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LOUGHEED'S "ENERGETIC" BUREAUCRATS: A STUDY OF SENIOR CIVIL SERVANTS IN PROVINCE-BUILDING DEPARTMENTS

by

Cynthia J. Bojechko

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled LOUGHEED'S "ENERGETIC" BUREAUCRATS: A STUDY OF SENIOR CIVIL SERVANTS IN PROVINCE-BUILDING DEPARTMENTS submitted by Cynthia J. Bojechko in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science.

Supervisor

Date Sept 15, 1982

To my parents and my sister Catherine

ABSTRACT

No study of the senior civil servants in Alberta's province-building departments has ever been undertaken. In this thesis, the author examines senior officials in the following central agencies which are crucial to Alberta's strategy of economic development: the Department of Federal and Intergovernmental Affairs; the Ministry of Economic Development; the Treasury Department; the Department of Energy and Natural Resources; the Premier's Office; the Executive Council Office. Thirty-three senior civil servants were interviewed by the author to obtain the information necessary to determine whether senior officials in the Lougheed administration are political administrators, or public administrators. On the basis of the interviews, senior officials' perceptions of their responsibilities, their influence, their accountability, and some aspects of their political philosophies are examined. In this thesis, the author argues that senior officials have assumed responsibilities which remove them from the realm of pure public administration.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to the thirty-three senior civil servants who generously offered their time, information, and opinion.

My thanks are also due to Dr. Allan Tupper for inspiring me to begin this thesis and for offering me the encouragement to finish it. I owe a special obligation to Dr. Frederick C. Engelmann, my supervisor, for the enthusiasm with which he shared this journey with me. I offer Dr. D.J.C. Carmichael my deepest appreciation for his frank appraisal of my thesis and his reassurance. I affectionately offer my admiration and gratitude to Bev Therrien for the suggestions and criticisms which she offered throughout the construction of this thesis and for being the best friend a person could have. I lovingly thank Alexander Parissis for his caring, patience, and understanding during a tense time when I devoted myself to my thesis.

These persons I have named and others so dear to me who have not been mentioned but are thankfully remembered, have helped me to realize my dream of completing this thesis, thus allowing me to embark on the fulfillment of a new dream.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The degree of influence exercised by senior civil servants in Canada's provincial governments is an area of study neglected by observers of Canadian politics. Despite provincial governments' increasingly active role in the federal political arena in the 1970s, no examination of senior provincial public administrators has been undertaken. This thesis represents an effort to fill a part of this void in Canadian political studies.

Wealth has allowed the Alberta government to assume an aggressive position in the federal arena. However, no thorough investigation has been completed which studies the role of Alberta's senior civil servants in the province's quest for economic diversification. Alberta's senior administrators have pledged allegiance to the economic development aspirations of the Alberta government. This is suggested by Richards and Pratt:

> Confident of its own administrative competence and committed to a provincial strategy of development, this state-administrative elite sees Alberta as the logical arena for the advancement of its career opportunities and, like its private sector counterparts, it is fiercely loyal to the province as a semi-sovereign political entity and deeply involved in the process of "province-building."[1]

No evidence, however, exists to support or refute Richards and Pratt's contention that senior officials in Alberta are mere administrators.

In the last decade, some attention has been focussed upon the federal government's senior civil servants. Numerous studies have examined federal "superbureaucrats" in an attempt to show that they have a powerful influence upon elected politicians.[2] Ottawa's mandarins

are described as a new breed of bureaucrats who are very unlike traditional civil servants.

In this thesis, I examine the following agencies of the Alberta government which are central to the economic development of the province, and which I therefore call the province-building departments: the Department of Federal and Intergovernmental Affairs (FIGA); the Ministry of Economic Development; the Department of Energy and Natural Resources; the Treasury Department; the Premier's Office; and the Executive Council Office (E.C.O.). The list of agencies to be studied could have been extended to include the Department of Transportation, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Tourism and Small Business. However, I chose to study those agencies which are the heart of Alberta's strategy of economic development, not the other agencies which are the province's arteries; for example, the Department of Transportation is the route from which the policies flowing from the Ministry of Economic Development travel. I limit my examination to those agencies which are the primary organs circulating programs and strategies for economic development in Alberta.

It is my hypothesis that the aggressiveness of Alberta's elected politicians is adopted by their senior civil servants. I contend that Alberta's senior officials are not traditional public administrators, but political administrators whose roles in the political process and accountability to the political system are ill-defined.

A traditional administrative organization, where the rule of law prevails, is governed by the continuity of official business, the delimitation of authority through stipulated rules, and supervision of bureaucrats' responsibilities, the separation of office and

incumbent, and the documentary basis of official business. Written impersonal rules identify the traditional bureaucrat's authority, thus limiting the scope of his power. Max Weber, master of the art and science of social analysis and creator of ideal-type constructions of bureaucracy, maintained that the value of a bureaucracy lies in its ability to be precise, efficient, knowledgeable and continuous. Weber believed that a traditional bureaucracy is a powerful organization.

> superior to any other form [of administration] in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability. It thus makes possible a high degree of calculability of results for the heads of the organization and for those acting in relation to it.[3]

Traditional civil servants are the politically neutral instruments of elected political leaders.

My concern in this thesis is to illuminate the responsibilities, the influence, the accountability, and to gain some idea of the political philosophies of senior officials in Alberta's province-building departments. I seek to discover whether senior officials have assumed influence which allows them to dominate, however subtly, the action which is performed in Alberta's political arena. I want to determine whether the senior officials involved in Alberta's strategy for economic development are a new breed of bureaucrats. This thesis represents an effort to understand how much input Alberta's senior officials have in the decision-making process. Have the responsibilities which senior officials fulfill removed them from the realm of public administration in the Weberian sense into a new domain, political administration, where they must be sensitive to the demands of their political

masters and to the needs of the private sector? In this thesis, I seek to determine whether Alberta's senior officials are politicized by examining their roles in government, the extent of their influence, their feelings of their accountability, and their personal opinions about key issues in Alberta politics.

To attain the evidence needed to prove or disprove my hypothesis, I conducted interviews with thirty-three senior officials from FIGA, Economic Development, Energy & Natural Resources, Treasury, the Premier's Office, and the E.C.O. I sent letters of introduction to thirty-eight senior officials, selecting the upper echelons of the agencies: deputy ministers, assistant deputy ministers, and executive directors. Only five senior officials were not interviewed; three were on holiday, while the other two were simply too busy to see me. On the average, interviews lasted not the single hour I requested in my letter, but two hours. I did not use a tape recorder since I thought that a better rapport could be established if I took notes.

I constructed a set of questions which are found in Appendix I. I tried to keep the questions as neutral and open-ended as possible. I did not design my questionnaire with the intention of rigidly adhering to it, instead, it provided me with a guideline reminding me which areas I wanted to cover. The first few questions were prepared to give my respondents and myself a few minutes to relax; after that, I hoped that my respondents would not feel anxious about answering questions which were crucial to me - those questions which asked respondents their personal opinions in respect to certain issues. For a denouement and for interest's sake rather than for analytical

purposes, I ended my interviews by asking senior officials some demographic questions; their responses appear in Appendix II. This thesis is based on the result of approximately sixty-six hours of discussion with thirty-three Alberta senior civil servants, including some of the most senior persons in the Alberta government.

This study is presented in four chapters. In the next chapter, I examine the responsibilities, influence, and accountability of their senior civil servants. A brief sketch of the organizational structures in which the senior officials interviewed function is provided. On the basis of my interviews, I examine senior officials' perceptions of their roles, their influence on public policy, and the objects of their feelings of accountability.

In Chapter three, I offer some insight into the personal political philosophies of Alberta's senior officials. I examine their responses to questions which revolve around their perceptions about federal-provincial relations, Alberta's strategy for economic development, the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund, and government intervention in the economy. Based on their views about these issues, I draw a sketch of senior officials' political philosophies.

My final chapter offers some concluding observations about the role of Alberta's senior province-building officials in the decision-making process.

CHAPTER TWO: POSITIONS, POWERS, AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The purpose of this chapter is to gain an understanding of the framework in which senior officials function, their perceptions about their responsibilities, their opinions about their influence on public policy, and their views as to their own feelings of accountability. In the first section of this chapter, a brief discription of the framework of the agencies studied is presented so that an idea of the agencies' mandates, jurisdictions, and hierarchies may be gained.

Organizational Framework

Every public agency fulfils a role, uses some skills which are more or less unique, has contact with some clientele, and is responsible for a geographical area. Functions allocated to a government agency are performed within a framework which allows varying degrees of room for growth and adaptation. In this section, the anatomy of the Ministry of Economic Development, the Department of Energy and Natural Resources, the Department of Federal and Intergovernmental Affairs, the Treasury Department, and the Premier's Office and the Executive Council Office are examined. New administrative containers have been designed to deal with new issues the Alberta provincial government has faced. Departments such as FIGA and Economic Development, new creations of the 1970s, exemplify the perceived need for change in the Alberta government. The Premier's Office and the Executive Council Office have grown to accommodate demands for efficiency and effectiveness in the coordination of government affairs. The brief sketch of the agencies' most recent structures of authority which

follows below does not do justice to their complex organization; however, the outline presented provides a foundation for grasping an idea of the framework in which senior officials operate.

The Ministry of Economic Development

The Speech from the Throne at the opening of the 19th Legislature's first session, delivered by the Lt. Governor of Alberta on May 24, 1979, emphasized the objective of Premier Lougheed's government to pursue a vigorous policy of economic development. To meet this priority, the Department of Economic Development was created to coordinate and provide initiative and enterprise in business, transportation, and agricultural processing in an attempt to maintain and strengthen Alberta's leadership in promoting Canada's economic expansion. The new Department of Economic Development was created

> with broad objectives for implementation of the government's economic strategy building up the strength of our base industries of energy, striving to diversify the Alberta economy and further efforts to encourage balanced economic growth throughout the Province will be primary objectives of the important new Department. [1]

Bill 24 is the Department of Economic Development Act. Organization Chart 1 shows the 1980-1981 structure of the Department of Economic Development.

Economic Development does not have a clearly defined mandate. Senior officials in Economic Development have little legislation or line authority to base their work upon. Economic Development has a broad mandate to produce ideas for Alberta's economic development and to sell Alberta to the world. Senior officials in Economic Development tend to be generalists rather than specialists. Based on the wide mandate Economic Development was given and its youth (it is three years

Organization Chart

Alberta
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT



old), senior officials in the department are trying to establish their usefulness within the government. Without strictly defined parameters of authority, Economic Development's senior officials step on the toes of other departments' officials as they try to delineate the boundaries of their responsibilities. As the offspring of the Department of Business Development and Tourism, many of the senior officials who worked in that department now hold senior positions in Economic Development.

My respondents in agencies other than Economic Development said that the department is comprised of persons "running around looking for a mandate." A senior official in Energy and Natural Resources described Economic Development as a "promotional department made up of good salesmen. They provide a sensible promotion of Alberta's resources and industry and this task is essential to economic progress." A senior Treasury official said: "Economic Development is only partially successful. They are up against very heavy odds. But they are a dedicated bunch of people from the top down." Although senior officials in Economic Development are respected as professionals, they are also perceived by other senior officials as having more time to think about politics and programs than the other agencies' officials.

How do senior officials in Economic Development perceive the style of their department? One senior official in Economic Development observed:

> We're getting more bureaucratic. We're imaginative... we're hard-working ... it is common that we work overtime. We're generalists, at the senior level. We've had expertise at various jobs in the private sector. How do other departments see us? They think we're a lot of trouble.

> They're very skeptical and they don't trust us. Because we have a wide mandate, they fear us. For example, we were shut out of federal-provincial energy negotiations because other provisional government agencies were frightened as to what our approach would be. They are also jealous of us, a lot of civil servants can't travel; they view travelling as romantic. Our view? No department is an island unto itself. We can only succeed if we work cooperatively with other departments.

Economic Development's organizational boundaries are blurred; its broad mandate means senior officials do not know how far their jurisdictions extend, leaving senior officials with flexibility to define for themselves the range of their responsibilities. It gives senior officials discretionary power to decide what they will do within the broad objectives provided by the government. It also means that in establishing their realm of responsibility, senior officials in Economic Development may encroach into the dominion of another agency. The high degree of discretionary power granted to senior officials in Economic Development inspires fear and distrust in other departments' officials who are trying to protect their turf; such a situation means that competition and conflict between Economic Development and other agencies is not unknown. Economic Development has not established itself as a valuable entity in the Alberta government. In the words of one senior official in Economic Development: "Energy and Natural Resources people don't like us because we don't make money. Treasury isn't too pleased with us, thinking that we just spend money." Economic Development has been a low-profile department within the government community although the following quotation shows that one of its senior officials sees a need to improve the department's image.

> We don't develop our image as much as some other departments. Since we're a policy department, we don't want to be too visible; we do our jobs quietly. Our image is not very good in government ... it is something we have to work on. But our image in the private sector and the federal government is pretty good.

Economic Development's close relationship to the business community has led other government agencies to see it as pro-industry and this perception is not unfounded since, in the words of one of the department's officials, the department

> is very free-enterprise. To the government we communicate the business community's needs and concerns. We are an atypical civil service department; we're fairly innovative. Some people did question our split from Tourism and Small Business. Personally, I find it difficult to distinguish Small Business and Economic Development; there is some overlap here. Economic Development is important because we try to provide opportunities for the business community. We are an idea department. We are pretty top heavy, high profile,, and our senior officials tend to be from the private sector.

From the evidence presented so far, it appears that Economic Development is experiencing growing pains as it tries to gain the respect of other agencies' officials. Economic Development has not found its niche in Alberta's public administration. On the basis of my interviews, I find that Economic Development has gained neither the respect nor the trust of other government agencies which is necessary for cooperative action.

The Department of Energy and Natural Resources

A major government reorganization in 1975 brought together the Department of Mines and Minerals and parts of the Department of Lands and Forests to create the Department of Energy and Natural Resources.

This marriage was performed to improve energy and renewable resource management. In the broadest terms, Energy and Natural Resources is responsible for the administration and management of Alberta's energy, mineral, forest, fish and wildlife resources, and public loans. Bill 13, the Department of Energy and Natural Resources Act, was assented to on June 25, 1975. Organization Chart II is the most recent (1981) document showing the divisions of Energy and Natural Resources.

There are twelve divisions reporting to two deputy ministers, and a direct reporting line was established for Alberta Oil Sands Equity to the Ministers. Besides the minister, there is an associate minister for public lands and wildlife.

The organization of Energy and Natural Resources is very complex. One senior official stated: "We are bound to have complicated arrangements when we have twelve line divisions reporting to three deputy ministers and two ministers ... but our organization works in spite of its complexity." How do Energy and Natural Resources officials think their department is perceived? Unlike Economic Development, where poor perceptions of Economic Development's value were noted by senior officials, in the Department of Energy and Natural Resources, senior civil servants had more positive images of their agency as noted in the following statement, typical of the comments made by Energy and Natural Resource officials.

> Treasury views us as people who are not big spenders. We do however, often demand new programs and in this respect they think of us as a nuisance trying to spend "their" dollars. FIGA people see us as low priority because the kinds of issues they handle for us are mundane. Economic Development people appreciate the importance of renewable resources. Both the Premier's Office and the Executive Council Office recognize that

Organization Chart II Alberta Energy and Natural Resources



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> our department has great significance in rural Alberta. We make decisions which affect the lives of those in rural communities.

Energy and Natural Resources officials tended to sound efficacious. They are confident in their positions and place in the Alberta government due to the fact that the department was in the spotlight throughout the 1970s because it collected the revenues from resources and was deeply involved in developing the resource sector. Another senior official said that other government agencies "are a bit careful mixing with us ... if there was a serious conflict, they won't attempt a showdown with us." Energy and Natural Resources is perceived as being very powerful; in the words of one official, it is "a big department with an influential minister." The nature of Energy and Natural Resources' responsibilities has led to its establishment as a "valuable" agency in the Alberta government.

Like Economic Development, Energy and Natural Resources has created for itself a good reputation in the business community. In the words of one senior official:

> We've a good reputation in industry. We're there to help industry. We've a regulatory role and a responsibility to assist in the development of the province's resources. We carry some clout within government because we collect so much money.

Because resources are crucial to Alberta's economic well-being, Energy and Natural Resources, being a money-collecting mechanism and a major actor in the resource industry, has played a central role in the provincial economy.

Energy and Natural Resource senior officials function within a complicated organization. The structure of the department places a

great coordinating load on the assistant deputy ministers and executive directors. Its complexity makes communiction between various branches difficult. In contrast to Economic Development which has a broad mandate, a senior Energy and Natural Resources official said: "We live and die by our statutes. Therefore, we have total precision in executing our responsibilities; we know our limits and how much room we have to maneuver." They have flexibility in performing their tasks since, more than Economic Development, Energy and Natural Resources has established its clout in government. The senior officials I interviewed perceive Energy & Natural Resources as a "heavy department."

