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PHASE OF THE SECOND EMPIRE

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
THE DEPUTIES OF FRANCE, 1851-1863
A QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF THE
FRENCH LEGISLATURE UNDER THE
AUTHORITARIAN PHASE OF THE
SECOND EMPIRE

by

KENNETH ROY BONIN



A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
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DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

SPRING, 1976

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled THE DEPUTIES OF FRANCE, 1851-1863; A QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF THE FRENCH LEGISLATURE UNDER THE AUTHORITARIAN PHASE OF THE SECOND EMPIRE submitted by Kenneth Roy Bonin in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

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ABSTRACT

Based on a quantitative analysis of the French legislature from 1852 to 1863, this study attempts to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the authoritarian phase of the Second Empire.

Initial consideration is directed to the origin of the regime and to the parameters restricting the constitutional institutions ceded by the dictatorship. The Corps législatif and its membership remain the central concern of the study, however, which evaluates many of the assumptions that have characterized previous histories and introduces new interpretations based on the examination of deputies' socio-political backgrounds.

The results discard the idea that the machinations of Louis Napoléon's regime are in themselves the sole explanation for the phenomenon of the authoritarian empire. Likewise, this study shows more continuity in personnel between the Corps législatif and previous regimes than has been usually recognized. Once the cliché descriptions of deputies as "hommes nouveaux," Orleanists and grands bourgeois are set aside in favour of discoveries in such aspects as career opportunism, nepotism, local prominence, previous national political experience and occupational background, a more realistic picture may be constructed.

Here the composition of the Corps législatif resembles earlier assemblies, with the majority of deputies drawn from fonctionnaire and learned professional occupational interests. In general, deputies' seats in the Corps législatif appear the result of a political career progression from politics at the département level, given a welcome boost by the elimination of many incumbents. Cooperation with the regime proves to be the norm in the Corps législatif, but what criticism is expressed concerns economic affairs more than traditional liberties. The stability in the socio-political background of the Corps législatif between 1852 and 1863 discounts any such change as an explanation for the liberalization of the empire after 1860.

The analysis of the Corps législatif in these and related facets yields the conclusion that the visage of the regime may be captured in features other than those of Louis Napoléon Bonaparte, autocrat.

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INTRODUCTION

The Second Empire owes its origin to the presidential coup of December 2, 1851 which made Louis Napoléon Bonaparte dictator of France. The basic constitutional framework that was to guide the regime for eighteen years went into effect four months later. In Louis Napoléon's plan of things administrative and governmental, "les hommes les plus illustres" were honoured in a Senate while the main legislative responsibilities of the Conseil d'Etat were entrusted to "les hommes les plus distingués."¹ Questioning this design one writer asked rhetorically: "De quoi se composerait donc le Corps législatif si tous les hommes 'illustres' ou 'distingués' avaient été pourvus ailleurs?"² The same question has inspired much of this study.

One year after the coup d'état Louis Napoléon was crowned Napoléon III, Emperor of the French--a title he retained until the Second Empire met its end in 1870, defeated in the Franco-Prussian War. In the interval, the government that began in a dictatorship had evolved into a constitutional monarchy. Commentaries on the regime therefore generally recognize two periods within the Second Empire, the authoritarian and the liberal phases.

The present study is a quantitative analysis of Corps législatif membership under the authoritarian empire. The intention is to provide an in-depth account of the period not presently available, evaluating the socio-political background of every deputy who served the authoritarian regime.

As might be expected, there are various interpretations as to when Louis Napoléon's liberal concessions eclipsed his authoritarianism. The most common position utilizes the first measures of a liberal nature to mark the transition. Thus the general amnesty of 1859 has been defined as the beginning of the liberal phase;³ more frequently, the reforms increasing the powers of the legislature are interpreted as indicative of the change so that the year 1860 is chosen.⁴ It should be noted, however, that certain historians date the shift much later, with the advent of more extensive liberalization, selecting 1857⁵ or 1868⁶ to mark the beginning of the liberal empire.

Focusing as it will on the authoritarian phase of the Second Empire, this analysis will concentrate on the years 1852-1863 and the first two legislatures of the regime. The period includes the liberal concessions of 1859-1862, widely interpreted as the dawn of the liberal empire, as well as two of the regime's four legislative elections and their related by-elections.

As reflected in Appendix I, this necessitates the analysis of 383 individual deputies' backgrounds. Fortunately,

the number was easily determined; the electoral medium establishes a precise definition of the group to be studied.⁷ The task was further facilitated by the use of a computer to collate the numerous categories and hundreds of variables applicable to each man.

Critics such as Richard Cobb might maintain that such an approach will glean only what "perhaps we thought we knew already; but now we will 'really' know," and have the same fare rehashed through a novel gimmick.⁸ In all fairness, the generalizations of earlier studies have fallen in error not so much by what they have said as by what has been omitted. Theodore Zeldin, for example, provided only a very superficial comparison of the various legislatures of the Second Empire; and he failed to analyze the backgrounds of all deputies. His perspective, concentrating on the whole "system" inaugurated by the coup d'état, was not really designed to allow for a very detailed look at each legislature.⁹

My method is to review available accounts of the Corps législatif in an effort to eliminate certain misconceptions that persist, even after one hundred years, presenting in the process a more detailed analysis per se. The quantitative basis on which the comparison depends reflects data compiled from the various published sources available--newspapers of the period, biographical dictionaries, various regional and area studies of France,¹⁰ and of course, numerous monographs.

4

To understand the medium in which the deputies acted as well as to provide a measure of background material, opening chapters will assess the character of the regime, its constitution and institutions, and the elections in which the deputies were selected.

With the deputies themselves our concern is in such aspects as their popularity at the polls, relationship to the community represented, the nature of past political experience, previous dynastic allegiances--and the relevance of each of these to the authoritarian regime. Opportunism and family connections also merit further exploration. And in the process of this analysis, discussion will subject the common generalizations about deputies' social status, politics and occupational backgrounds to careful scrutiny. Finally, passing attention will assess the latter part of the second legislature to determine if the liberal concessions may be attributed to any change in the Corps législatif between 1852 and 1863.

The men who served in Louis Napoléon's legislatures during the authoritarian empire must be evaluated as "deputies" in more than one connotation of the word, therefore. The most obvious sense is that associated with the title representing membership in the legislative body. But were they deputies, meaning delegates, and whom did they represent? And were they not deputies, that is, assistants, in the establishment and perpetuation of a regime founded on dictatorship?

CHAPTER I

THE DICTATORSHIP

The closing months of the year 1851 marked Louis Napoléon Bonaparte's third year as President of the Second French Republic. The presidential term of office was only four years, and the constitution stipulated that the incumbent could not succeed himself. Each of Louis Napoléon's efforts to secure the constitutional amendment that could prolong his tenure of office was frustrated by an Assembly that consistently refused its three-quarters majority approval for any constitutional modification.

Accounting for Louis Napoléon's initial electoral success of 1848, the historian Guizot, himself a former Prime Minister of France under the July Monarchy, commented that it was indeed enviable to embody simultaneously a national glory, revolutionary guarantees and the principle of authority.¹ These, together with a conducive economic and political climate, augured well for the coup de force of 2 December 1851 which freed Louis Napoléon from the constitutional limitations of the Second Republic. Together, they assured support as he declared himself President for ten years and terminated the life of the National Assembly, substituting in its place a virtually prostrate legislative Body.

By opposing the conservative Assembly's restriction of the suffrage Louis Napoléon appeared the champion of the rights of the common man, an image substantiated as well by his early writings, Napoléonic Ideas and The Extinction of Pauperism. Having eliminated the Assembly, he presented himself as the personification of the will of the people as expressed through universal manhood suffrage.² The preamble to his "Appel au Peuple" of December 2 attacked the National Assembly, claiming "que l'instabilité du Pouvoir, que la prépondérance d'une seule Assemblée sont des causes permanentes de trouble et de discorde."³

Ramifications of the President's confrontation with the Assembly went beyond the arena of politics, however. And so protracted was the crisis that many had despaired of a legal solution, fully anticipating a coup d'état; in fact, so widespread was rumour and premonition that the coup has been described as the result of an "open conspiracy," if indeed there was need for a conspiracy at all.⁴

The economic period coinciding with the Second Republic was hardly marked by prosperity, its dismal character undoubtedly being most pronounced in agriculture.⁵ Though its worst effects had passed by the end of 1851, government had failed to provide the confidence and financial incentives required to stimulate the business and financial community. Members of the latter adopted a "wait and see" attitude, expecting a turn of events that would resolve the political malaise, for better or worse. In the

interval, investment lassitude in both public and private sectors aggravated the economic situation. This was very evident in the sphere of railway expansion, for example, which came to a virtual standstill, the depreciation of shares joining the slump in land prices and general real estate values.⁶

To compound the political uncertainty, and contributing in no small way to economic insecurity as well, there was the whole question of the "red scare" prompted by socialist propaganda that trumpeted 1852 as the year of reckoning. Supposedly, a "red" triumph in the elections of that year would spur the labouring class to compensate itself at the expense of those who had suppressed and exploited it.⁷ At the least, the "crisis of 1852" as it was called, was expected to provide a unique opportunity for those dissatisfied with the existing system to stir up unrest in the country. Since both Assembly and Presidential terms were set to expire at about the same time (April 28 and May 10, 1852 respectively) the focusing of discontent on this particular period by constitutional revisionists supporting Louis Napoléon and leftists dissatisfied with the restricted franchise seemed to threaten another 1848.⁸

Financial circles, snatched from the impending storm by the coup d'état, were at least grateful for the promised stability of Louis Napoléon's new order, even if initially they had no hand in its design.⁹ Shortly, complaisant resignation would give way to active investment in the

regime's future which they soon allied to their own.

With interests in a stable status quo that in many ways paralleled those of the business sector, the church and its political supporters also accepted the coup d'état. The plebiscite on the coup d'état saw Montalembert, a former deputy in the then abolished National Assembly, soliciting votes for Louis Napoléon through the medium of a letter published in the legitimist and clerical Univers:

Voter contre Louis Napoléon, c'est donner raison à la révolution socialiste . . . c'est appeler la dictature des rouges à remplacer la dictature d'un prince qui a rendu depuis trois ans d'incomparables services à la cause de l'ordre et du Catholicisme.¹⁰

Two considerations figured prominently in such support, one negative, the other positive. The first was the avowed anticlericalism of the "reds"; the second was the record of the Second Republic under Louis Napoléon, which extended church influence in education and intervened in the Italian states to protect the temporal power of the papacy. Indeed, one bishop implied that so clear were the alternatives that a vote by Jesus Christ in this matter would be definitely inscribed "Oui" in favour of the coup d'état.¹¹

With the opportunity presented by political and economic crisis, and the endorsement of business interests and the church, Louis Napoléon also had the considerable advantage of the Bonaparte name and legend that had served him so well in 1848. The varied and substantial nature of this support was reflected in the initial calm response to the coup and in the results of the plebiscite of December 20, 1851.

Paris met the December 2 turn of events with an essentially "business as usual" attitude, although troops occupied all major public buildings, railway terminals and telegraph offices, and the presses and personnel of opposition newspapers had been silenced.

December 2 witnessed only token resistance by about 300 deputies of the deposed Assembly. Failing in an effort to hold the Assembly hall where they planned to convene an emergency session, they retired to the Mairie of the tenth Paris arrondissement; here they were met by police who broke up the meeting and arrested the participants. In the early hours prior to this, seventy-eight noted parliamentarians, journalists, Republicans and expected leaders of real opposition had been quickly and quietly confined to places of detention. It was announced as well that armed individuals or barricade builders would be shot on sight. By evening it looked as if the situation was well in hand.¹²

But three days later there was armed opposition in Paris and scattered uprisings of a local nature broke out in the provinces. While the latter cases usually collapsed upon the arrival of troops in the area, Paris felt the full force of repression required to clear barricades, insurgents and spectators from the streets. At least 600 people were shot down, not a few of them simply bystanders on the boulevards.¹³ In all, some thirty departments were placed in a state of siege, all police powers passing to the military.¹⁴ Everywhere, arrests and extraordinary measures

were authorized, as the administration of national order was momentarily rendered arbitrary.¹⁵ An executive decree of 8 December 1851 provided that any individual placed under police surveillance and attempting to elude it, or anyone thought to belong to a secret society, would be transported to a penal colony for reasons of the sûreté générale;¹⁶ in all, 26,642 suspects were ordered under arrest or placed under surveillance.¹⁷

Consolidating his position against opponents, whether confirmed or suspected, Louis Napoléon ordered the banishment of about eighty-five former parliamentarians of the Second Republic. Sixty-six of these were condemned as known leaders of 'socialism', while eighteen others were removed as potential agitators.¹⁸ As the Minister of the Interior had declared a few days before these sentences were finalized, even the most respected of symbols lose that respect when they recall unpleasant memories. As was the case with the motto liberté, égalité, fraternité, he argued, so it was with the former deputies: they served only to trouble and disturb passersby: "veuillez donc les faire effacer!"¹⁹

All of these measures Louis Napoléon interpreted as justified and/or forgiven by the popular acclaim he received in the plebiscite December 20, 1851. The basis of the election was his "Appel au Peuple" of December 2. The president, to serve a ten year term, would be responsible though the terms of this responsibility were not outlined. Ministers would be dependent solely on the executive

authority. A Conseil d'Etat would prepare laws and defend them before the legislature. The legislature, the Corps législatif, would be elected directly by universal suffrage to discuss and vote these laws. And finally, a Senate of notables would serve as the guardian of the constitution and the public liberties.²⁰ The results of the voting registered 7,439,216 in agreement with the proposal, while 610,737 voted against. The totals may be accepted as generally valid, since the ballots were counted publicly and in the presence of the voters to assure their credibility.²¹

The overwhelming popularity of his program as affirmed in the plebiscite offered Louis Napoléon a license to adopt whatever course he considered conducive to the design of new state institutions. Accordingly, a decree of 11 January 1852 abolished the National Guard; another of March 25 suspended all clubs. The press, which had been under restriction since December 4 was limited further through the decree of 17 February 1852: the 'best' that previous regimes had devised in the way of restrictive measures was combined in one comprehensive code now to be implemented by the enforcement agencies of the executive-- not the judicial arm of government.²²

No newspaper, journal or periodical could be founded or published without government authorization. All were subject to a stamp tax. Owners of publications were required to post a fee with the government which was for-

feited in any contravention of regulations. Any article in "bad faith" which might contribute to public disorder would result in heavy fines or imprisonment for those considered responsible. Three occasions of such "bad faith" would result in government suspension of the publication.²³ Of eighty-seven papers suppressed, seventy-one were classified as either republican, socialist or anarchical. By mid 1852 an additional thirty-seven newspapers, nine of which were pro-government, suspended publication because of their inability to meet government financial or press limitations. Those papers which continued to appear were soon disciplined into extreme moderation, neutrality or pro-government cooperation.²⁴

An executive order of 20 January 1852 dispatched the commissions mixtes to settle accounts with those arrested in the days following the coup. These extrajudicial tribunals composed of the prefect, the commanding general and the procureurs (public prosecuting agents) of each department were authorized to carry out proceedings against the political prisoners. While supposedly prosecuting only those who were considered a threat to the public order, the commissions mixtes in effect conducted a purge of those suspected of harbouring hostility to the new regime.²⁵ The total of 14,118 condemnations pronounced by these commissions--more than half of those originally detained were convicted--resulted in 9,769 sentences of transportation, 1,545 of exile and 2,804 of internment.²⁶

If the dictatorial nature of this regime produced misgivings, these must have been confirmed by the final article of the constitution which declared that all decrees issued by the Prince-President since December 2 would continue to be valid, even once the constitution was in force. In many ways the "Constitution Faite en Vertu Des Pouvoirs Délégués Par Le Peuple Français A Louis Napoléon Bonaparte Par Le Vote Des 20 et 21 décembre 1851"²⁷ must have seemed little more than the rules of order for his continued personal rule.

Nonetheless, the voluntary nature of cooperation with the regime must be stressed if we are to understand the role of the deputies in the Corps législatif, who remain the main interest of the present study. Too often the system of repression introduced by Louis Napoléon to consolidate his position at the outset is interpreted as the basic element explaining the whole phase of the Second Empire known as the authoritarian regime. To consider Louis Napoléon's administration in the one dimensional aspect of a dictatorship based solely on force, ignores the complexity of the factors actually involved. In this light the policy of repression appears as much an over-reaction to limited opposition as it was unnecessary in view of the plebiscite.

CHAPTER II

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FAÇADE

Though the regime stopped short of totalitarianism, the authoritarian phase of the Second Empire provided little more than a constitutional façade for the continuation of Louis Napoléon's personal rule. Neither in its origins nor in its evolution was the Constitution of 14 January 1852 the fulfillment of the mandate Louis Napoléon had received.

His "Appel au Peuple" had promised "une constitution que les Assemblées développeront plus tard."¹ When the eighty-member commission assigned to the task failed to expedite the matter to his satisfaction, Louis Napoléon charged the jurists Troplong and Rouher to throw a constitution together. This they did in forty-eight hours over three consecutive days.² While providing for certain institutions to share in the processes of state, this constitution simultaneously subordinated their powers to the authority of the president. Quite clearly, any 'development' of the constitution would be solely at the wish of the executive.³

Members of the new state institutions should have known where authority was centred even before March 29, 1851. But on that date, contrary to any parliamentary

practice, Louis Napoléon summoned the deputies and senators to him! But why not? Excepting the state of seige, all repressive restrictions established during the first four months of the regime remained intact.⁴ The legacy of decrees and the constitution that preceded convocation of new state assemblies assured the preservation of executive power in all essentials. Louis Napoléon obviously remained the sole possessor of executive power. Even after the dictator declared the dictatorship ended, decrees would far outnumber laws and continue to encroach on actual legislative affairs. As late as 27 January 1853, 6,153 individuals, almost half of those originally condemned by the commissions mixtes, remained subject to their penalties; another 5,450 were under police surveillance.⁵ The reinstatement of the empire at the end of 1852 further enhanced the basis of executive authority: power would now be wielded by Napoléon III not only for ten years, but for life. The single free expression of public opinion left to the electorate was the choosing of deputies to the Corps législatif, scheduled to take place once every six years.⁶ Since these deputies constitute the central interest of this discussion, it is essential that their power in the Corps législatif be given careful consideration.

The "Appel au Peuple" of 2 December 1851 placed fourth on its list of proposals "un Corps législatif discutant et votant les lois".⁷ A similar level of inferiority was reserved for the legislature in the Constitution

of 14 January 1852.⁸ The fact that the Corps législatif was not the most important institution of state is further reflected in its limited powers: the constitution confined it to discussing and voting laws and taxes. All initiative in legislation and all residual powers not delegated, rested with Louis Napoléon as President of France. In the business of drafting legislation, the President was assisted by the forty personally chosen members of his Conseil d'Etat.⁹ Louis Napoléon's view of amendments to proposed legislation -- "qui dérangent souvent toute l'économie d'un système et l'ensemble du projet primitif . . . qui était la source de si graves abus, et qui permettait à chaque député de se substituer à tout propos au Gouvernement en présentant les projets les moins étudiés, les moins approfondis"¹⁰--prevented their being raised on the floor of the Corps législatif. If the particular legislative commission reviewing a bill adopted any changes, these were to be suggested, without discussion, to the Conseil d'Etat. The Conseil d'Etat would decide whether the proposed amendment had merit; in the event of a negative decision, the amendment would not be deliberated in the legislature.

As an additional restriction on its influence, no petitions could be addressed to the Corps législatif. Instead, the constitution directed these to Louis Napoléon's handpicked senators. The Senate was also granted jurisdiction over the constitution which it could interpret and amend through a senatorial pronouncement known as a

Sénatus-consulte.¹⁰

Any efforts to secure a responsible parliamentary system would be made doubly difficult since all ministers, named by the President, were individually responsible to him alone, and did not form a cabinet. No minister could be a member of the Corps législatif, nor could he participate in its discussions. Government projects would be supported by members of the Conseil d'Etat. Louis Napoléon's attempt at justification claimed that as a result, "le temps ne se perd pas en vaines interpellations, en accusations frivoles, en luttes passionnées dont l'unique but était de renverser les ministres pour les remplacer."¹¹

Not only were the powers of the legislature severely limited, but its contact with the general public was restricted as well. Direct reports of legislative debate or the publication of anything beyond the official summary of proceedings was prohibited.¹² In contrast, the owner of any publication was obliged by the "Décret Organique sur la Presse" of 17 February 1852 to print all official documents and communications submitted by the government, "gratuite" and "en tête du journal," in the first issue after their submission.¹³ While the Corps législatif worked in relative obscurity, each of Louis Napoléon's executive proclamations was assured the maximum publicity possible. Furthermore, legislative sessions were to be short--three months per year, and elections infrequent--once every six years. Though the discussions would be open to the public, the

request of five deputies could effect a closed session. Not until ten months after the first legislature had been elected was the constitution modified to allow deputies a sum of 2,500 francs per month by way of compensation for the time they spent away from their regular occupations during each session.¹⁴ Under the Constitution of 14 January 1852, there was little possibility that the Corps législatif could escape the influence of Louis Napoléon Bonaparte. As President of France, he named the president, the vice-president and the secretaries of the Corps législatif; and it was he who convoked, prorogued or dissolved that body as well.¹⁵

In many ways the Corps législatif was designed only as a sounding board for the ideas of the executive. In physical appearance, its meetings resembled an audience participating in the performance of government only to the extent of registering approval or dismay; the arena of spirited debate that had characterized other periods of French legislative history was no more. Sitting in a block, facing a delegation from the Conseil d'Etat, deputies spoke from their places without the aid of either desk or speakers' rostrum.¹⁶ In addition, any decree or presidential message addressed by Louis Napoléon was simply read out to the assembled legislature by his appointed councillor without subsequent debate or vote.¹⁷ Finally, given the nature of Conseil d'Etat control over amendments to legislation, all that remained in the sense of legislative influence over the course of state affairs was the power to

reject proposed projects en bloc; but support which might have been attracted to amendments eluded efforts intending to scuttle proposals in their entirety.¹⁸

Louis Napoléon had no reason to expect much opposition. In addition to his other precautions, he had assured that all deputies would swear their loyalty to the existing regime. Article fourteen of the constitution declared that all ministers, senators, deputies, conseillers d'état, military officers, judges and civil servants were to take an oath of allegiance: "je jure obéissance à la constitution et fidélité au Président."¹⁹ A further decree of 8 March 1853 provided that in all cases, including that of deputies to the Corps législatif, refusal or failure to pledge the prescribed oath would be interpreted as an automatic resignation.²⁰ The presence of deputies in the Corps législatif who had taken a similar oath to Louis Philippe, and who now unhesitatingly accepted another to Louis Napoléon, might lead one to consider the issue as a simple formality; further discussion will reveal, however, that the prerequisite of the oath caused several resignations, preventing certain real opponents of the regime from accepting seats in the first legislature.

Deputies who did take their places in the Corps législatif received very minor guarantees of traditional legislative liberties. Though Louis Napoléon could dissolve the Corps législatif at will, the constitution obliged him to summon a new one within six months. His selections for

president and vice-president of the legislative body had to be chosen from among its membership.²¹ Furthermore, article twenty-nine of the February 2, 1852 "Décret Organique pour l'Election des Députés au Corps législatif" established that all salaried public offices were incompatible with the mandate of deputy to the Corps législatif.²² While this was somewhat of an assurance that Louis Napoléon would not pack the legislature with creatures that were on his payroll, it also spared him some of the criticism that had greeted Louis Philippe's legislatures of civil servants and royal household fonctionnaires. This provision was altered but slightly by a Sénatus-consulte of December 25, 1852 which allowed officers in the reserve forces to accept legislative seats and yet preserve their commands.²³ Finally, the deputies were granted traditional parliamentary immunity, exceptions to be determined by the Corps législatif; the constitution also appointed the legislature the sole judge of the validity of each of its elections.²⁴

Regulation of the Corps législatif left few vestiges of the powers that had characterized the legislature under the previous regime. Yet candidates still presented themselves for election.

CHAPTER III

THE ELECTIONS TO THE FIRST LEGISLATURE

As the very few concessions to legislature freedom were eclipsed by the authoritarian measures written into the constitution, so electoral restrictions and the system of official candidates compensated Louis Napoléon heavily for having permitted a legislature at all.

The main regulations pertaining to legislative elections were outlined on two separate occasions. The Constitution of 14 January 1852 established that elections would normally occur once each six years on the basis of universal manhood suffrage, with one elected representative for each 35,000 electors; the system of representation by lists was abolished.¹ More specific instructions were issued in the "Décret Organique pour l'Election des Députés au Corps législatif" of February 2, 1852. Each département would be divided into single-member circonscriptions or electoral divisions equal in number to the deputies allotted to it according to its population; an extra deputy would be elected in each département where the population exceeded the equal divisions of 35,000 by at least 25,000 electors. The constituencies would be revised, supposedly only to account for shifts in population, once every five years.

Each male citizen twenty-one years of age or older, possessing his civil and political rights and having resided in his circonscription for six months, was entitled to exercise a single vote through a secret ballot. Members of the military forces, however, could vote only in the commune where they had resided prior to their enlistment; in effect, since most soldiers were posted elsewhere, they were disenfranchised.

Candidates for election to the Corps législatif were required to be at least twenty-five years old and free of any criminal or political charges.² As already noted, they could be neither civil servants nor the recipients of any state salary. Candidates were not subject to a residence requirement, and multiple candidacies were permitted. But while one man could present himself for election in several constituencies, each deputy could represent only one in the Corps législatif. In order to be elected on the first ballot, a candidate required an absolute majority of the votes cast, with a minimum of one-quarter of the registered electorate voting. In the event of a failure to achieve these results, or if a successful candidate opted for another constituency in which he was also elected, a round of ballotage would be effected. Whatever the number of voters, a plurality of the votes cast would determine the winner in this second contest. In the event of a tie vote, the elder would be declared the successful candidate.

This same decree assigned the number of deputies to be elected from each department of France (see Table 1), excluded representation from the colonies completely, and set the total number of circonscriptions for the 1852 elections at 261.³

Even within the very limited jurisdiction established by the constitution, a Corps législatif of 261 overtly hostile deputies (or even a small but vocal fraction of that number), could have caused Louis Napoléon considerable embarrassment. Additional precautions were therefore thought necessary, and in this respect, the four-month period of personal dictatorship left a more than adequate legacy. It was not a coincidence that the first elections took place at a time when the country was still under the restrictions of a state of siege and the expediencies of absolutism could be employed freely, in the government's favour.⁴

In establishing the size of the legislature, for example, Louis Napoléon claimed a particular motive:

la chambre n'est plus composée que d'environ deux cent soixante membres. C'est là une première garantie du calme des délibérations, car trop souvent on a vu dans les assemblées la mobilité et l'ardeur des passions croître en raison du nombre.⁵

What went unexpressed was that with a similar assembly there would be less danger of factions among the membership alienating themselves from the influence of the executive and becoming the nuclei of irreconcilable opposition.⁶

Similarly, though the abolition of the list system of election suggested that electors might now be more insistent upon their member representing the particular interests of the circonscription which had elected him,⁷ the measure simultaneously discontinued a method which had greatly facilitated the co-ordination of opposition on a national scale. The provision that military personnel would be deprived of their votes unless they happened to be in their home constituencies at the time of elections, assured that invitations would hardly be forthcoming for the various candidates to introduce the divisiveness of partisan politics into the barracks and bases supporting Louis Napoléon's dictatorship. Furthermore, thousands of assuredly opposition votes and numerous potential opposition candidates (especially among former members of the National Assembly), were removed through the political charges and deportations effected in the wake of the coup d'état.

These elaborate precautions should have been adequate, one would think, to overawe the threat of any opposition expression in the powerless Corps législatif. Yet, another measure was included, the one which proved most effective of all: to qualify the expression of universal manhood suffrage, a system of government candidates was devised. It was officially argued that universal manhood suffrage was an innovation too recently introduced to be properly understood by the politically ignorant and the unlettered. Official candidates supported by the government

would serve as a tutorial means to aid in distinguishing between rival contestants in the election campaigns.⁸ While this may have been true, this system obviously aided the election of government candidates. As a further favour to these candidates, but on the pretext of conforming constituency boundaries to the required electoral limitations, the government employed the practice of gerrymandering to their advantage.⁹ Their ballots and posters were also printed on the white regulation paper restricted to government use and financed from the public purse.¹⁰ Only white ballots were enclosed with the voter registration cards sent to each elector.¹¹

As for opponents to the government's candidates, the courts acquiesced in declaring coloured ballots and posters non-official publications; their distribution was therefore subject to all restraints and special levies exacted on the press by law. Other laws were interpreted to prevent election rallies, and all gatherings required the supervision of a government agent. Finally, each non-government poster required the authorization of the prefect prior to its being posted in his département.¹²

With such extensive restrictions, why have elections by universal manhood suffrage in the first place? Indeed, shortly after the coup d'état Louis Napoléon assured the Austrian ambassador: "Je veux bien être baptisé avec l'eau du suffrage universel, mais je n'entends pas vivre les pieds dans l'eau."¹³ Nonetheless, each of the elections under the

authoritarian empire seems less intended to secure support for political policies than to confirm the legitimacy of the regime.¹⁴ It was claimed that the people's interests were in perpetuating the spirit of the plebiscite; what had been abdicated to Louis Napoléon in 1851 should not be wrested from him through the elections to follow. The consequence of such thinking caused each election to serve as a replication of the plebiscite of December, with each candidate considered not so much to represent the diverse interests of constituents as to embody loyalty or opposition to Louis Napoléon himself.¹⁵

The initial calm response to the coup d'état, followed by the general failure of opposing forces to instigate a widespread insurrection, and the resignation of influential sectors of society to the new regime were amply reflected in candidacies for the Corps législatif elections. News of apprehended revolts lent an air of authenticity to Louis Napoléon's claim that his coup d'état had averted a threat of anarchy, and that he represented the defence of law and proper order in the French state.¹⁶ Then too, protesting voices were rendered conveniently too distant--imprisoned, transported to Algeria or Cayenne, or in self-exile abroad--to extend any real challenge.

In defining its electoral aims for the 1852 contest Louis Napoléon's administration could hardly have been more demanding. A letter circulated among the Prefects by Minister of the Interior de Persigny stipulated no less than

" . . . deux cent soixante et un députés animés du même esprit, dévoués aux mêmes intérêts, et disposés également à compléter la victoire du 20 décembre".¹⁷ With the rejection of the system of election by list the government could no longer expect the lesser known names among its candidates to be carried by the fame of those with a national reputation. Each official candidate in each circonscription had to be known to the constituents who would be called upon to elect him; to assure that this was done, all the influence of local government authorities (who owed their appointments to the central administration), was brought to bear upon the selection of promising government candidates. While such a system perhaps failed to produce many deputies of the stature to grace the salons of Paris, it packed the Corps législatif heavily in the government's favour. The Paris diarist Viel Castel, for example, snobbishly remarked, "les candidats patronnés par le gouvernement ont été choisis par je ne sais qui, mais à coup sûr il a fallu beaucoup d'art pour rassembler de telles nullités."¹⁸ With the plebiscitary frame of reference in which the government cast the elections, however, these "nobodies" represented Louis Napoléon. Persigny maintained that voters were being offered a unique opportunity:

en votant pour les amis de Louis Napoléon, ils auraient une seconde fois l'occasion de voter pour le prince lui-même.¹⁹

It was therefore imperative that the expected overwhelming approval actually materialize; accordingly, the administra-

tion was very concerned that official candidates be chosen from among men the prefects thought likely to win--non-Bonapartists were as often as not selected de rigueur rather than have a more loyal choice as official candidate subject the government to the possible humiliation of an electoral defeat. There was always hope of rallying the successful non-Bonapartists since their election would have been achieved through government patronage for which they would appear somewhat obligated; at the same time, in accepting such patronage they would undoubtedly alienate themselves from their former allegiances.²⁰

This was especially true since the legitimist pretender to the throne, the Comte de Chambord, demanded of his adherents a complete abstention from political life.²¹ The republicans adopted a similar policy. For these and other opponents of the regime, the prospect of being under constant police surveillance, too frequently encountering printers and campaign workers who refused to aid them openly, and a general fear of standing in blatant contradiction to existing authorities wielding authoritarian powers easily disheartened all but the most courageous.²² Given the extent of administrative pressure and the extraordinary measures employed by the government in favour of its candidates, the almost universal defeat of electoral opposition comes as no surprise. The elections of 29 February 1852 returned only eight independent candidates as compared to 253 government members.

Four of the original eight were legitimists: Audren de Kerdrel, Bouhier de l'Ecluse, the Marquis de Calvière and Durfort de Civrac.²³ Audren de Kerdrel refused to accept the restoration of the Empire and retired from public life before its proclamation.²⁴ Bouhier de l'Ecluse resolved to make a test case of himself, repeatedly took his place in the Corps législatif, absenting himself only at the times designated for his taking the oath of loyalty; in the end he was physically restrained from entering the Chamber, declared démissionnaire and replaced in a by-election.²⁵ Calvière loudly decried the fact that he had been declared a government candidate without his assent; to give action to his assertions he resigned in protest.²⁶ Only Durfort de Civrac retained his seat for the duration of the first legislature.

The three republicans elected--Carnot and Cavaignac in Paris and Hénon in Lyon--collectively declined to serve Louis Napoléon's authoritarian regime and were replaced by government candidates in subsequent by-elections. The letter which renounced their election was officially suppressed:

Les électeurs de Paris et de Lyon sont venus nous chercher dans notre retraite ou dans notre exil; nous les remercions d'avoir pensé que nos noms protestaient d'eux mêmes contre la destruction des libertés publiques et les rigueurs de l'arbitraire, mais ils n'ont pas voulu nous envoyer siéger dans un corps législatif dont les pouvoirs ne vont jusqu'à réparer les violations du droit; nous repoussons la théorie immorale des réticences et des arrière-pensées et nous refusons le serment exigé à l'entrée du corps législatif.²⁷

The eighth independent candidate elected in the 1852 elections was a moderate republican, Pierre Legrand, who was

unopposed by the government and who posed no threat to it.²⁸

This almost complete failure of opposition candidates and the resignation of most of those who were elected, amply met government aspirations. The evaluation of electoral figures illustrates the full measure of this success best. As reflected in official election results, the voting population undeniably supported Louis Napoléon's regime (see Table 2). The eighty-four percent favourable vote received in the 1852 contest as a whole is rendered more impressive when the elections of individual deputies are considered (see Table 3). Fifty-two percent of the men who accepted their seats as deputies either in 1852 or after required by-elections prior to 1857 received over 90 percent of the ballots cast in their circonscriptions; all but a few of the deputies were elected with more than 50 percent of the electorate participating in the voting, with the majority attracting in excess of 60 percent of those registered to the polls. Again, the majority captured in excess of 50 percent of the registered vote, but a significant minority--35 percent--failed to draw half of the registered voters to their support.

Among the opposition deputies elected in 1852, all but Calvière failed to attract more than 60 percent of the ballots cast; he received 61 percent, while the others each won just over 50 percent of the vote. The registered voters who turned out to vote for them amounted to less than 50 percent in each case.

Two reservations could be held against the very favourable results garnered for the regime in 1852; both might be interpreted as indications of electoral opposition surpassing the 13 percent of the vote lost to opposition candidates. There is the question, first, of the spoiled or blank ballots returned in each election. A noticeably larger percentage occurred on the occasion of the legislative election of 1852 (see Table 2). This should not necessarily be attributed solely to expressions of protest, however. Legislative elections were slightly more complicated than the oui or non of the plebiscites; the failure of the illiterate to comprehend the mode of election could account for some of the spoiled ballots. This would be particularly true of the 1852 legislative elections when the system was newly introduced. Nonetheless, an inestimable extent of protest might also be contained in these spoiled or blank ballots which, especially in areas where only the government candidate was presented for election, would be one avenue open for the expression of dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs. In any event, the percentage is relatively insignificant in view of the favourable votes Louis Napoléon's administration received.

Much more evident than spoiled or blank ballots, however, is the factor of voter abstention (see Table 4). Once again it would be over-simplification to attribute the total phenomenon to the single interpretation of protest. Despite the unparalleled 36.7 percent abstention figure for

the 1852 elections--a rate unequalled in French electoral contests before or since--mitigating factors common to all elections require consideration. Voters who could not get to the polls; those who were not sufficiently acquainted with the various candidates to exercise an intelligent vote and who therefore refrained from voting; those indifferent to politics; as well as those who absented themselves due to their affiliation with political opposition to the right or left of Louis Napoléon's regime must be assumed in the total abstention figure.²⁹ Then too, the executive of the new order promised to virtually eclipse the legislative branch of government so that the latter would appear a mere shadow of the assemblies that had met under the Second Republic. Understandably therefore, the proposed Corps législatif failed to arouse great electoral interest.

To conclude, official candidates had the overpowering support of the government bureaucracy at their disposal; coming in 1852, while France was still under the heel of Louis Napoléon's dictatorship, the coercion that could be applied to assure favourable electoral results precluded the necessity for manipulation of figures after the fact.³⁰ Furthermore, by the end of 1852 only one of the independents originally elected to the Corps législatif remained; the other seven had resigned. But rather than summarize the government successes of 1852 further, let us turn our attention to the analysis of the deputies.

CHAPTER IV

THE POLITICS OF THE FIRST LEGISLATURE, 1852 - 1857

The story of Louis Napoléon's first legislature has been repeated too often to proceed as if it had never been told at all. Unfortunately, much of what was said in the past appears based on oversimplification of the facts, or worse, represents attempts to embellish or perpetuate myths introduced by anti-imperial interpretations. My own analysis of the Corps législatif between 1852 and 1857 is an attempt to clarify, confirm or cast aside previous accounts while providing a more accurate interpretation per se.

One of the earliest accounts, that of De La Gorce, dismissed previous public service among the deputies quite simply: they were "gens plus rompus aux affaires privées ou locales qu'accoutumés à la politique".¹ Gooch assumes that "the supporters of the government who sat in the body Corps législatif were largely newcomers to public life."² Seignobos notes, "aucun membre marquant des 'anciens partis,' sauf Montalembert".³ According to Marx, the Second Empire occasioned the exploitation of the wealth of the State by a band of nouveaux venus, without scruples, system or programme, in the interests of a very small group of the bourgeoisie.⁴

And what was the role played by these men? Too many historians have rendered valid the judgement of Montalembert; himself a deputy and disillusioned with the mandate he had assisted Louis Napoléon to secure, he disdainfully predicted:

"l'histoire dira si elle prend la peine de s'en occuper, quelle fut l'infatigable complaisance et l'incommensurable abaissement de cette première Assemblée du Second Empire."⁵

This line of interpretation would have us believe that the deputies were a subservient assembly, always expressing overwhelming approval of whatever the executive arm of government proposed.⁶ Perhaps the most eloquent exposition of the idea came in Victor Hugo's Napoléon le petit:

Le Corps législatif marche sur la pointe du pied, roule son chapeau dans ses mains, met le doigt sur sa bouche, sourit humblement, s'assied sur le coin de sa chaise et ne parle que quand on l'interroge. Il y a donc dans la boutique où se fabriquent les lois et les budgets, un maître de la maison, le Conseil d'Etat, et un domestique, le Corps législatif.⁷

In contrast Zeldin's analysis recently demonstrated that the Corps législatif included men of substantial means and experience, some with previous parliamentary experience, and he assumed as a corollary that these men would demand a liberalization of the regime and a more direct participation in the affairs of state.⁸ But is the connection as direct as Zeldin would suggest? Did the corollary necessarily follow?

One point unexplored in any previous study is the relationship between the deputies and the places of their election. This is particularly significant in view of the

abolition of the system of election by list. Though the impact of this factor cannot be measured in terms of the number of votes it augmented in Louis Napoléon's favour, it is nonetheless interesting. In discussing the face of the dictatorship as revealed in elections, numerous references were made to authoritarian measures that could be employed by the government to secure electoral successes. As effective as it proved in applying the 'stick' of persuasion, the regime also saw the advisability of employing the 'carrot'. Candidates, in the majority of cases, were chosen from the community of voters who would be called upon to elect them even though there was no formal residence requirement. Fifty-one percent of the deputies to the first legislature had been born in the département which they represented; 88 percent were residents or property owners in the area; and 78 percent had filled at least one public office there, either national or local, prior to their election under Louis Napoléon's regime. Only nine percent of the men studied showed no such relationships to the place of their election. (See Table 5.)

The high incidence of previous public experience points out the fallacy of interpretations claiming the deputies to be a collection of unknowns. Men having served on the lower levels of local government as either a conseiller municipal or a conseiller d'arrondissement are the least frequently encountered among the deputies to the first legislature, comprising only 12 percent of the total.

Former mayors accounted for 30 percent of the legislature. These Zeldin recognizes, though he does not mention any other local government experience.⁹ This is particularly unfortunate since such an examination would have supported one of the main elements of his thesis: he suggests a decentralized selection process for official candidates, explaining that the prefects, not Napoléon or the Minister of the Interior, exercised the greatest influence in the choosing. One might expect, as indeed is the case, that the prefects would prefer men known to them and of proven ability.¹⁰ Even more frequently than former mayors, therefore, former members of departmental councils may be found among the deputies. Fifty-six percent of the deputies to the first Corps législatif possessed the notability accompanying a position at the département level of local government, having served as a conseiller-général or a conseiller de préfecture. (See Table 6 and List 1.)

Political experience among the deputies did not end with local government offices, however. Estimates of turnover in political personnel should be approached with caution; proper recognition of the elements of continuity and change would place less emphasis on the latter part of statements such as this:

très vite rentrent dans l'ombre les noms les plus connus de la II^e République . . . Le Second Empire fait accéder au pouvoir toute une série d'hommes inconnus ou peu connus sous les régimes antérieurs.¹¹

Nowhere is continuity between Louis Napoléon's and previous regimes more evident than in the membership of the Corps

législatif. Sixty-three percent of the first legislature had held some form of national government position prior to their term of office under the Second Empire. (See Table 7 and List 2.) Of the deputies who served between 1852 and 1857, for example, 38 percent had previously served in Louis Philippe's administration; it should be noted, however, that slightly more than half of these held administrative or military positions not necessarily related to political affiliation with the regime. As well, almost without exception they had not been key figures of influence.¹²

Former deputies to the Constituent Assembly of 1848 accounted for 16 percent of the deputies to the first Corps législatif. And despite Louis Napoléon's use of force to crush the National Assembly in 1851, former members of that body accounted for 26 percent of the deputies to his first legislature. Furthermore, three cabinet officials of the Second Republic--Chasseloup-Laubat, Morny and Schneider--also served as deputies.

Dynastic loyalty cannot have been an overriding consideration for many of these men. A civil servant under the Restoration and civil servant and deputy under Louis Philippe, Chasseloup-Laubat went without position in 1848, returning as a deputy and then minister later in the Second Republic, and reappeared as a deputy to the Corps législatif in 1852, on the threshold of even higher appointments. Mésonan illustrates how the military guaranteed

perhaps the greatest continuity of all. The army, except perhaps the highest echelons of the officer corps, was relatively safe from the political turmoil accompanying each change of regime. Beginning his service in one of the great Napoléon's regiments, Mésonan continued his career under the Restoration and the July Monarchy, joining Louis Napoléon at Boulogne in 1840. His initial reward of official candidate status in the 1852 election was later augmented by a seat in the Senate. (See List 2 and List 10.) These examples are not unique; they complement Zeldin's inquiry which suggested that a very significant degree of continuity was bound to be expressed when about one-third of all deputies under the Second Empire came from political families and were thus "born into politics"; nepotism in dynasties of politicians assured that certain families would be represented in any legislature "though kings [sic] might come and go."¹³

To consider a few examples, Cambacérès, Gellibert des Séguins, Vast-Vimeux and Villedieu de Torcy succeeded their fathers in the Corps législatif, while Busson-Billault and Kersaint succeeded their fathers-in-law. The two Champagny, Montemart and Plancy brothers were deputies at the same time, as were the two Lemerriers--father and son. The elder Lemerrier's brother was a senator, as were the brothers of Caulaincourt, Chaumont-Quitry, Ladoucette, Las-Cases and Roguet, and the fathers of Beauveau, Ornano, Reille and Tascher de la Pagerie. The father of Charlemagne, the brother of Chevalier, the father-in-law of Delapalme and

the son of Parieu were members of the Conseil d'Etat, Delapalmé's brother-in-law was Baroche the minister; Maupas' son was Minister of Police; Abbaticci's father and Fortoul's brother were also ministers. Didier's brother and Chevreau's son were prefects. The brother of Cambacérès (the elder) was a member of Louis Napoléon's court.¹⁴

There were of course, other men, their loyalties to past regimes more marked, who were elected in 1852--many as official candidates.¹⁵ In the case of Chasseloup-Laubat, for example, dynastic connection in terms of his career advancement might be more accurate an expression than dynastic loyalty. There were thirty such men with Orleanist ties in the first legislature, 33 former legitimists and a moderate republican, Legrand. (See Table 8 and List 3.) If the careers of some of these men are followed, however, it again becomes apparent that individual careers superseded dynastic affiliations in many cases, perhaps flowering under one regime more than another and therefore becoming "tainted" due to the favours received.

The Orleanist Lemaire (Oise) is perhaps most significant for furthering the political fortunes of the Lemaire "dynasty" more than any other, serving as a civil servant under Napoléon I and the Restoration, and then as a deputy under Louis Philippe and in the National Assembly where he had protested against the coup d'état. (See List 2.) Nonetheless, he accepted official patronage in the election of 1852 and took his seat in the Corps législatif.

as a government deputy.¹⁶ Levavasseur retained his seat as a deputy from the July Monarchy through 1848, the Second Republic and the Second Empire until defeated in 1857. This was also true of Hérambault who outlasted Levavasseur in the Corps législatif. Few former Orleanists had served only the July Monarchy, receiving neither position nor favour from any other. (Compare List 3 and List 2.) Zeldin wrote of the Bonapartist group in the Corps législatif that barely half were "'pure' and free from all other loyalties."¹⁷ He could have made a similar remark about the so-called Orleanists. Perhaps this is one reason why Louis Napoléon's system of official candidacies proved accessible enough to these remnants of past regimes: provided that the new order was accepted, political antecedents could usually be ignored.¹⁸ After all, in many cases they had been ignored before. Then too, the importance of winning has been mentioned, and many of these men with their long, though varied, public careers had obvious advantages. And "new men," notable but without questionable political antecedents, were at a premium, as will be explained in due course.

There were exceptions, of course. The first legislature was 34 percent titled, yet not one deputy was first granted his nobility by the July Monarchy. (See Table 9 and List 4.) This is significant since men with Orleanist attachments were as conspicuous in the Corps législatif as were former legitimists. /This contradicts Beau de

Loménie's observations that few legitimists rallied to Louis Napoléon while numerous Orleanists did so without the least hesitation.¹⁹ Noble title dating to a particular regime may or may not be a clear indication of dynastic loyalty. Sale of such titles was not unknown, for example. Nevertheless, the acceptance or purchase of a noble title identified with a particular regime could be interpreted only as having accepted or solicited a favour from that regime; this weighed particularly heavily on the Orleanists. For the most part first or second generation in origin, Orleanist titles were often too recent to escape interpretation as examples of tainted rival influence--to be excluded as much as possible.²⁰

Most of the legitimist titles present in mid-nineteenth century French society had not been solicited by the bearer himself. For the large part inherited, these titles were displayed much like a good classical education as "a mark of good breeding, like the membership of an exclusive club."²¹ The Comte de Chambord considered such prestige to be sufficiently powerful to cause embarrassment by its absence.²² His wishes for abstention obviously went unfulfilled when 22 of the 33 former legitimists in the Corps législatif held titles, 19 predating the French Revolution. (Compare List 3 and List 4.)

Nevertheless, of the 33 legitimists the four elected as opposition candidates were "pure" in the sense of having abstained from prior national service completely (Calvière,

Durfort de Civrac) or having served only as representatives of the legitimist cause in previous parliamentary assemblies (Audren de Kerdrel, Bouhier de l'Ecluse). Even those who accepted official candidate status were relatively free of the connections with rival dynasties that the legitimist pretender decried. Bourcier de Villiers, who retained his military command, or Lescuyer d'Attainville, who remained in the civil service under the July Monarchy, are exceptions. Mortemart (Rhône) comes closest to approximating the public service careers of many Orleanists and Bonapartists, beginning a military career under the Restoration and then serving as a deputy under the July Monarchy and in 1848. Bucher de Chauvigné had held a judicial appointment under Napoléon I. Less than half had any prior public experience at the national level. Only twelve had held seats in previous legislatures. (Compare List 2 and List 3.)

This may explain why the accounts of the Second Empire repeatedly suggest a significant Orleanist presence in the Corps législatif while the equally large group of rallied legitimists has received considerably less attention. Obviously the Orleanists were more noticeable and Orleanist attachments were pronounced. Why? Among deputies bearing a distinction of the Legion of Honour, for example, almost half had received it from the hands of Louis Phillippe. (See Table 10 and List 5.) While he certainly included political favourites among his appointments, many were undoubtedly men of merit. Similarly, and as mentioned

previously over one-third of the deputies had gained political or administrative experience under the regime. And finally, like a few legitimists many Orleanists were not above opportunism in questions of political advancement versus dynastic loyalty. (Compare List 2 and List 3.)

In this characteristic they were similar, too, with many Bonapartists in the Corps législatif. If anything, men who had Bonapartist connections to bring to light had petitioned for official candidate status even more energetically than others who might wish their political pasts obscured.

