To the Moon and Back,” 2.

¹¹⁷ “Special Report: Man on the Moon,” Insert between pp. 28-29; Wilford and Wooten, “To the Moon and Back,” 2.

¹¹⁸ “Live From the Moon in TV Color,” i.f.c.

mankind,” and that their voyage united humanity and furthered global peace.¹¹⁹

Nixon’s comments fit perfectly with the magazine’s repeated depiction of a global community sharing an unprecedented historical experience—the United States peacefully exploring outer space—through the magic of television. Space exploration, *Amerika* argued, united humanity, and this imagined community shared in the victories achieved in space.

A piece written by Edwin “Buzz” Aldrin Jr emphasized the theme of global unity in its title: “We Sensed the Mystical Unification of All the People of the World.” Discussing what he prayed for when he served himself communion on the Moon, Aldrin wrote:

it is my hope that people will keep this whole event in their minds and see beyond minor details and technical achievements to a deeper meaning behind it all: ... the need to recognize that we are all one mankind, under God.¹²⁰

Other articles borrowed comments from notable observers—such as Norman Mailer or U Thant—to underline how Apollo 11 symbolized the “common identity” of people on Earth.¹²¹ Such reflections fit well with *Amerika*’s portrayal of spaceflight—and especially Apollo 11—uniting all mankind.

According to *Amerika*, “[s]ome of the loudest applause” for American space exploration came from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The magazine highlighted any evidence of Russian attention on U.S. space achievements no matter

¹¹⁹ Wilford and Wooten, “To the Moon and Back,” 2.

¹²⁰ “Our Impossible Goal, by the Apollo 11 Astronauts,” 40.

¹²¹ “Welcome Back! (Apollo 11),” 60. Mailer found poetic ways to suggest the unifying power of the spaceflight, and both its technical and philosophical scale. When Apollo 11 launched it would burn, he wrote: “as much oxygen as is consumed by half a billion people taking their breath — that was twice, no, more than twice the population of America.” See: Mailer, “A Fire On the Moon (Excerpt),” 40.

how trivial.¹²² It described “large crowds” drawn to view a model of the lunar module outside the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw, though only two people were shown in the accompanying photo. It was crucial for the magazine to underline for Soviet readers that their own leaders and media shared in the widespread excitement.¹²³ Such evidence of Soviet enthusiasm for the Moon landing underscored the overall message that American space exploration united humanity.

Amerika also strove to show examples of American’s peaceful overtures toward the Soviet Union. One article, for example, detailed how the Apollo 11 astronauts placed two medals honoring dead Soviet cosmonauts on the lunar surface. The widows of the fallen cosmonauts—Yuri Gagarin and Vladimir Komarov—gave the medals to American astronaut Frank Borman when he visited the Soviet Union in July 1969, and asked that they be placed on the Moon. To impart official authority to the gesture, and cast it emphatically as a symbol of peace between the two countries, *Amerika* quoted Nixon’s announcement that it would be done. The medals, he argued:

underscore an example we hope to set: that if we can reach the moon, we can reach agreement.¹²⁴

¹²² It reported, for instance, how a “portly Russian” in the United States approached an American after the moon landing, “shook his hand, and said, ‘Colossal!’” Wilford and Wooten, “To the Moon and Back,” 2. Also see the back cover of the April 1970 special edition: a montage of stamps from twelve countries around the globe commemorating Apollo 11, of which several were from within the Soviet Bloc. “Apollo Stamps,” *Amerika*, April 1970, b.c.

¹²³ It reported, for example, how Soviet president Nikolai V. Podgorny personally congratulated Nixon and the “courageous space pilots.” “Moscow radio,” according to the magazine, called the flight the “glorious dream of visionaries and scientists.” The Moon landing “generated ... [s]o much interest” that Moscow, in an unprecedented “gesture,” allowed “12 minutes of Eurovision’s live broadcast of the splashdown” to be shown. Wilford and Wooten, “To the Moon and Back,” 2.

¹²⁴ Wilford and Wooten, “To the Moon and Back,” 2. Nixon had made the comment at the Apollo 11 launch. The same passage was also quoted in: “Special Report: Man on the Moon,” Insert between pp. 28-29.

Other articles similarly described the medals.¹²⁵ But the anecdote of the widows seeking assistance from the American space program also demonstrated how Apollo 11 made the Soviets second in space exploration.

Amerika seized any opportunity to link the President with the American space achievements. American astronauts, sometimes still wearing their spacesuits, were regularly shown speaking on the phone or shaking hands with the President.¹²⁶ Images and text emphasized how keen the Apollo 11 astronauts were to promptly meet with Nixon after their mission.¹²⁷ One photomontage centered upon a television's split screen with Nixon on the phone in the White House on the left and the astronauts on the Moon on the right. Surrounding this symbolic link between Nixon and the astronauts were several images of crowds around the world observing Apollo 11 on large public television screens. Showcasing Nixon in the sole close-up of a television screen on this page implied that the global public eagerly followed not only the Moon landing, but also the political leader of the nation associated with it.¹²⁸

Not just presidents, but other members of the political establishment and federal agencies 'shared' the space exploration spotlight. *Amerika* described, for example, how congressmen, former Presidents, and foreign delegates joined "ordinary citizens" to attend the Apollo 11 launch. Its narrative unified the "ordinary" and the exceptional as a single mass who "concentrated all their senses on

¹²⁵ Neil Armstrong also considered the medals to be emblematic of how Soviet people "share our own dreams and hopes for a better world." "Our Impossible Goal, by the Apollo 11 Astronauts," 40.

¹²⁶ Stansbury, "On Target: Flight of Second U.S. Astronaut," 9; Stansbury, "John Glenn ... In Orbit," 7; "Special Report: Man on the Moon," Insert between pp. 28-29; Bowman, "Space Travelers Meet," 2-3. It also routinely showed Nixon awarding medals and "saluting" the astronauts at various events. After Apollo 11, it reported how at one event "a massed throng suddenly went silent" when Kennedy's promise to land a man on the Moon was replayed on loudspeakers there.

¹²⁷ Wilford and Wooten, "To the Moon and Back," 2; "Special Report: Man on the Moon," Insert between pp. 28-29.

¹²⁸ "Welcome Back! (Apollo 11)," 60.

the one spot.”¹²⁹ Other articles described similar groups of notable foreign and American political representatives applauding the Apollo 11 crew as they addressed a joint session of Congress on September 16, 1969.¹³⁰ Several articles showed photos of astronauts addressing Congress, or posing outside of the Capitol Building.¹³¹ Patriotic symbols often surrounded the astronauts and their compatriots.¹³² Thus, the moment of triumph was linked not only to American political leaders, but also to a wider idea of America.

Associating American politicians with space exploration also connected them with the masses worldwide who “followed” American spaceflights. In so doing, *Amerika* used its space coverage to accentuate the President’s qualities as a leader.¹³³ The magazine thus used the lofty heights achieved by Apollo to project the American political system and its representatives as the highest global political power.

Conclusion

¹²⁹ “00:4; 00:3; 00:2; 00:1; 00:0 (Apollo 11 Lift-Off),” 9.

¹³⁰ See the two-page photo spread documenting the event in: “Welcome Back! (Apollo 11),” 64-65. Bold type at the top of one image described the moment as “Climaxing the Nation’s Tribute.” The accompanying text reported Armstrong’s comment on the significant role that Congress played in the triumph: “It was here, in these halls, that our adventure really began.” Underlining the astronauts’ “shared” experience with their “fellow Americans,” one set of images showed the astronauts in the company of various groups, including McCormack and Vice President Spiro Agnew, Postmaster General Winton Blount, and Congress (shown in its near entirety in wide-angle view).

¹³¹ See, for example: Stansbury, “John Glenn ... In Orbit,” 2-7; Bowman, “Space Travelers Meet,” 2-3; “Welcome Back! (Apollo 11),” 60; “Apollo Soyuz Project: First International Manned Spaceflight,” 24; Everly Driscoll, “Apollo Astronauts: Where Are They Now?,” *Amerika*, July 1975, 30-31.

¹³² American flags occupied the background of three of the four images on the two pages. The Congressional emblem on the ceiling of the House of Representatives placed the American Eagle at the center of the largest photo of the spread. In two other photos, the astronauts presented McCormack and Agnew “with American flags that had been on the moon,” and received from Blount, an over-sized replica of a commemorative stamp boldly emblazoned with the words: “FIRST MAN ON THE MOON” and “UNITED STATES.” See: “Welcome Back! (Apollo 11),” 60.

¹³³ It was a “tanned, exuberant President” Nixon, for example, who vigorously greeted the returned Apollo 11 astronauts, telling “the spacemen they looked ‘great.’” Wilford and Wooten, “To the Moon and Back,” 2 Nixon’s conversations with the Apollo 11 astronauts gave him the opportunity to speak on behalf of “the American people and the peoples of the whole world.” “Special Report: Man on the Moon,” Insert between pp. 28-29. Nixon also “led” the foreign and U.S. dignitaries as they honored the Apollo 11 astronauts. “Welcome Back! (Apollo 11),” 60.

The “open world” and “world of free choice” themes, developed in response to a Soviet peace offensive, became the foundation of USIA’s promotion of an American conception of peace. Space exploration was especially well suited for such a role, since its global appeal not only attracted attention, but also provided a context for universal images and language suggesting that humanity was united.

When the United States trailed the Soviet Union in space exploration between 1957 and roughly 1965, the links between space and peace were less explicitly made in *Amerika* than in its Soviet equivalent.¹³⁴ Instead, *Amerika* portrayed the U.S. space program as benignly scientific and implicitly associated it with an “open world” and a “world of free choice.” *Amerika*’s coverage of space emphasized American openness by portraying an open media, an open space program, and an open society. Television functioned as the principal symbol of American openness. When Apollo 11 dramatically confirmed American space ascendancy, direct lines between space and peace were drawn in bold strokes. In universal language *Amerika* depicted humanity united (often around a television screen) to suggest that American leadership in space equated with American leadership of the “Free World” in its quest for peace.

¹³⁴ Although the Soviet Union continued to chart several notable firsts in its unmanned space program after 1965, after Alexei Leonov’s first spacewalk in March 1965 the United States began setting a string of firsts in manned space exploration. These included Gemini 3 in March 1965 (the first orbital maneuver by a manned spacecraft); Gemini 5 in August 1965 (the first to fly for eight days, which was long enough for a return voyage to the Moon); Gemini 6A and 7 in December 1965, which beat the Soviet Union to achieve the first “rendezvous” in space (the two spacecraft flew within one foot of each other); and several more until culminating with Apollo 11. Nikolai Kamanin conceded to his diary in March 1968 that the three years spent developing the N1 and L3 launchers had “let the United States take the lead.” See: Asif A. Siddiqi, *The Soviet Space Race with Apollo* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2003), 651. A recent *Washington Times* editorial rather generously dated the American lead in space to Alan Shepard’s first American suborbital flight in May 1961. See: “Grounding American Dreams: Manned space flight take a back seat to global-warming hysteria,” *Washington Times*, March 9, 2011.

4. “FORWARD TO NEW VICTORIES IN THE NAME OF PEACE, PROGRESS AND THE HAPPINESS OF MANKIND!”: Depicting the Peaceful Exploration of Space in *Soviet Life*

This chapter examines Soviet political discourse on peace and *Soviet Life*'s use of peace in its space exploration coverage. It seeks to explain how *Soviet Life* used space exploration to promote the Soviet Union as the leader in the global search for peace.

Even before the Soviet Union's December 1922 inception the Bolsheviks used propaganda to associate their policies with global aspirations for peace. According to Frederick Barghoorn, peace propaganda was “probably” the Soviet Union's “most powerful psychological instrument.” Peace, the Bolsheviks reasoned, enjoyed wide appeal, and helped legitimize the revolution. Subsequently, Soviet propagandists inherited an assumption that peace propaganda could powerfully influence global opinion. Commonly injecting the theme into materials on a wide variety of sometimes seemingly unrelated topics, Soviet propaganda portrayed the USSR as the leader in a global quest for peace.¹

Space exploration played an important role in spreading Soviet peace propaganda because it attracted widespread public interest. *Soviet Life*'s space propaganda closely followed the main contours of Soviet political discourse and was colored by its key themes: that socialism and peace were “indivisible”; that Soviet peace policies originated with Lenin and were therefore “permanent”; and that socialist “peace forces” (under Soviet leadership) struggled for peace against the imperialist system. However, evolving relations with the United States compelled a

¹ Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Soviet Foreign Propaganda* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), 80, 93-4, 100, 102, 104, 106.

discursive shift in the early 1970s toward depicting peaceful coexistence as an accepted standard for international relations. Soviet space propaganda directed at the United States not only reflected changing Soviet attitudes, it also revealed that space exploration played a significant role in the evolving superpower relationship.

Soviet Life's coverage of space exploration reinforced the overall message of Soviet peace propaganda communicated elsewhere in its pages. Space-themed articles, however, tended *not* to explicitly portray peace as a socialist struggle, but instead presented struggle in terms of a competitive space “race.” The magazine portrayed Soviet leadership in space to imply that the Soviet Union also lead in the search for peace on Earth.

The two major themes of progress and cooperation examined in subsequent chapters warrant mention here because both closely relate to the peace theme. Space cooperation fit particularly well with using space propaganda as peace propaganda. Space exploration was a field especially suited to international cooperation, and *Soviet Life*, following its mandate to foster international understanding, exchange, and cooperation with the United States, tended to emphasize this aspect from an early stage. Although it received some attention in Soviet space propaganda before 1969, after Apollo 11 cooperation became a central theme. *Soviet Life* continued to point out Soviet successes and (less) notable firsts, but also celebrated American accomplishments—which took their place “alongside” the Soviet Union’s “related achievements”—with grace.² As they marked the American lunar landing, the magazine’s editors stated that space cooperation was “in the interests of all

² Leonid Sedov, “Man on the Moon,” *Soviet Life*, September 1969, 11.

mankind.”³ High profile orbital cooperation with the United States perfectly illustrated Soviet leadership of the socialist struggle for peace. But extending the olive branch of space cooperation compelled Soviet propagandists to downplay ideological differences. Discussion of struggle between capitalist and communist systems would likely alienate American readers and cloud the peaceful message of space cooperation.

Progress, particularly political, allowed Soviet propagandists considerably more room to articulate ideological differences, but overall this theme’s emphasis on the “mutual benefits” that space exploration would bring to all mankind supported the peaceful notion that space united humanity. Ideological struggle still appeared in *Soviet Life*, but was largely compartmentalized away from space-themed articles. Instead, as this chapter shows, space articles emphasized the scientific or philosophically inquisitive aspects of Soviet space exploration to portray its peaceful basis, and depicted the power of space exploration to unite humanity to work towards peace. This chapter describes how *Soviet Life* treated these themes and provides context for this discussion by touching on some of the most relevant features of Soviet peace discourse.

Peaceful Exploration

Overt statements that space exploration was peaceful in nature occurred far more frequently in *Soviet Life* than in its American counterpart. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, leading the space race but still second militarily, the Soviet Union had some reason to discourage the militarization of space, and to use space to promote itself as

³ “Man and Outer Space: Introduction to the Special Issue,” *Soviet Life*, August 1969, 1.

the more peaceful of the two superpowers. The magazine's coverage of the first sputniks (satellites) in the late 1950s, stressed the scientific and cooperative aspects of space exploration in the context of the International Geophysical Year.⁴

Soviet Life explicitly linked subsequent Soviet spaceflight milestones with "the sacred cause of peace," and used its space coverage to issue pleas for peace to the "Whole of Progressive Mankind." Yuri Gagarin's April 12, 1961, first human spaceflight especially inspired such appeals. Statements by Nikita Khrushchev and the Party appeared within and alongside the magazine's reports on the flight. These seized the moment to depict Soviet leadership in the search for peace, to call for disarmament, and to subtly suggest that other nations were interested in militarizing space. They equated peace with socialism as they linked the Soviet search for peace with human "welfare" and "genuine freedom." (In Soviet ideological discourse, the only true freedom was socialist freedom from capitalism's inherent oppression.) They also explicitly associated Soviet space feats with socialism. Space successes were said to embody the "conditions created by the October Socialist Revolution" by demonstrating the Soviet Union's steady progress toward building communism.⁵

⁴ "Sputniks Underscore Man's Scientific Progress," *USSR*, December 1957, 1-2; "Scientific Cooperation--International Geophysical Year," *USSR*, March 1958, 51; "Sputniks and Space Ships," *USSR*, April 1958, 17-19. The term "sputnik" is simply the Russian word for "satellite," and can additionally be loosely translated as "fellow traveler." Although the official designation for the first satellite was "Simple Satellite PS-1," once its existence became known, the Soviet media, and after that the world press, simply referred to it as "Sputnik." *Soviet Life* accepted use of the term "Sputnik," differentiating them with a number ("Sputnik 1," for example), and referring to them in the plural as "sputniks." See: Asif A. Siddiqi, *Sputnik and the Soviet Space Challenge*, (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2003), 161, 168.

⁵ A CPSU "appeal for peace" addressed "To the Whole of Progressive Mankind" and "To the Peoples and Governments of All Countries" promised to use Soviet space exploration "not at the service of war but at the service of peace and the security of peoples." Khrushchev similarly conveyed his desire to establish peace to "all the governments of the world." "More and more Soviet people will soar into the cosmos," he predicted, they will "solve the secrets of nature and make them serve man, his welfare, make them serve peace. We emphasize—to serve peace! The Soviet people do not want rockets ... to carry lethal payloads." Khrushchev also called the Soviet "conquest of space ... a new triumph of Lenin's ideas, a confirmation of the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist teachings."

Like its American counterpart, *Soviet Life* often strove to associate its political leadership with Soviet successes in space. Coverage of Soviet human spaceflights, and the events held to celebrate them especially showed Soviet political leaders striving to associate themselves publicly with the space heroes.⁶ Several articles strongly associated the cosmonauts with Soviet officialdom by showcasing them dressed in their military uniforms or linking them to other institutions of Soviet society, such as the Young Pioneers.⁷ Khrushchev, and *Soviet Life*, thus capitalized on high profile milestones in space exploration to suggest Soviet leadership in the global struggle for peace.

Interpreting these recurrent statements associating space exploration with peace requires taking into consideration the nuances of the Soviet meaning of “peace.” A favorite mantra in Soviet leaders’ speeches throughout the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods was the axiom: “Socialism and peace are indivisible.” This

Elsewhere he declared that Vostok I “embodied the genius of the Soviet people, the powerful strength of socialism.” See: “The First Man in Space: Yuri Gagarin,” *USSR*, May 1961, i.f.c.-1; “A Day to Remember,” *USSR*, May 1961, 2-3.

⁶ Khrushchev and Gagarin appeared together on the May 1961 front cover, locked in embrace on the inside front cover, and several more times inside the issue, for example. See: “Nikita Khrushchev with Yuri Gagarin and his wife Valentina driving along a street in Moscow on their way to Red Square on April 14,” *USSR*, May 1961, f.c.; “The First Man in Space: Yuri Gagarin,” *USSR*, May 1961, i.f.c.-1; “A Day to Remember,” 2-3; “Heartfelt Gratitude,” *USSR*, June 1961, i.f.c., 1; “Moscow Welcomes the Hero,” *USSR*, June 1961, 6-9. For other examples see: “Second Soviet Cosmonaut in Outer Space,” *USSR*, September 1961, 14-15; Gherman Titov, “435,000 Miles Through Space,” *USSR*, October 1961, i.f.c., 1-7; “Hero’s Welcome for Cosmonauts in Moscow,” *USSR*, October 1962, 26-27; “Moscow Welcomes Cosmonauts,” *USSR*, August 1963, 26-27. The December 1976 edition featured a photograph of Brezhnev with Gagarin shaking hands and gazing into each other’s eyes. See: “Interview By Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee for French Television,” *Soviet Life*, December 1976, 8c. Brezhnev and Beregovoi were shown together in similar pose in: Boris Petrov, “The Space Experiment,” *Soviet Life*, January 1969, 10-11.

⁷ See especially the images of the first six cosmonauts in official portraits wearing their uniforms, and many medals in: “Do You Know Soviet Cosmonauts?,” *Soviet Life*, April 1964, 32-33. See also: Yuri Yakovlev, “Young Pioneers,” *Soviet Life*, January 1963, 26-29; Alexander Blokhin, “Cosmonaut’s Classmates,” *Soviet Life*, June 1964, 52-53; “Young Cosmonauts School,” *Soviet Life*, June 1966, 29; “Young Cosmonauts’ Club,” *Soviet Life*, August 1969, 16-21; “Young Cosmonauts,” *Soviet Life*, January 1972, 56; “Books for the Young,” *Soviet Life*, September 1972, 52-53; “Young Cosmonauts School,” *Soviet Life*, June 1974, 29; “Birthplace of First Spaceman Rebuilt by Students,” *Soviet Life*, September 1974, 18-23.

formula injected an element of class warfare into the Soviet conception of peace, since “struggle for peace” implied “struggle for socialism.”⁸ *Soviet Life* frequently portrayed the indivisibility of peace and socialism to suggest a Soviet lead in the search for peace.⁹ According to *Soviet Life*, the capitalist West not only lagged behind Soviet leadership of the peace front, it was also the chief obstacle to the fulfillment of Soviet peace initiatives.

Another key concept in Soviet discourse of the time was the ubiquitous catch phrase “peaceful coexistence” (*mirnoe sosysshchestvovanie*).¹⁰ Though Lenin was falsely credited with originating the term, it did not become a fixture of Soviet rhetoric until after 1920.¹¹ Stalin used the term only sporadically in the 1920s and by the Second World War it disappeared from usage as the Soviet Union aggressively expanded its

⁸ On this foundation, Soviet speechwriters and propagandists built a library of interchangeable phrases: “world peace” meant “world socialism”; “peace offensive” equaled “socialist offensive.” Capitalism and war were just as indivisible; those who opposed socialism also opposed peace. See: Ronald Roy Nelson and Peter Schweizer, *The Soviet Concepts of Peace, Peaceful Coexistence, and Detente* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988), ix, 2, 15. The ideological fusion of peace and socialism can be traced to the writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, who considered ending class struggle a prerequisite for ending war. See: Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Gareth Stedman Jones, *The Communist Manifesto* (London: Penguin Classics, 2002), 241. Lenin often argued similarly that there was an “inevitable connection between wars and ... class struggle.” See: Vladimir I. Lenin, *Socialism And War* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1970), 4; Vladimir I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 23, 4th ed. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), 80; Vladimir I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, trans. Julius Katzer, vol. 31, 4th ed. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), 213-214. Khrushchev and Brezhnev also embraced the fusion of socialism and peace in their political discourse, often linking the two concepts together in a single breath: “socialism and peace” or “peace and socialism.” See: Nikita S. Khrushchev, “On Peaceful Coexistence,” *Foreign Affairs* 38, no. 1 (October 1959), 1-3; Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev in America* (New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1960), 230; Leonid I. Brezhnev, *Selected Speeches*, (New York: Pergamon Press, 1978), 8, 31, 39, 51, 130-131, 164, 225, 232; Nelson and Schweizer, 4; Leonid I. Brezhnev, *Our Course: Peace and Socialism* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1973), 7.

⁹ “Message of N.S. Khrushchev to Heads of States (Governments) of the Countries of the World,” *Soviet Life*, March 1964, Special Supplement; Spartak Beglov, “Peaceful Coexistence: Principles and Practices,” *Soviet Life*, January 1973, 12-14; Georgi Zisman, “Peaceful Coexistence: Lenin’s Concept, Today’s Foreign Policy,” *Soviet Life*, April 1974, 4-5.

¹⁰ Roger D. Markwick, “Peaceful Coexistence, Detente and Third World Struggles: The Soviet View, From Lenin to Brezhnev,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 44, no. 2 (1990): 174; Robin Edmonds, *Soviet Foreign Policy 1962-1973 The Brezhnev Years* (London: Oxford University Press, 1983), 234.

¹¹ Lenin never specifically employed the term, though he did occasionally use a similar term—“peaceful cohabitation” (*mirnoe sozhitelstvo*)—to describe a temporary “breathing spell” in Soviet relations with capitalist systems. After 1920, People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs Georgi Chicherin began enthusiastically promoting the “image of peaceful coexistence.” See: Barghoorn, 91.

influence westward.¹² Though in some ways Stalin's foreign policy discourse reflected a shift toward prolonged accommodation with capitalist states, for the most part it remained preoccupied with the struggle between capitalist and communist systems.¹³

After Stalin's March 1953 death, during the period of "collective leadership" Prime Minister Georgi Malenkov was quick to put forward the possibility of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist world, and the term promptly resurfaced.¹⁴ Under Khrushchev, Soviet leaders routinely cited peaceful coexistence as the "basic principle" of Soviet foreign policy and credited Lenin with its origins in order to cast it as a central doctrine of Marxist-Leninist theory.¹⁵

Khrushchev uttered the phrase far more frequently than any of his predecessors and consequently devoted more energy to articulating its meaning.¹⁶ His

¹² Stalin did not utter the phrase publicly after 1927 when he last used it in an address to the Fifteenth Party Congress. See: Warren Lerner, "The Historical Origins of the Soviet Doctrine of Peaceful Coexistence," *Law and Contemporary Problems* 29, no. 4 (Autumn): 866-868, 870; Markwick, 174.

¹³ Fernando Claudin, *The Communist Movement: from Comintern to Cominform* (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1975), 73-4, 387, 390-391; Markwick, 174; E.H. Carr, *Socialism in One Country 1924-26*, vol. 3 (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1972), 19-20; Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin*, revised edition. (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1970), 388; Paul Marantz, "Prelude to Detente: Doctrinal Change under Khrushchev," *International Studies Quarterly* 19, no. 4 (December 1975): 505-506; Geoffrey Roberts, "Moscow and the Marshall Plan: Politics, Ideology and the Onset of the Cold War, 1947," *Europe-Asia Studies* 46, no. 8 (1994): 1379-80; Werner G. Hahn, *Postwar Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, 1946-53* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982), 67-93.

¹⁴ The period of "collective leadership" lasted from March 1953 to February 1955, during which time power was divided between Georgi Malenkov, Lavrenti Beria, and to a lesser degree Vyacheslav Molotov. In an August 8, 1953, speech before the Supreme Soviet, Georgi Malenkov declared "we, stand, as we have always stood, for the peaceful coexistence of the two systems." See: Markwick, 174; Adam B. Ulam, "Detente Under Soviet Eyes," *Foreign Policy*, no. 24 (August 1976): 149-150.

¹⁵ See, for example: Khrushchev, "On Peaceful Coexistence," 1-3; Nelson and Schweizer, ix, 7; Brezhnev, *Our Course: Peace and Socialism*, 7, 8; Edward McWhinney, "'Peaceful Co-existence' and Soviet-Western International Law," *The American Journal of International Law* 56, no. 4 (October 1962): 951; Brezhnev, *Selected Speeches*, 3-4, 245-47; Yevgeni A. Korovin, *International Affairs* 9, no. 4 (1963): 100; Vladimir I. Lenin, "An end to wars...", *Soviet Life*, April 1970, b.c.; Mikhail Sonkin, "Peace! New Russia's First Word," *Soviet Life*, December 1966, 12-17; Vladimir Lenin, "On Cooperation," *Soviet Life*, November 1969, 35; Len Karpinsky, "The Communist Ideal," *Soviet Life*, April 1970, 62-63; "Following the Leninist Course of Peace and Socialism," *Soviet Life*, July 1973, 3; Beglov, "Peaceful Coexistence: Principles and Practices," 12-14; Mikhail Zimyanin, "In the Name of Peace, In the Interests of All Peoples," *Soviet Life*, October 1973, 11; Zisman, "Peaceful Coexistence: Lenin's Concept, Today's Foreign Policy," 4-5.

¹⁶ Khrushchev defined peaceful coexistence "[i]n its simplest expression" as "the repudiation of war," a "commitment to non-aggression," and an "obligation" to not violate other states' territories or

usage of the term embraced both the indivisibility of socialism and peace, and the ideological struggle against capitalism.¹⁷ Khrushchev's official endorsement of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956 formalized a Soviet foreign policy shift away from the Leninist notion that a military conflict between socialist and capitalist states was inevitable.¹⁸ Peaceful coexistence did not relax struggle but rather shifted it away from military competition toward economic, cultural, and other forms of soft competition.¹⁹ This was not a status quo vision of peace, since it placed the onus of responsibility on the U.S. to make peace with the Soviet Union—the leader of the socialist system and the “peaceful forces.”

Another key phrase in Soviet peace discourse “*borba za mir*” can translate to English as either “struggle for peace” or “struggle for the world.” In the same way that peace and socialism were discussed inextricably, for Soviet theoreticians, who made frequent use of the phrase, the struggles for peace and the world were intertwined.²⁰ Implying conflict, the phrase was not very useful for promoting peaceful coexistence to foreign audiences but found common use among those receptive to communist ideology.²¹ Soviet propaganda often portrayed the struggle

“sovereignty.” See: Khrushchev, “On Peaceful Coexistence,” 3, 4, 7, 10, 14-15; “Message of N.S. Khrushchev,” Special Supplement. See also: United States. Dept. of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. V, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998), 40, 44 (hereafter FRUS followed by years and volume number).

¹⁷ Barghoorn, 98.

¹⁸ Markwick, 174; Jerry F. Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1986), 107; Barghoorn, 88-89; Marantz, 510-511; Edmonds, 234.

¹⁹ Nelson and Schweizer, x.

²⁰ R. Judson Mitchell, *Ideology of a Superpower: Contemporary Soviet Doctrine on International Relations* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), 69; Lerner, 869; Karl Radek, “The Bases of Soviet Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Affairs* 12, no. 2 (1934): 195-196.

²¹ Barghoorn, 80, 87, 99. For examples, see: Office of Research, “M-279-63, The Soviet Attack On USIA,” August 29, 1963, RG 306, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Office of Research, Research Memorandums 1963-1982, Box 1, NARA II; Office of Research, “M-174-63, Memorandum: Ideological Plenum Ilichev Report,” June 21, 1963, RG 306, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Office of Research, Research Memorandums 1963-1982, Box 1, NARA II; “Mirnogo

for peace against the “imperialist aggressor,” and condemned American “aggression,” “militarists,” and stonewalling of disarmament talks. Ideological motivations were apparent in routine critiques of American poverty, unemployment, crime, and racism.²² That peaceful coexistence meant continuing and increasing ideological struggle and competition is key to understanding Soviet propaganda directed at an American audience. Indeed, Barghoorn noted that peaceful coexistence was expressly intended to charm neutrals and anti-communists.²³ It therefore occupied a special role in Soviet propaganda. Western observers were divided over whether to interpret the message as a gesture, a promise, or a cunning deception.

By the mid-1960s, as American ascendancy in space became increasingly apparent, *Soviet Life* exhibited a distinctly darker view of the prospect that war on Earth could spread to space. In a May 1966 article, Yuri Melvil meditated on the implications of closer parity in space. He warned against the possible dangers of humankind expanding its activities beyond the isolated confines of planet Earth. He saw space exploration offering humanity the chance for immortality, “if man does not commit nuclear suicide or some other kind of suicide.” Further cosmic exploration, he argued, practically compelled mankind to choose the path of peace.²⁴

sosushchestvovaniia i ideologicheskai bor'ba (Peaceful Coexistence and Ideological Struggle),” *Kommunist*, no. 16 (1959): 7.

²² United States Information Agency, “M-160-65, Soviet Propaganda: Themes and Priorities,” April 30, 1965, RG 306, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Office of Research, Research Memorandums 1963-1982, Box 5, NARA II. Brezhnev readily upheld the idea that peaceful coexistence implied a continuation of class, ideological, and revolutionary struggles, and often criticized the “rapacious, plundering aggression of the imperialist states, first and foremost the USA.” See: Markwick, 177; Leonid I. Brezhnev, *Leninskii kursom* (Lenin’s course), vol. 2 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1974), 275, 289-290.

²³ Barghoorn, 87.

²⁴ Space exploration did not “automatically give man immortality,” but “the death of mankind was no longer inevitable” since humanity could take charge of its own destiny, and not simply “perish when the sun cools.” Yuri Melvil, “Man in the Space Age,” *Soviet Life*, May 1966, 48-49.

Ultimately, it was a hopeful message. But, perhaps reflecting the increasing perception that the Soviets had lost the lead in space, Melvil dwelt upon how the “space venture could also have diametrically opposite consequences.” Raising fears of nuclear cataclysmic weapons in space, he discussed the future of humanity in apocalyptic terms. Space exploration, he argued, should not only be an exclusively peaceful endeavor, it should also compel humanity to rectify “disharmony” on Earth. With typical Soviet propaganda motifs, he implicitly criticized the U.S. by depicting imperialist aggression as the major cause of war, and by decrying the hypocrisy of capitalist freedom by pointing to American social and racial inequality. His warning against carrying the “miserable and evil” aspects of society into the universe suggested that Soviet leadership in space would better serve humanity.²⁵

As the United States became ascendant in space exploration in the late 1960s the magazine’s depiction of the bond between peace and space became fraught with tension. When Apollo 11 dramatically fortified the perception of American leadership in space, *Soviet Life* responded by gracefully celebrating the American achievement while explicitly restating that space exploration should be a peaceful endeavor.²⁶ One August 1969 article on the Moon’s legal status sounded a note of tension, however, by pointing out that an international agreement dictated that the Moon could not be “annexed,” and was “to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.” It sounded a hopeful note overall though, presenting Apollo 11 as a signal of the need for closer international cooperation in space.²⁷

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ “It is to be hoped, and we have every reason to expect it,” one Apollo 11 article stated, that space exploration would contribute to “preserving peace on our planet.” Sedov, “Man on the Moon,” 11.

²⁷ Gennadi Zhukov discussed the January 27, 1967 “Treaty on Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other

The strategic reality imposed by nuclear weapons combined with increasing Soviet confidence in its ability to compete economically with the West, and (in the early 1970s) with the emergence of détente, to produce a noticeable shift in Soviet discourse about peaceful coexistence.²⁸ A period of warming Soviet-American relations and increased superpower dialogue, détente reached its peak between 1972 and 1975.²⁹ In part, Brezhnev and Nixon differentiated themselves from their predecessors by focusing on manageable, negotiable issues and approaching larger questions incrementally.³⁰ During détente, Soviet propaganda presented peaceful coexistence less as a *possible* basis for international relations than as an already widely accepted standard.³¹

Indeed, the differences between “détente” and “peaceful coexistence” in Soviet discourse are difficult to discern. Brezhnev used the term détente (*razriadka*)

Celestial Bodies.” He also implied that the Soviets would soon put humans on the Moon, and argued that the “rigorous and unfamiliar conditions” of the lunar surface “will demand the close cooperation of the people there from different countries.” See: Gennadi Zhukov, “The Legal Status of the Moon,” *Soviet Life*, August 1969, 30-31.

²⁸ Ilyichev argued at an Ideological Plenum in June 1963, for instance, that the American “imperialists” had recognized both the “folly” of nuclear conflict and the impossibility of competing economically with the Soviet Union. See: Office of Research, “M-279-63, “The Soviet Attack On USA.”; Office of Research, “M-174-63, “Memorandum: Ideological Plenum Ilichev Report.” Soviet discourse and propaganda—*Soviet Life* magazine included—often referred to these recent developments as “changes in the correlation of forces.” See: Beglov, “Peaceful Coexistence,” 12-14; “Message of N.S. Khrushchev,” Special Supplement. See also: Khrushchev, “On Peaceful Coexistence,” 4, 14-15; Markwick, 174, 179, f.n. 51; United States. Dept. of State, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. V, 41. By 1986, Soviet foreign policy historians asserted that détente had been brought on by the same formulation previously used to explain the emergence of peaceful coexistence: a “new correlation of forces in the world: by the achievement of thorough military-strategic parity of socialism and capitalism.” See: Markwick, 177; Andrei A. Gromyko and Boris N. Ponomarev, eds., *Istoriia Vneshnei Politiki SSSR 1917-1985* (History of Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1985), vol. 2 (Moscow: Nauka, 1986), 8, 16.

²⁹ Nelson and Schweizer, ix.

³⁰ Though Khrushchev had expressed a desire to settle international disputes using “peaceful means” such as negotiation, his (and the American presidents’) tendency to link separate issues such as disarmament, decolonization, and the unification of Germany, Korea, or Vietnam, made negotiations difficult. See, for example: “Message of N.S. Khrushchev,” Special Supplement. See: Brezhnev, *Selected Speeches*, 240; Markwick, 179.

³¹ Khrushchev tended to portray peaceful coexistence moving toward an “accepted principle of international law,” or as a concept that “found expression” in various “international documents.” See: “Message of N.S. Khrushchev,” Special Supplement; Korovin, 100.

infrequently in the late 1960s. Although it became common in Soviet discourse by the early 1970s, it never replaced the phrase peaceful coexistence. Soviet usage of détente drew from the original French sense of a relaxation of tension, but was invested with new meaning linking it to peaceful coexistence. Not quite synonyms, the terms were nonetheless closely linked.³²

The pacifying tone and diminished emphasis on struggle with the capitalist world in a Peace Program introduced by Brezhnev at the Twenty-Fourth Party Congress in 1971 hinted at the potential for authentic change in U.S.-Soviet relations. Whereas previous discussions of peaceful coexistence invariably stressed the continuation of class struggle, Brezhnev now avoided mentioning class at all. Peaceful coexistence thus took precedence over class antagonisms and world revolution.³³ When the Central Committee approved the report in November of that year, it sanctioned the report's emphasis on furthering peaceful coexistence but restored an accent on ideological struggle.³⁴ Brezhnev—and Soviet discourse in general—returned to the more confrontational and ideological tenor that was previously commonplace. Socialist struggle was declared necessary to “impose” or “foist” détente on the capitalist world.³⁵ The Soviet press praised the Peace Program as a “great peace offensive.”³⁶

³² The 1977 edition of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* had no article on détente. Instead, the index referred readers to the entry on peaceful coexistence. The 1979 handbook, *Short Dictionary: Reference Book for Agitators and Political Information Officers*, for instance, defined “détente” as: “the process of reorganizing the modern system of international relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence.” See: Markwick, 177, 178-9; Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, D.C. Brookings Institution Press, 1985), 25; Margot Light, *The Soviet Theory of International Relations* (Brighton, UK: Wheatsheaf Books, 1988), 53, 63, 70; Tunkin, 109.

³³ Peter M. E. Volten, *Brezhnev's Peace Program: A Study of Soviet Domestic Political Process and Power*, A Westview replica edition; (Boulder, Colo. Westview Press, 1982), 58-61; Markwick, 178-80.

³⁴ Volten, 63-65, 72-3, 75.

³⁵ Markwick, 180; V. Zagladin, “Revoliutsionnii protsess i mezhdunarodnaia politika (The revolutionary process and international politics),” *Kommunist* 13 (September 1972): 26; G. Tunkin, “Razriadka napriazhennosti i mezhdunarodnoe pravo (Détente and international law),” *Kommunist* 11

Soviet discourse and propaganda hailed the May 1972 Moscow Summit between the superpowers as a triumph of the new spirit of negotiation, and the Basic Principles Agreement signed there as nothing less than the American government's "official recognition" of peaceful coexistence as the basis of international affairs.³⁷ Even at the height of détente in 1974, Brezhnev emphasized how relations with capitalist states "require[d] constant political struggle."³⁸ In spite of détente and the slight and temporary abatement of struggle in Brezhnev's 1971 Peace Program report, the concepts of peace and struggle remained conjoined in Soviet discourse throughout the first two decades of the space age.

By the mid-1970s, the optimism inspired by the 1972 Moscow Summit began to wear off. Soviet observers began to note that the new era of international relations was in fact only at a "developmental stage." Although political détente had been won, military détente had not yet followed.³⁹ Soviet discourse on peaceful

(July 1974): 110; D. Tomashevskii, "Leninskii printsip mirnogo sossushchestvovaniia i klassovaia bor'ba (The Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence and the class struggle)," *Kommunist* 12 (August 1970): 111; Leonid I. Brezhnev, *Leninskii kursom*, vol. 4 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1974), 81; Brezhnev, *Selected Speeches*, 7-10, 225.

³⁶ Some press reports reflected the propaganda—rather than diplomatic—aspects of the peace campaign. *Red Star* claimed the "Peace Program ... has found the way to the hearts of millions of people," and signaled a "turning point" in European history. See: Volten, 74.

³⁷ The agreement on the "Basic Principles of Mutual Relations Between the USSR and the USA" was seen to embody the five principles of coexistence outlined by Khrushchev in 1956. *Pravda* considered it no less than a "changeover from the Cold War to peace and co-operation." See: Markwick, 179-180; Zafar Imam, "Soviet View of Detente," *International Studies (New Delhi)* 13, no. 4 (December 1974): 622, 628; Graham D. Vernon, "Controlled Conflict: Soviet Perceptions of Peaceful Co-existence," *Orbis* 23, no. 2 (Summer): 296; "Historic American-Soviet Summit," *Soviet Life*, July 1972, f.c.; "Basic Principles of Relations Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America," *Soviet Life*, July 1972, 2; "Joint Soviet-US Communiqué," *Soviet Life*, July 1972, 6-7; "The Moscow Summit Results," *Soviet Life*, July 1972, 8-11; "Soviet People Comment," *Soviet Life*, July 1972, 10-11; "A Program for the First Lady," *Soviet Life*, July 1972, 12-13; "Grounds For Hope," *Soviet Life*, July 1972, 14; Beglov, "Peaceful Coexistence," 12-14.

³⁸ Brezhnev, *Selected Speeches*, 234. The third edition of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* published that year also defined peaceful coexistence as: "a specific form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism in the international arena."

See: A. E. Bovin and A. M. Prokhorov, "Peaceful Coexistence," in *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, vol. 16, 3rd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1977), 625; Nelson and Schweizer, xi, xii.

³⁹ Markwick, 180-81; Nikolai Inozemtsev, "O novom etape v razvitií mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii (On the new stage in international relations)," *Kommunist* 13 (September 1973): 96, 98, 101; "Nikolai

coexistence similarly retreated. In October 1973 *Soviet Life* would only claim that peaceful coexistence was “increasingly,” or “becoming” a foundation for international relations.⁴⁰ Although by the mid-1970s Soviet leaders spoke of a “return” to Cold War, *Soviet Life* continued to suggest that the Cold War was receding into history, soon to be replaced by a new era of “mutually beneficial cooperation.”⁴¹

Soviet Life thus took its cues from the most positive aspects of the shifting discourse, as it tended to emphasize how relations between the two superpowers were improving. Soviet discourse and propaganda on peace thus found common ground with space propaganda through the notion of a “new era.” Such an idea cast space exploration as a symbol of peaceful progress, and the “universal” hope that humanity could pursue a more cooperative basis for global relations. Space propaganda thus encouraged greater peace and cooperation, even as political leaders sometimes resisted this impulse.

As détente emerged in the early 1970s, and the two superpowers embarked on a highly propagandistic joint space project, *Soviet Life* reemphasized the positive dimensions of space as a symbol of amity and a promise for a peaceful future. *Soviet Life*’s coverage of the Apollo Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) often explicitly associated it with peace.⁴² *Soviet Life* commonly presented the joint mission as a sign that peaceful coexistence had become the norm for superpower relations.⁴³

N. Inozemtsev, Reputed Kremlin Aide,” *The New York Times*, August 15, 1982, sec. Obituaries; Zagladin, “Revolutsionnii protsess i mezhdunarodnaia politika,” 26; N.I. Lebedev, *A New Stage in International Relations* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1978), xiii; Garthoff, 45-6.

⁴⁰ Tunkin, 108, 113; Markwick, 179.

⁴¹ Zimyanin, “In the Name of Peace,” 11; Zisman, “Peaceful Coexistence,” 4-5.

⁴² The joint mission, it claimed, “open[ed] new prospects for cooperation by different countries in the peaceful exploration of outer space.” To the Soviet leadership, the mission heralded “great new

Former *Soviet Life* editor Georgi Isachenko argued that it was not the scientific or technical, but “the political—the universal—aspect” of the joint mission that captured world attention:

The Soyuz-Apollo flight symbolized the emergence of a new atmosphere in the world today. It showed that the principles of relaxation of tensions and peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems are becoming an integral part of our lives.⁴⁴

The magazine thus exploited the joint flight as a symbol of improving relations between the superpowers, and a milestone in the search for peace.⁴⁵ Linking the joint mission with the Soviet principle of peaceful coexistence implied Soviet leadership of the peace race. Because ASTP provided a striking example of how the spirit of cooperation trumped ideological differences, *Soviet Life*’s coverage of it will be further examined in Chapter 10.

“Sputnikia”

Soviet Life commonly referred to the power of Soviet space achievements to unite humanity. One way that it implicitly portrayed this unifying force was by emphasizing the “international character” of science. Casting Soviet space science at the center of a vast exercise in international cooperation, it thus portrayed all of

successes in the exploration of outer space in the name of lasting peace on Earth.” “Congratulations From Leonid Brezhnev, Nikolai Podgorny and Alexei Kosygin,” *Soviet Life*, December 1975, 18.

⁴³ As another article quoted Academician Vladimir Kotelnikov, ASTP was no less than, “a reflection of the policy of peaceful coexistence.” Vladimir Makhotin, “Multinational Press Center,” *Soviet Life*, December 1975, 22-23.

⁴⁴ Isachenko’s description of a “turn from” the Cold War, and of the relationship between astronauts and cosmonauts as an example of “mutual understanding,” employed terms commonly found in Soviet political discourse of the time. Georgi Isachenko, “Earth Is Our Bearing,” *Soviet Life*, December 1975, 21.

⁴⁵ See, for example: “Soyuz-Apollo Experiment: A Bridge to the Future,” *Soviet Life*, December 1975, 1.

humankind following the Soviet lead in space.⁴⁶ The magazine did salute American space contributions alongside Soviet ones. Such an acknowledgement would have had obvious appeal for American readers, but it more importantly characterized space exploration as an international project and presented Soviet space science in a leading role.⁴⁷

Soviet Life routinely claimed that Soviet space achievements demonstrated the universal aspects of science.⁴⁸ The publication emphasized science's "impelling motive—to serve man," and portrayed Konstantin Tsiolkovsky as a model of such service.⁴⁹ Even the Soviet people who wrote in to volunteer for space missions—which, according to one article, the "overwhelming majority" of Soviet youth did—were similarly driven.⁵⁰ *Soviet Life* thus used space science to depict the Soviet Union working in harmony with the world.⁵¹ Such claims emphasized the unity of the world scientific community and implied Soviet leadership within that group. The magazine

⁴⁶ The first Soviet satellites were "symbolic of the cooperation of the scientists of all countries," for example. See: "Sputniks Underscore Man's Scientific Progress," 1-2.

⁴⁷ In early 1958, *Soviet Life* acknowledged that "progress" in space research would "be accelerated ... by other satellites, both Soviet and American." See: "Sputniks and Space Ships," 17-19. In 1966 the magazine continued to credit both the "Soviet and American space effort" when it discussed space science. See: Melvil, "Man in the Space Age," 48-49. ASTP provided an outstanding opportunity to present the two superpowers as equal partners, sharing the title of "the world's two leaders in space research." See: Alexei Leonov, "Challenging Space: Soviet-American Docking Experiment," *Soviet Life*, July 1975, 16-17.

⁴⁸ Sputnik for instance, was a "testimony to the global nature of knowledge, its international character." Oleg Pisarzhevsky, "Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, Cosmic Trail Blazer," *USSR*, December 1957, 3-5.

⁴⁹ It cited, for example, the Russian rocketry pioneer's remarks that the "basic motive of my life is to do something useful for mankind." Pisarzhevsky, "Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, Cosmic Trail Blazer," 3-5.

⁵⁰ According to the magazine, they were "motivated by the same urge for pioneering space exploration, the same desire to be of service to science." "Volunteers for Space Travel," *USSR*, September 1958, 14-15.

⁵¹ As Khrushchev claimed: "Soviet science is developing in close contact with world science." "A Day to Remember," 2-3.

emphasized how data from Soviet satellites was shared with the world's scientists and aided International Geophysical Year research.⁵²

In December 1958's "The United Efforts of the World's Astronomers," Alexander Mikhailov echoed these notions that space research brought the world's scientists together and showed the Soviet Union's leading role in international science.⁵³ Reporting on the Tenth International Astronomical Congress in Moscow, Mikhailov stressed how the world's astronomers worked together collectively. Pull-out quotes accompanying the article reported comments made by five of the individuals in attendance, including three Americans.⁵⁴ These suggested that strong relationships between the two countries were forming in the scientific community. They especially exhibited American astronomers' excitement to attend the event and make contact with their Soviet counterparts. The Vice President of the International Astronomical Union Leo Goldberg observed how many American astronomers even studied Russian in advance of the meeting.⁵⁵

Yet while Mikhailov stressed the international character of science, he also strove to portray Soviet scientific leadership. His report on a session devoted to satellites indicated the Soviet lead in its bold-faced heading: "Research by Sputnik." It described how preliminary studies performed by Soviet scientists on the satellite's "invaluable data" elicited much excitement and discussion from the participants.

⁵² "Scientific Cooperation: Sputniks Aid IGY Research," *USSR*, April 1958, 16. See also: "Sputnik III-Laboratory in Space," *USSR*, July 1958, 1-4.

⁵³ Mikhailov was the Chairman of the Astronomical Council of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

⁵⁴ A "pull-out quote" is text drawn from the main body of an article and repeated alongside it. Pull-out quotes usually feature a different or larger font, or bold type to draw the reader's attention to them.

⁵⁵ The Dutch President of the International Astronomic Union Jan Oort even described a "feeling of sadness" upon departing the Congress, which "again showed us that the flower of mutual understanding is now blossoming in all parts of the world." Alexander Mikhailov, "The United Efforts of the World's Astronomers," *USSR*, December 1958, 16-17.

The article especially highlighted eminent Americans' views on Soviet leadership in space research. Harlow Shapley, for example, observed that the gathering was particularly stimulated by the "new science" he named "*Sputnikia*."⁵⁶

Many other articles presented Soviet satellites as a sign of Soviet scientific leadership by emphasizing the worldwide impact of the research they performed.⁵⁷ In so doing, *Soviet Life* often used science to explicitly link the Soviet lead in space to its proclaimed lead in the global search for peace.⁵⁸

Uniting "All Mankind"

Soviet Life commonly generalized about the universal desire for peace in order to depict the Soviet Union leading and representing all mankind (or at least all "peace-loving people"). Its frequent mention of "world peace" or "universal peace" invoked a vision of a unified globe and paralleled such discourse in Soviet leaders' public speeches.⁵⁹ *Soviet Life* articles on Soviet peace initiatives often commented on the supposed desire of "people everywhere" for peace. They portrayed the pathway to peace in simplistic terms as choosing between—or balancing—the socialist and capitalist systems, and presented peaceful coexistence as the best answer to this worldwide aspiration for peace. Its depiction of struggle between these "two

⁵⁶ Shapley was Director Emeritus of Harvard College Observatory at the time. The Director of the High Altitude Observatory Walter O. Roberts similarly expressed his admiration for the work of Soviet observatories. Ibid.

⁵⁷ See, for example: Vladimir Belousov, "From Arctic to Antarctic," *USSR*, August 1958, 46; "Animal Space Travelers Returned to Earth," *USSR*, November 1958, 56.

⁵⁸ As Khrushchev remarked after Gagarin's flight, the Soviet Union would share its scientific capabilities and knowledge—but only with "those who are prepared to live in peace and friendship with us." "A Day to Remember," 2-3.

⁵⁹ "Message of N.S. Khrushchev," Special Supplement; Brezhnev, *Selected Speeches*, 9, 235, 239; Markwick, 181; Garthoff, 44.

systems” took on planetary dimensions, in terminology reminiscent of the space exploration stories elsewhere in the magazine.⁶⁰

Soviet Life’s commentary on agreements limiting the militarization of space likewise generalized about the universal desire for peace. The magazine heralded these settlements as important victories in the global search for peace.⁶¹ In spite of this, the Soviet government remained keenly interested in the military potential of space.⁶² Many key figures in the Soviet space programs had served as artillery officers, and the Ministry of Defense had immense influence over space policy. A June 1960 decree outlining space priorities for 1960 through 1967 even shifted the Soviet Union toward military exploitation of space, envisioning a military space station and satellites.⁶³ Soviet propagandists, meanwhile, focused on using space to portray the USSR as a global leader on the peace front.

Soviet claims to represent a broad swath of humanity included Americans too, or at least those peace-loving Americans who read *Soviet Life*. The magazine celebrated its own role in fostering peaceful Soviet-American relations, and emphasized how both peoples desired peace. It often printed letters from American readers expressing their concern for peace. As one of these letters explained,

⁶⁰ Zimyanin, “In the Name of Peace,” 11; Zisman, “Peaceful Coexistence,” 4-5; “Message of N.S. Khrushchev,” Special Supplement; Beglov, “Peaceful Coexistence,” 12-14.

⁶¹ “Message of N.S. Khrushchev,” Special Supplement. Peaceful coexistence informed Soviet views on the creation of international laws governing outer space exploration. See: G. P Zhukov, *Kosmos i Mezhdunarodnoe Sotrudnichestvo (Space and international cooperation)*. (Moskva, Izd-vo In-ta mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii, 1963), quoted in Robert D. Crane, “Basic Principles in Soviet Space Law: Peaceful Coexistence, Peaceful Cooperation, and Disarmament,” *Law and Contemporary Problems* 29, no. 4 (Autumn): 943.

⁶² For more on the relationship between the Soviet space program and defense industry, see: William P. Barry, “Sputnik and the Creation of the Soviet Space Industry,” in *Reconsidering Sputnik*, ed. Roger D. Launius, John M. Logsdon, and Robert W. Smith (London: Routledge, 2000), 95-115.

⁶³ The prospect of space war reportedly “depressed” Khrushchev. But in response to Lyndon’s Johnson’s 1958 statement that “Control of space means control of the world,” Khrushchev vowed “not to be caught unprepared ... if war reached into space.” Siddiqi, *Sputnik and the Soviet Space Challenge*, 211-12, 220, 230-32, 234-5.

American people wanted peaceful relations with the Soviet Union in spite of their own government and society that had “taught” them to fear the Soviet people. The Soviet Union’s peaceful foreign policy, it implied, better reflected popular aspirations for peace.⁶⁴ In similar fashion, *Soviet Life* printed commentary from prominent Americans who supported peaceful coexistence.⁶⁵ Such statements promoted the concept as the basis for Soviet-American relations.

Soviet Life strongly associated space exploration with visions of a unified world. The same universal language that described space exploration affecting (and capturing the imagination of) “all mankind” was used to portray global aspirations for peace.⁶⁶ Linking space exploration, peace and building communism, *Soviet Life* used its space coverage to declare how all three would greatly benefit “all the people of the world.”⁶⁷ The twentieth anniversary edition of the magazine featured a retrospective on spaceflight. The piece reprinted a statement made after Gagarin’s flight:

We believe that achievements in space exploration were made not only by our people, but by the whole of humanity. We are glad to place them at the service of all nations in the name of progress, peace and the good of all people on Earth.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ “Path of Peace,” *Soviet Life*, January 1965, 3.

⁶⁵ “To Make the Concept of Peaceful Coexistence a Reality, Interview with Bernard Feld,” *Soviet Life*, December 1973, 58-59.

⁶⁶ The CPSU message addressed “To the Whole of Progressive Mankind” repetitively stressed that “victories in space” belonged to “all mankind,” and promised “new victories in the name of peace, progress and the happiness of mankind!” “The First Man in Space: Yuri Gagarin,” i.f.c.-1.

⁶⁷ Khrushchev made such a link when he celebrated Vostok I in: “A Day to Remember,” 2-3. Brezhnev also employed universal and planetary language when using the space forum to express Soviet desires for peace and leadership of all mankind. See: “Leonid Brezhnev’s Greetings to the Soyuz and Apollo Crews,” *Soviet Life*, December 1975, 17; “Congratulations From Leonid Brezhnev, Nikolai Podgorny and Alexei Kosygin,” 18; “Greetings From Leonid Brezhnev to Our Readers,” *Soviet Life*, October 1976, 1.

⁶⁸ A sidebar to the article underlined the point by quoting Tsiolkovsky’s comment that “[t]he universe belongs to all people.” “Space, Interviews with Konstantin Feoktistov and Oleg Gazenko,” *Soviet Life*, October 1976, 2-9.

Such statements linked space exploration to an assumed universal human aspiration for peace, and implied Soviet leadership in both areas.

To similar ends, *Soviet Life* routinely depicted the universal, often unified, public attention given to Soviet space achievements. It commonly employed images of globes to emphasize the worldwide impact and interest in spaceflight.⁶⁹ One photograph showed a small crowd gathered around a large publicly displayed globe. In another, two students examined a globe on a desk, while a large wall map of the world filled the background behind them. (See Figure 4-1)⁷⁰ According to the

magazine, Soviet space planners foresaw how the first satellite would spark the world's curiosity and amazement. They purposely chose a more difficult trajectory for Sputnik I, it explained, so that the satellite's beeping signals could be "heard everywhere on the globe." A pair of accompanying images



Figure 4-1: Depicting worldwide interest in space exploration: Soviet children examine a globe.

Oleg Pizarzhevsky, "Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, Cosmic Trail Blazer," *USSR*, December 1957, 5.

⁶⁹ The inside front cover of the December 1957 issue featured an "artist's conception" of the world's first artificial satellite circling the globe. "An Artist's Conception of Sputnik 1 as it Appears From the Sky During its Globe-Circling Flight," *USSR*, December 1957, i.f.c.

⁷⁰ Other smaller images accompanying the article conveyed a similar sense of mass (if not global) interest in Sputnik 1. Pizarzhevsky, "Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, Cosmic Trail Blazer," 3-5.

showed the crisscrossing pattern of the first two satellites' paths over a map of the world.⁷¹ Such images suggested that interest in the spaceflight was not limited to Russia, but was indeed global in extent.

Articles and images commonly celebrated the widespread enthusiasm for space exploration among the Soviet public and especially its youth.⁷² Several shone a spotlight on radio amateurs' interest in the inaugural spaceflight. Repeated images of Ham radio operators tuning into the satellites' signal underscored the satellite's global impact, often by conspicuously displaying radio call numbers from around the world. A large photo with January 1958's "World's Hams Tracked Sputniks" captured a child's excitement as his father tuned in a satellite's signal. (See Figure 4-2) In the foreground, pamphlets of Ham call numbers from around the world were spread out on a table. The article described the intense excitement of radio operators around the world, who—like the thrilled child in the photo—could not contain their enthusiasm for the Soviet breakthrough. The father (a Moscow radio operator) fielded excited calls from several countries, several of which were quoted to convey a worldwide positive outpouring toward the Soviet achievement. "Every ham in the world," the article remarked, "seemed to be tracking the sputniks."⁷³

Other articles similarly emphasized how Soviet satellites had been tracked "in all countries," and especially noted that global interest had stretched beyond the

⁷¹ "Sputniks Underscore Man's Scientific Progress," 1-2.

⁷² "Volunteers for Space Travel," 14-15; Pisarzhevsky, "Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, Cosmic Trail Blazer," 3-5.

⁷³ Andrei Ivanov, "World's Hams Tracked Sputniks," *USSR*, January 1958, 15. A similar December 1957 photo of a Ham radio operator noted in its caption that "radio Hams heard Sputnik's beeps the world around." International radio call numbers were displayed on the wall behind the radio operator. See: Pisarzhevsky, "Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, Cosmic Trail Blazer," 3-5.

communist orbit.⁷⁴ Repetitive image and textual references to the “worldwide” communities of space enthusiasts reinforced the notion that space exploration had the power to unite humanity across boundaries. So too did frequent commentary on the “millions” around the world who followed Soviet space exploits.⁷⁵

Like *Amerika*, *Soviet Life* underlined the global interest in space achievements. But *Soviet Life*’s use of television to depict the “millions” who followed Soviet space feats was more constrained



Figure 4-2: Depicting worldwide enthusiasm for Soviet space exploration: a radio Ham operator tracks the sputniks.

Andrei Ivanov, “World’s Hams Tracked Sputniks,” *USSR*, January 1958, 15.

than its American counterpart. The magazine boasted about the European television broadcasts of the Red Square celebrations for Gagarin on April 14, 1961.⁷⁶ The Gagarin celebrations indeed brought live televised images of Moscow into European homes for the first time, reflecting how space milestones often compelled broadcasting ones as well. But after this auspicious debut, the Soviet Union never fully opened itself to the television cameras of the world, not even for space exploits.

⁷⁴ “Sputnik II: Cosmic Fact Finder,” *USSR*, 1958, 4-9; “Scientific Cooperation: Sputniks Aid IGY Research,” 16.

⁷⁵ “A Day to Remember,” 2-3.

⁷⁶ “A Day to Remember,” 2-3.

As a result, while *Soviet Life* sometimes described the television systems installed aboard Soviet spaceships to enable “reports” from the crew, and to broadcast “sights seen from aboard the ship,” it did not typically mention whether any such images were broadcast for public consumption.⁷⁷ Compared to its American counterpart, *Soviet Life* did not use television to portray Soviet openness.

Still, over time the magazine increasingly used television as a motif to demonstrate global interest in space exploration. A retrospective on spaceflight in the 20th anniversary edition displayed photographic highlights from the first two decades of space exploration, four of which were drawn from television images of various missions. Captions also drew attention to television cameras mounted on various spacecraft. The accompanying text reminded readers that “the whole world followed” the July 1975 ASTP mission, and a caption for an image of the mission’s television broadcast claimed that “[h]undreds of millions of people around the world watched the drama unfold on their TV screens.” The magazine did not make the case that Soviet technology or openness brought the world these images (as *Amerika* did). There was no mention of whether Soviet television even broadcast them.⁷⁸

Two photos in the December 1975 issue demonstrated this ambivalence about portraying television broadcasts of ASTP within the Soviet sphere. One, a “photo of a television screen” showed Stafford and Leonov shaking hands in orbit. But there was no indication of anyone watching the broadcast, no display of Soviet people gathered around a television screen, either in their homes or in public.

⁷⁷ “New Stage in Exploration of Space,” *Soviet Life*, January 1965, 4-11. *Soviet Life* did not even portray space exploits being broadcast within the Soviet sphere. When it acknowledged that Apollo 11’s television transmissions “were most impressive,” it did not detail whether the Soviet public viewed them. When it claimed that “the Soviet press” was as open “as the world press,” it did not specifically mention television. See: Sedov, “Man on the Moon,” 11.

⁷⁸ “Space, Interviews with Konstantin Feoktistov and Oleg Gazenko,” *Soviet Life*, October 1976, 2-9.

Beneath this, another photo showed two men in Houston, Texas, sharing a look at a newspaper, with ASTP coverage making headlines. Such a moment, the caption said, “was duplicated around the world.”⁷⁹ As *Soviet Life* made the case that interest in the spaceflight was widespread, it rarely showed the Soviet public consuming media products, least of all television. In 1960, there were 4.8 million television sets in the Soviet Union (only five percent of Soviet households).⁸⁰

Thus, one striking difference between *Soviet Life* and *Amerika* was in their depictions of the media. The American magazine promoted the idea of openness far more forcefully than did its Soviet counterpart. In one example, *Soviet Life* ran a two-page photo of a Soviet press conference for ASTP. The image highlighted the media



⁷⁹ Isachenko, “Earth Is Our Bearing,” 21.

⁸⁰ Ellen Mickiewicz, *Split Signals: Television and Politics in the Soviet Union* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1988), 3.

event, but, instead of suggesting openness, it displayed a degree of control not present in *Amerika's* images of the press. (See Figure 4-3) The photo, taken inside of a space facility in Starry Town, Russia, showed ASTP personnel sitting amongst mock-ups of the Soyuz spacecraft. Cosmonaut Vladimir Shatalov addressed the press, who were gathered off camera. References to widespread media coverage were also absent from the article. As the caption indicated, the press group consisting only of "Moscow reporters" did not come from around the world, let alone from across the country.⁸¹

Soviet Life photographs occasionally evoked the media swarm commonly seen in *Amerika*. One tightly framed shot showed several American reporters squeezed into a confined space to view a mock-up of the Soyuz spacecraft on display in the Cosmonaut Training Center in Stellar Town. Crowded, but not quite a crowd, the image hinted at an open press. But the caption offered a clue that openness was likely not the rule, indicating that Shatalov performed as a "guide" to the American reporters.⁸² Two prominently displayed images showing the ASTP cosmonauts interacting with the Russian public featured a handful of photographers in the background.⁸³ In one atypical example, *Soviet Life* (rather deliberately) tried to convey the openness of the Soviet media system. This December 1975 article celebrated the "Multinational Press Center" established at Moscow's Gorky Street Intourist Hotel to serve "some 700 Soviet and foreign correspondents" during the flight of ASTP.⁸⁴

⁸¹ Alexei Leonov, "Soviet-American Space Rendezvous," *Soviet Life*, January 1975, 34-37.

