

# Evolution of cooperation in spatio-temporal evolutionary games with public goods feedback

Haihui Cheng<sup>1,2</sup> · Liubov Sysoeva<sup>2</sup> · Hao Wang<sup>2</sup> · Hairui Yuan<sup>1</sup> · Tonghua Zhang<sup>3</sup> · Xinzhu Meng<sup>1</sup>, ✉

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**Abstract** In biology, evolutionary game-theoretical models often arise in which players' strategies impact the state of the environment, driving feedback between strategy and the surroundings. In this case, cooperative interactions can be applied to studying ecological systems, animal or microorganism populations, and cells producing or actively extracting a growth resource from their environment. We consider the framework of eco-evolutionary game theory with replicator dynamics and growth-limiting public goods extracted by population members from some external source. It is known that the two sub-populations of cooperators and defectors can develop spatio-temporal patterns that enable long-term coexistence in the shared environment. To investigate this phenomenon and unveil the mechanisms that sustain cooperation, we analyze two eco-evolutionary models: a well-mixed environment and a heterogeneous model with spatial diffusion. In the latter, we integrate spatial diffusion into replicator dynamics. Our findings reveal rich strategy dynamics, including bistability and bifurcations, in the temporal system and spatial stability, as well as Turing instability, Turing-Hopf bifurcations, and chaos in the diffusion system. The results indicate that effective mechanisms to promote cooperation include increasing the player density, decreasing the relative timescale, controlling the density of initial cooperators, improving the diffusion rate of the public goods, lowering the diffusion rate of the cooperators, and enhancing the payoffs to the cooperators. We provide the conditions for the existence, stability, and occurrence of bifurcations in both systems. Our analysis can be applied to dynamic phenomena in fields as diverse as human decision-making, microorganism growth factors secretion, and group hunting.

**Keywords** Evolutionary game theory · Replicator dynamics · Pattern formation · Spatial dynamics · Turing-Hopf bifurcation · Chaotic pattern

## 1 Introduction

Social dilemmas arise from conflicts between individual and collective interests and are observed in various domains, including humans (Bonneton et al. 2016; Kummerli et al. 2007; Li et al. 2018; Heggerud et al. 2022), animals (Cheng et al. 2022; Riehl and Frederickson 2016; Yamaguchi and Iwasa 2021), and microorganisms (Wakano et al. 2009; Behar et al. 2014; Lynn and De Leenheer 2019). Sustainable development necessitates

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✉ Xinzhu Meng  
E-mail: mxz721106@sdust.edu.cn

<sup>1</sup> College of Mathematics and Systems Science, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, PR China  
<sup>2</sup> Department of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2G1, Canada  
<sup>3</sup> Department of Mathematics, Swinburne University of Technology, Hawthorn, Victoria 3122, Australia

individual contributions and sacrifices for the collective good, such as air, water, fossil fuels, and fisheries. In animal groups, food obtained through group hunting efforts may be shared with non-contributing individuals (Cheng et al. 2022; Lett et al. 2004). Microorganisms secrete beneficial growth factors at a cost to acquire nutrients, allowing others to exploit their efforts (Schuster et al. 2010; Smith and Schuster 2019). Defectors exploit public resources without cost, potentially leading to a tragedy of the commons (Milinski et al. 2002; Rankin et al. 2007). Despite the risks associated with selfish behavior, cooperative behavior is prevalent in nature and human society, making it crucial to comprehend the underlying mechanisms sustaining cooperation. Evolutionary game theory (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998) is a vital framework for studying cooperation, with replicator dynamics (Nowak 2006) being widely employed.

Cooperation in populations is triggered by the production of public goods, which are essential for individual growth and development. Cooperators incur costs in order to produce or capture these shared resources, benefiting the entire population. The presence of public goods fosters an environment conducive to cooperation. The cooperative or non-cooperative behaviors of individuals have an impact on the availability of public goods, which then affects players' strategy choices. The term 'eco-evolutionary games' corresponds to scenarios where evolutionary game dynamics are environmentally coupled. This mutual feedback between public goods dynamics and strategy dynamics (Weitz et al. 2016; Hauert et al. 2019; Tilman et al. 2020; Cheng et al. 2023) was often overlooked in previous studies, which predominantly focused on economic aspects and neglected the interplay between public goods and strategies within the replicator dynamics framework (Charness et al. 2014; Lotito et al. 2013; Fallucchi et al. 2019). To address this gap, we combine replicator dynamics with public goods dynamics to construct an evolutionary game system with public goods feedback, enabling an exploration of the impact of public goods feedback on the evolution of cooperation.

Spatial diffusion plays a crucial role in strategy evolution. Based on Fick's law, matter in space exhibits heterogeneous distribution due to diffusion, which has been experimentally confirmed in microorganisms such as *Escherichia coli* (Kerr et al. 2002; Kirkup and Riley 2004; Conlin et al. 2014; Lambert et al. 2014), yeasts (MacLean and Gudelj 2006; Schuster et al. 2010), *Pseudomonas aeruginosa* (Wang et al. 2015; Griffin et al. 2004; Figueiredo et al. 2021; Mridha and Kummerli 2022), and *Bacillus subtilis* (Ratzke and Gore 2016). Cressman and Vickers (Cressman and Vickers 1997) examined density-dependent game models in one spatial dimension and demonstrated resistance to strategy invasion. Hauert (Hauert 2002) compared spatially expanding populations to well-mixed populations and observed that spatial expansion promotes cooperation in 2x2 games. Aydogmus (Aydogmus 2018) incorporated spatial effects into the classical hawk-dove game and revealed the disruption of evolutionarily stable strategies at low diffusion rates. However, the pattern formation of strategies in replicator dynamics with spatial diffusion remains unclear. Introducing spatial diffusion into replicator dynamics is challenging due to the emphasis on frequency rather than density variation. In this study, we convert player frequencies to player densities, allowing for the incorporation of spatial diffusion into replicator dynamics. Thus, we enable analysis of the spatio-temporal pattern formation in the framework of the eco-evolutionary model with both spatial diffusion and improved replicator dynamics.

While complex patterns are prevalent in physics and chemistry (Maini et al. 1997; Walgraef 2012; Deegan 2000), they also manifest in biological systems (Song et al. 2022, 2021; Manna et al. 2021). Previous studies have extensively explored spatial patterns in prey-predator systems (Chowdhury et al. 2021a; Pal et al. 2020, 2021; Jia et al. 2019; Yan et al. 2020) and infectious disease systems (Li et al. 2014; Berres and Ruiz-Baier 2011; Sun et al. 2009). Nevertheless, the spatial dynamics and patterns of cooperation in evolutionary game systems with public goods feedback remain understudied. In this analysis, we introduce spatial diffusion into the system by combining improved replicator dynamics with public goods dynamics. Our objective is to investigate the spatial strategy dynamics and patterns of cooperation in this eco-evolutionary game system.

The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we construct temporal and diffusion systems. In

Section 3, we examine the existence and bistability of equilibria, provide conditions for transcritical and Hopf bifurcations, as well as investigate the direction and stability of the periodic solution. In Section 4, we analyze the local stability, Turing instability, and Turing-Hopf bifurcation of the diffusion system. In Section 5, we explore the effects of parameters and diffusion coefficients on the spatial distribution of cooperation, leading to diverse spatial patterns. We summarize and discuss our findings in Section 6.

## 2 Model formulation

### 2.1 Temporal system

Consider a situation where individuals acquire resources from their surroundings to benefit an entire population, such as predators hunting in groups or cells extracting iron from some external substrate. Examine a scenario where every individual in a population can fall into one of two categories: cooperators or defectors. Cooperators put in some effort to produce public goods, while defectors directly cheat the cooperators to acquire resources. In our model, cooperative interaction only affects the enrichment process of public goods. Both cooperators and defectors consume resources to maintain their vital activities. Suppose that the growth-limiting public goods are extracted from some external source. Thus, the rate of public goods production should be bounded even for high densities of productive population. According to (Behar et al. 2014), in this case, the production of public goods can be written in the form of  $\frac{\beta u}{\alpha + u}$ . Assuming a linear consumption rate of the public goods, the dynamics of the resource can be represented by the following equation:

$$\frac{dm}{dT} = \frac{\beta u}{\alpha + u} - kNm, \quad (2.1)$$

where  $\beta$ ,  $\alpha$ , and  $k$  are the maximum productivity, the saturation parameter of production, and the consumption rate for public goods, respectively;  $u \in [0, N]$  and  $N$  depict the density of cooperators and that of all players, respectively;  $m$  is the concentration of public goods. Constants  $\beta$ ,  $\alpha$ ,  $k$ , and  $N$  are positive. The density of defectors can be denoted as  $v = N - u$ . Converting the densities of cooperators and defectors into frequencies gives  $\xi_1 = \frac{u}{N}$  and  $\xi_2 = \frac{v}{N} = 1 - \frac{u}{N}$ .

The payoffs in the game are influenced not only by the cooperation ( $C$ ) and defection ( $D$ ) strategies players adopt, but also by the concentration of public goods. Hence, we assume payoffs in the game to be a weighted linear combination of payoff matrices under poor and rich public goods conditions, where weights depend on resource concentration. Thus, the payoff matrix can be written as

$$\Pi = (\delta - m) \begin{array}{c} C \\ D \end{array} \begin{array}{cc} C & D \\ A_0 - \sigma_0 & B_0 - \sigma_0 \\ c_0 & d_0 \end{array} + m \begin{array}{c} C \\ D \end{array} \begin{array}{cc} C & D \\ A_1 - \sigma_1 & B_1 - \sigma_1 \\ c_1 & d_1 \end{array},$$

where  $\delta > 0$  represents baseline payoffs when  $m = 0$ . In the literature (Weitz et al. 2016; Tilman et al. 2020), it is usually assumed that  $\delta = 1$ . In our study, we expand  $\delta$  to be any positive value, since the concentration of public goods is not restricted to the interval  $[0, 1]$ . This enables us to study better the impact of  $\delta$  on the game dynamics. The cost of cooperation varies in different environments, while defectors do not bear the cost of cooperation (Hauert et al. 2019). Parameters  $\sigma_0 > 0$  and  $\sigma_1 > 0$  represent the costs of producing public goods under different environmental conditions. Later, we will study the effect of payoffs on the concentration of public goods and the density of cooperators. To enable independent consideration of each payoff, we rewrite the payoff matrix as

$$\Pi = (\delta - m) \begin{array}{c} C \\ D \end{array} \begin{array}{cc} C & D \\ a_0 & b_0 \\ c_0 & d_0 \end{array} + m \begin{array}{c} C \\ D \end{array} \begin{array}{cc} C & D \\ a_1 & b_1 \\ c_1 & d_1 \end{array},$$

where  $a_0 = A_0 - \sigma_0$ ,  $b_0 = B_0 - \sigma_0$ ,  $a_1 = A_1 - \sigma_1$ , and  $b_1 = B_1 - \sigma_1$ . Now we calculate the fitness of strategies  $C$  and  $D$ :

$$\begin{aligned} f_C(u, m) &= (\delta a_0 + (a_1 - a_0)m) \frac{u}{N} + (\delta b_0 + (b_1 - b_0)m) \left(1 - \frac{u}{N}\right), \\ f_D(u, m) &= (\delta c_0 + (c_1 - c_0)m) \frac{u}{N} + (\delta d_0 + (d_1 - d_0)m) \left(1 - \frac{u}{N}\right). \end{aligned} \quad (2.2)$$

The incentives of behavioral changes can be explained by the following combinations of elements in the payoff matrix.

$$\begin{aligned} \Gamma_1 &= f_C(0, \delta) - f_D(0, \delta) = \delta(b_1 - d_1), \\ \Gamma_2 &= f_C(N, \delta) - f_D(N, \delta) = \delta(a_1 - c_1), \\ \Phi_1 &= f_D(N, 0) - f_C(N, 0) = \delta(a_0 - c_0), \\ \Phi_2 &= f_D(0, 0) - f_C(0, 0) = \delta(d_0 - b_0). \end{aligned}$$

Parameter  $\Gamma_1$  depicts the incentive for an individual within the population to choose cooperation when other players in the population are defectors, and the public goods are abundant. Parameter  $\Gamma_2$  depicts the incentive for an individual to follow suit and become a cooperator when other players are already cooperators in a setting where the public goods are affluent. Parameter  $\Phi_1$  depicts the incentive for an individual to turn defector in a state where the public goods are scarce and other individuals in the population are cooperators. Finally, parameter  $\Phi_2$  depicts the incentive for an individual to follow a shift to strategy  $D$  when other players in the population have adopted strategy  $D$  and the public goods are barren. These parameters obtained from the payoff matrix explain the motivations that drive players to change their strategies. Thus, the payoff matrix can be determined arbitrarily regardless of cooperative interaction.

The replicator dynamics (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998) is a model used to describe the evolution of populations. It assumes that the frequency of a strategy increases when the fitness of those who adopt it is greater than the average fitness of the population. Replicator dynamics has previously been used to model behavioural changes in settings at the interface of ecology and game theory, such as economic activity around a coral reef being based on fishing or tourism (Milne et al. 2022) and eutrophication in shallow lakes where the discharge of pollutants into the water is determined by a behavioural model (Sun and Hilker 2021). Coupling equation (2.1) with replicator dynamics, and accounting for potentially different rates of environmental and strategic change, we obtain the public goods game system as follows:

$$\begin{cases} \varepsilon \frac{du}{dT} = u \left(1 - \frac{u}{N}\right) (f_C - f_D), \\ \frac{dm}{dT} = \frac{\beta u}{\alpha + u} - kNm, \end{cases}$$

in which  $\varepsilon > 0$  is the relative timescale for evolutionary rate of public goods compared to that of strategies. The inequality  $\varepsilon > 1$  ( $\varepsilon < 1$ ) means that public goods evolve faster (slower) than strategies. Rescaling the time by substitution  $t = \frac{T}{\varepsilon}$  and using equalities (2.2), we rewrite the system as

$$\begin{cases} \frac{du}{dt} = \frac{u}{N^2} (N - u) [(\eta_1 u + N\eta_2)m - \delta(\eta_3 u + N(d_0 - b_0))], \\ \frac{dm}{dt} = \varepsilon \left( \frac{\beta u}{\alpha + u} - kNm \right), \end{cases} \quad (2.3)$$

where

$$\eta_1 = a_1 - a_0 + b_0 - b_1 + c_0 - c_1 + d_1 - d_0, \quad \eta_2 = d_0 - d_1 + b_1 - b_0, \quad \eta_3 = b_0 + c_0 - a_0 - d_0.$$

Thus, we have developed a game system that depicts cooperative behavior with mutual feedback between strategy and surroundings within a well-mixed environment. This model is well-suited for describing planktonic cultures, where molecules diffuse rapidly and all bacteria experience the same concentration (Julou et al. 2013).