Prompted by the reelection of four courtiers (Belmont, Chaumont-Quitry, Chevalier and Labédoyère), who had served on Louis Napoléon's personal staff prior to their first election the diarist Viel-Castel commented: "Le gouvernement se donne le tort de patronner comme candidats à la députation une foule de nullités qui n'ont d'autre titre que d'appartenir comme fonctionnaires à la maison civile de l'Empereur."²³ But these four were not alone in taking advantage of their close relationship with Louis Napoléon to secure seats in his legislature. Others were relatives--Clary, Lafon de Cayx and Morny. Add to these the names of Conneau (Louis Napoléon's physician), Geiger (who was raised with him), Mésonan (from the Boulogne attempt), as well as Didier, Millet, Verclos, Wattebled, Arnaud and Massabiau.²⁴

Sometimes, reminders of service under the great Napoléon secured government recognition; despite the nearly

fifty-year interval between the two empires, 11 percent of the deputies elected between 1852 and 1857 had previously held positions in the service of Napoléon I. (See Table 7 and List 2.) For example, under the first empire Mercier had been a deputy, Bucher de Chauvigné had filled a judicial appointment, Houdetot had been a prefect, Thieullen a sub-prefect, and Lemaire (Oise) and Darblay other civil servants. An additional twenty-nine had served in Napoléon's military forces.²⁵

But if the Second Empire came too late to restore personal careers, hopefuls were quick to exploit service rendered by fathers, grandfathers or other relatives to secure an official candidacy in the election. And since government candidates were almost everywhere successful, the membership of the Corps législatif boasted, if not always the personages, at least some of the most famous names of Napoléon I's regime. (See List 2 and List 6.) As well, Delamarre (Creuse) was the nephew of one of Napoléon's ministers, and five deputies--Belliard, Bourlon, Duzat-Dembarère, Noualhier and Romeuf--were related to generals of the first Empire.

Apart from these men whose Imperial connections were de la veille, one must consider the Bonapartists du jour. Among the latter who appeared in the Corps législatif were various journalists--Delamarre, Granier de Cassagnac, Jubinal, Noubet and Véron--and members of Bonapartist electoral committees: Bouchetal-Laroche, Chevreau, Dela-

palme, Fortoul, Fauché-Lepelletier, Guyard-Delalain, Kerveguen, Koenigswarter, Leroux, Maupas and Schneider.²⁶ To these one can add the names of those belonging to the political families mentioned earlier.

To total all deputies in the first legislature with Bonapartist connections, either through personal service under Napoléon I, family connection through a father's or relative's attachments to the first empire, or because of personal or family loyalties to Louis Napoléon [Including those allegiances fairly new in expression] yields 121 names. (See List 2 and List 6 and compare with Appendix I.) None suggested by Zeldin have been eliminated; however there are many deputies with connections to Bonapartism no less evident than those he does mention who do not appear in his lists. For example, Zeldin notes "seventeen who had served under the great Napoléon as prefects, soldiers or members of parliament."²⁷ The biographical summaries upon which the present study is based reveal that deputies in this category total twice the number mentioned by Zeldin. Family connections to the first empire are also more extensive than Zeldin's description would suggest. This is true, as well, of family relationships between deputies, and between deputies and other officials of the regime.²⁸

This is not to imply that I would refute Zeldin's total of 70 Bonapartists and substitute the 121 names my own study suggests. Suffice it to say that between 1852 and 1857 121 members of the Corps législatif were men with

Bonapartist affiliations. This does not mean all were Bonapartists in the sense that others were legitimists for example. By 1852 many were proclaiming their Bonapartist connections in a fashion to fit the epithet 'opportunist' more so than Bonapartist. With this Zeldin's account is in agreement and concludes moreover that the so-called Bonapartists were hardly exclusive in their past dynastic loyalties, making the process of assigning party loyalties a definitely arbitrary one.

In this light the acceptance of an absolute figure for Bonapartists in the Corps législatif is nearly impossible. It appears that there were more than seventy men who could make this claim, yet the total number did not exceed half the legislature.

Additional collaborationists though not necessarily converts (i.e. compare List 3 and List 7), were recruited through Louis Napoléon's Consultative Commission, established just after the coup d'état. With resignations and additions depending on news of disorder spreading or apprehended, the membership changed from one day to the next until a final list appeared containing the names of 51 future deputies, several future members of the Conseil d'Etat, and others destined for the Senate. The deputy Véron concluded quite precisely: "c'était une première liste de candidats au pouvoir, aux places, aux honneurs."³⁰ Though the Commission never met as a body, the men who allowed their names to be added to the list in effect endorsed the

coup d'état and thus committed themselves to the new regime. Sixteen percent of the first legislature was composed of such men. (See List 7.)

But what about those without previous political connections either to retard or recommend their acceptance as government candidates? At that time, and since, these were known as les hommes nouveaux. A rather nebulous category at best, practically all accounts of membership in the Corps législatif have included it, unclarified.³¹ What remains indistinct, despite these accounts, is the number of deputies representative of these 'new men'. Zeldin notes "about forty new men" [By actual count, he lists 39 names].³² Still lacking, however, is a clear statement of the criteria used to establish the category and then to differentiate the members from the larger body. The definition Zeldin quotes is hardly adequate, 'new men' being interpreted as those "who have not been members of any previous parliament and who are consequently free and independent."³³ Many of the deputies without parliamentary experience were nonetheless committed by virtue of other government positions with political overtones, nepotism and family connections, or for other reasons--including many of those considered 'new men' by Zeldin.

Rejecting his classification entails a narrower delimitation of what the phrase les hommes nouveaux should comprehend. It is recognized that national government service, alone, is not usually a sufficiently accurate

measure of dynastic loyalty to support a classification system. But to be absolutely certain none but truly 'new men' are considered in this category, all those who occupied regional or national government positions under previous regimes will be eliminated. Those with known dynastic connections--including Bonapartists--cannot be counted as 'new men' either; nor should all deputies who owed their seats in the Corps législatif to nepotism or inherited family political influence. In short, taking the list of deputies (Appendix I), and deleting all names that may be identified with prior political associations leaves those who may be termed les hommes nouveaux. On such close examination, very few of the men elected in 1852 fit into the category.

Most notables had tasted politics under previous regimes, while few among genuine 'new men' were notables!³⁴ For similar reasons, there were no 'new men' among elected opposition deputies. Despite all the talk of their desirability in 1852 and their mention in most assessments of the election later, only seventeen 'new men' were elected in 1852; all told, they made up six percent of the first legislature. (See List 8.)

But how did this sundry collection of men function in the legislature, given their marked differences in political experience, loyalty to the regime and personal ambition? Surely these would lead to a diversity of views rather than a unity of purpose--at least this is Zeldin's viewpoint.

Although he provides only allusions to opposition in the Corps législatif before 1860, until quite recently his account was unique in suggesting even that much.³⁵ Older works, especially constitutional studies, have us assume that the submissiveness and complicity characterizing the legislature allowed only the futile, rare and isolated interruptions inspired by Montalembert.³⁶ Since the proceedings of legislative debates were not published under the authoritarian empire, there were no transcripts to refute this generally accepted interpretation.

We know, however, that the Corps législatif began its history in a less than compliant frame of mind. The legacy of decrees from the period of Louis Napoléon's personal rule, as numerous and comprehensive as they had been, precluded a very extensive order of business for the first session. The deputies therefore busied themselves with the passing of the budget for the following fiscal year. The occasion witnessed the extension of discussion to many non-budgetary matters, a practice strongly reminiscent of the assembly Louis Napoléon had just overthrown. Indignant over the constraints of the new constitution, Montalembert delivered a particularly damning speech condemning the limited prerogatives assigned the Corps législatif. Such was the impact that it was approved for publication by a vote of 75 to 59.³⁷

Unobserved, Louis Napoléon had entered the legislative chamber just in time to witness the uproar of protest

himself. This was patently opposed to what the constitution and decrees governing the conduct of the Corps législatif had envisioned. Reaction was swift and apparently effective. The Minister of State deposited a sternly written reprimand with the President of the assembly, ordering him to curtail all unscheduled discussion. Recalcitrants were summoned to the Tuileries by Louis Napoléon for a personal persuasion of the worth of his programme.³⁸

Against possible recurrences of such unauthorized debate, the Sénatus-consulte of 23 December 1852 established the following precautions: the budget for each ministerial department of government would be voted en bloc rather than by chapter and article as before. Special decrees by the Emperor could authorize budget changes from one chapter to another without legislative approval. He would also have personal control over all commercial treaties. These provisions were made applicable to the budgetary year 1853; promulgation of the budget just passed by the Corps législatif was reserved.³⁹

Supposedly deputies had been cowed. Some were flattered, and others satisfied with the sop of a salary for members of the Corps législatif which was introduced at the same time. But in the main, perhaps there was a certain recognition that their proper jurisdiction had been exceeded. Most government projects that followed were greeted with strong majorities of approval.⁴⁰ Records of the Conseil d'Etat show that opposition was not thereby

eliminated, however; amendments to government proposals, while mostly rejected, were nonetheless numerous.⁴¹ And in certain cases strong minorities voted against projects where amendments were not approved.⁴²

It is interesting that the potentially most volatile issue of the period 1852-1857 never reached the Corps législatif. In 1856, a proposed bill to lower protective tariffs aroused such general and overt hostility in the country, particularly on the part of French commercial, industrial and agricultural interests, that the government withdrew the legislation, promising to hold it back until 1861 at the earliest.⁴³ So the threat of a direct confrontation in the Corps législatif reminiscent of 1852 never was, and what could have proven a test of political versus economic allegiances was shelved for the moment.

On the dissolution of the legislature in 1857 Napoléon III commended the Corps législatif for the loyal cooperation which had enabled him to set up and sustain the regime the members had consented to serve.⁴⁴ With the overwhelming majority of France they had proven his 'deputies'. Their consent permitted the functioning of the new institutions within the parameters established by authoritarianism.

CHAPTER V

THE ELECTIONS TO THE SECOND LEGISLATURE

The authoritarian empire engineered the elections of June, 1857 to secure a popular acclaim even more overwhelming than the one received in 1852. Generally these efforts were a mixed success.

The electoral regulations of 1852 remained unchanged except for the number of deputies to be elected. A Sénatus-consulte of 28 May 1857 modified article thirty-five of the constitution so one deputy would represent 35,000 electors with an additional deputy granted in any department where the fraction exceeding the equal division by 35,000 was over 17,000. Accordingly, the Emperor decreed that 267 deputies would be elected in 1857.¹ (See Table 1.)

The government persevered in its policy of endorsing official candidates and applying administrative pressure to assure their election. In defence of the practice the Minister of the Interior asserted,

il ~~Le~~ gouvernement dira nettement au pays quel noms ont sa confiance et lui semblent mériter celle des populations; comme il propose les lois aux députés, il proposera les candidats aux électeurs, et ceux-ci feront leur choix.²

One prefect then counselled his subordinates that the role of the administration was to simplify the number of choices: "Imposez silence aux adversaires s'il en rencontre, empêchez énergiquement leurs manoeuvres."³ The letter of another,

noting the names of fonctionnaires who had assisted or retarded the progress of government candidates, revealed that the degree of one's cooperation went not without notice by the Ministry of Interior.⁴

Employing the methods so successfully utilized in 1852, the government was able to increase its popular support by five percent. The rate of voter participation increased only very slightly, however, to 64.5 percent from 63.3. (See Table 2 and Table 4.) Five years of success undoubtedly attracted some new support.

The origin of the regime's increased popularity is not overly difficult to ascertain. For one thing, there was the timing of the election. The year 1856 appeared as a high point in the fortunes of the Second Empire. Victory in the Crimea signaled a triumph that was crowned by a Congress of European powers meeting in Paris to settle the peace. Basking in the favour this success reflected upon him, Louis Napoléon chose this very auspicious climate to dissolve the Corps législatif one year early.

The economic climate was no less promising. The first period of Napoléon III's rule ushered in years of comparative prosperity. Of course the half-decade preceding the coup had been among the worst ever experienced, especially in agriculture.⁵ Coming as it did after a period of relatively poor investment prospects, growth therefore appeared all the more dramatic. In the first six months after the coup d'état the investment index of sixteen of the

largest French firms rose from 529 millions to 809. Launching a series of public works including long awaited railway expansion, the Emperor had spurred the construction industry, providing much-needed employment and inspiring investment confidence. A new era of development had been inaugurated bringing France into the full swing of the industrial revolution that had seemed to elude her before. And if there were lingering doubts, surely these were dispelled by the wonders of the 1855 Paris Exposition boasting all the technical marvels of the age.⁶

As well, the birth of the Prince-Imperial the following year gave the Emperor an heir and the regime a future. In 1852 as a matter of pride many men of note affected to have accepted--perhaps even with a small show of hesitant reluctance--the status of official government candidate. In 1857 the Minister of the Interior was inundated with requests for what was now interpreted as the privilege of serving as one of the Emperor's candidates.⁷ Of course deputies were now paid which may have drawn extra interest as well. But so pronounced was the general competition to be included in the regime's favours that Alexis de Tocqueville was moved to remark caustically:

. . . alors le gouvernement vendait les places, tandis qu'aujourd'hui il les donne; pour les acquérir, on ne fournit plus son argent; on fait mieux, on se livre soi-même.⁸

Understandably, with so many applicants to choose from, the government could afford to be highly selective in picking candidates. Certain works assert erroneously that

the government presented as candidates in the 1857 elections all those who were serving at the close of the first legislature, Montalembert excepted.⁹ Indeed, Minister of the Interior Billault did circulate a statement affirming that "tous les députés sortants" would be presented again; but it was qualified by the clause, "sauf quelques exceptions, commandées par des nécessités spéciales."¹⁰ Actually, eight former official candidates were dropped from the government's patronage list due to their opposition, unsatisfactory performance or poor prospects of reelection. These were Charlier, David (Gironde), Desmolles, Leroy-Beaulieu, Levavasseur, Migeon, Montalembert and Montreuil. Durfort de Civrac repudiated government support of his own accord. With the exception of Migeon, whose case will be discussed presently, all failed to secure seats in the following legislature.¹¹

Nonetheless, the elections of 1857 witnessed the success of more independents than is generally realized. Six republicans were elected: Carnot, Cavaignac, Darimon, Goudchaux and Ollivier in Paris, and Hénon in Lyon. Cavaignac died shortly after; in declining their seats, Carnot and Goudchaux recalled the collective republican protest resignation of 1852 and added that the intervening five years had merely confirmed their opposition to the regime.¹² By-elections which were delayed repeatedly finally resulted in two other republicans, Jules Favre and Ernest Picard, taking the oath as a formality and entering

the chamber the next year. Together with Darimon, Hénon and Ollivier who had accepted the oath in 1857, they formed the small republican group of five.

The Comte de Chambord continued to ban all political activity by his followers. But other nonrepublican independents were elected, including Migeon (whose presence was short-lived), the liberal Curé who rallied to the government before the end of the second legislature, Brame and Plichon who did not oppose the government, Hallignon and Morgan who supported it much of the time, and the conservative Javal.¹³

In an attempt to curtail opposition expression and to prevent all future protest elections which ended only in denunciations of the oath of loyalty and subsequent resignations, the Emperor promulgated the Sénatus-consulte of 17 February 1858; accordingly, none could be elected to the Corps législatif unless the administration received his written confirmation of the oath at least eight days prior to polling day. Unless this was received, no electioneering would be authorized.¹⁴

As in 1852, the majority of the deputies elected in 1857 succeeded in attracting an overwhelming percentage of the votes cast. Half of the deputies received over ninety percent of the votes expressed in their circonscriptions. Very few were elected with less than fifty percent of the electorate participating in the voting, and all but about one-third received the support of fifty percent of the electors eligible to vote. (See Table 11.) Among the

independent or opposition deputies elected, all succeeded in attracting at least fifty percent of the ballots cast, with Javal, Migeon and Plichon exceeding sixty percent--Javal and Migeon each received sixty-one percent (this marked a considerable decline for Migeon who as a government candidate in the previous election had gained ninety-four percent), while Plichon received ninety-nine percent of the ballots cast in his constituency. It should be noted, however, that Plichon was not opposed by a government candidate. All independents except Plichon were supported by less than fifty percent of the eligible voters; none of the republican group of five exceeded thirty-five percent.¹⁵

The success and popularity of Napoléon III were obviously reaffirmed in 1857 despite the election of a few additional independents. As the second Corps législatif met for the first time not even the slightest premonition hinted at the changes the deputies would experience before their term was ended.

CHAPTER VI

THE SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE CORPS LEGISLATIF 1852-1863

The social standings of the deputies to the Corps législatif have not been completely ignored by historians studying the second empire. We know, for example, of several common interpretive generalizations in this regard. When Marx elaborated on class support for the regime he cited the avid participation of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie.¹ The Duc de Broglie, at the opposite end of the political spectrum, also underlines the attraction Louis Napoléon's coup d'état had for "commercial and industrial interests."² Others mention an entourage of "grands bourgeois ou de serviteurs déterminés de la grande bourgeoisie," and though there may have been new faces among the deputies, "ils appartiennent tous à la même classe que leurs prédécesseurs. Ils sont pris eux aussi dans les rangs de la grande bourgeoisie."³ When occupations are specified, the three most common categories are propriétaires, fonctionnaires, and the grande bourgeoisie.⁴ This chapter will test these conclusions by determining exactly how many deputies belonged to each such category during the course of the authoritarian empire. The two legislatures will also be compared to note any changes or consistencies evident in the period.

Take the case of the propriétaire. A very inclusive term at best, Zeldin's delimitation of the word is very helpful. He sees the propriétaire as being similar to the English country gentleman, possessed of a living usually based on land (though use of the term did not necessarily connote great wealth), allowing him to pursue a life of leisure more or less according to his bent.⁵ This sense of the title will be employed here for those deputies with no other specified occupation.

Such men must have been especially attractive to the regime for they were probably notable and respectable; since a salary for deputies was not established until several months after the election of 1852, and since all state salaried individuals were excluded from the legislature, the propriétaires who presented themselves for the first election certainly enjoyed the particular advantage of their independent economic positions. Nonetheless, the category is not really significant in terms of numbers: only 37 deputies in the first legislature were propriétaires with no other specified occupations, twelve percent of the total.⁶ (See Table 12.) If the names of these men are considered, however, the attention given to propriétaires in previous accounts becomes understandable. (Cf. List 9, List 3 and List 8.) One of every three men in this category was of legitimist background, and all but four were no strangers to politics.

More numerous than any other category were deputies with previous careers as public administrators, professional politicians, courtiers, diplomats, magistrates and soldiers. The law excluding civil servants did nothing to prevent these former recipients of state salaries--fonctionnaires--from filling one-third of all seats in the first Corps législatif. (See Table 12 and List 9.) Half of these were retired soldiers; their petitions for official candidate status appealed for the recognition of distinguished careers sometimes dating from the first empire. They appeared in the Corps législatif, "generally to represent in silence the conservatism of merit rewarded."⁷

The third of the three most mentioned categories of occupation includes deputies who were members of the so-called grande bourgeoisie--financiers, industrialists, manufacturers and merchants. The boundaries between these four roles in the commercial field were not as clearly defined then as they frequently are now; as such, the financier sometimes found himself involved in the actual development of the industrial concern he had funded, guiding production and aiding in the marketing of its products to ensure a fair return on his investment. It is not inappropriate, therefore, to consider these occupational interests as a single group. As a group they numbered 58 (19%) among the members of the first legislature. (See Table 12 and List 9.) Zeldin concludes, significantly in the light of later developments, that their main concerns were with their

businesses. Serving as experienced consultants in industrial and commercial development and defending their interests in government policies appear to have been the extent of their political involvement in the Corps législatif.⁸

There were, of course, deputies who followed more than one occupation. Nonetheless, considerably less than half of the Corps législatif pursued interests outside of the three categories already mentioned; together, propriétaires, former fonctionnaires and grands bourgeois made up 65 percent of the first legislature. It is not uncommon for these three to be used to categorize the whole legislature.

This is unfortunate since many other occupational interests were represented, some as, or more, significantly than the propriétaires which everyone mentions, or the grande bourgeoisie that figures so prominently in Marxian accounts of this period. Zeldin excepted, not much mention is made of the legal profession. On the occasion of Lord Malmesbury's succession to the position of Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, Prime Minister Lord Palmerston remarked that the France that had accepted the Second Empire was "weary both of Bourbons and lawyers."⁹ If this assessment was perhaps valid in respect to the Bourbons, the Corps législatif did not reflect it in regard to lawyers who were more evident than any other single group except the fonctionnaires. Sixty (20%) of the deputies serving between

1852 and 1857 practiced law, either as barristers and solicitors, or as notaries.

Beside lawyers, liberal and learned professions were represented by eight doctors (two percent of the first legislature), seven educators (2%), twenty-two writers-- authors, journalists, playwrights and poets--composing seven percent of the legislature; and there were five (2%) editors, directors or founders of newspapers. An artist, Lemaire (Nord), was also elected, as were two engineers. Again it must be remembered that many of the deputies fit into two or more occupational categories, but approximately thirty-five percent of the first legislature was composed of deputies whose occupations were in the liberal or learned professions.

Finally, thirty deputies whose occupations were in agriculture composed ten percent of the legislature; and one, Chevreau, elected in 1852, kept a house of lodging. (See Table 12 and List 9.)

These figures represent the social backgrounds of the deputies to the first Corps législatif, an analysis that completes a picture usually presented only in fragments, if at all. The lack of lower class representation among the deputies might have been expected. Government candidates were successful in almost every case, and they had been chosen, as Persigny put it, 'to give the legislature to the upperclasses [sic]':

'We have openly supported and chosen our candidates, but from the highest ranks of society; from the great land-

owners, wealthy mayors and so on.¹⁰

A basis of comparison does not exist on which to measure whether or not the Corps législatif was a particular case in this respect. Were there socio-professional differences between the deputies and members of the other assemblies of state, for example? It is unfortunate that Wright's study of the Conseil d'Etat fails to present such information directly.¹¹ There is, however, a comparable study of the conseillers généraux along these lines.

Since most deputies had been conseillers généraux certain parallels should be expected. If the occupational interests of the conseillers généraux are grouped into the same large categories established for the members of the Corps législatif, similarities become very apparent. The percentage of men engaged in the liberal professions or those of the grande bourgeoisie are about the same. The Corps législatif included about ten percent more fonctionnaires, but about as many more conseillers généraux were propriétaires or men engaged in agriculture.¹²

Such figures do not support generalizations based on recognition of a preponderance of grands bourgeois influence in the regime. Despite Zeldin's note of certain differences between the occupations of Corps législatif members and those of their predecessors in earlier assemblies,¹³ the significance is very obviously in the continuity and not in the change. As before, fonctionnaires and members of the liberal professions proved most numerous.

This element of continuity is evident within the regime even more so than between regimes, despite changes in personnel and in the nature of the government. While most of the deputies who sat in the first legislature also sat between 1857 and 1863, approximately one-quarter did not. (See Appendix I.) It is evident, therefore, that replacements were recruited from the same social strata that characterized the first legislature. A comparison of the two legislatures in terms of deputies' occupational interests leaves little doubt of this. For example members of the grande bourgeoisie accounted for the same percentage of deputies in each legislature. (See Table 12.) Had the same men sat in each legislature, the significance of this identical number would be diminished; as it happened, however, there was a twenty-six percent changeover in grands bourgeois deputies between the first and second legislatures. (Cf. List 9, List 10 and Appendix I.) Three of the fifty-eight men in this category received government appointments prior to the 1857 elections--one in the civil service and two to the senate; two others died; six were defeated in 1857; and four retired for unknown reasons.¹⁴

Similarities in the two legislatures may be observed in other categories of occupational interest as well. There were only two fewer propriétaires in the second legislature than there had been in the first.¹⁵ (See Table 12.) Fonctionnaires increased in number, though not significantly; the minor difference was due mainly to an increase in the

number of career politicians among the deputies. But for Gautlier de la Guistièrre who died, all such men with no other occupations from the first legislature served in the second. The increase may be partially explained by the introduction of a salary for deputies after the first election, making a political career prospectively more attractive, or at least financially feasible.

The proportion of deputies from the liberal and learned professions remained stable. (See Table 12.) There were five fewer lawyers in the second legislature than there had been in the first, though. The drop is relatively insignificant in view of the continuity, but is interesting nonetheless. A changeover of twenty-five percent actually occurred in the period from 1852 to the election of 1857; yet all but five of these deputies were compensated for by recruits from the same legal professions elected in 1852. The reasons occasioning this change in Corps législatif personnel are varied. Six of the lawyers who served in the first legislature received appointments to high state offices: one to the Ministry, another to a judicial position, two to the civil service and two to the Conseil d'Etat. Two of the deputies in this category died during the first legislature; two more were defeated in the election of 1857; five retired for various reasons.¹⁶ (Cf. List 9, List 10 and Appendix I.)

To consider the other occupational interests, members of the liberal and learned professions were propor-

tionately no more or less numerous than in the first legislature. The same was true of deputies engaged in agriculture. (See Table 12.)

The proportion of deputies in each category of occupational interest remained stable not only in the legislatures of the authoritarian regime, but (judging by Zeldin's figures) generally throughout the Second Empire. Zeldin's breakdown of deputies by occupational interest for the whole period proves this conclusively if compared with the statistics for the first two legislatures. His totals reveal little change throughout the empire from the original proportions of 1852.¹⁷

This stability precludes any explanation for changes in the political climate of the Corps législatif on the basis of alterations in its social composition as the regime grew older. From the figures just presented it is apparent that demands for greater control of public finances came not because of an increase in the number of deputies belonging to the grande bourgeoisie. Encouragement for military ventures was neither augmented nor diminished by a change in the number of deputies with military backgrounds. The virtues of protectionism in trade were expressed none the louder in 1860 than in 1856 because of increases in the number of agriculturalist or industrialist deputies.

Thus, while the analysis of deputies' social backgrounds clarifies many misconceptions, it is not the key to understanding the political changes that announced the

liberal empire. To confirm this conclusion it is essential to consider the political and economic period that coincided with the second Corps législatif, from 1857-1863.

CHAPTER VII

THE POLITICS OF THE SECOND LEGISLATURE 1857-1863

If the domestic politics of the Second Empire were a drama production, then surely the second Corps législatif would serve as a recapitulation for playgoers coming late and intending to leave early. As did the regime itself, the second legislature opened with a show of authoritarian might and climaxed in liberal concessions amid the complexities of foreign relations. The concessions of 1860-61, often hailed as the dawning of the liberal empire, focused directly on the prerogatives of the Corps législatif. Among the first privileges granted were the right to vote an address in reply to the speech from the throne, in effect allowing discussion of matters of state before the whole assembly; in extenso publication of legislative debates in the Journal Officiel; and the appointment of ministers without portfolio to defend government bills in the Corps législatif.¹ This chapter will review the role of the legislature during this period to determine if it may have influenced in any way the granting of these concessions.

The temptation in pursuing this is to look for changes that might point to their move away from government influence. At first glance it appears that only a difference between the two legislatures could account for the

exhibition of discontent in the second Corps législatif when so little was expressed in the first. Yet it would be difficult to imagine any two assemblies more alike than the first two legislatures of the Second Empire. De La Gorce suggested that nothing changed as a result of the 1857 elections:

c'étaient les mêmes visages; c'étaient les mêmes places réparties sur les mêmes bancs; c'étaient les mêmes conseillers d'Etat investis des mêmes attributions; c'étaient le même règlement, et, selon toute apparence, établi pour longtemps.²

Were the assemblies truly identical? In the discussion of deputies' occupational backgrounds for example, differences in the two legislatures were identified. But none of these proved very significant, due mainly to the general continuity of personnel between legislatures and to recruitment of new deputies from the same sources as former ones. What about political backgrounds?

Generally, deputies with close ties to Napoléon III, his family or to other members of his administration were re-elected in 1857. Similar connections also assisted new candidates in 1857--such as Mariani who was selected as the second government candidate for Corsica after having served as aide-de-camp to Prince Jérôme-Napoléon.³

Deputies whose names had appeared on Louis Napoléon's 1851 Consultative Commission dropped in number. Five had died; eight had received higher government positions; four were defeated in 1857. (Cf. List 7 and List 10.)

Death took its toll among older deputies who had been chosen as government candidates by virtue of their service to Napoléon I. (Cf. Table 7 and Table 13; List 2 and List 10.) But sons of dignitaries associated with the first Empire were as evident in the second legislature as they had been in the first. (Cf. Appendix I and List 6.) And where sons had been recognized, there were also grandsons: J. David (Gironde) was the grandson of Napoléon I's celebrated court painter; Cambacérès (the younger) was the grandson of a former minister.⁴

There was a slight drop of five percent in the number of deputies having held national government positions before. This decline in experience was distributed fairly evenly, showing in most categories of public service under each previous regime. Men who had filled national offices under the July Monarchy remained the most numerous group in this category, as in the first legislature. (Cf. Table 7 and Table 13; List 2, List 10 and Appendix I.) As in 1852, Ministry circulars did not request the selection of candidates with previous national level experience; in effect, the recurring demand for 'new men' advocated the very opposite. Given the limitations imposed on the Corps législatif (and the case of Montalembert stood as a too recent reminder), experience among the deputies was probably not in the regime's interests anyway.

On the other hand, flamboyant titles of nobility and notables from among the Legion of Honour were no less

frequently encountered among the deputies than before.

(See Table 9 and Table 10.)

In terms of local reputation, as in 1852 the overwhelming majority of deputies were native sons, residents and/or property owners in their département. All but twenty-nine percent had some form of local public experience (See Table 6), while others had filled a national public office in or on behalf of the département. Only nine percent of the deputies are not known to have had such connections to the place of their election. The figures were pretty constant for both legislatures. (See Table 5.)

A sure indication of local influence in the selection of government candidates may be discerned in the increase in deputies who had previously served as conseillers-généraux or conseillers de préfecture. These two positions, the most common forms of local political experience among the deputies, were also the two positions in the organization of the département working closest to Monsieur le Préfet. The conseiller d'arrondissement and the conseiller municipal working through the offices or sub-prefects and mayors, respectively, were more removed from direct access to the prefects; likewise, one might assume that credit for effective performance by these councils went to their superiors. Given the five percent increase in former conseillers-généraux or conseillers de préfecture in the second legislature, it was obviously beneficial to be close to the prefect's office when government patronage was

distributed! (See Table 6.)

In general these figures point to the only possible conclusion: the two assemblies were so much alike as to render any differences negligible in comparison. This does not mean that everything remained the same. Montalembert, the most eloquent spokesman for the Catholic cause, had lost his seat in 1857. The same contest resulted in a drop in the number of former legitimists and Orleanists in the Corps législatif. (See Table 8 and Cf. Appendix I and List 3.) And of course there was the election of les cinq--the republicans in the second legislature--who introduced more than a change of personnel into the Corps législatif. Whenever the opportunity presented itself they used their parliamentary immunity to denounce the authoritarian regime, attempting to cajole, attack or embarrass Napoléon III into adopting a more liberal attitude in government.⁵

The presence of these independents assured that the process of verifying deputies' credentials received very careful scrutiny. In the course of investigation it was discovered that M. de Cambacérés (the younger) had not reached the age of twenty-five at the time of his election, and consequently, had been ineligible. Undaunted, Cambacérés presented himself for reelection a few weeks later; he won easily, in the process revealing how little the castigation by his opposition had affected the chances of a government candidate.⁶

The government in turn launched an inquiry into the election of the deputy Migeon. An official candidate in the 1852 elections, he was relieved of that status⁵⁷ in the hope that he could be replaced. But even without government support Migeon was successful and took his seat in the Corps législatif. The government then charged him with using a false title of nobility and a Legion of Honour decoration which was not his own to impress his constituents. It accused him of having utilized bribes, false promises of employment and numerous other electoral irregularities in his campaign. Coming as this did after Migeon's election and at the instigation of the government, the investigation seemed to resemble too much a government act of revenge against an opposition deputy to yield the expected result. After his original election had been invalidated, Migeon won again. Finally, securing a conviction on the bribery charge the imperial courts were able to sentence Migeon to two months imprisonment and force his final resignation.⁷

Whatever reminder this may have served to confirm the powers of an authoritarian regime was soon eclipsed by the events of 1858. On January fourteenth of that year Orsini, an Italian disenchanted with Napoléon III's failure to aid the cause of Italian independence, threw a bomb at the Imperial carriage as it was on its way to the opera. Though the Emperor emerged unhurt, several others were killed or wounded. The state of siege that had accompanied the coup d'état of 1852 was quickly reintroduced. Suspected enemies

of the regime were summarily arrested and deported without trial, the occasion serving as a convenient opportunity to settle accounts with any opposition, terrorist or otherwise. General Espinasse, known for anything but clemency, was appointed Minister of the Interior; the 400 arrests that followed the rash action of a few Italian conspirators testify to the general's interpretation of his temporary responsibility.⁸

Scattered and feeble attempts to inspire a vote of protest in the Corps législatif had limited effect: among the 251 who voted on the issue, all but twenty-four supported the action advocated by the government.⁹ Opposition in the Corps législatif could have done little to inspire a more liberal regime if limited to the nine percent that voted against the emergency measures of 1858. But events outside the Corps législatif were doing more to decide the fortune of the authoritarian empire than legislative proceedings reflect. It is not within the perspective of this study to provide the detail of loyalties lost through foreign and domestic policies that obviously pleased so few. Suffice it to say by way of summary that Napoléon III's Italian policies managed to alienate both Catholics and nationalists, while even the most patient of liberals enquired about the Emperor's earlier promise to "crown the regime" with greater freedom.¹⁰

That these matters should have occasioned only a shadow of opposition in the Corps législatif compared to the

general furor inspired by the Anglo-French trade treaty of 1860 should surprise no one. Analysis of the deputies' backgrounds has illustrated that these were gens d'affaires, men with careers in a variety of professional and influential fields, the majority having previous political experience. Their greatest occasion of protest had materialized in 1852 when the full realization of the restricted nature of their powers became apparent; it was very short, and they had quickly reconciled themselves to the situation which the overwhelming majority of the French people had sanctioned. Their limited influence on the affairs of state notwithstanding, the Corps législatif soon proved itself less indulgent in matters of finance and the public economy.

The number of amendments submitted by commissions of deputies studying proposals for legislation shows that criticism continued after 1852. Careful attention to the annual budget assured that the regime's finances were analyzed each year in the most sober of fashions. As a result, fully thirty percent of all amendments suggested in Corps législatif commissions prior to 1860 concerned the budget. After 1857 when the economy declined the number of amendments to the budget increased dramatically, doubling in the years between 1857 and 1860. Over half of all budgetary amendments were rejected outright by the Conseil d'Etat, but as the number of amendments increased, fewer and fewer were treated so arbitrarily; by 1860 the number rejected had dropped to one-third of those proposed.¹¹ Therefore

the tendency of the Corps législatif to pay increased attention to state finances and gradually, to have its concerns recognized had developed prior to 1860. This explains no small part of the reception given to the announcement of the 1860 trade treaty.

But opposition to the treaty in the Corps législatif was only one consideration in view of Napoléon III's intentions. The year 1860 was one of crisis even without anticipating deputies' protests. Difficulties with the clergy and the political power of Catholics concerned that the regime's Italian intervention threatened the temporal power of the pope were particularly acute.¹² The same policy was suspect in London as well but the signing of the trade treaty, the effect of which was to reduce French protective tariffs against cheaper British exports, provided some reassurance.¹³ Napoléon III also hoped that the treaty might instil new vigour into the French economy where the government was running an annual deficit of about 130 million dollars per year and the national debt had risen to 1,500 million.¹⁴ Placed in its actual perspective tariff reduction was only part of a planned programme of economic incentives to spur new development in industry, communications and public works. These other aspects would also make the pill easier for opposition to swallow.¹⁵

The opposition the regime already faced dictated caution. Only the continued popularity of the dynasty could assure its perpetuation after Napoléon III; and in January

of 1860 the Emperor was approaching his fifty-second birthday while his son had yet to celebrate his fourth.¹⁶ If the dropping of tariffs might gain some support due to the lowering of the cost of many commodities, Napoléon III was likewise aware of the protectionist sentiments of the country--especially since his 1856 attempt in this area of free trade had to be aborted. Accordingly, the 1860 effort demanded a different approach. The Sénatus-consulte of 23 December 1852 had placed the contracting of commercial treaties, and the modification of tariffs accordingly, solely within the jurisdiction of the head of state.¹⁷ The Emperor therefore signed the treaty with Great Britain on his own authority, keeping its negotiation a secret even from the majority of his ministers; once signed it was announced to the Corps législatif and the general public as a fait accompli.¹⁸

Certain writers suggest that the old system of protective tariffs was so dear and near to the hearts and wallets of so many deputies in the Corps législatif that they were driven to uncompromising opposition from that day forward; Napoléon III was then impelled to search out other sources of support: hence the liberal concessions and the dawning of the liberal empire.¹⁹

Such an interpretation other than in its simplistic convenience has little to commend it. The implication, though unstated, is that most deputies were drawn from the grande bourgeoisie, propriétaire and agricultural elements

of society. As illustrated earlier, this traditional view of the Corps législatif is far from accurate. Even if all three of these groups--the ones most likely to resent the commercial competition of freer trade--were to have been alienated completely, only forty percent of the legislature would have participated in the opposition. (See Table 12.) In actuality to ascertain the exact extent to which each deputy was involved in the defence of the protectionist system of trade is beyond the realm of our concern here.

The announcement that the treaty had been signed was definitely an unpopular one to make before the Corps législatif. The agenda was disrupted completely; debate began on the treaty though discussion had not been authorized by the Conseil d'Etat. The consensus clearly expressed a preference for more prudent management of the economy; and as well, the deputies resented the Emperor's arbitrary handling of the matter, even if it was legally within his prerogative: on such an important issue he had purposely evaded their consultation.²⁰

In view of Wright's analysis of relations between the Corps législatif and the Conseil d'Etat it would be an error to interpret this opposition as an isolated phenomenon. Criticism based on dissatisfaction with the regime's economic policies was certainly not new; the protest of 1860 appears more a logical development of earlier criticism than a sudden change in attitude among the deputies.²¹

And as in previous remonstrations founded on economic complaints the denunciations hurled against the government's programme were generally ineffective. In this particular case no change of policy was effected; the treaty remained.²² To argue that later concessions to the legislature had been exacted from the Emperor by the outburst of 1860 is purely speculative. Were those angered over economic matters likely to be satisfied by more liberal legislative procedures? Would these satisfy Catholics outraged over Napoléon III's Italian ventures? Certainly none had been bought off by the general amnesty of 1859. But to arrive at conclusive answers to these questions is not the purpose of this discussion. There is no real evidence to imply that Napoléon III was obliged to capitulate before the growing animosity of the Corps législatif.

Nonetheless, to meet the increasing challenges directed against government budgetary matters the semi-civil servants who were the Councilors of State were no longer adequate. In point of fact, one wonders if they had ever been adequate in this area since they had repeatedly failed to contain these debates to the yes or no prescribed by the constitution.²³ As government expenditures of the Corps législatif became more essential, Napoléon III realized that officials with greater authority were required to manage the situation.²⁴

Far from introducing sweeping political reforms, the Emperor altered what experience had shown he had not been able to control effectively: discussion of bills and amendments before the whole house as well as in committees, publicity of legislative proceedings, and division of the budget into sections, chapters and articles rather than by Ministry only.

It would be naive to assume that the Corps législatif was raised to the status of a parliamentary assembly by these changes.²⁵ While the modifications did establish certain legislative contacts with the public and with the mainstream of government denied by the Constitution of 1852, in its main elements the authoritarian constitution remained intact. Control over the drafting and presentation of legislation was not entrusted to the Corps législatif. Despite the creation of ministers without portfolio, the concept of a cabinet of ministers was not mentioned. As before each was individually responsible to the Emperor alone. And the Emperor was responsible only to the people, and he would decide when to put that responsibility to the test of a plebiscite.²⁶

Viewed from the perspective of the Corps législatif it is difficult to discern in this the dawn of the liberal empire. That Louis Napoléon had initiated the changes without the consultation of each of his ministers proves his undiminished control over government policy.²⁷ The reforms concentrated mainly on legislative matters, leaving undis-

turbed the repressive measures directed against basic freedoms and the press. The authoritarian concentration of power remained intact and essentially in the hands of the executive as before. There were no sudden shifts of power or personnel. The first real crisis sufficiently critical to warrant an extensive ministerial reorganization did not occur until after the end of the second legislature.²⁸

In the Corps législatif we know that as late as 1863 there had been only a thirty-one percent changeover in deputies. (See Table 13 and List 10.) Until 1863, therefore, any praise of legislative liberties would be mouthed by the same body that had served as Louis Napoléon's "deputy" in dictatorship, reconfirmed through its acceptance of the emergency measures of 1858. Deputies alienated over the free trade issue do not appear to have extended their support to others opposed to the regime on other issues. Though Napoléon III's 1861 speech from the throne inspired a lively debate, he received a vote of confidence.²⁹ A report on the Italian situation that some found lacking in respect for the pope was still accepted though 91 deputies voted to delete the offending passages. The vote was significant since it marked the first large-scale opposition registered in a vote on a political question.³⁰


Most trenchant criticism continued to be levelled against government fiscal proposals. The 1862 session witnessed the defeat of a bill authorizing an annual pension of 50,000 francs for General Cousin-Montauban, Count of

Palikao and his heirs in perpetuity. The legislature expressed its condemnation of such extravagance, counselled a more prudent management of public funds, and concluded with the rejection of the bill. But in 1863 the regime still retained the expediencies of authoritarianism and the Corps législatif was still subject to them. For his role in defeating the government measure the deputy Jouvenal was refused official patronage in the election of 1863; the government then did all in its power to assure that he would be defeated--and he was.³¹

Evidently the politics of the second legislature did not include a broadening of opposition effective enough to challenge such arbitrary exercises of power; no more than the deputies had proven instrumental in relieving restrictions placed on basic freedoms in general.

CONCLUSION

This discussion of the deputies to the Corps législatif ends in 1863. While further study would undoubtedly illustrate the continuation of certain authoritarian aspects after 1863, analysis of the period 1852-1863 provided numerous insights into the nature of the legislature and its membership during the most restrictive phase of the regime.

The authoritarianism of the Second Empire must be put into its proper perspective if the Corps législatif is to be understood. In the coup d'état and the construction of Louis Napoléon's new system France was less a victim than an  plice.¹ This is reflected in the observation that the French in the period 1848-1852 seemed "un peuple plus prompt à réclamer la liberté que jaloux de la conserver."² Even Proudhon concluded:

Napoléon III est l'expression légitime, authentique, des masses bourgeoises et prolétaires. S'il n'est pas précisément le produit de la volonté nationale, à coup sûr il l'est de la permission nationale.³

This "permission" no doubt assisted the election of government deputies, where half received over ninety percent of the ballots cast in their circonscriptions.

Such discoveries point to the necessity for a reevaluation of certain traditional assumptions regarding

the Corps législatif and its membership. Too much attention has been drawn to the one-third of the ballot box that remained empty in elections, ignoring the two-thirds of the electorate that did vote. It is true that Louis Napoléon's Machiavellian manipulations and contrivances have earned him a rather poor press among many historians; but as a result, the dictatorial aspect of the regime has been accentuated to a proportion completely out of contact with his actual contemporary acclaim. Part of this denigration has been the misrepresentation of the Corps législatif and its membership.

The evaluation of each deputy's background presents very different conclusions from those usually accepted. Called "nouveaux venus," many deputies were perhaps "venus" in terms of their sudden political advancement, but with few exceptions there was little "nouveaux" about them. Since such a small number could afford to be "new men"--with neither favour nor national experience to recommend them--the myth of "les hommes nouveaux" in the Second Empire should be laid to rest at last. The reality of political life, illustrating that nepotism, political connections and a favourable reputation had more to recommend a man than a supposedly "clean slate," effectively excluded most neophytes among both government and independent candidates.

The real key to understanding the Second Empire is closer to elements of continuity than change. The

inauguration of the Second Empire was found to have come too late to produce a reascendancy of pure Bonapartists from the days of Napoléon I, which confirms Zeldin's parallel investigations in this regard. The presence of a new generation and the numerous government shifts between the two Empires ordained that less than half of each legislature would have any pronounced allegiance to Bonapartism other than their support for Napoléon. Opportunism was definitely ascendant in this period, and dynastic loyalties--whether Bonapartist, legitimist or Orleanist--were rare. Though more deputies had served the July Monarchy in some form of public service than any other regime, in most cases they were occupying local government offices at the département level when the Second Empire offered a seat in the Corps législatif. Men well known to the local prefect, more times than not they were recommended by him to the central administration.

The social composition of the Corps législatif has been the subject of serious overgeneralizations as well. This study discovered propriétaires more significant in terms of who they were and the nature of their previous political experience than in numbers; grands bourgeois and propriétaires together did not equal the number of former fonctionnaires or the members of liberal or learned professions; lawyers alone outnumbered propriétaires or grands bourgeois. The true picture of the social standing of

deputies is middle class in character--not an aristocracy of industrial wealth nor a petty bourgeois collection of clerks--and this median cannot be summarized in the triad of propriétaires, fonctionnaires and grande bourgeoisie when only fonctionnaires proved as frequent among the deputies as the professional occupations that are rarely mentioned. Evidently the continuity between the Corps législatif and its predecessors in this regard is more pronounced than most accept. As before, fonctionnaires and members of learned professions provided the majority of deputies in each legislature.

In these conclusions the present method is not without its limitations. Additional data from unpublished sources unavailable to this inquiry might have permitted analysis of additional variables such as deputies' business relationships, education and parentage for which existing published sources are inadequate. Since quantitative studies depend heavily on the availability of comparative data for the maximum of cases, rather than in finding extensive information on a few, such inadequately documented variables had to be dropped.⁴

Nevertheless, this did not prevent a reappraisal of the role of the Corps législatif under the authoritarian empire. Government deputies were men from the provinces--lieutenants suddenly given the rank of captain. Understandably their views were essentially supportive of the regime. And as a few examples showed, such cooperation was not without the reward of even higher honours. But they were not

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
THE DEPUTIES OF FRANCE, 1851-1863
A QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF THE
FRENCH LEGISLATURE UNDER THE
AUTHORITARIAN PHASE OF THE
SECOND EMPIRE

by

KENNETH ROY BONIN



A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
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DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled THE DEPUTIES OF FRANCE, 1851-1863; A QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF THE FRENCH LEGISLATURE UNDER THE AUTHORITARIAN PHASE OF THE SECOND EMPIRE submitted by Kenneth Roy Bonin in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

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ABSTRACT

Based on a quantitative analysis of the French legislature from 1852 to 1863, this study attempts to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the authoritarian phase of the Second Empire.

Initial consideration is directed to the origin of the regime and to the parameters restricting the constitutional institutions ceded by the dictatorship. The Corps législatif and its membership remain the central concern of the study, however, which evaluates many of the assumptions that have characterized previous histories and introduces new interpretations based on the examination of deputies' socio-political backgrounds.

The results discard the idea that the machinations of Louis Napoléon's regime are in themselves the sole explanation for the phenomenon of the authoritarian empire. Likewise, this study shows more continuity in personnel between the Corps législatif and previous regimes than has been usually recognized. Once the cliché descriptions of deputies as "hommes nouveaux," Orleanists and grands bourgeois are set aside in favour of discoveries in such aspects as career opportunism, nepotism, local prominence, previous national political experience and occupational background, a more realistic picture may be constructed.

Here the composition of the Corps législatif resembles earlier assemblies, with the majority of deputies drawn from fonctionnaire and learned professional occupational interests. In general, deputies' seats in the Corps législatif appear the result of a political career progression from politics at the département level, given a welcome boost by the elimination of many incumbents. Cooperation with the regime proves to be the norm in the Corps législatif, but what criticism is expressed concerns economic affairs more than traditional liberties. The stability in the socio-political background of the Corps législatif between 1852 and 1863 discounts any such change as an explanation for the liberalization of the empire after 1860.

The analysis of the Corps législatif in these and related facets yields the conclusion that the visage of the regime may be captured in features other than those of Louis Napoléon Bonaparte, autocrat.

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INTRODUCTION

The Second Empire owes its origin to the presidential coup of December 2, 1851 which made Louis Napoléon Bonaparte dictator of France. The basic constitutional framework that was to guide the regime for eighteen years went into effect four months later. In Louis Napoléon's plan of things administrative and governmental, "les hommes les plus illustres" were honoured in a Senate while the main legislative responsibilities of the Conseil d'Etat were entrusted to "les hommes les plus distingués."¹ Questioning this design one writer asked rhetorically: "De quoi se composerait donc le Corps législatif si tous les hommes 'illustres' ou 'distingués' avaient été pourvus ailleurs?"² The same question has inspired much of this study.

One year after the coup d'état Louis Napoléon was crowned Napoléon III, Emperor of the French--a title he retained until the Second Empire met its end in 1870, defeated in the Franco-Prussian War. In the interval, the government that began in a dictatorship had evolved into a constitutional monarchy. Commentaries on the regime therefore generally recognize two periods within the Second Empire, the authoritarian and the liberal phases.

The present study is a quantitative analysis of Corps législatif membership under the authoritarian empire. The intention is to provide an in-depth account of the period not presently available, evaluating the socio-political background of every deputy who served the authoritarian regime.

As might be expected, there are various interpretations as to when Louis Napoléon's liberal concessions eclipsed his authoritarianism. The most common position utilizes the first measures of a liberal nature to mark the transition. Thus the general amnesty of 1859 has been defined as the beginning of the liberal phase;³ more frequently, the reforms increasing the powers of the legislature are interpreted as indicative of the change so that the year 1860 is chosen.⁴ It should be noted, however, that certain historians date the shift much later, with the advent of more extensive liberalization, selecting 1857⁵ or 1868⁶ to mark the beginning of the liberal empire.

Focusing as it will on the authoritarian phase of the Second Empire, this analysis will concentrate on the years 1852-1863 and the first two legislatures of the regime. The period includes the liberal concessions of 1859-1862, widely interpreted as the dawn of the liberal empire, as well as two of the regime's four legislative elections and their related by-elections.

As reflected in Appendix I, this necessitates the analysis of 383 individual deputies' backgrounds. Fortunately,

the number was easily determined; the electoral medium establishes a precise definition of the group to be studied.⁷ The task was further facilitated by the use of a computer to collate the numerous categories and hundreds of variables applicable to each man.

