

A Web of Extremism: How Anti-Government Extremists Survive Online Censorship

by

Jakub Romanek

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Department of Political Science
University of Alberta

© Jakub Romanek, 2023

Abstract

This thesis explores how extremism manages to survive in moderated online spaces. This work follows the attempts of the Instagram platform to minimize the presence of the right-wing extremist groups, specifically the Boogaloo movement, as a means of understanding how such groups survive and proselytize in the face of censorship. Addressing this question is done through the use of a multi-sited virtual ethnography spanning the Instagram Boogaloo community, Telegram channels and other external links shared by the accounts within the sample group over the course of two years. Publicly available posts from relevant accounts were archived and subject to content analysis to provide a baseline understanding of the group's ideology and determine existing and emergent themes in order to demonstrate the evolution of the group. Collection and analysis was a concurrent and cyclical process which yielded a deeper understanding of the Boogaloo movement's ideology and the meaning behind the symbols employed by the group. Furthermore, the results of this work showcase that the longer the Boogaloo movement spent circumnavigating censorship, the more the group began to resemble other successful extremist groups. Subsequently the analysis was informed by social movement theory and new institutionalism to explain how extremist groups approach adversity and uncertainty in a similar fashion to how institutions behave, which ultimately leads to homogenization.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express the upmost gratitude for Reza Hasmath and Andy Knight. Dr. Knight's international relations classes were foundational in my path to researching extremism. My interest in the security challenge posed by foreign terrorist fighters was fostered by Dr. Knight, who provided pertinent recommendations for further reading which ultimately paved the way for this work. Dr. Hasmath introduced me to concepts of organization ecology during my undergraduate degree, and when I spoke with him about applying isomorphism to extremist groups prior to beginning my graduate studies, his support and advice served as a catalyst for pursuing this thesis topic. I am tremendously grateful that these two instructors were willing to serve as my mentors and thesis supervisors. I cannot overstate my appreciation for their support, guidance, and patience throughout this work.

My gratitude also lies with Julián Castro-Rea. Dr. Castro-Rea's various classes on North American politics, and subsequent seminar on the American Far-Right, opened the door for researching North American anti-government extremism. This research interest was further cultivated by Dr. Castro-Rea and his guidance was fundamental in arriving at the research question which this thesis addresses.

I would also like to give thanks to Dr. Temitope Oriola who was willing to serve as a thesis committee member. Dr. Oriola's comments and suggestions provided insight and further reading which continues to satiate my academic appetite beyond the conclusion of this thesis.

Finally, I would be remiss if I did not express my appreciation for my partner Samantha. Words cannot express the reprieve she provided during a period where my work had me immersed in the dark online spaces this thesis sought out to investigate.

Table of Contents

| | |
|---|------------|
| Abstract..... | ii |
| Acknowledgements | iii |
| Table of Contents | iv |
| List of Figures..... | v |
| Chapter I: Introduction..... | 1 |
| Chapter II: Research Problem | 4 |
| Chapter III: Literature Review | 6 |
| Social Movement Theory and Institutionalism | 6 |
| Extremism, Terrorism, and Radicalization | 10 |
| Extremism and the Online Space | 14 |
| The Online Space | 17 |
| Research Gaps | 20 |
| Chapter IV: Research Methodology | 22 |
| Chapter V: Findings | 40 |
| Lack of adaptation..... | 40 |
| Identifying Adaptations..... | 41 |
| Iconography adaptation..... | 44 |
| Communicative Adaptation..... | 50 |
| Chapter VI: Analysis | 50 |
| Coercive Isomorphism | 51 |
| Mimetic Isomorphism | 55 |
| Chapter VII: Conclusion..... | 66 |
| Works Cited..... | 68 |

List of Figures

| | |
|--|----|
| Figure 1: newengland.right 2019-12-23 | 32 |
| Figure 2: firststofourth 2020-04-19..... | 32 |
| Figure 3: the_blak_patriot 2019-08-07..... | 32 |
| Figure 4: Antistate_ 2019-07-28..... | 33 |
| Figure 5: donetrueking 2020-03-29 | 33 |
| Figure 6: Mikey_trois.deux_duncanlemp 2021-12-07 | 34 |
| Figure 7: the_nsol_official 2020-02-01 | 34 |
| Figure 8: fullautodoggo 2019-04-02..... | 36 |
| Figure 9: violent.vibin 2020-01-31 | 36 |
| Figure 10: lonewulfe19 2019-11-25 | 36 |
| Figure 11: municipalmunitionsmedical 2019-12-29..... | 36 |
| Figure 12: Hicock45 2019-06-30..... | 38 |
| Figure 13: _boogaloo_bro_V2 2020-11-18 | 38 |
| Figure 14: walther_joeseph_kovacs 2020-04-07 | 38 |
| Figure 15: daynoodlez 2020-01-08..... | 39 |
| Figure 16: GeorgesBoatParty 2022-01-16..... | 39 |
| Figure 17: mikey_trois.deux_duncanlemp 2021-12-07..... | 43 |
| Figure 18: Arsenal_616 2020-07-05..... | 43 |
| Figure 19: Ancaprebel 2020-04-19..... | 45 |
| Figure 20: The_blak_patriot 2019-09-02..... | 45 |
| Figure 21: Garybear86 - 2020-08-15 | 45 |

| | |
|--|----|
| Figure 22: Task_unit_boozer 2021-01-13 | 45 |
| Figure 23: Cambruuu 2021-09-19 | 46 |
| Figure 24: mikey_trois.deux_duncanlemp 2021-12-07 | 47 |
| Figure 25: walther_joseph_kovacs 2020-01-30..... | 48 |
| Figure 26: ancaprebel 2021-05-15 | 48 |
| Figure 27: pnw_delta 2021-08-16..... | 49 |
| Figure 28: walther_joseph_kovacs 2021-07-02..... | 49 |
| Figure 29: ancaprebel 2020-09-29 | 49 |
| Figure 30: Municipalmunitionsmedical 2019-12-27 | 49 |
| Figure 31: mikey_trois.deux_duncanlemp 2021-12-07 | 49 |
| Figure 32: kickstumbles 2020-06-04 | 52 |
| Figure 33: Lonewulfe 2019-06-10..... | 53 |
| Figure 34: Arsenal_616 2020-07-22..... | 54 |
| Figure 35: meme_based_insurgency 2020-02-20..... | 54 |
| Figure 36: PNWGuerilla (Telegram) 2022-03-10 | 56 |
| Figure 37: "White nationalists shelter behind shields, displaying the Southern Nationalist flag" (Roberts 2021) | 57 |
| Figure 38: Lonewulfe19 2020-06-08..... | 58 |
| Figure 39: noncompliant_outfitters 2020-02-21 | 59 |
| Figure 40: crazymanraigles 2022-01-02 | 59 |
| Figure 41: BoogalooDoge 2020-03-11 | 60 |
| Figure 42: The Soufan Center 2020..... | 62 |
| Figure 43: Young 2021 | 62 |

| | |
|---|----|
| Figure 44: Konnerkahler 2021-11-23 | 62 |
| Figure 45: fullautodoggo 2019-11-05 | 63 |
| Figure 46: Lonewulfe19 2019-11-24 | 63 |
| Figure 47: Walther_joseph_kovacs 2020-10-12 | 63 |
| Figure 48: noncompliant_outfitters 2020-01-31 | 63 |
| Figure 49: third_hole_hooligan 2020-01-17 | 63 |
| Figure 50: Walther_joseph_kovacs 2022-01-13 | 63 |
| Figure 51: notgorillaman 2022-03-11 | 65 |

Chapter I: Introduction

In 2018, all recorded extremist-related killings in the United States were conducted by right-wing factions.¹ This is alarming when considering that the work of security scholars has pointed out how in a post 9/11 era that not only other researchers – but also policy makers, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies have focused their attention on Islamic extremism and terrorist attacks – leading to right-wing extremism being misunderstood and under-reported.² The contemporary threat posed by right-wing extremism (RWE) within North America goes beyond simple explanations of deviance or criminal behaviour derived from ideological motivations, and has caught the interest of researchers from various disciplines. Groups that were once in the peripheral vision of law enforcement agencies have come into full view through their actions and because of the media attention they receive. Vehicle attacks, in which a radicalized individual attempts to inflict mass casualties by driving into a crowd are a method of terrorist violence which was endorsed by Abu Mohammad al-Adnani and are largely indicative of Jihadi-inspired terror attacks;³ however, 2017 saw this method utilized with deadly effect targeting a group of counter-protesters during a Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville Virginia.⁴ Methods of instilling terror which mirrored that of Ted Kaczynski - the Unabomber - were utilized by Cesar Sayoc, who in 2018, mailed inert pipe bombs to prominent Democrats such as Joe Biden and Hillary Clinton.⁵ When the first wave of COVID – 19 began to take hold in the United States, Eduardo Moreno derailed a speeding train at the Port of Los Angeles in an attempt to strike the U.S. Navy Hospital Ship Mercy.⁶ Moreno expressed anti-government views and a specific

¹ Hoffman and Ware 2019.

² Koehler 2019.

³ ("Terrorist Attacks By Vehicle Fast Facts" 2021.) (Witherspoon 2017.)

⁴ BBC News 2019.

⁵ Gonzales 2019.

⁶ Weber 2020.

distrust of the ship's medical role as his motive.⁷ Agencies such as the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have slowly come to recognize the modern threat of RWE, specifically asserting in the October 2020 DHS Homeland Threat Assessment that Domestic Violent Extremists (DVEs) compose “the primary terrorist threat inside the United States”,⁸ with a multiagency 2021 publication specifying that “racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVEs) and militia violent extremists (MVEs) present the most lethal DVE threats”.⁹ The DHS identifies a DVE as “an individual based and operating primarily within the United States or its territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power”; thus, providing a descriptor for individuals such as Fields, Sayoc, and Moreno.¹⁰ Such a shift in focus is evidence-based as exemplified in a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report which attributes roughly 90 percent of terrorist attacks in the United States during 2020 to far-right extremism.¹¹ Furthermore, the same report finds that far-right attacks are the most likely to cause death in any given year based on a dataset of 893 terrorist plots and attacks between 1994-2020.¹² While the report identifies right-wing terrorists as white supremacists, anti government extremists, and incels, the majority of right-wing extremist killings in 2020 can be attributed to anti-government extremists.¹³ Furthermore, although the report identifies sovereign citizens, the militia movement, Three Percenters, and the Boogaloo movement as the subsets of anti-government extremism, it is particularly the Boogaloo movement which has caused the greatest death toll in 2020.¹⁴ Based on the Boogaloo

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2020, 17.

⁹ Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2021, 2.

¹⁰ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2020, 17.

¹¹ Jones, Doxsee, and Harrington, 2020.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Beckett 2020.

¹⁴ Ibid.

movement's penchant for violence and the lack of literature pertaining to the faction, it was chosen as the subject of analysis for this work. In recognizing the threat the group poses, understanding how the Boogaloo movement maintains its online presence on mainstream social media platforms becomes a question of paramount importance not only to academics, but also policy makers, tech experts, and law enforcement agencies. Due to their highly decentralized networks, extremist groups which operate online pose a significant threat. The decentralized and online nature of such groups makes them more insulated against the intervention of law enforcement agencies due to anonymity and the complexity of policing the internet.¹⁵ Additionally, this online access not only lowers the barrier of entry into the group provided by the convenience of the web, but also lowers the "capability threshold" for individuals to conduct advanced attacks due to the technical knowledge which can be provided and accessed online.¹⁶

The purpose of this work is to employ a virtual ethnography through the lens of social movement theory in order to answer the question of how the Boogaloo movement adapts to online censorship. This work begins with an overview of the Boogaloo movement's recent activity followed by the definition of key terms, discussion of ethnographic methodology, and explanation of social movement theory's applicability to the research problem. Subsequently, the findings will be presented thematically prior to their reorganization to show emergent trends.

¹⁵ Banks 2010, 233-244.

¹⁶ Cohen et al. 2013, 246.

Chapter II: Research Problem

The recent explosive rise in the Boogaloo movement, marked by its a role in the shooting of four (and death of two) law enforcement officers in 2020,¹⁷ its scheme to kidnap Michigan governor Gretchen Whitmer,¹⁸ and its plot to supply Hamas with weapons to attack United States soldiers,¹⁹ has led to the characterization of the United States-based Boogaloo group as extremist.²⁰ In June of 2020, Facebook announced that it would ban the group from its platforms:

Today we are designating a violent US-based anti-government network as a dangerous organization and banning it from our platform. This network uses the term Boogaloo but is distinct from the broader and loosely-affiliated Boogaloo movement because it actively seeks to commit violence. For months, we have removed Boogaloo content when there is a clear connection to violence or a credible threat to public safety, and today's designation will mean we remove more content going forward, including Facebook Groups and Pages. This is the latest step in our commitment to ban people who proclaim a violent mission from using our platform.²¹

Based on the ongoing removal of extremist Boogaloo content from such a public space, the primary concern of this thesis is understanding how extremist content adapts to social media hosts' censorship and de-platforming attempts. Specifically, this work seeks to develop an understanding of how the Boogaloo movement has maintained its presence on Facebook's

¹⁷ Dolan, Winton and Chabria, 2020.

¹⁸ Beckett, 2020.

¹⁹ The United States Department of Justice, 2021.

²⁰ "Assessing the Threat from Accelerationists and Militia Extremists", 2021.

²¹ Facebook 2020.

subsidiary photo sharing site Instagram, despite the host site's attempts to ban Boogaloo content.²² As of 2018, Instagram has roughly one billion active users, with over two thirds of users under the age of 34.²³ In comparison to its parent company Facebook, Instagram is based on the sharing of images accompanied by limited text descriptions and the ability to use hashtags to search for images pertaining to a certain topic or theme across the platform. Instagram also features an "explore page" as a means of discovering new content, populated with recommended posts based on the previous content "liked" by a user and curated by the platform's algorithm.²⁴ The combination of these factors makes Instagram an effective platform for disseminating extremist content with a low barrier of entry. Despite Facebook's pledge to remove Boogaloo content from its platforms,²⁵ the removal of content does not dismantle the group nor de-radicalize the individuals posting it. It must be explored how the accounts affiliated with the group adapt to maintain their online presence. A secondary research problem prevalent in studying the Boogaloo movement is that there is a lack of understanding or description of what ideological tenets the Boogaloo movement holds. The content analysis of posts spanning two years on Instagram, commencing prior to the flagging and removal of Boogaloo content, provides not only an understanding of the group's adaptation but also builds upon the existing literature by offering further insight into the group's ideology.

²² Alba 2020.

²³ Statista 2021.

²⁴ Mosseri 2021.

²⁵ Facebook 2020.