The Department of Federal and Intergovernmental Affairs

In the transformation from a rural and agricultural society to an urban and industrialized society, a greater degree of interaction between the federal government and the Government of Alberta has been become necessary in the last decade. The need for frequent contact and discussion between federal and provincial senior civil servants has been accommodated through the development of administrative machinery in governments with a mandate to coordinate intergovernmental affairs. In the Alberta administration there is a new type of official described by Donald V. Smiley as "the intergovernmental affairs manager, the official not involved directly with programs but rather with federal-provincial and interprovincial relations as such."[4]

On March 2, 1972 in the Throne Speech delivered to the Legislature, it was announced that the Department of Federal and Intergovernmental Affairs (hereafter referred to as FIGA) would be created. The Honourable Don R. Getty, Minister of FIGA, stated during the Throne Speech, that

> ... the role of the department as I see it functioning, is to provide the overall coordination of policies, programs and activities of the government of Alberta in relation to government outside of our provincial borders. That coordination does not mean getting in between our departments and our ministers, and other governments and other departments. In fact we encourage meetings by our ministers and other elected representatives in other governments, but we must make sure that these efforts are coordinated to fit into our general overall policies and plans.[5]

The Department of Federal and Intergovernmental Affairs Act was assented to on June 2, 1972. The Department of Federal and Intergovernmental Affairs is responsible for the coordination of the Government of Alberta's policies, programs, activities, and agencies in relation to the federal government, other provincial governments, and governments of foreign countries. Senior officials in FIGA ensure that Alberta's elected politicians maintain consistent and articulate policies in federal and interprovincial relations. FIGA officials analyze the implications and consequences for Alberta of federal and other provincial governments' policies, programs, activities, and intergovernmental agreements. FIGA officials have diplomatic responsibilities; they maintain and facilitate close liaison between the Alberta Government and other governments. FIGA was created "so that the Alberta bargaining position vis-à-vis the federal government might be strengthened and to ensure that the province is realizing full benefits from its intergovernmental agreements."[6]

Organizational Chart III shows that FIGA is structured so that contact is maintained with all provincial departments.[7]

One Energy and Natural Resources official said: "FIGA plays an important role. It coordinates all intergovernmental and interdepart-

mental communication. FIGA keeps everyone in the Alberta government appraised of federal-provincial issues." Another Energy and Natural Resources official said: "FIGA is the one department we cooperate most closely with. We have a high regard for FIGA officials. The key to their effectiveness is that they have short communication lines and a small staff; there is no line responsibility." As a central agency, FIGA's officials feel that other agencies approach them with a degree of resentment; this sentiment is reflected in the following quotation by a FIGA official

> ... [We] have a reputation for being academic whiz kids. We have a lot of bright people from university with some still in university. We are generalists. Our output is a quality above other departments. We're perceived as monkeying around in other department's areas. Some senior officials in other departments resent us because we have great prestige, we have no problems with our budgets, and we have better quarters. This resentment makes negotiations more difficult. But that is the nature of a central agency; one assumption of a central agency is that it is disliked by others.

FIGA's clout stems from its close relationship with Premier Lougheed, as noted in the following statement by a FIGA official.

> The last deputy minister of FIGA was a personal friend of the Premier's. The Premier likes and relies on this department so we have a great deal of influence. Other departments realize that we can get to the Premier easily.

FIGA's clout has allowed it to be a more effective mediator between departments. However, FIGA has now focussed its energy away from ad hoc intragovernmental activities to purely intergovernmental affairs. FIGA officials have establisdhed their role in government. The following statement by a senior FIGA official reflects the department's

ORGANIZATION CHART III

DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
MARCH 31/1981



officials' confidence in their ability to manage intergovernmental affairs.

> FIGA's style differs with each deputy minister. The deputy minister stamps his style on the department more so than the Minister does. We're a fairly pragmatic group in FIGA. We are very cooperative with other departments. We keep a fairly low profile in relation to the public eye, but we're very active within the Government. We are facilitators and mediators. In the last six years, we've come a long way towards initiating rather than being reactive as we were in our first four years of existence. We are now more purely an intergovernmental department than we had been in our early years. We limit our role to providing leadership where the intergovernmental dimension is major. We provide input at intergovernmental and interdepartmental meetings but we don't assume a leading role. We are trusted and respected. A number of departments have the belief that because we have a close relationship with the Premier, we can influence his views and perceptions... I chuckle at that since they believe we've far more influence than we do. Other departments have the view that we've greater input into policy making than we do.

FIGA is firmly entrenched in government organization. However, it should be noted that despite the positive attitude about FIGA voiced by senior officials in general, some FIGA officials were concerned that some other agencies' officials (who remained unnamed) perceived FIGA as being "too soft on Ottawa". A FIGA official said: "We give reasoned, well-thought out analyses where other departments will give knee-jerk anti-federal responses." The political orientations of FIGA's officials are explored in Chapter Three, providing an idea of where FIGA officials stand on federal-provincial issues.

FIGA is a young department which is perceived by senior officials as a very liberal organization. It is a small department with clout which has facilitated Alberta's position as a leader in federal-provincial affairs. It has also allowed interdepartmental contact and co-ordination to flow more effectively. As well, FIGA has provided the

mechanism for Alberta to establish itself internationally, thus facilitating international trade. In general, FIGA is an "academic" department which produces realms of research and position papers on intergovernmental issues.

The Treasury Department

The Treasury Department is responsible for the "management and control of the revenue and expenditure of the government."[8] It is "the" central agency. Organization Chart IV shows the Treasury Department's structure as of March 31, 1981.[8] In accordance with the provisions of the Financial Administration Act, 1977, the Treasury Department is responsible for

> the collection, management, control and reporting of revenue and expenditure; borrowings, investments, cash management; financial and budgetary procedures of the Crown including the Alberta Heritage Trust Fund; fiscal and economic planning, the development of tax policies and administration of corporate taxation and business incentives; and administration of public sector pension plans.

Treasury's role is to provide the economic and tax environment and the tools to be used for economic development. It is not in Treasury's mandate to diversify the economy.

Treasury is perceived in a positive way by senior officials. A senior official in Energy and Natural Resources described Treasury officials as having a "very heavy workload and being extremely competent." An Economic Development senior official said that Treasury officials were "professionals...they have to play the devil's advocate. It's a pain sometimes, but a necessary evil." Senior officials positive view of Treasury is due, in part, to the fact that in the last decade, the Alberta government has not had to penny-pinch. How-

ever, in an economic downturn, it would be interesting to ask the same officials their opinion of a tight-fisted Treasury Department. Treasury officials describe themselves as

> conservative in our approach. We don't get gung-ho on anything. We look at the pitfalls of everything. We're hardnosed, middle-of-the-road people.

In an economic crunch, it is my hypothesis that Treasury officials wold be more hardnosed than middle-of-the-road. Treasury officials, in the words of one of them, are

> holders of the purse strings. It's our job to ensure that money is well-spent. We're the government's friendly banker...but sometimes we're not so friendly. We have a questioning role. We ask: "Can you do this another way?" or "Will you be able to achieve this?"

Treasury is a vintage control agency. In an economic downturn, Treasury officials would likely be more authoritative and less generous in allocating funds for programs than in the last decade when departments hae enjoyed fewer monetary restrictions following Alberta's newfound prosperity.

The Executive Council Office and the Premier's Office

The Executive Council Office (hereinafter referred to as the E.C.O.) and the Premier's Office provide support services to the Executive Council and the Premier, respectively. Organization Chart V shows the structure of the E.C.O.[10] The E.C.O. is responsible for cabinet planning, committee delegations and cabinet tours.[11] The Premier's office provides the Premier with administrative assistance, performing such tasks as scheduling his appointments and taking calls from the public. Unlike the Prime Minister's Office, the Premier's Office is not an outside group of policy advisors. The staff of the Premier's

Alberta
TREASURY
31-MAR-81

ORGANIZATION CHART IV



1 of


1.
Provincial Treasurer
2.
Deputy Provincial Treasurer
4.
Office of the Controller
5.
Associate Deputy Provincial Treasurer — Finance
21.
Assistant Deputy Provincial Treasurer — Finance Programmes
Chief Investment Officer (Investment Management)
15.
Executive Director — Corporate Management Services
17.
Executive Director — Fiscal Policy & Economic Analysis
13.
16.
Risk Management & Insurance
22.
Finance Planning & Analysis
Banking & Cash Management
18.
Economic Analysis
14.
19.
Tax Policy
23.
Project Investments
26.
Investment Systems & Settlements
20.
Budget Planning

2 of 2

Office and the E.C.O. is composed of administrative persons responsible for research and secretarial services, not for providing policy advice. Unlike the Prime Minister's Office and the Privy Council Office, the Premier's Office and the E.C.O. do not foster a very high profile. A senior E.C.O. official emphasized: "We stay right out of policy review and creation. We are an administrative operation. We won't talk about the pros and cons of a policy itself." Under the Lougheed administration, it appears that the staff of the Premier's Office and the E.C.O. view their responsibilities as strictly managerial. One respondent in the Premier's Office said that the office is perceived by other government civil servants "as the Boss' office." We're on a pedestal because this is the ultimate official in provincial government." Senior officials approach the E.C.O. and the Premier's Office with trepidation because both offices are seen as head offices. The Premier's Office and the E.C.O. are involved in coordinating projects for government agencies; therefore, to ensure cooperation between departments, the aura of a head office is helpful as one E.C.O. official observes in the following statement.

> We are viewed with some mysticism by other government officials. The operations of the E.C.O. are not well-known to everyone. We're an extension of the Premier's arm. People are prepared to put out for us, therefore they cooperate more freely when we're involved than they would with each other.

The Premier's Office and the E.C.O. are small offices responsible for providing support services for cabinet committees and coordination between government agencies. There is nothing, however, to prohibit the Premier to change the emphasis of these offices away from provid-

ORGANIZATION CHART V

Alberta

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
OFFICE

AUGUST, 1980



ing purely administrative functions towards providing policy advice.

Role Perceptions

Introduction

Respondents' descriptions of their roles fall into five categories: 1) deputy ministers are the links between the realm of politics and the realm of administration; 2) liaison officers (they are principally found in Economic Development and, to a degree, in Energy and Natural Resources) are links between government and the private sector as well as between various government agencies; 3) financial analysts provide financial studies, assessment of various policies and programs (namely, persons in Treasury); 4) research-writers study various issues and write position papers for agencies (especially persons in FIGA); 5) senior support staff provide service functions such as note-taking at cabinet committee meetings or providing special project assistance or liaison with media and the general public (namely, persons in the Premier's Office and the Executive Council Office).

Deputy Ministers: Links between Politics and Administration

The relationship between politics and administration was one of the issues tackled when a science of administration was being developed. The conventional theory was that the distinction between politics and administration hinged on the relationship between ends and means. The dividing line between the two dominions was that administration translated into practice certain political decisions which were arrived at by elected politicians. A great gap existed between the world of administration and the political realm. Today, students of public administration learn that the dividing line between the two realms

is artificial; it is drawn as a matter of institutional convenience to denote the more general and the more detailed aspects of government decisions. At the highest levels of public administration the distinction between politics and administration is unrealistic.

Deputy ministers are best described as links between the political realm and the administrative realm. In this section I examine the roles of deputy ministers. They are the funnels through which decisions and recommendations flow to ministers. They are the valves through which influences which have been generated within the administrative process flow into the political realm. They are the funnels through which the political will flows into and energizes administration. Mannheim views the political-administration relationships as an arch: the left arc represents the political process while the right arc represents the administrative process. The apex of the arch represents a fusion of politics and administration; it is the grey area where political and administrative influences mingle. This area is not necessarily restricted to deputy ministers and politicians although they are the major actors in this area.

Deputy ministers said that ministers' style influences the behavior which occurs in the grey zone of political administration. Elected politicians emphasize their formal powers of supervision over civil servants. Ministers have limited resources: they are few in number, their time is precious, and their experience about the complicated mechanics of administrative machinery is limited. Deputy ministers ensure that decisions in administration are made, legislation is prepared, regulations are followed, interested groups are consulted, ad-

ministrative responsibilities are fulfilled, and advice is offered to ministers when it is requested. Deputy ministers are the administrative chiefs of departments. They are a unique mixture of political and administrative qualities. As appointments of the Executive Council, they owe their positions to political power.

Deputy ministers occupy posts as confidential policy advisors to ministers. They have to mix independence and compliance when filling the role of policy advisor; they must known when to express their opinions and when to keep their suggestions to themselves. A "yes man" would not be an inspiring idea man; therefore, a deputy minister must have an independent free-thinking mind tempered with empathy towards the governments' political objectives. He has a duty to illuminate the difficulties about a proposed course of events, but if he is required to do so, he must try to circumvent any obstacles. The best way he can provide advice is to have a common mind with his minister. One deputy minister described his job as accepting but not contributing to the political process, basing his advice on his administrative expertise. Another deputy minister stated than an intellectual understanding between himself and his minister was crucial to the effective execution of his responsibilities. Because a minister's time is in such high demand, a deputy minister often must "second-guess" what his minister requires. When both people get along well personally and share a common world view, the relationship can be one of harmonious collaboration. A minister and his deputy minister have something akin to a partnership.

The deputy minister of the E.C.O. is in an atypical position. In the E.C.O. the deputy minister, who may give advice to the Premier,

his minister, is in the area of government organization where functions change. He also advises on senior appointments. It should be noted that unlike Michael Pitfield in the federal government, the deputy of the E.C.O. cannot be described as the Premier's final briefers; rather, the Premier's briefers are his ministers. Indeed, the Premier has no "policy advisors" as such within his own organization. Within the E.C.O., then, the attempt is made to delineate the political from the administrative. The operations of the Cabinet, the Premier's Office, and the E.C.O. are very dependent upon the style of the Premier. Within the E.C.O. senior officials, including the deputy minister, stay right out of the policy review and policy creation process. One cannot argue that in managing the decision-making process of government, the deputy minister need not become entrenched in political pros and cons. Any matter, whether it is insignificant or important, can become political, although a great deal of detailed decisions are not.

Deputy ministers are the managers of their departments. The administration of a department involves planning, organizing, providing leadership and control of the organization in all its activity. A deputy minister lays the foundation of the department by laying out the overall plans and objectives which flow from government policy.

National issues have consumed the time of most deputy ministers. For example, in the Department of Energy and Natural Resources in the last two years, the deputy minister has been fighting brush fires which were fueled by the provinces' energy negotiations with Ottawa. The nature of energy means that the deputy minister experiences great

discontinuity in his job. In the past year, FIGA's deputy minister has been involved in issues which stemmed from Canada's Constitution. Since 1972, the size of the Treasury Department has quadrupled. Treasury's Deputy Provincial Treasurer now has added to his responsibilities: the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund (AHSTF), the Bureau of Statistics, pension and policy administration, and all the financial services necessary for the massive investment Alberta has undertaken. The deputy minister for lands, forests and wildlife in Energy and Natural Resources is responsible for the administration and management of Alberta's public land base which is fifty percent the total area of Alberta. The deputy minister of the E.C.O. has a much broader role in coordinating a more sophisticated decision-making process. The administrative demands upon deputy ministers have increased in the last decade. A deputy minister must create an organization which is well-staffed; he uses all the arts of administration to direct, coordinate and control it. For him, administration includes interpreting to his staff the rationale for doing something in a particular way or for explaining why a particular program was rejected. The importance of the deputy minister's role as a mediator cannot be overemphasized; he must reconcile the political process with the administrative process.

On the average, deputy ministers try to attend as few inter-agency meetings as possible. Like his minister, a deputy has many demands upon his time. "Meetings for meetings sake" are not encouraged. Some deputy ministers have delegated their responsibilities to attend meetings to their assistant deputy ministers or executive directors. One deputy minister no longer sits on any regular inter-agency meet-

ings and he is "truly grateful" for that. Deputy ministers try to avoid regular meetings because they believe they can get the job done without them. However, sometimes deputy ministers cannot escape meetings and so some find themselves chairing interdepartmental committee meetings. committees which must be attended include: the Manpower Committee; the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade; the Kananaskis Development Committee; the Energy Committee. Meetings tend to be functional; they have a "purpose". Deputy ministers prefer informal rather than formal meetings. Telephones allow easy communication within and between departments. More formal meetings tend to be ad hoc meetings to address particular issues. They are not held on a regular basis; rather, they are struck only when required. When committee meetings are struck, deputy ministers share the attitude that "short, snappy decisive" decisions must be arrived at.

Deputy ministers meet with people outside the government frequently. One deputy minister said: "Senior people in the private sector want to meet with senior people in government." Generally, deputy ministers meet with senior executives from companies. Occasionally, they will see individuals about complaints and concerns; however, deputy ministers believe in "the chain of command" and expect their field or administrative staff to resolve problems with the general public. Some deputy ministers meet with interest groups. Deputy ministers have an "open-door" policy; this may be due to their feelings of accountability to the business community, a subject explored later in this chapter.

Deputy ministers must be tuned in to what is happening in the political arena, the administrative realm, and the business world;

in general, my respondents were very sensitive to this responsibility. Alberta's senior civil servants, in general, see themselves as catalysts. The political will to encourage the private sector to foster Alberta's economic development has been communicated through deputy ministers to senior civil servants. Hence, they are very responsive to the emotions and messages of the private sector.

Deputy ministers are able to contact their ministers whenever the need arises. However, they use this privilege sparingly, respecting their ministers' valuable time. Most often, the minister will go to a deputy minister for information or to comment on a proposal or an issue. The crucial denominator in the relationship between the minister and the deputy is the personal style of the minister. The frequency of their contact is determined by the wishes of the minister. Does he invite his deputy to walk into his office whenever the need arises or does he encourage a more formal approach? One physical obstacle to close, informal contact is the fact that ministers reside in the Legislature Building away from the complex of offices blocks which house the deputy minister and his staff. When there have only one day a week to give their deputy ministers. When there is an associate minister, as in Energy and Natural Resources, he can devote more time to the deputy minister, seeing him once or twice a week. Some ministers develop a very close relationship with their deputy ministers, giving greater time to discuss day-to-day problems. Deputy ministers rely on notes, memos, and brief reports to keep in touch with ministers who are too busy for face-to-face discussions. This approach works well for simple things, but is inadequate for

major problems. Some ministers keep an allotted time to meet senior officials. Deputy ministers use the phone to keep ministers informed. They keep their ministers abreast of policy-issues, program changes, or program developments, and other issues which arise.