Critics such as Richard Cobb might maintain that such an approach will glean only what "perhaps we thought we knew already; but now we will 'really' know," and have the same fare rehashed through a novel gimmick.⁸ In all fairness, the generalizations of earlier studies have fallen in error not so much by what they have said as by what has been omitted. Theodore Zeldin, for example, provided only a very superficial comparison of the various legislatures of the Second Empire; and he failed to analyze the backgrounds of all deputies. His perspective, concentrating on the whole "system" inaugurated by the coup d'état, was not really designed to allow for a very detailed look at each legislature.⁹

My method is to review available accounts of the Corps législatif in an effort to eliminate certain misconceptions that persist, even after one hundred years, presenting in the process a more detailed analysis per se. The quantitative basis on which the comparison depends reflects data compiled from the various published sources available--newspapers of the period, biographical dictionaries, various regional and area studies of France,¹⁰ and of course, numerous monographs.

4

To understand the medium in which the deputies acted as well as to provide a measure of background material, opening chapters will assess the character of the regime, its constitution and institutions, and the elections in which the deputies were selected.

With the deputies themselves our concern is in such aspects as their popularity at the polls, relationship to the community represented, the nature of past political experience, previous dynastic allegiances--and the relevance of each of these to the authoritarian regime. Opportunism and family connections also merit further exploration. And in the process of this analysis, discussion will subject the common generalizations about deputies' social status, politics and occupational backgrounds to careful scrutiny. Finally, passing attention will assess the latter part of the second legislature to determine if the liberal concessions may be attributed to any change in the Corps législatif between 1852 and 1863.

The men who served in Louis Napoléon's legislatures during the authoritarian empire must be evaluated as "deputies" in more than one connotation of the word, therefore. The most obvious sense is that associated with the title representing membership in the legislative body. But were they deputies, meaning delegates, and whom did they represent? And were they not deputies, that is, assistants, in the establishment and perpetuation of a regime founded on dictatorship?

CHAPTER I

THE DICTATORSHIP

The closing months of the year 1851 marked Louis Napoléon Bonaparte's third year as President of the Second French Republic. The presidential term of office was only four years, and the constitution stipulated that the incumbent could not succeed himself. Each of Louis Napoléon's efforts to secure the constitutional amendment that could prolong his tenure of office was frustrated by an Assembly that consistently refused its three-quarters majority approval for any constitutional modification.

Accounting for Louis Napoléon's initial electoral success of 1848, the historian Guizot, himself a former Prime Minister of France under the July Monarchy, commented that it was indeed enviable to embody simultaneously a national glory, revolutionary guarantees and the principle of authority.¹ These, together with a conducive economic and political climate, augured well for the coup de force of 2 December 1851 which freed Louis Napoléon from the constitutional limitations of the Second Republic. Together, they assured support as he declared himself President for ten years and terminated the life of the National Assembly, substituting in its place a virtually prostrate legislative Body.

By opposing the conservative Assembly's restriction of the suffrage Louis Napoléon appeared the champion of the rights of the common man, an image substantiated as well by his early writings, Napoléonic Ideas and The Extinction of Pauperism. Having eliminated the Assembly, he presented himself as the personification of the will of the people as expressed through universal manhood suffrage.² The preamble to his "Appel au Peuple" of December 2 attacked the National Assembly, claiming "que l'instabilité du Pouvoir, que la prépondérance d'une seule Assemblée sont des causes permanentes de trouble et de discorde."³

Ramifications of the President's confrontation with the Assembly went beyond the arena of politics, however. And so protracted was the crisis that many had despaired of a legal solution, fully anticipating a coup d'état; in fact, so widespread was rumour and premonition that the coup has been described as the result of an "open conspiracy," if indeed there was need for a conspiracy at all.⁴

The economic period coinciding with the Second Republic was hardly marked by prosperity, its dismal character undoubtedly being most pronounced in agriculture.⁵ Though its worst effects had passed by the end of 1851, government had failed to provide the confidence and financial incentives required to stimulate the business and financial community. Members of the latter adopted a "wait and see" attitude, expecting a turn of events that would resolve the political malaise, for better or worse. In the

interval, investment lassitude in both public and private sectors aggravated the economic situation. This was very evident in the sphere of railway expansion, for example, which came to a virtual standstill, the depreciation of shares joining the slump in land prices and general real estate values.⁶

To compound the political uncertainty, and contributing in no small way to economic insecurity as well, there was the whole question of the "red scare" prompted by socialist propaganda that trumpeted 1852 as the year of reckoning. Supposedly, a "red" triumph in the elections of that year would spur the labouring class to compensate itself at the expense of those who had suppressed and exploited it.⁷ At the least, the "crisis of 1852" as it was called, was expected to provide a unique opportunity for those dissatisfied with the existing system to stir up unrest in the country. Since both Assembly and Presidential terms were set to expire at about the same time (April 28 and May 10, 1852 respectively) the focusing of discontent on this particular period by constitutional revisionists supporting Louis Napoléon and leftists dissatisfied with the restricted franchise seemed to threaten another 1848.⁸

Financial circles, snatched from the impending storm by the coup d'état, were at least grateful for the promised stability of Louis Napoléon's new order, even if initially they had no hand in its design.⁹ Shortly, complaisant resignation would give way to active investment in the

regime's future which they soon allied to their own.

With interests in a stable status quo that in many ways paralleled those of the business sector, the church and its political supporters also accepted the coup d'état. The plebiscite on the coup d'état saw Montalembert, a former deputy in the then abolished National Assembly, soliciting votes for Louis Napoléon through the medium of a letter published in the legitimist and clerical Univers:

Voter contre Louis Napoléon, c'est donner raison à la révolution socialiste . . . c'est appeler la dictature des rouges à remplacer la dictature d'un prince qui a rendu depuis trois ans d'incomparables services à la cause de l'ordre et du Catholicisme.¹⁰

Two considerations figured prominently in such support, one negative, the other positive. The first was the avowed anticlericalism of the "reds"; the second was the record of the Second Republic under Louis Napoléon, which extended church influence in education and intervened in the Italian states to protect the temporal power of the papacy. Indeed, one bishop implied that so clear were the alternatives that a vote by Jesus Christ in this matter would be definitely inscribed "Oui" in favour of the coup d'état.¹¹

With the opportunity presented by political and economic crisis, and the endorsement of business interests and the church, Louis Napoléon also had the considerable advantage of the Bonaparte name and legend that had served him so well in 1848. The varied and substantial nature of this support was reflected in the initial calm response to the coup and in the results of the plebiscite of December 20, 1851.

Paris met the December 2 turn of events with an essentially "business as usual" attitude, although troops occupied all major public buildings, railway terminals and telegraph offices, and the presses and personnel of opposition newspapers had been silenced.

December 2 witnessed only token resistance by about 300 deputies of the deposed Assembly. Failing in an effort to hold the Assembly hall where they planned to convene an emergency session, they retired to the Mairie of the tenth Paris arrondissement; here they were met by police who broke up the meeting and arrested the participants. In the early hours prior to this, seventy-eight noted parliamentarians, journalists, Republicans and expected leaders of real opposition had been quickly and quietly confined to places of detention. It was announced as well that armed individuals or barricade builders would be shot on sight. By evening it looked as if the situation was well in hand.¹²

But three days later there was armed opposition in Paris and scattered uprisings of a local nature broke out in the provinces. While the latter cases usually collapsed upon the arrival of troops in the area, Paris felt the full force of repression required to clear barricades, insurgents and spectators from the streets. At least 600 people were shot down, not a few of them simply bystanders on the boulevards.¹³ In all, some thirty departments were placed in a state of siege, all police powers passing to the military.¹⁴ Everywhere, arrests and extraordinary measures

were authorized, as the administration of national order was momentarily rendered arbitrary.¹⁵ An executive decree of 8 December 1851 provided that any individual placed under police surveillance and attempting to elude it, or anyone thought to belong to a secret society, would be transported to a penal colony for reasons of the sûreté générale;¹⁶ in all, 26,642 suspects were ordered under arrest or placed under surveillance.¹⁷

Consolidating his position against opponents, whether confirmed or suspected, Louis Napoléon ordered the banishment of about eighty-five former parliamentarians of the Second Republic. Sixty-six of these were condemned as known leaders of 'socialism', while eighteen others were removed as potential agitators.¹⁸ As the Minister of the Interior had declared a few days before these sentences were finalized, even the most respected of symbols lose that respect when they recall unpleasant memories. As was the case with the motto liberté, égalité, fraternité, he argued, so it was with the former deputies: they served only to trouble and disturb passersby: "veuillez donc les faire effacer!"¹⁹

All of these measures Louis Napoléon interpreted as justified and/or forgiven by the popular acclaim he received in the plebiscite December 20, 1851. The basis of the election was his "Appel au Peuple" of December 2. The president, to serve a ten year term, would be responsible though the terms of this responsibility were not outlined. Ministers would be dependent solely on the executive

authority. A Conseil d'Etat would prepare laws and defend them before the legislature. The legislature, the Corps législatif, would be elected directly by universal suffrage to discuss and vote these laws. And finally, a Senate of notables would serve as the guardian of the constitution and the public liberties.²⁰ The results of the voting registered 7,439,216 in agreement with the proposal, while 610,737 voted against. The totals may be accepted as generally valid, since the ballots were counted publicly and in the presence of the voters to assure their credibility.²¹

The overwhelming popularity of his program as affirmed in the plebiscite offered Louis Napoléon a license to adopt whatever course he considered conducive to the design of new state institutions. Accordingly, a decree of 11 January 1852 abolished the National Guard; another of March 25 suspended all clubs. The press, which had been under restriction since December 4 was limited further through the decree of 17 February 1852: the 'best' that previous regimes had devised in the way of restrictive measures was combined in one comprehensive code now to be implemented by the enforcement agencies of the executive-- not the judicial arm of government.²²

No newspaper, journal or periodical could be founded or published without government authorization. All were subject to a stamp tax. Owners of publications were required to post a fee with the government which was for-

feited in any contravention of regulations. Any article in "bad faith" which might contribute to public disorder would result in heavy fines or imprisonment for those considered responsible. Three occasions of such "bad faith" would result in government suspension of the publication.²³ Of eighty-seven papers suppressed, seventy-one were classified as either republican, socialist or anarchical. By mid 1852 an additional thirty-seven newspapers, nine of which were pro-government, suspended publication because of their inability to meet government financial or press limitations. Those papers which continued to appear were soon disciplined into extreme moderation, neutrality or pro-government cooperation.²⁴

An executive order of 20 January 1852 dispatched the commissions mixtes to settle accounts with those arrested in the days following the coup. These extrajudicial tribunals composed of the prefect, the commanding general and the procureurs (public prosecuting agents) of each department were authorized to carry out proceedings against the political prisoners. While supposedly prosecuting only those who were considered a threat to the public order, the commissions mixtes in effect conducted a purge of those suspected of harbouring hostility to the new regime.²⁵ The total of 14,118 condemnations pronounced by these commissions--more than half of those originally detained were convicted--resulted in 9,769 sentences of transportation, 1,545 of exile and 2,804 of internment.²⁶

If the dictatorial nature of this regime produced misgivings, these must have been confirmed by the final article of the constitution which declared that all decrees issued by the Prince-President since December 2 would continue to be valid, even once the constitution was in force. In many ways the "Constitution Faite en Vertu Des Pouvoirs Délégués Par Le Peuple Français A Louis Napoléon Bonaparte Par Le Vote Des 20 et 21 décembre 1851"²⁷ must have seemed little more than the rules of order for his continued personal rule.

Nonetheless, the voluntary nature of cooperation with the regime must be stressed if we are to understand the role of the deputies in the Corps législatif, who remain the main interest of the present study. Too often the system of repression introduced by Louis Napoléon to consolidate his position at the outset is interpreted as the basic element explaining the whole phase of the Second Empire known as the authoritarian regime. To consider Louis Napoléon's administration in the one dimensional aspect of a dictatorship based solely on force, ignores the complexity of the factors actually involved. In this light the policy of repression appears as much an over-reaction to limited opposition as it was unnecessary in view of the plebiscite.

CHAPTER II

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FAÇADE

Though the regime stopped short of totalitarianism, the authoritarian phase of the Second Empire provided little more than a constitutional façade for the continuation of Louis Napoléon's personal rule. Neither in its origins nor in its evolution was the Constitution of 14 January 1852 the fulfillment of the mandate Louis Napoléon had received.

His "Appel au Peuple" had promised "une constitution que les Assemblées développeront plus tard."¹ When the eighty-member commission assigned to the task failed to expedite the matter to his satisfaction, Louis Napoléon charged the jurists Troplong and Rouher to throw a constitution together. This they did in forty-eight hours over three consecutive days.² While providing for certain institutions to share in the processes of state, this constitution simultaneously subordinated their powers to the authority of the president. Quite clearly, any 'development' of the constitution would be solely at the wish of the executive.³

Members of the new state institutions should have known where authority was centred even before March 29, 1851. But on that date, contrary to any parliamentary

practice, Louis Napoléon summoned the deputies and senators to him! But why not? Excepting the state of seige, all repressive restrictions established during the first four months of the regime remained intact.⁴ The legacy of decrees and the constitution that preceded convocation of new state assemblies assured the preservation of executive power in all essentials. Louis Napoléon obviously remained the sole possessor of executive power. Even after the dictator declared the dictatorship ended, decrees would far outnumber laws and continue to encroach on actual legislative affairs. As late as 27 January 1853, 6,153 individuals, almost half of those originally condemned by the commissions mixtes, remained subject to their penalties; another 5,450 were under police surveillance.⁵ The reinstatement of the empire at the end of 1852 further enhanced the basis of executive authority: power would now be wielded by Napoléon III not only for ten years, but for life. The single free expression of public opinion left to the electorate was the choosing of deputies to the Corps législatif, scheduled to take place once every six years.⁶ Since these deputies constitute the central interest of this discussion, it is essential that their power in the Corps législatif be given careful consideration.

The "Appel au Peuple" of 2 December 1851 placed fourth on its list of proposals "un Corps législatif discutant et votant les lois".⁷ A similar level of inferiority was reserved for the legislature in the Constitution

of 14 January 1852.⁸ The fact that the Corps législatif was not the most important institution of state is further reflected in its limited powers: the constitution confined it to discussing and voting laws and taxes. All initiative in legislation and all residual powers not delegated, rested with Louis Napoléon as President of France. In the business of drafting legislation, the President was assisted by the forty personally chosen members of his Conseil d'Etat.⁹ Louis Napoléon's view of amendments to proposed legislation -- "qui dérangent souvent toute l'économie d'un système et l'ensemble du projet primitif . . . qui était la source de si graves abus, et qui permettait à chaque député de se substituer à tout propos au Gouvernement en présentant les projets les moins étudiés, les moins approfondis"¹⁰--prevented their being raised on the floor of the Corps législatif. If the particular legislative commission reviewing a bill adopted any changes, these were to be suggested, without discussion, to the Conseil d'Etat. The Conseil d'Etat would decide whether the proposed amendment had merit; in the event of a negative decision, the amendment would not be deliberated in the legislature.

As an additional restriction on its influence, no petitions could be addressed to the Corps législatif. Instead, the constitution directed these to Louis Napoléon's handpicked senators. The Senate was also granted jurisdiction over the constitution which it could interpret and amend through a senatorial pronouncement known as a

Sénatus-consulte.¹⁰

Any efforts to secure a responsible parliamentary system would be made doubly difficult since all ministers, named by the President, were individually responsible to him alone, and did not form a cabinet. No minister could be a member of the Corps législatif, nor could he participate in its discussions. Government projects would be supported by members of the Conseil d'Etat. Louis Napoléon's attempt at justification claimed that as a result, "le temps ne se perd pas en vaines interpellations, en accusations frivoles, en luttes passionnées dont l'unique but était de renverser les ministres pour les remplacer."¹¹

Not only were the powers of the legislature severely limited, but its contact with the general public was restricted as well. Direct reports of legislative debate or the publication of anything beyond the official summary of proceedings was prohibited.¹² In contrast, the owner of any publication was obliged by the "Décret Organique sur la Presse" of 17 February 1852 to print all official documents and communications submitted by the government, "gratuite" and "en tête du journal," in the first issue after their submission.¹³ While the Corps législatif worked in relative obscurity, each of Louis Napoléon's executive proclamations was assured the maximum publicity possible. Furthermore, legislative sessions were to be short--three months per year, and elections infrequent--once every six years. Though the discussions would be open to the public, the

request of five deputies could effect a closed session. Not until ten months after the first legislature had been elected was the constitution modified to allow deputies a sum of 2,500 francs per month by way of compensation for the time they spent away from their regular occupations during each session.¹⁴ Under the Constitution of 14 January 1852, there was little possibility that the Corps législatif could escape the influence of Louis Napoléon Bonaparte. As President of France, he named the president, the vice-president and the secretaries of the Corps législatif; and it was he who convoked, prorogued or dissolved that body as well.¹⁵

In many ways the Corps législatif was designed only as a sounding board for the ideas of the executive. In physical appearance, its meetings resembled an audience participating in the performance of government only to the extent of registering approval or dismay; the arena of spirited debate that had characterized other periods of French legislative history was no more. Sitting in a block, facing a delegation from the Conseil d'Etat, deputies spoke from their places without the aid of either desk or speakers' rostrum.¹⁶ In addition, any decree or presidential message addressed by Louis Napoléon was simply read out to the assembled legislature by his appointed councillor without subsequent debate or vote.¹⁷ Finally, given the nature of Conseil d'Etat control over amendments to legislation, all that remained in the sense of legislative influence over the course of state affairs was the power to

reject proposed projects en bloc; but support which might have been attracted to amendments eluded efforts intending to scuttle proposals in their entirety.¹⁸

Louis Napoléon had no reason to expect much opposition. In addition to his other precautions, he had assured that all deputies would swear their loyalty to the existing regime. Article fourteen of the constitution declared that all ministers, senators, deputies, conseillers d'état, military officers, judges and civil servants were to take an oath of allegiance: "je jure obéissance à la constitution et fidélité au Président."¹⁹ A further decree of 8 March 1853 provided that in all cases, including that of deputies to the Corps législatif, refusal or failure to pledge the prescribed oath would be interpreted as an automatic resignation.²⁰ The presence of deputies in the Corps législatif who had taken a similar oath to Louis Philippe, and who now unhesitatingly accepted another to Louis Napoléon, might lead one to consider the issue as a simple formality; further discussion will reveal, however, that the prerequisite of the oath caused several resignations, preventing certain real opponents of the regime from accepting seats in the first legislature.

Deputies who did take their places in the Corps législatif received very minor guarantees of traditional legislative liberties. Though Louis Napoléon could dissolve the Corps législatif at will, the constitution obliged him to summon a new one within six months. His selections for

president and vice-president of the legislative body had to be chosen from among its membership.²¹ Furthermore, article twenty-nine of the February 2, 1852 "Décret Organique pour l'Election des Députés au Corps législatif" established that all salaried public offices were incompatible with the mandate of deputy to the Corps législatif.²² While this was somewhat of an assurance that Louis Napoléon would not pack the legislature with creatures that were on his payroll, it also spared him some of the criticism that had greeted Louis Philippe's legislatures of civil servants and royal household fonctionnaires. This provision was altered but a little by a Sénatus-consulte of December 25, 1852 which allowed officers in the reserve forces to accept legislative seats and yet preserve their commands.²³ Finally, the deputies were granted traditional parliamentary immunity, exceptions to be determined by the Corps législatif; the constitution also appointed the legislature the sole judge of the validity of each of its elections.²⁴

Regulation of the Corps législatif left few vestiges of the powers that had characterized the legislature under the previous regime. Yet candidates still presented themselves for election.

CHAPTER III

THE ELECTIONS TO THE FIRST LEGISLATURE

As the very few concessions to legislature freedom were eclipsed by the authoritarian measures written into the constitution, so electoral restrictions and the system of official candidates compensated Louis Napoléon heavily for having permitted a legislature at all.

The main regulations pertaining to legislative elections were outlined on two separate occasions. The Constitution of 14 January 1852 established that elections would normally occur once each six years on the basis of universal manhood suffrage, with one elected representative for each 35,000 electors; the system of representation by lists was abolished.¹ More specific instructions were issued in the "Décret Organique pour l'Election des Députés au Corps législatif" of February 2, 1852. Each département would be divided into single-member circonscriptions or electoral divisions equal in number to the deputies allotted to it according to its population; an extra deputy would be elected in each département where the population exceeded the equal divisions of 35,000 by at least 25,000 electors. The constituencies would be revised, supposedly only to account for shifts in population, once every five years.

Each male citizen twenty-one years of age or older, possessing his civil and political rights and having resided in his circonscription for six months, was entitled to exercise a single vote through a secret ballot. Members of the military forces, however, could vote only in the commune where they had resided prior to their enlistment; in effect, since most soldiers were posted elsewhere, they were disenfranchised.

Candidates for election to the Corps législatif were required to be at least twenty-five years old and free of any criminal or political charges.² As already noted, they could be neither civil servants nor the recipients of any state salary. Candidates were not subject to a residence requirement, and multiple candidacies were permitted. But while one man could present himself for election in several constituencies, each deputy could represent only one in the Corps législatif. In order to be elected on the first ballot, a candidate required an absolute majority of the votes cast, with a minimum of one-quarter of the registered electorate voting. In the event of a failure to achieve these results, or if a successful candidate opted for another constituency in which he was also elected, a round of ballotage would be effected. Whatever the number of voters, a plurality of the votes cast would determine the winner in this second contest. In the event of a tie vote, the elder would be declared the successful candidate.

This same decree assigned the number of deputies to be elected from each department of France (see Table 1), excluded representation from the colonies completely, and set the total number of circonscriptions for the 1852 elections at 261.³

Even within the very limited jurisdiction established by the constitution, a Corps législatif of 261 overtly hostile deputies (or even a small but vocal fraction of that number), could have caused Louis Napoléon considerable embarrassment. Additional precautions were therefore thought necessary, and in this respect, the four-month period of personal dictatorship left a more than adequate legacy. It was not a coincidence that the first elections took place at a time when the country was still under the restrictions of a state of siege and the expediencies of absolutism could be employed freely, in the government's favour.⁴

In establishing the size of the legislature, for example, Louis Napoléon claimed a particular motive:

la chambre n'est plus composée que d'environ deux cent soixante membres. C'est là une première garantie du calme des délibérations, car trop souvent on a vu dans les assemblées la mobilité et l'ardeur des passions croître en raison du nombre.⁵

What went unexpressed was that with a similar assembly there would be less danger of factions among the membership alienating themselves from the influence of the executive and becoming the nuclei of irreconcilable opposition.⁶

Similarly, though the abolition of the list system of election suggested that electors might now be more insistent upon their member representing the particular interests of the circonscription which had elected him,⁷ the measure simultaneously discontinued a method which had greatly facilitated the co-ordination of opposition on a national scale. The provision that military personnel would be deprived of their votes unless they happened to be in their home constituencies at the time of elections, assured that invitations would hardly be forthcoming for the various candidates to introduce the divisiveness of partisan politics into the barracks and bases supporting Louis Napoléon's dictatorship. Furthermore, thousands of assuredly opposition votes and numerous potential opposition candidates (especially among former members of the National Assembly), were removed through the political charges and deportations effected in the wake of the coup d'état.

These elaborate precautions should have been adequate, one would think, to overawe the threat of any opposition expression in the powerless Corps législatif. Yet, another measure was included, the one which proved most effective of all: to qualify the expression of universal manhood suffrage, a system of government candidates was devised. It was officially argued that universal manhood suffrage was an innovation too recently introduced to be properly understood by the politically ignorant and the unlettered. Official candidates supported by the government

would serve as a tutorial means to aid in distinguishing between rival contestants in the election campaigns.⁸ While this may have been true, this system obviously aided the election of government candidates. As a further favour to these candidates, but on the pretext of conforming constituency boundaries to the required electoral limitations, the government employed the practice of gerrymandering to their advantage.⁹ Their ballots and posters were also printed on the white regulation paper restricted to government use and financed from the public purse.¹⁰ Only white ballots were enclosed with the voter registration cards sent to each elector.¹¹

As for opponents to the government's candidates, the courts acquiesced in declaring coloured ballots and posters non-official publications; their distribution was therefore subject to all restraints and special levies exacted on the press by law. Other laws were interpreted to prevent election rallies, and all gatherings required the supervision of a government agent. Finally, each non-government poster required the authorization of the prefect prior to its being posted in his département.¹²

With such extensive restrictions, why have elections by universal manhood suffrage in the first place? Indeed, shortly after the coup d'état Louis Napoléon assured the Austrian ambassador: "Je veux bien être baptisé avec l'eau du suffrage universel, mais je n'entends pas vivre les pieds dans l'eau."¹³ Nonetheless, each of the elections under the

authoritarian empire seems less intended to secure support for political policies than to confirm the legitimacy of the regime.¹⁴ It was claimed that the people's interests were in perpetuating the spirit of the plebiscite; what had been abdicated to Louis Napoléon in 1851 should not be wrested from him through the elections to follow. The consequence of such thinking caused each election to serve as a replication of the plebiscite of December, with each candidate considered not so much to represent the diverse interests of constituents as to embody loyalty or opposition to Louis Napoléon himself.¹⁵

The initial calm response to the coup d'état, followed by the general failure of opposing forces to instigate a widespread insurrection, and the resignation of influential sectors of society to the new regime were amply reflected in candidacies for the Corps législatif elections. News of apprehended revolts lent an air of authenticity to Louis Napoléon's claim that his coup d'état had averted a threat of anarchy, and that he represented the defence of law and proper order in the French state.¹⁶ Then too, protesting voices were rendered conveniently too distant--imprisoned, transported to Algeria or Cayenne, or in self-exile abroad--to extend any real challenge.

In defining its electoral aims for the 1852 contest Louis Napoléon's administration could hardly have been more demanding. A letter circulated among the Prefects by Minister of the Interior de Persigny stipulated no less than

" . . . deux cent soixante et un députés animés du même esprit, dévoués aux mêmes intérêts, et disposés également à compléter la victoire du 20 décembre".¹⁷ With the rejection of the system of election by list the government could no longer expect the lesser known names among its candidates to be carried by the fame of those with a national reputation. Each official candidate in each circonscription had to be known to the constituents who would be called upon to elect him; to assure that this was done, all the influence of local government authorities (who owed their appointments to the central administration), was brought to bear upon the selection of promising government candidates. While such a system perhaps failed to produce many deputies of the stature to grace the salons of Paris, it packed the Corps législatif heavily in the government's favour. The Paris diarist Viel Castel, for example, snobbishly remarked, "les candidats patronnés par le gouvernement ont été choisis par je ne sais qui, mais à coup sûr il a fallu beaucoup d'art pour rassembler de telles nullités."¹⁸ With the plebiscitary frame of reference in which the government cast the elections, however, these "nobodies" represented Louis Napoléon. Persigny maintained that voters were being offered a unique opportunity:

en votant pour les amis de Louis Napoléon, ils auraient une seconde fois l'occasion de voter pour le prince lui-même.¹⁹

It was therefore imperative that the expected overwhelming approval actually materialize; accordingly, the administra-

tion was very concerned that official candidates be chosen from among men the prefects thought likely to win--non-Bonapartists were as often as not selected de rigueur rather than have a more loyal choice as official candidate subject the government to the possible humiliation of an electoral defeat. There was always hope of rallying the successful non-Bonapartists since their election would have been achieved through government patronage for which they would appear somewhat obligated; at the same time, in accepting such patronage they would undoubtedly alienate themselves from their former allegiances.²⁰

This was especially true since the legitimist pretender to the throne, the Comte de Chambord, demanded of his adherents a complete abstention from political life.²¹ The republicans adopted a similar policy. For these and other opponents of the regime, the prospect of being under constant police surveillance, too frequently encountering printers and campaign workers who refused to aid them openly, and a general fear of standing in blatant contradiction to existing authorities wielding authoritarian powers easily disheartened all but the most courageous.²² Given the extent of administrative pressure and the extraordinary measures employed by the government in favour of its candidates, the almost universal defeat of electoral opposition comes as no surprise. The elections of 29 February 1852 returned only eight independent candidates as compared to 253 government members.

Four of the original eight were legitimists: Audren de Kerdrel, Bouhier de l'Ecluse, the Marquis de Calvière and Durfort de Civrac.²³ Audren de Kerdrel refused to accept the restoration of the Empire and retired from public life before its proclamation.²⁴ Bouhier de l'Ecluse resolved to make a test case of himself, repeatedly took his place in the Corps législatif, absenting himself only at the times designated for his taking the oath of loyalty; in the end he was physically restrained from entering the Chamber, declared démissionnaire and replaced in a by-election.²⁵ Calvière loudly decried the fact that he had been declared a government candidate without his assent; to give action to his assertions he resigned in protest.²⁶ Only Durfort de Civrac retained his seat for the duration of the first legislature.

The three republicans elected--Carnot and Cavaignac in Paris and Hénon in Lyon--collectively declined to serve Louis Napoléon's authoritarian regime and were replaced by government candidates in subsequent by-elections. The letter which renounced their election was officially suppressed:

Les électeurs de Paris et de Lyon sont venus nous chercher dans notre retraite ou dans notre exil; nous les remercions d'avoir pensé que nos noms protestaient d'eux mêmes contre la destruction des libertés publiques et les rigueurs de l'arbitraire, mais ils n'ont pas voulu nous envoyer siéger dans un corps législatif dont les pouvoirs ne vont jusqu'à réparer les violations du droit; nous repoussons la théorie immorale des réticences et des arrière-pensées et nous refusons le serment exigé à l'entrée du corps législatif.²⁷

The eighth independent candidate elected in the 1852 elections was a moderate republican, Pierre Legrand, who was

unopposed by the government and who posed no threat to it.²⁸

This almost complete failure of opposition candidates and the resignation of most of those who were elected, amply met government aspirations. The evaluation of electoral figures illustrates the full measure of this success best. As reflected in official election results, the voting population undeniably supported Louis Napoléon's regime (see Table 2). The eighty-four percent favourable vote received in the 1852 contest as a whole is rendered more impressive when the elections of individual deputies are considered (see Table 3). Fifty-two percent of the men who accepted their seats as deputies either in 1852 or after required by-elections prior to 1857 received over 90 percent of the ballots cast in their circonscriptions; all but a few of the deputies were elected with more than 50 percent of the electorate participating in the voting, with the majority attracting in excess of 60 percent of those registered to the polls. Again, the majority captured in excess of 50 percent of the registered vote, but a significant minority--35 percent--failed to draw half of the registered voters to their support.


Among the opposition deputies elected in 1852, all but Calvière failed to attract more than 60 percent of the ballots cast; he received 61 percent, while the others each won just over 50 percent of the vote. The registered voters who turned out to vote for them amounted to less than 50 percent in each case.

Two reservations could be held against the very favourable results garnered for the regime in 1852; both might be interpreted as indications of electoral opposition surpassing the 13 percent of the vote lost to opposition candidates. There is the question, first, of the spoiled or blank ballots returned in each election. A noticeably larger percentage occurred on the occasion of the legislative election of 1852 (see Table 2). This should not necessarily be attributed solely to expressions of protest, however. Legislative elections were slightly more complicated than the oui or non of the plebiscites; the failure of the illiterate to comprehend the mode of election could account for some of the spoiled ballots. This would be particularly true of the 1852 legislative elections when the system was newly introduced. Nonetheless, an inestimable extent of protest might also be contained in these spoiled or blank ballots which, especially in areas where only the government candidate was presented for election, would be one avenue open for the expression of dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs. In any event, the percentage is relatively insignificant in view of the favourable votes Louis Napoléon's administration received.

Much more evident than spoiled or blank ballots, however, is the factor of voter abstention (see Table 4). Once again it would be over-simplification to attribute the total phenomenon to the single interpretation of protest. Despite the unparalleled 36.7 percent abstention figure for

the 1852 elections--a rate unequalled in French electoral contests before or since--mitigating factors common to all elections require consideration. Voters who could not get to the polls; those who were not sufficiently acquainted with the various candidates to exercise an intelligent vote and who therefore refrained from voting; those indifferent to politics; as well as those who absented themselves due to their affiliation with political opposition to the right or left of Louis Napoléon's regime must be assumed in the total abstention figure.²⁹ Then too, the executive of the new order promised to virtually eclipse the legislative branch of government so that the latter would appear a mere shadow of the assemblies that had met under the Second Republic. Understandably therefore, the proposed Corps législatif failed to arouse great electoral interest.

To conclude, official candidates had the overpowering support of the government bureaucracy at their disposal; coming in 1852, while France was still under the heel of Louis Napoléon's dictatorship, the coercion that could be applied to assure favourable electoral results precluded the necessity for manipulation of figures after the fact.³⁰ Furthermore, by the end of 1852 only one of the independents originally elected to the Corps législatif remained; the other seven had resigned. But rather than summarize the government successes of 1852 further, let us turn our attention to the analysis of the deputies.



CHAPTER IV

THE POLITICS OF THE FIRST LEGISLATURE, 1852 - 1857

The story of Louis Napoléon's first legislature has been repeated too often to proceed as if it had never been told at all. Unfortunately, much of what was said in the past appears based on oversimplification of the facts, or worse, represents attempts to embellish or perpetuate myths introduced by anti-imperial interpretations. My own analysis of the Corps législatif between 1852 and 1857 is an attempt to clarify, confirm or cast aside previous accounts while providing a more accurate interpretation per se.

One of the earliest accounts, that of De La Gorce, dismissed previous public service among the deputies quite simply: they were "gens plus rompus aux affaires privées ou locales qu'accoutumés à la politique".¹ Gooch assumes that "the supporters of the government who sat in the body Corps législatif were largely newcomers to public life."² Seignobos notes, "aucun membre marquant des 'anciens partis,' sauf Montalembert".³ According to Marx, the Second Empire occasioned the exploitation of the wealth of the State by a band of nouveaux venus, without scruples, system or programme, in the interests of a very small group of the bourgeoisie.⁴

And what was the role played by these men? Too many historians have rendered valid the judgement of Montalembert; himself a deputy and disillusioned with the mandate he had assisted Louis Napoléon to secure, he disdainfully predicted:

"l'histoire dira si elle prend la peine de s'en occuper, quelle fut l'infatigable complaisance et l'incommensurable abaissement de cette première Assemblée du Second Empire."⁵

This line of interpretation would have us believe that the deputies were a subservient assembly, always expressing overwhelming approval of whatever the executive arm of government proposed.⁶ Perhaps the most eloquent exposition of the idea came in Victor Hugo's Napoléon le petit:

Le Corps législatif marche sur la pointe du pied, roule son chapeau dans ses mains, met le doigt sur sa bouche, sourit humblement, s'assied sur le coin de sa chaise et ne parle que quand on l'interroge. Il y a donc dans la boutique où se fabriquent les lois et les budgets, un maître de la maison, le Conseil d'Etat, et un domestique, le Corps législatif.⁷

In contrast Zeldin's analysis recently demonstrated that the Corps législatif included men of substantial means and experience, some with previous parliamentary experience, and he assumed as a corollary that these men would demand a liberalization of the regime and a more direct participation in the affairs of state.⁸ But is the connection as direct as Zeldin would suggest? Did the corollary necessarily follow?

One point unexplored in any previous study is the relationship between the deputies and the places of their election. This is particularly significant in view of the

abolition of the system of election by list. Though the impact of this factor cannot be measured in terms of the number of votes it augmented in Louis Napoléon's favour, it is nonetheless interesting. In discussing the face of the dictatorship as revealed in elections, numerous references were made to authoritarian measures that could be employed by the government to secure electoral successes. As effective as it proved in applying the 'stick' of persuasion, the regime also saw the advisability of employing the 'carrot'. Candidates, in the majority of cases, were chosen from the community of voters who would be called upon to elect them even though there was no formal residence requirement. Fifty-one percent of the deputies to the first legislature had been born in the département which they represented; 88 percent were residents or property owners in the area; and 78 percent had filled at least one public office there, either national or local, prior to their election under Louis Napoléon's regime. Only nine percent of the men studied showed no such relationships to the place of their election. (See Table 5.)

The high incidence of previous public experience points out the fallacy of interpretations claiming the deputies to be a collection of unknowns. Men having served on the lower levels of local government as either a conseiller municipal or a conseiller d'arrondissement are the least frequently encountered among the deputies to the first legislature, comprising only 12 percent of the total.

Former mayors accounted for 30 percent of the legislature. These Zeldin recognizes, though he does not mention any other local government experience.⁹ This is particularly unfortunate since such an examination would have supported one of the main elements of his thesis: he suggests a decentralized selection process for official candidates, explaining that the prefects, not Napoléon or the Minister of the Interior, exercised the greatest influence in the choosing. One might expect, as indeed is the case, that the prefects would prefer men known to them and of proven ability.¹⁰ Even more frequently than former mayors, therefore, former members of departmental councils may be found among the deputies. Fifty-six percent of the deputies to the first Corps législatif possessed the notability accompanying a position at the département level of local government, having served as a conseiller-général or a conseiller de préfecture. (See Table 6 and List 1.)

Political experience among the deputies did not end with local government offices, however. Estimates of turnover in political personnel should be approached with caution; proper recognition of the elements of continuity and change would place less emphasis on the latter part of statements such as this:

très vite rentrent dans l'ombre les noms les plus connus de la II^e République . . . Le Second Empire fait accéder au pouvoir toute une série d'hommes inconnus ou peu connus sous les régimes antérieurs.¹¹

Nowhere is continuity between Louis Napoléon's and previous regimes more evident than in the membership of the Corps

législatif. Sixty-three percent of the first legislature had held some form of national government position prior to their term of office under the Second Empire. (See Table 7 and List 2.) Of the deputies who served between 1852 and 1857, for example, 38 percent had previously served in Louis Philippe's administration; it should be noted, however, that slightly more than half of these held administrative or military positions not necessarily related to political affiliation with the regime. As well, almost without exception they had not been key figures of influence.¹²

Former deputies to the Constituent Assembly of 1848 accounted for 16 percent of the deputies to the first Corps législatif. And despite Louis Napoléon's use of force to crush the National Assembly in 1851, former members of that body accounted for 26 percent of the deputies to his first legislature. Furthermore, three cabinet officials of the Second Republic--Chasseloup-Laubat, Morny and Schneider--also served as deputies.

Dynastic loyalty cannot have been an overriding consideration for many of these men. A civil servant under the Restoration and civil servant and deputy under Louis Philippe, Chasseloup-Laubat went without position in 1848, returning as a deputy and then minister later in the Second Republic, and reappeared as a deputy to the Corps législatif in 1852, on the threshold of even higher appointments. Mésonan illustrates how the military guaranteed

perhaps the greatest continuity of all. The army, except perhaps the highest echelons of the officer corps, was relatively safe from the political turmoil accompanying each change of regime. Beginning his service in one of the great Napoléon's regiments, Mésonan continued his career under the Restoration and the July Monarchy, joining Louis Napoléon at Boulogne in 1840. His initial reward of official candidate status in the 1852 election was later augmented by a seat in the Senate. (See List 2 and List 10.) These examples are not unique; they complement Zeldin's inquiry which suggested that a very significant degree of continuity was bound to be expressed when about one-third of all deputies under the Second Empire came from political families and were thus "born into politics"; nepotism in dynasties of politicians assured that certain families would be represented in any legislature "though kings ~~[sic]~~ might come and go."¹³

To consider a few examples, Cambacérès, Gellibert des Séguins, Vast-Vimeux and Villedieu de Torcy succeeded their fathers in the Corps législatif, while Busson-Billault and Kersaint succeeded their fathers-in-law. The two Champagny, Montemart and Plancy brothers were deputies at the same time, as were the two Lemerçiers--father and son. The elder Lemerçier's brother was a senator, as were the brothers of Caulaincourt, Chaumont-Quitry, Ladoucette, Las-Cases and Roguet, and the fathers of Beauveau, Ornano, Reille and Tascher de la Pagerie. The father of Charlemagne, the brother of Chevalier, the father-in-law of Delapalme and

the son of Parieu were members of the Conseil d'Etat, Delapalmé's brother-in-law was Baroche the minister; Maupas' son was Minister of Police; Abbatucci's father and Fortoul's brother were also ministers. Didier's brother and Chevreau's son were prefects. The brother of Cambacérès (the elder) was a member of Louis Napoléon's court.¹⁴

There were of course, other men, their loyalties to past regimes more marked, who were elected in 1852--many as official candidates.¹⁵ In the case of Chasseloup-Laubat, for example, dynastic connection in terms of his career advancement might be more accurate an expression than dynastic loyalty. There were thirty such men with Orleanist ties in the first legislature, 33 former legitimists and a moderate republican, Legrand. (See Table 8 and List 3.) If the careers of some of these men are followed, however, it again becomes apparent that individual careers superseded dynastic affiliations in many cases, perhaps flowering under one regime more than another and therefore becoming "tainted" due to the favours received.

The Orleanist Lemaire (Oise) is perhaps most significant for furthering the political fortunes of the Lemaire "dynasty" more than any other, serving as a civil servant under Napoléon I and the Restoration, and then as a deputy under Louis Philippe and in the National Assembly where he had protested against the coup d'état. (See List 2.) Nonetheless, he accepted official patronage in the election of 1852 and took his seat in the Corps législatif.

as a government deputy.¹⁶ Levavasseur retained his seat as a deputy from the July Monarchy through 1848, the Second Republic and the Second Empire until defeated in 1857. This was also true of Hérambault who outlasted Levavasseur in the Corps législatif. Few former Orleanists had served only the July Monarchy, receiving neither position nor favour from any other. (Compare List 3 and List 2.) Zeldin wrote of the Bonapartist group in the Corps législatif that barely half were "'pure' and free from all other loyalties."¹⁷ He could have made a similar remark about the so-called Orleanists. Perhaps this is one reason why Louis Napoléon's system of official candidacies proved accessible enough to these remnants of past regimes: provided that the new order was accepted, political antecedents could usually be ignored.¹⁸ After all, in many cases they had been ignored before. Then too, the importance of winning has been mentioned, and many of these men with their long, though varied, public careers had obvious advantages. And "new men," notable but without questionable political antecedents, were at a premium, as will be explained in due course.

There were exceptions, of course. The first legislature was 34 percent titled, yet not one deputy was first granted his nobility by the July Monarchy. (See Table 9 and List 4.) This is significant since men with Orleanist attachments were as conspicuous in the Corps législatif as were former legitimists. /This contradicts Beau de

Loménie's observations that few legitimists rallied to Louis Napoléon while numerous Orleanists did so without the least hesitation.¹⁹ Noble title dating to a particular regime may or may not be a clear indication of dynastic loyalty. Sale of such titles was not unknown, for example. Nevertheless, the acceptance or purchase of a noble title identified with a particular regime could be interpreted only as having accepted or solicited a favour from that regime; this weighed particularly heavily on the Orleanists. For the most part first or second generation in origin, Orleanist titles were often too recent to escape interpretation as examples of tainted rival influence--to be excluded as much as possible.²⁰

Most of the legitimist titles present in mid-nineteenth century French society had not been solicited by the bearer himself. For the large part inherited, these titles were displayed much like a good classical education as "a mark of good breeding, like the membership of an exclusive club."²¹ The Comte de Chambord considered such prestige to be sufficiently powerful to cause embarrassment by its absence.²² His wishes for abstention obviously went unfulfilled when 22 of the 33 former legitimists in the Corps législatif held titles, 19 predating the French Revolution. (Compare List 3 and List 4.)

Nevertheless, of the 33 legitimists the four elected as opposition candidates were "pure" in the sense of having abstained from prior national service completely (Calvière,

Durfort de Civrac) or having served only as representatives of the legitimist cause in previous parliamentary assemblies (Audren de Kerdrel, Bouhier de l'Ecluse). Even those who accepted official candidate status were relatively free of the connections with rival dynasties that the legitimist pretender decried. Bourcier de Villiers, who retained his military command, or Lescuyer d'Attainville, who remained in the civil service under the July Monarchy, are exceptions. Mortemart (Rhône) comes closest to approximating the public service careers of many Orleanists and Bonapartists, beginning a military career under the Restoration and then serving as a deputy under the July Monarchy and in 1848. Bucher de Chauvigné had held a judicial appointment under Napoléon I. Less than half had any prior public experience at the national level. Only twelve had held seats in previous legislatures. (Compare List 2 and List 3.)

This may explain why the accounts of the Second Empire repeatedly suggest a significant Orleanist presence in the Corps législatif while the equally large group of rallied legitimists has received considerably less attention. Obviously the Orleanists were more noticeable and Orleanist attachments were pronounced. Why? Among deputies bearing a distinction of the Legion of Honour, for example, almost half had received it from the hands of Louis Phillippe. (See Table 10 and List 5.) While he certainly included political favourites among his appointments, many were undoubtedly men of merit. Similarly, and as mentioned

previously over one-third of the deputies had gained political or administrative experience under the regime. And finally, like a few legitimists many Orleanists were not above opportunism in questions of political advancement versus dynastic loyalty. (Compare List 2 and List 3.)

In this characteristic they were similar, too, with many Bonapartists in the Corps législatif. If anything, men who had Bonapartist connections to bring to light had petitioned for official candidate status even more energetically than others who might wish their political pasts obscured.

Prompted by the reelection of four courtiers (Belmont, Chaumont-Quitry, Chevalier and Labédoyère), who had served on Louis Napoléon's personal staff prior to their first election the diarist Viel-Castel commented: "Le gouvernement se donne le tort de patronner comme candidats à la députation une foule de nullités qui n'ont d'autre titre que d'appartenir comme fonctionnaires à la maison civile de l'Empereur."²³ But these four were not alone in taking advantage of their close relationship with Louis Napoléon to secure seats in his legislature. Others were relatives--Clary, Lafon de Cayx and Morny. Add to these the names of Conneau (Louis Napoléon's physician), Geiger (who was raised with him), Mésonan (from the Boulogne attempt), as well as Didier, Millet, Verclos, Wattebled, Arnaud and Massabiau.²⁴

Sometimes, reminders of service under the great Napoléon secured government recognition; despite the nearly

fifty-year interval between the two empires, 11 percent of the deputies elected between 1852 and 1857 had previously held positions in the service of Napoléon I. (See Table 7 and List 2.) For example, under the first empire Mercier had been a deputy, Bucher de Chauvigné had filled a judicial appointment, Houdetot had been a prefect, Thieullen a sub-prefect, and Lemaire (Oise) and Darblay other civil servants. An additional twenty-nine had served in Napoléon's military forces.²⁵

But if the Second Empire came too late to restore personal careers, hopefuls were quick to exploit service rendered by fathers, grandfathers or other relatives to secure an official candidacy in the election. And since government candidates were almost everywhere successful, the membership of the Corps législatif boasted, if not always the personages, at least some of the most famous names of Napoléon I's regime. (See List 2 and List 6.) As well, Delamarre (Creuse) was the nephew of one of Napoléon's ministers, and five deputies--Belliard, Bourlon, Duzat-Dembarère, Noualhier and Romeuf--were related to generals of the first Empire.

Apart from these men whose Imperial connections were de la veille, one must consider the Bonapartists du jour. Among the latter who appeared in the Corps législatif were various journalists--Delamarre, Granier de Cassagnac, Jubinal, Noubet and Véron--and members of Bonapartist electoral committees: Bouchetal-Laroche, Chevreau, Dela-

palme, Fortoul, Fauché-Lepelletier, Guyard-Delalain, Kerveguen, Koenigswarter, Leroux, Maupas and Schneider.²⁶ To these one can add the names of those belonging to the political families mentioned earlier.

To total all deputies in the first legislature with Bonapartist connections, either through personal service under Napoléon I, family connection through a father's or relative's attachments to the first empire, or because of personal or family loyalties to Louis Napoléon [Including those allegiances fairly new in expression] yields 121 names. (See List 2 and List 6 and compare with Appendix I.) None suggested by Zeldin have been eliminated; however there are many deputies with connections to Bonapartism no less evident than those he does mention who do not appear in his lists. For example, Zeldin notes "seventeen who had served under the great Napoléon as prefects, soldiers or members of parliament."²⁷ The biographical summaries upon which the present study is based reveal that deputies in this category total twice the number mentioned by Zeldin. Family connections to the first empire are also more extensive than Zeldin's description would suggest. This is true, as well, of family relationships between deputies, and between deputies and other officials of the regime.²⁸

This is not to imply that I would refute Zeldin's total of 70 Bonapartists and substitute the 121 names my own study suggests. Suffice it to say that between 1852 and 1857 121 members of the Corps législatif were men with

Bonapartist affiliations. This does not mean all were Bonapartists in the sense that others were legitimists for example. By 1852 many were proclaiming their Bonapartist connections in a fashion to fit the epithet 'opportunist' more so than Bonapartist. With this Zeldin's account is in agreement and concludes moreover that the so-called Bonapartists were hardly exclusive in their past dynastic loyalties, making the process of assigning party loyalties a definitely arbitrary one.

In this light the acceptance of an absolute figure for Bonapartists in the Corps législatif is nearly impossible. It appears that there were more than seventy men who could make this claim, yet the total number did not exceed half the legislature.

Additional collaborationists though not necessarily converts (i.e. compare List 3 and List 7), were recruited through Louis Napoléon's Consultative Commission, established just after the coup d'état. With resignations and additions depending on news of disorder spreading or apprehended, the membership changed from one day to the next until a final list appeared containing the names of 51 future deputies, several future members of the Conseil d'Etat, and others destined for the Senate. The deputy Véron concluded quite precisely: "c'était une première liste de candidats au pouvoir, aux places, aux honneurs."³⁰ Though the Commission never met as a body, the men who allowed their names to be added to the list in effect endorsed the

coup d'état and thus committed themselves to the new regime. Sixteen percent of the first legislature was composed of such men. (See List 7.)

But what about those without previous political connections either to retard or recommend their acceptance as government candidates? At that time, and since, these were known as les hommes nouveaux. A rather nebulous category at best, practically all accounts of membership in the Corps législatif have included it, unclarified.³¹ What remains indistinct, despite these accounts, is the number of deputies representative of these 'new men'. Zeldin notes "about forty new men" /By actual count, he lists 39 names.³² Still lacking, however, is a clear statement of the criteria used to establish the category and then to differentiate the members from the larger body. The definition Zeldin quotes is hardly adequate, 'new men' being interpreted as those "who have not been members of any previous parliament and who are consequently free and independent."³³ Many of the deputies without parliamentary experience were nonetheless committed by virtue of other government positions with political overtones, nepotism and family connections, or for other reasons--including many of those considered 'new men' by Zeldin.