Chapter III: Literature Review

Social Movement Theory and Institutionalism

One of the primary challenges faced by authors in the field of security studies is defining the phenomenon of extremism and the processes involved. Although media sources may conflate various distinct terms in their reporting, the differences between key terms is delineated for the purposes of this work. In much of the academic body of work, there is little consensus on clear definitions of ‘extremism’, ‘terrorism’, and ‘radicalization’ due to the fact that defining a term such as extremism necessitates an explanation of how one becomes an extremist – at which point radicalization must be defined. This becomes a point of contention within academic circles, as defining and explaining radicalization becomes tied to a framework. The field of critical terrorism studies provides reprieve from countless publications outlining the difficulty of defining extremism through the adoption of social movement theory advanced by McCarthy and Zald.²⁶ The study of political violence through the lens of social movement theory provides “a conceptual framework that directly addresses some of the key concerns raised by critiques of orthodox terrorism studies” due to the fact that “seeing militant organisations as part of a wider social movement, with a history and interacting with political actors and structures, helps to counter the ahistoricity and lack of context” of which terrorism research has often been accused.²⁷ The application of social movement theory to terrorism and subsequently to extremism provides a framework which a number of scholars have contributed to. Research on maritime violence and piracy in Nigeria and Somalia, as well as Boko Haram’s suicide bombings has utilized social movement theory as a conceptual framework.²⁸ The foundation of this

²⁶ McCarthy and Zald 1977.

²⁷ Gunning 2009, 157.

²⁸ (Schneider 2020.)(Amaechi 2017.)

framework involves the expansion of what scholars consider a social movement. The work of Donatella Della Porta was seminal in articulating that the social movements have a repertoire of action which exists outside of formal organizations such as political parties or unions, specifically suggesting that “there has been considerable fluctuation in the intensity of collective action over this period, as there has been in its degree of radicalism.”²⁹ The result of the intensified action Della Porta writes about has been given various names by scholars. Della Porta refers to this as “clandestine political violence” and outlines that “In considering clandestine political violence as an extreme form of violence perpetrated by political groups active in the underground, I have looked at the field of social movements for inspiration.”³⁰ Similarly, social movement researcher Sydney Tarrow contextualizes violence and killing under the term “contentious politics.”³¹ The application of social movement theory to groups such as the Boogaloo movement provides unique insight for analyzing the content published by the group. Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen outlines three key “strands” within social movement theory: Strain Theory, Resource Mobilization Theory, and Framing Theory.³² Dalgaard-Nielsen suggests that Framing Theory is the most suitable approach for studying violent radicalization.³³ Radicalization scholar Randy Borum references Dalgaard-Nielsen’s suggestion and suggests the importance of Framing Theory as a consideration in how a group constructs messages to resonate with its constituency as a means of fostering collective identity.³⁴ As will be seen later in the discussion on radicalization, framing shares key pillars of the radicalization process. In the context of social movement theory, these pillars are referred to as “core framing tasks” by

²⁹ Della Porta and Diani 2006, 2.

³⁰ Della Porta 2013, 282.

³¹ Tarrow 2011, 259.

³² Dalgaard-Nielsen 2008, 8.

³³ *Ibid.*, 9.

³⁴ Borum 2011, 18.

Benford and Snow.³⁵ The first of these is diagnostic framing, whereby a movement seeks to identify and focus blame on a source for an existing problematic situation.³⁶ This task encompasses the “attributional processes that seek to delineate the boundaries between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ and construct movement protagonists and antagonists”.³⁷ The second framing task, known as prognostic framing is based on putting forward a solution to the problem, or what Benford and Snow describe as a “plan of attack”.³⁸ The third and final framing task is described as motivational framing and involves the development of “vocabularies of motive” to serve as a “call to arms” for engaging in collective action.³⁹

An additional theory which is particularly pertinent to understanding how a group maintains survival comes from the field of Institutionalism, particularly new institutionalism or ‘neo-institutionalism’. DiMaggio and Powell’s research which sought to explain organizational homogeneity developed a theory of institutional isomorphic change which suggests three unique mechanisms leading to organizational adaptation. The first of these is coercive isomorphism – a change caused by formal or informal external pressures on an organization in forms such as regulation or cultural expectations.⁴⁰ Additionally, DiMaggio and Powell introduce the idea of mimetic isomorphism which suggests that organizations facing uncertainty will model themselves after similar more successful organizations within their field.⁴¹ The third and final isomorphic change which DiMaggio and Powell outline is normative isomorphism, whereby

³⁵ Benford and Snow 2000, 615.

³⁶ Ibid., 616.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid., 617.

⁴⁰ DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 150.

⁴¹ Ibid., 151.

organizational change is derived from professionalization.⁴² Within this professionalization process two unique strains are responsible for the isomorphic process:

One is the resting of formal education and of legitimation in a cognitive base produced by university specialists; the second is the growth and elaboration of professional networks that span organizations and across which new models diffuse rapidly.⁴³

Although the application of institutional isomorphism may seem restricted to conventional 'institutions' such as businesses or government bureaus, DiMaggio and Powell themselves criticize and reject such narrow macrosocial parameters and instead suggest that such theory necessitates the inclusion of a wider range of organizations.⁴⁴ Sociologist and social movement researcher Browyn Kara Conrad further contends this point in her research, suggesting that the conceptualization of social movements within institutional theory "will provoke social movements scholars, many of whom cast movements as 'extra-institutional,' ... or restrict the institutional or institutionalized politics to matters pertaining solely to the legal bureaucratic state, the passage of laws, and/or the power of political elites".⁴⁵ Thus, movements can be considered organizations within the framework of new institutionalism. Conrad's work provides a succinct understanding for why institutional theories are compatible with social movement theory in articulating:

This understanding of institutions is largely an artifact of the resource mobilization perspective, which has viewed social movements as "politics by

⁴² Ibid., 152.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 156.

⁴⁵ Conrad 2006, 325.

other [i.e., noninstitutionalized] means” because of the tendency of challenger movements to operate outside courts and legislatures and to adopt tactics involving civil disobedience. The view that what is institutional is what is legal or political and that culture and institutions are distinct is generally inconsistent with the ways in which neo-institutionalists have talked about institutions, institutionalization, and institutional analysis.

As such, it can be understood that Institutional theories may be symbiotic with the strand of social movement theory most applicable to contemporary social movements, and extremist groups. This understanding in conjunction with Randy Borum’s review of social science theories pertaining to radicalization, which leans on social movement theory to articulate that “the primary task of any organization or movement is to maintain its own survival,”⁴⁶ makes institutional isomorphism particularly appealing for studying the evolution of Boogaloo movement.

Extremism, Terrorism, and Radicalization

Within Mark Sedgwick’s article The “Concept of Radicalization as a source of Confusion” he concedes that “almost without exception, every terrorist group since the emergence of modern terrorism in the 1870s can be placed within a broader social, political, or ethnic movement, including both violent action and non-violent activism of some sort.”⁴⁷ Sedgwick expands the understanding of social movement theory in relation to extremism in presenting the idea of a continuum on which one side can be considered moderate; whereas the

⁴⁶ Borum 2011, 17.

⁴⁷ Sedgwick 2010, 485.

other, extremist.⁴⁸ Radicalization, thus according to Sedgwick, constitutes movement on the continuum towards extremist. The questions which remain from Sedgwick's contribution are twofold: what point on the spectrum meets the definition of extremism, and what indicators are used to determine position or movement on that spectrum? The answers to one of these questions can be gathered from Peter Neumann's article "The Trouble with Radicalization." Neumann's article introduces the idea that political ideas and motivations do not necessitate intervention, but rather the intention to break the law through the concept of behaviour radicalization.⁴⁹ Neumann himself raises the example of how America's Founding Fathers could be considered extremists based on such a definition. Despite this, Neumann's work serves the additional purpose of departing from the framework of "pathways" of extremism - whereby individuals and groups are pushed towards extremism by prescribed and pre-identified mechanisms of radicalization such as personal victimization and competition with state power. Such a framework, alongside similar concepts such as "Staircase to Terrorism" prove to be irrelevant for studies of extremism not grounded in a psychological approach, as they primarily function in the conceptualization - and ultimately documentation - of terrorist psychology after the fact, and under the guise that the results are replicable.⁵⁰ Neumann suggests that an understanding of extremism must examine the surrounding political and social context if it is to achieve depth.⁵¹ Using the example of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), it is argued that KKK terrorism cannot be understood in the action pathways of other extremist groups, but rather the "ideas, context, and conditions that have given rise to the Klan in its non-violent incarnations" must be

⁴⁸ Ibid., 482.

⁴⁹ Neumann 2013, 885.

⁵⁰ Decety, Pape, and Workman 2017.

⁵¹ Neumann 2013, 883-884.

considered.⁵² Such an understanding lends credence to the social movement theory framework, especially when it is expanded upon by JM Berger's recent publication titled *Extremism*. Berger's work provides a comprehensive literature review on extremism and develops a working definition predicated upon four tenets: a clearly defined in-group, a defined out-group, an understanding that the existence of the out-group threatens the in-group, and the definition of solutions which must be applied to the out-group. Berger's proposed framework is in line with social movement theory as these four conditions situate a group or individual on the "extremist spectrum" – a contrast to the conceptualization of pathways or a staircase to terrorism which suggests a unidirectional and linear progression towards an end state. Berger's contribution establishes that "once on the spectrum, a movement can radicalize (by adopting increasingly negative views about the out-group and endorsing increasingly hostile action), or it can moderate (by mitigating its views of the out-group or shifting to a lower scale of hostile action, such as abandoning an ideological commitment to genocide in favour of segregation)".⁵³ This seemingly addresses directly the concerns of Neumann's KKK example, alongside his concern that the Founding Fathers would be considered extremist by many definitions. Indeed, Berger's definition of extremism may see the Founding Fathers as extremists; however, this constitutes an etymological victory as it invalidates the age-old trope that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" through its unapologetic objectivity. Furthermore, Berger's work fits within social movement theory by differentiating extremist groups from social movements with his four pillars of extremism. Berger's idea of the "extremist spectrum" fits within a broader spectrum which contains social movements on one end and extremist groups on the other.⁵⁴ This provides

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Berger 2018, 122.

⁵⁴ Berger 2018, 48.

a model for Berger's idea that mainstream identities can transition into extremist ideologies,⁵⁵ while also recognizing that there are significant differences among extremist groups. Groups such as the proud boys, which called for violence against the outgroup in the form of punches or "brawls" at rallies,⁵⁶ differ significantly from groups such as Atomwaffen Division, which advocates for genocide.⁵⁷ As such, these two groups could both be placed on the extremist end of the spectrum; however, one would be further to the edge than the other. The adoption or abandonment of Berger's tenets of extremism would be an indication of a shift along the extremist spectrum. While this shift on the spectrum can be understood as radicalization,⁵⁸ the inverse more accurately describes the process of radicalization in the sense that radicalization is the process which causes a shift on the spectrum.

The causes of radicalization can be placed within two broad categories: categorization and learning bias, and disruptions to the status quo.⁵⁹ Categorization involves the adoption of a collective identity and formation of an in-group.⁶⁰ In line with social movement theory, categorization is not a process exclusive to extremist groups, as it can be seen in mainstream identities which value in-group membership through celebrations of culture, but do not bear resentment against other groups.⁶¹ However, this can also come alongside ascribed characteristics for the out-group, which further along the extremist spectrum can become centralized on de-personalization.⁶² This is coupled with learning bias, whereby individuals identifying as part of an in-group avoid meaningful interaction with members of the out-group

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ "Proud Boys Founder on Whether He Feels Responsible for Its Controversial Behavior" 2022.

⁵⁷ Southern Poverty Law Center n.d.

⁵⁸ Berger, 2018. 122

⁵⁹ Berger, 2018. 132

⁶⁰ Ibid., 132.

⁶¹ Ibid., 48.

⁶² Ibid., 132-133.

and limit new information which may change their perceptions of the out-group.⁶³ As will be discussed in the following section, the internet can play a significant role in facilitating learning bias.

Extremism and the Online Space

Scholars of both Communication Studies and Violent Extremism have highlighted the intersection between extremism and forms of communication as imperative to analyze based on the concept that violent extremism is at its core, a form of communication which struggles over access to “society’s ‘communication structure’”.⁶⁴ While various works have analyzed numerous means of communication and how they intertwine with extremism – from Taliban night letters⁶⁵ to IRA murals⁶⁶ – understanding the role the internet plays in extremism is a budding area of research, and as such, works involving jihadi extremism, incel violence, and broad right-wing extremism are utilized to establish the importance of the online space for extremism research. Jytte Klausen explains that prior to their use of the internet:

“[extremist groups] have - in the past at least - had to rely on mainstream media to broadcast their message. This essential dilemma drives terrorist behavior. The solution is to stage dramatic violent incidents against symbolic targets compelling the media to broadcast the message.”⁶⁷

Klausen’s point substantiates what may be considered one of the key elements which differentiates modern online extremism from generations prior. This lack of autonomous

⁶³ Ibid., 134.

⁶⁴ (Archetti 2013, 34-35.) (Crelinsten 1987, 420.)

⁶⁵ Johnson 2007.

⁶⁶ Welch 2019.

⁶⁷ Klausen 2014, 2.

communication presented a dilemma for extremist groups. Extremist groups lacking their own communication infrastructure must act in a way where their actions are likely to be broadcasted by mainstream media outlets. This underpins the idea of “theater of terror” as coined by Gabriel Weimann, whereby extremist acts require detailed theatrical considerations and “media orientation” in order to develop a symbiotic relationship with traditional news broadcasting services and be considered effective.⁶⁸ This is further discussed by Barbie Zelizer’s examination of US media and the content produced by the Islamic State, which concludes that the “Islamic State is playing at least in part by U.S. media rules, following a mnemonic pattern set in place long ago”.⁶⁹ While it would make sense that this is a feature of traditional extremism as a means of catering their content for external broadcasting via a well-established third party, this does not seem to be the case. Looking at the broad range of modern Islamic State propaganda published organically by the group, Semati and Szpunar highlight:

Yet the media to which the Islamic State is intricately tied is often accompanied by the adjective “Western.” In 2010, commentators responded to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s *Inspire* magazine with shock. It looks Western, it is “slick,” and it speaks “our” language. Today, ISIS propaganda is met with similar commentary.⁷⁰

As such, the theatrics and marketability of modern extremist groups is not a hallmark of pre-internet extremism dependent on third party providers to disseminate their content. Weimann’s own revisitation of his theater of terror concept in 2005 further clarifies this by explicitly highlighting that the change to an organic distribution means, and specifically the use of new

⁶⁸ Weimann 2005, 381.

⁶⁹ Zelizer 2016, 6080.

⁷⁰ Semati and Szpunar 2018, 2.

media, does not change the messaging nor the pageantry involved, but rather increases the ease of communication and the audience it can reach.⁷¹

Despite this, the body of Violent Extremism and Communication Studies literature which specifically focuses on the online space highlights the importance of the communicative dimension of extremism. Scholars from both fields have highlighted the danger of the online dimension in extremism research by arguing that online groups can facilitate the radicalization of individuals and entrench norms which sanction violent action.⁷² Scholars in both the fields of Sociology and Psychology have extended this concept to argue that the study of extremist groups online may necessitate an entire reconceptualization of how extremist groups are organized. Rather than a hierarchical structure or even a decentralized command where individuals “[do] the bidding of” a leader, they “bid to belong” to the in-group through their online interactions and offline actions.⁷³ By examining Canadian right-wing extremism, researchers Barbra Perry and Ryan Scrivens cast light on how the online space fosters “lone wolf” extremists “who independently feed their hunger for extreme right-wing rhetoric by attending to related websites, collecting propaganda, or disseminating messages with the intention of influencing others”.⁷⁴ Additionally, they demonstrate the international capability of this communication medium in stating that the writings of prominent Canadian white nationalist Paul Fromm may have been a factor which led to Dylann Roof murdering nine Black parishioners in 2015.⁷⁵

Based on the framework of social movement theory, it can be understood that the internet revolutionizing the nature of social movements has had a similar impact on extremist groups as

⁷¹ Weimann 2005, 380.

