Competing institutional logics, religion, and social movement outcomes: The case of solidarity economy enterprises in Brazil

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
in
Strategic Management and Organization

Faculty of Business
University of Alberta

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ABSTRACT

This research reveals how the work of social movement organizations is affected by multiple—and sometimes competing—institutional logics surrounding a movement. Communities are part of the context that influences the ability of social movements to achieve their goals, and multiple institutional logics permeate these communities. I focus on the Solidarity Economy Movement in Brazil, a movement in which the Catholic Church was a major actor and that promoted the establishment of cooperatives to address poverty and income inequality. Empirically, I show that religion is a fundamental institution that influences social movements. I demonstrate how regional variance in the predominant logic embraced by the Catholic Church affected the work of Cáritas, a social movement organization in Brazil, as measured by the number of solidarity economy enterprises founded in a given region. I contribute to the literature on social movements, institutional logics, and grand challenges.

Keywords: institutional logics, social movement outcomes, new organizational form, religion, communities

DEDICATION

To my parents, Maria Rita and Francisco.

I am sure that my confidence and sense of security comes from knowing how much you love me, and that is all that someone needs. This Ph.D. was the toughest and most emotionally draining thing I have done in my life, but it did not break me because of this confidence.

My desire to study topics that address social issues come from how you raised me with the belief that all human beings should be treated equally and have access to similar opportunities. You are exemplars of how to treat people. You have this amazing quality of being able to relate to anyone and converse as equals, independent of the person's background. You also never feel more or less important than anybody else. This taught me to be (or try to be) humble, but also to have the confidence to speak my mind, to challenge people's ideas and opinions, and to question.

Thanks for downloading data for me, Dad, and thanks for reading my articles, Mom.

To my daughter, Catarina.

You are one of the most just, empathic, and sensitive kids I know, and that makes me super proud and happy. I hope that you will continue to be amazed by women that made the world a little better, like Georgia Gilmore and Viola Desmond, and that you always remember what you wrote for your Color Town project about being a good citizen: be kind, be helpful, say nice things, and help others.

To my husband, Ighor.

You came along for this journey in this freaking cold weather and made my life here way more fun and enjoyable.

In memory of Ademar Bertucci, who was passionate and a key player in the SEM and Cáritas.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

You cannot live in a country like Brazil and not experience/see poverty and inequality on a daily basis. Homeless mothers carry their babies and ask for money from people who are walking down the street or stopped at streetlights. The wealthier classes of people live in gated communities and have bulletproof cars. All houses are fenced, and buildings have doormen on duty 24 hours a day. You can pass a mansion, and 3 minutes later be in a *favela* where people live in makeshift cardboard shelters. Coming from a country like this, I have always felt a desire to do something to help. I have chosen to pursue research to identify the root causes of these problems and possible solutions.

In college, I worked for the Incubator of Cooperatives of FGV. We would collaborate with NGOs and Catholic social organizations to help groups establish cooperatives. Most of the people who I helped were homeless people and former sex workers. I participated in two World Social Forums, where I visited one of the first Landless Movement communities. At the time of my visit, they had a cooperative farm, a school, and housing for families. It was also at this Forum where I learned about occupied bankrupted companies in Argentina, when I saw the premiere of a movie by Naomi Klein (*The Take*). One of the reasons why I decided to study solidarity economy enterprises was because I had personally witnessed how these initiatives have helped vulnerable populations.

I would not be here without the support I received from my advisors, Mike and Royston. I only decided to do a second Ph.D. because I had a lot of fun and learned a lot from your courses while I was a visiting student here. Thank you for believing in me and for giving me this opportunity. Thank you for all of your support over the years, specifically for reading my work, helping me focus, and showing how to do great research. My committee also played an essential role in my development by providing not only suggestions and constructive criticism, but also teaching me to celebrate the small wins. Thank you Trish, Joel, Emily, Chris, Lloyd, and Beth. Thank you to all of my professors and the staff affiliated with the Ph.D. program and the business school.

I have made great friends in this program. Having a beer after OT class with Johanna is probably why enduring this weather for a second Ph.D. didn't seem that bad. Chang, you were my rock and the person that I laughed most with. Mia, some of my favorite memories are working at Cha Island, and watching baseball with you guys. Thank you also to many students (or visitors) who were important in my journey: Thomas, Xiaoshuang, Cagla, Shilo, Evelin, Ke, Zahid, Rongrong, Helen, Fanmay. To my Ph.D. family cohort: Yay, I am so happy we have each other! Asma, Leanne, and JF, you are the best.

Thanks to my family. My aunt Ana Maria made inquiries to determine where I could find the Catholic Church's annual statistics book. My aunt Silvana went to her parish and took pictures of all dioceses in the statistics book because no digital version was available. Along with the pictures, she sent all the names of the municipalities in each diocese. My grandma prayed a lot that my dissertation would be complete soon.

This dissertation was only possible because I received a lot of professional help and developed key insights through ideological/theoretical discussions. Thank you: Kara for transforming this dissertation; Luis for all the last minute help and data mining; Lilith for the discussions about religion and social movements; Liz for innumerable discussions, especially for helping me figure out the North American cultural context; Milo for helping me out with my quantitative analysis; Greissom for showing me the way with data and analysis; and Lucas for keeping me focused.

As important as the professional help was, personal help was also essential to completing this project. Thank you, Zuzana and Agata. You were awesome friends and provided tremendous support throughout this journey. Without you, I am sure I would have given up on all of this. Also, special thanks to my daughter's friends (Martin, Larysa, and Bria) who kept her occupied with playdates, enabling me work without feeling guilty that my daughter was watching 4 hours of television per day. In the last years of my Ph.D. program, I made new friends (Anderson, Bianca, Flávia, Rodrigo, Carol, Diego) that made me feel at home, making a stressful time a fun time. Thank you.

I want to thank all the people who took time and shared their views and stories with me during interviews, as well as the people who helped me access the data or documents I needed. I also need to thank the National Solidarity Economy Secretariat for giving me access to SIES, FIRJAN for giving me access to Gini index scores for municipalities, and IBGE for giving me access to data on organizational founding activity in municipalities.

When I decided to do my second Ph.D., I was sure that it was what I wanted and that I would excel. Over the course of the program I had a lot of doubts about my research, my potential, and life as an academic. Was my research interesting? Was it important? Can I answer the "So what?" or "Who cares?" questions? Am I ever going to be able to make a theoretical contribution? Why does it seem like I never make progress? Am I good at this? Do I need to play this competitive game that I do not like? Do most academics not care about "lower level people?" Do I really need to work 7 days a week for 12 hours a day? Is taking off Sundays something out of the ordinary? I want to be part of my daughter's life while she is still young enough that she wants to hang out with me and not only with her friends. The doubts also came with a lot of negative feedback, and feelings of rejection, disappointment, indifference and being left out. This is a pretty tough field to be in. Yet, whenever I was feeling overwhelmed by my doubts and feelings, there were events, moments, students, and professors that in a very small way (either because of their attitude, or something they said in a talk, or a piece of feedback) helped me see light and become enthusiastic about my research and my potential. So, thank you. I share this as a way to tell Ph.D. students to try to focus on the good parts, on the compliments, on the excitement. Although these moments are rare, they are crucial.

Bob Marley, Pearl Jam, and Vanessa da Mata, your music kept me going at 2am.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Poverty and economic inequality are grand challenges of our time (Ferraro, Etzion, & Gehman, 2015; George, Howard-Grenville, Joshi, & Tihanyi, 2016). Poverty sits at the root of major societal problems such as food insecurity, infant mortality, violence, and a lack of job security, magnifies the impact of natural disasters, and fuels immigration to metropolitan areas, where the poor are relegated to slums and shantytowns (Singer, Silva, & Schiochet, 2014). Income inequality also creates problems such as community segregation, low self-esteem among the lower classes, a lack of trust, drug abuse, and extreme violence, among others (Berrone, Gelabert, Massa-Saluzzo, & Rousseau, 2016). While many countries around the world are plagued by these problems, the Global South has been affected more profoundly and for an extended period of time (Seelos & Mair, 2017).

In Brazil, the world's fifth-largest country by area and population, and its ninth-largest economy, poverty and inequality are arguably the most salient societal problems. Brazil is the most unequal society and second-poorest nation among the top 10 global economies, and the eighth-most unequal society worldwide.[1] These rankings were even worse in the 1990s, when a neoliberal agenda was in place and unemployment was high. According to data from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics/*Institution Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística* (IBGE)[2], in 1993, Brazil's Gini index[3] score was

[1] Based on the most recent data (all after 2010) from the OECD website (http://www.oecd.org/social/inequality.htm).
[2] https://ibge.gov.br/
[3] The Gini index is a measure of statistical dispersion intended to represent income or wealth distribution within a country. The most commonly used measurement of income inequality, it ranges from 0 (totally equal) to 100 (totally unequal).

60, and as of 1990, poverty affected 30 million people (21.6% of the population).[4]

Not surprisingly, several groups were not content with the situation. Four main sectors of society (the Catholic Church, unions, universities, and the Workers' Party) joined forces to establish the Solidarity Economy Movement (SEM). Drawing on examples of cooperative movements in Europe, like Rochdale in the United Kingdom and Mondragón in Spain, and on the writings of English and French utopic socialists Robert Owen, William King, Charles Fourier, Charles Gide, and Joseph Proudhon, the SEM proposed the creation of a new economic system composed of cooperatives (de Souza, 2013; Veiga & Fonseca, 2001). Movement activists argued that the capitalist system was one of the key reasons for high rates of poverty and inequality in Brazil, and theorized that cooperatives were a more viable and just form of organizing to address these challenges. In the document establishing the Brazilian Forum of Solidarity Economy in 2002, organizers claimed:

> The solidarity economy is a powerful instrument to combat social exclusion, as it presents viable alternatives for the generation of work and income, because it organizes the production and reproduction of society in order to eliminate material inequalities and to disseminate the values of human solidarity.

The idea was that cooperatives, which are collectively-owned and democratically-managed enterprises, would prioritize people over capital and empower the most vulnerable people in Brazilian society. Researchers have found evidence to support activists' claims that this organizational form functions as an important conduit of societal change by providing opportunities for vulnerable people to increase their income,

[4] By comparison, according to the World Bank (https://data.worldbank.org/), 1990s-era Gini index scores for Mexico, the United States, and Russia were 49.6 (1992), 38.2 (1991), and 46.1 (1996), respectively; poverty rates for Mexico, the United States, Russia, China and India were 7.7% (1992), 0.5% (1991), 24% (1993), 57% (1995) and 45% (1993), respectively. In 2015, Brazil's Gini index score was 51.3 and the poverty rate was 8%.

education, self-esteem, knowledge and social capital, and by empowering community involvement and collective action in the Global South (Sizya, 2001; Verhofstadt & Maertens, 2014; Wanyama, Develtere, & Pollet, 2008). The United Nations has recognized this organizational form and the solidarity economy as a valid framework for development, and has established an Inter-Agency Task Force to "raise the visibility of debates about the Social and Solidarity Economy within the UN system and beyond" (UNSSE, 2019).

Studies in Brazil have revealed similarly positive impacts of cooperatives that benefit members and communities (do Nascimento, de Barros, de Almeida, & Teixeira, 2011). In 2013, Brazil's National Secretariat for Solidarity Economy interviewed 2,475 members of cooperatives: 76% agreed that the incomes they earned working for cooperatives covered their living expenses; 76% said that their enterprises had training programs; and 73% said that many co-workers had improved their residences after joining the cooperatives. The effects of participation in cooperatives are not only economic, but also psychological, social, cultural, and political. For instance, when asked how her role in society and her view of herself had changed, one woman responded:

> Participating in the solidarity economy made me reborn. It made me believe that I am important and that I deserve to be respected and valued as anyone who has money. I started to look at people, because before I just looked at the floor. Today I am the owner and manager of my life, I am useful to society, and I am considered in the statistics of this country since today I have my own income. Look, I can tell you without fear, I am a person like all the others, and this [realization was only possible] because of the solidarity economy. (Cruz & dos Santos, 2010, p. 147)

Overall, evidence shows that cooperatives can improve the lives of vulnerable people and create more active and resilient communities. For more information on this relationship, please see Appendix A.

Due to the success of the SEM and solidarity economy enterprises (SEEs) in addressing poverty and inequality, this alternative organizational form has spread throughout Brazil. The number of SEEs founded each year has increased significantly since the emergence of the SEM in the 1990s, as shown in Figure 1.1. By 2013, more than 21,000 SEEs had been founded since 1970. The most recent data indicate that approximately 2.3 million individuals are members of SEEs (World Bank, 2013). Furthermore, in 2015, SEEs generated approximately BRL 500 million in 2015, equivalent to 1% of Brazilian GDP.



Figure 1.1. Number of SEEs founded (1970–2009).

(Source: National Secretariat for Solidarity Economy)

Despite the overall growth of cooperatives in Brazil, geographic dispersion of this organizational form has been noticeably uneven at both the state and municipal levels. Figure 1.2 shows that the most cooperatives have been founded in one state in the South and two other states in the Northeast. Common explanations point to different immigration patterns and poverty levels. For instance, it might be assumed that more cooperatives would be founded in areas with high concentrations of European immigrants because this alternative way of organizing economic activity originated in their home

countries. However, this is not necessarily the case: Europeans immigrated primarily to the three states in the South, yet the number of SEEs founded is high in only one of these states. Similarly, because the movement aims to address poverty, it is likely that more cooperatives would be established in poor locales. That might explain the higher number of SEEs founded in the Northeast (the poorest region), but again, variance exists across the region.



Figure 1.2. Number of SEEs founded, by state (1994–2009).[5]

(Source: National Secretariat for Solidarity Economy)

[5] The darkest color represents states in which 1,400 or more SEEs were founded between 1994 and 2009.

This variance in the number of SEEs founded also can be observed at the municipal level (Figure 1.3). This variation indicates a possibility that social movements and their organizations reach some communities and not others. Moreover, it shows that religious and cultural institutional pressures at the community level impact the work of the social movement, and consequently, the number of cooperatives founded.



Figure 1.3. Number of SEEs founded, by municipality (1994–2009).[6]
(Source: National Secretariat for Solidarity Economy)

Drawing on this empirical puzzle, my aim in this dissertation is to empirically and theoretically explore this variance. I examine how the SEM, which has successfully fostered the creation of cooperatives at the aggregate level, has experienced uneven success across communities. Studies aimed at investigating the factors shaping the

[6] The darkest color represents municipalities in which 20 or more SEEs were founded between 1994 and 2009.

establishment of new organizational forms have revealed the impacts of social necessity/demand (Boone & Özcan, 2014), political ideology (Boone & Özcan, 2014; Schneiberg, 2002; Schneiberg, King, & Smith, 2008; Simons & Ingram, 2003; Sine & Lee, 2009), a lack of governance structures (Simons & Ingram, 2003), immigration patterns (Schneiberg, 2002), institutional legacies (Greve & Rao, 2012; Schneiberg, 2006), and changing levels of receptivity (Hiatt, Sine, & Tolbert, 2009; Schneiberg, 2002, 2013; Schneiberg et al., 2008; Sine & Lee, 2009). In this dissertation, I examine elements heretofore overlooked in theory, yet revealed by my qualitative analysis to be important factors explaining the variance in the number of SEEs founded in Brazil: social movement organizations, community-level institutions, and institutional logics.

Social movement scholars have investigated how social movements advocate for change and examined mobilization processes, tactics, and more recently, outcomes (Giugni & Grasso, 2019; Giugni, 1998; Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2017). While scholars have examined how social movements develop markets and help disseminate new organizational forms (Schneiberg, 2002; Schneiberg et al., 2008; Sine & Lee, 2009), they have focused primarily on developed regions and how social movements change the receptivity of communities to new organizations and practices. Here, I explore how the dissemination of a new market/organizational form might have been stimulated by different types of social movement mechanisms—that is, the need for organizational infrastructure (or social movement organizations).

In general, I propose that movements disseminate collective organizational forms in impoverished settings not because they create frames that increase the receptivity of the population in a given locale to new ideas/practices, but because they create

organizational infrastructures. I further explain that these elements facilitate the dissemination of new organizational forms because they: (a) accomplish change from and for the periphery (Deveaux, 2018; Piven & Cloward, 2012); (b) draw attention to new practices/organizational forms which, in many cases, individuals and groups on the societal periphery do not have knowledge of; (c) change the cognitive and emotional perspectives of individuals by instilling a sense of empowerment and self-efficacy (Desmond & Travis, 2018; Van Dyke, 2017; Whittier, 2010); and (d) create the solidarity and purposive incentives needed for collectively-run enterprises (Aldrich & Stern, 1983; Ferree & Hess, 2002).

Nonetheless, contextual factors that shape the trajectories and outcomes of social movements affect the establishment of new enterprises (Giugni & Grasso, 2019; Passy & Monsch, 2019; Van Dyke & Taylor, 2018). In the social movement literature, scholars have mainly examined how national contexts influence activism (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004; Van Dyke & Taylor, 2018), and have paid less attention to how community-level characteristics influence social movement trajectories and outcomes. The focus on community-level context is important, because many social movements and forms of collective action (particularly initiatives aimed at addressing major social problems) are implemented at the municipal level (Dokshin, 2016; Sampson, McAdam, MacIndoe, & Weffer-Elizondo, 2005).

To understand community-level dynamics, I draw on the ideas of institutional theorists who have highlighted that communities have their own cultural and social institutional forces that affect the establishment of organizations and practices within a given community or geography (Galaskiewicz, 1991, 1997; Greve, Pozner, & Rao, 2006;

Greve & Rao, 2012; Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis, Glynn, & Davis, 2007; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis, Lounsbury, & Greenwood, 2011; Selznick, 1949). I argue that community-level institutions impact how social movement organizations (SMOs) become legitimatized, attract support, develop the ability to garner all types of resources, and create a sense of solidarity.

Furthermore, evidence in the institutional literature has demonstrated that in many cases, multiple institutional logics (i.e., values, beliefs, and practices that shape individuals' behaviour; (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012) influence the establishment of organizations and organizational practices. Often, these logics compete with each another, creating tensions and variations that impact how institutions are instantiated at the community-level (Greenwood, Díaz, Li, & Lorente, 2010; Lounsbury, 2007; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012). I argue that community-level institutions can be enactments of higher-level institutions with conflicting institutional logics, thus enabling variance from community to community. As such, I propose that SMOs impact the establishment of new organizations, and that this relationship is influenced by how institutional logics shape the instantiation of institutions at the community level. Thus, the overarching research question guiding my thesis is: *How do institutions and institutional logics shape the trajectory of a social movement and influence the community-level variance of key movement outcomes such as the establishment of new organizational forms?*

In answering this question, religion, especially the Catholic Church, emerges as an important institution that affects SEM development and outcomes. Religion is a major societal institution that guides individuals' behaviors (Friedland & Alford, 1991) as it

provides meaning systems and value structures that influence individuals' actions (Dana, 2009; Friedland, 2002; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Tracey, 2012). Moreover, religious beliefs have sparked the creation of social movements (de Souza, 2013; Hiatt et al., 2009), and religious spaces have been used as organizational hubs (Morris, 1986). Despite its importance for institutions and social movements, the religious institutional order remains under-studied in both the social movement and the institutional theory literatures (Greenwood et al., 2010; Tracey, Phillips, & Lounsbury, 2014).

This omission constitutes a shortcoming in the literature, as in many locales, religion is a crucial factor in institutional and social movement processes and outcomes. This thesis demonstrates that the spread of SEEs would not have been possible without the Catholic Church. Employing mixed methods, I focus on explaining how the Catholic Church legitimated the SEM and left cultural legacies that impacted the establishment of cooperatives in specific communities. With regard to the SEM movement, I zoom in on the most prominent SMO, Cáritas, which directly helped groups in impoverished locales establish SEEs by capitalizing on its robust networks and providing the necessary material infrastructure, and changing vulnerable people's cognitive and emotional perceptions. Because Cáritas is a religiously-oriented SMO, its efforts were affected by a conflict between two competing logics within the Catholic Church—a progressive logic and a conservative logic—that shaped how the Catholic Church interacted with the SMO in different community contexts.

To foreshadow my findings, I find that these competing logics took root in different regions. The progressive logic was more dominant in the Northeast, and the conservative logic was more pronounced in the Southeast. My findings suggest that the

SEM's organizational infrastructure seemed to play a less prominent independent role in the Northeast, mainly due to the dominance of the progressive logic of the Catholic Church. The Church had begun to establish SEEs in the region in the 1980s, thereby eliminating the need for additional organizational infrastructure beyond the parishes themselves. However, in the Southeast, SMOs appeared to play a larger role, both independently and in partnership with the Catholic Church. In that region, the SMO infrastructure played an important role in organizing groups into cooperatives, as well as in disseminating the ideals, values, and cultural toolkits necessary to accomplish the goals of the SEM.

In this dissertation, I make three main theoretical contributions to the literatures related to social movements, institutional logics, and grand challenges. First, I extend recent developments at the interface of social movements and institutional theories (Hiatt et al., 2009; Schneiberg, 2013; Schneiberg et al., 2008; Sine & Lee, 2009) by demonstrating that SMO effectiveness varies under different institutional conditions. I show that the work of an SMO alone is not sufficient for a social movement to achieve desired outcomes, and demonstrate the importance of institutions and institutional logics in the social movement literature. Although researchers have emphasized how a country's political context (i.e., opportunity structure) impacts social movement mobilization and repertoires (Jenkins, 1995), as well as how cultural context helps frame social movements to mobilize activities (Benford & Snow, 2000), I believe this study is one of the first to show how community-level conditions affect social movements and related outcomes. Studying the community-level context is especially important with regard to social

movements, because goals are realized through localized change, and many social movements are organized at the societal level and then disseminate to local communities.

Moreover, in showing that institutional logics influence the work of social movements, I add important nuance to social movement studies that feature SMOs as the *deus ex machina* with regard to movement-related outcomes. My work suggests that under conditions in which competing logics spark conflict, the infrastructure provided by formal organizations becomes necessary for movements to achieve their objectives. In these cases, there is some evidence that SMOs become free spaces (Polletta, 2012) in which a less dominant logic can travel, be theorized and problematized, and inform the action of social movement members. In general, I show that culture and institutions influence social movements not only by functioning as cultural toolkits for the mobilization of individuals (Benford & Snow, 2000), but also by guiding social movement work and outcomes (Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2017).

Second, I contribute to the institutional theory literature by explaining that even a very long-lasting and hierarchical institution (in this case, the Catholic Church) can be vexed by competing institutional logics, exhibiting a form of institutional complexity that many scholars have identified across an increasing array of organizational forms (Battilana, Besharov, & Mitzinneck, 2017). I further show how this variation is addressed by each locale adopting a single predominant logic. In each locale, materiality and salient contextual factors enable one logic to become more prominent or "make more sense" to individuals, contrary to what other higher status actors expect. Additionally, in contrast with previous studies indicating how one institutional logic influences how another logic shapes organizational practices (i.e., filters another logic) (Lee & Lounsbury, 2015; York,

Vedula, & Lenox, 2017), I investigate how competing logics influence the instantiation of an institution at the level of the community. In other words, I show that a institution at the societal level that is composed of two conflicting logics at that level will shape communities differently. So, I the complexity permeated at societal level might be solved by each community instantiating one or the other institutional logic.

Finally, my work speaks to how entrepreneurship can be used to address grand challenges. Poverty and income inequality are grand challenges of society, and cooperatives can be part of the solution by creating local and moral markets based on democratic organizations (Adler, forthcoming; Davis, 2013, 2016). As scholars and practitioners focus on grand challenges, my research suggests that it is critical to consider that SMOs are able to establish new organizational forms or moral markets in unreceptive communities. In addition, religion can be an important ally in facilitating such changes.

The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I provide an overview of the social movement and institutional logics literatures. I explain why these perspectives help me understand my empirical puzzle of the variation in the establishment of SEEs in Brazil. I argue that when dealing with low-income individuals who often have limited resource access, low self-esteem and little education, SMOs play an important role in the creation of collective enterprises. In addition, I elaborate on how institutions and institutional logics influence this relationship.

I explain my mixed methods approach in Chapter 3. I present my research design and describe the qualitative research techniques employed for the first part of the study. Applying a field analytic approach to archival and interview data, I explain the history of the SEM, the involvement of the Catholic Church, the mechanisms that enabled the

Catholic Church and Cáritas to facilitate the establishment of SEEs, and the various logics that affected outcomes of the movement.

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 illuminate the specific context of this study. In Chapter 4, I provide historical information that helps explain the circumstances under which the SEM emerged in Brazil in the 1990s, as well as other explanations for the variance associated with the establishment of cooperatives. In Chapter 5, I offer a historical account of the essential role played by the Catholic Church in the creation and legitimation of the SEM in Brazil. I also describe the history of Cáritas, and how the SMO's work was impacted by the logic instantiated by the Catholic Church in each community. In Chapter 6, I revisit the history of the Catholic Church in Latin America and Brazil to explain how a progressive logic within the Catholic Church emerged in the 1960s through the Liberation Theology. Moreover, I show how that logic was later criticized and suppressed by the Vatican in the 1980s, creating two competing logics within the Church.

In Chapter 7, I develop hypotheses based on my qualitative findings and the literature on social movements and institutional logics. Then, I describe my data sources, how I operationalized the variables, and the analytical models I used to empirically test my hypotheses. Results show support for my hypotheses, providing additional evidence that competing logics impacted the ability of the SEM to achieve its goals.

I discuss my findings in Chapter 8, highlighting how they contribute to the literatures on social movements, institutional logics, and grand challenges. I conclude by discussing the implications of my findings, explaining the limitations of this study, and identifying opportunities for future research.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

To understand factors contributing to geographic variation in the establishment of SEEs in Brazil, I draw on the literature at the intersection of social movements and institutional theory. First, building on the work of other scholars who have investigated how social movement membership influences outcomes by changing a community's receptivity to new practices and organizations (Hiatt et al., 2009; Schneiberg et al., 2008; Sine & Lee, 2009), I explore how a specific SMO, a "formal organization which identifies its preferences with a social movement or a counter-movement…attempts to implement its goals" (McCarthy & Zald, 1977a, p. 1218).

Second, I argue that community-level institutions affect the work of SMOs in a given locale by establishing norms, beliefs systems, practices, symbols and rules that influence individuals' knowledge of and susceptibility to a social movement's goals and ideals, and influencing access to the resources necessary to achieve them. Understanding how community-level institutions affect the ability of SMOs to achieve their goals is important, not only because many social movements operate at the community level, but also because scale shifts occur when higher level movements trickle down to lower levels, such as municipalities (Tarrow & McAdam, 2005; Tarrow, 2011).

Third, institutions are permeated by multiple logics; the influence of community-level institutions on the ability of SMOs to achieve their goals varies depending on how these logics are enacted. While findings in the institutional literature demonstrate how interactions among institutional logics affect how organizations respond to practice adoption (Lee & Lounsbury, 2015; York et al., 2017), I argue that institutional logics

within a broader institution vary by location, thereby influencing organizational outcomes. This helps explain how the same institution can be adopted in various ways.

This chapter is structured as follows. First, I explain the literature on social movements and examine how SMOs help people in impoverished settings accomplish change. I further highlight how context may affect how social movements achieve their goals. Second, I review the literature on institutional theory to reveal how this theoretical approach can inform why and how context influences activism. To do so, I discuss how institutional theorists argue that the environment—specifically, institutions—inform the actions of communities. Then, I explain how institutional theorists have shifted their lens from institutions at the societal and field levels to examine how communities instantiate specific institutions. Afterwards, I describe how institutions affect social movements. Specifically, I draw on the current conversation about multiple and competing logics to explain potential impacts on not only practices within communities, but also broader social movement efforts.

Social Movements, Social Movement Organizations, and Outcomes

Social movement theorists examine how collective action inside and outside formal channels influences institutional change (McAdam, McCarthy, Zald, & Mayer, 1996; Snow & Soule, 2010). Although many researchers have examined policy and political outcomes, far fewer have explored economic/market outcomes (Giugni & Grasso, 2019). In this stream, scholars have revealed how movements yield economically-oriented outcomes related to investment (Soule, Swaminathan, & Tihanyi, 2014), stock prices (King & Soule, 2007), industry emergence (Lounsbury, Ventresca, &

Hirsch, 2003; Weber, Heinze, & DeSoucey, 2008), and entrepreneurship (Hiatt et al., 2009; Schneiberg, 2013; Schneiberg et al., 2008; Sine & Lee, 2009).

Attempting to explain how social movements influence the founding of enterprises, Schneiberg et al. (2008), Hiatt et al. (2009) and Sine and Lee (2009) demonstrated that new types of organizations based on different economic structures are more likely to be established in communities with high levels of membership in social movements. They explained how social movement affiliation helps create motivational frames that mobilize individuals and change the normative, cognitive, and regulative institutional environments. Although these studies demonstrate the important role played by social movements in aggregating individuals with similar ideals and values and transforming a community's receptiveness to a new market or organizational form, researchers have not directly examined how the presence of an SMO that is actively working to establish these forms affects the number of enterprises founded in a given locale (Hiatt et al., 2009; Schneiberg, 2013; Schneiberg et al., 2008; Sine & Lee, 2009).

In their seminal work applying the perspective of resource mobilization to social movements, McCarthy and Zald (1977a) contended that organizations are tools used by activists to achieve their goals. I argue that social movements can be especially useful for the mobilization of poor people (Piven & Cloward, 2012). To that end, SMOs play an extremely important role by engaging with poor people who likely have no prior knowledge of a movement's ideas and goals, or access to the resources necessary to accomplish them. Overall, social movements and their organizations help poor people by: (a) accomplishing change from and for the periphery, (b) drawing attention to a new practice/organizational form unlikely to be known by a vulnerable population, (c)

changing the cognitive and cultural perspectives of individuals living in vulnerable situations (Marti, Courpasson, & Barbosa, 2013; Martin de Holan, Willi, & Fernández, 2017), and (d) strengthening the purposive and solidarity incentives necessary for the establishment of collectively organized enterprises when that is the goal (Aldrich & Stern, 1983).[7]

Accomplishing change from and for the periphery. For individuals at the periphery of society, it is very difficult to accomplish broad change, especially through formalized political action (Desmond & Travis, 2018; Deveaux, 2018; Zald, 1982). Social movements have played a role in most successful cases, including the civil rights movement in the United States and the landless movement in Brazil (Morris, 1986; Piven & Cloward, 2012; Rothschild, 2016). In both cases, even though participants were on the periphery and were not in a central position to effect change (unlike university students advocating for recycling or abortion rights), social movements gave them a voice and a "seat at the table" (Lukes, 2004). Therefore, social movements became theorized as a resource or tool (McCarthy & Zald, 1977a) for groups that generally had little or no access to human, social, or material capital. For example, despite widespread oppression of women, many are well educated and have social connections, and therefore have more skills and access to cultural toolkits to participate in formalized change processes, for example, by attending government meetings or creating advocacy groups.

Raising awareness of a new practice/organizational form. Impoverished regions lack resources and infrastructure. In most cases, education is low, and many individuals are illiterate. Thus, many individuals are unaware of social innovations and

[7] The cooperative form is an alternative to the bureaucratic form of organizing (Rothschild-Whitt, 1979). Because cooperatives are collectively-owned and democratically managed, findings show that founding cooperatives requires more entrepreneurial effort than traditional enterprises (Aldrich & Stern, 1983)

opportunities to change their professional and personal lives. For these groups, social movements provide a way to voice grievances and suggest solutions (Rao, Morrill, & Zald, 2000), and SMOs provide the material and human capital to make change possible. For instance, in a poor village far from an urban center, individuals might be illiterate and unable to read newspapers, and have no access to television; many have never traveled beyond the local region, and have no resources to try to effect change. SMOs have the potential to change all of these factors for communities and create opportunities for poor people to engage, for example, in entrepreneurship or political action.

Moreover, in this process of highlighting problems and promoting solutions, social movements stimulate a community's reflexivity, which might be fruitful when the goal is to establish new organizational forms. With reflexivity, individuals recognize that the more prevalent and taken-for-granted bureaucratic forms might carry negative consequences, leading people to consider alternatives (Davis, 2016; Schneiberg et al., 2008). For instance, Schneiberg et al. (2008) showed that cooperatives are more likely to emerge in communities where anti-corporate social movements are more active. They explained that social movements promote reflexive action against corporations, which concomitantly highlights the solution (in this case, cooperatives).

Changing cognitive and cultural perspectives. Social movements also play a critical role in changing the cognitive and cultural perspectives of individuals in impoverished settings. Scholars have shown that the poor lack entrepreneurship-related cultural toolkits (Marti, Courpasson, & Barbosa, 2013) and struggle to visualize long-term objectives and view themselves as entrepreneurs (Bruton et al., 2013; Martin de

Holan, Willi, & Fernández, 2017). Participating in social movements can help people in impoverished settings overcome these obstacles.

For example, Marti et al. (2013) demonstrated how, with the help of "known strangers," a poor community in Argentina created a new entrepreneurial culture. In their study of an entrepreneur in a shanty town in South America, Martin de Holan et al. (2017) highlighted how institutional constraints related to poverty impact individuals' cognition and emotions, making it difficult for them to engage in future-oriented projective agency (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). They showed that:

> in situations of exclusion and vulnerability—particularly when these have been naturalized by the actors through socialization—the presence of certain negative emotional states associated with poverty and exclusion limits the capacity to think and act beyond the oppressive context in which low-power actors are embedded. (Martin de Holan et al., 2017, p. 1)

They further highlighted that help from "known-strangers" is a crucial facilitator of cognitive change. Although "known-strangers" in these studies were not social movement activists or organizations, it is reasonable to place social movements and activists in this category.