Rejecting his classification entails a narrower delimitation of what the phrase les hommes nouveaux should comprehend. It is recognized that national government service, alone, is not usually a sufficiently accurate

measure of dynastic loyalty to support a classification system. But to be absolutely certain none but truly 'new men' are considered in this category, all those who occupied regional or national government positions under previous regimes will be eliminated. Those with known dynastic connections--including Bonapartists--cannot be counted as 'new men' either; nor should all deputies who owed their seats in the Corps législatif to nepotism or inherited family political influence. In short, taking the list of deputies (Appendix I), and deleting all names that may be identified with prior political associations leaves those who may be termed les hommes nouveaux. On such close examination, very few of the men elected in 1852 fit into the category.

Most notables had tasted politics under previous regimes, while few among genuine 'new men' were notables!³⁴ For similar reasons, there were no 'new men' among elected opposition deputies. Despite all the talk of their desirability in 1852 and their mention in most assessments of the election later, only seventeen 'new men' were elected in 1852; all told, they made up six percent of the first legislature. (See List 8.)

But how did this sundry collection of men function in the legislature, given their marked differences in political experience, loyalty to the regime and personal ambition? Surely these would lead to a diversity of views rather than a unity of purpose--at least this is Zeldin's viewpoint.

Although he provides only allusions to opposition in the Corps législatif before 1860, until quite recently his account was unique in suggesting even that much.³⁵ Older works, especially constitutional studies, have us assume that the submissiveness and complicity characterizing the legislature allowed only the futile, rare and isolated interruptions inspired by Montalembert.³⁶ Since the proceedings of legislative debates were not published under the authoritarian empire, there were no transcripts to refute this generally accepted interpretation.

We know, however, that the Corps législatif began its history in a less than compliant frame of mind. The legacy of decrees from the period of Louis Napoléon's personal rule, as numerous and comprehensive as they had been, precluded a very extensive order of business for the first session. The deputies therefore busied themselves with the passing of the budget for the following fiscal year. The occasion witnessed the extension of discussion to many non-budgetary matters, a practice strongly reminiscent of the assembly Louis Napoléon had just overthrown. Indignant over the constraints of the new constitution, Montalembert delivered a particularly damning speech condemning the limited prerogatives assigned the Corps législatif. Such was the impact that it was approved for publication by a vote of 75 to 59.³⁷

Unobserved, Louis Napoléon had entered the legislative chamber just in time to witness the uproar of protest

himself. This was patently opposed to what the constitution and decrees governing the conduct of the Corps législatif had envisioned. Reaction was swift and apparently effective. The Minister of State deposited a sternly written reprimand with the President of the assembly, ordering him to curtail all unscheduled discussion. Recalcitrants were summoned to the Tuileries by Louis Napoléon for a personal persuasion of the worth of his programme.³⁸

Against possible recurrences of such unauthorized debate, the Sénatus-consulte of 23 December 1852 established the following precautions: the budget for each ministerial department of government would be voted en bloc rather than by chapter and article as before. Special decrees by the Emperor could authorize budget changes from one chapter to another without legislative approval. He would also have personal control over all commercial treaties. These provisions were made applicable to the budgetary year 1853; promulgation of the budget just passed by the Corps législatif was reserved.³⁹

Supposedly deputies had been cowed. Some were flattered, and others satisfied with the sop of a salary for members of the Corps législatif which was introduced at the same time. But in the main, perhaps there was a certain recognition that their proper jurisdiction had been exceeded. Most government projects that followed were greeted with strong majorities of approval.⁴⁰ Records of the Conseil d'Etat show that opposition was not thereby

eliminated, however; amendments to government proposals, while mostly rejected, were nonetheless numerous.⁴¹ And in certain cases strong minorities voted against projects where amendments were not approved.⁴²

It is interesting that the potentially most volatile issue of the period 1852-1857 never reached the Corps législatif. In 1856, a proposed bill to lower protective tariffs aroused such general and overt hostility in the country, particularly on the part of French commercial, industrial and agricultural interests, that the government withdrew the legislation, promising to hold it back until 1861 at the earliest.⁴³ So the threat of a direct confrontation in the Corps législatif reminiscent of 1852 never was, and what could have proven a test of political versus economic allegiances was shelved for the moment.

On the dissolution of the legislature in 1857 Napoléon III commended the Corps législatif for the loyal cooperation which had enabled him to set up and sustain the regime the members had consented to serve.⁴⁴ With the overwhelming majority of France they had proven his 'deputies'. Their consent permitted the functioning of the new institutions within the parameters established by authoritarianism.

CHAPTER V

THE ELECTIONS TO THE SECOND LEGISLATURE

The authoritarian empire engineered the elections of June, 1857 to secure a popular acclaim even more overwhelming than the one received in 1852. Generally these efforts were a mixed success.

The electoral regulations of 1852 remained unchanged except for the number of deputies to be elected. A Sénatus-consulte of 28 May 1857 modified article thirty-five of the constitution so one deputy would represent 35,000 electors with an additional deputy granted in any department where the fraction exceeding the equal division by 35,000 was over 17,000. Accordingly, the Emperor decreed that 267 deputies would be elected in 1857.¹ (See Table 1.)

The government persevered in its policy of endorsing official candidates and applying administrative pressure to assure their election. In defence of the practice the Minister of the Interior asserted,

il ~~Le~~ ^{Le} gouvernement dira nettement au pays quel noms ont sa confiance et lui semblent mériter celle des populations; comme il propose les lois aux députés, il proposera les candidats aux électeurs, et ceux-ci feront leur choix.²

One prefect then counselled his subordinates that the role of the administration was to simplify the number of choices: "Imposez silence aux adversaires s'il en rencontre, empêchez énergiquement leurs manoeuvres."³ The letter of another,

noting the names of fonctionnaires who had assisted or retarded the progress of government candidates, revealed that the degree of one's cooperation went not without notice by the Ministry of Interior.⁴

Employing the methods so successfully utilized in 1852, the government was able to increase its popular support by five percent. The rate of voter participation increased only very slightly, however, to 64.5 percent from 63.3. (See Table 2 and Table 4.) Five years of success undoubtedly attracted some new support.

The origin of the regime's increased popularity is not overly difficult to ascertain. For one thing, there was the timing of the election. The year 1856 appeared as a high point in the fortunes of the Second Empire. Victory in the Crimea signaled a triumph that was crowned by a Congress of European powers meeting in Paris to settle the peace. Basking in the favour this success reflected upon him, Louis Napoléon chose this very auspicious climate to dissolve the Corps législatif one year early.

The economic climate was no less promising. The first period of Napoléon III's rule ushered in years of comparative prosperity. Of course the half-decade preceding the coup had been among the worst ever experienced, especially in agriculture.⁵ Coming as it did after a period of relatively poor investment prospects, growth therefore appeared all the more dramatic. In the first six months after the coup d'état the investment index of sixteen of the

largest French firms rose from 529 millions to 809. Launching a series of public works including long awaited railway expansion, the Emperor had spurred the construction industry, providing much-needed employment and inspiring investment confidence. A new era of development had been inaugurated bringing France into the full swing of the industrial revolution that had seemed to elude her before. And if there were lingering doubts, surely these were dispelled by the wonders of the 1855 Paris Exposition boasting all the technical marvels of the age.⁶

As well, the birth of the Prince-Imperial the following year gave the Emperor an heir and the regime a future. In 1852 as a matter of pride many men of note affected to have accepted--perhaps even with a small show of hesitant reluctance--the status of official government candidate. In 1857 the Minister of the Interior was inundated with requests for what was now interpreted as the privilege of serving as one of the Emperor's candidates.⁷ Of course deputies were now paid which may have drawn extra interest as well. But so pronounced was the general competition to be included in the regime's favours that Alexis de Tocqueville was moved to remark caustically:

. . . alors le gouvernement vendait les places, tandis qu'aujourd'hui il les donne; pour les acquérir, on ne fournit plus son argent; on fait mieux, on se livre soi-même.⁸

Understandably, with so many applicants to choose from, the government could afford to be highly selective in picking candidates. Certain works assert erroneously that

the government presented as candidates in the 1857 elections all those who were serving at the close of the first legislature, Montalembert excepted.⁹ Indeed, Minister of the Interior Billault did circulate a statement affirming that "tous les députés sortants" would be presented again; but it was qualified by the clause, "sauf quelques exceptions, commandées par des nécessités spéciales."¹⁰ Actually, eight former official candidates were dropped from the government's patronage list due to their opposition, unsatisfactory performance or poor prospects of reelection. These were Charlier, David (Gironde), Desmolles, Leroy-Beaulieu, Levavasseur, Migeon, Montalembert and Montreuil. Durfort de Civrac repudiated government support of his own accord. With the exception of Migeon, whose case will be discussed presently, all failed to secure seats in the following legislature.¹¹

Nonetheless, the elections of 1857 witnessed the success of more independents than is generally realized. Six republicans were elected: Carnot, Cavaignac, Darimon, Goudchaux and Ollivier in Paris, and Hénon in Lyon. Cavaignac died shortly after; in declining their seats, Carnot and Goudchaux recalled the collective republican protest resignation of 1852 and added that the intervening five years had merely confirmed their opposition to the regime.¹² By-elections which were delayed repeatedly finally resulted in two other republicans, Jules Favre and Ernest Picard, taking the oath as a formality and entering

the chamber the next year. Together with Darimon, Hénon and Ollivier who had accepted the oath in 1857, they formed the small republican group of five.

The Comte de Chambord continued to ban all political activity by his followers. But other nonrepublican independents were elected, including Migeon (whose presence was short-lived), the liberal Curé who rallied to the government before the end of the second legislature, Brame and Plichon who did not oppose the government, Hallignon and Morgan who supported it much of the time, and the conservative Javal.¹³

In an attempt to curtail opposition expression and to prevent all future protest elections which ended only in denunciations of the oath of loyalty and subsequent resignations, the Emperor promulgated the Sénatus-consulte of 17 February 1858; accordingly, none could be elected to the Corps législatif unless the administration received his written confirmation of the oath at least eight days prior to polling day. Unless this was received, no electioneering would be authorized.¹⁴

As in 1852, the majority of the deputies elected in 1857 succeeded in attracting an overwhelming percentage of the votes cast. Half of the deputies received over ninety percent of the votes expressed in their circonscriptions. Very few were elected with less than fifty percent of the electorate participating in the voting, and all but about one-third received the support of fifty percent of the electors eligible to vote. (See Table 11.) Among the

independent or opposition deputies elected, all succeeded in attracting at least fifty percent of the ballots cast, with Javal, Migeon and Plichon exceeding sixty percent--Javal and Migeon each received sixty-one percent (this marked a considerable decline for Migeon who as a government candidate in the previous election had gained ninety-four percent), while Plichon received ninety-nine percent of the ballots cast in his constituency. It should be noted, however, that Plichon was not opposed by a government candidate. All independents except Plichon were supported by less than fifty percent of the eligible voters; none of the republican group of five exceeded thirty-five percent.¹⁵

The success and popularity of Napoléon III were obviously reaffirmed in 1857 despite the election of a few additional independents. As the second Corps législatif met for the first time not even the slightest premonition hinted at the changes the deputies would experience before their term was ended.

CHAPTER VI

THE SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE CORPS LEGISLATIF 1852-1863

The social standings of the deputies to the Corps législatif have not been completely ignored by historians studying the second empire. We know, for example, of several common interpretive generalizations in this regard. When Marx elaborated on class support for the regime he cited the avid participation of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie.¹ The Duc de Broglie, at the opposite end of the political spectrum, also underlines the attraction Louis Napoléon's coup d'état had for "commercial and industrial interests."² Others mention an entourage of "grands bourgeois ou de serviteurs déterminés de la grande bourgeoisie," and though there may have been new faces among the deputies, "ils appartiennent tous à la même classe que leurs prédécesseurs. Ils sont pris eux aussi dans les rangs de la grande bourgeoisie."³ When occupations are specified, the three most common categories are propriétaires, fonctionnaires, and the grande bourgeoisie.⁴ This chapter will test these conclusions by determining exactly how many deputies belonged to each such category during the course of the authoritarian empire. The two legislatures will also be compared to note any changes or consistencies evident in the period.

Take the case of the propriétaire. A very inclusive term at best, Zeldin's delimitation of the word is very helpful. He sees the propriétaire as being similar to the English country gentleman, possessed of a living usually based on land (though use of the term did not necessarily connote great wealth), allowing him to pursue a life of leisure more or less according to his bent.⁵ This sense of the title will be employed here for those deputies with no other specified occupation.

Such men must have been especially attractive to the regime for they were probably notable and respectable; since a salary for deputies was not established until several months after the election of 1852, and since all state salaried individuals were excluded from the legislature, the propriétaires who presented themselves for the first election certainly enjoyed the particular advantage of their independent economic positions. Nonetheless, the category is not really significant in terms of numbers: only 37 deputies in the first legislature were propriétaires with no other specified occupations, twelve percent of the total.⁶ (See Table 12.) If the names of these men are considered, however, the attention given to propriétaires in previous accounts becomes understandable. (Cf. List 9, List 3 and List 8.) One of every three men in this category was of legitimist background, and all but four were no strangers to politics.

More numerous than any other category were deputies with previous careers as public administrators, professional politicians, courtiers, diplomats, magistrates and soldiers. The law excluding civil servants did nothing to prevent these former recipients of state salaries--fonctionnaires--from filling one-third of all seats in the first Corps législatif. (See Table 12 and List 9.) Half of these were retired soldiers; their petitions for official candidate status appealed for the recognition of distinguished careers sometimes dating from the first empire. They appeared in the Corps législatif, "generally to represent in silence the conservatism of merit rewarded."⁷

The third of the three most mentioned categories of occupation includes deputies who were members of the so-called grande bourgeoisie--financiers, industrialists, manufacturers and merchants. The boundaries between these four roles in the commercial field were not as clearly defined then as they frequently are now; as such, the financier sometimes found himself involved in the actual development of the industrial concern he had funded, guiding production and aiding in the marketing of its products to ensure a fair return on his investment. It is not inappropriate, therefore, to consider these occupational interests as a single group. As a group they numbered 58 (19%) among the members of the first legislature. (See Table 12 and List 9.) Zeldin concludes, significantly in the light of later developments, that their main concerns were with their

businesses. Serving as experienced consultants in industrial and commercial development and defending their interests in government policies appear to have been the extent of their political involvement in the Corps législatif.⁸

There were, of course, deputies who followed more than one occupation. Nonetheless, considerably less than half of the Corps législatif pursued interests outside of the three categories already mentioned; together, propriétaires, former fonctionnaires and grands bourgeois made up 65 percent of the first legislature. It is not uncommon for these three to be used to categorize the whole legislature.

This is unfortunate since many other occupational interests were represented, some as, or more, significantly than the propriétaires which everyone mentions, or the grande bourgeoisie that figures so prominently in Marxian accounts of this period. Zeldin excepted, not much mention is made of the legal profession. On the occasion of Lord Malmesbury's succession to the position of Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, Prime Minister Lord Palmerston remarked that the France that had accepted the Second Empire was "weary both of Bourbons and lawyers."⁹ If this assessment was perhaps valid in respect to the Bourbons, the Corps législatif did not reflect it in regard to lawyers who were more evident than any other single group except the fonctionnaires. Sixty (20%) of the deputies serving between

1852 and 1857 practiced law, either as barristers and solicitors, or as notaries.

Beside lawyers, liberal and learned professions were represented by eight doctors (two percent of the first legislature), seven educators (2%), twenty-two writers-- authors, journalists, playwrights and poets--composing seven percent of the legislature; and there were five (2%) editors, directors or founders of newspapers. An artist, Lemaire (Nord), was also elected, as were two engineers. Again it must be remembered that many of the deputies fit into two or more occupational categories, but approximately thirty-five percent of the first legislature was composed of deputies whose occupations were in the liberal or learned professions.

Finally, thirty deputies whose occupations were in agriculture composed ten percent of the legislature; and one, Chevreau, elected in 1852, kept a house of lodging. (See Table 12 and List 9.)

These figures represent the social backgrounds of the deputies to the first Corps législatif, an analysis that completes a picture usually presented only in fragments, if at all. The lack of lower class representation among the deputies might have been expected. Government candidates were successful in almost every case, and they had been chosen, as Persigny put it, 'to give the legislature to the upperclasses [sic]':

'We have openly supported and chosen our candidates, but from the highest ranks of society; from the great land-

owners, wealthy mayors and so on.¹⁰

A basis of comparison does not exist on which to measure whether or not the Corps législatif was a particular case in this respect. Were there socio-professional differences between the deputies and members of the other assemblies of state, for example? It is unfortunate that Wright's study of the Conseil d'Etat fails to present such information directly.¹¹ There is, however, a comparable study of the conseillers généraux along these lines.

Since most deputies had been conseillers généraux certain parallels should be expected. If the occupational interests of the conseillers généraux are grouped into the same large categories established for the members of the Corps législatif, similarities become very apparent. The percentage of men engaged in the liberal professions or those of the grande bourgeoisie are about the same. The Corps législatif included about ten percent more fonctionnaires, but about as many more conseillers généraux were propriétaires or men engaged in agriculture.¹²

Such figures do not support generalizations based on recognition of a preponderance of grands bourgeois influence in the regime. Despite Zeldin's note of certain differences between the occupations of Corps législatif members and those of their predecessors in earlier assemblies,¹³ the significance is very obviously in the continuity and not in the change. As before, fonctionnaires and members of the liberal professions proved most numerous.

This element of continuity is evident within the regime even more so than between regimes, despite changes in personnel and in the nature of the government. While most of the deputies who sat in the first legislature also sat between 1857 and 1863, approximately one-quarter did not. (See Appendix I.) It is evident, therefore, that replacements were recruited from the same social strata that characterized the first legislature. A comparison of the two legislatures in terms of deputies' occupational interests leaves little doubt of this. For example members of the grande bourgeoisie accounted for the same percentage of deputies in each legislature. (See Table 12.) Had the same men sat in each legislature, the significance of this identical number would be diminished; as it happened, however, there was a twenty-six percent changeover in grands bourgeois deputies between the first and second legislatures. (Cf. List 9, List 10 and Appendix I.) Three of the fifty-eight men in this category received government appointments prior to the 1857 elections--one in the civil service and two to the senate; two others died; six were defeated in 1857; and four retired for unknown reasons.¹⁴

Similarities in the two legislatures may be observed in other categories of occupational interest as well. There were only two fewer propriétaires in the second legislature than there had been in the first.¹⁵ (See Table 12.) Fonctionnaires increased in number, though not significantly; the minor difference was due mainly to an increase in the

number of career politicians among the deputies. But for Gautlier de la Guistièrre who died, all such men with no other occupations from the first legislature served in the second. The increase may be partially explained by the introduction of a salary for deputies after the first election, making a political career prospectively more attractive, or at least financially feasible.

The proportion of deputies from the liberal and learned professions remained stable. (See Table 12.) There were five fewer lawyers in the second legislature than there had been in the first, though. The drop is relatively insignificant in view of the continuity, but is interesting nonetheless. A changeover of twenty-five percent actually occurred in the period from 1852 to the election of 1857; yet all but five of these deputies were compensated for by recruits from the same legal professions elected in 1852. The reasons occasioning this change in Corps législatif personnel are varied. Six of the lawyers who served in the first legislature received appointments to high state offices: one to the Ministry, another to a judicial position, two to the civil service and two to the Conseil d'Etat. Two of the deputies in this category died during the first legislature; two more were defeated in the election of 1857; five retired for various reasons.¹⁶ (Cf. List 9, List 10 and Appendix I.)

To consider the other occupational interests, members of the liberal and learned professions were propor-

tionately no more or less numerous than in the first legislature. The same was true of deputies engaged in agriculture. (See Table 12.)

The proportion of deputies in each category of occupational interest remained stable not only in the legislatures of the authoritarian regime, but (judging by Zeldin's figures) generally throughout the Second Empire. Zeldin's breakdown of deputies by occupational interest for the whole period proves this conclusively if compared with the statistics for the first two legislatures. His totals reveal little change throughout the empire from the original proportions of 1852.¹⁷

This stability precludes any explanation for changes in the political climate of the Corps législatif on the basis of alterations in its social composition as the regime grew older. From the figures just presented it is apparent that demands for greater control of public finances came not because of an increase in the number of deputies belonging to the grande bourgeoisie. Encouragement for military ventures was neither augmented nor diminished by a change in the number of deputies with military backgrounds. The virtues of protectionism in trade were expressed none the louder in 1860 than in 1856 because of increases in the number of agriculturalist or industrialist deputies.

Thus, while the analysis of deputies' social backgrounds clarifies many misconceptions, it is not the key to understanding the political changes that announced the

liberal empire. To confirm this conclusion it is essential to consider the political and economic period that coincided with the second Corps législatif, from 1857-1863.

CHAPTER VII

THE POLITICS OF THE SECOND LEGISLATURE 1857-1863

If the domestic politics of the Second Empire were a drama production, then surely the second Corps législatif would serve as a recapitulation for playgoers coming late and intending to leave early. As did the regime itself, the second legislature opened with a show of authoritarian might and climaxed in liberal concessions amid the complexities of foreign relations. The concessions of 1860-61, often hailed as the dawning of the liberal empire, focused directly on the prerogatives of the Corps législatif. Among the first privileges granted were the right to vote an address in reply to the speech from the throne, in effect allowing discussion of matters of state before the whole assembly; in extenso publication of legislative debates in the Journal Officiel; and the appointment of ministers without portfolio to defend government bills in the Corps législatif.¹ This chapter will review the role of the legislature during this period to determine if it may have influenced in any way the granting of these concessions.

The temptation in pursuing this is to look for changes that might point to their move away from government influence. At first glance it appears that only a difference between the two legislatures could account for the

exhibition of discontent in the second Corps législatif when so little was expressed in the first. Yet it would be difficult to imagine any two assemblies more alike than the first two legislatures of the Second Empire. De La Gorce suggested that nothing changed as a result of the 1857 elections:

c'étaient les mêmes visages; c'étaient les mêmes places réparties sur les mêmes bancs; c'étaient les mêmes conseillers d'Etat investis des mêmes attributions; c'étaient le même règlement, et, selon toute apparence, établi pour longtemps.²

Were the assemblies truly identical? In the discussion of deputies' occupational backgrounds for example, differences in the two legislatures were identified. But none of these proved very significant, due mainly to the general continuity of personnel between legislatures and to recruitment of new deputies from the same sources as former ones. What about political backgrounds?

Generally, deputies with close ties to Napoléon III, his family or to other members of his administration were re-elected in 1857. Similar connections also assisted new candidates in 1857--such as Mariani who was selected as the second government candidate for Corsica after having served as aide-de-camp to Prince Jérôme-Napoléon.³

Deputies whose names had appeared on Louis Napoléon's 1851 Consultative Commission dropped in number. Five had died; eight had received higher government positions; four were defeated in 1857. (Cf. List 7 and List 10.)

Death took its toll among older deputies who had been chosen as government candidates by virtue of their service to Napoléon I. (Cf. Table 7 and Table 13; List 2 and List 10.) But sons of dignitaries associated with the first Empire were as evident in the second legislature as they had been in the first. (Cf. Appendix I and List 6.) And where sons had been recognized, there were also grandsons: J. David (Gironde) was the grandson of Napoléon I's celebrated court painter; Cambacérès (the younger) was the grandson of a former minister.⁴

There was a slight drop of five percent in the number of deputies having held national government positions before. This decline in experience was distributed fairly evenly, showing in most categories of public service under each previous regime. Men who had filled national offices under the July Monarchy remained the most numerous group in this category, as in the first legislature. (Cf. Table 7 and Table 13; List 2, List 10 and Appendix I.) As in 1852, Ministry circulars did not request the selection of candidates with previous national level experience; in effect, the recurring demand for 'new men' advocated the very opposite. Given the limitations imposed on the Corps législatif (and the case of Montalembert stood as a too recent reminder), experience among the deputies was probably not in the regime's interests anyway.

On the other hand, flamboyant titles of nobility and notables from among the Legion of Honour were no less

frequently encountered among the deputies than before.
(See Table 9 and Table 10.)

In terms of local reputation, as in 1852 the overwhelming majority of deputies were native sons, residents and/or property owners in their département. All but twenty-nine percent had some form of local public experience (See Table 6), while others had filled a national public office in or on behalf of the département. Only nine percent of the deputies are not known to have had such connections to the place of their election. The figures were pretty constant for both legislatures. (See Table 5.)

A sure indication of local influence in the selection of government candidates may be discerned in the increase in deputies who had previously served as conseillers-généraux or conseillers de préfecture. These two positions, the most common forms of local political experience among the deputies, were also the two positions in the organization of the département working closest to Monsieur le Préfet. The conseiller d'arrondissement and the conseiller municipal working through the offices or sub-prefects and mayors, respectively, were more removed from direct access to the prefects; likewise, one might assume that credit for effective performance by these councils went to their superiors. Given the five percent increase in former conseillers-généraux or conseillers de préfecture in the second legislature, it was obviously beneficial to be close to the prefect's office when government patronage was

distributed! (See Table 6.)

In general these figures point to the only possible conclusion: the two assemblies were so much alike as to render any differences negligible in comparison. This does not mean that everything remained the same. Montalembert, the most eloquent spokesman for the Catholic cause, had lost his seat in 1857. The same contest resulted in a drop in the number of former legitimists and Orleanists in the Corps législatif. (See Table 8 and Cf. Appendix I and List 3.) And of course there was the election of les cinq--the republicans in the second legislature--who introduced more than a change of personnel into the Corps législatif. Whenever the opportunity presented itself they used their parliamentary immunity to denounce the authoritarian regime, attempting to cajole, attack or embarrass Napoléon III into adopting a more liberal attitude in government.⁵

The presence of these independents assured that the process of verifying deputies' credentials received very careful scrutiny. In the course of investigation it was discovered that M. de Cambacérés (the younger) had not reached the age of twenty-five at the time of his election, and consequently, had been ineligible. Undaunted, Cambacérés presented himself for reelection a few weeks later; he won easily, in the process revealing how little the castigation by his opposition had affected the chances of a government candidate.⁶

The government in turn launched an inquiry into the election of the deputy Migeon. An official candidate in the 1852 elections, he was relieved of that status⁵⁷ in the hope that he could be replaced. But even without government support Migeon was successful and took his seat in the Corps législatif. The government then charged him with using a false title of nobility and a Legion of Honour decoration which was not his own to impress his constituents. It accused him of having utilized bribes, false promises of employment and numerous other electoral irregularities in his campaign. Coming as this did after Migeon's election and at the instigation of the government, the investigation seemed to resemble too much a government act of revenge against an opposition deputy to yield the expected result. After his original election had been invalidated, Migeon won again. Finally, securing a conviction on the bribery charge the imperial courts were able to sentence Migeon to two months imprisonment and force his final resignation.⁷

Whatever reminder this may have served to confirm the powers of an authoritarian regime was soon eclipsed by the events of 1858. On January fourteenth of that year Orsini, an Italian disenchanted with Napoléon III's failure to aid the cause of Italian independence, threw a bomb at the Imperial carriage as it was on its way to the opera. Though the Emperor emerged unhurt, several others were killed or wounded. The state of siege that had accompanied the coup d'état of 1852 was quickly reintroduced. Suspected enemies

of the regime were summarily arrested and deported without trial, the occasion serving as a convenient opportunity to settle accounts with any opposition, terrorist or otherwise. General Espinasse, known for anything but clemency, was appointed Minister of the Interior; the 400 arrests that followed the rash action of a few Italian conspirators testify to the general's interpretation of his temporary responsibility.⁸

Scattered and feeble attempts to inspire a vote of protest in the Corps législatif had limited effect: among the 251 who voted on the issue, all but twenty-four supported the action advocated by the government.⁹ Opposition in the Corps législatif could have done little to inspire a more liberal regime if limited to the nine percent that voted against the emergency measures of 1858. But events outside the Corps législatif were doing more to decide the fortune of the authoritarian empire than legislative proceedings reflect. It is not within the perspective of this study to provide the detail of loyalties lost through foreign and domestic policies that obviously pleased so few. Suffice it to say by way of summary that Napoléon III's Italian policies managed to alienate both Catholics and nationalists, while even the most patient of liberals enquired about the Emperor's earlier promise to "crown the regime" with greater freedom.¹⁰

That these matters should have occasioned only a shadow of opposition in the Corps législatif compared to the

general furor inspired by the Anglo-French trade treaty of 1860 should surprise no one. Analysis of the deputies' backgrounds has illustrated that these were gens d'affaires, men with careers in a variety of professional and influential fields, the majority having previous political experience. Their greatest occasion of protest had materialized in 1852 when the full realization of the restricted nature of their powers became apparent; it was very short, and they had quickly reconciled themselves to the situation which the overwhelming majority of the French people had sanctioned. Their limited influence on the affairs of state notwithstanding, the Corps législatif soon proved itself less indulgent in matters of finance and the public economy.

The number of amendments submitted by commissions of deputies studying proposals for legislation shows that criticism continued after 1852. Careful attention to the annual budget assured that the regime's finances were analyzed each year in the most sober of fashions. As a result, fully thirty percent of all amendments suggested in Corps législatif commissions prior to 1860 concerned the budget. After 1857 when the economy declined the number of amendments to the budget increased dramatically, doubling in the years between 1857 and 1860. Over half of all budgetary amendments were rejected outright by the Conseil d'Etat, but as the number of amendments increased, fewer and fewer were treated so arbitrarily; by 1860 the number rejected had dropped to one-third of those proposed.¹¹ Therefore

the tendency of the Corps législatif to pay increased attention to state finances and gradually, to have its concerns recognized had developed prior to 1860. This explains no small part of the reception given to the announcement of the 1860 trade treaty.

But opposition to the treaty in the Corps législatif was only one consideration in view of Napoléon III's intentions. The year 1860 was one of crisis even without anticipating deputies' protests. Difficulties with the clergy and the political power of Catholics concerned that the regime's Italian intervention threatened the temporal power of the pope were particularly acute.¹² The same policy was suspect in London as well but the signing of the trade treaty, the effect of which was to reduce French protective tariffs against cheaper British exports, provided some reassurance.¹³ Napoléon III also hoped that the treaty might instil new vigour into the French economy where the government was running an annual deficit of about 130 million dollars per year and the national debt had risen to 1,500 million.¹⁴ Placed in its actual perspective tariff reduction was only part of a planned programme of economic incentives to spur new development in industry, communications and public works. These other aspects would also make the pill easier for opposition to swallow.¹⁵

The opposition the regime already faced dictated caution. Only the continued popularity of the dynasty could assure its perpetuation after Napoléon III; and in January

of 1860 the Emperor was approaching his fifty-second birthday while his son had yet to celebrate his fourth.¹⁶ If the dropping of tariffs might gain some support due to the lowering of the cost of many commodities, Napoléon III was likewise aware of the protectionist sentiments of the country--especially since his 1856 attempt in this area of free trade had to be aborted. Accordingly, the 1860 effort demanded a different approach. The Sénatus-consulte of 23 December 1852 had placed the contracting of commercial treaties, and the modification of tariffs accordingly, solely within the jurisdiction of the head of state.¹⁷ The Emperor therefore signed the treaty with Great Britain on his own authority, keeping its negotiation a secret even from the majority of his ministers; once signed it was announced to the Corps législatif and the general public as a fait accompli.¹⁸

Certain writers suggest that the old system of protective tariffs was so dear and near to the hearts and wallets of so many deputies in the Corps législatif that they were driven to uncompromising opposition from that day forward; Napoléon III was then impelled to search out other sources of support: hence the liberal concessions and the dawning of the liberal empire.¹⁹

Such an interpretation other than in its simplistic convenience has little to commend it. The implication, though unstated, is that most deputies were drawn from the grande bourgeoisie, propriétaire and agricultural elements

of society. As illustrated earlier, this traditional view of the Corps législatif is far from accurate. Even if all three of these groups--the ones most likely to resent the commercial competition of freer trade--were to have been alienated completely, only forty percent of the legislature would have participated in the opposition. (See Table 12.) In actuality to ascertain the exact extent to which each deputy was involved in the defence of the protectionist system of trade is beyond the realm of our concern here.

The announcement that the treaty had been signed was definitely an unpopular one to make before the Corps législatif. The agenda was disrupted completely; debate began on the treaty though discussion had not been authorized by the Conseil d'Etat. The consensus clearly expressed a preference for more prudent management of the economy; and as well, the deputies resented the Emperor's arbitrary handling of the matter, even if it was legally within his prerogative: on such an important issue he had purposely evaded their consultation.²⁰

In view of Wright's analysis of relations between the Corps législatif and the Conseil d'Etat it would be an error to interpret this opposition as an isolated phenomenon. Criticism based on dissatisfaction with the regime's economic policies was certainly not new; the protest of 1860 appears more a logical development of earlier criticism than a sudden change in attitude among the deputies.²¹

And as in previous remonstrations founded on economic complaints the denunciations hurled against the government's programme were generally ineffective. In this particular case no change of policy was effected; the treaty remained.²² To argue that later concessions to the legislature had been exacted from the Emperor by the outburst of 1860 is purely speculative. Were those angered over economic matters likely to be satisfied by more liberal legislative procedures? Would these satisfy Catholics outraged over Napoléon III's Italian ventures? Certainly none had been bought off by the general amnesty of 1859. But to arrive at conclusive answers to these questions is not the purpose of this discussion. There is no real evidence to imply that Napoléon III was obliged to capitulate before the growing animosity of the Corps législatif.

Nonetheless, to meet the increasing challenges directed against government budgetary matters the semi-civil servants who were the Councilors of State were no longer adequate. In point of fact, one wonders if they had ever been adequate in this area since they had repeatedly failed to contain these debates to the yes or no prescribed by the constitution.²³ As government expenditures of the Corps législatif became more essential, Napoléon III realized that officials with greater authority were required to manage the situation.²⁴

Far from introducing sweeping political reforms, the Emperor altered what experience had shown he had not been able to control effectively: discussion of bills and amendments before the whole house as well as in committees, publicity of legislative proceedings, and division of the budget into sections, chapters and articles rather than by Ministry only.

It would be naive to assume that the Corps législatif was raised to the status of a parliamentary assembly by these changes.²⁵ While the modifications did establish certain legislative contacts with the public and with the mainstream of government denied by the Constitution of 1852, in its main elements the authoritarian constitution remained intact. Control over the drafting and presentation of legislation was not entrusted to the Corps législatif. Despite the creation of ministers without portfolio, the concept of a cabinet of ministers was not mentioned. As before each was individually responsible to the Emperor alone. And the Emperor was responsible only to the people, and he would decide when to put that responsibility to the test of a plebiscite.²⁶

Viewed from the perspective of the Corps législatif it is difficult to discern in this the dawn of the liberal empire. That Louis Napoléon had initiated the changes without the consultation of each of his ministers proves his undiminished control over government policy.²⁷ The reforms concentrated mainly on legislative matters, leaving undis-

turbed the repressive measures directed against basic freedoms and the press. The authoritarian concentration of power remained intact and essentially in the hands of the executive as before. There were no sudden shifts of power or personnel. The first real crisis sufficiently critical to warrant an extensive ministerial reorganization did not occur until after the end of the second legislature.²⁸

In the Corps législatif we know that as late as 1863 there had been only a thirty-one percent changeover in deputies. (See Table 13 and List 10.) Until 1863, therefore, any praise of legislative liberties would be mouthed by the same body that had served as Louis Napoléon's "deputy" in dictatorship, reconfirmed through its acceptance of the emergency measures of 1858. Deputies alienated over the free trade issue do not appear to have extended their support to others opposed to the regime on other issues. Though Napoléon III's 1861 speech from the throne inspired a lively debate, he received a vote of confidence.²⁹ A report on the Italian situation that some found lacking in respect for the pope was still accepted though 91 deputies voted to delete the offending passages. The vote was significant since it marked the first large-scale opposition registered in a vote on a political question.³⁰

Most trenchant criticism continued to be levelled against government fiscal proposals. The 1862 session witnessed the defeat of a bill authorizing an annual pension of 50,000 francs for General Cousin-Montauban, Count of

Palikao and his heirs in perpetuity. The legislature expressed its condemnation of such extravagance, counselled a more prudent management of public funds, and concluded with the rejection of the bill. But in 1863 the regime still retained the expediencies of authoritarianism and the Corps législatif was still subject to them. For his role in defeating the government measure the deputy Jouvenal was refused official patronage in the election of 1863; the government then did all in its power to assure that he would be defeated--and he was.³¹

Evidently the politics of the second legislature did not include a broadening of opposition effective enough to challenge such arbitrary exercises of power; no more than the deputies had proven instrumental in relieving restrictions placed on basic freedoms in general.

CONCLUSION

This discussion of the deputies to the Corps législatif ends in 1863. While further study would undoubtedly illustrate the continuation of certain authoritarian aspects after 1863, analysis of the period 1852-1863 provided numerous insights into the nature of the legislature and its membership during the most restrictive phase of the regime.

The authoritarianism of the Second Empire must be put into its proper perspective if the Corps législatif is to be understood. In the coup d'état and the construction of Louis Napoléon's new system France was less a victim than an accomplice.¹ This is reflected in the observation that the French in the period 1848-1852 seemed "un peuple plus prompt à réclamer la liberté que jaloux de la conserver."² Even Proudhon concluded:

Napoléon III est l'expression légitime, authentique, des masses bourgeoises et prolétaires. S'il n'est pas précisément le produit de la volonté nationale, à coup sûr il l'est de la permission nationale.³

This "permission" no doubt assisted the election of government deputies, where half received over ninety percent of the ballots cast in their circonscriptions.

Such discoveries point to the necessity for a reevaluation of certain traditional assumptions regarding

the Corps législatif and its membership." Too much attention has been drawn to the one-third of the ballot box that remained empty in elections, ignoring the two-thirds of the electorate that did vote. It is true that Louis Napoléon's Machiavellian manipulations and contrivances have earned him a rather poor press among many historians; but as a result, the dictatorial aspect of the regime has been accentuated to a proportion completely out of contact with his actual contemporary acclaim. Part of this denigration has been the misrepresentation of the Corps législatif and its membership.

The evaluation of each deputy's background presents very different conclusions from those usually accepted. Called "nouveaux venus," many deputies were perhaps "venus" in terms of their sudden political advancement, but with few exceptions there was little "nouveaux" about them. Since such a small number could afford to be "new men"--with neither favour nor national experience to recommend them--the myth of "les hommes nouveaux" in the Second Empire should be laid to rest at last. The reality of political life, illustrating that nepotism, political connections and a favourable reputation had more to recommend a man than a supposedly "clean slate," effectively excluded most neophytes among both government and independent candidates.

The real key to understanding the Second Empire is closer to elements of continuity than change. The

inauguration of the Second Empire was found to have come too late to produce a reascendancy of pure Bonapartists from the days of Napoléon I, which confirms Zeldin's parallel investigations in this regard. The presence of a new generation and the numerous government shifts between the two Empires ordained that less than half of each legislature would have any pronounced allegiance to Bonapartism other than their support for Napoléon. Opportunism was definitely ascendant in this period, and dynastic loyalties--whether Bonapartist, legitimist or Orleanist--were rare. Though more deputies had served the July Monarchy in some form of public service than any other regime, in most cases they were occupying local government offices at the département level when the Second Empire offered a seat in the Corps législatif. Men well known to the local prefect, more times than not they were recommended by him to the central administration.

The social composition of the Corps législatif has been the subject of serious overgeneralizations as well. This study discovered propriétaires more significant in terms of who they were and the nature of their previous political experience than in numbers; grands bourgeois and propriétaires together did not equal the number of former fonctionnaires or the members of liberal or learned professions; lawyers alone outnumbered propriétaires or grands bourgeois. The true picture of the social standing of

deputies is middle class in character--not an aristocracy of industrial wealth nor a petty bourgeois collection of clerks--and this median cannot be summarized in the triad of propriétaires, fonctionnaires and grande bourgeoisie when only fonctionnaires proved as frequent among the deputies as the professional occupations that are rarely mentioned. Evidently the continuity between the Corps législatif and its predecessors in this regard is more pronounced than most accept. As before, fonctionnaires and members of learned professions provided the majority of deputies in each legislature.

In these conclusions the present method is not without its limitations. Additional data from unpublished sources unavailable to this inquiry might have permitted analysis of additional variables such as deputies' business relationships, education and parentage for which existing published sources are inadequate. Since quantitative studies depend heavily on the availability of comparative data for the maximum of cases, rather than in finding extensive information on a few, such inadequately documented variables had to be dropped.⁴

Nevertheless, this did not prevent a reappraisal of the role of the Corps législatif under the authoritarian empire. Government deputies were men from the provinces--lieutenants suddenly given the rank of captain. Understandably their views were essentially supportive of the regime. And as a few examples showed, such cooperation was not without the reward of even higher honours. But they were not

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
THE DEPUTIES OF FRANCE, 1851-1863
A QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF THE
FRENCH LEGISLATURE UNDER THE
AUTHORITARIAN PHASE OF THE
SECOND EMPIRE

by

KENNETH ROY BONIN



A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled THE DEPUTIES OF FRANCE, 1851-1863; A QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF THE FRENCH LEGISLATURE UNDER THE AUTHORITARIAN PHASE OF THE SECOND EMPIRE submitted by Kenneth Roy Bonin in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

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ABSTRACT

Based on a quantitative analysis of the French legislature from 1852 to 1863, this study attempts to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the authoritarian phase of the Second Empire.

Initial consideration is directed to the origin of the regime and to the parameters restricting the constitutional institutions ceded by the dictatorship. The Corps législatif and its membership remain the central concern of the study, however, which evaluates many of the assumptions that have characterized previous histories and introduces new interpretations based on the examination of deputies' socio-political backgrounds.

The results discard the idea that the machinations of Louis Napoléon's regime are in themselves the sole explanation for the phenomenon of the authoritarian empire. Likewise, this study shows more continuity in personnel between the Corps législatif and previous regimes than has been usually recognized. Once the cliché descriptions of deputies as "hommes nouveaux," Orleanists and grands bourgeois are set aside in favour of discoveries in such aspects as career opportunism, nepotism, local prominence, previous national political experience and occupational background, a more realistic picture may be constructed.

Here the composition of the Corps législatif resembles earlier assemblies, with the majority of deputies drawn from fonctionnaire and learned professional occupational interests. In general, deputies' seats in the Corps législatif appear the result of a political career progression from politics at the département level, given a welcome boost by the elimination of many incumbents. Cooperation with the regime proves to be the norm in the Corps législatif, but what criticism is expressed concerns economic affairs more than traditional liberties. The stability in the socio-political background of the Corps législatif between 1852 and 1863 discounts any such change as an explanation for the liberalization of the empire after 1860.

The analysis of the Corps législatif in these and related facets yields the conclusion that the visage of the regime may be captured in features other than those of Louis Napoléon Bonaparte, autocrat.

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INTRODUCTION

The Second Empire owes its origin to the presidential coup of December 2, 1851 which made Louis Napoléon Bonaparte dictator of France. The basic constitutional framework that was to guide the regime for eighteen years went into effect four months later. In Louis Napoléon's plan of things administrative and governmental, "les hommes les plus illustres" were honoured in a Senate while the main legislative responsibilities of the Conseil d'Etat were entrusted to "les hommes les plus distingués."¹ Questioning this design one writer asked rhetorically: "De quoi se composerait donc le Corps législatif si tous les hommes 'illustres' ou 'distingués' avaient été pourvus ailleurs?"² The same question has inspired much of this study.

One year after the coup d'état Louis Napoléon was crowned Napoléon III, Emperor of the French--a title he retained until the Second Empire met its end in 1870, defeated in the Franco-Prussian War. In the interval, the government that began in a dictatorship had evolved into a constitutional monarchy. Commentaries on the regime therefore generally recognize two periods within the Second Empire, the authoritarian and the liberal phases.

The present study is a quantitative analysis of Corps législatif membership under the authoritarian empire. The intention is to provide an in-depth account of the period not presently available, evaluating the socio-political background of every deputy who served the authoritarian regime.

As might be expected, there are various interpretations as to when Louis Napoléon's liberal concessions eclipsed his authoritarianism. The most common position utilizes the first measures of a liberal nature to mark the transition. Thus the general amnesty of 1859 has been defined as the beginning of the liberal phase;³ more frequently, the reforms increasing the powers of the legislature are interpreted as indicative of the change so that the year 1860 is chosen.⁴ It should be noted, however, that certain historians date the shift much later, with the advent of more extensive liberalization, selecting 1857⁵ or 1868⁶ to mark the beginning of the liberal empire.

Focusing as it will on the authoritarian phase of the Second Empire, this analysis will concentrate on the years 1852-1863 and the first two legislatures of the regime. The period includes the liberal concessions of 1859-1862, widely interpreted as the dawn of the liberal empire, as well as two of the regime's four legislative elections and their related by-elections.

As reflected in Appendix I, this necessitates the analysis of 383 individual deputies' backgrounds. Fortunately,

the number was easily determined; the electoral medium establishes a precise definition of the group to be studied.⁷ The task was further facilitated by the use of a computer to collate the numerous categories and hundreds of variables applicable to each man.

Critics such as Richard Cobb might maintain that such an approach will glean only what "perhaps we thought we knew already; but now we will 'really' know," and have the same fare rehashed through a novel gimmick.⁸ In all fairness, the generalizations of earlier studies have fallen in error not so much by what they have said as by what has been omitted. Theodore Zeldin, for example, provided only a very superficial comparison of the various legislatures of the Second Empire; and he failed to analyze the backgrounds of all deputies. His perspective, concentrating on the whole "system" inaugurated by the coup d'état, was not really designed to allow for a very detailed look at each legislature.⁹

My method is to review available accounts of the Corps législatif in an effort to eliminate certain misconceptions that persist, even after one hundred years, presenting in the process a more detailed analysis per se. The quantitative basis on which the comparison depends reflects data compiled from the various published sources available--newspapers of the period, biographical dictionaries, various regional and area studies of France,¹⁰ and of course, numerous monographs.

4

To understand the medium in which the deputies acted as well as to provide a measure of background material, opening chapters will assess the character of the regime, its constitution and institutions, and the elections in which the deputies were selected.

With the deputies themselves our concern is in such aspects as their popularity at the polls, relationship to the community represented, the nature of past political experience, previous dynastic allegiances--and the relevance of each of these to the authoritarian regime. Opportunism and family connections also merit further exploration. And in the process of this analysis, discussion will subject the common generalizations about deputies' social status, politics and occupational backgrounds to careful scrutiny. Finally, passing attention will assess the latter part of the second legislature to determine if the liberal concessions may be attributed to any change in the Corps législatif between 1852 and 1863.

The men who served in Louis Napoléon's legislatures during the authoritarian empire must be evaluated as "deputies" in more than one connotation of the word, therefore. The most obvious sense is that associated with the title representing membership in the legislative body. But were they deputies, meaning delegates, and whom did they represent? And were they not deputies, that is, assistants, in the establishment and perpetuation of a regime founded on dictatorship?

CHAPTER I

THE DICTATORSHIP

The closing months of the year 1851 marked Louis Napoléon Bonaparte's third year as President of the Second French Republic. The presidential term of office was only four years, and the constitution stipulated that the incumbent could not succeed himself. Each of Louis Napoléon's efforts to secure the constitutional amendment that could prolong his tenure of office was frustrated by an Assembly that consistently refused its three-quarters majority approval for any constitutional modification.

Accounting for Louis Napoléon's initial electoral success of 1848, the historian Guizot, himself a former Prime Minister of France under the July Monarchy, commented that it was indeed enviable to embody simultaneously a national glory, revolutionary guarantees and the principle of authority.¹ These, together with a conducive economic and political climate, augured well for the coup de force of 2 December 1851 which freed Louis Napoléon from the constitutional limitations of the Second Republic. Together, they assured support as he declared himself President for ten years and terminated the life of the National Assembly, substituting in its place a virtually prostrate legislative Body.

By opposing the conservative Assembly's restriction of the suffrage Louis Napoléon appeared the champion of the rights of the common man, an image substantiated as well by his early writings, Napoléonic Ideas and The Extinction of Pauperism. Having eliminated the Assembly, he presented himself as the personification of the will of the people as expressed through universal manhood suffrage.² The preamble to his "Appel au Peuple" of December 2 attacked the National Assembly, claiming "que l'instabilité du Pouvoir, que la prépondérance d'une seule Assemblée sont des causes permanentes de trouble et de discorde."³

Ramifications of the President's confrontation with the Assembly went beyond the arena of politics, however. And so protracted was the crisis that many had despaired of a legal solution, fully anticipating a coup d'état; in fact, so widespread was rumour and premonition that the coup has been described as the result of an "open conspiracy," if indeed there was need for a conspiracy at all.⁴

The economic period coinciding with the Second Republic was hardly marked by prosperity, its dismal character undoubtedly being most pronounced in agriculture.⁵ Though its worst effects had passed by the end of 1851, government had failed to provide the confidence and financial incentives required to stimulate the business and financial community. Members of the latter adopted a "wait and see" attitude, expecting a turn of events that would resolve the political malaise, for better or worse. In the

interval, investment lassitude in both public and private sectors aggravated the economic situation. This was very evident in the sphere of railway expansion, for example, which came to a virtual standstill, the depreciation of shares joining the slump in land prices and general real estate values.⁶

To compound the political uncertainty, and contributing in no small way to economic insecurity as well, there was the whole question of the "red scare" prompted by socialist propaganda that trumpeted 1852 as the year of reckoning. Supposedly, a "red" triumph in the elections of that year would spur the labouring class to compensate itself at the expense of those who had suppressed and exploited it.⁷ At the least, the "crisis of 1852" as it was called, was expected to provide a unique opportunity for those dissatisfied with the existing system to stir up unrest in the country. Since both Assembly and Presidential terms were set to expire at about the same time (April 28 and May 10, 1852 respectively) the focusing of discontent on this particular period by constitutional revisionists supporting Louis Napoléon and leftists dissatisfied with the restricted franchise seemed to threaten another 1848.⁸

Financial circles, snatched from the impending storm by the coup d'état, were at least grateful for the promised stability of Louis Napoléon's new order, even if initially they had no hand in its design.⁹ Shortly, complaisant resignation would give way to active investment in the

regime's future which they soon allied to their own.