⁸² "Cosmonauts Town," *Soviet Life*, July 1975, 20-23.

⁸³ "Back to Planet Earth," *Soviet Life*, December 1975, 16-17.

⁸⁴ "Some 240 telephone calls and 500 telex connections were made daily," the article observed as it pictured the center as a communications hub to the world. Accordingly, it "looked like a huge multinational spaceship of the future." Makhotin, "Multinational Press Center," 22-23.

But aside from these few instances *Soviet Life* did not strive to make the case that the world or Soviet media enjoyed open access to the Soviet space program.

Conclusion

That *Soviet Life* seldom used the themes of worldwide attention and international television broadcasts to portray Soviet openness set it apart from its American equivalent. But in many ways, *Soviet Life* exhibited similar tendencies to *Amerika*. It often explicitly linked space exploration to peace to portray the Soviet Union as a leader in the global search for peace. In the first decade of the space age especially, it often portrayed space exploration playing a role in the “struggle for peace,” either by celebrating Soviet space launches as socialist “victories” or—after American space ascendancy became clear—by raising fears of spreading militarization or “social injustice” into space. Its routine depictions of space exploration uniting humanity reinforced the association between space exploration and peace. Like *Amerika*, *Soviet Life* also sought to demonstrate the power of space to unite humanity. In doing so, it portrayed the “international character” of science; showed Soviet and world scientists working closely together on space research; used universal and planetary language to argue that space affected “all mankind”; and regularly depicted a united global audience following Soviet space exploits.

Soviet discourse and propaganda on peace, meanwhile, subtly shifted throughout the first two decades of the space age. Some themes remained constant—the indivisibility of socialism and peace; the permanence of the Soviet search for peaceful coexistence; the “struggle for peace” against the capitalist world; and the tendency to use universal language to depict that struggle. Under Brezhnev, however, perceived changes in the correlation of forces and the emergence of détente allowed

the brief flourishing of the suggestion that peaceful coexistence had become an established norm in international affairs.

It is interesting to compare the chronology of this discursive shift with the timeline of space exploration. In the late 1950s and first half of the 1960s, when Soviet exploration had a clear propaganda advantage, peace was but a promise. In the late 1960s, as America gradually overtook the Soviet Union as the perceived leader in space, Soviet discourse and propaganda vigorously promoted a brand of peaceful coexistence closely linked to ideological struggle. By the early 1970s, after Apollo enormously enhanced the American claim to leadership in space, the Soviet leadership increasingly focused on negotiating with the United States, and even suggested that the Cold War had given way to a new era of mutual cooperation based on the recognition of peaceful coexistence as the accepted basis of international relations. Then, by the mid-1970s, the United States proved unable to maintain Apollo 11's soaring heights as propaganda (and abandoned Apollo altogether). When the highly propagandistic joint mission ASTP took to the skies (and beyond) in 1975, peace was once more just a promise.

SECTION II: SMALL STEPS AND GIANT LEAPS: PROGRESS

5. “PLEASE BE INFORMED THERE IS A SANTA CLAUS”: Scientific and Technological Progress in *Amerika*

This chapter examines how certain aspects of scientific and technological progress constituted a major theme in *Amerika*’s space propaganda. It describes how the magazine emphasized the scientific aspects of American space achievements and showcased the sophisticated technologies used by regularly employing scientific terminology. It shows how *Amerika* consistently stressed international scientists’ involvement in U.S. space missions to display American openness contributing to international scientific progress. It explains how the magazine utilized key motifs to depict space exploration as both an indication and promise of American scientific and technological progress. These included emphasizing what was new about space science and technologies; regularly describing space as an “endless frontier”; and using the notions of “small steps” and “giant leaps” to suggest accelerating forward motion.¹

Amerika especially celebrated the Apollo program as a symbol of scientific and technological progress, and made clear that human (as opposed to robotic) spaceflight was the truest indicator of progress. The space race victory of Apollo 11 provided the single most dramatic demonstration that the capitalist system was best equipped to further scientific and technological progress. The magazine used Apollo to demonstrate continuous technological improvement within the American space program. Its routine emphasis on the dangers faced by American astronauts and the

¹ Armstrong’s famous “giant leap” quote appeared with a photo of descending the ladder on the f.c. of the November 1969 issue. Also, the words “Giant Leap” were printed in a giant font on p. 29 of the same issue. See: “Man Makes His Epic Journey to the Moon,” *Amerika*, November 1969, f.c.; “Giant Leap,” *Amerika*, November 1969, 29-36.

efforts made to minimize the risks associated with spaceflight also showcased technological advancements while underscoring American openness.

Amerika essentially made space exploration synonymous with ‘progress’. In so doing, it aligned with space advocates who extolled the many economic and social benefits of exploring space. *Amerika* used space to not only portray the U.S. as an advanced industrial power with a broad scientific and technological base, but also to argue that capitalism was the ideal system for sharing the benefits of space exploration with society. Recurrent images of American affluence in space articles showed how capitalism abundantly provided the American public with commercial goods and wealth. This chapter argues that *Amerika*’s space propaganda promoted the United States as a world leader of scientific and technological progress while implying that its political, economic, and social system both accounted for this progress and ensured its continuance into the future.

Depicting Space Exploration as Scientific Progress

In the late 1950s, *Amerika* published relatively far fewer articles on space than it would in later years. Articles on other aspects of science were far more numerous were at this time. As they began to appear more frequently in the 1960s, space-themed articles emphasized the scientific and technological aspects of exploring space, and strove to portray the U.S. space program’s contributions to scientific progress.²

² John Jacobs, “Symphony of Science,” *Amerika*, 1956, 42-46; “Promising Scientists,” *Amerika*, 1956, 20-21; Virginia Evans, “James Van Allen: He Keeps His Head in the Clouds,” *Amerika*, 1959, 47; Harlow Shapley, “Man’s Fourth Adjustment,” *Amerika*, 1959, 6; Robert C. Cowen, “He Listens to the Universe,” *Amerika*, 1960, 19-21; L Jacobs, “Teen-Age Scientists,” *Amerika*, 1960, 10-12; Laura Winslow and John Winters, “Satellites Aid Meteorology, Navigation,” *Amerika*, 1960, 12-14; “The Chimp Who Came Back,” *Amerika*, 1960, 27; “Sputnik Echo 1: Symbol of Modern Plastics,” *Amerika*,

The symbolic significance of reaching the Moon made Apollo 11 especially important to this narrative, and *Amerika*'s coverage of the mission duly emphasized its scientific aspects. The November 1969 issue's 8-page special insert on the lunar landing exemplified how the magazine depicted the U.S. space program as both a reflection and driver of scientific and technological progress. Its formulaic narrative presented scientific investigation as the primary rationale for American space exploration, highlighted how 'new' discoveries reshaped and renewed old ideas, and predicted space exploration's profound impact on future progress. The report showcased the various scientific implements installed by the astronauts on the lunar surface, and emphasized their contribution to scientific progress.³ Images of Armstrong and Aldrin performing various scientific activities—collecting lunar soil samples; carrying and setting up the solar wind and seismic experiments—further illustrated the scientific scope of the mission. The instruments themselves supplied powerful visual cues not only of America's commitment to science, but to the impressive degree of American technological progress.⁴

Amerika highlighted the scientific community's great interest in the mission by portraying "eager scientists" back on Earth waiting to examine the lunar samples collected. Its description of the Moon rocks underscored how they were unknown to man and showed that their acquisition was an unprecedented step forward for geological and lunar science.⁵ It considered which lunar discoveries would be most "provocative": that the Moon might be "alive with volcanoes," or that water might

1960, 1; Phil Hirsch, "Three Years of American Satellites," *Amerika*, August 1961, 33-35; Richard Montague, "Atom Signals From Space," *Amerika*, May 1962, 42; Jack Fincher, "Piercing Earth's Mantle of Air," *Amerika*, August 1964, 41-43.

³ for example, it described a seismometer that would soon record "possibly the first moonquake ever heard by man."

⁴ "Special Report: Man on the Moon," *Amerika*, November 1969, Insert between pp. 28-29.

⁵ It described them as "spongelike vesicular rocks" or as a "rock that resembled biotite," for example.

be found.⁶ *Amerika*'s editors thus emphasized the most sensational aspects of lunar science. Such a strategy played up the significance of the mission's contributions to scientific progress by suggesting that the discoveries made would deeply transform human understanding of nature.

Subsequent articles on Apollo 11 continued accentuating the scientific nature of the mission and of the astronauts' activities on the Moon.⁷ Images for later Apollo 11 articles persistently focused on the mission's scientific instruments and experiments to reinforce the notion that the mission's primary purpose was discovery.⁸ *Amerika* continued to cast Apollo 11 as an important landmark of scientific progress by discussing scientists' widespread interest in the mission and emphasizing the unprecedented nature of the mission's findings. Frequently predicting how the mission's science would answer longstanding questions, confirm some of the most significant and well-known scientific theories, or lead to new theories, *Amerika* thus asserted that Apollo 11 represented a significant "great leap" forward for mankind's scientific progress.⁹

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ "The Wings of a Dream," *Amerika*, January 1970, 2; "(Rung By Rung) Armstrong Descends to the Moon," *Amerika*, April 1970, 18-19; "A New Frontier (Apollo 11 Moon Landing)," *Amerika*, April 1970, i.f.c. An April 1970 special edition on Apollo 11 depicted Armstrong's first steps on the Moon as scientific observations, calling them "tentative tests of the lunar soil's firmness." See: John Noble Wilford and James T. Wooten, "To the Moon and Back (Excerpt From Apollo 11: On the Moon)," *Amerika*, April 1970, 2-8.

⁸ Most of the photographs in April 1970's "(Rung By Rung) Armstrong Descends to the Moon," for example, centered on the mission's science experiments. "(Rung By Rung) Armstrong Descends to the Moon," 18-19. Almost the exact same set of photos appeared in another article as well. See: "On the Moon (Apollo 11)," *Amerika*, April 1970, 16-39.

⁹ Arthur Pariente, "Apollo 15: Touchdown for Science," *Amerika*, December 1971, 27. The April 1970 issue, for example, noted that the American "seismograph and laser reflector disc" on the Moon's surface elicited much excitement from the world's scientists, and focused on the impact that Apollo 11's scientific research would have on theories of the Moon's origins. See: "Deciphering The Moon's Secrets," *Amerika*, April 1970, 52. Another piece declared that the mission would "help scientists ... answer a wide range of unanswered riddles about the moon," and provide "the most sensitive tests to date" of key theories like Einstein's General Theory of Relativity." See: Wilford and Wooten, "To the Moon and Back," 2-8.

Amerika often linked space exploration with progress by emphasizing its association with all things “new.”¹⁰ Reports of its contributions to cutting edge theoretical science showed the American space program advancing scientific progress. According to *Amerika*, space exploration pushed science into a “new frontier.” The frontier has had an enduring place in American cultural narratives at least since Frederick Jackson Turner’s 1893 essay “The Significance of the Frontier in American History.”¹¹ Similarly, the notion of a scientific frontier has long been a ubiquitous slogan of scientific progress, especially used in the United States. Vannevar Bush’s “Science: The Endless Frontier”—a 1945 report to President Truman that guided post-war research and development in the United States—was extremely influential, not only in shaping the relationship between the American government and the scientific community post-World War II, but also in supporting the notion of science as a frontier.

¹⁰ March 1973’s “A New Theory,” for example, explained how space science provided the “first tentative signs” to verify an old theory (that black holes—first postulated in 1939—may exist), and led to a “new theory” of “white holes” put forward by astrophysicist Robert M. Hjellming at the National Radio Astronomy Observatory in Green Bank, West Virginia. See: “A New Theory,” 40. See also: “Man’s Landscape Is New,” *Amerika*, 1960, 4-7; Walter Froehlich, “New Space Research Enriches Life On Earth,” *Amerika*, October 1967, 36; “A New Frontier (Apollo 11 Moon Landing),” i.f.c.; Holmes, “The New Configuration,” 18; Lawrence Lessing, “What’s New In Space? The Shuttlebug,” *Amerika*, October 1972, 2; “A New Theory,” *Amerika*, March 1973, 40; Eisenberg, “A New Home In Space (Skylab),” 11.

¹¹ Linda Billings, “Overview: Ideology, Advocacy, and Spaceflight: Evolution of a Cultural Narrative,” in *Societal Impact of Spaceflight*, ed. Steven J. Dick and Roger D. Launius (Washington, D.C. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2007), 486-487; Frederick Jackson Turner, *Rereading Frederick Jackson Turner: “The Significance of the Frontier in American History” and Other Essays* (New York: Yale University Press, 1998); Vannevar Bush, *Science The Endless Frontier: A Report to the President on a Program for Postwar Scientific Research* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945). USIA broadly employed the idea of science as a “new frontier.” See: Trevor Rockwell, “New Frontiers of Knowledge: Science and Technology in Late 1950s American Cold War Propaganda,” *Past Imperfect* 15 (2009). NASA continues to invoke the notion to suggest scientific progress; its “New Frontiers Program” established in 2002 “represents a critical step in the advancement of solar system exploration.” See: “New Frontiers - NASA Science,” n.d., <http://science.nasa.gov/about-us/smd-programs/new-frontiers/>.

Amerika both directly labeled space a frontier, and indirectly described space exploration in terms that equated it with earlier exploration of the Earth.¹² It frequently invoked this key motif of American national identity and progress narratives, and broadened it to describe American activities opening an “endless frontier” in space. The April 1970 edition declared, for example: “Space is an endless frontier for our children, and for all future generations.”¹³ Such ambitious forecasts peaked in the years immediately after Armstrong set foot on the new world. Such depictions of the space frontier as “endless” suggested that American space exploration would also be without limits. It also expressed a desire for the United States’ identification as a world leader in scientific and technological progress to continue without end.

Later Apollo missions elicited a similar treatment in *Amerika*. Jay Holmes’ coverage of Apollo 12 in the May 1970 issue emphasized that mission’s potential contributions to geology and seismology. Holmes even suggested that the “rapid pace” of the Apollo program had made some scientists “uncomfortable” since they had barely begun to examine the Apollo 11 samples when the second set from Apollo 12 arrived. Holmes argued, nonetheless, “a rapid pace is necessary” so that “scientist-astronauts” could sooner visit the Moon.¹⁴ Other articles suggested that

¹² Krafft Ehrlicke declared, for example: “Orbits are the new lands of our time,” and touched on the Turnerian notion that the frontier was an essential component of the American spirit when he cited the “needed boundlessness of Man’s world.” Krafft A. Ehrlicke, “Extraterrestrial Imperative,” *Amerika*, March 1973, 44.

¹³ Vannevar Bush, *Science The Endless Frontier: A Report to the President on a Program for Postwar Scientific Research* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945); Thomas O. Paine, “Next Steps in Space,” *Amerika*, September 1970, 21. Space exploration, especially Apollo 11, had “opened up the endless frontier of outer space to future exploration and discovery.” See: “Man’s Restless Voyage.”

¹⁴ Jay Holmes, “Apollo 12: Why Go Back to the Moon?,” *Amerika*, May 1970, 46. Holmes depicted American “scientist astronauts” in a February 1971 article too, where he discussed how “[s]everal astronauts now in training are scientists and physicians who have been given intensive flight training.” See: Jay Holmes, “The New Configuration,” *Amerika*, February 1971, 18.

American astronauts were already scientists by describing their scientific training and by drawing comparisons between astronauts on the Moon and scientists on Earth.¹⁵ Such associations between astronauts and scientists reinforced the depiction of the U.S. space program's primarily scientific orientation.

Amerika's coverage of the Apollo program also advanced its promotion of American openness by routinely describing how the scientific boon would be shared with the international scientific community.¹⁶ The symbolic nature of this unprecedented step forward for science obligated the United States to share its achievement openly:

A new world has been reached. It belongs to all mankind. Therefore, American scientists have invited colleagues in all countries to join this historic quest for knowledge.¹⁷

Amerika thus portrayed Apollo not only as a "giant leap" for scientific progress, but also a demonstration of American willingness to share information.

Amerika also portrayed the United States' manned lunar voyages as superior to unmanned Soviet missions to the Moon. One article on Apollo 14 contrasted that mission's manned lander with the Soviet Lunokhod, which was "about to awake after the long lunar night and begin its second robotlike excursion over the moon's

¹⁵ One described, for example, the "extensive training in geology" that "all astronauts" received, and compared the astronauts to scientists on Earth, observing that the tools used to obtain lunar samples, for example, "would be familiar to any field geologist on earth." Jim Schefter, "Our First Day on the Moon – What Will It Be Like?," *Amerika*, May 1969, 47-51.

¹⁶ The data and lunar samples collected would be "carefully rationed out to scientists all over the world," including "[m]ore than 50 scientists from 16 countries" such as France, Italy, and the Netherlands. See: Holmes, "The New Configuration," 18. Another article similarly noted how the lunar "fragments were shipped to researchers throughout much of the world." "Elated scientists at over 140 laboratories around the world," it observed, had received Moon rocks. See: "First Stop For Men and Rocks (Lunar Receiving Lab)," *Amerika*, April 1970, 54. Yet another echoed the claim while noting: "But the task is too great even for all these investigators." See: Holmes, "Apollo 12: Why Go Back to the Moon?," 46.

¹⁷ Holmes, "Apollo 12: Why Go Back to the Moon?," 46.

surface.” Differentiating the sleeping Soviet machine from the lively American men implied that the latter had achieved a superior level of technological progress and would contribute more to scientific progress. Apollo 14 would “teach man more about the moon,” the piece claimed, “than all previous moon probes combined.”¹⁸ Such a statement suggested that Apollo 14 was a scientific step forward over previous Apollo missions, but the key word “probes” underscored how Apollo had put the U.S. ahead of the Soviets in lunar science.

As the Apollo program moved forward, so too did *Amerika*’s hyperbole about its impact on scientific progress. A December 1971 article on Apollo 15 described scientists’ reactions to that mission as “Mind-boggling!” (and defined for Russian readers what the term meant). The mission’s contribution to scientific progress would be extraordinary, the article predicted, since its very commitment to science was unprecedented. It boasted:

more than any other Apollo flight, more, perhaps, than any other exploratory voyage in man’s history – Apollo 15 was dedicated to science.¹⁹

Even after the Apollo program, *Amerika* continued to use space exploration to portray American leadership in advancing scientific and technological progress.

Launched May 14, 1973, the first American orbiting space station, Skylab, provided the U.S. with an opportunity to highlight further their contributions to scientific progress.²⁰

¹⁸ John Holway, “Odyssey to Fra Mauro (Apollo 14),” *Amerika*, July 1971, 2.

¹⁹ The mission’s “primary purpose,” the article enthused, would be “collecting scientific data,” and it was notably “packed with special instruments.” It detailed the mission’s “scientific work,” and “various experiments.” “It will be years,” it predicted, “before the store of data brought back by Apollo 15 is exhausted.” Pariente, “Apollo 15: Touchdown for Science,” 27.

²⁰ Even the station’s designation emphasized the scientific nature of the orbiting “laboratory.” The month before its launch, two articles in April 1973 highlighted the “60 or so experiments” to be

Amerika thus depicted the U.S. space program as primarily oriented toward scientific discovery, and showcased the scientific “experiments” and technological “instruments” used in pursuit of science. It moreover presented the successes within the American human spaceflight program—most notably Apollo 11—as signs of American superiority over its Soviet rival in furthering such progress. At the same time, *Amerika* also used its depictions of Apollo’s scientific experiments to further its portrayal of American openness.

Depicting Space Exploration as Technological Progress

Amerika used a variety of strategies to associate space exploration with American technological progress. It routinely employed narratives of continuous technological improvements within the American space program by pointing out “new” and “improved” technologies and characterizing them as “steps forward.”

Amerika frequently pointed out how space exploration produced new technologies and improved old ones. It predicted that rapid technological progress would continue into the future and suggested that advanced American technologies would greatly improve the material wealth around the world. Describing how space-derived technological improvements would impact everything from social and industrial systems to improving cities and the environment, one article enthused, for example:

Here are ways in which the results of space technology can change the history and economic development of many countries of the world.²¹

performed, and showcased the various instruments and laboratories onboard. See: Philip Eisenberg, “A New Home In Space (Skylab),” *Amerika*, April 1973, 11; “Skylab Experiments,” *Amerika*, April 1973, 14.

²¹ In the October 1967 issue Walter Froehlich described how “even in the current decade ... complex unmanned spacecraft and rockets, equipped with all sorts of devices, generates thousands of new

Amerika thus presented American space exploration as a demonstration of technological progress having a major impact on global society.

Amerika most dynamically exploited the Apollo program as a symbol of technological progress, routinely describing each successive mission as a step forward or a new “triumph of technology.”²² It generously sampled from positive comments made by American astronauts about how “beautifully” or “perfectly” their mission’s various components functioned.²³

In light of Apollo 11’s success, *Amerika* reexamined the history of American space exploration to depict a progression from early failures to ultimate triumph.²⁴ Indeed, its chronology of American technological progress sometimes reached even further back. Those watching the Apollo 11 landing at Washington’s Smithsonian Institution, *Amerika* pointed out, did so “under the very plane the Wright brothers had used to make man’s first timid, tiny steps into the air 66 years ago.”²⁵ American

ideas, inventions and technological improvements.” He observed that exploring space would lead to a “new control system” of novel management methods such as “systems analysis” or “technical systems development.” These approaches would allow both “technical” and “social” processes to be “analyzed using an electronic computer.” These new systems, he argued, could be widely “applied in ... industries, and science;” in planning “future cities”; conserving natural resources; curbing pollution; and improving the management of public services such as government, hospitals, and education. Froehlich, “New Space Research Enriches Life On Earth,” 36.

²² “Apollo 8: Now Man Has Circled the Moon,” *Amerika*, May 1969, 43-46; Archibald Macleish, “A Reflection (Introduction to Special Section on Apollo 11),” *Amerika*, November 1969, 25.

²³ Comments about Apollo 11, for example, suggested that the mission’s launch was “the smoothest ever,” and its television images “the clearest color television transmissions ever sent from space.” Wilford and Wooten, “To the Moon and Back,” 2-8.

²⁴ It contrasted the successful Apollo 11 launch with the “frustrations and tensions” surrounding Mercury and Gemini launches: Apollo 11 had “none of” the difficulties of the earlier programs, and it “ignited within milliseconds of schedule.” “Special Report: Man on the Moon,” Insert between pp. 28-29. It looked back on “times when rockets hadn’t gotten off the ground or had quickly fallen.” “But not this time,” it declared, Apollo 11 lifted off “precisely on schedule.” See: “00:4; 00:3; 00:2; 00:1; 00:0 (Apollo 11 Lift-Off),” *Amerika*, April 1970, 9.

²⁵ “Special Report: Man on the Moon,” Insert between pp. 28-29. See also: “Picture Parade,” *Amerika*, September 1969, i.f.c., which showed astronauts Frank Borman and William Anders at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C., donating the Apollo 8 capsule. Charles Lindbergh’s *Spirit of St. Louis* is clearly visible in the shot. Another article placed photograph of Apollo 11 in orbit

technological progress, these narratives suggested, made a successful Moon landing inevitable. As one article argued, had they failed to reach the Moon with Apollo 11, “it was all but certain the United States would try again.”²⁶

Articles on later Apollo missions emphasized how the astronauts walked (or drove) further on each successive mission and that they brought back more lunar samples than all missions previously combined.²⁷ *Amerika*’s narratives of continuous improvement used space exploration as proof that the United States was a world leader in advancing technological progress.

These narratives also showcased the highly progressive and technological character of American society by depicting the breadth of technical personnel at




Figure 5-1: Showcasing American industrial development while highlighting the openness of its space program: the Saturn V launch platform.

“Apollo: Preparations for Moon Flight,” *Amerika*, October 1967, 24-25.

around the Moon directly adjacent to a picture of the Wright brothers’ *Flyer*. See: Arthur C. Clarke, “Next - The Planets,” *Amerika*, November 1969, 34.

²⁶ Wilford and Wooten, “To the Moon and Back,” 2-8.

²⁷ Apollo 14 brought “the largest ever returned to Earth,” for example. Holway, “Odyssey to Fra Mauro (Apollo 14),” 2.

work to ensure the proper functioning of spaceflight technologies. Numerous photographs of the vast infrastructure at NASA facilities illustrated the advanced level of American industrial and technological development. One particularly striking two-page image in the October 1967 issue, for example, highlighted the immensity of the movable launch platform at Cape Kennedy using a wide-angle lens from a perspective looking up at the vehicle's huge continuous track. (See Figure 5-1) The accompanying text anthropomorphized and venerated the machine, which moved "slowly and majestically," and in whose "powerful and flat 'spine'" the Saturn-5 launcher rested.²⁸ Photographs also illustrated American technological progress by visually demonstrating the progressive improvement of photographic techniques and equipment in space.²⁹

Amerika's frequent emphasis on the manual controls used in American spacecraft also implied American technological superiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. One May 1962 article, for example, presented Glenn's first orbit as a "step forward" in spaceflight's technical progress, because it showed that astronauts could manually steer a spacecraft in orbit. The emphasis put a positive spin on the fact that Glenn was forced to guide the ship's reentry after its control systems gave him "a lot of trouble." Not only a frank admission, it also allowed a poke at the Soviet space program. Describing the first Soviet cosmonauts flying aboard "a powerful missile," it gave Soviet space successes a military association, and portrayed Soviet

²⁸ It also described a vast technological enterprise operating "among masses of buildings and cars." Construction of the launcher "took place in one of the biggest buildings in the world." There, the "giant rocket, topping 36 floors, weighing 500 tons" was built and mounted onto the pictured launch platform. "Apollo: Preparations for Moon Flight," *Amerika*, October 1967, 24-25.

²⁹ April 1968's "Earth Sits For Color Portrait From Space" contrasted the first photographs of the Earth from a synchronous orbit achieved by NASA's Applications Technology Satellite III (ATS-III) with earlier images of the Earth from space. "Earth Sits For Color Portrait From Space," *Amerika*, May 1968, 24.

cosmonauts as passive passengers in contrast with their active American counterparts.³⁰ Later reports continued to emphasize the astronauts “at the controls” of their spacecraft.³¹ Manual controls served as a symbol of American freedom and decentralized authority, and suggested both technological and political superiority.

Danger Narratives

A key supporting narrative emphasized the dangers of spaceflight to show how, as space missions went further, dangers increased, and so did safety measures, which were often technological in nature. Narratives about the dangers of spaceflight thus helped to illustrate how the United States used technology to minimize hazards. Danger narratives also demonstrated the American space program’s openness to public scrutiny by allowing Soviet readers to see the difficulties that the American space program encountered along the way. *Amerika* repeatedly described U.S. spaceflights as “dangerous,” or “harrowing,” or called their spacecraft “fragile.” These were “nervous” events where all participants faced a “submerged fear of failure” and the “much grimmer possibility ... of outright disaster.”³²

Ultimately, *Amerika* most often implied that technologies made the difference between failure and success. Advanced technologies monitoring how the astronauts’ heart rates “shot up” at key moments, for example, conveyed the elevated sense of

³⁰ Glenn’s use of “manual controls,” it stressed, “should be regarded as one of the main events” of the mission. Jeff Stansbury, “John Glenn ... In Orbit,” *Amerika*, May 1962, 2-7.

³¹ Wilford and Wooten, “To the Moon and Back,” 2-8.

³² “Our Impossible Goal, by the Apollo 11 Astronauts,” *Amerika*, April 1970, 40. Tellingly, An article on the ill-fated Apollo 13 mission featured one of the only pictures of astronauts who were not smiling. The piece described how NASA was able to “turn disaster into triumph.” See: “Rescue In Outer Space (Apollo 13),” *Amerika*, September 1970, i.f.c.-1.

danger.³³ Highlighting the monitoring and predictive capabilities of the American space program in this way suggested that attentiveness to the astronauts' safety was firmly founded on American scientific and technological advancement.³⁴ Recurring images of helicopters airlifting astronauts from their capsules after splashdown; of astronauts examining their capsules (which were, as one caption explained, "charred by the extreme heat of reentry"); or cutaways of spacesuits explaining the various safety components reinforced the sense of danger, and the sophisticated technologies used to mitigate it.³⁵ Spacesuits were key to using technology to protect American astronauts. As one article put it:

One leak and they would be doomed to instant death on a hostile world.³⁶

Amerika routinely expressed confidence in American "designing and planning," though at times these reassurances seem overstated and simplistic. In an article previewing Apollo 11, James Schefter interviewed Dr. Don Lind, a scientist involved in Apollo's lunar surface operations. Lind described how "every emergency" had been prepared for. After landing and performing a walk-around inspection of the Lunar Module, should the astronauts find any evidence of potentially hazardous

³³ Wilford and Wooten, "To the Moon and Back," 2-8; Charles Gregory, "As a Nation Watched ... 'Lift Off!'," *Amerika*, August 1961, 6-39.

³⁴ Wilford and Wooten, "To the Moon and Back," 2-8.

³⁵ See, for example: Gregory, "As a Nation Watched ... 'Lift Off!'," 38; Jeff Stansbury, "On Target: Flight of Second U.S. Astronaut," *Amerika*, December 1961, 9; Stansbury, "John Glenn ... In Orbit," 5; Marjorie Parsons, "'Faith-7' in Space," *Amerika*, September 1963, 12-13; "Meeting in Space," *Amerika*, October 1963, 38-39; Ralph Segman, "Gemini: Beginning and Successful Ending of a Project," *Amerika*, October 1967, 34-35; "Apollo 8: Now Man Has Circled the Moon," 46; Schefter, "Our First Day on the Moon – What Will It Be Like?," 47-51; "A Day in Outer Space," *Amerika*, November 1969, 27-28; "On the Moon (Apollo 11)," 38-39; Holmes, "The New Configuration," 18; James J. Haggerty, "The Giant Harvest From Space – Today and Tomorrow," *Amerika*, February 1971, 22; Arthur Pariente, "Apollo 15: Touchdown for Science," *Amerika*, December 1971, 30.

³⁶ Detailing the Extravehicular Mobility Unit—the "heavy, pressurized spacesuit" the astronauts wore for their sojourn on the Moon—the article even declared that it made "harmful accidents almost impossible." "Even the fragile-looking space helmet is shatterproof," it added: "A sledge-hammer blow by a circus strongman might not be enough to crack it." "Special Report: Man on the Moon," Insert between pp. 28-29.

damage to their spacecraft they would simply leave the Moon immediately and rendezvous with the Command Module. Should the Lunar Module be short of fuel when trying to leave the moon's surface, "we can still get part way back up by doing it quickly." Lind no doubt understood that something inconceivable could go wrong, forcing the astronauts and mission control to search for a solution where—quite possibly—none would be found. Certainly, the way out of every danger could not simply be, as Lind said: "we go home."³⁷ *Amerika*, however, needed to be careful to convey a positive voice of support for the admittedly dangerous missions. Its confidence in the space program demonstrated deep faith in the capabilities of American science and technology to succeed in exploring space safely.

The tragic deaths of astronauts Virgil Grissom, Ed White, and Roger Chaffee while performing pre-launch tests aboard Apollo 1 on January 27, 1967, and Vladimir Komarov's death aboard Soyuz-1 on April 24, 1967 made clear the very real dangers of spaceflight. In the subsequent months both countries put their manned space flight programs on hold while they made necessary improvements to their space technologies. NASA delayed all manned launches for a year and a half while the causes of the accident were investigated and remedied.³⁸ By the time American astronauts returned to space aboard Apollo 7 between October 11 and 22, 1968, their capsule had been substantially redesigned with their safety in mind.

³⁷ The article similarly noted that astronaut Russel Schweickart had once remarked on the "extreme possibility" that the Lunar Module's ascent engine might completely fail. While Schweickart accepted the risks, *Amerika* reassured its readers that notwithstanding such a "remote" but catastrophic possibility, "Apollo scientists believe they have made provision for every other contingency that can be anticipated." Scheffer, "Our First Day on the Moon – What Will It Be Like?," 47-51.

³⁸ Michael J. Sheehan has argued that the U.S. space program's priority on safety reflected an attunement to the damage to American prestige that casualties would cause. Michael J. Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2007), 50.

Amerika's report on the Apollo 1 accident, meanwhile, quoted statements Grissom had made to show that the astronauts believed:

It is worth it to risk one's life for the sake of space exploration.

The magazine had similarly stressed astronauts' courage in the face of danger since the first human spaceflight by an American. Often, the astronauts' bravery was expressed in terms of their confidence in their machines or in the scientific and technical personnel who worked tirelessly to ensure their safety.³⁹ Coverage of the Apollo program likewise detailed how advanced technologies had been applied to safeguard the astronauts, and employed similar narratives of danger, preparedness, and confidence. Depictions of "tense moments" in the "ominous blackness of space" were balanced against accounts of calm astronauts and "perfect" outcomes.⁴⁰ Danger narratives thus conveyed American preparedness based on scientific and technological advancement.

They also highlighted the technical expertise of American crews and support teams. Coverage of Apollo 11, for example, noted how poor weather changed the planned splashdown site on Earth. Houston instructed the astronauts to shift their landing target by nearly 400 kilometers. The anecdote underscored American technological capabilities by highlighting how NASA—and the aircraft carrier U.S.S.

³⁹ John Glenn remained "calm," for example, because he was "confident and secure" that "all measures" had been taken to guarantee his "maximum security." He could rely on the "latest" and "most versatile equipment" at his disposal. Gregory, "As a Nation Watched ... 'Lift Off!,'" 36-39. See also: Sherwood Harris, "Cape Kennedy: The Moon Has Changed the View," *Amerika*, October 1967, 20; Schefter, "Our First Day on the Moon – What Will It Be Like?," 47-51; "Our Impossible Goal, by the Apollo 11 Astronauts," 40; Wilford and Wooten, "To the Moon and Back," 2-8.

⁴⁰ "Special Report: Man on the Moon," Insert between pp. 28-29; "Apollo 9: Giant Step In Space," *Amerika*, August 1969, 2-7; Schefter, "Our First Day on the Moon – What Will It Be Like?," 47-51; "Our Impossible Goal, by the Apollo 11 Astronauts," 40; Wilford and Wooten, "To the Moon and Back," 2-8; "A New Frontier (Apollo 11 Moon Landing)," i.f.c.

Hornet scheduled to rendezvous with the spaceship—were flexible to adjust to significant last-minute changes.⁴¹

In spite of the potential dangers, the Apollo 11 astronauts were unharmed during their mission. Ultimately, when a “most daring voyage” such as this was successful, *Amerika* declared it a “triumph of great courage, determination, and technology.”⁴² It credited the Apollo program’s positive outcome to the scrupulous preparations made by American scientists and engineers, as well as the confident and capable performances of the astronauts and ground crew during the mission. Yet it was still important to accentuate just how difficult a feat space exploration really was. As Collins said shortly after Apollo 11:

This trip of ours to the moon may have looked simple and easy. I want to assure you that this has not been the case.⁴³

The astronauts, their equipment, and their support network on Earth, were all well prepared. Their missions were not only successful; they exceeded expectations and performed nearly flawlessly, a testament to American expertise.

Amerika’s accounts of Apollo 11 often discussed or featured in images the Mobile Quarantine Facility (MQF), which quarantined the astronauts for three days upon their return to Earth. Noting that the MQF had been “designed to protect the world from contamination by any possible ‘moon germs,’” the magazine used it to illuminate the potential dangers of the mission, to extend that danger to all of

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² “Apollo 8: Now Man Has Circled the Moon,” 43-46.

⁴³ Wilford and Wooten, “To the Moon and Back,” 2-8.

humanity including Soviet readers of the magazine, and to portray American concern for the safety of the world.⁴⁴

Depicting the U.S. as the World Leader in Scientific and Technological Progress

Amerika emphasized that space exploration was indeed progress by frequently discussing its tangible benefits to humanity. In so doing, it routinely described satellites with practical applications for improving meteorology, navigation, and communications.⁴⁵ The American contribution to improving global television broadcasting via space earned special attention, especially since people around the world increasingly experienced American space achievements through this medium.⁴⁶

James J. Haggerty's February 1971 article "The Giant Harvest From Space Today and Tomorrow" provided a focused discussion of space exploration's practical benefits to man.⁴⁷ Haggerty discussed the many "direct" benefits provided by a wide variety of American satellites, as well as what he called the many "derived" assets emerging "from general technological advances" associated with space exploration. Considering the Apollo program to be the principal source of such direct benefits, he called it:

the broadest and most rapidly progressive technological undertaking ever attempted by man.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ In a September 1970 article, NASA Administrator Thomas Paine did so as he enthused: "Space exploration already has made life better on Earth." Paine, "Next Steps in Space," 21.

⁴⁶ Holmes, "The New Configuration," 18.

⁴⁷ Haggerty was the editor of *Aerospace Year Book*, and "one of America's leading aerospace writers," The article originally appeared in *Air Force / Space Digest*.

Haggerty thus portrayed space exploration making significant contributions to technological progress, and presented Apollo in the leading role. Emphasizing the breadth of this progress, he pointed to many areas where space exploration indirectly stimulated the productive capacities of industrial society.⁴⁸ In doing so, Haggerty reinforced a broader narrative in *Amerika* that used space to portray the wide diffusion of science and technology across American society.

It routinely depicted the American space program as a broad collective effort of “literally hundreds of thousands of people.”⁴⁹ Extensive descriptions of the various tools and equipment used by the astronauts indicated that large teams of engineers had contributed to the space program. Many scientists worked to ensure that every detail of the astronauts’ needs was met.⁵⁰ It also portrayed the numerous groups of scientists, engineers, and geologists who studied the scientific data obtained during the mission.⁵¹

From designing and building the spacecraft’s many systems, through preparing for the flight and supporting the mission in progress, to recovery of the capsule after splashdown, *Amerika* depicted American space exploration as the successful product of a vast collective effort. Its coverage showcased the support-network of technicians at stations on the ground, and especially the numerous

⁴⁸ “The list,” of these benefits,” he asserted, “is far too lengthy to recount more than a random sampling.” Haggerty, “The Giant Harvest From Space – Today and Tomorrow,” 22.

⁴⁹ Stansbury, “John Glenn ... In Orbit,” 2-7; Gregory, “As a Nation Watched ... ‘Lift Off!’,” 36-39; “Saturn V Takes a Giant Step Toward the Moon,” *Amerika*, April 1968, 48-49; Schefter, “Our First Day on the Moon – What Will It Be Like?,” 47-51. As an Apollo 8 article similarly declared, that mission “had been borne to the moon on all man’s knowledge.” See: “Apollo 8: Now Man Has Circled the Moon,” 43-46.

⁵⁰ It often discussed their efforts to improve the quality of the astronaut’s meals, for example, or to provide “decongestant tablet[s]” to prevent the astronauts’ mouths from drying out from the pure oxygen they received as they slept. “A Day in Outer Space,” 27-28.

⁵¹ Schefter, “Our First Day on the Moon – What Will It Be Like?,” 47-51.

personnel at Mission Control in Houston.⁵² In doing so, it gave particular attention to the emotional relationship between the astronauts in space and their colleagues on Earth.⁵³ It generally depicted Mission Control in terms that emphasized their humanity and often showed them playing a key role in helping the astronauts overcome “loneliness” in space.⁵⁴

Such details not only gave NASA a human face, they also linked the American space program to the general public who shared in the excitement of observing—rather than participating in—the historic mission. In this way, the large collective effort that Mission Control signified could be transposed to American society at large. Similarly, *Amerika* routinely described the astronauts as “normal” yet exemplary members of society. Said to “represent the best of America,” the American astronauts were thus portrayed as both individuals and prototypical Americans, as normal as they were exceptional.⁵⁵

Amerika additionally seized any opportunity to associate space exploration with symbols of American industrial progress. Articles covering visiting Soviet cosmonauts’ journeys across the U.S., for example, invariably emphasized those locations that best represented American political, industrial, social and technological advancement, such as a “Steel plant in Baltimore,” or Seattle’s 21st Century

⁵² Stansbury, “John Glenn ... In Orbit,” 2-7; Gregory, “As a Nation Watched ... ‘Lift Off,’” 36-39; Wilford and Wooten, “To the Moon and Back,” 2-8; “A Day in Outer Space,” 27-28; “Special Report: Man on the Moon,” Insert between pp. 28-29.

⁵³ Mission Control was often shown “grounding” the astronauts, keeping them focused on the tasks at hand by putting them to work, or communicating to them with “terse, business-like messages.”

⁵⁴ They collectively held their breath, for instance, during key moments. They were also frequently depicted providing a “cheerful voice” in the abyss of outer space. See: Stansbury, “John Glenn ... In Orbit,” 2-7; “A Day in Outer Space,” 27-28. During Apollo 11, astronaut Michael Collins had to leave his colleagues on the Moon while he remained in orbit aboard the Command Module. As a result, narratives of that mission often emphasized Collins’ solitude during his “orbital vigil,” and described him as “the loneliest man since Adam.” See: “Special Report: Man on the Moon,” Insert between pp. 28-29; Wilford and Wooten, “To the Moon and Back,” 2-8.

⁵⁵ “Welcome Back! (Apollo 11),” *Amerika*, April 1970, 60.

exhibition.⁵⁶ Such details further depicted American society with a broad base of scientific, technological, and industrial development.

Reporting on the astronauts' final telecast from Apollo 11, *Amerika* highlighted how all three astronauts expressed their gratitude for the "blood, sweat and tears" of thousands of American workers, scientists and engineers" who had designed and manufactured the "complex equipment that made the mission possible." As Aldrin declared in the telecast, the collective effort of "one nation" had worked to satisfy "the insatiable curiosity of all mankind to explore the unknown."⁵⁷

Material Abundance

Several scholars have recently examined how American propaganda spread images of the "American way of life," or what Stephen J. Taylor called American "consumer modernity."⁵⁸ *Amerika's* space coverage supported this wider effort by highlighting American material abundance and affluence. It thus used the space theme to suggest that the American economic system was ideal for delivering the benefits of technological progress to society. In only one example, *Amerika's* description of NASA's Christmas festivities during Apollo 8 linked the spaceflight to materialism

⁵⁶ Anthony J. Bowman, "Space Travelers Meet," *Amerika*, August 1962, 2-3.

⁵⁷ Wilford and Wooten, "To the Moon and Back," 2-8.

⁵⁸ See, for example: Greg Castillo, *Cold War on the Home Front: The Soft Power of Midcentury Design* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2010); Laura A. Belmonte, *Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Kenneth A. Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence, KA: University of Kansas, 2006), especially Chapter 8, "Facts About the United States: The USIA Presents Everyday Life in America," 253-87; Victoria De Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance Through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Richard H. Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1998), 195-196; Peter J. Taylor, "Locating the American Century: A World-Systems Analysis," in *The American Century: Consensus and Coercion in the Projection of American Power*, by David Slater and Peter J. Taylor (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 1999), 3-6; Alexander Stephan, *The Americanization of Europe: Culture, Diplomacy, and Anti-Americanism After 1945* (New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2006), 3. See also: Lyn Gorman and David McLean, *Media and Society in the Twentieth Century: A Historical Introduction* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2003), 135.

and the nation. As the article earlier quoted astronaut James Lovell's comment from the Moon's orbit on Christmas Eve:

Please be informed there is a Santa Claus.⁵⁹

When the astronauts safely returned to Earth, NASA staff “broke out cigars and a huge American flag” around a Christmas tree erected inside Mission Control. The Russian Santa Claus “Grandfather Frost” (*Ded Moroz*), and Christmas trees had been particularly contested symbols in Soviet society. According to historian Karen Petrone the “New Year’s tree” (the Soviet reinvention of the Christmas tradition) became a symbol of defiance, status, and prosperity.⁶⁰ Anecdotes and images of Christmas in *Amerika* magazine illustrated American freedom and affluence by suggesting the abundance of material goods the American system provided for public consumption.

A 1970 excerpt from Norman Mailer’s *A Fire on the Moon* depicted the crowd that flocked to Florida to witness the Apollo 11 launch in terms that highlighted their identities as consumers.⁶¹ Elsewhere, numerous images showing spectators at American space launches showcased the American public’s access to a wide variety of cameras and large telescopes while offering a glimpse of American fashions and, by extension, prosperity.⁶² Frequent photographs of the post-flight ticker tape

⁵⁹ “Apollo 8: Now Man Has Circled the Moon,” 43-46.

⁶⁰ Karen Petrone, *Life Has Become More Joyous Comrades!: Celebrations in the Time of Stalin* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2000), 85-109.

⁶¹ Mailer described this “encampment of tourists” taking “economy flight[s]” to “cheap” Florida where they “rented cars” and joined “every variety of camper” en route to Cape Kennedy. The excerpt further suggested American affluence by comparing the “play of giant arc lights” at the launch to a “Hollywood premiere.” Norman Mailer, “A Fire On the Moon (Excerpt),” *Amerika*, May 1970, 40.

⁶² Gregory, “As a Nation Watched ... ‘Lift Off!’,” 39; Stansbury, “On Target: Flight of Second U.S. Astronaut,” 9; Bowman, “Space Travelers Meet,” 2-3. Images of crowds gathered to meet the astronauts after their spaceflights performed a similar role. See: Stansbury, “John Glenn ... In Orbit,”

parades typically foregrounded the American flags hanging on the shiny convertible cars that carried the astronauts being honored. These often also revealed the hundreds of flags hanging from the New York or Chicago skyscrapers—symbols of American enterprise—that towered over the scenes.⁶³

As discussed in Chapter 3, television played an important role as a symbol of the openness of the American media and society. Television also provided a central motif for symbolizing the material affluence and consumerist culture of the United States. Television played a key role in how Americans consumed news of—and

shared in the experience of—space exploration. Accordingly, *Amerika* published numerous images of Americans viewing spaceflights on television sets in their homes or in public areas.⁶⁴

One, for example, showed a large crowd assembled in front of a giant television screen on the wall of New York's Grand Central Station to receive news



Figure 5-2: Humanity uniting around a symbol of openness and material abundance: John Glenn's orbital flight being covered on a television screen in Grand Central Station.

Jeff Stansbury, "John Glenn... In Orbit," *Amerika*, May 1962, 5.

6. For a similar example from before the human spaceflight era see: "Stars Are Their Hobby," *Amerika*, 1957, 44-46.

⁶³ For example, the back cover of the May 1962 issue featured a large photo of John Glenn's ticker-tape parade. One Apollo 11 article featured five photos of such parades around the United States. See: "Welcome Back! (Apollo 11)," 60-61, 63.

⁶⁴ "Special Report: Man on the Moon," Insert between pp. 28-29; Gregory, "As a Nation Watched ... 'Lift Off!'," 37; Stansbury, "John Glenn ... In Orbit," 5; "On the Moon (Apollo 11)," 36-37; Wilford and Wooten, "To the Moon and Back (Excerpt From Apollo 11: On the Moon)," 2-7; "Welcome Back! (Apollo 11)," 62-63.

about John Glenn's February 20, 1962, flight. (See Figure 5-2) Next to the enormous screen emblazoned with the words "CBS News: For Glenn In Orbit" hung an equally massive ad for Westclox Watches featuring that company's slogan: "Keeps America On Time."⁶⁵ Such an image strongly associated American space exploration with the great technological abundance of capitalist consumer society. According to Soviet media historian Ellen Mickiewicz, only five percent of the Soviet population had access to television sets in 1960, compared to 64 percent of American households in 1955.⁶⁶ So the prevalent images of television sets showed Americans enjoying a luxury that was for most Soviet citizens as yet unattainable. *Amerika* even published several photographs of television screens to give Soviet readers a sense of what American viewers would have seen.⁶⁷ One, for instance, showed a group of Muscovites watching the Apollo 11 moonwalk.⁶⁸

Amerika's reports on cosmonaut's visits to the U.S. showcased American industry, and showed them exploring prominent sites symbolizing American affluence. One article covering the October 1969 tour of Georgi Beregovoi and Konstantin Feoktistov highlighted their visits to, among other places, Broadway and the Empire State Building. Photographs showed them in San Diego where they

⁶⁵ Stansbury, "John Glenn ... In Orbit," 2-7. Soviet watches were infamous for their poor-quality. Edward A. Hewett, *Reforming the Soviet Economy: Equality Versus Efficiency* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1988), 81; Susan J. Linz and William Moskoff, *Reorganization and Reform in the Soviet Economy* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1988), 50.

⁶⁶ There were 4.8 million television sets in the Soviet Union in 1960. That number increased significantly in the 1960s, more than doubling between 1965 and 1970. See Ellen Mickiewicz, *Split Signals: Television and Politics in the Soviet Union* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1988), 3. For the U.S. figures, see: Gary R. Edgerton, *The Columbia History of American Television* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2007), 103.

⁶⁷ "Telstar Links New York-Paris-London," *Amerika*, November 1962, 12-13; Fady Bryn, "Telstar Broadcasts Space Flight," *Amerika*, February 1963, 9-11; Parsons, "Faith-7 in Space," 11; "Broadcast From The Moon," *Amerika*, September 1965, 10-11; "Satellite Broadcasts Television," *Amerika*, February 1966, 10-11; "The Wings of a Dream," 6-7; Wilford and Wooten, "To the Moon and Back (Excerpt From Apollo 11: On the Moon)," 3, 5, 6-7; "Live From the Moon in TV Color (Apollo 14)," *Amerika*, July 1971, i.f.c.

⁶⁸ Wilford and Wooten, "To the Moon and Back (Excerpt From Apollo 11: On the Moon)," 7.

barbecued steaks and watched American football (See Figure 5-3); the Grand Canyon where they bought souvenirs at a store run by Hopi Indians; in Detroit where they rode “in an experimental car”; and in Houston where they visited the “glass-covered” Astrodome and a “giant electric scoreboard greeted them in Russian: “ZA VASHE ZDOROV’E!” (To Your Health!) One rather conspicuous photo showed Beregovoi and Foktistov



Figure 5-3: Depicting American abundance: Soviet cosmonaut Georgi Beregovoi barbecuing steaks in San Diego.

“Here Come the Cosmonauts! (‘69 U.S. Visit of Beregovoi & Feoktistov),” *Amerika Illustrated*, March 1970, 50.

wearing Mickey Mouse caps as they visited Disneyland.⁶⁹

The image may have been intended to recall Khrushchev’s September 1959 visit when the Soviet Premier cut short his trip after being disallowed from visiting the amusement park because of security concerns.⁷⁰ At any rate, images of

⁶⁹ “Here Come the Cosmonauts! (‘69 U.S. Visit of Beregovoi & Feoktistov),” *Amerika*, March 1970, 48-51.

⁷⁰ When told by the Los Angeles police that it would be “unsafe” for him to visit Disneyland, Khrushchev’s outburst was (according to the *New York Times*) “as dramatic a loss of temper” as had been seen since he emerged as the Soviet leader. “Premier Annoyed by Ban On a Visit to Disneyland,” *New York Times*, September 20, 1959, 1; Edith Evans Asbury, “Mme. Khrushchev Regrets Incident,” *New York Times*, September 21, 1959, 16. According to Max Frankel “[e]very paper in Moscow did its best to show that the incident was part of a concentrated campaign, by the State Department or vaguely identified circles, to keep Mr. Khrushchev ‘fenced off from ordinary Americans.’” See: Max Frankel, “Soviet Press Sours on the Tour; U.S. Said to Restrict Premier,” *New York Times*, September 23, 1959, 29. For more coverage of Khrushchev’s visit to Disneyland, see: Gladwin Hill, “Land Of Fantasy On Russian’s Tour,” *New York Times*, September 9, 1959, 13. An article in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* characterized the incident as a challenge to Khrushchev’s genuine popularity among the American people. See: K. Nepomnyashchy, “Poyezd tyanyet v San–Frantsisko (The Train Pulls Into San Francisco)” *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, September 22, 4.

cosmonauts and astronauts enjoying themselves at Disneyland and Disneyworld recurred periodically in *Amerika*. The caption to one showing Apollo 7 astronaut Walter Cunningham and his family on a Disneyland “rocket” ride underscored how such images were meant to indicate that Americans enjoyed ample leisure time: “What do astronauts do,” it asked, “on their days off?”⁷¹

Other space articles similarly focused on the material abundance and leisure time Americans supposedly enjoyed each day in space.⁷² Along the same lines, *Amerika* routinely detailed the food consumed by American astronauts to demonstrate material abundance and show American science and technology at work.⁷³ (See Figure 5-4) By outlining the often very elaborate menus that astronauts consumed in space, *Amerika* demonstrated the material affluence of American society while displaying NASA’s concern for the astronauts’ well-being.⁷⁴ These food narratives also reinforced the human connection between astronauts and *Amerika*’s

⁷¹ “Picture Parade - Astronaut’s Day Off,” *Amerika*, April 1968, i.f.c.

⁷² One detailed how Skylab astronauts spent the “several hours” allotted to them to “relax and enjoy” some of the many “leisure-time activities” aboard the space station. According to the article, an American astronaut could peruse the on-ship “library” of “magazines and more than 100 books” or listen to cassettes on “his portable tape recorder.” There was more: an “inflatable ball” to play with and a “special radiotelephone circuit” to communicate with their families. The astronauts’ lockers also “bulged” with the many items of clothing there. If they wished, the article stated, the astronauts “could change [their] clothes every day.” “There was no laundry problem, since anything the least bit soiled was discarded.” Eisenberg, “A New Home In Space (Skylab),” 11. In contrast, in June 1970 the two-cosmonauts aboard Soyuz 9 were only able to change their underwear once per week during their nearly 18-day mission. Aboard the Salyut Long-Duration Orbital Station (DOS) launched on April 19, 1971, cosmonauts could enjoy a number of activities during their free time. There was a tape recorder provided for them, as well as a library, sketchbook, a stationary bicycle, a stationary jogging track, and some other articles. In June 1971 Soyuz 11 became the only mission to dock with the DOS, which it did for more than three weeks before its crew were killed on their return passage to Earth. While docked with the Salyut station, their days consisted of eight hours of work, and six hours for meals, exercise, and free time. Asif A. Siddiqi, *Challenge to Apollo: The Soviet Union and the Space Race, 1945-1974* (Washington, DC: NASA), 725-26, 766, 767-68.

⁷³ One early article noted that Alan Shepard ate “orange juice, beefsteaks, eggs and toast” before his May 5, 1961 flight. Gregory, “As a Nation Watched ... ‘Lift Off!’,” 36-39.

⁷⁴ After describing Mission Control teasing the Apollo 11 astronauts by boasting about the steaks they would soon be eating, one article argued: “the food isn’t bad on Apollo.” It detailed the menu: “steak, spaghetti and meat sauce, beef hash, bacon, applesauce, shrimp salad, etc.” “A Day in Outer Space,” 27-28.

readers.⁷⁵ One article used the device of describing a “typical day in the life” aboard Skylab to detail the astronauts’ meals, which included many diverse options—even “filet mignon” and “lobster Newburg.” Indeed, the article noted, considerable




Figure 5-4: American abundance on display: the large bold-faced text accompanying this image said “Space Food.”

“A Day in Outer Space,” *Amerika Illustrated*, November 1969, 27.

funds had been spent on the astronauts’ food.⁷⁶ Citing Dr. Malcolm Smith, the NASA Chief of Food and Nutrition, it explained the rationale:

If you put a 10-cent meal on Skylab that messed up a multimillion dollar program, you’d feel awfully bad.⁷⁷

In general, the Americans did provide their astronauts with a more flexible menu with greater variety than the Soviets afforded their cosmonauts. The cosmonauts consumed more calories per day, however. One American study from the late 1980s

⁷⁵ It noted, for example, that in addition to the freeze-dried meals, the astronauts were “also given one ‘wet-pack’ meal a day — regular undehydrated meals just like those on earth.” Ibid.

⁷⁶ Other menu items listed included: “dehydrated scrambled eggs and sausage patties, orange juice, cocoa, and a pre-buttered roll ... Rice Krispies and milk, dried apricots, black coffee ... bacon wafers, cheddar cheese crackers and mints ... filet mignon, lobster Newburg, white bread, vanilla ice cream, and the like, and the canned meat balls, applesauce, jam, and turkey ... fruit juices, soup and vegetables ... chili with meat, frozen white bread, cheddar cheese sandwich spread, grapefruit juice, tea with lemon and sugar ... turkey and gravy, mashed potatoes, peaches, sugar cookies and coffee.”

⁷⁷ Eisenberg, “A New Home In Space (Skylab),” 11.

also showed that—via supplements and vitamins—cosmonauts also consumed more nutrients than astronauts.⁷⁸

Other images showing the American public celebrating space achievements featured even more ostentatious displays of American affluence. One interesting example was a large two-page shot of a formal dinner celebrating the Apollo 11 astronauts. It centered on a table spread enjoyed by one of the groups of guests, revealing evidence of a lavish meal. (See Figure 5-5) An opulent flower arrangement held large candles in the center of the table, while drinks (coffee, or perhaps tea, and presumably alcohol served in fine glassware), and cake, cluttered the scene. As the viewers' eyes moved up from the table they saw a vast hall and the astronauts on a stage in the distance; but in the space immediately above the table—occupying the center of the frame—was a richly-dressed woman, her back to the viewer and her fur coat draped across the back of her chair. The expensive jewelry, grandiose hairstyles,

⁷⁸ During the 30th minute of Gagarin's inaugural mission, he was tasked with attempting to eat nine different food products, in order to establish whether it was possible to consume, chew, and swallow in conditions of weightlessness. For the first two Soviet manned spaceflights, Gagarin and Titov were rationed approximately 2800 Kcal of meat products, tube-packed foods, including soups and cottage cheese, and drinks like coffee, cocoa, and juices. A key problem with early space food concerned the shelf life of perishable items. For early Soviet manned spaceflights, meat products were prepared just before launch. Rations developed for subsequent missions of up to four days in duration included canned meats, juices packed in aluminum tubes, and bread packed in bite-sized morsels. Cosmonauts for the Soyuz missions enjoyed four meals each day on a three-day menu cycle, which by then included dehydrated boiled meat. The first time Soviet cosmonauts had the ability to heat food in space (and enjoy a cup of coffee) was aboard the 18-day Soyuz 9 mission in June 1970. By this time, cosmonauts could heat food products in aluminum tubes, and each was allotted on average approximately 2,600 kilocalories each day. Drinking water was produced aboard the Salyut series of orbiting stations at a daily rate of two liters per cosmonaut. Salyut-3 was the first time cosmonauts tested using recovered water to rehydrate dried food products. Salyut 4 saw twenty percent of its food coming from such dehydrated products. Salyut 4, a space station in service from December 1974 to February 1977, provided the ability to heat bread and the aluminum-tubed foods at the same time, a convenience that marked a significant improvement in the cosmonauts' diets. Salyut 7 saw the calorie intake for cosmonauts increased to 3200 Kcal per day. Selina Ahmed, *Comparison of Soviet and U.S. Space Food and Nutrition Programs [Final Report]*, Report N89-20059, NASA/ASEE Summer Faculty Fellowship Program, (Houston, TX: NASA, 1988), 3, 4, 7, 9-10; Asif A. Siddiqi, *Challenge to Apollo: The Soviet Union and the Space Race, 1945-1974* (Washington, DC: NASA, 2000), 725; Colin Burgess and Rex Hall, *The First Soviet Cosmonaut Team: Their Lives, Legacy, and Historical Impact* (New York, NY: Springer-Praxis, 2009), 150, 159, 176, 193.



Figure 5-5: American affluence on display at a banquet honoring the Apollo 11 astronauts.
 “Welcome Back! (Apollo 11),” *Amerika*, April 1970, 62-63.

and fashionable dresses that she and the other women were wearing, symbolized American prosperity and the consumer benefits of a free market economy. Another prominent feature of the same image—a television camera towering over the crowd—spoke similarly of affluence and consumerism.⁷⁹

Images of the astronaut’s families’ prosperous lifestyles further displayed the wealth of the American economy. Signs of abundance, for instance, literally filled a large color photo showing Pat Collins watching Apollo 11 coverage on the television while enjoying champagne with her friends and family. (See Figure 5-6) In this photo taken from behind the family television set, the center foreground featured a silver ashtray and fancy glassware full of champagne placed on top of the television. Next to it, also in the foreground, a well-dressed young girl held a large live rabbit that appeared to gaze directly into the camera.

⁷⁹ “Welcome Back! (Apollo 11),” 60.



Figure 5-6: American affluence on display in Pat Collins' living room.

"On the Moon." *Amerika*. April 1970. 36-37.

The crowd of approximately one dozen women, the two girls, and one man were all fashionably dressed: the women—especially so. They wore colorful dresses cut above the knee, and jewelry and shoes that matched their outfits. Their hairstyles—beehive-like or heavily curled—suggested time spent in front of the mirror or at a salon, and money spent on hairstyling products. The two youngsters both wore wristwatches. There were at least five bottles of champagne visible in the scene. A cooler full of champagne bottles, and a stylish, glass-top coffee table jammed with glassware centered the image. There was no room left on the table for a plate of cake, which sat on the floor next to the table. Behind the crowd, two ornate wrought-iron wall lamps flanked a large fireplace, set in a stylish wall of white brick. Everyone, was visibly, ecstatically happy, with mouths open in excitement, eyes glued to the television screen.⁸⁰

Another photograph similarly featuring fashionably dressed ladies and children, surrounded by nice furniture, alcohol, and desserts showed Joan Aldrin,

⁸⁰ "On the Moon (Apollo 11)," 16-39.

mouth opened wide with excitement, watching the television. The angle and pose of this photo highlighted Aldrin's bare legs and arms protruding from her sleeveless mini skirt. The side foreground showed the clean lines of a large red sofa, while a florescent light covering nearly the full ceiling of the adjoining room lit the scene from behind. A close-up of Jan Armstrong, also smiling with mouth open wide, completed the two-page set of photographs of the astronauts'




Figure 5-7: An aerial photo of an American yard used to show the fidelity of American photographs of the Moon.

"Close-ups of Moon Show Three-Foot Craters," *Amerika*, November 1964, 60.

wives.⁸¹ Recurrent images of spaceflight participants and spectators with open mouths served as suggestive symbols of American openness.⁸²

In a 1965 article describing American photographs of the lunar surface, one image stood out: An aerial photograph of an American house and yard. (See Figure 5-7) While the caption stated that the supplementary image of the Earth surface was included "for comparison," the picture also served to highlight the material abundance of American citizens. A large car was shown parked next to an ample bungalow on a large property with several bushes and trees. The yard also featured a

⁸¹ "On the Moon (Apollo 11)," 16-39.

⁸² Gregory, "As a Nation Watched ... 'Lift Off!'," 39; Stansbury, "John Glenn ... In Orbit," 7; "Happy End to a Successful Space Flight," *Amerika*, November 1965, 34-35; Wilford and Wooten, "To the Moon and Back (Excerpt From Apollo 11: On the Moon)," 4; "On the Moon (Apollo 11)," 36-37.

separate patio with a table and two chairs.⁸³ Such images implied that the American economic system was well suited for supplying the public with the benefits of technological progress.

Founding Fathers

As will be seen in the next chapter, *Soviet Life* often discussed the founding fathers of the Soviet space program, a device it used to strongly associate Soviet spaceflight with the Soviet state. *Amerika*, in contrast, never used the motif, and only occasionally came close to doing so. Wernher von Braun was seldom discussed, which, in itself, is a curious omission suggesting that his association with Nazi Germany did not present U.S. space achievements in the best American light.⁸⁴ The magazine's depictions of American rocket pioneer Robert Goddard came closest to portraying a founding father of the American space program, though they did not specifically refer to him in this way. They typically noted Goddard's enormous influence, however, and that he worked secretly or in obscurity. *Amerika*'s central narrative of Goddard's life cast him as a demonstration of how the American system was well suited for advancing scientific and technological progress. The magazine's biographical sketches of Goddard concentrated on his efforts to procure funding for his experiments. In what was ultimately a story of triumph, Goddard received monies from a variety of public and private institutions, including Clark University, the Smithsonian Institution, the U.S. Army and Navy, and the Guggenheim

⁸³ "Close-ups of Moon Show Three-foot Craters," *Amerika*, November 1964, 59-61.

⁸⁴ For a recent biography of Wernher von Braun, see: Michael J. Neufeld, *Von Braun: Dreamer of Space, Engineer of War* (Toronto: Random House, 2007). For a less scholarly biography of von Braun, see: Bob Ward, *Dr. Space: The Life of Wernher von Braun* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005).

Foundation.⁸⁵ This narrative, cloaked in the tale of Goddard's financial hardships, ultimately showed Goddard's work garnering substantial fiscal rewards. It also showcased a broad base of institutions within the U.S. that supported science and technology, while highlighting Goddard's freedom from these bodies to choose the course of his research. Goddard's image thus contributed to *Amerika's* overall depiction of the American system being best suited for encouraging scientific and technological progress.