## 2.2 Diffusion system

The spatial distribution of cooperators and the public goods they produce can significantly affect the process of evolution. The evolution of cooperation exhibits significant differences under homogeneous and heterogeneous conditions, ranging from the extinction of cooperators to the coexistence of both cooperators and defectors (Julou et al. 2013; MacLean and Gudelj 2006). There is a range of experiments done to investigate the cooperation of yeast (MacLean and Gudelj 2006), *Escherichia coli* (Lambert et al. 2014; Kirkup and Riley 2004), and *Pseudomonas aeruginosa* (Julou et al. 2013) within heterogeneous environments. Thus, to account for the dynamic spatial nature of strategies and public goods, we introduce diffusion into the temporal system (2.3) as follows:

$$\begin{cases} \frac{\partial u(\mathbf{x}, t)}{\partial t} = \frac{u}{N^2} (N - u) [(\eta_1 u + N\eta_2)m - \delta(\eta_3 u + N(d_0 - b_0))] + d_u \nabla^2 u, & \mathbf{x} \in \Omega, t > 0, \\ \frac{\partial m(\mathbf{x}, t)}{\partial t} = \varepsilon \left( \frac{\beta u}{\alpha + u} - kNm \right) + d_m \nabla^2 m, & \mathbf{x} \in \Omega, t > 0, \\ \frac{\partial u(\mathbf{x}, t)}{\partial \nu} = \frac{\partial m(\mathbf{x}, t)}{\partial \nu} = 0, & \mathbf{x} \in \partial\Omega, t > 0, \\ u(\mathbf{x}, 0) = u_0(\mathbf{x}) \geq 0, m(\mathbf{x}, 0) = m_0(\mathbf{x}) \geq 0, & \mathbf{x} \in \Omega, \end{cases} \quad (2.4)$$

where  $u(\mathbf{x}, t)$  and  $m(\mathbf{x}, t)$  denote the density of cooperators and that of public goods in position  $\mathbf{x}$  at time  $t$ , respectively;  $\mathbf{x} \in \Omega \subseteq \mathbb{R}^2$  is a two-dimensional bounded domain;  $\nu$  is the outward unit normal vector of the smooth boundary  $\partial\Omega$ ;  $\nabla^2 = \frac{\partial^2}{\partial x^2} + \frac{\partial^2}{\partial y^2}$  is the Laplacian operator;  $d_u$  and  $d_m$  are the diffusion coefficients for cooperators and public goods, respectively. The Neumann boundary conditions are employed in system (2.4) since individuals cannot leave and enter via the boundary. In the upcoming sections, we will investigate various dynamical properties of systems 2.3 and 2.4. This includes determining the presence and stability of equilibria, as well as identifying any instances of bistability, transcritical and Hopf bifurcations.

## 3 Dynamics of temporal system

This section explores the various strategy dynamics properties, including the existence of equilibria, stability, bistability, transcritical bifurcation, and Hopf bifurcation for the non-diffusion system (2.3), which helps to predict the outcome of the evolution of cooperation in conditions where individuals and public goods are well-mixed.

### 3.1 Existence of equilibria

The two equilibria of system (2.3), namely  $E_1(0, 0)$  and  $E_2(N, \frac{\beta}{k(\alpha+N)})$ , corresponding to the absence of cooperators and public goods, and the absence of defectors, respectively, always exist. Further, we explore the conditions under which the internal equilibrium  $E^*(u^*, m^*)$  is feasible, enabling cooperators and defectors to coexist. From (2.3),  $u^*$  and  $m^*$  satisfy the following two equations:

$$(\eta_1 u^* + N\eta_2)m^* - \delta(\eta_3 u^* + N(d_0 - b_0)) = 0, \quad (3.1)$$

$$m^* = \frac{\beta u^*}{kN(\alpha + u^*)}. \quad (3.2)$$

Eliminating  $m^*$  by substituting (3.2) into (3.1), we have

$$\gamma_1 u^{*2} + \gamma_2 N u^* + N^2 \gamma_3 = 0, \quad (3.3)$$

where

$$\gamma_1 = \beta\eta_1 - N\delta k\eta_3, \gamma_2 = ((b_0 - d_0)N - \eta_3\alpha)k\delta + \beta\eta_2, \gamma_3 = \alpha\delta k(b_0 - d_0).$$

After solving equation (3.3), we obtain the solution

$$u_{\pm}^* = \frac{N \left( -\gamma_2 \pm \sqrt{\gamma_2^2 - 4\gamma_1\gamma_3} \right)}{2\gamma_1}. \quad (3.4)$$

Denote

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\eta}_3 &= \frac{\beta\eta_1}{N\delta k}, \\ \eta_3^* &= \frac{(b_0 - d_0)N}{\alpha} + \frac{\beta\eta_2}{k\alpha^2}, \\ \tilde{\eta}_3 &= \frac{2\beta\eta_1 + (b_0 - d_0)Nk\delta + \beta\eta_2}{k\delta(2N + \alpha)}, \\ \bar{\eta}_3 &= \frac{\beta(\eta_1 + \eta_2)}{k\delta(N + \alpha)} + (b_0 - d_0). \end{aligned}$$

It is observed from (3.2) that  $m_{\pm}^* > 0$  holds invariably. Therefore, the existence of  $E_{\pm}^*$  only requires that  $u_{\pm}^* \in (0, N)$  is guaranteed. Condition  $u_+^* \in (0, N)$  holds if  $\gamma_2^2 > 4\gamma_1\gamma_3$  and one of **(H1)** - **(H4)** below is true.

**(H1):**  $\eta_3^* < \eta_3 < \min\{\hat{\eta}_3, \tilde{\eta}_3, \bar{\eta}_3\}$ .

**(H2):**  $\eta_3 < \min\{\hat{\eta}_3, \tilde{\eta}_3, \bar{\eta}_3\}$  and  $b_0 < d_0$ .

**(H3):**  $\max\{\hat{\eta}_3, \tilde{\eta}_3\} < \eta_3 < \eta_3^*$  and  $b_0 < d_0$ .

**(H4):**  $\hat{\eta}_3 < \eta_3 < \min\{\tilde{\eta}_3, \bar{\eta}_3\}$ .


Similarly,  $E_-^*$  exists i.e.  $u_-^* \in (0, N)$  holds if  $\gamma_2^2 > 4\gamma_1\gamma_3$  and one of **(H5)** - **(H8)** is satisfied.

**(H5):**  $\eta_3^* < \eta_3 < \min\{\hat{\eta}_3, \bar{\eta}_3\}$  and  $b_0 > d_0$ .

**(H6):**  $\max\{\tilde{\eta}_3, \bar{\eta}_3\} < \eta_3 < \hat{\eta}_3$  and  $b_0 > d_0$ .

**(H7):**  $\eta_3 > \max\{\hat{\eta}_3, \eta_3^*, \bar{\eta}_3\}$  and  $b_0 > d_0$ .


**(H8):**  $\max\{\hat{\eta}_3, \tilde{\eta}_3\} < \eta_3 < \min\{\eta_3^*, \bar{\eta}_3\}$ .




**Fig. 1** Existence of equilibria for system (2.3). The cooperator and the public goods nullclines are depicted by green and blue curves, respectively, obtained from  $\frac{du}{dt} = 0$  and  $\frac{dm}{dt} = 0$  of system (2.3). The equilibria marked with red dots are present at the intersection of the green and blue curves. Parameters: (a)  $a_0 = 2.9, a_1 = 4, b_0 = 0, b_1 = 1, c_0 = 0.1, c_1 = 2, d_0 = 1, d_1 = 2, \delta = 2, \beta = 2.5, \alpha = 0.9, k = 0.2, N = 3, \varepsilon = 1$ . (b)  $a_1 = 3, b_0 = 2.3$ . (c)  $a_0 = 2, a_1 = 3, b_0 = 2, b_1 = 5, c_0 = 1, c_1 = 6, d_0 = 5, \delta = 7, N = 2, \beta = 5$ . (d)  $N=3.0152$ . Note that the remaining parameters of (b), (c), and (d) are taken from (a). The values of the parameters are detailed in Table 3.

In impoverished public goods environments, the disparities in payoffs between encounters among players employing different strategies and those among players employing the same strategy, along with the discrepancies in payoffs between encounters involving defectors, collectively contribute to determining the presence

of internal equilibria. The existence of equilibria for system (2.3) is demonstrated in Fig. 1. The parameters for Fig. 1 are chosen to satisfy the above conditions for the existence of internal equilibria and to demonstrate the potential positioning of equilibria. The internal equilibrium points  $E_-^*$  and  $E_+^*$  coincide in Fig. 1(d).



**Fig. 2** Temporal behavior of cooperators and public goods for system (2.3). The blue and red curves depict the evolution of cooperators and public goods over time, respectively. The initial conditions for (a) and (b)(c) are (0.6, 2.5) and (2, 2.5), respectively. The parameters of (a) and (b) are  $a_0 = 2.1$ ,  $b_0 = 2.1$ ,  $d_0 = 2.2$  and the rest of the parameters are adopted from Fig. 1(b). The parameters of (c) remain the same as in Fig. 1(b).



**Fig. 3** Bistability of system (2.3). The phase portrait exhibits three different bistabilities. The red and blue dots mark the stable equilibria and saddle points, respectively. The black curves divide the plane into three or four regions. The magenta and yellow-brown lines from different positions converge to separate equilibria. The parameters in (a) and (b) are chosen from Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 1(c), respectively. (c)  $\delta = 2.11$  and the remaining parameters are selected from Fig. 2(c).

### 3.2 Local stability and bistability analysis

For system (2.3), we investigate local stability and then derive bistability. Denote

$$\begin{aligned} \varepsilon^* &= \frac{u_-^*}{kN^3} [((\eta_1 - \eta_2)N - 2\eta_1 u_-^*)m_-^* + ((d_0 - b_0 - \eta_3) + 2u_-^* \eta_3)\delta], \\ b_0^* &= \frac{1}{(\alpha + u_-^*)\delta k N^2} [(((d_0 - \eta_3)\delta + m_-^*(\eta_1 - \eta_2))(\alpha + u_-^*)k - \beta\alpha\eta_2)N^2 + \\ &\quad + (2(\delta\eta_3 - m_-^*\eta_1)(\alpha + u_-^*)k + \beta\alpha(\eta_1 + \eta_2))u_-^*N - \beta\alpha u_-^{*2}\eta_1], \\ \tilde{\varepsilon}^* &= \frac{u_+^*}{kN^3} [((\eta_1 - \eta_2)N - 2\eta_1 u_+^*)m_+^* + ((d_0 - b_0 - \eta_3) + 2u_+^* \eta_3)\delta], \\ \tilde{b}_0^* &= \frac{1}{(\alpha + u_+^*)\delta k N^2} [(((d_0 - \eta_3)\delta + m_+^*(\eta_1 - \eta_2))(\alpha + u_+^*)k - \beta\alpha\eta_2)N^2 + \end{aligned}$$

$$+ (2(\delta\eta_3 - m_+^*\eta_1)(\alpha + u_+^*)k + \beta\alpha(\eta_1 + \eta_2))u_+^*N - \beta\alpha u_+^{*2}\eta_1].$$

The following theorem is utilized to elucidate the local stability of system (2.3).

**Theorem 3.1** (I)  $E_1(0,0)$  is a locally asymptotically stable node if  $d_0 > b_0$ ;  $E_1(0,0)$  is a saddle point if  $d_0 < b_0$ .

(II)  $E_2(N, \frac{\beta}{k(\alpha+N)})$  is a locally asymptotically stable node if  $\delta(c_0 - a_0) < \frac{\beta(\eta_1+\eta_2)}{k(N+\alpha)}$ ;  $E_2(N, \frac{\beta}{k(\alpha+N)})$  is a saddle point if  $\delta(c_0 - a_0) > \frac{\beta(\eta_1+\eta_2)}{k(N+\alpha)}$ .

(III)  $E_-^*(u_-^*, m_-^*)$  is a locally asymptotically stable node or focus if  $\varepsilon > \varepsilon^*$  and  $b_0 > b_0^*$ ;  $E_-^*(u_-^*, m_-^*)$  is an unstable node or focus if  $\varepsilon < \varepsilon^*$  and  $b_0 > b_0^*$ ;  $E_-^*(u_-^*, m_-^*)$  is a saddle point if  $b_0 < b_0^*$ .

(IV)  $E_+^*(u_+^*, m_+^*)$  is a locally asymptotically stable node or focus if  $\varepsilon > \tilde{\varepsilon}^*$  and  $b_0 > \tilde{b}_0^*$ ;  $E_+^*(u_+^*, m_+^*)$  is an unstable node or focus if  $\varepsilon < \tilde{\varepsilon}^*$  and  $b_0 > \tilde{b}_0^*$ ;  $E_+^*(u_+^*, m_+^*)$  is a saddle point if  $b_0 < \tilde{b}_0^*$ .

*Proof* See Appendix A.

We discover the following bistability regarding system (2.3) by the discussion in Appendix A.

**Corollary 3.1** (I)  $E_1(0,0)$  and  $E_2(N, \frac{\beta}{k(\alpha+N)})$  are stable when  $d_0 > b_0$  and  $\delta(c_0 - a_0) < \frac{\beta(\eta_1+\eta_2)}{k(N+\alpha)}$ .

(II)  $E_1(0,0)$  and  $E_-^*(u_-^*, m_-^*)$  are stable when  $d_0 > b_0 > b_0^*$  and  $\varepsilon > \varepsilon^*$ .


(III)  $E_2(N, \frac{\beta}{k(\alpha+N)})$  and  $E_-^*(u_-^*, m_-^*)$  are stable when  $\delta(c_0 - a_0) < \frac{\beta(\eta_1+\eta_2)}{k(N+\alpha)}$ ,  $\varepsilon > \varepsilon^*$ , and  $b_0 > b_0^*$ .

Choosing parameters that satisfy the local stability conditions of Theorem 3.1 yields Fig. 2, which illustrates the local stability of the temporal system. Three different evolutionary outcomes, including the extinction of cooperators and extremely poor public goods, pure cooperators and abundant public goods, and the coexistence of cooperators and defectors, occur due to different initial states and parameter values. For Figs. 2 (a) and (b), the same parameters are taken, but the difference in initial conditions leads to distinct evolutionary results. Keeping the initial value of the public goods fixed and increasing the initial density of cooperators leads to an evolutionary outcome from pure defectors to pure cooperators. Larger initial densities of cooperators enable pure cooperators to dominate if the initial concentration of public goods is identical. The third case of the Theorem 3.1 illustrated in Fig. 2(c) indicates that increasing the payoff of cooperator-defector encounters beyond its threshold and speeding up the evolution of public goods saves cooperators from extinction. The rapid turnover of public goods provides players with usable supplies, and the benefits to cooperators are increased, which motivates players to cooperate. Holding the initial values unchanged and varying the values of the parameters produce different evolutionary results see Figs. 2 (b) and (c).