With interests in a stable status quo that in many ways paralleled those of the business sector, the church and its political supporters also accepted the coup d'état. The plebiscite on the coup d'état saw Montalembert, a former deputy in the then abolished National Assembly, soliciting votes for Louis Napoléon through the medium of a letter published in the legitimist and clerical Univers:

Voter contre Louis Napoléon, c'est donner raison à la révolution socialiste . . . c'est appeler la dictature des rouges à remplacer la dictature d'un prince qui a rendu depuis trois ans d'incomparables services à la cause de l'ordre et du Catholicisme.¹⁰

Two considerations figured prominently in such support, one negative, the other positive. The first was the avowed anticlericalism of the "reds"; the second was the record of the Second Republic under Louis Napoléon, which extended church influence in education and intervened in the Italian states to protect the temporal power of the papacy. Indeed, one bishop implied that so clear were the alternatives that a vote by Jesus Christ in this matter would be definitely inscribed "Oui" in favour of the coup d'état.¹¹

With the opportunity presented by political and economic crisis, and the endorsement of business interests and the church, Louis Napoléon also had the considerable advantage of the Bonaparte name and legend that had served him so well in 1848. The varied and substantial nature of this support was reflected in the initial calm response to the coup and in the results of the plebiscite of December 20, 1851.

Paris met the December 2 turn of events with an essentially "business as usual" attitude, although troops occupied all major public buildings, railway terminals and telegraph offices, and the presses and personnel of opposition newspapers had been silenced.

December 2 witnessed only token resistance by about 300 deputies of the deposed Assembly. Failing in an effort to hold the Assembly hall where they planned to convene an emergency session, they retired to the Mairie of the tenth Paris arrondissement; here they were met by police who broke up the meeting and arrested the participants. In the early hours prior to this, seventy-eight noted parliamentarians, journalists, Republicans and expected leaders of real opposition had been quickly and quietly confined to places of detention. It was announced as well that armed individuals or barricade builders would be shot on sight. By evening it looked as if the situation was well in hand.¹²

But three days later there was armed opposition in Paris and scattered uprisings of a local nature broke out in the provinces. While the latter cases usually collapsed upon the arrival of troops in the area, Paris felt the full force of repression required to clear barricades, insurgents and spectators from the streets. At least 600 people were shot down, not a few of them simply bystanders on the boulevards.¹³ In all, some thirty departments were placed in a state of siege, all police powers passing to the military.¹⁴ Everywhere, arrests and extraordinary measures

were authorized, as the administration of national order was momentarily rendered arbitrary.¹⁵ An executive decree of 8 December 1851 provided that any individual placed under police surveillance and attempting to elude it, or anyone thought to belong to a secret society, would be transported to a penal colony for reasons of the sûreté générale;¹⁶ in all, 26,642 suspects were ordered under arrest or placed under surveillance.¹⁷

Consolidating his position against opponents, whether confirmed or suspected, Louis Napoléon ordered the banishment of about eighty-five former parliamentarians of the Second Republic. Sixty-six of these were condemned as known leaders of 'socialism', while eighteen others were removed as potential agitators.¹⁸ As the Minister of the Interior had declared a few days before these sentences were finalized, even the most respected of symbols lose that respect when they recall unpleasant memories. As was the case with the motto liberté, égalité, fraternité, he argued, so it was with the former deputies: they served only to trouble and disturb passersby: "veuillez donc les faire effacer!"¹⁹

All of these measures Louis Napoléon interpreted as justified and/or forgiven by the popular acclaim he received in the plebiscite December 20, 1851. The basis of the election was his "Appel au Peuple" of December 2. The president, to serve a ten year term, would be responsible though the terms of this responsibility were not outlined. Ministers would be dependent solely on the executive

authority. A Conseil d'Etat would prepare laws and defend them before the legislature. The legislature, the Corps législatif, would be elected directly by universal suffrage to discuss and vote these laws. And finally, a Senate of notables would serve as the guardian of the constitution and the public liberties.²⁰ The results of the voting registered 7,439,216 in agreement with the proposal, while 610,737 voted against. The totals may be accepted as generally valid, since the ballots were counted publicly and in the presence of the voters to assure their credibility.²¹

The overwhelming popularity of his program as affirmed in the plebiscite offered Louis Napoléon a license to adopt whatever course he considered conducive to the design of new state institutions. Accordingly, a decree of 11 January 1852 abolished the National Guard; another of March 25 suspended all clubs. The press, which had been under restriction since December 4 was limited further through the decree of 17 February 1852: the 'best' that previous regimes had devised in the way of restrictive measures was combined in one comprehensive code now to be implemented by the enforcement agencies of the executive-- not the judicial arm of government.²²

No newspaper, journal or periodical could be founded or published without government authorization. All were subject to a stamp tax. Owners of publications were required to post a fee with the government which was for-

feited in any contravention of regulations. Any article in "bad faith" which might contribute to public disorder would result in heavy fines or imprisonment for those considered responsible. Three occasions of such "bad faith" would result in government suspension of the publication.²³ Of eighty-seven papers suppressed, seventy-one were classified as either republican, socialist or anarchical. By mid 1852 an additional thirty-seven newspapers, nine of which were pro-government, suspended publication because of their inability to meet government financial or press limitations. Those papers which continued to appear were soon disciplined into extreme moderation, neutrality or pro-government cooperation.²⁴

An executive order of 20 January 1852 dispatched the commissions mixtes to settle accounts with those arrested in the days following the coup. These extrajudicial tribunals composed of the prefect, the commanding general and the procureurs (public prosecuting agents) of each department were authorized to carry out proceedings against the political prisoners. While supposedly prosecuting only those who were considered a threat to the public order, the commissions mixtes in effect conducted a purge of those suspected of harbouring hostility to the new regime.²⁵ The total of 14,118 condemnations pronounced by these commissions--more than half of those originally detained were convicted--resulted in 9,769 sentences of transportation, 1,545 of exile and 2,804 of internment.²⁶

If the dictatorial nature of this regime produced misgivings, these must have been confirmed by the final article of the constitution which declared that all decrees issued by the Prince-President since December 2 would continue to be valid, even once the constitution was in force. In many ways the "Constitution Faite en Vertu Des Pouvoirs Délégués Par Le Peuple Français A Louis Napoléon Bonaparte Par Le Vote Des 20 et 21 décembre 1851"²⁷ must have seemed little more than the rules of order for his continued personal rule.

Nonetheless, the voluntary nature of cooperation with the regime must be stressed if we are to understand the role of the deputies in the Corps législatif, who remain the main interest of the present study. Too often the system of repression introduced by Louis Napoléon to consolidate his position at the outset is interpreted as the basic element explaining the whole phase of the Second Empire known as the authoritarian regime. To consider Louis Napoléon's administration in the one dimensional aspect of a dictatorship based solely on force, ignores the complexity of the factors actually involved. In this light the policy of repression appears as much an over-reaction to limited opposition as it was unnecessary in view of the plebiscite.

CHAPTER II

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FAÇADE

Though the regime stopped short of totalitarianism, the authoritarian phase of the Second Empire provided little more than a constitutional façade for the continuation of Louis Napoléon's personal rule. Neither in its origins nor in its evolution was the Constitution of 14 January 1852 the fulfillment of the mandate Louis Napoléon had received.

His "Appel au Peuple" had promised "une constitution que les Assemblées développeront plus tard."¹ When the eighty-member commission assigned to the task failed to expedite the matter to his satisfaction, Louis Napoléon charged the jurists Troplong and Rouher to throw a constitution together. This they did in forty-eight hours over three consecutive days.² While providing for certain institutions to share in the processes of state, this constitution simultaneously subordinated their powers to the authority of the president. Quite clearly, any 'development' of the constitution would be solely at the wish of the executive.³

Members of the new state institutions should have known where authority was centred even before March 29, 1851. But on that date, contrary to any parliamentary

practice, Louis Napoléon summoned the deputies and senators to him! But why not? Excepting the state of seige, all repressive restrictions established during the first four months of the regime remained intact.⁴ The legacy of decrees and the constitution that preceded convocation of new state assemblies assured the preservation of executive power in all essentials. Louis Napoléon obviously remained the sole possessor of executive power. Even after the dictator declared the dictatorship ended, decrees would far outnumber laws and continue to encroach on actual legislative affairs. As late as 27 January 1853, 6,153 individuals, almost half of those originally condemned by the commissions mixtes, remained subject to their penalties; another 5,450 were under police surveillance.⁵ The reinstatement of the empire at the end of 1852 further enhanced the basis of executive authority: power would now be wielded by Napoléon III not only for ten years, but for life. The single free expression of public opinion left to the electorate was the choosing of deputies to the Corps législatif, scheduled to take place once every six years.⁶ Since these deputies constitute the central interest of this discussion, it is essential that their power in the Corps législatif be given careful consideration.

The "Appel au Peuple" of 2 December 1851 placed fourth on its list of proposals "un Corps législatif discutant et votant les lois".⁷ A similar level of inferiority was reserved for the legislature in the Constitution

of 14 January 1852.⁸ The fact that the Corps législatif was not the most important institution of state is further reflected in its limited powers: the constitution confined it to discussing and voting laws and taxes. All initiative in legislation and all residual powers not delegated, rested with Louis Napoléon as President of France. In the business of drafting legislation, the President was assisted by the forty personally chosen members of his Conseil d'Etat.⁹ Louis Napoléon's view of amendments to proposed legislation -- "qui dérangent souvent toute l'économie d'un système et l'ensemble du projet primitif . . . qui était la source de si graves abus, et qui permettait à chaque député de se substituer à tout propos au Gouvernement en présentant les projets les moins étudiés, les moins approfondis"¹⁰--prevented their being raised on the floor of the Corps législatif. If the particular legislative commission reviewing a bill adopted any changes, these were to be suggested, without discussion, to the Conseil d'Etat. The Conseil d'Etat would decide whether the proposed amendment had merit; in the event of a negative decision, the amendment would not be deliberated in the legislature.

As an additional restriction on its influence, no petitions could be addressed to the Corps législatif. Instead, the constitution directed these to Louis Napoléon's handpicked senators. The Senate was also granted jurisdiction over the constitution which it could interpret and amend through a senatorial pronouncement known as a

Sénatus-consulte.¹⁰

Any efforts to secure a responsible parliamentary system would be made doubly difficult since all ministers, named by the President, were individually responsible to him alone, and did not form a cabinet. No minister could be a member of the Corps législatif, nor could he participate in its discussions. Government projects would be supported by members of the Conseil d'Etat. Louis Napoléon's attempt at justification claimed that as a result, "le temps ne se perd pas en vaines interpellations, en accusations frivoles, en luttes passionnées dont l'unique but était de renverser les ministres pour les remplacer."¹¹

Not only were the powers of the legislature severely limited, but its contact with the general public was restricted as well. Direct reports of legislative debate or the publication of anything beyond the official summary of proceedings was prohibited.¹² In contrast, the owner of any publication was obliged by the "Décret Organique sur la Presse" of 17 February 1852 to print all official documents and communications submitted by the government, "gratuite" and "en tête du journal," in the first issue after their submission.¹³ While the Corps législatif worked in relative obscurity, each of Louis Napoléon's executive proclamations was assured the maximum publicity possible. Furthermore, legislative sessions were to be short--three months per year, and elections infrequent--once every six years. Though the discussions would be open to the public, the

request of five deputies could effect a closed session. Not until ten months after the first legislature had been elected was the constitution modified to allow deputies a sum of 2,500 francs per month by way of compensation for the time they spent away from their regular occupations during each session.¹⁴ Under the Constitution of 14 January 1852, there was little possibility that the Corps législatif could escape the influence of Louis Napoléon Bonaparte. As President of France, he named the president, the vice-president and the secretaries of the Corps législatif; and it was he who convoked, prorogued or dissolved that body as well.¹⁵

In many ways the Corps législatif was designed only as a sounding board for the ideas of the executive. In physical appearance, its meetings resembled an audience participating in the performance of government only to the extent of registering approval or dismay; the arena of spirited debate that had characterized other periods of French legislative history was no more. Sitting in a block, facing a delegation from the Conseil d'Etat, deputies spoke from their places without the aid of either desk or speakers' rostrum.¹⁶ In addition, any decree or presidential message addressed by Louis Napoléon was simply read out to the assembled legislature by his appointed councillor without subsequent debate or vote.¹⁷ Finally, given the nature of Conseil d'Etat control over amendments to legislation, all that remained in the sense of legislative influence over the course of state affairs was the power to

reject proposed projects en bloc; but support which might have been attracted to amendments eluded efforts intending to scuttle proposals in their entirety.¹⁸

Louis Napoléon had no reason to expect much opposition. In addition to his other precautions, he had assured that all deputies would swear their loyalty to the existing regime. Article fourteen of the constitution declared that all ministers, senators, deputies, conseillers d'état, military officers, judges and civil servants were to take an oath of allegiance: "je jure obéissance à la constitution et fidélité au Président."¹⁹ A further decree of 8 March 1853 provided that in all cases, including that of deputies to the Corps législatif, refusal or failure to pledge the prescribed oath would be interpreted as an automatic resignation.²⁰ The presence of deputies in the Corps législatif who had taken a similar oath to Louis Philippe, and who now unhesitatingly accepted another to Louis Napoléon, might lead one to consider the issue as a simple formality; further discussion will reveal, however, that the prerequisite of the oath caused several resignations, preventing certain real opponents of the regime from accepting seats in the first legislature.

Deputies who did take their places in the Corps législatif received very minor guarantees of traditional legislative liberties. Though Louis Napoléon could dissolve the Corps législatif at will, the constitution obliged him to summon a new one within six months. His selections for

president and vice-president of the legislative body had to be chosen from among its membership.²¹ Furthermore, article twenty-nine of the February 2, 1852 "Décret Organique pour l'Election des Députés au Corps législatif" established that all salaried public offices were incompatible with the mandate of deputy to the Corps législatif.²² While this was somewhat of an assurance that Louis Napoléon would not pack the legislature with creatures that were on his payroll, it also spared him some of the criticism that had greeted Louis Philippe's legislatures of civil servants and royal household fonctionnaires. This provision was altered but a little by a Sénatus-consulte of December 25, 1852 which allowed officers in the reserve forces to accept legislative seats and yet preserve their commands.²³ Finally, the deputies were granted traditional parliamentary immunity, exceptions to be determined by the Corps législatif; the constitution also appointed the legislature the sole judge of the validity of each of its elections.²⁴

Regulation of the Corps législatif left few vestiges of the powers that had characterized the legislature under the previous regime. Yet candidates still presented themselves for election.

CHAPTER III

THE ELECTIONS TO THE FIRST LEGISLATURE

As the very few concessions to legislature freedom were eclipsed by the authoritarian measures written into the constitution, so electoral restrictions and the system of official candidates compensated Louis Napoléon heavily for having permitted a legislature at all.

The main regulations pertaining to legislative elections were outlined on two separate occasions. The Constitution of 14 January 1852 established that elections would normally occur once each six years on the basis of universal manhood suffrage, with one elected representative for each 35,000 electors; the system of representation by lists was abolished.¹ More specific instructions were issued in the "Décret Organique pour l'Election des Députés au Corps législatif" of February 2, 1852. Each département would be divided into single-member circonscriptions or electoral divisions equal in number to the deputies allotted to it according to its population; an extra deputy would be elected in each département where the population exceeded the equal divisions of 35,000 by at least 25,000 electors. The constituencies would be revised, supposedly only to account for shifts in population, once every five years.

Each male citizen twenty-one years of age or older, possessing his civil and political rights and having resided in his circonscription for six months, was entitled to exercise a single vote through a secret ballot. Members of the military forces, however, could vote only in the commune where they had resided prior to their enlistment; in effect, since most soldiers were posted elsewhere, they were disenfranchised.

Candidates for election to the Corps législatif were required to be at least twenty-five years old and free of any criminal or political charges.² As already noted, they could be neither civil servants nor the recipients of any state salary. Candidates were not subject to a residence requirement, and multiple candidacies were permitted. But while one man could present himself for election in several constituencies, each deputy could represent only one in the Corps législatif. In order to be elected on the first ballot, a candidate required an absolute majority of the votes cast, with a minimum of one-quarter of the registered electorate voting. In the event of a failure to achieve these results, or if a successful candidate opted for another constituency in which he was also elected, a round of ballotage would be effected. Whatever the number of voters, a plurality of the votes cast would determine the winner in this second contest. In the event of a tie vote, the elder would be declared the successful candidate.

This same decree assigned the number of deputies to be elected from each department of France (see Table 1), excluded representation from the colonies completely, and set the total number of circonscriptions for the 1852 elections at 261.³

Even within the very limited jurisdiction established by the constitution, a Corps législatif of 261 overtly hostile deputies (or even a small but vocal fraction of that number), could have caused Louis Napoléon considerable embarrassment. Additional precautions were therefore thought necessary, and in this respect, the four-month period of personal dictatorship left a more than adequate legacy. It was not a coincidence that the first elections took place at a time when the country was still under the restrictions of a state of siege and the expediencies of absolutism could be employed freely, in the government's favour.⁴

In establishing the size of the legislature, for example, Louis Napoléon claimed a particular motive:

la chambre n'est plus composée que d'environ deux cent soixante membres. C'est là une première garantie du calme des délibérations, car trop souvent on a vu dans les assemblées la mobilité et l'ardeur des passions croître en raison du nombre.⁵

What went unexpressed was that with a similar assembly there would be less danger of factions among the membership alienating themselves from the influence of the executive and becoming the nuclei of irreconcilable opposition.⁶

Similarly, though the abolition of the list system of election suggested that electors might now be more insistent upon their member representing the particular interests of the circonscription which had elected him,⁷ the measure simultaneously discontinued a method which had greatly facilitated the co-ordination of opposition on a national scale. The provision that military personnel would be deprived of their votes unless they happened to be in their home constituencies at the time of elections, assured that invitations would hardly be forthcoming for the various candidates to introduce the divisiveness of partisan politics into the barracks and bases supporting Louis Napoléon's dictatorship. Furthermore, thousands of assuredly opposition votes and numerous potential opposition candidates (especially among former members of the National Assembly), were removed through the political charges and deportations effected in the wake of the coup d'état.

These elaborate precautions should have been adequate, one would think, to overawe the threat of any opposition expression in the powerless Corps législatif. Yet, another measure was included, the one which proved most effective of all: to qualify the expression of universal manhood suffrage, a system of government candidates was devised. It was officially argued that universal manhood suffrage was an innovation too recently introduced to be properly understood by the politically ignorant and the unlettered. Official candidates supported by the government

would serve as a tutorial means to aid in distinguishing between rival contestants in the election campaigns.⁸ While this may have been true, this system obviously aided the election of government candidates. As a further favour to these candidates, but on the pretext of conforming constituency boundaries to the required electoral limitations, the government employed the practice of gerrymandering to their advantage.⁹ Their ballots and posters were also printed on the white regulation paper restricted to government use and financed from the public purse.¹⁰ Only white ballots were enclosed with the voter registration cards sent to each elector.¹¹

As for opponents to the government's candidates, the courts acquiesced in declaring coloured ballots and posters non-official publications; their distribution was therefore subject to all restraints and special levies exacted on the press by law. Other laws were interpreted to prevent election rallies, and all gatherings required the supervision of a government agent. Finally, each non-government poster required the authorization of the prefect prior to its being posted in his département.¹²

With such extensive restrictions, why have elections by universal manhood suffrage in the first place? Indeed, shortly after the coup d'état Louis Napoléon assured the Austrian ambassador: "Je veux bien être baptisé avec l'eau du suffrage universel, mais je n'entends pas vivre les pieds dans l'eau."¹³ Nonetheless, each of the elections under the

authoritarian empire seems less intended to secure support for political policies than to confirm the legitimacy of the regime.¹⁴ It was claimed that the people's interests were in perpetuating the spirit of the plebiscite; what had been abdicated to Louis Napoléon in 1851 should not be wrested from him through the elections to follow. The consequence of such thinking caused each election to serve as a replication of the plebiscite of December, with each candidate considered not so much to represent the diverse interests of constituents as to embody loyalty or opposition to Louis Napoléon himself.¹⁵

The initial calm response to the coup d'état, followed by the general failure of opposing forces to instigate a widespread insurrection, and the resignation of influential sectors of society to the new regime were amply reflected in candidacies for the Corps législatif elections. News of apprehended revolts lent an air of authenticity to Louis Napoléon's claim that his coup d'état had averted a threat of anarchy, and that he represented the defence of law and proper order in the French state.¹⁶ Then too, protesting voices were rendered conveniently too distant--imprisoned, transported to Algeria or Cayenne, or in self-exile abroad--to extend any real challenge.

In defining its electoral aims for the 1852 contest Louis Napoléon's administration could hardly have been more demanding. A letter circulated among the Prefects by Minister of the Interior de Persigny stipulated no less than

" . . . deux cent soixante et un députés animés du même esprit, dévoués aux mêmes intérêts, et disposés également à compléter la victoire du 20 décembre".¹⁷ With the rejection of the system of election by list the government could no longer expect the lesser known names among its candidates to be carried by the fame of those with a national reputation. Each official candidate in each circonscription had to be known to the constituents who would be called upon to elect him; to assure that this was done, all the influence of local government authorities (who owed their appointments to the central administration), was brought to bear upon the selection of promising government candidates. While such a system perhaps failed to produce many deputies of the stature to grace the salons of Paris, it packed the Corps législatif heavily in the government's favour. The Paris diarist Viel Castel, for example, snobbishly remarked, "les candidats patronnés par le gouvernement ont été choisis par je ne sais qui, mais à coup sûr il a fallu beaucoup d'art pour rassembler de telles nullités."¹⁸ With the plebiscitary frame of reference in which the government cast the elections, however, these "nobodies" represented Louis Napoléon. Persigny maintained that voters were being offered a unique opportunity:

en votant pour les amis de Louis Napoléon, ils auraient une seconde fois l'occasion de voter pour le prince lui-même.¹⁹

It was therefore imperative that the expected overwhelming approval actually materialize; accordingly, the administra-

tion was very concerned that official candidates be chosen from among men the prefects thought likely to win--non-Bonapartists were as often as not selected de rigueur rather than have a more loyal choice as official candidate subject the government to the possible humiliation of an electoral defeat. There was always hope of rallying the successful non-Bonapartists since their election would have been achieved through government patronage for which they would appear somewhat obligated; at the same time, in accepting such patronage they would undoubtedly alienate themselves from their former allegiances.²⁰

This was especially true since the legitimist pretender to the throne, the Comte de Chambord, demanded of his adherents a complete abstention from political life.²¹ The republicans adopted a similar policy. For these and other opponents of the regime, the prospect of being under constant police surveillance, too frequently encountering printers and campaign workers who refused to aid them openly, and a general fear of standing in blatant contradiction to existing authorities wielding authoritarian powers easily disheartened all but the most courageous.²² Given the extent of administrative pressure and the extraordinary measures employed by the government in favour of its candidates, the almost universal defeat of electoral opposition comes as no surprise. The elections of 29 February 1852 returned only eight independent candidates as compared to 253 government members.

Four of the original eight were legitimists: Audren de Kerdrél, Bouhier de l'Ecluse, the Marquis de Calvière and Durfort de Civrac.²³ Audren de Kerdrél refused to accept the restoration of the Empire and retired from public life before its proclamation.²⁴ Bouhier de l'Ecluse resolved to make a test case of himself, repeatedly took his place in the Corps législatif, absenting himself only at the times designated for his taking the oath of loyalty; in the end he was physically restrained from entering the Chamber, declared démissionnaire and replaced in a by-election.²⁵ Calvière loudly decried the fact that he had been declared a government candidate without his assent; to give action to his assertions he resigned in protest.²⁶ Only Durfort de Civrac retained his seat for the duration of the first legislature.

The three republicans elected--Carnot and Cavaignac in Paris and Hénon in Lyon--collectively declined to serve Louis Napoléon's authoritarian regime and were replaced by government candidates in subsequent by-elections. The letter which renounced their election was officially suppressed:

Les électeurs de Paris et de Lyon sont venus nous chercher dans notre retraite ou dans notre exil; nous les remercions d'avoir pensé que nos noms protestaient d'eux mêmes contre la destruction des libertés publiques et les rigueurs de l'arbitraire, mais ils n'ont pas voulu nous envoyer siéger dans un corps législatif dont les pouvoirs ne vont jusqu'à réparer les violations du droit; nous repoussons la théorie immorale des réticences et des arrières-pensées et nous refusons le serment exigé à l'entrée du corps législatif.²⁷

The eighth independent candidate elected in the 1852 elections was a moderate republican, Pierre Legrand, who was

unopposed by the government and who posed no threat to it.²⁸

This almost complete failure of opposition candidacies and the resignation of most of those who were elected, amply met government aspirations. The evaluation of electoral figures illustrates the full measure of this success best. As reflected in official election results, the voting population undeniably supported Louis Napoléon's regime (see Table 2). The eighty-four percent favourable vote received in the 1852 contest as a whole is rendered more impressive when the elections of individual deputies are considered (see Table 3). Fifty-two percent of the men who accepted their seats as deputies either in 1852 or after required by-elections prior to 1857 received over 90 percent of the ballots cast in their circonscriptions; all but a few of the deputies were elected with more than 50 percent of the electorate participating in the voting, with the majority attracting in excess of 60 percent of those registered to the polls. Again, the majority captured in excess of 50 percent of the registered vote, but a significant minority--35 percent--failed to draw half of the registered voters to their support.

Among the opposition deputies elected in 1852, all but Calvière failed to attract more than 60 percent of the ballots cast; he received 61 percent, while the others each won just over 50 percent of the vote. The registered voters who turned out to vote for them amounted to less than 50 percent in each case.

Two reservations could be held against the very favourable results garnered for the regime in 1852; both might be interpreted as indications of electoral opposition surpassing the 13 percent of the vote lost to opposition candidates. There is the question, first, of the spoiled or blank ballots returned in each election. A noticeably larger percentage occurred on the occasion of the legislative election of 1852 (see Table 2). This should not necessarily be attributed solely to expressions of protest, however. Legislative elections were slightly more complicated than the oui or non of the plebiscites; the failure of the illiterate to comprehend the mode of election could account for some of the spoiled ballots. This would be particularly true of the 1852 legislative elections when the system was newly introduced. Nonetheless, an inestimable extent of protest might also be contained in these spoiled or blank ballots which, especially in areas where only the government candidate was presented for election, would be one avenue open for the expression of dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs. In any event, the percentage is relatively insignificant in view of the favourable votes Louis Napoléon's administration received.

Much more evident than spoiled or blank ballots, however, is the factor of voter abstention (see Table 4). Once again it would be over-simplification to attribute the total phenomenon to the single interpretation of protest. Despite the unparalleled 36.7 percent abstention figure for

the 1852 elections--a rate unequalled in French electoral contests before or since--mitigating factors common to all elections require consideration. Voters who could not get to the polls; those who were not sufficiently acquainted with the various candidates to exercise an intelligent vote and who therefore refrained from voting; those indifferent to politics; as well as those who absented themselves due to their affiliation with political opposition to the right or left of Louis Napoléon's regime must be assumed in the total abstention figure.²⁹ Then too, the executive of the new order promised to virtually eclipse the legislative branch of government so that the latter would appear a mere shadow of the assemblies that had met under the Second Republic. Understandably therefore, the proposed Corps législatif failed to arouse great electoral interest.

To conclude, official candidates had the overpowering support of the government bureaucracy at their disposal; coming in 1852, while France was still under the heel of Louis Napoléon's dictatorship, the coercion that could be applied to assure favourable electoral results precluded the necessity for manipulation of figures after the fact.³⁰ Furthermore, by the end of 1852 only one of the independents originally elected to the Corps législatif remained; the other seven had resigned. But rather than summarize the government successes of 1852 further, let us turn our attention to the analysis of the deputies.

CHAPTER IV

THE POLITICS OF THE FIRST LEGISLATURE, 1852 - 1857

The story of Louis Napoléon's first legislature has been repeated too often to proceed as if it had never been told at all. Unfortunately, much of what was said in the past appears based on oversimplification of the facts, or worse, represents attempts to embellish or perpetuate myths introduced by anti-imperial interpretations. My own analysis of the Corps législatif between 1852 and 1857 is an attempt to clarify, confirm or cast aside previous accounts while providing a more accurate interpretation per se.

One of the earliest accounts, that of De La Gorce, dismissed previous public service among the deputies quite simply: they were "gens plus rompus aux affaires privées ou locales qu'accoutumés à la politique".¹ Gooch assumes that "the supporters of the government who sat in the body [Corps législatif] were largely newcomers to public life."² Seignobos notes, "aucun membre marquant des 'anciens partis,' sauf Montalembert".³ According to Marx, the Second Empire occasioned the exploitation of the wealth of the State by a band of nouveaux venus, without scruples, system or programme, in the interests of a very small group of the bourgeoisie.⁴

And what was the role played by these men? Too many historians have rendered valid the judgement of Montalembert; himself a deputy and disillusioned with the mandate he had assisted Louis Napoléon to secure, he disdainfully predicted:

"l'histoire dira si elle prend la peine de s'en occuper, quelle fut l'infatigable complaisance et l'incommensurable abaissement de cette première Assemblée du Second Empire."⁵

This line of interpretation would have us believe that the deputies were a subservient assembly, always expressing overwhelming approval of whatever the executive arm of government proposed.⁶ Perhaps the most eloquent exposition of the idea came in Victor Hugo's Napoléon le petit:

Le Corps législatif marche sur la pointe du pied, roule son chapeau dans ses mains, met le doigt sur sa bouche, sourit humblement, s'assied sur le coin de sa chaise et ne parle que quand on l'interroge. Il y a donc dans la boutique où se fabriquent les lois et les budgets, un maître de la maison, le Conseil d'Etat, et un domestique, le Corps législatif.⁷

In contrast Zeldin's analysis recently demonstrated that the Corps législatif included men of substantial means and experience, some with previous parliamentary experience, and he assumed as a corollary that these men would demand a liberalization of the regime and a more direct participation in the affairs of state.⁸ But is the connection as direct as Zeldin would suggest? Did the corollary necessarily follow?

One point unexplored in any previous study is the relationship between the deputies and the places of their election. This is particularly significant in view of the

abolition of the system of election by list. Though the impact of this factor cannot be measured in terms of the number of votes it augmented in Louis Napoléon's favour, it is nonetheless interesting. In discussing the face of the dictatorship as revealed in elections, numerous references were made to authoritarian measures that could be employed by the government to secure electoral successes. As effective as it proved in applying the 'stick' of persuasion, the regime also saw the advisability of employing the 'carrot'. Candidates, in the majority of cases, were chosen from the community of voters who would be called upon to elect them even though there was no formal residence requirement. Fifty-one percent of the deputies to the first legislature had been born in the département which they represented; 88 percent were residents or property owners in the area; and 78 percent had filled at least one public office there, either national or local, prior to their election under Louis Napoléon's regime. Only nine percent of the men studied showed no such relationships to the place of their election. (See Table 5.)

The high incidence of previous public experience points out the fallacy of interpretations claiming the deputies to be a collection of unknowns. Men having served on the lower levels of local government as either a conseiller municipal or a conseiller d'arrondissement are the least frequently encountered among the deputies to the first legislature, comprising only 12 percent of the total.

Former mayors accounted for 30 percent of the legislature. These Zeldin recognizes, though he does not mention any other local government experience.⁹ This is particularly unfortunate since such an examination would have supported one of the main elements of his thesis: he suggests a decentralized selection process for official candidates, explaining that the prefects, not Napoléon or the Minister of the Interior, exercised the greatest influence in the choosing. One might expect, as indeed is the case, that the prefects would prefer men known to them and of proven ability.¹⁰ Even more frequently than former mayors, therefore, former members of departmental councils may be found among the deputies. Fifty-six percent of the deputies to the first Corps législatif possessed the notability accompanying a position at the département level of local government, having served as a conseiller-général or a conseiller de préfecture. (See Table 6 and List 1.)

Political experience among the deputies did not end with local government offices, however. Estimates of turnover in political personnel should be approached with caution; proper recognition of the elements of continuity and change would place less emphasis on the latter part of statements such as this:

très vite rentrent dans l'ombre les noms les plus connus de la II^e République . . . Le Second Empire fait accéder au pouvoir toute une série d'hommes inconnus ou peu connus sous les régimes antérieurs.¹¹

Nowhere is continuity between Louis Napoléon's and previous regimes more evident than in the membership of the Corps

législatif. Sixty-three percent of the first legislature had held some form of national government position prior to their term of office under the Second Empire. (See Table 7 and List 2.) Of the deputies who served between 1852 and 1857, for example, 38 percent had previously served in Louis Philippe's administration; it should be noted, however, that slightly more than half of these held administrative or military positions not necessarily related to political affiliation with the regime. As well, almost without exception they had not been key figures of influence.¹²

Former deputies to the Constituent Assembly of 1848 accounted for 16 percent of the deputies to the first Corps législatif. And despite Louis Napoléon's use of force to crush the National Assembly in 1851, former members of that body accounted for 26 percent of the deputies to his first legislature. Furthermore, three cabinet officials of the Second Republic--Chasseloup-Laubat, Morny and Schneider--also served as deputies.

Dynastic loyalty cannot have been an overriding consideration for many of these men. A civil servant under the Restoration and civil servant and deputy under Louis Philippe, Chasseloup-Laubat went without position in 1848, returning as a deputy and then minister later in the Second Republic, and reappeared as a deputy to the Corps législatif in 1852, on the threshold of even higher appointments. Mésonan illustrates how the military guaranteed

perhaps the greatest continuity of all. The army, except perhaps the highest echelons of the officer corps, was relatively safe from the political turmoil accompanying each change of regime. Beginning his service in one of the great Napoléon's regiments, Mésonan continued his career under the Restoration and the July Monarchy, joining Louis Napoléon at Boulogne in 1840. His initial reward of official candidate status in the 1852 election was later augmented by a seat in the Senate. (See List 2 and List 10.) These examples are not unique; they complement Zeldin's inquiry which suggested that a very significant degree of continuity was bound to be expressed when about one-third of all deputies under the Second Empire came from political families and were thus "born into politics"; nepotism in dynasties of politicians assured that certain families would be represented in any legislature "though kings ~~[sic]~~ might come and go."¹³

To consider a few examples, Cambacérès, Gellibert des Séguins, Vast-Vimeux and Villedieu de Torcy succeeded their fathers in the Corps législatif, while Busson-Billault and Kersaint succeeded their fathers-in-law. The two Champagny, Montemart and Plancy brothers were deputies at the same time, as were the two Lemerriers--father and son. The elder Lemerrier's brother was a senator, as were the brothers of Caulaincourt, Chaumont-Quitry, Ladoucette, Las-Cases and Roguet, and the fathers of Beauveau, Ornano, Reille and Tascher de la Pagerie. The father of Charlemagne, the brother of Chevalier, the father-in-law of Delapalme and

the son of Parieu were members of the Conseil d'Etat, Delapalmé's brother-in-law was Baroche the minister; Maupas' son was Minister of Police; Abbatucci's father and Fortoul's brother were also ministers. Didier's brother and Chevreau's son were prefects. The brother of Cambacérès (the elder) was a member of Louis Napoléon's court.¹⁴

There were of course, other men, their loyalties to past regimes more marked, who were elected in 1852--many as official candidates.¹⁵ In the case of Chasseloup-Laubat, for example, dynastic connection in terms of his career advancement might be more accurate an expression than dynastic loyalty. There were thirty such men with Orleanist ties in the first legislature, 33 former legitimists and a moderate republican, Legrand. (See Table 8 and List 3.) If the careers of some of these men are followed, however, it again becomes apparent that individual careers superseded dynastic affiliations in many cases, perhaps flowering under one regime more than another and therefore becoming "tainted" due to the favours received.

The Orleanist Lemaire (Oise) is perhaps most significant for furthering the political fortunes of the Lemaire "dynasty" more than any other, serving as a civil servant under Napoléon I and the Restoration, and then as a deputy under Louis Philippe and in the National Assembly where he had protested against the coup d'état. (See List 2.) Nonetheless, he accepted official patronage in the election of 1852 and took his seat in the Corps législatif.

as a government deputy.¹⁶ Levavasseur retained his seat as a deputy from the July Monarchy through 1848, the Second Republic and the Second Empire until defeated in 1857. This was also true of Hérambault who outlasted Levavasseur in the Corps législatif. Few former Orleanists had served only the July Monarchy, receiving neither position nor favour from any other. (Compare List 3 and List 2.) Zeldin wrote of the Bonapartist group in the Corps législatif that barely half were "'pure' and free from all other loyalties."¹⁷ He could have made a similar remark about the so-called Orleanists. Perhaps this is one reason why Louis Napoléon's system of official candidacies proved accessible enough to these remnants of past regimes: provided that the new order was accepted, political antecedents could usually be ignored.¹⁸ After all, in many cases they had been ignored before. Then too, the importance of winning has been mentioned, and many of these men with their long, though varied, public careers had obvious advantages. And "new men," notable but without questionable political antecedents, were at a premium, as will be explained in due course.

There were exceptions, of course. The first legislature was 34 percent titled, yet not one deputy was first granted his nobility by the July Monarchy. (See Table 9 and List 4.) This is significant since men with Orleanist attachments were as conspicuous in the Corps législatif as were former legitimists. /This contradicts Beau de

Loménie's observations that few legitimists rallied to Louis Napoléon while numerous Orleanists did so without the least hesitation.¹⁹ Noble title dating to a particular regime may or may not be a clear indication of dynastic loyalty. Sale of such titles was not unknown, for example. Nevertheless, the acceptance or purchase of a noble title identified with a particular regime could be interpreted only as having accepted or solicited a favour from that regime; this weighed particularly heavily on the Orleanists. For the most part first or second generation in origin, Orleanist titles were often too recent to escape interpretation as examples of tainted rival influence--to be excluded as much as possible.²⁰

Most of the legitimist titles present in mid-nineteenth century French society had not been solicited by the bearer himself. For the large part inherited, these titles were displayed much like a good classical education as "a mark of good breeding, like the membership of an exclusive club."²¹ The Comte de Chambord considered such prestige to be sufficiently powerful to cause embarrassment by its absence.²² His wishes for abstention obviously went unfulfilled when 22 of the 33 former legitimists in the Corps législatif held titles, 19 predating the French Revolution. (Compare List 3 and List 4.)

Nevertheless, of the 33 legitimists the four elected as opposition candidates were "pure" in the sense of having abstained from prior national service completely (Calvière,

Durfort de Civrac) or having served only as representatives of the legitimist cause in previous parliamentary assemblies (Audren de Kerdrel, Bouhier de l'Ecluse). Even those who accepted official candidate status were relatively free of the connections with rival dynasties that the legitimist pretender decried. Bourcier de Villiers, who retained his military command, or Lescuyer d'Attainville, who remained in the civil service under the July Monarchy, are exceptions. Mortemart (Rhône) comes closest to approximating the public service careers of many Orleanists and Bonapartists, beginning a military career under the Restoration and then serving as a deputy under the July Monarchy and in 1848. Bucher de Chauvigné had held a judicial appointment under Napoléon I. Less than half had any prior public experience at the national level. Only twelve had held seats in previous legislatures. (Compare List 2 and List 3.)

This may explain why the accounts of the Second Empire repeatedly suggest a significant Orleanist presence in the Corps législatif while the equally large group of rallied legitimists has received considerably less attention. Obviously the Orleanists were more noticeable and Orleanist attachments were pronounced. Why? Among deputies bearing a distinction of the Legion of Honour, for example, almost half had received it from the hands of Louis Phillippe. (See Table 10 and List 5.) While he certainly included political favourites among his appointments, many were undoubtedly men of merit. Similarly, and as mentioned

previously over one-third of the deputies had gained political or administrative experience under the regime. And finally, like a few legitimists many Orleanists were not above opportunism in questions of political advancement versus dynastic loyalty. (Compare List 2 and List 3.)

In this characteristic they were similar, too, with many Bonapartists in the Corps législatif. If anything, men who had Bonapartist connections to bring to light had petitioned for official candidate status even more energetically than others who might wish their political pasts obscured.

Prompted by the reelection of four courtiers (Belmont, Chaumont-Quitry, Chevalier and Labédoyère), who had served on Louis Napoléon's personal staff prior to their first election the diarist Viel-Castel commented: "Le gouvernement se donne le tort de patronner comme candidats à la députation une foule de nullités qui n'ont d'autre titre que d'appartenir comme fonctionnaires à la maison civile de l'Empereur."²³ But these four were not alone in taking advantage of their close relationship with Louis Napoléon to secure seats in his legislature. Others were relatives--Clary, Lafon de Cayx and Morny. Add to these the names of Conneau (Louis Napoléon's physician), Geiger (who was raised with him), Mésonan (from the Boulogne attempt), as well as Didier, Millet, Verclos, Wattebled, Arnaud and Massabiau.²⁴

Sometimes, reminders of service under the great Napoléon secured government recognition; despite the nearly

fifty-year interval between the two empires, 11 percent of the deputies elected between 1852 and 1857 had previously held positions in the service of Napoléon I. (See Table 7 and List 2.) For example, under the first empire Mercier had been a deputy, Bucher de Chauvigné had filled a judicial appointment, Houdetot had been a prefect, Thieullen a sub-prefect, and Lemaire (Oise) and Darblay other civil servants. An additional twenty-nine had served in Napoléon's military forces.²⁵

But if the Second Empire came too late to restore personal careers, hopefuls were quick to exploit service rendered by fathers, grandfathers or other relatives to secure an official candidacy in the election. And since government candidates were almost everywhere successful, the membership of the Corps législatif boasted, if not always the personages, at least some of the most famous names of Napoléon I's regime. (See List 2 and List 6.) As well, Delamarre (Creuse) was the nephew of one of Napoléon's ministers, and five deputies--Belliard, Bourlon, Duzat-Dembarère, Noualhier and Romeuf--were related to generals of the first Empire.

Apart from these men whose Imperial connections were de la veille, one must consider the Bonapartists du jour. Among the latter who appeared in the Corps législatif were various journalists--Delamarre, Granier de Cassagnac, Jubinal, Noubet and Véron--and members of Bonapartist electoral committees: Bouchetal-Laroche, Chevreau, Dela-

palme, Fortoul, Fauché-Lepelletier, Guyard-Delalain, Kerveguen, Koenigswarter, Leroux, Maupas and Schneider.²⁶ To these one can add the names of those belonging to the political families mentioned earlier.

To total all deputies in the first legislature with Bonapartist connections, either through personal service under Napoléon I, family connection through a father's or relative's attachments to the first empire, or because of personal or family loyalties to Louis Napoléon [Including those allegiances fairly new in expression] yields 121 names. (See List 2 and List 6 and compare with Appendix I.) None suggested by Zeldin have been eliminated; however there are many deputies with connections to Bonapartism no less evident than those he does mention who do not appear in his lists. For example, Zeldin notes "seventeen who had served under the great Napoléon as prefects, soldiers or members of parliament."²⁷ The biographical summaries upon which the present study is based reveal that deputies in this category total twice the number mentioned by Zeldin. Family connections to the first empire are also more extensive than Zeldin's description would suggest. This is true, as well, of family relationships between deputies, and between deputies and other officials of the regime.²⁸

This is not to imply that I would refute Zeldin's total of 70 Bonapartists and substitute the 121 names my own study suggests. Suffice it to say that between 1852 and 1857 121 members of the Corps législatif were men with

Bonapartist affiliations. This does not mean all were Bonapartists in the sense that others were legitimists for example. By 1852 many were proclaiming their Bonapartist connections in a fashion to fit the epithet 'opportunist' more so than Bonapartist. With this Zeldin's account is in agreement and concludes moreover that the so-called Bonapartists were hardly exclusive in their past dynastic loyalties, making the process of assigning party loyalties a definitely arbitrary one.

In this light the acceptance of an absolute figure for Bonapartists in the Corps législatif is nearly impossible. It appears that there were more than seventy men who could make this claim, yet the total number did not exceed half the legislature.

Additional collaborationists though not necessarily converts (i.e. compare List 3 and List 7), were recruited through Louis Napoléon's Consultative Commission, established just after the coup d'état. With resignations and additions depending on news of disorder spreading or apprehended, the membership changed from one day to the next until a final list appeared containing the names of 51 future deputies, several future members of the Conseil d'Etat, and others destined for the Senate. The deputy Véron concluded quite precisely: "c'était une première liste de candidats au pouvoir, aux places, aux honneurs."³⁰ Though the Commission never met as a body, the men who allowed their names to be added to the list in effect endorsed the

coup d'état and thus committed themselves to the new regime. Sixteen percent of the first legislature was composed of such men. (See List 7.)

But what about those without previous political connections either to retard or recommend their acceptance as government candidates? At that time, and since, these were known as les hommes nouveaux. A rather nebulous category at best, practically all accounts of membership in the Corps législatif have included it, unclarified.³¹ What remains indistinct, despite these accounts, is the number of deputies representative of these 'new men'. Zeldin notes "about forty new men" /By actual count, he lists 39 names.³² Still lacking, however, is a clear statement of the criteria used to establish the category and then to differentiate the members from the larger body. The definition Zeldin quotes is hardly adequate, 'new men' being interpreted as those "who have not been members of any previous parliament and who are consequently free and independent."³³ Many of the deputies without parliamentary experience were nonetheless committed by virtue of other government positions with political overtones, nepotism and family connections, or for other reasons--including many of those considered 'new men' by Zeldin.

Rejecting his classification entails a narrower delimitation of what the phrase les hommes nouveaux should comprehend. It is recognized that national government service, alone, is not usually a sufficiently accurate

measure of dynastic loyalty to support a classification system. But to be absolutely certain none but truly 'new men' are considered in this category, all those who occupied regional or national government positions under previous regimes will be eliminated. Those with known dynastic connections--including Bonapartists--cannot be counted as 'new men' either; nor should all deputies who owed their seats in the Corps législatif to nepotism or inherited family political influence. In short, taking the list of deputies (Appendix I), and deleting all names that may be identified with prior political associations leaves those who may be termed les hommes nouveaux. On such close examination, very few of the men elected in 1852 fit into the category.

Most notables had tasted politics under previous regimes, while few among genuine 'new men' were notables!³⁴ For similar reasons, there were no 'new men' among elected opposition deputies. Despite all the talk of their desirability in 1852 and their mention in most assessments of the election later, only seventeen 'new men' were elected in 1852; all told, they made up six percent of the first legislature. (See List 8.)

But how did this sundry collection of men function in the legislature, given their marked differences in political experience, loyalty to the regime and personal ambition? Surely these would lead to a diversity of views rather than a unity of purpose--at least this is Zeldin's viewpoint.

Although he provides only allusions to opposition in the Corps législatif before 1860, until quite recently his account was unique in suggesting even that much.³⁵ Older works, especially constitutional studies, have us assume that the submissiveness and complicity characterizing the legislature allowed only the futile, rare and isolated interruptions inspired by Montalembert.³⁶ Since the proceedings of legislative debates were not published under the authoritarian empire, there were no transcripts to refute this generally accepted interpretation.

We know, however, that the Corps législatif began its history in a less than compliant frame of mind. The legacy of decrees from the period of Louis Napoléon's personal rule, as numerous and comprehensive as they had been, precluded a very extensive order of business for the first session. The deputies therefore busied themselves with the passing of the budget for the following fiscal year. The occasion witnessed the extension of discussion to many non-budgetary matters, a practice strongly reminiscent of the assembly Louis Napoléon had just overthrown. Indignant over the constraints of the new constitution, Montalembert delivered a particularly damning speech condemning the limited prerogatives assigned the Corps législatif. Such was the impact that it was approved for publication by a vote of 75 to 59.³⁷

Unobserved, Louis Napoléon had entered the legislative chamber just in time to witness the uproar of protest

himself. This was patently opposed to what the constitution and decrees governing the conduct of the Corps législatif had envisioned. Reaction was swift and apparently effective. The Minister of State deposited a sternly written reprimand with the President of the assembly, ordering him to curtail all unscheduled discussion. Recalcitrants were summoned to the Tuileries by Louis Napoléon for a personal persuasion of the worth of his programme.³⁸

Against possible recurrences of such unauthorized debate, the Sénatus-consulte of 23 December 1852 established the following precautions: the budget for each ministerial department of government would be voted en bloc rather than by chapter and article as before. Special decrees by the Emperor could authorize budget changes from one chapter to another without legislative approval. He would also have personal control over all commercial treaties. These provisions were made applicable to the budgetary year 1853; promulgation of the budget just passed by the Corps législatif was reserved.³⁹

Supposedly deputies had been cowed. Some were flattered, and others satisfied with the sop of a salary for members of the Corps législatif which was introduced at the same time. But in the main, perhaps there was a certain recognition that their proper jurisdiction had been exceeded. Most government projects that followed were greeted with strong majorities of approval.⁴⁰ Records of the Conseil d'Etat show that opposition was not thereby

eliminated, however; amendments to government proposals, while mostly rejected, were nonetheless numerous.⁴¹ And in certain cases strong minorities voted against projects where amendments were not approved.⁴²

It is interesting that the potentially most volatile issue of the period 1852-1857 never reached the Corps législatif. In 1856, a proposed bill to lower protective tariffs aroused such general and overt hostility in the country, particularly on the part of French commercial, industrial and agricultural interests, that the government withdrew the legislation, promising to hold it back until 1861 at the earliest.⁴³ So the threat of a direct confrontation in the Corps législatif reminiscent of 1852 never was, and what could have proven a test of political versus economic allegiances was shelved for the moment.

On the dissolution of the legislature in 1857 Napoléon III commended the Corps législatif for the loyal cooperation which had enabled him to set up and sustain the regime the members had consented to serve.⁴⁴ With the overwhelming majority of France they had proven his 'deputies'. Their consent permitted the functioning of the new institutions within the parameters established by authoritarianism.

CHAPTER V

THE ELECTIONS TO THE SECOND LEGISLATURE

The authoritarian empire engineered the elections of June, 1857 to secure a popular acclaim even more overwhelming than the one received in 1852. Generally these efforts were a mixed success.