Deputy ministers, therefore, must have a personal rapport and a close intellectual rapprochement with their ministers. Neither deputy ministers nor ministers have the time to walk each other safely towards a particular goal. Deputy ministers often second-guess what it is their minister requires or, often enough, what they will require. Deputy ministers must be able to coordinate all the information they receive, anticipate problems, find solutions to them, and translate things of a technical nature to non-technical people.

The following quotation, from a British political scientist describing the role of a deputy minister, is equally appropriate in describing Alberta's deputies:

> Even though he must of course accept the minister's decision, he should always be thinking ahead of it, and he should always be ready to express his own views and to provide the information upon which they are based. For he is primarily concerned with the making of policy, and policy should not wait upon events.[12]

Two or three times a year, deputy ministers attend meetings which involve their provincial and federal counterparts. For example, at the annual Western Premier's Conference there have been specific issues on trade. On such an occasion, the deputy ministers responsible for development and trade in the Ministry of Economic Development would attend, acting as an advisor representing Alberta. Other meetings are on a more ad hoc basis. For example, the council of Provincial Energy Ministers has a deputy minister group which corresponds

to theministerial meeting. The deputy minister's task would be to sift through the items on the agenda. Some deputy ministers said that such meetings "are not as common as they were in the mid-1970s simply because they are not very productive." This reaction is understandable since it stems from the Department of Energy and Natural Resources and other agencies involved in energy issues where provincial and federal governments have conflicting interests. The nature of FIGA requires that a constant stream of meetings be held although it depends on the issue. In one period, the deputy minister of FIGA was in Ottawa seven times in five weeks to attend meetings. All deputy ministers agree that the most productive time when great understanding and consensus is achieved, is when; deputy ministers meet informally. The nature of the department and the issues it centers around dictate the nature of communication between provincial and federal deputy ministers. Most deputy ministers find that their relationships with their federal counterparts are strained, citing lack of cooperation on the part of the federal civil servants in the cause; however, a discussion of Alberta's relations with the federal government will be discussed in Chapter Three. Deputy ministers meet with their federal counterparts when issues require it. The deputy of the E.C.O., because of the nature of his responsibilities deals with internal government organization, does not need to maintain frequent contact with either his federal or provincial counterparts.

The deputy ministers I interviewed do not "play politician". After examining what deputy ministers "really do", one can understand that they are generalists. The scope of their responsibilities is

diverse, ranging from providing policy advice to the development and maintenance of a dynamic department. Deputy ministers have a crucial role to play in the political process: they are the linking pins, the funnels, the mediators between the political realm and the administrative realm. In his role, a deputy minister must be sensitive not to overstep into the political realm. Yet this blend of the political and administrative is something which cannot be avoided. Deputy ministers are not political eunuchs. As they tap the interests and needs of the public, try to interpret social and economic trends, listen to the propositions of academic theorists, consider the programs created by their experts, recognize the political constraints upon their ministers, they develop certain loyalties. Generally, when a person develops and administers a program, he has a certain belief or trust in its usefulness. The demands upon the deputy ministers seem comparable to those of their political masters. To meet those demands, they must be dedicated. Hence, they are neither impartial nor partisan.

Liaison Officers

The political will has filtered into the ranks of senior civil servants that one of their goals is to act as a catalyst, encouraging Alberta's private sector to diversity the economy. The views of industry and other relevant groups are carefully collected and transmitted by these senior officials. Eighty-six percent of my respondents who are "liaison officers" are from the Ministry of Economic Development. Fifty-seven percent are executive directors and forty-three percent are assistant deputy ministers. What follows is a generalization of liaison officers' responsibilities based on my interviews with them.

The people who are "liaison officers" work to promote private sector industry. They have few regulations to enforce. Liaison officers are like their counterparts in the private sector. They have found ways around government regulations and the "established" ways of doing things. The following paragraphs describe what they do, revealing that their responsibilities are not typical of civil servants.

Liaison officers have administrative tasks to perform. This area of responsibility is straight-forward, involving routine administrativematters such as organizing time and personnel. Each person has his own branch or division which he must coordinate, direct, and control. In these tasks, liaison officers are not different from other senior civil servants. Perhaps one might think that their administrative duties are more interesting since some of it involves organizing missions for ministers abroad, organizing receptions for foreign missions of government delegates and private enterprises interested in investing in Alberta or requesting information about how to organize something in their lands. However, liaison officers assured me that the glamour of such administrative functions soon wears off.

The focus of liaison officers' attention lies in their responsibility to promote industry. They achieve this objective in a number of ways. The first and most time-consuming method is by meeting with Alberta's private sector. Either industry comes to the officers or the officers go to them. Companies will come to liaison officers requesting information about expanding their markets overseas or informing the officer that a government policy or program is presenting an unnecessary obstacle in the marketplace. Liaison officers bring companies up to date on the latest government incentives, policies and

programs. They counsel companies who need financial help. Liaison officers are the links between the financial community and industry. Companies seek help in organizing trade missions in Canada, the United States, or abroad. Liaison officers help new companies work with established industries. All these meetings tend to be very informal and bilateral. Liaison officers have established good rapport with the business and financial community. This is probably because liaison officers tend to have worked in the private sector, bring their contacts, experience, and business style with them to their government positions and perhaps, a private sector bias or approach. The crucial objective for these individuals is to attract investment to Alberta; they try to achieve this goal by meeting with executives from companies, with industrial associations, and by hosting visiting companies.

When liaison officers receive delegations of companies visiting Alberta, they give speeches describing the economic and social climate of Alberta and any other information which would encourage investment. Liaison officers are the Alberta government's hosts, although ministers and other government officials attend receptions, tours of industries, and other displays of the benefits Alberta offers to investors. Through these means, liaison officers strive to fulfill their main task of guiding and assisting, not regulating, the private sector. Such meetings with the private sector are a continuous process.

Liaison officers allocate part of their time to preparing background information documents for their ministers or deputy ministers. One report, for example, provided a general analysis of the economic

climate in Alberta. To meet the needs of the Premier, a report was updated to provide Premier Lougheed with a document assessing the private sector's attitude to an issue. Some liaison officers attend most economic meetings with the premier; for example, the February 1, 1982 First Ministers' conference on the Economy in Ottawa included one liaison officer. He spent ten days, including one weekend, preparing five papers which provided the Premier with the necessary background. Liaison officers, then, are important policy advisors. They are not "economists" although they have an understanding of economics.

It is obvious that these men and women are crucially important to their ministers and to the Premier. Considering the time restraints they work under, they cannot afford mistakes. Indeed, the credibility of their branches is at stake. Yet, for all their expertise, which is where their influence stems from, they insist that they do not "speak policy", calling that task a "political perogative." The old belief that public administrators must be anonymous, faceless entities does not hold in the civil service I examined. Ministers cannot know all the details of the workings of industry or of complexities a government policy such as the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) or the National Energy Program (NEP). Public administration is more public. For example, when a minister received a call from a newspaper requesting a statement about Alberta's position on a particular federal policy, the minister referred the journalist to a liaison officer to get the technical details. Does this jeopardize the gap between politicians and administrators? That gap is unrealistic. Senior civil servants are capable of effectively executing their responsibilities

without being shielded by a veil of anonymity. This holds especially true for liaison officers who are constantly in touch with the business community. They are entrusted with the responsibility of selling Alberta to the world. No longer are senior civil servants confined to their desks and flow charts.

One liaison officer said: "We augment economic development." They address issues and develop policies. For example, one assistant deputy minister creates and changes policies in his area. Liaison officers are responsible for developing programs and finding ways to encourage various forms of economic development, ranging from agriculture to forestry to the coal industry to petrochemicals.

to meet the objective of upgrading Alberta's resources in the province, liaison officers encourage trade; in this way, they are catalysts. This responsibility sends liaison officers abroad either on ministerial missions or on trade missions with a delegation of companies to encourage foreign companies to invest in Alberta or to get an Alberta company established in a foreign country, particularly in a communist country where governments must be dealt with. Liaison officers have to be generalists; their knowledge ranges from the art of administration to knowledge of foreign producers to an understanding of foreign social-political-economic environment. They must also keep abreast of federal and provincial legislation since Alberta is very dependent on extraprovincial jurisdictions. They must have a comprehensive understanding of the problems of the business community so that they may counsel companies, perhaps to propose an alternative development strategy. As well, they must advise their ministers about what is happening in the various economic sectors. Moreover, they

liaise with other government departments. Things happen very quickly in their jobs; they work, in one official's words, at "company's pace". Their very untraditional roles are creations of the 1970s. Liaison officers are not the bureaucrats Max Weber described. They are a new breed of public administrators developed in the last decade. They may be unique to Alberta since no other province has the financial resources nor the natural resources which Alberta possesses. Their responsibilities and the structures in which they operate are still evolving, but they are obtaining more control as they become more adept at their tasks. Their roles have gained more importance as the private sector turns to the government during the economic recession. So far, they have been fire-fighting, acting in a reactive rather than a proactive manner as they respond to requests from the private sector; there has been little time for reflecting on how they could further develop the province's economy. Just as deputy ministers link the political and administrative worlds, so do liaison officers link government and industry. Contrary to belief, liaison officers do not appear to be gazing at the blue sky dreaming up programs to promote economic diversification.

Liaison officers' meetings with ministers are determined by events. Sometimes a liaison officer will only speak to his minister on the phone while other times, for example, to prepare for a meeting, they will meet more often. Ministers may travel on trade missions which may place the liaison officer in constant contact with him. The style of the minister dictates the structure of meetings. While some ministers are very informal, others require formal meetings and insist that the phone not be used. Liaison officers prefer the informal

approach because it allows them to know what ministers think before they start their process. The formal meeting process wastes time; if one does not know what the minister thinks, the probability of sending a policy paper he does not approve of is increased. the pace at which liaison officers work often demands that written, formal contact be set aside; there is not enough time to wait for written communication or formal meetings. On the average, meetings with ministers are about two to three times a month and written briefs are submitted on a daily basis.

Liaison offices have more contact with ministers than other senior officials because they have the opportunity to travel with them abroad. To deal with a minister, senior officials hold that "a person has to see things at the macro level rather than at the specialist's levels." Liaison officers tend to meet with other provincial governments' key personnel on a regular basis. Again, contact depends on the issue at stake. Liaison officers recognize the importance of establishing contacts in each province so that they can find out what is going on there.

Meetings with federal officials are very regular and informal. As well, Alberta's liaison officers meet informally with United States government officials to discuss trade and foreign investment issues. Informal contact ensures that the standard official rhetoric is not spewed out, allowing informal concerns to be voiced more freely. The same process occurs in Japan, Europe, Mexico and Trinidad. One interesting remark was made concerning liaison officer's trips abroad; a senior official stressed that when he was abroad he represented Alberta, but he is selling Canada. Whether this view is reflected throughout

Alberta's travelling corps I cannot say.

In fulfilling their responsibilities as liaison officers, they liaise with thousands of industries, with other Alberta government agencies, with other provinces, with the federal government, and with foreign governments and companies.

Financial Analysts

The third category of senior civil servants is responsible for the administration of the public money. The economic activities undertaken by the Alberta government greatly affect the performance of the province's and the country's economy. The administration of the public fisc includes issues such as taxation, expenditures, and in general, the management of the government's involvement in economic activities. Alberta has been in a unique position since 1975 when the government passed legislation which saves 30% of the revenue from natural oil and gas sales in a fund called the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund (AHSTF). To date the Fund has amassed $11B in assets. The major task the government has faced is to implement proper fiscal policy to stimulate the economic development in the province. Alberta's wealth has made government actions in economic affairs increasingly important since the early Seventies. Unlike the national government and other provincial governments, Alberta has not had a difficult time obtaining an adequate supply of revenues.

Controlled elements of the administrative process are the large number of existing programs and program proposals from departments and the means of financing them. The following section examines the role perceptions of the senior officials in government, particularly those in the Treasury Department, who budget for expenditures, obtain

revenue, and determine fiscal policy; I will call them "financial analysts."

The demands for various types of expenditures are great upon a province which has newly acquired much wealth. Program proposals are submitted through various channels within departments, eventually winding up on a desk somewhere in Treasury. The "chief bean counter" in government, Treasury's Controller, is responsible for advising the government as to how it should manage its finances. The government's budget is more than a list of proposed programs and estimated expenditures; it describes and identifies the relationship between different tasks, helps to make decisions about which programs will be adopted, and it clarifies political power. It is the foundation on which the decision as to where funds will be allocated are made. People involved in the management of the public fisc are key actors in the development of all programs and policies which impact the economy. These individuals help to establish the parameters within which the government's goals are confined.

Financial analysts tend to be divided into one group which is "project oriented" and a second group which is "system oriented".

The first group of financial analysts examine programs, analyzing their benefits from an economical perspective. They perform substantialanalysis of a project or proposal, weighing its pros and cons on an economic scale. These people also maintain a close surveillance of programs which involve the management of government investments. For example, one financial analyst is responsible for policy analysis related to the AHSTF. Such an individual spends much time at informal inter-departmental meetings oriented to specific issues, for example,

specific investment interests of a department. He would meet with specific firms to discuss the details of guaranteed loans. Other financial analysts review provincial crown corporation budgets, examining new programs or changes to established programs, weighing the cost implications by assessing the economic benefits and how the program could be financed. Special projects would include such things as the Alsands proposal or the Prince Rupert Grain Terminal. Meetings attended by such individuals tend to be project-related and ad hoc. In determining the financial arrangements, the financial analyst would meet, when necessary, with other governments, industry, financial institutions. Meetings are usually requested through ministers or their deputy ministers. Financial analysts provide comprehensive economic analysis on the proposal or project.

Financial analysts are also involved in long-term financial planning. For example, they would examine the legislation of the AHSTF to determine whether any amendments are required. Almost everything done by financial analysts is written. Meetings with their ministers are rare. However, they work quite closely with deputy ministers and their associates; contact with deputy ministers is informal. They have the privilege of seeing deputy ministers whenever the need arises.

Financial analysts have clout. They are the people whose approval must be won before a program is accepted. Unlike liaison officers, these people have a special area of expertise rather than a generalists approach. They are economists.

The second group of people involved in the administration of the public fisc are those who are more involved with the financial system

of government. Included in this category are the people who ensure that the financial system is appropriate for collecting and spending revenue. On the collection end, they are those persons responsible for policy analysis and offering ministers advice with respect to tax policy, budget planning, major economic policy issues, forecasting the short and medium term economic outlook, as well as developing tax programs and tax legislation. Meetings are an ongoing process with members from program departments; they meet as the issues demand. They also meet with the finance or tax divisions of the private sector. Meetings with these ministers occur when briefing on a particular issue is requested by ministers. During energy negotiations with Ottawa, these senior officials are one of many advisors. Meetings are not on a regular basis with their own ministers and with ministers from other departments such as Treasury, Energy and Natural Resources, Economic Development. Meetings with their provincial counterparts are regular meetings, struck to arrive at an economic strategy or tc analyzethe federal position. Meetings with the federal government occur over particular issues such as energy. Financial senior officials follow Alberta's unofficial policy of shunning bilateral meetings with the federal government.

Other more specialized collectors, are those persons responsible for ensuring that the financial system responsible for collecting 65 percent of Alberta's revenue from energy resources is sound. They are concerned with anything which has to do with finance stemming from energy revenue. In 1982-1983, the projected revenue from energy resources is $7 Billion.

Obviously, financial analysts are responsible for tasks crucial to Alberta's economic well-being. Their concern is that too much of their time is spent ironing out the cumbersome problems of all the administrative matters managers face and too little time remains to concern themselves with the problem of how to improve financial management in Alberta.

Alberta's financial administrators meet regularly with each other to discuss policy ideas and perceptions. They spend a fair amount of time with deputy ministers discussing the problems of the financial organization of departments and programs. Treasury officials do not meet with their provincial and federal counterparts. In Energy and Natural Resources, financial analysts often meet with their federal and provincial counterparts because they are responsible for the implementation of the September 1981 energy agreement. They meet with their ministers to report the status of energy revenues or to provide analysis during pricing negotiations.

Finance-oriented senior civil servants tend to be either advisors on policy matters in the economics area, economic judges of programs and policies, and administrators in the financial sector. They are responsible for relating programs to government for priorities. They are the individuals who can dismiss a policy proposal on the basis of economics. In the competition for government funding, they provide the statistics which determine whether a policy program will be carried out.