The three types of bistability in the temporal system are depicted in Fig. 3, with parameters chosen based on Corollary 3.1. Illustrating the first case of the Corollary 3.1 Fig. 3(a) shows that if the initial values are taken from regions II and III (resp. I and IV), the densities finally converge to  $E_1$  (resp.  $E_2$ ). Thus, if the initial density of cooperators is fixed, high initial concentrations of public goods lead to the extinction of cooperators and if the initial quantity of public goods is kept fixed, then the likelihood of cooperators survival is a non-decreasing function of the initial density of cooperators. Therefore, barren initial public goods and high initial values for the cooperator facilitate the survival and continuation of cooperators. Illustrating the second case of the Corollary 3.1 Fig. 3(b) displays two stable equilibria  $E_1$  and  $E_-^*$ . The basins of attraction for  $E_1$  (resp.  $E_-^*$ ) are regions III and IV (resp. I and II). Under such circumstances, a high initial density of cooperators or an adequate supply of public goods assists the cooperators in escaping extinction. Illustrating the third case of the Corollary 3.1 Fig. 3(c) depicts two stable equilibria  $E_2$  and  $E_-^*$ . If initial densities of public goods and cooperators belong to region III (resp. regions I and II) then densities eventually converge to  $E_-^*$  (resp.  $E_2$ ). After a prolonged period of evolution, cooperators and defectors eventually achieve stable coexistence when the population initially resides in a moderate concentration of public goods. Various evolutionary consequences



can occur in the same subgraph with the same parameters due to varying initial states. Comparing the three subgraphs, we find that even with the same initial values different parameters might lead to diverse evolutionary outcomes. Therefore, the choice of parameter values, the initial density of cooperators, and the initial state of the public goods can all lead to multiple evolutionary outcomes. In situations of scarce public goods, individuals within the population necessitate more of them to sustain essential life characteristics. This circumstance demands a high density of cooperators to facilitate the production of public goods. This explains the initial high density of cooperators favoring the continuation of cooperation in the case of initial public goods scarcity.



**Fig. 4** Stability of equilibria and bifurcation depending on  $b_0$ ,  $\delta$ ,  $d_0$ ,  $\epsilon$ ,  $\alpha$ , and  $N$  for system (2.3). The green, red, blue, and yellow lines indicate the values of  $u$  for  $E_1$ ,  $E_2$ ,  $E_+^*$ , and  $E_-^*$ , respectively. The solid, dotted, dashed, and dash-dotted lines depict stable equilibria, saddle points, unstable focus, and the emergence of periodic solutions, respectively. The HB and TB marked by solid black dots indicate the Hopf and transcritical bifurcations, respectively. The black dash-dotted line indicates the threshold at which bifurcation happens. The parameters and initial values remain unchanged from those in Fig. 2(c). Bistability occurs in intervals  $\delta \in (2.0604, 2.1967)$ ,  $\alpha \in (1.0179, 1.1242)$  and  $N \in (3.1179, 4.7079)$ . Some calculations yield critical values  $\delta^* = 2.0604$  and  $\epsilon^* = 0.7653$ .

### 3.3 Bifurcation analysis

In this subsection we explore the transcritical and Hopf bifurcations for system (2.3).

**Theorem 3.2** (I) If  $d_0 = b_0$ , then a transcritical bifurcation appears at  $E_1(0, 0)$ .


(II) If  $\delta = \delta^*$ , then a transcritical bifurcation appears at  $E_2(N, \frac{\beta}{k(\alpha+N)})$ .

(III) If  $\epsilon = \epsilon^*$  and  $b_0 > b_0^*$ , then a Hopf bifurcation appears at  $E_-^*(u_-^*, m_-^*)$ .

*Proof* See Appendix B.

Following the discussion above, we know that the Hopf bifurcation occurs at  $E_-^*(u_-^*, m_-^*)$ . However, the characteristics of the Hopf bifurcation such as direction and stability have not been clarified. Next, for the


Hopf bifurcation, we investigate its direction and stability. We know that  $\mathcal{V}$  determines the direction of the Hopf bifurcation from Appendix C. The Hopf bifurcation is subcritical (supercritical) if  $\mathcal{V} < 0$  ( $\mathcal{V} > 0$ ).  $S_1(\varepsilon^*)$  determines the stability of the periodic solution. The periodic solution is stable (unstable) if  $S_1(\varepsilon^*) < 0$  ( $S_1(\varepsilon^*) > 0$ ). The direction of the Hopf bifurcation and the stability of the periodic solutions depend on  $S_1(\varepsilon^*)$  since  $\varphi'(\varepsilon^*) < 0$ . Here, the forward and backward bifurcations are subcritical and supercritical bifurcations, respectively. Thus, we conclude with Theorem 3.3.



**Fig. 5** The dependence of cooperators and public goods in system (2.3) on parameters  $\varepsilon$ ,  $a_0$ ,  $b_0$ ,  $\sigma_0$ ,  $\sigma_1$ , and  $N$ . (a) System (2.3) is unstable at  $E_-^*$  when  $\varepsilon < 0.7653$  and is stable at  $E_-^*$  when  $\varepsilon \in (0.7653, 2)$ . Hopf bifurcation occurs if  $\varepsilon = 0.7653$ . (b) System (2.3) is stable at  $E_-^*$  when  $a_0 < 4.2905$  and is unstable at  $E_-^*$  when  $a_0 \in (4.2905, 5)$ . Hopf bifurcation occurs if the payoff when the cooperators meet is equal to 4.2905. (c)  $E_1$  is stable when  $b_0 < 1$ . If  $b_0$  lies in the interval  $(1, 6.6)$ , then  $E_-^*$  is stable.  $E_-^*$  is unstable and the periodic solution occurs when  $b_0 \in (6.6, 10)$ . Transcritical and Hopf bifurcations occur at  $b_0 = 1$  and  $b_0 = 6.6$ , respectively. (d)  $E_-^*$  is stable when  $\sigma_0 < 1.3$ .  $E_1$  is stable if  $\sigma_0$  lies in the interval  $(1.3, 5)$ . The transcritical bifurcation arises at  $\sigma_0 = 1.3$ . (e)  $E_-^*$  is stable. (f) Periodic solutions appear when  $N < 1.9225$ .  $E_-^*$  is stable if  $N$  lies in the interval  $(1.9225, 4.7079)$ . If  $N \in (4.7079, 5)$ , then  $E_2$  is stable. The remaining parameter values are taken from Fig. 2(c) except for those shown in this figure.

**Theorem 3.3** Suppose  $\varepsilon > \varepsilon^*$  and  $b_0 > b_0^*$ . Hopf bifurcation is subcritical (resp. supercritical), and the periodic solution is stable (resp. unstable) if  $S_1(\varepsilon^*) < 0$  (resp.  $S_1(\varepsilon^*) > 0$ ).

Density of strategy  $C$  presents different evolutionary trends with parameters  $b_0$ ,  $\delta$ ,  $d_0$ ,  $\varepsilon$ ,  $\alpha$ , and  $N$  (see Fig. 4). Increasing the values of payoff of cooperator encounter defector under poor public goods conditions ( $b_0$ ), baseline payoffs ( $\alpha$ ), relative timescale ( $\varepsilon$ ), and player density ( $N$ ) enhances the ability of cooperators to survive. However, increasing the value of defector-defector payoff under scarce public goods conditions ( $d_0$ ) leads to the extinction of cooperators. Interestingly, there is more than one parameter causing the bifurcation and bistability. Table 1 presents the properties of equilibria and bifurcations for the temporal system. In Fig. 4(a),  $E_1$  is stable, and  $E_-^*$  does not exist when  $b_0 < d_0$ . If  $b_0 > d_0$ ,  $E_-^*$  exists and is stable, while  $E_1$  becomes



**Fig. 6** Temporal evolution of strategy  $C$  and public goods (on the left), and phase trajectories in the  $um$ -plane (on the right). (a), (b)  $E_-^*$  is stable. (c), (d) Choose  $\varepsilon = 0.5$  and a stable periodic solution occurs near the unstable equilibrium  $E_-^*$ . (e), (f) Setting  $a_0 = 4.95$  yields that  $E_-^*$  is unstable, and a stable periodic solution appears.

a saddle point. The transcritical bifurcation occurs at  $b_0 = d_0$ , which corresponds to Theorem 3.2 (I). In addition, under given conditions  $E_2$  is always a saddle point meaning that the value of  $b_0$  does not affect the

stability of  $E_2$ . There is an overall upward trend in the density of cooperators as  $b_0$  increases, which means that increasing the payoff of strategy  $C$  when it meets strategy  $D$  inspires more players to pursue strategy  $C$ .

The second case of Theorem 3.2 is illustrated in Fig. 4(b). It shows that  $E_-^*$  is stable, while  $E_2$  is a saddle point if  $\delta < \delta^*$  and  $E_2$  remains stable when  $\delta > \delta^*$ , the transcritical bifurcation occurs at  $\delta = \delta^*$ . The interesting bistable phenomenon emerges due to  $\delta$ . Evidently, the value of  $\delta$  does not affect the stability of  $E_1$ , which complies with Theorem 3.1 (I). The small  $\delta$  favors the prevalence of the cooperative strategy in the population. Once the critical value  $\delta^*$  is reached, defectors become extinct, and cooperators dominate.

Illustrating the first case of the Theorem 3.2 Fig. 4(c) shows the occurrence of transcritical bifurcation at  $d_0 = b_0$ . Notice that the density of strategy  $C$  decreases with increasing  $d_0$  until  $d_0$  equals  $b_0$ . If  $d_0$  is greater than  $b_0$ , no player in the population adopts strategy  $C$ , and strategy  $D$  dominates. This suggests that increasing defector payoffs during defector encounters weakens players' incentive to adopt strategy  $C$ . Once the defector's payoff exceeds the threshold, no player is happy to adopt strategy  $C$ , which is detrimental to the continuation of the cooperative strategy.

Fig. 4(d) reveals the effect of relative timescale  $\varepsilon$  on the evolution of strategy  $C$ . It demonstrates that  $E_1$  and  $E_2$  are always saddle points and are unaffected by relative timescale changes. Interestingly, the periodic solution appears when  $\varepsilon < \varepsilon^*$ . In this case, the density of cooperators is in a state of periodic oscillation as shown in Figs. 6(c) and (d). This cyclical oscillatory behavior offers further possibilities for the retention of biodiversity. The oscillating state gives both strategies  $C$  and  $D$  a fair chance of survival. The Hopf bifurcation occurs when  $\varepsilon = \varepsilon^*$ , which verifies the third case of Theorem 3.2. Once  $\varepsilon > \varepsilon^*$ , the density of cooperators is no longer influenced by  $\varepsilon$ . If public goods evolve at a faster rate, the evolutionary outcomes of strategies in populations no longer depend on relative timescales.


**Table 1** The existence of equilibria, stability, and bifurcations for the temporal system (2.3). TB and HB denote transcritical bifurcation and Hopf bifurcation, respectively.

Equilibrium	Existence	Stable	Saddle point	Unstable node or focus	Bifurcation
$E_1(0, 0)$	always	$d_0 > b_0$	$d_0 < b_0$	—	TB, $d_0 = b_0$
$E_2(N, \frac{\beta}{k(\alpha+N)})$	always	$\delta(c_0 - a_0) < \frac{\beta(\eta_1+\eta_2)}{k(N+\alpha)}$	$\delta(c_0 - a_0) > \frac{\beta(\eta_1+\eta_2)}{k(N+\alpha)}$	—	TB, $\delta = \delta^*$
$E_-^*(u_-^*, m_-^*)$	(H1)-(H4)	$\varepsilon > \varepsilon^*$ and $b_0 > b_0^*$	$b_0 < b_0^*$	$\varepsilon < \varepsilon^*$ and $b_0 > b_0^*$	HB, $\varepsilon = \varepsilon^*$ , $b_0 > b_0^*$
$E_+^*(u_+^*, m_+^*)$	(H5)-(H8)	$\varepsilon > \varepsilon^*$ and $b_0 > \tilde{b}_0^*$	$b_0 < \tilde{b}_0^*$	$\varepsilon < \varepsilon^*$ and $b_0 > \tilde{b}_0^*$	—

To explore the role of the saturation parameter of production, we plot the variation in the density of strategy  $C$  with  $\alpha$  in Fig. 4(e). When  $\alpha$  lies in the bistable interval of  $\alpha$ ,  $E_2$  and  $E_-^*$  are locally stable, and evolutionary outcomes are contingent on the initial values of strategy densities and public goods. As the  $\alpha$  increases, the density of cooperators in stable equilibrium  $E_-^*$  rises, while after transcritical bifurcation occurs,  $E_2$  becomes stable. In this case, the increase in cooperators is more pronounced when the small  $\alpha$  gradually increases. When the value of production saturation reaches the threshold, the cooperators fill the entire population, and the defectors vanish.

We examine the effect of total player density  $N$  in Fig. 4(f). While  $N$  is changing between 0 and the first threshold periodic solutions occur, where cooperators and defectors oscillate and coexist. When  $N$  reaches the first threshold, system (2.3) has a Hopf bifurcation at  $E_-^*$ . When  $N$  reaches the second threshold,  $E_2$  transitions from a saddle point to a stable equilibrium, and a transcritical bifurcation emerges. System (2.3) exhibits a bistability, which is embodied in the fact that  $E_2$  and  $E_-^*$  are stable when  $N$  lies in its bistable interval. When  $N$  exceeds the bistable interval,  $E_2$  is stable, and  $E_-^*$  is absent. When fewer actors are involved in the game, individuals will vacillate between strategies  $C$  and  $D$ , leading to circular choices. With an increasing density of players and heightened competition, individuals exhibit a distinctive shift in their choice of strategies,

manifested in a phenomenon of bistability. In situations with a high density of players, supplies become insufficient, prompting individuals to lean towards cooperation to survive.



**Fig. 7** Evolutionary outcomes of cooperative strategies and public goods induced by two-dimensional parameters. (a)-(d), (m)-(t) Stable  $E_2^*$ , stable  $E_2$ , and unstable  $E_2^*$  are located in regions I, II, and III, respectively. (e)-(h) Stable  $E_1$ , stable  $E_2^*$ , and unstable  $E_2^*$  are located in regions I, II, and III, respectively. (i), (j) The stable  $E_2$  and  $E_2^*$  are located in regions I and II, respectively. (k), (l) The stable  $E_2^*$  and  $E_1$  are located in regions I and II, respectively. Note that periodic solutions occur in Region III. Region III in the first and second columns represents the maximum and minimum values for the density of strategy  $C$ , respectively. Region III in the third and fourth columns denotes the maximum and minimum values for public goods, respectively. Parameters are taken from Fig. 2(c).