Strengthening purposive and solidarity incentives. Aldrich and Stern (1983) argued that creating cooperatives requires not only great entrepreneurial effort, but also purposive and solidarity incentives, similar with familial altruism (Steier, 2003). Purposive incentives are "objectives, which give individuals a sense of satisfaction at having accomplished some goal larger than their own personal material enhancement" that are "characteristic of goal-oriented social movements," whereas solidarity incentives reflect "the joy of association with persons similar to oneself in attitudes and values" (Aldrich & Stern, 1983, p. 385). Social movements are embedded in collective action

(Sampson et al., 2005) motivated by solidarity and purposive incentives. SMOs inspire individuals to adopt these values and motives.

Social Movements and Context

In the social movement literature, scholars have acknowledged how political, geographical, and cultural contexts influence social movement mobilization, tactics, and outcomes (Jasper & Polletta, 2019; McAdam & Tarrow, 2019; Zhang & Zhao, 2018). Most have adopted the political opportunity structure perspective, arguing that the political structure of a given space influences how a social movement will mobilize, organize, and affect public policy (Meyer, 2004; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). The main argument in these studies is that regime types affect the repertoires of contentious activists (McAdam & Tarrow, 2019; Tarrow, 1996). Specifically, findings suggest that the more open institutional channels are to challengers, the more likely they are to enact "transgressive" and "contained" contentious action (McAdam & Tarrow, 2019, p. 24). Conversely, researchers posit that the more closed and repressive a regime, the more likely activists are to assume clandestine forms of activism, such as dissident writings (Glasius, 2012).

A second and newer focus is on how space influences social movements. This literature encompasses a broad spectrum of research, ranging from how geographical proximity affects activism, to how specific locales have social and cultural meanings that impact social movement trajectories (Zhang & Zhao, 2018). For the aim of this dissertation, it is important to understand the idea of scale shift (Soule, 2013; Tarrow & McAdam, 2005). According to Tarrow (2011, p. 193), scale shift occurs when "contention diffuses to different levels of the polity, where actors encounter a different

set of incentives and constraints, sometimes even spreading to other states or to international institutions." The scale shift can be upward, for example, from a field level movement to the federal government, or downward, when a national issue diffuses to the local level (Tarrow & McAdam, 2005; Tarrow, 2011; Zhang & Zhao, 2018). Both upward and downward scale shifts are common in social movements and deserve more attention, not only because they have been under-studied, but also because they interact with cultural context.

When scale shifts happen, social movements must adapt as ideas and goals are embraced in new cultural contexts. For example, a movement that starts in the United States and becomes transnational must adapt to different cultural beliefs and understandings to ensure messages and goals are accepted. Likewise, a national level social movement that shifts downward typically adapts to the local context. Although it is not explicitly discussed in the literature, continuous upward and downward scale shifts likely occur, whereby movements at different levels calibrate cultural underpinnings and draw on one another to achieve better outcomes. For instance, community-level SMOs gather at national level forums to discuss differences and conflicts between the SEM and other entities, particularly the federal government. At the same time, community-level SMOs discuss how to adapt the SEM's ideals and goals to local contexts.

Consequently, cultural elements permeate analyses of spatial context, particularly scale shifts. Scholarship examining the effect of cultural context on social movement tactics and trajectories can be divided into two main streams: a cultural take on the political opportunity structure; and culture as a resource for social movement action (Jasper & Polletta, 2019; Swidler, 1986). In the first stream, scholars investigate how

discursive opportunities (i.e., media coverage, public opinion, etc.) promote a favourable environment for collective action. In the second stream, scholars argue that social movement strategies must have cultural resonance or legitimacy if goals are to be achieved. In this stream, researchers focus on the role of framing, showing that social movement mobilization efforts work when the frames they use resonate with a society's broader cultural understanding (Benford & Snow, 2000). Institutional theorists also have explored links between culture and social movement trajectories and outcomes.

Scholarship at the intersection of institutional theory and social movements has highlighted how changes in institutional logics—higher-order principles that guide social action and appropriate behavior (Thornton et al., 2012)—offer "new ways of thinking about an issue" (Jasper & Polletta, 2018, p. 67), thereby creating opportunities for movements to emerge (Jasper & Polletta, 2019). Moreover, studies have shown that not only changes in logics, but the existence of multiple logics can spark contestation and lead to the creation and actions of social movements (Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007; Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2017).

Institutional scholars also highlight the role of community-level institutional pressures. While many social movements emerge and gain legitimacy at the societal and field levels (Lounsbury et al., 2003; Weber et al., 2008), other social movement activities are better understood at the community level. Some examples of social movement elements that operate at the community level are specific types of goals, such as the adoption of practices and founding of enterprises, as well as downward scale shifts (Lounsbury, 2001; Tarrow, 2010). Additionally, some movements specifically aim to

protect specific locales, such as not-in-my-back-yard (NIMBY) movements (Dokshin, 2016; Fischer, 1995; Gibson, 2005).

Institutions and Institutional Logics

Institutional theory highlights how environmental elements—such as norms, cultural understandings, rules, and laws—can be sources of organizational pressure. The main argument is that organizations need to comply or engage with these pressures to be legitimated in their environment. From this perspective, most institutional theorists have focused on how societal- and field-level institutions impact organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Schofer & Meyer, 2005). Only more recently have scholars begun to investigate institutions at the community level.

Communities are understood as "collections of actors whose membership in the collective provides social and cultural resources that shape their action. Membership can result from a number of factors including propinquity, interest in a common goal, or common identity" (Marquis et al., 2011, p. xvi). Although communities are not always defined by geographic boundaries, I follow early studies and define communities geographically in my research. Distinctive social networks, relationships, institutions, and logics develop in specific geographic regions, and residents adopt specific identities (Molotch, Freudenburg, & Paulsen, 2000) that affect organizations.

In early work, Selznick (1949), Zald and Denton (1963), and Zald (1967) highlighted how geographic communities influence formal and informal structures, strategies, and practices adopted by organizations. Selznick (1949) explained how social relationships within the community influenced the development of the Tennessee Valley

Authority. Moreover, Zald and colleagues (Zald & Denton, 1963; Zald, 1967) showed how practices of local YMCA chapters reflected the characteristics of the communities where they were located, despite common goals and objectives at the national level.

More recently, communities have attracted increased attention from institutional theorists, who have focused on two main areas: understanding the creation of new institutions or logics within specific locales (Galaskiewicz, 1991, 1997; Glynn, 2008; Lounsbury, 2007), and the influence of community-level institutions on organizational practices and forms (Freeman & Audia, 2006; Hiatt et al., 2009; Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis, Davis, & Glynn, 2013; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007; Simons & Ingram, 2003; Sine & Lee, 2009; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). In the first area, Galaskiewicz (1991, 1997) demonstrated how Minneapolis-St. Paul established new norms and behaviors related to corporate giving. Likewise, Glynn (2008) illustrated how the Olympics configured the relational and symbolic systems of a community, enabling it to change its norms and culture. In the second area, researchers have tested and explained how diverse elements of institutions influence organizations. For instance, Marquis et al. (2007) proposed how regulative, normative, or cultural institutions would impact the nature and level of corporate social practices. They explained that companies want to create social programs to reduce taxes, establish legitimacy and meet the expectations of non-profits. Similarly focusing on organizational founding, Simons and Ingram (2003) showed that community-level market and governmental pressures shaped the establishment of kibbutzim in Israel. Overall, literature in this second area of study reveals how community-level institutions could affect social movement activities and outcomes.

Institutions and Social Movements

Literature at the intersection of institutions and social movements has explained how institutional pressures affect the work of social movements in two ways. First, normative, regulative, and cultural-cognitive elements influence a community's acceptance of a social movement's ideals and practices. For example, in a community with more environmental laws, it would be expected that an environmental social movement's ideas would resonate more with residents (Hiatt et al., 2009; Sine & Lee, 2009). Similarly, other studies have shown how a progressive political ideology influences outcomes of social movements (Simons & Ingram, 2003).

Second, institutions may or may not provide cultural toolkits and institutional resources that social movements can utilize. For example, Lounsbury et al. (2003) explained how changes in stories and framing impacted the work of social movements in the creation of a recycling industry in the United States. Soule and colleagues (2004, 2006) showed how public opinion affected the implementation of women's equal rights amendments in different states. In a study of an HIV/AIDS advocacy group in Canada, Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence (2004) demonstrated that enacting change requires activists to theorize new practices and ideas that resonate with their stakeholders, in line with conceptualizations of framing resonance in social movement studies (Benford & Snow, 2000). Moreover, activists must adopt legitimate "subject positions" and bridge stakeholders, thereby helping individuals or groups to enact change (Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Maguire et al., 2004).

When the goal is to establish new organizational forms, institutions might be a source of reinforcing values as well as cultural legacies that can be used by movements.

Research has shown that ideologies, logics and norms, among others, shape how social movements incentivize or debunk the creation of new organizational forms. For example, several studies have demonstrated how a more progressive ideology is associated with the establishment of cooperative organizational forms (Boone & Özcan, 2014; Greve & Rao, 2012; Schneiberg, 2006; Simons & Ingram, 2003). Other studies have demonstrated how regulative institutions (i.e., specific laws) moderate the creation of new enterprises (Hiatt et al., 2009; Ingram, Yue, & Rao, 2010; Sine & Lee, 2009). Cultural toolkits also can be used by movements. For instance, purposive and solidarity incentives, which can be ingrained in certain communities, are essential for the establishment of cooperatives (Aldrich & Stern, 1983). Corroborating this possibility, Schneiberg (2006) and Greve and Rao (2012) showed how these incentives can be drawn from institutional legacies in the United States and Norway, respectively. Specifically, when a community creates a cooperative, cultural toolkits are developed that can be used to found cooperatives in the future. Likewise, Schneiberg (2002) highlighted how religion and immigration could be cultural carriers and create institutional environments more prone to purposive or solidarity incentives.

While these studies demonstrate the importance of institutional pressures to social movement outcomes, recent advances in institutional theory have revealed the role of multiple logics. More recently, institutional scholars have proposed that environments are composed of multiple institutions, or institutional logics—norms, values, beliefs, practices, assumptions, and rules that shape how individuals understand and engage in social reality (Thornton et al., 2012)—that enable variance in how institutional pressures

affect organizations. In the following section, I explain possible effects of multiple institutional logics on social movement trajectories.

Multiple and Competing Institutional Logics

Early institutional theorists looked at how institutional pressures lead to isomorphism (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). As the perspective developed, scholars pointed out that in many cases, there was not isomorphism, but variation in what was adopted and how adoption occurred. For instance, researchers demonstrated that organizational characteristics shape how organizations respond to pressures (Goodrick & Salancik, 1996; Lounsbury, 2001). More recently, scholars have shown that variation also occurs because institutions are composed of multiple logics that affect social action (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Greenwood et al., 2010; Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011; Reay & Hinings, 2009).

Multiple institutional logics are present in different orders of society (e.g., state, religion, markets, family) (Friedland & Alford, 1991). These logics create expectations about individual and organizational behavior and provide a context for decision making and action (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012). In a given field or organization, multiple logics cooperate or compete with one another (Goodrick & Reay, 2011) and affect individuals and organizations in different ways. In situations characterized by institutional complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011) when logics compete or conflict, either one logic becomes dominant or some type of balance occurs (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Greenwood et al., 2011; Lounsbury, 2007; Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2003; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Thornton et al., 2012). When one logic becomes dominant, the values and practices associated with that logic prevail.

However, when balance occurs, both logics affect individual and organizational actions. While most scholars have investigated how multiple logics influence individuals and organizations, few have discussed how multiple logics impact institutions at different levels.

In the few studies at the intersection of communities and multiple logics, scholars have focused on two major topics. First, researchers have focused on how communities influence the creation of logics within a given field or sector. For instance, in one of the earliest works looking at community-level competing logics and dissemination, Lounsbury (2007) analyzed how the communities of Boston and New York developed different logics of money management which affected how mutual funds in each city established contracts. Second, researchers have studied how multiple logics affect community outcomes. For example, Marquis and Lounsbury (2007) showed that the competing logic of geographic diversification influenced bankers to adopt the previous logic and resist acquisitions of local banks. Examining state and family logics, Greenwood et al. (2010) demonstrated how multiple logics of the state and family influence firms' downsizing strategies. Specifically, they explained that regional pressures influence the strength and relationship of these two logics on downsizing.

These studies highlight the importance of multiple logics for community-level business outcomes; however, multiple institutional logics also play a role in the adoption of practices aligned with the ideals of social movements. For instance, even though not measuring the presence of social movements, Lee and Lounsbury (2015) study environmental practices and explained how community logics filter how organizations understand field level logics, impacting companies' adoption of environmental practices

in two states in the United States. For example, they empirically showed how the field-level market logic influences companies differently based on whether the community-level logic is politically conservative or pro-environmental. When a community has a politically conservative logic, field pressure from a market logic positively impacts organizational adoption of environmental practices. However, if a community already has a pro-environmental logic, pressure from a market logic has no influence on the adoption of such practices. Similarly, York et al. (2017) demonstrated that regional logics play an essential role in determining the efficacy of private and public actors to adopt the LEED certification (an environmental certification that although not directly promoted by a social movement, it is aligned with environmental movements ideals). In addition, they examined how these logics affect the work of technology-focused SMOs, showing that the work of movements is stronger when the market logic is more prominent and is not affected when the community logic dominates (York et al., 2017).

Although these studies demonstrate the importance of multiple logics for practices that are aligned with the ideals of social movements, researchers have not investigated specifically how multiple logics affect institutions and the ability of social movements to achieve their goals. Like hybrid organizations (Battilana et al., 2017), institutions may be permeated by multiple (and sometimes conflicting) institutional logics that affect how an institution is enacted in different locales. Logics filter institutional understandings, thereby enabling the emergence of different values, beliefs, and practices for the same institution. Multiple logics thus affect how an institution influences social movement outcomes at the local level.

Summary

The literature reveals how social movements help individuals in impoverished locales enact social change. The institutional logics framework functions as a useful theoretical lens for understanding how contexts influence social movements' trajectories and goals. Findings suggest that multiple (and conflicting) institutional logics likely affect community-level institutions and shape the work of social movements.

My review of the literature reveals how institutions influence the ability of social movements to achieve their goals and suggest the importance also of institutional logics for movement-related practices. In this study, I examine *how institutions and institutional logics shape the trajectory of a social movement organization and key movement outcomes, such as the establishment of a new organizational form*. In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, I present findings from my qualitative investigation aimed at identifying institutional pressures or logics that have influenced the establishment of SEEs. Based on my findings, I engage further with the literature and propose hypotheses which I test empirically in Chapter 7. In the next chapter, I provide a detailed explanation of my research design.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN

To understand how institutions and institutional logics influence social movement outcomes, I employed a mixed methods research design with two phases (Kaplan, 2016). In the first phase, I qualitatively examined three elements: (a) how diverse actors coalesced in the emergence and development of the SEM in Brazil, (b) key institutions and institutional logics permeating the SEM and how they influenced the founding of solidarity enterprises, and (c) geographic characteristics and peculiarities that inform the variance in the number of cooperatives founded. To do so, I adopted a field analytic approach (Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007; Lounsbury et al., 2003; Scott, 2000) to detail the historical actions, events, struggles, conflicts, and interactions of diverse actors related to the movement. See Appendix B for an explanation of this method.

In the second phase, I performed regression analysis on multiple datasets covering more than 5,000 municipalities from 1994 to 2009 to test the hypotheses generated during the first phase. I first tested how social movements influenced the founding of new organizational forms, and then how the institution of religion moderates that relationship. I further analyzed how competing institutional logics interacted with community religious prominence in creating opposing effects on the establishment of SEEs. This research design enabled me to examine the mechanisms of how institutions affect the work of social movements as well as how competing logics influence social movement trajectories and outcomes, and to further test these relationships in all municipalities in Brazil.

The context surrounding the SEM in Brazil and the establishment of SEEs was appropriate for investigating my theoretical question for two main reasons. First, after the emergence of the SEM, the number of cooperatives founded increased dramatically, highlighting the importance of social movements; however, these activities were not uniform across the country. Analyzing factors associated with regional variance in the number of SEEs affords a better understanding of how a community's institutions affect the establishment of a new organizational form. Second, most researchers who have studied organizational founding activity have done so in Western industrialized regions, without considering how this phenomenon might occur in other contexts, such as the "less developed" Global South. Shifting focus to the Global South not only helps researchers address broader, more common challenges (Ferraro et al., 2015), but also may reveal the boundary conditions (or contingency effects) of existing theories (Briscoe & Gupta, 2016; Marquis & Raynard, 2015; Scott, 2005).

Qualitative Study

Data sources. In the qualitative study, I drew on three main sources of data: newspaper and magazine articles, documents from the SEM (including meetings minutes, research papers, etc.), and interviews.

Newspaper and magazine articles. First, I collected newspaper articles from the three major Brazilian newspapers (*Folha de São Paulo*, *Estado de São Paulo,* and *O Globo*), a business-related newspaper (*Gazeta Mercantil*) and three magazines (*Fórum, Página 22,* and *Veja*). I chose newspapers due to the availability of daily and longitudinal data (*Estado* has been in print since 1875, *Folha de São Paulo* since 1921, and *O Globo* since 1925). Media outlets are notoriously politically biased (Gitlin, 1980; Tarrow, 2011),

and these three specific newspapers are aligned with the center and center-right. To provide a counterbalance, I chose magazines that cover a broader political spectrum. Magazines also can be a good source of data because they publish long-form articles and more editorial or opinion pieces. *Fórum* is a leftist outlet created during the World Social Forum in 2001 by the Forum's participants that strongly represents the SEM; the Research Center for Sustainability of a management school founded the similarly leftist *Página 22* in 2006; and *Revista Veja* is arguably the most conservative news outlet in Brazil.

To identify articles to analyze, I searched the publications for the words "*economia solidária*" (solidarity economy). Although the time period for the quantitative research was 1994 to 2009, I collected qualitative data outside this timeframe to enable a historical analysis of the movement. Newspaper and magazine articles were important sources of data that enabled me to identify the actors and conflicts within the SEM and the Catholic Church, as well as to examine how these actors used news outlets to promote, legitimize, and expand the movement.

Primary and secondary documents. I also collected data from documents created by key organizations in the promotion of cooperatives in Brazil. These documents enabled me to trace the history of the movement from the perspectives of actors directly involved in incentivizing and creating cooperatives. Because all of these organizations operate at the national level, their documents reveal regional variance associated with the establishment of cooperatives and the SEM. I collected documents primarily from the following organizations: the Brazilian Forum of Solidarity Economy (FBES), the National Council of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB), and Cáritas.

FBES has a library of more than 3,000 documents, including reports and minutes of forums and events. The data are very rich, including transcriptions of discussions at these events, and many in-depth stories of specific cooperatives or solidarity economy programs at the state or municipal levels. For example, a transcription of the first solidarity economy seminar held at the World Social Forum in 2002 includes all speeches that were given. In an FBES newsletter, an article details the creation of three craft cooperatives in the southern state of Paraná, providing details about the supply chain and partner organizations as well as interviews with members of the cooperatives.

For CNBB and Cáritas, I searched for "*economia solidária*" (solidarity economy) and downloaded all documents. Documents from these two organizations revealed the views and actions of the Catholic Church and Cáritas with regard to the SEM, as well as regional variance in programs and opinions. For instance, many articles on the Cáritas website detail events and programs in northeastern Brazil aimed at addressing droughts and agriculture. Most of the CNBB documents detail events related to the solidarity economy organized by specific groups informed by the progressive logic of the Catholic Church.

In addition, more than 100 academic articles (Silva, 2018) and more than 1,200 dissertations published in Brazil focus on the solidarity economy. Given this large body of work, I was able to search for studies specifically related to my thesis, particularly those focused on the Catholic Church or Cáritas, or on a specific region. I found 22 dissertations and articles directly related to my research, many of which include fully transcribed interviews with cooperative members and SEM participants, thereby serving as sources of primary data. Even though the interview questions were not specifically

designed for this project, the data provided crucial information about the development of the movement, its relationship with the Catholic Church, and regional variance. Table 3.1 provides details about the archival data used in this research.

Table 3.1

Archival Data

Type	Source	No. of Articles/ Documents	Period	Use
Newspaper articles	*Folha de São Paulo*	88	1995–2017	History of the SEM, regional examples of enterprises
	Estado de São Paulo	219	1996–2017	History of the SEM, regional examples of enterprises
	O Globo	263	1999–2017	History of the SEM, regional examples of enterprises
	Gazeta Mercantil	62	2004–2017	SEE programs, examples of enterprises
Magazine articles	*Veja*	51	2011–2017	History of the SEM, actors' views of the movement
	Fórum	228	2007–2013	History of the SEM, actors view of the movement
	Página 22	18	2006–2016	History of the SEM, actors' views of the movement
Organizational documents	Cáritas website news	320	2001–2018	Role of Cáritas in the SEM, regional variance within Cáritas, relationship between Cáritas and the Catholic Church
	CNBB website news	90	2008–2018	View of the Catholic Church about the SEM, relationship between Cáritas and the Catholic Church
	FBES documents	880	1997–2009	History of the SEM, actors' roles, regional variance, community characteristics that affected the founding of SEEs
Other documents and books	Various sources	160	2000–2017	History of the SEM, regional variance, role of the Catholic Church in the SEM, history of the Catholic Church in Latin America, interviews

Interviews. I complemented these archival data with data from 14 semi-structured interviews. I selected interviewees who would have a national view of the SEM and regional differences in the number of SEEs founded. As I analyzed the documents and conducted initial interviews with participants in the movement, I realized the important roles played by Cáritas and the Catholic Church. Thus, I also decided to interview individuals who could give me a better understanding of the work of Cáritas in the SEM as well as the history of the Catholic Church in Brazil and associated regional variances. During the interviews, I followed two basic interview templates: one for the SEM experts and one for individuals affiliated with Cáritas or the Catholic Church. The templates appear in Appendix C.

I interviewed SEM stakeholders with diverse backgrounds, including: a consultant for solidarity enterprise projects who worked in all regions of Brazil, the former coordinator of dissemination and communication of the Secretariat of the Solidarity Economy (*Secretaria Nacional de Economia Solidária—SENAES)*, and one incubator coordinator who had worked in the field since the 1990s. Interviewees affiliated with Cáritas or the Catholic Church included: two national coordinators for Cáritas who served during two different periods, eight regional coordinators for Cáritas, and a religious scholar specializing in distinct groups within the Catholic Church (see Table 3.2 for a comprehensive description). I conducted 12 of the interviews in Portuguese via telephone or videoconference between May 2018 and February 2019. On average, the interviews lasted 1 hour, with the shortest interview lasting 15 minutes and the longest lasting 2 hours and 5 minutes. Two interviewees were not available for live interviews, but answered the questions via email. All interviews were recorded and transcribed. The

interviews enabled me to deepen my analysis by revealing connections and details that did not appear in the documents.

Table 3.2

Interviews

	Interviewee	Length	Use
1	Former coordinator Cáritas	125 min	Role of Cáritas in the SEM movement, regional variance
2	Cáritas regional coordinator (south)	32 min	Role of Cáritas in the region, factors affecting the founding of SEEs
3	Cáritas regional coordinator (north)	30 min	Role of Cáritas in the region, factors affecting the founding of SEEs
4	Incubator coordinator (south)	100 min	History of SEM and institutional influences on the founding of SEEs
5	Cáritas national coordinator	45 min	Role of Cáritas in the SEM movement, regional variance
6	Cáritas regional coordinator (south)	46 min	Role of Cáritas in the region, factors affecting the founding of SEEs
7	Cáritas and SEM participant	36 min	Role of Cáritas in the region, factors affecting the founding of SEEs
8	Cáritas regional coordinator (southeast)	15 min	Role of Cáritas in the region, factors affecting the founding of SEEs
9	SEE consultant, multiple regions	72 min	History of SEM and institutional influences on the founding of SEEs
10	Professor and researcher focused on the Catholic Church in Brazil	80 min	Catholic Church sectors and institutional logics
11	Former coordinator, SENAES	77 min	History of SEM and institutional influences on the founding of SEEs
12	Cáritas regional coordinator (southeast) and public policy coordinator	Email	Role of Cáritas in the region, factors affecting the founding of SEEs
13	Cáritas regional coordinator (northeast)	Email	Role of Cáritas in the region, factors affecting the founding of SEEs
14	Cáritas regional coordinator (northeast)	55 min	Role of Cáritas in the region, factors affecting the founding of SEEs
	Total	673 min	

Data analysis. I analyzed the data in three stages. During the first stage, my goal was to perform a historical analysis of the emergence of the SEM to understand how the movement created an infrastructure that would affect the founding of solidarity enterprises and how that infrastructure worked. To do so, I read all newspaper articles and key documents in chronological order and constructed a narrative and timeline of events, including actors who participated in each event, topics of discussion and conflicts at the time, and consequences of events (Langley, 1999). This analysis was a "preliminary step aimed at preparing a chronology for subsequent analysis" (Langley, 1999, p. 695). A timeline of events appears in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3

Timeline

Year	Government	SEM	Catholic Church	Brazil
1889	Republic	First cooperative founded in the state of Minas Gerais		
1956			Cáritas founded in Brazil	
1964	Military regime		Second Vatican Council	Military regime established
1968			Medellin Meeting CELAM	Military regime strengthens
1969		Organization of Brazilian Cooperatives (OCB) trade association founded	Emergence Liberation Theology and CEBs	
1975			Pastoral Land Commission founded	
1978			John Paul II becomes Pope	
1980			Cáritas focuses on Community Action Plan	Workers' Party founded
1984				Landless Movement founded
1985			Leonardo Boff silenced for his book *Church: Charisma and Power*; Cáritas establishes Solidarity Rotating Funds	Democracy restored
1987		Coopa-Roca founded		
1989				Constitution; first election
1990	Conservative government	ASMARE (garbage picker cooperative) founded	Schism in the Catholic Church	
1992			Leonardo Boff prohibited from attending ECO-92	Itamar Franco assumes power after Collor is impeached
1994		First Incubator of Cooperatives founded (ITCP-UFRJ); ANTEAG founded	Priests' editorials on Solidarity Economy; First edition of *Feicoop*	FHE elected (Neo-liberal agenda)

Year	Government	SEM	Catholic Church	Brazil
1998		Community Bank Palmas and Incubator of Cooperatives USP foundation; Parahyba blanket company taken over by employees		
1999		First public policy for SEEs implemented in the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul	Fraternity Campaign (Solidarity Economy)	
2000		UNISOL founded (offshoot of the labor union movement and Workers' Party to develop solidarity economy)		
2001		São Paulo, Santo André and Campinas (cities located in the southeast region) implement municipal-level public policies for SEEs		
2002	Liberal/progressive government	Brazilian Forum of Solidarity Economy founded at the second World Social Forum in Rio Grande do Sul, located in the South		Lula elected
2003		National Secretary of Solidarity Economy (SENAES) founded		
2004		Minas Gerais and São Paulo (states in the southeast) implement state-level public policies for the Solidarity Economy		
2006		Community Bank Network founded		
2008		Rede Moinho founded		
2009		HSBC CSR program for the creation of cooperatives		
2010			Fraternity Campaign (Solidarity Economy)	
2014		SENAES dismantled		

The timeline structures the narratives in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. This analysis enabled me to create a rich description of my empirical context and identify factors that may have influenced the establishment of cooperatives in each region. I include these as control variables in my quantitative analysis in Chapter 7. For example, one factor that emerged was the distinction between rural and urban cooperatives and how their creation and development differed. I therefore include a control variable measuring the percentage of a municipality located in urban versus rural areas.

During the second stage, my aim was to understand the possible local institutions that could explain why some communities more effectively established cooperatives and supported the social movement. For this analysis, I used documents as well as interviews. Again, I employed Langley's (1999) narrative approach, but this time the goal was contextualization; specifically, I sought to identify causal relationships between analytical themes and levels of analysis. During this stage, my primary focus was to identify which institutions affected the founding of cooperatives in Brazil. As I read the documents, I identified these institutions and related quotes that explained how each influenced the establishment of SEEs. For instance, I identified how universities played a role by theorizing the solidarity economy and providing training,[8] and how governments promoted and helped establish SEEs.

During this second stage of analysis, the importance of the institution of the Catholic Church emerged and became prominent. For example, I noticed that when the movement began, priests were the primary advocates for the solidarity economy, that

[8] "USP teaches a course on the Solidarity Economy and in July began an extension course…on Solidarity Economics and Local Development, training agents to work with social, political and economic analysis and to be able to formulate, implement and manage new development programs based on democratic and participatory management" (*Gazeta Mercantil*, 17 September 2001).

many Catholic Church organizations were involved with the SEM, and how political work of the Catholic Church during the dictatorship period influenced the creation of a policy within the Church to fight against social injustice. Moreover, Cáritas, a social organization within the Catholic Church, became one of the most important social movement organizations in the advocacy, training, and implementation of programs ofr the founding of solidarity economy enterprises. The role of the Catholic Church intrigued me. The few researchers who have considered the role of religion in organizational outcomes predicted that the Catholic Church would have a negative impact on the establishment of cooperatives (Dana, 2009; Schneiberg, 2002; Weber, 2013). Therefore, at this stage, I decided to zoom in on the role of the Catholic Church in the SEM and establishment of cooperatives.

During the third stage of analysis, I sought to understand: (a) why the Catholic Church was important for the SEM and for the establishment of SEEs; (b) whether the movement would have progressed without the Catholic Church; (c) what differentiates Catholic organizations from other organizations (such as incubators) involved in the founding of cooperatives; (d) and whether the influence of the Catholic Church explains the regional variance in the establishment of cooperatives, and if so, why. Drawing on grounded theory (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Locke, 2000; Strauss & Corbin, 1994), I adopted an inductive approach whereby I examined the data and then, in a bottom-up fashion, identified relationships and developed theories pertaining to mechanisms in the relationship between the Catholic Church and the SEM that influenced the establishment of cooperatives in Brazil.

I relied on interviews and documents, especially news articles from the Cáritas and CNBB websites, and categorized the data by the different ways that the Catholic Church affected the SEM (e.g., role of the Church, role of Cáritas, Church discourse renouncing neoliberalism and/or promoting a new economic system, the empowerment of individuals and groups, etc.). I re-read all of the categorized data to try to understand how they were related, and identified quotes that supported my narrative. This analysis is presented in Chapter 5.

After performing this analysis, I understood the importance of the two distinctive institutional logics of the Catholic Church. I then analyzed the documents and interviews to investigate how these logics influenced the work of the Catholic Church, and more specifically, of Cáritas. I identified the logics by employing a pattern inducing technique (Reay & Jones, 2016), whereby I used raw data to identify patterns indicating the existence of an institutional logic. This process enabled me to identify that the Catholic Church in Brazil had two main institutional logics that guided Catholic values and practices. I describe the two distinct logics and present representative quotes in Chapter 6.

Throughout my analysis, I took important measures to ensure the trustworthiness of the data (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). First, during the interviews, I ordered the questions from broader to narrower so the interviewees would not limit their answers to the elements that I had previously intuited as affecting the founding of cooperatives. For example, I first asked: “What factors make a community more prone to establish cooperatives?” Then, as the interview progressed, I added questions related to specific topics, such as the role of the Catholic Church. Second, I performed member checks at

the end of the interviews to assure that my interpretation of the data that I had previously analyzed was correct. Third, I regularly triangulated data among multiple sources.

Quantitative Study

Following a large body of institutional research, especially field analytic studies, I used my qualitative study to propose hypotheses and test my findings (Kaplan, 2016; Lounsbury, 2001, 2007; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007; Rao et al., 2003; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). Qualitative studies can be idiosyncratic and biased to the data available (e.g., the individuals interviewed and locations discussed more frequently in documents). Testing my findings across Brazilian communities enabled me to ascertain the generalizability and applicability of my findings. Thus, the results of hypothesis testing provide additional evidence of how institutions and institutional logics influenced the achievement of social movement outcomes. I describe my data sources and analysis techniques for the quantitative study after developing my hypotheses, as it facilitates a better understanding of how the hypotheses were operationalized and tested.

CHAPTER 4

EMPIRICAL CONTEXT: HISTORY OF BRAZIL AND THE SEM

To fully comprehend the impact of social movements on the spread of cooperatives in Brazil and the role of the Catholic Church in this process, it is necessary to have an overall understanding of the history of Brazil and the SEM, as well as regional differences that may have contributed to geographic variance in the founding of cooperatives. In the first section of this chapter, I briefly explain key periods of Brazilian history during which Brazil's social problems took root, and the development of a social sector inside and outside the Catholic Church. My narrative illustrates how the progressive Catholic Church left an institutional legacy of collective action during the dictatorship regime that played an important role in advancing the SEM when the Workers' Party assumed power in the federal government.

In the second section, I provide a detailed analysis of the history of the SEM and the creation of its infrastructure, which impacted the founding of cooperatives. My analysis reveals alternative explanations for the geographic variance in the establishment of cooperatives in Brazil, which I use as control variables in my quantitative analysis. In addition, this historical account of the SEM helps to contextualize how the movement evolved and the role of the Catholic Church in its development.

In the last section of this chapter, I describe regional differences that help explain the geographic variance in the establishment of cooperatives in Brazil. I differentiate primarily between the Northeast and Southeast regions, where the distinctive logics of the Catholic Church represent the two extremes. The Northeast is the poorest, most unequal region plagued by periods of drought, whereas the Southeast is the most developed

region, plagued by serious social problems stemming from urbanization and *favelas* (i.e., slums).