⁷² (Bliuc et al. 2020, 4.) (Doosje et al. 2016.)

⁷³ (Schmilde 2010, 66.) (Sageman, 2008.)

⁷⁴ Perry and Scrivens 2016, 825.

⁷⁵ (Ibid., 826.) (Quan 2015.)

well.⁷⁶ The inverse is proven to be true in studies which report that “social media play[s] a key role in radical right-wing political violence and in contemporary political action generally.”⁷⁷

While the term ‘media’ has been used within the literature on extremist communication to signify the specific means of communication the material is shared via - such as a news article,⁷⁸ the term ‘social media’ is distinct and can be understood as an umbrella terms which refers to “media... in the medium of Facebook, Youtube, Twitter, etc.”⁷⁹

The Online Space

The study of online extremist content involves unique considerations as outlined by Ilan Manor and Rhys Crilley, who contend that “scholars of violent extremism and CVE should pay attention not only to narrative but also to the broader aesthetics of communication”.⁸⁰ The impact or constraints of a communication medium has a role in the identity of the movement itself. One of these impacts and simultaneous constraints is the type of media which can be shared on a site. Journalists poked fun at the news of Twitter lengthening its constraining character limit on tweets, with articles titled “What could Donald Trump do with 280 Twitter characters? So, so much!”⁸¹ Not long after Gabbatt’s article was published, Dutch researchers endeavored to determine if this change did in fact have any impact on language usage on Twitter, and indeed concluded that it led to more formal tweets being published by the Dutch Twitter base.⁸² Within the framework of narratives this becomes of paramount importance. Based on the understanding that shared narratives form ideology, constraints or opportunities presented by a particular

⁷⁶ Castells 2015.

⁷⁷ Wahlström and Törnberg 2019, 781.

⁷⁸ Archetti 2013, 50.

⁷⁹ Amit, Barua and Al Kafy 2021.

⁸⁰ Manor and Crilley 2018, 121.

⁸¹ Gabbatt 2017.

⁸² Boot et al. 2019.

medium or medium-specific platform can create a unique identity. Scholars focusing on countering violent extremism (CVE) highlight how the current focus on linguistic narratives must be adapted for the Digital Age to include a focus on photographs, videos, and music.⁸³ The contemporary use of these multimedia forms online has been proven to foster a unique group identity, with research into the image and text sharing site 4Chan finding that:

Several chan sites and boards appeared to be facilitating an 'in-group' status that is so critical in fostering an extremist mindset, partially due to the visual culture present on chans which obfuscates extremist messaging to less-familiar observers. While some memes explicitly promoted violence or extremist narratives, others can be considered 'malleable', meaning they took on these connotations only when situated within a broader extremist context. Memes such as these require some level of digital literacy and familiarity with chan culture to interpret.⁸⁴

Even within the specific ecosystem of 4chan, differences among forums or “boards” exist. Within a project utilizing ethnography and quantitative data scraping between March and June 2020, Blyth Crawford finds that the weapon board known as /k/ on 4chan has unique cultural touchstones in the form of ‘memes’ which differentiate it from parallel boards such as that of /pol/ or the political board.⁸⁵ While racist memes and anti-Semitism are present on both /pol/ and /k/, highlighting an “overlap between visual cultures” on the two boards, these themes are more central to /pol/, whereas they seem to be merely tolerated on /k/.⁸⁶ Crawford’s work

⁸³ Manor and Crilley 2018, 121.

⁸⁴ Keen, Crawford, and Suarez-Tangil 2020, 4.

⁸⁵ Crawford 2020.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

particularly outlines the relevance of these unique multimedia ‘narratives’ to this thesis in writing:

In general, 4chan’s /k/ board has been the subject of increased interest following the rapid rise of the Boogaloo ‘movement’ – a loose, online network of radical firearms activists bound by a shared desire to incite civil war. Evans and Wilson traced the origins of the movement, showing that while devout Boogaloo supporters soon drifted to more mainstream social media platforms, the term ‘boogaloo’ was likely first used in reference to civil war on 4chan’s /k/.⁸⁷

Taking into consideration the framework which has been established, at this point the gaps in the existing literature must be highlighted. The memes shared by members of a group become critical to decipher in order to understand a group’s online messages. This understanding allows researchers to explore their narratives and understand group ideology. As mentioned earlier, these memes not only foster an “in-group” status, they also insulate communication from the out-group due to the familiarity required to understand them.⁸⁸ This becomes evident in Jarred Prier’s working definition of a meme as “a stylistic device that applies culturally relevant humor to a photo or video” in conjunction with the understanding that the culturally relevant humor may be unique to a particular group or demographic.⁸⁹ The digestible format of a format or video not only allows for effective dissemination of a message, but it also ensures viability on social media platforms built upon brevity such as Twitter, Instagram, and Tik Tok. Based on the understanding that “these memes, often generated by fringe communities, are being ‘weaponized’ and even becoming part of political and ideological propaganda”, researchers have

⁸⁷ Ibid. For OSINT reporting see also Evans and Wilson 2020.

⁸⁸ Keen, Crawford, and Suarez-Tangil 2020, 4.

⁸⁹ Prier 2017, 54.

endeavored to trace the evolution of memes on various platforms, and congruently with the framework of narratives, even sought out to “characterize Web communities through the lens of memes.”⁹⁰ In specifically looking at the American far-right, other researchers have highlighted that “far-right extremist memes have spread across social media sites like Instagram.”⁹¹ These social media sites should be considered more than just a mere extension on the existing extremist ecosystem online which resides on topic based websites and forums, as many internet service providers are seeking to regulate hate speech and other extremist content through the removal of such websites as a violation of terms of service agreements.⁹² As such, social media sites may provide a more secure medium for sharing content which is further insulated by the sheer volume of inconspicuous content amongst which extremist messages are shared.

Research Gaps

In understanding the framework which has been assembled at this point alongside its relevance to the research topic, it must be understood why its application is justified. Part of the purpose of this literature review is to situate this work in the existing literature, this review not only highlights notable research gaps, but must subsequently identify avenues for future research which are called for by academics within the field.

In researching jihadi extremist ecosystem online and platform migration on the Telegram messaging app, Amarnath Amarasingam, Shiraz Maher, Charlie Winter conclude by suggesting parallel extremist research into right-wing extremism on the basis that “what will continue to grow in terms of both prominence and importance is the challenge presented by the ‘new’ far-

⁹⁰ Zannettou et al. 2018, 1.

⁹¹ Holt, Freilich, and Chermak 2020, 3.

⁹² Banks 2010, 237.

right and the way its communities are evolving with the online space.”⁹³ This sentiment is echoed by Maura Conway in highlighting the “necessity for researchers in this area to widen our research beyond violent online jihadism, engage in more comparative analysis, consider virtual ethnography as a viable approach while at the same time not dismissing upscaling techniques.”⁹⁴

Broadly, an avenue for research which has been suggested is looking at “terrorists’ cyber capabilities and the materials they place online.”⁹⁵ More specifically, a necessary content analysis of right-wing extremist media is justified in the work of scholars who argue that an in-depth qualitative understanding of the language and communication of a group is required to build a foundation for future research.⁹⁶ Similarly, the work of John Curtis Amble suggests that human observation of extremist groups online is underutilized as a data collection method.⁹⁷

The suggestions of these scholars ring especially true when recognizing the gap in academic literature pertaining to the Boogaloo movement. A small number of academic publications have very recently come to focus on the Boogaloo movement. This includes the work of Velásquez et al. who used a quantitative comparison of the Boogaloo movement and ISIS to highlight similarities between the development of both groups.⁹⁸ In addition to this, Wiggins’ recent publication focuses on the language utilized by the Boogaloo movement to conclude a reliance on antagonistic expression and the formation reoccurring phrases.⁹⁹

⁹³ Amarasingam, Maher, and Winter 2021, 29.

⁹⁴ Conway 2016, 78.

⁹⁵ Aly et al. 2016, 7.

⁹⁶ Cohen et al. 2013, 251.

⁹⁷ Amble 2012, 349.

⁹⁸ Velásquez et al. 2021.

⁹⁹ Wiggins 2020.

Chapter IV: Research Methodology

For the purposes of this study, the methodology is centered on qualitative research using primary data. Specifically, content analysis using ethnographic methods is employed on posts stemming from identified boogaloo accounts. Broadly speaking, qualitative means are merited here based on their utility in exploring a complex problem in a situation where the researcher faces multiple unknown variables. Specifically, some of the complexities which necessitate a qualitative approach include a language barrier constructed through the use of slang by members of the Boogaloo movement, compounded by the use of obscure memes which require contextual understanding. Online writing conventions such as abbreviations, spelling variants, and idiomatic language have been demonstrated to pose a challenge for automated social media data collection.¹⁰⁰ Even if these difficulties within data collection are overcome, automated analysis and coding of extremist content presents further limitations in terms of efficacy.¹⁰¹ These complexities limited the possibility of utilizing software to provide automated capture and collation of posts from selected sample accounts, alongside coding and sorting – particularly since group identifying keywords changed and an understanding of the context was necessary to understand the new keyword. Utilizing a manual method ensured that the countermeasures utilized by the Boogaloo group to avoid Instagram’s automated censorship did not hide their posts from software employed by the researcher.

In recognizing these limitations Manjana Sold and Julian Junk of King’s College London Global Network on Extremism & Technology project highlight how ethnographic methodology may present a solution:

¹⁰⁰ (Bifet and Frank 2010) (Carter, Weerkamp and Tsagkias 2012) (Kim, Nordgrem and Emery 2020).

¹⁰¹ Alrhoun, Maher and Winter 2021, 16.

One way of coping with these intricacies is embedded research. The role, whether active or passive, that researchers adopt during the data collection process can have serious consequences for the internal validity of a research design and raises a subset of ethical questions. If researchers manage to assume a completely passive/observational role in the data collection process at all times, they will presumably not influence the observed communication processes – which might be of utmost importance for the validity of the research findings. However, there are often limits to observational roles (for instance, via targeted questions to the researcher’s profile) and there is a fine line to walk between non-intrusive and intrusive observations.¹⁰²

Such ethnographic methodology has previously been applied in the online space to the Boogaloo movement in the recent work of Talia Lavin. While one may argue that her work could be utilized as the academic baseline for understanding the group, part of the postpositivist approach recognizes that “the culture of an organization changes form with each attempt to pin it down; each observer comes away with a different interpretation based upon the personal values and experiences of the individual observer”.¹⁰³ At the start of her work, Lavin herself addresses her background as the antithesis of the prototypical right-wing extremist, characterizing herself as “a schlubby, bisexual Jew, living in Brooklyn, with long brown ratty curls, the matronly figure of a mother in a Philip Roth novel, and brassy personal politics that aren’t particularly sectarian but fall considerably to the left of Medicare for All”.¹⁰⁴ Here, the postpositivist ontology would not rely on objectivism to criticize Lavin’s work based on potential bias she may have against the

¹⁰² Sold and Junk 2021, 10.

¹⁰³ McNabb 2020, 312.

¹⁰⁴ Lavin 2020, Introduction.

far-right due to her background, but rather would highlight that she arrives at a different interpretation because of it. Such a claim is not intended to undermine Lavin's work, but rather points out that her conclusions come from the perspective of an out-group member or someone outside of the target market for the group's messaging. One could argue that Lavin's interpretation of the Boogaloo movement in Chapter 3 of her work lacks contextual understanding needed to understand 'dog whistles' or the messages being communicated via memes. In contrast to this, the researcher of this work finds himself as a member of the "eligible in-group", or the "broad identity collective that an extremist organization claims to represent and from which it seeks to recruit".¹⁰⁵ By virtue of being an able-bodied white male with prior military service, the author's background places him within the target demographic of far-right group's recruiting attempts,¹⁰⁶ and subsequently, within their organizational language.¹⁰⁷ This understanding of privileged subjectivity is an idea which explored in other Political Science disciplines conducting work in the online space - one example of which is Dr. Carrie Smith's feminist exploration of how women are perceived in predominantly male online spaces; whereby, her presence as a female researcher online led to further observations upon how her sample interacted with her.¹⁰⁸ This comes hand-in-hand with interpretivist epistemology based on the understanding that "interpretive approaches to research involve the use of what is essentially subjective narrative. Narrative methods are believed to produce knowledge that is different from knowledge gained by traditional (positivist) science".¹⁰⁹ This further coincides

¹⁰⁵ Berger 2018, 62.

¹⁰⁶ Within Canada and the United States and with reference to the Boogaloo movement specifically see Bell 2021.

¹⁰⁷ An acute example of this is the self-proclaimed Biting the Bullet podcast hosted by Marine Corps veterans with the description "Two Marine Vet's with hard-ons for being Anti-gov't. Biting the Bullet is our outlet to reach more Vet's to turn them towards the dark side against American Imperialism." (2020).

¹⁰⁸ Smith 2019.

¹⁰⁹ McNabb 2020, 48.

with McNabb's review of Martyn Denscombe's broad tenets of post positivism as applied to the field of Political Science, in which true researcher objectivity is impossible and reality is subjective due to the fact that it is constructed and subsequent interpreted by people.¹¹⁰ McNabb elaborates that "research can be classified as interpretive when it is builds on the assumption that humans learn about reality from the meanings assigned to social phenomena such as language, consciousness, shared experiences, publications, tools, and other artifacts".¹¹¹

These elements become the data of ethnographic work. The utilization of an ethnographic methodology in the online space is relatively new; however, it has nevertheless been utilized and published in the University of Alberta's International Journal of Qualitative Methods through the work of David Joseph Piacenti, Luis Balmore Rivas, and Josef Garrett operationalizing Facebook ethnography.¹¹² Within their work, they reinforce the notion of impossible objectivity by outlining that "it is not at all clear if we are being 'friended' as ethnographers or if we are being 'ethnographed' as friends. The identity lines are blurred as we co-exist within a continuum comprised of identities as town citizens, academics, friends, and family members, between personal identity and vocation."¹¹³ This continuum of identities becomes further blurred when considering how they change between online platforms or offline.¹¹⁴ Christine Hine addresses the difference between online platforms and the offline world in suggesting definitions for the various ways of scoping an ethnographic field site. The online field site is a broad term which captures ethnographic work in the online realm without any foray into the offline interaction.¹¹⁵ In contrast to this, a multi-modal field site includes various forms of communication both online

¹¹⁰ (Ibid., 48-49.) (Denscombe 2002.)

¹¹¹ McNabb 2020, 245.

¹¹² Piacenti, Rivas, and Garrett 2014.

¹¹³ Ibid., 235.

¹¹⁴ Postill and Pink 2012.

¹¹⁵ Hine 2017, 406.

and offline so long as they pertain to the group being studied.¹¹⁶ Hine also describes the concept of a multi-sited field project, which remains confined to the online space, but across various sites.¹¹⁷ The use of a multi-sited ethnography provides the potential benefit of accessing more information about a group while avoiding the multi-modal pitfall of physical presence when studying an extremist group.