The changes in public goods and density of strategy  $C$  with  $\varepsilon$ ,  $a_0$ ,  $b_0$ ,  $\sigma_0$ ,  $\sigma_1$ , and  $N$  are depicted in Fig. 5. While relative timescale value is small enough ( $\varepsilon < \varepsilon^*$ ), strategy  $C$  and public goods oscillate between the upper and lower lines, indicating the emergence of periodic solutions. Some calculations give  $S_1(\varepsilon^*) < 0$ . Thus, it follows from Theorem 3.3 that the periodic solution is stable and the Hopf bifurcation is subcritical. More detailed information on the periodic solution due to relative timescale value is available in Fig. 6. Density of strategy  $C$  and public goods ultimately oscillate in cycles as time changes and the periodic solution is stable. The Hopf bifurcation appears when  $\varepsilon = \varepsilon^*$  corresponding to the information expressed in Fig. 4(d). The parameters  $\varepsilon$  and  $a_0$  for Figs. 6(a) and (b) are taken from the stable interval in Fig. 5. Figs. 6(a) and (b) illustrate the stabilization of system (2.3) at  $E_-^*$ . A Hopf bifurcation occurs at  $a_0 = 4.2905$ . System (2.4) is stable at  $E_-^*$  when  $a_0 \in (0, 4.2905)$ . Once the payoff when the cooperators encounter each other exceeds its threshold,  $E_-^*$  becomes unstable, and stable periodic solutions emerge. The transition of stability due to the change of  $b_0$  is demonstrated in Fig. 5(c). The system is stable at  $E_1(0, 0)$  when  $b_0$  lies in interval  $(0, 1)$ . As  $b_0$  increases, the system is stable at the internal equilibrium  $E_-^*$ . Then,  $E_-^*$  becomes unstable, and periodic solutions appear when  $b_0 > 6.6$ . Figs. 5(d) and (e) inspect the effects of cooperation costs  $\sigma_0$  and  $\sigma_1$  on the evolution of cooperators and public goods. The transcritical bifurcation emerges at  $\sigma_0 = 1.3$ , which allows  $d_0 = b_0$  to hold, thus verifying Theorem 3.2(I). Unsurprisingly, raising the cost of cooperative strategies discourages individuals from choosing to cooperate. In Fig. 5(f), changes in  $N$  lead to multiple shifts in stability. Periodic solutions appear near the internal equilibrium  $E_-^*$  if  $N < 1.9225$ . When  $N$  exceeds its threshold, the stability of the internal equilibrium  $E_-^*$  changes, transitioning from unstable to stable. After  $N = 4.7079$ , the stability shifts once more, from the internal equilibrium  $E_-^*$  being stable to  $E_2$  being stable.

We next scrutinize the combined effect of the two parameters on the eco-evolutionary outcome. In Fig. 7, the shades of color indicate the evolutionary outcome of strategy  $C$  and public goods, forming heat maps. We compare the effects of the poverty and richness payoff matrices on evolution in Fig. 7(a)-(l). We explore the far-reaching implications of the different payoffs when cooperators encounter each other in barren and abundant public goods settings as shown in Fig. 7(a)-(d). If the cooperators meet in a poverty public goods, then the increase in the payoff for cooperators is conducive to the evolution of the cooperators in a positive direction. However, the increase in the density of cooperators is relatively slight. Surprisingly,  $a_1$  causes the huge transition of the densities, regardless of the size of  $a_0$ . In other words, when players employing strategy  $C$  meet in an abundance of public goods, the higher payoffs contribute to populations filled with cooperators. We discover that changes in  $a_1$  have a more significant and more profound impact on the evolution of cooperators and public goods than does  $a_0$ . The region III of the first row of Fig. 7 shows relatively significant differences in densities between (a) and (b), (c) and (d) meaning that the amplitude of the oscillations in the density of cooperators and the concentration of public goods is substantial, and this property is also revealed in Fig. 5(b) and Fig. 6(e). A large  $a_0$  and an intermediate value of  $a_1$  allow cooperators, defectors, and public goods to vary within a specific range.

Fig. 7(e)-(h) compares the effects of cooperators' payoffs on the strategies selected by players and the evolution of public goods in barren and rich environments when cooperators and defectors encounter each other. When  $b_1$  is small, an increase in  $b_0$  favors strategy  $C$  to dominate. Unexpectedly, when  $b_1$  is big reducing the value of  $b_0$  stimulates the players to choose the cooperative strategy. Similar to before, in region III of the second row of Fig. 7, system (2.3) oscillates around  $E_-^*$ , which gives defectors the possibility to occupy the population. A big  $b_1$  is always beneficial for cooperators and public goods, regardless of the size of  $b_0$ . When cooperators and defectors meet, the high payoffs of cooperators always contribute positively to strategy  $C$  in a rich environment. In contrast, the high payoffs for cooperators in poor environments have sometimes been detrimental to the continuation of strategy  $C$ . The reason for this phenomenon is that the abundance of the

public goods exceeds the  $\delta$ , and the payoff matrix of the poor public goods plays a negative role, in which case individuals receive lower payoffs in favor of survival.

To probe the effect of defectors' payoffs on the evolution of players and public goods when defectors encounter cooperators and defectors, respectively we plot heat maps for  $c_0$  and  $c_1$ ,  $d_0$  and  $d_1$  in Figs. 7(i)-(l). In Figs. 7(i) and (j), it can be observed that small  $c_0$  and  $c_1$  enable a high density of cooperators in the population. Under this scenario, defectors are extinct, and public goods are supremely abundant. If  $c_1$  is small, the density of strategy  $C$  first remains at its highest level as  $c_0$  increases. Once the switch from region I to region II is made, then increasing  $c_0$  causes the density of strategy  $C$  to decrease. Similarly, when  $c_0$  is small, increasing the value of  $c_1$  within a small range does not affect the absolute dominance of strategy  $C$ . Increasing  $c_1$  will only hurt the cooperators and the public goods once conversion from region I to region II has taken place.



**Fig. 8** Turing-Hopf bifurcation diagram in the plane  $\varepsilon$ - $\beta$ . The Turing-Hopf bifurcation occurs at the black point  $(\beta^*, \varepsilon^{**}) = (2.476, 0.762)$ .

An attractive phenomenon appears in Figs. 7(k) and (l). When  $d_1$  is small, an increase in  $d_0$  within a specific range is advantageous for cooperators and public goods, but an excessive increase in  $d_0$  is counter-productive, causing the cooperators to become extinct and the public goods to be depleted. When  $d_1$  is big, decreasing  $d_0$  provides a relatively small benefit to both cooperators and public goods. This illustrates that cooperators depend more on small  $d_0$ . Figs. 7(k) and (l) also indicate that cooperators and public goods prefer small  $d_1$ . Abundant public goods amplify changes in the fitness of cooperators and defectors caused by changes in payoffs. The replicator equation is distinguished by the fact that strategies with higher fitness are popular with players in the population. In Fig. 7(a)-(l), the color changes more dramatically in the vertical direction than in the horizontal direction. Therefore, the evolutionary outcomes of strategies and public goods are more sensitive to players' payoffs under rich public goods than under poor public goods conditions.

The transformation from the region I to region II in Figs. 7(m)-(p) discloses that an increase in the consumption rate of public goods increases the likelihood of survival of cooperators. When  $k$  is small, the fascinating phenomenon emerges that increase in  $\beta$  does not favor the dominance of cooperators. Unsurprisingly, reducing consumption rates and increasing maximum productivity can enrich public goods. Those figures also illustrate that the dominance of cooperators not necessarily leads to abundant public goods.

In Fig. 7(q)-(t), when  $\delta$  is small the increase in the density of players involved in the game brings a minor benefit for the cooperators. When  $\delta$  is large, this correlation becomes more pronounced. When  $\delta$  is big,

increasing the player density benefits cooperation and makes the public goods more barren. In addition, we note an interesting phenomenon in region II, the size of delta after fixing the density of participants in the game does not affect the evolution of cooperators and public goods.

#### 4 Dynamics of diffusion system (2.4)

In this section, we explore relevant properties of diffusion system (2.4), such as local stability, Turing instability, Hopf bifurcation, and Turing-Hopf Bifurcation.

##### 4.1 Local stability


Denote  $b_0^{**} = \frac{\eta_1(1-2u^*m^*)-\eta_2}{\delta N} + \frac{2u^*\eta_3}{N} - \eta_3 + d_0$  and  $\hat{b}_0 = \frac{1}{u^*+N} [u^*\eta_2 - N(d_1 - b_1 - d_0)]$ . For system (2.4), we summarize the stability of steady states  $E_1(0,0)$ ,  $E_2(N, \frac{\beta}{k(\alpha+N)})$ , and  $E_-(u^*, m^*)$  using the following theorem.

**Theorem 4.1** (I) The steady state  $E_1(0,0)$  is spatially stable if  $d_0 > b_0$ ; while  $E_1(0,0)$  is spatially unstable if  $d_0 < b_0$ .

(II) The steady state  $E_2(N, \frac{\beta}{k(\alpha+N)})$  is spatially stable if  $\delta(c_0 - a_0) < \frac{\beta(\eta_1 + \eta_2)}{k(N + \alpha)}$ ; while  $E_2(N, \frac{\beta}{k(\alpha+N)})$  is spatially unstable if  $\delta(c_0 - a_0) > \frac{\beta(\eta_1 + \eta_2)}{k(N + \alpha)}$ .

(III) The steady state  $E_-(u^*, m^*)$  is spatially stable if  $b_0 > \max\{b_0^*, b_0^{**}\}$  or  $b_0^{**} < b_0 < \hat{b}_0$ .

*Proof* See Appendix D.



**Fig. 9** Evolution of cooperators and public goods over time  $t$  and space  $x$ . The solution tends to  $E_-^*$  when  $\varepsilon = 1 > \varepsilon^{**} = 0.7603$ . The initial densities and parameters are  $u(x, 0) = 0.4381 + 0.01\sin x$ , and  $m(x, 0) = 1.3642 + 0.01\sin x$ , and  $\varepsilon = 1$ ,  $a_0 = 2.9$ ,  $a_1 = 3$ ,  $b_0 = 2.3$ ,  $b_1 = 1$ ,  $c_0 = 0.1$ ,  $c_1 = 2$ ,  $d_0 = 1$ ,  $d_1 = 2$ ,  $\delta = 2$ ,  $\beta = 2.5$ ,  $\alpha = 0.9$ ,  $k = 0.2$ ,  $N = 3$ ,  $d_u = 2$ ,  $d_m = 3$ .


##### 4.2 Turing instability

Next, we derive the conditions for Turing instability. According to Appendix E, we obtain Theorem 4.2 as follows.


**Theorem 4.2** Suppose  $\varepsilon > \varepsilon^*$  and  $b_0 > b_0^*$ . If  $\frac{d_m}{d_u} > \phi_1$ , then the Turing instability driven by diffusion appears near the steady state  $E_-(u^*, m^*)$ .



Theorem 4.2 reveals that the diffusion ratio ( $d_m: d_u$ ) of public goods and cooperators is decisive for whether Turing instability occurs. Smaller diffusion ratios do not affect the stability of the steady state  $E_-(u_*, m_*)$ , while larger diffusion ratios destabilize the steady state  $E_-(u_*, m_*)$ , and Turing instability arises.



**Fig. 10** Evolution of cooperators and public goods over time  $t$  and space  $x$ . The stable time-periodic solution appears when  $\varepsilon = 0.35 < \varepsilon^{**} = 0.7603$ .



**Fig. 11** Evolution of cooperators and public goods over time  $t$  and space  $x$ . Unstable spatially non-homogeneous periodic solution emerges.

#### 4.3 Hopf bifurcation

The diffusion system (2.4) undergoes a Hopf bifurcation as described in Theorem 4.3 below.


**Theorem 4.3** *The diffusion system (2.4) undergoes Hopf bifurcation at  $\varepsilon = \varepsilon^{**}$  if  $\varepsilon^{**} > \frac{j_{11}^* d_m}{N k d_u}$  and  $b_0 > b_0^*$ .*

**Remark.** The periodic solution is spatially homogeneous if  $n = 0$ . The periodic solution is spatially non-homogeneous if  $n \neq 0$ .

*Proof* See Appendix F.

**Table 2** Spatial stability and Turing-Hopf bifurcation for the diffusion system 2.4.

Steady state	Spatially stable	Spatially unstable	Turing-Hopf bifurcation
$E_1(0, 0)$	$d_0 > b_0$	$d_0 < b_0$	—
$E_2(N, \frac{\beta}{k(\alpha+N)})$	$\delta(c_0 - a_0) < \frac{\beta(\eta_1 + \eta_2)}{k(N + \alpha)}$	$\delta(c_0 - a_0) > \frac{\beta(\eta_1 + \eta_2)}{k(N + \alpha)}$	—
$E_-^*(u_-^*, m_-^*)$	$b_0 > \max\{b_0^*, b_0^{**}\}$ or $b_0^{**} < b_0 < \hat{b}_0$	—	$d_u < \hat{d}_u, \eta_2 < \frac{\eta_1 u_-^*}{N}, (\beta, \varepsilon) = (\beta^*, \varepsilon^{**})$



**Fig. 12** The dependence of cooperative strategies and public goods in system (2.4) on parameter  $\varepsilon$ . Hopf bifurcation appears when  $\varepsilon = \varepsilon^{**} = 0.7603$ .

#### 4.4 Turing-Hopf Bifurcation


Next, we explore the existence of the Turing-Hopf bifurcation. According to Appendix G, we obtain Theorem 4.4 as follows.

**Theorem 4.4** Suppose that  $d_u < \hat{d}_u$  and  $\eta_2 < \frac{\eta_1 u_-^*}{N}$ , then system (2.4) undergoes a Turing-Hopf bifurcation at point  $(\beta, \varepsilon) = (\beta^*, \varepsilon^{**})$ .

Figs. 8-11 illustrate Turing-Hopf bifurcation, whose conditions are formulated in Theorem 4.4. The parameters for those figures are chosen from Fig. 2(c) to allow the comparison between the temporal and diffusion systems and to explore the impact of diffusion on the evolution of cooperation. Table 2 provides a summary of the conditions that lead to steady states stability and the emergence of Turing-Hopf bifurcations. In Figs. 5(a) and 12, Hopf bifurcations occur at  $\varepsilon^*$  and  $\varepsilon^{**}$ , respectively, meaning that the spatially diffusive system (2.4) has an earlier Hopf bifurcation than the non-diffusive system (2.3).