Research-Writers

The fourth category of senior civil servants are those individuals whose main function involves the writing of reports. Generally, these

"research-writers" are involved in medium-term planning for their departments. They are generalists who try to foresee the course of events on the provincial, federal, and world scene. Events and issues dictate the subject matter of their papers. Often, reports are prepared in response to ministerial requests. One respondent in Energy and Natural Resources felt that he was mired in paperwork, leaving him insufficient time to create policy. These individuals examine specific issues or policies or programs thoroughly. Reports are prepared after much research into issues arising from the Constitution, for example, or from coal or oil policy; such reports often end up as Cabinet documents. The research involved in producing a paper may require meetings with other government departments, other governments, representatives from industry, or from the general public. Hence, meetings consume much of a writer's time. As well, a writer must be knowledgeable and aware of the technical issues of a particular area, which requires much reading. The thorough examination research-writers do to create a comprehensive report allows them to develop expertise and understanding in those areas. Therefore, writers are often the chief policy architects on those areas. Their expertise makes them invaluable to their ministers and deputies. Like their meetings with people inside and outside government, writers' meetings with ministers and deputies are spontaneous, sporadic, and informal. The frequency of meetings with ministers and deputy ministers is dependent upon the style of the minister and the issue. Most contact is in the form of memorandums and reports.

Besides reports and policy advice, research-writers are also responsible for the management of their branches.

Meetings with writers' provincial and federal counterparts are dependent upon the nature of their work. On the average, meetings are irregular and formal; for example, for a writer in Energy and Natural Resources, meetings with other provinces and the federal government range from once every two months to once every six months to sort out the ramifications of oil and gas marketing. The frequency of FIGA's writers' meetings with other provincial officials is dependent upon the year; for example, during 1980-1981, meetings on the Constitution were held once a week. On the whole, meetings with the federal government have diminished in the last few years. When neither government's political masters possess a cooperative attitude then civil servants are constrained, leaving little hope for constructive discussion. Most senior civil servants place the burden of responsibility for the decline in cooperative federalism at Prime Minister Trudeau's feet. Political masters set the tone of relations for their civil servants.

Writers, then, share some of the same responsibilities other senior civil servants perform. They review programs, forecast and plan, manage their divisions, meet with other officials and industry. But the focus of their efforts is to produce written documents which make Alberta's position clear on a particular issue. Only twelve percent of my respondents fall into this category; although they are few in number, they are crucial to their departments: they help to make Alberta's stance on key issues clear.

Senior Support Staff

The last category includes those civil servants who provide support services to departments, to ministers and to Cabinet Committees.

Support functions include projecting the needs of the agency and allocating resources. Other support people organize the meetings of ministers and answer telephone calls from the public. They are concerned with personnel administration. Those who are secretaries to Cabinet committees set up the agenda, get all the documents, take notes at the meetings, prepare minutes, record decisions and pass them on to the appropriate people. They meet with other department personnel officers rarely, and then, only to exchange ideas. The internal service nature of their activities means that they need not meet with their federal and provincial counterparts.

This sector of civil servants digests a great deal of information in the form of letters and phone calls from the general public, and from special interest groups. As secretaries, they prepare appropriate responses to all correspondence. The majority of service-oriented people interviewed were in the Executive Council Office. Their main tasks are to organize meetings and appointments and provide support services for Cabinet Committees. They do not play a policy role. They manage the Cabinet Committees work.

Influence and Accountability

When the issue of accountability is raised, two questions must be asked: To whom are these people responsible and for what? The traditional answer to the question about the nature of civil servants' responsibilities is that they are responsible for following the letter of the law in their procedures. Traditionally, the answer to the question 'to whom' civil servants are accountable is to their supervisors, both administrative and political. However, the traditional conception

of accountability is too narrow. Today, students of political science learn that senior civil servants are expected to be responsible for the consequences of their actions as well as for the procedures involved. The question of to whom senior civil servants are accountable has broadened as well. Today, one might expect a civil servant to feel accountable to his peers, to his clients, to his profession, as well as the traditional notion of supervisors. Perhaps, more than ever, with increased discretionary responsibility, civil servants must establish in their own minds, their accountability. With this view in mind, I asked senior civil servants to whom they felt accountable and in what sense. Before delving into their views, two competing questions on how civil servants are best controlled, the beliefs of Carl Friedrich and Herman Finer, are presented; I offer these competing views so that a better understanding of my respondents' comments can be gained.[13]

Herman Finer maintains that to have clear lines of responsibility civil servants must rely on formal controls. That is, a regime must be established which will place specific powers of control in administrative superiors and legislatures. He saw the solution to the problem of accountability not only in the strengthening of formal powers, but also in reducing the amount of discretion available to civil servants.

Carl Friedrich took the opposing view that the civil service must be self-regulating. He believed that civil servants must control themselves. Limiting civil servants' power through legislation is deemed ineffective from Friedrich's perspective. He held that since civil servants cannot be regulated by external controls, it must be ensured

that civil servants themselves believe in democratic values. If civil servants were responsible actors who believed in "good things" and acted according to democratic principles, there would not be a need for external controls. The key is to ensure that civil servants believe in the supremacy of elected politicians and the rule of law broadly defined (that is, to treat equal cases equally).

In examining my respondents' perceptions of their roles, I gained the impression that senior civil servants, in general, see their central task as the traditional role of providing advice to their political masters. Moreover, they tended to hold the traditional belief that they only advise their ministers when they are requested to. The senior civil servants I interviewed claimed "no right" to advise the minister. Careful examination of the civil servants' positions I interviewed in the political process leads me to conclude that they possess a great amount of responsibility, but very little real power. Their expertise and the expertise of their agencies are powers which can only be used as 'political' power by their ministers. Legally, senior civil servants are subordinate and accountable to a political superior, the departmental minister, who in turn is accountable to his colleagues, the Legislature, and ultimately, to Albertans. However, in the Alberta government senior civil servants have served the same government for over a decade. In some cases, such as FIGA and Economic Development and the E.C.O., the departments are the creations of the present Progressive Conservative government, led by the same Premier, Peter Lougheed. Some senior civil servants, as will be discussed in Chapter Three, have absolutely no experience in serving a government of another

political affiliation. I found that senior civil servants think that they are neither partial nor partisan in approaching policies and programs which they have created and implemented. After a decade of serving a government where the political opposition is very weak, is there a cause for concern when confronted with questions of accountability and neutrality of Alberta's senior civil servants? Must a cherished notion such as political neutrality be replaced by raw political reality? The accountability of the senior civil servants I interviewed is not an issue which has captured the interest of Albertans; it simply is not an issue. Unlike other Alberta departments, the agencies I examined are not in the public spotlight; they are low-profile in the public arena although they tend to be active participants with the business community. Public scrutiny is not something senior civil servants I am studying are familiar with. Perhaps one might note the possible exception of some media and academic interest about the management of the AHSTF, but even that issue has not been met with any great concern by Albertans. Two facts are obvious then: Albertans are apathetic when it comes to the management of the affairs of certain sectors of the Alberta government; and stemming from this, Alberta's media has not focussed its attention upon the agencies I am studying. Is there a cause for concern about the accountability of Alberta's senior civil servants? The answer to this question is uncertain since the subject has not even been broached.

The distinction between control over bureaucratic power as opposed to influence on a bureaucrat's behavior is crucial. People who may specifically control are those who have the power to use sanctions

and inducements formalized by law. Persons who enjoy an influence over a bureaucrat might include certain groups, in either formal business associations or institutions, or in less formal even bilateral meetings.

All bureaucrats are accountable to their legally formal hierarchical supervisors such as assistant deputy ministers, deputy ministers, and ultimately, ministers. Cabinet ministers are the controllers of bureaucratic behavior. Deputy ministers are in crucial positions since they have the capacity to reprimand senior officials. Senior civil servants are themselves in a position to over-ride the decisions of their subordinates.

Opposition members of the Alberta Legislature, especially because they are few in Alberta, can only exert influence upon bureaucrats by using, for example, question periods. One senior official remarked that some of his time was spent preparing answers to the rigorous questions asked by Mr. Grant Notley, leader of the Alberta New Democratic Party. Mr. Notley, then, could be said to be influencing one senior official's behavior. The media is typically one of the important influences upon bureaucrats throughout the world. The various media have the power of publicity at their disposal. They have the capacity to bring cases of bureaucratic bungling and injustice to the eyes of thousands, thus harnessing the force of public opinion against actions of public officials. But, as I have already noted, the media has not focussed its eye upon the departments under study in this thesis. Pressure groups might also be an influence upon the bureaucracy. Through interest group contact with civil servants, senior government administrators may be led to a better understanding of the publics'

needs and wants. In particular, we might expect certain industry groups to exert influence upon some of my respondents. Lastly, senior civil servants may impose influences upon themselves. They may believe in certain rules of governing which they regard as legitimate. They might have their own norms of acceptability.

These controls and influences could act upon senior officials. Which controls and influences do senior officials think act upon them? This is an unchartered area of study, as is the case with much of the activities and beliefs of Alberta's senior civil servants. Before I divulge my findings about their feelings of responsibility, I think it is best to begin by examining how great senior officials believe their sphere of influence upon public policy in Alberta extends.

Influence

How much influence do senior civil servants themselves think they wield upon Alberta's public policy? My question was very open-ended, leaving my respondents the opportunity to interpret, for me, what they meant by the term "influence". Most of my respondents immediately replied that I had asked a difficult question. This response supports my observation that senior civil servants occupy a special position in government, particularly in the areas of my study. They are either involved in areas where they possess special skills making them as varied as technical experts or as Alberta's diplomats to the business world and to governments abroad. They are not "mere administrators". The very nature of their activities precludes them from being neutral civil servants. Their power or influence stems from their special knowledge which ministers cannot absorb because of the demands for their

time. Whether a senior official is a generalist or a specialist, he tends to enjoy much more freedom of movement than his subordinates do; hence, his influence is likely that much greater than a typical civil servant's. But for political reasons, despite any assurances of confidentiality between interviewer and interviewee, what made my question difficult for senior officials, I think, is that they recognize that they are in special positions where they have the opportunity to assert their opinions and offer their advice. But it is crucial to understand that senior officials work for a government which has tried to emphasize the distinction between politics and administration, although it must rely upon the civil service as much as any other government. One respondent replied that given this cabinet and government, he did not think he had much influence upon public policy: "The government likes to maintain control." He went on to state that the government "probably does not like senior civil servants that much"; this was not an unusual response. Although the degree of influence exercised by a senior civil servant varies according to his position, his minister, and the civil servant himself, on the average, senior civil servants felt that the government does not trust them. Such perceptions probably would not be expressed further down in the hierarchy since such an observation would likely not be noticeable down the ladder. Such opinions of the government's attitude towards senior officials were not exceptions, but rather, a general commentary that in the last four to five years, the government has been adopting the attitude of a conservative government which bordered on, in the words of ten officials, "paranoia". Two senior officials hypothesized that the government's fear was a carry over from Diefenbaker's belief that

the federal civil service plotted against him. However, this perception of the government's fear of senior officials is not the only response generated by my open-ended question about influence.

Another reason senior officials had difficulty answering my questionswas because, in the words of one respondent, "after a decade one gets so close to it one cannot make a logical assessment." All of my respondents maintained that there is "no doubt that Alberta senior civil servants influence ministers and Cabinet in a different way than other governments do, particularly the federal government." My respondents said that the difference in the degree of influence Alberta and federal senior civil servants enjoyment was due to the differences in the size and complexity of the governments. Alberta's senior officials observed that federal cabinet ministers have a tough time dealing with all the issues and therefore, by default Ottawa's mandarins assume a great role in making policy. As well, it was noted that cabinet committees in Alberta, unlike their federal counterparts, do not have regular civil service participation, although, on occasion, a civil servant may be called as a witness. Always, the crucial point senior officials expressed was that the present Alberta government tries to keep the civil service at arms' length. Elected politicians in Alberta have stressed to the civil servants that elected leaders are in the driver's seat. My respondents were all very conscious that politicians believe they make Solomon-like decisions; decision-making, my respondents emphasized, is what elected politicians are elected to do. Ultimately, of course, this is true. At one time or another; Alberta's senior officials have offered advice to government which they believe is absolutely correct, and which the elected politicians understand to be

politically unacceptable. In such a situation, the political will prevails.

It appears that the Alberta government is highly sensitive when it comes to communicating to its senior administrators that there is a basic principle prescribing senior officials' role in the policy and analytical side of the political process: senior officials are there to provide their political masters with the best possible advice, pointing out advantages, disadvantages, and providing alternatives. Generally speaking, it seems that an attempt by elected politicians to draw a much clearer line between officials and ministers than in the federal government is apparent.

Although senior officials state that they do not have much influence directly upon public policy, they do state that in advising elected politicians, they have influence. One senior official stated that he felt senior civil servants possess great influence, but it flows in a circle. From his perspective, senior officials get very good indications from politicians about what they want; ministers communicate the government's overall objectives. Senior officials then devise the means by which the government objectives may be met. This advice is sent to the minister where it is discussed in caucus again. Perhaps, the proposal may be sent back to senior officials to be re-worked. This process, my respondent noted, is unlike the federal scene where civil servants exist in a vacuum. In Ottawa, my respondent reports, ministers do not seem to give the direction that officials receive from Alberta ministers. This description of the process where feedback is close and constant sounds very traditional. However, it ignores the degree of scope senior officials have in trying to fulfill the

very broad objectives government offers. One senior official states the case differently; his comments are interesting because, unlike many senior officials who have worked in Alberta's bureaucracy, he is new to the civil service. He observes that senior officials in Alberta have great influence. Ministers, he finds, rely very heavily on advisors who do the groundwork, consider the implications, and make a recommendation about a particular issue. True, the ultimate decision rests with the minister and Cabinet. Generally, however, he finds that ministers follow the recommendation of the senior official. This is not surprising since senior officials are experts in their area who have the time and resources to provide defensible recommendations. Moreover, senior officials are not politically naive. They will not propose something which they know will be rejected by their minister or Cabinet unless there is not an alternative. Unfortunately for the people of Alberta, such a process leaves little scope for innovation since creative thoughts can only flourish in an open atmosphere, responsive to new competing ideas rather than relying on stale acceptable methods. My respondent also keenly observed that senior civil servants can emphasize one thing over another; they can give a different light to something by downplaying one factor and emphasizing another. Another official recognized that an elected politician is not generally familiar with the mechanics surrounding a particular problem and he must leave it to administrators. In providing three alternatives to a minister, how much choice does he really have? A great deal of influence on public policy stems simply from choosing which recommendations and alternatives to offer the elected official. Ministers cannot be everywhere at once; they must delegate responsibility, rely upon senior

officials, follow what others say. It is not improbable that ministers' recognition of this truth has moved them to attempt to create a great gap between politics and administration. Recognizing the strict limits on their own power could create a sense of paranoia about the degree of responsibility and influence senior officials really wield in the political process. Hence, the last card the minister has to play is to ensure that the people around him think like he does, and as one senior official reflected, that is a minister's control over the situation. Such a situation, I believe, is cause for concern, since, as another senior official stated, the process is not merely a circle of give and take; rather, he described the situation as a "vicious circle". Why did he describe it as vicious? The majority of my respondents stated that they believed they must follow the will of the elected policy-makers. However, "feedback" has a different emphasis. Some senior officials feel that there is a lack of feedback from ministers. One senior official remarked that the feedback he gets is what he reads in the paper. The political will is inadequately expressed. Another senior official stated that he still quotes the Premier from two years ago -- one sentence - to which he hangs on to in developing priorities. He said that he thinks the lack of political direction is to "deliberately set out to make it obvious that they [the elected politicians] have achieved their objectives by separating politics from bureaucracy ... they are paranoid about the blurrying of that gap." Five other officials mentioned that they felt the government's drive to separate politics from administration had gone too far. My respondent was concerned that senior officials' "feedback" to the policy-maker what they perceived the policy climate to be. My respondent

frankly stated that "this process tends to reinforce Tory views." Ministers, he stated, "sometimes assume that there is greater objectivity in recommendations and advice than there actually is." The situation was described by another respondent, one of the most senior people I interviewed, as a "vicious circle wherein the senior official gives what the minister wants to hear and gets back what he expected. Once a policy direction is taken, the senior official encourages it to continue on." Asked what their success rate tended to be in submitting proposals, the majority of civil servants reported a high degree of success. Of course, when questioned, senior officials stated that they offer their best professional objective advice. Rare is the individual who admits that he is biased or slanted in his work. My overall impression, then, is that most of Alberta's senior officials were intent upon convincing me that they do not have as much influence as one might expect. It seems that Premier Lougheed has been successful in convincing his administrators to maintain that their jobs are restricted to providing advice to ministers. No concrete evidence can be presented from my interviews which reveals that senior officials impart considerable influence on public policy. There is, however, a great degree of freedom of movement in molding and shaping advice which makes senior officials more influential than they care to admit. The Alberta government is very sensitive to maintaining its power over the bureaucracy and senior officials, I find, are sensitive to this desire, allowing such an impression to be drawn. When a person knows he possesses influence, there is not a great need to flaunt it and upset the delicate working balance that has been struck. One main point of concern that must be reiterated: If Lougheed has been successful in surrounding

himself with similar-minded souls this, combined with the fact that the Opposition in Alberta's government is woefully weak, may mean that the degree of creativity and inspiration may not be up to par in the policy process. One official noted that senior officials too readily offer their ministers not what their best creative professional talents can conceive, but instead, careful to avoid rejection, they offer what they know will be accepted. Whether this attitude makes the minister best informed on a matter is doubtful.