Historical Contextualization of Brazil

Understanding the events of three historical periods—colonialism, the military regime, and the recent democracy—is the key to understanding how societal issues arose in Brazil, how the SEM developed, and the progressive logic of the Catholic Church emerged.

Colonialism. The colonial experience in Brazil explains many of the inequalities that instigated the SEM. In the 16th century, the Portuguese arrived in Brazil and divided the country into 14 hereditary Captaincies (large pieces of land) that were given to Portuguese noblemen; this unequal division of land and resources endures in Brazil to this day. This concentration of land ownership among the very rich ultimately became the driving force behind the creation of the Land Commission Pastoral (an organization within the Catholic Church) and the Landless Movement (a social movement supporting landless farmers), both of which were highly involved with the SEM. The Portuguese also brought the Catholic religion and slavery to Brazil. Brazil was the last Western country to abolish slavery (mostly brought from Africa) in 1888. The repercussions of freeing 4 million slaves without implementing programs for economic or social inclusion continue to be felt in Brazil today; black people are in the lowest classes and suffer from high poverty and discrimination (Lamont et al., 2016).

Military regime. The military regime played a major role in politicizing the Catholic Church, deepening inequality, and changing how social movements and collective action operate in Brazil. In 1964, the Brazilian military seized power and

established a dictatorship to combat a possible communist coup. Initially, large landowners, part of the urban population, and the Catholic Church backed the military regime, whereas students, artists and left-wing intellectuals protested against it. In response to increasing protests, the military regime became more radical and institutionalized torture in 1968. During this period, the regime persecuted, tortured, and killed dissidents.

Poverty and inequality became more severe, despite a dramatic increase in Brazil's GDP. This "economic miracle" resulted from the government allowing foreign entities to invest capital and farmers to export their products. At the time, the Ministry of the Economy justified the decrease in standard of living for most of the population, saying "you first make the cake grow and then you divide it." Yet Brazil's newfound wealth was never divided.

As social and political problems escalated under the authoritarian military regime, collective action flourished in the realms of the Catholic Church and civil society. The Catholic Church reversed its position of alliance, and began to combat the government. The progressive side of the Catholic Church was led by Dom Hélder Câmara, a bishop from the Northeast region who actively organized protests and initiatives against the dictatorship. During that period, many priests, bishops, and nuns were arrested, tortured or killed by the regime. At the same time, Dom Hélder and many other bishops in Brazil and Latin America were responsible for the emergence of the Liberation Theology, a movement of priests and bishops that argued for a reading of the Bible focusing on the poor and on the Church being politically and socially engaged to change societal

problems (I explain the Liberation Theology in detail in Chapter 6), where I discuss the role of the two competing institutional logics within the Catholic Church.

A common desire to resist the regime brought together diverse groups of people who founded the organizations that initiated the SEM or created the infrastructure that enabled the ideals and practices of the movement to spread, such as the Pastoral Land Commission, the Landless Movement, and the Workers' Party. To address the cruelty of the military regime, the deteriorating conditions of rural workers, and the repression of priests, Catholics founded the Pastoral Land Commission (*Comissão Pastoral da Terra*) in 1975. To combat the military dictatorship, union workers, the progressive side of the Catholic Church, left-wing artists and intellectuals founded the Workers' Party in 1980. Many of the founders had returned from exile in 1979, and the party was based on democratic socialist principles. The Workers' Party had a different political program than the more traditional Communist parties that followed the Soviet and Chinese political models; however, its opponents later argued that the party wanted to implement communism in Brazil.

During the dictatorship era, the Catholic Church also helped establish the Landless Movement (*Movimento Sem Terra; MST*). The MST ideology is based on the Catholic ideal that private property should serve a social function; because many private properties were not being used, the Church argued that it was morally correct for rural workers without land to occupy and farm abandoned arable properties. The movement originated in 1984 when the military regime implemented a more concentrated and exclusionary agrarian model based on selective agricultural modernization. This model, which excluded small-scale agriculture, initiated a rural exodus which led to the

exportation of production, intensive use of pesticides and concentration of not only land, but also financial subsidies for agriculture (www.mst.org.br). This movement played an important role in the creation of many agrarian cooperatives in Brazil and in the SEM.

Recent democracy. After the turbulent period of the federal military regime, and a lot of pressure for democratization, in 1985 Brazil government decided that they would transition to a democratic state and had its first election was not held until 1989. Fernando Collor, a conservative,[9] was elected that year, only to be impeached in 1992 after corruption scandals and protests (Mische & Pattison, 2000). In 1994, Fernando Henrique Cardoso was elected and left office after his second term in 2002. During his presidency he implemented a strong neo-liberalist agenda and privatized all Brazilian government companies except Petrobrás, an oil and gas company. During this period, levels of unemployment, poverty, and inequality surged and the SEM emerged.

In 2002, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva from the Workers' Party, which had been a proponent and initiator of the SEM, was elected president after losing to other candidates in the three most recent elections. During the campaign, Lula's opponents claimed that he was a communist who would turn Brazil into a communist state. During the dictatorship and until the end of the Cold War, Brazil—like much of the rest of the world—was immersed in the political conflict between capitalism and communism/socialism. This stigma affected the SEM movement, making the role of the Catholic Church even more important for its legitimation during the early years. With Lula's election and the absence of communist/socialist forces worldwide, the stigma associated with the Workers' Party diminished.

[9] Brazil had 35 parties register at the Electoral High Court in 2018.

In this brief summary of Brazilian history, I have tried to explain the roots of Brazilian social problems and describe the diverse organizations, groups, politicians and movements that emerged to combat social injustices. The military regime played an important role in igniting nonconformity and revolt among diverse groups, especially the Catholic Church, which became almost like a school for individuals to learn how to collectively organize in grassroots movements to combat a central and powerful actor. Ironically, it seems that the authoritative regime sparked collective action that left enduring institutional legacies. The recent democracy shows how most of these groups coalesced to create the Workers' Party, which played a critically important role in the establishment and dissemination of solidarity enterprises. In the next section, I describe the emergence and expansion of the SEM in detail.

The Solidarity Economy Movement

The SEM emerged in response to the aggressive neoliberal agenda implemented during Fernando Henrique Cardoso's two terms as leader of the Brazilian government (1989–1991 and 1992–1999). This agenda created widespread societal problems such as increasing unemployment and income inequality. On one hand, neoliberal policies created problems for the Brazilian manufacturing sector, driving many companies into bankruptcy, and leaving workers with only one option to avoid unemployment: take over the bankrupted companies. On the other hand, the policies resulted in widespread unemployment and concentrated land ownership. Both situations boosted the movement and the creation of SEEs,[10] as explained in the passage below.

[10] To distinguish the cooperatives the SEM was promoting from the large, non-capitalist cooperatives of the military regime, the movement introduced a new term, solidarity economy enterprises (SEEs). In this thesis, I use the terms cooperatives, solidarity enterprises, and solidarity economy enterprises interchangeably.

> At the beginning of the last decade, with the intensification of the process of opening up the Brazilian economy to international markets, a new challenge arose in the world of work: structural or technological unemployment, that is, unemployment with no return. It was in this process of change that…significant democratic-managed organizations appeared in Brazil, where workers began to take control of the assets of industrial production companies and, above all, managerial control. (ANTEAG, Solidarity Economy and Democratic Management as Radicalization of Democracy/*Economia Solidária e Autogestão como Radicalização da Democracia*, Seminar on Popular and Solidarity Economy, World Social Forum 2002)

Solidarity enterprises were advocated by four main actors in Brazilian society: the Catholic Church, the Workers' Party, universities and unions. An important advocate of the movement was Paul Singer, a professor and member of the Workers' Party, and Solidarity Economy Secretary from 2003 to 2014:

> To some in the Workers' Party, inequality and unemployment have no cure within capitalism. It is possible and (for those who think in this way) necessary to propose changes that will attenuate these harms, though eliminating them is only possible through the socialization of the modes of production. (Folha de São Paulo, 16 August 1996)

Many priests and bishops of the Catholic Church shared this sentiment and ideals: "Extreme social inequality, coupled with corruption and impunity, characterizes the injustice of the contemporary world and absolutely denies God's plan for a society of solidarity and fraternity" (Luciano Mendes de Almeida, Catholic priest, Folha de São Paulo, 18 November 1995).

As revealed in the passages below, movement actors shared common ideological and moral agendas (de Souza, 2000; Singer, 2002) rooted in the Liberation Theology; the Rochdale[11] movement; and the works of English and French utopic socialists Robert Owen, William King, Charles Fourier, Charles Gide, Joseph Proudhon, and Brazilian

[11] In Rochdale, England in 1844, the first cooperatives were founded based on the principles of voluntary and open membership; democratic member control; member economic participation; autonomy; education, training and independence; cooperation among cooperatives; and concern for the community.

educator Paulo Freire. Drawing on these ideals, the movement criticized the capitalist system and proposed the creation of cooperatives as a way to create a more equitable society. From the Rochdale movement and cooperative thinkers, the SEM adopted the idea that cooperatives could avoid exploitation and capital accumulation by implementing collective ownership and decision-making processes, thereby making societies more equitable (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Vieitez & Dal Ri, 2004). In line with the Liberation Theology, the SEM focused on uplifting communities and improving the lives of the poor. The passages below show how the movement aimed to address poverty and income inequality by promoting the creation of cooperatives.

> The Solidarity Economy is a powerful tool to combat social exclusion, since it presents viable alternatives for the generation of work and income, proving that it is possible to organize the production and reproduction of society in order to eliminate material inequalities and spread the values of solidarity...[The] Solidarity Economy was born between the oppressed and the excluded, those without access to capital, technologies and credit. It is from them that the aspiration and the desire for a new paradigm of organization of the economy and of society emerge. (Solidarity Economy Working Group, Solidarity Economy, Foundations of a Humanizing Globalization/*Economia Solidária, Fundamento de uma Globalização Humanizadora*, in Seminar on Popular and Solidarity Economy, World Social Forum 2002)

> The Social-Solidarity Economy is understood as "a socio-political movement aimed at integrating production, marketing, consumption and credit as a harmonious and interdependent, collective and democratically planned, managed system that serves the common goal of responding to the needs of survival and sustainable reproduction of the lives of all citizens in all dimensions, including in the fields of culture, art and leisure." (Cáritas, Solidarity and Popular Economy and the Radicalization of Democracy: Public Policies/*EPS e Radicalização da Democracia: as Políticas Públicas*, in Seminar on Popular and Solidarity Economy, World Social Forum 2002)

The SEM successfully created organizational capacity and a broad and interconnected institutional infrastructure composed of organizational (e.g., incubators, research centers, and non-profits), governmental (i.e., public policies at the municipal, state, and federal

levels), governance (i.e., a National Council and forums/networks at the national and state levels), and market (i.e., market fairs, community banks) elements. These infrastructural elements played an essential role in disseminating the ideals of the movement, facilitating the creation of solidarity enterprises, building and strengthening connections, and culturally transforming the lives of impoverished people. As carriers of the values, norms, and symbols of the movement, these infrastructural elements were interconnected with SMOs (including Cáritas, which I analyze in Chapter 5), and explain part of the geographic variance in the establishment of SEEs. Figure 4.1 is an adapted version of a figure created by the Brazilian Forum of Solidarity Economy that illustrates the field institutional infrastructure, showing the relationships between different infrastructural elements and organizations involved in the movement. In the sections that follow, I explain each of the infrastructural elements in detail.



Figure 4.1. The SEM field infrastructure.

(Source: Adapted from Cáritas documents and the Brazilian Forum of Solidarity Economy website: www.fbes.org.br.)

Organizational infrastructure. Many organizations facilitated the dissemination of SEEs and the ideals of the SEM. Some of these organizations directly helped groups establish solidarity enterprises, and others functioned as trade associations for solidarity enterprises that advocated for the movement.

Cáritas and university-sponsored incubators focused on helping individuals form groups, start enterprises, and learn about the values of the solidarity economy. Cáritas is a Catholic organization founded in 1956 by the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops/*Conferência Nacional dos Bispos do Brasil* (CNBB). Influenced by Basic Ecclesial Communities/*Comunidade Eclesiais de Base* (CEBs) and pastoral organizations, Cáritas strives to implement alternative projects in communities, supporting "groups of the Popular Solidarity Economy that aim for social, political, and economic emancipation that are located in impoverished communities" (Caritas, 2017). Throughout its history, the organization has not only supported the Landless Workers' Movement, but also helped more than 10,000 people organize cooperatives. As of 2017, the organization was present in all Brazilian states, with chapters in 430 municipalities. I explain the work of Cáritas in more detail in Chapter 5.

Incubators are university extension programs whereby students help unemployed or vulnerable groups create cooperatives as sources of income. The Federal University of Rio de Janeiro established the first Cooperative Incubator (ITCP) in 1995, and the University of São Paulo established one in 1998. Paul Singer, an economics professor, Workers' Party founder, and main proponent of the solidarity economy who was appointed Secretary of the National Secretariat of Solidarity Economy in 2003 led efforts

to found the University of São Paulo's ITCP. Today, more than 80 Brazilian universities have incubators aimed at establishing cooperatives, and the model has been replicated in government programs (Leca, Gond, & Barin Cruz, 2014; Marconsin, 2008).

Trade associations also help form the organizational infrastructure of the SEM. Some of the most prominent include the National Association of Workers of Self-Managed and Collectively-Owned Businesses/*Associação Nacional dos Trabalhadores em Empresas de Autogestão e Participação Acionária* (ANTEAG), the Center for Cooperatives and Solidarity Enterprises/*Central de Cooperativas e Empreendimentos Solidários* (UNISOL), the Landless Workers' Movement/*Movimento Sem Terra* (MST),[12] ANCOSOL (rural credit representatives), and UNICAFES (family agriculture representatives).

Governmental infrastructure. The SEM was very successful in influencing governments and public policies. The first time the solidarity economy was incorporated into a governmental agenda was in 1999 in the state of Rio Grande do Sul (in the South); the municipal governments of three cities located in the Southeast region (São Paulo, Santo André, and Campinas) followed in 2001 (Marconsin, 2008). The policies created training programs on the solidarity economy and business development for vulnerable groups. Governments provide three forms of support for the solidarity economy: public policy, councils, and funds. Some states only have a council, while others have all three.

[12] Member of La Via Campesina, the international movement that "brings together millions of peasants, those who work on small and medium-size farms, landless people, women farmers, indigenous people, migrants and agricultural workers from around the world. It defends small-scale sustainable agriculture as a way to promote social justice and dignity. It strongly opposes corporate driven agriculture and transnational companies that are destroying people and nature" (https://viacampesina.org/en/). As of 2018, the Landless Movement was composed of 100 cooperatives, 1,900 associations, and 350,000 families.

In 2003, with the election of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, the social goals of the cooperative movement became federal public policy. That year, da Silva created the Secretariat of the Solidarity Economy/*Secretaria Nacional de Economia Solidária (SENAES)* under the Ministry of Work and Employment. The Secretariat helped connect diverse ministries to create public policies to incentivize the establishment and sustainable operation of cooperatives. It also promoted forums and workshops, and funded the creation of collective enterprises and supporting organizations. Nonetheless, in 2015, without explanation, the Secretariat was eliminated.

It is important to note that even though initial public policies aimed at supporting the solidarity economy were implemented by members of the Workers' Party, over time, many governments kept or implemented similar policies despite being led by different parties. As of 2017, 19 (out of 26) Brazilian states had approved laws supporting the development of the solidarity economy. Also, municipalities such as São Paulo, with conservative mayors or leadership, had launched incubators for SEEs.

Governance infrastructure. As the movement progressed, participants began to organize events and forums. After the World Social Forum in 2001, which many followers of the Liberation Theology and members of the Workers' Party helped organize, movement participants established an annual Solidarity Economy Forum and a new organization, the Brazilian Forum on Solidarity Economy/*Fórum Brasileiro de Economia Solidária* (FBES). The composition of the FBES reflects the many actors of the SEM (Singer, 2002): 60% are cooperatives and 40% are members of other organizations (Marconsin, 2008). Decisions are made by a national plenary comprising two solidarity enterprises per state, one state-level support organization, five national

support organizations, and two networks of public managers in each Brazilian region. After the national forum, regional- and state-level forums emerged; by 2016, all 26 Brazilian states had their own forums.

Through these forums, the movement created a way to communicate with all of its organizations and chapters and established a collective voice to advocate for public policies, law changes, and funding opportunities, among others. These events enabled organizations at the local level to raise concerns, make suggestions, and share ideas with organizations at the state and national levels. These forums also provide a platform for organizing many workshops, fairs, and cultural events that mobilize new members of the movement, disseminate the movement's ideals, build a collective identity, and provide space for members to brainstorm about next steps required to achieve desired goals.

Market infrastructure. The movement also facilitated the creation of alternative markets. As the movement developed, participants determined that cooperatives could not prosper as islands in a sea of corporations; instead, they needed to create local and moral markets where suppliers, intermediaries, and buyers adopt the same organizational form. Thus, many SEM organizations shifted their focus from creating and assessing cooperatives to organizing market fairs, solidarity supply chains, and community banks. They organized market fairs so the cooperatives could commercialize their products and services on a regular basis, thereby addressing a major challenge to economic feasibility. Some of these market fairs also became important spaces for coordinating activities, disseminating ideals and building a collective identity.

For example, FEICOOP, the first fair exclusively for SEEs, has been held annually since 1994. Most recently, the fair attracted more than 250,000 visitors and 850

SEEs from 570 different municipalities located in 20 countries. In addition to commercialization opportunities, the most recent FEICOOP included many training activities, debates, and cultural events, as shown in Figure 4.2. The pictures in the left-hand column show the markets with the vendors (the bottom one shows vendors affiliated with the Landless Movement), and the pictures in the right-hand column show some of the cultural events (i.e., children singing a song, and a local band performing).

Figure 4.2. Pictures of FEICOOP.

(Source: Interviewee)

Another way to help solidarity enterprises succeed is by establishing productive supply chains. Supply chains help enterprises in a local region collectively establish a space for commercialization and partnerships to access funds. One example is the Fair Weft Network/*Rede Justa Trama*, which has 100 members in five Brazilian states. The

cooperative network includes cotton producers, weavers, and enterprises that use the fabric to produce clothing, buttons, jewellery and toys. The network also helps commercialize the products online and through partnerships.[13]

Furthermore, community banks—created by and for community members—offer microcredit to cooperatives that struggle to access capital, thereby providing social currency that facilitates the creation of moral markets. The neighborhood of Palmas is a well-known and internationally-studied example of a moral market (Fourcade & Healy, 2007). Palmas created its own closed-loop economy with the goal of retaining resources within the community. The creation of a social currency facilitated sustainable development within a geographically-restricted territory, so that community members would also consume in that space, preventing community resources from being spent in wealthy regions. For instance, instead of residents of an impoverished community spending money at Wal-Mart, they received incentives to spend money at local retail shops with the social currency, thereby ensuring that resources continued to circulate in that space. Nowadays, this local moral market includes a bank, a social currency, a local socio-economic forum, a solidarity economy market that ranges from 30–120 enterprises at each event, and a solidarity economy school. The bank's success led to the creation of another organization to establish community banks (França Filho, Júnior, Torres, & Rigo, 2012); as of 2006, 103 banks were members of the Community Banks Network. Now the Palmas community helps other communities create their own local economic systems by establishing development banks and social currencies.

Another example of a moral, self-sustained, geographically-restricted market is Cairu, a city situated in the Northeastern state of Bahia. In this municipality with a

[13] https://www.justatrama.com.br/

population of around 15,000 people,[14] 1,208 out of the 7,000 working-age citizens work for Cairu's 19 cooperatives: 4 production enterprises, 2 retailers, 8 service companies, 1 consumer cooperative, 3 collective organizations that share equipment, and 1 community bank that serves as the financial provider. The city's cooperatives also receive support from a university incubator that has been promoting cooperatives since 2008.

Outcomes

Thus far, I have explained how the SEM evolved, with a particular focus on infrastructure. Now I focus on outcomes of the movement. The main goal of the SEM is to develop a new economic system that improves equality; one of the movement's central beliefs is that cooperatives promote this type of economic activity, and a primary goal is to establish cooperatives throughout Brazil. Data seem to indicate that the movement has successfully achieved its objectives: between 1990 and 2010 more than 18,000 solidarity enterprises were founded (for examples of the types of SEEs, see Appendix D). However, cooperatives are not evenly distributed throughout Brazil; the number of cooperatives established varies dramatically by region. In this section, I explain this variance and provide demographic, economic, social, and political information about the two Brazilian regions that are the focus of my study.

Regional variance in the establishment of cooperatives. As an organizational form, cooperatives developed differently in various regions of Brazil (Silva et al., 2003), and are more concentrated in certain states. For instance, as shown in Figure 1.2, many cooperatives were founded in the most southern state (Rio Grande do Sul), which may be explained by immigration patterns; German and Italian immigrants who settled in that

[14] https://ww2.ibge.gov.br/home/mapa_site/mapa_site.php#populacao

area served as cultural carriers of this organizational form (Schneiberg, 2002). However, many cooperatives also were founded in two states in Northeastern Brazil which did not experience the same level of European immigration, and where the majority of residents are Indigenous or Black. While poverty is another factor that could explain the high number of cooperatives founded in the Northeast, regional variance also exists. Therefore, other factors explain this variance, such as a community's propensity to found cooperatives, as well as geographic differences in the infrastructures of the SEM and the Catholic Church.

Brazil has a total population of 209 million and is divided into 26 states and the federal district. These states are categorized into five regions: North, Northeast, Center-West, Southeast and South. The map in Figure 4.3 shows the Brazilian states and regions. The Northeast and Southeast are extreme examples of the two distinctive institutional logics of the Catholic Church. I use data from these regions in my quantitative analysis to differentiate how these logics impact the work of social movements.

Figure 4.3. Regions of Brazil, including Amazon and drought areas.

(Source: Created by the author using data from the IBGE.)

The Northeast is the first area the Portuguese colonized; 54% of the region is desert, making agriculture difficult and threatening the survival of small farmers (see the drought area outlined in Figure 4.3), 70% of the population is black or bi-racial (*pardo*), and tourism is a major industry. The region has the worst rates of poverty (32% of population) and extreme poverty (12% of population) and the highest level of inequality in Brazil (Gini index: .557) (see also Figures 4.4 and 4.5). A high percentage of the regional population is subject to discrimination, as it is the region with the highest percentage of Blacks (9.45%) and the second-highest percentage of bi-racial individuals

(59.78%). Education levels in the Northeast are the worst in Brazil and the unemployment rate is the highest in the nation (see Table 4.1 for specific data). Interestingly, the region also has the highest percentage of Catholics in Brazil (72%).



Figure 4.4. Gini index (Brazil and individual regions).

(Source: Created by the author using data from the IBGE.)



Figure 4.5. Poverty percentage (Brazil and individual regions).

(Source: Created by the author using data from the IBGE.)

Table 4.1

Brazilian and Regional Characteristics

Index	Brazil	North	Northeast	Southeast	South	Center-West
Economic						
GDP (BRL trillions) [a]	3.77	0.20	0.51	2.09	0.62	0.35
GDP (agriculture %) [a]	5.30	9.56	6.58	2.92	8.13	9.67
Rural area (%) [b]	26.50	8.10	29.90	46.30	57.10	44.70
Unemployment rate [c]	4.41	4.73	5.09	4.47	2.95	4.12
Full-time employees with benefits (%) [d]	45.29	28.94	31.42	54.12	49.78	43.98
Self-employed (%)	21.46	26.98	22.91	19.21	23.41	20.43
Social						
Poverty (%) [e]	16.34	25.70	32.29	9.03	8.68	9.36
Extreme poverty (%) [e]	5.80	7.71	12.58	2.93	2.63	3.31
Gini index	0.536	0.543	0.557	0.521	0.496	0.552
Gender income difference (BRL) [f]	-407.62	-259.54	-260.48	-468.18	-438.64	-429.55
Demographic						
Population (millions)	190.76	15.86	53.08	80.36	27.39	14.06
Composition (%)						
White	47.51	23.24	29.18	54.94	78.34	41.53
Black	7.52	6.51	9.45	7.82	4.00	6.59
Biracial [g]	43.42	67.19	59.78	35.97	16.70	49.45
Native	0.43	1.92	0.39	0.13	0.27	0.93
Asian	1.10	1.11	1.19	1.12	0.68	1.48
Not reported	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.00	0.02
Education (%)						
Illiterate	9.02	10.60	17.65	5.10	4.74	6.63
No instruction to some high school	63.91	67.58	70.99	59.57	63.95	61.51
High school diploma [h]	24.56	24.53	21.72	26.41	23.75	25.08
Secondary degree [h]	11.27	7.60	7.09	13.69	12.11	13.15
Religion (%)						
Catholic	64.99	61.22	72.61	59.75	70.42	59.92
Protestant	13.30	20.09	10.08	14.32	10.91	16.64
Evangelicals	22.16	28.50	16.39	24.58	20.18	26.82
Not religious	7.65	7.54	8.10	8.45	4.39	7.89
Atheist	0.32	0.20	0.14	0.43	0.36	0.46
Agnostic	0.07	0.02	0.04	0.09	0.07	0.07

Notes:

a Data from IBGE/SUFRAMA 2010

b Data from CENSO agropecuário 2006

c People 10 years old or older, economically active.

d Those who abide by the Consolidation of Labor Laws.

e Data from IPEA 2009

f People 10 years old or older with income; women's perspective.

g *Pardos*: multiracial descendants of Europeans, indigenous and Africans.

h People 25 years old or older who have earned a diploma or degree. Data from CENSO 2010.

Due to these persistent issues, the Catholic Church has invested significant effort in developing social programs in the Northeast region. Whereas the Church initially focused on soliciting donations, it later shifted toward creating programs to empower communities. The progressive institutional logic of the Catholic Church thus has a strong presence in the Northeast. As expected, the Northeast region is where the most SEEs were founded in 2010: more than 8,000 of the 19,000 SEEs founded in Brazil that year were located in the Northeast, and over 533,000 residents were participating in these enterprises. Due to the arid conditions of the region, many cooperatives were created so that the farmers could collectively create infrastructure to maintain their crops and commercialize them. Table 4.2 presents data about SEEs founded in all regions of Brazil in 2010.

Table 4.2

Total Number of SEEs in 2010 (by Region)

	Region				
Characteristic	Northeast	Southeast	North	South	Center-West
No. of SEEs	8040	3228	3127	3292	2021
Industry					
Agriculture and cattle	877	304	1041	478	754
Garbage collection	21	274	31	147	28
Commerce	801	382	269	679	95
Fashion	107	62	132	67	48
Food	473	252	331	615	108
Fishing	76	14	113	38	8
Location					
Rural	5804	959	1566	1382	1082
Urban and rural	682	682	290	518	269
Urban	1554	1554	1270	1392	670
Membership					
No. of members	533787	119362	279352	379746	111384
% of working age population	1.37	0.19	2.56	1.77	0.79
Ratio female/male	0.89	0.97	0.84	0.51	0.86
% minorities (black, biracial, native)	0.67	0.41	0.09	0.81	0.52

Source: SENAES

In contrast, the Southeast historically has been the richest region in Brazil (see Figure 4.6). Although the South has the best social indicators, the Southeast normally ranks second while also being the most populated, developed, and modernized region, and home to the two main metropolitan areas of Brazil, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Although Workers' Party candidates have won some municipal elections, the population is more inclined to vote for more conservative candidates affiliated with the Brazilian Social Democratic Party/*Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira*. A significant number of people migrated from the Northeast between the 1960s and 1990s; due to a lack of infrastructure, *favelas* emerged in urban areas. Although some agriculture cooperatives are located in this region, most enterprises are located in urban areas and operate in industries such as waste and recycling collection (195 enterprises, 63% of all recycling SEEs), food (252 enterprises), and commerce (382 enterprises).



Figure 4.6. GDP in Brazil and individual regions (thousands BRL).

(Source: Created by the author using data from the IBGE.)

Although the Southeast is the region with the lowest percentage of Catholics (59%), Catholicism is still the dominant religion. In this region, the Catholic Church supported ideas, values, and practices reflecting the conservative logic, transforming itself into a very conservative institution from the 1980s onward. In Chapter 5, I explain how characteristics of these regions shaped the establishment of cooperatives in the context of the SEM.

Summary

In this chapter, I have contextualized the history of Brazil and the SEM, focusing on outcomes of the movement and regional variance. First, I briefly explained how social inequality and poverty were deeply ingrained during the colonial period. I further explained how the military regime instigated collective action in diverse sectors of society, including the Catholic Church. These collective action initiatives left institutional legacies that became the seeds of the SEM and the progressive logic of the Catholic Church (Greve & Rao, 2012; Schneiberg, 2006). In addition, I briefly described the current democracy in Brazil and the role played by the Workers' Party as the main supporter and advocate of the SEM.

Second, I explained the emergence of the SEM and how it has created an infrastructure that permeates diverse sectors, including government, non-profits, and universities, among others. This infrastructure has had a direct effect on the founding of SEEs by helping to disseminate this organizational form, and enabling individuals to join together to create cooperatives.

Lastly, I described regional indicators that could help explain geographic differences in the establishment of SEEs. I use these factors as independent or control

variables in my quantitative analysis in Chapter 7. I specifically focused on describing the Northeast and Southeast regions, which represent extreme examples of the different logics of the Catholic Church. In Chapter 6, I use these regional characteristics to frame the community-level instantiation of conflicting logics of the Catholic Church that ultimately impacted the work of Cáritas aimed at establishing cooperatives. In the next chapter, I explain in great detail how the institution of the Catholic Church influenced the SEM.

CHAPTER 5

FINDINGS: THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE SEM

An examination of the overall narrative that emerged from the first and second stages of my data analysis clearly reveals that the SEM in Brazil was driven by four main actors: the Catholic Church, the Workers' Party, unions, and universities. Among these, the Catholic Church played the most prominent role in the legitimation and emergence of the solidarity economy and in the dissemination and development of SEEs. An examination of each actor's actions in the field reveals that they played different roles and participated in different stages of the movement. Universities played an important role in theorizing the movement and creating incubators of cooperatives, but their work did not begin until the mid-1990s; most incubators were established after 2002 in large metropolitan areas. Unions played the most prominent role in helping workers organize to take over bankrupt companies. The Workers' Party focused mainly on creating public policies and spreading the ideals of the SEM throughout Brazil after the movement had been formalized. The Catholic Church was the institution that legitimated the movement, with the most experience and coverage in facilitating the establishment of SEEs in Brazil.

Understanding the importance of this role, I returned to my data with a question: *How has the Catholic Church influenced the establishment of SEEs?* Specifically, I sought to identify practices or events (mechanisms) that revealed the role of the Church in the SEM. For instance, in this process, I noticed that Cáritas created the program that sowed the seeds for the SEM. I found that the Catholic Church facilitated the SEM through the broader religious institution and through an affiliated organization, Cáritas. As a religious institution, the Catholic Church: (a) legitimized and disseminated a new

organizational form and economic system, and (b) pioneered and created institutional legacies. Cáritas focused mainly on developing solidarity economy programs through its chapters located across the country. Specifically, my data reveal that Cáritas facilitated the establishment of cooperatives by: (a) building a broad, interconnected, and far-reaching network infrastructure, and (b) changing the cognitive and emotional perceptions of impoverished people.

The Role of the Catholic Church as a Religious Institution

Legitimizing a new organizational form and economic system. Among the four main institutional actors in the SEM, the Catholic Church was the most central and powerful organization, as well as the least stigmatized among the Brazilian elite. As discussed in Chapter 4, during and after the Cold War, many claimed the Workers' Party wanted to establish communism in Brazil. Unions, which became widespread in 1943 when a law made participation mandatory for workers, opposed industrial and agrarian elites. Universities also played an important role in legitimizing the movement, but their work was very localized in the two main metropolitan areas of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Thus, the Catholic Church, as the dominant religion in Brazil and the religion of the elites, was in the best position to legitimize the SEM.

The Catholic Church indeed advanced the ideals of the movement by publishing editorials in prominent newspapers and organizing events and campaigns about the solidarity economy. The first time the expression "solidarity economy" appeared in a Brazilian newspaper was in an editorial written by a Brazilian priest:

> All can see that over the last 15 years, the postulates of an autonomous economy, according to the ideals of neoliberal theory, created severe social problems. Sovereign are the market laws, which are disconnected from criteria for the

> common good, encourage the eagerness to profit and consume, generate larger social disparities, and increase the gap between rich and poor…extreme social inequality, together with corruption and impunity, characterize the injustice of the contemporary world, and deny (absolutely) God's plan for a brotherly solidarity society. (Luciano Mendes de Almeida, Catholic priest, *Folha de São Paulo*, 18 November 1995)

Priest Mendes de Almeida became a regular columnist for *Folha de São Paulo*, which was read at the time by elites and members of the upper middle class, and continued to justify why a new solidarity economy needed to emerge. He argued that Christians around the world supported the idea of a new economic system and that it was the Church's responsibility to implement it:

> Faced with the imbalances caused by an economic policy against social goals, it is fundamental to proclaim that the "economy is at the service of the person." Therefore, decisions and economic institutions must be judged according to their ability to protect and promote human life, the family and the rights that flow from it. It is understood, therefore, *that the leaders of the Episcopal Conferences of Canada, the United States and the Episcopal Council of Latin America, meeting from January 26 to 30 of this year in Saint Lucia in the Caribbean, considered the "solidarity economy" a priority in the light of the social doctrine of the church*. Indeed, in Latin America, 44% of the working population do not have suitable jobs, 70% of the economically active lack social protection and more than 30 million children are still working to survive. *Society has the duty…to mitigate and correct this situation. It is the responsibility of the church to collaborate in the formation of conscience for justice and solidarity, to strive to elaborate appropriate laws and to encourage concrete and exemplary actions that promote the proper transformation of the economic model*. As a result of the reflections presented at the Caribbean meeting, I would like to emphasize—without dispensing other solutions—the importance of economic experiences that favour community action, responsible participation under various forms of micro projects, small businesses, popular organizations, neighbourhood associations. (Luciano Mendes de Almeida, Catholic priest, *Folha de São Paulo*, 1 February 1997; emphasis added)

The Church also advocated for the implementation of a solidarity economy through events and campaigns. In 1999, the Catholic Church criticized the government's

neoliberal agenda during its Fraternity Campaign.[15] But this criticism was expressed in a different way than criticism offered by universities and members of the Workers' Party, who used political terms such as socialism and communism. The Catholic Church was more neutral and cautious about using language associated with political-economic systems.