Conclusion

Amerika's space propaganda employed a number of rhetorical strategies to portray space exploration as both a mirror and harbinger of American scientific and technological progress. It did so by emphasizing the scientific nature of spaceflight and the sophisticated technologies necessary, and by stressing its scientific and technological benefits to society. Its depiction of the broad scientific and technological base of the United States, and its portrayal of the capitalist system providing material advantages to the American public, and to American scientists like Robert Goddard, supported the overall argument that the American capitalist system was best suited for delivering the benefits of space exploration to the greater society.

⁸⁵ Milton Lehman, author of the 1963 biography *This High Man: The Life of Robert H. Goddard*, contributed a short piece on Goddard for the October 1967 issue. Lehman noted that his concepts "still exist on the drawing tables or in the dreams of scientists." He compared Goddard's significance with that of Julius Caesar and Galileo Galilei, but emphasized that Goddard worked quietly and in relative obscurity, not accompanied by "loud phrases." Milton Lehman, "Launching the First American Rocket," *Amerika*, October 1967, 23. See also: "The Wings of a Dream," 2.

6. “THE STORY OF THE SOVIET SPACESHIPS IS ONE OF CONTINUOUS PRECIPITATE MOTION”: Scientific and Technological Progress in *Soviet Life*

This chapter demonstrates how *Soviet Life* portrayed space exploration as a reflection of rapid scientific and technological progress in the Soviet Union. Like *Amerika*, it proclaimed spaceflight’s contributions to scientific knowledge, and the benefits of its technologies to engineers, industry, and society. It cast cosmonauts as scientists, used technical language to portray space exploration as a scientific exploit, and employed narratives of continuous improvement that demonstrated how each subsequent mission was larger, longer, or more complex than those before.

There were notable differences, however, between *Soviet Life* and its American counterpart. Unlike *Amerika*, *Soviet Life*’s treatments of the dangers of space exploration did not emphasize the technological improvements being made to improve safety. Instead, they typically highlighted the courageous “sacrifices” cosmonauts made in the pursuit of “human progress.” Often noting the cosmonauts had achieved “immortality,” these tributes ultimately suggested that the nations identified with the space explorers were similarly destined for immortality because of their selfless commitment to human progress.¹

Though, like its American counterpart, *Soviet Life* stressed the scientific nature of Soviet space missions, it did not provide any detailed information about the

¹ See, for example: Nikolai P. Kamanin, “His Life’s Cause,” *Soviet Life*, July 1968, 34; “Yuri Gagarin Citizen No. 1 of the Universe,” *Soviet Life*, July 1968, 25; “In Mourning,” *Soviet Life*, July 1968, 26; “Messages of Condolence,” *Soviet Life*, July 1968, 27; Yaroslav Golovanov, “He Wanted to Speed Up History,” *Soviet Life*, July 1968, 28-29; “Red Square, March 30, 1968,” *Soviet Life*, July 1968, 36-38; “Yuri Gagarin: ‘Set Yourself a Worthy Goal,’” *Soviet Life*, November 1968, 42; “Their Deeds Will Live Forever,” *Soviet Life*, September 1971, 13-16; Robert Rozhdestvensky, “Continue Their Work,” *Soviet Life*, September 1971, 17.

various missions' scientific programs, only vague generalizations about their contribution to scientific knowledge. It instead concentrated on technical aspects of spaceflight—how satellites were put into orbit, or probes were landed on the Moon—and portrayed these tasks as complex technological achievements that demonstrated Soviet technical prowess. The magazine also stressed that the Soviet Union's consistent and gradual approach to explore space via “progress by stages” deemphasized the American victory in the Moon race.

Soviet Life also portrayed space exploration as a great contributor to mankind's “spiritual progress,” and suggested that Soviet success in space was a result of “social progress” under socialism. It depicted a broad scientific and technical base emerging under Soviet leadership and portrayed Soviet space “triumphs” in close association to the future “triumph” of communism. To support such a link, *Soviet Life* commonly used space-themed images and text to suggest that scientific and technological evolution had broadly penetrated Soviet society. It also argued that future Soviet growth would bring material affluence on par with the American system, but with a higher level of “spiritual progress” among Soviet citizens.

Overall, *Soviet Life* justified space exploration by pointing out its perceived potential benefits, and in doing so it adopted a position of space advocacy. Most often, space exploration was defended in terms of how it contributed to scientific and technological progress. This chapter argues that *Soviet Life* used space propaganda to showcase Soviet scientific and technological progress and to suggest that the socialist system was superior for directing such advancement and ensuring it would continue into the future.

Depicting Scientific Progress

Like *Amerika*, *Soviet Life* routinely stressed the scientific nature of Soviet space missions. Calling the first satellites “a great triumph of man over nature,” it routinely emphasized the scientific instruments on board to collect data.² A December 1957 article about Sputnik 2, for example, did not refer to the satellite’s canine passenger Laika by name, and listed her secondarily to other “instruments” aboard. It also explained her purpose in scientific terms: she was sent into space to “determine the effect of cosmic space on life processes.”³ Technical language highlighting the scientific aspects of exploring space was common. Gherman Titov did not just look through his ship’s porthole, for example, he made “visual observations.”⁴

Soviet Life commonly rationalized exploring space for its contributions to humanity’s scientific and technological progress—that, as the title of one August 1969 piece declared: “Outer Space Helps Man.” Indeed, it rarely printed any suggestion that space exploration was not justified. Yuri Gagarin acknowledged in an April 1967 article that an “argument” existed over whether to hasten space exploration or postpone it to focus on solving Earthly problems. But according to Gagarin, the debate had been “settled once and for all.” In a section set apart under the bold-faced heading “Mirror of Scientific and Technical Progress,” Gagarin

² “Sputniks and Space Ships,” *USSR*, April 1958, 14; Oleg Pissarzhevsky, “Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, Cosmic Trail Blazer,” *USSR*, December 1957, 3-5; Andrei Ivanov, “World’s Hams Tracked Sputniks,” *USSR*, January 1958, 15.

³ The second satellite, it emphasized, had been launched even before the data from Sputnik 1 could be examined. “Sputniks Underscore Man’s Scientific Progress,” *USSR*, December 1957, 1-2. Reflecting the urgency with which the second Sputnik was launched, another article in the same issue referred in the future tense to sending animals into space. See: Pissarzhevsky, “Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, Cosmic Trail Blazer,” 3-5.

⁴ “Twenty-five Hours in Space,” *USSR*, November 1961, 13-15; Andrian Nikolayev and Pavel Popovich, “In the Starry Ocean,” *USSR*, November 1962, 4-7; Vasili Pavlov, “424 Hours in Space,” *Soviet Life*, October 1970, 12-13.

argued fervently in support of intensifying space exploration, citing its benefits to all humanity.⁵

A December 1967 interview with cosmonaut Konstantin Feoktistov similarly acknowledged the existence of space detractors to refute their arguments against space exploration. Taking a long view of scientific and technological development, Feoktistov argued that human “creativity” allowed it:

to advance from the caveman
to the skyscraper, from the
primary source of power—the
campfire—to the atomic power
station.

Noting the limitlessness of the Universe, Feoktistov concluded that space exploration had opened a path to progress without bounds.⁶

Visual and verbal
associations between space



Figure 6-1: Using space exploration to symbolize Soviet progress.

“Science Paves the Road to Progress,” *Soviet Life*, January 1958, front cover.

⁵ Gagarin observed that space exploration was not only “a triumph of human spirit and courage, intellect and scientific knowledge,” but also provided “hitherto unknown and faster ways of raising his material and cultural level” by helping to create “new materials,” discover “new production processes,” and “master scientific and technical knowledge.” He emphasized how “scientific experiment[s] in space benefit ... the scientists and engineers of our whole planet,” and stressed the importance of delivering “scientists’ instruments to practically any part of the universe.” Yuri Gagarin, “Man In Space,” *Soviet Life*, April 1967, 26-27.

⁶ “Wouldn’t it be better,” the interviewer asked, “to use the money spent on rockets and sputniks for hospitals, schools and factories?” Feoktistov answered in the negative, calling space exploration an aspect of “human progress” not incompatible with “efforts to create better living conditions.” He likened exploring space to “any other important scientific discovery,” such as electricity or nuclear power, and stressed both “its immediate uses,” and its contributions to “progress made in the most advanced fields of science and technology.” “Why Space Research? Interview with Konstantin Feoktistov,” *Soviet Life*, December 1967, 41.

exploration and scientific progress were numerous. As the title of a December 1957 article on the first Sputniks indicated: “Sputniks Underscore Man’s Scientific Progress.”⁷ The cover of the January 1958 issue declared “Science Paves the Road to Progress” above a photograph showing a statue of a nearly bare masculine figure, his arm and gaze reaching upward to the stars. (See Figure 6-1) The figure’s outstretched hand—pointed skyward and holding aloft a large stylized rocket and a model of a molecule—stretches above the background clouds into a stretch of blue sky.⁸

The outstretched arm in these images placed them firmly within the iconographic traditions of Soviet visual propaganda and sculpture. Other scholars have examined the motif in these other contexts and found Soviet artists and propagandists drawing heavily from classical and neo-classical traditions to convey Soviet progress. As historian Victoria Bonnell has noted, the extended arm was one of the “standard ingredients” in propaganda poster representations of Lenin. To Bonnell the pose not only pointed the way for Soviet citizens. She also noted that the stance may have been intended to recall images of benediction in Russian orthodox icons, which often pictured Christ or the saints with one arm raised to confer a blessing.⁹

The statue of Lenin erected in 1926 outside Finland Station in St. Petersburg was but one prominent and early example of the outstretched arm as a common motif in Soviet sculpture. Another example was the massive “Worker and the Kolkhoz Woman,” created for the 1937 Paris World Exposition. The sculptor, Vera

⁷ “Sputniks Underscore Man's Scientific Progress,” 1-2.

⁸ “Science Paves the Road to Progress,” *USSR*, January 1958, f.c.

⁹ See, for example, the 1920 poster “Prizrak brodit po Evrope, prizrak kommunizma” (A Specter Haunts Europe, the Specter of Communism), and the 1920 poster “Pust' gospodstvuushchie klassy sodrogaitsia pered kommunisticheskoi revoliutsiei” (Let the Ruling Classes Shudder before the Communist Revolution) by A. Sokolov. Victoria E. Bonnell, *Iconography of Power: Soviet Political Posters Under Lenin and Stalin*. Berkeley (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997), 144.

Mukhina allegedly took inspiration from Ancient Greek and Roman, and Modern French statuary. Mukhina's piece gained added exposure after 1947 as the logo for Mosfilm, the main Soviet cinema production house.¹⁰

The sculpture built for the Soviet Pavilion at the 1939 New York World's Fair—dubbed “Joe the Worker” by fairgoers—was yet another example of a high-profile monumental sculpture employing the outstretched arm motif. Boris Iofan served as the chief architect for both the 1937 Pavilion in Paris and the 1939 Pavilion and sculpture in New York. “Joe” stood nearly 25 meters tall, atop a pedestal more than 57 meters high. In his outstretched hand, he held a red star more than 81 meters above the ground. Commentators have noted that the lofty red star was likely a sculptural response to the torch held high by the nearby Statue of Liberty.¹¹ The height of the red star prompted the Fair's organizers to hoist an American flag atop the exhibition's parachute jump to symbolically reassert American supremacy by surpassing the height of the Soviet star.¹² In his study of the records of the Soviet Fair Commission that planned the 1939 Soviet pavilion, Anthony Swift has noted the planners' focus on portraying Soviet progress: to chart a transition from a pre-industrial past to an industrial present, and, according to the Commission, to further “show that the future belongs only to the Soviet system.”¹³


¹⁰ Mukhina was allegedly inspired by the Ancient Roman statue “Harmodius and Aristogeiton,” a copy of a Greek original; by the second century B.C. Greek statue “Nike of Samothrace”; and by François Rude's “Le Départ de 1792 (La Marseillaise)” completed between 1833 and 1836 for the Arc du Triomphe in Paris. Hans-Jörg Czech et al., *Kunst und Propaganda: im Streit der Nationen 1930-1945* (Berlin: Deutsches Historisches Museum, 2007), 186; Dawn Ades et al., *Art and Power: Europe Under the Dictators, 1930-45* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1995), 193.

¹¹ Joel Dinerstein, *Swinging the Machine: Modernity, Technology, and African American Culture Between the World Wars* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 285.

¹² Anthony Swift, “The Soviet World Tomorrow at the New York World's Fair, 1939,” *The Russian Review*, 57:3 (July 1998), 375.

¹³ Ibid, 367.

Another immense monumental sculpture to use the pose was *Rodina-mat' zovyot!* (The Motherland Calls!), which was publicly unveiled on October 15, 1967 atop Mamayev Hill in Volgograd to commemorate the Soviet victory at the Battle of Stalingrad. At the time of its creation it was the world's tallest statue, a record it held until 1989. From its base to the tip of the figure's raised sword it stands



approximately 85 meters tall. The sculptor Evgenii V. Vuchetich also drew inspiration from the “Nike of Samothrace,” and even insisted on dressing Mother Russia in a neoclassical costume against calls to give her more “national” Russian attire. According to historian Scott W. Palmer, Vuchetich considered that the neoclassical mode was necessary because the appeal and significance of the statue and its symbolism were timeless and universal.¹⁴

The May 1963 front cover of *Soviet Life* featured another statue using the motif, “To the Cosmos,” in which a bare male again reaches to the stars, this time holding a replica of the first Sputnik in one of his two outstretched hands. (See Figure 6-2) Under the text “Soviet Science and Scientists”—referencing an article in

¹⁴ Scott W. Palmer, "How Memory Was Made: The Construction of the Memorial to the Heroes of the Battle of Stalingrad," *The Russian Review*, 68:3 (July 2009), 375-77, 395-96.

that issue—the image identified Soviet science and space exploration with masculinity.¹⁵ The photo was reprinted in an October 1976 retrospective on Soviet space achievements. Here, a quotation from Yuri Gagarin underscored the masculine image of Soviet space exploration. Addressing “young people who dream of outer space,” he advised them to:

remember that the road to outer space is not only for the brave, but also for the strong in spirit, in physique and in knowledge.¹⁶

Noted for its record-breaking three-man crew, October 1964’s Voskhod 1 was widely touted by Soviet propagandists as a breakthrough for space science, since the larger crew could engage in experimentation to a degree not previously possible. The standfirst to a January 1965 article covering a press conference for the mission accentuated the cosmonauts’ roles as scientists.¹⁷ The main text called Feoktistov a “scientist-cosmonaut,” and claimed that each member of the crew was, “a specialist in a different field.”¹⁸ Academician and President of the USSR Academy of Sciences Mstislav Keldysh spoke at the press conference and authored one section of the article. His prominence in *Soviet Life*’s Voskhod 1 coverage highlighted the Soviet

¹⁵ “To the Cosmos, sculpture,” *USSR*, May 1963, f.c.

¹⁶ “Space, Interviews with Konstantin Feoktistov and Oleg Gazenko,” *Soviet Life*, October 1976, 2-9.

¹⁷ A “standfirst” is the text that follows an article’s headline, yet comes before the main text of the article. A standfirst is often set in bold type, a different font, or a larger font size to draw further attention to it. The standfirst in this article described the three crew members as: “pilot-cosmonaut Engineer Colonel Vladimir Komarov”; “research-worker-cosmonaut Master of Technical Sciences Konstantin Feoktistov”; and “physician-cosmonaut Boris Yegorov.” Asked by a member of the press what profession a fourth member of a future crew should be, Komarov imagined “a man who can do a useful job” such as a “newsman,” “astronomer,” or even a “cook.”

¹⁸ Other articles similarly emphasized the participation of “physicians” and “technicians” space simulation experiments on Earth. See: “A 120-Day Space Experiment,” *Soviet Life*, February 1965.

scientific community's involvement in the space program. Keldysh portrayed Voskhod as an important step forward for Soviet space science.¹⁹

Soviet Life remained studiously vague about the nature of the scientific program aboard Voskhod 1, however. It repeatedly mentioned the “observations,” “experiments,” and “investigations” undertaken aboard the flight, but did not offer much detail. A correspondent from the *New York Herald Tribune* asked the cosmonauts to identify the mission’s “most important single discovery.” Feoktistov simply evaded the question.²⁰ The mission, the cosmonauts claimed, had gathered a great deal of data, but they did not want to offer any “generalizations” or “conclusions” until the data could be examined. Though the results of its extensive research program were as yet unclear, it would no doubt interest many scientists, they assured. Cosmonaut Boris Yegorov offered that the mission had proven that they could handle “diverse scientific apparatus” in zero-gravity conditions. Thus, while the press conference and article strove to underscore the mission’s scientific image, it did little to illuminate the nature of its scientific program.²¹

Soviet Life even portrayed the plan to fly without spacesuits on Voskhod 1 as a decision made to enhance the mission’s scientific productivity.²² According to historians, however, the decision had been made under great political pressure to fly a three-man crew to score another impressive propaganda victory. There had been

¹⁹ The scientific programs of the earlier one-man Vostok flights, he noted, were very limited. Voskhod’s crew of three “considerably widen[ed] the range of scientific observations and experiments” possible, and allowed them to be “conducted ... on a higher scientific level.” Indeed, Keldysh claimed that the data collected “was substantially increased.” “New Stage in Exploration of Space,” *Soviet Life*, January 1965, 4-11.

²⁰ “It is hard to single out any particular fact,” he answered, “since investigations were conducted in such dissimilar fields.”

²¹ “New Stage in Exploration of Space,” 4-11.

²² According to Komarov, it had been “decided” in order to “make it more convenient to carry out the scientific investigations of the flight program.” Ibid.

considerable disagreement between those planning the mission, and ultimately it was decided that there was simply not enough room for the cosmonauts to wear spacesuits.²³

Depicting Technological Progress

To underscore the theme of scientific progress, and to indicate a rapid pace of technological advancement in the Soviet Union, *Soviet Life*—like *Amerika*—routinely employed narratives of continuous improvement. These emphasized how each subsequent spaceflight used more advanced space technologies, and had greater scientific capability than those previous.

The magazine's coverage of the first trio of Soviet satellites set the pattern for narratives of continuous improvement. *Soviet Life* routinely pointed out how each satellite traveled faster and farther, weighed more, and improved in capabilities over previous ones.²⁴ In one article, for example, a large illustration of the three sputniks next to each other graphically displayed the increasing size of the first three Soviet satellites, while a chart showed their increasing weight, apogee and duration. The text

²³ Asif A. Siddiqi, *Sputnik and the Soviet Space Challenge* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2003), 409-13, 421-26. See also: James E. Oberg, *Red Star in Orbit* (New York, NY: Random House, 1981), 77; Michael J. Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), 34.

²⁴ An article written between Sputnik 1 and 2 predicted that "larger" Soviet satellites carrying more "complex instruments" would be launched during the IGY. "Sputniks Underscore Man's Scientific Progress," 1-2. The "scientific program" of Sputnik 3 (dubbed a "laboratory in space") was "considerably greater than that for any of the satellites previously launched," its instruments "of a considerably more advanced design," and its data "further evolved." "Sputnik III--Laboratory in Space," *USSR*, July 1958, 1-4. *Soviet Life* repeatedly emphasized what was novel about each consecutive satellite: the "new devices," the possibility of obtaining "new data" in "new fields," verifying "new hypotheses," or "new avenues for research." Each mission brought "new problems," which led to "new solutions" and "new technologies." See: Mikhail Molodensky, "Earth Satellite: Learning More About Our Planet," *USSR*, January 1958, 10; Alexander Obukhov, "Earth Satellite: The World's Weather," *USSR*, January 1958, 11-12; S. Dolginov and N. Pushkov, "Earth Satellite: The Earth's Magnetic Field," *USSR*, January 1958, 12; Victor Ambartsumyan, "Earth Satellite: Observatories in Space," *USSR*, January 1958, 13; Sergei Vernov, "Earth Satellite: Trailing Cosmic Rays," *USSR*, January 1958, 14-15; "Sputnik II: Cosmic Fact Finder," *USSR*, January 1958, 4-9; "Animal Space Travelers Returned to Earth," *USSR*, November 1958, 56.

proclaimed that these improvements demonstrated the rapid pace of Soviet scientific and technological progress.²⁵ Long after the first three sputniks, *Soviet Life* continued to employ similar narratives of continuous improvement in its coverage of Soviet spaceflights.²⁶ The opening line of a November 1962 article declared:

The story of the Soviet spaceships is one of continuous precipitate motion.

Andrian Nikolayev and Pavel Popovich noted that it was the cosmonauts' duty to ensure progressive improvements to the distance, duration, and scientific agenda of each consecutive mission.²⁷ Articles in the early 1970s continued to narrate a story of continuous precipitate motion.²⁸ These noted previous enhancements to Soviet space systems while highlighting the presence of new equipment and portraying each mission as a progressive step toward improving further exploration.²⁹

By the mid-1970s, the appeal of space propaganda post-Apollo had largely begun to wane. Thus, although the Salyut-4 space station made longer missions a reality and provided cosmonauts with more time and space to perform scientific research, Soyuz 17, the first long-duration mission to the new station in January and February of 1975, only received a short piece in the magazine's "People and Events"

²⁵ The improvements "bear witness," it stated, "to the speed with which Soviet scientific research and engineering skill is moving ahead." "Sputnik III--Laboratory in Space," 1-4.

²⁶ Articles in the April 1962 and May 1963 issues showed the space program's progress by visually representing the increasing height and size of each consecutive mission. Anatoli Glasko, "Steps Into Space," *USSR*, April 1962, 22-23; "Reaching for the Stars," *USSR*, May 1963, 4-9. See also: "Soviet Diary - Earth-Space-Earth," *USSR*, April 1961, 15; "Twenty-five Hours in Space," 13-15; "2,800,000 Miles in Outer Space," *USSR*, October 1962, 22-23.

²⁷ "Every cosmonaut," they observed, "knew that when his turn came ... he would be expected to multiply [the previous cosmonauts'] mileage and time showings and complement their scientific program." Nikolayev and Popovich, "In the Starry Ocean," 4-7.

²⁸ Pavlov, "424 Hours in Space," 12-13; Sergei Petrov, "Space Travel. Its Present and Future," *Soviet Life*, October 1970, 14.

²⁹ The magazine duly noted each new improvement such as television and other communications equipment, a "climate control system" and "radiation safeguards." See: "Twenty-five Hours in Space," 13-15; Pavlov, "424 Hours in Space," 12-13; Petrov, "Space Travel. Its Present and Future," 14.

section. The brief notice still emphasized, however, the new “data” obtained, and the extended duration of the “30-day” mission.³⁰

Depicting the Soviet Union as the World Leader in Scientific and Technological Progress

Like *Amerika* did for the United States, *Soviet Life* sought to use space exploration to portray the Soviet Union at the forefront of driving global scientific and technological progress. *Soviet Life* devoted more energy, however, to arguing explicitly that space exploration demonstrated that great “social progress” was taking place in the Soviet Union. Such an argument tied advances in science and technology to politics and cast the socialist Soviet system as the primary mover of progress.

Between 1957 and 1975, *Soviet Life* published several pieces on the relationship between science and social progress.³¹ Almost universally, these articles used space exploration as proof of the rapid pace of Soviet progress in science and technology. *Soviet Life* portrayed the history of science as a long march of “spiritual” progress, a journey taking place for “thousands of years” during which time science had been replacing the perspective implanted by humankind’s “spiritual teachers.”³² New scientific research, theories and discoveries, thus contributed to human progress in general, and drove Soviet social progress by instilling a scientific mindset among the Soviet people.

³⁰ “A 30-Day Space Mission,” *Soviet Life*, June 1975, 1.

³¹ Alexander Topchiev, “Earth Satellite: Link in Over-all Scientific and Technological Development,” *USSR*, January 1958, 10-14; “Science and Social Progress,” *Soviet Life*, May 1972, 34-37; Mikhail Millionshchikov, “Science in the Service of Society,” *Soviet Life*, May 1967, 54; Djermen Gvishiani, “Science and Society: Planning Scientific and Technological Progress,” *Soviet Life*, December 1971, 49-50; “The Working Class and the Scientific and Technological Revolution,” *Soviet Life*, November 1974, 50.

³² Yuri Melvil, “Man in the Space Age,” *Soviet Life*, May 1966, 48-49.

From the beginning of Soviet space exploration, *Soviet Life* also used space to exemplify the broad social base of Soviet science and technology.³³ In this, the Soviet magazine was similar to its American counterpart. But *Soviet Life*'s consistent emphasis on science's contribution to the nation's productive capacity set it apart.³⁴ While both magazines used space exploration as a symbol of scientific and technical progress, *Soviet Life* cast it as a reflection of socialist progress in the Soviet Union and argued that the Soviet Union's centralized socialist system was the best for harnessing the potential of science and technology. The magazine portrayed scientific progress in Russia as stilted under Tsarism, and only beginning with the 1917 Russian Revolution and the rise of Soviet power.³⁵

Soviet Life thus closely associated space achievements with the Soviet state and the Communist Party.³⁶ It argued that Soviet space successes proved the superiority of the Soviet political system, since socialism held greater regard for scientific progress and was better equipped to encourage the development of a broad scientific base. Explaining that the degree of centralized control possible under the socialist system of government was superior for developing a scientific base, it argued that success in space meant not only scientific, but also political superiority:

³³ Topchiev, "Earth Satellite: Link in Over-all Scientific and Technological Development," 10-14.

³⁴ It showed, for instance, that "the strength of Soviet science lies in its bonds with practical work and life." Ibid.

³⁵ "Sputniks Underscore Man's Scientific Progress," 1-2; "Communism is Coming Soon," *USSR*, September 1961, 6-13.

³⁶ *Soviet Life* not only highlighted past and present achievements in space, it also promised more to come. Undoubtedly emboldened by recent Soviet space successes, an August 1961 article looked optimistically toward future progress in Soviet science and society. Describing an All-Union Conference of Scientific Workers held in June 1961 as "Soviet science planning an assault on the future," and preparing "for the next great stride forward," it observed: "Had the conference adopted a motto, it would have been 'Forward!'" It predicted that "Soviet scientists" would "occupy in the shortest possible time the world's leading positions in all major fields." See: "Soviet Science Looks to the Future," 1-2. An article the next month quoted the new Party Program to similarly note the Party's "striving" for the "further development" of science. See: "Communism is Coming Soon," 6-13.

Only a socialist society is capable of the concentration of means and the large-scale training of personnel required for the integrated solution of the exceedingly complex technical problems of today.³⁷

Montreal's EXPO-67 gave *Soviet Life* cause to reflect on the Soviet Union's "50 years of growth" and "progress achieved." The Soviet Pavilion in Montreal shone a spotlight on Soviet space exploration to combine celebrations of past Soviet achievements in spaceflight with the futuristic fancies typical of a world's fair. While the pavilion relied on the space theme to offer a bold vision of future progress, a feature article on it characterized the Soviet Union as:

a forward-looking country, a country on the rise, a country that treasures the new and progressive and discards the outworn and the reactionary.³⁸

Links between space, science and the Soviet state were common in *Soviet Life* space propaganda. Soviet space achievements were often identified with the "Soviet people," "Soviet soil," and the Soviet state, and were thus portrayed as symbols of Soviet nation building.³⁹ The regular "Our Calendar" column was a key site offering a

³⁷ "The achievements of Soviet science grow out of the socialist system," it concluded, and were "a logical development of ... the unlimited opportunity for scientific and technical progress in a socialist society." Furthermore, science had assumed a "primary place" in the Soviet Union because it was perceived "as an indispensable tool for building communism." The article stressed the roles of the USSR Academy of Sciences in overseeing a "very widespread network of coordinated scientific bodies" and the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for the Coordination of Scientific Research in working "to implement the decisions ... made by the Party and the Government." It summarized how the number of people "engaged in research" continually increased, as did government expenditures on research. See: "Soviet Science Looks to the Future," *USSR*, August 1961, 1-2.

³⁸ It described, for instance, how the pavilion's first floor showcased displays on space Soviet space exploration that gave visitors the opportunity to "track our country's progress step by step." Visitors could also enjoy a "simulated space trip" aboard a "kind of spaceship of the future." Interestingly, a "Moon Room" allowed guests to "take a walk on a simulated lunar surface" showing that in 1967, at least, the Soviet Union associated the future of its space program with human voyages to the Moon. See: "Fifty Years of the Soviet Union To Be Shown at EXPO-67: Interview with Georgi A. Fedyashin Deputy General Commissioner of the Soviet Section of Montreal's EXPO-67," *Soviet Life*, May 1967, 3-9.

³⁹ "Communism is Coming Soon," 6-13; "A Day to Remember," *USSR*, May 1961, 2-3.

retrospective view of significant events in the Soviet past. It consistently placed space achievements alongside other milestones of nation building.⁴⁰

A similarly retrospective photo-essay in the April 1970 edition cast Soviet space achievements as key markers of the Soviet Union's "considerable progress" in science and technology after the Second World War.⁴¹ It also argued that communism was the best system for harnessing such progress for the good of society.⁴² Space exploration's place among other key facets of Soviet national identity, including the October Revolution and the Great Patriotic War (World War II), contributed to an overall narrative associating the Soviet system with human progress.

Several other articles associated Soviet space accomplishments with a transformation from pre-Revolutionary "backwardness" to a high level of social, cultural, and industrial development.⁴³ Khrushchev employed a similar historical argument in his April 14, 1961, Red Square speech celebrating Gagarin's spaceflight. *Soviet Life* quoted his speech at length in its May 1961 issue. Contrasting "once

⁴⁰ The April 1964 calendar, for example, celebrated Gagarin's flight, Lenin and Khrushchev's birthdays, the formation of the Azerbaijan Socialist Republics, the first issue of *Bolshevik* magazine, as well as notable achievements in aviation including the first Moscow-USA nonstop flight, and the 1934 air rescue of an Arctic expedition at Cheluskin. See: "Our Calendar," *Soviet Life*, April 1964, 42; "Our Calendar," *Soviet Life*, August 1964, 42.

⁴¹ In a brief essay beside a collage showcasing images of space exploration, it quoted the Third Party Program to argue that the Soviet Union's "leading place in the world shows that the system born in October 1917 is stable and vigorous." It listed several Soviet space milestones (and included a nearly full-page photograph of Gagarin) as evidence of the Soviet Union's "leading place in the world." "Epoch's Image (1950-1970)," *Soviet Life*, April 1970, 54-56.

⁴² In a sentence defining communism, the article noted: "Communism ensures the continuous development of social production and rising labor productivity through rapid scientific and technological progress." Ibid.

⁴³ Mark Vistinetsky, "Soaring Land," *USSR*, November 1962, 11-17; Nikolai Semenov, "Science and Social Progress," *USSR*, November 1961, 42-44. Many portrayed the Soviet state's early and consistent support for space research, citing, for example, the 1934 First All-Union Conference for the Study of the Stratosphere organized by the USSR Academy of Sciences in Leningrad and a 1935 special conference held at Moscow's Jet Propulsion Institute as evidence of early "preparations for space flights." See: Lev Ekonomov, "Chief Rocket Engine Designer Interviewed," *Soviet Life*, August 1969, 48-49.

illiterate,” “horse-and-buggy Russia” with the “great industrial power” of the Soviet Union, he credited the socialist state with liberating scientists and engineers. He declared Soviet space successes were proof of the Soviet state’s commitment to scientific and technological progress. State support of science and technology, he asserted, would ultimately build communism, which like space exploration would benefit all of humanity.⁴⁴ Such an association made space exploration an ideal vehicle for disseminating propaganda about the superiority of the socialist system. Space achievements thus not only demonstrated the Soviet state’s viability and its commitment to scientific and technological progress, they also affirmed its role as a world leader dedicated to advancing social and political human progress.

A host of articles used space exploration to attribute the “rapid progress” of Soviet science and technology to the socialist system. These typically claimed that a “scientific and technological revolution” was underway in the Soviet Union and found its source in Marxist-Leninist theories or statements.⁴⁵ Alongside visual or textual references to Soviet space activities, such articles predicted that advances in science and technology would soon eradicate poverty and hunger and bring about “a good life for everyone on our globe.” Such universal prosperity was only possible, however, “given the proper social system.” Only the Soviet system with its “rational

⁴⁴ “A Day to Remember,” 2-3.

⁴⁵ In one article, for example, Bonifati Kedrov, the Director of the Institute of the History of Natural Sciences and Technology of the USSR Academy of Sciences, quoted Lenin to argue that his formulation that “Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country” made support for science and technology a central feature of Soviet policy. Such a focus brought about the scientific and technological revolution, which “began to gather momentum” in mid-century with the advent of things like “cosmonautics.” See: “Science and Social Progress,” 34-37.

planning” (the argument went) could assure the continuance of rapid scientific and technological progress.⁴⁶

Soviet Life thus—like *Amerika*—used the high visibility of space achievements to promote an image of humanity united behind a singular vision of human social, political, scientific, and technological progress. The two magazines’ notions of progress were set apart, however, by the divergent values of their respective governments. While *Amerika* implicitly attributed such progress to the freedom and openness of the capitalist system, *Soviet Life* explicitly ascribed it to the socialist Soviet state.

In reaction to the emerging ascendancy of the U.S. in space, the Soviet magazine also made a more explicit case to contrast Soviet and American motivations for progress. Soviet progress, it argued, was more peaceful and more consistent than its American counterpart.⁴⁷ After Apollo 11, for example, it asserted that the Soviets’ rational and gradual approach still measured up against the

⁴⁶ Additionally, because “in the socialist state science [was] expected to serve society,” and because the “communist society we are building” embodied an “ideal of social progress,” the Soviet Union was best suited to reap the harvest of benefits that science and technology would produce, and ensure that “all working people will enjoy the fruits of science.” See: Semenov, “Science and Social Progress,” 42-44; Millionshchikov, “Science in the Service of Society,” 54; Gvishiani, “Science and Society: Planning Scientific and Technological Progress,” 49-50; “Science and Social Progress,” 34-37; “Lodestar of Science, An Interview with Academician Nikolai Semenov, Nobel Prize Winner,” *Soviet Life*, May 1968, 36-39; Gustov Naan, “Science and Common Sense,” *Soviet Life*, August 1968, 28-29; “The Working Class and the Scientific and Technological Revolution,” 50.

⁴⁷ In the April 1967 issue, for instance, Gagarin suggested that Soviet technological progress was more peaceful. In splitting the atom, the Americans “made the world anxious for the destiny of the human race.” The Soviet sputniks, on the other hand, “resulted in admiration for human genius, pride in the scientists and joy at the possibility opened to man to glimpse into the deepest secrets of the universe.” Furthermore, Soviet people should be “doubly proud,” if their scientists and engineers “were the pioneers in space.” Gagarin even offered a reflection on American space ascendancy during the mid-1960s: “But progress is not the monopoly of any one nation, of course. What one nation can do can be done better by another, what one people can do can be done still more successfully by another people. But this does not prevent the Soviet people from being proud of the foresight of their country’s statesmen and scientists who initiated this trend in space exploration. Space exploration has enabled Soviet science and technology to take a leading role in mankind’s scientific and technical progress.” Gagarin further characterized Soviet space exploration as a “logical response to the needs of science and the technical progress of the entire human race.” See: Gagarin, “Man In Space,” 26-27.

Americans who had engaged in an all-out race to the Moon. The Soviet commitment to progress, the argument implied, would outlast the American one:

What distinguishes the Soviet space program is its consistency, its progress by stages.⁴⁸

Depicting the Broad Scientific and Technological Base of Soviet Society

Soviet Life presented Soviet space achievements as demonstrations of a vast and well-established scientific and technological base in the Soviet Union. In this, it emphasized the breadth as well as the “rapid progress” of Soviet science and technology. Its reports on Sputnik 1, for instance, implied that the first satellite was only one small piece of a broad scientific and technological establishment in the Soviet Union.⁴⁹ Similarly, coverage of later space missions typically claimed that a “great army” of scientists and engineers at numerous institutions had made Soviet space achievements possible.⁵⁰ Such portrayals showed the Soviet people to be broadly engaged with space and science. They suggested that there was a high degree of public support for the space program, for science in general, and by extension for the social and political order.⁵¹

In August 1963 the magazine took a special approach with its regular column “Queries from Readers” to focus on space-related questions. Normally in the

⁴⁸ Petrov, “Space Travel. Its Present and Future,” 14.

⁴⁹ Sputnik, it pronounced for instance, “was the product of an infinite number of hands and brains, ... the inevitable result of the development of the country’s science and technology as a whole,” and a reflection of the “progressive development” of Soviet industry. Topchiev, “Earth Satellite: Link in Over-all Scientific and Technological Development,” 10-14. Another piece described how the USSR Academy of Sciences had used rockets to conduct “extensive exploration” of the upper atmosphere “for many years” already. Plans for the IGY “alone,” it insisted, included launching “more than 100” such rockets. Pisarzhevsky, “Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, Cosmic Trail Blazer,” 3-5.

⁵⁰ “Soviet Diary - Awards for Space Research,” *USSR*, August 1961, 3; Gagarin, “Man In Space,” 26-27.

⁵¹ A January 1958 article even printed letters from Soviet citizens to convey the public’s interest in and support for space exploration, as well as its “complete faith in the success of Soviet science.” “Volunteers for Space Travel,” *USSR*, September 1958, 14-15.

column, the Editors answered questions from American readers. On this occasion, the Editors instead posed questions to select members of the Soviet public. The Editors asked a “secondary school teacher,” “engineer,” “journalist,” and “factory worker” to explain why they thought the Soviet Union had come first in achieving human spaceflight. The




Figure 6-3: Visualizing Soviet technological progress: A view inside the Russian Mission Control Center used for ASTP.

Vladimir Makhotin, “Multinational Press Center,” *Soviet Life*, December 1975, 22-23.

choice of professions seemed designed to provide answers that would illustrate the breadth of scientific and technological development across Soviet society. The respondents also ultimately argued that the socialist system was the key. As the Editors concluded:

Socialism is justly called the launching pad of cosmonauts.⁵²

Like *Amerika's*, *Soviet Life's* images commonly associated Soviet space exploration with scientific and technological progress. A large photograph in the December 1975 issue showcased the technologically advanced Mission Control Center (TsUP—*Tsentr*

⁵² The teacher, for example, cited the “high level of education” in the Soviet Union. The engineer noted the “highly developed industry and skilled engineers, technicians and workers,” and emphasized: “we train more than three times as many engineers every year as the United States.” The journalist offered that the concerted scientific effort necessary for spaceflight was “only possible in a socialist system where there are no competing firms ... where the state can plan scientific research and coordinate the efforts of its scientists.” The factory worker similarly reasoned: “only a country with a planned economy can pool enough resources on the big scale required for the conquest of space.” “Queries From Readers,” *Soviet Life*, August 1963.

upravleniya poletami). Underneath giant video screens, several personnel were shown working at dozens of computers. (See Figure 6-3)⁵³ A large photo with a July 1975 article on ASTP showed many technicians and cosmonauts posing for the camera in their white lab coats.⁵⁴

Images used in *Soviet Life* also illustrated the progressive nature of Soviet society by showing the Soviet public's embrace of science.⁵⁵ Articles on Soviet stamps, statues, or exhibitions, for example, frequently showcased space imagery proliferating in society.⁵⁶ One photo repeatedly printed in *Soviet Life* in the 1970s showed a small orchestra standing on an enormous parabolic antenna aboard the *Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin*, a research ship named to honor the first cosmonaut. This highly posed photograph clearly strove to relate Soviet culture with scientific space

⁵³ Vladimir Makhotin, "Multinational Press Center," *Soviet Life*, December 1975, 22-23.

⁵⁴ Alexei Leonov, "Challenging Space," *Soviet Life*, July 1975, 16-17.

⁵⁵ In the lead photo to a December 1957 article, for example, more than a dozen people were shown crowded around a publicly displayed globe "to learn more about cosmic flight." According to the caption, this small group was only a small representation of the "thousands" who similarly sought to educate themselves about space exploration. Three other images showed a half-dozen astronomers at Pulkovo "tracking" Sputnik 1 with "special instruments"; a radio HAM operator recording the satellite's signal to tape; and two "students" looking intently over a globe. According to the caption, Sputnik caused the students to take "a livelier interest in science." Pisarzhevsky, "Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, Cosmic Trail Blazer," 3-5.

⁵⁶ Regular articles on Soviet stamps commonly featured those commemorating space achievements. See: Ilya Zbarsky, "Stamps Picture Communist Party History," *USSR*, October 1961, 36; "Year's Great Events on Stamps," *USSR*, December 1961, 17; Tatyana Klimova, "Flowers, Cosmos, and Matchbox Labels," *Soviet Life*, January 1964, 56-57; "New Stamps: Space Commemoratives," *Soviet Life*, August 1964, 45; "Cosmic Stamps," *Soviet Life*, April 1965, 10; "Moscow on Stamps," *Soviet Life*, November 1975, b.c.; "Things Cultural: Stamps," *Soviet Life*, January 1976, 62; "Stamps," *Soviet Life*, July 1976; "Things Cultural: Stamps," *Soviet Life*, September 1976, 62. One series marked the 22nd Party Congress with a space-themed stamp, identifying the Party and its new Program with the scientific and technological progress that space exploration implied. See: "To Commemorate the 22nd Party Congress," *USSR*, January 1962, 36. Also see the photograph and column about the Sputnik monument erected on Mir Prospect in Moscow in: "Sputnik on Mir Prospect," *Soviet Life*, January 1965, 61. A brief April 1968 column on Moscow's USSR Exhibition of Economic Achievements gave special attention to the space artifacts shown there. The one accompanying image showed a rocket in the exhibit hall, while the text began by noting the "Cosmos Pavilion" built there in the previous year. "From a Needle to a Car," *Soviet Life*, April 1968, 41. A tapestry depicting ASTP illustrated a column on an art show "Glory to Labor" in the September 1976 issue. The exhibition, according to the caption, was "dedicated to the Twenty-fifth Communist Party Congress," identifying, once again, space achievements with the aims of the Party and depicting a scientifically minded Soviet society. "Things Cultural: Exhibitions," *Soviet Life*, September 1976, 62.

research. Such juxtapositions of art, science, and the state used the space theme to strongly associate Soviet society with scientific and technological progress. (See Figure 6-4)⁵⁷

Space images appeared in a wide variety of other articles in *Soviet Life*, providing a broad depiction of the Soviet public's interest—or at least




Figure 6-4: Using space to depict the broad scientific base within Soviet society and associate Soviet culture with science: An amateur orchestra performs on “one of the huge parabolic antennas” of the “research ship *Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin*.”

Ruben Baghiryan, “Oceanic Space Center,” *Soviet Life*, August 1972, 12-13.

exposure to—the space theme.⁵⁸ The magazine also harnessed popular interest in spaceflight to dramatize pieces on other forms of scientific and technological progress, even if the relationship with spaceflight was only tangential.⁵⁹ In similar fashion, planetary terminology was sometimes used to elevate the significance of

⁵⁷ “Space, Interviews with Konstantin Feoktistov and Oleg Gazenko,” 2-9; Ruben Baghiryan, “Oceanic Space Center,” *Soviet Life*, August 1972, 10-13.

⁵⁸ One cartoon showed the children’s characters Buratino, Petrushka, and several of their friends using rocket ships to play “hide and seek” among distant stars and planets, suggesting Soviet children’s interest in space exploration. “Hide and Seek,” *USSR*, January 1961, 32. Also see the comic piece: “The Interplanetary Chess Congress,” *USSR*, January 1962, 57-59. In one issue a “game” encouraged readers to move pieces around a stylized map of the Soviet Union, where a rocket ship featured prominently next to a dam and an electricity tower. See: “Hi, Travelers!,” *Soviet Life*, July 1964, 18-19.

⁵⁹ An article on the properties and benefits of silicones, for example, featured a drawing of a smiling rocket holding an umbrella. To demonstrate the usefulness of these compounds, the piece began by describing their use insulating spacecraft against extreme temperatures. The connection to space also imparted a sense of excitement to an otherwise dry topic: “A mighty roar,” the piece began, “and the rocket vanishes into space.” “Big Future For Silicones,” *Soviet Life*, May 1964, 21.

government programs. If Soviet ingenuity could succeed in exploring space, such links suggested, then it could also accomplish other bold ventures on Earth.⁶⁰

Taken as a whole, these numerous depictions of space images penetrating daily life argued to the reader that Soviet society had become scientifically minded. As several articles reporting on the prevalence of planetariums throughout the Soviet Union indicated, Soviet society had become, more specifically, space-minded.⁶¹ This recurring motif recalls historian Scott W. Palmer's account of the emergence of Russian "air-mindedness" earlier in the twentieth century. Palmer discerned a distinct relationship between "aviation culture" and modernity when he observed that the airplane became "the quintessential marker of twentieth-century progress."⁶²

Soviet Life's August 1969 tribute to Apollo 11 directly linked such air- and space-mindedness with a quote from the French writer and aviator Antoine de Saint Exupéry. Accompanying a one-and-a-half page photo of the Earth from outer space, it spoke to how such a distant view of the planet reoriented human society, making it more scientifically minded. Together, the quote and image suggested that spaceflight

⁶⁰ One, for example, evoked the space theme to draw attention to an article on Khrushchev's ambitious program to reform the vast northern steppe of the Kazakh SSR into agricultural land. A pull-out quote set in bold-faced type opened the piece with the implication that the campaign, like space exploration, was a milestone of human progress: "I am going," a Moscow State University student declared, "to make history." See: Valeri Koher, "The Planet Called Virgin Land," *USSR*, August 1963, 49-51. For scholarly studies of the "Virgin Lands" program, see: Martin McCauley, *Khrushchev and the Development of Soviet Agriculture: The Virgin Lands Program 1953-1964*, (New York, NY: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1976); Richard M. Mills, "The Formation of the Virgin Lands Policy," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Mar., 1970), pp. 58-69; Frank A. Durgin, Jr., "The Virgin Lands Programme 1954-1960," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Jan., 1962), pp. 255-280.

⁶¹ As one detailed, the Moscow Planetarium, opened 30 years previous, received "about one million visitors" annually, who came "to hear well-known Soviet scientists lecture on the breakthrough into outer space" or view "16 displays tracing the history of cosmic exploration." "Stars Brought Nearer," *Soviet Life*, April 1969, 42. Another related how a portable version of the Moscow Planetarium's dome and projector was developed to meet the demands of "many regional towns [that] wanted their own planetariums." "Portable Planetarium," *Soviet Life*, June 1969, 21.

⁶² Scott W. Palmer, *Dictatorship of the Air: Aviation Culture and the Fate of Modern Russia*, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 6. The term "air-mindedness" was actually coined by Americans to describe their own enthusiasm for aviation. See: Joseph Corn, *The Winged Gospel: America's Romance with Aviation, 1900-1950*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1983), vii.

represented progress in aviation history, and proposed that a society exploring space was a society broadly interested in science:

We become physicists and biologists and examine the shoots of civilization.
... We peer through the porthole, like a scientist through his microscope,
and appraise man by his place in the Universe. We read our history over
once more.⁶³

Depicting Astronomy as Progress

Several articles on earth and space-based astronomy furthered the notion of Soviet progress in science.⁶⁴ Though not as prominent a theme as manned spaceflight or satellite launches, earth-based astronomy in the Soviet Union received fairly wide exposure in *Soviet Life*.⁶⁵ Like the other articles on space exploration, astronomy articles focused on progress in astronomical research, highlighting the “new” wherever possible.⁶⁶ Typically astronomy articles discussed how advances in

⁶³ “The Earth from Outer Space,” *Soviet Life*, August 1969, 10-11.

⁶⁴ Alexander Mikhailov, “The United Efforts of the World’s Astronomers,” *USSR*, December 1958, 16-17; “New Soviet Telescope,” *USSR*, May 1961, 50-51; Pyotr Dobronravin, “Window on the Universe,” *USSR*, June 1962, 32-35; Yuri Rybchinsky, “The Earth Listens to the Stars,” *USSR*, June 1963; Viktor Ambartsumyan, “Riddle of the Distant Galaxies,” *Soviet Life*, March 1964, 50-52; Vladimir Belousov and Boris Silkin, “Probing the Sun,” *Soviet Life*, July 1964, 28-29; “Pulkovo,” *Soviet Life*, March 1966, 62-65; “Double Star Probed,” *Soviet Life*, December 1967, 14; “Microtelescope,” *Soviet Life*, February 1968, 44; “Telescope in the Stratosphere,” *Soviet Life*, April 1968, 40; “Focus on the Red Giants,” *Soviet Life*, July 1968, 23; “Largest Telescope,” *Soviet Life*, August 1968, 52; Igor Tindo, “Lunokhod’s X-ray Telescope,” *Soviet Life*, February 1971, 20; “Discovery in Astronomy,” *Soviet Life*, June 1971, 20; “New Observatory,” *Soviet Life*, October 1971, 46; “Joint Research in Astronomy,” *Soviet Life*, December 1973, 61; “Space Astronomy, Interview with Grigor Gurzadian,” *Soviet Life*, September 1975, 16-17; “Mirror of the Universe,” *Soviet Life*, July 1976, 1.

⁶⁵ Reflecting the secondary status of the astronomy theme vis-à-vis spaceflight, astronomy articles often noted how this field of science “obviously has direct bearing on space flight and will have more as the science develops.”

⁶⁶ Examples included a “new telescope,” “new observatory,” “new theory,” “new data,” or “new way of exploring the universe.” See: “New Soviet Telescope,” 50-51; Dobronravin, “Window on the Universe,” 32-35; Rybchinsky, “The Earth Listens to the Stars”; “New Observatory,” 46.

astronomy had radically revised our ideas of the solar system and universe.⁶⁷ They also, like other space articles, strove to portray Soviet leadership in the field.⁶⁸

Large and frequent images of telescopes helped to illustrate the broad level of scientific and technological development in the Soviet Union by depicting the wide proliferation of scientific facilities and projecting powerful images of satellite dishes dotting the countryside.⁶⁹ Captions often highlighted how widespread these facilities were.⁷⁰ One article on the observatory at Pulkovo looked at the long history of that site to highlight the progress made there in recent years via Soviet support for astronomical research.⁷¹ It portrayed a broad base of scientific interest and knowledge among the Soviet populace and credited the Soviet government's support for science for fostering such science-mindedness.

Astronomy articles also reinforced the narrative suggesting that space exploration symbolized a high level of Soviet technological development by providing another opportunity to highlight the “phenomenal craftsmanship” of Soviet engineers and technicians.⁷² Progress in the construction of telescopes also

⁶⁷ “Reconstruction of the Planet,” *Soviet Life*, February 1971, 40-41.

⁶⁸ Ambartsumyan, “Riddle of the Distant Galaxies,” 50-52.

⁶⁹ Photographs of “giant radiotelescopes” often graced the magazine’s covers and pages with captions routinely noting these devices’ power to discern, as a two-page July 1967 image of the Crimea’s Astrophysics Observatory did, “the ping-pings, fainter than the whine of a far-off mosquito, that come from outer space.” Anatoli Garanin, “Capturing the Sun,” *Soviet Life*, July 1967, 26; “This Giant Radio Telescope Built Near Moscow Registers Even the Weakest Signals From Space,” *USSR*, September 1963, b.c.

⁷⁰ A photo accompanying a 1958 piece on Soviet IGY activities, for example, showed a “Radio telescope at one of the 600 IGY stations on Soviet territory.” Vladimir Belousov, “From Arctic to Antarctic,” *USSR*, August 1958, 46.

⁷¹ A photo of the highway leading to the observatory on the back cover of the edition drew attention to the feature article. “Founded in 1839,” it noted, Pulkovo “earned the title of astronomy capital of the world.” “In Soviet times” it continued, “the observatory’s area of research was much enlarged.” Soviet support of Pulkovo also “organized” the complex and “installed ... new instruments.” Captions to the accompanying photo essay emphasized the observatory’s role as a “major center for the training of researchers” noting: “Pulkovo scientists do not live in ivory astronomical towers. They serve as learned guides for visiting groups from Leningrad and other nearby cities and lecture to lay audiences.” “Pulkovo,” 14.

⁷² “New Soviet Telescope,” 50-51.

garnered special attention in routine reports on the Soviet telescopes that led the world in size or power.⁷³

Soviet Life typically announced the construction of these record-breaking devices ahead of time, a practice very different from that used to report space launches.⁷⁴ One such telescope, the BTA-6 Large Alt-azimuth Telescope at the Special Astrophysical Observatory of the Russian Academy of Science, did not see first light until late 1975, more than eight years after it was first celebrated in *Soviet Life*.⁷⁵ The telescope's immense size (it was the world's largest until Keck 1 was completed in 1993) did require many years of planning and construction. It is notable that Soviet propagandists did not have to wait to capitalize on the propaganda rewards of this engineering feat.⁷⁶ Soviet Earth-based telescopes thus provided a rich opportunity for showcasing Soviet technological progress in a number of areas.

Space-based telescopes provided another chance to highlight Soviet scientific progress, and to look into the future toward the promise of even more.⁷⁷ In the

⁷³ Soviet telescopes were often called the "largest ... in the world" or "yet built." Rybchinsky, "The Earth Listens to the Stars"; Ambartsumyan, "Riddle of the Distant Galaxies," 50-52; "Largest Telescope," 52.

⁷⁴ "Largest Telescope," 52

⁷⁵ B. K. Ioannisianni et al., "The Zelenchuk 6M telescope /BTA/ of the USSR Academy of Sciences," in , vol. 92, 1982, 3-10, <http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1982ASSL...92....3I>.

⁷⁶ Once BTA-6 was completed, the magazine again celebrated the arrival of the "world's largest telescope" emphasizing its size by calling it a "mirror of the universe" and "the world's biggest 'eye,'" while noting that sections of the structure each "could easily accommodate a small house." The technological achievement was not only due to the telescope's immense size, it also required the development of a "special glass composition" and temperatures in the manufacturing process had to be controlled "with an accuracy of a few hundredths of a degree." The glass surface of the 70 ton mirror had to be "polished down to several fractions of a micron," and a "vacuum distillation process" had to be "specially developed" to finish it with an aluminum film. Once completed, all of the telescope's movements would be computer-controlled. "Mirror of the Universe," 1.

⁷⁷ In a September 1975 interview, Grigor Gurzadian—Director of the Garni Laboratory of Space Astronomy in Armenia, and the chief designer of the Orion 1 and Orion 2 space observatories that operated in orbit aboard Salyut 1 in June 1971 and Soyuz 13 in December 1973 respectively—saw a promising "next few years" for space-based astronomy. Space-based telescopes became necessary, he noted, as Earth-based ones "reached the limit of engineering possibilities." He further emphasized the complexity of the "high-precision" technologies involved. "Space Astronomy, Interview with Grigor Gurzadian," 16-17.

tropes employed in *Soviet Life*—that the study of space required and reflected a high level of technological advancement and brought key advances in science; that Soviet support for science and technology made these advances possible and fostered a scientific and progressive Soviet identity; and that these processes laid the groundwork for scientific and technological leadership in the present and future—astronomy-themed articles thus paralleled and reinforced the overall narrative that advances in space exploration signified Soviet scientific and technological progress.

Depicting Soviet “Abundance”

Compared to its American counterpart, *Soviet Life* did not as explicitly use space-themed articles to portray material abundance in the Soviet Union. However, articles on the Third Party Program—which, as discussed earlier, routinely associated the Party’s goals with Soviet space achievements—often promised an “abundance” of “public wealth” as the Soviet Union moved closer to achieving communism.⁷⁸ What most differentiated *Soviet Life*’s discourse on abundance from *Amerika*’s was that Soviet material abundance remained mostly a promise for the future. While *Amerika* could regularly showcase American material affluence simply by photographing Americans enjoying their high standard of living and wealth of consumer items, *Soviet Life* could not. Instead, it championed the promise that the Party would soon greatly increase production of consumer goods.⁷⁹ By the 1970s it showed Soviet material abundance by showing visiting U.S. astronauts touring sites of Soviet industry or

⁷⁸ Predicting that the Soviet economy would “surpass the strongest richest capitalist country, the USA, in production per head of population” during the first decade of the new Program, *Soviet Life* foresaw the Soviet “people’s standard of living” would soon “rise substantially.”

⁷⁹ “Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: A Summary of the Draft,” *USSR*, September 1961, 1-5; Vasili Moskovsky, “Program for Building a Communist Society,” *USSR*, October 1961, 12-14; “Our Aims Are Clear, Our Paths Are Charted,” *USSR*, December 1961, 2-12.

enjoying official hospitality.⁸⁰ (See Figure 10-1 on page 317) But the relatively late emergence of such images suggests that *Soviet Life*'s use of them was a response to the frequent displays of affluence in *Amerika*.

Soviet Life often linked space accomplishments with improving industrial production.⁸¹ It only occasionally, however, used images from spaceflight to showcase the availability of consumer goods in Soviet society.⁸² A December 1975 article on the center set up to accommodate the international press corps in Moscow to cover ASTP, for instance, described some of the "Soyuz-Apollo" consumer items available there.⁸³ Such descriptions of Soviet consumer products, though rare, nonetheless indicated that Soviet technological progress had brought a degree of material affluence to Soviet society.

At times *Soviet Life* instead tried to distinguish Soviet materialism from its American counterpart.⁸⁴ Unable to provide concrete examples that the socialist

⁸⁰ "The Apollo Crew in Moscow," *Soviet Life*, April 1974, 6-9; "On an Earth Orbit of Friendship," *Soviet Life*, February 1976, 2-6

⁸¹ It frequently argued that since "economic progress" was "dependent upon ... scientific progress," growth in the Soviet economy would soon follow its scientific achievements. "Soviet Science Looks to the Future," 1-2. See also: Topchiev, "Earth Satellite: Link in Over-all Scientific and Technological Development," 10-14; "Communism is Coming Soon," 6-13; "Lodestar of Science, An Interview with Academician Nikolai Semenov, Nobel Prize Winner," 36-39; Boris Petrov, "Earth-Moon-Earth," *Soviet Life*, January 1971, 18-21; "Epoch's Image (1950-1970)," 54-56.

⁸² An April 1968 column on the USSR Exhibition of Economic Achievements in Moscow illustrated by a photo of a rocket in the Cosmos Pavilion emphasized that another new pavilion there would display "over 30,000 items" including "everything produced by Soviet industry for the consumer, from a needle to a color TV to a car." "From a Needle to a Car," 41.

⁸³ It described, for example, the "space cigarettes" that became the "most sought-after souvenir, even for nonsmokers"; the chocolates that "everyone ate"; the EPAS perfume (the Russian acronym for the mission) that was the "only" brand that women used; and "good old Russian vodka ... in colorful boxes with the omnipresent Soyuz-Apollo emblem." Makhotin, "Multinational Press Center," 22-23.

⁸⁴ A March 1972 article, for instance, quoted one Soviet engineer's views that "we're not building communism just to wallow in this abundance but to free man of material worries and concerns so that he will be able to devote himself fully to his spiritual interests." "The Future We See," *Soviet Life*, March 1972, 30-31. A "special section" in the November 1972 issue was "dedicated to Soviet workers, people who create material values but do not have the narrow materialist approach to life." One article in the same issue argued that many in the West were pessimistic about "mankind's future" because they "see the possibility for social progress wiped out by the growing preoccupation with the acquisition of possessions they see around them." The piece railed against the purchase of consumer goods on credit, and the "monopolies" that "make people think that the ultimate in living is to be able

economic system provided material abundance comparable to the U.S., or to show that the optimistic forecasts set out a decade earlier in the Third Party Program had been realized, *Soviet Life* further delayed the arrival of abundance, and focused on the freedom Soviet workers already allegedly enjoyed from the burdens of consumerism.

Depicting the “Founding Fathers” of Spaceflight

Far more often than *Amerika* did, *Soviet Life* routinely employed the myth of the “founding father” to further portray the Soviet system’s contribution to scientific and technological progress.⁸⁵ As Asif Siddiqi has observed, depictions of Konstantin Tsiolkovsky as the founding father of the Russian space program closely identified space exploration with Soviet national identity.⁸⁶ Many articles explicitly called Tsiolkovsky the “founder and father” of variously “spaceflight theory,” “rocketry,” or “cosmonautics.”⁸⁷ He was repeatedly credited as the originator of various aspects of Soviet progress in space: from liquid-fueled rockets and spacesuits to an orbiting

to consume more and more goods.” In a thinly veiled attack on American consumerism, the article argued that in a “bourgeois society” the “desire to own” had replaced the “desire to be.” In contrast, *Soviet Life* proclaimed socialist society to be “the perfect medium for developing the human personality.” “Progress Material and Spiritual,” *Soviet Life*, November 1972, 3.

⁸⁵ For an overview of early spaceflight theoreticians and rocketry studies, see: Matt Bille and Erika Lishock, *The First Space Race: Launching the World’s First Satellites* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2004), 5-25; T.A. Heppenheimer, *Countdown: A History of Space Flight* (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1997), 4-58; Peter A. Gorin, “Rising from the Cradle: Soviet Perceptions of Space Flight Before Sputnik,” in *Reconsidering Sputnik*, ed. Roger D. Launius, John M. Logsdon, and Robert W. Smith (London: Routledge, 2000), 11-42; Walter A. McDougall, *The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1985), 20-40, 74-96.

⁸⁶ Asif A. Siddiqi, “Spaceflight in the National Imagination,” in *Remembering the Space Age*, ed. Steven J. Dick (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2008), 19-21.

⁸⁷ He was “far indeed in advance of his time,” they said, and his work laid the “groundwork for interplanetary travel.” Although others before him had dreamed of space travel, Tsiolkovsky was the “first man of science” to theorize how it could be done, and “transformed cosmonautics from fiction into science.” See: “Why Space Research? Interview with Konstantin Feoktistov,” 41; Glasko, “Steps Into Space,” 22-23; “Academician Sergei P. Korolyov,” *Soviet Life*, September 1966, 30; Gagarin, “Man In Space,” 26-27.

space station—which he called a “flying cosmodrome”—that could launch manned interplanetary voyages from Earth orbit.⁸⁸

Soviet Life frequently noted Tsiolkovsky’s role in advancing scientific progress.⁸⁹ Space exploration, it claimed, had shifted the sciences toward a “cosmic point of view,” which was “changing our idea of the universe” at an “ever accelerating rate.”⁹⁰ It thus cast spaceflight as a powerful engine of scientific progress that Tsiolkovsky helped to identify with the Soviet Union. Although Tsiolkovsky was celebrated as the central and most important figure in the development of Russian space science, *Soviet Life* often pointed out others in the “galaxy of Russian scientists.”⁹¹ These other space “pioneers” never rivaled Tsiolkovsky’s stature as a founding father, however. In fact, the magazine often only listed their names to supplement features on Tsiolkovsky and served mostly to illustrate the breadth of Russian space science.⁹²

One August 1969 article associated the Soviet state with both social and scientific progress by casting the nineteenth-century Russian scientist and political activist Nikolai Kibalchich as a victim of pre-Revolutionary stasis in Russia. Like it did with Tsiolkovsky, *Soviet Life* emphasized how Kibalchich’s selfless “sacrifice” provided a “great service” to his “country and mankind.” His significant

⁸⁸ Calling the January 1969 orbital docking of spaceships Soyuz 4 and 5 a step toward constructing a “flying cosmodrome,” *Soviet Life* declared that the mission “put into practice the ideas and forecasts of the great Tsiolkovsky.” Ari Sternfeld, “Flying Cosmodrome,” *Soviet Life*, August 1969, 22-24.

⁸⁹ One article listing him alongside other “great scientists” noted Tsiolkovsky’s contributions to a “fundamental reshaping” of human knowledge. The others listed were: “Copernicus, Bruno, Galileo, Newton, Lomonosov, Lobachevsky, Humboldt, Mendeleyev, [and] Einstein.” “From Geocentrism to Heliocentrism,” *Soviet Life*, April 1971, 9-11.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ These included Mikhail Lomonosov, Alexander Chizhevsky, Vladimir Vernadsky, Nikolai Kibalchich, Alexander Fyodorov, Fridrikh Tsander and Yuri Kondratyuk.

⁹² “From Geocentrism to Heliocentrism,” 9-11; “Prelude to the Space Age,” *Soviet Life*, August 1969, 12-13.

contributions to rocketry went unacknowledged until after the 1917 Revolution.⁹³

Such a narrative reached into the Russian past to demonstrate how scientific progress was restrained by the Tsarist system, and liberated by the socialist state.

Tsiolkovsky's biography lent itself well to associating the Soviet state with progress. As one bold standfirst quoting Tsiolkovsky declared:

Before the Revolution my dream could not come true. It was the October Revolution that brought recognition to a self-taught man, it was Soviet power and the party that helped me do what I did.