It is interesting to note that senior civil servants, when asked how they could offer more input into the direction of public policy, generally replied that they did not think they should; they thought that a good balance has been struck. They emphasize that the system flows both ways. This response becomes understandable when one learns that senior officials tend to agree that tension between politicians and administrators could exist if administrators doggedly pulled one direction and politicians pulled the other way. The key to success? Senior civil servants are excellent diplomats. One senior official succinctly sums the view of the majority of officials: "You must learn how to handle each situation. Interpersonal skills are vital to success." On the average senior officials assess the situation as "no real problem". Just as many senior officials have access to their ministers if they need it, but they do not abuse it, so too it is likely that they recognize their influence upon public policy, the sensitivity of their political masters, and hence, the need to refrain from asserting and announcing the extent of their influence. The problem is threefold. First, the Alberta government Opposition is too weak to provide

any effective challenge which would bring change when it is necessary. Second, Albertans are apathetic about the management of the province's economy. Third, Alberta's senior civil servants have become too close to the political process itself, principally because a single party has held the reigns of power for over a decade and in that time, it has surrounded itself with like-minded administrators. In the words of one official: "Senior administrators like to feel safe. They are not innovative. Senior civil servants protect their areas and their jobs." A very political system has become entrenched in the decision-making process. Ten senior civil servants pointed out that senior officials tend to propose programs which they know will be accepted.

When I asked senior officials to whom they felt accountable, the majority of them answered "their supervisors", which included administrative and political superiors. At first glance one might reflect that this is the "correct democratic" answer. But the government might be becoming inbred in Alberta; that is, senior officials in the words of one senior administrator, "tend to be associated with the government. There has been a lengthy period of the same government. Many senior officials associate very strongly with the government ... in a lot of areas I certainly do."

Accountability

Peter Self states that the "tensions between the requirements of responsibility or 'accountability' and those of effective executive action can reasonably be described as the classic dilemma of public administration ..."[14] Having gained insight into how much influence they believed they had on public policy, I asked senior civil servants to whom they felt accountable. This, I believe is an important question

since senior officcials must, in their own minds, define for themselves their own accountability. From senior officials' responses, it appears that the Friedrich approach is applicable; that is, senior officials do not simply maintain that they feel accountable to the hierarchical superior directly above them. The formal controls are in place, but with their discretionary powers, senior officials are self-regulating.

Overwhelmingly, senior officials responded that they felt they were accountable to their deputy ministers. Sixty percent of my respondents divided their accountability between the political head of the agency, the minister, and the link between the political and administrative realm, the deputy minister. Said one FIGA official, "I feel accountable to the minister and deputy minister almost equally because the minister knows who is responsible. He knows where analysis and recommendations come from. I am not doing things very frequently for the deputy minister, I'm doing them for the minister." A Treasury official said: "I feel directly accountable [to] both the deputy minister and to the minister." When there were two deputy ministers, as in Energy and Natural Resources, the officials responded that his feelings of accountability would depend on the issue.

Twenty-four percent of my respondents maintained that they felt they were accountable to the public. Only one respondent meant his particular "clientele" group when he said he was accountable to the public. Most senior officials said that feeling accountable to the public meant feeling accountable to the Canadian public since, in the words of one official, "anything that happens here affects Canada". Another senior official said: "I'm employed by the Premier, but I'm accountable to the people of Alberta because they pay my salary." The

following is a typical response:

> My feelings of accountability depend on the area I'm dealing with. I've a wide range of accountability. I feel least accountable to the organization. I'm accountable to my minister in my relation to the system. I feel strongly about the work I'm doing, and in that respect, I feel accountable to the people of the province. The key is that I'm contributing to the future of the province, although the impact right now is quite large. In the long range, I feel a societal accountability. I feel a very strong accountability to whoever is my client. I feel accountability to the community because of my role as a coordinator. As well, I've a strong sense of accountability to the government.

A Treasury official said: "I feel accountable to the people of Alberta. In considering the actions I will take, I consider whether this is a proper use of funds because I'm spending their money."

Fifteen percent of senior officials stated that they feel most accountable to themselves. A Treasury official said: "Basically, I'm accountable to the deputy minister, but first and foremost, I'm accountable to myself." An Energy and Natural Resources official agreed: "I have to feel good about myself. There are no problems with my standards, they're pretty high." A Treasury official said: "We all set our own goals and objectives; on a day-to-day basis, it is important to measure up against those." More passionately, one senior official said:

> 'To thine own self be true.' Clearly, I feel accountable to the deputy minister for my area of responsibility. I feel directly accountable to the minister for protecting his interests and the governments as a whole. 'To thine own self be true' doesn't mean self preservation or self-satisfaction. I am ultimately the judge of what I do. My standards keep it up ... I could do much worse and get away with it. I am accountable to the traditions of the deputy, to the overall aspirations of the government, to individuals such

> as the deputy minister and the minister. I feel accountable to the total government process and I am motivated by it. I'm not just doing a job. I really believe in what I'm doing. My job is all-consuming in my life, even taking precedence over my domestic life.

It is obvious then, that senior officials feel accountable to more than one source. Senior officials tend to feel accountable to their ministers and deputy ministers. This is probably because, being the upper crust of the administrative process, they have more contact with the political heads of their departments, more so than their underlings have. How does this compare to the federal "superbureaucrats" responses? Campbell and Szablowski found, when they asked their respondents to name one or two objects to which they felt most responsible that

> Thirty-eight percent named their immediate superior and 20 percent named the Prime Minister. Only 7 percent named the minister of their department; 11 percent, the cabinet; 5 percent, Parliament; 12 percent the people of Canada; and a mere 1 percent their personal conscience. Thus, our officials' responses hardly break with the classic view of accountability. The classic view studies show that, while bureaucrats may report more than one object of accountability, they will attend first to their superior ... .[15]

It appears, then, that my respondents, unlike their federal counterparts, depart from classic-view studies of accountability. Their closer feelings of accountability to ministers and deputy ministers, as the next chapter suggests, might be partly due to the fact that they share the Alberta government's overall philosophy in the most basic issues, such as government intervention in the economy, which the province confronts. As well, because the federal bureaucracy is so much larger than Alberta's, Alberta's senior officials have more frequent contact with political heads of other departments. Examining my respondents'

opinions closely, I find no interagency differences. Responses were varied throughout the agencies I studied. My respondents, in tending to feel most accountable to their minister and deputy minister, are rather unusual public administrators. No longer, it seems, do Alberta's senior officials feel most accountable to the superior directly above them. Instead, with greater responsibilities which make their input into the process more important than ever before, they have become more involved in the political side of government. Although they sensitively state that their influence on public policy is restricted to providing ministers and deputy ministers with alternative options, they do underemphasize their influence. Consider, for example, that senior officials told me that they understood how little time a minister has and the mountains of paper which deluge him. They told me that they must provide their ministers and deputy ministers with very short papers offering recommendations. That leaves senior officials in editorial positions. Knowing the demands on a minister's or deputy minister's time and the knowledge necessary to understand issues and be rational about them, and knowing that information provided to them is condensed, these facts leave senior officials with the power of an editor, the person who decides what to leave in and what to leave out. With such a capability it is not surprising that senior officials underscore their degree of influence on public policy or that they feel accountable to ministers and deputy ministers. I wonder if their closeness to ministers and deputy ministers means that if there were a drastic change in government in the next election, senior officials would still feel the same degree of accountability or if they would place more emphasis on accountability to their immediate administrative supervisors.

Conclusion

In this chapter, on the basis of interviews with thirty-three senior civil servants, I offered a portrait of the framework in which senior officcials function, their roles and responsibilities, their influence on Alberta's public policy, and the focus of their feelings of accountability. The Treasury Department is the oldest, most established agency. The Premier's Office and the Executive Council Office, much to my surprise, are very unlike the Prime Minister's Office and the Privy Council Office. These two provincial offices, I learned, are geared to providing support staff to cabinet committees and ministers rather than providing independent policy analysis, interpreting policies from a political perspective as the two federal offices do. The Department of Energy and Natural Resources is a complex new organization, a marriage of many resource sectors. The Department of Federal and Intergovernmental Affairs has established itself as a central agency, offering the Alberta government a mechanism to handle international relations as well as federal-provincial affairs. The Ministry of Economic Development is the youngest agency I studied. Its wide mandate is making it difficult for the ministry's senior staff not to encroach on other provincial agency's jurisdictions. As well, Economic Development people are finding it difficult to convince other provincial agencies of its value. Economic Development, I think, has an important role to play in the development of Alberta's economy; it might best be described as a barometer of the conditions in the private sector. In a sense, it is concerned with "opening up the west," specifically Alberta, by encouraging foreign investment, facilitating the exporting of Alberta's goods and services, and in general, acting

as a catalyst in the private sector. In general, the agencies I examined are prestigious organizations. The creation, growth, and continuing evolution of these administrations are a reflection that the Alberta government's responsibilities in old and new policy fields have become more sophisticated in the last decade.

In this chapter, I also provided a profile, based on senior civil servants' responses to questions about what Alberta's senior officials actually do. On the discovery that senior civil servants share the same basic duties but excel in some particular function, I categorized the roles and functions of senior officials into five areas: 1) links between the political and administrative realm; 2) liaison officials who work closely with the private sector; 3) financial analysts primarily responsible for maintaining financial control of public funds; 4) research-writers who examine issues which concern Alberta; and 5) senior service support staff who facilitate the organization of agencies. From their descriptions of their responsibilities, I find that the senior officials I interviewed participate actively in the formulation and execution of policies and programs.

This chapter included an inquiry into senior officials' beliefs about their influence on public policy and the objects of the feelings of accountability. I discovered that there has been a concrete effort by the Alberta government to establish and maintain an artificial gap between politics and administration. From their descriptions of their responsibilities, it was obvious to me that senior civil servants are not 'traditional bureaucrats' in the Weberian sense. My respondents are atypical public servants due to the very nature of their responsibilities. Senior officials perform tasks, such as dealing closely

and continuously with the private sector, which removes the traditional cloak of anonymity. Because they must be sensitive to so many values - those from the political and administrative realms as well as those from the market place -- belief in bureaucratic innocence is naive. I gained some evidence that the Alberta government's fear of the power of senior officials' verges on paranoia. It is trying desperately to adhere strictly to the principle of political neutrality of its public servants.

The dichotomy between politics and administration is no longer realistic. For example, from my interviews, I learned that the political will is only communicated in terms of broad objectives, which some officials said are rarely voiced. There is much room for interpretation of broad objectives by senior officials. They have special knowledge, training, and experience -- the instruments of power. I learned that contact with ministers is usually written. The sea of paper through which a minister must swim means that he demands very short papers from his senior officials. This means that a senior official can only transmit a small portion of the issue. This task is made all the more difficult by the fact that the senior official must often translate technical subjects for a non-technical person. The senior official has the great responsibility of deciding what information can be included and the relevance and irrelevance of things, all of which gives him editorial power. As well, a senior official, being an experienced editor, has the power of determining what to emphasize and what to understate. Neither the politician nor the senior official is naive. Elected representatives have likely become excessively fearful because they recognize the influence and power of their

civil servants. Elected politicians also recognize the need to maintain the myth that public servants are their neutral tools; this tale allows them to preserve the publics perception that they, not senior officials, are the creators and shapers of policy. It is not startling, either, that most senior officials were happy to tell me that they had a moderate share of influence, stressing that their political masters were the decision-makers and they merely followed orders. Senior officials have a stake in the myth too; by preserving popular perceptions they can enjoy their anonymity from the general public and yet exercise their influence without upsetting the public or the Premier. Senior officials are subtle. Their actual influence is greater than they reveal and their potential power is even greater.

Senior officials are the agents of change in Alberta. They create policies, programs, and articulate the needs of the private sector. But the Lougheed government has succeeded in limiting their role. Senior officials do not appear to move beyond the parameters defined by the government. They are being stifled by conservatism. The proper balance between politics and administration has not been struck in Alberta. The crucial problem is that an atmosphere of distrust is pervasive. If a person quickly glanced at senior officials' feelings of accountability, he probably would not register any concern about the state of affairs in administration. Senior officials, I found, tend to feel objectively rather than subjectively responsible. Their perceptions of accountability are in tune with the objectively responsible civil servant whose

> most prominent characteristic and value is accountable to those who have the power to promote, displace, or replace him. The controls and influences which he internalizes in the form of administrative values are those expressed by his hierarchical superiors. In making and recommending

> decisions, he anticipates and reflects the desires of his superiors ... he does not take initiative or risks which may get him or his superiors into trouble.[16]

Only a few of my senior officials can be said to feel subjectively accountable; to use Finer's language again, this type of official is 'morally' responsible in that he looks to his own conscience rather than to 'external punitive controls' for guidance. Because senior officials tend to feel objectively accountable, there is due cause for concern that their behavior is inflexible, unimaginative, unresponsive, and ineffective. This situation fits the Lougheed government's wishes since it appears that they do not have to fear rule by officials. However, care should be taken not to neglect the fact that senior officials are untraditional civil servants, particularly because many of their responsibilities are atypical of bureaucratic behavior, forcing them out of the administrative realm and into the private sector. Many senior officials, although not in Treasury or the E.C.O. or the Premier's Office, but in Energy and Natural Resources, FIGA, and Economic Development, are best described as Alberta's diplomats to the world. Senior officials are not, I emphasize, political eunuchs. Their creative talents are being neglected. Albertans are not getting the best possible proposals from Alberta's senior officials. Senior officials tend to be highly educated and articulate. The Lougheed government is doing the province a disservice by constraining senior officials excessively. It is not developing the human resources it has at its disposal.

In their influential positions, senior officials' value preferences help them make decisions. They are sensitive to the political, technical and administrative implications of their advice. Given this

truth, the question arises: What sort of values do senior officials hold? In Chapter Three, I offer some insight into this query.

CHAPTER THREE: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHIES

> The bureaucrat's value system is usually most directly moulded by the values of those hierarchical associates on whom he relies most heavily for approval and reward; that is, his political and administrative superiors and his peers and subordinates.[1]

In this thesis I have adopted a very broad approach since the subject of Alberta's provincial public administration has never been studied. So far, I have utilized my interviews with senior civil servants to show their role perceptions, their communication with ministers, with their federal and provincial counterparts, with private sector interests, and I have shown their perceptions of their own influence on public policy and their feelings of accountability. I now cross from this vantage point to another in the hope that a greater understanding of the people who occupy senior positions in FIGA, Treasury, Economic Development, Energy and Natural Resources, and the E.C.O. can be gained. That is, in this chapter, I examine senior officials' attitudes on key issues which Alberta confronts. I have confined myself to those very broad issues of concern to Alberta which affect its goal of economic diversification. First, I study senior officials' views of federal-provincial relations in general in the last decade. From their experience, has the degree of cooperation between the federal government and Alberta increased or diminished? Moreover, I gave senior officials the opportunity to suggest major improvements which they think would improve federal-provincial relations. In the first section, then, I offer insight into federal-provincial relations from a provincial administrative vantage point. My second section focusses on the

key elements of Alberta's strategy of economic development. From the point of view of the men and women who shape programs and policies designed to achieve economic development, what are the overall objectives of economic diversification? How has the political will expressed its desires of economic to senior officials? Moreover, what do senior civil servants think are the main obstacles to economic diversification in Alberta? Perhaps the most interesting question I asked senior officials was whether they believed that Alberta can rely on market forces to attain a diversified economy in Alberta, or whether greater government intervention must be undertaken. I then asked senior officials whether they thought the AHSTF plays a role in Alberta's strategy of economic development. In the last section, I examine their responses to my question about what recommendations they would make regarding the use of the AHSTF. With an analysis of attitudes on these issues, a better understanding is attainable about the personal philosophy of the persons who head some of the agencies which help to plot the courses for Alberta's future. My presentation of insight into senior officials' beliefs about these issues is not detailed, but a glimpse is offered into their world-views. The key question I try to answer in this chapter is: Do senior officials share with their political masters a common view about the subjects which are the heart of Alberta's strategy of economic development or do they hve diverse beliefs which compete with the philosophy of the Alberta government? More bluntly, my question is: Do the senior officials I interviewed share the position of the Alberta government's mentality which contains this schizoid characteristic: acting both as a public business entrepreneur in its own right while voicing a very conservative

philosophy upholding the rights of private enterprise and offering the electorate continued free-enterprise conservatism. Lougheed has led, since 1971, a Progressive Conservative government which views itself as an entrepreneurial actor in Alberta's economic development. Yet, it has never been studied whether his senior public administrators hold beliefs which are sympathetic to the Alberta Government's entrepreneurial aspirations.

Federal-Provincial Relations as Perceived by Alberta's Senior Civil Servants

The 1970s saw federal-provincial summitry under the glare of television bringing to the public the rivalries and confrontations of ten premiers and a prime minister. Canadians watched and learned that the institutions and processes of executive federalism, despite the changing of some actors, were not geared to harmony but rather, to conflict. However, the summitry which occurs in the ranks below elected politicians, the administrative realm, has remained behind closed doors. From their own experiences, how do senior officials view federal provincial relations?