The electoral regulations of 1852 remained unchanged except for the number of deputies to be elected. A Sénatus-consulte of 28 May 1857 modified article thirty-five of the constitution so one deputy would represent 35,000 electors with an additional deputy granted in any department where the fraction exceeding the equal division by 35,000 was over 17,000. Accordingly, the Emperor decreed that 267 deputies would be elected in 1857.¹ (See Table 1.)

The government persevered in its policy of endorsing official candidates and applying administrative pressure to assure their election. In defence of the practice the Minister of the Interior asserted,

il [Le gouvernement] dira nettement au pays quel noms ont sa confiance et lui semblent mériter celle des populations; comme il propose les lois aux députés, il proposera les candidats aux électeurs, et ceux-ci feront leur choix.²

One prefect then counselled his subordinates that the role of the administration was to simplify the number of choices: "Imposez silence aux adversaires s'il en rencontre, empêchez énergiquement leurs manoeuvres."³ The letter of another,

noting the names of fonctionnaires who had assisted or retarded the progress of government candidates, revealed that the degree of one's cooperation went not without notice by the Ministry of Interior.⁴

Employing the methods so successfully utilized in 1852, the government was able to increase its popular support by five percent. The rate of voter participation increased only very slightly, however, to 64.5 percent from 63.3. (See Table 2 and Table 4.) Five years of success undoubtedly attracted some new support.

The origin of the regime's increased popularity is not overly difficult to ascertain. For one thing, there was the timing of the election. The year 1856 appeared as a high point in the fortunes of the Second Empire. Victory in the Crimea signaled a triumph that was crowned by a Congress of European powers meeting in Paris to settle the peace. Basking in the favour this success reflected upon him, Louis Napoléon chose this very auspicious climate to dissolve the Corps législatif one year early.

The economic climate was no less promising. The first period of Napoléon III's rule ushered in years of comparative prosperity. Of course the half-decade preceding the coup had been among the worst ever experienced, especially in agriculture.⁵ Coming as it did after a period of relatively poor investment prospects, growth therefore appeared all the more dramatic. In the first six months after the coup d'état the investment index of sixteen of the

largest French firms rose from 529 millions to 809. Launching a series of public works including long awaited railway expansion, the Emperor had spurred the construction industry, providing much-needed employment and inspiring investment confidence. A new era of development had been inaugurated bringing France into the full swing of the industrial revolution that had seemed to elude her before. And if there were lingering doubts, surely these were dispelled by the wonders of the 1855 Paris Exposition boasting all the technical marvels of the age.⁶

As well, the birth of the Prince-Imperial the following year gave the Emperor an heir and the regime a future. In 1852 as a matter of pride many men of note affected to have accepted--perhaps even with a small show of hesitant reluctance--the status of official government candidate. In 1857 the Minister of the Interior was inundated with requests for what was now interpreted as the privilege of serving as one of the Emperor's candidates.⁷ Of course deputies were now paid which may have drawn extra interest as well. But so pronounced was the general competition to be included in the regime's favours that Alexis de Tocqueville was moved to remark caustically:

. . . alors le gouvernement vendait les places, tandis qu'aujourd'hui il les donne; pour les acquérir, on ne fournit plus son argent; on fait mieux, on se livre soi-même.⁸

Understandably, with so many applicants to choose from, the government could afford to be highly selective in picking candidates. Certain works assert erroneously that

the government presented as candidates in the 1857 elections all those who were serving at the close of the first legislature, Montalembert excepted.⁹ Indeed, Minister of the Interior Billault did circulate a statement affirming that "tous les députés sortants" would be presented again; but it was qualified by the clause, "sauf quelques exceptions, commandées par des nécessités spéciales."¹⁰ Actually, eight former official candidates were dropped from the government's patronage list due to their opposition, unsatisfactory performance or poor prospects of reelection. These were Charlier, David (Gironde), Desmolles, Leroy-Beaulieu, Levavasseur, Migeon, Montalembert and Montreuil. Durfort de Civrac repudiated government support of his own accord. With the exception of Migeon, whose case will be discussed presently, all failed to secure seats in the following legislature.¹¹

Nonetheless, the elections of 1857 witnessed the success of more independents than is generally realized. Six republicans were elected: Carnot, Cavaignac, Darimon, Goudchaux and Ollivier in Paris, and Hénon in Lyon. Cavaignac died shortly after; in declining their seats, Carnot and Goudchaux recalled the collective republican protest resignation of 1852 and added that the intervening five years had merely confirmed their opposition to the regime.¹² By-elections which were delayed repeatedly finally resulted in two other republicans, Jules Favre and Ernest Picard, taking the oath as a formality and entering

the chamber the next year. Together with Darimon, Hénon and Ollivier who had accepted the oath in 1857, they formed the small republican group of five.

The Comte de Chambord continued to ban all political activity by his followers. But other nonrepublican independents were elected, including Migeon (whose presence was short-lived), the liberal Cure, who rallied to the government before the end of the second legislature, Brame and Plichon who did not oppose the government, Hallignon and Morgan who supported it much of the time, and the conservative Javal.¹³

In an attempt to curtail opposition expression and to prevent all future protest elections which ended only in denunciations of the oath of loyalty and subsequent resignations, the Emperor promulgated the Sénatus-consulte of 17 February 1858; accordingly, none could be elected to the Corps législatif unless the administration received his written confirmation of the oath at least eight days prior to polling day. Unless ~~it~~ was received, no electioneering would be authorized.¹⁴

As in 1852, the majority of the deputies elected in 1857 succeeded in attracting an overwhelming percentage of the votes cast. Half of the deputies received over ninety percent of the votes expressed in their circonscriptions. Very few were elected with less than fifty percent of the electorate participating in the voting, and all but about one-third received the support of fifty percent of the electors eligible to vote. (See Table 11.) Among the

independent or opposition deputies elected, all succeeded in attracting at least fifty percent of the ballots cast, with Javal, Migeon and Plichon exceeding sixty percent--Javal and Migeon each received sixty-one percent (this marked a considerable decline for Migeon who as a government candidate in the previous election had gained ninety-four percent), while Plichon received ninety-nine percent of the ballots cast in his constituency. It should be noted, however, that Plichon was not opposed by a government candidate. All independents except Plichon were supported by less than fifty percent of the eligible voters; none of the republican group of five exceeded thirty-five percent.¹⁵

The success and popularity of Napoléon III were obviously reaffirmed in 1857 despite the election of a few additional independents. As the second Corps législatif met for the first time not even the slightest premonition hinted at the changes the deputies would experience before their term was ended.

CHAPTER VI

THE SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE CORPS LEGISLATIF 1852-1863

The social standings of the deputies to the Corps législatif have not been completely ignored by historians studying the second empire. We know, for example, of several common interpretive generalizations in this regard. When Marx elaborated on class support for the regime he cited the avid participation of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie.¹ The Duc de Broglie, at the opposite end of the political spectrum, also underlines the attraction Louis Napoléon's coup d'état had for "commercial and industrial interests."² Others mention an entourage of "grands bourgeois ou de serviteurs déterminés de la grande bourgeoisie," and though there may have been new faces among the deputies, "ils appartiennent tous à la même classe que leurs prédécesseurs. Ils sont pris eux aussi dans les rangs de la grande bourgeoisie."³ When occupations are specified, the three most common categories are propriétaires, fonctionnaires, and the grande bourgeoisie.⁴ This chapter will test these conclusions by determining exactly how many deputies belonged to each such category during the course of the authoritarian empire. The two legislatures will also be compared to note any changes or consistencies evident in the period.

Take the case of the propriétaire. A very inclusive term at best, Zeldin's delimitation of the word is very helpful. He sees the propriétaire as being similar to the English country gentleman, possessed of a living usually based on land (though use of the term did not necessarily connote great wealth), allowing him to pursue a life of leisure more or less according to his bent.⁵ This sense of the title will be employed here for those deputies with no other specified occupation.

Such men must have been especially attractive to the regime for they were probably notable and respectable; since a salary for deputies was not established until several months after the election of 1852, and since all state salaried individuals were excluded from the legislature, the propriétaires who presented themselves for the first election certainly enjoyed the particular advantage of their independent economic positions. Nonetheless, the category is not really significant in terms of numbers: only 37 deputies in the first legislature were propriétaires with no other specified occupations, twelve percent of the total.⁶ (See Table 12.) If the names of these men are considered, however, the attention given to propriétaires in previous accounts becomes understandable. (Cf. List 9, List 3 and List 8.) One of every three men in this category was of legitimist background, and all but four were no strangers to politics.

More numerous than any other category were deputies with previous careers as public administrators, professional politicians, courtiers, diplomats, magistrates and soldiers. The law excluding civil servants did nothing to prevent these former recipients of state salaries--fonctionnaires--from filling one-third of all seats in the first Corps législatif. (See Table 12 and List 9.) Half of these were retired soldiers; their petitions for official candidate status appealed for the recognition of distinguished careers sometimes dating from the first empire. They appeared in the Corps législatif, "generally to represent in silence the conservatism of merit rewarded."⁷

The third of the three most mentioned categories of occupation includes deputies who were members of the so-called grande bourgeoisie--financiers, industrialists, manufacturers and merchants. The boundaries between these four roles in the commercial field were not as clearly defined then as they frequently are now; as such, the financier sometimes found himself involved in the actual development of the industrial concern he had funded, guiding production and aiding in the marketing of its products to ensure a fair return on his investment. It is not inappropriate, therefore, to consider these occupational interests as a single group. As a group they numbered 58 (19%) among the members of the first legislature. (See Table 12 and List 9.) Zeldin concludes, significantly in the light of later developments, that their main concerns were with their

businesses. Serving as experienced consultants in industrial and commercial development and defending their interests in government policies appear to have been the extent of their political involvement in the Corps législatif.⁸

There were, of course, deputies who followed more than one occupation. Nonetheless, considerably less than half of the Corps législatif pursued interests outside of the three categories already mentioned; together, propriétaires, former fonctionnaires and grands bourgeois made up 65 percent of the first legislature. It is not uncommon for these three to be used to categorize the whole legislature.

This is unfortunate since many other occupational interests were represented, some as, or more, significantly than the propriétaires which everyone mentions, or the grande bourgeoisie that figures so prominently in Marxian accounts of this period. Zeldin excepted, not much mention is made of the legal profession. On the occasion of Lord Malmesbury's succession to the position of Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, Prime Minister Lord Palmerston remarked that the France that had accepted the Second Empire was "weary both of Bourbons and lawyers."⁹ If this assessment was perhaps valid in respect to the Bourbons, the Corps législatif did not reflect it in regard to lawyers who were more evident than any other single group except the fonctionnaires. Sixty (20%) of the deputies serving between

1852 and 1857 practiced law, either as barristers and solicitors, or as notaries.

Beside lawyers, liberal and learned professions were represented by eight doctors (two percent of the first legislature), seven educators (2%), twenty-two writers-- authors, journalists, playwrights and poets--composing seven percent of the legislature; and there were five (2%) editors, directors or founders of newspapers. An artist, Lemaire (Nord), was also elected, as were two engineers. Again it must be remembered that many of the deputies fit into two or more occupational categories, but approximately thirty-five percent of the first legislature was composed of deputies whose occupations were in the liberal or learned professions.

Finally, thirty deputies whose occupations were in agriculture composed ten percent of the legislature; and one, Chevreau, elected in 1852, kept a house of lodging. (See Table 12 and List 9.)

These figures represent the social backgrounds of the deputies to the first Corps législatif, an analysis that completes a picture usually presented only in fragments, if at all. The lack of lower class representation among the deputies might have been expected. Government candidates were successful in almost every case, and they had been chosen, as Persigny put it, 'to give the legislature to the upperclasses [sic]:

'We have openly supported and chosen our candidates, but from the highest ranks of society; from the great land-

owners, wealthy mayors and so on.¹⁰

A basis of comparison does not exist on which to measure whether or not the Corps législatif was a particular case in this respect. Were there socio-professional differences between the deputies and members of the other assemblies of state, for example? It is unfortunate that Wright's study of the Conseil d'Etat fails to present such information directly.¹¹ There is, however, a comparable study of the conseillers généraux along these lines.

Since most deputies had been conseillers généraux certain parallels should be expected. If the occupational interests of the conseillers généraux are grouped into the same large categories established for the members of the Corps législatif, similarities become very apparent. The percentage of men engaged in the liberal professions or those of the grande bourgeoisie are about the same. The Corps législatif included about ten percent more fonctionnaires, but about as many more conseillers généraux were propriétaires or men engaged in agriculture.¹²

Such figures do not support generalizations based on recognition of a preponderance of grands bourgeois influence in the regime. Despite Zeldin's note of certain differences between the occupations of Corps législatif members and those of their predecessors in earlier assemblies,¹³ the significance is very obviously in the continuity and not in the change. As before, fonctionnaires and members of the liberal professions proved most numerous.

This element of continuity is evident within the regime even more so than between regimes, despite changes in personnel and in the nature of the government. While most of the deputies who sat in the first legislature also sat between 1857 and 1863, approximately one-quarter did not. (See Appendix I.) It is evident, therefore, that replacements were recruited from the same social strata that characterized the first legislature. A comparison of the two legislatures in terms of deputies' occupational interests leaves little doubt of this. For example members of the grande bourgeoisie accounted for the same percentage of deputies in each legislature. (See Table 12.) Had the same men sat in each legislature, the significance of this identical number would be diminished; as it happened, however, there was a twenty-six percent changeover in grands bourgeois deputies between the first and second legislatures. (Cf. List 9, List 10 and Appendix I.) Three of the fifty-eight men in this category received government appointments prior to the 1857 elections--one in the civil service and two to the senate; two others died; six were defeated in 1857; and four retired for unknown reasons.¹⁴

Similarities in the two legislatures may be observed in other categories of occupational interest as well. There were only two fewer propriétaires in the second legislature than there had been in the first.¹⁵ (See Table 12.) Fonctionnaires increased in number, though not significantly; the minor difference was due mainly to an increase in the

number of career politicians among the deputies. But for Gautlier de la Guistière who died, all such men with no other occupations from the first legislature served in the second. The increase may be partially explained by the introduction of a salary for deputies after the first election, making a political career prospectively more attractive, or at least financially feasible.

The proportion of deputies from the liberal and learned professions remained stable. (See Table 12.) There were five fewer lawyers in the second legislature than there had been in the first, though. The drop is relatively insignificant in view of the continuity, but is interesting nonetheless. A changeover of twenty-five percent actually occurred in the period from 1852 to the election of 1857; yet all but five of these deputies were compensated for by recruits from the same legal professions elected in 1852. The reasons occasioning this change in Corps législatif personnel are varied. Six of the lawyers who served in the first legislature received appointments to high state offices: one to the Ministry, another to a judicial position, two to the civil service and two to the Conseil d'Etat. Two of the deputies in this category died during the first legislature; two more were defeated in the election of 1857; five retired for various reasons.¹⁶ (Cf. List 9, List 10 and Appendix I.)

To consider the other occupational interests, members of the liberal and learned professions were propor-

tionately no more or less numerous than in the first legislature. The same was true of deputies engaged in agriculture. (See Table 12.)

The proportion of deputies in each category of occupational interest remained stable not only in the legislatures of the authoritarian regime, but (judging by Zeldin's figures) generally throughout the Second Empire. Zeldin's breakdown of deputies by occupational interest for the whole period proves this conclusively if compared with the statistics for the first two legislatures. His totals reveal little change throughout the empire from the original proportions of 1852.¹⁷

This stability precludes any explanation for changes in the political climate of the Corps législatif on the basis of alterations in its social composition as the regime grew older. From the figures just presented it is apparent that demands for greater control of public finances came not because of an increase in the number of deputies belonging to the grande bourgeoisie. Encouragement for military ventures was neither augmented nor diminished by a change in the number of deputies with military backgrounds. The virtues of protectionism in trade were expressed none the louder in 1860 than in 1856 because of increases in the number of agriculturalist or industrialist deputies.

Thus, while the analysis of deputies' social backgrounds clarifies many misconceptions, it is not the key to understanding the political changes that announced the

liberal empire. To confirm this conclusion it is essential to consider the political and economic period that coincided with the second Corps législatif, from 1857-1863.

CHAPTER VII

THE POLITICS OF THE SECOND LEGISLATURE 1857-1863

If the domestic politics of the Second Empire were a drama production, then surely the second Corps législatif would serve as a recapitulation for playgoers coming late and intending to leave early. As did the regime itself, the second legislature opened with a show of authoritarian might and climaxed in liberal concessions amid the complexities of foreign relations. The concessions of 1860-61, often hailed as the dawning of the liberal empire, focused directly on the prerogatives of the Corps législatif. Among the first privileges granted were the right to vote an address in reply to the speech from the throne, in effect allowing discussion of matters of state before the whole assembly; in extenso publication of legislative debates in the Journal Officiel; and the appointment of ministers without portfolio to defend government bills in the Corps législatif.¹ This chapter will review the role of the legislature during this period to determine if it may have influenced in any way the granting of these concessions.

The temptation in pursuing this is to look for changes that might point to their move away from government influence. At first glance it appears that only a difference between the two legislatures could account for the

exhibition of discontent in the second Corps législatif when so little was expressed in the first. Yet it would be difficult to imagine any two assemblies more alike than the first two legislatures of the Second Empire. De La Gorce suggested that nothing changed as a result of the 1857 elections:

c'étaient les mêmes visages; c'étaient les mêmes places réparties sur les mêmes bancs; c'étaient les mêmes conseillers d'Etat investis des mêmes attributions; c'étaient le même règlement, et, selon toute apparence, établi pour longtemps.²

Were the assemblies truly identical? In the discussion of deputies' occupational backgrounds for example, differences in the two legislatures were identified. But none of these proved very significant, due mainly to the general continuity of personnel between legislatures and to recruitment of new deputies from the same sources as former ones. What about political backgrounds?

Generally, deputies with close ties to Napoléon III, his family or to other members of his administration were re-elected in 1857. Similar connections also assisted new candidates in 1857--such as Mariani who was selected as the second government candidate for Corsica after having served as aide-de-camp to Prince Jérôme-Napoléon.³

Deputies whose names had appeared on Louis Napoléon's 1851 Consultative Commission dropped in number. Five had died; eight had received higher government positions; four were defeated in 1857. (Cf. List 7 and List 10.)

Death took its toll among older deputies who had been chosen as government candidates by virtue of their service to Napoléon I. (Cf. Table 7 and Table 13; List 2 and List 10.) But sons of dignitaries associated with the first Empire were as evident in the second legislature as they had been in the first. (Cf. Appendix I and List 6.) And where sons had been recognized, there were also grandsons: J. David (Gironde) was the grandson of Napoléon I's celebrated court painter; Cambacérès (the younger) was the grandson of a former minister.⁴

There was a slight drop of five percent in the number of deputies having held national government positions before. This decline in experience was distributed fairly evenly, showing in most categories of public service under each previous regime. Men who had filled national offices under the July Monarchy remained the most numerous group in this category, as in the first legislature. (Cf. Table 7 and Table 13; List 2, List 10 and Appendix I.) As in 1852, Ministry circulars did not request the selection of candidates with previous national level experience; in effect, the recurring demand for 'new men' advocated the very opposite. Given the limitations imposed on the Corps législatif (and the case of Montalembert stood as a too recent reminder), experience among the deputies was probably not in the regime's interests anyway.

On the other hand, flamboyant titles of nobility and notables from among the Legion of Honour were no less

frequently encountered among the deputies than before.

(See Table 9 and Table 10.)

In terms of local reputation, as in 1852 the overwhelming majority of deputies were native sons, residents and/or property owners in their département. All but twenty-nine percent had some form of local public experience (See Table 6), while others had filled a national public office in or on behalf of the département. Only nine percent of the deputies are not known to have had such connections to the place of their election. The figures were pretty constant for both legislatures. (See Table 5.)

A sure indication of local influence in the selection of government candidates may be discerned in the increase in deputies who had previously served as conseillers-généraux or conseillers de préfecture. These two positions, the most common forms of local political experience among the deputies, were also the two positions in the organization of the département working closest to Monsieur le Préfet. The conseiller d'arrondissement and the conseiller municipal working through the offices or sub-prefects and mayors, respectively, were more removed from direct access to the prefects; likewise, one might assume that credit for effective performance by these councils went to their superiors. Given the five percent increase in former conseillers-généraux or conseillers de préfecture in the second legislature, it was obviously beneficial to be close to the prefect's office when government patronage was

distributed! (See Table 6.)

In general these figures point to the only possible conclusion: the two assemblies were so much alike as to render any differences negligible in comparison. This does not mean that everything remained the same. Montalembert, the most eloquent spokesman for the Catholic cause, had lost his seat in 1857. The same contest resulted in a drop in the number of former legitimists and Orleanists in the Corps législatif. (See Table 8 and Cf. Appendix I and List 3.) And of course there was the election of les cinq--the republicans in the second legislature--who introduced more than a change of personnel into the Corps législatif. Whenever the opportunity presented itself they used their parliamentary immunity to denounce the authoritarian regime, attempting to cajole, attack or embarrass Napoléon III into adopting a more liberal attitude in government.⁵

The presence of these independents assured that the process of verifying deputies' credentials received very careful scrutiny. In the course of investigation it was discovered that M. de Cambacérés (the younger) had not reached the age of twenty-five at the time of his election, and consequently, had been ineligible. Undaunted, Cambacérés presented himself for reelection a few weeks later; he won easily, in the process revealing how little the castigation by his opposition had affected the chances of a government candidate.⁶

The government in turn launched an inquiry into the election of the deputy Migeon. An official candidate in the 1852 elections, he was relieved of that status⁵⁷ in the hope that he could be replaced. But even without government support Migeon was successful and took his seat in the Corps législatif. The government then charged him with using a false title of nobility and a Legion of Honour decoration which was not his own to impress his constituents. It accused him of having utilized bribes, false promises of employment and numerous other electoral irregularities in his campaign. Coming as this did after Migeon's election and at the instigation of the government, the investigation seemed to resemble too much a government act of revenge against an opposition deputy to yield the expected result. After his original election had been invalidated, Migeon won again. Finally, securing a conviction on the bribery charge the imperial courts were able to sentence Migeon to two months imprisonment and force his final resignation.⁷

Whatever reminder this may have served to confirm the powers of an authoritarian regime was soon eclipsed by the events of 1858. On January fourteenth of that year Orsini, an Italian disenchanted with Napoléon III's failure to aid the cause of Italian independence, threw a bomb at the Imperial carriage as it was on its way to the opera. Though the Emperor emerged unhurt, several others were killed or wounded. The state of siege that had accompanied the coup d'état of 1852 was quickly reintroduced. Suspected enemies

of the regime were summarily arrested and deported without trial, the occasion serving as a convenient opportunity to settle accounts with any opposition, terrorist or otherwise. General Espinasse, known for anything but clemency, was appointed Minister of the Interior; the 400 arrests that followed the rash action of a few Italian conspirators testify to the general's interpretation of his temporary responsibility.⁸

Scattered and feeble attempts to inspire a vote of protest in the Corps législatif had limited effect: among the 251 who voted on the issue, all but twenty-four supported the action advocated by the government.⁹ Opposition in the Corps législatif could have done little to inspire a more liberal regime if limited to the nine percent that voted against the emergency measures of 1858. But events outside the Corps législatif were doing more to decide the fortune of the authoritarian empire than legislative proceedings reflect. It is not within the perspective of this study to provide the detail of loyalties lost through foreign and domestic policies that obviously pleased so few. Suffice it to say by way of summary that Napoléon III's Italian policies managed to alienate both Catholics and nationalists, while even the most patient of liberals enquired about the Emperor's earlier promise to "crown the regime" with greater freedom.¹⁰

That these matters should have occasioned only a shadow of opposition in the Corps législatif compared to the

general furor inspired by the Anglo-French trade treaty of 1860 should surprise no one. Analysis of the deputies' backgrounds has illustrated that these were gens d'affaires, men with careers in a variety of professional and influential fields, the majority having previous political experience. Their greatest occasion of protest had materialized in 1852 when the full realization of the restricted nature of their powers became apparent; it was very short, and they had quickly reconciled themselves to the situation which the overwhelming majority of the French people had sanctioned. Their limited influence on the affairs of state notwithstanding, the Corps législatif soon proved itself less indulgent in matters of finance and the public economy.

The number of amendments submitted by commissions of deputies studying proposals for legislation shows that criticism continued after 1852. Careful attention to the annual budget assured that the regime's finances were analyzed each year in the most sober of fashions. As a result, fully thirty percent of all amendments suggested in Corps législatif commissions prior to 1860 concerned the budget. After 1857 when the economy declined the number of amendments to the budget increased dramatically, doubling in the years between 1857 and 1860. Over half of all budgetary amendments were rejected outright by the Conseil d'Etat, but as the number of amendments increased, fewer and fewer were treated so arbitrarily; by 1860 the number rejected had dropped to one-third of those proposed.¹¹ Therefore

the tendency of the Corps législatif to pay increased attention to state finances and gradually, to have its concerns recognized had developed prior to 1860. This explains no small part of the reception given to the announcement of the 1860 trade treaty.

But opposition to the treaty in the Corps législatif was only one consideration in view of Napoléon III's intentions. The year 1860 was one of crisis even without anticipating deputies' protests. Difficulties with the clergy and the political power of Catholics concerned that the regime's Italian intervention threatened the temporal power of the pope were particularly acute.¹² The same policy was suspect in London as well but the signing of the trade treaty, the effect of which was to reduce French protective tariffs against cheaper British exports, provided some reassurance.¹³ Napoléon III also hoped that the treaty might instil new vigour into the French economy where the government was running an annual deficit of about 130 million dollars per year and the national debt had risen to 1,500 million.¹⁴ Placed in its actual perspective tariff reduction was only part of a planned programme of economic incentives to spur new development in industry, communications and public works. These other aspects would also make the pill easier for opposition to swallow.¹⁵

The opposition the regime already faced dictated caution. Only the continued popularity of the dynasty could assure its perpetuation after Napoléon III; and in January

of 1860 the Emperor was approaching his fifty-second birthday while his son had yet to celebrate his fourth.¹⁶ If the dropping of tariffs might gain some support due to the lowering of the cost of many commodities, Napoléon III was likewise aware of the protectionist sentiments of the country--especially since his 1856 attempt in this area of free trade had to be aborted. Accordingly, the 1860 effort demanded a different approach. The Sénatus-consulte of 23 December 1852 had placed the contracting of commercial treaties, and the modification of tariffs accordingly, solely within the jurisdiction of the head of state.¹⁷ The Emperor therefore signed the treaty with Great Britain on his own authority, keeping its negotiation a secret even from the majority of his ministers; once signed it was announced to the Corps législatif and the general public as a fait accompli.¹⁸

Certain writers suggest that the old system of protective tariffs was so dear and near to the hearts and wallets of so many deputies in the Corps législatif that they were driven to uncompromising opposition from that day forward; Napoléon III was then impelled to search out other sources of support: hence the liberal concessions and the dawning of the liberal empire.¹⁹

Such an interpretation other than in its simplistic convenience has little to commend it. The implication, though unstated, is that most deputies were drawn from the grande bourgeoisie, propriétaire and agricultural elements

of society. As illustrated earlier, this traditional view of the Corps législatif is far from accurate. Even if all three of these groups--the ones most likely to resent the commercial competition of freer trade--were to have been alienated completely, only forty percent of the legislature would have participated in the opposition. (See Table 12.) In actuality to ascertain the exact extent to which each deputy was involved in the defence of the protectionist system of trade is beyond the realm of our concern here.

The announcement that the treaty had been signed was definitely an unpopular one to make before the Corps législatif. The agenda was disrupted completely; debate began on the treaty though discussion had not been authorized by the Conseil d'Etat. The consensus clearly expressed a preference for more prudent management of the economy; and as well, the deputies resented the Emperor's arbitrary handling of the matter, even if it was legally within his prerogative: on such an important issue he had purposely evaded their consultation.²⁰

In view of Wright's analysis of relations between the Corps législatif and the Conseil d'Etat it would be an error to interpret this opposition as an isolated phenomenon. Criticism based on dissatisfaction with the regime's economic policies was certainly not new; the protest of 1860 appears more a logical development of earlier criticism than a sudden change in attitude among the deputies.²¹

And as in previous remonstrations founded on economic complaints the denunciations hurled against the government's programme were generally ineffective. In this particular case no change of policy was effected; the treaty remained.²² To argue that later concessions to the legislature had been exacted from the Emperor by the outburst of 1860 is purely speculative. Were those angered over economic matters likely to be satisfied by more liberal legislative procedures? Would these satisfy Catholics outraged over Napoléon III's Italian ventures? Certainly none had been bought off by the general amnesty of 1859. But to arrive at conclusive answers to these questions is not the purpose of this discussion. There is no real evidence to imply that Napoléon III was obliged to capitulate before the growing animosity of the Corps législatif.

Nonetheless, to meet the increasing challenges directed against government budgetary matters the semi-civil servants who were the Councilors of State were no longer adequate. In point of fact, one wonders if they had ever been adequate in this area since they had repeatedly failed to contain these debates to the yes or no prescribed by the constitution.²³ As government expenditures of the Corps législatif became more essential, Napoléon III realized that officials with greater authority were required to manage the situation.²⁴

Far from introducing sweeping political reforms, the Emperor altered what experience had shown he had not been able to control effectively: discussion of bills and amendments before the whole house as well as in committees, publicity of legislative proceedings, and division of the budget into sections, chapters and articles rather than by Ministry only.

It would be naive to assume that the Corps législatif was raised to the status of a parliamentary assembly by these changes.²⁵ While the modifications did establish certain legislative contacts with the public and with the mainstream of government denied by the Constitution of 1852, in its main elements the authoritarian constitution remained intact. Control over the drafting and presentation of legislation was not entrusted to the Corps législatif. Despite the creation of ministers without portfolio, the concept of a cabinet of ministers was not mentioned. As before each was individually responsible to the Emperor alone. And the Emperor was responsible only to the people, and he would decide when to put that responsibility to the test of a plebiscite.²⁶

Viewed from the perspective of the Corps législatif it is difficult to discern in this the dawn of the liberal empire. That Louis Napoléon had initiated the changes without the consultation of each of his ministers proves his undiminished control over government policy.²⁷ The reforms concentrated mainly on legislative matters, leaving undis-

turbed the repressive measures directed against basic freedoms and the press. The authoritarian concentration of power remained intact and essentially in the hands of the executive as before. There were no sudden shifts of power or personnel. The first real crisis sufficiently critical to warrant an extensive ministerial reorganization did not occur until after the end of the second legislature.²⁸

In the Corps législatif we know that as late as 1863 there had been only a thirty-one percent changeover in deputies. (See Table 13 and List 10.) Until 1863, therefore, any praise of legislative liberties would be mouthed by the same body that had served as Louis Napoléon's "deputy" in dictatorship, reconfirmed through its acceptance of the emergency measures of 1858. Deputies alienated over the free trade issue do not appear to have extended their support to others opposed to the regime on other issues. Though Napoléon III's 1861 speech from the throne inspired a lively debate, he received a vote of confidence.²⁹ A report on the Italian situation that some found lacking in respect for the pope was still accepted though 91 deputies voted to delete the offending passages. The vote was significant since it marked the first large-scale opposition registered in a vote on a political question.³⁰

Most trenchant criticism continued to be levelled against government fiscal proposals. The 1862 session witnessed the defeat of a bill authorizing an annual pension of 50,000 francs for General Cousin-Montauban, Count of

Palikao and his heirs in perpetuity. The legislature expressed its condemnation of such extravagance, counselled a more prudent management of public funds, and concluded with the rejection of the bill. But in 1863 the regime still retained the expediencies of authoritarianism and the Corps législatif was still subject to them. For his role in defeating the government measure the deputy Jouvenal was refused official patronage in the election of 1863; the government then did all in its power to assure that he would be defeated--and he was.³¹

Evidently the politics of the second legislature did not include a broadening of opposition effective enough to challenge such arbitrary exercises of power; no more than the deputies had proven instrumental in relieving restrictions placed on basic freedoms in general.

CONCLUSION

This discussion of the deputies to the Corps législatif ends in 1863. While further study would undoubtedly illustrate the continuation of certain authoritarian aspects after 1863, analysis of the period 1852-1863 provided numerous insights into the nature of the legislature and its membership during the most restrictive phase of the regime.

The authoritarianism of the Second Empire must be put into its proper perspective if the Corps législatif is to be understood. In the coup d'état and the construction of Louis Napoléon's new system France was less a victim than an accomplice.¹ This is reflected in the observation that the French in the period 1848-1852 seemed "un peuple plus prompt à réclamer la liberté que jaloux de la conserver."² Even Proudhon concluded:

Napoléon III est l'expression légitime, authentique, des masses bourgeoises et prolétaires. S'il n'est pas précisément le produit de la volonté nationale, à coup sûr il l'est de la permission nationale.³

This "permission" no doubt assisted the election of government deputies, where half received over ninety percent of the ballots cast in their circonscriptions.

Such discoveries point to the necessity for a reevaluation of certain traditional assumptions regarding

the Corps législatif and its membership. Too much attention has been drawn to the one-third of the ballot box that remained empty in elections, ignoring the two-thirds of the electorate that did vote. It is true that Louis Napoléon's Machiavellian manipulations and contrivances have earned him a rather poor press among many historians; but as a result, the dictatorial aspect of the regime has been accentuated to a proportion completely out of contact with his actual contemporary acclaim. Part of this denigration has been the misrepresentation of the Corps législatif and its membership.

The evaluation of each deputy's background presents very different conclusions from those usually accepted. Called "nouveaux venus," many deputies were perhaps "venus" in terms of their sudden political advancement, but with few exceptions there was little "nouveaux" about them. Since such a small number could afford to be "new men"--with neither favour nor national experience to recommend them--the myth of "les hommes nouveaux" in the Second Empire should be laid to rest at last. The reality of political life, illustrating that nepotism, political connections and a favourable reputation had more to recommend a man than a supposedly "clean slate," effectively excluded most neophytes among both government and independent candidates.

The real key to understanding the Second Empire is closer to elements of continuity than change. The

inauguration of the Second Empire was found to have come too late to produce a reascendancy of pure Bonapartists from the days of Napoléon I, which confirms Zeldin's parallel investigations in this regard. The presence of a new generation and the numerous government shifts between the two Empires ordained that less than half of each legislature would have any pronounced allegiance to Bonapartism other than their support for Napoléon. Opportunism was definitely ascendant in this period, and dynastic loyalties--whether Bonapartist, legitimist or Orleanist--were rare. Though more deputies had served the July Monarchy in some form of public service than any other regime, in most cases they were occupying local government offices at the département level when the Second Empire offered a seat in the Corps législatif. Men well known to the local prefect, more times than not they were recommended by him to the central administration.

The social composition of the Corps législatif has been the subject of serious overgeneralizations as well. This study discovered propriétaires more significant in terms of who they were and the nature of their previous political experience than in numbers; grands bourgeois and propriétaires together did not equal the number of former fonctionnaires or the members of liberal or learned professions; lawyers alone outnumbered propriétaires or grands bourgeois. The true picture of the social standing of

deputies is middle class in character--not an aristocracy of industrial wealth nor a petty bourgeois collection of clerks--and this median cannot be summarized in the triad of propriétaires, fonctionnaires and grande bourgeoisie when only fonctionnaires proved as frequent among the deputies as the professional occupations that are rarely mentioned. Evidently the continuity between the Corps législatif and its predecessors in this regard is more pronounced than most accept. As before, fonctionnaires and members of learned professions provided the majority of deputies in each legislature.

In these conclusions the present method is not without its limitations. Additional data from unpublished sources unavailable to this inquiry might have permitted analysis of additional variables such as deputies' business relationships, education and parentage for which existing published sources are inadequate. Since quantitative studies depend heavily on the availability of comparative data for the maximum of cases, rather than in finding extensive information on a few, such inadequately documented variables had to be dropped.⁴

Nevertheless, this did not prevent a reappraisal of the role of the Corps législatif under the authoritarian empire. Government deputies were men from the provinces--lieutenants suddenly given the rank of captain. Understandably their views were essentially supportive of the regime. And as a few examples showed, such cooperation was not without the reward of even higher honours. But they were not

bought completely, as revealed in Vincent Wright's Le Conseil d'Etat sous le Second Empire, there was a pattern of significant criticism of economic affairs in the Corps législatif that included the reception of the 1860 trade treaty with Great Britain and may be traced back as far as the budget discussions of 1852.

To search for a change in the second legislature as at least partial explanation for the concessions of 1860 is to seek in vain. The legislative changes represent an attempt to provide new channels in which to manage deputies' demands more than a capitulation to demands too difficult to handle. Pressure for truly fundamental changes in the nature of the regime on the part of a majority in the Corps législatif at this time would have required a drastic change in its membership. Yet it would be harder to imagine two assemblies more alike in socio-political terms than those that sat between 1852 and 1863. In the main the majority of deputies who had agreed to serve the authoritarian regime in 1852 were still sitting in 1860. And where death, electoral defeat or retirement necessitated replacements, they were recruited from the same socio-political groups that had provided the original members. The change in the Corps législatif that would secure a more liberal empire was still in the future.

In 1863, as in 1852, the deputies continued to represent Napoléon III to the people more than the people to Napoléon III. The majority in accepting the authoritarian system and its patronage became his willing seconds. But in

facilitating what the French people had themselves sanctioned, the deputies were also the 'deputies' of France-- the France that had approved the coup d'état and welcomed the crowning of an authoritarian regime.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

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5. J. S. Schapiro, "Heralds of Fascism: I. Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, Statesman," Chapter 13 in Liberalism and the Challenge of Fascism. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1949), 329.
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7. Elaboration of this methodological point may be found in André-Jean Tudesq's Les Conseillers Généraux en France au Temps de Guizot, 1840-1848, "Cahiers de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques" (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1967), p. 13. A good discussion of French elections, including those of the second Empire, may be found in René Rémond's La Vie Politique en France depuis 1789, 2 Vols. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1969).
8. For this disparaging view of the whole quantification process and the introduction of mechanical assistance in history, see Richard Cobb, "Historians in White Coats," The Times Literary Supplement (London), December 3, 1971, p. 1527.

9. Theodore Zeldin's The Political System of Napoleon III, Norton Library Edition, (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1971), provides numerous and valuable insights into the nature of Napoleon III's political machine, but analysis of the deputies' backgrounds does not attempt a degree of completeness comparable, for example, to D. Brunton and D. H. Pennington's British parliamentary study, Members of the Long Parliament (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1954). An example of this may be seen in his discussion of deputies' occupations. Zeldin, The Political System of Napoleon III, Norton Library Edition, pp. 62, 63.

Chapter I: THE DICTATORSHIP

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8. See the Mémoires du duc de Broglie as reproduced and translated by David Thomson in France: Empire and Republic, 1850-1940, "Documentary History of Western Civilization" series (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 39; and Girard, La Politique des Travaux Publiques, p. 82.
9. Schapiro, Liberalism and the Challenge of Fascism, p. 316; Simpson, Louis-Napoleon and the Recovery of France, p. 39; and Girard, La Politique des Travaux Publiques, p. 82.
10. Charles Seignobos, La Révolution de 1848-- Le Second Empire, Tome VI de l'Histoire de France Contemporaine, ed. Ernest Lavisse (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1921) 214.
11. On the occasion of the plebiscite the Bishop of Chartres addressed a circular to the clergy of his diocese, advising: "entraîné par vos propres vues, et plus encore par l'amour de la patrie, dont Jésus-Christ nous a donné l'exemple, vous signerez oui, je n'en doute pas." Moniteur Universel, le 16 décembre 1851, p. 3104.

12. Simpson, Louis Napoleon and the Recovery of France, pp. 140-141; and T. A. B. Corley, Democratic Despot (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1961), p. 105.
13. Detailed accounts of the insurrections may be found in Simpson, Louis-Napoleon and the Recovery of France, pp. 159, 172-175; and Emile Ollivier, L'Empire Libéral, II (Paris: Garnier Frères, 1897), 504-505.
14. Howard C. Payne, The Police State of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, 1851-1860 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966), p. 37.
15. Howard C. Payne, "Theory and Practice of Political Police During the Second Empire in France," Journal of Modern History, XXX (March, 1958), 18.
16. Cahen et Mathiez, Les Lois Françaises, p. 123.
17. Report of Minister of Police Maupas, "Proscriptions en décembre (1851)" as reproduced in Papiers et Correspondance de la Famille Impériale, I (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1870), 216-217.
18. Cahen et Mathiez, Les Lois Françaises, p. 123; and Payne, The Police State of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, pp. 60, 61.
19. Circular letter of De Morny to The Prefects, Moniteur Universel, 7 janvier 1852, p. 31.
20. Moniteur Universel, Supplément extraordinaire, le 2 décembre 1851, p. 1.
21. These, the figures officially released in 1851 were challenged in a few older studies, e.g., De La Gorce, Histoire du Second Empire, I, 12; Ollivier, L'Empire Libéral, II, 518; and Seignobos, La Révolution de 1848--Le Second Empire, p. 214. For a discussion of the reliability of these reservations, confirmation of the original figures, and an analysis of administrative pressure on the electorate see Simpson, Louis Napoleon and the Recovery of France, pp. 162-163.
22. Charles H. Pouthas, Démocraties et Capitalisme, 1848-1860, Vol. XVI in the "Peuples et Civilisations" series (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1961), p. 410.
23. Cahen et Mathiez, Les Lois Françaises, pp. 133-134.
24. Payne, The Police State of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, pp. 52, 56.

25. Paul Farmer, "The Second Empire in France, Chapter 17 in The Zenith of European Power, 1830-70, Vol. X of The New Cambridge Modern History, Edited by J. P. T. Bury (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1967), 445; and Pouthas, Démocraties et Capitalisme, p. 410.
26. Report of Minister of Police Maupas in Papiers et Correspondance de la Famille Impériale, I, 216, 217.
27. Cahen et Mathiez, Les Lois Françaises, pp. 127-132, contains a complete text of the constitution.

Chapter II: THE CONSTITUTIONAL FAÇADE

1. "Appel au Peuple," Moniteur Universel, Supplément extraordinaire, 2 décembre 1851, p. 1.
2. Pradalié, Le Second Empire, p. 9 and Duverger, Les Constitutions de la France, II, 461.
3. Deslandres, Histoire Constitutionnelle de la France, II, 461.
4. Ibid., p. 562.
5. Report of Minister of Police Maupas in Papiers et Correspondance de la Famille Impériale, I, 216, 217.
6. Taxile Delord, Histoire du Second Empire, I (Paris: Librairie Germer Baillière, 1869), 410; and René Rémond, La Vie Politique en France Depuis 1789, "Collection U, Série Histoire Contemporaine," II (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1969), 159.
7. Moniteur Universel, Supplément extraordinaire, 2 décembre 1851, p. 1.
8. Deslandres, Histoire Constitutionnelle de la France, II, 481.
9. Cahen et Mathiez, Les Lois Françaises, p. 127; and Pouthas, Démocraties et Capitalisme, p. 414. A detailed discussion of the powers and personnel of the Conseil d'Etat is provided in a recent study by Vincent Wright, Le Conseil d'Etat sous le Second Empire, "Travaux et recherches de science politique" (Paris: Armand Colin, 1972.)
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11. Moniteur Universel, 15 janvier 1852, p. 77.
12. Duguit et al., Les Constitutions, p. 78.
13. Cahen et Mathiez, Les Lois Françaises, p. 134.
14. Ibid., p. 133.
15. Duverger, Les Constitutions, p. 78.

16. Farmer, "The Second Empire in France," p. 450; J. M. Thompson, Louis Napoleon and the Second Empire (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1954), p. 133; and Philip Guedalla, The Second Empire (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1922), p. 187.
17. Félix Ponteil, Les Institutions de la France de 1814 à 1870 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966), p. 362.
18. L. Girard, Problèmes Politiques et Constitutionnels du Second Empire, p. 75; Ponteil, Les Institutions de la France, p. 366; and De La Gorce, Histoire du Second Empire, I, 28.
19. Cahen et Mathiez, Les Lois Françaises, p. 129.
20. Moniteur Universel, 9 mars 1852, pp. 389, 390; and Cahen et Mathiez, Les Lois Françaises, p. 130.
21. Pradalié, Le Second Empire, 362; and Cahen et Mathiez, Les Lois Françaises, p. 130.
22. Moniteur Universel, 3 février 1852, p. 177.
23. Cahen et Mathiez, Les Lois Françaises, p. 133.
24. Berton, L'Evolution Constitutionnelle du Second Empire, p. 77; and "Le Décret Organique pour l'Élection des Députés au Corps législatif," Moniteur Universel, 3 février 1852, p. 177.

Chapter III: THE ELECTIONS

1. Duguit et al., Les Constitutions, p. 253.
2. Moniteur Universel, 3 février 1852, p. 177; and Duguit et al., Les Constitutions, p. 253.
Zeldin is evidently in error, therefore, when he maintains that "all men over 21 could vote and stand /for election/." See The Political System of Napoleon III, The Norton Library Series, p. 10.
3. Moniteur Universel, 3 février 1852, p. 177.
4. Berton, L'Evolution Constitutionnelle du Second Empire, p. 91.
5. Moniteur Universel, 15 janvier 1862, p. 77.
6. Berton, L'Evolution Constitutionnelle du Second Empire, p. 78-79.
7. Henry Bergasse, Histoire de L'Assemblée (Paris: Payet, 1967), p. 219.
8. Rémond, La Vie Politique en France, II, 150.
9. Deslandres, Histoire Constitutionnelle de la France, II, 495; Girard, Problèmes Politiques et Constitutionnels, p. 70; and Rémond, La Vie Politique en France, II, 148.
10. Duverger, Les Constitutions, p. 79.
11. Theodore Zeldin, "The Myth of Napoleon III," History Today, VIII (February, 1958), 107.
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14. Bergasse, Histoire de L'Assemblée, p. 217.
15. Bergasse, Histoire de L'Assemblée, p. 217; and Rémond, La Vie Politique en France, II, 149.
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21. Ollivier, L'Empire Libéral, IV, 13.
22. De La Gorce, Histoire du Second Empire, II, 193; and Schapiro, Liberalism and the Challenge of Fascism, p. 332.
23. Deslandres, Histoire Constitutionnelle, II, 499; and Berton, L'Evolution Constitutionnelle, p. 93.
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25. Delord, Histoire du Second Empire, I, 536, 537; and Robert et Cougny, I, 557.
26. Robert et Cougny, I, 557.
27. As quoted. Delord, Histoire du Second Empire, I, 443, 444; and Ollivier, L'Empire Libéral. III, 21.
28. Deslandres, Histoire Constitutionnelle, II, 499.
29. Rémond, La Vie Politique en France, II, 156; Georges Dupeux, Aspects de l'histoire sociale et Politique du Loire-et-Cher, 1848-1914 (Paris: Mouton & Co., 1962), p. 389; and Alain Lancelot, L'Abstentionnisme Electoral en France, "Cahiers de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques" (Paris: Armand Colin, 1968), p. 15.
The latter work is the most complete analysis available on the topic, although it concentrates primarily on the twentieth century.
30. What irregularities there may have been generally took the form of coercion or pressure at the local level. See Zeldin, The Political System of Napoleon III, Norton Library Edition, pp. 80-84.

Chapter IV: THE FIRST LEGISLATURE 1852-1857

1. De La Gorce, Histoire du Second Empire, I, 63.
2. Gooch, The Reign of Napoleon III, p. 64.
3. Seignobos, La Révolution de 1848--Le Second Empire, p. 233.
4. Karl Marx, The Civil War in France (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), p. 5; and Beau de Loménie, Les Responsabilités des Dynasties Bourgeoises, I, 149, 162.
5. As quoted in Pradalé, Le Second Empire, p. 33.
6. Berton, L'Evolution Constitutionnelle du Second Empire, p. 93; Pontsill, Les Institutions de la France, p. 366; and Delord, Histoire du Second Empire, I, 703.
7. As quoted in Vincent Wright, Le Conseil d'Etat sous le Second Empire, "Série Travaux et Recherches de Science Politique" (Paris: Armand Colin, 1972), p. 143.
8. Zeldin, The Political System of Napoleon III, Norton Library Edition, p. 45.
9. Ibid., p. 11.
10. Ibid., pp. 15-19; and Bury, Napoleon III and the Second Empire, p. 38.
11. Jean Lhomme, Le Grande Bourgeoisie au Pouvoir, 1830-1880 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1960), p. 155.
12. Beau de Loménie, Les Responsabilités des Dynasties Bourgeoises, I, 161.
13. Zeldin, The Political System of Napoleon III, Norton Library Edition, pp. 51, 53.
14. Robert et Cougny, I-V, passim; and Vapereau, Dictionnaire Universel des Contemporains, passim.
15. In most cases, published material alone is inadequate to assess the political sympathies of individual deputies. Consequently, analysis here has been limited to delineating categories of dynastic affiliation based on the judgements of Robert et Cougny's Dictionnaire des Parlementaires Français and Zeldin's The Political System of Napoleon III--these having been based on unpublished primary materials not available to the present study.

16. Zeldin, The Political System of Napoleon III, Norton Library Edition, p. 18.
17. Ibid., p. 31.
18. De Persigny, "Circulaire du Ministre de l'Intérieur a la Veille des Elections, 11 février 1852," in Cahen et Mathiez, Les Lois Françaises, p. 136.
19. Beau de Loménie, Les Responsabilités des Dynasties Bourgeoises, I, 157, 159.
20. Zeldin, The Political System of Napoleon III, Norton Library Edition, pp. 32, 33.
21. Ibid., p. 35.
22. Beau de Loménie, Les Responsabilités des Dynasties Bourgeoises, I, 156.
23. Biel-Castel, Mémoires, IV, 88.
24. Zeldin, The Political System of Napoleon III, pp. 28, 29.
25. Ibid.; and Robert et Cougny, I-V, passim.
26. Ibid.
27. Zeldin, The Political System of Napoleon III, p. 28.
28. Compare Zeldin's description in The Political System of Napoleon III, pp. 28-32, with the present discussion, List 2 and List 6.
29. Zeldin, The Political System of Napoleon III, pp. 29, 33.
30. Véron, Mémoires, V, 259.
31. E.g., De La Gorce, Histoire du Second Empire, I, 63; Seignobos, La Révolution de 1848--Le Second Empire, p. 233; Jean Lhomme, La Grande Bourgeoisie au Pouvoir, p. 156; and Pouthas, Démocraties et Capitalisme, p. 418.
32. Zeldin, The Political System of Napoleon III, p. 32.
33. Calvet-Rogniat's note on himself, as quoted, Ibid., p. 31.
34. Zeldin, The Political System of Napoleon III, pp. 12, 14.
35. Ibid., pp. 45, 102-104.