> The CNBB [National Conference of Brazilian Bishops/*Conferência Nacional dos Bispos Brasileiros*] released the base text of the Fraternity Campaign, a book with 144 pages filled with criticisms of the Real Plan (Monetary Policy) and worsening unemployment…The Archbishop of São Paulo, Don Cláudio Hummes, also criticized the economic model and defended the forgiveness of debts. During Mass at Sé Cathedral, he said that a society with the unemployment index of Brazil needs to rethink its organization, not sink into injustice and social insecurity. According to the archbishop, the fight against unemployment is a matter of priority and the large number of unemployed people shows that the government is failing. (*O Globo*, 18 February 1999)

Again, in 2010, the Catholic Church partnered with FBES and referred to the solidarity economy in its Fraternity Campaign:

> On January 24, the 2010 Ecumenical Fraternity Campaign was presented during the World Fair and Social Forum of Solidarity Economy (FEICOOP), in the city of Santa Maria (RS). The theme of the campaign is Economy and Life and seeks to debate another economy, which promotes broad development without social exclusion. The event was sponsored by the National Council of Christian Churches (Conic) and the Brazilian Forum of Solidarity Economy (FBES). (*Cáritas News*, 26 January 2010)

The campaign had the following specific objectives:

> (1) To denounce the perversity of every economic model that aims first at profit, regardless of inequality, misery, hunger and death. (2) To educate for the practice of an economy of solidarity, of care for the creation and appreciation of life. (3) To urge the churches, religions and the whole society for social and political actions that lead to the implementation of an economic model of solidarity and justice for all people. (Me Táurio Edmundo Brand, Booklet *Campanha da Fraternidade Ecumênica 2010: Economia e Vida*, 2010)

[15] The Fraternity Campaign is an annual endeavour to raise money for a cause. The campaign theme guides the topics of readings and homilies during Mass.

These messages circulated in the most widely-read newspapers, and priests incorporated them into their homilies. Many priests connected the theme of the Fraternity Campaign to people's experiences and the Word of God. Overall, the Catholic Church exhibited broad support for a better economic system with a strong moral and normative message that a new, non-neoliberal market should emerge. This support, generated primarily through narratives and discussions, was essential to the legitimation of the movement.

The message, despite being new and partly against the status quo, resonated because of the legitimacy and central position of the Catholic Church in Brazil.[16] Catholicism is the most followed religion in Brazil, and as such, the Church serves as an important authority figure for diverse classes of Brazilian society (see Figure 5.1 for the percentage of Catholics in Brazil versus other religions). Most importantly for this discussion, the Catholic Church is a very prominent institution among the Brazilian elite, including higher classes. Figure 5.2 shows the percentage of Catholics in each wage bracket for the year 2000 (the earliest year for which this type of data is available). Catholicism is predominant in all brackets, but the highest percentages occur among very low income groups and elites. Members of the upper middle class earn 20 to 30 times the minimum wage and members of the upper class earn more than 30 times the minimum wage; respectively, these brackets represent 2.5% and 1.4% of the Brazilian population over age 10 in 2000. Similarly, Figure 5.3 demonstrates the same relationship between Catholicism and elites based on level of education.

[16] While most of my analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 is qualitative, in some cases I use quantitative data to corroborate some arguments, as well as taken-for-granted facts about Brazilian society.



Figure 5.1. Brazilian religions over time.

(Source: CENSUS IBGE)

Figure 5.2. Percentage of Catholics per wage bracket.

(Source: CENSUS IBGE)



Figure 5.3. Percentage of Catholics per years of education.

(Source: CENSUS IBGE)

Catholicism was an effective mechanism for disseminating the ideology of the solidarity economy, because it aligned the SEM with mainstream values and elites. Even though conflicts existed within the Catholic Church and the narratives of some Catholic priests were more radical, the Church was a very elite, powerful, and highly accepted institution. Given the recent dictatorship and Cold War, other prevalent institutions such as government/democracy and capitalism were not widely accepted or stable. Along with family, Catholicism was the oldest and most stable institutional order in Brazil at the time. In a sense, the Catholic Church occupied a strong societal position that enabled the movement to be accepted and prosper. When a legitimate and highly accepted institutional order or organization supports an ideology, the default assumption is that it must have some value or importance, and even elites must allow the ideas to proliferate.

Unlike the Protestant discourse (Weber, 2013), the Catholic discourse condemns wealth, and emphasizes the importance of helping the poor, the disadvantaged, and minorities, as Jesus did. Thus, the SEM narrative was not totally different than of the Bible and there was not an openly opposition by elites in the data that I analyzed.

Overall, promoting a narrative of change inside a very central and legitimate institution created a kind of balance. Although the ideals of the SEM were not perfectly aligned with elites' economic endeavours, they were aligned with their religious values; therefore, they were inclined to support the movement, because they knew they should help the poor. For lower classes of society, the SEM resonated because they were living with the challenges of unemployment and poverty.

In conclusion, I find that the Catholic Church was a key driver of the legitimation of the solidarity economy and SEEs. Thanks in large part to the Catholic Church's subject position (Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Maguire et al., 2004) and strong narrative, the movement was able to expand. It is important to note that these narratives and advocacy efforts began early in the movement, in the 1990s; afterwards, as the movement was legitimized and became part of the agenda of the Workers' Party, this cultural entrepreneurship—the use of narratives, stories, symbols, and other cultural elements to generate legitimacy and resources for a given actor (Gehman & Soublière, 2017; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Soublière & Gehman, forthcoming)—became less necessary and faded. Specifically, the Catholic Church facilitated the legitimation of the SEM because it engaged in a form of cultural entrepreneurship that resonated with society by framing the solidarity economy not as a socialist program (the form used by academics), but as a new economic system aligned with the actions and teachings of Jesus. In

addition, elites expressed little opposition to this discourse due to the powerful influence of religion in their lives.

Pioneering and creating institutional legacies. The Catholic Church also created many organizations that left institutional legacies regarding collective action and the establishment of cooperatives. On one hand, the Catholic Church created many religious organizations that instantiated norms, values, and models for focusing on social issues and organizing communities. On the other hand, the Church pioneered the establishment of cooperatives, which also left legacies about the practices and skills necessary to create cooperative enterprises.

Throughout its history, the Catholic Church has established many organizations to address social issues. Drawing inspiration from the Bible, these pastoral[17] organizations seek to help the poor and the vulnerable and to promote social justice. The National Conference of Brazilian Bishops/*Conferência Nacional dos Bispos do Brasil* (CNBB) sponsored the creation of organizations to help the elderly, children and youth, farmers, and immigrants, among others. For example, Zilda Arns (a pediatrician and sister of a Cardinal) established the Pastoral of Children/*Pastoral da Criança*, an organization that mobilizes volunteers to visit the homes of low-income families to help prevent infant mortality due to malnutrition. Although these organizations are ecumenical, their work is based on the teachings of the Bible. Arns explained:

> We know that the driving force of social transformation is the practice of the foremost commandment of the Law of God: love, expressed through fraternal solidarity, can move mountains. To love God over everything else, and others as we love ourselves. ["Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself"]

[17] In English and in the context of Christianity, the word pastoral means "concerning or appropriate to the giving of spiritual guidance" (Oxford Dictionary).

> means to work for social inclusion…to not have prejudice, to use our best talents to help those with the most pressing needs. (Zilda Arns, speech transcript, Haiti, 2010)

Another important organization was the Pastoral of Land/*Pastoral da Terra* created during the dictatorship to combat the military regime and improve conditions for small farmers. The military regime sparked the establishment of many religious organizations, for instance, Basic Ecclesial Communities/*Comunidade Eclesiais de Base* (CEBs) also emerged as the main model of organizing used by the progressive side of the Catholic Church. While the aforementioned organizations fostered a collective willingness to help the less advantaged, CEBs promoted also political engagement, collective decision-making and participation:

> Contrary to the Church's general trend of non-involvement in party politics, the CEBs encourage their members to participate in national political life through parties that advocate the popular causes…[CEBs] continue being "seeds of popular organization" and, without fear of political engagement, they actively participate not only in political parties, but also in trade unions, community councils, and solidarity economy experiences. (José Maria Mayrin, *Moderados disputam com esquerda na Igreja*, *O Estado de São PauloI,* 31 March 2002)

Overall, these social organizations created within the structure of the Catholic Church helped communities develop a collective identity, engage in social and political projects, and learn how to organize to drive change. Although they did not leave legacies specifically related to economic organizing (i.e., cooperatives), the social organizations established by the Catholic Church did leave legacies related to collective organizing.

Furthermore, the Catholic Church played a ground-breaking role in establishing cooperatives, not only in Brazil, but all around the world. For example, Mondragón, the most celebrated and well-known example of a cooperative complex, located in Spain and composed of 247 cooperatives, was idealized and created by a Catholic priest (Whyte &

Whyte, 1991). Likewise, priests were the first founders of cooperatives in Brazil: a Jesuit priest, Theodor Amstad, created the first cooperative in the state of Rio Grande do Sul in 1902 and Dom Ivo Lorscheiter started the first community bank in Santa Maria-RS in 1977 (de Souza, 2013).

The Catholic Church was also the first organization to help groups establish cooperatives. For example, in a dissertation about the *Asssociação dos Catadores de Papel, Papelão e Material Reaproveitável* (ASMARE), a cooperative of garbage pickers, Torres (2008) explained how the formalization of the cooperative[18] was accomplished with the help of the Pastoral of Homeless/*Pastoral de Rua* and Cáritas. Benedictine religious women and Cáritas convinced the group to organize as a cooperative:

> Two Benedictines, Maria Cristina and Fortunata, of the Pastoral of Homeless of the Archdiocese of Belo Horizonte, began work to reintegrate homeless people back into society…These two Benedictines began a work of approximation and dialogue with the group that was living on the banks of the Arrudas River. The group of paper pickers received them with a lot of mistrust. The waste pickers showed a sense of fear and resentment of being reneged by society…"Then we started meeting, but it was difficult to accept the Pastoral, because we thought that the Pastoral was there to harm us…but [Maria] Cristina and Fortunata met with us and talked with us… and we started the association on May 1st [Labor Day]" (Torres, 2008, p. 62)

The Catholic Church was also the first to develop programs to help groups organize cooperatives in the 1980s. Although universities played an important role in creating cooperative incubators, the first incubator was not established until 1995, and most were established after 2002, as shown in Figure 5.4. Public policies (e.g., regulations that created a council, fund, or program focused specifically on the solidarity economy) also played an important role in facilitating the establishment of SEEs; however, these also

[18] Legally, ASMARE was created as an association; in accordance with Brazilian Law, to formalize a cooperative, an organization must have at least 20 members.

were implemented later in the movement. The first public policy related to the solidarity economy was not implemented until 1999.



Figure 5.4. Number of incubators and public policies implemented per year.

(Sources: Incubator data from ITCP (http://www.itcp.coppe.ufrj.br/rede_itcp.php) and funding documents. Public policy data from the Network of Managers of Public Policies of Solidarity Economy/*Redes de Gestores de Política Pública de Economia Solidária.)*

Overall, social religious organizations (Pastorals and CEBs) and pioneering cooperatives left institutional legacies (Greve & Rao, 2012, 2014) in communities that later served as resources for the founding of SEEs. These legacies included values (i.e., solidarity, common goals, liberation from oppression), practices (i.e., collective action, democratic decision-making), and models for addressing poverty and oppression. An important illustration of this connection between the legacies of the Catholic Church and SEEs is the diocese of Cratéus; the establishment of CEBs there in the 1960s changed the region: "the most important stage, that permeates all other stages, is the priority given to the CEBs," because the "pedagogy of CEBs causes members, with high or low status, to

re-appropriate their creative capacity" thereby enabling the "multiplication of community organizations of agriculture, small drugstores, small projects, etc." (Dom Fragoso, *Igreja de Cratéus*, 2005, p. 44). This trajectory culminated in the establishment of SEEs in the municipality of Cratéus, which is among the communities in Brazil with the most SEE founding activity (82 SEEs founded from the 1970s until 2009), as shown in Figure 5.5.



Figure 5.5. SEEs founded in Cratéus.

(Source: SENAES)

The Role of Cáritas as a Social Movement Organization

Although many organizations affiliated with the Catholic Church engaged in social and political programs, and priests promoted the establishment of solidarity enterprises, Cáritas drove the Catholic Church's participation in the SEM. Cáritas was a

key actor in the SEM, along with six other organizations[19] when the first National Solidarity Economy Forum convened during the World Social Forum in 2002. Notably, a Cáritas coordinator served as the plenary chairperson. Most importantly, Cáritas had implemented programs to incentivize the creation of collective enterprises before the emergence of the SEM and the term "solidarity economy enterprise."

The Catholic Church founded Cáritas in 1956 to distribute food to poor communities with a focus on charity. In the 1960s and 1970s, following the progressive period of the Catholic Church, Cáritas began to work with social programs to fight poverty through community empowerment. It was at this moment that the solidarity economy began to be developed.

> In the 1980s, Cáritas agents began to breathe the atmosphere of popular education, the Basic Ecclesial Communities (CEBs) and the social organizations and Pastoralists. This enabled a renewal of its methodology of action. The new strategy required a study of reality to better understand it. It was in the 1990s that Cáritas Brasileira designed innovative initiatives such as Alternative Community Projects and, with stable teams (national, regional and many dioceses), it has taken an active leadership in social pastoralism as a whole. (http://caritas.org.br/quem-somos-e-historico)

Through its Alternative Community Projects/*Projetos Alternativos Comunitários* (PACs) program, Cáritas helped groups organize economically to form cooperatives engaged in production, services, and infrastructure creation with the goal of increasing incomes and promoting community empowerment. These projects were collectively and democratically managed. Although they were not called SEEs at the time, they shared many of the same characteristics. During the 1980s, PAC activities were not well structured and orchestrated among the Cáritas units; however, as unemployment and poverty rose under the neoliberal government during the 1990s, and Cáritas grew closer

[19] These included ANTEAG (an organization that help employees take over bankrupted business), CUT (union), IBASE and FASE (non-profits), and MST (the Landless Movement).

to the other actors proposing a new economic system, projects were formalized and merged with the SEM.

As of 2017, Cáritas supported "groups of the Popular Solidarity Economy that aim for social, political, and economic emancipation that are located in impoverished communities" (Caritas, 2017). Cáritas had been established in approximately 200 dioceses, and the organization had helped more than 10,000 people found cooperatives, including ASMARE, which I discussed previously, and a women's cooperative in a slum in the city of São Paulo:

> If you need to stop working for health or family reasons or want to start a job after a certain age, the woman often has to face a double resistance: the market and the family. To help in this process, the Pastoral of Women in Brasilândia (north of São Paulo) develops, along with Cáritas, PES (Solidarity Economy Project) Workshops and cooperatives where 90% of the female members produce bread and educational toys. Proceeds are divided among the members. Coopersedo (Domestic Services Cooperative) brings together 16 women who were unemployed. By cleaning, babysitting, cooking dinners and lunches, each earns, on average, $80 per month. "We are still in the beginning; we cannot live on what is earned through the cooperative, but it is a solution for female unemployment in this region," says Ednalva de Carvalho Vieira, 50, community leader and member of the group. (*Quarta-Feira*, 7 March 2001)

Furthermore, Cáritas helps cooperatives connect to form markets. In the municipality of Santa Maria, Cáritas has developed solidarity economy projects since 1987 and organizes FEICOOP, the market fair mentioned previously. In the state of Maranhão (Northeast region), Cáritas created what is called the Cassava Network (*Rede Mandioca*), which supports 200 cooperatives of farmers, fishermen and garbage collectors, among others, by providing training and creating a distribution center for their products. In most cases, Cáritas operates by providing workshops, events and funding. The following quote describes the assistance Cáritas has provided to a crafts cooperative: "The support they [groups or solidarity enterprises] receive from Cáritas is material,

technical training in embroidery and painting, and political training on issues such as human rights, gender relations, and income generation" (Interviewee 13, Cáritas Coordinator-Northeast, 2018)

In this way, Cáritas's work within the solidarity economy has transformed impoverished communities:

> The solidarity economy is one of the most important experiences of collective self-liberation (collective emancipation) sponsored by the Church and conducted/initiated by low-income communities. It has been a two-decade long journey for Cáritas, beginning with social assistance programs and evolving into the promotion of community projects characterized by productive/economic endeavours, of which the objectives were (and still are) emancipation from poverty, as well as political and spiritual emancipation through participants' engagement in the fight for a more just and less unequal society. (Cáritas Brasileira, *20 Anos de Economia Popular Solidária, Trajetória da Cáritas Brasileira dos PACs à EPS*, 2003)

Cáritas has helped individuals break the cycle of poverty and achieve political and spiritual emancipation through two main mechanisms: (a) by building capabilities (i.e., networks and material infrastructure), and (c) by changing the cognitive and emotional perceptions of impoverished people.

Building capabilities: Networks and material infrastructure. Cáritas created an interrelated and far-reaching network infrastructure that has enabled the idea of cooperatives and best practices to spread to other areas. Contact between Cáritas chapters in different communities has facilitated learning that has enabled the movement to flourish. Cáritas also has provided material infrastructure (space, capital, training, among others) for the creation of cooperatives.

Cáritas's governance infrastructure has facilitated the establishment of an interrelated, collaborative, and interconnected network in which ideas, problems, solutions, and goals are readily shared; in other words, Cáritas's primary role has been to

create a learning space. Even though each Cáritas chapter is initially founded by a parish or archdiocese, once established, chapters are governed by a national body that organizes them into regional and national groups. These governance bodies meet regularly to discuss organizational actions and outcomes, as well as difficulties encountered by Cáritas chapters. For instance, one of the interviewees was coordinator of a solidarity economy project, but also participated in Cáritas at the diocese, state, and national levels. This governance creates spaces of intersection and facilitates a bottom-up and top-down flow of information and support for the creation of SEEs and programs in areas with Cáritas chapters. During meetings, experiences and examples are shared, creating a "databank" of ideas that can be drawn upon and implemented in different locales. The governance structure also creates social networks that might be useful when multiple chapters of Cáritas are trying to implement similar practices. For example, one interviewee discussed how in one of these meetings she had an idea to be implemented in her region:

> We are even thinking of creating a [market fair of] the Amazon and that this project would include all the ventures of the solidarity economy in the North...There is also a fair in Crateús which I had the pleasure of participating in last year, in Crateús, in the Northeast. It is also a very cool fair for solidarity economy enterprises that can be used as a model. So, for example…in the last Council I gave a suggestion, incidentally, the Northeast has its fair and the South has its fair, so how about the North having its fair for solidarity economy enterprises? (Interviewee 3, Cáritas Coordinator-North, 2018)

More than interconnected, Cáritas's network is far-reaching, including municipalities that are excluded from most societal institutions. The Catholic Church has parishes in many municipalities that are isolated and have little access to other organizations (such as government agencies, banks, universities) that could help impoverished groups establish solidarity enterprises and change their situations. In many cases, municipal governments

might not even know about the SEM, and the closest cooperative incubators may be located more than 200 km away. The archdioceses and parishes of the Catholic Church enable Cáritas to reach many small villages and secluded communities. Figure 5.6 shows the locations of municipalities with incubators, municipal-level public policies supporting the SEM, and Cáritas chapters in 2009.

Figure 5.6. Municipalities with (a) incubators, (b) public policies, and (c) Cáritas chapters in 2009.

(Sources: Incubators: ITCP (http://www.itcp.coppe.ufrj.br/rede_itcp.php) and funding documents. Public policies: Network of Managers of Public Policies of Solidarity Economy/*Redes de Gestores de Política Pública de Economia Solidária* (http://www.rededegestoresecosol.org.br/). Cáritas: http://caritas.org.br/rede-caritas/regionais-e-entidades-membro).

In addition to structuring collaborative and wide-ranging networks, Cáritas provides material infrastructure for the founding of cooperatives. The organization has managed the Rotating Solidarity Funds (*Fundo Rotativo Solidário*) since 1985. These funds are organized within a community to help groups fund their enterprises:

> One of the things that Cáritas supports very strongly in the solidarity economy is solidarity finance and Rotating Solidarity Funds… it strengthens communities by maintaining a fund to support the basic needs of that community [to help and

> empower each other]…I think this aspect of Rotating Solidarity Funds is one of the important aspects of our work. (Interviewee 5, Cáritas National, 2018)

Solidarity funds not only provide a source of material capital, but also a space to practice collective action, solidarity, and democratic management. They also provide opportunities to change the cognitive and emotional perceptions of people in impoverished settings:

> Solidarity funds, rather than project financing mechanisms, are instruments of the community economy in the service of local development, since social projects must play a role of strengthening local organizations, generating local/community economic and social development. Hence the non-assistive pedagogical character of the solidarity funds, since they incorporate processes of citizen activism for the expansion and seizing of rights to engage in development, and also establish links with solidarity regarding the prioritization of the most impoverished and needy regions. (http://caritas.org.br)

Overall, Cáritas has provided network and resource infrastructures that are often seen as resources for social movements (McCarthy & Zald, 1977a; Morris, 1986). My analysis reveals the qualities that such networks must have, particularly to help impoverished people take collective action. These networks must be far-reaching to enable knowledge and information about the ideals of the solidarity economy to travel to places that lack market and governmental institutions (Mair & Marti, 2009). They are also interconnected due to the scale shifts of the movement (Tarrow & McAdam, 2005; Tarrow, 2011), thereby enabling learning to travel between SMOs located in different communities.

Changing the cognitive and emotional perceptions of people living in poverty. Due to their daily struggles, people living in impoverished conditions might have low self-esteem, self-efficacy, and projective agency. Most do not see themselves as entrepreneurs, even though they might have been self-employed for a long time. In many

studies of SEEs, members have acknowledged how participating in the cooperatives enabled them to "raise their heads," "believe in themselves," etc. These testimonials provide evidence of how difficult it is for individuals in impoverished situations to plan for the future and see themselves as entrepreneurs. For example, in 1988, the garbage pickers (and homeless people) of ASMARE published a letter after a police attack describing the oppression of disadvantaged people:

> We, the paper pickers of Belo Horizonte, have suffered a lot. The town hall made us trash, throwing us into the sewer. We have family and children to care for...The city hall arrived on August 22 with the military police and civil defense at four o'clock in the morning, throwing the shacks to the ground with our things and all of us inside. We lost everything we had: blankets, containers, documents, money, groceries, clothes, shoes. We also lost the paper, scrap, aluminum, copper, iron we had to sell...We were left with nothing and nowhere to go. Why the government municipality makes us, garbage pickers, suffer? (Mendonça, 2006, p. 43)

Cáritas helps members of SEEs deal with issues of self-esteem, self-efficacy, and agency, among others, by changing their cognitive and emotional perceptions. To change individuals' cognitive views, Cáritas focuses on empowerment, convincing them that they do not need assistance, but can succeed by themselves. The passage below illustrates this educational process:

> Human development is seen as the ultimate goal of productive and creative activity. The new paradigm proposes that the ownership and management of productive assets be attributed to those who work in them. *The politically innovative dimension of this paradigm lies in conceiving each person, each citizen or group of citizens as the potentially active and creative subject of their own development.* Economic, political and cultural empowerment becomes the main objective of decision systems and educational activity, from basic education to university. (FBES, 2002)

To achieve these goals, Cáritas focuses on: "Rescuing the identities of people and their self-esteem, fostering hope, empowering communities in the elaboration, negotiation and implementation of development projects, strengthening the values of

solidarity in function of life, with dignity" (*Caderno Cáritas 2 Economia Popular Solidária*, p. 41). Cáritas also tries to bolster emotional energy through what the organization calls *mística*, described by one interviewee as:

> something very special; it is what gives us the courage to never give up, to never be discouraged…Something that moves us…to overcome the difficult moments that each one of us has. So, [*mística*] is something that moves us from the inside out. It is more than a religion…It is a structural transformation within ourselves and in the environment in which we live. (Interviewee 6, Cáritas Coordinator-South, 2018)

The interviewee explained that this *mística* could be accessed through religion. "In all our formative activities we make the *mística*, read the word of God, make that motivation happen. So it can and does come from the various religions" (Interviewee 6, Cáritas Coordinator-South, 2018). This *mística* is based on faith and often is exemplified by the work/words of Jesus or other divine entities. Cáritas developed many publications devoted solely to the topic of *mística*. In one publication from 2003, Cáritas explained how *mística* gives hope (a necessary emotion for impoverished individuals trying to create new enterprises) and illustrated this using examples from the Bible (although for them, *mística* comes from any type of spiritual action). *Mística* brings not only hope, but also what Aldrich and Stern (1983) called purposive and solidarity incentives, by giving individuals a common identity and instilling a desire to help one another.

In a way, the collective is what enables *mística* (or this faith, energy, hope) to emerge. While it could be an individual action, it is mostly collective. Seeing similar others succeed makes individuals realize that they also can succeed, even in challenging times. Noticing that others are struggling and coming together to talk about difficulties and propose solutions makes *mística* possible. The passage below draws on the example of Jesus's life and illustrates how stories about others overcoming challenges ignite hope.

> Spirituality and *mística* for Cáritas is an experience of faith. This is particularly evident in the most difficult times, at the times when everything would seem to be hopeless: this is when…the passion for life and for human rights, the trust in the Word of the Lord becomes very strong. *In fact, we are immersed in miracles, extraordinary actions that happen every day, by the goodness of God, in the lives of people abandoned by our society and rulers; and these miracles, more than many other words, keep our faith alive*. Because of this, in situations where hopelessness would be expected, a strong hope actually arises. It is how we experience the sense of Jesus's victory over death: it was not a personal victory, a source of a new power that can replace human initiative; it was the confirmation that everything Jesus had done in his life, including the actions that were condemned by those who did not accept his practices and his proposal, was accepted by God as a way to accomplish his will. Death is overcome not only after physical death, but also in all the action that opens the way for people to overcome domination, discrimination, oppression, prisons, blindness, and mutilation. This is the Good News that must be proclaimed to the poor, and it is the source of hope, of resurrection (Lk 4: 14-21). (Cáritas, *Mística e Espiritualidade*, 2003, p. 12)

Linking to this idea that *mística* is what helps people overcome difficulties, one interviewee described how it supports the founding and survival of SEEs by fostering not only hope, but also self-esteem and self-efficacy:

> For us, *mística* is more than a religion, for it goes beyond the confines of all ethnicities, cultures and creeds. *Mística* is what gives us resistance, which strengthens our struggle and our courage, of course, along with faith and life. Without the *mística*, no enterprise would survive because at the first difficulty, people become discouraged and think it is not worth it. So…we still have a definition that we use a lot when we form the new groups, when we have meetings with the partners that says: 'The organization belongs to the people; is the people who organize. It does not need a university, it does not need religion, nobody has to say that the people have to organize themselves. The organization belongs to the people.' (Interviewee 6, Cáritas Coordinator-South, 2018)

These teachings and conversations about *mística* happen before meetings with the groups engaged in creating solidary enterprises and at the beginning or end of SEM events (e.g., workshops on the solidarity economy, the Brazilian Forum of Solidarity Enterprise, FEICOOP). During these meetings, stories are normally used to exemplify *mística*:

> I will take an example of the Acts of the Apostles, the first Christians who lived 2018 years ago. They lived the solidarity economy, the cooperativism; they put everything in communal terms. At the end of the text it says: "Among them, he did not need." This type of text helps us a lot. It highlights that sharing, that

> solidarity, that people who put everything in communal terms, they look around and everyone has what it takes to live. (Interviewee 6, Cáritas Coordinator-South, 2018)

Furthermore, through *mística*, Cáritas directly promotes a new understanding of entrepreneurship that is not individual, but collective and participatory. Throughout the passages below, there are many references to the community, the collective, the group, and the oppressed. For instance, in a booklet to explain the Cáritas Rotating Solidarity Funds, it is stated:

> In the Brazilian semi-arid region, agricultural families develop an important form of organizational work based on *solidarity relations*. Who never shared the little drinking water available, the meat of the goat or the slaughtered cattle with the neighbours?…Who never took seed borrowed to pay at the end of winter? You pass the time, you change the ways you do things, but these practices remain firm…The maintenance of these practices over time demonstrates its importance as an essential condition for the resisting, living convivially and improving the living conditions in the semi-arid region. It was rescuing and reinforcing this culture of sharing and solidarity that [the organization] Articulation of the Semi-arid of Paraiba (ASA-PB) has been disseminating new cooperation practices of mutual help, such as the Rotating Solidarity Funds. (*Cordel do Fundo Solidário: Gerando Riquezas e Saberes*, 2008, p. 9)

In another booklet about how to develop the solidarity economy in communities, it is explained:

> Cáritas has been active in the solidarity economy for over 30 years. Its main objective in this area is to strengthen the initiatives of communities that are in a situation of social vulnerability so they can build another model of development—[based on] solidarity, sustainability and focused on the territory. (*Fortalecimento da Economia Solidária no Brasil: Articulação Territorial no Campo da Economia Solidária*, 2015, p. 5)

The idea of Cáritas is that entrepreneurship aligned with the teachings of Jesus translates to the creation of a solidarity enterprise. Thus, it was not only the narrative and values of the work of Cáritas that changed individuals' self-esteem, but also the continuous practice of participatory and democratic management that changed individuals' cognitive

and emotional perspectives.

Overall, Cáritas workers became the "known strangers" (Marti et al., 2013; Martin de Holan et al., 2017) who helped people in impoverished settings transform their lives. Cáritas changed ideas about the nature of entrepreneurship and who can be an entrepreneur by using the Bible and stories about Jesus to show that disadvantaged people can be entrepreneurs, and by showing that a new type of organizational form—cooperatives—is more aligned with Jesus's teachings. In addition, through *mística*, Cáritas seems to have established a ritual that creates emotional energy (Collins, 2004) that imbues individuals with self-esteem, self-efficacy, hope, purpose, and perseverance, all of which are important characteristics for entrepreneurship, especially entrepreneurship that is collective and originating in an impoverished context.

Summary

In conclusion, my analysis of how the Catholic Church influenced the SEM revealed three mechanisms: one operating mainly at the field level and other two operating at the community level. After I identified the mechanisms, I returned to the data and applied a theoretical lens to determine how they work. At the field level, the Catholic Church played a very important role in legitimizing the movement and framing solidarity enterprises as the "correct/moral" type of economic system. The Catholic Church occupied a subject position because the institution was a powerful and authoritative actor for all of Brazilian society, including elites. Through newspaper texts, Fraternity Campaigns and priests' homilies,[20] the Church advocated and justified this new economic system based on readings from the Bible. Although these discourses were

[20] The homily is the part of the Mass service when the priest explains Bible excerpts and delivers a sermon to promote spiritual edification.

sometimes conflicting (with some being more radical, for example, by advocating socialism), in most cases they had a level of resonance necessary for legitimation (mainly because they were based on the Bible). This resonance was also made possible not only because of what the stories said, but because of who told them. This example shows that not only legitimation, but also the status and power relations of actors influence the possibility of a strong subject position (Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Maguire et al., 2004).

The Catholic Church was able to legitimize the SEM because it created a sort of "optimal distinctiveness" (Zhao, Fisher, Lounsbury, & Miller, 2017) between the status quo and alternative views through two different characteristics: its (elitist) subject position and its narratives and discourse, which were aligned with the alternative economic system. In other words, the idea was new and "subversive," but the organization advocating for it was neither.

At the community level, the Catholic Church has left cultural legacies and established an SMO (i.e., Cáritas) that facilitate the establishment of SEEs. Many social organizations created inside the Catholic Church have provided communities with institutional toolkits for collective action. Furthermore, through its pioneering work to spread the SEM, the Catholic Church has left behind cultural legacies for the establishment of cooperatives.

Social organizations leave institutional legacies (Greve & Rao, 2012) related to collective organization and a focus on social causes, as well as the purposive and solidarity incentives needed for the establishment of cooperatives (Aldrich & Stern, 1983). Therefore, these social organizations not only provide an organizational infrastructure that can help bring together disadvantaged groups and empower them, but

also create institutional legacies for impoverished communities (Greve & Rao, 2012). These legacies include skills and practices that could be used to establish SEEs. My findings reveal the role of religious organizations as carriers of institutional legacies. According to Greve and Rao (2014), "religious organizations may influence norms and beliefs and have long term effects on culture and organizations" (p. 35). Completing their argument, my analysis shows that these organizations also impact practices as institutional carriers, not just norms and beliefs. These carriers imprint communities by establishing practices (i.e., collective action) that impact the establishment of cooperatives.

Moreover, and surprisingly, some institutional carriers in my case were established in response to the authoritarian military regime. This is an interesting finding, as a period of repression that would be expected to silence overt protests actually led to the creation of organizations that eventually became main drivers of community empowerment and political activity. This contributes to our understanding of institutional legacies by addressing the origin of institutional carriers.