The accompanying article argued that Tsiolkovsky's statement also applied to many other scientists and engineers whose work went unnoticed under Tsarism.⁹⁴

Soviet Life repeatedly quoted Tsiolkovsky to portray his selfless devotion to human progress.⁹⁵ Such a focus cast him as a symbol of the Soviet state's dedication to science and technology in a similarly altruistic way giving humanity "the knowledge and power to build a better and happier life on Earth." At the same time, the spaceflight pioneer's influence on international rocket designers illustrated the

⁹³ In 1881, he conceived of a rocket-powered device that, although rudimentary in its design, was later acknowledged by Tsiolkovsky and Von Braun as influential. With the Tsarist political system derailing his scientific pursuits, Kibalchich's work with the rebellious Narodnaya Volya (People's Will) Party left him "very little time for scientific exploration." "He dreamed," the magazine asserted, "of freeing man from social oppression and the eternal grip of the Earth. He was a revolutionary in both politics and science." Only when imprisoned and awaiting execution did the "scientist-revolutionary" find the "free time" to compose his "Aeronautic Instrument Project." Though this scientific text made Kibalchich "immortal," the piece pointed out, it fell on deaf ears in the Russian Empire. "Ten Days Before Execution," *Soviet Life*, August 1969, 14-15. Celebrating Gagarin's flight, Khrushchev had declared Kibalchich a "scientist-revolutionary ... who dreamed of rocket flight into space and whom the Tsarist government executed." See: Lee B. Croft, *Nikolai Ivanovich Kibalchich: Terrorist Rocket Pioneer* (IIHS (Institute for Issues in the History of Science) Biography Series #1, 2006), 7.

⁹⁴ In one such passage, he described his life's motivation was "to contribute to the progress of humanity even if only a little." His work on spaceflight had earned him "neither bread nor power," but he hoped it would one day "give the human race heaps of bread and great power." The magazine quoted none other than Yuri Gagarin to interpret Tsiolkovsky's remark. "Speaking of 'heaps of bread' and 'great power,'" the first cosmonaut explained, "Tsiolkovsky had in mind the effect that the exploration of space and interplanetary travel would have on science and technology." "Prelude to the Space Age," 12-13.

⁹⁵ Pisarzhevsky, "Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, Cosmic Trail Blazer," 3-5.

Soviet Union's global leadership in science and technology.⁹⁶ As *Soviet Life* pointed out, Tsiolkovsky had influenced seemingly every subsequent scientist and engineer concerned with spaceflight—from Robert Goddard to Hermann Oberth.⁹⁷ Although the magazine paid tribute to the contributions of other people from other nations when it celebrated the first Sputnik, it still emphasized the ways that this Russian pioneer led the field.⁹⁸

The hardships Tsiolkovsky endured under Tsarism provided Soviet propagandists with a rich narrative of personal “trauma” through which to accentuate the progressive Soviet state’s role in recognizing and nurturing his genius.⁹⁹ In *Soviet Life*’s portrayal of Tsiolkovsky, the narrative of “trauma” under Tsarism and “triumph” with assistance from the Soviet government strongly associated the Soviet state with scientific and technological progress.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ “Foreign publications,” it noted, had “acknowledged” Tsiolkovsky’s “pre-eminence as the theorist of astronautics,” for example. “From Dream to Cosmodrome,” *Soviet Life*, December 1967, 40.

⁹⁷ Tsiolkovsky even foresaw a key “principle behind rocket capsules like the one in the American Apollo project for landing on the Moon.” Ibid.

⁹⁸ In a visual nod to the founding fathers of both the US and Soviet space programs, for example, one full-page of the August 1969 Apollo commemorative issue showed oversize images of the Konstantin Tsiolkovsky medal awarded to Yuri Gagarin and the Robert Goddard medal awarded to Victor Sokolsky, the Soviet scientist and author of *Solid Fuel Rockets* in Russia. See: “In Honor of Outer Space Dreamers and Research Pioneers,” *Soviet Life*, August 1969, 9.

⁹⁹ Biographical sketches of him noted his “severe childhood illness” that robbed him of “much of his hearing” and forced “to leave school at the age of ten.” Persevering through his own strength of character, Tsiolkovsky “continued his studies at home,” and eventually taught mathematics and geometry at a “district school.” “Tsiolkovsky Centenary,” *USSR*, November 1957, 35. As a “self-educated man,” Tsiolkovsky was essentially overlooked by the Imperial Academy of Sciences, which “gave him one small grant, that was all.” Even though “his papers were rejected and his ideas dismissed” Tsiolkovsky was not discouraged and continued his work in “hardship and obscurity.” “It was a hard life,” *Soviet Life* described, “with privation a frequent guest.” “From Dream to Cosmodrome,” 40.

¹⁰⁰ Once the 1917 Revolution brought to power a political regime attentive to the importance of harnessing science and technology to drive progress, Tsiolkovsky “won recognition” and “sufficient funds and equipment” to not only “pursue his work wherever it might lead him,” but also to be relieved “from the cares of a livelihood.” Additionally, the Soviet government published Tsiolkovsky’s books “in large editions” and assigned “Soviet engineers” to realize his “daring technical projects.” Pissarzhevsky, “Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, Cosmic Trail Blazer,” 3-5; “Tsiolkovsky Centenary,” 35; “From Dream to Cosmodrome,” 40.

Soviet Life presented Tsiolkovsky's manuscript *Free Space* to suggest his stature approached that of a prophet, noting that he completed it on April 12, 1883, "exactly 78 years before" Gagarin's first human spaceflight. It repeatedly invoked Tsiolkovsky's depiction of Earth as a "cradle" that mankind "was tied to" to suggest that he had predicted the emergence of a new era in human history.¹⁰¹ Linked as he was to his government's support for science and technology, Tsiolkovsky's visions of the future allied with the forward thinking of the Soviet state. Frequent discussions of his predictions also allowed the magazine to suggest that human presence in outer space would greatly increase in the future.¹⁰²

As the Chief Designer at the Experimental Design Bureau No. 1 (OKB-1) from 1946 to 1966, Sergei Korolev was, according to Asif Siddiqi, "the founder of the Soviet space program."¹⁰³ Korolev received significant attention in *Soviet Life* but was never accorded the status of a founding father. Only after his January 14, 1966, death did *Soviet Life* acknowledge Korolev's role and his "direction" of the Soviet space program.¹⁰⁴ As it did with Tsiolkovsky, *Soviet Life* held Korolev in great regard and portrayed the Soviet people's admiration for his achievements.¹⁰⁵ It emphasized Korolev's influence of—and connection to—a broader community of scientists and

¹⁰¹ "Man and Outer Space: Introduction to the Special Issue," 1. In various articles, cosmonauts Gagarin, Feoktistov, Leonov all confirmed Tsiolkovsky's power of premonition, noting his "accurate" depictions of various aspects of spaceflight. See: "From Dream to Cosmodrome," 40; "Changing Ships in Orbit, Interview with Alexei Leonov," *Soviet Life*, April 1969, 48-49.

¹⁰² People would "gradually populate interplanetary space," he believed, as they learned to create "artificial biosphere[s]" and "artificial cities" in space. "What Awaits Man in Outer Space," *Soviet Life*, August 1969, 34-35. The "amazingly bold ideas" in Nikolai Fyodorov's *Philosophy of the Common Cause* received a similar treatment, though significantly less attention. Fyodorov's view that "Human activity should be scaled to the Universe," his dream that humanity would "sow the seeds of their work far beyond the confines of our planet," and even his most provocative vision that mankind could "learn to rejuvenate dying worlds," had all, according to *Soviet Life* struck "a responsive chord in modern scientists." See: Ekonomov, "Chief Rocket Engine Designer Interviewed," 48-49.

¹⁰³ Asif A. Siddiqi, *The Soviet Space Race with Apollo* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2003), 967.

¹⁰⁴ "Academician Sergei P. Korolyov," 30.

¹⁰⁵ "Academician Sergei P. Korolyov," 30.

engineers.¹⁰⁶ In spite of his immense role, however, the magazine's portrayal of Korolev never approached that of Tsiolkovsky, who remained the *sole* founding father of the Soviet space program.¹⁰⁷ Korolev's life story was never discussed, and his status as a founding father of the Soviet space program was a distant second to Tsiolkovsky's. Indeed, the latter was often portrayed as the key influence on Korolev.¹⁰⁸

Korolev's secondary stature in official propaganda was in part necessitated by Soviet secrecy over his identity as Chief Designer. His biography precluded Soviet propagandists from mythologizing him as a founding father of the Soviet space program. Before he became Chief Designer, Korolev had spent six years in the Soviet gulag.¹⁰⁹ Though Korolev, like Tsiolkovsky, had a rich history of personal

¹⁰⁶ Pyotr Astashenkov, "Academician Sergei Korolyov," *Soviet Life*, November 1972, 50-51. It gave him credit as one of the "sponsors" for the Group for Studying Jet-Propulsion (GIRD) established in 1933, which became "the forerunner of today's collective of space scientists and designers."

"Academician Sergei P. Korolyov," 30.

¹⁰⁷ Though it acknowledged Korolev was a "brilliant organizer," a "great scientist," and a "mentor" to many others in the Soviet space program, it did not reserve a place for him as a "founder" of the Soviet space program, merely someone "who contributed so much to the founding of practical cosmonautics." "Sergei Korolyov: Designer of Space Rockets," *Soviet Life*, August 1969, 21-22; Astashenkov, "Academician Sergei Korolyov," 50-51.

¹⁰⁸ In a discussion of a fictional film—*Taming the Fire*—whose "hero" was "modeled on" Korolev, for example, it suggested that he became "preoccupied" with spaceflight only after he met Tsiolkovsky personally. "A Film About Spaceship Builders," *Soviet Life*, April 1973, 44-46. The meeting between the two was called "the turning point in Korolyov's life," and he was consistently portrayed as one of Tsiolkovsky's finest students. Korolev, "was one of the few people who saw the feasibility of Tsiolkovsky's ideas," the story went, and "from that day on" he dedicated himself to rocketry and "devoted his life to its development and progress." "Academician Sergei P. Korolyov," 30.

¹⁰⁹ Siddiqi has observed that "[f]or those reconstructing narratives of national space programs, these traumas become metaphors for the uphill battles faced by the space programs themselves." Siddiqi, "Spaceflight in the National Imagination," 19-21. Korolev was arrested on June 27, 1938 and sent to work in the Tupolev Sharaga (OKB EKV GPU/NKVD (Special Construction Bureau, Economic Division GPU/NKVD) until officially released on July 27, 1944). See: Michael Parrish, *The Lesser Terror: Soviet State Security, 1939-1953* (Westport, CN: Praeger, 1996); James Harford, *Korolev: How One Man Masterminded the Soviet Drive to Beat America to the Moon* (New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, 1997).

trauma, his main antagonist had been the Stalinist Soviet state. As a result, *Soviet Life*'s treatments of his past were deliberately vague.¹¹⁰

It still employed a narrative of trauma, but strictly to describe Korolev's experiences as Chief Designer. He "had reason to worry," for example, for the safety of his cosmonauts who faced perilous journeys into space, or that necessary components were delivered to his technicians on time.¹¹¹ Although these (mild) trauma narratives always ended triumphantly with a successful mission, the emphasis on Korolev's concern for the cosmonauts' safety lent a human—and compassionate—face to the Soviet regime, while obscuring Korolev's troubled past.

Conclusion

Like *Amerika*, *Soviet Life* used scientific terminology, the motif of newness, and narratives of continuous improvement to link space exploration with scientific and technological "continuous precipitate motion" in the Soviet Union. Also similar to the American magazine, *Soviet Life* sought to use spaceflight to demonstrate Soviet global leadership of such progress. To this end, it portrayed a broad base of Soviet scientific and technological development, as well as the science-mindedness of the Soviet public. Taking a space advocacy position, it also portrayed space exploration providing a tremendous impetus to humankind's intellectual, social, and spiritual progress.

Unlike its American counterpart, *Soviet Life* was studiously vague about the science Soviet space missions actually performed. It put far less emphasis on

¹¹⁰ "Though his background was not especially different," a November 1972 feature on him began, "Sergei Korolyov is a unique, a legendary figure." Astashenkov, "Academician Sergei Korolyov," 50-51.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

portraying Soviet “abundance,” and even criticized the materialism of American society. It argued that Soviet “progress in stages” was superior to the American crash program to put men on the Moon. It made far more explicit ties between space exploration and “social progress” in the Soviet Union. It used a variety of strategies to associate space exploration with the Soviet state, including the “founding fathers” myth, which contrasted Soviet support for science and technology with that of Imperial Russia. Ultimately, it argued that the socialist system was superior for advancing scientific and technological progress.

7. “LIKE SEA CREATURES IN A TIDE POOL”:

The Past and the Future in *Amerika*

This chapter examines how *Amerika* used “big history” to advance its depiction of space exploration as an indicator and a promise of human progress.¹ The magazine routinely looked back to the murky origins of humanity, and to ancient and historical visions of the cosmos to depict space exploration—and in particular, the Apollo 11 lunar landing—as the realization of a longstanding human dream.² It used depictions of human evolution to suggest that mankind stood on the brink of a new era of space exploration, or, to follow the evolutionary metaphor often applied, on the shore of a new sea. This evolutionary “big history” perspective advocated in favor of continued exploration of space, as if human evolution depended on exploring the cosmos further.

Amerika also commonly portrayed space achievements as opening a new era or marking a turning point in history.³ To justify these claims, the magazine depicted an ambitious future for American exploration of space. Bold visions of American exploration of the Moon, Mars, and beyond filled the magazine’s pages especially in the post-Apollo 11 euphoria of the early 1970s. This chapter argues that the big history perspective and the routine portrayal of an ambitious future of American

¹ For insight into the relationship between “big history” and space exploration, see: Steven J. Dick, ed., *Remembering the Space Age* (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2008) p. x., especially J. R. McNeill, “Gigantic Follies? Human Exploration and the Space Age in Long-term Historical Perspective,” 3-16.

² For more on using evolution to justify space exploration see: Taylor E. Dark III, “Reclaiming the Future: Space Advocacy and the Idea of Progress,” in *Societal Impact of Spaceflight*, ed. Steven J. Dick and Roger D. Launius, The NASA history series; (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Office of External Relations, History Division, 2007), pp. 568-569.

³ On the use of historical “turning points” in spaceflight narratives see: Roger D. Launius, “What Are Turning Points in History, and What Were They for the Space Age?,” in *Societal Impact of Spaceflight*, ed. Steven J. Dick and Roger D. Launius, The NASA history series; (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Office of External Relations, History Division, 2007), 680.

space exploration went hand in hand. These narratives combined not only to advocate for continued exploration of the cosmos, but also to heighten the significance of achievements already won.

Depicting Space Exploration as a Turning Point in History

Amerika frequently depicted space exploration, and visiting the Moon in particular, as an ancient dream that has fascinated mankind since the beginning of human existence. A March 1971 article, for instance, described astronauts “floating” in space “like sea creatures in a tide pool.”⁴ Such a statement suggested that astronauts were furthering the evolution of humankind, as the first from our species to venture out of the “sea.” The rest of humanity, it implied, was destined to follow. Elsewhere, *Amerika* quoted Nixon who told the astronauts soon after they splashed down that their mission marked “the greatest week in the history of the world since Creation.” Though he expressed a biblical view of the Earth’s origins, he nonetheless suggested that the Moon landing eclipsed any historical event since the very dawn of the universe.⁵

Far more frequently, though, *Amerika* made relatively less audacious statements portraying mankind’s ageless interest in the Moon.⁶ It cited examples drawn from centuries of literature about space exploration to emphasize human fascination with reaching our nearest celestial neighbor.⁷ In one rather conspicuous

⁴ A.R. Sorrells, “The Great Promise of Zero-G,” *Amerika*, March 1971, 34.

⁵ John Noble Wilford and James T. Wooten, “To the Moon and Back (Excerpt From Apollo 11: On the Moon),” *Amerika*, April 1970, 2.

⁶ As one article put it: “Lovers, poets and astronomers have discussed the moon for centuries, yet we still have much to learn about it.” “Deciphering The Moon’s Secrets,” *Amerika*, April 1970, 52.

⁷ It surveyed, for example, mankind’s long-held dream “of soaring beyond the confines of his planet Earth,” beginning with the “age-old myth of Daedalus” and continuing with the second century Lucian of Samosata’s dream “of a voyage to the moon”; Johannes Kepler’s *Somnium*; Bishop

juxtaposition of images, *Amerika* displayed four photographs of American space exploration alongside images of centuries-old fictional fantasies about space exploration, and portraits of important astronomers and early rocketry pioneers.⁸ Compared with the artistic renderings of space exploration fantasies, the photographs appeared as ancient dreams made real.⁹ A heading that set the images apart from the article's main text underscored the point: "A Once Impossible Dream Comes True." The contrast between old and new, between fantasy and reality, cast American space achievements as the fulfillment of a timeless human desire, and the pinnacle of a long trajectory of scientific and technological progress.

Amerika commonly compared space missions to other great voyages of exploration in human history. Most often, it likened exploring space to Columbus' discovery of the "new world" and suggested that Apollo 11 "perhaps even surpasses" the 1492 contact as a historical turning point.¹⁰ These statements tied space exploration to mankind's long history of exploration and discovery—of which the United States was itself a powerful symbol. *Amerika* articles sometimes further borrowed colonial terminology to call the Moon a new "new world" in outer space that the U.S. had conquered.¹¹ The magazine thus cast the United States as an embodiment of progress—a New World nation discovering even newer worlds in space.

Godwin's *Man in the Moone*, and Cyrano de Bergerac's, *Voyages to the Moon and Sun*. It gave special attention to Jules Verne whose *From the Earth to the Moon* had inspired "scientists and engineers" to explore the Moon.

⁸ These included photographs of Ed White's space walk, Gemini 4, 1965; a Saturn V (for Apollo); the "spidery Lunar Module"; and Armstrong and Aldrin on the Moon's surface.

⁹ "The Wings of a Dream," *Amerika*, January 1970, 2.

¹⁰ "Deciphering The Moon's Secrets," 52. See also: Thomas O. Paine, "Next Steps in Space," *Amerika*, September 1970, 21.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

Amerika's depictions of future space travel heavily exploited the motif of the “frontier,” and often described exploiting and colonizing this new region. Even though Nixon, as he endorsed NASA’s new plan for the 1970s, used the idea of space as an endless frontier to rationalize restraining American ambitions in space, *Amerika* continued to use it to portray an aggressive American effort in space. As one February 1971 article quoted the President:

with the entire future and the universe before us – we should not try to do everything at once. Our approach to space must continue to be bold – but it must also be balanced.¹²

Amerika, however, emphasized the “bold” over the “balanced” when it visualized the United States’ future in space. It also singled out for repetition in other articles the most optimistic and forward-reaching part of Nixon’s statement: “We must build on the successes of the past, always reaching out for new achievements.”¹³ Indeed, a special section taking up much of that very issue of the magazine highlighted the American space program “reaching out” by portraying an ambitious American program of exploration and discovery, and a deepening American presence in space. As such, it portrayed American scientific and technological progress continuing and increasing in the future.¹⁴

¹² Jay Holmes, “The New Configuration,” *Amerika*, February 1971, 18. The full text of Nixon’s statement is available here: “Statement by President Nixon on the Space Program,” March 7, 1970, <http://www.history.nasa.gov/SP-4211/appen-j.htm>.

¹³ “Moon: Exploring the Mysteries of the Moon,” *Amerika*, February 1971, 32-35.

¹⁴ Paine, “Next Steps in Space,” 21.

Amerika's narratives of discovery depicted the human urge to explore as an essential ingredient to man's progress.¹⁵ Krafft Ehrlicke wrote, for example, about how:

since the beginning Man has placed his dreams and aspirations among the stars and his nightmares into caves whence he came.¹⁶

Space exploration represented no less than the pinnacle fulfillment of the very trait that propelled humanity forward from its cave-dwelling roots—its desire to live “among the stars.” Furthermore, *Amerika's* descriptions of the timeless quest for knowledge often linked space exploration with the dawn of “life itself.” It frequently suggested, for instance, that the answers to humanity's biggest questions were to be found via exploring space. It suggested that what differentiated modern man from his ancient forbears was his “conception of the universe,” which was largely shaped

¹⁵ Jay Holmes, for instance, compared the lunar surface to the “Rosetta Stone,” in that the Moon provided the “key to unlock ... age-old mysteries” and “even clues to the origin of life itself.” Jay Holmes, “Apollo 12: Why Go Back to the Moon?,” *Amerika*, May 1970, 46. Other articles similarly discussed how spaceships looked “for answers to secrets locked since the beginning of time.” See: “Space Station ’75,” *Amerika*, November 1970, 14. Elsewhere *Amerika* depicted the Apollo astronauts searching for “the key to the secret of the very birth of the solar system.” See: John Holway, “Odyssey to Fra Mauro (Apollo 14),” *Amerika*, July 1971, 2.

¹⁶ Ehrlicke, “Extraterrestrial Imperative,” 44. Krafft Arnold Ehrlicke had been a space enthusiast since childhood. A propulsion engineer at the V-2 Factory at Peenemünde during World War II, Ehrlicke was brought to the United States with other German rocket experts as part of Operation Paperclip. He worked at North American Aviation beginning in 1965, (which became Rockwell International in 1973). In 1971, Ehrlicke finished a book-length manuscript called “The Extraterrestrial Imperative: from Closed to Open World” but failed to find a publisher. Portions of the work appeared in various settings. In 1979, Ehrlicke founded Space Global, a consulting firm that advocated widely for the industrialization and colonization of outer space. John L. Sloop, *Liquid Hydrogen as a Propulsion Fuel, 1945-1959*. (Washington, DC: NASA, 1978), 192-195; Krafft A. Ehrlicke, *Space Flight* (Princeton NJ: Van Nostrand, 1960); “The Anthropology of Spaceflight,” in *The Coming of the Space Age: Famous Accounts of Man's Probing of the Universe*, ed. Arthur C. Clarke (New York, NY: Meredith Press, 1967); *Exploring the Planets* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1969); “The Extraterrestrial Imperative,” *Futures* 13, no. 2 (April 1981), 107–114; Marsh Freeman, *Krafft Ehrlicke's Extraterrestrial Imperative* (Burlington, ON: Apogee Books, 2009).

by exploring space.¹⁷ It thus gave space exploration a prominent role in the progress of scientific knowledge.

Amerika ultimately presented space exploration as a monumental turning point in human history, one that distinguished contemporary man from his predecessors.¹⁸ It contrasted different generations' reactions to Apollo 11, "that unforgettable moment" when "[t]hree centuries seemed to meet." Older generations found the lunar landing hard to believe, while younger generations seemed unsurprised.¹⁹ The shared experience of Apollo 11 united people born in different centuries.²⁰ It also underlined its depiction of Apollo 11 as the start of a new era by highlighting how the exploration—and colonizing—of the new frontier would be carried out by future generations.²¹ It thus cast space exploration as a driver of progress by affecting powerful psychological changes on those who witnessed it. Moreover, it portrayed the lunar landing, as an unmistakable instant when the past ended and the future began.

¹⁷ Franklyn Branley, for instance, contrasted modern conceptions of the universe with the beliefs of ancient astronomers. Accompanying images visually demonstrated how "differently ... the ancients saw the heavens." Franklin Branley, "Conceptions of the Universe," *Amerika*, March 1973, 37.

¹⁸ As one article predicted, "Historians will record the 1960s as man's greatest decade of exploration." "Space Station '75," 14.

¹⁹ "Grandparents," it commented, found the lunar landing "simply incredible" while children "were blasé." See: "Special Report: Man on the Moon," *Amerika*, November 1969, insert between pp. 28-29. This "quantum leap from fiction to fact," it argued, "was simply an expected event in man's progress." As seen elsewhere, it also cited generational differences in responses to the Moon landing to further its description of progress. While the "epochal landing" thrilled adults, for children born since Sputnik "the excitement is muted" because they had come to expect such things. "A New Frontier (Apollo 11 Moon Landing)," *Amerika*, April 1970, i.f.c.

²⁰ It was a "moment that each would remember the rest of his life, which in many cases would be far into the 21st century." Ibid.

²¹ The April 1970 article "A New Frontier" did so as it claimed that Apollo 11 represented the inevitability of progress. "A New Frontier (Apollo 11 Moon Landing)". See also: Paine, "Next Steps in Space," 21

Amerika thus emphasized Apollo 11 as a historical turning point without par, a “universally felt” moment that “forever” changed humanity.²² The Moon landing happened, one article claimed, “for the first time in the two-million-year history of mankind.”²³ Its suggestion that humanity had been waiting its entire existence for this milestone to be reached elevated the Moon landing’s significance above any other accomplishment in space, and indeed over any other event in history. *Amerika* also portrayed Apollo 11 with enough symbolic weight to make anything associated with it a great historical moment.²⁴ It thus strove to cast the lunar landing as the most significant marker of human progress, and to imply that putting a human on the Moon was the space race’s true finish line.

Amerika contributors also commonly described space exploration, and Apollo 11 in particular, as opening up a “new era” or a “new phase” in history.²⁵ This new era, *Amerika* suggested, would be marked not only by the discovery of new worlds, or the development of new technologies to use in new environments in space, it would also mark a turning point in mankind’s intellectual and spiritual progress. In his *New York Times* piece that was used to introduce the *Amerika* special edition on Apollo 11, poet Archibald MacLeish contemplated how the astronauts

²² Arthur C. Clarke, “Next - The Planets,” *Amerika*, November 1969, 33-37; “Space Station ’75,” 14; Wilford and Wooten, “To the Moon and Back (Excerpt From Apollo 11: On the Moon),” 2. One article quoted House Speaker John McCormack who called Apollo 11 a “turning point of paramount importance in the journey of mankind.” See: “Welcome Back! (Apollo 11),” *Amerika*, April 1970, 60.

²³ “Man’s Restless Voyage,” *Amerika*, January 1970.

²⁴ It frequently reported on Nixon’s telephone call from the oval office at the White House to the astronauts on the Moon’s surface during Apollo 11. During that conversation, after calling the lunar landing “one priceless moment in the history of man,” the President observed that it “certainly has to be the most historic telephone call ever made.” The first telephone call on Earth paled in comparison to the first one on the Moon. Wilford and Wooten, “To the Moon and Back (Excerpt From Apollo 11: On the Moon),” 2; “Special Report: Man on the Moon,” insert between pp. 28-29.

²⁵ Paine, “Next Steps in Space,” 21; Sorrells, “The Great Promise of Zero-G,” 34; Archibald MacLeish, “A Reflection,” *Amerika*, November 1969, 25; “Special Report: Man on the Moon,” Insert between pp. 28-29.

“may remake our image of mankind.”²⁶ Krafft Ehricke similarly suggested that space exploration would transform the inner world of humankind, as the “vantage point of the stars” replaced the “perspective of the mudhole.”²⁷ Such statements imbued space exploration with profound promise to transform the human experience, and suggested that the Moon landing was key to this transformation.

The overall portrayal of Apollo 11 as a historical turning point clearly favored a teleological view of history, and a firm belief in progress. Space exploration—portrayed as an ancient dream now realized—provided proof of this advancement. It also fit perfectly with the teleological narrative’s broader implication that science and technology had quickened the pace of human development. *Amerika* routinely declared that Apollo 11 provided dramatic proof of just such an accelerated tempo.²⁸ In so doing, it used the lunar landing to signify that the U.S. was—and would continue to be—the nation most rapidly advancing scientific and technological progress. Such statements typically amplified the significance of current space achievements by predicting that they marked only the beginning of the “dizzying pace” of forward movement.

²⁶ Man, he envisioned, would move beyond his penchant for war and would “at last become himself”—a peaceful being. *Amerika* Editor John Jacobs expressed his amazement at the technological triumph of Apollo 11 but resisted characterizing its impact merely in technological terms. “To the overwhelming majority of mankind,” he proposed, “the landing is first of all a triumph of man’s questing spirit, not his computers.” Macleish, “A Reflection,” 25. That same issue’s special insert observed that space exploration was “everywhere lifting man’s horizons and spirits [and] crossing the barriers that divide men on Earth.” “Special Report: Man on the Moon,” Insert between pp. 28-29. To Neil Armstrong, quoted in an April 1970 article, Apollo 11 represented “the beginning of a new era ... when man understands the universe around him, and ... when man understands himself.” “Welcome Back! (Apollo 11),” 60. Other observers similarly remarked that with Apollo 11: “Intellectually, man’s horizons have jumped leaps and bounds beyond the historical situation they’ve always been confined to.” Branley, “Conceptions of the Universe,” 32.

²⁷ Krafft A. Ehricke, “Extraterrestrial Imperative,” *Amerika*, March 1973, 44.

²⁸ The November 1969 Apollo 11 special insert looked back at the rapidity of advancement in the field of space exploration and declared: “Like the powerful Apollo’s rocket engines, time itself seemed to have accelerated to an unearthly dimension.” “Special Report: Man on the Moon,” insert between pp. 28-29. Elsewhere *Amerika* observed: “the world had moved forward at a dizzying pace, especially in the realms of science and technology.” See: “Man’s Restless Voyage.”

Another motif of progress routinely employed by *Amerika* was the frequent identification of space exploration in general, and the Apollo program especially, as a series of “steps” (often “giant steps”) in space.²⁹ The magazine’s use of the “giant step” motif swelled and crested with the wave of propaganda following the lunar landing. Apollo 11 brought the most significant exploitation of this metaphor, not least because of Armstrong’s famous statement that his foot on the lunar surface represented both “one small step for man” and “one giant leap for mankind.”³⁰ The equation cast Apollo 11 as a symbol of accelerating progress—that small steps had become giant leaps. *Amerika* customarily described Armstrong’s foot on the moon as “man’s first step onto another world,” or, in shortened form as simply the “first step.” It often portrayed the first step as a singular “magic moment” when time itself stopped and then started again.³¹ In these portrayals, what made the “small step” equal to a “giant leap” was that it precisely marked a turning point in human history and the beginning of a new era. The “first step” motif also suggested that there would be more steps to come. *Amerika* frequently entertained various predictions of the “next steps” in the future of space exploration, which were typically very bold and ambitious in outline.³² Applied to these bold predictions of the future of American space travel, the motif suggested that America’s future in space would continue apace with remarkable “steps” and “leaps.”

²⁹ “Saturn V Takes a Giant Step Toward the Moon,” *Amerika*, April 1968, 48-49; “Apollo 9: Giant Step In Space,” *Amerika*, August 1969, 2-7; Paine, “Next Steps in Space,” 21.

³⁰ “(Rung By Rung) Armstrong Descends to the Moon,” *Amerika*, April 1970.

³¹ The moment was, according to *Amerika*’s calculations, “never experienced before, never to be experienced again.” “Special Report: Man on the Moon,” insert between pp. 28-29.

³² Thomas Paine’s 1970 article “Next Steps In Space,” for example, used the “steps” metaphor to discuss American space plans post-Apollo. Paine, “Next Steps in Space,” 21.




Figure 7-1: America's ambitious future in space: Robert McCall's "Moon Base."

"Moon: Exploring the Mysteries of the Moon," *Amerika*, February, 1971, 34-35.

The introduction to the February 1971 special section suggested that, by the year 1989, humanity would venture far into the endless frontier of space.³³ A series of Robert McCall illustrations prepared in consultation with “NASA experts” provided powerful visuals for the special section’s depiction of “the next two decades of man’s foreseeable adventures into his universe.” (See Figures 7-1, 7-2, 7-3, 7-4)³⁴ They depict a rapid and vigorous program of American manned exploration of the Moon, the other planets of the solar system, and beyond. One, for example, showed multiple spacecraft and rovers supplying a lunar base (See Figure 7-1) Another showed multiple space shuttles queuing to rendezvous with a large space station in Earth orbit. (See Figure 7-2) Still others showed manned voyages to Mars.

³³ Man would by then explore, it predicted, the “outer reaches of the universe, once so alien to him but now within his intellectual and physical grasp.” “Introduction to Special Section,” *Amerika*, February 1971, 17.

³⁴ “Introduction to Special Section,” 17; “Moon: Exploring the Mysteries of the Moon,” 26-27, 30-31, 34-35.




Figure 7-2: Future progress in American space exploration: Robert McCall's "On Board the Orbiting Station."

Several articles in the early 1970s imagined an endless series of future giant leaps.³⁵ Although the first “reusable rocket plane” discussed by these articles—commonly known today as the space shuttle—would not be launched until April 12, 1981 (the twentieth anniversary of Gagarin’s historic flight), *Amerika* was able to write in 1971 about the future in terms that clearly associated the shuttle’s inaugural flight with American national identity:

It is hoped that the first flights can take place in 1976 – the 200th year of American independence.³⁶

In another ambitious projection, an Apollo 15 article in December 1971 foresaw that permanent human settlements on the Moon would soon be feasible. Observing that

³⁵ The United States, *Amerika* repeatedly suggested, would soon “explore other planets and the universe” with “reusable vehicles,” “nuclear rockets,” and permanent orbiting space stations. Paine, “Next Steps in Space,” 21; “Introduction to Special Section,” 17; Holmes, “The New Configuration,” 18.

³⁶ Holmes, “The New Configuration,” 18.

the “average man” was probably more excited about this possibility than all of the Apollo program’s much-touted science, the article unknowingly noted the propaganda value of such optimistic predictions of future space exploration.³⁷ At any rate, *Amerika*’s bold vision of space exploration augured that the United States would continue making rapid headway for some time.

Amerika’s routine predictions of an ambitious future in space for the United States elevated the significance of the milestones already accomplished, and were thus useful for increasing the impact of current space propaganda. Space achievements gave added weight to *Amerika*’s propaganda on other topics as well.³⁸ *Amerika* thus used the space theme, and especially Apollo 11, to signify American progress broadly defined.

Depicting the Benefits of Space Exploration

Numerous *Amerika* articles focused on the practical benefits of space exploration to highlight its potential for broadly improving conditions on Earth. Combining its celebrations of the benefits already accrued by space technologies with predictions of a future transformed by benefits from space, it commonly emphasized that such progress would continue indefinitely into the future.³⁹

In outlining a very broad spectrum of potential future benefits from space exploration, *Amerika* frequently associated them with American ideals. It often, for

³⁷ Arthur Pariente, “Apollo 15: Touchdown for Science,” *Amerika*, December 1971, 27.

³⁸ For example, a few months after the magazine described Apollo 8 as a “voyage into the future,” an entire issue looked forward to the year 2000 to address “Man’s restless voyage into the future.”

“Apollo 8: Now Man Has Circled the Moon,” *Amerika*, May 1969, 43-46. Though it did not focus exclusively on space exploration, it nonetheless used Apollo 11 to suggest a contemporary break with the past, and to introduce its speculations about scientific, technological, and social progress in the United States in the coming decades. “Man’s Restless Voyage.”

³⁹ Holmes, “The New Configuration,” 18; Paine, “Next Steps in Space,” 21.

instance, described improvements in global communications, which, it pointed out, could lead to “direct television and radio broadcasting to homes of all people in the world.”⁴⁰ Future progress would thus spread American openness, and—with the suggestion that the “homes of all people in the world” would one day have access to television and radio receivers—material abundance.

As James Haggerty—Editor of *The Aerospace Yearbook* from 1957 to 1970 and author of several books on space for juvenile audiences in the 1960s —similarly declared in the February 1971 issue, “the real payoff was about to begin.”⁴¹ Haggerty strongly underlined the “great promise” of space exploration to bring a plethora of “expected,” “potential,” “foreseeable,” and “possible” benefits. He highlighted improving the capabilities, and capacities of existing technological systems at reduced cost—as did other clairvoyants in *Amerika*. But he also foresaw a “rapid acceleration of technology transfer ... in the next few years” that promised a wide assortment of applications that would enormously benefit all of humanity. He described how satellites had already brought the future into the present. The improvements brought by communications satellites, he argued for example, indicated progress achieved.⁴² Citing a plentiful “harvest of benefits” to come from space exploration, he implied that American scientific and technological progress would continue indefinitely to transform mankind’s relationship with nature.⁴³ Others in similar fashion portrayed

⁴⁰ “Space Station ’75,” 14.

⁴¹ *The Aerospace Yearbook* was an official publication of the Aerospace Industries Association of America. James J. Haggerty, *Spacecraft* (New York, NY: Scholastic Book Services, 1962); *Man’s Conquest of Space* (New York, NY: Scholastic Book Services, 1966); *Apollo: Lunar Landing* (Chicago, IL: Rand MacNally, 1969).

⁴² Declaring that “even larger comsats” would “inevitably” come, he presciently foresaw today’s Internet when he predicted communications satellites “linking together widely separated computers and other data-processing equipment.”

⁴³ James J. Haggerty, “The Giant Harvest From Space – Today and Tomorrow,” *Amerika*, February 1971, 22.

the United States exploiting an impressive wealth of natural resources from outer space that would greatly eclipse those available on Earth.⁴⁴

As it described an impressive future bounty from space, *Amerika* routinely employed capitalist terminology and arguments to imply that the American system was best suited to bring about future scientific and technological progress. It routinely described, for example, how “investments” in space paid “dividends,” and depicted a market for commercial enterprises in space emerging to exploit space and distribute its benefits to people on Earth.⁴⁵ This market, it argued, would be the ideal system to “reap the benefits” of outer space.⁴⁶ It predicted that a space-based commercial market would bring technological and economic gains here on Earth while possible economies of scale would greatly magnify industrial output.⁴⁷

James Haggerty’s summary of derived space benefits paid particular attention to how they would spread through the capitalist economy, and contribute to economic growth.⁴⁸ Noting that American society increasingly used computers to

⁴⁴ Ehricke argued, for example, that space exploration would improve mankind’s management and exploitation of resources, but not only on Earth. He foresaw “a domain of many environments, each serving us to maximum advantage” and argued that the United States could use its “nuclear muscle” (including “nuclear explosives” and “nuclear fusion torches”) to “exploit minerals with an efficiency that would be prohibitive on Earth.” Ehricke, “Extraterrestrial Imperative,” 44.

⁴⁵ Holmes, “The New Configuration,” 18; “Space Station ’75,” 14; Haggerty, “The Giant Harvest From Space,” 22.

⁴⁶ “Space Station ’75,” 14.

⁴⁷ As A.R. Sorrells observed in a March 1971 article: “In space, a machine or a building could be built from 10,000 to 100,000 times larger (simply because deadweight is no consideration).” See: Sorrells, “The Great Promise of Zero-G,” 34.

⁴⁸ He imagined “Regional Dissemination Centers, operated by universities and research institutes” that would distribute information and technologies derived from space exploration to “fee-paying industrial clients.” Access to these benefits for a fee, he envisioned, would be “information gold mines to businessmen exploring new markets, looking for answers to operating problems, or simply seeking to keep their technical personnel abreast of developments in their fields.”

conduct business, he argued that space derived information and technologies would be especially beneficial there.⁴⁹

Depicting Manned Spaceflight as Essential

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, while *Soviet Life* insisted that unmanned probes were superior for exploring the Moon and the planets of the solar system, *Amerika* emphasized the opposite. Several years earlier, on August 18, 1958, a National Security Council report NSC 5814/1—a “Statement of Preliminary U.S. Policy on Outer Space”—offered several rationales for manned rather than unmanned exploration of the planets, including rejecting potential Soviet claims of extraterrestrial sovereignty, and utilizing human skill and decision making to better exploit space. The NSC also understood the prestige rationale for manned space exploration:

To the layman, manned exploration will represent the true conquest of outer space. No unmanned experiment can substitute for manned exploration in its psychological effect on the peoples of the world.⁵⁰

So while American policy makers recognized the usefulness of men aboard spacecraft, and reacted to the possibility of manned exploration by their Soviet adversary, they also considered manned space exploration would result in better propaganda.

⁴⁹ He noted, for example, how “in this age of the computer, more and more business firms are automating their operations for increased efficiency in everything from complex machining to simple accounting. . . . Space spinoff is helping industry to reach new levels of efficiency at low cost, by making available programs that can be adapted to a wide variety of business uses.” Haggerty, “The Giant Harvest From Space – Today and Tomorrow,” 22.

⁵⁰ “National Security Council Report,” August 18, 1958 (NSC 5814/1: Statement of Preliminary U.S. Policy on Outer Space), U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960*, vol. II, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 850 (hereafter FRUS followed by years and volume number).

In December 1959, NASA laid out a decadal plan that proposed manned lunar orbits during the 1960s, and a manned lunar landing after 1970. Such a program would contribute, not only to the progressive improvement of space science and technology but also to preserving American leadership in advancing that progress.⁵¹ The document suggested that manned missions were crucial to the propaganda prize of winning the space race since there was relatively little prestige to be gained from successful unmanned missions.⁵²

A joint report by NASA and the Department of Defense argued similarly in May 1961 that, “it is man, not merely machines in space, that captures the imagination of the world.”⁵³ That report came within weeks after Gagarin’s first manned spaceflight, as did Kennedy’s seminal May 25, 1961, speech before a Joint Session of Congress urging the United States to put a man on the Moon before the end of the 1960s. Kennedy observed how Gagarin’s flight “should have made clear to us all, as did the Sputnik in 1957, the impact of this adventure on the minds of men everywhere.”⁵⁴ The emphasis on a manned—as opposed to unmanned—lunar mission, was thus largely a recognition of the powerful propaganda benefits of space achievements, and a response to Soviet successes at exploiting the prestige value of manned spaceflight. *Amerika* followed suit and routinely emphasized the importance

⁵¹ NASA Office of Program Planning and Evaluation, “Long Range Plan of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration,” December 16, 1959, <http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/report59.html>.

⁵² Michael J. Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), 46; Robert Parkinson, *Citizens of the Sky* (Stotfold: 2100 Publishing, 1987), 13.

⁵³ Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 50; Jon Trux, *The Space Race* (London: New English Library, 1987), 30.

⁵⁴ “Special Message to the Congress on Urgent National Needs,” May 25, 1961, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/003POF03NationalNeeds05251961.htm>.

of human rather than robotic exploration of space.⁵⁵ While *Amerika* emphasized the vital role that astronauts played in exploring space, its far fewer articles on robotic missions also demonstrated the greater propaganda appeal of human spaceflight.

The Apollo program was the ultimate expression of the American space program's emphasis on manned spaceflight. After Apollo 11's successful completion, *Amerika* articulated grand visions of the future of manned American space missions. These raised the significance of the lunar landing by predicting it would pave the way toward more extensive and intensive manned space exploration. *Amerika* often portrayed Apollo 11 as the first step in wider exploration of the solar system with text and images suggesting that an ambitious American program of manned exploration of the planets would soon be underway.⁵⁶ One April 1970 article, for example, cited Nixon's prediction that "in the year 2000 we on this Earth will have visited new worlds where there will be new forms of life."⁵⁷ Such highly ambitious projections only accentuated the depiction of Apollo accelerating the rate of scientific and technological progress.

⁵⁵ A May 1962 article on John Glenn, for instance, argued that while unmanned satellites offered important information, images and meteorological data, "we cannot rely entirely on robotic satellites [and] machines cannot always replace the man." Jeff Stansbury, "John Glenn ... In Orbit," *Amerika*, May 1962, 2-7. A January 1971 article similarly quoted NASA's acting administrator George Low to argue that "man belongs in space" because "man can achieve objectives well beyond the capabilities of any machine that has yet been devised." Holway, "Odyssey to Fra Mauro (Apollo 14)," 2.

⁵⁶ An article by Arthur C. Clarke—reprinted from *Playboy*—in the November 1969 issue was typical in this regard. An illustration of the solar system accompanied Clarke's text, which looked back on the "smooth line of development" from aviation to spaceflight technologies. Continued "excellent progress," with space vehicles, he argued, would soon make interplanetary travel not only possible, but affordable, and therefore practical. Clarke's explicit preference for manned, rather than unmanned, exploration fit well with *Amerika's* overall coverage of space. Clarke, "Next - The Planets," 33-37.

⁵⁷ Wilford and Wooten, "To the Moon and Back (Excerpt From Apollo 11: On the Moon)," 2.

In certain of his key speeches as President, Nixon used space, and especially human exploration, as a symbol of American progress.⁵⁸ Like Nixon, *Amerika* argued that human exploration of space signified human progress in a way that robotic exploration did not. It depicted manned exploration of the Moon as the clear goal of the space race, a sort of finish line first crossed by the United States. Using the occasion of Apollo 11 to reflect on how this milestone was reached, *Amerika* charted all Soviet and American manned spaceflights with text and images graphically depicting the Moon as a finish line in the space race.⁵⁹

Amerika's frequent emphasis that the Moon landing was a national achievement further reinforced the idea of an American “victory” in an international competition in space. Its depictions of Apollo repetitively linked the Moon with cherished American symbols. Photography and texts routinely featured, for example,

⁵⁸ His 1969 inaugural address, for instance, spoke of Apollo 8 in terms that highlighted the human experience, both aboard the ship and among the many observers on Earth. He described that mission as both a demonstration of scientific and technological progress—a “moment of surpassing technological triumph”—and spiritual progress: “man's first sight of the world as God sees it.” The human eyes and voices in space invoking “God's blessing” for Earth were essential for investing the mission with its profound meaning and symbolism. Nixon further used Apollo 8 to urge Americans to “go forward, firm in our faith, steadfast in our purpose, cautious of the dangers, but sustained by our confidence in the will of God and the promise of man.” Richard Nixon, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (United States Government Printing Office, 1972), 3-4; “Richard Nixon: Inaugural Address,” n.d., <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=1941>; United States. Dept. of State, *FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972*, ed. Louis J. Smith and David H. Herschler (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003), 53-55. To a graduating class of an air force academy at Colorado Springs on June 4, 1969, Nixon called the “journey of the astronauts ... more than a technical achievement; it is a reaching-out of the human spirit.” Comparing the United States to great civilizations in history, such as “Golden Age” Greece and Renaissance Italy, he proposed that “a resurgence of American idealism can bring about a modern miracle, and that modern miracle is a world order of peace and justice.” Apollo 11 would demonstrate, he predicted, how “every man achieves his own greatness by reaching out beyond himself, and so it is with nations.” United States. Dept. of State, *FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972*, 86-88.

⁵⁹ “Pioneers Together – Astronauts and Cosmonauts (Chart of Space Achievements of US and USSR),” *Amerika Illustrated*, November 1969, 30-31. See also: “A Calendar of Space Flight: Man's Countdown For the Moon (U.S. & U.S.S.R. Missions),” *Amerika Illustrated*, April 1970, 44-52.

the American flag erected on the Moon.⁶⁰ It also often compared the lunar surface to American terrain, such as “the high desert of the United States.”⁶¹

One article emphasized the American ‘victory’ over its Soviet competitor by portraying cosmonauts Georgi Beregovoi and Konstantin Feoktistov—who visited the United States in October 1969—like mere spectators to the American conquest of the Moon. It described how the cosmonauts were most fascinated by taking an “imaginary trip to the moon” in the simulators that American astronauts used to prepare for the lunar voyage. Emphasizing the cosmonauts’ child-like fascination with the simulation—during which Beregovoi burst into excited Russian and even added, ‘Oh boy! Oh boy!’ in English”—the article portrayed them as junior partners in space exploration. It essentially depicted them as any other tourists, enthralled with the Moon landing, but kept at a distance as they “peered ... through microscopes” at a sample of lunar soil.⁶² Its emphasis on Apollo 11 as the beginning of a “new era,” however, indicated that the race was not over. American leadership in accelerating human progress would continue indefinitely into the future. To underscore the American space program’s contribution to scientific progress, and to suggest that it would continue to remain at the forefront of this trend, *Amerika* gave special attention to portraying the next generation of space exploration.

Several articles predicting the United States would undertake human expeditions to Mars in the early 1980s portrayed a high level of American technological advancement already achieved and prefigured a quickening of its

⁶⁰ “Special Report: Man on the Moon,” Insert between pp. 28-29; “On the Moon (Apollo 11),” *Amerika Illustrated*, April 1970, 16-39; Wilford and Wooten, “To the Moon and Back,” 2-8.

⁶¹ Wilford and Wooten, “To the Moon and Back,” 2-8.

⁶² “Here Come the Cosmonauts! (’69 U.S. Visit of Beregovoi & Feoktistov),” *Amerika Illustrated*, March 1970, 48.

technical growth. Paine suggested, for example, that October 1983 would provide an ideal opportunity to embark on a voyage to Mars. Though Paine admitted that the envisioned trip to Mars, was entirely hypothetical, he nonetheless gave it a date, firing up the imaginations of both Soviet and American readers (in the U.S. the article was published in December 1969's *National Geographic*).⁶³ Several images in the February 1971 issue illustrated a proposed "Mars Landing Mission: 1981-1983." One showed a view from Earth orbit as two "nuclear-powered spaceships" leave for Mars. The caption noted that members of the press from "all nations of the Earth" would be aboard a space station to witness the historic departure. Another illustration showed two very large Apollo-type landers, and a rover vehicle on the Martian surface with a large rocket orbiting in the background.⁶⁴ These articles and images further suggested that the human expedition to Mars would be followed by similar voyages to "other planets."⁶⁵

Such ambitious forecasts clearly envisioned an acceleration of American scientific and technological progress and cast Apollo 11 as the opening salvo of a remarkable new era of human exploration of the solar system. They thus showed *Amerika* trying to extend the excitement generated by Apollo 11 into an imagined

⁶³ Paine, "Next Steps in Space," 21. Jay Holmes' article in the same issue provided very specific dates for such a manned mission to Mars. It "might be launched from Earth orbit on November 12, 1981," he predicted, and would return to "Earth orbit on August 14, 1983." Holmes even more ambitiously imagined a "swing past Venus on the flight back from Mars" where "automated probes ... might drop to the surface, [and] obtain samples of Venus" before returning to Earth. Upping the ante even further, he proposed that advancements in space craft could make it "possible to carry anyone in good health: Thus the expedition to Mars may well include some of the principal scientific authorities on that planet." Holmes, "The New Configuration," 18.

⁶⁴ "Mars: Sixty-Four Million Kilometers to the Red Planet," *Amerika*, February 1971, 36-39.

⁶⁵ "Mars: Sixty-Four Million Kilometers to the Red Planet," 36-39; Holmes, "The New Configuration," 18. In the meantime, while human voyages to other planets remained a prospect for the future, *Amerika* celebrated unmanned American probes to the planets. Reaching Mars with the unmanned Mariner VI and VII flyby missions, it claimed, represented milestones "of almost equal importance" to the Moon landing. *Amerika* looked forward to landing a craft on the Martian surface, "an event planned for 1973." "Rendezvous with the Red Planet: Mariners Capture Close-Ups of Mars," *Amerika*, December 1969, 38-39.

future, where further historic manned American missions would continue to capture the attention of all humanity.

Amerika's early 1970s coverage of orbiting space stations similarly demonstrated the American space program's ambitious designs for future progress.⁶⁶ It emphasized how such stations would not only greatly advance scientific research, but would also serve as platforms for "deep-space ventures."⁶⁷ Often, the magazine described these stations outright as space "laboratories." As such, they would mark a transition in the development of spaceflight from an emphasis on astronauts to one on scientists. They would also signal an advancement of scientific progress "roughly comparable" to Galileo's first telescope or Pasteur's first microscope. Unleashing the readers' imaginations to ponder the "incalculable" benefits of such stations, *Amerika* proposed that their greatest contributions to human progress were as yet inconceivable, and would "come from the unexpected." They would also "undoubtedly" push science and technology forward to "harrow fresh fields," and forge "new 'fallout' and 'spinoff' frontiers in dozens of areas ... [j]ust as Apollo had forged."⁶⁸

An American orbiting space station would also lead to a greatly expanded permanent human presence in space.⁶⁹ Some even foresaw space stations leading to "large space cities," as well as "giant factories and food-producing facilities" that would service the mining of extraterrestrial raw materials. Such developments,

⁶⁶ Paine, "Next Steps in Space," 21; "Space Station '75," 14; Holmes, "The New Configuration," 18; "Earth: Living and Working in Space," *Amerika*, February 1971, 25-31; Sorrells, "The Great Promise of Zero-G," 34; Ehrlicke, "Extraterrestrial Imperative," 44.

⁶⁷ Paine, "Next Steps in Space," 21.

⁶⁸ "Space Station '75," 14.

⁶⁹ "By the 1980s," one article predicted, it would become "a beacon, a way station for space travelers." "Space Station '75," 14.



Figure 7-3: Future progress in American space exploration: Robert McCall's "Skylab: Heavenly Laboratory."

"Earth: Living and Working In Space," *Amerika*, February 1971, 26-27.

Amerika underscored, would transform humanity.⁷⁰ Through such far-reaching predictions *Amerika* presented the American space program remaining at the forefront of scientific progress for the foreseeable future.

The February 1971 issue's "Earth: Living and Working in Space" provided a graphic illustration of the proposed first American orbiting space station, which now had a name emphasizing its potential contribution to scientific progress—Skylab. Many large full-color illustrations and captions highlighted Skylab's scientific program as they visualized the space station under assembly in orbit. (See Figures 7-2 and 7-3) Some focused on the prototype shuttle, seen transporting Skylab components into orbit. Suggesting that American progress in space would continue indefinitely, one caption predicted that to "future generations" even the space shuttle

⁷⁰ They would lead, for example, to "new cultural cells of mankind" developing that would increase "the plurality of human civilization." Ehrlicke, "Extraterrestrial Imperative," 44.

would “no doubt seem as primitive as airliners of the 1930s seem to us today.” These portrayed a dramatically increased human presence in space. One image showed many astronauts onboard and floating outside the station while several shuttles queued up to rendezvous with it.⁷¹ (See Figure 7-2)

Another McCall illustration depicted the station with the caption “Heavenly Laboratory”—a literal translation into Russian of “Skylab.” (See Figure 7-3) It showed the American space station in Earth orbit at an angle accentuating its size while two Apollo-type capsules and two space-walking astronauts busied themselves nearby. Such images of spaceflight’s future allowed *Amerika* to capitalize on the interest in space Apollo 11 generated to suggest American leadership in space would be long lasting. They also presented an ambitious vision of how America’s space program would proceed and envisioned a fast pace of development toward intensive use of space. The degree and speed of progress in space were imagined to be far greater than they turned out to be in reality.

At the time though, the shuttle was still only in the planning stages. *Amerika*’s depictions of the prospective space shuttle and space station—based as they were on actual designs under consideration by NASA—thus demonstrated both the openness of the American system and the breadth of the scientific and technological base in the United States.⁷²

Amerika portrayed such bold visions of future progress as essential to the identity of modern Western civilization. To Krafft Ehricke, human “[c]onfidence in a

⁷¹ “Earth: Living and Working in Space,” 25-31.

⁷² One image specifically showed competing designs submitted by McDonnell Douglas Corporation, Martin-Marietta Corporation, Grumman Corporation, as well as five other designs considered by NASA. Another image showed North American Rockwell’s ideas for a scientific research area aboard Skylab. “Earth: Living and Working in Space,” 25-31.

soaring future” had provided the critical “drive” and “spirit” for human progress since the Renaissance. He proclaimed:

And nowhere are the roots of the Renaissance spirit more deeply imbedded than in history’s boldest social achievement, the United States of America.⁷³

Such commentary demonstrated how *Amerika* envisioned an ambitious future for the United States in space in order to cast the nation as the global leader in advancing human progress.

Space Advocacy

Historians Linda Billings and Taylor E. Dark III have shown how such extensive and utopian visions of a future human presence in space were common themes among space advocates.⁷⁴ *Amerika*’s depictions of the United State’s future in space especially advocated for continued aggressive exploration of space. In so doing, the magazine shared many of the rationales for space exploration identified by Dark. These included an emphasis on the evolutionary necessity of space travel; an insistence that only a narrow window existed for mankind to step away from the Earth; and an absolute faith that such a move into space would be good for humanity. Such a distant gaze into the future gave currently planned space activities a grand and dramatic purpose, suggesting that they represented a turning point toward this bright and better future when human mastery over nature would be nearly

⁷³ “Confidence in a soaring future – spiritually as well as materially –,” he wrote, “is the essence of our techno-scientific civilization and Western Man’s greatest message to mankind.” Ehricke, “Extraterrestrial Imperative,” 44.

⁷⁴ Billings, “Overview: Ideology, Advocacy, and Spaceflight: Evolution of a Cultural Narrative”; Dark III, “Reclaiming the Future: Space Advocacy and the Idea of Progress.”

complete. It also characteristically viewed all technologies as beneficial to human development.⁷⁵

Amerika borrowed many of the rhetorical strategies that space advocates used to promote space exploration, including their emphasis on the benefits that space exploration provided, and their suggestion that these benefits could only be fully realized by further exploration. Haggerty explicitly acknowledged and agreed with who he called “space enthusiasts,” though he suggested the benefits they foresaw would come sooner than they predicted.⁷⁶ Ehricke routinely justified exploring space because it would “prove a boon to man,” and described exploring space as a necessity, since “Man has needs that will outgrow his planet in time.” Indeed, humanity had “no effective alternative but to plan for a world in which Earth and space are indivisible.”⁷⁷ Elsewhere A.R. Sorrells cited many comments made by experts who shared his enthusiasm for future technological progress. Such remarks implied that progress was inevitable, and that future progress was made necessary by progress already taking place.⁷⁸

Numerous *Amerika* articles portrayed space exploration having a profoundly transformative effect on Earth’s industries and economies. Many authors, for example, predicted moving industries into space, and provided several rationales for doing so, including lessening industrial damage to Earth’s environment and meeting the Earth’s energy needs with space-based solar and nuclear energy producing

⁷⁵ Sorrells, “The Great Promise of Zero-G,” 34.

⁷⁶ Haggerty, “The Giant Harvest From Space – Today and Tomorrow,” 22.

⁷⁷ Producing electricity in space, he argued, would help ensure human survival in the distant future. Ehricke, “Extraterrestrial Imperative,” 44.

⁷⁸ “Now is the time to exploit this new environment,” North American Rockwell Corporation’s Senior Vice-President Ralph Ruud argued, “because it is going to have a far-reaching impact on the industrial and economic strength of our society.” “Strange as it may seem,” Sorrells observed, “the Earth is getting too small for some processing which we may want to do some day.” Sorrells, “The Great Promise of Zero-G,” 34.

facilities.⁷⁹ Ehricke and others saw “a new era in manufacturing technology” based on the “unprecedented” possibilities afforded by zero gravity conditions in space. Several commentators underscored how zero gravity “space factories” would produce abundant new technologies, products, and processes that would lead to much faster and cheaper production.⁸⁰ Such commentary from several notable American experts on how space would transform industry, further demonstrated the




Figure 7-4: Future progress in American space exploration: A Robert McCall illustration depicting an American space station and other spacecraft in Earth orbit.

Krafft A. Ehricke, "Extraterrestrial Imperative," *Amerika*, March 1973, 46-47.

⁷⁹ Ehricke, "Extraterrestrial Imperative," 44.

⁸⁰ The prospects of manufacturing in zero-gravity “space factories” would affect “[a]lmost anything you can think of on Earth,” would have “unique advantages,” would make “unique products,” and would allow humanity “to do things better than we do them now.” According to Hans Wuenscher, assistant director of advanced projects at NASA’s Manufacturing Engineering Laboratory, there were “a great many things that can be done in space that cannot be done on Earth.” Items produced in space “would last 10 times longer” than those made on Earth. As Dr. Mathias Siebel the Director of NASA’s Manufacturing Engineering Laboratory explained, vaccines would grow “more than twice as fast as here on Earth.” Certain processes would also be performed much more cheaply in orbit. *Amerika* even looked toward an “Age of the Biological Machine” when machines could be grown “out of materials in the liquid state, molecule by molecule like nature does in producing men or insects or maple trees.” See: Ehricke, “Extraterrestrial Imperative,” 44; “Space Station ’75,” 14; Sorrells, “The Great Promise of Zero-G,” 34.

breadth of American scientific and technological progress.

A two-page Robert McCall illustration accompanying Ehricke's piece vividly portrayed a bold vision of future American industries in space, showing a large and complex orbiting space station serviced by several other vehicles including shuttle-type spacecraft. (See Figure 7-4) American astronauts in small spacecraft with robotic arms performing maintenance on an enormous solar array dominated a large area of the scene. *Amerika's* depiction of future space-based industries improving the efficiency and sustainability of meeting mankind's energy needs thus showed space exploration significantly contributing to human progress on a broad scale. American progress in space, it argued, would be very intensive, driven by commercial interests, and best supported by the capitalist system.

Conclusion

It is striking that an official publication of the United States government would advocate such a bold (and costly) vision. *Amerika* likely supported this position for a propaganda rationale. If mankind did not embark on a continuous and ambitious program of space exploration, the significance of Apollo 11 and other American space achievements would diminish over time. Casting American space exploration as steps towards a bold future in space both magnified the importance of American space achievements, and, in the same stroke, increased the impact of propaganda narratives about space. *Amerika's* repetitive use of a "big history" perspective to depict space exploration as the arrival of a new era combined with its fantastic visions of an ambitious American future in space to portray the country at the

forefront of humankind's scientific and technological progress. In this way, *Amerika* assured its readers that the United States' small steps in space were really giant leaps.

8. “THE BOLDEST INHABITANTS OF THE SEA”:

The Past and the Future in *Soviet Life* Space Propaganda

This chapter examines how, like *Amerika*, *Soviet Life* used “big history” to justify space exploration, often suggesting that it fulfilled a primordial human aspiration. Routinely depicting Soviet space achievements as the beginning of a “new era” it also used evolution to argue that space exploration signified a “turning point” in history toward a future of ambitious exploration of the cosmos. Like *Amerika*, it also articulated a bold vision of future exploration of the Moon, Mars, and beyond. It exhibited strong faith that exploration of space provided immense benefits to humanity.

Unlike its American counterpart, *Soviet Life* associated space exploration with the Soviet state to offer Soviet space exploration as proof that the bold vision of communism would soon be realized in the future. Its illustrated depictions of the future of Soviet space exploration were also far more stylized than *Amerika*’s, a fact that this chapter argues reflected Soviet secrecy.¹ *Soviet Life* also contended that its “multipurpose” space exploration was superior to the American approach. As the United States pressed ahead of the Soviet Union with its plans to send a manned expedition to the Moon with the Apollo program, *Soviet Life* increasingly emphasized that unmanned probes were superior indicators of technological progress, because

¹ For visions of the Soviet space program’s future see: “Spaceships Today and Tomorrow, An Interview with Konstantin Feoktistov,” *Soviet Life*, August 1968, 22-23; Igor Duel, “A Million Sputniks By 1990,” *Soviet Life*, December 1968, 54; Anatoli Andanov and Gennadi Maximov, “Space Stations of the Future,” *Soviet Life*, August 1969, 24-26; Sergei Petrov, “Space Travel. Its Present and Future,” *Soviet Life*, October 1970, 14; “Soviet Space Exploration: Results and Prospects,” *Soviet Life*, October 1974, 20-21; “Roads to the Stars by Dmitri Yankov was one of the entries in the ‘World in 2000’ art contest,” *Soviet Life*, April 1975, f.c.; Dmitri Bilenkin, “The Inevitability of Outer Space,” *Soviet Life*, April 1976, 6-8; Sergei Sokolov, “Exploring the Planets,” *Soviet Life*, July 1976, 22-23.

they obtained scientific results with fewer costs and risks.² This chapter argues that *Soviet Life*'s repeated evocation of "big history" and depiction of intensive and extensive future Soviet space exploration associated the Soviet Union with progress and suggested that the socialist system was ideal for advancing human evolution.

Depicting Space Exploration as a Turning Point in History

There were many striking similarities between the two magazines' treatments of space exploration. *Soviet Life* routinely referred to Soviet space exploration commencing a "new era" in history, a "Space Age" that began with the launch of the first Sputnik on October 4, 1957.³ Subsequent spaceflights elicited similar claims that monumental historical milestones had been reached.⁴ As with *Amerika*, such rhetoric proclaiming the arrival of a new era often claimed man's entry into space was a "turning point in history."⁵ *Soviet Life* also paralleled *Amerika* by often comparing

² Many American (and other) scientists have similarly contended that robotic spaceflight produces better results more cheaply and safely. For space historians' views on the debate between proponents of human v. robotic spaceflight, see: Howard E. McCurdy, "Observations on the Robotic Versus Human Issue in Spaceflight," in *Critical Issues in the History of Spaceflight*, ed. Steven J. Dick and Roger D. Launius, (Washington, DC: NASA, 2006), 77-106; Slava Gerovitch, "Human-Machine Issues in the Soviet Space Program," in *Ibid.*, 107-140; and David A. Mindell, "Human and Machine in the History of Spaceflight," in *Ibid.*, 141-162. For an extended critique of human spaceflight as "an exercise in theater," see T.A. Heppenheimer, *Countdown: A History of Space Flight* (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1997).