First, it must be understood that not all senior officials have regular or even sporadic contact with federal civil servants. For example, the support staff in the Executive Council Office and the Premier's Office rarely, if ever, meet with federal personnel. Officials in departments such as Treasury do not have as great contact with federal administrators as senior officials in Energy and Natural Resources have, simply because Energy and Natural Resources officials have been heavily involved in energy negotiations with Ottawa and projects such as the Prince Rupert Grain Terminal. FIGA people, of course,

have frequent regular contact with federal officials. Officials in Economic Development have regular contact with federal officials in departments such as International Trade and Regional Economic Expansion

Generally, no matter which department the senior official comes from, the widely held opinion is that federal-provincial relations have gone downhill in the last four to five years, especially since Trudeau regained his majority government position in 1980. Animosity between the Alberta and Ottawa governments stems from a number of factors, the major one being that since the early 1970s, with Alberta's newly discovered wealth, Alberta has been the leader of the provinces in supporting provincial rights. Senior civil servants generally contend that the federal government has been trying to step in on areas of provincial jurisdiction while Alberta generally attempts to keep out of those areas which are clearly federal responsibility. The federal government, one senior official stated, is "intruding into areas which have normally been within provincial jurisdiction." Senior officials cite the National Energy Program and the Constitution as examples of federal intrusion. Moreover, senior officials maintain that lately, the federal government's preoccupation has been to receive more "recognition" by emphasizing programs they have initiated. One official remarked that the "feds have learned a lesson on the NEP - they are not going to take us on head-on again."

If a person receives an impression that Alberta's relationship with the federal government is as confrontationist at the bureaucratic level as it is at the political level, it appears this impression would be justified. In examining my respondents' rather heated opinions about the sad state of relations between Alberta and Ottawa, I think that

it is not inaccurate to state that senior officials are promoters of provincial rights. On the basis of my interviews, I am able to maintain that the tension the public witnesses between Canada's premiers and prime minister has filtered down into the realm of administration. It is natural, however, as one senior official noted, that "there will always be points of contentions where opinion and interests diverge when national and provincial governments share certain areas of responsibility." The heart of the problem, most senior officials agree, is now a problem of personalities in the political arean. Narrowing the problem even further, Prime Minister Truddeau was almost unanimously viewed by my respondents as the crux of the problem. Senior officials' descriptions of Trudeau is very similar to the commonly held view: namely, he is seen as arrogant and uncooperative. Some senior officials, mostly those individuals who were involved in the September 1981 energy negotiations, stated that a more cooperative attitude from federal civil servants is necessary. Stated one official, "We are not consulted. We are told what is going to be done. There is no spirit of consultation or cooperation." The prevailing difficulty is that Ottawa sees Alberta as too wealthy and a potential destabilizing threat; Ottawa's actions, senior officials agree, are aimed at "preventing wealth in Alberta from expanding beyond acceptable limits." Hence, an attitude exists throughout the senior provincial bureaucracy not of cooperative federalism, but an "us-them" mentality.

I did get a few different interpretations about federal-provincial relations. One very senior official in Treasury who works with federal officials in determining the fiscal framework for some projects maintained that

> at the officials' levels, federal-provincial relations are in really good condition. We have a frank, open exchange of views. Difficulties arise at the political level where a lack of trust is predominant. At the political level, conflicting views about where the country is going and how we should get there is the norm. Officials, however, adopt a professional academic approach.

This more positive view of federal-provincial relations may be attributed to the fact that Treasury, a central agency, works with federal finance officials, also central agents. Central agents, one senior official observed, are used to "give and take discussions between departments." Treasury officials are involved, even in the provincial sphere, in situations characterized by conflict; for example, Treasury at times must reject departments' program proposals. My respondent continued: "People in finance departments tend to be more professional. They are not afraid to look at the alternatives, at the pros and cons of an issue." Departments which can be called program departments, tend to identify with the government's goals and objectives and sometimes, this gets in the way of their objectivity of the course to be charted.

Examining the responses from officials in Economic Development and Energy and Natural Resources, it seems that my Treasury official is accurate in his assessment. Those persons who are deeply involved in promoting programs which were opposed to the federal government's objectives, expressed a great deal more frustration than those officials whose responsibilities entailed less identification with Alberta's provincial rights. Conflict stems from two areas: those areas which involve federal-provincial tug-of-war over powers over the economy; and issues revolving around spending power. Only in the

decade has wealth in Canada shifted to Alberta. This one crucial change, officials in FIGA and Energy and Natural Resources noted, explains the nature of the NEP, the federal government's concern for increasing its visibility in the country, and it explains their position on equalization. Unlike most other provinces, in the last decade, Alberta has become less reliant on the federal purse. Hence, the Alberta government has been able to assert itself and plot its own destination to the consternation of the federal government. Most senior officials, like their political superiors, whether they be 'home-grown' or transplanted Albertans, enjoy the position that wealth has provided. This desire to reject "colonial" treatment is reflected in the following statements offered by one of my respondents:

> The federal government should concentrate on its areas of jurisdiction and realize that other parts of the country are capable of governing themselves and don't need the federal government to be guideposts in all their activities. The bureaucracy of the federal government is so concerned with control in Canada. They want control and visibility which results in their continuous intrusion in provincial responsibilities, meaning that government services and efforts are duplicated.

What do Alberta's senior officials want? Like Alberta's elected politicians they want two things: to try to maintain control over Alberta's destiny as best they can within Canada; and to try to get the federal government to move within areas of its own jurisdiction which Alberta needs in order to grow and develop.

In the last decade, Alberta's departments have felt the pressures of developing priorities and making trade-offs. Under this pressure, the departments, although young and continually reorganizing to meet new demands, have matured. They have become more effective in providing

elected politicians with the fuel to fight for provincial rights. The agencies I am studying reflect the transformation of a province once reliant upon the good will of the federal government to a province which has assumed a powerful bargaining position which does not allow the federal government to so easily dictate the terms of agreement in negotiations. Few senior officials said that cooperation with federal officials is high. The majority of senior officials expressed frustration and, indeed, outrage over the lack of cooperation, the stone-wall of unilateralism, which they encountered in their meetings with federal officials. It is not surprising, then, that senior officials tend to create elaborate defensive strategies for their political superiors to counter federal actions. Senior officials generally are sympathetic to the frustrations that the Premier of Alberta and his ministers voice. Is it not surprising, then, that a strategy for province-building -- one which would ensure that Alberta will avoid subjection to the colonial treatment it feels Ottawa is prone to inflict -- is the highest concern for senior officials? In the words of one FIGA official: "We can do as much or as little as we can afford to do; our efforts can only be curtailed by lack of money." Voicing a high degree of animosity, one senior official stated passionately:

> Trudeau is a jerk. He has screwed Canada. Animosity has sifted down to senior civil servants level ... we all smell the blood from our political leaders. Some Alberta officials have taken up the same hatred with a vengeance. This is unproductive. If civil servants would try to work cooperatively rather than perpetually hate, Ottawa, we could go a long way. Indeed, in lots of ways, what the feds do is not necessarily wrong.

This belief is supported by a senior FIGA officer who finds that his department's "people are slipping into feelings of hatred because they

hear it voiced so often by the Premier. It is difficult to offer different advice, contrary to what the Premier and his men want to hear, because it won't be accepted." The result of such attitudes assumed by senior officials is that, in the words of one official, "the department is becoming more politicized, meaning less objectiveity." Although such remarks are the exception, it may be that politicization is rearing its head in some departments. If this is the case, it is not surprising. Findings presented in the previous chapter indicate that the Premier has surrounded himself with like-minded souls. The officials I interviewed occupy positions of great responsibility and influence. My respondents tended to believe that the federal government places unnecessary obstacles to Alberta's objectives. I cannot offer concrete evidence which proves that the departments I examined are politicized; but neither am I convinced that the opposite, strict neutrality, is true. On balance, it appears that the scale tips in favor of the argument that the Alberta government is assisted by its senior officials in efforts to advance the overall province-building objective. The animosity between Lougheed and Trudeau, which one official describes as "greater than it might normally be", is generally echoed within the two levels of administration. What does this spirit of competition mean for federalism? It seems, as a very senior official, one of the most involved civil servants in intergovernmental relations, put it, that "federal provincial relations are approaching an all-time low." This is the pervasive sentiment throughout the senior levels of addministration I studied. On whom do senior officials place responsibility for federalims's dire straights? On the federal government, of course.

The sentiments expressed by the majority of my respondents are a reflection of the feelings of Albertans in general. One senior official, a keen observer of federal-provincial relations remarks that

> people in Alberta fear the Government of Canada ... the Olds-Didsbury by-election is a reflection of this fear, as distinguished from dislike. When Alberta wanted cooperative fiscal arrangements with the federal government, there was no discussion or dialogue. I have the feeling that the federal government, for whatever reason, is concerned with the strengthening of the provinces and therefore, they repeatedly try to cut us down to size.

Senior officials echo Lougheed's desire; "All we want is to have Alberta treated fairly." Over and over, the NEP was brought up by my respondents to prove that the "feds single Alberta out constantly." Senior officials, like Alberta's elected politicians, believe that Alberta has been and continues to be "shafted" by Ottawa. I find that senior officials tend to have blinkers on when it comes to dealing with federal officials and describing what is wrong with federal-provincial relations. When it comes to finding fault, Alberta's senior officials tend to place the burden of responsibility upon Ottawa's mandarins in particular and the federal government in general.

Not all senior officials maintain that federalism is headed for failure if things continue as they are. The few individuals who do not piously espouse their faith in Alberta, and their disdain for Ottawa, tend to have travelled throughout the world. Their view is less marked by animosity; their arguments are tempered with a more global perspective rather than thinking their responsibilities end at the Alberta border. Consider, for example, how one senior official describes federal-provincial relations:

> The major job is to have the central government understand the various regions. When one travels internationally, one comes to realize that we don't have any major problems. Oh, we talk of NEP and FIRA as problems ... they are not federal-provincial problems but Canadian problems.

These senior officials, however, agree that Trudeau is the heart of the problem. For example, "in creating a bilingual country making French and English Canada's two official languages, Trudeau did more to destroy the concept of French as a language for all of Canada because of the way he did it: he said 'you should' rather than 'you want to'." Relative to other countries, these officials recognize that Canada has minor problems. This is not to say that Canadians ought to feel smug and self-satisfied. But if officials and politicians took a calmer, more rational approach, problems might be solved. How can officials who express animosity towards the federal government hope to establish a cooperative spirit?

It is obvious, then, that senior officials are frustrated. It may be that they have cause. My respondents are individuals who, generally, have adopted the feelings of their political superiors. Working to realize the Alberta government's objectives, senior officials feel a bond to the programs and policies they help to create and implement. Hence, when obstacles, like the federal government, stand in the way of realizing their goals, Alberta and Ottawa administrations work at odds. My concern is that the present unfavorable state of affairs may be self-perpetuating. Contempt breeds contempt, not cooperation.

What did my respondents offer in the way of major recommendations which they think would improve federal-provincial relations?

It is not surprising that when first confronted with my question, they generally replied: "Get rid of Trudeau, his ministers, and his mandarins." Senior officials tend to maintain that the federal system is functionable. The new Constitution is not something all senior officials have spent time reviewing. Those officials who had looked it over, state that "it will be one of the biggest issues over the next five years." Asked if they felt there was a need for a national government, senior officials replied in the affirmative, some assuring me that they were not "closet separatists." I was told that the federal-provincial battle presently being waged is a contest for dollars. One senior official stated that "unlike an individual, in a country there are umbrella responsibilities which cover the whole country; for example, [redacted]s like education, language rights, and even the economy to some degree." The problem, senior officials maintain, is that in the last decade the federal government has been encroaching into areas of provincial jurisdiction, rather than confining itself to its own areas of responsibility. Five senior officials expressed concern that the Supreme Court has been given more power, by the Charter of Rights, moving Canada's political process closer to the American system "where individuals are allowed to make a mockery of justice." By giving the court more power the result, these senior officials forecast, will be a war of words.

One senior official thoughtfully suggested that the degree of present apparent conflict should neither be surprising nor alarming. He noted the obvious fact that Canada is a very regional country. Moreover, "from the start of this country we have had a system of conflict and confrontation and disagreement ... it's good!" The federal system

we have can reflect different regional needs, especially if the different levels of government desire it to do so. Unfortunately, the West is not as represented in national government to express its needs and concerns. Some officials are in favor of changing the present electoral system, based on population, to one which gives greater representation to less densely populated areas such as the West. Other officials stated that the centers of population are in the East, hence, it is only democratic to have greater representation from those areas. In their opinions about how to change the system, senior officials are as divided as any other group in society.

However, senior officials unanimously agree that federal officials need to re-think their definition of consultation. This, it appears from an examination of my respondents' opinions, entails a great change in attitude on behalf of the federal government. This change must begin with the Prime Minister as one senior official remarks in the following quotation:

> The system would work better if the Prime Minister had more enthusiasm for the benefits of combined meetings with premiers. Trudeau is not well-disposed towards the idea of joint federalism.

The same belief is expressed in a different way by an official in the E.C.O.:

> The federal government has decided that nothing is sacred. They want all the power. Through their unilateral actions, Ottawa people want to push the provinces into a corner ... it's been like this for the last four or five years.

Senior officials emphasize that the federal-provincial division of powers is satisfactory. The problem is how those divisions are handled and respected. One senior official concisely described the present

problem: "Honor has gone out of the system."

How can we put honor back into the political process? Senior officials unanimously agree that the federal government must be willing to hear the views of provinces and then take these views into consideration. One official states that presently, "the government in Ottawa is moving in a direction against any potential for cooperation." The 1970s are described by senior officials as "the decade of confrontation." For the 1980s, one official was unsure that major confrontation will continue. He asked: "What else can Ottawa do ?" The problem, it appears, is not only to arrive at a concensus, but to increase Alberta's input into the federal decision-making process. States an official in Energy and Natural Resources: "We can speak until we are blue in the face and, if we're lucky, we'll get a polite, quaint reaction from federal officials." There is a need for a "more meaningful exchange at the official levels prior to the development of policies." There is another factor which inhibits such meaningful discourse between senior government administrators: Alberta's officials tended to agree that there is "no doubt that senior officials in Ottawa are out of touch with reality." Alberta's senior officials state that in Ottawa, a person cannot tell what is a bureaucratic decision; one senior official cited the following example of this: "I was at a meeting with a federal minister who said: 'I've been instructed to say ...'. Deputy ministers are absolutely powerful in Ottawa. Ministers, especially new ones, feel helpless, manipulated. Such a state of affairs is atrocious and frightening." Alberta's senior officials maintain that their counterparts in Ottawa have much more influence than similar staff in provincial governments and this, they argue, is a central

factor in Ottawa's mismanagement of Canada. Alberta's senior officials are much more talkative about the problems of Ottawa's bureaucracy than they are about disclosing problems in their own government. In summary of Alberta's senior civil servant's perceptions of federal-provincial relations the following generalizations are apparent: 1) senior officials tend to maintain that the basic federal system is sound; 2) the electoral system does not provide regional representation in the federal political process; 3) the Trudeau government bears the brunt of responsibility for the all-time low of federal-provincial relations; 4) political personalities are crucial in establishing the spirit of cooperation in both the political and administrative arena; 5) the Ottawa bureaucracy is politicized.

Alberta senior officials appear to feel, to use one senior official's words, "disenfranchised." Having been treated as Ottawa's colony until Alberta's natural resource fueled the province's desire to strike back, Alberta senior officials approach consultations with their Ottawa counterparts with the agressiveness which characterizes new wealth and wariness which characterizes new-found freedom. Perhaps, keeping the challenge Quebec offered federalism in mind, Ottawa presents a unilateral face because it fears a young province seeking its just desserts, with the power of economic clout to support its demands. The result of these attitudes is confrontation rather than cooperation. Borrowing Harold Seidman's phrase, Canada has been experiencing "cooperative feudalism". As one senior official blithely stated, "The old codgers in Ottawa and here are hard to break." I received different perceptions from my senior officials about the amount of concern federal-provincial relations warrant. Although Alberta's senior officials

admit there are exceptions to the rule, they have, in the words of one senior Treasury official,[1] "lost faith in the integrity of federal civil servants ... basically, they are dishonest bastards ... we can almost not talk to them." It ccould be a more basic problem than personalities. Alberta senior officials describe the situation so vividly that I have gained the impression that Ottawa mandarins have fundamentally different perceptions about the nature of the country and the role of government than Alberta's senior officials; they do not share the same mentality. With Alberta's senior officials feeling so negatively towards Ottawa, it will be a surprise to see any cooperative effort in the future if the actors in the government process remain the same. My respondents appeared to enjoy this opportunity to vent their spleen about the evils which reside in Ottawa and haunt Alberta. My impression is that a person has cause to be concerned that within Alberta, although there are a few exceptions, a spirit of animosity has been fostered and fueled which promotes the polarization of views between Ottawa and Alberta. With such attitudes, indeed, with the degree of loathing expressed towards the federal government, it would seem remarkable if negotiations between the two levels of officials were characterized by cooperation. Alberta's senior officials, I find, have taken an extremely defensive and suspicious attitude which does not inspire optimism for the future of federalism as long as the present actors on both sides occupy the arena.