The data further show that Cáritas helped communities establish SEEs via two main mechanisms: by building capabilities through far-reaching interconnected networks and material infrastructure; and by changing individuals' cognitive and emotional perceptions. The interconnected network of Cáritas exemplifies a common dynamic in social movements that is not often discussed. The literature has explained how scale shifts occur upwards or downwards (Tarrow, 2010), but most discussions on the topic are very static. I propose a dynamic view, in which these upward and downward shifts constantly occur, enabling adaptation and learning within the context of social

movements, thereby increasing the likelihood of achieving goals (Giugni & Grasso, 2019; Van Dyke & Taylor, 2018; Wang, Piazza, & Soule, 2018).

The importance of religion to social movements lies primarily in the breadth and robustness of religious networks. Morris (1986) demonstrated how churches became connecting spaces for the civil rights movement in the United States. Similarly, my analysis shows that religion plays an especially important role in helping social movements achieve goals in areas with institutional voids that lack market and governmental institutions (Mair & Marti, 2009; Mair, Martí, & Ventresca, 2012). Due to the tenure of religion and the focus of some religions on conversion as a way to advance colonialism, this institution is far-reaching. Often, religion is one of the only institutional orders available to organize a given community and guide individuals' behaviors.

Lastly, Cáritas has changed the cognitive and emotional perceptions of individuals in impoverished situations. The organization utilized a pedagogical methodology of empowering and allowing individuals to learn and act without assistance. In addition, *mística*, a specific practice of taking time during meetings to discuss examples of overcoming struggles or religious texts, might be a ritualistic way to instigate emotional energy (Collins, 2004). This emotional energy is an essential part of mobilizing and developing social movements and achieving related goals (Jasper, 2011).

While the work of Cáritas supported the establishment of SEEs, this relationship was not contingent on the specific institutional logic of the Catholic Church in each community. In the next chapter, I discuss the two institutional logics of the Catholic Church in Brazil and how they have influenced the work of Cáritas and the activities of the Catholic Church in pioneering and creating cultural legacies.

CHAPTER 6

FINDINGS: COMPETING LOGICS IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

So far, I have explained the initial empirical puzzle motivating this dissertation—variation in the establishment of SEEs across Brazilian communities—which informed my research question: *How do institutions and institutional logics shape the trajectory of a social movement and influence community-level variance in key movement outcomes, such as the establishment of a new organizational form?* After the first stage of data analysis, which enabled me to craft a narrative of the development of the SEM, I noticed the prominent role of the Catholic Church in the movement. In the previous chapter, I identified the mechanisms of how the Catholic Church and an affiliated SMO, Cáritas, influenced the emergence and spread of the SEM and the founding of SEEs in municipalities.

While analyzing how the Catholic Church influenced the SEM, I noticed two distinct logics of the Catholic Church, and that the more progressive one seemed to be more aligned with the SEM. With that in mind, I returned to my data to try to understand these logics and how they influenced the SEM. To do so, I re-read documents in my data corpus pertaining to the role of the Catholic Church in the SEM and also searched for new documents related to the general history of the Catholic Church.

Catholicism is very hierarchical and authoritative, especially compared to other religions with flatter hierarchies that do not require pastors to have formal training and believe followers can connect with God without the need of a third party (i.e., a priest). However, I found that many Catholics have criticized this hierarchical structure and combatted against it. In this section, I explain the emergence of the Liberation Theology

and Movement, and how criticism of this theology led to the emergence of two competing logics in the Catholic Church—conservative and progressive—that were instantiated differently across geographic regions of Brazil. I further explain that materiality (or scarcity) was the reason why some communities predominantly adopted the progressive or conservative Catholic institutional logic.

Liberation Theology

In response to the rise of dictatorships in Latin America, the Catholic Church became politically active after the Second Vatican Council convened. Led by Hélder Câmara, a Brazilian bishop persecuted during the dictatorship, 15 bishops wrote and published "A Message to the People of the Third World," proclaiming that:

> "The peoples of the Third World are the proletariat of today's humanity," that "the gospel demands the first, radical revolution," and that the "wealth must be shared by all." The letter charges that the wealthy wage a "class warfare" against the workers, "massacring entire peoples throughout the whole world," and that "true socialism is Christianity integrally lived." (Smith, 1991, p. 16)

After that encounter, in 1968, 130 bishops met in Medellin, Colombia for a plenary session of CELAM (the Latin American Episcopal Council) titled "The Church in the Present-Day Transformation of Latin America in the Light of the Council." The final document describes how the bishops needed to take action against poverty and how poverty is against God's plan:

> The Latin American bishops cannot remain indifferent in the face of the tremendous social injustices existing in Latin America, which keep the majority of our peoples in dismal poverty, which in many cases become inhuman wretchedness. A deafening cry pours from the throats of millions of men, asking their pastors for a liberation that reaches them from nowhere else…Poverty, as a lack of the goods necessary to live worthily as men, is in itself evil. The prophets denounce it as contrary to the will of the Lord and most of the time as the fruit of the injustice and sin of men. (Poverty of the Church, Latin American Bishops, 6 September 1968)

These events led to the emergence of a broad social movement within the Catholic Church: Liberation Theology (previously called Revolutionary Theology). Liberation Theology is a set of religious beliefs and ideas about and for liberation, and "an attempt to mobilize a previously unmobilized constituency for collective action against an antagonist to promote social changes" (Smith, 1991, p. 25). This approach to theology is practical, in the sense that it is not based on the idea that religion should start with a set of beliefs and norms and individuals should apply them; on the contrary, it is based on the idea that people need to work for liberation and then reflect on these practices, establishing ideas and beliefs (theology) that then come full circle by informing their practices (Smith, 1991).

Overall, these theological ideals and beliefs can be explained by a focus on fighting for social justice. In that sense, Liberation Theology not only engages with the personal or spiritual realms of life, but also expects individuals to be socially and politically active to make society more just/equal. Advocates argue that while in North America and Europe the biggest "issue" of the Catholic Church is the non-believer, in Latin America the problem is the non-person, "the one who has been dehumanized through poverty, oppression, and domination" (Smith, 1991, p. 32). To solve the problem of the non-person, adherents to Liberation Theology interpreted the Gospel as privileging the poor, defining Jesus Christ as the liberator of the oppressed. Furthermore, although they recognized historical links between the Catholic Church and elites, they argued that this has changed over time and that the Church should become the Church of the Poor (Smith, 1991). Based on these ideals, Liberation Theology became the foundation of a very progressive sector within the Catholic Church.

Brazil was one of the original strongholds of Liberation Theology. In addition to Hélder Câmara, the Brazilian bishop who was a founder the movement in Medellin, two important thinkers of Liberation Theology, brothers Leonardo and Clóvis Boff, lived and worked in Brazil. Liberation Theology grew, especially during the dictatorship era, and priests aligned with the fight against political injustice, many of whom were tortured and/or murdered. During that time, the Liberation Theology movement encouraged a new form of organizing: Basic Ecclesial Communities/*Comunidades Eclesiales de Base* (CEBs).

Basic Ecclesial Communities

CEBs served as grassroots fora for Catholics (with the help of clergy and trained lay members) to organize and lead Mass as well as community and spirituality programs in homes or small chapels. These gatherings also functioned as political spaces in which new social ideas and the fight for democracy were discussed. CEBs introduced new ways of organizing. Because the CEBs were organized and managed in a democratic way (i.e., decisions were made collectively, and a priest was not required for an individual to engage in religious practices), community members engaged in a new, non-hierarchical and participatory way of organizing that deviated from the norms of the hierarchical Catholic Church. These organizations grew tremendously during the 1960s and 1970s with some studies suggesting the establishment of more than 60,000 CEBs in that era. These organizations continue to have a presence in Brazil:

> Born of Liberation Theology in the 1970s, the Basic Ecclesial Communities (CEBs) remain faithful to the preferential option for the left, with undisguised preference for the Workers' Party (PT)...With the CEBs and other acronyms of the Catholic avant-garde, there are more than 10 million people who frequently attend events and are committed to solving social problems. Parallel to their specific vocations in the spiritual and pastoral fields, the leaders of these

> organizations discuss [with their communities] the political candidates' proposals to assess which of them deserve an indication and, possibly, the explicit support of the community (José Maria Mayrin, *Moderados disputam com esquerda na Igreja*, 31 March 2002, *O Estado de São Paulo*)

The Emergence of Competing Logics

Despite its importance to Latin America and the endorsement of the Church during the 1960s and 1970s, Liberation Theology was harshly criticized in the late 1980s by the new Pope John Paul II, who did not accept the idea of a less centralized Catholic Church. This led to conflict inside the Brazilian Catholic Church and the emergence of two opposing logics. Leonardo Boff, a proponent of Liberation Theology silenced twice by the Catholic Church, once for publishing his book *Church: Charisma and Power*, and again to prevent him from attending ECO-92,[21] described the Brazilian Catholic Church in the 1990s as divided:

> There are two models in conflict. One is of the Church as institution, Church as hierarchy, Church as power, [Church] that is structured around the Pope, cardinals, bishops, dioceses, and parishes…and the other, that I would call Church-as-network-of-communities that is grounded in the communities, in the community associations, in groups [many of them CEBs] that live their faith in their meetings and that has its strength in the Christian archetype. (Leonardo Boff, *Caros Amigos,* 1997)

These two institutional logics inform how Catholics think, relate with God, practice their faith, and act in the world. In Table 6.1, I compare the logics. While both conservative and progressive values are rooted in the Gospel (i.e., the Bible), the interpretation associated with the conservative logic is more focused on the believer and his/her salvation. The primary focus is on doing good deeds so one can go to heaven after

[21] ECO-92 was a United Nations Conference held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in June 1992. This conference (United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, or Earth Summit) aimed to provide a forum for UN member states to deliberate and discuss the world's sustainability issues. Outcomes of this conference included Agenda 21 and the Climate Change Convention agreement, which led to the Kyoto and Paris agreements.

judgment day. Doing good means following the rules and practices of the Church, which are established by the Pope, the main authority of the Church. Some of these practices include attending church on Sundays and receiving all eucharists. Within this logic, believers cannot directly talk with God; instead, they need the help of a religious authority, such as a priest. Thus, authority comes from being a trained priest (and also being male, as nuns cannot lead Mass) and one's hierarchical position within the structure of the Catholic Church.

The progressive logic comes from a reading of the Bible focused on the poor, in which doing good equates to promoting social justice. While those who adopt this logic recognize the authority of the Pope, they also believe that laypeople can have a direct connection with God and can celebrate Mass and other eucharists. Because of the focus on social justice, governance is democratic and the main practices (and sources of identity) involve participating in social programs, helping the community, and fighting for social justice. The values underlying the progressive logic also have led to the emergence of new practices, such as holding Mass in a layperson's house, protesting against big corporations, and helping landless people acquire property, among others. These values and activities diverge significantly from those of the traditional, hierarchical Catholic Church, where only priests can lead Mass, and the Pope is the principal authority.

Table 6.1

Institutional Logics of the Catholic Church

Feature	Conservative Logic	Progressive Logic
Original metaphor	Gospel of salvation	Gospel of the poor: "There is no question, then, but that God's will is for human liberation." (Smith, 1991, p. 34)
Core values	Spiritual renewal: "The main objective of this Catholic branch, the militants affirm, is the spiritual renewal, thus, any performance in the social field should result from the inner maturation, therefore of individual character." (Jurkevics, 2004, p. 125)	Social justice: "Liberation Theology does not restrict itself to the personal or spiritual realms of life. It also engages with economic, political, and cultural matters." (Smith, 1991, p. 28)
Source of values	Gospel	Gospel: "Liberation, for Christians, draws its inspiration from the gospel, in the 'truth about Christ, the Church, and the human being." (Boff & Boff, 1986, p. 66)
Basis of the strategy (mission)	Disseminating a conversion doctrine: "They [conservatives] tend to view social ills in personal, not structural, terms and view the appropriate social role of Catholicism as providing conventional charity and moral guidelines for society and challenging individuals to personal conversion." (Smith, 1991, p. 52)	Collective action for social justice: "This analysis views poverty as a collective and conflictive result of oppression which can only be overcome through the establishment of an alternative social system through social-structural transformation" (Boff & Boff, 1986, p. 26-27); "He [God] is a God who takes sides with the poor and liberates them from slavery and oppression." (Gutierrez, 1983, p.7-8)
Sources of legitimacy	Formally determined, hierarchical, theological training: "Not all priests understood the ministries of the laity. They thought the 'traditional' church was right. They thought that lay people, especially the poor, coming from the impoverished environment, were ignorant and had not been prepared for [ministry]." (Fragoso, 2005, p. 52)	Faith and social/political action: "To know God is to do justice, is to be in solidarity with the poor person… Thus, in order to know or love God, one must come to grips with the concrete life situations of the poor today, and undertake radical transformation of a society that makes them poor." (Gutiérrez, 1983, p. 51)
Sources of authority	Following the rules of the Catholic Church set by the Vatican: "Conservatives are most concerned with maintaining Church tradition, hierarchical authority, and doctrinal orthodoxy." (Smith, 1991, p. 52)	Taking social/political action: "The experience and meaning of the faith based on the commitment to abolish injustice and to build a new society; this theology must be verified by the practice of that commitment, by active, effective participation in the struggle which the exploited social classes have undertaken against their oppressors." (Gutierrez, 1973, p. 11)
Governance	Hierarchical: "There is a common thought from above, from the authority with which the subjects —people, communities, and even local churches— must be and remain in an attitude of obedience and compliance." (Lebanese,	Democratic, participatory: "The construction of chapels — or of community halls where the sacraments were also celebrated — was decided according to the community and the priest, but not by the authoritarian decision of the

Feature	Conservative Logic	Progressive Logic
	2005, p. 19)	priest." (Fragoso, 2005, p. 53)
Control modes (formal and informal)	Authority of the Pope and priests: "The liturgy was practically the priest, who presided, celebrated with his back to the people, used the Latin language, made the homily alone, decided everything about the churches, the chapels, presided over the associations, administered the money of the cult. If you were to ask Christians in the poor regions who the church was, they responded that the church was the priest, the bishops, the Pope." (Fragoso, 2005, p. 50)	Authority of the Gospel: "It was understood that the Holy Spirit, not the person of the bishop or of the priest, was the great reference of their Christian vocation. They passed, little by little, of their mere condition of fulfilling tasks at the behest of the priest to their condition of Christians committed to the project of the Kingdom of God." (Ferreira Calado, 2005, p. 58)
Practices	Attending church every Sunday, participating in all eucharists, following the Church rules: "Thus, seeking to reinforce their catholicity, the Charismatic followers began to also enhance traditional Catholicism, in addition to emphasizing sacramental practices and unconditional adherence to the Pope." (Jurkevics, 2004, p. 127)	Layperson celebration: "The conciliar theme of the liturgy motivated, within the Christian communities, the study of the conciliar text, the stimulus of popular liturgical creativity, and the celebration of the day of the Lord without the presence of the priest." (Fragoso, 2005, p. 51)

These two competing logics influence the work of the Catholic Church, including the work of Cáritas, which is aligned with the progressive logic, albeit a less radical form. The passage below illustrates how the practices of the conservative logic of the Church, with its ritualistic ways, are disconnected from individuals' daily lives and highlights how differences between the logics affect individuals who work for Cáritas:

> Another way to nourish the faith is to participate in the liturgical celebrations of communities. We do this, and we often grow in our decision to follow Jesus. But this is not always the case, since many celebrations are done in a very ritualistic way, with repetitive formulas, unrelated to life. This leads us to experience some conflicts because we deeply desire the relationship with the community, but we do not feel well in the celebrations. We still see a lot of machismo presence in them, especially by the exclusivity of the presbyterate for celibate men, and little willingness to accept the free and responsible participation of people. There is a very great centralism, and this contradicts what we believe…regarding human/citizenship rights, as well as the Christianity practiced and proclaimed by Jesus, for he always promoted fraternal relations, equality between brothers…*The analysis [of Cáritas participants] revealed these tensions and conflicts and indicated, as we shall see, that this is one of the points that we will need to deepen.* (Cáritas, *Mística e Espiritualidade*, 2003, p. 11)

Materiality and the Adoption and Instantiation of Logics

These two institutional logics were instantiated differently in different regions of Brazil. Therefore, a secondary question is to examine why. My analysis indicates that this variation is due to the Pope's rearrangement of the top authorities of the Catholic Church, and superseding it, the material reality of each locale. To try to contain the progressive institutional logic, the Pope tried to shift the Latin American and Brazilian Catholic Church toward the conservative logic. To do so, John Paul II not only criticized Liberation Theology and silenced its most radical proponents, but also installed many new conservative bishops in the 1990s and 2000s. As a result, most progressive priests were relegated to the Northeast and North regions of Brazil, as explained by an interviewee:

> Some bishops "escaped" and were progressive. The ones that escaped were more bishops and not archbishops (the archbishops were in metropolitan cities, in leading ecclesial regions, in more important cities, and were chosen to be more loyal to the conservative project). On the contrary, the bishops that were sent to smaller, poorer, central Brazilian dioceses, were more combative and progressive…In general, the bishops in the Northeast and North were mostly progressive; in the Center-West some were progressive; nonetheless, in the Southeast and South most of them were conservative. (Interviewee 10, Professor, Researcher of the Catholic Church Brazil, 2018)

Corroborating this interview, in his book about the role of the Catholic Church in the SEM in Brazil, de Souza (2013) explained that John Paul II nominated conservative bishops for four out of the five positions in the Archdiocese of São Paulo (which previously had been a very progressive archdiocese located in the Southeast) as well as a conservative bishop from Rio de Janeiro (located in the Southeast) for president of CNBB. Additional evidence of this change, especially in the Southeast, was that a well-known progressive priest, José Comblin, encountered difficulties in organizing seminars

after he gave a speech criticizing the more conservative side of Catholic Church, especially the Opus Dei movement. Overall, "the Vatican did not position itself against democracy, but rejected the participation of its priests and bishops (*clérigos*) in the fights for political change" (de Souza, 2013, p. 44), particularly in the Southeast, the most industrialized region of Brazil.

As discussed in Chapter 4, the North and Northeast regions were the poorest and least developed areas of Brazil, which impacted the actions of the priests in that region. The material reality of the situation, especially in the arid area in the Northeast, led most priests in that region to embrace the progressive logic of the Catholic Church.

The arid area was given formal boundaries and dubbed the "Drought Polygon" (*Polígono da Seca*) by the government in 1951 in an effort to develop specific policies to address challenges associated with the dry climate of the region. The Drought Polygon is located in the middle of the Northeast region and includes 1,266 municipalities. Rainfall is minimal in most areas, whereas others are prone to heavy rains or floods, making the climate of the region extreme and causing famines, especially among the subsistence farmers. Many governmental and social initiatives, including Cáritas programs, helped families build cisterns to address water scarcity in the region.

The relationship between the Northeast region of Brazil and the more progressive form of Catholicism is clear based on data from many documents and interviews. For instance, when describing the Solidarity Funds of Cáritas, an interviewee identified that the material reality motivates the social actions of the Catholic Church in the Northeast:

> The Solidarity Funds started 10 years before because of the Northeast. The hunger and the situation in the Northeast has led the Bishops to take up this line of action...The Solidarity Funds. The Rotating Fund, which is not something that originated within Cáritas, emerged from grassroots groups [Pastorals and CEBs]

> of the Church that were already working in Paraíba [a state in the Northeast region]. Bishops held a large seminar there in the Northeast, due to the drought situation, because of the horrors of the dictatorship, and decided that they would create a fund to support small projects. (Interviewee 1, Former Cáritas Coordinator, 2018)

The punishing climate and consequent famine is one reason that even priests who had not been exposed to the progressive ideology ultimately engaged in social and political action. "Many priests who had a conservative training, when they arrived at very poor regions, they converted, and assumed clearly the 'option for the poor'" (Interviewee 10, Professor, Researcher of the Catholic Church Brazil, 2018)

Smith (1991) confirmed how material reality can change a priest's inclination toward a logic in the introduction to his book, *The Emergence of Liberation Theology Radical Religion and Social Movement Theory,* which tells the story of Archbishop Oscar Romero of San Salvador who was executed by a right-wing individual in 1980. Smith explained how the Vatican had nominated Romero to become an archbishop in 1977 because of his conservative inclination. However, this strategy backfired, as Romero changed his position once he realized the poverty, social injustices, and violence occurring in the region.

> No one would have predicted Oscar Romero's fate…he was a traditional bishop who spoke of the "eminently religious and transcendent" mission of priests, and who criticized political ideologies. His appointment rankled the progressive clergy of his archdiocese…Three years later…in the midst of great violence, Romero proclaimed in his Sunday homily, "Let no one take it ill that in the light of God's words that we read in our Mass we enlighten social, political, and economic realities. If we did not, it would not be Christianity for us. Every solution we want to give for a better distribution of land, to a better administration of money in El Salvador, to a political organization fitted for the common good of Salvadorians, will have to be sought always in the totality of the definitive liberation." (Smith, 1991, pp. 1-2)

Romero was canonized by the Catholic Church in 2015 and became the patron saint of Cáritas. Many other priests and bishops, including Dom Hélder Câmara in Brazil, experienced a similar ideological shift, as explained by one interviewee:

> For example, in my diocese, until recently, most of the priests were foreigners (Italians, Spanish, Belgians), who come from a reality of social welfare, and they come here and they find that reality; they enter a process to want a social transformation, because of this experience they have…if you get the trajectory of Dom Hélder Câmara, it was this as well; in the 1930s he was a sympathizer of integralism [a fascist and nationalist movement group operating in Brazil in the 1930s and 1940s]…he was a person who was able to change as the reality sensitized him…for example, when he saw that the donations of food from foreign countries [via Cáritas programs] were a form of domination and control, he stopped these programs. (Interviewee 14, Cáritas Coordinator-Northeast, 2019)

Summary

In the previous chapter, I explained how the Catholic Church was a primary proponent of the SEM and played an important role in the establishment of SEEs throughout Brazil. I highlighted that this work was facilitated indirectly by cultural legacies of Catholic social organizations, and directly by Cáritas, which helped groups develop the necessary infrastructure and cognitive and emotional dispositions to establish SEEs. However, the history of the Catholic Church in Brazil is permeated by a conflict between two institutional logics that reflect different beliefs, values and practices. I have demonstrated how these logics manifested in different regions, largely due to the material reality of specific locales.

I have shown how conflicting logics in a higher level field are resolved at the community level through the predominant adoption of a single logic (Thornton et al., 2012). Communities might predominantly adopt one of the logics due to their circumstances. While scholars have addressed how community logics emerge in different locales, or how institutional logics at the community level impact organizations and

enterprise establishment, I have extended the literature by examining why some communities adopt one logic and not the other, demonstrating how materiality (in this case, scarcity) structures how institutional logics impact the establishment of enterprises. In addition, I have shown that logics impact the ability of social movements and related organizations to achieve their goals.

Moreover, I have provided evidence that authoritarian regimes can drive the emergence of collective action and social organizations (in this case, religious organizations) that become carriers of institutional legacies (Greve & Rao, 2014; Schneiberg, 2006). My analysis reveals the origin of such carriers, an element that is missing from current theory on institutional legacies (Greve & Rao, 2014). It also indicates a flipside of authoritarian regimes for collective action. While those who adopt a political opportunity structure perspective would argue that under authoritarian regimes, collective action would be quieter compared with more open governments (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996)—which indeed seems to be the case, even though it is not the focus of this research—my findings highlight how this political structure influenced collective action years after it had been replaced.

Based on my findings, I expect that the regional variance in institutional logics affected the ability of Cáritas to achieve its goals and the work of the Catholic Church as a supporter of the movement. In the next chapter, I draw on my findings and on the social movement and institutional logics literatures to propose hypotheses which I then empirically test.

CHAPTER 7

HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT AND RESULTS

The support of the Catholic Church was crucial for the SEM and the work of Cáritas for the diffusion of SEEs. My qualitative analysis of archival and interview data suggests that the presence of Cáritas in a community had a positive effect on the establishment of SEEs. Furthermore, because the Catholic Church supported the SEM, I predict a stronger relationship between the presence of Cáritas and the founding of cooperatives in municipalities where the Catholic Church has a stronger presence. Yet, because the Catholic Church is an institution permeated by two competing institutional logics (i.e., progressive and conservative), I propose that the predominant logic shaped the relationship between Cáritas and the Catholic Church in facilitating the establishment of cooperatives. Below I draw on insights from my qualitative data analysis and the literature on social movements and institutional logics to develop my hypotheses.

Hypothesis Development

The presence of SMOs as a determinant of success. In studies on social movements and outcomes, researchers have examined various ways that social movements influence markets. We know how social movement protests created reputational problems for corporations, impacting companies' stock prices (King & Soule, 2007). Studies also have revealed how membership in social movements such as the Sierra Club and Grange (Carlos, Sine, Lee, & Haveman, 2018; Sine & Lee, 2009) influence outcomes, especially entrepreneurship. In this case, the mechanism involves the dissemination of new cultural ideas and frames to make the local context more receptive to the values and goals of the movement by: (a) opening pathways to new types of

entrepreneurship, such as wind farms for environmental movements (Sine & Lee, 2009); and (b) eliminating entrepreneurship opportunities in industries contrary to a social movement's ideals, such as breweries in the case of the Women's Christian Temperance Union (Hiatt et al., 2009). These studies have demonstrated the importance of social movements for economic outcomes; by influencing cultural norms and public opinion, social movements transform community receptivity to specific industries. Nevertheless, researchers have not yet examined the specific role of SMOs, especially economically-driven organizations, and their direct effects on outcomes (Snow & Beyerlein, 2019)

Overall, I expect that when an SMO is present in a community, social movement outcomes are more positive (Giugni, 1998). SMOs can influence cultural beliefs and norms within a community, changing residents' receptivity to the ideas and goals of a movement. In previous studies, scholars found that social movement membership influences outcomes (Hiatt et al., 2009; Schneiberg et al., 2008; Sine & Lee, 2009). SMOs contribute additional resources to social movements (Carlos, Sine, Lee, & Haveman, 2018; Cress & Snow, 1996; Greve et al., 2006; McCarthy & Zald, 1977a) that also can support the development of capabilities in a community; for example, SMOs facilitate the dissemination of knowledge and practices (Sine & Lee, 2009), create networks that connect individuals with similar objectives (Greve et al., 2006), and provide formal spaces that enable people with similar goals to gather, receive training, and share resources (Schneiberg et al., 2008). My qualitative analysis reveals how Cáritas played an important role in the SEM by creating a widespread, interrelated, and connected network and providing material resources. This network facilitated the

dissemination of knowledge to many communities, and enabled a learning process essential to achieving the movement's primary goal: the establishment of cooperatives.

In addition, I propose that SMOs can influence people's cognitive and emotional perceptions, especially in impoverished regions. SMOs help generate the emotional energy and persistence needed to accomplish the goals of social movements, which can be quite difficult, since most involve changing the status quo. Different from emotional empowerment, in which heightened feelings of anger and pride bind people together and alleviate concerns about free riding (Rao & Dutta, 2012), emotional energy and persistence provide strength in the face of adversities and obstacles. My qualitative findings show that through *mística*, individuals were able to persist in the establishment SEEs, despite numerous difficulties. *Mística* was used by Cáritas to create the emotional energy necessary for individuals in a community to organize cooperatives. Individuals felt supported and could empathize with others going through similar situations; moreover, they could collectively plan their future and work together to overcome obstacles to the establishment of cooperatives (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998).

In line with findings in the literature, Cáritas also educated community members about new organizational forms and practices, and helped them establish cooperatives by providing technical training, funding (i.e., from the Solidarity Economy Funds), social capital, and other material infrastructure. Thus, I predict:

Hypothesis 1: A positive relationship exists between the presence of Cáritas and the number of SEEs founded in a community.

The influence of religion on social movement outcomes. Community-level institutions such as religion affect organizational founding activity and social movements

(Marquis et al., 2013; Zald, 1982). Religion provides meaning systems, value structures, and infrastructures that influence the actions of individuals (Dana, 2009; Friedland, 2002; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Tracey, 2012) as well as the outcomes of social movements. Although religion is not prominent and secularization is strong in many countries (Dodd & Seaman, 1998), it remains a major organizing element in many locales, especially in impoverished regions (Mair et al., 2012) such as Brazil and other countries in the Global South. In a review about religion in Latin America, De la Torre and Martín (2016) explained: "religion is generally considered to be a foundation of Latin American culture and identity that has left obvious marks on the configuration of space and time in the region" (De la Torre & Martín, 2016, p. 474).

Moreover, religion has been an important player in incentivizing collective organizational forms, such as cooperatives. For example, kibbutzim are instantiations of Jewish ideological positions (Simons & Ingram, 2003), Hutterites created community collectivist organizations based on Anabaptist Christian beliefs in Western Canada (Nordstrom, 2016), a Catholic priest founded Mondragón (Whyte & Whyte, 1991), and as I discussed, the Catholic Church has played an important role in establishing cooperatives in Latin America (Rothschild, 2016). Thus, I expect that a community's religious composition and activities (characteristics that are typically overlooked in the literature) are essential elements to understanding a community's propensity to establish new collective organizational forms.

Religion influences social movement outcomes, especially the establishment of new organizations, through four main mechanisms: (a) by creating a sense of solidarity among community members; (b) by providing free spaces that help individuals feel

empowered; (c) by establishing the legitimacy of—and thus a community's receptiveness to—particular organizations and practices; and (d) by establishing social organizations that leave legacies that help social movements achieve their goals. A community's sense of solidarity, which can be enabled by religious beliefs, can increase its propensity to enact practices or create organizations that are good for the collective. For instance, Vaisey (2007) showed how moral order is important for creating "we-feeling," which gives a community "a sense of group identification and solidarity." This we-feeling is similar to the solidarity purpose needed for the establishment of cooperatives (Aldrich & Stern, 1983; Rothschild-Whitt, 1979; Zald, 1982). Religions can create this sense of we-ness or solidarity purpose by teaching about helping others, specifically people in need.

Religion provides a sense of liberation for oppressed groups by establishing free spaces within their parishes (Morris, 1986) or sponsoring festivals (Rao & Dutta, 2012). For instance, Morris (1986) described how the Baptist Church was a space in which oppressed black communities in the Southern United States could express themselves, share their struggles, and create a social structure separate from the rest of American society. Church experiences instilled these individuals with confidence, despite their low status outside their congregations. Churches provided environments that helped an oppressed group feel emancipated and empowered. Similarly, Rao and Dutta (2012) showed how religious festivals provided free spaces for soldiers of different castes to come together, thereby providing the emotional empowerment necessary to combat the English army. Similarly my qualitative analysis reveals that people in impoverished regions often feel a sense of hopelessness; many feel that they do not have the ability to change their lives, let alone found businesses or become entrepreneurs; religious spaces

play an important role by helping these individuals develop the self-esteem and self-efficacy necessary to found enterprises.

Religion also is an institution that grants legitimacy and increases receptivity to certain practices and organizations (Zald, 1982). For example, in their study of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union, Hiatt et al. (2009) demonstrated how the Union challenged the legitimacy of the alcohol industry, thereby contributing to a decrease in the number of breweries and an increase in the number of new soft drink firms. Schneiberg (2002) showed how the "proclivities" of religions to self-organize shaped the establishment of cooperatives in the United States. In my case, the Catholic Church played an important role in legitimizing the SEM by adopting a subject position (Maguire & Hardy, 2009; Maguire et al., 2004) and engaging in storytelling (Gehman & Soublière, 2017; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Soublière & Gehman, forthcoming) through editorial pieces in newspapers, homilies, and Fraternity Campaigns.

Lastly, religion can establish carriers of institutional legacies (Greve & Rao, 2014). My analysis demonstrates that the Catholic Church founded many social organizations and pioneered cooperatives that imprinted communities with practices and values that support collective action, social justice, and solidarity. In the context of the SEM, these communities had more cultural toolkits to draw upon, so residents understood the concept of cooperatives, how cooperatives organize, how poor people can collectively enact change, and the possibility for change, among others.

In conclusion, participation in religion can create a sense of solidarity among individuals, empower groups in less advantageous situations, increase the legitimacy of (and consequently, receptivity to) certain organizational forms, and serve as cultural

carriers for institutional legacies, which would indicate that, independent of religious doctrine, religion could positively impact the outcomes of social movements. Nonetheless, researchers have shown that some religions might more actively promote or be more prone to accept certain practices and organizational forms; consequently, I expect that in a community where the predominant religion's norms, values, and organizing practices align with the goals of a social movement, religion positively impacts the relationship between the presence of SMOs and social movement outcomes.

Furthermore, religion can influence the work of SMOs. My data analysis shows that the widespread network of the Catholic Church enabled Cáritas to reach remote locales. Additionally, the practice of *mística,* which generates emotional energy, has a religious/spiritual component that influenced the establishment of cooperatives. Moreover, for a religiously-affiliated SMO, the predominance of that specific religion in the community should increase its effectiveness because more individuals with similar values could help the SMO achieve its goals, and the community would strongly support the SMO's ideals.

In the case of the SEM and Cáritas, I expect that the stronger the presence of the Catholic Church in a community, the more Cáritas would have been able to help groups establish SEEs. Often, the Catholic Church condemns economic prosperity, and its strict hierarchical structure[22] stands in stark contrast to the ideals of cooperatives. Evidence in the literature demonstrates that Protestantism positively influences entrepreneurship (Weber, 2013) and the establishment of cooperatives (Schneiberg, 2002). In my empirical case, the Catholic Church was a central actor and strong supporter of the SEM. Thus:

[22] Primary tenets of Catholicism are that there is an intermediary between an individual and God (i.e., the priest), and that the Eucharist can only be led by a priest, not a layperson; moreover, the Catholic Church has a very strong hierarchy, with the Vatican and the Pope at the top.