It has previously been noted that the application of online ethnography in extremist research has been suggested as an avenue for future research by Maura Conway; however, Conway's work goes further by additionally describing the utility of online ethnography in extremist research, while also outlining how it can be operationalized. Tim Ingold states that "the objective of ethnography is to describe the lives of people other than ourselves, with an accuracy and sensitivity honed by detailed observation and prolonged first-hand experience."¹¹⁸ In response to this, Conway contends that ethnographic work provides insight into more than just the lives of people, but rather entire cultures, subcultures, and countercultures.¹¹⁹ 'Virtual ethnography', 'netnography', and 'ethnography in virtual worlds' applies the same methodology into a field site situated online.¹²⁰ Conway suggests that applying these methods "in research into violent online extremist spaces is doubly attractive because not only would it allow researchers to develop embedded understandings of the 'real' and 'online' day-to-day lives of particular countercultural groups, but in fact is being undertaken by many of us albeit largely unknowingly already."¹²¹ Conway substantiates this point by referencing research into Jihadi extremism done by Thomas Hegghammer. Hegghammer himself recognizes that he himself did not realize the

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ingold 2008, 69.

¹¹⁹ Conway 2016, 86.

¹²⁰ (Hine 2000) (Kozinets 2009) (Boellstorff et al. 2013).

¹²¹ Conway 2016, 86.

wealth of information he was gathering during his research, as he was initially focused on finding material pertaining to doctrine and theological reasoning.¹²² In recognizing that the plethora of “mundane” material he had accumulated could serve as an ethnographic dataset, Hegghammer has been able to write works which provide a more wholistic view of Jihadi extremist ‘culture’.¹²³ Hegghammer concludes his discussion of ethnographic methods by articulating that: “It was not possible to do participant observation with groups this radical. Fortunately, though, the internet has made available a large amount of high-granularity primary sources that allow for a form of ‘ethnography by proxy.’”¹²⁴

Hegghammer addresses the most evident limitation of ethnography involving extremist groups which is that obtaining primary data typically involves a presence which may be unsafe to researchers or would be unlikely to obtain ethics approval. The utilization of ethnography by proxy via the online social circles of extremist groups mitigates these concerns all while acting as a means of widening extremist research which is called for as a viable, and necessary, approach.¹²⁵ As such, this work modifies the method of participant observation utilizing an ethnography by proxy as a means of curbing interaction with the research sample. More specifically, this work follows the recommendations of Boellstorff et al. set out in the methodological handbook *Ethnography and Virtual Worlds*.¹²⁶ After establishing a research question related to a specific group, the next step is for the researcher to find and situate themselves amongst the group. Scoping the field site was restricted to the multi-sited online space rather than a multi-modal study due to the ethical challenges of physical presence among

¹²² Hegghammer 2016, 3.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹²⁵ Conway 2016, 78.

¹²⁶ Boellstorff et al. 2012.

an extremist group as well as coronavirus restrictions during the planned observation period. In the context of this work, situating in the field site involved searches of common Boogaloo hashtags on the Instagram platform such as the word “Boogaloo” itself. This process mirrored the actions a regular individual might take to find more posts belonging to the Boogaloo community if they sought to access more related content. This database of “Boogaloo” tagged posts provided a corpus of accounts associated with each post. These associated accounts were combed through to verify authenticity. The verification of authenticity was informed by Shehbat, Mitew, and Alzoubi’s verification of ISIS Telegram channels, in the sense that accounts with posts sharing Boogaloo propaganda, encouraging attacks against law enforcement and politicians, and sharing material pertaining to weapon and explosive manufacturing could be considered trusted Boogaloo accounts.¹²⁷ Accounts from this refined corpus were selected for observation based on characteristics such as high follower count - which meant that their posts were seen by more people and meant they could be considered a significant figure in the community – as well as interactions with other accounts within the corpus, which highlighted a degree of community membership. The result was a refined community of 71 accounts. The accounts were observed for a period spanning three years, from January 2019 to January 2022. During this time, all image posts and corresponding text was captured and collated as part of the data collection process. Data analysis was a cyclical process running concurrently with data collection. The hashtags corresponding to posts were analyzed as they changed to determine the meaning and significance of a new keyword. Additionally, the remaining text and the content of the image was coded and thematized to determine if there were macro changes the group was

¹²⁷ Shehabat, Mitew, and Alzoubi 2017, 28.

making to circumvent tightening censorship. As themes emerged, they provided context for previous posts and allowed for a deeper insight into the niche language and culture of the group.

The limitation of this methodology is that a lack of participation eliminates dialogue between the researcher and the research group, which would thus limit the learning process. By being able to interact, a researcher can ask questions of group members in the study to develop new understandings. This learning process was supplanted with the hermeneutic circle of consistent and ongoing reevaluation of archived posts.¹²⁸ Additionally, in the online space, and in the study of a relatively newly emerged group, this limitation is much less significant than one may assume. By virtue of the public nature of Boogaloo accounts and Instagram's open comment section, questions of clarification are not uncommon to be posted by individuals who have recently discovered the group's corner of the social media website. The publicly visible comments and their replies occasionally provided context or information similarly to how a dialogue between the researcher and the research subjects would and were also considered relevant data points. Ultimately, the nature of the sample within this study necessitated a limitation on participation. These modified ethnographic methods are employed by Lane Crothers in his book *Rage on the Right: the American militia movement from Ruby Ridge to the Trump presidency*:

This project offers an ethnographic, interpretive examination of the alt-right and militia movements in the broader context of American culture. Ethnography is an approach aimed at understanding how individuals perceive the world. Its focus is on how individuals explain events to themselves and how they justify their actions

¹²⁸ McNabb 2020, 245.

in terms of their own values and ideals. As a consequence, its analytic purpose is to recognize the systems of meaning in which individuals live. In order to do ethnographic research, it is necessary to gain access to information about individuals' beliefs and values. The primary source of information gathered for the first edition of this book was the Internet. Militia groups in the 1990s had a substantial presence online. Their sites typically explained what the group believed, what activities they thought were justified and why, and offered commentaries on government and other "mainstream" groups' actions that the group found troublesome. They were, in short, exactly the kinds of self-presentational material that make it possible to carry forward ethnographic analysis. As such, alt-right sites provided a treasure-trove of information waiting to be mined.¹²⁹

This online ethnographic methodology is what provided Crothers with the information necessary to encapsulate the militia movement from its historical roots to its almost contemporary resurgence. Applying this methodology to the obscure Boogaloo derivative of the militia movement allows a similar level of depth within the analysis. This helps in understand the communication and culture of the movement to meaningfully address the overarching research question in a way not viable to those without context. This in-depth understanding provides the basis for an inductive content analysis of archived posts to understand changes in what is shared and how it plays into group adaptation.¹³⁰

¹²⁹ Crothers 2019, 9-10.

¹³⁰ Kleinheksel et al. 2019.

Prior to the analysis pertaining to the overarching research question, a portion of this work will be devoted to sharing the contextual understanding of the group. The following two chapters will build up to the analysis of Boogaloo accounts by outlining the history, culture, and circulated media of the traditional north American militia movement, followed by an exploration of the modern Boogaloo movement utilizing primary sources explored throughout the course of this work as a baseline prior to the analysis of how associated accounts adapt to censorship attempts.

Mainstream media reporting of the Boogaloo movement has labeled its members as right-wing extremists without much consideration of how the group's ideology compares with other North American RWE groups. While the connections between the Boogaloo and other right-wing groups are explored within the analysis portion of this work, the unique identity of the Boogaloo movement must first be understood.

After gaining access to the Boogaloo community on Instagram, one of the first external links encountered was a podcast hosted by three veterans which occasionally featured other members of the Boogaloo Instagram community. The contents of the podcast episodes provide a firsthand account of what the Boogaloo movement means to members of the group, which was later corroborated by the content shared on Instagram by various affiliated accounts. At the most basic level, the Boogaloo movement is a response to what adherents view as tyrannical government overreach – often in the form of gun control measures which are perceived as a means of disarming the American population prior to further measures. At its core, the Boogaloo movement does not differ significantly from the American militia movement. The work of Lane Crothers, which similarly utilizes interpretive virtual ethnography to examine the evolution of

the American militia movement, presents numerous cultural touchstones shared with the Boogaloo movement.¹³¹

The term “Boogaloo” is derived from the practice of applying “Electric Boogaloo” to a circumstance to denote it as a sequel;¹³² however, this was co-opted by libertarian discussions of a second civil war, or “Civil War 2: Electric Boogaloo”. Despite this, a significant amount of Boogaloo imagery harkens back further to the American Revolution as depicted in figures 1, 2, and 3. Some examples of this include imagery of the founding fathers within various memes such as in figure 2, as well as describing members of law enforcement agencies such as the ATF as “redcoats”.




Figure 3: the_blak_patriot 2019-08-07



Figure 1: newengland.right 2019-12-23



Figure 2: firsttofourth 2020-04-19

¹³¹ Crothers 2019, 9-10.

¹³² “Electric Boogaloo.” 2020

Relying on historic vignettes of militia men combatting powerful government forces has been a longstanding tactic of modern militias seeking to legitimize their existence.¹³³ Harkening back to the imagery of the American Revolution frames militia members as freedom fighters; however, as can be seen in figures 4 and 5 the Boogaloo movement extends this framing to its adversaries by referring to politicians and law enforcement agents as tyrants and redcoats as a means of justifying calls for violence.



Figure 4: Antistate_ 2019-07-28



Figure 5: donetrueking 2020-03-29

Furthermore, events such as the shootout between Randy Weaver and law enforcement agents in Ruby Ridge Idaho 1992, as well as the ATF led raid on Branch Davidian complex in Waco Texas 1993 have served as more recent cultural touchstones in militia culture. The retelling of these events has served as rationale for the maintenance of militias capable of limiting perceived government overreach. This gene carries over to the Boogaloo movement, with a particular attention paid to circulating Waco imagery which presents the graphic deaths of ATF agents highlighted in figures 6 and 7. While the focus of the images is the death of ATF

¹³³ Crothers 2019, 34.

agents more so than government overreach, the images are nonetheless warranted in the minds of those circulating the posts by virtue of bridging the frame developed by the Boogaloo movement's militia forbearers.




Figure 7: the_nsol_official 2020-02-01



Figure 6: Mikey_trois.deux_duncanlemp 2021-12-07

In contrast to other groups which may take up arms as part of their cause or as a result of a politically mobilizing event, militias within the United States - and subsequently the Boogaloo movement - maintain organic armament. Rather than arm individuals who adhere to the cause, members of the Boogaloo movement typically join the movement with their own weapons and equipment. This means that funding is largely provided by members themselves, who supply their own rifles and commercially available tactical gear. As is the case with its militia counterpart, the arsenal of the Boogaloo movement is theoretically limited by the existing firearm legislation within the United States. Although regulations differ slightly from state to state, overarching federal legislation largely prohibits fully automatic firearms, and the purchase and use of sound suppressing adapters colloquially referred to as “silencers” typically involves paperwork and fees submitted to the ATF. Despite its visual similarity to military rifles such as

the M16 or modernized M4, the AR-15 platform remains available for civilian purchase throughout the United States and is ubiquitous within the Boogaloo movement. Variations of the AR-15 platform are frequently spotted in pictures of Boogaloo members conducting training or attending armed protests.

The standard AR-15 is differentiated from its military counterparts due to the fact that it is limited to semi automatic fire. The AR-15 has a safety selector switch which transitions the rifle from “safe” and incapable of firing while pulling the trigger - to “semi” which allows for the expenditure of one bullet for each pull of the trigger. In contrast to this, derivatives of this firearm not typically available on the civilian market have a third hole in the lower receiver which allows for a 180 rotation of the safety selector switch into “auto” – which works in conjunction with an automatic trigger sear to continually reset the internal hammer of the rifle; and thus, rapidly expend bullets so long as the trigger remains depressed within this mode. Multiple posts made by various Boogaloo accounts sampled for the purpose of this work provide detailed instructions to modify commercially available semi-automatic AR-15 platforms into fully-automatic alternatives. The complexity of the instruction varies to accommodate the differences in resources the audience may have at their disposal. This ranges from precise measurements and angles so that individuals are able to mill the necessary parts or 3D print them, to simple instructions detailing how to transform a wire coat hanger into an expedient full-auto sear – all accessible to a wide audience on the Instagram platform as seen in figures 8 and 9. Other similar posts involve instructions outlining the transformation of standard vehicle oil filters into sound suppressors or where to buy premade “solvent traps” which achieve the same effect shown in figures 10 and 11 respectively.

Man these 3D printed Phone stands are going to be awesome.




Figure 9: violent.vibin 2020-01-31



Figure 8: fullautodoggo 2019-04-02




Figure 10: lonewulfe19 2019-11-25

Skroutz
Fuel Filter Aluminum 1/2"-28 4003/24003 Durable Construction New - Skroutz Deals

\$34⁹⁵
FREE Shipping

Get \$10 off instantly: Pay 24.95 upon approval for the Amazon Store Card.

Get it Thu. Jan 31 - Fri. Feb 1 if you choose FREE

Q: Will this make my 308 lawnmower quieter.

A: I wouldn't use it on anything bigger than a 22.

andrew | 3 months ago

Q: Will this filter fit the toro dpms i think its the .223 motor with .556 rear end

A: It matches my dpms Oracle which is 1/2-28 thread. So yes, I believe it will.

tolamb3 | 1 month ago

Q: If i have a 9mm fuel line made in Austria, with aluminum baffles in it, will it do the job...

A: Yes but from feedback on similar products online, that is about the largest line recommend...

Craiger | 2 months ago

Figure 11: municipalmunitionsmedical 2019-12-29

The Boogaloo movement's decentralized stockpile of weapons and body armour draws another parallel to its militia counterpart's myth of the "minuteman"; however, the dissemination of information pertaining to the technical modification of firearms, and the wide availability of such information in the Boogaloo movement advances the groups combat capabilities beyond its predecessors and closer to that of law enforcement.¹³⁴ While militias may share such knowledge in person, it limits the spread of the information. Attempts to share the information online is constrained to the forum a militia utilizes, at which point the entire forum may be shut down by law enforcement agencies or the Internet Service Provider. While militia members have historically had to seek out, or be lent, texts such as the Anarchist Cookbook in order to learn how to manufacture home made explosives,¹³⁵ such knowledge is easily accessible within the Boogaloo movement without even needing to pollute one's internet search history thanks to the movement's parasitic relationship with the Instagram platform. Shown below, figure 13 outlines instructions for creating a modified Molotov cocktail while figures 12 and 14 provide details for creating a conventional shrapnel explosive.

¹³⁴ See Crothers 2019, 136. For a discussion on the militia movement's capability gap with the US government.

¹³⁵ McNatt 1996.

Me Mixing potassium chlorate and aluminum powder
And my friend ask what's the 3 pressure cookers for



Figure 12: Hicock45 2019-06-30

GRANDPA JULIUS' FLAMING HOT NAPALM CAKES



Figure 13: _boogaloo_bro_V2
2020-11-18

When you pass another shopper in Home Depot wearing a Hawaiian shirt with fertilizer, duct tape and 50 boxes of nails in their cart



Figure 14: walther_joeseph_kovacs
2020-04-07

Despite their similarities, where the Boogaloo movement significantly differs from the militia movement comes from the political ideology of the group. Militia groups are considered right-wing ‘conservative’ in the sense that they subscribe to the idea “that change, if it comes, must be slow and voluntary.”¹³⁶ This is a stark contrast to the Boogaloo movement, in which the circulated memes discuss acceleration and thriving during the collapse of society as highlighted by figures 15 and 16.