³ Already in late 1957, in its first articles covering Soviet space exploration, the magazine described the first Sputniks initiating an "age of cosmic exploration." "Sputniks Underscore Man's Scientific Progress," *USSR*, December 1957, 1-2. See also: "Sputniks and Space Ships," *USSR*, April 1958, 17-19; Anatoli Glasko, "Steps Into Space," *USSR*, April 1962, 22-23; Yuri Melvil, "Man in the Space Age," *Soviet Life*, May 1966, 48-49; Lev Ekonomov, "Chief Rocket Engine Designer Interviewed," *Soviet Life*, August 1969, 48-49; Leonid Sedov, "Man on the Moon," *Soviet Life*, September 1969, 11.

⁴ Gagarin's first human spaceflight, for instance, was called "the greatest feat in history," and an "immortal exploit" that would "will live through the ages as mankind's greatest achievement." Comparing Gagarin to Christopher Columbus, Khrushchev declared—and *Soviet Life* reported—that the cosmonaut's "name will be immortal in the history of mankind." "A Day to Remember," *USSR*, May 1961, 2-3.

⁵ Pyotr Astashenkov, "Academician Sergei Korlyov," *Soviet Life*, November 1972, 50-51; Ari Sternfeld, "Flying Cosmodrome," *Soviet Life*, August 1969, 22-24.

space exploration to milestones in human evolution.⁶ It likened space exploration to the time:

when man had not yet evolved, the boldest inhabitants of the sea ventured onto dry land to broaden their environment.

Claiming that those who retreated into the ocean became dolphins, while those who remained on land “evolved” into people, the magazine argued that exploring space fulfilled a primordial human instinct for progress.⁷ Rhetorically aligning its space narratives with its accounts of Soviet nationhood, *Soviet Life* routinely described such turning points in human evolution as “revolutionary.”⁸

Also like *Amerika*, *Soviet Life* frequently portrayed spaceflight as the fulfillment of an age-old desire on the part of humankind, a “centuries-old dream.”⁹ Such assertions crediting the Soviet Union with realizing an ancient dream suggested that Soviet science and technology were at the forefront of human progress. Elsewhere, *Soviet Life*, used space exploration to demonstrate how the advanced rate of development in the Soviet Union seemed to even accelerate time.¹⁰ The rapid pace of growth, the magazine asserted, was due to the Soviet Union’s socialist system. To

⁶ “Man and Outer Space: Introduction to the Special Issue,” *Soviet Life*, August 1969, 1. A January 1969 article, for example, discussed “the evolutionary scheme in larger scale,” and depicted mankind reaching several evolutionary “stages” in a “ladder of cosmic evolution.” Gustav Naan, “Does a Dialogue with Space Spell Danger to Us?,” *Soviet Life*, January 1969, 40-41.

⁷ Ekonomov, “Chief Rocket Engine Designer Interviewed,” 48-49.

⁸ “Man and Outer Space: Introduction to the Special Issue,” 1. Exploration of the cosmos, for instance, had “literally revolutionized many branches of knowledge,” and brought a “fundamental reconstruction of views.” “Soviet Space Exploration: Results and Prospects,” 20-21.

⁹ Or as Khrushchev declared, the “most daring of all daring aspirations of man.” See: “Man and Outer Space: Introduction to the Special Issue,” 1; “Sputniks Underscore Man’s Scientific Progress,” 1-2; “A Day to Remember,” 2-3; “Tsiolkovsky Centenary,” *USSR*, November 1957, 35; Petrov, “Space Travel. Its Present and Future,” 14.

¹⁰ Previously, for instance, Tsiolkovsky thought that “many more centuries of work” were necessary to realize his dreams: “But time has shrunk.” Oleg Pissarzhevsky, “Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, Cosmic Trail Blazer,” *USSR*, December 1957, 3-5. Gagarin did “what he could to turning the future into the present,” because: “He wanted to speed up history.” Yaroslav Golovanov, “He Wanted to Speed Up History,” *Soviet Life*, July 1968, 28-29.

make this point, it frequently contrasted Soviet support for science and technology with the alleged lack of such support in pre-Bolshevik Russia, examples of which were discussed in Chapter 6. *Soviet Life* portrayed spaceflight—more than any other field—as symbolizing the progressive development of the society that achieved it, and it used Soviet successes in space to suggest the rapid pace of development of Soviet science and technology.

Alongside the depiction of spaceflight inaugurating a new era, fulfilling an ancient human dream, and accelerating progress, were frequent glances into the future and assertions that Soviet space explorers were taking man's first "steps" on a long voyage into the depths of the universe.¹¹ Similar to those in *Amerika*, these presented a highly ambitious program of greatly expanded human activity in space, marked by manned interplanetary voyages, orbiting space stations, resource extraction from celestial bodies, and factories in space.¹² As with the possible futures imagined by *Amerika*, the ones described in *Soviet Life* took on the assumptions and arguments of space advocates as they utilized portrayals of the future to justify space exploration.

As did *Amerika*, *Soviet Life* raised expectations for space exploration's future in order to heighten the apparent significance of its past and present, and to underline the notion that it was ushering in a new era. It, also like its American counterpart, acknowledged that the propaganda appeal of spaceflight was in danger of receding after the lunar landing. It repeatedly observed in Apollo 11's wake, for

¹¹ "Sputniks Underscore Man's Scientific Progress," 1-2; "Man and Outer Space: Introduction to the Special Issue," 1.

¹² Pissarzhevsky, "Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, Cosmic Trail Blazer," 3-5; Bilenkin, "The Inevitability of Outer Space," 6-8; "Exploring the Moon," *Soviet Life*, May 1966, 22-25; "Automation in Space and on Earth, interview with Boris Sotskov," *Soviet Life*, January 1971, 22; Gersh Budker, "The Future Begins Today," *Soviet Life*, June 1974, 54-55.

example, that spaceflights were “no longer the sensation” that they once were.¹³ It argued that only a “most spectacular project,” such as a human voyage to another planet, could again capture the public’s attention. In an October 1970 article, Sergei Petrov summarized the rationale for both magazine’s depictions of a bold future in space:

We should look at today’s cosmonautics through the prisms of the past and the future. Only then will we see its greatness.¹⁴

Such statements spoke to how presenting an ambitious future in space elevated the importance of contemporary space achievements.

Depicting the Benefits of Space Exploration

Typically, *Soviet Life*’s space coverage predicted far-reaching changes for mankind’s future.¹⁵ Continued and increasing exploration of space, the magazine commonly asserted, would transform man’s relationship with nature.¹⁶ The attainment of such power over nature associated scientific progress—represented by spaceflight—with the material progress that would come from harnessing the resources of nature, on Earth and beyond. In this way, *Soviet Life*, like *Amerika*, offered not only scientific and technological, but also commercial justifications for space exploration. Often this took the form of emphasizing the current and future commercial benefits of

¹³ “What Awaits Man in Outer Space,” *Soviet Life*, August 1969, 34-35; Sergei Petrov, “Space Travel. Its Present and Future” 14.

¹⁴ Sergei Petrov, “Space Travel. Its Present and Future” 14. The “significance” of space achievements, a September 1969 article similarly argued, “will be fully manifest and completely realized only in the light of the future.” Sedov, “Man on the Moon,” 11.

¹⁵ Though it might seem “almost too fantastic for science fiction,” Yuri Melvil predicted in a May 1966 article, mankind would soon “realize that his physical and spiritual powers are unlimited.” Melvil argued that Francis Bacon’s vision that humanity would master the “effecting of all things possible” no longer “seemed entirely out of man’s reach.” Melvil, “Man in the Space Age,” 48-49.

¹⁶ “Heading for Unknown Worlds, Interview with Konstantin Feoktistov,” *Soviet Life*, October 1976, 8.

exploring space, and predicting that rich material resources could be exploited by space-faring nations.¹⁷ It also, like *Amerika*, emphasized the benefits of manufacturing in zero-gravity conditions.¹⁸

Also similar to *Amerika* was how the Soviet magazine assured that these benefits would be far greater in the future.¹⁹ Current advantages from space, it often asserted, were “only the beginnings of benefits.”²⁰ It also stressed how space exploration would stimulate broad progress in science, technology, and industry.²¹ In doing so, it not only celebrated the broad impacts of progress achieved, it also expressed confidence that such progress would continue, and even accelerate.²² One article on a press conference about the Soviet lunar probe Luna 9 included an exchange about farming on the Moon that was so fantastical to those present that it “brought laughter” from the room. *Soviet Life* likely included the discussion to add a touch of life to its otherwise dull depiction of the proceedings, but the anecdote was

¹⁷ “Diamonds from Outer Space,” *Soviet Life*, October 1970, 38; Ekonomov, “Chief Rocket Engine Designer Interviewed,” 48-49; “Before the USA and the USSR Meet in Orbit, Interview with Vladimir Shatalov,” *Soviet Life*, July 1975, 24.

¹⁸ See, for example: “Before the USA and the USSR Meet in Orbit, Interview with Vladimir Shatalov,” 24.

¹⁹ Space exploration, *Soviet Life* predicted, would “influence the progress of all modern technology,” and its influence would “become greater and greater” with the passage of time. Sedov, “Man on the Moon,” 11.

²⁰ “Queries From Readers,” *Soviet Life*, June 1968, 25.

²¹ The “scientific and technical achievements of cosmonautics,” it argued, would in the future lead to spinoff “progress in many industries,” and would become “one of the main stimuli of progress.” Petrov, “Space Travel. Its Present and Future” 14; “New Stage in Exploration of Space,” *Soviet Life*, January 1965, 4-11.

²² See, for example: Budker, “The Future Begins Today,” 54-55 One December 1968 article predicted, for example, that the “hundreds of earth satellites” in orbit at the time would become “more than a million by 1990.” Duel, “A Million Sputniks By 1990,” 54.

also very suggestive of the bold possibilities of Soviet science and technology.²³ At any rate, other articles similarly took up the idea of farming celestial bodies.²⁴

Like *Amerika*, *Soviet Life* routinely suggested that human progress in space would be limitless.²⁵ It foresaw space exploration leading to many dramatic innovations, such as space-based atomic energy stations or harnessing the energy of “antimatter” to propel spaceflights near or beyond the speed of light.²⁶ It also predicted that automation systems designed for space could lead to the “complete automation of factories” on Earth, and also allow mankind to “colonize” those celestial bodies off limits to human exploration.²⁷ Space achievements were thus used to dramatize the vast potential for technological progress to enrich humankind and liberate humanity from work.

In another parallel with *Amerika*, *Soviet Life* routinely forecasted that interplanetary travel would become normal in the not too distant future.²⁸ Such claims highlighted the potential for exploiting extraterrestrial mineral resources to

²³ Asked if it is “possible to grow farm crops on the moon” the unnamed “scientist” assigned to answer reporters’ questions responded “seriously” that, yes, it would be possible, if the “appropriate devices” were available. He went on to note that there had recently been “impressive achievements ... in this important field of science.” “Exploring the Moon,” 22-25.

²⁴ Budker, “The Future Begins Today,” 54-55; Ekonomov, “Chief Rocket Engine Designer Interviewed,” 48-49. One June 1975 piece even described how Soviet engineers had already designed a “space poultry farm” so that “[i]n the not too distant future crews of orbital spaceships and interplanetary craft will be able to add fried chicken, chicken soup and fried eggs to their menus.” “Poultry Farm in Outer Space,” *Soviet Life*, June 1975, 52.

²⁵ “The road to outer space has no end,” an article in the October 1976 issue, declared, “there will always be new frontiers.” “Space, Interviews with Konstantin Feoktistov and Oleg Gazenko,” *Soviet Life*, October 1976, 2-9.

²⁶ “Before the USA and the USSR Meet in Orbit, Interview with Vladimir Shatalov,” 24; Budker, “The Future Begins Today,” 54-55. An August 1969 interview with the Chief Rocket Engine Designer Valentin Glushko discussed many similar ideas but went even further to suggest that the very solar system “could be turned into a spaceship.” Ekonomov, “Chief Rocket Engine Designer Interviewed,” 48-49.

²⁷ The “great” potential of automation, it pointed out, was “illustrated most dramatically by the flight of the Luna 16 automatic probe.” “Automation in Space and on Earth, interview with Boris Sotskov,” 22. A similar future was outlined in: Bilenkin, “The Inevitability of Outer Space,” 6-8.

²⁸ Victor Kaznevsky, “Flight to the Stars,” *USSR*, April 1958, 16; “Rockets Explore the Upper Atmosphere,” *USSR*, September 1958, 8-13; “What Awaits Man in Outer Space,” 34-35; Budker, “The Future Begins Today,” 54-55.

justify an expanded human presence in space. They also displayed a strong degree of faith that Soviet science and technology would continue to progress rapidly.

In so doing, these confident forecasts served as a metaphor for Soviet society. The bold vision of manned travel to the Moon, Mars, and beyond served a similar role to utopian visions of a communist future, highly visible in other, mostly domestic, propaganda.²⁹ Ever on route to a plausible but distant communist future justified sacrifices made and hardships endured in the present. Meanwhile, space narratives suggested that the challenges of building a communist society—like those associated with space travel—would be “resolved in the near future.”³⁰ Routine forecasts that mankind would be visiting the Moon and other planets “in a matter of decades” predicted that humanity would be profoundly transformed, and often foresaw infinite prospects for human progress.³¹ The foreseen acceleration of progress not only applied to science and technology but would also impact humanity’s social and spiritual progress.

Several articles pondered the potential for finding extraterrestrial life.³²

Others emphasized the difficulties of making contact with extraterrestrial

²⁹ Richard Stites, *Revolutionary Dreams: Utopian Vision and Experimental Life in the Russian Revolution* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1989.)

³⁰ “Rockets Explore the Upper Atmosphere,” 8-13.

³¹ “What Awaits Man in Outer Space,” 34-35. “One cannot foretell, even roughly,” an August 1969 article wondered, “how man’s emergence into space will affect his thinking and action. The possibilities are as limitless as human valor.” “Man and Outer Space: Introduction to the Special Issue,” 1. Chief Rocket Engine Designer Valentin Glushko emphasized that man would “have to grow much faster as a social and ethical being.” Ekonomov, “Chief Rocket Engine Designer Interviewed,” 48-49. One article containing an excerpt from Fedorov’s 1903 book *The Study of World Space With Reaction Devices* even suggested that the “best part of mankind” would achieve “immortality” by learning to “migrate from sun to sun.” With such a development, it proposed, there would be “no limit to life, no limit to intelligence and to man’s possibility for perfection. His progress is endless.” “From Geocentrism to Heliocentrism,” *Soviet Life*, April 1971, 9-11.

³² “Queries From Readers,” *Soviet Life*, November 1963; “Civilization On Other Planets?,” *Soviet Life*, January 1964, 46-47; “Interplanetary Dialogue,” *Soviet Life*, February 1965; Ivan Yefremov, “Are We Alone in Outer Space?,” *Soviet Life*, April 1969, 24-26; “Extraterrestrial Civilizations,” *Soviet Life*, March 1972, 38; “Speaking to the Universe: The Search for Extraterrestrial Civilizations,” *Soviet Life*,

civilizations, while highlighting the contributions made by Soviet scientists to addressing this challenge.³³ Portraying Soviet scientists at the forefront of the search for extra-terrestrial life implied world leadership in this most compelling quest to discover new life.

The theme of extraterrestrial life was taken up in several examples of space-themed science fiction published in *Soviet Life* during the years covered by this study.³⁴ Of particular interest were two excerpts from Ivan Efremov's classic novel *Andromeda Nebula*, concerning a communist utopia set in the distant future, which appeared in the June 1963 and December 1964 issues.³⁵ These articles helped to capture the imagination of readers and attune them to the possibilities offered by space exploration. If fantastical, these stories suggested that space presented limitless opportunities to those who were sufficiently daring, socially developed and technologically sophisticated to accomplish exploration of distant space.

The close "dialog" between science fiction and space exploration fact was underscored in an August 1975 article that featured a conversation between Soviet

July 1972, 38-39. These often conformed to the pattern of other space-themed articles that depicted progress from "science fantasy" a few "decades ago" to finding "civilizations on other planets... in the foreseeable future." Naan, "Does a Dialogue with Space Spell Danger to Us?," 40-41.

³³ "What Awaits Man in Outer Space," 34-35.

³⁴ Vladimir Savchenko, "A Second Expedition to a Strange Planet," *Soviet Life*, August 1969, 56-61. *Amerika* only occasionally raised the idea of intelligent life on other planets. "Is Anybody Out There?" *Amerika*, March 1973, 49-50; Henry T. Simmons, "The Search for Extraterrestrial Life," *Amerika*, March 1975, 8-9; "Now You See 'Em, Now You Don't (UFO's)," *Amerika*, March 1975, 10-11.

³⁵ Ivan Efremov, "The Planet Zirda," *USSR*, June 1963; Ivan Efremov, "Epsilon Tucanae: excerpt from the novel - Andromeda a Space Tale," *Soviet Life*, December 1964, 38-41. For scholarly commentaries of Efremov's novel, see: Elana Gomel, "Gods like Men: Soviet Science Fiction and the Utopian Self," *Science Fiction Studies* 31, no. 3 (November 2004): 358-377; Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, "Science Fiction and the Thaw," *Science Fiction Studies* 31, no. 3 (November 2004): 337-344; Elana Gomel, "Science Fiction in Russia: From Utopia to New Age," *Science Fiction Studies* 26, no. 3 (November 1999): 435-441; Rafail Nudelman, "Soviet Science Fiction and the Ideology of Soviet Society (La science-fiction soviétique et l'idéologie de la société en URSS)," *Science Fiction Studies* 16, no. 1 (March 1989): 38-66; Fredric Jameson, "Progress versus Utopia; Or, Can We Imagine the Future? (Progrès contre Utopie, ou: Pouvons-nous imaginer l'avenir)," *Science Fiction Studies* 9, no. 2 (July 1982): 147-158; Frank H. Tucker, "Soviet Science Fiction: Recent Development and Outlook," *Russian Review* 33, no. 2 (April 1974): 189-200.

cosmonaut Vitali Sevastyanov and president of the American Science Fiction Writers Association Frederik Pohl.³⁶ An April 1976 article by Soviet science fiction writer Dmitri Bilenkin similarly examined the relationship between science fiction and fact. Arguing that “the wave of scientific and technical progress” exemplified by space exploration had made




Figure 8-1: Using space images to depict the “flowering of progress” in the Soviet Union.

Dmitri Bilenkin, “The Inevitability of Outer Space,” *Soviet Life*, April 1976, 6-7.

science fiction writers’ fictional predictions exciting, Bilenkin used the subject of science fiction to contrast starkly the “flowering” of Soviet progress from its withering in the West.³⁷

A full-page painting called “Flowers in Space” by Georgi Poplavsky accompanied the piece, and underlined the connection between space exploration and the “flowering of progress” discussed in the text. (See Figure 8-1) It showed a

³⁶ “Space Travel and Science Fiction: A Dialogue,” *Soviet Life*, August 1975, 30-31.

³⁷ He compared Soviet and American science fiction, noting that while extraterrestrial beings often attacked Earth in American stories, in Soviet science fiction there were “practically no such stories.” What really set Soviet and American authors apart, he argued, was Soviet writers’ “optimism,” which derived from Lenin’s influence on their sense of history and their feelings of “responsibility toward their readers.” He contrasted “[c]reative and harmonious individuals” in Soviet society with “egoists” and “individualists” who, he claimed, were “so widespread in the West.” Since “[p]rogress is passed on from people to people, generation to generation like a baton in a relay race,” the West increasingly experienced “the disintegration of society’s spiritual bonds” while Soviet society’s spiritual bonds strengthened over time. “Social and moral progress are very real,” he argued, and is “governed by an objective logic.” This logic, which led “inevitably” to disintegration in one society, and integration in another, explained why science fiction authors in the Soviet Union wrote “about a future that will be in the interests of all humanity.” The “goal of scientific socialism,” Bilenkin wrote, was “the flowering of a free, harmonious, creative individual,” and a “classless nonoppressive society” that is “rich and economically strong.” Bilenkin, “The Inevitability of Outer Space,” 6-8.

space-walking cosmonaut, suspended between several worlds. The cosmonaut appeared to release eleven flowers into space, suggesting progress through a metaphor of planting seeds.³⁸ Using themes of conquest and colonization similar to those found in *Amerika* magazine, the article's standfirst further declared:

The future of the Earth depends on our ability to explore and settle other parts of the universe.

To Bilenkin, space exploration answered a “human need.” He predicted an ambitious program of space exploration would lead to developments that would transform human societies.³⁹ The image and the text together showed *Soviet Life* using space exploration to demonstrate a Soviet vision of “social and moral progress.” As such, it suggested that the Soviet Union was the moral leader of the world and the best-equipped nation to oversee the profound transformations that the new era of space exploration would bring.

Like the American magazine, *Soviet Life* also used space-themed articles to suggest that its sponsoring country embodied the best social, political, and economic system for harnessing and advancing human progress. It commonly employed verbal and graphic symbols to associate Soviet spaceflights with the Soviet state, for example.⁴⁰ *Soviet Life* also used Soviet space achievements to argue that the Soviet

³⁸ It is difficult to assess the symbolic intention—if any—of the number of flowers, though there are eleven modern Slavic languages.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Textual descriptions and photographs of the pennants that routinely flew aboard Soviet probes strongly associated these missions with the Soviet state. One article on Venera 7, for example, showed four pennants that flew aboard that craft. Three of the four images had some patriotic element. One showed a bust of Lenin; another pictured the Venera 7 emblazoned with “USSR”; while a third featured the state emblem of the Soviet Union. Only the fourth pennant, which showed a drawing of the probe, had no overtly patriotic symbols. “Soviet Probe Lands on Venus,” *Soviet Life*, April 1971, 54-55.

system was superior for managing progress and ensuring that its benefits were used peacefully and distributed equitably among the world's working classes.⁴¹

It also often rhetorically linked its reports on space with its coverage of progress in building communism. Just as each success, however small, was portrayed as another "step" on the way to the bright future under communism, so were space missions referred to as "strides" toward mastery of space.⁴² In the same breath that it proclaimed Gagarin's flight the "greatest feat in history" it predicted that the construction of communism would be "the greatest victory mankind has ever won in its entire history."⁴³ Successes in space, such linkages implied, made certain that the Soviet Union would reach its political goals for the future.⁴⁴

One March 1972 article presenting Soviet citizens' answers to a questionnaire highlighted the role that space exploration played in envisioning the future. Asked to describe how they see the future, several of those whose comments the magazine's editors deemed worthy of publication referred to space as they described their

⁴¹ Space exploration's influence on broadly accelerating progress, it argued, would bring material benefits that would not only raise "the living standards of the working people," but would also contribute to "preserving peace on our planet." Sedov, "Man on the Moon," 11.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ "Communism is Coming Soon," *USSR*, September 1961, 6-13. Post-Khrushchev, the Soviet leadership stepped back from making such declarations that communism was coming. At the October 1964 plenum of the Central Committee that ousted Khrushchev from power, Mikhail Suslov decried such "lavish and indiscriminate [...] promises." Subsequently, bold proclamations of the imminent construction of communism were eventually replaced by a new notion of "developed socialism." Mark Sandle, *A Short History of Soviet Socialism* (London: Routledge, 1999), 333-370, quotation on 334; Robert V. Daniels, *A Documentary History of Communism* (Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England, 1993), 279; Mark Sandle, "Brezhnev and Developed Socialism: The Ideology of *Zastoi*?" in Edwin Bacon and Mark Sandle, *Brezhnev Reconsidered* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 166.

⁴⁴ Numerous articles in the first decades of the space age peered into the future to imagine how Soviet society would progress. See, for example: Mark Vistinetsky, "Twenty Years From Now," *USSR*, January 1962, 2-5; Robert Rozhdestvensky, "Letter to the Thirtieth Century," *Soviet Life*, December 1964, 42; "The Future We See," *Soviet Life*, March 1972, 30-31; "Social Contours of the Future, Interview with Grigori Romanov," *Soviet Life*, November 1972, 40-41; Budker, "The Future Begins Today," 54-55.

visions.⁴⁵ Such comments from Soviet citizens supported the argument that Soviet space exploration exemplified rapid Soviet progress in science and technology, made possible by the superior Soviet system of government. They expressed the faith that continued Soviet oversight of scientific and technological development would virtually assure that these idealistic visions of future progress would soon become reality.

Soviet Life commonly emphasized a link between scientific progress and the material, social, and political development of the Soviet Union. The intersection of these themes occurred most notably in the fall of 1961, when the 22nd Congress—and the introduction of the Third Party Program there—followed closely on the heels of the Soviet Union’s first manned spaceflights in the spring and summer of that year. Numerous articles on the Congress and Third Party Program in the fall of 1961 appeared alongside continuing coverage of Gagarin and Titov’s historic manned spaceflights.⁴⁶ Space and Congress-themed articles typically shared the

⁴⁵ A bus driver from Minsk, for example, foresaw that: “If man can move into space, he can certainly invent a car that won’t pollute the air and build roads where traffic jams and collisions will be impossible.” A student from Leningrad noted that many of his peers were not only fascinated with the promise of “interplanetary space travel,” but also with the approach of communism, “since communism’s aim is to make man happy, to create the conditions in which he can fully develop his abilities and potential.” “The Future We See,” 30-31.

⁴⁶ “Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: A Summary of the Draft,” *USSR*, September 1961, 1-5; “The 1919 Communist Party Program Has Become a Reality,” *USSR*, September 1961, 6-13; “Second Soviet Cosmonaut in Outer Space,” *USSR*, September 1961, 14-15; Yuri Gagarin, “The Road to Outer Space,” *USSR*, September 1961, 16-23; Gherman Titov, “435,000 Miles Through Space,” *USSR*, October 1961, i.f.c., 1-7; “Communists Discuss the New Party Program,” *USSR*, October 1961, 8-9; Vasili Moskovsky, “Program for Building a Communist Society,” *USSR*, October 1961, 12-14; “New Party Rules,” *USSR*, October 1961, 15; Gherman Titov, “The Earth from Outer Space,” *USSR*, October 1961, 44-47; “Millions Debate Their Future,” *USSR*, November 1961, 1-2; “Who Are the Delegates?,” *USSR*, November 1961, 3-7; Nikolai Semenov, “Science and Social Progress,” *USSR*, November 1961, 42-44; Alexander Maryamov, “A Trip to the Country’s Tomorrow,” *USSR*, November 1961, 10-12; “Twenty-five Hours in Space,” *USSR*, November 1961, 13-15; Ilya Kopalin, “First Flight to the Stars,” *USSR*, November 1961, 16-19; “Congress of Builders of Communism,” *USSR*, December 1961, 1; “Our Aims Are Clear, Our Paths Are Charted,” *USSR*, December 1961, 2-12; “The People at the Congress,” *USSR*, December 1961, 13; “Congress Delegates Speak,” *USSR*, December 1961, 14-16; “To the Stars Again,” *USSR*, December 1961, 26-27.

spotlight of being featured near the front of each edition, while space and Congress images alternately occupied the front covers of the November and December issues.⁴⁷ Coverage of the Congress highlighted the cosmonauts' participation there with photographs of them mingling with other delegates and excerpts from their speeches, which typically used the space theme to demonstrate progress and look forward to "new ventures" in the future.⁴⁸

These articles portrayed the Third Party Program as a plan characterized by continuing scientific and technological advancements, and predicted that such progress would accelerate in the future as Soviet society moved closer to constructing communism.⁴⁹ The next step in Soviet progress, they declared, would be nothing less than "the transformation of society and man." To demonstrate the feasibility of these ambitious goals, *Soviet Life* often recounted the past and present accomplishments of the Soviet state, in which space victories figured prominently.

Illustrations underlined the link between space exploration and the vision of future Soviet progress outlined in the Third Party Program and elsewhere. A graph representing the "Increase in Number of Scientific Establishments in the USSR" and the "Increase in Number of Research Workers" was set against a starry background through which a highly stylized winged rocket flew.⁵⁰ An illustrated map of the Soviet Union highlighting its industries and agriculture in graphic depictions featured a

⁴⁷ "Space brothers--Gherman Titov (left) and Yuri Gagarin.," *USSR*, November 1961, f.c.; "Nikita S. Khrushchev delivers the report "On the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" at the Twenty-second Communist Party Congress on October 18, 1961.," *USSR*, December 1961, f.c.

⁴⁸ For example, one photo showed Titov smiling and conversing with Nikolai Mamai, a Hero of Socialist Labor in: "Our Aims Are Clear, Our Paths Are Charted," 2-12. See also: "Who Are the Delegates?," 3-7; "Congress Delegates Speak," 14-16.

⁴⁹ "Communists Discuss the New Party Program," 8-9; "Communism is Coming Soon," 6-13; Alexei Kosygin, "Plan for 1965 Spells Higher Living Standards and Stronger Peace," *Soviet Life*, February 1965.

⁵⁰ "The 1919 Communist Party Program Has Become a Reality," 6-13.

cosmonaut waving beside a rocket on a launch pad in the general vicinity of Baikonur.⁵¹ One illustration showed a rocket launching into space above a landscape filled with symbols of industrial progress: factories, dams, electricity towers, cranes and a building branded with a nuclear symbol.⁵² The sole image in one article on Five Year Plans made the explicit link. As the caption for the large photograph of a rocket being readied for launch explained:

The country's scientific and technological progress is evident in its space program.⁵³

Besides these pieces about the Third Party Program, other articles examining the future were often accompanied by space-themed illustrations. Two rockets soared over an electricity tower and a form resembling the structure of a molecule in an illustration for a May 1963 article questioning whether the Earth had enough natural resources to serve all of mankind.⁵⁴ (See Figure 8-2) “The Future



Figure 8-2: Depicting the Soviet future of progress and space exploration.

Yevgeni Fyodorov, “Enough Natural Resources For Mankind?,” *Soviet Life*, May, 1963, 44-45.

⁵¹ “The Soviet Union Today: Its People, Territory, Economy,” *USSR*, November 1962, 8-9. Other graphics represented the projected growth in agricultural and industrial production to 1980. “Our Aims Are Clear, Our Paths Are Charted., 2-12”

⁵² Moskovsky, “Program for Building a Communist Society,” 12-14.

⁵³ “It was clear to all the world,” the article stated, that Sputnik “had been made possible” by the “unprecedented initiative of the new society,” and by the extraordinary growth of Soviet industry.” Gagarin’s flight had similarly “blazed a trail.” “Five-Year Plans 1928-1970: Science and Engineering,” *Soviet Life*, February 1971, 10-17.

⁵⁴ Yevgeni Fyodorov, “Enough Natural Resources For Mankind?,” *USSR*, May 1963, 44-45.

Begins Today,” a June 1974 article about how “technical progress ... has been accelerating,” was set underneath a drawing of several satellites and a wheel-shaped space station floating between galaxies. Earth’s broad curvature framed the bottom of the page, and an inset on the planet’s surface depicted a young couple walking through a futuristic urban setting.⁵⁵ Such imagery associating space exploration with a progressive future for Soviet society was common.⁵⁶

Soviet Life often made clear the Marxist-Leninist ideological basis of the Soviet conception of progress.⁵⁷ In doing so, the magazine portrayed the Soviet Union as the most advanced nation on Earth, and capitalist countries such as the United States as relics of the past. It emphasized, for example, that when a socialist state oversaw science’s contribution to economic production, the process would also forward mankind’s “material” and “spiritual” progress. It contrasted the “economic exploitation” and “spiritual exhaustion” of the “enslaved” worker in the West with the Soviet economy, which provided fully for the spiritual needs of the working class.⁵⁸

Space exploration was also used to put the Soviet Union at the forefront of global concern for the Earth environment.⁵⁹ It argued, for example, that moving industries to space would end the environmental degradation associated with

⁵⁵ Budker, “The Future Begins Today,” 54-55.

⁵⁶ See, for example: Vistinetsky, “Twenty Years From Now,” 2-5.

⁵⁷ It noted, for example, that the “objective laws of social development” outlined in Marxist-Leninist theory, made progress a “natural result of the development of society.” More explicitly, a bold-faced section header from the Third Party Program—summarized in *Soviet Life*—declared: “Transition from Capitalism to Communism Is the Road of Human Progress.” “Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: A Summary of the Draft,” 1-5; Semenov, “Science and Social Progress,” 42-44; “The 1919 Communist Party Program Has Become a Reality,” 6-13.

⁵⁸ Such care, it argued, was “possible only in a socialist state, where the means of production are publicly owned.” “Progress Material and Spiritual,” *Soviet Life*, November 1972, 3.

⁵⁹ See, for example: Ekonomov, “Chief Rocket Engine Designer Interviewed,” 48-49.

technological progress.⁶⁰ Planetary terminology was employed in several articles discussing man's relationship to the environment.⁶¹ In the same vein, a portrait of Yuri Gagarin in his space helmet sat prominently at the top of a collage separating two articles on the environment in the July 1971 issue.⁶² Such language and images linking space exploration to environmental awareness and protection suggested Soviet leadership of the progressive move to improve human stewardship of the environment.

***Soviet Life's* Stylized Depiction of Space**

There were some key differences between *Soviet Life* and *Amerika's* treatment of the progress theme. First of all, *Soviet Life's* discussion of its space program was noticeably more vague than *Amerika's*. It frequently provided little detail when defining the actual nature of its contributions to scientific progress, or in describing future missions. It often used unclear terms like "research," "research instruments," or "scientific apparatus," without detailing (to the same extent that *Amerika* did) the type of experiments undertaken or the equipment used.⁶³ Commentators would routinely cite a specific mission's "outstanding scientific importance," but would provide little, if any, insight into its scientific program. A May 1966 article covering a

⁶⁰ The Earth, Gersh Budker imagined, would "assume its primordial look" and become primarily "a place for rest and recreation. See for example: Budker, "The Future Begins Today," 54-55.

⁶¹ "Mother Earth and Her Children," *Soviet Life*, August 1966, 37; Maxim Goldberg, "Every Breath ... Poison," *Soviet Life*, August 1966; "Man, Nature, and a New Science," *Soviet Life*, April 1968, 50-51; Avetik Burnazyan, "Clean Air For Our Planet," *Soviet Life*, January 1969, 25; "Reconstruction of the Planet," *Soviet Life*, February 1971, 40-41.

⁶² Abram Genin and Victor Malkin, "Artificial Atmosphere," *Soviet Life*, July 1971, 43-44; Vladimir Klyatskin, "Auto Exhaust Pollution. Any Progress?," *Soviet Life*, July 1971, 42.

⁶³ See for example: "Queries From Readers: First Automatic Station on the Moon," *Soviet Life*, April 1966, 55.

press conference for Luna 9 was typical in this regard. Held at the Moscow Scientists' Club on February 10, 1966, the meeting featured President of the USSR Academy of Sciences Mstislav Keldysh, Professor Alexander Lebidinsky, and Academicians Alexander Vinogradov and Alexander Mikhailov answering questions from the press. Even though the reporters questioned the scientists for more detailed information about the mission's scientific program, the



Figure 8-3: A characteristically fanciful representation of future Soviet interplanetary travel. Drawing by Robert Abotinas.

Sergei Sokolov, "Exploring the Planets," *Soviet Life*, July 1976. 23.

men offered little detail about what it entailed.⁶⁴ Often, articles on Soviet automatic probes—highly touted for their “scientific” value—focused more on the technical feats of putting them into orbit, or of achieving a soft landing.⁶⁵ Such an emphasis may have been *Soviet Life* giving primacy to depicting Soviet space accomplishments as technological feats, rather than scientific ones, but it was also a result of the secrecy surrounding the Soviet space program.

Soviet Life's imaginative and artistic depictions of the ambitious future of Soviet spaceflight also reflected Soviet secrecy. Graphic depictions of Soviet interplanetary travel were typically highly stylized and unrealistic in comparison with

⁶⁴ “Exploring the Moon,” 22-25.

⁶⁵ “First Lunar Sputnik,” *Soviet Life*, August 1966, 53; “Queries From Readers: First Automatic Station on the Moon,” 55.

Amerika's. (See Figure 8-3) A February 1976 piece, for example, highlighted the very ambitious yet unrealistic concepts from a spaceship design contest held among Soviet youth. (See Figure 8-4)⁶⁶ Such images took the place of realistic proposals in the pages of *Soviet Life*, while still suggesting a dynamic Soviet future in space.

The magazine's front cover frequently presented fantastic interpretations of spaceflight in a futuristic setting. Such unrealistic jet-like spaceships appeared often in *Soviet Life*. Illustrations accompanying Alexei Savchenko's "science fantasy," for example, depicted two winged rockets linked together end-to-end.⁶⁷ Another early article made the prospect of space travel more conceivable to the magazine's readers—and suggested the prospects for mass travel in space—by describing space vehicles as the "Airliner[s] of tomorrow," which would "land like the usual plane of today." Comparing spaceflight with aviation in this way also expressed complete confidence that Soviet engineers would solve the problems associated with such spaceflights. A very imaginative illustration of such a "rocket plane" (really several jet-shaped crafts fused together) underscored the similarities between the air travel of today, and the space travel of




Figure 8-4: A stylized depiction of Soviet spaceships that also associated spaceflight with youth.

"Youthful Designers," *Soviet Life*, February 1976, 1.

⁶⁶ "Youthful Designers," *Soviet Life*, February 1976, 1.

⁶⁷ Alexei Savchenko, "Flight to the Stars: A Science Fantasy," *USSR*, April 1958, 46-51.

tomorrow. Reaching far above a large snow-capped mountain in the background, it also symbolized the ingenuity of man surpassing the perceived restraints of the natural world.⁶⁸

The front of the October 1958 issue showed an artist's rendering of another such sleek, colorful and four-winged rocket flying past an imagined celestial body. (See Figure 8-5) A young boy and girl gazed excitedly with heads lifted toward the scene. They symbolized



Figure 8-5: Associating the Soviet future (and youth) with spaceflight. The text in the top right corner says "Public Schools."

"Rocket," *Soviet Life*, October, 1958, f.c.

the future, while their otherworldly setting suggested they were not on Earth. The text indicating the issue's lead article, "Public Schools," reinforced the image's implicit connection between youth and future spaceflights.⁶⁹ Images of Soviet citizens gazing skyward frequently accompanied articles describing the bright Soviet future on the path of progress.⁷⁰

On the cover of the June 1961 issue, a waving cosmonaut stood outside of a similarly sleek multi-winged spacecraft on the mountainous surface of a distant

⁶⁸ See: Vasili Alexandrov, "Tomorrow's Rocket Plane," *USSR*, April 1958, 12. Other articles, however, stressed the differences between space and air travel. Kaznevsky acknowledged that the "appearance" of the "cosmic ship" of the future would "be unlike our present day planes and rockets." A drawing of how a "cosmic ship may look" accompanying the article placed a stylized winged plane-like craft atop a bulky conglomeration of engines, equipment, and giant spherical "fuel tanks." Kaznevsky, "Flight to the Stars," 16.

⁶⁹ "Rocket," *USSR*, October 1958, f.c.

⁷⁰ Maryamov, "A Trip to the Country's Tomorrow," 10-12.

world. As the centerpiece to a collage of children's literature titles, this image again linked Soviet youth with an ambitious future in space. Two text boxes on the page strengthened the connection by advertising both a Soviet exhibition of children's books then touring the United States, and the issue's feature article: "First Manned Flight Into Space." One of the children's books prominently




Figure 8-6: Future progress in Soviet space exploration. "The Year 2000 Artists' View," on the April 1975 front cover.

Dmitri Yankov, "Roads to the Stars," *Soviet Life*, April 1975, f.c.

featured in the collage forged another important link: "Stories about Lenin."⁷¹

The May 1963 cover photograph—a statue of a classically muscular male figure striding toward the stars—embodied the association between space and progress.⁷² One arm stretched to the cosmos while the other held aloft a satellite reminiscent of Sputnik 1. (See Figure 6-2 on page 172) While the skyward thrust of the photo indicated progress, the text underlined the association between space exploration and the "prospects" of "Soviet Science and Scientists."⁷³

⁷¹ "Visit the Soviet exhibition of children's books," *USSR*, June 1961, f.c.

⁷² Tricia Starks examines the prevalence of images of the ideal male physique in Soviet hygiene pamphlets and posters in *The Body Soviet: Propaganda, Hygiene, and the Revolutionary State* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2008), 193-196. Karen Petrone looks at similar themes in the context of physical culture parades of the 1930s in *Life Has Become More Joyous Comrades!: Celebrations in the Time of Stalin* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2000), 12, 30-34, 35-39.

⁷³ "To the Cosmos, sculpture," *USSR*, May 1963, f.c.

For the April 1975 issue's feature article on artists' views of the year 2000, *Soviet Life*'s editors chose a particularly fantastical image of space exploration. (See Figure 8-6) From the perspective of the interior of an immense spaceship, two cosmonauts aimed a beam of energy at a nearby nebula. Also in the foreground, seventeen spectators watched from what appeared to be a long bridge stretching into space. The artist treated the crowd of figures to accentuate the great length of the platform they stood on (the most distant people were one-third the size of the nearest) and to exaggerate the dimensions of the ship. The whole foreground scene was bathed in red light, a color that strongly associated the spacecraft with the Soviet state.⁷⁴ Such fanciful images indicated more about the symbolic meanings of Soviet spaceflight than they did about the actual activities of the Soviet space program. They thus showed *Soviet Life* portraying space exploration in a far more stylized, and far less realistic manner than *Amerika* did.

Manned vs. Unmanned Spaceflight

One other key difference between the two magazines concerned the ascendancy of the American space program, most dramatically symbolized by Apollo 11, which threatened Soviet propaganda claims for supremacy in space. In response to this changing position *Soviet Life* amended its view on what was the best method for exploring space and the truest indicator of progress: manned or unmanned spaceflight.

Until the late 1960s, *Soviet Life* unequivocally gave primacy to manned spaceflight, depicting it as the most esteemed method of exploring space and the best

⁷⁴ "Roads to the Stars by Dmitri Yankov was one of the entries in the 'World in 2000' art contest," f.c.

indicator of scientific and technological progress. Early reports celebrating the first unmanned sputniks, for example, frequently emphasized their importance as steps toward the goal of “future flights by man into outer space.”⁷⁵ Because the second satellite—launched only weeks after the first—had a living creature (the dog Laika) aboard, Soviet propaganda immediately set out to stir up excitement for human spaceflight.⁷⁶ The strategy entailed certain risk, should the United States reach the goal first, but for the time being it suggested that the Soviet Union had the upper hand by discussing Soviet “plans” for manned interplanetary travel to the Moon, to Mars, and beyond.⁷⁷ Several articles expressed the “certainty” that Soviet cosmonauts would “inevitably” visit other celestial bodies “within the next few decades” since Soviet scientists were already “working” on “plans” for such voyages.⁷⁸

These articles showed *Soviet Life* holding manned spaceflight in greater esteem than unmanned spaceflight, since such bold predictions about the future (even when presented as “fantasy”) relied on the human component to suggest how

⁷⁵ “Sputnik III—Laboratory in Space,” *USSR*, July 1958, 1-4; “Rockets Explore the Upper Atmosphere,” 8-13; “Sputniks and Space Ships,” 17-19; Pisarzhevsky, “Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, Cosmic Trail Blazer,” 3-5. Immediately after Sputnik I, *Soviet Life* began to depict a bold future for space travel including “journeys to the smallest bodies of the solar system and the populating of the entire solar system by the human race.” “Tsiolkovsky Centenary,” 35. A December 1957 article emphasized, for example, how satellites were primarily helpful to “future space flyers.” The caption to an image of two students who “one day may fly to the moon” underlined the point. “From the point of view of astronautics,” it argued, “artificial satellites acquire the greatest importance as potential interplanetary stations” that would play a vital role in “enabling cosmic journeys.” Pisarzhevsky, “Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, Cosmic Trail Blazer,” 3-5. As it described a long and extensive history of Soviet atmospheric research using rockets, it noted that these studies were “a prelude to man’s goal of outer space travel.” “Rockets Explore the Upper Atmosphere,” 8-13.

⁷⁶ “Sputnik II: Cosmic Fact Finder,” 4-9.

⁷⁷ One September 1958 article asserted that there was “no doubt” that such flights would take place, since “Soviet rocketry is already prepared to launch a manned rocket,” and was only waiting to solve problems of safety. “Volunteers for Space Travel,” *USSR*, September 1958, 14-15.

⁷⁸ “Tsiolkovsky Centenary,” 35; Pisarzhevsky, “Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, Cosmic Trail Blazer,” 3-5; “Sputniks and Space Ships,” 17-19; Kaznevsky, “Flight to the Stars,” 16; Alexei Savchenko, “Flight to the Stars: A Science Fantasy,” 46-51.

Soviet leadership in space exploration would continue indefinitely.⁷⁹ When human spaceflight became a reality on April 12, 1961, that month's issue of *Soviet Life* quoted Khrushchev's declaration that he was "confident" that such a flight was imminent.⁸⁰ After Gagarin's flight the magazine continued to predict a busy program of Soviet manned space exploration.⁸¹ Articles published in the mid-1960s likewise still looked forward to an ambitious Soviet human spaceflight program.⁸²

A two-page photo spread in the July 1967 issue showed a photograph of a "mock-up of Venus" that "together with many other things cosmic" was at that time on display in the Soviet Pavilion at the 1967 Montreal Expo. (See Figure 8-7) The photograph showed a "man-made rocket" blasting off from the Venusian surface, while others landed nearby. "Here and there," the caption continued, "stand bases built by earlier cosmonauts." The model and magazine feature clearly suggested that an ambitious series of manned Soviet missions to Venus was not in the realm of fantasy. *Soviet Life's* caption stating that the image showed an "earth traveler's" view further implied that voyages to neighboring planets may even become the experience

⁷⁹ In one both bold and naïve piece from April 1958, Alexei Savchenko depicted the voyage of the "first man-guided space ship," which he predicted would not take place until July 24, 1977! Imagining the first human spaceflight would be a yearlong trip to Mars and back, he depicted the cosmonaut accidentally bypassing Mars and leaving the solar system "at a speed approaching that of light." After stitching "metal sheets" into his spacesuit to protect him from damaging radiation and fastening himself to his ship "by rope," the astronaut, still traveling near light speed, space walks to repair his engine. Having rescued the ship, on the way back to Earth he has two revelations about the relativity of time and distance when traveling at near the speed of light. First, he discovers that there are "no boundaries to human travel in the universe—there are no unattainable worlds and galaxies!" Secondly, when he eventually returns to Earth—and Moscow—he realizes that having traveled for fewer than five months, twelve years have passed on Earth. Alexei Savchenko, "Flight to the Stars: A Science Fantasy," 46-51.

⁸⁰ "Soviet Diary - Earth-Space-Earth," *USSR*, April 1961, 15.

⁸¹ The May 1961 edition, for example, quoted Khrushchev's April 14, 1961 speech at celebrations of the event in Red Square where the Soviet Premier announced: "More and more Soviet people will soar into the cosmos." "A Day to Remember," 2-3.

⁸² They predicted for instance, "voyages of many years' duration ... to the planets of the solar system," as well as "observatories and man-made planet towns in space to provide space-travel facilities." "Why Space Research? Interview with Konstantin Feoktistov," *Soviet Life*, December 1967, 41. See also: "New Stage in Exploration of Space," 4-11.



Figure 8-7: The ambitious future of Soviet spaceflight: Close-up of a two-page photo spread showing a model from the Soviet EXPO-67 pavilion depicting an “earth travelers” view of a Soviet rocket on the surface of Venus.

Georgi Petrusov, “Venus Up-Close,” *Soviet Life*, July 1967, 4-5.

of common laymen.⁸³ The same image was reprinted in a retrospective of Soviet space achievements in the October 1976 issue.⁸⁴ Planetary exploration thus provided Soviet propagandists with an excellent opportunity to peer into the future and predict an ambitious program of future space development. Such predictions implied the continued ascendancy, and perhaps limitless progress, of Soviet science and technology.

Soviet propaganda clearly made a human voyage to the Moon a key goal for the continuing space race to win global prestige and the appearance of supremacy in space. A July 1968 article even quoted comments made by Gagarin at his first post-*Vostok* interview where the first cosmonaut expressed his personal desire to visit Venus and Mars, as well as his confidence that people would not “have to wait too long before we undertake a flight ... to the Moon.” To underline its agreement with the vision of imminent space travel to other celestial bodies, the article noted that Gagarin “seriously meant what he said.”⁸⁵ As it became apparent that the United

⁸³ Georgi Petrusov, “Venus Up-Close,” *Soviet Life*, July 1967, 2-3.

⁸⁴ “Space, Interviews with Konstantin Feoktistov and Oleg Gazenko,” 2-9.

⁸⁵ Golovanov, “He Wanted to Speed Up History,” 28-29.

States would win this leg of the race, however, *Soviet Life* shifted its emphasis to argue that unmanned lunar exploration was a superior and far stronger indicator of technological progress, and would provide more scientific results without the risks and costs associated with manned missions.

The intense secrecy surrounding the Soviet space program even allowed Soviet officials to deny that a manned mission to the Moon had been a goal. In fact, Korolev had lobbied for a manned mission to the Moon in 1963, largely in response to the challenge presented by the American Apollo program. His proposal was approved in 1964, but interagency infighting and Korolev's early death in 1966 when the project was still in its early stages led to sluggish progress, and the ultimate official denial that the Soviet Union had even engaged in a race to the Moon.⁸⁶ Meanwhile, in *Soviet Life* several articles on the Moon in the late 1960s continued to focus attention there on our nearest celestial neighbor, but ceased to discuss, even vaguely, Soviet plans for a manned lunar mission.⁸⁷

An August 1969 special issue celebrating the American achievement of Apollo 11 was prepared in advance to be on the newsstand in time for the historic flight. It struck a careful balance between offering sincere congratulations to the Americans and posturing to portray the continued superiority of the Soviet space program. Its numerous congratulations from a variety of figures in the Soviet government and space establishment celebrated the mission's contribution to science.⁸⁸ An article by "prominent Soviet journalist" Valentin Mikhailov in the same

⁸⁶ Asif A. Siddiqi, *Sputnik and the Soviet Space Challenge*, (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2003), 395-408, 461-516.

⁸⁷ "Queries From Readers," *Soviet Life*, April 1968, 25; Nikolai Kozyrev, "Luna: The Seventh Continent," *Soviet Life*, August 1969, 52-53.

⁸⁸ "Congratulations on the Successful Flight of Apollo 11," *Soviet Life*, September 1969, 1.

issue, meanwhile, suggested that the Soviet Union had never even considered a manned lunar mission. As the first line of his article asserted:

From the beginning of the space age, scientists planned to use automatic space probes in exploring the moon.⁸⁹

In January 1971, Boris Petrov similarly stated: “Lunar travel was still in the science fiction stage when Soviet scientists concluded” that they would give the “leading role to automatic stations” instead of human missions to the Moon. In a section headed in bold, “Should We Risk Human Lives?” Petrov explained that the Soviet rationale against manned exploration of the Moon was based on safety and cost-efficiency.⁹⁰ In the wake of Apollo 11, *Soviet Life* thus emphasized that unmanned probes were the superior way to explore space without the risks and costs associated with manned spaceflight.

A series of probes launched by the Soviet Union in the late 1960s and early 1970s achieved several notable firsts. These provided *Soviet Life* with a new theme with which to showcase the “multipurpose” character of the Soviet space program. *Soviet Life*’s coverage of unmanned Soviet probes strove to contrast the Soviet Union’s broad program of discovery with the United States’ singular goal of landing a man on the Moon.

⁸⁹ Valentin Mikhailov, “Exploring the Moon from Baikonur and Cape Kennedy,” *Soviet Life*, August 1969, 54-55.

⁹⁰ Unmanned probes were “20-50 times cheaper” and entailed no “human risk.” Boris Petrov, “Earth-Moon-Earth,” *Soviet Life*, January 1971, 18-21. For more on the Soviet Union’s reaction to the American lunar landing, including its official stance that the Soviet space program did not pursue such “politically motivated objectives,” and its emphasis on unmanned probes and space stations, see: Asif A. Siddiqi, *The Soviet Space Race with Apollo*, (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2003), 697.

As Soviet lunar probes approached the Moon in the mid-1960s, *Soviet Life* frequently covered Soviet exploration of that distant orb.⁹¹ Several articles in 1966 discussed Luna 9, the first Soviet probe to soft land on the Moon's surface, launched on January 31, 1966.⁹² Other articles celebrated Luna 10 the "moon's first manmade satellite," which entered lunar orbit on April 3, 1966, and Luna 13, which achieved a soft-landing on the Moon on December 24, 1966.⁹³ With these articles *Soviet Life* stressed the rapidity of Soviet space launches toward the Moon, and suggested that interest in reaching the Moon was universal. They implied progress by highlighting the scientific value of space exploration, by depicting an expanding Soviet presence in space, and by concentrating on those areas most easily understood by the general reader, such as what impact such a presence would have on radio broadcasts and weather forecasts. They also reflected an increasing commitment to explore the Moon robotically with "moon sputniks."⁹⁴

Several probes to other planets were also launched in the mid-1960s, including the Venera probes to Venus and the Zond probes to Mars. The long distances involved in sending probes to distant planets posed unique challenges and opportunities for the magazine's coverage of them. Notices about planetary probes frequently appeared as brief columns in the magazine's regular "Around the Country" and "People and Events" sections as they made their long journeys through the solar system.⁹⁵ These served to remind American readers of Soviet

⁹¹ "New Pictures of the Moon," *Soviet Life*, October 1965, 19.

⁹² "Diagram of Luna 9 Flight," *Soviet Life*, April 1966, 3; "Queries From Readers: First Automatic Station on the Moon," 55; "Exploring the Moon," 22-25.

⁹³ "First Lunar Sputnik," 53; "Luna 13 Reporting: New Achievement of Soviet Science," *Soviet Life*, May 1967, 22-25.

⁹⁴ "First Lunar Sputnik," 53.

⁹⁵ "Toward Venus," *USSR*, March 1961, 12; "Mars 1 Probe Continues Its Flight," *USSR*, January 1963, 7; "Jupiter's Rings," *Soviet Life*, April 1964, 22; "Mysteries Of Mercury," *Soviet Life*, June 1964, 7;

activity in this realm and reinforce the overall depiction of Soviet progress in exploring space. Once the spacecraft reached their destinations, feature articles followed, lauding them as symbols of Soviet scientific and technological progress, as well as demonstrations of the multipurpose character of Soviet space exploration.⁹⁶ These articles cast automatic probes as markers of scientific progress by portraying each achievement as a path-breaking step toward bettering mankind's scientific understanding of the universe.⁹⁷ The goal of exploring celestial bodies other than our own, *Soviet Life* suggested, would be largely fulfilled by Soviet robotic probes.⁹⁸

Soviet Life thus used its coverage of robotic probes to contrast the multipurpose Soviet space program with the singular focus of its American equivalent.⁹⁹ At the same time it emphasized how Soviet *and* American accomplishments in space “have all enriched world science.”¹⁰⁰ While deferring to

“Life on Mars?,” *Soviet Life*, January 1969, 58; “Ice in Mars’ Atmosphere,” *Soviet Life*, March 1970, 50; “New Lander on Venus,” *Soviet Life*, November 1972, 32; “New Flights to Mars,” *Soviet Life*, February 1974, 10; “Probing the Planet Venus,” *Soviet Life*, January 1976.

⁹⁶ N. Barabashov, “What Do We Know About Venus?,” *USSR*, April 1961, 8; “Toward Venus,” 5-7; “A Bridge From Earth to Venus,” *Soviet Life*, April 1968, 26-27; Yuri Marinin, “A Probe to Neptune?,” *Soviet Life*, June 1968, 40-41; Mikhail Marov, “Probing Secrets of Venus,” *Soviet Life*, June 1970, 6-8; “Soviet Probe Lands on Venus,” 54-55; Alexander Serov, “Destination Mars,” *Soviet Life*, June 1972, 54-55; Boris Konovalov, “Is There Life on Mars?,” *Soviet Life*, July 1974, 5; “Valuable Contribution to Planetology, Interview with Roald Sagdayev,” *Soviet Life*, July 1974, 4-5; Villen Lyustiberg, “The Strange World of Venus,” *Soviet Life*, March 1976, 21; Sokolov, “Exploring the Planets,” 22-23.

⁹⁷ Lyustiberg, “The Strange World of Venus,” 21; Sokolov, “Exploring the Planets,” 22-23.

⁹⁸ The standfirst to a January 1971 piece covering the September 1970 Luna 16 mission, the first robotic probe to successfully return samples from the Moon, proclaimed: “Today, moon soil. Tomorrow, samples from Mars. Thanks to automatic probes the ‘inaccessible’ planets are now accessible.” “Automation in Space and on Earth, interview with Boris Sotskov,” 22. See also: Marinin, “A Probe to Neptune?,” 40-41. A February 1971 article celebrated Luna 17 as a milestone achievement because: “For the first time in the history of space exploration an automated roving vehicle controlled from the Earth was delivered to the moon and made scientific studies.” “Moon Rover,” *Soviet Life*, February 1971, 18-19.

⁹⁹ Sergei Petrov, for example, noted in an October 1970 article that since the start of the space exploration era, “differences in the trends of research” of the two countries’ space programs “became more evident.” The “chief goal of the American space program for the last decade,” he observed, had been the “space feat” of Apollo 11. In contrast, he argued, the Soviet Union was “carrying out a planned multipurpose program for the study and use of space,” a systematic program of exploration “with automatic probes.” Petrov, “Space Travel. Its Present and Future,” 14.

¹⁰⁰ “Moon Rover,” 18-19.

the American Apollo achievement, *Soviet Life* thus strove to portray the Soviet space program's substantial contributions to scientific progress, and stressed that Soviet "automatic" probes were an essential—even superior—method of exploring space.

Soviet Life's coverage of unmanned planetary probes also highlighted Soviet technological progress. In doing so, it used many of the familiar strategies found in space-themed articles more generally. It routinely employed, for example, narratives of continuous improvement of Soviet technologies that indicated when a probe was "heavier than its predecessors."¹⁰¹ It made sure to comment on any notable "firsts" achieved by each probe.¹⁰² It also regularly mentioned any "new equipment" or "new technical solutions" utilized by each spacecraft.¹⁰³ It often portrayed a particular probe as a step toward more complex, more capable future probes, while asserting that cosmic exploration via automatic probes was "just beginning."¹⁰⁴ This coverage thus celebrated Soviet technological achievements while looking to an ambitious future in space to predict that Soviet progress in technology would continue to accelerate.

Soviet Life articles on Soviet planetary probes typically emphasized that these represented milestones in human history, were symbols of Soviet technological progress, were motivated by scientific discovery, and would lead to regular manned voyages throughout the solar system.¹⁰⁵ Articles on probes routinely discussed these probes' abilities to perform a "soft landing," a capability that was essential for any

¹⁰¹ "Soviet Probe Lands on Venus," 54-55. See also: "Toward Venus," 12.

¹⁰² Lyustiberg, "The Strange World of Venus," 21; Sokolov, "Exploring the Planets," 22-23.

¹⁰³ "Luna 13 Reporting: New Achievement of Soviet Science," 22-25; Serov, "Destination Mars," 54-55.

¹⁰⁴ Marinin, "A Probe to Neptune?," 40-41; Sokolov, "Exploring the Planets," 22-23; Serov, "Destination Mars," 54-55.

¹⁰⁵ "Toward Venus," 12; "Soviet Probe Lands on Venus," 54-55.

human voyage to another celestial body.¹⁰⁶ Luna 9, the first probe to achieve a soft landing on the Moon, for example, was declared a “great step forward” toward a manned lunar mission.¹⁰⁷

The Soviet space program never abandoned human spaceflights. With the Soyuz series of missions after 1967, the Soviet Union continued to have a human presence in Earth orbit. *Soviet Life* articles continued to describe an ambitious future of human spaceflight, including space stations and voyages to the moon, Mars and Venus.¹⁰⁸ These tended, however, to showcase the role of unmanned vehicles in servicing the manned program.¹⁰⁹ *Soviet Life* thus used its emphasis on automatic probes to portray the Soviet space program’s “multipurpose” character—its combined focus on both manned and unmanned spacecraft—maintaining Soviet progress in space well into the future.¹¹⁰ These articles portrayed a vast future human presence in space. The human element remained in the background, however, while the spotlight clearly shone on the “automatic” aspects of Soviet spaceflight.

Several articles in 1969 on future space stations provided further evidence of *Soviet Life*’s uneasy response to the impending American victory in the Moon race.

¹⁰⁶ “Queries From Readers: First Automatic Station on the Moon,” 55; “Exploring the Moon,” 22-25; “First Lunar Sputnik,” 53.

¹⁰⁷ In one article covering a Luna 9 press conference, an unnamed “scientist” fielding questions from reporters was asked to comment on the “next stage of a cosmonaut’s flight to the moon.” Though he acknowledged that Soviet scientists were “doing studies along these lines,” he stated that it was “still too soon to set any time limits for the actual solution.” See: “Exploring the Moon,” 22-25.

¹⁰⁸ “Spaceships Today and Tomorrow, An Interview with Konstantin Feoktistov,” 22-23; “Sergei Korolyov: Designer of Space Rockets,” *Soviet Life*, August 1969, 21-22.

¹⁰⁹ For example, in January 1971 Boris Petrov looked forward to “unmanned vehicles” landing on Mars and “more distant planets” while “[a]utomatic rockets will deliver freight to the personnel of orbital stations and planetary observatories and come to the aid of cosmonauts.” Petrov, “Earth-Moon-Earth,” 18-21.

¹¹⁰ A February 1971 article on the first Soviet lunar rover Lunokhod 1 described the mission not only as a stage “to develop a self-propelled vehicle in which cosmonauts will eventually be able to make successful lunar journeys,” but also to test “future automatic systems” to be used on “planets where conditions are unfavorable for human visitors.” The article foresaw a Soviet program of “automation-assisted exploration” of the solar system. “Moon Rover,” 18-19.

These described current Soviet space missions as important steps toward realizing the goal of orbiting space stations, and pointed to this development as the next step in human progress in space. They portrayed Soviet plans to use space-based launches from space stations orbiting the Earth as an alternative means for exploring the Moon and the solar system.¹¹¹ Emphasizing the benefits of launching from Earth orbit, they implied that launching from the Earth's surface—as Apollo 11 did—was an inferior method.¹¹² These articles instead depicted space stations as the foundation of an ambitious program of human exploration of the cosmos.¹¹³

Using the familiar tropes to characterize orbiting space stations as indicators of progress, these articles further argued that progress “depend[ed]” on such stations.¹¹⁴ Portrayed as space laboratories, orbital stations were also depicted as essential for advancing scientific progress.¹¹⁵ *Soviet Life's* articles on future space stations fit well with the overall narrative associating Soviet space exploration with progress. That space stations received special attention in 1969 revealed another way that *Soviet Life* adjusted this narrative to continue to suggest Soviet supremacy in space in spite of the American lunar landing.

¹¹¹ Sternfeld, “Flying Cosmodrome,” 22-24; Boris Petrov, “The Space Experiment,” *Soviet Life*, January 1969, 10-11; “Changing Ships in Orbit, Interview with Alexei Leonov,” *Soviet Life*, April 1969, 48-49; Andanov and Maximov, “Space Stations of the Future,” 24-26; Sergei Petrov, “Space Travel. Its Present and Future” 14.

¹¹² See especially: Sternfeld, “Flying Cosmodrome,” 22-24. A February 1971 article on the first Soviet lunar rover Lunokhod 1 described the mission not only as a stage “to develop a self-propelled vehicle in which cosmonauts will eventually be able to make successful lunar journeys,” but also to test “future automatic systems” to be used on “planets where conditions are unfavorable for human visitors.” The article foresaw a Soviet program of “automation-assisted exploration” of the solar system. “Before the USA and the USSR Meet in Orbit, Interview with Vladimir Shatalov,” 24.

¹¹³ In the August 1969 special Apollo issue, for example, “Space Stations of the Future” outlined such a vision and supported it with illustrations depicting numerous giant ring-shaped stations circling the Earth. Andanov and Maximov, “Space Stations of the Future,” 24-26.

¹¹⁴ Petrov, “The Space Experiment,” 10-11.

¹¹⁵ “Changing Ships in Orbit, Interview with Alexei Leonov,” 48-49; Petrov, “The Space Experiment,” 10-11. See also: “Before the USA and the USSR Meet in Orbit, Interview with Vladimir Shatalov,” 24.

Conclusion

Soviet Life's repeated depiction of Soviet space exploration as an important "turning point" in the big historical perspective, its projection of ambitious future exploration of the cosmos, and its use of these themes to associate the nation with progress, strongly resembled *Amerika*'s. Like the American magazine, *Soviet Life* routinely described space exploration providing great benefits for humanity to further associate it with progress. As with its American counterpart, *Soviet Life*'s portrayal of a bold future in space was necessary for the magazine's propaganda to maintain that current Soviet missions were in fact significant steps forward.