Hypothesis 2: The relationship between the presence of Cáritas and the founding of SEEs is stronger in communities with a stronger Catholic presence.

The effects of competing logics. Religion (specifically Christianity in the West), is a central institution that:

> shapes individual preferences and organizational interests as well as the repertoire of behaviors by which they may attain them. These institutions are potentially contradictory and hence make multiple logics available to individuals and organizations. Individuals and organizations transform the institutional relations of society by exploiting these contradictions. (Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 232)

Catholicism follows this path and has two competing institutional logics—that is, high-order sets of norms, practices, and values (Lounsbury, 2007; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Thornton et al., 2012)—that impact how priests and congregations enact their religious beliefs. Organizations encounter difficulties when attempting to respond to competing logics, which also affect missions, change initiatives and practices of organizations, professions and fields (Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Greenwood et al., 2011; McPherson & Sauder, 2013; Reay & Hinings, 2009). Recent scholarship also has highlighted how multiple logics interact to create community-level variation in both practices and social movement outcomes. For instance, Lee and Lounsbury (2015) explained how community logics filter how organizations understand field level logics, impacting companies' adoption of environmental practices in two U.S. states. York et al. (2017) demonstrated that multiple logics interact to determine the efficacy of social movements in bolstering the adoption of the LEED certification. They showed that technology-focused SMOs more effectively increase LEED certification when a market logic is stronger and has no effect in regions where community logics are dominant (York et al., 2017). Similarly, I expect that these competing logics of the

Catholic Church influenced the work of the SMO Cáritas. Nonetheless, in my case, the predominance of one logic within a community would largely influence social movement outcomes.

I argue that parishes with a progressive logic likely were more positively inclined towards the SEM, which would have supported Cáritas's work to establish SEEs. Institutional logics have specific values, practices, and beliefs that shape individuals' behaviors (Thornton et al., 2012). Thus, because the main goal associated with the progressive logic of the Catholic Church is to help the poor, individuals within communities where this logic was dominant likely would have been inclined to work for social justice, and thus, support and participate in Cáritas programs associated with the solidarity economy. Furthermore, these parishes were more likely to have created social organizations that left institutional legacies that supported the establishment of cooperatives. Overall, Cáritas would have had more resources available to enact its goals. Conversely, in places where the conservative logic is predominant, the opposite would have occurred: parishes likely would have had no affinity for the ideals of the SEM, and may have even tried to combat them, complicating the work of Cáritas and the spread of SEEs.

Nonetheless, another possibility is that the only way that the SEM could have flourished in conservative parishes is through Cáritas. Every community probably included some individuals (religious or otherwise) who would have liked to promote the programs of the SEM, but might not have had the support of their priests or parishes. In this case, within the institution of Catholicism, Cáritas likely provided free spaces—"small-scale settings within a community or movement that are removed from the direct

control of dominant groups, are voluntarily participated in, and generate the cultural challenge that precedes or accompanies political mobilization" (Polletta, 1999, p. 1)—that enabled opposing voices and ideas to be heard and disseminated. Consequently, the work of Cáritas would have been more important in conservative areas than in locales with progressive parishes, which likely had already been disseminating the ideals of the SEM and received support from other religious social organizations (such as CEBs or *Pastorais*) in the establishment of cooperatives. Therefore, I propose two competing hypotheses:

> *Hypothesis 3a: The relationship between the presence of Cáritas, the presence of the Catholic Church and the founding of SEEs is positive (negative) in communities where a progressive (conservative) logic is dominant.*
>
> *Hypothesis 3b: The relationship between the presence of Cáritas, the presence of the Catholic Church and the founding of SEEs is positive (negative) in communities where a conservative (progressive) logic is dominant.*

Data Sources and Analysis Techniques

To test my hypotheses, I drew on diverse government datasets and primary research to investigate the number of SEEs founded in more than 5,000 Brazilian municipalities between 1994 and 2009. My dataset is unique, because it includes data from in situ interviews with members of SEEs that reveal whether they were democratically managed and collectively owned. My dataset also overcomes the difficulty of measuring social movement outcomes due to a lack of longitudinal data (Snow & Soule, 2010) and addresses calls for more research based on data from the Global South (Briscoe & Gupta, 2016; Marquis & Raynard, 2015; Seelos & Mair, 2017).

While some have expressed concerns over the trustworthiness of data collected in the Global South, Brazil's statistical capacity score[23] was 83.3 (out of 100) for 2005 and 2010, and 91 for 2007, with an average score of 87 for 2004–2009. Although similar scores are not available for developed nations, the average score in Latin America is 67, ranging from 33 (Aruba) to 91 (Chile). Among the world's top emerging national economies, Brazil has the best average (Russia: 81; India: 78, China: 61).

I constructed a panel dataset of SEEs founded between 1994 and 2009. I used this study period for theoretical reasons and due to data constraints. The year 1994 was a sensible starting date because it marks the first year after the end of the Brazilian dictatorship when an elected president who was not later impeached took office; moreover, the term "solidarity economy" first appeared in newspapers the following year. The study ends in 2009 due to data constraints. The dataset used to identify SEEs ended in 2012; eliminating the final three years yielded more reliable data due to the process of enterprise identification, which I address in more detail in the dependent variable section.

I used the dataset to identify the number of SEEs founded in a given year in each community. I define communities as geographical places that represent distinctive values, cultures and infrastructures (Marquis & Battilana, 2009), and operationalize them as municipalities, following numerous empirical studies (Greve & Rao, 2012; Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis & Battilana, 2009). In the United States, many studies are based on county-level data, which typically best represent the institutional variables of a community; however, in the Brazilian context, even though it would be possible to aggregate municipality level data to *micro regiões* (micro regions), this would not be

[23] An indicator of the reliability of a country's statistical data published by the World Bank.

theoretically adequate because such regions are aggregated only for statistical purposes in Brazil (i.e., no political or social structures unite them).

Dependent variable. In this dissertation, I consider the primary social movement outcome to be the establishment of SEEs. While other variables could be used to measure SEM outcomes (e.g., the number of people involved in solidarity enterprises, the survival of SEEs, the creation of moral markets, number of public policies, etc.), the number of SEEs founded seems to best fit the main objective of the movement and its stage at the time. While the three first measurements relate to SEEs, public policies are a more indirect way to achieve the ultimate goal, which is the establishment of a new economic system. I decided not to use first three measures for various reasons: there was a lack of longitudinal data for the number of people involved in SEEs (i.e., the number of individuals was measured only twice during the study period); the work of the social movement was less essential to the survival of SEEs; and the SEM was in an early stage, so very few locales could be defined as having a new economic system, complicating any potential understanding of why SEEs were established in some locales and not in others.

Therefore, for my dependent variable I measured the *number of SEEs founded* in each Brazilian municipality per year. I used a dataset (*Sistema Nacional de Informações em Economia Solidária; SIES*) created by the National Secretariat of the Solidarity Economy (SENAES). To identify these organizations, SENAES brought together a group of organizations including universities, incubators, non-profits and cooperatives to develop a strategy. Collectively, these stakeholders determined how to identify SEEs and salient issues for data collection. Specifically, they created a website to enable organizations to self-disclose information, surveyed members of state-level public policy

organizations that sought to establish SEEs, and participated in diverse cooperative forums to search for enterprises. To ensure that all identified organizations were SEEs (i.e., collectively managed and owned organizations that may or may not be formally registered as cooperatives and are engaged primarily in economic activities), they asked state partners to confirm that the organizations met the criteria. For organizations that self-disclosed information on the website or at events, the Secretariat confirmed these characteristics when surveying the cooperatives.

The *Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos* (University of the Sinos River Valley; UNISINOS) organized the survey and trained local community members to collect data onsite. Local community members collected data in two waves, between 2005 and 2007, and between 2010 and 2012, using a questionnaire with more than 100 questions. I used the founding year collected via this questionnaire. It is unclear as to whether these data are supported with documents or based solely on interview responses. Nonetheless, is reasonable to expect that this information is accurate, as many documents were easily accessible and interviews were generally conducted with more than one interviewee present, thus reducing the likelihood of recollection problems.

By 2012, researchers had identified 19,708 SEEs. Recognizing the difficulty in identifying all organizations founded in a given survey year (e.g., some newly founded organizations might not have participated in events or received support from an incubator or public policy program in those years, making it difficult for SENAES to detect them), I excluded the last three years of data from the main analysis; however, I did use these data to perform a robustness check. The dataset includes organizations with different formal registrations—cooperatives (9%), non-profits/associations (61%), and businesses

(1%)—as well as businesses that were not formally registered with the government (29%). In Brazil, because legislation requires an organization to have at least 20 members to be considered a cooperative, many organizations that in practice are cooperatives are registered as associations or businesses because they do not meet the membership threshold. The dataset includes organizations engaged in production (76%), mass consumption or the establishment of a price sharing infrastructure (20%), exchange activities (2%) and banking (2%). Because these types of cooperatives exist for different reasons, I focused my analysis exclusively on cooperatives engaged in production activities that were more directly aimed at alleviating unemployment, poverty and income inequality.

Independent variables. To measure the *presence of Cáritas*, I created a dummy variable for Cáritas's main location in a diocese in a given municipality/year and gathered data from the Cáritas website, which lists all affiliated units. The website also includes a history that in many cases reveals the establishment of a Cáritas-affiliated organization in a diocese. To identify the year when each Cáritas unit was founded, a research assistant used information from the news section of the Cáritas website. Among the 192 Cáritas units listed, information for 149 units was available on the website. My research assistant and I called the 43 remaining Cáritas units to ask for their founding dates and to determine whether they were still active. When a Cáritas unit was unable to be contacted, the research assistant used a Brazilian database, the Map of Civil Society Organizations/*Mapa das Organizações da Sociedade Civil* produced by the Institute for Applied Economic Research/*Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada* (IPEA) which

contains information about all formally registered organizations, including their founding dates.

To measure *Catholic presence,* I used census data on the percentage of a municipality's population who self-reported as Catholic. Because census data are collected every 10 years, I followed previous studies (Schneiberg et al., 2008) and used linear interpolation to supply data for the missing years. I assumed that the more Catholics in a community, the larger the Catholic presence.

To identify *progressive versus conservative logic of the Catholic Church* I used regional variances. Previous studies showed that different logics could emerge in different locales and affect organizational outcomes differently. For example, in one of the earliest works in this area, Lounsbury (2007) discussed how different logics of investment banking in New York and Boston affect how mutual funds in each city establish contracts. The qualitative phase of this research revealed evidence that the progressive and conservative logics were more prominent in certain regions. Thus, I analyzed the two regions that exemplified a stark contrast between the logics: the Northeast and Southeast. Documents and interviews revealed that during the study period, Catholic ideologies in the Northeast and Southeast represented extreme cases, with extremely progressive views dominating the Northeast and conservative views dominating the Southeast. I created a dummy variable to identify whether a community is located in the Northeast or Southeast. While this could have been measured in other ways (e.g., by analyzing the documents of each diocese), doing so would have proven extremely difficult, as comparable documents were not available for all dioceses during the study period.

Control variables. An important concern in studies of social movement outcomes is eliminating explanations unrelated to social movement activities (Snow & Soule, 2010). To rule out these other possible explanations, I controlled for a number of variables related to the empirical setting (the SEM in Brazil) and variables previously identified in the literature (most of which are described in my analysis of the setting in Chapter 4). Important events in the SEM likely affected the number of enterprises founded in a given year. After the National Secretariat of the Solidarity Economy was created in 2003, many public policies and programs were established; thus, it is likely that the number of enterprises founded increased after that year. To control for this event, I created a dummy variable to account for the existence of the *Secretariat* position.

The movement also established an institutional infrastructure to help people found cooperatives—most notably, university incubators and public policy programs. To control for *incubators*, I used a database compiled by the Network of Incubators (*Rede Nacional de ITCPs*) and Unisol (a network of universities for workers' rights), and a list of beneficiaries of solidarity economy grants from FINEP (a government agency that funds innovation and research) to identify incubators actively operating in Brazil during the study period. A research assistant searched FINEP documents and online for information regarding each incubator's founding year, whether the incubator was still active, and if not, when it had ceased activities. Using this information, I created a dummy variable for the presence of an incubator in a given municipality/year. To control for *public policies*, I collected data from the Network of Public Managers of the Solidarity Economy (*Rede de Gestores de Políticas Públicas em Economia Solidária*) website listing all municipalities with public policies related to the solidarity economy. I

then created a dummy variable that I assigned a value of 1 if a given community had such a public policy, and 0 otherwise.

In addition, my interviewees noted that it is easier to establish SEEs in rural areas than in urban areas. Rural areas in Brazil have a rich history of similar movements, such as the Landless Movement (MST) and the Pastoral Land Commission/*Pastoral da Terra*, discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Thus, I used the percentage of the population living in *rural* areas based on data provided by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics/*Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística* (IBGE).

In the literature, many studies show that cooperatives are created for economic reasons. For example, farmers may establish a cooperative to build a dairy facility because they cannot afford to do so alone; likewise, consumers establish cooperatives to make large purchases and obtain price discounts (Boone & Özcan, 2014; Schneiberg et al., 2008). Since SEEs engaged in production focus primarily on alleviating poverty and empowering the poor through training, resources and policies, it is highly likely that such SEEs are viewed as economic opportunities. Thus, I controlled for *poverty* using census data on the percentage of the population living on 2 USD or less per month in a given municipality-year.

I also controlled for the availability of resources in a given community that would impact possible sources of funding for enterprise creation. I measured municipality resources as *GDP per capita* using data from the IBGE. *Municipality size*, measured based on area and population, influences the number of enterprises founded. In larger areas, it can be more difficult for people with similar concerns to meet and organize;

moreover, in areas with larger populations, more people could create groups to form SEEs. I used data from the IBGE for both measures of size.

Research has shown that *progressive ideology* positively influences founding activity (Boone & Özcan, 2014; Greve & Rao, 2012; Schneiberg, 2013; Schneiberg et al., 2008). Political ideals influence how a community thinks and acts; myriad studies have shown that communities with leftist ideologies are more likely to generate alternative organizational forms and practices (Boone & Özcan, 2014; Greve & Rao, 2012; Lee & Lounsbury, 2015; Schneiberg, 2013). To identify a municipality's political ideology, I examined voting patterns. Brazil is a multi-party democracy; thus, I used diverse academic research to classify each party as left, center-left, center-right, or right (Coppedge, 1997; Tarouco & Madeira, 2013, 2015). Then, I used a database produced by the IPEA listing the total votes received by each of the 46 parties in each election between 1994 and 2009. Elections occur every 2 years in Brazil, alternating between elections for president, senators, congressional members and governors in one year, and elections for mayors and municipal council members in the next year. So, for example, in a presidential election year, the total votes for a party equals the sum of votes for each candidate for president, senator, governor and congressional member affiliated with that party. For years without elections, I averaged the total votes from the preceding and following years. I totalled all votes for parties in each category and divided that figure by the total number of votes to yield a percentage of votes for each ideological category. I ran the analysis using both the original categorization, as well as a binary categorization between left (including left and center-left) and right (including right and center-right). Because both results were similar, I used the results from the binary category.

The extent of community engagement has been shown to be an important predictor of organizational founding activity (Dutta, 2017). To measure *community engagement*, I used data on the number of non-profits divided by the total population of a given community. I define community engagement as the extent to which residents of a given locale are involved in collective action. Measuring the number of non-profits reveals the nature of work at the community level and reflects the extent of interaction among residents. The IBGE granted me access to a dataset that enabled me to identify the founding year and municipality for each Brazilian non-profit. I summed the number of non-profits in each municipality and year. Due to skewness of the variable I logged it prior to running the models.

Findings from population ecology studies (Boone & Özcan, 2014; Hannan & Freeman, 1977) show that existing enterprises establish legitimacy for a new organizational format, which initially leads to an increase in founding activity; however, as legitimacy is reached over time, competition for resources among the new organizations leads to a decrease in founding activity. Thus, I used *previous SEE density (log)* and *previous SEE density squared* to control for this effect.

Analysis and Results

In Table 7.1, I present the summary statistics and correlation matrix. To address multicollinearity issues, I calculated the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each variable. Across all variables, the mean score is 2.64, and the highest is 7.70 for *previous SEE density squared*. Because all VIF scores are lower than 10, multicollinearity is not a concern (Kennedy, 1982). Also, because none of the variables are highly correlated, endogeneity concerns should be alleviated, thereby eliminating possible claims of

spuriousness (for example, that some other variables are driving the presence of Cáritas in a community and the founding of SEEs) (Snow & Soule, 2010).

Table 7.1

Correlations and Descriptive Statistics

	Variable	Obs	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1	SEEs	89803	0.14	0.67	0.00	55.00	1														
2	GDP per capita	82751	1.13	0.77	- 2.57	4.96	0.053	1													
3	Previous SEE density (log)	89536	0.49	0.78	0.00	5.27	0.392	-0.042	1												
4	Previous SEE density^2	89536	0.85	1.93	0.00	27.80	0.479	-0.022	0.921	1											
5	Pop. density	86424	3.14	1.43	-2.50	9.51	0.138	0.128	0.101	0.104	1										
6	Poverty (%)	89040	40.08	23.06	0.22	94.21	-0.034	-0.814	0.083	0.052	-0.244	1									
7	Progressive ideology	70755	0.26	0.16	0.00	1.00	0.118	0.181	0.222	0.202	0.195	-0.170	1								
8	Public policies	89547	0.00	0.03	0.00	1.00	0.076	0.036	0.046	0.065	0.060	-0.037	0.025	1							
9	Incubators	89536	0.00	0.05	0.00	1.00	0.215	0.064	0.143	0.206	0.113	-0.056	0.057	0.118	1						
10	Secretariat	89803	0.38	0.48	0.00	1.00	0.043	0.164	0.171	0.162	-0.004	-0.254	0.277	0.037	0.029	1					
11	Community engagement	84183	2.38	1.35	0.00	9.71	0.237	0.310	0.355	0.349	0.451	-0.356	0.291	0.059	0.157	0.136	1				
12	SMO (Cáritas)	89536	0.02	0.13	0.00	1.00	0.231	0.084	0.198	0.233	0.181	-0.079	0.099	0.055	0.215	0.021	0.293	1			
13	Catholic presence	81000	0.82	0.12	0.00	1.00	-0.104	-0.333	-0.114	-0.118	-0.129	0.330	-0.216	-0.032	-0.058	-0.214	-0.250	-0.073	1		
14	Progressive logic (Northeast)	89536	0.32	0.47	0.00	1.00	0.001	-0.622	0.213	0.164	0.122	0.692	-0.015	-0.014	-0.010	-0.004	-0.100	0.011	0.262	1	
15	Conservative logic (Southeast)	89536	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00	-0.068	0.272	-0.257	-0.197	0.172	-0.385	-0.019	0.037	-0.010	-0.018	0.086	0.006	-0.102	-0.471	1

Given the count nature of the dependent variable, and the expectation of over-dispersion, I ran a negative binomial model (Greene, 2003). To infer causality, I lagged all the independent variables by 1 year. Because a community-level dataset introduces the possibility of missing factors that could impact the results, I ran a fixed effects model.

In Table 7.2, I present the models. Model 1 shows the baseline model with control variables. As expected, *population density*, *poverty*, *incubators*, *public policies*, *Secretariat*, and *community engagement* are positively and significantly associated with the establishment of SEEs. A negative relationship exists between *GDP per capita* and the number of SEEs founded. Even thought this could seems unexpected, as a community with higher GDP would have more resources for the creation of cooperatives, the SEM addresses poverty and inequality, and as such, SEEs are expected to be less present in wealthier places. *Previous SEE density* has a negative and significant relationship, and *previous SEE density squared* has a positive and significant relationship with the number of SEEs founded, contrary to population ecology theory (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). These results might indicate that for alternative organizational forms, founding activity is higher when the innovation is being spread and then decreases, either because the focus shifts toward strengthening networks instead of founding new enterprises, or due to a lack of material resources. Nonetheless, when this new alternative model reaches a level of acceptance or builds an ecology of organizations (i.e., mini-market), founding activity increases.

In Model 2, I test Hypothesis 1, which is not supported. In Model 3, I test the effect of the interaction between the presence of Cáritas and the presence of the Catholic Church on founding activity. Not only is Hypothesis 2 not supported, but the opposite

relationship occurs. In a community with Cáritas, the stronger the Catholic presence, the fewer SEEs founded. Also surprisingly, Catholic presence has a significant negative relationship with the number of SEEs founded.

Finally, I test the competing Hypotheses 3a and 3b in Models 4 and 5. The results reveal that the relationship between the presence of Cáritas and the number of SEEs founded is positive and significant in the region dominated by the conservative logic (i.e., the Southeast), and negative but not significant in the region dominated by the progressive logic (i.e., the Northeast). It is also interesting to note that the interaction between Catholic presence and the conservative logic in the Southeast has a negative relationship with the establishment of SEEs, and conversely, the interaction between Catholic presence and the progressive logic in the Northeast has a positive relationship with the establishment of SEEs. This shows that only the progressive branch of the Catholic Church was able to advance the outcomes of the SEM without support from SMOs. The results also confirm that the progressive Catholic Church competed with Cáritas; moreover, there is a significant indication that Cáritas has been more effective in locales dominated by a conservative Catholic ideology. These results show the importance of competing institutional logics on movement-related outcomes.

Table 7.2

Fixed-Effects Negative Binomial Regression: Cáritas (Main Location) and SEE Founding Activity

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
GDP per capita	-0.130*	-0.133*	-0.172**	-0.166*	-0.230***
	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.066)
Previous SEE density (log)	-0.908***	-0.905***	-0.882***	-0.947***	-0.931***
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.055)
Previous SEE density^2	0.025+	0.025+	0.005	0.027*	0.012
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Pop. density	0.148*	0.132*	0.165*	0.143*	0.229***
	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.065)
Poverty (%)	0.018***	0.018***	0.017***	0.009*	0.009*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Progressive ideology	0.051	0.059	0.072	0.098	0.091
	(0.113)	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.114)
Public policies	0.716***	0.721***	0.658***	0.491***	0.711***
	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.140)	(0.143)	(0.136)
Incubators	0.277*	0.273*	0.187+	0.206*	0.197+
	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.100)
Secretariat	2.506***	2.495***	2.297***	2.022***	2.266***
	(0.148)	(0.147)	(0.156)	(0.146)	(0.161)
Community engagement	0.123*	0.123*	0.124*	0.146*	0.121*
	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.063)	(0.058)	(0.059)
SMO (Cáritas main location)		0.126	2.529***	2.636***	1.959**
		(0.101)	(0.524)	(0.603)	(0.630)
Catholic presence (CP)			-2.011***	-1.022+	-3.737***
			(0.560)	(0.568)	(0.654)
SMO (Cáritas main location) x CP			-3.389***	-3.655***	-2.756**
			(0.727)	(0.819)	(0.915)
Conservative logic (CL)				5.489***	
				(0.798)	
SMO (Cáritas main location) x CL				-2.690*	
				(1.143)	
Catholic presence x CL				-8.436***	
				(0.915)	
SMO (Cáritas main location) x CP x CL				4.044*	
				(1.636)	
Progressive logic (PL)					-5.828***
					(0.613)
SMO (Cáritas main location) x PL					1.070
					(1.207)
CP x PL					6.610***
					(0.736)
SMO (Cáritas main location) x CP x PL					-1.211
					(1.571)
Constant	0.074	0.098	1.830**	1.527*	3.486***
	(0.328)	(0.328)	(0.589)	(0.595)	(0.680)
Observations	29213	29213	28236	28236	28236
Number of municipalities	2058	2058	2025	2025	2025
Municipality fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note. Two-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, + $p < .10$.

Robustness Checks

In the primary analysis, I measured the presence of Cáritas based on its main location (municipality) within a given diocese. Although this is a reasonable inference of where Cáritas would be more present, it could be that other municipalities within a given diocese also were affected by the work of Cáritas. So, as a robustness check, I ran the model with a dummy variable for the all the municipalities of a diocese where Cáritas is located. I used the Catholic Annual Statistics of 2010 (*Anuário Católico de 2010*) to determine the municipalities within each diocese. Because the data are not available digitally, a research assistant looked up the municipalities for each diocese where Cáritas had a presence and manually entered the data into the dataset. The results, shown in Table 7.3, demonstrate that the presence of Cáritas is negatively and significantly associated with the founding of cooperatives; results for all other variables are similar to those in the main models, although the significance varies.

Table 7.3

Fixed-Effects Binomial Regression: SEEs Founded in Municipalities with Cáritas

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
GDP per capita	-0.335***	-0.334***	-0.378***	-0.345***	-0.387***
	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.093)
Previous SEE density (log)	-1.474***	-1.472***	-1.493***	-1.542***	-1.540***
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Previous SEE density^2	-0.058*	-0.059*	-0.076**	-0.059*	-0.068**
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Pop. density	-0.176	-0.176	-0.286+	-0.233	-0.292*
	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.148)
Poverty (%.)	0.030***	0.030***	0.023***	0.016*	0.008
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Progressive ideology	0.328*	0.328*	0.364*	0.364*	0.373*
	(0.157)	(0.157)	(0.160)	(0.160)	(0.160)
Public policies	1.576***	1.577***	1.494***	1.335**	1.444***
	(0.398)	(0.398)	(0.410)	(0.415)	(0.411)
Incubators	0.449+	0.440	0.286	0.307	0.287
	(0.270)	(0.272)	(0.278)	(0.278)	(0.280)
Secretariat	4.498***	4.494***	4.171***	3.918***	3.747***
	(0.226)	(0.226)	(0.253)	(0.259)	(0.262)
Community engagement	-0.182*	-0.181*	-0.177*	-0.130	-0.087
	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.084)
SMO (Cáritas main)		0.059	6.202***	6.252***	7.199***
		(0.208)	(1.214)	(1.558)	(1.670)
Catholic presence (CP)			-2.639**	-1.579+	-5.267***
			(0.895)	(0.921)	(0.995)
SMO (Cáritas main) x CP			-8.182***	-8.286***	-9.631***
			(1.572)	(1.962)	(2.300)
SMO (Cáritas main) x Conservative logic (CL)				-1.784	
				(2.603)	
CP x CL				-5.904***	
				(1.290)	
SMO (Cáritas main) x CP x CL				2.621	
				(3.584)	
SMO (Cáritas main) x Progressive logic (PL)					-1.558
					(2.571)
CP x PL					6.704***
					(1.098)
SMO (Cáritas main) x CP x PL					2.316
					(3.320)
Observations	29065	29065	28088	28088	28088
Number of municipalities	2048	2048	2015	2015	2015
Municipality fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note. Two-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$.

I also ran the models using a dummy variable to try to understand whether the relationship is true only for the number of SEEs founded rather than the intensity of founding activity. The results, shown in Table 7.4, show a few discrepancies with the main model. Community engagement has a negative and significant relationship with a municipality having at least one SEE founded in a given year. This might mean that community engagement is not necessarily helpful for the dissemination of knowledge and the initiation of a social innovation, but is important for scaling this new organizational form. Other results for this model are similar to the main results, except for the effect of Cáritas promoting SEEs in the Southeast.

Table 7.4

Fixed-Effects Logit Regression: Possible Explanations for SEE Founding Activity

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
GDP per capita	-0.335***	-0.334***	-0.378***	-0.345***	-0.387***
	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.093)
Previous SEE density (log)	-1.474***	-1.472***	-1.493***	-1.542***	-1.540***
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Previous SEE density^2	-0.058*	-0.059*	-0.076**	-0.059*	-0.068**
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Pop. density	-0.176	-0.176	-0.286+	-0.233	-0.292*
	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.148)
Poverty (%.)	0.030***	0.030***	0.023***	0.016*	0.008
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Progressive ideology	0.328*	0.328*	0.364*	0.364*	0.373*
	(0.157)	(0.157)	(0.160)	(0.160)	(0.160)
Public policies	1.576***	1.577***	1.494***	1.335**	1.444***
	(0.398)	(0.398)	(0.410)	(0.415)	(0.411)
Incubators	0.449+	0.440	0.286	0.307	0.287
	(0.270)	(0.272)	(0.278)	(0.278)	(0.280)
Secretariat	4.498***	4.494***	4.171***	3.918***	3.747***
	(0.226)	(0.226)	(0.253)	(0.259)	(0.262)
Community engagement	-0.182*	-0.181*	-0.177*	-0.130	-0.087
	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.084)
SMO (Cáritas main)		0.059	6.202***	6.252***	7.199***
		(0.208)	(1.214)	(1.558)	(1.670)
Catholic presence (CP)			-2.639**	-1.579+	-5.267***
			(0.895)	(0.921)	(0.995)
SMO (Cáritas main) x CP			-8.182***	-8.286***	-9.631***
			(1.572)	(1.962)	(2.300)
SMO (Cáritas main) x Conservative logic (CL)				-1.784	
				(2.603)	
CP x CL				-5.904***	
				(1.290)	
SMO (Cáritas main) x CP x CL				2.621	
				(3.584)	
SMO (Cáritas main) x Progressive logic (PL)					-1.558
					(2.571)
CP x PL					6.704***
					(1.098)
SMO (Cáritas Main) x CP x PL					2.316
					(3.320)
Observations	29065	29065	28088	28088	28088
Number of municipalities	2048	2048	2015	2015	2015
Municipality fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note. Two-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$.

I performed another robustness check by using a different variable to test for the conservative and progressive logics of the Catholic Church. Because the qualitative findings suggest that poverty largely determined whether a locale would adopt a progressive versus conservative logic, I ran the models using percentage of poverty as an independent variable. The results hold, as expected (see Table 7.5).

Table 7.5

Fixed-Effects Negative Binomial Regression: Poverty as a Moderator

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
GDP per capita	-0.223***	-0.227***	-0.265***	-0.189**
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.066)
Previous SEE density (log)	-0.917***	-0.913***	-0.888***	-0.896***
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)
Previous SEE density^2	0.037**	0.036**	0.014	0.001
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Pop. density	0.101+	0.086	0.127*	0.111+
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.063)	(0.062)
Progressive ideology	0.053	0.060	0.068	0.131
	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.115)
Public policies	0.771***	0.777***	0.708***	0.630***
	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.139)	(0.137)
Incubators	0.294**	0.287**	0.201+	0.101
	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.104)	(0.103)
Secretariat	2.179***	2.176***	2.017***	2.268***
	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.131)	(0.154)
Community engagement	0.083	0.081	0.076	0.166**
	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.060)	(0.061)
SMO (Cáritas main)		0.137	2.631***	3.060***
		(0.100)	(0.520)	(0.793)
Catholic presence (CP)			-1.993***	-3.684***
			(0.548)	(0.626)
SMO (Cáritas main) x CP			-3.528***	-3.170**
			(0.722)	(1.110)
Poverty (%)				-0.041***
				(0.012)
SMO (Cáritas main) x Poverty (%)				-0.122***
				(0.035)
CP x Poverty (%)				0.065***
				(0.012)
SMO (Cáritas main) x CP x Poverty (%)				0.119**
				(0.041)
Constant	1.165***	1.187***	2.913***	3.422***
	(0.223)	(0.222)	(0.538)	(0.642)
Observations	29213	29213	28236	28236
Number of municipalities	2058	2058	2025	2025
Municipality fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note. Two-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$.

Because the dataset contains many zeros for the dependent variable (91%), I considered the use of a zero-inflated model. A zero-inflated model consists of two regressions to first measure the probability of a zero before testing the hypotheses.

Nonetheless, if there is no theoretical reason to believe that the zeros are "fake," there is no need to run a zero-inflated model. For example, if I was measuring how many campers caught fish in a park, but I had no data on how many of the campers fished, my dataset would have many "fake zeros," meaning that many of the zeros would correspond not to people who actually fished and caught nothing, but to people who did not fish. In this case, a zero-inflated model would be necessary.[24] In my dataset, the zeros are actual measurements. Nonetheless, as a robustness check, I performed zero-inflated negative binomial regressions (Table 7.6) using population density to predict whether no SEEs would be founded in a given community. The results corroborate the previous analysis, and the significance is actually higher for this model. It is important to note that with the zero-inflated model, I was not able to test using panel data.

[24] https://stats.idre.ucla.edu/stata/dae/zero-inflated-poisson-regression/

Table 7.6

Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
GDP per capita	0.115***	0.106***	0.061*	0.058+	0.043
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Previous SEE density (log)	1.547***	1.561***	1.550***	1.511***	1.587***
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Previous SEE density^2	-0.144***	-0.151***	-0.153***	-0.152***	-0.163***
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Pop. density	0.043***	0.040***	0.033**	0.044***	0.092***
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Poverty (%)	0.002	0.001	0.002	-6.16e-05	0.011***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Progressive ideology	0.741***	0.738***	0.693***	0.667***	0.655***
	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.095)
Public policies	0.692**	0.694***	0.649**	0.808***	0.588**
	(0.212)	(0.210)	(0.210)	(0.207)	(0.200)
Incubators	0.231**	0.150+	0.111	0.041	0.082
	(0.084)	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.084)
Secretariat	-0.496***	-0.482***	-0.542***	-0.570***	-0.328***
	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.093)
Community engagement	0.123***	0.106***	0.106***	0.110***	0.113***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
SMO (Cáritas main location)		0.301***	1.163***	2.084***	0.436
		(0.051)	(0.279)	(0.384)	(0.329)
Catholic presence (CP)			-0.911***	-0.963***	-0.689***
			(0.118)	(0.129)	(0.138)
SMO (Cáritas main location) x CP			-1.154**	-2.380***	-0.131
			(0.370)	(0.493)	(0.459)
Conservative logic (CL)				-0.200	
				(0.200)	
SMO (Cáritas main location) x CL				-2.250***	
				(0.569)	
Catholic presence x CL				-0.176	
				(0.274)	
SMO (Cáritas main location) x CP x CL				3.310***	
				(0.813)	
Progressive logic (PL)					-0.864***
					(0.214)
SMO (Cáritas main location) x PL					1.702*
					(0.718)
CP x PL					0.372
					(0.261)
SMO (Cáritas main location) x CP x PL					-2.156*
					(0.906)
Constant	-4.090***	-4.029***	-3.179***	-2.976***	-3.835***
	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.153)	(0.158)	(0.176)
Observations	65239	65239	63219	63219	63219
Municipality fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note. Two-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$.