A Strategy for Economic Development

Larry Pratt, in his chapter "Whose Oil is It?", states that Alberta's economic development strategy "is based on the premise that the province has full ownership and control over its resource base."[2]

Pratt continues:

> Finally, there seems to be a broader political purpose beyond Mr. Lougheed's constant emphasis in a provincial patrimony whereas the motives cited above refer to "province-building" -- that is, extending the provincial government's control over the local economy -- the issue of a threat to resource ownership is also being used, in my opinion, to promote a kind of "nation-building" in Alberta. A sort of national mythology about Alberta is today being created by the ruling Conservative Party; the mythology of a new nation, struggling to win its independence but constantly threatened by external enemies with a return to colonial status.[3]

As I concluded in the previous section of this chapter describing federal-provincial relations, the senior officials I interviewed generally expressed fears that the federal government constantly singled out Alberta in an attempt to put the province in its former inferior position in federalism. Senior officials like to go to Ottawa meetings knowing they do not have to ask humbly "Please sir, may I have more?" Instead, They feel the difference economic clout makes in advancing the provincial rights. They are frustated by Ottawa's "last stand", namely the Natural Energy Program. They maintain that it is Ottawa which must capitulate. Senior officials, I find, echo the following sentiments expressed by the Provincial Treasurer of Alberta on October 28, 1980 after the NEP was unveiled:

> It's particularly sad, I think, that on the 50th anniversary of that historic struggle -- a quarter of a century to secure our resources -- on that 50th anniversary, which is this year, we are faced with nothing more or less than barefaced aggression by a federal government that wants to take away those hard-won resources. It's a shame, Mr. Speaker, that on the 75th anniversary of this province in a time when, hopefully, we thought we could be optimistic and filled with a sense of celebration, we are faced by an Ottawa government committed to reducing us and taking us back

> to the territorial status of 1904 -- we in Alberta face nothing more or less than massive discrimination against one small province ..,[4]

I asked my respondents what are the key elements of Alberta's strategy for economic development which would ensure that the province would always be treated fairly, so that Albertans would never again have to surrender to the demands of an overbearing federal government. In this section, I present senior civil servants' opinions of what the Alberta government is doing in the way of an economic development strategy which would free Alberta from the domination of central Canada and foreign markets.

A senior official in Economic Development observed that although Alberta is still the strongest province in Canada economically, its economic performance is declining: "The forest industry is in dire straights; the NEP is overtaxing one industry; and construction has fallen. Until recently, a person could do anything in business in Alberta and succeed." A small pamphlet was issued by the Alberta government called Alberta Economic Development, in which the following invitation is extended:

> The Province of Alberta is the fastest growing of Canada's 10 provinces. Economic progress, spurred on in recent years by developments in the energy resources sector, is rapidly transforming Alberta into a leading North American economic region. Significant personal and business opportunities have been realized in recent years but many others remain to be pursued. The province has a great deal to offer Canadians and citizens of other countries willing to take part in the development opportunities.[5]

Alberta has significant natural advantages which no other province enjoys; more than "eighty percent of oil and gas rights in Alberta are crown-owned (whereas, by contrast, in Saskatchewan much of the

province's heavy oil and potash deposits are freehold or privately owned)."[6] As the owner of oil and gas rights, Alberta can decide whether it will develop its resources and the conditions for that development, although the province must respect federal jurisdictions. It is not surprising, then, that Alberta's strategy of economic development would include upgrading its natural resources within the province. My interviews support Richards and Pratt's view that

> the provincial cabinets and bureaucracies of the West perceived Ottawa's resource policies as a fundamental attacck on their own power, and they were forced to elaborate and implement defensive strategies in response.[7]

How do senior civil servants describe Alberta's blueprint for economic development?

The overall objective, of course, is the economic well-being of the province; Albertans must have jobs, the province must offer investors economic and political stability, as well as a thriving economic climate. Senior officials, especially in Economic Development, and Energy and Natural Resources, have pinpointed those areas in which Alberta has a comparative advantage, over other Canadian provinces developing high technology around these areas, namely agriculture, energy, and to a lesser extent, forestry. Alberta's strategy of economic development is aimed at achieving balanced regional growth. This goal is generally dealt with by the Small Business and Tourism Department. Having created economic development regional offices in 10 communities throughout the province, government staff help local businesses help themselves. In the early 1970s, balanced regular growth was part of the Progressive Conservative platform. The peak of such growth was in 1975-1976. Although we may take the growth of small

centers for granted, such change has been plotted and to a large degree, successful.

The second of the government's nine-point strategy is the government's encouragement of small business development. To achieve this goal of expansion of small and existing businesses, five tasks are emphasized: management development and counselling; financial assistance to small companys with expansion potential; joint venture, licensing assistance; product marketing assistance; market identification. Meeting this goal is the responsibility of the Department of Small Business and Tourism, although Economic Development may offer assistance when requested. Small Business and Tourism is also responsible for two other points of the government's nine-point strategy, those being tourism development and making Alberta the gateway to the North.

Five further points for which the departments I studied are responsible are: resource development; the diversification of Alberta's industrial base; resource upgrading; to develop Alberta as a financial centre; and the development of technological expertise and facilities. As the name suggests, the Department of Economic Development is the strongest facet of Alberta's strategy for economic development.

> The fundamental objective of Alberta Economic Development is to implement the strategy of the Government of Alberta. This strategy involves building on the strengths of the province's base industries, energy and agriculture, striving to diversify the Alberta economy and encouraging balanced growth throughout.[8]

Alberta's strategy for economic development has been well-communicated to all departments and all the officials I spoke to. They pass with flying colors for being able to recite the nine-point strategy.

Everyone was able to tell me that economic diversification focussed on increasing secondary manufacturing, the improvement of Alberta's transportation system through the developments of ports, railways, and changing both the freight and tariff rates structures.

Establishing international contacts has been crucial to Alberta's strategy of economic development. My respondents in Economic Development who I earlier described as Alberta's ambassadors, are excited about the response they have received from markets abroad which wish to buy Alberta products and sell their goods and services in Alberta. One senior official in Treasury eloquently described Alberta's economic development efforts:

> The government saw itself facing a window to the world thanks to the energy situation in the 1970s. It recognized then that for a finite period of time; a lot of opportunities, not just in straight financial terms, but it also gave us momentum ... a place on the international stage. We have used that window to build a permanent kind of economic base in the province which will bring us into the by leagues in financial and economic terms. And that development is related to the resource industry, but hopefully, it will become something removed from the conventional oil industry. We're been pretty successful although we've faced, and we continue to confront problems..

The same official suspects that insufficient concern was given about the extent that we have made ourselves dependent on investment from outside Alberta and what an economic downturn would do to the province. In the face of an economic downturn during 1982-1983, senior officials will continue fire-fighting except this time, they will not be dealing with the problems of a booming province, but with problems such as how to respond to the onslaught of companies in Alberta which are going bankrupt. Senior officials, especially in Economic Development, must

deal with the tensions stemming from the high of a boom-time economy to the lows of unemployment. The economic slump makes Alberta's argument for diversification stronger. Senior officials are convinced that they must act to make Alberta less "dependent solely on oil and natural gas and agriculture which are all subject to the whims of the market place."

Although senior officials cited the government's nine-point strategy to me easily, they placed different emphasis on which points Alberta's strengths lay. Some officials maintain that in terms of secondary manufacturing, they "personally don't see that we should place much emphasis in this basket other than to supply local needs." Others believe that "diversification by far means that we should move away from our resource base." Senior officials, it is interesting to note, tend to be in favor of setting in place institutions and programs whose results will not be seen for twenty years; for example, the Medical Center will take at least a score to realize its benefits. Senior officials are not short-sighted. They are supportive and congratulatory of the Alberta government's long-term approach for Alberta's future: "Relatively speaking, this government has recognized the importance of long-term planning. It is tough for them because the average guy is only interested in interest rates and his job." Of the agencies I studied, the officials in Economic Development are the most-concerned individuals about developing new ideas for deiversifying Alberta's economy. Officials in other departments sound quite content about Alberta's ability to continue accumulating wealth from the oil and natural gas industries. For example, they tend not to be impressed

by ideas to attract high-technology, the so-called "footloose", industries. Officials in Economic Development express frustration about the fact that other agencies in the Alberta government "don't want to listen to us." Working under a fairly broad mandate, senior officials in Economic Development are not only involved in industry and business, they are concerned about "the interaction of the human being and environment, how they work together ... we're concerned with objectives like the quality of life." Perhaps most interesting, is one senior official's complaint that Economic Development is "perceived by most other departments as useless ... they feel we shouldn't have a department of Economic Development." Besides being a liaison department between business and government, Economic Development is a program development department. One Treasury official described Economic Development as "having the time to watch the clouds roll by in the sky." The complaints registered by Economic Development have touched a nerve in Alberta's central agencies involved in designing and implementing Alberta's strategy for economic development.

It appears to me that emphasis for economic development is focussed upon renewable resources. In some sectors, such as forestry, senior officials said that their areas, which they knew could be important to developing Alberta's economy, were being ignored; for example, one senior official stated that there is "great opposition to enhancing the forestry resource sector." One senior official said that there "has got to be greater emphasis on the management of our resources." But besides disagreements as to which sector should receive more attention, resource or industry, senior officials agree with the government's strategy. The strategy can succinctly be described as attempting

to put in place a basic infrastructure for economic activity. Obstacles cited include: Alberta's land-locked position (high freight rates); Alberta's distance from major markets; Alberta's population is not compatible for labor intensive industry; high cost of transportation; federal policies such as the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA) and the National Energy Program which Alberta's officials argue unnecessarily limit Alberta's ability to diversify its economy. Moreover, senior officials contend that the province does not need an increased number of agricultural boards which federal Minister Whelan is attempting to bring in. Again, senior officials think Ottawa intrudes where it has no place. The permutations which can be made with the basic strategy senior officials espoused are quite a few. The province's strategy for economic development is still evolving. One senior official forecasted that after the next provincial election, the province might change its emphasis, for example, by focussing more strenuously on agriculture.

When it comes to the issue of foreign investment, senior officials would like to encourage as much as possible into the province. They support foreign investment which encourages a net flow of dollars. They hold that although Canada needs some mechanism to examine and assess the equation of investments; FIRA, however, bleeds the country, and senior officials maintain that it should be abandoned. The spirit of senior officials towards FIRA is captured in the following statement made by one of the government's most senior officials. "To have the federal government turn away foreign investment is criminal ... there should be no limits."

When asked whether they supported government intervention in the private sector, overwhelmingly, senior officials believe that "we must rely on market forces." One senior official drew the following analogy: "The government's job is to prepare a flowerbed and maybe to water it. The private sector's job is to make the flowers grow." Senior civil servants tend to describe themselves as "catalystic agents". The government's job is "to create a good economic climate". Alberta's senior officials state that they "try to assist and support the private sector, not to intervene in the market place." They think they are acting in an interventionist manner only to the extent that they try to maintain positive policies which encourage private industry to locate in Alberta. By providing a good infrastructure, for example building better roads and offering housing programs, they maintain they are fostering a positive environment in which the private sector can flourish. One senior official stated: "We have no desire to attract uneconomic industry here. We let the private sector operate without interference from government ... we don't interfere with the economic decisions they make." Senior civil servants espouse the same Progressive Conservative free-enterprise philosophy that the Alberta government espouses. Just as they profess not to be bureaucratic empire-builders, so they believe that the market place must rule the private sector. But they do not go so far as to agree to laissez-faire: "There are moments when government must intervene for the good of the province." The most creative response I received about intervention was when one respondent managed to excuse Alberta's interventionist maneouvers as a response to the evils of the federal government:

> The Alberta government has been forced to intervene in the market place to offset the mismanagement of our economy by the federal government. We've had to introduce other government' policies to correct the intervention which created the problem.

If a person were to tally up the ills in Canada, and more particularly, Alberta, some senior officials in Alberta would be able to match federal actions which they would argue caused the problems in Alberta. It seems to me that by diverting attention towards the problems of the national government, which is some cases are very real, senior officials, like Alberta's elected politicians, hope to hide the mistakes and problems which the Alberta government has created. Consider the purchase of Pacific Western Airlines (PWA) and the creation of the AHSTF as two examples of government intervention in which the government has shrouded their management in mystery and which have caused controversy within the Alberta Progressive Conservative party. Luckily for the government, Albertans are generally disinterested in the management of their province's affairs.

My questionnaire did not include a question about senior officials views about the Alberta government's purchase of Pacific Western Airlines because I thought it would be too forward of me, inciting too much tension. Because my respondents were relaxed and seemed to talk to me easily, I was able to ask them whether they felt PWA was a mistake after they had recited to me their non-interventionist philosophy. It was interesting to watch them blink and wonder how they should answer this question. The usual response was that they did not know anything about the purchase and management of PWA nor had they thought about it nor did they care. Alberta must have really become a big gov-

ernment in the last decade, if senior officials in Treasury, Energy and Natural Resources, Economic Development, Premier's Office, and E.C.O. are so unaware about PWA that they tell me they are "too uninformed to respond." Senior officials' apparent lack of concern over the management of PWA could be a reflection that PWA may be a deep political scar which has touched nerves even in public administration.

A few senior officials expended a little more effort responding to my curiousity about their views as to PWA purchase. One senior official stated: "PWA is one of a number of contradictions of Lougheed's whole personality and philosophy." The same official put the Alberta Energy Company in the same package of contradictions. Another senior official stated that "PWA was a judgemental thing. I think that the original decision was timely ... but I'm not close enough to assess the whole situation." What I find amazing is that neither Albertans nor senior officials have any curiousity about the actions of the Alberta government. Lougheed's government has an incredible freedom of movement. It is amazing that he is surrounded by ministers and senior officials who could legitimize, in the name of the good of the province, of course, and more importantly, are so trusting about operations such as PWA and AHSTF -- despite their free-enterprise orientations -- that they state that "they are not close enough" to the situation. The way senior officials shrugged PWA off was as if we were discussing something inconsequential instead of a major crown corporation. No one seemed to care. Having informed me so strongly as to the virtues of the market place, senior officials left me with their view that it is not an issue whether or not PWA should be a public or private enterprise. Senior officials did not even both to present an

argument in favor of PWA; they did not try, for example, to give me an argument about how the airline has been used to promote diversification of the Alberta economy. I wonder if I would have received a different response if PWA were a federal government venture. Senior officials might strive to be politically neutral, but that does not mean they should give the impression that they are politically naive.

I asked senior officials whether they thought the AHSTF was being used to advance Alberta's strategy of economic development. I also asked them whether they could offer any major recommendations as to how they thought the AHSTF could be best utilized. Again, I cannot offer any big surprises. Senior officials tend to agree that the government is doing a wonderful job in using the AHSTF. The following statement by one very senior official is a typical response:

> I think the Fund should be used exactly as it is ... I concur with the government completely. We've been using it for the daily needs of Albertans.

Or, in the words of another official:

> The fund plays a role in funding specific programs which we couldn't undertake under a regular budget.

There are no problems of accountability in the management of the AHSTF according to senior officials: "The Attorney-General recently made a report which looked into the matter fully: there are no conterns as to the accounting books." Despite the majority of typical answers, there were the few exceptions who broke ranks; as is shown in the following example:

> The fund could provide better social services to residents. It should be invested rather than banked, especially with today's inflationary trend. Politically, the Fund is bad. It's viewed

> with jealousy by other provinces and with anger by the presidents of private companies, especially in hard times.

The AHSTF, senior officials tend to agree, plays a role in a strategy of economic development; examples cited include the Prince Rupert Grain Terminal and the establishment of the $300 million Alberta Heritage Foundation for Medical Research Endowment Fund, the purchase of 1,000 new rail hopper cars to increase the ability to move Alberta grain to market. As well, senior officials mentioned that over $900 million has been loaned to governments or agencies of six other Canadian provinces. Investments of the Fund include the Syncrude Oil Sands Project, a 50 percent ownership of the Alberta Energy Company, and long term loans to the Alberta Home Mortgage Corporation, the Alberta Opportunities Co., the Alberta Agricultural Development Corporation, the Alberta Municipal Financing Corporation. True, the Fund has been used for these purposes, but one could argue that they are responsibilities of the government which would have had to come from regular budget expenditure had the Fund not been established. It is interesting that recognizing the AHSTF as politiccally dangerous, one senior official recommended that the government "camouflage the thing rather than leaving it as one big $11 Billion sum ... hiding the money off into other areas so not one big target is left to get great attention." It is interesting that the federal government slipped into our discussions about the use of the AHSTF. One very senior civil servant argued:

> Today is the rainy day ... we're in trouble, serious trouble. Federal policies have exasperated problems with their stupid, willful attempts to control the energy industries in the country. It's a difficult time. It's incumbent on the Alberta government to get us out of it, to provide some assistance for Albertans and Alberta based industry.

But an even more senior official maintains that "it's not raining hard enough to bring out the Fund, it's only spitting." At least senior officials were evenly divided on whether Alberta should treat the Fund as a piggy bank or whether it should be used more as a financial instrument to allow more economic diversification. But they did not question the very existence of the Fund or the methods of accountability. As well, some senior officials said that the media and academic attention surrounding the Fund was "inaccurate, irresponsible and unprofessional ... the truth about the Fund is not being communicated to the people of Alberta." In summation of senior officials' general perception of the AHSTF: "It has contributed to a more sophisticated financial climate in Alberta."

Conclusions

Alberta senior civil servants, I find, share with Premier Lougheed a dream of the New West. Generally, they closely identify with the Premier's philosophy of economic diversification and industrialization. In this chapter, I have presented senior officials attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments toward federal-provincial relations, the Alberta government's strategy of economic development and government intervention. I find that senior officials have adopted Alberta's culture of grievance. They tend to be fearful and frustrated toward a national government that they perceive as hostile to Alberta's attempts to rise about colonial status in the Canadian federation. They maintain that the East, as manifested by the federal government, wants to appropriate the wealth of Alberta; senior officials are committed to ensuring that this does not occur. Senior officials have developed a sense of pride and worth in the last decade as they have come to wield economic clout

but they share Lougheed's fear that Ottawa will find some means to retaliate against Alberta's new prosperity. It is my concern that in trying to retain economic wealth, senior officials leave themselves inaccessible to ideas beyond those which centre around money and power. In striving to meet the Alberta government's goal of province-building, senior officials have turned their attention away from the issues and conflicts within the province towards a single war with the outside enemy, the federal government. Senior officials admit that they are constantly fire-fighting issues which are fueled by the low level of cooperation between the federal and the Alberta provincial governments. The spirit senior officials have adopted flows from the feelings their political masters express; both express a spirit of resentment for past perceived discrimination by Ottawa. It is a spirit of officials who are working to build a strong province.