When someone asks why you vote for antigunners as a firearm owner.



Figure 15: daynoodlez 2020-01-08



Figure 16: GeorgesBoatParty 2022-01-16

Boogaloo posts are clandestine and require esoteric knowledge. In many cases their violent content is veiled by humor; however, this should not diminish the seriousness of the posts. As Angela Nagle observed a similar phenomenon within her online ethnography of the Alt-Right, concluding that “what came to complicate the detached humor is that, as in so many

¹³⁶ Crothers 2019, 6.

other similar cases, it also allowed cover for genuinely sinister things to hide amid the maze of irony”.¹³⁷

Chapter V: Findings

Among the Boogaloo accounts observed for the purpose of this work, a number of unique outcomes was observed for accounts facing an increasingly restrictive censorship policy. For the simplicity of presentation, these outcomes will be presented in four categories: lack of adaptation, Identifying adaptations, iconographic adaptations, and communicative adaptation - prior to recategorization in the analysis portion.

Lack of adaptation

A notable outcome for Boogaloo associated accounts was deletion. A significant number of accounts did not adapt alongside increasing Instagram censorship and were banned from the platform throughout the course of this work. Account deletion typically unfolded with a suspension for violating the platform’s terms of service, alongside the automatic removal of certain posts. This suspension was followed by a review of the account’s posts, which allowed the user to appeal a ban and regain their account or face permanent deletion. Only in one instance was an account ban successfully appealed and lifted, allowing the user to regain control of their account and continue posting. The banning of an account meant that even with the account name being shared and tagged on the posts of another associated account, the link to the profile sent the user to an “account not found” page. As a means of circumventing this, seven accounts within the sample group created alternative profiles with additions such as “2.0” or “V2” in the name. These accounts were shared with the audience of the still active main profile and would be

¹³⁷ Nagle 2017, 9.

used in the event of the main profile's deletion; however, in instances where these secondary profiles did not adapt in another way, they too faced deletion.

One mitigation measure which did not require an account to adapt to censorship attempts was the transition to a private account. Changing an Instagram account to private hides the user's posts from the general public, and only allows access to their posted content after a request has been approved by the account holder. This measure was employed by only three accounts during the observation period, which removed them from further observation due to the user interaction and approval required to monitor further posts. In one instance, an account within the observation group changed to a private account, before shifting back into a public account roughly one month later. This allowed for an investigation into the account's archived posts to see if the content changed in nature around the time the account shifted to private settings; however, the posted content within that timeframe showed no significant difference from the remainder of the account's posts. One account within the observation group was not banned, but nevertheless ceased posting content. The account remained active with one of the most recent posts outlining that they are retiring their "callsign" while leaving the account up, stating that if the account is removed it would be due to the "feds".

Identifying Adaptations

A significant adaptation undergone by members of the Boogaloo movement on Instagram during the observation period was the development of identifying language. The term "Boogaloo" transformed into various derivatives on the Instagram platform throughout the course of observation. The earliest of these transformations within the observed group was the shortening of the term to "boog" and subsequent self identification as "boogbois". These terms were employed as hashtags on Instagram posts, allowing them to be searched on the platform.

These hashtags were often used in conjunction with the boogaloo hashtag prior to any attempts at censorship by Instagram.

The two earliest adaptations which distinctly differed from previous keywords used was a transition to “big igloo” and “big luau” which became prevalent throughout 2019 alongside the pre-existing “boog”. Shortly thereafter, the first quarter of 2020 saw three accounts transition to using the hashtag “thiccboogline”, with the first uses being alongside the pre-existing hashtags of “Boogaloo”, “big luau”, and “big igloo”. Overlapping with this timeframe, 10 separate accounts used the terms “Boogaloo” and “boog” for the last time between January - February of 2020, while three more ceased using these terms by the end of 2020. In March 2020, the vast majority of accounts within the observation group began using the hashtag “HisNameWasJohnSmith”.¹³⁸ On March 12, the user behind the account yungquant, was shot and killed in his Potomoc home by officers attempting to serve a warrant. Subsequently, the story and various images of news articles pertaining to the incident were circulated by group members on Instagram. A number of these posts were accompanied by the memoriam hashtag “HisNameWasJohnSmith”, which began to gain traction with the movement.

Concurrently, within the first quarter of 2020 the hashtag “boogbois” became banned by Instagram leading some of the milieu to adopt “boojihadeen” as a replacement self-identifying term. Alternatively, one account in the sample group utilized the term “coat hanger crusaders”; however, this was not terminology which was employed by other accounts. Following this, June 2020 saw a number of accounts transition to the pseudonym of “CNN bois” in response to a CNN article covering the Boogaloo movement, and labelling them as extremists.¹³⁹ Examples of

¹³⁸ For the purpose of this work the individual’s real name has been anonymized to John Smith.

¹³⁹ Kuznia, Griffin, and Devine 2020.

this change within images are shown in figures 17 and 18. Very shortly thereafter, by the end of July 2020, the hashtag “CNNboisgotzucked” was used on a post by one of the accounts within the observation group, indicating that the “CNN bois” hashtag was hidden by Instagram if an attempt was made to search for it on the platform.



Figure 17: mikey_trois.deux_duncanlemp 2021-12-07

When social media companies ban your favorite hashtags so you resort to using the branding and hashtags of the major corporate news outlets:



Figure 18: Arsenal_616 2020-07-05

Further adaptations to identifying key terms differed vastly from the traditional Boogaloo terminology and were seldom unified, leading to increasingly disjointed hashtags such as “rhetteboogie”, “frycookgames”, and “cowabunga”. When searched on Instagram, these hashtags directed users only to small branches of the Boogaloo community. The hashtags which remained in use throughout the observation group included “AllGunLawsAreInfringements” and “2A” as a reference to the second amendment; however, these hashtags were not necessarily keywords of the Boogaloo movement. A search of these hashtags on Instagram led to a corpus of posts by the broader gun owner community on Instagram, which contained only a small fragment of

intertwined Boogaloo posts. By the end of the observation period the last remaining unified hashtag associated with the Boogaloo movement was “HisNameWasJohnSmith”, which remains searchable on Instagram to this day and yields over 3000 posts from various accounts.

Iconography adaptation

In addition to changing the language associated with the movement, the attire of individuals within photos posted on Instagram also shifted over the course of the observation period. Due to the fact that the period between when a photo is taken and when a user uploads it to Instagram is typically unknown, the exact dates for shifts in group aesthetic is nebulous. This is especially true when considering that some members may be quicker to adopt new attire than others. Nevertheless, the change in group appearance followed a unified chronological order.

Prior to donning the hallmark Boogaloo Hawaiian shirts, likeminded individuals utilized revolutionary war iconography to express their ideology similarly not only in the memes they shared, but also in the attire they wore. Figure 20 depicts the use of such attire within circulated memes while photos posted by members of the observation group included individuals dressed in long blue coats and tricorner hats present at various local protests as seen in figure 19.

MY FRIENDS: "HOW
READY FOR THE IGLOO ARE YOU?"



Figure 20: The_blak_patriot
2019-09-02



Figure 19: Ancaprebel 2020-04-19

Following this, the mass adoption of floral patterned Hawaiian shirts became characteristic of the Boogaloo movement as seen in figure 21. Over time, a number of accounts adopted more subtle alternatives to Hawaiian shirts. In a number of instances this included the adoption of floral patterns on other smaller accessories, such as the pouch on a tactical vest, a holster (figure 22), the dust cover on one user's AR-15 rifle, or a rifle sling (figure 23).



Figure 21: Garybear86 - 2020-08-15



Figure 22: Task_unit_boozzer
2021-01-13



Figure 23:Cambruuu 2021-09-19

Another variation of this was the use of Boogaloo embroidered patches on tactical vests and helmets. A significant portion of modern tactical gear utilizes Velcro strips on pieces of clothing or protective equipment to allow user placement of Velcro backed patches on their equipment. While in a military or police context this provides the quick placement of rank, name, blood type, and unit identifying insignia, it also led to the development of artistic or humorous custom patches colloquially known as “morale patches” to be placed on uniforms and equipment without any permanent alteration required. The Boogaloo movement’s use of commercial and military surplus tactical gear and uniforms provided the Velcro real estate which slowly became populated with Boogaloo morale patches. Figure 24 includes two screen captures from a video posted by one user where a custom-made Boogaloo icon can be seen as a patch on an individual’s chest later in the video.



Figure 24: mikey_trois.deux_duncanlemp 2021-12-07

Congruent with the change in language, and roughly within the same time frame (2019-12/2020-01) a change from Boogaloo patches to igloo patches was observed among numerous accounts, with variations such as the “thin boog flag” depicting a United States flag with the stars replaced by an igloo and the center stripe adorned with Hawaiian print. Soon thereafter, various accounts replaced previously established Boogaloo patches on their equipment with a patch simply depicting an X on a rectangular background as depicted on a webstore inventory in figure 25 and on the chest of an armed individual in figure 26.



Figure 25: walther_joseph_kovacs 2020-01-30



Figure 26: ancaprebel 2021-05-15

Within the same short timeframe, a significant portion of accounts adopted skull mask iconography both in their own attire and photoshopped into shared memes. The final change in physical group appearance was the transition to the unique Rhodesian Brushstroke camouflage by some members within the observation group; however, this shift was not as widespread as others before it and was only seen in a fragment of the observed accounts. Although there were no other changes following this in the attire worn by members, eight members within the observation group adopted a red check mark on their Instagram profile pictures within the month of July in 2021, and one in August 2021. An example of this is shown in figure 27. The red checkmark on profiles arose in response to Facebook, and subsequently Instagram’s notification to users that they “may have been exposed to harmful extremist content recently”.¹⁴⁰ The symbol parodies the blue Twitter verification checkmark to highlight self identified “extremists” as expressed by figure 28.

¹⁴⁰ “Facebook Tests Extremist Content Warning Messages”, 2021.




Figure 27: pnw_delta 2021-08-16



Figure 28: walther_joseph_kovacs 2021-07-02

With this in mind, the last physical identifying piece of attire common to most of the remaining active accounts by the end of the observation period was the half skull face mask shown in figures 29 and 31, and utilized in memes as shown in figure 20 - the significance of which will be discussed in the analysis portion of this work. Furthermore, the transition periods between various iconic pieces of attire typically saw an overlap, with multiple identifying accessories worn at the same time, providing confirmation that new accessories common to numerous accounts still fell under the Boogaloo umbrella.



Figure 31: mikey_trois.deux_duncanlemp 2021-12-07



Figure 29: ancaprebel 2020-09-29

Sneak-peak at what cops will be looking at when they come to my house to confiscate my AR15



Figure 30: Municipalmunitionsmedical 2019-12-27

Communicative Adaptation

The third and final type of adaptation witnessed in the Boogaloo observation group was the transition off platform. Transitioning off platform meant providing links within a user's Instagram posts or on their profile itself, to another website or forum. While in one instance this was a link to a website where the user of an account had begun to start streaming a podcast, it was more common for external links to lead to messaging services which allowed for two-way interaction between the user of the account and other users who chose to join the forum or chat. Telegram links were the most prevalent of these, with six different Telegram chatrooms being shared between July of 2020 and August 2021. Each of the six chatrooms was advertised on an Instagram post made by the account owner, urging users to join their Telegram channel. By the end of the observation period, three of these Instagram accounts were deleted, but they were able to continue posting content on their Telegram channels.

Chapter VI: Analysis

While the shifts between keywords, appearance of members, and communicative platform of the Boogaloo movement may seem obscure, understanding the rationale behind such adaptations becomes paramount in tracing the genealogy of the group and subsequently understanding its ideology. By spending time immersed within the Boogaloo ecosystem on Instagram, the reason for various changes became more understandable when supplemented with contextual understanding. Various shifts occurred organically and slowly such as the transitions from "Boogaloo" to "big igloo", whereas other more abrupt changes could be explained by events the group faced. Analyzing the adaptations of the Boogaloo movement through the lens of social movement theory privileges the analyst with a unique lens in their toolkit. Asking how a group adapts must be preceded by the question of why it adapts. In the case of the Boogaloo

movement on Instagram, it has been discussed that it is out of necessity due to continuous censorship attempts by the platform. As such, it becomes clear that the observed changes are best described as forms of institutional isomorphism. DiMaggio and Powell's seminal work on isomorphism served to explain why there was significant homogeneity among organizations and outlined the isomorphic pressures which lead to homogenization. In the case of the Boogaloo movement on Instagram, two of DiMaggio and Powell's three isomorphic pressures best explain the adaptations undergone by the group, and subsequently present two unique outcomes.

Coercive Isomorphism

The prevalence of coercive isomorphic pressure is clear, from Instagram's "shadow banning" of Boogaloo hashtags, to the banning of certain posts and deletion of accounts. Although some accounts chose to deal with this by making their account private, it limited their engagement. Hosting a private account which can only interact with approved followers provided a screening mechanism which minimized the number of unknown users who could report one content; however, it also rendered the hashtags used by the user unsearchable and limited the number of potential new followers who could discover the account. As a result, such a course of action would have likely led to organizational death for the Boogaloo movement if it was widespread amongst its Instagram users. Furthermore, selecting a private account quickly became a futile option on Instagram. Although it meant less people interacting with an account to report content, the Instagram platform still reviewed content and hashtags upon posting and was able to ban individuals for violations regardless of if they were reported by others. Opting to change privacy settings did not lead to isomorphic adaptation; however, it only provided temporary respite from coercive pressure. Hashtags remaining public is necessary for the group's survival and evolution, as new members are able to find associated posts.

Although hashtags are able to act as searchable keywords on Instagram’s platform, the ongoing shifting of these keywords is detrimental to a group’s success. These constant shifts make it difficult for eligible individuals outside of the group to locate it; thus, limiting the advertising capability of the group. Despite this, these changes were a necessary measure when faced with the pressure of being deplatformed by Instagram or observed by law enforcement. While the keywords “Boogaloo”, “big igloo”, and “big luau” were used concurrently and even within the same post by various accounts within 2019, Instagram’s ban of the Boogaloo hashtag led to a greater reliance on its existing alternatives at the start of 2020 as expressed by figure 32.

When you just got confirmation your 6 pack of Hawaiian shirts have shipped but now the movement is moving away from that and the term "Boogaloo"



Figure 32: kickstumbles 2020-06-04

The first uses of a new hashtag being alongside the pre-existing hashtags was done to entrench a new keyword within the environment – changes were proactive based on the groups understanding that the platform would seek to ban stale keywords. For the average user, this meant that the concurrent use of established hashtags provided a smooth transition - whereby individuals who had just discovered the “Boogaloo” hashtag came to see secondary and tertiary

hashtags alongside it and were able to search for the alternatives if the primary keyword became compromised. Despite this proactive measure, Instagram censorship was rapidly progressing and tackled the alternative hashtags established by members soon after removing posts with the original “boogaloo” hashtag. In this light, the rapid adoption of “CNN bois” can be understood not just as a means of retribution against CNN, but as a rapid pivot away from the pre-existing keywords which were exposed and made public by CNN.