Unlike the American magazine, *Soviet Life* combined its bold vision of the Soviet future in space with similar aspirations for the prospective construction of communism. Its far more stylized depictions of the future—a reflection of Soviet secrecy—also differentiated it from *Amerika*. Finally, *Soviet Life* reacted to Apollo 11 by arguing that the "multipurpose" Soviet approach to space exploration was superior to the American's all-out race to put men on the Moon. *Soviet Life* thus used its visions of the past and future of Soviet space exploration to argue that the Soviet system was better for advancing human progress.

SECTION III: SHAKING HANDS IN SPACE: COOPERATION

9. “SOVIET SIGNALS GO THE SAME WAY, ONLY IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION”: Space Cooperation in *Amerika*

The first two decades of space exploration are widely regarded as the era of a competitive “space race” between the Soviet Union and the United States when the two contestants battled to demonstrate their supremacy vis-à-vis the other. Victory in this race was largely measured in terms of accrued international prestige, as accomplishments were understood to indicate world scientific, technological and military leadership. Both superpowers sought to exploit these space achievements to further suggest that they demonstrated the ascendancy of one political, economic, and social system over the other. *Soviet Life* and *Amerika* played a unique role since both magazines operated under mandates to improve Soviet-American relations. Both publications thus downplayed the competitive aspects of the space race and encouraged Soviet-American dialogue on cooperating in space.

This chapter examines American discourse and propaganda about space cooperation from the beginning of the space exploration era in 1957 to the July 1975 Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP). It seeks to understand the American rationales behind the highly symbolic “handshake in space,” in order to examine *Amerika*’s portrayal of space cooperation. The United States, it argues, sought to exploit the American lead in space that the Apollo program demonstrated, and to further the overall depiction of American leadership in pursuing international peace and in fostering scientific and technological progress. The American theme of openness was key to cooperation. While U.S. officials partly sought space cooperation to reduce the costs and maximize the prestige benefits of space exploration in the post-Apollo

environment, they also chose to leverage their lead in space to issue their Soviet rivals a challenge to cooperate. Though the Soviet Union consistently voiced its public support for space cooperation, it resisted the challenge for many years. Space cooperation would force the Soviet space program to accept a degree of openness.

ASTP was the highest profile and most symbolic example of superpower space cooperation. Its propaganda value largely outweighed any benefits accrued from the superpowers giving each other greater access to their space programs. Michael Sheehan called the Apollo-Soyuz mission a “purely political symbol of *détente* between the superpowers.”¹ Yuri Karash similarly observed that “scientists regarded the Apollo-Soyuz mission as “a real sacrilege” that had “nothing to do with science.”² The highlight of the mission—a handshake in space between Soviet cosmonaut Alexei Leonov and American astronaut Thomas Stafford was dreamt up by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, as a symbolic promotion of the Nixon Administration’s foreign policy of *détente* with the Soviet Union.³

The successful implementation of ASTP’s docking unit was intended to provide a basis for future cooperation. But the end of Apollo and the later space shuttle’s incompatibility for such docking meant that that promise went unfulfilled. Carrying the only American astronauts to fly into space between 1973 and 1981, July 1975’s ASTP was also the last American manned space mission for another six

¹ Michael J. Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), 51.

² Yuri Y. Karash, *The Superpower Odyssey: A Russian Perspective on Space Cooperation* (Reston, VA: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1999), 130; Roald Sagdeev, *The Making of a Soviet Scientist* (New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, 1994), 174.

³ Hans Mark, *The Space Station: A Personal Journey* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), 50; Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 65.

years.⁴ It thus represented the end of an era—the first roughly fifteen years of American manned spaceflights.⁵

Soviet-American space cooperation did continue throughout the 1970s, however.⁶ ASTP did, after all then, lead to closer ties between the two countries' space programs. But according to Roald Sagdeev, even this cooperation served mostly symbolic and political ends. In a context where Soviet-American relations veered from “periods of mistrust and overt hostility” to interludes of détente, what Sagdeev called “nothing more than symbolic gestures of collaboration” in space were actually quite useful for symbolizing warmer relations when they occurred.⁷

Portraying The Space Cooperation Dialogue

The cultural agreements of the late 1950s were the first bilateral accords between the two superpowers in the post-war period.⁸ Among other things, they provided for the exchange of the two magazines, which themselves thus signified increasing contact between the two countries. According to historian Kenneth Osgood, however, this did not signal the potential for an early end to the Cold War as much as it showed that “the conflict was entering a new phase, one where the psychological and political

⁴ In the interim period, the door closed on American space efforts at the scale of Apollo. On October 10, 1978, Jimmy Carter's Presidential Directive declared: “it is neither feasible nor necessary at this time to commit the US to a high-challenge, highly-visible space engineering initiative comparable to Apollo,” a conclusion that no president since has sought to overturn.

⁵ Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 68-69, 175; Mark, *The Space Station: A Personal Journey*, 231.

⁶ A trio of Soviet satellites in 1975, 1977, and 1978 carried payloads of American biological experiments during a period when no comparable missions on American launches took place. Also in the mid-1970s the two powers coordinated, and exchanged data from, their respective missions to Venus: Venera and Pioneer-Venus. See: Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 65.

⁷ Roald Sagdeev and Susan Eisenhower, “NASA - United States-Soviet Space Cooperation during the Cold War,” n.d., http://www.nasa.gov/50th/50th_magazine/coldWarCoOp.html.

⁸ Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 151-161.

competition assumed center stage.”⁹ Space cooperation, in this context, did not represent the antithesis of space competition but a facet of it. The indistinct relationship between space competition and cooperation was reflected in historian Rip Bulkeley’s observation that even in its nascent form during the International Geophysical Year, the Soviet-American space rivalry for prestige made it necessary to “cooperate in order to compete.”¹⁰ This paradox was borne out in the two countries’ space propaganda.

American propagandists embraced the contradiction. Superpower competition was central to USIA’s approach. However, although USIA assumed the context of “ideological struggle,” acknowledged the external perception of a superpower competition, and drafted its strategy in response to Soviet claims of superiority, it nevertheless prescribed downplaying the competitive aspects of scientific and technological development. Giving “undue weight” to “technological competition” between the superpowers, a November 1958 agency paper argued, would be “fruitless,” “counterproductive,” and might “indicate undue anxiety.”¹¹

⁹ Kenneth A. Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence, KA: University of Kansas, 2006). One contemporary observer Don E. Kash wrote in 1967 that “the primary goal of NASA has never been remotely related to cooperation; it has been to beat the Soviets into space... the very notion of using space cooperation to create a new political reality would be inconsistent with this conception.” See: Don E. Kash, *The Politics of Space Cooperation* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1967), 128; Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 68. A 1985 assessment of “International Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities” looked back on the first twenty years of the space age and concluded that the United States pursued competition in order to enhance its international prestige and cooperation to convince other states, eager for access to American space technology, to compromise on other issues. See: Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 63.

¹⁰ Rip Bulkeley, “The Sputniks and the IGY,” in *Reconsidering Sputnik*, ed. Roger D. Launius, John M. Logsdon, and Robert W. Smith (London: Routledge, 2000), 125.

¹¹ A November 18, 1958 “Basic Guidance and Planning Paper” directed the agency’s science and technology programs to “reduce the psychological impact of Soviet Scientific [sic] and technological achievements by full exploitation of U.S. and Free World achievements,” and characterized competition in space as “a new aspect to the continuing ideological struggle.” Sputnik, they concluded, had created “a world-wide impression of a direct scientific and technological competition between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and between the Free World and Communist nations.”

Instead of competition, USIA should concentrate on highlighting American participation in the international scientific community. Emphasizing the similarly global impact of technological developments, the report also urged the agency to show how American technologies improved “the American standard of living” while promising to do the same for the rest of the world. Arguing that science was “entirely without political overtones,” it advised the USIA programs to endorse “free cooperation” among the world’s scientists and “deplore ... the obstruction of cooperative efforts to solve the basic problems of mankind.” The international pursuit of scientific knowledge, it argued, *required* openness for scientific information to be shared within and across international borders.¹² The paper thus directed USIA materials about space exploration to focus ardently on American openness.

In the decade and a half before the 1972 Nixon-Kosygin agreement provided for the joint ASTP spaceflight, *Amerika* routinely expressed American openness to space cooperation. By reporting positively on cooperative initiatives, portraying similarities between Soviet and American space objectives, and regularly suggesting that the vastness of space demanded cooperation in exploring it, the magazine consistently communicated the American government’s interest in cooperation to its Soviet readers.

See: United States Information Agency, “Basic Guidance and Planning Paper No. 4, Subject: Science and Technology,” November 18, 1958, RG 306, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Historical Collection, Subject Files 1953-2000, Box 14, NARA II.

¹² In the “Free World,” it explained, science and technology were “matters of public interest.” For pursuits directly overseen by governments—such as spaceflight, it pointed out—Free World governments recognized their “responsibility to the people” they represented, and made “available to the press, for the public use, all information that does not bear immediately and directly on the national security.” It argued that a “free society” had “no need to operate under a blanket of secrecy for fear that the failure of a scientific experiment or of a technological prototype will in some manner reflect on the system or on the regime.” See: Ibid.

Articles on space cooperation often discussed a communication channel that had been set up between Moscow and Washington as part of a joint meteorological research program. As one article describing the signal path of information traveling from the United States to the Soviet Union via the United Kingdom noted:

Soviet signals go the same way, only, of course, in the opposite direction.¹³

Such a comment demonstrated how *Amerika's* coverage of space cooperation stressed the links and similarities between the two superpowers (as well as to other countries) and portrayed space cooperation positively as an endeavor that could transform international relations for the entire planet.

The 1958 Space Act that established NASA also formally proclaimed American interest in international cooperation in space. It opened American space scientists to a degree of international scientific collaboration that many of their Soviet counterparts envied. Positioning the United States as a scientific leader committed to the open and transparent development of space, it implicitly laid down the gauntlet to the Soviet Union to reciprocate in supporting space cooperation.¹⁴

¹³ From the United States, they would be sent to the Jodrell Bank radio telescope at the University of Manchester, which would send them up to the orbiting satellite to be relayed to the Zimenki Observatory at the N.I. Lobachevsky State University of Gorky (now Nizhny Novgorod). The existing Soviet-American connections, and those about to be built in the course of implementing the 1962 agreement, it predicted, would provide a foundation for continued superpower scientific cooperation in the future. The article noted, for example, that “collaborative studies are planned for the future (1965) year”—during a Year of the Quiet Sun when the eleven-year cycle of sunspots and solar flares would reach a nadir—to determine the level of danger that charged particles and radiation presented to astronauts and satellite instruments. See: Richard Montague, “Cooperation In Space,” *Amerika*, May 1964, 16; Jay Holmes, “The New Configuration,” *Amerika*, February 1971, 18.

¹⁴ By the time of its passage in Congress in July 1958, it was amended to reflect that “international space cooperation could promote peaceful relations among states and form the basis for avoiding harmful and destructive actions in space.” See: Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 43, 68; “Senate Resolution 327, Report No. 1925, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 24 July, 1958,” n.d.; “N.A. Space Act, 1958, Section 205,” n.d.; Sagdeev and Eisenhower, “NASA - United States-Soviet Space Cooperation during the Cold War.”

American support for space cooperation was thus inscribed into NASA's very creation.

NASA's leadership in the early 1960s thought cooperation in space could soothe superpower relations and enhance America's image abroad.¹⁵ In the White House, although competition with the Soviet Union remained a central theme of the Kennedy administration, space exploration stood apart as one area where the President publicly hoped that the two superpowers could find a basis for cooperation. In his January 30, 1961, State of the Union Address, Kennedy declared that his Administration would "promptly" search out avenues for the US and USSR to "explore the stars together." "Let both sides," he said, "seek to invoke the wonders of science instead of its terrors." He invited the Soviet Union, and "all nations," to cooperate to develop meteorological and communications satellites as well as planetary probes to Mars and Venus.¹⁶ Though Kennedy asked his advisors to devise proposals for space cooperation, for the first months of his presidency—and notably on May 25, 1961, when he declared that the United States should land a

¹⁵ T. Keith Glennan, NASA Administrator from August 19, 1958 to January 20, 1961, considered space cooperation might help to end the Cold War. From it, he told the Institute of World Affairs on December 7, 1961, "may yet come that common understanding and mutual trust that will break the lock step of suspicion and distrust that divides the world into separate camps today."¹⁵ James E. Webb, NASA Administrator from February 14, 1961 to October 7, 1968, felt that American support of space cooperation demonstrated the United States' desire "to work with other nations to develop science and technology," and fostered, "the image of a nation leading in this field and willing to share this knowledge with other nations." See: Vernon van Dyke, *Pride and Power: The Rationale of the Space Program* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), 235; Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 67.

¹⁶ In his Address he argued that "we must never be lulled into believing that [the Soviet Union] has yielded its ambitions for world domination." Reducing global politics to a stark division between "Freedom" and "Communism," Kennedy called for "open and peaceful competition—for prestige, for markets, for scientific achievement, even for men's minds," to combat the Communist threat. Yet, in the same speech, he called upon the two superpowers to cooperate in space exploration, to move "these endeavors from the bitter and wasteful competition of the Cold War." Likely because of space's vast expanse, Kennedy judged competition there differently than competition in other areas. A lack of criteria for judging who was ahead in the race did not produce a clear winner. He considered that although Soviet rockets had higher "capacity to lift large vehicles into orbit," the United States was nonetheless ahead in the science and technology of space." See: "John F. Kennedy: Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," n.d., <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=8045>.

man on the Moon by the end of the 1960s—the emphasis remained on competition. Kennedy’s motivation was highly prestige oriented.¹⁷

The ritual of exchanging congratulations after significant space achievements brought the first tentative steps towards building a dialogue on space cooperation. In a February 22, 1961, letter to Khrushchev, Kennedy proposed the two sides begin informally discussing the possibility for cooperation in space, both in person and through diplomatic networks.¹⁸ Khrushchev’s congratulatory message on the occasion of John Glenn’s first American orbital manned flight, on February 21, 1962, suggested the two countries should cooperate in space. Kennedy wrote back at once to “welcome” the idea of cooperation, saying that he had “long held this same belief” and had “put it forward strongly” in his State of the Union address. He told the Soviet premier that he was instructing his administration to outline some concrete proposals for US-Soviet cooperation in space.¹⁹ Two weeks later, as promised, Kennedy wrote to Khrushchev with some tangible ideas.

The two leaders’ exchanges opened the way to discussions on cooperation between Academician Anatoli A. Blagonravov and NASA Deputy Administrator Hugh Dryden over two sessions in 1962. Their dialogue led to an agreement signed

¹⁷ “No single space project,” he told Congress, “will be more impressive to mankind, or more important.” Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 47; “Special Message to the Congress on Urgent National Needs,” May 25, 1961, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/003POF03NationalNeeds05251961.htm>.

¹⁸ “Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev, February 22, 1961,” U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. VI, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 6 (hereafter FRUS followed by years and volume number).

¹⁹ Kennedy also noted his “strong support” of United Nations efforts in space cooperation, as well as the “obviously special opportunities and responsibilities” that fell to the two superpowers. He informed Khrushchev that he had instructed members of his administration “to prepare new and concrete proposals for immediate projects of common action” and expressed his hope that representatives from the two countries would soon meet “in a spirit of practical cooperation.” See: “Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union, February 21, 1962,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. VI, 97; Kennedy, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*, 158; Department of State, *Bulletin*, March 12, 1962, p. 411.

in December 1962 that provided for coordinated launches and data sharing from meteorological and geomagnetic satellites, as well as joint communications experiments using the American passive communications satellite Echo 2. According to Sagdeev, the 1962 Dryden-Blagonravov agreement established a “link” between Soviet and American scientists that became “a primary forum” for superpower dialogue on space cooperation.²⁰

Still, Kennedy continued to express some ambiguity towards whether space competition or cooperation should prevail. At a July 17, 1963, press conference, he betrayed a strong conviction that competition was at the forefront of his mind as he spoke in favor of the U.S. going to the Moon on its own.²¹ But that fall, Kennedy proposed bringing the Soviet Union into the Apollo program as an equal partner, telling NASA Administrator James Webb on September 18 to get the space agency ready for a joint program.²² In a September 20, 1963, speech before the United Nations, Kennedy advocated cooperation in space and suggested a joint US-Soviet lunar mission. According to Michael Sheehan this speech was the first time such a shared mission to the Moon was proposed. As he observed, the Soviet delegation

²⁰ “Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts, August 26, 1965,” *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXIV (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999), 73-4; “Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council (Welsh) to Vice President Humphrey, October 9, 1967,” *Ibid.*, 117; Sagdeev and Eisenhower, “NASA - United States-Soviet Space Cooperation during the Cold War”; Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 68.

²¹ Asked to address whether the United States should go to the Moon alone, Kennedy observed that “the capacity to dominate space, which would be demonstrated by a moon flight, I believe is essential to the United States as a leading free world power.” Edward C. Ezell and Linda N. Ezell, *The Partnership: A History of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project* (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1978), 50-51.

²² Roger D. Launius, “What are Turning Points in History, and What Were They for the Space Age?,” in *Societal Impact of Spaceflight*, ed. Steven J. Dick and Roger D. Launius (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2007), 34.

there “simply ignored” it.²³ In fact, a joint lunar landing had been discussed privately in Vienna in June 1961, and over the intervening two years Khrushchev had consistently argued that the Soviet Union would not cooperate in space unless an agreement on disarmament could be reached.²⁴ At any rate, the USSR did not respond to Kennedy’s 1963 proposal.

Several in Congress disapproved of Kennedy advocating space cooperation at the United Nations since it went against the government’s persistent claims that the space race was essential to confronting communism. Kennedy answered that his administration had supported space cooperation from the start, and that this required a strong American space program. In October 1963 though Congress amended NASA’s annual funding bill making it impossible for the United States to undertake a cooperative Moon mission with any “communist, communist-controlled, or communist-dominated country.”²⁵ Thus, while Kennedy publicly espoused space cooperation he faced significant political challenges to implementing such a vision.

Meanwhile, rather than detailing why the two sides had failed to agree upon a cooperative venture in space, *Amerika* emphasized how space cooperation was a common goal of the two superpowers. It shied away from putting blame on the Soviets for their intransigence on existing agreements, or on Khrushchev for insisting that space cooperation was not possible without a superpower agreement

²³ Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 34; Dodd L. Harvey and Linda C. Ciccoritti, *U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space*, (Washington, DC: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1974), 123.

²⁴ Khrushchev’s continued linking of space cooperation to disarmament is discussed in Chapter 9. See, for example: “Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, April 30, 1961,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. VI, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998), 17; “Memorandum of Conversation, June 4, 1961,” U.S. Department of State, *Ibid.*, 226.

²⁵ W. D. Kay, *Defining NASA: The Historical Debate over the Agency’s Mission* (Albany, NY: University of New York Press, 2006), 84-5; Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 62-3; Ezell and Ezell, *The Partnership: A History of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project*, 56.

on disarmament. Though Kennedy and Khrushchev had routinely expressed their views on their degree of openness to space cooperation for some time, *Amerika* tended to gloss over the ongoing—if limited—dialogue on cooperation to avoid discussing why these initiatives were faltering. It thus celebrated the fact that the space cooperation dialogue continued without explaining why it seemed to be going nowhere. Instead, it simplified the dialogue to focus exclusively on statements in favor of cooperation from both sides of the Cold War divide.²⁶

Amerika routinely portrayed the United States taking the initiative to promote space cooperation. In the August 1962 issue, Jay Holmes ignored over a year of tentative dialogue on space cooperation to concentrate on Kennedy’s concrete proposals” of March 1962.²⁷ Such a focus fit well with *Amerika*’s overall depiction of space exploration since the proposals emphasized American interest in collaborating on communications satellites, an objective that would have practical benefit to humanity and contribute to international openness.

Richard Montague’s May 1964 article “Cooperation In Space” also portrayed the United States taking the initiative to promote space cooperation with the Soviet Union. Giving an account of Kennedy’s September 1963 UN address proposing a joint lunar mission, Montague noted the President’s rhetorical question:

Why, therefore, should man’s first flight to the moon be a matter of national competition?

²⁶ One 1962 article, for example, recalled how in 1958 Eisenhower “expressed the readiness of the United States to cooperate with other nations in space exploration,” how in 1961 Kennedy “repeated this proposal,” and how Khrushchev simply “expressed the same view.” Jeff Stansbury, “John Glenn ... In Orbit,” *Amerika*, May 1962, 2-7.

²⁷ Jay Holmes, “Relay Stations In Space,” *Amerika*, August 1962, 4-6.

But Montague never ventured to answer it, and therefore never explained why competition in space remained the *modus operandi*. From the American perspective such an explanation would have entailed putting the blame on Soviet reticence and Khrushchev's insistence on linking space cooperation with disarmament. Instead, Montague chose to accentuate the positive by celebrating existing agreements and reaffirming American interest in continuing and expanding cooperation in the future.²⁸

American optimism about a joint lunar program, however, had already begun to wane. Before his death, Kennedy put NASA Administrator James Webb in charge of devising proposals for possible Soviet-American space cooperation. In November 1963, shortly after taking office, Lyndon Johnson asked Webb to provide a report on potential joint space projects. Webb appointed Hugh Dryden to strike an interagency meeting to begin a draft report. Delivered to Johnson on January 31, 1964, the position paper represented a "consensus" of the interagency group.²⁹ In sum, it proposed a "graduated approach" to building confidence between the two superpowers via "a joint program of unmanned flight projects to support a manned lunar landing."³⁰

²⁸ He discussed the Soviet-American cooperation made possible by a 1962 agreement reached between Hugh Dryden and Anatoliy Blagonravov (the so-called Dryden-Blagonravov agreement). See: Montague, "Cooperation In Space," 16.

²⁹ The interagency group consisted of representatives from: NASA; Department of State; Department of Defense; CIA; the Science Advisor; Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council.

³⁰ The report sought to guide negotiations with the USSR towards projects that stood "a reasonable chance" of being successfully achieved while still protecting American "national interests," and giving "careful consideration" to generating "favorable attitudes" amongst Congress and the American public. "If such a cooperative project were satisfactorily under way," Dryden told Johnson, "more advanced proposals could be considered." Webb considered this "the most realistic and constructive group of proposals which might be advanced to the Soviet Union" that would pursue "substantive rather than propaganda objectives alone." In his covering letter, Webb noted Soviet intransigence for providing the instrumentation and calibration details for understanding the data shared under the 1962 Dryden-Blagonravov agreement. Webb noted the need for "personal initiative" from both

Johnson had recently expressed his support for space cooperation, including a joint venture to the Moon. His January 8, 1964, State of the Union address declared that the U.S.:

must assure our pre-eminence in the peaceful exploration of outer space, focusing on an expedition to the moon in this decade--in cooperation with other powers if possible, alone if necessary.³¹

But while his administration became increasingly disillusioned with Soviet participation in existing cooperative agreements, the best they could hope for, it seemed, was to keep the communication channels open.³²

Meanwhile, an interagency committee addressing the future of American space exploration from a national security perspective looked favorably upon the United States undertaking a lunar landing on its own. A January 1964 report prepared by the committee discussed the high political prestige value of space cooperation.³³ It even weighed the possibility of undertaking a joint lunar landing “in

Johnson and Khrushchev. He advised that the United States should expand space cooperation with other nations to “demonstrate the serious intentions of the US with regard to international cooperation in space and to maintain some pressure upon the Soviet Union to follow suit.” See: “Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, February 29, 1964,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. XIV, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), 33; “Letter From the Deputy Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Dryden) to President Johnson, January 21, 1964,” *Ibid.*, 45-46; “Letter From the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Webb) to President Johnson, January 31, 1964,” *Ibid.*, 46-49.

³¹ “President Lyndon B. Johnson's Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union January 8, 1964,” n.d., <http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/640108.asp>; “Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts, August 26, 1965,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXIV, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999), 73-74.

³² In February Johnson's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy recommended taking no “immediate public action” citing a “need of Soviet performance on existing agreements.” For the time being, he assured Johnson, the United States “will continue to show interest” in space cooperation “through the existing Dryden-Blagonravov channel.” “Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, February 29, 1964,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. XIV, 34.

³³ The 20-member committee was made up of representatives from the Department of State, NASA, ACDA, OST, the CIA, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Exhibiting

lieu of a competitive race.” Although it foresaw such a mission potentially improving superpower relations, it also argued that the political advantages of achieving the first lunar landing on its own “would be sizeable.” After a manned lunar landing, the committee anticipated, the space race would undergo “a substantial change of pace and emphasis.” Such a shift, it argued, would provide an enriched “opportunity” for seeking greater international cooperation in space.³⁴ The report thus argued that competition should reign until after an American lunar landing.

Others in the Johnson administration similarly warned against proposing a joint manned lunar landing.³⁵ In March 1964, however, Johnson authorized Webb to pursue Soviet cooperation on a series of joint unmanned flights to support a manned lunar landing.³⁶ By May 1964, though, even Webb argued that the U.S. should compete with the Soviet Union in order to spur it to cooperate.³⁷ So while American

particular concern for “political prestige considerations in space activities” and for the “political implications of our achievements measured against those of the USSR,” the report argued that “international cooperation in space activities” would play an important role in enhancing American prestige.

³⁴ It foresaw several key factors driving this change: the “novelty of space will have passed away”; the US would have “redressed [its] present inferiority in space boosters” and would be “less dependent on reacting to a Soviet lead”; and there would be “increased international interdependence” in the space field. See: “Report Prepared by the Committee on National Security Policy Planning Implications of Outer Space in the 1970s, Basic National Security Policy Planning Task I (1), January 30, 1964,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXIV, 50-53.

³⁵ “The action is now with the Soviet Union,” Charles E. Johnson of the NSC staff wrote, and “some performance on their part is needed before we should make our next moves.” The President, he suggested, should first “communicate secretly” with Khrushchev to persuade him to “personally oversee and expedite the Soviet response to our offers of cooperation.” See: “Memorandum From Charles E. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), February 4, 1964,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXIV, 54.

³⁶ “National Security Action Memorandum No. 285, March 3, 1964,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXIV, 55.

³⁷ “The greater our lead in space,” he said, “the more ready the Soviet Union may become to cooperate with us in mutually beneficial ways that will lessen the dangers of nuclear war and advance the cause of freedom.” See: Ezell and Ezell, *The Partnership: A History of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project*, 58. Others in the Johnson administration continued to show concern about USIA foreign opinion polls suggesting that the United States had not yet “fully recovered from the blow to our prestige” that Soviet space successes had imposed. Such concerns competitively measured American prestige gains from space “vis-à-vis the Soviets” and sought a long-range space program that would assert and preserve American “world leadership in the advanced technology of space exploration.” See: “Action

officials continued to support space cooperation, competition with the Soviet rival remained powerfully seductive. Over the coming months, however, they grew increasingly frustrated with Soviet “unresponsiveness” to American space cooperation initiatives.³⁸

In early 1965, Johnson entrusted space matters to his new Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, who routinely voiced his support for space cooperation.³⁹ Humphrey soon asked the State Department for suggestions on how to improve overseas opinion of the American space effort. It advocated pursuing greater international cooperation in space, while expanding “public relations” campaigns to highlight “the openness, breadth and purposes of our space program.”⁴⁰ In his public discourse, Johnson continued to promote space cooperation as a remedy to

Memorandum From the Acting Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Owen) to Secretary of State Rusk, December 8, 1964,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXIV, 61-63.

³⁸ “Letter From the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Webb) to President Johnson, April 30, 1964,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXIV, 56; “Letter From the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Webb) to President Johnson, December 18, 1964,” *Ibid.*, 63-66. Still, it appeared to some that the great economic expense of space exploration was encouraging the Soviet Union to leave the space race, and might make them more open to cooperation. The Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Thomas L. Hughes interpreted the “artful vagueness” of Khrushchev’s statements on space to suggest that they were trying “to keep their options open.” Space cooperation would appeal to the Soviet Union, Hughes argued, because it emphasized, more than any other field, “the unique role of the world’s two superpowers.” Hughes suggested that the Soviets would be “more likely” to respond positively to “specific limited propositions,” however, “rather than cooperative programs for larger-scale space endeavors.” See: “Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk, July 15, 1964,” *Ibid.*, 57-59.

³⁹ Hirotaka Watanabe, “The Space Policy of the Johnson Administration: Project Apollo and International Cooperation,” *Osaka University Law Review*, no. 57 (February 2010): 49. On April 13, 1965, at his first meeting as chair of the NASC, Humphrey emphasized his conviction that international space cooperation was a cornerstone of United States policy.”

⁴⁰ The American rationale for pursuing further space cooperation with the Soviet Union continued to cite the potential for joint space ventures to contribute to “laying the groundwork for the creation of world peace” and show significant concern for “overseas public opinion” and especially perceptions of “the relative standing of the United States and the Soviet Union in space activities.” See: “Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, September 8, 1965,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXIV, 74.

divisiveness on Earth.⁴¹ He thus fulfilled the State Department's recommendations by conveying his government's interest—and openness to—space cooperation.

Though Johnson continued to urge Soviet-American space cooperation, the Soviet Union did not accept American invitations to join Intelsat, to view American launches, or to receive assistance in tracking Soviet space launches. In October 1965, the two powers did formalize a second agreement providing for a joint publication of a review of space medicine and biology.⁴² But for the rest of the 1960s, NASA's dissatisfaction with Soviet performance under existing agreements, and disappointment at Soviet unwillingness to expand space cooperation, only grew.⁴³ On December 2, 1965, Dryden passed away, silencing one of the strongest American voices advocating superpower cooperation in space. Over the course of six meetings between March 1962 and November 1964, Dryden and Anatoliy Blagonravov had tried to find a foundation for space cooperation, but the competitive urge still

⁴¹ At an August 29, 1965 press conference he asked: "as man draws nearer to the stars, why should he not also draw nearer to his neighbour? As we push ever deeper into the Universe, we must constantly learn to cooperate across the frontiers that really divide the Earth's surface." Speaking on the phone with the orbiting American Gemini 4 astronauts James McDivitt and Edward White on June 7, 1965, Johnson told them: "We do hope and we do pray that the time will come when all men of all nations will join together to explore space together, and walk side by side toward peace." See: "Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts, August 26, 1965," U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXIV, 73-74; Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 55-56; Kay, *Defining NASA*, 98.

⁴² The joint publication stemmed from discussions at a meeting between Dryden and Blagonravov in late May and early June of 1964, and so represented a consolidation of existing cooperative impulses rather than any new initiative. NASA and the Academy of Sciences jointly published the resulting text across three volumes in 1975 and 1976. See: "Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council (Welsh) to Vice President Humphrey, October 9, 1967," U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXIV, 116-118; *Foundations of Space Biology and Medicine*, 3 vols. (Washington, DC: Scientific and Technical Information Office, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1975); Ezell and Ezell, *The Partnership: A History of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project*, 58.

⁴³ Sagdeev and Eisenhower, "NASA - United States-Soviet Space Cooperation during the Cold War." Keldysh's August 1965 response to Webb's cooperation proposals reflected the tension existing between Soviet scientists and their authorities. "Soviet scientists positively evaluate cooperation between our countries in the study of cosmic space for purposes of its peaceful use," it read: "However, at the present time our representative cannot avail himself of your invitation." See: "Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, September 8, 1965," U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXIV, 74.

reigned.⁴⁴ For the rest of the decade, the U.S. space program concentrated its resources on being first to land a man on the Moon.⁴⁵

Meanwhile, American officials began to ponder the “significant political importance” of the space program’s post-Apollo direction. A State Department report prepared for the National Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC) in June 1966, for example, argued that the U.S. should continue to “exploit” its space program to “enhance our world position in the future.” Further noting how space exploration especially impacted American prestige vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, it urged the U.S. to have “a superior program characterized by openness” and to seek to maintain a position of “leadership” rather than “response” to Soviet challenges.⁴⁶ American officials thus advocated continuing competition in space in order to achieve a position of world leadership from which the U.S. could “issue challenges” to its Soviet rival.

While the State Department looked forward to the prestige gains that the U.S. would accrue from winning the competitive race to the Moon, it also hoped that an American victory in the Moon race would open the door to more superpower space cooperation.⁴⁷ Cooperation also became more attractive as budget reductions

⁴⁴ Blagonravov was the Chairman of the Soviet Academy of Science’s Commission on Exploration and Use of Space.

⁴⁵ Ezell and Ezell, *The Partnership: A History of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project*, 59-60.

⁴⁶ “Soviet skill in exploiting space achievements to their advantage in the areas of national prestige and international politics,” it contended, “must be recognized and countered. We must expect that space spectacles will continue to be the order of the day to the extreme limit of Soviet capability. And they will not stop at the moon.” It looked back on the first decade of space exploration and observed: “we have regularly found ourselves in the apparent position of following the Soviet lead in space exploration, of responding to, rather than issuing, challenges.” See: “Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State, June 14, 1966,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXIV, 98-99.

⁴⁷ An October 1966 State Department Policy Paper strongly favored “[d]e-fusing’ the space race between the U.S. and Soviets” and proposed “conducting major future ventures jointly, or at least coordinating national efforts with a view to limiting pressures for racing toward new goalposts deep in space.” It foresaw that “the moon race itself” was necessary to convince the Soviet Union “that

for the U.S. space program post-Apollo began to loom, and as American officials increasingly came to believe that global interest in a superpower space race was in decline. Furthermore, cooperation presented an opportunity to continue to exploit the U.S. space program to enhance global prestige, since it would demonstrate American openness “issuing challenges” to the Soviet space adversary.

By the fall of 1967, American officials’ pessimism about Soviet-American space cooperation was palpable. While NASC Executive Secretary Edward C. Welsh argued that the U.S. should still try to engage the Soviet Union on a limited joint venture in space, he characterized the American record at fostering such cooperation as a “gloomy picture.”⁴⁸ NASA’s October 2, 1967, report to Congress on Soviet-American cooperation in space expressed a similar mood of disappointment mixed with perseverance.⁴⁹ Still, that month Humphrey urged Welsh to convey to NASA

cooperation ... is more advantageous than wasteful national competition.” Humphrey found the paper “thoughtful, informative, ... provocative [and] very timely in light of the budgetary situation.” He had copies of it distributed to members of the NASC. He also decided to make it the focus of NASC meetings in late 1966 or early 1967. Revised and Resubmitted in May 1967, a new version of the Policy Paper foresaw that “space [would] be increasingly internationalized” as international interest in a space race between the two superpowers declined. “Department of State Policy Paper, October 1966,” *Ibid.*, 108-111; “Letter From Vice President Humphrey to Secretary of State Rusk, November 25, 1966,” *Ibid.*, 111; “Editorial Note,” *Ibid.*, 113-115. Also see: “Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Owen) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow), September 19, 1966,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXIV, 107-108.

⁴⁸ Secretary of State Dean Rusk continued to try—unsuccessfully—to exploit diplomatic channels such as meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at the 22nd United Nations General Assembly in September 1967 to press for further cooperation. By October, Welsh admitted that he no longer attached “significant weight” to Soviet officials’ routine “statements vaguely suggestive of cooperation.” He expressed his disappointment with Soviet contributions to “even these limited projects”. The “best that can be said,” he complained, was that it had been “[b]etter than nothing.” Welsh’s rationale continued to cite potential cost savings and to assume that space cooperation would better superpower relations. He urged that the U.S. should press forward and not become “discouraged” with Soviet reluctance to cooperate. See: “Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council (Welsh) to Vice President Humphrey, October 9, 1967,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXIV, 116-118; “Memorandum of Conversation, September 27, 1967,” *Ibid.*, 115-116.

⁴⁹ “We regret that the Soviets have not been prepared to move more rapidly and more broadly to cooperate in space,” it stated. NASA reaffirmed that it would not “stop trying” to engage the Soviet Union in “meaningful cooperation,” but it warned that without “very substantial changes” in Soviet “attitudes,” no “significant cooperation” would be possible.

and the State Department the importance of increasing space cooperation with all countries including the Soviet Union.⁵⁰

Shrinking budgets pressured NASA to seek avenues to reduce costs, which caused them to take even greater interest in international cooperation. As Richard Nixon assumed the Presidency, a report on international space cooperation prepared for the incoming President acknowledged the failure to engage the Soviet Union in this area so far, but argued for a renewed effort “at a high level.”⁵¹ In the months before Apollo 11, American officials repeatedly attempted to spark Soviet interest in space cooperation, but were routinely turned down.⁵²

Neither Nixon nor Brezhnev initially saw much potential for space cooperation, though in the spirit of détente, both actively pursued cooperation in other areas. Nixon did, however, remain open to space cooperation in his public rhetoric. Indeed, he continued to present cooperation in space as a panacea to conflict between nations.⁵³ Superpower interest in space cooperation gained traction

⁵⁰ “Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council (Welsh) to Vice President Humphrey, October 9, 1967,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXIV, 116-118.

⁵¹ “Memorandum from Secretary Rogers to President Nixon, March 14, 1969,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1969-1976*, vol. XIV, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005), 53-55.

⁵² In April 1969, NASA Administrator Thomas O. Paine wrote to Blagonravov to indicate that “the participation of Soviet scientists” in NASA projects would be “warmly welcomed.” Paine continued to contact Blagonravov throughout the spring of 1969, inviting the Soviets to put an experiment aboard Apollo 11, inviting Blagonravov to view the Apollo 11 launch at Kennedy Space Center, and suggesting that the two have a personal meeting. Paine’s requests were repeatedly rejected. Paine even toured Western Europe, Japan, Canada, and Australia in the fall of 1969 to “undertake very preliminary discussions on areas of cooperation in space activities.” Kissinger envisioned space cooperation with other nations as “something we could dangle in front of the Soviets to whet their appetite and push them into being more cooperative in other areas.” See: “Memorandum of Conversation, October 10, 1969”; Jennifer Ross-Nazzari, “Détente on Earth and in Space: The Apollo-Soyuz Test Project,” *OAH Magazine of History* 24, no. 3 (July 1, 2010): 29-34.

⁵³ “As we explore the reaches of space,” Nixon proposed in his January 20, 1969 inaugural address, “let us go to the new worlds together—not as new worlds to be conquered, but as a new adventure to be shared.” He argued that space exploration revealed how “man’s destiny on earth is not divisible.” In a September 18, 1969 speech before the United Nations, Nixon promoted “internationalizing man’s epic venture into space.” See: Richard Nixon, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (United States Government Printing Office, 1972), 3-4; “Editorial Note,” U.S. Department of State,

as the wider effort to reduce international tensions in the spirit of détente took hold in the early 1970s. The intense competition in space during the late 1950s and 1960s made high-profile cooperation there especially resonant. Both countries pursued space cooperation with their own allies.⁵⁴ But the greatest potential for real collaboration, cost savings, valuable experience, technological development, and propaganda payoff would be a cooperative venture between the two space-faring superpowers.

Shortly after Apollo 11 Paine contacted Mstislav V. Keldysh, President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, who now appeared more willing to discuss finding a joint Soviet-American space venture. Before long, the two began a serious dialogue on the subject. Paine proposed to Keldysh that the two countries might work together on NASA's Viking program—two planned probes to Mars. In October 1969, Paine sent Keldysh a copy of a recent Space Task Group report on the post-Apollo U.S. space program, that urged downgrading space competition in favor of increased international cooperation.⁵⁵ Assuming the notion that space exploration

FRUS, 1969-1976, vol. I, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003), 53-55; "Richard Nixon: Inaugural Address," n.d., <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=1941>. A December 1969 report prepared for USIA noted space cooperation as an example of the Nixon administration's "New Direction In Foreign Policy." "The Nixon Administration: A New Direction For America (A Summary Of A Year Of Reform)," December 1969, RG 306, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Director's Subject Files 1968-1972, A1 42, Box 4, NARA II.

⁵⁴ Interkosmos, a Soviet program of international cooperation, would see that country undertake joint missions with several Warsaw Pact countries beginning November 28, 1970, and continuing into the 1980s. See: Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 56, 63-4; Karash, *The Superpower Odyssey*, 75-6; Matthew J. von Bencke, *The Politics of Space: A History of U.S.-Soviet/Russian Competition and Cooperation in Space* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 79; Sagdeev and Eisenhower, "NASA - United States-Soviet Space Cooperation during the Cold War."

⁵⁵ Noting that the manned lunar landing had "resulted in a new feeling of 'oneness' among men everywhere," the report argued: "It inspired a common sense of victory that can provide the basis of new initiatives for international cooperation." The previous twelve years of space exploration, it observed, had been characterized by a "race to the moon" and by the two space-faring superpowers "vying over leadership in space." Further noting that such competition had been "an accurate reflection of one of the several strong motivations" for the American space program during the period, it nonetheless urged that international cooperation should gain importance as a rationale for

promoted internationalism, the report foresaw future space cooperation positively transforming international relations:

If we retain the identification of the world with our space program, we have an opportunity for significant political effects on nations and peoples and on their relationships to each other, which in the long run may be quite profound.⁵⁶

American officials' communications with Keldysh proved decisive in opening the door to greater Soviet-American space cooperation. Keldysh replied to Paine's letters in October 1970 stating that the two countries could broaden the as yet "limited character" of space cooperation. In January 1971, representatives from both countries' space programs met in Moscow to discuss furthering cooperation in space. Four days of exhaustive negotiations led by Keldysh and NASA Deputy Administrator George M. Low produced an agreement to work jointly on coordinated research in a number of areas. The two also found an opportunity to privately discuss a far bolder plan of docking orbiting Soviet and American space capsules—an idea that culminated with ASTP.⁵⁷

future American space missions. The Moon landing had not only "captured the imagination of the world," the technologies it used also "transcend[ed] national boundaries"

⁵⁶ Space Task Group, "The Post-Apollo Space Program: Directions for the Future, Space Task Group Report to the President, Sept. 1969," n.d., 7; Ezell and Ezell, *The Partnership: A History of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project*, 6-7.

⁵⁷ Ezell and Ezell, *The Partnership: A History of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project*, 125, 129. Space docking appealed to both sides because it could prove essential in the event of an emergency in outer space—something both countries had already experienced and wished to remedy in the future. At a 1970 meeting with Keldysh, President of the American Academy of Sciences Philip Handler mentioned the American film *Marooned*—which fictionally depicted Soviet cosmonauts rescuing American astronauts in Earth orbit—to suggest that the two countries should tackle the compatibility issues between their capsules to make such a rescue possible. The idea took hold as Keldysh and Low pursued it in their January 1971 discussions. See: Sagdeev and Eisenhower, "NASA - United States-Soviet Space Cooperation during the Cold War."

Amerika, meanwhile, had continued to highlight American officials' initiative in pursuing space cooperation.⁵⁸ Jay Holmes again reported on Soviet-American dialogue on space cooperation in February 1971. He discussed the 1962 Dryden-Blagonravov agreement and the coordinated launchings and data exchanges it provided for. Avoiding mention of American officials' disappointment with Soviet performance in these cooperative ventures, Holmes presented the agreement as a positive step forward in superpower space cooperation dialogue. He celebrated the U.S.-Soviet agreement signed in Moscow on October 28, 1970, as a "significant" step toward making Soviet and American spaceships compatible for docking in space. He looked forward to meetings in the spring of 1971 that would begin to design the necessary equipment for a joint docking mission.⁵⁹ *Amerika's* reports on the space cooperation dialogue thus continued to focus on its positive aspects while highlighting American initiative and interest in furthering cooperation.

Not all in the Nixon administration supported the idea of a Soviet-American docking in space, however. CIA officials expressed dismay at the idea, arguing that the Soviet Union would not give Americans reciprocal access to Soviet

⁵⁸ A September 1970 article by Tom Buckley described how in February 1969 Paine "invited Polish scientists to join in the international investigation of the moon's secrets." Buckley's comments conveyed the United States' "sincere hope" to expand Soviet-American cooperation in space. He also reported that Paine and the National Academy of Sciences had already called for expanding superpower space cooperation to "at least" trade more information but "perhaps" avoid duplicating efforts in space. See: Tom Buckley, "Thomas Paine's Arena Is the Universe," *Amerika*, September 1970, 18.

⁵⁹ "The Dryden-Blagonravov talks," he simply recalled, "led to another agreement in November 1965" to publish a joint review of findings in space biology and medicine. "Americans hope," he pointed out, that those talks would lead to "more fruitful discussions and relationships" between the two countries. He reported comments from an unnamed "top official" that "[t]he future could be more promising" as Americans would "continue to work vigorously with Soviet representatives for cooperative relationships of value to both sides." "History," Holmes added, "suggests the importance of such cooperation." See: Holmes, "The New Configuration," 18.

technologies.⁶⁰ Suspicions went both ways. On February 15, 1972, Kissinger met Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin to convey his desire for a space cooperation agreement to be reached before the upcoming Moscow summit in May. Dobrynin expressed Soviet concerns over American intentions with détente, and especially its submarine-launched ballistic missile program.⁶¹ At any rate, superpower dialogue on space cooperation moved forward, with technical discussions on the feasibility of the proposed joint mission conducted in Houston in March and Moscow in April 1972.⁶²

The Nixon administration continued to emphasize the positive propaganda aspects of a cooperative mission. White House communiqués, for instance, emphasized that a joint mission would bring “mutual benefits,” such as enhancing international opinions of both countries by dramatically symbolizing an improvement in the superpower relationship.⁶³ Nixon evidently viewed space cooperation as good publicity. Clarifying which issues he should discuss with Brezhnev in private, Nixon argued that space cooperation should be one area treated publicly.⁶⁴ He and Kissinger also agreed that the two leaders should personally sign the Space Cooperation Agreement in the spotlight of the Moscow summit scheduled for May 1972.⁶⁵ On May 24, 1972, Nixon and Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin signed

⁶⁰ “Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting, February 11, 1972,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1969-1976*, vol. XIV, 162-3.

⁶¹ “Memorandum of Conversation, February 15, 1972,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1969-1976*, vol. XIV, 177-179.

⁶² “Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, March 22, 1972,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1969-1976*, vol. XIV, 222.

⁶³ “Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, May 15, 1972,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1969-1976*, vol. XIV, 846-847.

⁶⁴ “Memorandum of Conversation, February 15, 1972,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1969-1976*, vol. XIV, 182.

⁶⁵ In fact, some tension existed within the administration over exactly who should sign the agreement. In his memoirs, Kissinger indicated that there has been “unending rivalry” between the White House and the various departments of the American government who had hammered out the agreements over who would get to sign the finalized documents. The Departments wanted some recognition for their role in the negotiation process, but Nixon still insisted on his “share of the glory.” A

the “Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes,” which provided for a joint space docking mission to be performed in July 1975.⁶⁶

Nixon’s presidency did not survive to see ASTP’s historic handshake in space, however. Shortly after the docking, in a conversation with the orbiting ASTP crew broadcast live on radio and television across the U.S., Nixon’s successor Gerald Ford cast the mission as a harbinger of future space cooperation and improved international relations. Perhaps unsurprisingly, his depiction of ASTP was remarkably similar to *Amerika*’s narratives of spaceflight.⁶⁷ But although both nations’ space

compromise was eventually struck where the signing of the agreements was postponed until the summit. There, the Cabinet ministers responsible for the various agreements would sign, while a “beaming Nixon and Brezhnev” looked on. See: “Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, May 15, 1972,” *Ibid.*, 846. As Nixon told Kissinger May 18, 1972—only four days before Nixon arrived in Moscow for the summit: “I see no damn reason why I shouldn’t be up front and center.” Specifically, Nixon did not want to “let the State’s boys get away with everything this time,” and give Secretary of State William P. “Rogers and his people a chance to piss on it.” In particular, Kissinger added, Nixon should be in the spotlight for the space cooperation agreement, “because that’s got so much imagination to it— and I—” Nixon interrupted: “Also, in my 1959 speech, remember I said: ‘let us go to the moon together.’ And, that’s a good point.” See: “Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), May 18, 1972,” U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1969-1976*, vol. XIV, 943-948.

⁶⁶ In signing the document, the political leaders merely confirmed an initial technical agreement reached between Interkosmos Deputy Chairman Vladimir A. Kotelnikov and NASA Deputy Administrator George M. Low, in April 1972. See: Asif A. Siddiqi, *The Soviet Space Race with Apollo*, (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida), 793-4.

⁶⁷ He called the mission a “tremendous demonstration of cooperation” and an “outstanding example of what we have to do in the future to make it a better world.” He discussed the broad scientific and technological base in both countries—the “thousands of American and Soviet scientists and technicians”—that made the flight a reality. He expressed his confidence “that the day is not far off” when similar cooperative missions “will be more or less commonplace.” Leonov agreed that ASTP was only “the beginning for future exploration in space between our two countries.” Stafford emphasized that the flight represented a milestone in technological progress by pointing out that this docking system was “the smoothest one so far.” Ford discussed the reciprocal language training both crews received, noting: “both sides have worked very hard to learn either Russian on the one hand or English on the other.” He even used food to highlight American affluence, recalling ASTP cosmonauts Leonov and Valeriy Kubasov’s September 1974 visit to Washington: “We flew from the White House to this picnic just across the river. We had some crab specialties that I enjoyed, and I think you did.” He then asked Kubasov about the “somewhat different food” available to the Russian crew in space. “We get good space food,” the cosmonaut replied, “some juice, some coffee, and a lot of water, no beer, no crab.” See: “Apollo-Soyuz Test Project: The President’s Telephone Conversation With the American and Soviet Crew Members Following the Rendezvous and Docking of the Two Spacecraft. July 17, 1975,” in *Presidential Documents: Gerald R. Ford, 1975*, vol. 11, n.d., 754-755.

officials continued to discuss possible avenues for cooperation after the flight, congressional pressure caused incoming President Jimmy Carter to end U.S.-Soviet dialog on cooperation by late 1978.⁶⁸

Portraying Similarities

Amerika's coverage of ASTP, emphasized the similarities between the two superpowers' objectives in space. In so doing, it highlighted both countries' commitments to the peaceful exploration of outer space while ignoring how differences between the two nations had protracted the space cooperation dialogue for several years. A July 1975 special section on ASTP, for example, sidestepped any discussion of the several years of space cooperation dialogue in the 1960s. It was only in April 1970, it claimed, that Paine and Blagonravov opened the conversation. After that, it implied, the dialogue on space cooperation proceeded rather smoothly, leading directly to a meeting between American and Soviet specialists on rendezvous and docking technology. "This was followed," it summarized, "by other meetings" and eventually the May 24, 1972, ASTP agreement. To address the many preceding years during which the U.S. and Soviet Union had engaged in limited space cooperation, the article simply explained that ASTP was "not the first instance of cooperation between the USA and USSR."⁶⁹ *Amerika's* ASTP coverage thus presented a simplified narrative of both countries unambiguously supporting cooperation in space.

⁶⁸ Congress was concerned that the Soviets had exploited ASTP to obtain valuable American technologies. See: Sagdeev and Eisenhower, "NASA - United States-Soviet Space Cooperation during the Cold War."

⁶⁹ "Apollo Soyuz Project: First International Manned Spaceflight," *Amerika*, July 1975, 21.

Though there were distinct differences in their approaches to space and in the timing of their efforts, *Amerika*'s discussions of space cooperation accentuated the commonalities between the Soviet and American space programs.⁷⁰ *Amerika*'s celebrations of American space achievements regularly acknowledged previous Soviet ones.⁷¹ *Amerika* paid tribute to Soviet accomplishments even as it suggested American superiority in exploring space.⁷² It thus recognized Soviet space achievements to balance conveying a peaceful, friendly, and cooperative message with taking a competitive stance. Such narratives underlined the two countries' shared experiences of spaceflight and suggested that—as the two world leaders in space exploration—they were the ideal partners for a cooperative venture in space.

Amerika routinely cited comments supporting space cooperation made by key figures in the U.S. space program. A special message from Frank Borman to *Amerika*'s Soviet readership printed in the June 1969 issue, for instance, exploited the attention garnered by Apollo 8 to express an invitation to cooperate.⁷³ Elsewhere Jay Holmes reported Neil Armstrong's comments to a large audience at the Moscow Academy of Sciences:

⁷⁰ Its reports on the similar experiences of overcoming the challenges of space exploration emphasized, for example, the "common Soviet-American program of space research." Montague, "Cooperation In Space," 16.

⁷¹ A May 1962, article on John Glenn's orbital flight, for example, gave due credit to Gagarin and Titov (who "amazed the world with seventeen orbital flights"), and acknowledged the contributions of both American and Soviet "scientists" and "technicians" to these achievements. Stansbury, "John Glenn ... In Orbit," 2-7.

⁷² A November 1964 article reported on the American probe Ranger 7, which filmed and photographed the Moon in late July 1964 from a distance of 2,125 km. It admitted that a Soviet probe had photographed the Moon in October 1959, but at "a distance of about 60,000 km." The American photographs, it boasted, "give much more information about the moon and especially about the possibilities of landing lunar ships with men on board." "Close-ups of Moon Show Three-foot Craters," *Amerika*, November 1964, 59-61.

⁷³ Noting that he and his "astronaut colleagues" were "deeply touched by the warmth that Soviet cosmonauts, the Soviet government and Soviet people have shown in their reaction to the American Apollo 8 flight," Borman relayed their wish: "we hope that our efforts will create favorable conditions for closer cooperation in the peaceful conquest of outer space." See: Frank Borman, "A Special Message to the Readers of Soviet Life," *Amerika*, June 1969, 40.

I have found in discussions with my Soviet cosmonaut colleagues that their objectives in space are very much the same as ours.

The audience, Holmes observed, “was pleased.”⁷⁴ Such anecdotes put a friendly face on the American space program, while generating interest in cooperation by allowing American astronauts to speak more directly on the subject to the magazine’s Soviet readership. Reports of similar remarks made by Soviet cosmonauts in support of cooperation further made the case for expanding it.⁷⁵

Holmes also reported the conclusions of a special task force. It envisioned American objectives in space for the next two decades and “emphasized the importance of international cooperation rather than competition in the years to come.” He cited the similar courses of Soviet and American space exploration to argue that the two leading space-faring nations should cooperate in space. First listing numerous early Soviet space accomplishments, then various recent U.S. achievements, Holmes used these common trajectories to predict that cooperation would soon “take the place of competition.”⁷⁶ *Amerika* thus emphasized the parallels between the two space powers’ experiences in space to encourage a shift from competition to cooperation.

It also underlined the two countries’ similar objectives in space. Cooperation-themed articles accentuated how international cooperation in space could further

⁷⁴ Holmes also reported Armstrong’s comment “that he would be happy to be a member of a joint Soviet-American space crew.” Holmes, “The New Configuration,” 18.

⁷⁵ In one example, *Amerika* cited cosmonaut Georgi Beregovoi’s comments to American reporters during an October 1969 visit to the United States. Asked whether or not cosmonauts and astronauts would ever “fly side-by-side,” Beregovoi answered by suggesting the similar objectives of the Soviet and American space programs: “We are going parallel but different directions, but in principle such a possibility exists.” See: “Here Come the Cosmonauts! (’69 U.S. Visit of Beregovoi & Feoktistov),” *Amerika*, March 1970, 48.

⁷⁶ Holmes, “The New Configuration,” 18.

scientific headway to help both countries achieve their goal of pushing forward the boundaries of scientific progress. In doing so, they employed many of the same strategies as other space-themed articles to associate cooperation with progress. For instance, they used scientific terminology to emphasize how joint projects, like those provided for by the 1962 agreement, made significant contributions to science.⁷⁷ They also stressed how space cooperation brought universal benefits for all mankind.⁷⁸ Joint collaboration on science, the magazine underscored, could strengthen global peace by overcoming the divisiveness of nations. Scientific data, it pointed out, transcended cultural and linguistic differences:

Satellites' voices in space do not much resemble either the Russian or English language, but they transmit data that are interpreted in these two languages.⁷⁹

Amerika's cooperation-themed articles also typically emphasized American interest in expanding the existing cooperative frameworks. They also highlighted how the United States would share the benefits of space cooperation with the entire world.⁸⁰ *Amerika* portrayed the United States as a world leader in international scientific cooperation by highlighting American partnerships with nations on four continents. It frequently emphasized how much "precedence" there was for broad international cooperation in space, often listing the numerous partnerships between NASA and

⁷⁷ Montague, "Cooperation In Space," 16; Holmes, "The New Configuration," 18.

⁷⁸ The joint program to study the Earth's magnetic field, Montague explained for example, would also "collect additional data on the invisible shield that blocks the flow of humanity from deadly solar radiation." Montague, "Cooperation In Space," 16.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Montague, for instance, affirmed American willingness to share scientific data with "any country provided that it assumes a share of the cost." Any country that wished to receive "fax images of local cloud cover" from the American Nimbus satellite, he added, could "acquire the necessary receiving equipment for less than 35,000 dollars." Ibid.

other nations to launch various spacecraft.⁸¹ It also underlined American cooperation with international scientists, and discussed the various joint Soviet-U.S. projects provided for under the 1962 and 1965 agreements.⁸² *Amerika* thus lauded how space exploration provided an ideal forum for broad international cooperation, and portrayed a space partnership between the U.S. and the Soviet Union as the pinnacle of space cooperation. *Amerika* often argued that the vastness of space, and the challenges inherent in exploring it, required a joint international effort.⁸³

In the 1970s, it continued to assert that the United States' ambitious plans to explore space further would lead directly to closer international cooperation. A September 1970 article quoted NASA Administrator Thomas Paine, for example, who argued that in order to generate "the maximum return" from orbiting space stations, it would be necessary to staff them with "the very best scientists in each specialty," some of whom would "inevitably ... not be Americans."⁸⁴ The ambitious nature of American plans to explore the Moon and nearby planets, Holmes likewise noted, virtually necessitated closer international collaboration. Once the expense and

⁸¹ NASA, Jay Holmes explained, provided facilities launch the satellites provided by the "foreign partner[s]." He described how "American satellites have carried at least 17 experiments for scientists in" Western Europe, while "[m]ore than 50 scientists from 16 countries other than the United States are involved with the analyses of the samples returned from the moon on the Apollo flights." Holmes, "The New Configuration," 18.

⁸² The "laser retroreflector" that Apollo astronauts had installed on the Moon, Holmes noted, had been "announced as available to all countries." He vaguely noted that "[m]any other countries cooperate" in a variety of activities related to space exploration. Finally, he discussed how space-based surveillance of Earth's resources was becoming an "important area of growing international cooperation" and observed how "work is under way in cooperation with Brazil, Mexico, Canada and India." Ibid. See also: Montague, "Cooperation In Space," 16.

⁸³ As Jeff Stansbury wrote in May 1962, even though there was increasing activity in space, there was "still enough room for everyone." Observing that both countries "still face innumerable challenges" in exploring space, he asserted: "it is extremely important that work on them is carried out jointly and not separately." Stansbury, "John Glenn ... In Orbit," 2-7.

⁸⁴ "In the future," Buckley said, "men from many nations will continue to work together on the (moon) research. Some will follow the Apollo astronauts to the moon and to the planets beyond." Paine looked into the future with a similar air of certainty: "That sense of international cooperation as fellow travelers on what Buckminster Fuller calls 'spaceship Earth,' he predicted, "will be one of the results of space exploration." See: Buckley, "Thomas Paine's Arena Is the Universe," 18.

physical challenges of spaceflight declined to “reasonable levels,” he predicted, “men and women of many nationalities undoubtedly will go into space.”⁸⁵ *Amerika* thus used the device of predicting the future to suggest that deeper exploration of the cosmos would make closer international cooperation inevitable.

Amerika also regularly suggested that space cooperation would profoundly transform international relations on Earth. A November 1970 article, for instance, foresaw a proposed space station becoming:

a wholesome resource from which will emerge ‘giant leaps’ for mankind’s next generation. Transcending national boundaries, the base, through international cooperation, could result in a significant reduction of world tensions.⁸⁶

Amerika thus not only predicted that space exploration would naturally bring about increased cooperation, it also promised that such cooperation would strengthen world peace. The increasing internationalization of space exploration, it argued, would inevitably reduce competition among nations. *Amerika*’s support for space cooperation thus reinforced its overall depiction of the American space program as a sign of the American world-leading commitment to peace and progress for all mankind.

Interpersonal Relations

The human element of the *handshake* in space was vitally important for conveying ASTP’s intended symbolic meaning. To reinforce its depiction of the mission as a symbol of peace, *Amerika* gave special focus to the interpersonal relations of the

⁸⁵ Holmes, “The New Configuration,” 18.

⁸⁶ “Space Station ’75,” *Amerika*, November 1970, 14.

astronauts and cosmonauts. Long before ASTP brought American astronauts and Soviet cosmonauts together in space, *Amerika* welcomed opportunities to show them working together and building friendly relations with each other, while demonstrating American openness to cooperation. It celebrated instances when—as the title to an August 1962 article proclaimed— “Space Travelers Meet.” Reporting on “the first Soviet-American ‘space journey’” when Soviet cosmonaut Gherman Titov visited the United States and met with “his American colleague” John Glenn, it emphasized the cordial, friendly relations between the two space explorers.⁸⁷ It made sure to report any examples of cooperation, noting, for example, that the “two cosmonauts” made a “joint statement to the International Committee on Space Research.”⁸⁸

According to *Amerika*, the manned aspect of ASTP distinguished it from previous Soviet-American space cooperation.⁸⁹ The human element also allowed *Amerika* to push ideological differences to the background by stressing that the main obstacles to cooperation were primarily linguistic differences.⁹⁰ It also underscored how such differences could be overcome by individuals’ sincere desire to find a basis for cooperation.⁹¹ It thus concentrated its narrative of the flight on the astronauts

⁸⁷ In one example linking Titov and Glenn as symbols of international friendship to a key symbol of the American nation, for example, it described how the two men ascended to the top of the Washington Monument while “exchanging jokes” with each other. It also used Titov’s visit to portray the potential for the Soviet space experts to learn from their American counterparts, which suggested American near-parity with the Soviet Union in space capabilities. “Glenn ... explained in detail to his Soviet guest the devices of the ‘Freedom 7’ capsule,” it reported, “in which the first American Alan Shepard made a suborbital flight.”

⁸⁸ Anthony J. Bowman, “Space Travelers Meet,” *Amerika*, August 1962, 2-3.

⁸⁹ “ASTP goes much further,” than previous collaborative ventures, it argued, “in the respect that it requires close contact between American and Soviet crews in space.”

⁹⁰ When asked in 1969 whether cosmonauts and astronauts would “fly side-by-side,” for instance, Beregovoi “flashed his familiar grin: ‘Maybe as soon as we learn English.’”

⁹¹ “Turning serious,” Beregovoi added: “We pilots have found a common language. We understood each other very well. I would like to see these meetings repeated.”

and cosmonauts “[a]cting as a group” and finding a “common language” at the interpersonal level.⁹²

Routine coverage of the cooperative training undergone in both countries in preparation for ASTP concentrated on the astronauts and cosmonauts overcoming the language barrier. These articles almost always noted the reciprocity of the language arrangement: that each side would learn the others’ language, and use it during the mission.⁹³ Such repetitive reports suggested that there was deeper symbolic meaning to ASTP’s linguistic arrangement. In practical terms, it did not disadvantage either country’s personnel by placing the onus of learning a second language on one country alone. But the language issue also provided *Amerika* with a human-interest angle demonstrating both sides’ commitment to overcoming the many challenges posed by cooperation. *Amerika* thus encouraged Soviet-American cooperation in exploring space by casting the interpersonal relations between astronauts and cosmonauts as a symbol of “friendly relations” between states. Just as individuals did in these narratives, so could nations find a “common language” to strengthen peace and further human progress through joint exploration of the cosmos.

Amerika’s exclusively positive portrayals of Soviet-American cooperation suggested complete openness on both sides, as if neither country was reluctant to share the secrets of their space programs nor were disappointed with the other sides’

⁹² “Here Come the Cosmonauts!,” 48.

⁹³ The decision to adopt the second languages of each party for the flight, *Amerika* admitted, “may seem strange, presumably, but such a decision had reasons.” When using a second language, it explained, people spoke slower and tried to enunciate their words more clearly. See: “Apollo Soyuz Project: First International Manned Spaceflight,” 21.

candor.⁹⁴ In a similar way, *Amerika* portrayed the problems posed by each country's differing technologies as minor and surmountable.⁹⁵ Whatever challenges did arise did not prove an obstacle to the mission's success, and the narratives of overcoming these difficulties demonstrated the advanced degree of both sides' technical progress. Such an unambiguously positive treatment of the joint mission seemed designed to encourage greater international cooperation in the future, by suggesting that the absolute sincerity and technological capabilities of both sides had led to a genuinely successful cooperative venture.