36. Delord, Histoire du Second Empire, I, 696; De La Gorce, Histoire du Second Empire, III, 516-519; Berton, L'Evolution Constitutionnelle du Second Empire, p. 93; and Ponteil, Les Institutions de la France, p. 366.
37. Ollivier, L'Empire Libéral, VII, 53-55. A more thorough analysis of the affair has been presented by Vincent Wright, Le Conseil d'Etat sous le Second Empire, pp. 136-142.
38. Rémond, La Vie Politique en France, II, 159; and De La Gorce, Histoire du Second Empire, I, 74; II, 29.
39. Moniteur Universel, 27 décembre 1851, p. 2199.
40. Berton, L'Evolution Constitutionnelle du Second Empire, p. 93.
41. Wright, Le Conseil d'Etat sous le Second Empire, pp. 144, 145.
42. Seignobos, La Révolution de 1848--Le Second Empire, p. 237.
43. Delord, Histoire du Second Empire, I, 696.
44. Le Constitutionnel, 17 janvier 1857, p. 1.

Chapter V: THE ELECTIONS TO THE SECOND LEGISLATURE

1. Duguit, Les Constitutions, p. 253; and Le Constitutionnel, 31 mai 1857, p. 1.
2. "Circulaire du Ministre de l'Intérieur, Billault, aux Préfets (30 mai 1857)," Le Constitutionnel, 1 juin 1857, p. 1.
3. From a circular by the Prefect of Deux-Sèvres as quoted in Delord, Histoire du Second Empire, II, 318.
4. "Lettre de M. le Comte de Lapeyrouse, Préfet du Doubs, au Ministre de l'Intérieur (11 juillet 1857)," as reproduced in Papiers et Correspondance de la Famille Impériale, II, 189.
5. Zeldin, France 1848-1945, Vol. I, 173.
6. Louis Girard, La Politique des Travaux Publics du Second Empire (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1952), pp. 85, 86; and Blanchard, Le Second Empire, pp. 71, 124.
7. De La Gorce, Histoire du Second Empire, I, 57; and II, 192.
8. See L'Ancien Régime, ed. by G. W. Headlam (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1904 [18567]), p. 99.
9. E.g., Ollivier, L'Empire Libéral, IV, 13; Pradalié, Le Second Empire, p. 31; and Schapiro, Liberalism and the Challenge of Fascism, p. 323.
10. Circular of Minister of the Interior Billault on the occasion of the 1857 election, as quoted in De La Gorce, Histoire du Second Empire, II, 191; and Delord, Histoire du Second Empire, II, 315.
11. Robert et Cougny, Vols. I-V, passim; and Zeldin, The Political System of Napoleon III, p. 70. Zeldin adds the deputy Rambourgt to his list of those dropped; this is evidently an error since Rambourgt was reelected in 1857 and remained a consistent government supporter.
12. De La Gorce, Histoire du Second Empire, II, 208.
13. Robert et Cougny, Vols. I-V, passim; Zeldin, The Political System of Napoleon III, p. 71; and Ollivier, L'Empire Libéral, IV, 50.

14. Le Constitutionnel, 20 février 1858, p. 1.
15. Robert et Cougny, Vols. I-V, passim; and Zeldin, The Political System of Napoleon III, p. 71.

Chapter VI: THE SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE CORPS LEGISLATIF


1. Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, New World Paperbacks (New York: International Publishers, 1963), pp. 105, 115.
2. Thomson, France: Empire and Republic, p. 38.
3. Lhomme, La Grande Bourgeoisie au Pouvoir, p. 156.
4. Farmer, "The Second Empire in France," p. 459; Pouthas, Démocraties et Capitalisme, p. 418; and Pradalié, Le Second Empire, p. 32.
5. Zeldin, The Political System of Napoleon III, p. 58.
6. Some gross figures on occupational interests among the deputies are presently available in Zeldin's The Political System of Napoleon III, 62, 63. Unfortunately, these lump together statistics for the whole of the second empire and are consequently inadequate to ascertain occupational interests in particular legislatures for purposes of comparison.
7. Zeldin, The Political System of Napoleon III, p. 57.
8. Ibid.
9. The Rt. Hon. Earl of Malmesbury, Memoires of an Ex-Minister, I (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1885), 318.
10. Zeldin, The Political System of Napoleon III, p. 57.
11. Wright, Le Conseil d'Etat sous le Second Empire, p. 57. He presents, instead, father's occupations as a determinant of member's social status.
12. L. Girard et al., Les Conseillers Généraux en 1870; Etude Statistique d'un Personnel Politique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967), p. 47.
13. Zeldin, The Political System of Napoleon III, p. 63.
14. Appointments: Pongérard, Favre (Loire-Inférieure) and Mouchy; died: Dupont (Vienne) and Huc; defeated: Bertrand, Charlier, Descat, Lanquetin, Montané, and Segrétain; unknown: Dugas, Leconte, Monnin-Japy and Schyler.

15. Despite three deaths during the first legislature: Jollivet de Castelot, Parmentier and Planté; three defeats in 1857: Durfort-Civrac, Levavasseur and Segrétain; and two resignations: Calvière and Lormet. (Cf. List 9, List 10 and Appendix I.)
16. To the ministry: Billault; judicial: Fortoul; civil service: Baragnon and Curnier; Conseil d'Etat: Bavoux and Chantérac; died: Bidault and Demesmay; defeated: Cabias and Delamarre; retired: Tixier, Bouhier de l'Ecluse, Favart, Perret, and Soullié.
17. Cf. Table 12 and Zeldin, The Political System of Napoleon III, pp. 62, 63. The only major dissimilarity occurs in the liberal and learned professions; this is due to a difference in presentation, not to a disparity in calculations of the deputies actually engaged in these occupations. Zeldin presents mutually exclusive categories whereas my own allow considerable overlap, particularly in regard to the learned professions where deputies frequently pursued more than a single occupational interest.

Chapter VII: THE POLITICS OF THE SECOND LEGISLATURE,
1857-1863

1. Le Constitutionnel, le 26 novembre 1860, p. 1.
2. De La Gorce, Histoire du Second Empire, II, 207.
3. Robert et Cougny, IV, 270.
4. Robert et Cougny, II, passim; and Zeldin, The Political System of Napoleon III, p. 28.
5. Berton, L'Evolution Constitutionnelle du Second Empire, p. 240.
6. Delord, Histoire du Second Empire, II, 370.
7. Robert et Cougny, I, 371; and Delord, Histoire du Second Empire, II, 371.
8. Philip Guedalla, The Second Empire (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1922), p. 221.
9. Thomas, Le Second Empire, p. 112.
10. Detail in this regard is readily available from numerous published sources. Gooch, The Reign of Napoleon Third provides a particularly succinct account. In opening the legislature session of 1853 the Emperor defended the authoritarian constitution maintaining that no lasting regime had been founded in liberty; liberty was the crown that came with consolidation of the political edifice. Discours, Messages et Proclamations de L'Empereur (Paris: Plon Freres, 1860), p. 212.
11. Wright, Le Conseil d'Etat sous le Second Empire, pp. 144, 145.
12. Blanchard, Le Second Empire, p. 131.
13. Ibid., p. 124.
14. Ibid., p. 134.
15. Arthur Louis Dunham, The Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce of 1860 and the Progress of the Industrial Revolution in France (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1930), p. 125; Blanchard, Le Second Empire, p. 125.
16. Roger L. Williams, The Mortal Napoleon III (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 99.

17. Cahen et Mathiez, Les Lois Françaises, p. 133.
18. Beau de Loménie, Les Responsabilités des Dynasties Bourgeoises, I, 194.
19. Blanchard, Le Second Empire, p. 126, 130; Bergasse, Histoire de l'Assemblée, p. 220; and Maurain, Baroche, Ministre de Napoléon III, p. 151.
20. Berton, L'Evolution Constitutionnelle du Second Empire, p. 238; and De La Gorce, Histoire du Second Empire, III, 232.
21. Wright, Le Conseil d'Etat sous le Second Empire, p. 151; and W. H. C. Smith, Napoleon III (London: Wayland Publishers, 1972), p. 104.
22. Dunham, The Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce, p. 134.
23. Wright, Le Conseil d'Etat sous le Second Empire, p. 151.
24. Zeldin, The Political System of Napoleon III, pp. 102, 106.
25. Such a view is presented in Bury, Napoleon III and the Second Empire, p. 88.
26. Duguit, Les Constitutions, pp. 277, 278; and Ponteil, Les Institutions de la France, pp. 356, 367.
27. Rémond, La Vie Politique, II, 170; and Zeldin, The Political System of Napoleon III, p. 104.
28. Pradalié, Le Second Empire, p. 27. Zeldin (The Political System of Napoleon III) uses the 'Fall' of the Minister of State, Fould, to support his claim that "the innovations of 24 November 1860 marked a radical change in the system." (p. 204.) Though he does mention that a financial programme advocated by Fould was adopted shortly afterwards (p. 105), he neglects to mention that Fould was then appointed Minister of Finance. "The victory of Persigny, Walewski, Haussmann and Morny against Fould" (p. 104), was thus rather short-lived! Such musical-chairs rotation of ministerial places had occurred before. The first real crisis significant enough to result in permanent personnel changes happened in 1863 with the fall of Minister of the Interior Persigny and Minister of State Walewski. See Corley, Democratic Despot, pp. 243, 263.
29. Viel Castel, Mémoires, VI, 117.

30. Berton, L'Evolution Constitutionnelle du Second Empire, p. 221.
 31. Delord, Histoire du Second Empire, II, 303, 304.
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CONCLUSION

1. Simpson, Louis Napoleon and the Recovery of France, p. 163.
2. Berton, L'Evolution Constitutionnelle du Second Empire, p. 10.
3. As quoted in Simpson, Louis Napoleon and the Recovery of France, p. 163.
4. A further explanation of this requirement may be found in Alison Patrick, "Political Divisions in the French National Convention, 1792-93," The Journal of Modern History, XLI (December, 1969), 421-474.

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- I. Methodological Sources
- II. Biographical Materials
- III. Works on the Second Empire
- IV. Histories of France in the Nineteenth Century

I. Methodology

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Floud, Roderick. An Introduction to Quantitative Methods for Historians. London: Methuen, 1973.

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B. Examples of Quantitative History

Cited later are two of the very best examples of this genre of history: Louis Girard et al. on the Conseillers Généraux en 1870, and Vincent Wright's work on the Conseil d'Etat under the Second Empire.

Brunton, D., and Pennington, D. H. Members of the Long Parliament. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1954.

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II. Sources of Deputies' Biographical Information

A. Dictionaries

"Robert et Cougny" undoubtedly remains the most useful of published material available in this form, but the others provide complementary information.

Balteau, J., Barroux, M. and Prevost, M. Editors. Dictionnaire de Biographie Française. Vols. I-XI (to "Duquet") complete. Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1933- .

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C. Others

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Les Grands Notables en France, 1840-49. 2 Vols. Publications de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines de Paris. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964.

The available studies of Second Empire personnel were also of great value and are worth mentioning here even if noted again elsewhere:

Girard et al., Les Conseillers Généraux en 1870.

Wright, Le Conseil d'Etat sous le Second Empire.

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TABLE 1

THE DISTRIBUTION OF DEPUTIES BY DEPARTMENT

Department	<u>Circonscriptions</u> 1852	<u>Circonscriptions</u> 1857	Department	<u>Circonscriptions</u> 1852	<u>Circonscriptions</u> 1857
Ain	3	3	Finistère	4	4
Aisne	4	4	Gard	3	3
Allier	2	2	Garonne	4	4
Alpes (Basses-)	1	1	Gers	3	3
Alpes (Hautes-)	1	1	Gironde	5	5
Ardèche	3	3	Hérault	3	3
Ardennes	2	2	Ille-et-Vilaine	4	4
Ariège	2	2	Indre	2	2
Aube	2	2	Indre-et-Loire	3	3
Aude	2	2	Isère	4	4
Aveyron	3	3	Jura	2	2
Bouches-du-Rhône	3	3	Landes	2	2
Calvados	4	4	Loire-et-Cher	2	2
Cantal	2	2	Loire	3	4
Charente	3	3	Loire (Haute-)	2	2
Charente-Inférieure	4	4	Loire-Inférieure	4	4
Cher	2	2	Loiret	2	3
Correze	2	2	Lot	2	2
Corse	1	2	Lot-et-Garonne	3	3
Côte-d'Or	3	3	Lozère	1	1
Côtes-du-Nord	5	4	Maine-et-Loire	4	5
Creuse	2	2	Manche	4	4
Dordogne	4	4	Marne	3	3
Doubs	2	2	Marne (Haute-)	2	2
Drome	3	3	Mayenne	3	3
Eure	3	3	Meurthe	3	3
Eure-et-Loire	2	2	Meuse	2	2

Table 1-- Continued

Department	Circonscriptions		Department	Circonscriptions	
	1852	1857		1852	1857
Morbihan	3	3	Sarthe	4	4
Moselle	3	3	Seine	9	10
Niévre	2	2	Seine-Inférieure	6	6
Nord	8	8	Seine-et-Marne	3	3
Oise	3	3	Seine-et-Oise	4	4
Orne	3	3	Sèvres (Deux-)	2	3
Pas-de-Calais	5	5	Somme	5	5
Puy-de-Dôme	5	5	Tarn	3	3
Pyrénées (Basses-)	3	3	Tarn-et-Garonne	2	2
Pyrénées	2	2	Var	3	3
Pyrénées-Orientales	1	1	Vaucluse	2	2
Rhin (Bas-)	4	4	Vendée	3	3
Rhin (Haut-)	3	3	Vienne	2	2
Rhône	4	4	Vienne (Haute-)	2	2
Saône (Haute-)	3	3	Vosges	3	3
Saône-et-Loire	4	4	Yonne	3	3
			Total:	261	267

Note: With the cession of the area of Nice and Savoy to France in 1860, the département of the Alpes-Maritimes was created, forwarding a single deputy to the Corps législatif.

Sources: Moniteur Universel (Paris), 3 février 1852, p. 178; Le Constitutionnel (Paris), 24 juin 1857, pp. 1, 2; and Robert et Coughy, Dictionnaire des Parlementaires Français, V, 584-621.

TABLE 2
ELECTION RESULTS AND LOUIS-NAPOLEON'S SUPPORT 1848-57

Date	Nature of Election	Registered Voters	Ballots Cast	Favorable %	Opposition %	Spoiled or Blank Ballots		
10/12/48	Presidential	9,927,452	7,449,471	5,534,520	74	1,879,298	25	12,434
20/12/51	Plebiscite	9,833,576	8,166,773	7,439,216	92	610,737	8	36,820
29/02/52	Legislative	9,836,043	6,222,983	5,218,602	84	810,962	13	193,419
21/11/52	Plebiscite	9,833,576	8,140,660	7,824,189	96	253,145	3	63,326
21/06/57	Legislative	9,495,955	6,136,664	5,471,888	89	571,859	9	92,917

Source: Le Constitutionnel (Paris), 11 juillet 1857, p. 1.

TABLE 3

BREAKDOWN OF ELECTIONS 1852-57

Deputies Involved: 302			
Percentage	Votes Received	Voter Participation	Registered Voter Support
Information Unavailable	1%	1%	1%
Under 50%	1%	12%*	35%
50-59%	9%	23%	36%
60-69%	8%	39%	18%
70-79%	10%	21%	9%
80-89%	19%	3%	1%
90-98%	40%		
99% or Over	12%		

Source: Based on the final election figures for each deputy as recorded in Robert et Cougny, Dictionnaire des Parlementaires Français, Vols. I-V.

*This table should be read as follows: "Of the 302 deputies' elections held between 1852 and 1857 12% had under 50% of the eligible voters participating," etc.

TABLE 4
ELECTORAL ABSTENTION 1848-70

Percentage of Abstentions:		0	5	10	15	20	25	30	35	40
Nature of Election	Date									
Presidential	10/12/48	-----24.9%								
Legislative	13/05/49	-----31.9%								
Plebiscite	20/12/51	-----17.2%								
Legislative	29/02/52	-----36.7%								
Plebiscite	21/11/52	-----20.5%								
Legislative	21/06/57	-----35.5%								
Legislative	01/06/63	-----27.1%								
Legislative	23/05/69	-----21.9%								
Plebiscite	08/05/70	-----17.8%								

Source: Alain Lancelot, L'Abstentionnisme Electoral en France, Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques (Paris: Armand Colin, 1968), p. 15.

TABLE 5

CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE DEPUTIES AND THE DEPARTMENTS
IN WHICH THEY WERE ELECTED

Connection	First Legislature 1852-1857 302 Deputies	Second Legislature 1857-1863 307 Deputies
Place of Birth only	18	18
Property Owner or Resident only	38	58
Prior Public Office only	28	18
Place of Birth, Property or Residence	98	88
Property or Residence, and Prior Public Office	358	358
Place of Birth, Property or Residence, and Place of Prior Public Office	418	418
No Connection Known	98	98

Sources: Robert et Cougny, Dictionnaire des Parlementaires Français, Vols. I-V;
and G. Vapereau, Dictionnaire Universel des Contemporains.

TABLE 6

PREVIOUS LOCAL POLITICAL EXPERIENCE
AMONG THE DEPUTIES

Position	First Legislature 302 Deputies	Second Legislature 307 Deputies
Mayor	21 7%	17 6%
<u>Conseiller-Général or Conseiller de Préfec- ture</u>	89 29%	101 33%
<u>Conseiller Municipal or Conseiller d'Arrondissement</u>	8 3%	5 2%
<u>Mayor and Conseiller- Général or Conseiller de Préfecture</u>	59 20%	68 22%
<u>Mayor and Conseiller Municipal or Conseiller d'Arron- dissement</u>	4 1%	3 1%
<u>Conseiller-Général or Conseiller de Préfec- ture and Conseiller Municipal or Conseiller d'Arron- dissement</u>	17 6%	17 6%
<u>Mayor and Conseiller- Général or Conseiller de Préfecture and Conseiller Municipal or Conseiller d'Arrondissement</u>	6 2%	4 1%
Total	204 68%	215 71%
No local experience known	98 32%	92 29%

Sources: Robert et Cougny, Dictionnaire des Parlementaires Français, Vols, I-V; and G. Vapereau, Dictionnaire Universel des Contemporains.

TABLE 7

PREVIOUS NATIONAL SERVICE AMONG THE DEPUTIES TO THE FIRST LEGISLATURE, 1852-57

Position	Regime			
	Napoléon I	Restoration	Louis-Philippe	1848
Deputies	1	3 (1%)	44 (15%)	48 (16%)
Peers	-----	1	4 (1%)	-----
Ministers	-----	1	1	3 (1%)*
Civil Servants	4 (1%)*	11 (4%)	36 (12%)	9 (3%)
Magistrates	1	2 (1%)	5 (2%)	2 (1%)*
Diplomats	-----	-----	2 (1%)	1
Courtiers	-----	-----	-----	4 (1%)
Military	28 (9%)	29 (10%)	28 (9%)	9 (3%)
Total:**	34 (11%)	47 (16%)	116 (38%)**	62 (21%)
				103 (34%)

*All percentages are rounded to the nearest integer.

**The cumulative total in excess of 100% is due to deputies who served more than one regime.

***This total is adjusted to account for men who served in two or more positions at the same time, e.g., a peer serving as a diplomat appears in both categories, but only once in this total.

Sources: Robert et Cougny, Dictionnaire des Parlementaires Français, Vols. I-V; and G. Vapereau, Dictionnaire Universel des Contemporains.

TABLE 8
PRE-1849 NON-BONAPARTIST DYNASTIC LOYALTY AMONG THE DEPUTIES

Affiliation	First Legislature 1852-1857 302 Deputies	Second Legislature 1857-1863 307 Deputies
Legitimists	33 (11%)	28 (9%)
Orleanists	30 (11%)	28 (9%)
Moderate Republican	1	1
Republicans	--	5 (2%)

Sources: Robert et Cougny, Dictionnaire des Parlementaires Français, Vols. I-V; G. Vapereau, Dictionnaire Universel des Contemporains; and Zeldin, The Political System of Napoleon III, Norton Library Edition, p.33.

TABLE 9

NOBILITY IN THE LEGISLATURE 1852-63

1852-57		Origin of Title					302 Deputies	
Title	Ancien Regime	Napoléon I	Restoration	Foreign	Unknown	Total		
Princes	3 (1%)	-----	-----	-----	-----	3 (1%)		
Dukes	1	2 (1%)	-----	-----	-----	3 (1%)		
Marquis	10 (4%)	2 (1%)	-----	-----	6 (2%)	18 (6%)		
Counts	7 (2%)	12 (4%)	-----	1	10 (4%)	30 (10%)		
Viscounts	5 (2%)	4 (1%)	1	-----	1	11 (4%)		
Barons	10 (4%)	17 (6%)	2 (1%)	-----	10 (4%)	39 (13%)		
Total:	36 (12%)	37 (12%)	3 (1%)	1	27 (9%)	104 (34%)		
1857-63		Origin of Title					307 Deputies	
Title	Ancien Regime	Napoléon I	Restoration	Foreign	Unknown	Total		
Princes	2 (1%)	-----	-----	-----	-----	2 (1%)		
Dukes	-----	2 (1%)	-----	-----	-----	2 (1%)		
Marquis	12 (4%)	2 (1%)	-----	-----	7 (2%)	21 (7%)		
Counts	11 (4%)	12 (4%)	-----	1	9 (3%)	33 (11%)		
Viscounts	4 (1%)	5 (2%)	-----	-----	1	10 (3%)		
Barons	10 (3%)	16 (5%)	2 (1%)	-----	12 (4%)	40 (13%)		
Total	39 (13%)	37 (12%)	2 (1%)	1	29 (9%)	108 (35%)		

Notes: No deputies are known to have been first ennobled by the July Monarchy or the Second Empire.

All percentages are rounded to the nearest integer.

Sources: Robert et Cougny, Dictionnaire des Parlementaires Français, Vols. I-V; and G. Vapereau, Dictionnaire Universel des Contemporains.

TABLE 10

DEPUTIES IN THE LEGION OF HONOUR*

Granted By	First Legislature 1852-1857 302 Deputies	Second Legislature 1857-1863 307 Deputies
Napoléon I	9 (3%)	9 (3%)
Restoration	3 (1%)	-----
July Monarchy	25 (8%)	29 (9%)
Second Republic	1	1
Louis-Napoléon	14 (5%)	16 (5%)
Total:	52 (17%)	55 (18%)

Sources: Robert et Cougny, Dictionnaire des Parlementaires Français, Vols. I-V; and G. Vapereau, Dictionnaire Universel des Contemporains.

*Prior to the date of their first election.

TABLE 11

BREAKDOWN OF ELECTIONS 1857-63

Percentage	Deputies Involved: 307			Registered Voter Support
	Votes Received	Voter Participation		
Information Unavailable	3%	4%		4%
Under 50%	1%	5%		34%
50-59%	9%	20%*		30%
60-69%	8%	40%		19%
70-79%	13%	25%		9%
80-89%	16%	7%		5%
90-98%	27%			
99% or Over				

Source: Based on the final election figures for each deputy as recorded in Robert et Cougny, Dictionnaire des Parlementaires Français, Vols. I-V.

*This table should be read as follows: "Of the 307 deputies' elections held between 1857 and 1863 20% had from 50-59% of the eligible voters participating."

TABLE 12

OCCUPATIONAL INTERESTS AMONG THE DEPUTIES

Occupation	1852-57		1857-63	
	Number of Deputies	Percent of Total	Number of Deputies	Percent of Total
<u>Proprietaires</u>	37	12%	35	11%
<u>Fonctionnaires</u>				
-civil servants	15	5%	19	6%
-career politicians	16	5%	23	8%
-courtiers	5	2%	8	3%
-diplomats	3	1%	4	1%
-magistrates	14	5%	14	5%
-military personnel	50	17%	45	15%
Grande Bourgeoisie	58	19%	58	19%
Liberal or Learned Professions				
-law	60	20%	55	18%
-medicine	8	3%	11	4%
-education	7	2%	6	2%
-literature	22	7%	25	8%
-newspapermen	5	2%	5	2%
-art	1	---	1	---
-engineers	2	1%	3	1%
Agriculture	30	10%	31	10%
Innkeeper	1	---	---	---

- Notes:
- the purpose of this table is to compare percentages for each occupation between the two periods.
 - since occupations may be multiple, the grand totals would exceed 100% and therefore prove meaningless.
 - all percentages are given to the nearest whole percentage.

Sources: Robert et Cougny, Dictionnaire des Parlementaires Français, Vols. I-V; and G. Vapereau, Dictionnaire Universel des Contemporains.

TABLE 13
PREVIOUS NATIONAL SERVICE AMONG THE DEPUTIES TO THE SECOND LEGISLATURE, 1857-63

Position	Regime				
	Napoléon I	Restoration	Louis-Philippe	1848	1849-52
Deputies	1	3 (1%)	36 (12%)	34 (11%)	59 (19%)
Peers	-----	1	3 (1%)	-----	-----
Ministers	-----	-----	1	-----	3 (1%)
Civil Servants	3 (1%)*	10 (3%)	36 (12%)	7 (2%)	14 (5%)
Magistrates	1	1	5 (2%)	1	2 (1%)*
Diplomats	-----	1	3 (1%)	-----	3 (1%)
Courtiers	-----	-----	-----	-----	4 (1%)
Military	20 (7%)	24 (8%)	27 (9%)	10 (3%)	10 (3%)
Total:**	25 (8%)	40 (13%)	107 (35%)*	50 (16%)	92 (30%)

*All percentages are rounded to the nearest integer.
 **The cumulative total in excess of 100% is due to deputies who served more than one regime.
 ***This total is adjusted to account for men who served in two or more positions at the same time, e.g., a peer serving as a diplomat appears in both categories, but only once in this total.

Sources: Robert et Cougny, Dictionnaire des Parlementaires Français, Vols. I-V; and G. Vapereau, Dictionnaire Universel des Contemporains.

TABLE 14
 CHANGES IN CORPS LEGISLATIF PERSONNEL 1852-1863

Total Deputies: 383		
Reason for Change	No. of Deputies	% of Total
Death	49	13%
Appointments to other state positions	25	7%
Business, Health	5	1%
Politics*	10	3%
Defeated in 1857 Election	16	4%
Unknown	11	3%
Total	116	31%

Source: Robert et Cougny, Dictionnaire des Parlementaires Français, vols. I-V.

*See List 10.

TABLE 15

DEPUTIES WHOSE FATHERS SERVED UNDER NAPOLEON I

Service of Father	First Legislature 302 Deputies	Second Legislature 307 Deputies
Deputy	10 (3%)	10 (3%)
Senator/Peer	2 (1%)	1
Minister	5 (2%)	4 (1%)
Civil Servant	10 (3%)	8 (3%)
Magistrate	2 (1%)	2 (1%)
Diplomat	1	1
Courtier	2 (1%)	2 (1%)
Military	21 (7%)	26 (8%)
Total:	53 (18%)	54 (18%)

Source: Robert et Cougny, Dictionnaire des Parlementaires Français; G. Vapereau, Dictionnaire des Contemporains; and Zeldin, The Political System of Napoleon III, Norton Library Edition, p. 28.

LIST 1

LOCAL POLITICAL EXPERIENCE AMONG
THE DEPUTIESFormer Mayors:

Alengry	Favre (Loire-Inférieure)
Allart	Fleury
Ancel	Geiger
Andelarre	Gisclard
Argent-de-Deux Fontaines	Godart
Arnaud	Hallignon
Aymé de la Herliere	Haudos
Barbentane	Hébert
Beauchamp	Hennocque
Beauverger	Herlincourt
Bouchetal-Laroche	Hervé de Saint-Germain
Eriot de Monremy	Jonage
Buquet	Lafond de Saint-Mur
Cabias	Las-Cases
Calvet-Rogniat	Laugier de Chartreuse
Carteret	Leclerc
Caruel de Saint-Martin	Leconte
Champagny (Morbihan)	Lédier
Chantérac	Lefebure
Charlemagne	Le Gorrec
Charpin-Feugerolles	Lemaire (Oise)
Chauvin-Lenardière	Le Mélorel de la Haichois
Chazelles	Lemercier (Charente)
Coëhorn	Lescuyer d'Attainville
Colbert-Chabannais	Lespérut
Corberon	Louvet
Corneille	Mame
Coulaux	Mercier (Orne)
Creuzet	Meslin
Crosnier	Millet
Curé	Millon
Dambry	Monnin-Japy
Darblay	Montjoyeux
David (Gironde)	Morgan
David, J.	Morin
Delavau	Mortemart (Rhône)
Desjobert	Murat
Desmaroux de Gaulmin	Nesle
Doumet	Noubel
Dubois	O'Quin
Duplan	Pamard
Duranti-Concressault	Pariou
Faure	Parmentier
Favart	Pennautier

LIST 1-- ContinuedFormer Mayors (continued):

Pérouse	Richemont
Perpessac	Rigaud
Perret	Rogé
Plancy (Oise)	Roques-Salvaza
Planté	Roy-Bry
Plichon	Seydoux
Pongérard	Simon
Pouyer-Quertier	Veauce
Rambourg de Commentry	Vernier
Ravinel	Villdieu de Torcy (the elder)
Remacle	Werlé
Réveil	

Former Conseillers-Généraux and Conseillers de Préfecture:

Alengry	Caulaincourt
Allart	Cazelles
Ancel	Chabrillon
Andelarne	Champagny (Côtes-du-Nord)
André (Charente)	Champagny (Morbihan)
Argnet-de-Deux Fontaines	Chantérac
Arjuzon	Charlemagne
Arman	Charlier
Aymé de la Herlière	Charpin-Feugerolles
Baragnon	Chasot
Barbentane	Chasseloup-Laubat
Barral	Chauchard
Baudelot	Chevandier de Valdôme
Beauchamp	Choque
Beauverger	Christophe
Belliard	Clary
Benqist	Clebsattel
Billault	Coëhorn
Blosseville	Conneau
Bouchetal-Laroche	Conseil
Bourlon	Corberon
Brame	Corta
Briot de Monremy	Cosserat
Brohier de Littinière	Couédic
Bryas	Coulaux
Bucher de Chauvigné	Creuzet
Buquet	Crosnier
Busson-Billault	Curé
Cabias	Cuverville
Caffarelli	Dalmas
Calvet-Rogniat	Dambry
Canaple	Dautheville
Caruel de Saint-Martin	Dauzat-Dembarrère

LIST 1-- ContinuedFormer Conseillers-Généraux/de Préfecture (continued):

David (Gironde)	Laffitte
David, J.	Lafond de Saint-Mur
David-Deschamps	Lagrange (Nord)
Debrotonne	Lanquetin
Delavau	Larrabure
Deltheil	Las-Cases
Desbassynes de Richemont	La Tour
Descours	La Tour du Moulin
Desjobert	Latour-Maubourg
Desmaroux de Gaulmin	Laugier de Chartrouse
Desmars	Lebreton
Devinck	Leclerc d'Osmonville
Devoize	Lecomte
Didier	Lédier
Douesnel-Dubosq	Lefebure
Drouot	Lefebvre-Herment
Dubois	Le Gorrec
Dupont	Legrand
Durand	Lelut
Durfort-Civrac	Lemaire (Oise)
Eschassériaux	Le Mélorel de la Haichois
Etcheverry	Lemercier (Charente)
Faugier	Lemercier (Charente-Inférieure)
Faure	Leret d'Aubigny
Fleury	Leroux
Flocart de Mépieu	Lescuyer d'Attainville
Gareau	Le Sergeant de Monnecove
Gaultier de la Guistièrre	Lespérut
Geiger	Louvet
Geoffroy de Villeneuve	Macdonald de Tarente
Girou de Buzareignes	Mame
Godard-Desmarest	Marey-Monge
Godart	Maupas
Gorsse	Mercier (Mayenne)
Gouin	Meslin
Gouy d'Arcy	Mesonan
Grammont	Migeon
Guillaumin	Millet
Hallez-Claparède	Millon
Haudos	Miral
Hennocque	Monier de la Sizeranne
Herlincourt	Montagnac
Hervé de Saint-Germain	Montjoyeux
Javal	Morgan
Jonage	Morin
Kergorlay	Mortemart (Rhône)
Kervéguen	Mouchy
Lacave	Murat
Laffitte	Nesle

LIST 1-- ContinuedFormer Conseillers-Généraux/de Préfecture (continued):

Normand	Roques-Salvaza
Noualhier	Roulleaux-Dugage
Noubel	Roy-Bry
O'Quin	Sainte-Croix
Ornano	Sainte-Hermine
Ouvrard	Sallandrouze de la Mornaix
Pamard	Schneider
Pennautier	Segris
Pérouse	Seydoux
Perpessac	Simon
Piré	Taillefer
Plancy (Oise)	Talhouët
Planté	Tesnière
Pouyer-Quertier	Thiullen
Rambourg de Commentry	Thoinnet de la Turmelière
Rambourgt	Tixier
Randoing	Toulongeon
Ravinel	Travot
Reille	Vast-Vimeux (the younger)
Reiset	Verclos
Renouard	Viard
Renouard de Bussières	Villedieu de Torcy (the younger)
Riché-Tirman	Wattebled
Richemont	Wendel
Rogé	Werlé
Romeuf	

Former Conseillers-Municipaux and Conseillers d'Arrondissements:

Arman	Delavau
Billault	Descat
Bois de Mouzilly	Descours
Briot de Monremy	Desmars
Brohier de Littinière	Devinck
Cabias	Dupont
Canaple	Duranti-Concressault
Chantérac	Durfort-Civrac
Chauvin-Lénardière	Favart
Christophe	Fouché-Lepelletier
Clebsattel	Gouin
Couédic	Kolb-Bernard
Curé	Lacave
Curnier	Lanquetin
Dabeaux	Laugier de Chartouse
Darblay	Lefebvre-Herment
David (Gironde)	Legrand
David (Deux-Sèvres)	Marey-Monge

LIST 1-- Continued**Former Conseillers-Municipaux and Conseillers
d'Arrondissements (continued):**

Noualhier	Thibaut
Parieu	Viard
Piré	Wattebled
Soullié	

Sources:

Robert et Cougny, Dictionnaire des Parlementaires
Français, Vols. I-V.
G. Vapereau, Dictionnaire Universel des Contemporains.

LIST 2

PREVIOUS NATIONAL SERVICE AMONG
THE DEPUTIESUnder Napoléon IDeputy:

Mercier (Orne)

Civil Servants:Darblay
HoudetotLemaire (Oise)
ThieullenJudicial:

Bucher de Chauvigné

Military:

Barral	Lebreton
Boissy-d'Anglas	Lemercier (Charente)
Brunet-Denon	Meslin
Cazelles	Mésonan
Dautheville	Normand
David (Deux-Sèvres)	Parchappe
Dumarais	Perrot
Duplan	Pétiet
Duvivier	Réguis
Gellibert des Séguins (the elder)	Rogé
Gorsse	Sainte-Croix
Hennocque	Soullié
Lagrange (Nord)	Tillette de Clermont-Tonnerre
Lanquetin	Vast-Vimeux (the elder)
Larabit	

Under the RestorationDeputies:Boissy-d'Anglas
Louis-Bazile

Mercier (Orne)

Peer:

Houdetot

Ministry:

Arjuzon

LIST 2-- ContinuedRestoration Service (continued)Judicial:

David (Gironde)
Douesnel-Dubosq

Remacle

Diplomat:

Blosseville

Civil Servants:

Andelarre
Baudelot
Bouhier de l'Ecluse
Chasseloup-Laubat
Delamarre
Delebecque
Lemaire

Lescuyer d'Attainville
Millet
Ouvrard
Partouneaux
Roques-Salvaza
Thieullen

Military:

Argent-de-Deux Fontaines
Boullé
Bourcier de Villiers
Chasot
Cuverville
Dautheville
Devoize
Duvivier
Gellibert des Séguins (the elder)
Gorsse
Hennocque
Jonage
Lagrange (Nord)
Larabit
Lebreton
Marrast

Meslin
Mésonan
Monier de la Sizeranne
Mortemart (Rhône)
Mortemart (Seine-Inférieure)
Normand
Parchappe
Perrot
Randoing
Reille
Rogé
Romeuf
Seydoux
Tillette de Clermont-Tonnerre
Vast-Vimeux (the elder)

Under the July MonarchyDeputies:

Billault
Boissy-d'Anglas
Brunet-Denon
Cambacérès (the elder)
Carayon-Latour
Chasseloup-Laubat
Choque
David (Deux-Sèvres)

Debrotonne
Delavau
Deltheil
Demésmy
Desjobert
Dusolier
Faure
Grammont

LIST 2-- ContinuedJuly Monarchy Service (continued)
Deputies (continued):

Hallez-Claparède
 Hérambault
 Herlincourt
 Jouvenel
 Larabit
 Lefebvre-Herment
 Le Gorrec
 Lemaire (Oise)
 Lemercier (Charente)
 Levavasseur
 Louis-Bazile
 Mercier (Orne)
 Mérode
 Meslin
 Monier de la Sizeranne

Morny
 Mortemart (Rhône)
 Plichon
 Renouard de Bussières
 Richemont
 Sallandrouze de la Mornaix
 Schneider
 Taillefer
 Tauriac
 Tillette de Clermont-Tonnerre
 Tixier
 Uzès
 Vautier
 Villedieu de Torcy (the elder)

Ministry

Gouin

Judicial:

Baudelot
 David (Gironde)
 Desmars
 Douesnel-Dubosq

Favart
 Janvier de la Motte
 Miral

Diplomats:

Lemercier (Charente-Inférieure) Ornano

Civil Servants:

Aymé de la Herlière
 Bigrel
 Brame
 Brohier de Littinière
 Caffarelli
 Canaple
 Chabrigon
 Chasseloup-Laubat
 Chauchard
 Corta
 Creuzet
 Dautat-Dembarrère
 Delamarre
 Devinck

Godart
 Granier de Cassagnac
 Grouchy
 Hallez-Claparède
 Hébert
 Lacave
 Ladoucette
 Laffitte
 Lafon de Cayx
 Lafond de Saint-Mur
 Lepeletier-d'Aulnay
 Lequien
 Leret d'Aubigny
 Leroy-Beaulieu

LIST 2-- ContinuedJuly Monarchy Service (continued)Civil Servants (continued):

Lescuyer d'Attainville
 Le Sergeant de Monnecove
 Mercier (Mayenne)
 Noualhier
 Plancy (Oise)
 Rambourgt
 Remacle
 Roulleaux-Dugage

Sainte-Hermine
 Sapey
 Talhouët
 Thioullen
 Thoynet de la Turmelière
 Vernier
 Werlé

Military:

Boullé
 Bourcier de Villiers
 Caulaincourt
 Clary
 Coulaux
 Dautheville
 David, J.
 Devoize
 Duvivier
 Gellibert des Séguins (the elder)
 Gorsse
 Hennocque
 Javal
 Kersaint
 Lagrange
 Las-Cases
 Latour-Maubourg

Lebreton
 Meslin
 Mésonan
 Morny
 Mouchy
 Parchappe
 Pennautier
 Perrot
 Pétiet
 Réguis
 Reille
 Renouard
 Rogé
 Romeuf
 Thiérion
 Travot
 Vast-Vimeux (the elder)

1848 ServiceDeputies:

Allart
 Audren de Kerdrel
 Bavoux
 Bidault
 Billault
 Bodin
 Carayon-Latour
 Cazelles
 Chauchard
 Choque
 Dautheville
 Debrottonne
 Delavau
 Descat
 Desmars

Desmolles
 Dusolier
 Faure
 Favre (Loire-Inférieure)
 Gisclard
 Guin
 Hérambault
 Lagrange (Gers)
 Langlais
 Larabit
 Lebreton
 Le Gorrec
 Lélut
 Levavasseur
 Louvet

LIST 2-- Continued1848 Service (continued)Deputies (continued):

Marrast
 Montalémbert
 Montreuil
 Morin
 Morny
 Mortemart (Rhône)

Randoing
 Renouard
 Sallandrouze de la Mornaix
 Taillefer
 Tillet de Clermont-Tonnerre
 Tixier

Judicial:

Aymé de la Herlière

Diplomat:

Benoit-Champy

Civil Servants:

Belliard
 Caffarelli
 Canaple
 Laffitte

Lafond de Saint-Mur
 Ollivier
 Sainte-Hermine

Military:

Boullé
 Dautherville
 David, J.
 Duvivier
 Gellibert des Séguins (the elder)
 Kersaint

Lebreton
 Parchappe
 Régis
 Reille
 Thiébaud

Under Louis-NapoléonDeputies:

Alengry
 Ancel
 André (Charente)
 Audren de Kerdré
 Bavoux
 Belliard
 Bertrand
 Bidault
 Bigrel
 Bouhier de l'Ecluse
 Bucher de Chauvigné
 Cambacérés (the elder)
 Carteret

Caulaincourt
 Chasseloup-Laubat
 Chauchard
 Hazelles
 Choque
 Clary
 Couédic
 Cuverville
 Dauzat-Dembarrère
 David (Deux-Sèvres)
 Debrottonne
 Delavau
 Deltheil

LIST 2-- ContinuedService Under Louis-Napoléon (continued)Deputies (continued):

Demesmay	Leroy-Beaulieu
Descat	Lespérut
Desjobert	Levavasseur
Desmaroux de Gaulmin	Louvet
Desmars	Marrast
Devinck	Mérode
Eschassériaux	Migeon
Faure	Montalambert
Favre (Loire-Inférieure)	Morin
Flavigny	Morny
Gouin	Mortemart (Seine-Inférieure)
Grammont	Mouchy
Hébert	Plancy (Oise)
Hérambault	Pongéard
Hervé de Saint-Germain	Randoing
Houdetot	Ravinel
Jacave	Renouard
Langlais	Riché-Tirman
Larabit	Rogé
Lebreton	Soullie
Lecomte	Suchet d'Albufera
Lecote	Talhouët
De Gorrec	Thieullen
Lélut	Tixier
Lemaire (Oise)	Vast-Vimeux (the elder)
Lemercier (Charente)	Viard
Lequien	Wendel

Ministry:

Chasseloup-Laubat	Schneider
Morny	

Judicial:

Aymé de la Hérlière	Brochant de Villiers
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Diplomats:

Dalmas	Séguir-Lamoignon
Murat	

Civil Servants:

Becquet	Cazelles
Caffarelli	Chambrun
Canaple	Christophe

LIST 2-- ContinuedService Under Louis-Napoléon (continued)Civil Servants (continued):

Fortoul	Latour-du-Moulin
Grouchy	Lehon
Hamel	Sainte-Hermine
Laffitte	Thiérion
Lafond de Saint-Mur	Toulangeon

Courtiers:

Belmont	Chevalier
Chaumont-Quitry	Labédoyère

Military:

Boullé	Lebreton
Dautheville	Parchappe
David, J.	Perrot
Duvivier	Réguis
Gellibert des Séguins (the elder)	Reille
Kersaint	

Sources:

Robert et Cougny, Dictionnaire des Parlementaires Français, Vols. I-V.

G. Vapereau, Dictionnaire Universel des Contemporains.

LIST 3

NON-BONAPARISTS AMONG THE DEPUTIES

Legitimists:

Andelarre
 Argent-de-Deux Fontaines
 Arjuzon
 Audren de Kerdrel
 Barbentane
 Blosserville
 Bouhier de l'Ecluse
 Bourcier de Villiers
 Bucher de Chauvigné
 Calvière
 Carayon-Latour
 Charpin-Feugerolles
 Chauvin-Lénardièrre
 Chazelles
 Colbert-Chabannais
 Desmolles
 Duclos
 Durfort-Civrac
 Ferrière

Flavigny
 Gouy d'Arcy
 Guéronnière
 Jouvenel
 Kolb-Bernard
 Langlais
 Lescuyer d'Attainville
 Lormet
 Mortemart (Rhône)
 Parmentier
 Pongérard
 Ravinel
 Rochemure
 Roques-Salvaza
 Tromelin
 Villedieu de Torcy (the elder)
 Villedieu de Torcy (the younger)
 Wendel

Orleanists:

Bigrel
 Brame
 Chasseloup-Laubat
 Chauchard
 Desbassyns de Richemont
 Favre (Loire-Inférieure)
 Gouin
 Hallez-Claparède
 Hérambault
 Herlincourt
 Lefébure
 Lefebvre-Herment
 Lemaire (Oise)
 Lemerrier (Charente-Inférieure)
 Lequien
 Leroy-Beaulieu
 Levavasseur

Louis-Bazile
 Mercier (Mayenne)
 Mérode
 Miral
 Monier de la Sizeranne
 Morgan
 Plichon
 Randoing
 Renouard
 Renouard de Bussièrres
 Roulleaux-Dugage
 Schneider
 Tauriac
 Uzès
 Vautier
 Viard

Republicans:

Darimon
 Favre (Seine)
 Hénon
 Ollivier
 Picard

Moderate Republican:

Legrand

Sources:

Zeldin, The Political System of Napoleon III, p. 33; and Robert et Cougny, Dictionnaire des Parlementaires Français, Vols. I-V.

LIST 4
ORIGINS OF NOBILITY AMONG THE DEPUTIES
1852-1863

Ancien Régime Nobility

Princes:

Beauvau	Mouchy
Bourcier de Villiers	

Dukes:

Uzès

Marquis:

Blosseville	Las-Cases
Calvière	Latour
Caulaincourt	Mortemart (Rhône)
Chaumont-Quitry	Mortemart (Seine-Inférieure)
Colbert-Chabannais	Sainte-Hermine
Grammont	Villedieu de Torcy (the elder)
Kergorlay	Villedieu de Torcy (the younger)

Counts:

Arjuzon	Ferrière
Barbentane	Gouy d'Arcy
Chabrillon	Hamel
Champagny (Côtes-du-Nord)	Kersaint
Charpin-Feugerolles	Montalembert
Couédic	Ségur-Lamoignon
Durfort-Civrac	

Viscounts:

Barral	Plancy (Aube)
Flavigny	Rambourgt
Guéronnière	Richemont

Barons:

Argent-de-Deux Fontaines	Lespérut
Beauverger	Montagnac
Carayon-Latour	Montreuil
Caruel de Saint-Martin	Plancy (Oise)
Chambrun	Ravinel
Jouvenal	Renouard de Bussières

LIST 4-- Continued
Titles Granted by Napoléon I

Dukes:

Macdonald de Tarente

Suchet d'Albuféra

Counts:

Boissy-d'Anglas

Lagrange (Gers)

Caffarelli

Lepelletier-d'Aulnay

Cambacérès (the elder)

Mérode

Cambacérès (the younger)

Morny

Champagny (Morbihan)

Murat

Hallez-Claparède

Ornano

Labédoyère

Sainte-Croix

Tascher de la Pagerie

Viscounts:

Clary

Houdetot

Drouot

Reille

Grouchy

Barons:

Brunet-Denon

Mercier (Mayenne)

Buquet

Mercier (Orne)

David, J.

Nougarède

Eschassériaux

Portalis

Gorsse

Roguet

Herlincourt

Romeuf

Ladoucette

Thieullen

Lemercier (Charente)

Tillette de Clermont-Tonnerre

Lemercier (Charente-Inférieure)

Travot

Lougier de Chartrouse

Viard

Titles Granted by the Restoration

Viscount:

Partouneaux

Barons:

Desbassyns de Richemont

Pétiet

Foreign Titles

Count:

Janvier de la Motte

LIST 4-- Continued
Titles of Unknown Origin

Marquis:

Andelarre	Piré
Belmont	Tauriac
Conéglano	Verclos
Nesle	

Counts:

Bryas	Pierre
Chantérac	Riencourt
Duranti-Concressault	Rochemure
Jonage	Toulangeon
Léhon	Tromelin
Pennautier	

Viscounts:

Kervéguen

Barons:

Benoist	Lagrange (Nord)
Chauchard	Mariani
Coëhorn	Reinach
Geiger	Vast-Vimeux (the elder)
Huc	Vast-Vimeux (the younger)
Lafond de Saint-Mur	Veauce

Note: The first title granted is that under which the deputies have been categorized.

Sources:

Robert et Cougny, Dictionnaire des Parlementaires Français, Vols. I-V.
 G. Vapereau, Dictionnaire Universel des Contemporains.