Various developments of new keywords were observed among individual accounts, such as the use of “coat hanger crusaders” or “cowabunga”; however, these adaptations could not become group adaptations unless they were adopted by more members. The example of “coat hanger crusaders” made sense contextually as a self identifying keyword derived from posts sharing instructions on turning a coat hanger into a fully automatic trigger sear. Although this term would have been able to replace the recently banned “boog bois” hashtag, it was only utilized by one observed account and did not catch on with the remainder of the group. Similarly, the term “cowabunga” was utilized in numerous memes as an expression of excitement towards violence. In one instance, an account within the observation group even adopted a patch with the inscription “cowabunga it is”.



Figure 33: Lonewulfe 2019-06-10

Despite some member’s willingness to adopt “cowabunga” as a keyword as seen in figure 33, it did not become used as a widespread alternative to pre-existing Boogaloo hashtags. The most likely reason for this was the fact that the term had become co-opted by other groups, with

an Instagram search of the term leading to a breadth of mundane memes disassociated with the Boogaloo movement. In contrast to this, the plethora of phrases within figures 34 and 35 highlights the breadth of Boogaloo related keywords available to the group.



Figure 34: Arsenal_616 2020-07-22



Figure 35: meme_based_insurgency 2020-02-20

In considering these two examples it becomes evident that the Boogaloo movement faced another challenge in adapting. The development of new keywords required terms which would be unique enough to avoid co-option by other groups, while casting a wide enough net to be willingly adopted by a critical mass of users within the movement. As with the example of CNN Bois, the most successful changes required timely external pressure which caused members to adopt new hashtags en masse. Another significant example of this was the death of John Smith at the hands of police officers. The death of John Smith in conjunction with pressure on the group

to develop their hashtags led to the use of the hashtag “HisNameWasJohnSmith”, with more than 3000 associated posts.

The changes in group aesthetic occurred concurrently with the changes in keywords. Although the Instagram platform is not advanced enough to automatically censor posts based on the contents of an image posted – and subsequently the attire an individual may be wearing in an image - the posts were still fallible to community moderation. In such instances, a post could be manually flagged and reported to Instagram by any user, at which point it would be reviewed by Instagram employees to determine if it violated the platform’s terms of service. This became considerably more hazardous to Boogaloo members when Instagram included the Boogaloo movement in its dangerous organizations. As such, changing to more subtle alternatives of existing uniforms or new pieces of identifying attire became a necessary adaptation. Similarly to the group’s keywords, changes in appearance required a critical mass to adopt them without becoming too generic to the point where they would be adopted by those outside of the community. The first adaptation from high-visibility Hawaiian shirts towards more subtle floral-patterned accessories and patches circumvented this issue without changing the iconography itself.

Mimetic Isomorphism

Coercive pressures exerted by Instagram’s censorship led to significant group adaptation within a short time frame. In considering some of the previously discussed challenges which come alongside constant adaptation, it becomes clear that coercive adaptation alone is by limited by a balance between creativity and the willingness of a group to adopt a particular change en masse. DiMaggio and Powell’s theory of institutional isomorphism suggests that times of

organizational uncertainty push organizations to mimic successful counterparts.¹⁴¹ This term can be described as modelling, or mimetic isomorphism.¹⁴²

The transition to Telegram channels via links posted on Instagram present a significant example of mimetic isomorphism within the Boogaloo movement. The uncertainty caused by increasing censorship and a lack of adaptation led members to capitalize on the previous successful adaptations of Jihadi



Figure 36: PNWGuerrilla (Telegram) 2022-03-10

groups. Transitioning from Instagram to Telegram amidst platform censorship mimicked the actions of the Islamic State (IS) when members and sympathisers faced a wave of bans on Twitter.¹⁴³ IS quickly transitioned to Telegram as a means of maintaining their online network due to Telegram's lack of enforcement.¹⁴⁴ In addition to this, Telegram's end-to-end encryption minimized the chances of the group's communications being intercepted.¹⁴⁵ The Islamic State's successful transition provided a model for the Boogaloo movement to mimic. Although users within the sample group still attempted to maintain Instagram accounts, Telegram provided a more secure means of communication which allowed members to share the names of their new Instagram accounts if they were facing deletion. Figure 36 was posted on a telegram channel

¹⁴¹ DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 151.

¹⁴² Ibid. 150.

¹⁴³ Warrick 2016.

¹⁴⁴ Clifford and Powell 2019, 8.

¹⁴⁵ Shehaba, Mitew, and Alzoubi 2017, 27.

associated to a deleted Instagram user. Near the end of the observation period Telegram accounts also began to be used to arrange meetings with individuals from the group in real life.

With regard to attire, the shift towards the patches rectangular “X” patches presented a marked departure from previous Boogaloo patches and attire, drawing a closer parallel to the symbols used by the far-right. The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) lists such a symbol in their database as the “League of the South Cross”, suggesting that it is used as white



Figure 37: "White nationalists shelter behind shields, displaying the Southern Nationalist flag" (Roberts 2021)

nationalist iconography.¹⁴⁶ The ADL also states that “the flag design has been adapted to fit shields, banners, lapel pins and other forms of display”, and further elaborates that “because some websites now sell versions of the flag as a “Southern Nationalist” flag rather than specifically a League flag, its usage may extend beyond strictly League members”.¹⁴⁷ The symbol as seen on the shields of white nationalist protestors in Charlottesville, 2017 shown in figure 37 appears congruent with the patch choice some members of the Boogaloo movement adopted.

It must be taken into consideration that this patch was only witnessed on six members of the observation group, and as such, was not as widely adopted as its preceding floral attire and patches; however, at this juncture the attire of the Boogaloo movement became fragmented. Numerous accounts did not adapt their aesthetics beyond the traditional Boogaloo floral attire; however, many such accounts were deleted or ceased posting. The accounts which did remain

¹⁴⁶ “League of the South” 2022.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

typically contained a lower follower count (<1000), which likely limited their engagement and the likelihood of other users reporting their content.

This became the first observable divide within the Boogaloo movement. Censorship pressure led some members to evolve their appearance by falling back on covert symbols developed by other groups which better expressed their ideology, while others refused to do so. The group which did not adapt sought to maintain their iconography, while attempting to distance themselves from their derivatives by posting memes which highlighted that their ideology was disassociated from white supremacy as seen in figure 38.



Figure 38: Lonewulfe19 2020-06-08

The adoption of Rhodesian Brushstroke pattern as a new camouflage of choice presented another significant change which had implications for the group's ideology. One should be hesitant to assume that wearing a particular pattern of camouflage necessitates an ideology congruent with that of the group the pattern was designed for. For example, some of the camouflage patterns worn by the Waffen-SS have lost their meaning, becoming adopted on fashion runways purely for their unique aesthetic.¹⁴⁸ Within American militias, some patterns may be worn simply because they were cheap and available at a local military surplus store. However, when a camouflage pattern becomes featured within memes and the symbols

¹⁴⁸ Friedman 2015.

associated with the original uniform become utilized as well, the choice of attire becomes more symbolic. Rhodesian Brushstroke camouflage was the working uniform of Rhodesian soldiers during the illegal white minority occupation of Zimbabwe,¹⁴⁹ and has become a part of the contemporary right-wing imaginary in the form of a white ethnostate fantasy where black citizens are subordinate.

Dylann Roof, who murdered nine black parishioners in a South Carolina church in 2015,¹⁵⁰ published his manifesto on a website titled *The Last Rhodesian* prior to his actions and was photographed sporting a jacket with the historical Rhodesian flag.¹⁵¹ In the words of one of the owners of



Figure 39: noncompliant_outfitters 2020-02-21

Fireforce Ventures, a webstore which specializes in surplus Rhodesian equipment, during his appearance on a Neo-Nazi podcast,¹⁵² “If you’re into the political stuff, get yourself a flag, because normies don’t know what that flag means, the Rhodesian flag”.¹⁵³ In addition to Rhodesian Brushstroke being used among members of the sample group, one account began selling subdued Rhodesian flag patches as seen in figure 39.

The use of Southern nationalist patches and Rhodesian Brushstroke was not the only instance of a



Figure 40: crazymanraigles 2022-01-02

¹⁴⁹ Wiseman and Taylor 1981.

¹⁵⁰ Shah and McLaughlin 2017.

¹⁵¹ Ismay 2018.

¹⁵² Joseph 2018.

¹⁵³ Seatter and Milton 2018.

change in iconography which gave insight into a shifting ideology. The adoption of skull masks by members within the group as seen in figure 40 presented another symbol with racist ties but disassociated from Southern U.S. heritage.

The use of such a distinct facemask was popularized by Atomwaffen Division (AWD) and The Base, American Neo-Nazi groups which largely organized online.¹⁵⁴ The groups overlap in attire by donning the same symbolic skull mask, but also in shared ideological underpinnings derived from the work of James Mason.¹⁵⁵ Although such masks may be seen worn by individuals who appreciate the aesthetic of a skull mask without subscribing to any associated ideology, when taken in context with the memes being circulated within the Boogaloo ecosystem such as that of figure 41 it becomes clear that members within this space are aware of the symbol's association.



Figure 41: BoogalooDoge 2020-03-11

James Mason's collection of writings in the SIEGE newsletter from 1980-1986 were refined and amalgamated into a book by the title of *Siege*.¹⁵⁶ *Siege* advocates for “war against the establishment” and violent revolution in order to “smash the system”, amidst Mason's claims

¹⁵⁴ Ware 2020, 82.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid. 85.

¹⁵⁶ “Siege by James N. Mason.” 2022.

that miscegenation constitutes “race reason” and praise of violence against Jews.¹⁵⁷

Counterterrorism scholars such as Jacob Ware claim that Mason’s work has informed a unique ideology which he dubs “Siege culture”, where it has “been a significant inspiration in this wave’s “accelerationism” strategy, which aims to speed up society’s collapse through race war and chaotic violence, and which has been embraced by Atomwaffen’s branches in Europe as well as by the Base”.¹⁵⁸ The Siege culture embraced by these two groups is not just predicated on preparation for a race war, but the subsequent overthrow of the U.S. government, culminating in the establishment of a white ethnostate.¹⁵⁹

At its core, the Boogaloo movement shared part of this ideology, with members preparing and training for the toppling of the U.S. government. As such, pressure put on members of the movement to adapt could lead individuals to adopt the esoteric symbols of other organizations which share similar ideological underpinnings. Although AWD officially disbanded in March 2020, as announced by James Mason himself in a recording released by the group,¹⁶⁰ communications scholars John Hendry and Anthony Lemieux contend that “even after its disbanding, AWD’s influence can be felt in the symbols and media produced by other organizations in the white power space”.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁷ Mason 1992, 32, 53, and 73.

¹⁵⁸ Ware 2020, 85.

¹⁵⁹ Hwang 2021.

¹⁶⁰ Makuch 2020.

¹⁶¹ Hendry and Lemieux 2021, 138.



Figure 42: The Soufan Center 2020



Figure 43: Young 2021



Figure 44: Konnerkahler 2021-11-23

Figure 42 comes from AWD, figure 43 is a picture taken of The Base members, and figure 44 is an image which comes from the members within the sample group of this work. The mass adoption of the skull mask by numerous members highlighted that the mask was not just an individualistic accessory, but a change in uniform. In addition to this, the many instances where a skull mask was photoshopped into a meme (figures 45-47) showcased that the mask was now part of the group identity in the same way Hawaiian shirts and floral print previously had been.



Figure 45: fullautodoggo 2019-11-05



Figure 46: Lonewulfe19 2019-11-24




Figure 47: Walther_joseph_kovacs 2020-10-12

Furthermore, A change in memes posted by accounts corroborated the idea that some group member's ideology was shifting. Whereas Boogaloo memes has typically made Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms agents the targets of their memes, five users within the observation group began addressing United Nations (UN) peacekeepers as enemies within their Instagram posts as seen in figures 48-50.



Figure 50:
Walther_joseph_kovacs 2022-01-13




Figure 49: third_hole_hooligan 2020-01-17




Figure 48: noncompliant_outfitters 2020-01-31

Without context, such a change may seem insignificant; however, to a variety of right-wing extremist groups, the United Nations has come to represent a monolithic enemy based on its perceived threat towards nationalism and ethnic homogeneity. At the forefront of this, conspiracy theories such as The Great Replacement drive the idea that political elites within the

UN actively seek out to eliminate white populations through mass immigration policies. This ideology has impacted far-right extremists such as Brenton Tarrant, the individual responsible for the the Mosque shootings in Christchurch, New Zealand in 2019 who penned his manifesto under the same title, “The Great Replacement”.¹⁶² Jacob Davey and Julia Ebner’s study of Great Replacement discussion online led to the development of a dataset which found that “the general memes in this set presented unsubstantiated, emotive and hyperbolic claims to ethnic and cultural displacement, as well as references to broader conspiracy theories focusing on racist, racialist and anti-Semitic tropes”.¹⁶³ Furthermore, Davey and Ebner highlight how sources directly from the United Nations were used in posts within the dataset to substantiate Great Replacement theory.¹⁶⁴ The UN acting as a perceived symbol of globalization runs parallel with the two theories that Jewish people lack loyalty to any country of origin and that organizations such as the UN are run by Jews.¹⁶⁵ Echoing this, within the far-right ecosystem, the term “globalist” has come to serve as a keyword associated with Jews.¹⁶⁶ Great Replacement theory directly utilizes this association by “blaming ‘globalist Jewish elites’ for mass migration”.¹⁶⁷ Telegram chatrooms shared by the sample group contain posts which corroborate this ideology – with UN peacekeepers being referred to as “ZOGbots”, meaning Zionist Owned Government robots.

¹⁶² “White Supremacist Terrorist Attack at Mosques in New Zealand” 2019.

¹⁶³ Obaidi et al. 2021, 26.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ “Globalist: #TranslateHate” 2021.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Davey and ebner, 12.

Bearing this in mind, it becomes clear that the adoption of Siege masks alongside a propensity to target UN peacekeepers in the place of ATF agents represents a distinct ideological shift for some members of the Boogaloo movement. The books recommended on posts by one member within the observation group corroborated the assessment that numerous members had begun to mimic groups within the broader Siege movement. One post (figure 51) shared a contemporary alternative to Siege, Mike Ma's self-published *Harassment Architecture*, which similarly advocates for accelerationist violence while delving into racism and antisemitism.¹⁶⁸




Figure 51: notgorillaman 2022-03-11

One question which remains unanswered is if the members of the Boogaloo sample group made formal connections with members of The Base, AWD, or any other parallel organizations. This work is not able to definitively answer this question; however, it can pinpoint that multiple members of the observation group were present at a gun rights rally in Virginia where AWD members were also present.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁸ Ma 2019.

¹⁶⁹ Ware 2020, 77.

Chapter VII: Conclusion

The objective of this work was to determine how the Boogaloo movement adapted to online censorship attempts as they gained more law enforcement and media attention over the course of the observation period. Through the use of virtual ethnography within the Instagram Boogaloo community and an analysis informed by social movement theory and new institutionalism, the objective of the research was met. DiMaggio and Powell's isomorphic pressures which were fundamental in explaining the similarity between various organizations within a field function similarly in the case of the Boogaloo movement and provide a theoretical backdrop to explain various observed adaptations. This informed the comparison of the Boogaloo movement's language, symbology, iconography, and even means of communication with that of other extremist groups within the analysis to showcase significant similarities between various groups.