The Turing and Hopf bifurcation curves depicted in Fig. 8 divide the plain into four regions. Fig. 9 illustrates that if parameters of system (2.4) correspond to region I of Fig. 8, solution eventually converges to stable state  $E_-^*$ , which indicates that the stability of the constant steady state  $E_-^*$  is not affected by  $\varepsilon$  when  $\varepsilon > \varepsilon^{**}$ . If parameters of the system (2.4) belong to region II of Figure 8, the stable time-periodic solution emerges as depicted in Fig. 10. The values of parameters belonging to region III meet the requirements stated

in Theorem 4.4. Hence,  $E_-^*$  is Turing-Hopf unstable, and unstable spatially heterogeneous periodic solutions appear, as shown in Fig. 11.



**Fig. 13** Spatial distribution of cooperators and public goods with  $\varepsilon = 0.8$  (column I),  $\varepsilon = 1$  (column II), and  $\varepsilon = 1.5$  (column III). The initial heterogeneous perturbation  $u(x, y, 0) = u^* + 0.01\cos\frac{2\pi x}{200}\cos\frac{2\pi y}{200}$ ,  $m(x, y, 0) = m^* + 0.01\cos\frac{2\pi x}{200}\cos\frac{2\pi y}{200}$  is performed on the homogeneous steady state  $(u^*, m^*)$ , with the spatial domain  $[0, 200] \times [0, 200]$ . All parameters are taken from Fig. 2(c) except for those mentioned deliberately and those shown in the figures. The values of the diffusion coefficients  $d_u$  and  $d_m$  are 0.1 and 3, respectively.


## 5 Pattern formation and chaos

In this section, we further investigate the effects of parameters and diffusion coefficients on the spatial distribution of players and public goods. Figs. 13-17 and 20 contain stationary and chaotic patterns, with the spatial patterns of cooperators and public goods evolving over time, showing various spatial distributions. To enable comparison the evolution of cooperation in well-mixed and heterogeneous environments, the parameters in Figs. 13-22 are chosen from Fig. 2(c).

### 5.1 Pattern formation due to relative timescale

The different values of the time scale  $\varepsilon$  bring about several Turing patterns. In the first column of Fig. 13, when public goods evolve slower than strategies ( $\varepsilon < 1$ ), the cooperators mainly cluster at the circular closed stripes, and a few are located in the vicinity of the circular closed stripes in the form of spots or short stripes. The predominance of cooperators at the higher abundance of public goods indicates that the abundance of public goods helps cooperators to survive and reproduce. The shape of the spatial distribution of public goods is relatively similar to that of the spatial distribution of cooperators, both showing circular closed stripes, the difference being that the density of public goods is not consistent, compared to that of cooperators. It illustrates that cooperators do not require extremely high densities of public goods and that as long as public

goods are not particularly scarce, there is hope for cooperators to survive. As shown in the second column of Fig. 13, increasing the evolution rate of public goods to that of strategies ( $\varepsilon = 1$ ) results in a shift in the spatial distribution of cooperators from circular stripes to scattered spots and short stripes. In this case, cooperators are less capable of aggregating than they are under conditions of slow public goods evolution rate. Further increasing of the evolution rate of public goods makes it faster than the speed of the game ( $\varepsilon > 1$ ). The third column of Fig. 13 illustrates, that high relative timescale value brings about a sparser distribution of cooperators and public goods. Thus, large time scales are not conducive to the density of cooperators and public goods. For the temporal system, we know that increasing the timescale does not affect the evolutionary outcome when the relative timescale exceeds its threshold value. However, increasing the value of the relative timescale decreases the cohesion and survival chances of the cooperators, for the diffusion system.




**Fig. 14** Spatial distribution of cooperators and public goods with  $N = 2$  (column I),  $N = 4$  (column II), and  $N = 5$  (column III). Note that additional parameters and initial values of Figs. 14-22 are taken from Fig. 13.

## 5.2 Pattern formation due to density of players

We now explore the effect of the total density of players  $N$  on the Turing pattern of cooperators and public goods. For the two-player game in column I of Fig. 14, some cooperators gather in solid circles in the form of speckles, while others disperse in other areas. Column II of Fig. 13 reflects a three-player game with the same parameters. In this case, the solid circle dissipates, and the short streak form of the cooperator increases. Further increasing the density of participants in the game, the cooperators are still mixed patterns of short stripes and spots, the difference being that the density of cooperators increases after the shift from the second column of Fig. 13 to the second column of Fig. 14. When the density of participants playing the game in the unit area increases again, the cooperators form a maze pattern through the long stripe as shown in the third column of Fig. 14. Thus, increasing the density of participants in the game favors cooperators and public goods density, causing cooperators to get closer together and form a long stripe pattern.






**Fig. 15** Spatial distribution of cooperators and public goods with  $d_u = 0.03$  (column I),  $d_u = 0.08$  (column II), and  $d_u = 0.15$  (column III). The value of  $d_m$  is 3.

### 5.3 Pattern formation due to spatial diffusion

Diffusion disrupts the homogeneous distribution of cooperators and public goods in space and induces Turing patterns, manifested in aggregating cooperators and public goods into spots and stripes showing heterogeneous density spatial distribution. We next investigate the influence of diffusion coefficients  $d_u$  and  $d_m$  on the Turing patterns. The different diffusion coefficients of cooperators create fascinating spatial distributions. If the conditions  $b_0 > b_0^*$ ,  $\varepsilon > \varepsilon^*$ , and  $\frac{d_m}{d_u} > \phi_1$  in Theorem 4.2 are satisfied, the Turing patterns appear as shown in Fig. 15. In Fig. 15(a), the cooperators spontaneously gather in the thick stripes. As  $d_u$  changes, the coarse stripes are reduced and supplanted by fine stripes and spots. Further increasing the value of  $d_u$ , we obtained Fig. 15(c), containing circles and rectangles. On this occasion, the distance between the cooperators is further increased, the stripes are further thinned, and the spatial domain occupied by the spots becomes wider. Thus, increasing  $d_u$  makes the density of cooperators lower. The growing thinness of the stripes and the decentralization of the cooperators increases the chances of contact between cooperators and defectors, which allows defectors to deceive cooperators more easily. Therefore, the stronger the proliferation ability of cooperators, the weaker the cohesion of cooperators, which suppresses players' enthusiasm to choose strategy  $C$  and increases the risk of cooperators' extinction. Moreover, public goods gradually decrease, and the harsh survival environment further exacerbates the players' hesitancy to choose cooperative strategies.

The spatial diffusion of public goods stimulates multiple patterns of populations and has a distinguishing impact on the sustainability of cooperation. If inequality  $\frac{d_m}{d_u} > \phi_1$  in Theorem 4.2 holds, the Turing instability appears as shown in Fig. 16. Fig. 16 considers the impact of the diffusion rate  $d_m$  of public goods on the spatial distribution of cooperators and public goods through the Turing pattern. In Fig. 16 (a), cooperators are loosely distributed and not sufficiently cohesive. Cooperators prefer coarse striped morphological distribution as the diffusion coefficient of public goods rises, as shown in Fig. 16 (b). The further increasing in diffusion rate of public goods allows for an increased density and cohesiveness of cooperators as shown in Fig. 16 (c). Therefore,


the increase in the diffusion rate of public goods assists players in adopting cooperative strategies. Interestingly, the distribution of public goods and cooperators form a similar overall profile except for the different intensities. Adequate public goods attract cooperators, who produce public goods, which further increases the level of public goods density, and then a suitable living environment is conducive to the reproduction of cooperators. Public goods and cooperators promote each other for mutual benefit. The diffusion rates of public goods and cooperators affect not only the development of patterns but also the strategies employed by the players, thus affecting the sustainability of the population.



**Fig. 16** Spatial distribution of cooperators and public goods with  $d_m = 2$  (column I),  $d_m = 2.5$  (column II), and  $d_m = 4$  (column III). The value of  $d_u$  is 0.1.


#### 5.4 Pattern formation and chaos due to payoffs

Figs. 17 and 20 depict the effects of payoffs  $a_0$  and  $a_1$  on the spatio-temporal dynamics of the cooperators, respectively. They reveal chaotic spatial patterns of cooperators, mainly reflected in changing and chaotic spatial distributions over time and parameters. Interestingly, the cooperators exhibit a regular centrosymmetric and axisymmetric distribution in the early stages of evolution, which can be seen in the first two rows of Figs. 17 and 20. Mixed distributions of chaotic patterns occur in the later stages of evolution (the last two rows of Figs. 17 and 20). The tendency towards chaos is almost unaffected by the changes in parameter values, with two exceptions. An intermediate value of  $a_1$  results in earlier chaos formation, whereas a large value of  $a_1$  leads to defectors' extinction, resulting in no chaotic patterns. Stationary patterns emerge in the second column of Fig. 13, and the distribution of cooperative behavior in space remains unchanged after some time. Increasing the value of  $a_0$  yields Fig. 17, which shows the chaotic patterns. The transition from the second column of Fig. 13 to Fig. 17 suggests that the increase in  $a_0$  causes uncertainty in the evolutionary outcome of the cooperators. In general, an increase in  $a_0$  benefits cooperators after a certain time of evolution by encouraging them to gather together and increasing the chances of survival of cooperative clusters. The same, but more pronounced effect is observed due to an increase in  $a_1$ . Thus, the evolutionary outcomes of strategies and public goods are




**Fig. 17** Spatial distribution of cooperators at times  $t = 500$  (row I),  $t = 1000$  (row II),  $t = 10000$  (row III), and  $t = 50000$  (row IV) with  $a_0 = 3.1$  (column I),  $a_0 = 3.5$  (column II), and  $a_0 = 4.2$  (column III).





**Fig. 18** The chaotic behavior occurs at position (100,100) with  $a_0 = 3.1$ .




**Fig. 19** The chaos induced by  $a_0$  at position (100,100). The blue part indicates that system (2.4) is spatially stable. The red part indicates that chaos appears in system (2.4).


more sensitive to players' payoffs under abundant public goods conditions than under scarce conditions. For the diffusion system (2.4), it is intriguing that  $a_0$  takes values from the stable interval of the non-diffusion system (2.3). However, unlike the non-diffusion system, the diffusion system exhibits heterogeneous distributions containing stationary and chaotic patterns, as shown in Fig. 17 and column II of Fig. 13. Therefore, comparing the diffusion system with the non-diffusion system, diffusion coefficients induce stationary and chaotic patterns for the cooperators.

To show the appearance of chaotic behavior in system (2.4) due to  $a_0$  we plot Fig. 18. In Figs. 18(a) and (b), the cooperators and public goods evolve over time with irregular oscillations, which manifest the emergence of chaos. Notice that the value of cooperators is equal to zero in some cases, which means that cooperators sometimes go extinct, but not all the time. The value of the public goods is always greater than zero, demonstrating that the public goods supply is never interrupted in the population. In Fig. 18(c), the phase trajectory eventually does not stabilize at a point or limit cycle but keeps evolving haphazardly, reflecting chaos. Cooperators and public goods transform from spatial stability to chaos as  $a_0$  changes as shown in Fig. 19. When the value of  $a_0$  is taken from the interval corresponding to the blue part in Fig. 19, system (2.4) is spatially stable at  $E_-^*$ . Under this scenario, the density of cooperators and public goods concentration increase






**Fig. 20** Spatial distribution of cooperators at times  $t = 500$  ( row I),  $t = 1000$  (row II),  $t = 10000$  (row III), and  $t = 50000$  (row IV) with  $a_1 = 3.1$  (column I),  $a_1 = 3.5$  (column II), and  $a_1 = 4.2$  (column III).



**Fig. 21** The chaotic behavior occurs at position (100,100) with  $a_1 = 3.5$ .




**Fig. 22** The chaos induced by  $a_1$  at position (100,100). The blue part indicates that system (2.4) is spatially stable. The red part indicates that chaos appears in system (2.4).

with  $a_0$ , suggesting that increasing the value of  $a_0$  assists the cooperators, similar to the role of  $a_0$  in the non-diffusion system (2.3) shown in Fig. 5(b). Unlike the non-diffusion system, the diffusion system develops fascinating chaotic dynamics when  $a_0$  exceeds a certain threshold. The parameter values in Figs. 17 and 18 are chosen from the red chaotic interval of Fig. 19. Under these circumstances, both cooperators and defectors have the opportunity to dominate parts of the area, and public goods remain in supply.

The coexistence of the chaotic and homogeneous patterns captures the effect of the payoff  $a_1$  on the spatial distribution of cooperators when they meet in high-density public goods. The location where the spots and hills are located is favored by the cooperators in Fig. 20(a). The spots and hills disappear, and the hollow forked symbol pattern appears in the middle of evolution. The first two subplots in the first column are centrosymmetric and axially symmetric, which explains the regularity of the distribution of cooperators during their early evolution. After a period of evolution, the spatial distribution of cooperators shows irregular mixed patterns of stripes and spots in Figs. 20 (g) and (j). The second column is obtained by increasing the value of  $a_1$  in the first column. Unsurprisingly, the maximum level of cooperator density increases with an increase of  $a_1$ . Surprisingly, the symmetrical pattern does not appear but rather a chaotic pattern in mid-evolution, demonstrating that the increase in  $a_1$  leads to an accelerated cooperative irregularity. Further increasing in

$a_1$  leads cooperators to evolve from a heterogeneous initial state to homogeneity. In this case, the density of defectors is zero, and cooperators occupy the entire population. When  $a_1$  is relatively small, the cooperators and defectors end up with a statically heterogeneous distribution in space, as shown in column II of Fig. 13. Under the circumstances, small  $a_1$  brings stable heterogeneous distributions. Moderate  $a_1$  leads to chaotic patterns, which exposes cooperators to uncertain environments and challenges cooperative behavior. Further increasing  $a_1$  allows only cooperative behavior in the population, in which it is in the best interest for cooperators to be protected from the risk of being cheated by defectors.

The time series of cooperators and public goods in Fig. 21 exhibit disorderly oscillations, reflecting the chaotic dynamics that happen in system (2.4). The erratic advance of the phase trajectory indicates the presence of chaos. Fig. 22 presents the interconversion of system (2.4) between spatially stable and chaotic states due to  $a_1$ . The blue and red parts correspond to spatial stability and spatial-temporal chaos states, respectively. System (2.4) is spatially stable at  $E_-^*$  when  $a_1$  corresponds to the first blue interval. Increasing the value of  $a_1$  within this interval promotes the prosperity of cooperators. When  $a_1$  exceeds the upper limit of the interval, the diffusion system changes from spatial stability to chaos, which is consistent with the phenomena depicted in Figs. 20 and 21. In this case, the values of the cooperators transform irregularly between zero and  $N$ , which allows the pure cooperators to occupy certain regions. The system turns spatially stable when  $a_1$  corresponds to the second blue interval, in which case defectors become extinct, and cooperators occupy the entire population. Once  $a_1$  reaches the red part again, the diffusion system (2.4) switches from spatial stability to chaos. Regardless of whether the diffusion system is spatially stable or chaotic, the density of public goods is always greater than zero, and therefore public goods are continuously supplied.