Images underlined the depiction of friendly relations between American and Soviet astronauts, cosmonauts, and politicians while further signifying the broader context of improved relations between the two countries. Photographs typically




Figure 9-1: Soviet cosmonaut Alexei Leonov at Disneyworld.
"Picture Parade," *Amerika*, July 1975, i.f.c.

showed cosmonauts and astronauts as colleagues working together side by side, or otherwise enjoying each other's company in both American and Russian locales.⁹⁶ Though such images suggested how

⁹⁴ Holmes painted just such a one-dimensional picture of astronaut-cosmonaut interactions at ASTP training sessions in the Soviet Union. Quoting NASA Administrator for International Affairs Arnold W. Frutkin, Holmes reported that the American "delegation was taken into the spacecraft, all its systems were explained to them, and all their questions were answered." See: Holmes, "The New Configuration," 18.

⁹⁵ "Apollo Soyuz Project: First International Manned Spaceflight," 21.

⁹⁶ Bowman, "Space Travelers Meet," 2-3; "Cosmonauts Visit USA," *Amerika*, January 1971, 48-51; "Here Come the Cosmonauts!," 48; "Apollo Soyuz Project: First International Manned Spaceflight," 21.

effectively Soviets and Americans could cooperate and highlighted similarities between the two countries' space programs, they also illustrated the benefits of openness in American society. In one image significantly placed on the inside front cover of the July 1975 issue, Soviet cosmonaut Alexei Leonov was shown riding an amusement park spaceship at Florida's Walt Disney World. (See Figure 9-1) While the caption indicating that Leonov was waving to his two American colleagues suggested that the image symbolized friendship, the amusement park signified American affluence and the pleasures available within the capitalist economic system. The scene was shot during a recreational visit during ASTP training sessions in the winter before the flight.⁹⁷ The coincidence of a similar image of American astronaut Walter Cunningham on a different spaceship ride at California's Disneyland appeared in the April 1968 edition suggested that *Amerika* may have staged the opportunity to photograph Leonov aboard such a ride for its ASTP coverage. (See Figure 9-2)⁹⁸



Figure 9-2: American astronaut Walter Cunningham at Disneyland.

"Picture Parade - Astronaut's Day Off," *Amerika*, April 1968, i.f.c.

⁹⁷ "Picture Parade," *Amerika*, July 1975, i.f.c.

⁹⁸ "Picture Parade - Astronaut's Day Off," *Amerika*, April 1968, i.f.c.

Conclusion

Amerika's coverage of ASTP employed many of the same tropes found elsewhere in its overall space coverage: It emphasized the immense and universal benefits that space exploration would provide for “all humanity.” It portrayed the world’s people uniting to view the space achievement.⁹⁹ It declared ASTP a turning point in history and a first step toward a positively imagined future of better superpower relations via an ambitious program of cooperative spaceflight. In short, it described the mission as a sign that the two superpowers’ attitudes towards space exploration had shifted, and characterized that transition as a turn from competition to cooperation. The new spirit of cooperation, it argued, would benefit all of humanity, not only by accelerating scientific and technological progress, but also by strengthening peace through defusing superpower tensions.

Cooperation, it suggested, was essential to further space exploration but also to realizing “universal” human aspirations of scientific and technological progress and the achievement of peace. The joint spaceflight’s greatest contribution to human progress, however, ran far deeper than science and technology.¹⁰⁰ ASTP, it argued, demonstrated how opposing geopolitical powers could unite for the betterment of humanity and could potentially—through the symbolic power of spaceflight—transform the attitudes of the world’s peoples and contribute to unifying mankind. It thus presented space cooperation’s potential to transform international relations, strengthen peace, and possibly end the Cold War.

⁹⁹ “Apollo Soyuz Project: First International Manned Spaceflight,” 21.

¹⁰⁰ “And if we add ... the spirit of cooperation,” one article concluded, for instance, “we can hardly doubt that the effect on the mother planet will be that people’s narrow national feelings will gradually extinguish and they will feel themselves earthlings in the fullest sense of the word.” See: “Apollo Soyuz Project: First International Manned Spaceflight,” 21.

Amerika emphasized the similar objectives of both the Soviet and American space programs by emphasizing both countries' interest in the peaceful exploration of space. It presented those nations as the two space leaders whose cooperation would best advance scientific and technological progress.¹⁰¹ *Amerika* thus portrayed international cooperation as essential to continuing progress in exploring space, and optimistically predicted that joint space efforts would become more common in the future. ASTP served as the symbolic culmination of this spirit of cooperation because the human handshakes of astronauts and cosmonauts in space personified the friendly and cooperative relationship emerging between the two nations.¹⁰²

¹⁰¹ One March 1975 article, for example, presented the history of space exploration as scientific progress and argued that international cooperation in space would significantly further progress in the future. Its portrayal of space exploration as a symbol and a driver of human progress emphasized American leadership in space, but also portrayed Soviet excellence in space and argued that cooperation between the two countries was becoming increasingly essential to advancing human progress. It praised past instances of Soviet-American cooperation and suggested that such collaboration would be necessary to explore other planets. It highlighted the power of science to contribute to mankind's intellectual progress by pointing to how scientific discoveries "inevitably" overturned old ideas and led to new ones. The scientific questions that space exploration sought to answer, it asserted, "concern[ed] all of humanity." It was hoped, the article explained, that the Soviet Union would contribute substantially to the American plan to launch two Viking spacecraft to Mars in 1976. Simply exploring Mars, it observed, "requires great human effort and huge sums of money and, of course, no one country can perform this task alone: this requires the joint effort and the talents and energy of people of many countries." See: Henry T. Simmons, "American, Soviet Spacecraft Seek the Answer – What's Out There?," *Amerika*, March 1975, 2.

¹⁰² "Apollo Soyuz Project: First International Manned Spaceflight," 21.

10. “WE REGARD EACH OTHER AS MEMBERS OF ONE CREW”:

Space Cooperation in *Soviet Life* Magazine

It is difficult to assess Soviet rationales for pursuing the Apollo Soyuz Test Project (ASTP).¹ Yuri Karash acknowledged as much in his study of the Russian perspective on cooperation in space. According to the party line, he noted, Soviet officials favored the joint mission for the purpose of strengthening global peace on the planet.² Other scholars, and Karash included, have suggested that access to American technologies was a strong incentive for Soviet officials to pursue partnerships.³ Karash additionally pointed out that the Soviet leadership also sought to promote an image of superpower parity.⁴ Contemporary observers evidently also thought that a high profile demonstration of Soviet parity with the U.S. might appeal to Soviet leaders.⁵ This chapter’s examination of *Soviet Life* coverage of ASTP suggests that the parity rationale was a strong motivation for Soviet officials.

¹ For an overview and primary sources on NASA’s efforts to foster international teamwork in space, see: John M. Logsdon, “The Development of International Space Cooperation,” in *Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program*, ed. John M. Logsdon, with Dwayne A. Day and Roger D. Launius, vol. 2, *External Relationships* (Washington, DC: NASA, 1996). For more on Kennedy’s perspective on joint space efforts with the Soviet Union, see: W. D. Kay, “John F. Kennedy and the Two Faces of the U.S. Space Program, 1961-63,” in *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 3, (Summer, 1998), pp. 573-586; John M. Logsdon, *John F. Kennedy and the Race to the Moon* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). See also: John Krige, “Technology, Foreign Policy, and International Cooperation in Space, in Steven J. Dick and Roger D. Launius, *Critical Issues in the History of Spaceflight*, (Washington, DC: NASA History Division, 2006), 239-260.

² Yuri Y. Karash, *The Superpower Odyssey: A Russian Perspective on Space Cooperation* (Reston, VA: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1999), 121-122.

³ Karash, *The Superpower Odyssey*, 86

⁴ Ibid. See also: Michael J. Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), 64.

⁵ Linda and Edward Ezell discussed how, in 1969, NASA Administrator Thomas Paine hoped that Apollo 11 would bring about a shift in Soviet attitudes to cooperating in space with the United States. “By working with the nation that had led the way to the moon,” they wrote, “the Soviets could create the image of technological parity.” Edward C. Ezell, and Linda N. Ezell, *The Partnership: A History of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project* (Washington, DC: NASA, 1978), 96.

Unfortunately, it is even harder to determine what motivations led Agitprop to the main themes of its propaganda about space collaboration. A close reading of Soviet leaders' rhetoric, however, provides some insight into their views of the symbolic meaning of space partnerships. This chapter, in part, examines Soviet discourse on Soviet-American space cooperation in order to understand better *Soviet Life's* coverage of the subject. It argues that Khrushchev persistently linked such collaboration with reversing the arms race on Earth. Following suit, *Soviet Life*—like *Amerika*—advocated in favor of superpower solidarity in space. But, unlike its American counterpart, the Soviet magazine regularly connected space coordination to disarmament. Only toward the end of the 1960s did *Soviet Life* drop the disarmament issue from its discussions of space collaboration.

By examining *Soviet Life's* coverage of the July 1975 ASTP, this chapter uncovers a number of similarities and differences between the two magazine's approaches to this highly symbolic joint spaceflight. *Soviet Life's* simplified narratives of the cooperation dialogue (like *Amerika's*) seemed deliberately positive.⁶ Both magazines used ASTP to further their broader depictions of space exploration as a demonstration of their nations' commitment to furthering global peace and human progress. Like its American counterpart, *Soviet Life* also focused on non-ideological "compatibility issues" to downplay ideological and political differences between the two countries, and use the human element to invest the mission with symbols of "friendly relations" and peace.⁷

⁶ See, for example: Stepan Korneyev, "Soviet-American Scientific Cooperation, New Prospects," *Soviet Life*, August 1971, 9.

⁷ For articles depicting the cosmonauts and astronauts working together in preparations for ASTP, see: Boris Petrov, "Soyuz and Apollo: Joint Space Project," *Soviet Life*, December 1972; 56; "Rendezvous In Space, Interview with Vladimir Shatalov," *Soviet Life*, December 1972, 57; Irina

Soviet Life, however, put far greater emphasis on portraying the mission as a demonstration of the new spirit of “reciprocity.” In doing so, this chapter argues, *Soviet Life* sought to cast ASTP as a symbol of Soviet parity vis-à-vis the United States. Such a focus on cooperation as a sign of parity reflected trends in Soviet leaders’ discourse at the time. As American space achievements came to overshadow Soviet ones in the late 1960s, Soviet leaders wished to remind the world of their leadership in space exploration. In the early 1970s, this desire combined with an opportunity to demonstrate visibly—and consolidate in global opinion—the parity with the U.S. that a flurry of détente agreements seemed to formalize. Brezhnev’s discourse in the years before ASTP reflected such a motivation with its increased focus on “reciprocity” and depiction of the superpowers as “equal partners.”

Portraying the Cooperation Dialogue

Even in its earliest coverage of space exploration *Soviet Life* regularly suggested this new field had great potential for international coordination. Initially, *Soviet Life* statements supporting joint space efforts were brief. Over time, the magazine’s endorsement of space partnerships took up more and more space as the magazine offered increasingly sophisticated arguments to support it. Its coverage of space

Lunacharskaya, “Preparing for the First Soyuz-Apollo Docking,” *Soviet Life*, April 1973, 41-43; “Soyuz-Apollo: Project for a Peaceful Planet, Interview with Konstantin Bushuyev,” *Soviet Life*, December 1973, 40-42; “The Crews of the Joint Apollo-Soyuz Flight,” *Soviet Life*, October 1974, 22-27; Alexei Leonov, “Soviet-American Space Rendezvous,” *Soviet Life*, January 1975, 34-37; “The first Soviet-American mission in space,” *Soviet Life*, July 1975, f.c.; Alexei Leonov, “Challenging Space: Soviet-American Docking Experiment,” *Soviet Life*, July 1975, 16-17; “Before the USA and the USSR Meet in Orbit, Interview with Vladimir Shatalov,” *Soviet Life*, July 1975, 24; “Meeting in Space: Stafford, Slayton and Leonov. Photograph courtesy of NASA and the USSR Academy of Sciences,” *Soviet Life*, December 1975, f.c.; Konstantin Bushuyev, “Soyuz-Apollo Experiment: A Bridge to the Future,” *Soviet Life*, December 1975; 19; “Soviet People on the Soyuz-Apollo Project,” *Soviet Life*, December 1975, 20; Georgi Isachenko, “Earth Is Our Bearing,” *Soviet Life*, December 1975, 21; “Cooperation in Space, Interview with Glenn Lunney,” *Soviet Life*, December 1975, 21.

cooperation continued to touch on the key themes of peace and progress outlined in previous chapters, and invested these themes with additional meaning to advocate for working together space. It thus played an active role in the superpower dialogue on the relationship in space throughout the late 1950s and 1960s.

Sputnik 1 inaugurated the space era as a contribution to the International Geophysical Year (IGY), an undertaking meant to increase international scientific cooperation.⁸ But even as IGY was in the planning stages, Soviet representatives resisted participating in open international exchanges of data, and accepted only non-obligatory agreements.⁹ Reaching agreement proved to be difficult, and the results were limited.¹⁰ While American interest in scientific partnerships pre-dated space exploration, so too did Soviet reluctance to participate in them.¹¹

In the late 1950s some factors seemed to encourage space cooperation. In 1957 and 1958, Eisenhower composed several letters to Premier Nikita Khrushchev and Prime Minister Nikolai Bulganin proposing coordinated efforts in order to ensure that space would be reserved for peaceful purposes.¹² In October 1958, the International Council for Science established a Committee on Space Research

⁸ IGY was a multinational scientific project organized under the auspices of the International Council of Scientific Unions to coordinate international scientists during a period of heightened solar activity. Taking place from July 1, 1957, to December 31, 1958, IGY lasted longer than a single year, and saw both superpowers achieve breakthroughs into space. See: Roald Sagdeev and Susan Eisenhower, "NASA - United States-Soviet Space Cooperation during the Cold War", n.d., http://www.nasa.gov/50th/50th_magazine/coldWarCoOp.html.

⁹ "Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Aeronautics and Space Council (Welsh) to Vice President Humphrey, October 9, 1967," *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXIV (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999), 116-118 (hereafter *FRUS* followed by year and volume number).

¹⁰ Rip Bulkeley has noted that although "the level of cooperation achieved was so imperfect, ... there was after all some degree of useful scientific interaction and exchange." See: Rip Bulkeley, "The Sputniks and the IGY," in *Reconsidering Sputnik*, ed. Roger D. Launius, John M. Logsdon, and Robert William Smith (London: Routledge, 2000), 152.

¹¹ The US State Department approved of IGY's "international cooperative scientific program" and urged: "this type of cooperation should be continued and expanded." See: "Circular Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions, July 28, 1958," *FRUS, 1958-1960*, vol. II (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 36.

¹² Sagdeev and Eisenhower, "NASA - United States-Soviet Space Cooperation during the Cold War."

(COSPAR) to promote international scientific research on space, and facilitate international exchange of data obtained from space.¹³ Under a charter allowing both the U.S. and the Soviet Union to appoint vice presidents, COSPAR created a channel for informal communication between both nation's space administrators.¹⁴

At the same time, there were also clear obstacles to space cooperation. Khrushchev's continuing insistence on linking space partnerships to disarmament was a major stumbling block delaying meaningful teamwork between the superpowers. Additionally, the Soviet space program's subordination to the military encouraged its international isolation at both the interpersonal and technological levels. Added to this, complete reliance on domestic hardware gave Soviet space technologies a high degree of incompatibility with other nations' components.¹⁵

In 1959 Sergei Korolev and Academician Mstislav Keldysh wrote a series of letters to the Soviet leadership on the future of the Soviet space program, specifically advocating the separation of the space program from ballistic missile development in order to allow for greater international solidarity. According to Asif Siddiqi, the Soviet leadership's "immediate response ... remains unclear" though the course the

¹³ According to Rip Bulkeley, COSPAR was essentially intended "to takeover the functions of the IGY working group. However, Soviet objections to its constitution meant that it was unable to contribute to the development of the principles of international cooperation on space science until the early 1960s." See: Bulkeley, "The Sputniks and the IGY," 141.

¹⁴ COSPAR's first appointed vice president was Soviet Academician Anatoli A. Blagonravov. An artillery engineer and general in the Imperial Russian army, Blagonravov had survived to become the Soviet Union's representative for multilateral space cooperation negotiations. See: Sagdeev and Eisenhower, "NASA - United States-Soviet Space Cooperation during the Cold War."

¹⁵ The Soviet space program was a classified arm of the Ministry of General Machine Building. Reporting directly to the CC of the CPSU, as well as a Commission on Military-Industrial Issues within the Council of Ministers, the ministry's primary client was the Soviet military, which also controlled the space program's infrastructure, including launch sites and ground control facilities. See: Ibid.

Soviet space program eventually took “ultimately fell far short of” the two men’s vision.¹⁶

Coming closely after Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” speech, many in Moscow’s scientific community hoped that a summit meeting between Eisenhower and Khrushchev scheduled to begin in Paris on May 16, 1960, would open an opportunity for increased bilateral cooperation, including space exploration. The U-2 incident on May 1, 1960, led directly to the summit’s collapse, dashing Soviet scientists’ hopes for more engagement with the American scientific community.¹⁷

Less than two weeks after Kennedy’s January 30, 1961, State of the Union Address expressing American desires to “explore the stars together” with planetary probes to Mars and Venus, the Soviet Union independently sent such a probe to Venus—the first of its kind.¹⁸ The historian Roald Sagdeev has stated that Khrushchev’s certainty that Soviet supremacy in space would continue indefinitely led him to not respond to Kennedy’s remarks.¹⁹ In fact he did respond, though not publicly. In a February 15 letter, Khrushchev wrote to Kennedy that the invitation to cooperate in space “impresses us ... and we welcome these utterances of yours.”²⁰

As congratulatory exchanges between the two leaders continued with each new accomplishment in space, a pattern emerged where each side commonly stressed

¹⁶ A May 27, 1959 letter called for the establishment of a Central Scientific-Research Institute for Interplanetary Research to design all future Soviet spacecraft. “This organization could become in the future,” Korolev and Keldysh argued, “a scientific center of space exploration on an international scale” where Soviet space achievements “could be fruitfully developed and extended in the future in cooperation with socialist countries.” A July 13, 1959 letter boldly went further in suggesting the prospects for international space partnerships could extend to non-socialist countries. See: Asif A. Siddiqi, *Sputnik and the Soviet Space Challenge* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2003), 208-210.

¹⁷ Sagdeev and Eisenhower, “NASA - United States-Soviet Space Cooperation during the Cold War.”

¹⁸ Venera 1 was launched on February 12.

¹⁹ Sagdeev and Eisenhower, “NASA - United States-Soviet Space Cooperation during the Cold War.”

²⁰ “Telegram From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev, February 13, 1961,” *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. VI (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 4; “Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, February 15, 1961,” *Ibid.*, 4-5

the universal benefits of scientific discovery and progress, while emphasizing how space exploration could contribute to peace on Earth.²¹ But while Khrushchev regularly linked joint space exploration with disarmament, Kennedy's letters never mentioned it.²²

Over lunch at the June 1961 Vienna Summit Kennedy proposed to Khrushchev the idea of a joint manned lunar landing. The Soviet leader said no but then quickly changed his mind: "all right, why not?"²³ But by the next day, Khrushchev reversed his stance. Noting that such a great expense would detract from Soviet defense resources, he suggested that the U.S. should go to the Moon—since it had more money—and the Soviet Union would follow. He also told Kennedy that without disarmament, cooperation in space would not be possible. Since rockets have both military and scientific uses, he argued, he was unwilling to commit Soviet rockets to a purely scientific endeavor. Kennedy suggested coordinating efforts without using any Soviet rockets. Khrushchev said he was open

²¹ "Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, April 18, 1961," Ibid., 7-8; "Telegram From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, May 6, 1961," Ibid., 17; "Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev, Undated," Ibid., 18.

²² In their exchanges after Gagarin's April 12, 1961 flight the two leaders continued to express openness to a space partnership. In his congratulatory letter to the Soviet premiere, Kennedy conveyed his "sincere desire that in the continuing quest for knowledge of outer space our nations can work together to obtain the greatest benefit to mankind." On April 30, Khrushchev replied to "express the hope" that the two superpowers "may work together on the matter of mastering the universe, considering the mastering of the universe as a part of the great task of creating peace without armaments and war." Khrushchev's reply thus stressed the connections between space exploration, cooperation, peace, and disarmament. See: John F. Kennedy, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*, vol. 2 (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1963), 257; "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union, April 12, 1961," *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. VI, 7; "Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, April 30, 1961," *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. VI, 17.

²³ "Memorandum of Conversation, June 3, 1961," *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. V, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998), 180.

to the idea but noted that space exploration had so far shown little practical use and had been a costly race primarily for prestige.²⁴

While competition in space continued, so too did the leaders' dialogue on space cooperation, and Khrushchev's insistence that the lack of an agreement on disarmament would be an impassable obstacle to cooperating in space.²⁵ After John Glenn's first American orbital manned flight, on February 21, 1962, Khrushchev sent a longer message of congratulations and suggested the two countries should cooperate in space.²⁶ He exhibited strong faith that space collaboration could transform international relations, but he continued to link partnership in space to working together on Earth to limit the production of weapons. Abstract notions of peace did not satisfy Khrushchev without a tangible slowing of the arm's race. His reply to Kennedy's "concrete proposals" was generally favorable. But Khrushchev upheld his condition that space collaboration could expand in the future:

up to and including joint construction of spacecraft for reaching other planets--the moon, Venus, Mars ... when agreement on disarmament has been achieved.²⁷

²⁴ "Memorandum of Conversation, June 4, 1961," Ibid., 226.

²⁵ Sagdeev and Eisenhower, "NASA - United States-Soviet Space Cooperation during the Cold War"; Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 68.

²⁶ He stressed the connections between the "new heights in science and technology" and the "genius of man" finding "lasting peace" and "prosperity" for "all peoples." The length and tone of Khrushchev's letter suggested a sincere desire to pursue the question of space collaboration. "If our countries pooled their efforts--scientific, technical and material--to master the universe," he wrote, "this would be very beneficial for the advance of science and would be joyfully acclaimed by all peoples who would like to see scientific achievements benefit man and not be used for 'cold war' purposes and the arms race." See: "Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, February 21, 1962," *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. VI, 96; Department of State, *Bulletin*, March 12, 1962, p. 411; *Pravda*, February 24, 1962.

²⁷ As in Vienna, Khrushchev argued that the Soviet Union could not afford to divert "military rockets" to "space rockets" as long as the arms race continued apace. See: "Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, March 20, 1962," *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. VI, 130. See also: "Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, May 17, 1963," *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. VI, 288; "Message From Chairmen Khrushchev and Brezhnev to President Kennedy, July 4, 1963," Ibid., 297-8; "Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, July 8, 1963," Ibid., 299.

Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964 did little to improve the space cooperation dialogue, though it did bring change. For one thing, the post-Khrushchev leadership sought to identify space successes with the Soviet government and in particular the Party, and less with the individual leader than Khrushchev had done.²⁸ Brezhnev initially also took a more negative, hard-lined approach to Soviet-American relations and soon undertook to increase Soviet military forces substantially.²⁹ The atmosphere permeated through to the Academy of Sciences' relationship with NASA. The fact that the Soviet military and Party apparatus oversaw the space program meant that the negotiation process—conducted by the Academy of Sciences—faced unique challenges. The Academy did not actually control the space program, but provided a front for its broad network of design bureaus. The highly secretive nature of the Soviet space program strained relations between Soviet and American scientists and engineers, and kept members of the Soviet space program from reciprocating the openness exhibited by their NASA colleagues.³⁰

Soviet Life articles in the Khrushchev era often addressed how space achievements contributed to international science and depicted this as a reflection of international teamwork. The first Soviet satellites were thus “symbolic of the cooperation of the scientists of all countries.”³¹ As the political leaders of the two superpowers took their first tentative steps toward engaging the other side in a

²⁸ Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 56; Vitali Sevastyanov and A. Ursol, “Cosmonautics and Social Development,” *International Affairs* (November 1977): 72.

²⁹ Soviet defense spending rose 40 per cent between 1965 and 1970. Mike Bowker, “Brezhnev and Superpower Relations,” in Edwin Bacon and Mark Sandle. *Brezhnev Reconsidered* (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2002), 90-109.

³⁰ Sagdeev and Eisenhower, “NASA - United States-Soviet Space Cooperation during the Cold War.”

³¹ “Sputniks Underscore Man's Scientific Progress,” *USSR*, December 1957, 1-2. See also: “Sputnik III--Laboratory in Space,” *USSR*, July 1958, 1-4.

cooperative venture in space, *Soviet Life* regularly—and supportively—commented on the emerging dialog.³² Often, these early endorsements of joint efforts subtly acknowledged superpower tensions and hinted at Khrushchev’s links between space partnerships and disarmament.³³ But they also presented space exploration as a promising area for further international collaboration, and in particular between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Even non-space-themed articles in *Soviet Life* often made statements in support of joint Soviet-American efforts.³⁴ They commonly contained overtures of friendship for the magazine’s American readers, for example, and praised various examples of Soviet-American “peaceful cooperation and truly good-neighbor relations.”³⁵

As *Soviet Life* began to focus more directly on space collaboration in the mid-1960s, like *Amerika*, it advocated for its expansion to reduce costs, minimize duplication, accelerate scientific and technological progress, and strengthen world peace. As before, *Soviet Life* continued to tie joint space efforts to disarmament. In a July 1964 piece Blagonravov wrote in favor of working together in space and portrayed the Soviet Union as a global leader in space collaboration initiatives.³⁶ He

³² See, for example: “A Day to Remember,” *USSR*, May 1961, 2-3; “Toward Venus,” *USSR*, March 1961, 12; “A Good Beginning,” *USSR*, July 1961, 1-3; Anatoli Glasko, “Steps Into Space,” *USSR*, April 1962, 22-23; Anatoli Blagonravov, “Outer Space and International Cooperation,” *Soviet Life*, July 1964, 26-27.

³³ They quoted him, for example, to express the Soviet desire to “share generously” their “scientific ... technical and cultural knowledge with all those who are prepared to live in peace and friendship with us,” and support a joint space effort because it would “see scientific achievements used for man’s benefit rather than for ‘cold war’ purposes and the arms race.” See: “A Day to Remember,” 2-3; Glasko, “Steps Into Space,” 22-23.

³⁴ A May 1967 article on Montreal EXPO-67, for example, suggested that a “rendezvous” between cosmonauts and astronauts “is likely in outer space.” See: “Fifty Years of the Soviet Union To Be Shown at EXPO-67: Interview with Georgi A. Fedyashin Deputy General Commissioner of the Soviet Section of Montreal’s EXPO-67,” *Soviet Life*, May 1967, 3-9.

³⁵ “An Open Letter From the Institute of Soviet-American Relations To All Americans,” *USSR*, January 1962, i.f.c.-1.

³⁶ He called space exploration a “new, powerful incentive to international scientific cooperation.” He cited Soviet “proposals for international cooperation in space research” only five months after

argued that international teamwork was necessary for exploring space, and would accelerate it measurably. He described the 1962 agreement as just the “beginning” of a Soviet-U.S. space partnership, but argued that expanding it further “is linked ... above all” with disarmament:

Truly breathtaking prospects in space exploration will open before the peoples of the earth when, in a world without armaments and armies, all countries will be able to pool their scientific, technical and economic resources for joint interplanetary and interstellar flights.³⁷

So while *Soviet Life* argued that space cooperation was essential to exploring space, and foresaw that it would strengthen world peace, it made clear that it could only be realized alongside a substantial agreement on disarmament.

An April 1967 article attributed to Yuri Gagarin similarly argued that international solidarity was necessary for mastering space and for accelerating human “progress.” Gagarin argued that Soviet scientists, engineers, and political leaders all wanted to expand space collaboration. It was “those who whip up the arms race,” he wrote, “who bear the guilt” for obstructing teamwork in space. To Gagarin, the joint exploration of space was only possible “if the arms race is stopped and the hot-beds of the ‘cold war’ [were] eradicated on our own planet.” Gagarin thus portrayed the

Sputnik 1, and the “exchange of messages” between Khrushchev and Kennedy in March 1962 that “clearly stipulated” the Soviet position on joint space efforts. Khrushchev’s message, he said, “pointed out that the USSR has always regarded its successes in space exploration not as the achievements of the Soviet people alone but of all mankind, and also indicated those areas where cooperation between the two leading space powers could even then be established.” Since the “purpose” of space exploration, he explained, was to put “its inexhaustible resources at the service of mankind,” he argued that “[a]ll nations [would] have much to gain from this cooperation.”

³⁷ Blagonravov, “Outer Space and International Cooperation,” 26-27.

Soviet Union leading the effort to not only establish cooperative ventures in space but also to achieve peace on Earth.³⁸

By the time of Apollo 11, *Soviet Life* often gave statements in favor of joint space efforts prominence in standfirsts, pull-out quotes, or at the very beginning or end of articles on space.³⁹ It celebrated Apollo 11 as a sign (as the bold-faced standfirst to one August 1969 article declared): “that in outer space there must be cooperation among all countries for the ultimate benefit of all mankind.” In that article, Gennadi Zhukov implied that the Soviets too would soon put humans on the Moon, and he argued that exploring the lunar surface would “demand” international teamwork.⁴⁰ Commonly suggesting that space exploration brought a “feeling of oneness” to humanity, *Soviet Life* routinely argued that working together in space would have a profoundly transformative—and positive—impact on humanity.⁴¹ Gone were the recurrent links between space collaboration and disarmament common in earlier years.

One August 1971 article was typical for its conformity to the tropes set out in earlier cooperation-themed articles. It argued that space exploration was one field that “required” closer international collaboration. It observed how joint efforts pushed scientific and technological progress forward, while positively impacting both Soviet-American relations and “the political climate all over the world.” It celebrated existing Soviet-American partnerships in unambiguously positive terms, and urged its expansion in the future. In short, it portrayed the Soviet Union’s emphatic support

³⁸ Yuri Gagarin, “Man In Space,” *Soviet Life*, April 1967, 26-27.

³⁹ See, for example: “Man and Outer Space: Introduction to the Special Issue,” *Soviet Life*, August 1969, 1.

⁴⁰ Gennadi Zhukov, “The Legal Status of the Moon,” *Soviet Life*, August 1969, 30-31.

⁴¹ Gustav Naan, “Does a Dialogue with Space Spell Danger to Us?,” *Soviet Life*, January 1969, 40-41.

for joint space efforts based on the belief that such collaboration would deeply transform and improve humanity. Such an article exemplified how *Soviet Life* more fully articulated such support while abandoning directly linking it to disarmament.⁴²

Though tempting, it is difficult to conclude that Apollo 11 triggered this change, since the broader context of Soviet-American relations was shifting at this time as well. After Apollo 11 the USSR increasingly used space exploration to promote détente and international partnerships as the Soviet-American dialogue on joint space efforts entered a new phase. Both sides still exploited the symbolic power of space for propaganda purposes, and still competed in space while espousing cooperation. But in the post-Apollo environment the two superpowers looked for joint ventures in space that were decidedly more modest than manned missions to the Moon.⁴³

Reaching an Agreement

Increased Soviet openness to cooperation was a major factor in the successful conclusion of the 1972 agreement that provided for the joint ASTP spaceflight.

⁴² Korneyev, "Soviet-American Scientific Cooperation, New Prospects," 9.

⁴³ Both sides also pursued different objectives for the longer-term development of their respective space programs. Searching for ways to economize on launches and to exploit the economic potential of space, the United States soon committed to constructing a reusable space shuttle. The Soviets, meanwhile, focused on developing the orbiting space stations—Salyut—a direction determined by internal rivalries within the Soviet space program and initially supported by the Soviet military for its potential to perform space-based reconnaissance of Earth. In support of this goal, the Soviet space program sought out opportunities to practice long-duration spaceflights, and durations of manned flights provided a new way to measure progress in space. They concentrated their resources on space medicine and improving the safety aspects of their manned spaceflight components. The post-Apollo direction of the Soviet space program was thus determined in part by internal rivalries within the industry, and in part by military priorities. In fact, both superpowers increasingly turned toward militarizing space in the late 1960s and 1970s. NASA budgets, for example, fell in the late 1960s while Pentagon space spending rose dramatically. While the Soviet space program steadily increased its military exploitation of space in the 1970s, its propaganda emphasized the humanistic aspects of its space achievements and criticized the United States for 'militarizing' space. See: Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 55; Sagdeev and Eisenhower, "NASA - United States-Soviet Space Cooperation during the Cold War."

A joint space-docking mission would have obvious political value to support the wider pursuit of détente. But there were also more practical benefits to be gained for the space programs of each side. For the Americans, a joint manned spaceflight in the mid-1970s would provide beneficial practice during a period of low activity in the piloted space program.⁴⁴ A joint program would also provide the Soviets with a valuable demonstration of space parity with the United States, a comparison that the American Apollo successes had made all the more desirable, and difficult to substantiate. Thus 1972 provided a favorable setting for the ongoing dialogue on space collaboration to move forward.⁴⁵

The Soviet leadership evidently considered the 1972 agreement a unique cause for celebration, in spite of the fact that Brezhnev did not personally associate himself with it to the same degree that Nixon did.⁴⁶ Reaction to the agreement in both countries emphasized its symbolic political dimension.⁴⁷ The fact that the

⁴⁴ Apollo lunar landings were scheduled to wind down in 1972. Following some Skylab missions scheduled for 1973 and 1974, American manned spaceflights were planned to pause for a minimum of five years as NASA prepared the reusable Space Shuttle. In February 1972 a Senior Review Group (SRG) discussed the proposed Joint Space Docking Mission. George Low, the NASA representative on the SRG, estimated that—in spite of the argument that cooperation should make space exploration cheaper—the mission would cost an additional \$275 million “over and above” NASA’s current budgeted amounts because it fell outside of “normal course of events.” But the trade off, Low emphasized, was that the mission would fill a gap in scheduled manned spaceflights. See: “Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting, February 11, 1972,” *FRUS, 1969-1976*, vol. XIV, 162-3; Asif A. Siddiqi, *The Soviet Space Race with Apollo* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2003), 793-4.

⁴⁵ Siddiqi, *The Soviet Space Race with Apollo*, 793-4.

⁴⁶ Immediately after the signing ceremony Brezhnev “kidnapped” Nixon, whisking the President away from his entourage, down a corridor into an elevator to a waiting limousine that sped off to a government dacha outside Moscow, while Nixon’s own car—“full of Secret Service agents beside themselves that the President of the United States had been abducted in front of their very eyes by the Soviet Union’s Number One Communist”—sped furiously behind them to catch up. Kissinger recalled that “Nixon accepted—there was little else he could do, since Brezhnev was physically propelling him into his car.” In “high good spirits” upon his arrival at the dacha, Brezhnev then “whisked” Nixon off again for a hydrofoil ride. See: “Editorial Note,” *FRUS, 1969-1976*, vol. XIV, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005), 1042.

⁴⁷ After the signing, a Pravda commentary emphasized the important role it believed space cooperation would play in improving international relations: “Earth is the planet of mankind,” it wrote on June 6, 1972: “Cooperation in space paves the road to peace, mutual understanding and the good of all the people.” U.S. Senator Marlow W. Cook expressed a similar sentiment on June 5, 1972: “(N)ations everywhere must begin to recognize that it is only through mutual interdependence that

agreement was signed during bilateral talks on SALT—a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty—linked this high-profile example of expanding space cooperation with disarmament. From the Soviet perspective, it thus seemed a fulfillment of Khrushchev’s insistence from a decade previously that one could not happen without the other.

Soviet Life celebrated the 1972 agreement and looked forward to ASTP as a symbol of peace and friendship between the two superpowers, and a promise of amicable relations in the future. As the title of a December 1973 article neatly summarized, ASTP promised to be a “Project for a Peaceful Planet.”⁴⁸ In the lead up to the mission, several articles emphasized how the manned aspect of the mission, and the fact that it represented “the first time that representatives of the two hemispheres” collaborated in space, made it “different” and more “important” than previous Soviet cooperative ventures with other “socialist countries” and with France.⁴⁹

Political and cultural differences between the two sides posed considerable challenges as preparations for ASTP took place between 1972 and 1975. Both sides remained guarded. From its inception, the Americans envisioned that ASTP must limit Soviet access to American technologies and keep it at “arm’s-length.”⁵⁰ In other

this world can exist peacefully for many tomorrows to come.” Boris Petrov, Chairman of the Interkosmos Council felt that the 1972 Soviet-US space agreement was highly significant for its political value. See: Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 64–65; Karash, *The Superpower Odyssey*, 113; Matthew J. von Bencke, *The Politics of Space: A History of U.S.-Soviet/Russian Competition and Cooperation in Space* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997), 79.

⁴⁸ “Soyuz-Apollo: Project for a Peaceful Planet, Interview with Konstantin Bushuyev,” 40–42.

⁴⁹ “Rendezvous In Space, Interview with Vladimir Shatalov,” 56; “Soyuz-Apollo: Project for a Peaceful Planet, Interview with Konstantin Bushuyev,” 40–42. See also: Petrov, “Soyuz and Apollo: Joint Space Project,” 56; Lunacharskaya, “Preparing for the First Soyuz-Apollo Docking,” 41–43; “Life-Support Systems in Space,” *Soviet Life*, September 1974, 50.

⁵⁰ Yale Richmond, *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), 212.

words, contrary to its propaganda claims, the U.S. sought to check its openness. Meanwhile, Soviet secrecy—and deliberate attempts to conceal the real Soviet space program behind the cover of the Academy of Sciences—meant that NASA remained unclear about who it was actually working with.⁵¹ Nonetheless, the fact that the joint mission and its collaborative preparations took place at all reflected *less* Soviet secrecy. Without such greater openness ASTP would not have been possible. In the three years before the July 1975 mission, Soviet and American space professionals cooperated closely on training and engineering compatible docking systems.⁵²

In *Soviet Life*, numerous interviews with Soviet personnel who were closely involved with ASTP preparations showed the interviewers clearly searching for comments on the mission's potential psychological impact. One, for example, asked Konstantin Bushuyev—ASTP's Soviet technical director and Korolev's Deputy Chief Designer from 1954 to 1972—to look past the “concrete details,” to answer what he thought ASTP's “global effect” would be.⁵³ Another asked Major General Vladimir Shatalov—Kamanin's successor as the Commander-in-Chief's Aide of Air Force from 1971 to 1987—his opinion on what the flight's “results” would be.⁵⁴ Thus prompted, both men emphasized the novelty and “great historical significance” of the joint mission, because it would likely lead to closer space collaboration

⁵¹ Experts within the Soviet aerospace industry pretended to be members of the Institute of Space Research while military officers disguised themselves in civilian clothes. All involved insisted—dishonestly—that the Baikonur launch site was run by the Academy of Science. Sagdeev has recalled how, before ASTP preparations got underway, Soviet authorities provided personnel with “a long and detailed secret questionnaire” that provided acceptable answers to “hundreds of questions” that “nosy Americans” might ask. See: Sagdeev and Eisenhower, “NASA - United States-Soviet Space Cooperation during the Cold War.”

⁵² Even Sagdeev assessed ASTP as “a rare and dramatic display of U.S.-Soviet friendliness during the depths of the Cold War.” See: Sagdeev and Eisenhower, “NASA - United States-Soviet Space Cooperation during the Cold War”; Sheehan, *The International Politics of Space*, 65.

⁵³ Siddiqi, *The Soviet Space Race with Apollo*, 965; “Soyuz-Apollo: Project for a Peaceful Planet, Interview with Konstantin Bushuyev,” 40-42.

⁵⁴ Siddiqi, *The Soviet Space Race with Apollo*, 974; “Rendezvous In Space, Interview with Vladimir Shatalov,” 56.

including international space stations and interplanetary expeditions. Such cooperative ventures, they asserted, would also be “for the benefit of all mankind.”⁵⁵ A host of other articles similarly foresaw ASTP as just the “beginning” of increasing international partnerships in space.⁵⁶ As Valentin Glushko of the USSR Academy of Sciences remarked in a September 1974 interview: “the conquest of space will become the business of the whole planet.”⁵⁷ Optimistically depicting a future in which superpower coordination in space became commonplace helped *Soviet Life* emphasize the significance of ASTP, and also showed the magazine playing a role in encouraging further space cooperation.

The front cover of the July 1975 *Soviet Life* showcased the ASTP insignia, drawing attention to the magazine on the newsstand as the mission took place.⁵⁸ Since that issue could not report on the actual event because of necessary delays in producing the magazine, coverage of the mission appeared in the December 1975 issue. The Editors claimed that the second special issue on ASTP was due to the mission’s immense historical significance, however. They further underscored ASTP’s symbolic weight by quoting a letter from a *Soviet Life* reader who found it “wonderful to see cosmonauts and astronauts shaking hands in orbit” as one example of “many such letters” the magazine received on the joint flight.⁵⁹

Just as in *Amerika*, *Soviet Life*’s coverage of ASTP conformed to its broader depiction of space exploration. Several articles emphasized in pull-out quotes, for example, ASTP’s contributions to scientific and technological progress, and to global

⁵⁵ “Soyuz-Apollo: Project for a Peaceful Planet, Interview with Konstantin Bushuyev,” 40-42;

“Rendezvous In Space, Interview with Vladimir Shatalov,” 56.

⁵⁶ Petrov, “Soyuz and Apollo: Joint Space Project,” 56; Lunacharskaya, “Preparing for the First Soyuz-Apollo Docking,” 41-43; “Life-Support Systems in Space,” 50.

⁵⁷ “Life-Support Systems in Space,” 50.

⁵⁸ “The first Soviet-American mission in space,” f.c.

⁵⁹ Alexander Makarov, “Editor’s Notes,” *Soviet Life*, December 1975, 2.

peace.⁶⁰ The magazine's handling of the joint mission cast it as both a symbol of achievements already made, and a harbinger of future growth.⁶¹ Many official congratulatory statements from Soviet and American political leaders served to link those men with the core themes of peace and progress.⁶²

Soviet Life strongly emphasized that cooperation had taken the place of competition in defining the superpower relationship. The significance of ASTP as a symbol of solidarity, it proposed, extended beyond Soviet-American relations to impact the whole world. Indeed, the joint flight, it declared, was "a realization of the universal hope for peaceful cooperation." Its impact continued to be felt even after the flight; as the space explorers "once again shook hands, this time on the ground" as the American astronauts arrived in Moscow for a two-week tour of the Soviet Union. With such post-flight publicity tours, it said, ASTP "continues its world-serving mission of cooperation and friendship." Rhetorically united in a neologism as

⁶⁰ Petrov, "Soyuz and Apollo: Joint Space Project," 56. See also: "Rendezvous In Space, Interview with Vladimir Shatalov," 56.

⁶¹ See, for example: Lunacharskaya, "Preparing for the First Soyuz-Apollo Docking," 43; Leonov, "Soviet-American Rendezvous," 34-37; "Before the USA and the USSR Meet in Orbit, Interview with Vladimir Shatalov," 24; Petrov, "Soyuz and Apollo: Joint Space Project," 56; Leonov, "Challenging Space: Soviet-American Docking Experiment," 16-17; Konstantin Kondrashov, "Training in Houston," *Soviet Life*, July 1975, 18-19.

⁶² See: "Leonid Brezhnev's Greetings to the Soyuz and Apollo Crews," *Soviet Life*, December 1975, 17; "President Ford Greets the Joint Flight Crews," *Soviet Life*, December 1975, 17; "Congratulations From Leonid Brezhnev, Nikolai Podgorny and Alexei Kosygin," *Soviet Life*, December 1975, 18. To heighten the link between space cooperation and the search for peace, an article on the ASTP crews' post-flight tours of the US and the USSR was immediately followed by a report—called "Peace is the Greatest Asset"—about a speech Brezhnev made on November 27, 1975. The American astronauts Vance Brand, Donald Slayton, and Thomas Stafford toured the Soviet Union for two weeks in September 1975 as guests of cosmonauts Alexei Leonov and Valeri Kubasov. Leonov and Kubasov then visited the United States in October 1975. See: Boris Strelnikov, "On an Earth Orbit of Friendship," *Soviet Life*, February 1976, 2-6; and: "Peace Is the Greatest Asset," Speech by Leonid Brezhnev at a Ceremonial Meeting in the Moscow Kremlin," *Soviet Life*, February 1976, 7. Later in the same issue, a feature article on "The Program to Win the Peace" focused on the Peace Program enunciated at the 24th Party Congress. It emphasized that improving relations with the United States was "one of the main areas" for implementing the agenda. In particular, it focused on examples of "mutually beneficial cooperation" with the United States and other countries, and pointed to how the "expansion of cooperation [...] contribut[ed] to the achievement of this goal." Specifically, it noted how ASTP "demonstrated the potential of this cooperation." See: "The Program to Win the Peace," *Soviet Life*, February 1976, 8-11.

“astrocosmonauts,” the two countries’ space explorers were also shown presenting Brezhnev with an ASTP commemorative plaque that had been fused during the flight from two segments brought separately by the American and Soviet crews.⁶³ *Soviet Life* thus presented ASTP as a definitive symbol of superpower cooperation, and portrayed this relationship as a great impact—and benefit—to the entire world. *Soviet Life* also took the opportunity to remind American readers how Soviet leadership in space initially inspired American space exploration. One lengthy anecdote, for instance, presented key figures in the early Soviet space successes, such as Korolev and Gagarin, as heroes who the American astronauts revered.⁶⁴

Much of Boris Strelnikov’s February 1976 article “On An Earth Orbit of Friendship” covering the ASTP crew’s two-week tour of the Soviet Union in the fall of 1975 focused on their journey to various sites that were strongly suggestive of Soviet progress.⁶⁵ (See Figure 10-1) The astronauts’ trip to Siberia—with notable stops in Akademgorodok, the “capital of Siberian science” and Novosibirsk “a village only 70 years ago”—portrayed that region as a definitive symbol of Soviet progress in a “new frontier.” A subsection called “Giant of the Future” described the impact of Soviet progress on the region, while addressing American misconceptions about the Soviet Union. The narrative described the Americans becoming stripped of their delusions about the Soviet Union, and coming to realize not only the great progress that had been made across the territory under Soviet rule, but also the

⁶³ Strelnikov, “On an Earth Orbit of Friendship,” 2-6.

⁶⁴ On a visit to the Korolev “house museum” the American astronauts expressed their “profound respect” for the Chief Designer, and recalled how Gagarin had inspired them to pursue careers as astronauts. See: Strelnikov, “On an Earth Orbit of Friendship,” 2-6.

⁶⁵ These included Leningrad’s Lenin Optical-Mechanical Plant (LOMO) and Kiev’s Paton Electric Welding Institute. Additionally, Strelnikov repeatedly mentioned that they flew aboard an Ilyushin IL-18, which, he noted, could transport the group from Moscow to Leningrad “[i]n a little more than an hour.” See: Strelnikov, “On an Earth Orbit of Friendship,” 2-6.

Soviet people's bold aspirations for future progress. Such progress, *Soviet Life* suggested, could be harnessed to alter the course of humanity. The journey format also stressed interpersonal connections between American and Soviet people, and illustrated ASTP's symbolic power to inspire "friendship" and "mutual understanding." In doing so, it suggested deep similarities between the United States and the Soviet Union.⁶⁶

Both magazines used the post-flight tours of the ASTP crew to acquaint their readership with aspects

of the society they visited.⁶⁷ But while *Amerika* presented to Soviet audiences the consumer pleasures afforded by the capitalist system, *Soviet Life* introduced American



Figure 10-1: Using the interpersonal relations of the ASTP astronauts and cosmonauts to depict Soviet progress, openness, and material abundance. The original caption read: "The astronauts began their tour of Leningrad with visit to LOMO, which makes a wide range of the sophisticated optical equipment used in research, from instruments that fit on a fingernail to those weighting many tons.

Boris Strelnikov, "On an Earth Orbit of Friendship," *Soviet Life*, February 1976, 4.

⁶⁶ American ASTP astronaut Vance Brand explained how he thought Siberia was "like the Far West was once for Americans. We in America called the areas to be developed new frontiers. Siberia is your new frontier." "To most Americans Siberia means mysterious reaches," Strelnikov added, "impassable forests, snow and frost. To us Siberia is the giant Bratsk, Ust-Ilim, the Sayano-Shushenskaya and Krasnoyarsk hydroelectric stations, new cities, territorial production complexes like the Bratsk-Ilim Complex in the Angara valley, the Taishet Metallurgical Complex under construction, the Kansk-Achinsk thermoelectric complex and the Baikal-Amur Railroad project. Siberia for us spells the people who are developing this land's riches." Ibid.

⁶⁷ For articles covering the joint tours of astronauts and cosmonauts in the United States and the Soviet Union, see: "Welcome Gherman Titov," *USSR*, June 1962, 6-9; "Space Explorers' Poll," *Soviet Life*, August 1969, 4-8; Yuri Somov, "Spaceman's Earth-Level Orbits," *Soviet Life*, November 1967, 54-55; "Meeting on a Familiar Planet," *Soviet Life*, August 1969, 39; "Frank Borman in the Soviet Union," *Soviet Life*, October 1969, f.c.; Ted Rukhadze, "Orbiting the USSR," *Soviet Life*, October 1969,

audiences to the noble suffering of the Soviet people. A key passage in Strelnikov's article—supported by a large image and a bold-faced pull-out quote—depicted the astronauts and cosmonauts visiting Mamayev Hill, a World War Two monument constructed between 1959 and 1967 overlooking Volgograd. His narrative of this part of the journey used the space explorers to emphasize the human bonds between the American and Soviet people. It repeatedly portrayed the American astronauts awakening to Soviet attitudes against war, a longing for peace born out of the immense suffering the Soviet Union experienced during the War. A pullout quote showcased American ASTP astronaut Donald Slayton's remark:

But we in America, of course, did not experience a hundredth part of what the Soviet people had to go through. If everyone comes to know what war is, there will be no more wars. I would like more Americans to see what we have seen today.⁶⁸

Strelnikov also recalled the World War Two alliance between the U.S. and USSR to underline Soviet-American empathies and cooperation. Pointing out that the Americans and Soviets cooperated against a common enemy in the War, he suggested that the astronauts' and cosmonauts' friendly relationships were symbolic of a broad and deep connection at the national level. A large photograph accompanying the text illustrated these bonds. (See Figure 10-2) It pictured Stafford and Leonov visiting the monument, where an elderly Russian woman—who spoke on behalf of “all the mothers” who lost sons in the region's battles—reached out to

18-23; Ted Rukhadze, “Good Start and Soft Landing!” *Soviet Life*, November 1970, 54-57; Ted Rukhadze, “American Astronaut Revisits Moscow,” *Soviet Life*, December 1973, 38-39; “The Apollo Crew in Moscow,” *Soviet Life*, April 1974, 6-9; “Back to Planet Earth,” *Soviet Life*, December 1975, 16-17; Strelnikov, “On an Earth Orbit of Friendship,” 2-6.

⁶⁸ Strelnikov, “On an Earth Orbit of Friendship,” 2-6.

Stafford, her hand placed upon his cheek.⁶⁹ The symbolic spaceflight, the article implied, had thus led to more “mutual understanding” between the Soviet and American people, and had strengthened peace between the two superpowers. *Soviet Life*’s ASTP coverage thus portrayed the space mission as proof that the Soviet Union was a capable world leader, who would wield its international influence to shape human life for the better.



Figure 10-2: Introducing the American astronauts (and readers) to the noble suffering and human touch of the Soviet people, while using the interpersonal relations of ASTP astronauts and cosmonauts to depict “friendly relations” between the American and Soviet people. The original caption read: “On Mamayev Hill a Russian woman, speaking for all the mothers whose sons were killed in the fighting here on the shores of the Volga, wished Thomas Stafford and his fellow astronauts a long and happy life.

Boris Strelnikov, “On an Earth Orbit of Friendship,” *Soviet Life*, February 1976, 6.

⁶⁹ Strelnikov, “On an Earth Orbit of Friendship,” 2-6.

Bridging the “Two Systems”

Like its American counterpart, *Soviet Life* depicted ASTP to demonstrate how the spirit of cooperation trumped political disagreements. Descriptions of the preparations for the mission accentuated overcoming non-ideological obstacles such as language, and the “compatibility” of the American and Soviet space capsules’ differing air systems and docking mechanisms.⁷⁰ Such an emphasis shifted the focus of ASTP narratives away from divisive discourse about differing ideologies. Instead of “two systems” of politics, they discussed “two systems” of engineering.

Of these various compatibility issues, language differences received the most attention. This issue most closely reflected Soviet-American correspondence back on Earth, and perhaps would have resonated most with American audiences as a less technical and more comprehensible challenge. A January 1975 article by ASTP cosmonaut Alexei Leonov used the language issue to close with a message of amity, and a suggestion that Soviet-American relations would continue to improve:

We believe that many of the new terms will have a permanent place in the English and Russian languages together with such familiar words as ‘friendship’ and ‘cooperation.’⁷¹

Soviet Life’s narratives of the “language barrier” between Soviet and American colleagues emphasized reciprocity by underlining how each crew would use the other’s mother language to communicate during the mission. It even offered the

⁷⁰ See, for example: “Rendezvous In Space, Interview with Vladimir Shatalov,” 56; Lunacharskaya, “Preparing for the First Soyuz-Apollo Docking,” 43; Leonov, “Soviet-American Space Rendezvous,” 34-37; “Before the USA and the USSR Meet in Orbit, Interview with Vladimir Shatalov,” 24; 18-19; Petrov, “Soyuz and Apollo: Joint Space Project,” 56.

⁷¹ Leonov, “Soviet-American Space Rendezvous,” 34-37.

same rationale as *Amerika* did for the mission's bilingual format: "when you use a foreign language, you speak more slowly and clearly."⁷²

The theme of interpersonal compatibility provided *Soviet Life* with a mode to discuss improving Soviet-American relations without stressing the two systems opposing ideologies. It routinely quoted Soviet ASTP participants to emphasize the "comradeship," "sincere friendship," and "close personal bonds" that developed between the two countries' crews. Such quotes also regularly portrayed the "team spirit" of the ASTP cosmonauts and astronauts who saw "themselves as full-fledged members of a single system."⁷³ As Konstantin Kondrashov observed: "We regard each other as members of one crew."⁷⁴ Repeated representations of the American and Soviet spaceships, once docked, operating as a "single unit," reinforced the depiction of the two countries as equal partners in space.⁷⁵ Like the two countries' space explorers and capsules, the two space control centers in Moscow and Houston would also "operate like a single mechanism."⁷⁶ As in *Amerika*, the human dimension of ASTP was all-important for *Soviet Life* to invest the mission with symbolic meaning. *Soviet Life* characterized ASTP as a symbol of peaceful superpower relations by commonly depicting astronaut-cosmonaut camaraderie. Its coverage of the

⁷² "Before the USA and the USSR Meet in Orbit, Interview with Vladimir Shatalov," 24. See also: Lunacharskaya, "Preparing for the First Soyuz-Apollo Docking," 43; "Rendezvous In Space, Interview with Vladimir Shatalov," 56; Kondrashov, "Training in Houston," 18-19; Petrov, "Soyuz and Apollo: Joint Space Project," 56.

⁷³ Leonov, "Soviet-American Space Rendezvous," 34-37; "Before the USA and the USSR Meet in Orbit, Interview with Vladimir Shatalov," 24.

⁷⁴ Kondrashov, "Training in Houston," 18-19.

⁷⁵ Petrov, "Soyuz and Apollo: Joint Space Project," 56; "Before the USA and the USSR Meet in Orbit, Interview with Vladimir Shatalov," 24.

⁷⁶ Leonov, "Challenging Space: Soviet-American Docking Experiment," 16-17.

mission underlined how the interpersonal relationships between Soviet cosmonauts and American astronauts were “essential” for successful space partnerships.⁷⁷

ASTP coverage frequently portrayed the two countries’ space explorers in terms that stressed their unity, and pushed ideological differences into the background. In a post-ASTP press conference, cosmonaut Alexei Leonov discussed relations with the American astronauts in a passage that seemed coached to offer the official Soviet position on collaboration. “The main difference between us,” he said, “is the fact that our two countries have different social systems.” But political dissimilarities “should not be an obstacle to cooperation,” he argued. ASTP proved that a superpower partnership was possible, and would lead to closer ties and increased coordination. Brezhnev, he observed, had repeatedly expressed support for such a development.⁷⁸ It is highly likely that Leonov received some direction for his comments at a post-flight press conference. Acknowledging the Soviet leader in his comment reinforced the impression that the Soviet leadership exploited the space milestone to portray themselves actively leading the global search for peace.

Photographs routinely showed astronauts and cosmonauts informally mixed together and smiling.⁷⁹ Similar images of other personnel behind the scenes reinforced the depiction of friendly relations. Photographs of Soviets and Americans working together established their unity as a group by showing them in uniform white laboratory coats, which blurred their individual and national identities.⁸⁰ Such

⁷⁷ “Rendezvous In Space, Interview with Vladimir Shatalov,” 56; Kondrashov, “Training in Houston,” 18-19.

⁷⁸ Vladimir Makhotin, “Multinational Press Center,” *Soviet Life*, December 1975, 22-23. See also: Strelnikov, “On an Earth Orbit of Friendship,” 2-6.

⁷⁹ See, for example: Leonov, “Soviet-American Space Rendezvous,” 34-37; Leonov, “Challenging Space: Soviet-American Docking Experiment,” 16-17; “Cosmonauts Town,” *Soviet Life*, July 1975, 20-23.

⁸⁰ Leonov, “Challenging Space: Soviet-American Docking Experiment,” 16-17.

images emphasized the similarities between the Soviet and American training systems, while depicting Soviet-American cooperation and parity.

Soviet Life's post-ASTP coverage of the joint flight continued to feature prominently images depicting the friendly interpersonal relationships between American and Soviet colleagues. The front cover of the December 1975 issue illustrated such closeness, showcasing astronauts Stafford, Slayton, and cosmonaut Leonov floating near together in weightlessness aboard ASTP.⁸¹ Other images showed the smiling cosmonauts and astronauts together aboard ASTP enjoying each other's company. In one, Leonov and Stafford smiled and proudly displayed their respective national flags, underlining the message that not only the men, but the nations too, were enjoying friendly relations.⁸² Taken together, these repetitive images indicated that the spirit of cooperation and friendship of the ASTP was both international and interpersonal. After the flight Leonov said of the cosmonauts' interaction with the astronauts:

We got to know them and liked them very much. During the flight we understood each other perfectly. And I have no doubt that as a result of our joint mission, we will understand each other here on Earth just as perfectly.⁸³

Comments such as this, in the context of an international propaganda magazine implied that the understanding achieved at the personal level by Leonov and his fellow space travelers could be prolonged after the flight, and even extended to the level of friendship between nations. Other post-ASTP articles also linked the

⁸¹ "Meeting in Space: Stafford, Slayton and Leonov. Photograph courtesy of NASA and the USSR Academy of Sciences," f.c.

⁸² "Soyuz-Apollo Experiment: A Bridge to the Future," *Soviet Life*, December 1975, 1.

⁸³ Makhotin, "Multinational Press Center," 22-23.

development of close personal bonds between the astronauts and cosmonauts with improving relations between nations.⁸⁴

Even the international journalists who gathered at the Multinational Press Center in Moscow to cover the joint spaceflight were caught up in the “spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding” that ASTP exemplified: They became “friendly—linked up,” and “set their own example of teamwork.”⁸⁵ The themes of teamwork and friendship, not only among the ASTP crews but also among those observing the symbolic flight, underlined the message that the joint space flight signaled improving relations between the superpowers, and emergent peace.

Soviet Life's greater emphasis on portraying ASTP as a sign of Soviet-American parity differentiated it from *Amerika*. Repeated discussion of the development of “the so-called androgynous docking device” showed *Soviet Life* making a concerted effort to portray Soviet parity vis-à-vis the United States. Numerous articles explained how this mechanism meant that the Soviet and American spaceships could now “play both an active and a passive role.”⁸⁶ With neither spacecraft assuming a lead role, the androgynous system thus signified Soviet-American reciprocity. (*Amerika* notably did not place a similar emphasis on the device's androgyny.) *Soviet Life*'s depiction of ASTP as a demonstration of the “two systems” operating as one at both an interpersonal and technical level thus underlined reciprocity and parity in Soviet-American relations. (See Figure 10-3)

⁸⁴ See, for example: Isachenko, “Earth Is Our Bearing,” 21.

⁸⁵ The reporters at the Multinational Press Center also agreed that ASTP symbolized détente: “Many of the journalists ... pointed out that the joint Soviet-American space experiment had been made possible by improvements in Soviet-American relations, that it was a product of the relaxation of tensions.” See: Ibid.

⁸⁶ Petrov, “Soyuz and Apollo: Joint Space Project,” 56; Leonov, “Soviet-American Space Rendezvous,” 34-37; Lunacharskaya, “Preparing for the First Soyuz-Apollo Docking,” 43.

To further the image of parity, *Soviet Life* frequently noted how both crews would visit one another's ships during the mission.⁸⁷

It routinely showed images of Soviet and American leaders or diplomats signing various space-related agreements, Soviet and American space explorers or scientists working together, and by repetitively underlining what was “common,” “similar,” “alike,” and “familiar” between the two

countries' space programs.⁸⁸ It also

regularly explained how Soviet cosmonauts and American astronauts “trained together” in both countries, and learned to operate each other's spacecraft.⁸⁹ It thus showed the Soviet Union and the U.S. sharing the spotlight as “the world's two leaders in space research.”⁹⁰ Such an emphasis cast ASTP as a symbol of both cooperation and of equality between the superpowers.




Figure 10-3: Depicting “compatibility issues”: Thomas Stafford and Alexei Yeliseyev examine the ASTP docking mechanism.
“Preparing for the First Soyuz-Apollo Docking,” *Soviet Life*, April 1973, 43.

⁸⁷ Leonov, “Challenging Space: Soviet-American Docking Experiment,” 16-17; Leonov, “Soviet-American Space Rendezvous,” 34-37; Petrov, “Soyuz and Apollo: Joint Space Project,” 56.

⁸⁸ “Rendezvous In Space, Interview with Vladimir Shatalov,” 56; Petrov, “Soyuz and Apollo: Joint Space Project,” 56; Lunacharskaya, “Preparing for the First Soyuz-Apollo Docking,” 43; “Before the USA and the USSR Meet in Orbit, Interview with Vladimir Shatalov,” 24; Kondrashov, “Training in Houston,” 18-19.

⁸⁹ Lunacharskaya, “Preparing for the First Soyuz-Apollo Docking,” 43; Kondrashov, “Training in Houston,” 18-19; Leonov, “Soviet-American Space Rendezvous,” 34-37.

⁹⁰ Leonov, “Challenging Space: Soviet-American Docking Experiment,” 16-17.

Soviet Life's coverage of ASTP did subtly suggest that the Soviet space program was superior in at least one aspect of space exploration when it repeatedly mentioned that the Soyuz capsule would touch down on dry land in the USSR, while the Apollo capsule would "splash down in the Pacific."⁹¹ Overall, however, *Soviet Life* focused on ASTP as a symbol of cooperation and minimized the competitive angle in its coverage of the mission.

Such a notion of equilibrium reflected political discourse insisting on "reciprocity" in superpower relations. In the early 1970s, Soviet-American "reciprocity" was a key motif in Brezhnev's rhetoric about peace and cooperation. His speeches often expressed a desire for international partnerships, and he frequently cited space coordination as a specific example. As his Report to the 24th Party Congress on March 20, 1971 indicated, he considered such collaboration was one of the "basic concrete tasks" in the Soviet Union's "struggle for peace."⁹² "Cooperation" became elevated in Brezhnev's rhetoric to occupy a place alongside of "peaceful coexistence" and the "struggle for peace." He routinely uttered "cooperation" and "peace" in the same breath.⁹³ The rhetorical elevation of "cooperation" reflected the role that it was projected to play in strengthening international relations. Closely linked with ideas of "mutual advantages," "mutual interests," and "mutual benefits," it also expressed Soviet concerns and expectations about the changing nature of Soviet-American relations. Cooperation, for example,

⁹¹ Leonov, "Soviet-American Space Rendezvous," 34-37. See also: Petrov, "Soyuz and Apollo: Joint Space Project," 56.

⁹² "The Soviet Union," he declared, "is prepared to expand relations of mutually advantageous cooperation in every sphere with states which for their part seek to do so." Brezhnev listed several of these spheres including "the exploration and development of outer space." See: Leonid I. Brezhnev, *Selected Speeches and Writings on Foreign Affairs* (New York, NY: Pergamon Press, 1978), 5-7.