Senior officials, like the Premier, profess their belief in the doctrine of free-enterprise. Like the Lougheed government, senior officials have this schizoid attitude: they profess to be free-enterprisers yet they are not disturbed that Lougheed's government owns an airline and 50 percent of Alberta Energy Company. I discovered that senior officials are conservative in their economic thinking. They firmly uphold the efficiency and effectiveness of the free-enterprise system, and generally, they oppose government intervention. Yet they were unconcerned, indeed, disinterested, in the issues surrounding two examples of government intervention: the ownership of PWA and the management of the AHSTF. Senior officials voiced no objections to the Alberta government's tendency towards intervention of the economy. It is ironic that in trying to free Alberta's economy from the

instability of the world market, senior officials would prefer little or no restrictions on foreign investment in the province; they condemn FIRA. All told, it appears that senior officials have offered their allegiance to the aspirations of the Alberta Conservative government.

CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

For the past decade, the Alberta government has been engaged in province-building. On the basis of observations presented earlier in this thesis, derived from interviews with thirty-three of Alberta's senior officials, I find that Alberta's senior civil servants share the Lougheed government's objectives and philosophy for the economic diversification of the province. Indeed, it was interesting to discover that senior officials remarkably share the attitudes and beliefs of elected politicians. In all my areas of enquiry, there was a majority of senior administrators who held a common view; dissenters to their notions were rare. In this final chapter I offer my concluding observations about the nature of senior civil servants involved in Alberta's economic development.

The first question to ask is: How influential are senior officials in Alberta? Answering this question is difficult. First, one must understand that the Lougheed government has a deep desire to assert its control over its public administration. Indeed, Lougheed's fear of the potential power of bureaucrats, described as paranoic by ten senior officials, has inspired him to foster the myth of a great chasm between the realm of politics and the realm of administration. Senior officials, sensitive to the fears of their political masters, benignly profess that they have little influence on public policy in Alberta. However, having examined the responsibilities of senior administrators, I found that they are in positions of great influence stemming from their responsibilities. They are experts in their fields who have continued contact with the business community, who communicate the needs industry, who recognize where new policies and programs must be devel-

oped and old policies and programs must be revamped, who create and implement policies and programs, and lastly and most importantly, who offer advice to their ministers.

Within the very broad objectives their political masters communicate, senior officials have tremendous scope. Senior officials did not state that they need more freedom of movement because senior officials understood that if they communicated the range of their influence on public policy, they would upset the delicate balance of power which is tilted in their favor. I cannot maintain that my observations about senior officials influence are conclusive. One must never forget that the Lougheed government has deep fear in its heart about the very real possibility that it could be ruled by officials. Ever wary, the government has a great desire to perpetuate the myth that it wields control over the public service and hence, the decision-making process.

However, my study of a limited section of Alberta's bureaucracy shows that political dominance over senior officials is a façade. It is unrealistic to subscribe to the view that politics and administration are two distinct dominions. By their very responsibilities, senior officials are thrust out of the realm of pure administration and into the world where they are subject to the demands and values of, in the case of my respondents, the business community and the political domain. The basic rules of the political game have changed dramatically in that senior public administrators are now more responsive and more responsible to the needs of industry and the needs of their political masters. Alberta's senior officials are attached to the programs and policies they help to create.

In gaining insight into some aspects of senior officials' political philosophy, I learned that they are not working at odds with the Alberta government. Lougheed is surrounded by senior officials who, like him, espouse the virtues of free-enterprise while supporting, in a schizoid manner, government entrepreneurialism. It is a paradox that senior officials maintain that government should refrain from intervening in the market place, yet when confronted with an example of intervention in Alberta, Pacific Western Airlines, they offer no criticism or defence or interest in the government's ownership of a major airline. A few senior officials made suggestions as to how the AHSTF could be further utilized, yet no one questioned its methods of accountability. Acceptance and adoption of Alberta's Progressive Conservative government's approach to economic development is almost unanimous amongst senior officials.

Senior officials along with elected leaders have been toying with economic diversification for over a decade yet, as the province feels the pressures of an economic downturn, it becomes obvious that the strategy for economic diversification has not left Alberta's economy immune to the forces of national and international market cycles. Senior officials recited to me Alberta's nine-point strategy for economic development and offered a few examples of development in Alberta. It is becoming obvious that the time for diversification is fading. It appears that even the Department of Economic Development, is becoming the focus of the realization that all that could be done is not.

The problem as I have come to understand it, is that Alberta's elected politicians and senior officials have the same political orientations which lead them to the same uninspired, inflexible con-

clusions and solutions about how to deal with Alberta's economy. This singular frame of mind is not challenged from the legislature because the opposition is so weak. Until recently, the media and the public showed no interest in the Government's economic strategy. Nowhere to be found was any stimulus to view the situation from a different vantage point. The alternatives provided to elected politicians by officials were recommendations which were known to be acceptable. In general, the Lougheed administration, its senior officials, and the business community it serves have shared the same orientations to economic development. Innovation, constructive new ideas, are not advanced. It is an inbred system.

I was impressed by Alberta's senior officials. They appear to be hard-working, informed, highly educated, upwardly-mobile, aggressive individuals. Yet they are stifled. The responsibility for this atmosphere rests on the Alberta government and on senior civil servants. The Alberta government is responsible for the imbalance between politics and administration. Obviously, senior officials have influence on public policy and on the decisions that politicians make. The pervasive atmosphere of distrust is not conducive to the production of the best ideas. Senior civil servants are not politically neutral. They have a stake in the success of the government's goals because that is where their own success lies.

I conclude this thesis with a question still tugging at my mind. I am pondering how much influence senior civil servants ought to have in the political process. It is my understanding that they are capable of offering the province more effective, innovative recommendations and programs. I think Albertans ought to be concerned that senior off-

icials are not offering the full spectrum of alternatives; they propose ideas which fit a particular orientation. Perhaps this is the way Albertans think senior officials should behave; maybe Albertans are getting the kind of government administration they deserve. However, I maintain that a fundamental re-thinking about the role of senior officials is necessary. The Government of Alberta, the senior officials, and even Albertans themselves are partaking in the perpetuation of a myth; they are fostering the façade that politics and administration at the highest levels are two distinct dominions. There is a need to question whether the pretense that politicians are Solomon-like decision-makers should prevail or whether the reality, that senior officials exert a great degree of influence on the decision-making process, should be recognized. I do not think that the political-administration myth is a noble lie. I continue to consider what a good balance between politics and administration would be. A balance should be struck where those who hold power can be trusted, as Socrates in Plato's Republic states, to be

> Putting what is right and the honors coming from it above all, while taking what is just as the greatest and the most necessary, and serving and fostering it, they will provide for their own city.[1]

Footnotes

Chapter One: Introduction

1. John Richards and Larry Pratt, Prairie Capitalism: Power and Influence in the New West, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1979, pp. 167-168.

2 The structure of the Canadian federal bureaucracy and the responsibilities and perceptions of its members have been closely examined in several recent studies. Colin Campbell and George J. Szablowski explore the inner workings of federal central agencies in their book, The Superbureaucrats: Structure and Behavior of Central Agencies. (Toronto, Macmillan Co, 1979). In Canadian political science texts, a person will find chapters examining the issue of alleged bureaucratic control over the federal government; for example, in Thomas A. Hockin's book, Apex of Power: The Prime Minister and Political Leadership in Canada, Mitchell Sharp asks: "Are Ministers puppets being manipulated by the mandarins, as is sometimes asserted or implied?" (Thomas A Hockin, editor, "The Cabinet and the Public Service: Reflections of Mitchell Sharp. J. Chrétien, et al.," in Apex of Power: The Prime Minister and Political Leadership in Canada, second edition, by Thomas A. Hockin, editor, (Scarborough, Ontario, Prentice-Hall of Canada Ltd., second edition, 1977, pp. 180-181). Canadian magazines have also lavished attention upon Ottawa's senior civil servants; for example, in the November/December 1981 issue of Policy Options, Hugh Segal examines "The Accountability of Public Servants," arguing that "our governments would be better if senior mandarins were less secure." Policy Options, Vol.,2, November/December 1981, p. 11). In his article "Bureaucrat-bashing," Geoffrey Stevens quotes David A. Brown, a professor of management at George Washington University, as saying: If political parties are all things to all people, governmental bureaucracies tend to be all things bad to all people. Because of their size, complexity, cost, and impact, they provide ample opportunity for even the most uninspired to find something wrong with them." (Report: The Magazine of Public Affairs, Vol.3, June 1980, p.7.) Interest in Ottawa's senior civil servants has not abated in the 1980's. The August 1982 issue of Saturday Night contains Sandford F. Borin's article entitled, "Mandarin Power," which, once again, seeks to shed light upon the federal government's senior executive. (Saturday Night, Vol. 97, August 1982, pp. 7-9).

3. Kenneth Kernaghan, editor, Public Administration in Canada Selected Readings, third edition, Toronto, Methuen Publications, 1977, p.5.

Chapter 2: Positions, Powers, and Accountability

1. Province of Alberta, Legislative Assembly, Speech from the Throne, May 24, 1979, n.p.

2. Government of Alberta, Department of Energy and Natural Resources, Organization Chart - Alberta Energy and Natural Resources. 1981.

3. Government of Alberta, Department of Energy and Natural Resources, Organization Chart - Alberta Energy and Natural Resources, 1981.

4. Donald V. Smiley, Canada in Question: Federalism in the Eighties, third edition, Toronto, McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1980, p.97.

5. Province of Alberta, Legislative Assembly, Speech from the Throne, March 2, 1972, n.p.

6. Government of Alberta, Department of Federal and Intergovernmental Affairs, A Summary of the Function and Activities of the Department of Federal and Intergovernmental Affairs, n.d., p.1.

7. Government of Alberta, Department of Federal and Intergovernmental Affairs, Eighth Annual Report to March 31, 1981, p.43.

8. Government of Alberta, "Financial Administration Act, 1976," in the Revised Statutes of Alberta, May 19, 1976, chapter 142.

9. Government of Alberta, Treasury Department, Annual Report for the Fiscal Year Ended 31 March 81, pp. 4-5.

10. Government of Alberta, Organization of the Government of Alberta, October 1980, p.12.

11. Before the E.C.O. assumed a coordinating role, after department programs were approved by cabinet, they went directly back to the deputy ministers. The initiation of programs depended on the department. But lack of communication meant that one department would unwittingly start at square one, which might already have been done by another department. The E.C.O. tries to bring together departments who should have input into a particular program. In the Manning and Strom administrations, the cabinet had no advisory support staff, no cabinet agenda, no record of decisions drawn, and no process to relay the decisions to the departments which were responsible for the implementation of programs. Strom did have some support staff, but their work was limited to only the premier's responsibilities and did not include the Executive Council's tasks.

12. A.W. Johnson, "The Role of the Deputy Minister," in Public Administration in Canada, edited by Kenneth Kernaghan, (Toronto, Methuen, 1977, p.280).

13. Kenneth Kernaghan, "Responsible Public Bureaucracy," in Public Administration in Canada, edited by Kenneth Kernaghan, (Toronto, Methuen, 1977, p.308).

14. Peter Self, Administrative Theories and Politics, London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1972, p.278.

15. Campbell and Szablowski, The Superbureaucrats, pp. 194-195.

16. Kernaghan, op. cit., pp 320-321.

Chapter Three: Political Philosophies

1. Kernaghan, Public Administration in Canada, p. 317.

2. Larry Pratt, "Whose Oil is It?" in Western Separatism: The Myths, Realities, and Dangers, edited by Larry Pratt and Garth Stevenson (Edmonton, Hurtig Publishers, 1981 p. 163.)

3. Ibid., p. 164

4. Province of Alberta, Legislative Assembly, Alberta Hansard, October 31, 1980, p. 1317.

5. Government of Alberta, Ministry of Economic Development, Alberta Economic Development, n.d., n.p.

6. Pratt, op.cit., p.163

7. Richards and Pratt, Prairie Capitalism p. 216.

8. Government of Alberta, Ministry of Economic Development, Alberta Economic Development, n.d., n.p.

Chapter Four: Concluding Observations

1. Allan Bloom, translator, The Republic of Plato, New York, Basic Books Inc., 540 d-e.

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APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE

1. What are your present responsibilities?

2. When did you enter provincial government service in Alberta?

3. How long have you held your present position?

4. What is your most time-consuming task?

5. Do you regularly attend inter-agency committees? If yes: Which ones? How frequently are these meetings held? What is your role at these meetings? What are the goals or purposes of the meetings?

6. Do you meet with people outside the government in gathering information for your department? For example, do you have any contact with interest groups? If yes: which ones? In what way are they useful to the fulfillment of your responsibilities?

7. Recalling the ministers with whom you have worked, could you tell me, in general, under what circumstances you met with them? What is the frequency of these meetings?

8. Do you meet with senior civil servants from other provincial governments? from the federal government? If yes: Under what circumstances? With which provinces? Frequency? In general, over what type of issues?

9. How much influence do senior civil servants have on public policy?

10. How could senior civil servants offer more input into the direction of Alberta's policies?

11. Would a greater degree of freedom of movement in the execution of their responsibilities be desirable?

12. To whom do you <u>feel</u> accountable? In what sense are you accountable?

13. In what way, if any, is the province of Alberta influenced in its policy-making by the federal division of powers?

14. In your opinion, what major changes are necessary to improve the relationship between federal and provincial governments?

15. From your perspective, what are the essential elements of Alberta's strategy for economic development?

16. Does the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund play a role in this strategy"? What recommendations would you make regarding the use of the AHSTF?

17. Is Alberta's economy too dependent on natural resources? What are the alternatives?

18. To attain a diversified economy in Alberta, can we rely on market forces or must greater government intervention be undertaken?

19. What are the main obstacles to economic diversification in Alberta?

20. When were you born? Where? (If subject has not always lived in Alberta, ask him when he came here.)

21. What was your father's major occupation while you were growing up?

22. How much formal education have you received? Where?

23. If subject went to university, what was his major field?

24. What was your career route to your present position?

APPENDIX II: DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

		DEPARTMENT				
		ECON DEV'T	ENERGY & NAT. RES.	PREM'S OFFICE & ECO	FIGA	TREAS
I	BIRTHDATE					
	Average year born	1936	1938	1941	1942	1938
II	a. BORN IN					
	i. Western Canada	57%	37%	80%	100%	60%
	ii. Ontario	-	25%	20%	-	20%
	iii. Quebec	-	-	-	-	-
	iv. Atlantic Provinces	-	-	-	-	20%
	v. Outside Canada	43%	13%	-	-	-
	b. THE AVERAGE YEAR THOSE WHO WERE BORN OUTSIDE ALBERTA CAME TO RESIDE IN ALBERTA	1964	1967	1941	1970	1976
III	a. FATHER'S OCCUPATION					
	i. Professional Persons	28.6%	22%	16.7%	25%	60%
	ii. Managerial Person	28.6%	33%	33%	25%	-
	iii. Farmer	14.3%	11%	33%	25%	20%
	iv. Other	28.6%	33%	16.7%	25%	20%
	b. MOTHER'S OCCUPATION					
	i. Housewife	87.5%	100%	83.3%	80%	83.3%
	ii. School Teacher	12.5%	-	16.5%	-	16.6%
	iii. Other	-	-	-	20%	-
IV.	EDUCATION OF RESPONDENT					
	a. high school	-	-	-	-	14%
	b. Bach/Arts degree	12.5%	18%	33%	33%	14%
	c. Bach/Sci degree	25%	27%	16.6%	11%	14%
	d. Bach/Com degree	25%	9%	33%	11%	-
	e. Mas/Bus/Admin	25%	-	-	-	-
	f. Bach/Law degree	-	9%	-	-	-
	g. Mas/Arts/thesis	-	9%	16.6%	22%	14%
	coursework only	-	9%	-	-	-
	h. Mas/Sci/thesis	-	-	-	-	14%
	coursework only	-	9%	-	-	-
	i. Doc/Phil Arts/thesis	-	-	-	-	14%
	coursework only	-	-	-	11%	-
	j. Doc/Phil Arts/thesis	12.5%	9%	-	11%	14%
	coursework only	-	-	-	-	-
V.	RESPONDENT'S WORK EXPERIENCE BEFORE COMING TO HOLD PRESENT POSITION (MULTIPLE RESPONSE)					
	a. business	50%	44.4%	40%	20%	50%
	b. professional	37.5%	22.2%	-	40%	50%
	c. Federal government	12.5%	-	-	40%	60%
	d. Provincial Government	37.5%	44.4%	60%	20%	20%

		ECON DEV'T	ENERGY & NAT RES.	PREM'S OFFICE & ECO	FIGA	TREAS
VI	AVERAGE YEAR RESPONDENTS ENTERED ALBERTA PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICE	1971	1971	1976	1974	1972
VII	AVERAGE YEAR RESPONDENTS ASSUMED PRESENT POSITIONS	1979	1978	1979	1978	1977