**Fig. 23** Dependence of cooperators' and public goods' densities in system (2.4) on different parameters. The magenta and red curves indicate the spatially averaged density of cooperators and public goods, respectively.

We restrict the parameters to the same range and explore their sensitivity by examining how the average density of the spatial distribution for cooperators and public goods changes with these parameters (see Fig. 23). Changing the values of the parameters does not affect the spatially averaged density of the cooperators when  $b_0 \in (0, 1)$ ,  $\sigma_0 \in (1.32, 3)$ ,  $\varepsilon \in (1.44, 3)$ ,  $d_u \in (0.17, 3)$ , and  $d_m \in (0, 2.08)$ . We observe that increasing the benefit of cooperators, the diffusion rate of public goods, and player density favor cooperation. In addition, decreasing the benefit of defectors, the cost of cooperation, the relative timescale, and the diffusion rate of cooperators can promote cooperation. The evolutionary outcome of the cooperators is sensitive to the parameters  $b_1$ ,  $c_1$ ,  $d_1$  and  $\varepsilon$ .

## 6 Discussion

Eco-evolutionary game systems that involve mutual feedback between strategy and environment frequently arise across different spheres of life. In ecology, one can consider a model with two strategies, each of which leads to producing the pollutant as a byproduct at different rates. Here the pollutant might be considered as a decaying resource, affecting the environment (Tilman et al. 2020). In psychology, deliberative and thoughtful decision-making can design an advantageously shared environment of social norms and institutions, but in this new environment less costly, non-deliberative decision-making benefits, forming cognition-environment feedback (Rand et al. 2017). In biology, there is mutual feedback between strategies and public goods. In microbial cooperation, public goods such as siderophores, enzymes, and biosurfactants (Smith and Schuster 2019) produced by cooperators in microbial populations impact the environment in which microbial populations live. Players in the microbial population choosing cooperative strategies influence the density of public goods. The density of public goods in turn affects the fitness of the strategies chosen by individuals in the microbial population. Siderophores produced by cooperators help *Pseudomonas aeruginosa* to scavenge iron in iron-depleted environments during quorum sensing (Diggle et al. 2007). Defectors utilize siderophores by deception.

However, research on eco-evolutionary game systems with spatial diffusion remains scarce. We aim to investigate cooperative strategy and public goods dynamics in the eco-evolutionary game with environmental feedback under well-mixed and heterogeneous environmental conditions. The focus of this work is on linear two-strategy eco-evolutionary games in which actors can adopt one of two strategies — a cooperative strategy to extract the resources at a cost and a defective strategy only to consume the same resource. Even this most straightforward form of evolutionary game enables substantial analysis of the spatio-temporal evolutionary patterns of cooperation and public goods distribution. Such kind of interaction can be demonstrated through experimental competitions between isogenic respirer (cooperator) and respiro-fermenter (cheater) yeast strains with alternative pathways of glucose metabolism (MacLean and Gudelj 2006). There is a significant difference between competition in a homogeneous environment (glucose-limited chemostats) and in a spatially structured environment (glucose-limited batch cultures), where competition results in the extinction of the cooperators and stable coexistence of both yeast strains, respectively.

In this study, we propose two models. Our first model combines replicator and public goods dynamics under well-mixed environment conditions (2.3), and the second model is a heterogeneous model with spatial diffusion (2.4). In our models, the fitness of cooperative and defecting strategies depends on two payoff matrices corresponding to poor or abundant public goods conditions, current public goods concentration, and  $\delta$ . In the resulting systems, we account for such parameters as player density, relative timescale, maximum productivity, the saturation parameter of production, and public goods consumption rate. As shown in Figs. 1-7 for temporal system and in Figs. 8-22 for diffusion system, each of those parameters can have a strong effect on the game dynamics. Unlike the multiscale analysis (Heggerud et al. 2020), we find that relative timescales can lead to Hopf bifurcations in both mixed and heterogeneous environments. In this study, we analyze the influence of

each parameter and some pairs of parameters on the evolution of the system with fixed values of the remaining parameters, based on previous works (Weitz et al. 2016; Tilman et al. 2020; Cheng et al. 2023). We also explore various dynamical properties of the obtained systems, including the existence and local stability of equilibria, bistability, transcritical, and Hopf bifurcations in the temporal system, and spatial stability, Turing instability, Hopf and Turing-Hopf bifurcations, Turing patterns formation in the diffusion system. Hence, we provide a mathematical approach and theoretical framework for exploring the spatio-temporal dynamics of eco-evolutionary game systems from an ordinary and partial differential perspective.

The presence and stability of equilibria reveal diverse evolutionary outcomes of cooperators and public goods, shedding light on the effectiveness of strategies and the adequacy of public goods. Some previous experimental studies have focused on identifying the factors that can benefit cooperators. It was shown that a higher initial population density in batch cultures leads to a higher equilibrium frequency of yeast cooperative strain (MacLean and Gudelj 2006). Using iron-scavenging siderophore pyoverdine as a model public goods for the bacterium *Pseudomonas aeruginosa* in different environments, it was observed that the most potent beneficial factor for cooperators was the reduction of individual dispersal (Figueiredo et al. 2021). In our investigation of the temporal and diffusion models, we found several factors that positively influence cooperator density. Such factors turn to be the player density (Figs. 4 (f), 7(q)-(t), 14), decreasing the relative timescale (Figs. 4 (d), 5 (a), 12-13), improving the diffusion rate of the public goods (Fig. 16), and lowering the diffusion rate of the cooperators (Fig. 15). However, for such multi-parameter systems, it is vital to consider a combination of all the factors when predicting the impact on cooperation and public goods dynamics. Typically, when more individuals work together towards a common goal, the benefits that come from that shared effort are greater. Yet, it is crucial to take all system parameters into account when examining the impact on the cooperation and availability of public goods. Our model suggests that a greater density of cooperators doesn't necessarily result in greater public goods density. Specifically, if the  $\delta$  is significant, increasing players' density benefits cooperators, simultaneously making the public goods more barren (Figs. 7 (q)-(t)). Also, if the consumption rate of resources is large, cooperators dominate, but public goods remain scarce (Figs. 7 (m)-(p)).

Studying the combined effects of payoffs taken from poverty and richness payoff matrices, also provides some counterintuitive conclusions. Increasing the cooperator's payoff while encountering defectors should increase the cooperator's likelihood of survival. However, as shown in Figs. 7 (e)-(h), this trend might change at certain parameter values. Similarly, increasing the defector's payoff should improve their chances of survival, but under certain conditions, raising the defector-defector payoff in a poor public goods environment could benefit cooperators (Figs. 7 (k)-(l)). In a diffusion system, increasing already large cooperator-cooperator payoff under abundant public goods conditions leads to a shift from the chaotic coexistence of cooperators and defectors to the dominance of cooperators. However, with a further increase of that payoff, the chaotic pattern returns (Fig. 22). Moreover, the system's bistability makes it crucial to consider not just the parameters but also the initial state of the system for correct predictions of its behavior. Fig. 3 illustrates how the system's various initial states can result in different evolutionary outcomes, ranging from cooperators' dominance to the coexistence of both strategies, or to the defectors' dominance. Therefore, it is essential to consider all factors and the initial state of the system combined in order to obtain accurate results.

To make the analysis of such systems easier, we present theorems for both non-diffusion and spatial diffusion models in this paper. These theorems provide conditions for the existence and stability of equilibria, and the occurrence of transcritical, Hopf, and Turing-Hopf bifurcations. Thus, we obtain a mathematical framework for studying the spatio-temporal dynamics of eco-evolutionary game systems with environmental feedback under well-mixed and heterogeneous environmental conditions. This theoretical framework will help to accurately predict the dynamics of cooperation and public goods distribution for ecological and biological systems where actors extract growth-limiting resources from their surroundings. However, certain aspects re-

quire further investigation. For instance, it would be of practical significance to investigate time delays (Xu et al. 2018; Yuan and Meng 2022; Wang and Cheng 2016) and environmental fluctuations (Zhao et al. 2022) in evolutionary game systems with spatial diffusion. Additionally, considering spatial diffusion within the context of multi-strategy games (Duong and Han 2016a,b) or multi-games (Cheng and Meng 2023; Chowdhury et al. 2021b) would also be worth further study.

## Declarations

### Conflicts of interest

All authors certify that they have no affiliations with or involvement in any organization or entity with any financial interest or non-financial interest in the subject matter or materials discussed in this manuscript.

### Availability of data and material

Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analyzed during the current study.

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## A Proof of Theorem 3.1

*Proof* (I) The Jacobian matrix for  $E_1(0, 0)$  is

$$J_1 = \begin{pmatrix} \delta(b_0 - d_0) & 0 \\ \frac{\beta\varepsilon}{\alpha} & -Nk\varepsilon \end{pmatrix}.$$

The eigenvalues of  $J_1$  are  $\delta(b_0 - d_0)$  and  $-Nk\varepsilon < 0$ .  $E_1$  is stable when  $d_0 > b_0$ . On the contrary,  $E_1$  is a saddle point when  $d_0 < b_0$ .

(II) The Jacobian matrix at  $E_2(N, \frac{\beta}{k(\alpha+N)})$  is calculated as

$$J_2 = \begin{pmatrix} \delta(c_0 - a_0) - \frac{\beta(\eta_1 + \eta_2)}{k(N + \alpha)} & 0 \\ \frac{\beta\alpha\varepsilon}{(N + \alpha)^2} & -Nk\varepsilon \end{pmatrix}.$$

The eigenvalues are  $\delta(c_0 - a_0) - \frac{\beta(\eta_1 + \eta_2)}{k(N + \alpha)}$  and  $-Nk\varepsilon < 0$ . The sign of  $\delta(c_0 - a_0) - \frac{\beta(\eta_1 + \eta_2)}{k(N + \alpha)}$  governs the stability of  $E_2$ .  $E_2$  is stable if  $\delta(c_0 - a_0) < \frac{\beta(\eta_1 + \eta_2)}{k(N + \alpha)}$ .  $E_2$  is a saddle point when  $\delta(c_0 - a_0) > \frac{\beta(\eta_1 + \eta_2)}{k(N + \alpha)}$ .

(III) The Jacobian matrix corresponding to the positive equilibrium  $E^*(u^*, m^*)$  is given by

$$J^* = \begin{pmatrix} j_{11}^* & j_{12}^* \\ j_{21}^* & j_{22}^* \end{pmatrix},$$

where

$$j_{11}^* = \frac{u^*}{N^2} [((\eta_1 - \eta_2)N - 2\eta_1 u^*)m^* + \delta((d_0 - b_0 - \eta_3)N + 2\eta_3 u^*)],$$

$$j_{12}^* = \frac{u^*(N - u^*)}{N^2} (\eta_1 u^* - N\eta_2), j_{21}^* = \frac{\alpha\beta\varepsilon}{(u^* + \alpha)^2}, j_{22}^* = -Nk\varepsilon.$$

The characteristic equation is

$$\lambda^2 - \text{tr}(J^*)\lambda + \det(J^*) = 0, \quad (\text{A.1})$$

where  $\text{tr}(J^*) = j_{11}^* + j_{22}^*$  and  $\det(J^*) = j_{11}^*j_{22}^* - j_{21}^*j_{12}^*$ . The stability of  $E^*(u^*, m^*)$  is determined by the signs of  $\text{tr}(J^*)$  and  $\det(J^*)$ . Some calculations reveal that  $\text{tr}(J^*) < 0$  (resp.  $\text{tr}(J^*) > 0$ ) and  $\det(J^*) > 0$  (resp.  $\det(J^*) < 0$ ) when  $\varepsilon > \varepsilon^*$  (resp.

$\varepsilon < \varepsilon^*$  and  $b_0 > b_0^*$  (resp.  $b_0 < b_0^*$ ). Therefore,  $E_-^*(u^*, m^*)$  is stable if  $\varepsilon > \varepsilon^*$  and  $b_0 > b_0^*$ . If  $\varepsilon < \varepsilon^*$  and  $b_0 > b_0^*$ , then  $E_-^*(u^*, m^*)$  is an unstable node or focus. In other cases,  $E_-^*(u^*, m^*)$  is a saddle point.

(IV) Note that the analytical procedure for the stability of equilibrium  $E_+^*(u_+^*, m_+^*)$  is similar to that for  $E_-^*(u^*, m^*)$ . We will not go into details here. This completes the proof.

## B Proof of Theorem 3.2 and values of the parameters

*Proof* The two expressions on the right-hand side of (2.3) are denoted  $K_1$  and  $K_2$ , respectively.

(I)  $d_0$  is selected as the bifurcation parameter. When  $d_0 = b_0$ , the eigenvalues regarding  $J_1$  are zero and  $-k\varepsilon N < 0$ . The eigenvectors of  $J_1$  and  $J_1^T$  concerning zero are

$$L_1 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ \frac{\beta}{Nk\alpha} \end{pmatrix}, \quad M_1 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}.$$

Then, we have

$$\begin{aligned} K_{d_0}(E_1; b_0) &= \begin{pmatrix} \frac{u}{N^2}(N-u)^2(m-\delta) \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}_{(E_1; b_0)} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \\ DK_{d_0}(E_1; b_0)L_1 &= \begin{pmatrix} \frac{3u^2+N^2-4uN}{N^2} & \frac{u(u^2+N^2-2uN)}{N^2} \\ 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ \frac{\beta}{Nk\alpha} \end{pmatrix}_{(E_1; b_0)} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \\ D^2K(E_1; b_0)(L_1, L_1) &= \begin{pmatrix} K_{1uu} + \frac{2\beta}{Nk\alpha}K_{1um} + \frac{\beta^2}{(Nk\alpha)^2}K_{1mm} \\ K_{2uu} + \frac{2\beta}{Nk\alpha}K_{2um} + \frac{\beta^2}{(Nk\alpha)^2}K_{2mm} \end{pmatrix}_{(E_1; b_0)} \\ &= \begin{pmatrix} \frac{2}{N^2k\alpha}(\delta k\alpha(3-N)(c_0-a_0) + \beta N(b_1-d_1)) \\ -\frac{2\varepsilon\beta}{\alpha^2} \end{pmatrix}, \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} K_{1uu} &= \frac{1}{N^2}[-6\eta_1 um + 6\delta\eta_3 - 2N(2\eta_2 - \eta_1 - \eta_2)m + 2N\delta(d_0 - b_0 - \eta_3)], \\ K_{1um} &= \frac{1}{N^2}[-3\eta_1 u^2 + 2N(2\eta_2 - \eta_1 - \eta_2)u + N^2\eta_2], \\ K_{1mm} &= 0, \quad K_{2uu} = \frac{-2\varepsilon\beta\alpha}{(\alpha+u)^3}, \quad K_{2um} = K_{2mm} = 0. \end{aligned}$$

Thus,

$$\begin{aligned} M_1^T K_{d_0}(E_1; b_0) &= 0, \\ M_1^T DK_{d_0}(E_1; b_0)L_1 &= 1 \neq 0, \\ M_1^T D^2K(E_1; b_0)(L_1, L_1) &= \frac{2}{N^2k\alpha}(\delta k\alpha(3-N)(c_0-a_0) + \beta N(b_1-d_1)) \neq 0. \end{aligned}$$

So we conclude that when  $d_0 = b_0$ , there is a transcritical bifurcation at  $E_1(0, 0)$ .