In another robustness check, I included SEEs identified during the second wave of data collection (2010–2012). The results appear in Table 7.7. Lastly, I ran mixed-effects negative binomial models for count data. The results appear in Table 7.8. Both models corroborate the results, with better levels of significance.

Table 7.7

Fixed-Effects Negative Binomial Regression, Including Data from 2010–2012

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
GDP per capita	0.081*	0.076*	0.032	0.021	0.024
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Previous SEE density (log)	1.313***	1.320***	1.335***	1.257***	1.363***
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Previous SEE density^2	-0.129***	-0.132***	-0.144***	-0.132***	-0.148***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Pop. density	0.026*	0.023+	0.014	0.021	0.057***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Poverty (%)	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.003*	0.012***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Progressive ideology	0.532***	0.534***	0.520***	0.499***	0.526***
	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.094)
Public policies	0.380**	0.392**	0.383**	0.435**	0.362**
	(0.135)	(0.134)	(0.132)	(0.135)	(0.131)
Incubators	0.110	0.080	0.043	0.028	0.045
	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.087)
Secretariat	-2.427***	-2.418***	-2.509***	-2.561***	-2.343***
	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.131)
Community engagement	0.176***	0.161***	0.164***	0.168***	0.157***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
SMO (Cáritas main location)		0.283***	1.584***	1.928***	1.251**
		(0.066)	(0.357)	(0.421)	(0.436)
Catholic presence (CP)			-1.129***	-0.983***	-1.191***
			(0.145)	(0.165)	(0.168)
SMO (Cáritas main location) x CP			-1.790***	-2.295***	-1.274*
			(0.484)	(0.560)	(0.619)
Conservative logic (CL)				0.356	
				(0.241)	
SMO (Cáritas main location) x CL				-1.209	
				(0.761)	
Catholic presence x CL				-1.062***	
				(0.313)	
SMO (Cáritas main location) x CP x CL				1.888+	
				(1.085)	
Progressive logic (PL)					-1.223***
					(0.247)
SMO (Cáritas main location) x PL					0.286
					(0.821)
CP x PL					1.048***
					(0.300)
SMO (Cáritas main location) x CP x PL					-0.480
					(1.065)
Constant	-2.656***	-2.606***	-1.584***	-1.403***	-1.855***
	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.190)	(0.199)	(0.213)
Observations	74647	74647	72586	72586	72586
Number of municipalities	4712	4712	4712	4712	4712
Municipality fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note. Two-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$.

Table 7.8

Mixed-Effects Negative Binomial Regression: Count Data

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
GDP per capita	0.106**	0.102**	0.054	0.043	0.043
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.040)
Previous SEE density (log)	1.416***	1.428***	1.434***	1.346***	1.469***
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Previous SEE density^2	-0.177***	-0.183***	-0.191***	- 0.179***	-0.196***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Pop. density	0.046**	0.042**	0.032*	0.044**	0.079***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Poverty (%)	0.007***	0.007***	0.008***	0.004**	0.014***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Progressive ideology	0.645***	0.643***	0.613***	0.584***	0.603***
	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.102)
Public policies	0.514**	0.515**	0.494**	0.564**	0.460*
	(0.190)	(0.190)	(0.189)	(0.191)	(0.188)
Incubators	0.387**	0.338**	0.280*	0.254*	0.267*
	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.121)	(0.122)	(0.121)
Secretariat	-0.277***	-0.276***	-0.313***	-0.336***	-0.245***
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.064)
Community engagement	0.197***	0.182***	0.183***	0.190***	0.178***
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
SMO (Cáritas main location)		0.373***	1.810***	2.295***	1.367*
		(0.081)	(0.446)	(0.568)	(0.551)
Catholic presence (CP)			-1.125***	-1.034***	-1.161***
			(0.160)	(0.185)	(0.185)
SMO (Cáritas main location) x CP			-1.967**	-2.674***	-1.325+
			(0.600)	(0.743)	(0.780)
Conservative logic (CL)				0.141	
				(0.267)	
SMO (Cáritas main location) x CL				-1.428	
				(0.942)	
Catholic presence x CL				-0.875*	
				(0.345)	
SMO (Cáritas main location) x CP x CL				2.231+	
				(1.336)	
Progressive logic (PL)					-1.293***
					(0.279)
SMO (Cáritas main location) x PL					0.515
					(1.029)
CP x PL					1.068**
					(0.335)
SMO (Cáritas main location) x CP x PL					-0.743
					(1.327)
Constant	-4.723***	- 4.667***	-3.681***	-3.483***	-3.878***
	(0.129)	(0.129)	(0.187)	(0.199)	(0.206)
Observations	65239	65239	63219	63219	63219
Number of municipalities	4694	4694	4656	4656	4656
Municipality fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note. Two-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$.

Separating Cáritas from the Progressive Logic

It is clear that Cáritas maintained a strong symbolic boundary (Lamont & Molnár, 2002) between itself and the progressive logic of the Catholic Church (at least the more vocal and radical sectors, including proponents of Liberation Theology). My analysis shows that Cáritas did not explicitly link itself with the progressive logic and intentionally tried to remain neutral between the two camps of the Catholic Church. Furthermore, the Cáritas infrastructure became redundant in communities where the more progressive Catholic Church already would have established social organizations.

Boundary building and achieving neutrality. To investigate the relationship between Cáritas and the progressive logic of the Catholic Church, I searched the Cáritas website, news articles, and documents for words explicitly related to the progressive logic (Liberation Theology, Basic Ecclesial Communities/CEBs, and Boff, which is the last name of the two main proponents of Liberation Theology in Brazil). These words rarely appear in Cáritas archival data: Boff appeared 5 times (of which 3 appeared in promotions for events sponsored by other organizations featuring Leonard Boff as a speaker), Liberation Theology appeared 6 times (mostly in reference to priests' biographical information and in interview transcripts), and CEBs appeared 42 times, primarily in news articles reporting the actions of these organizations, which have become less radical in recent years.

Furthermore, during my interview, the national coordinator clearly separated Cáritas from Liberation Theology and related persecution:

> I think that among the social pastorals, among all of the organizations of the Catholic Church, Cáritas was the one that suffered the least from persecution, because it does not adopt such a radical posture, a direct clash. Of course, Cáritas is rooted in the ideals of Liberation Theology, and draws on the principles of

> Liberation Theology, especially for its pastoral work and its transformative actions, but it was never using a very aggressive discourse. [Cártias was and is] not radical. [We engaged] in confrontation when we had to, *questioning the most conservative postures of the most conservative ward* of the Catholic Church in Brazil, *but without engaging in brutal radicalism.* Undoubtedly, this radicalism is what I think helped drive the persecution of the Pastoral Land Commission and Pastoral of Immigrants in particular, in the past and still to this day...without a doubt, Cáritas suffered less with this, because I think that Cáritas also has...strong credibility regarding its role in the Catholic Church in Brazil (Interviewee 5, Cáritas National Coordinator, 2018)

The evidence reveals an intentional separation between Cáritas and the progressive logic of the Catholic Church; even though Cáritas might be rooted in Liberation Theology and workers' views might align with it, there is a need to portray Cáritas as more neutral, linked with the more conservative and formalized Catholic Church. For instance, during the same interview, the national coordinator said: "Cáritas is an organism of the [Catholic] church in Brazil. It is independent; but, politically, is part of the structure of the Catholic Church in Brazil."

Being part of the Catholic Church structure was essential, especially to ensure Cáritas's legitimacy and ongoing funding, but it might also have helped legitimate the solidarity economy in Brazil. The SEM's links with the radical Workers' Party was a possible liability to the movement; Cáritas's involvement in the movement provided a counterbalance and helped establish a more neutral and legitimate discourse at the field level. In a sense, Cáritas's legitimizing role was established via a radical flank effect in which Liberation Theology was the extreme radical, and Cáritas was the moderate player (Haines, 2013; Jenkins & Eckert, 1986; Sawyers & Meyer, 1999).

Cultural toolkits vs. formal organization to advance movement goals. Apart from creating this cultural-cognitive divide between Cáritas and Liberation Theology, it also seems that the infrastructure created by Cáritas became redundant in regions where

the progressive side of the Catholic Church had already created similar infrastructures. As I discussed before, by providing cultural toolkits (Greve & Rao, 2012; Schneiberg, 2006) and organizational infrastructure (McCarthy & Zald, 1977a), social organizations can help groups to establish new cooperatives and social movements to achieve their goals. It seems that in this case, cultural toolkits are more critical than specific organizational infrastructure. It appears that in the Northeast, where the progressive logic of the Catholic Church is strong, there was a decomposability and transferability of the cultural toolkits left by previous collective action organizations of the Catholic Church (such as CEBs). During the dictatorship, many communities in the Northeast organized against the regime and established CEBs to fight for political and social justice; communities continue to draw on the legacies of these actions to organize collectively and democratically. Thus, even though cultural toolkits were not necessarily as important for the creation of cooperatives (as shown in previous studies), certain elements, such as the ability to take collective action, were essential.

Consequently, in the Northeast, even though groups might have needed some technical help from organizations in the form of training and capital, they already had a cultural-cognitive understanding of collective organizing, and were able to draw on previous experiences of fighting for a better society; such an understanding facilitated the establishment of cooperatives. In such communities, Cáritas might therefore have played a redundant role. For instance, one document from the Cáritas archives related to Liberation Theology refers to Dom Fragoso, an important advocate of Liberation Theology in Brazil[25] who was a priest and bishop in Cratéus (a city in the arid area of the

[25] Dom Fragoso signed the Pact of Catacombs in 1965, an agreement made by 42 priests to live like the poorest people in their parish. Dom Eldér Câmara was a proponent and also signed the Pact. Dom Fragoso

Northeast region) from 1964 to 1998. An analysis of the founding of SEEs and the existence of Cáritas in that community reveals that 82 cooperatives were established between 1984 and 2010, and only 8 of those were founded after a Cáritas chapter was established in 2006. A Cáritas regional coordinator from the Northeast confirmed:

> Maranhão (a state in the Northeast) is considered to be the cradle of the Basic Ecclesial Communities (CEBs), and in this way of being, the church *is very strong; there is an understanding of the value of each person, the community spirit, the strength of organization, law and justice*. *Particularly in the 1980s, a leadership structure emerged, and people were organized into community groups, unions, and associations* that won many rights, especially the expropriated land where they live and produce based on the principles of the Popular Solidarity Economy. Many of these leaders were arrested, tortured and killed by gunmen at the behest of landowners, but *they left a great example of political awareness, strength of resistance and courage to fight for life.* (Interviewee 13, Cáritas Coordinator-Northeast, 2018)

The examples above reveal how Liberation Theology and CEBs played a fundamental role in inspiring community engagement and organizing people in impoverished situations. As explained before, CEBs are organizations established by the Catholic Church that left institutional legacies at the community level related to democratic governance, participation, and social justice. Thus, CEBs might be carriers of institutional legacies from which communities can draw to establish cooperatives.

This analysis is further corroborated when examining the interaction between the presence of evangelicals and the work of Cáritas. Evangelical churches have been growing in Brazil and have played a particularly crucial role in weakening the influence of the progressive logic of the Catholic Church. My analysis reveals that Cáritas actually had a positive influence on the establishment of SEEs in the Northeast when the percentage of evangelicals increased (see Table 7.9). Thus, Cáritas had a negative impact

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published a book about the Parish of Cratéus titled *Cratéus Parish (1964-1998): A liberation and popular experience*/*Igreja de Crateús (1964–1998): Uma experiência libertadora e popular*.

on the establishment of SEEs primarily in areas with a strong progressive Catholic presence.

In summary, it seems that cultural-cognitive and infrastructural divides existed between Cáritas and the progressive logic of the Catholic Church at the community level. Cáritas clearly distinguished its activities from those of the Church to maintain its legitimacy and funding, and because the work of Cáritas and the progressive logic was largely redundant with regard to the establishment of SEEs.

Table 7.9

Fixed-Effects Negative Binomial Regression with Evangelicals as a Moderator

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
GDP per capita	-0.167*	-0.154*	-0.237***
	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.066)
Previous SEE density (log)	-0.888***	-0.951***	-0.943***
	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.055)
Previous SEE density^2	0.008	0.030*	0.015
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Pop. density	0.172**	0.154*	0.241***
	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.065)
Poverty (%)	0.016***	0.008*	0.008+
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Progressive ideology	0.068	0.088	0.100
	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.114)
Public policies	0.657***	0.506***	0.701***
	(0.141)	(0.144)	(0.137)
Incubators	0.207*	0.223*	0.230*
	(0.105)	(0.103)	(0.101)
Secretary	2.175***	1.917***	2.241***
	(0.156)	(0.149)	(0.166)
Community engagement	0.156*	0.185**	0.147*
	(0.063)	(0.058)	(0.060)
SMO (Cáritas main location)	-0.710***	-1.062***	-0.719*
	(0.214)	(0.242)	(0.287)
Evangelical presence (EP)	3.581***	1.868*	4.643***
	(0.768)	(0.787)	(0.865)
SMO (Cáritas main location) x EP	4.229***	5.501***	3.635**
	(0.978)	(1.149)	(1.201)
Progressive logic (PL)		-2.458***	
		(0.301)	
SMO (Cáritas main location) x PL		1.627***	
		(0.465)	
PL x EP		10.250***	
		(1.148)	
SMO (Cáritas main location) x PL x EP		-6.736***	
		(1.996)	
Conservative logic (CL)			0.563+
			(0.301)
CL x EP			-0.248
			(0.403)
SMO (Cáritas main location) x CL			-9.608***
			(1.066)
SMO (Cáritas main location) x CL x EL			3.245
			(2.200)
Constant	-0.358	0.317	-0.139
	(0.353)	(0.354)	(0.364)
Observations	28236	28236	28236
Number of municipalities	2025	2025	2025
Municipality fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note. Two-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$.

Adapting Organizational Practices to the Locale

Another reason why Cáritas may not have been as effective at establishing new cooperatives in the Northeast as in the Southeast is because the organization adapted its practices to different cultural norms in the two regions. Plagued by institutional voids, communities in the Northeast adopted a more grassroots, community-driven approach to market/ecosystem creation, which can be a slow process. However, in the highly-developed Southeast, SEEs tended to be more isolated, with the goal of integrating quickly into existing markets.

Based on the finding that a more grassroots, community-driven approach to solidarity market creation was adopted in the Northeast, I compared the communities in the Northeast and in the Southeast along two dimensions: (a) diversity of SEEs (i.e., communities having not only production and service cooperatives, but also banks, consumption cooperatives, and others); and (b) the size of the solidarity economy market, to identify whether the focus was on expanding the movement within communities or spreading it to other communities.

With regard to enterprise diversity, the data show that in 2009, among the 1,133 communities in the Northeast with SEEs, 507 (44%) had more than one type. In the Southeast, among the 481 communities with SEEs, 110 (22%) had more than one type (see Figures 7.2 and 7.3). Thus, in the Northeast, it seems that the primary focus was on building solidarity markets, whereas in the Southeast, the focus was on creating enterprises that would be inserted into the mainstream market. The examples of market formation corroborate these descriptive statistical data. Most of the examples of market formation (i.e., the neighborhood of Palmas, and the cities of Cairu and Cratéus) are all

located in the Northeast.



Figure 7.1. Community distribution based on enterprise diversity in 2009 (Northeast).



Figure 7.2. Community distribution based on enterprise diversity in 2009 (Southeast).

Solidarity economy markets were also larger in the Northeast: among the 612 municipalities with SEEs (35% of all municipalities in the region), 290 (47%) had more than one. These numbers indicate that communities in the Northeast expanded the SEM within community boundaries (see Figure 7.4). In contrast, among the 124 municipalities in the Southeast with SEEs (7.5% of municipalities in the region) only 43 (34%), had more than one SEE (see Figure 7.5). Although this data analysis is descriptive, it reveals that the development of the solidarity economy in the Northeast was more grassroots, market-oriented, and community-driven than in the Southeast.



Figure 7.3. Community distribution based on size of solidarity market in 2009 (Northeast).



Figure 7.4. Community distribution based on size of solidarity market in 2009. (Southeast).

Overall, this investigation demonstrates that in locales with weak markets or institutional voids with regard to market formalization (Mair & Marti, 2009) such as the Northeast region of Brazil, social movements are implemented differently and yield different outcomes. In the Southeast, the most developed region in Brazil, a strong market was already in place, and solidarity enterprises participated in this market; in the Northeast, solidarity enterprises might create a separate or niche market, or might comprise the only market in a given locale. Thus, the practices of a social movement are adapted to meet the needs of specific locales. In one of the interviews, a regional coordinator for Cáritas explained:

> The way the solidarity economy works in the South [/Southeast] region and how it works in the Northeast region, for example, are completely different. *Although the principles and values are maintained, the essence of the economy is maintained*, we have in the [Southern] regions, due largely to European influence, a somewhat more advanced organization of workers, communities that form somewhat more consolidated enterprises...*The maturation time of an enterprise is much faster in that [Southern] region than it is in the Northeast and North regions, for example. The Northern region has a much slower cultural response time than other regions*. The work of Cáritas is to dialogue with these local

> cultures; if not, it is an imposition, and not a desire of the community itself or of the group that is trying to create a cooperative. In the Northeast region, for example, you sometimes have entire communities that participate in advisory or political-pedagogical accompaniment processes to form solidarity economy groups. In the South and in a part of the Southeast, they are isolated groups, almost individualized. Although collective, they are groups that do not necessarily have a community focus/scope. So*, the methodology of work changes a bit*. (Interviewee 13, Cáritas Coordinator-Northeast, 2018)

This explanation corroborates the idea that cultural toolkits are probably more important than organizational infrastructure for the creation of new enterprises/markets. In the quote above, it is clear how, despite the values and work being the same (Gehman, Treviño, & Garud, 2013), the process was different in the two regions. The passage reveals that a cultural element had to be developed by Cáritas to facilitate the establishment of cooperatives in the Northeast. Thus, it is likely that in the Northeast, Cáritas ended up working in communities that might not have had a strong imprinting from the other social organizations promoted by the progressive side of the Catholic Church. Moreover, when Cáritas was present in a locale with a strong progressive ideology, as explained before, the organization's work aimed at establishing cooperatives was less effective because the community was already taking collective action and had already established SEEs.

CHAPTER 8

DISCUSSION

At the outset of this research, I sought to understand how institutions and competing institutional logics shape outcomes for SMOs, in this case, the establishment of new organizational forms by people in impoverished situations. In particular, I wanted to examine why many solidarity enterprises were founded in some communities, while others were unable to provide the resources and cultural toolkits necessary to establish even one cooperative. Drawing on a field analytic approach, I first identified important actors/institutions that helped the social movement achieve its goals. A historical and in-depth analysis of primary and secondary documents and personal interviews yielded crucial insights on the role of the Catholic Church, and an affiliated SMO, Cáritas, in the emergence of the SEM. My qualitative analysis also revealed that the Catholic Church impacted the SEM by legitimizing the new organizational form, creating social organizations that left institutional legacies, and founding Cáritas, an SMO that played an important role in building capabilities (by connecting individuals through its widespread and interconnected network, and providing material resources) and changing the cognitive and emotional perceptions of people in impoverished situations.

Based on my findings and theory, I proposed hypotheses about how Cáritas, by itself and in conjunction with Catholics in a community, impacted the establishment of cooperatives. My quantitative results are surprising; specifically, they suggest that SMOs effectively achieve desired outcomes only in communities with certain characteristics. Although the results contrast with my expectations, they do align with findings in the literature (Schneiberg, 2002; Weber, 2013) and show that even though the Catholic

Church was a proponent of the movement, a stronger Catholic presence in a given locale did not positively affect the work of Cáritas, as measured by the founding of SEEs. My second hypothesis was better understood when I accounted for regional variance in the competing institutional logics of the Catholic Church. In regions dominated by the progressive logic (which was aligned with the ideals and practices of the movement), a stronger Catholic presence positively influenced SEE founding activity. Coupled with previous institutional legacies and infrastructure, the progressive logic facilitated the establishment of cooperatives, and Cáritas became a redundant organization that did not seem to impact social movement outcomes. In contrast, in locales dominated by the conservative logic, a stronger presence of the Church seemed to positively influence the relationship between Cáritas and the founding of SEEs.

I explained how Cáritas and the progressive logic of the Catholic Church were competing mechanisms of SEE founding activities due to cultural-cognitive and structural separation between the two groups, and because Cáritas adapted its practices to different cultural norms in the Northeast and Southeast. My findings contribute to the social movement and institutional logics literatures, as well as the current conversation about how organizational theory can impact grand challenges.

Implications for Research on Social Movements

This research contributes three main insights to the social movement literature. The first is that social movements might not be able to accomplish their goals unless an institutional infrastructure is present. More specifically, I have shown that social movement outcomes are shaped by competing institutional logics. The second insight is the radical flank effect might be effective at the field level, but not at the community

level. Finally, religion shapes SMOs by promoting emotional energy amongst disadvantaged individuals and being carriers of institutional legacies.

First, my findings show that in contrast with the literature (Hiatt et al., 2009; King & Soule, 2007; Schneiberg, 2013; Schneiberg et al., 2008; Sine & Lee, 2009), SMOs may *not* necessarily help accomplish social movement objectives, because competing logics influence social movement outcomes. From a resource mobilization perspective, scholars have argued that organizational infrastructure is an essential tool for social movements (McCarthy & Zald, 1977a), and empirical studies have shown how SMOs directly and indirectly influence outcomes, such as the emergence of wind farms (Sine & Lee, 2009). Nonetheless, in an opposing body of literature, scholars have suggested that because of the iron law of oligarchy, SMOs end up being co-opted and fail to achieve desired institutional changes (Clemens & Minkoff, 2004).

My results shed light on mechanisms underlying this debate. Indeed, the SMO in this case was effective only under some institutional conditions; however, the reason for the lack of effectiveness was not the oligarchy, but competing institutional logics and associated effects on community characteristics. In Brazil, the two competing logics of the Catholic Church played a major role in the SEM. Regional variation in the predominant logic largely determined whether or not Càritas was able to achieve desired outcomes of the SEM.

Specifically, my findings suggest that when a social movement's ideals and goals align with a community's institutions, they might become competing mechanisms. However, when a community's institutions compete with the values and ideals of a social movement, tension and conflict may emerge, thereby increasing the need for the

infrastructure provided by formal organizations. In such cases, some evidence suggests that SMOs become free spaces (Polletta, 2012) in which a less dominant logic can travel, be theorized and problematized, and inform the actions of social movement participants.

Overall, revealing the impact of logics on social movement trajectories and outcomes adds important nuance to studies that feature SMOs as the *deus ex machina* with regard to movement-related outcomes (King, 2008; King & Soule, 2007; McCarthy & Zald, 1977a). While scholars have shown that institutions can affect social movement outcomes, I extend the literature by highlighting how competing logics influence the ability of SMOs to achieve their goals (Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2017).

Second, my findings reveal a more nuanced understanding of the radical flank effect (Haines, 2013). While scholars have shown that a radical actor might help legitimate a more moderate actor and advance the goals of a social movement (Jenkins & Eckert, 1986; Sawyers & Meyer, 1999), my findings demonstrate that this might not be the case when examining community-level mechanisms. The radical flank effect occurs at the field level (in this case, by helping to legitimate the SEM); nonetheless, it seems that at the community level, radical actors more effectively accomplish grassroots change by influencing a community's cultural-cognitive perspective and facilitating the spread of new practices.

Finally, my findings reveal how religion influences activism by supporting emotional energy and persistence and leaving institutional legacies at the community level. In previous studies, scholars identified four main mechanisms through which religion and religious organizations/events impact social movements: (a) by changing the legitimacy of—and consequently, a community's receptiveness to—certain organizations

and practices (Hiatt et al., 2009; Schneiberg, 2002); (b) by providing free spaces that foster a sense of empowerment (Morris, 1986; Zald, 1982); (c) by establishing solidarity among community members (Zald, 1982); and (d) by being a source of emotional empowerment (Rao & Dutta, 2012). My findings extend this list by revealing that religious institutions serve as sources of emotional energy and persistence and establish social organizations which leave institutional legacies that help social movements achieve their goals.

Unlike emotional empowerment, which explains why people with heightened emotions (such as hate and love) tend to support each other to engage in collective action with minimal concerns about free riding problems (Rao & Dutta, 2012), emotional energy (Collins, 2004) and persistence enable perseverance in the face of adversity and obstacles. Emotional energy and persistence are fostered through religious readings and stories and ecumenical prayers that acknowledge obstacles yet emphasize that they can be overcome, providing a sense of hope even when times are challenging.

Institutional legacies are known to facilitate the dissemination of new organizational forms (Greve & Rao, 2012; Schneiberg, 2006). Nonetheless, it remains unclear how carriers of institutional legacies emerge (Greve & Rao, 2014). My findings show how religious social organizations can function as carriers of institutional legacies. In Brazil, these organizations were founded to combat unfair practices of a military dictatorship regime. My findings show how religion can shape social movements by providing communities with cultural toolkits for activism.

Implications for Research on Institutional Logics

I contribute to institutional theory by showing how institutional complexity can be provoked even in solidified institutions such as the Catholic Church, and how materiality influences regional variance in the adoption and predominance of institutional logics. Religion is an institution that has received little attention in the literature (Greenwood et al., 2010). My research reveals how studying the influence of religion can shed light on many institutional processes, such as institutional complexity. While complexity is expected in hybrid organizations which generally have two opposing goals (Battilana et al., 2017), it is less discussed in studies involving traditional organizations such as corporations and religious organizations. My findings show that even traditional organizations/institutions are affected by competing logics.

I further propose that community characteristics impact whether an organization primarily adopts one logic over another, and possibly (although not investigated here) balances competing logics over time (Delmestri & Goodrick, 2016; Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Greenwood et al., 2011). The literature has shown that institutional logics also serve as toolkits that individuals draw upon in certain circumstances (McPherson & Sauder, 2013) and that a change in a dominant logic impacts organizational characteristics (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). However, very few scholars (if any) have considered how community characteristics influence the prevalence of institutional logics in organizations.

I have extended the literature on institutional logics and organizational outcomes by revealing the role played by community characteristics (in this case, materiality) in the process of logic attachment/dominance. Unlike Lounsbury's (2007) work, which showed

how different logics are created uniquely in different locales, this research demonstrates how materiality explains why a diffused logic attaches to some communities and not others. My findings show that independent of authority or power, individuals/organizations might change how they instantiate institutional logics depending on their material circumstances. Thus, even though the Pope or bishops commanded priests to adopt a conservative view of Catholicism and not to engage in social projects, they disobeyed their superiors once they saw the impoverished situations of the communities they served. Materiality is concrete and difficult to change, and serves as constant reminder of certain issues, values, problems, and practices, making it very difficult to ignore or avoid. In impoverished contexts, the level of poverty, misery, and suffering is constantly perceived, and thus hard to ignore.

Implications for the Conversation about Grand Challenges

Finally, this study has shown that although entrepreneurship can be used to address grand challenges, community contexts and the work of social movements impact the effectiveness of entrepreneurial efforts in this regard. My findings demonstrate the importance of social movements for the establishment of cooperatives and local and moral markets based on democratic organizations (Adler, forthcoming; Davis, 2013, 2016). As an increasing number of scholars and practitioners focus on grand challenges (Berrone et al., 2016; Ferraro et al., 2015; George et al., 2016), my research suggests that it is critical to consider that the dissemination of new organizational forms or moral markets can occur due to the work of social movements in unreceptive locales, or due to pre-existing organizational and institutional infrastructure. Moreover, environmental characteristics affect how new markets emerge. Specifically, in locales with market-

related institutional voids (Mair & Marti, 2009; Mair et al., 2012), the market-creation process might be more effective than in places with strong existing markets. In the latter case, the best approach would be to disseminate new organizational forms that integrate with the existing market.

Conclusion

My investigation was motivated by an empirical puzzle: despite the aim of SEEs to solve Brazilian social problems, their distribution is uneven across Brazilian communities. To examine this puzzle, I asked: *How do institutions and institutional logics shape the trajectory of a social movement and key movement outcomes, such as the establishment of a new organizational form*? Employing a mixed methods research design, I found that religion—in this case, Catholicism—played an important role in the founding of SEEs. Consequently, I focused my analysis on how the institution of religion and an SMO interacted to achieve social movement outcomes. My findings show that SMOs are not useful for advancing social movement trajectories and goals when a community has strong institutions with similar goals and ideals, but may be useful in communities that are less receptive to the movement. I further explained how religious institutions provide individuals with emotional energy and persistence, and serve as carriers of institutional legacies, and how materiality influences the dominance of one logic in contexts characterized by institutional complexity.

This study has some limitations that could be pathways for future research. First, it was conducted in a specific empirical context (Brazil and the SEM). Focusing on an emerging country provides an opportunity to look at the intersection between social movements, markets, and poverty. While movements aimed at helping the poor have

been studied before (Piven & Cloward, 2012), most scholars have examined "developed" movements, such as environmental movements that enable entrepreneurship (Pacheco, York, & Hargrave, 2014; Sine & Lee, 2009; York et al., 2017); or movements in developed countries, for example, Grange fostering cooperatives in the United States (Schneiberg et al., 2008). Some of my arguments and the mechanisms proposed here may not be as relevant to developed movements or contexts.

In general, especially for environmental movements, activists typically are well-educated people from higher social classes (Lounsbury, 2001; McCarthy & Zald, 1977b); in fact, education level is a strong predictor of activism in the United States (McCarthy & Zald, 1977b). This case reveals that for less-educated activists and groups in lower classes of society, widespread networks (to reach secluded, poor areas) and emotional energy (Collins, 2004) and persistence (to overcome difficulties) may play a more important role. Thus, it would be interesting to try to understand if the relationships identified here hold in other impoverished contexts, as well as in communities in developed countries afflicted by major social problems (e.g., Detroit or U.S. communities where illegal immigrants comprise a significant percentage of the population).

Several questions could guide future research: Does religion have the same impact in developed countries? If so, is the influence constant, or does in emerge only when impoverished communities are trying to establish new organizations and needs for emotional energy and persistence might be more exacerbated? While my research did produce evidence revealing the essential role of emotional energy and persistence, a deep investigation at the individual level was beyond the scope of the project. It would be interesting to try to understand the different practices used to support emotional energy,

as well as the circumstances under which it plays a more (or less) important role. Another opportunity for future research would be to replicate this study in contexts involving different types of alternative organizational forms that are not necessarily collective.

Second, and surprisingly, SMOs did not play an important role in the achievement of social movement outcomes in certain communities. While this was the case in this context, it would be interesting to identify specific circumstances or outcomes for which the presence of an SMO in a community is effective. For example, SMOs likely play a more important role in less politically engaged communities (Desmond & Travis, 2018), during disasters, or when a counter-movement exists, and a less important role when there is a progressive or more participative type of local government, or when an issue is highly publicized. It would also be interesting to understand the differences between the roles of social movement participants and SMOs, and how they interact to accomplish institutional change.

Third, because resource scarcity is omnipresent and impossible to forget or ignore, materiality significantly impacts the diffusion of institutional logics. My insights relate mainly to poverty and adversity, but other "material elements" could also have an influence, such as ongoing violence, terrorist events (e.g., 9/11 and changes in New York City), and architecture. Furthermore, it would be interesting to examine how materiality impacts (or is impacted by) not only diffusion, but attempts to balance competing logics, or changes in logics.

Lastly, religion is a key institution in Latin America. It would be interesting to understand the role of religion in social movements and organizations in other parts of the world, or in specific industries. For example, Islamic banking has been on the rise and

has impacted the financial industry and organizations. Likewise, a more conservative form of Christianity has grown in United States and impacted political and social systems. These are some examples of how religion could impact communities in different ways. It is also important to investigate whether the impacts of religion are similar to or different from those of other institutions such as the state, family, and market. Examining these topics will help advance research on institutional theory and social movements.

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APPENDIX A

THE EXTENT OF THE SEM IN BRAZIL AND THE IMPACT OF SEES

Participating in SEEs or in the SEM has yielded many benefits for individuals as well as communities. The movement has had economic and personal "effects on the life course of individuals who have participated in movement activities" (Snow & Soule, 2010, p. 218), with social and political ramifications. These outcomes are attributed to how cooperatives are structured, establishing practices that foster feelings of empowerment and collective action. Below, I have compiled many examples, quotes, and anecdotes that reveal these outcomes.