The significance of this research within the literature is its ability to develop a qualitative understanding of the Boogaloo movement's adaptations. A virtual ethnographic approach to the Boogaloo movement provides deeper understanding in the findings of Wiggins who characterized Boogaloo posts as "a kind of covert activism" predicated on antagonism and the development of a contextualized language.¹⁷⁰ Furthermore, the lens of isomorphic pressures helps explain the findings of Velásquez et al. who utilized quantitative comparisons of the Boogaloo movement and ISIS to conclude a similar evolution between the two movements.¹⁷¹

Despite some success, the most notable limitation of this work is derived from the inductive approach endemic to interpretivist work, as it limits the replicability of a study.

¹⁷⁰ Wiggins 2020, 3200.

¹⁷¹ Velásquez et al. 2021, 7.

However, Williams' concept of moderatum generalization provides some reprieve from such criticism when understanding that the purpose of this work is not to make general theoretical claims, but rather to answer a research question pertaining to a specific group at a specific time.¹⁷² A shortcoming within the scope of this work is the limitation of a multi-sited ethnography rather than a multi-modal work which could include interaction with members of the Boogaloo movement offline. The latter would better explore the "messy web" of social movement interaction across the dimensions of cyberspace and the physical world as suggested by Postill and Pink's recommendations for ethnographic work.¹⁷³ This limitation largely stems from the ethical considerations required to interact with such a group as well as a potential danger to the researcher.

Despite the challenges associated with employing a multi-modal study of the Boogaloo movement, such a possibility presents a promising opportunity for future research. The group's change of platform between Instagram and Telegram within this work provided a necessary depth in understanding the evolution of the movement. The Telegram posts sharing the locations of members as a means of meeting in person provide an opportunity and an avenue for future research which could only add further depth to the academic understanding of the Boogaloo movement.

¹⁷² Williams 2005.

¹⁷³ Postill and Pink 2012.

Works Cited

- Alba, Davey. 2020. "Facebook Bans Network With 'Boogaloo' Ties (Published 2020)". *Nytimes.Com*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/30/technology/facebook-ban-boogaloo.html>.
- Alrhoun, Abdullah, Shiraz Maher, and Charlie Winter. 2021. "Decoding Hate: Using Experimental Text Analysis To Classify Terrorist Content". GNET Reports. London: Global Network on Extremism & Technology. <https://gnet-research.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/GNET-Report-Decoding-Hate-Using-Experimental-Text-Analysis-to-Classify-Terrorist-Content.pdf>.
- Aly, Anne, Stuart Macdonald, Lee Jarvis, and Thomas M. Chen. 2016. "Introduction To The Special Issue: Terrorist Online Propaganda And Radicalization". *Studies In Conflict & Terrorism* 40 (1): 1-9. doi:10.1080/1057610x.2016.1157402.
- Amaechi, Kingsley Ekene. 2017. "From Non-Violent Protests to Suicide Bombing: Social Movement Theory Reflections on the Use of Suicide Violence in the Nigerian Boko Haram." *Journal for the Study of Religion* 30 (1): 52–77. doi:10.17159/2413-3027/2017/v30n1a3.
- Amarasingam, Amarnath, Shiraz Maher, and Charlie Winter. 2021. "How Telegram Disruption Impacts Jihadist Platform Migration". Center for Research and Evidence on Security Threats. <https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/how-telegram-disruption-impacts-jihadist-platform-migration/>.
- Amble, John Curtis. 2012. "Combating Terrorism In The New Media Environment". *Studies In Conflict & Terrorism* 35 (5): 339-353. doi:10.1080/1057610x.2012.666819.
- Amit, Sajid, Lumbini Barua, and Abdulla Al Kafy. 2021. "Countering Violent Extremism Using Social Media And Preventing Implementable Strategies For Bangladesh". *Heliyon* 7 (5): e07121. doi:10.1016/j.heliyon.2021.e07121.
- Archetti, Cristina. 2015. "Terrorism, Communication And New Media: Explaining Radicalization In The Digital Age". *Perspectives On Terrorism* 9 (1): 49-59. doi:<http://www.jstor.org/stable/26297326>.
- Archetti, Cristina. 2013. *Understanding Terrorism In The Age Of Global Media*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.
- "Assessing the Threat from Accelerationists and Militia Extremists". 2021. In *Hearing Before The Subcommittee On Intelligence And Counterterrorism Of The Committee On Homeland Security House Of Representatives One Hundred Sixteenth Congress Second Session*. Washington: U.S. Government Publishing Office. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-116hhrg43866/html/CHRG-116hhrg43866.htm>.
- Bal, Michèlle, and Kees van den Bos. 2017. "From System Acceptance To Embracing Alternative Systems And System Rejection: Tipping Points In Processes Of

- Radicalization.". *Translational Issues In Psychological Science* 3 (3): 241-253. doi:10.1037/tps0000123.
- Banks, James. 2010. "Regulating Hate Speech Online". *International Review Of Law, Computers & Technology* 24 (3): 233-239. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13600869.2010.522323.
- BBC News. 2019. "Charlottesville Attacker Apologises As He Is Jailed For Life". *BBC News*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-48806265>.
- Beckett, Lois. 2020. "White Supremacists Behind Majority Of US Domestic Terror Attacks In 2020". *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/22/white-supremacists-rightwing-domestic-terror-2020>.
- Bell, Stewart. 2021. "Extremist Groups 'Actively Recruiting' Military And Police, Canadian Intelligence Report Warns - National | Globalnews.Ca". *Globalnews.Ca*. <https://globalnews.ca/news/8128463/extremist-groups-military-recruitment-report/>.
- Benford, Robert, and David Snow. 2000. "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment." *Annual Review of Sociology* 26: 611–39.
- Berger, John M. 2018. *Extremism*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
- Bifet, Albert, and Eibe Frank. 2010. "Sentiment Knowledge Discovery In Twitter Streaming Data". *Discovery Science* 6332: 1-15. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-16184-1_1.
- Biting The Bullet. 2020. "Cops With CBRN Boogboi And Pat From Uncensored Tactical Ep. 50". Podcast. *Biting The Bullet Podcast*. <https://anchor.fm/biting-the-bullet/episodes/Cops-with-CBRN-BoogBoi-and-Pat-from-Uncensored-Tactical-Ep--50-ed8pgp>.
- Bliuc, Ana-Maria, John Betts, Matteo Vergani, Muhammad Iqbal, and Kevin Dunn. 2020. "The Growing Power Of Online Communities Of The Extreme-Right: Deriving Strength, Meaning, And Direction From Significant Socio-Political Events 'In Real Life'". ICCT Policy Brief. The Hague: International Center for Counter-Terrorism. <https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2020/04/The-growing-power-of-online-communities-of-the-extreme-right.pdf>.
- Boellstorff, Tom, Bonnie Nardi, Celia Pearce, and T.L. Taylor. 2012. *Ethnography and Virtual Worlds A Handbook of Method*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Boot, Arnout B., Erik Tjong Kim Sang, Katinka Dijkstra, and Rolf A. Zwaan. 2019. "How Character Limit Affects Language Usage In Tweets". *Palgrave Communications* 5 (1). doi:10.1057/s41599-019-0280-3.
- Borum, Randy. 2011. "Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories." *Journal of Strategic Security* 4 (4): 7–36. doi:10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.1.
- Carter, Simon, Wouter Weerkamp, and Manos Tsagkias. 2012. "Microblog Language Identification: Overcoming The Limitations Of Short, Unedited And Idiomatic

- Text". *Language Resources And Evaluation* 47 (1): 195-215. doi:10.1007/s10579-012-9195-y.
- Castells, Manuel. 2015. *Networks Of Outrage And Hope: Social Movements In The Internet Age, 2Nd Edi.* 2nd ed. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Cinelli, Matteo, Gianmarco De Francisci Morales, Alessandro Galeazzi, Walter Quattrociocchi, and Michele Starnini. 2021. "The Echo Chamber Effect on Social Media." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 118 (9). doi:10.1073/pnas.2023301118.
- Clifford, Bennett, and Helen Powell. 2019. Rep. *Encrypted Extremism: Inside the English-Speaking Islamic State Ecosystem on Telegram.* Washington, DC: Program on Extremism. <https://scholarspace.library.gwu.edu/work/9s161692z>.
- Cohen, Katie, Fredrik Johansson, Lisa Kaati, and Jonas Clausen Mork. 2013. "Detecting Linguistic Markers For Radical Violence In Social Media". *Terrorism And Political Violence* 26 (1): 246-256. doi:10.1080/09546553.2014.849948.
- Conrad, Browyn Kara. 2006. "Neo-Institutionalism, Social Movements, and the Cultural Reproduction of a Mentalité: Promise Keepers Reconstruct the Madonna/Whore Complex." *The Sociological Quarterly* 47 (2): 305–31. doi:10.1111/j.1533-8525.2006.00047.x.
- Conway, Maura. 2016. "Determining The Role Of The Internet In Violent Extremism And Terrorism: Six Suggestions For Progressing Research". *Studies In Conflict & Terrorism* 40 (1): 77-98. doi:10.1080/1057610x.2016.1157408.
- Crawford, Blyth. 2020. "/K/ And The Visual Culture Of Weapons Boards". Memetic Irony And The Promotion Of Violence Within Chan Cultures. Center for Research and Evidence on Security Threats. <https://crestresearch.ac.uk/comment/k-and-the-visual-culture-of-weapons-boards/>.
- Crelinsten, Ronald D. 1987. "Power And Meaning: Terrorism As A Struggle Over Access To The Communication Structure". In *Contemporary Research On Terrorism*. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press.
- Crothers, Lane. 2019. *Rage On The Right : The American Militia Movement From Ruby Ridge To The Trump Presidency.* 2nd ed. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja. 2008. Working paper. *Studying Violent Radicalization in Europe I: The Potential Contribution of Social Movement Theory.* Denmark: Vesterkopi as.
- Decety, Jean, Robert Pape, and Clifford I. Workman. 2017. "A Multilevel Social Neuroscience Perspective On Radicalization And Terrorism". *Social Neuroscience* 13 (5): 511-529. doi:10.1080/17470919.2017.1400462.
- Della Porta, Donatella, and Mario Diani. 2006. *Social Movements: An Introduction.* 2nd ed. John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated.

- Della Porta, Donatella. 2013. *Clandestine Political Violence*. Cambridge University Press.
- Denscombe, Martyn. 2002. *Ground Rules For Good Research: A 10 Point Guide For Social Researchers*. Buckingham; Philadelphia: Open University Press.
- DiMaggio, Paul J., and Walter W. Powell. 1983. "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields." *American Sociological Review* 48 (2): 147–60. doi:10.2307/2095101.
- Dolan, Maura, Richard Winton, and Anita Chabria. 2020. "Suspect In Killing Of 2 Bay Area Officers Tied To Right-Wing 'Boogaloo' Group, Prosecutors Allege". *Latimes.Com*. <https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-06-16/suspects-charged-killing-santa-cruz-cop-and-oakland-federal-officer>.
- Doosje, Bertjan, Fathali M Moghaddam, Arie W Kruglanski, Arjan de Wolf, Liesbeth Mann, and Allard R Feddes. 2016. "Terrorism, Radicalization And De-Radicalization". *Current Opinion In Psychology* 11: 79-84. doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2016.06.008.
- "Electric Boogaloo." 2020. *Know Your Meme*. December 6. <https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/electric-boogaloo>.
- Evans, Robert, and Jason Wilson. 2020. "The Boogaloo Movement Is Not What You Think - Bellingcat". *Bellingcat.Com*. <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2020/05/27/the-boogaloo-movement-is-not-what-you-think/>.
- "Facebook Tests Extremist Content Warning Messages." 2021. *BBC News*. BBC. July 2. <https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-57697779>.
- Facebook. 2020. "Banning A Violent Network In The US - About Facebook". *Facebook.Com*. <https://about.fb.com/news/2020/06/banning-a-violent-network-in-the-us/>.
- Friedman, Vanessa. 2015. "A New Camouflage Pattern Now in Fashion for the U.S. Army." *Nytimes.com*. The New York Times. July 1. <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/02/fashion/a-new-camouflage-pattern-now-in-fashion-for-the-us-army.html>.
- Gabbatt, Adam. 2017. "What Could Donald Trump Do With 280 Twitter Characters? So, So Much!". *Theguardian.Com*. <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/sep/27/donald-trump-twitter-280-characters>.
- "Globalist: #TranslateHate." 2021. *AJC*. American Jewish Committee. April 26. <https://www.ajc.org/translatehate/globalist>.
- Gonzales, Richard. 2019. "Florida Man Who Mailed Bombs To Democrats, Media Gets 20 Years In Prison". *Npr.Org*. <https://www.npr.org/2019/08/05/748420957/cesar-sayoc-florida-man-who-mailed-bombs-to-democrats-and-media-gets-20-years>.

- Gunning, Jeroen. 2009. "Social Movement Theory And The Study Of Terrorism". In *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda*, 156 – 177. New York: Routledge. <https://doi-org.login.ezproxy.library.ualberta.ca/10.4324/9780203880227>.
- Hegghammer, Thomas. 2016. "Why Terrorists Weep: The Socio-Cultural Practices Of Jihadi Militants". Lecture, Paul Wilkinson Memorial Lecture, University of St. Andrews, 16 April, 2015.
- Hendry, John, and Anthony F. Lemieux. 2021. "The Visual and Rhetorical Styles of Atomwaffen Division and Their Implications." *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* 14 (2): 138–59. doi:10.1080/17467586.2021.1913203.
- Hine, Christine. 2000. *Virtual Ethnography*. London: Sage.
- Hine, Christine. 2017. "Ethnographies of Online Communities and Social Media: Modes, Varieties, Affordances." Essay. In *The SAGE Handbook of Online Research Methods*, edited by Nigel G. Fielding, Raymond M. Lee, and Grant Blank, 401–13. SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Hoffman, Bruce, and Jacob Ware. 2019. "Halle Shooting: The New Terrorism Reality". <https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/halle-shooting-new-terrorism-reality>.
- Holt, Thomas J., Joshua D. Freilich, and Steven M. Chermak. 2020. "Examining The Online Expression Of Ideology Among Far-Right Extremist Forum Users". *Terrorism And Political Violence*, 1-21. doi:10.1080/09546553.2019.1701446.
- Hwang, Grace. 2021. "Examining Extremism: The Base." Web log. *CSIS.org*. Center for Strategic and International Studies. July 8. <https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-base>.
- Ingold, Tim. 2008. "Anthropology Is Not Ethnography". *Proceedings Of The British Academy, Volume 154, 2007 Lectures* 154. doi:10.5871/bacad/9780197264355.003.0003.
- Ismay, John. 2018. "Rhodesia's Dead — but White Supremacists Have Given It New Life Online." *Nytimes.com*. The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/10/magazine/rhodesia-zimbabwe-white-supremacists.html>.
- Johnson, Thomas H. 2007. "The Taliban Insurgency And An Analysis Ofshabnamah(Night Letters)". *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 18 (3): 317-344. doi:10.1080/09592310701674176.
- Jones, Seth G., Catrina Doxsee, and Nicholas Harrington. 2020. "The Escalating Terrorism Problem In The United States". CSIS Briefs. Center for Strategic and International Studies. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/escalating-terrorism-problem-united-states>.