(II) For  $J_2$ , the eigenvalues are  $-Nk\varepsilon$  and zero when  $\delta = \delta^* = \frac{\beta(a_0-a_1-c_0+c_1)}{(a_0-c_0)(N+\alpha)k}$ . For the eigenvalue zero, the eigenvectors of  $J_2$  and  $J_2^T$  are given by

$$L_2 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ \frac{\beta\alpha}{Nk(N+\alpha)^2} \end{pmatrix}, \quad M_2 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}.$$

Further,

$$\begin{aligned} K_\delta(E_2; \delta^*) &= \begin{pmatrix} \frac{u(N-u)}{N^2}(-\eta_3 u - N(d_0 - b_0)) \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}_{(E_2; \delta^*)} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \\ DK_\delta(E_2; \delta^*)L_2 &= \begin{pmatrix} \gamma_4 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ \frac{\beta\alpha}{Nk(N+\alpha)^2} \end{pmatrix}_{(E_2; \delta^*)} = \begin{pmatrix} c_0 - a_0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \\ D^2K(E_2; \delta^*)(L_2, L_2) &= \begin{pmatrix} K_{1uu} + \frac{2\beta\alpha}{Nk(N+\alpha)^2}K_{1um} + \frac{(\beta\alpha)^2}{(Nk)^2(N+\alpha)^4}K_{1mm} \\ K_{2uu} + \frac{2\beta\alpha}{Nk(N+\alpha)^2}K_{2um} + \frac{(\beta\alpha)^2}{(Nk)^2(N+\alpha)^4}K_{2mm} \end{pmatrix}_{(E_2; \delta^*)} = \begin{pmatrix} \gamma_5 \\ -\frac{2\varepsilon\beta\alpha}{(\alpha+N)^3} \end{pmatrix}, \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \gamma_4 &= \frac{1}{N^2}(3\eta_3 u^2 + 2N(d_0 - b_0 - \eta_3)u - N^2(d_0 - b_0)), \\ \gamma_5 &= \frac{2\beta}{kN(\alpha+N)}(-2\eta_1 - \eta_2) + \frac{-2\beta(\eta_1 + \eta_2)}{(a_0 - c_0)(N+\alpha)kN^2}(3\eta_3 + N(d_0 - b_0 - \eta_3)) + \frac{2\beta\alpha}{N^3k(N+\alpha)^2}(-7(\eta_1 + \eta_2) + 8\eta_2). \end{aligned}$$

Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} M_2^T K_\delta(E_2; \delta^*) &= 0, \\ M_2^T D K_\delta(E_2; \delta^*) L_2 &= c_0 - a_0 \neq 0, \\ M_2^T D^2 K(E_2; \delta^*)(L_2, L_2) &= \gamma_5 \neq 0. \end{aligned}$$

Consequently, a transcritical bifurcation appears at  $E_2(N, \frac{\beta}{k(\alpha+N)})$  when  $\delta = \delta^*$ .

(III) We know that  $\text{tr}(J^*) = 0$  and  $\det(J^*) > 0$  if  $\varepsilon = \varepsilon^*$  and  $b_0 > b_0^*$ . When  $\varepsilon = \varepsilon^*$ ,  $\lambda_{11} = i\sqrt{\det(J^*)}$  and  $\lambda_{12} = -i\sqrt{\det(J^*)}$  are the pure imaginary roots of (A.1). From (A.1), we deduce that

$$\left[ \frac{d\text{Re}\lambda}{d\varepsilon} \right]_{\lambda=\lambda_{11}, \varepsilon=\varepsilon^*} = \frac{1}{2} \left[ \frac{d(\text{tr}(J^*))}{d\varepsilon} \right]_{\varepsilon=\varepsilon^*} = -\frac{Nk}{2} < 0.$$

Thus, a Hopf bifurcation emerges near  $E_-^*(u_-, m_-)$  if  $\varepsilon = \varepsilon^*$  and  $b_0 > b_0^*$ . This completes the proof.

**Table 3** The values of the parameters. The parameters of Figs. 1(a), (b), (c), and 2(a)(b) are taken from (1), (2), (3), and (4), respectively. The parameters of Figs. 3(a) and (b) are chosen from (4) and (3), respectively. The parameters in the remaining figures are taken from (2).

	$a_0$	$a_1$	$b_0$	$b_1$	$c_0$	$c_1$	$d_0$	$d_1$	$\sigma_0$	$\sigma_1$	$\delta$	$\beta$	$\alpha$	$k$	$N$	$\varepsilon$
(1)	2.9	4	0	1	0.1	2	1	2	0.02	0.01	2	2.5	0.9	0.2	3	1
(2)	2.9	3	2.3	1	0.1	2	1	2	0.02	0.01	2	2.5	0.9	0.2	3	1
(3)	2	3	2	5	1	6	5	2	0.02	0.01	7	5	0.9	0.2	2	1
(4)	2.1	3	2.1	1	0.1	2	2.2	2	0.02	0.01	2	2.5	0.9	0.2	3	1

### C Proof of Theorem 3.3

*Proof* Let  $\hat{u} = u - u^*$  and  $\hat{m} = m - m^*$ . For convenience,  $\hat{u}$  and  $\hat{m}$  are still denoted by  $u$  and  $m$ , respectively. Then system (2.3) is rewritten as

$$\begin{cases} \frac{du}{dt} = \frac{(u + u^*)}{N^2} (N - u - u^*) [(\eta_1(u + u^*) + N\eta_2)(m + m^*) - \delta(\eta_3(u + u^*) + N(d_0 - b_0))], \\ \frac{dm}{dt} = \varepsilon \left( \frac{\beta(u + u^*)}{\alpha + u + u^*} - kN(m + m^*) \right). \end{cases} \quad (\text{C.1})$$

Applying the Taylor expansion, system (C.1) becomes

$$\begin{pmatrix} u_t \\ m_t \end{pmatrix} = J^* \begin{pmatrix} u \\ m \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} g(u, m, \varepsilon) \\ h(u, m, \varepsilon) \end{pmatrix}. \quad (\text{C.2})$$

For the nonlinear terms  $g(u, m, \varepsilon)$  and  $h(u, m, \varepsilon)$  are given by

$$\begin{aligned} g(u, m, \varepsilon) &= g_1 u^2 + g_2 u m + g_3 u^3 + g_4 u^2 m + \dots, \\ h(u, m, \varepsilon) &= h_1 u^2 + h_2 u^3 + \dots, \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} g_1 &= \frac{1}{N^2} (3\delta\eta_3 u^* - N(\eta_2 - \eta_1) u^* m^* - 3\eta_1 u^* m^* + N\delta(d_0 - b_0 - \eta_3)), \\ g_2 &= \frac{1}{N^2} (N^2 \eta_2 - 3\eta_1 u^{*2} - 2N(\eta_2 - \eta_1) u^*), \\ g_3 &= \frac{1}{N^2} (\delta\eta_3 - \eta_1 m^*), \quad g_4 = \frac{1}{N^2} (N(\eta_1 - \eta_2) - 3\eta_1 u^*), \\ h_1 &= -\frac{\varepsilon\beta}{(\alpha + u^*)^3}, \quad h_2 = \frac{\varepsilon\beta}{(\alpha + u^*)^4}. \end{aligned}$$

The characteristic roots of  $J^*$  are denoted as  $\lambda_{13} = \varphi + i\rho$  and  $\lambda_{14} = \varphi - i\rho$ , where  $\varphi = \frac{\text{tr}(J^*)}{2}$  and  $\rho = \sqrt{\det(J^*) - \left(\frac{\text{tr}(J^*)}{2}\right)^2}$ . When  $4\det(J^*) > \text{tr}^2(J^*)$ ,  $\lambda_{13}$  and  $\lambda_{14}$  are conjugate complexes. In particular,  $\lambda_{13} = i\rho$  and  $\lambda_{14} = -i\rho$  are pure imaginary numbers when  $\varepsilon = \varepsilon^*$ . Then the eigenvector of  $J^*$  about  $\lambda_{13} = \varphi + i\rho$  is

$$\theta = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ \theta_1 - i\theta_2 \end{pmatrix},$$



where  $\theta_1 = \frac{\varphi - j_{11}^*}{j_{12}^*}$  and  $\theta_2 = -\frac{\rho}{j_{12}^*}$ .

Let

$$\Theta = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ \theta_1 & \theta_2 \end{pmatrix}.$$

By the following conversion,

$$\begin{pmatrix} u \\ m \end{pmatrix} = \Theta \begin{pmatrix} s \\ z \end{pmatrix},$$

system (C.2) yields

$$\begin{pmatrix} \frac{ds}{dt} \\ \frac{dz}{dt} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \varphi - \rho \\ \rho & \varphi \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} s \\ z \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} P(s, z) \\ Q(s, z) \end{pmatrix}, \quad (\text{C.3})$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} P(s, z) &= p_1 s^2 + p_2 s z + p_3 s^3 + p_4 s^2 z + \dots, \\ Q(s, z) &= h_1 s^2 + h_2 s^3 + \dots, \end{aligned}$$

with

$$p_1 = g_1 + g_2 \theta_1, \quad p_2 = g_2 \theta_2, \quad p_3 = g_3 + g_4 \theta_1, \quad p_4 = g_4 \theta_2.$$

We formulate system (C.3) in polar form as follows

$$\begin{cases} \frac{dr_0}{dt} = \varphi(\varepsilon) r_0 + S_1(\varepsilon) r_0^3 + \dots, \\ \frac{d\theta_0}{dt} = \rho(\varepsilon) + S_2(\varepsilon) r_0^2 + \dots. \end{cases} \quad (\text{C.4})$$

If  $\varepsilon = \varepsilon^*$ , by the Taylor expansion, (C.4) leads to

$$\begin{cases} \frac{dr_0}{dt} = \varphi'(\varepsilon^*)(\varepsilon - \varepsilon^*) r_0 + S_1(\varepsilon^*) r_0^3 + \dots, \\ \frac{d\theta_0}{dt} = \rho(\varepsilon^*) + \rho'(\varepsilon^*)(\varepsilon - \varepsilon^*) + S_2(\varepsilon^*) r_0^2 + \dots. \end{cases}$$

We next explore the positivity and negativity for the coefficient  $S_1(\varepsilon^*)$ .

$$\begin{aligned} S_1(\varepsilon^*) &= \frac{1}{16} [P_{sss} + P_{szz} + Q_{ssz} + Q_{zzz}] + \frac{1}{16\rho(\varepsilon^*)} [P_{sz}(P_{ss} + P_{zz}) \\ &\quad - Q_{sz}(Q_{ss} + Q_{zz}) - P_{ss}Q_{ss} + P_{zz}Q_{zz}]|_{(0,0,\varepsilon^*)}, \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} P_{sss}(0, 0, \varepsilon^*) &= 6p_3, \quad P_{szz}(0, 0, \varepsilon^*) = Q_{ssz}(0, 0, \varepsilon^*) = Q_{zzz}(0, 0, \varepsilon^*) = 0, \\ P_{sz}(0, 0, \varepsilon^*) &= p_2, \quad P_{ss}(0, 0, \varepsilon^*) = 2p_1, \quad P_{zz}(0, 0, \varepsilon^*) = Q_{sz}(0, 0, \varepsilon^*) = 0, \\ Q_{ss}(0, 0, \varepsilon^*) &= -\frac{\varepsilon^* \beta}{(\alpha + u^*)^3}, \quad Q_{zz}(0, 0, \varepsilon^*) = 0. \end{aligned}$$

Clearly,

$$\text{sgn} \left[ \frac{\partial(\text{Re}\varphi)}{\partial\varepsilon} \right]_{\varepsilon=\varepsilon^*} < 0.$$

Denote  $\Upsilon = -\frac{S_1(\varepsilon^*)}{\varphi'(\varepsilon^*)}$ .