LIST 5
DEPUTIES IN THE LEGION OF HONOUR

Decorated by Napoléon I:

Brunet-Denon
Duplan
Gorsse
Houdetot
Mercier (Orne)

Parchappe
Perrot
Pétiet
Rogé
Sainte-Croix

Decorated during the Restoration:

Argent-de-Deux Fontaines
Mésonan
Uzès

Decorated by the July Monarchy:

Allart
Baudelot
Boissy-d'Anglas
Corneille
Curé
Delabecque
Durand
Gellibert des Séguins (the elder)
Godart
Hennocque
Javal
Jubinal
Kolb-Bernard
Lanquetin
Leclerc
Lecomte

Lefebvre-Herment
Lemaire (Nord)
Lemaire (Oise)
Lequien
Marey-Monge
Morny
Normand
Plancy (Oise)
Renouard
Roulleaux-Dugage
Sainte-Hermine
Sallandrouze de la Mornaix
Thiérion
Travot
Vast-Vimeux (the elder)
Véron

Decorated by the Second Republic or Louis-Napoléon:

Bourlon
Cabias
Chazelles
Dauzat-Dembarrère
Delavau
Descat
Devinck
Faure
Flocart de Mépieu

Fortoul
Guyard-Delalain
Josseau
Lebreton
Louvet
Lubonis
Meslin
Pérouse
Schneider

LIST 6

DEPUTIES WHOSE FATHERS HAD SERVED
UNDER NAPOLEON ISons of Deputies:

Boissy-d'Anglas
Buquet
Demesmay
Dumarais
Etcheverry
Herlincourt

Labédoyère
Lefebvre-Herment
Marey-Monge
Taillefer
Wendel

Sons of Senators/Peers:

Arjuzon

Lemercier (Charente)

Sons of Ministers:

Cambacérès (the elder)
Champagne (Côtes-du-Nord)
Champagne (Morbihan)

Lesperut
Petiet

Sons of Judges:

Dubois

Portalis

Sons of Diplomats:

Desbassyns de Richemont

Sons of Courtiers:

Chabrillan

Duplan

Sons of Civil Servants:

Bavoux
Beauverger
Devoize
Hamel
Ladoucette
Lepelletier-d'Aulnay

Mortemart (Rhône)
Mortemart (Seine-Inférieure)
Nougarède
Plancy (Aube)
Plancy (Oise)
Viard

Sons of Military Personnel:

Abbatucci
Beauveau
Belmontet
Buquet

Caffarelli
Caulaincourt
Charpin-Feugerolles
Chasseloup-Laubat

LIST 6-- ContinuedSons of Military Personnel (continued)

Coëhorn	Ravinel
Gellibert des Séguins (the younger)	Reille
Hallez-Claparède	Roguet
Lagrange (Gers)	Suchet d'Albuféra
Las Cases	Talhouët
Lemercier (Charente-Inferieure)	Tascher de la Pagerie
Macdonald de Tarente	Travot
Ornano	Tromelin
Partouneaux	Vast-Vimeux (the younger)
Piré	

Sources:

Zeldin, The Political System of Napoleon III,
pp. 28-30.

Robert et Cougny, Dictionnaire des Parlementaires
Français, Vols. I-V.

LIST 7

DEPUTIES WHO HAD ACCEPTED APPOINTMENT TO
LOUIS-NAPOLEON'S CONSULTATIVE
COMMISSION OF 1851

André (Charente)	Lanquetin
André (Gard)	Lebreton
Bavoux	Le Comte
Benoit-Champy	Lemercier (Charente)
Bertrand	Lequien
Bidault	Levavasseur
Bigrel	Mérode
Billault	Monnin-Japy
Cambacérès (the elder)	Montalembert
Chasseloup-Laubat	Morny
Chazelles	Mortemart (Seine-Inférieure)
Darblay	Mouchy
Delavau	Murat
Deltheil	Parieu
Desjobert	Plancy (Oise)
Desmaroux de Gaulmin	Plichon
Eschassériaux	Pongéard
Favre (Loire-Inférieure)	Renouard
Grammont	Renouard de Bussières
Granier de Cassagnac	Sapey
Hallez-Claparède	Schneider
Hébert	Seydoux
Hérambault	Suchet d'Albuféra
Janvier de la Motte	Vast-Vimeux (the elder)
Lagrange (Gers)	Viard
Lagrange (Nord)	

Sources:

Moniteur Universel (Paris), 3 décembre 1851, p. 1;
4 décembre 1851, p. 1; and 14 décembre 1851, p. 1.
Robert et Cougny, Dictionnaire des Parlementaires
Français, Vols. I-V.
G. Vapereau, Dictionnaire Universel des Contemporains.

LIST 8

NEW MEN AMONG THE DEPUTIES

André (Gard)	Keller
Balay de la Bertrandiere	Koenigswarter
Calley-Saint-Paul	Leharivel
Chabanon	Montané
Collot	Nogent-Saint-Laurens
Delamarre (Somme)	Pierre
Dugas	Quesné
Dupont	René
Garnier	Schylor
Huc	Segretain
Jossivel de Castelot	Varin d'Ainvelle
	Voruz

Sources: Robert et Cougny, Dictionnaire des
Parlementaires Français, Vols. I-V; and
G. Vapereau, Dictionnaire Universel des
Contemporains.

LIST 9

OCCUPATIONAL INTERESTS AMONG THE DEPUTIES

Propriétaires:

Buquet
 Cambacérés (the elder)
 Calvière
 Carayon-Latour
 Charpin-Feugerolles
 Chauvin-Lénardière
 Chazelles
 Collot
 Dambry
 Desmaroux de Gaulmin
 Druout
 Durfort-Civrac
 Geoffroy de Villeneuve
 Gouy d'Arcy
 Hallignon
 Haudos
 Hébert
 Herlincourt
 Jollivet de Castelot
 Jonage
 Ladoucette
 Lacheisserie

Lagrange (Gers)
 Lédier
 Lepelletier-d'Aulnay
 Leroux
 Levavasseur
 Lormet
 Maupas
 Montjoyeux
 Parmentier
 Pérousse
 Pierre
 Plancy (Aube)
 Planté
 Ravinel
 Reinach
 Rochemure
 Segrétain
 Talhouët
 Tauriac
 Verclos
 Villedieu de Torcy (the elder)
 Villedieu de Torcy (the younger)

Former Civil Servants

Becquet
 Caffarelli
 Cambacérés (the younger)
 Chambrun
 Chasseloup-Laubat
 Chauchard
 Creuzet
 Dalmas
 Delamarre
 Grouchy
 Houdetot
 Lafon de Cayx
 Lafond de Saint-Mur

Lemaire (Oise)
 Leret d'Aubigny
 Leroy-Beaulieu
 Mercier (Mayenne)
 Mérode
 Plancy (Oise)
 Sainte-Hermine
 Sapey
 Ségur-Lamoignon
 Thieullen
 Thoinnet de la Turmelière
 Toulangeon

Former Courtiers

Arjuzon
 Belmont
 Chaumont-Quitry
 Conegliano

Labédoyère
 Lehon
 Riencourt
 Tascher de la Pagerie

LIST 9-- ContinuedFormer Diplomats:

Lemercier (Charente-Inférieure)
Marey-Monge

Murat
Ornano

Former Magistrates:

Andelarre
Aymé de la Herlière
Baudelot
Brochant de Villiers
Bucher de Chauvigné
Dauzat-Dembarrère
David (Gironde)
Demars
Douesnael-Dubosq

Duboy
Janvier de la Motte
Le Mélorel de la Haichois
Miral
Rambourgt
Remacle
Renouard
Tesnières

Former Military Personnel:

Allengry
Argent-de-Deux Fontaines
Barral
Boissy d'Anglais
Boullé
Bourcier de Villiers
Brunet-Denon
Caulaincourt
Cazelles
Chabrillon
Chasot
Colbert-Cabonnais
Cuverville
Dautheville
David, J.
David (Deux-Sèvres)
Devoize
Doumet
Dumarais
Duplan
Duranti-Concressault
Duvivier
Gellibert des Séguins (the elder)
Gorsse
Hennocque
Kersaint
Lagrange (Nord)
Larabit
Las-Cases

Latour-Maubourg
Lebreton
Lemercier (Charente)
Mariani
Marrast
Meslin
Mésonan
Monier de la Sizeranne
Mortemart (Rhône)
Mortemart (Seine-Inférieure)
Normand
Parchappe
Pennautier
Perrot
Pétiet
Réguis
Reille
Rogé
Romeuf
Sainte-Croix
Suchet d'Albuféra
Thiérion
Tillette de Clermont-Tonnerre
Travot
Tromelin
Uzès
Vast-Vimeux (the elder)
Vast-Vimeux (the younger)

LIST 9*- ContinuedPoliticians and Elected Administrators:

Abbatucci	Parieu
Bigrel	Piré
Bouchetal-Laroche	Portalis
Carteret	Rambourg de Commeny
Caruel de Saint-Martin	Reiset
Charlemagne	Roguet
Christophe	Ferrière
Conseil	Flavigny
Couédic	Gaultier de la Guistiére
Curé	Jouvenal
Didier	Laffitte
Etcheverry	Lefebvre-Herment
	Macdonald de Tarente

Grande Bourgeoisie:

Ancel	Javal
André (Gard)	Kervéguen
Armañ	Koenigswarter
Arnaud	Lanquetin
Balay de la Bertrandiére	Leclerc d'Osmonville
Beauchamp	Lecomte
Bertrand	Leconte
Bois de Mouzilly	Lefébure
Bourlon	Leharivel
Calley-Saint-Paul	Louis-Bazile
Canaple	Louvet
Charlier	Mercier (Orne)
Coulaux	Millet
Darblay	Monnin-Japy
Deltheil	Montané
Desbassyns de Richémont	Morny
Descat	Mouchy
Descours	Noualhier
Devindk	Pongerard
Douesnel-Dubosq	Pouyer-Quertier
Dugas	Quesné
Dupont	Randoing
Durand	Renouard de Bussiéres
Favre (Loire-Inférieure)	Réveil
Fleury	Roy-Bry
Fouché-Lepelletier	Sallandrouze de la Mornaix
Garnier	Schneider
Geiger	Schylér
Gisclard	Seydoux
Godard-Desmarest	Thibaut
Gouin	Varin d'Ainvelle
Grammont	Vautier
Guyard-Delalain	Wendel
Huc	

LIST 9-- ContinuedLaw: Barristers, Notaries and Solicitors:

Allart
 André (Charente)
 Baragnon
 Bavoux
 Beauverger
 Belliard
 Benoit-Champy
 Bidault
 Billault
 Bouhier de l'Ecluse
 Briot de Monremy
 Brohier de Littinière
 Bussion-Billault
 Cabias
 Calvet-Rogniat
 Champagny (Côtes-du-Nord)
 Champagny (Morbihan)
 Chantérac
 Choque
 Clary
 Clebsattel
 Corta
 Curnier
 Dabeaux
 Dalloz
 David-Deschamps
 Debelleye
 Delamarre
 Delapalme
 Demesmay
 Duclos
 Dusolier
 Eschassériaux
 Faugier
 Faure
 Favart

Favre (Seine)
 Fortoul
 Gareau
 Gillibert des Séguins (the younger)
 Guyard-Delalain
 Halléx-Claparède
 Hérambault
 Josseau
 Langlais
 Latour-du-Moulin
 Latour de Chartrouse
 Legrand
 Legorrec
 Lequien
 Le Sergeant de Monnecove
 Lubonis
 Millet
 Millon
 Morin
 Nogent-Saint-Laurens
 Ollivier
 O'Quin
 Partouneaux
 Perret
 Picard
 Plichon
 Riché-Tirman
 Rigaud
 Roques-Salvaza
 Roulleaux-Dugage
 Ségris
 Soulié
 Tixier
 Vernier
 Viard
 Wattebled

Engineers:

Dalmas
 Grouchy
 Lacave

Varin d'Ainvelle
 Voruz

LIST 9-- ContinuedLiterature: Authors, Journalists and Playwrights:

Bavoux	Jubinal
Beauverger	Keller
Belmontet	Langlais
Blosseville	Latour-du-Moulin
Champagny (Morbihan)	Legrand
Crosnier	Lélut
Dalloz	Mame
Darimon	Migeon
Desjobert	Monnier de la Sizeranne
Dupont	Montalembert
Favre (Seine)	Noubet
Gellibert des Séguins (the younger)	Nougarède
Granier de Cassagnac	Renée
Gueronnière	Véron
Hamel	

Educators:

Belmontet	Delamarre
Chevalier	Demesmay
Corneille	Jubinal
Curnier	Lubonis
Delabecque	

Newspaper Editors and Directors:

Audren de Kerdrel	Latour
Darimon	Noubet
Dupont	Véron

Medical Doctors:

Chabanon	Lélut
Conneau	Massabiau
David (Deux-Sèvres)	Pamard
Delaveau	Taillefer
Girou de Buzareignes	Véron
Hénon	

Inn-Keeper:

Chevreau

LIST 9-- ContinuedAgriculture:

Argent-de-Deux Fontaines	Godart
Barbentane	Guillaumin
Beauveau	Hervé de Saint-Germain
Benoist	Kergorlay
Bodin	Lefébure
Brame	Lescuyer d'Attainville
Briot de Monremy	Lespérut
Bryas	Marrast
Champagny (Morbihan)	Millon
Chasot	Montreuil
Coëhorn	Morgan
Corberon	Mortemart (Rhône)
Darblay	Nesle
Debrottonne	Ouvrard
Desjobert	Perpessac
Desmolles	Richemont
Flocart de Mépieu	Tillette de Clermont-Tonnerre
Gellibert des Séguins (the younger)	Veauce

Sources:

Robert et Cougny, Dictionnaire des Parlementaires Français, Vols. I-V.
 G. Vapereau, Dictionnaire Universel des Contemporains.

LIST 10

REASONS FOR END OF DEPUTIES' SERVICE
1852-1863Appointments to State Offices:

a) Judicial	d) Ministry
Benoit-Champy	Billault
Dubois	Chasseloup-Laubat
Fortoul	
b) Civil Service	e) Senate
Baragnon	Barral
Curnier	Desbassyns de Richemont
Lequien	Favre (Loire-Inferieure)
Pongérard	Labedoyère
Remacle	Larabit
	Mésonan
c) Conseil d'Etat	Monier de la Sizeranne
Bavoux	Mouchy
Chanterac	Tascher de la Pagerie
Guéronnière	Thieullen
Langlais	
Riché-Tirman	

Death:

Alengry	Kersaint
Allart	Lafen de Cayx
Argent-de-Deux Fontaines	Lefebvre-Herment
Balay de la Bertrandière	Légrand
Belmont	Leharivel
Bidault	Lemercier (Charente)
Briot de Monremy	Maupas
Bryas	Mercier (Orne)
Chauvin-Lenardière	Normand
Chevreau	Nougarède
Collet	Ouvrard
Demesmay	Parmentier
Desjobert	Partouneaux
Desmars	Pétiet
Dupont (Vienne)	Planté
Duranti-Concressault	Renée
Duvivier	Rogé
Garnier	Roguet
Gaultier de la Guistièrre	Tillette de Clermont-Tonnerre
Godart	Varin d'Ainvelle
Gouy d'Arcy	Vast-Vimeux (the elder)
Houdetot	Vautier
Huc	Verclos
Jossivel de Castelet	Villedieu de Torcy (the elder)

LIST 10-- ContinuedElectoral Defeat:

Bertrand	Lanquetin
Cabias	Leroy-Beaulieu
Charlier	Levasseur
David (Gironde)	Montalembert
Delamarre	Montané
Descat	Montreuil
Desmolles	Segretain
Durfort-Civrac	Thibaut

Retirement:

a) For Reasons of Health
Lacave
Mortemart (Seine-Inferieure)
Renouard

b) For Reasons of Business
Tixier
Uzès

c) For Reasons Unknown
Dugas
Favart
Lagrange (Nord)
Leconte
Lormet
Monnin-Japy
Perret
Sainte-Croix
Sapey
Schyler
Soullie

d) For Reasons of Politics
Audren de Kerdrel and Calvière
resigned in protest over the
proclamation of the Empire.

Becquet held a salaried state
position at the time of his
election.

Bigrel's constituency was
dissolved in 1857.

Bouhier de l'Ecluse refused to
take the oath of loyalty.

Cambacères (the elder) and
Gellibert des Séguins (the
elder) resigned so their sons
could succeed them.

Ferrière resigned on the
suggestion of an irregularity
in his election.

Mérede resigned in protest
over the confiscation of the
House of Orleans' property.

Migeon was imprisoned for
electoral irregularities.

APPENDIX I
MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE 1852-1863

Deputy	Department	First Elections 29/02/1852-22/06/1857				Second Elections 22/06/1857-01/06/1863					
		Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.	Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.
		Corse	1852	1	48294	48381	55908	1857	1	25984	25991
Aude	1852	2	24157	27074	42139	1857	2	28585	30370	39700	
Allart	Somme	1852	1	16264	17597	33881	1857	1	22370	31087	44009
Ancel	Seine- Inférieure	1852	6	14814	16975	36275	1857	6	14708	16261	34496
Andelarre	Haute- Saône	1852	1	21703	22277	31677	1857	1	---	---	---
André	Charente	1852	3	21004	24811	38153	1857	3	18248	---	---
André	Gard	1852	1	19417	28017	44061	1857	3	24034	25269	38902
Argent-de-Deux Fontaines	Eure-et- Loire	1852	3	26071	29975	48830	1857	3	27093	33121	46323
Arjuzon	Eure	1852	3	26071	29975	48830	1857	5	13179	20529	33422
Arman	Gironde	1852	1	26231	28018	45537	1857	1	24491	---	---
Arnaud	Isère	1852	3	12745	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Audren de Kerdrel	Ille-et- Vilaine	1852	3	12745	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

Notes: The men elected who refused to take the required oath of loyalty, without having sat in the assembly, are not included as deputies in this analysis.
The number under the letter "C" designates the circonscription of election.

APPENDIX I-- Continued

Deputy	Department	First Elections 29/02/1852-22/06/1857				Second Elections 22/06/1857-01/06/1863					
		Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.	Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.
Aymé de la Herlière	Vosges	1852	2	20125	---	---	1857	2	24354	---	
Balay de la Bertrandière	Loire	1852	3	12145	22113	48167	1857	1	13224	---	
Baragnon	Gard	*1854	1	12830	12947	39678					
Barbentane	Saone-et-Loire	1852	2	21913	24211	38921	1857	1	16950	37798	
Barral	Cher	*1854	2	21983	22259	40595	*1858	3	30493	---	
Baudelot	Aisne										
Bavoux	Seine-et-Marne	1852	3	15663	22817	31476					
Beauchamp	Vienne	*1854	2	15735	15857	43113	1857	2	21051	43521	
Beauvau	Sarthe	1852	4	18888	22123	26346	1857	4	16538	26839	
Beauverger	Seine-et-Marne	1852	1	20337	28313	40591	1857	1	21321	38216	
Becquet	Bas-Rhin	1852	4	19311	20251	24327					
Belliard	Gers	1852	1	19715	20180	30489	1857	1	20607	---	
Belmont	Basses Pyrenees	*1855	2	23322	24707	36895	1857	2	29387	36015	
Belmontet	Tarn-et-Garonne	1852	2	18554	22908	35021	1857	2	20159	35865	

* Signifies a byelection.

APPENDIX I-- Continued

Deputy	Department	First Elections 29/02/1852-22/06/1857				Second Elections 22/06/1857-01/06/1863				
		Year	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.	Year	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.	
Benoist	Meuse					*1858	2	11134	21537	26500
Benoit-Champy	Ain	*1855	1	16496	16670					
Bertrand	Yonne	1852	2	18559	24874					
Bidault	Cher	1852	2	27647	28611					
Bigrel	Côtes-du-Nord	1852	5	15718	16283					
Billault	Ariège	1852	2	26962	27009					
Blosseville	Eure					1857	2	18469	27130	38405
Bodin	Ain	1852	3	16302	21862	1857	3	18470	19062	34819
Bois de Mauzilly	Finistère	1852	4	15018	15945	1857	4	25594	25793	35451
Boissy-d'Anglas	Ardèche	1852	3	10811	20115	1857	3	23581	25216	36426
Bouchetal-Laroche	Loire	1852	1	17514	19235	1857	3	21619	21818	32273
Bouhier de l'Ecluse	Vendée	1852	3	9462	18144					
Boullé	Morbihan	*1854	1	17218	17889	1857	1	19345	19543	38075
Bourcier de Villiers	Vosges	1852	1	14439	20806	1857	1	22892	23358	38582
Bourlon	Vienna	1852	1	22164	23090	1857	1	14858	21141	42240
Brame	Nord					1857	2	20704	35067	44480
Briot de Monremy	Meuse	1852	2	30896	32242	1857	2	18198	18801	26435

APPENDIX I-- Continued

Deputy	Department	First Elections 29/02/1852-22/06/1857				Second Elections 22/06/1857-01/06/1863					
		Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.	Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.
Carayon-Latour	Tarn	1852	2	24860	25237	36717	1857	2	20949	24950	37692
Carteret	Marne						1857	3	15995	21536	35604
Caruel de Saint-Martin	Seine-et-Oise	1852	1	17040	20381	36294	1857	1	16986	23571	35511
Caulaincourt	Calvados	1852	4	21648	21868	38070	1857	4	20412	21127	36400
Cazelles	Hérault	*1854	3	25778	25914	41592	1857	3	28625	28832	42936
Chabanon	Gard						*1861	2	30622	30686	42046
Chabrilan	Saône-et-Loire	1852	4	24763	26477	40628	1857	4	18727	25406	39102
Chambrun	Lozère						1857	1	18562	26924	37585
Champagny	Côtes-du-Nord	*1853	1	15637	15799	36776	1857	1	20543	27557	41204
Champagny	Morbihan	1852	2	18118	23998	39120	1857	2	24477	24557	35996
Chanterac	Bouches-du-Rhône	1852	1	12502	20874	43326					
Charlemagne	Indre						*1859	1	20484	28203	36411
Charlier	Jura	1852	2	29251	30485	42344					
Charpin-Feugerolles	Loire						1857	2	12489	18392	26373
Chasot	Orne						*1858	1	14326	27178	43151

APPENDIX I-- Continued

Deputy	Department	First Elections 29/02/1852-22/06/1857				Second Elections 22/06/1857-01/06/1863					
		Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.	Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.
		Chasseloup-Loubat	Charente-Inférieure	1852	2	12170	16566	29556	1857	2	13422
Chauchard	Haute-Marne	1852	2	25230	26433	39425	1857	2	24906	25462	36722
Chaumont-Qultry	Sarthe	*1854	1	17074	17143	33366	1857	1	18362	20069	32623
Chauvin-Lenardiere	Deux-Sèvres	1852	2	14109	24186	38065	1857	2	13684	14050	27384
Chazelles	Puy-de-Dôme	1852	1	20719	21513	33084	1857	1	18863	19036	31270
Chevalier	Aveyron	*1853	3	19920	21805	35066	1857	3	21969	22004	35960
Chevandier de Valdôme	Meurthe						*1859	3	28804	28969	33730
Chevreau	Ardeche	1852	1	16059	20319	35168	1857	6	13248	19152	24364
Choque	Nord	1852	6	15921	16941	26188	*1861	3	18980	19137	32508
Christophle	Puy-de-Dôme										
Clary	Loire-et-Cher	1852	1	21087	22463	36932	1857	1	16725	18937	36992
Clebsattel	Nord	1852	5	16312	16511	25071	1857	5	11259	18556	25064
Coëhorn	Bas-Rhin	*1853	4	20152	20647	25762	1857	4	20824	21059	26384
Colbert-Chabannais	Calvados						*1860	3	15424	18612	32941

APPENDIX I-- Continued

Deputy	Department	First Elections				Second Elections					
		29/02/1852-22/06/1857		22/06/1857-01/06/1863		29/02/1852-22/06/1857		22/06/1857-01/06/1863			
		Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.	Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.
Collot	Meuse	1852	1	27377	33579	45842	1857	1	25159	26314	35762
Conéglano	Doubs						1857	1	17387	29022	40579
Conneau	Somme	1852	3	22622	23189	32422	1857	3	16557	23186	31000
Conseil	Finistère	1852	2	9883	16173	44287	1857	2	20820	24185	36060
Corberon	Oise	*1853	1	16884	29379	40984	1857	1	22158	26645	39479
Cornelle	Seine-Inférieure	1852	3	16861	21651	36345	1857	3	19691	20293	34069
Corta	Jandes	1852	2	24506	27238	41228	1857	2	26607	27709	29623
Cosserat	Somme						*1861	1	26990	27761	45999
Coulaux	Bas-Rhin	1852	2	26584	27836	37950	1857	2	30672	31490	36936
Creuzet	Cantal	*1854	2	17296	18225	31529	1857	2	20417	20491	30075
Grosnier	Loire-et-Cher	1852	2	22043	24397	34156	1857	2	19887	21329	33607
Curé	Gironde						1857	1	9386	1722	60
Curnier	Gard	1852	1	13271	23686	40876	1857	2	17722	22168	36673
Cuerville	Côtes-du-Nord	*1853	2	14399	14490	28136	1857	2	17722	22168	36673
Dabeaux	Aude						*1861	2	24587	24775	41190
Dalloz	Jura	1852	1	28764	29422	45305	1857	1	28423	28680	44053

APPENDIX I-- Continued

Deputy	Department	First Elections 29/02/1852-22/06/1857			Second Elections '22/06/1857-01/06/1863		
		Year	Votes Rec.	Votes Reg.	Year	Votes Rec.	Votes Reg.
Dalmas	Ille-et-Vilaine				*1859	3 25570	29438 39404
Dambry	Seine-et-Oise				*1859	3 18893	27021 35168
Darblay	Seine-et-Oise	1852	2 17812	21904	1857	2 16247	28033 35413
Darimon	Seine				1857	7 12078	23523 36246
Dautheville	Ardeche	*1854	1 20411	23574	1857	1 21504	23654 34531
Dauzet-Dembarrère	Hautes-Pyrénées	1852	1 27313	27575	1857	1 21170	26869 34158
David	Gironde	1852	5 19161	21026			
David J.	Gironde				*1859	4 24872	24908 37212
David	Deux-Sevres	1852	1 32818	34556	1857	1 21999	22413 30354
David-Deschamps	Orne				*1860	2 14388	21611 38032
Debeyne	Dordogne	1852	2 20239	22202	1857	2 18822	21601 33033
Debrofenne	Aisne	1852	3 18843	22483	1857	3 24648	25725 42725
Delamarre	Creuse	1852	1 12831	25481	1857	1 12248	18669 34884
Delamarre	Somme	1852	4 16089	25199			
De La Palme	Seine-et-Oise	1852	4 14742	19239	1857	4 18078	19059 26991

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Deputy	Department	First Elections 29/02/1852-22/06/1857						Second Elections 22/06/1857-01/06/1863					
		Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.	Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.		
		Delavau	Indre	1852	2	20636	21406	37103	1857	2	18033	22604	35543
Delebecque	Pas-de- Calais						*1860	2	25627	25857	36245		
Deltheil	Lot	1852	2	28587	29178	41829	1857	2	30806	31489	42447		
Demesmay	Doubs	1852	2	26891	28025	39359	1857	3	15751	17334	34475		
Desbassyns de Richemont	Indre-et- Loire	1852	3	23355	24112	35158	1857	3	15751	17334	34475		
Descat	Nord	1852	2	23517	24409	42199	1857	3	19288	22817	36669		
Descours	Rhône												
Desjobert	Seine- Inférieure	1852	3	22259	22708	35910	1857	2	18948	19091	32864		
Desmaroux de Gaulmin	Allier	1852	2	25937	27079	44063	1857	2	18948	19091	32864		
Desmars	Loire- Inférieure	1852	3	11723	21678	35726	1857	3	21733	21787	31703		
Desmolles	Lozère	*1852	1	21028	21268	40092	1857	2	10472	20111	35086		
Devinck	Seine	1852	2	12189	21974	36082	1857	2	---	---	---		
Devoize	Isère	1852	2	18519	---	---	1857	2	---	---	---		
Didier	Ariège	1852	1	26432	26970	37601	1857	1	24666	27935	35906		
Douesnel-Dubosq	Calvados	1852	1	26432	26970	37601	*1859	2	16990	18127	31526		

APPENDIX I-- Continued

Deputy	Department	First Elections 29/02/1852-22/06/1857				Second Elections 22/06/1857-01/06/1863					
		Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.	Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.
		Doumet	Herauld	1852	1	13697	14099	39347	1857	1	16177
Drouot	Meurthe	1852	1	21386	23363	36759	1857	1	18628	22693	34508
Dubois	Maine-et-Loire	1852	1	18990	20273	39803	1857	1	11540	23594	38808
Duclos	Ille-et-Vilaine	1852	4	13528	19388	37772	1857	4	20959	21022	34442
Du Couedic	Finistere	1852	3	20562	22127	38011	1857	1	23587	24128	35199
Dugas	Rhone	1852	2	15829	18167	35910	1857	4	17628	23799	36268
Dumarais	Loire	1852	4	13525	23252	33394	1857	4	23745	23860	32678
Duplan	Haute-Garonne	1852	1	21272	22262	40395	1857	1	19601	23048	37592
Dupont	Dordogne	1852	2	22658	24064	43916	1857	1	26521	27601	44885
Dupont	Vienna	1852	1	26147	27320	45289	1857	1			
Durand	Pyrenees-Orientales	1852	1	22144	22876	39424	1857	1			
Duranti-Concressault	Cher	1852	4	9772	18757	34002	1857	3	14967	22004	32845
Durfort-Civrac	Maine-et-Loire	1852	3	20750	25365	39775	1857	3			
Dusolier	Dordogne	1852	1	16568							
Duvivier	Mayenne	1852	1								

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Deputy	Département	First Elections 29/02/1852-22/06/1857				Second Elections 22/06/1857-01/06/1863					
		Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.	Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.
		Charente-Inférieure	1852	3	25361	29236	46876	1857	3	22449	23144
Basses-Pyrénées	1852	3	23984	26869	39361	1857	3	28546	28766	35307	
Isère	1852	1	24079	24657	40545	1857	1	19252	24630	36021	
Hautes-Alpes	1852	1	14267	24091	36195	1857	1	25797	25991	34708	
Corrèze	1852	1	20403	26697	44265						
Loire-Inférieure	1852	2	7626	10573	36608						
Seine						*1858	3	11303	22507	33152	
Orne						*1859	3	14038	25906	38898	
Indre-et-Loire	1852	2	22931	23364	32669	1857	2	17818	18239	31811	
Loire-Inférieure	1852	4	9917	18933	36638	1857	4	18939	19121	34986	
Isère	1852	3	25437	25797	37928	1857	3	26223	26417	35994	
Basses-Alpes	1852	1	30117	30468	45751						
Seine	1852	6	15991	31192	39986	1857	6	13820	25995	39798	
Seine-et-Marne	1852	2	14102	18464	26936	1857	2	15283	16777	25465	

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Deputy	Department	First Elections 29/02/1852-22/c/1857				Second Elections 22/06/1857-01/06/1863					
		Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.	Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.
Garnier	Loire-Inférieure	1852	1	13934	20852	36873	1857	2	13824	14702	36715
Gaultier de la Guistière	Ille-et-Vilaine	*1853	1	15816	16053	34577					
Geiger	Moselle	1852	3	17411	26240	35050	1857	3	24897	25302	35334
Gellibert des Séguins (the elder)	Charente	1852	1	23783	26888	43033	1857	1	16623	28889	41121
Gellibert des Séguins (the younger)	Charente						*1859	1	15889	24742	40132
Geoffroy de Villeneuve	Aisne	1852	4	20066	28385	39386	1857	4	20937	24387	36794
Girou de Buzareingnes	Aveyron	1852	1	25083	27408	42042	1857	1	23403	23534	38316
Gisclard	Tarn	1852	1	19227	23544	35019	1857	1	19960	24136	36066
Godard-Desmarest	Nord	1852	8	12634	15142	38499	1857	8	21191	24287	37457
Godart	Marne	1852	1	25887	27855	36167					
Gorsse	Tarn	1852	3	20811	23460	36545	1857	3	19095	19255	30275
Gouin	Indre-et-Loire	1852	1	15128	16144	26501	1857	1	12642	13958	25692
Gouy d'Arcy	Seine-et-Oise	1852	3	17341	25211	36279	1857	3	21059	24720	35125
Grammont	Haute-Saône	1852	3	20861	21560	37580	1857	3	26046	26172	34916

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Deputy	Department	First Elections 29/02/1852-22/06/1857					Second Elections 22/06/1857-01/06/1863				
		Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.	Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.
Granier de Cassagnac	Gers	1852	3	24132	25149	32723	1857	3	26077	26363	32134
Grouchy	Loiret						1857	3	13685	18956	28710
Guéronnière	Cantal	1852	2	14698	21851	33509					
Guillaumein	Cher	*1856	1	19305	20566	40255	1857	1	23247	24977	40969
Guyard-Delalain	Seine	1852	1	13310	24771	35959	1857	1	10071	16831	33391
Hallez-Claparède	Bas-Rhin	1852	3	26554	27060	33411	1857	3	25661	26045	34272
Hallignon	Mayenne						1857	3	11336	19369	25120
Hamel	Deux- Sèvres						1857	2	15408	15750	25137
Haudos	Marne	*1856	1	19378	20142	24085	1857	1	25010	25374	34643
Hébert	Aisne	1852	1	22848	24618	39768	1857	1	25638	26392	38551
Hennocque	Moselle	1852	1	20993	22048	36188	1857	1	19238	22840	34869
Hénon	Rhône						1857	2	11969	22593	38034
Hérambault	Pas de Calais	1852	3	23329	23706	40531	1857	3	23578	23984	41180
Herlincourt	Pas de Calais	1852	1	11693	29851	43194	1857	1	27961	28099	41998
Hervé de Saint-Germain	Manche	1852	2	22420	24006	39111	1857	2	24847	25308	38239
Houdetot	Calvados	1852	2	19456	19781	33307	1857	2	17762	18135	32088
Huc	Herauld	1852	3	21126	21619	41715					

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Deputy	Department	First Elections 29/02/1852-22/06/1857				Second Elections 22/06/1857-01/06/1863					
		Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.	Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.
		Janvier de la Motte	Tarn-et-Garonne	1852	1	18874	20393	40425	1857	1	20868
Javal	Yonne						1857	2	14089	23231	36116
Jonage	Ain	1852	2	22236	25274	35522	1857	2	21884	22293	33671
Josseau	Seine-et-Marne						1857	3	17300	18718	30511
Jossivel de Castelot	Morbihan	1852	1	14461	25345	40035					
Jouvenal	Corrèze	1852	2	18518	24083	40803	1857	2	23075	26774	39433
Jubinal	Hautes-Pyrénées	1852	2	19349	25852	32929	1857	2	24065	24142	31091
Keller	Haut-Rhin						*1859	3	18509	29716	36845
Kergorlay	Manche	1852	1	23559	25089	40797	1857	1	21146	23826	38857
Kersaint	Puy-de-Dôme						1857	3	20057	20234	33357
Kervéguen	Var	1852	3	16128	17009	35198	1857	3	15753	16034	29395
Koenigswarter	Seine	1852	1	16568	23365	39775					
Kolb-Bernard	Nord	*1856	5	18314	18665	34304	*1859	1	15125	24515	35194
Labédoyère	Seine-Inférieure	1852	1	23863	28272	49673	1857	5	15712	19360	34493
Lacave	Loiret						*1859	1	20494	20755	29308
Lacheisserie	Drôme										

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Deputy	Department	First Elections 29/02/1852-22/06/1857				Second Elections 22/06/1857-01/06/1863					
		Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.	Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.
Ladoucette	Ardennes	1852	2	30271	33450	43276	1857	2	29272	30074	41590
Laffitte	Lot-et- Garonne	1852	2	20060	26297	35467	1857	2	22306	23638	34496
Lafond de Saint-Mur	Corrèze						1857	1	24746	29981	42156
Lafon de Cayz	Lot	1852	1	28713	29831	42732					
Lagrange	Gers	1852	2	20029	20942	31166	1857	2	17647	20551	29972
Lagrange	Nord	1852	4	19858	20003	28162					
Langlais	Sarthe	1852	2	17786	26216	36662	1857	2	18698	19315	34829
Lanquetin	Seine	1852	7	14386	26110	35334					
Larabit	Yonne	1852	1	20811	24052	38063					
Larrabure	Basses- Pyrénées						*1857	2	29137	29173	35688
Las-Cases	Maine-et- Loire						1857	4	9536	17904	33701
La Tour	Côtes-du- Nord	1852	4	15003	19912	34264	1857	4	21236	23417	37296
Latour-du-Moulin	Doubs	*1853	2	28324	28682	38117	*1857	2	22127	29070	36689
Latour-Maubourg	Haute- Loire	1852	1	23801	26739	40147	1857	1	24227	24229	38816
Lebreton	Vendée	*1853	3	11248	11514	34528	1857	3	14878	15025	34477

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Deputy	Department	First Elections 29/02/1852-22/06/1857					Second Elections 22/06/1857-01/06/1863				
		Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.	Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.
Leclerc d'Osmonville	Mayenne	*1853	1	15931	16503	39743	1857	1	14799	17471	39142
Lecomte	Yonne	1852	3	26371	28476	36574	1857	3	20116	25553	35151
Leconte	Côtes-du- Nord	1852	2	10278	22416	32700					
Lédier	Seine- Inférieure	1852	4	16641	20769	34455	1857	4	15068	17660	31990
Lefébure	Haut-Rhin	1852	1	19765	23099	48284	1857	1	24172	25577	45434
Lefebvre-Herment	Pas de Calais	1852	4	20375	24789	36092	1857	4	22880	22960	35283
Le Gorrec	Côtes-du- Nord	1852	3	10845	20242	32574	1857	3	16748	23362	40433
Legrand	Nord	1852	1	13515	25582	37610	1857	1	12257	24025	33945
Leharivel	Ille-et- Vilaine	*1853	3	20034	24893	43869	1857	3	25993	26746	40650
Lehon	Ain	*1857	1	17391	17465	29853	1857	1	17746	18108	30341
Lélut	Haute- Saône	1852	2	18409	18886	25247	1857	2	18455	18686	23825
Lemaire	Nord	1852	3	21170	24027	38159	1857	3	21015	21148	36912
Lemaire	Oise	1852	3	22195	26955	40599	1857	3	20483	26715	38720
Le Mélorel de la Haichois	Morbihan	1852	2	12360	20837	41744	1857	2	20203	24825	38931

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Deputy	Department	First Elections 29/02/1852-22/06/1857				Second Elections 22/06/1857-01/06/1863			
		Year	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.	Year	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.
		C				C			
Lemercier	Charente	1852	1 12791	18855	34120	1857	4 19671	20016	33711
Lemercier	Charente- Inférieure	1852	4 22724	23104	34379	1857	2 24486	25605	39637
Lepelletier-d'Aulnay	Nievre	1852	2 29212	29891	42274	1857	2 ---	---	---
Lequien	Pas de Calais	1852	2 18767	25559	35417	*1857	2 20601	27616	35121
Leret d'Aubigny	Sarthe	1852	2 16735	20145	33813	1857	2 15940	16076	34056
Leroux	Vendée	1852	3 12517	15034	37004	1857	1 20397	23579	32415
Leroy-Beaulieu	Calvados	*1855	1 22553	22568	31380	*1860	4 17623	26447	36123
Lescuyer d'Attainville	Var	1852	1 24400	28997	40691	1857	1 24035	24935	37714
Le Sergeant de Monnecove	Pas de Calais	1852	1 12791	18855	36420				
Lespérut	Haute- Marne	1852	1 17781	19125	31028	1857	3 16274	19040	36588
Levavasseur	Seine- Inférieure	*1855	3 18101	18137	36346	1857	3 18023	26550	36767
Lormet	Ain	1852	3 27914	28671	38727				
Lougler de Chartrouse	Bouches- du-Rhône	1852	3 27914	28671	38727				
Louis-Bazile	Côte-d'Or	1852	3 27914	28671	38727				

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Deputy	Department	First Elections 29/02/1852-22/06/1857				Second Elections 22/06/1857-01/06/1863					
		Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.	Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.
		Levet	Maine-et-Loire	1852	3	18920	22395	34300	1857	3	11806
Labonis	Alpes-Maritimes						1857	1	11444	16168	32772
McDonald de Tarente	Loiret	1852	2	27461	29436	43695	1857	2	10072	12424	24462
Mame	Indre-et-Loire						*1859	3	15224	20975	33843
Gray-Monge	Côte-d'Or						*1861	2	16554	23189	35665
Mianne	Corse						1857	2	23945	24398	29223
Mast	Landes	1852	1	23033	23707	41650	1857	1	22581	29690	40509
Masblau	Haute-Garonne	1852	3	23952	24596	33074	1857	3	24614	25670	33247
Maspas	Aube	1852	2	30066	34690	40106	1857	2	26944	28398	38826
Mercier	Mayenne	1852	2	19418	23670	36340	1857	2	20284	20650	34974
Mercier	Orne	1852	1	25514	29483	45976	1857	1	17909	20138	43428
Mérode	Nord	1852	8	20481	20925	38231					
Meslin	Manche	1852	4	19801	21006	39329	1857	4	22128	24348	38967
Mésonan	Finistère	1852	1	16870	17311	37793					
Migeon	Haut-Rhin	1852	3	25846	27429	37294	1857	3	17025	27862	35963

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Deputy	Department	First Elections 29/02/1852-22/06/1857				Second Elections 22/06/1857-01/06/1863					
		Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.	Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.
Millet	Vaucluse	1852	2	20967	22552	39206	1857	2	17661	23585	38605
Millon	Meuse	1852	4	20782	24680	37926	1857	2	19554	27253	35882
Miral	Puy-de-Dôme	1852	2	19456	21434	30667	1857	2	17706	19775	31148
Monier de la Sizeranne	Drôme	1852	4	11378	22755	41365	1857	1	31217	31578	47738
Monnin-Japy	Seine	1852	1	20139	23434	39652	*1860	1	25654	27312	45074
Montagnac	Ardennes	1852	1	10132	12752	32940	1857	3	20547	22893	33897
Montalambert	Doubs	1852	2	21827	27008	40060	1857	4	14323	25380	30858
Montané	Gironde	1852	3	20424	20766	28428	1857	2	21084	21194	32089
Monjoyeux	Nievre	1852	2	23373	25076	34588	1857	4	16944	21633	35773
Montreuil	Eure	1852	4	15595	22633	37621	1857	4	16944	21633	35773
Morin	Drôme	1852	5	20498	21447	36583	1857	1	33990	34510	42421
Morgan	Somme	1852	1	32438	32604	42549	1857	1	33990	34510	42421
Morny	Puy-de-Dôme	1852	1	24022	27147	40761	1857	1	33990	34510	42421
Mortemart	Rhône	1852	1	32438	32604	42549	1857	1	33990	34510	42421
Mortemart	Seine-Inférieure	1852	1	24022	27147	40761	1857	1	33990	34510	42421
Mouchy	Oise	1852	1	32438	32604	42549	1857	1	33990	34510	42421
Murat	Lot	*1854	1	32438	32604	42549	1857	1	33990	34510	42421

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Deputy	Department	First Elections 29/02/1852-22/06/1857				Second Elections 22/06/1857-01/06/1863					
		Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.	Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.
		Nesle	Cher	*1855	2	15889	16205	38313	1857	2	18768
Nogent-Saint-Laurens	Loiret	*1853	1	18093	19245	47782	1857	1	16805	17777	36490
Normand	Eure-et-Loir	1852	2	23694	29429	42062	1857	2	15488	26203	40489
Noualhier	Haute-Vienne	1852	1	21217	21711	40909	1857	1	13735	19783	35989
Noubet	Lot-et-Garonne	1852	1	18205	23759	34802	1857	1	19635	21483	33696
Nougarede	Aveyron	1852	3	20382	20544	35094					
Ollivier	Seine						1857	4	11005	21319	35347
O'Quin	Basses-Pyrenees	1852	1	25390	25855	39145	1857	1	30383	30494	38152
Ornano	Yonne	*1853	1	15381	17876	37940	1857	1	----	----	----
Ouvrard	Côte-d'Or	1852	2	18847	23630	36875	1857	2	19723	24692	35743
Pamard	Vauclause						*1861	1	18058	22176	36335
Parchappe	Marne	1852	2	22203	27584	35679	1857	2	23112	24192	34276
Parieu	Cantal	1852	1	18587	19144	30357	1857	1	20199	20278	30825
Parmentier	Herault	1852	1	12701	15008	39836					
Partouneaux	Var	1852	1	16352	16662	34693					

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Deputy	Department	First Elections 29/02/1852-22/06/1857				Second Elections 22/06/1857-01/06/1863						
		Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.	Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.	
Pennautier	Puy-de-Dôme	1852	3	16615	16751	34331						
Perouse	Gard	*1857	1	11200	12280	38367	1857	1	13624	21416	38622	
Perpessac	Haute-Garonne	1852	2	19971	23607	37386	1857	2	17311	23234	35438	
Perret	Seine	1852	5	13478	29182	38505	*1858	3	10111	18052	31434	
Perrot	Seine						1857	1	21503	28055	44495	
Pétiet	Nièvre	1852	1	29032	33871	48174	*1858	5	10404	19526	30503	
Picard	Seine	1852	5	13322	16318	29217	1857	5	14476	14711	27610	
Pierre	Puy-de-Dôme	*1856	1	19097	19176	33194	1857	1	20168	20266	35615	
Piré	Ille-et-Vilaine						*1861	2	16361	33506	38997	
Plancy	Aube						1857	2	19686	28950	37625	
Plancy	Oise	1852	2	25513	28301	38803						
Planté	Basses-Pyrénées	1852	2	25463	25677	38198						
Plichon	Nord						1857	4	19067	19178	26516	
Pongéard	Ille-et-Vilaine	1852	1	7932	14058	34921						
Portalis	Var	1852	2	14097	17797	34052	1857	2	18316	18398	32997	

APPENDIX I-- Continued

Deputy	Department	First Elections 29/02/1852-22/06/1857				Second Elections 22/06/1857-01/06/1863					
		Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.	Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	
Richemont	Lot-et-Garonne	1852	3	21322	25399	35993	1857	3	22148	24513	34856
Riché-Tirman	Ardennes	1852	1	23687	29910	47282	1857	1	30661	32874	45849
Riencourt	Somme	1852	2	13753	15875	35361	*1860	2	20460	20567	28693
Rigaud	Bouches-du-Rhône	1852	2	13753	15875	35361	1857	2	16037	17888	34995
Rochemure	Ardèche	1852	2	22276	22337	31874	1857	2	24826	24892	30714
Rogé	Sarthe	1852	1	18876	26669	35701	1857	4	21042	21797	36715
Roguet	Gironde	1852	2	23354	23631	36815	1857	2	24333	24368	35287
Romeuf	Haute-Loire	1852	1	25778	26857	45467	1857	1	26835	29255	43832
Roques-Salvaza	Audé	1852	2	14572	19308	38154	1857	2	21895	22479	38875
Roulleaux-Dugage	Herault	1852	2	14572	19308	38154	*1859	2	12831	21742	30094
Roy-Bry	Charente-Inférieure	1852	2	24120	27182	41875	1857	2	18512	23206	38558
Saint-Croix	Orne	1852	1	9367	16668	34376	1857	1	8994	12580	34371
Sainte-Hermine	Vendee	1852	2	22266	23560	37951	1857	2	17963	18224	37254
Sallandrouze de la Mornaix	Creuse	1852	1	17804	23264	34780	1857	1	18315	18696	30961
Sapey	Drôme	1852	2	24333	24469	38408	1857	2	20832	20995	39219
Schneider	Saône-et-Loire	1852	2	24333	24469	38408	1857	2	20832	20995	39219

APPENDIX I-- Continued

Deputy	Department	First Elections 29/02/1852-22/06/1857				Second Elections 22/06/1857-01/06/1863						
		Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.	Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.	
Schylet	Gironde	1852	4	21836	22898	37588						
Segrétain	Mayenne	1852	3	7428	18671	27756						
Segris	Maine-et-Loire						1857	1	19369	23143	38866	
Séguir-Jameignon	Meuse						*1858	3	15628	19323	26870	
Seydoux	Nord	1852	7	29160	29677	45420	1857	7	31537	31784	45087	
Simon	Loire-Inférieure						*1857	3	23720	23748	31899	
Soullié	Marne	1852	3	18311	21331	34059						
Suchet d'Albuféra	Eure	1852	1	18840	24310	37857	1857	1	15875	27254	36029	
Taillefer	Dordogne	1852	4	16096	24818	35882	1857	1	18789	26780	34435	
Talhouët	Sarthe	1852	3	22481	25383	34859	1857	3	19769	20790	31393	
Tascher de la Pagerie	Gard						1857	2	33573	33646	40704	
Tauriac	Haute-Garonne	1852	1	19301	21398	33798	1857	1	19871	22952	31733	
Tesnières	Charente	*1854	2	18066	21300	34331	1857	2	13369	24515	34330	
Thibaut	Seine	*1852	3	10107	18420	40182						
Thiérion	Gironde	1852	3	19800	20228	33965	1857	3	15442	22046	32181	
Thieullen	Côtes-du-Nord	1852	1	16505	23909	38216						
Thionnet de la Turmelière	Loire-Inférieure						1857	1	18467	18547	34905	

APPENDIX I-- Continued

Deputy	Department	First Elections 29/02/1852-22/06/1857				Second Elections 22/06/1857-01/06/1863					
		Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.	Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.
Tillette de Clermont	Somme	1852	2	25279	25587	36042	1857	2	17148	17338	28987
Tixier	Haute- Vienne	1852	2	24543	25112	42535					
Toulongeon	Jura						1857	2	24971	27875	40946
Travot	Gironde	1852	1	10132	12752	32940					
Tromelin	Finistère	1852	3	12800	17209	36793	1857	3	20784	20878	34986
Uzès	Gard	1852	2	16296	27562	35728					
Vast-Vimeux (the elder)	Charente- Inférieure	1852	1	18213	18909	29964	1857	1	15502	17524	29651
Vast-Vimeux (the younger)	Charente- Inférieure						*1859	1	15169	19841	29713
Vautier	Calvados	1852	1	12834	18457	31880	1857	1	12920	13431	30885
Veauce	Allier	1852	1	28695	29577	48507	1857	1	16328	16542	33075
Verclos	Vaucluse	1852	1	18577	22744	39705	1857	1	15281	20654	36460
Vernier	Côte-d'Or	1852	1	18392	30197	42461	1857	1	22779	28498	41332
Véron	Seine	1852	9	21493	26021	34043	1857	9	15416	24030	37680
Viard	Meurthe	1852	3	26893	29164	38136	1857	3	28063	28937	34644
Villedieu de Torcy (the elder)	Orne	1852	3	20462	21490	40547	1857	3	14408	20244	39153

APPENDIX I-- Continued

Deputy	Department	First Elections 29/02/1852-22/06/1857				Second Elections 22/06/1857-01/06/1863															
		Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.	Year	C	Votes Rec.	Votes Cast	Voters Reg.										
		Villedieu de Torcy (the younger)	Orne																		
Voruz	Loire- Inférieure																				
Wattebled	Pas de Calais	1852	5	14644	28924	31109					1857	5	25997	26487	34535						
Wendel	Moselle	1852	2	29140	29815	40355					1857	2	27413	27979	38194						
Werlé	Marne																				

Sources: Robert et Cougny, Dictionnaire des Parlementaires Français, V, 584-621;
I-V, passim.

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