- Joseph, Rebecca. 2018. "Rhodesian Flags, White Supremacist Podcast Appearance Prompts Canadian Forces Investigation." *Globalnews.ca*. Global News.
<https://globalnews.ca/news/4615124/canadian-forces-white-supremacy-investigation/>.
- Keen, Florence, Blyth Crawford, and Guillermo Suarez-Tangil. 2020. "Memetic Irony And The Promotion Of Violence Within Chan Cultures". Center for Research and Evidence on Security Threats. <https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/memetic-irony-and-the-promotion-of-violence-within-chan-cultures/>.
- Kim, Yoonsang, Rachel Nordgren, and Sherry Emery. 2020. "The Story of Goldilocks and Three Twitter's APIs: A Pilot Study on Twitter Data Sources and Disclosure." *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health* 17 (3). doi:10.3390/ijerph17030864.
- Klausen, Jytte. 2014. "Tweeting Thejihad: Social Media Networks Of Western Foreign Fighters In Syria And Iraq". *Studies In Conflict & Terrorism* 38 (1): 1-22.
 doi:10.1080/1057610x.2014.974948.
- Kleinheksel, A. J., Nicole Rockich-Winston, Huda Tawfik, and Tasha R. Wyatt. 2019. "Demystifying Content Analysis". *American Journal Of Pharmaceutical Education* 84 (1).
 doi:10.5688/ajpe7113.
- Koehler, Daniel. 2019. "Violence And Terrorism From The Far-Right: Policy Options To Counter An Elusive Threat". The Hague: International Center for Counter-Terrorism.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19617>.
- Koopmans, Ruud, and Paul Statham. 1999. "Ethnic And Civic Conceptions Of Nationhood And The Differential Success Of The Extreme Right In Germany And Italy". In *How Social Movements Matter*, 225-251. University of Minnesota Press.
- Kozinets, Robert V. 2009. *Netnography: Doing Ethnographic Research Online*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Kuznia, Robert, Drew Griffin, and Curt Devine. 2020. "Gun-Toting Members of the Boogaloo Movement Are Showing up at Protests." *CNN*. Cable News Network. June 4.
<https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/03/us/boogaloo-extremist-protests-invs/index.html>.
- Lavin, Talia. 2020. *Culture Warlords :My Journey Into The Dark Web Of White Supremacy*. 1st ed. New York: Hachette Books.
- "League of the South." 2022. *Anti-Defamation League*. Accessed March 18.
<https://www.adl.org/education/references/hate-symbols/league-of-the-south>.
- Ma, Mike. 2019. *Harassment Architecture*. Raleigh, North Carolina: Mike Ma.
- Mandel, David R. 2009. "Radicalization: What Does It Mean?". In *Home-Grown Terrorism: Understanding And Addressing The Root Causes Of Radicalisation Among Groups With An Immigrant Heritage In Europe*, 101-114. Amsterdam: IOS Press.

- Manor, Ilan, and Rhys Crilly. 2018. "The Aesthetics Of Violent Extremist And Counter-Violent Extremist Communication". In *Countering Online Propaganda And Extremism*, 1st ed., 121-139. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.
- Makuch, Ben. 2020. "Audio Recording Claims Neo-Nazi Terror Group Is Disbanding." *VICE*. March 14. <https://www.vice.com/en/article/qjdnam/audio-recording-claims-neo-nazi-terror-group-is-disbanding>.
- Mason, James. 1992. *Siege: The Collected Writings of James Mason*. Storm Books. Accessed via Internet Archive: https://archive.org/details/Siege_836/page/n71/mode/2up.
- McCarthy, John D., and Mayer N. Zald. 1977. "Resource Mobilization And Social Movements: A Partial Theory". *American Journal Of Sociology* 82 (6): 1212-1241. doi:<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2777934>.
- McNabb, David E. 2020. *Research Methods For Political Science Quantitative, Qualitative And Mixed Methods Approaches*. 3rd ed. New York: Routledge.
- McNatt, Glenn. 1996. "Anarchists Are Learning to Do It by the Book." *Baltimore Sun*. August 31. <https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1996-09-01-1996245100-story.html>.
- Mosseri, Adam. 2021. "Shedding More Light On How Instagram Works". *Instagram.Com*. <https://about.instagram.com/blog/announcements/shedding-more-light-on-how-instagram-works>.
- Muhic, Emir. 2021. "The Role of Radicalism and Extremism in Political Terrorism." *Technium Social Sciences Journal* 25 (November): 590–603.
- Nagle, Angela. 2017. *Kill All Normies: Online Culture Wars From 4Chan And Tumblr To Trump And The Alt-Right*. Winchester, UK ; Washington, USA: Zero Books.
- Neumann, Peter R. 2013. "The Trouble With Radicalization". *International Affairs* 89 (4): 873-893. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12049.
- Newman, Edward. 2006. "Exploring The "Root Causes" Of Terrorism". *Studies In Conflict & Terrorism* 29 (8): 749-772. doi:10.1080/10576100600704069.
- Obaidi, Milan, Jonas Kunst, Simon Ozer, and Sasha Y. Kimel. 2021. "The 'Great Replacement' Conspiracy: How the Perceived Ousting of Whites Can Evoke Violent Extremism and Islamophobia." *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 1–21. doi:10.1177/13684302211028293.
- Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 2021. "Domestic Violent Extremism Poses Heightened Threat in 2021". https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/21_0301_odni_unclass-summary-of-dve-assessment-17_march-final_508.pdf

- Perry, Barbara, and Ryan Scrivens. 2016. "Uneasy Alliances: A Look At The Right-Wing Extremist Movement In Canada". *Studies In Conflict & Terrorism* 39 (9): 819-841. doi:10.1080/1057610x.2016.1139375.
- Piacenti, David Joseph, Luis Balmore Rivas, and Josef Garrett. 2014. "Facebook Ethnography: The Poststructural Ontology Of Transnational (Im) Migration Research". *International Journal Of Qualitative Methods* 13 (1): 224-236. doi:10.1177/160940691401300110.
- Postill, John, and Sarah Pink. 2012. "Social Media Ethnography: The Digital Researcher in a Messy Web." *Media International Australia* 145 (1): 123–34. doi:10.1177/1329878x1214500114.
- Prier, Jarred. 2017. "Commanding The Trend: Social Media As Information Warfare". *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 11 (4): 50-85. doi:<https://www.jstor.org/stable/26271634>.
- "Proud Boys Founder on Whether He Feels Responsible for Its Controversial Behavior." 2022. ABC News. ABC News Network. Accessed April 21. <https://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/video/proud-boys-founder-feels-responsible-controversial-behavior-59766444>.
- Quan, Douglas. 2015. "Ex-Ontario Teacher Is International Director Of American 'White Nationalist' Group That Influenced Dylann Roof | National Post". *Nationalpost.Com*. <https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/ex-ontario-teacher-is-international-director-of-american-white-nationalist-group-that-influenced-dylann-roof>.
- Ramakrishna, Kumar. 2011. "Self-Radicalisation And The Awlaki Connection". In *Strategic Currents: Issues In Human Security In Asia*, 1st ed. Singapore: S Rajaratnam School of International Studies. <https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814345491-044>.
- Reed, Isaac Ariail. 2017. "Cultural Sociology As Research Program: Post-Positivism, Meaning, And Causality". In *The Oxford Handbook Of Cultural Sociology*. New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Roberts, Joshua. 2021. "Four Years Ago in Charlottesville - Pictures." *Reuters.com*. Reuters. November 23. <https://www.reuters.com/news/picture/four-years-ago-in-charlottesville-idUSRTXKGPPO>.
- Sageman, Marc. 2008. *Leaderless Jihad*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, Inc.
- Schmidle, Robert E. 2010. "Positioning Theory And Terrorist Networks". *Journal For The Theory Of Social Behaviour* 40 (1): 65-78. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5914.2009.00421.x.
- Schneider, Patricia. 2020. "When Protest Goes to Sea: Theorizing Maritime Violence by Applying Social Movement Theory to Terrorism and Piracy in the Cases of Nigeria and Somalia." *Ocean Development & International Law* 51 (4): 283–306. doi:10.1080/00908320.2020.1781383.
- Seatter, Erin, and Jon Milton. 2018. "Meet the Canadian Soldiers behind a White Supremacist Military Surplus Store | Ricochet." *Ricochet.media*. Ricochet.

<https://ricochet.media/en/2394/meet-the-canadian-soldiers-behind-a-white-supremacist-military-surplus-store>.

Sedgwick, Mark. 2010. "The Concept Of Radicalization As A Source Of Confusion". *Terrorism And Political Violence* 22 (4): 479-494. doi:10.1080/09546553.2010.491009.

Semati, Mehdi, and Piotr M. Szipunar. 2018. "ISIS Beyond The Spectacle: Communication Media, Networked Publics, Terrorism". *Critical Studies In Media Communication* 35 (1): 1-7. doi:10.1080/15295036.2018.1414751.

Shah, Khushbu, and Elliott C McLaughlin. 2017. "Victim's Dad Warns Dylann Roof: 'Your Creator ... He's Coming for You'." *Cnn.com*. CNN.
<https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/11/us/dylann-roof-sentencing/index.html>.

Shehabat, Ahmad, Teodor Mitew, and Yahia Alzoubi. 2017. "Encrypted Jihad: Investigating the Role of Telegram App in Lone Wolf Attacks in the West." *Journal of Strategic Security* 10 (3): 27–53. doi:10.5038/1944-0472.10.3.1604.

"Siege by James N. Mason." 2022. *Goodreads.com*. Goodreads. Accessed March 18.
<https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/6378795-siege>.

Smith, Carrie. 2019. *Russia's Information Warfare: The Case of Ukraine in a Global Comparative Context*. In person. Varscona Hotel, Edmonton AB.

Sold, Manjana, and Julian Junk. 2021. "Researching Extremist Content On Social Media Platforms: Data Protection And Research Ethics Challenges And Opportunities". GNET Reports. London: Global Network on Extremism & Technology. <https://gnet-research.org/2021/01/11/researching-extremist-content-on-social-media-platforms-data-protection-and-research-ethics-challenges-and-opportunities/>.

"Terrorist Attacks By Vehicle Fast Facts". 2021. *CNN*.
<https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/03/world/terrorist-attacks-by-vehicle-fast-facts/index.html>.

The Soufan Center. 2020. "Intelbrief: Atomwaffen Goes Global." *The Soufan Center*. August 11.
<https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-atomwaffen-goes-global/>.

Southern Poverty Law Center. 2022. "Atomwaffen Division." *Splcenter.org*. Accessed April 26.
<https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/atomwaffen-division>.

Statista. 2021. "Instagram: Age Distribution Of Global Audiences 2021". *Statista.Com*.
<https://www.statista.com/statistics/325587/instagram-global-age-group/>.

Tarrow, Sidney G. 2011. *Power In Movement: Social Movements And Contentious Politics*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

The United States Department of Justice. 2021. "Second Member Of "Boogaloo Bois" Pleads Guilty To Conspiracy To Provide Material Support To Hamas".

<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/second-member-boogaloo-bois-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-provide-material-support-hamas>.

- U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2020. "Homeland Threat Assessment".
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2020_10_06_homeland-threat-assessment.pdf.
- Velásquez, Nicolas, Pedro Manrique, Richard Sear, Rhys Leahy, N. Johnson Restrepo, Lucia Illari, Yonatan Lupu, and N. F. Johnson. 2021. "Hidden Order Across Online Extremist Movements Can Be Disrupted by Nudging Collective Chemistry." *Scientific Reports* 11 (1). doi:10.1038/s41598-021-89349-3.
- Wahlström, Mattias, and Anton Törnberg. 2019. "Social Media Mechanisms For Right-Wing Political Violence In The 21St Century: Discursive Opportunities, Group Dynamics, And Co-Ordination". *Terrorism And Political Violence* 33 (4): 766-787.
doi:10.1080/09546553.2019.1586676.
- Ware, Jacob. 2020. "Fighting Back: The Atomwaffen Division, Countering Violent Extremism, and the Evolving Crackdown on Far-Right Terrorism in America." *Journal or Deradicalization* Winter 2020/21 (25): 74–116.
doi:<https://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/411/253>.
- Warrick, Joby. 2016. "The 'App of Choice' for Jihadists: Isis Seizes on Internet Tool to Promote Terror." *The Washington Post*. WP Company. December 23.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-app-of-choice-for-jihadists-isis-seizes-on-internet-tool-to-promote-terror/2016/12/23/a8c348c0-c861-11e6-85b5-76616a33048d_story.html.
- Weber, Christopher. 2020. "Feds: Man Intentionally Derailed L.A. Train Near Hospital Ship". *Ctvnews.Ca*. <https://www.ctvnews.ca/health/coronavirus/feds-man-intentionally-derailed-l-a-train-near-hospital-ship-1.4878404>.
- Weimann, Gabriel. 2005. "The Theater Of Terror: The Psychology Of Terrorism And The Mass Media". *Journal Of Aggression, Maltreatment & Trauma* 9 (3-4): 379-390.
doi:10.1300/j146v09n03_08.
- Welch, Michael. 2019. "Signs Of Trouble: Semiotics, Streetscapes, And The Republican Struggle In The North Of Ireland". *Crime, Media, Culture: An International Journal* 16 (1): 7-32. doi:10.1177/1741659018822939.
- "White Supremacist Terrorist Attack at Mosques in New Zealand." 2019. *Anti-Defamation League*. March 15. <https://www.adl.org/blog/white-supremacist-terrorist-attack-at-mosques-in-new-zealand>.
- Wiggins, Bradley E. 2020. "Boogaloo and Civil War 2: Memetic Antagonism in Expressions of Covert Activism." *New Media & Society* 23 (11): 3179–3205.
doi:10.1177/1461444820945317.

- Wiseman, Henry, and Alastair M Taylor. 1981. *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe*. New York: Pergamon Press.
- Witherspoon, Josiah. 2017. "Analysis Of Low-Tech Terrorism In Western Democracies: Vehicles, Blades, And Incendiary Devices". *TSAS Working Paper 17 (5)*. <https://www.tsas.ca/publications/analysis-of-low-tech-terrorism-in-western-democracies/>.
- Young, Eric. 2021. *The Base Members Thomas Denton, Tristan Webb and Justen Watkins Stand with Firearms across from the Huron County Building during a Black Lives Matter Demonstration in Bad Axe Last Year*. *Huron Daily Tribune*. <https://www.michiganstthumb.com/news/article/More-charges-brought-against-members-of-The-Base-16380801.php>.
- Zammito, John H. 2004. *A Nice Derangement Of Epistemes: Post-Positivism In The Study Of Science From Quine To Latour*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Zannettou, Savvas, Tristan Caulfield, Jeremy Blackburn, Emiliano De Cristofaro, Michael Sirivianos, Gianluca Stringhini, and Guillermo Suarez-Tangil. 2018. "On The Origins Of Memes By Means Of Fringe Web Communities". *Proceedings Of The Internet Measurement Conference 2018*, 188-202. doi:10.1145/3278532.3278550.
- Zelizer, Barbie. 2016. "Journalism'S Deep Memory: Cold War Mindedness And Coverage Of Islamic State". *International Journal Of Communication* 10 (1): 6060–6089.