## D Proof of Theorem 4.1

*Proof* The equilibria  $E_1(0, 0)$ ,  $E_2(N, \frac{\beta}{k(\alpha+N)})$ , and  $E_-^*(u_-^*, m_-^*)$  of the temporal system (2.3) also satisfy spatial system (2.4). Define a two-dimensional domain  $\Omega : \{\mathbf{x} = (x, y) | 0 < x < V, 0 < y < V\}$  and its boundary  $\partial\Omega$  is a rectangle. As is known the following spatial eigenvalue problem

$$\begin{cases} \nabla^2 \mathbf{G} + n^2 \mathbf{G} = 0, & \mathbf{x} \in \Omega, \\ \frac{\partial \mathbf{G}}{\partial \lambda} = 0, & \mathbf{x} \in \partial\Omega, \end{cases}$$

has eigenfunctions

$$\mathbf{G}_{p,q} = \mathbf{F}_{p,q} \cos \frac{p\pi x}{V} \cos \frac{q\pi y}{V}, \quad n^2 = \pi^2 \left( \frac{p^2}{V^2} + \frac{q^2}{V^2} \right),$$

where  $p$  and  $q$  are integers,  $\mathbf{x} = (x, y)$ , and  $\mathbf{F}_{p,q}$  are Fourier coefficients. Linearizing system (2.4) at arbitrary steady state  $E(u, m)$  yields

$$\begin{cases} \frac{\partial \mathbf{W}}{\partial t} = \Gamma \mathbf{W} := D_1 \nabla^2 \mathbf{W} + \bar{J} \mathbf{W}, & \mathbf{x} \in \Omega, \\ \frac{\partial \mathbf{W}}{\partial v} = 0, & \mathbf{x} \in \partial \Omega, \\ \mathbf{W}(\mathbf{x}, 0) = \mathbf{W}_0(\mathbf{x}), & \mathbf{x} \in \Omega, \end{cases} \quad (\text{D.1})$$

where

$$\bar{J} = \begin{pmatrix} \bar{j}_{11} & \bar{j}_{12} \\ \bar{j}_{21} & \bar{j}_{22} \end{pmatrix}, \quad \mathbf{W} = \begin{pmatrix} \tilde{u} - u \\ \tilde{m} - m \end{pmatrix}, \quad D_1 = \begin{pmatrix} d_u & 0 \\ 0 & d_m \end{pmatrix},$$

with

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{j}_{11} &= \frac{1}{N^2} [-3\eta_1 u^2 m + 3\delta\eta_3 u^2 - 2N(\eta_2 - \eta_1)um + 2N\delta(d_0 - b_0 - \eta_3)u + N^2\eta_2 m + N^2\delta(b_0 - d_0)], \\ \bar{j}_{12} &= \frac{u(N-u)}{N^2}(\eta_1 u - N\eta_2), \quad \bar{j}_{21} = \frac{\alpha\beta\varepsilon}{(u+\alpha)^2}, \quad \bar{j}_{22}^* = -Nk\varepsilon. \end{aligned}$$

Now search for solutions  $\mathbf{G}_{p,q}(\mathbf{x}, t)$  of (D.1) in the following form

$$\mathbf{G}_{p,q}(\mathbf{x}, t) = \sum_{p,q} \mathbf{F}_{p,q} e^{\lambda(n^2)t} \cos \frac{p\pi x}{V} \cos \frac{q\pi y}{V}. \quad (\text{D.2})$$

Substituting (D.2) into (D.1) yields

$$\lambda^2 - \text{Tr}(n^2)\lambda + \text{Det}(n^2) = 0, \quad (\text{D.3})$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Tr}(n^2) &= -(d_u + d_m)n^2 + \bar{j}_{11} + \bar{j}_{22}, \\ \text{Det}(n^2) &= d_u d_m n^4 - (\bar{j}_{11} d_m + \bar{j}_{22} d_u)n^2 + \bar{j}_{11} \bar{j}_{22} - \bar{j}_{12} \bar{j}_{21}. \end{aligned}$$

(I) When  $E(u, m) = E_1(0, 0)$ , equation (D.3) has two eigenvalues  $\lambda_{1n} = -d_u n^2 + \delta(b_0 - d_0)$  and  $\lambda_{2n} = -d_m n^2 - Nk\varepsilon$ . We know that  $\lambda_{2n} < 0$  always is valid. Thus, the stability of  $E_1(0, 0)$  relies on  $\lambda_{1n}$ . If  $d_0 > b_0$ , then  $\lambda_{1n} < 0$  holds for all  $n$ . However, there exists  $n = 0$  such that  $\lambda_{10} = b_0 - d_0 > 0$  when  $d_0 < b_0$ . Therefore,  $E_1(0, 0)$  is spatially unstable when  $d_0 < b_0$ .

(II) When  $E(u, m) = E_2(N, \frac{\beta}{k(\alpha+N)})$ ,  $\lambda_{1n} = -d_m n^2 - Nk\varepsilon$  and  $\lambda_{2n} = -d_u n^2 + \delta(c_0 - a_0) - \frac{\beta(\eta_1 + \eta_2)}{k(N+\alpha)}$  are eigenvalues of (D.3). Clearly,  $\lambda_{1n} < 0$  holds for all  $n$ . Further,  $\lambda_{2n} < 0$  is true for all  $n$  when  $\delta(c_0 - a_0) < \frac{\beta(\eta_1 + \eta_2)}{k(N+\alpha)}$ . Conversely, there exists  $n = 0$  such that  $\lambda_{2n} = \delta(c_0 - a_0) - \frac{\beta(\eta_1 + \eta_2)}{k(N+\alpha)} > 0$  when  $\delta(c_0 - a_0) > \frac{\beta(\eta_1 + \eta_2)}{k(N+\alpha)}$ .

(III) When  $E(u, m) = E_-^*(u_-^*, m_-^*)$ , we have  $\bar{J}|_{E=E_-^*} = J^*$ . It is clear that  $j_{21}^* = \frac{\alpha\beta\varepsilon}{(u_-^* + \alpha)^2} > 0$  and  $j_{22}^* = -Nk\varepsilon < 0$ . Easily known  $b_0 > b_0^{**}$  and  $b_0 < \hat{b}_0$  enable  $j_{11}^* < 0$  and  $j_{12}^* < 0$  to hold, respectively. Therefore, if  $b_0 > \max\{b_0^*, b_0^{**}\}$  or  $b_0^{**} < b_0 < \hat{b}_0$ , then  $\text{Tr}(n^2) < 0$  and  $\text{Det}(n^2) > 0$  are valid for all  $n$ , which implies that  $E_-^*(u_-^*, m_-^*)$  is spatially stable. This completes the proof.

## E Proof of Theorem 4.2

*Proof* Following Theorem 3.1 (III), the positive equilibrium  $E_-^*(u_-^*, m_-^*)$  for the non-diffusive system (2.3) is stable when  $\varepsilon > \varepsilon^*$  and  $b_0 > b_0^*$ . Turing instability occurs when the spatially steady state  $E_-^*(u_-^*, m_-^*)$  for the diffusive system (2.4) loses stability due to small amplitude heterogeneous perturbations around  $E_-^*(u_-^*, m_-^*)$  in a two-dimensional square domain. Assuming  $\varepsilon > \varepsilon^*$  and  $b_0 > b_0^*$ ,  $\text{Tr}(n^2) < 0$  constantly holds, so Turing instability is only possible in the case of  $\text{Det}(n^2) < 0$ . For convenience, define

$$\varpi(n^2) := \text{Det}(n^2) = d_u d_m n^4 - (j_{11}^* d_m + j_{22}^* d_u)n^2 + j_{11}^* j_{22}^* - j_{12}^* j_{21}^*. \quad (\text{E.1})$$

When  $b_0 > b_0^*$ , one knows that  $\det(J^*) = j_{11}^* j_{22}^* - j_{12}^* j_{21}^* > 0$ . From (E.1),  $\varpi(n^2) < 0$  has the possibility to hold when

$$\chi(d_u, d_m) = j_{11}^* d_m + j_{22}^* d_u > 0.$$

Combining (E.1) with  $\text{tr}(J^*) = j_{11}^* + j_{22}^* < 0$ , it is evident that  $d_u \neq d_m$  and  $j_{11}^*$  and  $j_{22}^*$  have opposite signs. One can see  $j_{11}^* > 0$  since  $j_{22}^* < 0$ . We obtain  $j_{12}^* < 0$  since  $j_{11}^* > 0$ ,  $j_{21}^* > 0$ ,  $j_{22}^* < 0$ , and  $\det(J^*) = j_{11}^* j_{22}^* - j_{12}^* j_{21}^* > 0$ . The minimum value of  $\varpi(n^2)$  at  $n_{\min}^2$  is

$$\min_n \varpi(n^2) = j_{11}^* j_{22}^* - j_{12}^* j_{21}^* - \frac{(j_{11}^* d_m + j_{22}^* d_u)^2}{4d_u d_m},$$

where

$$n_{\min}^2 = \frac{j_{11}^* d_m + j_{22}^* d_u}{2d_u d_m}.$$

From  $\min_n \varpi(n^2) = 0$ , we obtain

$$j_{11}^* j_{22}^* - j_{12}^* j_{21}^* = \frac{(j_{11}^* d_m + j_{22}^* d_u)^2}{4d_u d_m}.$$

Let

$$\Lambda(d_u, d_m) := (j_{11}^* d_m + j_{22}^* d_u)^2 - 4d_u d_m (j_{11}^* j_{22}^* - j_{12}^* j_{21}^*) = j_{11}^{*2} d_m^2 + j_{22}^{*2} d_u^2 + 2d_u d_m (2j_{12}^* j_{21}^* - j_{11}^* j_{22}^*).$$

Set  $\phi = \frac{d_m}{d_u}$ , then

$$\Lambda(d_u, d_m) = j_{11}^{*2} \phi^2 + 2(2j_{12}^* j_{21}^* - j_{11}^* j_{22}^*) \phi + j_{22}^{*2} = 0.$$

According to  $\chi(d_u, d_m) = 0$ , we get

$$\phi = -\frac{j_{22}^*}{j_{11}^*} \triangleq \phi^*.$$

Since  $j_{12}^* < 0$ ,  $j_{21}^* > 0$  and  $\det(J^*) > 0$ , we have

$$4(2j_{12}^* j_{21}^* - j_{11}^* j_{22}^*)^2 - 4j_{11}^{*2} j_{22}^{*2} = 16j_{21} j_{12} (j_{12}^* j_{21}^* - j_{11}^* j_{22}^*) > 0.$$

Thus the equation  $\Lambda(d_u, d_m) = 0$  has two positive roots as follows

$$\begin{aligned} \phi_1 &= \frac{j_{11}^* j_{22}^* - 2j_{21}^* j_{12}^* + \sqrt{(2j_{21}^* j_{12}^* - j_{11}^* j_{22}^*)^2 - j_{11}^{*2} j_{22}^{*2}}}{j_{11}^{*2}}, \\ \phi_2 &= \frac{j_{11}^* j_{22}^* - 2j_{21}^* j_{12}^* - \sqrt{(2j_{21}^* j_{12}^* - j_{11}^* j_{22}^*)^2 - j_{11}^{*2} j_{22}^{*2}}}{j_{11}^{*2}}. \end{aligned}$$

Easily one can get

$$0 < \phi_2 < \phi^* < \phi_1.$$

If  $\phi = \frac{d_m}{d_u} > \phi_1$ , then  $\min_n \varpi(n^2) < 0$  and  $\chi(d_u, d_m) > 0$ . Thus,  $E^*(u_*, m_*)$  is spatially unstable which suggests that Turing instability emerges. Denote  $d_m^c = \phi_1 d_u$ , then the critical wavenumber is

$$n_c^2 = \frac{j_{11}^* d_m^c + j_{22}^* d_u}{2d_u d_m^c}.$$

### F Proof of Theorem 4.3

*Proof* When  $\text{Tr}(n^2) = 0$  and  $\text{Det}(n^2) > 0$ , (D.3) has pure imaginary roots. Take  $\varepsilon$  as the bifurcation parameter and denote

$$\varepsilon^{**} = -\frac{(d_u + d_m)n^2}{Nk} + \varepsilon^*.$$

If  $\varepsilon = \varepsilon^{**}$ , then  $\text{Tr}(n^2) = 0$ . Letting  $\varepsilon = \varepsilon^{**}$ , it is clear that  $\varepsilon^{**} > \frac{j_{11}^* d_m}{Nk d_u}$  allows  $[j_{11}^* d_m + j_{22}^* d_u]|_{\varepsilon=\varepsilon^{**}} < 0$ . It is known that  $b_0 > b_0^*$  leads to  $\det(J^*)|_{\varepsilon=\varepsilon^{**}} = j_{11}^* j_{22}^* - j_{21}^* j_{12}^* > 0$ . Therefore,  $\text{Det}(n^2)|_{\varepsilon=\varepsilon^{**}} > 0$  when  $\varepsilon^{**} > \frac{j_{11}^* d_m}{Nk d_u}$  and  $b_0 > b_0^*$ . From (D.3), we obtain

$$\text{Re}\left(\frac{d\lambda}{d\varepsilon}\right)_{\varepsilon=\varepsilon^{**}} = -\frac{Nk}{2} \neq 0.$$

The transversality condition is valid, so the Hopf bifurcation occurs at  $\varepsilon = \varepsilon^{**}$ .

### G Proof of Theorem 4.4

*Proof* Let  $\text{Det}(n^2) = 0$ , that is

$$d_u d_m n^4 - (j_{11}^* d_m - Nk\varepsilon d_u) n^2 - j_{11}^* Nk\varepsilon - \frac{j_{12}^* \alpha \beta \varepsilon}{(u + \alpha)^2} = 0. \quad (\text{G.1})$$

Denote  $\hat{d}_u = \frac{j_{11}^* (d_m + Nk\varepsilon)}{d_m + Nk\varepsilon}$ . Clearly, the Turing bifurcation curve cannot interact with the Hopf bifurcation curve  $\varepsilon = \varepsilon^{**}$  when  $d_u > \hat{d}_u$  and  $\eta_2 < \frac{\eta_1 u^*}{N}$ . If  $d_u < \hat{d}_u$  and  $\eta_2 < \frac{\eta_1 u^*}{N}$ , then substituting  $\varepsilon = \varepsilon^{**}$  into (G.1) yields

$$\beta(n) = \frac{(Nk j_{11}^* \varepsilon^{**} + (j_{11}^* d_m - Nk d_u \varepsilon^{**}) n^2 - d_u d_m n^4) (u_-^* + \alpha)^2}{(-j_{11}^* \alpha \varepsilon^{**})}, \quad n \in [1, n^*], \quad (\text{G.2})$$

where

$$n^* = \left\lceil \frac{Nk d_u \varepsilon^{**} - j_{11}^* d_m + \sqrt{(Nk d_u \varepsilon^{**} - j_{11}^* d_m)^2 + 4d_u d_m Nk j_{11}^* \varepsilon^{**}}}{-2d_u d_m} \right\rceil,$$

and  $[\cdot]$  represents the integer part function. Let

$$f(z) = Nkj_{11}^*\varepsilon^{**} + (j_{11}^*d_m - Nkd_u\varepsilon^{**})z - d_ud_mz^2, \quad z \in [1, n^{*2}].$$

One can see that  $f'(z) \geq 0$  for  $z \leq z^*$  and  $f'(z) < 0$  for  $z > z^*$ , where

$$z^* = \frac{j_{11}^*d_m - Nkd_u\varepsilon^{**}}{2d_ud_m}.$$

Let

$$n_* = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } z^* \leq 1, \\ \lceil \sqrt{z^*} \rceil, & \text{if } \beta(\lceil \sqrt{z^*} \rceil + 1) \leq \beta(\lceil \sqrt{z^*} \rceil), \quad 1 < \sqrt{z^*} < n^*, \\ \lceil \sqrt{z^*} \rceil + 1, & \text{if } \beta(\lceil \sqrt{z^*} \rceil) \leq \beta(\lceil \sqrt{z^*} \rceil + 1), \quad 1 < \sqrt{z^*} < n^*. \end{cases}$$

There exists  $n_* \in [1, n^*]$  such that  $\beta^* = \beta(n_*) = \max_{1 \leq n \leq n^*} \beta(n)$ . Therefore, system (2.4) undergoes Turing-Hopf bifurcation at point

$$(\beta^*, \varepsilon^{**}) = \left( \frac{(Nkj_{11}^*\varepsilon^{**} + (j_{11}^*d_m - Nkd_u\varepsilon^{**})n_*^2 - d_ud_mn_*^4)(u_-^* + \alpha)^2}{(-j_{11}^*\alpha\varepsilon^{**})}, \varepsilon^{**} \right).$$

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