⁹³ For examples, see: Brezhnev, *Selected Speeches and Writings on Foreign Affairs*, 5-7, 12, 33, 225, 232, 234, 238, 239.

was commonly expressed as “mutually beneficial,” and frequently accompanied by discussion of “reciprocity.” Together these concepts conveyed the Soviet desire to be treated, and viewed, as “equal partners” in the superpower relationship. To this end, Brezhnev strove to communicate to Americans the “considerable ... benefits” they could enjoy via collaborating with the Soviet Union in various fields.⁹⁴ Key words such as “strengthening” and “improvement” also tied cooperation to notions of progress, a link often explicitly made by characterizing teamwork as a sign of “important progress” in the superpower relationship. Space partnerships—and especially ASTP’s high profile handshake in space—not only played a symbolic role in the deepening of détente, but also demonstrated for the Soviet leadership the “mutual,” “equal,” and “reciprocal” nature of the superpower relationship.⁹⁵

Often, *Soviet Life* described ASTP in terms borrowed from Soviet political discourse on international relations. It routinely used, for instance, key phrases like “mutual understanding.” In his December 1975 article, Georgi Isachenko asked Herbert Smith, cochairman of an ASTP working group, which “compatibility” issue had been “most important” in preparations for the flight—the technical issues, or “perhaps the compatibility that we call mutual understanding?” Smith recalled the Americans’ sense of caution at their initial meetings with their Soviet counterparts, then a gradual shift from “very formal” to “more comfortable” interactions. “Once you make the decision to cooperate,” he told Isachenko, “there are no problems that cannot be solved.” Isachenko cast ASTP as an indication of improving superpower

⁹⁴ In a speech broadcast on American television on June 24, 1973, Brezhnev told the American people of the “considerable additional benefits and advantages which could be derived [from] cooperation in the economic, scientific, technological, and cultural fields.” See: Brezhnev, *Selected Speeches and Writings on Foreign Affairs*, 229.

⁹⁵ See, for example: Brezhnev, *Selected Speeches and Writings on Foreign Affairs*, 14, 31, 227, 229, 233, 234.

relations, a development that would greatly benefit the entire world, he suggested. He closed his piece by tying space cooperation to some of the larger issues facing humanity on Earth, including peace. The partnership of the two superpowers, Isachenko suggested, could powerfully and positively shape world society.⁹⁶

Conclusion

Soviet Life thus actively endorsed space cooperation with the United States from early on. Once a significant joint mission had been agreed upon with ASTP, the magazine celebrated space collaboration not only as a sign of improving relations between the superpowers, but also to suggest the power of space exploration to transform humanity and strengthen world peace. ASTP also gave the Soviet Union a high profile symbolic demonstration of scientific and technological parity with the United States that the magazine duly exploited. Employing narratives that focused on the interpersonal relations between cosmonauts and astronauts, and that concentrated on linguistic and technical “compatibility issues,” it showcased how Soviet and American colleagues worked together, while it downplayed their ideological differences.

Soviet Life declared ASTP “one of the great achievements of the twentieth century,” and as the title of a photo of the Soyuz capsule set against a backdrop of the Earth’s surface proclaimed: “A Bridge to the Future.” Most often, the historic import of the flight was portrayed as a product and symbol of improved superpower relations. But at times, the magazine presented a somewhat alternative explanation,

⁹⁶ ASTP, Isachenko argued, “has helped all of us to consider the future of the Earth and the need to ensure peace, to join our efforts in eliminating hunger and disease and building homes and schools. Moreover, it has shown the importance of practical steps to implement these goals.” See: Isachenko, “Earth Is Our Bearing,” 21.

suggesting that space exploration itself, “because it is international by its very nature,” had compelled the warming relations between the two systems.⁹⁷ Space exploration, international relations, and propaganda were indeed intertwined. The complex relationship between these trajectories makes it difficult to separate them into distinct areas of activity. The following concluding chapter will reflect further on what the interconnectedness of these themes means for the historiography of the Cold War.

⁹⁷ “Soyuz-Apollo Experiment: A Bridge to the Future,” 1; Bushuyev, “Soyuz-Apollo Experiment: A Bridge to the Future,” 19.

11. CONCLUSION:

Why Space Propaganda? To Lead “All Mankind”

The struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union for preeminence was the defining circumstance of the Cold War. In the geopolitical environment that surfaced post-World War Two, the new possibility of nuclear war made “hot” conflicts more undesirable. As historian John Lewis Gaddis has argued, the superpowers realized that “as weapons became *more* devastating they became *less* usable.”¹ Gaddis observed the difficulty of using nuclear weapons as “effective instruments of statecraft,” and stressed the roles that ideology, ideas, symbols, beliefs, popular perceptions, reputation, and credibility played in the course of the Cold War.² Nonetheless, he did not recognize—as recent historians engaged with the cultural history of the Cold War have done—the extent to which the nuclear stalemate elevated the importance of propaganda and the development of soft power.³ In such a view, what made the Cold War “cold” was the superpowers’ increasing recognition of the importance of harnessing and disseminating cultural ideas and products to promote an *image* of preeminence.

Historians have recently examined how the significance of international propaganda rose concurrently with the Cold War. As Scott Lucas has argued, the Cold War was not simply a political or economic contest, but “was presented, first

¹ John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking the Cold War* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1997), 86. Emphasis in the original.

² Ibid., 6, 282, 283, 286.

³ Ibid., 112.

and foremost, as a clash of cultures and ideologies.”⁴ Examining British and American propaganda, Tony Shaw has argued that the “more powerful financial and communications resources” in the West translated into a “greater ability to spread its message.” This set of circumstances, he perceived, was “surely crucial” to the outcome of the Cold War.⁵ World historians like Peter J. Taylor and Immanuel Wallerstein have similarly identified that what differentiated hegemonic powers from other “successful great powers” during the Cold War was their command of “something extra,” which gave them a leadership role and made them admired by other societies and “widely regarded as a model for the future.” Taylor has described the hegemonic influence as an “immense cultural power” and further distinguished that it was this “critical socio-cultural power which [made] them so much more than merely another, albeit powerful state.”⁶

During the Cold War, politics and culture intertwined as the two superpowers came to rely heavily on “soft power” and employ propaganda and cultural diplomacy to increase support for their rival ideologies, systems, and policies. Historian Alexander Stephan has noted that American “cultural diplomacy [is] sometimes defined as a form of ‘soft power’” and recent Cold War historiography often employs a similar terminology.⁷ Martin Halliwell argued that “soft” power was more effective at promoting American ideals overseas than “hard” power.⁸ The

⁴ Scott Lucas, *Freedom's War: The American Crusade Against the Soviet Union* (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1999), 2.

⁵ Tony Shaw, “The Politics of Cold War Culture,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 3, no. 3 (2001): 74, 75.

⁶ Peter J. Taylor, “Locating the American Century: A World-Systems Analysis,” in *The American Century: Consensus and Coercion in the Projection of American Power*, by David Slater and Peter J. Taylor (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 1999), 5-6.

⁷ Alexander Stephan, *The Americanization of Europe: Culture, Diplomacy, and Anti-Americanism After 1945* (New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2006), 5.

⁸ Martin Halliwell, *American Culture in the 1950s* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 9.

emergence of “soft power” to describe American cultural diplomacy highlights the importance of propaganda for waging the Cold War.

The present study of space propaganda supports these recent historians’ emphasis on the important role propaganda played in the Cold War. Its close readings of the two propaganda magazines’ space-themed articles has shown how far official ideologies permeated into each sides’ portrayals of space exploration. In doing so, it has sought to demonstrate how space exploration was itself an instrument of Cold War propaganda.

Through their space propaganda, both the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as victors in the space race: they achieved the goal of associating their nations with scientific and technological advancements in space. When one considers space propaganda in the broader context of the Cold War, however, its limitations become more evident. Both superpowers’ propaganda sought to use space exploration to associate their nation with the cause of global peace. This effort failed to overcome other opposing currents of the Cold War: nuclear proliferation, military conflict and the subjugation of lesser powers. It seems untenable today to describe either superpower during the Cold War as leading a global search for peace. Still, it is difficult to assess what impact the exercise of space exploration may have had on the collective psyche of humanity. After all, the Cold War ended without the apocalyptic nuclear conflict many had feared. Did space exploration raise awareness of the Earth and humanity as unified and fragile? Did such space consciousness cause humanity to hesitate at the abyss of atomic war, or even to take a step back? Such questions pose a challenge. How could historians even assess the existence or spread of such space consciousness, let alone its effect? As unanswerable as these

questions may be, they underscore how inextricable the history of the Cold War is from the opening of the Space Age, and vice versa. Official narratives of space exploration are thus central to understanding its social impact, and the ideological nuances of their Cold War purpose must be carefully considered. Likewise, examining the effect of space exploration on world leaders and the global public is essential for understanding the course of the Cold War.

Section I argued that both magazines vigorously portrayed their exploration of space as a peaceful endeavor, and in doing so they reflected their political leaders' differing ideological conceptions of peace. Notably, with the emergence of détente—significantly during the period post-Apollo 11 when American space supremacy seemed assured—Soviet discourse on peace shifted to assume that peaceful coexistence had become the accepted basis for international relations while *Soviet Life* magazine deemphasized ideological differences between the two countries in its ASTP coverage. Both depicted space exploration uniting humanity, although unlike its Soviet counterpart *Amerika* used its portrayals of the global audience for spaceflight to showcase the openness of the American media. In particular, *Amerika's* space coverage shone a spotlight on American television not only as a sign of technological sophistication and material prosperity, but most importantly as a symbol of openness. In this *Amerika* too reflected its political leaders' conceptions of peace, since American officials had explicitly endorsed the “open world” notion as a counter theme to the Soviet peace offensive.

Section II argued that both magazines strongly associated exploring space with scientific and technological progress, and used similar strategies to do so. Both used scientific terminology and images to emphasize the scientific and technological

aspects of spaceflight, and to suggest that the capability to explore space was a sign of past progress, and a promise of future progress. Both employed narratives of danger, and of continuous technological improvement of spaceflight systems to illustrate technological progress. Both used space-themed articles to showcase the broad scientific, technological, and industrial base of their respective society. Both claimed that space exploration represented a “new era” to cast the cosmic exploration as a turning point in history—and therefore a marker of human progress—and to underscore the significance of their space achievements. Both predicted an ambitious program of future spaceflight in order to accentuate the significance of each “small step” taken, and to suggest that they were in fact “giant leaps.” Both adopted a space advocacy position by assuming that space exploration was beneficial to humankind, and focusing on the practical benefits that they expected space to bring. Both sought to prove that their own political and economic system was best suited for achieving progress and for delivering the benefits of space exploration to the world’s people.

In many respects, the differences between both magazine’s overall portrayals of space exploration during this period were either contextual or a matter of degree. While both attempted to demonstrate their system’s superiority by showcasing the material affluence that they provided to their citizens, for example, *Amerika* was saturated with images of material abundance to an extent that *Soviet Life* could not compete with because of very real differences in the material affluence in the respective societies. The Soviet magazine may have put greater emphasis on “founding fathers” because Tsiolkovsky’s biography lent itself well to contrast Soviet support for scientific research with pre-Revolutionary Russia’s. In the broadest

picture, the two magazines differed in their content and approach to space exploration, but not in their overall message. Although one claimed capitalist superiority, and the other socialist superiority, what surfaces is the fact that both used space exploration to demonstrate those claims. In that sense, both emerged as “victors” in the space race, since both nations became strongly associated with space exploration.

One vital distinguishing theme was the American theme of “openness.” Absent from *Soviet Life*’s depictions of spaceflight, “openness” ran through the other themes of *Amerika*’s space propaganda as a fundamental principle of America’s conception of peace, its narratives of progress, and its interest in cooperation. In light of this key difference to American and Soviet space exploration narratives, as Section III has shown, ASTP represented a propaganda victory for the United States since it forced the Soviet Union to open itself—to a degree—in order to cooperate. But the joint spaceflight was a propaganda victory for the Soviet Union too, since it symbolized their parity with the United States in space.

In short, this study had shown the deep similarities in how the two superpowers used space exploration to promote their world-views and visions of national supremacy. The most striking difference between the two magazine’s approaches, was *Amerika*’s implicit emphasis on promoting the material abundance and openness of American society. These themes are part of Cold War historiography and support the work of scholars like Osgood, Taylor, De Grazia, and Pells, who have highlighted the significant diffusion of American “consumer modernity” in the period. But, in identifying the central idea of “openness” in American space propaganda, this study raises important questions about the effect of

American influence on Soviet society. Considering the significance of *glasnost*' (openness) in transforming the Soviet political landscape under Mikhail Gorbachev, historians should investigate the relationship between how openness was promoted as an ideal by American propaganda directed at the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s, and by Soviet domestic propaganda in the second half of the 1980s.

Effectiveness

Any attempt to measure these two magazines vis-à-vis each other must return to the question of their effectiveness of getting their message across to their target audiences. This research did not set out to appraise the effectiveness of propaganda, which is a notoriously difficult undertaking.⁹ A general statement can be made here, however, about the relative effectiveness of the two magazines solely based on comparing their popularity with their intended audiences. The large-format, lavishly illustrated magazine medium was more effective at reaching Soviet audiences than American ones during this time. This may in part stem from the more media-saturated nature of the affluent American society. Not only did the American newsstand have many other glossy magazines competing for readers' attention, television had become far more ubiquitous in American society by the late 1950s than it had in Soviet society. Another explanation for the uneven popularity of the two publications may be the nature of their editorial style and content. That *Amerika*'s editors came from careers in journalism and broadcasting may have also increased the public reception of the American magazine. Perhaps the drier tone of

⁹ L. John Martin, for instance, has summarized some of the difficulties in measuring propaganda's effectiveness. See: L. John Martin, "Effectiveness of International Propaganda," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 398, no. 1 (November 1, 1971): 61-70.

Soviet Life, which may have been a byproduct of the magazine's editors Party backgrounds, made it relatively less appealing for American audiences.

L. John Martin has argued that it is far easier to measure the international propaganda's effectiveness as *facilitative communication*—the objective of which is “to open or to maintain channels of communication with a given individual, groups, or public as potential future targets”—than to ascertain its persuasive capacities. To Martin, as long as a communication channel is open, it is effective.¹⁰ Such a view supports the argument that *Amerika*, simply because of its greater popularity, was far more effective than *Soviet Life* in facilitating communication between the American government and the Soviet public.

The negotiations over the magazines' circulation made clear that Soviet officials consistently had difficulties in getting *Soviet Life* to catch on with the American public. Anecdotal evidence, including several eyewitness accounts of long queues customarily forming whenever a new issue became available, attested to



Figure 11-1: A photo of Soviet cosmonauts (l. to r.) Valeri Bykovsky, Yuri Gagarin, and Gherman Titov reading *Amerika*'s Kennedy memorial issue appeared in the October 1965 edition.

“What's New” *Amerika*, October 1965, p. 1.

Amerika's popularity with Soviet audiences. Staff at the American Embassy in Moscow reported on their canvass of 22 kiosks in the capital on July 15, 1971, when one issue of *Amerika* hit the Soviet newsstands. The magazine was on sale at

¹⁰ L. John Martin, “Effectiveness of International Propaganda,” 63.

five locations, while four had already sold out, and six had not yet received their shipment, though they still expected to. The remaining kiosks were either closed, “or their vendors were non-committal.” Queues as long as 40 people had formed to buy the magazine. Embassy staff viewing the scenes were twice asked if they could hold someone’s place in line. Some customers expressed concern that the vendor would run out of copies before they reached the front of the line. One woman was seen getting back in line after purchasing a copy; she hoped to get around the vendor’s “one-to-a-customer” rule and buy three copies.¹¹ Embassy personnel conducting similar monitoring the following month reported that, at 22 kiosks observed, 13 were actually selling the magazine and another five had already finished selling their copies. A memorandum to the USIA Director observed that “lines of 15-30 persons” had formed at “most locations.” “Uniformed military officers” were even seen buying *Amerika* at two locations. Queues had even formed at two locations where the vendors had not received copies of the magazine yet. One vendor, who expected to sell out his shipment of one hundred copies, told Embassy staff that he “could sell a thousand in two hours but can’t get them.”¹²

There were other indications that the USIA publication regularly struck a chord. During *Amerika*’s first run, editor Marion Sanders interpreted attacks on the magazine published in major Soviet newspapers in 1949 as a good sign: “That means we must be getting read.”¹³ Over the next decades, the magazine’s articles were often

¹¹ Lyle D. Copmann, “Memorandum for the Director, Subject: America Illustrated,” July 20, 1971, RG 306, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Director’s Subject Files 1968-1972, A1 42, Box 24, NARA II.

¹² Ken Towery, “Memorandum for the Director, Subject: Demand for America Illustrated Magazine by Soviet Citizens,” August 25, 1971, RG 306, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Director’s Subject Files 1968-1972, A1 42, Box 24, NARA II.

¹³ “The Press: The Voice of Amerika,” *Time*, June 6, 1949, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,801913-2,00.html>.

attacked in the Soviet press, a fact that US officials interpreted as positive evidence that it was popular and that its content mattered.¹⁴ From the 1950s to the 1970s the popularity of *Amerika* and other USIA activities with Soviet citizens by 1957 contributed to a noticeable shift in Soviet perceptions of the US. American propaganda aimed at Soviet audiences contributed significantly to the long-term thaw in US-Soviet relations before, during, and after détente. According to US officials' analysis of the effectiveness of USIA propaganda, *Amerika* played a critical role, second only to the VOA, in "diminishing the effectiveness" of Soviet domestic propaganda. In 1959, officials at the US Embassy in Moscow reported home that, "with the exception of personal contacts, *Amerika* magazine has made the greatest contribution to better understanding of America by the Soviets and to provision of accurate information about the U.S., thus counteracting to some degree anti-American propaganda." The Embassy further reported that the magazine "enjoys wide popularity," sparked discussion, and generally made a "greater impact than [its] 50,000 circulation would imply."¹⁵

American journalists in the Soviet Union who occasionally reported on the magazine's impact between the 1950s and 1970s invariably found it making a positive impression. In early 1959, *New York Times* correspondent Max Frankel, for example, traveled through Siberia where he met a 26-year-old Polish diplomat who read *Amerika* "regularly." "Let there be peace," the diplomat told him, "and my real dream will come true: a world without borders, no passports, no rubber stamps.

¹⁴ Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 118.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 32, 119.

Nations, well, they'll be like you and I now."¹⁶ Frankel considered the fact that the Soviet people were "willing to pay twice and three times the list price" for *Amerika* meant that they had formed "an admiration and affection for the United States" in spite of Soviet propaganda insisting that they do otherwise.¹⁷

A June 26, 1974, *New York Times* piece examined how détente, combined with USIA activities and the increasing cultural and educational exchanges, stimulated Soviet "curiosity" and awareness of American life. According to the author, Christopher Wren, the US "has long been the yardstick by which most Russians, officially as well as privately, measure not only their country's progress but also the material well-being of their own lives." To Wren, the average Soviet citizen's "greater accessibility to information about the United States," was "circumscribed" by bleak and unflattering portrayals of America in the Soviet press, resulting in "most Russians" retaining "lingering feelings of ambivalence toward the United States." Meanwhile, the exchange agreements limited *Amerika's* effect, Wren argued, since the magazine could "print nothing that would offend the Soviet leadership." In spite of his modest valuation of the effect that American "information" had on Soviet perceptions of the United States, Wren's article provided some examples that the propaganda messages identified in this dissertation were actually reaching the Soviet public. As Wren observed:

The United States is no longer portrayed as a warmonger poised to unleash some terrible surprise attack upon the Soviet people, and the American people themselves are credited for having good intentions. Mutual cooperation, from space

¹⁶ Max Frankel, "Siberians, Proud of Gains, Found Ignorant of West," *The New York Times*, April 29, 1959, 1, 14.

¹⁷ Max Frankel, "Ivan Appears to Like the Way Joneses Live," *The New York Times*, August 2, 1959, E5.

exploration to trade and medical research, is receiving greater press play. But the ideological battle persists, though it is waged on a narrower front.¹⁸

Wren's comment suggests USIA's extensive promotion of peace, "mutual cooperation," and close association of these themes with space exploration had gained some traction. Wren's report of the questions Soviet people typically ask American visitors revealed a mixture of amazement and fear of the capitalist "other," but overall a fixation on American material abundance. A Muscovite wondered: "How can there not be a line in a store? ... It's impossible." A teen-age female steel-mill worker from Zaporozhe concluded: "America. I hear that it's a good place to live—if you have money." *Amerika's* celebration of American affluence, such comments suggested, had at least penetrated Soviet consciousness where it fused with official Soviet denigration of American society. As Wren reported, for example, the Soviet press service TASS in 1974 focused on the "millions of so-called prosperous Americans who continue to suffer from malnutrition and even outright hunger." As a result, the "average Russian," Wren observed, regarded the US as "a somewhat hazy contradiction." Quite aware of American "racism at home and aggression abroad," the Soviet people nonetheless "admire[d] the United States for its material abundance, its stunning technology and its free and vibrant life." One "average" Soviet citizen even suggested that space exploration—and space cooperation in particular—had played a significant role in improving Soviet impressions of America. As a teenaged boy on a collective farm told Wren: "I have read in school that America is the main capitalist country. But it's a good country,

¹⁸ Christopher S. Wren, "Russian's Curiosity About U.S. Is Rising," *The New York Times*, June 26, 1974, 16.

and I know there will be an Apollo-Soyuz space flight.”¹⁹ Space exploration, it seemed, had the power to capture people’s imaginations, and through association with positive themes, to improve their opinions of the country engaged in spaceflight.

Still, there were sometimes indications that Soviet officials—and perhaps the public—misinterpreted American propaganda messages. The 10th anniversary issue of *Amerika* in September 1966 provided two striking examples of this. That issue featured an optimistic appeal from Lyndon Johnson taking a positive look at Soviet-American relations. “We have more in common than we sometimes realize,” the President said, “Our people are more naturally friends than enemies. I would like to see us exchange goods and ideas and technology—all of the means to achieving common progress and prosperity.”²⁰ According to a *Pravda* editorial, however, the Soviet leadership’s response to Johnson’s appeal declared: “Hypocritical is the only word to describe the dulcet phrases about the benefits of gradual development of common interests between our two countries.” Peter Grose, the *New York Times* writer covering the exchange, noted the wide divergence between American intention and the official Soviet response:

Between these two phrases is exposed the frustrating failure of communication between the Soviet Union and the United States. No matter how sympathetic the translation, statements of the Kremlin and the White House come out wrong on the other side. The remarks of each sound commendable but hypocritical to the other; each seems to believe that the other’s analysis misses the point. There is parallel language but antipodal meaning.²¹

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ “Quotation of the Day,” *The New York Times*, September 28, 1966, 49.

²¹ Peter Grose, “U.S.-Soviet Exchange: The Communications Gap Is Widening,” *The New York Times*, October 2, 1966, sec. E, 3.

Vietnam in particular, Grose observed, made American statements on “self-determination” and Soviet ones on “noninterference” sound hollow. “But on other matters,” he complained, “even nonpolitical ones, the American ‘message’ often fails to get through here.” Indeed, the cover of the 10th anniversary issue provided another opportunity for Soviet authorities and audiences to misinterpret the American message. The cover image—the numbers 1956 and 1966 written in a highly stylized geometric design in red, white and blue—looked to Soviet audiences like “partial swastikas.” Given this context, Grose suggested, Russian readers could hardly be blamed for interpreting Johnson’s comments—that the President “must think in terms of the national interest and the nation’s security—even if this means stirring up some segments of public opinion no matter how vociferous” for example, as a “defense of something approaching dictatorship.”²²

USIA’s own research into the effectiveness of *Amerika* suggested similarly that the magazine enjoyed a widespread and loyal readership within urban areas in Soviet Russia. What is more, the Agency also found that the Soviet public particularly appreciated the magazine’s space-themed articles. Questionnaires enclosed in the October 1977, November 1977, and February 1978 issues of *Amerika* surveyed Soviet readers’ opinions of the magazine. Anticipating that the magazine would be “passed around,” each of these issues contained four copies of the questionnaire, along with a full-page explaining the survey and offering that respondents would receive “a set of prints by American artists.” No doubt hoping to claim the prize, “almost all” respondents included their name and address. A December 22, 1978,

²² Ibid.

USIA Research Report summarized the 1,900 “valid responses” received at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow by June 1978. James P. McGregor, an East European Analyst in the European Research Division of the USIA’s Office of Research and the author of the report, considered the study to have been “by far the highest of any known survey effort undertaken by a Western governmental agency in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union,” and the “single largest source of data on Soviet readers available to the Agency.”²³

The demographic information it collected on the magazine’s readership reflected USIA’s targeting of youth and intellectual leaders: 70% of respondents were between 16 and 39, while the 34% between 20 and 29 years of age made up the largest single group. As for their occupations, 34% of the respondents declared themselves “students,” while 14% were “engineers,” and 11% were “workers.” With 6% each, scientists, medical professionals, and artists were the next most common responses. The responses came from a broad geographical base: 77 of the 85 cities where *Amerika* was distributed according to the official agreement. According to the survey, the magazine also enjoyed impressive loyalty from its readership. On average, the respondents claimed they had been reading *Amerika* for “slightly more than three years,” while approximately one-third had read the magazine regularly for more than five years. About one-third claimed to have read all issues in the previous year, though most respondents answered that they typically read nine or ten issues per year.²⁴

²³ Office of Research, International Communication Agency, “Research Report R-32-78, Survey of Soviet Readers of America Illustrated: Findings and Implications,” December 22, 1978, 4, 7, RG 306, Records of the U.S. Information Agency, Office of Research, “R” Reports 1975-1982, A 1013, Box 44, NARA II.

²⁴ Ibid., 5-7, 11.

The questionnaires asked respondents to comment on articles appearing in the previous twelve months, and thus covered a total period of 17 months from October 1976 to February 1978. Asked to indicate which articles were most “interesting,” the respondents’ favorites were those articles “predominantly cultural and scientific/technical rather than political.” McGregor hypothesized that the Soviet readers’ lack of interest in politically themed articles “could be a reaction to the generally recognized overpoliticization of Soviet society.” It is hardly likely, however, that American respondents would have shown any greater preference for *Soviet Life* articles on economics or politics had they been similarly surveyed. The report listed a total of 36 articles and 13 collections of articles that were named 25 or more times as either “most interesting” or “also interesting.” The “single most often cited article” was one on space exploration— “Vikings Explore Mars”—in the June 1977 issue. That article was chosen as most “most interesting” nearly twice as many times as the second most successful article. The space theme clearly resonated with *Amerika’s* readership in the mid-1970s; it likely did so in the previous two decades as well.²⁵

The questionnaire also invited *Amerika’s* readers to suggest what they would like to see in future issues. “Culture”—defined in the report by its many sub-themes like “Music,” “Art,” and “Cinema”—topped the list by far, scoring 329. “Fashion and Cosmetics” came second with a score of 51. “Technology” came in sixth with 22 votes, while “Space” and “Science” tied for seventh place with 20 votes each. Further down the list “Joint U.S.-Soviet efforts (economics, space, etc.)” received a score of 8, while “Peace” – with its vote of 4 – tied with “The President,”

²⁵ Ibid., 17-20.

“Economics,” and “Opinion of the Soviet Union.”²⁶ Articles on space exploration were thus a significant component of *Amerika*’s overall illustration of the United States, and—according to the 1978 survey—were well-received by Soviet audiences. Though no comparable data on *Soviet Life* readers’ preferences has been uncovered, the quantity of space articles in that magazine showed that Soviet propagandists also valued the space topic.

The themes contained in both magazines’ space narratives, as this research has shown, projected the propaganda prerogatives of the government agencies that produced them. They therefore provide scholars with a fascinating resource for examining official Soviet and American narratives of space exploration. The magazine medium had a particular role in the overall propaganda strategy of each country. As print culture these publications harnessed the creative energies of many artists—writers, photographers, illustrators, and designers—in the propaganda project. As material objects they could be perused at leisure, scrutinized, passed around, and returned to again and again. Still, print culture remains an overlooked medium for scholars examining the enlistment of artistic and cultural products as propaganda. The abundance of space exploration and science narratives in these magazines also shows them to be an important—and untapped—source for historians interested in the popularization of science.

One avenue for further research would be to examine whether, and on what terms, Soviet and American audiences received the major themes of official space narratives. As the anecdotes provided above from American journalists in the Soviet Union suggest, Soviet audiences seemed to have at least reflected upon the American

²⁶ Ibid., 20-23.

propaganda themes of peace, progress, cooperation, as well as the sub-themes of openness, and material abundance. Also, the themes identified herein were most certainly used by Soviet and American propaganda agencies domestically, and in other regions. Future research in those areas could begin to grasp how official narratives of spaceflight were diffused. Additional research could also examine how other private and public agents of the world's mass media embraced the main themes of official spaceflight narratives. Ultimately, such research investigating state roles in producing the master narratives of spaceflight would be valuable for ascertaining to what extent government propaganda objectives colored understandings of space exploration in the mainstream media and popular consciousness.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archival Sources

- National Archives and Records Administration. General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives II at College Park, College Park, MD.
- National Archives and Records Administration. Records of the United States Information Agency, Record Group 306, National Archives II at College Park, College Park, MD.
- Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii (RGANI) (Russian State Archive of Contemporary History). fond 5. *Materialy otделov Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi Partii, 1953-1965: Rossiiskaia Sotsialisticheskaia Federativnaia Respublika* (Departmental Records of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1953-1965: Russian Socialist Federal Republic). Woodbridge, CT: Primary Source Microfilm, 2003.
- Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii (RGANI) (Russian State Archive of Contemporary History). fond 5. *Materialy otделov Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi Partii: Sovetskikh respublikh, 1953-1966* (Departmental records of the Central Committee of the Communist Party: Soviet Republics, 1953-1966). Woodbridge, CT: Primary Source Microfilm, 2003.

Newspapers and Magazines (various issues)

Amerika Illiustrirovannoye
Izvestia
Pravda
Soviet Life
The New York Times
The Times
The Washington Post
Time Magazine

Published Primary Sources

- Ahmed, Selina. *Comparison of Soviet and U.S. Space Food and Nutrition Programs [Final Report]*, Report N89-20059, NASA/ASEE Summer Faculty Fellowship Program, Houston, TX: NASA, 1988.
- Arkhangelsky, N. "Na ostrove bali (On the Island of Bali)." *Oktyabr*, No. 12, December, 1964, 168-175.
- Baturin, Iurii M. *Sovetskaia kosmicheskaiia initsiativa v gosudarstvennykh dokumentakh, 1946-1964 gg.* Moscow: RTSoft, 2008.
- Brezhnev, Leonid I. *Selected Speeches and Writings on Foreign Affairs*. New York, NY: Pergamon Press, 1978.
- . *Leninskii kursom* (Lenin's course). Various volumes. Moscow: Politizdat, 1974.
- . *Our Course: Peace and Socialism*. Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1973.

- Bush, Vannevar. *Science The Endless Frontier: A Report to the President on a Program for Postwar Scientific Research*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945.
- Chertok, Boris E. *Rakety i lyudi* (Rockets and People). Various volumes. Washington, DC: NASA, 2005-2009.
- Crane, Robert D. "Basic Principles in Soviet Space Law: Peaceful Coexistence, Peaceful Cooperation, and Disarmament." *Law and Contemporary Problems* 29, no. 4 (Autumn 1964): 943-955.
- Creel, George. "Propaganda and Morale." *The American Journal of Sociology* 47, no. 3 (November 1941): 340-351.
- . *How We Advertised America: The First Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on Public Information that Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe*. New York, NY: Harper & Brothers, 1920.
- Davison, W. Phillips. "Some Trends in International Propaganda." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 398 (November 1971): 1-13.
- Foundations of Space Biology and Medicine*. 3 vols. Washington, DC: Scientific and Technical Information Office, NASA, 1975.
- Glaser, William A. "The Semantics of the Cold War." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 20, no. 4 (Winter, 1956-1957): 691-716.
- Hyland, William G. "Brezhnev and Beyond." *Foreign Affairs* 58, no. 1 (Fall 1979): 51-66.
- Imam, Zafar. "Soviet View of Detente." *International Studies (New Delhi)* 13, no. 4 (December 1974).
- Inozemtsev, Nikolai. "O novom etape v razvitií mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii (On the new stage in international relations)." *Kommunist* 13 (September 1973), 89-101.
- Ivanov, K. P. *Leninskie osnovy vneshney politiki SSSR* (Leninist foundations of Soviet foreign policy). Moscow, 1969.
- Kamanin, N.P. *Skrytiy kosmos* (Hidden space). Two volumes. Moscow: Infortekst, 1995-1997.
- Kennan, George F. "Peaceful Coexistence: A Western View." *Foreign Affairs* 38, no. 2 (January 1960): 171-190.
- Kennedy, John F. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*. Vol. 2. United States Government Printing Office, 1963.
- . *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*. Vol. 1. United States Government Printing Office, 1962.
- . *Profiles in Courage*. New York, NY: Harper & Brothers, 1955.
- Khrushchev, Nikita S. *Khrushchev Remembers*. Two volumes. Boston, MA: Little Brown & Co., 1977.
- . *Khrushchev in America*. New York, NY: Crosscurrents Press, 1960.
- . "On Peaceful Coexistence." *Foreign Affairs* 38, no. 1 (October 1959): 1-18.
- Killian, James R. *Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977.
- Kissinger, Henry A. *White House Years*. 1st ed. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1979.
- . "The Meanings of 'Peaceful Coexistence'." *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 35, no. 1 (January 1976): 8.

- Korovin, Yevgeni A. "An Old and Futile Demand." *International Affairs* 9, no. 4 (1963): 100-101.
- Larson, Arthur. *What We Are For*. New York, NY: Harper, 1959.
- . *A Republican Looks at his Party*. New York, NY: Harper, 1956.
- Lebedev, N.I. *A New Stage in International Relations*. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1978.
- Lenin, Vladimir I. *Socialism And War*. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1970.
- . *Collected Works*. Translated by Julius Katzer. 4th ed. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965.
- Lerner, Warren. "The Historical Origins of the Soviet Doctrine of Peaceful Coexistence." *Law and Contemporary Problems* 29, no. 4 (Autumn 1964): 865-870.
- John M. Logsdon, ed., *Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume I: Organizing for Exploration*. Washington, DC: NASA History Office, 1995.
- Marantz, Paul. "Prelude to Detente: Doctrinal Change under Khrushchev." *International Studies Quarterly* 19, no. 4 (December 1975).
- Martin, L. John. "Effectiveness of International Propaganda." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 398 (November 1971): 61-70.
- Marx, Karl, Friedrich Engels, and Gareth Stedman Jones. *The Communist Manifesto*. London: Penguin Classics, 2002.
- McWhinney, Edward. "'Coexistence', the Cuba Crisis, and Cold War International Law." *International Journal* 18, no. 1 (Winter 1962): 67-74.
- . "'Peaceful Co-existence' and Soviet-Western International Law." *The American Journal of International Law* 56, no. 4 (October 1962): 951-970.
- Nagorski, Zygmunt. "Soviet International Propaganda: Its Role, Effectiveness, and Future." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 398 (November 1971): 130-139.
- Nichols, Walter. "Voice of America Forum Series." *College Art Journal* 19, no. 3 (Spring 1960).
- Nixon, Richard M. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1972.
- . *Nixon on the Issues*. New York, NY: Nixon-Agnew Campaign Committee, 1968.
- "Peaceful Coexistence and Ideological Struggle." *Kommunist*, no. 16 (1959): 7.
- Ploss, Sidney I. "Soviet Politics on the Eve of the 24th Party Congress." *World Politics* 23, no. 1 (October 1970): 61-82.
- Prokhorov, Alexander M. *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*. Translation of 1974 3rd edition. New York, NY: MacMillan Education Corporation, 1974.
- Radek, Karl. "The Bases of Soviet Foreign Policy." *Foreign Affairs* 12, no. 2 (January 1934): 193-206.
- Rand Corporation. *Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1998.
- Rowan, Carl Thomas. *Breaking Barriers*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1991.
- Schwartz, Donald V., ed. *Resolutions and Decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Vol. 5, The Brezhnev Years, 1964-1981*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982.
- Sevastyanov, Vitali, and A. Ursol. "Cosmonautics and Social Development." *International Affairs* (November 1977).

- Stepakov, V. Vladimir. *Partiinoi propagande--Nauchnye osnovy* (Party propaganda—Scientific foundations). Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1967.
- Tomashevskii, D. "Leninskii printsip mirnogo sossushchestvovaniia i klassovaia borb'a (The Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence and the class struggle)." *Kommunist* 12 (August 1970).
- Tucker, Frank H. "Soviet Science Fiction: Recent Development and Outlook." *Russian Review* 33, no. 2 (April 1974): 189-200.
- Tunkin, G. "Razriadka napriazhennosti i mezhdunarodnoe pravo (Détente and international law)." *Kommunist* 11 (July 1974).
- Turner, Frederick Jackson. *Rereading Frederick Jackson Turner: "The Significance of the Frontier in American History" and Other Essays*. New York, NY: Yale University Press, 1998.
- Ulam, Adam B. "Detente Under Soviet Eyes." *Foreign Policy*, no. 24 (August 1976).
- United States, Congress, and Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. *International Cooperation in Outer Space: A Symposium*. 92d Congress, 1st session. Senate. Document; no. 92-57;. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1972.
- United States Department of State. *Department of State Bulletin*. Various volumes. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961-1968.
- . *Foreign Relations of the United States*, Various volumes. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984-2006.
- United States Information Agency. *United States Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Motion Pictures and Filmstrips: Education Section 1958, Selected and Available For Use Abroad*. Washington, DC: United States Information Agency, 1959.
- . *New Frontiers of Knowledge: A Symposium by Distinguished Writers, Notable Scholars & Public Figures*. Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1957.
- Vernon, Graham D. "Controlled Conflict: Soviet Perceptions of Peaceful Co-existence." *Orbis* 23, no. 2 (Summer 1979).
- Whitton, John B. "Hostile International Propaganda and International Law." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 398 (November 1971): 14-25.
- Zagladin, V. "Revoliutsionnii protsess i mezhdunarodnaia politika (The revolutionary process and international politics)." *Kommunist* 13 (September 1972).
- Zhukov, G. P. *Kosmos i mezhdunarodnoe sotrudnichestvo* (Space and international cooperation). Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Instituta mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii, 1963.

Secondary Sources

Articles

- Allen, George V. "Are the Soviets Winning the Propaganda War?" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 336 (July 1961): 1-11.
- Andrew, Christopher. "Intelligence and International Relations in the Early Cold War." *Review of International Studies* 24, no. 3 (July 1998): 321-330.
- Benn, David Wedgwood. "New Thinking in Soviet Propaganda." *Soviet Studies* 21, no. 1 (July 1969): 52-63.

- Bostdorff, Denise M., and Steven R. Goldzwig. "Idealism and Pragmatism in American Foreign Policy Rhetoric: The Case of John F. Kennedy and Vietnam." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 24, no. 3 (Summer 1994): 515-530.
- Castillo, Greg. "Domesticating the Cold War: Household Consumption as Propaganda in Marshall Plan Germany." *Journal of Contemporary History* 40, no. 2 (April 2005): 261-288.
- Chester, Edward W. "Beyond the Rhetoric: A New Look at Presidential Inaugural Addresses." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 10, no. 4 (Fall 1980): 571-582.
- Csicsery-Ronay, Istvan. "Science Fiction and the Thaw." *Science Fiction Studies* 31, no. 3 (November 2004): 337-344.
- Cull, Nicholas John. "'The Man Who Invented Truth': The Tenure of Edward R. Murrow as Director of the United States Information Agency During the Kennedy Years." *Cold War History* 4, no. 1 (October 2003): 23-48.
- Day, Dwayne A., and Colin Burgess. "Monkey In a Blue Suit." *Spaceflight* 48, no. 7 (July 2006).
- Gavin, William F. "'Source Material': His Heart's Abundance: Notes of a Nixon Speechwriter." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 31, no. 2 (June 2001): 358-368.
- Glad, John. "Brave New Worlds." *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-) 7, no. 4 (Autumn 1983): 68-78.
- Gomel, Elana. "Gods like Men: Soviet Science Fiction and the Utopian Self." *Science Fiction Studies* 31, no. 3 (November 2004): 358-377.
- . "Science Fiction in Russia: From Utopia to New Age." *Science Fiction Studies* 26, no. 3 (November 1999): 435-441.
- Grossman, Andrew D. "The Early Cold War and American Political Development: Reflections on Recent Research." *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 15, no. 3 (Spring 2002): 471-483.
- Haefele, Mark. "John F. Kennedy, USIA, and World Public Opinion." *Diplomatic History* 25, no. 1 (Winter 2001).
- Jameson, Fredric. "Progress versus Utopia; Or, Can We Imagine the Future?." *Science Fiction Studies* 9, no. 2 (July 1982): 147-158.
- Johnston, Timothy. "Peace or Pacifism? The Soviet Struggle For Peace in All the World, 1948-54." *The Slavonic and East European Review* 86 (April 1, 2008): 259-282.
- Jr., Theodore Otto Windt. "Presidential Rhetoric: Definition of a Field of Study." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 16, no. 1 (Winter 1986): 102-116.
- Koman, Rita G. "Man on the Moon: The U.S. Space Program as a Cold War Maneuver." *Magazine of History* 8, no. 2 (Winter 1994): 42-50.
- Kramer, Mark. "Ideology and the Cold War." *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 4 (October 1999): 539-576.
- Launius, Roger D. "Perfect Worlds, Perfect Societies: The Persistent Goal of Utopia in Human Spaceflight." *Journal of the British Interplanetary Society*, no. 56 (October 2003): 338-349.
- Lesy, Michael. "Visual Literacy." *Journal of American History* 94, no. 1 (June 2007): 143-153.
- Lim, Elvin T. "Five Trends in Presidential Rhetoric: An Analysis of Rhetoric from George Washington to Bill Clinton." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 32, no. 2 (June 2002): 328-366.
- Logsdon, John. "Evaluating Apollo." *Space Policy* 5, no. 3 (August 1989).

- Logsdon, John, and A. Dupas. "Was the Race to the Moon Real?" *Scientific American* (June 1994).
- Lule, Jack. "Roots of the Space Race: Sputnik and the Language of U.S. News in 1957." *Journalism Quarterly* 68, no. Spring/Summer (1991): 76-86.
- Markwick, Roger D. "Peaceful Coexistence, Detente and Third World Struggles: The Soviet View, From Lenin to Brezhnev." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 44, no. 2 (1990): 171.
- Marlin, Cheryl L. "Space Race Propaganda: U.S. Coverage of the Soviet Sputniks in 1957." *Journalism Quarterly* 64 (1987): 544-549.
- McCurdy, Howard E. "The Decision to Build the Space Station: Too Weak a Commitment?" *Space Policy* 4, no. 4 (November 1988).
- McDougall, Walter A. "Journey to the Center of Jules Verne... and Us." *Watch on the West* 2, no. 4 (September 2001).
- . "Sputnik, the Space Race and the Cold War." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 41, no. 5 (1985).
- Mickiewicz, Ellen. "The Functions of Communications Officials in the USSR: A Biographical Study." *Slavic Review* 43, no. 4 (Winter 1984): 641-656.
- Nudelman, Rafail. "Soviet Science Fiction and the Ideology of Soviet Society." *Science Fiction Studies* 16, no. 1 (March 1989): 38-66.
- Osgood, Kenneth. "Hearts and Minds: The Unconventional Cold War." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 4, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 85-107.
- Palmer, Scott W. "How Memory Was Made: The Construction of the Memorial to the Heroes of the Battle of Stalingrad," *The Russian Review* 68, no. 3 (July 2009), 373-407.
- Perry, G. "Perestroika and Glasnost in the Soviet Space Programme." *Space Policy* (November 1989).
- Roberts, Geoffrey. "Moscow and the Marshall Plan: Politics, Ideology and the Onset of the Cold War, 1947." *Europe-Asia Studies* 46, no. 8 (1994): 1371-1386.
- Rockwell, Trevor. "New Frontiers of Knowledge: Science and Technology in Late 1950s American Cold War Propaganda." *Past Imperfect* 15 (2009).
- Ross-Nazzari, Jennifer. "Détente on Earth and in Space: The Apollo-Soyuz Test Project." *OAH Magazine of History* 24, no. 3 (July 1, 2010): 29 -34.
- Sandweiss, Martha A. "Image and Artifact: The Photograph as Evidence in the Digital Age." *Journal of American History* 94, no. 1 (June 2007): 193-202.
- Siddiqi, Asif A. "Sputnik 50 years later: New evidence on its origins." *Acta Astronautica* 63, no. 1-4 (July-August 2008): 529-539.
- . "The Rockets' Red Glare: Technology, Conflict, and Terror in the Soviet Union." *Technology and Culture* 44, no. 3 (July 2003): 470-501.
- Swift, Anthony, "The Soviet World Tomorrow at the New York World's Fair, 1939," *The Russian Review* 57, no. 3 (July 1998): 364-79.
- Vaughn, Justin S., and José D. Villalobos. "Conceptualizing and Measuring White House Staff Influence on Presidential Rhetoric." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 4 (December 2006): 681-688.
- Watanabe, Hirotaka. "The Space Policy of the Johnson Administration: Project Apollo and International Cooperation." *Osaka University Law Review*, no. 57 (February 2010): 39-64.
- White, Stephen. "The Effectiveness of Political Propaganda in the USSR." *Soviet Studies* 32, no. 3 (July 1980): 323-348.

- Yuravlivker, Dror. "‘Peace without Conquest’: Lyndon Johnson’s Speech of April 7, 1965." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 3 (September 2006): 457-481.
- Zarefsky, David. "Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 3 (September 2004): 607-619.

Books

- Ades, Dawn et al. *Art and Power: Europe Under the Dictators, 1930-45*. London: Thames and Hudson, 1995.
- Aldrin, Buzz, and Malcolm McConnell. *Men from Earth*. New York, NY: Bantam Press, 1989.
- Allen, Craig. *Eisenhower and the Mass Media: Peace, Prosperity, and Prime-Time TV*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1993.
- Andrews, James T. *Science for the Masses: The Bolshevik State, Public Science, and the Popular Imagination in Soviet Russia, 1917-1934*. College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 2003.
- Andrews, James T. and Asif A. Siddiqi, *Into the Cosmos: Space Exploration and Soviet Culture*, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011.
- Bacon, Edwin and Mark Sandle, eds. *Brezhnev Reconsidered*. New York, NY: Palgrave, 2002.
- Barghoorn, Frederick C. *Soviet Foreign Propaganda*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964.
- Barthes, Roland. *Image-Music-Text*. New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1978.
- Baturin, Iurii M., ed. *Sovetskie i rossiiskie kosmonavty: 1960-2000* (Soviet and Russian cosmonauts: 1960-2000). Moscow: Novosti kosmonavti, 2001.
- Belmonte, Laura A. *Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.
- Belotserkovskii, Serge M. *Pervyi kosmonavt: Istoriia zhizni i gibeli*. Lewiston, KY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000.
- von Bencke, Matthew J. *The Politics of Space: A History of U.S.-Soviet/Russian Competition and Cooperation in Space*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997.
- Benn, David Wedgwood. *Persuasion and Soviet Politics*. New York, NY: Blackwell, 1989.
- Bernays, Edward. *Propaganda*. New York, NY: Ig Publishing, 2005.
- Bernhard, Nancy. *U.S. Television News and Cold War Propaganda, 1947-1960*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Bille, Matt and Erika Lishock. *The First Space Race: Launching the World’s First Satellites*. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2004.
- Bogart, Leo. *Cool Words, Cold War: A New Look at USIA’s Premises for Propaganda*. Lanham, MD: University Publishing Associates, 1995.
- Bonnel, Victoria E. *Iconography of Power: Soviet Political Posters under Lenin and Stalin*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997.
- Boone, W. Fred. *NASA Office of Defense Affairs: The First Five Years*. Washington, DC: NASA Historical Division, 1970.
- Brandenberger, David. *National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.
- Brooks, Jeffery. *Thank You Comrade Stalin: Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.

- Bromberg, Joan L. *NASA and the Space Industry*. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1999.
- Brudny, Yitzhak M. *Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State, 1953-1991*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.
- Bryld, Mette Marle, and Nina Lykke. *Cosmodolphins: Feminist Cultural Studies of Technology, Animals and the Sacred*. London: Zed Books, 2000.
- Burgess, Colin. *The First Soviet Cosmonaut Team: Their Lives, Legacy, and Historical Impact*. New York, NY: 2009.
- Buzek, Antony. *How the Communist Press Works*. London: Pall Mall Press, 1964.
- Carr, E.H. *Socialism in One Country 1924-26*. Vol. 3. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972.
- Castillo, Greg. *Cold War on the Home Front: The Soft Power of Midcentury Design*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2010.
- Chomsky, Noam. *Language and Politics*. Expanded 2nd ed. Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2004.
- Claudin, Fernando. *The Communist Movement: from Comintern to Cominform*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975.
- Clewes, John. *Soviet Propaganda Techniques*. London: Methuen and Co., 1964.
- Clymer, Kenton J. *The United States and Cambodia, 1969-2000: A Troubled Relationship*. London: Routledge, 2004.
- Croft, Lee B. *Nikolai Ivanovich Kibalchich: Terrorist Rocket Pioneer*. IHS (Institute for Issues in the History of Science) Biography Series #1, 2006.
- Cull, Nicholas John. *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Czech Hans-Jörg et al. *Kunst und Propaganda: im Streit der Nationen 1930-1945*. Berlin: Deutsches Historisches Museum, 2007.
- Daniloff, Nicholas. *The Kremlin and the Cosmos*. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972.
- Day, Dwayne A. et al. *Eye in the Sky: The Story of the Corona Spy Satellites*. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Books, 1999.
- De Groot, Gerard J. *Dark Side of the Moon: The Magnificent Madness of the American Lunar Quest*. New York, NY: New York University Press, 2006.
- Deutscher, Isaac. *Stalin*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970.
- Dick, Steven J., ed. *Remembering the Space Age*. Washington, DC: NASA, 2008.
- . *NASA's First 50 Years: Historical Perspectives*. Washington, DC: NASA, 2009.
- Dick, Steven J, and Roger D. Launius, eds. *Societal Impact of Spaceflight*. Washington, DC: NASA, 2007.
- . *Critical Issues in the History of Spaceflight*. Washington, DC: NASA, 2006.
- Dinerstein, Joel. *Swinging the Machine: Modernity, Technology, and African American Culture Between the World Wars*. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003.
- Dizard, Wilson P. *Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the U.S. Information Agency*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004.
- Doherty, Thomas P. *Cold War, Cool Medium: Television, McCarthyism, and American Culture*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2003.
- van Dyke, Vernon. *Pride and Power: The Rationale of the Space Program*. London: Pall Mall Press, 1965.

- Ebon, Martin. *The Soviet Propaganda Machine*. New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 1987.
- Edmonds, Robin. *Soviet Foreign Policy 1962-1973 The Brezhnev Years*. London: Oxford University Press, 1983.
- Eisenhower, Dwight D. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956*. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1958.
- Elder, Robert E. *The Information Machine: The United States Information Agency and American Foreign Policy*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1968.
- Ezell, Edward C., and Linda N. Ezell. *The Partnership: A History of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project*. Washington, DC: NASA, 1978.
- Fairley, Peter. *Man on the Moon*. London: Mayflower Books, 1969.
- Fitzpatrick, Sheila. *The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992.
- French, Francis. *Into That Silent Sea: Trailblazers of the Space Era, 1961-1965*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2007.
- French, Francis, and Colin Burgess. *In the Shadow of the Moon*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2007.
- Fried, Richard M. *The Russians Are Coming! The Russians Are Coming!: Pageantry and Patriotism in Cold-War America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Garthoff, Raymond L. *Assessing the Adversary: Estimates of the Eisenhower Administration of Soviet Intentions and Capabilities*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1991.
- . *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1985.
- Graham, Loren R. *What Have We Learned about Science and Technology from the Russian Experience?*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998.
- . *Science in Russia and the Soviet Union: A Short History*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- . *Technology, Culture, and Development: The Experience of the Soviet Model*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992.
- . *Science and the Soviet Social Order*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990.
- Gromyko, Andrei A., and Boris N. Ponomarev, eds. *Istoriia vneshnei politiki SSSR 1917-1985* (History of Soviet foreign policy, 1917-1985). Vol. 2. Moscow: Nauka, 1986.
- Grose, Peter. *Operation Rollback: America's Secret War behind the Iron Curtain*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000.
- Hahn, Werner G. *Postwar Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, 1946-53*. Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982.
- Halle, Louis J. *The Cold War as History*. New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1967.
- Hansen, James R. *First Man: The Life of Neil A. Armstrong*. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2005.
- Hardesty, Von. *Epic Rivalry: The Inside Story of the Soviet and American Space Race*. Washington, DC: National Geographic, 2007.
- Harford, James. *Korolev: How One Man Masterminded the Soviet Drive to Beat America to the Moon*. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, 1997.
- Harvey, Brian. *Russia in Space: The Failed Frontier?*, New York, NY: Springer, 2001.
- . *The New Russian Space Program: From Competition to Collaboration*, New York,

- NY: Wiley-Praxis, 1996.
- . *Race into Space: The Soviet Space Programme*. Chichester: Ellis Horwood, 1988.
- Harvey, Dodd L, and Linda C. Ciccoritti. *U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space*. Miami, FL: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1974.
- Hazan, Baruch A. *From Brezhnev to Gorbachev: Infighting in the Kremlin*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987.
- . *Soviet Impregnational Propaganda*. Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis, 1982.
- . *Soviet Propaganda*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1976.
- Heppenheimer, T.A. *Countdown: A History of Space Flight*. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1997.
- Heil, Alan L. *Voice of America: A History*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2003.
- Hixson, Walter L. *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961*. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1997.
- Hodnett, Grey, ed. *Resolutions and Decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Volume 4, The Khrushchev Years, 1953-1964*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974.
- Hoffmann, Erik P., and Robbin Frederick Laird. *The Soviet Polity in the Modern Era*. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine Transaction, 1984.
- Holloway, David. *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994.
- . *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985.
- Hough, Jerry F. *The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1986.
- Humble, R. D. *The Soviet Space Programme*. London: Routledge, 1988.
- Ilyichev, Leonid F., ed. *Partiinaya propaganda i sovremennost* (Party propaganda and modernity). Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1963.
- Inkeles, A. *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967.
- Jackall, Robert. *Propaganda*. New York, NY: New York University Press, 1995.
- Johnson, Lyndon Baines. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*. Vol. 2. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1966.
- . *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64*. Vol. 1. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1965.
- Johnson, N. L. *Soviet Military Strategy in Space*. London: Jane's, 1987.
- Johnson, Priscilla. *Khrushchev and the Arts: The Politics of Soviet Culture, 1962-1964*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965.
- Jowett, Garth S. and Victoria O'Donnell, eds. *Propaganda and Persuasion*, 5th edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2012.
- Karash, Yuri Y. *The Superpower Odyssey: A Russian Perspective on Space Cooperation*. Reston, VA: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1999.
- Kash, Don E. *The Politics of Space Cooperation*. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1967.
- Kauffman, James L. *Selling Outer Space: Kennedy, the Media, and Funding for Project Apollo, 1961-1963*. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1994.
- Kay, W. D. *Defining NASA: The Historical Debate over the Agency's Mission*. Albany, NY: University of New York Press, 2006.

- Kenez, Peter. *The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917-1929*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Kilgore, De Witt Douglas. *Astrofuturism: Science, Race, and Visions of Utopia in Space*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003.
- Kissinger, Henry. *American Foreign Policy: Three Essays*. New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 1969.
- Krementsov, Nikolai. *Stalinist Science*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.
- Kruse-Vaucienne, Ursula M., and John M. Logsdon. *Science and Technology in the Soviet Union: A Profile*. Washington, DC: National Science Foundation, 1979.
- Khrushchev, Sergei N. *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Super Power*. State College, PA: Penn State Press, 2000.
- Lapp, Ralph E. *Man and Space: the Next Decade*. New York, NY: Harper, 1961.
- Larres, Klaus, and Kenneth A. Osgood, eds. *The Cold War After Stalin's Death: A Missed Opportunity for Peace?* Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006.
- Launius, Roger D., John M. Logsdon, and Robert W. Smith. *Reconsidering Sputnik*. London: Routledge, 2000.
- Levine, Arnold S. *Managing NASA in the Apollo Era*. Washington, DC: NASA Scientific and Technical Information Branch, 1982.
- Linden, Carl. *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-64*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966.
- Light, Margot. *The Soviet Theory of International Relations*. Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1988.
- Logsdon, John M. *The Decision to Go to the Moon Project Apollo and the National Interest*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970.
- . *John F. Kennedy and the Race to the Moon*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010.
- Lubrano, Linda and Susan Gross Solomon, eds. *The Social Context of Soviet Science*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980.
- Lucas, Scott. *Freedom's War: The American Crusade Against the Soviet Union*. New York, NY: New York University Press, 1999.
- Manning, Martin J. *Historical Dictionary of American Propaganda*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004.
- Mark, Hans. *The Space Station: A Personal Journey*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987.
- Maurer, Eva, Julia Richers, Monica Rüthers, and Carmen Scheide, eds. *Soviet Space Culture: Cosmic Enthusiasm in Socialist Societies*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
- McCannon, John. *Red Arctic: Polar Exploration and the Myth of the North in the Soviet Union, 1932-1939*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- McCurdy, Howard E. *Space and the American Imagination*. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997.
- . *The Space Station Decision: Incremental Politics and Technological Choice*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990.
- McDougall, Walter A. *The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age*. New York, NY: Basic Books, 1985.
- McKenna, Kevin J. *All the Views Fit to Print: Changing Images of the U. S. in Pravda Political Cartoons, 1917 – 1991*. New York, NY: Peter Lang, 2001.
- McLuhan, Marshall. *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man*. London: Routledge,

- 2001.
- Medhurst, Martin J. *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology*. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1997.
- Medvedev, Zhores A. *Soviet Science*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.
- Medvedev Roy and Zhores Medvedev. *Khrushchev: The Years in Power*. London, Oxford University Press, 1977.
- Mickiewicz, Ellen. *Split Signals: Television and Politics in the Soviet Union*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Millar, James R., ed. *Cracks in the Monolith: Party Power in the Brezhnev Era*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992.
- Mitchell, R. Judson. *Ideology of a Superpower: Contemporary Soviet Doctrine on International Relations*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1982.
- Mitrovich, Gregory. *Undermining the Kremlin: America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947–1956*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000.
- Mozzhorin, Iurii A. et al., eds. *Dorogi v kosmos* (The road to space). Moscow: MAI, 1992.
- Murasov, Boris. *Ubiistvo kosmonavta Yuriya Gagarina* (Murder of cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin). Moscow: Tsentr Khirosima-2, 1995.
- Murray, Charles, and Catherine Cox. *Apollo: The Race to the Moon*. London: Secker and Warberg, 1989.
- Needell, Allan A., ed. *The First 25 Years in Space: A Symposium*. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989.
- Nelson, Michael. *War of the Black Heavens: The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War*. Syracuse, NY: 1997.
- Nelson, Ronald Roy, and Peter Schweizer. *The Soviet Concepts of Peace, Peaceful Coexistence, and Detente*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988.
- O'Neill, William L. *Coming Apart: An Informal History of America in the 1960's*. New York, NY: Time Books/Random House, 1971.
- Oakes, Guy. *The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Oberg, James E. *Star-Crossed Orbits: Inside the U.S.-Russian Space Alliance*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Professional, 2002.
- . *Red Star in Orbit*. New York, NY: Random House, 1981.
- Ocherki istorii ideologicheskoi deyatel'nosti KPSS, 1938-1961 g.* (Essays on the history of the ideological work of the CPSU). Moskva: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1986.
- Osgood, Kenneth Alan. *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad*. Lawrence, KA: University of Kansas, 2006.
- Osman, Tony. *Space History*. London: Michael Joseph, 1983.
- Palmer, Scott W. *Dictatorship of the Air: Aviation Culture and the Fate of Modern Russia*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Parker, Martin, and David Bell, eds. *Space Travel and Culture: From Apollo to Space Tourism*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2009.
- Parkinson, Robert. *Citizens of the Sky*. Stotfold: 2100 Publishing, 1987.
- Parrish, Michael. *The Lesser Terror: Soviet State Security, 1939-1953*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996.
- Parry-Giles, Shawn J. *The Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945-1955*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002.

- Persico, Joseph E. *Edward R. Murrow: An American Original*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1988.
- Petrone, Karen. *Life Has Become More Joyous Comrades!: Celebrations in the Time of Stalin*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2000.
- Platt, Kenneth M. *Epic Revisionism: Russian History and Literature as Stalinist Propaganda*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006.
- Ponomareva, Valentina. *Zhenskoe litso kosmosa* (The female face of space). Moscow: Gelios, 2002.
- Poole, Robert. *Earthrise: How Man First Saw the Earth*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008.
- Puddington, Arch. *Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty*. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2000.
- Ra'anani, Uri, and Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. *International Security Dimensions of Space*. Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1984.
- Reeves, Richard. *President Kennedy: Profile of Power*. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1993.
- Richelson, Jeffrey T. *America's Secret Eyes in Space: The U.S. Keyhole Satellite Program*. New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1990.
- Richmond, Yale. *Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003.
- Rossoshanskii, Vladimir I. *Fenomen Gagarina* (The Gagarin phenomenon). Saratov: Letopis, 2001.
- Rubin, Ronald I. *The Objectives of the U.S. Information Agency: Controversies and Analysis*. New York, NY: Praeger, 1968.
- Sagdeev, Roald. *The Making of a Soviet Scientist: My Adventures in Nuclear Fusion and Space from Stalin to Star Wars*. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, 1994.
- Saunders, Frances Stonor. *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters*. New York, NY: The New Press, 2001.
- Schauer, William H. *The Politics of Space: A Comparison of the Soviet and American Space Programs*. New York, NY: Holmes & Meier, 1976.
- Scheffer, James. *The Race: The Complete Story of How America Beat Russia to the Moon*. New York, NY: Anchor Books, 2000.
- Shayler, David. *NASA's Scientist-Astronauts*. New York, NY: Springer, 2007.
- Sheehan, Michael J. *The International Politics of Space*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2007.
- Shulgan, Christopher. *The Soviet Ambassador: The Making of the Radical Behind Perestroika*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2008.
- Siddiqi, Asif A. *Sputnik and the Soviet Space Challenge*. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2003.
- . *The Soviet Space Race with Apollo*. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2003.
- Skuridin, G. A. *Entrance of Mankind into Space*. Washington, DC: NASA, 1976.
- Smith, Robert W. *The Space Telescope: A Study of NASA, Science, Technology, and Politics*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Snow, Nancy. *Persuaders-in-Chief: The Presidents and Propaganda That Shaped Modern America*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2005.
- . *Propaganda, Inc.: Selling America's Culture to the World*. New York, NY: Seven Stories Press, 2002.
- Sorensen, Thomas C. *The Word War: The Story of American Propaganda*. New York, NY:

- Harper & Row, 1968.
- Sperber, Ann M. *Murrow, His Life and Times*. New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 1986.
- Sproule, J. Michael. *Propaganda and Democracy: The American Experience of Media and Mass Persuasion*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Stares, Paul B. *Space Weapons and US Strategy*. London: Taylor & Francis, 1985.
- Starks, Tricia. *The Body Soviet: Propaganda, Hygiene, and the Revolutionary State*. Madison. WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2008.
- Stebenne, David. *Modern Republican: Arthur Larson and the Eisenhower Years*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006.
- Stephan, Alexander. *The Americanization of Europe: Culture, Diplomacy, and Anti-Americanism After 1945*. New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2006.
- Taubman, William, *Khrushchev: The Man and his Era*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 2003
- Taylor, Philip M. *Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Era*. New York, NY: Manchester University Press, 2003.
- Tompson, William J. *The Soviet Union under Brezhnev*. Harlow: Pearson, 2003.
- . *Khrushchev: A Political Life*. London: Palgrave, 1997.
- Trux, T. *The Space Race*. London: New English Library, 1987.
- Turpin, Jennifer E. *Reinventing the Soviet Self: Media and Social Change in the Former Soviet Union*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995.
- Ustinov, Iurii *Bessmertie Gagarina* (Gagarin's Immortality). Moscow: Geroi Otechestva 2004.
- Volkov, Solomon. *The Magical Chorus: A History of Russian Culture from Tolstoy to Solzhenitsyn*. Translated by Antonina W. Bouis. Toronto: Random House of Canada, 2008.
- Volten, Peter M. E. *Brezhnev's Peace Program: A Study of Soviet Domestic Political Process and Power*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982.
- Vucinich, Alexander. *Empire of Knowledge: the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (1917-1970)*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984.
- . *Science in Russian Culture*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1963.
- Winkler, Allan. *The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942-1945*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978.
- Zimmerman, William. *Soviet Perspectives On International Relations 1956-1967*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969.
- Zubok, Vladislav, and Constantine Pleshakov. *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996.