Benefits of Cooperatives

The benefits of cooperatives for impoverished communities have been documented in many reports and studies. It seems that benefits stem from an interconnected relationship between income acquisition, increased self-esteem, and empowerment. These main elements translate to changes in the community through social awareness and political engagement. Even when the level of income generated is not as high as expected, participating in cooperatives leads to many individual and cultural changes. According a book reporting on the Solidarity Economy Program in the city of Londrina in the South:

> The solidarity economy program of Londrina is still far from providing its members with the level of income and standard of living they deserve. But there are already clear signs of improvement in living conditions, personal acceptance and appreciation, social inclusion and the incorporation of new living practices with the increasing appreciation of values such as solidarity, honesty, democracy, transparency, mutual aid, and attitudes such as cooperation, transparency in management, learning from mistakes, and aggregating and distributing values. (Cruz & dos Santos, 2010, p. 148)

Especially because the solidarity economy is more present in impoverished areas, it is able to change individuals' cultural-cognitive understandings and help them overcome the many barriers they face every day. Most people in these locales have pre-conceived notions about the paths they can take (for instance, a woman becoming a maid), that in most (if not all) cases does not include owning a business or going to school. Furthermore, people in impoverished settings must overcome more barriers (material, cultural, social, and political) to change their lives. Two participants in two different SEEs in the neighborhood of Palmas explained how their lives have changed:

> When I compare my life with when I came here with my life now, I remember a song I always like to sing, "Taste of Honey:" "My victory today has a taste of honey," as the song says. My sister calls me sometimes and says that when she remembers the suffering she has been through in this neighborhood, she does not

> even want to walk around here. I tell her to come, because now it is different. (Dona Darcília, 2010, p. 1)[26]
>
> Young people also have opportunities in Palmas. With a loan, a [youth] group created the Palma Limpe, a small factory of cleaning products. Elias Lino dos Santos is the coordinator of the enterprise. Poor boy, he spent his childhood working to help his mother. Even so, he was able to enter the Federal University of Ceará (UFC), where he studies philosophy. "*This work gives me the necessities, so that I can maintain my life, I can feed and dress myself, help my mother and can keep going to university.* Although the course is in a public university, I have many costs. The costs are high, such as tickets, books and xeroxes, so my work allows me to do this, besides giving me a responsibility," explains Elias Lino dos Santos. He further states: "I think if I could reduce it to one word it would be *overcoming; overcoming prejudices, for being young, it is an overcoming of challenges, it is proof that we are capable*," says Elias Lino dos Santos, coordinator of Palma Limpe.(http://g1.globo.com/globoreporter/0,,MUL1052010-16619,00-BAIRRO +DE+FORTALEZA+CRIA+MOEDA+PROPRIA+E+ENRIQUECE.html)

Similar testimonies can be found in other research (see Table A.1). Importantly, these individual changes have also had an effect on communities. In a book evaluating the 20-year history of Cáritas's Community Action Program, evaluators asked participants and partners from the early 1990s about the outcomes and challenges of the program. They claimed the program yielded many individual, community, and societal benefits:

> In the plans and reports [from the regional chapters of Cáritas] we can find an endless number of expected results: employment and income generation; reduction of rural exodus; creation of better prospects of life, both in the countryside and in the city; development of the spirit of association and solidarity; reduction of social inequalities; access to public policies; valuation of gender issues; strengthening of community organization, etc. (Cáritas Brasileira, 2003)

The report further stresses the importance of the solidarity economy as a way to create political change:

> As far as the political dimension of the program, this is the element that differentiates this program from other projects assisted by Cáritas. The creation of cooperatives are pedagogical instruments for building political awareness, especially by strengthening individuals' organizational capacities [collective action], and by the individuals being able to identify themselves and their relationships with other actors such as the State and other sectors of society. (Cáritas Brasileira, 2003)

[26] http://g1.globo.com/globoreporter/0,,MUL1052010-16619,00-BAIRRO+DE+FORTALEZA+CRIA+MOEDA+PROPRIA+E+ENRIQUECE.html

Despite revealing some not so positive consequences, like the fragile relationship with other *Pastorais*, especially those with more assistance-oriented missions, the report shows that societal change was accomplished by expanding and strengthening solidarity:

> We identified a growth in solidarity relations expressed through various practices, collective relations and relationships established internally between the participants. The expressions of religious experience indicated the importance of linking religious manifestations with the commitment to transforming society, an issue that the program aims to achieve. (Cáritas Brasileira, 2003)

Overall, cooperatives have yielded small but important benefits for individuals and their communities. In Table A.1, I provide more detailed examples of each of these outcomes. Economic, individual, and political benefits are also expected to help change communities and society. Communities have become more vocal, and are demanding that their rights be recognized and minimum infrastructure be provided. For instance, in surveys conducted by SENAES between 2010 and 2012 with representatives of more than 19,000 SEEs, 37% said that they had received social commitments from members, 37% agreed that they had yielded benefits for the community (e.g., schools, housing, sewer systems), and 17% concurred that their members had become more politically engaged.

All of these changes are expected to address poverty and income inequality, both directly, by providing individuals with more income, and indirectly, by empowering individuals. As a result, vulnerable individuals have been inspired to: become more vocal and demand better living conditions from governments and corporations; take collective action to change their own situations and communities; help one another; and become more educated, well-spoken, and culturally adept, thereby increasing the likelihood of growing their enterprises or even helping themselves or their friends and family members obtain better jobs.

Table A.1

Outcomes Related to the Establishment of Cooperatives

Outcome Type	Example
Economic	
Employment	In a document about the solidarity program in the city of Londrina, members of cooperatives stated: "Well, I cannot work, I was not working because of the disease" (Member Cooperative C); "...because you see, we reach a certain age, companies do not want to hire us, even more with the little study that we have. So we have to figure out something" (Member Cooperative D); "Look, it's me talking for most of us here, it is difficult to get a job at our age" (Member Cooperative F).; "What motivated you? Unemployment. I think that every person, it's a work option, the only place I worked for was as a domestic helper, so...I was able to show what I was capable of" (Member Cooperative A). The report also states: "The possibility of carrying out a work activity that allows the development of capacities brings differentials in relation to other alternatives of employment, as shown in the following testimony, in which the only option was the work of a maid: 'So, I think that the city of Londrina is developing opportunities for us, to generate income without leaving our neighborhoods, besides that, what was the option of work? I think for everyone here was to work as a maid.'" (Borinelli, Santos, & Pitaguari, 2010, p. 168) Every day the number of people who are able to generate theirs and their family's whole livelihood by collecting recycling materials grows. Dona Geralda, a 54-year-old woman, knows very well what it is like to spend a lifetime dedicated to this profession. At the age of 8, Geralda was already on the streets of the capital of Minas Gerais in search of paper, cardboard, plastic, and whatever she could collect. "My mother came from the hinterland with the dream of having a better life, but it was not like that; she lost her dignity because she went to the streets." Geralda says that several times she spent days and nights in search of material, without returning to her home, a small shack on the outskirts of the city. She had 12 children, 9 of them alive, and everyone, just like her, became garbage pickers from an early age. Ten years ago, her husband also decided to follow in his wife's footsteps. "All I got was paper picking. I could feed my family, put food on the table." (https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/dimenstein/comunidade/gd131004.htm)
Income	As one of the leaders of the association reported: Beekeeping in the Alto Turi Region and in the state of Maranhão contributed to combating poverty through income generation, it also helped to combat the uncontrolled and criminal burnings that affected our region, particularly helped to improve the quality of life of beekeepers and their families. We do not have precise data about average income, but we can evaluate between 800 and 1,000 Reals per month [more than the minimum wage]. (Silva, 2014, p. 31) According to the ASMARE Report (2007), the average monthly income of the member of ASMARE is R$550. During the interview it was reported by the interviewees that the income varies from R$100 to R$1,400 among the members. In the same interview it was found that 61.1% receive between R$400 and R$600. When these values are compared with the minimum wage established by the federal government in the period (R$368), we can see that 71.5% of respondents receive above the national salary floor. When asked who had

Outcome Type	Example
	another paid job, 88% of the respondents said no, 9% said yes, and 3% answered sometimes. (Torres, 2008, p. 85) Other studies also report increases in income (Arcoverde, 2010; do Nascimento et al., 2011; Moreira, Vidal, & Farias, 2003).
Housing	Of the respondents, only 0.7% reported living on the streets, 57.8% said they own a home, 26.5% had a rented house, 9.5% lived in a home, 2.7% reported living on a plot or squatting in a house. (Torres, 2008, p. 89)
Psychological/individual	
Self-esteem	In this process, one of the members of an economic enterprise of the Western region, with eyes full of tears, declared: "Participating in the solidarity economy made me reborn. It made me believe that I am important and that I deserve to be respected and valued as anyone who has money"…Statements such as these were common during the research, such as "solidarity economy gave me back self-esteem and self-love," "my family began to look at me with different eyes," "today I feel an integral part of society," "I do not need to beg from anyone. I have my own money," "today, I even have lipsticks when I leave home." (Borinelli et al., 2010, p. 147) The increase in self-esteem is related to the change in the mentality of participants regarding their abilities, perceptions of reality, participation in the decision-making process, access to training, the expansion of their work capacities, and income generation. These elements interfere with the positioning of women within the family and in the community at large. The following discussion addresses the changes coming from psychological empowerment: "We've always been an employee, a worker, and a housewife. My life was like that from the factory to the house, at home washing clothes, cleaning, shopping, and nowadays there is no more [obligation] to make food for the husband, for children; I created a total independence. I even learned to let my kids get by on their own; before we gave everything with a kiss and lived only for them, and not now. I just woke up to life! Knowing that a woman is not only to stay behind a stove and take care of the children, understand? If an opportunity appears to travel, take a course and I can go, I will! I have learned to create independence, to value myself and to know that I am useful, that I can, to know that I am capable, that there will be no discrimination in front of me, because the business is mine and I am betting on it and that I can count on the friends I created." The statements "I am capable," "I can," "I go" express awareness of their capabilities and potentialities. This subjective process is fundamental, given the need to deconstruct the established images, the predetermined roles for women. In this sense, the questioning of gender inequality for women brings to the fore the autonomy, the capacity to go, to do, to develop, breaking with subalternity, with masculine dependence, as we can observe in the following testimony: "I feel proud to be part of the Association as a woman, to be able to know that I can. I did not have to put a man in the house to live at his expense and put up with everything again. My husband would not let me work outside, so he would do whatever he wanted and when we had an argument he would say, 'I provide everything, I did not let you go hungry.' Now I authorize myself to do what I want. So I feel proud, I work here and I do not need a man to survive, I feel proud to be able to include myself in something." (de Oliveira, 2013, p. 6) She remembers the prejudice and the indifference she had to face several times in the street. "When we were there separating material, the police and the prosecutor arrived to try to take the cart, sometimes a truck would arrive and it would wet all of us that were under the viaduct; I suffered a lot, people despised us." But for Geralda, starting in 1990, things began to improve, especially when the formation

Outcome Type	Example
	of cooperatives began. The garbage pickers have come to be valued and supported by the government as well. "Today it has changed a lot; before it was rubbish, now we have respect." Geralda gradually discovered the value of her profession. For her, garbage picking is synonymous with environmental agent. (https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/dimenstein/comunidade/gd131004.htm) Other studies also report increases in self-esteem (do Nascimento et al., 2011; Moreira et al., 2003).
Empowerment	The eradication of poverty will not be possible through unilateral means of government actions, such as income transfer programs. The success of such programs depends on the chances and spaces in which those affected by inequalities can choose the path to act as agents in the recovery of their dignity (Asseburg, 2007). It should then be taken into account the patterns of capacity deprivation (Sen, 1999; 2001) that affect people. Without their overcoming, they will not react adequately to more favorable opportunities to benefit from them in order to improve their living conditions. "Economic assistance from the state is not enough; the development of capacities should be promoted so that people can generate incomes on their own account and thus escape poverty themselves. Mechanisms for transforming capacities into income must be strengthened, which in turn enable the development of valuable functions and new capabilities." (Rodríguez, 2005, p. 223)
Education	Thus, for the interviewees in the professional scope, the contributions are translated into: participation in professional courses; acquisition of professional experience; opportunities to obtain their first job; opportunities to work in other professions; participation in training; improved working techniques. (Arcoverde, 2010, p. 47). Interviews with 12 (out of 40) members of a garbage pickers cooperative in Viçosa-MG revealed that they joined the cooperative out of necessity, and even though the salaries were lower than the minimum wage and the work was difficult, 66% of interviewees said that their overall quality of life improved after participating in the cooperative because of the increase in their household income, increased self-esteem, and *better education.* It was bad for health, *but good for education.* (do Nascimento, de Barros, de Almeida, & Teixeira, 2011, p. 35)
Cultural capital	We have a lot of opportunity to take trips, of course, to attend seminars, to help, to participate in cooperative projects. That has always given me strength, which is giving me strength to this day to bet on the cooperative. It's the chance I did not have in a company before, to participate, help make decisions, attend seminars, take courses. Then we create a very strong bond; we end up getting to know people from all over Brazil. I already went to Lapa, to Santa Maria; at the Solidarity Economy Fair, I sold products and participated in the workshops; I went to São Paulo, Joinville. Things that I never once thought I could do and I'm doing now. I also participated in the commemoration of the day of the worker, etc...I was representing our cooperative and many times I was also invited to give testimony about the cooperative, about what is cooperativism, through the university and churches. (de Oliveira, 2013, p. 8) Geralda is currently making a difference through the cooperative. She gives lectures, guides the new collectors and welcomes visitors. This year was also chosen by the organization Ashoka Social Entrepreneurs in a program of support to community leaders and will

Outcome Type	Example
	receive a grant-aid for their expenses. (https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/dimenstein/comunidade/gd131004.htm)
Family and social ties	In the personal realm, these contributions are expressed in the following way: they obtained more satisfaction and personal development; experienced increased harmony in interpersonal interactions; increased their knowledge; and broadened their friendship circles. In relation to the main contributions of enterprises in the family, we identified improvements in family life; increased income; family participation in the enterprise; and access to material goods. (Arcoverde, 2010, p. 47) At work I have the power to influence a decision, the power to contribute to decisions. I always say that working with people is the most complicated and challenging thing you have. It is not a button that you fix, that tightens, that adjusts...It is the meeting, it is the discussion, it is the conversation. (de Oliveira, 2013, p. 10)
Social/local	
Social awareness	The testimonials below demonstrate the relevance of this activity: "I feel good about this treatment that we have, the daily things we have the autonomy to decide. There is no business of others wanting to disqualify me, or diminish me because of my simplicity." Social empowerment includes access to information, knowledge, participation in social organizations and financial resources. It refers to educational levels and access to other skills. The following report shows how access to education is empowering: "I learned that it's never too late for anything, I went back to school and now I do not want to stop! It's been a year and a half I've been studying! In a college like this, in the midst of young people, it is totally different from the EJA (Youth and Adult Education) project…You are literate and at the same time participating and learning more about cooperatives. The solidary economy is a very interesting topic to exchange ideas, which gives strength and momentum. Access to information on health, public services, political configurations contributes to the feedback of the knowledge process, considering that knowledge is power. Women's self-development is permeated by the valorization of their knowledge, as well as by the apprehension of new information that informs their positions, which enables them to make arguments, and develop support and autonomy. I took the course of legal promoters, who worked with this side of violence in families, especially against women. It was 8 months and we learned the basics about the laws, the history of violence against women and also about rights." This reveals the importance of the intervention of external agents, such as those responsible for facilitating access to information, contributing and mediating the group organization process, instrumentalizing members by socializing knowledge, debating the problems based on the reality lived in each group. The following testimony exemplifies some themes that emerged in a women's enterprise. "The social worker MK discusses with the group the issues of entrepreneurship, functioning, and organization of production, but other social workers talked about early cancer of the uterus, violence against women, how to deal with drug addicts, and the alcoholics." (de Oliveira, 2013, p. 8)
Community development	Finally, we highlight the contributions of solidarity projects to local society, namely: the provision of services to the community; generation of employment and income; offering good quality products; community development; community mobilization; social inclusion. The importance of the solidary economy for the economy of Pernambuco, in general, is noted by the following data: the value of investments to the sector—approximately 24 million Reals; the total revenues of the enterprises—approximately 52 million Reals; and the number of workers of both sexes included in these enterprises—approximately 89,000 people. (Arcoverde, 2010, p. 49)

Outcome Type	Example
Political	Collective action: “So, I think from the moment we get to be aware that the community can work together, produce and buy their own products...From my point of view, I think it’s because when she has difficulty doing some kind of work, I’m being supportive of her, I’m giving her an idea, then she’ll give me an idea too. We work as a group, we are in solidarity with each other” (Group F; Londrina). (Nishimura & Rizzotti, 2010, p.164) Another factor that interferes with psychological empowerment is the occupation of public spaces, considering that historically women were “restricted” to the private. Solidarity initiatives allow the occupation of public spaces, the visibility of women. The testimonial below portrays the exit of the private space: ‘Because 10 years at home taking care of children, suddenly you are part of a group, then you go to sell, go to the university, which for us was an enclosed place, go to City Hall, go to the fairs. You see those marketers for years and we are just like them! Then came the press. That even left the group in the clouds, it was very beautiful. There’s even a lady who went to buy cloth, and then they said, ‘Are you from that group that came out in the newspaper?”’ This same interviewee brings another example that contributes to the visualization of her process of psychological empowerment: “One day I had to cash a check and I almost had a heart attack because I never left the house! I was just going to go to the doctor or go to the parents’ house. So joining the group made me go to meetings, courses, press interviews! It totally changed my life.” (de Oliveira, 2013, p. 6)

APPENDIX B

FIELD ANALYTIC APPROACH

Many scholars have adopted a field analytic approach in institutional studies. However, this approach has some barriers because it is not well-defined, little information exists on how to implement it, and many studies that I consider to be based on the approach do not explicitly disclose that this is the case. Below, I first explain the field analytic approach based on studies that explicitly describe its usage and other work involving field analysis. Then, I describe other studies and explain why I understand them as being based on a field analytic approach, even though it is not explicitly acknowledged. Lastly, I highlight the main components of a field analytic approach, its stages, and when to use it.

Field Analytic Approach in the Literature

To date, there are four studies in which scholars have explicitly used a field analytic approach as their methodology (Lounsbury & Crumley, 2007; Lounsbury et al., 2003; Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Caronna, 2000; Yan, Ferraro, & Almandoz, 2019). Overall, explanations of what a field analytic approach means are rather scant. However, all of these studies have several elements in common: they examine the field level, cover a long period of time, and consider how the dynamics of actors and relationships change the focus of institutionalism from isomorphism to conflict and variation (Lounsbury & Ventresca, 2003). These scholars mainly adopted a qualitative approach, and described their data analysis methods very briefly (if at all).

A key element of this methodology is the focus on fields, especially Bordieu's (1984,) conceptualization. In all four studies, scholars acknowledged the importance of fields for understanding organizational processes, especially within institutional theory. This focus differentiates the field analytic approach from case studies, which normally focus on examining one organization or comparing organizations, by stressing the need to always look at the field to understand any institutional process. The field becomes important, because it is at this level that scholars can investigate "temporal and spatial variations in meaning and the ways in which actors, enmeshed in relatively durable power relations, engage in continual struggles for positional advantage…the dimensions of similarity and difference that structure conflict and social interaction patterns" (Lounsbury & Ventresca, 2003, pp. 167-168).

Another common element of these studies is the historical focus to examine changes over time related to activities, practices, meanings, frames, actors' positions, and actors' relationships, among others. For instance, scholars have used the approach to track changes over time in money management activities and practices, to explore the evolutions of SRI in Hong Kong and Mainland China, and to account for both the institutional context and actor positions (Yan et al., 2019). Overall the field analytic approach is used "to track changes over time in a system of meaning, what we refer to as 'field frame,' associated practices and their social organization" (Lounsbury et al., 2003, p. 77).

It is clear that scholars who adopt the field analytic approach consider the dynamics of actors and relationships; specifically, they seek to identify the main actors in the field, how conflict emerges, and the institutions associated with these actors, among others. For instance, while investigating the emergence of the recycling field in the United States, Lounsbury et al. (2003) examined a broad range of important actors, including trade associations, social movements, non-profits, and governments, among others. Thus, a field analytic approach amounts to a: "culturally and politically informed analysis on how broader elements of stratification and societal beliefs embodied in category schemes such as logics, models, and frames constitute social actors and change as a result of multi-level political processes, involving a wide variety of actors such as producer organizations, state agencies, trade associations, social movement organizations and other field-level organizations" (Lounsbury & Ventresca, 2003, p. 183).

Data collection and analysis is focused mostly on archival data, but also interviews. Although data sources often are not clear, Yan and Ferraro (2016) drew on archival data and interviews, as well as observations. The majority of other scholars have used primary and secondary archival data complemented by interviews. Although it is not explicitly stated, I have inferred that researchers have collected data using a "snowball" sampling technique. In a first step, important documents are identified, and through them, researchers learn about other documents relevant to their research. Scholars typically analyze a wide range of documents, including books, meeting brochures, trade magazines, and proprietary documents (Lounsbury et al., 2003; Yan & Ferraro, 2016).

Typically, researchers describe the centrality and diversity of data in a field, but not the amount. The focus seems to be on obtaining relevant data that exemplify the different views and opinions of the actors in that field, thereby revealing conflicts. Thus, in studies based on a field analytic approach, the priority is to gather key documents that explain the field.

The researchers who performed these studies loosely explained their data analysis techniques. They described how each dataset helped them answer specific questions that yielded insights relevant to the main research question, but not much beyond that. Scholars did not explicitly disclose whether they used a specific "strategy" when reading the data, if they engaged in any coding, or how it was done. Yan and Ferraro (2016) used Langley's (1999) narrative and bracketing strategy in their study. Considering how all of the aforementioned studies present a narrative of the evolution of a field, I would expect that the use of Langley's (1999) processes are adequate, especially because many of these scholars break the narrative into periods of time, and provide a deeper analysis of each period to illuminate relevant mechanisms.

Field Analytic Approach in Other Studies

In the institutional theory literature, many mixed methods studies present a field analytic study followed by regression analysis. Typically, researchers craft a narrative of the field that informs hypothesis development. These narratives normally are divided into periods to reveal developments in the field, including changes in meaning, institutions and practices, and describe main actors and their conflicts. These studies are not explicitly described as mixed methods, but it is clear that these narratives are based on

careful analyses of archival data, and in some cases even interviews, that enabled the researchers to examine the field and identify how it evolved over time, thereby informing hypotheses that could be tested. Furthermore, these studies all explain either field (market) emergence, or how field-level transformations influence organizations, and practices.

In Table B.1, I list the studies in which scholars explicitly adopted a field analytic approach, as well as other mixed methods studies where one component appears to be based on this approach, even though it is not explicitly described as such. I have identified three main elements that constitute the field analytic approach: a field focus, historical span, and the conflicting/relational nature of actors.

Table B.1

Examples of Studies based on a Field Analytic Approach

Study	Empirical Context	Actors Identified	Study Period	Timespan (in years)	Methods	Data Sources
Goodrick & Salancik (1996)	Variation in caesarean practices in the United States due to hospital characteristics and uncertainty	For-profit, non-profit, public hospitals; scientists; insurance companies, professionals	1978-1986	8	Mixed-methods	Not described for qualitative work, datasets for regression analysis
Thornton & Ocasio (1999)	Transformation of the editorial field in U.S. and the impact on power positions	CEOs, publishers, publishing companies, professionals	1958-1990	32	Mixed-methods	30 interviews, datasets
Scott et al. (2000)	Field change in health care in the San Francisco Bay Area	Hospital, professionals, government, associations	1945-1995	50	Mixed-methods	Data, interviews, databases
Lounsbury (2001)	Variation in recycling practices due to staff differences	Universities, social movement organizations, government agencies, activists, staff	1960s-1996	36	Mixed-methods	Not described for qualitative work, datasets for regression analysis
Lounsbury et al. (2003)	Market emergence of the U.S. recycling industry	Trade associations, social movements, non-profits, government	1960-mid-1990s	~35	Qualitative	Archival data and 30 interviews
Rao et al. (2003)	Emergence of nouvelle cuisine in France	Elites, chefs, journalists, professional societies, schools	1970-1997	27	Mixed-methods	39 interviews, datasets
Lounsbury (2007)	Field change in the U.S. money management industry	Professionals, locations, industry, firms,	1944-1985	41	Mixed-methods	Not described for qualitative work, datasets for regression analysis
Hiatt et al. (2009)	Market emergence and decline due to the work of social movements	Movements, industries, immigrants, government,	1870-1920	50	Mixed-methods	Not described for qualitative work, datasets for regression analysis
Sine & Lee (2009)	Emergence of wind energy market due to the work of social movements	Environmental movement organizations, governments, entrepreneurs,	1978-1992	13	Mixed-methods	Not described for qualitative work, datasets for regression analysis
Yan & Ferraro (2016)	Market emergence of socially responsible investing in Hong Kong and Mainland China	Associations for sustainable investing, government, corporations, professionals	2000-2015	15	Qualitative	212 documents, 21 interviews, and observation

Summary of the Field Analytic Approach

Overall, after reviewing the studies, I have determined that studies based on a field analytic approach examine a field, have a historical frame, and focus on understanding the actors and their interactions over time. The method is used to understand how institutional processes emerge and evolve over time, and how cultural, political, social, and economic dynamics shape these institutional processes. Below I summarize what I believe to be the main elements and/or assumptions of the approach, as well as the main goals or questions researchers should have in mind when analyzing their data.

Elements/Assumptions of the Approach

1. Historical: Time span of the research is long to reveal field development/change.
2. Relational/political: Researchers examine the actors in the field, their interactions and conflicts.
3. Cultural/societal: Researchers link actors and history with institutional creation, meaning making, deinstitutionalization, etc.

Stages of Analysis

Data analysis generally involves creating thick descriptions (Geertz, 2015), crafting narratives, employing a bracketing strategy (Langley, 1999), and/or performing open coding to identify emerging topics or explanations, among others. Throughout the analysis, I think it is important for the researcher to keep the following objectives in mind:

1. Understand the development of the field.
2. Identify the important actors and their positions in the field.
3. Understand the field frames, symbols, practices and values, how they relate with actors in specific positions, and how they change over time.
4. Examine how these broad field changes shape organizations, markets, or practices.
5. Deeply analyze the surprising or puzzling findings, and explain them in light of the actors involved; political, social, cultural, and/or economic dynamics; developments over time; changes in meaning; and available theories.

APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

Interview Protocol: General Participants

1. Can you describe your involvement in the solidarity economy movement?
   Probing questions: When did you start participating? Which organizations and events were involved?

2. What is the solidarity economy to you?
   Probing questions: New market? Movement? Policy?

3. What were the most significant events/actions related to the solidarity economy in Brazil?

4. What were the most significant events for the solidarity economy in your state/city?

5. How do you think the movement has changed since the movement has been incorporated into the federal government (via SENAES)?

6. What regional variations do you see in the movement?
   Probing questions: In the creation of solidarity economy enterprises? In the survival of these enterprises? In the role of government? In the role of social movements (which ones)? In the role of the Catholic Church? In the role of universities?

7. Now we will focus more on the location where you have more experience. What variables of the community do you think influence the creation and survival of solidarity economy ventures?

8. How, in this locale, is the solidarity economy influenced by the government (municipal, state, federal)? Social movements and NGOs? Universities? The Catholic Church? Other churches?

9. The Catholic Church (mainly the most progressive wing and the work of Cáritas) was/is very important for the solidarity economy in Brazil. Do you see this influence on the ventures you have contact with?

10. In my quantitative research, the number of ventures created is lower in communities with a higher percentage of Catholics but increases as the percentage of evangelicals increases. Would you have any explanation for that?

11. Is there a question I did not ask that you think would help me understand why some communities are more successful in creating solidarity economy ventures and others are not? If so, what should I ask? Could you answer it?

Interview Protocol: Participants Associated with Cáritas and/or the Catholic Church

1. Could you speak about your involvement in the solidarity economy movement for Cáritas?
   Probing questions: When did you start participating? What are your responsibilities?

2. What is the solidarity economy to you?

3. For you, what is the role of the Catholic Church in the formation and survival of charitable undertakings?

4. In relation to Cáritas [location where the interviewee works], what are the actions of the organization in the solidarity economy?
   Probing questions: What kind of help? What types of entrepreneurship? Which industries?

5. Do other organizations help Cáritas with its charitable endeavours?
   Probing questions: If so, which ones? How do they help?

6. What are the elements of a municipality or community that you believe aid in the creation and survival of solidarity economy ventures (e.g., having a community leader, having access to finance, having public policies, having a rural population, having more Catholics in the region, etc.)?

7. How, in this locale, is the solidarity economy influenced by the government (municipal, state, federal)? Has there been a change in the ventures that you have undertaken since the creation of SENAES (National Secretariat for Solidarity Economy)?

8. The Catholic Church (mainly the most progressive wing and the work of Cáritas) was/is very important for the solidarity economy in Brazil. Do you think that only the most progressive wing helps in the dissemination and survival of these ventures, or does the most conservative part of the church help? If yes, how?

9. In your endeavours, are all people Catholics?

10. Do you think that being a Catholic helps in the creation and maintenance of the entity? If yes, how?

11. If in the enterprises you operate there are non-Catholic people, what religion are they?
    Probing questions: Do you think religion affects performance in the enterprise? How?

12. In my quantitative research, the number of ventures created is lower in communities

with a higher percentage of Catholics but increases as the percentage of evangelicals increases. Would you have any explanation for that?

13. Is there a question I did not ask that you think would help me understand why some communities are more successful in creating solidarity economy ventures and others not? If so, what should I ask? Could you answer it?

APPENDIX D

TYPES OF SEEs

There are six main types of solidarity enterprises: community banks, entities that trade (exchange) products and services, and entities that create a sharing infrastructure to collectively purchase materials, produce goods and provide services. Cooperatives may be farms of the Landless Movement, bankrupt companies taken over by employees, or organizations run by specific minorities such as women and homeless groups (e.g., garbage pickers), among others. All cooperatives are democratically owned and the decision-making is participatory, meaning that each member has one vote. Most members are people in vulnerable situations or minorities. To illustrate the diversity of these enterprises, I describe four successful examples: a blanket company, a garbage picker cooperative, a craft/fashion enterprise, and an agriculture cooperative.

Parahyba Blankets is a blanket weaving company that was very famous in the 1970s. The organization used to sell more than 2 million blankets per year to a wide range of establishments, from small Brazilian retailers to department stores in the United States like Macy's and Sears. The company went bankrupt in the 1990s, and in 1998 the employees took over the company. As of 2013, the company had 140 cooperative members and the capacity to produce 1.5 million blankets per year, with earnings of 7.1 million BRL (approx. 2.2 million USD). The company also invested more than 2 million BRL in new machinery.[27]

Homeless people founded ASMARE (*Associação dos Catadores de Papel, Papelão e Material Reaproveitável de Belo Horizonte*) in 1990 with the help of *Pastoral de Rua* and Cáritas. In 2013, the cooperative membership included 380 waste collectors. Even though most of the members stated that they would like to have a different profession (70%), many had been members of the cooperative for a long time (32% had been part of the cooperative for 10 to 17 years, and 27% for 5 to 10 years). The cooperative is an exemplar of how SEEs can grow and help communities. Available data show that in 2007, the members received BRL 550/month (minimum wage) and no one lived in the streets anymore. The organization has expanded from a shack to two warehouses to store the waste; a restaurant; a factory to build blocks from waste for sidewalk construction; a theatre group that promotes shows about recycling, consumerism, and the environment; and two cultural spaces. One of the cultural spaces is allocated for workshops about how to transform recycled material into crafts and jewellery and to build the carts used to collect the waste. The other cultural space hosts samba concerts, which are free for the cooperative's members (tickets are sold to other members of the community). Furthermore, the cooperative has partnered with many corporations that donate their waste (about 107 tons of recycled material per month) (Torres, 2008). ASMARE's latest accomplishment was the development of the first

[27] https://www.maxpress.com.br/Conteudo/1,507784,Coopertextil_volta_a_crescer_com_cobertores_Parahyba_,507784,5.htm
http://fsindical.org.br/imprensa/sao-paulo-sp-cobertores-parahyba-tenta-se-reerguer/

recycling plant managed by waste pickers in the world.[28]

Coopa-roca was founded in 1987 to provide opportunities for women in a slum community in Rio de Janeiro (Southeast region) to work from home. The cooperative uses leftover fabric to create fashion and design products. Over the years, the organization has expanded and incorporated other products into its business model. Designers come to the community to provide training and to design products for the women to produce. The organization's products have been exposed to international markets in Germany, Italy, France, the United Kingdom, and Holland. The Brazilian Foundation, Clinton Foundation and Kering Foundation support the organization.[29]

The last example is Rede Moinho, an organization founded in 2008 that sells goods produced by other SEEs. In addition to its store, the organization attends many farmers' markets in Salvador, a city in the Northeast region. Rede Moinho also provides opportunities for consumers to meet the producers, facilitating relationships that help consumers understand the living situations of the producers, and helps producers identify their clients' needs. The organization sells products that are traditional to the Northeast region, as well as produce and cleaning supplies, among others. For instance, they sell products made by Coopersuc, a cooperative of 271 members in the desert area of the Northeast that harvests a native plant of that region called *umbu* and transforms it into jams, spreads, and beer. In 2002, Coopersuc processed 18,000 kg of *umbu*; by 2010, that number had risen to 150,000 kg (Silva, 2016). Its products are not only sold at Rede Moinho and other supermarkets in Brazil, but also exported to France, Germany and Spain.[30]

[28] https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/dimenstein/comunidade/gd131004.htm

[29] https://www.clintonfoundation.org/clinton-global-initiative/commitments/expansion-business-market-coopa-roca, https://anakabum.wordpress.com/arte/coopa-roca-cooperativa-de-trabalho-artesanal-e-de-costura-da-rocinha-ltda/, http://www.keringfoundation.org/coopa-roca, https://brazilfoundation.org/project/coopa-roca-cooperativa-de-trabalho-artesanal-e-de-costura-da-rocinha/, https://tordboontje.com/come-rain-come-shine/

[30] http://www.coopercuc.com.br/english/